The Qur’an: A Philosophical Guide 9781474216197, 9781474216180, 9781474216227, 9781474216210

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The Qur’an

A Philosophical Guide

ALSO AVAILABLE FROM BLOOMSBURY The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy, edited by Oliver Leaman The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, edited by Clinton Bennett The Composition of the Qur’an, Michel Cuypers Hosting the Stranger: Between Religions, edited by Richard Kearney and James Taylor Interpreting the Qur’an, Clinton Bennett

The Qur’an A Philosophical Guide Oliver Leaman

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

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www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2016 © Oliver Leaman, 2016 Oliver Leaman has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4742-1619-7 PB: 978-1-4742-1618-0 ePDF: 978-1-4742-1621-0 ePub: 978-1-4742-1620-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Typeset by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakneham, Norfolk NR21 8NN

To Raphael K in gratitude for having discussed so many of these issues with me on our daily trips to school

Contents

Foreword  ix

1 How to Use this Book  1 2 Reading the Qur’an  7 3 The Qur’an and Philosophy  25 4 Qur’anic Verses and Philosophical Responses  45 Textual Cross-References  287 Bibliography  297 Index  311

Foreword

The idea for this book came about many years ago when I edited the History of Islamic Philosophy with Seyyed Hossein Nasr. My co-editor wrote a chapter entitled “The Qur’an and hadith as source and inspiration of Islamic philosophy.” I was then and am now intrigued by the title, since it led me to wonder how a religious text can be used philosophically. As someone interested in what is often called Islamic philosophy, I have often come across the Qur’an being used as a source of quotations to be used in arguments, and I wondered how this is supposed to work. After all, one tends to accept religious statements on the basis of something other than logical argument, while many versions of philosophy think they should be based on the latter. I can see how any sort of statement may be investigated philosophically, but not how any sort of statement can be used in a philosophical argument as part of the argument. Yet philosophers often use the Qur’an as though it shows something to be true and not just because it has been used as the starting point of an argument, as something to be analyzed, but often it is treated as part of the argument itself. When I looked closer at such reasoning processes it seemed that in fact there is a variety of ways in which the Qur’an is used by philosophers, and in the preliminary sections I shall be looking at some of those ways. The idea to look at how philosophy has reacted to the Qur’an has not been treated at all frequently up to now, and having written this book I can see why. There are some excellent books which tackle the topic, but my approach is a little different, in that I actually examine the direct references to the Qur’an by a variety of thinkers. It is a massive task and to do it thoroughly would take a lifetime. On the other hand, it seems to me to be too important a task not to try to do even in a limited sort of way, and that is what I have done here. I do not refer to every, indeed, to many verses in the Qur’an, and there are many philosophers I do not discuss at all. The verses I do discuss I do not on the whole discuss in great detail, and I really do not explain as fully as I should the theological context for those verses. Often I do not discuss these issues at all. Nor do I always quote the whole verse. Despite these caveats, I hope readers will find something of value here,



x Foreword

when they see how the Qur’an and philosophers work together, sometimes harmoniously and sometimes not so much. The Qur’an is such an important book that its philosophical value needs to be explored, and often has been, and an attempt has been made here to show how this has been done and how it continues to be done. I am tempted to say that I hope that readers will continue the process of using the Qur’an as a source and inspiration of philosophy, and vice versa. I would like as usual to thank my students for having worked with me on many of these themes, and for those in many different places who have patiently listened to my papers on various topics that appear here. It goes without saying that none of the views in the main part of the book on the Qur’anic verses should be attributed to me. I am trying to represent a variety of theoretical approaches to the Qur’an here, and some of the opinions I discuss are entirely repulsive as far as I am concerned, and yet still need to be examined. I have not only examined what might be narrowly called philosophical arguments but have included a number of legal and political issues which have an interesting logical structure in order to invite the reader to think about how those topics are supposed to operate rationally within the structure of religion. My editor at Bloomsbury, Colleen Coalter, has been a pleasure to work with and very supportive of the project through its various travails, and I am grateful to all at the publisher’s for their hard work and professionalism. Jennifer Laing did a great job on the copy. Despite all this excellent assistance, I am sure there are errors and they should and will be laid exclusively at my door. London, June 2015

1 How to Use this Book It would be a good idea to start by saying what this book is not and then readers will have a better idea what I am trying to do here and how it should be used. It is not an introduction to the Qur’an, nor is it an introduction to philosophy, not even to the philosophy of religion, nor to Islamic philosophy. I am looking at what some thinkers have said about particular verses in the Qur’an and I limit myself to direct references by them to the Book, not general arguments that are in line with what they find in the Qur’an. Many of the thinkers I discuss would be very surprised to find themselves described as philosophers, shocked even, but where they use philosophical arguments to propose theories and defend interpretations I take this to be philosophy in its widest sense. The division between theology and philosophy is always difficult to draw precisely, especially when we are concentrating on thinkers who address the Qur’an directly, as here, and some of the discussion will even deal with religious law, which seems even further away from philosophy. But it will be seen I hope that in the ways in which thinkers have worked with these ideas from the Qur’an philosophical principles are involved and they can be used to make interesting observations about what is going on in the Book, which is how I am going sometimes to refer to the Qur’an. Sometimes a verse will be discussed by many different thinkers, sometimes not quite so often, and some verses very little, except as part of an extended argument focusing on others, and what I have decided to do is group verses together in ways that seem to make sense to make apparent particular arguments, while at the same time having a list of the verses discussed in the order they appear in the Qur’an. The cross-references then take the reader to where that individual verse can be combined with others on the same or similar topic to make a point. I have taken a very simple-minded approach here to the Book, not peering in any depth beneath the surface, and taking together verses that appear to be on the same topic, in the hope of elucidating some aspects of the philosophical structure of the text. I have been particularly influenced by



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the ways in which the thinkers I am discussing have linked verses with each other. It is always useful to group verses together since in any discussion one can examine a variety of ways of making and extending a particular point. This book is not a concordance of the Qur’an (there are several of these excellent books of reference available already) but an attempt at linking verses with a similar philosophical sense. Having spent some time on it I realize that this is really a job for several lifetimes, so rich and suggestive is much of the text of the Qur’an. This book presupposes no familiarity with the language of the Qur’an, Arabic, but there is some Arabic in it, when discussing a certain word is helpful. Nor does it presuppose any knowledge of philosophy, and the view I take is that the topics that are discussed here are perfectly obvious ones that arise for every thoughtful reader of a religious book. If God says he is in charge of everything, how far are we free? If we are not free, how entitled is He to punish us for what “we” do? What can we know, in an environment where God knows everything? How close can we come to God? What sorts of descriptions can be made of the deity, given that we use our ordinary language to describe something extraordinary? I have also included some legal discussions from the Qur’an since I think they often illustrate philosophical ideas and principles. How the Qur’an sets out to establish rules of behavior is based on argument and this needs to be examined. These topics are preoccupations of both the Qur’an and those who write and think about it, and these are among the preoccupations of this book. I would caution the reader that what is found here is a very brief analysis of a range of issues that are often dealt with exhaustively in other sorts of books, and I have organized the book in such a way as to encourage the reader to be able to consider various accounts of the topics and see which scriptural verses are relevant to the issues. There are no solutions to be found here, merely the presentation of questions. This is not though the place to go for an introduction to the Qur’an or to Islam or Islamic philosophy. There are many books on these topics, and indeed I have written and edited a few of them myself, in particular on the Qur’an an edited work called The Qur’an: An Encyclopedia and a book on Islam called Islam: The Key Facts, written with Kecia Ali. On Islamic philosophy there is what is really a companion book to this one and by the same publisher, the Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy, which contains a vast variety of thinkers who are often not clearly philosophers at all but all of whom did work of philosophical relevance. Then there is my Islamic Philosophy: An Introduction, and the Introduction to Classical Islamic



How to Use this Book 3

Philosophy. The History of Islamic Philosophy, which I co-edited with Seyyed Hossein Nasr, is a substantial work with a great deal of information about a range of Islamic philosophers, as one would expect. Any of these can be read with this book, but I have written here in such a way as not to make any such assumptions. That means that there is a certain amount of repetition and recapitulation throughout, since after many years of teaching I am not under the illusion that every reader will have read, and remembered, everything they have read up to a particular point. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that not everything that appears here is explained here, and in just the same way that readers will need to have a copy of the Qur’an to hand, unless they have memorized it, they will also need to have some material giving them information about Islam and its history, and also about Islamic philosophy. Such information is easily obtained and is not essential to understand what is going on here, but would be helpful. Despite all these caveats, I hope something of the philosophical flavor of the Qur’an will come through in this book. I do not examine every verse of course, and the ones omitted are no less impressive than those discussed, but space is of course limited. It would be easy to write a book about just one verse, as has often been done. Many of the verses only appear partially and readers should be aware that they will need to read the Qur’an to see the whole verse, in many cases. This is not a pious book, although I hope I have been respectful of all the religious views I have examined here. It is written very much in the spirit of trying to make sense of a certain kind of writing, without implying the acceptance or otherwise of the divine source of that writing. I appreciate how complex such a process is and that is why before we get into the detail there is a chapter on the Qur’an itself and some of the controversies surrounding it, and also a chapter on the various ways in which thinkers used the Qur’an. It is important to stress that there is not of course just one type of Islamic philosophy and there will be material here from a wide range of thinkers and from every type of Islamic philosophy, including some who are hostile to Islam and everything that goes with it. Finally, an attempt has been made to represent something of the geographical range of Islamic philosophers, from America to Indonesia, from France to Syria. An expression I am avoiding is the “Islamic world” which today is largely meaningless and perhaps always was. There are certainly countries with Muslim majorities, but there are in modern times Muslims living all over the world, and naturally they try to make sense of their lives using concepts taken both from the Qur’an, and also perhaps from the local culture which they inhabit. Part at least of that culture is represented by philosophy.



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When I look at different ways of understanding verses I have generally used the translations of the Qur’an that the authors themselves use, and otherwise I have done my own translation, with the assistance of the various texts that are available. When used, Arabic terms are generally italicized, although words used ubiquitously such as aya (sign/verse) and hadith, for instance, are not always italicized. I have only included the ‘ayn and hamza in the transliteration of Arabic. In most of my earlier books I have included substantial bibliographical information, and of course for readers who would find that useful I suggest those books are consulted, but the development of recent internet resources such as Oxford Bibliographies Online has in my view made these now largely redundant, since not only are the online sources of reference excellent and easily available, but they are frequently updated and so keep up-to-date with new developments. For those who prefer a paper source of references and guide to the literature on the area, there is, in the Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy, very detailed information on bibliography, and since it was published recently (2015) it is quite up-to-date.

Abbreviated references The references to the Qur’an are given in the normal style of sura:verse (aya is equivalent to chapter). The name of the sura is generally not given, although sometimes when it is relevant it is. Anwar = al-Baydawi (1988), Anwar al-tanzil wa asrar al-ta’wil, 2 vols, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya. Asfar = Sadra, Mulla (1999), al-Hikma al-muta‘aliya fi al-asfar al-arba‘a, Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-‘Arabi. Asrar = al-Razi (1985), Asrar al-tanzil, M. Muhammad et al. (eds.), Baghdad: n.p. Case = Ikhwan al-Safa’ (1984), The Case of the Animals versus Man before the King of the Jinn, L. Goodman (trans.), Boston: Twayne. Elixir = Sadra, Mulla (2003), The Elixir of the Mystics, W. Chittick (trans.), Provo: Brigham University Press. Ep 22 = Ikhwan al-Safa’ (2009), Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. The case of the animals versus man before the King of the Jinn, L. Goodman and R. McGregor (eds. and trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.



How to Use this Book 5

Faysal = Jackson, S. (2002), On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s Faysal al-Tafriqa, Karachi: Oxford University Press. FM = Ibn Rushd (1961), Averroes On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy: A Translation with Introduction and Notes of Ibn Rushd’s Kitab fasl al-maqal with its Appendix (Damima) and an Extraction from Kitab al-kashf an manahij al-adilla, G. Hourani (trans. and intro.), London: Luzac. Fusus = Ibn al-‘Arabi (1946), Fusus al-hikam, A. ‘Affifi (ed.), Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Arabi. Futuhat = Ibn al-‘Arabi (1911), Futuhat al-Makkiyya, O. Yahia (ed.), Cairo: n.p. Heart = Chittick, W. (2001), The Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afdal al-Kashani, New York: Oxford University Press. Ihya’ = al-Ghazali (2002a), Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din, 4 vols, Cairo: ‘Isa-Bab al-Halabi. Imaginal Worlds = Chittick, W. (1994), Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-‘Arabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity, Albany: State University of New York Press. Kashf = Ibn Rushd (n.d.), al-Kashf ‘an manahij al-adilla fi ‘aqa’id al-milla, Cairo: al-Matba‘at al-‘Arabiyya. Mafatih = al-Razi, Fakhr Din (1981), Mafatih al-ghayb, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr. Mafatih al-ghayb = Sadra, Mulla (1994), Mafatih al-ghayb, M. Khajavi (ed.), Tehran: Intisharat-i Mawla. Matalib = Al-Razi, Fakhr Din (1987) A. Saqqa (ed.) Al-Matalib al-‘aliya min al-‘ilm al-ilahi, Beirut: Dar al-kitab al-‘arabi. Mathnawi = Rumi (1925), Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi, R. Nicholson (ed.), Leiden: E. J. Brill. Met Pen = Sadra, Mulla (2014), Metaphysical Penetrations, I. Kalin (ed.), S. Nasr (trans.), Provo: Brigham Young University. Munqidh = al-Ghazali, M. (1934), al-Munqidh min al-dalal, J. Saliba and K. ‘Iyad (eds.), Damascus: Maktab al-‘Arabi.

Mustasfa = al-Ghazali M. (n.d.), al-Mustasfa min ‘ilm al-usul, H. Hafiz (ed.), Jeddah: Sharikat al-Madina al-Munawarra li’l-Tiba‘a. Names = al-Ghazali M. (1992a), Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Al-Maqṣad al-asna fī sharḥ ma‘ani asma’ Allah al-ḥusna, The ninety-nine beautiful names of God, D. Burrell and N. Daher (trans.), Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society. Phil Theol = Nasr, S. and Aminrazavi, M., eds. (2010), Philosophical Theology in the Middle Ages and Beyond, London: I. B. Tauris. Qistas = al-Ghazali, M. (1909), al-Qistas al-mustaqim, Beirut: n.p. SD = Chittick, W. (1998), The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-’Arabi’s Cosmology, Albany: State University of New York Press. Sufi Path = Chittick, W. (1989), The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination, Albany: State University of New York Press. Tafsir = Sadra, Mulla (n.d.), Tafsir al-qur’an al-karim, M. Khajavi (ed.), Qum: Intasharat Bidar. TT = Ibn Rushd (1954), Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), S. Van Den Bergh (trans. and intro.), London: Luzac. Wisdom of Sufism = Lewisohn, L., ed. and trans. (2001), The Wisdom of Sufism, Oxford: Oneworld.

2 Reading the Qur’an We are often told that the Qur’an is the center or heart of Islam. Complemented by the sunna (the reported practice of the Prophet) and the hadith (the transmitted stories of the Prophet and his companions), then by the various schools of law, the imams for the Shi‘a and to whichever spiritual and legal authorities particular communities may owe allegiance, the Qur’an is clearly the major source of authority and sacrality in the religion of Islam. Even the status of Muhammad is based entirely on the Qur’an that states throughout that he is only a man, and his status is dependent on the Qur’an and his role in receiving it and then leading a small group of followers in very unpropitious circumstances to what has become one of the huge religions of the world. This is not a recent phenomenon, though. The Islamic empire became very big, very quickly. The Qur’an was the book, indeed the Book as it will be referred to here, which became ubiquitous and is the basis of prayer, lifestyle, and belief. That is what we always say, but is it really true? When it comes to looking at some of the remarks that philosophers have made about the Qur’an, the relevant question is whether this has been led by the Book or is it rather directed at the Book. We dealt with some of these distinctions in the introduction to this book, where it was argued that many thinkers do not properly engage with the Qur’an in their analysis: what we get is a rhetorical use of the Qur’an, or even an exercise in Qur’an-washing, where it is used to make a writing seem to fit in to a kind of narrative which it does not at all. The important point is that frequency of quotation is no criterion of serious engagement, and we need some theory of how scripture and philosophy actually work together. It is sometimes said that Islamic philosophy and spirituality are deeply linked, especially in its later period, after al-Farabi (872–950 ce) and Ibn Sina (980–1039 ce). Suhrawardi in the twelfth century ce (AH sixth century) is often seen as including major metaphysical and spiritual insights throughout even when dealing with rather dry issues stemming from



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Aristotle and having to do with the definition of what it is to be a substance. From Sabzawari (died c. AH 675/1276 ce) to Mulla Sadra (1572–1640) there seems to be a real concentration on the connection between Islamic spirituality and philosophy. Some commentators think that this is important to note and shows that Islamic philosophy, unlike the more secular types of philosophy practiced elsewhere, manages to maintain the long tradition of not separating thought from being. Here is not the place to consider this argument but it is worth bearing in mind that even if it is true, it does not show that the sort of spirituality employed in such arguments comes from the Qur’an. We need to steer clear of the sorts of platitudes that are constantly produced when discussing the Qur’an. Religions do tend to have texts that are important to them, and they will often refer to such texts, but it does not follow that what we observe in religious behavior is based on those texts at all. We often misidentify our motivation to act in particular ways, or even to have certain beliefs. At best, we should translate language about religion being based on a book as religion being based on the interpretation of a book, and the Qur’an is no exception here. For many Muslims the need for interpretation of the Qur’an is limited since they find the verses and meaning of the text perfectly clear and evident, and that they work well as a system of guidance for their lives and beliefs. In some ways casting around for a hermeneutic strategy may seem to be impious in a religion that sets out to address all humanity in a clear and comprehensive manner. But any text is capable of a variety of interpretations, especially writing from the past, however divinely inspired. The Qur’an is often said to be miraculous in its style and content, a perfect guide and a work that could not have been created by mere human beings. It is exquisitely shaped to represent the truth. Yet from an early period, issues arose as to how to understand the text, and those issues continue today. A contrast is often made between the Qur’an and other major books of religion such as the Jewish Hebrew Bible and the Christian New Testament. Those works have been subjected to radical examination, reorganization, and reinterpretation, although many believers reject the findings of these scholarly enterprises. These intellectual efforts represent the momentum of what is often called modernity, a cultural movement that is often taken to have had less effect on the Islamic world where scriptural criticism is concerned. This is hardly true. Islam has been full of thinkers asking radical questions about traditional religious texts and their meanings. Conversely, most commentators have stuck to the traditional interpretations but have



Reading the Qur’an 9

framed and expressed them in different ways. Here the emphasis is on putting the verses of the Qur’an into some sort of local context, since that represents the environment in which the verse was initially revealed, and should help us understand it. The Prophet was approached by the Angel Gabriel, who recited the Qur’an to him over a long period, and many of the verses are linked with particular historical incidents, or so it is often argued. During this entire period, the Prophet left Mecca with a few followers for Medina, where he found some support, and then eventually returned and captured Mecca and Arabia as a whole, leading to a rapid campaign of conquest throughout many of the neighboring countries. So the context was constantly changing, and we need to know this in order to understand the meaning of the Qur’an. Of course, here we need to distinguish between history and sacred history, which are often not entirely the same. One of the major successes of the traditional commentators is to engage in a detailed and painstaking analysis of the grammar of the Qur’an, and, surely, in any religion an attempt at grasping the detail of the language in which the religion is primarily represented is going to be of vital importance. For them, the language is the context, but for many others the issue of context has to be explored more widely. Once we get into the arguments over context, the issues of the meaning of the Book and how it should be read become more complex.

The Sunni popularizers Two of the major modern Turkish popularizers are Said Nursi (1878–1960) and his follower Fethullah Gülen (b. 1941), both of whom are Sunni and were determined to resist the push in Turkey towards a militant form of secularism initiated by successive Kemalist governments in the country. This official project led to campaigns designed to label Islam as old-fashioned and irrelevant in the modern age of what was the twentieth century. One form of resistance was to remind people of the extraordinary beauty of the Qur’an and the significance of its claims to represent the truth. In Nursi, there is an interesting blend of ideas, often using concepts taken from Sufi and Ishraqi philosophy: and, because he wrote a good deal when he was effectively in internal exile or on the run, there is a directness and fluency to his unsystematic approach that is compelling. Gülen is a follower, with not quite the same flair or originality, but he does present far better organized arguments for the relevance of the Book. Despite the popularity

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of both thinkers in Turkish communities, they are little regarded in the wider Islamic world, and not at all academically, although efforts have been made to acquire some influence there also in recent years. Two Sunni popularizers from the Arab world, Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926) and Amr Khaled (b. 1967), have also not been taken seriously by academic commentators. They both present a straightforward approach to understanding the Qur’an and its relevance to modern life. They are both seen as representing religious authority to millions of Muslims and are called on to present legal judgments in various contexts, and this has inevitably meant a lack of sophistication in their views given the necessity to always find a practical solution in the Qur’an, and of course the other sources of Islamic law such as the hadith, Arabic grammar, local custom, and so on. Islam is based on the Qur’an, which is easy to understand in its teaching of how we should live and what we should believe. Al-Qaradawi represents a traditional legal authority and is nonetheless capable to working with a large audience in modern times, and his views are often interesting. For example, although he defends the accounts of punishment that are to be found in the Qur’an, and their literal interpretation, he suggests that they only become valid in an Islamic state. An Islamic state is not a state that calls itself Islamic, but one which is truly Islamic and which completely implements the ideals and practices advocated in the Qur’an. There are of course no such states in existence yet, according to him, and so the implementation of Qur’anic hudud punishments is not acceptable at the moment. Both thinkers resemble the Turkish theologians in setting out to fight the forces of secularism, which they see as threatening the continuing role and influence of the Qur’an in society, and they cleverly use the technological forces of modernity such as TV and the internet to struggle with what they take to be its negative impact on religion. Their work resonates with the public, and yet it tends to be intellectually slender and changes with the fashion current at a particular time. A variety of other thinkers have taken to the popular media to broadcast their views on religion, in a variety of countries, often by presenters who see no great difficulty in understanding the Book and telling their audience precisely what it means. A European equivalent of these thinkers is Tariq Ramadan (b. 1962), who has defended the Qur’an as it is traditionally represented and yet been open to adapting it in certain ways to modern life in Europe, or so he sometimes says to European audiences. He has carried out much the same role as al-Qaradawi and Amr Khaled when addressing the non-Islamic intellectual



Reading the Qur’an 11

world, representing the Qur’an as an unproblematic guide to how human beings are to live and not at all threatening to the ways that are prevalent in Europe. He does not have to operate as a legal authority and so can make personal interpretations of the Book, which resonates with a postmodern and largely secular audience. This is actually not that different from the other popularizers’ claims, since they all set out to examine the Book with their own experiences and ideas to the fore, as though one does not have to be part of a particular legal or theological school in order to deal with the text comprehensively. Most interpreters of the Qur’an are in a particular legal and theological school, which gives them an ideological basis for their work, and of course, within those constraints they have scope for a degree of individuality and creativity. But in modern times, interpreters who are seeking a wide audience are reluctant to make clear what the bases to the judgments are, since that would constrain their ability to link up with the widest possible audience. There is nothing novel about this: in the nineteenth century, the thinker Jamal al-Din al-Astarabadi came to realize that his name indicated membership of a Persian and presumably Shi‘i community, and yet he wished to communicate with the Islamic world as a whole, not just the Shi‘i part of that world. A solution was to change the last part of his name to “al-Afghani,” which made his heritage a good deal more ambiguous. The popular commentators today tend to eschew a particular allegiance to a theological or legal school since they realize that would restrict their audience, but the unfortunate result is that their analyses tend to lack definition and rigor. We keep on being told what Islam is, what it demands of its followers and so on, without much in the way of sophistication of representing the varieties of religious belief and practice within the general Islamic rubric.

The contextualists The thinkers called the popularizers are apologists, and the main problem they set out to resolve is an apparent failure of the Qur’an to always link up with its contemporary audience. There is another group of thinkers who identify what they see as a serious fault in how the text itself has been interpreted, a fault that has to be rectified if the text is to remain relevant. Fazlur Rahman (1919–88) is the foremost figure here and his work has been taken as a clarion call to many intellectuals in the Islamic world. The Qur’an was revealed many years ago in an Arabia very different from the

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modern world and local conditions presumably shaped it. It came from a specific environment and developed initially in a very distinct context. There is what is sometimes called a science of understanding the Qur’an called asbab al-nuzul, which seems to understand each verse by linking it with the local conditions that obtained when it was revealed. This is a sensible procedure—we should always try to understand a text by relating it to its context—but it can be threatening also. One may ask why that interpretation remains authoritative in a different context, since every context is distinct. It is important for readers of the Qur’an to take its pronouncements as the word of God for everyone everywhere and that suggests the context is not important. It is this sort of dilemma that occurs for many religious believers, and it exists for Islam also. A group of theologians in Turkey, who have come to be labeled the Ankara School because they were based in the Theology Department at the University of Ankara (Körner 2006), try to balance viewing the Qur’an as a historical text with seeing it as not only a historical text, something they think tends to follow in Protestant Christianity. They are convinced that what is required is a new reading and thinking about the Qur’an. It is always difficult to reconcile a book’s immanent and transcendent status, and as we shall see in the discussion of the Qur’an throughout this book, this is a topic that arises all the time. Even President Sisi in Egypt reacted to the various violent attacks by those often called Islamists, although they tend to be labeled rather less politely in contemporary Egypt, by calling for a reinterpretation of Islam, one presumably that would rule out the sorts of barbarity which we often see carried out under an Islamic rubric. The al-Azhar university has a reputation for immediately going along with whatever the current ruler of Egypt advocates, and so did the right thing politically by agreeing, but there is no indication that any major reinterpretation is likely to emerge from its hallowed portals. After all, the previous regime had an entirely different attitude to the relationship between Islam and modernity, and who knows what the next regime may want, while al-Azhar has not survived for many centuries by failing to obey the political reality of the time. Nasr Abu Zayd (1943–2010) sharply distinguishes between Islam and the Qur’an, the former being a human institution and the latter the eternal and permanent word of God. On the other hand, he implies sometimes that the Qur’an was a bit of a collaborative effort between Muhammad and divine inspiration, rather a radical idea in that it implies that part at least of the text might be more human than divine, or a mixture of both, and we don’t know



Reading the Qur’an 13

which is which. It is hardly surprising that his work attracted a good deal of hostility in his native Egypt by those who condemn anyone who seeks to take a critical attitude to the text of the Qur’an. Abu Zayd points out that the understandings of the Book have varied from place to place since what is understood to be Islam itself varies, and this is because when the early Arab invaders took over in the various countries they conquered they embedded the new religion in the old culture, and what happened was that the former was shaped by the latter. The Qur’an needs to be reinterpreted for today if it is to be relevant, and relying on old Hijazi models of human behavior just because it was first revealed in the Hijaz is not going to make much sense in a totally distinct context. On the other hand, Abu Zayd’s enemies argued that those old ways of doing things that were supported both by the Book and appeared in the lifestyle of the Prophet are worth copying and maintaining even in the very different circumstances of today, since they represent the divine will and should be followed without deviation. This is a traditional discussion in religion: how far tradition itself can be enshrined in religious law and practice, and how far it merely represents the way things were done at a certain time and place. There is often nothing so modern as tradition, as practitioners of religion take some aspect of what they think is traditional behavior and reconstruct their version of religion around it. Some of the critical thinkers place a lot of emphasis on distinguishing radically between the Meccan and the Medinan suras, which is of course not dissimilar from the traditional approach to the interpretation of the Book. When the Prophet was in one city he is thought to have received some of the revelations that made up the Book, and others in a different city. The Medinan suras are more concerned with law and administration, since when he was in Medina the Prophet was leading a community of believers who needed to be organized and defended against their enemies. The Meccan suras by contrast are often more spiritual in direction, and general, and reflect a period when the Prophet was having problems attracting a wide following. God is taken to have provided revelations that fitted in with the context of the time. The Indonesian thinker Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) argues that the Medinan verses represent a time of pluralism, cohesion, and tolerance, which the Islamic world today should try to recapture, since these ideas go to the very heart of the Qur’an itself. Mahmud Taha (1909–85) takes a different line and suggests that these verses are to be related to the time at which they were revealed because they are only relevant to that time. So the rather harsh punishments they advocate, for example, are no longer relevant today, and he implies would not have arisen during the earlier period while the Prophet

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was in Mecca either. They were limited to their time and place. Mahanud Khorchide points out that of the 6,236 verses in the Qur’an only 80 deal with punishment, and he makes a strong distinction between the Meccan and Medinan verses: between the Prophet as a political and as a spiritual leader. If we can distinguish between those verses on the basis of their context then it might appear that there is nothing universal about them, although the Qur’an itself can be regarded as universal and eternal. On the other hand, it is a slippery slope. Once parts of the Book are said to be no longer relevant, it is not a huge move to say that none of it is relevant anymore. On the other hand, the shari‘a or religious law is often regarded as immutable, while fiqh as the body of legal opinions that are the result of human reasoning and experience is not. This represents the difference between God who is by definition perfect and infallible, and human beings who often err in what they take the divine message to be or to mean, but follow God legally. Hasan Hanafi (b. 1935) argues that the Qur’an needs to be regarded as existing on a variety of levels. As a divine product, it is an object of mystery and faith, but at a more prosaic level it sets out to have a relationship with the other and earlier works of revelation (Campanini 2011). It is their culmination. The Iranian thinker Abdelkarim Souroush puts the point in a similar way, suggesting that the type of discourse we use when talking about religion is social since it is based on language, and we can accept the point of disagreement here about the meaning of the Qur’an while maintaining the objectivity of what the language actually refers to, the Book itself. He argues that the Mu‘tazilite notion of the createdness of the Qur’an which became established in Shi‘i thought makes it easier for the Shi‘a to take a historical view of the text than it is for the Sunnis. He also goes a bit further and suggests that the Prophet is in some ways the author of the Qur’an, and that prophecy is widespread among humanity as a whole. This approach has often led to strenuous criticism from within the Muslim community itself (which is hardly surprising since it seems very much at odds with the Qur’an), while being enthusiastically taken up by those outside the community who are keen on finding and sometimes funding insiders who are in favor of a historical approach to the Qur’an that offers a path to its reinterpretation in what is taken to be an acceptable and liberal manner. After all, to contextualize is to demythologize, and to stress the role of historical features is to limit the scope of the Book to precisely those features. It seems to make the Qur’an resemble the other Abrahamic scriptures and make it more accessible to a variety of forms of control.



Reading the Qur’an 15

Among the contextualists ought to be classified those who argue that the Qur’an is a work of liberation theology (Farid Esack and Ali Shariati), and feminists who argue that it is based on the equality of men and women (Asma Barlas and Amina Wudud). There are some excellent ideas in all these works of interpretation, but they fail to do justice to the nuances of the Book, refusing to recognize that what is important for the interpreter might be different from that of the divine author in his last message. Of course, when one is committed to a certain line on what is right, God must be taken to agree. It is not difficult to argue that patriarchal systems of power and class privilege in the past marked the interpretation of Islam, and the Qur’an, and all that is needed now is to recognize the limitations of this context and then concentrate on the basic principles represented by the Book. Here one fills in the blank with whatever the personal commitment happens to be. But we cannot argue from the fact that the Qur’an can be given a progressive interpretation to the conclusion that it should be. The modernizing project often fails to offer an account of the Qur’an that is subtle enough to be balanced. The instruction to the community of Islam at 2:143 that they should situate themselves in the middle is something that the community of interpreters might also take to heart. Traditional interpreters, for all their limitations, had in the foreground of their work the linguistic structure of the text and the context in which it was written—and they provided nuanced interpretations which validated a variety of approaches. They were often reluctant to push the text in a particular direction given their respect for the text and the need to offer readers help in understanding its richness and diversity. It also has to be said that the best of interpreters tend to raise questions rather than settle them, but by contrast, those called progressives here have a list of answers that they are determined to find in the text and a very firm notion of the original context and why it provided a particularly problematic version of Islam that has come down to us today. These attempts are always interesting to observe, but they are often implausible and involve considerable twisting of the text to make it fit into an unaccustomed form.

Taking context one step further There is a group of thinkers who set out to follow a scientific approach to the Qur’an, in the sense that they have no commitment to any particular interpretation of the Qur’an beyond that available through studying the text, and what they take to be the context of the text. They are not necessarily Muslims

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and they set out to present the evidence for the nature and meaning of the Qur’an without raising any faith issues. They are part of the movement in European scholarship that often results in taking a radical line on the meaning of religious texts. Both these scientific thinkers and the contextualists take context to be significant, but for the latter, context explains why its eternal and universal meaning can appear to vary on occasion, since context changes from time to time and place to place. On the scientific approach, there is no commitment to a transcendental meaning, and how could there be on a scientific approach? Context is all that there is and has to be the primary object of study. This context is not the context as understood by most Muslims. The traditional history of the Prophet, the timing and dating of the various revelations and their placement, and the use of supplementary material such as the hadith literature often do not survive strict scientific inspection unscathed. The problem is not that these phenomena need to be accepted on the basis of faith, since they are perfectly rational ways of exploring the meaning of the Qur’an and linking it with a context. For example, the hadith are organized in terms of reliability and chains of transmission, and although many of them appear to be weak to almost everyone, some may well have stronger claims for acceptance. The important principle in operation here is perhaps that it is not a matter of what one would like to be genuine, but the issue is one of assessing the evidence. We may suspect that some are tempted to accept as genuine hadith of which they personally approve, but this is not the official criterion of acceptance. Many Muslims define history, and in particular the history of the Prophet and his companions, in a way that some historians doubt to be true. The sacred history of a religion is indeed part of the religion and often there is no objective evidence on which it rests, although it is part of what justifies those in the religion in carrying out their activities as they do. The largest research project of this century is that overseen by Angelika Neuwirth (b. 1943) and presented in Der Koran als Text der Spätantike: Ein europäischer Zugang (Neuwirth 2010). It is a project designed to continue until at least the 2020s and is designed to result in a scientific manuscript of the Qur’an, one which will painstakingly recreate what is taken to be the original text, paying attention throughout to the context within which the Qur’an was produced. The Qur’an will also be linked with a range of other texts, those that came before it as well as those which were contemporary. A vast scholarly commentary will be produced on the text, no doubt explaining all the variants, why particular formulations have been taken as



Reading the Qur’an 17

standard and so on, in line with the sorts of studies that have been made of other religious works. There is no doubt but that this project is going to define the study of the Qur’an for a long time to come, but whatever interesting outcomes emerge about the precise nature of the Qur’anic text, it does rest on some problematic assumptions: and these relate to the question of what it means to take a scientific approach to a religious text.

A science of the Qur’an? The Corpus Coranicum project argues in favor of the creation of a Wissenschaft des Islams in line with previous attempts by theologians to distinguish sharply between the claims that religions make about themselves, and what they are entitled to say. At the same time, the project suggests that we do not have to accept the idea of such a dichotomy between aligning with a tradition and accepting a scientific approach. Qur’anic and Biblical studies are often contrasted, to the detriment of the former. For a considerable period now very strenuous moves have been adopted to understand the Bible, both Jewish and Christian, using a wide range of hermeneutic principles, in order to grasp this issue of context. Different authors have been identified speculatively, and for the Gospels themselves of course different authors are actually self-announced. A vast literature has grown up explaining the various parts of the Bibles and often this is very challenging to the ways in which both Jews and Christians see their Bibles. A Wissenschaft des Judentums and a Higher Criticism have both called for a new understanding of the basic Jewish and Christian texts. The Corpus Coranicum project claims it sets out to avoid taking this sort of approach to the Qur’an while at the same time freeing the Qur’an from the tafsir tradition in Islam. It even tries to establish a link with Europe by arguing that the sorts of debates that were current in the Arab Peninsula during the seventh century were similar to those taking place in the Mediterranean region, and so ultimately to European issues. It is a very strange argument which ends up by saying correctly that the Qur’an is linked with late antiquity but uses this to argue that it is also part of the contribution that late antiquity made to Europe. According to Neuwirth, before the Qur’an was regarded as the definitive text of Islam, it was a reflection on a discussion within a community that responded to issues thrown up by late antiquity. She argues that the Book should not be seen as the work of just one author, who seeks to define the

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Islamic community once and for all, but is rather the result of a cooperative effort in which a variety of voices are heard. It is clear that she is following rather closely the approach of Theodor Nöldeke who fostered a powerful tradition of analyzing the Qur’an in terms of its style, the audience it was seeking, how it tried to foster and indeed create community, and finally its attempt to establish some religious rules. Neuwirth has little time for traditional Islamic Qur’an interpretation, since it does not provide in her view an acceptable account of the context of the text. So we have here two huge claims: one that the Qur’an is a sort of compilation built up over time and not by one author; and that the vast category of traditional Muslim commentary is not very helpful in understanding the Book. These are far from being new claims: they are commonplace in European and particularly German approaches to the Qur’an, and they do fit in nicely with what one would think is a scientific approach to anything, i.e., not basing it on the uncritical views of those who happen to be believers and inevitably see the text with sympathetic eyes. The secularization of the Qur’an seems inevitable if it is to be treated historically in a certain way, since it is often represented as a reorganization, and a pretty confused one, of original Biblical material, plus some other more local and contemporary material. The style and structure of the Qur’an is investigated and compared with older religious texts to which references are apparently made in the Book, and the Book is then grounded in a historical context rather than in anything transcendental. Muslims, by contrast, often choose as the appropriate context aspects of the Prophet’s life to explain the revelation. Neuwirth argues that these two apparently distinct approaches can be brought together. They can be regarded as complementary but it is mysterious how this is supposed to work, and of course, it does not work at all.

The context of Islamic philosophy The problem with taking a historical approach to the text is that post hoc is not necessarily propter hoc. Just because the Qur’an emerged within a particular context is not an explanation of what it means. Like the Qur’an and its biblical context, Islamic philosophy often had more of a context in the Shi‘i than in the Sunni world, and yet that does not show that there is any specific linkage between either world and the discipline itself. There is certainly very little evidence that most Islamic philosophy looks to a Shi‘i audience, although of course some of it does, in particular some



Reading the Qur’an 19

Isma‘ ili philosophy, where it would be impossible to thoroughly understand what was going on without understanding something about the logic and language of Isma‘ili thought. The Isma‘ilis are a Shi‘i group who emphasize the need to seek an interpretation of the text that refers to all sorts of issues which are very different from what appears in the text itself. Most interpretation of a text does not involve such a radical view. This is not the case in general though and as we shall see we have to be very careful about identifying links between religion and philosophy and the context in which they exist. It is not difficult to find influence everywhere, and that should make us worry about how useful the concept is (Leaman 2010: 35–45). Just because something is influenced by something else, it does not follow that the former is dependent on the latter, or indeed is the latter. Similarly, just because they are like each other does not mean that one has caused the other or is its source. That is precisely the problem with the concentration on context. Context is obviously relevant for meaning, but it is not equivalent to it. It is this sort of vagueness that seeps into Henry Corbin’s arguments for a specifically Shi‘i philosophy. On the one hand he points to a couple of ideas developed by Suhrawardi (not a Shi‘i of course) that were to feature in that philosophy, right up to the time of Mulla Sadra and beyond. On the other hand, he refers to Hermes (Trismegistus, the symbol of contact between humanity and divine wisdom) and the tradition that goes along with him and his crucial role in Shi‘i thought. According to their account of prophecy, he is not a legislative prophet, charged with revealing a shari‘a to humanity. What he transmits is a hikma laduniya, a kind of inspired knowledge. In contrast to this, the Sunnis condemned the hermeticism of the Sabians as a description of religion incompatible with Islam, because it can dispense with the prophet who establishes a shari‘a. The ascent of the spirit to Heaven, into which Hermes initiated his disciples, made it unnecessary to believe in the descent of an angel who reveals the divine text to the prophet. This does indeed bring out a feature of much Islamic philosophy that often suggests that not everyone needs prophecy. Some advanced thinkers can work out for themselves the sorts of rules and practices that are advocated by the prophet, since they have such an advanced intellect they do not need the sorts of information and advice provided to the general community. Corbin has this rather Romantic notion of the Sunni thinkers being hidebound by the requirements of religious law while for the Shi‘i this is unnecessary since they are said to have a direct link to the supernatural realm from where they can acquire the sort of knowledge they require for salvation. This is far from

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the case, though, since such a basic distinction does not exist between most forms of Sunni and Shi‘i Islam. For both, the traditional attitude to shari‘a is maintained, and as we have seen for the philosophers, especially the mashsha’i thinkers, there is always a question about the universal basis of shari‘a given the ability of advanced thinkers to do it themselves, as it were. They were almost all Sunni, and so it would be difficult to link this idea to Hermeticism and the Shi‘a. Corbin quite rightly emphasizes two achievements of Suhrawardi, although why we should see them as Shi‘a achievements is mysterious. One is the idea of the imaginal world, an ontological realm in some way in between this world and the spiritual world. The other is his apparent use of profoundly Iranian, even Zoroastrian ideas, which Corbin thinks came to characterize much Persian thought after its Shi‘i orientation became fixed, and he is thinking here in particular of course of Mulla Sadra and the major Shaykhi thinkers like Ahmad al-Ahsa’i (1753–1826) and M. Karim Kirmani (1809/10–1870/71). Many people have criticized Corbin’s arguments here, since he seems to wish to downplay the Arab and Muslim influence on Iranian thought while emphasizing what he sees as the ancient past in ways it is almost impossible to verify. Although of course Mulla Sadra does owe a great deal to Suhrawardi, he turns the latter’s theory round, so that instead of developing an ontology based on being Mulla Sadra goes for existence, and it is difficult to see either strategy as being more or less Shi‘a than any other. We do need to remind ourselves here that in many ways the difference between Sunni and Shi‘a is not in itself immense, and the idea that a metaphysics might accompany such a difference is profoundly misguided.

Shi‘ism and mysticism On the other hand, the claim is often made that there is something unique about the Shi‘i approach to aspects of philosophy such as mysticism. At the center of the doctrine of Shi‘a ‘irfan is the recognition of the position of the Imam as the inheritor and possessor of the inward and the outward knowledge of the Qur’an and the possessor of the power of wilaya. The ideal route to God combines the outward (zahir) and the inward (batin) features of religion and follows both as the middle nation (ummatan wasatan) is called upon to do. They ask Him “to illuminate his outward being with the light of obedience to Him and his inward being with His love, fill his heart



Reading the Qur’an 21

with [divine] knowledge, and his spirit with His vision,” in a prayer traditionally attributed to ‘Ali. The Qur’an has a manifest meaning and an inner one that is represented very differently. Some Shi‘i thinkers refer to four levels of meaning in the Qur’an, ranging from the text itself; the allusions that the text makes to other matters that are for a specific audience; the mysteries of the text that are for the friends of God; and the truth itself which is effectively reserved for the prophets. Its literal meaning can be understood and its commands and injunctions followed by all Muslims. The inner meaning of the Qur’an, “no one knows it but God and those who are steadfast in knowledge,” as we are told at 3:7. The steadfast in knowledge are identified by ‘Ali in a hadith recorded by Abu Dawud (817–89 ce) as those who are pure and from the family of the Prophet. ‘Ali is often seen as having been taught tanzil and ta’wil by the Prophet, and having passed on that information and technique to those coming after him. Apart from the specific route to mystical knowledge, though, there is nothing here that a Sunni thinker attracted to mysticism could not accept. The idea of an intermediary that is so significant in Shi‘ism is there in all aspects of Islamic mysticism, but it does not have to be an imam. There is of course the shaykh and the notion of the existence of stations is also redolent with the idea of something linking different stages of spiritual and intellectual development. So despite what is sometimes said, there is no essential link between the Shi‘a and even mystical philosophy. Even Ishraqi philosophy is independent of doctrinal affiliation: its originator was after all al-Suhrawardi, and there is certainly nothing Shi‘i about mashshai’i thought. We need to be very careful about making broad claims about who the audience was for the Qur’an, for Islamic philosophy, and for the ways of thinking connected to these sources. The point about religion, emphasized throughout by the mashsha’i thinkers, is that it provides information for everyone, regardless of their background, and the same goes for philosophy, albeit that that audience has to be at a certain level of training and knowledge before it can assess what is set before it. Apart from that though, they can come from anywhere, and in the Islamic world frequently did, from a range of countries, varieties of Islam, and even different or no religions. This is surely the important point here and the reason why the scientific approaches to the Qur’an should not be seen as threatening to its status. The fact that it was used to address a particular audience does not mean it is limited to that audience or that it was cobbled together by a random series of vague ideas shared with that audience. As the philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (AH 520–95/1126–98 ce) often points out, the way that we can

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The Qur’an: A Philosophical Guide

see something from two points of view does not mean that one is true and the other false. When I get up in the morning and watch a lovely sunrise when the birds are singing and everything in the garden is starting to look delightful I am not forming a scientific judgment of what I am experiencing, and I know that there is one from physics and biology and so on. The birds I hear singing a pleasant song are probably really warning each other off from going near them, but that does not make their song less pleasant. Ibn Rushd talked of there being different routes to the truth, where they all lead to the same place, but often along different routes, and this view is something of a commonplace of the philosophical tradition of which he was a member.

Hostility to the Qur’an Another way in which the study of context has had a baleful influence on the understanding of the Qur’an is by associating negative aspects of the environment of the Qur’an with the text itself. Bad things are sometimes done in the name of the Book, and it is quoted as justifying such actions: it is not difficult to assume that here we have the context for the Qur’an, a context that is prima facie undesirable. It is a bit like identifying someone with the neighborhood in which they are brought up, as though they were defined by their context and surroundings. Some commentators have become so concerned at the sorts of things that some Muslims say is in the Qur’an that they have adopted a hostile attitude to the Book as a whole. There is a range of such accounts of the Qur’an in modern times and the term “Islamophobia” is thrown around far too much nowadays to capture anyone who has critical remarks to make about aspects of Islam. In the past Muslims often accused each other of being unbelievers (takfir) if they took a slightly different line on anything to do with the faith, and that is definitely a suspect process. On the other hand, there is nothing wrong with using the expression to describe those who come to take a negative view of the Qur’an and those who try to base their lives on it. Some of them definitely seem to regard the religion in a negative light, and it is often the case that someone brought up in a religion comes to resent or even hate it. Often they are former Muslims like Ibn Warraq from Pakistan and present a broad assault on the Qur’an, as does Robert Spencer who directs his attention particularly at what he calls the lack of historical evidence for anything to do with it and early Islamic history. Christoph Luxenberg, as with Ibn Warraq (both pseudonyms), wrote an interesting book on how the Qur’an



Reading the Qur’an 23

is wrongly linked with Arabic but in fact should be read as though it were originally written in Aramaic, which hardly surprisingly produces different interpretations of the text. The argument is often clever but unfortunately is based on an entirely false premise about the languages then current in the Hijaz. A variety of other writers attack the Qur’an along with Islam especially for its treatment of women or minorities, but there is often no subtlety in any of these approaches and no capacity to distinguish between the Qur’an and how it has come to be understood in a variety of cultural contexts. Although these books are greeted with much enthusiasm by those hostile to Islam, they are so narrow in their approach to the Qur’an that it is difficult not to suspect the motives of the authors. Those who oppose them violently, and this has become increasingly common in recent times, rather play into the Islamophobic agenda that Islam is an objectionable and aggressive movement. At the center of what is wrong with it is its book, the Qur’an, and until this is either reinterpreted or reformed in some way there is no possibility of progress. What is strange about this criticism is that, ever since it was revealed, the Qur’an has been constantly reinterpreted and the practices of its followers frequently reformed (Leaman 2009a: 190–210). Readers of this book will see how arguments were developed to explain in a variety of ways the verses of the Book, and how followers of Islam are encouraged to study the text and ponder its rationale and the links between one verse and another. It may be that we often do not approve of the conclusions that readers draw, but that is not because the Book forces them to that conclusion, just that it makes it possible. Like all major religious works, the Qur’an is rich and multi-faceted, and it is a major error to try to sum it up as just one sort of writing, either from a positive or negative point of view. If there is anything useful about philosophy at all, it is that it constantly reminds us of this. One of the other aspects of philosophy is also helpful and that is the attempt to escape from the straitjacket of context. Philosophers tend to try to analyze statements in their most general form, to examine their logical structure and implications, to take them in many ways out of their immediate context, to liberate them from what might otherwise be seen as their restrictive local conditions. In this book, we shall see the value of this activity and what interesting questions it raises about the subject matter of the Qur’an.

3 The Qur’an and Philosophy To understand a religious text one has to put it into context, in just the same way as any word or sentence has to be linked with others to be understood. In the previous chapter, it was argued that we have to be very careful about what we say about context, but it is certainly true that the Qur’an needs to be read along with a range of other material. For example, there are hadith of varying authenticity, and these are very helpful in expanding on how certain verses should be understood. Then there are the asbab al-nuzul, the context in which the verse was actually revealed: Was it in Mecca or Medina? What were the immediate issues at stake? And so on. There is an understanding of the grammar of Arabic of that period, which is different of course from the Arabic of today and can be misleading to the unwary contemporary reader. There are the legal and commentatorial authorities who are trusted to deliver an accurate version of the meaning of a verse, and for some Muslims special people such as imams and saints who may have a particular insight into the meaning which is not available directly to everyone, but they can communicate it to their community. Then there are theories of how the whole Book hangs together, and these stylistic issues often contribute to the interpretation of particular parts of the Qur’an. It goes without saying that on all these issues there are disputes and controversies, as is normal in religious inquiry, and many longstanding disagreements continue to exist between Muslim and Muslim, and between Muslims and others, on what the Qur’an means. Sadly, these disagreements are often more than academic and result in death and injury. Interfaith dialogue is often said to be a path to peace and reconciliation, but it is generally within religions that the most vicious confrontations take place, just as civil wars are usually more damaging than wars between different countries. A fight between strangers may be violent, but is often surpassed by conflict between people who know each other, especially members of the same family. We know well how to hurt those who are closest to us,

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The Qur’an: A Philosophical Guide

and, if the crime statistics are to be believed, frequently act appropriately. This is not specific to a particular religion or even to religion at all. It is perhaps a feature of life within a community. Groups are always seeking to define and redefine themselves and those who interfere with this process, by taking an alternative position on some issue or another, can easily be seen as dangerous and subversive. This rather frenetic language seems inappropriate in a book on philosophy, but it should be remembered that the sorts of issues that philosophers discuss have often been the source of conflict between people at more than just the level of words. We should not think of words as just noises and sounds, with no more power and influence than temporary interventions on paper, on computer screens, or through other forms of media. Words are extraordinarily powerful things and it is no surprise that people are killed because of what they say, or are said to have said: words appearing here at secondhand or more usually at an even greater distance from their source. The Qur’an is the word of God, transmitted via the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad, we are told: and how those messages are understood is very important for Muslims, and indeed others. One feature of the way in which the Qur’an is often used, along with other religions, is that a particular verse or aya is selected to make a particular point, as though it is clear what the verse means and how it fits into the general argument that someone is trying to make. This is always very dangerous in religion, since words and indeed verses have to be put within a certain context if they are to be understood. Religions often say one thing in one place and something quite different somewhere else, and we require a theory to help us reconcile those passages, or to explain how one represents the final and best view of the text as a whole. Fortunately for those of us who are interested in such issues theologians exist whose very function is to do this, and we should never forget that religions are about more than just ideas, they are also crucially about worship. It is difficult to hear a verse from the Qur’an that may be used in a prayer, and which is regarded as the direct word of God, and treat it objectively, as though it might be true or false, or maybe merely dubious. It seems rather impolite to ask God what evidence He has for what He says, or to challenge Him by producing counterexamples. This is what philosophers tend to do, although often politely, and Islamic philosophers have over the centuries frequently challenged and questioned Qur’anic verses, although generally with the aim of explaining them and showing how they fit in with a philosophical approach to the truth, albeit in very different ways as particular philosophies differ.



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In the next chapter, I will be going through some of the verses in the Qur’an and discussing what philosophers say about them, or what philosophical claims they seem to be based upon, without necessarily linking those verses with other verses, or with the rest of the hermeneutical machinery that is characteristic of the Islamic sciences. Often verses will be linked with other verses, since the Qur’an often says similar things in different places. What readers need to bear in mind is that in focusing on a particular verse and taking it out of its context in the Book aspects of its meaning might well be missed or even ignored. On the other hand, the intention is to present enough of the verse and its broader meaning for it to be analyzed philosophically. Whether I have succeeded readers will have to decide, and the difficulty is only compounded by the fact that I frequently only quote a part of a verse, the part which interests philosophers, which of course is to take a phrase not only out of its context but even out of its sentence or paragraph! Considerations of space make this necessary, but a good excuse is that this is what is traditionally done in Islamic philosophy: only verses and parts of verses from the Qur’an are quoted, and their philosophical aspects discussed, without anyone worrying about whether those texts are really put within the right context for such treatment. It should be said, though, that the expected audience of such books probably would be expected to know the Qur’an well and so they could place those verses or parts of verses within something of a context that different sorts of audience probably cannot. Many readers of this book will need to have a copy of the Qur’an with them, perhaps in translation, since so many of the verses discussed refer to other verses not necessarily quoted in my text. In many cases I have not quoted the whole verse and so in that obvious sense the context is lacking, although I have quoted the parts of the verse that I think are relevant to the particular point the Book seems to be making. There is a lively discussion in philosophy as to how important the context within which a text was produced should be in our understanding of that text. This is a general controversy of course but it has obvious ramifications here. Some philosophers think that only if one has a firm idea of the history behind a text will one have any chance of understanding it. To a degree that is surely correct. As has just been argued, texts have to be put in some sort of context before they become meaningful, and that context could easily be historical, and indeed tends to be when interpreting the Qur’an. The trouble is though that that history is very much disputed territory and one would not want to say that before you can understand a text you have to accept a particular narrative within which one sees that text as operating, since it is a

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slippery slope from there to suggesting that in order to understand a religious text properly one has to be a believer, or a non-believer. A believer understands from a personal point of view what it is to believe that the text actually comes from God, while a non-believer can view the text objectively since he or she has no personal commitment to its background. Both have been cited as approaches that ought to be taken, and it is worth noting that even if one agrees with either approach it is important to ask what sort of believer one might be, and what sort of non-believer. As we know, there are many varieties of belief, and indeed of non-belief, and a Marxist non-believer is likely to take up a very different position from some other kind of non-believer. But then of course there are just as many doctrinal differences between Marxists as between religious groups, so it would be important to make clear specifically where a writer was on that continuum, perhaps. Clearly, when we read a text, to a degree our personal point of view comes into how we regard it, since we are moved by words and link those up with personal experiences that have meaning for us. Many Qur’anic commentators have pointed out how various are the approaches of the Qur’an, the aim being to attract the widest possible audience and encourage them to embrace Islam, or revert to Islam, depending on the sort of language one wants to use. That is surely true, religions seek to address a wide constituency and adopt appropriate styles to do so: it is important that we understand how this is done. Styles are always important, whether the style of writing or the clothes we wear. But style is not everything, and behind the style is a proposition that can be variously presented: but there is only one proposition there, in just the same way that behind the different clothes that can be worn is a body. The body is not completely independent of the clothes since to a degree when certain sorts of style are fashionable we shape our bodies to fit in, or try to do so, but then fashion with respect to clothes is not about the truth. In religion, style is about how to present the truth, or what is seen as the truth, and so it should be possible to detach, to a degree, the proposition that is being presented from the presentation. It would be wrong to think this is always easy to do, or that it might not be a matter of dispute what the proposition actually is, but the characteristic feature of religion is that it sees itself as being about something that is true. We can discuss and indeed evaluate that proposition without getting too tangled up in issues of how it is being presented, when it was first made, who was the original audience and so on, or so it is argued here. Many philosophers, including many Islamic philosophers, when discussing religious texts work on this principle, and it is on that basis that this book has been written.



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How to use the Qur’an philosophically Thinkers use the Qur’an in a variety of ways. Those critical of Islam stress certain parts of the Book and argue that this shows what is objectionable in the religion of Islam. Muslims of course may use it differently. Some take it to show the way to solve longstanding theoretical issues, and this seems entirely reasonable. After all, it is the word of God, His final revelation, and one would expect it to be full of truths that can be used to end debate on a variety of dilemmas which up to then had perplexed thinkers. Yet it is not at all clear how this is supposed to work, despite the generally very flattering references that thinkers make to the Qur’an. How is a religious work to contribute to a theoretical discussion? The answer might just be that a believer should accept the religious text and be skeptical of the human. After all, religion comes from God and He should be treated as a more reliable source of information than some human thinker. He communicated the truth to us for our guidance, and is the creator of everything, so He knows how the universe is put together, since He did the work himself, and He also knows why it was done in the way it was. We have to try to work this out by examining what He did, but, however clever we might be, we are immediately at a disadvantage. So our role as thinkers in a world created by God is to use our intelligence and divine guidance to try to work out what the nature of reality is. This seems obvious, but the problem is how we blend the theory with the divine guidance. There are two different forms of logical expression here, and there is an issue as to how, like bills in Congress and the Senate, they are reconciled. This was an issue much addressed by the mashsha’i (Peripatetic) thinkers impressed with the methodology of Aristotle and his logical organon. Aristotle argued that different forms of expression follow different rules of presentation, but ultimately they are based on the same rational truth. There is an English expression, “horses for courses,” and it brings out the fact that particular horses do well on certain kinds of ground, even when all the horses in themselves may be equally fast. So for some contexts a rhetorical claim might be right, but would not work in a more academic setting, where a discursive argument of greater logical opacity would fit. To give an example, if I am at the theater and a fire breaks out, it might be better for me to get up and shout “Fire!” than get up and explain the principles behind the combustion of flammable objects and invite those present to observe the present instantiation of those principles. One discussion is

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more scientific and precise: the other contains the basic truth and succeeds in communicating it widely to the audience. At an academic conference of course the process might be reversed: science would be appropriate and rhetoric regarded as a very poor form of approach. As is often observed, the greater obscurity with which a thinker can present ideas the more highly that thinker will often be considered, very different from the situation where your aim is to empty out a public space as swiftly and safely as possible. Although mashsha’i thought has a good deal to say on this issue, it is not restricted to that philosophical tradition. It arises just as much in Sufi and Ishraqi thought. Any system of philosophy that has dichotomies such as zahir/batin (open/closed), tanzil/ta’wil (revelation/interpretation), dark/ light and so on is going to require some explanation of how you can get from one to the other. So, for example, there is a public side to prayer, and it is important for most religious thinkers that it is pursued, but there is also an internal aspect to the practice which some think represents its whole point and so is just as or even more important than the public behavior. These all represent different approaches to reality and we need some method of moving from one to the other. As Patrick Quinn says, “Philosophy in the best sense of the term and religious faith aim to find truth, that is, to see reality as it is” (2003: 183), and surely he is right here. But the question is not whether religion and philosophy try to describe the same reality, but how they do this, and what rules we have to accept to be able to move from one to the other. In far too much Islamic philosophy, and many other kinds of religious philosophy, Qur’anic phrases and secular philosophy play off against each other as though it were obvious what is going on. But often it is not, and in much modern religious philosophy scriptural passages and philosophy are thrown together in a way that might satisfy those enthusiastic about religion but would be very unhelpful for those seeking to preserve some discursive neutrality. The point is that using scripture only works for those who accept it as scripture and so coming from God: and even for those people there is the need for some argumentative process to convert the text into something that works with other kinds of writing. Otherwise, what we get is material that evokes in its pious readers a warm and cuddly feeling but does little to advance any sort of argument. In many ways writers from earlier periods were often far more sophisticated in their use of the varying languages of religion and philosophy than those in more recent times. They knew that an argument was required when mixing up the different languages, and they sometimes tried to provide it, although certainly not always. For one thing, they may well have



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expected their audience to know what the process of unpacking religious language involved. It is not complicated, it is just a matter of bringing the two languages together in such a way that they share a form, and generally this means extracting the logical kernel from religious language and using it alongside the logical language that philosophy provides. For example, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi introduces his autobiography by explaining the delays involved in its production. One of these was due to the need to keep some religious teachings secret (an allusion to 3:28 and its comment on taking precautions about who one associates with) and then he quotes 7:34 which speaks of life having an appointed time, the worry being that if one delays one may miss the opportunity to do what should be done (1999: 22). It is not difficult to see what is being argued here. First, we are told that one should be careful about what one says, since there are audiences who would not understand a frank representation of the truth, something that would certainly resonate well with an Isma‘ili audience. It would make sense to any audience, though, and alerts his readers to the fact that he is expressing himself in a way that seeks to take account of what they find acceptable. His use of 7:34 is again not a mystery: it suggests that there are times to do things and one should not perhaps wait forever before doing something which ought to be done, since then one would miss the right time. So we can see quite easily how unpacking these religious verses fits in nicely with the sort of argument that al-Tusi is presenting: nothing very demanding at this stage. He suggests that he did not write as he is doing now in the past because the time was not appropriate then, but is now, for such thoughts to be made public. Then, he could not express himself as freely as he can now, and so now he is presenting this material for consideration by a reading public. On the other hand, he is writing carefully so as not to raise the hackles of those who would be hostile to the ideas he is presenting. The point here is not that we need to explain what he is doing because it is so complex, since it is far from complex. What is important is the way in which he uses the Qur’an as more than a stylistic flourish: it actually comes into the structure of the argument that he is presenting. This is quite common as part of the introduction to a work in Islamic philosophy, since the author knew that he needed to do more than just wave the Qur’an around as though it is a talisman. He needs to use the text from the Book to develop and expand his argument. So later on, al-Tusi discusses the nature of the connection between the creator and His creation, and he wonders whether God might have used an angel to transmit the divine message in place of a man: and we are told that had He used an angel He would have

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had to transform him into a man and given him ordinary clothes to wear (6:9 refers to the problems of sending an angel, and suggests it would have caused confusion), perhaps because only someone like us can communicate with us. How can someone as spiritual and independent of matter as an angel be connected with our world? We are told: Glory be to your Lord, the Lord of honor, above what they describe (37:180). What does this notion of being superior actually mean, apart from its apparent role in a prayer-like phrase? It means, as al-Tusi goes on to explain, that God is beyond all the distinctions we make between one and many, real and relative, similar and different, the distinctions that characterize so much of our relationship with our world. God is the one “who gave everything its existence, then guided it” (20:50, which is taken to show that whatever we manage to succeed in is ultimately brought about by divine instruction and guidance, summed up by: He is the first and last, the manifest and the hidden; He has knowledge of all things (57:3) (al-Tusi 1999: 41). The point here has not been that al-Tusi’s argument is valid or otherwise, but that he uses the Qur’an as an organic part of his methodology. He quotes relevant passages and then explains the point he thinks they make, and argues for that point. This is one way in which the Book is used: perhaps the most useful way. On the other hand, some thinkers use the text in what often seems to be mainly a decorative manner. They know it is a good idea to use it, and quote from it, but their use does not really do much to show how that passage is employed in the argument. A third use is as a source of reflection, although here often the detail of the Qur’an does not actually intercede much in the workings of the argument. Before looking at how various thinkers use the Book, it is worth stressing that often a thinker uses it in all these ways at different times. It might be because he anticipates having different audiences, it might be because he does not sharply distinguish between these different forms of employment of the text, and it might be that it is entirely acceptable to use scripture in this variety of ways. It probably is the latter, but here we are interested in philosophical arguments, and if a text is used in distinct logical ways in a reasoning, this is something we should notice and question. Is it clear always how a Qur’anic text is being used? It is not: and this is a criticism that can be made of this book, that in going for direct quotations from the Qur’an and then discussing how they are used, I am ignoring that very large corpus of work which is in fact discussing the Qur’an, but not directly. Allusions to the Qur’an are an excellent way of communicating with an educated audience who can then congratulate themselves on



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picking up the reference, while a less knowledgeable audience may enjoy the text without knowing precisely where it comes from. I think, given the theological nature of what was written, it would have been unlikely that there were many readers who fell into the latter camp. So for example in al-Taftazani’s attack on Ibn al-‘Arabi ‘s philosophy, he makes a reference to the Fusus when he talks of what leads men astray and accuses the work of leading to rust on human hearts (the reference is to 83:14, Knysh 1999: 147). This is a good example of a Qur’anic phrase being used rhetorically, since its use does not actually contribute to any sort of argument, it is just an exercise in mudslinging. The text by al-Taftazani is very different from this. It is a well-argued and logical work, but the Qur’anic phrase here is being used in the introductory poem which obviously is not where the intellectual heavy lifting is going to take place anyway. In any case, it is worth pointing out that it is customary for Muslim writers to start and conclude their work with words praising God and His Prophet, often quoting the Qur’an to emphasize those verses that are in line with the particular direction that is to be taken by the author. For example, in Ankaravi’s Elucidation of Wisdom (Ankaravi 1996) there are references to God giving wisdom to whomsoever He wishes, which only those capable of understanding will grasp (2:269), and the implications of this are obvious. Verse 13:29 suggests they can anticipate a reward and 68:1 refers to the divine origins of writing and recording. Verse 38:20 talks about the importance of wisdom and sound judgment. Verses 53:17 and 57:3 praise the Prophet in a manner to emphasize his fair mindedness and impartiality, again setting out the sort of principles which the author looks for in a reader, with the suggestion being that a disapproving reader goes against the favorable qualities of the Prophet and is not someone intellectually able to benefit from what God can provide (Ankaravi 1996). There are other, indirect, uses of the Qur’an which are much more significant than this as part of the argument, and this is where an author keeps on developing Qur’anic themes but without necessarily directly mentioning the Book. After all, for many Muslims the Qur’an is such a basic part of their education, and indeed of the Arabic language as it has developed, that it is difficult to keep references to the Book out of many discussions, or so it would seem. I have tried to mention a few examples of this literary phenomenon so as not to miss entirely the ways in which the Qur’an is used indirectly here, but the emphasis is definitely on those texts that explicitly mention the Book, and they are the vast majority anyway. There is no reluctance on the whole to reference the Qur’an. On the contrary, it is often taken

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to be a very helpful thing both to attract a reading public and not to alarm it given some of the rather frightening things a writer may say. One might even use the expression “Qur’an-washing” here to suggest that philosophers sometimes use the Qur’an in order to give what they say a brighter image and disassociate their work from heterodox views. When Ian Netton writes about the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa’) he titles a section “The Cloak of the Qur’an” (1982: 78). As he comments: “The corpus of the Rasa’il is saturated with the Qur’an like a sponge and innumerable quotations bear witness to the Ikhwan’s deep familiarity with the basic scriptural text of orthodox Islam. In it the Ikhwan are able to find the source, or at least the justification, for many of their ideas” (ibid.: 79). But one suspects also that the Book is used to make what would otherwise be puzzling, or even shocking, claims more amenable to a Muslim readership that naturally relaxes and feels at home when the Qur’an is quoted. What this suggests is that we have to be careful about what we take to be happening when we see the Qur’an used in a philosophical text: it may not be all that it appears. On the other hand, as Netton points out, the quotations are not usually thrown in haphazardly: they are there to make a point as well as perhaps to show how a religious work such as the Qur’an can be regarded as full of theoretical ideas if one only knows how to look for them. We need to bear in mind here how religious texts work, and the variety of levels of thinking that they seek to approach in their style. Using the terms “cloak” and “washing” implies that an effort has been made to confuse or hide the real opinions of writers, and this is not at all the attitude that is being proposed here. There are many ways of conveying the truth, and religions are good at developing complex texts that do this, often working at a variety of different levels. There is no reason why Neoplatonic ideas should not be expressed in Qur’anic ways, and often they were, and the issues that arise in the former that might challenge some of the latter would not need to be resolved directly in the Qur’an itself. This is how any intellectual inquiry into religion operates, by examining the resources of the religion via some theoretical machinery and seeing what happens. Religions are inevitably flexible enough to survive such treatment, and Islam certainly is.

One text, different theories The Qur’an spends a long time telling its readers and listeners that it is not poetry, by which is probably meant not just poetry, although the style



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of some of it is certainly poetic. It has been used in poetry quite often. A prime example of course is Rumi’s Mathnawi, which is full of verses from the Qur’an, but it is worth noting many of those verses are slightly altered in order to fit the structure of the text, which is entirely poetic. What philosophy does is add another level of complexity to the examination of the text, and as readers often notice, some of the comments that philosophers make express a very different view of the text than most ordinary believers will possess. It is often said that contemporary philosophers no longer have the ability to communicate with the general public and that philosophy has become a very technical discipline. There is some truth in this; certainly in Europe since the time of Kant, when philosophers started earning their living by working within an institution like a university, they have been expressing themselves in more and more obscure and complicated ways, as though the level of difficulty of understanding their work is a measure of its quality. In the past, it is said, philosophers wrote more gracefully and with the ability to address a wider audience. Whatever the truth of this, it has to be said that philosophy is often difficult and has problems in communicating with everyone for the very good reason that it involves considering a reformulation of the material it is considering. For an analytic philosopher who is committed to some version of Neoplatonism, for example, the description that the Qur’an gives of creation has to be modified in some way to take account of the connections between the different levels of creation and how they relate to the ultimate creator. The latter in both systems is definitely just one, although the precise relationship between that one being and what emerges from its being is expressed in different ways. For the Neoplatonists, a process like emanation is the process that explains how you get from one thing to a variety, and this is a rational mechanism based on thought, and it is constant, persistent, and has no obvious starting point. According to this theory, there is a hierarchy of being, starting with just one thing. That one thing thinks about itself, and that leads to two things, the thinker and the object of thought, and then we have three things, those two plus the relationship they have with each other. This third thing in turn can be divided into three, and so on. The traditional theory of creation in Islam is not quite like that, although not incompatible with it, since it is expressed in a way that owes a good deal to the idea of human agency, where someone does something at a particular time, and after the action takes place there is a product. This is not the place to enter into the complications of the comparison between the two models of creation (Leaman 2002: 41–106; 2009b: 24–35) but it is worth noticing that the Neoplatonic

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account sometimes sees itself as an analysis of the Qur’anic account and is much more difficult to understand. Yet in the theory of emanation there is no intention or purpose in what happens apart from the logical unfolding of the links between different levels of being. This is certainly not how religion talks about creation, but perhaps as the philosophers might say, this is what the Qur’an meant but it had to express itself in more circuitous, yet simpler language in order to gain an audience which is not limited to philosophers. This is not just true of philosophy in the Peripatetic (mashsha’i) style but is even true of Sufi and Ishraqi thought. They also analyze the scriptural text in terms of their own theories, and those theories seek to explain what is really going on in the text. Sufism often sees the creation of the universe as stemming from God’s love of Himself, since the only thing someone of His status could find to love appropriately is Himself. Since God is beautiful and loves beauty, He created other beautiful things to contemplate, and out of this process the creation of the universe took place, in ways not unfamiliar to Neoplatonism. Like the Neoplatonist, the Sufi is enthusiastic about the idea of a hierarchy of being, with different levels of enlightenment existing en route to apprehension of phenomena close to God Himself. The language here is frequently very difficult, as is that in Ishraqi thought. Suhrawardi argues that creation is a process of overflow from the original Light of Lights, and the universe and all levels of existence are basically equivalent to varying degrees of light. His thesis that essence precedes existence, taken over from Ibn Sina, fits in well with this approach, since things can wait in limbo, as it were, since their essences are there, and all they need is the nudge to existence. The idea that everything is waiting for light to come and display it, to bring it on line, is a potent one, and fits in nicely with the idea that we can think about things without necessarily having to think of them as actually existing, so essence does seem to come before existence. Here we have three forms of analysis, none of which are necessarily that representative of their particular school of thought. Other Ishraqis take a different line from Suhrawardi: Mir Damad, for example, developed a complex theory of time according to which everything that God creates is both finite and eternal, eternal as derivative from Him but finite in their character in the world. The important thing to note here is that every way of analyzing a religious text (and all these philosophies link up with the Qur’an in one way or another) is going to translate it into another kind of statement, and that statement is going to set out what the religious text means in a way that might be inaccessible to many believers. There is nothing mysterious about this, in just the same way a scientist will analyze



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something we understand in an ordinary way, but in a manner we cannot grasp, unless we are scientists, and indeed a particular type of scientist at that. We shall be producing many such forms of analysis in this book, and the arguments on which they rest. It must be borne in mind though that sometimes we might be a bit cynical about whether the thinker is really addressing the Qur’an at all, as opposed to finding some scriptural excuse for delving into a topic that interests him. Just because the Qur’an is used does not mean that it is being really addressed. We need to be alert to the different styles that are present in dealing with the Book in philosophy and what those styles have to tell us about whether the comments made are really about the Qur’an at all.

Using the Qur’an to attack enemies The Qur’an is often used in a rather aggressive manner. For example, in his Faysal al-tafriqa (Ghazali 2002a) al-Ghazali starts by comparing himself as he suffers the insults of his critics to the Prophet responding to his pagan opponents. They set out to oppress him but if God had willed it they would have been rightly guided (6:35). They reject evidence of the truth of what they are told (15:15, 6:7), and we should not be surprised at this since they generally reject the truth and would do so, unless God wished otherwise, even if they were addressed by angels and the dead (6:111). These objectionable people are apparently obsessed with money, local rulers, and their own baser nature. As a result, they have failed to prepare their minds for illumination so that they shine like the lamp mentioned at 24:35 and al-Ghazali suggests that the appropriate response is that recommended to the Prophet by God: Keep your distance from those who turn away from Our reminder and seek only the goods of this world. This is the limit of their knowledge, your Lord understands who wanders from the path, and He knows well who follows the way of truth (53:29-30). So people who disagree with al-Ghazali are compared to those who reject the Qur’an! Yet al-Ghazali often talks much more usefully of references in the Qur’an to things like light, or the preserved tablet (85:22), the throne, the chair and the divine pen (68:1, 96:4), which use these ideas as part of the argument and which do not always identify them precisely, since the assumption is that everyone will know what they mean. On the other hand, he takes on board the idea that one has to expect prophets to use metaphor (mithal) in their use of such ideas, since most people can only cope with their exoteric

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form. Al-Ghazali is going to try in his Ihya’ project to explore behind this to the internal meanings behind the exterior form (sura). This series of books was designed to encourage a revival of Islam, a renewed enthusiasm for its central principles, by talking about what he takes the essence of the religion is, to show how exciting and important it is. There have always been books that set out to describe the heart or essence of Islam, and of course, the Qur’an, and these books try to use the latter as a way of presenting the former. They continue to appear and generally settle on what they argue are a few key verses in the Book, and then they read the Book through the prism of those key verses. How plausible such a project is will, in each individual case, have to be left to the reader, but it is a very tempting project. It is also easily indulged in by those hostile to Islam: a few verses may be isolated and shown to be what the Book and consequently Islam is all about. This is a very popular strategy for Islamophobes, and it has its equivalent by those seeking to advocate Islam, who instead of highlighting particular verses, which are taken to be problematic, emphasize those that immediately look positive and cozy. What we need to do in religion is consider a whole variety of verses and see how they relate to each other in producing a composite and complex view. When he is poking fun at Ibn Sina’s theory that God can only know propositions that are unchanging, al-Shahrastani uses the aya “it is no longer the moment to flee” (38:3). According to Ibn Sina, when God perceives an eclipse, this is a particular event, but its coming about is a result of a process which God himself has set going and which has a logic which He alone entirely understands, since of course He has created it and has privileged access to it. Ibn Sina claims that God then knows this particular event, but in a universal way. Al-Shahrastani disapproves of this argument, and uses the phrase from the Qur’an to illustrate this. He goes on to quote “And he for whom God makes no light, is without light” (24:40) when trying to generate a paradox of whether divine knowledge is active or passive (2009: 71). He moves on to using all kinds of religious language and quoting again from the Book (34:3, 10:61, 20:7, 23:92, 40:19, 6:103, 67:14) to suggest that the distinction between the particular and the universal is subsumed in divinity anyway, so it is not an issue. He goes on to quote “Does He not know what He creates? And He is the subtle, the aware” (67:14; 2009: 73) as though this shows anything at all. It is a rhetorical flourish, as when he says, “Blessed be the name of your Lord, owner of majesty and honor” (55:78; 2009: 88) when dealing with the existence of contingent things in the world.



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Al-Shahrastani points out that we refer to a number of different ways in which contingent facts can be created and caused, and ignores the precise way in which Ibn Sina tries to analyze these relationships into just one type of logical nexus. Now, he might well be right in thinking that there are problems with Ibn Sina’s approach, but he does not establish that through argument, nor, more importantly here, does his use of the Qur’an do anything at all to show what if anything is wrong with Ibn Sina. According to the latter, following a general principle of the Peripatetic thinkers going back at least to al-Farabi (c. AH 259–339/c. 870–950 ce), beneath the varied examples of language lies a deep logical grammar that expressed the real meaning of all those types of language, since it represents the rational structure behind the language. Ibn Sina certainly knows that the Qur’an refers to God as a knower of everything and he tries to show how this is possible given the fact that, in his view, it is problematic for an unchanging deity to possess changing knowledge (Leaman 2002: 130–43; 2009b: 37–9). A similar entirely rhetorical approach is to be found at the end of one of Ibn Tumart’s theological addresses. He quotes 9:123: You who believe, fight the disbelievers near you and let them find you standing firm. Be aware that God is with those who are mindful of Him (1903: 265). His argument, or rather suggestion, is that those who disagree with him have the rank of disbelievers and God approves of those who stand against them. Using the Qur’an as a way of characterizing those who do not share one’s view in a negative light is not really to use it in a way that is respectful for what it contains. Like all major religious texts, it is balanced and contains a variety of material, and quoting a verse at random to besmirch those with whom one disagrees does little to represent the Qur’an accurately. Nor does it help in showing how to use a religious text as part of a philosophical argument.

Integrating the Qur’an into the argument Ibn Rushd starts the very small book called the “Decisive Treatise” (Fasl al- maqal) by trying to discover a legal principle according to which philosophical reasoning is obligatory for Muslims (Ibn Rushd 1961). Many of his opponents suggested that Islam, and indeed the Qur’an, proscribes philosophy as an objectionable activity. The verses 59:2, 7:185, 6:75, 88:17-18, 3:191 seek to establish the significance of nazar or theoretical

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reflection, although whether this really means philosophy is of course precisely the issue. His argument is that the Qur’an is complimentary about rational thought, in the sense that it encourages us to seek a pattern in nature and this naturally leads us to think of its purpose and direction. The Book goes on to suggest we think of its creator and the necessity that exists for it to have a creator given its form and contents. Ibn Rushd jumps in here and suggests that if the Book recommends rational thought, and if the best rational thought is discursive thought, the sort of thought advocated by philosophers, then it follows that the Qur’an is in favor of philosophy. Whatever one thinks of this argument, it has to be admitted that Ibn Rushd is using the Qur’an in more than an illustrative manner. Ibn al-‘Arabi criticizes him for relying only on reason, and argues that a wider concept of how to work philosophically would be very advantageous, and of course the Qur’an does not settle this point. It makes many approving comments on reason and derivatives of the concept, but that does not mean that it validates any particular form of reasoning. If there are alternatives, then what the Qur’an has to say about reflection may include them as well. The argument over this issue will include passages from the Qur’an: but will it be decided on the basis of those passages? It is not difficult to construct an argument and then use scripture to flesh out the argument as it were, to relate it to the religious text by including what look like relevant passages. After all, the difference between a pie and a cherry pie are the cherries. This might sound cynical, but the use of religion in philosophy is often far from organic. In some cases, religious passages are chosen just because there was the feeling that some religious passages need to be chosen, and not because they have to be used for the argument to work. Here Ibn al-‘Arabi has a tremendous apparent advantage over Ibn Rushd’s approach, since he emphasizes the use of paradoxes in religion, and that allows for a very varied selection of scriptural passages that do not have to aim at a particular conclusion. That process is regarded as being narrowly rational and does not allow for what we can know through other means, in particular through our hearts, through what we can know through imagination. These are important sources of information for what he regards as the hidden aspect of reality, which we can acquire to a degree, but not through reason. We shall see in what follows some of the ways in which he argues to make this point, but it is worth noting here that his approach gives him great scope to use a vast variety of Qur’anic passages. There is no doubt that he does this throughout many of his writings, and impressive though it is, one might ask whether the Qur’an is supporting his position, or does his



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position mean that almost anything in the Book can be used as an aide? This is not a criticism but rather an indication that different types of philosophy may call for a different marshaling of religious verses to support or illustrate the argument. So perhaps there is not just one way to link philosophy with religion, and if we see it being done in a way which does not seem to make much sense, it could be that the theory being employed is one which has a different view of how to carry out this sort of operation. Mulla Sadra starts his Book of Metaphysical Penetrations by saying that he is going to argue on the basis of faith in God and the last day, the sort of faith that is produced in souls by demonstrative knowledge, together with divine verses, and that this approach avoids the problems of philosophy and theology. His approach is both spiritual and logical, or so he claims, and clearly, the verses will have to work as more than just rhetorical flourishes in the approach to establishing conclusions from them. In fact, he turns epistemology into a kind of ontology. He argues that the intellect is the form of the body and is separate from matter, the closest thing in existence to God. Only through knowledge can we become an illuminated substance (jawhar nurani), and this is the source of everything good about us. It transforms the animal into the angel, the dark into the light, the lowest into the highest, and the one who had been imprisoned in the lowest depths (Sijjin) into one who soars to the most exalted heights (‘Illiyin), a reference to 83:7-8, and two terms for the lowest level of hell and the highest level of heaven. This knowledge turns the heart into a luminous star (reference to 24:35) which gives light to the inhabitants of heaven and earth, brings the dead back to life, and which advances before and to the right of the believers (57:12) on the day of judgment (Met Pen, 15–16). It is not difficult to see how these Qur’anic verses fit into the sort of theoretical approach he is advocating, but do they do more than illustrate the ideas which Mulla Sadra establishes by other methods? By “other methods” is meant by argument from one concept to the other where the Qur’an is not part and parcel of the process itself. In the Second Penetration he starts to analyze the concept of wujud or existence, and he denies it is a genus, a species, or an accident since it is not a universal or general term. It is undefinable and is something only known to those who are “firm in knowledge” (3:18). He identifies it with the sort of mercy “which embraces everything” (7:156). The first and most real wujud is different and has no essence, no definition, “and all faces will be humbled before the Ever-Living, the Self-Subsistent” (20:111). Again, it is relevant to ask what the aya or verse does for the argument. He follows these remarks by

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an extensive logical analysis of existence, which the translator has kept in its Arabic form of wujud, and then in the Seventh Penetration he returns to aya 7:156 and the idea of an extended existence that, as it were, embraces everything, like divine mercy, but is not like a universal or generalization. This is a useful example from the Qur’an, since something that comes from God and affects everything may not be a universal, although it is applied universally. But then he says it “is the principle of the universe, its life and its light, and penetrates into all that there is” (Met Pen, 44–5). Its relationship to God is like the relationship of light to the sun, a familiar image of the Ishraqi School of philosophy. Does the aya really advance the argument, though? Mulla Sadra claims at the start of the book to be basing it on both reasoning and the Qur’an, and some of the other Islamic sciences such as hadith and quotations from ‘Ali also crop up. Perhaps the combination of reason (burhan mantiqi) and scripture makes up what he calls burhan mashriqi, oriental wisdom, which he thinks is better than just logical reason. Or perhaps this oriental reasoning is entirely religious, but that makes it difficult to understand why Mulla Sadra spends so much time on what are after all perfectly respectable logical arguments. We are bound to ask: What is the difference between a logical argument, and a logical argument that comes from the East? After all, and to show that others can use ayat in philosophical debate, are we not told at 2:115: To God belong the East and the West; wherever you turn, there is the Face of God? Mulla Sadra refers to a type of knowledge that Nasr translates as heart knowledge. It is taken to be related to the Qur’an in passages such as 2:269 and 3:7 and there are eighteen references in the Book to it overall. This is an aspect of the very special form of knowledge that he wants to advocate, and which he argues is superior to knowledge that comes from ratiocination alone. The important thing about the heart in the philosophical language of the time is that it involves both reasoning and something extra, something that constitutes knowledge and also the individuality of the knower himself, but not in a way that involves subjectivity. Whatever we think of this notion, it is not too much of a stretch to see Mulla Sadra’s use of the Qur’an as, on the whole, helpful in trying to establish its nature. The religious verses suggest to him areas of investigation that should be pursued, hint at the sorts of issues that require deeper exploration, and as such they work in tandem with philosophical reasoning. That does seem to be, in most cases, how religion and philosophy works in his thought. It has to be said though that it is often not clear what precisely is going on at the argumentative level, and readers should be aware throughout that the use of a thrilling



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religious passage may do little for the reasoning, although a good deal for the emotions.

Using religion in philosophy Some authors use the Qur’an so much that it is difficult to distinguish between their own thoughts and that of the Book in many places. For example, Salim ibn Dhakwan, the Ibadi thinker, before he gets to his actual theological attack on the Murji’i and the Khawarij, quotes or paraphrases the Book at least 150 times in a relatively short work, but then this is not philosophy but definitely theology, although it does raise a number of philosophical issues. The translators of his work use a nice expression for his style, Quranicity, which captures it exactly (Dhakwan 2001: 27). This approach of using verses from the Qur’an in a sort of scattergun approach is quite common with philosophers: it must be a constant temptation and appear to be an easy way of establishing appropriate Islamic credentials in an environment where something is being done that could look dubious from a religious point of view. This is not just an issue for Islamic philosophy, but for all philosophy that deals with religion. The significant question is what the Qur’an and other Islamic writings actually do, apart from enliven the text. There is such a variety of material available that no philosopher will have difficulty in finding and using what she, or more usually he, wants. This is no criticism of the religious material; it has a part to play in the Islamic sciences, and we know well the sorts of rules of debate and evidence that are used when that material is being used, but it is very different from philosophy. Here al-Farabi had a good point that was well taken by earlier thinkers in both the Islamic and Jewish worlds. You cannot simply combine different types of discourse as though you are making soup and hope the different ingredients go together successfully. A theory is needed. The mashsha’i (Peripatetic) philosophers did have a theory that commentators often mock for its closeness to Aristotle, but it is quite clear in its structure. Different kinds of language each have their own level of logical exactness, and while we are within one of those types of language we know precisely what the rules are. So when we are creating or reciting poetry, for example, we know what the point of the activity is, and it is different from doing theology. All forms of language contain some sort of argument, albeit some contain very little (poetry) and some a lot (philosophy). These different kinds of language

may all be connected with each other through those arguments, since it is something they all share. The philosophers are the best at doing this, they argued, hardly surprisingly, since they are good at working with arguments and understanding their varied characteristics. Bringing into the argument Islamic sources immediately raises the question of how the religious content links up with the philosophy. Often this is not seen as a problem and this is why so much religious debate seems arbitrary. Thinkers take a religious statement or two, combine it with a similar number of philosophical principles, and may end up with any sort of conclusion at all and claim that that is the position of Islamic (or Christian, Jewish and so on) philosophy, or even the religion. This is a real danger in the use of scripture and philosophy together: it encourages lazy thinking, pompous pronouncements, and basically very poor reasoning. It often results in statements that sound very impressive and moving, yet really have very little intellectually behind them. I have tried to select passages in the next chapter that encourage readers to interrogate the text and see how well grounded or otherwise its use might be in rational argument.

4 Qur’anic Verses and Philosophical Responses In this chapter various passages from the Qur’an will be examined, starting at the beginning and going towards the end. Thinkers will be discussed who directly quote those passages and the philosophical significance of what they say will be the main focus. Sometimes the passages will be discussed by only the author of this book. Links will be made in many of the passages to other passages, so that readers are encouraged to see how arguments develop and change throughout the Qur’an. As has been pointed out earlier in the book, what we have here is nothing like the amount of discussion which each passage deserves, and they all of course have far wider meaning than merely philosophical. The aim of this chapter is quite limited and it is to bring out something of the philosophical flavor of the Qur’an and to encourage readers to engage with its arguments and some of the leading thinkers who produced them. Each passage here is identified in terms of the chapter or sura and verse or aya in this way – sura:aya. A list of passages discussed can be found in the appendix at the end of this chapter.

1:1-7 1 2 3 4 5 6

In the name of God, full of compassion, ever compassionate Praise to the Lord of all creation Full of compassion, always compassionate Master of the day of determination You alone do we worship, from you alone do we seek help Guide us to the path of true direction

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7 The path of those whom you favor Not of those who cause you anger Nor of those who took the path of deviation. Ibn al-‘Arabi refers to the fatiha (opening) in his Meccan Openings (Futuhat al-makiyya) when he talks about three levels of sincerity. The first is the sincerity of the masses, which is a matter of deeds (aya 5). The more sophisticated combine deeds with words, the second half of the aya. Higher than both these groups are those who are both observant and alert to the meaning of what they do, but are also patient (103:3). In his analysis of the text, he refers to part of it, the third aya, which refers to the Day of Judgment and so confirms our status as dependent on God, while the fourth aya calls for divine help, and only from that source, thus emphasizing His oneness and omnipotence. The end of the sura refers to the significance of the path on which God will guide us, and Ibn al-‘Arabi notes that there are five different paths mentioned in the Qur’an using the term sirat. Some are paths we can aspire to travel on while others are far beyond most human beings, and are only available to perfect people, and the path he has in mind here is the path that God Himself used to create us. He descends on this path, and ordinary people can of course get nowhere near it, but perfect people through their identity with God can travel on it in the sense that God travels on it, and they are identical with Him. Does that mean that they are the same as God? Certainly not, but they are created in the divine image, and as such are linked with God. All human beings are created in God’s image, but these special people actually live up to that description and so to a degree they share in what God does and where He goes. So in a sense they travel on the same path (SD, 133). As so often with Him it is a matter of balancing different directions in which we may want to go, and not excluding contrary routes. God discloses Himself in the universe, and this is not just an event that can be calmly accepted: Moses fell down when God disclosed Himself to him (7:143), even though He did not directly disclose Himself to him, but via a mountain that He destroyed. To a certain extent our awareness of the world around us provides us with evidence of God, and that is in line with the problematic principle of tashbih, making similarities of God with the world. However, we have to be very careful of identifying God with nature and should dissociate Him from such a relationship, tanzih, yet it would be an error to distinguish Him so radically from nature that we come to the conclusion that He has nothing to do with it at all.



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The fatiha is often called the Qur’an in miniature, since it discusses monotheism, prophecy, and the afterlife. These are the main themes of the Qur’an as a whole. Mustansir Mir, whose translation appears above (Mir 2008: 16–17), says it has the scope of a logical argument. The text notes the order and harmony of the universe, attributes it to a creator, and accepts that thanks are due to such a being. God the creator does not have to be so considerate, and as a result we know He must be compassionate and merciful. Since God does things for us, we are expected to do things that He finds agreeable and He will in any case judge us at some point. We need to serve Him and only Him. We need direction to the straight path, how He wants us to behave. The speaker of the verse commits himself or herself to following that path. How close is this to a logical argument? It does set out some of the arguments that are going to be presented in the Qur’an, so it is more a list of future arguments. It should be said right now that if it is an argument then it is not very powerful in itself. The fact that the world has a certain shape does not in itself tell us anything about the nature of its creator, if it had a creator. Why should we thank a creator unless we thought He had done something for us, and even if He has it does not follow that He has a particular character. On the other hand, one can see in the fatiha many of the themes that will arise again and again in the Book, so it sets out nicely some of the basic principles waiting to be established.

2:3-4 Who believe in the unseen and are steadfast in prayer; who spend from what We gave them; who believe in what was sent to you and what was sent before you, and in the life to come. An account of the people who are said to be conscious of God, which it is worth noting does not seem to be restricted to those in a particular religion. The spending is probably a reference to charity.

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2:6-7 It is the same whether or not you warn them; they will not believe. God has set a seal upon their hearts and ears; their sight is dimmed ... These unfortunate people will be punished in the hereafter. It is worth noting that it is not the evildoers who are mentioned in contrast with those who have faith, but rather the unbelievers, and they are accused of ignorance and obtuseness as their most serious offenses. This emphasizes how important knowledge is in the Qur’an, where epistemology has a definite moral flavor. The Qur’an suggests that: God chooses whom He will for His total grace (2:105), which fits in nicely with the idea that we need to work out what we should believe in, and if we do not then at least God may forgive us. After all, He created us in a particular way that involves His knowing what we are going to do, but that does not mean that we have no choice at all in the matter. Perhaps within the parameters that He has set for our behavior and intentions there is room for us to make independent choices, and also of course for Him to forgive us when we make the wrong choices. The monotheists of other religions are generally not included in the term “believer,” but neither are they always classified as “unbelievers.” The Qur’an sometimes defines evil as unbelief and sometimes as wrongdoing, although on one thing there is no ambiguity and that is that in general the virtuous, and the believers, where they are different, are rewarded, while the evil and the unbelievers are punished. It might be wondered how fair this is given that we are told that God has a part to play in who believes and who does not. It could be that what God does is ensure that bad people who lack faith do not wriggle out of their eventual punishment by suddenly changing their mind, for prudential reasons. God of course knows what His creatures are going to do and so He is not surprised when they behave poorly. This may seem to compound the problem, since if God always knew they were going to disbelieve, were they ever free to believe? The reference to hard hearts and deaf ears is an indication of divine foreknowledge. Since the individual being has the capacity to change his conduct, he can be called a free person though, according to al-Ghazali, the change in some persons is constrained either due to their ignorance or their reliance in the sense of dependency on their physical nature. In case of the former, change is possible if the person is guided and acquires the right sort



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of information, while for the latter due to hardness of the corrupted heart the situation is pretty hopeless. God refers to such people in this verse at 2:7. However, instruction, exhortation, education, and self-discipline are pointless unless we can act freely. It is because of the capacity for human freedom that we can talk about spiritual progress, which means progression from the material self (nafs al- ammara) to the reproaching self (nafs al-lawwama) and from this to the self at peace (an-nafs al-mutma’ina) (Winter 2001). The first stage of self is often entirely evil, the notion being of someone overpowered by passion. Reason has little effect and we often ignore the distinction between different kinds of souls. The Qur’an calls this low self al-nafs al-ammara. Rumi identifies it with hell (Rumi 1950: 61). The second stage—the reproaching self—is the precarious stage between good and evil in which we are in constant struggle. We are pulled between acting well and the reverse. The important thing about this stage is that it is self-conscious, hence the use of the term for reproaching. The third stage is constantly good and is marked by a raised consciousness. Here we act according to the principles of reason and so manage to overcome the tendency to do evil. At this stage, the destructive qualities are transcended and replaced with qualities that are more positive. We transcend the first two stages and the higher self, which is what we really are, becomes in charge of us and our character. The Qur’an calls it, as we have seen, al-nafs al-mutma’ina (McKane 1962). According to al-Ghazali each self is lined up with a type of world—the physical world (‘alam al-mulk), the mental world (‘alam al-jabarut), and the spiritual world (‘alam al-malakut). The way this works is that impressions and ideas affect our senses and the human heart. This makes the shift in heart from one state to the other: whatever the heart intends or resolves that first comes to it as thought and then leads to human action. By nature, the heart is in between angelic and satanic influences, and can be affected by either. The divine element is guided by reason (al-‘aql) while the satanic element is guided by our feeling. When they are brought under the control of reason, the heart becomes susceptible to angelic influences. We can develop and improve our own character, we can act, but not everything is under our control. The impressions and ideas that motivate us to will and act come to us from outside of us and impinge themselves on our character. However, when the impressions (al-khawatir) are translated into action we can make a choice (ikhtiyar) and so to that extent we are free. Our hearts do not have to remain sealed and it is possible for them not to be sealed in the first place (Nakamura 1994: 29–46).

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In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, the soul (al-nafs) is a single reality with various faculties and functions. Through the process of transubstantial motion (al-haraka al-jawhariyya) the soul which first appears as the body (al-jism) becomes the vegetative soul (al-nafs al-nabatiyya), then the animal soul (al-nafs al-hayawaniyya), and finally the human soul (al-nafs al-insaniyya). These various degrees or stages of development are considered to occur from within the substance of the original “body.” Through the process of transubstantial motion, the soul travels through the various levels or degrees of being until it finally attains complete independence of all matter and change and is able to attain immortal life. Thus, for Mulla Sadra although the human soul is brought into being with the body, it possesses spiritual subsistence which through the process of transubstantial motion enables it to attain a level of being which is completely independent of the body (Morris 1981: 137, 139).

2:22 … through which He brought forth fruits for your provision … According to al-Baydawi, God could create without intermediate causes, but it is much easier for us to understand the world and its links with the next world if we think in terms of causes and effects (Anwar, 1:37). So the system we have is one where we can observe phenomena linked together in terms of causes and effects, although in reality the only real cause is God. It would be very difficult for us to live in a world in which there was no perceptible connection between things, and even if we do not know what that connection is, we benefit from living in an environment where it is sensible to seek such connections and (eventually) find them. Al-Razi’s comment on 2:22 (Mafatih, 2:111) suggests that the connection between sickness, medicine, and health mirrored the connection between our obligations, good deeds, and reward. He sees this passage as one of the many that refer to divine organization in providing us with an environment suitable for us to live and prosper, and the idea is that the divine source of the design is something we could work out for ourselves if we look at nature in the right sort of way. This is not an infrequent assertion in Islamic philosophy and theology, and it does suggest a strong perceived connection between reason and Islam.



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2:23 And if you are in doubt about what We send down to Our servant, bring a chapter like it and bring your witnesses before God, if you are honest. The verse after this comments that you will never be able to do it. Al-Shahrastani is not happy with the traditional ways of arguing for this proposition, which is that the Qur’an must be a miracle since nothing like it will ever appear. It is a miracle because it goes against what could be produced naturally, i.e., not by God. Al-Shahrastani claims that we cannot tell what might be produced naturally since there are an infinite number of events in nature and we are not in a position to examine them all. He also suggests that as a challenge it is rather weak since how do we know that everyone has heard it and tried to respond? These are not very strong challenges, but a stronger one that he produces is that the grounds for the inimitability thesis are various. Some base it on style, others on content, and then people disagree about precisely what features establish the Qur’an’s perfection. He makes a good point here but his argument for the miraculous nature of the text is no more convincing, in fact less. He suggests that the basic formula “there is no god but God and Muhammad is his prophet” is miraculous, and since it is at the heart of the Qur’an it follows that the latter is miraculous. No one can deny the truth of the shahada, although they could try to deny it, but not sincerely set out to refute it (Mayer 2014: 1–41). This is such a poor argument, and annoyingly Shahrastani is contemptuous of many other thinkers who actually offer serious arguments in favor of their conclusions. Even the mutakallimun who offer competing explanations of the miraculousness of the Qur’an present more plausible arguments than this, and the fact that there is a variety of arguments does not show that they are all invalid, just that there is a variety of views (Leaman 2004a: 141–64).

2:25 “This is what we were provided with before …” The food in the next world is similar (mutashabih) to what we are used to in our world. Ibn ‘Abbas, the companion of the Prophet and his first successor as leader of the Islamic community, suggests in a well-known hadith that

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this world shares nothing with the next world except the names of things. But in that case, the only thing that is similar is independent of the actual objects themselves, and so the name tells us nothing apart from the fact that whatever the thing is, it is nothing like the thing referred to in this world. Ibn al-‘Arabi extends this point (SD, 172–3) to argue that unless you know the real thing to which the similarity is said to obtain, it is impossible to say how far it is similar and of course we cannot know God or aspects of the next world while in this world. He uses the example of the chameleon – we can tell how far the colors of the animals are like the colors it is trying to blend in with since we can see what it is trying to blend in with. We have access to both sides of the relationship, which we cannot when we are thinking about the next world, not at least while we are alive in this world. The point of having a material example in the view of the falasifa is that for most people matter is important and so we will only be able to form an idea of the next world as a pleasant or unpleasant place if we can think of it in material terms. What it will be like may be very different and for the philosophers is not as important as is the conveying of the idea that what we do in this world has consequences which stretch farther than just this world, and whatever works for most people represents the sort of language that should be used. Clearly, analogy, metaphor, parable, and simile are then going to be important forms of language that will have to be used.

2:26 God has no qualms about using a similitude of things, from the lowest to the highest … God does not hesitate to strike a similitude even of a gnat, or whatever is above it. As al-Jahiz points out, the gnat is perfectly designed for its task and can destroy tyrants (Jahiz 1958: 3:303–4). This is evidence of the design that the world is based on, and of its supernatural author. A theme of the Qur’an is how all animals, even very small and apparently insignificant, have a role to play and are obviously not there haphazardly but as part of a plan. A sign of Solomon’s wisdom is that he can speak to the animals: an impressive achievement and not just a trick. It suggests he understands the detail of the divine plan (see also 27:16).



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2:30 (see also 38:26, 6:165, 10:14, 10:73, 35:39, 27:62) “I am setting on the earth a vicegerent [khalifa] …” This refers to the trust between God and humanity which so annoyed the angels initially. As Nasr points out (1993: 134), we are the servants of God, need to do what He tells us He wants us to do, and are in charge of the natural world, in so far as we are in charge of anything. Therefore, we need to be active and take responsibility for our own actions and their consequences. It is incumbent on us, he argues, to look after the world and all its creatures and resources: only in this way will we flourish, since it will accord with how God wants us to act. Verses 22:65 and 7:172 do not really support his claim, though: the first refers to people being put in charge of the natural world and the second to the original compact between humanity and God, which does not actually suggest that we have a responsibility to look after our environment. It refers to judgment but not for what, and the obvious interpretation is just for our general moral conduct. This might of course include what we do in and to the environment, but more argument is needed to establish the Qur’an-based nature of such a duty. The angels in this aya respond to God: “Will you put someone there who will cause corruption and shed blood while we celebrate You and call You holy.” He said: “Surely I know what you know not.” Kashani suggests (Heart, 217) that this is part of a process whereby human beings have bodies in order to participate in the world and interact with other creatures. We may easily be tempted in the wrong direction: “Our Lord, make not our hearts swerve after You have guided us” (3:8). Some people “incline towards the earth” (7:176) and “their hearts become hard” (57:16). Concentrating too much on the material aspect of life could be seen as falling foul of the instruction not to go to extremes (2:143), and for the Sufis (who perhaps sometimes go rather far in their avoidance of the physical aspects of life) matter often seems to be something we ought to transcend if we can. Some Isma‘ilis take this verse not to apply to God as is generally taken to be the case but rather an imam or spiritual leader, and the angels are not really angels but the top echelon of people in the Temple of Light (Corbin 1983: 82).

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2:31 He taught Adam the names, all of them … Once the perfect human being had all the names, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi, his form became perfect and this brings together the universe and the real (Futuhat, 3:118). He is a barzakh between the universe and the real, the place where they meet and yet maintain their distinctiveness (1993: 17). The barzakh is a barrier where things that would otherwise mingle with each other and become just one thing maintain their own form (23:99-100, 25:53, and 55:19-20). His form is a mirror of both humanity and also the universe (Shaikh 2012: 75–7). Its existence is evidence of the power of God since the barzakh could not exist naturally.

2:34 And behold we said to the angels “Bow down to Adam” and they bowed down. Not Iblis, he refused, and was arrogant and was of those who are unbelievers. See also 38:75-6, and several other verses make a similar point: It is We Who created you and gave you shape; then We bade the angels bow down to Adam, and they bowed down; not so Iblis; He refused to be of those who bow down. …. “What prevented you from bowing down when I commanded you?” He said: “I am better than he: You created me from fire, and him from clay.” … “Go down from here: it is not for you to be arrogant: get out, for you are of the lowest.” (7:11-13) Behold! We said to the angels: “Prostrate before Adam”: They prostrated except Iblis: He said, “Shall I prostrate to one whom You created from clay?” He said: “Do You see? This is the one whom You have honored above me! If you will leave me alone until the Day of Judgment, I will surely bring his descendants under my control, except for a few.” (17:61-2)

Iblis says he is better than human beings since he is created from fire and they only from clay. The first act against humanity was his refusal to respect us and so we have the construction of a dichotomy of good vs. evil, but evil



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is not something inherent in the world, rather it is opposed to the natural order of things. That order is established by God and anything or anyone who opposes it is clearly on the wrong side of the moral equation. Could Iblis have been proud as well as a believer? Surely believers differ in their humility, and perhaps he was capable of belief but not of an appropriate level of humility. This suggestion would be difficult to justify in Qur’anic terms. The Book emphasizes throughout the significance of submission to the will and word of God, and pride is the opposite of that (Leaman 2014: 108–10). Pride is the belief in one’s own independence and value, something that the Qur’an is adamant is completely incompatible with faith. So Iblis’ pride is his undoing: it is mentioned before the reference to his lack of faith and should be understood as a sufficient condition of it. It is difficult to regard him as an unbeliever since he has personal knowledge of God and His attributes, so he believes in God. He just does not manage to realize the implications that knowledge should have for his behavior, i.e., obedience (Saud 2013: 47). Satan’s refusal to prostrate himself to Adam was not induced by monotheism and love for God; rather, it was due to arrogance and pride, or that at least is how it is represented. The implication is that a prime motive for disbelief is thinking yourself capable of deciding by yourself what you will think and do. It could well be linked with shirk or idolatry, associating others with God, where the association here is with one’s own ideas, represented as coming from Satan. It is not difficult to see how this can be extended to philosophy, the idea that it represents a way of coming to know that is in opposition to faith. After all, it advocates a source of knowledge and reason that is apparently independent of religion and may appear to produce contrary conclusions.

2:35 And we said, “O Adam, you and your wife can live in the garden, and eat as much as you like of what you find there, but do not come close to this tree or you will become transgressors.” But we are told in the next aya that Satan encouraged them to disobey, which led to their banishment from this pleasant location. As Andrew

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Rippin put it: “Among [Satan’s] tools to do this [viz., misguide people] are several vocal attributes: He calls (Q 31:21), simply speaks (Q 14:22; 59:16), promises (Q 2:268), and whispers (Q 7:20; 20:12, see also 50:16; 104:4-5 for more subtle ways of communication)” (2001: 526). The outcome is that God sent them down (that expression is used at 2:36), and into the world, and along with this comes the idea of an order of existence, with a higher and a lower, and where we live is definitely lower down morally at least and perhaps also in terms of what we can know than was the case for the first human beings. At 2:38 the going down idea is repeated, but it is softened by the fact that divine guidance will nonetheless be available, and at 2:36 there is a mention also of the possibility of finding a livelihood on the earth. This is also a good example of how when God punishes mercy is still available, mentioned at 2:37. Although it is often said that there is no original sin in Islam, it is not difficult to see these passages as just such a doctrine. On the other hand, God may have forgiven them to the extent of continuing to send messengers to their descendants, and also providing guidance for them. It is not at all clear how much choice they had in disobeying God: it often seems that Satan forced them to approach the forbidden tree and then the dire consequences of that action followed—whether they could have resisted Satan is a moot point. Surely God knew what they were going to do and allowed Satan to influence them, since it is certainly within His power to change both actions, and presumably what happened was what God expected and wanted to occur. On the other hand, it could be that God knew what was going to take place but not in a way that obliged it to happen. It is certainly not the case in Islam that all humanity is living under the curse of having its first members punished by God and their guilt rubbing off onto all their descendants. Yet the fact that we are living outside of paradise is due to our predecessors and the fact that God sent the first human beings down into our world of generation and corruption suggests that they were punished in a way that affected not only them. Even human beings of considerable prophetic stature like Adam, Moses, and Aaron are described as fallible, and although trying to do their best, are always in need of divine guidance to do the right things. As with other religions, Islam has no problem with events that happened earlier affecting people later on, for good or ill. Our predecessors like Adam and Eve (Hawwa—although she is never named in the Qur’an) made poor decisions which affect their descendants. On the other hand, the way in which early human beings established a relationship with



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God has a positive effect on later generations, and an obligation to behave in a certain way. Is it fair that these things should happen, that people who are different from those who originally acted are nonetheless affected by their actions? It might well be argued that it is. We are material creatures and so have causal links with other people and things in the world, so that when one thing happens, it will have an effect on other things. We understand that when we act it has implications for those connected to us, sometimes positive and sometimes otherwise. God can, and perhaps sometimes does, intervene to change what would otherwise happen, but when this does not occur, we have to put up with the vagaries of life in a material world.

2:60 And when Moses asked for water for his people, We said: “Strike the rock with your staff” and there gushed out twelve springs … This is an attack on the naturalists according to Nursi (2006: 24) and see also 21:69. Nursi suggests that it is not difficult to find water in the earth. He also takes this as a hint to humanity to develop equipment to find water. He often suggests that the Qur’an gives both spiritual and practical advice. We should follow both, and the practical advice gives us an indication of the sorts of scientific and technical advances that we should anticipate making. He follows a significant tradition in Islamic thought, which sees modern scientific laws and theories as prefigured in the Qur’an. Sometimes this is explained rather crudely, and the rather loose descriptive language of the Book is taken to clearly prefigure and predict whatever current scientific theory a particular author might think is so secure that it must have been indicated by God earlier on. On the other hand, there is no difficulty in accepting that a religious text might generally refer to scientific phenomena in the sense of areas of investigation, which might pay off for human beings. Since God knows how He has created the world and has organized it in a way that makes it amenable to us, He could also give us hints about where to look for scientific progress.

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2:61 He said “Will you exchange the better for the worse?” Moses criticizes the Israelites for demanding fresh vegetables and the verse condemns them for not acknowledging divine revelation, disobeying prophets, and trying to kill them. Verse 56:24 makes clear that they will suffer for their misbehavior.

2:62 Surely those who believe and the Jews and the Christians and the Sabians, who believe in God and the Last Day, and do good deeds will have their reward with their Lord. They need not fear nor grieve. Mahmud Mohamed Taha in The Second Message takes this to show that the reference to mu’minun or believers includes the People of the Book during the time of the Meccan revelations and advocates a more inclusive notion of who is a believer. See also 5:69, 4:136 (Taha 1987). On the other hand, in his Faysal al-Ghazali claims that, “The Jew and the Christian are unbelievers, since they deny the truthfulness of the Prophet” (al-Ghazali 2002: 92). He calls them mushrikun, people who associate God with someone else, because they along with many other religious groups regard one or more of the prophets to be a liar. This is strange, although the argument that they are not believers is well founded, but why does this mean they are mushrikun? Perhaps it is because they fail to understand the links between the world and God, since they reject a degree of prophecy, so they assume that the world has more independent power than in fact it has, or they think that their inaccurate view of God requires Him to have the assistance of other beings, since they reject the appropriate prophetic account of the deity. The argument might be that the range of prophets is significant, each prophet not only concentrated on a particular group of people and language but also a certain aspect of God. This is something that Ibn al-‘Arabi stresses, and so unless one accepted the complete range



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of prophecy one would have the wrong idea of religion and God. Would having the wrong idea make one inevitably a mushrik, someone who associates God with others? If so, it is difficult to see why Muslim men are allowed to marry the women of the People of the Book, for this would mean marrying idolaters. To a degree, it depends on how reliable the earlier revelations are thought to be. The Jewish Bible and the Gospel (Injil in Arabic, thought to be only one rather than four, since there could not be four versions of the truth) are indeed earlier revelations, but there are hints in the Qur’an that the Jews and Christians may have changed what they were originally given by God to represent the message they received in a way they found more amenable to their baser desires and instincts. The Jews in particular are said to have been punished for doing this by having to observe a harsh ritual law, although if they were not up to sticking to what God originally told them it is not clear how a strict level of observance could be expected subsequently. If what we have now is very unreliable, those who follow the texts must have inappropriate ideas about many things and perhaps do not believe in the right things and in the right way, and so could be classified as unbelievers. It might be said it is not their fault, but after the message of Islam becomes available and so obviously superior to other religions, as many of its supporters would say, then it is perverse to stick to the old religion, since it has clearly become outdated by the last message transmitted by the Prophet. On the other hand, in a famous hadith the Prophet refers to a tendency of people to stay in the religion in which they have been raised and this means that many Jews and Christians will remain Jews and Christians and rely on what they take to be their holy books for guidance. If what they rely on is inaccurate, then it would be right to wonder how far they could look forward to salvation, if to be saved means being the right sort of believer. As 7:40 has it: “The gates of heaven will not be open to those who rejected Our revelations and arrogantly spurned them, they will not enter the garden until the camel passes through the eye of the needle. This is how We punish the guilty.” See also 40:40, 3:19, and 3:85.

2:74 Then your hearts became hardened consequently and were like stones, or even harder; for there are

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stones from which rivers come gushing, and others split, so that water issues from them, and others crash down in the fear of God. God is not unaware of the things you do. According to Nursi, this verse, addressed to the Children of Israel, means that they rejected all attempts to convince them through the signs that God sent for them, so determined were they not to do what God wanted (Nursi 1992: 255–6). According to the Qur’an, even stones can serve to express the aspects of divine wrath. Moreover, when the Qur’an refers to the “stoning” of disobedient people, it employs an allegorical language, which implies some moral principles and lessons to be taken from the natural world in general, and from the stones in particular. Hearts can become harder and more lifeless than stone, since according to Nursi stone despite its hardness carries out its natural function in line with divine wishes. It lies there under the earth and allows water to run through it, and plays its part in the organization of the natural world while human beings are stubborn and often fail to act as God wishes; see also 2:218. The unfortunate actions of these hard-hearted people can be taken to include tahrif, corrupting the scriptures (2:75-6, 2:159, 2:174), Jews and Christians denying the truth, even though they really know it. See also 3:70-1, 3:78, 4:44, 4:46, 5:13-15, 5:41, 19:30-7, 62:5. Who is precisely responsible for this, though? The Qur’an often suggests it is not so much that one or two authoritative people falsified important texts and divine doctrines, but more that people in general stepped away from the pure monotheism of the original message and failed to live up to it. In that sense, it looks like it was almost everyone’s fault.

2:87 We supported him with the holy spirit (ruh). Here ruh is applied metaphorically to Gabriel since just as the ruh or spirit is the cause of life in humanity, so Gabriel is the cause of knowledge in the life of hearts. Al-Razi links this to 42:53: “We have revealed to you a spirit of Our command/bidding.” He is the intermediary between the Prophet and God and so the channel for human hearts to be revived and enlightened with the sort of knowledge and inspiration that they require through the Qur’an (Jaffer 2015: 173).



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2:102 They followed what the evil ones produced in opposition to the power of Solomon … teaching men magic … There are fifty-eight references in the Qur’an to witchcraft, magic, and its cognates, but this is the most developed section. All the prophets, including Muhammad, were at one time or another accused of being magicians, because of their ability to control people through what they said. The Epistle on Magic of the Ikhwan al-Safa (Brethren of Purity) has a small section quoting this verse, and see also 5:110, 6:7, 7:109-12, 7:120-1, 7:132, 10:2, 17:47, 17:101, 20:57-8, 20:63, 20:66, 20:73, 27:40. But apart from quoting these verses, it does not discuss the Qur’an, so the references to the Book seem to be largely decorative. The Ikhwan seem much more interested in views on magic from other areas of intellectual and cultural life (Ikhwan al-Safa’ 2011: 105–7). The Qur’an makes clear that any apparent magical power really owes its efficacy to something that God wishes to bring about.

2:105 God singles out for His mercy whom He will and God is of bounty abounding. Ibn al-‘Arabi suggests that hell cannot therefore be eternal (Chittick 2005: Chapter 9).

2:106 Any verse that We abrogate or cause it to be forgotten, We bring a better or something similar … The Jews argue that God cannot change a law once he has issued it, which is surely to deny that God can respond to new circumstances if he wishes. On the other hand, is anything really new for God? He is not going to be surprised by anything that happens since He is the author of everything happening.

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The problem with an institution like abrogation of course is that it is often not clear which verse abrogates which other, and so what the final understanding of the Book ought to be. There is often agreement on which verse was revealed before others, but not on all the verses, and disagreement here affects the understanding of abrogation, since presumably a later verse has to abrogate an earlier one: but not all do.

2:111-12 They also say: “No one will enter Paradise unless he is a Jew or a Christian.” This is their own wishful thinking, say, “Produce your evidence, if you are telling the truth.” In fact, any who direct themselves wholly to God and do good will have their reward with their Lord: there is no fear or grief for them. This suggests that behavior is crucially important for anyone who is justified in considering himself or herself a Muslim, someone who submits to God. It is not enough to be a member of a certain religious group, not even perhaps a Muslim group. Many commentators see this as setting out a task to be attempted rather than one which one may feel satisfied at having achieved because of prayers, fasting etc.

2:115 The east and the west belongs to God, wherever you turn there is the face of God … Sometimes taken as a response to the Jews who criticized the change in the qibla or direction of prayer, which at first was Jerusalem. The nature of the change is emphasized in 2:144: Turn your face towards the holy mosques, and wherever you are turn your faces towards it. Very popular with Sufis, who see it as emphasizing the all-pervading nature of God. Verses 50:16, 96:8, 7:57, and 15:21 are also often quoted to bring out the dependence of everything in existence on God and the need for us to concentrate on this point if we are to advance spiritually. For Ibn



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al-‘Arabi, it expresses the way in which perfect beings see everything as an example of divine self-disclosure. Microcosms understand that their partial viewpoint is of something far more developed, the reality of the macrocosm. He takes this to be an argument for being very careful in religion and not to be committed to one part of it as compared with the whole (Fusus, 113). The Ikhwan al-Safa’ take this to show that animals are always in communication with God and need turn in no direction to pay attention to Him since they see Him everywhere (Ep 22, 258). This verse is linked with 17:44: There is no thing that does not sing His praises, but you comprehend not their praise. The bee claims that they are always praying to God, from early morning to late night (Ep 22, 242–3), by contrast with human beings. Kashani regards the east as representing light and the esoteric, the west the exoteric and the dark. The face of God is the divine essence made apparent through his properties. We can observe those properties in the universe, and that is how He reveals himself, but it would probably be a mistake to think that we can just see Him in what is around us. Our hearts need to be prepared, our minds appropriately aligned in order to take advantage of whatever possibilities for knowledge obtain here. His presence can be felt if we allow His light to affect us, and if we can partially pierce the veil that He sets up, since we could not understand Him at all unless He was veiled. The light would otherwise be too bright to be seen. He very much follows the thought of Ibn al-‘Arabi here (Hamza et al. 2010: 1, 103–4).

2:117 “Be!” and it is. For God of course creation is instantaneous. It could not be the case that He would say something and subsequently something would happen, since this would make His action too much like ours. We often need a gap between thinking about what we are going to do, doing it, and then the result of what we do coming into existence. This is not the case for God, and our use of human language about action, since we have no other language, can confuse us here in thinking that God and His activity is very much like us and our activity.

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2:124 “I will make you an imam/leader to the nations.” He asked “And also my offspring?” He answered: “My promise does not extend to evildoers.” Abraham is told that he has been made an imam by God, but the honor will only extend to his descendants who avoid tyranny. At 21:73 is a reference to the general role of such leaders, which includes guiding people, encouraging them to pray, and to be charitable. The idea of hereditary leadership is not present in the Qur’an; leaders owe their status to their relationship with God and their offspring and so on, and may also manage to establish such a relationship, based on their own virtue and political skills: but they may not. On the other hand, the Shi‘a believe that leadership to the Islamic community has to be linked with the family of the Prophet and those linked with it, and that the Qur’an provides indications that this is the case. However, even among the Sunni links with the Prophet and his family are popularly taken to be significant.

2:129 “O our Lord, Send them a messenger from within their own ranks …” This is what Abraham said to God, and the result was of course the Prophet. ‘Abduh in his Theology of Unity argues that although some people found it difficult to convert, once they thought about Islam rationally they could see that it provides a perfect blend of theory and practice. The way in which one worships through the day serves to elevate the individual almost to heaven, and the demands the religion has on us physically are not great. It does try to be moderate in its requirements, while at the same time leaving adequate space for spirituality to develop. He emphasizes the rational basis for acceptance of Islam, following in a long line of tradition in Islamic philosophy where the religion is seen as being the best guide to human behavior as anyone who examines it objectively will be obliged to accept (quoted in McAuliffe 2015: 235).



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When looking at history he points out that some of the conquerors of the Islamic world decided to become Muslims, not because they were forced to do so: quite the reverse. The implication is, apart from what God did to make this state of affairs prevail, that there is something in the religion that is so attractive to anyone that it will be generally embraced by those who consider it fairly.

2:132 This is the religion that Abraham and Jacob recommended to their sons. They said, “O my son! God has chosen for you the religion. So do not die unless you are Muslims/submitters.” According to Ibn al-‘Arabi the definite article makes it clear that only Islam is acceptable to God, in the sense of complete submission to God (Fusus, 94). It is no good cherry picking what you want to do and believe.

2:143 Thus we have made of you a justly balanced community, so that you might be witnesses over the nations … The idea of balance in religion is always going to be crucial, and it is linked with the concept of justice, as in 2:143 where the followers of the Prophet are described as wasat. Sometimes the term is identified with being the best (68:28, 1:6-7), in the last verse contrasting sharply with the approach to religion taken by the Jews and the Christians. Indeed, Islam sees itself as standing between those who believe in anything at all and those who deny everything they cannot personally vouch for. It is a middle point between those who see the universe as the only important place and those who regard it as an illusion. In Islamic law, we find a system that seeks to balance crimes and penalties, and rules such as those of inheritance are designed to preserve equity. Now, when we get to the detail of such laws we may find much in them that is difficult to accept, but the principle here

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is entirely acceptable, that an attempt is made to be fair to all parties, to allocate people their deserts and preserve a sense of balance. For example, when it is a matter of knowing how much money to give away to charity, and how much to keep for oneself, 17:29 advocates taking a middle path, giving something away but not everything, which would result in personal poverty. There are hadith where the Prophet advocates his companions not giving all their money away to charity, but keeping some at least for their family. The identification of virtue with moderation is not difficult to understand since the universe itself was created in a balanced and presumably good way “And the earth We have spread out, and set on it mountains firm and immovable; and created in it all kinds of things in appropriate balance” (15:19). Another aspect of balance is its connection with justice, a highly significant concept in the Qur’an. It also comes into the appropriate balance between matter and the spirit, which is so much discussed by the Sufis. Perhaps by referring to the community as balanced there is a suggestion that if some go too much in the direction of emphasizing the spirit, this balances those in the community who go too far in the other direction.

2:152 Remember Me, and I shall remember you … Since forgetfulness of God is the cause of forgetfulness of self, remembering the self will involve God’s remembering the self, and God’s remembering the self will lead to the self ’s remembering itself. God’s remembering the self is identical with the self ’s existence, since God’s knowledge is presential (huduri) with all things. This sort of knowledge cannot be doubted since it is so close to us that it is undeniable. Thus, someone who does not have knowledge of the self does not in fact have a self at all, since the self ’s existence is identical with light, presence, and perception (Rizvi 2009: 84–93). This may seem strange but the notion of knowledge here is to be sharply distinguished from sense experience, which cannot give us knowledge of anything. Knowledge is a matter of grasping the intelligible form of something, here the self, and this has links with its ultimate source, God. There is an immediacy about this knowledge which means that it cannot be reasonably questioned (Leaman 2009b: 67–70).



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2:154 And say not of those who are slain on God’s path that they are dead; rather, they are living! But you do not understand. Literally this verse finishes with the expression wa lakin la tash‘urun, you do not feel it, referring to a type of knowledge that is so immediate it is more like feeling than knowing. The implication of not using the ordinary word for knowledge,‘ilm, or one of its derivatives, is that something distinct is meant here, not just the sort of theoretical knowledge that one has when one grasps a fact, but the sort of knowing that is very close to us and can easily become a part of our practice since it is so close. It is something that we can feel, and so becomes personal. As a matter of fact, we know that when people are killed they are dead and no longer alive. As a matter of what we think about them their actions had such significance that they are not truly dead at all from the point of view of our emotional selves, and in the Qur’an they can look forward to life in paradise as a reward for their actions on earth. It is, of course, a familiar experience to find that people who have died are close to us and never leave our minds: we often say the same of those who die in war defending us. Those who fight for the sake of God will surely fit into this sort of category.

2:155-7 And certainly, We shall test you with something of fear, hunger, loss of wealth, lives and fruits, but give glad tidings to those who are patient, who, when afflicted with calamity, say: “To God we belong and truly, to Him we shall return.” They are those … who are the guided-ones. This is often taken to mark the completion of the revelation on the day of Arafat: “This day I have perfected your religion, bestowed my favor upon you, and have chosen Islam as your way of life” (5:3). If it is perfected, why should it change? Clearly, there are pressures for Muslims to give up, or even reform some of their values in favor of liberal

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secular ideas, particularly for those living in the West. They claim that obligations such as segregation of the genders, Islam’s views on chastity, or its views on politics and shari‘a should be changed and updated to fit a “modern” secular society in much the same way that the other Abrahamic religions may have reformed, at least in terms of some groups, within those religions. However, the response is often that there is no way to change what God has completed and perfected. If there is a disparity between contemporary society and Islam, then it is society that should change, not Islam. One might think here of the occasions when prophets brought their messages from God to societies which often did not welcome them, but they did not back down in the face of public or official disapproval. The Prophet was given various offers to compromise Islam while living in Mecca, and according to the hadith he refused all offers to back down whatever benefits or penalties he might accrue. He acted on the principle: “Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best. Indeed, your Lord is most knowing of who has strayed from His way, and He is most knowing of who is guided” (16:125). This is the response of groups who tend to be labeled as Islamist and they argue that they know who has gone awry and who is on the correct path. The former will not only be liable for punishment in the next world, but in this also, at the hands of those who see themselves as acting on behalf of Islam.

2:156 For in the face of the worst calamity, he says: “To God do we belong, and to Him is our return.” Muslims place their trust in God, the person who sustains them and is compassionate. A person with knowledge of God takes pleasure from impotence, from fear of God. The second proposition is often used to mark someone’s death and acknowledges the fact that death is merely the return of a possession to its owner. With respect to the return (see also 28:85), since we are all aspects of God’s knowledge, and are what we are by virtue of God’s knowledge of us, we belong to Him in the most fundamental sense of the term, and will thus go back to Him, since all things must be returned to their rightful owners. This is sometimes regarded as an aspect of tawhid, the divine unity



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that underlies the whole of reality. In the Mathnawi, Rumi uses the phrase as motivating us to welcome non-existence, since then we shall be with God (Rumi 1925: 103). On the other hand, how plausible is it as an argument, apart from as a religious statement? As the latter, it is very impressive; the idea of people returning to God when they die is present in several religions and presumably it must reflect a good deal of human aspiration. It is rather like the claim that since God owns us He can do anything He likes with us, which is impressive and comforting, in the sense that it might make the issue of divine justice seem moot. After all, if God is entitled to do anything He likes with us, then whatever He does is just. When we think about our actions, though, and the living things that we possess, we do not normally think it is alright to do anything we like with them. We can be prosecuted or more importantly blamed for mistreatment of animals, for example, which are possessions of ours. Children are sometimes also regarded as possessions, but we quite rightly do not have the right to do whatever we like with them. Even slaves in the days of slavery had some rights to be treated in reasonable ways, depending of course on the particular system under which their owners operated. We should be careful about comparing the ways in which we own living things with the way in which God owns living things, but there is no reason to think there is not some resemblance, albeit a pale reflection. It is not clear either how far God can be considered our owner, although He is clearly taken to be our creator. Just because we make something does not mean it belongs to us or that we have the right to do with it whatever we like. We are not God, of course, but some argument is needed to show why He has the right to deal with us in whatever way He wishes. The Qur’an often says He is, and does, and that the disparity between Him and his creatures is such that it is impossible to understand often why He does what He does, but that does not resolve the question of whether what He does is justified. Even the rightful owner of something is not necessarily morally entitled to have it back when he wants it. If a hospital has installed a pacemaker in someone, which keeps him alive, but he refuses to pay the bill, the hospital is probably not entitled to retrieve it from him while he is alive, even in America!

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2:164 (see also 35:27-8, 16:3-18, 17:44, 57:1, 59:1, 61:1, 24:41, 20:50, 87:2-3, 7:54, 54:49, 15:21, 21:22, 27:60-4) In the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference between night and day … and the water which God sends down from the sky, so reviving the earth after its death … signs for people who have sense … Everything that has been created shows signs of exquisite design and organization, and operates according to principles of balance and organization. This is a proof not only of its divine origins but also of divine unity, since we are told that all the evidence suggests that only one creator is in operation (Mafatih, 4, 220).

2:173 God is always forgiving and merciful. In this verse there are things that Muslims are not supposed to eat but if they have to in order to survive then God will forgive them. Many of the qualities attributed to God are moral such as being compassionate or forgiving (2:182, 2:192, 2:218, 2:225, 2:226, 2:235), and just (16:90). Each sura except the ninth is prefaced by the phrase “In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.”

2:177 Those who believe in God and the Last Day, in the angels and the Book and the prophets … The text frequently uses much wider examples to denote the righteous



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than just believing in one God, but also in the eschatological tradition of Islam. The demand to believe the words of Muhammad suggests that faith in the divine nature of the Qur’an and the reliability of its messenger are themselves a precondition of being a believer, and then perhaps also the rest of the Islamic system is essential for what one has to count as belief as well. The specific virtuous actions mentioned in the text sometimes relate to charity and being good, and also sometimes prayer. Although we are not told explicitly that all unbelievers are unable to be good, it refers to evildoers and unbelievers in a similar way, and generally refers to their fate in rather grim terms, although other Qur’anic passages do perhaps countenance the possibility of an unbeliever being accepted into heaven.

2:183 (see also 22:37, 29:45) Fasting is prescribed for you as for those before you so that you may become righteous. Ibn Rushd suggests that fasting and prayer are practices that are ideal for the health of the soul (FM, 67–8). Religion deals with the health of the soul while medicine helps the body. It is very much a theme of Islamic philosophy in the Peripatetic tradition that a well-organized body, like a well-organized state, is harmonious and successful, and the job of the physician is to try to help the patient establish that sort of balance in his or her body.

2:186 If my servants ask you about Me, I am indeed close. I respond to the prayer of every supplicant when he calls on Me. … According to Ramadan (2009b), the Qur’an is marked by a lack of tragedy as compared to the Torah. “There is no haraj or anguish for you in religion” (22:78), or in the book sent down by God (7:2). This sort of anxiety or distress, or it could also be translated as difficulty, is characteristic of those who have been led astray and is dissipated in those who have been rightly guided by God and who surrender to Him (6:125). Akhtar also thinks that

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tragedy is completely missing from Islam (1990: 160). Bodman argues that tragedy does not mean a lack of faith in God but an acknowledgment that the path we are supposed to follow is not always clear to us (2011: 267). This is perhaps rather worrying, since living without a sense of tragedy might diminish the sense of depth in life. What Ramadan has in mind is the fact that the Muslim feels confidence in the fact that God has a plan for the world and for the role that everyone has to play in it, and eventually He will ensure that everything is resolved in a way that is fair and in accordance with His wishes. Many believers find this a very comforting thought. On the other hand, the sort of questioning of the direction that can be observed in the world by the biblical Job has a certain nobility about it, in that he is prepared to continue to respect God while at the same time being very critical about the ubiquity of divine justice. The faith in the world being directed by God, and so the lack of any questions about how this works or whether we should look for any evidence that it is true, might be criticized for being part of a banal view of religion.

2:190 And with those who fight to kill you, fight in the way of God … Many early Sufi thinkers adopted esoteric interpretations of the Qur’anic verses treating conflict. The real challenge and test comes from within. The reasons why the Prophet stressed that the greater jihad must be against the carnal soul (nafs) is that physical wars against infidels are occasional but the battle against the self is frequent, indeed constant. There are ways to avoid the visible weapons of the military foe, but less chance to escape the invisible weapons of the temptations of the soul; and although we can achieve martyrdom in war with the enemy, there are no rewards if one is defeated by our inner enemy (Leaman 2009b: 133–7). On the contrary, that defeat is the normal condition of human beings. This is followed by 2:191: “And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitna is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.”



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2:205 (see also 27:34, 11:18, 26:151-2, 18:28, 2:21) Yet no sooner does he turn his back than he tries to spread corruption in the world, destroying crops and progeny. God does not love corruption. Qutb sees monotheism as bringing about a social revolution, in that if there is only one God who is to be worshiped then the petty rulers and authority figures of society lose their aura (Qutb 1977). The person in this verse is someone who impresses people with his words and actions, and Qutb suggests that if we look to human beings as leaders we are likely to fall for people or indeed systems that will let us down. If on the other hand we see God as the sole ruler, and the Qur’an as the exclusive basis for government, then we will free ourselves of the wiles and deficiencies of human beings and their ideas and arrangements. However, there is going to be the necessity to find both human rulers and systems that will be the practical exemplification of the divine message, and it may well be that what is selected is found to be just as unsatisfactory as the sorts of arrangements it replaces (Kepel 1985; Donohue and Esposito 2006).

2:208 O you who believe, enter into Islam enthusiastically … The significance of moderation, which is urged by Islam, might be viewed critically when we are told here to enter Islam whole-heartedly. Being moderate in the application of Islam might seem to contravene this suggestion. Many of the characters in the Qur’an are however extreme, in either a positive or negative way, and it might be said that Iblis is punished because he is totally convinced of the superiority of creatures made of fire, as opposed to those of earth (like us), which makes it difficult for him to acknowledge the wisdom of the divine plan. Even though God says he knows why he is acting in the way he does, Iblis ignores this and suffers as a result. Even Musa in the experiences he has with Khidr falls foul of a lack of moderation since he is told not to question what he sees happen: but

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he constantly does, and in the end learns from the experience (18:60-82). Instead of considering the reasons for what is happening and restraining his tone as a result, Musa is indignant and demands an explanation for what is happening—precisely what Khidr tells him not to do. It might be said that moderation, like patience, is something one has to learn, the end or even part of a project that we set ourselves in life, and religions are often very helpful here in helping train us in the right direction. But moderating the word of God is to distort it and to end up creating your own way of doing things, which deviates a good deal from divine guidance. It is worth pointing out that there are some dichotomies in religion that can be dealt with in terms of some principle of moderation, but others cannot. For example, there has often been a conflict between those who advocate tasawwuf as a way of being a Muslim, and others, who stress kalam or a particular understanding of Islamic law. Mysticism seems to be specialized and based on personal training and advancement, while regarding Islam as equivalent to a series of doctrines, an ‘aqida, is the reverse. Yet these could be seen as different emphases in Islam, one on tashbih (immanence) and the other on the tanzih (transcendence) of God, like the contrast between the batin (hidden) and the zahir (open), or ‘aql (reason) and naql (tradition). There is scope in religion for certain ideas and even practices to be restricted to a small group of people who know how to operate with them, while religion on the whole is quite the opposite of this. It is open to everyone and its whole rationale is accessibility. As we are often told, the Qur’an addresses different people in different ways, and it appeals both emotionally and intellectually to a wide variety of constituencies. Some of these people are interested in acquiring a more personal access to the religion and they are prepared to undergo the sort of training that mystics engage in, while most people just expect to find in their religion some fairly simple rules of behavior and ritual which they can follow in order to do what God expects of them. The fact that both approaches can be found in the same religion suggests that there is flexibility to allow for different degrees of access to the truth, as one would expect given the variety of humanity that exists in the world. At 5:48, we are told that God could have created one nation in the world, but instead wanted people to learn from each other, and selected variety instead. That does not perhaps just refer to Muslims and non-Muslims, but also to different kinds of Muslims, and people in general. It is because of the variety of lifestyles that we find in the world that we can work out with some plausibility what counts for us as the right way of living, and the



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most moderate. This is not something we can just discover or be taught, it is a part of a process of self-discovery and reflection on experience. The Qur’an, like many other religious texts, is well adapted to helping us work out how we ought to live in a way that fits in both with us and with our creator. According to Rumi, Musa (Moses) and the Pharaoh represent two kinds of reality. Moses is the symbol of the divine intellect and the intellect of resurrection, while the Pharaoh is identified with the particular intellect, which is equivalent to the intellect that is merely discursive and oriented to this world (Rumi 2002b: 197).

2:213 (see also 21:92, 23:52) All humanity was once one community … Asad suggests that this was a primitive stage and we are more sophisticated now. The People of the Book first of all accepted the oneness of God but over time this belief weakened and when the last of the prophets came to reinstate the true religion they often refused to accept it, so set were they in their old ways (1980: 69). Sachedina (2001: 147) takes this to show that people are originally the same and then later on are divided up into different religions. This supports the idea that Islam is the din al-fitra, the original religion, and that since then, the original monotheistic message was corrupted and weakened, and the world broke up into different religious groups. The final prophet Muhammad was sent to encourage people to return to the one true religion, and become one community again. According to al-Razi the faith of the people to whom the Prophet came was fixed and it was difficult for them to give it up, so closely had it become intertwined in their very being (McAuliffe 2015: 289). Nurcholish Madjid sees this as linked with the principle of tawhid or divine unity, and Adam as the first man and upholder of the principle of monotheism according to the three Abrahamic religions, he claims (McAuliffe 2015: 633). The only true religion is Islam (3:85), and those who do not recognize it will suffer the consequences (3:19). Verse 3:64 calls on the People of the Book to worship the one God (Leaman 2009b: 122–3).

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2:251 … and if God had not repelled some men by others, the earth would have been corrupted ... This can be taken with 22:40: for had it not been for God’s repelling some men by means of others, cloisters, churches, and oratories would have been pulled down. Mainly concerned with the rules of initiating jihad, discussion of the rules of war tends to point to the major acceptable motive as helping the oppressed, whether or not such intervention is requested. According to Mutahhari this was the nature of most of the early Islamic wars, and another legitimate cause is the removal of political obstacles to the propagation and spread of Islam or, in other words, fighting in favor of the people that are otherwise condemned to isolation from the call of truth and against regimes that suppress freedom of speech. Defensive wars, for the defense of life, wealth, property, and land, and for independence and principles, are all legitimate. However, the defense of human rights Mutahhari places above the defense of individuals. The last of Mutahhari’s legitimate causes of war goes beyond any notion of defense: he supports a policy of moral expansionism. That is, when dealing with corrupt societies, whether democratic or otherwise, the Islamic state should seek to challenge the false ideas that persist there and it may be necessary to invade them or at the very least confront them militarily in order to convey the proper principles as to how they are to live (1989).

2:256 There is no compulsion in religion … This is often taken to be an indication of divine support for freedom of religion, but Sachedina suggests there is a trend in Islamic jurisprudence which bypassed this “Fitra-based Koranic spirit of freedom of conscience” (2001: 248) and insists on there being only one route to the truth, and that is (a particular version of) Islam. There certainly are religious groups within Islam who are not worried about forcing people to become Muslims, and that might seem objectionable given this verse. On the other hand, if Islam is seen as the religion God wants us to follow and people refuse to accept this, might there not be arguments for compelling people to acknowledge the truth and follow the way of life that God wants us to observe?



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2:261 Those who spend their wealth in God’s way are like a grain that sprouts seven ears, each bearing a hundred kernels … Charity is immensely beneficial to the donor. This should not interfere with normal business practices, however, nor with the inequalities in society.

2:269 … he for whom wisdom is given, he truly has received abundant good … Throughout the Qur’an, relatives of the word ‘ilm (knowledge) occur over 750 times and make up approximately 1 percent of the vocabulary of the entire book (Rosenthal 1970: 19–20).

2:282 When you deal with each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing ... whether it be small or big; it is more just in the sight of God, more suitable as evidence, and more convenient to prevent doubts among yourselves … Fear God and God will teach you … It is hardly surprising that many countries and political parties that regard themselves as Islamic or Islamist advocate policies of neoliberalism (Leaman 2014: 91). Verse 5:13 tells us that God loves those who are kind, but this does not tell us very much. A trawl of hadith does of course yield much more detailed information about how to treat labor but like all hadith it goes in a variety of directions and is of variable provenance. What characterizes the account of economic life in the Qur’an is its resilient

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realism. Business affairs should be transparent, efficient, and honest. Issues of inheritance need to be clearly defined and uncertainty reduced. The ban on interest, which may have been more of a ban on abusively high rates of interest, is shared by many other successful economic systems, and can easily be understood in such a way as not to interfere with the organization of commerce. Despite the claims of some critics of Islamic economics, there is no evidence that shari‘a law in any way was an obstacle to commerce, and certainly, the first few centuries of the Islamic expansion into the rest of the world outside of its Arab origins introduced a vast expansion of trade and economic activity wherever it reached. Even the Ottoman Empire, which was often seen as inefficient and in decline in its last few centuries, on an economic level was often dynamic and served as a magnet for immigration. According to many Muslim commentators, differentials in wages are acceptable so long as they increase productivity but should not be so great as to be unbridgeable. Workers should have contracts and be paid promptly. There should be profit sharing because this leads, he claims, to increased productivity and effort. It is not difficult to find both Qur’anic passages and hadith that go along with such suggestions, but it does not take enormous perspicacity to spot that these remarks are hardly religion-specific. We should contrast them with the discussion in the literature of how to deal with capital and investment, where the riba issue often arises. Here, there is detailed and precise analysis of exactly what sort of investment profile would be halal and what haram, and why. So a particular and exact formulation of how the investment is structured would make it acceptable as an Islamic investment, and it could then be registered as such, and of course a fee paid to those who had examined and accredited it for their services. Yet the enterprise that the investment finances (should it be more than merely a financial instrument) is apparently not regulated by any religious authority, except in the sense that the very vague generalizations that we have observed are applied to it. In the Qur’an, justice (‘adl) precedes ihsan or benevolence. Verse 16:90: God commands justice, the doing of good and liberality to relations, and he forbids all shameful deeds, injustice, and rebellion (Leaman 2002: 147–73, 180–2). The last sentence of 2:282 advocates being aware of God in whatsoever one does. Ibn al-‘Arabi takes this to mean that we acquire knowledge of how things really operate, i.e., not through our action but through God, and a much more perspicuous appreciation of the nature of existence results. God veils the individual from observing how his actions flow from him since in fact they come from God (SD, 309). It fits nicely with the way the verse starts



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since the point here is to be careful about what one does in both practical and religious life. In the former, it is important to note things and write them down so that in the future there is a record and if there is a dispute there are ways of resolving it to general satisfaction or at least agreement. Similarly, in our religious life we need to record what we do in some way, reflect on it, and be aware of how it all leads back to God. In The Case of the Animals, we find criticisms of commerce, and in particular of merchants (Ep 22, 290–1).

2:285 We make no distinction between His messengers … We are told that God makes no distinction between his prophets, although it is not entirely clear whether God is speaking here or humanity (probably the latter). Although the Qur’an treats the prophets with a great deal more respect than does the Jewish Bible, it is not obvious that they are all on a par. Moses, for example, comes in for some criticism in his journey with Khidr due to his lack of patience, and the Prophet Muhammad is often taken by the Sufis to be the Perfect Man, which implies perhaps that other prophets are not quite so perfect.

2:286 God burdens no soul except with that which it can do … Does this suggest that we have free will? God praises those who do good for the good that they do and censures evildoers for the bad things that they do. He also gives recompense to us on account of our deeds. This only makes sense if we carried out those deeds of our own volition, at least to a degree. The messengers are givers of glad tidings and warners so that humanity would have no argument against God after the messengers (4:165). If people were not free in their choices, their argument against God—that they had no guidance—would not become invalid after God sent the messengers, since if they were compelled in their actions it would make no difference whether or not they received guidance. There has to be a possibility that the guidance makes a difference. We only come to know that it was determined

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for the sinner to commit the sin after the action, given in 31:34: No soul knows what it will earn tomorrow. In our actions, we are both free and under God’s determination at the same time. Since God creates our actions and wills that we act, to that extent our actions are determined. But since we choose on our own which actions we wish to carry out—a choice which God has willed to give us—then we are free in our choices and earn the good or bad as a result. He always knows what we are going to do, but this does not interfere with our freedom, since all that means is that He understands our character.

3:6 There is no god but He, the mighty, the wise. Ibn al-‘Arabi (Futuhat, 2:633; Sufi Path, 218) suggests that what makes God so wise and powerful is the fact that He is not limited to just one way of thinking—rational thought—but can also in a way experience things, which gives him access to an entirely different type of thinking and one which Ibn al-‘Arabi regards as very important as a supplement or even replacement of many of the ways we can use reason. There is a passage where Abraham starts to wonder about the role of the planets in the governing of the world at 6:75-8 and this is often taken to represent part of his critique of the sorts of polytheism that were popular during his time. Ibn al- ‘Arabi sees it as rather, or also, a critique of using reason to work things out, not that one should not use reason at all, but it should be recognized that its use is limited, it is not the only way of finding the truth and indeed because of its adherence to the law of excluded middle (something has to be true or false) it misses how much of existence is actually organized and needs to be experienced by us in our attempt at understanding it (Fusus, 73). This sort of thinking is only available to certain sorts of people. It is of course difficult to provide an argument for not being rational, since an argument is valid if it is rational, and if it is not rational then there is no reason to accept that it or its implications are worth accepting. On the other hand, it is not difficult to see how an argument could work to suggest that rational argumentation is restricted in its scope. Ibn al-‘Arabi often suggests that rationality is limited, and of course it is in the sense that there are parts of our lives that are not governed by the principles of reason, like



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the taste of food or our mood when we get up in the morning. He applies this idea to God and in his analysis of the Qur’an emphasizes a variety of verses which seem to him to show that God is capable of much wider varieties of thinking than His creatures, not just in the sense that He knows more than us, but He knows in a different way and using a different concept of knowledge. He understands things that for us look contradictory, and He is able to reconcile those apparent contradictions. This is not an unusual claim to make within the context of religion, since many of the claims that religion makes are rationally problematic and it is not implausible that someone with far greater powers than us should be able to understand them and know how to reconcile what otherwise looks contradictory.

3:7 There are at least two feasible translations of this verse: As for those who have some deviation in their hearts, they follow the ambiguities in it, seeking discord and seeking interpretations. And none knows its interpretations except God and those firmly grounded in knowledge. They say: “We believe in it. All of it is from our Lord.” And none will take heed of this except for those who have insight …

and As for those who have some deviation in their hearts, they follow the ambiguities in it, seeking discord and seeking interpretations. And none knows its interpretations except God. And those firmly grounded in knowledge say: “We believe in it. All of it is from our Lord.” And none will take heed of this except for those who have insight.

In the distinction between the muhkamat or precise, and the mutashabihat or difficult, the text seems to invite suspicion of those who try to make the Qur’an more complicated than it need be. It goes on to suggest that those who value deviation tend to concentrate on the latter, and we need to rely on those who know how to interpret scripture. But who are they who know? For the theologians, those who know are the theologians. One way of parsing the sentence implies this, since it can end with the phrase “those who know are those who say: we believe in it, it all comes from God.” This could mean that those who know are those who just accept what is in the

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Book and leave its precise meaning to God. Or it could mean that they are people who know how to interpret all the verses, since if they do not it is not obvious what they actually believe. Al-Ghazali suggests that a range of interpretations can be contemplated, not only those by the traditional authorities, and as a Sufi some weight would be given to the flash of inspiration that one gets on thinking about certain verses. However, the only way to get to this stage is by practicing a normal Muslim life: one gets to the internal meanings by first accepting and acting on the external. The reference to those who are firmly rooted in knowledge is to those whom God actually teaches (SD, 217). The Akhbari Shi‘a thinkers differed in their approach to this verse. The phrase al-rasikhun fi’l-‘ilm, those well-grounded in knowledge, is taken to be a reference to the imams and both the Prophet and ‘Ali, but can also be taken to mean more strongly that the whole of the Qur’an could be misunderstood unless one received guidance from an appropriate authority (Gleave 2007: 228–9; Walker 1993: 27). Some Isma‘ili thinkers wondered whether the true meaning of the text is to be found in the literal meaning alone, as interpreted by the imams. Or is there a need for a higher level of interpretation that uses a specific methodology to investigate the text? The revelation may be tanzil, have a literal meaning, but its ta’wil or interpretation could be a rational exploration of the text, or it could be something else. Perhaps the inner sense is so different from its literal meaning that the latter is of little use in understanding it. The point here is that if someone grasps the real meaning of the text then it implies that perhaps the literal meaning is superfluous, as are the main rules of Muslim behavior such as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and so on (Walker 1999: 62–3). Tabataba’i suggests that the phrase “those well-grounded in knowledge” is supposed to contrast with others who are acting on the basis of perversity, so the distinction is moral rather than intellectual. It is as though we have to approach the text with the right sort of attitude, as well as with intelligence of course, and then we will be able to resolve difficulties in interpretation in the right sort of way (Tabataba’i 1973: 3: 26–7). Ibn Rushd reads the verse as ending with “those well versed in science” and this is to alert us to the fact that where difficulties in interpretation exist, it is for that group of thinkers to resolve it (McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 314). If there is a consensus about how to read such passages then we should not allegorize them, and Ibn Rushd claims that in many of the cases where al-Ghazali claims there is consensus, there is not. Ultimately, as the verse says, the interpretation lies with God, as Ibn Rushd reminds us (McGinnis



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and Reisman 2007: 314) and where he also quotes 17:85: And they will ask you about the spirit. Say: “the spirit is by the command of my Lord. You have been given only a little knowledge.” According to Ibn Qudama, God is being critical here both of those attracted to ta’wil and those who try to encourage dissent. The next verse, 3:8, directly attacks dissent, while this one might be taken to criticize ta’wil since if it were so important, why did the Qur’an not come with it? He provides a range of arguments in favor of his interpretation (Abrahamov 1998: 24–7), and one of the key ideas is that it does not affect practice anyway, since if we do not understand precisely what something in religion means, we do know what we are supposed to do, and we should get on with it. He does not say this but surely it is true that there are many things we do not understand but if we know something has come from God, that should be enough for us. The phrase “those who are firm in knowledge” is often quoted by thinkers to describe those who accept their argument. For example, Mulla Sadra uses it to identify those who understand his particular analysis of the unity of God, which he says is distinct from unity in general in that it has no definition. It has no genus or species and is very different from the sorts of unity that we construct out of what we see around us. After all, divine unity is the source of all these other kinds of unity, and when you consider it, he says, there is nothing you can compare it to since it is so pure. Only some people can grasp this: those whose knowledge is advanced (Met Pen, 61, 98–9; Kalin 2010: 256–86).

3:14 The love of what we want has been made beautiful for people; for women, sons, gold and silver, branded horses and cattle, and cultivation … Satan’s task is to seduce, mislead, and make beautiful material things in order to cause the soul to become attached to these things through its desires. He encourages human beings either to denial of the significance of the spiritual and so to advocate polytheism, or to disobedience and sin. There is no remedy for this other than the constant remembrance and seeking refuge in God and in putting one’s trust in Him (Leaman 2009b: 71–86; 2014: 176–900). This is a point frequently made by the Sufis:

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Verily, Satan is your enemy so take him as your enemy (35:6). The soul either ascends to the most beautiful station, or it may descend to the station of “the lowest of the low” (95:5).

The Qur’an mentions a variety of types of the human soul. The basic level is the one in which we are born which is called the blaming self (nafs al-lawwama). If it is neglected and left to its whims and desires, it will descend to the station of the commanding self (nafs al-ammara). If it is developed and refined through effort and resistance to its desires, it can ascend to the highest levels of contentment and love for God and those linked with Him. There is a hierarchy of stages here: above the blaming self is the secure self (nafs al-mutma’ina), followed by the content self (nafs al-radiyya), and finally to the satisfied self (nafs al-mardiyya) and that is the self that reaches what might be seen as its natural place and station which is the ultimate target. The Sufis extended this list of stages of the self to seven:

1. The commanding self (nafs al-ammara) The principle that is appropriate for its improvement is la illah illa Allah (There is no god except God). It is the lowest level of the self and the worst. In it is found extreme desire and lust for immortality and sovereignty. Thus, it is attached to the worst of characteristics from which we have been warned by God and His Prophet. For example self-satisfaction, arrogance and pride, hardness of heart, oppression of others, lying, gossip, backbiting, envy, jealousy, criticism, bitterness, lack of contentment, constant complaining, lack of gratitude, and so on, including all the possible vices we can acquire. This self represents the territory where most people operate. This commanding self is generally divided into two levels: 1 The animal self (nafs al-hayawaniyya): this is the self that runs after sensual desires and material possessions without regard for right or wrong, justice or inequity, the lawful or the unlawful. It is drowned in the pleasures of possessions, sex, and adornments. It is characterized by lewdness, evil, and lack of humanity. This is a very dramatic description but is probably supposed to represent where most people operate.



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2 The satanic self (nafs al-iblissiyya) is even lower than the animal self because its love for itself has taken it to the stage where it seeks to replace God. “I am your lord supreme …” as Pharaoh proclaimed, and “I am better than him …” as Iblis contended. This self leads to the heart becoming ill, and if it does not change course it is eventually incapable of change and is completely sealed. The root of this level of the self is that it is convinced that it is perfect and that others are flawed and that everyone will die but it will remain immortal. It got its name because of its constant demands and its numerous calls to satisfy its desires. So it demands a thing and before it attains it, it demands another thing and so on without end. The human in this state is the friend of Satan and the enemy of God.

2. The blaming self (nafs al-lawwama) Its healing principle is God. This is the self in its original state of birth into the world as God says, By the One who brought the self to equilibrium inspiring it with its transgression and its consciousness (91:7-8) This is the self that has been touched by divine mercy so that when it commits a sin or falls into disobedience, it blames itself and turns to forgiveness and repents. Then it holds on to obedience until it slips back into sin, then it turns to forgiveness and repentance, and so on. It is a self that is in constant fluctuation between obedience and disobedience. One time it is heedless and falls, and another it is aware and resists, which is the start of things getting better. This is the natural station from which we start at birth and from where we descend or ascend. Its sign is the fluctuation between the characteristics of the people of this world and the people of the next world. It is not in the same evil condition as the commanding self but the two desires of immortality and personal power are still active in it although in a much reduced or weakened condition. This is the first stage of salvation for the self and the first step towards its purification and success.

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3. The inspired self (nafs al-mulhama) It needs to concentrate on hu (the divine pronoun He). This is the self that has ascended through effort and commitment to its true way from the station of the blaming self to the station of the self that is constantly seeking forgiveness and repentance regardless of its guilt or innocence. This is due to its certainty that the root of its attributes is imperfection, fault, weakness, and incompletion. At this level the self is inspired with the early stages of love for good wholesome deeds and for the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet. It is also inspired with love of remembrance (zhikr) and to seeking forgiveness (istighfar) and to correcting its intentions (niyya) and accepting its repentance (tawba). This is the last level of danger for the self for it is still vulnerable to descending to the lower stages of blame and commanding. At this stage, the two desires for immortality and sovereignty are dormant except occasionally.

4. The secure self (nafs al-mutma’ina) Its aim is haqq (truth). It is the self that has ascended to the first station of development and the ladders of light towards intimacy, contentment, and love for God. Its refinement is attained through increasing commitment and honest and sincere fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the true way in all its aspects particularly with respect to human relationships and acts of worship. The secure self has entered the pathways, methods, and means of protection and healing through self-accounting, resistance, striving, and devotion. These efforts bear the fruit of certainty in the truth that God alone is an agent. He is the cause and motivator of everything for there is no god but Him and no Lord but Him. He knows the best interests of the self. This certainty leads to confidence in God. It leads to confidence in His mercy and generosity. The self becomes confident that what is with God is better and more enduring than whatever is in its possession or in the possession



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of others. In this way it reaches complete confidence in its Lord; He is the one who knows what is best for it and He is the best of sustainers (rabb) and the best of trustees (wakil). So the self becomes secure and ceases to occupy itself with anything other than what it has reached confidence in, that is, its Lord. The self in this station expands in its capacity beyond efforts and devotions towards repentance. Once it is secure with God it occupies itself with additional stations such as hope and fear and trust in Him (tawwakul). In this station the secure self is in constant remembrance of God both on the tongue and in the heart.

”Is it not through remembrance of God that hearts become secure?” (13:28) This is the first level of completion (kamal) of the self. The heart begins to shine with the light of consciousness. The ego’s power begins to shrink so that purity, refinement, clarity, and light dominate the heart so that it becomes the secure self. In this station, the desires of immortality and sovereignty become completely veiled and they are returned to their true owner who is God. Now the self begins to show its true attributes that were previously hidden; these are the attributes of servanthood, helplessness, humility, poverty, dependence, and annihilation (fana’).

5. The content self (nafs al-radiyya) ”Return to your Lord content …” (89:28) It is oriented to hayy (living). As the secure self ascends to its Lord the lights of the heart increase and fill the entire body, transforming the sensual desires of the ego to the desire for what the Prophet brought in the Qur’an and hadith. Its desires are now solely for these things and it is totally content with its Lord. Now hardship and comfort are the same to it as are harm and benefit, and withholding and giving because it has become certain after becoming secure that every action and deed is from God alone. It is content with whatever God wishes to do with it. The characteristic of this self is constant cheerfulness, gratitude, and thankfulness no matter what happens. This is the second stage of the complete self (nafs al-kamila), which is the station of servanthood. By ascending to this level, the content self has

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entered into the first stage of the final state. This station is connected to the station above it.

6. The gratified self (nafs al-mardiyya) ”Return to your Lord content and gratified.” (89:28) This stage is qayyum (self-subsistent). At this stage the self is not only content with its Lord but this is reciprocated.

God is content with them and they are content with Him. (98:8) At this stage, the heart is completed and becomes totally in awe of God:

Whoever is secretly in awe of the merciful and comes to Him with a sound heart. Enter it in peace! This is the day of immortality. In it they shall have whatever they wish, and with Us is more. (33:35) The people who attain this stage are the people who are able to witness the manifestations of the actions of the names of God. Those at this station of spiritual development are also gifted with unveiling and miracles to enable them to call people to the love of God. These miracles are essentially for those who deny and reject the truth but who are at the same time called to God. So He sends to them miracles so that people will submit to these miracles and thus return through God back to the divine path. When God loves one of His servants, He seeks him and calls him to Him. If once called the servant responds then he is brought near: the alternative is that God seeks him through trials, or through miracles. The divine command is eventually irresistible. This station is the last of the stations of faith (iman) and through it the self enters the presence of the station of “… the most beautiful station” (ihsan) which is the goal and desire of the heart of every servant.



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7. The complete self (nafs al-kamila) This is also known as the self of light (nafs al nuraniyya), the Muhammadan self (nafs al-Muhammadiyya), and the loving self (nafs al-muhibba). A relevant aya is:

God will bring people whom He loves and who love Him; they will be humble towards the faithful and stern towards the deniers. They shall strive in the way of God and will not fear any blame from the blamers. This is the favor of God that He grants whomever He wishes among His servants. God is all-encompassing and all-knowing. (5:54) A consequence of achieving such a stage of spiritual development is:

Then follow me and God will love you and forgive your sins. God is forgiving and merciful. (3:31)

3:19 The religion close to God is really Islam … There are arguments about the appropriate religion for humanity, but those who know it is Islam and argue against it will suffer in the hereafter. The suggestion is that some of the People of the Book appreciate this but are not prepared to acknowledge it, perhaps because they want to cling onto their old ways of doing things. To a certain extent it is difficult to understand this since if someone understands that Islam is the way in which God wants us to act, then what is there to be gained by acting in a different way? It is not as though we could hide our errant behavior from God nor fail to believe in a Day of Judgment, since we have accepted that Islam is the true religion. Then we will be punished eventually and perhaps rightly so, since we blatantly refuse to accept something that we know to be true and indeed in our own interests. This sort of behavior may appear to be difficult

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to understand. But we often know what we should do and fail to do it: selfdeception and weakness of will characterize our lives. We often have to struggle to do the right thing.

3:31 Say: “If you love God, follow me, and God will love you …” This is what the Prophet is told to tell his followers. We have to follow the prophets and the saints, those who have reached the ultimate reality (haqiqat) and achieved self-realization. The path to the haqiqat is defined by the religious law (shari‘at) and the tariqat (the realm of appropriate practice), which are both expressions of the Prophet’s sunna or way of acting, in both the outer realm of activity and the inner realm of spiritual development. Ibn al-‘Arabi takes this to show that God reveals the secrets of the world to the person who follows this approach, and sets out on a journey that turns out to be infinite. It might be thought that the infinity comes in here since God is without limit, so any form of attempted identification with aspects of His thinking would be similarly characterized. But this does not appear to be the argument; it is rather that despite the fact that our thinking is finite, God constantly helps us and our finite thinking can always be transformed (SD, 68). There are no limits to the permutations of even human thought, and one of the aims of Ibn al-‘Arabi is to encourage us to widen our intellectual approaches so that our thinking becomes a bit more like the thinking of those more advanced than us. God does not love everyone with equal love. He only loves people to the extent that they reflect His beauty, since His beauty is the height of beauty from which all other examples of beauty stem. Everything does indeed reflect God’s beauty, because everything is created in His form. But to be truly beautiful, Ibn al-‘Arabi argues, people should do what they can to attain the sort of beauty achieved by God, which we can only approach distantly of course. This means following the various prophets and whomever we think has reached the ultimate (haqiqat). The path to this end is via following the behavior of the Prophet, both internal and external. The Qur’an highlights the Prophet’s role in the path of love in this verse.



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3:49 “… and I heal the blind and the leper, and I quicken the dead, by God’s permission …” According to Nursi, this Qur’anic verse indicates that the most evident miracles of Jesus were healing sickness, and through it urging people to do the same thing. In the Qur’an, Jesus is a prophet and a healer. After all one of God’s names is al-shafi, the healer (1991: 255–6).

3:54 And they plotted and planned, and God also planned, and God is the best of planners. This is in a passage describing how people, presumably Jews, were setting out to kill Jesus, and while they were deceiving those around them, God deceived them by making it look like Jesus was killed but in fact he was taken up to heaven temporarily and someone else, perhaps one of the plotters, was killed in his stead. Ibn al-‘Arabi asks the question whether, since God deceives, deceiver should be one of his names. Or derider (9:79) or schemer (86:16) or mocker (2:15). Or even shirt-maker (16:81). He points out the possibility of forming an active noun out of these verbs. Although these are all possible names, he implies that it would not be polite to use them for God (McAuliffe 2015: 433); see also 17:110.

3:65 (see also 3:65-6, 3:84, 3:93, 3:113-14, 3:199) You people of the Book! Why do you argue about Abraham … The Qur’an uses the Torah and the Gospels to argue with the Jews and Christians. This does not necessarily mean that these texts are accurate guides to earlier revelations, since it is often suggested in the Qur’an that

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they have over time changed and become corrupted (tahrif) (Leaman 2014: 151–3).

3:85 If anyone seeks a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted, he will be a loser in the hereafter. An exclusivist suggestion: only Muslims will be going to heaven. On the other hand, the suggestion might be that everyone who is a believer will eventually go to heaven, but the believers who are not Muslims, if there is such a category, will not get there quite as quickly as the latter.

3:103 And hold tight to the rope of God and be not disunited … The idea of the importance of unity is important and should be considered despite all the disputes and disagreements that arise within the Islamic community. Rulers were often referred to as the rope of God, a religious label to match the idea of them as khilafa, viceroys of God on earth. The significance of the concept of the habl Allah, the rope of God, is explored in Gaiser (2010: 124–9).

3:104 Let there be a nation of you, calling to what is good, and commanding what is good (ma‘ruf), and forbidding what is wrong (munkar); those are the prosperers. Is this a call for action or for words? This may seem a strange question, but the verse explicitly mentions words and not actions, and there are many other verses that mention words as opposed to action. There are many



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hadith which emphasize the need to act virtuously when we can, and when we cannot then we can at least speak and think correctly. For use of the same phrase see: You are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God … (3:110) They believe in God and the Last Day; they enjoin what is right, and forbid what is wrong; and they hasten in good works: they are in the ranks of the righteous. (3:114) The hypocrites, men and women, with each other, they enjoin evil, and forbid what is just, and are close with their hands …. (9:67) The believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil; they observe regular prayers, practice regular charity, and obey God and His messenger. (9:71) Those who, if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the right and forbid wrong: with God rests the end of affairs. (22:41) O my son! Establish regular prayer, enjoin what is just, and forbid what is wrong; and bear with patient constancy whatever happens to you; for this is how matters are resolved. (31:17) … for he commands them what is just and forbids them what is evil; he makes lawful for them what is good and prohibits them from what is bad; He releases them from their heavy burdens and from the fetters that are upon them … (7:157)

See Leaman (2014: 110–12).

3:134 Those … who restrain anger and pardon people. God loves those who do good. The acts of “restraining anger” and “pardoning people” are introduced as two important attributes of the righteous. This gives us an idea of the nature of God’s attitude towards His enemies, and perhaps suggests how His human beings should behave to others generally and especially when they have authority over them.

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3:138-42 Here is a plain statement to people, to guide and instruct those who fear God … Did you think that you would enter Heaven without God testing those of you who fought hard and remained steadfast? This is often related to the Battle of Uhud (AH 3/625 ce), a setback for the Muslims in their conflict with the inhabitants of Mecca. The reference here to the precarious nature of warfare is used by commentators to suggest that if God always helped the believers there would be no free choice between belief and its opposite (kufr).

3:140 … that God may know those who believe and that He may take to Himself martyrs/witnesses. The martyr’s death represents an indication (shahada) or witness of the truth of Islam. The shahid is both a martyr and a witness, as in 2:143: Thus we have appointed you as a nation in the middle, that you may be witnesses/shuhada against humanity and the messenger may be a witness/shahid against you, which could be read with 57:19: And the witnesses/martyrs are with the Lord.

3:159 It is part of the mercy of God that you deal gently with them. … consult them … The Prophet is told to consult with the defeated population of Mecca. The Prophet was said to have emphasized mildness in his dealings with people, even those who had been fighting him. On the other hand, there are many accounts of his behavior, which suggest ruthlessness was also present. Here the advice is to ask for forgiveness for enemies, since being harsh and uncompromising may alienate them. It is not clear whether this is supposed to be advice on how to behave in general or just in the earlier stages of conquest, especially the reference to consultation with the defeated population.



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3:162-3 Is one who has followed the pleasure of God like one who has earned the displeasure of God and whose abode is hell? It is an evil destination. There are grades with God … See also 37:154 and 17:57 for the identification of grades (daraja) with stages (maqam) (Ansari 1996: 60–1). Ansari wants to suggest that in just the same way that the Sufis see progress to spiritual advancement being a process along which there are certain stages, moral progress can be seen as being similar. God will observe and judge people in terms of their grade of virtue, and those higher up will be rewarded and vice versa.

3:169 And consider not those who were killed in the way of God to be dead. Rather they are alive, sustained in the presence of God. Death does not involve the end of the spirit and human consciousness (al-Ghazali 1989: 126). There is the notion of an afterlife in which those who deserve a reward find it and so death is merely a stage that they have to go through to get to their eventual reward.

3:173 “God is enough for us and how excellent a guardian He is!” Nursi was very fond of this verse and it demonstrates his great confidence in the ability of believers to feel that they know how they should behave in whatever circumstances they find themselves (Vahide 2011: 250). There are many examples of Muslims in difficult situations putting their lives in divine hands and being confident of the outcome. Nursi himself had a difficult life during the Republican governments and their hostility towards religion,

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and he seemed to have reconciled himself to these difficulties by thinking about the way in which God directs the affairs of the world. Problems should be seen as trials where God is going to assess what his creatures do and will organize things so that they come right in the end. Ibn al-‘Arabi (SD, 86) often cites this verse and it is a basic principle that this is that sort of attitude that Muslims should aim to adopt. It represents an advanced level of human development, where trust in God becomes total.

3:185 (see also 39:30 and 2:156) Every living being shall taste death … Thinking about death is a useful way of orienting our thinking in the right direction. See also 5:18. Not only will we all die, but eventually we will return to God and He will decide what our eventual fate will be, and this sort of thought encourages us to consider the value of our behavior and its wider consequences.

3:190 Look! In the creation of the heavens and the earth and in the change between night and day, these are signs for those who understand. Al-Bayḍawi discusses in his comments on this verse how certain people’s intellects would be more likely than others to perceive and grasp the signs of God’s power in nature through non-deductive processes. Specifically, it was the intellects that are freest from the blemishes of the senses (al-hiss) and the imagination (al-wahm) who are the intended recipients of the signs (Anwar, I:195). It is those whose souls were least corrupted from their original fitra or nature who are best at grasping the significance of God’s signs in nature. Those of uncorrupted intellect were those best suited to going beyond recognizing that nature was a manifestation of God’s wisdom to comprehending the manifestations of God’s wisdom in nature. Gutas suggests that fitra salima could be very close to hads (either ‘conjecture’ or ‘intuition’), suggesting that some intellects were better suited than others



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to grasping the workings of nature (Gutas 1988: 170). It is not at all clear though how non-deductive this process is, since for Ibn Sina intuition is the ability to run through the deductive structure of reality very quickly, perhaps by grasping all the claims that combine things with each other, the major premises, all at once, and then immediately seeing what the consequences will be when other premises are connected to them (Goodman 1992: 181).

4:11 A man’s share is double that of a woman … Fatima Mernissi suggests there was a discussion about this in the past, with some women arguing that this implied that when a man died, his sins were counted as twice what they really were! (McAuliffe 2015: 624). It is sometimes argued that this is equitable because previously women got nothing, and the financial obligations of men are greater than those of women, so it is reasonable for them to get more money in inheritance (Leaman 2014: 71–84).

4:28 … humanity was created weak … See also 70:19 and 21:37 for references to human frailty.

4:59 Obey God and obey the Prophet and those in authority among you … According to many Sunni views, the important thing to realize about government is that we are only vicegerents who rule on God’s behalf and in accordance with his law and practice, the sunna. God is first, the Prophet who puts the divine commandments into practice is second, and those who rule in accordance with the divine will and the sunna of the Prophet are third (Lambton 1980: 138–9).

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Najm al-din Razi dedicated his Mirsad al-‘ibad (Path of Devotees) to the Seljuk ruler of Rum and placed obedience to the king on a par with obedience to God and his prophet. This is an identification that came to be made quite often in Islamic history, and not only there of course. It is perhaps not surprising that questions of succession came to have such an enormous effect on the future direction of the community. It should be noted that the meaning of “those in authority among you” is highly contested in Islamic legal and political writings. One of many interpretations concludes that it refers to the temporal sovereign power. Other Qur’anic verses referring to the legitimacy of sovereign decisionmaking over the Muslim public include 4:83: When there comes to them some matter touching safety or fear, they broadcast it. If they had only referred it to the Messenger, or to those charged with authority among them, the proper investigators would have examined it. The hadith reports of the Prophet also confirm rewards to just rulers. Issues arise as to how far Muslims should obey the orders of evil rulers, even if they are Muslims.

4:79 Whatever good happens to you is from God, and whatever evil occurs to you is from yourself … This seems counter-intuitive, since what would one say if something very unpleasant happened for which one could see no fault at your end of things? The answer might well be that there is a reason for its happening which is known only to God, and that we should be sure that however things turn out, they will be for the best. There are many claims in the Book that suggest that God is behind everything that happens, so there would need to be some additional argument why the bad things ought to take place.

4:80 (see also 48:10, 3:31) Whoever obeys the Messenger, obeys God … The idea here is sometimes said to be that we can express our obedience and indeed love for God through following His laws. The Prophet transmits divine light to our world and through this light he calls on people to follow God’s orders and come close to His light.



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4:117-20 Not calling on Him, they call upon the female deities: They call upon Satan, the constant rebel. God did curse him, but he said: “I will take of Your servants a portion marked off; I will mislead them, and I will create in them false desires; I will order them to slit the ears of cattle, and to deface the nature created by God.” Whoever, forsaking God, takes Satan for a friend, has certainly suffered an obvious loss. Satan makes them promises, and creates in them false desires; but Satan’s promises are nothing but deception. This verse refers to pagans who turn their backs on God and seek assistance in the wrong direction. See also 53:19-20. Satan is scathing in his comments to God about humanity:

17:62: He said, “Do You see? This is the one whom You have honored above me! If You will just leave me unhindered until the Day of Judgment, I will surely bring his descendants under my sway, all but a few!” The response from God is found in the next ayas:

17:63-5: “Go your way; if any of them follow you, hell will be the inevitable recompense of you—an ample recompense. And arouse those whom you can among them, with your voice; make assaults on them with your cavalry and infantry, share with them wealth and children, and make promises to them.” But Satan promises them nothing but deceit.

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“As for My servants, no authority will you have over them”: Your Lord is all we need as a guardian. This point is repeated at 15:36-42 where God says He will leave Iblis alone and let him try to confuse people by making the evil look good to them, but those who are really faithful to God will remain unaffected by this.

He said: “Because You have discarded me, I will lie in wait for them on Your straight path: Then will I assault them from the front and the back, from their right and their left: Most of them are not grateful” (7:16-17). God says that anyone who falls for this will go to hell.

And Satan will say when the matter is decided: “It was God who gave you a promise of truth: I too promised, but I failed in my promise to you. I had no authority over you except to call you but you listened to me: then reproach not me, but reproach your own souls. I cannot listen to your cries, nor can you listen to mine. I reject your former act in associating me with God. For wrong-doers there must be a grievous penalty” (14:22). Satan is intent on enticing people away from the right path, and tries to tempt us with alternative possibilities. It is important to recognize that he does not have any direct power over us—only God has that sort of power— but what he can do is put ideas and doubts in our minds. This is a skill that often results in our going astray. This is what the following verses are trying to illustrate: “And on them did Satan prove true his idea, and they followed him, all but a party that believed. But he had no authority over them, except that We might test the man who believes in the hereafter from him who is in doubt concerning it: and your Lord watches over all things.” (34:20-1)



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When you read the Qur’an, seek God’s protection from Satan the rejected one. No authority has he over those who believe and put their trust in their Lord. His authority is over those who take him as a friend/protector and who join partners with God. (16:98-100) Verily Satan is an enemy to you: so treat him as an enemy. He only invites his adherents that they may become companions of the blazing fire. (35:6) If a suggestion from Satan assails you, seek refuge with God; for He hears and knows. Those who fear God, when a thought of evil from Satan assaults them, bring God to remembrance, and then they see! But their brethren plunge them deeper into error, and never relax. (7:200-02)

The Qur’an makes a sharp distinction between being a believer and being a bad person. Believers cannot be bad, since if they are bad, they cannot be regarded as believers. God allows Satan to try to tempt people away from belief, which he will continue to do until the Day of Judgment, as part of the process of testing us. On the other hand, surely Satan himself is a believer in the sense that he believes in God, since if he did not, what is the point of arguing with Him on the issue of how Adam should be treated? The issue of who could be classified as a believer in Islam came to be very controversial in theology, since some argued that it is for God to decide who is a believer, not us. In any case, someone could be a believer and just not able to convert their belief into practice, presumably, or make a significant mistake in what they are supposed to do, although as the examples get more extreme the case seems less plausible.

4:125 God did choose Abraham to be His friend. Al-Ghazali speculates on how strange it is that God should be intimate with His creation. He also quotes: He spoke to him directly (4:164), referring to Moses, Jesus was God’s word and spirit (4:171), and Adam was chosen by God (3:33) (1989: 216). The fact that God is close to his creatures is what makes it possible, and tempting, for us to think of Him in rather human terms. It is not just that He is close to important people such as messengers and prophets; we are told that He is close to all creation. On the other hand, there are many verses in which this intimacy is emphasized and made much of by Sufis: the idea that God is close to us is something that is easy to understand rationally but not personally, and one of the tasks of religion is to help its followers understand this claim in an emotional manner.

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4:126 But to God belong everything in heaven and earth. And He encompasses (muhit) everything. Nasr takes muhit to refer to the environment and to mean that we should value it since it belongs to God (1993: 131). See also 17:44, 7:172, 47:38. Some thinkers take the fact that God has created everything and it all belongs to Him as an indication that we should not worry about the environment, since whatever He wants to happen to it will eventually happen anyway. We do not have to look after it since if it gets used up or harmed then God will help us with the future by doing things to make nature once more usable by us. This is not a conclusion that Nasr draws—on the contrary—but it is not obvious that divine ownership of the world provides us with any special duty of care to it just because we are His representatives. That is a very human way of looking at the relationship between God and the world.

4:157 What is certain is that he was not killed. Jesus was not killed but taken up to heaven. Someone was crucified in his place, and in the literature this is sometimes said to be one of the Jews who was trying to have him killed (Leaman 2014: 153–4).

4:164-5 … messengers we have already told you about … messengers who brought good news to humanity and warned them, so that they might have no argument against God after their coming … If people were not free in their choices, their argument against God—that they had no guidance—would not become invalid after God sent the messengers, since if they were compelled in their actions, it would make no difference whether or not they received guidance.



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According to the text, prophets have existed in all societies and it mentions certain revelations like the Tawrat or Torah, the Injil or Gospel, not Gospels, and the Zabur or Psalms. The Book also mentions that these scriptures have been corrupted over time, yet notes that God has revealed messages to all peoples. Presumably, the early revelations had an effect on the actions and beliefs of people prior to the Qur’an, since they constituted their only access to monotheism, but it does raise the issue of justice, of course. If earlier revelations are important, but the message has come to be damaged over time, have the people who rely on those messages really received the warning that they need and deserve? It is tempting to blame the original people for the damage to the original message, but then the consequences of those actions fall on innocent people later, perhaps, and that does not seem very fair. Even the Qur’an itself has problems in the sense that it is given for the whole world but it is apparently first of all addressed to Arabs: a Book of revelations well expounded, an Arabic Qur’an for those who understand (41:3). Its restricted nature is brought out by its central claim of the inimitability of its language as one of the strongest proofs of its genuineness. This claim may have been impressive in the environment of seventh-century Arabia, but one wonders if even in the Arabic-speaking world it still resonates with the same status. Increasing levels of literacy might challenge its status as a wonderful and unparalleled type of writing, and once it has to be read by those outside of the Arabic-speaking world there are difficulties in knowing what to make of the claim of the perfection of the language, since it is only by learning the language that they will indeed grasp it and those inimitability claims. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that the issue of language has not been an obstacle to non-Arabs embracing Islam, and the various translations of the Book, unsatisfactory though they are by comparison with the original, like all translations, have continued to resonate with a new and growing public. The fact that new believers may need to learn a new language, and not an easy one for many of them, has not put people off, nor even the prospect of learning to pray in a language they do not fully comprehend. Some people like religion to be difficult and they are attracted to Islam perhaps because it is tough in some ways by comparison with other religions. Although the Qur’an emphasizes how easy it is for the original Arabs to understand and follow the text given its literary nature, that is not true for many subsequent Muslims, yet religions often appeal to different audiences for different reasons, and for many believers the idea of a religion with counter-cultural rules of behavior and a distinct language that needs to be learned or at least vocalized for prayer is attractive.

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4:164 God spoke directly to Moses. This is taken to emphasize that God directly spoke (takliman) and it was not majaz or isti‘ara, figurative language or metaphor. This is an important issue since if the Qur’an is just a metaphorical illustration of divine truth, it lacks that connection with God directly. Many theologians argued that the Qur’an could not be divine speech since speech is an accident, and God cannot be the source of accidents (Sells 1996: passim). Moses was unusual in being communicated with directly, though, although the animals in The Case of the Animals suggest that one of the advantages they have over human beings is the fact that God communicates with them directly (Ep 22, 258). See 16:68 for divine communication with bees, and 24:41 for His knowledge of everything.

4:166 But God bears witness that what He has sent to you He has sent based on knowledge … See also 11:14, 35:11, and 2:255, which all refer to divine knowledge, while 41:15 and 51:58 relate the message He sends to describe His power. Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari says that in all such verses God establishes Himself as the origin of the attributes of knowledge and power, and part of his essence. The uses of the Arabic expressions like al-hayy, al-‘alim, al-qadir, and so on, mean what they usually mean in Arabic, and he concludes that this means they must be part of the divine essence and really describe God.

4:171 O people of the Book, do not go to excess in religion, and do not speak about God except the truth … Ibn al-‘Arabi suggests that there are two aspects of practice, one that is linked with the senses and one with the intellect. There are also two sides



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to knowledge, intellectual and legal, and each needs to be weighed by God when He gives it to His creatures. Hence the references to the importance of getting the balance right. The aya goes on to criticize the idea of the Trinity, perhaps taking it to be excessive in its multiplication of deities. The verse includes the instruction: say not “Three” … He is glorified above having a son … The Qur’an is adamant that Jesus is not the son of God, and that thinking of God as having children is to make inappropriate anthropomorphic claims about the deity. See also 5:72-3. Getting the balance right means that we should neither transgress nor fall short. The fact that a balanced approach is available does not mean that it is easy to achieve or practice. There is a tendency for human beings to get the balance wrong or misinterpret it, and the Book is there to help guide us in the right way of action and belief (Futuhat, 3:6).

5:3 Today I have perfected your religion for you, completed my grace upon you and chosen Islam as your religion … But for Taha (1967) this is an ideal that is yet to be established. In fact, no group of people yet deserve to be called Muslims: they have not behaved well enough. On the other hand, this passage might be a signaling of the fact that God was calling the last revelation Islam and prioritizing it as compared with the other religions that were around then: the vaguely respectable monotheistic faiths that nonetheless do not possess all the features of a correct form of monotheism such as one observes in Islam. It is said here that eating all cattle is permitted with the exception of carrion and a variety of other conditions apply like animals who have been sacrificed to gods, used in divination and so on. ‘Abd al-Jabbar concludes that since God says we can do it, so it is good, even for the cattle themselves. It cannot be that their pain is a punishment, since what could they be being punished for? Nor could it be to avert greater harm to them, since they are killed and there can be no greater harm. He concludes that they must then be compensated in the next world for their undeserved sufferings in this, After all at 6:38 it refers to animals being gathered to God (Heemskerk 2000: 167).

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5:5 (see also 2:168, 2:172, and 5:87) This day things that are good and pure have been made lawful for you … This has led to the general principle that provided something is clean and pure, it is prima facie going to be halal, unless we are told of a reason why not. The category of halal falls under a broader category of good, tayyib, or pure, a term which applies also to behavior (23:51), work (2:267), speech (22:24), and people (24:26), and even buildings (9:23, 61:12). The terms are connected often in the Qur’an, and 5:4: … They ask you what is halal, say, what is tayyib … . They are linked also at 2:167, 5:87, 7:157, 4:160. The opposite of halal is haram: “He has explained to you in detail what is forbidden to you” (6:119). As with so much of Islam, the organization of right and wrong is not supposed to be onerous or unduly restrictive. Islam is supposed to be the happy medium between being materialistic like the Jews and too spiritual like the Christians.

5:32 (see also 49:13) If anyone kills a person, unless it is for murder or spreading mischief in the land, it is as though he has killed everyone … There is a variety of ways in which these lines may be interpreted. Al-Tabari, by reference to a selection of hadith, suggests that the decree is universal and not binding only on the Jewish community; second, that the rule has a rational justification (a moral conclusion from the first murder of one of Adam’s sons by another); and third, that the verse means that punishment for murder must be extreme and cannot possibly be increased by further acts of murder (al-Tabari n.d.: 233). On the other hand, the Shi‘i Abu al-Futuh al-Razi provides a different interpretation of the verse emphasizing that penal laws function primarily as a deterrent, and that the literaI implementation of penal codes is not the goal of the lawmaker; they serve as a moral reminder to the Muslim society (1983: 139). Al-Zamakhshari’s interpretation is similar. By restricting the scope of corruption on earth mentioned in the verse, he limits the exception to the rule and maintains



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the gravity of the offense (n.d.: 627). It is important to prevent the notion of spreading mischief or corruption in the land from becoming too wide, since in that case it becomes a way of punishing harshly a whole range of activities that seem quite minor in themselves.

5:44 … if any fail to judge by what God has revealed, they are unbelievers. This point is emphasized again at 5:45, 5:47, 12:40, 6:79. These are all passages used by Sayyid Qutb to argue that basing any judgment on a source which is not divine is an aspect of shirk.

5:48 … compete with one another in good works … This suggests, since it is addressed to everyone, that there is a general concept of goodness common among everyone. But Sachedina accepts that there are other plausible interpretations which see it as more exclusionary (2001: 232). After all, the way one defines good works could be religiously based in such a way that it points to a particular religion.

5:51 God does not guide an unjust people. The comment comes at the end of a verse advising Muslims to be careful of making friends with and agreements with Jews and Christians. The implication is that if God disapproves of these groups of people He will no longer guide them; in a sense they have rejected the guidance by this stage perhaps in rejecting the Prophet, and so for Muslims to follow them will be to follow people whom God no longer guides. On the whole, following people who do not know where they are going is a bad idea. On the other hand, perhaps people who are unjust are precisely the people who need guidance? The implication could well be though that someone who is unjust is unable

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to recognize guidance in any case, and so it is a waste of time to supply it (Leaman 2014: 158–60).

5:54 He loves them, and they love Him ... According to this verse, God and human beings share in the attribute of love, so each side is the lover and beloved of the other. Rumi sometimes makes this point in the Mathnawi where a lover is said to seek the object of his love only if he or she is seeking him, where if you are thirsty the water is said to be looking for a drinker, and so on. Everything appears to be reciprocal (Mathnawi, iii, 4393–9; Sufi Path, 209). This is a very impressive piece of language but is it actually true? Does love have to be reciprocal? Rumi gives the example that one hand cannot clap by itself, but this is not much of a proof. In the ideal sense, it looks like it does and there is something very satisfying in the idea of love being returned and requited. Often this does not occur though, and the idea here is that if we approach God in the right sort of way, then He will respond. The kind of temporary emotional arrangements we make with other human beings is very different from the sort of relationship we can and indeed should try to establish with the deity. In a sense, God directs the search for Him, in the sense that He is behind all action in any case, and will respond when He is called upon, as the Qur’an constantly claims. Al-Ghazali suggests that when love is used to refer to God it means someone who loves goodness for all creation, treats them kindly, and blesses them. He contrasts it with the divine name of the merciful with the difference that mercy is shown to those who are in dire need of mercy, while the actions of God as loving do not require this. As he says, “blessing in the first place is a fruit of love” (Names, 122). Fakhr al-Din al-Razi makes a similar point about this verse. When we say that He loves His servant, this means that He wants to send good things to him and help him. On this interpretation, it is like mercy, except that mercy requires someone who is weak and in need of mercy, while love does not; rather, the object of love may be a person who has plenty of it already, and in fact this is often the case. The second possible meaning is that He is loving, in the sense that He causes people to love one another, as He says: …for them the Compassionate One shall appoint love (19:96). A third possibility is that the word for love (wadud) is a passive participle, in which case,



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God is beloved by the hearts of His friends because of the great favor He shows them. (1976: 273–4)

The Qur’an often uses the idea of the qalb or heart to describe a mode of reflective contemplation as in 50:37, 7:179, 13:28, 22:46.

5:64 The Jews say “God’s hand is tied.” Be their hands tied up and be they cursed for what they say. No, both His hands are outstretched, He gives and spends as He pleases… The Ash‘arites takes this to mean that God literally has hands. See also the references to divine hands at 17:29, 3:73, 57:29. It could be a criticism of the view of God held by Jews, where His ability to act is constrained by what He has done in the past. The Qur’an has a process of abrogation in terms of which earlier revelations can be abrogated in favor of later and better ones. This leads to problems in knowing which verses abrogate which, although there are of course within Islamic jurisprudence techniques for solving such issues, often based on determinations of asbad al-nuzul, the occasions of the revelations that make up the Qur’an. In this sura there is a lot of criticism of the People of the Book sticking to their revelations and not moving onto Islam which really is the appropriate step for them. They argue that they will continue to rely on the revelations that their communities received, and the suggestion is that they doubt the genuineness of the message of the Qur’an, as though God could not give any more revelations, His hands being tied. But Islam sees the Qur’an as being merely a confirmation of earlier messages and the final and best formulation of the word of God (2:75, 9:6) or words (6:115, 7:158, 10:64, 18:27, 18:109, 31:27). The suggestion is that God recognized the need for another messenger to be sent given the poor performance of the communities who had received earlier messages. The idea that He might be unable to do so implies a lack of power in Him and is in itself an indication of the need for another messenger.

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5:66 Had they upheld the Torah and the Gospel and what was sent down to them by their Lord, they would have eaten from what was above them, and what was beneath their feet … Kashani takes the reference to the food above them to be the potential connections between superior ways of thinking, and what is below them to be knowledge of the physical world (Heart, 228).

5:68 “O people of the Book! You have no ground to stand upon unless you stand fast to the Torah, the Gospel and all the revelation that has come to you from your Lord.” It is the revelation that comes to you from your Lord that increases in most of them their obstinacy and blasphemy … The implication is that many Jews and Christians are not faithful to their holy books and in rejecting the Qur’an perhaps they fail to understand them properly so really they cannot be faithful to them anyway. The next verse refers to the Jews, Christians, and Sabians:

5:69 All who believe in God and the last day and work righteousness, on them shall be no fear, nor will they grieve. This could mean that people in this category are regarded as believers and can look forward to an eventual reward: and that is how it is often interpreted. But the following verses are quite critical of such people and perhaps the implication is that they do not really believe in the right things,



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they only think they do. It is important for what happens to such people eventually to be just that they have an opportunity to acquire a correct view of how things really are. It might be the case that before the Prophet came to give the last message, earlier generations of believers have the possibility of ending up well, since it would be unfair for them to be denied that possibility given the fact that they are living up to the message from God which they then received. Yet for those who received but rejected the last message the situation is not quite so clear (Leaman 2014: 161–75).

5:75 Christ the son of Mary was no more than a messenger … They both had to eat their food … Christians are often taken to agree that before the coming of Jesus, the son of Mary, there were other prophets (for example, Moses, Abraham, Noah, etc.). After mentioning that Jesus the son of Mary was a messenger and that his mother was a righteous woman, why did God mention that “They both ate food”? In this verse, there is an argument and an attempted refutation of divinity. If Jesus and his mother were in need of food, it meant that their bodies both required sustenance, as human bodies do. But requiring food to continue to exist is a deficiency and how could anything divine be said to be deficient? This is not a particularly strong argument, since Christians regard it as an advantage that Jesus is a man, for part of his life anyway. In that case, what seems to be a deficiency actually works out as an advantage.

5:83 When they hear what has been sent down to the messenger, you see their eyes overflowing with tears because they know it to be true … What they hear Ansari divides up into three categories: There is knowledge of being, knowledge of the divine attributes, and knowledge of how to behave. The first he calls the door of Islam, the second the door of faith, and the third the door of sincerity. The third gate is in many ways what he

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sees as the aim of the believer, representing a place that beautifies the heart, expands joy and the sensation of love (Wisdom of Sufism, 198). This third gate is the sort of knowledge referred to at 18:65 and describing Khidr: “And We taught him knowledge of Our presence.” Theoretical knowledge is apprehension of the light of the divine essence and its attributes, whereas mystical knowledge is awareness of spiritual realities and words from God directly and without intermediation (Wisdom of Sufism, 199). At 48:10 God tells the Prophet: Those who swear allegiance to you swear allegiance to God: ‘Ayn al-Qudat suggests this means that seeking to know our own souls involves a grasp also of Muhammad’s soul (Wisdom of Sufism, 200). Whoever does not know God in this world will not know Him in the next (17:72). God will not recognize them: They forgot themselves so He forgot them (9:67), unlike those mentioned at 6:103: No vision can grasp Him but He can understand all vision, which ‘Ayn al-Qudat takes to mean that we can have very little knowledge (Wisdom of Sufism, 202–4). Ruzbihan points out how difficult it is to approach God in the right way. When believers are told at 33:41, “Remember God with much remembrance,” we need to reflect that to think of someone eternal with our contingent minds is impossible; in fact we have to try to remember Him using His form of remembrance, in so far as we can (Wisdom of Sufism, 142–3).

5:87 O you who believe! Do not make unlawful the good things which God has made lawful for you, but do no excess, for God does not love those given to excess. This can be seen as an instruction not to go to extremes. In criticizing the status of humanity, Iblis acted excessively, rather than waiting patiently to see how this new creation would work out (Kurzman 1998: 196–9). Al-Qaradawi argues for the Islamic duty to act moderately, since he identifies wasat or the middle path with the straight path of the Qur’an at 6:126. This straight path is mentioned in all the daily prayers, and it is his argument that the straight path is equivalent to acquiring a moderate disposition to our behavior. The whole structure of Islam contributes to this aim.



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There are references in the Qur’an as to how one should conduct debates with those of other and no faith (16:125, 29:46, 6:152) and we know it is incumbent on Muslims to present their views to those who need to know them. The idea of the tahaddi al-Qur’an, the challenge of the Qur’an, is often identified with establishing its miraculous origins and wonderful language. It might also be linked with trying to argue that Islam represents the most balanced and moderate way of living, with the Qur’an as its source, and so that tahaddi is not only to the non-Muslims but also to Muslims, to prove that they do in fact act in accordance with the straight path of moderation. It is not always clear what the moderate action is in a particular situation, but a useful connection that the Qur’an makes here is one between moderation and patience (sabr). One aspect of the tahaddi here for Muslims might be to show that they are more patient than others, unlike Iblis, for example. This has implications both for belief and practice, of course. Does the verse suggest that a believer could be over-enthusiastic in his attitude to Islam? It might since Islam sets out to advocate a balanced lifestyle in which the body as well as the soul play a role, and any excessive concentration on one at the expense of the other might raise suspicion of falling foul of this aya: hence, the many criticisms of believers or apparent believers like Sufis or Shi‘i who sometimes are involved in rituals that make very strenuous physical demands on them, like constant fasting or flagellation.

5:104 What! Even though their fathers had no knowledge whatsoever, and no guidance. See also 2:170 on which Shah Waliullah comments that this shows that general agreement on some issue is of no value unless it is based on the Qur’an. He uses 9:31, “They took their rabbis and monks as lords besides God,” to suggest not that this is literally true but that they relied on their judgment, which was a mistake since it is based on nothing solid. It is like the problem of shirk or idolatry because instead of relying on what they were told by God (in the Qur’an) some people rely on Jewish and Christian authorities whose grasp of the truth is very slight since their sources are so muddled (McAuliffe 2015: 249–50). Although Muslims often regard Islam as traditional, we need to remember that in its day at the time of the Prophet it was revolutionary and called for

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a complete moral and religious transformation of the lives of its adherents. In particular, it involved going against the practices that were popular and indeed traditional at the time, and in this verse God is suggesting that there is no point in basing anything on tradition unless one has grounds for thinking that that tradition is based on something solid. On the other hand, Islam made use of prevailing customs in many ways, and adapted its message to them, thus blending the old with the new. Religions often do this.

5:109 … knower of the things unseen (‘allam al-ghuyub). See also 72:26 and 74:31: None but He knows His hosts …, which the Brethren of Sincerity/Ikhwan al-Safa’ take to mean that everywhere and at every time there is some being acknowledging the majesty of God (Ep 22, 310). They make reference to everywhere in the seven heavens and clearly have in mind the whole of creation being connected to its creator. See also 69:18 and 11:6 for divine knowledge of everything, even what is hidden.

6:35 Had God so wished, He would have united them in guidance so do not be among the ignorant. Tariq Ramadan in his Western Muslims and the Future of Islam links this with 10:99 which repeats the point that God could have made everyone a believer and adds “Is it for you to force people to be believers?”; while 5:48 also repeats that point and concludes He is testing us and invites us to compete in good works. But would not the world be a better place if everyone agreed on the important aspects of belief and practice? Verses 2:251 and 22:40 suggest not, since if only one group dominated everything it would lead to corruption. So there is no compulsion in religion (2:256) and we are told to use the variety of people who exist to encourage them to find out about each other (49:13). This suggests that interreligious dialogue is something that Islam advocates and so Muslims should be prepared to discuss their religious views with those of others (McAuliffe 2015: 648–59).



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6:39 Those who reject Our signs are deaf and dumb … If people are looking for miraculous signs in order to determine whether the message of the Prophet is indeed true, they should look around with open and attentive eyes. If they do so they will find the world full of such signs, we are often told. If they regard any species of animal or plant, they can only admire the perfection of its organization. They will become aware of how its structure and characteristics are in complete alignment with its natural requirements. They will also observe how appropriate the arrangements are for providing it with food. This is just one of the many other signs of God, and one would see how true the message of Islam is concerning the attributes of God and the implication is that it is indeed necessary to live a righteous life in conformity with what we can derive of His nature. When the pagans of Mecca demanded “signs” or miracles from the Prophet, the Qur’an’s usual response was to point out the complexity, the regularity, and the order of nature itself, and to emphasize that the universe and all that is in it could not have brought themselves into existence. This claim appears to rest on the assumption, or rather seeks to prove, that the same God who created nature and displayed His wisdom in it so clearly has also revealed the verses (ayat, also meaning “signs”) of the Qur’an. Thus, Muhammad’s claim of prophecy stood vindicated. Thus, whereas natural miracles are, in a sense, weak for most of mankind and in the Qur’an are usually called simply ayat, the historical miracles, the supernatural miracles, and much more patently the revelation are called ayat bayyinat, or simply bayyinat: clear, manifest, and indubitable signs. Previous nations had been shown supernatural miracles at the hands of their prophets exactly as they had demanded them, but the people still rejected the prophets. Similarly, if Muhammad were to bring a thousand miracles to the Meccans or to Jews, it still would do them no good. The demonstration of life after death, the incidence of the quickening of four birds for Abraham (2:260), the birth of a child to the infertile wife of Zechariah (3:37), the miraculous birth of Jesus (3:40, 3:47), Saleh’s she-camel (17:59), numerous miracles of Moses (17:101-2, 20:40, 20:67-70), Job’s (Ayyub) striking the ground with his foot and flowing of a spring (21:83) are some examples of miracles narrated by the Qur’an. On the other hand, the belief in the veracity of miracles is sometimes regarded as not something that can be observed by just anyone. It is not a matter of cognition and hence

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not a matter of our sense-based limited rationality. We need to be looking at the world in the right sort of way for miracles to be visible: after all, at 17:85 there is: O men, you have been granted very little knowledge and we are endowed with as much knowledge only as we are capable of understanding and utilizing. A knowledge of the nature of soul is very difficult to acquire, as stated in 6:57: Judgment is God’s alone, and see also 12:40, 12:67. ‘Ali is supposed to have said that the Qur’an is recorded script, bound between two covers, and it does not speak. Only men give voice to it; the source is the historian M. Abu Mikhnaf (d. AH 157/ 773–4 ce) (Tabari 1970: 5:66). The Kharijis criticized him for being prepared to go to mediation in his dispute with Mu‘awiya, while the verses suggest that judgment is for God alone. He thus placed himself outside the community for them. This seems rather harsh, for will not God’s judgment make itself known through the workings of humanity? And if so then it was entirely proper of ‘Ali to approach the arbitrators and hope his claim would be favorably received. In the context the phrase occurs in here, it seems to mean that only God knows when the Day of Judgment is to come, which is hardly surprising. Verse 12:40 suggests that it is for God to command worship, and 12:67 that it is for Him to control our destiny. These various formulations of la inna al-hukma lila illahi are that Muslims and even Muhammad are supposed to wait patiently for God’s decree (52:48, 68:48, 76:24). Ironically, the slogan has often become in recent times an indication of political activism. For Qutb this and similar verses meant that only relying on God in all things is the Islamic path.

6:59 With Him are the keys of the unseen, the treasures that only He knows. He knows whatever is on the earth or in the sea. No leaf falls without his knowledge, no seed in the darkness of the earth, no wet or dry thing but in a clear record. This means that nothing in existence is unknown to God and many of those things have been described by Him, through a messenger or perhaps also in the evidence we see around of us of His creation and its nature. See also 11:8.



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The philosopher of the Jinn (Case, 116/Ep 22, 200) comments on this passage that it shows that what we see around us are merely copies or simulacra of what really exists, behind the veil of perception, and which only God knows entirely. Razi (Jaffer 2015: 42–4) takes this to refer to the desirability of symbols when addressing the community at large.

6:75 So We showed Abraham the power and the laws of the heavens and the earth, that he might be certain. God does not show Abraham the heavens to encourage him to believe in them, just the God they reveal. This is Ibn Rushd’s line on design, which is that the evidence of what is visible points to the existence of something lying behind it (Genequand 1984: 46, 166).

6:78 When he saw the sun rising in splendor he said “This is my Lord, this is the greatest …” When the sun sets, and so is no longer so splendid, Abraham realizes that he is mistaken and he no longer associates anything with God as having power over matter. Al-Ghazali discusses the suggestion which he attributes to Sufis that this should not be literally taken to be true, since by the sun and other references to planets is meant luminous essences which exist in a hierarchy and cannot actually be perceived. Surely, Abraham of all people would not have had to experience the setting of the sun before he came to appreciate its subsidiary role in the direction of the world? After all, earlier at 6:75 God had shown him the hidden realities of the heavens and the earth. Al-Ghazali is not convinced by this argument; although he implies he is happy to accept the allegorical interpretation, there is no reason to think that the literal reading is incompatible with it. After all, Abraham was young in the account of his looking at the heavens, and for al-Ghazali, although this is not something he mentions here, experience is an important part of

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knowledge (Griffel 2009: 253). Of even the Prophet, God reports that He found him wandering and gave him guidance (93:7). Ibn al-‘Arabi sees this passage as supporting the idea of divine unity. Abraham keeps on trying to find a thing that can be called the source of everything, and this needs to be something that is independent of everything else, otherwise it is just part of creation itself. First, he thinks it is the stars, then the moon, and finally the sun, but they are all subject to change and periodically go out of sight. They cannot be the cause of everything, Abraham infers, nor can they be partners in whatever is such a cause. The problem here is to counter tashbih, comparing God with other things, and Abraham comes to understand this (Futuhat, 2:289). However, it is also the case we do need to compare God with other things to get some idea of Him. Ibn al-‘Arabi points to 42:11: There is nothing like Him, He is the seeing, the hearing, which seems to go in both directions at once, denying similarity but asserting it at the same time (SD, 75). Tanzih, the incomparability of God, and tashbih, its reverse, seem to be combined. Ibn al-‘Arabi suggests this shows that we cannot rely on only reason to work out how to understand this, since rationality alone will not allow us to make progress here. We need faith and also the ability not to rely exclusively on looking at the world for evidence of God and his nature. Ibn al-‘Arabi was impressed with the verse 3:97: God is independent of the world, since that meant to him that the world, the source of proof for the existence of God, does not reflect that aspect of God where we can know nothing about Him, God, no doubt as He appears to Himself. We need to hold in our minds the idea of a deity whom we can know and yet who has to remain unknown to us (Futuhat, I, 439). It is a bit like the barzakh of course, where two different things are together and yet do not mingle with each other, since they are so different, but they do not go to make up something else. One just has to grasp the idea of their coexistence, and also accept that although they are different, they are part of just one thing.

6:83 That was the reasoning about Us that we gave to Abraham to use against his people … What is the reasoning? According to al-Ghazali, it is that God cannot just go in and out of contact with his world as happens when objects in the



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sky are visible and then invisible; see 6:76. It is not clear how good this proof is since Abraham seems to base it on prior knowledge of God (6:80) and the fact that He does not have partners is derived from the fact of movement in the sky (al-Ghazali 1909: 52–4). But just because something in the sky goes out of sight does not prove it no longer has power over everything else.

6:90 … follow therefore their guidance … According to Chelebi, al-Taftazani argued that this does not mean that people should follow Abraham, just the religion of Abraham (Chelebi 1957: 114). As 22:77 makes clear, the instruction is to follow Islam, as upheld by Abraham (Chelebi 1957: 115).

6:103 (see also 42:11) Vision cannot perceive Him at all, yet He perceives the vision … According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, since He is pure light, it is impossible for anyone else to perceive Him, yet He can see Himself, being of the appropriate constitution to do so (Sufi Path, 14). These all suggest God cannot be a thing, according to Jahm ibn Safwan. He thinks that calling God a thing is to compare Him with other things. It also limits Him. Denying that He is a thing is to question the anthropomorphic language frequently found in the Book and in particular denies He has attributes. It also suggests that the Qur’an is created. In his Kashf, Ibn Rushd links this passage with 42:11 and 24:35 and suggests that it is an indication of the significance of analogy in the language of the Qur’an (2011: 89, 96–7, 107).

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6:115 Perfected is the word of your Lord in truth and justice. Nothing can change His word, He is the hearer, the knower. Despite such pronouncements, Arkoun argues that we should deconstruct the Qur’an and all our preconceptions. He argued that this did not mean changing any of the words, but reinterpreting them to fit into contemporary circumstances, as had always happened in the past. But if it is perfect why does it need reinterpreting? The argument might go that although that it is perfect is a constant fact, how it is perfect needs to be explained for each time and place. If a religion and its text is going to remain relevant then it needs to be flexible and the major religions have survived for as long as they have due to their adaptability in times of change (Kurzman 1998: 205–21).

6:122 “Is he then who was dead and whom We gave life and set for him a light to walk among the people like someone in the depth of darkness from which he cannot emerge?” Life finds its contrary in death, where the body dies but the soul does not. But death is not like ‘adam (nothing), although it seems to be like that, since it is a separation from the source of life. Ibn al-‘Arabi attaches to it the special meaning conveyed by the Qur’an, comparing life and death to light and darkness because “death” occurs when the spirit, through which the body experiences the life presented by the sensory world, departs and is no longer joined to the body. He calls this “joining” the cause of life whereas death overcomes the soul because of lack of knowledge, based on the idea that only in “knowledge” is there true life (SD, 160, 161).



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6:125 Those whom God wishes to guide, He opens his breast to Islam … Al-Ghazali suggests one knows when this has happened when an individual turns against this world and concentrates on the fact of death before dying. Verse 67:2: He who created life and death to test you. Which of you is best in works? And the answer al-Ghazali gives is again the person who considers death, which is at 74:35-7: a warning to humanity, to whichever of you wants to go forward or to hold back. It is not clear whether what he has in mind is that the individual thinks about death and so starts to think about what leads up to it, and its consequences, and then God helps him by making it easier for him to continue along with the thought experiment, or is it God who opens up the path to the individual to carry out that sort of thinking in the first place (Watt 1994: 24).

6:129 We subject the unjust to one another, just as they deserve. Apparently carnivores only eat people who deserve to be eaten (Ep 22, 268), or so the representative of the predators suggests.

6:130 They will bear witness against themselves … In this aya the word for self, nafs, is used twice in the plural, anfusina. A variety of words in the Qur’an can be identified with the concept of soul. In the literature of the jahiliyya (pre-Islamic period), nafs often means the self or person, and ruh means “breath” and “wind.” In the Qur’an, nafs more specifically refers to the soul, whereas ruh is used for a special angel or messenger as well as a divine quality. Nafs and its plurals, anfus and nufus, refer to five notions. In most cases they mean the human self or person, as above. Sometimes nafs refers to God. It can also mean the human soul:

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“While the angels stretch forth their hands, ‘send forth your souls [anfus]’” (6:93). The notion of the soul has three characteristics: It is ammara bi ’l- su’, or commanding to evil (12:53). The concept represents human physicality and is linked with al-hawa, which, in the sense of “desire,” is always evil—it must be controlled and restricted, and its scope restrained. The nafs is lawwama—that is, it criticizes (75:2) the souls (anfus) of deserters. The Qur’an also calls the soul mutma’ina (tranquil) (89:27). These three terms form the basis of much of later Muslim ethics and psychology.

6:148 “Had God so willed, we would not have ascribed divinity to anything but Him nor would our forefathers; and neither would we have declared as forbidden anything.” Even so did those who lived before them give the lie to the truth—until they came to taste Our punishment! Say: “Have you any knowledge? You follow but conjectures, and all you do is guess.” This is what the idolaters argued. They suggest that it is God’s fault that they are idolaters. The Book suggests that had they closely examined their idolatrous opinions they would have realized they were not based on anything solid.

6:149 Say “to God belongs the convincing argument” … Thus the Qur’an frequently declares its own argumentative perfection, and also the perspicuity of the arguments so that they can all easily be understood, for it declares: Thus God makes plain to you His revelations, so that you may give thought (2:266), and claims bluntly: This Book is not to be doubted (2:2). Despite these assertions, the Book is not always that easy to understand or see what the implications it has for our behavior are. On top of this, we are told at 3:7 there are clear verses and some that are not so clear. We are not left entirely to our own devices in working out how



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to understand what we read or hear, since according to 2:213: God guides whom He will to a straight path. It probably does not mean that a confused reader or listener is someone whom God wishes to perplex.

6:152 We never charge anyone with what is beyond his capacity … The Qur’an refers to taklif or charging—the taking on of obligations—and it appears here in the claim that God does not impose the impossible on humanity (see also 7:42, 23:62, 2:286, 65:7, 2:233). According to ‘Abd al-Jabbar, divine action is directed to informing people about the obligations they have and to motivating them to fulfill those obligations. Sending prophets is a lutf, a sort of device to help us, as is pain. Acts of God are altaf. God acts with grace in providing us with assistance (Hourani 1971).

6:160 Whoever comes with one good shall receive ten times what he brings, and whoever comes with one will only receive the recompense for that. They will not be wronged. The world has been created and is maintained primarily by divine mercy rather than by justice. In other words, justice alone is not enough to explain what happens in the world. We are told: Were God to take mankind to task because of what they have earned, He would not leave any living being on its back! But He respites them until a specified time, and when their time comes, God indeed sees best His servants (35:45). The same notion is echoed in another verse: Were God to hasten evil for mankind with their haste for good, their term would have been over (10:11). The idea is that if the world were organized to respond to how human beings behave, a very sorry state of affairs would emerge. Fortunately for us, God is patient and always prepared to forgive us for our actions. Our haste for good here is not moral good, but the ways in which we try to make things better for us and the speed with which we try to do it.

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The same idea is very much a trope in the Qur’an, divine grace as the sole cause of the world’s survival: Were it not for God’s grace and His mercy upon you in this and the next world, a great punishment would have come to you for what you rushed into (24:14). Verses 10, 20, and 21 of the same sura and a few other verses in other Qur’anic chapters repeat the same notion with similar phraseology of “were it not for God’s grace” a variety of disasters would have struck different groups of people. The central idea here is that God gives without having in mind a narrow concept of who deserves what, since if He thought in those terms hardly anyone would get anything. Does that mean that God gives haphazardly or unfairly in his distribution of benefits and troubles? Should He not carry out such a distribution on the basis of desert, as surely happens in the next world? We are told: Were God to expand the provision for His servants, they would surely create havoc on the earth. But He sends down in a measure whatever He wishes. Indeed, He is all-aware, all-seeing about His servants (42:27). The idea is that He distributes in accordance with His understanding of what use can be made of what He gives. There are some people who can use it well, and those may receive a lot, while others are perhaps less well able to use what is available to others, and so for them there is less. Since God is the creator of all these different people it is not difficult for Him to know how to allocate the resources He selects as appropriate. Presumably, the same is true of those things that are less welcome to most people, unpleasant events and what they bring along with them.

6:165 … verily your Lord is quick in punishment; yet He is indeed often forgiving, most merciful. Often linked by Sufis with “Indeed, we belong to God and to Him is our return” (2:156).

7:12 … you have created me of fire, and him of clay. Iblis refuses to prostrate himself before Adam, although why he thinks fire



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is superior to clay is not obvious. It could well be a good example of the arbitrary distinctions that are made between individuals, which nonetheless have serious consequences for their futures. He is convinced that he is better than Adam: see also 38:76. Shah Waliullah uses this verse to criticize the use of analogy. Iblis is using analogy here, in fact, this is the very first use of analogy in history, he claims, and leads him into error (McAuliffe 2015: 248). Some Islamic legal schools do seek to restrict the use of analogy in their judgments, arguing that this extends the meaning of the original scriptural passage into something that can look quite distant.

7:46 Between them is a barrier (wa baynahuma hijab) … This is an expression used when discussing people in heaven and hell as in 17:45: There is a barrier [hijab] that separates the people of heaven from the people of hell. The idea is also to be found in: When you recite the Qur’an, We put between you and those who do not believe in the hereafter an invisible veil (hijaban masturan). The word hijab is also used in the story of Solomon, who describes the setting of the sun in this way: The sun was hidden in the veil (bi’l-hijab) (38:32). In this verse, the word hijab is used in reference to the night. So, the night can also be seen as a veil that covers things. In the story of Mary, God mentions the word hijab to refer to the partition that she placed between herself and others. She secluded herself from the people and devoted her life to prayer and fasting. Perhaps God sent the Angel Gabriel to Mary after and not before she chose seclusion, since it may symbolize separating oneself from worldly people, here represented by the Jews: She placed a screen (hijab) between her and her people. Then, we sent to her Our spirit. (19:17)

Verse 33:53, which refers to the barrier between men and women in the Prophet’s house, is often called the hijab aya. According to the hadith literature when the Prophet married Zaynab bint Jahsh he invited the companions to his house for a feast. The companions came and ate with the Prophet. When they had finished eating, most of them left except for a few who remained with the Prophet and engaged in conversation. This

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was probably because these companions had great love for the Prophet and desired to be in his presence as long and as often as possible. On that occasion, the companions were unwilling to leave and the Prophet was too polite to ask them to leave. He rose to his feet and went to the women’s quarter within the house. He hoped that the companions would also leave and go to their homes. After a while, the Prophet returned to the men’s quarter and found that the companions had not left yet. The Prophet was still reluctant to say anything to them, so he went to the women’s quarter again and this time Anas ibn Malik, who was a young servant of the Prophet, followed him. The Prophet drew a curtain between Anas and himself and this verse was revealed: O you who have faith, enter not the dwellings of the Prophet for a meal … except if leave be given you. But if you are invited, then enter. When the meal is ended, then disperse. Linger not in hope of discourse and conversation. That would really annoy the Prophet. He would shrink from telling you, but God shrinks not from the truth. And when you ask of them anything, ask it of them from behind a curtain. This is purer for your hearts and for their hearts. (33:53)

We can tell from this account that in the Prophet’s house there was a space allocated to men and a separate space allocated to women. There was also what was probably a curtain (hijab) which separated the two spaces. God commands the companions to respect this hijab and if they need to speak to the Prophet’s wives, they need to do so from behind the curtain. Thus, one can say that this separation of men and women—when there are guests in the house—is the practice or sunna of the Prophet. Before modern times, this tradition was followed in most Muslim countries and even today men and women often do not sit in the same room unless they are closely related. It is clear that the verse does not say anything about how men and women should dress. There are other verses that talk about that. In the relevant verses, God tells us about the separation between men and women in the house—and that can be done not only by clothing, but also by walls or curtains or whatever sort of barrier can be employed. A hijab such as a curtain is only possible indoors and rather than outside. The equivalent in the street is the way in which women may decide to cover themselves when there are male strangers around, which is of course likely to occur in a public place. Some people say that this verse relates only to the wives of the Prophet and that other women do not have to follow this injunction. This view



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is plausible, as the wives of the Prophet were held in great respect by the Muslims and their status was not like that of other women. On the other hand, there are not always reasons in the Qur’an for a particular rule. Here, however, we are told: This is purer for your hearts and for their hearts (33:53). Therefore, the ultimate reason (‘illa) for hijab is the purification of the hearts. According to a principle in fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence, if the reason remains, so does the rule. All hearts need to be purified, and so whatever can help bring this about should be implemented. God says to the Prophet at 39:65: If you should associate anything with God, your work would surely become worthless, and you would surely be among the losers. Is it likely for someone like the Prophet to even think of committing shirk? Given his status as the final messenger and for many Muslims as the perfect man, the answer is surely negative. In that case, this is supposed to serve as a caution. The verse says that even the Prophet’s works would become worthless, and so the question arises as to what implications this has for what other people do. Likewise, the verse of hijab outwardly addresses the wives of the Prophet whereas in reality all men and women must follow and respect this Qur’anic injunction. For if the hijab was needed for those superior men and women, it is definitely always needed. In any case, we are not told that there should be no communication with the wives of the Prophet, but only that when communication takes place it should be from behind a curtain. There is no general problem about communication between non-mahram (related) men and women. It means that this communication should always take place from behind a hijab. This view is also supported by the Sunna. Many of the Sahaba, male companions of the Prophet, would address ‘A’isha; and she would answer. She would tell them about her husband but she would do so from behind a screen. Such a hijab can be a curtain or a wall in the house, it can be modest dress, and it can also mean our behavior, our thinking, and our piety. Outward hijab is not efficient if it is not accompanied with inner piety. Inner piety always manifests itself in modest dress and behavior. Piety is, by itself, the most important and the most efficient hijab; for it is piety that gives meaning to modest dress: Piety is the invisible hijab that all Muslim men and women must wear. As the Qur’an also says: And the garment of piety, that is the best garment (7:26). Those opposed to the idea of a physical barrier might argue that an invisible barrier is sufficient nowadays.

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7:54 God, who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and is firmly established on the throne … Verily, His are the creation and the command … Al-Razi suggests the second phrase represents a hint to further thought. We notice evidence of design in the whole of creation, and then we wonder how it applies for each aspect of the detail of our world and what lies beyond it. But we cannot go much further and must accept our limitations. Prayer is the only thing we can do and we should be content with that. For some, however, who can go further, the next verse ends “supplicate your Lord humbly and secretly” (Asrar, 372–3). See also 3:190-1. This linking of creation with command, khalq with amr, is significant since it suggests the existence of two worlds, one which has been created in which we live and one which is the divine realm: See also 54:50 which refers to divine creation “as the twinkling of the eye,” which could be as the result of the use of just the one word kun (be), as in 16:40. Al-Razi takes this to mean that God creates in two distinct ways. He creates using his power and employing here the material conditions that are commonly found in the world of generation and corruption. The other method involves his command, and this is creation ex nihilo. After all, it only takes the twinkling of an eye for it to take place (Mafatih, 29:74). From this, he gets the idea that there is a big difference between the body and the soul. The form is brought about through divine causality operating through nature, while the latter through his command, since “… the spirit belongs to my Lord’s command …” (17:85). As for God’s sitting on the throne, is this to be interpreted literally as sitting in a physical sense? Or is it a reference to his position of authority? Verses 13:2, 32:4, 57:4, 20:4 do not resolve the issue. The Ikhwan al-Safa’ challenge the literal interpretation. Ibn al-‘Arabi uses language here to describe the links between night and day that is quite sexual in style. In this aya, night covers the day, sometimes it enters the day and vice versa (26:61), and at 39:5 day is wrapped around the night and vice versa (Murata 1992: 144). The fact that command comes after creation suggests to him that there are two forms of creation, one being where what is going to happen is planned out, as it were, and determined to have a particular shape, and then it is actually done. Once everything is



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in place in the world, we have the ability to decide what to do, how to react to the sorts of guidance we receive, and how far we are prepared to try to perfect ourselves. These factors are not determined when the structure of the world is, but are part and parcel of its dynamic operation and our role within it (SD, 50, 52, 260). The issue is not only moral but epistemological, in the sense that it involves our ability to see the divine presence in the everyday workings of the world, so that our belief in its creation by Him is not merely a reference to something that occurred in the past but an acknowledgment of his continuing role in maintaining the world in existence and supporting the character of its various iterations. There is plenty of anthropomorphic language in connection with the throne, including the idea of eight angels carrying it on the Day of Judgment (69:17), and an unspecified number at 40:7.

7:117 “Throw down your staff,” and it swallows up everything … Here what the staff swallows is taken to be what the Egyptian magicians managed to produce. There are many references in the Qur’an to Moses’ staff turning into a serpent (20:17-20, 20:65-70, 26:43-6, 27:10, 28:31). Al-Ghazali suggests that he believes in Moses’s prophecy but not on account of the literal acceptance of any miracles (Qistas, 80). For him we can take this story literally: since God can do anything He wishes with nature it is all at his disposal. For Ibn Rushd these stories cannot be taken literally since they oppose the idea that the world is organized in the way it has to be organized by the sort of creator who brought it about. The best miracle is the Qur’an itself, and that is not based on any interruption in the course of nature like changing a staff into a snake (TT, 316). What is miraculous about it is not so much its style, which is something that the theologians spend so much time arguing, although this does contribute to the wonderful nature of the Book, in that it is capable of leading people at all times and places to live well and in the right sort of way. It is available to everyone and at every time, so it far outweighs the ordinary miracles, which only take place at certain times and places. Al-Ghazali is often ambiguous on this point, sometimes agreeing that God has customs (sunna, ‘ada), the first referred to in 33:43 (1923: 109).

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God has an invariable and omnipotent will, so how He wants the world to be it is, and things operate regularly as a result. According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, the staff did not really become a serpent, it just looked as though it did (SD, 355–6).

7:156 My mercy embraces all things … This could be taken to apply to more than human beings: it does not state that it is limited to human beings, although it might be argued that other verses in the Qur’an make it clear that it does.

7:172 “Am I not your Lord?” They answered, “Yes we witnessed it (bala shahidna) ...” Before creation, God called the spirits of the future human beings and addressed them with these words. This idea of a primordial covenant/ mithaq between God and the world is important in Islam (Schimmel 1975: 24). It links Islam with other religions where the notion of covenant is significant, since if there is some original agreement then this establishes obligations on both parties. It is an interesting issue though how far an agreement made by our ancestors should continue to bind us now. Ibn Kathir takes it to mean that everyone is originally a monotheist (Ibn Kathir 1987: 3:431). According to Sachedina, this refers to the original fitra (2001: 244). According to Nasr, this is evidence of a pre-eternal covenant (mithaq) (1993: 134). Al-Ghazali connects this verse with 43:87 to establish that every human being is a believer: it is in our nature (fitra) to acknowledge God as our maker. Some people have forgotten it: 30:29 chides them for this; some remember (see also 2:221, 14:30, 38:28). At 5:10, God tells us that we all see the signs of Him but does anyone remember? (Phil Theol, 132–3). The verse is linked by Ibn al-‘Arabi with the idea of fitra (SD, 255) at 30:30 and the way in which by acknowledging God human beings place themselves in the category of those who undertake to have a relationship with Him. Mulla Sadra takes the verse to be an allusion to the pre-existence of the soul



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(McAuliffe 2015: 455). The idea is that there was a covenant between God and human souls before the existence of the body (al-Daylami 2005: 1).

7:179 (see also 25:44) They are like cattle, but more badly strayed … This is taken up by the animals when making their case for equal treatment with the humans, and is obviously a powerful point. If human beings can be like cattle, then it is not difficult to argue that there is not much difference between human beings and animals. Human beings often act in ways that are not in their long-term interests (22:11, 4:119) (Case, 184–5/Ep 22, 211). The Qur’an is often critical of the behavior of human beings but animals are spoken of in rather admiring ways, since their natural actions are seen as evidence of fine divine workmanship and the ability to create along the lines of a highly effective design.

7:180 God’s are the fairest names …. Al-Ghazali suggests this phrase is sometimes used to suggest that the name is different from the thing named. After all, God is said to have at least ninety-nine names, yet since He is only one how is this possible? He rejects the idea that this is a reference to different acts of naming since all the different names merely qualify one essence (Names, 22).

7:184 Have they not reflected? … By the Peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic world, this is generally taken to be an indication of the importance of reason, which for them is the means of acquiring knowledge. For Ibn al-‘Arabi though and those more attracted to mystical forms of philosophy reason is quite limited in where it can get a thinker. It is certainly useful, but limited, as is shown in the confrontation between Moses and what is often taken to be Khidr at 18:60-82 (Bashier 2004: 59–74).

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Chelebi compares people who contemplate the heaven and the earth and do not arrive at the desired religious conclusions as staring at them like a cow (Chelebi 1957: 25). It brings out a theme of many philosophers that one has to look at the world in the right sort of way to understand it.

7:185 Have they not examined the kingdom of the heavens and earth and all the things that God has created? … Ibn Rushd suggests that if we link this with 88:17-18 we get a good argument for the principle that the world’s organization is based on design, and behind that design must lie a deity such as the one described in the Qur’an (McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 309).

8:16 And whoever turns his back on them, except as a strategy or to join another group, will certainly attract the wrath of God, his abode will be fire, And what a wretched destination that is. The previous verse refers to fighting the unbelievers. This quotation from a London newspaper is a response to the practice of cutting heads off in Syria by ISIS: Look, I’m not into holding people’s heads and things like that, but in the battlefield people kill each other and things are done to terrify the enemy. So it may be used as a war ploy or a tactic—as it says in the Koran, chapter eight, verse 16, to terrorize your enemies so that the war can be finished quickly and your enemies run away. (Choudary 2014: 21)

He is right in thinking that there are plenty of verses which talk of the advantages of violence, but of course there are just as many and perhaps more that talk of the significance of peace and the importance of not prolonging conflict any longer than strictly necessary.



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8:17 When you threw it was not you who threw but God … From the point of view of multiplicity, there are agents in the world and they do things, but from the point of view of tawhid, divine unity, there is only God. We can perceive two realities at once (Futuhat, 3:456) and see also 90:8. So while we acknowledge that we carry out actions, the basis to those actions comes from outside of us in some way, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi, and is the responsibility of God. This passage is much quoted by Ibn al-‘Arabi and linked with 16:82 where Khidr (Futuhat, 3:525) reflects on his encounter with Musa. At the Battle of Badr, Muhammad threw sand, although really it was God who did it. The Qur’an does not simply say it was God who threw. It says you did not throw when you did throw, but God threw. Behind human action is God, and we have to acknowledge both divine and human action, although obviously the former has priority. As al-Ghazali puts it (Names, 47), the statement is not contradictory since there are two ways of seeing the action of throwing: one attributes it to creatures and the other to God. Hayy ibn Yaqzan, in the story by Ibn Tufayl, worked this out by himself (McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 289) since his observation of nature brought out how dependent things are on something else, like its form, which he sees as not in the thing but coming to it from somewhere else. Everything is dependent for its properties on something coming from outside of it, and so we get the idea that for an individual to throw, that property has to come from elsewhere, otherwise the human being would never be able to accomplish it. Here it is not clear what the claim is: the fact that physical objects are dependent on each other does not establish that they are dependent on an outside cause, which is the source of all of them. On the other hand, the idea that the events of the world require a necessary condition, something without which they would not take place, is not difficult to argue. Often in Islamic philosophy God is given the role of being not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition, a direct cause of what takes place, and that is of course difficult to reconcile with notions like free will and human activity.

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8:24 O you who believe! Respond to God and the Messenger when He calls you … Tirmidhi takes this to refer to different categories of believers and how they respond to God (1996: 57–8). The lowest level comprises those who pray and accept divine unity, with the highest being those who witness God directly, and Tirmidhi says they each have a type of life which fits in with their approach to God. There are five types mentioned here, and this is very much a theme of Islamic philosophy no matter what the variety: that there are varieties of believers and to each there is a separate form of knowledge and life. Those committed to Sufism are in any case attracted to the idea of there being ranks of believers, with more advanced believers at the top and then a declining level of spiritual attainment organizing the rest. That sounds elitist and is, but not necessarily in an objectionable way, since it could just reflect the fact that different believers put different amounts of thought and effort into what they do. There are some who are totally committed to leading a religious life, whereas for many others religion is just part of their identity, and perhaps not even a very important part, and provided they carry out a minimal level of tasks and hold the right beliefs they satisfy the basic criteria of being a Muslim. Others are on a higher rank in that they spend a great deal more time and attention on their religious duties. It would be wrong to conclude that the latter are necessarily at a higher level than the former since the more basic religious actor may be more sincere than the more sophisticated practitioner, more natural in his practice, and just a better person morally.

8:25 And fear tumult and oppression, which does not only affect those who do wrong … Mutahhari suggests that this means that good people who suffer some calamity will eventually be rewarded in accordance with their merit. God after all knows how to allocate rewards and punishment in the next world (2004: 50). As it says: He raised the sky and set up the balance (55:7).



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8:72 Those who believed, and the exiled, and fought for the faith, with their property and persons, for the sake of God, as well as those who provided aid and asylum, they are friends and protectors, one with another … A relationship of walaya or friendship originated between the Meccan emigrants and the Medinan helpers. A new kind of walaya, a walaya fi’l-din (Tabari 1970: 67–8). The next verse cautions Muslims to be careful of establishing similar relationships outside of the Muslim community, in line with a number of verses expressing caution about making alliances with people from different faith groups.

9:14 Fight them, God will torment them with your hands, humiliate them, empower you over them, and heal the hearts of the believers. The Qur’an advises believers to deal harshly with the enemies of Islam: To understand the significance of this verse, as with the rest of the verses in the Book, it is very helpful to look at the sira and hadith, the biography and reported conversations of the Prophet. As in a variety of religions, there are plenty of bloodthirsty accounts of the past that can be used to legitimate acting in similarly direct ways in the present and future. For example, there is the death of ‘Amr bin Hisham, a pagan Arab chieftain originally known as “Abu Hakim” (Father of Wisdom) until Muhammad renamed him “Abu Jahl” (Father of Stupidity) for his determined opposition to Islam. After ‘Amr was mortally wounded by a new convert to Islam during the Battle of Badr, it is reported that ‘Abdullah ibn Mas‘ud, a close companion of Muhammad, saw the chieftain collapsed on the ground. So he went to him and started abusing him. Among other things, ‘Abdullah grabbed and pulled ‘Amr’s beard and stood gloating on the dying man’s chest.

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According to Al-Bidaya wa al-nihaya (“The Beginning and the End”), Ibn Kathir’s history of Islam: “After that, he [‘Abdullah] slit his [‘Amr’s] head off and bore it till he placed it between the hands of the Prophet. Thus did God heal the hearts of the believers with it.” This could be seen as a practical exemplification of this verse. The idea here is that pious Muslims are so full of enthusiasm for the divine mission that the only way their inflamed hearts can be settled is to see those who oppose God and his prophet completely destroyed, not only killed but also humiliated, mutilated, and decapitated. Then the hearts of the believers can be at ease and “healed.” This is surely one of the reasons behind the Islamic State’s dissemination of gory videos and pictures of its victims: the new “caliphate” is trying to heal the hearts of every believer inflamed for the cause of God. This is also why many attacks on those seen as hostile to Islam have taken the particular bloody direction they have: they seek to follow on from the exemplars from the past. Some of the decapitated victims of the Islamic State have apparently had signs attached to them saying: “healing for hearts,” which presumably is a direct reference to this passage in the Qur’an. This verse is sometimes connected with 96:15-16, which also may refer to the fate of the hostile pagans: No! If he does not desist, we will surely drag him by the forelock—a lying, sinning forelock. According to al-Alusi’s tafsir, after ‘Abdullah placed his foot on the dying foe of Islam, ‘Amr opened his eyes and recognized him. The once proud chieftain lamented that he was being killed by a common “goat herder,” to which ‘Abdullah replied, “Islam elevates and nothing is elevated above it.” He then sheared his head off. But he could not carry it, so he made holes in the ears and put thread through them and dragged the head to the Prophet. Then Gabriel, peace be upon him, came laughing and saying, “O prophet, you got an ear and an ear—and the head between for a bonus!” Other pictures taken from the Islamic State’s websites often seem to follow the details of the killing of ‘Amr. In order to demonstrate that the enemies of Islam have been brought low, as 9:14-15 promised, Islamic State members often make it a point to place their feet atop their fallen corpses, most of which were first decapitated. The black flag of Islam is always raised above the fallen “infidels”—a reminder that “Islam elevates and nothing is elevated above it,” as ‘Abdullah told ‘Amr, with his foot on his chest, before beheading him. The fact that the victors are often smiling is perhaps a reference to Gabriel’s amusement, since if he is allowed a little jocularity so should human beings fighting on the same side. Other photos and video images are



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reminiscent of how ‘Amr’s head was treated: mutilated and dragged on the ground. The Qur’an tells Muslims to copy the behavior of the Prophet as far as they can (33:21) and it is not difficult for some Muslims to use this instruction together with what they take to be accurate accounts of the past to apparently feel justified in acting very brutally in situations of conflict (Ibrahim 2014). According to Ibn Taymiyya, there is a principle of rujhan or preponderance in accordance with which an agent, ultimately God, makes it necessary that we will act in a particular way. This leads to the reference in this verse to God punishing by your hands, where the hands are the secondary causes in bringing about the chastisement, but the ultimate cause is clearly the deity (Hoover 2007: 160–1). Hoover thinks this is not an entirely deterministic position but it is difficult to see why not.

9:23 O you who believe, do not take your fathers and brothers as friends if they love unbelief more than belief. Whoever of you turns to them in support is among the unjust. This is a theme in many religions, that the most important relationship one has is with God and anyone who threatens that relationship, including family and friends, is on a lower level. Verse 4:36 does talk of the importance of parents and people who need our help, but the first person mentioned in the verse is God. Verse 4:135 also prioritizes God, warning against being misled by parents who might have a view on what we ought to do that is variance with the truth (Leaman 1996: 251–62). No one knows better than God.

9:28 … and should you fear poverty, then in time God will enrich you out of His bounty … The context here is one where the idolaters are prevented from going to the main mosque, and presumably that would have represented a loss of revenue to the Muslim community. God instructs the community to pursue

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purity here and eschew financial reward, which He can easily replace either in material or spiritual ways or both.

9:31 They have taken their rabbis and monks as lords beside God and the Messiah, the son of Mary. And they were commanded only to worship one God, there is no God except Him, exalted is He above whatever they associate. This is often taken to be a criticism of the People of the Book. It is certainly true that religions often transform their leaders and other influential individuals into more than mere expounders of a text and here the dangers of shirk or idolatry lurk, not necessarily in the sense that such people are literally worshiped, although of course this does happen also. It is more that their writings and persons receive a degree of respect and honor which is more appropriately directed towards the Qur’an and the prophets.

9:68 God has promised the fire of hell for the hypocritical men and women, and the deniers of the knowledge of reality, to live there eternally. This is sufficient for them, and God has cursed them. There is unceasing suffering for them. All Muslims will pass through hell (19:71) but only those who deserve to remain will, and this is not a pleasant prospect. Mill criticized both Christian and Islamic views, which claim that such punishment exists, and for crimes that are ultimately brought about by God, since many in those religions attribute everything that happens to God. Some Muslim thinkers like Ibn al-‘Arabi also questioned whether life in hell could be eternal given the many references in the Qur’an to divine mercy. There is certainly no objection from the point of view of justice for such extended punishment,



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as the Book suggests, but the ubiquity of mercy would seem to prevent it (Abrahamov 2015: 32).

9:103 Take alms out of their wealth, so that you may cleanse them and purify them as a result … Taha sees this as heralding a future form of Islamic socialism, a society based on the verse that this one abrogates: When they ask you what to give away, say, “all that you do not need” … (2:219). This would really, as he says, bring about a social revolution and one that would seek to radically change the distribution of goods within society (Kurzman 1998: 271–83).

9:111 God has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return for paradise. They fight in the way of God, kill and get killed. This is a true promise from Him ... and who fulfills His promise better than God? Rejoice then at the bargain you have made with Him, for that is the great triumph. According to Qutb, this is the sign of the real believer, the person who is prepared to put his life on the line for God (2008: 119–22). It might be argued that someone who fights for the cause of God in order to earn paradise is acting for impure motives, and that is true. They seem after all to be acting prudentially; they are risking their present short and temporary lives in exchange for an eternal existence in heaven, and it does not seem as though it should be difficult to know how to choose in a situation like this. On the other hand, if they fight for God because they know that this is what they ought to do, and if, as a consequence, they go to heaven when they die, their motives have not been clouded by the prospect of the eventual happy outcome. The strong emphasis on the afterlife in the Qur’an does however raise important issues of muddling the issue of why Muslims do things.

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The Ikhwan use this quote as an example of the battle against the self and link it with 61:4 (Case, 195) /Ep 22, 304–5). The king says that the fight against the self is common in all religions. It is the theme of the Case of the Animals and many Sufi texts as well, of course, such as the Conference of the Birds (Attar, 1984). It harks back to the famous hadith where the Prophet distinguished between the greater and the lesser jihad, where the latter is physical warfare and the former the struggle against one’s own self. The reference to killing then is to killing the self, diminishing the significance of our individuality and self-importance, which is seen as such a crucial stage along the path to spiritual growth in a variety of religions and systems of philosophy (Leaman 2009b: 133–41).

10:5-6 It is He who made the sun a shining light and the moon alight and determined for it phases ... He details the signs for the people who know. As Izutsu points out, the idea here is that for the right people what they see around them confirms their belief in God, while for those disinclined to believe perhaps due to being led by their desires rather than intellect nothing convinces them (1984: 136–7); see also 3:118.

10:38 Say: “Then bring a sura like it; and call on whom you can beside God, if you speak truth!” The Qur’an sets out to establish a new approach to both literature and tradition. It openly invites competition several times and expresses its confidence in the outcome. The claim is considered that the Prophet wrote the Qur’an, or that the Qur’an is not divine but a human product. The Prophet is told: If they shall say, “the Qur’an is his own work,” say: Then bring ten suras like it of your devising, and call whom you can to your aid beside God, if you are men of truth! (11:13). This challenge to a competition in creating even a few suras probably relates to both the content and the form of the putative text, since both are supposed to be aspects of the inimitability of the



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Qur’an. The enormity of the claim really depends on understanding the high status of poetry in the jahaliyya period, in local Arab culture. There is some wonderful poetry from this period and it is often said that poetry was used in competitions between the tribes, and draped over the Ka‘ba in Mecca.

10:42 (see also 25:43-4, 7:179, 46:26, 27:80-1) And among them are those who listen to you. But can you cause the deaf to hear, even though they do not reason? The idea is that it is natural to be a monotheist and understand the divine source of nature, if we are capable of thinking clearly about what is around us. Otherwise, we are like a deaf person who is in the presence of noise but cannot hear it. It is not enough to be able to hear, one has also to be able to think about what one is hearing.

10:47 (see also 21:25, 61:6, 4:171, 14:4, 5:48) Each nation has its messenger … According to a hadith, 240,000 prophets had been sent to earth. It is important from the point of view of divine justice that everyone should have received some guidance.

10:61 … not even the weight of a speck of dust, whether in the heavens or on earth, escapes his notice. The Necessary Existent knows everything universally but no individual thing escapes its attention. Ibn Sina admits that how this is possible is something of a mystery (McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 217). It is one of the three

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propositions that al-Ghazali in his Incoherence of the Philosophers selects as a clear indication of an objectionable principle for Islam, like denial of a physical afterlife and creation of the world out of nothing (2002b).

10:62 In truth the friends of God will not be affected by fear or grief. According to Junayd, the friend of God lives in the moment, and is unconcerned about the past or the future, since he has such a profound faith, which results in a contentment that cannot be shaken (Wisdom of Sufism, 45).

10:80-1 Then, when the sorcerers came, Moses said to them, “Cast down whatever you will cast.” And when they had cast, Moses said, “What you have produced is magic; Surely God will suppress it. Surely, God upholds not the work of the corrupt (mufsidun).” Even if the corrupt can through their tricks influence people and appear to change the course of nature, what they do will only have a temporary effect. Unlike the miracle of the Qur’an, which is part and parcel of the text itself, sorcery plays no solid part in changing people’s minds or instructing them about the nature of what is true (see also 2:102).

10:99 Had it been your Lord’s will, they would all have believed … The verse continues by asking the Prophet, “Would you compel the people in order that they become believers?”



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The meaning of the verse is that despite the evident truth and compelling force of Islamic revelation, there will always be people who for different reasons will not accept it. This arrangement of reality is His universal will, which has decreed that in this world Satan and the believers, truth and falsehood, reality and deception will coexist. In similar fashion, we are told at 11:118: And if your Lord had willed, He could have made mankind one community; but they will not cease to differ. Here the meaning is the same as in the first verse, i.e., in His universal will (al-irada al-kawniyya) God has decreed that in this world despite the truthfulness of God’s message there will always be people who because of the constitution of their souls and moral failings will not cease to differ. None of these verses states that the disagreement regarding the truth is a divine command in the sense of irada shar‘ iyya, but only that the existence of disagreement, despite the evident truth of the revelation, is part of the irada kawniyya of God, just like the existence of evil and those who encourage us to choose it.

10:100 No soul can believe except by permission of God … In the same vein, go 7:29-30, 6:125, 2:6. But on the other side, taking the view that human beings do have the autonomy to take their own decisions, there are 18:28, 20:84, 16:106, 2:14, and 40:37.

10:103 We shall save our messengers and the believers. We are obliged to save the believers. Presumably, this could refer to the hereafter as well as their fate in the ordinary world.

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10:107 And if He wills good for you, there is none who can repel His bounty … It is for God to decide how close we can come to Him (Ansari 1996: 94).

11:1-2 Alif, Lam, Ra. A book whose verses are made firm … from the wise, the aware. That you should worship no one except God. This reference to making suggests to Nasir-i Khusrow that the text is created (Khusrow 2000: 80). He also argues that the world is the first divine creation, while the Qur’an is the second, referring to 2:1-2: Alif, Lam, Mim. That is the book in which there is no doubt, a guidance to the God-fearing. The letters in the first verse he takes to be an allusion to the physical size of the world, with alif being length, lam breadth and mim depth (2012: 204).

11:6 … knows their every lair and refuge … God knows where all the insects live (Ep 22, 225), a symbol of knowing absolutely everything, however apparently insignificant.

11:7 His throne was upon the water … Ibn al-‘Arabi comments that the word “upon” means “in,” so that the throne was in the water, and in fact the water is the throne since it is the source of everything that exists, apart from God Himself of course (Futuhat, 9:441). “From water” God created every living thing (21:31). For Ibn ‘Arabi, things not created have an infinite possibility of taking on forms at the moment



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of creation. Things can take on any appearance, just as water adopts the shape of whatever container it finds itself in. According to Junayd: “Water takes on the appearance of whatever container it finds itself in. The gnostic (‘arif) perceives the changes in the container, other people do not” (Sufi Path, 350).

11:69 And certainly did Our messengers come to Abraham with good news. They said “Peace.” He said “Peace” and did not delay in bringing a roasted calf. An indication of his hospitality, and also of the significance of hospitality in Muslim culture (see 59:9 and 12:59).

11:118 (see also 49:13) Had your lord willed, He would have made mankind one nation, but they will not stop differing. Often taken to be an indication of the desirability of variety of belief in society. But the next verse refers to people and jinn going to hell, so presumably there is something of a warning in this verse. It is worth contrasting it with verse 2:213, which reports that once all humanity was one community. It could suggest that God might have forced people to be united but left us to ourselves to a degree and the result is that we constantly argue with each other. The implication might be that it would be better for us to behave differently.

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12:24 She really desired him and he would have desired her had he not seen the proof of his Lord. This is how it is that We can turn him away from evil and indecency. He was certainly one of Our chosen servants. The chosen never sin. It is a principle of the Shi‘a that the prophets and the imams have to be ma‘sum, or perfect (Tihrani 2011: 346). Al-Qadi al-Nu‘man takes it to mean that she was after knowledge from him about someone else who also was only seeking knowledge, not his body (al-Nu‘man 1960: 142). It could not be otherwise in the sense that Joseph could not desire an improper relationship with Zulaykha, since he is a prophet. This takes the perfection principle to its ultimate conclusion: it is as though Joseph is so perfect that he could not even desire her and overcome that desire, but he had never to feel improper desire at all.

12:40 Those who you worship besides Him are but names which you have named, you and your fathers … Al-Ghazali comments that they did not worship the names literally, but the idols that the names purported to describe (Names, 20–2). The reference to names is useful, though, since there is a tendency to think that if there is a name then there is a corresponding reality. The reference to fathers brings out that Islam sees itself as the original religion, the din al-fitra, but not necessarily the religion acknowledged by more modern ancestors. They might well be part of the decline in human appreciation of monotheism that led to some of the alternative religions to Islam, and they need to be challenged, as does the natural obedience of their children to their religious views.



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12:53 … the soul that commands to evil … Together with “the soul that blames” (75:2) this represents stages on the route to “the soul at peace” (89:27). The soul in the body is capable of advancing along the way to improvement, and this can take place spiritually, in the material word, and in our imagination. Other stages are the soul that urges evil, the soul that blames, and the soul at peace. See also 79:37-41: As for whoever exceeded the limits and preferred the life of this world, surely his abode will be the fire; and as for whoever feared to stand before his Lord and restrained the desires of his self, surely his abode will be the garden.

12:76 … above everyone possessing knowledge is a knower. In Keys to the Arcana Shahrastani enumerates the number of times different letters appear in the Qur’an and then quotes this passage (2009: 102). God is the most knowledgeable (‘alim), and see also 8:60 (Leaman 2009b: 51–70).

12:106 And most of them believe not in God without also associating other deities with Him. This is a comment about the majority of humanity (12:103). It may not mean that most people literally believe in a variety of gods, but rather that they have beliefs that do not cohere with monotheism.

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13:2 He regulates affairs, He differentiates the signs … The “signs” are the proofs of the profession of His unity. Each created thing gives a proof, specific to itself, of the unity of Him who brought it into existence. Everything has a distinctive sign proving the oneness of the deity, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi (SD, 4).

13:3-4 It is He who spread out the earth and placed upon it rivers and irremovable mountains. He gave all plants a pair and wrapped the day with the dark veil of night. Surely in this are signs for people able to think [yatafakaruna]. And in the land there are fields, vineyards and cornfields and palm groves, the single and the pair. All are nourished by the same water yet We give them a different taste. Surely, also in these there are signs for people who can use their intellect [ya‘qiluna]. The Qur’an often uses rational language to describe itself, and its claim to acceptance. This seems to agree with Ibn Rushd’s argument that we need to use rational thought in our approach to scripture—he quotes 59:2 in his Fasl al-maqal: “Reflect, you have vision” and “Have they not studied the kingdom of the heavens and the earth, and whatever things God has created” (7:185) (FM, 44–5).

13:11 God does not change the condition of a people unless they change what is in themselves … This is a reference to the need for the community to bring about a change



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in themselves if they want God to act on their behalf. If some of them are inculcated in the discipline of taqwa (piety), they would be assured of God’s favor which would in turn translate into favor for the entire Muslim community. In this case, it is up to God to determine when individual efforts are sufficient to merit change in what would otherwise be fate. He has promised that in a number of verses (65:2-5). Although God may choose to punish a whole community for the acts of a few, the Qur’an often rejects that option: 6:164, 17:15, 35:18, 39:7, and 53:38. Iqbal takes this verse to suggest that human action is something we share with God (Iqbal 2013: 10). As for revelation, in more than one verse God describes Himself as “creator of everything” (13:16, 39:62, 40:62), and the concept “thing” can be taken to include every substance, accident, cause, and effect that exists and operates in each moment. God also states about Himself: Every day, He is engaged on something (55:29). “Day” in this context simply refers to a unit of time.

13:17 He sends down water from the skies, and the channels flow, each according to its measure, but the torrent bears away the foam that rises to the surface. … The scum disappears like froth cast out while that which is for the good of humanity remains on the earth. God produces parables/ similitudes/examples/amthal. Al-Ghazali takes this to be a reference to the way in which prophecy affects an appropriately prepared consciousness. The light from above converts the mind of the individual (his lamp or spirit) into a siraj al-munir or lightproducing lamp (33:46) for the community. Ibn al-‘Arabi claims that God has created the universe in such a way that it is full of examples of how He operates which makes His presence available for everyone who looks at it in the right sort of way. However, this is not something we should do, since in 16:74 we are told: Do not strike any similitudes for God, since God knows and you do not. This is because a similitude works on the basis of knowledge, and we do not know what God is really like, so any attempt

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by us at saying what He is like is bound to go awry. There is of course also here a risk of shirk or associating God with others in such a way that would lead to problems. There are three sorts of similitudes. One is based on what we see around us and the resurrection is a powerful symbol used here, since it indicates the way in which the world is organized to take account of us and eventually to judge us. Then there is the hidden aspect of God which is available not to our senses but to our hearts. Finally, He reveals Himself through both the open and the hidden which involves the sort of paradoxical thinking that Ibn al-‘Arabi thinks is so important if we are really to understand the complexities behind the ways in which our world is linked with God (SD, 213–14). According to the Ikhwan al-Safa’, the water sent down from heaven is the Qur’an, and the riverbeds are the hearts of the human beings who hear and accept it. The scum is the meaning, which at first is obscure, but in due course, as in the verse, it clarifies and this is seen to show that wisdom remains (Netton 1982: 81).

14:7 “If you are thankful, surely I will increase you …” The increase here according to Ibn al-‘Arabi is to be seen as equivalent to forgiveness, and it will be different for every believer. There are diverse paths to God, as He said: ‘To every one of you We have appointed a right way and an open road’ (5:48). The ultimate reality is one being which is the final aim of these paths, as indicated by His words at 11:123: To Him the whole affair will be returned (SD, 63).

14:11 God favors whom He will in guiding them … This suggests to al-Shahrastani a problem, since it asserts that we have the power to choose between alternatives, which then goes against the idea of divine grace and guidance (49:17). He tries to reconcile these competing claims by arguing that we have the power to act, but only within the context of a being who is in charge of the whole process (Phil Theol, 172–3).



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14:22 “Do not blame me but blame yourselves …” This is what Satan replies when people in Hell blame him for having misguided them. Although he clearly tempted them, they are responsible for giving in to temptation. It is an interesting issue when being tempted whether succumbing is an exercise in free will or coercion. After all, a very skillful tempter might manage to pull so many of the levers that control us that we really should not be blamed for what happens as a result. On the other hand, one of the things that religions are very good at doing is helping us appreciate how difficult it often is to act well and so how cautious we ought to be about how we behave in general.

14:33 (see also 31:20) And He has made subject to you the sun and the moon … According to the Ikhwan, the fact that the heavens are subordinate to God’s command and will shows the divine nature of the organization of the world. Everything is designed, and designed well, for the needs of creatures and we can find the source of that design in the deity. This is a claim very frequently made in and about the Book (Ep 22, 273).

14:48 One day the earth will be changed to a different earth and so will the heavens … The religious argument is an attempt to justify his doctrine of transubstantial change on the grounds of faith. Mulla Sadra quotes a number of Qur’anic verses where the notion of change is cited, such as 50:15: “Were We worn out by the first creation? Yet they are in doubt about a new creation.” There are still more verses that allude to the change in substance or the transformation of nature. This argument, however, relies totally on the Qur’anic verses as evidence rather than logical arguments (Asfar, 3; 7:178-9).

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Ibn al-‘Arabi, Jalal al-Din Rumi, Mahmud Shabistari, and other Sufis believed that the archetypes were in constant development on their path to attaining perfection. The mystic doctrine is also called the renewal of the images, meaning that every existent is in constant renewal in the form of dressing after undressing. The changing existent is annihilated and receives a new existence based on the image of its previous existence. No existent will ever continue between two moments of change. The doctrine of transubstantial change is different from that of the mystics in four ways. First, Mulla Sadra’s doctrine is not purely mystical. It is philosophical too and supported by logical arguments. Second, the change in substance as well as accidents is existential because “existence” and not “essence” is the sole reality. Third, there is no distinction in his system between substance and its existence. Fourth, we cannot say that existence is something added to substance when they were emanated (Leaman 2009b: 88–90).

15:4 We never destroyed a town without a decree. The point here is that when something negative occurs, there is a reason for it and we are never in a position to really understand what it is. Everything that happens has a rationale.

15:14-15 Even if we opened out to them a gate from heaven, and they carried on climbing up, they would say “Our eyes have been confused, we have been bewitched.” This is used by al-Ghazali along with 11:35, 6:7, and 6:111. He takes this to show that some people just cannot accept the truth, however obvious it is (Ghazali 2002a: 86–7).



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15:29 (also 38:72) “I breathe in him of my spirit …” God is the source of the human spirit, since this refers to Adam. We long for the source of our being, i.e., God, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi. Since the spirit comes from God it remains to a degree perfect even when in a material form.

15:30 (see also 2:30) So the angels prostrated themselves … On the Isma‘ili line, the terrestrial angels are commanded to bow down to the young imam, who will in due course become the first prophet of that particular cycle of time (Corbin 1983: 82). For the Ikhwan this means that the animal, representing the animal soul, submits itself to what it recognizes as appropriately in control of it (Ep 22, 274).

15:39 “… since You have put me in the wrong … I will put them all in the wrong.” Here Iblis accuses God of having put him in the wrong, and he will go to show Him that human beings were not worth treating in such a preferential way. One has to think that since God is the creator He is going to win this contest, since He knows exactly what His creation is like. In The Tawasin of Mansur al-Hallaj (1974) by al-Hallaj, Iblis is noble and heroic in refusing to bow down to anyone except God but also wrong in not doing what he is told. This might be regarded as a tragic situation, and yet the claim is often made that there is no tragedy in Islam.

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15:85 (see also 30:8, 46:3) God created heaven, earth, and everything in between only with truth (haqq). The whole enterprise of jurisprudence is concerned with discerning the reality or haqq of things in terms of the instructions of the shari‘a. The creator of everything has created the law for human beings, and everything is based on truth in the sense that it is all well designed. For an account of the Peripatetic theories of creation see Leaman (2002: 41–106).

15:99 Worship the Lord until there comes to you certitude [al-yaqin]. Note the emphasis on the significance of certainty and the connection between religion and knowledge.

16:5 (see also 36:57, 42:22, 50:35, 52:22) And He has created cattle for you, from them you derive warmth and many benefits, and they are food for you. The next verse refers to the pleasure that men feel when cattle are driven home in the evening. It is clear that the animals have been provided for human use. The Case of the Animals (Ep 22, 53–5) refers to these passages and also 23:22 and 40:80, which describe the value of animals that can be ridden on. The mule however argues that these verses merely point to general divine providence and implies no preference for humans over animals, or as it might be better put, for human animals over non-human animals. Verses 16:8 and 43:12 are used to help emphasize this point.



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16:32 “Peace be on you, you enter the garden because of what you did.” The garden is paradise, and pure people are brought in by an angel. Referred to by the King in The Case of the Animals is the fact that humans and not animals can look forward to going to heaven (Case, 201/Ep 22, 311–12). The animals answer that at least they then avoid ending up in hell.

16:40 (see also 2:117) God says “Be” and it is. Mulla Sadra calls this phrase, kun ya fayakun, an existentiating judgment, hukm al-takwini, and distinguishes it from a hukm al-tadwini or recorded judgment, which refers to the Qur’an and the sunna. The first judgment applies to everything, the second only to those who are human (Tafsir, 111–12). Ibn al-‘Arabi notes that the word in Arabic for “be” is kun and consists of two open letters and one hidden one, the waw which joins together the consonants but which is not actually written on the page. The suggestion is that for every act of creation there are both open and hidden aspects (SD, 196–7).

16:44 And we have revealed to you the reminder so that you may explain to mankind what has been sent down to them. This suggests that the Qur’an had then been completely explained and finalized. Not according to Taha. It can never be finalized, although it can be written down.

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16:66 And you will find a useful sign in cattle also. From inside their bodies, between where they excrete and blood, We produce for you to drink milk, which is pure and enjoyable for those who drink it. The Ikhwan are impressed at the way that something as good as milk can come from somewhere as unimpressive as the stomach of a cow (Ep 22, 235). In the following verses as references to the remarkable substance that comes from the belly of the bee (Ep 22, 233) see 16:68-70. Verse 16:68 itself states: And your Lord taught the bee to build its cells in the hills, on trees, and in buildings. This along with 24:41 suggests according to the Ikhwan that the animals did not need an intermediary to learn what they ought to do and what God wished of them; they could communicate with heaven directly, and so have an advantage over human beings, for whom the reverse is very much the case (Case 158/Ep 22, 232–7). The implication is that human beings are not then superior to other living creatures.

16:71 And God made some of you superior to others in your provision … Some types of nourishment are spiritual and some physical, and they are all appropriate to different people (Fusus, 132); see also 20:50.

16:125 Call people to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good teaching. Reason with them in the most courteous way, for our Lord knows best who has strayed from His way and who is rightly guided. Al-Kirmani suggests that this refers to both knowledge and action. Both are



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involved in appropriate worship. Faith and works are both important and there is no salvation in relying on just one way of approaching God (Walker 1999: 70). Ibn Rushd points out that truth cannot contradict truth, so that the truths of demonstration must accord with the truths of religion. That is not to say that everyone has to understand all the truths of either, but we should be assured that they are all in agreement. There are different kinds of believers (18:11) and so the truth has to be explained in various ways (Leaman 2014: 161–75).

17:1 … in order to show him by our signs that He is the hearing, the seeing. Mulla Sadra comments that as one increases in knowledge the individual becomes more and more part of God and his being (wujud). At the highest level, the intellect comes into contact with the principles behind reality and what is seen and heard (Mafatih al-ghayb, 351).

17:4 And We gave a warning to the Children of Israel in the Book …. This, al-Qaradawi continues, has led some to say that Sufis, including al-Ghazali, believed that the Crusader invasion was a divine punishment for Muslims as a result of their sins; and thus, they were not opposed to it. The second interpretation offered by al-Qaradawi, which is more apologetic, is that al-Ghazali was primarily preoccupied with spiritual growth from within, for internal fasad paves the way for external invasion, as the Qur’an indicates (al-Qardawi 1994: 174, referring to the start of 17:3-46).

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17:32 Do not come near to adultery, for it is shameful and evil, opening the road. It opens the road to other bad things, the implication is here. Sayyid Qutb sees Western society as particularly prone to sexual misconduct and the mistreatment of women as a result, unlike Islam. Islam has a strict ethics of sexual conduct, according to his view of Islam, and if everyone is encouraged to adhere to it, adultery is far less likely to occur, and the chief victims of adultery are often women, so such a strict ethical system is to be the benefit of women. In the West, they are more likely to be abandoned by errant husbands intent on sexual adventure with those not their wives, and lax standards of modesty also work to the disadvantage of women. They have the freedom to dress largely as they wish, but the result of this is that their relationships with men are likely to be temporary and unhappy (1977: 33).

17:33 Do not take life, which God has made sacred, except with just cause … This is sometimes linked with our status as at the top of the created beings category. We are the most precious and the noblest (17:70), and very well made (95:4). In Islamic law, the integrity of body and soul is marked by punishing those who committed a cardinal sin like murder, with penalties in this world such as retaliation (2:178, 5:45), the payment of blood money (4:92), and with future penalties such as eternal damnation (4:93). To regard murdering a human being as like murdering all human beings (5:32) is another indication of the inviolability of life. The verses “Do not kill yourself ” (4:29) and “Do not throw yourself into danger” (2:195) make the position of the Qur’an on suicide and euthanasia seem quite clear. In Islam, human beings are commanded to preserve their lives, which after all were given to them ultimately by God. We can find this idea in the verse: Do not throw yourselves into danger with your own hands (2:195). Preserving the integrity of body and soul is incumbent on the Muslim.



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Those who do not protect their souls will not fulfill their duties either towards God, or towards human beings and other creatures (22:65, 14:33). For that reason, a believer should not knowingly put his or her life in danger. Protecting human life is a basic principle. For example, life-threatening starvation can be eliminated by eating what is otherwise forbidden (2:173, 5:3, 6:145, 16:115), and thirst by drinking wine (hamr), if there is no other option. According to the Hanafi and Shafi‘i schools of law, in case of life-threatening thirst, forbidden beverages and foods are allowed, on condition that only amounts necessary to preserve life are consumed. Malik and Ahmad ibn Hanbal are of the same opinion. It is due to the same principle that tayammum or dry ablution is acceptable before prayer according to many legal opinions (2:267, 4:43, 5:6) in cold weather, even if water is available. Islamic jurists often accepted that it is obligatory to shape our action to save and maintain life. They also argued that if someone acts otherwise and dies, he is guilty of not using properly what God has given him, and this is also true if we do not help others to live. The whole emphasis of what might be called Islamic ethics is on preserving life. The legal base of this principle is verses such as: Do not kill yourselves (4:29); Do not throw yourselves into danger with your own hands (2:195). Actions that might cause danger and hardship to human life are regarded as mashakka (hardship) and the preference for an easier course of action is recommended in verses such as: God wishes you easiness, not hardship (2:185); God wishes to lighten your burden (4:28); God did not give you any hardship in religion (22:78). Another theory that indicates the need for opting for life is “self-defense,” which is allowed for preventing unjustified attacks on someone’s life, honor, and property. The principle finds its base in revelations that permit retaliation against violence (2:194). Islamic law does not give believers the right to have the disposition of their lives. Knowledge about birth (55:3) and death belongs only to God (6:2). Hence, determining the life length (ajal) of people is up to God (56:60). The Qur’an states that “wherever you are, even in tall buildings, death will reach you” (4:78). Moreover, human beings cannot backdate or postpone their ajal (lifetime) (7:34, 10:49). We are also told that: God does not postpone anyone’s death, when the ajal (term of life) comes to an end (63:11). It seems quite clear from these passages that it is up to God to determine when we live and when we die, and to interfere with His plans is dubious from a religious point of view. We cannot after all determine when we are to die, either to hasten or postpone death. Therefore, difficulties should not allow terminating life. The health-giver is God and it is only He who knows the future. Even if the

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conditions of life are very bad, life cannot be terminated and the struggle for life is needed. The Qur’anic verse that includes the order not to kill yourselves (4:29) includes this principle. To give up and to wish for death in the face of the hardships of life, even to commit suicide, is forbidden. It is God who kills and revives any living being (55:3) and the knowledge about that does belong in the end only to Him (6:2, 15:23, 50:43). Due to the verse “It is We who determine the death among you” (56:60), God claims to be the one who determines the issues of life and death. Since interfering in these affairs means interfering in the right of God to act as He thinks appropriate with what is after all His property and His creation, it suggests a lack of trust in God and a relative refusal to accept his role in the world and its management. Consequently, it might be argued that euthanasia is not allowed and most writers on the topic do so. On the other hand, the fact that we do not control our lives ultimately could be used to suggest that we should not take medicine or medical advice, leaving our fates to God, and few would argue this. Similarly, the right to self-defense against other people might be taken to be rather similar to defending ourselves against the discomfort and indignity of preserving our lives for longer than we wish. On the Hanafi madhhab which prevails in much of the Islamic community the principle of wellbeing or maslaha is important in determining how we should behave, and it might be argued that part of our wellbeing is bringing our lives to an end at the right sort of time for us. It is also worth pointing out that considerable respect is given by some religious authorities to those who die by choosing to kill others at the same time as they kill themselves, provided of course the target is regarded as appropriate. Here the verses on jihad and its rewards are often quoted (for example, 60:1). But even without such a target, suicide is often regarded as at least not to be condemned. The so-called Arab Spring was initiated, it is often said, by the suicide of a putative fruit seller after being humiliated by a (female) Tunisian police officer over his lack of a permit. Finally, it might be argued that since Islam offers its followers a religion that is not designed to be difficult, but the reverse, why would it insist that people endure pain and suffering when recovery and palliation are not options? It seems that an argument based on the Qur’an could be constructed to allow suicide and euthanasia, so the direction of the relevant verses on this issue is not quite as obvious as many think. The fact that only God knows when we are to die could be taken to show that He knows when we would commit suicide, or kill someone else whose life was miserable at their request, but it does not in itself rule out as immoral such behavior.



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17:35 Give full measure when you measure and weigh with even scales … Al-Ghazali refers to this passage in the title of his book Qistas al-mustaqim (The Correct Balance) where he tries to show that syllogistic logic is basically Qur’anic. He claims that he weighs knowledge by the “correct balance.” According to him, this balance consists of five Qur’anic scales of knowledge (Qistas, 14; McCarthy 1991: 246). By being asked about the way in which he knew the correctness of this balance, al-Ghazali answers that authoritative teaching (ta‘lim) can arise via tawatur (excellent transmission) and cannot be doubted. The teaching is simply the Qur’an and the clarity of the correctness of the Qur’an’s scales is known from the Qur’an itself (Qistas, 15; McCarthy 1991: 247). An interesting attack is aimed at those whose faith has become corrupt through philosophy to the extent of rejecting the essence of prophecy (nubuwwa). In his Munqidh he makes a sharp distinction between two levels of knowledge. There is the stage of knowing through the intellect (al-΄aql), in which things necessary, possible, and impossible are apprehended. Then there is the stage of perceiving through prophecy, in which things beyond the scope of intellect are seen, i.e., the unseen (al-ghayb). Against the doubt of some intellectuals about the existence of things perceptible through prophecy, al-Ghazali states that they do not have any supporting reason except that they have not attained that stage themselves (Munqidh, 111; McCarthy 1991: 84; Watt 1994: 64). Moreover, he presents two further proofs for its existence. The first is that there is an analogous sample of the special character of prophecy in that which is apprehended in dreaming (McCarthy 1991: 84–5). “For the sleeper perceives the unknown that will take place in the future, either explicitly or in the guise of an image, the meaning of which is disclosed by interpretation” (McCarthy 1991: 84). The second proof is that there is knowledge in the world of the same sort as that perceptible through prophecy; that is knowledge that could not conceivably be obtained by the intellect or observation alone, but can be acquired only by a divine inspiration (McCarthy 1991: 84). He gives the example of astrological rules (ahkam nujumiyya) (McCarthy 1991: 85) which are based on phenomena that occur only once every thousands of years. There is then no scope for knowledge of them to be obtained empirically.

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In addition to the above discussion, al-Ghazali discusses the claim of those who verbally profess belief in prophecy, but equate the prescriptions of revelation with philosophical knowledge. According to al-Ghazali, this is in reality a disbelief in prophecy because “faith in prophecy is to acknowledge the affirmation of a stage beyond reason: in it an eye penetrates whereby a special perception of certain perceptibles is apprehended; from the perception of these, the intellect is excluded” (McCarthy 1991: 93). Al-Ghazali wonders how those who are influenced by philosophers believe in such perception, while they deny the prophetic special perceptions that are confirmed by miracles. The answer in general is that for the philosophers prophecy is merely an extrapolation from reason of principles that are designed to communicate the truth to the widest possible audience. It does not involve any especial form of perception or knowledge, and the perceptions of unique or exceptional phenomena are merely aspects of very general rules of nature with such unusual features. A good example here for Ibn Rushd is the Prophet Muhammad, who received the message he did, not because of any miraculous qualities he possessed, but because he was a wonderful person with the natural qualities to construct and lead a community.

17:36 Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge… This can be taken with: “Produce your proof, if you speak truly” (2:111). The Qur’an constantly emphasizes the importance of arguing and supporting one’s beliefs with proof. In general, Al-Ghazali strongly condemns taqlid or imitation since there is no reason to think one is imitating the right thing. Rejecting the view of the Ta‘limiyya (Isma‘ilis) that the way to get at truth (tariq ma‘rifat al-haqq) is taqlid, he, in the Mustasfa min ‘ilm al-usul, says that by taqlid we specifically mean accepting an opinion (qawl) without proof (hujja) so whenever there is a lack of proof, and the truth is not known, neither by common sense (bi-darura) nor by evidence (bi-dalil), then imitation (al-ittiba‘) which might have to be tried would be based on ignorance (jahl). (Mustasfa, 140)



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Furthermore, in the course of his refutation of the Ta‘limiyya’s speculations, he quotes a number of verses which, he states, forbid taqlid and direct to knowledge (Mustasfa, 144). He, however, does not completely oppose taqlid, rather he distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable taqlid. While he strongly supports the prevailing view of the ‘ulama’ that taqlid is haram (unlawful), in the case of those who are capable of ijtihad he opposes the argument of some that even al-‘awamm, i.e., the ordinary people, must look profoundly into the evidence (yalzamuhum al-nazar fi al-dalil) (Mustasfa, 147). He entirely rejects this opinion on the basis of the following two arguments. The first is, “the consensus of the Companions (ijma‘ al-sahaba), for they used to give a fatwa (jurisprudential judgment) to the ‘awamm without ordering them to achieve the rank of ijtihad (Mustasfa, 147). The second is that, “a consensus has been reached that al-‘ami (an ordinary man) is charged (mukallaf) with al-ahkam (Islamic rules), and thus enjoining him to achieve the rank of al-ijtihad is impossible, because it would lead to the ruin of the world since instead of working, people would have to seek al-‘ilm, which here means religious knowledge (Mustasfa, 148). In short, al-ittiba’, i.e., the following of the‘ulama’, the religious scholars, or the muftis in this context, is, for practical reasons, unavoidable in the case of the ‘awamm or the masses according to al-Ghazali. Otherwise, no one would do any work—they would all be amateur theologians. In addition, al-Ghazali sets out some conditions which have to be met in order that taqlid or ittiba’, in the case of the ‘awamm, proves to be acceptable. With respect to seeking a legal opinion (fatwa), an ‘ami must ask only a person who is known for ‘ilm, i.e., religious knowledge, and ‘adala (justice) (Mustasfa, 150). This of course raises the issue of how one is to know—especially if one is not a specialist in those matters, how can you tell who is knowledgeable and who is a good person? In recent years, there has been a dramatic growth in TV evangelism in the Islamic world, especially the Arab world, where a number of people, some with a formal theological background and some without, have tried to persuade Muslims that certain courses of action are desirable and others not, from a religious perspective. They obviously earn money from their work but do they lead virtuous lifestyles, and is their advice well founded? It is always a problem determining the truth of the matter. In the matter of iman (Islamic faith), Al-Ghazali insists that every person liable to understand what he or she is doing learns and understands the shahada, i.e., that there is no god but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God, and also believes in it without any doubt or hesitation (Ihya’,

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149; McCall: 53). This, however, can be obtained by mere taqlid without necessarily the means of investigation (bahth), penetration (nazar), and formulating evidence (tahrir al-adilla). But just reciting the formula and believing in it without knowing more about it might seem insufficient to constitute belief, since presumably the implications of what one believes have to be understood to a degree at least, as do the practices associated with it. This is why al-Ghazali seriously attacks, in Faysal al-Tafriqa bayn al-islam wa’lzandaqa (a group of mutakallimun) who charge the ‘awamm with unbelief (kufr), just because they do not come to their view of the creed through their own theological strategy. He accuses them of being extremists, because firstly they restrict the mercy of God and going to heaven to a limited group among the mutakallimun, and secondly they reject what has been reported, through tawatur, that the Prophet and his Companions accepted the Islam of the illiterate Arabs who did not concern themselves with the science of reasoning (‘ilm al-dalil). Similarly, he challenges the idea that the means to find iman is kalam and abstract reasoning, because iman is light (nur) which is cast by God on the hearts of His servants as a gift, which is certainly how it is often represented in the Qur’an. Al-Ghazali, however, does not deny that the reasoning of the mutakallimun may lead to iman, but this, according to him, is very rare and it is not the only way to iman. Kalam is not only unnecessary for the ‘awamm but it is also extremely risky, because it may lead this group of people to unbelief (shirk). To warn against this potential risk, he composed his book Iljam al-‘awamm ‘an ‘ilm al-kalam (Restraining Ordinary People from the Science of kalam), and the title tells us what the point of the book is. For an extended outline of al-Ghazali’s position on taqlid, see Frank (1992: 207–52).

17:44 The seven heavens and the earth and all that they contain give glory to Him; and there is not a single thing but exalts Him with praise; yet you do not understand their praises. Surely God is the most benevolent and forgiving. This verse gives a view of nature in which every creature, from the lowest to the highest, has its own language through which it praises God. The two things that



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are most constantly visible to humans are the heavens and the earth and these are mentioned a great deal in the Qur’an. It is often argued that as a result the Qur’an promotes an extensive knowledge of the earth and the heavens. Mulla Sadra suggests that existence is in principle identical with knowledge and consciousness. In a sense, all beings are aware of God and prostrate before Him (Asfar, 4; 1:164). According to Nasr, we often forget this, but need to remember it, and the universe encourages us to do this through its structure and contents (1993: 133). As 2:115 suggests, we need to see the face of God everywhere, and it is everywhere to be seen. Ibn al‘Arabi advocates here what he calls seeing with two eyes, not only basing our judgments on what is before us, which represents seeing with one eye, but having an eye turned inwards as it were to detect evidence of divine influence on the nature of existence (Sufi Path, 356/SD, xxiii).

17:49 (see also 34:7-8, 50:2:73, 3:47-8, 45:25, 29:53-4, 36:48, 51:12, 79:42) “When we are turned to bones and dust, shall we really be raised up in a new act of creation?” There are many references to the improbability of resurrection, especially when faced with the reality of dead bodies and their parts. Although thinkers like Iqbal point to the large number of empirical observations made in the Book, this can also be used as a source of criticism of people who spend far too much time examining the facts and not enough the source of those facts. The pagans were quite right to question whether the natural laws of growth and decay can be overturned, since from what we observe there is no evidence that it can. The Qur’an suggests we need to ask those deeper questions and we are drawn to them by the evidence of what we see around us once we look at it in the right sort of way. The Book is quite frank on how improbable resurrection looks, when we examine the blunt facts of the natural world and our experience of things around us. There is said to be some evidence of resurrection in the ways in which the earth revives after rain, and similar phenomena where something looks as though it were finished but something happens and brings it back to life. There are many references also to divine power, such as: We created you from earth and return you to earth, and then bring you forth from it once more (20:55); Has He not the power to give life to the dead? (75:40). The

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suggestion at 36:79-81 is that someone who could create the heavens and the earth is easily capable of restoring something dead to life. Verse 50:15 takes up this theme again and wonders why someone who created could not resurrect. Creation seems harder, if it means creation out of nothing, whereas with resurrection there is something there to work on, as it were, although not with very promising material. On the other hand, as the Qur’an often points out, the sorts of things that we are initially made from are pretty disgusting: but that did not prevent God from producing us out of it in the first place. Sura 50 is particularly scathing of those who disbelieve in resurrection, identifying the doubt as, basically, disbelief in God. The first half of the sura talks about this and the second half about the punishments that await those who disbelieve. The latter are taken not just to be wrong on what they think is the case, but on not trusting in divine power. It is not difficult to see the problem with that, since it comes close to disbelieving in God.

17:58 There is not a township but We shall destroy it before the day of resurrection, or punish it with dire punishment. That is set forth in the book. The context suggests that this is part of a warning process. We should not be surprised at disasters that sometimes occur to communities and cities, since the fate of everything and everyone is dependent on God, and such experiences should be seen as helping us grasp our role as dependants of Him.

17:70 We have ennobled the children of Adam and carried them in the land and sea, provided them with good things and preferred them greatly over many of those We created. Kashani (Heart, 200) says that the other animals were created for our use. Verse 36:71-3 he quotes a bit earlier to defend the eating and riding of animals. According to Sachedina (2001), this honoring of humanity is



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connected with universal ethical cognition and he connects this verse with 91:7-10: By the soul, and that which shaped it and inspired it about what is wrong and right for it. Prosperous is he who purifies it and he who hides has lost (see also 30:30). This suggests that being favored by God is conditional on our attempts at improving and developing our characters, and it might be argued that as the only creatures who can really do this, it is incumbent on us to make the effort if we wish to achieve the status that God makes available to us. There is that notion in Islamic thought not to interpret the approving comments about People in the Book as being final and something we can feel satisfied about, but rather that they set moral and practical aims and objectives. So when we are told that Islam is the religion God has chosen for humanity this is not an invitation for Muslims to be smug about their religious achievement, but a call to action and reflection to ensure that they really are living and thinking in the ways that Muslims should.

17:71 One day We shall call together all human beings with their imams … Salim Ibn Dhakwan takes this to mean that God will call people to judgment on the day of resurrection in accordance with their imam or spiritual leader, who may well be their political leader also (2001: 48–9). This shows how important issues of leadership can be. The notion of secular leadership comes under strain if we may be punished for what they did, and the requirement will be that all leadership fits into a religious framework. On the other hand, it may just mean that everyone will be questioned however powerful or important, and that we should not think that we can hide behind our leaders.

17:85 Say “the spirit is of the command of my Lord. And you have been given only little knowledge.” God does not explain the nature of the spirit since most people do not understand it. It is spiritual and luminous, unlike the soul, which is corporeal. God links the spirit with himself at 15:29, 19:17, 32:9 (Ankaravi 1996: 59–60).

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Al-Razi points to the richness of the term ruh (spirit). Its main meaning is the life that God breathes into humanity. Sometimes (at 21:91 and 66:12) it means the breath that God puts into Mary to bring about the conception of Jesus. He suggests that 17:85 implies that the spirit that brings life differs from the physical body and its accidents, and that it is only attached to the body for a period of time. This is ruled out by the Qur’an. Life is something that comes into existence through divine command (amr) and is basically different from what it affects, and in itself does not change. God’s orders create things immediately and ex nihilo, they do not involve substantial or accidental change, and since they are so different they cannot be like what it is that they appear to be combined with. Verse 16:40 and similar verses are important here, the idea being that God just has to command something to happen and it happens. He can link things that are basically distinct, and fail to link things that look as though they would quite naturally come into contact with each other and become something new (see the discussion of the barzakh, above). Met Pen, 64, 66 suggests the spirit is the most sublime creation, and is superior even to Gabriel and other archangels. As an aspect of divine command it is linked with our hearts and synthetic forms of knowledge. According to Ibn Sina, the body is designed by God to receive the soul, and this involves developing rationally until it is able to come into contact with the Active Intellect. The soul is separate from the body and this is emphasized by the fact that it originates from the divine spirit, which of course is entirely non-physical itself (1952: 185).

17:88 Say: “Really even if people and jinn got together and produced something like the Qur’an, they could not do it even if they helped each other.” How plausible is this as an argument? It is difficult to say, since counterfactuals are always hard to verify. The miracle of the Qur’an, sometimes called the only miracle in Islam, is that the Book is so wonderful that it could not have been created by human beings, and here not even by the latter when helped by the jinn. It is worth pointing out that the jinn were capable of magically transporting the Queen of Sheba’s throne to Solomon’s palace, yet they could not produce something like the Qur’an, even with the help of humanity.



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17:110 Say “Call upon God or call upon the all-merciful, whichever you call upon, to Him belong the most beautiful names …” Ibn al-‘Arabi frequently comments on the issue of naming God, especially as 17:23 has forbidden us from associating anyone with Him and 13:33 suggests it is impossible to produce an alternative name. The name accords with His essence and everything else that we ascribe to Him is attached to Him in a way that we really cannot grasp properly. This bewilderment he argues leads to the appropriate attitude to God, which is wonder, and so prayer and the religious law which provide us with a route to approach Him in a way that is acceptable intellectually (McAuliffe 2015: 432–7).

18:7 … test and trial as to which of them are best in conduct. It is a frequent feature of the Qur’an that it treats the world as the site for testing its creatures. See also 21:35. Satan always tries to lead us astray; he is mentioned eighty-eight times and as Iblis sixteen times in the Book. According to 7:11-23, he will be doing this without interruption until the Day of Judgment. Verse 41:36 urges us to seek refuge in God from him.

18:23-4 And say not of anything “Well, I shall do that tomorrow” without “if God wills.” And remember your Lord when you forget … God makes everything happen and our impression of being able to do things ourselves is illusory.

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18:49 “It leaves nothing neither small nor big but has counted them” … This refers to the record of human actions, but here Mulla Sadra is referring to the way that the Necessary Being is the point to which everything returns. Divine existence is the existence of everything, since He is pure existence (Mulla Sadra 2010b: 24).

18:54 … but man is, in most things, contentious. Although they should be aware of everything that God has done for them, and what his role in the creation of the world is, people often argue with what they are told to do and do not accept what God tells them.

18:56 They resort to falsehood, in order to rebut the truth … Al-Iji (c. AH 700–56/c. 1300–55 ce) takes this to show that argument can be a waste of time; see also 43:58 and 22:8. The fact that people do not know does not prevent them from arguing; in fact, often quite the opposite is the case. Yet argument is a good thing (16:125, 29:45), as is reflection on the nature of the world (3:188). He assumes that to a degree we are protected potentially from the problems of argument by the need for guidance, which means that we should be careful about using nothing more than argument to work out what is true (Nasr and Aminrazavi 2010). There have always been messengers and the need to heed their messages. After all, 17:16: We do not punish until we send a messenger (Phil Theol, 274–5). Does this mean that those born at a time when there was no prophet escape punishment? Not according to the Maturidi and Hanafi thinkers, but the Shafi‘i disagree (Chelebi 1957: 67). Punishment is not unfair for the former two schools since people could have observed through looking around them that there



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is a God and worked out using their rationality that He is one. If they fail to do this, they deserve to suffer the consequences.

18:60-82 This long passage leads to a concentrated discussion in the Qur’an often taken to be between Moses and Khidr on understanding why things happen as they do and the significance of patience in confronting the puzzling events of the world. Khidr tells Moses that he is going to see some things happen which he will not understand, and he must not ask why they happened, which is precisely what he constantly does. Khidr equally constantly finds a plausible reason for those events. It might be that these verses are just calling on people to exercise patience and faith that God has a plan for how things turn out and we should be content with that. But the contrast between Khidr and Moses might mean something in addition to that, since the former is often described as intuitive while Moses blunders through the whole episode: he is clearly supposed to be the fall guy. Khidr understands that sometimes the solution to what look like problems is to refuse to say that something is either just or unjust, but to hold both ideas together in some way, thus acknowledging the complexity of existence and the role that imagination has in our access to it. Basic to the whole relationship is that Khidr appreciates much more than does Moses that knowledge is genuinely limited to God, and also how significant patience is in religion (Leaman 2014: 115–16). Moses might have raised the issue of what the difference is between patience and passivity.

18:109 (see also 31:27) Say: “If the sea were ink for the words of my Lord, the sea would be exhausted long before the words of my Lord are exhausted …” Ibn al-‘Arabi relates this to knowledge, and suggests that however much we may come to know, we do not exhaust the source of knowledge: it keeps on providing us with resources to know yet more. Physical resources may run out and come to an end, but intellectual work can continue without running up against such problems. By knowledge, he has in mind here

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knowledge defined in a religious manner, and so the more one thinks about things the more there is yet to consider, and as one develops intellectually there is no end to the sorts of development that are feasible for the thinker. The end point is perhaps 15:99 which he mentions in the same passage (Heart, 230): And serve your Lord until you reach certainty. It could be that the certainty at issue here is related to death and the prospect of judgment.

18:110 Say “I am but a man like yourselves, the revelation has come to me that your God is one God …” Ali Shariati compares this passage where man is represented by the term bashar with 17:11 where it is insan, and argues that the former is a biological expression; the latter is full of much higher possibilities for what humanity can mean (Kurzman 1998: 187–95). Although the Book holds the Prophet in great respect, he is just a man and not responsible for the message he received. “Indeed, God and His angels bless the Prophet! Bless him, believers, and greet him with respect” (33:56). But he did not create the text, nor does he have any special powers; he is merely the transmitter of the divine message. This of course is a highly significant role, but just a role nonetheless. On the other hand, the Prophet has come to take on a huge significance for Muslims since in many ways he is the symbol of Islam. For all Muslims his lifestyle and sayings are important sources of legislation and daily practice. For the Shi‘a, leadership of the community should be from those from the family of the Prophet or with some close connection to that family, all of which suggests that he cannot be regarded as an ordinary man. It is often said that the insan al-kamil, the perfect man, can be identified with the Prophet, as Ibn al-‘Arabi suggests, but this does not imply that he is anything more than a human being, albeit a very special one. His wife ‘A’isha reports that his character was the Qur’an and this is a rather useful way of seeing why he ought to be emulated and yet still maintain his status as just a human being.



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19:17 We sent to her our angel as a well-proportioned man. Gabriel appears before Mary, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi, and this is how God conveys knowledge to people by doing something, and not always something compatible with reason, to communicate with us. The result of this encounter is of course Jesus (Imaginal Worlds, 81).

19:20 She said “How will I have a son, since no man has touched me, and I am chaste.” So Jesus is born of a virgin, under a palm tree, and has no divinity. He is eventually taken up to God, and someone else was crucified in his place (4:157, and see also 5:19, 3:48). Yet the Ikhwan al-Safa’ suggest that he was in fact crucified, died, and was buried, and there is some suggestion that they think he was resurrected. They often quote from the Gospel, although sometimes they are quite critical of Christianity.

20:5 Most Gracious is firmly established on the throne. Verses 32:5, 16:50, 67:16, 35:10, 89:22, 2:210 are also instances of spatialization, referring to the throne, sitting, descent, ascent, and so on, all things that bodies do. The Ash‘arites interpret these expressions literally.

20:9-36 Has the story of Moses reached you?… This is a reference to Moses and the burning bush. The Isma‘ilis claimed that God did not really talk to Moses and the verse has an esoteric meaning.

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20:12 “Truly I am your Lord. So take off your shoes …” God orders Moses to throw things down, which al-Ghazali takes to mean throw off the corporeal and so ascend to the rational realm where God’s presence is to be found. We can acquire a luminous (nurani) type of spiritual substance (1998: 30). The Isma‘ilis take it to be metaphorical and not to be taken as literally true. But al-Ghazali saw no reason why it could not be both literally true—Moses took off his shoes—and also have a deeper meaning (1998: 34). He is more sympathetic to the idea of metaphor in other places (Faysal, 109).

20:50 He said “Our Lord is He who gave everything its nature, guided it correctly.” God guides us through prophets and scholars who help people find happiness in the next world, and puts them on the straight path (Names). Hayy (Ibn Tufayl 1972: 131–2) takes this to refer to animals, who are designed by God to carry out their various roles in the world, and he worked this out by himself by the age of thirty-five. He also came to the conclusion that everything perishes except His face (28:88). He reaches this conclusion by working from the principle that God is not just an agent but is in fact perfect existence, since His existence is way beyond the sorts of existence that occur in the things he creates. So non-existence cannot affect Him, and He can have no end. The Ikhwan (Case, 58) take this comment by Moses to mean that God has made everything to help the animals in the world to achieve what is good for them and to avoid the harmful. When the human being boasts about how well he has been constructed the animals reply that it is the same for them and all their parts are specifically designed to help them live and live well. When the human being refers to his beauty the animals suggest that beauty varies with the species, and animals have the power to attract others, which suggests that they have the right level of beauty for this to be possible.



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20:74 There they neither die nor live. Even in hell, punishment is not total, and however angry God is, it is tempered with mercy, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi. “God forgives all sins” (39:53) and “Wherever you turn, there is the face of God” (2:115). At 57:13, we are told, “And a wall will be set up between them, having a door in the nonmanifest side of it which is mercy, and on the manifest side which is punishment.” This wall between heaven and hell is representative of mercy, he argues (Imaginal Worlds, 117).

20:110-11 And they do not compass Him with their knowledge and faces are humbled before the living and the self-subsisting … Mulla Sadra takes this to mean that only He can have knowledge of Himself (Kalin 2010: 179).

20:114 Say, “My Lord, increase me in knowledge!” This is what God suggests to the Prophet. Ibn al-‘Arabi takes this to mean knowledge of Him and how everything in the universe is basically a reflection of God. He does not require any more knowledge of legal issues or details about how human beings should behave: those he knows, but it is the deeper metaphysical truths that we have difficulty understanding, given our limited intellect. All we know is the tiny amount of existence to which we have access: we only know our own states, as he says in SD, 24, whereas the creator knows all aspects of the created thing. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the earlier part of the verse calls on the Prophet to wait until the whole of the revelation had been completed; after all, it took a considerable time.

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21:5 No, they say “He made up confused dreams, he is only a poet. Let him bring us a sign as originally.” The Prophet is accused of being one or all of a dreamer, a poet, and a forger. The Qur’an constantly denies it is poetry (see also 37:36, 52:30, 69:41) or the work of a soothsayer (52:29, 69:42), and it could not have been forged since we are often told that no one except a divine source could be identified as its author. Interestingly, the messenger is asked why he does not bring a sign with him like the previous prophets. The implication could be that the Qur’an as a whole is the sign, and indeed its verses are called in Arabic ayat, signs.

21:22 Were there gods in heaven and earth alongside God, surely they would both go to ruin ... This argument claims that two creators cannot be in harmony when they create; necessarily one’s will is denied while the other’s is dominant. Verse 11:96-8 discusses what a terrible guide Pharaoh, the exemplar of the totalitarian ruler, was to his people. Presumably, the problem here is that affairs are then being run by both Pharaoh and God, the latter of course being the ultimate ruler of everything. According to Ibn Rushd, this is a proof of divine unity, since if there were two rulers and they both tried to do the same thing, presumably since they know that it was something that ought to be done, this would not be optimal since it would result in corruption, presumably again because too much would be done. One of the rulers would have to refrain from acting, to allow the other to do what needed to be done, but this is absurd: how could a deity refrain from action, in the sense of being unable to act? (Kashf, 123). Ibn al-‘Arabi suggests that this is indeed a proof of God’s unity, and follows the same reasoning. He extends it to include considering what would happen if they disagreed, since that would result in nothing being done, and that goes against our experience (Sufi Path, 356). Al-Baydawi (Anwar, I, 98) seems to have thought that other kinds of astronomical organization were possible, so that the fact that God is the



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controller and creator of everything does not mean that other kinds of organization are inconceivable. By contrast, Ibn Rushd suggests that God has to create the best possible organization, since how could He create otherwise? The idea that God could select an organization that is inferior in some way is indeed difficult to understand, but so is the idea that a particular organization is more rational than another type.

21:69 We said: “O Fire, be coolness and peace for Abraham.” According to the story as narrated in the Qur’an, Abraham broke the idols of his people, and as a result, they wanted to punish him by throwing him into the fire. When Nimrud ordered him thrown into the fire, he was not burned. The verse could be taken to suggest that there are two kinds of protective clothes against fire: spiritual and physical. The spiritual kind, which protects against the fire of hell, is faith in God, while the physical protective cloth consists of the equipment someone wears that prevents fire from burning them physically. According to Nursi, the verse stimulates both spiritual and physical protections, since it encourages human beings to develop and wear the appropriate protection both spiritually and physically. Nursi (Twentieth Word) sees this as an attack on naturalism and an example of divine control over the world. Abraham broke the idols of his people, and as a result, they wanted to punish him by throwing him into the fire. Nimrud ordered him thrown into the fire, but he was not burned. According to Nursi, the verse encourages using both spiritual and physical protection against fire: we cannot always expect God to preserve us from fire. We need to develop our spiritual as well as material lives and the Qur’an helps us discover what we should do. This passage is popular also with Rumi and Iqbal. Nursi also sees this passage as an indication of divine mildness, since instead of responding violently to his enemies, Abraham merely avoids them. Of course, al-halim, the mild, is one of the names of God that human beings ought to try to emulate. Ibn al-‘Arabi (SD, 181) works with the idea of hell and heaven contrasting where the pains of hell, like fire, are experienced as pleasure by those deserving of heaven. As he points out, we are not surprised to see roses in

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a rose garden, but to see fire around a prophet like Abraham is surprising, albeit it is not actually experienced by him as fire, of course. Bliss is more blissful if it contrasts with its opposite, he suggests, and indeed has no meaning by itself. One of the problems with conceptions of heaven, it is often argued, is that an eternal lifetime removed from the cares and discomforts of the everyday world might soon start to pall.

21:73 And We made them imams (paradigms/leaders/ exemplars) who guide by Our command. This refers to Isaac and Jacob. Bad guides, especially rulers, have the opposite effect on people as in: “And we made them exemplars that invite to the fire and on the day of resurrection they will not be helped” (28:41; see also 2:124). The children of Israel are described as imams once they recognized the signs of God. In the Qur’an a key issue is who people should follow, whose words they accept as valid and important. This is hardly surprising since the whole text is an argument that hearers and readers should follow the message they find there, a message that of course is not represented as new but as final and confirming other more recent messages.

21:105-7 (see also 71:12-14, 24:55) And truly we have written in the Psalms, after the reminder, “My servants, the righteous, shall inherit the earth,” there is certainly a message in this for people who would worship God. We sent you only as a mercy to creatures. The point of the messages sent at various times by God is to help people.



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22:18 Do you not see that to God bow down in worship all things that are in the heavens and on earth, the sun, the moon, the stars, the hills, the trees, the animals, and a great number among humanity? … In the Qur’an even mountains are regarded as obedient to divine orders so that they keep the earth stable.

22:41 God is the end of things. A popular phrase to end a theoretical work, as in ‘Abduh’s book on theology (McAuliffe 2015: 539). Its use is ubiquitous in Islamic theoretical literature.

22:45-6 How many cities We have destroyed in their evildoing! …What, have they not traveled through the land so that they have hearts to understand and ears to hear with? It is not the eyes that are blind but the hearts within the breasts are blind. Sachedina suggests that the idea here is that we examine the evidence of what we see around us, ponder on what we see, and come to reasonable conclusions about how to act. The consequences of evil behavior are there to be observed and provide us with a learning opportunity (2001: 234–5). It does bring out nicely a frequent theme in the Book that it is not enough to have working sense organs to understand the world. If our way of assessing the evidence is awry, then all the information gets to be misinterpreted.

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22:47 (see also 70:4) … surely a day with your Lord is as a thousand years of your counting. How we organize time is different from its real, divine, nature, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi (see Yousef 2008).

22:65 Have you not seen how God has subjected to you everything that is on earth? He holds back heaven lest it should fall upon the earth, save by His leave? Surely God is all gentle, all compassionate. According to Nasr, the first part of the verse does not imply that we can do anything we like in the world (1993: 134) and needs to be balanced by our responsibilities to look after the world given that it has been placed in our charge.

22:70 Do you not know that God knows what is in the heaven and the Earth? Surely this is in a record; surely this is easy for God. God has written in the Preserved Tablet (85:22) everything that will ever exist until the day of resurrection.



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23:12-14 We created man out of a clot Then we placed him as sperm in a place of rest, firmly fixed Then we made the sperm into a clot of congealed blood, and then a lump out of that clot. Then out of that lump we made bones and covered the bones with flesh Then we developed out of it another creature So blessed be God, the best to create. Ibn Rushd points out that God created us using intermediaries, and by that, he means causality, and if He did it in that way it must have been the best way. So those thinkers who claim that God is the direct cause of everything Himself and causality is unreal in a basic ontological sense must be wrong (TT, 540–1). We need to pay attention to the last proposition in the verse, which comments on God’s role in the process, not just in the process of the creation of humanity from the point of view of creation, but also from the point of view of the process. For Ibn Rushd, the causal properties of things are not just contingent features of them that might exist or otherwise, as is the case for his Ash‘arite opponents, although the things themselves are of course entirely contingent. Those properties are part of the meaning of the things (Leaman 1997) and if we move away from the properties then we move away from the thing having the same meaning that it normally has. At TT, 542 he suggests that if we think in this way we shall no longer be able to think of the world as a place consisting of stable objects which we understand, but it is unfair, since the occasionalists also think that we are allowed to think of the world in that way. For them though the only basis to that way of working with the world is God and his allowing the world to operate in ways that accord with our thinking. They translate material object language into language involving God, and so does Ibn Rushd, but for him God is several stages further away from the objects than is the case for al-Ghazali, for example (Leaman 2009b: 162–78).

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23:52 (see also 7:181, 4:135) This nation is one nation (umma) and I am your Lord so keep your duty to me. People are responsible for acting properly and promoting justice, and will be held accountable if they fail. Verse 2:143 gives people the role of being witnesses against people, but those people are also witnesses against them so Muslims need to behave well. Although the Muslim community is called the best, they may still be punished if they do not keep up to the mark that God has set for them, as in 3:110, 29:2-3. One of the most striking experiences of many of those who go on the major pilgrimage, the hajj, is the variety of races and peoples who come. It was Malcolm X’s experience of the event that removed his racist attitude and led him to discover the potential of unity of humanity, no matter the race nor the nation, based around the belief in Islam.

23:99-100 When death comes to someone he says, “O my Lord send me back so that I can do good things in what I neglected.” Certainly not. His words are useless, behind them there is a barrier (barzakh) until the day they are resurrected. See also 25:53 and 55:19-20, which refer to two kinds of water meeting but not intermingling, and preserving their original character. This is a suggestive idea for Ibn al-‘Arabi and obviously links up with the idea that the dead person in the grave has to wait for some form of judgment before going to where he or she is supposed to go after being questioned by someone acting for a judge. The move from the corporeal to the spiritual represents two different forms of thought, and if one is not prepared to raise one’s thinking, then the possibility of moving onto heaven and higher forms of thought is compromised. For him there is a connection between the barzakh and imagination. After all, sleep is compared with death (39:42) and imagination does have a foot in two camps; like the barzakh, it is both conceptual and connected closely to the senses. The world of imagination



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is no less real than any other world for Ibn al-‘Arabi, alongside the material and spiritual worlds (Imaginal Worlds, 99).

23:101 Then when the trumpet blows, no ties of blood or family upon that day will last. They will not ask after one another. Once the decision is taken on who is to go where on the Day of Judgment, nothing can help those being allocated their appropriate end.

24:2 … let no pity for them seize you … The context here is to the harsh corporal punishment for men and women who are adulterers and engaged in other forms of illicit sex. Ibn al-‘Arabi describes the very popular hadith that on the Day of Resurrection a tree will say to a Muslim, when it sees him hunting for a Jew, “O Muslim, there is a Jew behind me, so slay him,” and he will slay him. Only the thorn bush (gharqad) will conceal the Jew when he comes to it, which is why the Prophet cursed it. He quotes this Qur’anic passage presumably to suggest that one should not feel sorrow for the demise of the person hiding behind the thorn bush since he shares the same status as the adulterer (Chittick 1993: 10).

24:22 And let not those of virtue among you and wealth swear not to give to their relatives and the needy and the emigrants for the cause of God, and let them pardon and overlook. Would you not like that God should forgive you? And God is forgiving and merciful. Izutsu maintains that humanitarian ethics in the Qur’an is a mirror of what he calls the divine ethics setting out the relationship of humanity with God.

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This verse is what he has in mind here (1966: 17). From his analysis of this verse, Izutsu claims that because in the Qur’an God Himself is always ready to forgive, therefore, human beings should follow this divine example and always set out to pardon and forgive. This approach as developed by Izutsu is applicable to the understanding of the Qur’anic perspective on war and peace; essentially, the attitude of God towards his enemies provides a paradigm of behavior regarding the situation of war causalities and the appropriate methods in the resolution of such conflicts. In order to explore this sacred paradigm, it is necessary to explore two relevant arguments of Izutsu. It is important to understand how the Qur’an treated and reoriented the jahali (pre-Islamic) tribal culture’s attitude to the virtue of courage, and also to appreciate the status of hilm or mildness within the Qur’anic ethical structure. Regarding the Qur’anic treatment of courage, Izutsu suggests that in pre-Islamic culture, “blood vengeance” functioned as the greatest sign of courage and was the supreme law of the desert, connected most strongly with the Arab idea of honor. Persistence in seeking revenge was a vital aspect of the moral ideal of the Bedouin (1966: 68). Such a deep-rooted idea could not immediately be changed for something less strenuous. Izutsu argued that Islam compromised by accepted payment for spilled blood in order to produce peaceful settlements of disputes. In the end, though, the prerogative to take revenge belongs to God, not to human beings, even those closely linked with the individual initially harmed. Izutsu notes that the virtue of hilm, a term that includes the virtues of forbearance, patience, self-control, mitigation of rage and sudden passion, is adopted by the Qur’an as the central point of its moral system. It is obvious that the control of the jahali cultural predisposition towards blood revenge and the introduction of self-restraint as a primary Qur’anic virtue would have important consequences for both the causes and the methods of divinely sanctioned conflicts. We do in fact find that in the Book, where the emphasis in accounts of conflict is often on how to resolve them and pardon aggressors rather than recommending a bloody conclusion to disputes (see 3:134). Modern day critics of the ways that some Islamic communities still value a narrow sense of honor, which is embodied in a strict sexual ethics within the family and defended by extreme violence, are often regarded as being based on what al-Jabri calls a type of tribalism that set in quite early on to replace the sort of ethics that the Prophet himself tried to establish (1999).



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24:31 And reveal not their adornment save such as is outward; and let them cast their veils over their bosoms. Here the adornment (al-zina) is often taken to suggest the face and hands. The word al-khimar (whose plural khumur occurs in the verse) means the veil that covers the head, not necessarily the face, and the word al-jayb (whose plural juyub is in the verse) means the chest. The women have been commanded to put a covering on their heads and to lower it over their chests. In the Qur’an, believers who are men are advised to lower their gaze in the presence of women and to keep their ‘awra (the sexually relevant parts of their bodies) covered. Some follow the practice of the Prophet as they imagine him to have worn long garments, and nothing ostentatious. Hence, beards are popular among some male Muslim communities, given that the Prophet is taken to have had one.

24:35 God is the light of heavens and the earth. The semblance of his light is that of a niche in which is a flame, the flame within a glass, the glass a glittering star as it were, lit with the oil of a blessed tree, the olive, neither of the east or the west, whose oil appears to light up even though fire touches it not, light upon light. God guides to his light whoever He will. Al-Ghazali comments that this very special light has the feature that it is so intense it is hidden (Al-Ghazali 1998: 22–4). It makes possible our rational faculties and he suggests that there are a variety of lights that affect different parts of our being, and that of the rest of existence. He means that this passage refers to a truth about God that some will grasp and others not, depending on whether they are guided by divine light or otherwise.

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He distinguishes what is lit up, the world, with the nature of what provides the light, ultimately God. He goes on to say, “Knowledge is above faith and tasting is above knowledge, because tasting is a finding (wijdan) but knowing is drawing analogies and having faith is mere acceptance through imitation” (al-Ghazali 1998: 38). Sense experience is the only real way to know God, while reasoning and imitation can only take you so far. Hence the critique of the use of intellect by the philosophers and in Faysal al-tafriqa, imitation by the theologians. For Mulla Sadra, the symbol “lamp” means the light of God when it is manifest. The Prophet is the mishkat or lamp-niche illuminated by the lantern or lamp (misbah) which is the Qur’an. When he received illumination, the Prophet was illuminated with knowledge, and those who assent and believe in the veracity and guidance of the Qur’an, Muhammad’s prophecy, and the infallibility of the Imams can also attain real knowledge. Discussing Ibn Sina’s Isharat, Mulla Sadra says that the oil is the passive intellect which is about to be illuminated by the active intellect, an indication of intuition (hads). As the prophet knows more and more he quickly grasps the nature of reality without really having to be taught or thinking at length about the subject matter (Morris 1981: 341–2). The light represents existence in everything. “Niche” means the lower beings of this world. “Glass” is a symbol for higher beings such as the intellects and souls that operate at higher levels of existence. “Oil” means the “breath of the compassionate” (nafs al-rahman), which represents perfect being as it extends from the real (al-haqq) to creation. It also means the emanation of illumination over the creation called “the most sacred emanation” (al-fayd al-aqdas). The “blessed tree” is a symbol for “being” (wujud) or “light” which emanates from the “most sacred emanation.” It effuses being or light over all the composite things in the world in proportion to their receptivity and preparedness. Just as a tree has many branches and leaves, the most sacred emanation has also many dimensions. This emanation “is neither of the east nor of the west.” That means, it neither pertains to being in the state of complete unity, nor to the essences that are in multiplicity. “Light upon light” means that the higher necessary light contacts through emanation the lower possible light. “God guides His light to whomsoever he pleases” means He manifests His self-subsisting being upon whomsoever He wills. Through this process of illumination, something comes into the light of being from the darkness of non-being. Mulla Sadra draws a variety of implications from this theory for those who seek to link up with the light. We cannot know much about the light,



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which is only known to itself. We can say that the natural light is perceived by itself, the light of the soul by itself and so on. He goes on to suggest that the way to the straight path and eventually to God is not on the earth nor in the sky, not in this world nor in the next, but entirely within the self of the traveler who, Mulla Sadra says, travels from it and in it towards God (Tafsir, 4:347–78; 2003: 30). Razi argues that religious knowledge, represented as light, can be attained by an individual rather than being the result of the intellect’s effort (Asrar, 159–68). Religious knowledge, represented as light, can be attained by an individual rather than being the result of the intellect’s effort (Jaffer 2015: 159). The Isma‘ili al-Sijistani takes light to be the light of reason coming from the word, the intellect, and the soul, while the lamp is the source of knowledge, which stands in Muhammad’s place when he is no longer available to guide his community and prevent them from the darkness of doubt and dispute. The glass is Imam Hasan and the star Imam Husayn (Walker 1999: 128). Al-Dabbagh argues that divine light is like its origin— one—but what it leads to are impressions on a variety of objects, which are of course many. There is a hierarchy here: angels receive existence, life, knowledge, love, and beauty from the divine light; human souls are imperfect and so their reception of knowledge is limited; while the next stage down, human bodies, only receive existence, life, and beauty. Living things get only existence and beauty, while inanimate things are limited to just existence. We can attain closeness to God by receiving divine love via divine light (Abrahamov 2003). According to Kashani, the soul is like a lamp inside a glass and the body is like the niche. The soul is lit by itself and the body receives light from the glass, metaphorically speaking (Heart, 210–11). The light actually comes from the blessed tree, neither from the east of the spirits nor west of the bodies. But really, the light does not come from anywhere, it is there in the candle already and any attempt at discovering its source is like looking in a mirror. It is an error to say when looking in a mirror that there are two things since the mirror image is nothing but the reflection of one thing, and the religious implications here are that we should be careful about dividing up the basic unity of reality, tawhid, into more than one thing and so associating others with God. We should also beware of tashbih, comparing God with other things, and so the process we should initiate is pondering on the divine attributes while at the same time holding in our mind the way that they are bound up in just one thing so always point to

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that unity. We should not take the signs of God to be separate from God, and Kashani gives the nice example of reading something and then erasing the signs, in order not to confuse what we read with the reality that lies behind it. Rumi takes the line in the Qur’an that God is the light of the heavens and the earth, and develops it to suggest that what prevents the individual from falling into darkness is the acceptance of love, religion, wisdom, and knowledge as his guiding light. The significance of thinking about love is not because it is likely to gain one entrance to heaven, but because it elevates thought closer to the light of lights. The spiritual power of selfconfidence puts the world in our hands and places us at the center of the world (Rumi 1995: 44), as so often Rumi uses the Qur’an as part of his poetic expression.

25:27-9 And the day, the wrong-doer will bite his hands, saying, “Oh, if I had only taken a path with the Messenger! Woe is me! If I had only not taken so-and-so as a friend! He certainly led me astray from the reminder after it came to me. And Satan is a deceiver of humanity!” Selecting friends and companions has to be done carefully, since the consequences of mixing with the wrong people can be dire.

25:53 It is He who has freed the two bodies of floating water, one palatable and sweet, one salt and bitter, and he made a barrier (barzakh) between them, a partition not to be breached. The fact that two different things remain distinct, whereas one would have expected them to merge and become just one thing if left to themselves, has



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for a very long time been seen as a proof of the existence of God. Davidson suggested that this argument in Greek thought found supporters in Islamic philosophy also, once it had been passed on through the transmission of Greek thought into the Islamic world (Davidson 1987). This reference to the barzakh produced a novel idea that came to be put to extensive use in Islamic thought.

25:55 (see also 30:40, 10:34-5) Your Lord is powerful, yet besides God they worship what can neither help nor hurt them … Wolfson argues that the emphasis on the power of God was designed originally to emphasize the power of God with respect to competing gods, of whom there was a wide variety at the time the Qur’an was revealed (1976: 610–12). The power of God also often seems to overwhelm the capacity of human beings to make their own decisions. Similarly, Wolfson suggests that the relative emphasis on tanzih rather than tashbih, on distancing the concept of God from material language in case he came to resemble his creatures too closely, is likewise a strategy to differentiate Him from his competitors. The implication is that a result of this sort of language is that the concept of God may be interpreted as implying that we can form no idea of Him at all and that we have no freedom to act on our own. Yet, there are plenty of Qur’anic passages that go against these ideas and they also have to be considered before a final view of God and human freedom of action can be assessed.

25:74 And those who say “Our Lord, grant us the comfort of our wives and of our children and make us exemplars/imaman for those who ward of evil.” See also 21:73, which talks of Isaac and Jacob as exemplars. There are also negative exemplars, 28:41, and Pharaoh is a prime example at 11:96-8.

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25:75 (see also 2:153) Those are the ones who will be rewarded with the highest place in heaven because of their patient constancy. There they will find salvation and peace. Patience is consistently praised throughout the Qur’an (Ebadi 1995: 72).

26:78-80 “He who created me will guide me. He who provides my food and drink and cures me when I am ill.” The Ikhwan favor preventative medicine and think that using knowledge of astrology will help an individual remain healthy. This passage is evidence of a deep faith in divine design, which might perhaps be seen more as a prayer than a description of how reality might be for a particular individual. It does not mean that medicine is not sometimes necessary but implies that if it works then it is because of the divine organization of the world and us in it (Case, 180/Ep 22, 285). The latter part of this phrase is often used as part of a prayer or incantation when someone is sick.

26:88-9 (see also 7:179) “The day when neither wealth nor son shall profit, but only he who comes to God with a pure heart.” The Qur’an frequently criticizes the desire for wealth. Al-Ghazali uses this verse to make a firm distinction between the soul and the body where the heart represents the essence of the human spirit, and its significance is that it is the faculty that allows us to have knowledge of God, and is healthy if it has that knowledge. Without it, the reverse is the case, as in 2:9-10 (Munqidh, 25). He goes on to argue that when we are physically unwell we need to listen to our physicians and do what they tell us regardless of whether we really understand why, since they have acquired their knowledge in ways



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that are often not accessible to us. He sees the source of that knowledge in prophecy, which gave them information about the properties of things. In the same way we need to forego our intellects when we seek spiritual health and a remedy for our religious ailments, the medicine consists of prayer and the prophets tell us how to act and think if we wish to align ourselves with the right way of acting and feeling, and that is what we should do whether we understand precisely why or otherwise. It is often said that al-Ghazali is a rigorous opponent of taqlid or imitation, and often he is, but like so many of the thinkers during this period, such as Ibn Rushd and al-Farabi, he was convinced that in many areas of life and thought sometimes we have to do what we are told since we cannot know what the reasons are which underlie the topic. Medicine is a good example with respect to the body and religion provides us with remedies for the heart (McAuliffe 2015: 428–9). The Peripatetic thinkers, who were often physicians and lawyers, emphasized how they might give advice to people who would not really understand it, since they themselves were not lawyers or physicians, and yet it was in their interests to do what they are told by those who know.

26:217 (see also 9:51, 58:10) And put your trust in the almighty, the all merciful. Tawakkul (trust) is regarded by Sufis as complete dependence on God and involves denying the existence of secondary causation. Everything is then done by God and we can expect Him to help those in need. A Qur’anic verse explains how Solomon asked his assistants to bring her throne to him miraculously: Said the one who had a sort of knowledge of the Book “I will bring it to you in the twinkling of an eye.” Then when he saw it brought to him firmly, he said: “This is from the grace of my Lord.” (27:40)

This verse is sometimes taken to predict modern scientific developments. It suggests that the transmission of sound, vision, and perhaps even matter is possible. Telecommunication and television systems are sometimes seen as hinted at in this verse by naïve commentators on the Qur’an, which directs attention to the possibility of the transmission of material things exceeding even the speed of light. Although scientists have discussed the possibility of the latter idea, it has not yet been realized. Still, we may draw the principle

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that the Qur’an elucidates this long-range target for scientists. It not only encourages people to develop appropriate equipment and techniques, but also to transform the earth into a more harmonious place, whose inhabitants can simply communicate with one another, as an aspect of their thankfulness to God, the person who has made nature so open to human science.

27:16 (see also 27:15 and 17:44) …. We have been taught bird language and provided with everything. Surely this is an obvious favor. One of the points of the narrative in these verses is to bring out the high status of Solomon/Sulayman as a prophet and king. In the above passage the reference to what he has been given is generally taken to mean knowledge, something he acknowledges comes about as a result of the special grace of God. He can use magic and understand the language of animals. He expresses gratitude to God for his powers, which include bringing the Queen of Sheba’s chair from her palace to his in an instant. When the Queen comes, she sees the glass floor of the palace room and takes it to be water. When she realizes she is wrong she becomes a Muslim: a decision that has come in for much comment (Leaman 2003: 23–37; Mir 2007: 43–56).

27:39 A devil of the jinn said, “I bring it to you before you rise from your place” … This refers to Bilqis’ throne via tayy al-ard (folding up the earth), instantaneous self-transportation. It was transported to Solomon’s palace instantly.

27:40 “…that He may test me and see if I shall show gratitude or not …” This is how Solomon responds when he is accused of using magic tricks to



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do spectacular things that amaze people, and represent a talent he himself possesses. According to the cricket in The Case of the Animals no one believed him until God sent a termite to eat his staff, and then he fell down (Case, 191/Ep 22, 139–40, 299). The animals point to the ways in which human beings are impressed by political authority and power and refuse to acknowledge the ultimate power of God. By contrast, the animals are grateful for what God does and are aware of the design and power of the deity. Animals also avoid the sorts of sectarian disputes that exist in the human world, and are by contrast with humans all monotheists. Solomon wants to emphasize that his success is not due to either his own skill or his trickery but is due to God.

27:88 (see also 70:9) You see the mountains and think them firmly fixed: but they shall pass away like the clouds pass away [with] the artistry of God, who disposes of all things in perfect order: for He is well acquainted with all that you do. Thus, mountains are, like other creatures, signs of God’s omnipresence: they prostrate themselves before God along with all other creatures.

28:5 And We wished to be gracious to those who were being oppressed in the land, to make them leaders and make them inheritors. Often quoted by Khumayni and prefaces his famous speech titled: “First Day of God’s Government” (McAuliffe 2015: 573).

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28:78 The guilty will not be questioned about their sins. This is often taken to mean that they will not be called to account immediately. Muhammad Shahrour asks the question why they are not interrogated by God (Christman 2009: 32). It is because a mujrim, a dissenting atheist, does not believe in the existence of God and this by itself sends him straight to hell. He will not even be asked by God about his acts in this world. The reason is that he has no account with God. The omission of prayer, the breaking of the fast, the tampering with weights and scales (corruption in trade and commerce) and such, which are all sins that God might forgive a believer (muslim), will not even be mentioned in the case of someone who has cut off his ties with God. A person cannot be made accountable for things whose consequences for the afterlife have never been acknowledged by him in the first place. We are told: Except the companions of the right hand, in gardens, they will question each other, and the sinners: “What led you into the fire?” They will say: “We were not of those who prayed, nor were we of those who fed the poor; but we used to talk vanities with vain talkers, and we used to deny the Day of Judgment” (74:39-46). Is it fair to punish people so much for their lack of assent to divine existence? If such people are not accountable, why are they punished? It could be because they are not even on the morality grid, as far as God is concerned, and so have the status of animals, perhaps. Unlike animals though they do have the possibility of working out the nature of God, or of accepting revelation, so if there is punishment it is perhaps for not making these intellectual moves.

28:88 … everything will perish except His face … Only God really exists. According to Mulla Sadra all contingent things lack real existence by contrast with the source of their existence, although they are necessary when they are brought into existence (Met Pen, 53). The contrast between the necessary existence of the source of things and the things themselves



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is often used in Islamic philosophy of all varieties, and receives its clearest theoretical formulation in Ibn Sina. Ibn al-‘Arabi sometimes represents this contrast as between our poverty and the opposite for God, since we always rely on Him and are nothing without Him, whereas He does not need us at all and is completely independent of us, a point repeated by Ankaravi (2011: 83).

29:2 Do people imagine that they will be left alone once they say “we believe” and will not be tested? The community will always be tested and needs to think about taking charge of its own destiny by doing what it ought to and avoiding evil. God knows everything so there is no point in trying to mislead Him.

29:20 Say: “Travel through the earth and see how God brought about the creation, in just the same way He will produce a second creation.” God has power over all things. In the next world, an eternal life will be available to human beings in line with God’s promise (wa‘d) and this is described as a second creation. The idea is that since He could create everything in the first place, bringing people back to life later on would not be a problem, indeed, easier than the first creation.

29:43 … none grasps this but those who know. The frog in The Case of the Animals (Ep 22, 228) refers to the way in which some animals kill and eat each other, which he sees as part of a wellorganized design. The Ikhwan refer to the proclivity of warring groups to

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enslave each other just like the way humans take control over animals as evidence of the way in which fortunes change (Ep 22, 116). The text actually refers to parables or examples and claims that only some will understand them.

29:46 And say: “We believe in what has been revealed to us and what has been revealed to you, our God and your God is one …” Tariq Ramadan (McAuliffe 2015: 651–2) suggests that this is the basis of dialogue among the People of the Book, links it with 3:64 and 3:2-4, and emphasizes the importance of dealing with others in the best way (16:125, 29:46). The Qur’an tends to be more positive about Christians than about Jews and others (5:82) (Leaman 2006a: 59–73; 2011: 82–94).

29:49 Rather, it is evident signs in the hearts of those who are given knowledge … The word belongs to the world of command, according to Mulla Sadra, and is restricted to those who can use their hearts to understand it. By contrast, the book belongs to the world of creation and is easily available to everyone: We have written for him on the tablets (7:145). With respect to the word: No one touches it except for the pure; it is a revelation from the Lord of the worlds (56:79-80). Mulla Sadra starts this section by distinguishing between the Qur’an as a recitation, and as a furqan or discernment, a method of analysis. Creation involves differentiating existence and so relates to the Qur’an as furqan, while command encourages us to view existence as part of a basic and divinely established unity, and that appeals to the sort of thinking that takes place in the heart (Met Pen, 62).



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29:56 O My servants … truly My earth is wide, so worship Me. According to Ibn al- ‘Arabi, while on earth our worship is to take place in it. Since we always remain servants in our relationship with God this reference to earth is not to the ordinary place that we inhabit but to an intelligible earth which never changes. It cannot change since if it did our eternal servanthood would be capable of change (Futuhat, 3:224).

30:7 They only know and recognize the outward appearance of the temporal world … This is referred to in Hayy ibn Yaqzan as describing those who rely on nothing more than reason, and so are unable to achieve any deeper access to reality (Khalidi 2005: 149). It is often a theme of those criticizing philosophers, that the latter rely on nothing more than reason, that they are only aware of the surfaces of things, while if they used a broader set of epistemological techniques they would become aware of more profound truths.

30:30 (see also 7:8-9, 21:47, 59:9) Set your face towards religion, in accordance with your nature, which God has established. There is no change in the creation of God. This is the right religion, but most people do not recognize it. Here is a reference to our fitra, our natural disposition to act morally in response to the divine guidance we receive, and without which we would not know what our duty was. Calling humanity hanif or correctly guided and having fitra shows how natural it is for us to act properly: yet, many people do not understand this and are led astray. On the other hand, it has to be said that much of what passes for religion is quite unnatural and

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requires us to curb what we would otherwise do, and think. There is a celebrated debate in Islamic philosophy between al-Ghazali and Miskawayh about the social basis of religion (Leaman 2014: 110–11). According to the latter, what religions like Islam do is build on the natural inclinations of humanity and thereby make it relatively easy for us to carry out our religious duties. Hospitality is a good example here: we like helping people and being with people, and religion puts this within a wider transcendental context that both encourages us in a certain direction and establishes rules for those actions. This is not a natural law doctrine, but it is one that suggests our natures are well attuned to our duties: this is hardly surprising since God created us. He knows very well what is in our interests and establishes a system of legislation accordingly. It fits us and the rest of creation, and that is the point of it: it is there for our benefit. God does not require us to act in any particular way since God has no needs, but we should act in accordance with divine law to accord with the sorts of creatures we are, and of course in Islam there is also the prospect of an eventual reward in the next life. The straight path on which we are told to travel is one where it is important to be balanced, since otherwise one is likely to stray from going in the right direction.

30:39 And whatever increase (riba) you ask for in the property of people, it does not increase with God … The contrast is made with charity: what you give will increase with God, and there will be a reward. Often the Qur’an refers to the importance of spending money, and the aim is to encourage spending it on helping the poor. Many commentators of the Qur’an are of the opinion that the word riba in this verse does not refer to usury or interest. Al-Tabari thinks that the word riba in this verse means a gift offered by someone to a person with the intention that the latter will give him in return a greater gift. But some commentators of the Qur’an have taken this word to mean usury. This view is attributed to Hasan al-Basri as reported by Ibn al-Jawzi. If the word riba is used, this verse is taken to mean usury according to this view, which seems more probable, because the word riba used in other places carries the same meaning—there is no specific prohibition against it in the verse. The most it directly suggests is that riba does not bring with it a reward from God in



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the next world. So this verse does not contain a prohibition against riba, but does imply that God does not think positively of it, as in 4:161: And because of their charging riba while they were prohibited from it. In another verse, while listing the evil deeds of Jews, it is mentioned that they used to take riba that was prohibited for them. The implication is quite clear here of disapproval. Verse 4:153: The People of the Book ask you to bring down upon them a Book from heaven. This verse suggests that all the future verses were revealed in answer to the objections of the Jews who came to the Prophet, and asked him to bring down a Book from the heavens like the one given to the Prophet Musa/Moses. So this series of verses was revealed at a time when Jews were present in Medina and were in a position to argue with the Prophet. Since most of the Jews had left Medina after the fourth year from the Hijra (Muhammad’s arrival there from Mecca), this verse would probably have been revealed before that time. Here the word riba refers to usury which was indeed prohibited for the Jews. That does not necessarily imply the explicit prohibition of riba for Muslims. It simply mentions that riba was prohibited for the Jews but they did not comply with the prohibition, a complaint often raised against them in the Qur’an. The suggestion might be that it is a sinful act for the Muslims also, otherwise why blame the Jews for the practice? On the other hand, it could have just been a rule set for the Jews, with no implications for Muslims at all. After all, the Jews are often blamed for not carrying out their ritual laws, which are not incumbent on Muslims. However, we are told: O those who believe do not eat up riba doubled and redoubled (3:130). This verse contains a clear prohibition for Muslims and it is often said that it is the first verse of the Qur’an through which the practice of riba was forbidden for Muslims directly. Some commentators have also pointed out the reason why this verse was revealed in the context of the Battle of Uhud. They say that the invaders of Mecca had financed their army through loans based on interests, as people often do. This is not in itself an indication of what is wrong with usury; the invaders probably prepared for battle by bringing water and weapons with them also, but that could hardly be banned. That the prohibition of riba had been imposed sometime around the Battle of Uhud finds further support from an event reported by Abu Dawood in his hadith collection, al-Sunan. The report says that ‘Amr ibn Aqyash was a person who had advanced some loans on the basis of interest. He was inclined to embrace Islam but was reluctant to do so because it occurred to him that if he became a Muslim he would lose the interest they owed him and so he put off accepting Islam. After the Battle

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of Uhud, he decided not to delay any more and came to the battlefield, started fighting on behalf of Muslims, and achieved the rank of a shahid (martyr) in the same conflict. So he presumably went to his eternal reward, and the interest would not have been of any personal advantage to him anyway, since he was not alive to receive it. This tradition suggests that riba was prohibited before the Battle of Uhud and it was the basic cause for the reluctance of ‘Amr ibn Aqyash to embrace Islam. 2:275-81: Those who take interest will not stand but as stands whom the demon has driven crazy by his touch. That is because they have said: “Trading is just like riba.” And God has permitted trading and prohibited riba. So, whoever receives advice from his Lord and stops, he is allowed what has passed, and his matter is up to God. And the ones who revert back, those are the people of fire. There they remain for ever. God destroys riba and sustains charities. And God does not like any sinful disbeliever. Surely those who believe and do good deeds, establish prayer and give charity, have their reward with their Lord, and there is no fear for them, nor shall they grieve. O those who believe, fear God and give up what still remains of riba if you are believers. But if you do not, then listen to the declaration of war from God and His Messenger. And if you repent, yours is your principal. Neither do wrong, nor be wronged. And if there be one in misery, then give him time until he can pay. And if you leave it as charity that is far better for you, if you really know. And be fearful of a day when you shall be returned to God, then everybody shall be paid, in full, what he has earned. And they shall not be wronged.

The background of the revelation of these verses is often given that after the conquest of Mecca, the Prophet had declared as void all the amounts of riba that were due at that time. The declaration was apparently that nobody could claim any interest on any loan advanced by him. We are told that the Prophet negotiated with the population of Taif and arranged for them to become Muslims by making a treaty with him. One of the proposed clauses of treaty was that the local tribe, the Banu Thaqif, would not forego the amounts of interest due on their debtors but their creditors would forego the amount of interest. The Prophet did not accept that provision and just wrote a sentence on the proposed draft that the Banu Thaqif would have the same rights as all Muslims have. As a result when the tribe claimed interest from another tribe, they promptly declined to pay interest on the ground that riba was prohibited for Muslims. The matter was placed before the governor of



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Mecca. The Banu Thaqif argued that according to their treaty they were not bound to forego the amounts of interest. The Prophet considered the issue and we are told that a consequence was the revealing of 2:278-9 above. The implication is that the tribe lost their case (Leaman 2014: 88–101).

30:50 See the signs of divine mercy, how he revives the earth after it was dead. He is indeed the one who revives the dead and has power over everything. Many thinkers see the revival of plants after winter, for example, as a sign of divine providence and power.

31:14 “Show gratitude to Me and to your parents …” The parrot points out that animals, unlike human beings, do not have to be told to be nice to their parents: evidence of the problematic ethical status of humanity (Ep 22, 271). This passage reflects on the hardships of mothers sustaining and bearing children, something the parrot suggests animals do not have to be told.

31:27 (see also 18:109) And if all the trees on earth were pens and the oceans behind it to add to it, yet would not the words of God be exhausted, for God is exalted in power, full of wisdom The words of God are correlated with the things in the world, and according to Ibn al-‘Arabi, they are infinite. They start with the word, and command, “Be” (16:40) and they never run out (Futuhat, 3:135, 451).

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31:34 No soul knows in what land it will die … Mulla Sadra takes this to show that the soul changes its nature as it does different things. When it is connected to nature it is imaginative, and this is the way in which Islamic philosophers normally saw imagination—as irretrievably connected to nature. We take our experiences of material things and play around with them, and without those experiences imagination would have no role. By contrast, when our thinking is oriented to higher intellectual issues it becomes more aligned with the nature of existence and reality and is no longer constrained by what we can try to know as mere physical creatures. For Mulla Sadra it is important that we move from the physical to the intellectual and throughout our lives we are always potentially changing in that direction (Mulla Sadra 1999: 74–5).

32:4 It is God who has created the heavens and the earth and everything between them in six days, then He established Himself on the throne … Nasir-i Khusrow points out that the literalists take this to mean that it took God six days to make everything, after which he sits on a throne and retains influence over what he created. Yet on his interpretation of 16:40, He could not have just commanded everything to come into being instantaneously. It also suggests that before He created the world He did not own a throne, since nothing apart from Him existed (Khusrow 2012: 152). The Isma‘ilis take a far more nuanced and allegorical approach to the notion of divine creation.

32:8 Then He fashioned His progeny of an extraction of worthless water. This refers to human beings (see also 36:77, 80:17-19). These references are designed to restrain our feeling of self-importance, as are 14:34,



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41:49, and 39:8. Verse 32:8 also reflects on the power of God that He can create something so complex out of something very simple and different from it.

32:13 (see also 24:35) Had We so wished, We would have guided every soul … It is often suggested that this is not a sign of divine imperfection, but reflects the different levels of knowledge of people. Some people are not prepared to try to find out what the nature of reality is and so naturally go awry; God could bring them back to the straight path but chooses not to do so.

33:4 … And God speaks the truth, and He shows the way. Yet behind what we see there are realities of which we are unaware, and Sufis think that their methodology helps us increase our knowledge of this hidden aspect of reality. According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, the universe as it is available to us guides us along the way, provided we look at it in the right way. The world is constantly changing and in so far as we can be aware of these changes we get some glimpse of the truth that lies behind it and in it, the omnipresence and omnipotence of God. After all, “the words of God do not run out” (31:27), but we need to be able to read them in the right sort of way. He suggests that there is a variety of different approaches to these words and some people use reason while others “have hearts through which they use intelligence” (22:46). The verse continues by saying the problem lies not in the eyes being blind but with the hearts, and this means that a more intuitive form of thought needs to be engaged here, not just our sense experience or our rational faculties. For one thing, everything is interconnected: Ibn al-‘Arabi quotes 75:29—the leg is intertwined with the leg. To grasp this linking of phenomena we need a different kind of thinking than the analytical form of reasoning popular with the Peripatetic philosophers (SD, 214; Bashier 2004: 130–1).

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33:5 You will not be blamed if you make a mistake, only for what your hearts deliberately intend. God is most forgiving and merciful. The heart is again given a leading role in expressions of both sincerity and intelligence. Someone who tackles a mathematics problem and comes up with the wrong answer, but shows in the working of the solution that they know how to do it, should be graded differently from someone who has no idea of how to do it at all.

33:15 And yet they have made a covenant with God not to turn away, and an agreement with God will be answered for. Agreements are serious things and contracts may be enforced. On the other hand, it is always a question in religion how far a generation is responsible for agreements made with predecessors. Just because our ancestors made an agreement with God, how does that bind us? This point is understood by all those Muslim thinkers like al-Ghazali who saw some of their work as in the ihya’ genre, designed to encourage the revival of religion and presumably a reassertion of earlier commitments to God and His message.

33:21 (see also 3:144) You have indeed in the Messenger of God an excellent example for he who hopes in God and the final day, and who remembers God a great deal. One of the many complimentary references to the Prophet establishing his status as a paradigm for human beings. Thinking about God constantly is always encouraged by religion.



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33:59 O Prophet, say to your wives and daughters and the believing women that they draw their outer clothes close to them … The word al-jilbab (whose plural jalabib occurs in the verse) is often taken to mean a veil covering the head, perhaps a shirt or garment. It is part of the idea that whatever is recommended to the wives of the Prophet, and other women linked with him, is a good idea for everyone, or could be taken to be compulsory for everyone. One of the significant ideas for many Muslims is the need to copy as far as possible the example of the Prophet, and most relevant information is found not in the Qur’an itself but in the hadith and sira (biographical) literature. On the other hand, it has also been argued by some modernist commentators that practices common during the time of the Prophet are not necessarily relevant now, given the differences of context.

33:61 … accursed wherever they are found, seized and killed. This is a reference to the appropriate treatment for the hypocrites. However, as Tabataba’i contends, this verse is not meant to be a direct order to be implemented by Muslims everywhere and at all times; it only stands as a severe deterrent. In another example, 9:123 refers to the disbelievers with a similar hostile tone: “O you who have believed, fight those disbelievers who are nearby and be ruthless to them ... And know that God is with the righteous.” In this instance, the use of the word, often translated as harshness, ruthlessness, or hardness, appears to encourage being mean to the enemy (Tabataba’i 1973: 16:532). Tabataba’i opposes translating the word as “harshness” in the context of war against disbelievers because, he points out, the Qur’an as a whole is not keen on the idea of such behavior in war, although it is in favor of the practice of being firm when resisting iniquity. Deterrence is important, and may require sternness in posture. He notes that 9:73 and 66:9 also tend to identify our attitude to the enemy in

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war with how we should behave towards unbelievers and hypocrites. On the other hand, the Qur’an makes it clear that violence needs to be controlled in war, as in 2:190: “Fight in the way of God those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, God does not like transgressors.” Restraint is clearly recommended in verses 4:90, 2:193, 4:84, and 9:29, and once the threat passes, there is clearly no further need for violence. For example, we see in 4:84: So fight, in the cause of God; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And encourage the believers so that perhaps God will restrain the might of those who disbelieve, and God is greater in might and punishment. There is also 4:90: So if they remove themselves from you and do not fight you and offer you peace, then God has not made for you a cause against them. We are also told at 2:193: Fight them until there is no dissention and until religion is for God. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors. On the other hand, the much broader 9:29, “Fight those who do not believe in God or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what God and His messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth,” seems to countenance far wider justifications for conflict.

33:72 We did indeed offer the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused it, being frightened, but man accepted it, he was indeed unjust (zalum) and foolish (jahul). As a result of taking on this trust, humanity assumes the vicegerency as khalifa on the earth. Sufis sees this as a reference to our being made in divine form in 2:31: God taught Adam the names, all of them. This comes right after a verse describing how God has decided to place Adam on the earth as his representative. The acceptance of this trust (amana) made the role of being divine representatives feasible, and the consequence of this is that we can be judged on the basis of what we do. Our weakness, both intellectual and moral, leads to many problems in carrying out this role (7:179, 95:5-6, 91:7-8) but it is a role we have been assigned by God, according to the Book.



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Shah Waliullah (Hermansen: 1988) analyzes divine qadar (power) in terms of His attributes of will. Ordinary people may think that things are predetermined, and by contrast the prophets apprehend the unity of the whole universe. This unity they understand to be governed by one universal scheme (al-tadbir al wahdani) that is determined by God’s eternal will, power, and wisdom. Nothing can take place that is at the slightest variance with it. The universal scheme is established through the sunnat al-Allah—God’s ordained mode of operation. How things change and their evolution from one state to another is the operation of this sunna of God. It is possible only when they have potentiality and capacity (isti’dad) for action, and that they owe to divine grace. The things which ordinarily happen day to day are actually present in the eternal scheme that transcends our space and time, but they figure in our world to a degree also, of course. Shah Waliullah illustrates human freedom through the concept of taklif (responsibility). It is through our responsibility of accepting the trust (amana) of God that enables us to choose between various alternatives. We can do this, unlike angels. The verse of the Qur’an above notes the agreement between God and humanity. Our undertaking the trust provides us with the status of being responsible for our actions. So we can choose to do things we wish or otherwise, in the material realm, but in the eternal scheme of things our choices are fixed and determined, and we cannot act any differently. It is then an issue whether we are really free or this is merely how things seem to us to be, although this is not how Shah Waliullah sees the topic (Kemal and Kemal 1996: 663–70).

34:3 … not even the tiniest atom in heaven and earth escapes Him … His knowledge is pre-eternal and identical with his essence (Ankaravi 2011: 88).

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34:12 We have subjected the wind to Solomon, so that he may go a two-month distance in one day and We caused the fount of copper to gush forth for him and We gave him certain of the jinn who worked for him by permission of his Lord … A popular way of interpreting texts like this is to see the first part of the verse as hinting at the importance of discovering equipment by means of which one would be able to fly in order to shorten long distances, i.e., the discovery of the airplane. The Qur’an, as indicated in this verse, has been calling upon humanity to discover an aerodynamic system for almost fifteen hundred years. Interpreted by Nursi, the verse’s suggestion is that just as Solomon could ride in the air due to his appropriate relationship with God, if we work hard and apply ourselves to understanding His laws of nature, we shall share in this. Hence the invention of the plane (Nursi 1992: 254–5). In addition to the melting of iron, also cited in the Qur’an, is a verse referring to the fact that mountains and birds praised God along with the prophet David. On the one hand, the sincerity of David in his prayer is emphasized, and on the other, it draws attention to the importance of benefiting from the natural features of the world. David is regarded as a prominent prophet of God, who brought the message of God to humanity through the revelation of the Psalms in the Qur’an, and Muslims consider David an exemplary personality, unlike the gravely flawed David that the Bible presents. We see in 34:10: And surely, We have given David grace from Us. O mountains and birds, echo his psalms of praise. And We made the iron supple to him. This is taken to imply the fact that human beings, thanks to God, can usefully exploit natural resources like metals. There are also verses like: We have subjugated the mountains to him in order to exalt God with him in the mornings and in the evenings (38:18). The suggestion is perhaps that the mountains, along with everything else, can be used by human beings in their own interests, given the way that God has designed them (Nursi 1992: 264).



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34:13 (see also 12:103) “… Few indeed are those that are thankful among My servants.” It is interesting to think about how far we should be thankful in particular situations. The Qur’an, like many religions, is keen on people being grateful for what He does, and prayer is full of references to the significance of the fact that God created us and our world. He did not have to do it, He does not need us, and He did not have to construct the world in such a way that it is relatively easy for us to find our way around it, and indeed everything in it is able to develop in line with their nature. This is a frequent claim by those committed to a religion, and it accords well with the sorts of feelings that some people have when thinking about the world as a whole on the basis of the small part that is before them. But it might be asked why God should want us to thank Him, or even worship Him, although we are told that that is the whole purpose of His creation sometimes. Worship should probably be seen as a form of gratitude, and indeed we might even see morality and lifestyle as an aspect of gratitude, since it could be regarded as a way of thanking God by trying to emulate Him (making our actions conform as much as possible to the divine names, for example). On the other hand, this emphasis on giving thanks might be regarded as being unsavory and something that involves us treating God too much like a human being. Obviously we need to thank each other for good things that we do as it encourages renewed benevolence and improves mutual social ties, but is this so appropriate for God? He is good due to His nature and is looking for nothing from us, in the sense that He needs nothing from us, so it is difficult to see why we need to be so effusive in our thanks to Him. It would be a bit like thanking the weather for being good on a particular day, as though it had any choice in the matter and could be affected by us. We do, of course, but then such behavior is not entirely rational, like kicking a chair when we knock into it. It is not as though the chair decided to trip us up, yet we personify it for a few seconds sometimes and retaliate with violence. It might be said though that God must expect us to be grateful to Him since in Islam there is such an emphasis on the next world and how we will be judged there, partially on the basis of whether we have done things in this world that express our gratitude to God. Have we prayed, have we obeyed the divine laws, have we acted in accordance with the

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Qur’an? These are all relevant questions that will be raised on the Day of Judgment, and they imply an attitude to God that to a degree is based on a degree of caution at His power and the consequences of misunderstanding its nature and scope. One of the aspects of this is the idea that a certain degree of gratitude on our parts is appropriate to our creator, and if we do not express or demonstrate it we may be in for trouble. It is not that God requires our thanks, like a human superior, perhaps, but more a matter of thanking Him in order to understand our relationship with Him. We thank Him and in that way appreciate our role as His dependant, and of course one of the things that religions are very good at is presenting us with practices that change our dispositions to behave in certain ways. Prayer at certain times and places changes our character gradually and makes us think of our relationship with God, and the more we do it the more we change to become the right sort of people, or so it is to be hoped. Of course, it sometimes happens that the more we do it, the more it becomes routine and done unthinkingly, which rather defeats the purpose, but on the other hand even this sort of performance might be regarded as having positive features, and is still superior to not praying at all. Then there are all those moral activities, which we might find much easier to do if we think we do them for God in gratitude for what He has done for us, rather than out of pure motives like the desire to do good. As we grow in moral terms we may start doing something because we think God wants us to do it, and we are grateful to Him so we want to reciprocate in some way, and then after our characters have been changed to find doing good easier we might appreciate that really we should be good for no other reason than the fact that virtue is desirable in itself.

34:37 It is not your wealth nor your children that shall bring you nearer to Us, except for him who believes, and does righteousness … See also 7:31 on the undesirability of prodigality, and 8:28 and 64:15 on wealth as a test.



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35:15 O humanity, you are poor with respect to God and God is completely independent, worthy of praise. For Ibn al-‘Arabi poverty is linked with contingency, in the sense that we need God to create us and keep us and our world in existence, while He needs nothing. As we increase in knowledge we come to appreciate this, and the precise way in which human beings are dependent on God is an important stage of knowledge about the nature of existence and our role in it. He links it with 3:97: God is independent of His creatures (SD, 184–5). On the other hand, there seems to be a degree of reciprocity here, since he denies that independence is superior to dependence, but they are part of the same relationship. This is to make the point that rich human beings are just as dependent on God as poor human beings, since we are all contingent by contrast with God. It is also true that some people are only poor because others are not, in the sense that the concept of poverty involves gradations. On the other hand, when he considers which is superior, God or his creatures, he comments that such a question reveals the ignorance of the person raising the issue (Futuhat, 2:654). Yet the obvious answer to the question is that God is superior. Ibn al-‘Arabi perhaps thinks that there is a need for us to find Him in the world, and unless we are around to do this, a less satisfactory state of affairs exists. We need to find Him, and He needs to find us, although He can get on without us and we cannot get on without Him, yet in a sense this is a reciprocal relationship in which both sides are irretrievably linked. It is worth pointing out that what we can come close to in our understanding of our indigence with respect to God is only that part of Him which He reveals through His world, and we never have access to the hidden aspect of the deity. It is surely nonetheless true that for Ibn al-‘Arabi the way in which God allows part of His being to be revealed requires someone else to be aware of it, and in that sense neither party is entirely independent of the other.

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35:28 (see also 39:9, 58:11, 20:114, 3:18) … among his servants, only those who have knowledge are in awe of God … There is sustained emphasis on the importance of ‘ilm or knowledge in its many forms in the Qur’an. But what sort of knowledge is this, revealed or secular? Revealed is clearly the case in 2:120, 3:61, 6:119, 6:140, 6:143, 11:14, 11:49, 13:37, 13:43, 19:43. When people go awry it is often bi ghayri ‘ilm, without having any knowledge, which means not that they do not know what they are doing factually, but that they lack the appropriate moral dimension; see 30:29-30, 6:140, 6:144. As we are told at 2:102, “They learn what is harmful and not what helps them.” These people simply do not understand the implications of what they do so that “they only know the outward appearance of life and do not understand the life to come” (30:7). Of course, God is the real source and repository of knowledge (46:23, 12:76) but, although God knows, you do not know (2:216, also 3:65-6); this does not mean that we should not try to understand what lies before us in the world, on the contrary. It does suggest though that without the guidance we receive from God, and our acceptance of it, our chances of understanding the real nature of reality are very limited. A significant problem here is that we are in the world of matter and have no access to the world that lies behind this world, the ‘alam al-ghayb (see 39:46, 46:92, 6:63, 59:22, 9:105, 6:50, 68:47, 16:77). We are told at 6:59: Only God has the keys to the ghayb, only He knows them. What we can know though, at least to a degree, is the physical world, the shahada, and we need to grasp it as far as we can, but also its implications for wider concepts of knowledge. Verses 3:190, 67:3-4, and 27:60-4 encourage us to understand the world around us and even the Prophet cannot go further. It says at 72:26-7, “God alone knows the hidden (ghayb), and He does not disclose it to anyone, except a messenger whom He has chosen,” which suggests that Muhammad does have this form of knowledge, but he is also told: “I do not tell you that I possess the treasures of God, nor do I know the ghayb … I only follow what is revealed” (6:50). It is not that puzzling, since the unknown can be grasped by us, but only through revelation, and then only to a limited extent since we can have no experience, at least in this life, of



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what is inaccessible to our senses. It is made clear in the Book however that through revelation we can know for the first time as much about the next world, for example, as is knowable for human beings (see 11:49, 27:65-6, 68:12).

35:32 Then We have given the Book as an inheritance to those of Our servants that we have chosen, but there are among them some who have wronged their own souls, some who follow a middle path, and some who are by God’s leave the foremost in good deeds, and that is the highest grace. This is a popular verse for those committed to mystical forms of Islam. Those who combine the outward (zahir) and the inward (batin) of religion and observe both as the middle nation (ummatan wasatan) represent the ideal traveler on the path to God. He asks Him to illuminate his exterior with the light of obedience to Him and his inward being with His love, fill his heart with knowledge, and his spirit with His vision. At the center of the doctrine of knowledge (‘irfan) is the recognition for the Shi‘a of the position of the imams as the inheritors and possessors of the inward and outward knowledge of the Qur’an and the possessors of the power of wilaya (Safavi 2007: 64–8). The Qur’an is often regarded as having a manifest meaning and an inner and non-manifest one. It has four aspects: al-‘ibara, that is to say, the text, that is for the common people; allusions (al-ishara), for the elite (khawass); subtle mysteries (al-lata’if) for the friends of God (awliya); and finally, the truths (al-haqa’iq), which are for the prophets (anbiya). Its outer meaning can be understood and its commands, practices, and injunctions observed by all Muslims. As to the inner meaning of the Qur’an, this is restricted to God and those who are steadfast in knowledge (3:7). For the Shi‘a this emphasizes the significance of leadership of the community by those who have the right background to be in charge. Those referred to as having the right sort of knowledge are often seen as the descendants of the Prophet. ‘Ali is often taken to have learned from the Prophet, who of course learned from God, and then the former taught humanity. Only God knows the reality

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and reveals it only to the pure (mutahharun) and those who are steadfast in knowledge (rasikhun f ’il- ‘ilm) (3:7). In his Qur’anic commentary on the relation between mercy and justice, ‘Abdullah Ansari points out that benevolence and mercy presuppose the existence of justice. Commenting on 35:32, Ansari says, “Be cognizant that whatever is undertaken on the basis of benevolence/bounty will never be inflicted by any defect, for justice never dominates benevolence.” He adds: “Look at the Qur’an and see wherever mercy is mentioned before punishment in the text, it is only a warning (wa‘id), but wherever punishment precedes the mention of mercy, punishment becomes annulled. And wherever mercy and punishment are mentioned together, the ruling is mercy-based.” He concludes that “This is because the all-wise gives priority to people’s rights over His own rights.” The Qur’an discusses friendly relationship among Muslim believers within the moral space of bounty as a divine gift and an essential necessity for the survival of the Muslim community (Maybudi 1973: 289). Hayy (Ibn Tufayl 1978: 131) argues that the perfection of God lies in the fact that everything is carefully designed, not just the important things.

35:45 Were God to take humanity to task because of what they have earned, He would not leave any living being on its back. But He respites them until a specified time, and when their time comes, God really sees His servants. He sees their merits and failings and at that stage they may be appropriately judged. The world has been created and is maintained primarily by grace rather than by justice. In other words, justice alone cannot save the world. This cosmic concept is echoed in the above Qur’anic verse: The same notion is echoed in another verse: “Were God to hasten ill for mankind with their haste to bring about the good, their term would have been over” (10:11). Although the word justice (‘adl) is not used, the suggestion is that there is justice by which all living creatures would have perished had it been in operation. God is reluctant to retaliate against wrongdoing, shows patience and mercy, and does not operate in accordance with a crude notion of justice, fortunately for his creatures.



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We are told: Were it not for God’s grace and His mercy upon you in this world and the hereafter, a great punishment would have landed on you for what you rushed into (24:14). Verses 10, 20, and 21 of the same chapter and a few other verses in other Qur’anic chapters repeat the same notion that “were it not for God’s bounty” such and such a calamity would have befallen certain communities or all of humanity (2:64, 4:83, 4:113). There is of course the testing of people, and justice does operate eventually. Verse 17:21 reminds the reader that God’s grace is unevenly spread on earth and in heaven: Observe how We have given some of them an advantage over some others; yet the hereafter is surely greater in respect of ranks and greater in respect of relative merits. This notion of uneven grace may seem contrary to the egalitarian principle of Islam and might seem unfair. But another verse sheds better light on the cause of these limits: Were God to expand the provision for His servants, they would surely create havoc on the earth. But He sends down in a measure whatever He wishes. Indeed, He is all-aware, all-seeing about His servants (42:27). The distribution of grace is directly linked to the capacity of each and every individual. As a result, it can be argued that limited assistance for someone who will not really benefit from it is inappropriate. In other words, they get less chance to do evil and harm themselves.

36:7-10 The verdict has been passed against most of them, for they refuse to believe. We have placed collars around their necks, right up to their chins, so that their heads are forced up, and set barriers before and behind them, blocking their vision: they cannot see. It is all the same to them whether you warn them or not: they will not believe. In his translation Abdel Haleem presents the second verse here as: “[It is as if] We have placed [iron] collars around their necks,” which suggests they are just stubborn. Without those interpolations the implication is that they will never be believers whatever anyone does (Abdel Haleem 2013: 68). The point is to excuse the Prophet for his lack of success with some people: he

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can only really warn people who are believers and are prepared to receive the good news (see also 51:54-5).

36:54 On that day no soul shall suffer the least injustice. You shall be rewarded according only to your deeds. The issue of theodicy is addressed in all religions. Islam defends God against the charge of being involved in evil by advocating a system of eschatology based upon individual action. On the other hand, how far we are responsible for our own deeds is also an issue in the Qur’an (Leaman 2014: 113–18).

36:77-9 Can man not see that We have created him from a drop of fluid? Yet he disputes openly, producing arguments against Us, forgetting his own creation. He says, “Who can give life back to bones after they have decayed?” Say: “He who created them in the first place will give them life again. He is behind every act of creation.” Creating something from something that has already existed is easier than creating something out of nothing. As al-Kindi (died c. AH 256/870 ce) points out, creating something from its opposite such as fire from green trees is possible and we can experience it. It is conceivable, then, that life will again come to a body that is dead. After all, the creation of man or bringing him back to life again after death is easier than creating the universe, which was not there in the first place. For us we need time and something to work with if we are going to create something, but none of this is important for God (1950: 356). Abu Rida (1950: 56–8), commenting on al-Kindi’s interpretation of this passage, suggests that something can be reassembled after disintegrating, and we actually have experience of it. Things can also be created from their opposite. In some ways, it is easier to create something out of something than something out of nothing, which God did when he



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created the world. If he can create from nothing, then surely he can create life after death.

36:82 (see also 16:40) When God wants something to happen he says to it “Be” and it is. Hayy ibn Yaqzan (Ibn Tufayl 1978: 130) suggests that the sort of causality that operates here is outside of time, since the agent and the action are simultaneous. According to Mulla Sadra the divine command and speech precedes all existents (Met Pen, 61–2) and the word of God consists of the perfect words and “the firmly established verses” (3:7). As he points out there are other references in the Qur’an to words being used as aspects of creation, as in: He projected His word onto Mary and a spirit from Him (4:171).

36:83 … in His hand is the dominion of each thing … See also 6:102 for emphasis of God as the creator. But not negative things, argued Ibn al-‘Arabi. God created the good things and those that are bad are not real, so God could not be expected to be in charge of them (Murata 1992: 205; Imaginal Worlds, 46).

37:95 “Do you serve what you carved?’” Commentators such as Zamakhshari and Baydawi understand this passage in different ways. Zamakhshari took the passage to generally reflect the absurdity of idol worship given that people then worship not what made them but what they made. Baydawi saw it as emphasizing God’s control over humans and what we manage to do, whether it is something we should do or the reverse.

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37: 96 “For God created you and everything you do.” Ibn Rushd quotes this passage in his Kashf (114) to show that God is ultimately responsible for everything, not unlike the Ash‘arite doctrine of iktisab, according to which we participate in action by apparently acquiring some of God’s power. He adds that the sort of causality which the Ash‘arites decry is in fact the source of predetermination in nature (Urvoy 1978; Geoffroy 2001). But the passage refers directly to the idols that have been created by human beings and criticizes the idea that they have power; it does not directly make any claims about God’s power over everything. On the other hand, if God really is in charge of our actions, it is not clear how this operates, as Ibn Rushd suggests. Is it that He has set up the system of nature by which things take place and so indirectly lies at the source of everything that happens, and in that sense he creates everything we do? In this case, the person carving the idol can do it because they are motivated to do it by their upbringing and trade, the resources are available, and nothing on a particular occasion interferes with their doing it. Or is it the case that God is more closely involved? Then He is the real carver of the idol, although of course He disapproves of such an activity, and the action is something that the carver merely borrows from God in a sense, and merely has the illusion of acting, whereas in fact God is acting. As the Ash‘arites argued, in a sense we borrow the action from the ultimate actor, God.

38:26 (see also 2:30, 6:165, 10:14, 10:73, 35:39, 5:69, 5:74, 27:62) O David, we made you a vicegerent on earth … David is called a viceroy in the earth (khalifa fi’l-ard) and told to be a fair judge. The reference to the earth recalls the original trust amana that obtained between humanity and God. It is quite clear from the phrase and the other references to those who have been appointed as imams that their selection is dependent on their continuing obedient and virtuous behavior.



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38:27 (see also 23:115) We did not create the heavens and the earth and everything in between without a purpose … If God did not create the world as a joke or without a purpose, then it has a meaning and part of that meaning might be taken to be the judgment that comes to everyone eventually.

38:39 … so give freely or withhold, without account. Zuhd or renunciation should be seen as a battle against the self, to be waged without restriction (Ansari 1996: 94). Although it is realistic in its account of commercial transactions, the Qur’an is constantly critical of people trying to hoard money.

38:46 We have purified them by means of a pure thought, remembrance of the final abode. Ansari takes this to be a reference to the nur al-kashf or light of unveiling which allows the seeker after truth to make spiritual progress (Ansari 1996: 95).

38:72 “And I formed man and I breathed my spirit into him …” The forming of man is a reference to the body, which is then prepared to receive the soul, something very different from it.

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39:9 “Are those who know and those who do not know equal?” There is a hadith accepted by the Shi‘a which sees this verse as referring to the special role of the imams, along with al-rasikhun fi’l- ‘ilm (3:7), those rooted in knowledge who can work out the meaning of the difficult verses. The imams come after the ahl al-bayt (33:33), the family of the Prophet, and those who have authority (4:59). Ibn al-‘Arabi links it with 6:122: Like the one who is in darkness, and he never comes out (SD, 160). He uses the concept of light a good deal to bring out what he means by different levels of knowledge, and their ultimate dependence on God. The Ikhwan regard it as a rhetorical question since ignorance is obviously not the same as knowledge (Ep 22, 279–80).

39:23 The best of messages has God sent down, a book which is consistent, and teaching by repetition … There is a reference here to the message being mutashabihan or clear, and this should be linked with 3:7 and the distinction between clear and ambiguous verses in the Qur’an. The Book rejects the idea that it uses techniques like poetry to present its message, but it obviously does in places. What is wrong with poetry is that it perhaps emphasizes style at the expense of content, and where we are concerned with the truth, as we are in religion, this is obviously problematic. The way in which poetic lines are repeated, often in order to increase the emotional impact of the messages, can be highly effective, and yet of course from a logical point of view appears superfluous.



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39:38 If you ask them “Who created the heavens and the earth” they will reply “God.” Ibn Rushd in the Kashf suggests that only slow reasoners do not come to this conclusion (2011: 19). He goes on to say, quoting 22:73, that everything that people appeal to apart from God could not create even a fly even if they all got together (2011: 34).

39:42 God takes the souls at the time of their death and those who have not yet died in their sleep … Yet how can the soul’s experience of sleep be similar to death if the human being remains alive during sleep? Al-Razi takes it to mean that during sleep God takes up the souls, and some he does not return, so those people die, while others are returned, wake up, and continue to live (Mafatih, 26, 284). He links it with 6:60. Yet there is surely a big difference between sleep and death, although the comparison is often made. He escapes the problem by suggesting that God removes some from life, and others not (Mafatih, 195–9). Sleep is like death since when God removes the soul from the body it is as though it were dead, and sometimes it is dead, since He does not return it. It is when the soul infuses the body that it is alive.

39:62-3 God is the creator of all things, and He is the guardian and disposer of all affairs. To Him belong the keys of the heavens and the earth … This (like 81:28-9) very much suggests that God does everything: For whoever among you who wills to go straight. And you do not will except as God wills, the Lord of the worlds, and 37:96: God created you and what you do.

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On the other hand there is 2:223: Go to your tillage as you will, which is a reference to husbands and their freedom to approach their wives as they wish, and also 9:46: If they had wanted to proceed, they would have prepared provisions for it, which suggests the existence of free will. Yet at 42:9, there is a reference to God having power over everything, very much a general theme of the Book.

39:69 The earth will be illuminated by the light of its Lord … Since the earth referred to here, our world, is not yet illuminated, this suggests a reference is being made to the world to come (Khusrow 2012: 153). This is an interesting use of allegory, not uncommon in Isma‘ili philosophy, but seems to go too far since the earth is surely at least partially illuminated by divine light, given the view that it is such light that gets the world going and keeps it in existence.

40:37 “So that perhaps … I may look on the god of Moses …” Ibn al-‘Arabi notes that Pharaoh does not refer to the being whom Moses says is a god but the God of Moses, and he takes this to mean that he recognizes the real one God. On the other hand, he says at 28:38: I do not know that you have any god but me. He goes on to discuss building a tall palace, which will enable him to climb up to the level of Moses’ god. He also accuses Moses of being a liar in both ayat. It is difficult to know how to reconcile these two passages (SD, 53–4). It may be that the point here is to represent the fact that even Pharaoh’s errant conception of God captures some aspect of Him. Since God discloses Himself in an infinite variety of ways, which we could never grasp perspicuously, and some of the ways we can think of him involve tashbih or similarity with things we understand, and tashbih is exercised through imagination, a range of imaginative but false judgments about God may represent genuine



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instances of His self-disclosure. From the point of view of tanzih or rejecting such comparisons, and from the point of view of the way we use reason to work out the issues here, this is not at all satisfactory. Pharaoh either really knows God or he does not, and since he calls Moses a liar and refers to himself as God it looks like he does not: this is the judgment which one would be likely to make from a rational point of view. But from an imaginative perspective there is something to be said for the idea that he is a god, since if the Egyptians see Pharaoh as a god they manage to think in terms at least of there being a god and this is not a bad starting point, although from an Islamic point of view it is of course wrong. Comparing God to a human being is a serious error and yet it raises the right question: What is God like? It is worth noting that the question also presupposes the existence and significance of God. The question cannot really be answered but virtually anything that encourages us to think about God is positive according to many religious thinkers.

40:40 Whoever does evil will be repaid with something similar. Whoever does good and believes, whether a man or a woman, will enter paradise and be provided for without limit. Is there gender bias in the Book? While the fountains, the pool of mercy, and the rivers of milk are universally desirable, the beautiful large-eyed houris, untouched by any men or jinn, seem oriented mainly to men.

40:45-6 … will be exposed to the fire, morning and evening, and on the day when the hour has come “Admit the people of Pharaoh to a severe chastisement.” According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, the first exposure to fire is at the imaginative level in the barzakh; the next is physical (Morris 1995: 104–9).

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40:57 Certainly the creation of the heavens and the earth is greater than the creation of men … This is often taken to indicate that God created the universe out of nothing and humanity from already existing matter, and the former is a more impressive achievement. There is also 41:11, “the sky had been smoke,” a verse that suggests that even the world was created out of something that already existed, but it could be that God created the smoke, and then made the earth out of it. After all, we see in 52:35: Were they created out of nothing?—something that could mean, “were they made for no reason?” And the issue is not in any way fixed in the Qur’an. It certainly seems that before God created He had at least a throne, although there is no suggestion that He created the universe out of the throne. When it is said that He had a throne it does not necessarily mean that this should be taken literally, of course, and this was to be a highly controversial issue in Islamic theology.

40:64 God … has given you form, and made your form beautiful … The Qur’an tells us that God is the form-giver (musawwir) and that He formed human beings and made their forms beautiful (see also 64:3). There is much discussion of the meaning of form. Many theologians think it simply means that God created Adam in Adam’s own form, that is, as a fully formed adult. But many others understand it to be a clarification of 2:31: He taught Adam the names, all of them. For further discussion of this topic, see Murata and Chittick (1994).

41:31 There you shall have everything your souls desire, all you call for. In just the same way that God provides us with experiences and content for



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our thinking in this world, in the next world he will do the same, although it will be clearer there, and aligned with our own conceptions of paradise. This suggests that the very physical descriptions of paradise are designed to appeal to the widest possible constituency, since most people see happiness in terms of material pleasure, so paradise would be like that for them, at least initially (Imaginal Worlds, 107–10).

41:33 (see also 2:62) Who is fairer in speech than one who calls to God and performs the righteous deed and says: “I am one of those who submit (min al-muslimun).” It is worth noting here the combination of words and action, since where they work in tandem it can be said genuinely of someone that he is a submitter, a Muslim.

41:53 (see also 21:32) We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in themselves, until it is clear to them that it is the truth, Does not your Lord suffice, since He is witness over all things? Al-Baydawi suggests that habit is important for us since without it miracles are difficult to understand. He sees the signs as indications of what God normally does, since that establishes a basis for our expectations about what is going to happen, and a miracle can be identified as minimally something that defies those expectations. A necessary condition of recognizing a miracle is to know what to contrast it with, the regular lawlike state of affairs (Anwar, 2:357). In his translation of this verse Morris has the last few words as “that Hu is the truly real” and he comments: “Retaining the Arabic pronoun in such frequent Qur’anic contexts (rather than usual English ‘He’) is one way of at least partially conveying that the reference is to the ultimate, all-encompassing divine essence (dhat), to what is most Real. Present and absolute—not at all to any sort of ‘abstraction’ or ‘concept’ or ‘absent’ reality

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(much less something remotely of ‘male’gender). This expression is the Islamic equivalent of the ‘unspeakable’ divine Name in other traditions” (2001: 25). Kashani links this passage with 51:20-21: In the earth are signs for those with certainty, and in your souls. What, do you not see? One of the implications he draws is that human beings are far more valued by God than animals (Heart, 201); see also 17:70. Ibn Karbala’i suggests that when we try to contemplate divine essence we come to realize that this life and the next are one and the same. We can only appreciate this when we base our thinking entirely on our heart and spirit, and leave behind anything to do with the material world (World of Sufism, 183). This unusual view has the advantage of bringing out aspects of what is involved in really seeing the world and its creator as one. We have a tendency to break things up, distinguishing between us and God and of course each other, and nature, but these are all parts of tawhid, divine unity, and once we see everything as a sign of God we are in a position to reorient our attitude to everything. It is materiality that encourages thought of the diversity and variety of the world, and once we get away from the material we can see everything spiritual as just one thing, out of which the material emerges in some way. This is not a conclusion one naturally arrives at through a reasoning process, but as part of an experience, or rather, as a way of organizing experiences and thoughts that are the result of a process of developing our thoughts along a spiritual path. See also Elias (1995).

42:11 Nothing is like Him and He is the seeing, the hearing. Ibn al-‘Arabi often used this expression to show that God is both incomparable and, like us, a combination of tanzih and tashbih. We need to keep both these ideas in our mind at once; the creative tension between them represents nicely our pivotal role in the universe, although it is difficult to achieve. He argues it is something that can be contemplated completely only by perfect people. Normally philosophers argue that if two propositions are in conflict with each other, then there has to be a way of reconciling them. It could be that both are false, that one is true and the other false, but not that both can be true. Conversely, Ibn al-‘Arabi often argues that there



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are contradictory propositions that we must accept, and yet from a logical point of view this is problematic. For one thing, it is a logical observation that from a contradiction any proposition may be derived. What he means is that in some situations as when discussing God we are bound to make claims about Him that cannot be held together at the same time, since we are not in a position to know how to reconcile them, and yet we cannot abandon one of the propositions at the expense of the other (Chodkiewicz 1993: 37). To take the case here, we know that God is nothing like us, and yet we say that He can see and hear. Does that not mean then that He is like us? Ibn Rushd gets around this difficulty by suggesting that when we talk about seeing and hearing we are using a derivative of what God does, since for Him those activities are represented in their perfection, while for us it is just a pale reflection of the meaning that those words have when used about Him (Leaman 2009b: 45–50).

42:28 He is the supreme friend/protector (wali al-hamid). As the messenger of God, Muhammad had two missions. One was to communicate the nature of the divine law which explains how to put the injunctions of the Qur’an into practice. The series of prophets came to an end and to its most perfect stage with Muhammad the final Prophet of God (the seal of the prophets, khatam al-nabiyyin). For some Muslims the other important function of the Prophet was spiritual guidance, initiation to inner spiritual life or wilaya. It might seem strange to use a term for a friend or protector in such a way, but the idea is that such a relationship denotes both physical and spiritual nearness. Wilaya is the inward essence of prophethood (nubuwwa). It is often regarded as the heart of religion and love is its essence, thus combining the sorts of links that exist between people who are friends. It can be seen as the spiritual authority and power of initiation with respect to the path of traveling towards God and establishing friendship with Him. Wilaya is the basis of the authority that enabled Moses to perform the miracle of turning his staff into a snake, preserved Jesus, and enabled Muhammad to ascend to heaven and stand close to the divine presence. Wilaya comes from God and from nowhere else. On the Shi‘a view, wilaya is a prerequisite to undertaking a spiritual journey, on the principle that without a guide nothing serious can be

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accomplished. It is also part of how the principles and achievements of the inner life are taught and converted into action. Whoever manages to achieve such a level of thought and practice is labeled a waliullah or friend of God. Wilaya involves understanding the truth that the God who is at the center of our existence is absolutely one but his manifestations are many. These things symbolize the divine names and qualities. In God, all names and attributes find their absolute perfection. The Prophet and following on from him the imams are the theophany of qualities hidden in the divine names and attributes and when one reaches the station of wilaya one’s words and deeds are like those of God, because he subsists in God and sees nothing other than God all the time and everywhere (Leaman 2014: 40–2). Islamic spirituality and what in due course became known as Sufism (tasawwuf) is often regarded by its adherents as starting symbolically with the Prophet’s ascension to heaven (mi‘raj) that took place before his migration (hijra) from Mecca to Medina in 622. There is a vivid description of this event as the Prophet told his companions: The night that they took me to my nocturnal journey and I entered heaven, Gabriel opened the gate of that palace for me and I entered. I saw a house made of white pearl. I entered the house and in the center of that house I saw a trunk locked with a lock made of light. I said “O! Gabriel! What is this box?” He said: “O master! There is a mystery in that box that God would not reveal to anyone except whom He loves.” I begged Gabriel to open it but he refused and said that I should ask God for His permission to open the box. I asked for God’s permission and He commanded Gabriel to open the box. I saw a cloak and poverty in the box and asked what they are. A call came from the divine throne that “I have chosen these two things for you and your community. Since I created them I have not created anything that I love more, and I will not grant these to anybody but the one whom I love.” (Sells 1996)

We are told that on the night of the mi‘raj the Prophet received from God the power of wilaya and the cloak that symbolized the esoteric authority and knowledge. On the Shi‘ i version of the story, when he returned from this journey, he gave his cloak to ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and initiated him into the inner life. Indeed, through this symbolic act the Prophet transmitted the power of wilaya to ‘Ali. This incident marked the birth of Islamic spirituality (‘irfan, Sufism). The Prophet then passed on the cloak to Hasan, who in turn passed it to Husayn, and through him it passed eventually to all the following imams. The cloak now is with the Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam who is in occultation but nonetheless guides the Shi‘a community. He is the



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reason that wilaya will continue until his reappearance, at the beginning of the end of time. So the first channel of transmission of wilaya was from the Prophet to ‘Ali and through him to his descendants who succeeded him as the Shi‘ite imams.

42:38 Those who listen to their Lord …. Muhammad al-Jabri (1990: 231–61) used this verse to define a political period in early Islam of shura or consultation, since it goes on to mention “consult each other in their affairs.” In the time of the Prophet the state was based on the Islamic creed or ‘aqida. Muhammad’s Medinese community was a real political community and can be defined as an “Islamic state.” This was not to last long: the Ummayads distinguished in the person of their ruler the function of religious scholar (‘alim) and leader of the state. Mu‘awiya’s mulk or kingdom was continued by his successors, replacing ‘aqida with qabila or tribalism, and an authoritarian government resulted, since one tribe had to dominate the rest if stability was to be preserved. The subsequent domineering regimes were based on tribalism, and its noxious heritage continues to this day.

42:51 And it was not for any mortal (bashar) that God should speak to him except through inspiration or from behind a veil or he sends a messenger … Ibn al-‘Arabi takes inspiration here to mean to their hearts, from behind a veil to their hearing and intellect. To work, these being aspects of tajalli (the theophany through which God addresses his creatures), they need to be correctly interpreted by their audience, and people will differ in their ability to do this, in the sense that some will recognize the veil for what it really is, a divine message, and some will not. According to Kashani, this outlines three kinds of knowledge, correlated with the heart, sight, and hearing. The heart is the seat of the spirit and intellect, sight makes it possible to perceive visible images, and hearing messages from prophets and messengers (Heart,

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228). It is clear what the superior faculty is taken to be, but for many people it is the visible and the auditory that take priority, since these are the ways of knowing that mean most to them.

42:52 We have revealed to you a spirit of our bidding … Al-Razi says that ruhan here refers to the Qur’an, since the Qur’an brings life from the death of ignorance and unbelief (see also 40:15).

43:32 We are the ones who give them their share of livelihood in this world and We have raised some of them above others in rank, so that some may take others into service. This is a justification of disparities in wealth. Nasir-i Khusrow suggests that were it otherwise everything would be chaos and confusion (2012: 148). This is a reference to the idea that were the world to have more than one ruler, chaos would result. If there were not rich and poor people, then who would be in charge of civil society? Presumably, for stability the idea is that the natural arrangement is that the wealthy are in charge and tell everyone else what to do. In some ways, it might be argued that inequality is important in religion, since unless we see ourselves as below God in rank we are unlikely to do what He tells us.

43:44 It is surely a reminder for you and your people, and soon you will be brought to account. The distinction between intellectual and transmitted knowledge is implied in what are sometimes called the two shahadas (“testimonies”) that are usually cited as the foundation of Islamic belief. These are the statements



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“There is no god but God” and “Muhammad is God’s messenger.” The Qur’an presents the first shahada, “the words about divine unity” (kalimat al-tawhîd), as a universal and ahistorical truth, true in all times and all places. It was known to Adam and was taught by every prophet. Moreover, it is accessible to human intelligence without the necessity for prophetic intervention, because we are made in God’s image, and our primordial nature (fitra) naturally recognizes things as they are. The function of the prophets is not to teach these basic truths about divinity; it is to “remind” (dhikr, tadhkira) people that they already understand the unity of the divine. Sometimes people when they convert to Islam do not use the expression “convert” but say they have reverted to Islam, acknowledging its role as the din al-fitra, the original religion that we all originally followed. There are many references in the Qur’an to reminders and to the Qur’an itself as a reminder, as here (Leaman 2009b: 22).

43:67 On that day friends will be one another’s enemy except for the righteous. Al-Isfahani uses this verse to prove that all types of friendship other than friendship based on religion will turn into enmity in the next life. In a chapter called “The Virtue of Love,” he claims that friendship and justice are both aspects of social order, and the latter would be obsolete if the former was present, since if people were linked by friendship (mahabba) they would not need impersonal rules to govern their behavior (Fakhry 1991: 182). This comment relates to this sort of passage where Muslims are warned against taking unbelievers as their friends, since it is only if relationships between people are based on something solid that they will persist, and religion is one such source of stability. It is no good basing friendship on emotion since this will not last, and a sense of justice is in itself not enough to bind people together.

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43:84 He who is a God in heaven and a God on earth … Taken by some Isma‘ilis like Hisham ibn al-Hakam to suggest that in fact there are two deities, one completely ineffable and unavailable to us and the other much more connected to us and our world. This is a useful example of the sorts of allegorization that the Isma‘ilis went in for (Corbin 1983: 166). This is taken by Sayyid Qutb to show that not only is there only one God, but He is the only legitimate ruler; see also 12:40, 3:64. The rule of God on earth is a matter of basing all legislation on following His laws, not on human rulers or rule by the church or anything like a church (McAuliffe 2015: 562). The question then follows as to how we are to know which laws are divine and relevant now since it could be that some of the early laws in the Qur’an are not intended by God to apply everywhere and at every time. This is not Qutb’s view of course; for him and for many of those seeking to base modern society on earlier laws the latter contrast with law in general by being divine. As such, they are meant by God to apply everywhere and at every time.

44:36 “Then bring our forefathers if you are telling the truth.” That is what those skeptical of the claims to an afterlife say to the Prophet. They suggest he makes their ancestors reappear. Like 17:49, this is a real challenge to someone who claims to know that we do not just disintegrate and disappear. Why does he not respond to the challenge? Or rather, why does God not produce a revelation to respond? The Qur’an is quite clear both that the Prophet is only a man, not a magician or soothsayer, two roles which are often disparaged in the Book for their trickery, and the temporary nature of the effects they induce. The Qur’an seeks to produce the logical response to this question by establishing arguments to convince readers of the plausibility of resurrection.



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44:25-9 How many were the gardens and the water springs that they left behind. And the cornfields and the good places and pleasant things in which they took delight! But we made it an inheritance for other people: And heaven and earth did not weep for them, nor were they reprieved. Al-Ghazali (1992b: 119) warns us about being attracted to worldly temptations by referring to this verse, and suggests that if you want to create wells and canals, think how many of them have fallen into ruin in the past. If you intend to build a big house, think about how many have become derelict; and the same goes for gardens.

44:38-9 (see also 2:164, 6:97-9, 25:45-6, 88:17-20, 30:22, 3:190-1, 29:20, 24:44, 31:20, 16:12, 21:16, 3:191, 38:27, 10:5, 14:19, 15:85, 16:3, 29:44, 30:8, 39:5, 45:22, 46:3, 64:3) We did not create the heavens, the earth, and all between them, just for play. We created them only in truth: But most of them do not understand. A constant theme of the Book is that the world is designed by God and did not just come about haphazardly. There is an implication from some of the discussion that many in the local audience, presumably not the Jews and Christians, did not discern a pattern to existence, and so there was no need to think of a creator. This is particularly marked when it comes to thinking about the nature of death, where some of the local community obviously thought that we just die and that is the end of it. This does not fit at all into the Qur’an’s account of reality. It is always surprising when commentators assume that the main audience the Qur’an is focused upon is the People

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of the Book since so much of the material is directed to those who do not seem to share the presuppositions of those religions. Of course, it is often said that the Book addresses a whole variety of different audiences, including pagans, and has different approaches to each variety of listener. There are a number of different arguments for the existence of God in the Book, but the most popular by far is the argument from design (Leaman 2012: 66–76).

45:24 … yet nothing but time destroys us … This is what people say who deny the role of God in our fates, and the Qur’an accepts that from the evidence around us this would not be an unreasonable conclusion. As time proceeds, everything starts to change and apparently in one direction only. Only a religious point of view can see time as subordinated to something more powerful like God.

47:19 (see also 6:106, 17:15) … therefore that there is no god except God … It is not clear how one would know this without being told it. Reason could not get us to these conclusions: we require revelation (Abrahamov 1998: 12–13). But for some thinkers this is something we could work out for ourselves. In fact there is quite a neat division between those who argue that one has to have revelation to know that there is a God, and the advantage of that view from a religious point of view is that it validates the significance of religion. On the other hand the idea that we can use reason to work out religious truths for ourselves gives religion a rational basis, and a way of arguing that people should accept religion without leaps of faith or anything similar. A religious problem with that view is that the religion itself might seem to be superfluous for those capable of reaching its principles without the benefit of revelation. Would such people need religion at all?



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47:38 God is the self-sufficient, and you are the needy … Al-Razi gives this as an example of tanzih (deanthropomorphism) like 42:11, 112:1, 20:5, 16:50, 35:10, 4:78, and 4:79 (Dhamm al-ladhdhat 42-3). There is such a gap between us and the deity that our language does not manage to describe Him adequately: and perhaps the size of the gap is revealed by the difference between someone who is dependent on other things to exist and operate, and someone who is completely independent. God is linked with us of course but he need not be, and by contrast, for us entirely the reverse is the case. Comparing two very different things is difficult if they seem to have no point of contact. Al-Razi also refers to this passage at Matalib, 8, 116–18, and there also to 6:59, 13:8, 4:78, 4:49. As he says, if prophecy is to be effective it has to mediate between tashbih and tanzih (Matalib, 124–5). After all, a major point here is how we may be saved (Matalib, 119) and guidance (irshad) is a result of prayer rather than intellectual excellence. So rhetoric is better than dialectic, from the point of view of most people for most kinds of religious expression, and also more generally available than demonstration (al-Razi 1987: 252–3). He takes this to show that there is not much point in discussing demonstratively the nature of religious issues. At least there should be no expectation of everyone justifying their religious beliefs rationally, a point often made by Islamic philosophers. There is a variety of ways of understanding the link between this world and its origin. Some refer to it being created by God (khalq), while others speak of all emanating from Him (fayd). There are many ways of combining these ideas: al-Kindi is a good example of this. The basic idea is that the world needs some source in reality, since in itself it is ontologically poor. God is rich and the world is poor is one way of characterizing this. God is rich in everything that contributes to existence, while everything else has to be made to exist, in a sense, in just the same way that someone with a lot of money contrasts with someone who is poor. Poverty is often seen as a desirable aspect of Sufism, in that the poor person recognizes at every stage of his life his dependency on God via his dependence on the generosity of other people.

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48:1 Surely We have opened for you a clear opening. This is an address to the Prophet and the opening relates, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi, to the giving of the Qur’an and its perfection (Chittick 2012: 31). No one can protest against it since it is so perfect. The opening of the unveiling is carried out through the signs that were shown to the Prophet on the night of his ascension.

48:2-3 That God may forgive you your sins, the earlier and the late, and complete His blessing upon you, and guide you on a straight path, and that God may help you with considerable help? He let us know through the forgiveness of the latter sins that the Prophet is incapable of sin (ma‘sum), something very much stressed by the Shi‘a. What confirms his inerrancy is that God made him an example to be emulated. If God had not placed him in the station of inerrancy, it would be necessary for us to emulate the sins that he committed if there were no text concerning them, like the text He provided concerning “marriage by gift” (al-nika bi’l-hiba). This belongs exclusively to him according to the revealed law, while it is unlawful for anyone else. The reference is to 33:50, which deals with the Prophet’s wives beyond the four allowed to the believers, and the fact that a believing woman can give herself to the Prophet: O Prophet, We have made lawful for you your wives …; and any woman believer, if she give herself to the Prophet and if the Prophet desires to take her in marriage— just for you as distinct from the believers. We know what We require of them with respect to their wives and what their right hands own. Hence there may be no fault in you. At 48:2 we are told: And complete His blessing upon you, He says through this verse that the blessing He gave Muhammad was fully created, i.e., complete in its creation. The term “fully created” (mukhallaq) is mentioned in 22:5 in a passage that refers to the creation of something in just the right way for its purpose. The reference in 48:2 to the straight



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path is to the path upon which God is based, as the prophet Hud says: “Surely my Lord is upon a straight path” (11:59). All the revealed laws are compared to lights, but among those lights the law revealed by Muhammad is like the light of the sun among the light of the stars. When the sun is shining, the lights of the stars are hidden within the greater light. Their hiddenness is equivalent to that of the earlier revealed laws that are abrogated through his revealed law, even though they continue to exist, just as the existence of the lights of the stars continues even though we cannot see it. That is why Muslims are obligated in their all-inclusive law to have faith in all messengers and all revealed laws. On the other hand, according to the notion of tahrif or the idea that some of the original and earlier revelational texts have been corrupted, the believer may not be able to know which of the earlier sources as we have them now are reliable and genuine. All the more reason then, presumably, to take very seriously the message conveyed by the Prophet.

48:26 (see also 30:4) … and God has knowledge of everything. Time is completely under divine control, according to Ibn al-‘Arabi. It is “a relation that has no wujud in its entity” (Futuhat, 3:546; Chittick 1998: 128). Time is a relation between events or, in other words, it is the principle arranging events in a sequence. Individual moments are aspects of the order time establishes. Things increase or diminish, but their immutable entities do not, by definition, undergo any change. This is a category that Ibn al-‘Arabi uses to discuss those things that can be thought of existing for God but do not necessarily exist for us, and which do not change. The a‘yan thabita or immutable entities are not universals but each ‘ayn thabita is individual and particular. It is not an early stage of a thing before it comes into existence. By contrast, the primary mode of being for an entity is as an ‘ayn thabita which denotes its existence in the presence of God. It never changes, it is after all immutable, and so when God considers them his thinking never changes, consisting as it does of unchanging objects. From our point of view these entities are linked with the objects in the world of generation and corruption, which of course do change over time and come in and go out of existence. For God to have knowledge of everything means to have

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knowledge of the immutable entities, not the contingent affairs of our world that we derive from them. A point of this doctrine is to find some way of reconciling those claims in the Qur’an that God knows everything that happens in the world with the idea that He is unchanging, and if He knows everything that happens literally, the contents of his mind would be constantly changing. See 6:58-9, 50:16.

49:13 O humanity! We created you from a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes that you may know each other. Verily the most honored among you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you, and God has full knowledge of and is well acquainted with all things. Ramadan suggests that this is better than tolerance, which smacks of condescension due to a power relationship making the weaker group less able to present and defend its views. God requires mutual respect based on knowledge of each other and asserts that He alone knows what people are really thinking (2007: 116). This form of taqwa or righteousness goes with knowledge according to Mulla Sadra (2010b: 61). See 39:9, 6:50:11:24, 13:16, 13:19, 35:19, 40:58. The Qur’an links faith with knowledge and the intellect (3:7, 13:19, 38:29) and links unbelief with ignorance and narrow perspective (7:179, 10:7, 16:107-8). Those who believe reflect on and consider divine revelation, both in scripture and in their environment, and they use their reasoning powers to do so (3:190-1, 10:24:13, 3, 16:11, 25:61-2). The unbelievers do precisely the reverse: they refuse to ponder the evidence that is available to them (7:146, 21:1). Noah contemplates the death by drowning of the unbelievers and their delivery to the fire of hell, and requests, “O my Lord! Do not leave a single unbeliever on earth” (71:26). God does deal harshly with those who disagree with Noah: We saved him and those with him in the ark and drowned those who denied our signs/verses. They were a blind group (7:64). Sachedina suggests that this verse means that there is a common epistemological foundation upon which to build a universal ethical



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framework (2001: 235). See also 22:45-6. He refers to 4:1-2 which talks about our duties to God, stemming from our origins in a single soul and reflecting the fact of the existence of a fitra that is capable of nobility. This human nature can link individual responsibility with taqwa, moral and spiritual awareness (91:7-10), and the result is to produce a certain kind of humanity. The Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shawki Allam, uses this passage to criticize those radical groups that kill others of a different religious background, quoting also 5:32: If anyone kills a person, it is as if he kills all humanity, and if anyone saves a life it is as if he saves the life of all humanity (Allam 2015). Yet he surely did not mean that Islam condemns all killing or even all saving of life, since there are many other passages which certainly seem to go in a very different direction. There is nothing in the Qur’an that suggests killing people just because they are not Muslims. On the other hand, that is not what radical groups tend to do. They find some reason for killing people and try to legitimate that reason in religious terms by finding appropriate scriptural passages. They may well be wrong and certainly casuistic in their approach to the text, but refuting them requires more than just referring to the way in which God created different communities in the world. Many Muslims believe that this should be seen as a temporary stage of humanity, until everyone comes to accept Islam.

49:14 The Bedouin said: “We believed.” Say: “You did not believe.” Say: “We have submitted, for faith has not yet been clarified and established in your minds.” Here we have a distinction between outward behavior (islam) and inward belief (iman). It is sometimes said that iman is not restricted to Muslims, and could be shared with those of other religions such as the People of the Book. On the other hand, the difference between Muslims and everyone else is stressed by al-Ghazali (Izutsu 1984: 29) where he says that it is a sin to leave alive a thousand unbelievers at the cost of shedding a little blood from just one Muslim. It is also a familiar issue in religion to find a satisfactory way of linking beliefs with action (Leaman 2014: 161–6). One might want to distinguish

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between someone who says he believes something when his actions suggest something different. On the other hand, being a believer does not mean that everything one does is necessarily in line with belief, since there exists selfdeception, mistaken action, weakness of will, and so on. My religion may tell me to be charitable but it may be very difficult for me to act charitably since I may find it difficult to do what I know I ought to do as a religious person. I would not want to say that I was not a believer, just that I was not very good at acting in accordance with my religious principles all the time. There was a prolonged debate over this issue in early Islamic theology, with some arguing that belief involves a commitment to action, while others suggesting that only God could tell who is a believer, and that that decision has to be left to him on the Day of Judgment when our fates are determined. Alongside this issue is the problem of knowing when someone really has submitted in the sense of the verse here—when he really believes what the religion demands, even without considering what the relevant actions that should accompany belief might be. Converting to Islam involves reciting, and believing, the shahada but presumably also means understanding it: and it is quite a complex claim despite the apparent simplicity of its expression.

50:4 (see also 36:78-9, 71:17-18, 39:68, 70:43, 30:56, 50:42) We already know how much of them the earth removes … The resurrection will be physical, according to the Qur’an. After resurrection (ba‘th) there is the hashr or gathering of those waiting for the last day. The falasifa tended to doubt this could be literally true, since there is no resurrection of what no longer exists. The soul is permanent and can continue but the body cannot, and physical descriptions are only symbols to help most people understand how they should act in order to earn a positive afterlife outcome. This view is denounced by al-Ghazali as unbelief in his Tahfut al-falasifa (1966: 84–90). Some thinkers argued that there are permanent parts of the physical body which are the basis for the sort of body that is constructed on the day of resurrection (al-Juwayni 1950: 371-2; al-Razi 1992: 89–90).



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50:6 Do they not look at the sky above them? How we made it and adorned it, and there is no flaw in it. It is not clear what a flaw in the sky would be.

50:15 Were We worn out by the first creation? Yet they are in doubt about a new creation. Mulla Sadra refers to this verse to develop the idea of “dressing after dressing” (labs ba‘da labs). In transubstantial change, renewal is continuous, meaning that the newly generated forms are different and at the same time connected with the previous forms. The previous forms become the basis for the generation of the new forms and both are connected in terms of existence. The material world is the place where this operates, and all physical things are generated and eventually go out of existence. They move through different degrees of perfection in two different directions: descending and ascending. These two directions correspond to an increase and decrease in intensity of existence. The contrast here is with things developing out of something entirely new, which is an idea often used in Sufi thought, where God creates anew at every moment. It is also an important notion in Ash‘arite theology, which is based on a thoroughgoing occasionalism.

50:16 Truly We created man and We know what his soul whispers to him, for We are closer to him than his jugular vein. Mulla Sadra takes this to mean that God is closest to everything in existence (Asfar, I, 3:400). He refers also to 57:4, 3:18, 41:53, and 6:19. With reference to the Necessary Being, he suggests that it has a very special status that distinguishes it from everything else in existence: it has no genus and

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differentia, no definition, and serves as its own proof. Nothing in existence can be used as a proof of it, and it requires no proof since it is its own proof. See also Met Pen (51). This verse is often taken to show that God is both transcendent and immanent.

50:22 … we have removed from you your covering, so that now your sight is piercing. The idea here is that when we die, we wake up, in the sense that we are on our way to the next world where everything is more vivid than in our world. Everything there is clear and the sorts of dichotomies, divisions, and contradictions that characterize our world are absent. The body is seen as an obstacle to real knowledge, and when it no longer has control over us we can really appreciate the nature of reality. Najm al-Din Razi distinguishes between a variety of removals, starting with intellectual unveiling (kashf-i ‘aqli), which merely works on the level of rationality but represents where most philosophers operate. When the heart is really engaged there is kashf-i shuhudi, followed by mukashifat-i sirri where the secrets of creation are revealed. Finally, there is a level of unveiling called the mukashifat-i ruhi (spiritual unveilings), where the hierarchies in heaven and hell are visible, as are the angels, with whom conversation is then possible (Wisdom of Sufism, 186). As with many of these accounts of spiritual growth, the intellectual level is way down the scale of perfection and growth. Al-Ghazali says that is what will be said to the damned when the veil is lifted and they are about to be punished (Winter 1989: 154). Verses 52:15-16 refer to the veil of God being lifted and the fire revealed (see also 39:47).

50:37 Surely in this there is a reminder for everyone who has a heart or gives an ear and is aware. The person who has the science of the heart is a Sufi; those who hear are the theologians since they rely for their sources of information on reflection



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and inference (Corbin 1993: 177). This way of breaking up the different audiences into those working at different intellectual levels is popular with all varieties of Islamic philosophy. The Qur’an often suggests that a reader or listener who thinks about the nature of the text and is prepared to be rational could not fail to agree with it. The reference to the heart suggests something more than just reasoning but it also involves reasoning. There is a level of personal emotion that can be employed with reason to help improve our understanding. As always, the problem perhaps is to get the balance right (2:143) so that we both are rational but also allow our personal reactions to what we experience to affect our thinking.

51:19 And in all that they possessed a due share to those who might ask and those who might suffer privation. The Qur’an does not make a distinction between the two terms sadaqa, as voluntary alms-giving, which was practiced in Mecca, and zakat (charity) which was instituted in Medina (al-Nu‘man 2002: 199, n.1). Asad renders sadaqat (pl. of sadaqa) as “offerings given for the sake of God.” This comprises everything that a believer freely gives to another person out of love or compassion, as well as what they are morally or legally obliged to give, without expecting any material return (which is the primary meaning of sadaqat, e.g., at 2:263-4), as well as the obligatory tax called zakat (“the purifying dues,” because its payment purifies, as it were, the person’s property from the stain of selfishness) (2003: 303, n. 81). See also: And in whose possessions there is a due and recognized share, for those who ask and those who are deprived (70:24-5). The Prophet dispatched his agents to collect the zakat. He instructed them to take zakat from the property of the rich and return them to the poor. The Qur’an tells the Prophet: Accept that of their possessions which is offered for the sake of God, so that you may cleanse them thereby and cause them to grow in purity, and pray for them: behold your prayer will be comfort to them (9:103). A type of profit that was particularly excessive, riba, was totally forbidden (in 2:275-8, 3:130, 4:161; see Leaman 2014: 88–101). Any speculation in foodstuffs, especially hoarding them, is forbidden. Similarly, any selling where there is an element of speculation or

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uncertainty is prohibited (Ikhwan 2004: 1–74). It is difficult to know how far this is to be taken since there is often uncertainty in commercial affairs. Praying to God and other devotional acts are regarded as a waste of time in the absence of active assistance for the needy. There is 107:1-7: Have you ever considered who gives the lie to all moral law? Behold, it is someone who thrusts the orphan away, and feels no urge to feed the needy. Woe, then, to those praying ones whose hearts from their prayer are remote, those who want only to be seen and praised, and at the same time refuse all assistance. There is also 70:19-21: Humanity is by nature timid: when evil falls on someone, he panics, but when good things come to him he prevents them from reaching others. Really, man is born with a restless disposition. Whenever misfortune touches him, he is filled with self-pity, and whenever good fortune comes to him, he selfishly withholds it. In another passage, the Qur’anic criticism of human nature becomes very sharp. It states: But as for man, whenever his sustainer tries him by His generosity and by letting him enjoy a life of ease, he says, “My sustainer has been generous towards me” whereas, whenever He tries him by straitening his means of livelihood, he says, “My sustainer has disgraced me.” But no, no, you are not generous towards the orphan, and you do not urge one another to feed the needy, and you devour the inheritance with devouring greed, and you love wealth with boundless love! (89:15-20)

The Qur’an vehemently criticizes the accumulation of wealth for wealth’s sake in chapters 102 and 104. In Surat al-Takathur (Greed for more), it states: You are obsessed by greed for more and more until you go down to your graves. Yet in time you will come to understand. And once again: In time you will come to understand. If you could only understand with an understanding of certainty, you would indeed, most surely, behold the blazing fire. In the end you will indeed, most surely, behold it with the eye of certainty: and on that day you will most surely be called to account for the pleasures of life. (102:1-8)

In Surat al-Humaza (the Slanderer), we read: Woe unto every slanderer, fault-finder, who amasses wealth and counts it a safeguard, thinking that his wealth will make him live forever. No, but he shall indeed be abandoned to crushing torment. And what could make you understand what the crushing torment will be? A fire kindled by God, which will rise over the hearts: verily it will close in upon them in endless columns. (104:2-9)



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The Qur’an stipulates that the rich should participate in charity more or less in proportion to their incomes (92:5-10), as in 18-21: Thus, as for him who gives and is conscious of God, and believes in the truth of the ultimate good, for him shall We make easy the path … But as for him who is niggardly, and thinks that he is self-sufficient, and calls the ultimate good a lie, for him shall We make easy the path towards hardship; and what will his wealth avail him when he goes down … he that spends his possessions so that he might grow in purity, not as payment for favors received, but only out of a longing for the countenance of his sustainer, the highest Lord: and as such, indeed shall in time be well-pleased.

Feeding the hungry, helping an orphan or a needy stranger, and freeing a human being from bondage are all praised and encouraged by the Qur’an. In Surat al-Balad (the Land), it states: the freeing of a human being from bondage, or the feeding, upon a day of hunger, of a related orphan or of someone lying in the dust, that he will be of those who have attained to faith and who enjoin upon one another patience in adversity, and enjoin upon one another compassion. Such as they that have attained to righteousness; whereas those who are bent on denying the truth of Our messages, they have lost themselves in evil, the fire closing in upon them. (90:13-20)

See also 76:8-9, where people feed the needy, the orphan, and the captive for the sake of God. In his Islam and Capitalism, Maxime Rodinson (1981: 14) points out that the Qur’an is not opposed to private property, since it lays down rules for inheritance. The Qur’an looks with favor upon commercial activity, confining itself to condemning fraudulent practices. It is not always clear though what counts as fraud, since speculation often traces a fine line between taking a risk and gambling. For example it states in Surat al-Mutaffifin (Those who give short measure): Woe to those who give short measure; those who, when they are to receive their due from people, demand that it be given in full—but when they have to measure or weigh whatever they owe to others, give less than what is due (83:1-3). Yet inequalities are not to be challenged; the Book is happy with denouncing the habitual impiety of rich people, stressing the uselessness of wealth in the face of God’s judgment and the temptation to neglect religion and charity that wealth brings. For example in Surat al-Nisa’ (Women) it states at 4:32: Hence, do not covet the bounties which God has bestowed more abundantly on some of you than on others.

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After all, 16:71 states: And on some of you God has bestowed more abundant means of sustenance than on others: and yet, they who are more abundantly favored are unwilling to share their sustenance with those whom their right hands possess. And at 17:21 there is: See how We bestow more bounty on some of them than on others: but the life to come will be far higher in degree and far greater in merit and bounty.

51:21 Within your own selves do you not see? For Sufis this marks the way that our hearts, if suitably prepared, can experience the basic truths of faith (Shabistari 1995: 305). Seeing with the self is seeing using our essential awareness of how things are, and we have a suggestion here of a different way of thinking that is not limited to superficial knowledge, the sort of things we can know without really calling on our basic nature. This is not supposed to be subjective thinking though, and for Sufis can be just as organized and rigorous as logical thought. This claim is in the middle of a number of connected propositions:

51:20: And on the earth are signs for those who have faith with certitude. 51:21: And also in your own selves. Will you not then see? 51:22: And in the heaven is your provision, and that which you are promised. 51:23: Then by the Lord of the heaven and the earth, it is the truth, just as it is the truth that you can speak. The certain (mawqinin) are those who have attained the knowledge of certitude (‘ilm al-yaqin) through whatever method might be approved of by a particular thinker, and they look at the world in order to increase their certitude and knowledge so that they may perceive the signs of God. They are attentive at all times to find signs of divine mercy in all things so



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that through attentiveness and reflection they may attain to such a state of awareness that they may perceive things as representatives of divine attributes and extend their knowledge of certitude to certitude by sight (‘ayn al-yaqin). Humanity is the only representative of the divine attributes which has the capacity to transcend the world of contingent being through the faculty of our spiritual soul. We are often more attracted by nature, and plunge into the depth of the mire of materiality. Despite the existence of our potentially divine vicegerency, we often ignore our inward eye and refuse to perceive the signs of the divine in order to know Him. Acquisition of the knowledge of the origin and resurrection is dependent upon knowing one’s self. First, one is supposed to know one’s self in one’s own being as the sign of the existence of God. We can acquire knowledge of the origin and resurrection of ourselves as they are reflected in a secure and accepted (mashhur) tradition of the Prophet that one who knows his own self and truth knows his Lord. Knowing one’s self is not really directed at the body: but one who knows his own self through acquiring knowledge of this status as a created being, and that he is a manifestation of God and his attributes, may know God within the limited capacity of his knowledge and existence. So the body does come into it. Verse 22 is saying that your provision and what is promised to you are in heaven descending upon the earth through rain, snow, and sunlight, through which vegetation grows on which we feed. What is promised has been sent down as divine signs. The word “heaven” (sama’) here may refer to the celestial realm, the world of the Preserved Tablet (lawh mahfuz) in which everything that occurs and is to occur is laid down forever, including the provision (rizq) preordained for us from the beginning of creation and also what is promised to believers in paradise. Although the meaning of provision (namely what constitutes human sustenance and our natural requirements) is what we first think about, taking into account the clause “and what is promised” with the conjunct “and” and the following verse, it is obvious that a wider meaning is intended—one which refers to what we will be provided with in the next world, if we deserve such treatment.

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51:49 And We created everything in pairs that perhaps you will remember and contemplate. Rumi responds to the Qur’anic verse that God created everything in pairs and affirms, like Ibn Sina and many others, that all movement in the universe is God’s love reflected in the seeking and yearning of creation. He refers to each pair in a relationship of love relating to its mate (Mathnawi, iii, 4400–1).

51:56 And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me. There are a lot of indications in the Qur’an that worshiping God is the most important thing for people to do. Obedience is praised at 66:11 and we see (at 49:13): Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you, and also (at 4:124): And whoever does righteous deeds, whether male or female, while being a believer, those will enter paradise and will not be wronged. There is also: Whoever does righteousness, whether male or female, while he is a believer, We will surely cause him to have a good life, and We will surely give them their reward according to the best of what they used to do (16:97). We need to bear in mind 49:13: Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you, i.e., who has the most taqwa. See 2:183 where fasting is said to be helpful for taqwa (for people to become muttaqun or pious). Throughout the Book the correct attitude to God is paramount.

52:4 And the well-appointed house … The bayt ma‘ mur is regarded as at the peak of existence, above the heavens, a place only attained by the saints (Tirmidhi 1996: 28–9).



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52:29 Issue a warning, for you by the favor of your Lord are neither soothsayer nor possessed. God is here distinguishing Muhammad from a soothsayer, or someone possessed. It should also be noted that the term soothsayer is equivalent to the idea of a poet, and that both are characterized as possessed (by a jinn or shaytan). Both the soothsayer and the poet are depicted in entirely negative ways. The difference between them, as this aya implies, is the same as the one between paganism and monotheism, for the Prophet’s words are entirely based on his prophethood, and seeing any resemblance between that and poetry is entirely erroneous. Unlike the Prophet, the poet-soothsayer has nothing to do with anything coming from God, and no privileged access to the truth. The aya stresses this by warning people not to confuse the roles, since instead of relying on the senses and emotions the Prophet relies on our ability to follow the argument that he transmitted and recognize its supernatural source. On the other hand, we are told that Ibn ‘Abbas, the Prophet’s companion, was very impressed by poetry, and in particular the poetry of ‘Umar ibn Abi Rabi‘a, and he was able to quote from memory large sections of his poetry, which is often rather risqué (Noorani 2010: 49–68).

52:35-6 Were they created by nothing, or were they themselves the creators? Or did they create the heavens and the earth? No, they have no firm belief. There are some people who do not believe in the existence of the one God. In this part of the Qur’an we have an argument that the organization of the world could not have arisen out of nothing. If someone is not prepared to acknowledge that they came out of nothing, the only alternative, we are told, is that they created themselves. We know that that is not possible. If they themselves were created out of nothing, and they themselves are not the creator, then how did they emerge? Somebody must have created them. There must be a creator. It is not a compelling argument in itself. On the other hand, it has interesting ethical consequences. The verse compares

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human beings to someone capable of creating the universe, with the implication that we are much less important than whoever did that. That means we need to think about our attitude to ourselves. It is an argument against human arrogance, for example.

53:11 The heart did not lie in what it saw. The heart is the conduit of the divine light that humans have possessed since pre-eternity and that, if properly developed, can distinguish between material input which is of far less value and the sort of knowledge that comes from above. See also 94:1 (Tirmidhi 1996: 50–5).

53:18 Indeed, he saw the greatest signs of his Lord. This passage is generally taken to refer to the Prophet’s ascension (mi‘raj) to the divine presence: he saw the greatest of the signs of his Lord. The word mi‘raj means ladder, and thus the act of ascending carried out by the Prophet on heaven’s ladder is seen as taking place in a graduated manner, with his meeting different prophets at different levels of reality. He is guided by the intellect or Muhammadan reality (al-haqiqa al-Muhammadiyya) or the Muhammadan light (nur Muhammadi). Many commentators link intellect with the Muhammadan reality or light, for they are all different ways of describing the first entity to be created by God. This is also a point that is made in different contexts by many authors, such as ‘Ayn al-Qudat, Ibn ‘Arabi, Dawud al-Qaysari, and Mulla Sadra.

54:49 Indeed, We have created all things with a measure (qadar). This suggests that everything is preordained so that our scope for action is severely limited: that there is divine preordainment of all things before their



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creation as though it were written down in the book in which everything that is decreed is recorded. As it says in 57:2: “No calamity befalls on the earth or in yourselves but it is inscribed in a book before We bring it into existence. Indeed, that is easy for God.” It is open to us to believe or otherwise: “And say: ‘The truth is from your Lord.’ Then whosoever wills, let him believe; and whosoever wills, let him disbelieve” (18:29). Conversely, we find: We surely showed him the way, whether he be grateful or ungrateful (76:3). God knows everything that happens, as in: So whosoever does good equal to the weight of an atom shall see it. And whosoever does evil equal to the weight of an atom shall see it (99:7-8). There are consequences to what we do: And it will be cried out to them: “This is the paradise which you have inherited for what you used to do” (7:43), and: “so taste the abiding penalty for what you used to do” (32:14).

55:1-4 The God of Mercy, taught the Qur’an, created man, taught him speech. This is a dramatic formulation, with very short statements which seem to run on from each other closely. Al-bayan in the fourth aya, here translated as speech, could also be eloquence, articulate communication, and stylistics. It emphasizes the significance of language in the view of the Qur’an.

55:26-7 All that is in the world will pass away and your Lord’s face will alone endure in His majesty and honor. Shahrastani explains the passage as meaning that He is veiled from humanity through his majesty, so we cannot perceive him, and he is always present

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through his bounty so we cannot deny him (2009: 159). This is a strong representation of the contrast between fana’ and baqa’, annihilation and subsistence. Mulla Sadra takes this to mean that our physical side only exists because of its links with our spiritual side (Sadra 2003: 51).

55:29 ... every day He is upon some task. The day is the measure of God’s breath that keeps everything in existence, and Ibn al-‘Arabi refers often to the idea that the world is kept in existence by constant contact with God. The issue is that if everything is changing all the time, as is our experience, how can we account for the unity of God, the source of all the change? We can see how one thing can be behind the variety with which we are familiar, but the problem is to perceive the unity of the ultimate cause when everything before us is very far from being just one. Ibn al-‘Arabi refers to another aya, 57:3, which talks of God being the first and last, and also to the variety of divine names, all of which suggest that behind a variety and diversity there could be just one thing which holds them all together. Although there is a variety of phenomena in the world, these are just a trace of Him, in the same way that His different names really all refer to the same entity.

55:36 (see also 5:69) So which of the favors of your Lord will you deny? A theme of the Book is our necessity to be grateful for what God has provided for us, not only in this world but in the next if we merit going to heaven: Into the gardens of Eden shall they enter, with bracelets of gold and pearl shall they be decked there, and there shall their clothes be of silk (35:33). The description is repeated elsewhere: Their clothing green silk robes and rich brocade: with silver bracelets shall they be adorned, and drink of a pure beverage shall their Lord give them (76:21).



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55:46 But for someone who fears standing before his Lord, there will be two gardens. Mulla Sadra uses this verse to discuss the contrast between two ontological realms, the world of the intellect and the world of the senses (Asfar, 1, 3:503-4; Kalin 2010: 112).

55:70 In each, the fair, the beauteous ones. This is how the Qur’an speaks about women in heaven who will be rewards for men. In the next aya it mentions: Houris kept close in their pavilions.

Then it says: And we have made them ever virgins, Dear to their spouses, of equal age with them. (56:36-7)

And then: And ladies with swelling breasts, similar in age. (78:33)

The woman in the passage from the Qur’anic text is generally but not always represented rather modestly. A beauty in paradise (houris as the Qur’an calls them) is not described in much detail in comparison with the sorts of things that go on in poetry and the language used is restrained, as one would perhaps expect in a religious text. The account of the bracelets, armlets and anklets, silk robes, and so on is very much limited to their physical qualities. This is true of the other features of the next world: gardens with over-branching trees and fountains flowing through them, soft green cushions and beautiful carpets, etc. So although the account is very material and often phrased in terms that people would find very attractive, it is not predominantly erotic. It is always difficult to know in religion how far metaphor is being employed, and there is obviously a balance to be struck between treating everything as metaphorical and everything as

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literally true. The verse at 3:7 refers to this issue, and deciding which verses are going to be taken in which way is always an issue in religion. The whole passage is quoted below.

55:62-72 And beside these are two other gardens – Which then of the bounties of your Lord will you deny? – Of a dark green – Which then of the bounties of your Lord will you deny? – With gushing fountains in each – Which then of the bounties of your Lord will you deny? – In each fruits and the palm and the pomegranate – Which then of the bounties of your Lord will you deny? – In each the fair, the beautiful ones – Which then of the bounties of your Lord will you deny? – Fair ones, kept close in their pavilions.

55:78 The possessor of majesty and honor. A description of God, and Mulla Sadra takes it to include negative as well as positive aspects of Him, linking this verse with 42:11: and His are the best names (Asfar, 6:118).



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56:77-8 (see also 85:22 and 43:3) An honorable Qur’an in a hidden book. The belief in a pre-existent and uncreated Qur’an was the cause of much controversy in Islam. The reference to its being hidden suggested to some that the Book was not created by God but was just there with Him as an eternal being, which seemed to some as providing an associate for Him, and thus threatening the rule against associating partners with God. On the other hand, seeing the Qur’an as a divine product makes it look rather arbitrary in structure since it is only the product of someone, albeit that someone is divine.

57:1 Everything in the heavens and the earth glorifies God … For Ibn al-‘Arabi, this description of an attitude to the world that we might initially identify as subjective and emotional is also cognitive, since everything knows God and His role in their creation and sustenance, and consequently they have this very positive attitude towards Him. Here is a good example of the microcosm/macrocosm dichotomy of which he made much use, where the whole of the universe worships God, and lesser creatures share in this since they include within themselves portions of the whole and reflect it in their existence. The idea of animals acknowledging and worshipping God through their ordinary behavior is one of the motifs of the Ikhwan al-Safa’ in their presentation of the case of the animals against humanity. People have to be given rules of when and how to pray, but to animals this all comes naturally and they pray through their normal behavior.

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57:3 He is the first and the last, and the outer and the inner, and He is knower of all things. As Sufis often point out, God is also the outer or exterior of things, not just the secret interior. Yet since we cannot see Him, this is difficult to understand. They tend to argue that everything that has an outside is in fact the exterior of something interior, so the way to know the outer is via knowledge of the inner. In the Conference of the Birds by Farid al-‘Attar (1984) the birds go on a long and dangerous journey to meet the king, only to discover that there is no king: they are the king (it works better in Persian since thirty birds (si murgh) is the same word as Simurgh, a legendary bird often associated with power and authority). The Queen of Sheba comments that “kings, when they come into a town, ruin it and destroy the honor of its people” (27:34). Was the journey a failure then? No, because along the way they discovered the virtues of fighting the self by devoting themselves to the task in hand despite its difficulties, which turned out to be the meaning of the whole enterprise. So, their physical and spiritual tasks were seen as linked and perhaps part of the same thing—or at least on their way to becoming characterized in this way. God perfectly conjoins these aspects of His being, while we have to work towards it. When he quotes this verse, Ibn al-‘Arabi (SD, 125) takes it to show that a large part of reality is not visible to us, i.e., the non-manifest aspects of God and the sorts of existence they represent. God is not only infinite existence, He is also infinite knowledge: God encompasses all things in knowledge (65:12). He is their creator and knows them even before they have been created and after they no longer exist, and of course this includes knowledge of the world to which we have no access. This description of God is only comprehensible by those who are perfect, since only they will know how to reconcile the contradictions between the one and the many, the hidden and the open, the first and the last, agent and object. It is like the expression at 8:17 on which Ibn al-‘Arabi also focuses: “You did not throw when you threw, but God threw.” God can of course encompass these opposing qualities, but only those perfect in thinking can get close to understanding how. The notion of there being a place which is no place, familiar in Sufi thought, perfectly captures this sort of conceptual difficulty.



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We understand through reason how different God is from us, and through imagination we get some idea of how similar He is to us. We need to keep these ideas together, since if we only use reason we get the idea of God as being entirely unconnected with our world, while sticking with His similarity falls into the danger of shirk, associating Him with others, things in our world. According to Tirmidhi, this verse describes the process by which the mystic moves from the outer to the inner. Divine light can help us on this path if it is strong in us and we allow it to dominate our physically oriented soul. The outer represents God’s attributes, and once they have been comprehended, one is at peace and has reached the inner (1996: 98). Ibn al-‘Arabi points to the significance of the reference to knowledge here: our knowledge only extends to our experience and so one of the problems we have is working out how to get from the variety of that experience to some idea of the unity of the deity (SD, 173). Mulla Sadra suggests that the Necessary Existent is the light and everything else is what comes from light. There is a danger here that the relationship between the light and what it affects is expressed in terms of a dualism, so that there are two sorts of things in existence, the source of existence and the existing things themselves. But in reality there is just one thing, and what we take to be other things are merely states or flashes of that one thing (Met Pen, 59).

57:4 He is with you wherever you may be … ‘Abdallah Ansari suggests that the idea of longing (shawq) for God is only felt by those who are spiritually impoverished, and is not mentioned in the Qur’an or the hadith because God is always near us (1996: 95). On the other hand, the ideas of being on a path towards God and of there being different stages to the path do suggest we are trying to get to some end, and unless we want to attain the end it is difficult to make sense of undertaking the journey. Yet the point is well taken in that theories of spiritual development often try to counter the idea that it is like a process of getting more of something the further one goes along a particular path, since this makes the whole activity very like what we normally do, i.e., action in order to get something or to achieve some aim. Ansari suggests that in some ways it is

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natural to feel the presence of God, but this is not something one should set out to attain as compared with just allowing it to happen. According to Ibn al-‘Arabi we should not think of the natural world as only a sign of God, although of course it is that, but as the letters of the language that God uses, as his names, and their ultimate meaning is God Himself (SD, 5). He made Himself single in our plurality, and plural in our unity as in the aya: We are nearer to Him (50:16) (SD, 170). We should move from acknowledging a particular attitude to the world to trying to understand the nature of that attitude, which here is to consider what it means to live in a world created by a deity who is always present. How He is always present is an issue that inevitably arises, and what we take as evidence of this equally so. The idea that the world is like a book is suggestive, and the letters and words of the Qur’an are after all called ayat or signs, so the facts of nature are also regarded as signs of something underlying them—their divine origin and significance. The world is seen as a theophany, and, unless it is seen in this way, it is profoundly misunderstood.

58:11 God shall raise those of you who have believed and those who have achieved knowledge many grades … Al-Iji uses this verse as part of a description of the process of improving one’s knowledge by leaving the low level of imitation and reaching certainty (Phil Theol, 252). This is a theme in much Islamic philosophy: the idea that there are different levels of knowledge and ordinary believers may only achieve a low level. Imitation is important in religion, since we need to learn how to practice the religion in the same way that in learning a language we need to master its basic rules. But after this stage there are higher levels and if we are the sort of people who can reach these, this is seen as something that God can assist us in achieving.



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58:20 Those who reject God and His messenger will be among those most humiliated.

58:22 You will not find a people believing in God and the last day loving those who oppose God and His Messenger even though they were their own parents, or children, or brothers, or kinsfolk. See also 60:1: O you who have faith! Do not take My enemy and your enemy for friends, offering them affection … if you have set out for jihad in my way and to seek My pleasure. The criterion for deciding who can be a friend should be one who shares your basic beliefs, and should not be based on kinship. It is not possible to be friends with people who are immoral, or who are very different from us. This might seem to be rather humorless—don’t we often make friends with people who are very different from us? Additionally, since God has made us members of different communities, is this not a good thing? The word here for friends could be protectors and this might make better sense, especially given the reference later on in the aya to conflict. It is probably not a good idea to go on a military campaign and leave people behind in positions of authority who you know are antagonistic to you and your cause. On the other hand, we often do form friendships with people who are very different from us, but there are clearly limits here. It would be difficult to be friends with someone whose actions one saw as repugnant, for example. How difficult is an interesting question though.

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59:7 (see also 33:36, 4:13-14) Whatever the messenger gives you, take it. And whatever he forbids, abstain … This suggests that the only basis to knowing what we ought to do is following what God tells us. It is certainly true that some of the rules that are outlined in the Book have no reasons attached to them, as is the case in many religions. The rationale for such rules is that God wishes us to observe them, and He knows why but need not tell us. Indeed, it might be said to be a useful aspect of religion that it encourages its adherents to do things without knowing precisely why, or even having any idea why, since there are things in life we have to do without knowing why. We cannot expect to understand everything about the world around us; we are finite creatures whose knowledge is necessarily limited. This is not essentially a religious point but one that is also plausible in an entirely different framework. It fits in nicely with a religious perspective where the deity knows why He has legislated in a particular way and how that legislation recommends policies that are in our best interests, were we only to know it. The falasifa often give the example of going to a doctor, which must have easily come to mind since many of them were physicians, and doing what we are told not because we understand why but because we assume that someone knows, hopefully the doctor. Religious law is medicine for our soul, and although we may not understand how it works, we should defer to higher authority here, as we do in the case of our physical health. See also 30:30.

59:9 … those who … had homes …show their affection to those who came to them for refuge … and give them preference over themselves, even though poor … they are the ones who become wealthy. This Qur’anic verse was revealed, according to Bukhari, on the basis of the hospitality shown to a guest by Abu Talha and his wife Umm Sulaym. Abu Talha welcomed a hungry traveler into his home even though there was very little to eat. He instructed his wife to bring whatever provisions they had



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and give it to the guest. As the guest ate his fill, the hosts pretended to eat in the dark. The following day the Prophet gave them the news about this verse that God revealed. As Levinas puts it, hospitality is “being torn from oneself for another in giving to the other the bread from one’s mouth, a hospitality that does not expect reciprocity and withholds nothing from the guest” (1981: 79). After all, Abraham/Ibrahim seems to have put the welfare of his guests far above himself: Has the story reached you of the honored guests of Abraham? Behold, they entered his presence and said: “Peace!” He said: “Peace to you, people I do not know.” Then he turned quickly to his household, brought out a roasted fattened calf, and placed it before them. He said: “Will you not eat?” (51:24-7)

Although he was perhaps dubious about their appearance he not only did not turn them away, he immediately set food before them even before asking whether they wanted anything. And not any food but the best he had available. His nephew Lot/Lut also displayed hospitable behavior, in marked contrast with the inhabitants of Sodom, who were later punished by God. The Lot example is instructive since he lived somewhere that did not seem to value hospitality, yet despite this he stood up for the values he held dear, and acted in the right way. When he offers his daughters to those who are about to violate his guests (11:78, 15:68-9) he presumably wants to mark the significance of treating guests well, since if the alternative is for his daughters to be violated, that is of course undesirable but preferable. Al-Ghazali would suggest that this exemplifies his approach that divine law is often opposed to what it is natural or easy for us to do, and we are often asked by religion to extend what we mean by our duty despite the problems attached to such behavior. This is very much the account of hospitality we find in Levinas, and the “reasonable view” advocated by others such as Rawl, and Walzer, and to a certain extent by Derrida, would be seen by him and al-Ghazali as not doing justice to the abilities of human beings to engage adequately with the moral demands that impinge on them. It is worth emphasizing that in this view the act of hospitality is not a supererogatory act, something above and beyond duty, although it is not always easy to carry out. It represents an obligation on us: and the three Abrahamic religions, a much misused term, are at least Abrahamic in the significance that they attribute to the obligation to be hospitable. This is not specific to the Abrahamic religions. There is a word in Sanskrit, atithisatkara, which literally means doing good to a guest, and

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the notion of guest here has a link with someone who travels. Clearly, it is generally very helpful to cultures to respond sympathetically to those who arrive on their doorstep from far away and require assistance. It might be cynical to suggest that for traveling monks dependent on alms it is no bad thing to prioritize helping those who require alms, whatever they look like and even though they are not part of the native group. This comes out nicely in the Greek word philoxenia, love of strangers, which is not something that the ancient Greeks were likely to act on. There are many stories in Asian literature of generosity to strangers who look very odd resulting in great reward, since in fact they were the representatives of someone significant, or were significant themselves. We saw this in the Abraham story, where strangers who may initially look unsavory turned out to be angels. In Buddhist stories, the stranger often turns out to be a buddha or an arhat— someone of significance. But does this not mean that the urge to offer hospitality is often mercenary? A wide variety of religions and cultures contain the idea that the mysterious stranger may in the end turn out to be someone for whom it might have been a good idea to offer help, and one can see how a society which welcomes or at least tolerates the stranger is likely to be better than one which does the reverse. People who travel often bring ideas and skills from one place to another and can be advantageous to the host society. The Islamic calendar starts with the completion of the journey from Mecca to what came to be known as Medina, and many descriptions of the religion involve the notion of travel. Travel is only feasible if travelers are treated at least with respect and at best with kindness.

59:19 Do not be like those who forgot God, and so He let them forget themselves. They are wrongdoers. According to al-Ghazali (1998: 1) knowledge is dependent on God, and we can only come to know God if we know ourselves (see also 8:24).



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60:1 O you who believe, do not take My enemies and your enemies as awliya’ (friends) … As when Abraham (9:114) prayed for his father until it was clear that he was an enemy of God, the implication here is that a time comes when one has to separate oneself from people who have very basic differences from us, at least in so far as the leading principles of religion are concerned.

64:8 So believe in God and His messenger and in the light which He sent down … Light is that by which things are revealed and al-Ghazali goes on to suggest (1954: 12) that the Qur’an is represented by the sun and all the prophets are lamps but that the Prophet has a special status (Gairdner 1954: 14).

65:3 God brings about what He intends … Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) gives the example of the Mongol conquest and sack of Baghdad, which looked like a disaster at the time, but turned out well for the Muslim world (McAuliffe 2015: 538).

67:2 Who creates death and life … Two of the divine names are al-muhyi (the life giver) and its opposite, al-mumit. Since we are told that God “creates everything in the best way” (32:7), presumably there is no great problem in the existence of death. One of the aspects of al-mumit is the idea that God takes back what really belongs to Him.

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67:3 You can see no fault in the Gracious One’s creation, then look again, can you see any gaps? The fabric of creation is taken to be perfect. What the criteria of perfection are here though is difficult to identify.

67:10 “Had we but listened or used our intelligence, we would not be among the companions of the blazing fire!” When the people who are condemned to hell go in, they realize that their fault lay in not listening to the message. They did not use their faculties of reasoning to decide whether the message was true or false. Understanding the arguments used in the Qur’an is one of the ways we can save ourselves from the above punishment.

67:14 Should He not know, He who created? … Mulla Sadra suggests He knows because He has created knowledge (1976: 9). Since He gives existence to things, it is ridiculous to think that He himself might not exist (1976: 121).

68:4 Surely you have a khuluq ‘azim, excellent character. The link between the creation (khalq) and morality (akhlaq) is suggestive for Ibn al-‘Arabi. The Qur’an’s commendation to the Prophet that he has a noble nature (khuluq ‘azim) is a reference to the perfection of Muhammad’s realization of his own original nature, created upon the divine form.



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69:40-3 That this is really the word of an honored messenger … not the word of a poet … neither is it a word of a soothsayer (kahin) … it is a message from the Lord of the worlds. Here we have a reference to the Qur’an pointing to a contrast between someone honorable (karim), on the one hand, and the phrases “the word of a poet” and “a soothsayer” on the other. The Prophet is worthy of all honor since the source of his message is based on authenticity, whereas the poet is inauthentic and untruthful. The Prophet is a representative of God, whereas the poet’s word is merely self-proclaimed and need have no connection with the truth at all. However, there is evidence that some at least of the early Muslims did value poetry, even secular poetry. There is a tendency for some religions to disapprove of fun, as Asef Bayat (2007) points out.

70:19-21 Truly man was created intolerant (halu’), fretful (jazu‘) when evil affects him ... Human beings are fragile and react badly when things go wrong.

72:10 We do not know whether evil is intended on those on earth or whether their Lord desires them to go right. This is something Muhammad is told to say. It suggests some scope for individual action and decision.

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72:16 (see also 71:10-12) We shall give them to drink the water in abundance. The water is sometimes taken to symbolize divine grace.

72:26-7 (see also 55:1-2) “The knower of the unseen, and He reveals to no-one His secret, except to every messenger that H5e has chosen.” At 20:114, Muhammad requests, “My lord, increase me in knowledge.” Real knowledge is linked with revelation, is often limited in its accessibility, and the divine messengers clearly have it, but its only source is God. See also 2:129, 31:12, and: God will exalt those who believe among you and those who have knowledge to high ranks (58:11). The unity of the knower and the known is linked in Mulla Sadra’s view with the unity of being and his emphasis on existence. Since both the knower and the known exist and the things that exist are in constant motion and development, they are all mutually linked (Moris 2003: 101; Rahman 1975: 237).

75:2 And I do call to witness the self (nafs) that blames (lawamma). This nafs is conscious of its own imperfections. Hasan al-Basri (AH 110/ 642–728 ce) said, “You always see the believer blaming himself and saying things like ‘Did I want this? Why did I do that? Was this better than that?’” The hadith means that it is only if we interrogate ourselves that we can move positively on the road of spiritual improvement. One of the problems with formal religions is that they tend to encourage the belief in their adherents that they have done everything they need to do—they have prayed, given charity, gone on pilgrimage, fasted and so on,



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which may result in a feeling of self-satisfaction. In some ways, there is nothing wrong with this since religions are designed for us and we should feel happy with our participation in them. Islam sees itself as the best religion, the religion in the middle as it were between the materialism of Judaism and the austerity of Christianity. However, like those religions, it contains rules and there is a certain satisfaction in accomplishing the rules of one’s religion, as there is in carrying out any task which has aims and objectives. The self that blames is then important since it asks us whether we have really done everything we should have done, and is generally dissatisfied with our answer, since we could often have gone further. This works both at a specific time and over time, since it leads us to continue to seek to grow spiritually due to our dissatisfaction with where we are at any particular point.

75:22-23 Some faces that day will shine, looking towards their Lord. Ibn al-‘Arabi (SD, 91, 176) defended the idea that in heaven we see God and if we are not successful in getting there we are veiled from him (83:15). The following aya (75:24) refers to some faces on the Day of Judgment being sad. He often contrasts these verses with each other. It is worth noting how abstract this conception of paradise and its contrary are: very different from the material description in the Qur’an.

76:2-8 (see also 83:1-6, 96:1-8, 2:6-20, 70:19-21, 4:128, 91:9-10, 59:9) We certainly created man from a drop of mingled sperm in order to test him … the virtuous … fulfil their promises … feed the poor, the orphan and the captive for only the love of God. The important thing about our actions is that we should do the right thing because of how God wants us to behave.

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76:3-4 We showed him the way … Therefore, according to the Qur’an everything in the natural world is a sign (aya) of God and as such it is continuously praising Him. In short, the natural world as presented and described by the Qur’an is a living, holistic, orderly, and perfect world, populated by angels, jinn, human beings, and animals. Above all, the universe, with all its causal processes, is our main route to determining how it came about, and how it operates. See also 27:88 (Rahman 1980: 68–9).

76:29-30 Indeed, all this is an admonition: whoever then so wills, may find a way to his sustainer. But you cannot will it unless God wills: for behold, God is indeed all-seeing, wise. This was a popular quotation with the Jahmiyya, an early theological group, as part of their thesis that human beings have no free will. The issue of free will was much discussed in Islamic theology as to which view on freedom was most in line with the Book. The idea is that in the first place God has to want us to find a route to Him and if He does not, then naturally, we will not. It does not, however, firmly establish that there is no free will, since it could be that God decides who to help come close to Him and who not to help on the basis of what He knows of their character, limiting His assistance to those who deserve it.

81:28-9 To whoever among you wills to go straight you will not unless God, the Lord of the worlds, wills. This suggests that we cannot act well unless guided by God. Perhaps this need not involve the Qur’an, and certainly could not have done so at the



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time when all that existed were earlier revelations. Since there have always been messengers, we are told, there always were opportunities to be divinely guided. Some philosophers also thought that we could work out using reason alone what our duties are, and for them of course this might be represented as acting in accordance with the divine will. After all, it might be said that God has made them in a certain way, a way that enables them to acquire this information by themselves.

82:7-8 He who created you made you in the best proportion and well balanced. However He wanted to make you, He put you together. Like 95:4, this can refer solely to human beings, or as the Ikhwan al-Safa’ would suggest, it is about creation as a whole, which seems plausible, since there are many other verses which refer to the high level of design in the Book. It is not as though God, like us, has a limited amount of creative power, and decided just to concentrate on us. In a sense it also has to be said that the better designed everything is, the better it is for us, since then we are operating in an environment in which everything works well. Of course, it is not so good for us if the excellence of nature did not fit in with our interests, but the Qur’an constantly argues that this is not the case at all.

83:15 No indeed, but upon that day they shall be separated from their Lord. According to Tusi (1999: 46), this is a reference to something coming between two souls, such as a teacher and a pupil: when the the pupil goes in their own direction and so not uniting their mind with that of the teacher. This results in their being stuck in the darkness of purgatory (the barzakh), trapped in the veil of multiplicity and so failing to come into contact with anything higher and closer to the source of unity. The idea here is of a spiritual leader influencing his followers, and the necessity of their minds coalescing, which is only possible if nothing comes between them. Ibn

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al-‘Arabi uses this verse to describe the fear of those who have to face the consequences of what they did in their mortal lives (SD, 162).

85:21-22 No, it is a glorious Qur’an on a guarded tablet. Al-Ash‘ari suggests that this must be taken literally, despite 6:103: No vision can grasp Him. The latter verse he takes to refer to this world, not the next. This became a controversial issue in Islamic theology and was modified by some of his followers to suggest that we have to accept the literal truth of what the Qur’an says, but do not have to accept that we know how it can be true.

87:1 Praise the name of your Lord most high. According to al-Ghazali, only God can know God: all we can know are his names. It is not the name that is praised but what it describes (Names). Ibn al-‘Arabi links it with 2:255, i.e., that it embraces the heaven and the earth, where the latter represents the extent of divine mercy (SD, 330). Verse 87:1 represents the highest level that a response to that mercy can achieve.

87:16-17 Yet you prefer the life of this world, while the afterlife is finer and more permanent. According to al-Ghazali, what makes people greedy for the dunya, this world, is their excessive desire for food and sex. In addition, he explains that preferring the dunya over the afterlife is our dominant trait. It is a constant theme of all Islamic philosophers that most people are obsessed with materiality, hence the use of so much material imagery in the Qur’an. Al-Ghazali reminds us that there are many aspects of this positive attitude to this world, among which are love of wealth and status (Ihya’, 3:231).



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88:17-20 Why do they not think of the camels—how they are created? And the heaven—how it is raised, and the mountains—how they are set up, and the earth— how it is laid down? These verses suggest scientific exploration of the heavens, the earth, animals, and mountains not as something “out there” but as part of the cosmic web designed by the creator. The Prophet, in the early period of his life, we are told was focused on contemplation and was close to nature. There is a hadith in which he is thought to have said of Uhud, a mountain on the outskirts of Medina, “It is a mountain that loves us and we love it.” The Prophet is also thought to have spoken to the mountain, saying, “Uhud, be calm.” The close relationship between the Prophet and his environment is emphasized in this tradition. Therefore, one of our duties is to think of the environment that is entrusted to us by God and to be in harmony with it. Ibn Rushd uses this and similar verses to defend the idea of proving the existence of God through design (Kashf, 36).

88:21-22 Then remind them, as you are only a reminder. You have no dominion over them. According to Taha (1987), this refers to the polytheists who refuse to worship God and construct idols. Even the Prophet who is referred to by God as “a great moral character” (68:4) is not allowed to have dominion over them.

89:20 (see also 2:177, 57:20, 70:19-20) And you love wealth with a passion. This verse is used by Shahrour (Christman 2009: 25) as an argument that

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much of what is normally called Islam does not accord with human nature (fitra). This is generally al-Ghazali’s approach also, that the purpose of religion is to change basic human traits.

89:24 (see also 31:33, 35:5) “O would that I had prepared for my life.” Ja‘far b Mansur al-Yaman takes this to mean he should prepare this changeable life for the permanent life, a life based on the external and matter for one that is interior and spiritual (2001: 101). This book is remarkable both for its use of Qur’anic quotations and also for it being such a piecemeal use that usually the actual phrases that are taken have nothing to do with their original role in the Book.

89:27 ”O self, in complete rest and satisfaction!” This is said about the nafs al-mutma’ina (the soul at peace) and it is told to expect the reward of entering heaven. Mulla Sadra links this verse with 39:42, 58:11, 6:165, and 3:55 (Elixir, 85–7). This nafs is tranquil as it rests on the certitude of God. According to various hadith we are told that Ibn ‘Abbas called it the believing soul and another Companion, al-Qatada, provides a nice description of the believer who is so sure of his knowledge of God, his names, and his attributes that he is entirely relaxed about everything that happens to him. He does not get excited about things going well or the reverse, since he knows that this was decreed long before they happened, even before he was created, and he is entirely confident that anything that happens is under the direction of God. This brings out the basic meaning of muslim, which is someone who submits to God, and along with that goes the need to have a self which is happy with its role in existence.



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90:8 Have We not given him two eyes? Ibn al-‘Arabi takes this to mean that we can see things both as they are in the world of appearance and as they are behind that world; see 8:17. It also means that instead of simply relying on one route to knowledge, such as reason, we acknowledge that there are other ways of knowing, perhaps via imagination and intuition, and we try to use them together, although of course it is difficult; and here the analogy with two eyes is a good one, since they tend to operate together, if they are working properly. Ibn al-‘Arabi suggests here that we should try to develop our thinking in such a way that we manage to carry out a variety of epistemological strategies at the same time, which is what is necessary given the constantly changing world we try to understand and the fact that it is the product of a creator to whom we do not have access. A good contrast here is with the Dajjal, the person who appears at the end of days to challenge the Messiah, and whose appearance is often described in the hadith literature as grotesque. A noticeable feature of him is that he has one eye, so he is limited in his thinking, Ibn al-‘Arabi refers to him at SD, 24 as being tied up and restrained, presumably by his narrow perspective. Eventually he is defeated by the Muslims, which is often referred to as a final struggle between Muslims and Jews, and which perhaps symbolizes the defeat of one-dimensional thinking that cannot take seriously the idea of a variety of perspectives by a more sophisticated and complex form of thought (Leaman 2004b: 203–17).

93:11 And for your Lord’s favor, proclaim it! A woman who was completely covered apart from her hair was chided for this and in response she cited this aya as justification for showing her hair if she wanted to. Hair is thus regarded as ‘awra, a sexually relevant part of her body, by her critic (Malti-Douglas 2001: 36). When the woman defended herself she referred to 26:80, “And whenever I am sick, He heals me,” to suggest that if she did anything wrong, God would find an appropriate way of resolving the situation.

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95:4 Indeed, We have created humanity in the best mold. “The best mold” (fi ahsan taqwim) is often taken to mean more than that which we can operate reasonably successfully most of the time in the world. The way in which we have been made can represent the form of humanity that may be taken to be a model of the whole world, on the principle that we are a microcosm that mirrors the macrocosm. But this is the ideal. The next verse states “then We cast him back to the lowest of the low,” suggesting that our matter (maddatuhu) tends to drags us down. The only escape is “except those who attain to faith,” which for Mulla Sadra (Asfar, 7:174) cannot be separated from attaining intellectual wisdom. Finally it is also important to “do good works” (95:5-6), indicating the perfection of “practical wisdom.” So, action is significant here, but it seems to come some way below thinking. He uses the nice expression that we are kneaded from two different ingredients, perhaps referring to the distinction that Ibn al-‘Arabi makes between the command and creation, where we have both the conceptual (tajarrud) form of the command and the sensory matter of creation. When talking about practice Sadra imports the notion of takhalluq, which refers to the way in which human beings can create for themselves, out of their understanding of the divine attributes, moral principles that they need to follow (Asfar, 1:31). The mule in The Case of the Animals (Case, 57/Ep 22, 110) complains that this best stature does not mean that there is anything wonderful about human stature, since all animals have physical features that are appropriate to them, as in 20:50: “gave to every creature its nature then guided it” (Ep 22, 111–12). There is also 32:7: “created all things well.” On the other hand they do not claim that the whole of creation is God’s representative on earth, but there are certainly many Qur’anic passages which refer to the whole of creation as an indication of God and his mercy. Presumably that has implications for how the whole of creation ought to be treated, and if everything is the recipient of divine mercy, and if morality involves us trying to emulate the names of God, should we not attempt to treat all creatures with mercy? Nursi links this with 2:31: He taught Adam the names, all of them; and with 32:7: God created everything in the best way. We start with a huge range of advantages but do not generally live up to our role as God’s



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representative on the earth, often forgetting our primary relationship with God and obsessed with selfishness. In many ways, his persistent attack on materialism is based on the idea that it leads us away from our divinely given role as representative of God to concentrating on other, far less important, aspects of life. It is the role of religious revivers such as Nursi to try to make religion relevant for the contemporary generation who (as in the Turkey of his time) are dominated by secular forces hostile to all religion. He saw secularism as also significant in Western Europe and the great obstacle that Islam has to overcome (Leaman 1999). Like Sayid Qutb, a very different thinker, Nursi saw modern society as a new jahaliyya or period of ignorance and Islam is required more than ever to show people how they are to live and what they should believe. Another danger is that the Islamic community itself feels dissatisfied with the version of Islam that has come down to them: it needs to be revived to make it apparent that it is just as necessary now as in the past. There is a hadith that suggests that during every period someone will come to revive religion and this verse is a potent one to establish this point, since humanity has to feel itself to have been chosen by God to carry out His work. It is the role of the reviver of religion to make him or her appreciate that, not only intellectually but also emotionally.

95:5-6 Then We restored him to the lowest of the low, save those who believe and do righteous deeds. A reference to how disappointing human behavior can be, despite our elevation to the status of representatives of God in the world.

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96:1-5 Say! In the Name of your Lord Who created He created man from a clot of blood Say! Your Lord is the Most Generous, He is the One Who taught man writing He taught him what he did not know. According to Sufism, this suggests that the divine is within, and when the soul is sufficiently purified, the name or divinity of God becomes manifest enough to appreciate the truth. This is often taken to be the first revelation given to the Prophet, and the pen symbolizes the idea that the soul can gain knowledge. The reference to a connecting substance involves the laws of causality, through which the divine law works, and if we live according to that law we will deserve to be taught what we did not originally know (Helminski 2003: 205). Ibn Khaldun quotes this passage at the end of his chapter in the Muqaddima (III:398), which deals with human writing and its development. It is perhaps too obvious a quote to be interesting (Ibn Khaldun 1958).

104:2-4 Who piles up wealth … thinking that his wealth would make him live forever. Isfahani points out that most people regard the successes of this world as their end, but for God it is a route to the end (1973: 396, discussing 34:13 and 61:10-11). Generosity is part of faith (2:3, 64:16, and 6:125) and this verse criticizes hoarding wealth and holding the latter in high regard.



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112:1-4 Say, He is God, the One and Only God, the Eternal, Absolute He does not beget, nor is He begotten And there is none like Him. This refers to the exclusive transcendence of the divine essence that lies beyond all relationships with anything else. Al-Jili refers to the paradoxical nature of God’s essence being both exclusive and inclusive (1995: 31). As unity it is entirely inclusive; as divinity it is the opposite. The sura of sincerity is referred to by Shahrastani as establishing divine independence (2009: 55–6), since no one according to him denies the existence of God (40:12, 39:45, 17:46, and 19:93). The only outstanding issue is over the monotheistic question. He rightly acknowledges that this is not quite so evident, even if the existence question is taken as resolved. According to Ibn Sina, this sura demonstrates how the chain of being operates, starting with the Necessary Existent and developing a hierarchy of its necessary concomitants emanating from it. This Necessary Existent is in itself unknowable except through its products. It is closest to God, and has a negative and positive quality, the former being its lack of an essence separate from its existence, and the latter the fact that it is the first principle. In Himself, God is entirely one, yet his existence leads to the existence of many other things. Nothing like Him can be produced by Him since His essence cannot be shared by anything else. Why not? The main reason is that the products, unlike their producer, have essences that are distinct from their existences, and so are indeed very different from their origin. The phrase “He has no children and was not himself a child of anything else” refers to His basically complete independence of everything (Ibn Sina 2002: 123–9).

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Appendix to Chapter 4 1:1-7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2:3-4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2:6-7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2:22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 2:23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2:25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2:26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 2:30. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 2:31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 2:34. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 2:35. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 2:60. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 2:61. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 2:62. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 2:74. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2:87. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 2:102. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 2:105. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 2:106. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 2:111-12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 2:115. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 2:117. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 2:124. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 2:129. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 2:132. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 2:143. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 2:152. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 2:154. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 2:155-7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 2:156. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 2:16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2:173. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2:177. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2:183. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 2:186. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 2:190. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 2:205. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 2:208. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 2:213. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2:251. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 2:256. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 2:261. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77



Qur’anic Verses and Philosophical Responses 279

2:269. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 2:282. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 2:285. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 2:286. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 3:6��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 80 3:7��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 81 3:14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3:19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 3:31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 3:49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 3:54. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 3:65. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 3:85. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 3:103. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 3:104. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 3:134. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 3:138-42. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 3:140. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 3:159. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 3:162-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 3:169. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 3:173. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 3:185. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 3:190. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 4:11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4:28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4:59. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4:79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4:80. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4:117-20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 4:125. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 4:126. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4:157���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������102 4:164-5�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������102 4:164���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������104 4:166���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������104 4:171���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������104 5:3�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������105 5:5�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������106 5:32�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������106 5:44�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������107 5:48�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������107 5:51�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������107 5:54�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������108 5:64�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������109

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5:66�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 5:68�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 5:69�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 5:75�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������111 5:83�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������111 5:87�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������112 5:104���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������113 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42:28���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������227 42:38���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������229 42:51���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������229 42:52���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������230 43:32���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������230 43:44���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������230 43:67���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������231 43:84���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������232 44:36���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������232 44:25-9�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������233



Qur’anic Verses and Philosophical Responses 285

44:38-9�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������233 45:24���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������234 47:19���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������234 47:38���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������235 48:1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������236 48:2-3�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������236 48:26���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������237 49:13���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������238 49:14���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������239 50:4�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������240 50:6�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������241 50:15���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������241 50:16���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������241 50:22���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������242 50:37���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������242 51:19���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������243 51:21���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������246 51:20���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������246 51:21���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������246 51:22���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������246 51:23���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������246 51:49���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������248 51:56���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������248 52:4�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������248 52:29���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������249 52:35-6�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������249 53:11���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������250 53:18���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������250 54:49���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������250 55:1-4�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������251 55:26-7�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������251 55:29���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������252 55:36���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������252 55:46���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������253 55:70���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������253 55:62-72���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 55:78���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 56:77-8�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 57:1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 57:3�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 57:4�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������257 58:11���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������258 58:20���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������259 58:22���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������259 59:7�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������260

286

The Qur’an: A Philosophical Guide

59:9�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������260 59:19���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������262 60:1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������263 64:8�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������263 65:3�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������263 67:2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������263 67:3�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������264 67:10���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������264 67:14���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������264 68:4�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������264 69:40-3�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������265 70:19-21���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������265 72:10���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������265 72:16���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������266 72:26-7�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������266 75:2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������266 75:22-3�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������267 76:2-8�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������267 76:3-4�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������268 76:29-30���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������268 81:28-9�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������268 82:7-8�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������269 83:15���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������269 85:21-2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������270 87:1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������270 87:16-17���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������270 88:17-20���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������271 88:21-2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������271 89:20���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������271 89:24���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272 89:27���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272 90:8�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������273 93:11���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������273 95:4�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������274 95:5-6�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������275 96:1-5�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������276 104:2-4�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������276 112:1-4�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������277

Textual Cross-References

The suras that are listed on the left here are those that occur as secondary references in the book, although sometimes they are primary references also, with their own entry. The suras on the right are the primary references. 1:6-7 2:143 2:1 6:149 2:1-2 11:1-2 2:3 104:2-4 2:6 10:100 2:6-20 76:2-8 2:9-10 26:88-9 2:15 3:54 2:21 2:205 2:30 2:35, 38:26, 72:26-7 2:31 33:72, 40:64, 95:4 2:36 2:35 2:37 2:35 2:62 41:33 2:75-6 2:74 2:75 5:64 2:102 35:28 2:115 20:74 2:111 17:36 2:117 16:40 2:120 35:28 2:124 21:73 2:129 72:26-7 2:143 3:140, 23:52, 50:37, 72:26-7 2:144 2:115 2:156 3:185, 6:165

2:159 2:74 2:164 44:38-9 2:167 5:5 2:168 5:5 2:170 5:104 2:172 5:5 2:173 17:33 2:174 2:74 2:177 89:20 2:178 17:33 2:182 2:173 2:185 17:33 2:190 33:61 2:191 2:190 2:192 2:173 2:193 33:61 2:194 17:33 2:195 17:33 2:210 20:5 2:213 11:118 2:213 6:149 2:216 35:28 2:218 2:173, 2:74 2:221 7:172 2:223 39:62-3 2:225 2:173 2:226 2:173

288

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2:233 6:152 2:235 2:173 2:251 6:35 2:255 4:166, 87:1 2:256 6:35 2:260 6:39 2:263-4 51:19 2:266 6:149 2:267 5:5, 17:33 2:268 2:35 2:275-8 51:19 2:275-81 30:39 2:278-9 30:39 2:286 6:152 3:2-4 29:46 3:7 6:149, 35:32, 36:82, 39:23, 49:13, 55:70 3:8 2:30, 3:7 3:18 35:28, 50:16 3:19 2:62, 2:213 3:31 3:14, 4:80 3:33 4:125 3:37 6:39 3:40 6:39 3:47 6:39 3:47-8 17:49 3:48 19:20 3:55 89:27 3:61 35:28 3:64 2:213, 29:46, 43:84 3:65-6 35:28 3:70-1 2:74 3:73 5:64 3:78 2:74 3:84 3:65 3:85 2:62, 2:213 3:93 3:65 3:97 6:78, 35:15 3:110 3:104, 23:52

3:113-14 3:65 3:114 3:104 3:118 10:5-6 3:130 51:19, 30:39 3:134 24:22 3:144 33:21 3:188 18:56 3:190-1 7:54, 44:38-9, 49:13 3:191 44:38-9 3:199 3:65 4:1-2 49:13 4:13-14 59:7 4:20 7:54 4:29 17:33 4:36 9:23 4:43 17:33 4:44 2:74 4:46 2:74 4:49 47:38 4:57 7:54 4:59 39:9 4:78 17:33, 47:38 4:79 47:38 4:83 35:45 4:84 33:61 4:90 33:61 4:92 17:33 4:93 17:33 4:113 35:45 4:119 7:179 4:128 76:2-8 4:135 9:23, 23:52 4:136 2:62 4:153 30:39 4:157 19:20 4:160 5:5 4:161 30:39, 51:19 4:164 4:125 4:165 2:286



4:171 4:125, 36:82 5:3 2:155-7, 17:33 5:4 5:5 5:6 17:33 5:10 7:172 5:13-15 2:74 5:18 3:185 5:19 19:20 5:32 17:33, 49:13 5:41 2:74 5:45 5:44, 17:33 5:47 5:44 5:48 6:35 5:54 3:14 5:69 2:62, 38:26, 55:36 5:72-3 4:171 5:74 38:26 5:87 5:5 5:110 2:102 6:2 17:33 6:7 2:102, 15:14-15 6:19 50:16 6:38 5:3 6:50 35:28, 49:13 6:57 6:39 6:58-9 48:26 6:59 47:38 6:60 39:42 6:63 35:28 6:75-8 3:6 6:75 6:78 6:79 5:44 6:80 6:83 6:93 6:130 6:97-9 44:38-9 6:102 36:83 6:103 5:83 6:106 47:19 6:111 15:14-15

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6:115 5:64 6:119 5:5, 35:28 6:122 39:9 6:125 2:186, 10:100, 104:2-4 6:140 35:28 6:143 35:28 6:144 35:28 6:145 17:33 6:152 5:87 6:164 13:11 6:165 2:30, 38:26, 89:27 7:2 2:186 7:8-9 30:30 7:11-13 2:31 7:11-23 18:7 7:16-17 4:117-20 7:20 2:35 7:26 7:46 7:29-30 10:100 7:31 34:37 7:34 17:33 7:40 2:62 7:42 6:152 7:46 54:49 7:54 2:164 7:57 2:115 7:64 49:13 7:109-12 2:102 7:120-1 2:102 7:132 2:102 7:143 1:1-7 7:145 29:49 7:146 49:13 7:157 3:104, 5:5 7:158 5:64 7:172 2:30, 4:126 7:176 2:30 7:179 5:54, 10:42, 26: 88-9, 33:72, 49:13

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7:181 23:52 7:185 13:3-4 7:200-02 4:117-20 8:17 57:3, 90:8 8:24 59:19 8:60 12:76 8:116-18 47:38 9:6 5:64 9:23 5:5 9:29 33:61 9:46 39:62-3 9:51 26:217 9:67 3:104, 5:83 9:71 3:104 9:73 33:61 9:79 3:54 9:103 51:19 9:105 35:28 9:114 60:1 9:123 33:61 10:2 2:102 10:5 44:38-9 10:7 49:13 10:11 6:160, 35:45 10:14 2:30, 38:26 10:24 49:13 10:34-5 25:55 10:49 17:33 10:64 5:64 10:73 2:30 10:80-1 2:102 10:99 6:35 11:6 5:109 11:8 6:59 11:13 10:38 11:14 4:166, 35:28 11:18 2:205 11:24 49:13 11:25 49:13

11:35 15:14-15 11:49 35:28 11:78 59:9 11:96-8 21:22, 25:74 11:118 10:99 11:123 14:7 12:40 5:44, 6:39, 43:84 12:59 11:69 12:67 6:39 12:76 35:28 12:103 12:106, 34:13 13:2 7:54 13:3 49:13 13:8 47:38 13:16 13:11, 49:13 13:19 49:13 13:28 3:14, 5:54 13:37 35:28 13:43 35:28 14:19 44:38-9 14:22 2:35, 4:117-20 14:30 7:172 14:33 17:33 14:34 32:8 15:19 2:143 15:21 2:115, 2:164 15:23 17:33 15:29 17:85 15:36-42 4:117-20 15:68-9 59:9 15:85 44:38-9 15:99 18:109 16:3 44:38-9 16:3-18 2:164 16:8 16:5 16:11 49:13 16:12 44:38-9 16:40 7:54, 17:85, 31:27 16:50 20:5, 47:38



16:68-70 16:66 16:71 51:19 16:77 35:28 16:74 13:17 16:98-100 4:117-20 16:81 3:54 16:82 8:17 16:90 2:173, 2:282 16:107-8 49:13 16:115 17:33 16:125 2:155-7, 5:87, 18:56, 29:46 17:11 18:110 17:15 13:11, 47:19 17:16 18:56 17:21 35:45, 51:19 17:23 17:110 17:29 2:143, 5:64 17:44 2:115, 2:164, 4:126 17:45 7:46 17:46 112:1-4 17:47 2:102 17:49 44:36 17:57 3:162-3 17:59 6:39 17:61-2 2:31 17:62 4.117-20 17:63-5 4:117-20 17:70 41:53 17:72 5:83 17:85 7:54 17:101 2:102 17:101-2 6:39 17:110 3:54 18:27 5:64 18:28 2:205 18:29 54:49 18:109 5:64, 31:27 19:17 17:85, 54:49

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19:30-7 2:74 19:43 35:28 19:71 9:68 19:93 112:1-4 20:4 7:54 20:5 47:38 20:12 2:35 20:17-20 7:117 20:40 6:39 20:50 2:164, 16:71, 95:4 20:55 17:49 20:57-8 2:102 20:63 2:102 20:65-70 7:117 20:67-70 6:39 20:66 2:102 20:73 2:102 20:114 35:28, 72:26-7 21:1 49:13 21:16 44:38-9 21:22 2:164 21:31 11:7 21:32 41:53 21:35 18:7 21:37 4:28 21:47 30.30 21:69 2:60 21:73 2:124, 25:74 21:83 6:39 21:91 17:85 21:92 2:213 22:8 18:56 22:11 7:179 22:24 5:5 22:37 2:183 22:40 2:251, 6:35 22:41 3:104 22:45-6 49:13 22:46 33:4

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22:46 5:54 22:65 2:30, 17:33 22:73 39:38 22:77 6:90 22:78 2:186, 17:33 23:22 16:5 23:51 5:5 23:52 2:213 23:62 6:152 23:115 38:27 24:10 6:160 24:14 6:160 24:20 6:160 24:21 6:160 24:26 5:5 24:41 2:164, 4:164, 16:66 24:44 44:38-9 24:55 21:105-7 25:43-4 10:42 25:44 7:179 25:45-6 44:38-9 25:53 23:99-100 25:61-2 49:13 26:43-6 7:117 26:61 7:54 26:80 93:11 26:151-2 2:205 27:10 7:117 27:34 2:205, 57:3 27:40 2:102, 26:217 27:60-4 2:164 27:62 2:30, 38:26 27:80-1 10:42 27:88 76:3-4 28:31 7:117 28:35 2:156 28:38 40:37 28:41 21:73, 25:74 28:88 20:50

29:2-3 23:52 29:20 44:38-9 29:44 44:38-9 29:45 2:183, 18:56 29:46 5:87, 29:46 29:53-4 17:49 30:4 48:26 30:7 35:28 30:8 15:85, 44:38-9 30:22 44:38-9 30:29-30 35:28 30:29 7:172 30:30 7:172, 17:70, 59:9 30:40 25:55 30:56 50:4 31:12 72:26-7 31:17 3:104 31:20 14:33, 44:38-9 31:21 2:35 31:27 5:64, 18:109, 33:4 31:33 89:24 31:34 2:286 32:4 7:54 32:5 20:5 32:7 67:2, 95:4 32:9 17:85 32:14 54:49 33:33 39:9 33:35 3:14 33:36 59:7 33:41 5:83 33:43 7:117 33:53 7:46 33:56 18:110 33:59 7:46 34:7-8 17:49 34:10 34:12 34:13 104:2-4 34:20-1 4:117-20



35:5 89:24 35:6 3:14, 4:117-20 35:10 20:5, 47:38 35:11 4:166 35:18 13:11 35:19 49:13 35:27-8 2:164 35:33 55:36 35:39 2:30, 38:26 35:45 6:160 36:48 17:49 36:57 16:5 36:71-3 17:70 36:77 32:8 36:78-9 50:4 36:79 17:49 36:81 17:49 37:36 21:5 37:96 39:62-3 37:154 3:162-3 38:26 2:30 38:27 44:38-9 38:28 7:172 38:29 49:13 38:32 7:46 38:72 15:29 38:75-6 2:31, 7:12 39:5 7:54, 44:38-9 39:7 13:11 39:8 32:8 39:9 35:28, 49:13 39:30 3:185 39:42 23:99-100, 89:27 39:45 112:1-4 39:46 35:28 39:47 50:22 39:53 20:74 39:62 13:11 39:68 50:4

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40:7 7:54 40:12 112:1-4 40:15 42:52 40:40 2:62 40:58 49:13 40:62 13:11 40:80 16:5 41:3 4:164-5 41:11 40:57 41:15 4:166 41:36 18:7 41:49 32:8 41:53 50:16 42:9 39:62-3 42:11 6:78, 47:38, 55:78 42:27 6:160 42:22 16:5 42:53 2:87 43:3 56:77 43:12 16:5 43:58 18:56 43:87 7:172 45:22 44:38-9 45:25 17:49 46:3 15:85, 44:38-9 46:23 35:28 46:26 10:42 46:92 35:28 47:38 4:126 48:10 4:80, 5:83 49:13 5:32, 11:118 49:17 14:11 50:2 17:49 50:15 14:48 50:16 2:35, 2:115, 48:26, 57:4 50:35 16:5 50:37 5:54 50:42 50:4 50:43 17:33

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51:12 17:49 51:20-1 41:53 51:24-7 59:9 51:58 4:166 52:15-16 50:22 52:22 16:5 52:30 21:5 52:35 40:57 52:48 6:39 53:19-20 4:117-20 53:38 13:11 54:49 2:164 54:50 7:54 55:1-2 72:26-7 55:3 17:33 55:7 8:25 55:19-20 23:99-100 55:29 13:11 56:36-7 55:70 56:60 17:33 56:79-80 29:49 57:1 2:164 57:2 54:49 57:3 55:29 57:4 7:54, 50:16 57:13 20:74 57:19 3:140 57:20 89:20 57:29 5:64 58:10 26:217 58:11 35:28, 72:26-7, 89:27 59:1 2:164 59:2 13:3-4 59:9 11:69, 76:2-8 59:16 2:35 59:22 35:28 60:1 17:33, 58:22 61:1 2:164 61:10-11 104:2-4

61:12 5:5 62:5 2:74 63:11 17:33 64:3 40:64, 44:38-9 64:16 104:2-4 65:2-5 13:11 65:7 6:152 65:12 57:3 66:9 33:61 66:12 17:85 67:2 6:125 67:16 20:5 68:4 88:21-2 68:28 2:143 68:47 35:28 68:48 6:39 69:17 7:54 69:18 5:109 69:41 21:5 70:9 27:88 70:19 4:28 70:19-21 51:19, 76:2-8 70:19-20 89:20 70:24-5 51:19 70:43 50:4 71:10-12 72:16 71:12-14 21:105-7 71:17-18 50:4 72:26 5:109 72:26-7 35:28 74:31 5:109 74:39-46 28:78 75:2 12:53 75:24 75:22-3 75:29 33:4 75:40 17:49 76:3 54:49 76:8-9 51:19 76:21 55:36



76:24 6:39 78:33 55:70 79:37-41 12:53 79:42 17:49 80:17-19 32:8 81:28-9 39:62-3 83:1-3 51:19 83:1-6 76:2-8 83:15 75:22-3 83:15-16 50:22 85:22 22:70, 56:77 86:16 3:54 87:2-3 2:164 88:17-18 7:185 88:17-20 44:38-9 89:15-20 51:19 89:22 20:5 89:27 6:130, 12:53 89:28 3:14

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90:13-20 51:19 91:7-8 3:14, 33:72 91:7-10 17:70, 49:13 91:9-10 76:2-8 92:5-10 51:19 92:18-21 51:19 93:7 6:78 95:4 82:7-8, 17:33 95:5-6 33:72 96:1-8 76:2-8 96:15-16 9:14 98:8 2:115, 3:14 102:1-8 51:19 103:3 1:1-7 104:2-9 51:19 104:4-5 2:35 107:1- 7 51:19 112:1 47:38

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Index

‘Abd al-Jabbar 105, 123 ‘Abduh 64–5, 179, 263 ‘Abdullah b. 135–6 Abraham/Abrahamic 14, 64, 65, 68, 75, 80, 91, 101, 111, 115, 117, 118–19, 145, 177, 178, 261–2, 263 abrogation 62, 109 Abu Zayd, N. 12–13 Adam 54, 55–6, 75, 101, 124–5, 153, 166, 206, 224, 231, 274 ‘ada 129 ‘adam 120 ‘adl 78, 214 Afghani 11 afterlife 47, 51–2, 95, 139, 142, 194, 232, 240, 270 Ahsa’ i 20 Akhtar, S. 71 ‘alam al-ghayb 212 ‘alam al-jabarut 49 ‘alam al-malakut 49 ‘alam al-mulk 49 ‘Ali 21 ‘alim 148 ammara bi’l-su 122 amr 128 ‘Amr b. Hisham 135–6 analogy 125 Anas b. Malik 126 angel/angelic 19, 31–2, 37, 41, 49, 53, 54, 70, 122, 129, 153, 155, 172, 173, 187, 207, 242, 262, 268 animals 52, 69, 104, 105, 131, 154 see also Gabriel Ankara 12 Ankaravi 33, 167, 195, 207

Ansari 95, 111–12, 144, 214, 219, 257–8 ‘aql 49, 74, 161 Arabia 9, 103 Arabic 2, 4, 10, 23, 25, 33, 42, 59, 103, 104, 155, 176, 225 ‘arif 145 Aristotle 8, 29, 43 Arkoun, M. 120 Asad, M. 75, 243 asbab al-nuzul 12, 25, 109 al-Ash‘ari/Ash‘arite 104, 109, 173, 181, 218, 241, 276 Astarabadi see Afghani authority 7, 10, 11, 73, 78, 82, 97, 98, 100, 101, 128, 193, 220, 227, 228, 256, 259, 260 aya 4, 26, 38, 41, 42, 45, 115, 176, 258, 268 ‘Ayn al-Qudat 112, 250 balance 39, 65–6, 70, 71, 105, 113, 134, 161, 180, 198, 243, 254, 269 see also middle position baqa’ 252 Barlas, A. 15 barzakh 54, 118, 168, 182, 188–9, 223, 269 batin 20, 30, 74, 213 Battle of Badr 133, 135 Battle of Uhud 94, 199–200 Baydawi 50, 96, 176, 217, 225 bayyinat 115 belief 7, 11, 28, 48, 55, 71, 75, 94, 101, 103, 105, 113, 114, 115, 129, 134, 140, 145, 147, 162, 164, 182, 239, 240, 249, 259 see also unbelief

312 Index Bible 8, 16, 59, 79, 208 Bodman, W. 72 burhan mantiqi 42 burhan mashriqi 42 charity 47, 66, 71, 77, 93, 198, 200, 243, 245, 266 Chelebi 119, 132, 170 Christians 8, 12, 17, 44, 58–9, 60, 62, 65, 91, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 138, 173, 196, 233, 267 commerce 78–9, 194 context 9, 10, 11–19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 81, 116, 137, 149, 150, 163, 166, 183, 198, 199, 205, 225, 250 Corbin, H. 19–20, 232, 243 covenant 130–1, 204 creation 31, 35, 36, 45, 63, 70, 96, 101, 108, 112, 114, 116, 118, 128–9, 130, 142, 144, 145, 151, 153, 154, 155, 160, 165, 166, 168, 170, 181, 186, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 209, 216, 217, 224, 236, 241, 242, 248, 251, 255, 264, 269, 274 daraja 95 Day of Judgment 41, 46, 89, 99, 101, 116, 129, 169, 183, 194, 210, 240, 267 death 25, 68, 70, 94, 95, 96, 115, 120, 121, 135, 159–60, 172, 182, 216–17, 221, 230, 233, 238, 263 design 50, 52, 65, 70, 117, 128, 131, 151, 154, 160, 162, 168, 174, 189, 190, 193, 195, 202, 204, 208, 214, 225, 233–4, 267, 269, 271 dialogue, interreligious 25, 114, 196 din al-fitra 75, 146, 231 Esack, F. 15 Europe/European 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 35, 275 euthanasia 158–60

existence 20, 32, 36, 38, 41–2, 54, 56, 62, 63, 66, 78, 80, 115, 116, 117, 118, 128, 129, 130, 131, 139, 143, 148, 152, 165, 168, 170, 171, 174, 175, 185–7, 189, 194, 196, 202, 211, 222, 223, 228, 233–4, 235, 237, 239, 241–2, 247, 249, 251, 252, 255, 256, 257, 263, 264, 266, 271, 272, 277 falasifa 52, 240, 260 fana’ 87, 252 al-Farabi 7, 9, 39, 43, 191 fasad 157 fasting 62, 71, 82, 113, 125, 248 fatiha 46–7 fatwa 163 fitra 76, 96, 130, 197, 231, 239, 272 foreknowledge, divine 48 free will 2, 48, 49, 73, 76, 79–80, 94, 96, 102, 133, 151, 158, 189, 207, 222, 243, 268 freeing slaves 245 Gabriel 9, 26, 60, 125, 136, 168, 173, 228 Ghazali 37–8, 48, 49, 58, 82, 95, 101, 108, 117–18, 119, 121, 129, 130, 131, 133, 142, 146, 149, 152, 157, 161–2, 163–4, 174, 181, 185, 186, 190, 191, 198, 204, 233, 239, 240, 242, 261, 262, 263, 270, 272 Gospel(s) 17, 59, 91, 103, 110, 173 grace, divine 48, 105, 123–4, 150, 191, 192, 207, 208, 213, 214, 215, 266 guidance 8, 29, 32, 56, 74, 79, 82, 102, 107–8, 113, 114, 118, 119, 129, 141, 144, 150, 170, 186, 197, 212, 227, 235 Gülen 9–10 habl 92 hadith ix, 4, 7, 10, 16, 21, 25, 42, 51, 59, 66, 68, 77, 78, 87, 93, 98, 106, 125,

Index 313 135, 140, 141, 183, 199, 205, 220, 257, 266, 271, 272, 273, 275 hads 96, 186 halal 78, 106 Hallaj 153 Hanafi, H. 14 Hanafi 159, 160, 170 haqiqat 90 haqq 86, 154, 162, 186 haraj 71 haraka al-jawhariyya 50 see also transubstantial motion haram 78, 106 hawa 122 Hawwa 56 hayy 87, 104 Hayy ibn Yaqzan 133, 174, 197, 214, 217 heart 21, 33, 40, 41, 42, 48, 49, 53, 59, 60, 63, 81, 84, 85, 87, 88, 109, 112, 126, 127, 135, 136, 150, 164, 168, 179, 190, 191, 196, 243, 244, 246, 250 hell 41, 49, 61, 95, 99, 100, 125, 138, 145, 151, 155, 175, 177, 194, 238, 242, 264 hermeneutics 8, 17, 27 hijab 125–7 hilm 184 hiss 96 hospitality 145, 198, 260–2 Hu 86 huduri 66 hukm 116, 155 Iblis 54, 55, 73, 85, 100, 112, 113, 124, 125, 153, 169 Ibn ‘Abbas 51, 249, 272 Ibn al-‘Arabi 33, 40, 46, 52, 54, 58–9, 61, 62–3, 65, 78–9, 80–1, 90, 91, 96, 104–5, 118, 119, 120, 128, 130, 131, 133, 138, 144, 148, 149–50, 152, 153, 155, 165, 169, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 180, 182–3,

195, 197, 201, 203, 211, 217, 220, 222, 223, 226, 229, 236, 237, 250, 252, 255, 256, 257, 258, 264, 267, 270, 273, 274 Ibn Dhakwan 43, 167 Ibn Kathir 130, 136 Ibn Qudama 83 Ibn Rushd 22, 39–40, 71, 82–3, 117, 119, 129, 132, 148, 157, 162, 176–7, 181, 191, 218, 221, 227, 271 Ibn Sina 7, 36, 38, 39, 97, 141, 168, 186, 195, 248, 277 Ibn Taymiyya 137 Ibn Tufayl 133, 174, 214, 217 Ibn Warraq 22, 23 idolaters 59, 122, 137 ihsan 78, 88 ijma‘ 163 ijtihad 163 ikhtiyar 49 Ikhwan al-Safa’ 34, 61, 63, 79, 114, 128, 140, 150, 151, 153, 156, 173, 174, 190, 195, 220, 244, 255, 269 ‘illa 127 ‘ilm 67, 77, 82, 162, 163, 164, 212, 247 imam 7, 20, 21, 25, 53, 64, 82, 146, 153, 167, 178, 186, 187, 189, 213, 218, 220, 228, 229 iman 88, 163–4, 239 Iqbal, M. 149, 165, 177 irada kawniyya 143 irada shar‘ iyya 143 ‘irfan 20, 213, 228 irshad 235 see also guidance ishraqi 36 Islamic State 136 Islamic state 10, 76, 229 Islamophobia 22 Isma‘ili 18–19, 31, 53, 82, 153, 162–3, 173, 187, 202, 222, 232 Israelites 58 istighfar 86 Izutsu, T. 140, 183–4, 39

314 Index jahiliyya 121, 141 Jahiz 52 Jesus 91, 101, 102, 105, 111, 115, 168, 173, 227 Jews 17, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 91, 102, 106, 107, 109, 110, 115, 125, 196, 199, 233, 275 jihad 72, 76, 140, 160, 259 jinn 117, 145, 168, 192, 208, 223, 248, 249, 268 jism 50 Job 72, 115 Joseph 146 Junayd 142, 145 justice, divine 69, 72, 78, 103, 120, 123, 138, 141, 214–15, 216 justice, human 23, 26, 78, 84, 163, 182 kamal 87 Kashani 53, 63, 110, 166, 187–8, 226, 229 Khaled 10 khalifa/khilafa 53, 92, 206, 218 khalq 128, 235, 264 khawatir 49 Khidr 73–4, 79, 112, 131, 133, 171 Khorchide, M. 14 Khusrow 144, 202, 222, 230 Khwarij/ Khariji 43, 116 Kirmani 156–7 kufr 94, 164 kun 128, 155 liberation theology 15 light 21, 30, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 53, 63, 66, 86, 87, 89, 98, 112, 119, 120, 140, 149, 164, 185–8, 213, 219, 220, 222, 228, 237, 247, 250, 257, 263 love 21, 36, 55, 73, 77, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 93, 98, 108–9, 112, 125, 187, 188, 213, 227, 278, 231, 243, 244, 248, 262, 267, 270, 271 lutf 123 Luxenberg, C. 23

magic/magician 61, 129, 142, 168, 192, 232 Maliki 159 maqam 95 ma‘ruf 92–3 Mary 111, 125, 138, 168, 173, 217 mashsha’i 20–1, 29–30, 36, 43 see also Peripatetic Mecca/Meccan 9, 13–14, 25, 58, 68, 94, 115, 135, 141, 199, 200–1, 228, 243, 262 Medina/Medinan 9, 13, 14, 25, 135, 199, 228, 243, 262, 271 mercy, divine 41, 42, 56, 61, 85, 86, 94, 103, 123, 124, 130, 138, 139, 164, 175, 178, 201, 214, 215, 223, 247, 251, 270, 274 Mernissi, F. 97 messenger 56, 64, 71, 79, 93, 98, 101, 102, 111, 116, 121, 127, 134, 141, 143, 145, 163, 170, 176, 188, 200, 204, 206, 212, 227, 231, 237, 259, 260, 263, 265, 266, 269 middle position 15, 20, 65–6, 94, 112, 213, 267 Mir, M. 47, 192 Mir Damad 36 miracle/miraculous 8, 51, 88, 91, 113, 115–16, 129, 142, 162, 168, 183, 191, 225, 227 mithal 37 mithaq 130 see also covenant moderation 64, 66, 73–5, 112–13 modernity 8, 10, 12 monotheism 47, 48, 55, 60, 73, 75, 103, 105, 130, 141, 146, 147, 193, 249 Moses 46, 56, 57, 58, 75, 79, 101, 104, 111, 115, 129, 131, 142, 171, 173, 174, 199, 222–3, 227 Muhammad 7, 12, 13, 16, 26, 37, 51, 61, 64, 66, 68, 71, 75, 79, 87, 94, 97, 99, 107, 112, 115, 116, 133, 135, 162, 163, 186, 187, 199, 212, 227,

Index 315 229, 231, 236, 237, 249, 263, 264, 265, 266 see also Prophet, the muhit 102 muhkamat 81 Mulla Sadra 8, 19, 20, 41–3, 50, 83, 130–1, 151–2, 155, 157, 165, 170, 175, 186–7, 194, 196, 202, 217, 238, 241, 250, 252, 253, 255, 257, 264, 266, 272, 274 munkar 92–3 Murji’a 43 Musa 73, 74, 75, 133, 199 see also Moses musawwir 224 mushriqun 58, 59 Mutahhari, M. 76, 136 mutakallimun 51, 164 mutashabih/mutashabihat 51, 81, 220 nafs 50, 72, 121–2 nafs al ammara 49, 84 nafs al-hayawaniyya 50, 84 nafs al-iblisiyya 85 nafs al-insaniyya 50 nafs al-kamila 87, 89 nafs al lawwama 49, 84, 85, 122, 266 nafs al-mardiyya 84, 88 nafs al-Muhammadiyya 89 nafs al-muhibba 89 nafs al-mulhamma 86 nafs al mutma’ina 49, 84, 86, 122, 272 nafs al-nabatiyya 50 nafs al-nuraniyya 89 nafs al-radiyya 84, 87 nafs al-rahman 186 naql 74 Nasr, S. ix, 3, 42, 53, 102, 130, 165, 180 Neoplatonism 34, 35–6 Netton, I. 34, 150 Neuwirth, A. 16–18 New Testament 8 niyya 86 non-existence 69 Nöldeke, T. 18

Nu‘man 146, 243 Nurcholish, M. 13, 75 Nursi, S. 9–10, 57, 60, 91, 95–6 pagans 99, 115, 136, 165, 234 People of the Book 58–9, 75, 89, 91, 104, 109, 110, 138, 196, 199, 239 Perfect Man 79, 127, 172 Peripatetic 29, 36, 43, 71, 131, 154, 191, 203 Pharaoh 75, 85, 176, 189, 222–3 piety 127, 149 pilgrimage 82, 182, 266 poetry 34–5, 43, 141, 176, 220, 249, 253, 265 prayer 7, 21, 26, 30, 32, 47, 62, 71, 82, 93, 103, 112, 125, 128, 159, 169, 190, 191, 194, 200, 208, 209, 210, 235, 243, 244 prophecy/prophets 14, 19, 21, 37, 47, 56, 58–9, 61, 68, 70, 75, 79, 90, 91, 101, 103, 111, 115, 123, 129, 136, 138, 141, 146, 149, 153, 161 Prophet, the 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 18, 21, 33, 51, 56, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 68, 72, 75, 82, 86, 87, 90, 94, 97, 98, 107, 111, 112, 113, 115, 118, 125–7, 135, 136–7, 140, 142, 162, 164, 172, 175, 176, 183, 184, 185, 186, 199, 200, 201, 204, 205, 212, 213, 215, 220, 227, 228, 229, 232, 236, 237, 243, 247, 249, 250, 261, 263, 264, 265, 271, 276 see also Muhammad Psalms 103, 178, 208 punishment 2, 10, 13–14, 48, 56, 59, 68, 73, 89, 105, 106–7, 122, 124, 134, 137, 138, 158, 232, 275 qalb 109 al-Qaradawi 10, 112, 157 qayyum 88 qibla 62

316 Index Qutb, S. 73, 107, 116, 139, 158, 158, 232, 275 rabb 87 rahman 186 Rahman, F. 11, 266, 268 Ramadan, T. 10–11, 71–2, 114, 196, 238 rasikhun 82, 214, 220 Razi, Abu al-Futuh 106 Razi, Fakhr Din al- 50, 60, 75, 108, 117, 128, 168, 187, 221, 230 Razi, Najm al-Din al- 98, 242 riba 78, 198–200, 243 Rippin, A. 55 rufhan 137 ruh 60, 121, 168, 230, 242 Rumi 35, 49, 69, 75, 108, 152, 177, 188, 248 Ruzbihan 112 Sabians 19, 58, 110 sabr 113 Sabzawari 8 Sachedina, A. 75, 76, 107, 130, 166, 179, 238 Saleh 115 Satan/satanic 49, 55–6, 83–4, 85, 99–101, 143, 151, 169, 188 science 12, 17, 27, 30, 42, 43, 57, 82, 164, 192, 242 secularism 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 30, 68, 167, 212, 265, 275 shafi 91 Shafi‘i 159, 170 Shah Waliullah 113, 125, 207 shahada 51, 94, 163, 212, 230, 231, 240 shahid 130, 200 Shahrastani 38–9, 51, 147, 150, 252, 277 Shahrour, M. 194, 271 shari‘a 14, 19, 20, 68, 78, 90, 154 Shariati, A. 15, 172 Shi‘a 14, 18–20, 21, 64, 82, 172, 213, 220, 227, 228, 229, 236

shirk 113, 150, 164, 257 sira 135, 205 siraj al-munir 149 sirat 46 Solomon 52, 61, 125, 168, 191, 192, 193, 208 soul 41, 49, 50, 71, 72, 79, 80, 83, 84, 96, 100, 112, 113, 116, 120, 121, 122, 128, 130, 131, 143, 147, 153, 158, 159, 167, 168, 186, 187, 190, 202, 203, 213, 216, 219, 221, 224, 226, 39, 240, 241, 247, 257, 260, 269, 272, 276 Souroush, A. 14 Spencer, R. 22–3 Sufi 9, 30, 36, 53, 62, 66, 72, 82, 83, 84, 95, 101, 113, 117, 124, 134, 140, 152, 157, 191, 203, 206, 228, 235, 241, 242, 246, 256–7, 276 Suhrawardi 7–8, 19, 20, 21, 36, 134, sunna 7, 90, 97, 126, 127, 129, 155, 207 Sunni 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 64, 97 sura 38 Tabari 106, 116, 135, 198 Tabataba’i 82, 205 tafsir 17, 136 Taftazani 33, 119 Taha, M. 13–14, 58, 105, 139, 155, 271 tahaddi 113 tahrif 60, 92, 237 takfir 22 taklif 123, 207 tanzil/tanzih 21, 30, 46, 74, 82, 118, 189, 223, 226, 235 taqlid 162–4, 191 tariqat 90 tasawwuf 74, 228 tashbih 46, 74, 118, 187, 189, 222, 226, 235 tawba 86 tawhid 68–9, 75, 133, 187, 226, 231 ta’wil 21, 30, 82, 83, 86

Index 317 tayyib 106 Tirmidhi 134, 249, 250, 257 Torah 71, 91, 103, 110 tragedy 71–2, 153 transubstantial motion 50, 151, 152, 241 tribalism 184, 229 Turkey/Turkish 9–10, 12, 275 Tusi 31–2, 169

wahm 96 wakil/tawwakul 87 walaya/wilaya 20, 135, 213, 227–9, 263 war 25, 67, 72, 76, 94, 132, 140, 184, 200, 205, 206 wasat 20, 65, 112, 213 Wudud, A. 15 wujud 41–2, 157, 186, 237

unbelief 48, 137, 164, 166, 230, 238, 240 unity, divine 68, 70, 75, 83, 92, 118, 133, 134, 148, 176, 186, 187, 188, 196, 207, 226, 231 see also tawhid

zahir 20, 30, 74, 213 Zamakhshari 106–7, 217 zikhr 86, 112 Zulaykha 146