The Quest for Japan's New Constitution: An Analysis of Visions and Constitutional Reform Proposals 1980-2009 (Routledge Contemporary Japan Series) [1 ed.] 0415593964, 9780415593960

Citation preview

The Quest for Japan’s New Constitution

This book examines the many attempts over the last three decades to revise Japan’s constitution. As the book shows, these attempts at revision have been relatively conservative, aiming to embed in the constitution visions of a different future for Japan. Specific reforms advocated include: enabling Japan to have a more proactive foreign policy, more independent of the US-Japan alliance; strengthening the role of the Emperor, and excluding female succession to the throne; and emphasising more citizens’ duties, rather than their rights, in order to strengthen community and societal cohesion. By far the most comprehensive analysis of Constitutional reform debate in Japan to be published to date, it offers translations and analysis of more than two dozen amendment proposals. The book provides a comprehensive analysis of the details of the reform proposals, charts the so far unsuccessful attempts to bring about the reforms, discusses the different groups arguing for reform, and assesses the nature of the proposed reforms. It categorises different versions of the vision for Japan’s future and shows that only a few campaigners are advocating anything like a return to Japan’s pre-war constitution. Christian G. Winkler is currently Visiting Researcher in the Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University, Japan.

Routledge Contemporary Japan Series

1 A Japanese Company in Crisis Ideology, strategy, and narrative Fiona Graham 2 Japan’s Foreign Aid Old continuities and new directions Edited by David Arase 3 Japanese Apologies for World War II A rhetorical study Jane W. Yamazaki 4 Linguistic Stereotyping and Minority Groups in Japan Nanette Gottlieb 5 Shinkansen From bullet train to symbol of modern Japan Christopher P. Hood 6 Small Firms and Innovation Policy in Japan Edited by Cornelia Storz

9 Adoption in Japan Comparing policies for children in need Peter Hayes and Toshie Habu 10 The Ethics of Aesthetics in Japanese Cinema and Literature Polygraphic Desire Nina Cornyetz 11 Institutional and Technological Change in Japan’s Economy Past and present Edited by Janet Hunter and Cornelia Storz 12 Political Reform in Japan Leadership looming large Alisa Gaunder 13 Civil Society and the Internet in Japan Isa Ducke

7 Cities, Autonomy and Decentralization in Japan Edited by Carola Hein and Philippe Pelletier

14 Japan’s Contested War Memories The ‘memory rifts’ in historical consciousness of World War II Philip A. Seaton

8 The Changing Japanese Family Edited by Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka

15 Japanese Love Hotels A cultural history Sarah Chaplin

16 Population Decline and Ageing in Japan – The Social Consequences Florian Coulmas 17 Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity David Chapman 18 A Japanese Joint Venture in the Pacific Foreign bodies in tinned tuna Kate Barclay 19 Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907–2007 Joseph P. Ferguson 20 War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Post-War Japan, 1945–2007 The Japanese history textbook controversy and Ienaga Saburo’s court challenges Yoshiko Nozaki 21 A New Japan for the TwentyFirst Century An inside overview of current fundamental changes and problems Edited by Rien T. Segers 22 A Life Adrift Soeda azembo, popular song and modern mass culture in Japan Translated by Michael Lewis 23 The Novels of Oe Kenzaburo Yasuko Claremont 24 Perversion in Modern Japan Psychoanalysis, literature, culture Edited by Nina Cornyetz and J. Keith Vincent 25 Homosexuality and Manliness in Postwar Japan Jonathan D. Mackintosh

26 Marriage in Contemporary Japan Yoko Tokuhiro 27 Japanese Aid and the Construction of Global Development Inescapable solutions Edited by David Leheny and Carol Warren 28 The Rise of Japanese NGOs Activism from above Kim D. Reimann 29 Postwar History Education in Japan and the Germanys Guilty lessons Julian Dierkes 30 Japan-Bashing Anti-Japanism since the 1980s Narelle Morris 31 Legacies of the Asia-Pacific War The Yakeato generation Edited by Roman Rosenbaum and Yasuko Claremont 32 Challenges of Human Resource Management in Japan Edited by Ralf Bebenroth and Toshihiro Kanai 33 Translation in Modern Japan Edited by Indra Levy 34 Language Life in Japan Transformations and prospects Edited by Patrick Heinrich and Christian Galan 35 The Quest for Japan’s New Constitution An analysis of visions and Constitutional reform proposals 1980–2009 Christian G. Winkler

The Quest for Japan’s New Constitution

An analysis of visions and Constitutional reform proposals 1980–2009 Christian G. Winkler

First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2011 Christian G. Winkler Typeset in Times New Roman by Bookcraft Ltd, Stroud, Gloucestershire

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Winkler, Christian G. The quest for Japan’s new constitution : an analysis of visions and Constitutional reform proposals, 1980-2009 / Christian G. Winkler.   p. cm.   “Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada.”   Includes bibliographical references and index.   1. Constitutional law--Japan. 2. Constitutional history--Japan.   3. Law reform--Japan. I. Title.   KNX2070.W56 2011       342.5202’9--dc22   2010016911 ISBN: 978-0-415-59396-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-84067-2 (ebk)

Contents



List of figures and tables Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Introduction

1

Conservatism: theory and reality in postwar Japan 1.1 Conservatism: An attempt at a definition 1.2 1945–1960: An age of attempted (partial) restoration 1.3 1960–2000: The era of the conservative mainstream: living with the new system 1.4 2000–2010: The end of conservatism? 1.5 Conclusion

2

3

Framing the issues: conservative criticism of postwar Japan and the vision of a new Japan 2.1 The Emperor system: a vision between genuine and invented traditions 2.2 Four visions for a new national security policy 2.3 Curing moral illnesses, aiming for a dignified nation In quest of Constitutional reform: introducing the drafts written between 1980 and 2009 3.1 Overview and clarification 3.2 The Drafts I (1980–1989) 3.3 The Drafts II (1990–1999) 3.4 The Drafts III (2000–2009)

ix x xi xiii 1 1 6 8 17 23 24 24 36 49 61 61 62 66 94

viii  Contents 4



Key issues of Constitutional reform and their meaning to the conservative movement 4.1 The preamble: towards a balance between universalism and traditionalism 4.2 Maintaining the postwar Tennō system between genuine and invented traditions 4.3 Article 9: towards a more proactive national security policy 4.4 Rights and duties: towards a dignified nation? 4.5 Macro-level analysis: the reflection of a conservative vision 4.6 A link to the past: a comparison to the Constitutional reform debate prior to 1980 Epilogue Notes References Index

134 134 138 147 156 171 180 191 195 200 211

List of Figures and Table

Figures 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Revising the preamble Positions on Emperor system: overview Specific revision proposals: an overview Placing the Constitutional reform proposals Placing the Constitutional reform proposals 1950–65

137 145 173 176 188

Table 2.1

List of female Tennō

30

Acknowledgements

I first encountered Constitutional reform as an interesting, albeit little researched subject as an exchange student at the University of Hokkaido in Sapporo in 2004. Since then it has become the focus of my research as a master student and later as a PhD candidate in Japanese Studies. The results of half a decade of working with the topic are presented in this book which is based on my doctoral dissertation Japan’s Conservatives and their Quest for Constitutional Reform which I submitted to Munich University in March 2009. This volume is a significantly revised and amended version of the dissertation. Specifically, the book newly features a comparison between the most recent reform initiatives and their earlier counterparts, as well as the inclusion of the most recent Constitutional reform draft. In order to present the results in a more coherent and structured way, I have re-written large portions of the original manuscript. It is hoped that this book will be a valuable contribution to a little researched, albeit obviously important topic that for better or worse faded from the spotlight in 2007. I would like to express my gratitude to the Japanese Ministry of Education and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) without whose financial support, the completion of this research would have been impossible. Moreover, I should like to thank Keio University for providing me with an affiliation during my two year-stint in Japan. My supervisor Professor Klaus Vollmer (University of Munich) deserves special thanks for patiently offering valuable advice when it was needed. Furthermore, I’m indebted to Uno Shigeki (University of Tokyo) as well as Juha Saunavaara (University of Oulu) and Kimiko Ozawa (University of Wisconsin-Madison) for their fruitful criticism and thoughtful comments. Peter Sowden deserves praise for being an extraordinary editor. Finally, the support of my mother Gerdi Winkler to whom this book is dedicated, has been most important. For this book the Hepburn transcription was utilized to transcribe Japanese terms into Roman letters. Japanese names are given in their proper order, i.e. with the surname first and the given name second. Translations are my own, if not otherwise noted. Munich, February 2010

Abbreviations

DPJ GDP GHQ LDP NDPT NPT PKO PRC SDF TMD UN

Democratic Party of Japan – Minshutô gross domestic product General Headquarters Liberal Democratic Party – Jiyûminshutô National Diet Proceedings Transcript Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (United Nations) Peace Keeping Operations People’s Republic of China Self Defense Forces – Jieitai theater missile defense United Nations

Introduction

The amendment of a nation’s Constitution is generally not considered an epochal event. After all, most modern Constitutions are revised frequently. The Basic Law, i.e. the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, has been revised several dozen times since its enactment in 1949. Among the many revisions only a limited number have stirred controversial public debates, such as the addition of stipulations pertaining to rearmament in the 1950s or emergency regulations in 1968. Many other amendments, however, have been passed without the majority of the public even taking notice. If one considers amending or revising a Constitution a matter of course in a democratic state, then Japan certainly represents a rare, special case, as its more than 60-year-old supreme law has yet to be revised. Thus, modern Japanese history knows many revision proposals, yet only one actual reform of the Constitution, i.e. the change from the old Constitution of the Empire of Japan, also known as Meiji Constitution, to the current postwar Constitution. Japan saw the first wave of Constitutional drafts1 appear in the late 1870s and early 1880s (Tsujimura 2008: 33–34), at a time when public sentiment, in particular the popular rights movement (jiyū minken undō), had forced the reluctant Meiji government to promise the establishment of a parliamentary system and Constitutionalism. The result of the subsequent deliberations was, of course, the aforementioned Meiji Constitution of 1889. However, as Berger put it, ‘even the possibility of amending [this] document was considered anathema at all levels of respected public opinion’ (Berger 1977: 28). Hence, the Meiji Constitution was left untouched until the Imperial age came to an end following Japan’s defeat in World War II at the hands of the United States. The – at the time – new Constitution for a democratic postwar Japan was legally the result of a revision of the old supreme law, based on its Article 73 (Tsujimura 2008: 47). For better or worse, this Constitution is still the country’s supreme law, despite the fact that calls for its revision are almost as old as the document itself. It is this historical background that explains why, in late 2006, Tamura Shigenobu summed up his expectation of the impending realization of its revision with such pathos, when he wrote that: [The realization of Constitutional reform] has certainly entered the countdown phase. Presently, I feel inside my own body that the flow towards Constitutional reform is turning into a current of historic necessity.

xiv  Introduction If I may say so as somebody who until now had worked on the [issue of the] Constitution in the LDP’s policy research council for many years, Constitutional reform will probably be realized at least within the next five years. (Tamura 2006: 166) Tamura was by no means an exception. In September of the same year, one of the most outspoken proponents of Constitutional revision, Abe Shinzō, had become prime minister. Initially popular among the electorate, the grandson of Kishi Nobusuke had raised high hopes among those aiming for a revision of the despised supreme law ‘forced upon’ a defeated Japan by General Douglas MacArthur’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in 1946. The Abe cabinet quickly enacted the law regarding the process of revising the Constitution of Japan, seemingly paving the way for a revision of the supreme law in the not-so-distant future. Meanwhile, public support for Constitutional reform, including a revision of the law’s most controversial stipulation, Article 9, also known as ‘the Peace Clause’ had been increasing slowly but surely since the early 1990s. According to a poll by Japan’s leading daily, Yomiuri, in March 2004, a record two-thirds of the respondents supported a revision of the supreme law (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 451). Parallel to this development, an unprecedented number of Constitutional reform proposals had been published since 1990. In short, Tamura and other proponents of the supreme law’s amendment had plenty of reason to be optimistic. Fast forward to 2008, and a glance at the editorials of the country’s leading daily newspapers on May 3, i.e. Constitution Memorial Day, conveys a strikingly different mood. Instead of publishing new reform proposals or joyfully counting the numbered days of the current Constitution, the tone of the Yomiuri and Sankei’s editorials is probably best described as ‘exasperated’ or ‘desperate’. Lamenting the stalemate between the ruling coalition and the opposition in the Diet, both editorials call for a swift appointment of the still-dysfunctional examination committees on the Constitution (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2008: 3; Sankei Shimbunsha 2008: 2). A detached observer might wonder where the optimistic mood of previous years had gone, within the comparatively short span of a year or two. For one, Prime Minister Abe resigned after a mere year in office, following his party’s crushing defeat at the July 2007 House of Councilors election. With the opposition in control of the House of Councilors, Abe’s successors have shown far less enthusiasm towards Constitutional reform, busying themselves with consumer protection, economic stimulus programs and other pressing issues instead. Simultaneously, opinion polls have shown more people in favor of retaining the current Constitution rather than of revising it for the first time in 15 years (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2008a: 1). Debates about Constitutional reform have come and gone throughout the postwar period. In the 1950s the topic had been high on the government’s agenda, before almost completely disappearing from the spotlight in the 1960s. It resurfaced briefly in the early 1980s, before vanishing yet again for the second half of that decade. The most recent wave of Constitutional reform initiatives, however, traces its roots back to the end of the Cold War. During the nearly two decades that

Introduction  xv have passed since then, the momentum toward the realization of Constitutional revision had been steadily building up, at least until the anticlimax of 2007. To make an analogy to one of Shakespeare’s famous plays, the proponents of Constitutional revision, confident in realizing revision under Abe’s tenure, might have felt like Macbeth. Having been told by the weird sisters that ‘no man of woman born shall harm Macbeth’, he was confident of victory in his final confrontation with Macduff, before learning that the latter was ‘from his mother’s womb untimely ripp’d’ (Imanishi 1987: 214, 284). The play’s ending leaves no open questions, as its final scene depicts Macbeth’s beheading at the hands of Macduff. To argue that the quest for Constitutional reform in postwar Japan had found a similarly definite end to that of Shakespeare’s protagonist would be premature, yet it is safe to say that what until mid-2007, seemed to be within reach, has since regained some of its former intangibility. Important as these recent developments are, they are not at the center of the following research. Furthermore, it is not my intention to offer a mere history of Constitutional reform during the previous three decades, 1980–2009. A comprehensive comparison of reform proposals has yet to be delivered in English. This might therefore be a worthwhile undertaking in its own right. However, while it is hoped that this book might also become a valuable source of reference to those whose interest lies mainly with the proposals and less with the connection between conservatives and Constitutional reform, the goal of this research goes beyond ‘merely’ providing an overview of the various proposals. As already suggested by its title, the aim of the research is to link two ‘constitutions’, i.e. the Constitutional amendment proposals since the 1980s, with their conservative originators’ visions for the constitution of new Japan. This can be interpreted as a long overdue reflection of a major theme in the debate over Constitutional reform, namely the understanding of revision as a symbol for a new Japan. Widening the scope of my research beyond the usual limits of Article 9 and drafts authored by conservative parties has allowed me to dispel the following two popular myths: 1

2

Constitutional reform was either an ‘ultimate structural reform’ needed to secure Japan’s continued relevancy (Tamura 2006: 29) or an attempt to once again morph Japan into the authoritarian, militaristic power it had been until 1945 (Katō, Asai, Sakurai 2008: 55). Revisionists agreed on many more points than they disagreed on. This has led some to the simplistic conclusion that the only major stumbling block to a potential amendment was the public referendum (Cooney 2007: 183–85).

Just a brief glance at Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4 will make it clear to the reader that an overwhelming majority of proposals are too ‘conservative’ to be considered a radical reform or breakaway from the current postwar regime, not to mention constitute to an attempt to revive the pre-war system. The same figure also shows very clearly that the differences between would-be reformers are still significant, if only one chooses to widen the focus beyond Article 9 and the proposals put forth by the conservative parties represented in the Diet.

xvi  Introduction

Outline of research As mentioned above, the idea of Constitutional reform representing more than a mere revision of the country’s supreme law is not new. It may not be the most well-known theme in the West, but in Japan it appears in writings by both proponents and opponents of Constitutional revision. Arguably the most prolific and knowledgeable critical voice is Hitotsubashi University professor Watanabe Osamu. He has written extensively about the revision being one part of wideranging structural reforms (kōzō kaikaku) and a means to turn Japan into a major military power operating side by side with the United States in a neo-liberal world (Watanabe 2005: 30–43). Nagoya University professor Aikyō Kōji has taken a similar view (Aikyō 2006: 40). Proponents, as well, believe that the quest for Constitutional reform holds more significance than a mere revision of the supreme law. In Tamura’s words: ‘the announcement of the [LDP’s] Constitutional reform draft was a first step towards the “ultimate structural reform” set to revise the country’s shape from the ground up’ (Tamura 2006: 29). As suggested by the identical terminology (‘structural reform’), Watanabe and Tamura have similar views on what Constitutional reform represents; they disagree only on the evaluation. That being said, as already mentioned above, my research has shown that such bold descriptions tend to exaggerate the scope of revision attempts. It goes without saying that linking the proposed amendments to a vision for a new Japan is not the sole interpretation of the meaning of Constitutional reform. For Keio University professor Oguma Eiji, Constitutional reform, like nationalism, is an outlet for the anxiety caused by the inability to address domestic and international change during the two decades 1990–2009. Instead of devising specific policies aimed at solving the problems caused by these changes, politicians were taking an easy way out by attempting to escape into an abstract debate over the Constitution (Oguma 2005: 28, 31). Unlike most Japanese authors, be they for or against revision, I do not view the link between the Constitution and the vision for Japan’s future constitution as a matter of course. Rather, the key objective of my research is to examine whether the link does indeed exist. In other words, are the proposed amendments really reflective of the visions put forth by its (in the case of this research) conservative originators, as suggested by Watanabe, Tamura and other Japanese authors? And if so, how well are the latter reflected in the former? This research question naturally leads to the question of ‘why conservatives’? The answer can be found by taking a glance at postwar political history. If one understands postwar history as a political competition between conservative and progressive forces, i.e. the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and opposition parties led by the socialists and the communists, then it is easy to see which side was in favor of Constitutional reform and which against it. As outlined in Chapter 1, the LDP may have ignored the issue for lengthy periods of time, yet the realization of Constitutional revision has been part of the party’s charter since 1955 (Abe 2006: 29). Meanwhile, the two leftist parties have been fiercely opposed to revision of the supreme law in general, and of Article 9 in particular (Fuwa 2007; Doi, Sataka 2007)2. Naturally, this trend is also reflected in the Constitutional

Introduction  xvii reform proposals discussed in this volume. In stark contrast to 27 drafts written by conservative elites, be they politicians, intellectuals, think-tanks or media, since 1980, the progressive camp has only produced two such proposals during the same time period (Itō 1994: 110–15; Kawamoto 2004: 252–66). Before proceeding with the analysis of any given amendment proposal, however, it is mandatory to determine whether or not it qualifies as ‘conservative’. With ‘conservative’ parties being a fixture in a democratic system, the term ‘conservative’ is generally used in a very casual way. Due diligence demands a clear definition of the term. Section 1.1 is an attempt to provide such a definition. However, as Ponton and Gill have correctly pointed out, ‘political parties often call themselves by titles that do not accurately reflect their ideological leanings’ (Ponton, Gill 1993: 47). Ponton and Gill only refer to political parties in the United Kingdom and the United States, but as we will see in Chapter 1, their observation also holds true for the Japanese LDP. Hence, applying a narrow definition of conservatism would exclude the most influential actors, whether organizations or individuals, who either label themselves or are labeled conservative. The value of this research would as a result be significantly diminished. So as to offer an analysis that is as broad as possible, I have thus taken the liberty of not adhering strictly to the criteria provided by a narrow definition of the term ‘conservative’, as presented in section 1.1. For want of a more appropriate term, these organizations and individuals, including the authors of the 27 Constitutional reform proposals, will therefore be referred to as conservative. Moreover, a qualification has to be made with regard to use of the term ‘draft’. In the context of this book, the term ‘draft’ is defined as a proposal featuring concrete revisions of articles and paragraphs. Some draft authors may propose revisions only of certain articles, whereas others have chosen to revise the entire document. Narrowing the definition of the term ‘draft’ has been a deliberate choice, made so as to keep this research reasonably concise. A broader definition, i.e. the inclusion of written statements on the current Constitution and more or less specific suggestions as to how to revise it, would have resulted in up to twice as many documents falling into scope of this research. The potential gain from analyzing more than the 27 drafts introduced in Chapter 3 would make this seem a futile exercise. I am therefore confident that the revision proposals discussed below constitute a qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient overview of the available range of reform proposals. This book covers the Constitution’s preamble and its first three chapters, whose topics are the Emperor system, national security and the people’s rights and duties. This selection has been a deliberate choice, first, because preambles offer a glimpse of the draft authors’ thinking, and second, because those three chapters of the supreme law relate directly to what are arguably the most important parts of the conservative vision. Among these, the discussion about Article 9 is clearly the most important. Not only has the ‘Peace Clause’ traditionally been the main target for revision (Yamaguchi 2004: 3), but the entire national security framework, including Article 9, remains a contentious issue among conservatives to this day. While not as controversial as Article 9, the Constitution’s first chapter, containing stipulations regarding the Emperor, has been the second major target of reform initiatives. The paramount importance of this institution to the Japanese nation

xviii  Introduction and its continued existence is unquestioned in this context. In fact, conservative criticism is generally not even directed at the substance of the symbolic Tennō system itself, but rather at the definition of its position in the Constitutional text. In the context of this research, not only the position of the Emperor, but also the arguably more contentious topic of Imperial succession will be given ample attention. Last but not least, the research will examine proposals for a new Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Instead of looking at the entire chapter, the focus here will be on the following aspects deemed to be of importance to the conservative movement. These include a revision of the basic concept of individual rights and duties as expressed in Articles 11, 12 and 13, as well as Article 24’s stipulations relating to the family. Missing from the supreme law in its current form are the three aspects of upholding the law,3 defending the nation and environmental protection. In each of these cases, a large number of conservatives have identified troublesome developments requiring course corrections, often by taking hints from the past. For instance, given how often conservatives tend to touch on the subject of the family in disarray (Ibuki 2005: 96–97), it is worth analyzing whether, and if so, how, they address this perceived problem in their revisions of the Constitution’s Article 24. In Chapter 1, the roots of conservatism as a political tradition as well as its specific manifestation in postwar Japan will be outlined. The development of political conservatism in postwar Japan will then be presented in three phases: 1952 to 1960, 1960 to 2000 and 2000 to 2010. This concise overview of the postwar period will serve as a historical frame for the following chapters. In Chapter 1, I argue that the so-called conservative mainstream within the LDP has had a significant effect on the pursuit of Constitutional reform, or rather, the lack thereof since 1960 (Pyle 2007: 241–77). Given that the LDP originally pledged to reform the Constitution upon its foundation in 1955 (Tominomori 2006: 106), this might seem paradoxical at first glance. However, as we shall see, the lack of Constitutional reform can be seen to be a result of the dominance of the conservative mainstream. This chapter is intended to provide an overview of Japanese postwar conservatism in a historical context. As we established above, Constitutional reform is seen by many as one part of a bigger picture. This larger picture is the subject of Chapter 2. The primary object of analysis herein is the criticism of postwar Japan; and second, the vision of a new ‘post-postwar’ Japan, symbolized or complemented by a new Constitution. Thus, the chapter’s purpose is to familiarize the reader with the ideological framework of the revision proposals. As such, Chapter 2 will focus on the aforementioned three major groups of topics with direct relevance to the parts of the drafts introduced in Chapter 3, namely the Emperor system (Articles 1 and 2), national security (Article 9), and rights and duties (Articles 11, 12, 13, 24, 97 and articles relating to the duty to uphold law, national defense and environmental protection, if available). Chapter 3 will then introduce the drafts written by conservative parties, politicians, individuals, pressure groups and media outlets between 1980 and 2009. English translations of the relevant sections of each draft will be provided. An in-depth comparison, categorization and analysis of the content of Chapter 3’s proposals will follow in Chapter 4. As the main part of this research, Chapter 4 attempts to connect the framework outlined in Chapter 2 with the content of the drafts presented in Chapter 3. The key question in this context will be whether, and if so, to what extent, the revision

Introduction  xix proposals represent the various conservative visions for a new Japan. Following this micro-level analysis, the reform proposals will be placed in a macro-level framework in section 4.5. As a result of this macro-level analysis, it has been possible to identify three different types of conservative vision: moderate, centrist and reactionary.

Literature review Unlike nationalism, conservative thought during the postwar period in general seems to be an unpopular topic among Western scholars, as little has been written on the topic. If conservative thought is discussed, then the discussion in most cases seems to focus on the Yoshida Doctrine. A recent example of a publication providing an excellent overview and critical analysis of the Yoshida Doctrinebased policies of the conservative mainstream in Japan is Kenneth Pyle’s 2007 book Japan Rising (Pyle 2007: 241–77). Pyle and most other authors, however, focus on Japan’s pragmatic strategy towards foreign relations or economic policy, mainly from a government perspective. Unlike existing literature, this research, looking beyond the positions of the LDP, attempts to offer a slightly more complete overview over the spectrum of contemporary conservative thought. As for Constitutional reform, 2001 saw the publication of Hook and McCormack’s Japan’s Contested Constitution (Hook, McCormack 2001). As its title suggests, Moore and Robinson’s volume, Partner for Democracy: Crafting the new Japanese State under MacArthur (Moore, Robinson 2002), primarily deals with the period of the Constitution’s creation. Therefore, their analysis of the history of attempted amendments is very short and lists only the most important reform proposals (Moore, Robinson 2002: 320–28). In 2005, Boyd and Samuels presented a concise overview over the debate surrounding the revision of Article 9 (Boyd, Samuels 2005). Hughes followed up the following year by providing an article dealing with Article 9 and Constitutional reinterpretation (Hughes 2006: 725–44). Also in 2005, the Reischauer Institute’s Helen Hardacre published an article on Constitutional reform and religion (Hardacre 2005). Also in the same year the Reischauer Institute inaugurated its Constitutional Revision Research Project (Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies 2005). The project’s website features a decent, if not complete, bibliography of literature on the topic. As their titles suggest, the articles by Samuels and Hughes focus exclusively on Article 9. Furthermore, they discuss only reform proposals by the major political parties, all but ignoring individual drafts. Finally, Fred Uleman translated a volume detailing the stances of a wide array of political and other organizations towards Constitutional reform, which was published in 2006 (Uleman 2006). As already hinted above, the existing research, presented above, suffers from two key problems: too often the focus is on Article 9 and the positions of political parties. One could question the wisdom of analyzing the drafts of conservative intellectuals. After all, unlike the political parties, they would not be involved in the process of drafting and submitting an amendment to the Diet. However, given the significant influence of organizations like the Nippon Kaigi or the Yomiuri Shimbun on politicians and/or public opinion, their contributions to the debate are well worth analyzing, in my opinion.

xx  Introduction Among the publications noted above, the one closest in nature to this research is Hook and McCormack’s book. It provides complete translations of four proposals relating to the future of the Constitution, among them two reform drafts. The analysis pertaining to Constitutional reform is not only very short and at times biased, but also tends to ignore research by Watanabe Osamu and other Japanese scholars. For instance, the book claims that Nakagawa’s ‘influential’ 1984 proposal was representative of all Constitutional reform drafts published prior to 1989 (Hook, McCormack 2001: 34). This notion is problematic for a number of reasons. First, Watanabe Osamu’s assessment that the proposal had no influence is supported by this research, as no other draft author has chosen to incorporate Nakagawa’s restorative approach. Second, the reform initiatives of the 1950s and 1960s are hardly comparable to those of the 1980s. As Watanabe has pointed out, during the former period full-scale revisions of the Constitution were the rule. Meanwhile, the reform discussion of the 1980s was generally characterized by proposing only minor revisions to the Constitution, in order to gain greater public acceptance for the project. In the context of the 1980s, Nakagawa’s draft clearly has to be seen as an exceptional proposal rather than a representative one (Watanabe 2002: 448–49, 753). The Constitutional reform debate of the 1950s and 1960s is not discussed in great detail in this research, because it has already been meticulously examined in a 1982 volume written by Reinhard Neumann (Neumann 1982). It is referred to on numerous occasions, and section 4.6 features a concise comparison of the findings for the last three decades and this earlier period. The period and process of the Constitution’s drafting is not covered in this book, because others have already written extensively on this topic. In addition to the previously mentioned book by Moore and Robinson (2002), two seminal works on the topic are Inoue’s MacArthur’s Japanese Constitution (Inoue 1991) and The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution by Koseki Shōichi (Moore, Koseki 1997).

Sources and challenges The findings presented in this book are based mainly on research in Japanese publications, including books and magazine and newspaper articles. In addition, transcripts of National Diet sessions as well as sources in English, in particular those related to the theory of conservatism and national security policy, have been used. The selection of Constitutional drafts presented in Chapter 3 is mainly, albeit not completely, based on lists compiled by Watanabe Osamu, Morohashi Kunihiko and Higashitani Satoshi (Watanabe 2002: 19; Morohashi 2005; Higashitani 2005: 248–49). In addition to these drafts as published in books, in magazines or on the internet, the sources consist mainly of publications in the following categories: 1

Publications about Japan’s postwar political history, most notably those written by Ishikawa Masumi, Nakamura Masanori, Hirosawa Takayuki and Tominomori Eiji (Hirosawa 2005; Ishikawa 2004; Nakamura 2005; Tominomori 2006).

Introduction  xxi 2

3

Books and articles written by conservative writers criticizing postwar Japan and offering their views as to what a better Japan should look like. Most of those articles are taken from monthly opinion magazines, such as Sekai, Ronza, Gendai, Chūōkōron, Bungei Shunjū, Shokun, Seiron and Voice. Books and articles on the Constitution’s interpretation and the issue of its revision authored by scholars, such as Watanabe Osamu, Kobayashi Setsu or Tsujimura Miyoko.

While I have tried to cover as wide a spectrum of opinions as possible, the quantity of available material related to the issues discussed in this book (conservatism, Constitutional reform and postwar history) makes it impossible to offer a complete picture, while touching upon each and every aspect of the discussion in detail. Since this volume’s main objective is to analyze the Constitutional reform proposals published since the 1980s and the visions behind them, I have chosen to refrain from discussing in great detail various side issues, such as the roots of modern Japanese conservatism or the strong influences exercised by Meiji-era thought on postwar conservatives. The latter topic will be addressed in the context of invented traditions, concerning mainly the Emperor system, but, unlike in the case of the Stephen Vlastos-published collection of articles (Vlastos 1998), invented traditions will not be the focal point of this research. The major challenges in researching the topic at hand are related to the following two facts: as already mentioned, the large quantity of available material dealing with conservatism, postwar political history and Constitutional reform makes it a particularly challenging task to provide a logical and concise overview. The second challenge arises from the quality of the sources. This is not exclusively limited to the question of how conservatism should be defined, or what individual or organization should be labeled conservative. Rather, it also encompasses the assessment of the debate about Constitutional reform, due to its polarizing nature, i.e. authors either supporting or criticizing the supreme law’s revision. Hence it should come as no surprise that opinions on this issue are sharply divided between opponents and supporters of such a reform. Watanabe Osamu (Hitotsubashi University), Mizushima Asao (Waseda University), Aikyō Kōji (Nagoya University) and Okudaira Yasuhiro (University of Tokyo) belong to the former camp. Meanwhile, Kobayashi Setsu (Keio University), Nishi Osamu (Komazawa University) or Kitaoka Shinichi (University of Tokyo) can be considered members of the latter camp. Furthermore, conservative intellectuals like Watanabe Shōichi (Sophia University), Yagi Hidetsugu (Takasaki City University of Economics), Nakanishi Terumasa (University of Kyoto), Nakagawa Yatsuhiro (Tsukuba University) or Nishibe Susumu are all highly critical of the current Constitution and strongly support the call for Constitutional reform. Conducting an objective analysis has therefore been quite a daunting task. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the end result of the research presented in this book will provide the reader with a concise yet detailed account of the history of the conservative Constitutional reform movement and its significance that goes beyond the polarization found in most writings on the topic.

1 Conservatism Theory and reality in postwar Japan

1.1  Conservatism: an attempt at a definition Naturally the first question that emerges when pondering the topic at hand is what exactly is conservatism? Unfortunately there is no definitive answer to this question, as scholars have failed to agree upon any one definition. Many conservatives, regardless of their origin, tend to emphasize what it is not: namely an ideology (Etō 1996: 19; Honderich 1990: 17–18). Dunn and Woodard argue that ‘conservatism is about cultural traditions and values which defy simple definition’ (Dunn, Woodard 1991: 24). R.J. White, meanwhile, has offered the following assessment: ‘To put up [conservatism] in a bottle with a label is like trying to [liquefy] the atmosphere […]. The difficulty arises from the nature of the thing. For [conservatism] is less a political doctrine, than a habit of mind, a mode of feeling, a way of living’ (White 1950: 1). Agreeing with the last part of White’s statement, the late Etō Jun calls conservatism a feeling, as opposed to an ideology like socialism or capitalism (Etō 1996: 17–18). The word ‘conservatism’ is derived from the Latin verb conservare, meaning ‘to conserve’ or ‘to keep’. Looking at this original meaning of the word, one would be tempted to assume that a conservative was opposed to change, as his goal was to preserve the current status (Rodee et al. 1983: 103). This definition seems to be supported by the following statement made by former US President Abraham Lincoln: ‘What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new and untried?’ (Dunn, Woodard 1991: 21). If that were the case, then why are conservatives in favor of reform, which by its nature entails the new and untried (Honderich 1990: 5; Machimura 2005: 23)? What at first seems a paradox can be explained as follows. As Karl Mannheim has pointed out, there is a difference between what has been called natural conservatism or traditionalism, i.e. an individual’s natural aversion to change, and (political) conservatism (Mannheim 1984: 92–98). To demonstrate the difference between the two concepts, Mannheim gave the following an example. The traditionalist’s reaction to an invention, e.g. the introduction of a railroad, is obviously negative. Meanwhile, the conservative’s reaction depends on the structure of the conservative movement in the respective country and the respective age (Mannheim 1984: 94). As this example demonstrates, conservatism, unlike traditionalism, is not a reactionary resistance to change of any kind.

2  Conservatism: theory and reality In the Japanese case, Kitaoka Isao has identified not two, but three types of conservatism. He argues that a third form of conservatism, i.e. archaic conservatism, existed in Japan, between Mannheim’s traditionalism and conservatism. According to Kitaoka, traditionalism could be found in Japan until the Edo period (1600–1868). It is followed by archaic conservatism. This form of conservatism existed from the Meiji period (1868–1912) until the collapse of the pre-war regime in 1945. Kitaoka describes it as traditionalism with political and social elements existing in a half-feudalistic society (Kitaoka 1992: 1–41). Archaic conservatism could possibly be interpreted as Kitaoka’s label for what Mannheim referred to as traditionalism becoming reflective under certain conditions (Mannheim 1984: 111). It is not the aim of this research to delve deeper into this admittedly interesting discussion, since our focus is firmly on the postwar era and (political) conservatism. In Europe, conservatism’s roots as a political tradition can be traced back to the late eighteenth century. Political conservatism came into being in opposition to the French Revolution of 1789. Its founder was the British scholar and politician Edmund Burke (Honderich 1990: 1; White 1950: 10–12; Kitaoka 1992: 27). A fierce opponent of the French Revolution, Burke directed much of his criticism at Jacobin rationalism and radicalism (White 1950: 28). That being said, Burke, like his spiritual heirs, was not necessarily against reform per se; rather, he criticized the drastic changes brought upon France, and indeed Europe, by the Revolution (Honderich 1990: 5). Burke’s view was echoed by twentieth-century conservative thinker Russell Kirk, who suggested that change, regardless of whether it was economic, political, religious or social in nature, ‘should happen gradually and within the framework of existing customs and established institutions’ (Dunn, Woodard 1991: 30). One reason for the conservative’s emphasis of gradual versus rapid change is his firm belief in the limits of human reason. As a result of this limitation, no individual or group could possibly possess the ability to foresee each and every consequence of a certain government policy. Rationalists, however, claim to know precisely what they are doing and what the outcome of their actions is going to look like. J.S. McClelland sums up the conservative’s reply to this rationalistic assertion as follows: ‘Would you trust someone who doesn’t even understand how existing clocks work to design an entirely new kind of clock which he claimed was going to be better than any clock which ever existed before in the world?’ (McClelland 1996: 414). To stay in McClelland’s metaphor, instead of reinventing said clock, whose inner workings human reason can’t fully comprehend in the first place, slight modifications to an existing clock, such as a replacement of the battery, are the order of the day. As Burke saw it, the French Revolution was exactly such a radical and futile attempt at reinventing the clock. This philosophy has also been applied to the English constitution. Unlike the French National Assembly creating an entirely new constitution, ‘the English ruling class has become adept at Constitutional management by limiting damage during crises’ (ibid.), in other words, ‘make as little change as possible in order to preserve as much of the existing constitution as possible’ (ibid.). If a battery change or reforms are deemed necessary, conservatives will attempt to proceed with ‘caution, humility and the broadest sense of democratic support’ (Dunn, Woodard 1991: 33; Rodee et al. 1983: 103–4). This observation by Dunn and

Conservatism: theory and reality  3 Woodward also supports the case made by Suzuki Shigetaka. Six decades ago the late historian wrote that conservatives respected compromise. They did not regard compromise as ‘juggling’; rather, they believed truth was to be found in compromise rather than in radicalism. Hence, compromise was considered a way to achieve progress (Nakajima 2007: 49). In this context the use of the term ‘democratic support’ instead of ‘democratic rule’ should be pointed out, because conservatives share a common ‘distaste for democracy’ (Honderich 2005: 164). In fact, they do not regard popular sovereignty as an adequate choice, because they loath the possibility of rule by what Lord Macaulay called ‘the poorest and most ignorant part of society’ leading to ‘social chaos’ (Honderich 2005: 163). The conservative’s counter proposal to popular sovereignty is a Platonic ‘natural aristocracy of citizens, i.e. an elite whose authority is not based on inherited status, but on demonstrated good judgment and experience in whose hands the affairs of the state should be concentrated’ (Rodee et al. 1983: 104–5). This might also help to explain why conservatism can be considered to be ‘more given to authoritarianism than other political traditions’ (Honderich 2005: 182). This observation also raises the question of equality. As Honderich reminds us, there are different kinds of equalities, and conservatives treat them in different ways. For one, they do not believe in what has been called ‘natural equality’, i.e. the notion that all men are born ‘with equal powers and faculties, to equal influence in society, to equal property and advantages through life’ (Honderich 2005: 221). On the other hand, conservatives are supportive of the equality of opportunity, despite its realization being a result of the dreaded French Revolution. Unlike their opponents, conservatives, firmly rooted in their belief in natural inequality, see in equality of opportunity not a road to social equality, but one to inequality (Honderich 2005: 225–26). After all, people are born with different skills and therefore a naturally more gifted person is bound to make more out of a given opportunity than his less gifted fellow. Thus it is not surprising that conservatives have a lot of comments, albeit no positive ones, to make about equality of results. Meanwhile, they are in favor of equality before the law and equality of persons or spiritual equality (Honderich 2005: 223, 225, 239–59). Furthermore, conservatives, unlike liberals, tend to emphasize the ‘social whole’, as opposed to the individual. Hence, the good of society as a whole may take precedence over individual rights (Ponton, Gill 1993: 46). It is necessary, however, to make one important qualification to this statement. Conservatives may see little wrong in limiting civil rights for the sake of the social good, yet they are very protective of property rights. Therefore, they are ‘for a form of government that is prevented or at least impeded [...] from interfering with private property and what goes with it’ (Honderich 2005: 171). Now that we have briefly acquainted ourselves with the European origin of political conservatism, the conservative in Japan becomes the center of our attention. First of all, Kitaoka has argued convincingly that the aforementioned political conservatism of Burke made its way to Japan only after 1945. Political conservatism could not have existed in the half-feudal pre-war system, as there was no political confrontation between liberal and conservative parties before 1945. In

4  Conservatism: theory and reality fact, the emergence of political conservatism was only possible as a result of the radical changes of the early postwar period, as those changes presented a target for conservative criticism (Kitaoka 1992: 45), just as the French Revolution presented a target for Burke’s powerfully eloquent criticism in the late eighteenth century. Before thinking about particular elements of conservatism and whether and how they can be found in postwar Japan, it is imperative to make one important qualification. As Ponton and Gill have pointed out, labels like conservative, as used by political parties such as the Conservative Party in the UK or the Republican Party in the US, do not accurately reflect the ideological leaning of those parties (Ponton, Gill 1993: 47). If this is the case in the homeland of political conservatism, then it is definitely more true for Japan’s leading conservative organization, the Liberal Democratic Party. The reason is explained as follows. Even though one could call the 1955 regime a two-party system, there never was real parity between the LDP and its political rival, the Socialist Party.1 Hence, whereas regime change between Labor and Conservatives, and Democrats and Republicans has been the order of the day in the UK and the US, the LDP’s comfortable majorities in parliament allowed it to rule Japan as the sole party in government for almost four decades, from its foundation in 1955 until 1993 (Tominomori 2006: 104–5). To remain in government for such a long period obviously required ideological flexibility. The LDP’s internal power groups, the factions, also contributed effectively to this flexibility. Had Prime Minister A from faction B lost public support for his policy agenda, the party would have elected a new Prime Minister C from faction D, who not only emphasized different policies, but occasionally also had a different ideology than his predecessor. This made regime change unnecessary and allowed the LDP to stay in power for four consecutive decades.2 As will be discussed in the following sections, this ideological flexibility demands the exercise of caution when putting the label ‘conservative’ on the LDP, in particular against the background of the Burkean conservatism discussed above. In addition to this qualification, the following distinction between conservative and right wing has to be made. These two labels are frequently attached to a number of different individuals and organizations, to the extent that one is left wondering whether there is any difference between them. According to Nakajima, both may value traditions, yet right-wing intellectuals and activists aiming for a society where everybody except the Emperor is considered equal tend to side with the people (Nakajima 2007: 52). For reasons discussed above, conservatives, on the other hand, distrust public sentiment and question the common man’s ability to make sound political decisions. The second differentiating factor between the two groups is the perception of social inequality. As previously mentioned, the right wing believes in egalitarianism under the Emperor. As discussed above, conservatives, by contrast, have little to say about egalitarianism that is positive, unless it is of the legal or spiritual kind. Unfortunately, in reality the distinctions between the two groups are not as clear cut as the aforementioned observations would suggest. Nakajima criticizes that conservatives and right-wing activists did not understand this fundamental thought and instead merely showed enthusiasm towards certain topics they had become infatuated with, such as Constitutional reform or Yasukuni (Nakajima 2007: 54). This reality makes it difficult to draw a clear line between conservatives

Conservatism: theory and reality  5 and right-wing activists. As previously mentioned in the Introduction, this research will focus on groups and individuals generally labeled as conservatives. Therefore, right-wing groups such as Suzuki Kunio’s Isuikai will not be discussed. With the conservative in postwar Japan in mind, we will first discuss the object of his conservation attempts. In a country where the sole existing political tradition had been a subject’s loyalty towards his local lord, the Shogun or the Emperor (Sakamoto 2005: 54), one could conclude that conservatives were focused on preserving the political tradition and its radical implementation, the kokutai system. To stay with the previously mentioned metaphor of the clock, this prewar system was the existing clock that conservatives initially wanted to preserve. Attempts at conserving the system by proposing only slight revisions to the Meiji Constitution in 1946 could be interpreted in such a fashion. As we will see in the following chapter, however, this was the case only in the immediate aftermath of the war, when conservatives busied themselves with restorative attempts (see section 1.2). What followed was the conservation of a system which certainly had little to do with Japanese traditions, namely the postwar system, including the Constitution and the Fundamental Law on Education. In other words, a majority of conservatives had come to accept an entirely new clock, given to them by the US Occupation. The sole common feature of the pre-war and postwar clocks or systems was the Tennō system, and in particular the exclusively male lineage, as prescribed by the Imperial Household Law. The latter has survived without change from the Meiji period to the present.3 This, however, is not to say that all conservatives have been supportive of the adoption of the new clock or system. Beyond the conservative mainstream, demands for a restoration of the pre-war system could and still can be heard occasionally (Nakagawa 2004: 2–4). This also explains why Burke has the dubious honor of frequently receiving lavish praise from various conservative individuals and organizations. The controversial Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo tsukuru Kai), for instance, devoted an entire page to Burke in its Kōmin Kyōkasho (Nishibe 2001: 32). Meanwhile, Nakagawa Yatsuhiro praised Burke in a 2002 publication on the topics of his philosophy and Constitutionalism (Nakagawa 2002: 273–75). While representatives of the conservative mainstream happened to take a very rational approach to policy, the traditional criticism of rationalism is not completely absent from Japan’s conservatism. In his 2005 bestseller Kokka no Hinkaku, Fujiwara Masahiko singles out rationalism as the main reason for the recent decline of all leading industrial nations (Fujiwara 2005: 20–21). Last but not least, what about the rights of the individual versus the good of society as a whole? After all, this very line of thought can also be found in an ideology which, over centuries, exerted significant influence on Japan, namely Confucianism. This point is touched upon by former LDP vice-president and secretary-general Yamasaki Taku in his book of 2001. He points to the problematic construction of Narita Airport in Chiba prefecture as an example, where the local farmers’ selfinterest, e.g. their determination to protect their farmland, was clearly adverse to public interest. Yamasaki concludes that self-centrism had ‘gone too far’ and individualism was widely ‘misunderstood’. These two phenomena not only stood

6  Conservatism: theory and reality in direct contrast to the public interest, but would eventually endanger the unity of society (Yamasaki 2001: 18–19). On the other hand, the Constitution obviously guarantees a Japanese citizen all the freedom one would come to expect of a modern Constitutional state democracy.4 That being said, if one believes Tominomori Eiji’s assessment of postwar democracy, the conservatives would certainly have reasons to rejoice. Tominomori argued that Japan was a ‘spectator’s democracy’ in which people still looked up to the central government as a father figure that needs to be revered and trusted (Tominomori 1993: 198–99). This also seems to be the expectation of various conservative politicians in postwar Japan who did not necessarily believe in the soundness of their electorate’s judgment (Nara 2007: 80–82). Nishibe Susumu and Fujiwara argue that the soundness of this judgment, or rather the lack thereof, stems from the simple fact that man happens to be an imperfect being (Fujiwara 2005: 83–84; Nishibe 1984: 26–27). This might explain Kitaoka’s notion as to why democracy and conservatism in Japan have, throughout their relatively short existence, at times shared a tense relationship (Kitaoka 1992: 89–90). To summarize, the key question concerning postwar conservatism is which clock or system one considers worth conserving or restoring. Is it the existing postwar system, i.e. an entirely new clock forced upon Japan by the American watchmakers at GHQ, or is it the very clock that the Americans destroyed and replaced? On the one hand, a return of the latter is obviously unpopular and unrealistic. Hence, conserving the current clock, i.e. the postwar framework, is the only pragmatic choice for a conservative. Meanwhile, the unrealistic and unpopular restoration of the old clock sounds like a radical stance. However, if, following Kitaoka’s argument, one considers the destruction and replacement of that old clock a radical act of revolution, not unlike the French Revolution in Burke’s time, then the restoration of the prewar clock could, arguably, be considered conservative. As we shall see below, the first two phases of conservatism in the postwar period reflect this difference very well. Those two phases may begin well before the period discussed in this research, yet, in order to fully comprehend the historic context of the research, i.e. the development of postwar conservatism in postwar Japan and its connection to Constitutional reform, the following overview is of essential importance.

1.2  1945–1960: An age of attempted (partial) restoration The first phase of conservatism, which lasted until 1960, is distinguished by attempts to bring back the old clock. Unlike during the later period (1980 to present) discussed in this research, during the one and a half decades between 1945 and 1960, restoration was not merely the unrealistic mind game of a few intellectuals, but to a certain degree a real option. Two of the LDP’s early predecessors, the Hatoyama Ichirō-led Jiyūtō and the Shinpotō initially viewed the pre-war Kokutai-system, centered on the Emperor and not popular sovereignty, as an established institution worthy to be conserved (Tominomori 2006: 2–8). The will to conserve the (at the time) existing political framework is also reflected in the revision proposal of the Meiji Constitution drafted by Minister of State

Conservatism: theory and reality  7 Matsumoto Jōji. However, the so-called Matsumoto draft was quickly rejected by GHQ because its author had merely made a few ‘cosmetic repairs’ to the Meiji Constitution (Neumann 1982: 49–51). Facing a political elite unwilling to accept the demanded radical change, MacArthur decided to take the initiative. In February 1946, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ordered GHQ’s government section to come up with a draft for a new Constitution. MacArthur’s strategy of using this draft as a means to pressure the reluctant Japanese cabinet into accepting the radical changes proposed by the Occupation Authorities worked. Eventually, the Americans’ proposal served as a foundation for the actual Constitution, whose content was the subject of intensive negotiations between GHQ and Japanese officials (Neumann 1982: 52–56). The dream of preserving the Kokutai system hence turned out to be a short-lived one, coming to an abrupt end with the enactment of the current Constitution and other reforms initiated during the Occupation era. The new postwar framework did not prevent Japanese conservatives from continuing to seek a partial restoration of the old system. After Japan had regained complete sovereignty in 1952, parts of the conservative camp felt that these Occupation-era reforms had gone too far and the pre-war system should be restored – certainly not fully, but partially. This is the postwar conservatism mentioned by Kitaoka. This vision of partial restoration had its two most influential proponents in Hatoyama and Kishi, whose fondness for ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ had already worried Kishi’s predecessor as prime minister, Ishibashi Tanzan (Nakamura 2005: 70). And while the return to power of pre-war political figures such as Hatoyama or Kishi in the early 1950s was followed by various measures that can rightfully be called ‘reactionary’ or ‘anti-democratic’, e.g. the strengthening of the police’s power, or restrictions on the union’s’ political participation and strikes, or Kishi’s use of the police to ensure passage of the revised Anpo’s ratification in 1960 (Hirosawa 2005: 43, Ishikawa 2004: 77, Nakamura 2005: 73), the restorative wave couldn’t bring down the one document many conservatives dreaded most, the new Constitution. The 1955 election for the Lower House saw those opposed to revision, i.e. the progressive parties, winning the necessary one-third of seats needed to block the amendment. As a means to break down the opposition’s resistance, Hatoyama proposed a reform of the electoral system that, if enacted, would have favored the LDP. This tactic quickly drew strong opposition from all sides, resulting in the proposal’s being scrapped in 1956 (Nakamura 2005: 71, 76–77). Four years later, Kishi succeeded in getting the Anpo revised, yet he paid with his job for the questionable means of pushing through the ratification (Nakamura 2005: 75–76). Some, like Tominomori, question whether the differences between Yoshida and Kishi/Hatoyama were really as substantial as is suggested above. He argues that the latter’s basic policy differed from the former’s only in their aiming to pursue a more independent course (Tominomori 2006: 106). As mentioned above, I am in agreement with Hirosawa and Nakamura’s assessment of the period. A glance at the Constitutional amendment proposed by a Liberal Party committee chaired by Kishi shows that this draft has striking similarities with parts of the Meiji Constitution (Neumann 1982: 113, Watanabe 2002: 504). Therefore, it is hard to argue that Kishi’s restorative stance differed only in nuances from that Yoshida and representatives of the conservative mainstream, who, as we shall

8  Conservatism: theory and reality discuss in greater detail below, had realistically accepted the postwar system as a framework. The Liberal Party proposal is not the only amendment proposal reflective of the early postwar period’s comparatively strong restorative tendencies. As discussed in section 4.6, the proposals of that period in general tend to be more restorative than those published since the 1980s. This is another example of how well the quest for Constitutional revision reflects conservatives’ overall vision for a future Japanese constitution.

1.3  1960–2000: The era of the conservative mainstream: living with the new system As mentioned above, the fondness for parts of the old clock lasted only until 1960. Kishi’s successors as prime ministers opted realistically to work with the clock given to them by the Americans, in other words, they accepted the sweeping changes of the initial postwar period as the framework for postwar Japan. The protagonists of this altered modus operandi were representatives of what has been called the conservative mainstream (hoshu honryū). Within the framework of this research the conservative mainstream is of relevance not only because it eventually would become the dominant force among postwar conservatives, but also because of its connections to Constitutional reform. Much has been written about this conservative mainstream, and hence one is confronted with a wide array of fundamentally different definitions and applications of the label ‘conservative mainstream’. There is general consensus among scholars and political commentators that the mastermind of the conservative mainstream was Yoshida Shigeru (Hirosawa 2005: 72; Nakamura 2005: 163; Yayama 2003: 52). Similarly, Yoshida’s political heirs, Ikeda Hayato and Satō Eisaku, are cited as key representatives of the conservative mainstream. This is as far as the agreement goes, however. When the topic comes to the post-Satō era, each author includes different politicians in his list. Nakamura Masanori includes Prime Ministers Fukuda Takeo,5 Ōhira Masayoshi, Suzuki Zenkō and Miyazawa Kiichi in his list, saying that Miyazawa was the last Hoshu Honryū representative to occupy Japan’s highest political post (Nakamura 2005: 163). Yayama, on the other hand, argues that neither Suzuki nor Miyazawa (nor Kōno Yōhei and Miyazawa’s successor as faction leader, Katō Kōichi, for that matter) had ‘even a single fragment of conservative spirit’ inside them (Yayama 2003: 52). These different applications of the label ‘conservative mainstream’ are of course merely an expression of significantly different definitions of the term. Nakamura relies on the following definition provided by former LDP secretarygeneral Hori Shigeru: It’s about managing politics under the spirit of the new Constitution. Additionally, the Peace Treaty of San Francisco and the Mutual Security Assistance Treaty have become the framework for this new postwar Japan. To preserve and develop this framework is, in short, the consciousness of the [conservative] mainstream. (Nakamura 2005: 163)

Conservatism: theory and reality  9 In his definition of the term, Matsuno Raizō stressed the importance of realism. The mainstream’s basic policy might have been a focus on economic matters and a small military, but there was no such thing as a conservative mainstream policy. When a policy was conceived, the starting point was not ideology, but a concrete proposal (Sentaku 2008: 53). Meanwhile, Tanaka Rokusuke reduced the term to ‘responsibility for the government’ in his book published in 1985 (Tanaka 1985: 118–19). Former LDP secretary-general Koga Makoto defined it in a similar fashion: it pointed to a ‘group possessing the ability and consciousness to take responsibility for the administration of the country’s politics’ (Katō, Koga 2005: 154). In addition to this quality, the aforementioned Katō Kōichi mentioned the responsibility for the entire party, and singled out Tanaka Kakuei as a prime minister possessing exactly this quality. Katō singles out the faction of Tanaka’s rival, Fukuda Takeo, as a group with little sense of responsibility for the entire party (ibid.). These definitions can hardly be reconciled with each other. On the one hand, Yayama emphasizes Yoshida, Ikeda and Satō’s interest in Constitutional reform and the ‘encouragement of a pride-possessing education’ (Yayama 2003: 52). On the other hand, Matsuno, Tanaka, Koga and Katō offer far fewer ideological definitions centering on the responsibility for country, government and party. Meanwhile, Hori’s definition, including the term ‘managing politics under the spirit of the Constitution’, stands in stark contrast to Yayama’s interpretation. That being said, the non-ideological definition seems to be the most commonly accepted one. Tominomori, for instance, claims that Yoshida had arrived at his version of postwar conservatism, i.e. the focus on economic matters and cooperation with the United States, through his experience with the profit-and-loss arithmetic of international relations (Tominomori 2006: 98–99). As correctly observed by Tominomori and Hirosawa, within the postwar framework his political heirs focused on a comparatively non-ideological economic policy and a mercantile foreign policy that concentrated on economic rather than political or military strength (Hirosawa 2005: 72; Tominomori 2006: 43–44, 106–7). This was one result of the security alliance with the US. It allowed Japan to focus on economic policy, while keeping its defense expenditures to a minimum. Hori and Matsuno’s definitions can both be seen as reflections of this rational choice in favor of economic policy, close cooperation with the US and acceptance of the postwar framework, including the Constitution. Mikuriya goes one step further by describing the conservative mainstream as ‘unideological’ (Mikuriya 2007: 131). Former LDP secretary-general and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) chairman Ozawa Ichirō offers a similar assessment, observing that the sole task of postwar politics was to think about the re-distribution of wealth. Even though Ozawa acknowledges that this re-distribution was a demand of its time, it also resulted in a two-dimensional political vacuum, namely the lack of personal leadership and political content (Ozawa 2006: 58). Saeki wonders whether the LDP under the 1955 system should even be called conservative (Saeki 2007: 153–55). Saeki’s notion raises the question of just how conservative the conservative mainstream has been. For one, Hori’s definition certainly does sound eerily similar to Burke and Kirk’s conservative

10  Conservatism: theory and reality assertion, according to which change of any kind, and this includes Constitutional revision, should happen gradually and within the framework of existing customs and established institutions. If one realistically accepts Hori’s statement, then the conservative mainstream could be considered conservative. However, this observation is based on the assumption that this existing framework is the newer, mostly American-made clock created during the early postwar years. As already mentioned, there is one more clock or system, the prewar system, which some have identified and continue to perceive as ‘established institutions’. It goes without saying that, in the eyes of those who prefer the old clock and consider the new one a revolutionary and radical invention, the conservative mainstream would hardly qualify as conservative. Of course, this also relates to the question whether the Emperor-centric pre-war system should be regarded as authentically traditional or ‘quite recent in origin and […] invented’ (Hobsbawn, Ranger 1984: 1). In section 4.2 I will argue that it should be considered the latter rather than the former. Furthermore, the equivalent to the policy of distributing profit in a welfare state, mentioned by Ozawa above, is not called conservative, but social democratic in Europe (Yamaguchi 2007: 57). Last but not least, when reflecting on the issue of Constitutional reform, it could also be considered a historical irony that those who have called themselves conservatives opted to conserve, among other things, a Constitution drafted at least partially by GHQ staff influenced by Roosevelt’s liberal New Deal ideas. The conservative mainstream and Constitutional reform It would be negligent to jump to the conclusion that the conservative mainstream completely supported the Constitution for all time, based on Hori’s definition. After all, Hori talks only about the ‘spirit of the Constitution’ and not the actual document itself. Furthermore, Tanaka Kakuei, a key conservative mainstream politician, albeit briefly and unsuccessfully, pushed for Constitutional reform (Satō 2005: 64). Additionally, various proponents of Constitutional reform with conservative mainstream roots have stressed the importance of retaining the ‘spirit of the Constitution’, despite their plans to amend it (Ozawa 2006: 159–60). Nonetheless, it is my belief that the emergence and subsequent dominance of the mainstream within the LDP has a lot to do with the lack of any Constitutional revisions thus far. One certainly can’t completely dismiss Yayama’s claims regarding the LDP leadership’s interest in Constitutional reform (Tominomori 2006: 78–79). Nevertheless, as Watanabe has argued convincingly, Yoshida wanted to solve the contradiction between the existence of the Reserve Police Force (established in 1950 as a reaction to the outbreak of the Korean War) and the second paragraph of Article 9 not through Constitutional reform (like Hatoyama or Kishi), but rather through interpretation (Watanabe 2002: 420–22). Eventually the LDP attempted to realize Constitutional reform under Hatoyama and Kishi, but lacked the necessary two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet to do so (Nakamura 2005: 84; Tominomori 2006: 106). This lack of a sufficient majority was to remain an insurmountable hurdle for any ambitions in this direction for decades. Thinking about Matsuno’s definition, it hence made sense for the mainstream to shelve the

Conservatism: theory and reality  11 issue, given that it was de facto mission impossible to obtain the necessary majorities in the Diet. Another reason for the LDP to take this pragmatic stance was the memory of the massive Anpo demonstrations on the streets of Nagata-chō in 1960 and the collapse of the Kishi cabinet (Watanabe 2002: 434; Tominomori 2006: 155). Interpretation of the existing document was therefore the more realistic and applicable alternative. Accordingly, the party and its conservative mainstream leadership stopped pursuing reform of the Constitution or the Fundamental Law on Education until the 1980s. Meanwhile, the attempt by the party’s far right wing to challenge this modus operandi proved to be ineffective.6 Representative of this change of mind within the LDP was the government’s committee on the Constitution. Established in 1956 under Hatoyama, the initial aim behind its creation was to draw up a draft proposal for a new Constitution. Yet, when the commission eventually submitted its report to Prime Minister Ikeda in 1964, it presented not a proposal, but merely various opinions of the commission’s members. While one group questioned the feasibility and necessity of Constitutional reform, proponents of a new Constitution were divided into one group aiming for a restorative approach and a second one, including Nakasone Yasuhiro, that aimed at a new approach of proposing the direct election of the prime minister (Watanabe 2002: 19; 435–42). Not only did the Ikeda and Satō governments abstain from touching the issue of Constitutional reform, but also only one year after submitting its report, the commission on the Constitution was dissolved (ibid.). Afterwards the topic faded from the agenda for almost two decades. As Moore and Robinson bluntly remarked, ‘the Yoshida bureaucrats lacked the stomach for engaging the left on this issue’ (Moore, Robinson 2002: 324). If one recalls Nakamura’s list of conservative mainstream prime ministers, their respective terms happen to coincide pretty closely with this time span. This can be seen as yet another indicator that a mainstream-dominated LDP has had little interest in the issue of Constitutional reform. It has to be emphasized again, that mainstream politicians have by no means exclusively been ardent defenders of the Constitution, however. Some, like Gotōda Masaharu, Miyazawa Kiichi or Nonaka Hiromu certainly have been outspoken defenders of the current Constitution (Gotōda, Katō 2005: 49–50; Miyazawa 1995: 243; Iokibe, Itō, Yakushiji 2008: 304). Many others, while not being against the idea in general, merely did not believe the Constitution had to be revised at all costs (Sentaku 2008: 53). This was a pragmatic acknowledgement of the infeasibility of Constitutional reform under the restrictions of the 1955 regime. The ‘Nakasone Intermezzo’: a temporary surge of the side stream This situation temporarily changed in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Even before the birth of the first Nakasone cabinet in 1982, the first justice secretary of the Suzuki cabinet, Okuno Seisuke, began to call for Constitutional reform (Watanabe 2002: 712). While Suzuki himself emphasized that his cabinet had no intention of touching the issue of Constitutional reform (Watanabe 2002: 714), his successor had a completely different view on the topic. During Nakasone’s fiveyear tenure as prime minister the issue was back in the spotlight, but nonetheless

12  Conservatism: theory and reality he did not manage to put it on the political agenda. Nakasone may have been one of only two side-stream representatives to become PM since Kishi (the other one being Miki Takeo), but he owed his appointment to the Tanaka-led mainstream. However, true to his side-stream roots, he showed little enthusiasm towards the mainstream’s policies (Ishikawa 2004: 147–49). Only Tanaka Rokusuke claims that the Nakasone government was in fact part of the conservative mainstream (Tanaka 1985: 131). However, his opinion, based on a rather broad definition of the term, seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Even Yayama, who argues that Nakasone’s complete settlement of postwar politics (sengo seiji no sōkessan) did not negate the basic principles of postwar Japan, remarks that he had ‘crushed’ the Yoshida doctrine. Since Japan had already managed to become the world’s second largest economy after the US, the exclusive focus on economic policy was not deemed adequate anymore. Instead, Japan was to think about how it could contribute to the international community through its culture as well as its economic and scientific capability (Yayama 1987: 38, 211). A far more controversial contribution, however, was Nakasone’s decision to strengthen the military alliance with the United States. Concrete results of this decision, which was a first small step away from the minimum military capability policy, were the symbolic increase of the defense budget to more than 1 percent of GDP, participation in research related to the United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative and the creation of loopholes in Japan’s weapons export ban (Tominomori 2006: 328). While Nakasone repeatedly stressed that he had no intention of putting the topic of Constitutional reform on the political agenda of his cabinet, he also made it known that he wanted to study the issue and, upon reaching a consensus among the Japanese people, aimed at Constitutional reform being realized in the medium or long term (NDPT 1982; NDPT 1983). Thus, Nakasone could be seen as a spiritual heir of Hatoyama and Kishi (Mikuriya 2007: 133). It should be noted, though, that Nakasone, unlike the latter two politicians, was pragmatic enough to realize his limits. After all, public support for the Constitution was high in the 1980s, and as 1982’s interim report of the revived Commission on the Constitution showed, it would have been anything but easy to rally the party behind the idea of Constitutional reform (Watanabe 2002: 446–47; Fukui 1992: 205). Given these circumstances, Nakasone’s decision not to put the topic on his cabinet’s political agenda certainly made sense. Indeed, as Watanabe has pointed out, Nakasone was for the time being content with just punching holes in the various written and unwritten laws, e.g. the 1percent ceiling for defense expenditures and the weapons export ban based on the Article 9 regime (Watanabe 2002: 447). Therefore Nakasone clearly stands in pure contrast to Yoshida’s political heirs and their non-ideological economic-policy-first and hands-off-the-Constitution approach. Nonetheless, Nakasone’s foreign policy can also be considered quite pragmatic. In fact, Nakasone succeeded in one key point, where Yoshida’s political heirs had begun to struggle, namely upholding good relations with the US. Given the aforementioned focus of the conservative mainstream on the Anpo regime, this may seem paradoxical at first glance. However, at least from the perspective of the American public and the government in Washington, DC, the conservative mainstream’s economic policy had become too successful. The success of Japan’s

Conservatism: theory and reality  13 export-driven economy was perceived as a threat to US economic interests and Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō’s controversial comments regarding the US– Japanese security alliance in 1981 had caused strains in the relationship between Japan and its most important ally (Ishikawa 2004: 146, 162; Tominomori 2006: 327–28). Apart from his close relationship with US President Ronald Reagan, Nakasone’s willingness to cooperate closely with the US on security matters helped to mend some fences (Tominomori 2006: 328). This meant breaking, albeit only symbolically, with the mainstream tradition of light military capability (Tominomori 2006: 328), but at the same time this policy shift helped to sustain the relationship with the US, which clearly had been a key pillar of the mainstream-led LDP’s agenda, as outlined above. Seen exclusively from this perspective and limited to this aspect, one could even agree with Tanaka Rokusuke and argue that the Nakasone government represented the conservative mainstream. Following Tanaka’s argumentation, Nakasone, after all, showed responsibility for the government by mending ties with Japan’s most important ally, at least so far as foreign and defense policy was concerned. Leaving aside this aforementioned interpretation based on Tanaka Rokusuke’s definition of the conservative mainstream, the significant differences between the Nakasone government and the previous mainstream governments are strikingly evident, regardless of whether one chooses to classify Nakasone as a spiritual successor to Hatoyama and Kishi, in accordance with Mikuriya, or defines him in a different manner, like Hirosawa. According to the latter, Nakasone shared Hatoyama and Kishi’s nationalistic conservatism, but unlike them did not want to impose a regime from above, but rather to create a conservative system from bottom to top (Hirosawa 2005: 73). That being said, be it his attempts at creating a small government, his official visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, his ethnical nationalism7 or his continued emphasis of the need for Constitutional reform, Nakasone certainly had more in common with Kishi than his mainstream predecessors. Nakasone’s style of governing may have made him look like a president, but his powerbase was in fact limited, because he depended on the support of the LDP’s two mainstream factions, the Tanaka faction and the Kōchikai (Tominomori 2006: 332; Haga 1989: 228–29). This explains why his agenda remained largely unrealized (Pyle 2007: 276) and why his successor as prime minister was Takeshita, the political heir of Tanaka Kakuei. As we shall see below, the following years saw a return to the mainstream’s modus operandi, beginning with the birth of the Takeshita cabinet. It thus may seem as if Nakasone’s ‘largely unrealized’ agenda did not outlive his five-year term as prime minister (Pyle 2007: 276). However, as we shall see below, Nakasone could be interpreted as a first sign of things to come in the not-so-distant future. 1987–2000: Between consistency and change According to Nakamura, the conservative mainstream was already beginning to vanish during the transition from a big government emphasizing Keynesian economic and welfare state policy to a small government in the early 1980s. One

14  Conservatism: theory and reality result of this radical change in economic policy was the birth of a new, different conservative mainstream. Nakamura sees the Koizumi administration, to be discussed below, as a direct result of this mainstream shift (Nakamura 2005: 164). Tominomori Eiji, meanwhile compares Japan’s postwar conservative mainstream to an ‘illegitimate child’ of the Cold War, which could only survive under the framework of the Cold War and hence did not last beyond the 1980s (Tominomori 2006: 105–6). Kenneth Pyle offers a similar assessment, stating that the Yoshida Doctrine left Japan unprepared for the realities of the post-Cold War era (Pyle 2007: 290–99). Furthermore, this geopolitical shift was not the only challenge Japan and its government encountered during the last decade of the old millennium. Domestically, a new era began in 1989 with the death of Emperor Shōwa and the birth of the Heisei Tennō. In the same year, postwar Japan’s economic miracle came to an abrupt end as the bubble burst. Four years later, the LDP temporarily fell from power for the first time in the four decades of its existence. Meanwhile its political competitors, old and new alike, struggled along as parties were founded, merged and dissolved almost on an annual basis (Fukuoka 2004: 52). However, it was not only the political world that had entered a phase of instability. As the Japanese economy went through numerous recessions, a powerful earthquake striking the Kansai area and a terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum sect shocked the country in the year 1995. Some have gone so far as to call this combination of tragic events the worst crisis in Japanese history (Etō 1996: 117). At first glance, it might seem as if the conservative mainstream continued to dominate politics throughout this turbulent decade. Nominally, party leaders Miyazawa Kiichi, Kōno Yōhei, Katō Kōichi, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Obuchi Keizō and Nonaka Hiromu were all members of the two mainstream factions. This factional affiliation cannot belie several significant policy shifts, however. While the LDP left the ideological issues, e.g. the reform of the Constitution and the Fundamental Law on Education, on the shelf until the Obuchi era, it eventually opted to remove the dust from the long-shelved topics. Specifically, both houses of the Diet passed legislation leading to the creation of research commissions on the Constitution during Obuchi’s time in office. Furthermore, the Headquarters for the Enforcement of Educational Reform was set up in 1999 to prepare for the eventual revision of the Fundamental Law on Education (Hirosawa 2005: 162; Watanabe 2005a: 256–57). For an organization that originally claimed the revision of the Constitution to be one of its primary goals, the LDP, however, was remarkably late to the party. By the time it decided to introduce the law stipulating the creation of the research commissions into the Diet, various individuals and organizations had already published more than ten Constitutional reform proposals since the beginning of the decade.8 As early as 1992 and 1993, the LDP’s newly formed conservative competition, as represented by Hosokawa Morihiro and Ozawa Ichirō, joined intellectuals like Nishibe Susumu or Nakagawa Yatsuhiro in calling for Constitutional reform (Hosokawa 1993: 19–20; Ozawa 1993: 123–24). These renewed calls for Constitutional reform were at least partially the result of the Gulf War. The US government put significant pressure on Japan to make good on Takeshita’s pledge to contribute to the international community (Gotō

Conservatism: theory and reality  15 2000: 449). However, whereas Takeshita had disarmament programs on his mind (Gotō 2000: 450–51), the Americans demanded military contributions from Japan (Ishikawa 2004: 170). In this situation, the Kaifu government opted for a difficult balancing act. On the one hand, it upheld its traditional mercantilist foreign policy by offering significant financial aid totaling USD 13 billion. On the other hand, it eventually dispatched the Self Defense Forces to the Persian Gulf. This dispatch, however, came only after the end of major combat operations and did not include the requested transport airplanes and tankers, but only mine sweepers (Ozawa 1993: 34; Nakamura 2006: 41). Neither the financial support, nor the mine sweepers provoked much international appreciation, however, as critics in the US lambasted Japan for offering ‘only money, but no blood’ (Hashimoto 1993: 102; Nakamura 2006: 41). This criticism had a major influence on Japan, resulting in what Nakamura appropriately refers to as ‘Post Gulf War Syndrome’ (Nakamura 2006: 41). The criticism from abroad had demonstrated the flaws of Japan’s onestate pacifism, as symbolized by the Constitution’s Article 9 (Nakamura 2005: 195). This sentiment naturally gave rise to renewed calls for Constitutional reform. And indeed, looking at the number of drafts published following the Gulf War, one gets the impression that Japan’s very own ‘Gulf War Syndrome’ served as a catalyst not only for the resurgence of the Constitutional reform debate, but also, as we will see in section 2.2, for calls to radically change Japan’s foreign policy. That being said, the domestic call for Constitutional reform probably had less influence on the LDP’s agenda towards the issue than did pressure from abroad, specifically from the United States. This pressure did not abate after the Gulf War, but remained at a high level during the Clinton presidency. The consequence of this pressure was the revision of Japan’s security alliance with the US. Under the revision, Japan was to take a more active role in the alliance (Watanabe 2002: 27–28). One could argue that the Koizumi administration’s decision to dispatch the SDF to Iraq was a logical consequence of this more active Japanese role. However, as the discussion about the constitutionality of this action has shown very clearly, growing global military responsibilities always raise the question of whether to revise the Constitution’s Article 9, despite the New Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation emphasizing that ‘Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three nonnuclear principles’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs N.A.). Already in the 1998 edition of its annual white paper, the Defense Ministry (at that time, the Defense Agency) noted: ‘Of course, the New Guidelines do not call for an immediate revision of the Constitution, but it goes without saying, that the further strengthening of the New Guidelines’ framework is closely related to Constitutional reform, as far as it demands Constitutional reform in order for the process of Japan becoming a major power taking a new step [forward]’ (Watanabe 2002: 219). And indeed, as legislation related to Japan’s new role (specifically, the law relating to measures for preserving the peace and security of Japan in the event of a situation in the areas surrounding Japan (shuhen jitaihō) was passed, the floodgates opened and a new wave of Constitutional reform proposals and initiatives began to appear. Not only was the aforementioned legislation demanding the establishment of the research

16  Conservatism: theory and reality commissions on the Constitution introduced, but the Hashimoto faction published its own Constitutional reform draft in 2000 (Watanabe 2002: 31, 327–30). Looking at what we have established above, in sections 1.2 and 1.3, a conservative mainstream faction actually publishing its own Constitutional reform draft certainly could be seen as a major policy shift. Thus, as we have also observed, the reason for shelving the issue was not necessarily a passionate affection for the current Constitution, but rather the result of pragmatism. As American pressure mounted and conservative parties competing with the LDP kept publishing proposals and setting up their own research committees, the conservative mainstream factions pragmatically adapted to the new situation. That is not to say that everybody was supportive of this new stance on the issue, however, as is demonstrated by the examples of Miyazawa, Gotōda and Nonaka. In fact, one might get the impression that breaking certain principles of the Yoshida Doctrine, such as keeping a light military force that is not dispatched abroad or revisiting the topic of Constitutional reform, was a pragmatic decision aimed at upholding another principle of the doctrine, namely the security alliance with the US. Therefore, one could argue the foreign policy decision making in the 1990s was reminiscent of Nakasone’s policy in the mid-1980s. Actually, Hashimoto had admitted already in 1993 that, as a result of the Gulf War fallout, ‘nobody inside the LDP wanted to continue the traditional mercantile foreign policy’ (Watanabe 2002: 106). At the same time, however, Hashimoto himself has shown little enthusiasm towards Constitutional reform (Watanabe 2005a: 367). Hence, unlike Nakasone’s agenda (Pyle 2007: 355), the decision-making process in the 1990s still seemed to be strongly influenced by mainstream pragmatism and the need to manage various crises rather than a grand scheme based on a certain ideology. This pragmatism is exemplified not only by foreign policy, but also by the domestic situation. If not for that pragmatism, the LDP most likely would not have joined forces with its traditional arch-enemy, the Socialist Party, to form a coalition government in 1994. However, one cannot deny that the formation of this coalition certainly benefited from the Socialist Party’s pragmatism in no small way. In stark contrast to their traditional positions, the Socialists under Murayama Tomiichi accepted Hi no Maru and Kimi ga Yo as the national flag and anthem, recognized the SDF as Constitutional, and pledged to continue the Anpo regime (Ishikawa 2004: 184–85). Irrespective of whether one regrets the disappearance of an admittedly unrealistic alternative to the LDP’s postwar system or applauds this shift by the Socialists towards a more pragmatic policy, it certainly made the birth of the coalition far more digestible for the LDP. For its part, the LDP showed a good deal of pragmatism, too. The party did not raise the topic of Constitutional reform at that time, and if not unanimously, eventually supported the following initiatives: a law supporting the victims of the nuclear bombings, the political settlement of the ‘comfort women’ issue, and aid for previously unrecognized victims of the Minamata disease (Tominomori 2006: 362). This pragmatism was not limitless, though, as made evident by the controversy surrounding the Diet’s resolution to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II (Nakamura 2005: 227–28). Nonetheless, the LDP has also been lambasted for the aforementioned pragmatism. Nakanishi Terumasa, for instance, strongly criticized the party

Conservatism: theory and reality  17 for becoming ‘liberal’ for the sole purpose of regaining control of the government. LDP leaders like Katō Kōichi had ‘abandoned their conservative identity’ and transformed the party into a ‘Murayama LDP’ (Nakanishi 2005: 54). From the perspective of these strongly criticized LDP leaders, however, the formation of the coalition government was a pragmatic decision to secure the party’s continued relevance (Nonaka, Iokibe et al. 2007: 247–48). If we recall the definitions of the conservative mainstream discussed in section 1.2, in particular those of Matsuno, Tanaka and Koga emphasizing pragmatism and responsibility for the party over ideology, then the formation of the 1994 coalition certainly can be seen as an example of the conservative mainstream’s modus operandi. Seeing how the LDP slowly but surely managed to strengthen its grip on power again in the following years, one could also argue that this pragmatic strategy was quite successful. Against the background of the various political, economic and social changes, the direction of Japanese conservatism in the 1990s is difficult to determine. The conservative mainstream, employing its pragmatic strategy, guided the country through the decade. Pragmatically, it broke with various principles of the Yoshida Doctrine and even entered into a coalition with the Socialists. The rational aim behind these difficult decisions was twofold: internationally, it was to uphold the Anpo – regime and the close relationship with the US. Domestically, it was the ambition to remain relevant in a rapidly changing party environment. Only rarely were ideological issues addressed, such as in the case of the controversial national anthem and flag law (Ishikawa 2004: 200). The establishment of the research commissions on the Constitution in both houses of the Diet may seem like another such ideological issue. However, this could also be interpreted as a rational reaction to a decade which had seen growing support for Constitutional reform among the public, the publication of an unprecedented number of Constitutional reform drafts and, most importantly, constant pressure from the United States (Watanabe 2002: 27–28).

1.4  2000–2010: The end of conservatism? Whereas the conservative mainstream therefore opted to react conservatively, i.e. cautiously, to the various challenges, with gradual reforms within the established framework, others proposed more far-reaching reforms (Tominomori 2006: 357–58; Watanabe 2005a: 367). Unlike under the 1955 regime, those aiming for a more significant overhaul were to be found not only among the LDP’s right side stream and vocal intellectuals. Rather, this topic had become a sphere of activity for former mainstream politicians, like Ozawa. Ozawa dreaded Japan’s ‘capitalism light’, the convoy system as well as the government’s handling of the Gulf War situation (Ozawa 1993: 2–3, 33–36). He emphasized economic neoliberalism, more power for the prime minister’s office, reforms without compromises and, unlike Prime Minister Kaifu, argued that a dispatch of the Self Defense Forces to the Gulf would not have been unconstitutional (Ozawa 2006: 83–85; Tominomori 2006: 342–43, 350). Looking ahead, Ozawa proposed a shift away from the ‘passive non-aggressive defense strategy’ and towards an ‘active peace-building strategy’ (Ozawa 1993: 119), a demand that is also reflected in his

18  Conservatism: theory and reality Constitutional reform draft (see section 3.3.11). While Ozawa was ‘repeatedly […] frustrated and overwhelmed by the confused and troubled times in Japanese politics’ (Pyle 2007: 355), the appearance of him and other forces demanding wide-ranging reforms can probably be interpreted as a sign of the very reformoriented policies that were to come in the first years of the new millennium. The eventual realization of the policies that Ozawa had laid out during the 1990s benefited in no small part from the mainstream factions’ declining power. Not only had the people lost faith in its traditional modus operandi of distributing profit (Nonaka et al. 2007a: 248–50), but even prior to the so-called Katō no Ran, i.e. the unsuccessful attempt by Kōchikai chairman Katō Kōichi to force acting Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō out of office with a motion of no-confidence, rifts between Katō and fellow mainstream leaders had become visible (ibid.). Moreover, when Mori’s predecessor in office, Obuchi Keizō, suffered a fatal stroke the Heiseikenkyūkai lost its eighth high-profile representative since Tanaka.9 Meanwhile, Katō’s unsuccessful coup resulted in a split in his own faction, the Kōchikai (Ishikawa 2004: 202–3). At odds with each other and unable to field a viable candidate other than the politically damaged Hashimoto, the conservative mainstream factions could not prevent Koizumi Junichirō’s rise to power. The self-declared ‘maverick reformer’ won the 2001 LDP presidential election by a landslide (Itagaki 2005: 192–93). What Koizumi’s election and his five-year tenure as prime minister meant and what he actually stood for is the subject of controversial debates. While Mikuriya acknowledges that the question whether Koizumi can be called conservative is a ‘complicated’ one to answer (Mikuriya 2007: 134), Kenneth Pyle refers to Koizumi as a ‘colorful and determined reformer’ (Pyle 2007: 355). Nakajima emphasizes that Koizumi was certainly no conservative, but rather a neoliberal reformer (Nakajima 2007: 54). Looking at Nakajima’s argumentation, this categorization certainly makes sense. After all, Nakajima, quoting Suzuki Shigetaka, argues that conservatives preferred compromise over radicalism. This stands in pure contrast to Koizumi’s modus operandi. Instead of seeking further consultation over the privatization of Japan Post in 2005, Koizumi, borrowing a page from Ozawa, simply labeled those opposed to his plans ‘resistance forces’ and forced them out of the party (Tominomori 2006: 359). Beyond the aforementioned criteria of being willing and able to compromise, Koizumi and his political agenda certainly do not fit the definition of conservatism that we established in section 1.1 Instead of opting for ‘gradual change within the framework of existing customs and established institutions’ like Hashimoto, Koizumi chose an approach closer to Ozawa’s, thereby embarking on a quest to transform Japan radically without regard to the established framework (Tominomori 2006: 358). While this plan to transform Japan also included a more assertive foreign policy and revisions of the Constitution and the Fundamental Law on Education, Koizumi and his economics czar Takenaka Heizō arguably devoted more energy to neoliberal economic reforms.10 At first glance, the more ideologically charged part of Koizumi’s political agenda, e.g. the reform of the Constitution and the Fundamental Law on Education, may be reminiscent of Hatoyama, Kishi or Nakasone. This is particularly true of the revised Fundamental Law on Education. Under Koizumi’s watch

Conservatism: theory and reality  19 the LDP originally aimed to include the term ‘patriotism’ (aikokushin) in the revised text. Eventually, the party abandoned its insistence on the inclusion of the controversial term after junior coalition partner Kōmeitō objected (Watanabe 2007: 101–2). However, there are key differences that deserve attention. Despite his stretching the interpretation of the Constitution further than any of his predecessors by dispatching the SDF to Iraq, even LDP members admit that it was Yamasaki Taku who pushed Koizumi to move forward with the drafting of a Constitutional reform proposal during his tenure (Tamura 2006: 18). Furthermore, the Koizumi government did not increase defense expenditures.11 Moreover, unlike his ideologically oriented predecessors on the right of the LDP’s political spectrum, Koizumi in fact exhibited great flexibility so far as tradition was concerned. Had Princess Kiko not given birth to Prince Hisahito in 2006, there is a high possibility that Koizumi would have single-handedly broken a tradition related to a generally sacred realm: the Imperial Household or, to be more precise, the imperial succession. Only the birth of the first male heir to the Chrysanthemum Throne in four decades prevented the administration from pushing through the Diet a revision of the Imperial Household Law. Despite being criticized by party members and conservative scholars, the revised law would have allowed not only for the accession of a female member of the royal family to the Chrysanthemum Throne, but also, more importantly, a female lineage. This proposed reform will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.1. No prime minister before Koizumi had dared to touch this highly controversial issue. This example further illustrates the difficulty of applying the label ‘conservative’ to Koizumi. What to make of all these different aspects? Koizumi is certainly comparable to Nakasone in a variety of ways. Both men preached the neoliberal sermon of small government and privatizing state enterprises. Both succeeded in forging close relationships with the United States. Nakasone managed to please the Reagan administration by increasing defense spending and declaring Japan an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’, while Koizumi heeded George W. Bush’s call for ‘boots on the ground’ and dispatched the Self Defense Forces to Iraq. Lastly, Nakasone and Koizumi both visited the Yasukuni Shrine in their official capacity as prime minister of Japan (Ishikawa 2004: 144). The major difference is that Koizumi could go one step further than Nakasone on several fronts, ranging from his annual visits to Yasukuni, his dispatch of the SDF to Iraq, the constant diplomatic quarrels with South Korea and China, to driving forth the revision of the Fundamental Law on Education; this was due to his popularity and the weakness of opposition both within and outside the LDP. This also counts for Constitutional reform. Well aware of the strong public support for the Constitution, Nakasone emphasized he was not going to put Constitutional reform on the agenda of his government (NDPT 1982; NDPT 1983). Koizumi, on the other hand, never hid his intention to actively pursue the revision of the Constitution and the Fundamental Law on Education.12 Given that Koizumi, unlike Nakasone, had shown little interest in reforming the Constitution before becoming prime minister, while Nakasone has been actively calling for revision throughout his political career, this certainly has to be considered an irony. Nonetheless, Koizumi’s initiatives greatly exceeded

20  Conservatism: theory and reality Nakasone’s schemes in quantity and quality. That being said, as Mikuriya pointedly remarked, Koizumi’s five-year tenure as prime minister and LDP president is comparable to a roller-coaster ride. Once one reform was tackled, he immediately set his sight on another one, making it exceedingly difficult to comprehend where all the reforms were to lead Japan (Mikuriya 2007: 162). Pyle offers a similar assessment, writing: ‘Koizumi had no grand design as Nakasone had and he laid out no well-articulated agenda as Ozawa did, but his efforts to bring about reform were more successful than theirs’ (Pyle 2007: 355). What we have understood from examining Koizumi’s tenure, however, is that he certainly should be labeled a reformer rather than a conservative. Taken together with Ozawa’s powerful call for radical reforms throughout the 1990s, Koizumi’s agenda has demonstrated one thing very well: for nominally conservative politicians, the name of the game was no longer conservation or careful reform within existing frameworks, but instead radical reform. The influence of Ozawa’s rhetoric and Koizumi’s lengthy stay in power could be taken as indicators of the power of this radical reform message. As a result, some pundits claim that the end of conservatism, at least as the driving force of Japanese politics, was already upon us (Mikuriya 2004: 79). In retrospect, however, it seems as if the success of the Koizumi years did not survive his resignation in September 2006. Koizumi’s major election victory in 2005 led Tanaka Naoki to quickly proclaim the birth of a ‘2005 regime’ (Tanaka 2005), yet, looking at the often-chaotic post-Koizumi period, one cannot help but wonder whether this declaration wasn’t premature.13 For one thing, the events of the post-Koizumi period suggest that the 2005 regime’s durability is in no way comparable to that of the 1955 regime. As Yamaguchi Jirō correctly observed in an article shortly after the fall of the Abe government: During the time of Koizumi Junichirō, it looked like easily comprehensible politics, i.e. a popular leader puts forth a clear policy, and sustains a long-term government, had been realized. However, with Koizumi’s exit, the straying of party politics continues anew. (Yamaguchi 2007: 35) Koizumi’s successor, Abe Shinzō, raised high hopes, in particular among conservative intellectuals who were disappointed by Koizumi (Nishio 2006: 268–81). Abe’s agenda was decidedly ideological. Instead of economic policy, he vowed to make the revival of the educational system and Constitutional reform the major topics of his tenure. The aim was to ‘break away from the postwar regime’ (Sasaki 2007: 29). On the way to achieving this goal, the Abe government scored some early victories, as the law related to the public referendum on Constitutional reform, the promotion of the Defense Agency to a ministry and the revision of the Fundamental Law on Educational all passed the Diet. Soon, however, Abe was forced to deal with a mountain of problems totally unrelated to his initial priorities: irregularities in the Social Insurance Agency’s pension system, various slips of the tongue by cabinet members, financial scandals and the suicide of a cabinet member. As a result of this seemingly endless string of

Conservatism: theory and reality  21 scandals, the coalition government suffered a crushing loss in the Upper House election of July 2007, thereby losing control of the Upper House, as the DPJ won the election by a landslide. Unlike Uno or Hashimoto, Abe initially chose not to resign. However, less than two months after the election he eventually left office (Asahi Shimbunsha 2007). A key problem faced by the Abe administration was the lack of enthusiasm on the part of local party members and the general populace towards many of its signature initiatives, including Constitutional reform. Katayama Satsuki, an LDP parliamentarian and one of the so-called Koizumi Children conceded as much in an interview with Newsweek, saying: ‘Local party members don’t talk about the Constitution. They are focused instead on bringing money and jobs to their constituencies’ (Caryl and Kashiwagi 2007: 26). This focus very much seems to correspond to the electorate’s expectations. A poll conducted prior to the Upper House election of July 2007 found that voters were most interested in social security (30.4 percent), fiscal reconstruction (16.8 percent) and the economy (12.1 percent). On the other hand, only 5.2 percent of respondents wanted Constitutional reform to become an election topic (Uenoharu, Ōgawa, Taniguchi 2007: 53). Problematically, Abe’s aim was to make exactly this topic the centerpiece of his party’s Upper House election campaign (Watanabe 2007: 121–22). The development of the quest for Constitutional reform could not have been more anticlimactic. It is the tragedy of Abe, the most ardent supporter of Constitutional reform in recent years, that during his premiership, at a time when an amendment had seemed a more realistic possibility than ever before, the election loss under his watch squashed all hopes for a revision in the foreseeable future. As a reaction to the unexpectedly abrupt demise of the Abe government, the LDP performed a 180-degree turn in choosing Fukuda Yasuo as its next leader. Fukuda represented experience rather than youth, pragmatism rather than ideology (Caryl, Kashiwagi 2008: 30). During Fukuda’s term in office, Abe’s ‘break away from the postwar regime’, including Constitutional reform, quickly faded from the spotlight, much to the dismay of conservative intellectuals, who called Fukuda’s election an ‘anachronism’ (Nishio 2007: 54). Together with the partial re-unification of the Kōchikai (Asahi Shimbun 2008: 4), one could argue that the LDP had rediscovered the conservative mainstream’s modus operandi. Furthermore, the main stalwart of reform in the 1990s, Ozawa also had returned to his mainstream roots. As Democratic Party chairman he in fact attempted to differentiate his party from Abe’s LDP by authoring a ‘social democratic [policy] program’ (Yamaguchi, Satō 2007: 65). As was established in section 1.2, the conservative mainstreamdominated LDP in fact championed such a profit-distributing policy also. Hence, one could argue, Ozawa, if only for strategic reasons, rediscovered his roots, after a decade of demanding neoliberal reforms, many of which had been realized by the Koizumi administration. With the DPJ under Ozawa proposing an economic policy partially reminiscent of the conservative mainstream and the LDP under Fukuda acting more like its mainstream-dominated former self under the 1955 regime again, has the mainstream risen from the ashes like a phoenix? The answer is most likely ‘no’. For one thing, because some question the wisdom of even using an old ‘worn-out’ term like conservative mainstream

22  Conservatism: theory and reality these days, when the differences between pragmatist mainstream and idealist side stream are not reflected in actual politics and factions are now nothing more than heterogeneous groups of politicians with different views (Sentaku 2008: 53). Granted, factions have never been entirely homogenous entities (Hirosawa 2005: 72), but looking at the decade 2000–2009 this argument is hard to dismiss. Moreover, Fukuda resigned after one year in office, only to be succeeded by Asō Tarō. Asō may be the grandson of mainstream mastermind Yoshida Shigeru, and may have vowed to make Japan’s economic recovery his number one priority, but traditionally he has been considered closer to Abe than Fukuda (Asahi Shimbun 2007: 1). And indeed there is no denying that the LDP’s right wing was very well represented in the Asō cabinet.14 However, this did not translate into a resurgence of ideologically charged topics. During Asō’s one year in office, Constitutional reform or a more patriotic education system received close to no attention. Calls by Abe to at least include a reference to collective self-defense in the party’s election manifesto fell on deaf ears, as party leaders viewed the issue as being too closely linked to the LDP’s defeat at the previous Upper House election in July 2007 (Asahi Shimbun 2009). Instead, economic policy once again had taken center stage, if only because the financial crisis of 2008 had left the Asō administration with no other viable option. Subsequently, the Lower House election of September 2009 sent the LDP back to the opposition bench as a three-party coalition led by the DPJ took over the reins of government. Joining the Democrats in this coalition are the Social Democrats and the New People’s Party (Kokumin Shintō). Among the new administration’s goals are many ambitious items, e.g. radical restructuring of the budget or the re-negotiating of the agreement on the relocation of American troops stationed in Okinawa to a location outside the prefecture (DPJ 2009), but Constitutional reform is not among them. At first glance, it may seem strange, because the most powerful figures in this new coalition have a track record of supporting the quest for Constitutional reform. Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, DPJ secretary-general Ozawa and minister of infrastructure Maehara Seiji have long been staunch supporters of revising the supreme law. Both Hatoyama and Ozawa have even published their own amendment proposals (see sections 3.3.11 and 3.4.10). However, upon further investigation, things don’t look so bright. The DPJ’s junior coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, has been one of the most powerful voices fighting for the upholding of the Constitution, especially Article 9 in its current form (Ishikawa 2004: 213; Yamaguchi 2004: 43–47). Moreover, the DPJ has yet to produce its own reform draft and this is unlikely to change any time soon. Those searching for concrete hints pointing to future developments will be disappointed to find a non-committal declaration tucked away on the last page of the party’s 2009 election manifesto. There, the party pledged that it ‘would continue to conduct free and open-minded discussions with everybody about the Constitution at various places, and carefully, yet proactively examine whether many people demand a revision and whether a comprehensive and satisfactory agreement can be reached’ (DPJ 2009). The unwillingness or inability to act in a bolder fashion is as much the result of consideration towards the coalition partner as it is an attempt to strike a careful balance within the party. Unlike party

Conservatism: theory and reality  23 leaders Hatoyama, Ozawa, Maehara and former Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) members, e.g. the founders of the Sōken Kaigi (see section 3.4.13), a growing number of DPJ-affiliated junior parliamentarians show no enthusiasm for revising the Constitution’s Article 915 (Mainichi Online 2009). To further complicate things, the differences between the drafts put forth by Hatoyama, Ozawa and the Sōken Kaigi are by no means negligible, as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4. If the government’s ambitious reform agenda is factored in, Constitutional reform will in all likelihood remain what it has been for Fukuda and Asō, a low-priority issue, even though the introduction of revision proposals to the Diet will legally become possible in May 2010. Already prior to the Lower House election, Hatoyama had suggested as much, stating that filling the people’s wallets was a priority for a DPJ-led government (Asahi Shimbun 2009).

1.5  Conclusion What can be said with certainty is that the reactionary ambitions of the early postwar period have long faded into the obscurity of history. Instead of wondering how to partially restore the old clock, most conservatives, in particular the members of the conservative mainstream, have turned to the new clock, i.e. the postwar system, as the object of their conservation attempts. As we shall see in sections 4.5 and 4.6, this shift is reflected very well in the debate over Constitutional reform. There is no denying that much has changed since the 1980s, whether be it due to the end of the Cold War and the 1955 regime, as well as to the reforms demanded by Ozawa and carried out by Koizumi. After all, Japan has tried, and in some areas, e.g. national security policy, already succeeded in charting a new course for the twenty-first century. Arguably, more important than those definitely significant changes is the fact that the key features of the postwar clock, e.g. democracy or fundamental human rights, have remained untouched. Even the decline of the conservative mainstream, which had been instrumental in upholding this system, didn’t change this fact. Critics on the left may see things differently, but as the analysis that follows below demonstrates, the conservative nature of most amendment proposals put forth since the 1980s ensures that even an under current circumstances unlikely reform of Japan’s supreme law based on those reform drafts would not change that fact. Since the abrupt end of the Abe administration, the probability of an amendment has decreased significantly. Against the background of a steady rise in public support for Constitutional reform and an unprecedented wave of revision proposals since the early 1990s, the events of the year 2007 certainly marked an anticlimax. None of Abe’s three successors has had the time, freedom and political will to resurrect the always controversial topic. It is unlikely that this situation will change fundamentally any time soon, even though this time the slumber may not last as long as the two-decade long shelving of the issue at the hands of the conservative mainstream.

2 Framing the issues Conservative criticism of postwar Japan and the vision of a new Japan

2.1  The Emperor system: a vision between genuine and invented traditions Unlike the issues related to national security and foreign policy discussed below, the Emperor system generally has never been at the center of such heated debates, at least not among conservatives. The fact that the topic is barely touched upon in many conservative publications,1 can probably be seen as a reflection of this general agreement and the resulting lack of a necessity to discuss the topic. With opinion polls showing continued high support rates for the Imperial family,2 calls to abolish it are few and far between in today’s Japan. Even the Communist Party deleted the demand to abolish the Tennō system in its 2004 party charter. On the other hand, Livedoor founder Horie Takafumi and the Happiness Realization Party (Kōfuku Jitsugentō; see section 3.4.14) have expressed support for a presidential system. What the nation required in the twenty-first century was a leader equipped with wide-ranging authority. Horie stated his belief that previous governments had not made any change to the symbolic Tennō system because of fear (Nakano 2004: 241, Mainichi Online 2005). The opinions of Horie, who once unsuccessfully ran for the LDP in 2005’s Lower House election, and the Happiness Realization Party have to be taken as very rare exceptions, because conservatives have supported the Imperial institution throughout the postwar period (Kitaoka 1992: 85). Generally speaking, they do accept and support postwar Japan’s symbolic Tennō system. Some refer to it as a ‘national treasure’ (Asō 2008: 34), others proclaim that a Japan without the Tennō is ‘unthinkable’ (Kimura 1996: 23). A survey in 2003 conducted among parliamentarians found overwhelming opposition, across party lines, to giving the Emperor the right to make public political statements.3 With that being said, certain conservatives seem concerned about what they perceive as a reduced standing of the institution or even fear for its continued existence. Etō Jun, for instance, laments that the Emperor has been degraded to the role of the prime minister’s doorman (Etō 1996: 27). The Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei as well as the late Upper House chairman Kimura Mutsuo criticize that ‘certain political parties’ thought they could abolish the system with a simple majority vote in the Diet (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993: 19; Kimura 1996:23). As we shall see in section 4.2, conservative authors of Constitutional amendment proposals seek to better this situation by making the Emperor the head

Framing the issues  25 of state, or in some cases, to remove from Article 1 the provision according to which his position was based on the will of the people. Those perceived problems and the solutions put forth are qualitatively and quantitatively minor and cannot detract from an evident consensus among conservatives concerning the upholding of the present symbolic Tennō system. This consensus does not preclude criticism targeted at various members of the Imperial family. This kind of criticism, as outlined by Shillony (2008: 147–62) must not be confused with the criticism, or lack thereof, directed at the symbolic Emperor system that is discussed in this book. Conservatives who support a return to a Meiji-period Constitutional monarchy headed by an Emperor equipped with significant authority are scarce. The most vocal advocate of this second ‘Meiji restoration’ is the retired Tsukuba University professor Nakagawa Yatsuhiro. This consensus is not restricted to the symbolic Emperor system, but also extends to the second component of Article 1, i.e. popular sovereignty. Just like the former, the latter principle is not called into question by most conservatives. In fact, it generally seems to be considered a matter of course (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 54; Yamasaki 2001: 37). That being said, a few conservatives object to this unconditional support for the rule of the people. While Hiranuma praises democracy as a ‘splendid idea’, he warns of it being turned into ‘ochlocracy’ or ‘populism’ (Hiranuma 2005: 118–20). This sentiment is echoed by Nishibe, albeit much more strongly than in Hiranuma’s case. Unlike the latter, the former believes that democracy is not such a splendid idea, but instead is nothing but a ‘tyranny of the majority’. Accordingly, Nishibe sees ‘an ochlocracy under the name of postwar democracy’ (Nishibe 2004: 13, 112). In order to curb the transgressions of the majority and prevent people from throwing overboard ‘good old traditions’, he has put forth a rather unique proposal. The present population will not be completely free in their decision making; rather, they must obey Japanese traditions (Nishibe 2004: 110). This concept of course is very conservative, in the sense that it is born out of the traditional skepticism towards popular sovereignty and the suspicion that rationalist elements may act without regard for traditions. Last but not least, Nakagawa Yatsuhiro labels the rule of the people a ‘revolutionary dogma’ that has to be abolished (Nakagawa 2004: 40–42). As has been mentioned above, Nakagawa is the only conservative who supports a return to the authoritarian pre-war system established in 1889. Symbol, head of state or both? Article 1 of the Constitution reads: ‘The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.’ Furthermore, Article 4 states, ‘he shall not have powers related to government’ (Hook, McCormack 2001: 190). However, because Articles 6 and 7 grant the Emperor representative functions vis-à-vis foreign countries, one could raise the question whether, under the current Constitution, he could not be considered a formal head of state void of actual authority. The answer to this question largely depends on how one defines the term head of state. And herein lies the key problem, because there is no fixed definition of the term

26  Framing the issues (Tsujimura 2004: 83–84). If one chooses to apply the following definition, then the Tennō certainly cannot be called head of state. The person who is in the position to domestically control the affairs of state as head of the government and externally represents the nation is called head of state. […] If one is applying the meaning of the leader participating in a [G8] summit, then the Japanese head of state is not the Emperor, but the Prime Minister. (Ibid.) Furthermore, Article 3 of the Constitution clearly limits the Emperor’s representative functions by stipulating that ‘the advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor’ (Hook, McCormack 2001: 190). This expression has led Tsujimura Miyoko and Tsuburaya Katsuo to conclude that diplomatic authority rests with the cabinet, and not the Emperor. Accordingly, they dismiss the notion that the latter could be referred to as head of state (Tsujimura 2004: 84; Tsuburaya 1990: 69). Conservatives tend to take a different stance on this issue, however. They argue that the Emperor is in fact already head of state under the current Constitution, and is treated as such by the governments of foreign countries (Kobayashi 1992: 121). Ueda Masakazu has also argued that if one focuses exclusively on formal authority, the Emperor might be called head of state (Ueda 2005: 46). In 1973, the then head of the cabinet’s legislation bureau, Yoshikuni Ichirō, offered a similar assessment, saying that the Emperor could be called head of state under the current Constitution, depending on the term’s definition (Ōhara 1997: 26–27). As we will see in Chapter 3, this ongoing discussion is reflected very well in the debate about Constitutional reform. Almost all authors of Constitutional reform proposals specifically refer to the Emperor as head of state in their reform drafts. Since they already think of the Emperor as head of state right now, the aim of their reform initiatives is not a radical breakaway from the existing modus operandi, but rather the attempt to cement the institution’s position by clearly defining the Emperor as formal or representative head of state in their revised versions of Article 1. In addition to the legal aspect outlined above, the discussion over the Emperor’s position has another, i.e. a historical, dimension. The key question here is whether the institution’s symbolic role as stipulated by the current Constitution is a Japanese tradition or whether GHQ has broken yet another tradition by stripping the Emperor of his previously significant authority. Whether the Tennō’s traditional role is that of a symbolic head of state removed from the treacherous and perennially conflict-ridden realm of day-to-day politics (fushinsei), or whether his role is to directly exercise his sovereign power and rule over his subjects (shinsei) has traditionally divided the scholarly world (Nakano 2004: 227–28). The institution’s position in the postwar period obviously falls into the former category, but what of the period prior to 1945? Ishii Ryōsuke has argued convincingly that, with a few notable exceptions, the Emperor’s symbolic role of the postwar years was in

Framing the issues  27 fact consistent with his traditional role throughout the centuries. Both the Meiji era and the Ritsuryō period a millennium earlier, as well as the unsuccessful attempts by Emperors Gotoba (1180–1239) and Godaigo (1288–1339), who had exercised direct imperial rule, to wrest power from the Shogunate, were deviations. The impulse during those times to turn the Emperor into a politically involved institution had come not from within, but rather from abroad, in the former case from Prussia and in the latter from China. Hence, Ishii concludes, these were not only rare exceptions, but also caused by foreign influences and not based on Japanese traditions (Kitaoka 1992: 84; Ishii 1982: 47, 337). An overwhelming majority of conservatives recognize that the role bestowed upon the Emperor by the postwar Constitution corresponds well with the fushinsei tradition outlined above. This consensus is shared by a wide array of conservatives, including moderates like Katō Kōichi as well as generally hard-line intellectuals like Nakanishi Terumasa. According to Nakanishi, it was ‘very dangerous’ and a ‘mistake’ to make the Emperor the commander-in-chief (Katō 2005: 255; Okazaki, Nakanishi 2007: 133–42). However, not everybody views the Meiji period as a mistake and a deviation from tradition. Nakagawa, for instance, claims that the fourth paragraph of his Article 11, which reads ‘the supreme command authority over the National Defense Army is delegated to the prime minister by the Emperor’ (see section 3.4.6) and is similar to Meiji-era stipulations,4 is at least partially based on Japanese tradition. Nakagawa and Yagi base their argument on a formalistic interpretation of Imperial history. The Shogunate may have been the center of power in pre-Meiji Japan, yet it was the Emperor who, qua his ‘traditional authority’, appointed the Shogun (Nakagawa 2004: 86). Hence, the only difference between the two periods was that the Shogun had been replaced by the prime minister. This interpretation is problematic for a number of reasons, however. The Tokugawa clan had acquired and maintained the position of Shogun through its power and not through an Imperial edict (Ishii 1982: 262). The latter was merely a formality. This situation stands in stark contrast to the Constitutional theory and reality since 1889. As Fujii Shinichi explained in his commentary on the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor was not only sovereign and holder of sovereign power, but he also ‘exercise[d] [this power] personally over his subjects’ (Fujii 1979: 124–26). As Herbert P. Bix noted in his award-winning book Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, the grandson of the Meiji Emperor, for instance, made extensive use of the powers bestowed on him by the Imperial Constitution. The Shōwa Tennō frequently involved himself in the decision making on the Imperial Army and Navy’s battle against America’s armed forces in the Pacific (Bix 2001: 475–79). The contrast to the pre-Meiji era, which is described by Okazaki as follows, could not be more striking: ‘Successive Emperors had lived in modest buildings like the Imperial Palace in Kyoto, wielding no power by themselves, leaving even the government in the hands of [other] people’ (Okazaki, Nakanishi 2007: 134). From the evidence presented above we can deduce that, in accordance to Ishii’s assessment, the period from 1868 until 1945 was indeed a deviation, as the role of the Emperor traditionally had been that of a detached and symbolic head of state.

28  Framing the issues Hence, one can conclude that the introduction of direct Imperial rule in the second half of the nineteenth century was not the result of a restoration of genuine traditions, but instead constituted an invention of a new tradition necessitated by the state of affairs at that time. Had the lower and mid-ranked samurai that eventually became the Meiji oligarchs fought the Tokugawa shogunate without the blessing of the Imperial Palace, the legitimacy of their entire campaign could have been called into question. By, at least officially, returning governmental authority to its supposedly rightful owner, the rebels from Satsuma and Chōshū managed to deflect criticism of their struggle against the incumbent central government in Edo as nothing less than a coup d’état (Nishida 2009: 33). As we shall see below, not only the role of the Emperor, but also the mode of Imperial succession underwent significant changes during that time, due to genuine traditions being replaced by invented ones. The question of Imperial succession Arguably, the greater controversy surrounding the Tennō system throughout the decade 2000–2009 has been the question of Imperial succession, more specifically, whether female members of the Imperial family should be included in the line of succession. As we shall see below, conservatives rarely criticize the existing framework of an exclusively male lineage. Instead, they quarrel over the desirability and necessity of altering the present system. In this context it is worth pointing out that the discussion about Imperial succession has become a major topic only in recent years. In addition to growing awareness of the problem of declining birth rates, the birth of Princess Aiko in 2001 can probably be seen as the main catalyst for this heated discussion – because the one child of Crown Prince Naruhito and his wife, Princess Masako, happened to be ‘only’ a girl; no male heir to the throne had been born for four decades, the last being the Crown Prince’s brother, Fumihito, in 1965 (Kōshitsu Tenpan ni kan suru Yūshikisha Kaigi 2005: 6,7; Kasahara 2003: 177–78). Eventually, this situation changed in September 2006, when the wife of Prince Fumihito gave birth to a son, Prince Hisahito. For better or worse, the birth of the long-awaited male heir has removed the previously felt sense of urgency to make changes to the current male succession. Historic and legal framework of Imperial succession To fully comprehend the arguments made in favor of and against reform of the system of Imperial succession, it is necessary to briefly acquaint the reader with the past and present legal framework that has been the basis of succession for the past century. Unlike its predecessor, the Meiji Constitution, the current Japanese Constitution does not limit Imperial succession to an exclusively male lineage. Article 2 only demands that an heir is a direct relative of the reigning Emperor (Hook, McCormack 2001: 190). This interpretation at least seems to be common among scholars of Constitutional law (Hasegawa 1992: 51; Kobayashi 2006: 25; Ueda 2005: 47; Tsujimura 2004: 84). Similarly, the House of Representatives’ Research Commission on the Constitution, in its final report, also came to the

Framing the issues  29 conclusion that the Constitution would not prevent female members of the Imperial family from becoming Tennō (Shūgiin Kenpō Chōsakai 2005: 326–27). This interpretation is challenged by Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, who argues that the Japanese term for succession used in Article 2 of the Constitution, seshū, implies maleonly succession. Nakagawa argues that Imperial succession should be compared to the succession in a family of Kabuki performers, where the term automatically means a male lineage, excluding female heirs (Nakagawa 2007: 64). Even among conservatives, this questionable argumentation, which perhaps has less to do with the letter of the law than with cultural preferences, does in fact seem to be a rare exception. As we will see in Chapter 3, Imperial succession is rarely dealt with within the context of Constitutional reform drafts, as there is a tendency among authors to leave the Constitution’s Article 2 untouched.5 Instead, the focus here is on the one law to which Article 2 of the Constitution refers, namely the Imperial Household Law. Adopted in 1947, its first article bans women from ascending the throne, by stipulating an exclusively male lineage (Nakano 2004: 302). Whether this preferential treatment of the male sex is Constitutional or not has been another subject of debate among scholars. Some progressive scholars, like Tōhoku University professor Tsujimura Miyoko, argue that this ‘different treatment based on distinction by sex fulfills the function of fostering or retaining the sex discrimination in Japan’s legal system and customs’ (Tsujimura 2004: 207). Tsujimura claims that the exclusively male lineage as prescribed by Article 1 of the Imperial Household Law is in violation with the Constitution’s Article 14 and the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women,6 which the Diet ratified in 1985 (ibid.). Other scholars of Constitutional law dispute the claim of the unconstitutionality of the Imperial Household Law by contending that equality between the sexes, as stipulated in Article 14 of the Constitution, does not apply to the Tennō system as a result of the institution’s unique status based on a historical class system incompatible with the modern principle of individual equality. Since the Tennō system has been retained under the current Constitutional framework, despite this obvious incompatibility, Takahashi Kazuyuki and Aminaka Masaki, for instance, conclude that it is not appropriate to apply the principle of individual equality in this case. On these grounds Takahashi dismisses the claim, that the current Imperial Household Law discriminates against the female sex in an unreasonable way, and therefore is Constitutional (Takahashi 2005: 44–45; Aminaka 2006: 241). Even though there is no denying that Tsujimura’s argument makes sense, for the time being it remains a theoretical argumentation, because the six-decades-old law has yet to be revised and is unlikely to change anytime soon, as we shall see below. Under the existing legal framework, a female member of the Imperial family can, theoretically, become only a temporary regent, in the event that the Emperor is physically or psychologically unable to perform his duties as prescribed by the Constitution.7 As we will see below, the exclusion of women from the Imperial succession has less to do with century-old traditions than with the demands of a changed reality in the nineteenth century. In fact, the exclusively male lineage was first prescribed during the Meiji era. In 1889, the government enacted the predecessor to the current Imperial Household Law and matters pertaining to the Imperial House,

30  Framing the issues including the succession, thereby became the subject of a law for the first time in Japanese history (Yoshida 2006: 179). It should be noted, however, that the 1889 law was no mere standard law, which could have been revised by the Imperial Diet. Unlike the current Imperial Household Law, it was legally on the same level as the Meiji Constitution, and outside parliamentary jurisdiction. Furthermore, the old law included illegitimate children of the Emperor as potential heirs (Ishii 1982: 282; Kasahara 2003: 155, 181; Kōshitsu Tenpan ni kan suru Yūshikisha Kaigi 2005: 33). As mentioned above, prior to the late nineteenth century no legal framework had governed the Imperial succession. Hence, no laws or edicts had barred Empresses or princesses from becoming Tennō. And while a woman occupying the Chrysanthemum Throne was not a common event, the eight women who ascended the Throne between the sixth and the eighteenth centuries demonstrate that females could and in fact did become Tennō prior to the Meiji period (Table 2.1). Accordingly, it is not the existence of female Tennō per se that has sparked controversy among scholars, intellectuals and politicians, but their function and role. In line with Meiji-era interpretations (Nakano 2004: 115), many conservatives view these eight women as ‘placeholders’ occupying the throne only until the next male heir in line came of age. Supporters of this school of thought point to the fact that all eight descended from the throne unmarried (Kobori, Sakurai, Yagi 2006: 70–72). This theory, however, has been challenged by many historians. Some call the placeholder argument ‘discriminatory’, because in many cases male Emperors had been placeholders as well. Others argue that female succession had originally been one of several possible choices of succession. In fact, some evidence even points to the existence of a female lineage during the sixth century (Nakano 2004: 8, 116–20, 142–46, 170–72, 262, 307). Moreover, Keio University’s Kasahara

Table 2.1  List of female Tennō Xth Emperor

Name

Lifetime

Reign

Comment

33

Suiko

554–628

592–628

35

Kōgyoku

594–661

642–45

35 41

Saimei Jitō

594–661 645–702

655–61 Second reign of Kōgyoku 686/690–97*

43

Genmei

661–721

707–15

44

Genshō

680–748

715–24

46

Kōken

718–770

749–58

48 109

Shōtoku Meishō

718–770 1623–96

764–70 1629–43

117

Gosakuramachi

1740–1813

1762–70

Second reign of Kōken

Sources: Kasahara (2001: 78, 84, 92, 107. 113, 116, 123, 128, 269, 278); Nakano (2004: 116). Note: *  Kasahara and Nakano give different dates here.

Framing the issues  31 Hidehiko has argued convincingly that out of the eight female Tennō, three, namely Suiko (554–628), Kōgyoku (later Saimei; 594–661) and Kōken (later Shōtoku; 718–70) were no ‘puppets’, but instead powerful rulers in their own right. On the other hand, he concedes that Genmei (661–721), Genshō (680–748), Meishō (1623–96) and Gosakuramachi (1740–1813) could be considered placeholders (Kasahara 2005: 204–5). Thus, if one considers the examples of Suiko, Kōgyoku and Kōken, one cannot help but wonder whether the Meiji-era view of the historic female Tennō wasn’t born out of the demands of that particular age, rather than a century-old tradition. The gender of the Emperor only mattered in the nineteenth century because the Meiji oligarchs had decided to break with the tradition of the symbolic Emperor system, as described above. By officially returning the government to the Emperor, they had solved the problem of how to legitimize their rule. However, another issue persisted, because ‘in Tokugawa times only the shogunate was known to the realm and people were unaware that the imperial house existed’ (Gluck 1989: 73–74). To remedy this inconvenient situation, the still young Meiji Tennō was sent on numerous ‘publicity tours’ throughout his empire (ibid.). Thus, the Emperor who, as previously pointed out, had for centuries lived in the obscurity and insularity of the palace in Kyoto became a highly visible monarch. This transition from genuinely traditional fushinsei to shinsei mandated the invention of another ‘tradition’, i.e. the exclusively male lineage. As the extremely visible sovereign of the nation at a time when female suffrage had not been realized and the civil code stipulated paternal rule over wife and family (Nakano 2004: 307; Neuss-Kaneko 1990: 59–62), a female on the Chrysanthemum Throne was deemed a paradox and hence unacceptable. Had the Emperor remained the traditional symbol removed from the people’s view, there would have been no need to prevent women from becoming Tennō. It is thus clear that the oligarchs opted to break genuine traditions and invent new ones because their grand design demanded that such changes be made. The reform debate Almost 120 years later, the successor of the Meiji-era household law, which had inherited the exclusively male lineage from its pre-war counterpart, was at the center of a heated reform debate. The initiator of this debate was the reformminded Koizumi Junichirō, who became the first prime minister to ponder a revision of the Imperial Household Law since its enactment in 1947, even though the topic proved to be extremely contentious among conservative politicians (Asahi Shimbun 2005: 3). While Koizumi was the strongest advocate of reforming the exclusively male lineage, he was not the only one. Other notable supporters of a female Tennō, albeit not of female lineage, include former Prime Minister Asō (2008: 32) as well as Asō’s successor, Hatoyama. Former Defense Agency chief Aichi Kazuo as well as scholars Nishi Osamu and Kobayashi Setsu have all demonstrated support for the idea by revising Article 2 accordingly in their Constitutional reform drafts. Koizumi’s reform proposals were based on the findings of the Advisory Council on the Imperial Household Law (Kōshitsu Tenpan ni kan suru Yūshikisha Kaigi

32  Framing the issues 2005: 1). This body’s work was guided by the following three principles: finding a solution that would receive the support of the Japanese people, that was based on tradition, and that provided stability as a system. Based on these principles, the council suggested including female members of the Imperial family (princesses, queens and their descendants) in the line of succession (Kōshitsu Tenpan ni kan suru Yūshikisha Kaigi 2005: 2–3, 8–11). Had the law been revised on the basis of these recommendations, it might not only have allowed a female member of the Imperial family to ascend the Chrysanthemum Throne for the first time in two centuries, but also have opened up the possibility of a female lineage (Tsujimura 2008: 75). This proposed revision triggered a fierce and at times polemical debate among conservatives, at least until the birth of Prince Hisahito in September 2006. Thereafter, the revision of the Imperial Household Law was put on hold, even though public support for a female on the Chrysanthemum Throne still hovered above 50 percent after the prince’s birth.8 Nonetheless, the years 2006 and 2007 in particular saw conservative intellectuals going on an all-out attack against the notion of a female Emperor or a female lineage. Their criticism and scorn was directed mainly at Koizumi and his advisory council (see, for instance, Nakagawa 2007; Kobori, Sakurai, Yagi 2006; Watanabe, Nakagawa 2006). The most reasonable complaint criticizes Koizumi and his advisors for rushing to reach a decision in less than a year, even though a healthy Crown Prince Naruhito would ensure secure Imperial succession for the next four decades (Watanabe, Nakagawa 2006: 14). Other points of criticism are the alleged destruction of tradition, genetic problems of a female lineage, women’s inability to perform certain rituals, and ignorance of the opinion of the Imperial family (Hara, Mikuriya 2005: 103–13; Kura 2006; Nakagawa 2007: 66, 69; Watanabe, Nakagawa 2006: 18). More polemical versions look like the following: the discussion about a female Emperor was merely a ploy to distract from the reformers’ alleged true aim, the abolition of the Tennō system. This ‘criminal bloodless revolution’ was a fabrication of Koizumi, whom Nakagawa likens to Stalin (who ordered the killing of the Russian Czar and his family), and his advisory committee, made up of ‘self-declared experts and communists’ (Nakagawa 2007: 24, 331–32; Watanabe, Nakagawa 2006: 17–19). Lamenting the high approval rating for a female Tennō shown in opinion polls, the former president of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, Yagi, suggests that the Japanese did not understand the far-reaching consequences of a female Tennō, not to mention a female lineage. Those supporting these changes would be ‘guilty of unconsciously committing a crime’ (Kobori, Sakurai, Yagi 2006: 64, 206). In view of this harsh criticism, it is clear, that the aforementioned conservative intellectuals have a completely different take on how to ensure a secure imperial lineage in the decades to come. Nakagawa called upon all ‘sane Japanese people’ to pray for the birth of a male heir by 2021. In retrospect, those prayers were obviously answered with the birth of Hisahito in 2006. In the case of there being no new male heir during the next one or two decades, Nakagawa proposed to reinstate all male members under the age of 40 from the eleven former Imperial families, who by law became commoners in 1946. They would be far more appropriate than a female for the position of Emperor (Watanabe, Nakagawa 2006: 34, 40).

Framing the issues  33 Beyond the obvious polemics, the aforementioned criticism’s validity is still at least partially questionable. Similarly, the suggestion of either leaving the current Imperial Household Law as it is or allowing male members of former Imperial families to rejoin the circle of the Imperial family must be considered problematic from various angles. Even if Kura’s claim that the Y chromosome of Emperor Jimmu could only be inherited via a male lineage is biologically correct, it is hard to prove whether the first Emperor really was a historical person or merely a legend (Kasahara 2001: 3; Takase 2005: 39). The Imperial ceremonies which a female Tennō, in particular a pregnant one, could not perform, could be temporarily cancelled. After all, precedents for such a temporary cancellation do exist in Japanese history.9 The Tennō as an apolitical symbol is not allowed to make political statements in public;10 thus, demanding that his opinion or that of the Imperial family on Imperial succession be heard is in fact unconstitutional. The claim that the birth of a male heir, i.e. Prince Hisahito has solved all problems is not unchallenged either. Even the head of the Imperial Household Agency, Haketa Shingo, openly admitted that the birth of a new male heir does not bring the desired long-term stability to the Tennō system. His opinion is echoed by experts such as Kasahara or Shizuoka University of Welfare professor Takahashi Hiroshi (Kasahara 2006: 212–13; Takahashi 2006: 122–27). The duo specifically point out two major problems. First, half of all historical Emperors were bastards, i.e. children of an Emperor’s concubine, and not of the Empress. Apart from polygamy being illegal and far less socially acceptable nowadays than it was two or three centuries ago, the current Imperial Household Law bans illegitimate children from becoming heirs to the throne. The second problem is related to Article 12 of the law, which stipulates that a female member of the Imperial family who marries a commoner will automatically become a commoner as well. Thus, even if a son is born to a princess and her husband, this child is not considered an heir to the throne, because it is not a member of the Imperial family. Practically, this means that Princess Aiko and Prince Hisahito’s two older sisters will most likely leave the Imperial family within the next two or three decades. Should Hisahito’s wife fail to give birth to a son, the system of Imperial succession will again face a crisis. Hence both Kasahara and Takahashi support the proposal of Koizumi’s expert commission to allow females to become heirs to the throne (ibid.). The wisdom of reinstating the eleven former Imperial family lines is also questioned. Nakagawa’s idea of reinstating all male members of those families under the age of 40 is problematic, because proper preparation for the future role of Emperor is time consuming. Recent Emperors have received the necessary personal education from the very young age of three or four (Takahashi 2006: 123). Kasahara bluntly dismisses the suggestion as ‘unrealistic’. The Keio University professor questions whether the reinstatement of those former royals, after having lived as commoners for six decades, would find much public support. Additionally, he points out that the common ancestors of these former royals and the current imperial family lived more than six centuries ago. Ignoring these historical realities might have potentially dangerous results. According to Kasahara, the public would inevitably perceive the reinstated princes as ‘outsiders’ rather than as genuine members of the Imperial family. To push through the reinstatement

34  Framing the issues without regard to public opinion might damage the standing of the institution of Tennō and the Imperial family with the Japanese public. Furthermore, it would hardly be compatible with the principle of the symbolic Tennō, who, according to Article 1 of the Constitution, ‘[derives] his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power’ (Kasahara 2006: 214–15). Because Yagi, Nakagawa and Watanabe Shōichi obviously share Burke’s conservative skepticism about mass democracy and rationalism, opinion polls evidently mean little to them. Instead, they unconsciously or deliberately borrow a page from Burke’s strongly worded attacks on the French revolutionaries by labeling those who dare to alter what they deem a sacred tradition as ‘communists’ or ‘criminals’. To remove the possibility of any tampering with this sacred tradition, various authors of amendment proposals, including Nakagawa, suggest deletion of the stipulation according to which the Emperor’s position was ‘based on the will of the people’ from Article 1, as is outlined in section 4.2. Such a revision would pave the way to ignoring public preferences. Instead, matters pertaining to the Imperial household, including the mode of succession, would be governed exclusively by tradition, even if that tradition were not genuine, but invented a mere 150 years ago, as described above. Even if one subscribes to the view that the eight women who had occupied the Chrysanthemum Throne were placeholders, there is no denying their existence. Given the potential risks associated with reinstating the former royal families, would not a female placeholder be preferable to the riskier solution? After all, with the age of patriarchical society, male suffrage and a sovereign Emperor having already come to an end more than six decades ago, the reasons for the introduction of an exclusively male lineage are things of the past. As mentioned above, many conservatives see things differently. Not only because they continue to believe in the invented tradition of the exclusively male lineage, but also in some cases because they loathe the principle of gender equality. Tsujimura suggests as much when she writes that ‘the different treatment based on distinction by sex fulfills the function of fostering or retaining the sex discrimination in Japan’s legal system and customs’ (Tsujimura 2004: 207). Tsujimura’s accusation is worth pondering. After all, if proved correct, this argument would constitute another powerful explanation for continued resistance to any change to the current mode of Imperial succession. The previously cited idiosyncratic interpretation of Article 2 by Nakagawa, according to which the term ‘seshu’ implied an exclusive male lineage comparable to the line of succession in a family of kabuki performers, serves as a first confirmation of Tsujimura’s suspicion. Considering the reactionary tendencies of Nakagawa’s arguments and his preference for the patriarchal and thus discriminatory pre-war civil code, this is hardly a surprise, however. As already mentioned, Nakagawa’s extreme positions are not representative of the majority opinion among conservatives who, as we have seen, are not aiming for a revival of the pre-war system. That being said, many conservatives still seem to be uncomfortable with gender equality. Unfortunately, however, they tend to discuss this contentious topic not in the context of Imperial succession. The main target of their often scathing criticism is the so-called ‘gender-free education’ which

Framing the issues  35 supposedly reduces the differences between the sexes to biological aspects, thereby wiping out essential culturally developed distinctions between men and women, with worrying implications for Japanese society (Machimura 2005: 121–22; Yagi 2004: 128). The results of this ‘radical thought’ were ‘the denial of masculinity and femininity, cutting off family bonds, endorsing radical sexual education and the dismantling of social order’ (Yagi 2004: 150–51). Those who subscribe to this view are naturally opposed to a female Emperor. After all, a female on the Chrysanthemum Throne would be a powerful symbol of a more sexually equal country. However, Yagi or Nakagawa already consider the current initiatives aimed at gender equality, i.e. the Basic Law for a Gender-equal Society, problematic, despite Japan’s poor performance in international studies such as the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum 2009). Thus, we can conclude that sexual discrimination may also play a role in the unwillingness of some, albeit not all conservatives to end the invented tradition of the exclusively male lineage. Conclusion Generally speaking, conservatives seem to be happy with the symbolic Tennō system and popular rule in their current form. Thus, the differences between postwar reality and conservative vision are minor. Naming the Emperor as head of state is a mere formula if one – like most conservatives – believes that he already occupies this highest formal position in the country under the current Constitutional framework. And while some lament the declining respect for the institution, proponents of radical change are far outnumbered by supporters of the existing system. In fact, only Nishibe and Nakagawa demand an end to popular sovereignty. As we shall see in the following chapters, this conservation of the existing framework is reflected particularly well in the Constitutional reform proposals. Reflecting on the comparatively unenthusiastic reaction on the streets of Tokyo to the birth of Hisahito, Meiji University historian Hara Takeshi writes: ‘the people’s cool reaction toward the birth of the prince is proof that the “unbroken imperial line” ideology is already completely wiped out’ (Hara 2006: 112–14). Hara’s observation is underpinned by opinion polls showing continued strong public support for a female Tennō even after the prince’s birth. Judging by the observations made above, the same cannot be said of conservatives. While a few powerful conservatives, including former and current Prime Ministers Koizumi, Asō and Hatoyama, have spoken out in favor of opening the Imperial line of succession to women, the suggestion represents a minority opinion among conservatives and, for better or worse, has been shelved following the birth of Prince Hisahito. Beyond the scathing and often polemical criticism launched against Koizumi’s initiatives by conservative intellectuals, a silent majority do not concern themselves with the issue, thereby tacitly approving the existing exclusively male lineage. The small number of amendment proposals that include a revised Article 2 is again a good reflection of the indifference towards the issue, or the tacit support for the current exclusively male lineage.

36  Framing the issues What is interesting is the divide between the character of the traditions that have become the subject of conservative preservation attempts. Conservatives have correctly identified the Tennō institution’s symbolic role during the postwar years as a continuation of the genuine tradition of fushinsei. Yet, at the same time they are unable or unwilling to recognize the exclusively male lineage as an invented tradition created for political purposes during the second half of the nineteenth century and to restore the genuine tradition.

2.2  Four visions for a new national security policy Among the three framework issues discussed in this chapter, national security is obviously the hottest. Accordingly, this topic has, for better or worse, received by far the most attention inside and outside of Japan. On the one hand, national security is, arguably, one of the best researched subjects in Japanese studies; Richard Samuels’ Securing Japan and Kenneth Pyle’s Japan Rising are just two recent examples of high-profile volumes that deal with the topic. On the other hand, the continued focus on national security and its manifestation in the Constitution, i.e. Article 9 (Yamaguchi 2004: 3), has created a very one-sided view of the entire revision debate, as discussed elsewhere in this book. Below, we will take a look at the criticism conservatives aim at the traditional national security policy of postwar Japan and examine the national security visions they have set out as potential future replacements. As part of this analysis, common stances and differences between the various conservatives will be discussed. The advent of all-out criticism: turning away from postwar passivity As mentioned in the previous chapter, Yoshida and the conservative mainstream leaders that followed him pursued a mercantile foreign policy and passive national security policy that concentrated on economic rather than political or military strength within the framework of the Anpo regime. Japan at that time was a ‘cheap-riding trading state [with] a non-aggressive, low-cost […] security policy’ (Samuels 2007: 6, 29). In the 1980s, Takeshita and long-time minister of foreign affairs Abe Shintarō emphasized their country’s willingness to contribute to international peace, but, unlike Koizumi two decades later, a dispatch of the SDF to foreign countries was not on their minds. Instead, the two LDP heavyweights proposed that Japan should use its considerable economic and scientific power as a means to further global peace and prosperity, for instance, by playing a leading role in global disarmament. At the same time, the country should avoid radiating the ‘sense of a major power’ in dealing with other countries (Gotō 2000: 450; Abe 1984: 18, 279–83). Calls by the LDP’s right-wing and conservative intellectuals to pursue a more aggressive security policy remained, for the time being, without consequence. As discussed above, even Prime Minister Nakasone could do little more than punch a few holes in the Article 9 regime. Two decades later, Pyle wrote that ‘the Yoshida Doctrine, once proclaimed as Japan’s permanent strategy, is a dead letter. […] Presently, [the transformation of Japan’s policies and institutions] is taking place through a slow evolution, but there

Framing the issues  37 can be no question that Japan is on the threshold of a new era’ (Pyle 2007: 374). Samuels pointedly remarked that ‘much has changed since the late 1980s, when Japan was known as an economic giant and a political pygmy’ (Samuels 2007: 63). The early catalyst that forced Japan to begin the process of transformation described by Pyle was the outbreak of the first Gulf War. Japan awoke to the brave new world of the post-Cold War era in an unprepared state (Pyle 2007: 290–99). All of the sudden the means of the mercantilist foreign policy were perceived as inadequate, as evidenced by the lack of gratitude towards Japan for its considerable financial contributions. The realization that money was no longer enough triggered what Nakamura appropriately refers to as Japan’s very own ‘Post Gulf War Syndrome’ (Nakamura 2006: 41). What used to be a ‘permanent strategy’ (Pyle 2007: 374) had turned into a serious problem whose discussion and criticism has since become a standard feature of conservative publications, even those authored by members of the conservative mainstream. In 1993 Hashimoto declared that nobody within the LDP wanted to continue the foreign policy of a mercantilist state (Hashimoto 1993: 106). Ozawa lamented Japan’s image as ‘[a] country that tries to solve everything with money, without [ever] spilling its own sweat’ (Ozawa 2006: 155–56). Across the whole political spectrum, calls to put an end to the ‘passive pacifism of the past’ (Hiranuma 2005: 171) or ‘no good’ one-country pacifism (Ōta 2007: 58) could be heard. While the aforementioned criticism was directed at the reluctance to send troops abroad during and after the first Gulf War, many conservatives, in particular intellectuals, have identified another dimension of what they regard as problematic passivity. The traditional modus operandi had left Japan’s national defense physically and mentally ill-prepared for the present and future challenges. The country depended on the US to defend it, since it had devoted inadequate resources to its defense budget. This dependence on the US was criticized by the outspoken justice minister of the first Suzuki cabinet, the late Okuno Seisuke, who claimed that ‘Japan has entrusted [its] security entirely to the US. Because [Japan] has also become [such] an economic strength, it has repeatedly been told: “please at least make the effort to defend your country on your own”’ (Okuno 2002: 267–68, 328). Even the LDP had forgotten about the value of ‘defending our own country with our own hands’, bemoaned journalist Sakurai Yoshiko (Sakurai, Abe 2005: 34). Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō and former chief cabinet spokesman and foreign secretary Machimura Nobutaka lamented that the Japanese state had not even been able to prevent North Korean agents from abducting Japanese citizens in the past (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 200; Machimura 2005: 70–71). While China ‘was pointing nuclear missiles at 25 major Japanese cities’ (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 144–46), Japan had been mired in a decades-long ‘undemocratic and naïve thought stoppage’ that prevented any badly need discussion of its foreign and security policy in general, and specific means of deterrence, e.g. the deployment of nuclear weapons (Kusaka 2005: 18; Nakagawa 2007: 37–38). The underlying sentiment among many conservatives was summed up by Nishioka Tsutomu in late 2006 as follows: The hindrance of a proper [foreign] policy evolution by voices based on an excessive sense of atonement for the past and an idealistic pacifism à la ‘if

38  Framing the issues Japan does not have military power, East Asia will be secure’ or ‘Japan should mildly listen to what other countries have to say’, this is postwar Japan. (Nakanishi, Nishioka 2006: 51) The strongly worded criticism is not exclusively directed at the government, though. Some conservatives, like Ishihara and Nakanishi Terumasa have equally harsh things to say about the people. The former blames the ‘US-made postwar system’ for the people’s unwillingness to take responsibility for their safety and fight for their country (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 226–27). Meanwhile, the latter laments the existence of a ‘spiritless pacifism in an indecent Japan’ whose people’s mercantilism he likens to pigs thinking only about eating (Nakanishi 2005: 91–97). Such harsh words may still be the domain of a small number of hard-line politicians and intellectuals, but generally speaking, conservatives have found common ground since the early 1990s when it comes to criticizing Japan’s traditional security policy. The time when the country solved problems exclusively through financial means and demonstrated passivity in all military matters had to come to an end. As we shall see below, however, this consensus does not necessarily extend to the vision of a future national security policy. Four visions In fact, four specific visions for Japan’s future national security policy can be distinguished: Small Japanist, Asia-centrist, autonomist and Anpo plus Alpha. According to Samuels, one axis defining positions in the discourse on national security is the relationship with the US (Samuels 2007: 112). Like this author, Samuels has identified autonomists Ishihara and Nishibe as staunch critics of the Anpo alliance (Samuels 2007: 120–23). His conclusion that ‘the days when Japanese nationalists saw the US alliance as a “necessary evil” – to combat the greater threat of Communism – are long gone’ (ibid.) is also hard to dismiss, even though some conservatives like Nishio Kanji, who shares many of Ishihara and Nishibe’s ideas, still argue that Japan on its own lacked the strength to effectively fend off the potential enemies in its neighborhood, as mentioned above. More importantly, against a background of ever closer cooperation with the US on military matters (Bōeishō 2007: 231, 247–51; Kyōdō Tsūshinsha Kenpō Shuzaihan 2007: 50–51), the question of whether Japan should or could distance itself from the US is, arguably, the subject of a theoretical discussion. I would argue that the more important, because more realistic, choice of a distinctive feature is Japan’s future relationship with its Asian neighbors, in particular the People’s Republic of China. Accordingly, each conservative’s respective stance on Japan’s relationship with Asia has become one axis in the following categorization of conservative national security visions. Based on this understanding, the following four distinctive visions have been identified. 1

Anpo plus Alpha: This group consists of America-friendly conservatives, like former Prime Ministers Abe and Asō as well as the late finance minister Nakagawa Shōichi. Their initial aim is to enable collective self-defense in

Framing the issues  39

2

3

4

order to strengthen the existing alliance with the US. Within this bilateral relationship, they hope eventually to see eye to eye with their long-time ally on the other side of the Pacific, by becoming a more active partner. In the medium or long term, they envision an expansion of the bilateral alliance by adding fellow democratic countries, e.g. Australia, India or NATO member countries. The emphasis on this ‘value-based diplomacy’ conveniently allows them to build an alliance that either excludes or even actively challenges the PRC, which has been the target of often strongly worded criticism by supporters of this vision. Asia-centrist: Unlike proponents of the first vision, supporters of the Asiacentric vision aim to openly embrace the PRC and Japan’s other neighbors in East Asia, instead of keeping their distance from them. At the same time, they seek to continue the existing relationship with the US. Be it for purely pragmatic, i.e. economic, reasons or more idealistic ones, i.e. common cultural roots, they believe in the importance of building and maintaining a close relationship with other East Asian nations. The most ambitious representatives of this group are convinced that a multinational security organization, i.e. an Asian version of NATO or even a supranational body like the EU, can be built in East Asia within the next three to five decades. Autonomist: This relatively small group consists mainly of conservative intellectuals who are highly skeptical of the motives of other nations, even Japan’s closest ally, America. While they generally do not go so far as to demand an end to the Anpo alliance, they are very vocal about its perceived weaknesses and problems. Unlike proponents of the second vision, they regard Japan’s neighbors not as friends or partners, but as potential enemies. Moreover, they view the world as a dangerous place where peace is merely an interlude between one war and another (Nakagawa 2004: 43; Nishibe 2004: 137). Accordingly, their threat assessment for Japan has been very dire. In the 1980s, the biggest threat was the USSR, whose invasion of Hokkaido was ‘likely’. Two decades later, North Korea and the PRC, which planned to invade Okinawa, have become the biggest challenges to Japan’s security. Borrowing a page or two from the handbook of realism, they argue that Japan’s national defense had to be rapidly and greatly improved, if the country was to combat those threats effectively. They generally support not only the reintroduction of forced conscription, but also the deployment of a more potent military capability, e.g. a nuclear arms potential to deter North Korea and the PRC. Unlike the two other groups, their focus is evidently on securing and defending Japan. Participation in international peace-keeping missions is, for them, an afterthought. Small Japanist: A completely different foreign policy concept, which is closer to traditional postwar policy, i.e. the previously cited ideas voiced by Takeshita and Abe Shintarō in the 1980s, than to the more prominent and ambitious visions discussed above, has been articulated by New Frontier Party (Shintō Sakigake) members Takemura Masayoshi and Tanaka Shūsei as well as New Party Nippon leader Tanaka Yasuo. They are critical of Japan’s major power ambitions. Instead, they envision a foreign policy based on Ishibashi

40  Framing the issues Tanzan’s ‘small country’ concept. According to this concept, Japan should concentrate its international efforts on soft power (based on its economy, culture, technology and knowledge) rather than hard power, e.g. military might (Takemura, Tanaka 1995: 63–64; Tanaka 2006 preface: 58, 79–80). This is the only vision whose realization does not depend on Constitutional reform. The US–Japanese alliance: a hardly challenged lifeline As established in the previous chapter, the relationship with the US has been a key pillar of Japan’s security policy throughout the postwar era. For all the criticism conservatives direct at what they have identified as flaws of the traditional postwar regime, only a very small number are proposing to tear down this important pillar. The absolute majority simply realistically view the continued existence of the Anpo alliance as a ‘life line’ for Japan (Hiranuma 2005: 72). Hence, the consensus is to uphold or strengthen the two countries’ already close cooperation (Abe 2006: 129; Hiranuma 2005: 72; Katō 2005: 108; Kobayashi 1992: 162; Ozawa 2006: 146). For the alliance to become even closer, Japan would have to stop thinking of the US as its ‘watchdog’ and become a more proactive partner (Abe 2006: 130–31; Hiranuma 2005: 74–75). Conservatives’ method of choice to reach this new stage in the partnership is to enable the right to collective selfdefense. Because a majority of conservatives would like collective self-defense to go beyond the bilateral alliance with the US, we will discuss this topic separately below. Returning the focus to the alliance’s current state, a review of conservative opinions shows that the acknowledgement of its necessity does not translate into an absence of criticism. For one thing, only the autonomists question America’s motives behind upholding the alliance. Ishihara or Nishibe Susumu question America’s willingness and ability to defend Japan against external threat such as North Korean missiles. They contend that the Anpo regime was merely a part of the US’s global strategy and that the primary purpose of American military bases on Japanese soil is not the protection of the partner country, but simply a demonstration of military presence in East Asia for the sake of continued American influence in the region (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 79, 127; Nishibe 1999: 119–20). To do away with this unsatisfactory situation, Nishibe proposes the following solution: In the long term after US forces stationed in Japan [had been] reduced or [entirely] removed, and in their place a Japanese defense army [established] and thus a position of equality had been restored, either a military alliance or a military pact between the US and Japan should be newly concluded. (Nishibe 1999: 119) Nishio Kanji also laments Japan’s dependence on the American military, yet he is worried about the potentially gloomy consequences of a complete withdrawal of US troops from Okinawa. Specifically, he warns that Japan could not defend its southernmost prefecture against an invasion by the PRC’s People’s

Framing the issues  41 Liberation Army on its own. He concludes that Japan needs America to stand up to China, Russia and the two Koreas (Nishio 2004: 57, 77–78, 83–84). As we shall see below, other autonomists, like Nakagawa Yatsuhiro or Nakanishi, seem to share this sentiment of Nishio’s. Meanwhile, the second Iraq War has others, like former LDP secretary-general Katō Kōichi and Gotōda Masazumi, worrying about ‘American unilateralism’ (Katō 2005: 140) and ‘America’s fondness for war’ (Gotōda 2008: 157). Despite all this criticism, it is evident that even among autonomists only very few individuals go so far as to demand an end to the Anpo alliance. Most conservative realistically acknowledge that, despite certain irritations, this lifeline is too important to Japan’s continued security. Accordingly, they do not consider the reduction or severing of that sixty-year-old tie a realistic option. With few exceptions, e.g. Nishibe Susumu, even autonomists see a future for the alliance, because, as we shall see below, they would prefer ‘renting’ American ballistic missiles over developing their own nuclear arms arsenal. The big divide: the China question Arguably the biggest difference among conservatives on the topic at hand is the China question. The alliance with the US may not be free of criticism, yet as we have seen above, those disagreements are minor when compared to the extremely different answers conservatives give to the question of how to deal with Asia in general and the PRC in particular. In fact, it seems as if this is the single most important differentiating factor among the various conservative national security visions. The following two schools of thought exist on this issue. The first group believes in the importance of being on good terms with its Asian neighbors, including the PRC. The supporters of this Asia-centric approach are representatives of the old conservative mainstream, e.g. Koga Makoto, Katō Kōichi, LDP president Tanigaki Sadakazu, former economics minister Nikai Toshihiro, Gotōda Masazumi or Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio. While they all firmly believe that Japan’s place is within the community of Asian neighbors, their motives and future designs are quite varied. On the one hand, there is the pragmatic acknowledgement of Asia’s importance to the Japanese economy (Katō 2005: 152; Sentaku 2006: 48). On the other, one can also find idealistic reasoning, i.e. the emphasis on two millennia of joint history and a common culture between Japan and China (Katō 2005: 150). Therefore it is hardly surprising that, in their eyes, the frosty foreign policy of former Prime Minister Koizumi toward Asia ‘recklessly planted the seed of antagonism’ (Katō 2005: 152) and Asō’s proposal to create an ‘arc of liberty and prosperity’ based on common values (see below) was an attempt to ‘encircle China’ (Asahi Online 2007). While some Asia-friendly conservatives, like Koga, do not deny the importance of a value-based foreign policy, they always stress the importance of initiatives aimed at building the very Asian cooperation systems (Koga 2006: 52, 58) that those critical of the PRC wholeheartedly reject (see below). During his eventually unsuccessful campaign to become LDP president in 2006, the then finance minister Tanigaki emphasized the ‘extreme importance’ of coexisting with neighboring countries, in particular

42  Framing the issues China and Asia. Carefully listening to the opinions of the people of these countries would enable Japan to play a leading role in the region (Tanigaki 2006: 70). The DPJ’s Hiraoka and Kondō even argue that Japan’s best national security policy was friendly relations with China (Hiraoka, Kondō 2006: 90). To avoid getting drawn into any potential conflicts between the PRC and the US, Katō and journalist Tahara Sōichirō suggest that Japan should seek to become the tie that binds those two major powers (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 141–42; Katō 2005: 148–52). The most ambitious proposals call for the establishment of multinational or supranational organizations modeled on NATO and the EU within the next three to five decades (Gotōda 2008: 153; Hatoyama 2005: 18; Hiraoka, Kondō 2006: 78, 85; Katō 2005: 140). One curious proponent of intra-Asian multinational cooperation is Hiranuma Takeo.11 Koizumi’s former economics minister realistically acknowledges that the lack of common values and enemies in East Asia makes the formation of a security alliance difficult, yet he still considers it desirable. Furthermore, he proposes the dispatch of a multinational maritime force to the Strait of Malacca to protect the flow of economically vital resources from the Middle East to East Asia (Hiranuma 2005: 166–69). The difference between Katō’s and Hiranuma’s stance here is obvious. Whereas the latter rationally views a multinational security alliance as vital to Japan’s economic interests, Katō not only supports closer organized Asian cooperation for rational economic reasons, but also brings up a more idealistic argument, namely Japan’s joint history and culture with China. The second group, consisting of advocates of the Anpo plus Alpha and autonomist vision, takes exactly the opposite stance. Its representatives view China alternatively as an ‘international trouble maker’ (Nakagawa 2007a: 38) or an aggressor and invader (Nishio 2004: 54–59). They have traditionally expressed sympathy toward Taiwan and Tibet and criticized the PRC’s handling of the two territories (Ishihara 2006: 87–90; Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 177–78; Nakagawa 2007a: 39). More importantly, in particular, autonomists fear the consequences of what they interpret as Chinese hostility towards Japan. Some, like the Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi’s (one of the Nippon Kaigi’s predecessor organizations) Matsumura Takeshi, fear the creation of an anti-western alliance by the PRC (Mayuzumi 1994: 149–50). Others predict that a democratized China might team up with the US and a united Korea and then proceed to systematically weaken Japan by forcing it into a framework not unlike the Treaty of Versailles, which the Allies forced upon the defeated German Empire after World War I (Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 234–35). Meanwhile, Nakanishi and Nishio paint an even gloomier picture. In their crystal balls they see that China will first establish control over the disputed Senkoku islands before attempting to invade Japan’s southernmost prefecture of Okinawa or even Kyushu (Nakanishi 2005: 97; Nishio 2004: 54–56). Those in favor of an Asia-centric foreign policy or an Asian community of nations had not learnt their lessons from pre-war history. As a result of Stalin’s tactics, the pre-war regime had been tricked into adopting the policy of erecting the Great Asian Prosperity Sphere which led to Japan being drawn into the ‘mud’ of the Sino-Japanese War (Nakanishi, Nishioka 2006: 58). To make sure the same thing does not happen again, they aim to either deter their neighbor by building an

Framing the issues  43 international alliance based on common universal values, or alternatively, turning Japan into a major military power capable of deterring the Chinese threat alone. While believers in the Anpo plus Alpha strategy, i.e. proponents of the former alternative, generally tend to propose taking a tougher stance on territorial disputes or the usage of the gas field in the South China Sea (Nakagawa 2007a: 40), autonomists who support the latter alternative favor more drastic counter measures, i.e. strategic use of official development assistance as a means to put pressure on China (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 189–91) or the development and deployment of nuclear weapons potential, or at least the threat of its pursuit (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 197; Nakanishi 2006: 48). Military capabilities A decade ago, former diplomat and noted foreign policy expert Okazaki Hisahiko expressed his satisfaction with Japan’s military capabilities. Adding a theater missile defense (TMD) system was all that was needed for the US and Japan to counterbalance the growing military might of the PRC (Okazaki 1999: 63–71). The deployment of this ballistic missile defense system, which encompasses a sea-based and a land-based component, is currently underway (Ema 2007: 469).12 Leaving aside the autonomists, most conservatives seem to welcome its installation (Hiranuma 2005: 165). In 2007, Samuels echoed Okazaki’s comments, writing: ‘Japan’s military posture had not been this robust since before the Pacific War’ (Samuels 2007: 5). Unlike Okazaki however, Samuels criticizes the deployment of the missile shield as ‘overinsuring’. He warns of a security dilemma, i.e. state A taking steps to improve its security resulting in A’s improved strategic posture being considered a threat to the security of state B (Goldstein, Pevehouse 2007: 51), in the making, because the RPC and North Korea were also ‘overinsuring’, resulting in a situation in which each of the three countries has made the other two less secure (Samuels 2007: 5). Of course, given the questions surrounding the shield’s efficiency,13 one could ask what good it is to pay expensive insurance premiums, if the insurance in question is unable to pay on the occurrence of a supposedly insured event. On the other hand, it is hard to deny the possibility of an arms race based on the logic of the security dilemma. Applying this logic to the Japanese case would translate into the PRC deploying additional and/or enhanced missiles to overcome the Japanese missile shield. Beyond this shield, most conservative do not demand a further and significant military buildup, however. Instead, the Yomiuri Shimbun, former DPJ president Maehara Seiji and Yamasaki all want to include the existing principle of an exclusively defensive military force (senshu bōei) in a new Fundamental Law on National Security (anzen hoshō kihonhō), which should complement the national security stipulations of a new Constitution (Maehara 2005: 186–88; Yamasaki 2001: 27; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 1995: 13–15). Yamasaki goes so far as to ban not only nuclear weapons, but also offensive conventional weapons systems, e.g. aircraft carriers, in his national security policy proposal (Yamasaki 2001: 27). Among proponents of Asia-centrism and Small Japanism, some even aim for arms reduction. Tanaka Yasuo argues that Japan should seek to become a strong

44  Framing the issues nation by building not a huge army, but a wealthy society (Tanaka 2006: 205). In the early 1990s, then Prime Minister Hosokawa envisioned a global security framework that would allow Japan to go down the road of arms reduction (Hosokawa 1993: 223). Similarly, Gotōda Masazumi believes the creation of the aforementioned joint security sphere in Northeast Asia would allow Japan to cut its defense budget and channel the amount of money saved into welfare and environmental protection (Gotōda 2008: 157). Katō claims that weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction, lost their power in the post-Cold War era. What matters most these days is not the size of a nation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons, but rather its financial capital and technological prowess (Katō 2005: 185). For the sake of its long-term future, Japan, as a country lacking natural resources, has to rediscover the very foundation of the postwar economic miracle, knowledge and technology (Katō 2005: 186). Another proponent of this ‘soft power’ concept is the veteran journalist Tahara Sōichirō, who believes that Japan can and should use its economic, technological and cultural assets as tools for its foreign policy. Reminding his readers of Japan’s loss in World War II, Tahara argues that a strong Japanese military is far less useful than these tools, in particular vis-à-vis the United States (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 189–93). In nukes we do(n’t) trust!? Despite autonomists calling for nuclear armament, a majority of conservatives have pledged to uphold the three non-nuclear principles. In 2007, for instance, Tanigaki and former defense secretary Ishiba Shigeru both spoke out against the nuclear option, arguing that it would trigger an arms race in Asia, cause problems in the vital relationship with the US and spell trouble for Japan’s civilian use of nuclear energy under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime (Koizumi et al. 2007: 121, 130–31). As we shall see in Chapter 3, the Yomiuri Shimbun and Hatoyama Yukio go so far as to include the three non-nuclear principles in their respective Constitutional reform proposals. Yamasaki Taku or Maehara Seiji do not see the need to include such a stipulation in a new Constitution; instead they would like the three principles to become part of a new Fundamental Law on National Security (Maehara 2005: 186–88; Yamasaki 2001: 27). Only autonomists who are distrustful of all other countries’ including the US’s intentions recommend a significant arms build-up. Given their dire threat assessments and lack of confidence in the efficiency of UN Security Council resolutions and the missile defense shield (Nakanishi, Nishioka 2006: 54), it is only consequential that they support the building up of a very potent military force capable of deterring all potential enemies. Autonomists don’t necessarily propose that Japan should develop and deploy its own arsenal of nuclear weapons. Instead, they generally seem to prefer what they refer to as the ‘Pershing Option’. Already in the mid1980s, Nakagawa Yatsuhiro demanded that American Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles, which previously had been stationed in Western Europe, should be deployed to Japan’s northernmost island of Hokkaido to counter the threat of ‘a likely Soviet invasion’ (Nakagawa 1985: 177). More than two decades later, Nakanishi has unearthed Nakagawa’s proposal, calling for medium-range ballistic

Framing the issues  45 missiles to be set up in Japan to deter North Korean and Chinese aggression. This interest in America’s mighty weapons arsenal could serve as an explanation why ‘the days when Japanese nationalists saw the US alliance as a “necessary evil”’ (Samuels 2007: 121) will not be gone anytime soon. Only in the event that the US denied this request, should Japan opt out of the NPT and pursue its own nuclear weapons program (Nakanishi, Nishioka 2006: 54). No matter what the origin of the nuclear weapons, Nakanishi seems confident that their deployment would lead to a stable Sino-Japanese relationship through a state of mutual nuclear deterrence (Nakanishi 2006: 48). Another autonomist who does not believe in the missile shield is Nishio Kanji. He calculates that it would be more cost-effective to purchase 800 Tomahawk cruise missiles, which could be used as both a deterrent and a first-strike weapon (Nishio 2004: 128–29). While he does not elaborate further on this idea, Tomahawk cruise missiles, conveniently, are able to deliver not only conventional, but also nuclear warheads. As an alternative to actually deploying an arsenal of new, potent conventional or nuclear weapons, autonomists have proposed playing mind games with the enemy. They suggest that maybe it was not even necessary to go as far as developing and deploying nuclear arms. Instead, the mere threat to do so might result in the desired deterrent effect. To that end, Japan would have to create only the scientific and psychological foundations required for the development and/or deployment, and occasionally demonstrate its ability and determination to put this plan into action (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 197; Nakanishi 2006: 51). The dream of a strong, self-reliant military force anchored by an arsenal of nuclear weapons is likely to remain just that, however. In the 1980s the Defense Agency briefly toyed with the idea of an independent nuclear force. However, the plan was quickly abandoned (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2004: 2). Considering the serious ramifications of a nuclear-armed Japan outlined above, e.g. a new arms race or sanctions under the NPT regime, as well as the public’s continued strong antipathy towards nuclear weapons,14 it is hard to believe that the leaders of the sole country ever to suffer a nuclear attack would change their minds on this issue in the foreseeable future. Towards greater international contributions As already outlined, since the Gulf War and the harsh American criticism toward the Japanese contribution or the lack thereof, the Japanese government has chosen to send the SDF on peace-keeping missions to Cambodia (1992), Mozambique (1993), the Golan Heights (1996), East Timor (2002) and Nepal (2007) (Bōeishō 2007: 295). The Koizumi administration went one step further, by enacting two Special Measures laws in 2001 and 2003. The first was aimed at supporting the international effort to bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the September 11 terror attacks on the US (for instance by providing fuel to allied ships in the Indian Ocean), whereas the second was the legal basis for the dispatch of an SDF contingent to help with the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq (Uchiyama 2007: 117–25). In particular, Koizumi’s decision to send SDF personnel to Iraq has been criticized as being unconstitutional by scholars of

46  Framing the issues Constitutional law (Watanabe H. 2005: 143–46). And despite various conservatives questioning the wisdom and legitimacy of the Indian Ocean and Iraq missions in particular,15 the consensus opinion among advocates of the Anpo plus Alpha and Asia-centric visions seems to be in favor of Japan generally playing a more active role in international peace-keeping operations. Hatoyama, Hiranuma, Koga, Yamasaki and the Yomiuri, for instance, all argue that Japan had to continue along the path leading from the dreaded ‘passive pacifism’ of the past to an ‘active pacifism’, i.e. proactive participation in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) (Hatoyama 2005: 75; Hiranuma 2005: 171; Koga 2006: 53; Yamasaki 2001: 28; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 75). Seeing how many scholars of Constitutional law have already questioned the constitutionality of the SDF’s dispatch to Iraq, it is obvious that it would be complicated to achieve this transformation under the current Constitutional constraints imposed by the Article 9 regime. Past governments may have shown a great deal of flexibility when it came to interpreting and re-interpreting Article 9, yet many conservatives are anything but happy with those constant re-interpretations and hence aim to change the actual Article 9, not merely its interpretation (Hatoyama 2005: 69; Yamasaki 2001: 62–63, 68–69). As will be discussed in section 4.3, this explains why almost all Constitutional amendments proposed during the last two decades include stipulations pertaining to SDF missions outside Japan, in particular PKO. Even if conservatives are united in their proactive peace-building vision, opinions on the modus operandi of such are missions are sharply divided. The Democratic Party, for one, wants to limit the scope of international missions by the SDF to peace-keeping activities under the auspices of the United Nations (DPJ 2006). The party has repeatedly explained its disapproval of the Iraq dispatch by the lack of a UN mandate for the mission. Conservative intellectuals and LDP politicians obviously tend to dismiss such criticism. They certainly agree with their political opponents over the need to actively take part in UN peace-keeping missions (Hiranuma 2005: 170–71), but, as the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq has demonstrated, the party has so far shown no intention of making a UN mandate necessary for sending the SDF abroad. The reluctance of many LDP politicians and other conservatives to make a UN resolution mandatory for the SDF’s dispatch is often explained by the incapability of the Security Council to agree on initiating a PKO (Yamasaki 2001: 26; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 92–93). Despite these problems concerning the decision-making process at the UN, conservatives, in particular proponents of the Asia-centric vision, have put forth arguably bold proposals aiming at the creation of a standing army under United Nations control. Ozawa and Hosokawa first voiced this idea in the early 1990s, arguing that Japan should take a front-runner role in providing troops to such an army (Hosokawa 1993: 221–22; Ozawa 2006: 158–59). Since then, similar proposals have also been made by Hatoyama and Katō (Hatoyama 2005: 77; Katō 2005: 100). As will be discussed in section 4.3, this debate over the umbrella under which peacekeeping operations ought to be conducted is well reflected in the Constitutional reform drafts. The UN may the organization of choice, yet many conservatives choose to be less specific in their proposed stipulations concerning peace-keeping operations, leaving the door open for other umbrellas.

Framing the issues  47 When it comes to explaining the rationale behind their recent fondness for such dispatches, the consensus among supporters of a more proactive role quickly breaks down. Machimura explains to his readership that Japan wanted peace on earth and hence decided to send the SDF to Iraq, where its mission was the rebuilding of infrastructure and not fighting, as the former foreign secretary emphasizes (Machimura 2005: 90–91). Others openly admit that such dispatches were not only about idealistic love for peace on earth, but also connected to Japan’s economic interest. Already in 1994, Gakushūin University professor Kayama Kenichi had written that a stable world was of great importance to a trading nation like Japan. Hence, it made no sense for Japan to deny cooperation on peacekeeping missions (Mayuzumi 1994: 148). Abe, for instance, acknowledges that the stabilization of an oil-rich country like Iraq is in Japan’s interest (Abe 2006: 135). Hiranuma states that the Iraq mission of the SDF was at least partially about securing continued US support to deal with the North Korean situation (Hiranuma 2005: 72–75). Statements such as these show that many conservatives believe that Japan simply cannot afford to be a ‘cheap-riding trading state’ any longer. As Keio University’s Kobayashi Setsu candidly has remarked, ‘in the eyes of the people of many countries, who think Japan obviously has a responsibility to participate in military activities to maintain international peace, a Japanese refusal is seen as nothing but mere “cowardice” or “irresponsibility”’ (Kobayashi 1999: 132–33). Naturally, autonomists are an exception here. They have little to say about the topic of peace-keeping operations. Given the huge number of threats posed to Japan’s security by its neighbors, it is not surprising that they focus their attention on national defense. Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, for instance, does not even bother to address the issue in his most recent books on Constitutional reform. In 2004, Nishio Kanji expressed mixed feelings about the SDF’s mission to Iraq. While he praised the Koizumi government’s decision as a strong signal to China and South Korea, who had not anticipated this ‘bold move’, he lamented the fact that the Japanese contingent had to be protected by Dutch soldiers, saying that the SDF was no ‘young boys’ international cooperation corps’ (Nishio 2004: 119–23). Collective self-defense: same means, different goals As we have already hinted , the key means to becoming a more proactive player on the world stage, or at least within the existing alliance with the US, is enabling the right to collective self-defense. Precisely how this right, which is banned under the current interpretation of the Constitution (Boyd, Samuels 2005: 9–10; Yamasaki 2001: 71–72),16 should be enabled will be discussed in section 4.3. Collective self-defense is first and foremost thought of as a means of strengthening the US– Japanese alliance and ensuring smooth joint operations by the two countries’ militaries. It would contribute to increasing the maturity of the alliance by bringing out a greater degree of equality in standing and in sharing duties (Abe 2006, 130–32; Hiranuma 2005: 164; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 107; Yamasaki 2001: 76–77). For the medium and long-term future, many conservatives have more ambitious applications than the bilateral relationship with the US in mind, however. The complex challenges of the globalized world could not be solved by two countries acting

48  Framing the issues alone, instead they demand multilateral solutions (Katō 2005: 137–40). The multilateral security alliance of choice of course depends on its author’s view of who is Japan’s friend and who its foe. As discussed above, the major divide among the country’s conservatives is the answer to the question whether the PRC specifically, or East Asia in general, falls into the former or the latter category. Asiacentrists, like Katō or Hatoyama, stress the importance of a good relationship with Japan’s Asian neighbors, in particular the PRC, and propose the creation of a multilateral security framework in Asia, i.e. an Asian version of NATO including the US, or even a supranational entity like the EU, within the next three to five decades (Hatoyama 2005: 75–76; Katō 2005: 139). Supporters of the Anpo plus Alpha vision, who fear or loathe closer ties to Asia and China in particular, obviously have a very different framework in mind. In their eyes, ideal future partners are countries such as Australia, India or NATO members, which share common universal values, e.g. democracy and fundamental human rights, with Japan (Abe 2006: 160; Asō 2007: 45–48; Nakagawa 2007a: 38). On the other hand, this values-based selection of prospective alliance partners conveniently excludes the PRC. Autonomists are also in favor of enabling collective self-defense. Nakagawa (see sections 3.2.2, 3.3.2 and 3.4.6) and Nishibe (section 3.4.8), for instance, are among the few authors to explicitly mention it in their proposals. As mentioned above, they are less interested in using collective self-defense to build global alliances, however. That being said, they view it as Japan’s inherent right, based on the stipulations of the UN Charter (Nakagawa 1991: 103–4) and some of their ambitious military build-up plans, e.g. the previously cited Pershing option could be more easily realized by enabling collective self-defense. Hence, we can conclude that the enabling of the right to use collective selfdefense may be considered an effective means to initially strengthen Japan’s position within the Anpo alliance and later facilitate the integration in a multilateral security framework by all conservatives except those who are weary of alliances in the first place. However, even though the means may be identical, the same cannot be said of the ultimate goal behind this move. Instead, the sharply differing stances on Japan’s relationship with Asia, and the PRC in particular, serve as the foundation of two visions as to what a multinational security framework should look like. One, emphasizing the necessity of close ties with Japan’s Asian neighbors, argues for the creation of a regional security framework not unlike NATO in East Asia, whereas the second, based on skeptism or open animosity towards China, seeks to build an alliance with fellow democracies, without or against the ‘trouble maker’ (Nakagawa 2007a: 38) China. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the aforementioned disparity between means and aims makes it difficult to create a link between these visions and the proposed Constitutional amendments. Conclusion As we have established above, four distinct national security visions can be identified. The emphasis of the two most prominent ones, i.e. Anpo plus Alpha and Asia-centrism, does not seem to be on a re-militarization of Japan, as claimed elsewhere. Instead of building an even more robust military force, their focus is on

Framing the issues  49 transforming Japan into a major player within a multilateral security framework that goes beyond the existing bilateral Anpo alliance. The means of choice to achieve this integration in an arguably ambitious security alliance, be it one based on values or one based on geography, is collective self-defense. Hence, it is no surprise that all proposals for a new Constitution break with the existing modus operandi by implicitly or explicitly enabling the right to make use of collective self-defense, as outlined in section 4.3. In its new role as a more proactive member of the international community, most conservatives want Japan to participate in peace-keeping operations. However, they disagree about whether a UN Security Council resolution should be a precondition for such a dispatch of the SDF. The comparatively small number of autonomists and Small Japanists obviously see things differently. The former group sees a country surrounded by hostile nations. Hence, the focus of its representative is on securing the homeland by bolstering Japan’s military capabilities, for instance by deploying nuclear weapons. Sending troops abroad is an afterthought to them. However, in order to strengthen Japan’s defenses they view amending the Constitution as an important measure. Meanwhile, the vision of a Small Japan is closest to the traditional postwar policy. It emphasizes the necessity and possibilities of soft power, while being critical of hard power, i.e. military means as a key tool of Japanese foreign and security policy. Accordingly, this vision does not necessitate Constitutional reform and therefore Tanaka Yasuo or Takemura have not published any revision proposals, nor do they see the immediate need for an amendment of the supreme law. This is obviously not the case with the other three groups. For them, Constitutional revision is a necessity because of the ambitious designs of the multilateral security frameworks or the significant military build-up they have in mind. Some have suggested that Asia-centrists were generally against Constitutional reform, due to the influence exerted on them by the Chinese government (Sentaku 2006). And while Hiraoka and Kondō, for instance, have indeed spoken out against revision (Hiraoka, Kondō 2006: 90), Yamasaki and Hatoyama have pushed for it for more than a decade and even published their own drafts (see sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.10). After all, a multilateral security framework in East Asia, just like an alliance based on common universal values, would be unimaginable without enabling the right to collective self-defense. Since Hatoyama and his fellow Asia-centrists share the disdain of their Anpo plus Alpha counterparts for continued re-interpretation of the existing Constitution, the only other option for enabling the use of this right is the actual revision of the supreme law.

2.3  Curing moral illnesses, aiming for a dignified nation As many conservatives see it, individualism, egoism, materialism and other moral hazards have taken a heavy toll on Japanese society. Some of the causes of and solutions to these problems lie with the Constitution and its proposed revision, others with the Fundamental Law on Education. It is for this very reason that the revision of the Constitution’s Chapter 3, i.e. the provisions stipulating the people’s rights and duties, has become one focal point during the last decade. To fully comprehend the conservative criticism of the Constitution and the proposed

50  Framing the issues patches discussed in section 4.4, a broader picture of the conservative criticism of postwar society and the vision towards a better future will be painted below. A key reason for conservative concern is the spiritual decline of Japan during the last six decades. During the postwar period, the Japanese people became egocentric materialists who had not only forgotten their nation, but also every single value beyond profit-loss arithmetic, or, in the words of Nakanishi, were no different from pigs whose sole concern was to eat all day long (Nakanishi 2005: 95–96). This obviously raises the question of what kind of values supposedly have disappeared and turned the once-noble Japanese into dirty pigs similar to what Miyazaki Hayao depicted in the popular animation movie Spirited Away (Sen to Chihiro no Kamikakushi). In the following, the grave illnesses supposedly plaguing postwar Japanese society, as well as their proposed remedies, will be discussed. As mentioned above, the various problems are linked to a variety of stipulations of the Constitution’s Chapter 3. The debate about individual freedom versus the public interest, for instance, relates to Articles 11 to 13, while positions on the family’s role in society are linked to Article 24. Furthermore, the discussion on environmental rights and on the duties to observe the law and defend the nation is directly reflected in the reform proposals through newly included stipulations. Illnesses of the present If the often strongly worded criticism of mercantilism discussed above was an assault on postwar foreign policy, then the following criticism of individualism and materialism is an attack on postwar domestic policy. This criticism is not an invention of the past decade, however. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, the domestic policy choice of Yoshida’s political heirs, beginning with Ikeda, to focus on economic growth has always aroused the ire of politicians and intellectuals on the right. Already in the 1970s the Seirankai unsuccessfully demanded a return to ‘original LDP politics’ centered on amending the Constitution and strengthening the Japanese military (Tahara 1978: 180–81). However, with the possible exception of Nakasone’s five-year interregnum, these voices remained unheard until the 1990s. Instead, representatives of the conservative mainstream defended their strategy against critics by pointing out the obvious. They had successfully rebuilt a country ravaged by the horrors of war and turned it into an economic superpower and wealthy nation. One example of this view of things is an article written by the late Miyazawa Kiichi in 1985. In it the future prime minister emphasized the importance of legally guaranteed personal and material freedom for postwar Japan and praised this as a major achievement of the conservative mainstream’s policy. Miyazawa did not completely turn a blind eye on potential future challenges, such as the need to manage newly gained wealth and protect the environment (Miyazawa 1985: 6, 11, 12). Nonetheless, the article clearly is a eulogy for the conservative mainstream’s agenda, praising its success in bringing freedom, explicitly including the materialist component thereof, to the Japanese people. In recent years, however, such eulogies have all but disappeared. Some, such as Ozawa or Machimura, may still admit that the rational focus on economic growth was a correct policy choice

Framing the issues  51 in the aftermath of the war (Machimura 2005: 59; Ozawa 2006: 65), but this is already as much praise as most conservatives have been willing to heap on the conservative mainstream’s guiding principle. After all, as Ozawa has remarked, the golden age described by Miyazawa did not last forever (Ozawa 2006: 65). With the splendor of the economic miracle quickly fading, more and more conservatives looked at their country and slowly but surely began to see issues about which only the LDP’s side-stream and conservative intellectuals had hitherto cared. Perhaps the most striking example of this shift in perception is the view that Japan has paid a very high price for its pursuit of materialistic wealth. To read critical treatises of the conservative mainstream’s policies in books written by politicians such as Abe or Ishihara is hardly surprising (Abe 2006: 29, 128; Ishihara 2006: 112–13). After all, the former can be considered a political heir of the Seirankai, while the latter was one of its founding fathers. It is, however, telling that criticism of the conservative mainstream’s modus operandi also comes from its very own spiritual heirs. In his book of 2005, Miyazawa’s heir Katō Kōichi conceded that economic growth alone was insufficient. The nation also needed firm values and self-confidence. As a result of the exclusive focus on economic matters, the Japanese had lost their identity. Katō goes so far as to call this situation a national ‘crisis’ (Katō 2005: 256–57). Takemura and Tanaka Shūhei also criticize the damage that materialism has caused to human kindness, humility and family bonds (Takemura, Tanaka 1995: 190), but as we shall see below, they do not view patriotism as the solution. This phenomenon is similar to what we have already observed in the field of national security. The quality of the criticism may not have changed dramatically during the last three or four decades, but the quantity certainly has. If the Gulf War was the single biggest catalyst for a reassessment of the nation’s mercantilist foreign policy, it was the burst of the economic bubble and the following ‘Lost Decade’ that made many conservatives re-evaluate the domestic policy agenda during the 1990s. The perceived focus on materialism is not the only problem Japan has to overcome, however. Postwar society was also suffering from ‘excessive egocentrism’ and ‘misunderstood’ or ‘gone-too-far’ individualism. This condition was not only against public interest, but ultimately would also endanger the unity of society (Tamura 2006: 128, 130; Yamasaki 2001: 19, 93; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 107). In the conservative debate, egocentrism and individualism have two dimensions: a materialist dimension related to the aforementioned problem, and a more abstract dimension pertaining to an individual’s role in and stance toward society and the nation. Representative of the first dimension is the struggle over the construction of Narita Airport in Chiba prefecture. The property rights of local farmers unwilling to make way for the then new airport’s construction were in conflict with public interest, i.e. the construction of the airport (Yamasaki 2001: 19). These individual property rights may be part of the freedoms lauded by Miyazawa; yet, as already mentioned in section 1.1, many conservatives emphasize the good of society as a whole over individual rights. This emphasis on the whole of society seems to be the origin and the goal of Yamasaki’s demand for a ‘balance’ between individual property rights and public interest. The occasionally proposed revision of Article 29 could be interpreted as a reflection of this aspect, which, as established in section 1.1, certainly is unlike anything Burke would have proposed.

52  Framing the issues The second, arguably more important albeit more abstract, dimension of this perceived ‘excessive egocentrism’ and ‘misunderstood individualism’ regards the individual’s role in and stance toward society and the nation. Whereas their ancestors during the pre-war years were proud of their country and cared about the nation, the Japanese people have come to either ignore the nation or consider it and the state as evil entities, throughout the postwar period (Abe 2006: 96, 202; Hiranuma 2005: 53–54, 61–62; Katō 2005: 257). In a society consisting of atom-like individuals, the rights of each individual have become all important, with community becoming a distant afterthought. Some go so far as to compare this condition to the state of nature famously depicted by Hobbes (Yagi 2003: 214–15; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 107). This trend is partially blamed on a supreme law alternatively seen by its critics as featuring too abstract and vague stipulations,17 overemphasizing the protection of individual rights vis-à-vis the nation and the state or outright ‘rejecting community’ (Sōken Kaigi 2006: 32, 33; Yagi 2003: 215). Another cause of society’s pitiful state was a ‘one-sided’ education centering on the old Fundamental Law on Education. Similar to the Constitution, this law was forced upon Japan by the US occupation to make sure that Japan would remain a weak nation and never pose a threat to the United States again (Ezaki 2007: 224–25; Ozawa 2006: 177–80). Void of any patriotism, the resulting education ‘made one hate Japan’ (Machimura 2005: 112–13). The obvious consequence was a refusal to contribute to the well-being of society or the nation. Instead, the people, unwilling to defend the nation with their own hands, expected the state to ensure their continued safety (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 226–27). To make things even worse, education, or rather the lack thereof, resulted in rapidly declining morals and discipline. This was the result of a denial of inherent Japanese values. Representative of this view is Ozawa’s explanation. Regarding the lack of traditional disciplinary education as the reason behind this decline in morals, he complains that the pre-war period’s disciplinary education had been considered ‘reactionary’ and ‘feudalist’ during the postwar years (Ozawa 2006: 179). Similar arguments can be found in the publications of Machimura, Hiranuma, Etō Jun or the Nippon Kaigi (Etō 1996: 24, Ezaki 2007: 226–27; Hiranuma 2005: 61–62; Machimura 2005: 129). Less positive assessments of pre-war education can occasionally be read as well, even though they are rare. Representative of these more liberal views is the stance of Tanaka Yasuo. Citing the Imperial Rescript on Education as an example, the former governor of Nagano prefecture criticizes the influence of politics on education, writing that it was ‘irresponsible to force the results of political ineptitude’ (Tanaka 2006: 62–63) on the educational system. That being said, such critical reflections of the pre-war years are evidently few and far in between and hardly representative of the majority opinion among conservative elites. Another victim of the education system, on the one hand, and of individualism, on the other, were Japanese families. The ‘misunderstood’, ‘gone-too-far’ individualism and materialism were undermining traditional family bonds (Ibuki 2005: 96–97). While the Constitution’s Article 24 did not stipulate the protection of the family as the fundamental social unit (Yagi 2003: 216), the educational system no

Framing the issues  53 longer presented a traditional family, consisting of a husband, a wife and children, as role a model (Abe 2006: 215–16). This education in turn had resulted in parents no longer teaching their children discipline or how to become self-reliant (Ozawa 2006: 167–73). Additionally, while in the good old days the strict old-lady-fromnext-door would contribute her share to the children’s education, nuclear families living in the individualized anonymity of industrialized urban centers have resulted in the decline of these community-oriented ways of educating children (Katō 2005: 209). Whereas these circumstances are perceived by almost all conservatives as highly problematic, it is in particular the LDP’s right-wing and conservative intellectuals who consider ‘gender-free’ education another major obstacle in rebuilding Japanese society. They view ‘gender-free’ education as a feminist or communist invention, resulting in children no longer being taught about the culturally developed sexual distinctions between a man and a woman (Machimura 2005: 121–22; Yagi 2004: 128). These distinctions, which go beyond the biological differences between the sexes, were created by culture and society. Thus, the rationalist proponents of the ‘gender-free’ concept believe, these traditional distinctions could easily be abolished (Yagi 2004: 140). Meanwhile, more liberal minds, like Takemura or Tanaka Shūhei, perceive these traditional distinctions as ‘old social customs’ which, together with flaws in the legal and social systems, represented major obstacles for women’s participation in society (Takemura, Tanaka 1995: 183). Those such as Yagi counter this assertion with an argument (Yagi 2004: 140) witnessed multiple times throughout the course of this research. Similar to the French revolutionaries, these modern-day rationalists were simply tearing down traditions which are supposed to be handed down from generation to generation. Another issue related to materialism is the condition of the natural environment. Although it may not be the subject of such heated debates as are the Tennō system or national security among conservatives, the fact that, with few exceptions, conservative Constitutional reform proposals have incorporated paragraphs stipulating the right and duty of environmental protection shows a certain level of conservative interest in an issue that is perceived as important by the public.18 In his 2005 book, Machimura bitterly remarked that the Japanese landscape is even dirtier than the thoughts of the Japanese people these days (Machimura 2005: 58). The originator of this physical pollution, whom conservatives also directly or indirectly blame for the spiritual pollution, is easily found: the conservative mainstream and its emphasis on economic policy and public works projects (Machimura 2005: 59; Ibuki 2005: 93–94). The post-materialist tone of this critique may sound surprising to some ears. After all, post-materialism has traditionally been more closely associated with the political left than with conservatives (Inglehart 1977: 366). However, this debate also has a traditionalist component to it. As many conservatives see it, living in harmony with a fair, natural environment was a Japanese tradition (Katō 2005: 252–53). A quick glance at Japanese history suggests that this is another invented tradition, however. Conservatives, who lament the havoc wreaked on the environment by public works during the postwar years, conveniently turn a blind eye to the unsustainable mining of precious metals during the Edo period (1600–1867) or the damage done by copper

54  Framing the issues mining in Ashio during the Meiji years (McClain 2002: 238–40; Wildman Nakai 1988: 107). The vision of a dignified nation From this disease pattern we can infer the conservative vision of a healthy Japan without too much trouble. Conservatives seek to restore ‘the dignity of the nation’, to borrow the title of Fujiwara Masahiko’s bestseller. As we have seen above, the wish for a less materialist and individualist, more traditional, social and patriotic country seems to unite most conservatives. With very few exceptions, e.g. Tanaka Yasuo, they are also convinced that the key to future national dignity is hidden in the past. However, as soon as the question of precisely how much more tradition and patriotism, and how much less materialism and individualism amount to a dignified nation, comes up, differences come into sight. Katō Kōichi envisions a Japan that upholds firm values and is as self-confident as it used to be. The common value for the twenty-first century is quality of life realized through a back-to-the-roots movement, e.g. back to traditional local communities and back to admiration of nature (Katō 2005: 256–60). That is as far as Katō’s recourse to the good old days goes. As a moderate, he is weary of the exploitation of patriotism for political reasons and restrained in his critique of individualism (Katō 2005: 91). Meanwhile, many of Katō’s less moderate peers formulate a bolder vision with a stronger patriotic undertone. The Sōken Kaigi stresses the importance of community and suggests that a re-discovery of Japan’s peculiar identity as manifested through its long history, rich traditions and unique culture is in order (Sōken Kaigi 2006: 16–17). The vision of a dignified nation with a vigorous economy and reliable society, as proposed by Katō’s long-time political ally Yamasaki Taku, already draws more inspiration from the not-so-distant past. To Yamasaki, key values for realizing his vision are love for Japan and fellow Japanese as well as the obligation to defend and show allegiance toward the nation (Yamasaki 2001: 22–23, 30). Similarly, Machimura suggests that Japan should strive to become a nation of high standards that boasts beautiful landscapes, proud history, traditions and culture (Machimura 2005: 60). Hiranuma argues for the restoration of a ‘samurai Japan’ where patriotism and Confucian values were more important than the economy (Hiranuma 2005: 61–62). Ishihara advocates the return of the following values: passion for traditional culture, a feeling of friendship and belonging, a true sense of identity and responsibility based on self-restraint and self-sacrifice (Ishihara 2006: 114). Arguably the best and bluntest summary of the sentiments reflected in these proposals is given by Fujiwara Masahiko, who, in Dignity of the Nation, wrote: Japan must not become one of those vulgar countries that see nothing objectionable in single-minded money worship. We must work to preserve the dignity of our nation. No matter if the price is century-long economic decline, we must stand aloof, we must dare to be different. The economy is not the be-all and end-all. (Fujiwara, Giles 2007: 277)

Framing the issues  55 In other words, Japan should break out of the materialist and individualist mindset that dominated the conservative mainstream-led postwar era and set itself a new, old national target, i.e. become a proud and dignified national community. It is impossible to overhear the nostalgic longing for the supposedly good old days in those statements. One has to be careful not to misinterpret these yearnings for more community, history, culture and traditions as radical reactionary thought aimed at restoring the pre-war regime, however. After all, as we established in section 2.1, the upholding of democracy remains a matter of course to all conservatives except for a very small number of reactionaries, e.g. Nakagawa and Nishibe. In his commentary to the Yomiuri’s third draft, Kitaoka Shinichi explained as much in writing ‘I’m not of the belief that we should incorporate [every aspect of Japanese history into a new Constitution], but a certain amount of respect for the legacy of the past is needed’ (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 302). The remaining problem is how to achieve this goal of a dignified nation. Cures of the past Since the goal itself seems to be partially inspired by the pre-war period, it is only consequential that many conservatives believe the methods of achieving it are also to be found in Japanese history. One way of curing the woes of the postwar period and achieving the new national goal of a proud, dignified nation, aware of its identity, is to instill patriotism in the younger generations. Thus, many within the conservative establishment have long demanded a revision of the heavily criticized 60-year-old Fundamental Law on Education. The revised law was to foster the inheritance of culture and traditions, patriotism, a public spirit, morals, a spirit of self-reliance, and religious sentiment – in other words, all the important and desirable values that are missing in Japan these days. Furthermore, the amended law should define the roles and responsibilities of parents and administration (Watanabe 2007: 101–2). Much to their supporters’ dismay, these education targets did not all make it into the revised version of the law, due to resistance from the LDP’s junior coalition partner, Kōmeitō (Watanabe 2007: 102). The targets of education as outlined in Article 2 of the revised law do include the wording ‘cultivate a moral sense’ (paragraph 1), ‘cultivation of an attitude [...] independently participating in the formation of society and contributing to its development based on communal spirit’ (paragraph 3) and ‘cultivation of an attitude honoring traditions and culture, loving our country, which has fostered those, and one’s hometown’ (paragraph 5; e-Gov Database 2006). The term ‘patriotism’ and any references to religious sentiment are missing, however. Instead, environmental protection has become a newly declared target, as paragraph 4 stipulates ‘the cultivation of an attitude that values nature and contributes to the environment’s preservation’ (ibid.). The inclusion of this latter passage, however, apparently did little to console those such as Sakurai Yoshiko. They strongly criticized the LDP for not including the term ‘patriotism’ and for what they perceive to be a lack of clear values (Watanabe 2007: 100). Meanwhile, the DPJ received some rare praise for its counter proposal, because the preamble of the party’s draft included the phrase ‘foster hearts that love Japan’ (ibid.; DPJ 2006a). Evidently,

56  Framing the issues conservatives are resorting here to old solutions in an attempt to solve the problems of the present. The following extract is taken from Carol Gluck’s excellent Japan’s Modern Myths. She describes the perceived problems of the Taishō era (1912–1926) and how the government thought it would cope with them. Taishō educators spoke of a moral crisis in the face of ‘progressivism’ and once again sought its solution in the strengthening of moral education. Sounding much like their counterparts in the 1880s, they argued that moral education was necessary to instill in youth a proper civic ‘sense of nation’. […] Moral education would further serve to protect young people from such encroaching ‘abnormalities of thought’, as materialism, individualism, and socialism. (Gluck 1989: 279) If the references to Taishō and Meiji were removed, one could easily mistake the above for a conservative assessment of Japan during the first decade of the new millennium. This is obviously not to suggest that the tragic turn that the Japanese Empire took during the 1920s and 1930s was indicative of what the future had in store for Japan. The lack of differences between the assessments of what initially seem to be two completely different situations can still be considered instructive. Similar to the traditions, such as the exclusively male lineage, invented in the late nineteenth century, this is yet another reminder of how influential Meiji-era thought remains among conservative elites in presentday Japan. Even if the DPJ’s draft of the Fundamental Law on Education had been adopted, one question would have remained. How effective is this new law in fostering patriotism? Abe or the Nippon Kaigi, for instance, are apparently convinced that the nurturing of patriotic people should be a target of the education system (Abe 2006: 207). Meanwhile, moderates like Katō seem to believe that patriotism is born of a natural feeling. Katō calls this natural patriotism good nationalism, while labeling its use or abuse, in particular for political purposes, bad nationalism (Katō 2005: 91). Despite his party’s proposal for the revised Fundamental Law on Education including the controversial phrase ‘foster hearts that love Japan’, Ozawa has taken a stance similar to Katō’s. Real patriotism cannot be forced upon the people, but has to evolve naturally over the course of time, Ozawa wrote in 2006. In this context, he makes two noteworthy observations. First, the patriotism forced on the people by the state until 1945 could not possibly be called real patriotism. And second, demanding that a person who does not care for his or her family, friends or local community, should love his country, is a futile endeavor (Ozawa 2006: 185–90). Seeing how conservatives point to exactly this missing sense of belonging to a family or a nation as a key problem of current times, Ozawa’s argument here does make a lot of sense. If a young person does not even feel that he or she belongs to a very concrete entity, such as a family, that person probably will care little about a far more abstract entity, such as the nation. Whereas Katō and, to a lesser degree, Ozawa are concerned about the means to achieve patriotism, they at least share the ultimate aim of a patriotic people with

Framing the issues  57 those such as Abe. Not surprisingly, patriotism is not a part of the more liberal vision of a future education system. Instead, Tanaka Yasuo and Takemura propose an education system based on the recognition of diversity, globalism and individuality (Tanaka 2006: 63). The second remedy widely thought to be a cure for the nation’s woes is Constitutional reform. As we have learnt during our analysis of Japan’s woes, the Constitution’s third chapter was as much to blame for Japan’s sorry state as was the Fundamental Law on Education prior to its revision. An in-depth discussion of the proposed Constitutional amendments will follow below in section 4.4; hence the following will only be a brief overview. Individual freedoms should not be absolute anymore, but subject to limitations pertaining to another person’s rights, social order and virtue (Yamasaki 2001: 99). Moreover, additional duties should be added to the Constitution’s chapter 3, to correct the perceived current imbalance between rights and duties (Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 33). Arguably the most prominent, and at the same time controversial, new duty is the obligation to defend the nation. The people should fight for their country rather than waiting for the government to guarantee their continued safety (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 226–27). Given the number of threats many conservatives see, this emphasis on national defense should not come as a surprise. As already pointed out in section 2.1, not only since the 1998 North Korean missile test have many conservatives exhibited a tendency to exaggerate perceived threats to Japan’s national security. In the 1980s, Nakagawa Yatsuhiro warned of a ‘likely’ Soviet invasion of Hokkaido (Nakagawa 1985: 177). Two decades later, various conservatives predicted a Chinese invasion of Okinawa. This perceived insecurity and sense of danger explains the necessity of a strong military deterrent. Since autonomists either question the trustworthiness of the US–Japanese alliance and the Anpo regime or simply do not think it is desirable for Japan to be heavily dependent on the US military, they advocate the creation of a Japan capable of defending itself. Lacking an awareness of the nation, the Japanese people do not want to fight for their country, but expect the government to assume responsibility for their safety, criticizes Ishihara (Ishihara, Tahara 2000: 226–27). Nishibe, who compares the US soldiers stationed in Japan to mercenaries, also believes that ‘awareness about national defense has to be endowed upon the Japanese people’ (Nishibe 1999: 120). According to Nishibe, unwillingness to defend one’s home country amounts to a ‘crime of ingratitude’. The importance of defending the nation with one’s own hands is also emphasized by Sakurai or Abe (Abe 2006: 96, 108; Sakurai and Abe 2005: 34). The logical result of this criticism would be to return to the pre-1945 compulsory military draft. Hence, it comes as no surprise that Nakagawa Yatsuhiro’s Constitutional reform drafts, for instance, include a passage stipulating exactly such a draft system (Nakagawa 2004: 18). That being said, we will see in the following chapters that the majority of conservative draft authors do not go quite that far. The obligation to defend the nation does not appear in the visions of Katō, Ozawa, Hatoyama, Takemura or Tanaka Shūhei (the heirs of the conservative mainstream), or of Tanaka Yasuo or the Yomiuri Shimbun. In fact, the drafts by the Yomiuri, the Sōken Kaigi and Hatoyama are the only ones explicitly banning conscription. Despite the obvious differences between these individuals,

58  Framing the issues they at least still seem to be influenced by the ideas of the traditional conservative mainstream to a certain degree. The Yomiuri, meanwhile, questions the logic of conscription in an age when the country’s defense relies on technologically advanced military equipment, e.g. missile defense, so sophisticated that it requires highly trained experts to control it (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 77). Moreover, the challenges of the twenty-first century, such as combating global terrorism or active participation in international PKO could not be addressed effectively by increasing the number of soldiers through a draft (ibid.). To prevent the further disintegration of traditional families, a constitutionally stipulated protection of the family is suggested. In an age of divorce and juvenile crime, the family’s decline as a social institution could be halted by introducing a stipulation prescribing the protection of the family, similar to the German Basic Law’s Article 6 (Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 94–95; Yagi 2003: 216). Unfortunately, conservatives fail to explain how such a provision could effectively remedy the aforementioned problems in Japan, when European divorce rates are high,19 despite the existence of such provisions. While not exactly a remedy from the past, a significant number of authors have incorporated stipulations pertaining to environmental protection into their amendment proposals. As with the previously discussed remedies for the woes plaguing Japan, it is not entirely clear how conservatives seek to combat environmental pollution, because they generally offer little in the way of concrete solutions to this arguably important problem. Machimura, he who had complained that ‘the Japanese landscape was even dirtier than the thoughts of the Japanese people’, suggests that taxpayers’ money should be spent on rebuilding Japan’s beautiful landscape (Machimura 2005: 58–59). His, however, is one of the very few specific suggestions. Others include Takemura and Tanaka’s proposal aiming at consumer education, a greater focus on renewable sources of energy and the realization of a ‘recycling society’ (Takemura, Tanaka 1995: 170). Yamasaki limits his suggestions to waste separation and recycling (Yamasaki 2001: 107). While conservatives are of the opinion that the articles pertaining to environmental protection in the revision proposals have the potential to become the foundation for proactive environmental policies (Sōken Kaigi 2006: 48), the noncommittal tone of the commentaries has led to the accusation that those provisions were nothing more than mere rhetorical bonbons aimed at sweetening Constitutional reform (Watanabe 2002: 62). Conclusion Conservatives have a lot, albeit nothing positive, to say about the state of mind and values of postwar Japan. The quality of the criticism differs from author to author. Moderates, like Katō, are not so critical of the situation as are most conservative intellectuals. However, despite those differences between moderates and reactionaries, there is widespread agreement that the price Japan paid for its quest for individual rights and material wealth was too high. Furthermore, conservatives agree that a mix of a missing identity and of exaggerated materialism and individualism has resulted in postwar Japan suffering from a lack of

Framing the issues  59 dignity. The people have forgotten about their once-proud nation, its long history and traditions, families are disintegrating, the environment is polluted. The absoluteness of individual rights, accompanied by an absence of obligations, has led to irresponsibility and chaotic social conditions. To make things worse, there is no new national goal in sight that could replace the dreaded accumulation of wealth. These grave illnesses which plague present-day Japan obviously demand the administering of a potent medicine. To cure the country and its people of the sorry state they are in, conservatives suggest a reformation of laws and minds. The two main subjects of legal reform have been the already revised Fundamental Law on Education and the Constitution. Specifically, the inclusion of patriotism as a key goal in the former and amending the latter’s chapter 3, e.g. by stipulating additional duties, have been proposed. It is telling, however, that even some conservatives have expressed doubts concerning the effectiveness of this sort of medicine. Katō and Ozawa, for instance, have questioned whether patriotism could or should be forced upon teenagers. As Ozawa has pointed out, no law will make somebody who doesn’t even care about his family bother about the national society. The same is true of the proposed solution to the problem of the decline of the traditional family model. As mentioned above, many conservatives propose to tackle this problem by borrowing a page from European constitutions, e.g. the German Basic Law’s Article 6 (Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 94–95; Yagi 2003: 216). Conservatives conveniently ignore that divorce rates are high in Europe, despite the existence of such provisions. Thus, the reader is left to wonder how the introduction of a similar stipulation could possibly remedy the problems in Japan. There is no denying that conservatives have both a clear view of their country’s current flaws and a vision for a better, more dignified nation. Similarly, the existence of some, yet certainly not all, of those problems, e.g. environmental pollution or the decline of traditional arts, is hard to deny and the necessity of addressing them is blatantly obvious. As the examples outlined above make abundantly clear, however, what conservatives lack is a realistic means of correcting the perceived flaws and realizing their vision. The attempt to cure present-day illnesses with remedies of the past, e.g. traditionalism and patriotism, is a prime example of this conundrum. Consequently, critics have zeroed in precisely on this Achilles heel of most conservative proposals. Tanaka Yasuo and Oguma Eiji charge that the drawing up of grand designs, e.g. the revival of a strong, dignified nation, and their reflection in the debate over Constitutional reform amount to nothing more than inability or unwillingness to embark on the more challenging task of recognizing concrete problems and devising specific policies to combat them (Oguma 2005: 28- 31; Tanaka 2006: 205–7). As if to confirm the duo’s criticism, the conservative argument against materialism has lost some of its former punch, against the background of growing regional and individual (income) disparities, the struggles of the so-called ‘working poor’, and worsening medical care, due to a lack of doctors as a result of the neoliberal reforms of the Koizumi government (Hashimoto 2006: 90–93) and the global financial crisis in 2008. There is no denying that Japan is still a very wealthy country, yet the number of people struggling to satisfy even minimal material needs is on the rise.20 Obviously, the growing numbers of homeless on the streets

60  Framing the issues of Tokyo or of the working poor have more pressing issues to address in their daily lives than seeking the intellectual satisfaction to be attained by becoming proud members of a dignified Japan that adheres to values other than materialism.21 A reflection of these recent trends is notably absent from conservative treatises, even though precisely these trends present a potentially major obstacle to the conservative quest for a new national identity. As Hōsei University professor Sugita Atsushi observed, if people don’t find safe jobs after graduating, if they struggle to make a living, cannot afford medical care or receive pensions, then they will eventually start questioning the state, regardless of how strongly patriotism is emphasized in school (Sugita 2007: 33–34). Other critics warn that patriotic education will not unite the nation, as many conservatives claim (Hiranuma 2005: 62), but rather create an ‘us versus them’ thinking in a society where those who refuse to accept the government-prescribed patriotism are being discriminated against, not unlike in the pre-war system (Aikyō 2008: 96–97). As we shall see in Chapter 4, the various aspects of this complex topic are reflected very well in the Constitutional reform proposals. The wish for more traditionalism is evident in the preamble drafts introduced in section 4.1. As section 4.4’s analysis of the proposed revisions to the supreme law’s chapter 3 will show, the vision of a more responsible, less individualist and less chaotic society is reflected particularly well in the restrictions of fundamental human rights, the additional duties and the protection of the family. At the same time, the ambiguous nature of several proposed amendments seems to reflect the widespread uncertainty about how to achieve the ambitious vision of a dignified nation.

3 In quest of Constitutional reform Introducing the drafts written between 1980 and 2009

3.1  Overview and clarification The following compilation of Constitutional reform drafts published between 1980 and 2009 is based mainly on the following three sources: 1 2 3

Watanabe Osamu’s excellent 2002 book Kenpō ‘Kaisei’ no Sōten – Shiryō de yomu Kaikenron no Rekishi. An article written in 2005 by journalist Higashitani Satoshi. An overview compiled by Morohashi Kunihiko for the National Diet Library.

The compilation is complemented by a number of drafts that I have unearthed during the course of my research. The year written against each proposal indicates the year of its publication, which may in some cases differ from the timing of its initial announcement. If the draft author has chosen to revise a certain article or paragraph, the translation of that revision is provided below. If the content of a specific article is unaltered (except for minor grammatical changes), it is not translated but is listed as ‘No revisions made’. The exclusion or deletion of an article is noted. Unless the numbering of the article has been altered by the respective proposal’s author, its numbering in the current Constitution has been applied. One important question that comes up when discussing drafts is that of what actually constitutes a draft and what does not. As there are some differences in the lists compiled by the three authors named above, it seems that the question has no definitive answer. Many documents that are identified as drafts in their three lists, for instance by private sector industry organizations, could be more fittingly described as written opinions or statements. On certain issues of importance, such as the Emperor system or national security, they do include specific demands, but overall they are often lacking in detail (for a prime example, see Nippon Keidanren 2005). I have thus chosen to define a draft as a document featuring a clear structure and comprising a preamble, articles and paragraphs that look like an actual Constitution. This is the reason why the 27 drafts listed below have been selected. As we shall see, only two drafts were published during the 1980s. As previously mentioned, the fall-out of the government’s handling of the Gulf War served as a catalyst and the 1990s saw the number of published drafts rise to ten. After

62  In quest of Constitutional reform both houses of the Diet voted, for the first time in postwar history, to establish research commissions on the Constitution in the year 2000, a dozen new drafts were published during the following five years. Interestingly enough, in the four years since the commissions submitted their final reports in 2005, only three drafts have been published. The translations provided below aim to provide an overview over the various reform drafts compiled since the 1980s. Included are translations of the respective draft’s preamble and the equivalents to the current Articles 1, 2, 9, 11, 12, 13, 24, 97 and 98 Paragraph 2. Also included are articles related to the environment and the duties to defend the nation and obey the law, if they exist. If an article or paragraph has been deleted from the respective draft, this is noted. Similarly, if the author has chosen to leave the respective article or paragraph unchanged, this is also noted.

3.2  The Drafts I (1980–1989) 3.2.1  Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei First Draft (1981) This draft was written by Komazawa University professor and scholar of Constitutional law Takehana Mitsunori. In fact, he was asked to compile the draft by the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei. Founded in 1955, this association of former and acting Diet members is the precursor to the current Shinkenpō Seitei Giin Dōmei. The draft was initially published in 1981, but one year later Takehana followed up with an extended version, including further revisions (Watanabe 2002: 721–22). Furthermore, he provides alternative versions of revised articles in several instances, as in the cases of Articles 1 and 9. Like his 1993 proposal (see 3.3.4), the following draft is only a partial rather than a complete revision of the Constitution. In his introductory commentary Takehana himself concedes that a complete revision of the Constitution was impossible to achieve at the time that he compiled the draft. Hence he opted for the step-by-step method, focusing on articles where the necessity for revision was easily understood (Watanabe 2002: 723). Deleted/ignored articles, if any: preamble, 2, 11, 12, 13, 97, 98 Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1

First proposal: The Emperor shall be the symbol of the unity of the Japanese people, and represent Japan vis-à-vis foreign countries. This position is derived from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power. Second proposal: The Emperor is the head of the state of Japan, and represents Japan vis-à-vis foreign countries. This position is derived from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power. (Watanabe 2002: 723)

In quest of Constitutional reform  63 Chapter 2: Renunciation of war ARTICLE 9

First proposal (addition of the following third paragraph to the existing two paragraphs): 1 No revisions made 2 No revisions made 3 In order to defend the independence and security of Japan and to protect the Japanese people’s fundamental human rights the necessary force (or military force) is maintained. The two preceding paragraphs do not preclude the use of force. Second proposal (replacing the second paragraph): 1 No revisions made 2 The military force maintained by Japan is aimed at defending the independence and security of Japan and protecting the Japanese people’s fundamental human rights. (Watanabe 2002: 724) Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 24

1 No revisions made 2 No revisions made 3 The state has to respect and protect the family as the fundamental unit of the people’s life. (Watanabe 2002: 733) 3.2.2  Nakagawa Yatsuhiro First Draft (1984) The following Constitutional Reform draft is the first of three drafts published by Tsukuba University professor Nakagawa Yatsuhiro. In the period examined in this research, this draft (and the subsequent revisions published in 1991 and 2004, see 3.3.2 and 3.4.6) is unique because it features extraordinarily strong restorative tendencies, such as the Emperor, not the prime minister being commander-in-chief (Article 7) and the inviolability of the Emperor’s dignity (Article 1). Those two stipulations, which are criticized by Watanabe as ‘anachronistic’ (Watanabe 2002: 753), are basically the Meiji Constitution’s Articles 3 and 11. While McCormack and Hook describe this draft as ‘influential’ and representative for the Cold War period (Hook, McCormack 2001: 34), there are no signs of Nakagawa’s restorative tendencies having had any impact on other Constitutional reform drafts introduced in this paper. In fact, as Watanabe Osamu has argued, the Takehana draft (see 3.2.1), with its minor changes, is far more representative of the debate over Constitutional revision in the 1980s (Watanabe

64  In quest of Constitutional reform 2002: 722). It is also worth pointing out that no other draft proposes to abolish popular sovereignty and to return the Emperor to his pre-1945 position as a powerful head of state and commander-in-chief. Furthermore, only two other drafts include a clause similar to the lèse-majesté stipulation of Nakagawa’s Article 1 Paragraph 2. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble Solemnly proclaiming its respect for liberty and just democracy, Japan firmly resolves to constantly strive after peace for its own country and the world, revises the Constitution of Japan, which had been enacted under the Occupation, when Japan had lost its sovereign power, and here newly enacts [this] Constitution. (Watanabe 2002: 754) Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1

1 The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people. He shall represent Japan. 2 The Emperor’s dignity shall be inviolable. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 2

The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial Household Law. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 7

The Emperor is the symbol of the supreme command over the National Defense Army. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: Peace and security ARTICLE 9

1 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever do not recognize war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In quest of Constitutional reform  65 2 The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not preclude our country from using its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in order to defend our nation’s peace and security. 3 In order to accomplish the aim of the two preceding paragraphs, Japan maintains a National Defense Army. 4 The supreme command authority over the National Defense Army is delegated to the Prime Minister by the symbol of the National Defense Army’s supreme command, the Emperor. (Ibid.: 755) ARTICLE 10 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations must be faithfully observed. (Ibid.) Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 12 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 13 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The fundamental human rights enjoyed by the Japanese people shall not be limited, unless in the case of maintaining the security and public order of the country, to the extent that it does not interfere with public welfare or the fundamental human rights of another person, or in the case of a state of emergency. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 14

The Japanese people have the honorable right and duty of defending Japan. Compulsory military service by the Japanese people, the conscientious objection thereto, other exemptions from military service, as well as substitute social labor are determined by law. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 15 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life and as well as their right to pursue happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. The privacy rights of individuals and families are guaranteed. (Ibid.)

66  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 24

Freedom of marriage is guaranteed. The family shall be protected and respected. (Ibid.: 756)

3.3  The Drafts II (1990–1999) 3.3.1  Nishibe Susumu (1990) After the end of the Cold War, Nishibe Susumu was the first conservative intellectual to use the start of the new era as a pretext for a Constitutional reform proposal (Nishibe 1990: 136–37). Unlike Takehana a decade before him, Nishibe proposes a complete revision of the supreme law. He is critical of the continued focus on Article 9 and aims to widen the discussion (Nishibe 1990: 138). Therefore he offers revisions of many key components of the Constitution, such as the preamble and the first three chapters. Nishibe distinguishes between citizens and people. As explained in his preamble, the former are currently living Japanese, while the latter are the embodiment of traditional Japanese norms. Similarly, Nishibe states in his revised Article 2 that the Imperial succession should be based on customs. In his eyes, the Imperial Household Law should be a customary law beyond the political sphere, unlike both the current and the Meiji-era Imperial Household Law (Nishibe 1990: 142). Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 11, 24, 97, 98 Preamble Based on real democratic thought, our Constitutional legislation council consisting of representatives duly elected by the Japanese citizens, shall fundamentally revise the Constitution of Japan which had been enacted during the American Occupation under the supervision of the American military, and shall determine a new norm for the Japanese nation and the Japanese citizens’ activities here. We proclaim loudly and clearly, that in real democratic thought sovereignty resides with the people. However, in this case the Japanese people are a group of putative people assumed to completely embody fundamental norms pertaining to existing people and society maintaining Japanese traditions. Accordingly, on the occasion of the actually living citizens making their own decision, they have to obey these putative sovereigns. Therefore, our government promulgates this legitimate authority to the people who honor Japanese traditions. Based on the trust of the citizens, their representatives exercise the powers affected by this validity, and the citizens shall enjoy the welfare yielded thereby. This is the principle of real democratic politics and this Constitution upholds this principle. Accordingly, our

In quest of Constitutional reform  67 Constitutional legislation council calls upon all citizens to exhibit their own abilities to the utmost, requesting that on the foundation of their emotion and intellect, they become aware of [each and every one of] them belonging to this people. Our Constitutional legislation council desires the arrival of peace in the international community, and therefore deems coordination with other countries’ authorities necessary, as absolute Japanese foreign power is impossible. Accordingly, when deciding their own country’s intent, the citizens shall not only endeavor to be able to exercise their authority competing for Japanese superiority, but also have to recognize that other countries and their decisions also hold the authority to compete for peculiar superiority. This is not only of importance for peace in the international community, but also essential for the continuous prosperity of Japan. Our Constitutional legislation council establishes the [preamble written] above as the fundamental principles of Japanese politics at home and abroad, and extends these principles into the Constitutional articles written below. Compliance therewith is demanded from all citizens. (Nishibe 1990: 138–39) Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1

The Emperor is the symbol of the people’s tradition and therefore the symbol for the unity of the Japanese citizens. The Emperor is the cultural head of the Japanese state and celebrates cultural ceremonies appropriate to [his position]. The position of the Emperor is derived from the historic will of the people, with whom resides sovereign power. On the occasion of the citizens making a decision regarding this position, they accept the limitations stemming from Japanese traditions. (Ibid.: 141) ARTICLE 2

The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the traditions of the Imperial Household. (Ibid.: 142) Chapter 2: Defense ARTICLE 9

The Japanese citizens have the duty to maintain the security and the independence of the Japanese nation. To accomplish this duty, the Japanese government has to maintain a Self-Defense Army.

68  In quest of Constitutional reform The Self-Defense Army must not use its military force for the purpose of invading another country. War as a means to settle international disputes is recognized only as long as it serves the purpose of self-defense or under the condition of utmost consideration of international cooperation. (Ibid.: 143) Chapter 3: Fundamental rights and duties ARTICLE 12

The fundamental freedoms guaranteed to the citizens by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the citizens. The citizens shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and shall always have the fundamental responsibility of utilizing them for the public welfare. (Ibid.: 144) ARTICLE 13

The freedom to demand personal safety, freedoms related to daily life, such as residence, moving, choice of occupation, the freedom to use property for private purposes as well as freedoms related to expressive activities, such as religion, speech, press, assembly, association, study and education are guaranteed to all citizens as fundamental freedoms. The responsibility to obey the law, be liable to taxation, participate in national defense, and have boys and girls receive education are imposed on all citizens as fundamental responsibilities. (Ibid.: 145) 3.3.3  Nakagawa Yatsuhiro Second Draft (1991) Seven years after his initial draft, Nakagawa published his second revision in 1991. Compared to the original proposal, there are only a few, albeit significant, differences to be found here. In his initial draft, Nakagawa had referred to the Emperor as ‘the symbol of the Japanese state and the unity of the Japanese people’ (Article 1) as well as ‘symbol of the supreme command over the National Defense Army’ (Article 7). In the following proposal all mention of the word ‘symbol’ has disappeared, emphasizing even further the restorative character of Nakagawa’s draft. These changes also make it even more clear that sovereignty resides with the Emperor, and not the people. For instance, the revised Article 1 now reads: ‘The Emperor is head of the state of Japan and represents Japan.’ Meanwhile, Article 7 simply proclaims: ‘the Emperor has the supreme command over the National Defense Army’. While the draft is in fact still a complete revision of the entire current Constitution, Nakagawa, unlike Nishibe (see 3.3.1), addresses almost exclusively matters related to Article 9 and national security in his commentary (Nakagawa 1991).

In quest of Constitutional reform  69 Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble Solemnly proclaiming its respect for liberty and just democracy, Japan firmly resolves to constantly strive after peace for its own country and the world, revises the Constitution of Japan, which had been enacted under the Occupation, when Japan had lost its sovereign power, and here newly enacts [this] Constitution. (Nakagawa 1991: 2) Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1

The Emperor is head of the state of Japan and represents Japan.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 2

The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial Household Law. (Ibid.: 3) ARTICLE 3

1 … 2 The Emperor’s dignity shall be inviolable.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 7

The Emperor exercises supreme command over the National Defense Army. (Ibid.: 4). Chapter 2: Peace and security ARTICLE 9

1 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever do not recognize war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 2 The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not preclude our country from using its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in order to defend our nation’s peace and security.

70  In quest of Constitutional reform 3 In order to accomplish the aim of the two preceding paragraphs, Japan maintains a National Defense Army. 4 The supreme command authority over the National Defense Army is delegated to the Prime Minister by the Emperor. (Ibid.: 6–7) ARTICLE 10 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations must be faithfully observed. (Ibid.) Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 12 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 7–8)

ARTICLE 13 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The fundamental human rights enjoyed by the Japanese people shall not be limited, except in the case of maintaining the security and public order of the country, to the extent that it does not interfere with public welfare or the fundamental human rights of another person, or in case of a state of emergency. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 14

The Japanese people have the honorable right and duty of defending Japan. Compulsory military service by the Japanese people, the conscientious objection thereto, other exemptions from military service, as well as substitute social labor are determined by law. (Ibid.: 8–9) ARTICLE 15 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life and as well as their right to pursue happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. The privacy rights of individuals and families are guaranteed. (Ibid.)

In quest of Constitutional reform  71 ARTICLE 24

Freedom of marriage is guaranteed. The family shall be protected and respected. (Ibid.: 13) 3.3.3  Kobayashi Setsu (1992) The following Constitutional reform draft was published in 1992. Its author is Kobayashi Setsu, a professional lawyer and professor of Constitutional law at Keio University. Kobayashi describes himself as a reformer with anti-reform tendencies, and looking at his draft, it is easy to see why. While pretty much all other authors of drafts introduced in this research have either ignored the preamble or, alternatively, gone to great lengths to completely rewrite it, the version introduced in this proposal is very similar to the current text. Similarly, Kobayashi retains the order of chapters. This is one of the few proposals explicitly allowing male and female members of the Imperial family to become Tennō (Article 2). Furthermore, Kobayashi is the first draft author to incorporate environmental rights into his proposal. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: none Preamble We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited by the horrors of war, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly maintain this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all Constitutions, laws, ordinances and rescripts in conflict herewith. We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources. (Kobayashi 1992: 43–44)

72  In quest of Constitutional reform Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1

The Emperor shall be the monarch and head of the state of Japan and the symbol of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power. (Ibid.: 44) ARTICLE 2

The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to, regardless of gender, in accordance with the Imperial Household Law passed by the Diet. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: National security ARTICLE 9

1 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of aggression, except to maintain the country’s independence and international peace. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will be maintained as a Self-Defense Army. Similarly, the right of belligerency of the state will not be renounced. The supreme commander of this Self-Defense Army is the Prime Minister. In order to maintain the independence of our country as well as international peace, the Prime Minister can order the dispatch of the Self-Defense Army upon obtaining approval by the Diet either prior to or depending on the circumstances after [the dispatch] or upon receiving a request by the United Nations. Matters related to the organization of the Self-Defense Army, its administration and the state of emergency are determined by law. The people bear the duty of defending the nation as provided by law. However, according to law, the freedom of a conscientious objection to military service is guaranteed to every person. 2 The Japanese people possess the right to live in peace. (Ibid.: 46–47) Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 11

1 No one shall be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. However, due to the idiosyncrasy of foreign nationals’ position,

In quest of Constitutional reform  73 limitations on their enjoyment of human rights shall be imposed. The fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights. 2 As fundamental law of the entire legal system, this stipulation of the Constitution shall also be applied directly and indirectly to legal relationships between private persons. However, private autonomy must not be unjustly harmed thereby. (Ibid.: 48) ARTICLE 12

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 13

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 24

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 52–53)

ARTICLE 25

1 … 2 The residents’ right to enjoy a favorable environment is guaranteed. The freedom to smoke is guaranteed. However, smoking must not harm another person’s health. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 97

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 72)

ARTICLE 98

1 … 2 No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 72–73)

74  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 99

The Japanese people and public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution. (Ibid.) 3.3.4  Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei Second Draft (1993) Twelve years after its initial draft compiled by Takehana Mitsunori (see 3.2.1), the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei published a second draft, again written by Takehana Mitsunori, in early 1993 (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993). Similar to the 1981 proposal, this new draft is not a full revision of the Constitution, but rather focuses on select articles and paragraphs which the group felt needed to be addressed most urgently. The reason behind this decision was the ‘people’s strong Constitutional reform allergy’ (ibid.: 5, 6, 14). Similarly to his initial draft, Takehana has not written a revised preamble for this proposal. In the commentaries, this lack is explained by the preamble’s being a guideline for the interpretation of the Constitution or a declaration lacking the legally binding character of the articles and paragraphs below (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993: 15). Deleted/ignored articles, if any: preamble, 2, 11, 12, 13, 97, 98 Chapter 1 ARTICLE 1

The Emperor shall be the head of the state of Japan and the symbol of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the traditional will of the people with whom resides sovereign power. (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993: 16) ARTICLE 9

1 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever do not recognize war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2 No revisions made. 3 The provision of the preceding paragraph bans wars of aggression prohibited under international law as well as the threat or use of force. It does not prohibit the possession and use of military capabilities within limits necessary for self-defense. (Ibid.: 24–25)

In quest of Constitutional reform  75 Chapter 3 ARTICLE 24

1 No revisions made. 2 No revisions made. 3 The state has to respect the family as the fundamental unit of the people’s life and protect it. (Ibid.: 49–50) ARTICLE 99

1 The Japanese people have the obligation to faithfully observe this Constitution and the law. 2 No revisions made. (Ibid.: 162) 3.3.5  Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi (1994) This organization, founded in 1981, is one of the two predecessors of Nippon Kaigi. In 1997, the Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi decided to merge with the Nihon wo mamoru Kai to form the current Nippon Kaigi. The group described its aims as follows: ‘[…] it has been our dearest wish to change the postwar national consciousness based on the Tokyo Tribunal’s view of history as a fundamental problem, and specifically, revise the current Constitution’ (Mayuzumi 1994: 1). Consequently, the Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi published its own Constitutional Reform draft in 1994. It was the result of a joint effort by Ōhara Yasuo (Kokugakuin University professor), Odamura Shirō (vice-chairman of Nippon Kaigi), Kase Hideaki, Kobayashi Hiroaki (Nihon University professor), Kobori Keiichirō (honorary professor, Tokyo University) and Yoshihara Tsuneo (Takushoku University professor; Mayuzumi 1994: 50). Similar to the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei’s two drafts (3.2.1 and 3.3.4), this proposal is only a partial revision, excluding various articles, such as Article 2, which have been left out of it. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 2, 11, 13, 97, 98 1. Preamble Affirming the coexistence of various values, in harmony and coexistence with nature, while respecting traditions, and through the adoption and assimilation of foreign civilizations since ancient times, the Emperor and people of Japan have become one and allowed the nation to evolve. Based on this national character of our country, we enact this Constitution to allow us to inherit and evolve the spirit and history of Constitutionalism since the Meiji [period], which has established popular will as the foundation of

76  In quest of Constitutional reform government, be conscious of the responsibility of being a member of the nation, while respecting fundamental human rights, and to anticipate the progress toward the formation of a new country, and to achieve worldwide peace. (Mayuzumi 1994: 51) 2. The Emperor ARTICLE 1 (NO ARTICLE NUMBER GIVEN, CURRENTLY ARTICLE 1)

1 The Emperor shall be the head of state, the symbol of the permanence of Japan and the unity of its people. 5 The sanctity of the head of state and symbol must be protected. (Ibid.: 52, 67) ARTICLE 3 DEFENSE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 Aspiring sincerely to international peace, our country observes international treaties and strives for settling international disputes through peaceful means. 2 To protect our country’s peace and independence and at the same time contribute to international peace, our country maintains a National Army of appropriate size. 3 The organization of the National Army is determined by law. 4 The supreme command over the National Army is exercised by the Prime Minister, who is the head of the cabinet. (Ibid.: 70–75) 4. International cooperation Our country will actively conduct international cooperation in order to realize an international peace based on the principles of coexistence and co-prosperity of different races and nations, for harmony between environmental protection and industrial development, and preservation of the global environment on the principle of self-help and appropriate burden of all countries for the preservation of cultural property and promotion of welfare on a global scale. (Ibid.: 77) 5. Rights and duties of the people 1 The freedoms and rights determined by this Constitution have to be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs. At the same time, these freedoms and rights can be limited to prevent their abuse, for the purpose of respecting another person’s rights, and for the realization of public welfare. 2 On the occasion of enjoying those freedoms and exercising these rights, the people are to observe the principles of self-supporting endeavors and self-responsibility and to strive after the realization of public welfare.

In quest of Constitutional reform  77 3 Rights and duties appropriate for the present-day nation shall be adopted. 7 It shall be stipulated that the state has to respect, protect and encourage respect for household and family, which are the natural fundamental unit of the nation and society, as well as the respect for the individual and equality of the sexes in family life. 10 The obligation to abide by the law and protect the country shall be newly stipulated as the people’s duties. (Ibid.: 81, 82, 93, 100) 3.3.6  Yomiuri Shimbun First Draft (1994) Japan’s leading daily newspaper published its first Constitutional reform draft on November 3, 1994 (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 1994: 18–20). In the period examined in this research, the Yomiuri proposal was the first to alter the order of chapters and introduce a new chapter 1 titled ‘The people’s sovereign power’. Furthermore, this proposal, as well as its two updates released in 2000 and 2004, is among the small number of drafts that do not refer to the Emperor as head of state. As for the revision of chapter 2, the inclusion of the three non-nuclear principles (Article 10 Paragraph 2) and the prohibition of forced participation in the armed forces (Article 11 Paragraph 3) are important features, as only Hatoyama Yukio (see 3.4.10) has included similar limitations in his proposal. Since this draft has already been translated in Hook and McCormack’s 2001 publication Japan’s Contested Constitution, that translation is quoted below. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble We, the Japanese people, hold sovereign power in Japan and, ultimately, our will shall dictate all State decisions. Government is entrusted to our duly elected representatives, who exercise their power with the trust of the people. We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time, respect the spirit of international cooperation and pledge to use our best efforts to ensure the peace, prosperity and security of the international community. We, the Japanese people, aspire to a free and vigorous society, where fundamental human rights are duly respected, and simultaneously strive for the advancement of the people’s welfare. We, the Japanese people, acknowledge the inheritance of our long history and tradition and the need to preserve our fair landscape and cultural legacy, while promoting culture, arts and sciences. This Constitution is the supreme law of Japan and is to be observed by the Japanese people. (Hook, McCormack 2001: 55)

78  In quest of Constitutional reform Chapter 1: Sovereign power of the people ARTICLE 1: THE PEOPLE’S SOVEREIGN POWER

Sovereign power in Japan resides with the Japanese people.

(Ibid.: 56)

ARTICLE 2: EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER

The people shall exercise their sovereign power through duly elected representatives in the Diet, and at national referenda held to consider amendments to the Constitution. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: The Emperor (currently Chapter 1) ARTICLE 4: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 1)

The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people of Japan. The Emperor’s position shall be based on the sovereign will of the people. (Ibid.: 57) ARTICLE 5: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

No revisions made. Chapter 3: National security (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 10: RENUNCIATION OF WAR AND BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

1 No revisions made (Article 9 Paragraph 1). 2 Seeking to eliminate from the world inhuman and indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction Japan shall not manufacture, possess or use such weapons. (Ibid.: 59) ARTICLE 11: ORGANIZATION FOR SELF-DEFENSE, CIVILIAN CONTROL, AND DENIAL OF FORCED CONSCRIPTION

1 Japan shall form an organization for self-defense to secure its peace and independence and to maintain its safety. 2 The Prime Minister shall exercise supreme command authority over the organization for self-defense.

In quest of Constitutional reform  79 3 The people shall not be forced to participate in organizations for self-defense. (Ibid.: 59) Chapter 4: International cooperation ARTICLE 12: PRINCIPLE

Japan shall aspire to the elimination from earth of human calamities caused by military conflicts, natural disasters, environmental destruction, economic deprivation in particular areas and regional disorder. (Ibid.: 59–60) ARTICLE 13: PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding article, Japan shall lend active cooperation to the activities of the relevant well-established and internationally recognized organizations. In case of need, it may dispatch a party of its self-defense organization for the maintenance and promotion of peace and for humanitarian support activities. (Ibid.: 60) ARTICLE 14: OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed. (Ibid.) Chapter 5: Rights and duties of the people (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 15: BASIC DECLARATION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

The people possess all fundamental human rights. The fundamental human rights guaranteed by this Constitution are inviolable and eternal rights. (Ibid.: 60) ARTICLE 16: RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM AND RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall always make efforts to harmonize them with the public welfare and who shall refrain from any abuse of them. (Ibid.: 61)

80  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 17: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 26: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY IN FAMILY LIFE AND EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SEXES (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 No revisions made. 2 No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 63)

ARTICLE 28: RIGHTS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Every person possesses the right to enjoy a favorable environment and is obliged to preserve the same. The State shall endeavor to maintain the environment in a favorable condition. (Ibid.: 63–64) 3.3.7  Nishi Osamu (1995) The following draft was written by Komazawa University professor Nishi Osamu and his seminar (Nishi 1995). The scholar has retained the current Constitution’s order of chapters, starting with the Emperor, followed by contributions to international peace and maintenance of independence and rights and duties of the Japanese people. This is the only draft making references to World War II in its preamble. Another unique feature is the explicit ban on advertising or glorifying war, which can be found in Article 8. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97, 98 Preamble Our country’s domestic and foreign affairs have changed significantly from the time the Constitution of Japan was proclaimed on May 3, 1947 until today. Japan has risen from the ruins of defeat, and through the diligence of its people, has become an economically rich country. Fundamental rights have established themselves deeply among the people. In the international community, international peace is being rebuilt centered on the United Nations. We welcome trends like these. On the other hand, the harmony between economic and spiritual wealth, family ties, inheritance of cultural heritage, preservation of environment and ecosystem, contribution to international peace, realization of social justice, and further perfection of social welfare are deemed to be of vital importance. Reflecting on the changes which happened after the proclamation of the Constitution

In quest of Constitutional reform  81 of Japan, we enact a new constitution, while confirming the fundamental principles of popular sovereignty, eternal peace and the respect for fundamental human rights, which are implied by the Constitution of Japan, and allow these principles to evolve even further. Critically contemplating the past, we wish for the happiness of people, present and future, and pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources. (Nishi 1995: 229–30) Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1

The sovereign power over Japan resides with the Japanese people. Based on the will of the people, the Emperor occupies the position of the symbolic head of state of the Japanese nation. (Ibid.: 231) ARTICLE 2

The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to, regardless of gender, in accordance with the Imperial Household Law passed by the Diet. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: Contributions to international peace and maintenance of independence ARTICLE 8 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 In order to maintain international peace and stability, Japan is striving to prevent and banish threats to peace. In accordance with the goals of the United Nations Charter, Japan will take necessary steps against acts of aggression and other acts of destroying international peace. 2 Japan will resolve international disputes through peaceful means, and unconditionally deny war and the threat or use of force as a means to oppress another country’s territorial integrity or liberty. 3 Glorifying or advertising war is prohibited. (Ibid.: 234–35) ARTICLE 9

1 To maintain Japan’s independence and security, as well as contribute to worldwide peace, Japan keeps Self-Defense Forces. 2 In all cases, the Self-Defense Forces shall obey civilian control. (Ibid.: 235)

82  In quest of Constitutional reform Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 10 (CURRENTLY ARTICLES 11 TO 13)

1 Throughout their life, all humans shall be free and equal, their dignity is inviolable. 2 The human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall not be limited, unless for the public welfare of the democratic society. 3 The application of the human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution to foreign nationals shall be determined by law. 4 The reality of this constitution guaranteeing specific rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights inherently possessed by man. (Ibid.: 236) ARTICLE 33

The state has to use its endeavors for the protection of the natural environment and the ecosystem. (Ibid.: 242) ARTICLE 39

All people have the obligation to observe this Constitution and the law. (Ibid.: 243) 3.3.8  Kimura Mutsuo (1996) This is the first Constitutional reform proposal written by a, albeit retired, politician that meets the criteria for the term ‘draft’ that have been set out above. Its author, the late Kimura Mutsuo, was an LDP politician and speaker of the Diet’s Upper House. He also served as chairman of the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei (Watanabe 2002: 191). This partial draft lacks a revision of the preamble, but otherwise revises the current Constitution considerably. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: preamble, 13, 97, 98 Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR

Based on the history and tradition of Japan, the Emperor is the dynastic head of state of the nation and represents Japan. (Kimura 1996: 13)

In quest of Constitutional reform  83 ARTICLE 2: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 1)

The Imperial Throne shall be the symbol of the unity of the people, based on the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 3: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION, ERA NAME (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

1 … 2 The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and [succeeded] in accordance with the Imperial Household Law. (Ibid.: 23) Chapter 2: National security ARTICLE 8: RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER, RENUNCIATION OF WAR (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

Aspiring sincerely to international peace, Japan does not recognize any act of aggression and war as a sovereign right of the nation, except for the case of self-defense. (Ibid.: 31) ARTICLE 9: OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 10: MAINTENANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE ARMY

In order to protect the peace and independence of the country and the fundamental human rights of the people, Japan maintains a Self-Defense Army. The organization, command and supervision of the Self-Defense Army fall under the authority of the Prime Minister. When the Prime Minister orders the dispatch of the Self-Defense Army, he has to obtain the Diet’s approval. (Ibid.: 31–32) ARTICLE 11: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND OVERSEAS DISPATCH OF THE SELF-DEFENSE ARMY

In case the United Nations votes to take measures of collective selfdefense, and our country confirms the necessity of cooperation, the Prime Minister can dispatch the Self-Defense Army overseas in order to maintain international peace and security. In case of the Diet being closed,

84  In quest of Constitutional reform the approval of the Diet has to be obtained within one month after the dispatch. (Ibid.: 32) Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 13: ENJOYMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROHIBITION OF THEIR ABUSE (CURRENTLY ARTICLES 11, 12)

1 All fundamental human rights determined by this Constitution are guaranteed to the people as inalienable rights. 2 The people shall always utilize these rights for the public welfare and refrain from abusing them. (Ibid.: 44) ARTICLE 22: MARRIAGE, HOUSEHOLD (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 Marriage shall be based on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife. 2 With regard to a husband and wife’s domicile, property rights and other matters, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of a happy and wealthy family life. (Ibid.: 66) ARTICLE 25: RIGHT TO EXIST

All people shall have the right to maintain a wholesome and cultured living and have the right to exist. The State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health as well as the preservation of a favorable environment. (Ibid.: 69) ARTICLE 32: DUTY OF DEFENDING THE NATION

The people are obliged to defend the nation as provided by law.

(Ibid.: 79)

ARTICLE 34: DUTY TO UPHOLD THE LAW

The people are obliged to observe the Constitution and the law. (Ibid.: 83–84)

In quest of Constitutional reform  85 3.3.9  Aichi Kazuo First Draft (1996) Former Defense Agency chief Aichi Kazuo published the first edition of his draft in 1996. While it has been argued that Ozawa’s draft (see 3.3.11) was the first published by an active politician (Ozawa 1999: 94), this draft was published three years prior to Ozawa’s 1999 draft. Similar to the Yomiuri Shimbun drafts, Aichi’s initial draft moves the stipulation regarding the Tennō to chapter 2, and introduces a new first chapter dealing with popular sovereignty. This proposal follows the examples of Kobayashi’s and Nishi’s in explicitly stipulating that the Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by a member of the Imperial family regardless of gender. Finally, Aichi is one of the first authors to include rights relating to the environment in his proposal. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble We, the Japanese people ultimately determine the intent of Japan. Through the trust of the people, the duly elected representatives of the people are responsible for the government. We, the Japanese people vow to overcome all borders, beginning with national borders, to join hands with people around the world and endeavor to protect the global environment, which is the foundation of mankind’s existence, to prevent wars between fellow men and to leave a secure and prosperous world behind for the generations following us. The Japanese people endeavor to build a society in which the fundamental characteristic as a human being is respected and man and non-human beings coexist. The Japanese people are proud of the long history of the Japanese race and its traditions, [but] at the same time also pay their respect to other races. On the occasion of building this country, the Japanese people protect the land and traditions they have inherited from their ancestors, and also create new traditions. (Aichi 1996: 24) Chapter 1: Principles of national sovereignty ARTICLE 1: LEGITIMACY OF RULE

All authority related to the rule over the nation comes from the people. (Ibid.: 24) ARTICLE 2: SUBJECT OF RULE

1 All authority related to the rule over the nation is exercised by the people.

86  In quest of Constitutional reform 2 The people exercise their authority through their duly elected representatives in the Diet. (Ibid.: 25) Chapter 2: The Emperor ARTICLE 4: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 1)

1 The Emperor is the head of the state of Japan. 2 The Emperor represents the State and the Japanese people towards foreign countries and is the symbol of Japan’s traditions, culture and the unity of the Japanese people. 3 The position of the Emperor is based on the will of the people. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 5: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

1 The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic. 2 The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded by a member of the Imperial family regardless of gender, in accordance with the Imperial Household Law. (Ibid.) Chapter 3: National security and foreign relations (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 13: PRINCIPLE OF WORLDWIDE PEACE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 The Japanese people aspire to the banishment of humanitarian disasters, such as military disputes, oppression, hunger, poverty and environmental destruction. Not only direct murder and mayhem against man, but also acts such as destroying the global environment in the medium term and threatening global security are not recognized. 2 In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, the Japanese nation endeavors to play a leading role in the formation, preservation and evolution of an international order based on justice, by devoting peaceful means if possible. It will actively participate in the administration and activities of established international organizations from a responsible position, which includes the use of force. (Ibid.: 26) ARTICLE 14: NATIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

1 Japan possesses the right to defend its own independence and security, and to resist and defend itself against imminent, unjust invasion. 2 In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, Japan possesses a National Defense Organization.

In quest of Constitutional reform  87 3 Upon confirmation that it is necessary to achieve the goals of the previous article’s second paragraph, Japan can use its National Defense Organization after obtaining the cooperation and consent of foreign countries. 4 The supreme command authority over the National Defense Organization resides with the Prime Minister. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 15: GLOBAL SECURITY

Not only direct murder and mayhem against man, but also acts such as destroying the global environment in the medium term and threatening global security are not recognized. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 16: OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

It is necessary that the treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations are faithfully observed. (Ibid.) Chapter 4: Rights and duties (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 17: BASIC PRINCIPLE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

1 Among the people, every person has the right to enjoy fundamental freedoms as a human being. The rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution are inviolate and eternal rights. 2 The application of the rights guaranteed by this Constitution to foreign nationals is determined by law. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 18: DUTY TO MAINTAIN FREEDOM AND RIGHTS AND THE PEOPLE’S DUTY TO OBSERVE THIS CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

1 The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people. 2 The people shall not abuse the freedoms and rights guaranteed to them by this Constitution and shall always aim to harmonize them with the public welfare. 3 The people shall be obligated to observe this Constitution and the law. (Ibid.: 26–27)

88  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 19: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 27)

ARTICLE 32: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY IN FAMILY LIFE AND EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SEXES (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 No revisions made. 2 No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 28)

ARTICLE 34: RIGHTS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

1 Everybody has the right to enjoy a favorable environment. Everybody is obligated to inherit this right to future generations. 2 The state has to use its endeavors to preserve and improve a favorable environment. (Ibid.) 3.3.10  Takehana Mitsunori (1997) Technically, this is the third proposal drafted by Takehana introduced in this research. As previously mentioned, the late professor of Constitutional law had already written two proposals for Jishu Kenpō Gisei Giin Dōmei (see 3.2.1 and 3.3.4). However, those earlier proposals are hardly comparable with Takehana’s most recent draft. Unlike his previous works, this draft published in 1997 is a complete revision of the Constitution. Not only in quantity, but also in quality the revisions have become bolder. In the preamble Takehana devotes an entire paragraph to criticizing the current Constitution of Japan. Instead of adding a third paragraph to the current Article 9, as he had proposed in the two earlier drafts, Takehana offers a complete revision of the Peace Clause, in line with other recent reform proposals. This proposal seems to have been a source of inspiration for Aichi’s second draft (3.4.4), given that several phrases in the preamble and articles 13 and 15 of Aichi’s proposal closely resemble parts of this draft. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 13, 97 Preamble Our country possesses a long history of three thousand years. Throughout this [long history], the unity of the people with the Emperor as an integral main point has overcome the many hardships it has faced and achieved a formative development.

In quest of Constitutional reform  89 Taking this glorious tradition as a foundation, the Japanese people shall realize real democracy, allowing for a reason-based balance of freedom and equality, rights and duties in the realms of politics, economics and society. Based on the principle of ethnic self-determination, the Japanese people resolve to realize worldwide eternal peace on the premise of equal reciprocity among all ethnic groups. On the occasion of embarking on this new enterprise for our country, we shall be aware of the importance of the responsibility assigned to us and with a spirit of morality, benevolence and courage vow to devote all our energies to achieving these goals. From the beginning, the Constitution of Japan which was proclaimed during the occupation on November 3, 1946, was not a Constitution originating in the Japanese people’s free will. The emphasis on universality led to a disregard for [Japan’s] uniqueness. As the Constitution of a sovereign nation, the number of deficiencies was not small. Furthermore, [because] the classical liberal tendencies are strong, the Constitution of Japan was flawed as a current-day Constitution. The complete revision of the Constitution can be called a necessity in order to aim for greater development and the enlargement of the people’s prosperity, and to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world. Grounded in the course of history, the Japanese people hereby solemnly affirm the establishment of an independent Constitution envisioning a new era. (Takehana 1997: 128–29) Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1: SYMBOLIC CHARACTER OF THE IMPERIAL THRONE

Based on the people’s utmost will, the Emperor is in possession of the Imperial throne that is the symbol of the unity of the people. (Ibid.: 129) ARTICLE 2: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 3: THE EMPEROR’S REPRESENTATIVE ROLE TOWARDS FOREIGN COUNTRIES

The Emperor is the head of State of Japan and represents Japan vis-à-vis foreign countries. (Ibid.)

90  In quest of Constitutional reform Chapter 2: The people’s fundamental rights and duties (formerly Chapter 3) ARTICLE 10: ENJOYMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 132)

ARTICLE 11: UPHOLDING OF RIGHTS AND PROHIBITION OF THEIR ABUSE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 12: RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

The fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution cannot be restricted by law except in the case of maintaining the recognition of and respect for another person’s human rights and, when necessary, to protect Constitutional order and uphold public life. (Ibid.: 132–33) ARTICLE 28: FREEDOM OF MARRIAGE, PROTECTION OF FAMILY, RESPONSIBILITY OF BOTH SEXES IN FAMILY LIFE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 The freedom to marry and have a family is guaranteed. 2 Marriage shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as its foundation. 3 The state has to respect and protect the family as the fundamental unit of society. 4 With regard to all matters pertaining to marriage and family life, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes. (Ibid.: 136) ARTICLE 33: DUTY OF DEFENDING THE MOTHERLAND

All people are obliged to defend their motherland.

(Ibid.: 138)

In quest of Constitutional reform  91 ARTICLE 34: DUTY TO OBSERVE THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW

All people are obliged to observe the Constitution and the law.

(Ibid.: 139)

ARTICLE 36: DUTY TO PROTECT NATURAL AND CULTURAL PROPERTIES

All people are obliged to preserve nature and protect cultural properties. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 37: RIGHTS PERTAINING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

In order to maintain a healthy and pleasant life, all people have the right to demand a favorable environment and forbid attacks on this environment. (Ibid.) Chapter 9: Diplomacy and defense (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 121: OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

Japan faithfully observes treaties concluded by it and established laws of nations. (Ibid.: 166) ARTICLE 122: RENUNCIATION OF ILLEGAL WARS, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

1 Japan renounces all wars illegal under international law. 2 Japan settles international disputes through arbitration courts and other peaceful means. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 123: LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

Based on the condition of equal reciprocity, Japan agrees to transfer part of its sovereignty to international peace organizations. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 128: MAINTENANCE AND MISSION OF SELF-DEFENSE ARMY

1 Until worldwide eternal peace has been achieved, Japan maintains a SelfDefense Army in order to defend the country’s independence and security, protect its people’s fundamental human rights and participate in international peace-keeping activities led by international peace organizations.

92  In quest of Constitutional reform 2 Based on exceptional necessities and answering to the Prime Minister’s request, the Self-Defense Army shall assist in land development and disaster relief. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 125: SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY, NONINVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

1 Military authority is strictly subject to the civilian government’s authority and must obey this rule. 2 The Self-Defense Army must not become involved in politics, and is required to transcend partisanship at all times. (Ibid.: 166–67) ARTICLE 126: ORGANIZATION OF THE SELF-DEFENSE ARMY

The organization and formation of the Self-Defense Army are determined by law. (Ibid.: 167) ARTICLE 127: DEFENSE EXPENSES

Defense expenses must not exceed the limit necessary for defense and have to be appropriated by the Diet in the budget every year on the basis of not putting a strain on other expenses. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 128: SUPREME COMMAND AUTHORITY

The supreme command authority over the Self-Defense Army is wielded by the Prime Minister as representative of the Cabinet. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 129: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1 The National Security Council receives the Cabinet’s advice on the defense budget, the dispatch and mobilization of the Self-Defense Army and other important matters pertaining to defense. 2 The organization of the National Security Council shall be determined by law. However, the Prime Minister is required to preside over the council and a majority of the council members are required to be civilians. (Ibid.)

In quest of Constitutional reform  93 ARTICLE 130: APPROVAL OF DISPATCH AND MOBILIZATION OF THE SELFDEFENSE ARMY

Except for the case when a state of emergency is declared, the dispatch of the Self-Defense Army requires approval by the Diet. In events other than being invaded by a foreign country or the danger of an invasion being imminent, mobilization requires prior approval by the Diet. (Ibid.: 167–68) ARTICLE 131: MILITARY TRIBUNAL

Except as otherwise provided for by law, military personnel fall under the jurisdiction of a military tribunal only for crimes committed on genuine defense [duty]. (Ibid.: 168) ARTICLE 132: RESTRICTIONS ON ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL’S FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

In view of the necessity to maintain the discipline and effective activities of the Self-Defense Army, restrictions on fundamental human rights imposed on active military personnel are separately determined by law. (Ibid.) 3.3.11  Ozawa Ichirō (1999) Ozawa’s call for Constitutional revision dates back to his 1993 bestseller Nihon Kōzō Kaikaku (Ozawa 1993: 123–24). Six years later, Ozawa published his Constitutional reform proposal in Bungei Shunjū (Ozawa 1999: 94–106). This draft is noteworthy for the following reasons: it is one of the very few drafts introduced in this research which does not propose a revision of Article 1. Furthermore, it retains Article 9 in its present form and only adds a third paragraph, instead of deleting the second paragraph. Apart from Takehana’s 1981 and 1993 proposals, Ozawa has been the sole conservative to opt for this minimal revision of Article 9, although this solution is also favored by the Kōmeitō (Hughes 2006: 739). A partial reform proposal, Ozawa’s draft does not include any revisions of the preamble or chapter 1. In fact, as far as the first three chapters of the Constitution are concerned, it only includes revised versions of Articles 9 and 12 and a new article regarding international activities. As with the 1994 Yomiuri proposal, the Ozawa draft has already been translated into English (Hook, McCormack 2001: 161–76). Thus, that translation is quoted below.

94  In quest of Constitutional reform Deleted/ignored articles, if any: preamble, 1, 2, 11, 24, 97, 98 Chapter 2 ARTICLE 9

1 No revisions made. 2 No revisions made. 3 The regulation in paragraph 2 does not prevent the maintenance of military power for the purpose of exercising Japan’s right of self-defense against military attack by a third country. (Hook, McCormack 2001: 165–66) ARTICLE 10: INTERNATIONAL PEACE

In order to maintain and restore international peace and safety from threats to, the collapse of, or aggressive actions against, peace, the Japanese people shall contribute positively to world peace, through various means including taking the lead in participating in international peacekeeping activities, and supplying troops. (Ibid.: 166) Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 0: PUBLIC WELFARE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall respect public welfare and public order. Matters regarding public welfare and order shall be stipulated by law. (Ibid.: 169) ARTICLE 0: THE RIGHT TO PURSUE HAPPINESS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

The right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people. The people shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights. (Ibid.)

3.4  The Drafts III (2000–2009) 3.4.1  Yomiuri Shimbun Second Draft (2000) Six years after its initial proposal, the Yomiuri Shimbun published its second Constitutional reform draft on May 3, 2000 (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2000: 14–15). Whereas the former had referred to the Self Defense Forces as ‘organization for self-defense’ (Article 11), the word ‘organization’ has been replaced with ‘army’

In quest of Constitutional reform  95 in the latter (Article 12). Otherwise, this draft does not differ significantly from its 1994 predecessor. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble We, the Japanese people, hold sovereign power in Japan and, ultimately, our will shall dictate all State decisions. Government is entrusted to our duly elected representatives, who exercise their power with the trust of the people. We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time, respect the spirit of international cooperation and pledge to use our best efforts to ensure the peace, prosperity and security of the international community. We, the Japanese people, aspire to a free and vigorous society, where fundamental human rights are duly respected, and simultaneously strive for the advancement of the people’s welfare. We, the Japanese people, acknowledge the inheritance of our long history and tradition and the need to preserve our fair landscape and cultural legacy, while promoting culture, arts and sciences. This Constitution is the supreme law of Japan and is to be observed by the Japanese people. (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2000: 14)

Chapter 1: Popular sovereignty ARTICLE 1: THE PEOPLE’S SOVEREIGN POWER

Sovereign power in Japan resides with the Japanese people.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 2: EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER

The people shall exercise their sovereign power through duly elected representatives in the Diet, and at national referenda held to consider amendments to the Constitution. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: The Emperor (currently Chapter 1) ARTICLE 5: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 1)

The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people of Japan. The Emperor’s position shall be based on the sovereign will of the people. (Ibid.)

96  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 6: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

Chapter 3: National security (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 11: RENUNCIATION OF WAR AND BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 No revisions made (Article 9 Paragraph 1). 2 Seeking to eliminate from the world inhuman and indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction, Japan shall not manufacture, possess or use such weapons. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 12: ARMY FOR SELF-DEFENSE, CIVILIAN CONTROL AND DENIAL OF FORCED CONSCRIPTION

1 Japan shall form an army for self-defense to secure its peace and independence and to maintain its safety. 2 The Prime Minister shall exercise supreme command authority over the army for self-defense. 3 The people shall not be forced to participate in the aforementioned army. (Ibid.) Chapter 4: International cooperation ARTICLE 13: PRINCIPLE

Japan shall aspire to the elimination from earth of human calamities caused by military conflicts, natural disasters, environmental destruction, economic deprivation in particular areas and regional disorder. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 14: PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding article, Japan shall lend active cooperation to the activities of the relevant well-established and internationally recognized organizations. In case of need, it may dispatch a party of its self-defense organization for the maintenance and promotion of peace and for humanitarian support activities. (Ibid.)

In quest of Constitutional reform  97 ARTICLE 15: OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

Chapter 5: Rights and duties of the people (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 16: BASIC DECLARATION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

The people possess all fundamental human rights. The fundamental human rights guaranteed by this Constitution are inviolable and eternal rights. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 17: RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM AND RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people. The people shall always mutually respect [each other’s] freedom and rights, make efforts to harmonize them with the public interest, such as the people’s security, public order, and a healthy living environment, and refrain from any abuse of them. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 18: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness must, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public interest, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 27: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY IN FAMILY LIFE AND EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SEXES (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 No revisions made. 2 No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 29: RIGHTS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Every person possesses the right to enjoy a favorable environment and is obliged to preserve the same. The state shall endeavor to maintain the environment in a favorable condition. (Ibid.)

98  In quest of Constitutional reform 3.4.2  Yamasaki Taku (2001) Veteran LDP politician and faction leader Yamasaki Taku has been an outspoken proponent of Constitutional reform for more than a decade (Yamasaki 1996: 66–68). In 2001, Yamasaki published his own Constitutional reform proposal. This partial draft is one of the few proposals that does not refer to the Emperor as ‘head of state’. Being a partial draft, this document lacks revisions of Articles 11 and 24. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 11, 24, 97, 98 Preamble The Japanese people are the sovereign, who ultimately determines the intent of the country. The [responsibility of] government is carried by duly elected representatives, who have received the trust of the people. The Japanese people strive to maintain world peace and actively perform international contributions. Steadfastly maintaining its independence, Japan will adhere to pacifism as a member of the international community and pursue relationships of coexistence between nations. The Japanese people aim for a trustworthy society abounding in vitality, where fundamental human rights are respected. Rights accompany duties, and responsibility is inherent in liberty. The rights of the independent people will on occasion be adjusted from the standpoint of the public interest. Valuing the principle of coexistence, the Japanese people will protect and foster Japan’s history and traditions, its unique culture and beautiful land, and as independent individuals exhibit a spirit of serving society. The Japanese people jointly pledge the realization of such a ‘moral nation’. They enact this Constitution of Japan as the supreme law of the country. (Yamasaki 2001: 49) Chapter 1: The People and the Emperor ARTICLE 1

1 The sovereignty of Japan resides with the people. 2 The Emperor is the symbol of the state and the unity of the people. (Ibid.: 50)

ARTICLE 2 (PARAGRAPH 1: CURRENTLY ARTICLE 10, PARAGRAPH 2: CURRENTLY PART OF THE PREAMBLE)

1 The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.

In quest of Constitutional reform  99 2 The Japanese people exercise their sovereign power through their duly elected representatives in the National Diet. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 3 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

Chapter 0: National security (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 0 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force, except for the use of the right of self-defense. 2 To protect the sovereignty and independence of Japan, maintain the country’s security, and cooperate in realizing global peace, Japan maintains land, sea, and air forces, as well as other organizations under the supreme command of the Prime Minister. (Ibid.: 86)

Chapter 0: Rights and duties of the people (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 0: RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM AND RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always aim for harmony with the public interest. (Ibid.: 100)

ARTICLE 0: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public interest, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. (Ibid.)

100  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 0: DUTY TO OBSERVE THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW

All people are obliged to respect and observe the Constitution and the law. (Ibid.: 104) ARTICLE 0: RIGHTS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT, DUTY TO PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT

Every person has the right to enjoy a healthy and pleasant environment. Every person is obliged to strive after the environment’s preservation. The state has to use its endeavors to protect and improve the environment. (Ibid.: 108) ARTICLE 0: DUTY TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE NATION

The people are obliged to contribute to the nation’s security as provided by law. (Ibid.: 125) 3.4.3  Nippon Kaigi (2001) The following proposal is based on the 1994 draft released by the Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi (see 3.3.5). As mentioned above, this organization was a predecessor of the current Nippon Kaigi. Compared to the 1994 draft, Ōhara Yasuo and his co-authors have altered the wording, but the proposed revisions of the preamble and the first three chapters do not differ significantly from the initial proposal. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 2, 11, 13, 97, 98 Preamble Since ancient times, guided by the harmony between man and man, affirming the coexistence of various values, in coexistence with nature, while respecting traditions, and through the adoption and assimilation of foreign civilizations, we, the Japanese people have built a peculiar culture, and allowed the nation to evolve as the Emperor and the people have become one. Based on this national polity of our country, we enact this constitution to allow us to inherit and evolve the spirit and history of Constitutionalism since the Meiji [period], which has established popular will as the foundation of government, to be conscious of the responsibility of being a member of the nation, while respecting the people’s liberty and rights, and to anticipate the progress toward the formation of a new country, and to fulfill the international responsibility of contributing to the realization of international peace as well as the coexistence and reciprocity of all peoples. (Watanabe 2002: 358)

In quest of Constitutional reform  101 Chapter 1: The Emperor (1) (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 1)

1 The Emperor shall be the head of state, the symbol of the permanence of Japan and the unity of its People. 5 The sanctity of the head of state and symbol must be protected. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: Defense (1) (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, our country observes international treaties and strives for settling international disputes through peaceful means. 2 To protect our country’s security and independence and at the same time contribute to international peace, our country maintains a National Army. 3 The supreme command over the National Army is exercised by the Prime Minister. 4 The command over and the organization of the National Army is determined by law. (Ibid.: 359) Chapter 4: International cooperation Our country will actively conduct international cooperation in order to realize the aims laid out below based on the spirit of coexistence and co-prosperity of different races and nations: 1 The realization of a free and just international economic society. 2 Harmony between environmental protection and industrial development, and preservation of the global environment on the principle of self-help and appropriate responsibility of all countries. 3 The preservation of cultural property and the reconstruction of peculiar ethnic cultures on a global scale. (Ibid.) Chapter 5: Rights and duties of the people 1 The freedoms and rights determined by this Constitution have to be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs. At the same time, these freedoms and rights can be limited to prevent their abuse, for the purpose of respecting another person’s rights, and for the realization of public welfare. 2 On the occasion of enjoying these freedoms and exercising these rights, the people are to adhere to the principles of self-supporting endeavors and

102  In quest of Constitutional reform self-responsibility and to strive after the realization of public welfare. 3 Rights and duties appropriate for the present-day nation shall be adopted. 6 In addition to the obligation of receiving education and paying taxes, the obligation to abide by the law and protect the country shall be newly stipulated as the people’s duties. 9 It shall be stipulated that the state has to respect, protect and foster the family, which is the foundation of the nation and society’s existence, as well as respect for the individual and equality of the sexes in marriage. 11 With regard to the right to own or to hold property, the commonality of land shall be declared and the aim of harmony between the people’s right to own or to hold property, the use of land and the protection of the natural environment stipulated. (Ibid.: 359–60) 3.4.4  Aichi Kazuo 2004 Draft Revision (2004) In 2003, the Atarashii Kenpō wo tsukuru Kokumin Kaigi, an organization chaired by Aichi, published a proposal almost identical to the following draft which was released in 2004. Minor differences between the two proposals can be found only in the preamble; therefore the Atarashii Kenpō wo tsukuru Kokumin Kaigi draft is not listed separately in this research. That being said, the differences between Aichi’s original 1996 draft and this new proposal are significant. The latter features far bolder changes than the former. Specifically, the following changes are noteworthy: first and foremost, Aichi has removed chapter 1 of his original draft proposal. Meanwhile, stipulations regarding the national anthem and flag are now prominently featured in the second chapter. Whereas the 1996 proposal spoke of a National Defense Organization, this draft speaks of a National Defense Army (Article 12). Initially, Aichi had also proposed to add the phrase ‘regardless of gender’ to Article 2, but in this new version he decided to again omit this phrase and instead leave Article 2 unchanged. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble Since the foundation of our country, the people have united their efforts and while encountering many hardships, have overcome them, and achieved a formative development under our country’s unique national polity, which makes the Emperor the symbol of the people’s unity. Throughout history, our ancestors have paid respect to other countries’ cultures, and while incorporating, assimilating, and adapting them, built our country’s unique culture. Above all, it is a culture that honors human dignity and therefore respects the peace of man. It [also] respects nature and therefore aims for harmony with nature. Moreover, it is a culture that respects other cultures and therefore aspires to peace.

In quest of Constitutional reform  103 This ‘spirit of sympathizing with others’ in particular is the essence of our Japanese nation’s culture. While maintaining our country’s unique national polity, which makes the Emperor the symbol of the people’s unity, we shall hereafter look forward to the realization of a society open to the world, a balanced society with genuine democracy possessing ‘liberty and equality’, ‘rights and duties’ as well as reason, and a sustainable society bearing in mind the happiness of generations following us, based on the essence of Japanese culture, that is, ‘the spirit of sympathizing with others’. At the same time, we shall play an active role in the international community, so that the many challenges facing the world will be resolved and all men living on this planet can live a wealthy life, equally and in peace. Based on the Japanese people’s utmost independent will, we declare, by means of [this] new constitution, that we will use all our strength, so that the twenty-first century will become a century of peace. (Aichi 2004) Chapter 1: The People and the Emperor ARTICLE 1: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR

1 The Emperor is the head of state of Japan. 2 The Emperor represents the State and the Japanese people towards foreign countries and is the symbol of Japan’s traditions, culture and the unity of the Japanese people. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 2: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION, ERA NAME

1 No revisions made. 2 Upon Imperial succession, an era name shall be determined.

(Ibid.)

Chapter 3: National security (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 10: INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PRINCIPLE OF GLOBAL SECURITY, ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 The Japanese people aspire to the banishment of humanitarian disasters, such as military disputes, oppression, hunger, poverty and environmental destruction. 2 Not only direct murder and mayhem against man, but also acts such as destroying the global environment in the medium term and threatening global security are not recognized.

104  In quest of Constitutional reform 3 In order to accomplish the aims of the two preceding paragraphs, the Japanese nation endeavors to play a leading role in the formation, preservation and evolution of an international order based on justice, devoting peaceful means if possible. It will actively participate in the administration and activities of established international organizations from a position of responsibility, which includes the use of force. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 11: RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE, CONCLUSION OF ALLIANCES

1 Japan possesses the right to defend its own independence and security, and to resist and to defend itself against imminent, unjust invasion. 2 Based on the aim of the nation’s defense, Japan can join alliances with other countries. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 12: MAINTENANCE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ARMY

1 In order to accomplish the aims of the preceding two articles, Japan maintains a National Defense Army. 2 The organization of the National Defense Army is determined by law. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 13: THE ARMY’S NON-INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

The National Defense Army must not become involved in politics, and is required to transcend partisanship at all times. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 14: SUPREME COMMAND

The supreme command authority over the National Defense Army resides with the Prime Minister. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 15: APPROVAL BY THE DIET

Excluding the declaration of a state of emergency prescribed in Article 88, approval by the Diet is required for mobilization of the National Defense Army. Prior approval of the Diet is required for mobilization in cases other than invasion by a foreign country or the imminent threat of an invasion. (Ibid.)

In quest of Constitutional reform  105 Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 18: ENJOYMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

All people shall enjoy fundamental human rights. The rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon them as inviolate rights. The application of the rights guaranteed by this Constitution to foreign nationals is determined by law. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 19: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY, RESPECT FOR AND PROHIBITION OF THE ABUSE OF FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE APPROPRIATE EXERCISE OF FREEDOM AND RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLES 12, 13)

1 The people shall be respected as individuals. 2 Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the general welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. 3 The people shall not abuse the freedoms and rights guaranteed to them by this Constitution and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the general welfare. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 27: RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND EQUALITY OF THE SEXES IN FAMILY LIFE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 As society’s foundation the family has to be protected. 2 No revisions made (Article 24 paragraph 1). 3 No revisions made (Article 24 paragraph 2).

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 42: DUTY TO OBSERVE THE LAW

The people are obliged to observe this Constitution and the law.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 44: DUTY OF DEFENDING THE NATION

The people have the obligation to defend the nation.

(Ibid.)

106  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 121: OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98, PARAGRAPH 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

3.4.5  PHP Kenkyūsho (2004) The PHP Institute, one of Japan’s leading conservative publishing houses, unveiled its Constitutional reform draft in 2004. Its authors were PHP executive Eguchi Katsuhiko and researcher Nagahisa Toshio. The draft has a very particular order of chapters (1. Popular sovereignty, 3. Tennō, 4. Diet, 5. Prime Minister and Cabinet, 6. National Security; note: probably due to a typing error, Chapter 2 is missing from the source). Like most other documents published during the first decade of the new millennium, it stipulates that the Emperor shall be head of state (Article 37) and drastically revises Article 9. On the other hand, changes to provisions pertaining to the people’s rights and duties, such as Articles 11–13 and 24 are few and far between. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97, 98 Preamble We, the Japanese people, sovereign of Japan, declare that we shall aim for the improvement of the country’s security, the peace of our domestic order, and the people’s welfare, while inheriting and evolving the history and traditions of Japan, as well as actively contributing to the prosperity of all people and the realization of world peace, based on the principles of liberty, democracy and respect of human rights. (PHP Sōgō Kenkyūsho 2004) Chapter 1: Popular sovereignty (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 1: RESIDENCE OF SOVEREIGNTY

1 Sovereign power in Japan resides with the Japanese people. 2 The Japanese people have the right and duty to protect the independence and sovereignty of Japan. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 4: ENJOYMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

The people shall enjoy all fundamental human rights. The fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution are inviolate and eternal rights. (Ibid.)

In quest of Constitutional reform  107 ARTICLE 5: RESPONSIBILITY FOR UPHOLDING FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS AND PROHIBITION OF THEIR ABUSE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public interest. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 6: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY, PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS, PUBLIC INTEREST

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness must, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public interest, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 16: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY IN FAMILY LIFE AND EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SEXES (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 No revisions made. 2 No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 18: RIGHTS AND DUTIES RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Every person shall have the right to enjoy a favorable environment. The state and the people are obligated to future generations to use their endeavors for the preservation and harmonious improvement of a favorable environment. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: The Emperor (currently Chapter 1) ARTICLE 37: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 1)

The Emperor is the head of state of Japan. He stands for the permanence of Japan and represents Japan as the symbol of the unity of Japan and the Japanese people. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 38: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

108  In quest of Constitutional reform Chapter 5: National security (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 78: RENUNCIATION OF WARS OF AGGRESSION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

Japan does not wage wars of aggression, nor does it approve of wars of aggression [waged] by other countries. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 79: MAINTENANCE OF A NATIONAL ARMY

In order to protect its own independence and sovereignty, as well as to contribute to peace in the international community, Japan maintains a National Army. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 80: SUPREME COMMAND OVER THE NATIONAL ARMY

The supreme command over the National Army resides with the Prime Minister. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 81: DIET APPROVAL RELATED TO THE NATIONAL ARMY

1 The Diet’s approval has to be obtained [in matters] related to the National Army’s strength, organization and budget. 2 On the occasion of the National Army’s mobilization and dispatch, the Diet’s approval must be obtained either prior [to mobilization or dispatch] or within five days thereafter. (Ibid.) 3.4.6  Nakagawa Yatsuhiro Third Draft (2004) This is the third draft published by the retired Tsukuba University professor. It retains all the key features of the previous two iterations. The changes described below make this draft by far the most radical departure from the current Constitution among the proposals introduced in this research. Whereas the preambles of Nakagawa’s proposals in 1984 and 1991 still proclaimed the ‘respect for a free and just democracy’, this sole mention of the word ‘democracy’, along with the pledge to strive after peace, has been deleted in this newest draft. Noteworthy is the addition of the duty to enshrine and honor the war dead (Article 17 Paragraph 2). Furthermore, Nakagawa has replaced the term ‘fundamental human rights’ (Article 13) with the following phrase: ‘the freedom and other rights enjoyed by the Japanese people, which they have inherited from their ancestors’. In his initial two proposals the human rightsrelated stipulations of Articles 11 to 13 were retained with some limitations. Last but not least, this third Nakagawa proposal is one of the very few full revisions published since the mid-1990s that does not include any stipulations concerning international cooperation and rights and duties related to the environment.

In quest of Constitutional reform  109 Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 11, 97 Preamble In order for our virtuous motherland abounding with liberty, which we have inherited from our ancestors, to continue [to exist] forever, we, the Japanese people have resolved to fulfill our hereditary responsibility, revise the ‘Constitution of Japan’, which had been enacted under the Occupation, when we had lost our sovereign power, and enact a new constitution here. (Nakagawa 2004: 13) Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1

The Emperor is head of the state of Japan and represents Japan.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 2

1 The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial Household Law. 2 When a revision of the Imperial Household Law is required, the Imperial Assembly shall conduct it based on a proposal by the Imperial House. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 3

1 … 2 The Emperor’s dignity shall be inviolable.

(Ibid.: 14)

ARTICLE 7

The Emperor has the supreme command over the National Defense Army. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 9

The sanctity of rituals and ceremonies of the Imperial House shall not be violated. (Ibid.: 15)

110  In quest of Constitutional reform Chapter 2: National Defense Army and international law ARTICLE 11 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 Aspiring sincerely to a just, orderly and free world, the Japanese people forever renounce the use of force as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 2 The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not preclude our country from using its right of individual or collective self-defense based on international law, in order to defend our nation’s independence, security and inherent territories. 3 In order to accomplish the aim of the two preceding paragraphs, Japan maintains a National Defense Army. 4 The supreme command authority over the National Defense Army is delegated to the Prime Minister by the Emperor. (Ibid.: 16) ARTICLE 12 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations must be faithfully observed. (Ibid.) Chapter 4: Rights and duties of the people (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 16 (CURRENTLY ARTICLES 12 AND 13)

The freedoms and other rights enjoyed by the Japanese people, which they have inherited from their ancestors, shall be respected to the utmost extent, unless maintaining the security and public order of the country, to the extent that it does not interfere with public welfare or the fundamental human rights of another person, or in the case of a state of emergency. (Ibid.: 17) ARTICLE 17

1 The Japanese people have the honorable right and duty of defending Japan. Compulsory military service by the Japanese people, the conscientious objection thereto, other exemptions from military service, as well as substitute social labor are determined by law. 2 The heroes who sacrificed themselves for the defense of Japan shall forever be held in reverence and their souls together with their glory enshrined forever. (Ibid.: 18)

In quest of Constitutional reform  111 ARTICLE 18 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 The family shall be respected. Ancestral rituals [conducted by] the family shall be protected and respected. Freedom of marriage shall be guaranteed. 2 Any legislation which does not respect the family shall not be permitted. (Ibid.) 3.4.7  Yomiuri Shimbun Third Draft (2004) The most recent draft proposal by Japan’s leading daily newspaper was published in May 2004. It features a slightly longer, partially rewritten preamble as well as some other minor changes. As for imperial succession, the proposal does not mention the Imperial Household Law, but only speaks of a law in general (Article 6). Furthermore, the human calamities listed in Article 13 now include international terrorism. Last but not least, a new paragraph emphasizing the role of the family as the fundamental unit of society and demanding its protection has been added to Article 27. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble We, the Japanese people, hold sovereign power in Japan and, ultimately, our will shall dictate all State decisions. Government is entrusted to our duly elected representatives, who exercise their power with the trust of the people. We, the Japanese people, aspire to a free and vigorous society, where fundamental human rights are duly respected and the people’s welfare is advanced in the spirit of individual autonomy and mutual cooperation. We, the Japanese people, acknowledge the inheritance of our long history and tradition and the need to preserve our fair landscape and cultural legacy, and to use them for the future aim of the advancement of culture and science, as well as to strive for the creation of a country rich in creative power. We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time, respect the spirit of international cooperation and pledge to continue using our best efforts to ensure the peace, prosperity and security of the international community. The global environment is the basis of human existence. While cooperating with the international community, the Japanese people shall work hard for its preservation and aim for coexistence between man and nature. The Japanese people wish to attain these ideals and aim to occupy an honorable position in the international community. This Constitution is the supreme law of Japan and is to be observed by the Japanese people. (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 327–29)

112  In quest of Constitutional reform Chapter 1: Popular sovereignty ARTICLE 1: THE PEOPLE’S SOVEREIGN POWER

Sovereign power in Japan resides with the Japanese people.

(Ibid.: 330)

ARTICLE 2: EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER

The people shall exercise their sovereign power through duly elected representatives in the Diet, and at national referenda held to consider amendments to the Constitution. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: The Emperor (currently Chapter 1) ARTICLE 5: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 1)

The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people of Japan. The Emperor’s position shall be based on the sovereign will of the people. (Ibid.: 331) ARTICLE 6: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with law. (Ibid.) Chapter 3: National security (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 11: RENUNCIATION OF WAR AND BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 No revisions made (Article 9 Paragraph 1) 2 Seeking to eliminate from the world inhuman and indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction, Japan shall not manufacture, possess or use such weapons. (Ibid.: 335) ARTICLE 12: ARMY FOR SELF-DEFENSE, CIVILIAN CONTROL AND DENIAL OF FORCED CONSCRIPTION

1 Japan shall form an army for self-defense to secure its peace and independence and to maintain its safety. 2 The Prime Minister shall exercise supreme command authority over the army for self-defense.

In quest of Constitutional reform  113 3 The people shall not be forced to join the army mentioned in the first paragraph. (Ibid.) Chapter 4: International cooperation ARTICLE 13: PRINCIPLE

Japan shall aspire to the elimination from earth of human calamities caused by military conflicts, international terrorism, natural disasters, environmental destruction, economic deprivation in particular areas and regional disorder. (Ibid.: 336) ARTICLE 14: PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Based on the principle of the preceding article, Japan shall actively cooperate in activities of established international organizations, as well as other joint international activities to maintain and restore international peace and security as well as for humanitarian support. In case of need, public officials can be dispatched and a part of the army can be allowed to participate in international activities with the Diet’s approval. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 15: OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

Chapter 5: Rights and duties of the people (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 16: BASIC DECLARATION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

The people possess all fundamental human rights. The fundamental human rights guaranteed by this Constitution are inviolable and eternal rights. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 17: RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF FREEDOM AND RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people. The people shall always mutually respect [each other’s] freedom and rights, make efforts to harmonize them with the public interest, such as the people’s security, public order, and a healthy living environment, and refrain from any abuse of them. (Ibid.: 338)

114  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 18: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness must, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public interest, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 27: FAMILY, MARRIAGE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 As society’s foundation, the family has to be protected. 2 No revisions made (Article 24 paragraph 1). 3 No revisions made (Article 24 paragraph 2).

(Ibid.: 342)

ARTICLE 30: RIGHTS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Every person possesses the right to enjoy a favorable environment and is obliged to preserve the same. The state shall endeavor to maintain the environment in a favorable condition. (Ibid.: 344) 3.4.8  Nishibe Susumu Second Draft (2004) Nishibe Susumu published his second reform proposal in 2004. Compared to the initial draft (3.3.1), the changes made to the preamble and to Articles 1, 12 and 13 of this proposal are generally within the realm of semantics and style, the sole exception being his decision to replace ‘head of state’ with ‘representative’. Furthermore, Nishibe has again chosen not to include articles stipulating environmental rights in this draft. As for Article 24, no revision is explicitly proposed in the draft, but in the commentary one specific yet comparatively minor revision is outlined. Based on the commentary, I have chosen to include a translation of Nishibe’s version of Article 24 below. The substantially altered version of Article 9 arguably deserves more attention, however, as this is the only proposal explicitly proclaiming Japan’s right to use a pre-emptive military strike as a means of self-defense. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 11, 97, 98 Preamble Representing the Japanese citizens our Constitutional legislation council shall fundamentally revise the Constitution of Japan, which had been enacted under the Occupation regime and under the supervision of the Occupation army. To set new norms for the Japanese nation and the

In quest of Constitutional reform  115 activities of the Japanese people, we shall enact this New Constitution of Japan here. The New Constitution of Japan is based on the principle of popular sovereignty. The Japanese people are the people who are at the center of Japanese traditions, the Japanese people who until now have shouldered the fundamental domain relating to society as well as the Japanese people who will bear this burden in the future. Sovereignty resides with these people. On the occasion of making their own decisions, the Japanese citizens must obey the sovereignty of the people. Therefore, our government promulgates this legitimate authority to the people who carry Japanese traditions. Based on the trust of the citizens, their representatives exercise the powers affected by this validity, and the citizens shall enjoy the physical and spiritual wealth yielded thereby. This is the political principle of rule by the citizens based on popular sovereignty. The New Constitution of Japan will maintain this political principle. Accordingly, our Constitutional legislation council calls on the current and future citizens of Japan to effectively exhibit the powers of rule by the citizens, while complying with the authority of the Japanese people. Aspiring to the advent of peace within the international community, our Constitutional legislation council deems coordination with other countries’ authorities necessary, as absolute Japanese foreign power is impossible. This international cooperation based on the principle of limiting national authority is essential not only for the international community’s peace, but also for the prosperity of Japanese society. Accordingly, the Japanese citizens have to contribute to the creation of international rules, so that this cooperation will be conducted in more harmonious ways. Establishing the principles of the people’s sovereign power and rule by the citizens domestically, and the principle of limiting national authority externally as political principles, our Constitutional legislation council shall expand on these principles in the Constitutional articles [below]. Compliance therewith is demanded from all citizens. (Nishibe 2004: 105–6) Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 1

The Emperor is the symbol of the Japanese people’s tradition and therefore the symbol of the unity of the Japanese citizens. The Emperor is the cultural representative of the Japanese State and therefore celebrates cultural ceremonies appropriate to [his position]. The position of the Emperor is derived from the historic will of the people. On the occasion of the citizens making a decision regarding this position and its function, they shall accept the limitations stemming from Japanese traditions. (Ibid.: 129)

116  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 2

The Emperor shall administer all matters directly concerning the Imperial Household, beginning with Imperial succession, in accordance with the traditions of the Imperial Household, while accepting the advice of the Cabinet. (Ibid.: 132) Chapter 2 ARTICLE 9

The duty to maintain the security and the independence of the Japanese nation is imposed on the Japanese citizens. To accomplish this duty, the Japanese government has to maintain a National Defense Army. The National Defense Army must not use its military force for the purpose of invading another country. On the occasion of preparing and executing military activities for the purpose of self-defense, including pre-emptive strikes, the National Defense Army has to show utmost consideration to international cooperation, including collective self-defense or international police. The supreme command authority over the National Defense Army resides with the Prime Minister. (Ibid.: 147) Chapter 3 ARTICLE 12

On the occasion of enjoying fundamental freedoms and performing fundamental responsibilities, every Japanese citizen has to observe the rule of law. The protection of traditional Japanese norms related to public welfare shall also be included in this rule of law. (Ibid.: 163) ARTICLE 13

All citizens have to respect not only their own, but also another person’s freedoms under the law to the utmost extent. The freedom to demand personal safety, the freedom of residence, moving and choosing one’s occupation, the freedom to use property for private purposes as well as freedoms related to expressive activities, such as religion, speech, press, assembly, association, study and education; these four freedoms are guaranteed to all citizens as fundamental freedoms. The responsibilities of participating in national defense, paying taxes, having boys and girls receive education, and complying with the rule of

In quest of Constitutional reform  117 law: these four responsibilities are imposed on all citizens as fundamental responsibilities. (Ibid.: 167) ARTICLE 24

1 Marriage shall be concluded upon honoring the consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation, with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. 2 No revisions made. (Ibid.: 181) 3.4.9  Sekai Heiwa Kenkyūsho (2005) Established in 1988, this Tokyo-based conservative think-tank chaired by former Prime Minister Nakasone published its draft in early 2005. Compared to the proposal drafted and published by his own party in 2005, Nakasone was able to go further with the following proposal. Not only has he changed the order of the chapters, by introducing a new one named ‘popular sovereignty’, but he has also revised Article 1, referring to the Emperor as head of state. Another revision missing from the LDP draft is the duty to defend the nation. On the other hand, just like his party, Nakasone has retained Articles 2 and 24 as well as the first paragraph of Article 9. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble We, the Japanese people, have over successive generations inherited beautiful, wave-washed Northeast Asian islands in the Pacific Ocean, lived under the emperor as symbol of the people’s unity, formed and developed an original culture as well as an indigenous ethnic lifestyle. On top of the experience of our long history, we shall now arrange a new national framework, maintain our independence, and realize the ideal of human coexistence. Our Japan is a democratic nation, where the people have sovereign power. Based on the trust of the people, representatives of the people are responsible for the government, and the people shall enjoy the fruits thereof. We shall uphold the country’s polity based on the respect of liberty, democracy, human rights and peace. In the international community we shall aspire sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, and contribute to its realization. We endeavor to develop a vigorous, free and just society, and promote national welfare; we attach great importance to the promotion of education, aim for coexistence with nature, and will work hard for the preservation of the global environment. We acknowledge the importance of a culture bringing about international harmony and solidarity, and shall actively contribute to the

118  In quest of Constitutional reform creation of our own country’s culture as well as a global culture. While remembering the historic significance of the Constitution of the Great Empire of Japan and the Constitution of Japan, we, the Japanese people, here in our people’s name enact this constitution as a fundamental norm of a Japan of a new era. (Sekai Heiwa Kenkyūsho 2005: 13) ARTICLE 1: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR

The Emperor is the head of state of Japan, whose sovereignty resides with the people. The Emperor is the symbol of the people’s unity. (Ibid.) Chapter 1: Popular sovereignty ARTICLE 2: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND MEANS OF EXERCISING SOVEREIGNTY

The sovereignty of Japan resides with the Japanese people. The people exercise their sovereign rights through their representatives in the Diet and at public referenda. (Ibid.) Chapter 2: The Emperor (currently Chapter 1) ARTICLE 6: IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

Chapter 3: National security and international cooperation (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 11: RENUNCIATION OF WAR, NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENSE ARMY, PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, CIVILIAN CONTROL (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 No revisions made (Article 9 Paragraph 1). 2 In order to protect its own peace and independence, and to maintain the security of country and people, Japan possesses a Defense Army. 3 To maintain international peace and security as well as for the purpose of humanitarian support, Japan can allow the Defense Army to participate in activities under the framework of international organizations and international cooperation.

In quest of Constitutional reform  119 4 The supreme command authority over the Defense Army resides with the Prime Minister. In case he orders the Defense Army to [engage] in activities involving the use of force, approval by the Diet has to be obtained either beforehand or, depending on the circumstances, thereafter. (Ibid.) Chapter 4: Rights and duties of the people (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 13: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

1 Every person shall enjoy all fundamental human rights as natural rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights. 2 Excluding qualitative limitations of rights, the rights of the preceding paragraph are guaranteed equally also to foreign nationals. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 14: FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

1 The freedoms and rights guaranteed by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of all people, and shall not be abused. 2 Every person shall mutually respect [the other’s] freedoms and rights. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 15: RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL, LIFE, LIBERTY AND PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

Every person shall be respected as an individual. Their right to life as well as their right to pursue happiness must, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public interest, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 28: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY IN THE HOUSEHOLD AND IN FAMILY RELATIONS AND EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SEXES (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 The family is the fundamental unit forming society. Every person has to endeavor to uphold and build the family one belongs to. 2 No revisions made (Article 24 paragraph 1). 3 The family is based on individual dignity and essential equality of the sexes. The nation shall protect the family. 4 No revisions made (Article 24 paragraph 2). (Ibid.)

120  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 30: RIGHTS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Every person shall have the right to enjoy a favorable environment and be obliged to use their endeavors for its preservation. The State has to use its endeavors for the preservation of a favorable environment. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 35: OBLIGATION TO PROTECT PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE

All people are obliged to defend the peace and independence of the country. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 105: OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

3.4.10  Hatoyama Yukio (2005) Long-time Democratic Party leader and Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio published his complete reform draft in 2005. The grandson of Hatoyama Ichirō had already called for Constitutional revision during his election campaign to become Minshutō president in 1999 (Shiota 2007: 121). Unlike his grandfather, Hatoyama is no reactionary. On the contrary, his is one of the most moderate proposals discussed in this book. Apart from being one of the few authors who has revised Article 2 to allow the accession of female members of the Imperial family to the Chrysanthemum Throne and refrained from altering the fundamental human rights stipulations of Articles 11 to 13, Hatoyama is one of only two authors who has incorporated a ban on weapons of mass destruction and the renunciation of compulsory military service in his proposal. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble This Constitution inherits the tradition of parliamentarism and party politics initiated by the Constitution of 1889, as well as the ideals of international cooperation and pacifism established by the Constitution of 1946 and evolve them even further. Valuing human dignity and aspiring to enjoy the fruits of peace, liberty and democracy together with the people of the entire world, we desire and pledge to continue our constant endeavor toward the establishment of an eternal system of economic and social cooperation as well as collective security around the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

In quest of Constitutional reform  121 We aim for the creation of a fraternal country based on the spirit of independence and coexistence. That is to say, we seek to inherit the traditions and culture cultivated throughout this country’s long history, protect the rich environment and beautiful land, and pass them on to future generations. Furthermore, under an order based on the principle of complementation, we respect the self-government and independence of the regions to the utmost extent, take a global perspective, desire to jointly progress towards the creation of a dignified country connected to the peoples of the world through friendship and knowledge, and here enact a new Constitution of Japan. (Hatoyama 2005: 27–28) Chapter 1: Basic principles ARTICLE 1: SOVEREIGNTY AND GOVERNMENT

1 The sovereign power of Japan resides with the Japanese people. 2 Japan is a democratic nation, whose head of state is the Emperor, the symbol of the people’s unity. 3 The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law. (Ibid.: 33) ARTICLE 2: INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 11)

The dignity of man is inviolable. The fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution are eternal and inviolate rights. The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. (Ibid.: 33) Chapter 2: The Emperor (currently Chapter 1) ARTICLE 7: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 2)

The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded by a male or female member of the Imperial family in accordance with the line of succession determined by the Imperial Household Law passed by the Diet. (Ibid.: 40) Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 11: DUTY TO MAINTAIN FREEDOM AND RIGHTS, PROHIBITION OF THEIR ABUSE AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXERCISING THEM (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 12)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 57)

122  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 12: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY, RESPECT FOR LIFE, LIBERTY AND PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 13)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 57)

ARTICLE 25: RESPECT FOR THE FAMILY, INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY AND EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SEXES (CURRENTLY ARTILE 24)

1 As the fundamental unit of society, the family has to be respected. 2 No revisions made (Article 24 paragraph 1). 3 No revisions made (Article 24 paragraph 2). (Ibid.: 61) ARTICLE 29: RIGHTS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE DUTY TO PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT

Every person has the right to enjoy a favorable environment. Every person has to strive after the preservation of the natural environment and historical and cultural heritage, and is obliged to maintain a favorable living environment as a collective and let it develop. Local governments, the state, as well as other public institutions have to take steps necessary for the people to enjoy a favorable environment. (Ibid.: 62) Chapter 4: Pacifism and international cooperation (currently Chapter 2) ARTICLE 46: RENUNCIATION OF WARS OF AGGRESSION (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 Respecting the justice and order in the international community and aspiring to the establishment of eternal worldwide peace, the Japanese people do not recognize any acts of aggression against and destruction of peace. 2 Based on the spirit of the preceding paragraph, Japan renounces forever the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (Ibid.: 73) ARTICLE 47: PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Japan actively cooperates in peace-keeping and -creation activities conducted by the United Nations and other established international organizations. (Ibid.)

In quest of Constitutional reform  123 ARTICLE 48: TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY

1 Japan can transfer a part of its sovereignty to an international organization according to law as far as this is not adverse to the fundamental order of government determined by this constitution. 2 In order to contribute to the peace and security of the international community, Japan can, according to law, limit its sovereignty when taking part in collective security operations. (Ibid.: 73–74) ARTICLE 49: OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98 PARAGRAPH 2)

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 74)

Chapter 5: National security ARTICLE 50: SELF-DEFENSE ARMY

1 In order to preserve its independence and security, Japan maintains a SelfDefense Army. 2 Matters related to the organization and activities of the Self-Defense Army are determined by law. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 51: SUPREME COMMAND AUTHORITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER

The supreme command authority over the Self-Defense Army resides with the Prime Minister. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 52: APPROVAL BY THE DIET

When the Prime Minister orders the dispatch of the Self-Defense Army, approval by the Diet in accordance with the law is required. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 53: NON-POSSESSION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The development, production and possession of weapons of mass destruction, beginning with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, is prohibited. (Ibid.: 75)

124  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 54: RENUNCIATION OF MILITARY DRAFT

The Japanese people shall not be forced to participate in the Self-Defense Army. (Ibid.) 3.4.11  Hiranuma Takeo (2005) Former economics minister Hiranuma Takeo has published this draft in his 2005 book Shin Kokkaron. Hiranuma has not written out his version of Article 1 in full, and omitted entirely any mention of Articles 2 and 24. Like many other conservatives, he seems to be in favor of amending Article 1, however. According to Hiranuma, a new Constitution should stipulate that the Emperor becomes head of state and represents Japan vis-à-vis foreign nations (Hiranuma 2005: 134). Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 1, 2, 11, 13, 24, 97, 98 Preamble The sovereign power of the Japanese nation rests with every single Japanese citizen. Based upon the trust of the people, representatives of the people are responsible for the government. We, the Japanese people respect liberty and democracy, and uphold the system of the country, which is embodied by those values. Under the autonomy of the individual and the spirit of mutual cooperation, the Japanese people respect each other’s human rights and actively contribute to other peoples’ prosperity and the realization of world peace. In addition to inheriting our country’s unique culture and traditions, we, the Japanese people, aim to coexist with nature, and contribute to the development of the world’s cultures. This Constitution was enacted by the will of the Japanese people. It is the supreme law of the Japanese nation, which the Japanese people shall adhere to. (Hiranuma 2005: 133–34) ARTICLE 9

Japan actively cooperates in activities under the framework of the United Nations and other established international institutions for the preservation of worldwide peace and security, as well as for humanitarian aid. If necessary, it will dispatch public officials, and with the Diet’s approval let the army, whose purpose is self-defense, participate [in a mission]. The Japanese nation neither conducts wars of aggression nor does it approve of wars of aggression by other countries. This policy shall be upheld forever. In order to protect its own independence and sovereignty, and to maintain the security of the country and the people, the nation of Japan deploys an army for the purpose of self-defense.

In quest of Constitutional reform  125 The supreme command authority over the army rests with the Prime Minister. In the event that he orders the army to [conduct] operations including the use of force, he has to obtain the Diet’s approval beforehand, or if that is difficult [to accomplish], quickly thereafter. An extraordinary tribunal, namely a military court, shall conduct trials on matters related to the army’s missions. However, it will not be given final judicial power. In order to promote mutual understanding between nations, and to preempt wars and conflicts, the nation of Japan undertakes constant diplomatic endeavors. (Ibid.: 140–42) ARTICLE 12

1 The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people. 2 The people shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always respect each other’s freedom and rights, and aim for harmony between themselves and public interests, such as the country’s safety, public order and a healthy living environment. (Ibid.: 135) 3.4.12  LDP (2005) In time for the commemoration of the party’s fiftieth anniversary, the LDP unveiled its Constitutional reform draft in November 2005. The draft does not propose any structural changes nor does it alter Chapter 1 in any meaningful way. It is one of the few drafts that does not call for the Emperor to become head of state. Similarly, Articles 11, 13, 24 and 97 have all remained untouched, with only Article 12 being subjected to the revision treatment. Naturally, changes to Chapter 2 are more significant, as the second paragraph of Article 9 is replaced by four new paragraphs. Environmental rights have been incorporated, but the duty to protect the nation has been left out of this draft. The LDP’s proposal has not only at times drawn fierce criticism even from scholars in favor of Constitutional revision, but has also been criticized from within the party.1 Deleted/ignored articles, if any: none Preamble We, the Japanese people, based on our own intention and determination as sovereign, enact a new Constitution here. The symbolic Emperor system shall be maintained. Furthermore, the fundamental principles of popular sovereignty, democracy and liberalism shall be inherited as eternal values. Through affection toward and a sense of responsibility and spirit for their country, we, the Japanese people share the responsibility of supporting and protecting ourselves, aim for

126  In quest of Constitutional reform the development of a society vigorous in [its] liberty and justice, and the substantiality of the nation’s welfare as well as attach great importance to the promotion of education, creation of culture, development of local self-government. We, the Japanese people sincerely wish for international peace based on justice and order. In order to realize this we will cooperate with other countries. While recognizing the multitude of values in the international community, we shall undertake constant endeavors to eradicate tyranny and the violation of human rights. We, the Japanese people will work hard to protect our own country as well as the precious global environment, in the belief in coexistence with nature. (LDP 2005) Chapter 1: Emperor ARTICLE 1

No relevant revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 2

No relevant revisions made.

(Ibid.)

Chapter 2: National security ARTICLE 9

Paragraph 1: No revisions made. Paragraph 2: Deleted. 1 To uphold our country’s peace and independence as well as the security of country and people, [Japan] maintains a Self-Defense Army, whose commander-in-chief is the Prime Minister. 2 In accordance with law, the Self-Defense Army obeys the approval of the Diet and other controls when conducting activities for the purpose of accomplishing its mission based on the stipulations of the previous paragraph. 3 Apart from conducting activities in order to accomplish its mission in accordance with the previous paragraph, the Self-Defense Army can carry out activities conducted by cooperating internationally to maintain the peace and security of the international community, and activities to uphold public order in a state of emergency as well as protect the lives and liberty of the people, in accordance with law. 4 Other than the aspects provided for in the previous two paragraphs, matters related to the organization of and control over the Self-Defense Army are stipulated by law. (Ibid.)

In quest of Constitutional reform  127 Chapter 3: Rights and duties of the people ARTICLE 11: ENJOYMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 12: OBLIGATION OF THE PEOPLE

The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people. The people shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights, and while being conscious of the responsibility and duty which accompany liberty and rights, shall always be responsible for enjoying their liberty and using their rights in a way that does not interfere with the public good and order. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 13: INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY

All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public interest and order, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 24: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES RELATED TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

ARTICLE 25: THE STATE’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION

The State has to use its endeavors for the preservation of the environment, so that the people can enjoy the blessing of a favorable environment. (Ibid.)

ARTICLE 97: MEANING OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

128  In quest of Constitutional reform ARTICLE 98

1 … 2 No revisions made.

(Ibid.)

3.4.13  Sōken Kaigi (2006) The Sōken Kaigi is a group headed by DPJ members Yonezawa Takashi and Tamaki Kazuya. The group has enlisted the help of professors Katō Shujirō (Tōyō University) and Ikeda Minoru (Nihon University) to draft its first Constitutional reform proposal. This proposal does not feature a chapter on national security. Instead, the authors have chosen to include their revised version of Article 9 (Article 3) in an introductory chapter. This introductory chapter also features the draft’s equivalent to Article 1. Article 2 has remained unchanged, but chapter 3 has undergone various revisions and additions which have become mainstays in recent proposals, including environmental rights and the emphasis of the family’s special status. While the duty to defend the nation is also included, Article 3 explicitly bans forced conscription. Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 97 Preamble Aspiring to peace and prosperity for our country and the international community, we, the Japanese people proclaim our intent here on the occasion of enacting this new Constitution. Throughout eternal history, the Japanese people have built rich traditions and a unique culture. We shall inherit and evolve these, and proceed to create a country replete with an ethos of friendship based on independence and coexistence. Inheriting the principle and tradition of Constitutionalism, the Japanese people have built a free and democratic nation based on the principle of respecting fundamental human rights. On this foundation, we shall promote the people’s welfare and use our endeavors to build a vigorous and just society. By the virtue of their beautiful land and abundant nature, the Japanese people stand in awe of the working of nature and are inspired by living together with it. We shall convey this to future generations and use our endeavors to secure coexistence with nature on a global scale. Since ancient times, the Japanese people have endeavored to adopt foreign culture and be in concord with other countries. We shall join hands with the people of peace-loving nations, contribute actively to the maintenance of international peace, and proceed to build a dignified country. As a result of the variation of the archipelago’s climate and natural features, the Japanese people have made local culture brimming with individuality the

In quest of Constitutional reform  129 inspiration of their spirit. We shall respect the self-governance and independence of local communities and proceed to create a country abundant in diversity and creativity. We pledge the honor of the nation and the people to accomplish these high ideals and purposes. (Sōken Kaigi 2006: 114–15) Introductory chapter ARTICLE 1: SYMBOLIC EMPEROR SYSTEM, PEOPLE’S SOVEREIGN POWER

The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people. Sovereign power resides with the people; all the powers of the state are derived from the people. The people exercise their sovereign power through representatives or in other ways determined by this Constitution. (Sōken Kaigi 2006: 115) ARTICLE 2: HUMAN DIGNITY, PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

Every person shall be respected as a human being. Based on the spirit of coexistence and friendship, the people must endeavor to protect the freedoms and rights determined by this Constitution. (Ibid.: 115–16) ARTICLE 3: INTERNATIONAL PACIFISM, ARMY, RENUNCIATION OF MILITARY DRAFT (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

1 No revisions made (current Article 9 paragraph 1). 2 Japan maintains an army in order to protect the independence and sovereignty of the state, to protect the life, freedoms and property of its people, to preserve its territory, as well as to contribute to the peace of the international society. 3 The Prime Minister shall exercise supreme command authority over the armed forces. 4 A military draft shall not be established. 5 Matters pertaining to national security shall be determined by law. (Ibid.: 116) Chapter 1: The Emperor ARTICLE 6: IMPERIAL SUCCESSION

No revisions made.

(Ibid.: 117)

130  In quest of Constitutional reform Chapter 2: Rights and duties (currently Chapter 3) ARTICLE 12: ENJOYMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, RESPECT OF FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS, LEGAL LIMITATIONS THEREOF AND BAN ON THEIR ABUSE (CURRENTLY ARTICLES 11 TO 13)

The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. The freedoms and rights guaranteed by this Constitution can be restricted by law in order to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. The people shall refrain from abusing these freedoms and rights and maintain them by their constant endeavor. (Ibid.: 120) ARTICLE 39: PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY, FREEDOM OF MARRIAGE (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 24)

1 The family is the natural and fundamental unit of society, which the state shall protect. 2 Having custody of the children and bringing them up is the parents’ right and duty. The state shall provide the support necessary for the parents to fulfill their responsibility of their children’s custody and upbringing. 3 Marriage shall be based on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. 4 With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws respecting individual dignity, essential equality of the sexes, and the value of the family as the foundation of society, shall be enacted. (Ibid.: 128) ARTICLE 44: RIGHTS RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

1 Every person possesses the right to enjoy a favorable environment and is obliged to preserve the same. 2 The state has to endeavor to enforce policies in order to maintain the environment in a favorable condition. 3 Only according to provisions of a law concretizing the right set forth in paragraph 1, can redress be demanded in court. (Ibid.: 130)

In quest of Constitutional reform  131 ARTICLE 46: DUTY TO OBSERVE THE LAW

Every person is obliged to observe this Constitution as well as laws and ordinances provided for by the state and local governments. (Ibid.: 131) ARTICLE 47: OBLIGATION TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY

All people are obliged to defend the security and independence of the country. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 115: OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 98, PARAGRAPH 2)

2 No revision made.

(Ibid.: 156)

3.4.14  Happiness Realization Party (2009) The newest amendment proposal was put forth by Ōkawa Ryūhō, the former chairman of the Happiness Realization Party, in early 2009. This political organization was established by the religious sect Kōfuku no Kagaku (Happy Science, formerly known as The Institute for Research in Human Happiness) in the same year. This draft is noteworthy for several reasons. Not only is it the first draft to be published in more than three years and by far the shortest complete revision (16 articles), because its author thought that a significant restructuring of the Constitution was necessary to once again widen the people’s freedom, which had in the past been restricted by too many legal provisions (Happiness Realization Party 2009); but more important than the length is the arguably radical content. This draft is the only one proposing the adoption of a presidential system. Accordingly, it merely states that the Imperial system has to be respected (Article 14). Unlike most proposals, it does not demand that the Emperor should be head of state, nor is his position specified in any way in the document. The peculiarities of Ōkawa’s document do not end there. The chairman of the Happiness Realization Party has also significantly shortened or entirely removed stipulations to which conservatives generally tend to attach great importance, e.g. provisions concerning fundamental human rights and the family. Together with Nakagawa’s 2004 proposal (3.4.6), this document is the only proposal published since that mid-1990s that is devoid of articles pertaining to international (military) cooperation and environmental rights. While it may not be as radical as Nakagawa’s work, this document clearly is as far removed from the mainstream of conservative Constitutional reform ideas as Nakagawa’s concept.

132  In quest of Constitutional reform Deleted/ignored articles, if any: 2, 24, 97 and 98 Preamble We, the Japanese people, centered on the spirit of the gods and buddhas, strive for peace, development and prosperity in Japan and the entire world, stipulate that the essence as children of gods and buddhas shall be the foundation for the dignity of man and enact this new Constitution of Japan here. (Happiness Realization Party 2009a) ARTICLE 1

The people shall value harmony and honor an avoidance of wanton opposition. The people shall actively strive after the construction of worldwide peace to achieve its realization. (Ibid.)2 ARTICLE 3

The executive is exercised through a presidential system determined by public vote. The mode of the president’s election and his term of office are determined by law. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 4

The president is the head of state of the nation and the chief executive of national defense. The president can appoint and dismiss Cabinet ministers. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 5 (CURRENTLY ARTICLE 9)

To protect the people’s lives, safety and property, a defense army is formed by land, sea and air force. The police are tasked with [upholding] domestic public order. (Ibid.) ARTICLE 10 (CURRENTLY ARTICLES 11–13)

All rights are guaranteed to the people to the extent that they do not interfere with equality of opportunities and the law. (Ibid.)

In quest of Constitutional reform  133 ARTICLE 14

The Emperor system and other cultural traditions shall be respected. However, to the extent that they do not pertain to the independence of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, their function and content are determined by law. (Ibid.)

4 Key issues of Constitutional reform and their meaning to the conservative movement

4.1  The preamble: towards a balance between universalism and traditionalism As the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei explained in the commentary to its 1993 draft (3.3.4), preambles are merely declarations of intent, without any binding legal power (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993). These declarations of intent, however, do provide a good glimpse of the respective draft author’s vision for the country and a short summary introducing the most important aspects of the legal text set forth below them. In section 2.3 we noted that conservatives have a clear idea of the values a new Japan should feature. Despite evident differences between moderates and reactionaries, we concluded that conservatives envision a dignified, proud nation with a strong identity. Since the aim of this research is to analyze how this vision is reflected in the proposals, a closer look at the preambles should provide a good idea of the degree to which this vision has found its way into the proposed amendments. Prior to examining the preambles proposed by the conservative authors, we will first take a look at the criticism they direct at the existing preamble in order to understand their rationale for amending it. The current document is often criticized for sounding ‘unnatural’ and ‘like a translation’ (Nishi 1995: 221; Nishibe 2004: 95–96; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 39). One might say that this is only natural, given that the current preamble was at least partially the result of patchwork. The fathers of the Constitution took excerpts from existing Western documents, such as the American Constitution or the Atlantic Charter (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 39). That being said, when compared to the content, the style is obviously deemed the lesser problem. The contentual critique resembles the criticism of postwar values that was discussed in section 2.3. The lack of references to Japan’s long history, unique culture and traditions is the most frequently voiced criticism (Yagi 2003: 208). Ōhara Yasuo laments that, due to the complete lack of such references in the preamble, a reader of the Constitution probably would have trouble guessing which country’s supreme law he or she has just read (Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 27). Takehana Mitsunori wrote in his preamble proposal, ‘the emphasis on universality [in the current Constitution] led to disregard for [Japan’s] uniqueness’ (Takehana 1997: 128). Similarly sounding criticism is voiced by most would-be reformers, irrespective of whether they are moderates or reactionaries. Another common

Key issues of Constitutional reform  135 point of criticism is directed at the idealist tone of the present preamble. ‘How should we achieve “peaceful cooperation with all nations”’, ask the conservative critics, when it is abundantly clear that not every nation is worthy of or interested in ‘peaceful cooperation’. To the ears of an autonomist like Nishibe, who defines peace as the time that passes between two wars, this part of the preamble sounds like a ‘child’s essay’ (Nishibe 2004: 100). Tamura Shigenobu likens the preamble’s idealism to leaving one’s house, deliberately keeping the door unlocked and leaving a note reading ‘Dear burglar, I trust you’ for the criminal who is sure to exploit the situation (Tamura 2006: 111). Even the more idealistic and moderate Hatoyama agrees, writing that not all countries love peace (Hatoyama 2005: 24–25). Furthermore, conservatives point out that the current preamble does not postulate a national goal appropriate to this time and age (Aichi 1996a: 9; Yamasaki 2001: 15; Tamura 2006: 109). This criticism is only consequent, considering that conservatives had nothing positive to say about the old goal of seeking material wealth in section 2.3. Last but not least, the apologetic tone of the preamble, in particular the phrase ‘[we] resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government’, has stirred the ire of many conservatives (Kimura 1996: 222; Tamura 2006: 111). To Kimura, this sort of penance, which is a complicated way of saying ‘through the actions of government, our country until now has caused great wars of aggressions. For that we are very sorry’, has no place in the preamble (ibid.). Despite this harsh criticism, most conservatives still find praise for universal values, i.e. democracy, fundamental human rights and pacifism. In 1992, Kobayashi wrote: ‘As Constitutional principles, respect for human rights, popular sovereignty, pacifism, these so-called three great principles of the Constitution of Japan are the best mankind can think of’ (Kobayashi 1992: 80). Seeing how Kobayashi’s proposal leaves the present preamble almost entirely untouched, this glowing accolade could be expected, but despite most authors being more reserved in their commentary, there seems to be a general agreement that the three principles should be inherited by any new Constitution (Nishi 1995: 221; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 31, 35). If we recall what has been said in section 2.3, then those grievances shared by most conservatives have a familiar tone. Consequently, it stands to reason that the proposed amendments also reflect the vision described in section 2.3. Therefore, we should not expect to find any references to the old national goals, i.e. the dreaded quest for materialist wealth and the harshly criticized ‘excessive’ individualism. In fact, the sole reference to ‘economic wealth’ can be found in the preamble to Nishi’s draft (3.3.7). There, the Komazawa University professor stresses the importance of ‘harmony between economic and spiritual wealth’. The word ‘prosperity’ is used more frequently, but exclusively in the context of Japan’s contributions to ‘peace, prosperity and security of the international community’ (3.4.1). The few preambles that make reference to individualism do so ‘under the spirit of individual autonomy and mutual cooperation’. In other words, if the aspiring reformers had their way, the age of egocentric individualism and mindless materialism would be history. This brings us to the vision that conservatives have set out as a replacement. However, at first glance, the vision of a ‘dignified nation’ discussed in section 2.3

136  Key issues of Constitutional reform is nowhere to be found in the preamble revisions. In fact, only Hatoyama (3.4.10) and the Sōken Kaigi (3.4.13) have used the word in their respective versions. That being said, if we recall what has been said in section 2.3, the acknowledgment of and respect for Japanese history, tradition and culture are, albeit to varying degrees, considered important parts of the vision of a dignified nation. And indeed, references pertaining to ‘tradition’ (mentioned 19 times) and Japan’s ‘long history’ (14 times) are most prevalent among the 23 preamble drafts.1 The traditions spoken of in this context may be mainly cultural, yet several authors also make mention of Japan’s parliamentary tradition going back to the Meiji Constitution of 1889, as if to remind their countrymen and women that it wasn’t the American occupation authorities that introduced parliamentary politics to Japan. Meanwhile, the Emperor is mentioned in only six preambles, despite the importance conservatives generally tend to place on the (symbolic) Emperor system (see section 4.2). Moreover, as a result of conservative support for the universal values of the current preamble and Constitution, references to democracy or fundamental human rights have been retained by an overwhelming majority of draft authors. Thus far, no strong restorative tendencies are visible, even though references to Japan’s long history or unique culture have led critical minds on the left, e.g. Watanabe Osamu, to suggest otherwise (Watanabe 2002: 50, 72). As already explained in section 2.3, awareness of culture and traditions is meant not to supplant, but to complement universalistic values. A look at Figure 4.1 shows this very clearly. There is no denying a trend towards a greater degree of traditionalism in the revised preambles. However, Figure 4.1 confirms that most authors are not as reactionary as they are made out to be by their critics. Only Nakagawa’s third proposal (3.4.6) has received a very traditionalist rating of -2, compared to the current preamble’s very universalistic score of +3. This is the result of Nakagawa and Nishibe’s rejection of the concept of universal values. Nakagawa emphasizes the necessity of purging the Constitution of the four ‘revolutionary dogmas’, i.e. human rights, popular sovereignty, separation between state and religion, and equality (Nakagawa 2004: 40–42; Nishibe 2004: 104). It doesn’t require any further explanation to comprehend the radicalness of Nakagawa’s idea here. Nishibe may speak of ‘real democracy’ in the preamble of his initial draft, but it is important to understand that he is no fan of popular sovereignty, either. Similarly to the original conservative vision of Burke discussed in section 1.1, Nishibe, like Nakagawa or Yagi, is weary of what he regards as ‘an ochlocracy under the name of postwar democracy’ (Nishibe 2004: 13) or, quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Nishibe 2004: 112). In order to address this perceived flaw of democracy Nishibe has come up with a unique concept. Sovereignty does not rest with the currently living people (whom he calls citizens), but rather with ‘putative people carrying the traditional spirit’ (Nishibe 2004: 110). The idea behind this concept is to prevent the currently living generation from insisting exclusively on its own opinions (Nishibe 2004: 109), without giving ample thought to the nation’s past and future. Strange as this proposal may initially sound, the underlying idea should be quite familiar. After all, Nishibe is, in a Burkian sense of the word, truly conservative. If one recalls McClelland’s clock comparison from section 1.1, Nishibe aims to use the traditional spirit as a safety device designed to prevent

Key issues of Constitutional reform  137

Revising t h e preamble 4 Current Preamble

Kobayashi

3 E

Nishi

.CO

"5 2

'E

D l

E

.to

"5

AichM

1

Yamasaki

Yomiuri 1 Yomiuri 2

I o

ihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi

PHP

» Kòfùku Jitsucento

Nippon Kaki Aichi2 Sekai Heiwaken

e

.0 +3 ■5

LDP Soken Kaigi

»—•—»»»

Yomiuri 3 Hatoyama :oyama Hiranuma

Nishibe 1

-1

JakaeaWa1Nak85awa2

-w Nishibe 2

Takehana

Nakagawa 3

-2

-3 Figure 4.1  Revising the preamble

the (currently living) people from redesigning the clock McClelland wrote about. Changing the battery is tolerated, toying around with the cogs certainly not. In the words of Yagi, a nation is not a private good, i.e. a building which should be torn down and built anew by each generation, but a public interest handed down from one generation to another (Yagi 2004: 164, 284). The strongly particularistic tones of Nakagawa and Nishibe’s preambles can be seen as attempts to right the damage inflicted on the house that is Japan by universalist values such as fundamental human rights or, in the words of Yagi and Etō, ‘Anglo-Saxon progressivism’ (ibid.) and ‘American ideology’ (Etō 1996: 24). It has to be emphasized once again, however, that these anti-democratic, reactionary sentiments represent only a very small fraction of aspiring revisionists as well as conservative elites in general. In fact, most preambles try to strike an even balance between universalistic and traditionalist values and accordingly score ratings of +1 (slightly universalistic), 0 (balanced) or -1 (slightly traditionalist). This result confirms the aforementioned assumption, that the proposed revisions of the preamble reflect the concept of a dignified nation, well aware and proud of its cultural heritage and traditions, but firmly founded on the democratic pillars of the postwar system.

138  Key issues of Constitutional reform Last but not least, one more common feature of the preamble drafts will be presented outside the universalism–traditionalism divide. Fourteen out of 23 proposed preambles, in particular those published during the last 15 years, include references to living in harmony with nature or, in other words, environmental protection, demonstrating the high degree of importance attached to the issue by the drafts’ authors. Many of these references are particularistic, referring to Japan’s ‘fair landscape’ (Yomiuri 1–3, Yamasaki, Hatoyama, Sōken Kaigi), often in the context of Japanese traditions, while others have a more universalistic tone to them (Nishi, Sekai Heiwa Kenkyūsho, Hiranuma). Therefore, it is difficult to attach either the universalistic or the particularistic label to these references, which has led to my decision to present environmental protection outside the universalism–traditionalism divide. Conclusion Precisely because preambles are declarations of intent, they shed ample light on the conservative vision for a future Japan. As we have established above, the renewed emphasis on traditionalist elements, e.g. references to Japan’s long history, culture and tradition, is obviously very reflective of the vision of a dignified nation that was discussed in section 2.3. The widespread references to Japan’s proud history and culture can be seen as concrete expressions of the wish for a dignified nation with a strong, peculiar identity firmly grounded in the country’s long history and traditions. As with the vision discussed in section 2.3, the consensus about the need for more traditionalism cannot belie an evident contentual differentiation, however. The analysis of the preambles cited above shows clear differences in the degree of traditionalism. The content of most preambles is balanced, only slightly universalistic or, alternatively, slightly traditionalist. This corresponds very well with the conservative vision of a more traditionalist, yet at the same time not reactionary, i.e. authoritarian, nation. The sole exception is Nakagawa, whose reactionary third preamble revision amounts to a 180-degree turn by creating a strongly traditionalist imbalance. As we shall see in the following sections, in this context the preambles serve their purpose quite well as declarations of intent and summaries of the legal text set forth beneath them. A majority of conservatives seek to turn Japan into a country more conscious and prouder of its tradition and culture, but within the established postwar framework. A (partial) restoration of the old clock, i.e. the authoritarian pre-war system, which was still in vogue in the 1950s and early 1960s (see section 4.6), has long lost its luster, even for conservatives.

4.2  Maintaining the postwar Tennō system between genuine and invented traditions The position of the Emperor As we have discussed already in section 2.1, most conservative authors evidently do not aim to alter significantly either popular sovereignty or the current symbolic

Key issues of Constitutional reform  139 Tennō system. This is reflected very well in the proposed amendments. While only the drafts by Ozawa (3.3.11) and the LDP (3.4.12) retain Article 1 in its current form, a total of 17 proposals do explicitly mention popular sovereignty in one of their first articles. Takehana (3.3.10), Aichi (3.4.4), Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi (3.3.5) and its successor, the Nippon Kaigi (3.4.3) have omitted mention of it in any article, but refer to it in their preambles. Nishibe may write of ‘real democracy’ in the preamble of his initial draft (3.3.1) but, as already stated above, his idea is to severely limit the sovereignty of the currently living people by traditions. Finally, given Nakagawa’s disdain for democracy, it is hardly surprising that he has eliminated all references to democracy from his Article 1. The second key element of the supreme law’s first article, i.e. the symbolic Emperor system, is treated in similar fashion by would-be reformers. Twentythree drafts2 explicitly state that the Tennō shall be the symbol of nation and/ or the unity of the Japanese people. Ōkawa Ryūhō does not mention the term ‘symbol’ in the Happiness Realization Party’s proposal (3.4.14), but there is no evidence that he aims to make any changes to the Imperial institution’s symbolic role except for the introduction of a presidential system, which will be discussed below. As always, Nakagawa’s amendment proposals constitute the exception to the rule. The retired Tsukuba University professor has deleted the phrase from his later proposals (3.3.2 and 3.4.6). Given that Nakagawa also rejects democracy, it only follows that he also has little sympathy for the Emperor’s being the symbol of a democratic nation. The widespread retention of the two most important elements of Article 1 leads to the question of how the criticism mentioned in section 2.1 is reflected in the proposed amendments. In other words, how have would-be reformers ensured that the ‘greatest axis located at the heart of the nation’ (Asō 2008: 34) remains at its rightful place and is treated with the respect it deserves? The most obvious answer to this question is by declaring that the Emperor shall be ‘head of state’. With the exceptions of Ozawa Ichirō, Yamasaki Taku, Nishibe Susumu (in his second proposal), the Yomiuri Shimbun, the LDP and the Happiness Realization Party, all draft authors propose to alter Article 1 accordingly. In most cases, the text simply states ‘the Emperor is the head of state of the nation’ (3.3.8, Article 1), even though some authors have added qualifications to the term. In Nishibe Susumu’s case the qualification is ‘cultural’. Meanwhile Nishi Osamu (3.3.7) has used the term ‘symbolic’. In both cases the qualifications were included to emphasize the Emperor’s formal role (Nishi 1995: 222; Nishibe 1990: 141). According to Ozawa’s explanation, he did not deem it necessary to include the term head of state in his draft, because the Emperor could already be considered head of state under the current Constitution (Ozawa 1999: 97). The Yomiuri Shimbun decided against the inclusion of the term, at least for the time being, in its 2004 draft, for fear that this would lead to the negative image of a perceived political return to the pre-war period (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 58). Nishibe Susumu’s decision to refer to the Emperor as ‘cultural representative’ (daihyō) in his second revision proposal is founded on a similar argumentation. Despite his acknowledgement that ‘head of state’ (genshu) would be a more appropriate designation in the terminology of Constitutional law, he nonetheless chose to use the term

140  Key issues of Constitutional reform ‘representative’. Nishibe explains his choice by observing that the term genshu is still thought to mean the pinnacle of political power in Japan, whereas in other countries there had been a tendency to limit the role of the head of state to cultural ceremonies (Nishibe 2004: 129–30). As suggested by these comments, even the small number of authors who have chosen not to refer to the Emperor as head of state have done so based on strategic reasons, not because they were opposed to the idea in general. Apart from the addition of the title ‘head of state’, one out of two draft proposals discussed in this research actually makes one more revision of significance to Article 1. The current Article 1 proclaims that the Emperor’s position derives ‘from the will of the people’. Conservatives argue that this stipulation and the provision of Article 2 stating ‘the Imperial Throne shall be dynastic’ are nothing less than a logical paradox (Etō 1997: 115). To solve this perceived paradox a dozen proposals simply delete the phrase altogether. Nishibe (3.3.1) and the second proposal of the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei (3.3.4) have adopted the terms ‘historical will’ and ‘traditional will’, respectively. The reason for the phrase’s subtraction or replacement, however, also has a deeper meaning. If the position of the Tennō was based on the will of the people, then it would be theoretically possible to abolish the institution, provided that a majority of the people were in favor of abolition. To make sure that ‘people can’t trample on tradition’ (Nishibe 1990: 142), Nishibe added the adjective ‘historical’, whereas other authors have simply chosen to delete the phrase ‘based on the will of the people’ altogether. The result is obviously a legal framework created to conserve what is arguably the single most important tradition or, in Asō’s words, Japan’s ‘national treasure’ (Asō 2008: 35), namely the Tennō institution. This is one example where the conservative’s skepticism toward popular democracy becomes apparent. Just like the revolutionaries in eighteenth-century France, the ‘indecent’ Japanese people of today might one day dare to throw tradition overboard and, not knowing what they are doing, abolish the Emperor system. As the aforementioned parliamentarians’ association observed in 1993, ‘certain political parties’ still thought they could abolish the Tennō system with a simple majority vote (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993: 19). Whether this fear is justified or not is, of course, debatable. After all, public support for the Tennō system has steadily remained at exceptionally high levels throughout the postwar period.3 Last but not least, a small number of drafts re-introduce the lèse-majesté stipulation of the Meiji Constitution’s Article 3. The Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi (3.3.5) and its successor, the Nippon Kaigi (3.4.3), proclaim that ‘the sanctity of the head of state and symbol must be protected’. The Nippon Kaigi explains that, as head of state and symbol, the Emperor and his family naturally should command more respect than ordinary citizens (Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 61). Seeing how strongly Nakagawa has been inspired by the Meiji Constitution, the re-introduction of the Meiji Constitution’s Article 3 in his three drafts is consistent with other restorative tendencies, e.g. the abolition of democracy and the symbolic Emperor system. It is telling, though, that only five proposals set out by two authors introduce such reactionary stipulations. While not suggesting a return to the preMeiji modus operandi, Nishibe proposes to let customs and traditions govern the

Key issues of Constitutional reform  141 internal workings, including succession of the Imperial House unrelated to power politics.4 Even though this suggestion has to be considered genuinely traditional, it does not seem to have any supporters among conservatives other than Nishibe. Despite this general lack of restorative tendencies, i.e. signs pointing to a restoration of the pre-war system, where the Emperor was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Watanabe Osamu cites the drafts of Kobayashi Setsu, the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei, the Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi, Kimura Mutsuo, and Nippon Kaigi as examples of drafts aiming to strengthen the position of the Emperor (Watanabe 2002: 59–60). As we established in Chapter 2, the conservative authors of the drafts argue that they are merely stating the obvious. Unlike Watanabe, they do not consider this issue problematic, because, according to their argumentation, the subject at hand is merely a question of formal representation and the appropriate expression thereof in the Constitution. In their eyes, referring to the Emperor as ‘head of state’ does not constitute an actual change in the institution’s authority, because the Emperor should already be considered head of state under the current Constitutional framework (Kobayashi 1992: 123; Nishi 1995: 222; Ozawa 1999: 97). From the conservative perspective, the revision of Article 1 is hence not so much a result of criticism directed at the postwar Tennō system; rather, it aims to put an end to the discussion about who is head of state. As mentioned in section 2.1, some scholars have argued that the prime minister was head of state. To see the historic institution of the Emperor reduced to a mere symbol or ‘the Prime Minister’s doorman’ may be an offense in the eyes of conservatives (Nishibe 1990: 141; Etō 1996: 27) but, as outlined above, they are nonetheless generally against the idea of strengthening the institution beyond its formal, representative authority. Therefore, for conservatives the choice is not ‘to preserve a limited symbolic role, emperor position or to choose Constitutional monarchy’ (Hook, McCormack 2001: 42), but a combination thereof; seeing how, for instance, Ozawa has argued, the current Constitution was already based on the principle of a Constitutional monarchy (Ozawa 1999: 97). The motivation here is similar to the explicit mention of Japan’s right to maintain armed forces, which will be discussed below in section 4.3. In both cases, the aim is to clarify an existing interpretation. The abovementioned small quantity of restorative concepts notwithstanding, the general lack of conservative criticism of the substance of the symbolic Tennō system during the postwar period is conspicuous. Two possible explanations can be adduced for the absence of widespread demands for far-reaching changes. First, the current system has stood the test of time. As opinion polls show, it has remained popular throughout the postwar period; hence, changing it is both unnecessary and unrealistic. The second, less obvious and deeper potential explanation has already been outlined in section 2.1. Conservatives have correctly identified fushinsei, i.e. the non-involvement of the Emperor in day-to-day politics, as a genuine tradition that should be preserved. In this context, it should be emphasized that the institution in its present form deserves to be preserved because it is such a long-running tradition, and not because the supreme law says so. In particular, conservative intellectuals are quick to point out this correlation (Okazaki, Nakanishi 2007: 134), so that no one can jump to the conclusion that

142  Key issues of Constitutional reform the Tennō owes its status to the dreaded Constitution. The widely held understanding of the symbolic Tennō system as a long-running tradition might help to explain why conservatives can apparently live very well with the current postwar setup (Akasaka 1990: 78; Okazaki, Nakanishi 2007: 133), even though some are well aware of what they regard as a paradox between Article 1 basing the position of the Emperor on the will of the people, on the one hand, and the hereditary principle prescribed in Article 2, on the other (Etō 1997: 115). In line with tradition, however, they do demand that the Emperor be officially restored to the formal position of head of state. Thus, the key question surrounding the status of the Emperor is not so much related to the symbolic Tennō system as such but, rather, centers on different interpretations of the term ‘head of state’. With the one exception mentioned below, conservatives define head of state in a traditional way, e.g. a formal role removed from day-to-day politics. It can only be called an irony, that Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, the man who considers himself one of only three ‘serious’ Japanese scholars of Burke, the father of conservatism as a political tradition (Nakagawa 2002: 289), is the sole conservative arguing against the abovementioned tradition. The wish for a strong monarchical institution could be explained by the critical stance of Burke and Nakagawa toward mass democracy, even though the concept of an Imperial House equipped with wide-ranging power clearly has little to do with the traditional role of the Tennō in Japan. On the other hand, Nakagawa has shown strong admiration for the fathers of the Meiji Constitution, in particular Inoue Kowashi, whom he referred to as ‘Japan’s wise man’ in the dedication of his 2004 Constitutional reform draft (Nakagawa 2004: 2). Accordingly, Nakagawa’s draft is the only one that, particularly regarding the Tennō system, more closely resembles the Meiji Constitution than the current Constitution. To legitimize the Meiji Restoration and hence their rule, the fathers of 1868’s political change claimed, they were merely returning absolute authority to its traditional and rightful owner, the Emperor. To facilitate this claim, references to the Ritsuryō period, when the Emperor was indeed more than just a formal symbol, were used (Ishii 1982: 268, 270–71). As Ishii Ryōsuke has pointed out, however, the Ritsuryō period, just like the Meiji era, should be considered an exception in Japanese Imperial history, because in both cases a foreign influence (in the former case China, in the latter Prussia) has led to the direct involvement of the Emperor in day-to-day politics (Kitaoka 1992: 84; Ishii 1982: 47, 337). Hence, one could argue, Nakagawa’s stance regarding the Emperor’s position is certainly logical and conservative, if one considers the influence that Meiji-era political thought inspired by nineteenth-century European concepts, and Burke’s eighteenth-century European conservatism have had on his ideas. However, thinking about the issue at hand in the context of Japanese history, it can hardly be called conservative. The imperial tradition to which Nakagawa relates therefore hardly qualifies as genuine, but should, rather, be considered an imported or invented tradition. An even more radical design was set out by the Happiness Realization Party. As already mentioned above, this organization’s draft is the only one proposing the introduction of a presidential system. Its author, Ōkawa Ryūhō, argues that Japan, like the US or France, needed a directly elected powerful president to replace the

Key issues of Constitutional reform  143 current ‘disorderly and ineffective’ Cabinet system (Happiness Realization Party 2009a). His draft merely stipulates that the Tennō system should be respected as a cultural tradition (3.4.14, Article 14), yet its future role and function are not specified. In his commentary, Ōkawa argues that in the event of another war being lost, the responsibility would rest with the president, who is supreme commander of the armed forces, and not the Emperor. Accordingly, even after the president’s fall from grace, the Imperial institution could live on (ibid.). This anxiety for the Tennō system’s survival and the resulting determination to protect this important pillar of the Japanese nation from potential harm is certainly an idea that Ōkawa shares with other conservatives. The means to achieve this aim, however, are radically different from all other conservative proposals. In fact, the suggestion of establishing a presidential system and thus relegating the Emperor to the role of a mere symbol is without precedent in the history of conservative Constitutional amendment proposals. Given the broad consensus among conservatives on making the Emperor the formal head of state, this concept, similarly to Nakagawa’s strong restorative tendencies, has to be taken as an individual opinion which is neither representative of the general conservative vision nor a likely scenario for a potential future revision of the supreme law. Article 2 and Imperial succession For various reasons, conservatives clearly feel less urgency to revise Article 2 than Article 1. As explained in Chapter 2, the question of Imperial succession is generally seen primarily as an issue related to the Imperial Household Law rather than to Article 2 of the Constitution. Accordingly, only Kobayashi, Nishi, Aichi (in his initial proposal) and Hatoyama have included the phrase ‘regardless of gender’ in their respective revisions of Article 2. Hatoyama admits that practical problems, such as the status of a female Tennō’s husband, would have to be addressed if a female were to ascend the Chrysanthemum Throne. Nonetheless, he seems to believe that the time has come to pave the way for a female Tennō (Hatoyama 2005: 38). Just like Nishi and Kobayashi, Hatoyama mentions the principle of gender equality as a key reason behind his support for the controversial idea (ibid.; Nishi 1995: 222; Kobayashi 1992: 135). According to Nishi, ignoring the principle of gender equality when it comes to the Tennō system would ‘look like an encouragement to violate the Constitution’ (Nishi 1995: 222). This argumentation demonstrates that the aforementioned draft authors see Imperial succession not only in the light of tradition, but also from the perspective of rationalism and universalism. This view is surprisingly close to the progressive stance, according to which the current exclusively male lineage constitutes ‘discriminatory treatment void of any logical reasons’ (Tsujimura 2004: 207). This statement should, however, be qualified by pointing out that these drafts were all published long before the birth of Prince Hisahito. The birth of the first male heir to the throne in four decades might well have changed the views of Nishi, Kobayashi and Hatoyama since then. After all, Aichi rolled back his proposal for Article 2 in his 2004 draft, and Koizumi de facto abandoned his plans for a revision of the Imperial Household Law following the announcement of the prince’s birth.

144  Key issues of Constitutional reform Meanwhile, six authors (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei, Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi, Ozawa Ichirō, Nippon Kaigi, Hiranuma Takeo, Happiness Realization Party) did not include Article 2 in their proposals, a sign of low priority. An additional eight draft authors (Aichi Kazuo in his second draft, the Yomiuri Shimbun, Takehana Mitsunori, Yamasaki Taku, PHP, Sekai Heiwa Kenkyūsho, LDP, Sōken Kaigi) have chosen to leave it untouched. Nakagawa, Nishibe and Kimura have chosen to alter Article 2 by deleting the phrase ‘passed by the Diet’. Because there is a lack of explanation for this subtraction in the commentaries, one can only speculate as to the reason behind it. By cutting out the aforementioned phrase, Article 2 becomes essentially identical with its Meiji Constitution counterpart, with the exception that the latter featured the stipulation of a male lineage.5 A critical observer could interpret this as an attempt to partially restore the Imperial Household Law to the special status given to its predecessor during the pre-war period. As mentioned in section 2.1, the initial, Meiji-era Imperial Household Law was not a standard law, but legally on the same level as the Constitution. The Meiji Constitution itself could not be revised without the Imperial House’s consent, but the Meiji-era Imperial Household Law was not even within the legal authority of the Imperial Diet.6 In case this was truly the various authors’ intent, however, merely deleting the term ‘passed by the Diet’ would be insufficient. In order to achieve this aim, the draft would have to feature a clause proclaiming the special status of the Imperial Household Law similar to the Meiji Constitution’s Article 74. Such a stipulation is missing from all drafts, with the exception of Nakagawa Yatsuhiro’s 2004 draft. Therefore, it is difficult to conceive of the subtraction of this phrase as a restorative tendency. Nishibe Susumu, who is critical of the concept of the Imperial Household Law before and after World War II, suggests that imperial succession should be based on customs, not a law written or easily revisable by politicians (Nishibe 1990: 142). Nishibe’s suggestion essentially means a return to the ‘lawless’ pre-1889 modus operandi under which custom, not law, governed the Imperial succession. If it were not for Nishibe stating his indifference to the discussion about the exclusively male lineage (Nishibe 2004: 133), it could be interpreted in a similar fashion as the proposed deletion of the term ‘based on the will of the people’ from Article 1, discussed above. As Koizumi has shown, rationalist reformers in the Diet might well use, or as many conservatives see it, ‘abuse’ their power and attempt to revise the Imperial Household Law, thereby spitting on what is supposedly an age-old tradition. As already established in section 2.1, most conservative intellectuals are, unlike Nishibe, anything but indifferent to the question of the Imperial succession. In the eyes of Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, Kobori, Yagi or Watanabe Shōichi, even the attempt at such a revision constitutes a ‘crime’. Traditions, real or invented? What form of Imperial succession qualifies as ‘traditional’ in this context is debatable, however. In fact, this debate shows striking similarities to the aforementioned question of the Emperor’s position. Just as in the case of the Emperor’s active involvement in day-to-day politics, the exclusively male lineage can be seen as an

Key issues of Constitutional reform  145 invented rather than a genuine tradition. During the drafting phase of the Meiji-era Household Law, the inclusion of women in the Imperial succession had actually been under discussion. Its implementation failed, due to Inoue Kowashi’s objection. Inoue questioned how a woman could possibly become the nation’s sovereign at a time when women’s suffrage had yet to be realized (Nakano 2004: 307). Inoue’s argument makes a lot of sense here. It would have been a paradoxical situation if a woman who had not even been allowed to cast her ballot were to occupy a position endowed with such far-ranging authorities as supreme command over the armed forces. Had the Emperor remained the symbolic figure detached from worldly politics and residing in the relative obscurity and insularity of the palace in Kyoto, the gender of the Chrysanthemum Throne’s occupant would, arguably, have been of far lesser importance. In that sense, it could be argued, the invented tradition of the Emperor as a head of state equipped with significant authorities going far beyond formal representation forced the Meiji government to invent this second tradition of an exclusively male lineage. Accordingly, the eight female Tennō were dismissed as mere ‘placeholders’. As Nakano Masashi has noted, this nineteenth-century ideology has survived the war and continues to exist today (Nakano 2004: 115). A century ago, Inoue’s argument made sense, but with female suffrage having been realized in postwar Japan and the Emperor’s current position being relatively close to his traditional (pre-Meiji) role, the Meiji-era argumentation obviously has become obsolete. It speaks for the continued strong influence exerted on certain postwar elites by Meiji-era thought, that Nakagawa, Yagi or Kobori nonetheless fiercely defend this (invented) tradition, while a majority of conservatives at least seem to condone it tacitly (Figure 4.2). Interestingly enough, the intensity of influence of this nineteenth-century thinking seems to vary depending on the subject. When it comes to the Emperor’s

Positions on Emperor S y s t e m : Overview Position of the Emperor (Artide 1 )

!

I

|

Postwar

I

P.!^~M?.jy!

Symbolic Emperor-Systetn Law- cent rio ...I.. Genuine Tradition

ra

I M?JJ! Direct Imperiai Rule

n c

n : c

.^.!y°„. .i. .?.. .!! l.i „..., |

Law-centric Invented Tradition

Imperiai Succession (Artide 2)

l

I

l

Postwar P.r®.lM?.!J! Esclusive ly y , ,. Fé male and male lineale maleJ ine age : male Jineagg Invented _ „ . Genuine Tradition Tradjtjon Tradjtjpn J Kobayashi Others ! Nishibe ; Hatoyama !

Figure 4.2  Positions on Emperor system: overview

I I

I ^.?..'.l. Exclusively male lineale Invented Tradition

| ; j

Nakagawa

146  Key issues of Constitutional reform position, conservatives have not only accepted his role as symbolic, but also managed to break away from the constraints of traditions invented just over a century ago. Accordingly, conservatives view the symbolic Emperor system not as a relic of the Occupation era, but rather a reinstated genuine tradition. The same obviously cannot be said of the Imperial succession. In drawing up the current Imperial Household Law, GHQ did in fact lower the legal status of the Meiji-era law by turning it into a normal law falling within the Diet’s jurisdiction, but the key component of the old law, i.e. the exclusively male lineage, survived the transition unharmed. With the notable exception of Koizumi, no prime minister has shown interest in revising it, enabling the continued existence of this invented tradition up to the present. The few proponents of allowing female members of the Imperial family to become Tennō may include powerful political figures, such as (former) Prime Ministers Asō and Hatoyama. However, despite such influential support, no initiative has been taken since the birth of Prince Hisahito in 2006 to revive the discussion about revising the Imperial Household Law. Conclusion: a realistic vision as reflected by the Constitutional revision proposals Compared to Article 9 and national security, the reform proposals for Article 1 are considerably more reflective of the conservative vision of the Tennō system. As outlined above, this vision does not differ fundamentally from the existing postwar modus operandi, i.e. the symbolic and representative character of the institution, in particular if one accepts the conservative claim, according to which the Emperor is already head of state under the existing Constitutional framework. Hence, one could argue, the vision is already a reality. The only thing left for the proposals to do is to record this reality unmistakably in a new Constitution, so that it can no longer be contested. Furthermore, the second important aspect of Article 1, i.e. popular sovereignty, is not challenged by conservatives, with the exceptions of Nakagawa and Nishibe. Considering the overwhelming support for these two pillars of the postwar system, the frequently voiced accusations of restorative tendencies in revision proposals, i.e. one of the myths mentioned in the introduction, seem to be based on fiction rather than on fact. Only the suggestion of removing the stipulation according to which the Emperor’s position was based on the will of the people could be interpreted in such a way. Given the strong support for the institution among the population throughout the entire postwar period, its abolition is nothing more than an unrealistic mind game. The situation is slightly more complicated with Article 2. Given that the issue of Imperial succession is widely regarded as a question primarily related to the Imperial Household Law and not to the Constitution, it is not surprising to see many conservatives refraining from revising or even discussing Article 2. Given the prolonged and heated debate over the issue, a more proactive treatment could have been expected, yet in reality many conservatives have avoided discussing this controversial issue, thereby condoning the current exclusively male lineage. Based on this evidence, one could argue that, similar to the Emperor’s position, the vision for Imperial succession is not so much a bold vision, but an extension of

Key issues of Constitutional reform  147 postwar reality. After all, before the proposed revision of the Imperial Household Law was put on the agenda by Koizumi, the Imperial succession had hardly been a topic of debate among conservatives, who, with the notable exceptions of Hatoyama or Asō, are seemingly unwilling to break with a tradition invented one and a half centuries ago. This fact seems to be reflected in the lack of substantial Article 2 revision proposals.

4.3  Article 9: towards a more proactive national security policy Seeing how Article 9 happens to be the most contentious issue in the entire debate about Constitutional revision, the variety of reform proposals is hardly surprising. Despite all the variety, it is still possible to distinguish between two major types of proposal. The minimalist approach retains the current two paragraphs, while simply adding one or two additional stipulations. The Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei drafts (3.2.1 and 3.3.4) and Ozawa’s proposal (3.3.11) are examples of this approach. As Watanabe has pointed out, this minimalist revision was an attempt to address the public skepticism towards and resistance to Constitutional reform throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Watanabe 2002: 722). With opinion polls showing a steady increase in public support for Constitutional reform until the year 2004 (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2008b: 12), these considerations quickly became obsolete, however. Therefore, it is not surprising to see proponents of this minimalist approach being largely outnumbered by their counterparts, proposing a more radical revision. Representatives of the latter group have all chosen to delete and replace paragraph 2. Some, e.g. the LDP (3.4.12) or the Sekai Heiwa Kenkyūsho (3.4.9) retain paragraph 1, whereas a majority have opted to replace both paragraphs. Improving the legal basis for the military’s existence The most obvious revision concerns the explicit mention of Japan’s right to defend itself against foreign attacks and, based thereon, the right to maintain an army. Leaving aside the problem of collective self-defense, which will be discussed below, Japan already possesses this right under the existing Constitutional framework, even though the second paragraph of Article 9 may suggest exactly the opposite to an unsuspecting reader. According to common interpretation (Nishi 1995: 40–41; Hasler 2005: 130–32), the phrase ‘in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph’, a part of what is known as the Ashida amendments, refers to ‘war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes’, mentioned in paragraph 1 (Nishi 1995: 40–41). However, because voices calling the SDF unconstitutional have not disappeared,7 and the Constitution’s unsuspecting reader, ignorant of the aforementioned interpretations, could easily come to the conclusion that the SDF is in fact unconstitutional, conservatives aim to dispel these doubts and ambiguities with their proposals. Hence, all the drafts introduced in Chapter 3 include explicit mention of the right to self-defense and the existence of armed forces. The choice

148  Key issues of Constitutional reform of the term ‘armed forces’ instead of SDF in this context is deliberate. In fact, only two drafts have chosen to retain the armed forces’ current name. Meanwhile, the Self-Defense Forces have been renamed to National Army, National Defense Army or Self-Defense Army in 19 cases. Conservatives argue that this renaming merely reflects the reality of the SDF’s improved military capabilities (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 76), while critics decry it as yet another step towards Japan again becoming a major military power (Fuwa 2007: 56). To counter this argument, conservatives point to the restrictive stipulations, e.g. bans on weapons of mass destruction and forced conscription, which they have included in their proposals (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 75; Hatoyama 2005: 80). These restrictive stipulations, which will be looked at below, are the exception rather than the rule, however, as they have been excluded from most revisions. Beyond the two common components, i.e. the right to self-defense and the existence of armed forces, the different revisions feature a very different set of stipulations. In particular, a great variety in both the quantity and quality of restrictions is apparent. That being said, three features of the existing framework, namely the renunciation or prohibition of wars of aggression, civilian control and the observance of international law, have been incorporated into most proposals. Observance of international laws and treaties ratified by Japan, i.e. the provisions of the current Article 98 paragraph 2, has been retained unchanged in all proposals that include it. Similarly, almost all (18 out of 23) drafts which feature an article pertaining to civilian control entrust the supreme command authority over the armed forces to the prime minister. Meanwhile, only ten, generally newer, proposals explicitly require the Diet’s approval for the mobilization of the SDF. Nishi stipulates only that the armed forces shall obey civilian control (3.3.7, Article 9 Paragraph 2). Following the example of the Meiji Constitution, Nakagawa (3.4.6) envisions the Emperor as commander-in-chief. The supreme command authority therefore does not rest with the prime minister, but is only delegated to him by the Emperor (Article 11 Paragraph 4). Meanwhile, the Happiness Realization Party (3.4.14) proposes to make the president commander-in-chief (Article 5). The drafts by the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei (3.2.1, 3.3.4), Nishibe (3.3.1) and Ozawa (3.3.11) do not include any mention of civilian control. One can assume that this is not due to their being against civilian control in principle but, rather, owing to the fact that these are partial revisions aimed at addressing only the most ‘glaring issues’ of the current Constitution. There is one more important aspect to civilian control, however. Unlike the pre-war system that allowed senior military figures like Yamagata Aritomo or Tōjō Hideki to become prime minister, the postwar Constitution stipulates in Article 66 Paragraph 2 that ‘the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians’ (Hook, McCormack 2001: 198). It goes without saying that this provision is to eliminate the undue influence of the military on politics (Watanabe 2002: 515). The article’s wording, however, begs a simple yet important question: Who is considered a civilian and who not? Does a military officer become a civilian upon retirement and therefore become eligible to be Prime Minister, or does he remain ineligible in retirement because of his military career? There is no agreement among scholars concerning this question. Some argue that the term ‘civilian’

Key issues of Constitutional reform  149 excludes only current members of the military; others interpret Article 66 in a more stringent way, saying it excludes both current and former armed forces personnel. According to Tsujimura, the latter interpretation was more appropriate based on the pacifist spirit of the Constitution (Tsujimura 2008: 433–34). Among aspiring reformers of the supreme law, Nakagawa and Aichi seem to prefer the former interpretation and have revised Article 66 accordingly. Eleven proposals have retained the existing paragraph, while ten other, mostly partial, proposals do not include a corresponding stipulation. Unfortunately, supposedly as a result of this lack of changes, authors do not specify their preferred interpretation of Article 66. That being said, as with the question of the supreme command authority, there is no evidence indicating any radical changes to the existing modus operandi. The renunciation or rejection of wars of aggression can be found in 22 out of 27 proposals. Fourteen drafts retain the first paragraph of Article 9 in its current form, while an additional eight proposals feature stipulations closely resembling the current provision. The sole exceptions are Aichi Kazuo’s two proposals (3.3.9 and 3.4.4) and the drafts by the Nihon wo mamoru Kokumin Kaigi (3.3.5), Nippon Kaigi (3.4.3) and the Happiness Realization Party (3.4.14). The tone of Aichi’s proposals is general, stating in a rather unspecific way that ‘direct murder and mayhem against man’ and ‘threats to global security’ are not ‘recognized’ (3.4.4, Article 10 Paragraph 2). The remaining three proposals are even less binding in their nature, stipulating only that Japan will ‘strive for settling international disputes through peaceful means’ (3.4.3) and ‘shall actively strive after the building of worldwide peace’ (3.4.14, Article 1). Beyond these three common features, the following comparatively wide array of restrictive stipulations can be found in multiple drafts. None of them could be considered a standard feature of a majority of proposals, however. The ban on weapons of mass destruction, i.e. the existing three non-nuclear principles, have made it into the proposals of the Yomiuri Shimbun (3.3.6 Article 10 Paragraph 2, 3.4.1, Article 11 Paragraph 2, 3.4.7 Article 11 Paragraph 2) and Hatoyama (3.4.10, Article 53). Takehana’s draft (3.3.10, Article 125) and Aichi’s 2004 proposal (3.4.4, Article 13) stipulate the armed forces’ non-involvement in politics. An additional provision proposed by Takehana is an, albeit unspecific, upper limit for defense expenditures (3.3.10, Article 127). Last but not least, Nishi has proposed banning the glorification or advertising of war (3.3.7, Article 8 Paragraph 2). As mentioned above, unlike the rejection of wars of aggression, civilian control and observance of international law, these restrictive stipulations are not a part of the set of common features of the reform proposals discussed in this research. Generally speaking, a tendency to limit restrictions to the aforementioned three features is apparent, at least on the Constitutional level. This does not necessarily translate to a complete lack of restrictions, because many conservatives aim for the creation of a Fundamental Law on National Defense to complement a new Constitution. Various restrictions, such as the three non-nuclear principles or an exclusively defensive security policy, would be part of this law rather than of the Constitution (Hatoyama 2005: 80; Maehara 2005: 186–88; Yamasaki 2001: 27; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 1995: 13–15). It goes without saying, that this set-up would greatly increase the Japanese government’s flexibility in matters of national

150  Key issues of Constitutional reform security, since the law could be revised more easily than the Constitution. While this fact is hard to deny, the inclusion of the non-nuclear principles in such a national security law would translate into an enhancement of their present status, which is that of national policy void of legally binding powers. What is more, given the retention of the existing key restrictions outlined above and the general lack of demands for offensive military capabilities, e.g. aircraft carriers, cruise missiles or bombers, it is questionable whether the flexibility offered by the new legal framework outlined above would inevitably lead to a return to militaristic sentiments. After all, the highest priority item on the to-do list of most conservatives is not further enhancement of the already potent military potential but rather, the military’s international role. The proposals for the Constitutional framework that is meant to serve as the legal foundation of this new, active role will be discussed below. As outlined in section 2.2, this role is not exclusively defined by participation in international peace-keeping operations, but also in security alliances. The legal framework for ‘active pacifism’ The second major focal point of revision is the implementation of stipulations governing the dispatch of military forces abroad. Accordingly, provisions concerning the dispatch of military personnel abroad have begun to appear in reform proposals since the mid-1990s. Since then, they have become a standard feature. 21 out of 27 proposals specifically mention contributions to international peace as a reason for the Japanese military’s existence and/or, however vaguely, stipulate specifics concerning the military’s dispatch abroad. If one considers only those drafts published since 1990, 21 out of 25 include such stipulations.8 This is a striking difference from the 1980s, when the main goal of reform drafts was still to clearly define the SDF as a Constitutional entity (Watanabe 2002: 44, 51). Stipulations concerning potential SDF operations outside Japan are missing from these earlier proposals. In particular, when considering the argument between the LDP and the DPJ regarding the necessity of a UN mandate for a foreign dispatch of the SDF, one key point of interest is the question of under which umbrella Japanese military personnel should operate abroad. Ozawa and Kimura have specified the United Nations as that umbrella in their proposals, while Nishi does the same in his commentary (Nishi 1995: 129). In the cases of Hatoyama and Hiranuma, the UN and other ‘established international organizations’ are specified. Meanwhile, Aichi’s second and all three Yomiuri proposals speak only of ‘established international organization’, while Takehana and the Sekai Heiwa Kenkyūsho refer to unspecified ‘international peace organizations’ and ‘international organizations’, respectively. As Watanabe correctly observed (Watanabe 2002: 55–56), when the drafts speak of ‘international organizations’, they may very well mean the United Nations, but by avoiding the explicit mention of that particular organization they leave open the possibility for military cooperation outside UN PKOs. This is consistent with many conservatives’ unwillingness to make a Security Council resolution a mandatory requirement for such foreign dispatches, as

Key issues of Constitutional reform  151 mentioned in section 2.2. As already explained, the refusal to limit foreign deployments to UN missions can be partially explained by a lack of faith in the Security Council’s ability to make decisions, due to frequent disagreements among the Council’s five veto powers (Yamasaki 2001: 26). Another reason is the openly expressed interest in other umbrellas, which we already discussed in section 2.2. The Yomiuri Shimbun or Hatoyama Yukio envision a regional supranational organization, i.e. an Asian version of the European Union (Hatoyama 2005: 75–76; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 90). Others, whose focus is more on what Asō has termed ‘value-based diplomacy’ instead of an Asian alliance, may want to explore future military cooperation with NATO or India and Australia. The former obviously is a concrete piece of the Asia-centric national security vision, while the latter is an option popular among the proponents of Anpo plus Alpha strategy. In both cases, a key means to achieving such closer international cooperation is collective self-defense. Enabling collective self-defense As explained in section 2.2, the realization of the conservative national security and foreign policy vision depends to no small extent on the success of the quest for Constitutional reform. As the tool of re-interpretation has become less adequate to facilitate the various ambitious visions of Japan becoming a more active global player acting alongside the US and, in the medium term, within a ‘coalition of the willing’ united by common values (Anpo plus Alpha) or an Asian multi- or supranational organization (Asia-centrism), Constitutional reform has become one significant key to turn those visions into reality. This can be observed very well when looking at the decade 2000–2009. Initially, the Japan–US security alliance was strengthened without touching either the Mutual Security Assistance Treaty or the Constitution (Watanabe 2002: 25–26). However, as the Ministry of Defense openly acknowledged a decade ago in the year 1998, a further strengthening of the New Guideline regime going forward was intimately connected to Constitutional reform (Watanabe 2002: 219). Specifically, this concerns collective self-defense, a right that Japan, like every other member nation of the UN based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, possesses, but cannot use under the current Constitutional framework (Hiranuma 2005: 160). For reasons explained below, almost all drafts alter this current set-up by implicitly or explicitly allowing the use of the right to collective self-defense. However, different authors treat the issue in different ways. As Watanabe observed in 2001, there are three ways to enable collective selfdefense: 1) by explicitly mentioning it in a new Constitution; (2) by drafting a National Security Law; and (3) by changing the existing interpretation of the Constitution. According to Watanabe, the second and third options were favored initially, before the first option became the preferred choice in the late 1990s (Watanabe 2002: 56–57). Based on the analysis of proposals introduced in the previous chapter and their commentaries, I have come to a slightly different conclusion. The Abe administration’s interest in the third option notwithstanding (Iijima 2007: 15), a general trend towards option 1 and/or 2 has certainly become

152  Key issues of Constitutional reform apparent, even though it seems as if the right to exercise collective self-defense is either implicitly or explicitly included in almost all revision proposals. According to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau’s current interpretation, Article 9 Paragraph 2 prevents Japan from using its right to collective self-defense. Following the Bureau’s interpretation, a deletion of this second paragraph should automatically put the Japanese government in a position to exercise this inherent right. Since the paragraph has been deleted from all but three proposals (the two Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei proposals and Ozawa’s draft), one can assume that collective self-defense is implied in all of them.9 For this very reason, the fact that Kobayashi, Nishi and Takehana mention collective self-defense in neither their proposals nor their commentaries does not necessarily constitute a continued ban on the use of collective self-defense. The aforementioned trend runs parallel to an increasingly close military cooperation between the US and Japan, which found its temporary culmination in the New Guidelines and the enactment of the law relating to measures for preserving the peace and security of Japan in the event of a ‘situation’ in the areas surrounding Japan in 1999. In fact, the number of proposals explicitly mentioning collective self-defense before and after 1999 has remained low. Until 1999, three out of 12 proposals explicitly mentioned collective self-defense (the first two Nakagawa drafts and Kimura’s proposal). Post-1999, again only three explicitly speak of collective self-defense (Nakagawa’s third and Nishibe’s second draft, as well as Hatoyama’s). Initially, this observation may seem to contradict the aforementioned trend. The explanation for this assumed discrepancy can be found in the proposals’ commentaries. Whereas prior to 1999, collective self-defense was discussed in only two (Yomiuri Shimbun 1, Aichi Kazuo 1) out of ten remaining draft commentaries, a study of post-1999 commentaries tells a completely different story. Apart from the three drafts that explicitly mention collective self-defense, the commentaries on nine out of ten remaining proposals speak of implicitly allowing the use of collective self-defense. Considering the importance the conservatives attach to the issue, the decision not to explicitly include the phrase in a proposal’s text may seem questionable, if not counterproductive at first glance. After all, this could open the door to renewed discussions about whether collective selfdefense was Constitutional after all. That being said, by leaving the term out of their proposals most authors seem to have oriented themselves towards existing foreign Constitutions, none of which explicitly mentions collective self-defense (Hatoyama 2005: 70). The ability to exercise collective self-defense can be considered what the Defense Agency referred to in 1998 as a ‘further strengthening of the New Guidelines’ framework’. As the agency noted back then, this strengthening was ‘closely related to Constitutional reform’. In fact, given the one-sided reality of what has been called a treaty of mutual cooperation between the US and Japan during the Cold War and the fact that even in the case of the Iraqi mission Dutch and Australian soldiers had to ensure the safety of the SDF troops stationed in Iraq (Boyd, Samuels 2005: 10), the exercise of collective self-defense would mark nothing less than a revolution in Japanese national security policy. Judging from their Constitutional reform proposals and other publications,

Key issues of Constitutional reform  153 conservatives certainly seem to hope that this revolution will come sooner than later. The result should be even closer cooperation between Japan and the US, based on more trust than in the past (Sōken Kaigi 2006: 107), because, after all, Japan could no longer be criticized for ‘cowardice’ or being ‘willing to give only money’. Conservatives apparently already have a good idea of how to use this trust in Japan’s national interest. They go to great lengths to emphasize that collective self-defense is not a duty but a right, meaning that it is within the Japanese government’s sphere of influence to decide whether or not to exercise it (Abe 2006: 132; Hatoyama 2005: 81; Hiranuma 2005: 161; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 108; Yamasaki 2001: 79; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 82). The emphasis on such a case-by-case evaluation has to be interpreted as an attempt to dispel fears that Japan might in the future be drawn into controversial American military operations around the globe, similar to the second Iraq War. However, more important than the right is the political will and the ability to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to an American request. Calls for Japan to say ‘no’ to the US can be heard from to time (Ishihara, Etō 1991), but if recent events, whether the drafting of the New Guidelines or the Iraq dispatch, are any indication, Japanese leaders have tended not to offer much resistance to pressure from Washington. Conservatives argue that Japan’s more active role will allow greater leeway to occasionally say ‘no’ to its ally on the other side of the Pacific (Hiranuma 2005: 162–63), but because the enabling of collective self-defense would certainly create high hopes in Washington, there is a risk of disappointing these increasingly high expectations by saying ‘no’ when decision-making time arrives. The resulting American reaction might be similar to that seen after the first Gulf War. The potential for a vicious circle of escalating requests definitely exists and, unlike the 1950s, when Yoshida still could utilize Article 9 as a shield against American requests (Boyd, Samuels 2005: 7), Japanese leaders would have no such institutional shield at their disposal at such time as the Constitution had been revised and stipulations regulating the exercise of collective self-defense in a Fundamental Law on National Security could be easily changed by a simple vote in the Diet. Disregarding this potential for future problems, Constitutional reform proposals allowing the exercise of collective self-defense must be viewed as a key part of the conservative vision of continuing and strengthening the relationship with Japan’s most important partner. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this fondness for the alliance in many cases has less to do with idealism but is, rather, a pragmatic stance, viewing the relationship as being in Japan’s national interest. In addition to strengthening the US–Japan alliance, there is another element of great importance to collective self-defense. In the medium or long term, Anpo plus Alpha representatives envision alliances with NATO, Australia or India based on the concept of common universal values (Asō 2007: 45–50), while Asia-centrists propose collective security arrangements in Asia (Hatoyama 2005: 27–28, 75–76; Katō 2005: 140). These ambitions going beyond the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance are hardly ever mentioned in the actual proposals; yet judging from the commentaries and other articles introduced in section 2.2 these concepts play a significant role in the various authors’ medium and long-term strategic visions.

154  Key issues of Constitutional reform Reading critically, one could get the impression that Watanabe Osamu is writing precisely about these visions when arguing that Constitutional revision is an essential piece in a puzzle depicting a well-armed Japan following the American call to arms in a global campaign aimed at supporting the neoliberal expansionism of major corporations with force. Those corporations were always seeking new markets and low-cost production sites (Watanabe 2002: 22–23; Watanabe 2005: 30–43). If this was indeed one aim behind the various SDF dispatches, then the majority of areas where SDF personnel have been stationed during the last 15 years, were not chosen very wisely. For the sake of recollection, the list of countries includes Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, East Timor, Iraq and Nepal. Granted, a significant amount of the world’s untapped oil resources lie in Iraqi territory, but it is hard to imagine any of the other countries on the list being of particular interest to Japanese corporations. A key precondition for direct investment by a company in a foreign country is political stability. Assuming that this is the case, the countries listed above are less than ideal locations to build new factories.10 As discussed in section 2.2, it does indeed seem that most conservatives are genuinely concerned about Japan’s political standing in the world. This has to be interpreted as a consequence of what Nakamura has dubbed the ‘Post Gulf War syndrome’, i.e. the criticism Japan faced for its handling of the first Gulf War. From this perspective, the inclusion of provisions regarding SDF operations outside Japan in most drafts is only a consequent extension of the various laws passed since 1992’s PKO law. An attempt at classification Having concluded the analysis of the various drafts’ revision proposals for Article 9, it is time to wonder what these proposals tell us about the conservative national security vision analyzed in section 2.2. In other words, what kind of picture do we see when looking at the conservative landscape through the lens of Constitutional reform? As we will see below, the answer varies, depending on the depth the viewer expects to see. The visions of Japan assuming a more assertive role within the international community by dispatching SDF personnel abroad to actively build peace as well as upholding and/or strengthening the strategic relationship with the US are well reflected in the Constitutional reform proposals. The former through stipulations pertaining to the armed forces’ dispatch abroad, the latter through the implicit or explicit enabling of the right to collective self-defense. The same can be said about the constitutionally sanctioned existence of the armed forces. Given that this point has been one of the biggest reasons behind the quest of Constitutional reform throughout the postwar period, it is not surprising that no proposal leaves even the smallest bit of latitude for the traditional ‘theological battles’ over the constitutionality of the SDF. Considering these common aspects, it is evident that the large features of the conservative national security vision are clearly visible through the lens of Constitutional reform proposals. The observer interested in greater detail might be disappointed, though, as certain motives behind the introduction of the aforementioned features are not reflected extremely well. For instance, one could

Key issues of Constitutional reform  155 wonder whether it isn’t possible to link the groups identified in section 2.2 to various proposals. In this context, though, one problem very quickly becomes apparent. As stated above, collective self-defense is not only envisioned as a tool to strengthen the US–Japan alliance, but in the long run is also regarded as a legal pillar to create either a global alliance sharing common values or an intra-Asian security framework. With the possible exception of Hatoyama’s proposal (3.4.10 preamble), the respective preference is not reflected at all in the various drafts, however. Aichi’s second proposal specifically allows for the formation of alliances (3.4.4 Article 11 Paragraph 2), but does not give any hint of his preference. Therefore, one has to conclude that even if the means, i.e. enabling collective self-defense by Constitutional revision, may be identical, the ultimate goal is not. Collective self-defense, or more specifically the goal behind it, is thus a prime example of the challenge involved in the attempt to link certain features of Article 9 revisions to the four groups discussed in section 2.2. The one Constitutional reform draft best fitting section 2.2’s classification is Nakagawa’s excessively restorative third draft (3.4.6). Unlike his first two proposals, his most recent draft does not include any references to contributions to international peace-keeping. Against the aforementioned trend of justifying the military’s existence by national defense and contributions to international peace-keeping, Nakagawa defines the defense of the fatherland as its sole raison d’être (3.4.6 Article 11 Paragraph 2). Moreover, Nakagawa does not waste even a single line of his commentary in discussing this topic which is otherwise prominently featured in most other commentaries (e.g. Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 87–98). Nishibe’s second proposal, the only one explicitly allowing for pre-emptive strikes (3.4.8 Article 9), also can be interpreted as a specific result of the autonomist view of an anarchic international society where the term ‘peace’ merely refers to the period of time that passes between one war and another (Nakagawa 1991: 85). The vision of small Japanism, the proponents of which do not regard a Constitutional amendment an urgent matter (Takemura, Tanaka 1995: 46–47), is also reflected well. As outlined in section 2.2, the ‘soft power’ vision of Tanaka Yasuo or Takemura, which is closer to traditional postwar policy than the other three national security visions, doesn’t necessitate a revision of the supreme law. Accordingly, they have not published any reform drafts. However, beyond that, categorization becomes a ‘mission impossible’. This is the result of the following problem. The one key issue identified in section 2.2 as the key distinctive feature between the various national security visions, i.e. the treatment of Asia, and particularly the People’s Republic of China, is not reflected in the proposals at all. Therefore it is impossible to categorize reform proposals according to section 2.2’s distinction. Compared to the proposed changes of other articles, the aforementioned revisions of Article 9 are probably the boldest initiatives discussed in the context of this research. That being said, they can also be interpreted as yet another consequent step in the evolution of Japan’s security doctrine since the end of the Cold War. As explained above, initially this evolution was able to be pursued without

156  Key issues of Constitutional reform touching the Constitution. However, the conservatives’ ambitious visions of Japan as an important actor in a multilateral security framework are impossible to realize under the current restrictions of the Article 9 regime, e.g. the ban on the use of the right to collective self-defense. Therefore, a revision of Article 9 might be preferable to yet another re-interpretation of the existing text. How to interpret this development depends largely on one’s personal convictions. Proponents of Constitutional reform will dismiss criticism of renewed militarism by correctly pointing to the retention of key restrictive stipulations, e.g. civilian control or the rejection of wars of aggression, in most drafts as well as the evident weakness inherent in the ‘armed alliance for worldwide neoliberal domination’ argument voiced by Watanabe Osamu. Critics of a potential Constitutional amendment will remind their audience that a revised Article 9 would give the government (far too) great flexibility in security matters, thereby opening the door to Japanese participation in combat missions, even if those were conducted under the umbrella of an established international organization, be it the UN, NATO or a yet-to-be-founded Asian security organization. To those critics, the unwillingness to take part in those missions may be a laudable act of pacifism based on the reflection of the horrors of World War II; needless to say that, as discussed in section 2.2, to conservatives this unwillingness amounts to nothing short of irresponsibility.

4.4  Rights and duties: towards a dignified nation? The final piece of our micro-level analysis of the Constitutional reform proposals is chapter 3. On the background of the findings introduced in sections 2.3 and 4.1, the proposed amendments to the articles pertaining to fundamental human rights (Articles 11–13, 97), marriage and the family (Article 24) as well as newly added provisions stipulating new rights and duties, e.g. environmental protection or the duty of national defense, are of particular importance to our undertaking. After all, our previous research has shown that conservatives have a clear vision of what the national society of the future should look like. We have established that the conservatives sought to create a ‘dignified nation’, less materialistic and individualistic, rather than proud of its history and traditions, but nonetheless democratic and free. However, our inquiry has also brought to light that the conservative answer to the ‘how’ question was far less convincing than that to the ‘what’ question. The latter question was convincingly answered not only in the general context discussed in section 2.3, but also in the revised preambles introduced in section 4.1. If the preamble is the place where the vision, in other words ‘the what’, is discussed, then chapter 3 of the supreme law ought to be the place where we should get a basic idea about the methods of achieving this vision, in other words ‘the how’. Furthermore, if the assumption that the content of the Constitutional reform proposals reflects the visions discussed in Chapter 2 holds true, then the ambiguity of the methods that was attested in section 2.3 should be evident in revisions made to the Constitution’s chapter 3, also. Without aiming to pre-empt the results presented below, the following analysis will demonstrate that this is indeed the case.

Key issues of Constitutional reform  157 Fundamental human rights Given what has been said in section 1.1 with regard to conservatives’ willingness to limit an individual’s rights, excluding the right to property as well as the harsh criticism about ‘gone-too-far’ individualism discussed in section 2.3, the proposed revisions of Articles 11 to 13 and 97 are of particular interest. All four articles are part of the Constitution’s stipulations pertaining to fundamental human rights (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 108). The most apparent change is the absence of Article 97 from most proposals. In fact, it has been ignored or deleted in all but two cases, namely the Kobayashi (3.3.3) and LDP (3.4.12) proposals. Reasons for this treatment are hard to find in the commentaries, however. Only the Yomiuri Shimbun in the commentary accompanying its 2004 proposal (3.4.7) explains the deletion of Article 97 as wanting to avoid a duplication of content already incorporated in the proposal’s Article 16 (ibid.). Among the remaining three articles, revision attempts are concentrated on Article 12 (21 revisions). With around a dozen proposed revisions, this number is considerably lower in the case of Articles 11 and 13. Fundamental human rights, as stipulated in the Constitution, are defined by three characteristics, i.e. their inherence, inviolability and universality (Itō 2007: 84–86). These three elements are expressed through Articles 11 and 97. As previously mentioned, the latter has been either ignored or deleted by most revision proposal authors, hence the analysis has to be limited to Article 11, which prescribes in its current form that ‘the people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights’ (Hook, McCormack 2001: 191). In section 4.1, it was established that conservatives, with few exceptions, aim to uphold the principles of the current Constitution, including fundamental human rights. Seeing how it was also established in section 4.1 that the preambles discussed in that section have an introductory function, it will be interesting to see whether the revisions of Article 11 keep to what has been promised in the preamble. After all, the continued commitment to fundamental human rights has been accompanied by widespread criticism of ‘excessive individualism’ based on their abuse, as introduced in section 2.3. The latter aspect might lead one to assume that conservatives would propose limitations to fundamental human rights in their drafts. Four reform proposals (Nakagawa 1 and 2, Takehana, LDP) retain Article 11 in its current form, whereas nine more revise it, albeit while retaining the three previously discussed current characteristics of the inherence, inviolability and universality of fundamental human rights. Kimura’s, the Sōken Kaigi’s and Aichi’s second draft each lack one or two of those three elements. The remaining eleven reform drafts make no mention of Article 11 at all. These proposals are predominantly partial reform proposals featuring neither a revised version of Article 11 nor commentary of any length on it. Nakagawa’s most recent revision proposal and the two drafts authored by Nishibe are exceptions, however. Both Nishibe and Nakagawa reject the principle of fundamental human rights altogether (Nishibe

158  Key issues of Constitutional reform 1990: 144; Nakagawa 2004: 40–42, 47). In its stead they proclaim ‘fundamental freedoms’ (3.3.1 Article 12) rooted in Japanese traditions and ‘freedoms and other rights enjoyed by the Japanese people, which they have inherited from their ancestors’ (3.4.6 Article 16). Given what has been observed in section 4.1 about the strongly anti-universalist sentiment of both men’s reform proposals, this should not come as a surprise. However, these exceptions notwithstanding, one can conclude that the revisions of Article 11 generally live up to the promise made in the revised preambles, i.e. the continued upholding of fundamental human rights. With a dozen proposals basically retaining the spirit of the current Article 11 and seven more ignoring it, the perceived widespread abuse of fundamental human rights based on ‘excessive individualism’ obviously has yet to be addressed. Draft authors have accorded the role of curbing this abuse to the revised Article 12. The fact that 21 out of 27 proposals include such an altered version of Article 12 speaks of the importance that conservatives attach to this matter. In its current form, Article 12 stipulates that the people shall ‘refrain from any abuse of [the] freedoms and rights [guaranteed to them by the Constitution] and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare’ (Hook, McCormack 2001: 191). However, neither Article 12 nor any other article of the Constitution defines what exactly amounts to ‘public welfare’ (kōkyō no fukushi). As a result, numerous interpretations have been conceived during the last six decades. The initial interpretation viewed ‘public welfare’ as a means to limit all human rights. It treats ‘public welfare’ as ‘public interest’ or ‘public law and order’, i.e. an abstract higher good. Therefore, it was feared that, based on this interpretation, restrictions on human rights could be easily imposed (Itō 2007: 121, 123; Tsujimura 2008: 163). Additionally, as we shall see in section 4.6, discussions about further limitations on fundamental human rights were on the agenda of proponents of Constitutional revision in the 1950s (Neumann 1982: 125–27). By contrast, the current common interpretation no longer treats ‘public interest’ as an abstract higher good, but rather treats it as a principle of essential equality to address contradictions and collisions between two parties’ human rights (Tsujimura 2008: 163; Kenpō Seijigaku Kenkyūkai 2007: 92). Tsujimura Miyoko describes the result of the shift toward the current interpretation in the following way: ‘The age when human rights could easily be restricted by bringing up public welfare (or the good of the whole or public interest) has gone away’ (Tsujimura 2007: 147). Based on what has been established in section 2.3, it is obvious that, unlike Tsujimura, many conservatives are not too fond of this development. Instead, they are seeing a disintegrating society, unable to function anymore because of an obsession with one’s own rights stemming from gone-too-far individualism (Yamasaki 2001: 100). Although not a single commentary explicitly refers to the aforementioned interpretations, there is ample evidence suggesting that a majority of authors have at the very least been inspired by the initial interpretation. In its current form, Article 12 in general and the term ‘public welfare’ in particular have been subjected to criticism in the commentaries of multiple revision proposals, in particular those published since the mid-1990s. Earlier proposals generally do not feature such explicit criticism. This can be seen as a sign that conservatives have become bolder in putting forth revisions of Article 12 as

Key issues of Constitutional reform  159 public opinion swayed in favor of Constitutional reform during the 1990s. The Yomiuri Shimbun, Ozawa, Yamasaki, Nishibe, Hiranuma, Tamura and the Sōken Kaigi characterize ‘public welfare’ as an ‘abstract’, ‘undefined’, ‘ambiguous’ or ‘hard to comprehend’ concept (Ozawa 1999: 100; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 100; Yamasaki 2001: 97–98; Nishibe 2004: 161; Hiranuma 2005: 135; Tamura 2006: 128; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 33). The Yomiuri has identified this as a cause of the confusion which ruled supreme in all layers of society from the family to the central government, when it comes to the question of how to define the term ‘public’ (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 100). Going one step further, Yamasaki charges that the ambiguity was an invitation to abuse individual rights (Yamasaki 2001: 97). To do away with this damaging ambiguity, a majority of draft authors apparently share the common understanding that it should be possible to restrict an individual’s human rights (Ozawa 1999: 101; Yamasaki 2001: 99; Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 75; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 103, 107; Hiranuma 2005: 135; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 33). The only two authors who do not alter Article 12 and the restrictions embedded in it are Kobayashi (3.3.3) and Hatoyama (3.4.10). While almost all proposals retain the undefined ‘public welfare’ or replace it with another term, more specific grounds for restricting human rights can be found in a substantial number of proposals. Ten proposals explicitly mention the protection of national security and public order; eleven single out another person’s human rights. Moreover, four proposals enable restrictions in order to secure a healthy living environment for the general population. Eight proposals stipulate the aforementioned features as straightforward ‘restrictions’, whereas 12 proposals employ a softer tone, proclaiming that the people ‘shall make efforts to harmonize [rights] with public welfare’ (3.3.6 Article 16) or ‘shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the general welfare’ (3.4.4 Article 19). Irrespective of the style, the inclusion of public order or national security in many revisions of Article 12 does indeed suggest a return to the initial interpretation of Article 12 and the term ‘public welfare’. As previously mentioned, the draft authors do not touch on this topic in their commentaries. They claim that they were merely applying international standards instead of six-decade-old domestic Constitutional interpretations. The Yomiuri Shimbun, Yamasaki and the Sōken Kaigi, for instance, cite the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a guideline for their Article 12 revisions (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 107; Yamasaki 2001: 99; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 33–34).11 Then again, this is hardly surprising. After all, basing a reform proposal’s stipulation on a 60-year-old interpretation of the current Constitution would only damage the author’s aim of making a convincing case for Constitutional reform. There is another feature hinting at recourse to the initial interpretation. As previously mentioned, many conservatives perceive the term ‘public welfare’ as too abstract and ambiguous. Therefore, one-third of the proposals simply replace it with a supposedly more comprehensible alternative. The most frequently suggested replacement is the term ‘public interest’ (kōkyō no rieki), which first appeared in the Yomiuri’s second proposal (3.4.1). Subsequently, the same term has been adopted by Yamasaki (3.4.2), PHP (3.4.5), the Sekai Heiwa Kenkyūsho (3.4.9), and

160  Key issues of Constitutional reform Hiranuma (3.4.11). Other suggestions include ‘general welfare’ (ippan no fukushi), as proposed by Aichi (3.4.4), or the LDP’s ‘public interest and order’ (kōeki to kō no chitsujō). In particular, the Yomiuri’s ‘public interest’ and the LDP’s ‘public interest and order’ sound like the previously discussed connotations attached to ‘public welfare’ during the phase of the initial interpretation of Article 12. Tamura may define the term used in the LDP’s proposal as ‘everybody’s happiness’ (Tamura 2006: 128) in his commentary, but a definition of any sort is missing from the actual draft. This is the rule rather than the exception among the proposals studied in this research. This lack of explanation in the actual drafts has led various scholars to question the proposed adoption of these ‘new old’ terms, however. They argue that, without further explanation, the replacements would not offer any improvement over the current wording and still could be interpreted in multiple ways (Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2005: 15). Thus, the Constitutional reform proposals which merely replace the term ‘public welfare’ are no less vulnerable to the criticism of being ‘too abstract’ or ‘undefined’ than is the current Constitution. Even among conservatives, the enthusiasm for more stringent restrictions on fundamental human rights based on ‘public welfare’ stipulations is not universally shared. As previously mentioned, Kobayashi and Hatoyama have refrained from altering Articles 12 and 13 in their proposals. Meanwhile, Nishibe Susumu warns that the essence of ‘public welfare’ will always be determined by the majority. The minority would have to accept the majority decision. Hence ‘public welfare’ was not really ‘public’, but rather the ‘welfare of the majority’. Therefore, it was necessary to protect the minority from this potential ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Nishibe 2004: 162). The proposed revisions of Article 13 are comparable to Article 11 rather than to Article 12. Article 13 is retained in its current form by six authors, and altered only marginally in eight more drafts. These eight proposals merely replace ‘public welfare’ with the new term they introduced in Article 12. Three partial proposals (the two Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei proposals and the Hiranuma draft) do not mention Article 13 at all and a number of proposals delete it or fuse it with Article 12. This is yet another clear sign that would-be reformers are directing their attention to Article 12. Article 13 stipulates that ‘all of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs’ (Hook, McCormack 2001: 191). The term ‘public welfare’ has already been discussed in the context of Article 12. This leaves two remaining components, ‘respect for the individual’ and the ‘pursuit of happiness’, as objects of analysis. Directly after the Constitution’s enactment the latter stipulation was considered a mere declaration void of the nature of a specific right. However, similar to the interpretation of ‘public welfare’, this interpretation has changed over the course of time (Tsujima 2007: 147). Since the 1960s, the pursuit of happiness has been linked to ‘respect for the individual’ and interpreted as a ‘comprehensive right subsuming rights and freedoms indispensable to personal life’ (Tsujimura 2007: 147; Kasuya 1997: 65). Recently, these rights have been understood to include so-called ‘new human rights’, e.g. privacy rights, right of self-determination, etc. (Tsujimura 2007: 148, Kasuya 1997: 69–71).

Key issues of Constitutional reform  161 The inclusion of these new human rights in Article 13 is conveniently neglected by conservatives who tend to use the alleged lack thereof as a reason for the necessity of Constitutional reform (Takehana 1997: 90; Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 77–81). Arguably more important to certain conservatives is the discussion about the article’s first sentence, i.e. ‘all of the people shall be respected as individuals’. Naturally, this sentence does not sit well with those who believe that individualism has ‘gone too far’ or morphed into ‘egoism’ during the postwar period. Despite lamenting this sad reality, Yamasaki leaves the phrase untouched (Yamasaki 2001: 94). Ozawa has chosen to delete it from his version of Article 13, but does not offer any explanation for the decision in his commentary. Fortunately, Nakagawa, who has also deleted the sentence from his third proposal (3.4.6), is more forthcoming. Sounding like Yagi, he squarely blames the atomization of society on this stipulation (Yagi 2003: 214; Nakagawa 2004: 47). Man could only be defined through his affiliation with a nation or traditional intermediate organization, i.e. family. An individual on its own deserved no dignity (Nakagawa 2004: 47, 117). As always, Nakagawa’s opinion on this topic has to be considered extreme and hardly representative of the majority opinion of conservatives. The fact that a large majority of draft proposals retain both key components of the current Article 13, i.e. ‘respect for the individual’ and the ‘pursuit of happiness’, reaffirms this assessment. Obviously, at the same time the third element of importance, namely the previously discussed ‘public welfare’, has been revised or re-defined in many proposals to allow for a more proactive handling of restrictions of fundamental human rights. The proposed changes to the restrictions of human rights have not gone without criticism, however. Critics point out that Constitutions were created to restrain the state’s authority and protect the rights of the people. Tsujimura rhetorically asks whether it’s the people or the state that should be restrained (Tsujima 2007: 148). Aikyō Kōji observes that former Prime Minister Abe ‘hated’ the idea of the relationship between state and individual being a contentious one. According to the Nagoya University professor, Abe rejected not only the postwar regime, but also modern Constitutionalism, because the contentious relationship between state and people, i.e. the latter’s struggle against oppression by the former, was the reason modern Constitutions existed (Aikyō 2006: 43). A glimpse at commentaries accompanying recent Constitutional reform proposals reveals that Abe is not an exception. Several conservatives have expressed frustration with the traditional emphasis of the contentious element in the relationship between nation and individual. As they see it, Constitutional reform would be a good opportunity to break with this view of things (Nishi 2005: 164; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 105–7; Hiranuma 2005: 135; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 32). While Nishi pledges only for a debate over the matter (Nishi 2005: 164), others already have expressed their ideas for a new and better relationship between nation and individual. Abe advocates correlation instead of conflict (Abe 2006: 65). Expressing a similar view, the Sōken Kaigi states its belief that the realization of a national community based on a ‘healthy’ view of the nation was achievable (Sōken Kaigi 2006: 32). It should be noted, though, that this new conception of Constitutionalism is not representative of the vision of all conservative

162  Key issues of Constitutional reform Constitutional reform drafts. Furthermore, it seems to be a comparatively recent concept. Because this discussion has been absent from proposals published in the 1980s and 1990s, one possible explanation for its appearance during the five years 2005–9 is the boost in confidence that Constitutional reform proponents received from rising public support.12 Conclusion The conservative critique of present-day Japan and the suggested remedy are reflected particularly well in the revision proposals for the Constitution’s human rights stipulations. Determined to curb the excessive individualism or egocentrism and the resulting abuse of individual rights from which Japan has allegedly been suffering in recent decades, many draft authors have apparently been inspired by the initial interpretation of ‘public welfare’, i.e. an abstract good utilizable as a means to restrict human rights. The various terms put forward as ‘more easily comprehensible’ alternatives to ‘public welfare’, e.g. ‘public interest’ or ‘public order’, in combination with the accompanying commentaries certainly seem to confirm this suspicion. Meanwhile, Kobayashi or Hatoyama have taken a more cautious approach. Given Kobayashi’s previously discussed praise for the current Constitution, this is hardly surprising (Kobayashi 1992: 80). On the other side of the spectrum Nakagawa and Nishibe reject fundamental human rights altogether. This again is consistent with their strong opposition to democracy and universalism as discussed in section 4.1. On the other hand, the general lack of any substantial revisions to Articles 11 and 13 demonstrates widespread conservative support for fundamental human rights as a key principle of the Constitution, and indeed of postwar Japan. This is also consistent with the proposed preambles and commentaries pledging to uphold these rights. Taken together with the widespread support for democracy discussed in section 4.2, it is difficult to argue that a majority of conservatives were intent on restoring the authoritarian pre-war system. As we shall see in section 4.6, this clearly distinguishes them from their predecessors, who were far less enthusiastic about upholding fundamental human rights in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Family Matters relating to marriage and the family are stipulated in the Constitution’s Article 24. The two paragraphs of the article read as follows: Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes. (Hook, McCormack 2001: 192)

Key issues of Constitutional reform  163 The key components of Article 24 are ‘mutual consent’, ‘equal rights of husband and wife’, ‘individual dignity’ and ‘essential equality of the sexes’ (Itō 2007: 188). These stipulations were aimed at tearing down the pillars of the old civil law, i.e. patrimony, the wife’s inability to perform property transactions or parental authority resting exclusively with the father under the ie system (ibid.). Tsujimura lauds Article 24 for abolishing the pre-war sex discrimination and establishing individual dignity and genuine equality between the sexes (Tsujimura 2007: 150). Considering their assessment of the supposedly dire state of Japanese families, it is not hard to fathom conservatives disagreeing with Tsujimura’s glowing evaluation. That being said, most draft authors end up betraying the resulting expectation of sweeping change. Five revision proposals (by Ozawa, Yamasaki, Hiranuma, Nishibe and the Happiness Realization Party) exclude Article 24. A further six have retained the two paragraphs in their existing form. Conservatives, backed by growing support rates for Constitutional revision, may have become bolder in their attempts at reforming Article 12, over time, but the same cannot be said about their handling of Article 24. Not only drafts released in the early 1990s, such as Kobayashi’s (3.3.3) or the Yomiuri’s first one (3.3.6), but also two of the most recent proposals by PHP (3.4.5) and LDP (3.4.12), for instance, have left the article unchanged. A total of nine revisions add a third paragraph to the two existing ones.13 Nishi Osamu (3.3.7) and Aichi in his second draft (3.4.4) have retained the current first paragraph, while replacing the second one. The only author who has entirely revised Article 24 is Nakagawa Yatsuhiro. Looking specifically at the current Article 24’s four key components listed above, ‘individual dignity’ and ‘essential equality of the sexes’ have been retained in 16, and ‘equal rights of husband and wife’ in 17 out of 22 drafts including Article 24. Meanwhile, the fourth element, i.e. ‘marriages based only on the mutual consent of both sexes’ appears in only 13 out of 22 revision proposals. Unfortunately, only Nakagawa and Nishibe comment on the removal of this last phrase. Both argue that the phrase was incompatible with the Japanese tradition of arranged marriages, even though Nishibe declares his support for putting an end to sex discrimination (Nishibe 2004: 181; Nakagawa 2004: 114–15). Obviously, the changes discussed above could hardly be considered adequate in addressing the severe problems that the family, and indeed Japanese society, is facing. Juvenile crime and divorces on the rise, parents killing their own children; the way conservatives see it, the family as an institution was in dire need of help (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993: 51–52; Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 95; Nakagawa 2004: 103; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 130–39; Sōken Kaigi 2006:50). As a ‘first-aid package’ half of the proposals add a new paragraph to Article 24, stipulating that the family has to be respected and/or protected as the ‘fundamental unit of society’ (3.4.10 Article 25) or the ‘basic unit of the people’s life’ (3.3.4 Article 24). Draft authors do not specify precisely what protective measures they are envisioning, yet they characterize this protection as ‘proactive’ (Ōhara and Momochi 2001: 95; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 140; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 50). For reference, the current Article 24 allows only for passive protection, banning the state from interfering with internal family matters (Tsujimura 2007: 149).

164  Key issues of Constitutional reform Similarly to restrictions on human rights, two sources of inspiration for this new paragraph are conceivable. One is recourse to the Constitutional reform debate of the 1950s and 1960s;14 another source of inspiration is European Constitutions and international declarations. Similar to the human rights discourse, conservatives generally ignore the former and instead emphasize the latter influence. In this context the most frequently cited documents are the German Basic Law, the Italian Constitution, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Ōhara and Momochi 2001: 95–96; Yagi 2003: 216; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 134; Hatoyama 2005: 49; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 49). There is no denying that various paragraphs stipulating the protection of the family closely resemble Article 23 Paragraph 1 of the covenant.15 On the other hand, the same can be said about revision proposals from the 1950s.16 Which influence has been stronger is of little significance here, however, because regardless of whether the universality of the issue is emphasized (Hatoyama 2005: 49) or not, the vision, i.e. the view of the family, is identical. What precisely constitutes a family and what does not is not specified in the proposals, yet based on the commentaries, the understanding of the family is decidedly traditional. The common understanding is that a family shall consist of parents, children and grandparents (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993: 51; Kimura 1996: 67; Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 95; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 135–37; Abe 2006: 217). Other types of families, e.g. a single parent with child, are hardly ever acknowledged or discussed. Instead, conservatives stress the importance of the (traditional) family for both the individual and national society. Not only was the family the irreplaceable basic unit indispensable to the prosperous growth of the latter, but the former also could not exist without it (Kimura 1996: 97; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 138; Hatoyama 2005: 49; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 49–50). It is exactly because of this paramount importance that conservatives attach to the family that many feel it deserves and requires constitutionally guaranteed protection. Those who on the basis of this perception have added corresponding stipulations to their revision proposals seem confident of the positive effects such provisions will have on the condition of Japanese families (Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei 1993: 52; Yagi 2003: 216). Precisely why and how these stipulations would result in improved conditions for families remains anybody’s guess, however, as conservatives do not elaborate on this issue any further. In fact, this is one of the weak spots of the conservative argument. A revision of the Constitution is supposed to bring about an altered Constitutional reality. However, this has evidently not been the case in countries where such a Constitutional theory has been in place. In the previously mentioned case of Germany, the Constitutional theory, i.e. existence of an article stipulating the respect for and protection of the family, has certainly not had the desired effect on that country’s Constitutional reality. High divorce rates and internal family problems are the reality in Germany, as much as they are in Japan, with or without the existence of Constitutional provisions proclaiming the family’s protection. As Tsujimura points out, changing life-styles and the emergence of different family types, e.g. single parent with child or homosexual couples, have resulted in the

Key issues of Constitutional reform  165 dismantling of traditional families (Tsujimura 2007: 150). Whether these social trends could be stopped by merely amending the Constitution’s Article 24 is highly doubtful. Furthermore, the generally traditional view regarding the family’s composition expressed in the commentaries raises the question whether the increasing number of single mothers, a group arguably in great need of support by the state, would benefit from protection. It is noteworthy that a large majority of draft authors either retain most of the current Article 24’s features, with the sole addition being a third paragraph in half of the cases. After all, it is not too far-fetched to expect drastic measures to address the allegedly critical state of Japanese families and society as a whole, which conservatives liken to a ‘national crisis’. However, the only author whose drafts suggest a radical departure from the postwar framework of individual dignity and equality of the sexes is Nakagawa. He is the only author proposing a return to the pre-war ie system (Nakagawa 2004: 104–5), even though others also criticize Article 24 for being one of the causes of the current state of the Japanese family. Just like Nakagawa, Yagi and the Yomiuri claim that Article 24 was denying Japan’s ‘good old’ family values by overemphasizing individualism (Yagi 2003: 215; Nakagawa 2004: 104, 113; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 135). This has not prevented the Yomiuri from adding only one paragraph to Article 24, while leaving the existing two paragraphs untouched. This sort of criticism expressed in the commentaries has led Tsujimura to strongly condemn the ‘current Article 24 revision debate not [as] an accommodation to a collective family model, but a camouflage version of a nationalist family model’ (Tsujimura 2007: 150). The arguably unrealistic vision of a revival of the traditional family that most conservatives seem to desire could be viewed as a nationalist or reactionary tendency. However, this tendency is not reflected in the proposals which tend to retain the key elements of the current Article 24. Provided one subscribes to the view that conservatives were inspired less by European Constitutions than by the Constitutional reform debate of the 1950s and 1960s, the only evident component of the reform proposals that could be called ‘reactionary’ is the addition of the ‘respect and protection’ paragraph. Conclusion Conservatives evidently still hold the traditional image of the family in high regard. Given the almost unanimous critique of the damage that materialism and individualism had inflicted upon Japanese families, the quality and quantity of the amendments discussed above may seem underwhelming. This is especially true when keeping in mind that conservatives fail to explain how an altered Constitutional theory, i.e. protection of the family, is supposed to have a positive influence on the Constitutional reality, i.e. the situation of families in Japan, when this influence evidently has not been visible in European countries like Germany. It is misleading to infer from this lack of amendments that conservatives would simply accept what they view as a grim reality. As noted in section 2.3, many conservatives view the revised Fundamental Law on Education as another important key to improving the state of the Japanese family.

166  Key issues of Constitutional reform These attempts, however, also speak of a certain level of unwillingness or inability to accept an altered reality. Pointing to migration into the cities and the trend towards nuclear families, Neumann remarked three decades ago that the ‘return to old ideals should hardly be possible anymore’ (Neumann 1982: 124). Nevertheless, only few conservatives, such as Katō, are willing to acknowledge as much. This reality supports our initial argument according to which the vision for a dignified nation is far more convincing than are the methods that conservatives believe will transform Japan into the country of their visions. Stipulations regarding the environment Environmental rights allow the people to enjoy and control a favorable environment, enabling them to maintain a healthy and pleasant life (Itō 2007: 387). The meaning of the term ‘environment’ is the subject of a dispute among scholars, however. Some believe that the term should be interpreted in a narrow sense; others pledge for a broader interpretation. The former definition is limited to air, water and daylight, whereas the latter also encompasses historical and cultural environments, e.g. ruins, shrines or temples, as well as social environments, e.g. roads, parks, schools, electricity (ibid.). It goes without saying that the second definition offers ample potential for conflict between the provision of social environment, e.g. the construction of a road, and the natural environment. Hence, the narrow definition is viewed as predominant (ibid.). Environmental rights may not be explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but, scholars argue, they are covered by Article 25, or alternatively Articles 13 and 25 (ibid.). As previously mentioned, conservatives tend to conveniently ignore this interpretation, arguing that these environmental rights and other ‘new rights’ were not adequately stipulated in the current supreme law (Takehana 1997: 90). As a result, stipulations pertaining to the environment began to appear in Constitutional reform proposals in the early 1990s and have since developed into a common feature of Constitutional reform initiatives. This could be interpreted as a reaction to public opinion. Opinion polls suggest a continued strong interest in the environmental issue in the context of Constitutional revision.17 Hence, it does not come as a surprise that 18 out of 27 proposals include stipulations pertaining to environmental rights and/or duties. Among the 13 drafts published since the year 2000, only three do not incorporate such stipulations. In total, nine proposals lack references to environmental rights and duties. These eight proposals can be divided into two groups. The two Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei proposals (3.2.1 and 3.3.4) and Ozawa’s 1999 draft (3.3.11) are partial revision proposals taking a comparatively minimalist approach aimed at ‘fixing’ only the most important issues, such as Article 9. Albeit a complete revision, the extremely short proposal put forth by the Happiness Realization Party (3.4.14) also features no mention of environmental rights. Hence, the lack of an article stipulating environmental rights and/or duties should not be unexpected, in particular of the two former proposals, which were published well before the topic gained its recent importance. In the meantime, Ozawa readily acknowledges the necessity of stipulations pertaining to the environment (Ozawa 1999: 101), but has not included any specific paragraph

Key issues of Constitutional reform  167 or article. Meanwhile, Nakagawa and Nishibe have chosen to ignore the topic entirely. In fact, apart from the Happiness Realization Party’s draft, the duo’s most recent proposals are the only ones published since the year 2000 that exclude an article or paragraph concerning environmental rights and duties. The various proposals for stipulations pertaining to environmental rights and duties fall into the following two major categories. The first one establishes the state’s responsibility to ‘use its endeavors for the protection of the natural environment and the ecosystem’ (3.3.7, Article 33). Nishi (3.3.7) as well as Kobayashi (3.3.3), Kimura (3.3.8) and the LDP (3.4.12) have chosen to establish environmental protection exclusively as a duty of the state. Meanwhile, the people have the right to enjoy the favorable environment that is hoped to result from the state’s protection measures. The 12 proposals falling into the second category define environmental protection as both a right and a duty of the people. Irrespective of whether it is stipulated as a right or a right and a duty, draft authors claim that they were treating environmental protection as a serious issue. The problem consisted not only of the environmental hazards of the past, but also of future challenges (Hatoyama 2005: 51; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 164). Yamasaki, for instance, is convinced that cases of environmental destruction by individuals and corporations are bound to increase in the future (Yamasaki 2001: 107). In the discussion of preamble proposals in section 4.1, environmental rights were excluded from the universality–traditionalism divide. This decision was based on the observation that some conservatives tend to frame this particular issue in a universalistic way, while others accentuate the particularistic component. This divide is also visible in the commentaries, if not in the proposals themselves. On the one hand, Hatoyama, Nishi, Tamura and the Yomiuri emphasize the universality of the issue, pointing to 1972’s Stockholm Declaration, 1992’s United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and a high number of constitutions incorporating environmental protection stipulations (Hatoyama 2005: 51; Tamura 2006: 135; Nishi 1995: 203–6; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 165–66). On the other hand, other authors attach a distinctively more national connotation to it. Protecting Japan’s environment also meant the preservation of the ‘nation’s history and culture’, writes for instance Yamasaki (Yamasaki 2001: 107). Yamasaki seems to apply the aforementioned broad definition, whereas the Nippon Kaigi argues against the inclusion of social or cultural environments and in favor of the narrow definition.18 Judging by their commentaries, draft authors seldom seem to make a distinction between the two definitions, however. Instead, many commentaries refer readers seeking further details to unspecific laws and policies (Kimura 1996: 70; Yamasaki 2001: 107; Yomiuri Shimbunsha 2004: 166; Sōken Kaigi 2006: 48). Such a concrete law, i.e. the Basic Environment Law, has existed for almost two decades (Ministry of the Environment 1993). Unfortunately, the commentaries do not shed any light on conservatives’ perception of this law. Only Nishi briefly touches on the issue, implying that a simple law alone was insufficient to address it (Nishi 1995: 206). Revision authors therefore leave their readership with few specific suggestions. A vision for environmental protection beyond adding an article or paragraph to a new Constitution is hardly visible, making for a

168  Key issues of Constitutional reform striking contrast to the previously discussed issues of national security and human rights. In both cases, conservatives frequently tend to offer a lengthy treatise on specific supplementary measures, i.e. the revision of the Fundamental Law on Education or a Fundamental Law on National Security. Meanwhile, no author has felt compelled to comment on environmental protection and the stipulations pertaining to it on more than the three pages devoted to it by Nishi, the Yomiuri and the Nippon Kaigi. If Machimura was indeed right in his bold assessment that the ‘Japanese landscape was even dirtier than the Japanese mind’ (Machimura 2005: 58), then one wonders why conservatives are generally either unwilling or unable to propose any specific countermeasures beyond the addition of an article or paragraph to the Constitution. After all, the results of the opinion polls cited above suggest that the general populace has continued to attach a high level of importance to environmental rights. Critics of course are quick to charge that conservatives were not genuinely concerned about the environment, but merely (ab)used the popular amendments to sweeten the taste of a bitter pill, i.e. the proposed revision of Article 9 (Watanabe 2002: 62). The little space that draft authors tend to devote to the topic, as well as the lack of a comprehensive and coherent vision in commentaries, certainly does more to reaffirm this criticism than to dispel it. Conclusion Answering the question of ‘how the conservative vision is reflected in the revision proposals’ is difficult because, as we have observed above, conservatives do not devote a lot of space to the topic. The few suggestions discussed in section 2.3 do not go beyond obvious measures such as waste separation or recycling, and can therefore hardly be called a vision. The evident absence of either a bold vision, e.g. a strategy to break the dependency of rural communities on construction projects potentially damaging to the environment, or specific ideas extending beyond the inclusion of an article in a proposal and a few general measures, suggests that the aforementioned suspicion does have some truth to it. At least, judging from the quality and quantity of the relevant commentary, conservatives would have a hard time dispelling the notion that they have included paragraphs pertaining to the environment only in order to divert attention from more controversial components of their quest for revision. The duty to obey the law In its current form, the Constitution stipulates that only ‘the Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution’ (Hook, McCormack 2001: 202). The people were deliberately not included in the provisions of Article 99 because the aim of this article, and in fact of the entire Constitution, was to protect the people from arbitrary abuse of power by those wielding such power, i.e. those mentioned in the aforementioned quote (Tsujimura 2008: 535–36). This, however, does not mean that the people are

Key issues of Constitutional reform  169 free to disobey the Constitution. In fact, by imposing on public officials the duty to uphold the Constitution, the people themselves also fulfill their responsibility of protecting the supreme law (Kobayashi 1992: 210–11, Tsujimura 2008: 536). Nonetheless, half of the revision proposals feature newly included articles explicitly stating the people’s duty to observe the Constitution and the law. This is by no means a recent feature of Constitutional reform drafts. In fact, a majority of proposals explicitly demanding that the people uphold the Constitution and the law were published during the 1990s. Regardless of the respective draft’s time of publication, the articles included in the various proposals are formulated in a very similar fashion. A typical example is Kimura’s (3.3.8) Article 34, which reads as follows: ‘The people are obliged to observe the Constitution and the law.’ The commentaries explaining the inclusion of these articles show a similar lack of variety. Conservatives are concerned about what they view as a tendency to observe a stipulation only if it is explicitly mentioned in statutory law. Since this is not the case with the obligation to uphold and protect Constitutional order, certain people seem to believe that there was no need to observe this duty. Accordingly, Kobayashi, for instance, includes the people in his revised version of Article 99 so as to avoid any further ‘unnecessary confusion’ on the topic (Kobayashi 1992: 211). While offering similar views, others use their commentaries to lay the blame squarely on the postwar system, where obvious things were unfortunately not considered obvious anymore, unless they were written down in statutory law (Sōken Kaigi 2006: 55; Ōhara, Momochi 2001: 86). Conclusion Unfortunately, conservatives do not specify who those people are who supposedly obey the law only as long as it is written down. The commentaries may not shed light on the identity of those people, but as the aforementioned examples of the Sōken Kaigi or the Nippon Kaigi show, they make it clear that the postwar system is to blame for this regrettable trend. In this respect, the addition of the duty to observe the Constitution shares a common feature with other objects of revision. Just like the current position of the Tennō, i.e. head of state, the duty to uphold the nation is viewed as something that is blatantly obvious. However, because certain people are unwilling to acknowledge these ‘given facts’, conservatives feel the urge to include them in their proposals. Moreover, similarly to other phenomena, e.g. exaggerated individualism or the dismantling of families, this issue is seen as being caused by the shortcomings of the postwar system. The duty of national defense: an amendment and the problem of specifics As explained in section 2.3, many conservatives believe that it is time for the Japanese people to once again ‘defend the nation with their own hands’. Therefore, it is not surprising to find articles stipulating such a duty in various proposals. At first glance, provisions such as ‘the people are obliged to defend

170  Key issues of Constitutional reform the nation as provided by law’ (3.3.8 Article 32) may sound like a restoration of the pre-war period’s compulsory military draft. And indeed, six proposals (written by Nakagawa, Nishibe and Kobayashi) seem to confirm the suspicion of revision opponents claiming that conservatives ‘putting the country above the people’s lives’ were trying to re-introduce conscription, which is banned under the current Constitutional framework (Doi, Sataka 2007: 50–51; Asagumo Shimbunsha Henshūkyoku 2008: 631–32). The fact that only six out of 27 drafts propose a re-introduction of conscription suggests, however, that this kind of criticism is at least to some degree based on generalization. Conservatives apparently are well aware of and sensitive to such criticism, a stance that makes sense in the light of public opinion remaining strongly opposed to forced conscription.19 Five proposals (by the Yomiuri Shimbun, Hatoyama and the Sōken Kaigi) ban conscription outright. Judging by their commentaries, even those authors whose proposals include the duty to defend the nation seemingly feel the need to reject the notion of restoration.20 They claim that ‘defending the nation’ does not automatically translate into forced military service. Instead of such a narrow definition, they suggest that ‘defending the nation’ should be understood in a broader way, including for instance private diplomacy or moral support for the troops (Mayuzumi 1994: 100; Kimura 1996: 80; Yamasaki 2001: 123). Without consulting the commentaries this is not apparent, however, as authors have often chosen to include the duty to defend the nation in their drafts, albeit without specifying what actions constitute ‘defense’. These sorts of ambiguous stipulations can be found in eight proposals. The Sōken Kaigi proposal (3.4.13) represents a special case, as it obliges the people to defend the nation (Article 47), while banning conscription (Article 3). Meanwhile, the drafts published by the Jishu Kenpō Kisei Giin Dōmei, Nishi, Ozawa, Hiranuma and the LDP do not include any articles or paragraphs pertaining to such a duty. However, in his commentary Tamura emphasizes that the LDP does reject conscription (Tamura 2006: 124). The aforementioned accusation, according to which conservatives seek to reinstate the pre-war period’s forced conscription, certainly seems hard to uphold, given how half of the proposals either ban conscription outright or lack any stipulations pertaining to national defense in the first place. On the other hand, it is worth noting in many cases the gap between entirely unspecific regulations establishing the duty of ‘national defense’ and commentaries specifically emphasizing that national defense does not mandatorily result in conscription. It may not necessarily be re-introduced as a result of the proposed amendment, yet many conservatives refuse to rule out that possibility. This naturally leads to the suspicion whether there is method in this ambiguity. Given many conservatives’ distrust of neighboring countries’ intentions and their belief that the Japanese people should be able and willing to defend the nation against any threat with their own hands, conscription certainly seems a desirable option to explore. Therefore, one gets the impression that the lack of specifics was meant to leave the door open for a potential introduction of forced conscription, while avoiding the inevitable criticism of revisionism.

Key issues of Constitutional reform  171 Conclusion Conservatives tend to criticize the vagueness of the current Constitution, e.g. the ‘public welfare’ stipulations of Articles 12 and 13, yet many proposals do not offer much of a remedy. One-third of the proposals replace ‘public welfare’ with another term, only to subsequently leave this new term undefined. As for national defense, conservatives wary of being labeled restorative are adamant about not wanting to re-introduce forced conscription. However, in many cases the articles stipulating the duty to defend the nation do not ban conscription. Actually, it is not specified at all what actions are included in the term ‘defend’. These vague formulations leave the door wide open for a large number of interpretations. A critical mind might even wonder whether there is method in this deliberate ambiguity. After all, conveniently sidestepping the issue of definitions and specifics would give the government the freedom to interpret the respective articles at its own discretion. The undesirable side-effects of this freedom created by ambiguity are endless battles over the constitutionality of certain policies before a Constitutional court that many conservatives want to be set up. That being said, this is not the only plausible interpretation of the reason behind this widespread ambiguity. The lack of specifics inherent in many revisions to key components of chapter 3 verifies our initial assumption, according to which the ambitious goal of a dignified nation is more easily described than achieved. Put differently, conservatives have had far less trouble in producing a clear vision of what the national society should look like than in coming up with realistic means of achieving their goal. For better or worse, this occasional lack of realism makes the conservative argument susceptible to the claim that suggested solutions, e.g. the addition to Article 24 of a third paragraph stipulating the protection of the family, merely mask helplessness in the face of unwanted yet inevitable change. Regardless of this significant problem related the vision’s realization, key parts of the concept of a dignified nation, e.g. curbing excessive individualism, rebuilding traditional families, environmental protection and the fostering of more responsibility for society and nation through new duties are reflected very well in the proposed amendments of chapter 3. As already discussed, the remaining component of the vision, i.e. the cultivation of greater patriotic sentiment, is related to the Fundamental Law on Education. Last but not least, we can note that the conservative draft authors have, unlike their peers in the 1950s and 1960s, resisted the temptation to lobby for breaking down a key pillar of the postwar system, i.e. the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The general lack of substantial revisions of Articles 11 and 13 proves as much, and demonstrates that the commitment thereto expressed in the preambles (see section 4.1) was indeed more than a nicely worded, yet ultimately empty promise.

4.5  Macro-level analysis: the reflection of a conservative vision Judging by the observations made in the preceding four sections, it can be concluded that Constitutional reform reflects the conservative vision decently, albeit not perfectly. In addition to the slightly limited reflection of a more

172  Key issues of Constitutional reform assertive national security vision discussed in section 4.3, two more limitations have to be pointed out. Constitutional reform is not the only means through which conservatives seek to transform Japan. As mentioned in Chapter 2, revisions of various other existing laws, e.g. the Fundamental Law on Education or the Imperial Household Law, or the creation of entirely new laws, e.g. Fundamental Law on National Security, also play important roles. Moreover, the lens of Constitutional reform does not cover the entire conservative spectrum, but instead leans slightly to the right. Several individuals and organizations mentioned in Chapter 2 do not feature in Chapters 3 or 4 because they have not published any revision proposals. As the example of the DPJ illustrates, this is not to say that these groups or individuals are against amending the supreme law. The DPJ or the Kōmeitō, for instance, have published several papers detailing their stance toward the issue, yet neither party has produced a document that would qualify as a draft.21 The former party of course is well represented in this research through the proposals of Ozawa (3.3.11), Hatoyama (3.4.10) and the Sōken Kaigi (3.4.13). On the other hand, the liberalleaning conservatives cited in Chapter 2 are, if not against, at least cautious of Constitutional reform initiatives. While Katō openly admits to being torn over whether to favor or oppose revision (Katō 2005: 101–10), the two Tanakas, Takemura or Gotōda Masazumi seem to believe that the Constitution should be given an opportunity to, in Takemura’s words, ‘shine in the post-Cold War era’, before Japan enters into a lengthy discussion on whether certain parts of the supreme law should be revised (Takemura, Tanaka 1995: 46–47; Gotōda 2008: 150–51). Therefore they have less motivation to produce Constitutional reform proposals than do their counterparts, whose position is closer to the other side of the spectrum. This obviously leads to the problem that their views are not adequately reflected. That being said, during the second half of the period researched in this thesis, many liberal-leaning conservatives have lost a lot of their former profound influence. In the mid-1990s, Takemura was finance minister, Tanaka (Shūhei) chief of the economic planning agency and Katō the head of the LDP’s second-largest faction. Takemura and Tanaka have since retired from active politics. The 71-year-old Katō still sits in the Lower House, albeit his influence within the LDP has decreased significantly since the Katō no Ran. Therefore, one could argue that during the 10 to 15 years since 1995– 2000 these individuals have come to represent an increasingly small proportion of the conservative landscape, and hence their vision has become far less important. Since it has been established above that, despite these limitations, the proposed Constitutional amendments do indeed reflect multiple conservative visions, we can now proceed to answer the initial question: What kind of conservative visions are reflected in the quest for Constitutional reform? To this end, the results of the micro-analysis conducted throughout the preceding four sections will be put into a broader perspective below. Based on the results of this macro-level analysis, it should be possible to answer the initial research question.

Key issues of Constitutional reform  173 The issues Figure 4.3 can viewed as a summary of the results of the micro-level analysis presented in sections 4.1 through 4.4. Taking a closer look at the figure, it is possible to identify three groups of proposed amendments: one on the far left, one on the far right, and a third one in the middle. Popular sovereignty, fundamental human rights and universalism, in other words key components of the current Constitution, are the main characteristics of the group on the far left. Meanwhile, the group on the far right emphasizes precisely the opposite, i.e. traditionalism and the rejection of democracy and fundamental human rights. The group in the center agrees with either the far-left or the far-right group, depending on the respective issue, although it evidently has more in common with the former than the latter. Only on the topic of the right to (collective) self-defense based on the vision of a more assertive national security policy do all three share a common stance. Before we proceed with a quantitative analysis, let us review the positions of the three groups in greater detail. 1

Moderates: The group on the far side of the spectrum will be referred to as moderates. As mentioned above, they are in favor of retaining a majority of the current Constitution’s key components, i.e. popular sovereignty (Article 1), the symbolic Emperor system (Article 1), fundamental human rights

S o e c i f i c r e v i s i o n orooosals: A n o v e r v i e w Moderate

Reactionary

Emperor as symbolic head of state g

e

Artide 1

Position of Emperor based on the will of the people

Io

Sovereign Based on tradition

o

Popular sovereignty

QJ

Authoritarian

Q

Articles 11-13

Retaining existing stipulations

> &

Limitations on human rights

Rejection of fundamental | human rights

I 3

Right to (collective) self-defense Artide 9 SDF missions abroad

N/A

Duty to defend the nation

N/A —Chapter3

Forced conscription

Ban of conscription

M 1

Artide 2 Articles 1 3, 24

11

Male&female lineage |

Esclusively male lineage Individuai dignity

Artide 24

Essential equality of the sexes

Chapter3

Enviranmental prò te et io n

Figure 4.3  Specific revision proposals: an overview

No respect I for individuai Sexual inequality N/A

Q.

3

174  Key issues of Constitutional reform

2

3

(without any new restrictions being placed on them; Articles 11–13, 97), individual dignity (Articles 13, 24) and essential equality of the sexes (Article 24). In fact, they take the existing Constitution’s universalism even further by explicitly allowing female members of the imperial family to become Tennō. Furthermore, they support an explicit ban on conscription and the stipulation of new rights, such as environmental protection. As mentioned above, the one aspect in which they do not differ from the other two groups is their support for the enabling of the right to collective self-defense. The decision to preserve or only slightly modify all of the Japanese Constitution’s key components except for Article 9 is in line with the comparatively positive view of postwar Japan. Kobayashi, for instance, may eloquently criticize the Article 9 regime, yet he also acknowledges the many positive aspects of the Constitution (Kobayashi 1992: 12–13, 80, 83, 170–75). Contrary to a ‘reactionary’ like Nakagawa, he does not dwell on the subject of the pre-war period and Japanese traditions. In fact, he considers the Meiji Constitution inferior to the current supreme law and likens his revision proposal to a car’s ‘model change’ (ibid.). Just as his draft, the car’s new model is very similar to its predecessor except for some enhancements (Article 9) and added features (e.g. environmental rights). Accordingly, he perceives the current Constitution not as a radical or revolutionary departure from Japanese traditions but, in the words of Hori Shigeru as a ‘framework for this new postwar Japan’ (Nakamura 2005: 163). Hence, one could argue that this moderate revision concept corresponds to Hori writing about preserving and developing this framework. This statement of course sounds similar to Burke’s stance on Constitutional reform, namely ‘[making] as little change as possible in order to preserve as much of the existing Constitution as possible’ (McClelland 1996: 414). Centrists: As the name suggests, this group stands between moderates and reactionaries. Proposals falling into this category by far outnumber those of the other two groups. This quantity brings with it a considerable amount of qualitative bandwidth. However, generally speaking, these proposals share many features with their moderate counterparts. First and foremost, they do not question popular sovereignty, the symbolic Emperor system and fundamental human rights. That being said, they are, to varying degrees, in favor of limiting these fundamental human rights through Article 12’s ‘public welfare’ stipulations. Furthermore, some authors agree with the reactionaries on the necessity to prevent the abolishment of the Emperor system.22 And while they incorporate environmental rights and stipulations pertaining to SDF missions outside Japan, they generally tend to share the third group’s view that the people are obliged to defend their country, even though they hesitate to explicitly demand the reintroduction of conscription. The topic of imperial succession is mostly ignored by them, which can be taken as a sign pointing to support of the current modus operandi, i.e. the invented tradition of an exclusively male lineage. Reactionaries: The group on the far right of the spectrum acts as the antipole to the moderates. They reject the three principles of the Japanese

Key issues of Constitutional reform  175 Constitution, i.e. democracy, protection of fundamental human rights and pacifism. Democracy to them is the ‘tyranny of the majority’ or an evil dogma invented by the French revolutionaries two centuries ago. As autonomists distrustful of the motivations of friend and foe alike, they view peace as merely an interlude between one war and another. This hostile international environment obviously necessitates a strong country, mentally and physically capable to deter and defeat potential aggressors. Accordingly, conscription is to them an obvious duty of the people. The continued existence of the Tennō institution will not be based on the will of the people. Furthermore, they show no interest in the participation of the SDF in international peacekeeping missions or environmental rights. For all these common traits, it is possible to distinguish between two types of reactionaries. Nakagawa is focused on a restoration of the Meiji Constitution. Therefore, he proposes to again turn the Emperor into the sovereign monarch that he was until 1945. While sharing Nakagawa’s contempt for popular sovereignty, Nishibe does not solve this perceived problem by returning the Emperor to the powerful position he had held under the system in the Meiji era. Instead, he puts forward the idea of the living people having to obey the ‘historical will’, i.e. Japanese traditions, whenever they want to make a decision. As mentioned numerous times in the preceding chapters, the distrust in the people’s decision-making capabilities and the resulting authoritarian tendencies, along with the emphasis of traditions, be they genuine or invented, does show certain similarities to Burke’s conservatism. At first glance it may seem that they disagree with Burke on one key issue, however. After all, Burke was an outspoken critic of radical Constitutional revisions, i.e. precisely the kind of changes Nakagawa and Nishibe are demanding. However, this assessment is misleading, because the classic conservative way of thinking is reminiscent of Kitaoka’s description of the early postwar conservative who considered the postwar reforms, including the creation of the current Constitution, a universalistic revolution gone too far by breaking with previously established traditions.23 What for Burke was the French Revolution, is for this type of conservative the postwar system whose foundations, including the Constitution, were laid during the Occupation era. It is necessary to make one important qualification with regard to these three categories. These three kinds of visions are archetypes. In other words, not all the specific elements listed for each group will apply to every single draft. This can be demonstrated by looking at Kobayashi’s proposal (3.3.3). It falls into the ‘moderate’ category and indeed features all the components listed above, except for one. Instead of banning conscription, Kobayashi proposes exactly the opposite, namely the introduction of conscription. Similarly, Nishibe’s drafts can be found in the third category because they reject democracy and fundamental human rights. At the same time, as explained in section 4.2, Nishibe, unlike his peers, is indifferent to the question whether or not female members of the Imperial family should be allowed to ascend the Chrysanthemum Throne. Moreover, he does not condone sexual discrimination within the family, as mentioned in section 4.4.

176  Key issues of Constitutional reform Placing the proposals Figure 4.424 illustrates the various proposals’ respective positions between retention of the postwar system and restoration. A set of x and y values is assigned to each proposal, measuring the level of universalism/traditionalism (on the x axis) democracy/authoritarianism (on the y axis).25 The higher the x-value, the more traditionalist the proposal is, and the lower the x-value, the more universalistic. Correspondingly, the higher the y-value the more authoritarian the draft is, and the lower the y-value, the more democratic. It is easy to deduce that the Japanese Constitution’s values (0/0) are very low, whereas the Meiji Constitution’s values are very high (5/7). The national security vision and Article 9 amendments are not reflected in Figure 4.4. This exclusion is based on the following reasoning: as mentioned above, the right to (collective) self-defense, one of the key components of any Article 9 revision, is the sole common feature shared by all drafts. Precisely because it is a shared feature across all three categories, little would change if it were added to the equation. Additionally, as explained in section 4.3, the four conservative national security visions outlined in section 2.2 are only inadequately reflected in the proposals. The set of values assigned to each proposal is based on an analysis of the proposed amendments of the various articles and paragraphs. In line with John Maki’s observation that ‘the guarantee of fundamental human rights is the embodiment of democracy, while the lack of such a guarantee means no democracy’ (Luney, Takahashi 1993: 48), the y-value, i.e. the level of democracy or

Placing the Constitutional reform proposals

—8-jMeiji Constitution

-7-4-

E

'e

*eactkìonof *ly W*

-6-4