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THE PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT
THE PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT IN CITY CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PHILADELPHIA CIVIL SERVICE Bjr Frances L. Reinhold
Philadelphia UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS London: Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press
1937
Copyright 1937 U N I V E R S I T Y O F P E N N S Y L V A N I A PRESS
Manufactured in the United States of America
CONTENTS Page
Cha-pter INTRODUCTION
Ι
I . T H E P L A C E OF T H E P R O V I S I O N A L A P P O I N T M E N T IN A M E R I T S Y S T E M . F R A M E W O R K AND S T A T I S T I C S OF T H E PHILADELPHIA CIVIL SERVICE
4
I I . P R O V I S I O N A L A P P O I N T M E N T S IN P H I L A D E L P H I A III.
TESTIMONY ABUSE
OF O F F I C E
HOLDERS
REVEALING
OF P R O V I S I O N A L A P P O I N T M E N T S
IN
.... THE
PHILA-
DELPHIA
43
I V . P R O V I S I O N A L A P P O I N T M E N T S IN O T H E R C I T I E S V. THE
EFFECT
OF
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENTS
O T H E R P H A S E S OF T H E M E R I T S Y S T E M .
....
SUMMARY
COMPARA-
AND C O N C L U S I O N S
A P P E N D I X . V E R B A T I M T E S T I M O N Y OF O F F I C E H O L D E R S . . .
Ν
51
ON
TIVE CIVIL SERVICE PRACTICES VI.
20
63 88 93
INTRODUCTION
of contemporary interest in better government personnel, discussion of any phase of civil service is timely. Public opinion seems to be divided in two equally unfortunate directions. One group of people appears to have faith in everything that goes by the name of civil service, while the other appears to be convinced that no reform can defeat the political spoilsmen. Both stereotypes obviously need qualification. N VIEW
I
There is an aspect of civil service that has received scant attention to date though it is the most vulnerable spot in many municipalities. It is to be found in the device of the provisional appointment. This book purposes to reveal the extent to which such a simple invention could nullify the finest civil service in existence. It happens to have been convenient to study the practice in Philadelphia, but this city is typical of many another. The place of the provisional appointment in a merit system will be shown. This will be followed by a detailed account of the way in which these appointments are legally manipulated in order to dominate the system politically. Testimony corroborating the statistical evidence will be offered. There will be a chapter on the extent to which the misuse of provisional appointments prevails in other cities. The effect of provisional appointments on classification schemes, salary standardization, efficiency ratings, promotions, transfers, dismissals and the like will be elaborated. From the comparative practices that are set forth, certain suggestions for improvement in Philadelphia—or in any other city—will be made. Because of its many advantages, the four-year period from 1932 to 1935 was selected for detailed study. This represents an entire administration—the most recent administration for which figures are complete. Furthermore it was an administra1
2
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
tion under a conservative reform mayor. Therefore no matter how dark a picture is presented, it is still the best picture to portray. T h e depression had cut patronage to the bone so that it was possible to make an investigation of the 482 provisional appointees during this particular four years. Otherwise it would have been impossible to conduct a one-man investigation of the normal two thousand appointees. The members of the Civil Service Commission gave much help and frankly conceded the existence of many defects in the system—always stopping short of party disloyalty. Just as reasonably they insisted on recognition of the system's better features. Answers to questionnaires were received from Civil Service Commissions of seventy large cities in the United States, together with copies of the laws, regulations, annual reports, and sample examinations. From this mass of material, newspaper files, personal correspondence, and from interviews, the comparative data of the book is derived. The method of misusing provisional appointments has been perfected over a long period of years so that it can scarcely be improved. Hence any party machine that wishes to dominate the civil service is virtually compelled to use this device if it wishes to remain within the law and to accomplish its purpose at the same time. That is the significant thing about the mechanism. It is necessary. It is legal. It is workable. Textbooks on municipal government and on civil service are aware that it is used, but are vague about the actual way in which it is manipulated. In fact, there appears to be no single treatment of the provisional appointment in print and few sources that contain more than a paragraph on the subject. It is often charged that too much attention is paid to the selection of employees and not enough to their maintenance. But too much attention cannot be paid to induction when all public moneys either go to the personnel staff in payment for services rendered, or pass through its hands for public expenditures. The double objectives of better selection and better maintenance are admittedly twin ideals, but obviously the one precedes the other in point of time. T w o divergent opinions have grown up
INTRODUCTION
3
among the experts. The older view conceives of the merit system as an instrument of protection; the newer conceives of it as an instrument of service. From this mutually exclusive "thesisantithesis" will probably develop a "synthesis" combining both schools of thought. But let it be repeated, the function of protection must logically precede the function of service. And it is just because the majority of American cities, of which Philadelphia happens to be a typical instance, are still concerned with the problem of recruiting a non-political personnel that a study of the provisional appointment as a method of circumventing merit induction is important and timely. Change in a local political situation hardly interrupts the practice except to alter the partisanship of the Commission, hence the partisanship of the new provisional appointees.
I
T H E PLACE OF T H E PROVISIONAL APP O I N T M E N T IN A MERIT SYSTEM FRAMEWORK A N D STATISTICS OF T H E PHILADELPHIA CIVIL SERVICE EST the uninitiated reader find himself perplexed as to the J exact relation of the part to the whole, it is desirable to sketch a complete civil service system in order to show the place of the provisional appointment in it before attempting a thorough analysis of that subject itself. The framework of the Philadelphia Civil Service is established in Articles X I X and X X I I of an Act of the Pennsylvania Legislature of June 25, 1919, supplemented by the Rules of the Civil Service Commission of the City of Philadelphia and more recently by another act of the state legislature revamping the commission.1 The long tortuous development of the service is historically interesting but adds no weight to the present argument. It is sufficient to note that the current system stems from the year 1920. Comparatively speaking this is a recent revision. But in the light of newer research it leaves much to be desired. While the city and county boundary lines have been identical since 1854, the logical city-county consolidation of structure and function2 has not yet been accomplished. Thus there are two types of Philadelphia employees—city and county—and the procedures by which they are maintained are totally different. Although this report is confined to the former, in the interests of clarity and perspective, it is advisable to refer briefly to the scope of the latter. Most American municipalities are still troubled
L
House Bill No. 964, signed by the Governor March 19, 1937. ' Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research, The City and County of delphia: A Discussion of Their Relations, Philadelphia, 1923. 1
4
Phila-
IN A M E R I T S Y S T E M
5
with the duplication of city-county governments. Hence the particular system herein described may be read in the light of a general situation. T h e 1936 budget authorizes salaries for some 3,545 county employees, itemized as follows: 3 City Controller City Treasurer Commissioners of Fairmount Park Clerk of Council (including councilmen) Clerk of Quarter Sessions Coroner City Commissioners (central office) Bureau of Weights and Measures Courts of Common Pleas Orphans Court Quarter Sessions Court Supreme Court Municipal Court House of Detention Board of Viewers Board of Magistrates District Attorney Prothonotary Inspectors of County Prisons Receiver of Taxes Board of Revision of Taxes Recorder of Deeds Register of Wills Sheriff Registration Commission Art Jury Commercial Museum, Exhibition and Convention Halls . Free Library Total
59 43 382 63 97 40 72 101 92 31 62 9 563 42 18 59 108 107 214 355 139 80 55 167 26 2 . 72 487 3.545
T h e significant feature of the county system lies in its freedom from the restraint of civil service law. Hence county offices con* These are not all county employees strictly speaking, but they are outside the present jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
6
PROVISIONAL A P P O I N T M E N T
stitute the juiciest political plums, the sinecure portfolios, and are the aspiration of long-suffering politicians.4 Only one exception must be made, and that is in the Free Library Department where concerted effort to obtain trained personnel has resulted in a happier situation. However, there are six times as many city positions as county, but these are a little more difficult to manipulate technically, since they are under civil service jurisdiction. The organization of the city Civil Service is most simply seen in diagrammatic form.
sified and unclassified. The classified service is further subdivided into three parts, the competitive class, the exempt class, and the labor class more clearly illustrated as follows:
4
A state legislative investigating commission is now probing Philadelphia County's government with a view to reorganization. Even should this be accomplished it would be only one reform in a single state that would alter the "total iituation" but a fraction.
IN A MERIT SYSTEM
7
Having outlined the service from several different angles, it is also advisable to know the distribution of employees in the various departments.5 Office Office of the Mayor Department of Public Safety Department of Public Works Department of Public Health Department of Public Welfare Department of Wharves, Docks, and Femes Department of City Transit Department of Law Civil Service Commission Department of Supplies and Purchases Department of City Architecture Total
'932 16
'935
'933
1934
7.879 6,713 3.037 558
17 7,619 6,071 i.973 475
»7 7,110 6,388 1,904 466
16 7.24« 6,359 2,816 471
107 185 7» 31 40 «3
107 62 79 3« 39 6
129 54 78 3° 36 6
117 40 80 31 36 6
18,650
17,479
I7.3I8
17, « 3
Thus the total number of city employees declined by 1,437 during the period under study. This, of course, was merely a reflection of the financial difficulties incurred by the depression. Since city services are constantly increasing, the long view will "These figures are compiled from the four Annual Reports put out by the Civil Service Commission for 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935·
PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT
8
show a corresponding increase in the number of employees. T h e Department of Public Safety has the largest personnel, due to its supervision of the police and fire services. Because of the many employees in the Street Cleaning and Highway Bureaus, the Department of Public Works ranks next numerically.® T h e Health Department is likewise sizable as it requires large hospital staffs. Unclassified Classified Exempt Competitive Labor
'93^
'933
r934
'935
49 18,601
5° 17,429 2,617 10,252 4,5fo
51 17,267
51 17,162
1,456 9,948 4,863
»,417 9,765 4,980
2 ,579 10,924 5,098
From these comparative figures it can be seen that the unclassified service is a minute part of the total personnel, while the competitive class bulks larger than all other branches put together. It is also interesting to note that exclusive of the labor class, approximately 12% of the entire service is exempt from examination. A t this point several parenthetical remarks are appropriate. W e have seen that county employees are politically recruited. W e have noted that city employees for the most part are under civil service rules. Does that fact fer se place city employees outside the political pale? A simple negative involves further explanation. By definition, the unclassified service is political, since executive jobs are obtained by party effort either through popular election or organization appointment. The exempt class is also political. Exemptions are made either by charter or by Commission ordinance and in neither case is there effective legal restraint in the hiring or firing of personnel. The labor class, too, is frankly politically recruited. In the competitive class one might β
A s of January 1 9 3 7 , the Street Cleaning and H i g h w a y Bureau were merged
under executive order. T h i s appears to have been a political m o v e in o r d e r to oust the chief of the Street C l e a n i n g Bureau. B y abolishing the position, this civil servant was removed without violation of the tenure clause o f the civil service l a w . H o w e v e r , it resulted in the wholesale dismissal of the Street C l e a n i n g Bureau. Nevertheless, in the reorganization, the desirables were retained.
IN A MERIT SYSTEM
9
expect freedom from political influence. Such is not the case, as will be seen in subsequent pages. The influence is a little more subtle, perhaps, but none the less penetrating and powerful. Thus while the spoils system runs merry riot in county offices, it has a happy, if more subdued time, in city offices as well. Philadelphia cannot be said to have a merit system in the strict sense of the word. Nevertheless, its efforts in that direction are worthy of study if only to discover why they have failed. The Civil Service Commission is composed of five members. Two are appointed by the mayor, two by the controller, and the fifth is appointed by concurrent resolution of the original four. All have four-year tenure. Vacancies are filled by the method of original appointment. The Commissioners select one of their number for President and one for Secretary. All go through the formality of taking oaths of fidelity and of posting $25,000 bonds. While the Commission appoints the Examiners, most other appointments are made technically by the department heads. The power of reclassifying positions and amending the rules rests squarely upon the Commission. While the Griffenhagen Report of 1920 and the Jacobs Report of 1930 advised and outlined improved classifications, nothing has been done along this line to date. "The exempt class shall include positions except that of unskilled laborer, for the filling of which the Commission shall have found competitive examinations to be impracticable." Before exempting any position the Commission must hold a public hearing and must state "that it is unable to obtain by competitive examination persons possessing the usual and requisite qualifications for filling such office or position. . . ." Considering the fact that there are several thousand exemptions each year, this subterfuge for political appointments becomes interesting. The formality of holding public hearings is faithfully observed. There are no legal irregularities here or anywhere else in the actual administration of the law. However, the mass use of this particular mechanism obviously circumvents the intent of the law. Moreover it is simply assumed that competitive examinations are impracticable. There is no attempt made to hold exam-
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
inations first and to conclude afterwards. Perhaps all that was done years ago and was settled to the satisfaction of the permanent staff. If so, the conclusion has been universalized to cover all new exemptions. It is further required that the Commission state specifically the reasons for exemptions in its Annual Reports. A few sample quotations from these reports are in order.7 D E P A R T M E N T OF WHARVES, DOCKS, AND
FERRIES
Exempted M a r c h 23, 1 9 3 2 , for a period of one year from April I, 1932 to M a r c h 3 1 , 1 9 3 3 , for the following reasons: 1. O n account of the unreliable character of the help employed and the constant changes occurring. 2. T h e necessity for having full crews on all vessels, as the number of men in the crews is fixed on the vessel's papers, and it is a punishable offense to operate with smaller crews than those specified, this means that it is frequently necessary to procure men at a moment's notice or keep the vessel tied at the wharf until a sufficient number of men are secured. 3. T h e licensed officers, masters, engineers and under United States licenses, which are procured only number of years' experience in those particular lines after passing examinations. N o other persons can fill lawfully.
pilots operate after a certain of w o r k , and these positions
4. T h e s e men (officers and crews) being seafaring men, are so frequently away on voyages or trips that it is impossible to keep lists from which to select employees. It almost invariably happens that in cases of vacancies the men desired are away and we are obliged to take any one w e can get. 5. T h e work is hard and dirty, and the hours long, and very f e w men, except those w h o are accustomed to this kind of w o r k , will accept these positions; the employees are required to live on board the vessels, which makes the positions undesirable for men w i t h families. 6. T o stop work on one of these vessels twenty-four hours, while a fireman, deckhand or other employee is attending to the requirements of the Civil Service Commission, would entail a loss of time ' Since the large bulk of exemptions are identical year in and year out, due to the fact that exemptions may be made only f o r a period of one year, the same reasons are printed perennially. W h i l e this happens to be quoted from the 1932 Annual, it is repeated verbatim in the 1935 A n n u a l .
IN A
MERIT
SYSTEM
to the City of Philadelphia from $ 3 0 0 to $ 4 0 0 . In fact, many of the men refuse to go to the trouble of running around seeking endorsements to -an application and pay a notary's fee to swear to the same when they can get as good a job, or better, or any steamer on the Delaware River without all that trouble.
In addition a number of cleaners' jobs are always exempted in the Department of Public Safety, preference being given to the widows of patrolmen and firemen. In the Welfare Department, chambermaids, shoe repairers, attendants and the like are exempted because the work is undesirable and poorly paid. In the Health Department, clinical chiefs, specialists and such are exempted because of the technical nature of their jobs. Aside from exemptions made by the Commission, there are also exemptions made by the Charter itself—namely for "the chief assistant to the head of each of the Departments of government® (except the Civil Service Commission) one secretary or clerk appointed by the Mayor and one secretary or clerk appointed by each head of each department of the City Government." The extension of exemptions automatically decreases the operation of the merit system by withdrawing personnel from its sphere of influence. "In 1920 the rates (of exempt positions to competitive positions) was 18.8%; in 1925 it was 19.9%; in 1930 it was 22.9% j and in 1934 it was 24.7%."· Unskilled labor is cared for separately. Prospective appointees must fill out application blanks under oath and must be endorsed by two United States citizens over 21 years of age. If the candidates pass a physical examination they are placed on the proper eligible list according to the merit of their applications and the priority thereof. These lists are in force for a period of two years. An employee of the labor class may never be promoted or transferred to the competitive service. The following table shows the status of labor appointments during a four-year period. "This clause got into the law by a clerical error and does not apply to the bureau chiefs. * Citizen's Business, March 31, 1936. No. 1245, published by the Bureau of Municipal Research.
PROVISIONAL Labor
Applications filed Examined Passed N u m b e r on eligible list at end o f y e a r Appointments Reinstatements Transfers Increase in salary Demotions Separations
APPOINTMENT Clots10 '933 JI6 480
'934 1,278 1,278
'935 1,814 1,803
1,275 668 607 12
1,787 858 858 16
III
59 122
3 86 84
877
303
352
3 88 64 940
'932 100 «44 »44 33
479 217 262
67 44 4 60
54 6
Turning now to the competitive service we find that the Commission is compelled to publish notice of all examinations ten days in advance, in five newspapers having a minimum circulation of thirty thousand, and to post similar notices in the Commission's office where they may be seen by the general public. Such a notice takes the following form: C I V I L S E R V I C E COMMISSION PHILADELPHIA
Schedule N o . 609 Date of Exams. '936
Sept. 4 A u g . 31 Sept. 18 Sept. 22
Position and Service
Clerical Service Auditor (Men) Clerk Principal A c c o u n t Clerk ( M e n ) Engineering (Operating) Service S t a t i o n a r y Engineer
Annual Salary
Bureau
Dept.
$2,500 $1,500-1,700 $1,800 & M .
Hosp.
Safety Sup.&Pur. Health
#1,800 & L .
Hosp.
Health
Police
It is at the point where vacancies are to be filled in the competitive class that the provisional appointment comes into play. As will be explained more fully in the next chapter, appointments may be made without examination—that is to say, provisionally—in the absence of an eligible list. In other words, the provisional appointment is to be found at the threshold of induction to the service. If politically abused, the whole spirit of the merit system is nullified at the outset. If persons have been separated from the service through no 10
C o m p o u n d e d f r o m the f o u r A n n u a l Reports.
IN A M E R I T
SYSTEM
13
fault of their own, they may be reinstated by the Commission within one year without further examination. The formal notice reads as follows: Notice of Reinstatement, Competitive Class Department of Public Works Philadelphia, February 2 3 , 1 9 3 7 T o the Civil Service Commission: Mr. John Doe, residing at 3 4 5 Roe Street, having been certified to me by you on February 79, 1937 for reinstatement, I hereby notify you that I have reinstated him, to date from Feb. 20, 1937. The title of the position κ Window Cleaner. Bureau of City Proferty. Salary, *5-75 P e r dayAppropriation Item. Richard Hoe Director.
It is permissible, but not mandatory upon the Commission to maintain efficiency records. As a matter of fact no such performance ratings are kept except those voluntarily maintained by the department heads for their own use. There is one important exception to this generalization and that is to be found in the office of Public School Medical Inspectors, which is partly under Civil Service jurisdiction and partly under the control of the Board of Education. Here the most elaborate, complete system of determining efficiency is maintained that the writer has ever seen. Not only are the ninety-two Medical Inspectors rated frequently by their supervisors and by their Director, but they must also approximate the average diagnosis made over a period of a year by all of their colleagues. They are paced on the number of cases handled, on the accuracy of diagnosis, on the completeness of detailed reports, on their cooperation with everyone concerned, on the success of their recommendations. The personnel files are overflowing with all kinds of ratings. The clerical work involved in computations is enormous. With all due credit to the School Medical Inspection Department, the rest of the city service suffers that much more by comparison. Even the police and fire department ratings are comparatively poor, with an emphasis on inefficiency rather than efficiency. Conversation with
14
PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT
the other bureau chiefs revealed the fact that they think they know their permanent employees so well as to make written efficiency records unnecessary. That may be true, but it tends to put too large a premium on the prejudices and preferences of individual executives. There are some forty cities throughout the United States now using the Probst Rating System, to say nothing of numerous other systems in vogue. Philadelphia is decidedly out of step on this score. Seniority records, on the other hand, are carefully preserved, since salary increases and promotions often depend upon the years of service. Tenure is a pertiment consideration11 in any discussion of Civil Service. In an attempt to rate Philadelphia on this score a case analysis was made of the seniority records in the current files of the Commission. Because labor appointments are inherently high in turnover, while police and fire services are inherently low in turnover, these records were not tabulated. This is justifiable when it is considered that their respective turnover percentages tend to cancel each other. As of August 1936, the seniority records in the remaining 20% of the service were distributed by department and by year as follows:
Year
fe ί S
e
J
l
. ^ l
i
I« e
1890 1891 1891 1893 1894
— — — — —
— ι ι 2 ι
— ι — 2 2
ι — — —
1895 1896 1897 1898 1899
— — — — —
' — 1 — 3
— ι — — — — I — 1 2
1900 1901 1902 1903 1904
— — — — —
— 4 2 12 — 13 4 3 ι 7
1
ι I I 2 7
i
-δ' S i
l
Si ® ?
J
^
s
ü
g
^
l
4
—
33 37
—
I
II
6
'4
—
—
I
—
14
Total
—
5
—
40
I
tj —
—
—
50
35
I I
—
12
—
I
I
5
31 20
7
—
> —
3 2
5» 54
I
—
I
'3 II
—
—
i
28
—
5
—
I
—
2
—
0 ϋ
O'
— —
2
«41 213 22$ 144 207
264
—
«17 Il6
— — —
«74
—
«79
—
228
—
—
94
—
—
—
5 I
—
—
—
—
—
—
39 40 81
2 27
—
—
—
43
8
17
I
384
126
95
34
5°
5
3.7««
80
Summarizing these statistics we find that: ι. The turnover in the departments over which the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction, exclusive of unskilled laborers, uniformed policemen and firemen, for the first six months of 1936 was 1 1 % . This was the first six months of a new administration.
16
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
2. Approximately 1 5 % of this part of the service tabulated has had less than five year tenure. T h e percentage might have been higher had not the depression compelled considerable curtailment of the payroll. 3. Approximately 2 3 % has had more than five but less than ten year tenure. 4. Approximately 2 6 % has had more than ten but less than fifteen year tenure. 5. Approximately 11 % has had more than fifteen but less than twenty year tenure. 6. Approximately 9 % has had more than twenty but less than twenty-five year tenure. 7. Approximately 4 % has had more than twenty-five but less than thirty year tenure. 8. Approximately thirty-five year 9. Less than 1 % forty-five year
1 % has had more than thirty but less than tenure. has had more than thirty-five but less than tenure.
An evaluation of these percentages leads to the conclusion that in the 20% of the service thus tabulated, tenure plays a more important part than turnover. That is also true of the police and fire services, but for 80% of the city's administrative force, turnover is greater than tenure. N o persons in the classified service or seeking admission thereto shall be appointed, p r o m o t e d , suspended, r e d u c e d or r e m o v e d or in any w a y f a v o r e d or discriminated against because of his political or religious opinions or affiliations. N o inquiry in any application, e x a m i n a t i o n or investigations shall relate to the religious or political affiliations of a n y person.
H e r e again the letter of the law is preserved intact. Whatever transgression there is, is of the spirit alone. T h e political subterfuges used will unfold as these pages run their course. Standard maximum or minimum salaries for each class of positions are to be enforced. This is, of course, a very flexible provision. W h i l e maximum and minimum rates are levied, classifications are inadequate, so that there are not always similar salaries for the same jobs. Philadelphia employees on the whole are not underpaid compared with city employees elsewhere. T h e
IN A MERIT SYSTEM major injustices exist in the differentials within our own system. Removal from the service must be for just cause, and just cause "shall not be religious or political." Legal reasons are readily advanced in lieu of political inadequacies so that this section of the law is easily punctured. The mayor may remove members of the unclassified service at will." Employees in the exempt class may demand written reasons for removal, but usually are notified verbally that their services are no longer needed. The same is true for laborers. In the competitive service, removals are preceded by the formality of written reasons, or by the more simple device of asking for resignations. The employee has the right to make written reply, but the decision of the appointing officer is final except in the case of policemen and firemen, who may demand a hearing before the trial board. Whenever an administration changes, the employees in a given department are asked for undated resignations. By accepting the resignations of the undesirables, the necessity for preferring formal charges is eliminated. This invention is a veritable sword of Damocles because employees never know whose resignation will be accepted next. Policemen and firemen must be given a chance to defend themselves within thirty days after charges have been preferred against them. For these instances there is a special Trial Board whose findings are conclusive. The services of this board may be ascertained from the table printed below. T H A L BOARD 1 »
Number of Public Hearings in Police and Fire Bureaus Number of cases heard Number of cases dismissed Number disciplined by fine or suspension Number held under advisement Number of resignations accepted Number of pensions for physical disability Applications for reinstatement Reinstatement granted u
'93*
1933
*934
'935
IJ 7J 7 23 ο
30 30 4 17 9
ao 55 12 11 ιJ
20 52 n 6 6 0 0 26 1
ο ο
1 5
21 Ii
0 0
7 6
0 0
For a brief discussion of this phase of city government see an address by William C. Beyer, Director of the Bureau of Municipal Research of Philadelphia, entitled How Personnel is Hired and Fired in the City and County of Philadelfhia, delivered before the Institute on Trained Personnel in Government on February 3, 1935. "Compounded from the four Annual Reports.
18
PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT
From the following statistics one can see the extent to which the system of asking for resignations operates. COMPETITIVE SEPARATIONS14
Cause Resigned Dismissed Dismissed, physical disability Laid off, lack of funds, lack of work Dropped at end of probationary period Died Positions abolished Dropped—age 65 Totals
193*
'933
'934
646 27
186 21
181
7 471 3 97 231 »7
68 2 no 26 24
».499
438
I
35 3 II
0 S s
'935 ι i3 3$ 5 39 0 104
>4
12
28
388
378
Of the total separations, resignation accounted for 4 3 % in 1932; 4 2 % in 1933} 4 7 % in 1934; and 4 0 % in 1935. Nevertheless, Philadelphia is not such a gross offender in this respect as are some other cities. For example, Bridgeport, Connecticut, included in its new civil service law of March 1936 the provision that " A resignation executed previous to appointment shall be of no effect." T h e writer never discovered any instance in Philadelphia where a prospective city employee preceded his application blank with a resignation. T h e Commission must keep minutes of its proceedings and must publish an annual report, five hundred copies of which are to be publicly distributed. This is done faithfully and well, the reports running to forty pages of statistics. Finally, there are penalties for falsification of papers filed by and with the Commission, for illegal conduct in examinations, and for partisan political activity after appointment. There remains one final matter of factual importance, namely, that of finance. Is the appropriation granted to the Philadelphia Civil Service Commission adequate? Is there a yardstick by which this may be measured? T h e writer asked the following question from the floor at a meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science devoted to Better Government Personnel: 15 " H a v e the experts agreed as to what percentage " Compiled from the Annual Reports for the years under discussion. 15 This meeting was held on November 16, 1936, in Philadelphia.
IN A MERIT SYSTEM
19
of the annual payroll cost ought to be appropriated for the maintenance of a municipal civil service agency?" There was no opinion on the matter. Finally, Mr. H . Eliot Kaplan, Executive Secretary of the National Civil Service Reform League, replied that he thought the minimum appropriation ought to be eight dollars per employee. Philadelphia's appropriation for 1936 was $84,670.04 and that for 1937 will be $115,950. Since there are 18,000 city employees under Civil Service, the appropriation should be $144,000 according to Mr. Kaplan's reasonable estimate. While the tendency to increase the appropriation is well marked, it is obvious that we are much too far below the minimum to expect efficient administration. This chapter has been concerned with a description of a municipal Civil Service law in order to show the place of provisional appointments in a merit system. The law happens to operate in the city of Philadelphia but it is typical of many similar laws operating in similar ways throughout the United States. In describing this law, the legal provisions have been elaborated. The distribution of employees has been shown. The organization has been diagrammed. Statistics for a complete administration have been compiled and interpreted. W e know that the system appears to be sound. W e also know that it is not sound. W e are now ready to see why it has not fulfilled the hopes of those who have had faith in it.
II PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENTS IN PHILADELPHIA that have mastered the technique of recruiting a nonpolitical personnel find the problems of maintenance more momentous than those of induction. On the other hand, cities which have civil service laws, but are bound none the less by a party machine, have to concentrate on better appointments before they can afford to pay much attention to other phases of the service. Because the latter group are more representative of the present status of civil service in American municipalities, and because Philadelphia is an excellent example of this group, it is chosen as the situs for a scientific analysis of the use to which the provisional appointment may be put in circumventing the merit principle of induction. Only after the spoilsmen have been thwarted do the potentialities of a true career service become operative. ITIES
The total number of provisional appointments each year is small compared to the total number of exemptions and labor appointments, though the competitive class at any given time is always larger than any other. This seems to minimize the importance of provisionals until one realizes that it is only in the competitive class, for which provisional recruits are directly headed, that any claim is made to the functioning of the merit principle. The labor class is frankly political in character. So is the exempt class; likewise the whole unclassified service. Thus the provisional is in a strategic position. Any breakdown in the merit principle is likely to begin here. At the outset it becomes necessary to distinguish between provisional and temporary appointments. Provisional appointments are emergency appointments to posts in the permanent service. 20
IN PHILADELPHIA
21
Temporary appointments are emergency appointments to posts outside of the permanent service. Thus a sudden death in the Department of Health might necessitate a provisional appointment, while a flood would probably necessitate the temporary appointment of a number of doctors to the Health Department. In Philadelphia a provisional is appointed for a period of three months, at the end of which time he usually competes in an open examination for permanent appointment. A temporary appointment, by law, extends solely for one month and there is no intention of aiming for the permanent service through that channel. This distinction must be made because the laws of other cities sometimes use the designation "temporary" where the Philadelphia system uses "provisional." While there may be a difference in nomenclature, there is no real difference in principle in the various city administrations. As a matter of fact there are only rare instances of temporary appointments in Philadelphia— usually in cases of great emergency, or of pressure during investigations and trials. T h e legal time limit surrounding both temporary and permanent appointments in the first-class cities of Pennsylvania is rather significant. This makes it virtually impossible to indulge in successive reappointments of provisionals for an indefinite period of years. As an extra precaution there is an absolute prohibition of such a contingency. A provisional appointment in Philadelphia could never be a permanent appointment fer se as is possible in some other municipalities. Full credit must be given to the Philadelphia Commission here as elsewhere for observing the letter of the law. In only two cases of the five hundred examined was any violation of this tenet apparent. That is a remarkable score as comparative records go. These two instances resulted from the physical impossibility of marking examinations within the rigid sixty-day limit. T h e examinations were for the position of Guard in the Public Welfare Department. There were hundreds of applicants and a very small examining division. Hence permanent appointments were delayed five days. Promptly at the expiration of the three-month period the civil lists record that the provisional has either ( ι ) been permanently appointed after
22
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
reaching the top of the eligible list in open examination} (2) canceled his own appointment} (3) been dropped by the Commission for failure to make a passing grade; (4) been exempted from examination at the command of the Commission after public hearing; (5) been appointed to the labor class; (6) been transferred to the unclassified service; or the like. T h e procedure is almost automatic. Before the expiration of the threemonth period, a competitive examination is ordered and an eligible list prepared so that the position can be filled as soon as it is legally vacant. The question arises as to why a vacancy is filled provisionally in the first place—why it is not immediately filled by competitive examination. The law on that point reads:1 Positions in the competitive class may be filled without competition only as follows: W h e n e v e r there are urgent reasons for filling a vacancy in any position in the competitive class and there is no list of persons eligible for appointment after a competitive examination, the appointing officer may nominate a person to the C i v i l Service C o m mission for non-competitive examination, and if such nominee shall be certified by the said Commission as qualified after such non-competitive examination, he may be appointed provisionally to fill such vacancy until a selection and appointment can be made after competitive examination, but such provisional appointment shall not continue for a longer period than three months. I n every case the Commission shall at once proceed to hold an examination and procure an eligible list.
Even this is not a satisfactory explanation. Barring such things as death or disability, usually a vacancy can be foreseen so that an eligible list could be available, thus eliminating the need for a provisional appointment. It is admitted that without changing a single letter of the law, the whole provisional system could be dropped except for great emergencies, and in its place could be instituted a series of advance examinations which might give effect to the merit principle. For obvious political reasons this is not done. There are, however, two exceptions, and they are to be 1
Section 9 ibid.
IN
PHILADELPHIA
23
found in the Police and Fire Departments. In these essential services more regard is paid to merit.2 That is true of most cities today. Rarely are provisionals appointed—for the very good reason that eligible lists are always on hand from which vacancies may be filled. In considering provisionals hereafter, the police and fire departments are specifically excluded. The success of maintaining eligible lists in these two departments is proof positive that the principle could be extended to other departments. In fact, the hope of better government personnel in Philadelphia, as elsewhere, really depends upon a Commission that is willing to abandon the abuse of provisional appointments. It has even been stated that the most necessary reform is the fundamental reform of the Commission's personnel—that all else is mere minutiae. In reply it may be stated that prevention of the misuse of provisional appointments, either by public opinion or by law, would automatically curb a recalcitrant Commission. Exactly what is the procedure involved in obtaining a provisional? In the first place, a department head notifies the Commission of an imminent vacancy in the following manner: Requisition, Comfetitive Class Department of Public Health Philadelphia, February 25, 1937 T o the Secretary of the Civil Service Commission: Dear Sir: I hereby request you to certify from the appropriate eligible list the proper number of names for filling one vacancy in the position of Nurse Bureau of Health. Salary, $1,350 per year. Appropriation Item. Cause of vacancy Resignation of last incumbent. Name of last incumbent Margaret Mead. Charles Noe Director.
The appointing officers then ascertain whether or not there is an eligible list in existence for that particular job. Eligible lists This is not to say that the Police and Fire Departments are above reproach on all counts. Indeed these services are dominated by many other abases, though not that of provisional appointments. 1
24
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
automatically expire at the end of two years, but may be terminated by the Commission any time after one year. If there is a list, the appointing officers have two alternatives open to them. T h e y may either appoint one of the first two on the list, or they may ask the Commission to terminate the list so that they may appoint a provisional. The frequency with which the Commission consents to the cancellation of eligible lists, and to the appointment of political provisionals, is a serious count in this proof. 3 T h e ward number of every provisional appears in red ink beside his name on the civil list. Of course no application blank may request the statement of a man's political or religious beliefs, but the significance of a ward number is clearly political. Then there are occasional remarks beside a candidate's name on these original lists to the effect that some prominent politician is interested in his appointment. Indeed it frequently happens that ward politicians know of impending vacancies before the Commissioners themselves know it. They go to the bureau chiefs and request clearances in exchange for councilmanic votes on necessary appropriations. Moreover, ward leaders periodically endorse city jobholders, and it is safe to say from all testimony that no jobholder, even the most efficient, can hold out indefinitely against a powerful opposition leader. Having been called to the attention of the appointing officers by the proper political authorities, the candidate fills out an application blank and files it with the Commission. H e usually appears in person before the Chief Examiner. Then he is certified to the department in which he is placed. H e receives notice of his provisional appointment. His name is certified to the Controller so that his salary will be forthcoming. H e serves his time and is subsequently notified by the examination division when he is to take the open competitive test. T h e eligible list is computed and published. His name appears at the top by a process to be explained in a later chapter. H e is again certified and finally given a permanent appointment just about the time his three month provisional expires. * T o be substantiated in the f o l l o w i n g pages.
IN
PHILADELPHIA
Department of Public Notice of Appointment,
25
Welfare
Competitive
Class
Philadelphia, February 26, 1937 T o the Civil Service Commission: O f the two names certified on February 24, 1937 I have selected Robert Loe for appointment, to date from February 25, 1957 to the position of Chief. Bureau of Charities and Corrections. Salary is $4,000 per year. Cause of vacancy Retirement. Name of last incumbent Stanley Boe. Appropriation Item. Register 1 9 3 7 Page 46. Henry Foe Director.
As has already been stated, specific conclusions will be drawn from the provisionals appointed during the four-year period from 1932 to 1935. During this time the competitive class averaged 5 8% of the entire service. Normally the percentage would be higher and not lower. Thus it would be possible to circumvent the merit system in over ten thousand jobs by appointing political provisionals who would subsequently receive permanent appointments through a definitely chartered route. While it is inconceivable that there would be a mass separation of the entire competitive service at any one time, nevertheless there is a sufficient annual displacement to make this patronage an efficient whip in the hands of the executive. Having seen that at least 58% of the city's jobs are filled by competitive examination, it is now imperative to determine whether the whole 58% had the prior advantage of provisional appointment or whether independents do have an opportunity for admission. The following figures are offered for interpretation: A N A L Y S I S O F P R O V I S I O N A L L I S T S FOR
1932
T o t a l number on the official provisional civil list—94 O f this number, before the year was out, 3 were placed in the labor class
20
PROVISIONAL A P P O I N T M E N T 4 ι ι 38
were exempted from examination was transferred to the unclassified service canceled appointment by letter were summer playground jobs which were never intended to run beyond three months. 4 were dropped at the end of the provisional period for cause amination
43 were given permanent appointments after competitive ex94 total T h e total number of appointments made from the eligible lists, not including the Police Department appointees, was 48 for 1932. Since 43 of the provisionals were permanently appointed, it is obvious that 5 must have been chosen in some other way— either by examination, or by reinstatement. From this analysis two conclusions may be drawn. First, 89^2 % of the total appointments made from the eligible lists, which were based on competitive examination in 1932, had the advantage of provisional appointments. Secondly, 8% of those provisionally appointed (exclusive of recreation jobs which were clearly temporary anyway) were finally dropped. T h e other 92% were permanently appointed either by being reinstated, by succeeding in the examination, by being exempted, or by being transferred to the labor class. A N A L Y S I S OF PROVISIONAL LISTS FOR
1933
Total number on the official provisional civil list—120 Of this number, before the year was out, 4 canceled appointments 4 were exempted from examination 30 were summer playground jobs 7 were dropped at the end of the provisional ι resigned 74 were given permanent appointments after competitive examination 120 total
IN
27
PHILADELPHIA
The total number of permanent appointments from the eligible lists, not including policemen or firemen, was 116 for 1933. Since 74 provisionals were permanently appointed, 42 others were taken from the reinstatement or original entrance competitive lists. The two conclusions for 1933 are: first, that 6 3 ^ % of the total appointments made in the competitive class for 1933 had the advantage of provisional appointments} secondly, 7^2% o£ those provisionally appointed in the first instance, exclusive of recreation jobs and voluntary resignation, were finally dropped. A N A L Y S I S O F P R O V I S I O N A L L I S T S FOR
1934
Total number on the official provisional civil list—152 Of this number, before the year was out, 5 canceled their appointments 68 were summer playground jobs ι was exempted from examination ι was placed in the labor class ι resigned 76 were given permanent appointments after competitive examination 152 total T h e entire number of permanent appointments from the eligible lists, not including appointments in the Fire Department, for 1934 was 123. Since 76 provisionals were permanently appointed, 47 others were taken from the lists according to their merit in competitive examination, or were reinstated without examination. T h e first conclusion for this particular year is that 62% of the total appointments made from eligible lists, based on competitive examination, had the advantage of provisional appointments. Secondly, 7 % of those provisionally appointed, exclusive of recreation jobs, canceled or resigned their appointments. No provisionals were dropped during this year at the expiration of their service. A l l those provisionally appointed in the first instance, except those who canceled or resigned appointments, were permanently placed either by competitive examination, by exemption, or placement in the labor class.
28
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
A N A L Y S I S OF P R O V I S I O N A L L I S T S FOR
1935
Total number on the official provisional civil list—116 Of this number, before the year was out, 5 canceled their appointments 2 were exempted from examination ι was placed in the labor class ι resigned 5 were dropped 102 were given permanent appointments after competitive examination 116 total T h e number of appointments from eligible lists, not including the Police and Fire Departments, was 147. O f this number 102 were provisionals, while 45 others were taken in the order of their rank on the examination or reinstatement lists. Hence, 69 % of the total appointments in 1935 in the competitive class had the advantage of provisional experience, while 9^4% of those provisionally appointed were either dropped, resigned, or canceled. Because these four years bracketed the depression depths, the number of appointments was smaller than customary. F o r the same reason the number of honorable discharges was larger than usual. Hence whenever new appointments were made it was the policy of the Commission to reinstate those who had formerly been with the service. This accounts for the fact that provisional appointments constituted a smaller percentage of the whole during these four years than at any other time. It is argued by former Commissions interviewed on this matter that the normal percentage lies between 90 and 95 for those who were provisionally appointed in the first instance. T h u s in 1932 when there were few reinstatement lists, the percentage of provisionals who were finally appointed was 8 9 ^ — a fair approximation of the norm. However, even if the best record of all were selected, that for 1934 when the provisionals constituted but 6 2 % of the total permanent appointments, the view would still be sound—
IN PHILADELPHIA
29
namely that provisionals were favored to the exclusion of others.4 Nevertheless it is surprising that a few independents were placed in the Civil Service. This is startling because Philadelphia is a machine city with a long tradition for party spoils and the possibility of legally indulging 100% patronage. T h e fact that there are some non-politicians who receive appointment can be accounted for in several ways. In the first place, there are some jobs which require the services of experts. In these instances the Commission is compelled to seek the man, regardless of political affiliations, whereas ordinarily the man seeks the office. Again, there are some outsiders who do so well in the examinations that it is impossible to deny them their legal rights. Nevertheless, they must soon make the acquaintance of their ward leaders and they must go along quietly with the party interests. Finally, due credit must be given to the integrity of the examining staff and to their genuine desire to obtain the best men whenever they are free enough from political pressure to make their own selections—which is not often. There is a second interesting fact that emerges from this same group of figures. Approximately 8 % of the annual provisional appointments are dropped—usually for failure to pass the examination. If the Commission were 100% politically minded, every provisional would receive his permanent appointment. T h e fact is, however, that some of these politically appointed men are so miserably ill fitted for the jobs which they wish to fill that they simply cannot meet minimum requirements. While everyone knows that there are drones at City H a l l , at least there are no low-grade morons. T h e bureau chiefs weed out the hopelessly inefficient for their own protection. T h e letter of the law is observed at any cost—a fact which makes Philadelphia superior to many of her sister cities where both letter and spirit are openly flouted.5 T o continue, ward leaders sometimes experience a ' In partial corroboration of this point see a monograph published by the Bureau of Municipal Research, written by Philip A. Beatty, in 1933, called Public Works Insfection in Philadelphia, in which it is stated that two-thirds of the inspectors began their service as provisionals. " In passing, it might be added that the writer was favorably impressed with
30
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
change of heart about their favorite candidates. Occasionally a man is satisfied with three months' work and the patronage can be passed along. By and large, 3 0 % of the non-provisionals taking the open competitives fail to pass. T h e average 8 % of failures in the provisional class is therefore quite low. Considering that examinations are based on actual office work, failures in this class ought to be fewer than for those who have not had the benefit of mastering the routine. APPORTIONMENT
O F JOBS A M O N G
VARIOUS
WARDS
T h e Commission makes an annual tabulation of all jobholders by wards. O f course this is not a matter of public information. Indeed the writer stumbled upon that discovery quite by accident after having plotted a similar chart for the four years of the last administration. T o what use this knowledge is put by the Commission can only be surmised. There is a tradition that once a job is placed in one ward, it belongs forever more to that ward unless some other leader is strong enough to wrest it from the original holder. This subject will be treated more fully in a later section, but this suffices to establish a political link between provisional civil service employees and their distribution by w a r d s — even during the best administration that Philadelphia has had for many years. There is a reform movement on foot, instituted by an independent citizens group, to consolidate the wards. T h e r e is a counter movement on the part of politicians to subdivide them further. N o matter which group succeeds in accomplishing its aims, it is probable that ward apportionment of jobs will continue as long as the civil service is politically dominated. EXAMINATIONS
" I n communities where the civil service commission and the departments have not been interested in merit principles, but have been desirous of circumventing civil service, temporary appointments have been used as one of the most flagrant means of the ability of the personnel in most cases. T h e y a p p e a r to m a k e a f a i r s h o w i n g beside the personnel of p r i v a t e industry. T h e o n l y serious o b j e c t i o n that c a n be o f f e r e d lies in the fact that p o l i t i c a l issues cloud a l l other perspectives. I t need h a r d l y be added that this is a necessary concomitant of the system.
IN
PHILADELPHIA
31
flouting the merit system. Not only are temporary appointments continued for long periods . . . but examinations have been so drawn as to make it easy for favored temporary incumbents... It has already been stated that examinations in Philadelphia are based on the nature of the work in the job to be filled. That is so by virtue of legal mandate.7 It needs no apology. Indeed it is merely a choice of several possible alternatives. General intelligence tests were deliberately ignored because they revealed no special aptitudes as determined by long experience. Individual tests based on the candidate's past training would be an administrative impossibility. By the process of elimination the practical test was deemed most desirable, though its weaknesses are candidly admitted. Unquestionably it does offer special privilege to provisionals. On the other hand, it does not offer a totally impregnable barrier to non-provisionals. Every examination has at least two parts, and sometimes five. Each section is weighted. There is but one legal stipulation— namely that the "oral part shall not receive a mark exceeding one-fourth of the whole mark attainable in such examination." T h e common criteria on which a candidate is judged are: ( 1 ) training and experience} (2) practical test; (3) practical written questions; (4) personal fitness; and (5) physical fitness. Not all examinations use all five. For example, skilled labor examinations are ordinarily based on training and experience, practical demonstration and physical fitness. Clerical jobs, on the other hand, revolve about training and experience, a written examination, and personal fitness. Examinations for school medical inspectors cover all five tests. The process of taking each criterion in turn and analyzing five hundred cases where it was applied will reveal trends if not established conclusions. T R A I N I N G AND E X P E R I E N C E
According to Section 9 of the Act, no provisional may be given credit for his three months' training when he competes in open * Better Government Personnel, page 48, Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel. * Section 14 of the Civil Service Act.
32
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
examinations. The letter of the law is observed here, the credentials of non-provisionals frequently being given a higher rating than those of provisionals. In fact this is so often the case that one might suppose the Examiners to have leaned over backwards in their efforts to observe the law. "Honorably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines who have served as such in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States or in the National Guard of this State" may receive special credit. Such a provision was more important in the post-war years than it is now. T h e wording of this particular veterans' preference clause is suspiciously vague. Still it leaves the rating to the discretion of the examining board. That is better than making it mandatory upon the board to place them automatically at the top of the eligible list as is customary elsewhere. It is interesting to note that this part of the entire examination is usually weighted heavily. In supervisory positions, such as Superintendent in the Street Cleaning Department, Chief of the Water Bureau, General Superintendent of Horses in Street Cleaning, Superintendent of Hospitals, Chief of Lighting and Gas, and others, training and experience count 5 units or 5 0 % . The same is true for foreman carpenters, leader pavers, foremen of bridge repairs, and all assistant foremen. Then in more hazardous work, such as drawbridge operator, filter machine operator, steam fireman, and the like, training and experience is also weighted half the entire grade. Obviously cooks, bakers, hodmen, farmers, engineers, and hose menders would be useless without previous experience, so they too are rated 5 0 % on their past training. Doctors, nurses, special investigators, clerks, chemists, bookkeepers, telephone operators, pursers, social workers, laboratory technicians, receive a maximum credit of 40% for training and experience. Dynamomen, sewer constructors, bridge painters, bricklayers, carpenters, chaffeurs, ironworkers, machinists, to mention but a few, receive 3 0 % on this count. Training and experience for stenographers, elevator operators, and messengers is weighted 2 0 % , while in the case of school medical inspectors only 1 0 % is given. With the exception of this
IN PHILADELPHIA
33
last class, the respective weights given for different groups of workers do not appear to be arbitrary but rather in accord with the requirements of the jobs. T o prove the assertion that this section of the examination is reasonably administered, some grades given to provisionals on this score are submitted. These are selected at random during the four-year period and are not by any means all inclusive of the lower marks.
Position Assistant Clerk Instrument Installer Engineer Painter Neuropathologist Blacksmith Technician in Biochemistry
Dept. P.S. P.S. P.S. P.W. P.H. P.H. P.H.
Bureau Police Elect. Elect. Hywys. Hosp. Hosp. Hosp.
Exam. Wt.for Candidate's grade for training and training and experience experience 4.0 4-5 30 3° 4.0 3° 4.0
75 78 70 71 75 70 75
Of course, one could draw up a parallel list of other provisionals who received 98, 97, 95, and such, but the presence of so many lower grades in the list gives credence to the statement that training and experience is honestly recorded. G R A D I N G S OF P R O V I S I O N A L S ON T R A I N I N O A N D E X P E R I E N C E *
Year 1932 1933 1934 1935
90s 21 4» 37 37 137
80s 16 3° 31 55 13*
70s 9 7 8 '4 38
T o be sure, no one can deny that unconscious favoritism, if not conscious preference, may be an influence. Only the examiners themselves could answer that charge, but on the basis of these comparative statistics, there is no cause for undue skepticism. One matter ought to be mentioned in this connection. It may be significant, but it need not be. Apparently no provisional ever fails on training and experience. T o the extent that he receives * These figures do not entirely coincide with the provisional figures in other places because cancelations, exemptions, and transfers alter the totals in each case. But that does not affect the validity of each set of totals for its specific purpose.
34
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
a grade of 70, his provisional experience may count for him. T h a t cannot be proved, nor is there any point in laboring to do so by devious routes. It is enough merely to mention that nonprovisionals occasionally fail for want of training and experience. O n the other hand, f u l l credit appears to be given to nonprovisionals for previous training. T h e caution evidenced in these statements is due to the fact that letters from former employers are required by law to be strictly confidential. One can base conclusions only on the data provided by the applicant on his training sheet. PRACTICAL TEST This part of the examination is highly technical. In fact, the services of outside experts are mainly substituted for the judgment of the examiners themselves. Reputable doctors and engineers give their time to rating applicants for certain city jobs. If one wishes to question these results, the integrity of outside professional men is involved. It b hardly necessary to go so far in one's academic doubts. As has been stated above, this practical test usually takes the place of a written examination. Horseshoers, for example, show their ability more conclusively in actual demonstration than they would in written examinations. Indeed, some of the most skilled among them cannot write. T h e weightings here, too, are in fair proportion to the requirements of the work. Some of those receiving 5 0 % of their total grade on performance tests are sewer constructors, bridge painters, bricklayers, carpenters, chauffeurs, ironworkers, machinists, blacksmiths, climbers, and derrick operators. Dynamomen, marine engineers, moulders, truck drivers, receive 4 0 % for the practical part of their test; messengers 3 0 % ; pilots and school medical inspectors 2 0 % . PROVISIONALS'
Year
1932 1933 1934 1935 Total
GRADES
ON
90s
PRACTICAL
TESTS
Sos
5
70s
10
4 4
1
0 ι ο
78
10
3
31 22
0
2
IN
35
PHILADELPHIA
The high number receiving 90 or above on this practical test might be suspicious were it not for the fact that non-provisionals often received similar grades. A parallel tabulation for nonprovisionals would be necessary to make this point conclusive. The presence of so many statistics from hundreds of disappointed office seekers would confuse the tables actually required for clarity, and they are not necessary since the conclusions of this book stand without them. PRACTICAL W R I T T E N
TESTS
The written test is unquestionably an important part of the candidate's examination. Occasionally an oral test is substituted for it but only in cases where the nature of the job might draw illiterate people. First-year apprentices and certain kinds of draftsmen are graded 60% on their written work. Stenographers receive 4 units for a stenographic test, and 1 unit for arithmetic. The usual weight for this part in the majority of jobs is 40%. P R O V I S I O N A L S ' G R A D E S TOR W R I T T E H T E S T S
Year
90s
80S
70s
60s
1932
26
1933 1934
23 29 44
19 ιS 19 33
I 10 8 10
I 2 2 2
122
86
29
7
ms
Considering the fact that written questions are based on the nature of the jobs which the provisionals have already filled for three months, it is interesting to note that only half received 90 or above. One might have expected a better showing. Since the papers are numbered and not named, they are graded by the examiners without knowledge of the author's identity. That rule is strictly observed. T h e striking thing is the frequency with which non-provisionals receive grades of 90 despite their initial handicap. It is essential to explain how the seven cases which received grades of 70 or less in their written tests were nevertheless permanently appointed. Here again a brief tabulation is in order.
36 Position 1. General Duty Nurse 2. Messenger 3. Graduate Nurse 4. Clerk
PROVISIONAL
Tr. and Practical Exp. Test
Dept.
Bur.
P.H. Law
Hosp.
80 95
P.H. P.H.
Hosp. Health
80 90
C.P. Hywys.
80 95 85
5. Foreman Carpenter P.W. 6. Leader Paver P.W. 7. Law Clerk Law
APPOINTMENT
98
Written Test
Personal Fitness Average
67 45 Spell. 90 Arith. 96 Penm.
95
77.8 85.0
66 52 Arith. 95 Letter 95 Penm.
95 95
77-4 89.2
95 95 95
78.8 89 80.6
66 65 69
T h e General Duty Nurse in this chart came out fourth on an eligible list of ten from which three were appointed. B y certifying one of the first three names twice, number four automatically moved up to third place. The Messenger did well in every other test except spelling in a five-part examination, and came out second on an eligible list of twenty-three from which the first two names were appointed. In the case of the Graduate Nurse, there were no other competitors for the job. T h e Clerk came out first on an eligible list of two, even with a rating of 52 in Arithmetic. The Foreman Carpenter was second on his list. There were only two competitors and he was preferred to the number one man. The Leader Paver was first on a list of two and both men were appointed. The Law Clerk came out third on a list of nine, from which two men were appointed. By the device of double certification one of the first two was eliminated and he moved up to a place where he could be legally selected.® Thus it is quite safe to say that even if a man does poorly on his written work, his other scores may be sufficiently compensatory to send him to the top of the list. While the same is true, of course, for failures in any one phase of the examination, it is more important for the written aspect since this usually counts 4 0 % of the whole. * From this it might appear that the method of certification is the chief defect rather than the method of making a provisional appointment. Such is not the case. The certification device merely accentuates the provisional evil.
IN
PHILADELPHIA
37
PERSONAL FITNESS
Definition of Personal Fitness is a subjective evaluation at best. A sample rating sheet is herewith presented as an indication of the line followed in determining this factor. RATING SHEET—PERSONAL
Examination
FITNESS
TEST
Date
Examiner
Candidate No. Manner and Bearing Force Tact Judgment Poise Rating Use letters Ε—Excellent 90-100; G—Good 80-90; F—Fair 70-80; Ρ—Poor 60-70; V. P.—Very Poor 50-60; for each of the above factors and enter the rating as a percentage.
Personal Fitness never counts for more than 25% and most often counts for 20%, but, as will soon be evident, this is a very important part of the examination. There is no secrecy about identities here since all candidates are given a personal audition. These comparative ratings offer the most startling implications of any. P R O V I S I O N A L R A T I N G S TOR P E R S O N A L F I T N E S S
Year 1932 1933 1934 >935
pat
80s
32 36 34 65
3 1 1 4
Ο Ο Ο Ο
60s 0 0 0 0
167
ΙΟ
0
0
70S
Thus it is that practically all provisionals receive 95 for Personal Fitness, which is enough to send them to the top of the list provided they have reasonably passed on other counts. In the ten instances where marks of 80-90 were given, there are several explanations. Practically all of these were on examina-
38
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
tions for promotion within the service. Hence one provisional was preferred above a former provisional. Once or twice, however, the provisional was competing in open examination, but though his grade for personal fitness may have been only 85, nevertheless it was the highest given to any candidate. In fact that is a sound conclusion for all the provisionals. N o matter what the grade, it was the highest offered. Once in a while, a non-provisional received a similar rating but it is obvious that his average would not surpass the provisionals. O r again, when there were five places to be filled and only three provisionals to be cared for, then two of the non-provisionals may also have received top grades for this part of the examination. Without attempting a complete tabulation of all non-provisional ratings for Personal Fitness during this four-year period, a random sampling of 500 cases—a number comparable to the number of provisionals analyzed—shows the lower grades given to those who do not have the benefit of this political advantage. N O N - P R O V I S I O N A L R A T I N G S FOR P E R S O N A L
Year
90s
1 93 2
FITNESS
80s
70s
60s
—
1
129
Ι
50s
1933
—
48
Ρ
—
1934
—
36
98
—
>935
—
Ι
118
5
I
—
87
396
6
3
Ι — Ι
It should be clearly understood that there is absolutely nothing illegal in the procedure outlined above. A rating for Personal Fitness is quite an arbitrary matter and the examiner's opinions are as valid as anybody's else. Nevertheless, it is at this particular place that the provisional receives the necessary boost that sends him to the top of the list. T h e figures speak for themselves. If this were not proof enough, the same conclusion could be reached by a process of elimination. Since it is illegal to give the provisional the benefit of his three months' experience, a separate category for training and experience is clearly marked and strictly observed. That removes one possibility. T h e practical test could be eliminated from immediate suspicion because of the services of disinterested experts. Since the written
IN
PHILADELPHIA
39
examinations are graded without benefit of identity, the third possibility is disposed of. There remain but the ratings on personal and physical fitness. These two are rarely used in the same examination. Hence either the one or the other must be the channel through which the provisional rises to the surface. The figures leave no doubt as to the validity of this conclusion. The testimony in the succeeding pages will give final confirmation. P H Y S I C A L FITNESS
Where Physical Fitness is used as a criterion, it is often weighted more heavily than Personal Fitness, though not invariably so. An analysis of the comparative ratings on this point leads to conclusions similar to those reached for Personal FitP R O V I S I O N A L S ' G R A D E S ON P H Y S I C A L
Year
1932 »933 1934 1935
90s
FITNESS
80s
70s
60s
2 Ο
51 44 54
0
Ο
0 0 0 0
160
4
3
0
II
I
2 I
I
ness. It is, of course, a little more difficult to ignore flagrant ill health than it is to ignore some phase of personal unfitness. In all fairness, it should be stated that non-provisionals have a somewhat better chance of receiving full credit here than they have on Personal Fitness. Even so, the ratings are bound to be arbitrary and quite unchallengeable. F I N A L AVERAGES
There is little to be gained from a table of final averages of successful provisionals since of legal necessity these represent PROVISIONALS' FINAL AVERAGES
Year
1932 1933 1934 1935
90s
80s
70s
60s
24 46 31 43
20 29 4» 61
2 2 3 3
0 0 0
»44
»5»
10
0
0
40
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
the highest totals. Nevertheless it is interesting to see that there are more 80s than 90s, and that there were ten positions filled on averages of 70. PROMOTIONS
Promotions, unless specifically exempted by the Commission after public hearing, follow the same procedure as original appointments, except that the examinations, while competitive, are closed to those outside the service. The provisional handicap operates just as effectively here as in the first instance, for one man is selected to fill the promotion vacancy for a preliminary period of three months. During this time he receives the increased salary appertaining to the job. When the time comes for him to take the examination for permanent appointment, he may have to compete with others in the department who feel themselves qualified for the advanced work. The criterion of Personal Fitness is now replaced by a seniority record and by the recommendation of the Department Head. Hence the provisional is practically always certain of promotion on the latter count alone. Promotional provisionals are included in all the tabulations above because of the political advantage in each case. The conclusions for one apply equally to the other. Notice
of Promotion,
Competitive
Department of Public
Class
Health
Philadelphia Feb. T o the Secretary of the Civil Service Commission:
28,
1937
T h e name of John Joe having been certified to me as eligible for promotion from the position of 2nd Ass't Supt. Bureau of Hospitals at a salary of £ 3 , 3 0 0 meals to the position of Ass't. Supt.t Bureau of Hospitals. Salary £ 3 , 5 0 0 -f- meals; I hereby notify you that I have made the promotion as stated, to date from February 2 7 , 1937· T h e present vacancy was caused by promotion of last incumbent Elwood
Emoe Director.
There is a direct correlation between the increase of applications and the decrease in the percentage of appointments. The
41
IN PHILADELPHIA
increase in the percentage passing the examination could be indicative of many things—so many in fact that one hesitates to do more than enumerate the possibilities. It may be that examinations are easier. It may be that a larger number of college and STATISTICS o r COMPETTTVE E X A M I N A T I O N S 1 0
Applications Received, including promotions Persons examined, including promotions 11 Percent passing, including promotions Percent appointed, including promotions
'932
'933
2,158 2.031 70-65 10.45
1,193 1,110 78.37 10.23
'934
4,149 3,838 86.11 3-75
'935
5,141 4,732 90.89 3-41
high school graduates are endeavoring to enter government service. It may be that the police and fire departments held examinations which attracted an increasingly large number of people. Unquestionably, all of these factors are relevant. The statistical evidence of this chapter may be summarized as follows: 1. A t least 90% of the permanent appointments receive the advantage of provisional appointment in the first instance. 2. Provisional appointments are political in nature. 3. Positions in the competitive branch of the Civil Service are apportioned by ward, the distribution of which depends upon the political influence exercised by the Mayor, the Councilmen, or the ward leaders. 4. Examinations are divided into five parts. (a) Provisionals do not receive special credit for their Training and Experience as provisionals. (b) Practical tests may be graded on a political basis, but this involves the integrity of outside experts. Provisionals, however, have the advantage of familiarity with the job for which they are being examined. (c) Written tests are marked without knowledge of the author's identity. Nevertheless questions are based on the routine of the job to be filled. Therefore provisionals have a decided advantage. " Compiled from the f o u r Annual Reports. These figures include firemen and policemen. a Since promotions are open to competitive examination, it is necessary to include promotion statistics for the sake of completeness.
42
PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT
( d ) Ratings on Personal Fitness are arbitrarily given in favor of the provisionals. It is through this channel that the provisional legally reaches the top of the eligible list. (e) T h e same may be said of the ratings for Physical Fitness. 5. Promotion vacancies are invariably filled by provisional appointments before competitive examination is held. These provisionals, although already within the service, are likewise political in nature. T h i s spreads the abuse throughout the entire civil service. W h i l e the evidence of this chapter was based on conditions in a Republican administration, it is significant of a practice that prevails in Democratic administrations elsewhere. In other words it is farty practice rather than a particular party's practice. Therefore, temporary political changes do not affect its validity or its universality. Moreover if the Democrats take over the Philadelphia Civil Service they will be compelled to follow the same procedure assuming that they hope for political entrenchment, because the system has been perfected by years of experience. It seems to be invulnerable. It is hard to see how it could be improved upon as a legal device for politically dominating the finest civil service law that could be promulgated.
III TESTIMONY
OF
REVEALING PROVISIONAL IN
OFFICEHOLDERS THE
ABUSE
OF
APPOINTMENTS
PHILADELPHIA
ISCUSSION of a civil service law and an analysis of its statistiD cal aspects have their proper place. However, these are but the bony skeleton of a system that comes to life under the compelling hand of party organization. Civil Service on paper and Civil Service in practice may be more different than parallel aspects of many other subjects. Since the whole argument of this thesis points scientifically to the destruction of the merit system by the legal perpetuation of spoilsmen who have entered the service provisionally, it is perhaps necessary to substantiate the premise that provisionals are recruited politically. Borrowing the methodology of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel,1 the writer interviewed a former Mayor, the members of two Civil Service Commissions, most of the Bureau Chiefs, numerous city and county employees, half of the ward leaders, and some representative division leaders. Their testimony is given verbatim in the Appendix. SUMMARY OF THE TESTIMONY
From this mass of evidence, certain conclusions leap forth in sharp relief. It is obvious that the system is political from top to bottom. The merit principle is a myth unless one chooses to say that it is applied to distinguish good politicians from better ones. There is no doubt that political influence is the paramount consideration. Doubt enters only in determining whose political influence is favored above others. It seems safe to say that the Mayor's Office has the right of way, through the department 1
The Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, Minutes of Evidence, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 19J5.
43
PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT heads, in the competitive class; that the ward leaders control the unskilled labor appointments; that the City Committee exercises dominion over the crumbs in the city service which the Mayor lets fall; that the Judges have the preference in county offices; and that the City Committee distributes the remainder of the county jobs among the ward leaders. With all that, however, there still remain a few highly technical jobs which are above party influence. Even these are coveted from time to time until the party recognizes the complications involved in amateur manipulation. The Civil Service Commission would have to be a veritable Gibraltar indeed to withstand pressure from twentytwo councilmen, fifty ward leaders, the City Committee, the Mayor, and the Judges, to say nothing of numerous small-time huntsmen. A politician's definition of politics is as amusing as it is amazing. Politics within the Organization is natural, just, and routine. In fact it often comes perilously close to the concept of statesmanship. At worst, it is nothing more than the rules of a nerveracking game. But let the opposite party play the same game, or let the Mayor crack his personal whip, or the Judges indulge in the practice of nepotism, then the term "politics" is hurled around as the worst opprobrium. So it is that the only kind of "politics" ever applicable to the Civil Service by those who are the customary players is the kind that the momentarily preferred are accused of practising by the momentarily non-preferred. It seems incredible but true that some party leaders are naive about the operation of the system beyond the focal point of their immediate bailiwicks. They know their own wards. They have developed their own techniques. Sometimes they know how other colleagues differ from them in manipulation. More often those are secrets that are closely guarded from all who might profit by the knowledge. They have vague ideas about the operation of the Civil Service. After all, they need never come in personal contact with any members of the Commission. A telephone call, a signature, a note, and whatever can be done, is done. Mostly they are impressed with the formality of the Civil
ABUSE IN PHILADELPHIA
45
Service procedure. The smarter leaders are not. They know how the system works and they smile about it. One of the most significant things about these interviews is the revelation that politicians bear no malice toward the personnel of the Commission. Whatever animosity there is appears to be directed vaguely against the "law" or the "system." Many of the leaders are even anxious to defend individual members of the Commission. As a matter of fact, a few are only too anxious to convince the interviewer that the system is quite free from politics. Subsequent investigation reveals that these are men whose chief interest lies in county jobs, and their ignorance is quite genuine. Not all of the ward leaders know all of the jobholders in their own territory. Frequently they do not know the appointees of the Mayor, the Judges, or of those who have moved into their districts from other wards. However, those who have smaller wards, those who are the most aggressive, the very old leaders, and the very new ones seem to stress personal contact. These are the ones who asserted their knowledge most vigorously. Some would be amazed, were amazed in fact, to learn that their colleagues were not personally familiar with their own jobholders. However, even if the ward leaders themselves do not know the employees, their committeemen do, and for the purposes of establishing the political link, that is all that is necessary. The unanimity of the testimony on this point is enough in itself to substantiate the thesis that the Philadelphia Civil Service is politically dominated. Some kind of political endorsement is obviously necessary for city as well as county jobs. The amount varies with the locale. The ward leader's endorsement appears to be the minimum requirement. Of course, if deserving committeemen wish to place anyone, it is their recommendation which is of first importance. In such cases the ward leader's approval is in the nature of a rubber stamp—but a stamp that is essential nevertheless. Since some of the ward leaders are also councilmen, and since some wards have no councilmen, the problem of double certification is not a universal one. In any case the councilman, while closer to City Hall, is under the control of the ward leader who really
46
PROVISIONAL A P P O I N T M E N T
made him what he is. There are occasional exceptions. Then whether or not the councilman's signature is likewise necessary depends on the ward leader's willingness to share his importance. As has been stated above, none of these is so effective as the endorsement of the Mayor or a Judge. Even if an occasional non-political candidate does well in the examinations and is in line for appointment, the ward leaders usually take the credit for it if they can. It is more difficult to generalize about the police and fire systems because they are evidently in a transition stage between politician and civil servant. Some of the older wards are still strong enough to control these appointments on the ground floor as well as in the promotional ranks. But the majority appear to be reconciled to the loss of this patronage. There are numerous explanations, foremost of which is the realization that the city cannot afford to be without adequate protection. It is too easy to saddle responsibility for losses on the party which prevents proper protection. That responsibility becomes a liability too great to be borne without dangerous repercussions. In the second place, the police service is closer to the Mayor's Office than it is to the city committee. If the Party cannot have the patronage anyway, it is willing to use the merit system to prevent a possible recalcitrant executive from dominating the force for his own elevation. It appears to be quite customary for policemen and firemen to give the names of politicians for reference on the application blanks, but the politicians know very well that they are not the determining factor. Furthermore, it has become difficult to remove men in these services, so they become independent in their own right. They move around from one section of the city to another, taking their jobs with them, so that the ward leaders do not even bother to keep up with them. Ward leaders may come and go, but policemen and firemen go on indefinitely. At this stage these public servants are not expected to be politically active. Of course on the side they may be friendly with the politicians on their beat, but they are not asked to ring doorbells to get out the vote. They may exercise their franchise as they see fit. If they see fit to vote Republican, nobody has
ABUSE IN PHILADELPHIA
47
the right to comment. However, the writer begs leave to quote an authority evidently more familiar with this point. "Last fall the 50th ward Republican Executive Committee of Philadelphia sent a circular letter to all policemen living in that ward, asking for a "voluntary" contribution toward campaign expenses, although the Philadelphia law makes the payment of political contributions by members of the police and fire departments an offense punishable by a fine of $300 and two years' imprisonment. At the same time, employees of the county and state offices which have no civil service laws, were asked for 3 % monthly.'" The Fire Bureau is evidently on a higher plane than the Police Department. At least that is the impression one gathers from interviews, though neither can be said to be absolutely free from political influence. Except for a few promotions, the provisional appointment is no longer used here. Eligible lists are maintained constantly, and that in itself eliminates much of the political factor. A great deal of resentment and wishful thinking for the good old days when police appointments were avowedly political was apparent. The party henchmen were evidently torn between two desires—the desire to escape responsibility, and the desire to control those jobs. That is a difficult spot—for a politician. The struggle for patronage is real indeed. In fact it is the driving force behind a ward leader's daily existence. It is also at once the cohesive and disruptive force in the party. It cements the party when menaced by opposition. It divides the party when it divides the jobs. Evidently conditions are changing with the change in party management. In the old days of the Vare Machine the President of the City Committee was the chief patronage dispenser. He distributed jobs fairly and regularly. However, by virtue of the tenure clause, civil service made greater inroads on the distribution machine than was intended. Then with the weakening of the power of the boss and the rise of numerous factions, patronage went to the mighty. County jobs are ' Eastern States Regional Conference of the Civil Service Assembly of the United States, Summary of Proceedings. Washington, D.C., April n and 1 3 ,
'93ί. page 39·
48
PROVISIONAL A P P O I N T M E N T
still reapportioned sporadically, but it is the city jobs that outnumber them six to one. Even here there is some attempt made to distribute labor appointments. The tradition of holding county and labor jobs once they have been obtained by a ward has become deeply rooted. Those who dare to move out of a ward know that they must leave their jobs behind them. The unanim ity with which the leaders agree that there should be a fairer reapportionment is surprising. One would expect those who had the lead to have expressed satisfaction. They did not. They smiled over the plight of their less fortunate colleagues, admitting that it was not fair. Nevertheless they vowed to expend their last breath in defense of their own vested interests. Some of the so-called independent districts have always fought an uphill battle on the patronage question. Logically patronage goes to the place where it will do the most good. Solid middleclass districts regularly vote Republican anyway. So the party workers are bereft of their rightful heritage and those districts that cannot be depended upon to "vote regular" receive the lion's share of the booty. Small wonder that there is weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth. When a ward is divided, with the consent of the electorate concerned, the patronage falls as it may. Those residents in the newer half who have jobs, bring those jobs with them into the coffers of the new ward leader. Those who live on the other side of the line retain their jobs for their old ward. The leaders must be ever alert for possible vacancies. The department heads do not notify them, so they must discover impending vacancies as best they can. As a matter of fact, so alert are the politicians that they frequently know of a vacancy before the Civil Service Commission itself is notified. It is not unusual for the whole fifty leaders to rush for one job. If the former incumbent's ward leader does not immediately assert his rights, he is likely to be minus another position. The stakes are high, so the competition is desperate— Civil Service hurdles to the contrary notwithstanding. Occasionally cooperation can be just as effective as competition, and when the leaders realize this they agree to "trade" jobs. The attitude of the leaders toward Civil Service is a rationalization of their ability to defeat the merit principle. The more
ABUSE IN PHILADELPHIA
49
penetrating thinkers admit that it is a protection for the party. The public has faith in anything labeled "Civil Service." Therefore the party can function unhampered by a suspicious public opinion. Furthermore, politicians can stave off persistent office seekers by placing the responsibility on an impersonal system. Moreover they appreciate the advantage of freezing the party in key positions when it happens to suffer temporary defeat at the polls. But their resentment knows no bounds when a victorious opposition resorts to the same practice. There are no more ardent advocates of the sanctity of Civil Service than defeated politicians. Then too, many of them sincerely believe in the merit system for state and federal employees, at the same time insisting that municipal employees are in a class by themselves. On the other hand it is generally admitted that Civil Service does handicap the distribution of patronage and to that extent politicians are opposed to it. They long for the days when a job could be placed on the auction block and sold to the highest bidder. They are convinced that the party system is absolutely essential to American government, that patronage is just as essential to the party, and that the stupid public defeats the spirit of democracy, by virtue of a vicious circle, when it starves the party by enforcing civil service. Opinion seems to be divided on the advisability of rotating jobs in order to widen party support. Some leaders believe in this principle and practise it accordingly. Others believe that it makes too many enemies—that a man may be loyal while he is on the payroll, but that his loyalty disappears with the loss of his job to his neighbor. Wherever it is possible for a provisional appointee to be dropped by Civil Service because of his own inability to do the work, the leaders are glad enough to rotate that job because they get credit for having done their best to place the man. It is obvious that not only are original entrance appointments political in character, but promotional appointments too are dictated by the party. However, promotions are made from within the service, so except for the matter of efficiency, the outside public is many times removed from this particular aspect of party life.
5o
PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT
All of the above is preliminary background for the discussion of provisional appointments. By showing the extent of political influence throughout the whole system, it is now easier to be convincing about the most important single phase of it. Repetition for the sake of emphasis is not amiss, so let it be said again that while the Civil Service Law is legally observed, the merit principle is already moribund before the law has an opportunity to operate. Provisional appointments that are politically dictated stifle the spirit of civil service from its inception. Ward leaders and mayors all know that a provisional appointment is the open sesame to the control of the entire service. Consequently they clamor for more and more provisionals. Despite the safeguards on removal in the law itself, there is no incentive to keep the back door locked when the front door is so widely open. Some of the leaders know the technique of elevating a provisional to the top of an eligible list. Others do not. The latter simply believe that a man has a natural advantage in an examination when he has served a three months' apprenticeship. That is unimportant. What is important is that they all know the significance of a provisional appointment. Some admitted that when one of their workers was about to resign he could be persuaded to, serve out the full year for which the pertinent eligible list applied, so that the list could be canceled in order to make way for another political provisional. The potentialities of this practice are greatly enhanced because of the poor classification system in effect. The charge of a politically dominated merit system is not new. It is in fact, trite, since we have heard such an indictment for half a century. However, it is the renewed proof that is important at this writing. Old stigmas have a way of persisting long after their causes have been remedied. It is essential just now when the electorate appears to be civil service minded, to have rechecked the evidence in order to resubstantiate the old charge and to establish a more scientific base-line upon which to work for modern improvements. In the next chapter we shall see that cities other than Philadelphia find themselves in similar difficulties because of the abuse of provisional appointments.
IV PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENTS IN OTHER CITIES N WHAT
I
way is the practice of making provisional appointments
already described for Philadelphia, indicative of similar prevailing practices elsewhere? No civil service law was found which did not provide for provisional appointments. That is speaking evidence of the value of such a safety valve. It is in no way a commentary on the extent to which the device is abused. The most recent textbook available in American municipal government says:1 By far the most common way of evading the merit principle is to give a provisional appointment to the person preferred. Every civil service law provides that in case of emergency, or in the absence of an eligible list, provisional appointments may be made, not to exceed a certain period, perhaps three months. Some such clause is probably necessary, because there are times when unforeseen conditions or inadequate examining staffs may force bureau chiefs to act, without waiting for formal examinations to be held. But it is astonishing how frequently such "unforeseen conditions" arise in the municipal service. Many times the number of provisional appointees on the city's payroll is a considerable percentage of the total number of city workers.
Civil service laws invariably impose a maximum time limit for these temporary appointments. However, violation of the law is not unknown. There was the case of one provisional appointee who held his job for nineteen years without resigning or taking the legally required competitive examination.® With ' Austin F . MacDonald, American City Government and Administration, Revised Edition, Thomas Crowell Co., N.Y., 1936, page 401. A similar paragraph appears in J. D. Kingsley and W. E. Mosher, Public Personnel Administration, Harper, 1936, pp. 205-206. ' Joseph Wright, Selected Readings in Municipal Problems, pp. 474-82.
51
52
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
the renewed interest in better government personnel it must be conceded that the law is better observed today than such an example would indicate. Nevertheless here is the testimony of Mr. Robert B. Mclntyre, Former Chief, Bureau of Municipal Investigation and Statistics, Department of Finance, City of New York. 3 W e l l , there is a class known in the civil service as non-competitive positions, emergency appointments. U n d e r the civil service rule, u n less it has been amended, in the absence of an appropriate eligible list, the head of the department is permitted to employ anybody he pleases for a fifteen-day period. H e thereupon notifies the Civil Service C o m mission that he has appointed J o h n Jones to the position of accountant, because there is no list for accountants. U n d e r the rules, the Civil Service Commission is supposed to give what is called a noncompetitive examination within fifteen days, but this is very rarely done. T h e fifteen days often is strung out to fifteen months, and sometimes t w o or three years. Meanwhile, there is no regular eligible list where the people in the department interested in the case of the young man have dug around and found some other title for which there is no eligible list, and he has been put under that title.
In fairness to the present Fusion government in New York City it should be stated that much improvement has been made in all phases of civil service during the past year. The legal time limits for provisional appointments vary considerably from two years in Portland, Maine, to fifteen days in San Jose. Charlotte, North Carolina, permits six months. The same is true of Seattle, Birmingham, Duluth, Cedar Rapids. New York and Bridgeport, Connecticut, limit provisional appointments to a period of four months, the latter holding that they may be made only if absolutely necessary to "prevent the stoppage of public business or inconvenience to the public but not otherwise. . . . " A similar provision is found in the Jacksonville law, and it has already been stated that the Philadelphia law contains an identical clause. Dallas reports that there is no legal time limit for provisional appointees. * T h e Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, Minutes of dcncet McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1 9 3 5 , p. 169.
Evi-
IN O T H E R
CITIES
53
Employment of this kind is made only when there is no eligible register for such class and there is an emergency for the appointment, not permitting time to hold an examination. In such case, the appointment is made subject to the appointee's taking and passing the examination for that classification when held. W e also have a rule that permits the Civil Service Board to certify names from another eligible register if those are found that meet the requirements for that position; if one has been laid off or is on leave of absence, he is to be appointed first.4
San Francisco allows ninety days in the absence of an eligible list. Likewise Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus, Scranton, Grand Rapids, and Dayton. Minneapolis and Norfolk limit the provisional appointment to two months. Salt Lake City and Portland, Oregon, have a thirty-day limitation. The Jacksonville, Florida, Commission has been functioning for only one year but its reply to the question on provisional appointments is interesting. T h e writers of the Act, governing Civil Service for this city, evidently knew that provisional and temporary appointments were the most flagrant means of flouting a civil service law. For this reason our law reads that under no condition shall a provisional appointment exceed a period of sixty ( 6 0 ) days and no person shall serve provisionally more than one time. O u r provisional appointees in this city, who compete in open examinations, do not always come out at the head of the eligible list; the reason being that we do not give credit for temporary service nor do we ask any questions in examinations which are unfair or which could not possibly be answered unless that candidate had served, provisionally or otherwise, in the position for which he is being examined. This system is discouraging to the officials who make provisional appointments for political reasons. During the past year two provisional park foremen, one provisional posting clerk and one provisional typist clerk, out of a field of six ( 6 ) provisional appointments, failed to attain passing grades in the examinations, and their names, therefore, are not entered on the eligible list.5
To the direct question, "Are provisional appointments re' Letter to the author from the Secretary and Chief Examiner dated September 16, 1936. 5 Letter to the author from the Assistant Secretary of the C i v i l Service Board dated September i , 1936.
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
cruited politically?" most of the Commissions replied in the negative. That, however, was to be expected since any admission to the contrary might be deemed indiscreet. Nevertheless several replies were quite frank. One stated that provisional appointments in that particular city were "usually the result of scheming by a department who has a favorite. Provisionals are given an unfair advantage." Another facetiously responds, " W e l l , n o w ! " which was sufficient confession. Several others replied, " Y e s , but they must fulfill minimum requirements of position." Yet another typical reply was "Theoretically, no. Actually, perhaps in some cases." T h e matter of rotating provisional jobs in the city of Columbus, Ohio, was called to the attention of the city attorney in 1 9 3 5 . H e replied:® I am in receipt of your letter of the 18th inst; in which you ask for an opinion on the status of provisional appointees in the event that it is desired to lay off, specifically, a provisional appointee say as a Grade C clerk and refill the same position of Grade C clerk with another provisional appointee, all of which will take place in view of no eligible list being available through our commission. I am therefore of the opinion that one holding a provisional appointment under the classified service cannot be removed without cause until a proper eligible list is available. Oakland, California, admits difficulty in exercising the proper control over provisional appointments. According to M r . Graham, Secretary of the Civil Service Board: 7 Whenever a position is created or becomes vacant and no eligible list exists for the classification, the number of applicants for provisional appointment eager for a "chance," is so great, and the pressure from their friends and others is so formidable, that the Board is sorely put to it to hold to the principle of certifying only those who, by experience and qualification, are proved to be eligible. T h e Civil Service Board is hampered by an insufficient staff and in the interest of economy, it does not urge any expansion at this time; therefore if it is properly shown that the exigencies of the service require that "Supplement to the City Bulletin, Ohio, p . 4 3 . Minutes of Evidence, p. 4 1 6 .
Annual Reports, 1 9 3 J , City of Columbus,
IN OTHER CITIES
55
a position be filled provisionally, such an appointment will be approved pending the creation of an eligible list.
It would be difficult to ascertain the extent to which permanent appointments in other cities have had the advantage of provisional service without a complete examination of the records such as that made for Philadelphia in the previous chapter. Still a compilation of figures offered by letters from the Commission helps to clarify the picture. Provisional Appointments 1932 '933 Philadelphia 120 94 New York 118 134 San Francisco 3,097 1,96s 648 Cleveland 584 210 Milwaukee 179 Minneapolis no 58 ij6 Columbus 184 103 II Duluth Oakland 75 73 — Sacramento 100 Hamilton 2 6 Portland, Me. 3 3 2 San Jos£ 2 I Salt Lake City 30 — Erie Dallas »3 99
'934 I $2 18J i,93i 6j3 291 102 458 7 120 158 5 »5 2 I
Permanent
'935 116 1,157 1,994 1,104 142 —
224 »7 «35 217 8 8 2
Appointments
—
3 14
—
'934 123 J12 689 700 271 1,224 60 33 55 12 6 7 3 7
36
48
85
'932 48 1,018 654 461 283 1,239 48 15 39 — —
'933 116 387 535 403 159 1,012 94 12 46 »4 2 —
—
»4 3 11
—
—
118
108
—
'935 147 1,673 464 826 »45 1,089 128 23 70 28 10 »4 3 4 5 60
Such a chart has little comparative value because the figure bases are not coincident. Some figures include fire and police appointments. Others do not. The best that can be got out of this particular group of figures is a correlation between the provisional and permanent appointments for each individual city. Quotations from reputable sources prove more satisfactory. A public office holder in the city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, frankly admitted to the writer that 99% of that municipality's civil service was recruited politically through the mechanism of the provisional appointment. Mr. Douglas Sutherland, Executive Secretary of the Chicago Civic Federation and Bureau of Public Efficiency, testified,8 "In general I would say that in the city of Chicago civil service law is observed, but I would also say, in gen* Minutes
of Evidence,
p. 140.
56
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
eral, that whenever there is any particular reason for not observing it, it is not observed." The Secretary and Chief Examiner of the Long Beach Civil Service Commission answered as follows:® W h i l e temporary appointments probably will always be the chief source of evasion of civil service, they seem to be a necessary evil. It is impossible, with the limited budget allotted for civil service administration, to maintain eligible lists for every classification, and, in fact, it would be impractical to attempt to anticipate every emergency appointment and to maintain eligible lists for classifications which are likely to be used very little and in some cases only one employee to a classification. I t is true, no doubt, that some of these emergencies arise for the sole purpose of providing employment for certain persons; however, most of them are genuine and the department heads are usually desirous of obtaining competent employees.
It is evident that the use and misuse of provisional appointments is not confined to Philadelphia but is one of the favorite loopholes for political machines wherever they happen to be found. 10 Cincinnati, Milwaukee, some of the New Jersey municipalities, and possibly Seattle and San Francisco appear to have risen above this particular practice. St. Paul, New York, and some of the smaller cities like San Antonio and Jacksonville are working very hard on a solution to the problem. But by and large, American municipalities are still struggling with the initial task of civil service reform—namely that of conquering the spoilsman, hence that of protecting provisional appointments. The question now arises as to whether the provisional appointment is a "necessary evil" as was stated above. After all the assumption of the necessity of these provisional appointments in some instances is the fundamental premise on which this book rests. Lest that assumption be challenged, concrete evidence must be presented in its behalf. Cincinnati had made no provisional appointments in years. ' Letter to the author, dated September 14, 1936. " A section of a monograph called "Employment Management in Municipal Civil Service" published by the Special Commission on Civil Service of the National Municipal League in 1923 established that the proportion of provisional appointments to the total number of appointments ranged from 1 8 % to 7 2 % in many cities. See p. 449.
I N O T H E R CITIES
57
Therefore one might have concluded that the concession could be removed altogether from the law. The writer suggested as much to the Cincinnati Commission and received the following reply,11 We would not say that provisional appointments can be dispensed with entirely and agree with you that this procedure has been widely abused. We have been fortunate, inasmuch as we have been able to prevail upon department heads not to make appointments of this kind, inducing them to wait until we could hold an examination and establish an eligible list when we had no list to certify from immediately. In some instances the emergency appointments have been of service in this connection. During the flood recently no provisional appointments were made but it was necessary to make a large number of emergency appointments and in some few instances the emergency period was extended for a reasonable period beyond the usual thirty days.
Here was the kind of emergency that necessitates the provision for a safety valve. Serious stoppage of the public business would have resulted if some kind of quick appointments could not have been made after the flood. To be sure, the device used by Cincinnati was the temporary appointment rather than the provisional appointment, but it is the emergency character of both these mechanisms which makes them similar. And it is significant that the Commission itself would not completely dispense with either one. A better emergency can be found than a flood to illustrate the necessity for provisional appointments. Recently seven hundred. members of the Street Cleaning Department in Philadelphia went out on strike. If the Commission had to wait until it could hold seven hundred examinations following the legal requirement of posting notices ten days in advance, and allowing a considerable time for the marking of these tests, it is clear that the stoppage of street cleaning for several weeks would be dangerous to the health of the community. A new staff was appointed immediately through the safety valve of the proviu
Letter to the author from the Secretary of the Commission dated April j ,
>937·
58
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
sional appointment. It is ironic that this should be not only the emergency method of appointment but also the normal route to the permanent service. There is only one Milk Inspector for the city of Harrisburg and its environs. If this official were to be incapacitated, public safety would demand an immediate provisional appointment. The same would be true for the only man legally allowed to issue building permits in this city. And for the only quarantine officer that it possesses. Should a school nurse elope, an emergency appointment without benefit of thorough examination would be necessary. These are only a few instances of the many that might be offered proving that some kind of emergency appointment must be provided for in the interest of the public health, welfare, and safety. That device happens to be the provisional appointment in the American Municipal Service. Abolish it because it has been abused; substitute an alternative nomenclature if you will; but the principle remains just as imperative. Again it is profitable to draw on the opinion of experts. It is discouraging to have such a thorough student of civil service as Mr. H . Eliot Kaplan, Executive Secretary of the National Civil Service Reform League, reach the following conclusion:12 Provisional appointments are often necessary, and while they m a y be abused
for political
reasons,
the
provisional
appointment
can
scarcely be done a w a y with altogether just because it is sometimes taken advantage of in order to secure an advantage for a favored candidate. I think every student of the civil service is aware of how this can be done, and is done frequently.
On the other hand, Mr. Charles P. Messick, Chief Examiner and Secretary of the Civil Service Commission of New Jersey, takes a more optimistic point of view. 13 O n e of the difficulties that reformers never seem to get over is the fact that a person w h o m a y owe his original selection to political or personal or business influence may be equally as capable and equally as good a citizen as one w h o is unable to obtain consideration f r o m a 11
Letter to the author, September 4, 1 9 3 6 . Letter to the author, dated September i , 1936.
IN O T H E R C I T I E S
59
these sources. There is no public personnel agency whose service is so completely effective thus far as to eliminate the possibility of all provisional appointments. When a provisional appointment must be made, somebody must make the decision as to what individual is to be appointed. T o say that such appointee is incompetent merely because somebody in public life knows him and commends him to the. consideration of the appointing authority is to go beyond the facts or reason. What people are thinking about who oppose this is more likely to be the desire that they should be in position to name the individual. I do not say that temporary appointments are not frequently, even for the most part, made with some political or personal consideration attached but the provisional appointee ought to have and reformers would want him to have, if they are fair in their thinking, the same opportunity to qualify for the position sought as all of the other applicants. I think that provisional appointments should be kept to a minimum and that the public personnel agency should have sufficient eligibles available for all "active" classifications, that is, where appointments are fairly frequent. I would not say that a service is vitiated merely because, after fair examination and no favor a provisional appointee succeeded in obtaining a place sufficiently high on the eligible register to receive consideration for permanent appointment.
If provisional appointments are necessary, as they appear to be, the next logical step is to determine whether anything is being done to protect them from abuse. As might be expected, numerous devices have been employed to this end; one of the most frequent of which seems to be that now used in San Antonio. W e do not have provisional appointments. All applicants must take a written and medical examination for original entrance into the departments. From the successful examinees we compile our eligible list, and from this list certify them to the Commissioner of Fire and Police. The latter individual has in each department what we term, an "extra board" to fill vacancies due to sickness, suspension or leave of absence of regular employees. These extra men do not receive any stipulated pay, but we endeavor to provide more than half a month's work for each of them. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the regular ranks, the individual at the top of the extra board is selected to fill such a position.14 "Letter from the Chief Clerk to the author, August 31, 1936. However, San Antonio maintains Civil Service only for its Police and Fire Departments.
6o
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
T h e division of school medical inspectors in Philadelphia uses very much the same procedure to good effect. Still another method used is that described by M r . Warner M c l n t y r e , a local secretary of the United States Civil Service Commission. 15 T e m p o r a r y employees should never be employed unless the board first passes on their qualifications. T e m p o r a r y employment has been a sort of thorn in the side of the various civil service commissions, whether federal, state, county, or city, inasmuch as quite frequently some politician gets one of his favorites a temporary position, and later, when the examination is held, the temporary employee has a decided advantage over everyone else. F o r that reason temporary employees, as far as possible, should be limited to persons w h o have the necessary qualifications for permanent employment.
New Y o r k City has recently adopted this procedure of requiring provisional and non-competitive appointees to meet the prerequisites of competitive candidates. This should constitute some improvement, though it would be unwise to anticipate exaggerated gains from a small technical change. Another device now being used by New Y o r k that looks more promising is that of certifying competitive lists to lower grades without changing the status of the original lists. This permits qualified persons to take the places that were formerly filled by unqualified provisional appointments. It does not work any great hardship on those drawn from the original eligible register since they return there automatically at the first opening. T h e Comptroller of St. Paul issued an order in 1932 that blank provisional permits were no longer to be granted to appointing officers unless no eligible could be found on any existing suitable civil service list. T h e decrease in the number of provisional appointments since that time is evidence of the success of such an order. In Oakland, California, an attempt has been made to reduce the provisional evil by requiring the unanimous consent of the Such a procedure as that outlined above w o u l d be i n o r d i n a t e l y expensive f o r a l l branches of a l a r g e metropolitan service. " Minutes of Evidence, p. J20.
IN OTHER CITIES
61
Civil Service Board for all such appointments. This would be largely effective for a genuinely bi-partisan board. What do these various solutions offer for improvement of the Philadelphia situation? Amendment of the law does not appear to be necessary. Without changing a single ride of the Commission, eligible lists could be allowed to run their full two years instead of being canceled so frequently at the expiration of one year. Furthermore, eligible lists could be regularly maintained for the jobs where the turnover is highest. Probably the most fundamental change involves the adoption of a sound classification scheme so that fewer eligible registers need to be maintained. Moreover the Commission could, if it were so minded, rule that provisional appointments were never to be made without its unanimous consent. It could certify eligibles to lower positions without removing these names from their original place on higher registers. It could maintain a temporary half-time, half-pay reserve corps for the most important scientific positions. If a provisional appointment is absolutely necessary, then the Commission could compel the appointee to match the standards of those on a properly executed eligible list. Moreover, the Commission could rule itself subject to punishment at law for the misuse of the provisional privilege. Other suggestions have been made from time to time, but upon closer inspection they are found to be faulty. For example, it has been suggested that the provisional appointment be abolished and appointment on a per diem basis pending examination be instituted in its stead. But to what effect? A per diem appointee can be just as political as a provisional and can receive the same advantage in experience and in personal fitness. If a prohibitory clause were attached making it impossible for the per diem appointee to receive permanent appointment, serious damage to the public service might result from the employment of amateurs, and the permanent appointment could still be achieved by the same methods now used in elevating provisionals. Again it has been suggested that the Commission be compelled to certify the highest name on the eligible list. But the
62
PROVISIONAL A P P O I N T M E N T
provisional appointee can readily be number one man, as has already been shown. Then, too, it might be made illegal for the Commission to weight Personal Fitness more than i % of the entire examination. But what is to prevent the Commission from observing the rules, at the same time setting up another category weighted 19% which would depend just as much on an arbitrary rating as does Personal Fitness? Facing the facts squarely, it must be admitted that unless the Commission is divorced from machine control, there is no likelihood that any improvements will be made. Nevertheless the outlook is not so dark as might be inferred, for the provisional appointment evil has been largely eliminated from police and fire services. The machine has come a long way when it has consented to having its locks shorn to that extent. Summarizing the argument of this chapter we find that: i. The most common way of evading the merit system is to employ provisional appointments. 1. This evasion is still widespread in municipalities where party machines flourish. 3. It has been eliminated in a few well-governed cities. 4. Numerous devices have been developed to prevent the abuse of the provisional evil. 5. Some of these devices might profitably be used by Philadelphia. 6. In the last analysis, no permanent panacea seems possible without the elimination of machine control. 7. Much improvement can be hoped for by increasing the number of hurdles which the machine must master.
ν
T H E E F F E C T OF PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENTS ON OTHER PHASES OF T H E MERIT SYSTEM COMPARATIVE C I V I L SERVICE PRACTICES
of the service from spoilsmen is the first objective of any merit system. W e have seen how politics can dominate civil service if the provisional appointment is put to unfortunate uses. But there are aspects other than induction. Let us see how provisional appointments affect the maintenance of the service on the one hand, and how defective maintenance increases the use of provisional appointments on the other. There is a reciprocal relationship between recruitment and maintenance which is frequently more subtle than obvious. A comparison of various municipal practices will aid in the clarification of this relationship. Thus we shall be able to accomplish two things at once— first, to see how provisional appointments affect and are affected by such things as efficiency ratings, promotions, salary schedules, classification systems, and the likej secondly, to observe the specific practices in these fields in other American municipalities. ROTECTION
P
COMPARATIVE A G E
OF T H E
LAWS
Municipal civil service started in New York and Massachusetts in 1884, so that a fifty-year history is comparatively short. Since then the idea has spread sporadically but certainly, so that today practically every city of over a hundred thousand population has a Civil Service Commission, while many of those over twenty-five thousand have also joined the ranks. Chicago's law became effective in 1895 but has been amended as recently as 1931. Scranton is still operating under a law prescribed and established in 1907. Minneapolis' law was passed in 1913 but
63
64
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
the Rules were revised in 1931 and have been subsequently amended to 1935. Dayton's current law became effective in 1920. St. Paul's Rules were revised as recently as February 1933. A l l of the cities in Massachusetts operate under a law of August i , 1922, as amended down to 1934. Cities of more than 130,000 population in Florida are subject to a State Civil Service law as of 1935. Of course there has been a tremendous impetus to the improvement of government personnel since the depression, hence many cities coming under civil service jurisdiction for the first time have all the advantage of experience in other places. Birmingham, Alabama, for example, is under a "Personnel Board" since May 1 , 1936, and Bridgeport, Connecticut, adopted Civil Service as recently as March 1936. The significant point in these laws for the purpose of this thesis is the fact that all provided for provisional appointments. Hence it becomes clear that such a device is deemed to be just as necessary in new laws as it was in the old. As a safety valve it is desirable as well as indispensable. Moreover the merit system has been in existence in cities for a long enough period to be rid of the abuse of provisionals if there were any real inclination to have done so. DIVISION OF SERVICE
Does the particular way in which the service is divided extend or diminish the opportunity for provisional appointments? Is one kind of division superior to another? While most classified services are divided into three parts— exempt, competitive, and labor—Scranton, for example, adds a fourth class labeled non-competitive. Some other cities go no further than "classified" and "unclassified." St. Paul makes the threefold division but marks them "Graded Service, Ungraded Service, and Common Labor Service." A comparison of the percentages of jobs in various classified and unclassified services is in order. From these random selections one can conclude that while most cities make a good showing on the percentage of city employees in the classified service, when exemption and labor percentages are deducted the number in the competitive class is low.
COMPARATIVE
City Philadelphia New York San Francisco Cincinnati Jacksonville Hamilton, O. Columbus, O. Duluth Long Beach Oakland, Cal. Dallas Camden, N. J. Elizabeth, N. J. Newark, N. J. Paterson, N. J. Trenton, N. J.
% in Unclassified Service Less than 1% Less than 1% 0%
4-7 Less than 1% 10
5o 25 6
15 34 «•3 4 2
5 2
PRACTICES
%in Classified Service 99% 99 100
95-3 99 90 5° 75 94 85 65
% Exempt 14%
5
65
% Competitive 56% 56 82.5
8.2
65.9 4-7 Less than 1% 75 1 88 1 45 8 75
%
Labor 30% 38 9-3 29-3 24 10
I
80
45 17 »9
15
75
10
*
*
98.7
I
43
96 98
1
51 39
46
72
16
95 98
I
69
4 23
*
-3 •4
69
Yet even here we have seen how the provisional appointment renders the classified service politically vulnerable. Modern theory sanctions no exemptions for purely administrative officials. Abolition of the exempt class tends to extend the competitive service. This is good per se. However, since it is in the competitive service that the provisional appointment operates there is a possibility of increasing the latter abuse if the law were amended to prohibit exemptions. Still, it would be an improvement upon the abuse of exemptions if only because it is an extra "nuisance hurdle" for politicians. One division does not appear to be better than another provided each is clearly delineated and no fundamental principle—such as exemptions—is at stake. COMPARATIVE SIZES OF SERVICES
Does the size of the Civil Service have any effect on the use or abuse of provisional appointments? W e have seen that Philadelphia's service approximates 18,000 not including the public school system, but compared with New York's 89,000 its real size dwindles considerably. Even Chicago's total personnel in the classified service is but 22,500. San Francisco has 12,500 employees including teachers but exclusive of temporaries. Seattle employs about 6,000; Minneapolis, 5,011 in the classified service alone. Cincinnati, frequently called the best governed
66
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
city in the United States, counts 4,291 people in its city service. The Dallas payroll carries 2,085. Then there are very much smaller services. San Jose, California, employs a mere 215 j Sacramento, 862; Hamilton, Ohio, 280; E l Paso, Texas, 350 exclusive of fire and police departments which are under a separate civil service jurisdiction} East Orange, New Jersey, 523 including laborers; Norfolk, Virginia, 875 exclusive of schools and unclassified labor 5 Erie, Pennsylvania, 278; Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 116; Portland, Maine, 250.1 T h e size of a service appears to have no effect on provisional appointments. Thus Philadelphia, which resorts to provisional appointments on a large scale, has the same ratio of civil servants to population as has Cincinnati where no provisionals have been appointed for many years. Moreover Oakland, California, admits as much difficulty in controlling these appointments as does New York. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS
Does the type of Commission provided by law affect provisional appointments? Commissions are usually bipartisan bodies, composed of three members appointed by the Mayor for staggered terms at low salaries. However, there are interesting variations. Detroit has a four-member bipartisan commission which appears to work satisfactorily and to check the advance of political domination by one party. Kansas City and St. Paul have only one Commissioner, who is directly responsible for the entire employment program. Tacoma, Washington, has a popularly elected Commission, which is quite unusual in the United States. Birmingham, Alabama, has what is known as a personnel board of three members, each having a six-year term. In addition there is a Citizens' Supervisory Commission of not less than five persons composed of the District Court Judges, the Presidents of two universities or colleges in the vicinity, the President of the local Medical Society, the President of the Local Trade Union, the President of the Junior and Senior Chambers of Commerce, the President of the local Veterans' Association, the President of the Parent-Teachers' Association, and the Probate 1
Figures as of January 1936.
COMPARATIVE
PRACTICES
67
Judge. Then again, in Jacksonville, Florida, one member of the Commission must be from the Labor class, one from the Professional class, one from the Business class, and all must serve without pay. Bridgeport, Connecticut, has a Commission of five appointed by the Mayor, serving five-year terms, not more than two members of which may be of the same political party. It may be fairly concluded that the type of Commission provided by law does affect provisional appointments. T h e major problem is to obtain an independent Commission. T h e method used is of secondary importance. Nevertheless some methods seem to be better designed for divorcing politics from civil service than others. Ideally, the Commission should be appointed by some nonpartisan body, perhaps by the heads of the higher educational institutions in the vicinity, as was suggested in the original Seabury Charter for N e w York City. T h e terms of office should be at least six years and should be staggered so that the whole Commission does not retire at the same time. Salaries should be adequate to attract able men or else the prestige value of the service should operate in lieu of pecuniary compensation. It need hardly be repeated that the control of provisional appointments rests almost entirely in the hands of the Commission. Without its consent no provisional appointment could ever be made. CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES O f what importance is a sound classification scheme in preventing the misuse of provisional appointments? Some sort of classification system is present in all the municipal services, but they are usually haphazard, unscientific, and grossly unjust. A number of cities are gradually reclassifying—with ultimate savings for the treasury. Minneapolis has done so. St. Paul's system is especially good. T h e new Jacksonville law places much emphasis on a sound classification plan indicating "as far as practicable the natural
or probable lines of
promotion." Classification
schemes are pending in N e w York City, E l Paso, Bridgeport, and Jackson, Michigan. T h e Act of 1920 gives the Philadelphia Commission the right to establish a classification plan. There
68
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
is a patchwork system in operation. Twice Council authorized a scientific survey at considerable expense. 2 But after these surveys were completed Council refused to adopt their recommendations, probably because it would have meant a curtailment of patronage, of some salaries, and consequently of revenues for the Republican party war chest. T h e r e are about twenty-two hundred different titles extant which could and should be consolidated into four hundred categories at most. Each class rer quires the maintenance of separate eligible lists. T h e potential evils of poor classification become apparent when it is stated that the Commission, as at present staffed, has all that it can do to hold one hundred examinations a year. A n eligible list must expire by law at the end of two years. Obviously the expense of holding frequent examinations in order to maintain current eligible lists for so many classes of jobs would be exorbitant. So the provisional appointment is a convenient answer. A good classification plan would help to prevent the improper use of this device. SALARY STANDARDIZATIONS Proper classification of positions is a necessary preliminary to proper salary standardizations. E v e r y position should be correctly labeled according to stated duties and qualifications for appointment and promotion. E v e r y position should then have its maximum and minimum salary limits. In that way all persons doing the same work would receive the same pay. Furthermore, hours of work should be standardized along with salaries. Vacations, holidays, and sick leaves should be uniform throughout the service. W h i l e these things may be costly innovations, failure to incorporate them into the service is far more expensive in the long run. Closely connected with the whole salary problem is the matter of certification of payrolls by the Civil Service Commission in order to prevent payroll padding by bureau chiefs. T h e Commission should check the official payroll against the official civil list at frequent intervals. Private management would consider such a routine the simplest preliminary of business efficiency. Public management seems slow to learn the A Β C's. A l l 5
Griffenhagen Report of 1920 and the Jacobs Report of 1931.
COMPARATIVE
PRACTICES
69
of the things advocated above are still very much in the theoretical stage. A few cities, but not enough, have put them into practice. Salary standardization is quite a rare thing. Philadelphia is without it. So is New York. Perhaps the best system in operation is that found in St. Paul. 8 Here salaries are based on the cost of living, subject to annual adjustment, plus five semi-annual pay increases amounting to 5 % of the basic entrance salary. The base year used is 1916 because at the time the system was adopted, in 1922, this was considered the best norm. Other cities reporting standardized salary systems are Chicago, San Jose, Salt Lake City, Sacramento, Hamilton, Erie, Portland, Maine, Cincinnati, and Oakland, California. Cities not having standardization of salaries are Cleveland, Duluth, Minneapolis, Grand Rapids, Jacksonville, Lawrence and Boston, Massachusetts, and Portland, Oregon. Milwaukee answered this part of the questionnaire as follows: T h e J. L . Jacobs Company of Chicago did a standardizing job for us in 1 9 1 7 . This, of course, is hopelessly out of date. Fred Telford revised it two years ago but the Common Council turned down his revision. As a result there are many inequalities though the situation is by no means as bad as it is in many other jurisdictions. Incidentally you should be very hesitant to accept any claim that inequalities do not exist. I doubt if it can be true anywhere. Even when a reclassification scheme is most scientifically done there are almost sure to be incorrected injustices. Moreover any such plan gets out of date in a very short time. Attempts to keep it up to date usually result in a crazy quilt patchwork. It is not that mere determination of what is right is so difficult but any changes have to be approved by the Common Council and to secure such approval is often an impossibility.
The warning conveyed in the letter just quoted is timely and sound. It is difficult to obtain perfect standardization. It is even difficult to obtain a quasi-perfect scheme. Nevertheless it is not impossible to improve contemporary practices that work great * Articles describing and recommending this plan may be found in the Monthly Labor Review for Aug-ust 1923, March 1928, and December 1929; in the National Municipal Review for October J926 and October 1932; in the American City for January 1931; the Survey for November 15, 1932; and Public Management for June 1933.
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
hardships on all concerned. Long Beach, California, replied in a similar vein:4 T h e City Council passes the salary ordinance and the salaries are fixed thereby. I believe an attempt is made to equalize salaries as nearly as possible according to the responsibility entailed, although it is not true that all employees who work under one classification are receiving the same salary—it seems that in some departments certain classifications may require a great deal more ability than the same classification in other departments. The same political spirit which is responsible for flagrant provisional appointments is likewise responsible for perpetuating the status quo in these other phases of the service. SERVICE RATINGS
There is a direct connection between the excessive use of provisional appointments and the absence of service ratings. The latter are of little use when political winds blow frequently. Efficiency ratings, even in their crudest forms, serve many purposes. Promotions, reductions, salary increases, dismissals, transfers, leaves of absence, and vacations are all essentially dependent on some tangible record of past performance. The Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel stated in a report released January 7, 1 9 3 5 : Service reports or "efficiency ratings" are an essential tool of personnel administration, particularly in connection with the promotion system. While the Commission has taken considerable testimony on this subject from experts both in public and private personnel offices, it regards the technique of rating as falling outside its domain. T h e Commission believes, however, that a desire on the part of the supervisory personnel to establish and maintain a system of periodic reports is far more important than the kind of system which is set up. The nature of the system is a problem richly deserving scientific study and experimentation. Apparently the best rating system available at the present time is that evolved by J . B. Probst in 1927. 5 Since then over forty 4
Letter to the author from the Secretary and Chief Examiner, dated September 1 4 , 1936. T h e following publications discuss the Probst system: Manual of Police
COMPARATIVE
PRACTICES
71
cities have adopted it with apparently satisfactory results. Among those are Duluth, Norfolk, Cincinnati, Jacksonville, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Tulsa, Seattle, and Indianapolis. The chief feature of this system is its mechanical rating device which translates the simple checks made by the department head into proper letter ratings. The mechanical equipment costs one hundred dollars and the service report forms cost ten dollars per thousand in lots of twenty thousand or more. Mr. Herbert Cornell, Secretary of the Milwaukee Civil Service Commission, answered inquiry on this point as follows:8 We experimented with the Probst rating system but found great difficulty in using it. In the first place there was much complaint from labor organizations who adopted an unsympathetic attitude toward it. In the second place, we found that superiors of the labor boss type could not use it as they could not with sufficient clearness understand the meaning of the phrases. The Probst system is predicated on the assumption that all superiors are well educated. In clerical and professional services, this of course, is true but it is not true in the labor service and in some cases is not true in the skilled labor service. We no longer use the system.
This is an extremely interesting and valuable dissenting opinion. However, in Milwaukee the argument would have more force than in other cities because even the large labor force operates on the merit principle. Some of the "homemade" efficiency schemes in operation serve their purpose. At least they indicate a sincere desire to emphasize not only selection of personnel, but maintenance as well. Some of the rating schemes are unintentionally amusing. For example, one of the questions on the San Antonio Police rating blanks reads, "Does he keep in training (in the pink of condition) or is he fat and lazy?" Dayton requires the departmental directors to submit monthly Records, August 19311 Public Management, January 1933; American Political Science Review, June 1933; Resolution by the Assembly of Civil Service Commissions of the United States and Canada in convention in Berkeley, California, 1931. 'Letter to the author dated September 14, 1936.
72
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
efficiency reports, "the standard of efficiency to be based on a marking of 8 o % . " Department heads in St. Paul are required by law to maintain service records, and here too, "Eighty percent shall indicate that the employee is performing normal, or average service." In Youngstown the department head may remove employees whose efficiency average continues below 7 0 % . In Oakland, California, "efficiency marks below 7 5 % for three consecutive months may be grounds for demotion, suspension, or discharge from the service of the city." New Jersey municipalities coming under the jurisdiction of the state civil service have to submit quarterly reports on their employees. Important advances are being made in New York for the adoption of a service rating plan.7 Since all of these reforms appear to be more difficult of initiation, of adoption, and of operation on a large scale, any achievement made in a metropolitan machine city deserves special mention. It has already been noted that Philadelphia is behind the times in the matter of efficiency records. The law permits the Commission to adopt such a system at its discretion. The only records that it has ever chosen to keep are roster files for the purpose of determining seniority. Inquiry of the department heads revealed that here again no records were kept, the only exception being in the School Medical Inspection Service. At the 1935 session of the National Civil Service Assembly in Milwaukee it became apparent that there was a universal need for some better system of service rating than any yet in use. For the many cities still battling machine politics, there is a more urgent need for restricting the practice of appointing political provisionals. Once these are in the service, efficiency ratings are of little account because these appointees retain their positions by party favor in any case. EXAMINATIONS
Examinations definitely affect and are affected by provisional appointments. If the examination is based on the nature of the job, then the provisional has a decided advantage. If the examina' Supplement, National Municipal
Review, October 1 9 3 5 .
COMPARATIVE
PRACTICES
73
tion is drawn up to meet the qualifications of the provisional, he has even less difficulty in achieving his goal. So long as the Commission wishes to resort to provisional appointments, it is not likely to take advantage of newer examining techniques. Great progress has been made in the last twenty-five years in the preparation of suitable examinations. Unfortunately, however, the popular impression of civil service examinations still rests on amateur, pioneering attempts. Typists are no longer asked to plot the curvature of the earth's surface, nor electricians to trace the influence of Milton—if indeed they ever were asked the ridiculous except by the spoilsmen who deliberately capitalized on the opportunity of disgracing a formidable foe. Mr. Carl P. Herbert, Director of the St. Paul Bureau of Municipal Research, tells the following story.8 W h e n I went to the Dayton Civil Service Commission in 1 9 1 5 , they had examinations the same as we have today; but after the names of all Democrats who applied for a position as policeman they would put a period, after the Republicans a comma, after the Socialists, a dash; if they were doubtful, they wouldn't put anything. I t was interesting to note that, with a Democratic C i v ü Service Commission at the time, every man with a period after his name was appointed a policeman.
The best and most recent criticism of contemporary civil service examinations is to be found in Better Government Personnel * There is no longer any valid reason why every person in municipal administration should not be selected on a merit basis, by way of competitive or non-competitive examination. Policydetermining officials should, of course, be elected, but all others should be appointed according to merit. This is a long step from the original concept of a civil service that would be applicable only to small jobs. In high-salaried positions, training, experience, and the oral interview count for much more. Written tests for these higher jobs are usually of the non-assembled or even non-competitive type. Moreover, physical examinations are now *Minutes of Evidence, p. 301. * Pp. 42-45. T h i s is the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, 193J.
74
PROVISIONAL A P P O I N T M E N T
generally required for every branch of the service. More and more emphasis is likely to be placed on physical fitness as city pension systems become more widespread. The matter of civil service examinations is indeed an interesting one. The writer made a collection of examinations given in different cities for the positions of stenographer and clerk, dietitian, nurse, and laboratory technician. The variations in design, technique, and range were amazing. While most tests were of the practical type, as required by law, some added general intelligence questions for good measure. San Francisco's examinations are particularly difficult and comprehensive. One unusual feature of the examination for General Clerk-Typist is a list of fifty questions testing knowledge of the laws. This part is a true and false test, but the penalties for incorrect answers are heavy enough to discourage guessing. St. Paul uses a "Knowledge of City" section in some examinations. Hamilton, Ohio, gives a short oral reading test to its general clerks in addition to a writing, spelling, and arithmetic examination. In Cleveland examinations are long and detailed. That for Clerk consists of 45 specific questions on Office Information and Procedure} 60 names to be filed alphabetically; 80 pairs of numbers to be accurately checked where the first number is both more than one-third and less than one-half of the second number; 10 catchy problems in Arithmetic; 40 words to be spelled correctly; and 25 problems in vocabulary. The examination for Distribution Clerk is especially difficult because of its technical questions on the theory of bookkeeping, examples in business arithmetic, and knowledge of accounting codes. Jacksonville, Florida, uses the standard Otis Intelligence Tests prepared by Dr. Arthur S. Otis, formerly Development Specialist with Advisory Board, General Staff, United States War Department. The Stenographer's examination given by the City of Sacramento is as difficult as one could find. There are 25 questions on the fine points of General Business Practice. This is followed
COMPARATIVE
PRACTICES
75
by ίο questions testing knowledge of Office Practice. There are also ι ο difficult problems in Business Arithmetic, 40 questions on good English, 40 on Spelling, an accuracy and penmanship test, 10 problems in filing, 40 searching questions on Social Relations, a dictation test at 130 words a minute, and a typing test— these in addition to an oral examination. In a small booklet issued by the Civil Service Bureau of St. Paul10 there is a paragraph on the newst examination technique. It is quoted here as a further basis for judging existing procedures. The object of an examination is to test the applicant as to his general intelligence and knowledge of the position he applies for and his ability to do the work. T h e various tests in the examination are designed to attain this object. Through research and experience it has been found that the short-answer test is particularly suited to this purpose. In this type of test the questions are so framed that an applicant can answer them by the writing of a single word or figure, or by merely making an " X , " or a check mark, or an underscore. T h e length of a short-answer test varies generally from 100 to 300 or more questions for a single examination. A 100-question test of this type can often be answered easily in about a half-hour's time. This type of test makes for clean-cut and definite answers and removes the necessity of considerable writing on the part of the applicant. In a recent analysis of all the examinations held during the year it was found that over 9 0 % of the questions were either of the short-answer type or consisted of practical demonstration tests at the work.
Because of the increasing number of applications for civil service jobs, examining boards everywhere are convinced that less time must be required for marking examinations and more time spent in preparing questions. All sorts of mechanical testing devices are being introduced in the hope of relieving overworked examiners. For example, Milwaukee now uses a stationary machine for testing truck drivers. The federal government is developing the "electric eye" for automatically rating short-answer papers. Phonograph dictation at regulated speed is sometimes " General Information Pertaining to Civil Service Requirements and Tests, Including Samfle Questions, issued by the Civil Service Bureau, City of Saint Paul, Minnesota, January 1935.
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PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
used for stenographic tests, while copyists are required to type between triple-spaced copy so that inaccuracies show up immediately. Not only is the examining technique itself undergoing constant transformation, but examining techniques for the purpose of testing examining techniques are being developed. Sometimes consolidated examinations are given—that is to say, a general examination is prepared for a number of different jobs and a general eligible register is maintained rather than numerous separate lists. Again, some commissions are showing a disposition to appoint one full-time field examiner whose sole duty it is to keep posted on new civil service techniques throughout the United States. A new type of oral examining is being developed in New York City to reestablish faith in the now discredited method of rating personal interviews. T h e New York development will bear watching. As a matter of fact, throughout the country the use of the oral examination is becoming more and more popular. However, there is a tendency to employ personnel specialists for these rather than mere technicians in given fields. Some places believe in examining three or more candidates at the same time in order better to reveal the personality traits of individuals as they react in groups. T h e passing mark for examinations varies considerably. Bridgeport requires a competitor to obtain 75 or over in all subjects. Grand Rapids and New York City require not less than 50 in any of the parts nor less than 75 on the whole examination. Portland and St. Paul place the bar at 75 for the total test. Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Chicago, Dayton, and Youngstown set the general average at 70. Scranton holds that a candidate must receive a general average of 70, and not less than 20 in any required subject, nor less than 70 in any technical subject when the position to be filled is of a technical, scientific, or professional nature. Since 1935 Columbus, Ohio, will not accept applications for classified positions until the examinations are actually scheduled. Chicago's Commission provides extremely rigid regulations for grading examination papers. They are so detailed that a specific
COMPARATIVE PRACTICES
77
sum for every possible error must be deducted from ioo according to a definite code. Jacksonville's law says, " N o questions which are misleading or unfair or in the nature of catch questions shall be asked." Youngstown rules state that "examinations for any department, division, or district shall not be held oftener than twice each year." Examinations in all places are not free. Several cities, notably Bridgeport, charge a small percentage of the salary as a fee for financing the test. N o matter what objections may be offered, and there are several, at least self-supporting examinations permit the use of modern techniques. Youngstown charges a $2.00 fee for medical, dental, and physical examinations. Birmingham charges $ 1 . 0 0 for each application blank. In addition numerous civil service coaching schools have been doing a profitable business throughout the country. One such school in N e w York City received $750,000 for coaching 15,000 prospective patrolmen. In order to offset such economic waste N e w York's examinations are now being shifted from a factual to a general basis where outside coaching will not be necessary. Extra-expense examinations here require the payment of a fee of 2 / 1 0 per cent. A t this point it might be noted parenthetically that N e w York has included fingerprinting as an integral part of its examination procedure. Again it should be repeated that the use of provisional appointments has definitely prevented the adoption of scientific examination. Examinations for labor appointments present no very great difficulties. Physical fitness is the prime requisite together with a demonstration of skill in a particular line. Methods of appointment vary here as elsewhere, but it is obvious from the wording of the laws that this part of the service is frankly political. For example, Minneapolis rules that certification for unskilled laborers shall "be as far as practicable for each ward of the city." Grand Rapids permits the department heads to fill labor appointments with the approval of the City Manager. Philadelphia and Dayton hire laborers in the order of priority of application. Jacksonville gives preference to laborers having the largest
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PROVISIONAL A P P O I N T M E N T
number of dependents. Scranton gives preference to veterans, as do many other cities. New York City has just recently lowered its maximum age limit for entrance to 40 years for labor, 45 for skilled labor, 45 and 50 for professional and semi-professional positions. A court decision in 1932 now compels St. Paul to appoint, lay off, and reemploy skilled laborers on a straight seniority basis, that is in the order of the filing of applications. With all its effects, this system seems to have definitely reduced the power of politicians in this branch of the service. In Hamilton, Ohio, it was discovered that some of the regular janitors were employing outside help to carry on their duties. This gave the laborers time for their political duties and yet netted them a small profit on the use of cheap substitute labor. Cleveland has been waging a bitter battle over the question of labor appointments. There is a reform movement on foot to place unskilled labor under civil service, but the Mayor and Council are openly fighting that since their patronage depends largely on the distribution of these jobs." After the presidential election the Mayor attempted to rebuild his patronage set-up by dismissing over eight hundred men from the labor service. This is not by any means the all-time high, for when the Mayor took office a year ago he fired twenty-seven hundred city employees and rehired political favorites at a rate of one hundred a week. In Philadelphia labor appointments are under the control of the ward leaders. They are apportioned among the wards, not always fairly, and the rapid turnover in the nature of these jobs gives politicians a splendid chance to rotate the patronage. If labor should be placed in the competitive class as in Milwaukee something might be gained. But if the political machine controls the civil service, this move would undoubtedly increase the malpractice in provisional appointments. Police and fire employees in municipalities are increasingly selected by means of the merit system. Since these are essential protective agencies, it is important that they be recruited from responsible citizens. Indeed some places apply civil service rules 11
See issues of the Cleveland Plain Dealer vember io, 1936.
from Sept. 4, 1936 until No-
COMPARATIVE
PRACTICES
79
to these two groups of city employees when they do not do so for any others. This is true of Indianapolis, Oak Park and Rockford, Illinois, Salt Lake City, Norfolk, Cedar Rapids, Little Rock, Covington, Charlotte, and Portland, Maine, to mention but a few. It is clear that standards of selection for policemen and firemen are universally higher than for other branches of the city service. These appointments are invariably made from standing eligible lists after competitive examination. Nevertheless August Vollmer, Professor of Police Administration at the University of California, stated:12 "I have been to three hundred police departments; I know their insides; I have taken them apart. I can assure you that there are no good ones." Jacksonville accepts only Training School Graduates for its police and fire services. To New York, however, go the laurels for the establishment of training schools—not only for policemen and firemen, but also for social workers and building inspectors. Milwaukee is exceptionally proud of its police and fire services, as well it might be, for they are decidedly above the average of most American municipalities. Our systems are notoriously inefficient compared with those on the continent of Europe. One of the major reasons for this unhappy record is that our police appointments are still frequently rewards for political activity or protection for lucrative sources of income for the party treasury. The provisional appointment evil is less characteristic of the police and fire services than of any others. When that is said, a great deal has been said for a city that is still struggling to combat spoilsmen. CREATION O F AND A P P O I N T M E N T S FROM E L I G I B L E LISTS
Eligible registers appear to be in force for a period of one to two years. Philadelphia, Grand Rapids, Minneapolis, Chicago, and others permit a list to stand for two years. Dayton's list expires automatically at the end of one year. St. Paul's Commission may extend the duration of a list from one to two years if " Minutes of Evidence, sonnel, p. 466.
Commission of Inquiry on Better Government Per-
8o
PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT
necessary. The San Jose Commission may extend the time beyond two years if it wishes. Furthermore "in offices or employment where more than one grade is established by the Commission, the name of a person placed on the eligible list for the higher grade may also, upon request in writing, be placed on the eligible list for the lower grade in the position to which his rating entitles him." In Milwaukee eligible lists are good for at least three years and perhaps five. Recently some cities have been experimenting by training those high on the eligible lists even before they receive any appointment. The proper length of time for maintaining a given list is controversial. Longer periods save money but permit lists to become stale. Short durations are expensive but up to date. The guiding principle should be predicated on some compromise that would keep expense at a minimum, yet would ensure to the city the most valuable talent available. There is no serious objection to the Philadelphia practice on this point except that eligible lists are so frequently terminated in the minimum time in order to make way for provisional appointments. But that practice could be continued and is continued elsewhere, even if lists were required to stand for a longer period. After the examination has been duly marked and the qualified candidates placed on eligible lists in order of their numerical ranking, it is incumbent upon the commission to submit names from these lists to the appointing authority. Chicago, Minneapolis, Bridgeport, and Detroit compel the certification of the highest name on the register. Grand Rapids, St. Paul, York, Portland, Scranton, Birmingham all permit the appointing authority to choose one of the first three. In Jacksonville the highest on the "Reemployment List" must be certified, but if there is no "Reemployment Register," then the appointing authority may select one of the first five names on the "Employment List." The City Manager of San Jose must choose one of the first three names but he may disqualify any name by certifying it three times without appointment. In Portland, if the first man on the list is certified three times without appointment, he is automatically removed from the list. If a man is not first on the
COMPARATIVE PRACTICES
81
list he may be certified four times without appointment before he is disqualified. Scranton disqualifies after three certifications except in the case of veterans who are given special preference all along the line. The recent trend is to certify fewer and fewer names so that the highest on the list shall ultimately receive the benefit of his true position. However, some of the manager cities, for example, Dayton and Kansas City, compel the Commission to certify all names on the eligible list. The discretion thus given to the city manager is justifiable if it is not abused. Philadelphia certifies the two highest names on the list, but double certification without appointment results in cancellation. In this way political favorites can be chosen even if they are somewhere further down the list. So it may be seen that eligible lists serve the provisional in two ways—first, by termination, thus creating a vacancy} and secondly by securing permanent appointment when the provisional is certified somewhere near the top of the list. PROBATION PERIODS
Probation periods of six months after examination and prior to permanent appointment seem to be integral parts of most Civil Service laws. Scranton has an unusually short probation period of only three months and Birmingham has an unusually long trial period of one year. There is a reviving interest in the importance of this training period which has been generally ignored for years. More progressive services are now paying special attention to workers on probation, subjecting them to stricter efficiency ratings, training courses, and the like. Philadelphia's law provides for a three-month probation, but to all intents and purposes the permanent appointment really starts from the first day of appointment. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether employees ever realize that they are on trial. There is not much point in emphasizing preliminary trials when the whole procedure from beginning to end is perfunctory routine and meaningless red tape. The probation period could serve to disqualify unfit provisional appointees who succeeded in obtaining permanent appointment. Since the same authorities supervise probationers as supervise provisionals, it is not likely
8A
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
that the probation period will serve its true function until provisionals become non-political appointments. PROMOTIONS
One of the chief attractions of a career service is to be found in the promise of a fair, certain system of employee advancement. Promotions are generally made within the service by way of competitive examinations, much attention being paid to seniority. Some laws prevent promotion prior to six months' or a year's service in one particular capacity. Youngstown stipulates that candidates for promotion must have held positions for at least three years in the next lower grade. T h e passing grades for promotion examinations are often higher than those required for entrance. This is particularly true in the police and fire services where a grade of 80 is often the minimum passing mark. Some cities like Minneapolis have regular promotion schedules carefully catalogued and ranked so as to leave no doubt as to the march of events. Chicago, too, provides for rigid line promotion. Vacancies are almost always preferably filled by promotion. But St. Paul follows this procedure: "Whenever a vacancy in the classified service exists, such vacancy shall be filled whenever possible in the following order: ( 1 ) by reduction, (2) by transfer, (3) by reinstatement, (4) by promotion, (5) by original entrance." The practice of placing transfer before promotion is in line with the latest developments. Jacksonville requires more than one person to qualify for a promotional examination if the examination is not to be thrown open to the public. In Birmingham vacancies are filled first by Transfer, secondly from the Departmental Lay-Off List, thirdly from the General Lay-Off List, fourthly from the Promotional List, and finally from the Eligible List. Furthermore, no promotions are made unless an efficiency rating of 85 % has been achieved in the position already occupied. In 1935 New York City provided for permanent lines of promotion on a city-wide basis rather than on the oldfashioned, narrow departmental scale. In many places special credit is given to promotional candidates who have continued their educational courses. There is also a growing awareness of
COMPARATIVE PRACTICES
83
the desirability of transferring employees, either with or without promotion, not only from one department to another, but from one city to another, and ultimately from one governmental unit to another. Thus, in 1935, five members of the St. Paul police were promoted directly into the State Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. Provisional appointments in promotions bring political influence within the service as much as they do on the threshold of induction. Thus the provisional is almost certain to be the victorious candidate even when competing with others in the department who feel themselves just as qualified to take the promotional examination. It must be said that promotions are almost always filled within the service. At least political henchmen from the outside are rarely moved in over the heads of those henchmen already in the service. Seniority is given great weight—supposedly—but actually the department head determines the promotion, without benefit of efficiency ratings or anything else except his own inclination or the wishes of the politically powerful outside. Improvement in the promotional system is ultimately dependent upon more fundamental reforms, not the least important of which is the curtailment of provisional appointments. D I S M I S S A L S AND S E P A R A T I O N S
Though permanency of tenure is one of the major features of any civil service law, there are always safeguards for the city, and rightly so. For lack of funds or lack of work a man may be honorably dismissed. He may resign of his own free will. He may reach the retirement age. He may be disabled. None of these reasons constitute any major problem. But what of the inefficient man? Is he to be retained because of a blanket law? All the statutes provide for the dismissal of the inefficient, but the procedures for dismissing unsatisfactory workers vary considerably. Departmental heads have the right to dismiss at the end of the probationary period. Charges are usually preferred against subordinates in the permanent service. These may be answered in writing, but often no appeal may be had from the
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APPOINTMENT
appointing officer's decision except in the case of policemen and firemen. There the Commission is generally required to act as a trial court. However, some charters hold that there can be no appeal from dismissal except in the regular courts. There appears to be no proper way of providing dismissal. It should be fair to the employee as well as to the service. Dismissing experienced employees by telegram because "they couldn't wait to write me a decent letter," is, of course, inexcusable and costly to the morale of the administration. All laws list specific reasons for dismissal. Peculiar reasons make interesting reading. In addition to the usual valid grounds such as habitual intoxication, insubordination, conviction of crime, deception in examination, inefficiency, political activity, failure to report absence from duty, going into debt and the like, Minneapolis permits separation for "disloyalty to the government of the United States." The City Manager of Dayton may remove and discharge employees at will for an efficiency rating which is consistently below 7 0 % . Removal for religious or political reasons is invariably forbidden. We have seen in previous sections how easy it is to circumvent the law by simply asking for resignations in blank at the beginning of each new administration in Philadelphia. Thus the unpleasant task of preferring charges for inefficiency is dispensed with as the employees know that they have no redress in any case. Nevertheless the normal number of separations per year in Philadelphia is in the neighborhood of one thousand, while in New York it is approximately two thousand. Of course the latter has a larger service. Dismissals are often used to make room for new political provisionals. It is easier to curb provisional appointments than it it to curb political dismissals for "inefficiency." Hence if it were known that the front door were locked, the back door might not be left open. REINSTATEMENTS
If a man is discharged through no fault of his own, he is usually placed on a reinstatement list for reappointment within a given time. H e is thus given preference over outstanding eligible lists and is not required to take a reexamination. Rein-
COMPARATIVE PRACTICES
85
statements within the year appear to be the regular practice. However, Bridgeport, Minneapolis, and Birmingham permit reinstatement within two years. Philadelphia maintains reinstatement lists that are valid for one year, the names being placed in the inverse order of lay-off. That is to say, those laid off last are placed at the top of the list. Reinstatements are given preference over original entrance. Those separated from the service for delinquency may only be reinstated by permission of the Commission and clearance of the charges made against them. Those who resigned from the service voluntarily may be reinstated within a year of the resignation with the Commission's approval. To the extent that compulsory reinstatements prevent additional provisional appointments they are good. To the extent that a reinstatement once was a political provisional, nothing is gained. TRANSFERS
Cities vary in their willingness to transfer employees within the service from one department to another. Older laws frequently prohibit such transfer unless it is accompanied by competitive examination. However, newer laws are allowing the Personnel Director more latitude in this connection. The success of such an arrangement depends entirely upon the degree to which the merit system actually functions. Portland permits an employee to be transferred once without additional examination, but even then the position may not be made from a lower to a higher position. A central agency that knows the needs of the various departments at any given moment could easily transfer employees in response to demand. This would frequently eliminate the necessity of holding examinations that result in overmanning certain portions of the service for the sake of a sporadic rush period. Moreover, mistakes in original recruitment can often be mitigated by the judicious use of the transfer, either of the temporary or permanent type. It represents a chance to save experience, always a desirable investment. Transfers, like reinstatements, may be used to prevent provisional appointments. On the other hand, if an incompetent political provisional receives a permanent appointment, the po-
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A P P O I N T M E N T
tential value of the transfer privilege in a career service is almost certainly lost. POLITICAL
ACTIVITY
PROHIBITED
A l l laws prohibit the actual participation of civil service employees in politics. Moreover, they are quite specific about what constitutes political activity. Political assessments, contributions, purchase of buttons, and the like are banned. Political party office-holding, soliciting of votes, the use of political influence for city contracts, for promotions, for entrance is carefully circumscribed. Nevertheless, the legal phraseology is quite ineffective. Within the last year New York City indicted thirty civil service racketeers for the sale of promises to obtain places on civil lists. Everybody knows that the rank and file of Philadelphia employees contribute to party finances and also work to swell the party vote. In the last few months the Controller purged the city payroll of known political actives. Employees answer the telephone not in their official capacity but as "leader of the 55th ward." The city's time is frequently used to attend party caucuses or to get out the vote or to attend a political funeral. There is little point in multiplying instances when the generalization stands. It has already been shown how the entire service is politically dominated if the provisional appointment is widely misused. There would be less political activity within the service if there were less political activity in getting into it. VETERAN'S
PREFERENCE
Most civil service laws still carry provisions for veterans' preference. Chicago actually places veterans at the top of the eligible list "provided they are found to possess the business capacity necessary." In promotional examinations, however, Chicago veterans receive only additional percentages added to their examination grade. Even the recent Jacksonville law permits ex-service men to be placed at the head of the eligible register. Dayton gives veterans an additional 20% of their total grade in examination, and the same procedure is followed in Youngs-
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PRACTICES
87
town and Scranton. All cities in Massachusetts are under the jurisdiction of a state-administered Civil Service law. Here veterans of the Civil War and persons having received medals of honor need not take any examination at all. Other veterans do take the examination but are placed at the head of the eligible list in the order of their ranking in examination. Disabled veterans are given preference over all other persons, including veterans. Again the merit principle has had to bow to political expediency. Service to nation, as service to party, receives the spoils of victory. Philadelphia's civil service is not overloaded with veterans as are some others. Nevertheless veterans invariably enter the service through the provisional ranks. IN-SERVICE TRAINING
In-service training on the municipal level is even more experimental than it is on state and federal levels. Nevertheless, New York City has begun to cooperate with its local educational institutions in placing students with the city service. The National Youth Administration is also fostering student surveys which appear to have been rather valuable. Private industry long ago realized the value of equipping employees with preliminary training. Public service is only awakening to the promising opportunities in this direction. No form of interneship has ever been contemplated in the Philadelphia system. But there are many other cities that have been equally unimpressed. There can be no hope of adopting such a modern practice in any service where political provisionals flourish. This chapter has endeavored to do several things. First, it has attempted to show how the practice of appointing provisionals is affected by the legal division of the service, its size, the type of Commission, and the particular classification scheme in operation. On the other hand, it has shown the effect of the provisional appointment on salary standardization, service ratings, examination technique, eligible lists, probation periods, promotions, dismissals, separations, reinstatements, transfers, political activity, veterans' preference, and in-service training. Finally, comparative civil service practices were presented.
VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS the provisional appointment is the most vulnerable aspect of American municipal civil service, it has been made the study of this book. T h e Philadelphia service was presented as a whole in order to show the place of the provisional appointment in any merit system. That place happens to be strategically located at the threshold of induction where the work of the finest civil service law drafted can be readily nullified. ECAUSE
B
Because most American municipalities are still battling political spoilsmen, civil service as an instrument of protection has been largely unsuccessful—primarily due to the abuse of the provisional appointment. If the merit principle has not been successful as an instrument of protection, it is obviously not yet ready to be an instrument of service. Hence too much attention cannot be paid to inductive techniques. Provisional appointments are necessary safety valves. Therefore they are written into the law. W h e n politicians use the safety valve as a normal mechanism, there is no illegality involved. T h u s there can be no effective protest, nor can the Commission be held responsible for any violation. It has been shown in the preceding pages that in Philadelphia 9 0 % of the permanent appointments to the service normally have the advantage of provisional appointment in the first instance. This becomes significant when it is proved that provisional appointments are political in nature. Authorities in other cities admit that the most common way of evading the merit system is to employ provisional appointments. This is particularly true in municipalities where the party machine flourishes. However, the abuse has been eliminated in a few well-governed cities, and numerous devices are being developed to curtail the practice. Police and fire services throughout the country have shown the most progress in controlling the misuse of this device.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
89
Because no provisional appointment can be made without the consent of the Civil Service Commission, the public would do well to assure itself of an independent staff. From then on, one might expect the merit principle to develop its potentialities first as an instrument of public protection, and secondly as an instrument of public service. Credit must be given for the good features of Philadelphia's civil service administration. The present administrators must not be held responsible for the deficiencies of the charter law. The law itself is strictly observed. There are no illegalities discernible in its administration. The city happens to have a form of government where power is evenly divided between the mayor and the council. Thus the executive is compelled to use the patronage machine to preserve his office from legislative encroachment. Even the best of mayors has been forced into this position. Hence the Commission cannot be independent. There is no doubt that the uses to which the patronage system might be put could be a great deal worse—are in fact a great deal worse in many other places. The backbone of civic protection, namely the police and fire services, is removed from the worst political influences. As a matter of fact, Philadelphia's fire service is one of the best in the country in the matter of equipment and performance. The records of the Commission are in good shape. Every examination is carefully preserved. Every civil list is complete and up to date. The efficiency of the permanent staff is higher than might be expected. The Trial Board appears to administer justice even in the face of political opposition. The law itself has some fine features—for example, the three-month limitation of provisionals and the prohibition against successive provisional appointments. The respective weightings in examinations appear to be scientific. On the other hand, the system as administered is open to many charges. The Commission is not independent. It must take orders from the comptroller and from the Mayor, to say nothing of an infinite number of small-time politicians. Being under the control of the party machine little can be expected in the way of better government personnel. Moreover, from all indications,
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it is likely to continue under the domination of a party machine— if not one then another. T h e practice of granting provisional appointments is abused. Therefore there is no attempt made to give modern examinations. Nor is there sound classification of positions. There is no salary standardization. T h e probation period is generally ignored. There is not sufficient freedom of transfer. There is no system of efficiency ratings. T h e wholesale use of resignations in blank date is unsound. Promotions are rigid in line and political in nature. There are too many exemptions. And the Councilmanic appropriation for the maintenance of the staff is inadequate. The most important single indictment is the abuse of the provisional appointment, and if the Commission had a popular mandate to do so it could improve the whole system with little effort. However, there is a definite need for a fundamental revamping of the city's government which would permit a merit system to fulfill its dual function of protection against the spoilsmen and service for the public. Philadelphia ought to have citycounty consolidation that would make it possible to extend the merit system to all public offices. The Corrupt Practices Acts should be widened in order to prevent the political machine from drawing on undesirable financial sources once it can no longer depend on political assessment of officeholders. If the citymanager plan were adopted, the executive would no longer need to control patronage in order to whip Council into line for the execution of his policies. If the city-manager were a non-resident, it might be desirable to give him complete control over the hiring and firing of civil service employees. The Civil Service L a w might be drafted along modern lines to provide for: 1 1. An independent expert Commission with a long staggered tenure and an adequate salary or honorary prestige in lieu thereof. 2. A Personnel Director with a central statistical, research agency. 3. Improved methods of recruitment that would penalize the 1 The incorporation of these provisions in any municipal civil service law would unquestionably improve the caliber of public administration and go f a r toward establishing a definite career service in government.
S U M M A R Y A N D CONCLUSIONS abuse of provisional appointments and make it possible to establish: a. In-service training. b. Short-answer written examinations plus expertly conducted oral examinations. c. Extension of examinations to all administrative positions. d. Appointment of the highest on the eligible list. e. Careful supervision during the probationary period. f. Establishment of training schools. g. Abolition of the residence requirement. h. Elimination of veterans' preference. i. Increased publicity, via radio, advertisement in technical journals and the like, in order to attract career servants. 4. Improved methods of maintenance, i.e.: a. Classification of positions. b. Standardization of salaries. c. Establishment of some adequate efficiency-rating system. d. Certification of payrolls. e. Uniform hours, vacations, holidays and sick-leave privileges. f. Flexibility in transfer. g. Better promotion technique. h. Abolition of reinstatement for all except those who were laid off for lack of funds, or lack of work. i. Increased publicity given to Annual Reports of the Commission. j. Modern pension system on an actuarial basis for superannuated employees, with employee and city contributions. Based on age and length of service. k. Cooperation between the Commission and the Civil Service Employees Union. 1. Appropriation of at least eight dollars per employee for the use of the Civil Service Commission. There is a final conclusion without which no treatise on civil service would be complete—namely, that the administration of any law is principally a matter of good faith. Without the good will and good faith of those in charge of its execution, the finest
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legal draft can be put to naught. It is difficult to generalize about the status of any governmental concept, but it seems fair to say that the majority of cities in the United States are still engaged in thwarting the spoilsmen, a task for which their laws were unsuccessfully designed. Thus it is that the problem of induction to the service is still the most pressing problem of better municipal personnel. Without the control of provisional appointments at the inductive level, the adoption of modern techniques such as those outlined above would be virtually useless.
APPENDIX: VERBATIM TESTIMONY OF PUBLIC OFFICEHOLDERS Testimony of a Confidential Secretary in a City
Department
Question: W h a t is your impression of the practice of granting provisional appointments in Philadelphia? There is no such thing as the merit system in Philadelphia or in any other city in the United States. T h e r e is no system that is completely free from political manipulation. T h e Philadelphia system was never intended to be a merit system in the proper sense of the word. T h e law is faulty. I can drive a team of horses through almost every section of it. T h e r e is not an appointment made that does not have to have the endorsement of the precinct leader, the ward leader, and the councilman. Question: Does that apply to the police and fire services too? Yes. T h e police system in Philadelphia at the present time is much more corrupt than the provisional appointment practice because of the protection that the police are giving to the white slave and drug traffics. Beside such a situation, the political aspect of the civil service sinks into insignificance. Question: M y statistics show that approximately 9 0 % of the provisional appointees get to the top of the eligible list. D o you know how that is managed? Y e s . Sometimes the examination grades are deliberately changed even if they have been honestly marked in the first instance. T h e more usual method is to give a greater weighting to the provisional appointee on personal or physical fitness. Question: Have there never been any appointments from the eligible lists to your knowledge that have been free from political influence? Sometimes a man will reach the top of the eligible list on his ability but before he is appointed he must make contact with his ward organization. Occasionally an expert technician in some field is so valuable that political factors must be overlooked. Usually such a man is placed in the exempt class.
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PROVISIONAL A P P O I N T M E N T Question: Do you think that the practice of granting exemptions is abused? I know it is. I never had to take a civil service examination, nor did my personal secretary. I could not afford to give her the time off to take the examination so the Commission simply exempted her. There is no reason why any person in the employ of the city—that is, with the exception of the elective offices—should be exempt from a civil service test that is honestly administered. Question: Is there a split in the present commission ? On the surface, perhaps, but not on any fundamental matter. The feigning of a split is good politics because persistent office seekers can be dissuaded on the ground that the other members of the commission are not friendly. Council elects the Commissioners so there must be compromise on some counts, but the Commission works as a unit nevertheless. Question: Are there any sinecure jobs in the service to your knowledge ? Yes, plenty. Question: Mr. A—, in the Transit Bureau, insisted to me that he has been in the employ of the city for twenty-five years and during that time he has had nothing to do with politics. Do you believe that to be true ? Yes. Mr. A— is a Transit expert of the highest grade. He has kept himself entirely free from political contacts. But every administration tries to abolish his job for that very reason—until they find that they simply cannot get along without this key man. He is sadly underpaid. He knows more about transit problems than any man in the country. He is frequently called to Boston and New York for consultation. He is quite na'ive about the political aspects of his surroundings. But he is the one man who has kept the city transit system from being worse than it is. His is an exceptional case. Question: Do you believe that there is complete acquiescence on the part of the entire Civil Service Commission to the wishes of the political machine ? I have known the Chief Clerk to go to bat for some members of his staff whom he knows to be efficient. Ordinarily he is acquiescent, but when the work of his department is endangered by the dismissal of some particularly efficient employee, he has been known to defy the political machine. Then, too, the President of the Commission seems to be a fine man. While he cooperates with the party on most
TESTIMONY
OF
OFFICEHOLDERS
issues, I doubt whether he would ever knowingly allow the law to be deliberately broken. Question: I have plotted a graph of the seniority record of all city employees and I find a rather large percentage who have held office for many years. H o w do you account for this nucleus of permanent employees if political considerations are invariably paramount? There is no employee at City Hall who can be absolutely certain of his job. If you walk through the corridors around election time you will find little groups of them everywhere discussing the possibilities of a new administration. If they do stay it is because they have been ardent workers for the party, because they have not antagonized ward leaders, or because they themselves hold political power in the wards. Question: Is the school medical inspection service on a higher level than other branches of the service? I have come to the conclusion that it is the best administered unit in the city. Yes. T h i s service is maintained on a high level—after recruitment. Even the doctors have to have political endorsement before they get on the payroll. Once on the payroll they are comparatively safe from political pressure. A s a matter of fact there are some jobs that require the service of medical men that do not involve any pay and even these must be endorsed politically! Some people who would not stoop to political favors for money are not averse to accepting a political job without pay—just for the honor of it. Question: During the four years of the last administration I found that a large number of persons obtained jobs who were not provisionally appointed in the first instance. T h i s would lead one to believe that these were outsiders who took the examinations and quite honestly came out at the top of the eligible list. Is this assumption correct? No. W h a t happened was this. In 1932 there was a change of administration. Y o u will find that about 9 0 % of the provisionals were later made permanent. T h e n in 1933, 1934, and 1935 you will find that only about 6 3 % of those appointed were provisionals but that does not mean that the other 3 7 % were non-political. O n the contrary. There were a great many promotions during those years and while provisional appointments are customary for promotions, frequently the examinations were given without the provisional appointment but the specifications were so narrow that virtually the only persons eligible for the examination were one or two politicians. Be-
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cause their names did not first appear on the provisional list does not at all mean that they were free from politics. Testimony of a former Sheriff of
Philadelfhia
Question: D o you know personally every man in your ward who holds a public office ? Yes. All ward leaders know their officeholders because they are the ones who have to recommend them for jobs. Question: D o committeemen, ward leaders, and councilmen have to endorse each jobholder? T h e organization works like this. T h e people elect the committeemen, then the big city committee elects the ward leaders from the committeemen. T h e ward leaders have to give their recommendation for councilmen. Well, wait a minute. T h a t last doesn't always hold. I had a councilman forced on me by M r . Vare whom I didn't want, but that is an unusual case. Usually the ward leaders pick their councilmen. Well, the whole organization is rooted in the people and it only lasts as long as it gives service. One of the services which the party has to render is the dispensation of jobs. N o w usually the committeeman sends an applicant to the ward leader, so actually both the district leader and the ward leader endorse the man. T h e councilman's endorsement is not necessary. Question: Does this apply to the police and fire departments too? Well, no. Not to the same extent. Policemen and firemen may give the ward leader's name as reference but they don't need to. As a matter of fact I have about twenty or thirty policemen in my ward who did not have my help in getting their jobs. Question: Does the executive branch have a tighter hold on the patronage than the ward leaders? Perhaps. But the Mayor's office can't put in anybody and everybody either. T h e mayor's friends also have to pass civil service examinations. Question: If you give a man a job in your ward and he moves out of the ward do you believe.that the job belongs to you? Ordinarily I do, but there may be exceptions. For instance, some time ago I got a man a job and he had a large family. W h e n the family grew up, the neighborhood had deteriorated. It was overrun by some southern sharecropper Negroes who had moved North. T h e man came to me and said he wanted to move. So I said all right, I understood. Just the same, if that man had had the right spirit he would have moved to the nice part of my ward instead of moving out
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OF OFFICEHOLDERS
97
altogether. But I guess his family had something to say about that. I think that if the ward is good enough for me, it is good enough for him. After all, I've run a business up there for thirty-eight years. I couldn't move out. So this man was earning his livelihood from a public office through my ward. He shouldn't have left that ward either. Question: Did you ever try to create jobs for your workers? No. A ward leader can't create a job by himself. There has to be a legal reason for it and councilmanic approval and so forth. I was Sheriff of Philadelphia from 19. . to 19. . . Ordinarily we have about two hundred sheriff sales a month but during the depression we were having as many as eight and ten thousand a month. I kept thinking each month that this couldn't last so I overworked my staff instead of getting more help. But it never did let up and those boys certainly earned their money those four years. But none of them died from the work just the same. Question: Y o u were a real estate assessor once, were you not? Yes. W e thought we were good if we could come within 1 0 % of the right value for our assessments. Testimony
of a County
Commissioner
Question: D o you know personally everyone in your ward who holds a city job? Yes, every single one. Question: D o officeholders have to have the endorsement of precinct leaders, ward leaders, and councilmen? No. Councilmen have no business meddling with the patronage. T h a t belongs to the ward leader. Just as soon as you allow the councilmen to have anything to say about jobs you split your ward in half. I've seen it work that way too many times. Councilmen should pay attention only to the city's business. That's all. Question: T h e n the ward leader's endorsement is enough? No. It ought to be but it isn't. If the judges have any relatives they get first chance at the jobs after the Mayor's friends have been taken care of. T h e Mayor has a great deal more to say about the patronage than the ward leaders. In the old days all the jobs were handed over automatically to the City Committee Chairman. He parceled them out evenly and fairly. But not any more. It all depends on who you know at the top. Judges ought to be made to keep their hands off patronage. Question: W h a t about the police and fire services?
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W e don't bother with them. O h , well, if a man I've known for twenty years wants my name for a reference before he takes the fireman's examination, I'm always glad to give it to him. Remember I am a Republican. I never recommend anyone for any job who can't help the party along with votes. But I'd never ask a policeman or a fireman to do any political work even after I gave them a reference. Question: Have any policemen or firemen in your ward ever got their jobs without your endorsement? Yes, they are doing it right along now. Question: If you helped a man to get a job and he moves out of your ward, do you think that the job belongs to you ? If I give a man a job I ' m pretty sure that he is going to stay with me. But it is true that the jobs are not evenly divided as they should be. T h e old ward leaders have the advantage over the new ones. I've been a party worker for forty years. I fear no man in the Republican Organization. I am outspoken. I was a close friend of Bill Vare when he died. I was one of the few who did not run out on him when he was sick. He gave me a job years ago and I never forgot it. W h y , there are some ward leaders today who ought to be driving ash carts. They don't deserve their jobs. Question: D o you believe in the Civil Service system? Yes, I do. I think it is a protection for the worker. Otherwise he could be fired whenever the boss felt like it. It does try to obtain men who can at least read and write. That's something. Testimony of City Councilman
A
Question: D o you know personally every office holder in your ward? No. M y committeemen do. I guess I know 9 0 % of them though. Question: D o all jobholders have to have the endorsement of the committeeman, the ward leader, and the councilman? That's the theory on which we work. Question: If a jobholder in your district moves to another district do you want his job back again ? Sure. If you did something for somebody else and that person walked out on you, you wouldn't like it, would you? W e l l neither do I. Sure, that's my job and I go after it all right. Question: D o you believe that there is a fair distribution of jobs among the wards? No. That's always a contention. Some wards have a lot of patronage and others have very little.
T E S T I M O N Y OF OFFICEHOLDERS
99
Question: What happens when a ward is divided into two wards? The patronage falls wherever the addresses of the officeholders fall. Question: Do you believe in the merit system? No. Look at what's happened at Washington and at Harrisburg. W h y , they've thrown civil service into the ocean and it's not fair. Question: Has it hurt your ward organization? Sure it has. A man gets a job or relief from the Democrats so naturally he has to vote Democratic. They've thrown civil service into the ocean. Question: Have you ever known of civil service being used to throw off persistent office seekers without incurring their displeasure? Well yes, it has been used that way. Testimony of Ward Leader A Question: Do you know personally every man in your ward who holds a city job? Almost all of them, but not every one. Question: Do you ever rotate your jobs in order to get more votes? Yes. Question: What endorsement is needed to obtain a city job? Theory is that you need your precinct, ward, and councflmanic endorsement. Question: For police and fire services too? No. That's under civil service and we can't touch them. If you are thinking about going into politics, take my advice and stay out of it. It has just about ruined me. I am trying to persuade my enthusiastic twenty-one-year-old boy not to follow in my footsteps because it's ruined me and it will ruin him. Question: Is there a fair distribution of jobs among the wards? No. Testimony of City Councilman Β Question: Do you know personally every office holder in your ward? All except one and he is just a recent appointee. I've lived in my ward for thirty-five years so I ought to know everybody. Question: Do you have to endorse every appointment made from your ward? No. I don't say that I ever "endorsed" any appointment. If a policeman or fireman wants to give his committeeman's name as a reference he can do that just like he can give his preacher's or his
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
doctor's name. Remember, though, the man always has to take a civil service examination and pass. Question: Do you believe in civil service ? Yes I do when it is administered right. Not the way it is being administered by the federal government now. Why they've taken 250,000 Democrats and put them under Civil Service to make their jobs permanent. That isn't fair, because there were a lot of men who had to be laid off in 1 9 3 2 because of lack of funds. Those are the ones that should have been reinstated when the money came back. T h e Democratic governments at Washington and Harrisburg have just ruined our ward morale. I think if you have a civil service system you ought to keep it civil service and not let partisan politics enter into it. Question: Do you ever withdraw your endorsement from a provisional appointment? No, but if the man isn't good enough after three months he is sometimes dropped. Question: T h e provisionals almost always come out on top of the eligible list, don't they? Yes, they do because they are naturally more familiar with the job. If you asked me a question about some point in education I would probably fail. Ask me something about politics and I'd do all right. Well, it's the same with the provisional. He is in his own field so he comes out on top. That doesn't mean he's always the best man either. Question: Do you ever lose any job in your ward to another ward? Yes. In the last thirty years I have probably lost a hundred jobs because my district is changing from a residential to a commercial center. When they tear down residences to put up office buildings my job holders have to move out. I don't take their jobs from them when they go. Then, too, the Civil Service Commission takes one of the first three on the list regardless of where the man lives so that sometimes loses a place for me. Again I don't always have the proper men for the jobs that are vacant, so if I don't have good enough men there is no use in sending just anybody up because they will fail in the examinations. Testimony of Ward Leader
Β
Question: A m I correct in believing that every appointment to the city service must be accompanied by the endorsement of the precinct leader, the ward leader, and the councilman?
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101
No! Don't you know that we have a civil service system in this city where people have to compete in examinations and the best men get the jobs? I believe in the merit system. I think the one we have here works fine. I think civil service all over the United States works fine— everywhere that is except in the Federal Government, and I think the practices in the municipalities are better than in the federal postoffices. Why, I have a darky who delivers my mail in our neighborhood and he can't even read my name. That's the federal civil service for you! Why, when I tried to get a bright young boy a job, and he was one of the smartest boys I know, he had to come up before that Civil Service Commission and he couldn't do fractions, so he just failed that examination, came out about number 40 on the eligible list, and I never could get him placed. I think Commissioner D is an honest upright man. He wouldn't do anything crooked. Question: Is it not true though that the organization must approve all city appointments? Well,—yes. Those appointments are usually favors for politicians. But the city committee doesn't pass on all the jobs. Just the committeemen, the ward leaders and the councilmen, but not the city committee. W h y , I believe that every man is honest until he shows me that he is crooked. When I took over the Philadelphia Organization in 1932 we were at the lowest ebb. W e had lost the election, the committeemen were out of jobs, their morale was gone, the leader was dead, there was factional fighting, we had debts all around us—nothing could have been worse. Then, do you know what I did? I thought of the women. They had not been in politics very much until that time. Their morale was not broken. There were only seventy-eight women's political clubs—Republican clubs, that is. I organized them. Now we have 1,500 active women's clubs, the morale of the organization is restored, we won the next election by 17,000, the one after that by 49,000 and we are going to win this election by 100,000! I never divide my loyalties. I am a Republican through and through. What do I get out of politics? The only reason why I am in politics today is because I am one of the few men who believe in the Constitution and the American ideals of the past. I am financially independent and I don't need anything from politics, but I am giving my life to defeating Roosevelt and saving our American institutions. And if some politician has been talking to you about me and my organization, you just remember that. Question: Do all provisional appointees become permanent appointees, in your estimation ?
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
No. Often there is no intention on the part of the ward leaders to endorse provisionals for more than three months. After that somebody else gets a chance. Question: But if the ward leader wants a provisional permanently appointed, there is no difficulty about that, is there ? No, I suppose not—if the man is good enough to pass the examination. Testimony of ση A ssistant Chief Clerk, tti a City
Department
Question: D o you ever receive any men in this department who were not originally provisionally appointed? Y e s indeed. See those two stenographers over there. T h e y took the examinations ten or twelve years ago and came out at the top of the list, got appointed, and they've been working for me ever since. Question: Are they exceptions or the general rule? Well, provisional appointments are more usual though not invariably so. Question: T o the best of your knowledge are provisional appointments political? Not always. Usually. Question: If you get any non-political employees do they not have to become acquainted with their ward leaders? Yes. I suggest to them that it would be good policy to make the acquaintance of their committeemen and of their ward leader. T h e y need do nothing more than that, however. And they are certainly never bothered by the politicians after that. I am speaking now of the 4 0 % "efficiency staff" that functions without political interference. Sixty per cent of the service is admittedly political and we expect a 6 0 % turnover with each new administration. Everybody knows that this 6 0 % has to get out the vote and all the rest of that. W e struggle along with them as best we can. T h e y never have anything but routine jobs anyway and they don't expect to keep their jobs so it's easy come easy go. But with the 4 0 % permanents, we get first-rate service that is free from political pressure. Question: Where did you get the 40-60 figure? I am a college graduate, an instructor in a School of Engineering, an efficiency expert, and that is my own conclusion based on some twenty years of observation. Question: Are promotions made within the service or do outsiders ever compete?
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OF OFFICEHOLDERS
103
Promotions in our department are made within the service. Question: D o you maintain any kind of efficiency ratings? No. W e don't need any performance ratings for the 6 0 % political appointments, and as for the 4 0 % permanents, well I know every man and woman in the department and I know just how efficient each one is in his own job. W e had one man in the service who has worked for the city for 50 years. He could have been retired on pension long ago but we thought it was a good publicity stunt to keep him on. T h e newspapers used to publicize the fact that here was a man who had a permanent job with the city—fifty years, no politics, pension if he wanted it, full time if he didn't. T h a t was in order to inspire faith in the service and to attract better people to it. Question: A t the beginning of each new administration, do you follow the usual practice of collecting resignations from all members of your department? No. I have full faith in the Civil Service Commission. I think M r . Η is a splendid chief clerk. He knows his job better than anyone. He sends me good men. Incidentally there is nothing inherently wrong with organized politics. Even reformers have to have organization. W e are living in a real world and we have to make compromises. Nothing can be ideal, human nature being what it is. T h e only thing that a person can do is to accept human weaknesses for what they are and operate as honestly as possible. N o w in our department we insist on purchasing only the first grade lumber, wheelbarrows, and other supplies for use in city property. W h y ? W e l l because in the long run that saves the city money. Just as soon as we use second grade lumber, the grandstand collapses and people are hurt—which results in the city's being sued. So we figure it is cheaper to use the best even if it does seem a little more expensive in the first instance. T h e n , too, once in a while we have to find a farmer to cultivate some of the grounds around the city hospitals. W e l l , there aren't any farmers living in the city, so in spite of the law saying that all city employees must live in the city, we have to go outside for a good farmer. O f course, we make him live on the city property so that he will have a city residence, but that is not dishonest or corrupt. Some people would have you believe that the politicians were violating the law in hiring outside help. T h a t simply isn't true. There is no other alternative in such cases. I get as good results out of my 4 0 % permanent staff as any private industry could get. Once in a while my banker friends say to me: " A h a , I see you had another inside payroll robbery today." But they never want to compare
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the many times that such a thing happens in private business. It is only the mistakes of public business that are publicized. Testimony
of a Chief Clerk in a City
Department
Question: Are the appointments to your department political? No, thank goodness. This happens to be a very technical department. Instead of being pestered by politicians, I have a hard time finding people to fill the jobs in my department. There are only three cities in the United States that have underground transit systems—Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. Consequently we are almost always short of expert help. Besides, all my men have to be college graduates—because this is an engineering department primarily. I draw up the specifications, send them to the Civil Service Commission, ask them to hold an examination, and send me some men. T h e system works beautifully. I couldn't function without the Commission. Question: At the beginning of each administration, do you not follow the usual procedure of collecting resignations, blank date, from your employees? Well, I have had to do that as a matter of routine, and the men are always hurt about it too, but I only file them away in the safe for a few months and then bring them out and tear them up in the presence of all assembled. Question: Do ward leaders ever come into your department and ask you to create a vacancy for some political henchman ? No. I have been in this service for twenty-five years and I can honestly say that I am never molested. Question: Do you mean to say that your employees do not have to have the endorsement of the ward leader to hold their jobs? Not to my knowledge. You may call them in and ask them for yourself. I'll send for M r . Κ , one of my best men. Κ , have you ever had to see a ward politician to keep this job? Mr. Κ : Yes, sir. Mr. A : You did! When ? Do you believe that I wouldn't keep you on here unless I was told to do so by the politicians? Mr. Κ : I believe you would keep me, sir, if you could, but if the ward leader did not want me here, I don't believe that there is much you could do about it. Mr. A : Well, this is a disappointment and a surprise to me. Is that the way the other men feel about it, Κ ? Mr. Κ : Yes, sir, I believe so.
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OF OFFICEHOLDERS
105
Question: Are promotions made within the ranks? Yes. W h e n I get hold of a good man, I promote him as fast as I can get salary for him. Question: D o you keep efficiency ratings for your staff? No, it isn't necessary because I work with them so closely that I know all their strong points—and their weak points. T o this day I can tell you the whereabouts and the history of nearly every person who ever worked for me in the past thirty years. T h e y are all my friends, and my wife and I have a personal interest in " m y boys." W h a t ' s more I am always on the lookout for bright young college graduates that want a future in civil engineering. Testimony
of a Bureau
Chief
Question: Are you ever approached by ward politicians with requests for placements for political henchmen? Certainly. W a i t a minute and I'll see if there are any hanging around this morning. There are usually a half dozen or more somewhere within reach. Question: D o you ever listen to their requests? Certainly. A l l things being equal, I prefer to accept their recommendations. T h e y are the ones who get us our appropriations. W e help them. T h e y help us. A politician's recommendation is just as good as a doctor's or a lawyer's. O f course if the candidate is not efficient, ward leader or no ward leader, he is not kept on in my department. I give him a chance to make good. T h a t is all that any politician expects. Question: Are promotions made within the service or do you accept political endorsements for these jobs too? If there are any promotions to be made in my department, I am the one who does the appointing, and I know my men, and I promote the ones that I think are best qualified for advancement. Question: W h a t about the Civil Service requirements? T h e y are all met according to law. But remember I have the legal right to certify one of the first two names for appointment. Question: Are most of the jobs in your department filled by provisional appointment? Most of them are, but not all. Question: D o you maintain efficiency ratings for the men in your department? No, why should I when I know all of my employees personally?
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Testimony of the Director of School Medical
Inspection
Question: Do you maintain efficiency ratings for school medical inspectors? Indeed we do. Our personnel files are full of records of every description. There are ninety-two medical inspectors in the public schools. These have to keep complete records of every examination made. Not only do they have to keep reports but the school nurses also have to keep books and the two sets must tally. In addition to that a yearly average of all cases handled is computed and the number handled by each doctor must come within reasonable reach of the average. So the doctors work against their own records and against the records of the group. Then there are inspectors who inspect the inspectors. That is to say, the supervisor diagnoses fifty or a hundred cases annually in each school. These same cases must also be diagnosed by the doctor assigned to that school. There must be a fair correlation in these two independent judgments. If there is not, then I am called in to be the final arbiter. T h e supervisor rates the doctors periodically along with the ratings offered by the school principals, and once a year I rate the ninety-two doctors myself. Question: Is there permanency of tenure in your department? Yes, contingent upon good service. Question: Does politics enter into the appointment of school doctors in the first instance? I do not know anything about that. My doctors reach me through civil service examinations. I don't know anything about them until they report to me for work. It is my job to make good school medical inspectors out of the material that is sent to me. I am in a rather peculiar position myself. T h e Board of Education pays my salary and the salary of all my employees. If I don't meet their requirements they can't abolish my job but they can abolish my salary. On the other hand, if I don't play ball with the boys at City Hall, they can technically abolish these jobs. Then if I don't keep the peace between the Department of Public Health and the Board of Education, the people at Harrisburg will step in. So this is a three-way job and while I know what is going on in my own department, I don't always know what is going on in the others. Question: Are school medical inspectors appointed provisionally in the first instance ? Yes. W e do not have very many vacancies, so eligible lists are not
T E S T I M O N Y OF
OFFICEHOLDERS
always available when vacancies occur—hence the necessity for provisional appointments. As a matter of fact, I always have a few extras or substitutes in the background, in case any of the permanent staff are temporarily indisposed, and when there is a vacancy I can usually fill it provisionally with one of these substitutes. Testimony of an Employee on the Civil Service Staff Question: Are provisional appointments usually political? Usually, but not always. When we need an expert of some kind we do not bother with political considerations but offer the job to a technician for the provisional period of three months until we can either give him an examination, or else declare the position exempt. Unfortunately there is a great deal of political pressure brought to bear upon the Civil Service Commission that cannot be ignored. W e of the staff heartily wish that we could do away altogether with the system of provisional appointments and do all our appointing directly from eligible lists prepared after competitive examinations. It would save us a great deal of bookkeeping and the necessity of holding so many examinations. Of coürse, in emergencies, in cases of unexpected death, where there are no eligible lists, provisional appointments would be necessary. Incidentally there are no provisional appointments for recruiting policemen or firemen. Question: Am I correct in assuming that about 9 0 % of the provisional appointments subsequently become permanent? That would be about right. During the last administration there were not so many because of the necessity of cutting down expenditures. Question: Do you apportion jobs among the various ward leaders according to the size of the ward or other similar considerations? No. W e never bother about that. As a matter of fact, we don't know the ward designation of half our employees. Whenever we do know about it it is usually because the politicians have heard that there is going to be a vacancy even before we know it ourselves! It is our job to hold examinations fairly, honestly, and on time. W e do that to the best of our ability. W e could do it better if the politicians would let us alone. Question: Do provisionals ever serve for more than three months? No. W e observe the law strictly. Of course we do not have a very large staff and sometimes when we have to hold an examination for policemen and firemen for which there are a thousand and more appli-
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cants, it is a physical impossibility to mark them all within the allotted sixty day limit. T h e law is too rigid here, but no great harm is done because this situation will occur only once or twice in a dozen years. Question: Is it not strange that the provisional appointees usually come out at the top of the eligible list? T h a t is not an invariable rule. I can show you cases where the provisionals have done so poorly in the examination that they have not received permanent appointments. O n the other hand, I can show you cases where outsiders did better than the provisionals. Furthermore it is natural that when a man has worked three months on a routine job he should do better in an examination on the nature of that work than a rank stranger. Question: Is it not true that the provisional can always be made to go to the top of the eligible list by simply giving him a 95 or 90 on Personal Fitness or Physical Fitness? I prefer not to answer that question except to say that I can find instances to prove that it is not necessarily true. Question: In your opinion is the practice of granting exemptions abused? No. Exemptions are never made unless they are absolutely necessary. I t is just ridiculous to expect certain groups of people to submit to examinations—lower paid workers, and extremely high-grade professional men. Question: Are jobs classified and are salaries properly standardized? No. W e admit that that is one of the weaknesses of the system. W e have had several notable suggestions for improvement, namely the Griffenhagen and Jacobs reports, but nothing has been done about them. Question: Y o u r examinations are of the practical type required by the Philadelphia law. D o you think that any other type would be more desirable? No. W e have no use for general intelligence tests. W e think they don't prove anything. W e ' v e compared our own system with that of other cities and we think that we have as good a system as they have. O f course, if we had a larger staff we could probably keep more up to date in examination technique. A s it is we have all we can do to carry on with the system we have evolved after many years of experience. Question: Are you in favor of service-ratings for Philadelphia employees? In principle, yes. But they would be expensive and they are not
TESTIMONY OF OFFICEHOLDERS perfect either. I would like to see some elaborate system of qualifications worked out so that the appointing division would know the experience and abilities of every employee at a moment's reading of his divergent qualifications. This would help tremendously in the proper placement of employees. Question: Are there many temporary appointments? Very, very few. I can count them on my fingers for the last ten years. Question: Are labor appointments political? I wouldn't like to say that. Labor appointees must be recruited from the lower strata of society. The turnover is very rapid. Question: Is the tenure of the service secure? We have a sizeable turnover with each new political administration. Every Mayor has to depend on patronage. It is part of the larger system under which we live. Question: If a man refuses to hand in his resignation, what can the Commission do about it? We can always prefer charges against him on grounds of physical disability, inefficiency, age limit, or the like. That, of course, is always unpleasant. Question: Does the city provide pensions for civil service employees? Yes, that is one of the chief attractions of the service. Testimony of Ward header C Question: When a man from your ward wants a city job does he have to have the endorsement of the committeeman, the ward leader, and the councilman? The ward leader is enough. The committeeman's O.K. would not be enough. Question: Does the councilman or the ward leader have greater influence in the matter of patronage? The ward leader, because it is he who makes the Councilman. When we recommend a man or a woman for a city job we know they are lost to the Organization because they must legally become politically inactive. That is not true of a county job of course. Nevertheless it is a reminder to their friends that we stand ready to help. We recommend an Armenian girl for a stenographer's job in City Hall and we get the Armenian vote. We give a state scholarship to a smart Negro boy and we get the colored vote. But we know that the actual recipients of these jobs will probably not amount to much politically. The only reason
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w e give them the jobs is because in themselves they would never amount to much in the Organization but when they symbolize the philanthropy of the party, they serve a better purpose. W e wouldn't send an active, live leader to City Hall. That's only the place where w e send the deadwood. W h e n w e want good men on our organization, w e don't mind raiding the opposition camps. If I want to find out whether a young fellow has any political ability, I don't waste my time indulging him. I deliberately make him angry so that he leaves our party and starts out on his own, either as an independent, a reformer, or a Democrat. T h e n if he does a good job over there I know he has ability, so I offer him a better opportunity than he has any chance of obtaining where he is and he comes back to us with no hard feelings. I know how to get desirable, bright young leaders. I started out as a reformer myself. Question: D o you know personally every city office holder in your ward? Yes. Question: If a vacancy occurs in a city job which has been filled by someone in your ward, do you think that job belongs to your ward? Yes. Jobs vacated by residents in my ward are usually refilled from my ward. T h e patronage system in the United States is all wrong. T h e r e is no reason in the world why a political party should have to exchange favors for votes. In England a politician goes out and canvasses his district at each election, but he doesn't have to dispense jobs. That's the way it should be here. Question: D o you believe in the merit system? T h e merit system throughout the country has had a tremendous setback during the Democratic administration. Eight billion dollars has bought out this election. Penal statutes have been set aside, civil service has been made a farce. W h y right here in Philadelphia, the Mint, the Arsenal, the N a v y Yard are so overcrowded with D e m o cratic watchmen that they are ashamed to have them all on one shift, so they dismiss them in numerous shifts. T h e r e are so many watchmen that they step all over each other in the corridors. A n d as for the W P A ! That's the worst outrage the country has ever known. Question: Does that have any effect on the city patronage? W h y the Negroes in my ward have been Republicans for forty years but they registered Democratic this time in order to keep their W P A jobs. But that doesn't mean they are going to vote Democratic. N o t a bit of it. T h e y know w h o has given them medical care all these
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years, who has paid their rents, helped them out of jail. They have to carry water on both shoulders now though. That's what the WPA has done to our organization. The scholarship funds are a splendid leverage. We offer state scholarships to the University to the racial minorities like the Lithuanians, the Jews, and the colored. These are vote getters because the racial minorities appreciate an opportunity for education. Lately we have been dividing one four-year scholarship among four different boys, but there has been some complaint about that and we'll have to stop it unless we can get the law changed. Testimony of Ward Leader D Question: Do you believe in civil service? Personally I do not. The party would run along much better without it. In the old days a politician could recommend a man for policeman whom he knew to be fearless. Nowadays a man can come from another city—maybe he was a crook—live here a while, and take an examination for policeman. He gets on the list and is appointed. No, it's all wrong. See what I mean? Why I knew a policeman that stood on the wharf for twenty years. He couldn't read or write, but he made a good policeman just the same. A man would come up and hand him a piece of paper on which an address would be written, and he'd simply say, "I left my glasses at home today." But he always knew someone who would help him out and he gave as good service as anybody would want. He was really a wonderful policeman, but under civil service he wouldn't have had a chance. Question: Do you know personally all the city officeholders in your ward? No, not all. I know most of them personally and the rest my committeemen know. Of course I know all of them from hearsay. Question: If a vacancy occurs in a job that was filled by someone in your ward, does that job still belong to you? It should but it doesn't. If you're on the inside of the machine you can get all the jobs you want. I happen to be out of the machine's good graces, consequently jobs in my ward are grabbed off by others before I even know there are vacancies. When there are lists, though, a man has to be taken from those regardless of the politician's wishes. Question: But these lists are often canceled to make way for provisional appointments, are they not? Well, if a list is eleven months old, the appointment is often held up for a month until the list can be legally conceled at the end of one year.
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Question: Do your division leaders always come to you when they want jobs for their district residents? No. Sometimes the district leaders make other contacts at City Hall and get on the list without my knowledge. Testimony of Ward header Ε Question: Is it the tradition in Philadelphia that every city appointee must have the endorsement of the division leader, the ward leader, and the councilman? That is about right. However, no committeeman would be permitted to get a job for anyone without the ward leader's consent unless there was a split between city committee and the ward leader. As a matter of fact, the ward leader's O.K. is all that is necessary. Question: Do outsiders sometimes take the examinations and then come out on the top of the eligible list without political influence? Occasionally that happens, but the ward leader always gets the credit for the appointment anyway. It's worked like this. Civil Service calls up the ward leader and says, "Mr. John Smith has come out third on the eligible list and there are four appointments to be made. I see that he hasn't given any political references in his application, but he lives in your ward. Do you have anything against him?" Then if I say that I don't know the man, they say they are going to appoint him anyway, so then I say, "What's his name and address?" Then I get in touch with him and tell the man that I was responsible for getting him the job even if he was going to get it anyway. That's good business. There's no law against it and it is done wherever the circumstances warrant it. Question: Do you know every city employee in your ward? Yes, every last one of them I know personally. Of course my office is not under Civil Service. It is purely a political job and doesn't pretend to be anything else. I've been in this office for thirty-five years. I am a hundred percent Republican. I can't even see anything else. Perhaps I am too partisan. I don't know, but it is the way I'm made. Well, we get plenty of hamfatters in these political jobs, but if they don't hold up even we politicians get rid of them gradually—usually right after one election and long before another. After all, the heads of city departments are responsible for getting work done and much as we'd like to do somebody a favor, we've got to have efficient men or else we take the blame. So whenever a fellow ward leader wants me to place one of his men in my department I take him on until he proves
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that he can't do the work, and after that I've done all I can be expected to do. Out he goes. Question: Do you ever withdraw your endorsement from a provisional appointment at the expiration of the three-month period? No. Provisional appointments always go through unless a man simply can't do anything in the examination. Anyway the ward leader gets the credit for having done his best. Question: Do you feel that you have a vested interest in the jobs filled by your ward residents? Yes. W e fight to keep the jobs in our ward. If a man from my ward who holds a city job moves into another ward, he is apt to lose his job, because I need that job for my own patronage. W e feel that there is an unfair distribution of jobs among the various wards. It is a constant source of trouble. Question: Are these jobs ever reapportioned, and if so by whom? No, they just grow up by custom. It was a hard fight to get them in the first place, and it is a harder fight to keep them. Question: D o you believe in the merit system? Yes and no. While my department is not under Civil Service, nevertheless I give my applicants a kind of civil service test. That's the merit system applied to politicians. If I'm going to have politicians, at least I want the best politicians I can find. I give a man an application blank with some thirty questions and then I watch him fill it out, from the corner of my eye. If he hesitates, bites his pen, asks what he should write in here and there, makes mistakes—right away I know he is no good. However, I think patronage is essential to a party machine in the United States. If you don't have patronage, you have to depend on protection from corporations, gambling dens, utilities, and the like. Patronage is better than having to grant special privilege to the big corporations. A t least I think it is. Good organization is necessary. There is nothing wrong with tight organization. It just depends on what purpose you use the organization. If the ward leaders keep up the morale of their people, set them a good example by not drinking, gambling, or indulging in any immorality, give their people all the service that is good for them—not necessarily all they want—stand up to their conscience, at the same time they listen to the voice of public opinion, they could never be beaten. Of course, if a man happens to live in the tenderloin district and wants to be a ward leader, he has to be a good fellow, not a goody-goody if he wants those votes. Unfortunately those are the fellows that the public usually hears about. They are the
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ones that give the Organization the black eye which the rest of us cannot remove. I make my district leaders into salesmen. They have a product to sell and they have to have good reasons for convincing the public that the Republican party is better than the Democratic. It isn't enough that their fathers always voted Republican and that they live in a Republican district. They've got to be more convincing than that. W e give our lives to the success of the Organization—not because we have jobs and win elections—that's only incidental—but because we believe heart and soul in the goodness of our party and the democratic system. Testimony
of Ward Leader F
Question: Do you know personally every city office holder in your ward? No. I know many of them and I know of all of them. Ward leaders change but civil service jobs go on indefinitely. However, even if I don't know them all, my district workers do and that is all that is necessary. Question: Do you feel that you have a right to a job that is filled by someone living in your ward, even if that person moves out of your ward, or leaves it vacant for some reason ? There is a tradition that ward leaders should keep the jobs in their own wards but if an officeholder moves into another ward, the new ward leader is only too glad to endorse him because that means another job for him. T h a t usually results in a fight. If a new ward is created, as two were created in the last few years, patronage doesn't follow until the new ward leader is strong enough to fight for it. Question: Do you think that the politician in Philadelphia uses the merit system to his own advantage? Yes. T h e merit system is a great protection to the political party because it lays the blame for failure to place men on the payroll on an impersonal system. No political party has anything to fear from civil service. Patronage of course is the backbone of the party. Without it there couldn't be any political organization. Question: W h o endorses men for the city service? T h e ward leader and the councilmen have to endorse candidates. Question: What about the division leaders and the city committee? T h e endorsement of the division leader is not enough unless the ward leader wishes to accept it since he doesn't know the applicant. A councilman's endorsement has more weight than a ward leader's because the councilman is right on the inside track of the city jobs. T h e City
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Committee never has anything to do with the patronage except perhaps the President of the City Committee who is the head of the Philadelphia Organization and also head of the patronage machine. The City Committee is composed of all the ward leaders. Question: Do you ever withdraw your approval after a three-month provisional in order to circulate the patronage? Never, because that makes too many enemies. Incidentally the ward leaders do not have very much to do with the highly skilled positions in the civil service. W e function mainly with the labor jobs. There the turnover is more rapid. Testimony of a former member of the Civil Service Commission Question: Does every appointment to a city job have to be politically endorsed? Practically. Of course, once in a while a man may do so well in the examination that he reaches the top of the list without political backing. Well, he gets the appointment all right—for a short time, until his ward leader makes a friend of him. If he doesn't play ball, he finds himself out in no time. Civil service is just a laugh. It doesn't exist anywhere in the country. It ought to be abolished because it costs the taxpayers too much money. It's just a farce. Question: Are the Civil Service examinations "fixed" on Personal Fitness and Physical Fitness? I don't know about that, but I believe that it is just done by drawing up an examination that a provisional appointee would have an advantage over an outsider. Question: Do all the ward leaders know their city employees personally? They all should, but they don't. I think about 5 0 % of them go to the trouble of knowing all their employees. T h e other 5 0 % don't bother; That's what's wrong with the Organization today. Of course, about 9 5 % of the committeemen know all the jobholders in their wards, but not the ward leaders themselves. Question: Is a councilman's endorsement more effective than a ward leader's? Under the present administration the councilman is more important. In all other administrations the ward leader was most important, but they both usually work together. Question: Do the policemen and firemen have to have political endorsements too? Yes. The police system in Philadelphia today is just rotten with
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politics. T h e fire bureau is about as clean as any branch of the city service but even there politics enters in on the ground floor to some extent. Question: When you were a member of the Civil Service Commission, how do you account for the fact that there were fewer provisional appointments than usual? Well, we didn't have so much money then and we had to lay off a number of people in 1 9 3 2 . Then when we had to take on more people in the last three years, I insisted that those who were laid off for no fault of their own, should be reinstated. Well, on the civil lists they would be listed as non-provisionals but that doesn't mean anything. They are just as political as if they had been provisionals. Question: A m I right in thinking that about 9 0 % of those provisionally appointed finally receive permanent jobs? That's about right. Maybe 9 5 % . Question: Do jobs belong with the wards that originally filled them? They should of course, but they don't. Sometimes ward leaders will agree to trade. That is if a man in my ward held a job and moved to another ward, the other ward leader would ask me to let him keep the job and I would say yes if the next time one of his men moved to my ward I could have his job. There is such a lot of this moving around business that it's a difficult thing to keep track of. Why about 4 0 % of the city employees don't even live in the city. They simply hire a room somewhere in town, pay $ 1 5 or $20 a year and that's their city address. Don't mean a thing. Question: Do you believe in Civil Service? No. It's a waste of money. Just a false face for the party machine. When I was Commissioner we had Council vote an appropriation for $20,000 for an investigation of some kind—turned out to be the Jacobs Report. Well I was against that from the very beginning. I told them they were wasting their money, but they authorized it anyway. When the thing was finally completed in 1930 a copy of it was brought to me, all tied up in a little bundle, and I never even opened the thing the whole time I was Civil Service Commissioner—for six years after that. I've never read it yet. I never had to. Council appropriated the money and then never adopted the report. That's civil service for you. Costs the city about $85,000 a year to maintain that office and it only works for the politicians anyway. Testimony
of Ward Leader
G.
Question: Do you know personally everyone in your ward who has a city job?
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I most certainly do. A ward leader has to know them all personally. Question: In your opinion is the ward leader's endorsement as effective as the councilman's? It is more effective. M y councilman and I have an agreement whereby I have to make the first endorsement and he gets the second endorsement. If anybody comes to him first, he sends them to me. After all a ward leader only lasts as long as he can control his district. He's got to control his councilman too, but the people in the ward have to respect the councilman as well. So that's why we require the double endorsement, but my O . K . is the most important. Question: If a precinct leader ever dealt directly with the President of the City Committee would you permit it? What's a precinct leader? You mean a committeeman? He would regret it. He wouldn't last any time in my district. I am the leader of the "strip district"—the waterfront—and it's one of the most important wards in the city as far as the Organization goes. It's been regular longer than most of the others. But I've got to assert my control if I expect to hold it. A ward leader has to be as rigid as his district. Question: Do you ever withdraw your O . K . after a provisional appointment? Never have. Once I give it, it stays. Question: Is there harmony among the ward leaders? There is temporarily—until after election. But then there will be a big split. Question: Do you think that there is a fair distribution of jobs among the wards? No. Some wards obtain jobs for every committeeman. Others have only a small proportion. That shouldn't be. Question: Once your ward obtains a job, do you believe that that job belongs to you, no matter what? Y o u bet I do. I fight for that job if I have to chase the incumbent to the end of the earth. But that's a subtle question you ask. W e fought that out in City Committee not so long ago. One ward leader went to great pains to make a park guard. He even got a law passed at Harrisburg creating a new job for this particular man. After a while the man moved to another ward and the new ward leader wanted that job for his man. So there was a big battle I can tell you. T h e old leader said that once he gives his O . K . to anyone, it stays forever and nobody can remove it. Well, his man kept his job for nine years, but the other ward leader finally beat him out of it. Now C and S who have wards alongside of each other and who have a considerable tran-
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sient foreign population have an agreement. If C 's man moves to S 's ward, S has to "clip" that job within a year or else it belongs to C and vice versa. Question: If a new ward is created, do all the ward leaders give up some of their patronage in the interests of the party organization? Get this straight. No ward leader ever gives up anything. He is always fighting for more. He's got to be hard-boiled about such things. Question: Do you have to endorse policemen and firemen as well as other city job holders? After the policemen and firemen are once in, we don't bother with them, but they do have to have my endorsement in the first place. Say there are thirty-five hundred men who take the examination and there are two hundred and fifty jobs to be filled. Well, they are apportioned among the wards and we pick out the names we want, endorse them and the Civil Service Commission arranges for them to come out on top. Testimony of City Councilman C Question: As a party do you believe in the civil service system? Personally I don't but that's just my personal opinion. Question: Do you believe that the Mayor has a tighter hold on the patronage system in Philadelphia than the ward leaders? Well, the Mayor has a tighter hold on the city jobs but we control the county jobs and they are the most profitable ones anyway. Question: Have you ever had to give your endorsement to an applicant for a job in the police or fire departments? Personally I never had to endorse a policeman for anything except promotion. I have helped lots of policemen to get promoted, but never helped any to get their jobs on the force. I think civil service ought to operate there. Question: Do you try to keep the patronage in your ward, or when a man wants to move out with a job, do you let him go? Yes, I let him go. After all he's just as good a party member in one ward as another. I never make any fuss about it. Some of the ward leaders do, I know. But we're all working for the party, not for ourselves. Question: Is there harmony among the ward leaders? Well, there is on some things and not on others. O u r biggest worry right now is what the W P A is going to do to our election totals. So many of my good old Republican families have had to register Democratic this time in order to get their relief money. But they're going
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to vote Republican. W h y this relief business is a racket. I live in a colored ward and the colored people are having more parties, more luxuries, and better times now than they have the whole twenty-two years I've been in politics. There are more tap-rooms opened in my district than ever. I can't get any of the colored folks to do any work. I offered one a job for $21 a week just the other day. I was turned down because she was getting $15 a week from the relief for doing nothing. I think that the whole trouble lies in poor administration. O n e district worker simply has too large a district for him to know what is going on. I think that the mailman or the policemen ought to be made responsible for the administration of relief. T h e y know their beats better than any outsider and they know who needs relief and who doesn't. Testimony of Ward header Η Question: D o you think that the merit system works well in Philadelphia? No I don't W e have the merit system and everywhere it is checked by the political machine. W e have a political machine and everywhere it is checked by some civil service regulation. W e have both, so we have neither. Personally I don't believe in civil service for municipalities. I only believe in it for the federal government because there is an attempt there to provide permanent jobs. In the cities there has to be a turnover too often in order to keep your parties alive. Question: D o ward leaders have more influence in procuring city jobs than councilmen? T h e y should but they don't always. T h e party machine here is handicapped by the fact that the Mayor has more influence and more patronage than the ward leaders put together. W e can never promise our workers anything, because if the Mayor has a friend, then we're simply out of luck. O f course in the county jobs we manage to hold our own. T h a t isn't only the present Mayor either. That's been true of all the Mayors that I can remember. Question: D o you ever endorse men for the police or fire service? I wish I could, but I can't because that's the from top to bottom. W e don't really have a Safety. It's a political system—only it's political zation—that is, personal—for the Mayor. Question: D o you believe that there is a fair among the wards?
mayor's department Director of Public outside the Organidistribution of jobs
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There most certainly is not. M y ward is the largest and most thickly populated in the city and we have the smallest proportion of jobs in any ward, and I don't mind saying I get pretty sore about it. If you know somebody on the inside track, you are all right. Y o u can get all the jobs you want. But if you don't know anybody, it's just too bad. But we still have to be producers of votes, patronage or no patronage. I've been leader in my ward for twenty-two years and I've produced as much as any other ward leader, for all the good it does me when it comes to getting more patronage. Question: D o you know personally all the men in your ward who are on civil service payrolls? How could I? There are 780 of them. I have a complete list of course, and those I don't know, my committeemen know. Testimony
of Ward header
I
Question: D o you know personally every city employee in your ward? Pretty nearly all of them. Question: W h e n you hear of a vacancy formerly filled by one of your ward men, do you believe that that job belongs in your ward? Yes, but if one of my men moves out of my district, I let him take the job with him. He can be just as good a Republican in the next ward as he is in mine. Question: W h e n you certify a man for a provisional appointment, do you ever withdraw your approval at the expiration of three months? No. T h e Civil Service department heads take care of all that. I can never promise anybody anything any more. Because a half dozen other ward leaders are promising their men the same jobs and it's just anybody's guess who gets it. If my boys come out well in the examinations, I'm glad to give them my endorsement. But the ward leaders don't amount to anything any more in the system as it's run today. T h e y are just nothing at all. Question: D o you endorse the policemen and firemen in your ward? Personally I have never endorsed any in twenty-two years. Testimony
of Ward Leader J
Question: D o you know personally everyone in your ward who has a city or county job?
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Not a bit of it. I have a list and I suppose if I went over it carefully, I could identify many of them, but I don't know about that either. Question: What endorsement is needed to obtain a job? T h e ward leader's name as a reference on the application blank is enough. Question: Not the councilman's too? There are fifty ward leaders and only twenty-two councilmen so some wards don't have councilmen. It's all the same anyway. They are all one organization. Question: D o policemen and firemen have to have political endorsement in the first instance? T h e y often give a ward leader's name as reference, but we don't usually touch them. I have policemen and firemen in my ward who were appointed before I became a ward leader five years ago and I can't even reach them. If I could I would have a lot of jobs transferred in my ward. Question: Is there a fair distribution of jobs throughout the city? There isn't and there ought to be. M y ward is larger than many yet it has fewer jobs than a small ward downtown. Question: Is it your impression that provisional appointments usually become permanent? So far as I know they always become permanent—especially if they were appointed by the Mayor. I am thinking of one recent case where the Mayor's provisional came out fifth on the list. T h e Mayor had to go to great trouble to get those names ahead of his to withdraw. I don't know whether civil service fixes the examinations or not. I should not wish to investigate, but I do think Civil Service is on the level. But I simply don't know what goes on over there. I do know that the Commission stands up for its policemen and firemen when we want to get rid of them. Question: If you once obtain a job for your ward, do you believe that it ought to stay in your ward, even if the incumbent moves to another ward? County jobs and labor jobs have to stay in the ward. City civil service jobs don't but they ought to. As a matter of fact it is easy enough to get a man's city job if he moves out of your ward. You give him five days' notice. He has to submit some reason why he should not be dismissed. His reason isn't good enough and that is all there is to it. N o man ought to have a public office just because
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he is competent. If he can't produce the votes, he ought not to be in office. Question: When your workers get city jobs are they not lost to the organization's cause? Well, some of them turn on you and say they are sorry they can't contribute because they are now under Civil Service, but a ward leader can generally make his jobholders produce if he wants to. Question: Do you ever use civil service as an excuse to fend off persistent office-seekers? Well, you can tell a man you'd help him if you could, but that he'll have to stand on his own feet in the examination. T h e trouble is that most of them won't believe you. Question: Does the Mayor's office have the inside track on city jobs? Yes, a ward leader hasn't a chance if the Mayor's got a friend. Question: Do the department heads ever notify you of a vacancy? Never. W e have to be on our toes. When there is a vacancy, fifty ward leaders rush for it. Question: Do you believe in Civil Service? No. You can't have a party system under a democratic government without patronage. The rules of the game apply to both parties. One party is no better and no worse than the other. It just depends on who's in and who's out. No use criticizing the federal government because we do the same thing at City Hall whenever we get a chance. Testimony of Ward Leader Κ Question: Do you know personally everyone in your ward who has a city or county job? Yes, every one. Question: Do you ever withdraw your O.K. from a provisional appointee at the expiration of three months in order to rotate the job? I don't understand your question. I can't imagine a situation of that kind. Once you endorse a man, he goes right through unless he fails to pass the examination. Question: Practically all provisional appointments become permanent, do they not? Yes. A man would have to be pretty dumb in order not to pass
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the examination. T h e provisionals usually do 2 0 % better than the others. Question: Is it necessary to have the endorsement of the committeeman, the ward leader, and the councilman? No. Only the councilman and the ward leader. If the ward leader happens to be the councilman too, why t h e n — Question: Is that true for policemen and firemen also? Well, no. T h e police and fire departments have a special law. It is civil service too, but we don't have anything to say about those services any more. I remember the time when they were provisionally appointed but it hasn't been of late years. Question: Not even in the first instance do you recommend policemen? Doesn't Civil Service call you before they make up the list? No. G e t this straight. W e have a good civil service. Remember too that Civil Service has nothing to do with provisional appointments. T h e department heads make those and they all have to be approved by the Mayor. Question: T h e n the Mayor has a tighter hold on the city patronage than the ward leaders? Yes. But the ward leaders control the county patronage because that is not under civil service. Question: Is there a fair distribution of jobs? No. T h a t is due to poor central organization. T h e city committee often discusses that problem, but never does anything about it. Question: D o jobs once obtained by your ward always stay in that ward? If a man moves out of the ward without getting his leader's permission, he is likely to get into trouble. He has to leave his job behind him. Testimony
of a Real Estate Assessor
Question: D o you know personally everyone in your ward who has a city job? N o , I don't. Question: Is it necessary for city jobholders to have the endorsement of the committeemen, the ward leader, and the councilman? Just the ward leader is enough. Question: Is that true for policemen and firemen too?
124
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
No. W e don't have anything to do with them any more. Once in a while they give our names as references, but that's all. Question: Do most of those provisionally appointed receive permanent appointments? Most of them do because they have an advantage in knowing the work. However, I've known them not to get high enough on the list. But we get the credit for recommending them anyway. But I've known perfect strangers in my ward to come out at the top of the eligible list and of course they get the jobs. On the other hand, I've known men who had every possible political pull but were just too dumb to pass the examinations, so they didn't get the jobs. W e all know that once a man gets a city job, he is lost to the party. Why, I met a man the other day whom I had recommended for a city job three years ago. I haven't seen him since. I had to ask him whether he was still living in my ward. He said he had moved out of the division but was still in the ward. Question: If he had moved out of the ward would you have wanted him to leave that job behind him? No, he would have had to take it because he was protected by Civil Service. Policemen and firemen especially move all over the place and there is nothing we can do about it. Question: Is there a fair distribution of jobs among the wards? Well, no. There just couldn't ever be. County jobs and labor jobs are fairly well allotted, but not city civil service positions. Question: Does the Mayor control the city patronage more than the ward leaders? T o a certain extent. Of course even the Mayor is checked by the Civil Service. He can only make provisional appointments when there isn't a list. Question: Do you believe in Civil Service? Not for county jobs, but for police and fire services, yes. T h e men need protection. That's what's wrong with the federal service today—no protection for the workers. Question: Could the party function without patronage? Yes, I think it could. I've seen it function better without patronage than with it. Then the people fall in love with their party, not because of the jobs it offers them, but because of the principles. Most of the young Republicans and the women are more loyal party workers than those who are always after jobs. I was never interested in
T E S T I M O N Y OF OFFICEHOLDERS
125
a job for twenty-five years. I pulled a throttle on the railroad until I got too old for that. Then was when I became interested in a political job. Testimony of Ward Leader L Question: Do you know personally everyone in your ward who has a city and county job? Yes, every single one. Question: Is it necessary to have the endorsement of the committeeman, the ward leader, and the councilman? T h e ward leader's is enough. Question: Do jobs once in your ward always belong in your ward? County jobs must remain in the ward. If a laborer from my ward moves out my conscience wouldn't let me take his job away from him, because he would most likely have a large family, and his salary would be little enough anyway. Civil Service jobs belong to the city and it's pretty hard to hold them in the ward. Question: Is there a fair distribution of jobs among the various wards? No. Some wards have all the high paid technical jobs, while the other wards seem to have all the low paid stenographers and clerical jobs. T h e higher paid experts are not subject to party assessment nor are they any good for party service. Question: When you speak of party assessment, what dp you mean specifically? There isn't such a thing as assessment really. It is all voluntary. A party has to live on something so it lives on the contributions from its patronage. T h e expenses of a ward leader are heavier than the public ever realizes. There isn't a ward leader in Philadelphia today whose credit is good. After this election I expect to be in debt for my whole next year's salary. All ward leaders have to borrow heavily to finance their wards. I run a day nursery for two hundred children—and it isn't even in my ward either. I have to give shows and benefits to keep it up, and when expenses don't meet I have to dig in my own pocket. Tonight I am giving a show and it will cost me about $125. I only earn $100 a week. Question: Is there a fair distribution of jobs among the wards? No, there isn't. County jobs are apportioned and so are the labor jobs, but the city jobs are not. T h e Mayor controls the city jobs.
126
PROVISIONAL
APPOINTMENT
Testimony of City Councilman
D
Question: D o you know personally everybody in your ward who has a city or county job? Everyone but one, and he is a new administration employee. He was appointed by the Mayor and neither I nor any of my committeemen know him. Question: Is there a fair distribution of jobs among the different wards? No. M y ward was created out of a part of an old ward in 1932 and I had practically no patronage then, but I have built up a fairly good patronage system since then. It is a case of dog eats dog though. Y o u have to fight for everything you get. Question: Once you obtain a job for your ward, do you insist that those jobs remain with you? County jobs must remain in the ward. T h e labor jobs need not remain if a man is poor. W a r d leaders do have a conscience, you know, and my conscience would not let me take away a man's bread and butter even if he did move out of the ward. O f course, if I knew he could get something else where he moved, then I'd take it quickly enough. City jobs are under civil service and it's a little harder to control those, but they can be had if necessary. W e simply prefer charges of inefficiency against the man and he has a hard time proving he is efficient. Question: W h a t about police and fire jobs? W e don't touch those. Occasionally they give our names for reference, but they don't need to. I don't have any firemen living in my ward. Question: Does the Mayor have the inside track on city patronage?· Y e s he does, and he and the judges have the inside track on the county jobs. What's left we get if we fight hard enough. It's a case of dog eats dog. Question: D o department heads ever notify you of vacancies? No indeed. W a r d leaders have to be right there or somebody else will steal the job right out of your own territory. Dog eats dog. Question: Whose endorsement is necessary for a city job? T h e ward leader's is enough. Testimony of City Councilman Ε Question: D o you know personally everyone in your ward who has a city and a county job?
TESTIMONY OF OFFICEHOLDERS
127
No, not everyone. Question: Is it necessary for jobholders to have the endorsement of the committeeman, the ward leader, and the councilman? Yes. Question: Would a councilman ever go over the head of a ward leader in making an appointment? No. Question: What about the police and fire services? Ward leaders have nothing to do with those jobs. They belong under civil service. Question: Is there a fair distribution of jobs among the various wards of the city? No. It would be a good idea to distribute the jobs evenly, but it could never work in practice because of civil service. People move all over. Question: Do you ever withdraw your O . K . from a provisional appointment in order to rotate the job? No. Once I give my O . K . it stays. Question: Do you think that the party could function without patronage? No, I do not.
INDEX Appointments, notice o f , 25,
79-81.
L o n g Beach, 5 5 , 65, 70, 7 1 .
B i r m i n g h a m , 5 2 , 64, 66, go, 8 1 , 82.
Los Angeles, 71.
B r i d g e p o r t , 52, 64, 66, 67, 76, 7 7 , 80.
M e d i c a l Inspectors, Public School, 1 3 ,
Camden, 65.
34. 60, 72. Messick, C h a r l e s P . , 58. M i l w a u k e e , 5 5 , 56, 69, 7 1 , 7 5 , 78,
C e d a r Rapids, 5 2 , 66, 79. Charlotte, 5 2 , 7 9 . C h i c a g o , $$, 63, 6 j , 69, 76, 79, 80,
79. 80. Minneapolis, $3, 5 5 , «3. «S. 6 7 , 69,
82, 86. Cincinnati, 5 3 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 6$, 66, 69, 7 1 . C i v i l Service Commissions, 66-67.
7 1 . 76, 7 7 . 79» 8 o > Newark, N.J., 6 j .
Classified service, 6, 8.
N e w Y o r k C i t y , J 2 , 5 5 , j 6 , 60, 6 5 ,
Classification plans, 6 t , 67-68.
8z>
8 4-
66, 67, 68, 76, 7 7 , 78, 79, 82, 86,
C l e v e l a n d , 5 5 , 69, 74, 78.
87.
Columbus, 5 3 , 5 4 , 5 5 , 65, 76.
N o r f o l k , V a . , 5 3 , 66, 7 1 , 79.
Competitive Class, 6, 1 2 , 20, 4 1 .
O a k l a n d , C a l i f . , 5 4 , 5 5 , 60, 6 5 , 66,
D a l l a s , J 2 - J 3 , 5 5 , 6 j , 66.
69, 72.
D a y t o n , 5 3 , 63, 7 1 , 73, 76, 7 7 , 79,
Paterson, N . J . , 6 j .
84, 86.
Personal Fitness, 3 7 - 3 9 , 62.
Detroit, 66, 80.
P h i l a d e l p h i a , 4 , 29, 5 5 , $7, 6 1 , 6$,
Dismissals, 83-84. Duluth,
68, 69, 7 2 , 7 6 , 7 7 , 7 8 , 79, 80, 8 1 .
J J , 6 5 , 69, 7 1 .
Physical Fitness, 39.
Efficiency records, 1 3 , 1 4 , 7 0 - 7 2 .
P o l i c e Service, 14, 16, 1 7 , 23, 4 6 - 4 7 .
E l i g i b l e lists, 23, 6 1 , 7 9 - 8 1 .
P o l i t i c a l A c t i v i t y , prohibited, 86.
Elizabeth, N . J . , 6 5 .
P o r t l a n d , M e . , 52, 5 5 , 66, 69, 76, 79,
Erie, 5 5 , 66, 69. Examinations, 3 0 - 3 1 , 3 s , 36, 4 1 , 7279·
80. P o r t l a n d , Ore., 53. Practical T e s t , 34-36.
E x e m p t Class, 6, 8, 9, 10, 20.
Probation, 81-82.
F i r e Service, 14, 16, 1 7 , 23, 4 6 - 4 7 .
Promotions, 4 0 - 4 1 ,
G r a n d Rapids, $3, 69, 76, 7 7 , 79, 80.
Provisional lists, 2 5 - 2 9 .
82-83.
G r i f f e n h a g e n R e p o r t , 9, 68.
Reinstatement, 1 3 , 84-85.
H a m i l t o n , O h i o , 5 5 , 65, 66, 69, 74,
Requisition f o r m , 23.
78.
Resignations, 1 7 , 18.
H a r r i s b u r g , P a . , 5 5 , 57.
Sacramento, 5 5 , 66, 69, 74.
Indianapolis, 7 1 , 79.
Salary standardization, 68-70.
In-Service T r a i n i n g , 87. Jacksonville, 52, 5 3 , 56, 6 j , 6 7 , 69, 7 " . 74. 7 7 . 7 9 . 80, 82, 86. Jacobs R e p o r t , 9, 68. Kansas C i t y , 66, 8 1 . K a p l a n , H . E l i o t , 58. L a b o r , 6, 8, 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 4 , 20.
Salt L a k e C i t y , 5 3 , 5 5 , 69, 79. San A n t o n i o , 5 6 , 59, 7 1 . San Francisco, 53, 5 5 , 56, 65, 74. San Jose, 5 2 , 5 5 , 66, 69, 80. Scranton, 53, 63, 76, 78, 80, 8 1 , 87. Seattle, 52, 5 6 , 7 1 .
129
i3o
INDEX
Service ratings, 1 3 , 14., 1 5 , 70-72. St. Paul, 60, 64, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75. 78. 79> *3· Tacoma, 66. Temporary appointments, 20, 2 1 . Training and Experience, 31-34.
Transfers, gj-86. Trenton, N . J . , 65. T r i a l Board, 1 7 . Unclassified service, 6, 7, 8. Veterans' Preference, 32, 86-87. Youngstown, Ohio, 72, 76, 77, 82, 87.