256 9 19MB
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T h e Price of Vision T he D iary o f H enry A . W allace 1 9 4 2 -1 9 4 6
Also by John Morton Blum JOE T U M U L T Y AND THE W ILSON ERA THE REPUBLICAN ROOSEVELT WOODROW WILSON AND THE POLITICS OF M ORALITY y e s t e r d a y ’s c h il d r e n
( Editor )
THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE ( Editor ) THE PROMISE OF AMERICA FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES
i. Years of Crisis, 1928-19)8 11. Years of Urgency, 19)8-1941 in. Years of War, 1941-194S ROOSEVELT AND MORGENTHAU
The Price of Vision
The Diary of Henry A . Wallace 1942-1946 EDITED AN D W IT H A N IN TROD U CTION B Y
JOHN MORTON BLUM
Boston
Houghton Mifflin Company
1973
First Printing w Copyright (g) 1973 by the Estate of H enry A . W allace and John Morton Blum A ll rights reserved. N o part o f this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and record ing, or b y any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data W allace, H enry Agard, 1888-1965. T h e price of vision. i. W allace, H enry Agard, 1888-1965. 2. United States—Politics and government—1933-1945. 3. United States—Politics and government—1945-1953.4. United States—Foreign relations—1933-1945. 5. United States —Foreign relations—1945-1953.1. Blum, John Morton, 1921ed. II. Tide. E748.W23A36 1973 973-9i7'o92'4 [B] 72-6806 ISBN 0-395-17121-0 Printed in the United States of America
T o the Century of tke Common M m
Foreword T o t h o s e w ho do not remember Henry A . W allace or American his tory during W orld W ar II, the significance of the contents o f his diary may not be immediately apparent. T he editing o f this book is intended to help those readers to understand him and the men and issues he discussed. T he biographical sketch o f W allace assays to explain his background, his beliefs, his early years, and his years in public office as they relate to questions o f policy about which he wrote from 1942 through 1946. T he headnotes to each section o f the book attempt to accomplish a similar purpose much more briefly and with reference only to the parts of the diary that follow each o f them. T he still briefer footnotes to the diary entries provide identifications immediately rele vant to his ongoing remarks. In different depth and different contexts, the introduction, headnotes, and footnotes, which can be read inde pendently o f each other, cover some o f the same developments. There follows a discussion of the nature of the diary as a document and the processes adopted for its editing.
A NOTE ON METHOD AND MATERIALS
T h e diary o f Henry A . W allace, as readers o f this edited edition will quickly surmise, consists primarily o f daily entries that W allace ordi narily dictated for typing. Since he did not dictate spelling or punctua tion, I have corrected and standardized spelling and punctuation but retained his paragraph structure. I have also, as the note to the text in dicates at the appropriate place, made other editorial changes for the period of W allace’s trip to Siberia and China. In order to conserve space, I have eliminated the daily calendar o f appointments that usually preceded W allace’s diary entries. Indeed on almost all days in which he kept no diary, his secretary kept the calendar. Notes to the text mark periods o f any considerable length, for example, February, March, and most of April 1945, when W allace made no diary entries. Ordi narily he dictated six or seven days a week, but I have not selected
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material from every day. For the days from which I have used material, ellipses ( . . . ) indicate m y omissions from the full text. T w o short spurts o f diary, one in 1935 during the controversy within the Department of Agriculture, one in 1939-40 preceding, dur ing, and following W allace’s nomination fo r V ic e President, predate the start o f the almost consecutive diary that runs, as this edition indicates, from early 1942 through September 20, 1946. (A s W allace once ob served, he had more time to play tennis after he became V ice Presi dent than he had ever had before; he also had more time to keep a diary, which he never resumed after leaving public office.) Because the material for the fragments of diary o f 1935 and 1940 bears no direct relationship to the material for the period beginning in 1942, I have, according to m y understanding with the W allace family, included none o f the earlier entries in this edition. As the notes to the text show, I have selected for publication here some o f the letters to the Presidents and others that W allace attached to his diary. I have referred to and used in the notes other such letters, as well as texts o f speeches and clippings from newspapers and maga zines which W allace also occasionally attached to or interpolated within his record. O f the actual diary entries for the period 1942-46, this edition in cludes what I consider a representative sample o f W allace’s comments about all significant issues to which he adverted, and a much fuller selection o f his remarks about Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and about questions deeply important to him. Those questions involved the Board o f Economic W arfare and its sundry activities, American occu pation policy during the war, the development of American trade, the problem o f postwar full employment, the control o f atomic energy, and American relations with China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Overall the selections total about twenty-five percent o f the full text. I made the selections w ith the intention o f providing a suffi cient record for laymen or historians interested in the period. O f course a biographer o f W allace w ill want to go to the full, original text, but the diary as here published should satisfy the ordinary needs o f a scholar working on the problems that interested W allace, and should reveal the nature o f W allace’s ideas and policies as well as his modes o f thought and operation. A s his temperament dictated, W allace was a frank but never an intimate diarist. Because he recorded no intimacies, and because, again in keeping w ith his character, his frankness never assumed mean or brutal forms, I have had no occasion to omit passages which might be
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embarrassing, libelous, or slanderous. Still, by previous, friendly agree ment, I did ask the W allace family to review my selections. Mrs. Wallace suggested only a few deletions, none of them of historical significance and all o f them involving only a brief phrase not o f her late husband's but o f an acquaintance talking to him about still a third person. For the notes to the text and for the introduction, the responsibility is solely mine. T h e notes are intended economically to identify the people and the issues W allace mentioned. T h e y are not designed to provide a period history, though now and then I have had to write a paragraph or tw o in order to place a development within a context which the diary does not adequately provide. Especially in those longer passages, as also in the introduction, I have profited from memoirs, biographies, and historical studies that I have cited at relevant points. I have also gained much understanding and received much hospitable encouragement from the W allace family, from Henry A . W allace’s sons, Henry B. Wallace and Robert B. W allace; from his daughter, Mrs. Leslie Douglas; from his sister, Madame Charles Bruggmann; and especially from his widow, Mrs. Henry A . W allace, who is a great lady. I met Mrs. W allace and undertook this venture at the suggestion o f Paul Brooks of Houghton MifHin Company whose comments have improved the final product. This project, like others, my w ife has suf fered gladly in spite of the unavoidable burdens it has occasionally placed upon her family and her professional life. T h e diary o f Henry A . W allace w ill be closed until November 1975, as his w ill stipulates. T he original text, along with a rich collec tion o f other W allace manuscripts and records, is in the Special Col lections Department o f the University o f Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa. W allace’s correspondence as V ice President, which consists pri marily o f incoming letters, is in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at H yde Park, N ew York, while further W allace materials are at the Library o f Congress in Washington, D.C. A n ongoing indexing and microfilming project should soon make all the W allace Papers avail able in all three places. A t the request of the W allace family, the Special Collections Department at die University o f Iowa made the diary itself available to me on microfilm. Also at the request of the family, I was permitted to see parts of the voluminous oral memoir of Henry A . W allace, which is at the Oral History Office of Columbia University in N ew York. That memoir, like the diary, w ill be closed until November 1975. 1 used it sparingly, only where the notes to the text specifically reifer to it.
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Concerned as I have been with editing the diary for the war years, I have not consulted the extensive manuscript materials (except die diary) for the periods before 1942 or after 1946. T h e years this edition covers constitute, I believe, a special and significant part o f W allace’s career, as well as o f American history, for public policy during W orld W ar II moved without sharp interruptions into the early months o f the Cold W ar. That development in turn assumed a more intractable qual ity precisely because W allace was forced to leave public office. T h e portrait o f W allace, while focusing on the period o f 1942-46, attempts, albeit briefly, to relate his spirit, ideas, and policies in that time both to his earlier and to his later life. T hat relationship, however, alike in content and spirit, emerges most clearly and forcefully in the pages o f the diary itself. J ohn M orton B l u m
N ew Haven, Connecticut
Contents Foreword vii Portrait of the Diarist i i. T h e Board o f Economic W arfare February 1942-July 1943
51 11. Witness without Portfolio August 1943-January 1945 *3*
Into the Cold W a r A pril 1945-September 1946 429 h i.
Appendices “ T he Price o f Free W orld V ic to ry ” M ay 8,1942 635
Statement about the Board o f Economic W arfare June 29,1943 641 “T he W a y to Peace” September 12,1946 661 Index 671
Portrait of the Diarist
X JLenry A gard W a lla c e wanted to be V ice President of the United States, mounted no campaign to secure or retain that office, disliked many o f its duties and limitations, and ye t desired renomination and resented those who prevented it. Those attitudes reflected predictable responses b y the kind o f man W allace was to the nature of the vice-presidency, especially under the conditions that Franklin D. Roosevelt imposed upon die conduct o f business during his administrations. T he President could prescribe political snake oil even to so practical an intelligence as W allace’s. A t his ebullient best, Roosevelt could engage W allace’s transcendental faith in progress and brotherhood. W ithin the privacy o f his person, as his diary disclosed, W allace recognized with bemused skepticism his own accepting vulnerability to the combination o f guile and greatness that characterized his chief. In that privacy he also conceded nothing, though officially he had continually to yield, to those decisions of Roosevelt’s that bore adversely on policies to which Wallace attached some personal and larger public importance. During the portentous years o f W orld W ar II, the relationship of the President and the V ice President o f the United States, their com mon objectives and their intermittent disagreements, deeply affected their party, their country, even the world. In considerable measure those relationships also forecast the more bitter and ominous conflicts that were later, at a critical time, to force W allace out of public life and deprive American government o f his humane sensibilities. •
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W allace’s path into and out of the vice-presidency began in the Middle Border, in the Iowa o f the late nineteenth century, where the determining roots o f his being grew out of his family, the soil it nur tured, and the culture it both shaped and absorbed. Alw ays a man o f that west, Wallace brought to Washington the perspectives and com mitments that his western experience fostered continuously from his childhood to his middle life. He was the third Henry Wallace, the son of Henry Cantwell W al
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lace and grandson o f the first Henry Wallace, “ Uncle Henry,” who had grown up on the farm o f his Ulster-Scot father near W est N ewton, Pennsylvania. T he first Henry W allace began his westering in search of a seminary that offered a liberal Calvinist training. A fter ordination o f improved health and of a seminary that offered a liberal Calvinist training. A fter ordination he continued west to Iowa to find a parish comfortable with his own reformist views. Soon he had to escape the tensions o f his over-conscientious pastorate b y turning to w ork the good ground of Winterset, Iowa, where he taught his neighbors about the scientific farming he practiced. Believing, as did thousands of Americans—all spiritual heirs o f Thomas Jefferson—that farmers were the special agents of the Lord on earth, W allace believed, too, that they had a duty to preserve the bounty of the earth. Christian faith, agrarian pride, and a conservationist practicality provided the foundations for the secular sermons that Uncle Henry contributed to his local newspaper during the 1880s. Those doctrines made him, too, a devoted Granger whose editorials attacked industry and the railroads —“ the trusts”—that seemed to arrogate hard-won earnings of Iowa husbandmen to monopolistic profits of remote eastern capitalists. Those messages were the texts also of the ablest farm leaders o f his generation, W allace’s friends Seaman Knapp o f Iowa State College and James W ilson (“Tama Jim” ), another Iowan who was in time to serve the longest term (1897-1913) as Secretary of Agriculture in American history. Together, in sundry ways, they promoted scientific agriculture, sound farm management, and government policies favor able to their constituents. Uncle H enry counseled his constituents primarily through the newspaper he edited, W allace? Farmer, a farm w eekly purchased in 1895 b y bis eldest son and published first in Cedar Rapids and later in Des Moines. He and his tw o friends, with others of similar mind, took their texts to the entire nation in their “ Report of the Commission on Country Life,” prepared in 1908-09 at the instiga tion of President Theodore Roosevelt. A persuasive summation of the program o f agrarian progressives, the report called for redressing the grievances o f rural America so as to preserve a “scientifically and eco nomically sound country life.” For Uncle Henry, that objective would ensure the future o f the nation. “ G ood farming,” he believed, “ is simply obedience to natural law, just as good living is obedience to moral law.” In 1916 his last will and testament encapsulated his creed: “Religion is not a philosophy but a life.” 1 N o one influenced Henry A . W allace more than did Uncle Henry. 1 Quoted in Edward L. and Frederick H . Schapsmeier, Henry A . Wallace of Iowa: T he Agrarian Years, 1910-1940 (Ames, 1968), p. 15. For the period it covers, the
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Bom in 1888, W allace as a small child lived in Ames, where his father was teaching at the state agricultural college. In 1895 the family moved to Des Moines where the boy began to spend hours almost daily with his devoted grandfather. From Uncle H enry, w ho delighted in his grandson’s quick mind and serious manner, young H enry learned about his family, about pioneering, about the land and plants and beasts. He learned, too, to recognize G od in nature and man, and to serve him through w ork—w ork at the chores that sustained the land and its tillers, and w ork at the services that profited mankind. “ Be sure," his mother often told her sons, "that you have clean hands. And remember that you are a W allace and a gentleman." Those lessons reached young W allace from every point o f his boy hood compass. His mother, a dedicated gardener, showed him the satisfactions o f cultivating flowers, which he always loved. "Become gardeners," he recommended to his associates many years later. "T hen you w ill never die, because you have to live to see what happens next year."3 His father guided him through the laboratories at the college and introduced him to a student he had befriended, a lonely, young black genius, G eorge Washington Carver. T h e boy, habitually a soli tary individual, eschewed his contemporaries to follow Carver, always an encouraging tutor, on botanical excursions. Carver “ made so much o f it," W allace recalled, “ . . . that, out o f the goodness o f his heart, he greatly exaggerated m y botanical ability. But his faith aroused m y natural instinct to excel . . . [and] deepened m y appreciation of plants in a w ay I can never forget.” * And like Uncle Henry, Carver saw a divine force in all living things. T h e b oy’s father encouraged his son’s emerging interests. H enry C. W allace, “ H .C .” or H arry to his friends, eldest o f Uncle H enry’s children, had a professional competence in breeding livestock and improving grains. From one of his friends, his teen-age son received some seed com to test for productivity. W ith the seed, in 1904, Henry A . W allace proved that the contours o f an ear o f com did not correlate with its propensity to yield. T h e shape of the ear did not matter; what did was the genetic quality o f the kernel. A t sixteen W allace had discovered that the symmetry o f a plant in Schapsmeiers’ thorough w ork has been continually an important source for this introduction. Also useful for that period were Russell Lord, T h e Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, 1947) and Mordecai Ezekiel, “H enry A . W allace, Agricultural Economist,” Journal of Farm Economics, V ol. 48, N o. 4, Part I, November 1966, >. 789-801. enry A . W allace, “T h e Department as I Have Know n It,” Ms., W allace Papers in the possession o f his family. 8 Quoted in Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, Wallace: Agrarian Years, p. 19.
H
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no w ay assured its utility; indeed that in all life appearances could deceive. His characteristically tousled hair and rumpled clothes at tested to his own indifference to appearance, as did his vigorous but conspicuously inelegant tennis. More important, he had learned from Carver as well as from genetics the lesson that he was later to label “genetic democracy," a doctrine by no means prevalent in the Middle Border or elsewhere in the United States in 1904. His other lessons, some yet fully to be absorbed, had similar vectors. The experience o f westering, for Uncle Henry and through him for his grandson, was an experience o f cooperation, of a mingling of strangers in a common land where essential collective efforts gave individuality a chance to thrive and permitted groups o f individuals to bargain with aggregates o f distant economic power. T he brother hood of man, an article o f Christian faith, was a palpable necessity as a means for surviving the rigors o f the receding frontier and for con trolling the threatening circumstances o f contemporary life. So, too, the application o f intelligence to environment, die employment of science to improve the products of nature, the utilization of economic data to manage the otherwise uncertain fluctuations o f the market— those acts of mind and w ill guaranteed an abundance ample for the comfort o f all men, truly a land o f milk and honey, a new Jerusalem. A t Iowa State College and then on the family newspaper, W allace refined his understanding o f those conclusions. Sober, diligent, ascetic, he made few friends, studied hard, and conducted his experiments with genetics and with techniques for hybridizing com . His Bachelor’s essay demonstrated the importance of soil-building, one form o f con servation, for raising livestock. Problems of land utilization were to interest him for the rest of his life. Though uninvolved in politics, he was, like his father and grandfather, an enthusiastic supporter of Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party in 1912. T he regulatory state that Roosevelt advocated, W allace believed, would ultimately prevail even though the Bull Moose failed. Indeed for the sake o f a prosperous agriculture, it had to prevail. W allace’s studies in economics and mathematics convinced him of that. A fter college he undertook to educate himself in those subjects, as well as to exploit the other resources o f the Des Moines Public Li brary. His children remember him arriving home at night always with a stack o f books in his arms. Soon an expert on statistical correlations, Wallace used that method to derive accurate indices of the cost of production o f hogs. He began publishing those indices in the family newspaper in 1915. On the basis o f other data, he suggested in 1919
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that productivity cycles in livestock had a seven-year pattern—higher productivity followed rising prices until the saturation o f the market led to falling prices that induced lower productivity. Further study, now o f census figures, persuaded W allace that with industrialization and urbanization, the average size o f families diminished. W ith the do mestic market consequently curtailed, farmers would need larger mar kets abroad for their crops. His book summarizing his work, Agricul tural Prices (1920), was, in the judgment of one leading economist, “ perhaps the first realistic econometric study ever published."4 Later W allace mastered even newer techniques for computing multiple cor relations and regressions. W ith a mathematician as his collaborator, in 1925 he published Correlation and Machine Calculation, an early venture in the creative march toward computer technology. Statistics, mathematics, genetics, scientific husbandry, economics, demography, all those skills impinged upon the future of his Iowa neighbors, the men and women throughout the state who lived on the farms they worked. • t t Those men and women could control some of the variables that af fected them. W allace proved as much by putting into commercial use his knowledge about hybridization. W ith some business associates, he founded in 1926 the Hi-Bred C om Company (later the Pioneer Hi-Bred C om Company) to produce and sell hybrid corn. Characteristically, he also realized that the establishment of tw o competing concerns would help to supply the market, which would need all they could furnish. T hat act o f faith in science, abundance, and competitive capi talism reflected no lack of business acumen. W allace intended his com pany to make a legitimate profit. More, he intended his customers to profit from the use o f his superior product, and in profiting to improve the quality and reduce the price of com , to the advantage of all who purchased it. During years of agricultural depression the company shrewdly built the market for its seed b y offering it to customers with out demanding payment in cash on the condition that they plant half their acreage in hybrid, half in ordinary com , and then repay a portion o f the value o f the higher yield on the acres growing the hybrid variety. B y 1966, the higher yield from hybrid seed accounted for one quarter o f the total national com crop. That innovative method for selling seed drew upon the example of W allace’s grandfather’s friend, Seaman Knapp, who had devised the * Ezekiel, “W allace.”
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system o f demonstration farming to persuade cotton growers to im prove their methods of cultivation. W allace’s readiness to promote hybrid com b y inducing others also to enter the business revealed in some measure his intellectual debt to Thorstein Veblen, the powerful critic o f American capitalism whose books W allace read with enthusi astic reward. Veblen provided a systematic analysis to support the sus picions o f monopoly that W allace had absorbed from his family and their adherence to the old Granger program. In industries dominated b y a few large firms, Veblen argued, management could adjust produc tion to demand in order to sustain prices and profits. T h at process, administered pricing in the vocabulary of a later generation, held production below capacity. In Veblen’s words, it involved the sabotage b y managers o f the abundance which engineers w ere capable o f cre ating. It inhibited productive potentialities which, if realized, would assure plenty for all Americans. Veblen imagined a solution in a revo lution that would transfer industrial authority to a soviet of techni cians, men committed to maximum production and equitable distri bution. W allace, educated also b y other economists, was moving toward a less dramatic formulation, but one from which he expected similar results. Like other western progressives, he advocated a vigorous ap plication o f the antitrust laws and other federal controls to limit the size and power o f industrial concentrations, and to prevent them from restricting production or retarding technological advances that in creased productivity. Like Veblen, he envisaged a technologically dynamic society dedicated to the efficient making and sharing o f in dustrial and agricultural commodities, a society that would need scientists and managers to fashion an abundant life for the common man. In its agricultural sector, that society—capitalistic but not be holden to laissez-faire doctrines—would function according to the model he had created for marketing hybrid com . Through manage ment, science and technology would overcome poverty and hunger, “ Science,” W allace later wrote, “ . . . cannot be overproduced. It does not come under the law o f diminishing utility . . . It is perish able and must be constantly renewed.” 8 It was for him the continuing frontier, the limitless source o f new plenty and leaping hope. T h e selfishness of industrial practices, in W allace’s view, had its political equivalent in the selfishness o f economic nationalism, o f pro tective tariffs and other artificial restraints on international trade. That trade, he believed, if unfettered, would provide the avenue to sharing 6 W allace, “T h e Department as I Have Known It.”
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abundance throughout the world. W allace had grown up with the “ Iowa Idea,” a plan that called for removing or reducing the pro tection afforded products manufactured b y larger corporations, in cluding many products farmers bought, like barbed wire and harvesters. Confronted by European competition, American manufacturers would have to reduce their prices or lose some of their market. In either case, farmers would benefit. Just as important, as Europeans gained access to the American market, they would earn dollars which they could then spend to purchase American agricultural commodities. Reduction o f tariffs, as W allace saw it, also related to the preserva tion of peace. In the absence of restraints on trade, nations would be come more dependent upon each other and therefore less able to em bark upon war. T o that issue Veblen also spoke. Imperial Germany, he believed, constituted the greatest threat to peace, for the Prussian autocracy and the military elite formed a combination o f purpose and power committed to domination and conquest. For Wallace, that grim potentiality could mark the United States if an industrial plutocracy and an ambitious military combined to direct national policy. Accordingly W allace anguished over the future o f his country when he observed during the years of W orld W ar II that Standard Oil o f N ew Jersey, part of a cartel controlled by I. G . Farben, had manipu lated patents to prevent the American development o f synthetic rubber; that oil companies in general came to foster that development but to oppose increasing natural sources o f rubber in Latin America, sources on which the United States would be partially dependent; that industry and the military combined to dampen, almost to eliminate, federal prosecution o f firms violating the antitrust laws; that the American cornucopia, sufficient to feed a devastated world, was to be confined, according to the preferences o f the same men of money and of arms, to helping only those peoples, whatever their need, whose politics fol lowed American prescriptions; and that the findings of American science were to be similarly contained. Those developments made profits and even plenty the handmaidens of politics. Yet for W allace politics was only a necessary means for setting policies that would put both profits and plenty within the reach o f every man. •
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W allace disliked politics in all its aspects. N ever gregarious, he was uncomfortable alike in smoke-filled rooms and noisy halls. Shy but candid and sometimes blunt, he lacked small talk. He detested both the manipulation o f men and the prolonged conniving it demanded. He
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learned to campaign, but his speeches, while often effective, made only clumsy concessions to the harmless blarney that ordinarily punctuated political oratory. “Farmer W allace,” he was called b y Alice Longworth, Theodore Roosevelt’s daughter and Washington’s social doyenne. She did not mean it as a compliment, but as usual her de scription had some substance. In her salon, in her world o f genial conspiracies, W allace was never wholly at ease. Y et W allace entered politics, first as an editor supporting com patible candidates, later as a holder o f high office, ultimately as a can didate himself, because he had no alternative except to abandon the public policies he urged upon the nation. Like his Iowa neighbors, as a private citizen he could control only some of the variables affecting his life and theirs. T he others fell to the control or misdirection or indifference o f the government. Both major political parties continually disappointed the Wallaces. T he Republicans during the T a ft years did nothing to help agricul ture. T he Democrats under W oodrow W ilson proved to be rather stingy benefactors. Congress did reduce the tariff and ease conditions for agricultural credit. Further, the Food Administration under Her bert Hoover during W orld W ar I stimulated the production o f com and hogs. But, as W allace’s father continually demonstrated, Hoover —Iowa-bom but otherwise bred—paid Iowans meanly for their efforts. In 1921 Henry C. W allace accepted appointment as President W ar ren G . Harding’s Secretary of Agriculture. His son, now editor of the newspaper, had also a close view o f the operations o f his father’s de partment. H .G recruited a staff o f experts who brought unprecedented technical talents to their tasks. He was able, too, with Harding’s support, to persuade Congress to enact legislation to assist agricultural marketing and to curb speculation in commodities. But the senior W allace failed in his program to reach markets overseas. His successful antagonist was again Herbert Hoover, now Secretary o f Commerce, whose re lentless opposition to promoting agriculture contrasted with his vigorous efforts in behalf o f industry. Hoover, so Henry A . W allace believed, contributed inadvertently to the frustration and fatigue that taxed his father’s strength and reduced his resistance to the operation from which he was unable to recover in 1924. Before his death, H. C. W allace had endorsed a plan for agriculture for which his son helped thereafter to organize increasing support. Incorporated in a succession of bills sponsored b y Senator Charles L. M cN ary of Oregon and Representative Gilbert N . Haugen of Iowa, that plan proposed a two-price system for commodities. Government purchases were to sustain the domestic price at the level of “ parity"—
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the ratio between agricultural and industrial prices that had prevailed during the years 1910-14, good yea n for farmen. T he government would sell its purchases abroad at a lower price while taxing farmerbeneficiaries to cover any losses. There were shortcomings to the plan. European tariffs, rising to compete with American protection, would impede the necessary sales. Europeans were in any case short o f dollan because o f the drain o f repaying the United States for debn incurred during the war. More important, the M cN ary-H augen plan placed no limits on production, which would increase to unmanageable propor tions if the government guaranteed farmers a high price on all their crops. President Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover both opposed the plan, which Congress twice passed and Coolidge twice vetoed, primarily on other grounds. T h e y contended that it would destroy individualism, establish artificial prices, and create a dangerous federal bureaucracy to administer it. Those objections ignored the artificial prices, large bureaucracies, and collective rather than individualistic nature o f American corporate enterprise. A registered Republican, W allace condemned the G O P for its cal lousness toward the farmer, whose share o f national income was steadily falling, and for its acceptance of the business creed. He urged his readers in 1924 to vote for Robert M. La Follette and his new Pro gressive Party, and in 1928 to vote for A lfred E. Smith, the Democratic nominee who had endorsed the latest M cN ary-H augen bill. Y et so unpolitical was W allace that he neglected to change his party regis tration until 1936. From 1924 forward, he consulted continually with some o f the econ omists his father had employed in the Department of Agriculture, in particular H enry C. T aylo r , at one time chief of the Bureau o f A gri cultural Economics, and tw o younger men, Mordecai Ezekiel and Louis H. Bean, who were to continue fruitfully to advise the depart ment and its head throughout the 1930s and 1940s. He also came to know the tw o leading academic experts on agricultural economics, John D. Black o f the University o f Minnesota and later Harvard, and M. L. W ilson o f the University o f Montana. A fter the onset of the Great Depression, with its devastating consequences for markets at home and abroad, Black and W ilson worked out the Domestic A llot ment Plan, the program that W allace and like-minded farm leaders endorsed in 1932 as a preferred substitute for the defeated M cN aryHaugen proposals. T h e new plan, the basis for the Agricultural A d justment Administration o f the N ew Deal, looked to the federal gov ernment to pay farmers to withdraw acreage from cultivation and thus curtail their production o f crops. T h e withdrawal o f marginal land and
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the rotation o f cultivation o f fertile soil applied the principles of conser vation. More immediately, reduction in supply to the domestic market would lift commodity prices, while government payments would en large farm income, with parity in purchasing power again the goal. Especially after the crash of 1929, farmers had other crushing prob lems. Land values had fallen during the 1920s and now shrank further, while the interest payments on mortgage debts incurred during the prosperous war years remained cruelly high. T h e deflation in com modity prices made the weight o f debt intolerable, led to more and more foreclosures, and embittered the countryside. W allace came to advocate federal action for mortgage relief and controlled inflation. Influenced b y Irving Fisher, the foremost American economist of his generation, W allace served as vice president o f Fisher’s Stable M oney League. It demanded a commodity dollar, a dollar valued not on a fixed ratio to gold but b y a constant relationship to purchasing power, in itself elastic. Wallaces* Farmer educated its readers in those ideas, while W allace became a familiar figure at conferences concerned with preserving a healthy rural America. Like his father and grandfather, W allace became a reformer without becoming a radical. H e saw the need for strong federal action and for a large federal establishment to protect the existence o f the independent farmer. Price supports, mortgage relief, and managed money were adventurous departures from past policy. A s their advocate, W allace contemplated major institutional change. But he did not approve farmer strikes to withhold crops from market, or the sudden liquidation o f mortgages, or an undisciplined recourse to printing paper or coining silver money. Those more radical measures had their many champions b y 1932, for an angry impatience naturally flowed from the desperation o f American farmers. But Franklin D. Roosevelt, the successful aspirant for the Democratic nomination that year, b y temperament a moderate, found the reforms w ith which W allace was identified compatible with his own sense o f proper remedy. W allace, one o f the experts whose advice Roosevelt solicited, supported him both before and after his nomination. Once elected, Roosevelt decided, after reviewing several other possibilities, that W allace had the confidence o f the farm leaders and the qualities o f mind and purpose that he wanted in his Secretary of Agriculture. W allace accepted the position. N o w , in spite o f him self, his commitment to agricultural reform had drawn him into politics, both the politics o f decision-making within the federal government and the politics o f competition between the parties.
Portrait o f a Diarist
*3
There was a part o f Henry W allace that Franklin Roosevelt recog nized but never criticized. Some o f his less sympathetic associates w or ried about what they considered W allace’s mysticism, a quality they considered disturbing and unpredictable in its consequences. Y et W al lace was not a mystic, unless that description, as he once said, applied to any man of Christian faith. W hat made him seem a mystic to those who called him one was primarily his indomitable curiosity, a curiosity that led him to explore everything that caught his interest, religion not the least.* Essentially W allace’s religion was the Christianity common in the Middle Border. It had its foundation in faith rather than theology. Like Uncle Henry, W allace concluded that the rigid tenets o f orthodox Calvinism clashed with his generous belief in the pervasive goodness of God. Those tenets were at variance, too, with his sense o f the presence of G od in nature and life. H e did not use the vocabulary o f transcen dentalism, but he shared the convictions o f that creed about the im manence o f G od in man. Still he also tried continually to find God, not palpably but spiritually, whether in the beauty o f growing things, in the symmetry of genetic patterns, or in the evocations o f religious rituals. Consequently he experimented with religion, just as he ex perimented with com , seeking the most satisfying yield. W allace tested his responses to various churches. He was conscious o f the spiritual excitement that Methodism could stir but too private a man to find continuing fulfillment in collective rhapsody. The gorgeous rituals of Catholicism also moved him, but Catholic dogma and hierarchy put him off. H e tried to feel what the saints had felt b y practicing one kind o f ascetism or another, but for him deprivation of the flesh or spiritual removal from the world divorced religion too much from life, which he was resolved to serve. He was at times fas cinated b y the occult and he studied oriental faiths, but they, too, failed to answer his needs, though his reading led him to a concept of Confucius, a “constantly normal granary,” a phrase he adapted for his own use. He settled in the end for membership in the Episcopal church, which he attended regularly during his years in Washington. Here, particularly in the communion service, he received as much as formal religion could offer him. He interpreted the Lord’s Supper his own way. “It is the function of the church,” W allace said at one communion breakfast, “ to emphasize the ties which draw men together no matter how much finite differences may appear to separate them fl For a somewhat contrary but informed and incisive view of the questions cov ered in this section o f the introduction, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the N ew Deal (Boston, 1959), pp. 28-34.
H
T he Price o f Vision
. . . W eak as is the church . . . it is a synthesizing, centripetal force . . . on behalf o f the sacredness o f the individual and the unity o f humanity.” 7 It was the symbol and the agency o f the brotherhood o f man. T hat brotherhood had a special psychological importance for W al lace. Just as he was not a hail-fellow, so, outside o f his immediate family, he was not an intimate man. His aloneness in life fostered his need for brotherhood in spirit, a need he recognized in other men, particularly those who lived on the soil. He put it best, perhaps, in discussing the people o f Soviet Asia: “ A ll o f them . . . were people o f plain living and robust minds, not unlike our farming people in the United States. Much that is interpreted . . . as ‘Russian distrust’ can be written off as the natural cautiousness o f farm-bred people . . . Beneath the . . . new urban culture, one catches glimpses o f the sound, w ary, rural mind.” 8 Those w ary men and women W allace discovered everywhere he went, in Siberia, China, throughout Latin America, as well as in the countryside o f the United States and beneath the skins o f Ameri cans in labor unions or military regalia or governmental suites. N o t their spiritual com fort only, but also, in the shadows o f an awful war, the prospects for a genuine peace depended upon a centripetal force that would assure the sacredness o f every one o f them and the unity of mankind. Essential though it was, the church was not enough. A lw ays a Calvinist in part, W allace had a sense o f duty, even o f mission, to accomplish the w ork of the Lord. His continual recourse to biblical metaphor was more than the rhetorical habit o f a minister’s grandson. He was an austere moralist, impatient less w ith impiety than with sloth, deceit, selfishness, and materialism. More, he cast himself often as prophet or witness, now in the role of Joseph husbanding his people’s resources, now as Micah beating swords into ploughshares, now as Gideon attacking a wicked citadel. That last role he assumed in 1948, in his predictably futile campaign for the Presidency as the candidate o f a disorganized new party, against the advice o f his family and his loyal friends, indeed against his better judgment. He had, he felt, to bear witness against the policies he had attacked and for the beliefs he had broadcast. Y e t the compulsions o f mission that inhered in W allace’s religion were balanced b y a contemplative gentleness. It was not just that he loved his family, which he did, deeply though undemonstratively. It 7 W allace Diary, February 22, 1940. 8H enry A . W allace, Soviet Asia Mission (N ew York, 1945), p. 21.
Portrait o f a Diarist
15
was also that when he crossbred com or strawberries, he had more at stake than productivity. He loved the plants, just as he loved grasses—grasses, as he described them, growing quietly taller, silently dropping their seeds onto the earth and into the winds, full fields of grasses bending with the prevailing breeze, full fields observed from the air in huge patterns of contrasting greens and browns. He loved the soil, the w ay it felt between the fingers, its pungent darkness. W ithout direct contact with growing things, he lost touch with the universe and its creator. His Washington victory garden, planted in his sister’s yard, provided a useful crop, but more important, gave him when he worked in it a serenity he could capture no other way. In the soil he found his ultimate communion. His was strongly a Social Gospel, but he tempered that gospel with a tenderness that displayed his natural charity. Joseph he could emulate, or Gideon, but at the core he was more akin to Paul. T o the secular mind, W allace’s faith seemed outmoded, his wit nessing quaint, his spirituality incomprehensible. T o the urban mind, his affinity with nature appeared irrelevant and distracting. As for his inquiries into the occult, secular and urban Americans took them for an eccentricity. Washington was filled with the polished, the urbane, and the fashionable, so in Washington Farmer W allace, spiritually as well as culturally uncomfortable, felt often bored and out of place. As Roosevelt realized, that did not matter. He needed W allace to manage the Department o f Agriculture and its programs, and for that task, W allace, practical scientist and progressive reformer, was admirably equipped. • • • During his eight years as Secretary o f Agriculture, Henry A . W al lace accomplished more than did any one else who has ever held that office. Each o f the many programs the department initiated, as one of its officers later attested, “ had W allace’s close attention and support.”* Each profited, too, from the support W allace solicited from the Presi dent and from the skills of the administrators, lawyers, economists, and agronomists to whom the Secretary delegated responsibilities for the detailed supervision and the technical research without which the department could not have functioned. T h e y were impressive men, several o f whom became W allace’s lifelong friends. Am ong the most effective were Rexford G . Tugw ell, W allace’s first Under Secretary, one of Roosevelt’s original brain-trusters, who, like Wallace, had •Ezekiel, “W allace.”
16
T he Price o f Vision
studied Veblen; Mordecai Ezekiel, senior economic adviser, and his talented associate, Louis Bean; Paul Appleby, chief administrative of ficer, and Milo Perkins who ran various special programs like the Food Stamp Plan for the distribution o f surplus commodities to impoverished Americans; Chester Davis, who for some years managed the Agricul tural Adjustment Administration; and, for a brief period, Jerome N . Frank, a brilliant young N ew Y ork law yer.10 T h e Agricultural A c t o f 1933, a keystone in Roosevelt’s recovery program, made national policy o f the various proposals with which W allace had been identified before the election. Am ong the provisions o f the act, one founded the Agricultural Adjustment Administration within the Department o f Agriculture to manage the Domestic A llot ment Plan. In developing policy under that plan, W allace confronted tw o major crises which he resolved with a practical opportunism that revealed both a disciplined toughness and a political sensitivity sur prising to his critics. T he earlier episode arose because the Domestic Allotment program was established too late to affect planting or husbandry in the spring o f 1933. Farmers in the south had already started their cotton, farmers in the west had already bred their hogs, before the Agricultural Adjust ment Administration could begin to make payments for the withdrawal o f acreage or the limitation o f production. Y et cotton and hogs, glut ting the market, were selling at historically low prices. T o remove the glut, to prevent it from carrying over to 1934, to raise prices and to increase farm income, W allace deliberately violated his own profound belief in abundance and its distribution. He mobilized the Extension Service o f the department to enlist cotton farmers, in return for boun tiful payments ($100 million in all), to plough up a quarter of their crop. Less drastic measures assisted grain farmers. A s for hogs, on the advice o f local committees throughout the west and o f the Farm Bu reau Federation, the department purchased and slaughtered six million little pigs. Much o f the baby pork was given to the hungry on relief, but W allace deeply regretted the conditions that had forced his hand. “ T he plowing under . . . o f cotton . . . and the slaughter of . . . pigs,” he said, “ were not acts o f idealism in any sane society. T h ey were emergency acts made necessary b y the almost insane lack of world statesmanship . . . from 1920 to 1932.” He had to play, he explained, 10 T h e best account o f the agricultural policies o f the early N ew Deal, an account on which I have relied heavily, is in Schlesinger, Coming of the N ew Deal, Ch. i. Also helpful and sometimes of a contrasting interpretation were the works o f the Scnapsmeiers and o f Ezekiel, cited above.
Portrait o f a Diarist
17
the cards that were dealt him; industry had limited production artifi cially for many years, and “ agriculture cannot survive in a capitalistic society as a philanthropic enterprise.*’11 T he unavoidable destruction of crops in 1933 prepared the stage for the successful operation o f A A A and in later years for new directions of policy, but a second crisis intruded before W allace could embark on those new directions. Recourse to the Extension Service, as W allace knew, reinforced the position within the department of one of its most conservative sections, for the Service had long fostered the inter ests o f the Farm Bureau Federation, an organization dominated b y large commercial farmers, whose needs often conflicted with those of small, independent farmers, tenants, and farm laborers. Further, W al lace had had temporarily to accept as head of the A A A George N . Peek, a father o f the M cNary-Haugen scheme, who remained commit ted to dumping surpluses abroad rather than controlling production at home. Soon able to get rid o f Peek, W allace replaced him with Chester Davis who, like his predecessor, had the confidence o f the Farm Bureau Federation. Wallace felt he needed that group’s large influence in Congress, but the price proved high. In 1935 Davis and Jerome Frank clashed over A A A contracts which Frank and his young associates had written to protect farm tenants and sharecroppers in the South. Either he or Frank, Davis told W allace, would have to go. W allace regretfully fired Frank and most of his group in the General Counsel’s office. Frank was shocked, as was Rex Tugw ell, for they believed they had been following the Secretary’s wishes. Years later, others believed W allace had acted to purge the department of com munists, o f whom a few were in Frank’s office. T he latter issue simply did not occur to Wallace. T he former pained him, for, as with the little pigs, he realized that he had departed from principle in order to preserve his ability to move ahead, albeit with reduced speed, toward larger goals. H e had already concluded that the habit of dissent, typical in his experience o f the western Democrats who had jointed La Follette in 1924, obstructed a practical approach to solving urgent problems. “It seems,” W allace wrote in 1935, “ as though . . . Progressives are splendid critics but very poor builders.” 1* T h e episode o f the purge, perhaps especially T u gw ell’s angry dis appointment with the Secretary’s expediency, had a double impact on W allace. It persuaded him, under the tutelage o f W ill Alexander o f his staff, more thoroughly to examine the wretched circumstances of 11 Quoted in Schlesinger, Coming of the Nev> Deal, p. 63. 13 W allace Diary, January 26, 193;.
i8
T he Price o f Vision
southern croppers, white and black, and o f the displaced and miserable migrant farm laborers o f the west. H e proceeded then more aggres sively to seek effective remedies for their problems. H e added his own support to the efforts to create the Resettlement Administration (under T u gw ell and later Alexander) and the Farm Security Administration (under Alexander, Milo Perkins, and C. B. Baldwin). Those agencies began, though belatedly, to help the downtrodden in American agri culture. W allace had earlier sponsored the Rural Electrification A d ministration that carried inexpensive electricity to farm homes, an objective first defined by the Country Life Commission. As Ezekiel wrote, R E A “ revolutionized the face o f rural America.” Further, W al lace’s grow ing concern for eradicating rural poverty and his growing suspicions o f the Farm Bureau Federation sensitized him to the prob lems o f urban poverty and o f American blacks, and rekindled his appre hensions about big business and its privileges. B y the time o f W orld W ar II, he had become the champion o f the common man alike on the streets and on the land. H e had become, too, an opponent o f the de mands not only o f arrogant industrialists but also o f the equally arrogant Farm Bureau. T h e episode o f the purge had also a more personal effect on W allace. Because he had to decide between Davis and Frank, he had no escape from the politics of allocating power. Because he accepted a short-run loss in order to try to win long-run gains, he had to bend principle to expediency. In so doing, he had to wound an able and trusting sub ordinate. Later, during W orld W ar II, W allace may have recalled the pains o f 1935 when Roosevelt in effect fired him first from the chair manship o f the Board o f Economic W arfare and later from the vice presidency. In both cases the President sacrificed some principle to more expediency; in both he sacrificed a valued colleague to his own assessment o f political exigencies. In both instances, W allace, though gravely wounded, remained loyal to Roosevelt, whom he still preferred to any other chief. T he problem, W allace realized even in 1935, grew out o f the N e w Deal’s style o f administration. “ In this administration,” he wrote, “ the objectives are experimental and not clearly stated; there fore, there is certain to be, from the W hite House down, a certain amount o f what seems to be intrigue. I do not think this situation will be remedied until the President abandons . . . his experimental and somewhat concealed approach. There are . . . many advantages to this approach but it does not lead to the happiest personal relationships and the best administration.” 18 Roosevelt never abandoned his ap13 W allace Diary, February 3, 1935.
Portrait o f a Diarist
*9
proach. In the politics o f the N ew Deal, as W allace discovered, one had on occasion to dish it out, and on other occasions to take it. The game was worth the anguish if the stakes were high enough. For W allace they were, for during the middle 1930s he succeeded in ad vancing his most cherished objectives. T he Supreme Court's invalida tion o f the Agricultural Adjustment A c t of 1933 forced the department to devise a constitutionally acceptable alternative. T h e Soil Conserva tion and Domestic Allotment A ct o f 1936 and the Agricultural Adjust ment A c t o f 1938 preserved the practice o f managing production. Those measures also put a new emphasis on conservation, on withdraw ing acreage not only to reduce crops but also to follow a rational system of land utilization. From 1936 forward, as W allace said, “ the Department launched a positive attack on the dual problem of soil destruction and unbalanced cropping."14 T he dreadful dust storms o f the years immediately preceding had attested to the indispensability o f protecting the 'Voiceless land." Those disasters also reminded Americans o f the vulnerability of agriculture to nature and o f the possibility o f shortages in food stuffs. T he act of 1938 gave W allace the opportunity he had long sought to create an "ever-normal granary," to employ government purchases, storage, and sales so as to assure adequate supplies without future gluts or shortages. T he resulting program provided food for Americans and their allies during the extraordinary years o f W orld W ar II and the early postwar period. As W allace admitted, he had not foreseen the war when he formulated his program, but his success led him to hope, as he wrote in 1942, for the establishment o f an ever normal granary on a world wide scale. That concept underlay the plans recommended in 1946 by Sir John Boyd Orr, Director-General o f the Food and Agricultural Organization o f the United Nations, plans W allace energetically en dorsed. He had earlier adopted comparable policies to build up Ameri can strategic reserves through the Board o f Economic W arfare. Just as the accumulation o f reserves depended upon sources abroad, so, as W allace saw it, did the efficient functioning o f the American economy. Contending during the 1930s, as he long had, that "America must choose,” he related the choice to national prosperity. T he option lay between domestic self-sufficiency, which would inhibit and distort economic growth, and open international trade, which would encour age the United States to produce and export what it did best and to import goods produced more efficiently elsewhere. W allace took the side of maximum growth, for it would provide employment for men
14
W allace, “T h e Department as I Have Known It.”
20
T he Trice o f Vision
and capital and permit the elimination o f want. T h e N e w Deal’s reciprocal trade treaties took a limited step toward freer trade, but W allace envisaged much more dramatic changes that would open all markets and all shipping and air routes. T h e w ar spurred him to urge even more insistently interrelated policies to promote free trade, eco nomic growth, and full employment. •
•
•
W allace’s objectives, accomplishments, and expanding sympathies marked him b y 1940 as one of the country’s outstanding statesmen. He had demonstrated the personal loyalty to the President that John N . Gam er, V ice President since 1933, so stubbornly withheld. W allace had, too, the liberal credentials that Roosevelt wanted for his running mate in 1940. And during the first six months o f that year W allace had taken a position on the war in Europe that answered Roosevelt’s political needs. T h e President, in the view o f his isolationist critics, was leading the nation too close to the conflict abroad. In the view of those, still a minority, who wanted at once to join the endangered British cause, the President had delayed too long in taking steps to supply Great Britain and to develop American armed forces for employment over seas. Privately Roosevelt m ay have shared the latter assessment but politically, he believed, he could not afford either to increase his pace or to give the isolationists further cause for complaint. W allace stood about where the majority o f Americans did after the Germans had overrun most o f western Europe. H e detested Nazism, which he con tinually attacked, as he always had. H e saw potential danger to the Americas in Germ any’s advance. H e therefore preached hemispheric solidarity and national preparedness—the mobilization o f the economy and o f a strong and balanced military force. “ W e must,” he told Roose velt, “be in a position to command fear and respect.” 16 Y et W allace also opposed American entry into the war and resisted the thought that it was inevitable. Further, he believed that mobilization need not entail a surrender o f policy to generals and financiers, and that a good neigh bor should sponsor democratization along with friendship in Latin America. Indeed with the spread o f fascism in Europe, the new world more than ever before had to provide a persuasive example o f effective democracy. W allace, as Roosevelt insisted, suited his needs, but few of the President’s counselors or o f the party leaders agreed. W allace had is W allace D iaiy, M ay 22, 1940; see also January 2, 1940, on hemispheric policy.
Portrait o f a Diarist
21
always ignored the powerful captains o f the_ great Democratic city machines. H e disliked and distrusted, perhaps even despised, men like K elly o f Chicago and Hague o f Jersey G t y , who felt the same w ay about him. His increasing zeal for civil rights for black Americans and for relieving the poverty o f the sharecroppers of the South, many o f them black, offended most o f the influential senior southern Demo crats in the Senate. Like many o f their northern colleagues, they con sidered his ideas radical, his religion puzzling, and his manner remote. W allace also lacked the confidence of Roosevelt’s circle of immediate advisers, particularly those whom Felix Frankfurter had recruited. T h e y knew he was learned, but he was not one o f them, and b y their standards he had none o f the polish the W hite House required. For his part, W allace did not quite trust them. He called them “ connivers” and considered them preoccupied with power, though he knew they had made significant contributions to reform. Even Ben Cohen, perhaps the gentlest and ablest man in the group, operated too guardedly for W allace’s taste. Cohen, along with some others, feared for a time in 1939 that Paul M cN utt, a handsome but vacuous Indiana Democrat, might be Roosevelt’s choice for the vice-presidency. Against that chance, W allace observed that “ the N ew Dealers”—he used the phrase pejoratively—resisted taking a “ position of too great an oppo sition against M cN utt . . . T h e N e w Dealers . . . don’t like the M cN u tt possibility but feel they must prepare for it as a contingency." W allace did not feel that w ay, nor did he have any enthusiasm for a V ice President selected from the inner circle of the W hite House or from its outer fringe, perhaps H arry Hopkins, the President’s émi nence grise, or W illiam O. Douglas. T h e y were little to be preferred, he felt, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, a favorite of conservative Southerners, or National Chairman James A . Farley, whom the city bosses liked. Farley, an active candidate, felt that Roosevelt was blocking his am bitions. A lw ays on pleasant terms with Wallace, Farley early in 1940 complained to him about the President. “ Farley was incorrect,” W al lace judged, “ in calling the President a sadist although there is a certain amount o f that element in his nature. T he predominant element, how ever, is the desire to be the dominating figure, to demonstrate on all occasions his superiority. H e changes his standards of superiority many times during the day. But having set for himself a particular standard for the moment, he then glories in being the dominating figure along that particular line. In that w ay he fills out his artistic sense o f the fitness o f things.” 16 16 W allace
Diary, January 18, 1940.
22
T he Price o f Viiion
In spite o f that insight, in spite o f the opposition he knew he pro voked, W allace was a completely receptive, though never an active, candidate for nomination. He organized no movement on his own behalf because, as he told a cabinet colleague, “ I did not look on myself as very much o f a politician.” 17 H e did not think that nomination as V ice President would lead to the Presidency, for unlike Farley, he expected Roosevelt to live out a third term. “ T he President,” W allace observed, “ is more likely to maintain his vitality by being President than b y retiring.” 18 N or did he expect Roosevelt to retire. One of W al lace’s Iowa friends asked him if he ‘V a s interested in having m y name presented to the national convention in case the President did not run. I told him that it was scarcely worth thinking about because I was so certain the President was going to run. I said, o f course, if the Presi dent did not run, I would be interested.” As for the vice-presidency, “ I said that would depend altogether on what the powers that might be might think would best insure victory.” 1* Roosevelt was die power that was. T o a reluctant convention he dictated the choice o f W allace as his running mate. He even contem plated withdrawing himself if the convention should reject his selection. It almost did, but Roosevelt’s adamancy, the energetic politicking o f H arry Hopkins, the President’s emissary on the floor, and the timely appearance o f Eleanor Roosevelt as her husband’s special ambassador for W allace brought the unhappy delegates around. Roosevelt made W allace V ice President in 1940. Four years later, when Wallace had far more support within the party, Roosevelt dumped him. H e announced his personal preference for W allace but he also expressed his satisfaction with several other possible candidates and then let the party leaders move the convention to a decision he had previously approved. That change in Roosevelt’s tactics, as W al lace realized, constituted a complete reversal. T he President again had been the dominating figure, filling out, now to W allace’s disadvan tage, “ his artistic sense of the fitness of things.” •
•
•
Receptive though he had been to nomination as V ice President, W allace discovered little satisfaction in that office when he entered it in January 1941. Usefully busy almost every day for the eight pre ceding years, he now had almost nothing to do. Presiding over the it W allace Diary, M ay 24, 1940. 18 Ibid.
1* W allace Diary, June 27, 1940.
Portrait o f a Diarist
23
Senate’s meandering debates bored him. O ften he appeared to doze in the chair. More often he turned the chair over to a colleague. T he Democratic M ajority Leader, Alben Barkley, an engaging Kentuckian, ran the business of the Senate. Most o f the members o f that body respected W allace but few welcomed him to the informal gatherings, the Senate’s club, which b y temperament he had no desire to join. H e had, W allace said, more time for tennis than ever before in his life, but seldom had the nation faced more urgent issues. For their resolution Roosevelt intended to harness W allace’s talents, but he was slow in finding an appropriate role for him, for he was slow in estab lishing offices properly geared first for mobilization and then for war. W hile the President procrastinated, W allace educated himself in the problems o f national defense and o f the defense economy b y discussing them regularly with experts on the staffs o f the W hite House, the de partments, and the defense agencies. A t Roosevelt’s initiative, he was among the few originally to learn about S - i, the then infant project to develop an atomic bomb. In July 1941 the President gave him a first assignment as chairman o f the Economic Defense Board, estab lished at that time as a “ policy and advisory agency” to deal with “ international economic activities” including exports, imports, preclusive buying, shipping, foreign exchange, and similar matters.20 That mandate, as it turned out, was as broad as the agency’s actual authority was narrow. Power over its supposed functions remained dis persed among the executive departments, and decisions, when they were made, remained the prerogative o f the W hite House. So, too, with the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board that the President created in August 1941 with W allace as chairman. In characteristically Rooseveltian fashion, it was superimposed upon the Office o f Produc tion Management, which had been crippled b y friction within its staff and by its rivalry with the W ar and N a vy departments. SPAB was to serve as the coordinating center for defense mobilization. It failed for the reasons that had vitiated the Economic Defense Board and OPM . Even before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, those responsible for mobilization chafed at Roosevelt’s reluctance to delegate and cen tralize authority. T h e advent o f war forced the President to act. A t least in theory, real authority over the domestic economy was granted in January 1942 to the new W ar Production Board under Donald Nelson, a former vice president o f Sears, Roebuck w ho had been executive director o f SPAB. W allace was to sit as chairman, along 20 Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Prophet m Politics: Henry A . W allace and the W ar Years, 1940-6s (Am es, 1970), p. 9.
*4
T h e Price o f Vision
with various Cabinet officers as members, o f W P B ’s governing com mittee. He liked and admired Nelson, but he did not, as one friend observed, “ find it congenial to w ork with the big businessmen who dominated that organization, nor with the admirals and generals who were their military counterparts.”*1 Far more satisfying to the V ice President, Roosevelt had also made him chairman o f another new agency, established b y executive order on December 17, 1941, the Board o f Economic W arfare. It was to assume the responsibilities o f the Economic Defense Board but with strengthened authority—as it turned out, less than enough—to deal directly with foreign governments in the procurement o f strategic materials and related functions. W allace now had a mandate, one he believed he could use both to abet the war effort and to influence postwar policy. As he had in the Department o f Agriculture, W allace in the Board o f Economic W arfare devoted himself to questions of policy and delegated responsibility for daily administrative and technical decisions. T h e major weight o f that responsibility he assigned to his executive director, Milo Perkins, an old friend and associate and an energetic promoter o f W allace’s own purposes. Under Perkins were the three sections o f B E W : the Office o f Imports, charged with procuring stra tegic materials and with preclusive buying all over the world, but especially in Latin America where neither the Germans nor the Japa nese had become a military threat; the Office o f Exports, which was to use its licensing authority to prevent goods from reaching Axis nations; and the Office o f W arfare Analysis, which selected targets o f economic importance for strategic bombing. T h e first o f those sections com manded most o f Perkins’s and W allace’s attention, and its operations were the bases for the controversies that were to mark the history o f the agency. A bout tw o months after the establishment o f B E W , with those controversies in their first stages, W allace resumed keeping a diary. T w ic e before he had initiated and abandoned that practice, on both occasions initiating it when political events in W ashington especially involved him. H e had kept a diary briefly during the Davis-Frank episode, and he had again for the months preceding his nomination for V ice President. N o w he began once more, with few lapses until he left public office. T h e content of the diary revealed his continual engagement in political developments within government and in the policies that politics affected. More than an outlet for reflection, it 21 Ezekiel, “W allace.”
Portrait o f a Diarist
25
served, as its author intended, as a record o f his activities. Such was also the case with the diaries o f so many of Roosevelt’s Cabinet, H enry Stimson, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Harold Ickes, and James Forrestal in particular. W ith varying degrees of self-consciousness, they recorded an account o f what they had said and heard and done, an account to which they could refer should some colleague challenge their con sistency or veracity. Such challenges emerged from the personal fric tions engendered b y Roosevelt’s style o f administration. As Morgen thau, speaking from experience, warned Wallace, relationships with Jesse H. Jones especially imposed on a prudential man the self-pro tective task of keeping a full record. Like the diaries o f his colleagues, W allace’s diary, while incidentally convenient for history, had a more contemporary and expedient use. W hile he kept the diary for himself, W allace in 1942 also took his thoughts to the American people with greater frequency and moment than ever before. N o member of the administration except the Presi dent made more public speeches or attracted more continual attention. Roosevelt probably planned it that way. In the interests of national unity and o f harmony within the Grand Alliance, the President during the war years moved with more than his customary caution. But Roosevelt typically was less cautious privately than he appeared to be in public. B y no means averse to examining bold policies for adoption once the war had been won, he needed a scout to test the responses o f both national and international audiences, a semiofficial spokesman whose proposals he could embrace if they were w ell received or repu diate if they were not. T h e President did not have to cast W allace in that role, for the V ice President without prompting seized every occasion he could to pub licize his hopes for the postwar world. Indeed W allace was restless with the failure o f the American government to set forth in clear detail a plan for the future that would lift the spirits and galvanize the wills of men everywhere. H e fretted not the least because the relative silence from the W hite House permitted other voices to seem louder and more persuasive than in his opinion they should have. So, for one example, though he shared many o f the sentiments o f W endell W illkie’s One W orld, he distrusted WUlkie’s instincts in domestic policy. So, for another, he detested the confident chauvinism of Henry Luce’s “ American Century.” Like Archibald MacLeish, the eminent poet who served for a short and unhappy season as the head of the Office o f Facts and Figures, W allace believed that Roosevelt was forgoing a commanding opportunity to define the war as a vehicle for practical
26
T he Price o f Vision
idealism. T h e President, preoccupied with military problems and the conflicts among the nation’s major allies, emphasized victory above all other considerations. A fter victory, he told MacLeish, he would speak more concretely about the nature o f the peace. W allace, for his part, while always committed to the eradication o f Nazism as a first priority, was determined, too, to stir the blood o f democrats everywhere, to prophesy, as he did, the coming century o f the common man. Hjs rhetoric in that cause gave a testamental cast to the sundry ob jectives that engrossed him. As his diary disclosed, his activities on the Board of Economic W arfare aroused the quick opposition o f tw o o f the most powerful conservatives within die administration, both noted for their influence on the Hill, Secretary o f State Cordell Hull and Secretary o f Commerce Jesse Jones, w ho was also head of the federal lending agencies. Both men had a long record o f defending any ap parent invasion o f what they jealously considered their personal do mains. N o w Hull resented any independence from State Department supervision of B E W representatives negotiating with foreign govern ments. Jones was even more indignant over Milo Perkins’ efforts to arrange loans for the development abroad o f sources of strategic mate rials without proceeding through the dilatory, sometimes obstruction ist, lending agencies. Enlisted b y Perkins, W allace tried to persuade Roosevelt to grant B E W independence from Hull and Jones, but the President, under pressure also from W allace’s antagonists, gave B E W more the semblance than the sinew of what it sought. T h e bureaucratic struggle merely clothed fundamental disagreements about policy, particularly in Latin America. There W allace and Per kins had tw o large goals. “ International trade,’’ W allace had earlier written, “ has always been closer to economic warfare than the Ameri can people have been trained to think.” 22 Through international trade he endeavored in Latin America to develop sources for essential mate rials o f w ar—rubber and quinine for tw o—which the United States had previously obtained from areas the Japanese had conquered. Preclusive buying also denied those and other materials to the Germans. T he procurement o f adequate supplies, W allace believed, depended upon increasing the productivity o f Latin American workers, whose physical strength and morale suffered from malnutrition, disease, miserable sani tation and housing, and skimpy wages. Efficiency demanded social reform, as did the first step toward a decent future for the laborers. B E W tried to take that step b y writing into procurement contracts obligations on the part o f Latin American governments or entrepreneurs 22 W allace D iaiy, June 6, 1940.
Portrait o f a Diarist
27
“ to furnish adequate shelter, water, safety appliances, etc.,” to consult with B E W “ as to whether the wage scale is such as to maximize pro duction,” and to cooperate “in a plan to improve conditions of health and sanitation,” a plan for which the United States would pay half the costs.2* Hull attacked that policy indirectly. T he State Department endorsed some o f B E W ’s conditions for contracts, but it also complained that the conditions as a whole constituted interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign nation, a course the department claimed to eschew. Noninter ference, as practiced by the State Department, had special connotations. The doctrine served for several years as Hull’s excuse for protecting the pro-Nazi but officially neutral government o f Argentina from the disciplinary measures o f economic warfare recommended continually b y Arm y Intelligence and the Treasury Department. T oo, the State Department helped to arrange shipments of Lend-Lease arms to Latin American governments, non-fighting allies against the Axis, that were openly repressive toward workers and peasants. Hull knew that W al lace welcomed social change in Latin America. Indeed W allace had identified that change with peaceful revolution. T he Board o f Eco nomic W arfare did not demand that Latin American states alter their laws; it attempted only to write contracts to help Latin American workers. But that was too much revolution for Hull, and therefore b y his standards too much interference. Like Wallace, Hull was a dogged proponent of freeing international trade from artificial restraints. Like Wallace, he was eager to enlarge American markets abroad in the postwar period, temporarily b y ad vancing generous credits. But the Secretary of State and most of his colleagues equated that objective with the spread o f American institu tions, political and economic. T h ey expected their trading partners to be or to become capitalistic republics in the model o f the United States. W hen the war ended, they attached political conditions to com mercial negotiations. W allace did not. He sought postwar trade with any nation, whatever its system o f government or pattern of property ownership. And, during the war, he wanted American credits, trade, and contracts to turn the calendar toward the century o f the common man. He lost. A s much as Hull, Jesse Jones contributed to that defeat. T he delays and the parsimony o f Jones’ lending agencies retarded procurement, as W allace and others demonstrated and Jones self-righteously denied. W allace found just as aggravating the political objections to B E W con& Quoted in Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, Prophet in Polities, p. 45.
28
T h e Price o f Vision
tracts, which Jones claimed were needlessly costly. Preoccupied with prices and interest rates, Jones never grasped the greater importance, during the crisis o f war, o f productivity, one o f W allace’s goals. He did understand and reject W allace's long-range social concerns, which he scoffed at as an international W P A . He scoffed, too, at W allace’s worries about the postwar implications o f American policy on synthetic rubber. W allace feared that federal assistance for the synthetic rubber industry, which he knew was essential for wartime supply, would lead to postwar tariff protection for that industry, and consequently inhibit postwar natural rubber developments which B E W was nurturing in Brazil and elsewhere. A s ever, W allace argued that without a market in the United States, those natural rubber producers would be unable to survive, and unable, too, to purchase American products. Jones fixed his interest on the postwar profits o f the domestic rubber industry. Jones had the sympathy and support o f like-minded senators, includ ing senior southern Democrats like Kenneth M cKellar and H arry Byrd, who chaired powerful committees. T h e y gave him a platform from which to attack B E W , its policies, and the concessions to it that Roose velt had made. W here Hull ordinarily expressed his negative opinions in colorful but private invective, Jones habitually broadcast his vitriol. He both offended and infuriated Milo Perkins, who regrettably struck back in kind. Provoked largely b y Perkins, so did W allace, with little more circumspection. A fter several public skirmishes, the open war fare between tw o o f his subordinates, a circumstance Roosevelt would not tolerate, led to the President’s decision in June 1943 to abolish B E W . H e transferred its functions to a new superagency, the Office o f Economic W arfare, and appointed to the chairmanship o f the body Leo C row ley, whose ability to flatter the President and to placate Congress considerably exceeded his taste for reform or his personal probity. Perkins left the government. W allace remained, his authority and sta tus severely diminished, his spirit undeterred. •
•
•
W allace’s “ Century o f the Common Man,” a major address he de livered in M ay 1942, set forth themes which he repeated and elaborated for the next several years. T h e y grew out o f his previous ideas, some partially formed even in his youth, and they foreshadowed the disagree ments between him and others in government during his last year in office. Y et his speeches, book, and articles said less about his precise objectives than did his diary, and his written words communicated his purpose only in the context o f the actual issues to which he adverted
Portrait o f a Diarist
*9
daily. Each theme he associated with the century o f the common man had hard correlatives in the questions that occupied wartime W ash ington. Peace, the essential first condition for the future o f mankind, meant different things to different Americans during W orld W ar II. For W allace, the establishment and preservation o f peace demanded a true internationalism, a world community o f nations and peoples linked economically and politically through the agency o f a United Nations. His vision included his familiar convictions about trade and economics, and his expectations for the economic development o f underdeveloped areas along the lines that B E W drew. A s he saw it, with the end o f the war the United Nations would assume the bulk o f that task. It would first have to concentrate on the restoration o f areas devastated b y war, a function which devolved before the end o f hostilities to die United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. A n enthusiast for that agency, W allace recognized that it had to rely in its early w ork primarily on American resources, for the United States alone o f the great nations was emerging from the war with an ebullient economy. But W allace believed that American wealth should not give the United States a proportionate influence either in U N R R A or within the United Nations. Those agencies, in his opinion, had to bend to multilateral direction and to serve multinational interests. T h e internationalizing o f responsibility for providing nourishment, relief, and development throughout the world depended upon political internationalism, which W allace stressed. It could eventuate only with the end o f European imperialism and with the abandonment of balanceof-power politics. On that account, he was especially critical o f the British, particularly Winston Churchill. Continued British domination over India, in W allace’s understanding, violated the whole purpose of the war, as did Churchill’s impulse for empire, his unabashed belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority, his disdain for China and distrust o f Russia, his preference for secret negotiations, and his manifest intention to hold the reins o f world leadership, whatever the semblance of world government, in British, American, and, unavoidably, Soviet hands. Roosevelt, too, expected the great powers to dominate the U N and enjoyed and exploited his secret conferences either alone With Church ill or in the larger company that included Stalin. But the President seemed to W allace to share his anti-imperialism and even some o f his other doubts about the British. So also, Roosevelt was determined to get along with the Russians. Further he was as emphatic as was W al lace in calling for the withdrawal of British and European, as well as
30
T h e Price o f Vision
Japanese, political influence in East and Southeast Asia. T h e y looked forward there not to American encroachments but to the independence, in most instances after a period o f transition, o f the various Asian peoples. In the case o f China, as they both realized, Chiang Kai-shek could expect to rule only if he cleared out the corruption o f the K u o mintang, embarked upon major social reform including distribution o f land to the peasantry, and reached a modus operandi with his com munist opponents, whose grow ing strength fed on the discontent his policies fostered. Still, Roosevelt’s concern fo r victory first and victory as fast as pos sible resulted in wartime decisions that struck W allace as ominous for the future. T h e United States, W allace believed, had to align itself unequivocally with the forces o f democracy everywhere. O n the ground o f military expediency, Roosevelt did not. H e authorized the negotiations and arrangements in N orth A frica and Italy that made notorious fascists the approved local agents o f Anglo-Am erican occu pation. T he State and W a r Departments nurtured those policies which W allace came privately to oppose. W allace also parted with the President, though without public or private acrimony, over the question o f the peace-keeping role o f the United Nations. Roosevelt talked in general terms about a postwar international police force to prevent aggression, but while the fighting continued, he deliberately postponed serious consideration o f the nature and structure o f such a force. Indeed he seemed often to regard it as a convenient substitute for the positioning o f American units abroad. Further, he was too busy with grand strategy to give time to detailed postwar planning. M ore important, he did not want predictable British, American, and Russian disagreements about postwar policies to impede the functioning o f the wartime alliance. H e sensed, too, that the Con gress and the American people were loath to approve much more than the principles o f international organization, and he dreaded a divisive domestic debate that might generate the kind o f opposition to a United Nations that had defeated W ood row W ilson’s League o f Nations. Roosevelt had not w holly decided about his course. H e did expect after victory rapidly to withdraw American forces from Europe and Asia. He had no apparent sympathy for postwar American military adventures overseas. Y et his announced descriptions o f postwar world organization, at best opaque, appeared to presume a political stability founded on a balance o f influence among the strong. W allace for his part advocated wartime planning for a United N a tions that would exercise responsibility for peace and fo r disarmament.
F Offrait o f a Diarist
31
Like Undersecretary o f State Sumner W elles, he saw regional agree ments as a necessary foundation for the larger mandate o f the U N . Regionalism, as he later admitted, could provide a cloak for spheres o f influence—o f the United States in the Americas, o f the Soviet Union in eastern Europe, and o f the British, French, and Chinese in areas o f their traditional concern. But he counted on the United Nations to prevent regionalism from becoming colonialism. Further, to estop aggression o f any sort he advocated endowing the United Nations with its own army and air force, and w ith authority to impose economic sanctions. He contemplated a degree o f surrender o f national sovereignty to an international body larger b y far than was acceptable to any but an insignificant few in high offices in any o f the governments o f the major partners in the war against the Axis. Indeed few Americans who understood W allace’s purpose fu lly supported it. T h e senior mem bers o f the State Department especially looked upon his proposals as fanciful. So did the senior Democrats in the Senate, while the Repub lican leadership was even more chary o f international commitments. For those critics, as for most o f their constituents, peace, in whatever international garment, implied primarily “ freedom from fear”—from threats to the security o f the United States. T hat security was to be assured essentially b y American power alone or in willing alliance with demonstrably trustworthy friends. A s W allace realized, from that position the step was short to unilateral American adventurism undertaken in the name o f peace. •
•
•
As in international, so in domestic policies, W allace b y 1944 had advanced w ell beyond the consensus o f the American people and their congressional representatives.24 T hat gap reflected their conservatism, for W allace, b y no means alone in the forward sector, had not de parted from the traditional objectives of American reform movements or the grow ing body o f economic doctrine o f the time. T h e bases for the political dem ocracy that W allace associated with his century o f the common man were so conventionally American that he did not need to spell them out. T h e nuances o f his speeches and the thrusts o f his activities indicated that he meant b y political dem34 Compare the W allace D iary with the analysis o f public opinion in Jerome S. Bruner, Mandate from the People (N ew Y ork, 1944) and the analysis o f con gressional roll calls in Roland Young, Congressional Politics m the Second W orld W ar (N ew York, 1956); see also Richard Polenberg, W ar and Society: T h e United States t 94S -t 94S (Philadelphia, 1972).
3*
T h e Price o f Vision
ocracy representative government, universal suffrage, and the civil liberties guaranteed b y the Constitution o f the United States. Those conditions did not w holly obtain during the years o f W orld W ar II. H e worried particularly about the distortions o f representation that resulted from the disfranchisement of blacks in the South, from the power o f Democratic machines in the N orth (Chicago especially both ered him), and from the influence that wealthy individuals and corporadons exerted on Congress and on some executive agencies. He also despised the redbaiting techniques o f the Dies Committee in the House and the M cKellar Committee in the Senate. Obsessed with fears about radicals, those committees, reckless in their accusations, bullied the witnesses they disliked. Again and again in his diary W allace ex pressed his ow n reservations about “ Communists” or “ reds,” but in his distress about the tactics o f the witch-hunters in Congress and the FBI, he constantly also expressed a discriminating opposition to professional anticommunists. O nly men with the truncated mentality o f Dies or M cKellar could discover, as they did, sinister and radical tendencies in W allace’s ideas about economic democracy. W allace simply incorporated his under standing o f wartime developments into his long-standing proposals for promoting and distributing an economy o f abundance. T h e ex perience o f the war provided a telling verification o f the theories of John Maynard Keynes and his American interpreters and disciples. T h e enormous federal deficits o f the w ar years spurred private invest ment and employment, and achieved at last the full recovery that had eluded the N ew Deal. T o W allace, as to the Keynesians he regularly saw, it was patent that properly managed federal fiscal policy could sustain prosperity in the postwar years. A ccordingly he believed, with Roosevelt, in the ability o f the government to establish and preserve the conditions that would provide sixty million jobs, a figure that seemed outrageously high in 1944 to the adherents o f conventional economics. In order to achieve that goal, as W allace understood, the government had systematically to employ experts to study the economy and its performance, and to make continual recommendations about federal fiscal and monetary policies to sustain maximum employment. T o that end he supported each o f the series o f bills introduced by Senator M urray of which the last was passed, after revisions, as the Employment A c t o f 1946. T h e long years o f depression had whetted the interest o f all Ameri cans, however much they disagreed about means, in achieving an economy o f plenty. Americans, however, disagreed profoundly about
Portrait o f
a Diarist
33
how and to whom to allocate shares o f prosperity. Debates about the particular aspects of that general question proceeded through the war years. A fter the Democratic reverses in the elections of 194z, a coali tion o f Republicans and southern Democrats controlled congressional decisions. W hile that coalition tried, with considerable success, to roll back die N ew Deal, the President accepted most o f the defeats his policies suffered without more than token protest. Eager for the sup port o f the conservative coalition for his military and foreign policies, he deferred batde over domestic issues. “Dr. N ew Deal,” Roosevelt told the press, had been succeeded b y “Dr. W in-the-W ar.” Depressed by die resulting situation, Henry Morgenthau commented that he could put all the remaining N ew Dealers in his own bathtub. He exaggerated. There was in Washington a group o f young liberal Keynesians who were eagerly planning a new postwar N ew Deal. T h e y had the sig nificant cooperation o f the leadership o f the C IO and the Farmers' Union. In the Senate they had influential friends like Claude Pepper o f Florida and Robert W agner o f N ew York. And they had visible champions in high office, o f whom W allace was the most senior in rank and most articulate in speech. His program for economic dem ocracy reflected their thinking, as well as his own. As he had for so long, W allace during the war combated the power o f big business. In the continuing struggle for control o f the W ar Production Board, he sided with Donald Nelson, a protector of small industry, against Ferdinand Eberstadt, the ingenious investment banker who represented the preferences o f the armed services and their cor porate allies.29 Increasingly in 1943 and thereafter, W allace also con sulted the lawyers in the antitrust division o f the Justice Department, serious young attorneys who were frustrated b y the President’s suspen sion of antitrust proceedings at a time when bigness was growing rapidly. W ith them, W allace attacked American corporate giants that had been (and would again be) associated with international cartels, and, like them, he searched for w ays to revise the patent laws so as to prevent monopolies based on patent rights, especially patents developed at large cost to the federal government. He was not anti-business but anti-bigness; he was not an opponent of capitalism but a proponent of competition. So, too, W allace allied himself with the workers against their em ployers. H e had earlier applauded the success o f the CIO in using collective bargaining to increase the share of labor in corporate profits. M Sec Bruce Canon, T he W ar Lords o f Washington (N ew York, 1948), chap. 10 if.
34
The Price o f Vision
Unions, he believed, would have to function to that end after the war. Though he deplored wartime strikes that retarded production, he recognized the validity o f many o f the demands o f the strikers and he opposed congressional efforts to punish union labor and its leadership. Supporting Roosevelt, W allace also advocated holding down wartime agricultural prices so as to prevent inflation from eroding die gains in income that labor had achieved. T o his satisfaction, the strength o f the unions, the impact o f wage and price controls, and the incidence o f wartime taxes resulted during the war years in a significant redis tribution of income favorable to working men and women. Wallace stood behind other programs to assist industrial and agri cultural workers. He advocated federal support for education, espe cially in technical and scientific subjects, so as to make learning avail able to qualified candidates who could not otherwise afford it. He praised the proposals o f the National Resources Planning Board (an agency which congressional conservatives dissolved out o f spite) and o f the Social Security Administration for postwar increases in old age and unemployment benefits, and for postwar extension o f coverage to millions o f Americans then still outside o f the social security system. Eager to improve the delivery of health care within the United States, he commended the program Henry Kaiser had devised for the col lective care o f workers employed b y his firms. W allace applauded, too, the less adventurous but still controversial plan o f the Social Security Administration to include medical insurance within its province. “So cialized medicine,” as the American Medical Association called it with characteristic imprecision, stirred up so much opposition that Roose velt would not attach his prestige to a Treasury measure sponsoring it. H e could not, the President argued, take on the A M A in the middle o f a great war. W allace could and did, as did Bob W agner and the other authors o f the unsuccessful W agner-M urray-Dingell bill for revising social security to encompass medical insurance. For Wallace, then, economic democracy directly affected the com mon man. It would increase national income b y utilizing fiscal policy to encourage economic growth and antitrust policy to discourage monopolistic restraints on production. It would increase the share of the common man in national income. It would also provide him with protection against the trials o f unemployment, old age, and illness. Taken together, those purposes constituted what Roosevelt meant by “ freedom from want.” Taken together, they also constituted what W allace’s critics called either communism or socialism or the welfare state. T h ey were anathema to the still formidable number o f business
Portrait o f a Diarist
35
men and their lawyers, accountants, and clerks w ho believed, in spite of all that had happened since 1929, in something they called “ the American system,” b y which they meant the political economy of the HardingCoolidge-Hoover years. W allace disturbed an equally large constituency b y his advocacy of “genetic democracy,” another major facet o f his century o f the com mon man. T he phrase was peculiarly his own. His experiments in hybridizing com had led him to an adjective for which most other men substituted “ racial.” H e meant that and more. He urged equal oppor tunities for black Americans in voting, employment, and education, but he sought the same objectives for women o f whatever color. Further, he envisaged in the not distant future equal political and economic opportunities for Asians and Latins, not only for American citizens. In the case o f the Jews, he came before 1944 to agree with the Zionists that a prosperous and dignified future for European Jews, particularly after the ghastly experience of N azi persecution, could materialize only in an independent Jewish state in the area o f Palestine, then British-controlled. His were politically dangerous convictions. Even during a w ar against Nazism, most white Americans remained openly prejudiced against men and women o f darker skins, most were uneasy about directly assisting European Jews, most were indifferent about the rights o f women. Indeed Roosevelt disagreed with W allace. T h e President had doubts about Zionism, little patience with militant Women, and little respect for most women in public life. Further, he had condoned the incarceration o f the Japanese-Americans, and he had erected a bureaucratic barrier of personal aides to spare him from having to listen to the legitimate demands o f American blacks. W al lace’s genetic democracy put him in a lonesome salient far out ahead o f the army o f American voters and o f their elected commander. H e had a related vision still further from the American consensus. It was a prospect incomprehensible except to those fe w who shared W allace’s belief in the brotherhood o f man, his faith in the experience o f westering as an avenue to that brotherhood, and his conviction that commerce brought and held societies together. W hen first he met M olotov, he described to him, as he later did in print for American readers, a huge stretch o f highways and airports reaching northward from the west coast o f South America to Alaska and across the Bering Sea westward through Siberia to European Russia. A long that line he saw potentialities for a vibrant commerce. W hen he reflected about strategy in the Pacific, W allace gave Alaska a high priority for defense, for he viewed Alaska as the last American frontier. But the larger
36
T he Price o f Vision
frontier, the one he postulated for settlement and development in the late twentieth century, made Alaska only one part o f a vast area that also included Soviet Asia and Mongolia. There he believed a com mingling o f peoples from America, Siberia, China, and Mongolia could build a new center o f civilization, a center founded on agriculture, the commerce to sustain it, and the industry that would follow population and employ the extraordinary resources of die northern Pacific triangle. That prospect beguiled him before his visit to Soviet Asia and China. T he observations he made on that trip, recorded in his diary and in his Soviet Asia Mission, confirmed his sense o f the possibilities for realizing the prospect. T he rivalries o f international politics made it only a dream in 1944, but it was precisely those rivalries which W allace believed had to be tempered and contained so that the century o f the common man could begin in the northern Pacific as in all lands. Wallace's beliefs provoked the opposition to his renomination that was virtually universal among Roosevelt’s advisers and the Democratic party leadership. He knew they did not want him. He knew, too, that thousands of rank and file Democrats shared his kind o f aspiration and supported his candidacy. But in 1944, as in 1940, he did not cam paign. B y default rather than b y direction, he left his chances to a few friends who were almost as clumsy and uninfluential as they were ardent and dedicated. A t Roosevelt’s request, W allace even left W ash ington for Asia during the critical weeks before the national conven tion. Again, as in 1940, he knew his presence or his activity made little difference. T he decision about the nomination was the President’s to make. And Roosevelt dropped him. T he President's disingenuous re marks during their discussion of the nomination wounded W allace at least as much as did the President’s decision. Once he became aware o f it, W allace fought, too late and with too few allies, to hold his office, but he accepted defeat in good grace and campaigned hard for the ticket. That earned Roosevelt’s gratitude and W allace’s nomination as Secretary of Commerce. T he episode confirmed W allace’s sense o f the President’s style. Eager to dominate ye t reluctant to offend, Roosevelt hated to tell a loyal friend the simple truth when that truth was bound to hurt. In stead he fenced, he turned to humor, evasion, and half-truths. He would have been kinder in 1944 to tell W allace the truth, for W allace had the character to accept it. T he truth was that the renomination o f W allace would probably have hurt the ticket. W allace admitted as much in 1951 in conversation with an interviewer who asked him what would have happened if he had been renominated and then succeeded
Portrait o f a Diarist
37
to the presidency after Roosevelt’s death. “ Anyone with m y views,” W allace answered, “ would have run into the most extraordinary diffi culties . . . It would have been a terrific battle for control o f public opinion . . . It’s quite possible that I would not have been able to get the support o f Congress.” 36 Indeed, it was quite probable, for the Senate, with the Democrats bitterly divided, in 1945 barely approved W allace’s appointment as Secretary o f Commerce, and then only after stripping that office o f the lending authority Jesse Jones had exercised. A s for public opinion, in 1944, as W allace realized, it was running against him. In his own retrospective assessment, the American people were “ prosperous, fully employed, complacent.” T h e y were w eary o f controls, w eary of shortages, eager for victory and for postwar security and personal com fort. T h e y were not seeking new obligations, new causes, or strange adventures.37 A ccordingly they w ere uncomfortable with the impli cations o f W allace’s century o f the common man. In Wisconsin the voters had eliminated W endell W illkie, W allace’s closest Republican counterpart, from the race for his party’s nomination. Roosevelt, ac cepting the counsel o f his advisers and o f his own instincts, removed W allace, who had taken positions the President was willing to have tested but, in the President’s judgment, had failed the test. W allace had said in 1940 that the question of his nomination was subordinate to the best interest o f the party. In 1944 he had not changed his mind. Though he and his friends thought that his renomination would strengthen the ticket, he had to defer to Roosevelt’s contrary conclu sion. He would have found it more palatable if the President had been more candid. •
•
•
A fter Roosevelt’s death, W allace remained in the Cabinet because he expected, as Secretary o f Commerce, to initiate programs to expand both the American and the world economy, and because he hoped to exert a liberalizing influence within the government. A s he confided in his diary, he did not trust the new President. H arry Truman, though his ow n record was clean, had ties to the corrupt Pendergast machine in Kansas C ity. His sponsors included men like Robert Hannegan and Edwin Pauley whose motives and methods W allace sus-*• *• Oral History, H enry A . W allace, pp. 4566-4570, Oral H istory Project, Colom bia University. 17 Ibid, and Bruner, Mandate from the People.
38
T h e Price o f Vision
pected. Further, in W allace’s view Truman had followed a devious course in winning the vice-presidential nomination. In time, W allace was to consider his suspicions confirmed. W here Roosevelt had been engagingly disingenuous, Truman, in dealing w ith W allace, became transparently dishonest. But at first, though he did not much like W allace, the President was disarming. His apparent openness, his earthiness, his self-effacing eagerness to master his new office and its problems persuaded W allace that they might be able to w ork together productively. T h e y remained within reach o f each other on domestic policies. Truman approved W allace’s plans for reorganization o f the Commerce Department, though he kept W allace off the governing board of the Export-Import Bank. A fter some hesitation, the President gave his full support to the employment bill. W ith less commitment than W allace, he also supported the continuation o f the Office of Price Administration and its efforts to retard inflation. H e recommended continuing wartime policies designed to provide equal employment opportunities for blacks. H e opposed Republican measures to cripple labor unions, but he had limited sympathy for the postwar militancy o f the CIO , and he recommended punitive action against the railroad brotherhoods when they walked out on strike. Recognizing his own political weakness in labor circles, Truman, as he later disclosed, kept W allace in the Cabinet primarily to placate the unions. H e listened to W allace’s advice about labor issues and on occasion used him as an emissary to C IO leaders. T h at role pleased W allace, who also knew that Truman as a senator had voted consistently for N ew Deal measures. As President, he now urged Congress to expand social se curity, to provide for national medical insurance, and to increase minimum wages. N o more than Roosevelt could he be faulted for the conservative coalition in Congress or for the yearning for “ normalcy,” so like the mood o f the early 1920s, that infected so many Americans, war veterans not the least. T o W allace’s grow ing disillusionment, however, the President acted in a manner at variance with his rhetoric. It was not the conservatives in Congress but Trum an himself w ho altered the profile of the Cabinet. Like any President, he naturally wanted his ow n men around h in tmen loyal to him, not to the memory of FD R. But most o f those he chose struck W allace, as they did others, as less able than their predecessors, less liberal, and often meaner in personal and public spirit. W allace had never found James F. Byrnes, the new Secretary o f State, a sympathetic colleague. H e had liked H enry Morgenthau and valued his spontaneous enthusiasm for myriad good causes, but
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after Morgenthau resigned, Fred Vinson and John Snyder, both per sonal friends o f Truman, brought to the Treasury department a narrow view o f both domestic and international issues. W allace had had his problems with Harold Ickes, but he cheered Ickes’ opposition to the nomination o f Edwin Pauley, another Truman crony, as As sistant Secretary o f the N avy. T he Senate blocked that appointment, for Pauley’s associations with the oil industry made the prospect of his control over N avy oil reserves ominous. Still, Ickes resigned, dubious as was W allace about Truman’s concern for the conservation policies Roosevelt had nurtured. Even more disheartening had been the Presi dent’s earlier selection o f Howard M cGrath to replace Francis Biddle as Attorney General. A political hack from Rhode Island, M cGrath filled the Justice Department with nonentities who vitiated the anti trust division that Biddle’s men had energized. T he incompetence as well as the permissiveness of many o f the newcomers to die Justice and Treasury Departments led to the series o f episodes o f petty cor ruption that later gave Truman’s cronies a deservedly shoddy reputa tion, one that hurt the President, too. W allace, who saw government gradually losing its indispensable integrity before those scandals oc curred, lamented equally the concurrent loss of constructive social purpose. The President’s selection o f associates, in W allace’s opinion, cost him much of his credibility. T he last o f the N ew Dealers to remain in the cabinet, W allace held on primarily because o f his overriding concern about military and foreign policy. Truman let him stay in order to appease the restless liberal intellectuals and labor leaders. W allace symbolized their hopes, and as long as he was there, though they might grumble about Truman, they were unlikely to desert him. O nly slowly did W allace learn that he was just a symbol, that he had no influence, that Truman from the outset had had no intention o f taking his advice. T he President let him talk, but he made him an outsider. As they moved apart from each other, Truman contributed to the ultimate separation b y dissembling in what he told W allace. Though W allace would probably have dis sented anyway, he could not be expected to understand, much less to approve, policies about which he was at least partially misinformed.98 2* T h e entire discussion in this section of the introduction rests primarily upon W allace’s Diary and Harry S. Truman, Year o f Decisions (Garden G ty , i ç j s ) . On questions of military and foreign policies, I found particularly stimulating W alter La Feber, America, Russia, and the C old War, 1945-1966 (N ew York, 1967). Also useful was Thomas G . Patterson, ed.. Cold War Critics (Chicago, 1971). For another informed but doctrinaire interpretation, see Norman D. Markowitz, T he Rise and Fall o f the People's Century: H enry A . W allace and American Liberalism, 1941-1948 (N ew York, 1973).
4o
T he Price o f Vision
Still, the failure o f communication between Truman and W allace counted far less than did their fundamental disagreement about the role o f the United States in world affairs. T h ey started with different assumptions. The President and his closest advisers believed that na tional security depended upon military strength and position, on a large and poised strategic air force that could retaliate in the event o f an attack, on the availability o f safe bases from which both bombers and naval aircraft could operate, and on a large reserve army ready for quick mobilization. T h ey were, in a sense, preparing for the war that had just ended, for defense against another blitzkrieg or another attack upon Pearl Harbor. T h ey were fashioning a system o f deterrence (before that word had become the vogue), a system to which the American monopoly of die atomic bomb gave unparalleled power. But there was no point in building that system o f defense in the absence o f an enemy. T h e y identified the Soviet Union as that potential enemy. That identification rested on several premises. Those who made it considered Russian policy in Poland and in the eastern zone o f G er many evidence o f an expansionist purpose at least as extensive as were historic Russian ambitions in the Black and the Mediterranean seas. T h ey tended to forget or to ignore the natural concern for their own security that the Russians felt, especially about Poland through which the Germans had attacked twice within one generation. T h ey tended, too, to overlook the Russian need for reparations to replace capital equipment destroyed by war and unavailable from the United States in the absence o f a credit which the State Department would not ap prove. T oo, suspicions of the Soviet Union fed on American fears about communism as a doctrine and about Stalin as a dictator, as a mad and evil genius who quickly replaced Hitler in American demonol ogy. T he Soviet Union did intend to protect its interests as it defined them, but Truman’s counselors exaggerated the dangers to the United States inherent in that intention. Truman’s own tough talk to Molotov early in his presidency expressed his real opinion o f the Soviet Union better than did his more placatory public pronouncements. And more and more the President accepted as fact the presumptions about a Soviet menace that were advanced with rising emphasis b y Secretary o f State Byrnes, Ambassador Averell Harriman, and their staffs. W allace proceeded from a different set of assumptions. National security, in his view, depended not on American arms but on a strong United Nations, on the abatement o f international hostilities rather than the deployment o f American forces, on comity, not deterrence. A large reserve army, a powerful strategic air force and navy, the bomb, and a global ring o f American bases, he argued, served only to
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alarm the Soviet Union, obviously the only potential target for Ameri can strength. So alarmed, the Russians in their turn were bound to be hostile. It was not some demoniacal quality in Stalin or in communism, as W allace saw it, but ancient Russian fears that accounted for their policies in eastern Europe. N ew anxieties about American encircle ment would provoke them to an arms race that no nation could afford and the peace o f the world might not survive. As before, like some others in Washington, W allace accepted the existence of spheres of influence as at least a temporary circumstance o f the postwar period.29 He did not expect the Soviet Union to intrude in Latin America, and he did not expect the United States to intrude in eastern Europe. Probably he underestimated the repression that accom panied Soviet domination; certainly he did so in 1947 and 1948. But at no time, his critics to the contrary, did W allace condone repression b y any nation. Rather, he believed that the elimination o f international tension would, over time, lead both to a softening o f Soviet foreign policy and a relaxation o f police methods within areas o f Soviet con trol. T o encourage that relaxation he advocated more patience in diplomacy than Byrnes or Truman ordinarily displayed. He urged, too, energetic cultivation o f Soviet-American commerce, first of all b y the extension o f a credit to Russia, exactly the policy Harriman and the State Department blocked. T he establishment o f a basis for trade, W allace predicted, would serve the economic advantage o f both na tions and help gradually to convert suspicious hostility to tolerant rivalry between tw o different political and economic systems. He w holly expected the American system to prove its greater worth. Truman’s stance toward the Soviet Union was the most continual but by no means the only source o f distress to Wallace. He worried, too, about relations with Great Britain, with Latin America, and with China, as well as about decisions affecting the control o f the atomic bomb. W ith respect to China, he had no quarrel with Truman’s at tempt, unsuccessful though it was, to w ork out an accommodation between Chiang Kai-shek and the communists. In contrast to Truman, however, W allace held that the presence and deployment o f Soviet troops in Manchuria, which militated to the advantage o f the Chinese communists, accorded with agreements between Roosevelt and Stalin. Still, W allace and Truman agreed that the United States had done and was doing all it could for the Generalissimo; if he fell, the fault would be his. T h e y came close to agreement, too, about domestic control o f a* O n that attitude in the early postwar period, see H . Stuart Hughes, 'T h e Second Year o f the Cold W ar, Commentary, August 1969, pp. 27-32.
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atomic energy, though not about related international policy. W al lace, who had known from the beginning about the project to develop the atomic bomb, turned for advice about its control to the nuclear scientists w ho had created it. Informed b y those physicists, whom he trusted as the experts in their field, he concluded that atomic weapons were far too destructive to be left to the control o f the military. T oo, the development o f atomic science was far too important to be removed from control o f the physicists. W allace realized there was no secret about atomic energy. European scientists had played indispensable roles in the American project; the Germans and Japanese had built cyclotrons during the war; the Soviet Union, whose scientists were first-rate, had an atomic bomb within its reach if it was prepared to defray the enormous costs o f making one. But the prospect o f a nuclear arms race appalled W allace. H e envisaged instead the utiliza tion o f atomic energy as a source o f power and a field o f research, in both thrusts as a boon instead o f a threat to mankind. Those considerations accounted for his opposition to the May-Johnson bill which would have left the military with authority over Ameri can atomic development. W ith many o f die nuclear scientists, with the essential assistance of Director o f the Budget Harold Smith, and against the devious opposition o f General Leslie Groves, W allace en couraged the drafting and enactment o f the McMahon bill. It pro vided, he felt, even after unfortunate amendments designed to m ollify congressional saber-ratders, acceptable assurances of civilian control over the domestic atomic energy program. T h e McMahon A c t could not guarantee that civilian authorities, the President included, would not yield to military counsel. In W al lace’s opinion, many o f them already had. Vannevar Bush had sup ported the May-Johnson bill, as for a time had other scientists and administrators o f organized science including James B. Conant. Even Robert Oppenheimer had not enlisted against it, and until Harold Smith and others persuaded him to reconsider, Truman had gone along with Bush and thus with General Groves. In the end the President did exert his influence for the McMahon measure, but he accepted, with far more equanimity than did W allace, the amendments to the bill that gave the military a stronger voice than most o f the veterans o f Los Alamos deemed safe or wise. W ith too few exceptions to matter, congressmen felt a kind of panic at the thought o f sharing the supposed secret o f the bomb with any nation, especially with the Soviet Union. Y et science recognized no national borders. Passionately, therefore, W allace advocated a policy
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o f openness about American scientific information, as his communica tions to Truman and others disclosed. T hat policy would ease appre hensions about American intentions, a politically desirable eventuality. It would also avail people everywhere o f knowledge with which they could harness atomic energy to build an abundant society. T h at view , close to the opinion o f Secretary Stimson and a few others in the Cabinet, was neither radical nor irresponsible. T h e sharing o f basic scientific information did not im ply the disclosure o f technical details about the production o f fissionable materials or the triggering mechan ism for an implosion weapon. But the sharing o f basic scientific in formation seemed to the timid and the ignorant equivalent to the loss o f a precious secret on which national security depended. So thought Secretary o f the N a vy James Forrestal. So thought enough congress men and ultimately, with less intensity, the President himself, to limit American flexibility in approaching die issue. Privately Truman concluded that W allace’s opinions about atomic policy were unsafe. He also took pains not to venture beyond what Congress would approve. H e could not obtain that approval without Republican support, so in atomic, as in all foreign policy, he paid the high price o f bipartisanship. A t the least that price involved con tinual concessions to the outsized vanity o f Senator Arthur Vandenberg, senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee. O n that and other accounts, Truman found it necessary often to employ anticom munist rhetoric, w hich he seemed not to consider distasteful. Further, he drew back without any prodding from offering the Soviet Union anything, even basic scientific information that he could not long keep secret, without receiving in return something he felt he had been denied. In the case o f atomic energy, he moved to circumvent the Soviet position on the use o f the veto in the Security Council o f the United Nations. T h e proposals that he had Bernard Baruch put for ward in the U N were less liberal than the preliminary recommenda tions drafted b y David Lilienthal and Dean Acheson, w ho was b y no means soft in his view o f M oscow. A s W allace complained, the Baruch plan, unlike Acheson’s, eliminated the veto as it applied to questions o f atomic energy while it also guaranteed for a decade American monopoly o f atomic weapons, and offered the Soviet Union informa tion only on the installment plan, with each installment conditional upon Soviet good behavior during the previous period. A proud and powerful nation, capable o f mounting an atomic energy program on its own, was bound to reject the Baruch proposals. A more generous offer, W allace believed, would have w on Soviet trust and acceptance.
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A s he saw it, men like General Groves, Secretary Forrestai, and Baruch had infected American opinion and warped American policy. A s for Truman, who had seemed to wobble for months, he struck W allace, as he did Eleanor Roosevelt, as a weak and vacillating man. B y W allace’s standards, the President also appeared cynical. Truman looked upon Latin America as a counter in the game o f world politics. T o hold the nations to the south to a hemispheric coalition dominated b y the United States, the President through his spokesmen at San Francisco arranged die admission o f Argendna, then manifestly a fascist country, to the U N . That maneuver aroused the suspicions o f the Soviet Union, which had been no less cynical in its role in the politics o f the conference. It also presaged the meretricious manner o f the State Department in Latin American relations—the appointment o f ambassa dors content to cooperate with the conservative forces o f the military, the church, and the large landholders; the arming o f those governing coalitions which used the weapons they received to stifle opposition; the abandonment o f the objectives the Board o f Economic W arfare had advanced. W allace had seen Latin America as the first beneficiary o f the policies he advocated for the common man. N o w he watched the President and State Department revert to the neocolonialism of the 1920s, to a policy pitched to the alleged needs o f national defense and the palpable advantage o f American investors, a policy impervious to the woeful conditions o f daily life which he believed the United States had an obligation to mitigate. Wallace also interpreted as cynical Truman’s early approach to the Palestine question. Disinclined to alienate Great Britain, the President yielded to London’s anxieties about placating the Arabs and protecting British control in the Middle East. T he definition o f Palestine’s bor ders and the limits on Jewish immigration on which British and American negotiators first agreed left Palestine too small and weak for economic development or military security, and left thousands o f dis placed European Jews without access to a permanent home. W allace, who urged Truman to demand a solution more favorable to the Jews, played on the President’s political sensitivities. British convenience and prospects for American oil investments in the Middle East came gradually to count less with Truman than did the Jewish vote. But W allace had meanwhile concluded that the President had little more humane concern for the Jews o f Europe than for the impoverished in Latin America. He also considered the President’s original position on Palestine as typifying an unfortunate course of American relations with Great Britain.
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T h at issue disturbed W allace as much as did any other. He admired the heroic role o f the British common people in their resistance to the Nazis. But like so many Middle Western democrats, he despised the British upper classes for their haughty manner and their arrogance about race, national origin, and social position. Further, he blamed them for British imperialism, which he wished to eradicate. On that account he distrusted Churchill, alike for his aristocratic ways and his imperialistic sentiments, so freely expressed whenever the Prime Min ister visited Washington. Even after the election o f a Labor govern ment, W allace feared that Great Britain would remain Churchillian in purpose, would continue to hold the uncritical affection o f Anglophiles in the Department o f State, and would induce the United States to as sume a partnership in world politics. He had trusted Roosevelt to resist that role, but Truman was more vulnerable to British influence, partly because he shared Churchill’s fear o f Russia, partly because among his closest advisers were men like Dean Acheson, who characteristically associated American with British interests. From April 1945, when Roosevelt died, through the remainder o f the year, W allace grew more and more restive with die international policies o f the administration. Increasingly he realized that Truman in private conversations gave him assurances that the President’s public actions contradicted. Still W allace allowed himself to hope that Truman might change. During 1946 he lost that hope. T he Baruch plan alarmed him. So did the hard line toward the Soviet Union that Averell Harriman advanced upon his return from M oscow to Washington, the tough policy that Secretary o f State Byrnes pursued in his negotiations with the Russians, the tough talk o f State Department Russian specialists like Charles Bohlen and George Kennan. T h e y read Stalin’s monitory address o f February 9, 1946, as a trumpet o f hostility, o f communist militancy and Russian expansionism. W allace read it as a regrettably inimical response to threats that Stalin perceived in his exaggerated interpretation o f American policy. According to that reading, there was still room for reciprocal understanding. But then at Fulton, Mis souri, with Truman on the platform, Churchill delivered his celebrated “ iron curtain” speech, that called for a fraternal alliance o f the Englishspeaking people. It was precisely the alliance W allace most opposed. Involving, as it did, the fading grandeur of the British empire and the implicit threat of the atomic bomb, it was addressed aggressively against the Soviet Union. It portended the rejection of spheres of influence in Europe that had been defined b y the deployment of troops at the end o f the war. It invited Anglo-American penetration o f the
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Soviet sphere. Speaking at Stuttgart* Germany, in September, Secre tary o f State Byrnes sounded the first notes of that new policy which would gradually make the United States the catalyst, initially in the economic and later in the military reconstruction o f W est Germany as a part o f a larger anti-Soviet bloc. There were provocations, as W allace knew, for Byrnes' address. T he Soviet Union had permitted no democracy in the areas it ruled; it had seized German industrial equipment and commandeered German labor in its eastern zone; it had broken promises made at Yalta and at Potsdam; it had disregarded human rights in Poland and elsewhere in eastern Europe; it had been intransigent in preventing a common policy for occupied Germany as a whole. But the United States had been intransigent, too, in its unilateral control over occupied Japan, in its deployment o f strategic air power, in its manipulations in Latin America. American occupation authorities in Japan had wantonly de stroyed the Japanese cyclotron. Washington officials, while denying a credit to Russia, had arranged one for Great Britain, possibly on harder terms to the Labor government than they would have extended to the Tories. Politically and ideologically, the world had begun to polarize b y September 1946. W allace’s hopes were evaporating for the kind of world he had associated with a century of the common man. A t Madison Square Garden on September 12, he tried again to put his message across, to warn against Churchill’s proposals and to urge an other approach to the Soviet Union. He criticized alike British imperial and Russian political practices, and the communists in the audience booed him, for he was pleading not for Russia but for peace. Truman, who had read and approved the speech, disavowed it after W allace’s opponents opened fire and Byrnes and Vandenberg insisted that the speech impeded their diplomacy at the ongoing conference o f foreign ministers. On Truman’s order, W allace promised to speak no more until that conference was over. But that tenuous arrangement only postponed the obvious solution. Byrnes, dissatisfied, demanded that Truman fire Wallace, and Truman did. T he President had, after all, issued the directions Byrnes was following. A s W allace and Truman both knew, there could be at any one time only one American foreign policy. Once the issue was openly joined, W allace had to go. •
•
•
Though Truman’s administrative decision was incontestably correct, his foreign policy was not. Like his critics at the time, so critics since have questioned both his presumptions and his tactics. W allace was
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only one o f the first to do so. In the absence o f access to the Soviet archives, there can be no sure assessment of W allace’s case. American provocations may only have confirmed fixed Soviet decisions about postwar policy. But provocations there certainly were, as W allace argued. A t least until the time o f Fulton, the possibility existed of a practical accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union, o f a temporary coexistence of mutually suspicious spheres of influence, o f a gradual lessening o f hostility and a gradual movement, as W allace recommended, first toward commercial and scientific and then toward political cooperation, all within the framework o f the United Nations. Even after the Fulton speech, the United States could have assisted the countries o f the Southern Hemisphere more on an altruistic and less on a political basis. American records, easy o f access, disclose that Truman never expected a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. W allace had reason to disagree. He had the prescience to realize that the hard line abroad would generate hysterical reactions to dissent at home, lead to the postponement of urgent domestic reforms, and encourage military adventures costly alike of men and morale. He had the foresight to propose alternatives to which the United States government turned only after a quarter century of terrible waste had made accommodation more attractive to most o f the American people. Y et in the months immediately following his departure from public office, W allace’s insights were cloudy. A s his fears about Truman’s policies grew, so did his vulnerability to those who were urging him to run for the presidency on a third party ticket.80 He was tempted to embark on that unhappy course on several counts. Out of govern ment, he was removed from the councils of state to which he had often contributed and from which he had often also learned. He was re moved, too, from easy access to the kinds of experts who had given him such influential assistance in earlier years, for one example in the making o f agricultural policies. H e had to rely instead more on his intuitions and hopes than on hard data and salient technical knowledge. Further, those w ho now advised him lacked the experience and judg ment o f his former counselors. M any of the men in the group around him were naive; some were eager to use him to advance their own interests; none had much political insight. Y et their pressure moved w W allace kept no diary after he left office. Further, there is no wholly satisfac tory study o f his role during the years 1946-48 or of the Progressive Party, for his papers for that period nave not been available. One useful brief account and another compendious one are respectively Karl M. Schmidt, Henry A . W allace: Q uixotic Crusade 1948 (Syracuse, i960) and Curtis D. MacDougall, Gideon's Arm y, j vols. (N ew York, 1965). T h e sympathies o f the latter imbue Markowitz, T h e Rise and Fall o f the People's Century.
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W allace less than did his own temperament. Believing that Truman was leading the country and the world toward war, committed to a contrary view o f the new century, W allace disregarded the warnings o f his family and old friends and followed his ow n compulsion to stand political witness to his faith. In his eagerness to find a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, he blinded himself to the mounting evidence o f Russian tyranny in eastern Europe. In his determination to resist redbaiting, he became indifferent to the debilitating tactics o f communists within his Progressive Party o f 1948. For several years, his passion overcame his practicality. Even so, he remained perceptive. Long an advocate o f American assistance in the rebuilding o f the European economy, he urged em ploying international agencies to administer aid programs and granting aid exclusively on social and economic rather than political bases. Those considerations led him to underestimate the responsibility o f the Soviet Union for keeping eastern Europe out o f the Marshall Plan. Earlier, however, he had protested against the Truman Doctrine and its applications in Greece and T urkey. A s W allace then said, that doc trine ignored and weakened the United Nations, substituted unilateral for multilateral aid, and gave military assistance unfortunate priority over economic assistance. W orse, the anticommunist rhetoric o f the doctrine expressed a universal commitment to antirevolutionary inter ventions. A s W allace foresaw, both the precedent and the rhetoric had ominous portents. Indeed W allace’s fundamental trepidations about American policy, all o f them prominent before he left office, had become by the early 1970s common criticisms o f the history o f the interceding years. T h e collusion o f the military with those industrial interests that depended upon defense expenditures had resulted in enormous waste and bureau cratic inefficiency. T he military-industrial establishment against which D w ight D. Eisenhower warned his countrymen in 1961 had worried W allace tw o decades earlier. Indeed the military, as Americans learned b y 1970, had proved unable to maintain the standards o f financial probity and disciplined warfare on which professional soldiers liked to pride themselves. Unilateral military intervention, as W allace had feared, had become something o f a national habit, w ith the war in Vietnam only the most recent and most dreadful example of the cor rupting dangers of American adventurism. T o o , war and preparation for war, deterrence and its cost, balance-of-power politics with their related expenditures—even bribes—for the purchase of allies, had debili tated the U N and absorbed national income needed for domestic social
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programs, the very programs W allace had urged for relief o f poverty, conservation o f the land and its resources, education o f the young, the delivery o f health care, and the protection o f the aged. T h e inversion o f national priorities, attacked in 1968 b y Eugene M cCarthy and Robert Kennedy and in 1972 b y G eorge M cGovern, had drawn W allace’s criticisms in 1942. In other w ays also W allace proved prescient, a man far ahead o f his times, as he had so often been. A fter the revolution in Cuba, Washington recognized Latin America again as a continent full o f people, not just a reservation for private investment and seductive mili tary aid. T he Alliance for Progress that John F. Kennedy launched in 1961 had as its social targets precisely those o f the Board o f Eco nomic W arfare. Even Richard Nixon discovered what W allace had always maintained, that communist ideology did not constitute an in superable hurdle to communication. In 1971 N ixon w ent to China, which he had condemned as demoniacal for more than tw o decades, and in 1972 to M oscow, there to suggest that the encouragement of commerce between the Soviet Union and the United States would benefit both nations and ease their political relationship. For saying such things W allace had been called a red or at least a pink from 1946 through 1948, as were others o f his opinion, with N ixon one of their most fervent accusers. T he irony o f history should have restored W allace’s reputation, but in the early 1970s he was still remembered more for his occasional fallibility than for his extraordinary foresight. Three decades earlier he had imagined a splendid century which still had yet convincingly to begin. H e would have welcomed a century o f the common man, as he welcomed the N e w Deal, whenever it began. He would have lost none o f his verve for administering the agencies to promote it, shed none o f his worries about the persisting impediments to it, surrendered none o f his zeal fo r opposing the enemies o f it. W hile he found armor for his missions in his faith, while he preached his best hopes, H enry A . W allace sought their fulfillment less in his message than in the hard labor o f learning and doing. B y his works, he believed, practical Christian that he was, men would know him. In his works they would find a good man.
I T h e Board of Economic W arfare February 1942 — July 1943
T his sectio n o f the diary o f Henry A . W allace begins, as it ends, on the continual controversy over the Board o f Economic W arfare, o f which he was chairman. T hat controversy involved him in a struggle for authority with both Jesse H. Jones, the Secretary of Com merce and head of the major federal lending agencies, and Cordell Hull, the Secretary o f State. A t one level the struggle was a bureau cratic contest, characteristic o f Washington during Roosevelt's adminis trations. Wallace, an experienced infighter, had been through similar battles before, for example with Harold Ickes over control of the Forest Service. N o w again he had to defend his authority, which was exercised primarily b y Milo Perkins, director of the B E W , from Jones’ deliberate foot-dragging in making loans for the procurement of vital commodities abroad, and from Hull’s insistence on State Department supervision over American nonmilitary activities in foreign nations. Jones and Hull, for their part, viewed W allace and his associates as intruders in their domains. A t another level, the Board of Economic W arfare operated as W al lace’s particular instrument for the vigorous prosecution o f the war. H e would not have fought for authority as he did had he not believed that the B E W was providing essential services to the country, particu larly in arranging to procure scarce commodities, but also in other activities relating to export controls and to die identification o f in dustrial targets for aerial bombardment. Jones’ dilatory and parsi monious habits, annoying in themselves, became significant for the nation, as W allace saw it, because they delayed the essential stock piling that the B E W was understaking. So, too, the State Department’s constraints on overseas personnel had similar effects. Even more important, W allace disagreed with his antagonists about the desirable nature of the postwar world. Their behavior, he felt, interfered with his efforts to construct a thriving and equitable postwar international economy. H e and his agency, in contrast to the Depart ments o f State and Commerce, were eager to use the contracts they negotiated, especially in Latin America, to raise the standards o f work-
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ing and living o f agricultural and other laborers. T he increased costs paid o ff immediately in increased efficiency and permanently in a more democratic social order. Economic democracy, democracy among the races, and political democracy—all to be shared b y all men everywhere—constituted the goals W allace defined in his speech of March 8, 1942, on the century o f the common man (see Appendices). H e repeated and rephrased those goals in several important speeches thereafter, including his address in Detroit in July 1943 at the time this section ends. T he pursuit o f those goals and their corollary policies, such as freedom for all nations in the use o f the air, occupied W allace’s attention during the entire period o f the fight over the B E W . That pursuit led him, too, to the conclu sions he drew during the same period about the dangers o f British im perialism, the need for postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union, the failures o f American policy in N orth Africa, and the drift toward con servatism in American domestic politics. For W allace, all those issues were related, all bore upon the conduct o f the w ar and the nature o f the peace. All, for him, including the control o f the Board of Economic W arfare and the extent of its au thority, were essentially matters not o f bureaucratic politics but o f fundamental principle. T h e significance o f the stakes, as he defined them, pervaded the episodes o f the struggle.
FEBRUARY 24, 1942 HENRY A. WALLACE TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Dear Mr. President:1 . . . W e have a few competent people in the Board o f Economic W arfare working on postwar problems and recently w e have gotten the help o f A lvin Hansen and W infield Riefler2 on an international ever-normal granary program. W e have very little faith, however, in how effective it w ill be to present ideas o f this sort to a peace con ference. O ur feeling is that w e are writing the postwar world as w e go along and that w e need some o f the R F C powers now to do a good job of it. Those powers can be used to get in raw materials from abroad more aggressively than they have been used in the past. T h e administrative machinery thus set up to help win the war w ill be the most effective economic means through which w e can win the peace later on. W ith out labeling it as such, w e can thereby get an international ever-normal granary functioning long before we ever come to an armistice. 1 W allace occasionally included among the papers o f his diary letters which he considered particularly important. This letter and the several that follow it were of that kind. T h e y made the case, which he also pressed in conversations with the President, for administrative changes intended to increase the authority and independence of the Board of Economic W arfare. A s the letters reveal, W allace was eager to become his own banker so as to escape the slow and often obdurate responses o f Jesse Jones to B E W requests for loans for stockpiling. Further, W allace wanted his subordinates in the field freed from the need to report to American ambassadors or ministers who tended to reflect the characteristic inflexibilities o f the State Department. Those changes, W allace believed, would significantly enhance his ability to create and regularly replenish stockpiles of critical war materials. H e had in mind as a model the “ever-normal granary” which he had built up from domestic produc tion in the prewar years and which in 1942 was proving to be an indispensable source of food supplies for the United States and its allies. 2 A lvin H . Hansen and W infield Riefler, able economists, served continually as advisers to various federal agencies during the N ew Deal and the Second W orld W ar. Hansen was in his time probably the most influential American advocate o f Keynesian principles, and Riefler was perhaps the most distinguished econo mist of those who worked at any time for the Board of Economic W arfare.
5e Price of Vision
Harlan M iller1 told me, after W endell W illkie had left, that when W illkie was pointing out the many w eak spots in Churchill . . . W ill kie had in mind Roosevelt just as much or perhaps even more than Churchill. Curiously enough, when W illkie finished his discourse on Churchill I mentioned that I had received the day previous from the N ew Y ork Genealogical Society a genealogical table indicating that in the eighth generation Churchill and Roosevelt had three pairs o f ances tors in common. I had pointed this out w ithout having in mind at all what . . . was in W illkie’s mind. It seemed to me that W illkie w ent out o f his w ay to be unusually pleasant, talking only about the need for defeating the common enemy. W illkie maintained that as nearly as he could get at it, w e had only about 100,000 soldiers in England and Ireland. H e thought there w ere 400,000 Germans in France. H e said the British w ith all their obser vations o f the Germans had been unable to locate 30 German divisions. I mentioned that there was a considerable part o f the Germ an air force w hich had not been spotted. W e both agreed that there was a consid erable supply o f Germ an strength being held in reserve. W illkie spoke quite bitterly about Senator Danaher2 o f Connecticut, claim ing that his isolationism was totally at variance w ith the sentiment o f the people o f Connecticut. H e pointed out that Danaher was governed to a con siderable extent b y the church o f w hich he is a member . . . I suggested that the best inform ation indicated the Germans them selves did not expect to destroy the Russian arm y this year but they did expect to make sufficient progress so they w ould be able to put on a strong peace offensive directed at England. W illkie said he thought there was much more likelihood o f a peace offensive taking hold in the United States than in England and mentioned the probability o f Ham Fish’s8 reelection as an indication o f the thoughtlessness o f even the most intelligent Am erican people. W illkie said he presumed that the district represented b y Fish was one o f the most highly educated in the United States . . . au g u st
1 1 , 1942
. . . Colonel Lord told me that he thought D on N elson was on his w ay out, that he probably w ould not last more than tw o months 1 Harlan Miller, Iowa journalist, since 1940 a columnist for the W ashington Post, had just been ordered, as a captain in the A ir Corps reserve, to active duty as a W a r Department liaison officer. 8 Jo h n A . D anaher, R ep u b lica n senator fr o m C o n n e c tic u t (19 3 9 -4 5 ).
8 Hamilton Fish, articulate Republican conservative and isolationist, United States representative from the 26th N ew Y ork district (1919-45).
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longer, that the battle fundam entally was between A rm y and civilian control over procurements, the difficulty was that A rm y had the m oney. Lord felt it would be unfortunate fo r the A rm y to come out on top because he thought the w ar effort could be put across in a more balanced, com plete, and rapid w ay under civilian co n tro l I called up David N iles, w ho has just taken on the job o f being one o f the President’s assistants, and found that he shared some o f Colonel Lord’s views, said that he and Lubin had been talking about the matter. I suggested that N iles get in touch w ith Colonel Lord. T b e Brazilian party was a barbecue w ith the meat cooked out o f doors over an open fire according to the system w hich is used in R io Grande do Sul . . . Leon Henderson proclaim ed that he was really good at things w hich w ere vulgar and required plenty o f energy. H e said that M ilo was the kind o f gu y w ho started fires but I was the kind o f g u y w ho put fires out and he was the kind o f fellow w ho enjoyed fires. Leon danced fo r about tw o hours continuously and seemed to be fresh as a daisy at the finish . . .
a u g u st
12,1942
I had an exceedingly interesting conversation w ith M cD ougall o f Australia about postwar planning, especially w ith regard to food. M c D ougall has the idea that one o f the w ays o f keeping peace w ould be to require that Europe grow not more than 75 percent o f all w heat w hich she consumes, w hich is the proportion that she used to grow prior to 1930, and that she be required to have not more than certain stocks on hand. In return for this, the United States, Argentina, Canada, and Australia would agree to have certain quantities o f w heat stored up, and hold it in w orld ports available at reasonable prices. T h e idea is that if none o f the western European countries had any large quantities o f w heat stored up, it w ould be impossible fo r them to start a w ar . . .
a u g u st
13,1942
. . . General G eorge and Colonel Smith1 are handling air transport fo r the A rm y. M ost o f the men in this w ork came from the commer cial airlines. Colonel Smith, e.g., was president o f the Am erican A ir lines. T h e y are very much interested in our getting suitable air bases in various spots over the w orld w hen the w ar comes to an end. T h e 1 M ajor General Harold L. George, commanding general of the A ir Transport Command, A rm y A ir Forces, and Colonel Cyrus R. Smith, w ho had resigned as president of American Airlines, Inc. to become George's deputy.
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A rm y has these bases today, but the question is, w ill w e be traded out o f them when the peace comes? In some w ays this is one o f the most important o f all the peace problems. I sketched to diem m y idea o f the importance o f the highw ay and air route from Argentina to Siberia w ith feeders coining in from India and China. I believe this idea, w hich I have tried out on m any people, w ill eventually take hold . . . Espada1 wanted to tell me how disappointed he had been in his con tacts w ith the Export-Im port Bank, etc. H e had not been able to bor row the m oney w hich he thought was necessary to build some highly im portant roads and irrigation systems. de Lozada thought the B E W ought to pass out directives to the State Department and to Jesse Jones w hich would give Espada what he wanted. I told him w e are not in position to do that but nevertheless made an appointment fo r Espada w ith M ilo Perkins. A t die Ezekiel1*3 party, Kaiser* seemed to be more interested in hous ing fo r defense workers than anything else . . . T here was considerable discussion about the division o f authority in W ashington, the failure to get things prom ptly decided, the failure to maintain proper supervision over inventories, etc., etc. Kaiser was very keen about getting a prom pt expansion in steel production, claim ing that he could start today and have a steel mill running in io months. T h e view he presented was directly at variance w ith the view s presented b y R obert Patterson in Novem ber o f 1941 when Bob was tryin g to pre vent steel expansion that I was tryin g to bring to pass. Bob was very sincere and very fine but is alw ays battling fo r the needs o f the imme diate present.
au g u st
2 0 ,1 9 4 2
. . . Fow ler Hamilton4 is hard at w ork on the problem o f determin ing just w hich industries in the enem y countries best deserve bombing. H e told how he had worked w ith various businessmen w ho had been in Japan to determine just what w ere the industrial potentialities o f Japan fo r the making o f airplanes. H e claims that the A rm y has been too low 1 Joaquin Espada, Bolivian Minister o f Finance. 3 Mordecai J. Ezekiel, economic adviser to the Secretary o f Agriculture (193344), a liberal Keynesian whose advice, like that o f Louis Bean, often influenced Wallace. 3 H enry J. Kaiser, industrialist extraordinary o f the Second W orld W ar, then about to turn his remarkable entrepreneurial energies to steel production, the object o f his constructive ambitions on that evening. 4 Fowler Hamilton o f the B E W s Office o f Economic W arfare A n a l y s i s .
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in their estimates o f Japanese potentialities. T h e A rm y thought the Japs could make only 6500 airplanes a year. Ham ilton finally got them up to about 10,000. H e really thinks they have potentialities fo r mak ing between 15,000 and 20,000 planes a year . . . T h e President was very much interested in a new typ e o f colonial administration. H e told o f a conversation w ith Churchill in w hich he told Churchill he did not think there should be mandating after the w ar was over. Roosevelt thought there w ere certain areas o f the w orld that should be run b y trustees representing several nations—one from Latin Am erica perhaps, one from the U nited States and Canada perhaps, and one other. T h e President indicated very clearly that he was not going to get into the Texas situation. It was evident that he had considerable dis gust w ith the Texas congressmen and senators for letting O ’Daniel1 get into a position o f so much pow er. H e had no question but that O ’Dan iel w ould w in, and spoke contem ptuously o f Jesse H . Jones, w ho had not done anything to hold the line in Texas . . . T h e President has received inform ation from someone whose infor mation has hitherto been correct about Japanese moves that the Japa nese have now decided not to attack Siberia this fall. T h e President said he had passed this inform ation on to Stalin and he thought Stalin had w ithdrawn some men from Siberia on the strength o f this report to strengthen his line in the W est against the Germans. I told the Presi dent I thought it was still in the cards fo r the Japs to attack Siberia. T h e President did not think so, however, because he said only tw o months o f good weather w ere now le ft and that the Japs w ould hardly dare to strike w ith w inter closing dow n so soon . . . T h e President entered into a rather lengthy discourse about a con versation he had had w ith Churchill. Before he ended up the discourse, he had forgotten that it was w ith Churchill he had been talking to and d ie other man had become W illkie . . . T h e President, speaking to M ilo and me about an international sys tem o f public w orks, said that he had always had the idea it was all right to construct public w orks w ith a special kind o f m oney, pro vided this special kind o f m oney w ere retired over a number o f years b y the receipts from the public works. H e spoke o f a conversation w hich he had many years ago w ith Adolph M iller3 and other members 1 W . Lee "Pappy” O ’Daniel, anti-New Deal Texas Democrat, victor over Lyndon B. Johnson (whom F D R supported) in a special election in 1941 for the United States Senate, successful canaidate for re-election in 1942. a A dolph C. Miller, economist, member o f the Federal Reserve Board (1914-36).
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o f die Federal Reserve Board w ith regard to this idea. I recognized it as the idea known as the G uernsey M arket House Idea. M iller, accord ing to the President, said the plan was perfectly sound provided that there did not eventually com e to pass public w orks o f such poor qual ity that th ey could not produce the incom e necessary to retire the capital structure. W hile I did not say so to the President, m y ow n fear w ould be that under some condidons such a large volum e o f public w orks m ight be started that inflation m ight result. T his could happen, how ever, only if there w ere fu ll em ploym ent or em ploym ent at wages unduly high. If inflation is prevented and the quality o f the public w orks is incom e-producing, it w ould seem that the President's idea has in it much o f m erit. W hile M ilo and I w ere talking w ith die President, I mentioned inci dentally the pride w hich the Am erican people had in the fact that at last w e w ere able to take the offensive even if only fo r a short time in the Pacific. T h e President did not seem to be com pletely happy about it all and said w ith regard to M acA rthur1 as though he found him a problem child, “Som e b oy” . . . a u g u st 2 1 , 1942
Jerry G reen1 came in fo r the specific purpose o f finding out w hether I did not think the President was going to run fo r a fourth term. H e said the Tim e people w ere convinced that that was the case. I said so was Joe Patterson,1 that he had been running editorials along this line fo r at least six weeks. I said I was sure the President him self was not thinking about this but that it was quite possible there m ight be a fourth term in case the w ar w ere still going on in M ay o f 19 4 4 and it w ere apparent that he was vital to keeping the country united in vigor ous prosecution o f the w ar effort. I told Jerry that that was the w ay I had read the situation last time, that I was quite convinced the Presi dent him self did not finally make up his mind until along in M ay o f 19 4 0 . . .
A t cabinet meeting the President seemed to have especially on his mind the problem o f preventing inflation. A pparently he has decided to use his powers as Com m ander-in-Chief to prevent agricultural prices from getting out o f line and simultaneously take action also on the 1 General D oughs M acArthur, Supreme Commander o f Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific, had ordered the attack o f August 7, 1942, b y United States Marines, on Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. * Jerry Green, T hru reporter. * Joseph M . Patterson, editor o f the N ew Y o rk Daily New s.
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labor front, not throw ing the matter into Congress but taking executive action. H e also mentioned that 40 or 50 ships could be saved in m oving meat if G reat Britain bought her meat in the United States instead o f in Argentina. H e estimated that this m ight reduce meat available to the people o f the United States b y about 15 percent, and to make the re maining meat go around, it would probably be necessary to have meat less days. I told the President I thought the Am erican people w ould rise to the need for saving shipping in a very splendid w ay but that there would be a political repercussion when the price o f cattle w ent dow n because the farmers would then blame the governm ent fo r hav ing destroyed the appetite o f the Am erican public for meat and w ould say that it was because o f that that the price o f meat w ent down. A t the close o f cabinet meeting, I told the President about President L6pez’ desire to have me visit Colom bia sometime this fall, indicating that the Colom bian ambassador, T urbay, w ould probably be approach ing me on the subject sometime during September. I also mentioned the fact that Prado, the President o f Peru, had w ritten me a letter w anting me to come down. T h e President was quite enthusiastic about m y going dow n but I said I did not w ant to go unless the State Depart ment really wanted me to. I said it w ould be impossible fo r me to find out how the State Departm ent really felt. T h e President said he w ould find out and w ould call Sumner W elles . . . I told die President I thought the offensives o f the past 10 days had had a splendid effect on Am erican psychology. H e said they w ere not really as significant as the public believed. I said it seemed to me never theless th ey served a very im portant function. I pointed out to the President that in certain Latin Am erican circles the story is going the rounds that the United States looks on Russia as p retty w ell finished and does not take her so very seriously. I said I real ized that this attitude was not true but as long as certain Latin Am er icans w ere spreading this idea, it had to be kept in mind because it w ould through certain left-w ing sources reach the Russians. Probably this is the reason fo r Litvinov’s radier red-headed attitude vis-à-vis the State Departm ent, I said. I told the President I thought this situation ought to be taken into account in our handling o f Litvinov. I did not mention to the President the w ay in w hich our A rm y officers had tried to bring pressure to bear on the M exican embassy to prevent the Rus sian M ilitary Mission from getting a visa to M exico. U ndoubtedly Quintanilla must have gotten this w ord over to Litvinov or his people.
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T he Price o f Vision
AUGUST 23, 1942
I met A d o lf Berle Sunday evening and he began talking at once about the importance o f w orking on our access to com m ercial as w ell as m ilitary airports in various countries after the w ar is over.1 It was evident to me that the talk M ilo and I had had w ith the President had been passed on to Berle. Berle thought this question o f having air bases was exceedingly important. I told him it did not necessarily mean that w e should have exclusive rights to these air bases but that some mechanism should be worked out w hereby these airports could be used in such a w ay as to increase the com m ercial traffic o f the w orld, saying that anything that helps the w orld in a big w ay is going to help the United States. Berle agreed w holeheartedly. H e thinks w e ought to w ork on a series o f mechanisms fo r handling problems like internationalization o f airports, public w orks, relief, etc., etc. Berle at times has a considerable amount o f imagination. H e is the only member o f the original brain trust left around the capital and I suspect that on certain kinds o f jobs he is still being used extensively b y die President.
a u g u st 2 6 ,1 9 4 2
. . . Nelson R ockefeller wanted to know what he should tell the Brazilians w ith regard to our future demand fo r rubber in the United States. I told him to tell them that improvements w ere being made in the breeding o f natural rubber just as they w ere being made in syn thetic rubber and let them draw their ow n conclusions. I described fo r him—as I have for a good many others in recent months—the prob lem o f the billion people located in Larin Am erica, eastern Asia, three fourths o f w hich live on the land and three fourths o f w hich cannot read or w rite. I said these billion people w ere a great challenge from an altruistic point o f view but from the strictly selfish point o f view o f safety and security o f the United States in the future, they w ere just as much o f a challenge. If w e did not help them to read and w rite and improve their agriculture and become m echanically literate, there would inevitably be a considerable amount o f chaos among these billion people or the Germans and Japs would organize them. I said w e had absolutely no choice, whether w e approached the problem 1 Berle was in charge o f American negotiations about postwar commercial avia tion.
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from an altruistic point o f view or a selfish one. I described this as a new “ missionarism” w hich would appeal both to the church people and to businessmen. Nelson seemed to respond . . .
Au g u st 27,1942
. . . Lauchlin Currie,1 w ho has just returned from China and India, said the Chinese people are very much interested in the Indian ques tion, not so much, he thinks, from the m ilitary point o f view as from the point o f view o f the racial situation, said confidentially that Chiang Kai-shek thinks it im portant fo r the United States to make a pass at intervening even though it is rejected. H e thinks it very im portant fo r the United States to maintain her position w ith regard to races like the Indians and Chinese and not get sucked into taking the British position. T h e British, because o f their censorship control over India, are printing only the newspaper reports from the U nited States w hich indicate that the U nited States is favorable to the British posi tion. T his is rapidly alienating the Indian sym pathy from the U nited States. I asked Currie if he had passed on this point o f view to the President. H e said he had . . .
a u g u st
29,1942
W hen I called on Jim Farley after the D em ocratic Convention in Chicago in July o f 1940, the one thing w hich he dw elt on was that he still w ould have control o f the N ew Y ork State party m achinery. It was obvious to me then that he felt very deeply and was planning for the future.2 I was alw ays very fond o f the unspoiled Jim Farley in the early days o f the N ew Deal and have felt in recent years that he has per haps been used too much b y others, that he has responded to their needling . . . 1 Lauchlin Currie, economist, since 1939 an administrative assistant to Roosevelt, head o f the President’s economic mission to China in 1941-42. 3 James A . Farley had just won a personal victory over the President b y arrang ing the Democratic nomination for governor o f N ew Y ork for John Bennett, the state's incumbent attorney general. Roosevelt and his friends in N ew Y ork had preferred Senator James Mead.
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AUGUST 3 1 , 1942
O w en Lattim ore1 came in to tell me he was going on the payroll o f Chiang Kai-shek fo r a couple o f months or so and he was leaving soon fo r China. H e wondered if there was any inform ation I had that he ought to have. I told him he ought to see M ilo, that there was a possibility there w ould be a Chinese Mission set up on the opposite number basis w ith a Chinese expert to match each Am erican expert. H e told me that the Chinese experts in road and construction engi neering w ere unusually good, said there w ere certain fields o f chem istry where the w orld had made great progress in w hich d ie Chinese had not kept up; the Chinese knew that they could not keep up because it had been impossible fo r them to send their men out o f the country. I asked Lattim ore if the Chinese b y heredity did not have just as good minds as w e. H e said he was sure they did and that as a matter o f fact all races w ere about the same as far as heredity was concerned. H e said training had resulted in some rather marked differences, said the Chinese w ere good at remembering things but w ere perhaps not as good on initiative. H e said the M ongols w ere on the other hand good on initiative. H e said he thought this was a result o f their nomadic life. He said the M ongols w ere extraordinarily ingenious w ith ma chinery and made the w orld’s best mechanics . . . SEPTEMBER I, 19 4 2
A t the W PB meeting the chief thing up fo r discussion was Thurm an A rnold.1*9 Don Nelson felt very deeply that A rnold was interfering 1 Ow en Lattimore, professor at the Johns Hopkins University, an outstanding American authority on China, was in 1941-42 political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and in 1942-44 deputy director o f Pacific Operations of the Office o f W ar Information. Increasingly critical of Chiang’s corruption and inefficiency, Lattimore became one advocate of a detente among the United States, Chiang, and the Chinese communists. H e often advised W allace about Asian affairs. A controversial figure during the period o f postwar hysteria about alleged com munist influences on American Chinese policy, Lattimore was falsely accused of subversion. 9 Thurman Arnold, then head o f the antitrust division of die Justice Department, in his few years in that office initiated more prosecutions for violations of the antitrust laws than had his predecessors during the fifty preceding years. H e believed that "the function of the Antitrust Division was just as important during the war as it was prior to the war,” especially since wartime procure ment “created a great opportunity for conspiratorial agreements . . . with respect to prices, bidding, consolidations, and mergers” ; see Thurman Arnold, Fair Fights and Foul (N ew York, 1965). Further, Arnold had helped the Truman Committee to reveal many connections between large American
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w ith the w ar effort b y some o f the prosecutions w hich he was starting. Bob Patterson o f W ar feels the same w ay. Lubin took up the cudgels fo r Arnold . . . Richard L aw 1 asked me pointblank if I did not think that it was the duty o f the United States and England to cooperate to solve the post w ar situation. I told him in reply that a great deal depended on how England handled die India situation, that the people o f the United States did not believe in imperialism and it would seem to me that England and the United States could hardly go it alone, that it seemed to me necessary to take into account China, Russia, and perhaps Latin Am erica. I gave m y custom ary talk on the importance o f the 800 million people in eastern Asia and the necessity o f a great public w orks program in Asia. I mentioned M cD ougall’s great interest in food and especially his plan to set up ever-normal granaries in the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and possibly England but not allow ing Europe to have more than three months’ supply o f food on hand in any country. This had to do pardcularly w ith w heat and fats. T he idea would be to make wheat and fats available at very reasonable prices but not to allow any o f the European nations an opportunity to accumulate supplies enough to allow them to start another war. Law took up the cudgels very vigorously on behalf o f Europe. I told him it seemed to me England was much more definitely faced tow ard Eu rope than she was tow ard the rest o f the w orld. H e then announced it was England’s game to play part o f the time w ith Europe and part o f the time w ith the rest o f the w orld. Evidently the new balance-ofpow er tactics o f England are going to be on this theory; b y playing o ff Europe against the United States, Latin Am erica, and Asia. A p parently m y anti-imperialistic remarks irritated Law because he said, “ H ow about Am erica’s dollar diplom acy?” . . . firms and German cartels. In wartime, as Arnold saw it, the antitrust laws, if they were enforced, would exercise a symbolic deterrence greater even than their actual legal effect. But the W a r and N avy Departments and the W P B feared that recourse to antitrust prosecutions against major suppliers would at the least de up business execudves in w ork unrelated to procurement, and at the worst cripple and alienate indispensable firms. T h a t cautious attitude, to which Roosevelt also subscribed, prevailed. Yielding to the greater influence o f the A rm y and N avy, the Justice Department on March 20, 1942, had agreed, except in instances when the President specifically ruled otherwise, to suspend for die duration of the war prosecutions to which the W a r or N avy Department objected. T h a t policy was later to strike W allace as providing an unwarranted shield for big business. 1 Richard Law, Undersecretary o f the British Foreign Office, was in charge for G reat Britain o f plans for the reconstruction o f liberated and conquered areas.
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SEPTEMBER 2, 1942 . . . A t the luncheon w ith the President, I found the President in com plete accord w ith Cordell H ull and m yself that the United Nations Rehabilitation Commission as tentatively w orked out should not be announced at the present time, but that the memorandum adopted b y the B E W and as modified by the A rm y and N avy should be used as a basis for further discussion. T he President spoke about how at the end o f the w ar all the fleets o f the w orld should be put together in one pot and then divided on the basis o f the prewar percentages—fo r example, if the D utch had 8 percent o f the shipping in 1939, they m ight perhaps have 7 percent when the w ar ended, etc. I gave the President a cop y o f the M cD ougall memorandum . . . and urged that now was the time to strike w ith single-mindedness on all fronts including the psychological front as suggested b y M c Dougall . . . I told the President about Mrs. Friant and Mrs. Cunningham1 com ing over on behalf o f w anting the President to have a lady as one o f his six anonymous advisers. H e said, “ M y G od, no.” H e said the question w ould come up at once as to w ho should have the job. I judge his experience w ith Mrs. Roosevelt has left its mark . . .a . . . Cordell H ull quoted at some length from a report made to him by M urphy,8 one o f his observers in northern A frica, in w hich both H ull and the President have a great deal o f confidence. M urphy, according to H ull, says that the oil and food w e are sending into northern A frica are trem endously appreciated b y the population. It appeared that Cordell wished to get from the President a blessing for continuing the State Departm ent policy w ith respect to V ichy France, and that the President was quite w illing to give the bless ing . . . 1 Mrs. Bertha Friant and Mrs. Minnie Fisher Cunningham, both information specialists in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, had called on the V ice President on August 28, 1941. 3 W allace, who always held Mrs. Roosevelt in high regard, intended no slur in his remark. H e was referring to the difficulties that had attended her earlier, abbreviated role in the Office of Civilian Defense; see Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin (N ew York, 1971), Ch. 51. 3 R oben D. Murphy, a foreign service officer, had as Roosevelt’s personal repre sentative investigated conditions in French N orth Africa. There in 1941 he concluded an economic agreement with V ich y forces. In 1942 he was engaged in making preparations, later the subject o f major controversy, to facilitate the Allied landings in N orth A frica in November.
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W hile the President was talking so vigorously about not having any woman among his six helpers, he made reference to Miss H arriet E lliott1 whom he had appointed on the first national defense board and there she had an excellent opportunity to do things. H e said she was an excellent educator but she just did not know how to measure up to the job . . .
SEPTEMBER 3, 1942
. . . I spoke to Adm iral Leahy* . . . found that Leahy knew very little about Alaska . . . I thought the best point from w hich to pro ceed against Japan w ould eventually prove to be the Aleutians and Leahy said that our submarines w ere executing great havoc among the Japanese merchant marine. H e felt w e could lick Japan and that w e should go ahead and destroy her utterly. H e felt Japan was our Car thage and that w e ought to take advantage o f this opportunity to make it certain that she never could again be a w orld power. It was either us or Japan, according to Leahy . . .*
Oc t o b e r
i, 1942
. . . Gallarza1*4* wanted to let me know that his friend Jim Carey* w ho is secretary o f the C IO is being kicked around in the C IO b y the communist group, including Lee Pressman,6 w ho is still very strong. G allarza said that the C IO leaders wanted to know whether they should put m oney into the political campaign this fall like they did in the fall o f 1940 through the Labor Non-Partisan League. H e said Phil 1 Harriet W . Elliott, professor and later dean at the W om en’s College of the University o f N orth Carolina, an active Democrat who held various advisory positions during the N ew Deal, had been consumer member on the Advisory Committee to uie Council o f National Defense. * Admiral W illiam D . Leahy, ambassador to V ich y France (1940-42), now back in Washington as Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff. * W allace kept only a record o f appointments, not a diary, for the period Sep tember S-29, 1942. H e was away from Washington September 12-22, primarily on vacation but also for an address in Los Angeles on September 16 to mark Mexican Independence Day. 4 Ernesto Gallarza o f the Pan-American Union. 8 James B. Carey, form erly president of the United Electrical W orkers, since 1938 national secretary and in 1942 also secretary treasurer o f the Congress o f Industrial Organization. * Lee Pressman, assistant general counsel fo r the Agricultural Adjustment A d ministration (1933-3$), general counsel for the W orks Progress Administration (1933-36), in 1942 general counsel fo r the CIO .
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M urray1 wanted to know that but that M urray had not talked to him direct. I suggested it m ight be better if M urray would get in touch w ith the President direct, that obviously this was a decision that could be made only b y the President . . . Oc t o b e r
2,1942
. . . A t cabinet the President was in the very highest spirits. H e told about his trip in some detail. H e said that H enry Ford still was not producing any bombers at W illo w Run but he probably would be in three or four weeks. H e felt Ford had not done an especially good job. H e thought on the w hole the best job was being done on the Pacific Coast. H e mentioned visiting Jack Garner in Texas and said that Garner had told him there was no trouble in getting labor to run the cattle business. I said the situation in the dairy regions was different, that a survey o f dairy farmers w ho had lost one man indi cated that they had reduced the number o f cow s about 43 percent whereas those w ho had not lost any men had increased their number o f cow s . . . T h e President said the farmers o f the M iddle W est w ere not using any ingenuity, that they w ere adopting a defeatist attitude, that they had no imagination about cooperating w ith the tow n people about getting the necessary labor. I told him I was con vinced the problem o f manpower on die farms o f the country was ten times m ore important in farmers’ minds than the price squabble w hich had been going on the last tw o weeks. H e w ent into specific instances w hich he had run into in H yd e Park and on the W est Coast indicating that if the farmers would only use a little ingenuity they would have plenty o f manpower to get by. T h e President continued to take w hat to me seemed to be a rather strong anti-farm er attitude, saying that they w ere not w orking like they used to w ork 20 or 30 years ago. I replied that I thought the farmers w ere com ing closer to w orking like they did 30 years ago than any other group o f our people. M cN utt3 rather supported the President’s view and Don Nelson and Forrestal supported me. Nelson said he had been before the Senate A gricultural Committee on the question o f manpower fo r the farmers and he had found the commictee up in arms because w ord had gone out that an arm y o f 13 million 1 Philip Murray, since 1940 president o f the CIO .
2 Paul V . M cN utt, Indiana Democrat, onetime national commander o f the American Legion, a handsome, undistinguished, and inordinately ambitious con servative whom Roosevelt appointed to various positions, including the chair manship o f the W ar Manpower Commission, which he held at this time.
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men was to be raised. M cN utt confessed that General H erahey1 had made such a statement. I then interpolated it w as this 13 million state ment w hich had somewhat stirred up the farmers o f the M iddle W est, if the present arm y o f only 2 million had created such a tightness. T h e President said that the total A rm y force b y the end o f 1943 w ould not be more than 6400,000. I asked if there w ould be any ob jection to making figures o f this sort public. H e said, yes, there w ould. There was considerable discussion o f the lack o f uniform ity in methods used b y the draft boards. M cN u tt said there w ould have to be better appeal m achinery w orked out. Biddle then began to talk about the w ay in w hich the A rm y had taken men in the various departments. H e said Justice had lost 24 percent and some o f the other departments had lost a higher percentage. H enry M orgenthau took rather sharp issue w ith Biddle saying that the governm ent in W ashington should lose its men just as much as people out in the open country. T h e President finally appointed a committee composed o f Biddle, M orgenthau, M cN utt, and A rm y and N avy representatives to go into the question o f p olicy relative to the drafting o f men in governm ent. I pled w ith the President on the necessity fo r having an overall look at the manpower picture from the standpoint o f how the total w ar effort o f the country could best be served. It was obvious that this proposal greatly disturbed M cN utt. T h e President ducked. D on N el son thinks that probably the w ar effort could better be served b y having armed forces o f 5 or 6 million men fu lly equipped w ith a civilian econom y in shape fu lly to support them than b y having a large A rm y. M cN utt said he had testified to the Senate A gricultural Com m ittee that the maximum should not be in excess o f io'/2 million. A t the conclusion o f the cabinet meeting, 1 gave to the President a little bust o f him self in the nature o f a caricature made in Cuba . . . T h e President was tickled to death w ith it and is going to put it in his museum at H yd e Park. I gave him the w ording o f the homage as passed b y the Cuban Congress and told about the idea o f putting a statue o f him at die Panama Canal. H e said w hat he really wanted was a U niversity o f the Am ericas established north o f the Panama Canal at an aldtude o f 3000 feet close to the Costa Rican border. I gave the President the B E W report on Japan shipping in w hich he was very greatly interested and also the report w hich B E W had prepared fo r me on die weakness o f the German transportation lines 1 General Lewis B. Herahey, since 1941 director o f the Selective Service System.
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back o f Stalingrad and R ostov on d ie Don. I was gready pleased to find that he had been thinking about this problem himself and had been w orking w ith the British, the Russians, and our ow n high com mand to have die maximum o f bombing to com e up to these points. I told him I thought the heart o f the problem this w inter was to keep up an everlasting bom bing attack against the German transportation systems in Russia, against Germ any herself, and against the Japanese shipping. H e said w ith great glee that our submarines had been doing a great execution in sinking Jap ships. H e mentioned a number o f very encouraging specific instances w hich I had not read about in the press. It w ould seem that the Japanese from now on w ill surely bleed to death pretty fast. T h e President started out b y saying that one o f the things that that impressed him most on his trip was the large number o f wom en w orking in the factories. H e said that in the factories in the near future, 40 percent o f the w orkers w ould be women. H e was not re ferring to wom en in w hite collar jobs but wom en actually doing things w ith their hands. H e said morale was highest on the W est Coast, second highest in the M iddle W est and South, third in the East, and that in W ashington morale would rank down about 15th, that in fact the morale in W ashington was the w orst o f any place in die country.
Oc t o b e r
5,1942
. . . Lauchlin Currie told me that the present ambassador to China1 was not getting along at all w ell and that a new one was going to be appointed in his place. H e said that he w ould like to be ambassador to China. H e said that the Chinese sense it when there is a feeling o f superiority. H e said he him self had no feeling o f superiority and thought he got along very w ell w ith the Chinese. Currie says that die present Chinese regime is very conservative including Chiang Kai-shek, die Soongs, et al. H e said that T . V . Soong has had his w ings clipped, that his brother-in-law K ung had taken aw ay most o f Soong’s bank perquisites. K ung’s w ife is Soong’s sister but Mrs. K ung doesn't think much o f T .V . according to Currie . . .* 1 Clarence E. Gauss, United States ambassador to China (1941-44), an informed, impatient, and often impious critic o f Chiang Kai-shek. * T . V . Soong, chairman o f the Bank o f China, and H . H . Kung, Chinese Finance Minister, were respectively brother and brother-in-law of Madame Chiana Kai-shek. For many years both men had influenced Chinese financial and economic policy, and engaged, with shifting success, in the rivalries and intrigues that marked the regime or the Generalissimo and his wife.
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OCTOBER 6 , 1942
. . . A t the W P B meeting Nathan1 outlined the total productive resources o f the nation and the percentage that could go to the w ar effort w ithout too much disruption. H e seemed to doubt, in case w e w ent to $50 billion this year in the w ar effort, that w e could do very much beyond it or $60 billion next year w ithout bringing about such a reduction in die civilian life as to make the situation dangerous. General Som ervell took very violent exception. Then he (Som ervell) and Henderson go t into a very picturesque verbal fight. Somervell proclaim ed that if the armed forces only had 60 billion dollars’ w orth o f help fo r the year 1943, that was just like giving them only 50 cents. T his made Leon Henderson thoroughly angry and he started calling the general very picturesque names. I could not figure out w hat Somer vell's m otives w ere in saying things w hich w ere obviously unbalanced and untrue. Perhaps he was tryin g to make Henderson blow up . . . Oc t o b e r
12,1942
. . . T . V . Soong told me that he w ould like to carry w ord to the Generalissimo o f m y very great interest in the improvement in the efficiency o f Chinese agriculture. I again told Soong that I believed die first step in raising the Chinese standard o f living was increasing the efficiency o f agriculture, and ventured the belief that an im prove ment o f 30 percent could be made in ten years. T . V . Soong said he thought an even greater improvement could be made and spoke o f a number o f projects w hich had to do w ith irrigation and flood control. K ingsley M artin3 was seriously disturbed about H enry Luce’s letter to the British in the O ctober 12 issue o f Life. H e felt the Indian situa tion was causing a serious difference o f opinion between the Am ericans and the British. I told him I did not think the Indian situation was so very much on the Am erican people’s mind but that when it was called to their attention the great bulk o f the people w ere against the British, believing that the situation in India was a little bit like that o f the Am erican colonies in 1765. H e asked w hat I would suggest. I told him I did not care to suggest anything . . . M artin professed great alarm about the proposal to build a io-m illion-m an arm y in the United States. H e felt that an arm y o f such size would interfere seriously w ith the total w ar effort. I told him I agreed . . . 1 Robert R. Nathan, liberal economist, chairman o f the Planning Commission of the W a r Production Board (1942-43), and acting director of the AngloAmerican Combined Production and Resources Board (1942-43). 3 Kingsley Martin, editor of the English N ew Statesman and Nation.
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120 Oc t o b e r
13,1942
. . . A t the W P B meeting both Leon Henderson and Som ervell had cooled off. Leon had the figures to back up his position, figures indieating that the consumers o f the United States w ould only be getting in die year 1943 less than one-fifth as much o f the consumer durable goods as they had gotten in 1942. Nelson called attention to the face that d ie President had issued a number o f “ must programs” such as Russian requirements, 30 m illion additional airplanes, etc., etc., that these "m ust” programs w hich had come in w ere o f such magnitude that it would be impossible to accomplish the rest o f the program set fo r the year 1943 until sometime in the fall o f 1944. W e all agreed that there should be a fresh overall examination o f d ie situation b y the Joint Chiefs o f Staff in cooperation w ith D on Nelson and finally b y the President. I said I thought the key figure in this matter o f harmonizing the different programs was the number o f men w hich w e expected to have overseas at certain specific dates. Som ervell said that w e expected to have over tw o million men overseas b y Decem ber o f 1943 and four m illion b y Decem ber o f 1944. Som ervell also said it took about 9 tons o f material fo r each man in the first instance and after that about one ton a month. H e said in the case o f airmen, it took 14 tons o f material in the first instance. I asked Som ervell if w e w ould have enough shipping b y Decem ber 1943 to transport supplies to tw o millions. I hastily calculated that the transportation o f 3,400,000 tons a month (or perhaps 500 or 600 ships) together w ith the necessary protection w ould be required to supply our overseas forces from Decem ber 1943 onward. I asked Som ervell if w e would have enough shipping to do the job. H e said yes. Adm iral Robinson1 started to say something and then kept quiet. I judge he is not quite so certain. Som ervell said the British w ere carrying on a regular propaganda campaign all over tow n against a large arm y in die U nited States. Nathan o f the W P B had told me earlier that Som ervell was ex ceedingly anxious to have a big arm y so that the United States could have more influence at the peace table. Nathan felt that Som ervell w ould be glad to see the w ar continue a year or so longer if thereby the United States A rm y could have a chance to show its power. I said to Som ervell, w h y should w e not be happy to have the British and 1 Admiral Samuel M. Robinson, form erly chief o f the Bureau of Ships, in 1942 chief of the Office o f Procurement and Material.
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Russians do the fighting fo r us w hile it needed to be done, w ith our furnishing the materials laid down at the battle front instead o f using them in die U nited States to create an exceedingly big arm y. Som ervell said it was all right provided the British w ould re d ly fight. It appeared to me there has been a lamentable lack o f overall plan ning. I w ould say the fault is w ith the Joint Chiefs o f Staff and D on Nelson. Som ervell has rushed in to grab everything he can w ithout any sense o f balance or understanding o f the program as a whole. I made the point to Don Nelson that it was high time he presented the whole problem to the President . . . C ox1 w ith his interest in Lend-Lease took a very strong sta. J on the side o f a m oderately sized Am erican arm y. Lend-Lease wants to con tinue to be able to furnish the British, Russians, et al., w ith substantial quantities o f materials and they don’t like the A rm y program for such an excessively big arm y. I made Som ervell’s point about the Bridsh carrying on propaganda fo r the Am ericans having a small arm y so that the British w ould have more influence at the peace table. Cox claimed that the British w ere not carrying on any propaganda o f this kind, that it was just a commonsense expression by the British based on their ow n experience. T he final success o f the w ar effort w ill depend in very considerable measure on the President’s skill in determining just how many Am eri can soldiers should be abroad at certain definite times, how many men altogether should be in the Am erican A rm y at certain definite times and how much material should be allotted at different times to the Am erican, British, Russian, and other armies. T h is w hole problem from now on w ill jell very rapidly.
Oc t o b e r 1 4 ,1 9 4 2
. . . I asked M ilo to get for me w hat inform ation he could on the food situation in Russia. I told him I was going to speak on Novem ber 8 on behalf o f Am erican-Soviet Friendship and that I was doing every thing in m y pow er to make sure that the Russians did not make a sep arate peace.9 1 Oscar S. Cox, a creative law yer with a seasoned skill in maneuvering through the labyrinth o f official Washington, was general counsel o f the Lend-Lease Administration and o f the Office o f Emergency Management (1941-43). H e became general counsel o f the Foreign Economic Administration when it was established in 1943. * W allace had begun to draft his address scheduled fo r November 8, 1943, before the Congress o f American-Soviet Friendship at Madison Square Garden. In
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It is becom ing increasingly clear to me that sometime w ithin the next 60 days there w ill be a second front started in northwest A frica. This is the front I suggested to the President within tw o or three weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I can't help thinking that the Germans know all about our plans, and hope they don’t beat us to the punch. W hen I talked to the President about m y N ovem ber 8 speech, I told him I had no desire to take on a speaking engagement and that the only reason I was considering it was because o f the possibility o f a separate peace b y the Russians. T h e President said he thought I ought to make the talk and said I m ight w ell bring out the extent to w hich Russian and Am erican ideals w ere com ing together, that the Russians had gone perhaps 40 percent o f the w ay tow ard making their system into a dem ocracy and that the United States had gone perhaps 40 percent o f the w ay in making our capitalistic structure more social, that now w e are perhaps only 20 percent apart. I asked the President how it would be if I mentioned m y conversation w ith M olotov about combining Am erican high-airw ay across the Am erican hemisphere into Siberia w ith feeders com ing in from China and India. H e said it would be all right. OCTOBER 15, 1942
. . . In the discussion w ith the President w ith regard to the attitude o f H enry Luce toward the British empire, someone ventured to say that Mrs. L u c e 1 was probably responsible for H enry’s slant. T he President spoke up brightly saying, “O h, you mean that loose woman.” general, the speech followed the lines o f "T h e Century o f the Common Man.” A t the suggestion o f Roosevelt, W allace, in looking forward to the triumph everywhere after the w ar of the democracy o f the common man, called for a balance between the economic democracy o f the Soviet Union and the political democracy of the United States. H e also commended Russia for its “educa tional democracy” and for its equality o f opportunity for women and for all races and minority groups. H e referred, as Roosevelt had agreed he might, to his conversation with M olotov about highway and air transport, and he asso ciated that conversation with the importance o f a United Nations charter that would include an international bill o f rights and economic guarantees of inter national peace. Stripped o f imperialism, a free world of the future, W allace concluded, would depend upon the continuing cooperation of all nations. 1 Clare Boothe (Mrs. Henry) Luce, author, playwright, elected that November Republican congresswoman from Fairfield County, Connecticut, a handsome lady with an acid tongue that did not spare W allace, whom she characterized as an advocate o f “globaloney.”
T he Board o f Economic Warfare OCTOBER 21 ,
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1942
W . Beatty1 told o f the extraordinarily low state o f Indian education in . , . Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador . . . H e quoted the President o f Bolivia as saying to Allan Dawson3 o f the State Departm ent that it was communistic to educate the Indians. W hen Dawson pressed him, he said, after the Indians w ere educated, they wouldn’t w ork for noth ing. Beatty hopes that the United States can cooperate w ith the Indian countries on the W est Coast o f Latin Am erica to set up a number o f schools for training teachers to give the right kind o f education to die Indians. I suggested that he get in touch w ith E. de Lozada . . . M ilo and I had a nice visit w ith K in g and Marshall. I pressed in the most tactful w ay for the desirability o f bom bing the mainland o f Japan and w atching any possible drive o f the Germans tow ard Dakar. Marshall took the slant that the Russians had not killed nearly as many Germans as is popularly assumed. H e felt that too much emphasis had been placed on the Aleutian Islands and that the A rm y had been forced b y political pressure to send too much strength up there. O f course, I disagreed w ith him on this but I did not say so . . . K nox started out the conversation3 brightly b y saying he thought all the Junkers ought to be sterilized, both men, wom en, and children. H e insists that b y heredity they are a different type o f humanity, and that the w orld cannot have peace until this blood strain is eliminated. H alifax asked fo r a vote on the subject o f whether or not the Junkers ought to be sterilized. H alifax and K nox voted vigorously on the affirmative. I insisted vigorously that from the standpoint o f pure heredity there is no difference between Prussian Junkers and anyone else. Felix Frankfurter quoted somebody that ever since the N apo leonic w ar, the w hole system o f education in Germ any had been directed tow ard w ar. I agreed enthusiastically w ith Felix and said that the Prussian indoctrination had in effect gone back many, many cen turies. I said the all-important thing was to take control o f the Germ an educational system fo r a generation. H alifax and K nox con curred, saying it would be too difficult a job. It was very apparent that the British are exceedingly sensitive w ith regard to India . . . I was inclined to question this but I said nothing because o f the exceedingly real sensitivity o f the British T ories on the 1 W illa r d W . B e a tty , since 1936 d irecto r o f ed u ca tio n in the O ffic e o f Indian A ffairs.
* Allan Dawson, foreign service officer, in 1942 on assignment to the Division of American Republics in the Department o f State. 3 A t din ner a t the B ritish em bassy.
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Indian problem. I assumed that the British did not w ant the United States to butt in on India any more than w e would like to have England butt in on Puerto R ico. T h e situation, however, has an importance from the standpoint o f the United Nations even aside from its demo cratic human im portance, w hich can’t help giving us in the U nited States the greatest concern even though out o f deference to the British w e do not express it at the moment . . .
Oc t o b e r
24,1942
. . . M ike Cow les1 gave a very com plete and interesting account o f his trip w ith W illkie around the w orld. M ike was exceedingly im pressed w ith the Russians and said that W illkie was even more im pressed. H e said Stalin has the greatest pride in the fact that he changed Russia from a country that was 90 percent illiterate to a country that was 10 percent literate in 22 years. Stalin, M ike says, has a very deep feeling against the British. It seems that he and Churchill did not get along w ell and that both o f them have made very biting comments about the other to various people since. A t the big party in the Krem lin, there w ere many courses o f food and many courses o f V odka. It is supposed to be a matter o f courtesy to do “ bottoms up” every round o f drinks. Finally they finished w ith champagne. Everyone had a terrible hangover the next m orning when they flew fo r about three or four hours. M ike was trem endously impressed w ith the fact that half o f the people w orking in the Russian factories w ere women . . . T h e man agers o f the factories w ere getting paid about ten times as much as the average w orker. M ike told o f some personal experiences in Baghdad. H e and W illkie had been getting sort o f bored w ith all the dinners and luncheons. W hen the governor general, a severe Britisher, called on M ike to make arrangements fo r the evening banquet, M ike suggested a little enter tainment. Som ebody had told him about the girls o f Baghdad so he suggested they be invited. A t the evening luncheon, M ike was seated next to the w ife o f the governor general who was the only woman 1 Gardner Cowles, Jr., publisher o f the Des Moines Register and Tribune, briefly in 1942-43 domestic director o f the Office o f W a r Information, resigned from that position to accompany W endell W illkie on his trip around the world. A W illkie supporter, Cowles was also an old friend of the W allace family. H e rendered his account of the trip at dinner at the home o f W allace’s younger sister Mary, Madame Charles Bruggmann, whose husband was Swiss minister to the United States.
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present. She was quite a plain wom an o f die typical angular British type and spoke at length about archaeology. T h e governor general arose and said, “A t the request o f Gardner Cow les, w e shall now be entertained b y the girls o f Baghdad.” T h e w ife o f the governor general then put her elbow out on the table to shut o ff M ike’s view and said, “ W e are not interested in this, are w e, M r. Cow les?” It seems that the girls o f Baghdad run the houses o f prostitution and appeared on the scene w ith die minimum o f clothing. W illkie was gready delighted and kept shouting to M ike but M ike was operating under difficulties w ith the archaeologist absorbing all his attention. M ike indicated on a map the various airfields and said that at no time w ere they delayed by as much as ro minutes because o f plane difficulties, weather, or shortage o f gas. H e spoke at some litde length about the tow n o f Yakutsk in Siberia, north o f the G obi Desert, not far from the A rctic Circle. T his is a tow n on the Lena R iver o f about 55.000 people. T h e y have an opera house and put on an opera w hich would have done credit to a tow n o f 200,000 people in the United States. T he library had 500,000 volumes as compared w ith about 300.000 volumes in Des Moines. W hen they visited this library, they found it very actively in use. M ike reached the conclusion that die Russians are a very fine people w ith an up-and-com ing spirit very similar to that w hich the United States people had in 1910. In China M ike found Chiang Kai-shek had exacdy the same strong feeling against the British as Stalin had. Chiang Kai-shek thought k w ould be quite possible to throw the Japs out o f Burma and open up the Burma Road provided the British w ould cooperate. Chiang Kaishek believes that die British w ant the Japs in possession o f Burma when the w ar comes to an end so that they can be sure to get Burma back. H e believes that the British w ould hate to see a com bination o f Chinese-Am erican-Hindu and British troops capture Burma because that w ould throw a cloud on the British right to the territory. M ike spoke out vigorously against the Am erican ambassador in China, M r. Gauss, w ho has lived in China more than 20 years and has not learned to speak Chinese and seems to glo ry in his ignorance. H e seems to antagonize the Chinese. T his is exacdy the same story w hich Lauchlin Currie had previously brought me. T his man did a good job in Shanghai but is apparendy totally unadapted to Chung king. I judge the State Departm ent knows the man is not fitted for this particular post and w ill replace him shordy. M ike was impressed b y the extent to w hich the various Siberian air ports have been developed and provision made fo r snowplows.
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126 Oc t o b e r
28,1942
. . . A t the lunch w ith Generals Strong and Deane1 . . . I told Strong that M ike Cow les had talked to Chennault in Chungking and Chennault had told him that if he could only have 60 DC-5, 80 medium sized bombers, and 100 pursuit planes, he could lick the Japs b y himself. Strong said, MB y G od, I believe he could too.” I then w ent on to say that I understood from Cow les that in order to have sufficient gas to operate this number o f planes, it w ould be necessary to chase the Japs out o f Burma so that w e could reopen the Burma road. Strong indi cated that the Chinese could operate more planes than they now have. Strong was very much o f the opinion that more o f our supplies ought to be going to Russia and China. H ow ever, w e agreed that the best second front and the place to keep w ell supplied at all costs was N orth A frica. Strong agreed w ith me that bombing the homeland o f Japan w ould have a very strong psychological effect. I quoted . . . Craigie,* the British ambassador to Japan, to the effect that the bom bing o f T o k yo had caused great consternation among the civilian popula tion . . .
Oc t o b e r
29,1942
. . . A t cabinet, the President started out b y indicating that the Adm irals had done a poor job in handling the publicity w ith regard to Guadalcanal. H e said the battle there was not a decisive battle, no matter whether w e w on or lost. H e said the Guadalcanal operations had gained us precious time to fo rtify N ew Caledonia and a number o f other isles. T h e chief subject o f discussion had to do w ith the desirability o f appointing a Food Adm inistrator fo r handling the reoccupied countries in Europe the same w ay as H oover did in 1919 and 1920. T h e Presi dent had the impression that H oover did an unusually good job at that time. Stimson spoke up to say that he had seen H oover a couple o f weeks ago fo r the first time in several years and that H oover was in a very patriotic frame o f mind and would like to serve. T h e President and the A tty. General indicated that they w ere quite skeptical o f the school at Charlottesville being conducted b y G eneral 1 General George V . Strong, head o f M ilitary Intelligence, was also attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as was General John R. Deane, w ho was American secretary to the Combined Chiefs o f S o ff. * Sir Robert Craigie.
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G uillion and General W ickersham .1 I said that Louis Brow nlow 123had told me that the school was getting along better than he had anticipated it w ould, that there w ere a number o f good men in the sch o ol T h e President told Sdmson that he had just sent him a memorandum w ith regard to the Charlottesville school that w ould make his hair curl. Cordell H ull spoke o f the w ork done b y Leith-Ross8 and Dean Acheson. Claude W ickard mentioned that Paul A ppleby had been doing a lo t o f w ork along this line in cooperation w ith Dean Acheson. It was evident that the President wanted to think particularly about the type o f organization that w ould handle the food and clothing problem o f the occupied territories after the A rm y left. T h e final decision was to appoint a com m ittee o f m yself, Cordell H ull, Claude W ickard, and Don N elson to make a recommendation to him w ith regard to a skeleton group w hich m ight take over from the A rm y the food and clothing problem in the occupied countries. A fter cabinet meeting, I stopped to give to the President the ac com panying memorandum w hich I had received from Barnes4* . . . I told him the W illkie ballerina story and the M ike Cow les Baghdad story both o f w hich he greatly enjoyed. H e said that W illkie when he came in to see him had obviously been drinking considerably and on checking w ith die newspaper boys later, they said he had not been drinking excessively, that he had had only fou r or five drinks in the 1 T h e W a r Department had established a school for military government ar Charlottesville, Virginia, to train army officers for managing civil affairs in areas conquered b y American forces. A cting under instructions from Secretary Sdmson, Provost Marshal General Allen W . Gullion had founded the school, which was under the immediate command o f Brigadier General Cornelius W . Wickersham, in civilian life a partner in the N ew Y ork law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham and T aft. T h e school, in the view o f its crirics, emphasized the military role in civil affairs in occupied territories to the detriment of civilian authonries. Wickersham, in that view, symbolized the W all Street influences which many N ew Dealers considered endemic in the W a r Department. Among those crirics, whom Sdmson disdainfully dismissed as “the cherubs,” Harold Ickes had urged Roosevelt on O ctober 27 to act quickly “to displace the huge organization which the Provost Marshal General is building.” Roosevelt, as W allace here reported, scolded Sdmson, but to no effectual end. 3 Louis Brownlow, journalist and specialist in public administration, in 1942 presi dent o f the American Society for Public Administradon, then and later an occasional visitor at W allace’s office. * Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Director General o f die British Ministry of Economic W arfare, then in Washington to w ork out with Dean Acheson plans for provid ing relief to liberated areas, as well for general postwar relief. 4 Joseph Barnes, foreign news editor o f the N ew Y ork Herald Tribune (1940-42), deputy director of the overseas branch o f the Office o f W a r Information (1941-44), had accompanied W illkie on his trip. His memo related to that journey.
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45 minutes before he w ent in to see the President. T h e President wanted to know if Barnes or Cow les said anything about W illkie drinking too much. I said they did not. T h e President said he told Cowles before he left on the trip to see that W illkie did not say anything that w ould antagonize the A llied nations. T h e President feels that W illkie had his chance and has m uffed it. W hen I told the President about Chiang Kai-shek's slant vis-à-vis the British in Burma, the President seemed to think it was true. H e started to talk about the A tlantic Charter, saying that it had been his idea all along that it was a charter w hich applied to the Pacific as w ell as the A tlantic and that Churchill was responsible in the first instance fo r calling it the “ A tlantic Charter.” H e said, however, that Churchill thought it applied to a w ider area until he got mixed up in the Indian trouble. Then Churchill began to take the slant that it w ould not apply to the East. T h e President said, “ I hope Chiang Kaishek does not know this.” Oc t o b e r
30,1942
B ill Hutcheson1 indicated his exceeding friendliness. H e breathed fire and brimstone against the C IO and claimed they w ere a bunch o f communists. H e proclaimed A F L had never allowed any communists to belong to any o f the A F L unions. H e was very proud o f the fact that he had w orked closely w ith em ployers. H e said he had been tryin g to straighten out the Petrillo situation3 and that he w ould like to be o f service in any w ay possible to the President in the w ar effort. One or tw o things he let drop lead me to believe he is fairly close to John L. Lew is.8 On the whole, he seems like a conservative well-mean ing fellow w ho is not fu lly aware o f the signs o f the times . . . NOVEMBER
2,
1942
. . . I read over the closing part o f m y N ovem ber 8 speech to Bill H erridge. H e liked it very much. H e thinks it is important that both the President and m yself come out strongly w ith regard to an interaai W illiam L. Hutcheson, president o f the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, vice-president o f the American Federation of Labor, a steady Republi can in his politics and a conservative in his views about labor organization. * James C. Petrillo, president o f the American Federation o f Musicians, w ho were then conducting a prolonged strike. 8 John L. Lewis, stormy president of the United Mine W orkers, a founder and the first president o f the C IO , and in those roles a bitter enemy of Hutcheson, had since moved his union into an unaffiliated status and in 1940 moved himself into opposition to Roosevelt.
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tional N ew Deal, saying that the United States has gone as far as she could w ith our domestic N ew Deal and that in order to make the N ew Deal really effective it is necessary also to have an international N ew Deal. Russia has her N ew Deal and it w ill help China to build hers. T he prosperity o f Am erica cannot stand up against the poverty o f the w o rld Bill still thinks w e are losing the w ar because w e do not have a fight ing spirit, that w e do not have a fighting spirit because w e do not know w hat w e are fighting for. H e says the people o f the w orld really want an international N ew Deal. H e said he was going to be down again about N ovem ber 15 and wanted to see me at that time. I said O .K . I told him when I took in m y Russian speech over fo r the President’s O .K ., I w ould discuss w ith him the need for taking the offensive w ith regard to an international N ew Deal; also w ith regard to a food offen sive directed tow ard E u rop e. . .
NOVEMBER 4 , 1942
A t the m eeting w ith H ull, W ickard, and N elson, the discussion na turally turned to the election.1 H ull seemed to think the country was going in exactly the same steps it follow ed in 1918. H e thought it was utterly important to keep the sequence o f events from follow ing the 1918-1921 pattern because he felt if w e w ent into isolationism this time, the w orld was lost forever. T here is something very noble but exceed ingly dispiriting about H ull’s approach to things. H e was very sore at W illkie and was inclined to blame W illkie’s perform ance on Joe Barnes, w ho he said was half communist, w ho, H ull said, associated w ith Oum ansky in M oscow . H ull said Oum ansky was a great enem y o f the United States . . .* * Tuesday, November 3, 1941, the Republicans had won 44 additional seats in the House of Representatives and 9 in the Senate. T h e y had also turned Democratic governors out o f office in N ew York, Michigan, and California. Am ong the osers were some o f the ablest liberal congressmen. Senator George Norris of Nebraska for one, and among the victors were many Republicans like Hamilton Fish with intracoble conservative and isolationist records. Most contemporary interpretations of the returns stressed the degree to which a light turnout, especially among young defense workers and soldiers w ho were unable to vote, hurt the Democrats, as also did ethnic issues, not the least, Iolian-American hostility against the administration’s policy, only recently reversed, toward enemy aliens. T h e Democrats suffered, too, from intraparty divisions, as in N ew York, and from public dissatisfaction over both inflation and consumer rationing programs. Further, the w ar news since Pearl Harbor had been regularly depressing, and the invasion o f N orth A frica had yet to occur. In the new Congress, coalitions o f Republicans and conservative, mostly southern, Democrats would dominate both houses.
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Secretary W ickard bumbled along w ith some miscellaneous unintel ligible comments, w hich caused Cordell to say, “ I agree w ith w hat you are thinking but I can’t understand what you are saying.” T he purpose o f the meeting was to make a recommendation to the President as to w hat should be done about a skeleton organization to take over the job o f feeding and clothing the hungry peoples o f Eu rope when the A rm y w ent out o f the picture. H ull began talking in an abused tone o f voice to the effect that the State Departm ent had had a com m ittee w orking w ith the help o f the other departments under the leadership o f Dean Acheson on the so-called Leith-Ross Plan. H e said this plan had been approved b y the various departments and the B E W , that he and I had taken it to the President, and the President had approved it as eventually the right thing to do. W ickard asked if China and Russia had approved the plan. H ull said th ey had been kept in form ed. I put forw ard the idea that the best man to run a show o f this kind was F. L . M cD ougall o f Australia, that he was genuinely progres sive, that he knew the lines both in England and the United States and that he had a positive passion for the food problem. H ull said that the British had suggested the man to handle the show ought to be an Am er ican and that the U nited States w ould get a great deal o f prestige out o f doing the job. I asked if the State Department people had examined the M cD ougall plan. H e did not know but said that the State Depart ment people thought very highly o f M cDougalL I suggested that the Dean Acheson com m ittee meet again and examine the M cD ougall plan and see whether or not it should not be incorporated. I asked if H ull, W ickard, and Nelson had a better man to suggest than M cD ougall. T h e only man put forw ard was that b y Nelson. H e thought that G overnor Lehman1 would be excellent fo r die job. W e all agreed . . .
NOVEMBER 5,
1942
. . . A t the W hite House the President read m y proposed Russian speech and suggested the addition o f the clause making it apparent w e w ould furnish Russia supplies to the lim it o f our shipping. H e also did not like m y reference to Anglo-Saxon snobbishness and wanted me to 1 Herbert H . Lehman, governor o f N ew Y ork (1932-42) had declined to run again that year. A n old friend o f Roosevelt, Lehman in December 1942 was appointed director o f foreign relief and rehabilitation operations within the Skate Department. H e later became director general of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Roosevelt’s plans to the contrary notwithstanding, Lehman in 1943 played a role subordinate to the A rm y’s in relief in occupied areas.
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make it d ear in the speech that I was supporting econom ic equality and not social equality. A pparently the President is very sensitive as to w hat the southern senators feel. I made the changes and the President seemed quite w ell satisfied w ith the speech w ith die suggested changes added . . .
NOVEMBER 6 , 19 42
. . . Smathere1 wanted to let me know how Leon Henderson and various other N ew Dealers’ activities contributed to his defeat in N ew Jersey. H e claims that if he had run on a platform opposed to the President, he w ould have won. H e said Senator Johnson’s2 ability to w in in Colorado was because o f having been in opposition to the Presi dent. I told Bill about Lincoln’s situation in 1862 and 1864 and told him I thought he was thinking a little too much about small things and not enough about the big trend . . . NOVEMBER 7 , 1942
. . . A typical Am erican communist is the contentious sort o f indi vidual that w ould probably be shot in Russia w ithout any cere m ony . . .
NOVEMBER IO, 1942
A t the Big Four3 meeting, the President started out b y giving the details on the planning necessary fo r the N orth A frican invasion.4 H e mentioned how it had been talked over w ith Churchill when he was here last June. I said it was m y recollection he had had it in his mind as early as Decem ber o f 1941 in a theoretical w ay. H e said, yes, that was true (I remembered that I had sent him as a Christmas present, in Decem ber o f 1941, a book on the Mediterranean, calling his attention to certain chapters and recommending to him the N .W . A frican at1 W illiam H . Smatheis, Democratic senator from N ew Jersey (1937-43). 2 Edwin C . Johnson, since 1936 Democratic snator from Colorado. 2 T h e Big Four: the V ice President, the Speaker o f the House, and the majority leaders o f both houses—respectively W allace, Rayburn, Barkley, and Representa tive John McCormack of Massachusetts. * On November 8, 194z, American forces, commanded by General Eisenhower, invaded French M orocco and Algeria in the largest amphibian operation ever ventured to that date. T h ey quickly defeated, though not without substantial casualties, French garrisons at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. On November 11 in Algiers French Admiral Jean-François Darlan signed an armistice.
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tack). T h e President said the m atter began to take more definite form in July o f 1942 when Hopkins visited London b at it did not really take definite form until along in August. Then the question came up as to just when the attack should be. T h e y thought it should be at a time when there was a minimum o f m oonlight at night. T his meant that it should be along about the tenth o f O ctober or the seventh o f N ovem ber (darkest moon at this tim e). It was impossible to do it in O ctober; therefore, it had to be delayed until Novem ber. T h e President referred in a very grieved tone o f voice to the Joe Patterson editorial on the threat o f die Japs to the U nited States be cause o f their occupation o f Kiska. T h e President claimed that Patter son was utterly w rong, that the Japs’ occupation o f Kiska was an advantage to the United States because it gave us an opportunity to sink a number o f their ships . . . I objected m ildly, “ But surely you w ould occupy Kiska if the Japs should leave it, w ouldn’t you?” . . .
NOVEMBER 12 , 19 42
Just before the B E W m eeting took up, H arry W hite1 o f Treasury congratulated me most strongly on m y N ew Y ork speech, saying that it was very rare when a person could make one outstanding speech in a year but I had made tw o . . . A little later in the day, M ilo called me to say that Dean Acheson had tried to get him to release oil fo r shipment to Sweden, thus violat ing the agreement w hich was made that morning at B E W meeting. T o do so would righ tfu lly have made Bob Patterson and H arry W h ite intensely angry. I told M ilo to push the Joint Chiefs o f Staff fo r their opinion at the earliest possible moment, that I thought w e should ac commodate Dean Acheson as soon as possible but obviously w e could not agree to do contrary to the action o f the Board just because State Departm ent was pushing. A guirre2 told me o f visiting the priests, bishops, et al., in the Latin Am erican countries. H e claimed about io percent o f the Am erican clergy in all o f Latin Am erica are o f fascist origin and that th ey are friends o f the A llied cause. H e spoke to the various Catholic meetings 1 H arry Dexter W hite, Assistant Secretary o f the Treasury, architect o f that deparanent’s policies in international finance, a contentions but learned and effective administrator, was accused after the war o f communist affiliations, which he denied under oath. * José Aguirre, form erly president o f the Basque government which had enjoyed a short period of home rule before the victory o f General Franco in the Spanish G v il W ar.
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about the need o f charity in the Catholic church. H e asked w h y the Catholics could claim to be charitable when Franco had at least 300,000 or perhaps 500,000 people in concentration camps in Spain. A t cabinet the President again told the N orth A frican story. C . H ull said there was a problem o f how to handle the civilian governm ent behind the m ilitary lines in N . A frica. T h e President then spoke up and told o f the good w ork done by Consuls M urphy and M atthews1 during the past year. (H enry M orgenthau had told me the preceding evening o f the gold m oney w hich had been passed out b y M urphy, et al., to various key figures among the French in N . A frica ). T h e Presi dent apparently thinks that M urphy and M atthews know so much about the political life 1 * N . A frica that their suggestions should be supreme. A t the moment their suggestions are that the French authori ties be left in control o f civilian life. T he President’s statement was o f considerable interest because the preceding day M ilo Perkins had re ceived from General Deane o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff a letter direct ing B E W to handle the civilian problem in N .W . A frica. T h e President’s statement meant that Deane’s letter would be withdrawn. 1 knew M ilo w ould be somewhat disappointed but it seemed to me that the President had probably taken a wise stand and that M ilo need not be concerned about this particular stand being a precedent fo r running the postwar w orld. I stopped just a moment after cabinet to let the President know that I was beginning the study o f Russian. H e seemed to be delighted and said he understood that their alphabet made it quite difficult. NOVEMBER l 6 , 1942
H arold Smith and I discussed postwar problems at some length. H e has a feeling that the National Planning Board is at sixes and sevens and that it is not doing the planning on the domestic front that it should. H e says Frederic Delano has now become very forgetfu l and that there is great difference o f opinion between the different members o f the board.3 1 Robert M urphy and H . Freeman Matthews, w ho had succeeded M urphy as minister in V ich y and in 1942 had become acting chief of civil affairs on Eisenhower’s staff. * T h e National Resources Planning Board under its aging chairman, Frederic A . Delano, was actually developing, albeit slowly, postwar domestic programs, including, among others, plans for national medical insurance and federally financed urban renewal. T h e liberal, Keynesian attitudes of die board and its advisers irritated the conservative majority in Congress which in 1943 cot off the board’s appropriations and ordered it to wind up its affairs.
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H arold Sm ith said that he had been a strong League o f Nations man and that he was very eager to do everything he could to insure the w in ning o f the peace. H e thought it was im portant to utilize the institu tions o f higher learning in building up public sentim ent I agreed w ith him w holeheartedly—and w e agreed that when w e ate dinner w ith Biddle Friday night, w e w ould turn the conversation in that direc tion . . . Senator Trum an1 came in to say that they had lost five congressmen from Missouri and he thought the farmers in the M iddle W est had gone Republican partly because o f the w ay in w hich Leon Henderson had administered livestock prices and partly because o f the shortage o f manpower on the farms. I told him part o f the situation could be handled b y putting food administrators over in the Department o f A griculture and part could be handled b y manpower legislation. I told him that if Claude W ickard was not big enough to handle the food administrators, there should be a new Secretary o f A griculture but I thought it was possible Claude m ight handle the job if the organization situation was straightened out. W e talked about the type o f legislation that w ould handle the farm labor problem. H is observations w ere ex actly the same as m y ow n based on m y contact w ith Iow a farm folks in September . . . NOVEMBER
18,
19 4 2
. . . T h e President spoke about his press conference concerning Darlan, referring to a Serbian proverb about how it was permissible crossing a stream to ride on the back o f the devil until you got to safety. I said to the President that it appeared that R obert M urphy had done an exceedingly good job in N orth A frica. T h e President then w ent on to say he had been responsible for M urphy’s rise, that he had brought him into the embassy in Paris when the consular service was looked on ow lishly b y the embassy.* 1 Senator H a n y S. Truman. 3 M any American liberals, in government and out, were protesting against M urphy’s preinvasion agreements with Admiral Darian, w ho deemed himself the North African spokesman for the V ich y government, a claim that govern ment repudiated after the invasion. Roosevelt, like the State and W a r Depart ments, had considered the arrangements with Darian essential to minimize French resistance, which the President believed they had, even though each side suffered about 3000 casualties and considerable naval and air losses. Continuing Anglo-American collaboration with Darian resulted in December in his reten tion by the Allies as chief o f state in N orth Africa, a position he held until he was assassinated on Christmas eve. Darlan’s dominance seriously offended General Charles de Gaulle, the leader o f the Fighting French and head o f the
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' I told the President I noted that Clark Eichelberger*1 was on his ap pointment list recently and asked him if he did not think it was about time to give Eichelberger’s organization and similar organizations the green light to go ahead. T h e President said he had suggested to Eichel berger that he use “ U nited Nations” instead o f “ League o f Nations.” T h e President mentioned that the others had not paid any attention to the statement he had given out w ith regard to the Philippine Islands last Sunday, Novem ber 15. H e himself looked on it as a very significant statement, holding up the P. Isles as a pattern w hich might w ell be fol low ed b y other nations w ith regard to colonies, like Java, Sumatra, Borneo, etc., etc. H e mentioned a conversation w ith Chiang Kai-shek in w hich Chiang said he thought Java w ould be ready for com plete independence in 15 or 20 years, Sumatra ready in 40 or 50 years, and Borneo not fo r 100 years . . . NOVEMBER
20 ,
19 42
T h e President, after having had Cordell H ull in fo r lunch, opened up w ith the most vigorous statement w hich I have ever known him to make in cabinet. H e said there had been altogether too much power grabbing and backbiting, and that everybody around the table had been gu ilty o f it except die Postmaster General.* T h e President was mak ing a statement relative to N orth A frica. H e paid a strong tribute to the splendid w ork done b y R obert M urphy there and said that the job o f running the civilian life in N orth A frica, as far as the United States was concerned, should be done through the State Department. H e said that any m onetary w ork w hich m ight be done b y M r. Bernstein* o f T reasury should clear through State Department, and if M r. Bernstein Free French govemment-in-exile. D e Gaulle blamed the Americans for the development o f Allied p olity in N orth Africa. “It is a strategic error," he told the British, “to place oneself in a situation contradictory to the moral character o f the war” ; see T h e W ar M em oirt o f Charles de OauUe (N ew York, 1959), Ch. 2. 1 Clark M. Eichelberger, national director o f the League o f Nations Association, consultant to the State Department (1942-43), later a consultant to the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference that established the United Nations. a Frank C . W alker held that office (1940-45) and was also chairman o f the Democratic National Committee (1943-44). * Bernard Bernstein, lawyer and monetary expert, held various posts within the Treasury during the N ew Deal. Ir 1942 a lieutenant colonel, Bernstein was financial adviser to the Allied Forces and to the North African Economic Board. Later he performed similar services in Sicily, Italy, and Germany. In those roles, ordinarily for good reason, he frequently criticized policies the A rm y adopted and regularly communicated his views to Secretary Morgenthau and others in the Treasury Department.
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wanted to get in touch w ith H enry M orgenthau he should do so through State D epartm ent A fter cabinet m eeting was over, I stopped to see the President a moment about Josh Lee’s desire fo r a job, and then ventured to say that when the Joint Chiefs o f Staff w rote M ilo asking him to do dûs w ork, that M ilo had had nothing to do w ith getting them to w rite him, and that when Cordell H ull had stepped into the picture and M ilo called me about it, I had told M ilo about the M urphy matter. Biddle dien spoke up and said that the President was putting on a show fo r Ickes’ special benefit. T h e President said Ickes was pow er-hungry. I told the President I regretted that he had not given the State Departm ent a spanking too; that th ey had held up our telegrams and had changed some o f them in transmission and that I felt his statement w ould cause the State Departm ent to become harder than ever to get along w ith. T h e President said that was a different problem; that Cordell was abso lu tely helpless as an administrator and that he claimed he didn’t have any control over his ow n department. T h e President said Sumner W elles was hungry fo r publicity, was a bureaucrat, and that Berle was bitten b y the same bug. I told the President that much o f our trouble was due to Collado, w ho was w orking under W elles’ instructions. T he w hole affair was an interesting demonstration o f the w ay in w hich the President w ill respond to suggestion . . . Dean Acheson took violent exception to H arold Smith’s suggestion.1 Francis Biddle proclaim ed that the President didn’t want anything go ing on that was in the nature o f postwar planning. I told Biddle I thought he was w rong; that the President didn’t w ant the governm ent to be hooked up w ith postwar planning at the present time but he was anxious fo r other people to start public education, especially w ith re gard to a United Nations setup. It was rather obvious that most o f those present w ere chiefly con cerned w ith some method o f keeping the A rm y from taking charge o f everything. Reference was made to the high percentage o f reactionaries in the A rm y. I raised the question as to w hether there w ere more reaction aries in one department than another. Jessup2 said there was a strong element in the A rm y w ho felt w e should start streng thening France 1 Smith had proposed a civilian-dominated Occupation A uthority independent o f the A rm y and o f all cabinet departments. a Philip C. Jessup, distinguished authority on international law, was soon to become chairman o f the Office o f Foreign Relief in the State Department and later assistant general secretary o f U N R R A .
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and G erm any so as to avoid Russia having things too much her w ay. I replied I thought there were just as m any people o f this kind in the State Department. I further said that w hile it was p erfectly clear that the channel in running civilian affairs in N orth A frica should be the State Department, I nevertheless felt that the State Department’s ex perience and personnel w ere not such as to make diem ideal for doing the occupied job in other places. I strongly favored H arold Smith’s proposal o f an Occupation A uthority. Dean Acheson said he thought it was very dangerous . . .
NOVEMBER
2 applying to the foreign front. H ow ever, I did not menrion this to Jimmie because frankly I fe lt 9347 could be interpreted to apply to the foreign front so I m erely said to Jimmie, “ Is it true that yo u have not been dealing w ith disputes affecting the Coordinator’s O ffice, State Departm ent, et aL” H e said none had come up. A few minutes later he spoke about settling a dispute concerning oil in w hich the State Departm ent was involved. I said m y purpose in bringing Executive O rder 9347 to his attention was to indicate to him that I had assumed, from reading o f the order and his explanation o f it w hich he had sent to the various agencies, that he had no jurisdiction over disputes m volving the State Depart ment, B E W , etc. Jimmie said in case there was a doubt on this, die order ought to be changed. I told Jimmie that I thought he had not wanted to get into the difficulty between Jesse Jones and m yself. Furtherm ore I understood he had told .M ilo Perkins w hen I was in South Am erica, at the tim e when M ilo had attended Lehman’s con ference at the W hite House, that he, Byrnes, had told the President that the situation between W allace and Jones was so hot that he, Byrnes, did not w ant to touch it. But I said in view o f the fact that Jimmie apparently felt that he had authority in the matter, I w ould not insist that he take the letter back w hich he had w ritten me. I wanted him to know that I would have been glad to come over in response to a phone call. I also wanted him to know that if he felt he had jurisdiction in this field, he should have gotten into the problem long before this. A lthough this made Jimmie somewhat mad, it was very useful. I made it clear to Jimmie that I thought the important thing was getting a constructive answer fo r the future—and that I thought the only constructive answer was to make B E W separate from R F C in the im port field so that Congress w ould make a direct appropriation to the Board instead o f to R F C . A bout that time Jesse Jones came in, glow ering and glum , saying that H enry W allace had called him a traitor. I said to Jesse, “ I see
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b y the N ew Y ork N ew s, w hich has a circulation o f 2 m illion, that they think you are going to hit me the next time you see me.” I said, “Is that true, Jesse? A re you going to hit me?” Jesse came back to the refrain o f his song, “ H enry W allace called me a traitor.” T hen he got out a paper on w hich he had picked out all die different things I had called him and read them over—bureaucrat, backdoor convplainer, etc., etc. Jimmie then said, “ Y ou don’t think Jesse is a traitor, do yo u ?" I said, “N o , I haven’t called him a traitor and I don’t think he is.” . Jimmie said, “ W ill you make a statement to that effect?” I said, “ I am sure there is no statement w hich I can make that w ould be satisfactory to Jesse.” W e then w ent at some length into w hat M cK ellar said on June 4. Byrnes said everybody knew that M cK ellar was irresponsible and that I should not have been stirred up b y his statement. I said I was sure that w hat M cK ellar said was based on something that Jesse Jones had said to M cK ellar. Jones pulled out o f his pocket a cop y o f his statement before the M cK ellar committee. T his statem ent was quite harmless. I still stuck b y m y guns, however, that M cK ellar could not have said w hat he did unless it was based on inform attion w hich he had received from Jesse Jones. I then made the point that the all-im portant thing was getting constructive w ork done in the future. Byrnes eagerly took up this thought. I said, “ W hile w e are getting a constructive solution, obviously w e w ill have to go along as w e have been going, but B E W ought to apply to Congress fo r independent funds so as to be free from Jesse as soon as possible.” I said if B E W w ere to go before Congress to ask fo r independent funds fo r doing its w ork, w e ought to have some assurance that Jesse and his organization w ould not do w hat they had been doing the past three weeks on the H ill. Jesse claimed that they had not been doing anything. I did not mention the Flynn memo1 w hich had been circulated to certain members o f the Senate but I did say that certain members o f the M etals Reserve Com pany had spoken to mem bers o f Congress about “ m y p olicy on giving preference to foreigners at the expense o f Am ericans.” I said that other R F C employees had criticized B E W fo r being extravagant and engaging in postwar plan ning. Jesse denied all this. Jesse left then and Jimmie urged me to issue a statement. I said, 1 A memorandum b y John T . Flynn, an ardent and-Rooseveltian, incorporated Senator M cKellar’s contention that die B E W was an extralegal agency, created b y the Executive without congressional approval, that spent moneys in an unauthorized manner for questionable purposes and ordinarily without review b y the cabinet members on the board. T h e memo also attacked Milo Perkins as a mystic and a radical, epithets Flynn never hesitated to use also about W allace.
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“Jimmie, you w rite out the kind o f a statement you think I ought to issue.” Jimmie w rote out this statement in longhand. I took it, stopped at M ilo’s office. M ilo pointed out there w ere certain matters o f phraseology that w ould get us into trouble w ith Congress. I read back the statement as changed to Jimmie. H e suggested one change, where I had said, “ M r. Jones agreed to this p olicy decision.” H e suggested the phraseology, “ M r. Jones did not object to this p olicy decision” . . . Jesse Jones said m y attack on him was not Christian. H e said he m ight not go to church as often as I did but that he knew w hat was Christian and m y act was not a Christian act. Jesse said the purpose o f the attack was to destroy him, that M ilo Perkins and M orris Rosenthal had had that purpose all the time. H e said they had obviously prepared the attack for me. H e said Perkins was disingenuous because he, Perkins, on June 7 had w ritten him about the M cK ellar June 4 attack and he in his reply had cleared the matter up (I remembered M ilo as telling me that Jesse had been evasive in his rep ly). Jesse’s point was that M ilo’s preparing the attack and having his (Jesse’s) letter in refutation o f M cK ellar could not have been honest. Jesse claimed that he always fought for the President’s program on die H ill. Jimmie Byrnes chimed in to say that Jesse had been helpful to the President b y lobbying on the H ill fo r the subsidy and the roll back. Jesse claimed he alw ays did everything he could to help the President’s program on the HU1 and that he never fought the President's program. Bym es wanted me in m y statement to indicate that M cK ellar had quoted Jesse incorrectly. W hen w e dug into this a little bit, it appeared that Jesse got cold feet. H e definitely had qualms about w hat he had done on the H ill although Jimmie Bym es in his telephone conversation interpreted the matter otherwise. I endeavored to shape the conference to an agreement that B E W should go direct to Congress for its m oney to finance im portations and that there should be an agreement that Jesse and his organization w ould not fight such a program on the H ill. Jesse seemed to be in accord. T h at is w h y Jimmie Bym es, in w riting down a statement w hich he proposed I make, w rote it as he did. T h at is w h y I put in the sentence saying that M r. Jones agreed and w h y Jimmie Bym es felt it was perfectly all right to put in the sentence but changing it to make it read “ M r. Jones did not object . . .” But w hile M r. Jones did not object between 5 and 6 on June 30, he did object most strenuously b y 10:30 that night in his release to the newspapermen . . .
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J U L Y 1, 1943
I called up the President and told him I thought he had let me off v e ry ligh tly in his press conference on June 29, and I wanted him to know I appreciated it. H e replied in quite an apologetic w ay that at the time his press conference was held, m y letter to him enclosing the Jesse Jones statement had not come into his hands. In view o f the cordial tone o f his voice, I then w ent on to say, "Y ou w ill remember, M r. President, I mentioned in m y letter o f June 10 to you the kind o f situation that was brew ing." H e made some polite statement to this w hich did not let me know w hether or not he had read the letter o f June 10. I then w ent on to tell him about the poll o f the Republicans in the House, that 52 o f them wanted D ew ey as the candidate, 32 M acA rthur, 30 Bricker, 13 W illkie, 9 T a ft, etc. T his seemed to amuse the President and he said, "W e shall have W illkie w ith us yet." I made some statement indicative o f distrust o f W illkie. O n thinking d ie conversadon over, I am not sure whether the President meant that W illkie would become a Dem ocrat in 1944 or whether the President was indicating his judgm ent that W illkie w ould be the Republican candidate in 1944 . . .
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ly
6,1943
M ilo's statement in reply to Jesse Jones1 . . . was issued w ithout consultation w ith me. I told him I thought it was a fine thing he had made the statement and that I was glad he could not get in touch w ith me prior to releasing it. M ilo told me that Elm er Davis had called him on the carpet about it, and about the firm stand he, M ilo, had taken w ith regard to issuing it. Elm er also criticized me fo r issuing the statement follow in g the Byrnes conference. M ilo said very little in re-* * O n July y, 1943, Jones had issued a 30-paçe statement denying the charges in W allace’s statement o f June 29. M ilo Perkins, on his own initiative, attacked Jones. T h e exchange irritated Roosevelt, who found public disagreements among his subordinates personally distasteful and politically embarrassing. Speaking fo r the President, James F. Byrnes on July 6, 1943, wrote W allace: “Public recrimination b y the head o f one war agency against another is bound to hurt the war effort and lessen the confidence o f the people in their government. N ow that you and Mr. Jones have published your statements I must urge that no further statements or counter statements be made b y either o f you except in response to a congressional inquiry.” Such an inquiry was threatening, for Representative Richard B. W igglesworth, Massachusetts Republican, had intro duced a resolution directing the House Rules Committee to investigate the Wallace-Jones feud. T h e administration, as W allace’s diary reveals, interceded to defeat the resolution.
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sponse to that because he did not w ant to put Jimmie Byrnes on die spot. O f course, he knew as w ell as I did that the statement follow ing the Byrnes conference was put out at Byrnes’s insistence. W hen I left Byrnes’ office about 6:20 p.m. on June 30, I did not tell him fo r sure that I w ould issue a statem ent It was not until I called him about seven o’clock that he knew definitely I was going to go ahead. Nevertheless, according to J. H . S h o rt correspondent fo r the Baltimore Sun, one o f Byrnes’ aides announced that I w ould issue a statement. Jimmie must have read in m y attitude that I w ould issue die statement although I had not said so in words. On July 6 I received the . . . letter from Jimmie Byrnes. I assume Jesse Jones received a similar one. M ilo consulted w ith me from tw elve to one o’clock, telling me about the W igglesw orth resolution in the House and the fact that Sabath,1 chairman o f the Rules Committee, had announced there w ould be a vote in the House at 3 p.m. that day w ith regard to an investigation o f Jesse Jones and m yself. M ilo said that any congressional com m ittee w hich m ight do the investigating w ould be playing politics and that the only w ay to get a fair investigation was to have somebody from the general public conduct the investigation. H e suggested someone like form er C hief Justice Hughes heading up the investigation. H e also suggested Baruch, Conant, and Com pton, form er members o f the Rub ber Committee. I called the President on the telephone at H yde Park and told him about the House vote com ing up at 3 p.m. today and suggested a public com m ittee as the w ay out. T h e President suggested I talk the problem over w ith Byrnes, asking Jimmie to get in touch w ith Sam Rayburn. H e favored the public committee approach, pro vided w e could not beat the W igglesw orth amendment in any other w ay. I then called Jimmie and passed on to him the w ord from the Presi dent. Jimmie said, “ It ought to be possible to head o ff the W iggles w orth resolution.” I made it clear to Jimmie that I did not fear an investigation, that strictly from the standpoint o f B E W , w e w ould welcom e an investigation. Jimmie said an investigation b y the Rules Committee would be horrible, that Cox o f G eorgia, Dies o f Texas, H ow ard Smith o f V irginia, and Ham Fish o f N ew Y ork would do nothing but play politics.8 Jimmie said, “ L et me w ork on this problem 1 Adolph J. Sabath, since 1907 Democratic congressman from Chicago. ■ Of the four congressmen mentioned, Fish was a Republican and ate other three —Edward E. Cox, Martin Dies, and H oward W . Smith—were notoriously conservative Democrats.
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w ith Sam R ayburn.” A little later Jimmie called back to say he thought he had the situation w ell in hand, that a meeting o f the Rules Com m ittee had been called fo r 2 p.m. and he thought the W igglesw orth resolution could be defeated. I made the point again to Jimmie, how ever, that I thought it w ould be a good plan to have a public Committee go into the situation, that B E W w ould w elcom e an investigation b y any fair committee . . . J u l y 7,1943
Senator Thom as1 o f U tah came up to see me w hile I was presiding. H e mentioned m y talking to him concerning a race riot problem and asked if I had noticed that there had been introduced on July 6, Senate 71, b y Senator Brooks o f Illinois. H e said this resolution, calling fo r an investigation o f the race riots, had been referred to the Senate Judiciary Com m ittee and that V an N uys had referred it to a sub committee composed o f M cCarran, O ’M ahoney, and Ferguson. Thom as said he thought the subcommittee was about as bad as it could be from the standpoint o f the administration and from the standpoint o f the election in 1944. H e said he thought the N egro vote w ould deter mine the outcom e in O hio, Pennsylvania, and N ew Y ork and that some thing ought to be done to prevent the m atter from getting into the hands o f the President's enemies. A little later in the day, Charles Marsh called up to say that G erald K . Smith3 had had lunch w ith Dies on M onday, the 5th, and that this was responsible fo r the introduction o f the Brooks resolution. I then called up Miss T u lly and dictated a note to her to pass on to the President. In the note, I told the President substantially w hat I had learned . . . But I did not definitely hook up the Brooks resolution w ith the Dies8 and G erald Smith meeting on M onday. 1 Elbert D . Thomas, Utah Democrat, was one o f the senators most friendly tio W allace. Other senators to whom he referred in the con versa tio n here -re ported were C W ayland Brooks, Illinois Repnblican; Frederick V an Nuys, Indiana Democrat; Patrick A . McCarran, Nevada Democrat; Joseph C. O ’Mahoney, Connecticut Democrat; and Homer Ferguson, Michigan Republi can. 3 Gerald L . K . Smith, preacher o f a native American fascism that focussed its poisonous rhetoric against radicals, blacks, Jews, foreigners, and N ew Dealers. * Martin Dies.
224$ Ju l y
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. . . Nelson R ockefeller was seriously alarmed as a result o f a con versation he had had w ith Jimmie Byrnes the day before. Byrnes had told him about a proposal to blend together the foreign activities o f R FC , the C IA , Export-Im port Bank, B E W , and various other agencies. Nelson believes very strongly that the w ork w ith Latin Am erica w ould be seriously handicapped if it w ere blended in w ith an agency o f that sort. I said I agreed w ith him. H e wanted to know w hat to do. I suggested he get in touch w ith H arry Hopkins and have Anna Rosen berg get in touch w ith Samuel Rosenman. I said it was m y under standing that this consolidation idea had been under consideration fo r many months, that Judge Rosenman had been w orking on it fo r some time. A t cabinet meeting the President said absolutely nothing about the unpleasantness between Jesse and m y se lf. . . Ju ly
14,1943
A long about 6 p.m. I called General W atson on the telephone and said that I was going to be making a speech in D etroit on July 25, in w hich I would be mentioning among other things labor and race riots, and I thought I ought to get the President’s approval o f it. I told Pa W atson that I w ould be out over the weekend and that apparently it would be necessary to see the President either before Friday noon or after Tuesday noon. Pa replied, “ W ell, I better get you right in to m orrow morning.” T h e follow ing morning w ord came from the W hite House to clear the speech w ith Steve E arly. I noticed later on that H arold Smith’s name was on the President’s appointments on Thursday. I realized then that M ilo’s off-the-record speech1 . . . must 1 T h at speech was to the staff o f the B E W , to whom Perkins had said that W allace’s attack on Jones was what “any red-blooded American” would say when he turned over a rock and saw “slimy things crawling" under it. T h e B E W , Perkins added, would live on. H e was wrong. O n July i j , 1943, Roose velt abolished the B E W and placed its responsibilities, along with some o f Jones’ lending agencies, within a new agency, the Office o f Economic W arfare. That office in turn in September was placed with the Lend-Lease Administra tion within another new and larger agency, the Foreign Economic Administra tion. T h e President appointed Leo C row ley the head of the O E W and later the FEA . T h e outcome was clearly a defeat for Perkins and W allace and was so interpreted at the time, to the dismay of many liberal Democrats and the gratification o f their opponents in both parties. W allace was angry and hurt. O ver the telephone to Harold Ickes on July 16, he said that it looked as if the country was needed fo r a bipartisan American fascism. T o one group o f his advisers, he expressed his feelings about Roosevelt characteristically b y quoting
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have provoked the President to go ahead w ith the action w hich he had long contem plated. A pparently there w ere in w ith Harold in drawing up the executive order Jimmie Byrnes, H arry Hopkins, Sam Rosenman, and W ayne C oy. W ayne C o y,1 and Harold Smith are reported b y W ayne C o y to have counseled delay. T h e others w ere exceedingly eager to push the executive order through at the earliest possible moment. J u l y 20,1943
T h e fact that the President him self read m y entire speech3 more carefully than he has read any o f m y speeches and made several minor changes in his ow n handwriting suggests his usual technique o f being very nice to a person he has just gotten through hitting. H ow ever, it must also be said that he is really fond o f me except when stimulated b y the palace guard to move in other directions . . . M ilo, Tharon,8 and I talked very little about the recent action o f the President. W e went over to the garden and talked to m y aster M ary. It seemed to me, however, that M ilo was very much more bitter to ward the President than he had been the first evening. I don't think he has been talking bitter to anyone else, however. T he reason fo r M ilo's bitterness is that since the death o f his son he has tended more and more to identify his extraordinary efforts w ith his son. H is son’s last words to him had been to “ stay in and slug," and his son had meant not only from the standpoint o f getting materials but also from the standpoint o f making Jesse Jones behave, and so M ilo subconsciously feels that the President has really dealt a blow to the m em ory o f his son. But M ilo has never said anything o f this sort and I don’t think he ever w ould.4 the Bible: “Though H e slay me, yet will I trust Him.” W allace continued to do so, but he also felt, as did his supporters in the press, that Roosevelt had betrayed him. 1 W ayne C oy, competent, versatile, and ordinarily anonymous assistant director o f the Bureau o f the Budget. * W allace gave the speech on July 25, 1943, to a labor meeting in Detroit. H e began with a generous tribute to Roosevelt, a tribute that signaled the return of official peace in the battle o f Washington. T h e President, he said, was the symbol the world over o f the dearest aspirations of the common man for the peace to come. W allace then attacked Roosevelt’s enemies, proponents of an “American fascism,” and went on to his familiar themes about a century of the common man and “a capitalism o f abundance.” * Mrs. M ilo Perkins. * T hat day W allace also wrote Roosevelt: A mutual friend has stated that you never received m y letter of June
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228 JU LY
21 , 194 *
. . Leo C row ley came in and said he thought the President had given me an utterly raw d eal Previously he had told the same thing to M ilo. C row ley told me that the President in the first instance had told him (C row ley) that he had to get rid o f M ilo and later on he told his press conference it was up to C row ley whether or not he wanted to get rid o f M ilo. In other words, he made C row ley the goat fo r fir ing M ilo and C row ley rather resented it. O f course, M ilo resigned be fore C row ley could fire him w hich made it m uch easier fo r him* I told C row ley that he was going to have real trouble w ith his export w ork because State did not understand the mood o f the exporters and because the exporters did not like the decentralization plan w hich had been fathered b y State. I gave him a clipping from the N ew Y o rk Tim es to show him how the exporters felt. C row ley indicated that if he had trouble w ith State on the export front, he w ould go to the Presi dent and tell him to* give the w ork to State. I told C row ley that w ould be very unfortunate from a political point o f view because I felt State I Yesterday I sent to Don Nelson m y resignation from W P B because Samuel Rosenman in originally notifying me of m y membership in the predecessor agency SPAB said my membership was on the theory that I represented the foreign claimants for United States goods (exclusive, o f course, of Lend-Lease and the M ilitary). It is obvious that someone else should now take m y place on W P B in order that the private claimants in foreign lands be properly represented. It may interest you to know that on the evening of your recent action, Milo in talking things over with his w ife said, "W ell, he is still the greatest President this country has ever had." His wife concurred. I appreciate deeply your having taken the time to read m y Detroit speech. T h e corrections you suggested have been incorporated with one exception. T h e speech, of course, was written prior to your recent action. Rereading with tnat in mind, I reached the conclusion that I should move m y tribute to you from the last o f the speech to the very first and make it much more vigorous. T h e first question of people about the Detroit speech will be, "W hat does Mr. W allace think now about the President?" T h e Re publicans are waiting hopefully. I am going to settle that in the first tw o minutes. I shall be in Iowa most o f the time in late July and the first half of August • • « Roosevelt replied on July 28: It was good of you to write me as you did . . . I was forced to conclude that under all the circumstances there was no other course for me to pursue. It is needless for me to tell you that the incident has not lessened m y personal affection for you. Your speech was splendid and I sincerely appreciate your very generous references to me. It seems to have been well received except in some few uarters and nothing you could have said would have pleased them . • . .S. You drew blood from the Cave Dwellers!
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w ould create m any enemies. I said . . . the State Departm ent was not a good operating agency and in the very nature o f things could not he . . . M orris Rosenthal is extrem ely bitter at the President, much more so than M ilo. H e feels that the President has betrayed the cause o f lib eralism . . .
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o o s e v e l t ’ s a b o l i t i o n o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare probably signified, as many commentators suspected at the time, that the Presi dent had decided against insisting, as he had in 1940, upon the nomi nation o f W allace as his running mate in 1944. T h e Republican gains in 1942 and the conservatism o f the Congress in 1943 also suggested the political advantages Roosevelt m ight gam er from abandoning the most insistent liberal in his administration. Y et W allace, though he wanted renomination, made no effort to secure it. A s he often said, he was no politician. Indeed he abhorred the backroom politics b f bargain and intrigue. Further, W allace believed that as V ice President he had an obligation to rise above politics, and also to serve the President directly and the nation as a sym bol o f purpose. M ost important, in spite o f the hurt he felt, W allace considered Roosevelt the most promising sponsor o f desirable domestic and foreign policies and the strongest available Dem ocrat, just as he considered the Dem ocratic Party the best available vehicle for progress. O n those accounts he was resolved to take no action that w ould disrupt the party or weaken the President. W allace was equally resolved to continue to w ork further to develop and prom ote the postwar objectives he had already defined. H e elab orated upon those objectives in speeches he gave throughout the coun try, and he publicized them in Democracy Reborn, a collection o f his addresses that was published in 1944. Otherwise he left his political future to the interm ittent and unsystem atic ministrations o f his assistant, H arold Young, and his senatorial friend, Joe G u ffey. H e concentrated on longer-range and less personal goals. N ow deprived o f a portfolio in the w ar cabinet, W allace perform ed instead as a witness to his ow n selfless purpose. Perhaps he miscal culated, fo r his goals had becom e so much identified w ith his career that political failure foreboded, too, a failure o f mission. Still, from A ugust 1943 until (he end o f 1944, even after he lost renomination, he pursued the only course com patible w ith his character and tempera-
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meat. It apparently never occurred to him, or at least it did not w o rry him, that that course enhanced die opportunities o f those w ho w ere conspiring to succeed him. His services to the President and to his ow n hopes fo r the postwar period took him halfw ay around the w orld to Siberia and China, across much o f the United States as a cam paigner fo r his party, and ultim ately back to W ashington as a replacem ent fo r Jesse Jones—an outcom e not w ithout irony or justice.
AUGUST I I , I9 4 3
. . . H ugh C ox,1 whom I have long looked on as one o f the smartest, finest people in Justice, told me that the facts in the Joseph Borkin book were true. T here m ight be difference o f opinion w ith regard to the conclusions to be drawn from them. I told Cox I was going to be seeing Borkin and that I was disposed to take up the cudgels w ith re gard to international cartels . . . I had a very interesting talk w ith Joseph Borkin. H e told me he had w ritten a number o f Thurm an A rnold’s speeches. H e said the secret o f A rnold’s success was the w ay in w hich he cultivated news papermen. H e said he thought A rnold had made a mistake b y the w ay in w hich he prosecuted farmers and workers, that first things should come first, and the international cartel abuses w ere so infinitely greater than anything in agriculture or labor that there was no question where the action should have been taken. H e said, however, that when A r nold stepped into labor, it resulted in Ed O ’N eal going to bat for A rnold’s appropriation. Borkin said the administration had never given the antitrust division any real support . . . 1 Hugh Cox, w ho fined W allace’s description, had been special assistant to the Attorney General since 193$ and counsel for the Justice Department before the temporary National Economic Commission in 1938-39. H e served as assistant Solicitor General (1943-45). A n expert on problems of domestic oligopoly and international cartels, Cox rendered a learned assessment of the criticisms of their practices set fo n h in a book by his Justice Department colleague, Joseph Borkin, in collaboration with Charles A . W elsh, Germany's Master Plan: T h e Story of Industrial Offensive (N ew York, 1943). Moved partly b y Borkin’s analysis, partly b y the supporting revelations o f the Truman and Kilgore committees of the Senate, W allace had already begun to attack cartels, in one instance in a radio interview in Des Moines on August 5, 1943. “T h e corporations which need to be watched most closely,” he said then, “are those which move in international trade, and those which enter into international cartels respecting markets, prices, and the use o f inventions.”
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236 AUGUST 1 7 , I9 4 3
I had a long and rather unsatisfactory talk w ith H erridge. I agree w ith him in die main thesis that I must hammer continually on fu ll employment. O n general strategy w e are in com plete agreement. O n tactics w e are in com plete disagreement. I told him to prepare 10 pages o f w hat he thinks I ought to say in a speech. H e is to spend all Sunday afternoon and evening w ith me A ugust 2 9 . 1 don’t believe he can w rite a good speech. H is sentiments are fine but when, you get beyond a certain point, it is just mere repetition. O n broad strategy, H erridge is O .K . but on tactics he is poor. H is sincerity is admirable and his broad analysis is sound. H erridge tells me he saw E liot Janeway1 o f the Tim e-Fortune crow d a few days ago in N ew Y ork . H e asked Janeway w ho w ould w in in 1944. Janeway said, "T h e T ories w ill w in.” H erridge replied, "W h at do you mean b y that?” Janeway came back w ith the statement, "O h, R oosevelt and the gang around him w ill get back in pow er again.” H erridge thinks I ought to stop looking on m yself as V ice President o f the United States, that I should realize that I am leader o f a very im portant group o f people not only in the United States but also in the entire w orld. H e thinks I should speak not as V ice President but as leader o f this im portant group o f people. H e doesn’t like the draft o f the speech w hich I have prepared fo r Septem ber 11 because he thinks it is not on a sufficiently broad basis. I told him I was going to go ahead on that basis anyw ay but fo r him to go ahead and prepare the kind o f speech he thinks I ought to make. H e believes that I should no longer feel tied to the President’s coat tails. H e thinks the President was a gallant figure in the early days o f the N ew Deal but that he has never known w hat the econom ic thing was all about and at the present tim e he (the President) really repre sents the forces o f reaction. H erridge wants me more and more to break loose from the President altogether . . .
au g u st
19,1943
. . . Elm er Davis told me that the State Departm ent had recently prohibited O W I from putting out a statement to the effect that Italy 1 Eliot Janeway, journalist and author, was an admirer of Roosevelt's conduct of the war, especially on the home front. Janeway was an advocate, too, o f the views of the armed services in their continuing and successful efforts to con trol domestic production policies in spite of the attempts of the W ar Production Board to protect the interests o f small business; see Eliot Janeway, T h e Struggle fo r Survival (N ew Haven, 1951).
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under Badoglio1 was an ally o f Germ any. Eisenhower told me that H ull had talked to him fo r an hour or tw o to the effect that O W I must not put out anything that had ideology in it. Bob Sherwood asked me if O W I had not made a mistake b y distributing three million copies o f m y Century o f the Common Man speech in Italy. I said, “ W ell, I am afraid there is lots o f ideology in it” . . . Elm er said he had had a heart-to-heart talk w ith the President last w eek and the President assured him that he him self was sound at heart w ith regard to certain matters in w hich the State Departm ent is in volved. T his reassurance from die President was a great help to Elm er’s morale. I told Elm er I thought the President was sound at heart and that he w ould demonstrate at the right time in terms o f action just where he stood. A t the Bowes-Lyons’, Robert Sherwood and A rchie M acLeish said to m y sister M ary, “ W e just love yo u r brother, H enry.” M ary said, “ W h y don’t you tell him?” A rchie replied, “ Y ou just can’t tell a man like H enry that” . . . If the Dem ocrats w ere going to lose, H ull thought it important not to raise the hopes o f foreign nations.2 In other words, H ull is acting as m uch as possible like a Republican so there w ill be as little shock as possible in the transition. H ull proclaim ed he was against “ isolationism, internationalism, and W allacism .”
au g u st
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Sumner W elles told me that he had sent his resignation to the Presi1 Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Italian conqueror o f Ethiopia, had executed a coup on July 25, 1943, tw o weeks after the Allied invasion o f Sicily, through which he succeeded Benito Mussolini as head of the Italian government. Though Badoglio officially dissolved the Fascist Party, he could not on that account cleanse himself o f his own fascist past. Indeed an O W I broadcast beamed from London on July 26 had quoted an American columnist who, with admirable precision, had attacked bom the Marshal and the Italian king as fascists. Roose velt denounced the broadcast the next day. Meanwhile the Allies negotiated with Badoglio for a surrender, which was signed in September, but the German forces in Italy continued to resist. T h e negotiations with Badoglio, which excluded the Russians, offended those Americans who had previously objected to the Darlan episode and its sequels. Roosevelt and the State and W ar Depart ments again defended their policy on the ground of military expediency, but it did not significantly hasten the arduous task o f driving the Germans from Italy and it cost the United States much confidence among European, and especially Italian, democrats. • S o H ull had said, according to what W allace had learned, to Arthur Sweetser, then deputy director o f the O W I and long an ardent supporter o f the League o f Nations.
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dent and that his resignation had been accepted,1 and d u t it w ould be announced when the President came back to W ashington on A ugust 26 or 27. Prior to that time he expected to leave tow n and said he hoped to see me when he got back. I told him I was very sorry to hear he had resigned. H e said it was the only thing he could do. I asked him w hat he was going to do. H e said he was going to retire com pletely, and said that the President had urgently asked him to do some special w ork and Secretary H ull had agreed, but W elles made it clear that the issue between himself and H ull had been stirred up b y H ull and not b y himself. H e said that the President, w ith H ull concurring, had asked him to w ork on the immediate problem o f Russian relations. H e said he had decided not to do this . . . I asked W elles w hat H ull’s com plete domination o f the State Departm ent meant in terms o f international affairs. H e said it meant that England would try to deal w ith Russia direct and put us in the position o f dealing w ith Russia through Eng land as an interm ediary. H e said the British had been w orking on this fo r a long time. H e said Litvinov was not com ing back to the United States; that he had been appointed a vice commissar in Russia. I asked him w hat this meant. H e said he had interpreted it as meaning that Stalin was making a strong effort to strengthen his Foreign O ffice. M aisky from London and Litvinov from W ashington tried to keep Stalin fu lly inform ed as to w hat was really going on in the w orld. W elles said that Concheso, the Cuban Ambassador to the United States, w ho was recently in Rus sia, reported that he had an hour and tw enty minutes w ith Stalin. T h e first half o f the period was spent b y Stalin in tryin g to find out about Latin Am erica. T his conference proved that Stalin was com pletely ignorant o f Latin Am erica. Concheso then tried to find out about Russia and her plans. Stalin then said that he felt it was impossible to raise the standard o f living in Russia the w ay it ought to be raised w ith out Russia becom ing a part o f the “ fam ily o f nations.” I asked W elles if he had passed that inform ation on to the President, as it seemed to be very important. W elles said he had. W elles said, “ 1 am not a com munist and I know you are not a communist, but I believe you and I are o f the same attitude on Russia.” I said, “ Yes, I think the future peace o f the w orld hangs on developing collective security in coopera tion w ith Russia.” W elles said the English theory was still the balance o f pow er theory—the theory w hich England has always had except in 1 W elles’ enemies had forced his resignation, H ull b y his constant complaints, Bullitt b y malicious personal attacks which the President could neither deny nor ignore.
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the brief time when she was in the League o f Nations. I said, “ b y collective security you mean the same doctrine L itvinov preached during the latter part o f the twenties?” W elles said, “ Yes.” W elles thinks it is only a m atter o f weeks until the Russians w ill determine their course. A t the moment the situation looks good, but it could rapidly change fo r the worse in the very near future. T h e President received, last w eek, a long telegram from Stalin indicating willingness fo r a meeting. It was a well-phrased telegram. W elles believes in regional organization, and international organiza tion grow ing out o f the regional organization. I asked W elles if he believes in the same kind o f regional organization as Churchill. H e said, “ N o .” H e said Churchill was planning his European regional organi zation so as to w ork out a balance o f pow er theory in Europe. H e said nearly a year ago he (W elles) w orked out his theories on this line and that they had been given to the President, and the President had ap proved them. I said, “ D o you visualize us as being a member o f the European regional organization?” H e said, “ N o.” I said, “ D o you vis ualize us being a member o f the A siatic organization?” H e said, “ A member o f the N orth Asiatic group along w ith Canada, Russia, and China,” but that he thought the South Asiatic group consisting o f the Philippines, Australia, and the various islands should be separate. I asked him w hat he thought o f the peace committees as they had been set up in the State Department. H e said he thought they had been doing good w ork until six months ago. U p to that time he had been in charge o f the political planning committee. W hen he had charge the method was to bring up the various points at issue, study the facts, and arrive at a decision. Since Secretary H ull had charge the method had been to gather together facts but take no action on them. H e said the w ay Secretary H ull leads the Departm ent it would never decide any thing. I asked him if M yron T a ylo r was doing good w ork on the plan ning com m ittee.1 H e said, “ Yes, excellent w ork.” H e said he had grow n in stature enorm ously. I asked him about Norm an Davis. He said he was com pletely subservient to M r. H ull and seemed to have no fixed opinions o f his own. H e said Isaiah Bowman was a tow er o f strength, and Anne O ’Hare M cCorm ick—magnificent. I told W elles that Enrique de Lozada w ould be heartbroken to hear o f his leaving the Departm ent, that Enrique looked on him and L arry 1 T h e State Department’s postwar planning committees included, among others, M yron C . T aylor, form erly Roosevelt’s personal representative to the Vatican; Norman H . Davis, often a delegate to international conferences and a close friend o f H ull; Bowman; and Anne O ’Hare M cCorm ick, the talented N ew Y ork Tim es analyst of foreign affairs.
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Duggan as the only liberal sparks in the Department. I told W elles d u t die Russian situation was so exceedingly im portant and eventual dan ger o f w ar w ith Russia was so great that he should, b y all means, do w hat the President wanted him to do. H e said he had not declined the invitation yet, but that he fu lly intended to do so. I urged him again and again to reconsider as I thought it was too im portant from the standpoint o f the future peace o f the w orld. H e said that Cordell H ull was intensely prejudiced against Russia. I said, “ D o you mean to say he has the same attitude as the English T ories have had tow ard Russia since 1919—an attitude w hich has made Russia continue to be distrust fu l because they know the T ories are doing everything possible to destroy the Russians?“ W elles mentioned that when he had been out o f tow n Cordell H ull had had various personal contacts w ith A rthur K rock and that the w hole newspaper story about W elles had been carefully planned b y H ull and K rock. I ventured to say that w hile H ull m ight know very little about Latin Am erica or Russia, he certainly was a skillful politi cal maneuvered I ventured that I had never, at any time, had any question in m y mind about the President’s ultimate soundness about foreign affairs— that I had never had a moment’s regret fo r being in the D em ocratic Party or w orking w ith Roosevelt. M y experiences had been infinitely happier than m y father’s. I w ent on to say that w hile there are some evil influences in the D em ocratic Party, there w ere many more evil influences in the Republican Party, that the greedy international mo nopolists had much more influence there than in the Dem ocratic Party. W elles said he agreed one thousand percent. H e said he was absolutely sure o f the President’s fundamental soundness in his international atti tude. H e said the President’s attitude is like his and mine and not like that o f H ull. I again said, “T hen you surely ow e it to the President to help him out on this Russian m atter.’’ W elles said it would be a difficult job to do good w ork w ith the State Departm ent against him. I then asked W elles if he w ould read the A ugust 21 edition o f m y September 11 speech.1 H e suggested one or tw o very minor changes and said he thought it was a very pow erful speech, that it was espe cially pow erful because o f the specific illustration given. H e said, in his opinion, from w hat he knows o f the President’s attitude that the 1 W allace delivered the speech on September i t , 1943,10 * meeting o f die Chicago United Nations Committee. It followed the lines o f his earner addresses in 1942-43 and included an attack upon international cartels.
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President w ould approve every w ord in the speech. H e said the speech w ould make Cordell H ull go straight up in the air. I told him that I did not propose ever again to clear a speech w ith Cordell H ull, but I did think I would let the President know I w as making the speech and offer to let the President see it if he w ould like to do so. I told W elles I was greatly disturbed to know that H ull was deter mining his foreign p olicy on the thesis that the Republicans would w in in 1944. I said I could tell him the source o f m y belief if he really wanted to know. H e said he very much wanted to know and so I told him the Sweetser story that m y sister had told me. I also told him that Mrs. H ull, according to Mrs. W allace, had taken the same attitude some six months ago in talking w ith the W om en’s Dem ocratic Club. W elles said Mrs. H ull and Cordell both had taken the same attitude w ith Mrs. W elles in 1940. W elles w ent on to say that it had alw ays been H ull’s thesis that the administration in its foreign policy should follow after public opinion. O n the contrary it was the President’s belief, his ow n, and he believed mine as w ell that it was the duty o f the administration to keep the public inform ed and to help the public make up its mind. T here is no question but w hat the H ull approach is safer from a personal point o f view . It is better politics. But there is a real question about the safety o f the country. T h e H ull approach w ill give England and Russia the initiative . . . A t M ary’s party, the most interesting thing was the discussion o f the remarks b y Clapper and M inister Buder1 o f England concerning de G aulle. D apper spent an evening w ith de G aulle w ith about six other people present. H e says de G aulle is a man o f great force, that w hile he was not popular in A lgeria, he was m arvelously popular in Tunisia. Buder confirm ed this, saying that the populace there fairly w ent into hysterics over de G aulle. Butler and Clapper agreed that de G aulle is exceedingly popular w ith the French people in France. De G aulle speaks quite good English and joked w ith Clapper about the United States, saying, “ A s nearly as I can figure it out, W illkie has taken over the President’s foreign p olicy and the President has taken over W fllkie’s dom estic p olicy.” Clapper says de G aulle when he wants to put on the charm can put on just as much o f it as Roosevelt, that he is a man o f very real magnetism and that there is no question but that he has a great deal more force than Giraud. N either Clapper nor Buder could figure the reason fo r the delay in recognizing the French Com m ittee. T here seems no question that when 1 R. A . Buder, then Undersecretary o f the Foreign Office.
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the Germans have cleared out o f France, de G aulle w ill com e into pow er b y popular acclaim. It seems a m ystery w h y both the U nited States and England should w ant to antagonize the man w ho is going to be the real head o f the French people. Clapper probably thinks that de G aulle has considerable o f the instincts o f the dictator in him and does not have quite the same admiration fo r him that Lippmann has . . .
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. . . H enry M orgenthau said he wanted to com plim ent me on the w ay in w hich I had behaved on the recent Jesse Jones m atter.1 H e said he could not have behaved as w ell. H e says when folks have asked him about the situation, he has said steadily, “ Jones ever since A p ril 1942 has steadily fought against the President’s A p ril 13 executive order.” H enry says that Jones throughout the w hole period was really fight ing the President not me . . . M orgenthau wants to weave the W agner Social Security proposal into his new tax legislation. H e says he has talked to some o f the C IO chieftains about this and they are agreeable. T his, however, is abso lu tely confidential. T h e W agner proposal w ould take 6 percent out o f wages and 6 percent from the employers. T he annual amount raised would be something like 7 billion dollars. O f course, large sums w ould be returned to necessitous w orkers later on. T h e W agner proposal takes in everybody including domestic servants and farm workers. H enry says he can’t understand w h y the W hite House places so much confidence in men w ho come from the legislative branch o f the governm ent like Jimmie Byrnes, Vinson,3 Prentiss Brow n, and M arvin Jones. T h e President has said that these men have influence w ith Con gress. H enry M orgenthau says they don’t have influence really w ith Congress anym ore. T h e y used to have it when they w ere in Congress 1 W allace had received a more unexpected compliment in an entertaining letter o f August 10, 1943, from W illiam Allen W hite, w ho wrote: “For a month I have been filling up with good intentions to write to you and tell you I am for you in your fight. W hich doesn’t mean I am ever going to support you for President or V ice President. You shinny on your side, and I’ll shinny on my side. G od knows there is plenty for us to do in both parties. And the Con servatives are about as plentiful and as mean on the one side as the other—little fools led by big scoundrels . . . I have upheld the President. . . . But when he is wrong, I am free to say so . . . Between you and me, twelve years is going to get him. I mean get his keen sense of justice, get his quick reaction to evil . . . I just want you to know that you have m y blessing and m y prayers.” 2 Frederick M. Vinson, Democratic congressman from Kentucky (1913-29, *31-38), then associate justice of the United States Court of Appeals in W ash ington, D.C., resigned that post to become director of the Office o f Economic Stabilization (1943-45), where he served as Byrnes’ right-hand man.
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but they don’t now. H e says the w ay to have influence w ith Congress is to have influence w ith the people. Apparently H enry has consider able contem pt for the W hite House secretariat. N either can he under stand w h y the President lets H ull and Jones run over him. I told him not to get discouraged, that it was m y opinion the President would com e to a showdown w ith Jesse Jones before the end o f the year . . .
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Pat Jackson1 told me that a friend o f his w ho is also a friend o f Ben nett Clark1*3 told him that when Bennett was in to see the President the second w eek in July the President said substantially the follow ing: “ I have had m y experience w ith the professors, the enthusiastic young men, the idealists. T h ey mean w ell but they are not practical. I am through w ith them.” I said to Pat, “ But that doesn’t mean that he really feels that w ay at heart. H e tempers his statements according to the man w ith whom he is talking.” Pat said, “ But Mrs. Roosevelt has the same idea. She talks very frankly to me and she thinks that he is no longer guided b y warm, hu man emotion. H e is thinking about his place in history. In his first term this was not true. H e acted on impulse then.” I said, “ Mrs. Roosevelt’s landing in N ew Zealand was a great surprise to me.” Pat replied, “She did not want to go. She was ordered to go. T h e N egro situation was too hot” 8 . . . SEPTEMBER 2, 1943
M cA lpin4* told me how exceedingly popular the President was in England. H e wanted to know whether this country was going as far to the right as the superficial observer w ould gather from the papers. 1 Gardner Jackson, champion o f just about every liberal cause since the trial o f Sacco and Vanzetd, held various minor federal offices during the N ew Deal and war years and now and then in that time talked about his hopes and fears with W allace. 3 Bennett C. Clark, since 1933 Democratic senator from Missouri. 3 T o be sure, Southerners in particular were attacking Mrs. Roosevelt because o f her open sympathy for civil rights fo r blacks. “Eleanor stories,” most o f them vile, circulated freely in the South. H er trip to the South Pacific, however, was in fact a substitute the President designed to trade off for her request to visit the Soviet Union and China; see Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin (N ew York, 1971), Chs. 53, 34. * E. W . M cAlpin, London editor o f the Australian Consolidated Press.
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I cold him I did not think die President was going so ve ry far to the right, that I fe k his one concern was to do w hatever m ight be neces sary in order to get votes in the Senate fo r his peace program. D ick W ilson1 has spent several months in England and N orth A frica, and wanted to find out whether or not I had broken w ith the Presi dent. I told him there was nothing to that story, that I had recen d y had tw o very nice letters from the President. H e suggested that die President had gone conservative whereas I was progressive. I said no, die President was m erely thinking about getting votes in the Senate so that he could w in the peace as w ell as the war. W ilson asked, “ H ow are things between yo u and H arry Hopkins?” I said “Per fe ctly all right so far as I know . I never had an unkind w ord w ith H arry.” 1 said to W ilson that I thought the President had managed things very skillfully from every point o f view , that it was quite ap propriate that he should be conservative at the moment. It was also quite appropriate that I should be in die position o f leading the pro gressive forces. I said I thought the President was happy to have it this w ay. D ick said, “ W ell, here is some gossip I have picked up. I don’t know whether there is anything to it or not.” T h e story is that in late July the President asked C lyde H erring to go out to Iowa to sew up the Iowa delegation to make sure I w ould not have it in 1944. I made no comment w hatever on this and started saying, “ Is it true that both M ike and John Cow les feel that their number one business in life at the present time is to defeat Roosevelt in 1944?” H e said yes, it was true. I asked w h y it was. D ick said, “ W ell they feel the N ew Dealers are very poor administrators." I said, “ W ho do th ey mean? H arry Hopkins?” H e said, “ Perhaps so.” I said, “ T h at is quite curious because H arry was responsible fo r both o f them being in W ashington.” I asked D ick w ho w ere some o f the other N ew Dealers they thought w ere so poor as administrators. D ick then men tioned M orris Rosenthal. I said, “ W ell, M orris is neither a Republican, a Dem ocrat, nor a N ew Dealer. H e is just a businessman w ho has been in W ashington only during the past year and a half, fresh from business. It is true that he has some liberal ideas but he could hardly be called a N ew Dealer.” “ W ell, at any rate,” said D ick, “John and M ike believe that the only w ay to have decent governm ent in the U nited States is to clean out the President and the w hole crow d o f the administrators that he has brought in.” I said to D ick, “ I wish yo u w ould get this across to John and M ike. W hen I look at the tw o 1 Richard L . W ilson, W ashington correspondent o f the Des Moines Register end Tribune and other Cowles papers.
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parties and consider the forces behind the tw o parties, I am sure that die central group w hich controls the Republican Party is so under the domination o f international cartels that in m y opinion it is abso lutely essential in order to prevent w orld disaster to make sure that the Republicans are kept out o f pow er.” I emphasized this repeatedly and told D ick I wanted him to make sure that M ike and John under stood this. I told him there was no split between Roosevelt and me and there wasn’t going to be any . . . A t cabinet meeting the President started out saying, “ H ello, H enry. H ow are you?” I replied, “ Fine, M r. President.” Jesse Jones, before the President came in, had put at the President’s place a little piece o f styrene w ith a note under it. T h e President then said after greeting me, “W ell, I see here is a piece o f polym erized styrene. I bet there is nobody here w ho knows w hat that is except Jesse.” Don Nelson spoke up to say that it was used to make rubber and Jesse said yes, it was made out o f alcohol and is used for rubber. T h e President said, “ W hat interests me is w hether or not it can be turned back into alcohol again.” It was rather obvious to me that the President was kidding Jesse and not taking him seriously. T h e President then asked H ull if he had anything to bring up. H ull started talking about Russia. Said he had asked W elles back in 1940 to go over Russian affairs very closely, examining every cranny and crevice, w hile he, Cordell, examined Japanese affairs in the same w ay. H e said he wanted to know whether either o f these tw o powers had any just com plaint against the U nited States even on small items. It was obvious that Cordell was defending him self against the charge o f being anti-Russian and tryin g to put responsibility on W elles for developm ent o f Russian policy. T h e President spoke about the Russian habit o f sending him a friendly note on M onday, spitting in his eye on Tuesday, and then being nice again on W ednesday. H e said it took him a w hile to learn this was Russian technique. H e said the first time it happened he was sore. H e came back at the Russians w hich caused them to main tain their disagreeable attitude for a w eek or tw o. H e later found that when he paid no attention to their disagreeable notes, they straightened out o f their ow n accord the details. It was then that he realized that the Russians w ere alternately agreeable and disagreeable just as a part o f their diplom atic program. T he President then w ent on to say that it was still a secret that Davies had taken a note from him to Stalin inviting Stalin to meet
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with him b y himself.1 This, o f course, was in the papers at the time and while [it was] not announced officially, Davies had had in a few friendly reporters and had said to them, “ Confidentially I am taking a note from Roosevelt to Stalin inviting Stalin to meet with the President." However, the President told us in cabinet that it was a great secret. T h e President mentioned that the Americans and British in dealing with the Italians about peace matters had simply forgotten to call in the Russians. T h e y were changing that now and were most happy to call in the Russians. W hile the President was saying this, I could not help wondering if the Russians might talk peace matters over w ith the Germans and thoughtlessly forget to call in us and the British. I hope they don't have that kind o f thoughtlessness. T h e President spoke about the type of recognition given to the Free French Committee. H e said it was now arranged that there was to be limited recognition but that government in France was not to be turned over to them as fast as the British-American armies conquered French territory. He said in that case the Free French Committee would not be in position to dictate the form o f French government without regard to the w ill o f the French people. H e made it clear that the British did not have the same slant on this matter that w e had and suggested their motives were unworthy. Hull then spoke up to say that he had battled with Eden on this point for several hours and had told Eden that he was an opportunistic politician. H e w ent on to say that he himself was on the point o f becoming a statesman and then, smiling rather sourly, he said he told Eden, “ Y ou know in the United States a statesman is a dead politician." T he President told the cabinet the same story about M olotov that he told me back in June. This is the story about how he found M olotov completely poker-faced, that he could not get anywhere w ith him all the time he was in the W hite House until he gave him a lot of liquor to drink, then told him an off-color story. M olotov leaned back in his chair and roared and after that the President got along with him after a fashion. H e then told again how M olotov had gone on a trip with one secret service man to N e w Y ork to have a good time, and how Davies had told this story to Stalin. Stalin had said in Molotov's presence, “T he thing that surprises me is w h y M olotov w ent to N ew Y ork instead o f to Chicago, where he could have asso1 Joseph E. Davis, former American ambassador to M oscow, had returned in June from a special mission as representative of the President to deliver mes sages to Stalin, one o f which proposed an informal, private meeting o f the tw o heads o f state. Instead Roosevelt met with both Stalin and Churchill in Teheran, November 28 to December 1, 194).
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dated with fellow gangsters/' T h e whole conversation back and forth between the President and Hull suggested to me that the President was appeasing Hull in every w ay possible . . . I told the President that die farmers were working hard, they were disturbed about a lot o f litde things.1 T hat they had been told by local government representatives that farmers were in trouble until that man Roosevelt was out o f power. I mentioned that Ed O ’Neal eight or nine months ago had made a speech in Iowa in which he said that the only difference between labor in this war and labor in the last w ar was that in the last war, labor wanted only one silk shirt and one botde o f whiskey, whereas in this war they wanted tw o silk shirts and tw o botdes o f whiskey. I said wherever I had gone I had pointed out to farmers the relationship between their income and the total payrolls o f labor and the w ay in w hich the representatives o f organized labor had helped them in their legislation. I said I felt the feeling o f farmers against labor was a national weakness and something ought to be done about it. I said the farmers were working about nine or ten hours a week longer than they did before the war, but that they ought to appreciate that labor also was w orking longer hours, and that when they took into account the time labor spent getting to and from the factories, labor sometimes was w orking as many hours a week as the farmers. Then the President asked me what the farm labor situation was. I told him the farmers felt a little better about it than they did last September, that the high school boys and girls were w orking now as w ell as the businessmen working in the evenings, that the farmers were getting a little tired w orking such long hours and working their women and children so hard. W hen I told the Ed O ’Neal story, the President w ent off on a tangent, saying something about the need o f labor for continuing to have plenty o f beer. SEPTEMBER 7 , 1943
I told the President I was going out to Chicago on Thursday. He said, “ Fine” ; that he was leaving also on Thursday but not for Chicago. I said I was going out to speak on the same platform with Senator Ball on the B3H 3 Resolution, Senate 1 1 4 .3 I said I thought I’d pay m y 1 In Iowa in August W allace had talked w idely with farmers and leaden o f farm organizations. a Senator Joseph H . Ball, eager to provoke debate in Congress about the peace, in March 1943 had introduced Senate Resolution 114 (with Republican Senator H arold H . Burton o f Ohio and Democratic Senaton Carl A . Hatch of N ew M exico and Lister H ill o f Alabama—thus B3H a). T h e resolution, bold and
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respects Co Colonel M cCormick. H e said, ‘T in e!” I said with regard to the Ball resolution that I was not in accord with all o f it, especially the first tw o sections, but that I thought now was a good time to plug for the general idea. T h e President said he, himself, at heart was for the main part o f the Ball resolution but that he couldn’t come out for it publicly because he couldn’t get it passed, for the reason, among others, that Tom Conn ally was against it. T h e President asked if I would send m y speech over to Cordell Hull for him to take a look at it. I said that 1 couldn’t do that. H e said, then, could I send it to him and let him clear it with CordelL I said to die President that I was through having speeches cleared b y Cordell. H e said he had been having quite a time with Cordell and that I didn’t know what a job he had had keeping the Old B oy sweet. H e said the Old B oy had been suffering from a lot o f unfair criticism. H e said that for the general welfare o f the country he had to keep Cordell sweet at the present moment and that he would tell me all about it some day. I said I had done everything I could to cooperate w ith Cordell and that I had gotten no thanks for it and that I was through. T h e President said Cordell was not in any thanksgiving mood. I made it very clear to the President that I valued his judgment at all times and would like to clear with him personally. He indicated, though, that this did not get him off his hot spot w ith Cordell. I finally told the President I would send the speech over to him and he said he would talk to Cordell about it. SEPTEMBER 1 1 , 1943
M ayor K elly1 was strategically out o f town when I was in Chicago. Herman Bundescn2 told me that H arry Hopkins and K elly were specific beyond the preferences o f Roosevelt and H all, “called for the United States to ask the United Nations to form a permanent international organization during the war” with “power to carry on the war, occupy territory liberated from the Axis, administer relief and economic rehabilitation, and provide machinery for the peaceful settlement o f disputes.” T hat language provoked Senate isolationists luce Burton K . W heeler and Robert T a ft to bitter rejoinders. Most congressional members o f both parties, while anxious to appear sympa thetic to a postwar world organization, nevertheless supported H ull’s insistence upon a vague, less binding commitment, at least for the duration o f the fighting. T hat attitude exactly suited T o m Connally, who in October drafted a bland resolution of his own that his Foreign Relations Committee reported out. T h e B2H 2 proponents tried unsuccessfully to add strengthening amendments; see Robert A . Divine, Second Chance (N ew York, 1967). 1 Edward J. K elly, since 1933 mayor of Chicago, and long-time boss of that city’s powerful, pro-Roosevelt Democratic organization. 2 Herman N . Bundesen, since 1931 president o f the Chicago Board o f Health. .
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very close. H e attributed the mayor’s absence to H arry’s influence. He said H arry had been visiting K elly for a good many years, that H arry’s great passion was going to horse races and that Harry, K elly, and a man b y the name o f Hertz1 (1 suppose H ertz of the Y ellow Cab) w ere in the habit o f going to horse races together. A t any rate, ac cording to Bundesen, the Democratic political machine in Chicago did not turn a finger to make the September 11 meeting a success. Neither did the AFX, do much. Apparently the greater part o f the w ork was done b y the CIO. A ccording to Bundesen, the strongest political force behind Ed K elly is Barney Hodes,9 a Jewish boy o f about fo rty years of age. W hen Cermak was shot in Florida and K elly was in on a temporary basis, and had been very severely attacked, Hodes took hold of him (K elly) under the most unfavorable circumstances and created a favor able public opinion for him. Hodes has control of the famous 24th ward, which is a Jewish ward where the vote for the President in 1940 was 24,000 to 900. Hodes, while admitting the remarkable crowd that turned out for the Chicago meeting, said that it had been handled in altogether the w rong w ay. H e said the Democratic machine was sore because I had come into Chicago and he was afraid the Democratic machine would be sore wherever I w ent unless the methods were changed . . . Hodes told me that from his point o f view there is only one pur pose in m y making speeches and that is to get the nomination for the vice-presidency next July in Chicago. H e says I am already looked on as the leader o f the liberals, that I should now go out to get other folks as well, and especially I should go over the list o f all of the Democratic national committeemen and the potential delegates to the convention, find out just who I can count on. I told Hodes that m y object in making the speeches was to make sure that when the peace came it was a lasting one. I told him that I recognized very w ell that in order to get a lasting peace it was necessary to have the Democrats continue in power. H e said, yes, but more than that is necessary. It is necessary, he says, not only to have Roosevelt run again for President but you as V ice President. He said he had been around the W hite House himself and he knew o f a certainty that the crowd around the W hite House w ere moving heaven and earth to make sure o f a fourth term for the President. H e thought they were working 1*3 1 John D . Hertz, founder o f the Yellow Cab Company, partner m Lehman Brothers, adviser on wheeled vehicles to the Secretary of W ar. 3 Barnet Hodes, former Chicago alderman, since 1935 corporation counsel o f the d ty .
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against me fo r V ice President. H e said he was sore that I could w ork matters out if I w ent at it in the right w ay to make it a cer tainty that I would be nominated for V ice President. I told him I had never gone at matters in that w ay, that I thought political maneu vering that was being done was being done b y Harold Young. Hodes suggested that some type o f national organization be formed, “ United Nations for Peace” for example. He urged that it be a non partisan organization but that in reality it be m y organization. Unquestionably Hodes meant well in talking to me but I must confess that practical politics o f this sort doesn’t appeal to me . . . SEPTEMBER 1 5, 1943
. . . I talked to Justice Jackson1 about cartels. H e had a number o f good ideas and offered to send me some material. H e says that the soul o f free enterprise is found in the small businessman. H e reached that conclusion as a result o f his observations living in Jamestown, N e w York. I asked him what kind o f job Justice Frank M urphy was doing. He said he was the most unpredictable man he had ever known, that he did not know how to think for himself but that he generally w ent along w ith Hugo Black. H e was all right on civil liberties. H e said Justice Douglas also w ent along with H ugo Black. It seems d u t Justice Byrnes once said to Jackson that in the Senate H ugo Black was a lone w o lf and oftentimes could not get anyone to go along with him but that in the Supreme Court he had three votes nearly all the time. Jusdce Jackson said that the Chief Justice1 was deeply concerned about the w ay in w hich Bill Douglas was running for President or V ice President. M urphy told Bob Jackson that T om m y Corcoran was in Douglas’s office very frequently. Eliot Janeway o f the T im eFortune crow d is w orking with Corcoran in managing Douglas’ cam paign. Bob says that Joe Kennedy is also very active. Bob says m y disagreement w ith Jesse Jones has worked out marvelously w ell . . . SEPTEMBER 18, I9 4 3
T h e . . . memo which I released this morning was based on the conference which Berge, Borkin, and I had w ith Gallagher and Harden 1 Robert H . Jackson, since 194t an Associate Justice o f the Supreme Court, had previously served successively as assistant A ttorney General, Solicitor General, and Attorney General, roles m which he turned much o f his energy to antitrust policy. aChief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.
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this morning.1 Gallagher and Harden came down very strong on the cartel nature o f the British business and on the highly cartelized nature o f the British oil companies. T h e y were referring to the Anglo-Persian and the Dutch Shell. T h e y said these companies were employing methods which are making it very difficult for them to get along in the foreign field. T h e y said one-half o f their business was foreign business. Apparently they feel that they have suffered much more from cartel practices than they have gained from them . . . Gallagher claimed that the butyl plant at Baton Rouge was really producing about one-third o f capacity because o f unexpected bugs. T h e y were sure they were going to lick the bugs. Gallagher said that their geologists were sure there was lots o f oil along the Urals in Central Russia. Gallagher claimed that fully to rehabilitate their foreign oil business after the war would cost Standard Oil o f N e w Jersey from 750 millions to a billion dollars. He said they did not want to spend this much money if they were going to have to buck British oil cartels.
SEPTEMBER 2 1 , 1943
. . . Leo W olcott, who is working with Governor Lehman in the Office o f Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, reports the usual difficulties with the State Department. W hen it comes to approving personnel, passports, etc., the State Department is apparently just as constipated as ever. W olcott said Lehman had tried to get Morris Rosenthal but that Hull personally had turned thumbs down. W o lco tt has great ad miration for Governor Lehman but says he is not a very good fighter, says he doesn’t know the w ay things are done in Washington. H e 1 Ralph W . Gallagher, president o f Standard O il o f N ew Jersey, and Orville Harden, a vice president, had come to W allace to make peace. A fter W allace’s Chicago speech about cartels, Gallagher had stated that the V ice President should know about Standard’s cooperation with various government agencies. W allace replied in a public statement noting several instances of “subterfuge, concealment, and double-dealing” by Standard in its unhappy history of affilia tion with I. G . Farben, a relationship that had retarded the development of synthetic rubber in the United States. N o w on September 18, Gallagher, as W allace then said, had assured him and W endell Berge, head of the antitrust division o f the Justice Department, that “there should be no international agree ments to hold prices above competitive levels, and . . . all international agree ments made b y private parties should be filed with the . . . Federal Govern ment,” that Standard favored unrestricted licensing o f patents at reasonable prices, that cartels were “against public policy and . . . inconsistent with our principles o f free enterprise,” and that postwar production should be increased nationally and internationally.
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hopes that eventually they w ill get out from under die heel o f the State Department when OFR& R is changed to United Nations R elief and Rehabilitation Administration . . .
SEPTEMBER 22 , 1943
. . . John Lew is1 o f PM wanted to talk about what I thought ought to be done to make the world safe against cartels. I told him I thought the first step was a law to provide for putting cartel agreements on file. I said I was not sure that I agreed w ith the Department o f Justice that all cartels ought to be destroyed. I said m y feeling was that there ought to be some world organization to supervise cartels and d u t I was beginning in m y thinking to believe there ought to be something in the nature o f a variable regional organization to handle world affairs. One group would have a dominating interest in the employment situa tion, another in food, another in cartel supervision, etc., etc. . . .
SEPTEMBER 2 5 , 1943
. . . Harold Smith wanted me to know that he thought the planning function o f government should rest in the Bureau o f the Budget. H e felt that the National Resources Planning Board2 had rather made a mess o f things and that planning was not something that could be done in a closet off to one side but was a daily operation o f the government. H e would have planning conducted in each o f the departments run ning along with the operations o f the departments and the whole thing finally heading up in the Budget Bureau. There is a great deal to what he says. It is obvious that Smith doesn’t get along w ith H enry Morgenthau . . .
SEPTEMBER 28, 1943
A t the dinner fo r Claude Bowers* . . . T om Connally, w ho acted as toastmaster, dealt at some length on the thought that the quality o f the Senate at the present time was fu lly equal to that o f the times o f Daniel W ebster and H enry Clay. H e went ahead to say, however, 1 Jo h n P . L e w is , m a n a gin g e d ito r o f PM. * C o n gress had liq u id ated th e N a tio n a l R esou rces P la n n in g B oard . > C la u d e G . B o w ers, journalist, historian, d ip lom at, ard en t D e m o cr a t, States A m b assad o r to S p ain (19 33-39 ) an d since 1939 t o C h ile .
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that die times o f today were not such as to call out qualities like those displayed b y Webster, H enry Clay, and Patrick H enry. T om is looking for opportunities such as his forefathers had and apparently is completely unable to see the extraordinary opportunity which is today within his own hands. H e doesn't realize that the situation today is one giving opportunity fo r display o f much greater talents than those o f Clay, H enry, or W ebster. It is time for T om Connally to roll over in his sleep and wake up. Ed Stettinius came to the meeting and gave an informal talk, the high point o f which was about some American soldiers just landed in Italy with some English Tommies on the shore. T h e American sol diers began talking about how the w ar was not going to last long now, they were going to push the Germans back in short order, etc., etc. One o f the English Tommies then spoke up and said, “T h at is the first time I ever heard Russians speaking such good English.” A t the conclusion Claude Bowers gave a talk about the politics of Chile and then ended up w ith a plea that everyone follow the Commander-in-Chief, that the only issue in the campaign o f ’44 should be (he assumed that Roosevelt would be nominated in ’44 as a patriotic duty) “ Follow the Commander-in-Chief.” H e said the Democrats during the campaign should talk nothing but victory, victory, victory, and war, war, war. I gained the impression that Bowers is a very cagey politician. H e looked around and saw certain senators present and decided that he would not say anything that sounded the least bit progressive. Barkley also talked nicely but he said nothing even slightly progressive. A s a matter o f fact, m y statement was die only one that had the suggestion o f a progressive note in it . . . SEPTEM BER
29, 1943
A t the W hite House the high point o f the meeting was when the President made it clear that he would be most happy to have brought out on the floor o f the Senate as soon as possible a resolution such as B3H 3 or the Fulbright resolution.1 Barkley asked if the President did 1 Fulbright in April 1943 had introduced a resolution in die House for the crea tion of “appropriate international machinery with power adequate to prevent future aggression and to maintain lasting peace.” In June the Foreign Affairs Committee redrafted the resoludon to make it more compatible to most of the members o f the House. T h e new draft eliminated the reference to preventing future aggression. Fulbright then introduced a revised resoludon asking Con gress to go on record in favor o f the creation of appropriate international machinery with adequate power to establish and maintarn peace. Roosevelt was probably referring to that latter version.
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not want consideration o f the resolution held back until after the con ference with Russia. T he President made it very clear that it ought to be a good thing to bring the resolution out at once. He said flatly that he thought he, the President, was behind the country and the Senate was behind him. I ventured, “ And I suspect, Mr. President, that the Foreign Relations Committee o f the Senate is behind the Sen ate” . . . T h e highlight to me o f m y conversation with D ick Russell1 was the extraordinary feeling he acquired against the British in his trip around the world. H e thinks the British nearly everywhere are cut ting our throats. H e spoke o f the Lend-Lease commodities w e fur nished nearly every part o f the world which the British as distributors handled b y taking o ff our labels or substituting the British flag. H e was impressed b y the fact that the only news the people get in E gypt, India, and Australia comes through the Reuter’s press. He says it costs the United States news agencies much more to get news into these coun tries than it does the British through Reuter’s. He said that all five o f the senators including himself, Mead, Lodge, Chandler, and Brewster w ere o f the same opinion . . . SEPTEMBER 30, 1943
. . . A t the dinner at the W hite House for the sons o f the king o f Saudi Arabia, Secretary Ickes was the only cabinet member present. Colonel Hoskins9 was there to interpret for the Arabians. Hoskins is the son o f the American missionary who speaks Arabian like a native and who was sent out to Arabia b y Berle. T he Arabians were dressed in flowing robes . . . Berle was about the only member from the State Department present. Berle has been working on the Arab matter for a long time and apparently felt quite proud last night. It was also a high moment for Hoskins. A s to what the whole thing means from the standpoint o f the Jewish Zionist movement, I can’t figure out. Perhaps Saudi Arabia is not concerned. 1 Democratic Senator Richard B. Russell o f Georgia, recently returned from a much publicized and little productive international jaunt on which his senatorial colleagues had been Democrats James M. Mead of N ew York and Albert B. Chandler of Kentucky, and Republicans H enry Cabot Lodge o f Massachusetts and R. O w e n Brewster o f Maine. 2 C o l o n e l Harold B. Hoskins had been sent in October 1942, at Roosevelt's instigation, to find out whether the Jews and Arabs could reach a modus vivendi about Palestine. On returning Hoskins reported pessimistically and recom mended freezing the question o f Palestine until after the war, while also pro ceeding at once to help rescue Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe.
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O n m y left sat F d ix Frankfurter . . . Felix spoke in very high terms o f Milo. This . . . amused me because I had known o f the w ay Felix had run M ilo down when there was a possibility that Milo might impinge in some w ay on his friend Dean Acheson. Felix expressed concern that Burt W heeler1 should have become so emotionally involved that he was no longer a liberal. I said yes, it was very unfortunate when any person became completely dominated by his hatreds. I w ent on to say that it was a mistake to pay any man the compliment o f hating him because in the process of hating him, yo u give that man power over you. I said in the process of hating Germany, w e were in some danger o f thereby making ourselves like Germany. T h e Arabs spoke o f meeting Patrick H urley2 out in Arabia. Hoskins showed me some pictures o f the king8 and said he was quite a fine, simple-minded old gentleman. He is sixty-three. T h e older o f the tw o sons is thirty-eight and is already a grandfather. If the oil re sources o f Saudi are as great as people say, there is a lot o f trouble ahead for these simple-minded Arabians. Octo ber i, 1943
. . . Talked with Bean4 . . . He asked about the Saudi Arabia boys and said that when Chaim Weizmann, head o f the Zionists, visited the President last summer, that the President said to W eizmann that he thought that K ing Feisal o f Saudi Arabia5 was for sale, that b y using $15 million he could get the Jews the opportunity they needed in Palestine. Bean wanted to know if anything of that sort had shown up. I said no, but that I figured the presence o f Frankfurter at the President’s dinner indicated the possibility o f something o f this sort. I have no doubt 1 Democratic Senator Burton K . W heeler had run in 1924 as vice-presidential candidate on Robert La Follette’s Progressive Party ticket. His bitter opposition to American involvement in the Second W o rld W a r had led him into strangely conservative friendships to a grim dislike of the President, and to rancorous objections to even the mildest proposals for American postwar participation in any international association. Early in September he had urged Roosevelt to act at once to “bring about peace in Europe and establish democracy throughout that war-tom continent”—a suggestion at once w holly desirable and w holly impossible. 3 Patrick J. H urley, Secretary of W a r (1929-33), Roosevelt’s special representa tive to the Soviet Union (Novem ber-Decem ber 1942) and in 1943 to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and the A rab States; in 1944 appointed United States Ambassador to China. 3 Ibn Saud. 4 Louis Bean. • Feisal II was king o f Iraq.
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whatsoever that the Feisals would greatly appreciate $15 million to do with as they like. Certainly there is quite a drama going on w ith re gard to Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and oiL Oc to ber 2,1943
Morris Ernst said he had written a letter to die President about his proposal to have Simon & Schuster put out four pamphlets on the Four Freedoms.1 In writing the President he had indicated that he wanted Sumner W elles to do the one on Freedom from Fear (w ar) and me to do the one on Freedom from W ant. He had said in the letter to the President that he wanted to make sure that the project was agreeable to him and that his choice o f authors was agreeable. H e had also said in his letter that inasmuch as the President had slapped down the men w ho were really closest to his point of view, it might be w ell if their point o f view, which really was the President’s, were put before the public. Morris showed me the President’s reply, dated September 21, in which the President spoke o f interchanging tidbits with Morris. A p parently, the President feeds Morris gossip and Morris feeds the Presi dent gossip. T h e President in this particular letter fed Morris the gossip that W oodruff o f Coca-Cola and Mack o f Pepsi-Cola2 were prepared to raise a lot o f money to back Bricker* for President if Bricker were nominated. T h e y would not do so, however, if D ew ey ware nomi nated because they hated D ew ey just like they hated the devil—and the President added in his own handwriting “ (or me).’’ T h e President con cluded the letter b y saying in a single sentence that he thought Morris* choice o f authors for the Four Freedoms pamphlets was excellent . . . Octo ber 8,1943
. . . G rom yko4 told me o f the fine visit he had had with the Presi dent. He said Secretary Hull would be in M oscow on October 16. H e said an agenda had been drawn up. Apparently he seemed to feel quite satisfied with his interview both with the President and w ith Secretary Hull. He said nothing whatsoever that could be construed as being critical o f Hull. T h e Ambassador referred to Senator Lodge’s statement about Si1 T h e fo u r pam phlets u n d e r discussion w e r e n o t w ritten .
* Robert W . W oodruff, chairman o f the board o f directors o f the Coca-Cola Company, and W alter S. Mack, Jr., president o f the Pepsi-Cola Company. * Republican Senator John W . Bricker of Ohio, in 1944 governor of Otuo, die favorite o f his party’s conservative wing, and the vice-presidential nominee. 4 A n d r e i A . G r o m y k o , n e w ly arrived S o v ie t A m b assad or t o th e U n ite d States.
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berian bases, said that if the Russians put in enough men into eastern Siberia to enable the United States to use Siberian air bases against the Japs, the result easily could be that the Germans, being relieved from Russian pressure, would be able to cost the Americans many hundreds o f thousands o f lives on the W estern Front. It is obvious, o f course, that the 400,000 Japanese troops massed on the Manchurian border o f the narrow strip o f Russian land leading to Vladivostok could pinch o ff this narrow tongue in tw o weeks. Undoubtedly Siberian bases w ould be a very great help to the United States in the attack on Japan, provided the United States and Russians together w ere in position to hold them without weakening o f the fight against Germ any. In agi tating for Siberian air bases at the present time, the people o f the United States are not as w ell justified as the people o f Russia are in agitating fo r a second front . . . Senator Brewster took rather strong exception to w hat Lodge had said about Siberian bases saving a million American lives. H e referred particularly to a conversation o f Thursday morning which the senators had had w ith General Marshall at w hich it was indicated very clearly that a public statement about Siberian bases at the present time would be definitely against the country's w ar interest. Marshall made it clear also that Siberian bases, militarily speaking, would not be w orth what Lodge said they would be. Brewster apparently was very much put out because, after all this, Lodge had gone ahead and spoken as he had. From listening to Brewster, no one could reach any other conclusion but that he looks on Lodge as a very irresponsible and dangerous young man . . . Senator Johnson1 o f California took issue w ith Brewster. A t the close o f Brewster’s presentation, he made an urgent plea for the United States making known her attitude with regard to w orld collaboration. Connally took some exception to this as did Vandenberg. Both are for extreme caution and great slowness. It would seem that the President is right when he says that on foreign collaboration, the President is slower than the people o f the United States but that the Senate is slower than the President. It now appears that the Senate Foreign Rela tions Committee is slower than the Senate and that T om Connally and Senator Vandenberg are the slowest o f all. Senator Johnson gave a speech w hich started out with "I am against Joe Stalin. I am an American.” T h e old man was so weak and emotional that he choked up and could not continue very long. 1 Hiram W . Johnson, eminent progressive in the y e a n before W orld W a r I, Republican senator from California since 1917, in tnat role a constant spokesman for American insularity.
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Ralph Ingersoll told me he had been w orking with some o f the gen erals in London, especially with Lieut. General Jacob Devers.1 These men have been working especially on the opening up o f a genuine second front in France. Ingersoll was greatly concerned about tw o things and both o f these items he had gotten effectively to H arry H o p kins. First, the British have been strongly against a second front and in case there were a second front, they wanted to have control o f it themselves, even though the United States were furnishing tw o or three times as many men as the British. Part o f their plan was to get General Marshall over to England serving on a very high level, while the British generals o f the 21st A rm y really ran the show. Ingersoll found, in talking with H arry Hopkins, that he had been aware o f this maneuver on the part o f the British and it seemed as though effective steps had been taken to prevent General Marshall from becoming a mere figurehead in the stratosphere. It seems that General Marshall w ill go to England but on an effective and not an ineffective basis. Everyone seems to be agreed that Marshall is the only one who has the necessary combination o f real knowledge, guts, and front to handle Churchill. Churchill has enough military knowledge and front so that he is able to talk down most American generals. Ingersoll had also talked with Hopkins about the shocking lack o f landing craft. H e told Hopkins that he had briefed the minutes o f the Quebec Conference for the American generals in London and he knew that both the British and American navies had in effect lied about landing craft. T h e y claimed there were a certain number, which was correct, but did not mention that one-third o f them w ere out being repaired and another third could not be used fo r other reasons. Inger soll said that if it were not for the shocking shortage in landing craft, the landing could have been made in France this fall and the w ar could have been terminated this year. But the shortage o f landing craft was such that the landing would be on such a narrow basis that the Germans would be able to wipe out the bridgehead. N o matter how many men w e have in England, it doesn’t do us any good unless w e have the landing craft to land over a considerable area—an area so wide 1 Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, then commander o f United States Forces in the European theater, was succeeded in that position at the end of 1943 b y General Eisenhower. Devers then replaced Eisenhower in North A frica and served, too, as deputy Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater. In London Eisenhower took charge o f plans and preparations for the crossChannel invasion o f 1944.
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that the Germans cannot wipe us out before w e get started. T h e gen* erals talked with Don Nelson about the problem when he was in Lon don a couple o f weeks ago and Don said that it was a simple matter to g et adequate production o f sufficient landing craft; it merely required building one less cruiser or a fe w less airplanes. Ingersoll said the British are afraid to put on a real second front because they fear the loss o f so many men in their ruling class. T h e British still look on war as a gentlemen’s show, with officers gallantly leading their men, which means that a high percentage o f officers are killed. T h e upper-class Englishman thinks that the decadence o f England since W orld W a r N o. i has been the result o f the loss o f so many o f their ruling class at that time and for that reason they hate to see anything done at this time which w ill result in another long period o f decadence. Ingersoll's comment on this attitude was that it is high time the British began to look toward the common people as the source o f renewal o f their strength. Ingersoll feels that the British are still exceedingly superior in their class consciousness. Superficially, they are not as obnoxious as the Prussians but in essence their attitude in some ways is even worse. T h e y are firmly convinced that the English are the chosen race and will stop at nothing in making good on that belief. A t one time the expectation was that the landing would be made in France about the middle o f September. It is now put off until next spring. Arrangements have now been made with the Russians so that they can stage a powerful drive at the same time that w e start our landing. Ingersoll is convinced that if w e had foreseen the need for landing craft and had staged an invasion o f France at the same time that the Russians were pushing in the East, the war would have been over in a month or two. Ingersoll mentioned that the United States admiral in charge o f landing operations looks on his position as a de motion instead of a unique opportunity. T h e only w ay Ingersoll can explain the N a v y ’s singular blindness with respect to the situation is that the N a v y has concentrated on the idea o f doing a complete job in the Pacific; also, the N avy has never been properly interested in landing craft. Ingersoll apparently feels that while the N a v y has ap parently been an extraordinarily efficient organization in many respects, in other particulars it is unbelievably blind. Churchill told Devers that the Italian show was important to give the people some victories to cheer them up.1 Devers told Churchill that the important thing was 1 O n September 2, 1943, American and British forces had crossed the Straits of Messina to Italy. O n September 9 American troops landed near Salerno and took Naples on O ctober 1. German resistance since then had prevented further advances.
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not to give the people victories to cheer them up but to end the w ar and therefore d û t w e should invade France. Devers speaks bluntly to Churchill and is a very capable man but he doesn’t carry enough weight to do anything more than to make Churchill resent him . . . A t the small Sumner W elles dinner were present a Philadelphia cousin o f Mrs. Welles, Morris Ernst, the Brazilian Ambassador and his w ife. A fter dinner W elles drew me to one side and told me the Presi dent had had him to H yde Park recendy and he spent all one Sunday there. H e said the conference w ith the President had been completely and utterly satisfactory and that the President asked him to go to Russia. W elles gave no answer but the following day he w rote the President giving him in great detail w h y he believed he should not go to Russia, in effect pointing out that anything he was able to negotiate with Russia would be stopped either b y Secretary Hull or b y Secretary H ull acting in conjunction with the Senate. W elles indicated that he could not understand w h y this country w ent out of its w a y to prolong the power o f the House o f Savoy in Italy . . . Oc to ber 1 3 ,1 9 4 3
. . . Lord Keynes’ conversation indicated to me very clearly that he is follow ing the Churchill line o f an Anglo-Am erican alliance. I would judge that Lauch Currie is doing everything that he can to co operate with Lord Keynes. It was clear to me that Lord Keynes had a very great mental ascendancy over Currie. Oc to ber 1 4 ,1 9 4 3
. . . A t the W hite House dinner, the President was exceedingly amiable and asked that I sit beside him after dinner to talk w ith Presi dent Lescot.1 T h e President during his toast to Lescot stated that Haiti this year would be furnishing 10,000 tons o f rubber (this is wrong; Haiti w ill not furnish this much until 1945). T h e President then w ent on and, very much to m y gratification, proclaimed that natural rubber would be cheaper than synthetic rubber and also better, and that the American consumer should not be gouged in the postwar period b y a tariff on tires. A fter the dinner was over, I congratulated the President most heartily on this statement . . . T h e President o f Haiti gave President Roosevelt some little memento from the time o f Toussaint l’Ouverture. I don’t think I have seen any 1 President É iie L e sco t.
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state dinner which the President has so relished giving as this particular one. H e looks on Lescot as a real friend and evidently has a real per sonal fondness for Haiti, which he visited for the first rime twenty-five years ago. OCTOBER 1 5 ,1 9 4 3
. . . Lord Keynes told me some o f the details o f what he has been up to here in the United States. H e had been w orking not only on postwar currency stabilization and an international investment bank but also on commodity agreements, buffer stocks, and international controls o f cartels. H e claimed himself to be enormously heartened at the progress made. He felt the important thing was for the United States and Britain to arrive at certain agreements. H e told me that England was willing to agree not to engage in bilateral trade agree ments after the war was over. I told him I was very much surprised at this; that I had understood that England was very much alarmed about het balance o f payments and that it was customarily assumed that England would find it necessary to engage in bilateral trade agree ments. Keynes apparently is willing to take the statesmanlike attitude that the best w ay out for England is to take steps to bring about world wide prosperity. H e feels that the steps taken in agreement with our officials on currency matters, commodity agreements, etc., are suf ficient to lay the foundation for worldwide prosperity. H e said that the President and Isador Lubin w ere strong for an unemployment con ference to be held sometime in December or January. H e proclaimed himself to be strongly against this, saying that any conference o f this sort would be nothing but hot air. Lord Keynes is very proud o f himself fo r using the currency stabilization thing as a front to deceive the newspapers while he met w ith numerous public officials on all kinds o f other matters o f importance. H e thought that the foundation o f an economic modus operandi fo r the world has been worked out and he is going home enormously encouraged. In working on the problems o f buffer stocks and commodity agreements, he said that there were tw o extremes o f thought on the part o f the Americans: one, represented b y W ill Clayton, w ho took die extreme laissiez faire position, and the other represented b y Paul A ppleby and Les W heeler,1 who took the extreme planning position. H e said the British took the middle ground between the tw o positions. Lord Keynes said before 1 Leslie A . W heeler, economist in the Department o f Agriculture (1926-39), since 1939 director o f the Office o f Foreign Agricultural Relations.
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he came to the United States he had a meeting for tw o hours w ith the British cabinet and they w ent over all the matters which he was to discuss, with the exception o f cartels. H e said the British had no background of history against cartels such as w e have in the United States. T h e y couldn’t understand, therefore, w h y w e were so strongly against cartels. He said he could understand it but at the same time, he professed considerable personal admiration for M cG ow an,1 the head o f Imperial Chemicals. H e said that they had been doing some marvelous experimenting which had been very helpful during the war. He said that they had had the benefit also o f the knowledge and ex perience o f many of the German Jews w ho had been responsible for so many o f the German inventions. Lord Keynes said that in most o f the conversations he sat in on, M yron T aylo r served as chairman. This indicated to me that Keynes sat in on the regular State Department Economic Committee. This dictation about Lord Keynes reminds me, b y the w ay, o f what he said the other evening with regard to the Free French. W hile he proclaimed himself a liberal, he seemed to think it was the only practi cal thing to do to w ork with the House o f Savoy in Italy, Salazar in Portugal, Franco in Spain, and the old Civil Service crow d in France. I told him flatly I thought there would come a time when the wrath of the common man would boil over. I asked Lord Keynes what Churchill thought today about the book w hich he (Lord Keynes) had written back in 1925 about the E con om e Consequences o f Mr. Churchill. In this book Keynes criticized Churchill very severely for putting England back on the gold standard at a time when it was bound to bring nothing but disaster for England. H e said Churchill recognized that he was right in his criticism but was inclined to blame it on the bankers for giving him (Churchill) bad advice back in 1925. Lord Keynes said that he and H arry W hite o f Treasury were in practical accord now on currency stabilization problems and that the Federal Reserve officials, especially Golden weiser and Gardner,9 also agreed; that among the members o f the board, Ransom9 was the one most nearly in agreement with him. H e said Pasvolsky4 was in accord 1 Lord M cGowan, an outspoken champion o f cartels. 2 Emanuel A . Goldenweiser, since 1926 director o f research for the Federal Reserve Board, and W . Gardner, one o f his consultants. * Ronald Ransom, vice chairman o f the Board o f Governors of the Federal Reserve Board. 4 Leo Pasvolsky was in 1943 supervisor o f the Division o f Political and Economic Studies in the State Department. T h e next year he became executive director o f the Committee on Postwar Programs.
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w ith him in the State Department. I said I thought Pasvolsky was an “ old dodo.” H e replied, “ W ell, he is coming along, he is coming along.” W ith his very great prestige, Keynes has undoubtedly made a lot o f hay while he has been in the United States . . . Oc to ber 16,1943
. . . Father Masse appeals to me strongly. H e is a genuine pro gressive w ho is exceedingly keen about solving the problem o f freedom and planning in a democracy. He always felt that Thurman Arnold’s trust-busting was not enough, that there must be planning. H e was a little disappointed in m y Chicago speech because he thought it was going too far in the trust-busting direction and not far enough in the planning direction . . . Oc to ber 17,1943
A t the W hite House Mrs. W allace and I ate w ith Mrs. Roosevelt and Miss Thompson.1 W hen Miss Thompson had left and the three of us were alone, Mrs. Roosevelt spoke very frankly. She said the chil dren w ere all strongly against a fourth term for the President, they had not been very keen for the third term but were all very strongly against a fourth term. I said that some newspaper surveys indicated that if the war with Germ any were over b y next summer, the prob abilities were that the President could not win. She said she had real ized that if the war w ith both Japan and Germany were over, the President could not win, but she had not heard about surveys on the basis o f what the situation would be in case only Germany were de feated. She asked very practically what would be done about it. I was amazed when she said that she thought if I were nominated I could win. O f course, I said nothing in reply. She went on to say that the difficulty would be to get me nominated, that, o f course, she and the President would be for me as the logical one to carry out the policies o f the President. She assumed, however, that the Southerners would be dead against accepting me. I made no comment whatever except to say that I felt the forces behind the Republican Party were such that it would be very dangerous for the Republicans to w in in 1944. W e talked some about W illkie and D ew ey and I ventured the be lief that the situation now was swinging to W illkie, that the moneyed and influential powers in the Republican Party were going to use 1 Malvina Thompson, Mrs. Roosevelt’s secretary and friend.
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D ew ey to run interference for W illkie and in the final showdown W illkie would win the nomination. Mrs. Roosevelt doesn’t think much o f W illkie. I said I thought both W illkie and W elles had done a serv ice to the American people b y coming out against any partial alliance in their tw o speeches and standing for England, the United States, Russia, and China serving as a base for building a United Nations approach. She was very skeptical about W illkie on domestic matters. She said she did not like Jesse Jones. I said he was a very hard working and able man but I was afraid o f what it would mean to the future o f the country if he used his abilities in disposing o f the billions o f dollars in defense plants in a w ay which strengthened his friends . . . Octo ber 21,1943
T h e meeting with Sidney Hillman1 was unusually interesting. H e has been in 40 o f the 48 states and has been in touch with the Brother hoods and A F L as well as the CIO. Everywhere he has beén w orking definitely on the job o f organizing labor politically. T h e response has been exceedingly good. Incidentally he says the attitude toward me is unusually fine. H e asked me what I thought about {his] taking, on Nathan, who he understands has been discharged b y the A rm y because o f his bad back. I told him I thought Nathan was the best of the young economists around Washington, that I had the highest regard for him. H e asked also about a publicity man. I had no suggestions to make at the moment but told him I would have some names ready when he was in Washington, next Tuesday. Hillman says that Frank W alker shows every desire to play closely with him. Hillman went especially into the situation in the states o f the Northwest from Minnesota out to the coast. He says the FarmerLabor group is re-forming its line. Sidney says he now has about $200,000 in his treasury and he knows where to put his hands on $500,000 more. H e is very keen to see the President and feels the President needs to be told certain things. He intends to do the telling. It should be said, however, that Sidney did not ask to see the President and had no intention o f asking. David Niles3 had told Sidney that the President wanted to see him. 1
Sidney Hillman, president o f the Amalgamated Clothing W orkers o f America and former vice president o f the C IO , held federal positions in the O P A and W P B and in 1943, not least according to his own assessment, was the most active and influential labor leader in Democratic politics. During October he had been touring the country to prepare his Political Action Committee o f the C IO for the 1944 campaign.
3
D a v id K . N ile s , m em ber o f th e W h it e H o u s e staff an d d o s e assotiate o f H a r r y H o p k in s.
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OCTOBER 23, 1943
K aufm ann1 wanted me to talk to the Zionist meeting in N e w York on Novem ber 1. I told him I naturally could not make a talk o f this sort without a complete understanding with the President. I said since the Jews themselves had become more and more unified on behalf o f Zionism I had become more and more interested in Zionism . . . I told him I had spoken to Churchill about Palestine and that Churchill seemed to be quite friendly. This was last M ay. Kaufmann said Churchill was not so friendly now as he was then. Kaufmann is going to speak to Judge Rosenman to see if he can get clearance from the President . . .
NOVEMBER 3, 1943
A t die C IO meeting in Philadelphia on W ednesday, I found that there is considerable dissadsfacdon w ith the President among the C IO leaders. T h e y feel he has been rather reacdonary on both the domes tic and foreign fronts and they are not going to come out for him for a fourth term. W hen I spoke to the CIO , however, and mentioned the President himself, I found that the rank and file among the leaders reacted in a w ay which caused me to believe they are very strong for him. T h e C IO now has a membership o f over 5 million. A t lunch I ate with the vice presidents from unions representing a total membership o f nearly four million. Everybody was having a great time kidding Johnny Green about Bridges3 supporting him for President o f C IO instead o f Phil M urray. Johnny Green is from the banks o f the Clyde and is a grand little Scotchman. A person can’t help having a great deal o f affection for men like Phil Murray, Johnny Green, and R. J. Thomas.* 1 Edmund I. Kaufmann, W ashington resident, president o f the chain o f K ay Jewelry Stores, and form er president o f the Zionist Organization o f America, asked W allace to speak on November 1, 1943, to a meeting of Jewish leaden at Carnegie Hall, N ew York. Through Sam Rosenman, Kaufmann discovered that Roosevelt did not want W allace to appear. Both W itlkie and D ew ey spoke. W illlde called for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and D ew ey for opening Palestine to Jewish refugees from Europe. uIt is interesting to n oter W allace wrote in his diary the day after the meeting, uhow vigorously W illkie is going to town for Palestine.” ‘ John Green, vice president, and H arry R. Bridges, president, o f die Interna tional Longshoreman’s Association. ‘ Rolland J. Thomas, president o f the United Automobile W orkers and vice president of the CIO.
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NOVEMBER 4 , 1943
. . . Herridge and Kaiser clicked amazingly well.1 Kaiser is v e ry much sold on a four-wheel-drive car which he has worked out w eigh ing around 1300 pounds. H e thinks it can be a tremendous service to the average working man and that it can be adapted not only to taking the working man to and from w ork, but also for plowing and culti vating on his small farm. Kaiser’s most novel idea had to do with marshaling the credit o f the country to meet the postwar problem. H e would have an agency half private and half governmental take charge o f all the life insurance funds, trust funds, etc., etc., so that they could be used as risk capital to get the expansion necessary to prevent unemployment. Kaiser thinks peace is coming on very rapidly and that it is bringing with it problems enormously greater than anyone realizes. H e thinks if w e don’t move rapidly, w e w ill have a bloody revolution. In this Kaiser and Herridge are in complete accord. Kaiser went at some length into his hospital projects which are de scribed in Paul de K ru ifs book. H e says the greatest fear o f many human beings is being sick for a long time and incurring doctor bills which may take them years to pay off. H e has serviced his 70,000 em ployees at a cost o f 7 cents a day. One man has been in the hospital for eleven months and it only costs him 7 cents a day. This 7 cents a day, however, has been sufficient to pay not only for the doctors but also to pay for the hospital and its equipment within tw o years. Herridge was much impressed with Kaiser and thought that I ought to w ork out dramatic w ays o f using him as an illustration o f a means o f getting jobs done in abundance in the postwar world . . .
NOVEMBER 8, 1943
Sidney Hillman told me that he had had a very fine visit w ith the President, 40 minutes in fact, that he kept R o y H oward w ho was to have lunch with him (the President) waiting 20 minutes. Sidney told the President that labor was losing confidence in the administration and especially in the men who were immediately around the President and that some o f the people were beginning to lose confidence in the President himself. Sidney told the President that the only member o f 1 T h e y talked at dinner at Herridge's home where W allace and Kaiser were guests. W allace wrote Roosevelt the next day that Kaiser’s ideas could be "o f great value to the nation.”
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the President’s entourage in whom labor had complete confidence was myself. He told the President the story first told by Eliot Janeway. Someone asked Janeway w ho was going to win in 1944. Janeway re plied, “ T he Tories.” Janeway was then asked, “ W hat do you mean b y the Tories?” H e replied, “ I mean that Roosevelt will w in for the fourth term and that w ill put the Tories who are around him into power again.” I did not ask Hillman what the President’s reaction was to this blunt statement and Hillman did not volunteer. However, Sid ney did say that he came away from the conference feeling better than when he went in. I told Sidney that it was m y impression that the President’s heart was in the right place but that he had felt it was necessary to surround himself as he had in order to get the best results out o f the war effort. Sidney said Hopkins had been wanting to get in touch with him but that he had been rather dubious about seeing Harry. He feels that H arry is responsible for most of the men by whom the President is now surrounded. Apparently Sidney received a green light from the President to go ahead and cooperate with Frank W alker in political organization. Sidney still feels that the President’s sense o f timing is badly off. T h e President told Sidney what a good sense of timing he had and that he felt there was not any hurry. Sidney disagreed utterly. I told Sid ney I agreed with him. Hillman apparently is cooperating with Frank W alker in getting the right kind of delegates to the Democratic N a tional Convention . . .
NOVEMBER 1 3, 1943
Arnold Beichman1 told o f various conversations which he had had with W illkie which indicated very clearly to him that W illkie was a pure opportunist and not really sincere. He said after the passage o f the Smith-Connally A ct, before the President had signed it,® W illkie 1 Arnold Beichman o f PM . 1 In June 1943 Congress had passed over the President’s veto the Smith-Connally
W ar Labor Disputes A ct, an antiunion measure that proved ordinarily to pis ineffectual. It extended the President’s power to seize strike-ridden industrial plants useful to the war effort, made it a crime to foment strikes in those plants, and ordered their return to private management within sixty days after normal production had resumed. Before calling strikes, labor leaders in all plants had to observe a thirty-day cooling off period and to obtain a majority vote of union members. O n this and other domestic issues o f the Second W orld W ar, there are excellent accounts in Richard Polenberg, W ar and Society: T h e United States, 1941-4S (Philadelphia, 197z).
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had declared this was the test o f whether or not the President was a liberal. A t that time W illkie was making all kinds o f strong statements on behalf o f labor. Later on, when W illkie was in St. Louis at the time o f his broadcast answering Missouri Republicans, he had a more or less private meeting with some o f the big Republican businessmen. O n that occasion he spoke very vigorously as to just how liberal labor ought to be handled. Beichman apparently has a number of cases o f this sort which cause him to question W illkie’s sincerity. H e thinks even less o f D ew ey, claiming that D ew ey has absolutely no sense o f humor. Beichman’s purpose in coming in to see me was to get me to make a statement against the w ay in which minorities were being abused in the United States. H e referred especially to the anti-Jewish riots in Boston. H e said that a Catholic priest had told him that Cardinal O'Connell1 could stop the riots at any time. H e said that the Cardinal, instead o f stopping them, salved his conscience b y giving $1000 to some kind o f racial understanding organization. I told Beichman I had talked w ith some o f m y Jewish friends about this matter and I did not think any good purpose could be served at the present time b y making a statement. I must confess that diese antiminority manifestations are suspiciously suggestive o f the techniques that later led to Hitler’s rise to power. T h e y must be watched w ith great care. NOVEMBER 15 , 1943
D orothy Thompson2 felt most vigorously that the time for speech making and writing had gone b y and that now was the time for ac tion. T h e matter she was particularly interested in was to make sure o f full employment after die war. She asked me if the government w ere doing any real planning along this line. I said unfortunately not. I read to her the speech I was going to make on the N e w Y ork Herald Tribune Forum.* She liked it but said, “ W hat are you going to do about it?” She thinks Germany is going to go communisric. I told her I thought Stalin was against Germany going communisric. She said that might be true and that it might be that [what] Stalin did would do nothing to make Germ any go communisric but nevertheless G er many would go that w ay because she had no other w ay to go. I told 1 Cardinal W illiam H . O ’Connell o f Boston. 2 D orothy Thompson, trenchant and often gloom y syndicated columnist o f the N ew York H erald Tribune. * O n the worldwide importance o f full employment.
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her I thought Stalin would much prefer to see a rather impotent democracy in Germ any than a vigorous communism. She agreed to all that but said there was nothing either Stalin or Ourselves could do about it. She granted that there might be a rather kind o f futile democ racy for a time but that its inability to solve the problems o f unem ployment and full production would inevitably result in a strong swing to a dictatorship o f the left. She thinks that Germ any and Russia w ill be drawn together . . . NOVEMBER
18, 1943
. . . Jack Bell1 o f the  P came in to see me and wanted to know w hat was the political significance o f the speeches I had been giving. I told him there were certain views w hich I had long held, which I thought were o f importance to the general welfare; that w ith regard to many o f these views I had attempted to educate the public while I was editor o f W allaces’ Farmer and that I had continued to do it while Secretary o f Agriculture, and that as V ice President I was continuing to talk, although not quite as often as when I was Secretary o f A gricul ture. H e wanted to know if 1 thought the President was running for a fourth term. I said I didn’t know any more than he did but that I as sumed the President would be nominated fo r a fourth term. H e wanted to know, pointblank, if I was running for V ice President. I told him what I was interested in was getting m y ideas over. H e said, “ W ell, you could get your ideas over much better if you were V ice President than you could if yo u w ere out o f public life." H e contin ued^ “ I suppose yo u know that some o f the men around the W hite House are against your being nominated again.” I said I didn’t know that, but that I had understood from general conversation that some o f the men around the W hite House had been quite active in the Jesse Jones affair . . . NOVEMBER 20, 1943
. . . A t the dinner for Mrs. Roosevelt, I talked to her at some length on the future o f liberalism in the Democratic Party. She agreed completely that the Democratic Party must be a liberal party. She then said she had been talking about the matter to the President. T h e President had told her that so far as he personally had been concerned, it had been necessary for him to refrain from furnishing 1 Jack Bell, head o f the Associate Press office in the Senate.
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liberal leadership until the Democratic primaries w ere over in the southern states. H e did not want a third party put in the field in the South. I told her about Jay Franklin1 calling on me and wanting me to call a meeting o f liberals to discuss the political situation. I said it was m y judgment that I should not do so. She said I was right. I then asked her how it would be if certain o f the liberal senators would come out vigorously. She said she thought that would be all right . . . Referring back to the conversation I had had with her the last time I was at the W hite House, I told her I was com pletely loyal to the President. She indicated she did not think he ought to run for a fourth term if there was no chance o f his winning and she was sure his political judgment was good enough that he would not run if there was any likelihood o f his losing. She mentioned again as she had before, the fact that the children did not want him to run . . . I told Mrs. Roosevelt I thought the three big distracting forces in the Democratic Party at present were: one—the big interests; tw o— the bigoted Catholics; three—the venomous Roosevelt haters. I put on some Red Russian army song records for Mrs. Roosevelt and also some Russian rural songs. She seemed to like both. Also I put on several Spanish records. Mrs. Roosevelt put in most o f her time knitting a sweater, which was nearly completed and which was very well done. Apparently she has rather unusual facility as a knitter . . .
NOVEMBER 23, 1943
. . . Major Schreiber2 gave me further information on the approach to the morale problem in the A rm y and the w ay in which morale pre vents psychiatric disorders o f various kinds. It seems that about 5 percent o f the men are affected with psychiatric disorders and it ap pears that the number o f psychiatric disturbances can be reduced to one-fifth o f what they would otherwise be. T h e Russians are not seriously troubled with psychiatric difficulties because they believe in what they are fighting for. M any o f our men do not believe in what they are fighting for because they do not know what they are fighting for. Schreiber implored me to make more speeches because they are so helpful to the morale o f the men . . . ijo h n Franklin Carter, Jr. (Jay Franklin), author and columnist, form erly an economic specialist in the State Department (1928-31) and an official in the Department of Agriculture (1934-36). 2 Possibly W alter R. Schreiber, form erly of the Agriculture Department, then an officer in the A U S .
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NOVEMBER 25, 1943
A t the end o f the Thanksgiving service at St. Patrick's, I said hello to Archbishop C urley1 and the Apostolic Delegate, Most Rev. Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, D.D . T h e y were both very appreciative o f my having attended the annual service for Latin America. Curley went much further and complimented me on m y courage and said he hoped I would continue to fight the w ay I had been fighting in recent months, that I was doing an unusually good job. I know very little about Curley but his manner suggests that he belongs to the pro-Allied common man group in the church rather than to the Coughlin-Beckman group which is concerned chiefly in hating Russia. I can’t help wondering how men like Curley would stand, however, with respect to some o f the reactionary movements o f the Catholic church in cer tain Latin American countries where the church, the army, and the big landlords act together to hold back the cause o f progress . . .
NOVEMBER 30, 1943
. . . M yrdal2 told me that he had been working for several years w ith Carnegie Institute on the study o f the N egro problem in the United States. H e is now a Swedish senator and wanted to talk to me about the desirability of Finland being independent of Russia. He thinks that if the United States is to be really friendly with Russia, it is necessary for the Scandinavian countries to serve as a sort o f bridge between us and Russia. He thinks the Scandinavian countries can serve that function much more effectively if Finland is independent. H e recognizes that Finland should perhaps give up a little o f her territory to Russia but thinks it would be a great mistake if the island o f Hangar in the G u lf o f Finland went to Russia. M yrdal was pessi mistic about the w ay things were going both in the United States and in Europe . . . 1 Archbishop Michael Joseph Curley o f Baltimore. 9 K . Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish economist and lawyer, director o f the Study of the American N egro Problem for the Carnegie Corporation of America (1938-42), author o f the resulting classic, A n American Dilemma (N ew York, 1944).
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DECEMBER 4 , 19 4 3
I had an exceedingly interesting conversation with V . Bosh about war secrets. Scientifically speaking, our N a v y is not so hot. It is too stiff-minded. T h e A rm y is better than the N a v y in accepting scien tific suggestions. Folks down the line in N a v y are O .K . T h e trouble is with the folks at the top. There is bad organization in die top brackets. Vannevar Bush told me about the German long-range rocket gun in somewhat the same w ay as it is described in the N e w Y o rk Tim es o f December 5. H e said the experiments had been conducted b y the Germans on an island in the Baltic and that they had hoped to get into sufficient volume o f production to release it with devastating effect against England in September o f this year. Churchill himself, however, insisted that the R A F blast the particular spot where much o f this w ork was going on. Curiously enough, the R A F did not want to do it. Churchill got the job done; also the R A F blasted some o f the emplacements o f these rocket guns in northern France and Belgium. As a result the Germans have now put the rocket gun emplacements so deep that they can scarcely be reached. T h e guns are carried into place on trucks placed on 32 wheels. A new type o f explosive is being used consisting o f liquid oxygen and some other liquid gases. T h e explosive effect is several times as great a s . . . T N T . Bush thought that at Sorrento the Germans had quite good results against our shipping with a type o f aerial torpedo controlled in the air b y radio from a plane. One o f these which did not explode was recovered and w e know from the model that it was not in production but it was an experimental model; also w e know that w e have the same kind o f thing much better perfected. W e have not used it yet. T h e danger o f the German rocket gun is that a number Of these can be released in the daytime and in a few minutes travel 100 miles to London and catch the Londoners unprepared in the streets, killing anywhere from 50 to 10,000 o f them. T h e preparation o f the rockets represents an enormous expense and enormous diversion o f priorities. However, there is every indication that the Germans w ill be ready to strike w ith a mass attack on London sometime in early February. Bush described to me the success o f the R A F in blasting a (heavy) water plant in N orw ay. This has enormous significance, which I shall never put down on paper until the w ar is over. Bush told me in detail about his trip to London and about certain negotiations w hich he and Secretary Stimson had w ith Prime Minister Churchill about a matter
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o f v e ry great importance both during the w ar and during the period after die war.1 This also I shall not put on paper until after die w ar is over. DECEMBER 6 , 1 943
. . . A s I have watched the foreign operations o f the different in dividuals in . . . government and have heard them cuss each other out, I have reached the conclusion that all o f them are pretty ignorant from the standpoint o f having an overall picture o f w hat the truth really is. It is going to be necessary to have a new type o f government servant with larger loyalties and larger understanding. T h e business men w ho come into government from outside are worse on the whole than those w ho have been raised in government. DECEMBER
8, 1943
. . . Harold Ickes was extremely resentful w ith regard to H arry Hopkins, declared that H arry had tried to knife him with the President fo r many years. He said that the President could not manhandle him (H arold); if the President pulled any rough stuff w ith him he would get out at once. H e said the President had made many promises to him which he never kept. H e referred back to the old Forest Service matter, said that the President had promised to give him FS not only verbally but in writing. Also said that back in 1940 the President was going to make him Secretary o f W ar. But Ickes is sure that H arry Hopkins and Felix Frankfurter between them blocked that . . . Harold says that if the President gets rid o f him (H arold) he will do some serious w ork writing. M y guess is that if he writes he w ill pay o ff his old scores w ith the President and w ith H arry Hopkins. Harold says he owes his present job to Baruch, that Baruch told the President that Ickes was his best administrator. Harold said that he handled the coal strike altogether on his ow n w ithout consulting w ith the President, and that he had had absolutely no w ord from the President after set tling the strike.2 3 2 Those discussions in London in July led to the Q uebec agreement o f August 19, 1943, signed b y Roosevelt and Churchill, relating to the collaboration o f their tw o countries on atomic energy. T h e agreement provided for a renewed though still incomplete exchange o f information; see H ew lett and Anderson, T h e N n a W orld, pp. 275-84. 2 Ickes had w orked with John L . Lewis to develop a formula fo r the settlement o f the bituminous coal strike o f O ctober-N ovem ber 1943, one o f a series of
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Harold said that Jimmie Byrnes was over to see him yesterday and much worried because the President was not coming back as soon as he had been expecting. Apparently he wants to stay in A frica and do some sightseeing and possibly even see Italy. Eisenhower is much worried about it all and thinks the President should get back to the United States as soon as possible. I told Harold that I had had some questions about Bernard Baruch so far as I personally was concerned because o f the w ay Jimmie Byrnes had acted on the Jesse Jones matter. Harold said he did not think that Baruch had influenced Jimmie Byrnes in any w ay. A s a matter o f fact, Baruch had never said a thing against me at any time. I said I knew that Baruch had always been a great help to Milo but that I also knew that Baruch was very close to Byrnes. Harold thinks that Jimmie Byrnes is not part o f H arry Hopkins’ kitchen cabinet but he does think that Jack Hertz, Sam Rosenman, and Hopkins oftentimes plan together . . . Gradually it became obvious to me that Harold’s purpose in talking to me was that it had to do with Harold’s ambition to become demobilizer for industry when peace comes. He thinks he has Baruch in his com er. Baruch is doing everything he can to prevent Jesse Jones from taking on the job. Baruch looks on Don Nelson, who is also ambitious for the job, as Hopkins’ protégé. M y guess is that the line-up is Baruch, Jimmie Byrnes, and Harold Ickes on one side of the fence with H op kins, Jesse Jones, and Don Nelson on the other side.
DECEMBER
9, 1943
. . . Faymonville*1 said he first got interested in Russia at the time o f the other war. He was in the Philippines when the other men left to go to France. He decided there would be activity sooner or later in the Far East and studied Russian. He was stationed for a time in Siberia in 1918. Later on, at the time of the disarmament conference in Washington in January of 1922, the Far East republic which com prised the eastern part o f Siberia was unofficially represented and the upshot o f it was that he was over there to have a look around. He was strikes b y the United Mine W orkers that had alienated public opinion, moved Congress to the passage o f the Smith-Conn ally A ct, and irritated both Roose velt and his W ar Labor Board. 1 Colonel Philip R. Faymonville, recently recalled to Washington, had been in charge of. Lend-Lease in the Soviet Union in 1942—43. There he had operated with a calculated independence from the resentful Ambassador Standley who disapproved o f the assumptions and tactics that Faymonville described to W allace.
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a W hite House-aide in 1933. H e was sent in 1934 as military observer when our Russian Embassy was opened up. In September of 1941 he was sent over as representative o f Lend-Lease. W hile he has been a colonel in the A rm y right along, he served Lend-Lease in Russia up until he left there a month ago. H e is a great admirer o f the Russian people. I asked him about the Russian attitude toward the United States. H e said they were very fearful about us on June 22, 1941. He said the Atlantic Charter and the President’s declarations allayed this fear somewhat. In January and February o f 1942 they were desperate and wondered w h y w e were not sending them help faster. W hen w e eventually complied with our promises, they gained more and more confidence in us. I asked him what was die nature o f his difficulty in Russia to which reference was recently made in the press. H e said it was a very simple situation. He said he had always told the Russians a very simple story, that w e were sending Lend-Lease aid to Russia because w e felt b y so doing w e were helping the United States. He never tried to drive any bargains with Lend-Lease aid. It seems that some o f our other government officials wanted to use Lend-Lease aid to get information. Faymonville said he always stuck to his original story and that these U.S. government officials did not like it. A p parently that is the reason he was recalled. Colonel Faymonville thinks that so far as the future is concerned it is all-important that the United States and Russia stand together. He doesn’t like the idea o f our standing with England against Russia or playing second fiddle to England in our relationship with Russia. He thinks w e should deal with Russia directly. W hile he did not refer to the State Department, he plainly inferred that there were officials there w ho believed in playing the British game . . .
DECEMBER
14, 1943
Mrs. Boettiger1 told me that the labor groups out in Seattle were very anxious to have me come here. She understood that the labor groups in Portland, Oregon, were going to call me and ask me to come to Portland. She thought Seattle was better than Portland . . . She says that the National Committeeman in Washington is a Farley man and that the State Chairman is a dried-up little law yer with one stenographer whose heart is in the right place but who has very little energy. In brief, the Democratic Party in Washington doesn’t amount 1 Anna Roosevelt Boetdger, the President’s daughter and then the w ife of John Boettiger, publisher o f the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
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to much. T h e labor influx into Washington from the East has brought a great many people w ho are Republican rather than Democratic. T h e program for complete registration may bring about as many Repub lican registrants as Democratic. Mrs. Boettiger said she thought there ought to be meetings coming out now endorsing her father and myself. She is very liberal in her views. She is in town with her three children so that she can be w ith die rest o f the family when they gather around the President fo r the first tw o nights after his return. She said die just could not think o f missing those first tw o evenings. T h e President’s unequaled powers as a storyteller apparently fascinate his children as they fascinate everybody else. I told Mrs. Boettiger that I thought the President had been playing the international game w ith remarkable skill. She said yes, that her father long had it on his mind to avoid the mistakes o f W ood row W ilson and she thought he had done it to a remarkable degree. W e agreed that it would be a splendid thing if the President would make a report on his trip to the Congress. She thought there was very wide spread resentment that the Reuter N ew s A gen cy had scooped the American press. I said I did not think there was much resentment except among the newspaper men and among those w ho wanted an excuse to criticize G reat Britain or the conduct o f the war. I told her I felt quite good about the situation generally, that I thought things were going to fit together very w ell b y next summer or fall. She herself apparently did not feel optimistic at all. She has no idea whether the President w ill run fo r a fourth term or not. She said in 1940 her mother and she tried again and again to find out whether he was going to run for a third term and did not have any luck. Appar ently she is going to pump her father again as hard as she can. A t the same time she feels her father is quite right in not taking either her or her mother completely into his confidence . . .
DECEMBER 1 5, 1943
Lowderm ilk1 told me some very interesting things about his experi ence in northern China, north and a little east o f Chungking, just north o f Tsinling Shan mountains and a little west o f Sian but east o f Lanchow. He had three Chinese technicians w orking w ith him and he got them pretty well indoctrinated with the principles o f soil erosion. H e 1 W alter Clay Lowderm ilk o f the Soil Conservation Service o f the Department o f Agriculture had just returned from China where he had served as an adviser to the Chinese government on soil and forest conservation and flood control.
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told me that he very much wanted to stop off in Palestine but the State Department refused him a visa to stop there. T h e State Department is definitely anti-Zionist. Lowderm ilk himself feels that the Arabs would greatly profit if the Jews were able to have a free hand in developing Palestine and Transjordania. H e is strongly in favor o f bringing in water from the Mediterranean Sea b y canal to the Jordan River, thus developing power. T h e y could utilize all the streams running into the Jordan River for irrigation purposes. H e says there are great possi bilities o f mining magnesium, bromine, and potassium in the Dead Sea. H e says the prosperity created b y the Jews would have great effect on the surrounding Arabs . . . M cDougall wanted to talk to me about future plans for food and agriculture and U N R R A as segments o f the United Nations organi zation . . . O f course I made no commitment whatever on his suggestion that I head up this show. H e said he would get in touch with me in early January because no matter what I decided to do, he wanted to get m y advice. H e asked how it would be to have Roosevelt head up the whole show. I told him the President’s name was invaluable and that the President had many excellent characteristics, among others, his acute appreciation o f geography. I told him I didn’t think the Presi dent was a good executive but that nevertheless his methods seemed to get results and that was what counted. He said it was his impression that the President at heart was really an aristocrat. H e said the Presi dent was infinitely preferable to Churchill, and he got to reminiscing about Churchill in an interesting w ay. H e mentioned how when M ontgomery was given charge o f the troops in N orth Africa, Churchill had him in for a talk and asked him if he was fit for the job. Mont gom ery started out b y saying that he got up early every morning and took a run before breakfast; that he didn’t smoke or drink alcohol; and that as a result he was ioo percent efficient. Churchill replied, “ W ell, I don’t get up until noon, I start drinking alcohol at once and take it continuously all day, and when I’m not drinking I have a cigar in m y mouth; I am 200 percent efficient.” Churchill got to moralizing with one o f his cronies, saying, “ History is going to be aw fully hard on those folks w ho stood b y when they saw this war coming in the thirties and didn’t do anything about it; yes, it is going to be aw fully hard; I am damn sure it is going to be hard because I am going to write the history!” (M cDougall suggested about this time that the smartest thing Churchill could do would be to retire as soon as the war was over because if he did so, he could
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then rank as one of d ie three or fou r greatest Englishmen o f all times. If he didn’t resign he w ould be proved b y events to be very incom petent.) Churchill made a crack about Sir Stafford Cripps, just after Cripps left the room, saying, “ T here but fo r the grace o f G od goes G od .” M cD ougall says there is some truth in Churchill’s observation about Cripps; that he is characterized b y too much surface goodness and too great a certainty that he is right . . .
DECEM BER 1 7 , 19 4 3
. . . Baruch dw elt at some length on the great pow er o f the U nited States and on the need o f the United States being strong if this country w ere to do w hat she should both fo r herself and fo r the w orld. I asked him if he thought a recession was inevitable after the w ar. He said, “ D ecidedly not.” John H ancock1 agreed w ith him. H e said every thing depended on our having confidence, confidence that w e w ere going to be living in a peaceful w orld. Baruch mentioned how strong he had been fo r W ood row W ilson and the League o f Nations. T hen he w ent on to speak on the subject w hich I think he really had on his mind, and that was adequate protection fo r synthetic rubber. Baruch did not suggest a tariff on rubber although I think that was w hat was in H ancock’s mind . . . Baruch started out b y saying, “ W e have the synthetic rubber plants paying high wages. T h e British and D utch don’t need to get us dow n again. W e should have a heart for the coolie labor in Java and the Straits Settlements. W e should demand that they raise the wages o f this coolie labor. I am thinking about the little fellow .” I replied to turn, “ Yes, I know that labor over there is only getting about eighteen cents a day and I w ill agree that its productivity entitles it to a higher wage. I am sure, how ever, that a heavy tariff on rubber w ould make these people much w orse o ff than they are now. I am dead against a tariff.” H ancock started to object to m y position then stopped. Baruch did not take direct issue but began again to let his heart bleed fo r the poor people in the East Indies. I said to Baruch, “ I am wondering if under the guise o f getting their wages raised, there m ay not be a danger that most o f them w ill lose their eighteen cents and finally get only five cents a day. A ren’t you really tryin g to get these people off o f the rubber m arket o f the U nited 1 John M. Hancock, an industrial banker, had worked with Baruch in 194a on the rubber survey and was collaborating with him again on planning for postwar industrial reconversion.
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States?’* I then suggested that if there w ere an opportunity to bargain w ith the British, it m ight be w ell to get them to adopt the principle o f gradually increasing the wages to at least tw ice w hat they w ere now. A fter some more discussion, M ilo and Baruch both claimed that w e saw eye to eye. I am not altogether sure . . . Baruch held forth at some length about the butter-m outhed English men all the time advancing hypocritical arguments so that they could get in position to exploit subject peoples. In his argument, I was never quite sure whether Baruch was more interested in getting rid o f British com petition so Am erican businessmen could make more m oney or more interested in the subject peoples. T ow ard the close o f the conference, Baruch was apparently as suming that I was going to be a negotiator at the peace table and urged that he be m y “ evil partner.” H e spoke o f die firm o f W allace and Baruch and said, “ N o w when they (I suppose he meant the British although I don’t know fo r sure) ask fo r things w hich they should not have and w hich you can’t deny, just send them over to me saying, 1 agree w ith you but I don’t believe I can get this b y w ith that fellow Baruch.’ ” T h e old boy is still a clever operator, apparently placing a small bet on the possibility that I m ight one w ay or another eventually be in a position o f some pow er, and he is putting in his bid to w ork w ith
me • • • I mentioned to Baruch that the Jews w ere getting very uneasy about Palestine and the Arabian princes, the oil there, etc. H e said he had a solution o f his ow n fo r that, w hich he had talked about to the President. It was to have each o f the United Nations agree to take a certain quota o f Jews. I said that offhand it m ight sound good but I did not know if it w ould satisfy the Jews. Baruch made the point that the biggest card the President had to play was the productive m ight o f the United States. N o other nation had the mass production technique o f the United States. W e had tw ice saved the w orld because o f our mass production technique. Baruch thinks w e are going to furnish immense quantities o f produce to the outside w orld. I asked him to name the top five. H e did not name a single one but said that in general w e w ould furnish products that could be made b y mass production. H ancock said such as automobiles, refrigerators, etc., etc. T he President opened up cabinet b y saying how much impressed he was w ith Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo meeting, said he had the most delightful smile on occasion. H e w ent into some detail about w hat
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had been promised to China, saying again w hat has already appeared in the press. T h e President then w ent on to say that he tried to get things fixed up so w e could give H ong K ong back to China but Churchill was very mulish on the subject. A t Teheran it was apparent that the President and Stalin stood to gether on the subject o f an adequate second front. Stalin and the President finally got w hat they wanted but not all o f it. A s a result o f this partial triumph over the British at Teheran, the President later on had to give in to them to some extent on agreeing to operations in the eastern Mediterranean. T h e President thought that the fu ll strength o f the landing craft should be used for the Burma campaign but the British insisted on part o f it going to the Mediterranean campaign. W ith regard to T u rkey, the President said he did not know w hether they w ere com ing in or not and he did not think it made an aw ful lot o f difference. T h e President said that Stalin was very keen about Manchuria going back to China, said that all that he was interested in fo r Russia was a warm -water port. T he President then suggested that Dairen, the ex treme southeastern port in Manchuria, be made an open port and that the railroad across from Siberia to Manchuria down to Dairen be put under such management as to permit the Russians free access to the shores o f the Y ellow Sea. Stalin said he had never thought o f this idea and thought it was a splendid one. T h e President said that Stalin felt very tough tow ard both Germ any and Japan. T h e President suggested dividing Germ any up into five small countries and tw o international areas. One o f the international areas would include K iel, Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, etc. T his area would be made into a series o f free ports open to the use o f all the nations. Stalin said he had not thought about this . . . Stalin spoke about access to the Persian G u lf and the President sug gested a free port and a railroad that would give Russia the same access to the Persian G u lf as to the Y ellow Sea. A t this point, the President digressed to speak about w hat a p erfectly marvelous job our soldiers w ere doing in Iran. H e seemed to think there was more poverty in Iran than any place he had ever seen. H e said i percent o f the people w ere living off the fat o f the land and all the rest w ere sharecroppers. T here is bad w ater there, and many kinds o f disease. Stalin said the thing he was interested in about Germ any was to make sure that she would not fight again w ithin 20 years. T he Presi dent said there had been absolutely no discussion about Palestine. A pparently the President had a rather hard time w ith Churchill all
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the w ay. H e said the British w ere never keen about the Chinese [being] counted as one o f the Big Four. W ith Stalin it was all right, how ever . . . Just before he called on Cordell H ull, the President told how at M oscow 1 Cordell had prepared the w ay fo r him. H ull returned the com plim ent b y saying that he had had an easy time at M oscow be cause they knew the President was com ing. Francis Biddle told about the difficulties w ith the Japs at T u le Lake. Jimmie Byrnes spoke up and said he thought D illon M yer3 was not a strong enough man to handle the T u le Lake situation and recom mended that it be put under Francis Biddle. Biddle did not w ant it and suggested Ickes. Ickes said he did not w ant it and Jimmie Byrnes said that at the present tim e it was on the President's doorstep and he did not w ant it either. Biddle is going to take it. Byrnes mentioned about the various misdeeds o f the Japs at T u le Lake. T h e President sug gested that a strong hand be used and it did not make any difference w hat the Japs in Japan thought about it. I spoke up at once and said, “ W ait a minute, M r. President. It makes a lo t o f difference to the Am ericans whom the Japs have in the camps in the Philippine Islands." Jimmie Byrnes took m y side at this point and the President backed aw ay. TTie President gave it as his opinion that W ashington was just like a squirrel cage, that the people in W ashington had lost all sense o f perspective. H e thought the people o f the United Sûtes w ere all right but W ashington was very bad. H e spoke about giving a lecture to Congress . . . A little later on he asked me what had happened among m y charges (he always tends to refer to the senators when talking to me as charges), said that when he was in Oran in N orth 1 A t the conference o f foreign ministers that preceded the Teheran meeting, a Dillon S. M yer, a veteran official o f the Department of Agriculture, had become director o f the W a r Relocation Authority in 1942. A t this time he was under severe criticism from the press and the Congress because a group of militant Japanese-Americans at the internment camp at T ule Lake had gone on strike in protest against the lamentable treatment they were receiving. Those and other T u le Lake internees had earlier refused to pledge their loyalty to the United States largely because that pledge would have permitted them only the right to enter the armed services, and would have cost their interned and confused parents their important support. M yer’s critics, advocates of repressive measures, understood little about the conditions that had provoked the trouble, which M yer had tried unsuccessfully to dispel. A fter his failure to do so, the A rm y took over the camp where a tense quiet merely obscured the still unresolved roblems; see Audrie Girdner and Anne Lofds, T h e Great Betrayal (N ew rork, 1969) and especially D orothy S. Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, T h e Spoilage (Berkeley, 1946).
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A frica, he smelled something very bad, that he had learned that th é southern Dem ocrats w ere going to start a new party. H e asked m e w hat was back o f it all. I told him how Senator G u ffey ,had issued a statement after the failure o f the soldier vote and that this had touched o ff Byrd, Bailey and Cotton Ed Smith but I said I did not regard it as too serious.1 1 turned to Jimmie Byrnes and H ull fo r confirm ation and they both agreed. I mentioned the editorials in the Raleigh Observer and the Nashville Tennesseean, Jimmie Byrnes, in talking on the soldier vote situation, placed all the blame fo r it on John Rankin o f Mississippi and said he thought it was going to w ork out into a good political issue. T h e President indicated that he thought that one o f the best things that could happen to the people o f the U nited States w ould be to have a few Germ an bombs fall here to w ake us up. R eferring to de G aulle, he said that the French people w ere m ore and more getting on to de G aulle and that the people com ing out o f France w ere indicating that the people o f France did not w ant de Gaulle. T his point o f view , w hich the President has held steadily, is totally different from that w hich is presented in . . . T h e Nation. It w ill be most interesting to see w hich ultim ately proves to be correct as to the sentiment o f the real French people—the President or the Gaullists. T h e President said that England wanted the restoration o f die G reat France. Stalin said, how ever, that before France could amount to anything, it w ould be necessary to get rid o f the old French bureau* 1 Republicans and dissident Democrats had defeated the administration’s voting bill. It would have established a bipartisan W a r Ballot Commission to send ballots to all servicemen in advance o f the 1944 election. Congressman John E. Rankin o f Mississippi argued that the bill violated states’ rights under the Con* sdtudon, while Robert T a ft feared that soldiers would b e intimidated into voting for the President. T h e Senate, in December 194), and the House the next February endorsed a substitute measure proposed b y James Eastland o f Mississippi, John McClellan o f Arkansas, and Kenneth M cKellar o f Tennessee that merely recommended that the states adopt legislation enabling soldiers to vote. Later legislation permitted sates to use a federal ballot to that end, but Roosevelt’s bill had lost. W hen it was killed, Senator Joe G uffey had castigated those o f his fellow Democrats w ho helped to defeat it. There rushed to the counteratack doughty southern Tories, including H arry Byrd of Virginia, Josiah W . Bailey o f North Carolina, and Ellison D . Smith o f South Carolina, with Byrd gladly suggesting the need for a third party o f southern Democrats to hold the balance o f political power in Congress for the good of their en lightened section o f the country. From the first, W allace had supported Roosevelt’s plan. H e hoped, he said, that Congress would make certain that servicemen received ballots, for “as a matter o f simple justice, every American soldier, sailor, and marine should have an opportunity to vote in 1944.”
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cracy and the aged, tim e-serving politicians. A ccording to Stalin, France can’t amount to anything until there is totally new blood running the show. Stalin said there must be a w orld police force. T h e President said, “ I f there is to be a w orld police force, there w ill have to be police stations at strategic points.” Stalin said, “ W hat are the strategic points?” T h e President started to list some o f them but Stalin spoke up and said, “ You w ill w ant Dakar, w on’t you?” . . . T hat President said that fo r three days he, Churchill, and Stalin sat around a very big table, 30 feet or so in diameter, and w ere not getting anywhere at all. O n the fourth day they got results. Stimson spoke up at this point and said he had read the minutes. T h e results had to do w ith the establishment o f a real second front. T h e President mentioned how Stalin was continually ribbing Church ill. T h e President also mentioned that he wanted to do aw ay w ith die w ord Reich. Stalin said, “ I don’t care w hat you do w ith the word.. W hat I w ant is to do aw ay w ith the fact.” T h e President referred to how he had a hard time w ith Churchill at Cairo on his w ay back and how he finally had to give in to Churchill and agree to divert 18 landing barges from Burma to the eastern M ed iterranean. This was directly in contradiction to w hat the President had promised Chiang K ai-shek.. T he President immediately inform ed Chiang about it w ho was very much annoyed. A ll the President could do, o f course, was to promise w e w ould manufacture the 18 additional barges in the United States und get them over to Burma as soon as possible.
DECEMBER l 8 , 1943
A t the Big Four m eeting at the W hite House this morning (Jimmie Byrnes was present as w ell as the President), the President told the same story as he had at the cabinet meeting the preceding afternoon. H ow ever, he w ent into much more detail about the w ay in w hich Stalin ribbed Churchill. A t the evening banquets the conversations apparently w ere altogether in the form o f toasts. Stalin said that thinking about the future peace o f the w orld, he de cided there could not be any assurance o f peace until 100,000 o f the leading Prussian arm y officers had been killed. H e m ight be w illing to cut this down to 50,000 but he thought that was as low as he could go. Churchill was annoyed at this and said it had not been the British habit to slaughter prisoners o f w ar, especially officers. T h e President
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then proposed a toast and said, “Suppose w e compromise and make it 49,000.” T he President looked on the w hole conversation as deliberate ribbing o f Churchill b y Stalin. H ow ever, it seemed that Stalin was more or less serious. A fter a while, Churchill g o t into the spirit o f the ribbing and g o t up and gave a toast in w hich he began to make a play on the w ord “ rosy.” He claimed that everyone com ing in contact w ith Russia had become more or less rosy. T h e red color was beginning to take effect. A fter Churchill made a number o f smart cracks along this line, Stalin interrupted w ith a toast, “T o the rosiness o f humanity, that w hich in dicates a state o f perfect health.” T h e President fell into the spirit o f the occasion and finally proposed a toast, “T o the rainbow, the sym bol o f hope w hich contains all the colors.” N o doubt all o f this was taken down w ith great care and w ill be available to future historians. T he President again told the story o f how he said, “ I want to do aw ay w ith the w ord R eich.” But this time he added the phrase, “ in any language.” I spoke up and asked the President w hat did Churchill think o f the phrase “ in any language.” T h e President said, “ I don't think he liked it.” T h e President then w ent on to talk about dividing up Germ any into five states, a proposal w hich did not please Churchill but did please Stalin. I interrupted to ask, “ Did you propose a customs union for the five Germ an states?” T h e President said, “ N o, I w ould propose a customs union for all o f Europe.” A t the cabinet meeting I did not get it clear as to the second area w hich was to be internationalized. T h e first one, w hich the President described on Friday, was composed o f the old Hanseatic Germ an free ports w ith a strip o f land somewhat w ider than the Panama Canal back from the ocean. T h e second area included the Ruhr and Saar Basin where the iron and coal mines have served as a source o f pow er fo r the industrialists o f both France and Germ any, w ho have from time to time precipitated international conflict. T h e President de fended Stalin’s attitude w ith regard to Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. H e said Stalin did not w ant Finland but did w ant that part o f Finland w hich was necessary to protect Leningrad and w hich Russia had ob tained in the w ar against Finland in 1940. T h e Russian idea about Poland is to take that part o f Poland east o f the old Curson Line, that part largely inhabited b y Ukrainians, that part w hich Russia had when she moved in in late 1939. Russia, however, according to the President, wants a strong Poland and w ould give East Prussia to Poland. Russia would give to Poland an area o f land from Germ any equal to that
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w hich she lost in East Poland. In view o f the fact that the land w hich Poland would obtain from Germ any w ould be o f better quality than that w hich she would lose on the east, Stalin thought Poland should be satisfied. T his proposal is very much like that w hich was suggested to me personally b y A nthony Eden some six or seven months ago. Stalin does not w ant the Dardanelles but he does w ant the control to be denationalized sufficiently so Russia can have free access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Apparently the President and Stalin spoke each other's language and go t along fam ously . . . D on N elson Luncheon Conference I asked Don about his trip to Russia. H e was exceedingly enthusiastic about the Russians. H e said w e can’t judge Russia b y M oscow . H e spoke o f visiting the big industrial centers about Tashkent, M agnito gorsk, and Novosibirsk. H e said these cities typ ically contained only about 200,000 people three or four years ago but now they contained from 700,000 to a m illion. T h e w orkers have been moved out o f Leningrad, Stalingrad, K iev and K harkov along w ith the factories to these cities. In this area there seems to be no great food problem. T h e w orkers have joined w ith the cooperative and collective farm groups and do a real job o f food production. T h e factory manager in one o f these cities told proudly how many thousands o f tons o f food he had stored up. In the western part o f Russia, there is shortage o f food. T h e shortage w ill not interfere w ith m ilitary operations but the civilians w ill go very hungry. Nelson was enorm ously impressed w ith the high sense o f participa tion w hich the w orkers in Russia seem to have. Special cash prizes are handed out to the groups w hich produce the most. Apparently every one is paid according to his ability. But it is not only on a material basis. For example, when the factory w orkers w ere evacuated from western Russia, they evacuated just as carefully the artists because they felt the musicians, et al., w ere necessary to keep up the spirit o f the people. A rt is a people's art in Russia. D on told how he had been laid over fo r an extra tw o or three days in Tashkent and how the people w ho w ere w ith him insisted that he go to the opera that evening. H e asked w hat was on at the opera. T h e y said Prince Igor. H e said he had seen Prince Igor and was not interested. A n hour or so later they came back and said the program had been changed and they w ould put on Swan Lake ballet for him. T h is was late afternoon. Don attended the ballet and was amazed how p erfectly it was done. H e could not see how they could change
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at such a late hour and y e t do a thorough job. T h eir plane w as delayed several more days and he saw several more perform ances and th ey w ere all excellent. Nelson has the impression that there is in some w ays more free enterprise in Russia than here in the U nited States. H e talked quite a w hile about w hat w ould be necessary to maintain the things tin t w e deem necessary in the United States and y e t get the driving pow er o f participation b y the common man. I put it this w ay, “ H ow can w e get the profit system to w orking fo r everybody?” Don Nelson began to tell me about a plan o f lus to maintain fu ll em ploym ent in the U nited States after the w ar. H e said the weakest spot in our econom y w ould be in the capital goods in dustry. H e said, “ W e have a tremendous supply o f machine tools, construction m achinery, et cetera, hanging over the market. If these businesses go into a tailspin, they w ill carry the rest o f our econom y along w ith them.” H e, therefore, proposed that w e w ork out a scheme fo r trading these materials to the outside w orld fo r building up huge stockpiles o f the basic materials like copper, tungsten, manganese, etc., etc. H e would sterilize these stockpiles and release them to the public on ly when there is a tw o-thirds vote o f both Houses o f Congress or a m ajority vote o f both Houses and the signature o f the President certi fy in g to a national em ergency. T his w ould prevent the huge material stockpiles from creating business depression in the local raw material industries. Don, like John H ancock, believes that our technological “ know how ” in certain lines is the w onder o f the w orld and that it can be made o f great service to the w orld. D on is very much disgusted w ith the W ashington intrigue and w ould like to get aw ay as soon as possible. H e says Charles W ilson also wants to leave . . . I asked him w hat he (D on) was going to do. H e said he did not know , that he thought he m ight go w ith a com pany w hich w ould be w orking on a w orldw ide basis on irrigation, flood control, and pow er projects. I asked him w h y he did not stay on and w ork on the problem o f reconversion.1 H e replied, “ T h at is Baruch’s job.” I 1 Nelson was hoping to begin the process o f reconversion early in 1944 so that increasing proauction for civilian use would take up the slack of declining orders for military equipment, and thus sustain full employment and help small business. T h e W a r Department considered that prospect potentially dangerous fo r its supply lines and immediately crippling to civilian morale which, in the military view, should not be diverted from the war. Like the W ar Department, Charles E. W ilson soon found himself at odds with Nelson over the issue. For an account o f the controversy unabashedly favorable to Nelson, see Bruce Catton, T h e W ar Lords o f W ashington (N ew Y ork, 1948).
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said I had had lunch w ith Baruch, M ilo, and John H ancock. H e spoke up and said H ancock was the w orst o f all the N ew Deal haters, that he was so know n in N ew Y o rk G ty , that he hated the President and all the N ew Dealers. I said, “ H e looks to me like he drinks a lot.” N elson said that was not true, that he did not think H ancock drinks at alL W ith regard to Baruch, Nelson said he had never been able to figure out just w hat Baruch was really up to. H e expressed no feeling either against or fo r Barney. I told him I had picked it up indirectly, but not from Baruch, that Baruch did not like Nelson because he felt that Nelson was close to H arry Hopkins. Nelson replied, “ It is true. I am close to H arry H opkins. I think a lo t o f H arry. H arry has never let anything stand in the w ay o f w inning the w ar and winning it as soon as possible. E verything has been subjected to that one objective." I said I thought that that was true, that H arry had devoted every effort even to the extent o f im periling his health to w in die w ar. N elson ventured that he was under the impression that Jimmie Byrnes w as not any too enthusiastic about Hopkins. A pparently, therefore, there is gradually shaping up an inner circle conflict w hich m ight con ceivably find H arry H opkins’ men, Jesse Jones, Stettinius, and D on N elson on one side w ith Baruch’s men and Jimmie Byrnes and H arold Ickes on the other. I told Nelson that I was beginning to think that at the present time Baruch in a sense was a front man fo r John H ancock. N elson said that was his opinion also, that H ancock was d ie action man behind Baruch. Perhaps the situation w ill simmer dow n eventually to John H ancock vs. Jesse Jones. Both are pow er grabbers o f the first order. DECEMBER 2 0 , 1943
Mrs. Emma G u ffey M iller1 came in to push fo r the amendment to the Constitution—equal rights fo r wom en. She wanted me to w rite her a letter about it. I told her to have her brother, Senator G u ffey, fix up a letter and I w ould take a look at it . . . lE m m a G u ffey Miller, Joe G uffey’s sister and the Democratic National Committeewoman from Pennsylvania, had been a devoted champion o f women’s suffrage, a member o f the Consumers League, and a seconder of the successive nominations for President o f A lfred E. Smith and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1943 she was legislative chairwoman o f the National W om an’s Party for an Equal Rights Amendment.
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1944
D e Lozada came around to see me on Saturday to ask if I thought he should give up his fight in view o f the State Departm ent opposition. I told him that I had known fo r many years how he had felt about the policy o f the owners o f the Bolivian tin mines and that I thought he ought to be true to him self.1 I said, “ For m y part, I can’t have any thing to do w ith the affairs o f other nations. I am influenced solely b y w hat is good fo r the U nited States, the G ood N eighbor P olicy, and the hemisphere." I asked de Lozada about the anti-Semitism com m ent o f L arry Duggan. H e said there was a man connected w ith the form er governm ent b y the name o f Medina w ho had illegally let some 15,000 Jews into Bolivia, charging them w hat the traffic w ould bear. Some times he charged as much as $5,000 or $10,000. A s a result o f this, he had made more than a million dollars personally. De Lozada said these 15,000 Jews, locating chiefly in the tw o or three larger cities, had created a very difficult com petitive situation among the middle-class Bolivians. T h e y w ere intensely dissatisfied w ith the illegal action taken b y Medina; therefore, the Estenssoro party had gone on record very strongly against Medina. De Lozada said he had talked to influential Jews about this and that the new governm ent had really nothing to fear from the anti-Sem itic action. I also told de Lozada that Edgar M ow rer had told me that the new governm ent was being looked on w ith fear b y Chile because o f its emphasis on getting a port at A rica. D e Lozada said that the new governm ent was not hitting that as hard as Penaranda did, that Penaranda talked about A rica and access to the sea all the time. I told de Lozada that from the standpoint o f the people o f the hemisphere, it seemed to me the thing for Bolivia to stand for w ould be making A rica a free port, that I did not think Bolivia ought to im peril the peace o f the hemisphere b y talking too vigorously about getting A rica back again. Enrique mentioned a number o f things w hich the State Departm ent had done w hich indicate that there are certain individuals in the State 1 On December 21, 1943, Major Gualberto Villarroel and his forces overthrew the Bolivian government o f President Enrique Penaranda. O nly Argentina recognized the new regime, which most observers considered undemocratic. T h e S a te Department decided against recognition on January 25, 1944. In the weeks preceding that decision, de Lozada served as the confidential agent in Washington for the new government. As such, while lobbying for recognition, he argued against the prevalent and reasonable American identification o f the new ju n a with the fascist Ramirez government o f Argentina.
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Departm ent w ho w ill stoop to any level. H e said that for the time being, he had blocked their move looking tow ard a counterrevolution. L arry Duggan had told me he would have much more confidence in the new regime if it included the P I R group led b y Antonio A rze.1 I asked de Lozada w here A rze was. H e said he had left M exico for Bolivia but the State Department, using Panagra and the Peruvian governm ent as stooges, had blocked A rze from getting any further than Panama, claim ing that the Peruvian governm ent w ould not give him a visa to fly over Peru, so the State Departm ent is in the curious posi tion o f w anting to see die P I R group included in the new governm ent and at the same time o f doing everything possible to prevent the inclusion. In other words, the State Department, outside o f Duggan, wants a revolution to the right and only gives lip service to the forma tion o f a governm ent w hich w ould really help the people o f Bolivia get a higher standard o f living. De Lozada is convinced that H ull him self is probably all right. H e wants in some w ay to get to Secretary H ull so he can tell him the true story. J a n u a r y 3,1944
. . . G ene3 began talking about H arry Hopkins. H e gave specific details as to how Hopkins had tried to cut m y throat at various times. I have no doubt that Gene is absolutely accurate in reporting this. H e said he had told the President that he has got to get rid o f H arry Hopkins. G ene says the Dem ocratic N ational Committeemen, when they meet here January 22, are going to demand that Hopkins be gotten rid o f before the national campaign. G ene said he had told the President that he has made a great mistake in having H arry Hopkins’ friends, Ed Stettinius’ friends, and A verill Harriman’s friends, et al., at the W hite House on Sunday evenings when he should be having in senators and congressmen. G ene said, “ O h, yes, I know the business men affiliated w ith the so-called M organ Banking crow d proclaim themselves as being very friendly to the President and to Hopkins. But when it comes to die final showdown, they w on’t vote for the President and there aren’t enough o f them to make any difference anyw ay.” I told Gene that w hile I knew that H opkins had been wholeheartedly against me, that I felt he also had been wholeheartedly fo r winning the w ar, and that he had w orked w ith the President to good advantage * José Antonio A rze, leader o f the Bolivian left. * E u g e n e C a sey .
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to w in the war. G ene came back and said, “ Y ou are a Christian and I love you fo r it. But you are w rong about yo u r attitude tow ard H arry. H e is selfish and a no-good and I am going to g et him” . . . JANUARY
7, 1944
. . . I told General Marshall about m y concern w ith the A rgentine situation, that I feared that the Argentine m ilitary clique and the fascists’ nests w ere up to no good.1 T h e problem is not only an im mediate one but a long-distance one as w ell. I said I thought Argentina w ould be a center fo r fascist infection after the w ar was over and that she w ould endeavor to be so strong m ilitarily at any time that she could take over Brazil and all the rest o f Latin Am erica put together. I found that the General was quite fu lly awake to the danger and as a m atter o f fact had been putting in a lo t o f time that morning talking w ith [the] State Departm ent about it. H e is very much concerned w ith the w ay in w hich w e have furnished m ilitary material to the various Latin Am erican nations. H e also was much concerned w ith the inefficiency o f our ow n gov ernment. H e said he had found again and again that the British w ere much better coordinated than w e. H e said the British secretarial sys tem resulted in the British fighting out their difficulties dow n the line, then presenting a coordinated front when the time came fo r meeting an external problem. Marshall says the President oftentim es takes ac tion and the only w ay he, the General, learns about it is through the British. I did not ask him anything whatsoever about his pronouncem ent on the strike situation2 but he volunteered that he had inside inform a1 T h e Treasury Department, as W allace knew, gravely disturbed b y evidence o f N azi activity in Argentina, was proposing to freeze Argentine assets in the United States and to cut British purchasing o f Argentine wheat and beef b y substituting American and Canadian supplies. T h e State Department had long opposed the former course and the W a r Shipping Administration and the W a r Food Administration found the latter impracticable. T h e Argentine involve ment in the'coup d’état in Bolivia, however, so angered H ull that in January he reversed his policy and agreed to the freezing or Argentine assets. Before the Treasury could promulgate the necessary order, the Ramirez government con veniently discovered an espionage plot b y Axis agents and, on January 27, severed relations with Germany and Japan. T h e State Department, with W hite House support, then canceled authority for the freezing order. A s it worked out, within another month Axis agents were again freely at w ork in Argentina; see John Morton Blum, From the Morgentbau D ienet, 3 vols., Years o f W er III (Boston, 1967), pp. 194-206. * T o prevent a threatening strike b y the railroad brotherhoods, Roosevelt on December 27, 1943, had directed the W a r Department to seize and operate the
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don that the Germans w ere going to nse the Am erican strikes in a strong propaganda drive. T he reason he spoke out he said was to fo resa il the Germans. T his did not sound so very reasonable to me but I made no comment whatever. Marshall is very deeply dissatisfied w ith the State Department, feels they know nothing w hatever about administration. Marshall has an excellent concepdon o f orderly administradon and is a very fine man. H e makes no pretense o f know ing anything about political consid erations . . . T he U ndersecretary o f State fo r Canada was very strong on low er tariffs and very keen about the idea that the source o f prosperity was a larger volume o f w orld trade. M cD ougall and I took the point o f view that the altogether im portant thing was fu ll employment. M c Dougall argued fo r a conference on fu ll employm ent. Twentym an* thought the im portant thing fo r the future o f the prosperity o f the w orld was to have low er tariffs in the United States. I said I thought the important thing was to have fu ll em ploym ent in the United States, that if w e have fu ll employm ent w e w ould im port over the tariff walls. Theoretically I agree w ith Tw entym an and have argued that philosophy ever since 1920. H ow ever, I am not now as sure as M r. Tw entym an that tariffs are so all-im portant. Politically it m ay be impossible to get the adjustment in tariffs w hich the United States, a creditor nation, ought to make. T h at doesn’t mean the w orld is sunk provided there is fu ll employment in the United States . . . J a n u a r y to, 1944
. . . A t the Big Four meeting, the President seemed to be in excel lent spirits. H e still showed some evidence o f his cold. T h e President rather indicated that Congress had been lyin g down on the job and it was time fo r them to get busy . . . I told the President I hoped he was paying some attention to the Argentine situation. H e said H ull w as com ing in tom orrow w ith a plan for our stopping the purchase o f Argentine beef. I said, “ D o you have a plan also fo r having the British stop their purchase o f beef?” H e said no, that the British would not cooperate. H e is quite indignant at*1 roads. T h e y were returned to private management three weeks later after the President had successfully arbitrated the outstanding issues. T h e crisis, poten tially damaging to internal lines o f supply, so disturbed Marshall that he had considered resigning in protest against labor’s demands for higher wages, which he considered unpatriotic. 1 W allace probably meant Undersecretary Tweedym an.
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the British fo r their failure to play ball in the Argentine situation. I said I thought this shutting o ff o f Argentine beef w ould be popular in the M iddle W est and the mountain states but indicated that the matter w hich I thought was o f the greatest concern was the w ay in w hich Argentine was rearming, that the Duperial Chem ical Com pany was bringing about a very rapid production o f explosives and that Argentina was rapidly getting into position to clean up South Am erica as she wanted to or at any rate to throw her w eight around in the same w ay G erm any did in the thirties. T h e President promised he w ould look into this m ilitary situation in Argentine . . . Barkley told a story o f how he had been making speeches dow n in K entucky and how th ey had asked him questions about everything under the sun. Finally some one asked him w hat about the fourth term. Barkley said he answered it in this w ay. H e said it reminded him o f a story when Senator Bankhead, father o f the present senator, died and T om H eflin decided he w ould run fo r the place. H eflin ap parently was in the House at the time. H e w ent dow n to Alabama and visited around there, came back to W ashington. T h e newspaper cor respondents asked him, “ W ell, how about it?” H eflin replied, “ W ell, there was so much public clamorment fo r me running that I guess I w ill have to do it.” Barkley in many w ays is a jo y forever. H e is loyal and steadfast and has a sense o f humor. U ndoubtedly he is one o f the finest o f the D em ocratic senators . . . A t the Russian Embassy w ere present Secretary o f the Treasury M orgenthau and his w ife, Secretary o f the N avy and M rs. K nox, A d miral Leahy, Assistant Secretary o f W ar M cC loy1 and various Soviet army and navy and Purchasing Commission attachés. T he Ambassador started out the evening in the middle o f the first course b y a toast to President Roosevelt. I responded w ith a toast to Marshal Stalin. T he toasts then became thick and fast. Mrs. M orgen thau gave a toast to the Russian wom en. T here w ere various toasts to the Russian soldiers, to the Am erican soldiers, to the Am erican and British seamen. H enry M orgenthau, after strong urging b y Mrs. Knox, gave a toast to Churchill and the heroic British nation. M rs. K nox gave a toast to Chiang Kai-shek. General W atson gave a toast to the artil lery. Sir Ronald Campbell got up and gave a toast saying, “ H ere is the Scotch toast: H ere’s to us. W ho is like us? Damn few .” H e gave this in a broad Scotch accent. Mrs. K nox, w ho was sitting next to me, said, “ T h at is the toast w e alw ays use in the English-speaking Union 1 John J. M cCloy, Stimson’s right-hand man.
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up in Manchester, N ew Hampshire." I told Madame G rom yko I thought this toast was an exceedingly aristocratic one. She thought so too and urged that I give a toast for real dem ocracy. So I go t up and said I had been inspired b y Madame G rom yko to give a toast in Russian. T h e Russian Ambassador translated the toast almost precisely w ord fo r w ord as follow s: “ T h e V ice President drinks to victo ry and to the realization o f new possibilities fo r the common man o f all lands.” T h e absolutely precise translation o f w hat I said in Russian w ould have been: “ I drink to complete victo ry and to new opportunities for the common man o f all countries” . . . JAN UARY
17, 1944
HENRY A. W ALLACE TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
D ear M r. President: . . . the keystone o f the Germ an foreign policy is to drive a wedge between Russia on the one hand, and the British and Am ericans on the other. Such a w edge, successfully driven, represents the only hope the Germans have—barring a secret weapon o f unexpected pow er, w hich I don't think they have. T h e hope o f an enduring peace depends in very large measure on closer relationships between the United States and Russia. T h e G er mans are w illing to go to any lengths to prevent that from com ing to pass. A nother thought suggests itself to me and that is that the German counterespionage m ay have reached such a high degree o f perfection that it m ay plant certain documents1 for the specific purpose o f pro m oting dissension . . . 1 W allace was replying to a confidential memorandum from the President o f January 14, 1944, about an alleged document from the German Foreign Office which proved later to be a forgery. Roosevelt's memo read in part: T h e enclosed I am sending to you in utter confidence because I am sure you would want me to. T h e gist o f it is that you talked to brother-in-law, that he passed it on to Switzerland, that then it fell into the hands o f the Germans from whom the American secret organization picked it up. Obviously, o f course, the story told in it is so utterly untrue that I am sure it could not have originated from your brother-in-law . . . T h e enclosure read: T h e V ice President’s general political comments on the M oscow Confer ence were the most interesting part o f the Swiss Minister’s report . . . N ow that it is over, everyone who is familiar with the results of tne conference is certain that the British and Americans alone must win W orld W ar II, possibly even against Russia, and that Russia means to dominate the whole of Europe and has already made substantial progress toward this end. T h e main outcome o f the M oscow Conference is not apparent so much in the
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*9 4 JANUARY 1 8 , 19 4 4
Conversation between die V ice President and L arry Duggan, January 18,1944 V P said he called on President A lfonso L6pez (o f Colom bia) yes terday afternoon and spent nearly all his time talking about the peril o f fascism b y w ay o f Argentina. It m ay have been indiscreet but that is the w ay the V P felt, so he laid it on thick . . . T he President was friendly to the V P as a person but he apparendy thought the idea was unrealistic. L arry said he was surprised; that the State Departm ent had received assurances from Colom bia that they would “go along” on measures to protect other countries from A igentine fascism. V P said no doubt they w ill go along but it is doubtful w hether their heart w ould be in it. V P thinks the Germans have their minds made up that they have lost this w ar and they are already preparing fo r the next one; that th ey have begun their preparations through Argentina, and that die next w ar w ill com e via that country. W ith modern technology backed up b y the cartel mechanism, they can w ork very rapidly. V P has partic ular reason to be alarmed because o f a certain thing he has discovered. One aspect o f it is a m ilitary secret and V P wants L arry not to speak o f it. T here are certain resources in southern Brazil that would be o f great use to the Germans m oving from Argentina as a base. V P w ould fear Argentine rearmament directed against Brazil, w ith the idea o f getting certain parts o f Brazil closest to Argentina under effective con trol, if not actual sovereignty. W ithout mentioning any o f the above to the President o f Colom bia, V P made the prophecy that if w e are not exceedingly vigilant Germ an fascism w ill get the upper hand in South Am erica via Argentina. V P said he doesn’t think there is so much o f this in the Bolivian revolution, although there m ay be some o f it . . . resolutions adopted as in the realization that the ideology of a W orld Revolution is still alive . . . T h e report of the Swiss Minister is a valuable supplement to the reports from friendly diplomats which I [the German Minister to Switzerland] sent earlier. T h e reason that the above report contains so much more con crete information than the data which came to Bern from the American and British government is due to the fact that the V ice President was talking to the Swiss minister, his brother-in-law, in the greatest confidence . . . T o W allace’s dismay, Admiral Leahy, in his memoirs, referred to the fake document as true. A fter W allace informed him of his error, Leahy, in a correction to his memoirs, retracted his statement. In the years since, that re traction has sometimes been overlooked by W allace’s critics.
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Senator Trum an came in to say he w ill probably be in St. Louis w ith me on February 13. H e is anxious to have me come to meet Bob Hannegan,1 the new chairman o f the National Dem ocratic Committee, at a party w hich the Missouri people are putting on in the M ayflow er to night. Trum an repeated w hat he said, that he was eager to support me fo r V ice President again, that he and I had seen things just alike, e tc , etc. . . . J a n u a r y 25,1944
. . . I arrived at D rew Pearson’s home about ten-thirty and found Sumner W elles, Barnet N over, Edgar M ow rer, A rchie MacLeish.* I told them I thought the tendency in the United States now was toward getting our boys out o f Europe at the earliest possible moment and then having as little as possible to do w ith Europe in the fu tu re I said I thought every victo ry strengthened the grow th o f this kind o f atti tude. Then w e discussed the article w hich W elles was putting in the W ashington Post on W ednesday morning8 . . . T h e central thesis in this approach is the mechanism fo r utilizing regional organizations in a w orld organization. On the w hole, this approach seemed to me to be more promising than any other. In general terms, I m yself have come out fo r the regional approach a year or so ago. W elles had some technical details w hich appear in this article . . . w hich make the regional approach somewhat more feasible. I told them I had been try ing to get some senator to introduce this article into the Congressional Record and that I w ould talk to Senator Lister H ill about the need fo r stirring up interest along this line. W e discussed quite frankly the danger o f Secretary H ull being jealous o f any such movement. W elles said that he thought H ull was for this general idea but that his w hole 1 R oben E. Hannegan, Commissioner o f Internal Revenue, was elected chairman o f the Democratic National Committee on January 22, 1944. T h en and later, he organized the campaign to nominate H arry S. Truman for the vice-presidency in 1944. On July 1, 1945, Truman appointed Hannegan Postmaster Général. * Archibald MacLeish, poet and literary critic, Librarian of Congress (1939-44), had been director o f the Office of Facts and Figures (1941-42) and assistant director o f the Office o f W a r Information (1941-43). In those roles he con stantly urged the President to define and announce specific plans fo r a liberal peace. • T h at article provided a preliminary statement about the kind o f world organi zation that W elles deserved more fully in T h e Tim e fo r Decision (N ew York, «944>-
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philosophy was to w ait until the people had led the w ay and not to attempt in any w ay to form public opinion himself.
J a n u a r y 26,1944
. . . Miss O livarez1 wanted me to come out w ith a statement urging the Am erican people both in the United States and in Latin Am erica, and particularly in Argentina, not to be deceived b y this apparent change in front o f the Argentine governm ent in breaking o ff relations w ith the A xis. I called up Berle about it and reached the conclusion that I w ould say something like the follow ing: “T h e real question in Argentina is not the breaking o ff o f relations w ith the A xis but the cleaning out o f the N azi nests w hich are a center o f infection o f the w hole hemisphere." (Later I decided not to do it . . . ) I also took up w ith Berle the significance o f the W elles statement in the January 26 W ashington Post. Berle said that W elles had de voted his life to thinking about problems o f this sort, and that there was no difference between W elles and H ull so far as he (Berle) knew w ith regard to this particular matter. Berle said the difference between H ull and W elles was in an altogether different area. I asked Berle pointblank if it w ould not be helping H ull if public opinion w ere marshaled behind some such proposal as that o f W elles. Berle thought it w ould. I asked Berle to consider the problem o f T om Connally. H e had no suggestions in this field. Berle said the State Departm ent and H ull in particular w ere quite aware o f the need for Argentina going far beyond her present step. I told Berle how delighted I was to know this. I then w ent on to urge that as the State Department continued to m ove on Argentina, it should also consider straightening out the situation in Bolivia in terms o f the people o f Bolivia themselves. Berle im mediately started talking against the present governm ent, saying several members o f the present governm ent had promoted the over throw in the office o f Per6n in Argentina,12 etc., etc. This m ay or may 1 Maria Rosa Olivarez of the Office o f the Coordinator o f Inter-American Affairs. 2 Colonel Juan D . Perön, an Axis sympathizer, as American military intelligence had reported, still headed the strongest clique within the government of General Pedro P. Ramirez. In February 1944 Peron led a group of colonels in seizing the Argentine Foreign Office and then replacing Ramirez in the presidency with their puppet, General Edelmiro Farrell. T h e new government released the Axis agents whom Ramirez had imprisoned, nullified civil liberties, and accelerated a military build-up. Those developments persuaded the State Department, which had not recognized the Farrell government, to recall the American
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not be true. I still have an absolutely open mind on that subject. It is quite w ithin the realm o f possibilities that evidence against the Bolivian governm ent is planted evidence and that Berle has been taken in b y it. It is also w ithin the realm o f possibilities that Berle has helped to plant the evidence. H ow ever, I am inclined to think that w ith regard to the Argentine matter, Berle is absolutely sincere. A t the same time, I can not help feeling that w ith respect to Bolivia, he is protecting either the Catholic church interest or the tin interests and that his sincerity m ay not be altogether com plete. In other words, I still don’t know w hether Berle is com pletely sound both w ith regard to Bolivia and Argentina, whether he is sound only w ith respect to Argentina, or w hether he is partially a deceiver and partially a man deceived. Cer tain aspects about Berle are quite satisfying w ith regard to the State Departm ent because he does deal in facts and does take a definite atti tude. I don't believe he understands the rank and file o f the people in South Am erica. I believe on the whole he is governed b y certain prin ciples o f expediency in the service o f his conception o f w hat he believes is right and sound in the w orld. A s to just w hat that conception really is, I still don’t quite know . H e is a good technician but psycho logically twisted . . . J a n u a r y 27,1944
. . . A t G overnor Lehman’s, H arry W hite o f T reasury told me that considerable progress was being made on international plans,*1 that the final outcom e w ould not look altogether like the procedure w hich he had advocated nor like the procedure w hich Lord Keynes had advo cated. It w ould be a compromise but perhaps a little more like the Am erican plan. W hite is very anxious for me to go to Russia, said Russia was the one country to w hich w e could loan m oney safely in the postwar period. I told W hite I w ould be very glad to go to Russia . . . Ambassador. For its part, the Bolivian government, which did recognize Farrell, moved away from Aryendne influence during 1944 and on that account gained recognition from the United States. 1 For what was to become the International Monetary Fund.
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*9* FEBRUARY 16 , 19 4 4
Sidney Hillm an told me he had had a long conference w ith the President that morning and that there was absolutely no question but w hat the President was actively running and planning fo r a fourth term. H e said the lay o f the land was m uch more certain in this respect in February o f 1944 than in February o f 1940 . . . W e took [the] Bob Jacksons to the N ational Sym phony concert. Bob told me d u t David Law rence/ the Philadelphia politician from Pitts burgh« was in to see him and had told Bob w ithout know ing anything about Bob’s friendship fo r me, that I was the only vice-presidential candidate w ho w ould strengthen the President in Pennsylvania. L aw rence was looking at the matter in a purely hard-boiled w ay and was basing his statement on talks w ith Pennsylvania people.
FEBRUARY
18, 1944
. . . T h e President was unusually cordial. H e im m ediately asked about the situation in California.1*3 A pparently he is much interested in H elen Gahagan* running fo r Congress. H e thought she w ould be an 1 David L. Lawrence, a rising political broker and member of the Democratic National Committee, was elected mayor o f Pittsburgh in 1945. 3 W allace had returned from a two-week swing west that took him successively, usually for major speeches, to Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, Milwaukee, Chicago, Springfield, St. Louis, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. In his addresses W allace put himself unequivocally on his party's left. American fascists, he said in Seattle, were “desperately striving” to control delegates to the state and national conventions. B y fascists he meant “those w ho believe that W all Street comes first and the country second and w ho are willing to go to any length through press, radio, and demagogue to keep W all Street safely sitting on top o f the country.” Colonel M cCormick, he aaded, in Chicago, was one o f them. Everywhere W allace called for “a general welfare economy” and redicted a “ profound revolution” after the w ar that could be “gradual and loodless” if the press, politicians, and men of wealth used their influence “on behalf o f the public good.” T h e tax system, he said, should give corporations incentives to employ their reserves for innovation and productivity. W ith “economic abundance" as a national policy, monopolistic practices would no longer have a place in society. W allace also recommended the establishment o f a federal “job authority” to advise the President and Congress about how to achieve and maintain full employment. T h at objective, he said, would entail cooperative planning b y federal, regional, and private groups. His remarks w on Roosevelt's public praise. 3 Helen M . Gahagan, actress w ife o f film star Melvin Douglas, was, like her husband, an active liberal in California Democratic politics. Elected a National Committeewoman in 1940, she was later appointed b y Roosevelt to an unpaid position in the Office o f Civilian Defense. H er candidacy for the Congress in 1944 succeeded, but, six years later, running for the Senate, she fell victim to the calculated, undiscriminating, and ferocious tactics o f Richard M . Nixon.
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offset to Clare Luce. I told him H elen was smarter than Clare Luce and her heart was in the right place. H e asked about M elvin Douglas and I said I understood he was in .India. I cold the President that a great many people had asked me to trans m it to him their warm est regards. H e said, “ Yes. It makes me cynical. T h eir interest in me is so that th ey get re-elected.” I said, “T h at is very natural, M r. President” . . . H e was very happy about having his veto sustained w ith regard to die subsidy.1 H e w ill be sending up a tax veto message in the very near future and expects to have that sustained also. H e looked quite rested. H e claimed he still had a hangover from the flu, in his shoulr ders, said that they tw inged quite a b it I said, “ Double your dosage o f vitamins.” H e said he was taking a pill now w hich had in it all the vitamins. 1 said, “ W ell, take tw ice as m uch.” H e spoke w ith great animadon about how he had been planning w ith Lord Beaverbrook about starting a four-page newspaper in this country after the war. Beaverbrook said he was making more m oney on his paper since it was cu t dow n to four pages than in the old days. T h e saving in newsprint more than made up for the loss in advertising. T h e President said he had been a newspaperman once and he w ould have no editorials, nothing but straight news and facts. T h e first page would deal w ith the w orld news, news o f broad significance. T h e last page would deal w ith local news. One o f the inside pages w ould deal w ith sports and wom en. A pparently this was Beaverbrook’s sugges tion. T h e President asked, “ W h y do you put sports and wom en on the same page?” Beaverbrook replied, “ One o f them is outdoor sports and the other is indoor sports.” T h e fourth page, I think he said, w ould be devoted to business and econom ic matters. H e w ould have the publication come out simultaneously at several spots over the coun try , transmitting the makeup either b y radio television or b y teletype. H e w ould have the size o f die papier m idway between the present tabloid and the present newspaper. Beaverbrook assured him that this was very econom ical in size. I suggested to the President that one page o f the piapier m ight vary according to the typie o f circulation, fo r exam ple, there could be an edition especially fo r labor, another fo r farmers, another fo r businessmen. T h e President said the newspapier should be o f a sort so there w ould be absolutely no opinion expressed whatso ever . . . 1 Congress had sustained Roosevelt's veto o f an act continuing the life o f the Commodity Credit Corporation but also increasing federal subsidies to agricul ture. Those subsidies, the President had noted, would have aggravated inflation. Later legislation merely preserved the COC.
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Stettinius was present at cabinet meeting and the subject fo r discus sion dealt w ith activities in the House Committee on Foreign A ffairs, apparently something relating to the W hite Paper.1 Secretary Stimson prom ptly go t into the discussion, saying how dangerous it was now fo r the House Committee to come out w ith anything along this line. T h e President, Stettinius, and Stimson seemed to be in com plete accord that the Moslem w orld was all ready to be set on fire all the w ay from M orocco to Arabia and the m ilitary situation w ould be imperiled b y any action taken at the present time. A lso Stettinius brought up certain difficulties involving oil, having to do w ith the British and ourselves in Arabia. It seems the British don’t like to see us active in oil in the N ear East. M ention was made o f a particular individual w ho apparently had called on Ickes, Stettinius, and Jimmie Byrnes w ith regard to the unfair practices o f the British. I have forgotten the name o f the man but Jimmie Byrnes said very strongly that if this man’s story was made public, it w ould almost pro duce a w ar between the United States and England. T h e President said that Ibn Saud, the king o f Arabia, was very much insulted because Chaim W eizm ann had sent a G entile archaeologist from England to Saudi and the archaeologist had offered $120 m illion to Saud if Saud would agree to an independent Palestine. Saud did not need the m oney at the particular moment and, therefore, proclaimed himself as being greatly insulted and furtherm ore he said he w ould never see another Jew until there had been an apology fo r this insult o f offering a bribe. Stimson called the State Departm ent the w ailing w all fo r the Jews. A t the opening o f cabinet meeting, the President said in a very friendly manner, “ W ell, the V ice President has just returned from a great trip. H e found the country was still there. Some o f the folks had begun to question it” . . . 1 T h e committee had been investigating the deliberate delays, especially those attributable to Breckinridge Long, in assisting the rescue o f European Jews threatened by H itler’s “final solution.” T h at investigation revealed Long’s antiSemitism as well as the hideous consequences o f his evasions and procrastina tions. Prodded by the hearings and by the Treasury Department, Roosevelt in January set up the W ar Refugee Board to find sanctuaries for European Jews and to facilitate their removal to them. Palestine, the closest and largest sanc tuary, remained substantially closed to refugees by the stipulations of the British W hite Paper that limited Jewish migration there. Until the war ended, the W ar Refugee Board located temporary sanctuaries outside of Palestine, which Zionists in the United States and elsewhere continued to consider the only appropriate Jewish homeland; see Feingold, Politics o f Rescue, Chs. 8, 9.
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21 , I 944
A t the W hite House the President started out b y reading extracts from his veto o f the tax b ill1 H e dw elt at length on the foolishness o f Congress in perm itting, in the tax bill, the timbermen to count their income from cutting trees as capital gains instead o f annual income. A lben Barkley took very sharp issue w ith him. T h e debate continued fo r about an hour. It is obvious that Alben for the first time is thor oughly disgusted w ith the President and feels that he has been badly treated b y the President . . . W hen I drove Barkley up on the H ill, he said, “W hat’s the use? I am through.” I said, “ Alben, w e all love you. Y ou have been a pillar o f strength.” Barkley came back w ith “ W hat’s the use? I can’t get the votes in the Senate under the methods that are being follow ed.” It was obvious to me that the President is very much delighted w ith his veto message and is certain o f the soundness o f his position and w ill make no change. Barkley is equally sure o f the soundness o f his position . . . FEBRUARY
22, 1944
. . . K rzyck i and K ulikow ski123wanted to let me know about the Am erican Polish Labor Council. K rzyck i is from M ilwaukee, a mem ber o f the C IO , and very eager to see that Polish nationalism in Europe has no effect w hatever on Polish voting within the United States. H e read from a letter w hich he had sent President Roosevelt o f w hich he is going to send me a copy. T h e Polish Ambassador here has undoubt edly been m ixing too much in internal affairs o f the United States. T h e Polish language press has been very reactionary. K rzyck i claims that this press does not represent the sentiment o f the Polish w orkers. H e, therefore, thinks that the Am erican Polish Labor Council is very im1 T h e tax bill fell far short o f providing the revenue the Treasuty had requested both to finance the war and to combat inflation. T h e bill also included many regressive schedules that favored business interests whose lobbies had influenced Congress. Educated about the bill’s deficiencies by both the Treasury and Bymes and Vinson, the President vetoed it as providing relief “not for the needy but for the greedy.” T h e timber schedule, as he noted, afforded one example of the bill’s deficiencies. It provided for taxing cut timber as capital gains, which would reduce taxes on lumbering companies, instead o f as a crop to be taxed at ordinary and higher rates. O nly W allace at the meeting of February xi, 1944, supported Roosevelt’s proposed veto. O n that veto ana ensuing de velopments, see Blum, Years o f War, pp. 64—78, and Bums, Roosevelt: Soldier o f Freedom, pp. 433-437. 3 L e o K r z y c k i, president o f the A m e r ic a n P olish L a b o r C o u n cil, and A d a m H . K u lik o w s k i, C h ic a g o publish er o f a Polish jou rnal, th en w ith th e O W L
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portant. H e is tryin g to persuade K ulikow ski to com e and w ork fo r this council. T his council apparently w ill w ork parallel w ith Sidney Hillm an’s organization but w ill not be a part o f it . . .
FEBRUARY 23, 19 4 4
. . . Senator Barkley’s statement was the most outstanding session o f the Senate w hich I ever presided over.1 A fter Barkley began speak ing, the Senate chamber rapidly filled up. A number o f people came over from the House especially from Virginia. A fter Barldey finished, practically every senator stood on his feet and clapped for about one and a half minutes. Barkley’s speech apparently had been very hastily prepared because every few minutes Senator M cK ellar w ent out to get fo r Barkley new typew ritten pages. A t one time, it looked as though Barkley was about to run out. I w onder if any senator ever received such a spontaneous ovation as Barkley . . . T h e news o f Raym ond Clapper’s death came to me w hile I was on the W est Coast. I im mediately w rote a letter to Mrs. Clapper. Raym ond, in spite o f his tendency to sw ing around every fourth year to the presi dential candidate w hich his paper was supporting, was just about as fine a newspaperman as I ever knew. U ndoubtedly he was more inde pendent than 9 out o f io newspapermen. M ost o f them as a matter o f course are like chameleons, taking on the changing colors o f their em ployers. Clapper did this too to a m inor degree in the latter part o f each fourth year . . . T here are many very fine newspapermen but I do not know o f very many w ho stand up quite as independently as Clapper unless it is M arquis Childs.123 W hile I was talking w ith M rs. Clapper, Lister H ill came in and in dicated very clearly his sympathies w ere all w ith Senator Barkley and that it was time fo r the President to stop kicking so many people around up on the H ill. I w ent into A lben’s office. H e told me that there was no one to whom he was so loyal, fo r whom he had so much respect, w ith the one exception o f W oodrow W ilson, as Roosevelt; nevertheless he felt that 1 A n g ry over Roosevelt’s veto of the tax bill, as were most Democrats in Con gress, Barkley resigned as M ajority Leader of the Senate, made a speech on the floor that attacked the Presidents interpretation of the timber schedule, and denounced the President’s comment about relief for the greedy as a “calculated and deliberate assault upon the legislative integrity of every member of Con gress.” Self-respect, Barkley said, demanded a vote to override the veto. 3 Marquis W . Childs, since 1926 a reporter for the S c Louis Pott-D ispctcb, had just become a columnist for the United Feature Syndicate.
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die Congress derived its pow er w ith the people and that the President had not played fairly w ith Congress, and that he, Barkley, just had to make his statement. I told him undoubtedly the Dem ocradc senators w ould choose him again as M ajority Leader when they m et tom orrow m orning, and that he, Barkley, w ould be in a stronger position than he ever had been. H e said he had not made his speech w ith any political m otive in mind. I said, “ Yes, I know that, but nevertheless it seems to me you can use this situation to g et some discipline into the Dem ocratic Party. 1 think yo u ow e it to yourself, the party, and the country to do this.” I told Hassett1 over at the W hite House w hat a fine attitude Barkley had tow ard the President and he said he w ould pass it on to the Presi dent. Earlier I had told G race T u lly , before Barkley began to speak, w hat was in the air. A fter Barkley finished, I told Hassett about how the Senate had received the speech. A lso I told him tw ice to tell the President not to issue any statement until the President had read Bark ley’s speech in fu ll. It was obvious during the speech that Senator B yrd and Senator W alsh123and the Republicans w ere getting a great deal o f unconcealed pleasure out o f it. A fter Barkley concluded, Sen ator M cClellan o f Arkansas, LaFollette o f W isconsin, and a number o f others came up to shake hands w ith him. Barkley more and more is universally beloved in the Senate; even Senator M cK ellar, w ho less than a year ago was at daggers’ points w ith him, now seems to be one o f Barldey’s dearest friends. G u ffey is the one now w ho seems to have the greatest antagonism tow ard Barkley. W infield Riefler told me that his office in London was now a very big thing, that it had to do not only w ith blockade matters but that both the Am erican and British armies had turned over to it w ork hav ing to do w ith picking bom bing objectives. R iefler thinks w e are com ing into a postwar w orld o f pow er poli tics w ith the w orld being run b y the U nited States, England, and Rus 1 W illiam D . Hassett and Grace T u lly o f the President’s personal staff. Roosevelt was at H yd e Park. W hen Hassett released W allace's account of Barkley’s speech, the President said: "Alben must be suffering from shell shock,” but he showed "no w ord of anger, resentment or recrimination” ; see W illiam D . Hassett, O ff the Record w ith FD R (N ew Brunswick, 1958). A fter talking to Bymes, Roosevelt sent Barkley a conciliatory telegram urging him to remain as M ajority Leader and expressing the hope that if he did resign, his colleagues would re-elect him. O n February 25 the Senate overrode the veto, as the House already had. For the first time in American history. Congress had overridden a veto of a revenue bill. T h at day the Senate Democrats also re-elected Barkley their leader. 3 David I. Walsh, since 1929 Democratic Senator from Massachusetts.
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sia. H e thinks there is no prospect w hatever fo r any type o f League o f Nations. I asked him w hat accounted for the change during the last year and a half. He said the reason was the remarkable progress made b y the Russian armies. I asked him w hat reports he had on the kind o f people the leading Russians w ere. H e says they are people w ho came up b y the hard w ay, w ho have had very little outside experience. T h ey are com petent and capable technicians but are very suspicious toward the outside w orld, animated b y peasant cunning. Riefler said one o f our Am erican attachés, w ho was very friendly to Russia, says the Russians don’t w ant foreigners to see how poverty stricken they are now. T h at is the reason they keep foreigners o u t T h e y w ill be most happy to show foreigners around 20 years hence when they have been able to do a real job. Riefler thinks Russia w ill be the most pow erful country in the world and that she w ill dominate all the Slav, the Baltic, and the Balkan states. H e thinks that their cultural traditions w ill be so different from ours that it w ill be hard for us to get along w ith them. I told him I thought the thing for us to do was to let England and Russia settle Europe but for us to have direct access to Russia w ith respect to Asiatic matters. I said I thought our people would ulti m ately be disgusted if w e go t into boundary questions in Europe. Barkley said pointblank to me that the President had been misled b y his advisers and he knew who they were. H e said they w ere the same people w ho had gotten him into trouble w ith regard to railw ay labor, folks who w ere more clever than honest. I asked him w ho he meant. He hesitated for a moment and finally said he meant Jimmie Byrnes and Fred Vinson . . . Barkley has drawn the issue clearly fo r Congress, the President has drawn the issue clearly fo r the people. FEBRUARY
24, 1944
. . . David D ubinsky1 was very frank in describing the affairs o f the Am erican Labor Party in N ew Y ork C ity as they related to the fight between him and Sidney Hillman. H e said Hillman now has con trol o f the communists in the Am erican Labor Party. Dubinksy has been fighting the communists. H e said that Hillman in 1942 supported Bennett but that he could not make the Am erican Labor Party vote for him (Bennett). 1 David Dubinsky, since 1932 president of the International Ladies Garment W orkers Union, and in 1936 a founder of the American Labor Party in N ew York.
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H e says if Hillm an, in the prim ary w hich is now com ing up with the Am erican Labor Party, wins out, the David D ubinsky-A lec RossDean A lfange group w ill have to set up another party.1 T h e y w ill be fo r Roosevelt and W allace just the same as Hillm an’s group, but the David D ubinsky group w ill find it necessary to denounce the Hillman group. Dubinsky says that Hillman is doing a good job everyw here in the country except in N ew Y ork C ity. Dubinsky says that Hillman is try ing to settle some ancient scores in N ew Y ork C ity and is doing the President damage there. Dubinsky saw the President recently and told him the situation. T h e President said he would get in touch w ith H ill man . . . H e says the communists are very hard workers, that they are fa natics. H e says the best w orkers in his ow n organization are ex-com munists. David says the present communistic front orders come from Oum ansky in M exico C ity. T his checks w ith m y ow n observations. D ubinsky says the communists today are fo r the President in the w ar effort just as strongly as they w ere against the President and the w ar effort three years ago. T h is also checks w ith m y observations as made on m y recent trip. T h e communists in the United States today are not only for the President and the w ar effort but they are against the class struggle and fo r W all Street. T h e communists are aw ay over to the right o f where most w orkers and union labor are located . . . FEBRUARY 2 Ç, 19 4 4
. . . C row ley is quite stirred up at the attacks on him in PM .2 H e thought he ought to talk w ith Marshall Field.* H e w ent into detail about V icto r Emanuel. H e said Emanuel inherited 25 million dollars from his father and in the twenties w ent to England and built a castle and became president o f the H unt Club. H e came back here in 1930 and settled down. In 1932 he gave $80,000 to help get the President elected. H e also gave quite a bit o f m oney in 1936. H e gave $10,000 to Leo 1 In M ay 1944 A lec Ross and Dean Alfange, w ho had been A L P gubernatorial candidate in 1942, did join Dubinsky in founding the progressive but anti communist Liberal Party in N ew York. 3 1. F. Stone was writing that series o f articles. One o f them condemned Crow ley for his failure, while Alien Property Custodian, to take the steps necessary to revent General Aniline and D ye from reverting after the war to control by G . Farben. * Marshall Field III, president o f the Field Foundation and o f Field Enterprises, had established both the Chicago Sun and PM in N ew Y ork to assure the availability o f a liberal newspaper in those cities.
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w hich L eo personally gave to some one. I have forgotten just w ho Leo said. Leo says there is absolutely nothing im proper about w hat he has done relative to V icto r Emanuel either w ith regard to die A lien Property Custodian or F E A , that he w ould be glad to have both agen cies examined b y congressional committees . . . C row ley spoke at some length about General Aniline and D ye. T h is is probably the most effective o f the Germ an chem ical setups in this country. C row ley said it could be handled in any one o f three w ays: i —b y negotiated sale; z—b y com petitive bidding, and 3—b y voting trustees. H e thinks only b y the last tw o w ill it be possible to keep General Aniline and D ye free from Germ an influence after the w ar. Leo says that General Aniline has about 70 researchers and about 4000 patents. H e says they have adopted a program for licensing the use o f patents at reasonable rates so that they can be used generally. Superficially at least, his w hole program sounded very good. Leo said that V icto r Emanuel was m ore in accord w ith the President in his econom ic view s than most o f the big businessmen, that he felt Emanuel was definitely more progressive than either Baruch or Jesse Jones. I told L eo that I was glad to know he had such progressive plans in view fo r the use o f patents. C row ley also w ent into detail about the w ay in w hich he had han dled F E A . H e said the first thing to do was to get it quieted down. H e said his w orst trouble was w ith the State Department. H e has a very deep feeling o f resentment against H ull and G eorge Messersmith. H e is fu lly fam iliar w ith the w ay in w hich Jesse Jones w orks through H arry B yrd and Senator M cK ellar . . . It was interesting to hear L eo pay considerable tribute to H enry M orgenthau. I could not help remembering how M orgenthau a year or so ago brought in to me a terrible indictm ent o f both C row ley and V icto r Emanuel. C row ley claims that he and Frank W alker are the tw o most promi nent Catholics in the administration. I asked him how about Frank M urphy. H e says the Catholics look on Frank more or less as a joke. T h e y have no use fo r a man w ho parades his religion in the w ay M urphy does . . .
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. . . Charles T a ft1 made the observation that the D em ocratic Party 1 Charles P. T a ft, Cincinnati lawyer and urban reformer, in 1944 in the State Department as director o f W artim e Economic Affairs, that night at a dinner given b y Secretary o f Labor Frances Perkins.
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was subsidizing the leading N egro preachers in die country. Madame Secretary disagreed. T a ft spoke about a big Baptist N egro congrega tion in Harlem . Kane1 spoke up and said he thought die pastor o f this congregation, a M r. Pow ell,3 was perhaps m ore a communist than a Dem ocrat. Madame Secretary said she thought the communists in spired the recent attack on the Bureau o f Labor cost-of-living figures. She said M eany is not a communist but she knows the names o f tw o communists w ho inspired him. I told her I doubted w hether the com munists inspired this attack because m y observations w ere that die communists w ere doing everything possible now to support the w ar effort . . m arch
3,1944
. . . T he cabinet m eeting was quite short. T h e President passed part w ay around the table a picture o f a baby w ithout much clothes on entitled, “T h e Fourth T erm ” w ith a phrase under it, “ O h, G od Dammit.” It w ent as far around the table as Frank K nox and Claude W ickard then stopped because they did not want to pass it on to Madame Secretary. . . . Stetdnius indicated that the A rgentine situadon was still very fluid and that Farrell and Perön w ere undoubtedly N azi sympathizers. H e said there had been an agreement reached among all the Latin Am erican nadons except Venezuela and Chile not to recognize the new governm ent. Secretary H ull did not w ant to proceed w ith nonrecogni tion measures until Venezuela and Chile had agreed . . . I showed the President after cabinet m eeting a two-sentence memo o f Stalin’s reaction to a presentation made b y the British Ambassador on behalf o f Churchill w ith respect to the Polish situation. T h is memo indicated that Stalin was angry, that he grunted and said nothing. T h e President said to me w ith regard to the memo that he was fam iliar w ith w hat had taken place. T hen he w ent on to say, “ Did I ever tell yo u the story o f French Indochina? A year or so ago when Church ill was over here, I called his attention to the fact that the French had renounced their claims to Indochina in favor o f the Japs six months be1 R. Keith Kane, N e w Y o rk lawyer, held various federal positions during the war, in 1944 on the staff o f the Secretary o f the N avy. 3 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., since 1937 minister of the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem, had been in 1941 the first black ever elected to the N ew Y ork C ity Council. Then as always an eloquent and aggressive champion of black rights, Powell often sounded radical but he was never a communist. Indeed, during the war, the. Communist Party, urging national unity as the best w ay in which to aid the Soviet Union and defeat the Germans, advocated the postponement o f agitation for d v il rights.
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fore the United States was attacked b y the Japs.” T h e President then continued b y saying, “ I believe that after the Japs are driven out, the French have no longer any claim to French Indochina and I am sure the Chinese w ill not w ant French Indochina.” Churchill came back b y saying, “ O f course, the Chinese w ill want it.” T h e President then tw itted Churchill by saying, “ W ell, you are speaking for Britain w hich has been fo r centuries an imperialistic pow er and you have several generations o f imperialist ancestors behind you. You have never re fused a square mile anywhere that you could lay your hands on.” Follow ing this, the President w rote or telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek and asked if he wanted French Indochina. T he Generalissimo replied, “ N o.” Later on, at Cairo, the President in Churchill’s presence asked Chiang Kai-shek if he wanted French Indochina. T h e Generalissimo again said, “N o .” Later on again, at Teheran, the President asked Stalin if he thought France should have French Indochina after the w ar was over. Stalin said, “ N o .” T h e President said his idea was that French Indochina should be run for a time under a trusteeship prelimi nary to the time when she w ould be given her independence, some 30 or 40 years hence, in the same w ay as the Philippine Islands w ill be given their independence. Stalin said that w ould be fine and came around and shook hands w ith the President showing how strongly he was fo r the idea. Roosevelt said to Churchill, “ W ell, w e are three to one against you on this. You had better come across and w e w ill make it unanimous.” Churchill said, “ W ell, I w ill have to consult w ith m y cabinet.” T h e President said, “T h e trouble with you is that you are thinking that Burma might want to be independent, that the Straits Settlements m ight want to be independent, or the D utch East Indies m ight w ant to be independent after they have gone through an apprenticeship under a trusteeship.” T h e President said he thought the Poles as usual w ere handling things very badly, that he thought Stalin’s ideas w ere sound w ith re gard to Poland. Stalin thought that the Poles should have that part o f Germ any up to within about 30 miles o f Berlin including Brandenburg, Pomerania, etc. I said to the President, “ I assume you mean the G er mans w ould be moved out o f this area and into Germ any proper?” T he President said, “ Yes.” He said this part o f eastern G erm any was much richer than eastern Poland beyond the Curzon Line. A fter this conversation, I said to the President, “ H ow w ould it be sometime during the next month or tw o if I w ent to Russia?” T he President said, “ I think they are going to be shooting at you during the campaign fo r being too far to the left. M y ow n feeling is that
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you had better not go to Russia.” H e continued, “ I think it w ould be better fo r you to go to China b y w ay o f Alaska and Siberia. Y ou could stop o ff and visit some o f the towns in Siberia on your w ay to Chung king, spending some little time in each o f the Siberian towns. T h e weather is more settled in the Alaska-Siberian country between June fifteen and A ugust fifteen.” I said to the President, “ H ow w ould it be to go on from China to visit the boys in the Southwest Pacific?” H e said, “ It would be fine if you could find some w ay o f keeping aw ay from the generals” . . . 1 mentioned the David D ubinsky m atter to him and told him that David wanted me to w rite him (D avid) a letter saying the Am erican Labor Party had been doing a patriotic w ork and it ought to continue to exist. T h e President said, “ W ell, let’s w ait awhile.” H e said, “ I have talked to Sidney Hillman about it and Hillm an has agreed to eliminate all communists from running fo r office but thinks that David Dubinsky is being unreasonable in w anting to exercise some o f his personal prej udices w ith regard to candidates.” I talked briefly to the President about the Barkley situation. T h e President said when he left for H yde Park last Tuesday he had no idea anything o f that sort w ould happen. T h e first w ord he had o f it was the w ord w hich G race T u lly transmitted from me about 12:30 on W ednesday. I told the President that it m ight be w ell to give the Senators and Barkley somewhat more responsibility than he had given them hitherto. A t any rate, it m ight be good strategy to try out this method fo r a time . . .
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N elson R ockefeller was exceedingly disturbed about the Argentine situation. I agreed w ith him utterly as to its seriousness. H e says the difficulty is w ith Cordell H ull, that Stettinius is all right. It seems that H ull wants to w ait to get all the other Latin Am erican nations seeing things just the w ay w e do. It is interesting to see the extent to which R ockefeller has become com pletely disgusted w ith H ull. T he atmosphere at the W hite House correspondents’ dinner was re m arkably friendly to the President. T h ey put on an exceptionally good show. I congratulated several members o f the press on the un usually fine feeling. Apparently the men felt that this m ight perhaps be the last time w e would have a W hite House correspondents’ dinner w ith Roosevelt and they w ere on their best behavior . . . T h e Presi dent g o t a great kick out o f it.
T h e Price o f Vision
3 ïo MARCH 6 , 19 4 4
. . . I talked to the President at some little length about the Pales tine meeting on M arch 9. H e definitely turned down saying anything like the . . . attached1 in m y longhand which I read aloud to him. He said Churchill was a Zionist. T hen he discussed the Arabian situation at some length. H e also discussed the plans which he has for future han dling o f the Jewish question. Apparently he intends to get the Jews what they want without setting the Arabs on their ear. H e suggested that at the M arch 9 meeting, I talk about the persecution o f the Jews and their need fo r tolerance . . . A t the W hite House, I stopped for a moment to show the President a map w ith a route marked on it showing a proposed trip. H e put his finger on the 3300-mile hop from Australia to Ceylon and said that was too much risk to take. H e thought 16 hours in the air was too much. H e suggested I leave on the trip sometime during June and arrange to get back to Fairbanks, Alaska, about the time the National Democratic Convention begins, say about July 17. H e thought it would be about right to leave early in June, thought I ought not to spend much more than three days in Chungking. I told him about m y idea o f the future importance o f Siberia and eastern Asia generally as well as Latin America, saying that this part o f the world was going to have the most rapidly grow ing population, that there was going to be pioneer exploitation o f this part o f the world, that roads, airports, and railroads would be built, that there would be need for construction machines and machine tools. I said that I felt this area had the very greatest importance to the United States, that technologically speaking w e w ere the leaders with regard to this area. I told him I hoped that m y trip to some extent would contribute to this general idea . . .
m arch
7,1944
I gave Ed Stettinius the map which I had shown the President and told him the President’s ideas about China. Ed confirmed completely Sdmson’s views that China was a very, very thom y problem right now. Ed thought I ought to go on to India, that I could do an awful lot o f good there, also in Australia. Said he felt so strongly about the 1 W allace had written but then did not use the following passage: MI am glad to be here tonight—to associate myself in this w ay with this movement. T h e homeless Jews o f the world have the right to a land which they can call their own. Democracy owes such a home to those Jews whose families have been mistreated beyond all compréhension.”
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subject he Was going to take it up w ith the President when he saw him the follow ing day to see if he could not induce the President to let me go on to India and Australia. H e also said he did not see any reason w h y I should not go to M oscow. H e thought it would be good poli tics rather than bad politics if I went on to M oscow.
m arch
9,1944
Stetdnius called up after his visit to the President and told me he was returning the map. H e said that the President definitely did not want me to go to India or Australia, that he had his heart set on m y going to China and it did not make any particular difference where I w ent in Siberia . . . Lauch Currie, Davies,1 and Fairbank3 came in to express the opin ion that they thought it was very important for me to go to China. T h e y felt that m y mere presence there would straighten out certain difficulties, especially difficulties between the Russians and the Chinese. Currie is going to w ork up for me a tentative schedule in China. Lauch says Madame Sun Yat-sen is a grand person but has been denied free dom o f movement b y her jealous sisters. Currie thinks the shorter time I spend in Chungking, the better it w ill be. Currie said a representative o f the National C ity Bank* was up in Shensi and S. Lansi, the com munistic areas o f northeast China, recently, and was quite lyrical about how honest and fine the people w ere up there as compared w ith peo ple around Chungking. I asked w hat the Chinese communists were like and was told that they were agrarian reformers. T h e y want a law passed so interest rates w ill not be more than 33 percent a year . . .
m arch
10,1944
I asked Owen Lattimore to come in because Lauchlin Currie had telephoned that he thought Lattimore would be ideal to go with me on the trip. Lattimore brought on an English translation o f the G en1 John P. Davies, capable foreign service officer assigned to the staff of General Joseph W . Stilwell, commanding general of American forces in the China, Burma, India theater. Throughout the war Davies’ reporting from China “aroused interest because o f its search for essentials, its vividness, and its au dacity. A ll recipients o f Davies’ memos read them with alert attention” ; Herbert Feis, T h e China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), p. 257. 3 John K . Fairbank, Harvard professor o f Chinese history and assistant to Currie on Chinese matters, had recently returned from Chungking. • G . Martel Hall.
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T he Price of Vision
eralissimo’s book C hinas Destiny, which has not ye t been published, and also his own book, T h e Making o f M odem China. Lattimore thinks very highly of Colonel Faymonville, said he met the Colonel in 1936 in M oscow. He understands the internal political situation in China very well and also the situation between China and Russia. He thinks I can render a very great service b y going to Siberia and China. H e himself would be utterly thrilled to go along . . . A t cabinet meeting Cordell Hull w ho had just returned from Florida started out talking about Argentina, stating that the latest Ramirez move was an effort to get the Chief Justice o f the Supreme Court in as President. H ull said that if it worked it would be Âne because the Chief Justice was a friend o f the United States. T h e President spent about ten minutes ribbing Hull on Howland Shaw1 and the 130 young diplomats whom Shaw had tried to get exempted from the draft. In the paper that was sent over to the President, the claim was made that these men were necessary because o f the hard climate. T h e President, w ho is an expert on geography and climate, went over the places one b y one and pointed out that in most o f the places the climate was not hard at all. For example, he stated one man was necessary in Caracas because it was a very hard climate. T h e President said that everybody knows that Caracas is a perfectly lovely climate all the year round. Hull got a little nettled and said everybody was kicking the State Department around because it was so old, it could not do any thing. T he President then proceeded to say, “ Oh, you are just talking about Arthur K rock.” It was obviously a sideways dig at Hull because o f the w ay in which the State Department uses K rock con tinuously as a stooge to pull its irons out o f the fire. T h e President may have been a little unfair to the State Department but he certainly had a thoroughly good time with Arthur K rock and Howland Shaw. This precipitated the whole manpower question. Each agency had lost, or was on the point o f losing, a large part of its key personnel. T h e President very vigorously took the side o f the A rm y and the N avy, and said he had to have 1,200,000 men and that the government could not be exempted. M cN u tt led the opposition to the President, pointing out, for example, that nearly all the personnel in young industries like radar, electronics, etc., are manned b y young men, and that obviously there are many o f these industries so important to the war effort that no good purpose whatsoever would be served in having these young men Âght with guns instead o f making radar. M cN u tt’s 1 G . Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary o f State with special duties relating to foreign service personnel.
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answer to the problem is to get the married man, o f whom he claims there are plenty. Stimson claimed there is a great reserve on the farms and that the farmers could get along perfectly all right if it were not for their un willingness to buy machinery. O f course, Don Nelson, Claude W ick ard, and I knew absolutely this was not true. It is amazing how often complete distortions o f fact get b y unchallenged in cabinet meeting. O f course, Stimson is a fine old man but he doesn’t have the remotest glimmering of the farm situation. T h e President held forth at some little length about how . . . Stephen W ise and Rabbi Silver1 were in to see him and how he had started out b y attacking them vigorously b y saying, “ D o you want to be responsible b y your action for the loss o f hundreds of thousands o f lives? Do you want to start a H o ly Gehad?” T h e President con tinued along this line, quoting his conversation with regard to the danger o f attacks from the enraged Arabs. It is exactly the same line he had pulled on M onday when I raised the question. And yet I knew because Silver had talked to me at length the night before that the bulk o f the President’s conversation had undoubtedly been to cause W ise and Silver to believe that he was in complete accord with them and the only question was the timing . . . T h e President certainly is a waterman. He looks one direction and rows the other with the utmost skill . . . Ickes spoke up and said that W ise and Silver were very much pleased w ith their interview with the President. I did not see W ise myself but Silver told me, the evening o f March 9, that he was very much pleased. Silver had also told me that the opposition to Zionism came from the State Department . . .
m arch
11,1944
. . . I showed the General3 the proposed map o f m y trip. Like Secretary Stimson, the General said the situation in China was very 1 Rabbis Abba Hillel Silver and Stephen S. W ise had seen the President on March 9. On leaving the W hite House they issued the following statement: "T h e President authorized us to say that the American government has never given its approval to the W hite Paper o f 1919. T h e President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees, and that when future decisions are reached, full jusnce will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home, for which our government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight o f hundreds o f thousands o f homeless Jewish refugees." 2 G eorge Marshall.
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T b e Price o f Vision
bad. H e has no faith whatever in Madame Chiang. H e said Churchill was also disillusioned. H e said Churchill at first had been com pletely taken in b y the Madame. He gave quite a different picture o f Sdlw ell’s operations in Burma than Stimson had given me recently. Stimson had been very pessimistic; Marshall was optimistic and said it was a question o f just how good a job Stillwell had done o f training the Chinese troops . . . I told the General I would like to take Colonel Faymonville w ith me on this trip. T h e General w ent straight up in the air. H e said Faymonville was a representative o f the Russians, not o f the United States. He said Faymonville was more than anyone else responsible for the blowup in Russia which had resulted in Admiral Standley com ing back, said there was another A rm y man, b y the name o f Colonel Michela,1 w ho was also to blame, although Michela had been on the opposite side o f the fence from Faymonville. Both o f them had been brigadier generals in Russia. Both o f them had been demoted to colonel on their return to the United States. T h e General said the FBI had a file on Faymonville (this probably does not mean a thing because the FBI no doubt has a file, as the President himself has suggested from time to time, on Mrs. Roosevelt, that would make her appear to be the worst person in the United States). A nyhow , seeing how hot the General was on Faymonville, I shied completely aw ay from that subject. It was rather obvious to me that the General belongs to the school o f thought which is fearful o f Russia. H e is a decisive man and probably about the most progressive man w e could have in this key position in the A rm y. In die broader field o f policy, I am afraid he would get lost rapidly. H e is a man o f character radier than o f broad vision . . . Currie also thinks very highly o f Colonel Faymonville. H e also thinks very highly o f General Marshall. This reminds me too that O w en Latdmore spoke to me in the very highest terms concerning Faymon ville. W hile I was in Currie’s office, I had a visit w ith John Carter V in cent,3 who heads up Chinese affairs in the State Department. H e has 1 General Joseph A . Michels, American military attaché in M oscow (1941-4)). 2 John Carter Vincent, a learned, perceptive, charming veteran China hand, had been counselor o f the embassy at Chungking (1942-43) and then assistant to the chief of the S a te Department’s Division o f Far Eastern Affairs. In 1944 he became chief o f that division. A long with Lattimore, Davies, John S. Service, and other relatively young men w ho gave the United Sates government the most accurate and trenchant analyses o f Chinese affairs available to any gov ernment, Vincent, y e a n later, after the communist victory in China, became a scapegoat for the ignorant and suspicious men w ho temporarily dominated American policy.
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spent some time in China and Carrie tells me that he is a perfectly splendid man. Currie called up Secretary H ull’s secretary about 2:30 to ask if the Secretary was in and whether or not I could stop around to see him. H ull’s secretary said he was not in. Currie called again about 4:00 and the report was still that he was not in. Shortly after ward I came down and noticed Secretary H ull’s chauffeur in the hall and asked H arty about what time H ull had arrived. H e said about 3:30. W hen I go t home, I called Hull on the W hite House telephone and it was amusing to see how extraordinarily agreeable he was. T h e old fox knew I had caught him and immediately began to say how the President had sent over a lot o f very important w ork which was going to keep him busy and if I would come around about 6:00 p.m. he would be most happy to see me, etc. I interrupted and said I had been talking with the President about a trip to China and had already talked to Ed Stettinius and I wanted to talk to him about it after he had had an opportunity to talk w ith his advisers on the subject. He said yes, he had heard something about the trip and that he would be perfectly happy to place at m y disposal any o f his advisers. His atti tude over the telephone was just about the warmest I have ever known it to be and y e t apparently he had given his secretary instructions not to let me know that he was in. I guess that is customary office pro cedure around the State Department. T h e boys have to keep in practice.
m arch
13,1944
. . . I told the President . . . that I had talked to H ull on the tele phone with regard to the trip to China and also that I had talked with Stimson and General Marshall. It immediately appeared that the President is much stronger for the trip than I had ever thought. I told him that I told Hull that I did not want to go on the trip unless I could do some real good. T h e President said, “Oh, you must go. I think you ought to see a lot o f Siberia.” I said that I had reached the conclusion since he had first spoken to me about going to China and Siberia that he had chosen very wisely in limiting the trip to just those tw o places and that apparently he had more in mind than I had suspected when he first mentioned China to me. H e then said how he had talked to his daughter Anna Boettiger and how she had said that the businessmen on the W est Coast were looking forward to a huge trade w ith Siberia. I told the President about m y conversation with General Marshall about Faymonville. T h e President said yes, that he knew how the General felt, that Marshall felt that Faymonville was a
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T he Price o f Vision
traitor. T he President said Faymonville stood pretty low in the A rm y right now and it probably would be best not to take him w ith me. I told the President that Lauchlin Currie was hoping to see him some time tomorrow after press conference and that Lauch thought very highly o f John Carter Vincent in the State Department. I told the President I hoped both the A rm y and the State Department w ould be for the trip. W hen I turned to go and had walked nearly across the room, the President put his hand up to his mouth and whispered in a very loud whisper, “Things w ent off pretty well, didn’t they?” H e was refer ring to the relationship with Barkley . . .
m arch
15 ,19 4 4
. . . Pregel1 had some pamphlets on Russia, dealing with the mineral resources in various parts of Siberia. It appears that there are especially rich resources in the southern part o f the Khirgiz from Alma A ta and Tashkent to U zbeck and from there on south. There are significant uranium deposits there. T h e W ar Department has not had this infor mation and has asked Pregel for it. Pregel told me about a device they have worked out very secretly for using uranium as a source o f power b y converting the great heat 1800c into energy b y using that heat to heat a certain metal alloy inside o f a metal tubing. It is m y guess that «.his w ill eventually make passé oil, coal, waterpower, etc., as sources o f power . . .
m arch
20,1944
T he Ambassador and I talked for some time about Madame G ro m yko’s health and then began talking about m y trip. He wanted to let me know that the Soviet Union would be most happy to have me make a trip to Moscow. I gave him the background o f the trip and told him w h y it seemed inadvisable for me to go to M oscow. T h e atmosphere was most cordial throughout. H e told me a story which the President told him about Stalin’s good sense o f humor. It seems the President said, after he stopped being President he would like to be a salesman handling Georgian champagne (the champagne at Teheran must have been very good) and Stalin put his finger to his forehead 1 Boris Pregel, a friend and occasional adviser to W allace, was an expert on radium. His loan of uranium had permitted the first experiments at Columbia University preliminary to the development o f atomic energy.
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and thought a moment and said, “ It seems to me there was a German b y the name o f Ribbentrop w ho was a specialist in selling cham pagne” . . .
m arch
23,1944
. . . Oscar Ew ing,1 vice chairman o f the Democratic National Com mittee, said he wanted to make a report to Harold Young and me with regard to the sentiment as he found it among the Democratic organi zation people in the different states in the west. He said he thought H . Y . and I ought to know the truth even though it was bad news. H e said the organization people in Colorado were against me because o f some stand I had taken on beet sugar, that there was no enthusiasm at all in Idaho; in Oregon there was a mild enthusiasm; in Minnesota he found them strong for me.12 A fter Ew ing left, Harold ventured the opinion that Ew ing was trying to be friendly. Ew ing made the point that a member o f the National Committee could take no part whatever as between candi dates. I told him I agreed with him absolutely. I did not tell him that I had heard . . . that Hannegan was passing word around that it was "thumbs down” on me. Ew ing said that the Democratic organization people left to themselves would probably pick Sam Rayburn. He said, however, in his opinion the President would handle the situation just like he did last time, that he would wait until the last minute. K now ing the President as he knew him, he thought the President would hesitate to make a change and, therefore, the President would pick me. I said I thought the man w ho would be picked for V ice President would be the one w ho gave the best prospect o f helping the ticket win in the fall. Ew ing said in his opinion the President would make his choice o f a man he (the President) felt would make the best V ice President and the man who would make the best President in case anything happened to him (the President). Harold may be right in saying that Ew ing’s motive was to make a friendly gesture while at the same time displaying no partiality. M y own feeling is that there is something else involved although I don’t know just what it is . . . 1 Oscar R. Ewing, N ew Y ork lawyer, vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee since August 1942. 2 In comparison, the Gallup Poll, early in March, as the V ice President knew, had found nim the strong first choice for renomination among rank and file Demo* crats in every section o f the country. O n a nationwide basis Gallup allotted W allace 46 percent with only 21 percent for Hull, w ho was in second place, and 13 percent to Farley in third. Others shared fractions of the balance.
T he Price o f Vision
318 MARCH
24, 1944
. . . Pehle and Luxford1 presented the case o f the Treasury against Argentina. Pehle reminded me o f the time back last December when w e had the meeting on censorship in Frank W alker's office and I had stood out for continuing censorship intercepts because 1 felt that A r gentina would be a center of N azi machinations against the safety o f the hemisphere. Pehle said, after the meeting A . A . Berle had talked to him about how exaggerated m y fears were. Pehle also spoke o f another meeting later on at w hich he (Pehle) and Berle were present and at w hich Berle took the Treasury severely to task because Treasury said that the present Argentine government was a fascist nest. I said, “ W ell, I have talked to A . A . Berle during the past month or tw o and he talked perfectly fine about the danger o f fascism in Argentina." Pehle said then, “ W ell, I am afraid Mr. Berle sometimes talks tw o dif ferent w ays at the same time." T h e Treasury has clear-cut proof that Argentine funds enable die fascists to operate over the whole hemisphere. T h e y think the funds ought to be frozen. T h e y think furthermore that the United States and Britain should clamp down an embargo even though it means that the United States should have to reduce her total meat rations b y 10 percent to take care o f the British . . .
m arch
27,1944
. . . Pehle seems to be an especially capable person. H e told me that Secretary Morgenthau was very keen about the W ar Refugee Board doing a real job. It seems that the Executive Order which was signed b y the President was prepared in Treasury. It seems that the order is strong enough to give the Treasury Department a chance to knock the heads o f State and W a r together in order to get the job done. T h e y are approaching the problem solely from the standpoint o f saving lives and I am sure from what he said they have saved many thousands o f lives and w ill save many thousands more . . 1 John W . Pehle, director o f foreign funds control in the Treasury (1940-44) and executive director o f the W a r Refugee Board (1944-45), and Ansel F. Luxford, Treasury lawyer with a special competence in international monetary policy, represented the best o f the intelligent, vigorous, and dedicated staff that Secre tary Morgenthau had recruited to discharge fais department’s wartime duties.
Witness Wittsout Portfolio MARCH 28,
3*9
1944
. . . Lord1 says he is chief o f staff for Eisenhower on handling sup plies fo r the invasion forces. H e also seems to be chief o f staff fo r a number o f other things. H e says Eisenhower is a very fine person, that he is a first-class executive because he places responsibility and then expects results, but if the results are not forthcoming, he places the responsibility elsewhere. Lord thinks M ontgom ery is a publicity seeker. H e says in the initial invasion forces, there w ill be 20 American divisions and 17 British divisions. A fter that, there w ill have to be all American divisions because there are no more British. I asked if sufficient intensive w ork had been done with regard to the weather. H e said yes, that they had been w orking on it continu ously for more than a year, that they had planes going every day be tween England, Iceland, and Greenland. H e spoke o f the very high tides in the Channel and how important it was to have good weather for three days in succession. I asked him w h y the Italian front had been moving so slowly. H e said the truth was w e did not have the men to spare, that w e had no more men on the Italian front than the Germans. W e did have the advantage with regard to airplanes and ar tillery but this was offset b y the advantage the Germans had in position. H e said during the past tw o weeks our air forces had been doing some aw fully good w ork bombing industrial targets in France and Germany. H e said prior to that they had done some very poor w ork on account o f bad weather. H e said our publicity had claimed good results from some bombing raids on which w e had not actually obtained much in the w ay o f results. Lord says the British are great folks for talk, that they outtalk the Americans every time but that the Americans are better when it comes to action. W hen he goes into conference with the British, he always arranges matters so that only one person on the American side w ill do the talking. H e says the British always have matters planned out so that they w ill always be a unit. I asked about the weather because apparently weather at Cassino balled things up after the big bombing. I had thought the A rm y was not sufficiently weather-minded. m arch
29,1944
. . . A t Morgenthau’s lunch w ere present Marvin Jones and Luxford o f Treasury in addition to the Secretary and myself. T h e subject of 1 General Royal B. Lord, just returned from London.
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the conversation was an effective Argentine embargo. Marvin Jones was dead against it. H e said England and the United States needed the food from Argentina. Luxford gave the specific facts with regard to the German backing o f many o f the Argentine army crowd. I told Marvin flatly that I looked on the Latin American situation as very bad, that I thought the w ay in which the cost o f living was outrunning wages made it possible for the fascist propaganda from Argentina to take hold almost everywhere. It was clear that Marvin, w ho is a member o f the Combined Food Board . . . is afraid to face the con sequences of meeting the Argentine situation head on. Luxford, M orgenthau, and I presented some o f the other sides o f the case, and Marvin agreed to re-examine the problem.
Ap r i l
5,1944
I gave Mrs. Roosevelt . . . a realistic survey o f the N e w Y ork C ity political situation made b y one o f the C IO men. This survey indicated a very bad situation in the city and indicates quite clearly that as a result o f dissatisfaction among the Irish, Italians, Negroes, Polish, and other foreign groups, the Democratic majority in N ew Y ork C ity might be reduced to considerably less than 300,000 with the result that the state would go for D ew ey rather than for the President. I told Mrs. Roosevelt that I thought the President would w in against D ew ey if there were 45 million or more votes cast and that w e would have more Democrats in Congress than w e had now if there were as many as 50 million votes cast. I said I did not think that Hillman’s P C A was making quite as much progress in registration as was necessary. She expressed some disturbance about the Dubinsky-Hillman situation in N ew Y ork C ity and felt that Hillman had not handled the problem to the best advantage. She said that was getting word o f a great many people w ho were Republican and who did not like the President at all w ho nevertheless would feel obliged to vote for him if the war contin ued. I said undoubtedly there were a very great many people o f this sort and cited the Des Moines Register poll o f last January which in dicated that even Iowa would go Democratic and vote for Roosevelt against the best possible Republican nominee if the war were on. It is obvious that Mrs. Roosevelt doesn’t like the idea o f the President running again but she also feels that he may be forced to run because o f sentiment among the people . . .
Witness W ithout Portfolio
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APRIL 7 , I 9 4 4
. . . A t cabinet meeting most o f the time was given to discussion o f whether or not coal miners should be exempted from the draft. M cN u tt held strongly to the position they should be but Sdmson was cautiously holding to the position that they should not be, but hiding behind Hershey’s 1 skirts. T h e president played a very shrewd game in between both Stimson and M cN utt, saying merely that he wanted to be sure that there was enough coal so that he would not be cold in his house next year. M cN utt tried to get him pinned down to an abso lute statement that the President would stand behind him in M cN u tt’s recommendations to Hershey. T h e President refused to do this. Ickes held that the coal miners were just as important to the war effort as soldiers. A fter cabinet, without mentioning Ingersoll’s name or giving any authority whatsoever, I asked the President pointblank if Stalin yet knew o f the fact that the date o f the invasion had been postponed for 29 days and that the invasion in the South o f France had been called off.12 T h e President said Stalin did not know it. I said, “ O f course, I don’t know o f the precise nature o f the understanding arrived at at Teheran but I would assume that die understanding was such that Stalin should know what had happened.” T h e President said that the invasion o f southern France had not yet been definitely called off but it looked like it probably would have to be for certain reasons which he did not mention. Then I said to the President, “ W ell, isn’t this situation a little bit like tw o American A rm y companies, say Company A is supposed to arrive at a certain point at twelve noon, Company B is supposed to arrive on the other side o f the hill at a certain point at one-fifteen. Company B is counting on Company A to carry out its commitment. If the commander o f Company B gets to the spot and finds that Company A has not carried out its commitment, then Company B will carry a deep resentment against the commander o f Company A .” T he President said, “ W ell, I guess I had better get in touch with Stalin myself. Stalin w ill take it better from me than he w ill from Churchill.” I said to the President, “ Then, o f course, there is M ontgom ery’s provision that if the weather forecasts for five days after the date o f the invasion, and the tide and the moon are unfavorable, that the invasion can be post poned for another, twenty-eight or twenty-nine days” . . . 1 Major Genera] Lewis B. Hershey, director o f Selective Service. 2 Ralph Ingersoll had so informed W allace.
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T h e Trice o f Vision
W hen Madame Chiang Kai-shek was staying at the W hite House, the President said to her, shaking his head, “ Y ou are not in m y good graces. I don’t like you anymore.” She replied, evidently much dis turbed, saying, “ W hat have I done?” T h e President then said, “ T h e time when you called W endell W illkie an adolescent, you said I was sophisticated. I am not at all sure that the w ord ‘sophisticated* is com plimentary.” T h e President then said that the Madame was very fast on her feet, and she replied, “ A h, but, Mr. President, I did not say that. It was the fault o f the translation. W h at I really said was that you were very civilized” . . . T h e President said he was going aw ay for a while, going to be in a house where no telephone could reach him. H e was going to fish. His spirits w ere excellent but it seems to me his appearance was worse than I have ever seen it. His hands were a little shaky. M y guess is that he is now subject to minor irritations in a serious w a y for the first time. H e should come back from this rest thoroughly rejuvenated. A fter cabinet meeting, H enry Morgenthau stopped around and said, “ Have you read W illkie’s speech at Omaha?” I said, “ N o .” H e said, “ You ought to read it.” I said, “ W ell, what does it say that it is so important?” H enry replied that it was about our foreign policy. I said, “ W ell, w hat about it?” Morgenthau said, “ W ell, W illkie calls a spade a spade.” 1 H enry has long disapproved o f the pussyfooting foreign p olicy o f the State Department and his implied approval o f W illkie’s speech is merely a continuation o f his long, deeply felt grievance w ith regard to the State Department. I told the President that I had applied to Cordell H ull fo r someone qualified in Chinese affairs to go with me and that I had arranged for O w en Lattimore o f O W I to go. T h e President said, “ Lattimore is a good man.” It is obvious that he knows Lattimore and likes him. 1 W illkie had suffered a catastrophic defeat in the W isconsin Republican primary on A pril 4. In that contest, delegates pledged to G overnor D ew ey w on 40 percent o f the vote; to General M acArtnur, 24 percent; to Harold Stassen, 20 percent; and to W illkie only 16 percent. T w o days later W illkie in Omaha delivered the most strenuous indictment of Roosevelt's foreign policy he had yet made. H e blamed the administration fo r failing to state “in plain terms what w e stand for and what we are fighting for,” for secret diplomacy, for dealing with fascists in N orth A frica and Italy, and fo r not establishing a United Nations Council to guide the common effort o f all the anti-Axis coun tries. Following that speech W illkie announced his withdrawal from the race for the Republican nomination.
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3*3
APRIL 12, 1944
. . . Marquis Childs told me how he was with the President for an hour before he w ent away and the President was in remarkably good spirits. Childs thought he would come back from the trip to the South very much rested. Childs said I have a great many friends in the coun tr y but he thought I ought to give them some more definite idea as to just whether or not I was a candidate fo r V ice President. I told him there was only one man that counted in this and that was the President himself, and that I was sure that the President himself would not make up his mind until the last minute . . .
Ap r il
14,1944
. . . M ajor General Leslie Groves1 presented me w ith a report on a governmental secret project which is the most interesting report ][ have ever seen. This is a project about which I have talked w ith Vannevar Bush for the last tw o years. This is a project which should result in definitely ending the war within another 18 months at the outside . . . A t the Lord Halifax dinner were present Francis Biddle, Justice Jackson, Mrs. Stettinius, the Archbishop o f York, and various British officers and their wives. T h e Archbishop is a nice old boy. H e looked 100 percent better than when he first arrived in this country a week ago. T h e food has done him good. H e says he has enjoyed it enor mously, having the feeling always that this w ill be the last good meal. H e spoke very highly o f the Russian patriarch and his tw o archbishops. H e said Stalin personally was responsible fo r the opening up o f so many o f the churches. W hen w ar came on, and so many people were killed, people wanted religious services both for the dead and for the living. Stalin felt his people had made such sacrifices that they should be given what they wanted. If they wanted religious services, they should be given religious services. In this the Archbishop was quoting the Norwegian Minister to Russia w ho is said to know more about Russia and to have more standing w ith the Russians than anyone else in the diplomatic corps . . . 1 Commanding officer o f the Manhattan Project, the operation developing the atomic bomb.
T he Price o f Vision
3 *4 Ap r il 19,1944
. . . Kulikowski1 left the attached concerning the American Polish Congress. He was very deeply concerned and called attention espe cially to the last tw o paragraphs, which indicate that the objective o f the American Polish Congress is partly to defeat the present administra tion and partly to stir up the maximum o f anti-Russian sentiment. He said he talked to Jonathan Daniels* about this. I called Daniels on the telephone. Daniels said he thought the w ay to handle the situation was to come out with a clear-cut statement o f policy, that the Atlantic Charter applied to eastern Europe just as well as to anyplace else. I said to Daniels, “ Does this mean that w e are going to send an army over to eastern Europe to invoke the Atlantic Charter?” Daniels backed away at once and said that he would take the matter up with the President at once when he returned. I asked him when the Presi dent would return. He said possibly the latter part o f this week but he did not know for sure. Kulikowski said certain individuals, he thought either Hull or Biddle, should see him at once. I told him any thing o f this sort would have to be done directly from the W hite House . . . I asked Peter Fraser* how the broadcasting o f the parliamentary procedure over the radio to the people o f N e w Zealand had w orked out. H e said “ Fine,” that it had stopped filibustering and it caused the members o f the Parliament to talk sense. H e said they started on this scheme with considerable trepidation, but now they would not think o f going back to the old w ay. I told him it seemed to me like the first step toward genuine political democracy.
Ap r i l
20,1944
G u ffey wants to give a garden party for Mrs. W allace and me before I leave for China, wants to make it clear just where he stands. He 1 Adam Kulikowski o f the O W I had given W allace a memo about the American Polish Congress and the various organizations and individuals affiliated with it. T h e congress, which excluded those who did not support the Polish govemmentin-exile in London, was planning to mobilize public opinion against the Polish government in Lubin, which the Soviet Union sponsored. Kulikowski expected the congress also to attack Soviet policies elsewhere in eastern Europe. A s he saw it, the congress and its affiliates would move ethnic groups in the United States in an effort to influence American foreign policy along lines irrelevant to the true national interest. * Jonathan W . Daniels, son o f Josephus Daniels and his successor as editor of the Raleigh New s and Observer, was at this time an administrative assistant to the President. 8 N ew Zealand Prime Minister.
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says die situation up in Pennsylvania is coming along fine. H e says Robert T a ft told him that D ew ey was going to be the nominee. G u ffey thinks the President can beat D ew ey quite easily. Gladieux1 wanted to tell me about the situation inside o f W P B . He said Don Nelson stands very high with labor groups and small business groups and that he is doing everything he can to go to bat for labor and small business. Almost the whole organization is on the other side o f the fence, including Charles W ilson o f General Electric. Nelson w on’t admit that he is having a hard time w ith Charles W ilson but there is no question but that W ilson is trying to cut Don Nelson’s throat. I expressed high admiration o f Don Nelson to Gladieux . . . Josephus Daniels* is very critical o f the President for having men like Stimson and Knox in the cabinet. H e thinks the cause for which the President stands is being betrayed inside his ow n family . . .
Ap r il
24,1944
. . . Wasserman* . . . said he had had lunch last week with W illkie, that W illkie was very sore at D ew ey, that he preferred Roosevelt to D ew ey but naturally he could not say anything about that. This was all a build-up on the part o f Wasserman to the effect that the President should appoint W illkie as a special adviser on postwar planning. He asked what 1 thought about it. I said I thought W illkie would be very unhappy because it was m y observation that all people placed in a position o f responsibility and doubtful authority got into trouble. I told Wasserman I did not see how W illkie could take a position o f this kind because I felt W illkie was smart enough to see the inherent difficulties in such a job. Wasserman says W illkie is very critical o f Roosevelt’s domestic policy but thinks that, on the whole, Roosevelt has done very well in the foreign field. Wasserman confirmed what I had heard from other sources that W illkie is very resentful o f the w ay in which Stassen12 *4 has cooperated with D ew ey . . . 1 Bernard Gladieux of the W P B , form erly with the Budget Bureau. 2 Josephus Daniels, a Bryan Democrat then in his eighties, had been Secretary of the N avy (and therefore FD R ’s superior officer) during the W ilson Adminis tration and Roosevelt’s Ambassador to Mexico (1933-41). 2 W illiam S. Wasserman, an adviser to the Smaller W ar Plants Corporation, had been head of the Lend-Lease mission to Australia in 194z and the representative o f the Office o f Economic W arfare in England in 1943. * Harold E. Stassen in 1943 had resigned as governor o f Minnesota to join the N avy which assigned him to the staff o f Admiral W illiam F. Halsey. In 1944 Stassen was engaged in the first o f his seven successive and futile campaigns for the Republican presidential nomination.
T he Price o f Vision
326 APRIL 28, 1944
Vincent, head o f the Department o f Chinese Affairs in the State Department, seems to be very glad to go to China with me.1 He seems like a fine fellow in every w ay. W e talked about minor details o f the trip together and I gave him a co p y o f Chinese extracts o f the Confucius Economics on the constantly normal granary. I outlined to him some o f the things I might want to say in the only carefully pre pared speech I expected to make in China. I w ent over w ith L . Bean the statistical facts back o f the importance o f export trade and considerably modified the opinion w hich I had formerly held . . .
m a y
2,1944
. . . Dr. W ei12 3*spent all his time telling me what bad folks the Chinese communists were. He said in his home province in southern China, where they originated, they killed the young people and old people and made the adults join their movement. H e says they don’t fight against the Japs the w a y they should, says they are more interested in Russia than they are in China. H e says they are conducting a very extensive campaign in the United States. W ei spoke deprecatingly o f the Tim e magazine article . . . Apparently he doesn’t think much of T ed W hite.8 This reminded me that Mrs. Luce had spoken to m y 1 A week earlier, after others had leaked the news, W allace had announced his plans for his trip to Siberia and China. Newspapers had been speculating about its significance, sometimes interpreting it as a device to boost W allace’s candi dacy, more often as a w ay through which Roosevelt could get him out of the country so as to open the field to his rivals. A few analysts expected the trip to result in unpredictable changes in American China policy. W allace’s statement of April 21, 1944, expressed his real purpose as he saw it then and always: I am hoping to visit not only China but also that part o f Russia which may be called her W ild East in the same sense as tne territory west o f our Missouri River was called the W ild W est in the years immediately follow ing the Civil W ar. T h e most significant fact in American history was the rapid opening up o f our Great W est during the 30 years following 1870. Siberia w ill have an equally exciting development during the next 30 years. O n this trip, I especially want to get acquainted with Russian pioneering and her Great East and Chinese pioneering and China’s Great W est. Following the war, the common men o f the world w ill fill up the vacant spots as they try to attain a fuller and deeper life b y harnessing nature. This is the kind o f a job with which our fathers and grandfathers were fully familiar. W e Americans should examine what is going on in the most sympathetic way. 2 W ei Tao-ming, then Chinese Ambassador to the United States. s Theodore H . w h ite . Life correspondent, author o f “L ife Looks at China,” had just returned from China where he had developed a sympathy for General
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sister M ary about T ed W hite just returning from China and had asked if I did not want to see him. It also reminded me that Charles Marsh asked me if I did not want to see W hite. I am not going to see W h ite or Mrs. Luce but this is not saying that W hite m ay not be accurate in his descriptions . . . Benton1 said that he had read all o f m y speeches for the past 12 months and he was surprised to find how good they were. H e said he had read them because o f arguments he had had w ith some o f his business associates who thought that I was a dangerous character . . . Benton used to be in the advertising business with Chester Bowles*2 3 o f C P A . H e says that Bowles is a greater admirer o f mine. A t the present time, Benton is w orking w ith the Committee for Economic Development. H e claims that his attitude is somewhat like mine, that is, that our economic function is to bring about the full use o f man power, resources, and skills. H e says he has always voted the Dem o cratic ticket. H e says the strongest criticism that can be urged against the President in the forthcoming election is the possibility that his health is impaired, together with the fact that his leading advisers have an age o f about seventy years, also the fact that Knox recently died under the strain. Benton said if he were fighting the administra tion he would hammer again and again on the age and physical con ditions o f the men at the top; therefore, he thinks the President ought to get rid o f his old men and replace them b y younger men. M y guess is that Benton has been sitting in w ith businessmen w ho are high up in the Republican circles and knows that they are going to hammer on this day and night. Undoubtedly there are a tremendous lot o f stories going around the country at the present moment to the effect that the President is in bad health. Personally, based on m y observation o f him the last time I saw him, I don’t believe this to be true. It is amazing, however, how long his vacation was continued . . . Stil well, an understanding o f the Chinese communists, and a disdain for Chiang Kai-shek and his government that was common to almost all able American journalists w ho had covered the area. W hite spelled out his views in his book, written with Annalee Jacoby, Thunder O ut o f China (N ew York, 1946). 2 W illiam Benton, at this time vice president o f the University o f Chicago, had retired from the advertising business in 1936 and was to go on to become chair man o f the board o f Encyclopaedia Britannica and for a term Democratic senator from Connecticut. a Chester Bowles, Benton’s former advertising partner, had been head o f the Office o f Price Administration since 1943 and was to go on to become for a term Democratic governor of Connecticut and in the 1960s Undersecretary of State and Ambassador to India. Bowles did admire W allace and shared many of his ideas, especially his concern for federal wartime planning to achieve postwar full employment.
T he Price o f Vision
3*8
MAY 4, I944
Randall Gould,1 who is now with the Christian Science M onitor, wanted to give me his views on China . . . Gould seems to agree w ith nearly all the other American newspapermen that the description o f China as set forth b y T ed W hite in the L ife magazine article is sub stantially accurate. H e says he would not go quite as far to the left as Edgar Snow.i23 He does feel, however, that the Generalissimo is not fair to the Chinese communists . . .
may
8,1944
. . . A t the W hite House the President seemed to be in the best o f spirits. Apparently the Hill-Pepper primaries had made him more happy. H e mentioned confidentially that Barney Baruch had asked him if he felt it was important for H ill and Pepper to win. T h e President had told Baruch it was important. T h e President thought Baruch had sent money down to both Hill and Pepper. T h e President laughed and laughed about Joe Kennedy’s daughter marrying the son o f the Duke o f Devonshire. T h e President said he had known the Duke o f Devonshire for a long time and that his family were rabid Protestants. Alben Barkley said he was going up to N e w Y ork to make an ad dress at the . . . Jefferson D ay dinner. H e quoted what he was going to say about D ew ey and also his remarks about the Republicans who defeated the League o f Nations in W ilson’s day. H e had the word "malicious” in. T h e President suggested he strike out the word “ mali cious.” T he President said he thought Lodge and one or tw o others were malicious but that the rest were not. T h e President told a story related by President Eliot* concerning Senator Lodge. T h e President mimicked President Eliot in the w a y he held his tw o hands together at the finger dps. “ Yes, take it b y and large, I think Senator Lodge is the man most lacking in humility o f any man I ever knew. There is just one exception and that is the Senator’s father” . . . Alben Barkley said he thought it would be a good thing if various senators and congressmen took some trips to different parts o f the world. H e indicated he would very much like to go along with me. i Randall C. Gould, chief Far Eastern correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, earlier editor o f the Shanghai Evening Pott and Mercury (19)1-41). 3 W allace had also talked with Edgar P. Snow, then associate editor of The Saturday Evening Post, veteran reporter on Chinese affairs, author of Red Star Over China (1937), a book more prophetic than it seemed in 1944. * T h e late President Charles W . Eliot o f Harvard.
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T h e President made some statement about my trip to China and how important it was. H e spoke o f the inflation and the strained relation ship between China and Russia and also the state o f domestic infelicity between the Generalissimo and the Madame. He said it was up to me to act the part of Cupid to bring them together again . . . I stayed behind after the meeting broke up and showed to the President m y schedule—leaving W ashington M ay 20 and getting back to Washington on July 9. He went into it in some little detail and seemed to be delighted that I was stopping at so many places in Siberia. Apparently he seemed to think the schedule was all right in every w ay . . .
m ay
9,1944
Planned with Vincent and Latdmore about the trip. Vincent had read the proposed pamphlet for the IPR.1 He said he really could not find anything to disagree about in it. He advises that I not submit it formally to the State Department because it would take so long to go round and round. H e did not see any reason w h y the State Depart ment should complain about it anyw ay . . . Markell Hall told me the most fascinating story. He was with the National C ity Bank in Peiping in December o f 1941. He had antici pated that the Japs might declare war against the United States and so had made arrangements in such eventuality to move west through the Chinese communist territory. Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the communists picked him up and passed him westward. In the first instance, he had a positive prejudice against the Chinese com munists, but, after living with them for eight months, he came to have a fondness for them. He says they are quite young, decisive, and decent. He says they are not really communists but agricultural reformers. He spoke o f the leaders with great affection. T h e leaders came from southern China. Most o f the rank and file o f the communists, how ever, are northern Chinese. Hall says the communists stand first for winning the war against Japan; second, for good government (in which they include agricultural reform ), and, third, for a united China. I said to Hall, 'W e ll, doesn’t the Generalissimo stand for exactly the 1 W ith the help o f Vincent and Latdmore, W allace wrote O ur Job m the Pacific, a pamphlet published in 1944 b y the American Council Insanité of Pacific Relations (IPR Pamphlet Number 12). T h e pamphlet developed themes char acteristic of W allace’s speeches. He urged American postwar economic assist ance for the industrial development o f Asia, a viable trade policy with Asia, the emancipation o f colonial areas in Asia, the demilitarization o f Japan, and inter national control o f air power in the Pacific.
330
T he Price o f Vision
same thing?'’ H e replied, “ T h e difference is that the Chinese commu nists do something about it and the Generalissimo doesn’t." I said, “This reminds me o f what Luis Quintanilla, the Mexican Ambassador to Russia, wrote me. ‘People here do every day w hat the people in the United States talk about on Sunday.’ ’’ Hall replied, “ W ell, that reminds me o f a story o f an American communist lady and a British colonel, both o f whom w ere at the dock on a Russian river. T h e American communist lady looked at die dock workers and said, ‘Isn’t it marvelous how they work? Y o u can tell b y their general attitude that they feel themselves a part o f the whole show. A n y system o f government which can make people feel that w ay is certainly worthwhile.’ A t the same time the British colonel was saying, ‘Just look at these folks, the scum o f the earth. L ook at the w ay they are dressed. Obviously they don’t have enough to eat. I f anyone needed proof that communism isn’t practical, you have go t it right here.’ ” I then came back at Hall saying, “ W ith w hat preconception did you approach the Chinese communists?" H e said, “ I was definitely prejudiced against them." O f course, Hall may not be telling me the truth but I can’t fo r the life o f me figure out w hat the motive might be in this man w ho is still employed b y the National C ity Bank taking a very pronounced slant for the Chinese communists. H e says he personally tried out w ith a great many o f the Chinese communist army their ability to read and write. Practically all kn ow how to read and write. H e made the same trial w ith the government army and found that every man could not read and write. T h e communist army is alert, bright, and intelli gent. T h e government army is dumb. T h e communist arm y can learn any new thing in a fraction o f the time required b y the government army. W hen Hall got to Chungking, he had a number o f talks w ith dif ferent Chinese and found their attitude toward the Chinese communists was exactly like that o f the most reactionary Republican businessmen toward the administration. T h e y continually spread poison without any basis in fact. H e challenged them repeatedly to produce their facts and they could not. T h e y had none. Hall thinks the Generalissimo means w ell but he just doesn’t know what is going on. Those around him hide the real truth from him. Hall says the Methodists feel they ow n the Generalissimo. T h e y take the government side. W hile he was in Chungking, Hall stayed w ith an old Methodist missionary. H e speaks most highly o f Ambas
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sador Gauss and says that Madame Chiang Kai-shek com pletely pulled the w ool over W illkie’s eyes when she prejudiced him against Gauss. I said there w ere rumors o f marital unhappiness between the General issimo and the Madame. H e said, yes, he thought the Generalissimo did have another and younger woman, that that was customary in China and he thought the Generalissimo should not be criticized for it. Hall said, however, that the Madame still had very great influence w ith the Generalissimo . . .
m ay
11,1944
. . . W alter W hite,1 since W illlde’s withdrawal, has swung com pletely over to the Democratic side and is doing everything he can to g et the colored people to vote for Roosevelt again. I was surprised to find how strong he was against D ew ey . . . m ay
12,1944
. . . L. Bean gave me a memorandum from A lger Hiss3 w ith re gard to m y Chinese trip. T h e memorandum was excellent. A s a result o f this memo, I called Hull on the telephone, thanked him for the excellent cooperation which the State Department had given, and asked to see him before I left. I shall be seeing him next Thursday morning at 10 o’clock. H e thought I should delay seeing him as long as pos sible so as to get the last w ord about the Chinese military picture. H e was obviously seriously alarmed about both the military picture and the extent o f the inflation in China. Hiss advised that I cultivate Gauss, w ho, he says, is a very fine man. This checks w ith what Markell Hall told me. This reminded me that I had met Stanley H om beck the night before and H om beck had talked in glow ing terms o f Gauss, saying that while he was not popular with the Chinese, nevertheless, he was doing a very good job o f representing us. H om beck said China had put on a tremendous campaign to have Gauss recalled simply because Gauss was handling American interests in a firm w ay. W illkie w ithout much knowledge had lent himself to that campaign. 1 W alter W hite, since 1931 secretary o f the N A A C P , of all black leaders prob* ably clocesc to Roosevelt bat still without significant influence, had learned to expect little from the President and less from his staff. WiUkie’s record on civil rights compared favorably to Roosevelt’s. Y et neither had sensed, as W hite did, the increasing militancy o f blacks, particularly black soldiers, about whom W h ite wrote incisively in A Rising W ind (1945). a A lg er Hiss, then serving as a specialist on international organization in the S a te Department.
T he Price o f Vision
33* m a y
1 7 ,1 9 4 4
Harriman1 says, “ Is there anything that can be done about the FBI? T h e y are perfectly crazy in the w ay they call certain people com munists.” I said that I did not know o f anything that could be done about the FBI.
M A Y l8 , I9 4 4
. . . I . . . called on Hull. H e told me how in M oscow they in sisted that China be looked on as one of the four great powers at a time when England was dead against China being so recognized and Russia was quite unenthusiasdc about it. Hull told me much the same thing as Stettinius had about the progress being made in setting up a world organization. H e is w orking very quietly with certain o f the members o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this matter. Everyone is sworn to secrecy. T h e world organization would not have a police force o f its own but the members would bind themselves to furnish their armed forces against any nation that was threatening the peace. T h e new world association would apparently have an executive council composed o f five members, o f which four would be the United States, England, Russia, and China. T he fifth would be a smaller power that would change from time to time. A ll the nations o f the world would belong to the assembly. In its main outlines this is very much like the program worked out when Sumner W elles was Undersecretary. I then called on Isaiah Bowman. He laid great emphasis on the fact that it was important for the Generalissimo to move in fast and come to an understanding with the Chinese communists, said if the G en eralissimo did not do so, Russia would be sure to cause serious trouble in Manchuria and Manchuria might be lost to China. W hen I talked with the President,3 he started out by telling me* * Averell Harriman, at this time temporarily in Washington on a visit from his post as United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. 9 Roosevelt had defined the general purposes of W allace’s trip. H e wanted the V ice President, as an agricultural expert, to observe the ways of life in Siberia, Outer Mongolia, and China, and to reach some conclusions about how to minimize sources o f conflict between China and the Soviet Union. He wanted him also to influence Chiang Kai-shek to arrange a modus operandi with the Chinese communists in order more vigorously to pursue the war against Japan, to take steps to control inflation in China, and to establish a fair and realistic value for tapi, especially as they were exchanged for the American dollar. So as to prevent embarrassing W allace in his negotiations with Chiang, the Presi
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what I ought to say to the Generalissimo when the subject of inflation was brought up. He said he thought the Generalissimo ought to call in one person from each province, that they ought to agree to issue a new currency on the basis of $200 worth o f it to $1 o f the old Chinese yuan. Following this, he should fix prices and really enforce them. I said to the President, “ Don’t you think I had better talk to H arry W hite o f Treasury about this inflation problem?” H e said, “ Yes, go ahead and talk to H arry.” Then the President began to talk about how the Generalissimo should handle the Chinese communists. H e said the first rule for the Gen eralissimo to remember was “ N othing should be final between friends.” This was the old Bryan statement which the President emphatically endorsed. Then he quoted A i Smith as saying w ith regard to warring factions, “L et me get them all into the same room w ith good chairs to sit on where they can put their feet on the table, where they can have cold beer to drink and cigars to smoke. Then I w ill knock their heads together and w e w ill settle everything.” T h e President said that he would be happy to be called in as arbiter between the warring factions. He told me to tell the Generalissimo that it might be a good thing if “ he would call in a friend.” T h e President referred to Charles Francis Adams when he was ambassador to England in 1861. Adams said that there were some Englishmen w ho were taking sides but they are friends o f the entire United States. T h e President made it clear that he felt himself to be a friend o f all China. T h e President then said, “ A t Cairo I made it perfectly clear that I wanted Manchuria to be Chinese. Later on, I got Stalin to agree to this.” He told me to tell the Generalissimo that as far as he knew the plans were still O .K . on Manchuria but if the Generalissimo could not settle the communist thing he, the President, might not be able to hold the Russians in line. T h e President went ahead to say he knew the Russians would change if the present situation should continue . . . dent told him not to visit the Chinese communists. Further, the itinerary pre cluded conversations between W allace and Sdlwell, a bitter critic o f Chiang, though it included a visit with General Chennault, who was sympathetic to the Chungking regime. Yet Roosevelt also urged W allace to take with him Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, both informed skeptics about the Generalis simo. T h e V ice President’s party also included John Hazard, chief liaison officer, Division o f Soviet Supply, w ho served as W allace’s interpreter in Russian; Captain Kenneth Knowles as military observer; Colonel Richard T . Kight, commander of the Skymaster airplane, who had also been pilot for W illlde; and the rest o f the airplane’s crew.
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M A Y 20 ,
1944—EDMONTON, CANADA
Gen. G affney, bom in Massachusetts, raised in Texas, strong for the North.1 Prefers it to tropics. Likes to hunt. Tells o f our unprepared ness in Alaska. Japs could have taken Seward. W e had no cruisers up there. A rm y high command was convinced Japs would not strike at Alaska. Thinks there are great mineral and agricultural possibilities in northwest territory. Prof. Blackfoot o f University o f Alberta thinks there are enormous possibilities dairying and hog possibilities. Soil marvelous, deep, black . . .
M AY
21 ,
19 4 4 — FAIRBANKS, ALASKA
. . . T o o k us to visit Alaska University, President Bunnell and Dean Gasser. T h e y told us following—64 million acres agricultural land in Alaska tw o states size o f Iowa capable o f producing w hen cleared o f poplar, birch and spruce, fifteen to 20 bushels of wheat. Best variety early sort from Siberia Chugot ripens in 90 days, fine milling qualities— Average yield at station for 30 years 20 bushels—Varieties from Canada and U.S. too late—Swedish select oats—70 bushels. Wisconsin beardless barley yields 50 bushels. Best hay, oats and peas. Also yellow Siberian alfalfa Brome grass best pasture. Blue grass grows w ell—Brome grass and blue grass just starting to head—Costs $100 to clear an acre—less with a tractor . . . Gasser says cost would be tw ice that o f U.S. $1.30 vs. $0.70 but cost o f transportation from U.S. $60 a ton. Holsteins favorite breed—produces about like in U.S. Saw Univer sity pit silo with oat and pea silage good quality. Cow s eat 40 pounds a day—10 pounds o f hay and one pound feed to 4 pounds o f milk . . . Soil when cleared lacking in phosphorus and nitrogen. 1 On the first day o f his trip, W allace had reached Edmonton, Canada, where General Dale V . Gaffney met him and his pony. T h e V ice President had also begun to keep a record in handwriting in a pocket-size daybook. T h at record, his diary from M ay 20-July 5, 1944, also provided the basis for his revelatory book, Soviet Asia M ission (N ew York, 1946). T h e diary as published here in excised form varies from the original in several ways. T o facuitate understand ing, W allace’s Russian script, used continually in naming places and people, has been transliterated, and many o f his abbreviations have been spelled out. Place names have been inserted in the headings for each date. Insofar as his hand writing offers clear clues, his spelling and punctuation have been retained. Though he kept his diary daily, the selections omit some days of only marginal interest. T h e selections were chosen to reveal his characteristic observations about agriculture, demography, and culture, and to include all of his important remarks about public policy. T h e diary as he actually kept it contains a less telling account about Siberia but a much fuller account of China than does his Soviet Asia Mission.
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Backbone o f Alaska w ill be mining with agriculture to support mines. T en billion tons o f lignite coal south o f Fairbanks . . . Biggest placer gold mine in w orld 8 miles from Fairbanks . . . Tomatoes and lettuce in green houses—Radishes and lettuce just coming up out* side . . . T ru ck drivers earn more than General Gaffney. Ice cream sodas cost 40 cents Bottle beer 60 cents. Bam has double windows—equipped with steam heat which is turned on when outside temperature gets down to 30 degrees below zero and inside temperature is 38 above. Has one boiler for house and bam w hich required only 30 tons last winter which was wanner than usual. V e r y little wind in the winter . . . Visited H usky D og station. W o lf bitch crossed w ith dog !4 w o lf and % dog—Three pups, % dog and V» w olf—Siberian dog excellent— Sledge made o f birch or hickory . . . Used for rescue w ork—5 res cues last winter . . . Rainbow trout 7 pounds to 10 pounds . . . Alaska w ill have a big tourist, hunting and fishing trade which w ill bring in more money eventually than mining . . . Col. K eilor1 very enthusiastic about the high quality o f Russians coming to Fairbanks for P 39s, B 25s and A 20s V e r y well behaved— Colonel would be proud to pick a bunch o f Americans equally good and equally fine and capable in behavior in a foreign country . . .
M AY
23, 1944—VELKAL, SIBERIA
. . . T h e town was started in 1941 and Semonov2 was very proud o f it. Landing field built o f slatted w ood—2 b y 6"s with 2" inch side up —Several P 39s on field. Probably 300 planes go west thru this field each month. General Semenov very proud o f his 38 pigs—Splendid type York shires—Each in his individual stall. Snow drifts outside several feet thick. Temperature about 35 degrees and snow slow ly melting. Fancy Banquet only about 3 hours after our Nom e lunch . . . Col. 1 Colonel Russel KeOor, W allace’s host and escort in Alaska. * M ajor General Ilya Sergeyevich Semenov, commander of the Yakutsk military area, which extended from Lake Baikal to the A rctic Ocean, accompanied W allace through Siberia, as did Sergei Arsenevich Goglidze, a friend of Stalin and the president o f the Executive Committee o f Khabarov Territory, under which the Far Northern area was governed. W allace’s other Russian com panions were Dimitri Chuvakhin and G regory Dolbin, both from the Soviet Foreign Office, and M ajor Mikhail Cheremisenov of the N K V D , the Soviet secret police.
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Mazurak1 very g ay at Banquet insisting that Hazard drink much vodka —champagne and wine. T h e women helpers at table had been brought over from M oscow b y plane. T h e winter climate is too severe for women . . . Arrived Seimchan 7:15 p.m. local time . . . A n elaborate banquet . . . —mineral water from Caucasus vodka Champagne Red W in e excellent bread cheese—caviar—salmon—pork, etc. Ice cream at finish —Green cucumbers from cold frames—fruit . . . Long discussion in plane w ith Chuvakhin about whether the Re publicans would win next fall. H e told w h y Russia did not send more students to U.S. Outside o f Harper at Chicago, Robinson at Columbia123and 2 or 3 others the attitude o f the universities . . . was false toward Russia. H e felt papers like N ew Republic and Nation were edited b y men o f little mental grasp. H e asked for circulation o f papers like P Â I. and Chicago Sun . . .
M AY
24, 1944—SEIMCHAN, SIBERIA
. . . Hospital—sulpha drugs vitamins . . . vitamin pills made lo cally . . . Warehouses—Penick and Ford com oil from Cedar Rapids. Pillsbury reinforced flour from Minneapolis. A ll kinds o f lend-lease goods. Kindergarten and nursery combined—43 children also several babies. One teacher three helpers and a nurse. Powerful movie on . . . Leningrad siege . . . A t 2 p.m. w e got in tw o C 47s with red stars and went to Magadan, first flying over the Kolym a river which is Seimchan’s source o f goods in summer. In winter Seimchan gets goods via the 560 kilometre high w ay built from Magadan on the coast. T o o k one hour and 20 minutes to Magadan over the high mountains. Flew at 13,000 feet. A ir port at Magadan 50 kilometres from town. Road . . . was like a gravel road in Iowa in 1905. Nevertheless w e w ent along in a very good car at 40 miles an hour. I rode with Ivan Feodorovich Nikishov, a Russian director o f Dal1 Colonel (later general) Ilya Pavlovich Mazurak was one o f the pilots w ho in 1937 had landed Soviet explorers at the N o n h Pole and b y virtue o f that feat had become a “Hero o f the Soviet Union.” In 1944 he served as pilot o f the Russian airplane in which W allace flew while in Siberia. 3 Professors Samuel Harper and Gerold T . Robinson.
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stroi.1 T h e trust has 100 mines coal, lead, gold in which w ork 300,000 people over a wide area extending more than 800 kilometres from Magadan. Magadan has a beautiful harbor. It receives goods to trans mit to interior but the goods produced in the mines goes out b y the rivers. In 1933 Magadan had tw o houses. T o d a y it has 40,000 people in cluding its suburbs. Goglidze (who is a close friend of Stalin’s) calls Nikishov a millionaire. A s director o f the trust, he runs everything. He looks like an up and coming American business man o f 45. Goglidze says the whole idea o f developing the Magadan area was Stalin’s. Colonel Mazuruk piloted us over and at the dinner that night Col onel K ight and Colonel Mazuruk sat together and I proposed a toast to the tw o colonels and the airplane company they might form linking the tw o countries together . . . T h e trust owns a number o f airplanes. It could not do business without them. Nikishov thinks a railway impractical because o f the effect o f the permafrost on the road bed. Airplanes are vital to Si berian development . . .
M AY
25, 1944—MAGADAN, SIBERIA
W en t out for a walk in taiga,2 7:45 to 8:45. Then breakfast. Then the port where there was 22,000 tons o f stuffs stored. Parts for three oil refineries which the Japs would not let them ship to Vladivostock. T hen auto repair plant where they make many parts locally which we would order from Detroit. Complete set o f machine tools. Service 1200 trucks and all mining machinery. M et several Stakhanovites.2 Ordinary w orker gets 1000? or 1200 rubles a month. A Stakhanovite w orker gets 2000 rubles a month. Then visited store. M ost smoked fish selling at 17 to 19 rubles a kilogram. Cheese from America 23 per kilogram. W om an’s coat 650 rubles. W om an’s wash dress o f a sort which sells for tw o dollars in U.S., 147 rubles. Fur store—squirrel, fox, ermine, w o lf and bear. School—1200 students . . . Final exams Physics class . . . Each one had drawn a question and was subject to oral questioning. W e listened 1 T h e Far Northern Construction Trust, which W allace also described as “a combination T V A and Hudson’s Bay Company." * T h e northern evergreen forest. • W orkers so designated for their high productivity.
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to die examination o f a girl w ho got 5 the top grade. T h e Professor was kindly but thorough in his examination on kinetic energy—speed o f bullets etc. T h e principal said school began at 9 and continued to 3. T h e y take time off for 3 meals in the school dining room—about 15 or 20 minutes fo r each meaL Splendid dining room and kitchen. N inety percent o f the graduates go on to the University o f M oscow, or Leningrad or some other university in die central or western part o f the country . . . D rove to Collective. Manager is a Tartar. H o g man a Lett.1 A ll hogs an excellent type o f English Y ork. T h e y tried the Danish but found the Y ork could stand the climate best . . . A ll grain is shipped in from Vladivostok. T h e y have cleared quite a bit o f land w ith tractors. T h e roots o f the trees are shallow because o f permafrost. Season too short fo r grains. G ro w potatoes—rutabagas—and oats for silage. Use a pit silo somewhat like the one at Fairbanks. Cow s about half Simmerthaler, half Kholm ogory. T h e last breed came to the Archangel-Murmansk region from Holland about 1710. M osdy black and white but some brownish red. V e r y hardy . . . Great cleanliness w ith one man in constant attendance, scraping ma nure aw ay every time a cow drops any . . . Chickens all white L eg horns. O ld fashioned incubators for 3800 chicks. Begin taking them off in January. Best month is February. W orst is June. Begin to lay when they are 4 Vs months old. Average production, 118 eggs a year . . . In the Magadan House o f Culture an excellent concert. I don’t think I have ever seen anything any better put on b y the talent o f a single city. Red A rm y choir, composed o f men stationed in Magadan. N on professional w ith the exception o f five or six orchestra professionals . . . Leader has been here past five years. Ballet troops was evacuated from Poltava in the Ukraine in 1941. It first came to Irkutzk but was not appreciated there . . . W e saw in the House of Culture the art exhibition, all b y local 1 In a revealing comment about those he met in Siberia, W allace later wrote: “I did not find the people o f Soviet Asia difficult to understand, and I met persons in every walk o f life, including many native Asiatics . . . A ll o f them . . . were people o f plain living and robust minds, not unlike our farming people in the United States. Much that is interpreted . . . as ‘Russian distrust’ can be written off as the natural cautiousness of farm-bred people . . . Beneath the ideological talk, the diplomatic protocol, the new urban culture, one catches glimpses o f the sound, w ary, rural mind” ; Soviet Asia M ission, p. si.
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artists. Excellent w ar cartoons . . . Goglidze says the 700 people in the hall were Nikishov’s aristocracy. Nikishov says there are 8000 en gineers and economists in Magadan and that in this audience are repre sentatives o f workers as w ell as engineers and economists. I met N . I. Adagin w ho has 55,000 miners in his union which covers the whole region. H e sent his regards to Hillman and M urray, not to JX..L.1
M A Y 26, 19 4 4 — KO LYM A, SIBERIA
. . . Gold, coal and lead are the explanation o f nearly everything in the Kolym a region. W e saw tw o gold mines—one small, one very large. Placer, surface mining . . . W orkers mostly come from old Russia on a three year contract. W ages 2000 rubles a month compared w ith 800 rubles in old Russia . . . T h e Director has a tremendous faith in the future of gold and thinks Russia must have lots o f gold. Stalin has made gold mining a preferred w ar industry and has frozen the men in it. In every mining town . . . the three buildings w hich stand out are the hospital, the school and the club. T h e Director says that because o f the hard winter it is necessary to have more entertainment. In the winter the men dig up huge piles o f gold bearing rock. T h e y do not w ork outside when the weather is more than 40 degrees below zero . . . Nikishov and the director and I w ent out for a long w alk in die taiga afterward. H e gamboled about like a calf enjoying the wonderful air immensely. T h e larches were just putting out their new leaves and the taiga valley looked marvelous with the snow covered mountains 30 miles away . . . Goglidze proposed a toast to Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, refer ring to the painting o f the three at Teheran as made b y a local artist. Co. Mazuruk proposed a toast to the modernizadon o f China. G oglidze modified it “ M ay China remain in the w ar” . . . M A Y 2 7 , 19 4 4 — YAKUTSK, SIBERIA
. . . Yakutsk3 is a autonomous Republic. President is a Yakutsk. V e r y Indian in appearance. T h e permafrost here is 600 feet thick. A ll the buildings are l o w streets are paved w ith what appears to be round stumps cut off. Larch 1 John L. Lewis. * Yakutsk had much impressed W illkie.
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i foot long—8 inches in diameter laid on gravel which in turn is laid on the permafrost. N o t treated. W ill last 20 years. Along the Lena river, there seems to be quite a bit o f cultivation. A bout 95 percent o f the plow land is put in grain crops. Barley is preferred because it is hardier. T h e y grow a 6 rowed, rough awned type. Climate here is about 45 degrees below zero in January but about 58 above in July. A bout an 88 day growing season. V e r y d ry here, about 10 inches in a year. Population 25 percent Yakutsk. Remainder Russian and Tartar and other tribes. M ostly Russian . . . T he section o f the museum showing development since 1928 was most interesting. T he party worker who was an archeologist took us around . . . Production has gone up fully five times. T h e old fash ioned Yakut winter and summer house has been abandoned. W e then visited the normal school and sat in several classes. Then the public library with 500,000 volumes, Director a Yakut. Most o f the patrons seemed Yakut. About 18 people busy cataloging. W e visited the stacks which were primitive but effective. Then visited a public school . . . A t normal school they are proud o f their research. T he Biological professor is corresponding with some American professors and studies the Biological Abstract. T h e chemical teacher (a Yakut) is conducting research in vitamins . . . A t banquet, we asked the president what the revolution had meant to Yakut people. First they got a chance to farm. Second they learned to read and write. A ll the young people know how to read and write and within 10 years everyone w ill know. T h e president was very eager to know about Alaskan agriculture. So was General Semenov. He spoke of the desirability o f interchange o f information and seeds with Alaska. I suggested the smooth awned barley from Alaska would be o f value although it might be too late . . . T w o theatres. One for Yakut folk lore. W e w ent to Russian the atre. Performances four times a week . . . Most o f players come from Leningrad. Played there during much o f the Blockade. T h e Russians all seem to look on the defense o f Leningrad as even more important than the defense o f Stalingrad . . . MAY 28, 1944—KOMSOMOLSK, SIBERIA
L eft Yakutsk about 7:40 and arrived at Komsomolsk about 1:30 p.m. T en degrees south and 8 degrees east of Yakutsk. A ll the time on the plane I talked to Dimitri Chuvakhin about the fundamental difference
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between Trotskyites and Stalinites. H e said T rotsky wanted to make peace with the kulaks. T h at he felt w orld revolution was vital. Stalin believed Russia must discipline herself and that agricultural and indus trial production must be increased and it was not necessary to have world revolution . . . Komsomolsk city o f youth—started in 1932. N o w has 120,000 people mostly under 30. Enormous flocks o f children. It was Sunday and everyone was out walking in the victory garden. W e first visited the shipyard . . . T h e y were just finishing the construction o f an 8,000 ton cruiser and three little gun boats. T w enty-five percent o f the w ork ers are women . . . Sixty-five hundred miles from the front they had large numbers o f German tanks for scrap. A splendidly equipped machine shop with Cincinnati machine tools received on lend-lease . . . T h e refinery gets its oil from Sakhalin. T h e y are making 95 octane gas. T h e director said 70 percent o f the workers were women and that for technical w ork they were just as good as men . . . W e are living in the rooms o f people who have given up their apart ments to us. John Hazard was bothered b y bed bugs last night . . . T h e mayor says his greatest problem is getting manpower and money for streets, streetcars, schools, hospitals, etc. Everything has been sacrificed to the war. Visited airplane factory employing 13,000 people. Director T im o feev1 was Mazuruk’s mechanic on the N orth Pole flight. F orty percent workers women. M any boys under 16 years o f age. M any Stakhanovites. One a boy o f 16 had turned out three times his norm. H e worked only six hours a day. T h e plant is like the old Boeing plant at Seattle. Probably turns out three or four planes a day. T w o motored bombers cruising range 3600 miles . . . Plane first put in production four years ago . . . G ive vitamin C to the workers. T h e y claimed only 14,000 man hours per plane. I would guess at least 40,000 hours. T h e y have good machine tools o f American make put in before the war. T h e y get aluminum from U.S. Have a month’s supply on hand at present time . . . Plum trees in bloom, absolutely hardy. Pear trees and apple trees fairly hardy. Black currents, hardy. W ild red raspberries larger and tastier than the tame sorts. Black currents yield 3 kgs per bush. V e r y rich in vitamins. Steel mill uses army scrap. Enormous numbers o f German tanks. 1 D . A . Tim ofeev.
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Also German helmets. Employs 2200 people, 40 percent women . . . Pay here 900 rubles per month compared with 1500 in airplane fac tory. Put in here only 48 hours per week compared with 54 in air plane factory. Airplane factory averages 68 percent over its goal. W herever w e go in the auto, the children exclaim “ Amerikantsi.” Visited . . . big concert hall for 2000 people. Large squads o f chil dren under five under care o f tw o women. Obviously children o f the women in the nearby air factory. T h e y were rather poorly dressed and a little thin but obviously were quite healthy and happy . . . T h e young city is dishevelled and run down and the people look overworked. T en years hence it w ill be a lovely city. T od ay they are doing remarkable production job o f planes, cruisers, and steel. T h e roads are pretty bad because they can’t take time off from the war work. M AY
31, 1944—IRKUTSK, SIBERIA
. . . W e went to a typical French musical comedy—Garters and ruffles. V oice and choruses excellent. This particular company puts [on] a new comedy every few days. W e sat in a box. W hen I came in the people clapped and rose. I think this must have been organized. Otherwise how could they have recognized me? W e got home a little after 11 p.m. Irkutsk in 1939 had 250,000 population—a year ago 400,000—today 300,000. T he refugees from the Ukraine have nearly all gone back home. T h e atmosphere here is remarkably like Minneapolis. T h e y think this is going to be a great air center . . . JUNE I,
1944—IRKUTSK
. . . Visited a collective farm—142 households. Four hundred men in the army. Seventy o f the women in war work. Seventy percent o f the w ork done by women. T h e y run tractors. T h e lady manager . . . says the women do more w ork than the men ever did. T h e fine looking church is used as a grain elevator. T he school house takes care o f 200 students. O nly a 7 year elemen tary course. T he government pays for school. T h e collective farm holds a lease in perpetuity on the land. But the collective has to pay a heavy tax to the government. Sixty percent o f grain the government buys at one fourth the market value. T h e gov ernment furnishes tractors and combines . . . Saw the drama T he Siege o f Leningrad written b y a soldier w ho
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took part in it. Gave m y first speech in Russian.1 It was well re ceived . . .
JU N E
2, 1944—LAKE BAIKAL, SIBERIA
W en t 60 miles b y auto to Lake Baikal—took tw o hours . . . Lake B. contains more ancient forms o f water life than any place in the world. Lake has been as it is now for about 20 million years. Deepest lake in world 1700 meters deep. Some o f the fish living at 1,000 meters depth are mammals. T h e y are 50 percent fat. M any musk deer in mountains. Bears. Elk or something o f the sort the horns o f which when ground furnish male sex hormone. T h e sci entific station is situated at south western com er o f lake where the Angara river flows out. T h e rapid outflow of the Angara river keeps the lake water always fresh and free from salt . . . G reat need o f more people. Population doubled since 1918. Possibly double again by 1970. Birth rate 27 per 1000—death rate per 1000.16. Eight to ten hectares per person on collective farms. W hole col lectives have been transferred from Russia to Irkutsk. Children o f Yakuts and Mongols w ho have mastered Russian do just as well as Russian children. A re especially good in engineering and medicine. Before the revolution 50 doctors in Irkutsk area. N o w 1500. Three hospitals before revolution. N o w 30 or 40. O nly 1.5 percent o f wounded soldiers turn out to be useless. One half the wounded go back to the front. University was founded after the revolution. Has six faculties—agriculture—mining—medicine—biology and geography. Eighty-five percent o f high school students in Irkutsk go on to the University. Students have their expenses paid . . .
JU N E
3, 1944—IRKUTSK
W e rested at the comfortable dacha o f the commissar overlooking the river. Some discussion with the Russians about the Japs initiated by Vincent. A s to what should be done w ith the Japs after the war they said—“ T h e same as to Germ any.” Goglidze thinks Japan ought to be confined to her own island . . . 1 W allace said that the history o f Siberia reminded him of the history of the American Far W est. H e praised the pioneers o f both nations and expressed confidence in the future of the Pacific North in both continents.
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344 JU N E 4 , 19 4 4 — IRKUTSK
. . . W e had a discussion at breakfast about the excellence o f the Russian schools o f language. T h e Chinese school o f language at Lenin grad is the best in the world. T h e English school at M oscow is excel lent. W e have a lot to learn from the Russians. T heir world outlook is broader and more scientific in some respects than ours. T rin ity Sunday which the Russian people are celebrating as a holiday b y walking in the sunshine on the bank across the river. Y ou can hear them singing. Dimitri Chuvakhin and Vincent got into an argument about religion. Vincent asked him what church he would belong to if he belonged to any. H e [said] “ T h e Catholic.” Chuvakhin is the most intense Communist o f all. I said he was the most religious man at the table—He said “ But it is not the same religion as yours.” I said “ I am willing to grant that your religion is doing the world good. A re you willing to do the same for ours?” H e was too intolerant, too in tense and too honest to do so. I respected him for his intellectual hon esty. W e then had a long talk on religion and economics in both the narrow and broad sense. W e went to see the musical com edy Columbine. Before it began w e talked about the com edy o f the fight between the tw o collectives— One Jewish raising vegetables and the other Cossak raising rabbits. T h e rabbits ate the vegetables. B oy and girl from opposing collectives. M any Communists can joke and laugh . . .
TUESDAY, JUNE
6, 1944—KRASNOYARSK, SIBERIA
. . . M r. Goglidze at supper time . . . told us most solemnly o f the opening o f the second front. It took aw ay all our appetites. W e were so excited. A fter the usual very heavy meal w ith the usual fine Georgian wines . . . Vincent, Latdmore and I w ent walking in the Park. Y ou pay ad mission to get in. Lots o f girls and soldiers strolling around.
JU N E
7, 1944—KRASOYARSK, SIBERIA
W e went out to the anti-aircraft factory . . . H alf the machines were brought out from M oscow. In 1929—80,000 people . . . T od ay 250,000 or possibly 300,000. One hundred tw enty thousand came out because o f the war. O f these, 30,000 have gone back. N early all the rest w ill remain permanently. T h e iron here comes from Kuznetz—the
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coal from Irkutsk. Definitely the war has caused a permanent move ment o f industry to Siberia . . . T h e y kidded Major Cheremisenov1 about having accompanied the various Americans through Russia and someone suggested he write a diary. H e said his heading for the W illkie trip would be “ Vodka—V o d k a V od ka” and for our trip would be “Boiled W ater—Boiled W ater— Boiled W ater.” Dolbin spoke up and said Secretary H ull spent his entire time in the house2 and that the Russians made great efforts to see that the tempera ture was precisely at 22 degrees Centigrade . . . JU N K
8, 1944—MINUSINSK, SIBERIA
. . . W e got on a beautiful river boat at 6 p.m. and proceeded down the Yenisei on the most beautiful river ride I shall ever take. It is a more beautiful river than the Volga. T h e river life of Siberia is all important. T h e towns are on the rivers. W e were on an unusually large and luxurious river boat. T he Russians sang beautifully . . . A little later Dolbin announced there would be a dance. T h e waitresses and the tw o girl radio operators danced with Dolbin, Colonel Kight, Vincent . . . et al. I felt sorry for the girls having to w ork so hard. T hen Goglidze called for tea. It was about midnight. W hen I got up the next morning at 6, the girls were hard at work. Both the Russian and American men seemed to me rather thoughtless. Everywhere we go the Russian women especially in the country are doing the work. JUN E 12, 1944—SEMIPALATINSK
L eft b y plane at 10:20 a.m. for Semipalatinsk—lovely clear day after tw o showery cool days. It is a very dry spring . . . I drank three bowls o f kumiss with the president in his yurta. V e r y nicely furnished inside. Made o f sheep skins. Draped with rugs inside. Kumiss is mare’s milk which has been fermented a day. Contains about same alcohol as beer. V e r y acid—tastes smoky . . . These people speak Kazakh which is primitive Turkish. T heir blood, however, is Mongolian. T h e y think the present regime is much better than the Czar’s. T h e y fought against conscription in 1916. N o w they are eager to fight the Germans . . . 1 Cheremisenov had also accompanied W illkie. 2 Dolbin was referring to H ull’s stay in Moscow.
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. . . Just north o f here 35 miles toward the mountains, the rainfall increases enough to make a fine wheat region. This accounts for big flour mill here. Mine operator from the Don basin son o f a coal miner —grandson o f a peasant. Chuvakhin pointed to Karaganda and said “ This kind of thing saved Russia. T rotsky was against. H e thought there had to be a world revolution. Stalin had faith in the moral stamina o f Russian people. He said ‘W e can and we will.’ And they did—they created the necessary capital out o f their ow n hides. Russia would have been lost without Karaganda” . . . L eft about 12 for Balkhash. 70,000 people; in 1929, 180 . . . Cop per mine—like Chuquicamata in Chile. Produces 55,000 tons a year. Refines to 99 percent stage. Five thousand workers in open pit mine . . . Head o f refinery a woman mayor from Leningrad. H er father was a factory superintendent and she brought him out here. Her husband is in the tank corps in the army . . .
JUNE
14, 1944—TASHKENT, SIBERIA
. . . L eft at 9:20 a.m. for four hour flight to Tashkent. It now has 1,100,000 people compared with 300,000 in 1929. W e stay at a lovely dacha. T he Tashkent oasis is much like California but it freezes some in winter so they can grow no oranges . . . In the afternoon w e went over to the pest control station. Central station for plant protection . . . N o boll weevil—cotton insects less than with us. T h e y have developed a w ilt resistant strain. From cen tral Asia comes the only strain o f alfalfa resistant to wilt. T h e y think our Buffalo alfalfa has in it blood o f this sort. O ur people got seed o f it in 1929. T he people here are almost completely up to date on latest English and American literature. Full equipment o f microscopes and technicians. Have worked out spraying machinery . . . Had a very jovial banquet with Harriman, American Ambassador to Russia, Quintamilla, Mexican Ambassador to Russia—Chinese Ambassa dor to Russia1 . . . T h e y gave me a marvelous Usbek robe. Quinta milla drank large quantities of vodka but held it remarkably well. 1 Fu Ping-sheung.
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JU N E 15 , 19 4 4 — TASHKENT
Quintamilla told me the story o f his visit to Stalin. A t first they did not want to let him in but Q . said he had a letter from the President o f Mexico and would not deliver it except in person. Stalin said through interpreter “ W hat does he want?” Q. said “ Nothing—but does S. want to know anything about Latin America?” T h e y talked 1 Vt hours. S. is interested only in facts. He goes to sleep on theories. He likes to know facts exactly. He is a very insignificant appearing man but after you talk to him you find he is a genius. He was remarkably informed on all aspects o f L .A . but a little vague on some o f the geog raphy and he promptly refreshed his mind b y consulting a globe . . . JU N E
17, 1944—ALM A ATA, SIBERIA
Landed in Alma A ta about noon. This is the capital of Kazakhstan. Forty thousand people in 1929. T o d a y 340,000. T h e completion o f railroad line between Tashkent and Semipalatinsk b y w ay o f Alma Ata accounts for the increase. Packing plant, canning plant, flour mills, textiles, woolen goods, cigarettes, movie industry . . . A nice concert—ballet—Red A rm y chorus. Ballet the best w e had seen . . . I gave a farewell toast. Quintamilla says Alma Ata means in Spanish “T h e Soul binds.” Harriman said m y trip had done an amazing amount o f good. He and Quintamilla and the Chinese A m bassador left at 6:30 a.m. June 18.
JU N E l8 , 19 4 4 — TIHW A, CHINA
L eft about 9:20 a.m. M uch interested in the air in looking for the road to Sinkiang and in looking at the last Russian settlements or rather Kazak settlements. W en t through the pass and over the blue lake. T he road seemed to be in excellent condition with good bridges. Evidences o f when the Mohammedans had farmed before the Chinese had cleaned them out 80 years ago. Farming is possible here only with irrigation. W e are now for the first time in the area where the water does not flow into the A rctic. T h e drainage is simply Central Asia—it does not flow into any ocean. T ih w a or Urumchi is a town o f 90,000. Governor Sheng1 has a mixed reputation. W e were received b y a band and soldiers . . . T he Russian consul and his assistants were there. Also the British. T h e only 1 Sheng Shih-tsai, governor o f the northwest province o f Sinkiang.
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American in Tihw a is the American consul, Horace H . Smith a fine young fellow. A fter passing through the streets lined with school children w e were lodged inside a recently constructed governor’s pal ace with a medieval stockade around it. W e were transported in Rus sian cars—foxier than those used anywhere in Siberia or Central Asia . . . Lincoln body with a Buick motor. T h e Chinese say the Russian cars hold up much better under rough road conditions than do American cars. Dr. W ang from Chungking called on me. I told him about the fine w ork o f the Russian experiment stations—about how finely I regarded the w ork o f the Russian scientists. Dr. W ang wanted to know what the Russians felt about the Chinese. I told him I had not asked but I thought John Carter Vincent had talked with them. I said the Russians were very anxious to end the war quickly and that they hoped the Chinese would continue to fight. H e wanted to know if Russia would fight Japan. I said I had not talked to them about that but it was m y belief that if the Italian and French fronts w ent well—the Russians being realists would come in against Japan at the proper time. Then the Governor came in to talk to me. He told me that in Sinkiang were 4,500,000 people; tw o million Uighurs speak much the same language as Kazaks and Uzbeks; 400,000 Chinese, 100,000 Moham medan Chinese; 200,000 Kazaks; 30,000 Uzbeks; 40,000 Manchus; 80,000 Mongols; 70,000 W hite Russians. His policy is to teach the children in the primary grades in their native tongues. He says 60 percent literacy. Main crops are wheat, rice, alfalfa and vegetables . . . He thinks three million acres can eventually be irrigated. Great oil resources. He says the Russians were producing 20 tons o f gasoline a day when they took their equipment back to Russia because they needed it in their war effort. H e showed no critical bias against Russians whatever. I am told however, that the Russians do not like him at all. Horace Smith tells that while the G o v ernor has done good w ork on racial minorities and education that he is so much concerned about his own safety that he is quite a tyrant. Complete surveillance o f all dinner parties. H e puts people in jail under slight suspicion. Uses torture against them. Hanging them by the heels and beating . . . Everywhere the Russian influence is very strong. A ll manufactured products from Russia. W e saw an evening entertainment which was poorly put on com pared with Russian standards . . .
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JU N E 2 0 , 1 9 4 4 —CHUNGKING, CHINA
. . . W e go over the desert, see die G reat W all with green on the south side—desert on the north. Come to the deeply eroded areas o f loess’ near Lanchow. Then w e turn south—the land gets very green— it begins to cloud up. W e have to land at Chantuk fo r an hour. This is the B 29 base . . . T h e boys are full o f their June 15 raid. T h e y take us to the chart room and show us full details, including radar pictures . . . Beautiful farming country at Chantuk. Suddenly w ord comes that the clouds have lifted at Chungking. W e fly above the clouds all the w a y and break through an 800 foot ceiling with radio direction from the boys on the ground. This is the first rainy weather w e have had on the trip. Gauss, the American Ambassador, introduces me to the Generalis simo and the diplomatic corps. I go to the car where Madame Chiang is seated. W e drive to the President’s house for a cup o f tea. It is about a 40 minute drive. T h e Generalissimo asks questions and the Madame translates m y replies. He asks m y opinion o f Sinkiang and I tell o f m y great admiration o f the w ork o f Madame Sheng in the schools—express surprise that General Sheng should have put a tardy chauffeur in jail. T h e Generalissimo laughs. He says “ H o w —h o w how ” all the time. H e has an almost feminine charm. H e asks about m y trip in Russia. I pay a strong tribute to Russian science. Describe Komsomolsk. Speak highly o f the agricultural work. H e wanes to know m y opinion o f the agricultural w ork in Sinkiang. I tell him I would like to talk to the Minister of Agriculture about it— that I think I may have some suggestions on sheep breeding—but I am not sure y e t until I get certain information. Madame Chiang tells me I have a grandson, bom on June 171 . . . A t the tea in the very American house are present the four members o f m y party and T . V . Soong, Dr. W ang, Ambassador Gauss. Madame Chiang complains o f her nervous illness. Nervous urticaria. Harring ton, the N a v y doctor is treating her fo r it. She looks well, smokes cigarettes, and is animated. W e leave b y car for Embassy. T . V . Soong rides with me. I tell him I have not come to China to talk about inflation. H e says the Gen eralissimo wants to bring in b y air 2000 tons o f cloth a month. I tell him it is impossible to bring in b y air enough goods to control inflation. He asks me about Russia. I tell him how deeply impressed I am 1 A ctually a granddaughter, as W allace soon discovered.
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with Russia’s science in both agriculture and industry. H e wants to know about Russia’s attitude toward China. I tell him that Russia wants China really to fight. H e says the military situation is not too bad—that even if the Japs take Kweilin,1 the Americans still have ade quate air bases from which to proceed against the Japs. I tell him I think it would be a very serious economic blow to China if the Japs get as far as Kweilin. I tell him there must be no possibility of war between Russia and China. A t the Ambassador’s house . . . the Ambassador unfolds the story . . . o f Chinese personalities. Madame Chiang has continually been knocking the U.S. ever since she got back from her trip . . . Gauss says T . V . Soong is O .K . Says that when T .V . spoke frankly to the Generalissimo on his return from U.S. the Generalissimo went straight up in the air. T .V . for a time expected to get shot. T h e situ ation is better now. Gauss says Madame Kung and Madame Chiang through stooges used the U.S. advance of $100,000,000 as a medium o f speculation* . . . K ung may or may not have been in on it. T h e Generalissimo found out . . . K ung took the stooges with him to the U.S. and it w ill be a long time before they venture back. A t the Gauss informal dinner were representatives of the various U.S. Agencies. T he military told me the Chinese did not fight. T h e y ran away and the peasants attacked them because they had robbed the peasants. T h e y look on the situation as bad. T he Generalissimo has been spreading the propaganda that 17 Jap divisions have been released b y the Russian treaty. O ur military say they have not been able to identify even one Jap division so released. T he Chinese military claim only four. It is true that the Japs have lowered their draft age and now have more divisions and are shipping more divisions to Manchuria and other mainland points. JUNE
21, 1944—CHUNGKING
Visit the Red Cross. Soldiers. Play a little volley ball with the en listed men. T . V . Soong calls on me at the Embassy. Tells me of his1*3 1 A t the end o f October Japanese advances forced the American troops to destroy their air base at Kweilin. 3 T h e United States Treasury had deposited in China’s account $200 million o f the $500 million credit that Congress voted China in 1942. Though American officials in Chungking suspected that members of the Soong family had used some of that deposit for their personal gain, those suspicions were never proved. Incontestably Kung and others did use American aid unwisely.
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precarious position vis a vis the Generalissimo and o f his great faith in China. He fears the Gim o does not understand. H e is too much the soldier to comprehend the economic forces at work. Call on Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen1 who are both very liberal in their expressions. I give Madame Sun Yat-sen Mrs. W allace’s pres ent. Eat lunch with Secretary o f W ar. Visit the universities. G o out to Gim o’s and have first formal conversation with him. I present to him what the President told me verbally about the Communists, and say “ There must not be left pending any situation which w ill lead to conflict with Russia.” I hold out the hope o f the significant future o f a great democratic China with a strong agriculture and strong industry. I point out the part which the U.S. can play and how it is important for American business men that there be peace in eastern Asia.
JU N E
22 , 19 4 4 — CHUNGKING
. . . On the w ay back from the station the Minister o f Agriculture spent his time denouncing the Chinese Communists just as Ambassador W ei had done in Washington. I told him the U.S. did not propose to fight Russia. W e get to the G im o’s about 6 and plunge into Conversation II. This time Vincent was present and we listen to the Gim o’s case against the Communists. It was full of bitter feeling and poor logic. I like the Gim o but fear his lack o f vision will doom him to a Kerensky’s fate. I was very sad after the second conversation. I told both Madame and T .V . so. T h e y passed it on. T he Gim o refused to reply to Vincent on the matter o f military observers in Communist China. T . V . Soong’s for dinner. I spent m y time talking to the great scholar Tai. He tells me the essence of Buddhism: 1. Love o f all life 2. Equality 3. Liberty He and the Gim o studied together in Japan and had the same house keeper then which means the same mistress. She had a child which is generally credited to the Gim o although some say it is T a i’s. T he Gimo recognizes the child . . . 1 Sun Fo was the son o f Sun Yat-sen, the father o f the great Revolution of 1911. Sun Yat-sen’s widow, his second wife, was the elder sister of Madame Chiang.
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23, 1944—CHUNGKING
It is still rainy and cool. A t breakfast I tell Gim o about m y con versation with Tai. I ask Gim o what contribution Taoist monasteries make to China’s general welfare. H e says none. Buddhist monasteries are worse than useless. Christianity is all right because it is associated with science. In the conversation after breakfast I open up on strictly military problems and Gim o agrees to military observers. I go to Embassy and find President’s wire.1 I get General Ferris2 and get the G im o’s con firmation late in the afternoon. W e have made some progress. I drive home again and again fundamental thesis. “ There must be left pending no questions which w ill lead to war with Russia.” W e have supper with Madame Kung, T .V ., Madame Chiang and the Gimo. Strictly Chinese dinner. O nly chop sticks. T h e Madame is sicker than I thought. T h e Gimo knows about the President’s commitment on D airen warm water free port to which Russia might have access. Madame wants her warmest regards to President and Mrs. Roosevelt and to American people. Vincent takes full notes. I tell Gim o that story was abroad that T .V . was in jail and that it would help dispel the story if T .V . would come back to U.S. with us. JU N E 24, 1944—CHUNGKING
Gim o says he would appreciate good offices o f U.S. in initiating con versations w ith Russia. H e thinks T .V . might come to U.S. later on to w ork on this matter but not now. W ith Madame going to U.S. he needs T .V . as a mouthpiece to America. I am convinced Gim o is headed straight toward being a Kerensky. I like him but I do not give him one chance in five to save himself.2 1 Roosevelt’s wire spurred Chiang to the concessions explained in W allace's diary o f June 24, 1944. a Brigadier General Benjamin G . Ferris, one o f Sdlwell’s subordinates, «ras the senior American officer then stationed in Chungking. 2 In Chungking on June 24, 1944, W allace and Chiang Kai-shek issued a joint statement. “Enduring peace in the Pacific,” they said, “will depend upon: 1. effective permanent demilitarization o f Japan; 2. understanding friendship and collaboration . . . among the four principal powers in the Pacific area, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the British Commonwealth o f Nations, and among all United Nations willing to share in the responsibilities o f postwar international order; and 3. recognition o f the fundamental right o f presently dependent Asiatic peoples to self-government, and the early adoption of meas ures in the political, economic and social fields to prepare those dependent
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Gimo, through Madame, on w ay to airport dictates to me 10 points to President.1 peoples for self-government within a specified practical time limit." T h e state ment also assumed a mutual understanding between China and the Soviet Union and said that “no balance o f power arrangements would serve the ends of peace.” 1 W allace recorded in longhand, often with abbreviations here mostly spelled out, what were actually twelve points. H e wrote in pencil but later inserted in ink a few nouns and verbs to make his account clearer. T h e points follow: T o Pres, from Gim o 1. Attitude o f Pres, in Cairo conference, his warmth etc. has immense his toric value to people and army o f China. 2. Grateful for abrogation o f unequal treaties & efforts on behalf o f repeal of exclusion act. 3. H A W visit to China as representative o f Pres, is to bring about accord with Russia shows great friendship for China. 4. H A W visit at this dark hour will help morale of troops—give hope that American aid will continue. 5. Assure the Pres, that Gim o understands the necessity under which the Pres, acted when he changed plans at Teheran—Nevertheless Gimo foresaw what the change meant. W hen Gim o sent strong frank memoranda to Pres^ it was because he foresaw what is now happening. If the Gimo foresees that China’s collapse will come, he must tell tne Pres. China has not yet arrived at the collapse state which he predicted to Pres. Things today are not as bad as he feared. 6. Respects greatly Pres, character, views, etc. 7. Deeply touched when I told him about how badly the Pres, felt about Teheran change relative to Gim o personally. Therefore he again appre ciated most deeply that I should come out on behalf o f Russia-Chineae friendship. 8. China Communist question internal political problem. W ould, however, welcome Pres. help. H e feels Chinese Comm, are not men of good faith— their signature no good. H e would not like to see Pres, blamed for Comm, failure to carry out a commitment. Just the same he happy to have Pres, help if the Pres, after mature consideration decides he would like to do so. H e (Gimo) would not consider the Pres, participation as meddling in China’s internal affairs, but the Gim o a true fnend, w ho knows the Chinese Communists thru and thru thinks that no matter what Communists say they may do, it will not be carried out—in which case the Pres, prestige would suffer a great loss. Gim o wants President to know that conflict between Communists and central gov’t, is not like that between capital & labor in U S ., not analagous. 9. Gimo eager to have closer cooperation and understanding with Pres. How? T o o many channels through State Dpt. Churchill has personal rep resentative . . . Both political and military matters. Could Pres, pick a man like this? Could perform an invaluable task. T od ay military cooperation is very difficult because of personnel. Feels Chenault is most cooperative. Srilwell has improved. Srilwell has no understanding of politics, entirely military in outlook. 10. Gimo has utmost confidence in Dr. Kung. In helping Kung, will be helping Gimo. 11. Gimo is shaping everything toward Democratic path. China Destiny to
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W e take off at 11:10 a.m. Chungking. First sunny morning in Chungking. Arriving Kunming, w e meet General Chennault and G en eral Glenn1 . . . Play several games o f volley ball indoors because o f intermittent showers outdoors. Chennault is 54 years old but has trou ble with his hearing and a little with his eyes. H e is a swell fellow and is looking forward to the day when he can retire on a Louisiana plantation . . . JUNE
25, 1944—KUNMING
Early in the morning w e walk the borders o f the rice paddies. A man is leveling a little field with a water buffalo with a baby strapped to his back. His son is leading the buffalo and his w ife w ith a hoe is straightening out the paddy border. T h e women do all the transplant ing o f rice. Garden crops are cabbage, Chinese cabbage, egg plant, soybeans. Earlier they had harvested wheat. Attended Chennault’s 8 a.m. staff conference when w e had a report on the war in all theatres but with special reference to the Kweilin front. W e had a report as to just what precisely some o f the B-29 bombers had done which w e had seen taking off the preceding evening. Then w e visited the field and went over the B-24S, C-46S, C-47S, the P-40S, the P-51S. It is amazing what Chennault’s boys have been able to do with P-40S in spite o f their slowness. V isit with the crew pro tecting the field w ho can get in to the air in three minutes . . . In the afternoon, visit the refugee university. T h e professors nearly all graduates from American universities are very progressive, sympa thetic, to the Chinese Communists. T h e y say there is no freedom o f speech or press in China. I gave a talk to the University students. In the evening at the Governor’s dinner I give a talk based on the Dragon boat festival. T od ay is the fifth day o f the fifth month. It seems that Chu Yuan on 5th day o f the 5th moon jumped into the lake because his advice was not heeded b y the prince. I suggested it was even better to live for an ideal than to die for one.*12 to fall into line. W ants Communists to be a political patty. getIansCommunists such advance in agrarian program that Communists w ill have no opportunity. 12. Hopes after war to get interest rate for farmers down to 10%. Hopes to promote land ownership & breaking up o f large landholdings. T h e reference to Teheran in point 5 related to the decision at rite conference there to postpone the invasion o f Burma to which Roosevelt had temporarily agreed at Cairo. Chiang’s request for having in Chungking a personal repre sentative o f the President led later, along with other developments, to the appointment o f Patrick H urley as Ambassador to China. 1 Brigadier General Edgar Eugene Glenn, Chennault’s chief o f staff.
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JU N E 2Ö, I9 4 4 — KUNMING
V isit to artillery school for Chinese General W aters.1 A swell job with 75 nun. howitzers packed both on mules and on shoulders o f 24 men—or six mules to do die job— 3.3 miles an hour. T h e infirmary. One fifth o f the men definitely undernourished. M any die. Scabies. T h e shoes, straw. T h e Chinese infantry school where I talk briefly. T h e firing range— the Chinese are good marksmen. Here were trained several divisions which are now on the Burma front. Waters says he is supposed to give Chinese in six weeks what w e in U.S. give in three months. Teaching is almost all out o f doors prac tice. T h e y do an awful lot with very üttle here. A t the infirmary they have no vitamins . . . T h e Generalissimo, the Secretary of W ar, etc., have not really sup ported artillery schools, infantry schools, etc., staffed b y American army officers because they know these men will prove very superior to the Chinese trained. T h e y fear the men w ill upset the static bal ance o f power in China. I am beginning to think they would almost prefer to lose the war rather than to see the old Chinese system upset in any w ay. Definitely the Chinese and Americans have not combined to do the job that could have been. Everyone agrees that the enlisted man and the Chinese junior officers are splendid material. I was gready impressed with them myself. But the damned smiling grafters above? T h e y stand for mediocrity forever condnued. A t Kunming I saw the P-38 that photographed the damage b y the B-29S on Japan. Several hundred acres o f Jap residences were burned out. O nly one direct hit on a steel mill—the steel mill was going full blast the next day. O n the whole I would say the raid was not too successful. In view o f the great danger o f cutting off eastern China I cannot help wondering w h y it is not better right now to use B-29S against Hankow, Canton, etc., which are the base o f Jap supplies on this very dangerous full powered Jap offensive.
JUN E 27, 1944—KWEILIN, CHINA
G o to Kweilin w hich is now the front line air field and the next big objective o f the Japs in their drive south. Curious dome-like limestone hills all around Kweilin—like big wigwams. General Casey Vincent is 1 Brigadier General
Jerom e J. W a te r s , Jr.
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in charge o f air base. General Lindsey in charge o f ground troops1 . . . [General] Vincent says Japs are advancing from the north at the rate o f 15 miles a day. In five to seven days they w ill be close enough to destroy the effectiveness o f his radio network and he w ill have to abandon this base. He has the air field mined. There are about 1500 troops, both air and land to be taken out b y transport plane and rail road. T h e Chinese generals show me the places on the map where they are going to make various last stands. T h e y say they can hold Kweilin for tw o months. Vincent says if they can hold Kweilin for tw o months he can operate on the supply lines with sufficient energy to defeat the Japs. T h e Chinese generals are putting great emphasis on the defense value o f the caves in these limestone hills. T he American generals say the Japs will by-pass Kweilin. T h e Chinese say they have the troops to attack from the flanks. T h e Chinese say these troops on the flank are o f excellent quality—“ T he Old Ironsides.” Vincent agrees. T h e Chinese want artillery. Lindsey says even if w e had it—w e should not give it to the Chinese because it would fall into the hands o f the Japs. He says w e have already furnished artillery in their area which has fallen into the hands o f the Japs. T . V . Soong was with us on this trip. It convinced him East China was lost and that he should go to Washington. Latdmore tells me he thinks the whole Soong family is now making its get-away. Madame Chiang and Madame Kung to Brazil—T .V . to Washington. Kung is already in Washington. T .V . swears his trip would only be a short one. I believe him but Latdmore thinks he would not come back to China. W e leave after tw o hours at Kweilin and go to Chengtu to be o f ficially received b y Governor, etc., etc. Dinner b y the Governor. Completely the Generalissimo’s man but a very nice man. His w ife is a very fine woman. This is the center of several Christian universities. I visit in the hospital the tw o thirds burned survivor o f one o f the B-29S which crashed. H e is from Missouri. It is now 14 days and he w ill recover. He couldn’t see me but he very much wanted to talk. JUN E 28, 1944—KWANHSIEN
W ent up the Min river b y auto about 30 miles to Kwanhsien “ the Isolated Hill” which was cut through in 300 b .c . b y Governor Lee Bin and his son to provide irrigation for this valley. 500,000 acres irrigated land. 1 Brigadier Generals Clinton Dermont Vincent and Malcolm F. Lindsey.
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There are tw o temples to the Lee Bins at Kwanhsiea w ith appropri ate mottos: “ Cut the channel deep— “ Keep the dikes low.” T h e upper temple is run b y the Taoists. Like all the temples, it is located at a nice spot to have a picnic. T h e abbot is a pacifist, 86 years old. But he thinks it nice that the Americans are doing the fighting fo r the Chinese. A n old pig tail peasant is getting his fortune told b y the lottery stick method. Yield o f rice here about 60 bushels an acre. A fter the rice is trans planted, they give it three rakings to keep the weeds down . . . Most o f the land is rented and the tenants pay the rice crop as rent and get the other crops for themselves. There is lots o f tobacco. Soy beans on the borders between fields . . . Farmers are doing fairly well here although the cost o f clothing has gone up faster than the cost o f rice. Road is crowded w ith rickshaws, wheelbarrows and tw o wheel carts with old auto tires. China became the ultimate market for old auto tires about ten years ago. More and more hard surfaced highways are built. Pigs are carried to market belly up upon wheelbarrows. N ext after the Nile, this is probably the oldest irrigation system in the world and probably the simplest. Attended a dinner b y the nine universities. Miss W u —a typical, nice, lady o f Republican conservative background gave a beautiful little speech. T h e people here have not the slightest w orry about the KweiÛn military situation. One man at the table speaks Russian and has lived on the Russian side o f the border for three years. Strangely enough, he also does not understand the underlying situation, either political or military . . . JU N E 29, 1944—CHENGTU
. . . W ord comes that D ew ey and Bricker have been nominated. I express surprise that it was not D ew ey and W arren.1 Lunch given b y the local General T en g Si-hou, commander o f Szechwan province. Both the governor and the general have been very helpful to the military. A fter the dinner Miss W u expresses to John Hazard great alarm about the rapid advance o f the Russians around Urtebsk. She has all the actions o f a very nice reactionary N ew York Republican. H er kind o f people w ill result in Russia eventually taking over China. 1 Republican G overnor Earl W arren o f California.
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General gives me a very lovely 300 year old jade belt buckle. W e go to the bombing held. 1 play four games o f volley balL W on three out o f four. T alk twice General Gilkeson1 and Colonel Duncan both very much impressed b y the w ay the Chinese built their B 29 field in less than three months. T h e y feel Governor Chang and General T en g w ere marvelous. T w o hundred fifty thousand Chinese—all hand labor. Both feel the Washington situation utterly screwball in not using B 29s against Jap supplies at Nanking, H ankow and Canton. T h e y believe East China is w orth saving. JUN E 30, 1944—LANCHOW
. . . A t dinner Governor K u had in all the local dignitaries including a “ living Buddha” from T ibet and one who had lived in Mongolia but now lives in China. This latter is an old friend o f O w en Lattimore— also according to Lattimore a friend o f the Roerichs. Lattimore said “ Your friends the Roerichs.” I said “ T he Roerichs are not my friends. T h e y are crooks.” Lattimore tells me George Roerich knows M ongol and Tibetan but that he is a phony. He met George in 1934.3 1 Brigadier General Adlai H . Gilkeson. 3 Nicholas Roerich, a ' his son, George, had caught W allace’s attention Roerich’s promotion of the Banner of Peace, a project to negotiate an international pact to pledge signatories in case o f war not to destroy cultural treasures. W allace’s efforts helped in >935 to effect the signing of that pact by twenty-two nations. W allace was aware, too, o f Roerich’s spiritualism and o f his knowledge about central Asian agriculture. In 1940 the Republican Party collected letters from W allace to Roerich, some genuine, some forged, which W estbrook Pegler published in 1948. Those letters contained many mystical references which Pegler intended to embarrass W allace. By his own account, W allace had a lifelong interest in spiritual phenomena, but the forged letters gravely distorted that interest. Some historians, including Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in T h e Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1959) pp. 31-34, have found the Roerich letters credible. W allace expressed a contrary view in his comments to the Columbia University Oral History Project (W allace Oral History, pp. 5102-11) where he said: I can’t think of Nicholas Roerich and certain of his fanatical followers and the relationship of FD R and myself to the Roerich expedition, which began some time in the early summer of 1934, without a strong feeling of disgust. I don’t doubt that FD R was moved by the highest motives in authorizing the Roerich expedition, but the actions taken by Nicholas Roerich and his son George were such as to open the door to utterly disgraceful action by others. I know o f nothing lower than the actions which some of die fanatical followers o f Nicholas Roerich took after I had dismissed Nicholas Roerich and his son, George, from the employ of the U S . Department of Agriculture in January of 1936. T h e link between Roosevelt and Nicholas Roerich was Roosevelt’s mother,
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Sara, as well as his own intense interest in central Asia—all the w ay from Tibet to die Siberian border. T h e climate, the people, the history, the ecology, and the religion of this area fascinated him. He felt that this area was a breeding place for future wars and the reladonship of this area to China, Russia, and Japan intrigued him. Because of his ancestors being linked with China he always attributed a greater importance to China than most people. He had the idea that the G obi desert had once grown trees and that when the trees were cut off, the climate had changed . . . H e felt the climate might be changed back again by growing trees. I think Roerich had some idea along that line also. Roosevelt also thought that some of the plants of central Asia would be useful to the U.S. I told him that the U.S. Depart ment of Agriculture had previously imported crested wheat grass (Agropyron cristatum) from this area and that this wheat grass was serving a useful purpose in our Great Plains area. A t the time of the Dalai Lama in late 1933 Roosevelt speculated with me about an expedition to Tibet—this was one day after cabinet meeting in late December. I told him that the U.S. Department of Agriculture was much interested in importing drought-resistant grasses from central Asia. Both Roosevelt and I knew Nicholas Roerich. I had met him once when I was on m y w ay to Europe in August 1929. Roosevelt had known him when he was governor and referred to him affectionately. I’m sure, however, that the strongest bond between him and Nicholas Roerich was his mother. In the 1920s Nicholas Roerich traveled extensively in central Asia. These travels were given wide publicity. Roosevelt knew of these travels and we decided to ask Nicholas Roerich to head the expedition. Nicholas Roerich’s son was supposed to be peculiarly fitted to travel in central Asia because he had studied many Oriental languages. R o o se v e lt directed me to tell L e w is D o u g la s personally, w h o w as at that tim e D ir e c to r o f the B u d g e t, to see th at th e fun ds necessary fo r the exped i tion w ere p ro vid ed fo r in the D ep artm en t o f A g r ic u ltu r e b u d get.
T h e expedition began in the summer of 1934. Nicholas Roerich and his son, George, spent the winter o f 1934^-35 in Harbin, with a W hite Russian colony. A t the time it was a nest o f international intrigue. He was bitterly attacked in the W hite Russian press and in the summer of 1935 articles began to appear in the United States about Roerich. T h e State Department was seriously disturbed about his being in this troubled spot. As a result, I directed him to proceed southward and finally to northern India. In January of 1936, 1 terminated the expedition. A ll of these actions, which I took beginning in the summer of 1935, w *re opposed in a gentle w ay by Roosevelt. He \ ' w * >ient t^c 0jj man ^ # # A fter I ended fanatical followers began to undermine me. T h ey got their first opportunity in 1940 when I was running on the Democratic party ticket for V ice President. That campaign, under cover, was exceedingly dirty. Certain material was being peddled around concerning W illkie’s private life and some of the fanatical Nicholas Roerich followers peddled around certain material which I was alleged to have written to Nicholas Roerich. Large sums of money were asked for the material. I never saw the material I was alleged to have written to Nicholas Roerich until quite a while after the campaign when Roosevelt laughingly showed me some photostats of material which had been offered for sale. T h e material was composed for the most part of unsigned, undated notes, which I knew I had never sent to Nicholas Roerich, but there were a few letters addressed to Nicholas Roerich signed by me and dated which were
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JU LY 2 , 1944—ULAN BATOR, OUTER MONGOLIA
Arrived in Ulan Bator about noon—over 100,000 people tw o air fields. W e land on one closest to town. Fifteen years ago 50,000 peo ple. M any modern buildings—textile factory, meat slaughtering, southern Outer Mongolia mostly desert. Northern part very good pasture . . . Lattimore says they have improved enormously in last 20 years . . . Russian influence in some ways very marked. In other ways unexpectedly absent . . . T h e people o f Outer Mongolia are still very religious but they have been freed from the monk racket in large measure. O n ly one influen tial monastery in the country now. Museum had an excellent collection o f Buddhist images, etc. . . .
J u l y 5,1944
G o t up at five and were in the air at 7 a.m. Headed for Seimchan. Due to bad weather at Seimchan, w e shifted our course to Yakutsk, flying much of the w a y at 17,000 feet. Arrived at 12:15 P-m- T o o k three hours exactly to eat and refuel. Farewell meal w ith Goglodze and Gubakhin and General Mazuruk. M any toasts. Goglodze toasted Lattimore and Vincent because they were experts on China and on them rested a great responsibility for the future o f China. Goglodze toasts V .P . W allace coming to M oscow after the war, also toasted President Roosevelt’s re-election. W e are now headed for Fairbanks and are flying through the clouds*1 . . .
SUMMARY OF POLITICAL MANEUVERING
W hen I reached Fairbanks on July 5 I called Joe G uffey. Joe said, “Things are not going well. Some o f the people around the W hite House are saying, ‘W e need a new face.’ ” A little later Samuel Rosenman called saying that he and Secretary Ickes wanted to see me at the written in rather high-flown language. N one of the material seemed to cause F D R the slightest concern . . . T h e y tried to peddle the letters in the 1940 campaign and nobody would have anything to do with them, and Fm told that they tried in 1944 and everybody just laughed at them. In 1948 they came out through W estbrook Pegler . . . 1 W ith his return from Alaska, W allace resumed dictating his diary, the text o f which is edited hereafter as it was before the Asian journey.
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earliest possible moment and wouldn’t it be nice if I would eat lunch witH them in Secretary Iclces’ office on Monday, July 10. T h e reason for haste was that Secretary lekes had a date on the W est Coast and had to leave the afternoon o f the 10th on the train. (Ickes does not fly and so it was proposed that I fly all night in order to make it pos sible fo r Ickes not to fly at all.) It was asked that I send a wire when it became a little more certain when I was arriving in Washington. O n Sunday, July 9, 1 sent a w ire to Rosenman from Seattle1 saying that I thought I ought to see the President before seeing him and Ickes. A fter flying all night (leaving Seattle at 5 p.m. Sunday) I arrived in W ashington at 9:30 a.m. Monday, July 10, after being gone 51 days and traveling 27,000 miles. A t 10 I phoned the President but was in formed he was bathing. A little later General W atson called and in formed me the President wanted me to see Ickes and Rosenman before I saw the President at 4:30 in an “ on-the-record conference.” Therefore I asked Sam and Ickes to lunch at m y apartment. A fter half an hour o f polite inquiries they got down to business. Ickes said how much I had grown in his esteem. T hat I was a true liberal and that he and I were die only tw o real liberals left in the government. Sam said, “W hat about me?” Ickes said, “ I am talking about liberals in the western sense o f the word.” Ickes then made it clear that I had made many enemies, that I was a bone o f contention in the convention and that I ought not to let my name be presented. Before Ickes made this presentation, however, Sam made it clear that the President preferred me as a running mate. In other words Sam created the impression that the President wanted me but he either did not think I could w in in the convention nor help him win in the fall. Neither Sam nor Ickes got very far before I said, “ I am seeing the President at four-thirty. I have a report to make on a mission to China. I do not want to talk politics.” T h e y beat a hasty retreat. A t 4:30 the President was very cordial. I gave him m y report on China. W e talked for tw o hours about it. Then he opened up on poli tics saying that when I w ent out I should say that no politics were dis cussed. H e said, “ I am now talking to the ceiling about political mat1 In Seattle W allace broadcast a report to the nation about his trip to Siberia and China. H e also talked with Harold Young, w ho reported, as had Joe G uffey, that the V ice President’s political prospects looked gloomy. Contrary to same gossip at the time, which W allace considered fanciful, he did not feel the battle was lost. Rather, almost comforted by the challenge, he moved as fast as he could to repulse it.
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ters.” H e said I was his choice as a running mate, that he was willing to make a. statement to that effect. I asked him if he would be willing to say, “ If I were a delegate to the convention I would vote for H enry W allace.” H e said, “ Yes, I would.” H e then went on to say that a great many people had been in to see him saying that I could not be nomi nated unless the President did what he did in 1940 and even then they were not sure. I at once broke in and said that I would not want him to do what he did in 1940—that if I had known about it in advance I would not have advised him to do it in 1940. I said I did not want to be pushed down anybody’s throat but that I did want to know definitely whether or not he really wanted me and was willing to say so. H e was very ready with his assurance. Then the President returned to die theme o f his visitors w ho had told him that I would cost the ticket from i to 3 million votes. I said at once, “ Mr. President, if you can find anyone w ho w ill add more strength to the ticket than I, b y all means take him.” T he President did not say that he believed those who thought I would cost the ticket 1 to 3 million votes. H e then said he could not bear the thought o f m y name being put up before the con vention and rejected. I said I had been used to hard situations, that they gave me my best opportunities—that he need not w orry about me. He then said, “ But you have your family to think of. Think o f the catcalls and jeers and the definiteness of rejection.” I said, “ I am not worried about m y family.” A t this stage o f the conversation I was thinking, “ I am much more worried about the Democratic party and you than I am about myself and m y family.” He then asked me to come back for lunch on Tuesday and Thursday. I told him I was going to be seeing Joe G u ffey that evening and that I had been out o f the country a long time and that I had had absolutely no opportunity to become current. H e asked me to take a look around and report the following day. I got in touch with Charles Marsh and he completed a state-by-state report which looked very good.1 For the Tuesday lunch I came in the back w ay. I presented the President with a glorious Uzbek robe which he liked. (T he previous day I gave him some Outer Mongolian postage stamps and money which had cost me $10 but which were probably worth many times that because no Americans have been in Mongolia for 17 years.) W e 1 Marsh’s analyses predicted a majority vote for W allace on the first ballot for the vice-presidential nomination, and predicted, too, victory in November for a Roosevelt-Wallace ticket. Those conclusions drew some support from the latest Gallup Poll, which showed W allace still the vice-presidential candidate most favored b y Democrats.
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then talked quite a bit about Siberia. Then he read carefully page b y page the Marsh memorandum. Also the tabulation o f the vote next fall w ith and without me. I told him this tabulation was based on w ork done b y some o f Sidney Hillman’s people. H e put a date on it and kept it. He agreed that N ew Y ork was no better than 50-50. He was doubtful about W est Virginia and K entucky but thought he had an outside chance in Verm ont and Maine because o f the war situation. In his Monday talk the President indicated that he meant his fourth term to be really progressive. He was going to get rid o f “Jesus H .” Jones and W ill G ayton and other folks who were thinking only about their own money. T he President also told me on Monday how Hannegan was going to send him a letter the following day and how he would accept. A fter leaving the President on Tuesday I went over to the State Department and called on G rew and Hull and Stettdnius. Then I played tw o sets o f tennis with m y son Bob and called up the press to comment on the President’s statement (they first having called m y office in my absence). Joe G u ffey came around at 9 p.m. He looks on me as a son in this fight. (I forgot to mention that I left with the President, when I was w ith him at lunch on Tuesday, a statement which Joe G u ffey assured me would bring my nomination on the first ballot. T h e state ment read, “ It appears the convention w ill name me. I trust the name with me will be H enry A . Wallace. He is equipped for the future. W e have made a team which pulls together, thinks alike and plans alike.” T he President said he had worked out another wording. But nevertheless he wanted to keep mine.) T h e President mentioned how many people looked on me as a com munist or worse. He said as a matter o f fact there was no one more American than myself, no one more o f the American soil. He said some referred to W allace as that fellow who wants to give a quart of milk to every Hottentot. I said, “ You know, Mr. President, I never said that. T hat was said for me b y the President o f the National Asso ciation of Manufacturers.” He was greatly surprised to learn that and then launched into a description o f what his defense of me had been. T he secretary to Governor Am all o f Georgia called on me and assured me that Georgia was for me. However, he said there might be trouble holding the delegation after the first vote unless there was some public utterance of preference for me by the President. I told him I was seeing the President on Thursday. H e asked me to call him or the Governor after seeing the President.
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I made arrangements to meet with Joe G u ffey in m y office in the Senate Office Building immediately after m y lunch with the President on Thursday. Joe phoned Wednesday morning to say that Sam Rosenman was saying to him that I would get beaten at Chicago. Joe replied w ith fire. Joe says Phil M urray is going to bat for me. Charlie Marsh phones that the secretary to Governor Am all phones him that Georgia Light and Power, operating out o f W all Street, is putting the pressure on the Governor to lay off o f me. T h e W all Street crowd is beginning to line up as hard as it can behind Barkley. O f course this is not the Rosenman-Ickes-Corcoran game or the Hannegan game. T h e Hannegan game is to knock me at every possible turn in the hope that Truman w ill be the ultimate beneficiary. T h e Ickes game is to have Douglas as the beneficiary. Hannegan called up m y office and came over to see me in m y apartment Wednesday morning. He said he wanted to tell me that I did not have a chance. He said I ought to withdraw. I said I w ould not withdraw unless the President did not want me. And I said the President has indicated he does want me. I said I had never been in favor o f the President delivering a fiat to the convention. H e said he had been with the President last night and that he thought the President was going to indicate me as first choice and someone else as second choice, and that b y so doing this would automatically result in the second choice person getting all the dissident votes and there fore winning. I told him that I had known for a long time that he thought I did not have a chance—that his views were well known and had been freely expressed to many people. I said w e might as well understand each other—that I was not withdrawing as long as the President preferred me. A little later I got word that a newspaperman met Hannegan at the front door o f die Wardman and that Hannegan referred to me as a terrible person. Furthermore, Hannegan declared he was not going to Chicago unril this vice-presidendal thing is setded.1 W ord comes from several sources that Biddle, Tom m y Corcoran’s friend, is working very hard for Douglas and very strong against me. Claude Pepper came in to indicate that while he naturally had ambitions himself, he wanted to cooperate w ith me on the early ballots at least. He was worried about the fact that w ith the President 1 T h « meeting of July is was between Hannegan and one Harris of the S c Louis Pott-Dispâtcb, w ho immediately made a record o f the conversation, which he then gave to Marsh.
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not available, the party machinery would be left in the hands o f those w ho are unfriendly to the progressive cause. H e told about his con versation with H arry Hopkins and how H arry Hopkins had “ Yes, butted” me in the highest terms. Pepper said that at a recent party at Joe Davies’, Paul M cN utt had pulled him o ff to one side and had said fiercely, “W ell, it w on’t be W allace this time. I do not give a damn what Roosevelt says.” Sidney Hillman came in at nine W ednesday evening and said he was going to be seeing Roosevelt the following morning. He told me that Ickes had phoned him that I, W allace, did not have a chance and that they better find a second choice. Sidney had apparently been softened a little b y their pressure but on the whole was standing fairly firm. H e is revising P A C so as to avoid any legal complications. H e has a payroll o f $65,000 a month and has a more powerful organization fo r getting out the vote than the Democratic National Committee and a payroll several times as large. I told him that Tim e was coming out w ith him on the front page cover (a very Semitic likeness), the idea being to create as much prejudice against Roosevelt as possible the week o f the convention. T h e thought is to make it appear that Jewish labor is running the Democratic party. O n Thursday I came in to lunch the back w ay at one o’clock. A t 1:40 I saw Sidney Hillman’s back out o f the com er o f m y eye. He must have been with the President more than an hour. T he President started to talk to me about Sidney but I cut in, saying I would like to ask a favor of him, “I would like to have the privilege o f putting his name in nomination.” He said Alben had asked for that, and in view o f Alben’s speech against him on the floor o f the Senate he thought it was best for Alben to do it. W e talked at some little length about the letter Gim o Chiang had sent me and which I had turned over to the State Department with the suggestion d u t they prepare a reply for the President’s signature. Vincent had prepared an excellent reply, which Hull had approved and which I had brought in purely as an expediter. T he President referred to Chiang’s continual request for a man who had the President’s complete confidence who would serve the same purpose as Carton de W iart serves for Churchill in China. Suddenly the President said, “ I think I w ill send Don Nelson over . . . ” . . . H e then told me that he was going to handle the V ice President situation b y sending a letter to Senator Jackson, the permanent chair man.1 H e was going to compose the letter that afternoon and send it 1 Roosevelt’s letter to Senator Samuel D . Jackson o f Indiana, w ho was to be permanent chairman o f the Democratic convention, said: **. . . I have been
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from H yde Park on Friday, July 14. Jackson could release it as soon as he wished, which probably would be Monday but might be Sunday. In the letter he would say that he had known me a long time, that he thought a lot o f me, and that if he were a delegate to the convention he would vote for me. He would also go on to say that he did not wish in any w ay to dictate to the convention. He wanted to get die wording just right so that it would not seem in any w ay like dictation but so that it would be just to me. T he President told me about the meeting Tuesday night at which were present Ed Flynn, Ed K elly, Pauley o f California,*1 Hannegan, and some o f the other professionals. According to the President they all thought I would harm the ticket. I said at once to the President, “ If you think so, I w ill withdraw at once.” H e said “ I have no basis for a judgment o f m y own. T he only w ay I could find out would be to drive among the farmers in Duchess County. There i s -------------who is nominally a Republican but mighty independent.” H e dien described a number o f men in detail who could give him the basis o f judgment he had to have. But, he said he did not have the time to see these men and so he could not say. He said it was mighty sweet o f me to make the offer but he could not think o f accepting it. H e then went on to say that the professional politicians thought H arry Truman was the only one w ho had no enemies and might add a little independent strength to the ticket. T h e y thought Douglas might bring a little strength on the W est Coast. Moreover he was a pic turesque figure because his hair got in his eyes and he had to sweep it out with a gesture of his hand. Jimmie Byrnes was too old and had the handicap o f coming from a section which would alienate the N egro vote. He told o f a conversation he had recently with Jimmie and o f how hot Jimmie was for the job and how he had covered all angles with Jimmie. He said, “ W h y , you know Jimmie is older than I am? He is sixty-five.” He then talked about Alben at some length, his age, his speech, the tax law, etc., etc. I told him about the public utilities swinging in behind Barkley in a big w ay yesterday. He asked associated with H enry W allace during his past four years as V ice President, for eight years earlier while he was Secretary of Agriculture and well before that. I Tike him and respect him and he is m y personal friend. For those reasons, 1 personally would vote for his renomination if I were a delegate to the Convention. “A t the same time, I do not wish to appear in any way as dictating to the Convention. Obviously the Convention must do the deciding . . 1 Edwin W . Pauley, a wealthy Californian oil executive and a promoter of Truman’s candidacy, was in 1944 treasurer of the Democratic National Com mittee.
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w hy. I said I did not know, that I thought Alben was pretty progres sive but I guessed perhaps they thought he was conservative compared to me. I asked the President if he was going to do what Hannegan wanted and give an alternative name. He said no. That would be too much like dictation. I gave him the account o f Hannegan’s conversation with Harris after Hannegan’s visit with me yesterday morning and said in view o f the fact that the President would not have a H arry Hopkins at the convention and in view of the fact I could not trust Hannegan, I hoped there would be some method o f Joe G u ffey getting in touch w ith him direct. He said Joe could get in touch with him at his railroad car at San Diego by getting in touch with Latta1 at the W hite House. T h e ship w hich is taking him northward from San Diego has a broken crankshaft and will not be able to leave as soon as he had expected. He said also that he had told Sidney Hillman that he could get in touch with him through Latta. W hen 1 was leaving I said to the President, “ W ell, 1 am looking ahead with pleasure to the results o f next week no matter what the outcome.’’ As I shook hands with him he drew me close and turned on his full smile and a very hearty handclasp, saying, “ W hile 1 cannot put it just that w ay in public, I hope it w ill be the same old team.’’ W hen he referred to H arry [Hopkins] he said that H arry did indeed have his full confidence but that H arry was a very sick man. Harry had eaten lunch with him on W ednesday but could hardly hold his head up for the entire meal and had to go away immediately after lunch to lie down. T h e President said, “Even though they do beat you out at Chicago, w e w ill have a job for you in world economic affairs.” ca.
Ju ly
31, 1944 ( u n d a t e d ) 2
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE CHICAGO
19 4 4
CONVENTION
I arrived late W ednesday morning, July 19, at the 63rd Street Station and w ent direct to the Sherman Hotel. Shortly thereafter I saw Phil Murray, Sidney Hillman, Beanie Baldwin, and R. J. Thomas at the Morrison. Phil told me that on Monday Jimmie Byrnes had told him 1 Maurice C . Latta, executive clerk at the W hite House. 3 W allace wrote this memorandum during the period July 22-31, 1944. H e was at the convention in Chicago July 19-21, then in Des Moines, July 22-30, and in W ashington July 31.
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that I had been o f very little service to labor—that he, Jimmie, coaid be o f mach better service because he could get into the details o f legislation, could persuade legislators, etc. Sidney denied that he had said anything on behalf o f Truman. Phil told me later that when Sidney started out opening the door to Truman in a press conference, he, Phil, had shut it uncompromisingly b y saying there was no second choice. W hen I entered the hall W ednesday evening I was amazed at the friendly reception given me. Joe G u ffey told me the following morn ing that Dave Lawrence, the Pittsburgh boss, was holding out against me in the Pennsylvania delegation, as well as a Philadelphia man b y the name o f Clark w ho was being guided b y Frank W alker. Francis Biddle started out against me in the Pennsylvania delegation but swung around to me when he found that Tom m y Corcoran’s protégé had no chance. Frank W alker stayed steadfastly against me in the caucus, saying to Joe G u ffey, “ I am loyal to the boss and the boss does not want H enry W allace.” Then came the smoke-out o f the letter from the President to Hannegan.1 K elly had given a dinner Tuesday eve ning in honor o f Hannegan at which Pepper and G u ffey were present. Hannegan worked one end o f the table and K elly the other, saying the President was for Truman but not saying a w ord about Douglas. G u ffey made a public statement which forced Hannegan to divulge his full letter to the press about 6:30 Thursday evening. T h e effect was damaging to Hannegan’s reputation. I realized then that Hannegan had gotten the President to do that which he, the President, had prom ised me the preceding week he would not do—“ introduce a second name.” T he President’s explanation to me doubtless would be that all he meant to say to me was that he would not include a second name in his letter to Jackson. A fter the tremendous demonstration for me Thursday evening,1 1 Hannegan had persuaded Roosevelt to write him on July 19, 1944. T h e Presi dent’s letter opened the w ay for the nomination o f Truman: “You have written me about H arry Truman and Bill Douglas. I should, of course, be very glad to run with either o f them and believe that either one o f them would bring real strength to the ticket.” 2 T h e demonstration, the noisiest o f the convention, followed W allace’s speech seconding the nomination o f Roosevelt. W allace said, in part: “T h e future belongs to those who go down the line unswervingly for the liberal principles of both political and economic democracy regardless o f race, color, or religion. In a political, educational, and economic sense there must be no inferior races. T h e poll tax must go. Equal educational opportunities must come. T h e future must bring equal wages for equal w ork regardless of sex or race. Roosevelt stands fo r all this . . . T h e only question is whether the convention and party workers believe wholeheartedly in the liberal policies for which Roosevelt has
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Beanie Baldwin gave me his size-up o f the state-by-state situation. He also told me o f a conversation he had had w ith Paul Porter about the situation in the Democratic National Committee. Paul Porter, ac cording to Beanie, had been shocked b y the direct methods used by Hannegan against me. Porter said to Baldwin, "This attitude does not originate with Hannegan but with the President himself.” Friday morning I got word of the strong actions employed b y Pauley in trying to get the California delegation to desert me. W ord also came that Hannegan, Flynn, and Pauley claimed to be talking with the President at frequent intervals and that he was upbraiding Hanne gan for not getting busy to put Truman over in a hurry. W o rd came that Senator Maloney and Homer Cummings1 were against me in the Connecticut delegation but that all 16 o f the other delegates w ere for me and therefore these tw o had to go along. I also heard that when Truman had breakfast with Hillman on Tuesday morning he was pushing Jimmie Byrnes. Leo C row ley, who had come out Monday to w ork for Byrnes, was working for Truman on Thursday. He said nothing against me personally but claimed that m y followers were telling lies. It is said that the President got in touch with C row ley personally so as to get Byrnes to pull out. Hannegan according to Littell*12*had called me a “ son o f a bitch” because I refused to withdraw. H e repeatedly spread stories to the newspapermen that I was about to withdraw. T h e Minnesota crow d was glorious, also southern Cali fornia, G uffey, Phil Murray, T om Miller* o f Austin, Texas, and W ilson W y a tt4 o f Louisville, Kentucky, and Pepper o f Florida, and many others. Gene Casey was working steadily with Ed Flynn to knife me. T ed Hayes, Flynn’s man, who used to be very warm to me, was very cold to me in the elevator. I am convinced that some months ago Flynn sold Hannegan to the President and that part o f the deal was that large sums o f money could be had for the 1944 campaign if the President would only ditch me. T h e President agreed in spite o f his very real affection for me. He tried to wriggle out but could not. T h e always stood.” Some observers, with whom W allace came to agree, believed that the convention would have renominated him right after selecting Roosevelt if those running it had not forced an overnight adjournment. In die interim, according to that theory, Truman’s sponsors lined up the votes they needed. Though W allace led on the first ballot the next day, Truman won on the second. 1 Senator Francis T . Maloney and former Attorney General Homer S. Cummings. * Norman M. Littell, at that time Assistant United States Attorney General. • M ayor Tom Miller of Austin, Texas. 4 W ilson W . W ya tt had represented the Board o f Economic W arfare in N orth A frica (M arch-M ay 1943) and in 1944 was mayor o f Louisville.
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money boys meant business. A fter it was all over he felt very remorse ful for a brief moment and apparently remembered what he said to me so warmly when I said goodbye to him on Thursday the 13th. A t any rate Friday evening on July 21 he wired me, “ You made a grand fight and I am very proud o f you. T ell Ilo not to plan to leave W ash ington next January.” W ord came on Thursday that Truman had said to the newspaper boys that he had been designated for the job and that he hated to have to beat H enry Wallace. Flynn, K elly, Hague, W alker, Casey, Jonathan Daniels, and practically the entire W hite House-National Committee ménage threw everything they had at me, including such picayunish things as not letting the Iowa boys have tickets on Friday (this was Pauley’s punishment for the demonstration made on m y behalf on Thursday). Baldwin told me that most o f the demonstration on m y be half even on Thursday evening was made b y people w ho had gotten in as a part o f the K elly machine but nevertheless were for me. T h e C IO boys did have 1500 people they wanted to get in on Friday but they simply could not get tickets although the galleries were practically empty. Beanie says the demonstrations for me were mostly b y Kelly people and other Chicagoans of no particular affiliation. Joe G u ffey tried to get through to the President on Thursday, using Latta as the President had suggested to me. N o luck. Perhaps the blame is K elly’s telephone operators. Perhaps the blame is the Presi dent’s. I told Joe to tell the President that if the President would write another letter asking me to withdraw, I would withdraw at once. However, Joe did not get through to the President and I am glad he did not. I shall w ork for the President’s election because I am afraid of what the D ew ey alternative means. I shall not speak under the auspices o f the National Committee or under the auspices o f the CIO. I shall hold the number o f speeches down as much as possible and ye t do an effective job. Jim Farley, on his w ay home from the convention, said to a news paperman that if either the N ew York or Illinois delegations had been polled Thursday morning there would have been a majority for me in both delegations. T he Tim e story o f July 31 is roughly accurate. Also the K ent and D rew Pearson stories o f July 28. Also T.R.B., T he N ew Republic o f July 31.1 1 Time attributed Truman’s victory to the influence o f the Democratic bosses, especially Hannegan, W alker, K elly, and Flynn. Frank R. Kent and Pearson
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G u ffey said on July 31 he was positive that the drive for Truman came from the President and not from K elly and Hague.*1 He is sure that Hague was telling him the truth the week before the convention when he said flatly he did not want Truman because the nomination o f Truman would raise the boss issue. He is sure also that this was K elly’s stand. He is confident therefore that the President forced Truman on the bosses. Personally I think the thing originated with Flynn via Hannegan. G u ffey may be right about Hague but I am not so sure about K elly. T h e thing may also have had some roots in Hopkins via K elly. T h e hard thing for me o f course is to reconcile w hat the President said to me when I left on July 13 with what he later did. W hat he said to me on July 13 just as I was leaving. Pulling me b y the hand so m y ear was close to his mouth, was—“O f course, I cannot say it publicly but I do hope it will be the same old team.” On the other hand, there is no doubt in my mind as to his intentions when I returned from Alaska on July 10. (H e wanted to ditch me as noiselessly as possible.) And then he apparently changed momentarily when m y presentation clearly indicated that he had been lied to by his advisers. Probably the advisers really won at the W hite House meeting the evening o f July 11. a u g u st
i, 1944
I ate lunch with Alben Barkley Tuesday, August 1. I did not let him talk much about the convention, saying continually to him that the important thing now is to look ahead to November 7, that we must do everything possible to re-elect the President. I told Alben if there was any w ay in which I could help him get re-elected in Kentucky, I would like to do so. Alben said he thought Jimmie Byrnes had been worse hurt b y the President than anyone. Jimmie talked to him about tw o hours on Wednesday or Thursday of last week. It seems that Hannegan and K elly saw the President on Saturday, July 15, when the President went through Chicago. Immediately following this visit Hannegan got in touch with Byrnes and urged him to get into the race. According to Barkley, Jimmie was running like a scared rabbit on Monday and Tuesday, thinking he had the blessing o f the President. He was all broken up when he found he had not. Jimmie also told Alben that and T.R.B. agreed but also emphasized Roosevelt’s role in “double-crossing" W allace. A ll interpreted the outcome as a defeat for the liberals. 1 Frank Hague, since 1917 mayor and notorious boss of Jersey City, and since 1912 a member o f the Democratic National Committee.
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the famous letter to Hannegan about Truman and Douglas was not written on July 19 but was actually written on Friday, July 14. It seems therefore, that the President’s letter to Jackson on m y behalf and the President’s letter to Hannegan on behalf o f Truman and Douglas w ere typed and signed the same day and both within 24 or 36 hours o f the time the President told me with such deep feeling, “I can’t say it publicly but I hope it w ill be the old team.” Barkley said Truman talked to him on Monday, that Truman at that time was w orking hard for Jimmie Byrnes and that he declared w ith the greatest vigor and apparent sincerity that he did not have die slightest interest in the job himself. On Wednesday, Truman told Barkley that the President had called him on the telephone and asked him to quit fooling around and hurry up and get the nomination for himself. Barkley says if the convention had not been dictated to b y die President, I would have gotten the nomination. Barkley says he himself got into the race only when the word was passed around that the President did not want me. Barkley declared that he himself would have been glad to support me if the President had kept hands off. Barkley says Truman told him he would have voted against the President on the tax bill veto. A fter Alben got this out o f his system, I got him to agree there was only one thing to do and that was to go down the line for the President on November 7. Alben could not help coming back to the theme, however, o f “ It makes you aw fully de pressed when you know a fellow w ill do things like that. He may be a smart politician but how can he go in tw o different directions at the same time?” I told Alben I was very happy about the whole situation, that I realized Jimmie Byrnes had been seriously hurt. Alben said Jimmie left the convention to go back to Washington Thursday. Those com mentators who say Jimmie was working against me on Friday are probably doing him an injustice. Alben told me he was going to refuse to accept any funds from the Democratic National Committee in his race in K entucky this fall. I told him that I was going to refuse to appear under the auspices o f the Democratic National Committee, that I would pay m y own railroad fare. (I understand at die convention that Frank W alker called up every delegation and said that the President was for Truman.)
a u g u st
2,1944
I wanted to talk to Harold Smith about the possibility o f getting from his organization certain information that bears on the problem o f
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full employment after the war. I told him I wanted to make speeches daring the campaign on this subject and would like to have them as sound as possible. H e told me that his people were beginning to think it would be necessary to have a national budget o f around $25 billion dollars after the war. His people were very much afraid that w e were m for an annual unemployment o f around 10 million persons. He then got to talking about the Chicago convention, saying how deeply pained all his people were. H e said he thought Jimmie Byrnes was the one originally responsible for getting the President in the frame o f mind that he ought to have someone else than me to run with him. Harold said that on Tuesday, July 11, he had lunch with Secre tary Ickes, and Iekes told him with some humor o f the meeting that Ickes and Sam Rosenman had had with me the day previous. T h e y had been sent b y the President to talk to me. A fter I refused to talk politics, Ickes told w ith some humor how he had said, “ W ell, I guess I have to be going. I have got lots o f w ork at m y office.” T hen Sam spoke up and said, “ Harold, can I get a ride back with you?” Then Ickes w ent ahead to say to Harold Smith, “ O f course, w e both came in the same car and w e were both headed direct for the W hite House.” Ickes laughed and seemed to enjoy the hypocrisy o f it all tremendously. Ickes then proceeded to volunteer that his w ife had said he was a fool to get in a mess like this, that he got exactly what he deserved. a u g u st
3,1944
H arry Truman came in this morning. H e started out b y saying that he was a very unhappy man, that he never spent such an unhappy week in his life as the week at Chicago. H e said, “ You know, this whole matter is not one o f m y choosing. I went to Chicago to get out o f being V ice President, not to become V ice President.” He said they w ill dig up all the dead horses which he thought he had gotten safely buried and throw them at him. H e said, “ It w ill be very hard on m y family.” I was exceedingly happy throughout the interview and he was very doleful and lugubrious. His whole attitude was that o f a man w ho has not been sleeping. H e used the specific phrase that he had not been engaged in any “ machinations” for the nomination. He asked fo r the continuation o f m y friendship. I said, “ Harry, w e are both Masons” and smiled at him very sweetly and said I would do every thing I could to make the election come out right. I said the impor tant thing was to look ahead and not back. H e said he was not a deep thinker like I was and he needed m y help on policy matters during the campaign. I made no comment whatever that I would help him,
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neither did I say I would not. H e told me he was going to resign from his committee today although a number o f folks wanted him to con tinue. I told him I thought he was wise in so doing, that he would need all his energies now for the campaign. I said nothing in any w ay to him which could be interpreted as being anything less than friendly; on the other hand, I made absolutely no commitment to him. I judge he w ent aw ay relieved and somewhat happier than when he came in. He is a small man o f limited background who wants to do the right W hen Truman professed such deep friendship for me, I refrained from mentioning to him the fact that three months or so ago, he came out for Rayburn, and on Monday and Tuesday at the convention, he was working hard for Jimmie Byrnes. These actions took place after he had told me on the floor o f the Senate that I was his candidate for V ice President, that all he wanted to do was to continue in the Senate. This kind o f action convinces me beyond doubt that he is a small op portunistic man, a man o f good instincts but, therefore, probably all the more dangerous. A s he moves out more in the public eye, he will get caught in the webs o f his ow n making . . . a u g u st
8,1944
. . . Phil M urray was getting a bit o f satisfaction out o f licking Ben nett Clark in Missouri.1 M urray told me that after the Chicago con vention, Hannegan had come to him saying how important it was to elect Clark. Phil replied, “ Important to who? It is important to us to defeat Clark.” Phil said he was going to be seeing Hannegan that afternoon at 2:30. Phil is not at all satisfied with the treatment he received from the administration. He would like very much for me to head up the new National Citizens Political Action Committee. I said to him, “ W hat is to become of Sidney Hillman?” He said, “ Sidney Hillman was only in there temporarily.” Phil confirmed my suspicions of Hillman. He said that Sidney on Monday was saying, “ W e must have a second choice.” Phil thinks it quite possible that the President and Sidney cooked up the second choice idea when they were together on Thursday, July 13. Phil says that when he and Sidney had dinner with Hannegan on Monday evening, July 17, Hannegan said, “ W e w ill w ith draw Jimmie Byrnes if you will withdraw W allace.” This confirmed the statement that was made to me b y Barkley that the idea o f getting 1 Clark had lost his campaign for renomination.
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Jimmie Byrnes to go to Chicago and run was cooked up b y the Presi dent and Hannegan when the President came through Chicago on July 15. If it had not been for Phil M urray’s straightforward strength, this plan would have succeeded. On the other hand, if Sidney Hillman had insisted that Phil M urray and R. J. Thomas go in with him to see the President on July 13, I am practically certain that I would have won overwhelmingly on the first ballot. I said so to Phil and he agreed. I also said to Phil that looking toward the future, I was very glad that he and Thomas had not gone in with Sidney Hillman, that the situation was better the w ay it was. I told M urray that in all o f m y actions so far I had gone the whole route for the President. I said, however, that I was not going to make any speeches for the ticket until I found as a result of personal conversations with the President just where he stood with respect to liberalism after the election is over. Phil said that H arry Hopkins had come over to see him earlier in the day, that H arry was much stronger now. Phil said that he had told H arry in the most vigorous kind of language about m y unusual strength w ith the people o f the United States. H arry had professed very high regard for me and blamed the Chicago convention results on the Presi dent’s other advisers, disclaiming all responsibility himself. Phil says H arry still has some N ew Deal tendencies. I suggested to Phil that he see the President himself and not depend on Harry Hopkins. Phil says that both D ew ey and W illkie have made much better statements on wage policy than the President or the Democratic Party platform. Phil thinks the C IO has received a raw deal from the President. He gave me a carefully worked out memo on this subject. Phil M urray said when he talked with K elly that K elly was not against me. He said that K elly had absolutely nothing against me, that all he was doing was to follow out the desires of the President. T h e same story has come to me from other folks concerning Hague, that Hague as a matter o f fact w ent out of his w ay to keep hands off, doing the very minimum which was necessary to com ply with the President’s wishes. Phil says that word was freely circulated in the Pennsylvania delegation that the Catholic hierarchy was against me. Phil himself had a letter from Bishop Shiel1 of Chicago saying that he, the Bishop, had a very high esteem for me. Phil M urray says that Frank W alker refused to have any part in the Catholic drive against me which was started in the first instance b y Tom m y Corcoran and which was con tinued, so Phil is convinced, by Hannegan . . . 1 Bishop Bernard J. Shiel.
T he Price of Vision
37rcoran were doing everything they could to get the Presi dent to appoint Bill Douglas as Secretary of State. Certain others, he said, are trying to get Jimmie Byrnes appointed to that secretarial post. I think he included in this number Felix Frankfurter. M urphy said Joe Kennedy is strong for Douglas because Douglas is his protégé . . . Curiously enough, right after I had dictated the above, Harold Young wanted me to come in to meet C y Bevan, Michigan National Committeeman. Bevan started in at once saying how amusing Justice M urphy was. He said he served a useful purpose in his day in Michigan but that he could not get elected to dog catcher now. Said just before the Chicago convention M urphy would get in touch with him as often as twice a day saying, “ O f course, I am not a candidate for V ice Presi dent but look at the experience I have had: M ayo, o f Detroit; G over nor of the State; Governor General o f the Philippine Islands; Attorney General; Justice o f the Supreme Court, etc., etc., listing a number o f minor items as well. Look at W allace. Look at Truman. D o they have any experience like mine? O f course, you understand I am not a candi date.” Then he would go ahead and enumerate all o f his qualifications again. Bevan then went on to say that M urphy is all right but he is such a terrific egotist, has such excessive ambitions that he has abso lutely no influence in Michigan. L. Currie was very much concerned that Lend-Lease assistance to Russia should be kept up. It seems that Admiral Leahy has been trying to terminate L -L to Russia. L. Currie feels it is important in case Russia is going to help us fight Japan that L -L continue after the war with Germany is over . . . 1 Thomas J. Pendergast, Democratic boss of Kansas C ity and a political mentor of H arry Truman, had been convicted in 1939 of income tax evasion.
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A t the ro: 30 appointment at the W hite House, Alben Barkley im mediately began talking about how hard he had campaigned in Ken tucky, how he had traveled 8000 miles b y automobile, how he had made 50 speeches, and how in the last tw o days he had made 24 speeches. H e said his health was fine and that he was in better shape at die finish o f the campaign than he was at the start. Rayburn congratulated me on the vigorous campaigning I had done, saying, “T h e y sent you nearly everywhere, didn’t they?” Barkley then spoke up and said, “ You didn’t campaign under die auspices o f die National Democratic Committee, did you?” 1 said, “ N o, I cam paigned under the auspices o f the State Democratic Committees and the independent organizations.” T h e President seemed to be in unusually good health and spirits. H e has lost quite a little weight and I think it has done him a lot o f good. H e said that for the first time in history the Democratic National Committee had ended up its campaign without a deficit. H e said Pauley had done a perfectly swell job. I couldn’t help thinking that this meant that Pauley had probably received considerable sums o f money from sources which would be expecting a payoff o f some kind. 1 have no confidence in either Pauley or Hannegan. T h e President, however, is very much delighted w ith the present situation and expatiated at some length on what a fine feeling it was to come out o f the campaign with no deficit. This was brought up in connection w ith the necessity o f doing a real job in 1946. H e spoke particularly o f beating Clare Luce in 1946 . . . There was considerable talk about the vast sums o f money the Re publicans had spent. T h e President said in Dutchess C ounty the Republicans had spent $40,000. Barkley asked him what he thought the Republicans had spent, directly or indirectly, in the nation as a whole. T h e President estimated 15 million dollars. Barkley said they had raised $200,000 in K entucky to beat him. Rayburn spoke o f the $200,000 which had been raised b y Pappy O ’Daniel to beat the Presi dent. H e said that D ick Kleberg had given $2500, Senator M oore o f Oklahoma had given $25,000,* etc., etc. Barkley said that O ’Daniel had come into K entucky to campaign against him and against the President. Then the talk got over onto Jesse Jones and it was obvious that nei ther the President nor Rayburn had any use for him . . . There was some talk about the Missouri V alley A uthority. Rayburn 1 1 Richard M. Kleberg, Texas cattleman and Democratic congressman (1933-45), and Edward H . Moore, Oklahoma oil producer and cattleman, Republican Senator (1943-49).
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indicated that he didn’t think a permanent Fair Employment Practices bill should come up in this Congress. H e thought the next Congress would be much more friendly to it. NOVEMBER 1 6 , 19 4 4
. . . Milo told me that he had been talking with B. Baruch and that Baruch spoke in the highest terms o f m y executive ability. Baruch said, according to Milo, that I had been the best executive among all the government people during the Roosevelt administration. H e said, how ever, he did not understand how I could talk as vigorously as I did at times about W all Street. I told Milo that this proved to me that the President had talked to Baruch the day before about the idea o f m y becoming Secretary o f Commerce and that Baruch had figured that there was a good chance I would be Secretary and, therefore, was trimming his sails to fit the wind. Milo said that Baruch was getting quite old . . . NOVEMBER 30, 19 4 4 HENRY A. W ALLACE TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT YOUR CORDIAL LETTER W AR M LY APPRECIATED1 STOP M Y M EM ORY GOES BACK TO M Y CONFERENCE W ITH YOU JU ST BEFORE LUNCH ON AUGUST 29 W HEN YOU EXPRESSED SIM ILAR CORDIALITY AND INTEREST IN M Y DEFINI TION OF POETIC JUSTICE STOP M Y INTEREST IN POETIC JUSTICE IS STRONGER NOW THAN EVER STOP SIXTY M ILLION JOBS W IL L REQUIRE YOU PLUS PER FECT COORDINATION BETW EEN AGRICULTURE LABOR AND COMM ERCE STOP M Y JOB SEEMS TO BE COMM ERCE STOP ORGANIZATION PLANS SHOULD FOL LOW NOT PRECEDE THESE APPOINTMENTS STOP THANKS IF I M A Y SERVE
DECEMBER 5 , I9 4 4
. . . A t the lunch w ith Ickes I expressed disappointment in the ap pointment o f W ill Clayton and said probably the President had some broader plan in mind which w e didn't know anything about. Ickes claimed to be thoroughly disgusted. H e had no regrets about having i In a letter o f November 27, 1944, thanking W allace for his assistance in the campaign, Roosevelt had said that both he and W allace understood the Ameri can people had voted for the Four Freedoms and for abundance at home. He was writing, the President concluded, “not only in thanks for your help but to say that I count upon it in the great tasks ahead, to which America has dedi cated its purpose and its future.”
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T he Price o f Vision
fought for the President in the campaign against D ew ey. H e said, however, that if W illkie had run he thinks he might have supported W illkie. A t any rate, he would not have been active in support o f the President. I told him I didn’t feel that w ay about it . . . Ickes said the President had told him that he was going to get rid o f W ill Clayton after the election.1 I told Ickes that he had told me the same thing. Ickes was very bitter about Hopkins . . . Ickes then w ent on to say that A be Fortas12 had spoken to him about his going to bat for me with the President. I said yes, Lauch Currie had said something to me about this. He asked if I had told the Presi dent I wanted to be Secretary o f Commerce. I said yes, I had, both before and after the election. H e expressed surprise at this, saying that just before the President w ent to W arm Springs on Novem ber 29 he had been in to see the President and that the President had said to him, “ W hat are w e going to do about H enry?” T h e President also asked Ickes what he thought about H enry Kaiser for Secretary of Commerce. Ickes expressed some question about Kaiser because o f his widespread business connections. Ickes showed me a letter w hich he received from the President, dated August 15, in reply to a hot letter which Ickes had written to the President. In this letter the President spoke very highly o f me. T h e letter from Ickes to the President had criticized Hannegan for misleading the President with regard to m y strength with the people. Ickes said that since the election he was the fair-haired boy at the W hite House and that all the people around the W hite House were kow tow ing to him now. He said this was in marked distinction to the situation which existed immediately after 1940. A t that time he went for eleven months without ever seeing the President except at cabinet meetings. T he President refused to grant him an appointment. T he situation did not change until the President put him in charge o f petroleum and then a little later in charge o f coal for the war effort. Ickes keeps all his letters from the President in his left-hand, lower drawer. He has a number o f them, o f which he seems to be very proud. I judge he is keeping a very complete record o f all his contacts with the President with the idea o f some day writing them up. 1 Roosevelt had nominated W ill Clayton as Assistant Secretary as one part of a major shakeup o f the S a te Department. Clayton was to administer foreign economic affairs, with authority over some o f the functions that had previously fallen to the Foreign Economic Administration or to Jesse Jones. T he liberal press and some of the old N ew Dealers in Washington, troubled b y Clayton’s conservative view o f economic issues, interpreted the nomination as a sop to Jones and an omen of defeat for their own postwar hopes. 2 Since 1941 Abe Fortas had been U ndersecreary of the Interior Department.
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Later in the evening Charlie Marsh called me to say that Ickes had gotten in touch with D rew Pearson immediately after his lunch with me; that D rew Pearson had told him about it over the telephone. Ickes had reported that I was very sad (which wasn’t true) and that there wasn’t any fight in me whatsoever. (I am glad this is what Ickes re ported to Pearson.) Charlie Marsh is probably unjust to Ickes but nevertheless he is also probably closer to the truth than 80 percent of the liberals who look up to Ickes as a great hero . . .
DECEMBER 7 , 19 4 4
. . . Bill Wasserman1 came in this morning to say four things: First, that he hoped I would not accept any position from the President un less I had absolute assurance that I had adequate power to meet the responsibility and real backing from the President. He hoped that I would not become Secretary o f Commerce unless I had the power o f RFC. H e hoped also that I would have F E A but he said R F C was much more important than FEA . T h e second point he wanted to make was that he hoped I would make friends o f A F L people. He said some o f them felt that I had high-hatted them and had refused invitations to address A F L meetings. I told him that I had not been aware o f re fusal to attend any A F L national meeting except once when I had another engagement. I said the President told me that Bill Green had called the W hite House opposing m y continuing as V ice President. I said I had found the greatest friendship on the part o f A F L people down the line but I questioned whether there was anything I could do to make men like Green, Hutcheson, and W oll* more friendly. Jim Patton came in to say that up until rather recently he had hoped I would not remain in government. H e now thinks it would be a fine thing if I could have a job like the Department of Commerce with Presidential backing. He said Beany Baldwin and Phil M urray had asked him about Claude W ickard. H e told them that the probabilities were they would get a much worse man than Claude W ickard and advised them to continue to back Claude W ickard as Secretary of Agriculture. He thinks the Democratic National Committee would very much like to get rid of Claude so that they can put in someone who is satisfactory to the businessmen who contributed to the Demo cratic campaign. Patton has no use fo r the Hannegan crowd, the Ickes-12 1 In 1944 W illiam S. Wasserman was special adviser to the chairman o f the Smaller W ar Plants Corporation. 2 Matthew W o ll, former president o f the International Photo-Engravers Union and at this time a vice president o f the American Federation of Labor.
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Corcoran crowd, or the Bymes-Baruch crowd. H e has his fingers defi nitely crossed about the President and thinks he cannot be trusted any more. Apparently the nomination o f Clayton as Assistant Secretary o f State greatly shocked him. I told Patton I would like to have the position o f Secretary o f Commerce if I could get the same backing from the President that I had when I was Secretary o f Agriculture . . . Charles Marsh phoned in to say that Beany Baldwin had been to see Dave Niles and that Dave Niles told Beany Baldwin that a man o f m y very great distinction and high attainments should have something very much more important to operate than a Department o f Commerce which had been stripped o f all power,1 and that therefore the boys were working on a cabinet position that would give suitable scope to m y creative energies in the field o f exports, imports, and postwar jobs. I told Charlie Marsh it sounded very funny to me. A s a matter o f fact, it sounds very much like die job which Donald Nelson is supposed to operate. Moreover, it sounds like one o f the brilliant improvisations which the President so often makes in order to get out o f a tight spot. These improvisations nearly always lead to some kind o f intra-adminis tration crisis later on because in the process o f improvising the Presi dent puts the person for whom he improvises in a position to step on a great many toes. T h e President gives the man responsibilities without power and the man, trying to carry out his responsibilities without in adequate power, inevitably gets into trouble. I think the President gets a certain amount o f satisfaction out o f improvising in this w ay and then watching the results o f the improvisation without shedding any tears but, in fact, with a considerable amount o f quiet satisfaction . . .
DECEMBER 1 1 , I9 4 4
. . . H enry Morgenthau said he was much disturbed about the State Department appointments.12 3 H e said he had gotten along quite well 1 T h e reorganization o f the State Department had reduced the lending authority of the Secretary o f C ommerce, which was vulnerable to still further reductions. A s W allace saw it, however, a cabinet post was bound to provide a better source o f influence than the anomalous new position of Donald Nelson as a special adviser to the President. 2 T h e changes Roosevelt had proposed in the S a te Department included die nomination of Edward Stettinius, Jr., to succeed Hull, w ho had resigned, as Secretary o f S a te ; the nomination o f Joseph C. G rew as U ndersecreary; and the nomination as Assistant Secretaries o f Clayton, Nelson Rockefeller for Latin American affairs; Archibald MacLeish for public information; James C. Dunn and Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes. O f that list, liberal Democrats approved only o f MacLeish, whom Senate conservatives opposed. Senators
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w ith Stettinius—better, in fact, with Stetdnius than with Hull. He couldn’t understand the W ill Clayton appointment, the Julius Holmes appointment, or the Jimmie Dunn appointment. W ith regard to Holmes he told me substantially the story as it appears . . . in PM , w ith especial emphasis on his association w ith M urphy in N orth Africa. W ith regard to W ill Clayton, H enry Morgenthau said he couldn’t understand what the President was up to because, back in 1938 or thereabouts, H enry Morgenthau wanted W ill Clayton for a special job involving foreign exchange. H enry had thought that W ill Clayton’s worldwide business experience would enable him to be helpful to H enry in his dealings w ith the French on the franc-dollar exchange. H enry put the matter up to the President and the President said not to have anything to do with W ill Clayton; that he was thoroughly re actionary. Morgenthau attributes everything that is going on now to Hopkins. H e pointed out to me from his window the place where Hopkins has his office in the East W hite House office building not far from where Jimmie Byrnes has his office. H e says Hopkins reads every day every w ire that comes into the W hite House and every wire that goes out . . . H enry Morgenthau thinks Ickes is “good troops’’; that he can be depended upon. I told Morgenthau I was not quite as certain about Ickes’ reliability as he—that there was always the question o f the vari able quality of the Corcoran influence. Morgenthau doesn’t like Jimmie Byrnes. He said about three months ago Jimmie Byrnes was quite a dominant power around the W hite House and that the Hopkins influence was very low at the time he last returned from the M ayo Clinic. Morgenthau is very eager for me to be in the cabinet. He said folks had been talking about m y being either Secretary of Labor or Secre tary o f Commerce. I told him I hoped the President would not ask me to be Secretary o f Labor; that I didn’t want the post; that I would do everything I could to avoid being Secretary of Labor. I told him I wanted to be Secretary o f Commerce. H e asked if the President knew that and I said yes, that I had told the President that on August 29 and had sent him a wire recently . . . Pepper and G uffey led a lonely and futile fight against the confirmation of the others, w ho struck them as either too closely connected to great wealth or, as in the case o f Holmes, with Robert M urphy’s tactic of expedient collaboration w ith fascists. PM considered Holmes to oe excessively distrustful o f the Soviet Union. T h e Philadelphia Record and T h e N ew Republic also attacked the nominations aggressively but to no effect.
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H e said he was going to be seeing Mrs. Roosevelt. H e asked if Mrs. Roosevelt knew what I wanted. I said no, I hadn’t told her. He said Mrs. Roosevelt was very, very strong for me. W hen he told me this I couldn’t help but think that this would make me weaker with the President because I have the feeling that at the present time he fights everything she is for. I didn’t care to say this to H enry Morgenthau, however. Morgenthau said he was exceedingly anxious for me to be in the cabinet because he felt otherwise the forces of reaction were in serious danger o f taking over the President. He thought Ickes, he, and I could w ork together . . . Jack Shelly is an A F L man and a state senator from San Francisco. George Irvine is a Railroad Brotherhood man from San Francisco. Both men were delegates to the convention in Chicago. Shelly took con siderable pleasure in telling about a certain meeting which he had with Bob Hannegan, Ed Flynn, Ed Pauley, Frank W alker, and Jack Malone (a California Democratic leader) the evening o f Thursday, July 20, in what Shelly called “ the sweat box.” This is a room under the Speaker’s stand in the Chicago Stadium. T h e Democratic digni taries had Shelly in, arguing with him while Quentin Reynolds and Helen Gahagan made their speeches. T h e y argued with him for about tw o hours, Hannegan doing most of the talking, urging him to vote for Truman. Hannegan said, “ Don’t you know that Truman is going to be nominated and then you will be in bad?” Shelly just replied, “ W ell, if you are so sure he is going to be nominted w h y are you working so hard on me?” Hannegan then shifted and said, “ Don’t you know the President is for Trum an?” Shelly replied, “ N o, I don’t; the President is on record as being for W allace.” Then Hannegan laid it on thick, saying, “ Don’t you know if W allace wins radical labor will have control of the Democratic Party and of the nation? You don’t want radical labor to have things their own w ay, do you?” Hannegan went on like this and as he did so Ed Pauley, w ho knew that Shelly was a labor leader, fidgeted in his chair. Finally, Hannegan, gathering from watching Pauley’s actions that something was wrong, said, “ B y the w ay, what is your business?” Shelly said, “ I am a labor leader.” Hannegan said, “ A F L or C IO ?” Shelly said, “ A F L .” Hannegan then proceeded to say that his remarks applied only to the CIO. Everybody smoothed things down as much as possible but Shelly still made it clear that he was going to stay by me. Shelly said that undoubtedly I would have been nominated if the vote had been held Thursday evening; that the Hannegan crowd had had it all arranged to put the thing through Thursday evening and
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then, when the demonstration broke loose for me after the President’s speech, they got scared and adjourned the meeting. Shelly told quite an interesting story o f his experience as he sat on the platform waiting to make a seconding speech for me—a speech which he never made because both Pepper and Frankensteen1 grabbed the floor mikes on their own and made seconding speeches for me which had not been planned on. Shelly said they had been very anxious for me to come out to the W est Coast during the campaign but they realized that it wasn’t necessary.
DECEMBER
14, 1944
. . . G regory12 told me more o f the details about the w ay in which Hannegan knifed the St. Louis meeting which I was supposed to ad dress. I expressed surprise at this because Hannegan was one of the ones who wanted us to go to St. Louis. G regory told how the State Democratic Chairman had been all for the meeting in the morning and then how he pulled off in the afternoon after he got in touch with Hannegan. This checks with information I have had from a number of other places where Hannegan tried to prevent meetings I was ad dressing from being a success. G regory also said that the Missouri Bankers Association had at one time employed Hannegan. G regory is a banker and knew about this from firsthand information. He said Hannegan bought the votes o f legislators with money. G regory’s opin ion o f Hannegan is pretty low. His tendency is to favor the formation of a third party. I called Harold Young in and Harold tried to con vince G regory that that wasn’t the best method of approach. I sug gested that Young look up the laws in the different states with regard to third parties. Young said as a practical proposition in most States it was necessary for a new party to get a certain number o f votes in the preceding election in order to get on the ticket in the following election. He thinks it is much easier to make the Democratic Party liberal than to start a liberal party on its own. Senator Pepper wanted to talk to me about his fight on the State Department confirmations. I kept hands off and told him he would have to make up his own mind on that. I told him I couldn’t figure what the President was up to unless, like a man in a rowboat, he was looking one w ay and rowing another . . . 1 Richard T . Frankensteen, Detroit labor organizer and president of the W ayne County, Michigan, Labor Non-Partisan League. 2 W . L . G regory o f the Plaza Bank o f St. Louis.
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DECEMBER 15 , 19 4 4
G u ffey came in to see me and wanted m y advice on the State D e partment confirmations. I told him that I had no advice to offer. H e wanted to know what the President was up to and I said maybe it was like the report of the conference between Churchill and Stalin. Churchill is reported to have said to Stalin, “This is what England wants to do in Greece.” Stalin replied, “A ll right, go ahead, it is up to you.” Then Churchill said, “ This is what w e want to do in Yugoslavia.” Stalin replied, “ A ll right, go ahead, it is up to you.” And so on w ith several countries. Stalin didn't argue a single point but at the con clusion merely said, “ O f course you w ill have to take into account the people themselves.” I said to G uffey, “Perhaps the President said to Stettinius with regard to each o f the appointments, 'Sure, go ahead and appoint them, it is up to you.’ A t the finish the President may not have said, 'Perhaps the people may have something to say about it,’ but the President may have thought it, nevertheless.” G u ffey said, “ I am not sure that this is the situation. Stettinius claims that the President himself appointed these men” . . . I told Senator M urray1 how much I thought o f his new bill which he w ill soon introduce. He wanted m y opinion on the State Depart ment confirmations. I told him I couldn’t get into that fight but that I did look on it as the first skirmish in the fight to make the United States truly liberal. I told him I thought the really important things were going to have to do with full employment as handled in his bill. He wanted to know if I would advocate that the senators filibuster against the State Department confirmations. I refused to give an opin ion. I told M urray the same story I told G u ffey about Churchill and Stalin, and M urray came back with the same reply as G uffey, to the effect that Stettinius said the appointments o f these men were due to the President and not to Stettinius . . . 1 Democratic Senator James E. Murray o f Montana was sponsoring legislation to make full employment a stated objective of federal policy ana to direct the President to prepare annually a national budget to achieve that end. T h e bill as introduced in the new session o f Congress in January 1945 was also spon sored by Senators Robert W agner o f N ew York, Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, and Joseph C. O ’Mahoney o f W yom ing. Its long and complicated legislative history, including the attachment to it of softening amendments, culminated in 1946 in the passage of the Employment A c t which incorporated much of what Murray and his colleagues had initially proposed; see Stephen M. Bailey, Con gress Makes A Low (N ew York, 1950).
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DECEMBER 1Ç, 19 4 4
. . . Sulzberger1 just returned last week from a 26,000-mile trip to the various islands in the South Pacific, including Saipan and Leyte. O n Leyte he was close to the front and on one occasion a sniper bullet came within a few feet o f him. His first concern is that there be a working arrangement between England, United States, and Russia. He feels that Roosevelt’s great contribution has been in working out this coordination and he feels Roosevelt is best fitted for maintaining it. That is w h y he supported Roosevelt instead of D ew ey. On the basis of domestic issues he would have supported D ew ey. He thinks the Re publicans w ill win in 1948. H e was intensely devoted to W illkie and if W illkie had run, he would have supported him instead o f Roosevelt. Sulzberger was exceedingly friendly, invited Mrs. W allace and me to come up and spend a weekend with them, saying that he could have Charles Merz2 and his w ife present, and that the six of us would thresh out everything. Sulzberger is very keen about the spiritual approach to the world’s problems. H e feels very deeply about the future and obviously wants to do the right thing. He mentioned that he had only interfered with Arthur K rock once and that was when Arthur started to indicate that W illkie would have been against Roosevelt if he had lived. Sulzberger thinks he would have been for Roosevelt if he had lived. I told him I had some evidence from Indiana indicating that W illkie would not have come out for either Roosevelt or Dew ey. I also told him about some o f W illkie’s ideas about the starting o f a progressive party in the spring o f 1945. I told him I felt it was much better to make the Democratic Party into a progressive party. Sulzberger did not think it could be done. H e told me how strong he was for compulsory military training . . . Sulzberger is enormously impressed with the A rm y but rather critical o f the N avy. He thinks M acArthur has done a perfectly marvelous job in the Pacific. H e also has considerable admiration for Eisenhower. His worship of M acArthur is most extraordinary. He feels that where the A rm y and N avy were working together and the A rm y had top command, a good job is done; but where they are working together and the N a vy had top command a bad job is done. Perhaps this is because M acArthur gave him a good sales talk or maybe it is true. Sulzberger said that our national policy with regard to Russia should 1 Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher o f the N ew Y ork Tim es. 9 Charles Merz, editor o f the N ew Y ork Tim es.
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be to utilize them just as long as they were killing German soldiers and Jap soldiers. H e thinks Russia w ill come in on our side against Japan after Germany has been defeated. H e thinks the Russians are not fighting quite as hard as they might right now because Russia would like to see the United States suffer from some heavy casualties. H e says that after the Russians have gotten through fighting the Germans and Japs, w e should come to a showdown with diem. H e doesn’t think w e should fight them. H e prays that may not be necessary. H e says, how ever, that the Russians will need lots o f help from us as soon as the w ar is over and that we should not furnish it except under certain condi tions. I suspect Sulzberger is probably reflecting the M acArthur point o f view. Sulzberger said m y position in the Democratic Party was somewhat like W illkie’s in the Republican Party but that I was farther to the left. It seems to me rather obvious that just as Roosevelt was hoping a year ago to use W illkie as a wedge to split the Republican Party so Sulz berger now rather hopes to use me as a wedge to split the Democratic Party. I told him I was very strong for the Democratic Party because it could be made into a liberal party. He claimed it was impossible on account o f the returning N egro soldiers in the South to make the Democratic Party into a liberal party. It seems almost certain that Sulzberger w ill support a Republican in 1948 no matter who runs on the Democratic ticket. He claims that he got a great deal out o f his visit with me and was eager that I see him again soon. I got it on very good authority yesterday that Edgar Hoover con tinually has D rew Pearson shadowed. Hoover specializes on building up a file against the various public figures and especially against the columnists. H e has not as ye t built up much o f a file against W alter W inchell.1 W inchell has so far been too smart for Hoover. Hoover is apparently on his w a y toward becoming a kind o f an American Himmler.
DECEMBER 2 0 , 19 4 4
. . . The President started out b y opening up a letter from Jimmie Roosevelt and as he went along quoting from the letter saying that Jimmie said he had just won a dime from a fellow soldier on the basis of D ew ey getting less than ioo electoral votes. 1 Both D rew Pearson in his “Washington M erry-Go-Round” and W alter W in chell in the N ew Y ork M irror and his Sunday radio broadcasts were during the war often critical and more often irreverent about federal policy and many federal officials, particularly in the State Department.
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H e then got started talking about when he managed A 1 Smith’s cam paign in 1924 in N ew York. Then he mentioned that one of the newspapermen said, “ Is it true that 350,000 votes taken away from you and properly placed would have given D ew ey a majority o f the electoral vote?" T h e President replied, “ I’ll ask you another one. Is it also true that 125,000 votes taken aw ay from D ew ey and given me properly placed would have given me all the electoral vote?" I then said, “ Yes, Mr. President, during the cam paign I said in the Middlewest if the Democratic Party had started or ganizing a year ago, w e could have carried every state in the Union.” O f course, I admitted it would have been pretty hard to carry Kansas and Nebraska. T h e President said, “ Yes, the Kansas folks are pretty difficult. I remember back in 1924 when I was acting as manager for À 1 Smith at the N ew Y ork convention, the Kansas delegates came in to see me and I sent word out to bring in A l. A 1 had been attending an Irish wedding. T he Kansas delegates looked like Kansas farmers with square-toed shoes, stocky, round-faced men. T h e y all looked just alike." A 1 came in with his shiny silk hat on the corner of his head, with spats and a cane and a flower in his buttonhole, talking in his broadest “ Irishese.” T h e President watched the Kansas boys freeze up and kissed good-by to Kansas right then and there. A l’s breezy manner just did not meet the Middlewestem situation. T h e President then went on from there to talk about how he got the D.C. vote for a time for A l. A fter about 45 ballots, the President thought that a break would be a good thing so he asked someone to go around and see what could be done to get the four votes from the D.C. for A l. T h e y agreed to vote for A l if their hotel expenses were paid for the remainder of the convention. Some wealthy lady agreed to put up the money and for three ballots the D.C. voted for A l, whereupon the M cAdoo forces raised the ante and they came back into the M cA d oo1 fold. T he President then said to me, “ I got your wire. It is all right. You can have Commerce.” I said, “ 1 don’t want it unless you are really en thusiastic about m y taking it in the same w ay yo u wanted me to take Agriculture." He said he really wanted me to take the job. I gave him the enclosed cop y o f m y ideas about reorganization o f Com merce2 and asked him to read it. H e read over the entire memorandum 1 Smith's close rival for the Democratic nomination in 1924 had been W illiam G . M cAdoo, W oodrow W ilson’s Secretary o f the Treasury and son-in-law. T h e deadlock between them was resolved only after more than one hundred ballots b y the nomination of John W . Davis. 2 W allace’s long memo recommended “a new Department of Commerce and a new concept o f its work.” H e proposed closer ties to American business “so
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and indicated he was in agreement. He said, however, he had asked Crow ley to stay on at F E A until V E -D ay. I would judge, therefore, that F E A would not go into Commerce. He said he had not yet w rit ten a letter to Jesus H. Jones accepting his resignation but would do so immediately after Christmas. W ith regard to this letter he was going to write Jesse, the President said he would put it on the basis o f want ing to reduce the average age o f his cabinet. He also spoke o f Jesse as being sick. I said I had seen Jesse recently and he looked remarkably well to me. I told the President that the idea of using Commerce to make the most jobs possible intrigued me greatly as well as the idea o f dealing with small-business problems. He seemed to be in substantial accord with regard to the last paragraph o f this memo dealing with relations with the State Department on foreign commerce. I told him it was m y observation that one of the most fatal things around Washington was to have responsibility without having ade quate authority or power to carry out the responsibility. I said this after he had given an extensive disquisition regarding the standard o f living of people everywhere over the world, embroidering this with considerable discussion o f the low standard o f living o f the people in Africa. I told the President about the M urray bill for full employment and it seemed to interest him. H e suggested that there be appointed a committee on which would sit a representative o f State Department, Commerce, Agriculture, as well as a senator and a congressman, and Henry Kaiser. T he purpose o f the committee would be to draw up a program for foreign trade and to suggest the necessary legislation. T he President said, “ W ill Clayton is not so bad and his w ife is a dear.” A t one stage in the conversation, I said, “ I am sure there w ill that business opinion and business reality can be injected into governmental policy,” service at home and abroad related to business needs, an emphasis on federal aid to small business, and a consolidation into one central organization of all federal agencies to which business might look for its contacts with govern ment, including loans, technical advice, and economic reporting. As W allace saw it, the domestic wing o f the Commerce Department should include its existing bureaus and the existing lending agencies as well as those parts of war agencies that could contribute to reconversion. T he foreign wing, he wrote, should include the agencies necessary to negotiate governmental credits abroad that affected trade, to control assistance to exporters operating in markets where other countries limited imports, to purchase materials abroad for federal use where private business was unwilling to assume the necessary risks, and to sell federal surplus property abroad. W allace also asked for authority to restructure the department ana to appoint overseas commercial representatives independent of the direction of the Department o f State.
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not be any difficulty concerning m y confirmation in the Senate.” He said, “ N o, o f course not. But then sometimes you can’t tell. Just take the current fight, for example.” Then he mused a moment and said, “ I do not trust all six of them either. Take this fellow Holmes, for example, and then there is Jim mie Dunn. O f course, I put in Jimmie just to make Cordell feel good.” He then continued, “T h e y w ill all stand watching, including W ill Clayton.” I then said to him, “ W hat do you expect to do with R F C ?” He said, “ I expect you to take that as well as Commerce.” T he President described how Firestone was paying the natives of Liberia 17 cents a day to w ork on the rubber plantations and how they wanted to get higher wages. Again and again he hit the problem o f the low standard of living of the people in the various backward parts o f the world. I said, “ Mr. President, if you expect to do anything about matters o f this sort, w e w ill have to develop international com modity agreements.” I said I did not know how W ill Clayton stood on international commodity agreements at the present time but I had known that in the past he had been against them, that he definitely be longed in his thinking to the Manchester School o f Economics. T h e President said that w e have got to have international understanding about certain problems. H e said, “ I wish there were some w ay to get away from the word ‘cartel.’ ” He seemed to think government cartels were all right. I said, “ W h y not get away from cartel and use the phrase ‘international agreement’ and use ‘international agreement’ un der government supervision with full protection both for producers and consumers?” He seemed to like that idea. I said, “ If you are going down the line on this, you are bound to run into trouble with W ill Clayton.” T he President talked about the idea o f putting Maritime Commission and Civil Aeronautics Bc-ird under the Department of Commerce. I told him the C A B was already there in a w ay although not very definitely so. I told the President that several years after the war was over, I thought there was going to be the most extraordinary kind o f a back lick which was going to bring serious trouble on us and it would be necessary to act with very great comprehension and imagination in planning to avoid this trouble. I said after W orld W ar N o. 1, Hoover had very big plans for large export trade but these plans as a result of our high tariff policy eventually came to naught. I said we would have to have a very comprehensive and well thought out long-time plan
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if w e were to avoid the same pitfalls which overtook die Republicans in 1930. T h e President gave an assent to this but I don’t think he really understood it. His thinking is completely in other fields. I told the President that the Commerce funcdon might not amount to an awful lot until the war came to an end. Then I took a second thought and said, “But there certainly should be comprehensive plan ning long before the war comes to an end and the planning should be started at once." He said, “ You know I am one o f those who never has predicted an early end o f the war. Churchill said it would end in 1944. Eisenhower said 1944." H e continued, “ You know all astrologers are agreed that it will not end until 1947." I said, “ W ell, Mr. President, I disagree with you strongly. I think the German war w ill end in 1945 and the Jap war in 1946." W hen the President referred to the astrologists, I judged that he halfway believed in them. Speaking o f small business, I told the President I liked the idea o f getting out to the small business groups in the medium-sized towns, to the Chambers o f Commerce, etc., etc., and meeting with representa tives o f labor and agriculture with these Chambers o f Commerce and small business groups. He seemed to like the idea. In discussing W ill Clayton, the President spoke at some length about cotton in Brazil. H e said that sometime in the late thirties, he had visited with a gentleman b y the name o f Penas who owned a marvelous estate form erly owned b y the brother o f the Emperor o f Brazil Dorn Pedro, a perfectly glorious palace and estate. T h e President said to Penas, “ Do you own other land in Brazil?" H e replied, “ Yes. I ow n three hundred million acres in Matto Grosso.” I was rather aghast at 300 million acres because that represents an area equal to 8 states the size of Iowa. T he President said this man cleared 10 million acres o f land each year to produce cotton. I interjected to say that this surely could not be true because w e only plant 20 million acres o f cotton in the United States. T he President said Penas told him also that he could produce the cotton for 4 cents a pound laid down at the port. T he President thinks w e ought to stabilize our cotton prices in the United States at around 15 or 16 cents. I said, “ Mr. President, as near as I can figure out, this program means an international cotton agree ment." I also mentioned that rayon during the past 5 or 6 years had been taking the place o f 4 or 5 million bales o f cotton and that rayon competition was bound to grow. A little later the President discussed China, and said H urley was do
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ing a swell job. He said, “ You know, I had a devil o f a job with Marshall with regard to Sdlwell. I had to say to Marshall, i f Chiang Kai-shek were only Generalissimo, I would not have to recall Stilwell just because Chiang doesn’t like him. But you must remember that Chiang is President o f China.’ ” T h e President went on to say that if Churchill would say to him, “ You must get rid of Marshall—” then all of a sudden the President backed up and realized that his illustration was going in absolutely the w rong direction and reversed himself and said, “ If I found, for exam ple, that Sir John Dill o f England were not agreeable to me as represen tative here, I would expect Churchill to remove him if I complained.” It was obvious to me that the President’s mind roams as far afield as ever, that he still talks endlessly about everything under the sun but that he is losing considerable o f his old power of focus. His mind isn’t very clear anymore. His hand trembles a great deal more than it used to . . . During the discussion o f the full employment bill . . . I told the President that the fundamental idea originally came from Jim Patton, and went through in some little detail with the Simon Kuznets theory o f capital formation in its relation to total national production. I then described the bill in course o f action and said, “ N o w suppose, Mr. President, that you found in a particular year, for example, the fiscal year 1947, that 40 billion dollars o f capital formation would be neces sary to bring about full employment whereas the prospective capital formation from private sources and from local and state governments was only 25 billion dollars. T h e congressional committee looking at the deficiency o f 15 billion dollars and looking at our total debt amounting to perhaps 250 billion dollars would say, ‘W e can’t go into debt anymore.’ Â t this stage o f the game, it might be necessary, Mr. President, if w e are to have jobs for all, to issue non-interest-bearing government securities, provided a definite stop were put on their issu ance to prevent inflation and provided also that they were paid off b y the returns from self-liquidating projects. “ T h e other non-debt-producing alternative would be to bring about huge common stock investments.” I said, “ I am in favor of such modifications o f the taxation system as would favor capital investment.” I also said to the President that if w e were really going to meet this problem, it might be necessary to sooner or later run head-on into the W all Street setup, that their methods of high interest financing were really one of the blocks in the w ay o f sufficient flow o f capital.
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T h e President went to some pains to say that he thought Jesse Jones through his nephew had quite a bit to do with the Texas M ay conven tion revolt. Apparently he could not forgive Jesse for being indirectly connected with the Texas regulars. H e said he thought W ill Clayton was absolutely pure on this score. I did not tell him that Charles Marsh had told me that Anderson o f Anderson and Clayton1 furnished some o f the first money to the Texas regulars prior to the M ay convention. Evidently the President is a long-time friend o f Ed Stetdnius. H e mentioned back when Ed was president o f United States Steel Corpora tion that he, the President, had spoken to Ed about his desire to take a cruise around the world in economical leisurely manner. Stetdnius told him that the w ay to do it was in the director’s suite o f the 15,000-ton boats owned b y the U.S. Steel Corporation. These boats form what is known as Isthmian line. T h ey are not supposed to carry passengers but friends o f the U.S. Steel Corporation can travel in the director’s suite b y paying $5 a day and signing up as a member o f the crew at a compensation o f $1. T h e President then described in detail how the boats go laden with steel products to M orocco, unload some o f the steel and then go on to Bathurst. He then described the scene at Bathurst. W hile he himself had never made this trip b y boat, he visited Bathurst b y air and told about his conversations with the British Consul general there. H e asked the British Consul general what was the chief export product and he said peanuts. T h e President had driven out into the open country to our airport and saw the primitive method of cultivating the peanuts and asked the Consul how much return the British empire got out o f Gambia for each shilling o f investment. T h e Consul general replied, “ A bout a pound, I would say.” T he President then said, “ W ell, I see some cultivating being done here with a crooked stick drawn b y tw o women. If these people were given more purchasing power, they could buy things from Great Britain to raise their standard o f living.” T h e President then indicated that probably these people should not wear clothes because it had been demonstrated in the Southwest Pacific that those natives who wore clothes succumbed to tuberculosis and those who did not wear clothes did not succumb to the disease. He then related a story about Miss Suckley’s mother, who was very active in the Missionary Society collecting clothes for the Liberians. T h e President told her that the Liberians who received clothes from the Missionary Society would undoubtedly be murdered. T h e old lady 1 Anderson, Clayton and Company, cotton factors in Houston, Texas.
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looked up the facts, found they were correct, and stopped her mission ary activity. I mention these matters merely to indicate a few of the many sub jects which the President thought had a point when he started telling them but which point he promptly forgot as he went further afield. His whole habit o f mind is that o f a man who is continually traveling, seeing fresh pictures. His extraordinary discursiveness may have served a very useful purpose as President but as he gets older it makes him less and less capable as an administrator and more and more irritating to administrators . . . W hen the President mentioned H enry Kaiser’s name, I said I had a great admiration for Kaiser and asked the President how it would be to counsel with Kaiser on what might be needed in the reorganization o f the Department o f Commerce in the w ay o f new legislation. H e said it would be fine to go ahead. W hen I left, I asked the President what to tell the press. He said to tell them w e had a nice conference, that there was nothing they could ask me that w e did not talk about, that w e focused particular attention on reforestation in Iran.
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Oscar Chapman1 started out b y saying that he wanted either me or Harold Ickes to call a meeting o f some o f the key liberals. He had on his list Senator G uffey, Senator Murray, Senator Pepper; plus Dan T obin o f the A F L ; Sidney Hillman or Phil M urray o f CIO ; H enry Kaiser and Aluminum Reynolds,2 representing business; Jo Davidson, representing Arts and Sciences; Leon Henderson, representing Inde pendent Voters for Roosevelt, et al. I told Oscar I did not think I should call the meeting, that I was a marked man. H e asked how it would be for Harold Ickes to call the meeting. I suggested it might be just as well if calling the meeting were to be delayed a little while. Oscar then started to talk about how much I meant to all the liberals and began to reminisce about the Chicago convention. He said the man w ho really hurt me more than anyone else at the time when the hurting counted was Tom m y Corcoran. He said Tom m y really was not for Douglas but was pushing Douglas to beat me. H e said Tom m y moved in several weeks before the convention on Ickes and convinced Ickes that I had no support whatever in the country. W hen Ickes, represent1 Oscar L. Chapman, since 1933 Assistant Secretary of the Interior Department. 3 Richard S. Reynolds.
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ing the supposed liberals, and Hannegan, representing the orthodox Democratic crowd, both told the President the same thing, that I had no support, the result was fatal, according to Chapman. Oscar mentioned that he had called on H arry Hopkins on Friday, July 14, just prior to the convention and had told H arry that he wanted to know what the President wanted at the convention. H arry seemed to think that was all right. Chapman also reported that he was w ith H arry the week follow ing the convention and he said to H arry, “W ell, I suppose I am in bad with the administration because I sup ported W allace instead o f Truman at the convention.” H arry told Chapman that those w ho supported W allace at the convention were not in bad with the administration. O n Saturday, July 15, Ickes had Chapman in to his office, and asked him to support Douglas. Chapman told Ickes he was going to support me. A be Fortas, the Undersecretary o f Interior, is very close to Corcoran and was serving as a gobetween between Ickes and Corcoran. Chapman threw in paren thetically that Michael Strauss, who is another Assistant Secretary o f Interior, had no use whatever for T om m y Corcoran and has told Ickes and Abe Fortas to keep Tom m y out o f his end of the building. O f course, H arry Hopkins had no use whatever for T om m y Corcoran. Chapman now reports that Felix Frankfurter is very bitter against T om m y Corcoran. Chapman said that W ednesday night July 19 Frank W alker called up the chairman o f the Colorado delegation and said, “ This is the Postmaster General speaking. I am speaking for the Presi dent and want you to vote for Truman.” I have heard this from many sources. Oscar was very eager to know what I was going to be doing. I told him I was not sure yet. He said, “ Y ou know, I hoped yo u would be Secretary o f State. I was in Chicago the day Stettinius’ appointment was announced and, when I came out o f a certain building, there were the headlines. A couple o f ladies came b y and saw the headlines. One o f them said to the other one, ‘W ell, the President let W allace down again.’ ” Chapman said that was the w ay he felt. He said he had been thinking about what I should do and he thought I could do more for the liberal cause inside the administration than out and he had been thinking about the jobs I might hold, said there were only tw o foreign jobs that would be good, one was Ambassador to England, the other was Ambassador to Russia. Concerning the cabinet, he thought it would be a serious mistake for me to be Secretary of Labor. On the whole, he thought the best thing, in case Ickes would leave, would be for me to be Secretary o f Interior, either that or Secretary o f Com merce. Although he thought there would be less risk looking toward
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1948 in being Secretary of Interior. I told him frankly that I would prefer to be Secretary o f Commerce because I thought there was a chance from a base as Secretary of Commerce to do some good w ork looking toward full employment. W hen Chapman was holding forth on Corcoran, I asked w h y it was that Tom m y hated me so. Chapman replied, “ T hat is very simple. Y ou did not let him put any of his lawyers in the Department o f Agriculture.” Obviously Oscar is not a Corcoran man, nor a Byrnes man nor a Baruch man. It is quite possible, however, that he is a Hopkins man. H e specializes in keeping in touch with the various independent liberal organizations which supported the President during the campaign . . . I hike Chapman. H e seems to be on the right side o f things. I would say he might be pretty close to H arry Hopkins, and that H arry at the present time is possibly casting around to find an alliance somewhere in the liberal camp. It is conceivable that H arry may have sent Oscar out as a scout to find out how I was feeling. DECEMBER
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. . . A t cabinet the President came in looking thinner than usual. H e started in with gaily telling about the lunch he had had with D ick Law,1 what a fine young man he was, how he would make a good Prime Minister if only he were a little older. H e then began to talk about shortage o f shipping and about the hardships o f the people in Belgium because o f the shipping shortage. Jimmie Byrnes said w e were plan ning to build 18 million tons of shipping in the year 1945 and that about half o f it would be in V ic to ry ships, which are much superior to the Liberty ships. Secretary Sdmson presented a very serious report, prepared b y Gen eral Marshall, on the German attack.2 Eisenhower had wired that 1 Richard L aw (later Lord Coleraine), a Conservative Member of Parliament, head of the British delegation to the 1943 United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture that created U N R R A , and in 1944 a British delegate to the Bretton W oods Conference that created the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2 T h e surprise German counteroffensive had begun on December 16 in the Ardennes and cut a huge gap in the Allied lines. Eisenhower on December 19 put Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery in charge of all forces north of the Ardennes salient and Lieutenant General Omar N . Bradley in command of all forces to the south. He also ordered Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jrn to attack the southern bulge o f the German line and drive on to relieve Bastogne, where the Americans were holding out against a fierce attack. B y Christmas the German generals realized they had lost the battle; b y the end of January they had retreated from all the ground previously gained. For both sides, die Battle o f the Bulge was enormously cosdy.
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Bradley is doing a magnificent job o f commanding the American armies. Stimson likened the situation to the German attacks in March, April, M ay, June, and July o f 1915. He doesn’t seem to be too much discouraged. (As he was mentioning this, I could not help thinking o f the talk I had the previous evening with Vannevar Bush about a new type of shell1 which the Americans began to use on December 21 which is three times as efficient as the previous shells because o f the time fuse which sets off the explosion just about the ground. Bush said that just 10 days ago he was in that part o f Belgium and France where the G er mans are now attacking and that our people there had an adequate supply of this new kind o f shell, which they are going to start using. These shells might well prove to be a determining factor in holding the Germans back.) Henry Morgenthau mentioned about closing the racetracks. Both Jimmie Byrnes and H enry were strong for closing racetracks. T h e y said it creates a very bad impression on our soldiers when they come back to Florida, for example, and see hundreds o f cars parked around a racetrack and special trains running to the races. Jimmie mentioned that a Pennsylvania train he was taking was held up an hour and a half so that cars carrying four racehorses could be attached to the train. I knew nothing about the background o f the racetrack controversy but I somehow had the feeling that Morgenthau and Bym es were shooting at somebody. T h e President laughingly referred to Herbert Bayard Swope,2 who has been active in this kind o f business and w ho is now in the W ar Department. Leo C row ley seemed to think that there was danger of an attack on racetracks getting into the field of Prohibition and held up very tentatively and carefully a finger o f warning.* M or genthau took great pride in the fact that his war loan had amounted to 21 billion dollars when he had only asked for 14 billion dollars. Stimson indicated that he would need more men. Bym es said more men would be needed in the building o f ships. There was indication everywhere that the recent turn o f the war meant that a shortage of manpower would continue quite a while longer. T h e President took 1 W allace was describing the proximity fuse, an important new development both for the Batde o f the Bulge and later for use by naval vessels against Japanese suicide planes in the Pacific. 2 Herbert Bayard Swope, then a consultant to the Secretary of W ar, had been a distinguished reporter for the N ew York W orld and later that paper’s executive editor. He was also chairman of the N ew York Racing Commission. •B y m e s ordered all horse and dog tracks closed on January 3, 1945. T h e y were permitted to reopen on May 9, immediately after the war in Europe had ended.
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the slant that what w e needed now was a continuation of war psychol ogy and no suggestion o f peacetime psychology or peacetime planning of any kind. T he necessity for maintaining war psychology is that when peacetime psychology gets around, thousands of people immedi ately leave their war jobs and start looking for peace jobs. W ickard brought up the question of holidays in the government departments. T h e President said there was only one holiday and that was Christmas. T he President expected the government departments to w ork on N ew Year’s D ay and every other holiday except Sundays and Christmas. A fter the President had gone all around the cabinet, he said to me, “ And so you see, H enry.” I assumed b y this statement he meant that it would be necessary to proceed cautiously in planning for peace as long as the war with Germany is on. The President, referring to the Greek situation,1 said he thought the best solution was to give both sides in Greece all the rifles and ammu nition they wanted and then everybody pull out and let them fight it out. Jimmie Byrnes mentioned that he was getting the office o f O W M and Reconversion established and staffed, and that under the terms o f the A c t setting up the office apparently it had very wide powers. H e mentioned particularly the power to formulate or have formulated such plans as are necessary to meet the problems arising out of the transition from war to peace. He said this power as contained in the A ct was as wide as a bam door and about everything could be done under it. DECEMBER
2 J , 1944
. . . I told Biddle how much I thought of Hubert Humphrey2 in Minnesota . . . 1 Allied forces had occupied Athens on October 13, 1944, but civil war in Greece erupted soon thereafter. British troops assisted the supporters of the regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, w ho had been appointed b y King George II with Churchill’s blessing. T h e insurgents consisted of leftist factions, some commu nist, some not. Though the fighting ceased on January 15, 1945, the Archbishop and his British sponsors maintained only a shaky hold on the government while resistance continued to grow. T h e disaffected groups refused to participate in a general election o f March 1946, which the royalists won. In M ay guerrilla activities prefaced another six months of civil war. 2 W hile stumping in Minnesota, W allace had met Hubert H . Humphrey, who was in charge o f the campaign in that state for the Roosevelt-Truman Com mittee. Humphrey took office as reform Democratic mayor of Minneapolis in
■ 945*
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Biddle spoke very highly o f Jimmie Byrnes and said he was most cooperative and fine to w ork with. He asked if I thought H arry H op kins was behind the appointment o f W ill Clayton. I said I didn’t know. H e said he hoped I would be in the new administration and wanted to know if I had any plans. I said I didn’t have any plans but that I would very much like to be Secretary o f Commerce. H e asked if he could be o f any help in this matter. I said, “ N o.” H e asked if I w ould be interested in Commerce even if R F C were not included. I said, “ Yes,” but that I thought R F C was very important to successful op eration with regard to full postwar employment . . .
DECEMBER
28, I944
Lauchlin Currie came in to tell me about a talk he had had w ith the President. He told the President that the liberals everywhere were very much discouraged about his appointments to the State Depart ment. H e said the President was really quite apologetic about it, apparently admitted that Dunn and Holmes were pretty bad, then said to Currie that “ Clayton is a pretty good fellow, isn’t he?” Currie then proceeded to develop the theme that the one thing which the President could do that would greatly encourage the liberals would be to appoint me as Secretary o f Commerce. T h e President did not give Currie any direct answer but merely said he thought Currie would like what he was going to do with regard to Commerce. Currie reported with regard to H arry Hopkins, that Hopkins said to friends of mine like Bob Nathan, “ H enry is a grand fellow. He helped greatly in the campaign. W e must get something for him, etc., etc.” But to other people even closer to H arry Hopkins than any o f these, Hopkins said, “ Yes, H enry is a fine fellow but can you vision him as Secretary o f Commerce trying to get an appropriation on the H ill?” Lauch says that he understands from a third party that Clayton feels I was responsible for the attack on him in the Senate. Lauch thinks that Clayton’s operations abroad as revealed b y Treasury records were pretty bad. He says, however, that Clayton in his face-to-face contacts seems like a very fine fellow. Lauch reports that there is a great deal o f intrigue in the W hite House. He says the President’s original inten tion was to put in Jimmie Byrnes in the State Department as Secretary. This alarmed H arry Hopkins, who told the President that he would have the same trouble with Byrnes that he had with Hull. Hopkins sold the President on the idea if he was going to be his ow n Secretary o f State, he would have to have Stettinius. H arry and Stettinius are
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very dose and the tw o o f them together worked out the six appoint ments. W ill Clayton is not really Hopkins’ man but Jimmie Byrnes’ man and was put in to conriliate Byrnes . . . Lauch says that H arry Hopkins is terrifically jealous o f anybody who tries to get close to the President. H e has not only fallen out with Jimmie Byrnes but now has very strained relations with both Sam Rosenman and Steve Early. Lauch thinks the strong man in the State Department w ill undoubtedly be W ill Clayton, which means an in direct triumph, so Lauch says, for Byrnes and Baruch. Lauch says he has talked with Don Nelson about the current Chi nese situation. It seems that Pat H urley has done a good job over there in getting the communists and the Generalissimo together. He ques tions whether it will last very long. Lauch says that Nelson is now out o f an assignment. H e has an office and a staff but nothing for them to do . . .
JANUARY I ,
1945
. . . A t 6 o’clock in the evening Ed Stettinius dropped by, saying that the President had told him that he wanted me to be Secretary of Commerce. Stettinius was bubbling over with enthusiasm, saying how happy he was about it and how fine it was for the country. H e then wanted to talk about the relationship between the Department o f Commerce and the State Department on the problem o f foreign at tachés, mentioning that Hawkins1 was going to head up the coordina tion o f various economic activities for the State Department in London. I told him that Hawkins was an excellent man and then laid down the thesis that it seemed to me the State Department should be supreme on the policy level and that Commerce ought to be allowed to deter mine operational matters in its own proper field o f activity. I told him m y observations concerning agricultural attachés since they had be come a part o f the State Department and said it seemed to me that if a real job were to be done the agency responsible for operations ought to have the power to hire and fire. Stettinius said the old-line crowd in the State Department would agree with me on the proposition that it was not the duty o f the State 1 H arry C . Hawkins, for many years an official in the State Department, chief o f the Division o f Commercial Policy and Agreements (January-September 1941) had become Economic Counselor of the American embassy in London in October 1944.
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Department to engage in operations. O n the whole it seemed to me that there should be no difficulty in arriving at a suitable agreement with Stetdnius. He spoke about Milo’s being such a fine man and I told him that it wasn’t my intention to bring Milo back into die pic ture. I agreed with him utterly and completely that Milo was an un usually fine person. I told him that when I was V ice President I could not engage in operations myself but that as Secretary o f Commerce I wanted to be my own contact man both with Congress and other peo ple in the executive branch o f the government, as, for example, with Stettinius. I visioned sitting down with Stettinius and Clayton to w ork on commercial problems in the foreign field. Stettinius, like Clayton, agreed with me enthusiastically about the need for a big export-import trade. Stettinius said, in a musing w ay, “ H ow will Jesse like it when he is only in the loan field?” I said the President indicated to me that he was going to give me R F C as well as Commerce. I said o f course the R F C would be a headache in many ways but nevertheless if cer tain things were to be done it seemed to me essential to have RFC. A t the party at Thurman Arnold’s . . . Senator and Mrs. O ’Ma honey1 took a very strong anti-Russian stand, claiming that the Presi dent had appeased Russia. O'M ahoney also took a very strong stand against the M urray Full Employment Bill, claiming that it was the doorway to totalitarianism. I told him while there were many 'langes I would make in the M urray bill, I utterly disagreed with him in this analysis and I felt the backwash o f the w ar would make it necessary for the government to step in on the overall fiscal and employment picture in a strong w ay, trying, o f course, to get results through private initiative if possible; nevertheless approaching the problems o f peace with the same vigor that it approached the problems o f war . . . JANUARY 2, 1945
T he President looked unusually well and was in excellent spirits. He talked at some length about the international situation, indicating his troubles with Churchill. He indicated that when he went on his trip this time, he would meet with Ibn Saud and try to settle the Palestine situation. H e said the Greeks were very hard people to get along with, that every one of them was a violent politician. T he President came out very strongly for universal military train ing. Sam Rayburn indicated this would be very hard to put over. T he President took the page o f pictures o f the American dead and 1 Joseph C . O ’Mahoney, W yom ing Democrat.
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wounded from the January 2 issue o f the Washington Thnes-Herald and passed it around. These pictures were entitled "A gain and Again and Again,” and in essence are probably as treasonable a thing as has ever appeared in an American paper in time o f war. T h e President said nothing but the rest o f us spoke our minds pretty freely. I said to the President there were certain senators who felt that w e should get our troops out o f France as soon as possible so that we would be in shape to fight Russia later on, that there were some sena tors w ho felt that the President was appeasing Russia. T h e President defended his course vigorously. He said that in England there were certain people who felt the same w ay, that at Teheran Churchill very much wanted the second front to be opened up on the Dalmatian Coast or some place else in the Balkan states. Apparently the Church ill idea has been that the Anglo-Saxons should open up a sphere of influence in the Balkan states to offset Russia. T h e President stood fast fo r opening up a second front in France . . . T h e President put in a plug for Senator Fulbright going on the Foreign Relations Committee. Barkley indicated it could not be done, that there were too many sitting senators who wanted positions . . . A t the conclusion o f the meeting o f the President with congressional leaders I stayed behind for a moment to tell him what a fine luncheon meeting I had had with Mr. and Mrs. Clayton and also about the meet ing with Ed Stetdnius. I told him it seemed to me as though there should not be any serious difficulty on this matter o f the foreign com mercial attachés. I told the President it was my intention to meet with Stettinius and Clayton myself and I thought that it would be possible to iron matters of this sort out satisfactorily. I mentioned that I in tended to be my own contact man with Congress as well as with men like Stettinius and Clayton. 1 said when I was V ice President I couldn’t do this. T h e President then asked how Milo was and spoke in glowing terms about him, saying that we must get him back into the picture again. I told him I thought it would be unwise for me to bring Milo into the picture—at any rate, that I shouldn’t do so at first. I said to the President that Stettinius had said, “ H ow w ill Jesse take it being restricted only to the R F C ?” and then w ent on to indicate that I felt it would be unfortunate to leave Jesse in R FC; that it would prove to be a headache both for him and for me and for the Demo cratic Party. T h e President said he agreed absolutely. H e asked if I had seen C row ley and I said, “ N o .” I don’t know what he had in mind with regard to C row ley because he said he wanted C row ley to stay on until V -E Day. He said C row ley got on well with Congress. H e
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said there would be a question o f appointing another man when C row ley got out. I still can’t figure out whether he wants F E A to go into Commerce on V -E D ay or not. H e said he would write the letter to Jesse Jones accepting his resig nation this afternoon if he got around to it. H e also said that his plan was to send m y nomination to Congress on January 20 so that there would be no interregnum whatsoever. J a n u a r y 5,1945
. . . A t cabinet meeting the President spoke about the Greek situa tion and again referred to the best policy being to give both sides plenty o f ammunition and let them shoot each other up while the Allies stayed in boats off the G reek coast. Looking at Jesse Jones, he said that the Greeks were a good bit like Texans, they liked to shoot each other. Then he said, “ W ell, I guess there have not been any kill ings in Texas since last spring.” T h e President said he had been babying Halifax along. H e gave it as his general impression that Churchill had slipped greatly in England and was much worried. H e said, however, recently he had received a message from Churchill in poetry form and this indicated that Churchill was beginning to recover because a man doesn’t write poetry w hen he is downhearted . . . T h e President mentioned, as he always does when the G reek ques tion comes up, that he is a member of the Order of Aheppa but that Greeks love to talk politics and whenever they talk politics they get excited and want to cut each other up. H e said he could say this be cause all the Greeks in the country had voted for him in the last election. Stimson spoke at some length on the military situation. H e referred to the fact that in France the French have 7 divisions, the British 14, and w e have about 50. W e also have several divisions in England. H e said the Germans have about the same number as w e have but the German divisions are smaller and not as good. He read from a letter received from General Patton o f December 27 in which Patton ex pressed the belief that this was the decisive battle against Germ any. Patton mentioned that the new type o f ammunition is w orking splen didly. T he President said again, as he has said a number o f times recently, that he had not heard anyone talking in the past month about recon version. Apparently he wants all attention fastened on the war effort.
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JANUARY 9 , 19 4 J
. . . I told H enry Kaiser the President wanted me to talk with him about plans for the Department o f Commerce. W ith Kaiser every thing adds up to the question o f jobs and establishing the proper w ork ing relationship with labor. He says his sympathies are more with the C IO than the A F L although more o f his unions are A F L unions. His formula for full employment is what he calls his 3 H's and a T . In other words, Housing, Health, Highways, and Transportation. He would have government financing at low rates o f interest of hospitals in connection with in. astry, the same w ay he has done out at Van couver, Washington. In other words, he would have a sort o f F H A for clinics and hospitals applied on a nationwide scale. H e thinks there would be less opposition to this approach than to the M urray-W agnerDingell Bill on so-called federalized medicine.1 I told him I did not think the Secretary o f Commerce had any very direct power in creating jobs but that if I had the right kind of backing from the President and from labor, it might be possible to do quite a lot. Something would depend on who was Secretary o f Labor. He asked if I had anyone to suggest. I said I thought it might be important that the Secretary o f Labor not be from the ranks of labor but that he be someone who could get along with labor and who could envision the possibility o f chang ing our economy sufficiently to get full employment. Kaiser said he thought the businessmen now appreciated the abso lute necessity of a national income of 140 billion dollars a year or a gross national product o f 170 billion dollars a year . . . A t the conference at the W hite House there were present Speaker Rayburn, John McCormack, Senator Truman, Alben Barkley, and T om Connally. Sam Rayburn started out b y presenting the President with a box o f pecans, which caused the President to talk about Jack G am er and the w ay in which Jack gets his hands stained because he spends his time hulling pecans. T he President then talked about how Jack G am er claimed the N ew Deal was going to ruin him because of low interest rates. It seems Jack G am er had been accustomed to lending his money at 15 percent and didn’t like getting only 12 percent. 1 Senators Robert W agner and James E. Murray, and Democratic Representative John Dingell o f Michigan had introduced an omnibus welfare bill, based upon earlier reports of the National Resources Planning Board, that provided, among other things, for national compulsory health insurance. For a full account of that forward-looking but little supported measure, see J. Joseph Huthmacher, Senator Robert F. W agner and the Rise o f Urban Liberalism (N ew York, 1968) pp. 292-94.
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Sam Rayburn said he didn’t belong to that school o f thought because he was on the borrowing side and not on the lending side. There was some discussion o f the manpower and universal military training legislative situation. Sam Rayburn indicated that he thought the President ought to go slow in pushing for the universal military training and that the boys ought to spend a good bit o f their time learning how to be mechanics and learning how to farm. Alben Bark ley said this would not do because the colleges didn’t like the idea o f the boys’ getting too much educational training b y the government. In discussing the foreign situation it became obvious that the Presi dent anticipated that the next Dumbarton Oaks meeting would be sometime during the latter part o f March. Connally spoke about Sen ator Vandenberg and the Polish question and said they had been quiet ing Vandenberg b y saying that the question o f the Curzon Line could be opened up with the United Nations Council fifteen years hence. T h e President said, “ N ow , wait a minute! W hat will I do if I open this up and Stalin doesn’t agree?” T h e President then w ent on to say that the Russians were insisting on having 17 representatives at the next Dumbarton Oaks Conference and therefore Brazil was going to insist on 26, Canada on 6, and the United States on 48. John M cCorm ack said he understood the Chinese communists were not fighting the Japs. I said that every military man who had returned from among the Chi nese communists, no matter what his political opinion, reported that the Chinese communists were doing a good job. T h e President spoke up to say that the Chinese communists were not communists but were agrarians. I mentioned what Colonel Olmstead had told me the pre ceding day, which had also been told me in China, that the Japanese soldiers were making quite a bit o f money b y trading w ith the Chinese, no matter whether they were government people or communists. J a n u a r y 11,1945
. . . T h e President started out cabinet1 b y talking concerning the meeting with the eight senators from the Foreign Relations Committee.3 1 This was to be the last of Roosevelt’s cabinet meetings about which W allace commented in his diary. T h e President left for the Yalta Conference before W allace was confirmed as Secretary of Commerce and died on A pril 12, 1945, before W allace resumed keeping a record. 2 T om Connally had appointed a Committee o f Eight Senators to confer with the State Department about plans for a world organization. A rthur Vandenberg of Michigan, the most influential Republican on that committee, approved, as did Connally, o f Hull’s cautious approach to the problem, though Vandenberg was even more hesitant than Hull. T h e senator considered Roosevelt soft on
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He «aid he was having this prior to his meeting with Stalin and Church ill, which meeting he said was going to be held at the N orth Pole. T he President was pleased with Vandenberg’s speech; Jimmie Byrnes spoke up very strongly in favor o f Vandenberg saying that he thought the senator’s nephew in the air force, General Vandenberg, who was given a great play in this week’s issue of Tim e had been working on the sen ator and that the senator now had a much more enlightened attitude than he had earlier . . . A t the conclusion o f cabinet meeting, H enry Morgenthau wanted to see me so we went out for a walk for about 20 minutes. He wanted to tell me the details o f a conversation he had had with Ed Stettinius about F E A and about a certain cabinet committee for handling the economic affairs of the United States vis-à-vis the outside world. I told him I would not tell anyone about the details of this matter so I am not even writing them down here. Suffice it to say, I was very much pleased with the proposal as made by Stettinius to Henry Morgenthau. H enry Morgenthau was also much pleased . . . T h e President went to bat in a very mild w ay for Bob Hannegan and his patronage. Apparently Hannegan had been in to the President complaining that Public W orks and Housing had not been cooperating with him . . . T h e President very mildly in his statement said that he did not think it was necessary to have more than 90 percent o f the employees in the government Republicans, that he realized that C P A was largely Re publican but he did not see w h y all the agencies should be so largely Republican. H e said maybe the various administrative officials could have Hannegan in and talk to him like a Father. Obviously the Presi dent was doing what Hannegan had asked him to do and he was handling the situation as carefully and gently as he could. Russia and insisted upon the right o f Congress to veto any use of force for collective security. Still, on January 10, 1945, * major speech to the Senate, Vandenberg called for “maximum American cooperation, consistent with legiti mate American self-interest” to make a new world organization succeed. He criticized but did not condemn the Soviet Union, and he urged American leaders to persuade Stalin of the necessity o f collective security. Vandenberg’s generous and genuine motives on that occasion derived as much from his own developing ideas as from any influence of his nephew, Brigadier General H oyt S. Vandenberg, then deputy chief of the A ir Staff; see Robert A . Divine,
Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (N ew York, 1967), passim but especially p. 262 ff.
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JANUARY 13 , 19 4 5
. . . Jim Patton told me he is going to be seeing the President next week and that he hoped I would be Secretary o f Commerce. I told him I had mentioned to the President his (Patton’s) part in forming the full employment bill. Patton says he doesn’t trust any o f the labor leaders except Phil Murray. H e says all the others are indiscreet or w ill double-cross you. Apparently he means this to apply especially to Sidney Hillman. H e says Hillman doesn’t like him. He told me that he would very much like to be Secretary o f Labor but not to put on any drive for him. I told him I thought I would mention it to Phil M urray . . . Both Charles Marsh and Morris Rosenthal have reported that Jesse Jones has told a newspaperman (Tim e-Life-Fortune) that he, Jesse, knew the President wanted to get rid o f him and put H enry W allace in his place. According to Rosenthal, Jesse told the newspaperman that the President would have to blast him out. According to Charles, Jesse said the President would have to dynamite him out. Obviously Jesse is doing his best to put on a warlike appearance. Probably it doesn’t mean a thing unless the President is worked upon in some w ay b y Jesse’s friends. O f course, there is the possibility that Jesse may try to cause trouble in the Senate. Apparently Jesse has told Harold Smith that he is planning to stay on. J a n u a r y 14 ,19 4 5
. . . Ernst asked what the President was going to do with Jesse Jones? 1 said, “ W h y should he do anything with Jesse Jones?” Ernst replied, “ W ell, if he takes care o f Jesse in some w ay, it will reduce the amount of discord.” I said, “ W ell, it seems to me it would be better for the President to fight on this issue and get licked than to give Jesse something.” In other words, what I was really saying to Ernst was that I would rather not be confirmed b y the Senate than to have Jesse Jones still in government1 . . . 1 W allace was almost not confirmed. His diary, which he abandoned temporarily when his term as V ice President ended on January 10, 1945 (he resumed keep* ing it on April 27) contains no record o f the long fight over his nomination as Secretary o f Commerce. Senate conservatives, assisted b y Jesse Jones, who testified that W allace lacked the business acumen to run the R FC and other lending agencies, blocked W allace’s appointment until the Administration had no alternative to a two-step compromise. First, Congress passed a bill, introduced b y Senator W alter F. George, Georgia Democrat, that stripped the Department of Commerce o f all the lending authority Jones had exercised. Then, in March
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1945, drc Senate confirmed Wallace's appointment as Secretary. Jones’ con tention was wholly unfounded, for as Secretary of Agriculture W allace had demonstrated his competence in handling federal funds. Yet Jones' argument served as an excuse for Republicans and southern Democrats who objected to W allace’s positions on the issues which the former V ice President had been stressing for several years. T h e same Senators who had sided with Jones in the struggle over the B E W , and who had led the movement to dump W allace from the national ticket, had now punished him again. Still, W allace had lost another battle without yet losing the war. As Secretary of Commerce he remained an important and potentially essential figure in the ongoing effort to direct federal policy to achieve and sustain postwar full employment, to develop foreign trade m the pattern he had long recommended, and to contrive a peace uninfected by traditional imperialisms or new hostilities.
Ill Into the Cold W ar April I94f-September 1946
X or th o se w h o had w o r k e d c l o s e l y w ith Franklin Roosevelt for many years, his death, a profound personal shock, also created a po litical dilemma. In different measures, they had trusted him. Each realized that Roosevelt played his subordinates off against each other, phrased what he told each man in a manner calculated most to placate or to encourage him, and kept ultimate control at the W hite House. Still, each o f his close associates had become accustomed to Roosevelt’s manner, each felt he exercised influence on some of the President’s policies, and all considered him, whatever his limitations, the incom parable national leader in war and peace. N o w Truman assumed the presidency. He would want to select his own advisers, some at once, some when it became convenient, as other successors to that office had in the past and would again in the future. But with the war still under w ay and the problems of peacemaking emerging, Truman needed the experience of Roosevelt’s ablest counselors and the continuity they brought to government. For their part, though they offered their resig nations as a matter of course, they felt, with few exceptions, an obli gation to serve the new President and through him the country for as long as he wanted them to, and as they could accommodate to his un familiar and still unpredictable ways. Most o f them were anxious about, some suspicious of, those ways. Truman was to prove to be far stronger than many had expected but also at times as devious as the most dubious had feared. W allace in April 1945 especially felt the uncertainties that in almost equal measure also troubled Biddle, Ickes, and Morgenthau. More than any o f them, W allace had reason to distrust Truman, who had dis played the devious side of his character in his maneuvering before and during the Chicago convention. Y et W allace also had a fierce commit ment to striving for the kind o f peace, domestically and internationally, that he had long advocated. He chose to w ork with Truman not the least because practically there was no equally promising alternative. Though W allace did so with reservations, he also tried to believe in
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his chief, tried to persuade himself—sometimes to the point o f selfdelusion—that Truman shared his objectives. H e remained in the cabi net longer than any other N ew Dealer (James Forrestal could scarcely be classified a N ew Dealer). H e attempted, even after intermittent dis appointments, to bring the President vigorously to support the domes tic programs which the Commerce Department was developing, to re-endow the department with some o f the lending authority Jesse Jones had exercised, and to embrace a reconversion and stabilization policy equitable to labor and small business. More important, as W al lace saw it, was the necessity for overcoming the influences on Truman, as well as Truman’s ow n inclinations, militating toward an increasingly hostile stance against the Soviet Union. T hat question involved many related issues—the role o f the military in American life, the control o f atomic energy, the future o f China, the special relationship with Great Britain, the settlement o f boundaries and the direction o f politics in both western and eastern Europe. A t once hopeful and saddened at each critical juncture in the evolution o f American policies on those issues, W allace shifted more and more to disapproval o f Trum an’s major decisions. As the Cold W ar developed, W allace believed that the United States at each stage contributed at least as much to the mounting tensions as did the Soviet Union. A fter Churchill’s Fulton speech, he kept the faith only with visible pain. T he Democratic Party, he continued to argue, was capable, as the Republican Party was not, o f forging a liberal program at home and a just peace abroad. Truman, he judged, would be the Democratic nominee in 1948. H e had to try, he concluded, to cooperate with party and President while he also strove to push them to his own positions. For Truman, W allace was both a convenience and a nuisance. So long as he remained in the cabinet, the President knew, the Democratic left would not desert, though it would continue to criticize, the ad ministration. There primarily lay the convenience, though W allace was also useful as an adventurous proponent o f domestic programs Truman endorsed and as a mediator with union labor whose hostility Truman hoped to dispel. Y et W allace was insistently antagonistic to policies Truman had privately decided to follow. There lay the nuisance. T h e President intended from the outset to be far firmer with the Soviet Union than W allace believed wise, and firmness rapidly rose to confrontations, most o f them acidulous, between American and Russian negotiators concerned with every question of interest to both countries. As Truman saw it, and as in like manner did his closest ad visers—Byrnes, Acheson, Marshall, Forrestal—the Soviet Union was
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determined to dominate both eastern Europe and Asia, either directly or indirectly. T he President moved a long w ay toward a policy of containment before George Kennan gave that policy a label. In so doing, Truman was provoked again and again by Soviet actions and Soviet rhetoric, but for his part he was equally provoking to his con testants. Wallace, his access to secret information slimmer and slimmer, un derstood the latter half of that menacing relationship better than he did the former. His eagerness to reach a genuine détente with the Soviet Union made him generous beyond Truman’s tolerance in his interpre tations of Russian initiatives and responses. From the beginning the tw o men were moving apart. That movement accelerated in the spring o f 1946. Their tenuous official relationship snapped in September. Then and earlier, W allace, b y no means either w holly naive or wrong in his assessment o f Truman’s policies, was honest with the President, a courtesy Truman only sometimes reciprocated. T h e Pres ident may often have felt honest when he was in fact dissembling, for he tried, as Roosevelt had, to please each of his associates as he talked to him. But in the case o f their conversation about the Fulton speech, as W allace later learned, Truman lied to him. So too did the President w riggle past the edge o f prevarication in his public remarks about W allace’s September Madison Square Garden speech, the episode that provoked their final break. But as W allace’s diary discloses, that break would have come soon had it not occurred when it did. Though both men kept their tempers under admirable control, though both practiced an amicable civility in their meetings, Truman and W allace on questions o f international policy had become irreconcilable months before the President asked his Secretary o f Commerce to resign.
APRIL 2 7, 1945
President Truman was exceedingly cordial. H e started out talking about the surplus property disposal, how he thought it belonged in Commerce. I said it was going to be quite a headache but w e would do the best we could with it. I told him that A 1 Schindler1 was going to have complete responsibility of supervising the administration and that he was going to operate it from a business point o f view and not a political; that when he appointed people he would let the senators know about it in advance but that he would be influenced b y only one consideration and that was efficiency. He said that was just the w ay he believed in operating. I said that Joe G u ffey had wanted us to name a certain political figure and that Mr. Schindler was calling up Senator G u ffey and gently saying that w e couldn’t use the person for a variety o f reasons. President Truman said that Joe G u ffey was terrible on patronage; that Senator G uffey, Dave Lawrence, and other Pennsyl vania boys had called on him the day before. President Truman said that he had been rough with them in a nice w ay, indicating that they had gotten more patronage than they were entitled to. I told him that as Secretary o f Agriculture I had always had the closest relationship with President Roosevelt; that I had served him loyally and he had backed me up completely. T he only tw o disagree ments w e had had were on the purge campaign in 1938 and the ques tion o f the transfer o f forestry from Agriculture to Interior. Truman interposed to say that I had done a magnificent job as Secretary o f Agriculture and that he had said so many times both privately and pub licly. I then went on to say that in 1940 the President had really wanted Jimmie Byrnes as V ice President and that after the election he continually used Jimmie Bym es as his liaison with the Senate rather than myself. T he President had seemed to look on me as a man for doing special jobs. I described in some little detail the trips to Mexico 1 A lfred Schindler had worked in the Federal Loan Administration and the Defense Plant Corporation. W allace had just arranged for his appointment as Undersecretary o f Commerce.
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and to South America. W ith regard to China I mentioned the ob jective o f my trip over there and suggested that the President get in touch with John Carter Vincent. I also mentioned that there were a number of people in both China and Poland who would like to see the United Sûtes get into war with Russia. He said, “T hat must not be.” [H .A .W . footnote.] I said the reason I had been brought in to the Board o f Economic W arfare was because there were misunderstand ings between S u te and Treasury and the President apparently thought that I was the only one outranking both cabinet officers who could step into the position. T he same situation existed in the W ar Pro duction Board between Knudsen and Don Nelson. I referred to the Jesse Jones incident of July 1943, and said that this surprised me greatly. Truman said that it surprised him too; that he was in my com er at the time. I spoke highly o f Milo Perkins and he spoke just as highly. I said that while m y relations with Roosevelt had been o f the finest, y e t there had been some people about Roosevelt who appar ently were conniving against me. I told him I was prepared to serve him as loyally as 1 had Roosevelt, provided he wanted me to do so. He was very emphatic in saying that he did. I then said that there were folks around Roosevelt who apparently had connived against me. I told him that I didn’t care to go through that kind o f thing again and that if I were to continue I would expect him, himself, to let me know when there was need for change in policy or attitude. He spoke very vigorously about connivers, saying that he was against them and that he was going to get rid o f them as soon as he could. N o names were mentioned. A fter I had mentioned that the only disagreements I had had w ith Roosevelt as Secretary o f Agriculture were on the purge and the for estry matter, he said he wouldn’t give tw o cents for a man with whom there weren’t disagreements from time to time, but he said he certainly would be above board with all the cards on the table. Secretary Stettinius called up while I was there and after the con versation ended he spoke very emphatically against the Russians, say ing that it was always the custom to have the host country furnish the presiding officer. He said that at the insistence o f the Russians w e had arranged to have the four main countries alternate with the presid ing officer. Truman and Stettinius, however, had insisted that Stet tinius be the senior of the four. T h e President had just told Stettinius to stand pat on this and if it was not agreeable to M olotov to “ tell him to go to hell.” 1 1 T h e United Nations Conference on International Organization had opened in San Francisco on April 25, 1945. Stettinius was head o f the American delegation.
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I said that now that Germ any was about to be defeated there would be things happening very rapidly on the home front and that full em ployment would be the most important single objective. He said he agreed. I said that o f the old-line departments Commerce and Labor would be especially involved. He told me very confidentially that he was going to have L ew Schwellenbach come in as Secretary of Labor1 and that he hoped to have him in before the end o f M ay. H e also told me confidentially that he thought Hitler was dead and that Germ any would give an uncon ditional surrender either today or tomorrow.*i*3 H e said he had found there was no one to whom he could tell things in absolute confidence; that the congressmen and senators invariably leaked if he told them anything but that he had confidence in me. I told him that as soon as Schwellenbach came in I thought it would be a splendid thing if he could have Schwellenbach and his right-hand man, myself and m y right-hand man, and Judge Vinson and Bob Nathan get together so that a program could be worked out. I said there was no time to lose. I spoke very highly o f Vinson and Bob Nathan. He also spoke highly o f both. H e said Bob Nathan had worked closely with him when Bob was in the W ar Production Board. Trum an was exceedingly eager to agree with everything I said. He also seemed eager to make decisions o f every kind with the greatest promptness. Everything he said was decisive. It almost seemed as though he was eager to decide in advance o f thinking. O n leaving I mentioned the air problems and he said he was very much interested in that. He feels that international air is, together with reparations, the most important postwar international problem. H e said he wanted to have another talk with me when w e could go into these things more in detail. H e thinks the Civil Aeronautics A d ministration should be in the Department o f Commerce rather than out side. H e says he has given international air a lot o f study. A fter I left, the newspaper boys asked me a variety o f questions. I T h e United States and the Soviet Union immediately opposed each other on a series of issues. T h e first was symbolic. Though the host nation traditionally supplied the chairman for international conferences, M olotov insisted that the leaders o f the delegations of the Big Four (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, ana China) route in the chair. Anthony Eden proposed an accepuble compromise, according to which the roution would occur at plenary sessions but Stettinius would preside over the more important Steering and Executive committees. i Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Democratic senator from Washington (1935-40), then United Sûtes District Judge, was appointed Secreury of Labor in M ay 1945. * T h e German surrender was actually ten days away. Truman designated M ay 8, 1945, his birthday, as V -E Day.
43 8
T b c Price o f Visum
told them merely about surplus property disposai. T h e y asked me if I had any comments to make on the Pennsylvania delegation, including Joe G uffey, Emma G u ffey Miller, and Dave Lawrence, stating to the newspaper boys that they had just been in to assure President Truman of their support in 1948. I said, “ N o comment." T h e y asked what kind o f visit w e had had and I said w e understood each other perfectly. M AY I,
1945
. . . Harold Smith was thoroughly alarmed about die fascist-minded proposal o f Vannevar Bush, spearheading for the W a r Department and the N a vy to set aside $100 million for research which would not go through regular Congressional channels.1 T h e more Smith talked about this the more alarmed he became and the more I shared his alarm. I like Vannevar Bush, but he really knows nothing about gen uine democratic government. H e believes in government for scientific aristocracy. Smith talked to me in some detail about what they call in the Budget Bureau the “ Manhattan Project." I told Smith I thought this definitely was involved in Bush's proposal. Smith told me that he had recom mended to President Roosevelt die stopping o f the Manhattan Project, but that Roosevelt felt it should not be stopped. I told Smith I ques tioned whether it should be stopped, but that I thought the peacetime implications should be examined very carefully. m ay
2,1945
. . . W ill Davis* and I had an excellent talk w ith A ttorney General 1 Eager to preserve independence in research for American scientists, and without confidence in the willingness o f Congress to do so, Bush had recommended replacing the wartime Office o f Scientific Research and Development with a Research Board for National Security. T h e board was to consist of A rm y and N avy officers, an equal number o f civilian scientists and engineers to be selected b y die National Academ y of Sciences, and members of Arm y and N a vy or ganizations. Stimson and Forrestal had established the board early in 1945, but Harold Smith refused to release funds to support it. Smith was not against science. Rather, entirely apart from his anxieties about excessive military influ ence, he insisted upon proper channels for appropriating the growing funds necessary to support scientific activities. Bush then put forward a new proposal, similar to his previous one, described in detail in his July 1945 report to die President, “Science, the Endless Frontier.” Again he advocated keeping scientific research under the control of scientists and free from the interference o f politicians, though again he seemed not to consider military officers a problem; see Richard G . Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., T h e N ew World 1939•94*, PPs W illiam H . Davis, N ew Y o rk patent law yer, since 194a chairman o f the National W a r Labor Board.
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Biddle tboüt die Patent Committee. Biddle expressed his alarm about Vannevar Bosh and Kettering.1 It was finally agreed that Davis would take W alton Hamilton o f the Justice Department on his staff as well as Houston Kenyon.1 It was also agreed that both the A ttorney Gen eral and I would sit in on the committee from time to time. Davis has great confidence that something constructive will come out o f this Patent Committee • • • m ay
3 ,19 4 5
. . . A t the conclusion, just before he was leaving, Adlai Stevenson3 told me personally how much disturbed he was about the conference at San Francisco. H e said the Russians were right with regard to A r gentina and that many people in the State Department realized this to be the case. It happened, however, that Nelson Rockefeller placed the unity o f the hemisphere above the unity o f the world and that he felt it was more important to bring in Argentina than to w ork out a satis factory world formula. This may not be stating it quite fairly to Nelson Rockefeller. T h e only conclusion I could reach, however, from 1 B osh and Charles F . K e tte r in g , v ic e president o f G e n e r a l M oto rs, w h ere he had been gen eral m anager o f the R esearch L aboratories, had clashed o v e r federal patent p o lic y w ith the Justice D ep artm en t, H a r o ld Sm ith, and D e m o cra tic Senator H a r le y M . K ilg o r e o f W e s t V irg in ia . Sm ith and K ilg o r e especially ad v o ca te d a departure from previous p o lic y in o rd er to assure th at research sponsored b y go ve rn m e n t fun ds w o u ld be free fro m paten t restrictions. Bush and K e tte r in g con sidered the existing patent system essential as an in cen tive to private organizations en g ag ed in go vern m en t research. T h e P aten t O ffic e la y w ith in the C o m m e rce D ep artm en t, w h ere W a lla c e , eager fo r p aten t reform , had created a co m m ittee on the problem w ith D avis as its chairm an. a W a lt o n H . H a m ilto n , Y a le la w professor, on e-tim e m em ber o f the N a tio n a l R e c o v e r y A d m in istration B oard , au th or o f m a n y b oo ks ab o u t antitrust la w in clu d in g Patents and exp ert in p a ten t la w .
Free Enterprise
(1 9 4 1 ); and H o u sto n
K e n y o n , also an
* Aalai E. Stevenson, w ho had served under W allace in the Department of Agriculture, was a special assistant to the Secretary of State and a member of the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference. H e was upset over Stettinius’ decision to press for the admission of Argentina to the United Nations. T hat decision had broad ramifications. Truman had approved the Soviet demand to seat W hite Russia and the Ukraine. T h e Latin American nations, whose votes were needed for that purpose, insisted in return on the admission of Argentina. M olotov protested on die ground that the conference had refused to admit Poland under the Lublin government and yet was accept ing Argentina, a fascist country that had not fought against the Axis. T h e Executive Committee voted unanimously to seat the Soviet Republics and divided, 9 to 3 with 2 abstentions, in favor of Argentina. A t the plenary session M olotov challenged that outcome, but Argentina was admitted by a vote of 32 to 4, with 10 abstentions. Stettinius and Rockefeller mustered the Latin Ameri cans for that vote, an action that Stevenson and others considered a moral defeat for the United Sates.
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Stevenson’s statement was that we had definitely entered an era o f power politics with the United States on one side and Russia on the other. As Stevenson put it, Russia will look at the United States and say, “There is the United States with tw enty American republics plus Liberia plus the Philippines, representing a total of twenty-three votes in the Assembly. Add in the other Latin nations and the British Com monwealth and where does it leave Russia?” Stevenson said that under such circumstances the Russians necessarily would tend to play their own game, not trusting the world organization. T h e y would see them selves outvoted again and again in the Assembly. I must confess that Stevenson’s analysis of San Francisco made me feel very much de pressed concerning a constructive outcome on behalf o f world peace. It begins to look like he is right in suggesting that we are entering an era of power politics rather than world organization. O f course the superficial appearances may indicate to the contrary.
M AY
4, 1945
. . . A t cabinet meeting President Truman opened up b y calling attention to President Roosevelt’s orders with regard to not engaging in interdepartmental fights. He was very vigorous, decisive, and hardboiled in presenting his viewpoint, saying there was nothing which had happened but that he was saying this merely to prevent interdepart mental difficulties from breaking into the papers in the future. Undersecretary G rew stated that he had just talked with Secretary Stettinius and that everything was going along very well at San Fran cisco. The most significant thing at cabinet meeting came when Presi dent Truman told G rew and Ickes to go ahead and take possession in the name of the United States o f the continental shelf out from the shores of the United States beginning at low tide.1 This means that Ed Pauley has lost out. Ed Pauley had tried at various times practically to bribe Ickes on this matter for the sake o f the oil industry in Cali fornia. This is an indication that the new President will not fall for some of the obvious machinations concerning which many people feared at the time when they saw Pauley for such a long time in T ru man’s car on the funeral train coming back from H yde Park . . . Truman’s decisiveness is admirable. T he only question is as to 1 T h e tidewater areas were rich in oil along the G u lf and Pacific coasts. T h e Eisenhower administration later delighted the oil industry by turning control of the tidewater beds over to the states whose coastlines adjoined them. Most of the states then welcomed the oil companies into the fields.
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whether he has enough information behind his decisiveness to enable his decisions to stand up. Thus far I would say the evidence would indicate a net plus on small things and even on medium-sized things. T he query is as to whether his decisions in the international field have been wise. On the whole it seems to me that his attitudes have been such as to increase the liability of disagreement with Russia. In this connection the June 24, 1941, N ew Y ork Tim es story may furnish the key to his fundamental slant. According to this story Truman said, tw o days after Russia was invaded b y Germany, “ If w e see that G er many is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany. And that w ay let them kill as many as pos sible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any cir cumstances. Neither o f them think anything of their pledged word.” The fear I have is that his instinctive attitude toward Russia may prevent Russia from coming into the war at the right time against Japan. Russia, in view o f the attitude w e are now taking, may reach the conclusion that it is desirable to see as many Americans and Japa nese killed as possible. President Truman asked me to remain after cabinet meeting. He wanted to talk about patents. W ill Davis and the A ttorney General also remained. Truman indicated he had read m y Reader’s Digest ar ticle and that he agreed with it. H e said he thought the great difficulty with patents was in the contracts. I asked him if this meant that he thought there should be no new patent legislation. A t first he didn’t seem to be altogether clear on this point. A s we discussed the matter he agreed to the idea that w e should get a report to him b y the middle of June. Vinson interjected, saying that the present patent laws were very contradictory and that it was time they were straightened out. Davis spoke very highly of Conway Coe, the present Commissioner of Pat ents,1 and the President concurred. T he Attorney General questioned whether Coe was quite such a good man. I pointed out that Coe had offered his resignation to President Roosevelt. Truman said he hadn’t seen it. Davis said Coe was one o f the best Commisisoners of Patents the Department had ever had. I referred to the fact that the House Patent Committee had been in to see the President and asked if that had in any w ay changed the directions the President wanted to give us. He said no; that he still felt like he had always felt and that he thought my ideas were exactly the same as his. I then mentioned that Harold Smith had talked to me about scientific research and governmental patents and asked him if he wanted our committee to go ahead and 1 Conway Coe resigned later in the month.
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look into this question o f governmental research and governmental patents after w e had finished up with the w ork on patents legislation. H e said yes, to go ahead. I told him I thought the matter was very im portant because w e had to get into this problem in order to keep up with England and Russia. T he President said w e ought not only to keep up with England and Russia but w e ought to be ten years ahead o f them. I said I thought the greatest shortcoming o f the N ew Deal was that it did not back scientific research the w ay it should have. T h e President mentioned that Harold Smith had talked to him about this problem that morning. Fred Vinson also spoke up and said that Harold Smith had talked to him. Spruille Braden1 was exceedingly vigorous in his statements about actions of dictators in South America. He said Batista3 had grafted to the extent o f about $ 2 0 million in Cuba and his w ife had another $ 1 0 million or so. He said he had come to this country and hired a pub licity agent and was going around making talks trying to impress peo ple with his liberalism. H e said that Grau San Martin was honest and a liberal but rather impractical. He told about the coup the Cuban army had tried to stage to prevent the election o f Grau San Martin. Apparently Spruille Braden himself b y the action he took was responsible for the victory o f Grau San Martin in the last Cuban election. Braden also paid his respects very vigorously to Dictator Trujillo* in Santo Domingo and Somoza4 in Nicaragua. He said the United States had a lot to answer for in the w ay it played ball with the dicta tors. I was more impressed with Spruille Braden than I had ever been before. He is going to move cautiously in Argentina but it is obvious to me that he is going to throw his full weight on the side o f democracy in the hemisphere . . . m ay
5,1945
. . . Tim Campbell* told me a most interesting story o f the visit he had had with the colored people on the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Bel1 Spruille Braden, American ambassador to Argentina, former ambassador to Colombia and to Cuba. 3 Colonel Fulgencio Batista, elected president o f Cuba in 1940, lost his campaign {ox re-election in 1944 to Ramön Grau San Martin. Batista regained power in a coup d’état in 1951 and held it until Fidel Castro overthrew him in 1959. * Rafael Leonidas Trujillo had controlled the Dominican Republic since 1930. 4 Anastasio Som oza, president and d ictato r o f V e n ezu ela sin ce 1937.
* Tim othy M. Campbell of the Tuskegee Institute, also an Extension Field Agent o f the Department o f Agriculture.
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gian Congo, and various other spots in Africa. H e says die British attitude toward the colored people in A frica is rather better than the American attitude toward the colored people in the United States. T h e economic condition o f the colored people, o f course, is very bad. H e thinks the British have consciously prevented the N egro people from learning up-to-date methods o f taking care o f their crops. H e had a number o f very interesting pictures. T im Campbell, w ho is a colored man, himself, thinks there is marvelous opportunity for agricultural extension in Africa. A t the Pinchots’ were present three members o f die French under ground, one a girl o f about tw enty-four w ho had gone back and forth between England and France under the most trying conditions. On her return trip to France she usually parachuted at night, sometimes landing in the top o f trees. T he three different members o f the French underground all had the same attitude w ith regard to Germ any but their attitude with regard to the French collaborationists differed gready. A fter listening to them I couldn’t help thinking that France was going to be the same divided, inefficient, rather decadent country in the future that she has been in the past. T h e individual French are very attractive but the nation is trying to sit on tw o or three different stools at the same time. It doesn’t know where it is going and it can’t find out.
m ay
6 ,19 4 5
A t the picnic at the Burlings'1 on Sunday several people spoke in horrified tones o f Russia and especially o f die disappearance o f the sixteen members o f the Polish underground. More and more it begins to look like the psychology is favorable toward our getting into war with Russia. This must not be. It seems incredible that our people should drift toward this whirlpool which will inevitably end in world communism. Am ong those present at the Burlings’ picnic were W ill Clayton and Robert H . Brand, w ho used to be with the British Food Mission but who now is head o f the United Kingdom Treasury Delega tion. I mentioned about how tight the food situation would be and how important I thought it was for us to re-examine it to see whether w e couldn’t increase the amount o f food w e would send to Europe. Brand said he thought this was a very important thing to do; otherwise, the European countries would go communistic. 1 Edward B. Burling was a leading Washington lawyer and a partner in the city’s best-known law firm, Covington, Barling, Rublee and Achcson.
T he Price o f Vision
444 m ay
7 ,19 4 5
. . . Harold Young brought in Creekmore Fath.1 Creekmore re ported that when Nelson Rockefeller was recently back here for a few days, justifying his budget with the subcommittee o f the Appropri ations Committee under Louis Rabaut,* he insisted that the full com mittee be called together and also any members o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who might be in town. A fter this dramatic move, according to Creekmore Fath, Rockefeller laid before the group his need for having three or four million dollars for w ork in the hemisphere so that the hemisphere might present a solid front against Soviet Rus sia. He prided himself that Argentina was now in the hemisphere bloc and claimed that Argentina was especially important because Argen tina had the most determined attitude o f all against Russia. I would have been inclined to question this statement o f Fath’s except for the fact that it agreed in considerable measure with a story told me b y Adlai Stevenson. Apparently Rockefeller, in his vigorous endeavor to get hemispheric unity, is bent on provoking the type o f w orld disunity which will inevitably produce war. Fath thought the information was so important that it should be gotten to President Truman. I told him that I didn’t feel disposed to take the initiative in the matter. H e then said, “ H ow about H arry Hopkins getting into it?” and mentioned that D ick Gilbert* was close to H arry Hopkins. I then said, “ I will put you in touch with D ick Gilbert and you can pass the story on to him.” Fath spoke at some little length about the speed at which Colonel Donovan’s outfit is growing reactionary. It seems that the few liberals which the President put in OSS are being let out as o f June first. I asked Fath how he managed to survive so long in OSS and he said it was because the President sent a letter over to Donovan placing him there. Both Fath and his immediate superior, M r. Muehle, are being let out as o f June first. Donovan is pushing full steam ahead with his plan for having an integration of international intelligence services under his direction.1*3 4 1 Creekmore Fath, a friend o f W allace’s, at this time on the staff o f the Office o f Strategic Services. 3 Louis C. Rabaut, Democratic congressman from Michigan since 1935, member o f the House Committee on Appropriations and chairman o f the subcommittee for the Departments of State, Commerce, and Justice. 3 Richard V . Gilbert, an economist, who had assisted H arry Hopkins while he was Secretary of Commerce, had worked with the O P A during the war. H e arranged an appointment for Fath with Hopkins. * T h e National Intelligence Authority was established in January 1946 and sue-
Into the Cold War This has in it many dangerous implications. I can’t believe that A rm y, Treasury, N avy, F E A , and Commerce will agree to it. It that last October when Colonel Donovan pushed the President move o f this kind the President told him that he should first get ance from the agencies I have just mentioned . . .
m ay
44 5
State, seems for a clear
8,1945
W e arrived at 8:15 at the W hite House, stood around in the Cabinet Room for ten or fifteen minutes, and then went into the Press Room where the President held a press conference which consisted in read ing to the press the statement he gave later over the radio.*1 Then we went down to the Radio Room, where we listened to the President’s speech and, follow ing that, the speech o f the Prime Minister. A t die conclusion, the President said he would like to talk to me about the problem o f handling social security to take care o f workers w ho lost their jobs between V -E D ay and V -J Day. I asked him if he wanted me to stay then or to come in later. H e suggested that I come back later . . . Eberstadt came in to talk about investment policies. H e said if w e are going to have the maximum flow o f private investment it would be necessary to speed up the processes in the Securities and Exchange Commission. I . . . said w e would look into it. Bill Wasserman came in w ith the flat statement that our relationship with Russia was never worse, and that Stettinius and Averell Harriman had handled the situation in a very bad w ay in San Francisco; that w e are headed straight for w ar with Russia, and w e must do something very concrete and definite about it. H e thought I should sell the President on the idea o f me, myself, going to Russia as head of a commercial mis sion with very prominent names from General Electric, Westinghouse, U.S. Steel, the House o f Morgan, etc., going along with me, and com ing back from Russia with a big volume o f orders and a plan for im porting large quantities o f goods from Russia . . .
may
9,1945
. . . W ith the President . . . I said the Department o f Commerce was not reaching out to get any function belonging to any other ceeded in July 1947 b y the Central Intelligence A gency. T h e latter office, unlike the former, was organized along the lines Donovan had recommended. 1 Announcing victory in Europe.
4+6
T he Price o f Vision
agency bnt that I realized that sooner or later the question o f export controls would probably be coming to the department and that w e did believe the question o f controlling the volume o f exports had a pronounced bearing on full employment, on the one hand, and taking adequate care of the domestic consumer on the other. T h e President was very emphatic in saying that he thought export controls ought to be in the Department of Commerce. T he President was delighted to know the Census Bureau was in shape to furnish monthly data on a sample basis on unemployment. H e also indicated that he was much interested in the presentation which Bailey o f Arkansas had made to him with regard to patents and monopoly. O n everything he seemed to take the right slant; so much so, that I was moved to say that I hadn’t yet found anything concern ing which I had disagreed with him. H e is definitely liberal on the patent thing. W hen I told the President that the first and all-important thing in determining what might be needed in the w ay o f unemployment bene fits to tide the workers over the prospective period o f unemployment was to get from the A rm y their real ideas as to the cutback, he said he agreed with me. I said I saw according to the morning paper that the A rm y estimates an expenditure o f 52 billion dollars for munitions this year as compared to 58 billion last year. I said m y guess would be that they would actually spend around 37 or 38 billion dollars. He said his estimate would be around 35 billion dollars. I said I thought he ought to get from the A rm y, not for publication but for his own in formation, their true estimate as to what their expenditures would actually be. H e said he was going to get it. He said I knew how he felt w ith regard to the danger o f too much domination b y the mili tary . . . m ay
10 ,19 4 5
. . . A t the Symington dinner . . . I told them1 that none o f their plans were any good unless w e could be sure o f peace between the United States and Russia; that at present it looked like the United States was getting ready to embark on an era o f power politics and imperialism in international affairs. Senator Morse2 spoke up very vigorously to say that in the cloak1 A group o f men from the National Planning Association were preparing for a meeting o f that enlightened, private organization later in M ay, at which they expected to announce comprehensive plans for an expanding economy. 3 W ayne L. Morse, then stul a Republican, had just begun, his long tenure as senator from Oregon.
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rooms on the H ill there was an immense amount o f anti-Russian talk. Holme1 said that General Electric had already sold to the Russians equipment to take care o f nine units of the Dneprostroi dam. In the first dam General Electric had equipped five o f the units and the Rus sian government had equipped four. General Electric apparently feels very proud that it has been called on to do the whole job this time. I suggested it might be a good thing if the top men from General Electric, Westinghouse, United States Steel, J. P. Morgan, etc., would go to Russia and come back w ith orders and also w ith a plan regard ing the imports w e would be willing to accept from Russia. I said a tangible action o f this sort would mean more than a thousand speeches.
m ay
12 ,19 4 5
. . . A t the luncheon, Don Nelson spent all his time talking about Russia. H e said the w ay w e were going w e would certainly have war with Russia, and there was absolutely no need o f it. H e said he knew exactly how the trouble arose. It appears he put the responsibility chiefly on Averell Harriman. H e said that A verell last August began with his policy o f getting tough with Russia. Don said that Averell really knew nothing about Russia, that he didn’t know the Russians, that Russia could get along all right without us, and that our methods o f dealing with Russia were just no good—they were not factual. He also said that there was a faction in the A rm y that was looking toward war with Russia. H e said this also was utterly foolish—that the Russian A rm y was better than our A rm y because die Russian soldiers would put up with more hardship; that they were more flexible and more in genious. Don also spoke about Ed Stettinius going along w ith Averell Harriman. . . . Don said Averell Harriman was an aw fully nice fellow. I said, "A nd so are Ed Stettinius and Nelson Rockefeller.” Don said that Averell Harriman, in a press conference at which W alter Lippmann and R ay mond Gram Sw ing1 had been present, had said, "T h e aims and purposes o f the United States are irreconcilable with those o f Russia.” A ccord ing to Don, Ed Stettinius, in a press conference at San Francisco, after the seating o f Argentina, spoke o f our gaining a "victory over Russia.” Nelson really felt very strongly with regard to both Stettinius and Harriman—feeling that while they were both exceedingly pleasant peo ple and well-meaning people, ye t their ignorance was such as to make them v e ry dangerous to the peace o f the world at the present time. 1 Stanley Holme, a General Electric executive. * Raymond Gram Swing, die notable radio commentator on foreign affairs.
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T he Price o f Vision
He felt that unwittingly they had taken a stand at San Francisco which was leading us toward a conflict with Russia. He said he hoped to see the President early next week, and that he had a memorandum worked out which he would leave with the Presi dent, concerning the kind of trade we might have with Russia. H e thinks that President Truman might have the same interest in this which Roosevelt had had, and it might be possible with Truman to prevent Harriman from blocking things . . .
m ay
16,1945
. . . Anna Boettiger told o f the meeting she had had that after noon with President Truman. She said that Truman said that all his advisers had urged him to be hard with the Russians. I said to Anna Boettiger, “ H ow does the President feel this has worked out?” Anna Boettiger said the President now feels that it was a mistake. This means to me that Don Nelson had a very deep effect on President Truman. Elliott Roosevelt claimed that our bombing in Germany had caused three or four million German civilians to lose their lives. Everyone else questioned Elliott’s figures. Elliott claimed that our objective in Japan should be to keep on bombing until w e have destroyed about half the Japanese civilian population. John Boettiger still clings to the idea o f an early and an appeasing peace with Japan. Anna Boettiger feels that one o f the great contributions b y her fa ther was holding relationships with Russia on a constructive and stable basis. It was obvious she feels the new President has not done well on this front. Grace T u lly, when she was talking to me alone, kept saying again and again, “ I just can’t call that man President.”
M A Y 17 , 1945
. . . A t the Russian reception there were almost no high-ranking Americans. T he Russian personnel also had changed. T he whole at mosphere reminded me somewhat o f that which existed back in 1940, when Russia was so unpopular in the United States. Madame G rom yko expressed to me the most vigorous opinion that everything depended on me to maintain friendly relationships between Russia and the United States. I told her I would do everything I could.
Into the Cold War
449
A t m y sister M ary’s were Henry Morgenthau and Senator Aiken.1 Secretary Morgenthau held forth very vigorously on the idea that it meant a great deal to the United States to get Russia into the war so as to clean up Japan quickly. He took very strong issue with those who play up minor points to stir up discord between the United States and Russia. M y brother-in-law and sister took a slightly anti-Russian bias. H enry Morgenthau told me again how happy he was that he had had the privilege o f spending the evening o f A pril 11 with the Presi dent—the last evening the President was alive. He said the President was in the best o f spirits; that he ate very heavily, especially of some caviar which had been given him; that he drank tw o cocktails. T he President’s mental processes were exceedingly clear. T h e only thing which disturbed H enry was that the President was unable to pour accurately from the cocktail shaker into the glass and H enry had to do the pouring for him . . . m ay
18,1945
. . . T h e cabinet meeting was very routine. Francis Biddle indi cated he thought the government would lose the M ontgom ery-W ard case in the lower court. T he President came out flat for carrying it up to the Supreme Court.2 Biddle said he thought it might be serious if w e lost it in the Supreme Court because it would undermine the President’s power in time o f war. Vinson said in any event he thought the President ought to know just how much power he had in time of war. And so it was Vinson and Truman against Biddle. It seemed to me rather obvious that Truman wasn’t too enthusiastic about Biddle. Bob Patterson dwelt at some length on the very high qualities o f the American soldier and the American A rm y in Europe. He said they had made an extraordinary record and had just reached the peak o f their striking power when the European war ended. I mentioned in cabinet that the Business Research and Statistics boys in the Department of Commerce figured that by 1947 the total output 1 George D . Aiken, internationalist Republican senator from Verm ont since 1941. 3 Roosevelt had taken over Montgomery W ard first in A pril and again in Decem ber 1944 because the company’s and-union president, Sewell L. A very, had refused to comply with orders of the W a r Labor Board. In January 1945 a United States District Judge disallowed the seizure but permitted the govern ment to retain control pending appeal. B y a vote of z to 1 the Circuit Court ruled that the W a r Labor Disputes A c t authorized the seizure. A fter Mont gomery W ard appealed to the Supreme Court, the government withdrew. In October A very returned and resumed his fight against the union.
4JO
T h e Price o f Vision
o f goods and services in the United States would be about 40 billion less than for the year 1944, and that this would mean something in the neighborhood o f 7 million unemployed. I said the boys in die Depart ment o f Commerce figured this was not too disturbing a situation. I said I thought it was pretty disturbing. General Fleming1 said he thought it was very disturbing. T he President said he felt that w ay about it, too. H e said he hoped I was w orking on the problem and that he knew I was. I said I hoped that it would be possible for our boys to get together with Bob Nathan and then perhaps at some future date w e could make a presentation o f the nature o f the problem to the cabinet. I then w ent on to mention the fact that there w ere exchange con trols in thirteen o f the Latin American countries and that these con trols were used in considerable extent to make sure there was an excess o f exports over imports; that this was a matter which interfered with free movement o f trade. T h e President indicated that in future cabinet meetings he would bring up particular subjects for discussion in order to get the judg ment o f the various members o f the cabinet. He said he would have done that before this but had been so pushed b y a variety o f things that he had been unable to do so; that he had found that a lot o f matters had not been handled during the months prior to die President’s death because the President had not been in good health at the time. A t the close o f cabinet meeting I told the President that at the Spanish lunch which I attended every Friday one of the members had called m y attention in Spanish to the article in the N e w Y ork Tim es indicating that the United States, Britain, and France were lined up against Russia and China. T he President mentioned how sorry he was that he couldn’t speak Spanish and then went on to say the Russian situation was causing him a lot o f concern. I said there was just one point I wanted to make and that was I hoped he would not accept the representations made to him b y the State Department without looking at them twice. He said he had no confidence in the State Department whatsoever and that he was going to get new leadership as soon as pos sible. He said as soon as he got new leadership in the State Department and Labor Department he thought w e would have a fine team. H e said there might be one or tw o other little changes that ought to be made. I suspect he was thinking about Francis Biddle. H e said he hadn’t told anybody else about his plan for reorganizing the State Department. 1 M ajor General Philip B. Fleming, since 1941 Federal W orks Administrator.
Into the Cold War
45*
He said that President Roosevelt had obviously been sick for the last month o f his life; that there were a number o f wires from Stalin which had not been answered. He said the Russians had not kept their agreements which they made at Yalta.1 He said they had put the sixteen Poles in jail. I said I had heard that the sixeen Poles had been killed. He said that wasn't true; that there was one general who had been killed but the other fifteen were alive. T h e President said that all o f his wires to Stalin had been couched in the most friendly language. He also said that Russia would not let us send people in to Rumania, Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, and Berlin. I couldn’t quite understand this because it is m y understanding that w e already have people in some o f these places or soon will have. T h e President said the Russians were like people from across the tracks whose manners were very bad. He said, however, that his one objective was to be sure to get the Russians into the Japanese war so as to save the lives of 100,000 American boys. Apparently, Lend-Lease is still being continued to Russia9 via Vladivostok or Magodan. M y guess is that it would have to be via Magodan because the Japanese surely would not let further supplies through to Vladivostok. T h e President said his great fear was that one o f the Russian generals would take over, acting like a Napoleon. It seemed to me that Truman was still committed to the doctrine o f acting tough with Russia and that neither Don Nelson nor Anna Boettiger had as much o f an effect on his mind as they thought. 1 A t Yalta Roosevelt and Churchill had rejected Stalin’s proposal for recognition of the Lublin government, then in power in W arsaw. A fter lengthy discus sions, the three agreed instead on a reorganization of the Polish government to include noncommunist leaders. T h e reorganized government was then to hold free elections. Most London Poles denounced the agreement and declined to participate with the W arsaw Poles in forming the proposed new government. T h e Russians refused to accept the credentials of still other noncommunists. Further, Moscow negotiated a mutual assistance treaty with the W arsaw govern ment, and turned over to that government the administration of Danzig and parts of Silesia which Germany had held before the war. T h e Russians also imprisoned sixteen leaders o f the Polish underground who had fought the Germans during the abortive W arsaw uprising. B y mid-May 1945 those de velopments had made Poland a major issue of controversy between the United States and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. T h ey had also provoked the unprecedented and severe scolding that Truman had given Molotov in Washington on April 23, 1945. * Pursuant to the instructions in the Lend-Lease A c t of April 1945, Truman had cut oif Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union on M ay 8, with the end of the war in Europe. T he abruptness of his order, as well as the cessation o f American support, angered Stalin, who interpreted the move as hostile. T h e United States did continue some shipments to Siberia, as it had promised to do, to assist the build-up there for Stalin’s promised entry into the war against Japan.
T he Price o f Vision
45*
In the talk I had with the President after cabinet meeting he made it very clear that he felt that during the time when he was V ice President, President Roosevelt had not taken him into his confidence about anything. He., said rather plaintively, “T h e y didn’t tell me any thing about what was going on.” Joe G uffey came in to say that Averell Harriman had been up meeting with the senators at lunch and that he had made a very favorable impression. Harriman among other things made it clear that Russia would not fight. Apparently, the tough doctrine that Harriman has sold to the President is based on Harriman’s belief that the Russians will not fight . . .
m ay
22,1945
. . . A t the W hite House, the President immediately signed a pro posal that would give the Coast and Geodetic Survey the right to go ahead preparing charts for civil aviation.1 T h e A rm y A ir Force has been trying to take this right away from the Coast and Geodetic Survey. The President made it clear that General Marshall agrees with him entirely that in time o f piece the A rm y should not get into certain functions which definitely are civilian functions. T h e President also made it clear that the Services of Supply, in other words, General Somervell, does not have this idea. In other words, the President feels that Marshall is right, but that Generals Arnold and Somervell are wrong in their slant with regard to certain problems involving civilian life. T he President said he knew that I knew how he felt about these matters when he was in the Senate. I told him about our visit to Langley Field the day before, and he told about his visit there a couple of years ago. W e had a little talk about the early history o f the N A C A —how it started on such a modest scale with only a five-thousanddollar appropriation in 1915 and o f the very significant service it had rendered to the war effort, in the development o f different types o f planes.12 I suggested that this same approach might be used with regard 1 The Coast and Geodetic Survey was under the Commerce Department. 2 T h e National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, established b y Congress in 1915, was composed during W orld W ar II of both military and civilian mem bers appointed by the President. Its successive wartime chairmen were Vannevar Bush and Jerome C. Hunsaker. T h ey directed the committee’s fundamental research, its primary responsibility. T h e armed forces incorporated in American military aircraft virtually all of the designs the committee developed.
Into the C old War
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to developing other scientific programs. T he President said he thought there were many government agencies involved in this. I said it should not be left with the A rm y and N avy; that there was one project which I could think o f (I could tell from a little exclamation which he made that he knew exactly what project I referred to) that should not be left with the A rm y because it had such profound peacetime implica tions. T h e President asked how everything was getting along over at Commerce. I said very well, but I thought the day was not far distant when w e should get to w ork in more clear-cut fashion on the unem ployment problem. I said it was going to be necessary sometime within the next thirty days or so to assign certain responsibilities more defi nitely. T h e President said he recognized that, and he wanted to have a straight line flow of responsibility where there would be no oppor tunity for conflict between agencies . . . Ralph Ingersoll is a Lt. Colonel and has been serving on General Bradley’s staff. General Bradley is a great hero to him. He thinks Bradley is much better than Eisenhower. He says Eisenhower caters continually to the British, and that the British picked him with that in mind. For example, he said that under the Yalta Agreement the Ameri can troops were never supposed to be at the Elbe; that they were sup posed to be about 50 miles further west. Churchill, however, had a conference, face to face, with Eisenhower and Bradley and suggested that the American troops stay 50 miles further east than they were supposed to. Churchill’s argument was if the troops would stay this much further east the British and Americans under the doctrine of possession being nine points of the law would have «a bargaining point with the Russians. It sounds to me like this is where a large part o f our trouble with the Russians may have originated. Churchill was using the Americans as a spear-point with which to needle the Russians . . .
m ay
29,1945
W hen I went in to see the President I said I thought Stettinius had made an excellent speech last night. T h e President said he thought so, too. I commented that it seemed to me very important for the world to look on the President not as a spokesman for Anglo-Saxondom or for Pan-Americanism. He said he felt that w ay very strongly and that he was glad Stettinius had put Argentina in her place in his speech last night. He said Stettinius had conferred with Hull on that section o f his speech.
454
TA* Price o f Vision
I said the world was hungry fo r leadership and Stalin couldn't fur nish w orld leadership because the Latin nations and China, as well as England, distrust him; that Churchill couldn't furnish it because Russia, China, and many o f the so-called “subject” peoples distrust him. I said it was important for the President to get into the position of being a moderator because in China w e stood better than either the British or the Russians and in Latin America w e stood better than the British. M any o f the so-called “ subject” peoples look to us. T h e President said that he agreed. W hen the President started reading m y Churchman A w ard speech1 he stopped at the sentence where I said no President had done so much to promote good w ill as President Roosevelt, and said, “ And that is right.” W hen I came to the sentence saying, “ 1 am satisfied this is the policy of President Truman,” he said, “ It is.” I then suggested that I change die sentence to read, “ I know this is the policy o f President Truman.” H e liked the stronger statement. Again, in the follow ing paragraph where I said, “ President Trum an is follow ing die Roosevelt policy," he said, “ I certainly am. I have conferred with all w ho knew anything about his policy, including the immediate members o f his family, and I am doing everything I can to carry it out.” I there fore suggested changing the sentence to read, “President Truman is follow ing the Roosevelt policy to the letter.” H e liked this change. W hen 1 came to the religious note in the third to the last paragraph he said, “ It is right to say that abundance is not enough and peace is not enough.” I said that I would be glad to m odify the speech in any w a y that would be more helpful. H e said he thought it was fine the w a y it was and he would stand behind me on it. I called his especial attention to the statement that Roosevelt could still say today, as he did three years ago, “T h e road ahead is dark and perilous.” I said that since Stettinius’ speech o f last night I felt that the road ahead looked much brighter than it had previously. Truman said, “ N o, you were right the w ay you had it. T h e road ahead is still dark and perilous. There still are many enemies o f the peace.” H e made special reference to Bob T aft, w ho apparently has broken his truce with Truman and Truman resents it. Truman said that b y sending H arry Hopkins to M oscow he had straightened out a fundamental misconception o f Stalin and that Stalin was going to come along all right now.1 1 O n M ay 28 W allace was officially voted the Churchman A w ard o f the Protes tant Episcopal Church for his constructive role in international relations. H e accepted the award in a speech on June 4. 3 A t the ulying o f Bohlen and Harriman, Truman had sent Hopkins to Moscow to talk directly with Stalin about the growing problems in Rossian-American
Into the C old W ar
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I called his attention to the part o f m y speech where I said, "T h e United States is the great world leader o f political democracy based on freedom o f religion, freedom o f information, freedom o f expression, and the right o f small nations to separate existence.” I said the phrase, “the right of small nations to separate existence” might be interpreted as a poke at the Russians. H e said, “N o , that is all right to say. I also am going to take a little poke at the Russians when I speak out in San Francisco.” It was obvious, however, that Trum an now feels much more kindly toward die Russians than he did before. Apparently, H arry Hopkins has been really helpful in Moscow. I called his attention to the sentence where I said, "Roosevelt was willing to give up a little sovereignty for a lot o f peace.” Truman liked that sentence. I told him a little about the background o f the Churchman A w ard and said that I had hesitated to take on awards o f this sort since die war was on. H e said I shouldn't be; that no one deserved an award o f this kind more than I, myself. Truman said he realized that our relationship w ith Russia had to be solved before w e could go ahead with satisfactory planning o f domestic affairs. H e also mentioned that he had refused several times to meet w ith Churchill because he felt he ought to meet w ith Stalin first. W e talked briefly about the time when Schwellenbach, Vinson, and I would get together with certain technicians and arrive at a funda mental policy with regard to the full employment problem. H e thought w e ought to w ait until Schwellenbach was confirmed . . . m ay
30,1945
. . . Charlie Ross1 . . . said w ith m y permission he would tell President Truman that I had ’phoned him and that I concurred in the suggestion that it would be w ell for die President in closing the con ference at San Francisco to make a strong, courageous statement in support o f the economic and social, as w ell as the political, objectives o f the Charter. Ross said his ow n feelings ran in exacdy the same direction as mine. relations. Bohlen and Harriman accompanied him on the trip and at his meet ings with Stalin and Molotov. Emphasizing American good will toward die Soviet Union, Hopkins raised cjuestions about Lend-Lease, Poland, Argentina, Soviet participation in the Pacific war, and Allied policy toward Germany. T h e y also discussed the forthcoming meeting o f Truman, Stalin, and Churchill at Potsdam. Though nothing was settled, Stalin and Hopkins got along well, and early in June Hopkins left encouraged; see Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and H opkins (rev. ed., N ew York, 1950), pp. 885-916. 1 Charles G . Ross, Truman's press secretary.
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The Price o f Vision
MAY 31, 1945
. . . Cordell Hull had apparently gained about fifteen pounds. He was a little pale but his mind was functioning clearly. He was very disdainful of the w ay in which “ Little Rockiefeller” had handled the Argentine situation. He indicated that Rockefeller from the very time he got in as Assistant Secretary, had gone out of his w ay to appease Argentina. He referred to Avra W arren1 with the same disgust. He spoke in the very highest terms o f Pasvolsky and Jimmie Dunn. I judge he gets his information from them and from tw o or three others who visit him quite continuously. He indicated that he wanted the Presi dent to take Jimmie Dunn and Pasvolsky to Yalta and apparently he was very much disappointed when the President didn’t take them. His mind went back to the Atlantic Charter meeting in August o f 1941 when the President took Sumner Welles. His hatred for Sumner Welles remains as deep as ever. He says he is not honest. Cordell Hull spoke about how he and Roosevelt had the same ideals but oftentimes the President took hasty action which Hull had to patch up. A t the time o f the Atlantic Charter meeting, for example, Churchill sold the President on the idea of taking very decisive action against Japan. Hull said this was all very well and good for the British be cause they had neither military nor naval strength in the Pacific. Strong action against Japan would mean that the United States would have to carry the load all by herself. W hen W elles returned to Washing ton, therefore, wanting to get out within a few hours a strong state ment against Japan, Hull would not permit it. He pigenholed the proposal which President Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed on. Cordell referred at some little length to the unwise action which the President and Henry Morgenthau had initiated at Quebec. He said that Henry Morgenthau and the President had agreed to let England have three billion dollars under Lend-Lease for postwar construction purposes and three billion dollars for certain other purposes without exacting any quid pro quo.3 Apparently Cordell took a great deal o f pride in having upset this agreement. 1 Avra M. W arren, foreign service officer, in 1945 director o f the Office of American Republic Affairs in the State Department. 9 T h e Quebec agreements, less precise by far than Hull suggested, did provide for diminished American Lend-Lease to Great Britain during Phase II, the period from the German surrender to the end of the war against Japan, and for probable but still smaller American aid thereafter. Details for both periods needed careful working out in Anglo-American negotiations, which in the end made no provision for the latter period. In some respects, the Quebec assur ances about Lend-Lease explained Churchill’s temporary endorsement o f the
Into the Cold War
457
He then dealt at some length on how he had tried to take foreign policy out o f the political campaign in the fall of 1944. He mentioned how he had had Dulles down to talk with him hour after hour. He told how he had worked himself completely out and then, when he had gotten so low that he felt he couldn’t go along, the President came out to see him to try to persuade him that he shouldn’t resign. Cordell said the President remained with him for an hour and forty minutes and that he felt like he was practically dead when the argument began and he felt like he was really dead when the argument ended; that then the President send Admiral M clntire*1 out to argue with him and he argued for forty minutes. He called the Argentine government all kinds o f names and referred to the w ay in which they had cooperated with Hitler and the Nazi methods which they had used inside their own country. He said no wonder the Russians reacted the w ay they did when w e took up the cause o f the Argentines . . . Hull said Truman had gotten along pretty well so far but that he had not got out into deep water yet. It is obvious that Hull feels Truman is pretty ignorant o f foreign affairs. JUNE I, 1945
. . . A t the cabinet meeting, which lasted only half an hour, only tw o significant things took place. First, Henry Morgenthau took a pot shot at W P B for breaking that that there would be 1,800,000 unem ployed at the end o f the year. He said he didn’t think anyone knew how many would be unemployed a year hence and that such state ments were bad for the bond drive. Jim Forrestal spoke up and said he thought there would be few er people unemployed tw o years hence than there are today. Paul M cN utt spoke up and said that there would be no unemployment at any time in the next ten years. I then suggested that it would be wise to take another look at the situation after the bond drive was over. A t the close o f the cabinet meeting, Ickes, Biddle, and I were stand ing together waiting for our cars and laughingly said how fine it would be if there would be no unemployment. W e thought it amusing to see the Democrats engaging in the same Pollyannish performance as Morgenthau Plan for Germany. It was that plan, not the Lend-Lease agree ments, that H ull successfully attacked after the conference; see Blum, Years of War, pp. 316-414. 1 Admiral Ross T . Mclntire, W hite House physician (1933-45).
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The Price e f Vision
the Republicans, refusing to admit the truth o f a prospective situation for fear it might interfere with some particular project. A t the con clusion o f the unemployment discussion, President Truman made a statement indicating that he wanted no public statement w ith regard to die extent o f prospective unemployment. H e was very incisive and hard-boiled about it. This tendency toward an incisive and hard-boiled attitude has its advantages but sooner or later it w ill result in obscuring the truth and then there w ill be trouble. Ickes mentioned in cabinet meeting that there was still extensive un employment in the anthracite area, die miners saying they w ould not come back to w ork until the National Labor Relations Board did cer tain things. T h e President took a prompt and emotionally hard-boiled attitude, saying the miners could stay out o f w ork until next Christmas as far as he was concerned . . . J une 8,1945
. . . In our meeting w ith Mrs. Roosevelt and her daughter, M is. Anna Boettiger, Anna said she had it from Mrs. Ickes that Harold had written the President about certain matters having to do with the Philippines and the President had not replied. Whereupon, Ickes had sent quite a sharp note to the President. W hen Harold then called on the President the President started out b y saying to Ickes, “ I want yo u to feel perfectly free to come over here at any time and call me any kind o f an S.O.B. you want to.” This cheered Harold up enormously. Mrs. Roosevelt also reports that Jim Loeb1 and the other liberals o f N e w Y ork want her to find out from me any instructions which I have for them. T h e y are . . . waiting for me to give the word . . . J une 9,1945
. . . Sam Rayburn displayed considerable feeling against the Bureau o f the Budget and against Harold Smith, saying that they wanted to get into matters o f policy which were none o f their business. I said it seemed to me the proper w a y to handle these questions o f policy about which continual action must be taken would be—in the case o f do mestic matters—to set up a committee composed o f the Director o f 1 James Loeb o f the Union for Democratic Action, a N ew Y ork liberal whom the Communist Party had denounced, and others o f his views were worried about Roosevelt’s seeming drift to the right in 1944-45 and Truman’s apparent leanings in that direction. W allace, also worried, nevertheless remained con vinced that he could most effectively influence national policy from within the cabinet and the Democratic Party. H e had no “word” for the N ew Y ork group.
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W ar Mobilization, Fred Vinson; the Director o f the Budget, Harold Smith; the Secretary o f Agriculture; the Secretary o f Commerce; and the Secretary o f Labor. It would be ideal, I said, if the President would serve as chairman o f this committee, and meet w ith the com mittee for an hour once a week. I said there might be certain situa tions that would make it advisable to have in the Secretary o f the Treasury as well; others where it would be desirable to have in the Secretary o f the Interior. But, I said, if rapid action was to be obtained with a minimum o f disturbance it seemed to me the three cabinet officers, plus the tw o directors, would be ideal. I said, o f course, if the President couldn’t afford the time it would be advisable to have die D irector o f W a r Mobilization serve as chairman. Rayburn seemed to think this was an excellent idea. Rayburn said the new President was getting o ff to an excellent start. I said he seemed to be making his decisions with great speed. Rayburn said yes, he certainly is, but I am afraid one o f these days he w ill make a decision based on inadequate information. Rayburn said that Franklin Roosevelt would go down as one o f the great men o f history. He said, however, he was a terrific waster o f time. H e said when he and Alben Barkley and John M cCormack and m yself used to go down to meet with the President in the Big Four meetings, the President would gossip along saying not much o f any thing fo r an hour and a half. He said w ith Truman they get more decided in fifteen minutes than President Roosevelt used to decide in an hour and three quarters . . . ju k e
n , 1945
. . . W e showed W righ t Patman1 the plan fo r reorganizing the department. H e immediately started in criticizing the department for the stand which it had historically taken in favor o f chain stores as compared with the small, local merchant. H e said he thought the small, local merchant should be given every break possible. H e didn’t like the idea o f having an Assistant Secretary in charge o f Small Busi ness because he felt the department had not been friendly to small business. Then he changed his phraseology and said that he would have an open mind. M aury Maverick1 is a close friend o f W righ t Patman’s and it was to be expected that he would take the attitude 1 W righ t Patman, Democratic congressman from Texas since 1919, chairman o f the House Banking and Currency Committee, self-appointed scourge o f big banks and big business. * Maury Maverick, former Democratic congressman from Texas, since 1943 chair man o f the Smaller W a r Plants Corporation.
4$o
T h e Price o f Vision
which he took. I told him the question was whether after the w ar there would be a big Department o f Commerce in charge o f small business or a small Department o f Commerce in charge o f big business. I told him I thought there ought to be one Department o f Commerce and not tw o competing Departments o f Commerce. W e showed Senator Pepper the plan for reorganization and he seemed to like it. Senator M cKellar’s chief comment on the reorganization plan was that it would cost several thousand dollars more to pay for three new Assistant Secretaries than it had heretofore cost. M cKellar was really quite friendly but I never before realized how exceedingly small he is with regard to sizing up an overall picture. His habit o f mind has been formed b y taking budget bills and examining them item b y item. He has suddenly become much older. His general attitude was ex ceedingly friendly. Alben Barkley had no particular comment to make on the plan for reorganization. In general he seemed to think it was all right. J u n e i 2 , 1945
. . . A t the Export-Import Bank meeting the question up for dis cussion was the purchase o f the Mexericsson Telephone Co. b y Mextelco, which is the Mexican branch o f International T el. & T el. T h e Export-Import Bank would advance 23 million dollars to International Tel. & T el. to buy out Mexericsson and Mexericsson’s holdings o f Mextelco. T he interest rate would be 4 percent. There would in effect be an understanding with the Mexican government that would make it possible for the united company to charge higher telephone charges to the consumer. W ith the help o f these higher charges and economies resulting from the united operation, it would be expected that begin ning four or five years after the transaction was completed it would be possible for the united company to pay 4 percent interest on the loan and enough on the principal to retire 75 percent o f the loan within 20 years. I told them I would very much like to get the opinion o f the Federal Communications Commission. It was obvious that the staff o f the Eximbank was doing everything it could to put the loan through at the earliest possible moment. W hen I bucked and the Treasury representative, Mr. Ness,1 bucked, there was a lot o f fluttering in the dovecote. I told them as far as I was concerned they could go ahead 1 Norman N e s .
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and tell the Mexican government they were going to give die loan bat that the loan was being granted in spite of the opposition o f the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary o f Commerce. T h e y said that the loan had the approval o f the Mexican government. I said, “Just who in the Mexican government?” T h e y said, “T h e Minister o f Communications.” I said, “Just w ho is the Minister o f Communica tions?” It then developed the Minister of Communications was Maximino Avila Camacho, the brother o f the President, who is now dead. It was obvious the State Department was very keen about the deal and Collado said Messersmith very much wanted to have the matter approved b y the Eximbank for the sake o f strengthening his hand when he returned to Mexico C ity. T h e State Department people were not at all shocked at the idea that the United States government should use its power to help one o f our utilities to raise its rates in a foreign country in order to make a loan good which had been made b y this country. It seems this kind o f thing has been done again and again b y the State Department working with private corporations . . . J une
13,1945
. . . A t the staff meeting Mr. W aring1 gave a most interesting presentation on his experiences at San Francisco. H e told how certain members o f the delegation had leaked again and again to Scotty Reston2 o f the N ew Y ork Tim es and how one of the delegates one morning said, “ I have been studying our agenda for the day and find it differs in certain particulars from what appeared this morning in the N ew Y ork Tim es. I should like to inquire which is the official version.” H e mentioned that on Saturdays the schoolchildren swarmed over the place getting autographs and one delegate reported that he had heard one o f the children saying, ‘T il trade you six T om Connally’s for one Anthony Eden.” He told about the high quality o f the Russian delegation and his picture was totally different from that which would be gathered b y reading the newspapers. I am more and more begin ning to reach the conclusion that it is a mistake to read the newspapers about any controversial matter because they so often give an absolutely inaccurate picture. Undoubtedly the newspapers should be read so far as possible with the idea that account should be taken o f the bias. It is just as important to take account o f the bias o f newspapers as it is to take account o f the directions of the wind when flying an airplane. 1 Frank A . W aring. * James B. Reston, since 1941 in the Washington bureau of the N ew Y ork Tim es.
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JUNE 1 j , 1945
A t the W hite House w e showed the President the chart on the re organization o f the Department o f Commerce and he was much pleased with it. I explained it to him just like I had to the different senators and congressmen. H e was very keen about moving Smaller W ar Plants into the Department o f Commerce right away. H e said M aury Maver ick had been in to see him and had given him advice on everything under the sun except small business. H e said M aury was so good at giving advice about these various countries such as Italy, Germ any, Russia, Africa, and all the other countries o f the world that he thought be would just give him a chance to try out one o f those countries. He said he had had people working with W righ t Patman on a prob lem. I told him about our conversation with W righ t Patman. Also I told him that Maury had seen one o f our people and had gone straight up in the air. He said also that some o f the conversations I had had with some o f the senators had gotten back to Leo C row ley and he was very much disturbed. T he President seems to be very keen about put ting these various war agencies back into the departments. T h e President was very humble about his own ability, saying that he knew he didn’t have much in the w ay o f brains but that he did have enough brains to get hold o f people who were able and give them a chance to carry the responsibility. I told him that w e wanted to be sure to push hard enough on the reorganization but on the other hand w e didn’t want to push too hard. H e suggested that w e hold up a little while on the Assistant Secretary in Charge o f International Trade and the Assistant Secretary in Charge o f Industrial Economy. Appar ently he wants to wait until Schwellenbach gets on the job before he moves on this front. Also, he w ill want to get back from his trip to the Big Three meeting . . . J une
18,1945
W hile w e were waiting at Speaker Rayburn’s office for General Eisenhower to appear, Madame Perkins and Admiral Leahy got into quite an extended discussion o f Russia. T h e y both agreed that com munism was a kind of religion that people were glad to die for. A d miral Leahy made the rather astonishing statement that whenever there was a religion anywhere else in the world that people were ready to die for, the United States must o f necessity be deeply concerned and be ready to defend itself against the onslaught o f such a religion. It
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was obvious to me that Admiral Leahy is among those w ho are vig orously getting ready to fight Russia . . . A t die Eisenhower dinner I sat at a litde table with Senator Austin, M ajor General Bedell Smith,1 Assistant Secretary o f State Julius Holmes, and Admiral H ewitt.2 Senator Austin told a most interesting story about how his boy in the T ank Corps had been wounded three times. I told General Bedell Smith how highly I thought o f General Bradley as w ell as o f General Eisenhower. Bedell Smith and I both agreed it was a shame that Bradley had been put in charge o f the Veterans Administration. W e both felt that he would be more useful elsewhere. Bedell Smith also thought it was a shame that Eisenhower was taking on the civil administration o f Germany. J une
22,1945
. . . Richard Patterson2 told quite a horror story about T ito and the Russians in Yugoslavia. He said he had a friend w ho knew that 600 people w ere killed b y T ito in Zagreb. (T h e evening o f June 22 I met w ith André Visson, one o f the employees o f the Reader's Digest, at the Wassermans’. I asked Visson if he had talked to Patterson and he said he had. I asked him if he believed Patterson’s horror stories. H e said Patterson was green in the country and had only a part o f the picture.) Patterson thinks that T ito is killing off certain o f the people in Yugoslavia at the suggestion o f M oscow. Apparently the Russian army is out o f Yugoslavia at the present time. Patterson thinks there w ill be quite complete expropriation o f American properties through out all the Balkans and that it w ill be necessary to make very strong representations to get them back. T h e Standard O il Company is par ticularly affected. Pawley4 w ent into detail about his airplane plant, which is located in the highlands just west o f Madras in India. H e said as the result o f a good diet he was able to make this plant very efficient, getting as good results from the Hindus as he would from an equal number o f Ameri cans. He had made arrangements where all the Hindus, no matter what their caste or faith, could eat in the same cafeteria. H e reinforced the vegetables with vitamins so that those w ho were vegetarians would 1 M ajor General W alter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s chief of staff. 3 V ice Admiral H . Kent H ew itt had been in command o f the naval forces daring the landings at M orocco, Sicily, and southern France. * Richard C . Patterson, Jr., N ew Y o rk broadcasting executive and Democrat, then American ambassador to Yugoslavia. a W illiam D . Pawley, corporation executive, then American ambassador to Peru.
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The Price o f Vision
have a good diet. Pawley said that the British were gravely concerned about the success o f this airplane plant and wanted to kill it off. He told about the methods which they used in killing it off. Pawley says the British are so shortsighted in their efforts to keep India a purely agri cultural country without industry that they will inevitably throw the Hindus into the hands of Russian ideology. Pawley told also about his experience in getting a sulphate of am monia plant established and the w ay in which the British tried to sabotage that. He agrees with me that we must find some w ay to get the British interested in big things instead of in small, mean, dirty pilferings. Pawley is really friendly to the British but he is certain that the methods which they are using will bring disaster to themselves and to the world . . . J u ly 5,1945
. . . Claude1 spoke at some little length about his disillusion about the w ay things were going. He seemed to think there was danger o f the present administration making many o f the same mistakes that the Harding administration made. He seemed to be especially disillusioned with the appointment of Tom Clark and Jimmie Byrnes.2 He said that Francis Biddle had told him that one day Steve Early called him up and said the President would like to have his resignation within tw entyfour hours. Biddle immediately replied, saying, “ W h y doesn’t the President speak to me himself?” T h e upshot o f it was that the President had him over and Biddle said, “ O f course, Mr. President, you can have m y resignation, but w h y didn’t you speak to me about it rather than have Steve Early call me?” T h e President said, “ I thought maybe it might be embarrassing.” Biddle came back b y saying, “ W ell, you see, it is really very simple.” He then said, “ M ay I inquire, Mr. President, whom you are going to appoint in my place?” T h e Presi dent said, “ Tom Clark.” Biddle then said, “W hom have you checked with with regard to Mr. Clark?” T he President replied, “ Sam R aybum and Bob Hannegan both think highly of him.” Biddle then re plied, “ Mr. President, they have quite a record on Mr. Clark both in the Justice Department and in the Office of the Collector of Internal 1 Claude Pepper. 3 A s he had been planning to, Truman had appointed Thomas C. Clark, a Texas Democrat and fnend o f Hannegan, as Attorney General, and James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State. T h e President had waited to replace Stetdnius until the end of the San Francisco Conference. Bymes preferred a harder line toward the Soviet Union than had Stetdnius, while Clark preferred a softer policy on andtrust than had Biddle.
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465
Revenue.” T h e President said, “ W ell, I didn’t know about that” . . . Claude thinks that Hannegan’s game is to set up a national admin istration based on the “ city boss” idea, under which everything is controlled with an iron hand. Claude’s counteroffensive is to call the liberals together in a meeting to get them unified behind a program for full employment. Claude indicated he very much questioned the sincerity o f Truman’s humility. He said that during M ay and June 1944, just prior to the convention, Hannegan had arranged for Truman to make a very large number o f speeches in many different states. These were not large speeches but he said he knew that Truman made at least five speeches in Florida during this time and that in his opinion Truman and Han negan were working a very astute game during the tw o months just prior to the convention. I told Pepper that the Democrats would lose control o f the House in 1946 unless w e got out a big vote and that it was going to be neces sary for Democrats o f all kinds to w ork together to get out the vote. I said so far as Hannegan and K elly and the other bosses were con cerned, the future would take care of the situation and they would eventually stand revealed to the American people for exactly what they are. I told Claude I thought he was doing a very wise thing in for getting all about gossip o f this kind and concentrating his attention on rallying the progressive forces behind full employment. J u l y 6,1945
A 1 Schindler came in to say that one of his Missouri friends was saying that it was common talk in the Midwest now that the “ Missouri gang” was taking over the government. A 1 furthermore said that it was commonly believed that he, A l, was part of the gang. A 1 pro tested that he had been appointed b y President Roosevelt. Nevertheless, A l’s friends continue to push him by saying that the public looked on him as part o f the “ Missouri gang.” Apparently this has gotten under A l’s skin and he advocated that w e check things over once a week to decide when would be the best time to get out. I suspect perhaps the Morgenthau resignation1 had something to do with that state o f 1 Morgenthau’s personal loyalty to Roosevelt and Truman’s disapproval o f the Morgenthau Plan for Germany had made the question of Morgenthau’s resigna tion only a matter of time. T h e President had wanted to delay acting on a new Secretary o f the Treasury until his return from Potsdam, but when Morgenthau asked for assurances that he could remain in office until the end of the Pacific war, Truman precipitated his resignation and appointed Fred Vinson in his place.
4934~35)t since 1933 A d v is o r y C o u n cil.
a
m em b er
an d
since
1934
chairm an
of
the
Business
Into the Cold War items total $28 billion, or about 80 percent o f the total recom mended expenditures. C learly, a large reduction in the federal budget would re quire a cut in m ilitary appropriations. These appropriations are now m ore than ten times as great as they w ere during the thirties. In the 1938 budget appropriations fo r national de fense w ere less than a billion dollars, compared w ith $13 bil lion fo r the present fiscal year. Thus, even from a purely dollars-and-cents standpoint Am erican businessmen and the Am erican people have an interest in organizing a peaceful w orld in w hich the com pletely unproductive expenditures on national defense could be reduced. H e claimed, and apparently several others o f the B A C agreed, that the general public w ill infer m y phrase, “ a good many businessmen,” to refer to them. H e said they resented the idea that they wanted the national budget cu t at the expense o f our preparedness. A s à m atter o f fact, it was very clear in listening to W illiam s talk that he believes strongly in arming to the hilt in order to fight Russia. A m ajority o f the men in the Business A dvisory Council apparently w ould like to see a w ar w ith Russia. T h e y did not put it that bluntly but that was the only conclusion I could reach from their psycho logical state o f mind. It is true, o f course, that a good many men in the Council furnished goods to the A rm y and N avy and their business w ould be reduced b y reduced m ilitary appropriations. W il liams’ resolution was finally not brought to a vote and all the business men seemed to feel happy because they had let me know their w illing ness to be taxed heavily so as to be in position to fight Russia if the need arose. I made a brief talk indicating that m y letter to the President was meant only for the President; that the leak on the letter did not take place in the Departm ent o f Commerce but elsewhere; and that I had released the letter only when directed to do so b y Charlie Ross; and that the w ording w hich appears herewith was the specific dictation o f Charlie Ross: R E LE A SE O N R E C E IP T Tuesday, September 17, 1946 In view o f the fact that a co p y o f Secretary W allace’s letter o f July 23, 1946, to the President was filched from the files and is in the hands o f a newspaper columnist, the Sec retary o f Commerce is today releasing this cop y o f the letter:
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I said that in view o f the fact that this was private personal corres pondence between m yself and the President and that it had leaked through no fault o f m yself or the Department o f Commerce, it seemed to me that the resolution o f M r. W illiam s was most unjust. I said, moreover, that not only members o f the Council had spoken to me about high taxes but that there w ere a great many businessmen w ith whom I had talked who w ere not members o f the Council and that they should not look on themselves as the only men to whom die phrase “businessmen” should be applied. I finally suggested to them a phraseology w hich seemed to represent the view point o f the m ajority present. T h e y w ere very happy w ith the suggested phraseology and afterward m any o f them came up and shook hands w ith me, including d a y W illiam s, expressing a high esteem fo r me personally even though they m ight disagree w ith me on the Russian matter. I can't help feeling that C lay W illiam s was put up to his resolution b y some o f the reactionary southern politicos. O n the other hand, O a y himself is probably the force behind a number o f the reactionary Southern politicos. I was very happy to have the businessmen say exactly w hat they thought. It gave me an insight into how pow erful and widespread is the desire to be ready to fight Russia. SEPTEMBER
20, 1946
HENRY A. WALLACE TO HARRY S. TRUMAN
Dear H arry: A s you requested, here is m y resignation. I shall continue to fight for peace. I am sure that you approve and w ill join me in that great endeavor. R espectfully yours . . .
Into the Cold War
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Trum an first requested W allace’s resignation b y letter. “T he tele phone call,” W allace later recalled (O ral H istory, 5028), w hich T ru man mentioned to the press, came about 9:30 in the morning. It was a short conversation. “A s a matter o f fact w hat Trum an did was to w rite me a letter o f a low level and I called him up and said, ‘You don’t want this thing out.’ H e agreed. ‘N o, I’ll send a man over to pick it up.’ H e got over in about five minutes and I gave it to him. “W hen I called Trum an the conversation was very amicable be cause he realized he’d been very hot-headed. I suppose Clark Clifford and General Vaughan and the rest o f them had talked to him. I don't know just w hich ones they were. “ I called him at once after I received the letter and he was very happy to take it back. I think it was dated that morning. It was not abusive, but it was on a low level. I don’t remember anything about it—it didn’t contain profanity—I just remember that it was on a low level and took it back.” A t his press conference that day, Trum an read the follow ing statement: T he foreign policy o f this country is the most important question confronting us today. O ur responsibility for ob taining a just and lasting peace extends not only to the people o f this country but to the nations o f the w orld. T he people o f the United States may disagree freely and publicly on any question, including that o f foreign policy, but the government o f the United States must stand as a unit in its relations w ith the rest o f the w orld. I have today asked M r. W allace to resign from the cabinet. It had become clear that between his views on foreign policy and those o f the administration—the latter being shared, I am confident, b y the great body o f our citizens—there was a fun damental conflict. W e could not permit this conflict to jeopardize our position in relation to other countries. I deeply regret the breaking o f a long and pleasant official association, but I am sure that Mr. W allace w ill be happier in the exercise o f his right to present his views as a private citizen. I am confirmed in this belief by a very friendly conversation I had w ith M r. W allace on the telephone this morning. O ur foreign policy as established by the Congress, the President, and the Secretary o f State remains in full force and
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T he Trice of Vision effect w ithout change. N o change in our foreign policy is contemplated. N o member o f the executive branch o f the government w ill make any public statement as to foreign policy w hich is in conflict w ith our established foreign policy. A n y public statement on foreign policy shall be cleared w ith the Department o f State. In case o f disagree ment, the matter w ill be referred to me. A s I have frequently said, I have complete confidence in M r. Byrnes . . .
T hat evening, W allace broadcast a statement o f his own: M y fellow Americans: W inning the peace is more important than high public of fice. It is more important than any consideration o f party politics. T he success or failure o f our foreign policy w ill mean the difference between life and death for our children and our grandchildren. It w ill mean the difference between the life or death o f our civilization. It may mean the difference be tween the existence and the extinction o f man and o f the w orld. It is therefore o f supreme importance, and w e should every one o f us regard it as a holy duty, to join the fight for winning the peace. I, fo r m y part, firm ly believe that there is nothing more important that I can do than w ork in the cause o f peace. T he action taken b y the President this morning relieves me of my obligation o f last W ednesday. I feel that our present foreign policy does not recognize the basic realities w hich led to tw o w orld wars and w hich now threatens an other war—this time an atomic war. H ow ever, I do not wish to abuse the freedom granted me b y the President this morn ing by saying anything tonight w hich might interfere w ith the success o f the Paris Conference. But I do feel it proper to clear up some points about which there has been widespread misunderstanding o f m y Madison Square Garden speech. I don’t have to tell anyone w ho has follow ed m y views on international affairs that I began talking about “one w orld" more than fifteen years ago. I do not believe in tw o worlds. I have continuously and wholeheartedly advocated the prin ciple o f living in one world. W e cannot have peace except in “ one w orld.”
Into the Cold War I wish to make it clear again that I am against all types o f imperialism and aggression, whether they are o f Russian, British, or American origin. Also I wish to emphasize that the “ one w orld” concept must be held steadfastly; and that any regionalism necessary to give practical form to the w orld economic and political realities must take into account the rights o f small nations just as the nations o f the W estern Hemisphere have done under Franklin Roosevelt’s “G ood N eighbor” policy. T he success o f any policy rests ultim ately upon the confi dence and the w ill o f the people. There can be no basis for such success unless the people know and understand the issues, unless they are given all the facts and unless they seize the opportunity to take part in the framing o f foreign policy through full and open debate. In this debate, w e must respect the rights and interests o f other peoples, just as w e expect them to respect ours. H ow w e resolve this debate, as I said in m y N ew Y ork speech, w ill determine not whether w e live in “ one w orld” but whether w e live at all. I intend to carry on the fight for peace. Later W allace recalled: I always had in my mind that if I were going to get out o f the cabinet I should get out on the peace issue. Ever since Morgenthau and Ickes had left, I figured it was only a ques tion o f months until I’d be getting out. I did want to get out on a basis w hich would help bring about an understanding between the United States and Russia and insure peace. I wanted to dramatize peace. It wasn’t m y objective to have the September 12 speech do that. K now ing the number o f people in the cabinet and in Congress w ho felt the importance o f having a showdown w ith Russia instead o f any understanding, I felt it was in evitable that sooner or later I would get out on that issue. So if it hadn’t been this speech, it would have been another one, I have no doubt. Trum an may have been convinced politically that the cost o f breaking w ith Byrnes was greater than the cost o f breaking w ith me. I think that was probably the w ay it finally shaped up in his mind. I think he’d lost his personal esteem fo r
632
T he Price o f Vision Byrnes at this time, but the combination o f Vandenberg, and Byrnes and Connally—tw o o f them senators and one o f them a form er senator and all three o f them known to Trum an when he was a senator for many years—was just too much for him. So he swung over to their point o f view . H e didn’t really w ant to do it but he was forced to do it.
Appendices T h e Price o f F ree W orld Victory Statem ent by V ice P resident W allace
,
Chairm an o f th e Board o f Econom ic W arfare T h e W ay to Peace
The Price of Free World Victory (MayS, 1942) between a slave world and a free world. Just as the United States in 1862 could not remain half slave and half free, so in 1942 the w orld must make its decision for a complete victory one w ay or the other. A s w e begin the final stages o f this fight to the death between the free world and the slave world, it is w orthw hile to refresh our minds about the inarch o f freedom for the common man. T he idea o f free dom—the freedom that w e in the United States know and love so w ell —is derived from the Bible, w ith its extraordinary emphasis on the dignity o f the individual. Dem ocracy is the only true political ex pression o f Christianity. T he prophets o f the O ld Testament were the first to preach social justice. But that w hich was sensed b y the prophets many centuries before Christ was not given complete and pow erful political expression until our nation was formed as a Federal Union a century and a half ago. Even then the march o f the common people had just begun. Most o f them did not yet know how to read and w rite. There w ere no pub lic schools to w hich all children could go. Men and women cannot be really free until they have plenty to eat, and time and ability to read and think and talk things over. D ow n the years, the people o f the United States have moved steadily forward in the practice o f democ racy. Through universal education, they now can read and w rite and form opinions o f their own. T h ey have learned, and are still learn ing, the art o f production—that is, how to make a living. T h ey have learned, and are still learning, the art o f self-government. If w e were to measure freedom b y standards o f nutrition, education, and self-governm ent, we m ight rank the United States and certain na tions o f W estern Europe very high. But this would not be fair to other nations where education has become widespread only in the last tw enty years. In many nations, a generation ago, nine out of ten o f the people could not read or w rite. Russia, for example, was changed from an illiterate to a literate nation w ithin one generation and, in the proc ess, Russia’s appreciation o f freedom was enormously enhanced. In T
h is is a f ig h t
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The Price of Vision
China, the increase during the past thirty years in the ability o f the peo ple to read and w rite has been matched by their increased interest in real liberty. Everyw here, reading and w riting are accompanied b y industrial progress, and industrial progress sooner or later inevitably brings a stronger labor movement. From a long-time and fundamental point o f view , there are no backward peoples which are lacking in mechanical sense. Russians, Chinese, and the Indians both o f India and the Am eri cas all learn to read and w rite and operate machines just as w ell as your children and m y children. Everyw here the common people are on the march. W hen the freedom -loving people march—when the farmers have an opportunity to buy land at reasonable prices and to sell the produce o f their land through their own organizations, when workers have the op portunity to form unions and bargain through them collectively, and when the children o f all the people have an opportunity to attend schools w hich teach them truths o f the real world in w hich they live— when these opportunities are open to everyone, then the w orld moves straight ahead. But in countries where the ability to read and w rite has been recently acquired or where the people have had no long experience in govern ing themselves on the basis o f their own thinking, it is easy for dema gogues to arise and prostitute the mind o f the common man to their own base ends. Such a demagogue may get financial help from some person o f wealth who is unaware o f what the end result w ill be. W ith this backing, the demagogue may dominate the minds o f the people, and, from whatever degree o f freedom they have, lead them backward into slavery. T he march o f freedom o f the past 150 years has been a long-drawnout people’s revolution. In this great revolution o f the people, there were the Am erican Revolution o f 1775, the French Revolution o f 1792, the Latin Am erican revolutions o f the Bolivian era, the German Revolution o f 1848, and the Russian Revolution o f 1917. Each spoke for the common man in terms o f blood on the battlefield. Some w ent to excess. But the significant thing is that the people groped their w ay to the light. M ore o f them learned to think and w ork together. T h e people’s revolution aims at peace and not at violence, but if the rights o f the common man are attacked, it unleashes the ferocity o f a she-bear who has lost a cub. W hen the N azi psychologists tell their master H itler that we in the United States m ay be able to produce hundreds o f thousands o f planes, but that w e have no w ill to fight, th ey
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are only fooling themselves and him. T he truth is that when the rights o f the Am erican people are transgressed, as those rights have been transgressed, the Am erican people w ill fight w ith a relentless fu ry w hich w ill drive the ancient Teutonic gods back cowering into their caves. T he Götterdämmerung has come for Odin and his crew . T h e people are on the march toward even fuller freedom than the most fortunate peoples o f the earth have hitherto enjoyed. N o N azi counterrevolution w ill stop it. T he common man w ill smoke the H itler stooges out into the open in the United States, in Latin Am erica, and in India. H e w ill destroy their influence. N o Lavais, no Mussolinis w ill be tolerated in a Free W orld. T he people, in their millennial and revolutionary march toward manifesting here on earth the dignity that is in every human soul, hold as their credo the Four Freedoms enunciated b y President Roosevelt in his message to Congress on January 6, 1941. These Four Freedoms are the very core o f the revolution for w hich the United Nations have taken their stand. W e who live in the United States m ay think there is nothing very revolutionary about freedom o f religion, freedom o f ex pression, and freedom from the fear of secret police. But when w e begin to think about the significance o f freedom from want for the average man, then w e know that the revolution o f the past 150 years has not been completed, either here in the United States or in any other nation in the w orld. W e know that this revolution cannot stop until freedom from want has actually been attained. And now, as we move forw ard toward realizing the Four Freedoms o f this people’s revolution, I would like to speak about four duties. It is m y belief that every freedom, every right, ever privilege has its price, its corresponding duty without w hich it cannot be enjoyed. T h e four duties o f the people’s revolution, as I see them today, are these: 1. T h e duty to produce to the limit. 2. T h e duty to transport as rapidly as possible to the field o f battle. 3. T he duty to fight w ith all that is in us. 4. T he duty to build a peace—just, charitable, and enduring. T h e fourth duty is that w hich inspires the other three. W e failed in our job after W orld W ar I. W e did not know how to go about building an enduring worldw ide peace. W e did not have the nerve to follow through and prevent Germ any from rearming. W e did not insist that she “learn w ar no more.” W e did not build a peace treaty on the fundamental doctrine o f the people’s revolution. W e did not strive wholeheartedly to create a w orld where there could be free dom from want for all the peoples. But b y our very errors w e learned
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The Price o f Vision
much, and after this w ar w e shall be in position to utilize our know l edge in building a world w hich is econom ically, politically, and, I hope, spiritually sound. M odern science, w hich is a by-product and an essential part o f the people’s revolution, has made it technologically possible to see that all o f the people o f the w orld get enough to eat. H alf in fun and half seriously, I said the other day to Madame Litvinov: “T he object o f this w ar is to make sure that everybody in the w orld has the privilege o f drinking a quart o f milk a day.” She replied: “ Yes, even half a pint.” T h e peace must mean a better standard o f living fo r the common man, not m erely in the United States and England, but also in India, Russia, China, and Latin Am erica—not m erely in the United Nations, but also in Germ any and Italy and Japan. Some have spoken o f the “ Am erican Century.” I say that the cen tu ry on w hich w e are entering—the century w hich w ill come out o f this w ar—can be and must be the century o f the common man. E very where the common man must learn to build his own industries w ith his ow n hands in a practical fashion. Everyw here the common man must learn to increase his productivity so that he and his children can eventually pay to the w orld com m unity all that they have received. N o nation w ill have the G od-given right to exploit other nations. O lder nations w ill have the privilege to help younger nations get started on the path to industrialization, but there must be neither mili tary nor economic imperialism. T he methods o f the nineteenth century w ill not w ork in the people’s century which is now about to begin. India, China, and Latin Am erica have a tremendous stake in the peo ple’s century. A s their masses learn to read and w rite, and as they be come productive mechanics, their standard o f living w ill double and treble. M odem science, when devoted wholeheartedly to the general welfare, has in it potentialities o f w hich we do not ye t dream. And modem science must be released from German slavery. Inter national cartels that serve Am erican greed and the German w ill to power must go. Cartels in the peace to come must be subjected to international control fo r the common man, as w ell as being under adequate control b y the respective home governments. In this w ay, w e can prevent the Germans from again building a w ar machine while w e sleep. W ith international m onopoly pools under control, it w ill be possible fo r inventions to serve all the people instead o f only the few . Yes, and when the time o f peace comes, the citizen w ill again have a duty, the supreme duty o f sacrificing the lesser interest for the greater interest o f the general w elfare. Those who w rite the peace must
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think o f the whole w orld. There can be no privileged peoples. W e ourselves in the United States are no more a master race than the Nazis. And w e can not perpetuate econom ic warfare w ithout planting the seeds o f m ilitary warfare. If we really believe that we are fighting for a people's peace, all the rest becomes easy. Production, yes—it w ill be easy to get production w ithout either strikes or sabotage, production w ith the wholehearted co-operation between w illing arms and keen brains; enthusiasm, zip, energy geared to the tempo o f keeping at it everlastingly, day after day. H itler knows as w ell as those o f us w ho sit in on the W ar Production Board meetings that \ye here in the United States are winning the bat tle o f production. I need say little about the duty to fight. Some people declare, and H itler believes, that the Am erican people have grow n soft in the last generation. H itler agents continually preach in South Am erica that w e are cowards, unable to use, like the “ brave” German soldiers, the weapons o f modern war. It is true that Am erican youth hates war w ith a holy hatred. But because o f that fact and because H itler and the German people stand as the very sym bol o f war, we shall fight w ith a tireless enthusiasm until w ar and the possibility o f war have been re moved from this planet. T he Am erican people have always had guts and always w ill have. You know the story o f Bomber Pilot Dixon and Radioman Gene A ldrich and Ordnanceman T o n y Pastula—the story which Americans w ill be telling their children for generations to illustrate man’s ability to master any fate. These men lived for thirty-four days on the open sea in a rubber life raft, eight feet b y four feet, w ith no food but that w hich they took from the sea and the air with one pocketknife and a pistol. And yet they lived it through and came at least to the beach o f an island they did not know. In spite o f their suffering and weakness, they stood like men, w ith no weapon left to protect themselves, and no shoes on their feet or clothes on their backs, and walked in m ilitary file because, they said, “ if there were Japs, we didn't want to be craw ling.” T h e Am erican fighting men, and all the fighting men o f the United Nations, w ill need to summon all their courage during the next few months. I am convinced that the summer and fall o f 1942 w ill be a time o f supreme crisis for us all. W e must be especially prepared to stifle the fifth columnists in the United States, w ho w ill try to sabotage not m erely our war-material plants, but even more important, our minds. W e must be prepared for
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The Price of Vision
the w orst kind o f fifth-colum n w ork in Latin Am erica, much o f it operating through the agency o f governments w ith w hich the United States at present is at peace. W hen I say this, I recognize that the peo ple, both o f Latin Am erica and o f the nations supporting the agencies through which the fifth columnists w ork, are overwhelm ingly on the side o f the democracies. W e must expect the offensive against us on the m ilitary, propaganda, and sabotage fronts, both in the United States and in Latin Am erica, to reach its apex some time during the next few months. But in the case o f most o f us, the events o f the next few months, disturbing though they may be, w ill only increase our w ill to bring about complete victory in this w ar o f liberation. Prepared in spirit, w e cannot be surprised. Psychological terrorism w ill fall flat. A s w e nerve ourselves for the supreme effort in this hemisphere, w e must not forget the sublime heroism o f the oppressed in Europe and Asia, whether it be in the mountains o f Yugoslavia, the factories o f Czechoslovakia and France, the farms o f Poland, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, among the seamen o f N orw ay, or in the occupied areas o f China and the Dutch East Indies. Everyw here the soul o f man is letting the tyrant know that slavery o f the body does not end resistance. There can be no half measures. N orth, South, East, W est, and M id dle W est—the w ill o f the American people is fo r complete victory. N o compromise with Satan is possible. W e shall not rest until all the victim s under the N azi yoke are freed. W e shall fight for a com plete peace as w ell as a complete victory. T he people’s revolution is on the march, and the devil and all his angels cannot prevail against it. T h ey cannot prevail, for on the side o f the people is the Lord. H e giveth power to the faint; to them that have no m ight H e increaseth strength . . . T h ey that w ait upon the Lord shall mount up w ith wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be w eary; they shall w alk and not be faint. Strong in the strength o f the Lord, w e w ho fight in the people’s cause w ill never stop until that cause is won.
Statement by Vice President Wallace, Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare (June 29,1943) A s Originally Prepared for the Senate Committee on Appropriations O n j u n e 4, 1943, the Chairman o f this Committee discussed the w ork
o f the Board on the floor o f the Senate. His statement contained certain inaccuracies fo r w hich the Senator was not responsible. H e was basing his comments on testim ony w hich he said M r. Jesse Jones had given before the Joint Committee on the Reduction o f Non-Essential Federal Expenditures. I realize that when the distinguished Senator from Tennessee made his remarks on the floor o f the Senate he felt he had been correctly informed b y the Secretary o f Commerce. T he actual facts are at vari ance with the information given the Senator, however, and I feel com pelled to state the correct information for the record. Senator M cK ellar said on June 4: “ N o Congressional appropriation has ever been made fo r the payment o f a single person employed in the Board o f Econom ic W arfare. T h e Senate Appropriations Committee, o f w hich I happen to be tem porarily the head, has never appropriated any money for the Board o f Econom ic W arfare.” On M ay 30, 1942, the President transmitted fo r the consideration o f Congress an estimate o f an appropriation for the salaries and expenses o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare fo r the fiscal year 1943 (Docum ent N o. 760, 77th Congress, 2nd Scss.). A fter hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, during w hich w e gave detailed testimony, that Committee favorably reported H R 7319, w hich contained an item for salaries and expenses o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare (Report N o. 2295, 77th Congress, 2nd Sess.). T he bill passed the House on June 30, 1942, and was reported b y Senator M cKellar, for the Senate Committee on Appropriations, on July 10, 1942. T he report suggested changes in some other items in the bill but left unchanged the item
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fo r salaries and expenses o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare (Senate Report N o. 1542). T h e bill as passed b y the Senate on July 16, 1942, and approved b y the President on July 25, 1942, contained an item in the amount o f $12,000,000 for salaries and expenses o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare (Public Law N o. 678, 77th Congress). Mr. Perkins was not called upon to testify w ith regard to the item when it was con sidered by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. H ow ever, on O ctober 12,1942, M r. Perkins appeared before the subcommittee o f the Senate Committee on Appropriations, w ith Senator M cK ellar presid ing, to explain the need for certain amendments in the appropriation language, prim arily to take care o f the payment o f living and quarters allowances to employees stationed abroad. These amendments w ere included in an item entitled “Board o f Econom ic W arfare” in Public [Law ] N o. 763, 77th Congress, approved O ctober 26, 1942. In the same statement on the floor of the Senate on June 4, 1943, Senator M cK ellar said: “ Mr. Jesse Jones testified a day or tw o ago before the so-called Econom y Committee, that M r. M ilo Perkins abso lutely ran the entire establishment o f 2620 employees; that his w ord was law, even over him, M r. Jesse Jones, and that he had received a directive from M r. Perkins to furnish the m oney to pay all these employees.” T he Board has never obtained m oney fo r administrative purposes from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, nor has the Board ever directed M r. Jesse Jones or any Reconstruction Finance Corporation subsidiary to furnish m oney to pay the salaries o f any o f the Board’s employees or any o f its administrative expenses. A ll such salaries and expenses are paid from funds appropriated by the Congress to the Board o f Econom ic W arfare. There have been a few occasions where, in connection w ith the joint operations o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation field staffs in foreign countries, arrangements have been worked out jointly for the payment o f certain joint staff expenses b y either the Board or the Corporation. In these cases reimbursement b y the one agency or the other has been made in accordance w ith established governm ent procedures. On June 4, Senator M cK ellar also said: “ T he Board o f Econom ic W arfare was not created by the Congress.” T he Board o f Econom ic W arfare was established b y the President on July 30,1941, b y executive order, as were other w ar agencies. From time to time additional functions have been transferred to the Board o f Econom ic W arfare by the President pursuant to authority vested in
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the President b y the Congress, particularly b y the First W ar Powers A ct o f December 18, 1942 (Public Law N o. 354, 77th Congress). Congress has appropriated the monies w hich the Board is using to discharge these responsibilities. Furthermore, Congress has specifically directed in Public Law N o. 638,77th Congress, approved June 30, 1942, that unless the President shall determine otherwise, the Board o f Eco nomic W arfare shall administer the Export Control Law. It is not enough to make these corrections. T he false impression w hich M r. Jones created before the Byrd Committee is similar to the impression he created in early December before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. It is time to prevent further harmful mis representations o f this nature. On A pril 13, 1942, the President vested in the Board o f Econom ic W arfare complete control o f all public purchase import operations. M r. Jones has never been w illing to accept that fact. H e has instead done much to harass the administrative employees o f the Board in their single-minded effort to help shorten this war b y securing adequate stocks o f strategic materials. T he report o f the Trum an Committee, dated M ay 6, 1943, has set the proper pattern for dealing w ith situations o f this kind. T w o brief paragraphs from that report are o f particular relevance: Energetic, aggressive men, striving to meet war needs, w ill tend to clash when their duties bring them into conflict. But destructive, wasteful feuding must be suppressed. T he task o f control and guidance is o f utmost importance. Clear leadership in strong hands is required. T he influence from above must be always toward unity. W here necessary, heads must be knocked together. T he President’s Order o f A pril 13, 1942, provided for “ clear lead ership” in programming the im port o f strategic materials. A s a conse quence o f M r. Jones’ reluctance to accept that leadership there has been too much “ destructive, wasteful feuding.” T he Board o f Eco nomic W arfare has tried for over a year now to do its job in spite o f the obstructionist tactics M r. Jones has employed from time to time. T he Congress showed great foresight, very early, in authorizing government stockpiling o f strategic materials by passing legislation and b y making funds available for this purpose w ay back in 1939 and 1940. In June o f 1939, the Secretary o f the Treasury was empowered to purchase and stockpile strategic materials as directed b y the Secretary o f W ar and the Secretary o f the N avy. This program was compara-
644
T fo
Price o f Vision
d vely small. Then in the summer o f 1940, the Congress made sub stantial funds available to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for carrying out a. program for purchasing and stockpiling all critical and strategic materials. From the summer o f 1940 until w ell past December 7, 1941, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation failed dismally, so far as the im port field was concerned, to build the government stockpiles authorized and directed by the Congress nearly eighteen months before Pearl Harbor. During this period, o f course, private purchasing o f imports con tinued on a somewhat increased scale due to better business, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation entered into various underwriting agreements w ith some countries under w hich w e agreed to take sur pluses if they were not bought privately. This seems to us to have been a timid, business-as-usual procedure; at least it was a “ far cry " from the aggressive government stockpiling which the Congress di rected and authorized so that this nation might have a margin o f security in its imported raw materials inventories. On December 8, 1942, M r. Perkins and I testified before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee and gave partial evidence o f the de lays to our w ork for w hich w e felt M r. Jones was responsible. W e gave testimony on his failure to meet the Office o f Production Manage ment’s directive to stockpile industrial diamonds and block mica. W e gave evidence on the extent to w hich he had delayed the foreign rubber program and cited specifically his stalling in the gathering o f w ild rub ber in South Am erica and the planting o f rubber plantations in A frica and in the planting o f cryptostegia for natural rubber in the Caribbean. W e also presented evidence on the months o f delay in starting a pre clusive buying program in European neutral countries to prevent stra tegic materials from going to the Axis. These delays took place be fore Pearl Harbor and extended beyond Pearl Harbor right up to the 13th o f A pril 1942, at which time the President transferred im port powers from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and its sub sidiaries to the Board of Econom ic W arfare. T he evidence which we presented on Decem ber 8, 1942, to the Sen ate Banking and Currency Committee was only partial evidence. It is a matter o f public record in Hearings on S. 2900. I now desire to present additional evidence on government stock piling-com m odity by com m odity, for consideration b y this Com mittee, by the entire Congress, and by the public at large. I want to point out first that all o f our administrative w ork on im
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ports is done under the broad direction o f the W ar Production Board and in some cases under the broad direction o f the W ar Food Adminis tration. I now feel it m y duty to get down to specific cases. For rea sons o f m ilitary security, I shall not include figures w hich m ight be o f value to the enemy. T h e figures I am able to use, however, have not been previously presented to the Congress . . . BERYL ORE
B eryl ore has very im portant m ilitary uses, the outstanding one being its use as an alloy w ith copper. On Decem ber 1, 1941, the O ffice o f Production Management, the forerunner o f the W ar Production Board, recommended the purchase b y Reconstruction Finance Corporation o f 3000 m etric tons o f beryl ore. A s o f A p ril 13,1942, the day the President transferred im port powers from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the Board o f Eco nomic W arfare, one 300-ton contract had been made, and no deliveries effected. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, eleven contracts calling fo r the delivery o f 4118 m etric tons o f ore from four different countries (Argentina, Brazil, India, South A frica) had been made; 640 tons had been de livered. This was done under Board o f Econom ic W arfare directives. CASTOR SEEDS
T h e oil extracted from castor seeds is vitally important fo r w ar purposes. Am ong other things, it is used as a hydraulic fluid for jacks and brakes in w ar machines, as a solvent in paint, and (dehydrated) as a special protective coating fo r testing airplane motors. N o adequate substitute is known. O n Novem ber 19, 1941, the O ffice o f Production Management rec ommended to Reconstruction Finance Corporation the purchase o f 178,571 long tons o f castor seeds. A s o f A p ril 13, 1942, over fou r months after Pearl H arbor, none had been purchased. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, at the direction o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare, spot purchases totaling 73,799 long tons had been made and long-term contracts had been executed fo r another 220,000 long tons. COBALT
Cobalt is vitally important to our m ilitary effort, its chief use being in high-speed cutting steels.
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T he Price o f Vision
O n N ovem ber 17, 1941, O ffice o f Production Management recom mended to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation die purchase o f ores containing 2500 short tons o f cobalt metal. A s o f A p ril 13, 1942, contracts had been made b y the Metals R e serve Com pany for the purchase o f ores contam ing only about 159 tons o f cobalt metal. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, governm ent contracts fo r ore purchases from foreign sources totaled about 876 short tons o f cobalt metal. In creased private purchases have now put us in a com fortable supply position. CORUNDUM
Corundum, vitally im portant fo r its use as an abrasive fo r grinding optical glass and telescope lenses, is obtained almost exclusively from South A frica. T here is practically none in the U nited States, although there are some interesting experiments being carried on now , in the southeastern section o f the country. On Novem ber 18, 1941, the O ffice o f Production Management recommended to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the purchase o f 6000 long tons o f South A frican corundum. T h e recommendation was subsequently increased. A s o f A p ril 13, 1942, over fou r months after Pearl H arbor, no pur chases had been made. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, there w ere under contract (one contract; made by M etals Reserve Com pany in June 1942) 12,000 long tons o f South A frican corundum fo r delivery during 1943 and 1944. T h is was done under the Board o f Econom ic W arfare directives. FATS AND OILS
T h e fats and oils group includes approxim ately 25 different prod ucts, ranging all the w ay from sunflower seeds to ouricury nuts and whale oil. These products are critically needed in the w ar effort fo r a variety o f industrial uses as w ell as for human consumption. T here is one large group o f edible oils, needed fo r A rm y, N avy, Lend-Lease, and civilian uses. A nother group, w hich includes babassu nuts, coconuts, palm kernels, murumuru nuts, tucum nuts, and ouricury nuts, contains a high per centage o f lauric acid, from w hich glycerine—used in the m anufacture o f explosives—is derived. These products are also used for plasticizers (to reduce brittleness) and in the m anufacture o f soap and synthetic rubber.
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O iticica oil and linseed oil are used as solvents in paints. T here is no adequate substitute fo r cashew nut oil« w hich is used to impregnate and toughen brake linings and fo r magneto harness cover ings. N eats-foot oil is used in impregnating leather. T allow , seal ofl, and whale oil are used in soap-making processes, in the course o f w hich glycerine is produced. Palm oil is essential in the manufacture o f tinplate. Certain marine engines require rapeseed oil as a lubricant. Sperm oil is used as a special lubricant for airplane engines (allow ing the "cold ” breaking in o f m otors), in the rifling o f gun barrels, and as a high-pressure smokeless lubricant in Diesel engines. One w ould think, in view o f the critical m ilitary urgency o f going out to get these imported raw materials, that M r. Jones would have moved aggressively to build governm ent stockpiles o f these fats and oils, and ye t here are the facts: In O ctober 1941, the O ffice o f Production Management recom mended to die Reconstruction Finance Corporation the purchase o f approxim ately 30,000 long tons o f various types o f fats and oils from foreign sources. In N ovem ber this total was increased to 208,571 long tons; in January 1942, to 308,571 tons; in February to 317499 tons. (T h e total has, since A pril 13, 1942, been increased much beyond this last figure.) A s o f A p ril 13, 1942, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had purchased (according to the best inform ation w e have) only 2200 long tons (rapeseed o il); none had arrived in this country. T h e pur chases w ere all spot; no development program had been devised. There m ay be a minor error in this particular figure due to the inadequate com m odity accounting records o f the Reconstruction Finance Cor poration, but w e believe the figures to be substantially accurate. For all practical purposes, however, virtually nothing was done b y M r. Jones to build a governm ent stockpile o f fats and oils even after Pearl Harbor, when the Japs w ere conquering the Far East, from w hich w e had been getting tremendous supplies. T h e Board o f Econom ic W arfare, shordy after it was given its re sponsibility in the im port field, on A p ril 13, 1942, shifted the financing o f the fats and oils program to the Com m odity C redit Corporation, but retained general administration o f it. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942: (1 ) 276,622 tons o f foreign fats and oils had been bought on a spot purchase basis.
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T he Price o f Vision
(2) T h e Board o f Econom ic W arfare had negotiated and the Com m odity C redit Corporation had entered into development and long term purchase contracts calling for the delivery o f 500,000 tons. Several additional development contracts beyond this total w ere sub sequently negotiated. (3) T h e private import trade, dealing in fats and oils, w hich was threatened w ith extinction because o f distortions in the w orld price structure, was organized into the Em ergency G roup for Foreign V ege table Oils, Fats and Oil-Bearing Materials, and its services made use o f as an integrated part o f the program. (4) Agreem ents for joint purchasing w ere made w ith the British and Canadians, eliminating com petitive buying and resulting in a sub stantial reduction in the prices paid for a number o f fats, oils, and oil-bearing materials. PALM OIL
Since there is no adequate substitute fo r palm oil, w hich is used in the manufacture o f tinplate, I desire to call special attention to it. On O ctober 20, 1941, the O ffice o f Production Management recom mended to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the purchase o f 30,000 long tons o f palm oil. A s o f A p ril 13, 1942, none had been purchased. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, purchases (spot) totaled 23,928 long tons. T his took place under Board o f Econom ic W arfare directives. FLAX FIBER
I now w ant to discuss flax fiber, w hich is used fo r parachute w eb bing and w hich is also used as industrial sewing thread fo r high-tension purposes. On O ctober 27, 1941, the O ffice o f Production Management recom mended the purchase b y the Reconstruction Finance Corporation o f 6500 tons o f flax. A s o f A pril 13, 1942, the day the President transferred im port powers from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the Board o f Econom ic W arfare, no purchases had been made. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, contracts had been made fo r approxi m ately 8000 tons annually from Canada, Peru, and E gyp t under Board o f Econom ic W arfare directives. JUTE
Jute is another com m odity w hich must be imported from abroad. On September 5, 1941, the O ffice o f Production Management had
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directed the purchase o f 80,000 long tons o f jute, nearly all o f w hich conies from India. A s o f A pril 13, 1942, over four months after Pearl H arbor, the Re construction Finance Corporation had done practically nothing to ful fill this important directive, having bought only 1210 long tons, al though the situation in India during this period was highly uncertain. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, the Board o f Econom ic W arfare had arranged for the purchase o f the full 80,000 long tons, plus another 8000 long tons to cover a supplementary directive. M oreover, most o f this jute was shipped from Indian ports b y the end o f 1942. T he Board o f Econom ic W arfare’s insistence on maintaining in Calcutta, India, a special agent, w ith a full business background in this industry, has been an important factor in the establishment o f this perform ance record. SISAL
Sisal is a hard fiber needed particularly in the manufacture o f binder tw ine fo r the harvesting o f our grain crops. A s o f September 5, 1941, the O ffice o f Production Management had recommended the purchase o f 100,000 short tons o f sisal (increased to 250,000 tons on M arch 18, 1942). A s o f A pril 13, 1942, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had purchased only an approximate 33,600 short tons against this urgent directive. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, the Board o f Econom ic W arfare had negotiated contracts fo r approxim ately 310,000 short tons, all to be produced b y June 1945, and o f w hich 150,000 tons is expected to be produced b y the middle o f 1943. B y Decem ber 31, 1942, some 88,000 tons had been delivered. W e lost many o f our fibers sources in the Far East to the Japanese. B y Decem ber 31, 1942, the Board o f Econom ic W arfare had entered into contracts for the developm ent and purchase o f a number o f hard fibers in M exico and Caribbean areas as w ell as in A frica, as part o f a tremendous development program. W e are planning to put 70,000 acres in these crops. 40,000 acres have already been planted. D uring a w ar w e have to fight as vigorously to buy goods as w e have to fight in peace time to sell them. TANTALITE
Tantalite is another strategic material carrying the very highest mili tary priorities. It is used, among other things, fo r contact points in radio tubes.
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The Price o f Vision
In Decem ber 1941 there was an exchange o f correspondence be* tween the O ffice o f Production Management, the State Department, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation w hich made clear the necessity o f increasing substantially United States tantalite imports b y public purchase. O n M arch 15, 194z, the W ar Production Board form ally recommended the purchase by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation o f 1,000,000 pounds. A s o f A p ril 15, 1942, over four months after Pearl Harbor, no tan talite had been purchased b y the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, some 322,000 pounds had been purchased. This increase has been due in large measure to an aggressive Board o f Econom ic W arfare program o f tracing down every possible source o f an ore w hich occurs only in very small and scattered deposits. M ost purchases have been in exceedingly small lota. In order to open up new sources o f supply w hich w ill permit ful filling the purchase recommendations w e have received from the W ar Production Board, the Rare Metals Section o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare’s M etals and Minerals Division has contacted private pro ducers or governm ent representatives in Australia, Brazil, South Rho desia, Argentina, French Equatorial A frica, N igeria, Portuguese East A frica, India, and Uganda. It is estimated that, very largely as the result o f Board o f Econom ic W arfare efforts, 1943 im ports into the United States m ay be 60 percent above 1942 imports and ten times the total w orld production in 1939. This program is typical o f the w ay in w hich the Board o f Econom ic W arfare fights fo r every pound o f strategic materials as though a soldier’s life depended upon it—w hich, o f course, it does. ZIRCONIUM
I now desire to discuss zirconium , w hich is so im portant in the manufacture o f flares, signals, tracer ammunition, and blasting caps. O n September 5, 1941, O ffice o f Production Management recom mended to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the purchase o f “ reasonable amounts” o f zirconium from B razil A s o f A p ril 13, 1942, die day on w hich the President transferred im port powers from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the Beard o f Econom ic W arfare, no purchase contracts had been made under the O ffice o f Production Management directive. A s o f Decem ber 31, 1942, contracts had been made fo r the purchase from foreign sources o f 21,575 short tons o f zirconium ores, o f w hich 16,500 short tons w ere from Brazil. T h is w as done under Board o f Econom ic W arfare directives.
Appendices
651
A s previously indicated, I have deliberately given figures o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare accomplishments through Decem ber 31, 1942, only, fo r the purposes o f m ilitary security. T h e progress in the foreign field for the first six months o f 1943 is even more encourag ing, considering the difficulties w e have faced, than it was during the last six months o f 1942. A s an overall figure fo r this committee to bear in mind, I should like to point out that total purchases o f imported raw materials subject to Board o f Econom ic W arfare directives w ill run roughly a billion and one-half dollars fo r the 1943 fiscal year and slightly over tw o billion dollars fo r the fiscal year o f 1944. O ver tw o hundred critically needed strategic materials w ill be included in these public purchase programs. Contracts w ill be made in over thirty foreign countries. M r. Perkins is in position to give this Committee detailed and cur rent inform ation on any im ported strategic material in a com pletely secret and off-the-record discussion if this Com m ittee desires to have such facts placed before it in this manner. H e can indicate the figures for the fu ll fiscal year 1943 as w ell as contemplated figures fo r the 1944 fiscal year. Under no conditions w ould w e make such current inform ation a matter o f public record. W e are, how ever, very anxious to inform this committee as to how such vast sums are being spent. I used the w ord “ spent,” but im ported strategic materials are, o f course, sold b y subsidiaries o f the Reconstruction Finance Corpora tion to our w ar industries. Public purchase is used to assure adequate supplies. Detailed inform ation has already been given the House Com mittee on Appropriations. W e w ant to give the fullest possible infor mation to the Senate Committee. Since the 13dl o f A pril 1942, when fu ll im port powers w ere trans ferred from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the Board o f Econom ic W arfare, tremendous progress has been made in stepping up the procurem ent o f certain strategic materials, shortages o f w hich could not adequately have been foreseen b y the O ffice o f Production Management prior to Pearl H arbor. Outstanding among these is the increased production o f balsa w ood and mahogany, largely in this Hemisphere. W hen the fu ll story can be told, it w ill be one o f the most dramatic successes o f the w ar effort. O ur country can be proud o f having achieved w hat seemed to be almost impossible on this front. Although the President, on A pril 13, 1942, transferred full control over the programming o f im ported strategic materials from the Recon struction Finance Corporation to the Board o f Econom ic W arfare, w hich operates under broad directives received from the W ar Produc tion Board, M r. Jones has never fu lly accepted that authority. H e and
652
T h e Price o f Vision
tm personnel down the fine have throw n a grea t many obstacles in the w ay o f oar exercise o f the powers given as to c a n y oat oar wartim e assignments. Some o f these obstructionist tactics have been minor and annoying and some have been o f major consequence in this gigantic job o f w aging total w ar. I now desire to inform this Committee and the Congress* and the public at large about some o f these delays, w hich have not ye t seen the light o f day. First o f all I desire to discuss quinine. Brig. G en. H . G Minton has informed as that: “ Anrim abrial preparations derived from cin chona are, o f course, essential to adequate control and treatment o f malaria, in conjonction w ith the accepted synthetic antj-m abriab.“ Far East cinchona bark contains 7 to 10 percent quinine sulphate; Latin Am erican bark about 2 percent. O n A pril 14, 1942, General M ac A rthur w ired W ashington that tw o million seeds o f a high grade strain had been brought o at o f the Philippines (on one o f the last planes leaving fo r Australia); adding that they “ must be planted vnthout delay” I am sorry to have to inform this committee that Jesse Jones and W ill Clayton stalled fo r months on this program. As I indicated to the Senate Banking and C urrency Committee last Decem ber, there are times when what w e need is more fights and few er shortages. L t. Col. A rthur F. Fischer, w ho brought those seeds from the Philip pines to the United States, came to the Board o f Econom ic W arfare w ith his proposal—to plant the seeds in Costa Rica—on August 24, 1942. W ithin three weeks, the Board o f Econom ic W arfare had w orked out a detailed pbn and submitted it to the other interested agencies. Reconstruction Finance Corporation representatives at first acquiesced in the proposal when it was discussed w ith them on Sep tember 11 and 29. U ndersecretary o f W ar Patterson approved it form ally on O ctober 7, 1942. Then, on O ctober 10, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation noti fied the Board o f Econom ic W arfare that “ the matter requires further consideration.” Those “ considerations“ continued for four months. M r. Jones said that our proposal was postwar planning because o f the time it takes for cinchona trees to come to full m aturity for profit able stripping. T h e Fischer trees couldn’t be harvested for 2 lA years at the earliest; norm ally, seven years pass before stripping o f the bark begins. During 1941 M r. Jones may have felt that this w ould be a short w ar in w hich w e wouldn’t become involved; in any event he did not buy quinine during that period in adequate amounts for governm ent
Appendices
653
stockpiles; during 1942 he acted as though the w ar m ight be over b y 1944, if w e can take his attitude toward this quinine project as a criterion. A United Press story in the N ew Y ork Journal o f Com m erce o f February 3, 1942, quotes Jesse Jones as follow s: “Secretary o f Commerce Jesse H . Jones told the House Banking Committee today that he believed the United States w ill be getting ‘all the rubber w e need from the D utch East Indies' b y the end o f 1943 despite the present Japanese threat to that area." M r. Jones m ay be right, but w e dare not take chances and base our imports w ork on any such opti mistic estimate. A s a matter o f fact, M r. Jones m ay have been considering some thing else. H e takes great pride in the profits o f the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and some o f its subsidiaries, as evidenced b y his recent testim ony before the B yrd Committee. If the cinchona trees w hich w e have been discussing have to be stripped after 2 14 years because o f desperate m ilitary needs fo r quinine, they w ill yield about 10,000 ounces o f quinine—and a $125,000 loss to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. T h a t w ill mean red ink on the books o f the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. I do not like to assign motives, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a possible dollar loss held up this production project. L ike many things in total w ar this project m ay, o f course, prove to be an expensive undertaking in terms o f dollars. It seems to us to be a wise investment in terms o f saving lives, however. W hatever his reasons m ay have been, the facts are that M r. Jones disregarded the constant proddings b y the Board o f Econom ic W ar fare, and fo r a w hile he ignored the fact that I, as Chairman o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare, had personally investigated the matter and recommended immediate action. H is “ considerations" continued right on through the battle—w ith malaria and w ith the Japs—at Guadal canal. It was not until late January 1943 that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation finally announced that it would spend some m oney for this quinine project. For all the full pow er the President has given the Board o f Econom ic W arfare over imports, w e are helpless when Jesse Jones, as our banker, refuses to sign checks in accordance w ith our directives. Finally, w e have w on out in all such cases, but die time lost has been precious time w hich there was no excuse for losing. T here have been many other times, o f course, when personnel down the line in both the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Board o f Econom ic W arfare have found themselves in com plete agreement
6j4
T he Price o f Vision
and hare moved forw ard together w ith speed. T h e situation b better than it w as a w hile back, and Mr. Perkins emphasized this fact in his recent testim ony before the House Appropriations Committee. Colonel Fischer is now in Costa Rica and the quinine project is under w ay. Some o f his seeds have been germ inating in the Depart* m ent o f A griculture’s experimental station in Beltsville and are about to be sent to Costa Rica. T h e rest w ill be planted there. It w ill be 1946 before quinine from the seeds brought out o f the Philippines b y Colonel Fischer can be put to w ork fighting malaria in the tropics. Even so, our armed forces may need it desperately by that time if they are still fighting in the malarial regions of the Southwest Pacific. W e and the A rm y w ould be quite w illing to strip a greater part o f the young trees at the end o f 2 lA years if w e have to do so to get quinine fo r our soldiers, even though the Reconstruction Finance Corporation m ay lose a litde m oney through not w aiting seven years to let the trees mature fo r the most profitable period o f stripping. In fairness to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation I w ant to report that on a recent development project in Guatemala, where three hundred million cinchona trees fo r quinine are being planted under Board o f Econom ic W arfare directives, w e have thus far had no opposition from the R FC . W e had previously w on our fight in terms o f principle on the Fischer project just described and M r. Jones has n ot y e t opposed us on the much larger project w e have w orked out in Guatemala. T he other quinine programs o f the Board, such as gathering w ild cinchona bark in Latin Am erica, have been pushed aggressively b y the Board o f Econom ic W arfare, and A rm y officers are now surveying this w ork in die foreign field w ith members o f our staff. Even this w ork, I am sorry to report, was held up b y M r. Jones in the late summer o f 1942, some nine months after Pearl H arbor. I w ant to sub mit the follow ing facts: In February 1943 the Board o f Econom ic W arfare took over the actual im port purchase negotiations under O rder N o. 5, w hich I signed as chairman o f the Board o f Econom ic W arfare. O rder N o. 5 is a part o f our form al budget presentation. These negotiations had pre viously been handled by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation sub sidiaries. T he 1942 record o f Reconstruction Finance Corporation’s purchases o f cinchona bark, under Board o f Econom ic W arfare direc tives, illustrates w h y the procedures w ere changed in the interest o f shortening this w ar. (1 ) On June 19, 1942, the Board o f Econom ic W arfare gave D e-
Appendices
655
fense Supplies Corporation a detailed outline o f a program fo r pur chasing Latin Am erican cinchona bark from United States im porters, and directed that it be put into immediate effect. A checkup five days later revealed that nothing had been done; the Federal Loan Adm inis trator had “ objected to the tone o f finality” about the letter o f June 19. A nother w eek was lost because M r. C layton “ has apparently mislaid the directive and requests another cop y.” T hat's the w ay the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was handling the cinchona pro gram fo r quinine three months after w e had lost Bataan.
May-Johnson bill (atomic control), 42,
Index May-Johnson bill, contd. 498- 99, 5^7- 9 , 5*7ö ; end O W M R , 509-11 Mead, James M., 111, 254, 603-5 Meany, George, 307 Medina Angarita, Isafas, 517 Mediterranean, 280, 283 Meehan, Mike, 445 “Meet the Press,“ W allace interview on, 4«9
Meitner, Dr. Lise, 472 Merz, Charles, 405 Messersmith, George S., 14m, 168-70, 185, 461, 57711, 610-12; C row ley’s re sentment toward, 306; and ExportImport Bank loan to Mexico, 461, 471- 73, 47* Metal Reserves Corporation, 166, i86n, 221 Mexericsson Telephone Co., 460-61, 473, 476 Mexico, 90, 141, 436, 460-61, 503; im ports from, 16&-70; W allace visits (1946), 612n Meyer, Eugene, 70 Meyer, Mrs. Eugene, 70-71 Michela, General Joseph A ., 314 M idway Island, 87 Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw, 507 Mikoyan, Anastas, 625 Military Liaison Board, 568n Miller, Adolph C., 107-8 Miller, Emma G uffey, 287, 438 Miller, Francis P., 160-62 Miller, Harlan, 104 Miller, Tom , 369 Missouri Banking Association, 403 Missouri Valley Authority, 396-97 Mitchell, Hugh B., 558 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 35, 40, 85-86, 88, 122, 171, 176, 490; Polish premier’s view of, 153; and Churchill, 210; FD R ’s story about, 210, 246; Nelson discusses Sino-Soviet relations with, 386n; and U N San Francisco confer ence, 436, 437n, 4390; and Truman, 45m, 613; and Hopkins mission to Moscow, 4550; ana Byrnes, 497-98, 502, 585, 588, 589 Mongolia, 36; W allace visits, 332, 360, 362, 484 Monnet, Jean, 89 Montero Bemales, Carlos, 517 Montgomery, General Sir Bernard, 157, 277, 321, 4150; Lord’s opinion of, 319
691
Montgomery W ard Company, 449 Moore, Edward H., 396 Morgan, Stokeley W ., 580 Morgan, Mrs. Stokeley W ., 580 Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 25, 33, 117, >33* >3$» 292, 319; W allace’s ad miration for, 38-39; and Jesse Jones, 69-70, 147; Bond Drive efforts, 70; and Latin America, 80, 158, 186; and Leo Crow ley, 96-97, 306; and LendLease to Britain, 147-49, »5 1» >54» 456» observations on Hopkins, 149; and postwar taxation, 196; compliments W allace, 242; and W agner Social Se curity proposal, 242; and FD R’s ad visers, 242-43; and Harold Smith, 252; his Treasury Department staff, 3i8n; and State Department foreign policy, 322; and State Department shakeup (1944), 400-401; eager for W allace in cabinet, 401, 402; and closing of race tracks (1944), 416; and cabinet com mittee to handle economic affairs, 425; and death of FDR, 431; and Soviet-American relations, 449; last eve ning with FDR, 449; at Quebec con ference, 456; and postwar employ ment, 457; resignation from Treasury, 465, 466, 631; and Truman’s failure to follow FD R ’s policies, 577; and Philip Murray, 586 Morgenthau, Mrs. Henry, 79, 186, 292 Morse, W ayne L., 446-47 Mosher, Ira, 479-80 Moscow: foreign ministers’ conference (1943), 281; Stettinius urges W allace to visit, 311 ; G rom yko invites W al lace to visit, 316; American Embassy, 559; W allace proposes trade mission to, 599-600; Fatner Sheehy urges W allace to visit (1946), 617 Mowrer, Edgar A ., i94n, 288, 295 Murphy, Frank, 250, 306, 394- 95 » 565» and Hopkins, 213 Murphy, Robert D., 114, 133-36 passim, 178, 40m; and North Africa, 160-62, 167, 174, 179-80, 401 Murray, James E., 404, 408; as liberal, 413; and employment bill, 420, 466; and atomic energy, 494 Murray, Philip, 32, 115-16, 164, 265, 339» 364» 399» 4 *6» 4795 et Chicago convention (1944), 367, 368, 369; dis satisfaction with the administration, 374- 7 5» 493» 54°» invites W allace to
692
Index
Murray, Philip, contd. CIO convention (November 1944), 392; as liberal, 413; and Truman, 529, 555—56, 575; and proposed national stabilization conference, 585-86 Myer, Dillon S., 281, 392 Myrdal, K . Gunnar, 271 Nagasaki, 4730 Najera, Francisco Castillo, 90-91 Nash, W alter, 199-200 Nathan, Robert R., 119, 120, 140, 192, 418; W allace’s regard for, 264, 437; and postwar unemployment, 450; and wage policy, 493 National Advisory Committee for A ero nautics, 157, 452 National Advisory Council, 586 National Association o f Manufacturers, *70» 544-45 National Citizens Political Action Com mittee, see Political Action Commit tee (PA C ) National Council o f American-Soviet Friendship, 499 National Defense Research Committee,
1890 National National National National National
Grange, 170 Intelligence Authority, 444 Labor Relations Board, 458 Planning Association, 446n Resources Planning Board, 34,
*33» 252 National Labor Board, see W a r Labor Board Nazism, 20, 26, 35; in Argentina, 290, 296, 307, 318, 320, 451, 611-12 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 6211, 9011, 559 Nelson, Donald, 23-24, 33, 57, 59, 65, 66 * 76» 93 * 94* io4“ 5* « 9 * 1*4, 43*; and W allace’s resignation from W PB , 70, 22^1; and tariff policy, 82; and Combined Production and Resources Board, 86n; and Thurman Arnold’s antitrust prosecutions, 112-13; and manpower policy, 116-17, 3! 3* and consumer goods policy, 120; and overall planning, 121; and postwar relief policy, 127, 130; and Eberstadt, i4on, 191-93; and landing craft short a g e 259i and Hopkins, 274, 287; trip to Russia, 285-86; and postwar full employment, 286; and F D R ’s ad visers, 287; his standing with labor and small business, 325; W allace’s ad
miration for, 325; as FD R ’s repre sentative to China, 365, 386-87; presses for reconversion, 376; as special ad viser to President, 400, 419; and Rus sia, 447-48, 451; and Baruch, 469 Ness, Norman, 460 N ew Deal, 32-33, 128-29, 139, 244; and agriculture, 16-17; style of adminis tration, 18-19; rod international trade, 20; and Truman administration, 432 N ew England, W allace campaigns for FD R in (1944), 381-82, 384 Newhall, Arthur B*, 92-93 Newman, James R., 498-99, 527, 530, 55*~53
N ew Y ork Genealogical Society, 104 N ew Zealand, 199-200, 324; Mrs. Roose velt’s visit to, 243 Nicaragua, 165-66 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 184 Niebuhr, Richard, 184 Nikishov, Ivan F., 336-37, 339 Niles, David K., 105, 264 Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 38311, 577n Nixon, Richard M., 49; and Helen G . Douglas, 2980 Norris, George W ., 12911, 164 North Africa, 30, 54, 114, 140-41; and second front, 122, 126; invasion of, 131-32; planning for civilian govern ment in, 133-35* 137* 160-64, 171* *74"75, 179-80; and Stalin, 148; FD R’s estimate of German troops in, 177; black market, 183 North African Economic Board, 1350 Norweb, R. Henry, 77 Nover, Barnet (Barney), 295
O ’Connell, W illiam Cardinal, 268 O ’Connor, Basil, 165 O ’Daniel, W . Lee (Pappy), 107, 396 Office of Economic Stabilization, 555n Office of Economic W arfare, 28, 2260 Office of Export Control, B E W , 24, 99, 141 Office o f Foreign Relief and Rehabili tation, 251 Office of Price Administration (O P A ), 38, 4 9 4 -9 6 . ÎSÎ. 555“ . 574. 579; T ro man considers veto of, 582-83; new bill signed by Truman, 601-2 Office of Production Management, 23 Office of Scientific Research and De velopment, i89n
Index Office of Strategic Services (O S S )y 160, 161» 444» 49 » Office of W ar Information (O W I), i6 if 181, 191, 236-37 Office of W ar Mobilization and Recon version (O W M R ), 498, 507» 5i7n; and nuclear policy recommendations, 509-11 Oil, 81, 82, 189, 251; to North Africa (1942), 1 14; to Sweden, 132; and Middle East, 255, 256, 279; and Brit ish, 300; Truman policy, 440 Olivarez, Maria Rosa, 296 O ’Mahoney, Joseph C., 225, 4040; antiRussian stance, 420 O ’Mahoney, Mrs. Joseph G , 420 O ’Neal, Edward A ., 170, 235, 247 Ooms, Casper, 544 Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 42, 493, 494, 516; W allace meets with, 496-97 Oran, North Africa, 281-82 Orizu, Nigerian prince, 392 Orlando, Vittorio, 584 Orr, Sir John Boyd, 19, 607-8 OSS, see Office of Strategic Services Ottawa, English-American air confer ence (1943), 2I9 Oumansky, Constantine A ., 129, 148, *55» 305 “O ur Job in the Pacific” (W allace pamphlet), 3290, 385-87 Outer Mongolia, see Mongolia Outland, George E., 531 P A C , see Political Action Committee Palestine, 609; and W allace, 35, 44, 193, 310, 605; and FDR, 35, 211, 280, 310, 313, 420; and Truman, 44, 588-89, 603-7; and Jewish-Arab conflict, 254, 255, 277, 279, 310, 313; in W illkie and D ew ey campaign oratory (1943), 265; Churchill, 265, 310; and State De partment, 277; British W hite Paper on, 3oon, 313m, and British oil policy, 300; Jewish terrorists in, 58811-890 Palmer, Charles F., 146 Palmer, Robert, 581 Paris Peace Conference (1946), 58485, 588-89; and W allace’s foreign pol icy speeches, 613-14, 618, 620-22, 623, 630 Pasvolsky, Leo, 262-63, 456 Patman, W right, 459-60, 462; -Murray full employment bill, 466
693
Patterson, Joseph M., 72, 108, 132 Patterson, Richard G , 463 Patterson, Robert P., 93, 99, 106, 113, 132, 192, 200, 449, 538, 564; as possible Democratic candidate (1944), 140; and FDR, 217; in Truman cabinet, 466, 477, 480, 497, 515, 604; and nu clear policy, 507, 508, 527, 530-32, 55211, 565, 569; and U S . troops in Iran, 519; and State Department China experts, 520 Patton, General George S., Jr., 4150, 422 Patton, James G ., 164, 399-400; and full employment bill, 411, 426 Pauley, Edwin W ., 37, 39, 366, 369, 370, 611; FD R compliments on campaign efforts, 396; at Chicago convention, 402; and Truman administration, 440, 491, 499, 520, 546; and Ickes’ resigna tion, 550, 551, 552 Pawley, W illiam D., 463-64 Peace, 14, 189, 249, 279; and Imperial Germany, 9; W allace’s view, 29, 54, 148-49, 156, 203, 597-98; and trans it, 86, 106; and food, 95, 105; Sta’s view, 283 “Peaceful Atom ic Abundance,” W al lace speech (Madison Square G ar den, December 1945), 522-23 Pearson, Drew, 154, 209, 295, 370, 399, 406, 540; and W allace’s letter to T ru man regarding Russia, 6oin, 615 Peek, George N., 17 Pegler, W estbrook, 358n, 36on Pehle, John W ., 318 Penaranda, Enrique, 288 Pendcrgast, Thomas, Jn 37, 395, 615 Pepper, Claude, 33, 145, 328, 5740, 586; and 1944 ticket, 364-65; at Demo cratic National Convention, 368, 369, 403; and State Department reorgani zation (1944), 40m, 403; as liberal, 413; and Commerce Department re organization, 460; disillusionment with Truman administration, 464-65, 572n; and Russia, 544, 568; and Truman, 575-76 Perkins, Frances, 98, 3o6n, 307, 462 Perkins, George, 204n, 227 Perkins, Milo, 16, 18, 80, 95, 101, 106, 107, n o , 1 12, 121, 123, 175, 191, 287; and Board of Economic W arfare, 24, 26, 28, 53, 65, 67, 69-70, 75, 78, 79, 81, 136, 137, 138, 142; leaves govern-
694
Index
Perkins, Milo, contd. ment, 28; conflicts with Hull, 81; and Acheson, 91, 132, 255; and postwar population planning, 99; and export control, 99; Leon Henderson’s view of, 105; and civilian government in North A frica, 133; and Danaher Amendment, 142; and Jones, 145, 155—56, 186-87, *9*» 2