The Population of Israel 9780231888370

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DOV FRIEDLANDER AND CALVIN GOLDSCHEIDER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK 1979

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Friedlander, Dov, 1930The population of Israel. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Israel—Population. 2. Israel—Population policy. I. Goldscheider, Calvin, joint author. II. Title. HB3634.A3F74 301.32'9'5694 78-13139 ISBN 0-231-04572-7

Columbia University Press New York Guildford, Surrey Copyright © 1979 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

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Figures Tables

viii ix

Foreword by Bernard Bereisen

xiii

Preface

xxi

PART I: THE BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL Chapter 1. Zionism and Population The World Jewish Demographic Context; Zionist Ideology and Population. Chapter 2. Demographic Background: Population Change in Palestine and in Israel Population Changes in the Late Turkish Period; The British Period; Jewish Population Change in Israel; Arab Population Growth in Israel.

1 3

15

vi

CONTENTS

PART II: POPULATION POLICY: TRENDS AND PATTERNS Chapter 3. Immigration Policies and Patterns in Palestine The Beginnings of Modern Immigration: The Turkish Period; The Period of the British Mandate; Economic Absorptive Capacity; Political Quotas. Chapter 4. Immigration Policies and Patterns in Israel The Institutional Context of Immigration Policy; Mass Immigration: Patterns and Policies; Post-Mass-Immigration Period (1951— 54); Immigration Patterns and Policies: 1955-67; Immigration Patterns and Policies in the Post Six Day-War Period: 1968-75; Some Concluding Observations.

51 53

83

Chapter 5. Natality Policies: Trends and Patterns 119 The Origins of Pronatalism; Pronatalism in Israel: The First Fifteen Years; Family Planning and Child Allowances; The Natality Committee Report; The Demographic Center and Policy Implementation. PART III: EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY 141 Chapter 6. Natality Policy: A Critical Evaluation 143 Omissions: The Issue of Immigration and Fertility Targets; Failure to Examine Fertility Trends More Fully ; Effects of Policy on Fertility; Effects Of Restrictions of Induced Abortions on Family Size; Evaluating Moslem Fertility.

CONTENTS

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Chapter 7. Implications of Past Population Policies

161

Chapter 8. Future Population Policies and Patterns: Alternatives and Implications

189

Consequences of Past Demographic Patterns and Policies; The Volume and Timing Effects; Societal Implications of Age-Sex Dynamics; Aging: An Illustration of the Future Implications of Past Population Patterns.

Future Population Size and Dynamics; Israel as a Demographic Minority in the Arab Middle East; Israel and World Jewish Population; Israel's Population and Its Arab Minority; Population and the Ethnic and Religious Composition of Israel; Population Change and Human Resources; Appendix: Population Projections.

Chapter 9. Means and Goals of Population Policy in Israel 219 Notes 229 Index 237

2.1 The Development of the Jewish and Arab Populations in Palestine and Israel, 1922-76 2.2 Annual Immigration to Israel by Countries of Origin, 1920-75 4.1 The Components of Immigration and their Interrelationships 4.2 Immigration Selection Rules (1952) 4.3 Alternative Patterns of the Relationship between Mass Migration, Restrictive Policies, and the Decline in Immigration 7.1 Population by Age and Sex, Actual and according to the "Zero-Immigration" Assumption, End of Years, 1947-72 7.2 Population by Age and Sex, according to the ConstantImmigration and Zero-Immigration Assumptions, End of Years, 1947-72 7.3 The Jewish Male Population by Age 1947-72 Actual and Projected Echo Effects Resulting from Mass Immigration, 1948-51 8.1 Percentage Jewish Population in Palestine and Israel, Actual (1922-76) and Projected (1977-2010) 8.2 Age-Sex Distributions of Population Subgroups in Israel

18 21 85 99 104 165 166 177 195 200

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1.1: Estimated World Jewish Population Size by Major Regions 1850-1948 2.1: The Development of the Population in Palestine and in Israel by Population Group, 1922-75 2.2: Components of Population Growth, Jewish Population in Palestine and in Israel, 1919-75 2.3: Components of Population Growth, Arab Population by Religion, 1932-75 2.4: Arab Population in Palestine and in Israel by Religion, 1922-75 2.5: Vital Rates, Gross Reproduction Rates, and Life Expectancy by Religion, 1922-75 2.6: Number of Immigrants, Rate of Immigration, and Percent Illegal Immigrants by Year of Immigration, 1919-75 2.7: Immigrants by Continent of Origin and Period of Immigration, 1919-48 2.8: Immigrants by Country of Origin and Period of Immigration, 1919-48 (Percentages) 2.9: Immigrant Earners by Occupation Abroad and Period of Immigration 1919-47 2.10: Immigrants by Sex, Age, and Period of Immigration, 1928-48 (Percentages)

5 30 31 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 39

TABLES

2.11: Immigrants by Country of Birth and Period of Immigration, 1948-75 2.12A: Immigrants with Occupation Stated by Continent of Residence before Immigration and Occupation Abroad, Males, 1950-71 2.12B: Immigrants with Occupation Stated by Continent of Residence before Immigration and Occupation Abroad, 1972-75 2.13: Immigrants by Sex, Age, Continent of Birth, and Period of Immigration, 1948-75 2.14: Gross Reproduction Rates and Net Reproduction Rates in Israel, Jews (by Origin) and Arabs, 1944-75 2.15: Age-Specific Fertility Rates by Religion: Non-Jews, Israel, 1963/4-75 2.16: Non-Jewish Employed Persons (Males) By Occupation 1955-75 6.1: Average Number of Children by Place of Birth, Period of Immigration, and Ethnic Origin, Jewish Women, Marriage Cohorts 1920-59 6.2: Age-Specific Fertility Rates in the Kibbutz and in Israel at Large by Birthplace of Women, Jewish Population, 1960-72 6.3: Monthly Romanian Birth Rates, 1966-74 7.1: Jewish Population by Age and Sex according to the "Zero-Immigration" Assumption 1947-72 7.2: Jewish Population by Age and Sex according to the "Constant-Immigration" Assumption, 1947-1972 (in Thousands) 7.3: Jewish Population by Age and Sex, 1948-72 (in Thousands) 7.4: Total Population 1943-1972: Actual and according to the Zero-Immigration Model; the Volume and Timing Effect of Immigration 7.5: Total Population 1947-1972: Actual and according to the Constant-Immigration Model; the Timing Effect on Growth Patterns 7.6: Relationship between Jewish and Arab Population

40 42 44 45 47 48 50 146 152 154 167 168 169 170 170

TABLES

7.7: 7.8:

7.9: 7.10:

7.11:

7.12: 8.1: 8.2:

8.3: 8.4:

8.5:

Size and Percentage Jewish in Israel under Various Immigration Alternatives, 1947-72 Population Size and Composition in Israel according to Four Alternative Peace Settlements and Assumptions concerning Past Immigration, Mid-1967 Jewish Population by Age and Sex, Actual and Hypothetical according to Assumption on VolumeTime Variations in Immigration and Fertility of Immigrants in Israel—the Differential Fertility Effect, 1972 (in Thousands) Population Dynamics Implications Resulting from Actual Demographic Patterns and according to Two Immigration Assumptions: Israel, 1947-72 The Average Size of a Single-Year Male Age Cohort in the 15-24 Age Group, Actual, according to the Zero-Immigration and the Constant-Immigration Models, 1947-72 (in Thousands) Changing Population Size and Annual Growth Rates (r), Actual and Hypothetical under Various Assumptions, Varying Fertility Levels with Zero Immigration, Jewish Population, 1947-72 (in Thousands) Growth Characteristics of the Aged Population, Israel 1947-2040 Population Size (1973) and Rates of Population Growth (1970-73) in Various Arab Countries Population in Israel and in the Middle East, Actual 1970 and Projected to the Years 1990 and 2010, according to Various Projection Assumptions (in Thousands) Percentage Jewish Population within Age Groups in Israel by Various Assumptions concerning Jewish Immigration and Fertility, 1970, 1990, and 2010 Percentage Jewish Population within Age Groups in Israel and the Administered Occupied Areas by Various Assumptions concerning Jewish Immigration and Fertility, 1970, 1990, and 2010 Non-Jewish Population, Actual and Projected, by

170 172

175 179

182

183 185 191

192 196

197

xi i

8.6: 8A: 8B:

8C:

8D:

8E:

8F:

TABLES

Age Group, Religious Group, and Fertility Assumption, Percentages, 1970, 1990, and 2010 Jewish Population, Active and Dependent Age Groups, Actual 1970 and Projected 1990-2020 by Projection Assumptions Projection Assumptions for the Various Population Groups in Israel and the Administered Occupied Areas Jewish Population in Israel, Actual 1970 and Projected to the Years 1990 and 2010 by Age and Alternative Assumptions concerning Immigration and Fertility (Absolute Figures and Percentages) Total Population (Jewish and Non-Jewish) in Israel, Actual 1970 and Projected to the Years 1990 and 2010 by Age and Alternative Assumption concerning Immigration and Fertility (Absolute Figures and Percentages) Total Population (Jewish and Non-Jewish) in Israel and the Administered Occupied Areas, Actual 1970 and Projected to the Years 1990 and 2010 by Age and Alternative Assumptions concerning Immigration and Fertility (Absolute Figures and Percentages) The Composition of the Jewish Population by Ethnic Groups and Age, Actual 1970 and Projected to the Years 1990 and 2010, according to Three Assumptions on Immigration: Medium Fertility Levels Are Assumed for All Groups (Figures in Thousands and Percentages) Non-Jewish Population Groups in Israel and the Administered Occupied Areas by Age, Actual 1970 and Projected to the Years 1990 and 2010 according to Three Fertility Assumptions (Absolute Figures in Thousands and Percentages)

202 204 209

212

213

214

215

216

THIS BOOK IS a scholarly analysis of Israel's population dynamics from before independence through the present and into the future. As such it illuminates political issues of the Middle East on the one hand and policy issues of induced demographic change on the other. Both are high on the world's agenda these years, neither is likely to disappear in the near future. This volume makes an important contribution to their understanding. The demography of Israel looks backward into the convulsions of Central and Eastern Europe in the twentieth century, forward into the Middle East of the twenty-first: it is in the nature of population trends that they carry some of the future within them. The political story properly begins in antiquity but the modern version might start with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that "His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people . . . it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." At the time there were about fourteen million Jews in the world, well under 1 percent of the total population: half were in Russia, three million each in Europe and the United States, over half a million in North Africa and the

xiv

FOREWORD

Middle East, nearly 85,000 in Palestine. Their prospects in Europe were hardly felicitous: the torments of Eastern Europe not forgotten, nor indeed absent; the convulsions of Central Europe just ahead. There seemed to be in principle three options: seek a socialist solution in Europe, an individualistic solution in America, a collective and ideological solution in the new homeland. The first two were already closing in and closing down in the early 1920s, and the pressure grew for the third. No wonder, then, that the growing Zionist movement was in process not only of developing ideological, moral, political, and financial support for the promised homeland but also of encouraging and subsidizing immigration into the area. The attendant political problems, to say the very least, were difficult, not only with the Arabs of Palestine and surrounding areas but with the mandatory power as well: Britain struggled with the intransigent issues through one White Paper and Commission after another during its quarter century of responsibility, with population implications always closely involved. As with many other things, World War II drastically changed the situation. The Holocaust and the subsequent plight of European Jews made the matter immediately urgent, and specifically raised irresistible pressures for mass immigration into Palestine, whether considered legal or not. Within twenty-four months after the last commission—this one a joint Anglo-American committee of enquiry—had sought to dispose of the exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to Palestine "once and for all," the State of Israel was declared in May 1948. When the dust of battle had settled, the new country covered part of what had been Palestine and included about 650,000 Jews and 150,000 Arabs. The bitterness and bloodshed that characterized the history from declaration to statehood is only too evident today, nor does it seem likely to go away tomorrow. The population basis of political issues was recognized by the various commissions that sought to address them, and expert analyses and projections of demographic trends within Palestine were constantly being deliberated, with regard not only to migration patterns but also to differential fertility and mortality between

FOREWORD

XV

Arabs and Jews. This fascinating, and continuing, politico-demographic history is carefully reviewed in this volume, and the echoes are clear today: How large a proportion are the Jews likely to be of the total Palestine population? was a question for the Anglo-American Enquiry over thirty years ago. How large a proportion of Israel's population are the Arabs likely to become? is a question involved not only with differential fertility and migration but also with territorial definitions today. The demographic dynamics underlay a whole range of political problems for the new state once established. Large numbers of Oriental Jews—themselves refugees from Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East, to some extent a mirror image of the Arab migration from Israel—arrived in the country later than the European Jews. Not only were their cultural, ethnic, and occupational differences reflected in fertility and mortality measures but their political assimilation into the mainstream of Israeli life is only now being reflected there as well. Moreover, the demographic and political balance between Jews and Arabs within the Israeli population has been remarkably maintained so that in 1978 it is within a few percentage points of what it was in 1948, realized through the balance of high immigration on the one side against high fertility on the other (and thus recalling Canada where the French "revenge of the cradle" historically compensated for greater British immigration). Always dominating the political scene from 1948 to 1978 have been the requirements of military security and hence of requirements in manpower—even though the area has given the world its most dramatic demonstration of what the modern technological capacity of a small population can achieve militarily against vastly overwhelming numbers. The political repercussions of demographic change were most deeply felt during the mandate on issues of immigration, both in British policy and in internal clashes. As this study makes clear, immigration is still an important population issue for Israel today and tomorrow. Now, moreover, it is intimately involved in international politics. Over 80 percent of the world's Jews now live in the United States, Israel, and the Soviet Union. Immigration of deprived or disadvantaged Jews in substantial numbers

xvi

FOREWORD

can now come only from the latter source: few are left in Central and Eastern Europe, North Africa or the Middle East; those in the West are not inclined to leave. Thus the only large reservoir of potential Jewish immigrants resides in the superpower with Israel's Arab antagonists as its client states and hence unlikely to be particularly forthcoming on that score: "let my people go" may not be heard this time either. Beyond that, there is now a further complicating factor with its demographic repercussions neatly spelled out here in innovative analysis—namely, the population effects of decisions with regard to the territories occupied after the 1967 war, now in sharp dispute. In all these regards, the population dynamics of Palestine and Israel in the past sixty years present a fascinating chronicle of the intermingling of demography and politics. Similarly, it illustrates the contemporary treatment of policy issues on population matters. The "population problem" has become widely recognized in recent years and widely addressed. In the main, however, it has been defined as a problem of rapid growth in the developing countries, a problem for India and Bangladesh, Nigeria and Mexico. Yet there are problems of population growth, not to mention population distribution, in the developed world as well: advocacy of zero growth on resource and environment grounds in a few countries, concern over "demographic stagnation" in others, especially in Eastern Europe. Here too, Israel constitutes an instructive case study. Hardly a current population issue is lacking. From the reproductive standpoint, it is not one society but three: high fertility in its Moslem segment, as in other developing Moslem societies (and still with little of the lowering trend anticipated by some demographic analyses for Commissions of the mandate period); moderately high fertility among the Oriental Jewish immigrants, reflecting the traditional fertility practices of the societies from which they came but with a striking convergence downward within only a generation or so; and low fertility among the European immigrants and the native-born, like their Western counterparts. In this respect it is, so to speak, the demographic crossroads

FOREWORD

xvii

between Asia and the West, with birth rates for population subgroups almost as diverse within this small country as in the world as a whole, and for much the same reasons. As in the world generally, such differentials are overlayed with socioeconomic and educational differentials among the communities in a mutually reinforcing relationship: higher fertility going along with lower occupational status, lower education, lower status for women. As in many other countries, it is when the ethnic differences are intertwined with socioeconomic differences that the policy shoe begins to pinch. Rural/urban residence and industrial/agricultural occupations are also entangled in this matrix along with the sticky issues of housing and settlement. The echo effects of population fluctuations up and down as a result of the mass immigrations of the early years are still having their impact today—just as the baby boom does in the United States. Whether even moderate fertility can be sustained along with women's liberation and limited housing is not at all clear, as the Eastern European countries are now finding despite pro-natalist efforts. The problems of an aging society are already being felt in Israel, and the more serious problems ahead can already be seen. The social and economic consequences of differential migration and growth—consequences for jobs, housing, education, health, even the marriage market—press for attention within while security requirements remain monumental for a small country in the midst of unfriendly to hostile neighbors. Throughout its short history, Israel has sought to address policy issues of population, both migration and fertility: selective immigration as against mass immigration, and if selective on what criteria and in what magnitudes, family assistance schemes, incentives for large families, control over induced abortion, availability of family planning services and information. Years before the recent national population commissions in the United States, Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands, the Israelis had set up their own; its report appeared within months of the 1965 Geneva Conference that symbolized the serious attention given by the developing countries to their population problems ; and its recommendation to establish a demographic center in the Prime Minis-

xviii

FOREWORD

ter's office was implemented years before a similar recommendation was made in the World Population Plan of Action at the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest. How population issues were addressed and with what degree of success are fully documented in this volume; indeed, a major contribution of this important book is the authors' critique of governmental policy and their own offer of preferred alternatives. Another is their objective demonstration of the limits of such policies in the absence of supporting conditions and attitudes. It is thus a sobering thought, not without its encouraging aspect, to appreciate how far population policies can miss their mark, either in bringing about something desired or in preventing something undesired, against the will of individual people: where people's lives are intimately involved they not only can be the best judges of their self-interest but they can exercise that judgment against all but overwhelming power. In his concern with the need for Jewish citizens, David Ben-Gurion as much as any other modern governmental leader tried to follow the old precept that "to govern is to populate," but even he was not able to realize all his objectives in this regard. In any case, no realistic population policy can raise Israel's proportionate population vis-à-vis the Arabs of the region: under the most extreme assumptions it will remain no more than a slight fraction of the territory, with whatever that may imply for political position and military security. Beyond that, nothing that the Jews of Israel can do will substantially contribute to a Jewish demographic renaissance in the world: the traditionally low fertility of Jews within their societies, plus perhaps a trend toward even further assimilation in the West will continue to keep their numbers relatively small—as a result of the Holocaust, about the same size today as at the time of the Balfour Declaration six decades ago. This book is not content to dissect the demographic past, as academic exercise, but seeks as well to chart the demographic horizons. Israel is an intensified microcosm, speeded up, of current population issues and responses. Hardly anything is missing: the most active immigration policy in modern history, social

FOREWORD

xix

layers of differential fertility and mortality, planned population distribution internally, extreme demographic differences vis-à-vis hostile neighbors, wide-ranging demographic projections resting on the judgments of individual couples on the one hand and the decisions of international politics on the other, worrisome regional trends affecting security prospects, reproductive practices subject to strong religious and cultural proscriptions both Jewish and Arab, rational efforts at policy consideration and instrumentation, shortfall from policy goals. It is to the authors' credit that they find a scientific path through the minefield of technical and policy issues, and in doing so enlighten the demographic past, present, and future of this vital people. In the best sense, this book, meritorious and timely as it is, uses scholarship to elucidate complex matters of consequence. Social demography is sometimes perceived as the private preserve of an esoteric band specializing in dry-as-dust numbers— and sometimes, fair to say, that is what it is. Not here, however: what shows through this exemplary study is the life blood of a people and their nation—not mere numbers but what they represent in individuals living and dying, moving and assimilating, escaping from communal despair into communal opportunity, providing life chances for their children, somehow harmonizing their individual goals and the national good, struggling and surviving. In the end, one might say, the politics and the policy become one, and to that process this book has made a most worthy contribution: scholarship in the service of democratic freedom. Bernard Berelson President Emeritus and Senior Fellow The Population Council Irvington, New York April 1978

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THIS BOOK EXAMINES the relationship between population

growth and policies in Palestine and Israel, focusing on social, economic, and political determinants, consequences, and implications. Population processes have been integral features of the dynamic changes that have characterized the country over the last several decades. Indeed, one of the dominant themes in the sociopolitical evolution of Israeli society has been the relative size and growth of Jewish and Arab populations and issues related to immigration and natality patterns. Moreover, populating Palestine and Israel has been one of the main goals of Zionist nationalism and a focus of its policies and programs. The open-door immigration policy formulated when Israel was established has been one of the clearest expressions of Zionism. This policy, in combination with sociopolitical and economic processes, resulted in a mass migration to Israel 1948-51, unprecedented in modern demographic history. In turn, this mass migration has been, and continues to be, the dominant factor shaping Israeli society. Understanding these population processes and their implications is therefore an essential first step in analyzing the evolution and continuity of Israel as a viable State in the Arab Middle East. The changing Arab-Je wish and Arab-Israeli conflicts, on the one hand, and the changing socioeconomic and socioethnic structure of Israeli society, on the other hand, are to a large extent conse-

χχπ

PREFACE

quences of population patterns and policies. Of no less significance are the short- and long-term implications of population policies for the changing structure of Israeli society that are likely to continue through the twenty-first century. Although in many ways population policies and patterns in Israel are unique, just as in other countries, Israel provides a fascinating case study of the relationship between population processes and policies and the implications of these patterns. The book is divided into three major sections. The first provides a background to population growth and policy in Palestine and Israel, focusing in chapter 1 on the general relationship between Zionism and population. Chapter 2 provides a basic demographic description of the changes among Jewish and Arab populations in Palestine and Israel. Against this ideological and demographic background, Part II discusses in detail the trends and patterns of population policy. Changing immigration policies in Palestine (chapter 3) and in Israel (chapter 4) are analyzed as part of the general socioeconomic and political changes in the area. Of particular importance is the analysis of the impact of policy on immigration patterns and the effects of immigration on policy changes. The trends and patterns of natality in Israel are presented in chapter 5, with a focus on official Israeli policy emerging from the Israeli Natality Committee Report. Given the ideological and demographic background and the analysis of policy, the third section of the book evaluates and analyzes the implications of population growth and policy. Israel's natality policy is evaluated critically in chapter 6. The demographic and societal implications of past population policies are analyzed in chapter 7. In an attempt to investigate and evaluate alternative population policies, a series of models were developed and the implications of these alternative future population patterns are discussed in chapter 8. A final chapter takes an overall view of the means and goals of population policy in Israel to suggest the role of policy and its limitations. In general, studies of social and demographic processes in Palestine and Israel are often characterized by ideological and political biases, implicitly or explicitly. As Israelis and demogra-

PREFACE

xxiii

phers, we have tried to focus on analytic issues that seemed to us of central importance and have attempted to carefully avoid entering into ideological and political polemics that have so often clouded the analysis of population policy and change in this area. Most of the materials presented in this volume have not appeared before. Some of the analysis of natality policies appeared in the chapter on Israel in Population Policy in Developed Countries (McGraw Hill, 1974), edited by Bernard Bereleson; the consequences of immigration for population dynamics appeared in "Mass Immigration and Population Dynamics in Israel," Demography (November 1975); the implications of Jewish and Arab population growth patterns for the future was presented in "Peace and the Demographic Future of Israel," Journal of Conflict Resolution (September 1974). These published materials have been revised and expanded for inclusion in this book. The authors would like to extend their appreciation to the Population Council, New York, for grant D71059C which provided support for the analysis of fertility policy in Israel and to the Rockefeller-Ford Program for Population Policy Research for supporting the analysis of immigration policy. Many persons have assisted in the various research projects that form the basis of the analysis in this book. We are particularly indebted to the former President of the Population Council, Bernard Bereleson, who initiated and supported the project from the beginning. Ruhama Yitzchaki assisted in the first phases of the analysis of natality policies. Steve Plaut, Hector Jaimovich, Alon Axelrod, Noami Karsolowski, Nurit Yaffe, and Dorit Tal, former students in the department of demography of the Hebrew University, assisted in the organization and preparation of the materials analyzed. Our colleagues Judah Matras, Helmut Musham, and Ephraim Kleiman read parts of the manuscript and offered constructive and helpful advice. To our students and colleagues we express our sincerest thanks. D.F. C.G. Jerusalem May 1978

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PürttO THE BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL

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ZIONISM AND POPULATION

POPULATION GROWTH, population policies, and the relationships between them in Palestine and Israel are inextricably linked to the major social, historical, and political processes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Modernization, nationalism, and socialism are among the societal forces that have influenced significantly the evolution of demographic changes and policies related to population in Palestine and Israel. An overview of this general background provides the perspective within which the relationships between population change and policy in Palestine and Israel may be understood. Two major processes represent the central historical themes underlying population changes in Palestine and Israel: demographic processes emerging among European Jewish communities and the evolution of Jewish nationalism. These processes were intimately related to the more general changes associated with modernization that were sweeping European societies from west to east in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and were part of the general emancipation of European Jewry. Issues associated with the general relationship between nationalism, modernization, and demographic changes are complex and require detailed analysis. Examining these relationships

4

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

for a minority subpopulation adds to the complexities. Nevertheless some broad generalities help place in context the processes of population change and policy in Palestine and Israel.

The World Jewish Demographic Context From the middle of the nineteenth century through World War II, world Jewry experienced a series of revolutionary demographic changes that had profound implications for Jewish life in Europe, America, and Palestine. Some of these changes paralleled the general European demographic transition; others were related to the particular Jewish situation in these countries. Three population changes that are of special importance in the present context may be identified: first, Jewish population was increasing significantly in size in the process of the transition toward low levels of mortality and fertility. This expansion characterized most conspicuously the large concentration of Jews in Eastern Europe. Second, the distribution of world Jewry was toward greater urban concentration within countries and was shifting from Europe to America as a result of large-scale international migrations. Third, the Holocaust devastated European Jewry through the systematic annihilation of 6 million Jews, reducing the Jewish demographic and sociocultural center to a marginal remnant. The magnitude of these demographic changes is reflected in the patterns of Jewish population size for major regions of the world beginning in the mid-nineteenth century (table l.l). 1 The size of the Jewish population began to increase rapidly toward the middle of the nineteenth century, accelerating significantly in the last three decades. Estimates suggest that total world Jewish population size in 1825 was around 3.25 million, increasing to almost 8 million by the 1880s and to over 10 million by the turn of the twentieth century. Continual growth persisted up to the eve of World War II; world Jewish population size had expanded to almost 17 million by 1939. In a little over a century (1825-1939), the size of the Jewish population had increased fivefold. Jewish population growth was not equally spread among Jewish commu-

ZIONISM AND POPULATION

5

Table 1.1 Estimated World Jewish Population Size by Major Regions, 1850-1948 Millions 1850

1880

1914

1939

1948

World total Europe (total) Eastern Europe Other Europe Asia Africa America-Oceania

Al 4.1 3.3 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.1

7.7 6.8 5.4 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.3

13.5 9.1 7.1 2.0 0.5 0.4 3.5

16.6 9.5 7.5 2.0 1.0 0.6 5.5

11.5 3.7 2.6 1.1 1.3 0.7 5.8

World total Europe (total) Eastern Europe Other Europe Asia Africa America-Oceania

100 87 70 17 6 4 2

100 88 70 18 4 4 4

100 57 45 12 6 4 33

100 32 23 10 11 6 50

Percent 100 68 53 15 4 3 26

SOURCE: Adapted from O. Schmelz, "Demography," Encyclopedia 1, p. 1495.

Judaica,

vol. 5, table

nities during this period. Increases in Jewish population size were particularly large for the East European Jewish population where most of world Jewry lived and were largely the result of natural increase (the excess of births over deaths). The increase from 3.3 million to 7.5 million Jews in Eastern Europe (1850-1939) understates the very high rates of natural increase, since an estimated one-third of the East European Jewish population migrated to America and overseas countries during this period. Hence, the natural growth rate among East European Jewry was sufficiently high to generate an overseas population movement of 2.5 million Jews (1880-1924) at the same time sustaining a population increase within Eastern European Jewish communities. Rates of Jewish population growth in America and Oceania were even more rapid as a combined result of immigration and initial high levels of natural increase among immigrants. Within a ninety-year period beginning in 1850, the Jewish population in America and Oceania grew at a striking pace—from an estimated 100,000 Jews in 1850 to over 5.5 million in 1939.

6

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Looking at these patterns from the point of view of the changing distribution of world Jewish population, several key changes may be noted. In 1850, there were an estimated 4.7 million Jews in the world. Of these, 87 percent lived in Europe, 70 percent in Eastern Europe, only 10 percent in Asia or Africa, and 2 percent in America. Starting in 1880 this pattern shifted significantly. The proportion of total Jewry living in Europe declined to 68 percent, largely reflecting the decline of East European Jewry, from 70 to 53 percent. By 1914, the percentage of Jews living in America and overseas countries had increased to one-fourth of the total world Jewish population. These trends continued in the interwar years, and by 1939, Eastern Europe no longer contained the majority of world Jewish population and one-third of all Jews were living in America and Oceania. The changing distribution of Jews from Europe to America may also be seen in the fact that in both 1850 and 1939 nine out of every ten Jews lived in Europe or America but the American share of the total increased from 2 to 33 percent. A distinguishing feature of the Jewish population in all these continents had been their urban concentration. This characteristic had major implications for the sociodemographic structure of the Jewish population and the receptivity of Jewish communities to social and demographic changes. Even where Jews lived in nonurban places there was a tendency toward urban rather than agricultural occupations. The Holocaust and the destruction of European Jewry put an end to Jewish growth patterns and reduced Jewish population size by 6 million.2 In mid-1948, before mass immigration to the newly established State of Israel, world Jewish population was 11.5 million. Of these, almost 6 million lived in America, about 4 million lived in Europe (two-thirds of whom lived in Eastern Europe), 2 million lived in Asia or Africa (about 650,000 were in Palestine). In less than a decade, a profoundly new Jewish demographic reality was emerging with two major demographic centers, America and Israel, epitomizing alternative solutions to the Jewish problem. Jewish population growth and redistribution were the conse-

ZIONISM AND POPULATION

7

quences of the broader societal changes associated with the modernization of societies where Jews resided. These demographic changes along with the Holocaust had a profound impact on broader social changes unfolding in Jewish communities. The nineteenth century represented not only the beginnings of Jewish civic emancipation and social liberation but signaled the emergence of a revolutionary new demographic era. The implications of these demographic changes and the social upheavals they reflect are profound. At the most elementary level, the changing size and distribution of world Jewry represented changes in the potential number and characteristics of Jews available for, or receptive to, immigration to a Jewish national homeland. More importantly, the demographic and societal changes characterizing East European Jews in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries set the stage for the renewal of Jewish settlement and the sociodemographic development in Palestine. Moreover, the Holocaust and the events in and outside of Palestine exerted enormous pressure toward the establishment of the State of Israel and subsequent sociodemographic evolution. In the late nineteenth century, European Jewish society was being uprooted from traditional social life—geographically and socially. Immigration from Eastern Europe to America was in part a traditional response of Jews to persecution and oppression. The expanding economic opportunities in America and the receptivity to minority populations helped make the United States look like the "promised land" to East European Jewry. Many Jews in West European countries opted for integration and assimilation, identifying with the broader cultural, universalistic context of their country of residence. The solution to the "nationalism" issue for many Jews in Eastern Europe was to adopt American nationality or the nationality of a West European country. Some East European Jews elected to stay, and while full sociopolitical and economic integration in their country of origin seemed remote, the stirrings of revolutionary movements held out some hope. For a small but influential segment, the uprooting in Eastern Europe, the potential or real anti-Semitism in Western Europe,

8

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

and the ethos of nationalism resulted in a different response. Their argument was that neither America, Western Europe, nor revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe could alter the particular position of Jews in modern society. Ethnic group identification and a sense of peoplehood could not be sustained where assimilation and integration were occurring, because the larger society would reject the Jew and/or the Jew would reject his own particularism. Hence, it was argued that only Jewish nationalism represented the solution to the Jewish problem. Thus the emergence of the idea of Zionism—a return to a land controlled by Jews and a resurgence of Jewish sociocultural identity—took shape. Out of the demographic uprootedness and the social upheavals of European society, Zionism emerged as the core theme of contemporary Jewish history. It is to the relationship between Zionism and population that we now turn as a basis for understanding population policies and patterns in Palestine and Israel.

Zionist Ideology and Population Out of the turbulence and revolutions of the nineteenth century, Zionism—Jewish nationalism—emerged. Zionism was surrounded by the general paradoxes of European modernization— growing universalism and the particularism of nationalism; the emancipation of Jews and anti-Semitism; assimilation and discrimination. For Zionism there were two unique features: (1) Jewish nationalism proposed that the liberation of Jews was to take place in a territory on another continent and not where Jews lived; (2) Zionism proposed national unity for an ethnoreligious group that was heterogeneous linguistically and socially, despite a common core of history, culture, and religion. The Zionist solution to the "Jewish problem" in Europe was not to change the society where Jews resided through sociopolitical revolution nor to move to a new society that was more receptive to Jews. While they rejected both socialism in the country where they resided and immigration to America as solu-

ZIONISM A N D POPULATION

9

tions, socialism and immigration were essential parts of Zionism and Zionist activities.3 Zionist ideology contained as a central motif the idea of maximizing Jewish population settlement in the national homeland. This emerges most clearly in the stress of Zionism on the "ingathering of exiles" or more directly in the immigration of Jews to the national homeland. Large-scale movement of Jews to a common territory, settlement, development and control over their own society have been master themes of the Zionist nationalist ideal. Hence, in addition to the stress on developing a common language, the objectives of Zionism were "to direct Jewish migration to Palestine and establish a community there which would be free from the social and cultural problems that attended the Jewish status as a dispersed minority people in the Diaspora; and to carry out all the transformations in social and economic distribution, create the appropriate social institutions, and foster the cultural changes necessary for such a program." 4 Although the stress on immigration and settlement was central as an end in itself and as a means of social and cultural change, Zionist ideology was neither monolithic nor static. An examination of the different factions of the Zionist movement clearly reveals variations in Zionist goals related to increasing Jewish population size in the national homeland and to the volume, selectivity, and timing of desired Jewish immigration. Moreover, the importance of population growth and the relative priority of mass immigration over other sociopolitical and economic goals shifted among Zionists in response to external historical events and internal developments within Palestine. In particular, Zionist ideologies differed on such key demographic issues as (1) the pace of immigration—should population increase result from a mass movement of Jews during one compressed time period or should the movement be regulated, planned and spread over time; (2) population composition— should population growth be accomplished through immigration of a cross-section of the population, the immigration of workers, or of a cultural, intellectual elite; (3) eventual population size— should the goal of Jewish settlement in the national homeland be

10

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

the immigration of all of world Jewry, the majority of world Jewish population or a sufficient number to develop a viable new Jewish society or cultural center. Disagreements over ultimate Jewish population size in Palestine and Israel revolved in part around the issue whether the national homeland should have a Jewish majority relative to the local Arab population or a Jewish population size large enough for renewed Jewish sociocultural activities. For the most part, the various debates about these issues were theoretical. Nevertheless, Zionism as a sociopolitical movement was influenced by the emphasis placed, and priorities set, on population questions. Activities, implementation, organizational and institutional programs varied in response to the particular ideas on population that were accentuated and stressed. How were these various positions on population related to general Zionist ideologies? Differences on population issues were rooted in the differing general theoretical views of the nature of the "Jewish problem" and in the related sociopolitical reality of different Jewish communities.5 Conceptually, Zionist orientations to the population question stemmed from two basic premises. One view of the Jewish situation focused on the problem of being a Jew in nations where Jews had experienced restricted political rights, economic discrimination, and societal and popular oppression. The argument was that as long as Jews lived in societies where they were in the minority—politically, economically, socially, and demographically—and suffered as a result from their minority status, the only viable solution was the transfer of Jews to a land where Jews could have control over their own social and economic lives, and where the Jewish community was politically sovereign. The definition of the Jewish problem in sociopolitical terms called for both political and practical strategies of implementation. Some argued for the priority of political legitimacy—the need for the international recognition of the political rights of Jews to their national homeland prior to the concentration of population and socioeconomic development of a total Jewish society. Other placed emphasis on the practical side, focusing on

ZIONISM A N D POPULATION

11

the need for building the demographic and economic foundations of a Jewish society in the homeland through selective population settlement of pioneer agricultural workers as a prelude to mass Jewish population transfers and as a basis for political legitimacy. No one seriously argued for a major demographic concentration in a national homeland without either the political or socioeconomic groundwork. However, despite disagreements over the process of nation building, "political" and "practical" Zionists shared an ideological consensus, however amorphous and imprecise, that the long-run goal was to establish a national homeland where the majority of Jews could concentrate and exercise national sovereignty. Whether the establishment of Jewish political rights was defined as a primary goal before an effective demographic concentration, or whether settlement was emphasized as the prerequisite for political legitimacy and socioeconomic growth, differences were of strategy and priority but not of ultimate objectives and goals. Nevertheless, differing emphasis on strategies and priorities had major implications for organizational and institutional activities designed to encourage and facilitate Jewish population settlement. A different view of the Jewish problem emphasized the dilemma of Judaism in addition to the problem of Jewishness. From this perspective, the major basis in the past for consensus and continuity in the Jewish community—religious centrality and cohesiveness in segregated, autonomous Jewish communities— was dissolving in the wake of Jewish emancipation, secularism, and modernization. The argument was made that traditional Judaism was not able to respond to the challenges of modernity, and there was therefore a need to develop an alternative, wider basis for maintaining Jewish identity in the modern world. Hence, the focus shifted to the revival and development of secular Jewish culture. Zionists who emphasized the central role of cultural revival in nationalism tended to view selective settlement in a national homeland as part of that goal. Jewish population settlement in Palestine and Israel would involve the planned immigration of a selected elite that would rejuvenate the Jewish people culturally, perhaps as a prelude to some mass settlement but more

12

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

clearly as a cultural center for world Jewry. The idea that Jewish population concentration in Palestine should remain small and elitist was of great pervasive ideological importance, affecting many Jewish organizations and institutions organized around Zionist and non-Zionist principles. The culutral Zionists were not powerful politically or organizationally but had an enormous impact on Jewish leadership in Western Europe and America. These different conceptual foundations of the variants of Zionism were related to the socioeconomic and political realities of differing Jewish communities. For Western European and American Jews, Zionism almost always meant cultural Zionism. There developed in Western societies an emphasis on the special set of emotional, spiritual, and cultural relations with a homeland among Jews who for most practical purposes intended to stay where they were. The initial emphasis on the cultural variant of Zionism and the subsequent focus on finding a homeland for the Jewish homeless, refugee, and oppressed, were consistent with the ideological context and sociopolitical situation of Western Jews. For the most part, Jews in Western countries identified with the nationalism of their country of residence where the level of political disabilities was relatively low and the degree of pluralistic integration and assimilation was relatively high. Western intellectuals came to Zionism "not as potential emigrants but in search of inner dignity and secure personal roots in their people and its history." 6 Generally, the idea of mass Western population settlement in a national homeland was deemphasized and indeed largely rejected by Western Zionists. For them, Zionism did not mean that all Jews must return to Palestine. The need for political legitimacy of a national homeland and for immigration was to " s a v e " the "unfortunate Jews" suffering from political, economic, and social oppression, who were neither integrated in their societies nor had any real option of migration elsewhere. For Jews in Western societies the role of Zionism was psychological, cultural, and spiritual: Zionism, as one pamphlet stated, "wishes to give back to the Jew that nobleness of spirit, that confidence in himself, that belief in his own powers which only perfect freedom can give. . . . He will feel that he belongs somewhere and not everywhere." 7

ZIONISM AND POPULATION

13

In contrast to this cultural-spiritual emphasis among Jews in Western societies, Eastern European Jews tended to emphasize the practical-political variant of Zionism. In large part, this reflected the sociopolitical situation of East European Jewry. For many Jews, remaining in Eastern Europe was becoming increasingly problematic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the choice was either to move to the more hospitable environment of the West and primarily North America, or to settle in Palestine. Under these conditions, Zionists in Eastern Europe could hardly emphasize Palestine as a solution to the spiritual-cultural problems of Judaism in the modern world nor could they stress the idea that a national homeland should be mainly a center of cultural rejuvenation for Diaspora Jewry. The sociopolitical and economic conditions of their community did not permit such theoretical luxuries. Hence, most of the Zionist thinking among East European Jewry was either of the practical or the political variant. Despite these differences, most of the main factions of Zionism agreed on some long-term goals and on the core ingredients of Jewish nationalism. These included the settlement of Jewish population in a national homeland, socioeconomic development, cultural-linguistic unity, and political legitimacy and international recognition of Jewish rights to a national homeland. In the early stages of Zionism, debates focused on strategies, priorities, and the relative importance of these core elements. In terms of population factors, these debates centered on the questions of priority and strategy vis-à-vis other core elements of Zionism. Priorities among these issues shifted over time as events inside and outside of Palestine changed. The early theoretical, philosophical, and ideological exercises were superseded by history. The rise of Hitler and events surrounding World War II and the Holocaust redirected the question of priorities and pressed the need for the political, international recognition of Palestine as the Jewish national homeland and the overwhelming practical need for the rapid settlement of Jewish refugees, the survivors of Hitler's "final solution." Beginning in the 1930s, Zionism stressed that Palestine was the Jewish national homeland for the hundreds of thousands of unwanted, persecuted, homeless Jews of Europe.

14

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

All Zionist factions and most of the non-Zionist organizations could not accept a halt to Jewish immigration to the Jewish settlement in Palestine (Yishuv). Immigration and population growth in a Jewish-controlled political and social system became the dominant concern. The view of the national homeland as a cultural center, of slow, planned population growth, and the mass movement of safe, Western, assimilated Jewry had to take a much lower priority than rescuing Jews who were being annihilated in the European Holocaust. While strategies of implementation varied, the major priority of Zionism after the rise of Hitler was to encourage as many Jews as possible to escape and migrate to Palestine; in the aftermath of the war, the aim was to transfer the stateless, homeless remnants to the national homeland. Clearly the postwar emphasis on the mass migration of refugees to Palestine fit the Zionistic theories of Jews in Western societies. The nucleus of Palestine-Israel as the cultural center was stressed less than the idea of a national homeland as a haven. The convergence of the variants of Zionism in the late 1930s and 1940s over the population question was not in the goal of moving to Palestine the majority of world Jewry nor a majority of Jewish population vis-à-vis the local Arab population. Rather the consensus emerged around a select, symbolic segment of Jewry who had suffered enormously because of their Jewishness and who had few options open to them. The problem of "Jewishness" had been pushed to the forefront. Israel was to become a population center, not of world Jewry, but for those for whom no other options were available.

Cbmp^Yw© DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND: POPULATION CHANGE IN PALESTINE AND IN ISRAEL

THE MODERN DEMOGRAPHIC history of Palestine begins toward the end of the nineteenth century. Prior to that time, the Jewish population living in Palestine was small, numbering less than 25,000 in 1880. Some scattered evidence suggests that Jewish population size had more than doubled in the quarter century starting in the mid-1850s, stemming mainly from selected immigration of Jewish religious groups. However, starting in the 1880s a major change in the volume, source, and character of Jewish immigration to Palestine began, representing a major break from prior immigration patterns. The immigration of Zionist pioneers— secular nationalists from Eastern Europe—had a major impact on population growth and policies and on the structure and pattern of Jewish society in the national homeland.

Population Changes in the Late Turkish Period Beginning in 1882 with an estimated population size of 24,000, the Jewish sector doubled in eighteen years and further increased to 85,000 by the year 1914. Although accurate data are not available on Jewish birth rates and death rates during the late Turkish period, it is generally assumed that these rates were fluctuating at

16

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

relatively high levels and natural increase was low. Most of the gains in Jewish population size, therefore, were the result of net immigration. During the period of World War I, Jewish immigration to Palestine came to a halt. Moreover, deportations, expulsions, and the emigration of thousands of foreign nationals took place subsequent to the cancellation by the Ottoman government of the system of Capitulations in 1914. Along with higher mortality rates due to epidemics and famines, Jewish population size declined from 85,000 in 1914 to around 57,000 during 1916-18. Return migration of deported Jews and the beginning of new waves of immigration following the Balfour Declaration in 1917 brought the population size of Jews in 1922 back to the 1914 level of 85,000. It is much more difficult to obtain reliable information on population changes among Arabs during the late Turkish period. Estimates indicate that between the middle of the nineteenth century and the outbreak of World War I, the Arab population grew slowly to around 500,000 or 600,000. Growth rates were slow and fluctuating among Arabs, mainly due to high mortality and high fertility. Fluctuations in natural increase were the major determinants of the low rate of Arab population growth. The differential demographic factors accounting for the growth of Jewish and Arab sectors of the population of Ottoman Palestine—net immigration for Jews and natural increase for Arabs—persisted as a major feature of population changes during the British and Israeli periods.

The British Period

The relative and absolute growth of Arab and Jewish population in Palestine was a central issue from the beginning of the British Mandate until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The total population of Palestine at the beginning of the Mandate period based on the 1922 census was 752,000—668,000 Arabs and 84,000 Jews (table 2.1). (Tables 2.1 to 2.16 appear at the end of this chapter.) The demographic developments of these two popu-

POPULATION CHANGE

17

lations, resulting from a combination of natural increase and immigration, are of paramount importance in the analysis of emerging population policies. The Jewish population grew at an annual average rate of about 9 percent during 1922-48, threequarters of which may be attributed to immigration and the remainder to natural increase. The Arab population did not expand as rapidly but grew nevertheless at an average annual rate of 2.75 percent during the British period. This growth was almost entirely the result of high natural increase—high fertility and low, declining mortality (tables 2.2, 2.3). The differential growth of the Jewish and Arab sectors and the different demographic factors responsible for population change had important societal consequences and implications. In particular, relative population growth and size were interrelated with economic and social changes over time and to the central questions associated with nationalism and political control of the country. Moreover, the continuation of rapid population growth of the Arab population depended mainly on high fertility levels that could be expected to remain high as long as there were no major social changes in that community. Social changes that were taking place among Arabs were slow and, hence, a trend toward declining fertility was remote. In contrast, the continuation of the high volume of Jewish immigration could and did change from one period to another in unpredictable fluctuations. (See figure 2.1.) Political, economic, and social changes in the relative situation of Jewish communities in Palestine and in other countries were in part responsible for these patterns. Of some importance were changes in British immigration policies and regulations and changing Jewish policies and programs. In table 2.2 it can be seen that natural increase of the Jewish sector was much more stable over time than the fluctuations in immigration but contributed much less to total Jewish population growth. Hence, while population growth of the Arab sector was relatively high and predictable in the short and medium run, Jewish population growth was extraordinarily high but erratic, unstable, and unpredictable even in the short run. These overall demographic differences between Jewish and

18

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

2.1 The Development of the Jewish and Arab Populations in Palestine and Israel, 1922-76

Arab populations in Palestine along with their sociopolitical implications put into context the efforts of Jews, Arabs, and the British to influence patterns of population growth through policies. A more detailed account of Arab and Jewish demographic trends is needed to understand the evolution of population policies and political developments in Palestine. Arab Population Growth The Arab population in Palestine consisted of a predominate Moslem majority with a minority of Christians and other religious groups, including Druzes. In the 1922 census taken by the British in Palestine, the proportions of these three religious groups were 88, 11, and 1 percent, respectively (table 2.4). These proportions did not change significantly during the Mandate period. A series of socioeconomic and demo-

POPULATION CHANGE

19

graphic characteristics differentiated segments of the Arab population beyond the question of religion. Throughout the Mandate period, the Arab sector as a whole may be characterized as belonging to the "less developed" category. The Christian minority was clearly much more modernized than the Moslem and were concentrated in urban areas with higher levels of educational attainment and in higher status occupations. This socioeconomic differentiation between Moslem and Christian Arabs is reflected in demographic variation. Although demographic data related to the Arab population during the Mandate period are not always consistent and often imprecise, broad population profiles may be sketched from various data sources that illustrate interreligious demographic differentials (table 2.5). Birth rates and death rates have been much higher for Moslems than Christians, and mortality trends for both subpopulations indicate clear patterns of reduction over time. However, while fertility levels among the small Christian population declined over time, Moslem birth rates have been very high and relatively stable. Hence, the dominant Arab-Moslem majority was characterized by high rates of population growth through natural increase. These patterns continued through the period after the establishment of the State of Israel. One obvious implication of the divergent patterns between Christians and Moslems is the increasing numerical dominance of the Moslem population within the Arab sector. This does not emerge clearly in the Mandate period but is a major trend that developed later. Hence, the growth rate of 2.75 percent per year for the Arab population during the British Mandate was the result of mortality declines of all religious subgroups within the Arab population combined with a high, stable fertility of Moslems. Although Arab immigration and emigration characterized this period, the records are not complete and data available are not accurate. Generally, Arab migration tended to be seasonal, temporary, and largely labor mobility. The net effects of Arab immigration on population growth are difficult to assess accurately but appear to be relatively minor.

20

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Jewish Population Growth Since the demographic development of the Jewish population was affected largely by immigration, the patterns of population change are more complicated. Some of the variations in immigration volume before the establishment of the State of Israel cannot be ascertained directly, particularly in the decade prior to 1948. This is because illegal immigration often was not registered fully and in some periods was an important proportion of total immigration. The very large volume of immigration and the substantial variation over time in the amount and rates of immigration per thousand population are presented in table 2.6 and figure 2.2. Total Jewish immigration to Palestine was particularly high during the period 1920-26 with a record immigration rate of 282.5 per 1,000 population in 1925. The declines in immigration volume 1927-31 followed the economic crisis in Palestine, as well as in the world. The rise of Nazism in Germany and the deterioration in the conditions of the European Jewish communities resulted in a large-scale immigration to Palestine 1932-36. Subsequently, immigration declined considerably during the war years and after the imposition of severe immigration restrictions by the British. Immediately prior to and after World War II, in response to restrictions of Jewish immigration imposed by the British and the pressures to salvage the remnants of European Jewish populations, illegal immigration rose sharply in volume and as a proportion of total immigration. The peak in illegal immigration in absolute and relative terms was reached in the last year of the British Mandate (1947) when 67 percent of the total immigration of over 22,000 was illegal Jewish immigration (table 2.6). „Hence Jewish population growth during the period of the British Mandate in Palestine was very high and largely due to immigration patterns. The waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine—legal and illegal—were an integral part of general political and specific population policies of the British authorities in Palestine and were a central issue in the emerging conflict between Jewish and Arab political national interests. The interplay of British, Arab, and Jewish policies and immigration are discussed in detail in the following chapters.

POPULATION CHANGE

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22

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

The evolution of Jewish population and society in Palestine was obviously tied directly to the volume of immigration and also to the changing characteristics of immigrants. One important aspect of the immigration pattern was the greater selectivity and more voluntary nature of the early streams of immigration, compared to the patterns subsequently. Immigration up to the mid1920s consisted predominantly of idealist pioneers from Russia who chose to immigrate to Palestine rather than North America so as to settle and develop the Jewish national homeland. The first three immigrant waves were mainly from Eastern Europe, where the "pull" of Zionism and its meaning for developing a viable Jewish-controlled settlement was paramount. In contrast, immigration 1924-31 contained a higher proportion of middle-class professional and urban-commercial immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Balkans with an increasing proportion from Central and Western European countries (tables 2.7-2.9). Immigration from Asian and African countries was relatively small during the British period, except during World War II when 18 percent of the small number of immigrants were from Eastern origins, mainly Yemen and Turkey. An examination of the changes in occupational distribution of immigrants reveals a similar pattern of changing selectivity. The early period was characterized by the immigration of a large proportion who had experience in agriculture and training farms, while commerce and the liberal professions characterized the occupations of immigrants beginning in the 1930s (table 2.9). The age-sex structure of immigrants to Palestine shows a pattern typical of most international migrations. Immigrant waves contained a relatively small proportion of children and a high concentration of young adults with a slight surplus of males (table 2.10). The combination of a high immigration volume with a young age structure had important demographic and societal implications. Immigration volume and composition affected population growth rates at the time and had implications for population dynamics in the long run. Since no data are available showing the distributions of migrants by both age and marital status, an evaluation of the marital status of migrants is problematic. Esti-

POPULATION CHANGE

23

mates show that immigrants to Israel tended to be more concentrated in the single category when compared to the population, although not to an extreme. In sum, the Jewish population that was developing in Palestine was largely of European origins, of relatively high occupational and educational levels, relatively concentrated among the young adult ages, with a Western European pattern of marriage and low mortality. Fertility levels among the Jewish population were consistent with these European patterns. Gross reproduction rates were around 1.3 in the 1930s until the end of World War II.* Current fertility rates rose subsequently as part of the general baby boom (table 2.5). Crude birth rates in that period were particularly high and in combination with low death rates resulted in high rates of natural increase. These high rates of natural increase were strongly influenced by the young age structure of the Jewish population. Indeed, public attention was focused in the late 1930s on the fact that high rates of Jewish natural increase were temporary and artificial, since there was an exceptionally high proportion of young females in the reproductive ages, resulting from immigration. Hence, Jewish population was increasing rapidly through both natural increase and immigration but both sources of population growth were not stable or of a long-term character. This accounts for the fact that concern was expressed over Jewish population growth in this early period despite its high rate. This concern became more accentuated during and immediately subsequent to World War II as the enormity of the destruction of European Jewry was reported. Immigration and resettlement in Palestine of the remnants of European Jewry were in clear opposition to the policies of the British, which imposed a low ceiling on the total volume of Jewish immigration to Palestine, and conflicted directly with the politiconational aspirations of the Arab population. The pressures, local and international, moral and political, to allow the mass immigra*Gross reproduction rates measure the number of daughters which would be born to women passing through their reproductive years, assuming the continuation of current age-specific fertility.

24

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

tion of Jewish refugees to Palestine resulted in dramatic efforts to organize and transport tens of thousands of Jews to Palestine despite British immigration quotas and policies. Illegal immigration of Jews in the last two years of the British Mandate gained momentum. With the active participation of Jewish organizations in Palestine and around the world, tens of thousands of European Jews were organized and transported to Palestine. Many drowned in the inadequate ships that were used, only to add further drama and pressure to solve the problems of Jewish refugees. Others were deported by the British to Cyprus for detention but many immigrants succeeded in arriving in Palestine. Illegal immigration in 1946 and 1947 represented 58 percent and 67 percent of all Jewish immigration to Palestine (table 2.6). The major aims of this illegal immigration movement were to demonstrate the urgent need to establish an independent Jewish State in Palestine, to increase the Jewish population of Palestine, and to provide a homeland for a small segment of European Jews who were homeless as a result of the war. Illegal immigration became the master symbol of conflict between Jewish and BritishArab interests in Palestine. It represented as well the continuous implementation and realization of Zionist ideology stressing mass immigration as a solution to the Jewish problem.

Jewish Population C h a n g e in Israel

The end of the British Mandate and the declaration of statehood for Israel in May 1948 altered the demographic situation considerably. The relatively small-scale fighting that had begun early in 1948 became a full-scale war between Jews and invading Arab armies. The newly established Jewish State occupied only part of Palestine. Moreover, over 500,000 Arab residents who had lived in areas included in the new State fled during the war. The population of Israel after Independence consisted of 806,000 people, a majority of whom were Jewish (81 percent) and the remainder Arab (table 2.1). Of equal importance, the control over the flow of immigration was now in the power of the Jewish authori-

POPULATION CHANGE

25

ties. One of the first legislative acts passed by the Knesset was the Law of Return stating the right of every Jew to immigrate and settle in Israel with the aid and assistance of the State (see chapter 4). This policy enabled and encouraged hundreds of thousands of Jews from dozens of countries to immigrate and settle in Israel. The impact of immigration on population growth was enormous. Within three years subsequent to statehood, nearly 700,000 Jewish immigrants were added to a base Jewish population of 630,000 in an unprecedented immigration stream referred to as the wave of mass migration (table 2.6 and chapter 4). For these three years, annual Jewish population growth was an astounding 24 percent, almost 90 percent of which was due to immigration. Immigrants arrived in large volume from a variety of countries: tens of thousands of Europeans arrived from Cyprus, having been imprisoned by the British for attempting to enter Palestine illegally. Others came from European refugee centers, the survivors of the Holocaust; some came from Eastern European countries where emigration was possible. Still others immigrated from Mediterranean and Afro-Asian Jewish communities where they had been settled for centuries (table 2.11). Thus, mass migration meant first and foremost an enormous volume and very high rates of immigration and, of no less significance, movement from a variety of countries of origin. Following the period of mass migration, immigration volume and rates declined considerably, although in certain years, immigration was high by international standards. Even in the postmass-immigration period, immigration made a significant contribution to Jewish population growth (table 2.2). Immigration to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s continued its wavelike pattern, reflecting changing sociopolitical and economic conditions in Israel and in countries of origin. Following the very low levels of immigration 1952-54, the volume of immigration increased 195557. For most immigrants during this period (i.e., North African Jews), the Sinai Campaign of 1956 was of particular importance. After another decline, immigration volume increased 1961-64. This migration wave was in part a response to improved economic conditions in Israel, that was followed by an economic recession

26

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

and a reduction in immigration. Throughout this period, the major sources of immigration were Asian and African countries and Eastern Europe (table 2.11 and figure 2.2). One of the most important shifts in immigration patterns to Israel relates to changes in the composition of immigrant streams by country of origin (table 2.11). Before the establishment of the State of Israel, the majority of immigrants were European in origin and in social, economic, cultural, and demographic characteristics. After statehood, a gradual shift toward increased immigration from Afro-Asian countries occurred. Changes in the composition of immigration streams had an immediate impact on the composition of Israel's population and on the structure of Israeli society. Moreover, because Afro-Asian immigrants had sharply different socioeconomic and demographic characteristics compared to European immigrants (table 2.12), important long-term implications for population growth and social structure emerged. These initial socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic differences resulted in the creation of two distinct socioethnic strata within the Jewish population. The fact that Jewish immigrants from African and Asian countries arrived somewhat later in the mass migration stream was a further factor in these socioeconomic differences. These initial differences were to become one of the bases of social stratification in Israeli society. The immigrant population from Asian and African countries had, in general, a younger age structure compared to the European migrants, which had direct implications for birth rates and death rates and, in turn, natural increase (table 2.13). Most importantly, fertility levels were different between these two groups (table 2.14). While gross reproduction rates of Jews from European countries varied between 1.1 and 1.4, the rates for the AfroAsian group were twice as high, with a rapid trend of decline as duration of residence in Israel increased. Thus, sharply reduced mortality combined with young age structure and high fertility resulted in a rapid natural increase of the Afro-Asian population subgroup compared to the European subgroup. Hence, it was the ethnic group of lower socioeconomic status that reproduced more

POPULATION CHANGE

27

rapidly and represented an increasing proportion of the total population over time. These differences, although diminishing, characterized the second generation as well, i.e., Israeli born of Asian-African origins compared to the Israeli born of European origins. These patterns of differential population growth within the Jewish population were identified as part of the growing social problem in Israeli society and constituted one element in the formulation during the 1960s of a selective pronatal policy. The aim of that policy was in part to encourage higher fertility among the more affluent European origin subpopulation as well as to provide welfare to the large families of the Afro-Asian subpopulation. In this way, it was proposed to reduce the social gap between these groups and to raise the level of natural increase of the Jewish population as a whole as a counterbalance to the very high growth rates of Israel's Arab minority (see chapter 5). In the period after the Six Day War of 1967, immigration to Israel gradually increased again in volume and changed substantially in composition. Over 0.25 million migrants entered Israel between 1969 and 1974. Over one-third of these were from the Soviet Union, another one-third were from Western countries and one-fourth were from Asian and African countries. The increase in immigration stemmed from the new political realities after Israel's victory in the war and the economic boom that followed. Moreover, emigration policies of the Soviet Union changed, allowing a select number of Jews to emigrate to Israel. The socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants in this period differed sharply from previous waves of immigration to Israel in the high concentration of the more educated, occupationally skilled, and affluent segments (table 2.12). This new wave of immigration posed a challenge to Israel because of the higher standards of absorption required. A reorientation of immigration absorption patterns begins to emerge in this period (see chapter 4). The voluntary nature of Western immigration to Israel also implied a higher rate of return migration. A relatively high level of return movement occurred after the October 1973 war and subse-

28

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

quent economic recession. Emigration combined with a reduced volume of immigration to Israel resulted in a near zero net immigration level for 1975.

Arab Population Growth in Israel

The Arab minority that remained within Israel's boundaries in 1948 formed 19 percent of the total population and numbered 156,000. However, as data in table 2.1 indicate, the growth rate of the Arab population was very high. Israel's Arab population in 1975 was almost 3.4 times as large as in 1948, growing at an annual average rate of well over 4 percent during the period 1948-75. The growth rate of the Moslem population was even higher. Under conditions where the contribution of immigration is negligible, such a continuous growth rate is one of the highest in the world. High growth rates among the Arab population have been the result of two processes: first, Israel's Arab population has enjoyed high standards of medical services and public health extending back to the Mandate period, which has resulted in low rates of mortality and an expectation of life of over 70 years, comparable to the Jewish population (table 2.5). Second, the Moslem population has not until very recently shown any sign of a fertility decline and has retained high levels of fertility—around nine births per woman. High fertility levels have resulted in a very young age structure, implying low death rates and high annual birth rates. The fertility pattern of the two main religious groups among the Arabs is not identical. While no discernible fertility decline has been noted among Moslems until the most recent period, fertility levels of the minority Christian population have declined steadily and continuously to around 3.5 births per woman. Druzes representing less than 8 percent of the non-Jewish population are more similar to Moslems in their higher fertility rates (table 2.15). Since the Moslem population dominates numerically the Arab population of Israel, fertility and population growth of the Arab minority in Israel remains high.

POPULATION CHANGE

29

More significant changes in fertility levels of Moslems may be expected in the near future. Beginning in the mid-1950s changes in various socioeconomic spheres have taken place among the Israeli Arab population that are likely to result in fertility reduction. These changes include the large shift from agriculture to nonagricultural employment (table 2.16), the development of stronger ties between the economic sectors of Arab and Jewish populations, the employment of thousands of Arabs, including Arab women, in industrial and construction jobs outside their villages, increases in educational levels, and a general increase in living standards. Despite these major changes, fertility of Moslem women remains high and shows few indications of decline. The contemporary demographic situation indicates a natural increase of nearly 40 per 1,000 for the Arab population compared to 17 per 1,000 for the Jewish population, which has clear implications for the majority-minority issue if Jewish immigration is low. These differential growth rates have been one of the central issues in the evolution of Palestine and Israel and perhaps the single most important factor in understanding the attempts toward proimmigration and pronatalist policies that have developed among Jews in Israel. Against this general descriptive background the interrelationships between population patterns and policies in Palestine and Israel will be examined in detail.

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POPULATION CHANGE

31

Table 2.2 Components of Population Growth, Jewish Population in Palestine and in Israel, 1919-75 Absolute Numbers (000) (per Period Palestine 1919-23 (3rd Aliya) 1924-31 (4th Aliya) 1932-38 (5th Aliya) 1939-45 1946-14.5.1948 Israel 5/15/1948-12/31/1948 a 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Annum)

Total Increase

Migratory Increase

7.2 10.3 33.8 21.6 34.0

6.0 7.1 27.8 12.7 22.0

1.2 3.2 6.0 8.9 12.0

109.1 255.2 189.1 201.4 45.8 33.4 42.4 64.5 77.0 95.2 47.4 48.7 52.4 70.5 87.2 86.7 83.6 59.9 45.8 38.7 51.2 71.9 75.2 80.0 90.7 92.3 62.0 52.5

104.4 234.9 160.1 166.9 10.7 -1.6 11.1 31.2 43.8

4.7 20.3 29.0 34.5 35.1 35.0 31.3 33.3 33.2 34.1 32.9 34.0 34.6 32.7 32.2 33.7 35.6 37.0 37.5 34.4 38.5 40.1 43.0 47.0 44.8 44.2 49.3 51.8

61.1 14.5 14.7 17.8 37.8 55.0 53.0 48.0 22.9 8.3 4.3 12.7 31.8 32.2 33.0 45.9 48.0 12.7 0.6

Natural Increase

SOURCES: Palestine—M. Sicron, Immigration to Israel, 1948-1953, Statistical Supplement, 1957, table A2. Israel—Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various volumes. 'Refers to specified period only (not annual).

32

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Table 2.2 Continued Rates per 1000 Mean Population

(per Annum)

Percent Total Increase

Total Period

Increase

Migratory Increase

Natural Increase

due to Migratic

Palestine 1 9 1 9 - 2 3 (3rd Aliya)

102

85

17

1 9 2 4 - 3 1 (4th Aliya) 1 9 3 2 - 3 8 (5th Aliya)

70

48

22

111 44

91 26

20 18

56

36

20

161 336 187 167

168 310

33

8 -1

1939-45 1946-14.5.1948

83.3 68.7 82.3 58.9 64.7

Israel 5/15/1948-12/31/1948 a 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954

23 29

1955 1956 1957

42

158 139

26 29

95.8 92.1 84.7

28 25

23.3

7

82.8

24

-4.6

8

21

26.1

22

48.3

48 57

20 28 37

20 20

1958

27

8

19

56.9 64.1 30.7

1959 1960

27 28

8

19

30.2

10

33.0

1961 1962

37 44 42

18 17

1963 1964 1965

39 27

20 28 26 22

16 16 17

53.6 63.1 61.1 57.4

10 4

17

38.2

16

18.1

2

15 16

1966 1967

20 17

1968 1969

21 29

13

1970 1971 1972

30 31

13 13 17

5

1973 1974

33 33 21

16 4

1975

18

0

16 17 18

11.1 24.8 44.2 42.8 41.3

16 17

48.6 47.9

17

12.1 1.1

18

of

POPULATION CHANGE

33

Table 2.3 Components of Population Growth, Arab Population by Religion, 1932-75

Totala 1932-35 1936-39 1940-42 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69" 1970-75° Moslems 1932-35 1936-39 1940-42 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69" 1970-75 Christians 1932-35 1936-39 1940-42 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69" 1970-75

Absolute Numbers per Annum (000)

Rates per 1,000 Mean Population per Annum

Total Increase

Total Increase

Migratory Increase

Natural Increase

Migratory Increase

Percent of Total

Natural Increase

Increase Due to Migration

22.9 25.8 26.2 6.4 7.6 11.3 27.3 19.2

2.8 -0.4 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.6 14.2 0.7

20.1 26.2 15.1 5.9 7.6 10.7 13.1 18.5

27 28 25 36 36 44 77 40

3 0 1 3 0 3 40 1

24 28 24 33 36 41 37 39

12.2 -1.5 4.2 7.8 0.0 5.3 52.0 3.6

18.7 22.6 22.5 4.1 5.5 8.6 22.4 15.7

0.9 -1.0 -0.2

17.8 23.6 22.7

2 -1 0

24 29 25

4.8 -4.3 -0.7

0.0 0.4 12.0 0.1

5.5 8.2 10.4 15.6

26 28 25 34 38 48 87 43

0 3 47 0

38 45 40 43

0.0 4.7 53.6 0.6

3.5 2.9 3.4 1.6 1.2 1.4 3.6 2.1

1.5 0.6 1.3

2.0 2.3 2.1

21 6 18

20 21 10

42.8 20. 38.2

-

-

0.0 0.0 2.1 0.6

1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5

41 27 28 42 27 27 56 28

-

-

-

-

-

0 0 33 8

-

27 27 23 20

-

-

0.0 0.0 58.3 28.6

SOURCES: Government of Palestine, Vital Statistics Tables, 1922-45, tables A41 and A2. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various volumes. a Figures and rates for 1965-69 relating to migratory and total increase are strongly influenced by the annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel in 1967. "Figures and rates relating to natural increase include East Jerusalem since 1970. 'Including Moslems, Christians, and others.

34

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Table 2.4 Arab Population In Palestine and in Israel by-Religion, 1922-75 Total End of Year Palestine 10/23/1922 11/18/1931 1935 1940 1945 Israel 11/8/ 1948 1951 1954 1957 5/22/ 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1974 1975

Thousands

(census) (census)

(registration)

(census)

Percent

Moslems

668 859 953 1081 1256

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

88.2 88.4 87.4 87.7 87.7

(156.0) 173.4 191.8 213.2 247.1 286.4 390.3 a 440.0 a 493.2 a 514.7 a 533.8 a

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

68.6 68.7 68.9 69.1 70.6 73.4 74.7 76.5 76.8 77.1

-

Christians

Druzes and Others

10.7 10.4 11.0 11.2 11.1 -

22.5 21.9 21.5 20.4 19.4 18.1 17.2 15.5 15.3 15.0

1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 -

8.9 9.4 9.6 10.4 10.0 8.5 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.9

SOURCES: Palestine—The Jewish Agency of Palestine, The Department of Statistics, Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine, compiled by D. Gurevich and A. Gertz, 1947, p. 52. Israel—Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various volumes. "Including the population of East Jerusalem (about 66,000 in 1967).

POPULATION CHANGE

35

Table 2.5 Vital Rates, Gross Reproduction Rates, and Life Expectancy by Religion, 1922-75. Wal Rates Birth Jews 1923-25 1926-30 1931-35 1936-40 1941-45 1946-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-75 Moslems 1922-25 1926-30 1931-35 1936-40 1941-45 1946-49 1950-54° 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-75 Christians 1922-25 1926-30 1931-35 1936-40 1941-45 1950-54 a 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-75

Death

Gross

Natural Increase

35.8 34.3 30.3 25.7 26.3 28.8 31.0 26.0 22.5 22.5 24.4

14.1 11.6 9.3 8.0 7.5 6.5 6.5 5.9 5.9 6.7 7.3

21.7 22.7 21.0 17.7 18.8 22.3 24.5 20.1 16.6 15.8 17.1

50.2 53.5 53.0 48.9 50.1

26.9 28.3 25.3 21.2 19.4

23.3 25.2 27.7 27.7 30.7

-

48.8 51.0 55.1 52.1 48.9 -

38.3 36.3 35.0 32.1 33.6 34.2 34.8 31.0 27.0

-

9.8 8.8 6.8 6.2 5.8 -

18.5 15.4 13.3 10.6 9.4 7.3 6.5 6.1 7.1

-

39.0 42.2 48.3 45.9 43.1 -

19.8 20.9 21.7 21.5 24.2 26.9 28.3 24.9 19.9

Reproduction Rate

-

1.74 1.36 1.20 1.34 -

Expectation of Life

-

(58.5) 61.0 62.8 64.4 -

1.88 1.73 1.64 1.63 1.59

68.6 69.7 71.9 71.9 72.2

(3.40) (3.80) (3.80) (3.50) (3.50)

35.0 37.5 42.0 47.0 49.9

-

(3.65) 3.98 4.55 4.42 4.05 -

(2.50) (2.50) (2.40) (2.20) (2.28) 2.24 2.27 2.06 1.74

-

67.7 b 70.4 70.5 70.6 -

(50.0) 53.7 58.8 59.8 -

67.7" 70.4 70.5 70.6

SOURCES: Government of Palestine, Vital Statistics, tables, 1922-45; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various volumes. "Figures for 1954 only. For 1950-53 data are not available. "There are no separate life expectancy estimates for Moslems and Christians. The values shown for 1955-74 relate to all Arabs. However, some evidence suggests that there are no significant differentials between these two groups.

36

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Table 2.6 Number of Immigrants, Rate of Immigration, and Percent Illegal Immigrants by Year of Immigration, 1919-75

Year 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948e

Number of Immigrants' (000) 1.8 8.2 8.3 8.7 8.2 13.9 34.4 13.9 3.0 2.2 5.2 4.9 4.1 12.6 37.3 45.3 66.5 29.6 10.6 14.7 31.2 10.6 4.6 4.2 10.1 15.6 15.3 18.8 22.1 17.2

Rate of Immigration" 31.7 134.8 115.2 105.8 91.2 146.3 282.5 92.7 20.3 14.4 33.5 30.0 23.7 69.1 184.5 176.9 200.6 79.6 27.3 32.4 72.2 23.2 9.7 8.7 21.1 29.2 28.7 32.6 36.4 71.6

Percent Illegal Immigrants -

-

-

-

-

10.2 43.8 55.4 19.9 43.8 15.4 6.6 15.8 58.2 67.0

Year 1948 d 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Number of Immigrants' (000) 101.8 239.6 170.2 175.1 24.4 11.3 18.4 37.5 56.2 71.2 27.0 23.9 24.5 47.6 61.3 64:4 54.7 30.7 15.7 14.3 20.5 37.8 36.7 41.9 55.9 54.9 32.0 20.0

Rate of Immigration 229 266 154 132 17 8 12 24 35 41 15 13 13 25 30 30 25 14 7 6 8 15 14 16 21 20 11 5

-

SOURCES: Sicron (1957) table A1; Central Bureau of Statistics, Immigration to Israel, 1948-1972, Part B, table 1 ; Immigration to Israel, 1973, table 1 ; and Statistical Abstract of Israel. a For 1919—May 14, 1948, immigrants include registered immigrants on arrival, registered illegal immigrants, travelers registered as immigrants, unregistered (estimated) illegal immigrants, and travelers remaining illegally. "Per 1,000 mean population. c Until May 14, 1948. "After May 15, 1948.

POPULATION CHANGE

37

Table 2.7 Immigrants by Continent of Origin and Period of Immigration, 1919-48 Continent

of Origin

All countries: thousands percent Asia and Africa® Eastern Europe" Central Europe 0 Balkan" Western countries®

1919-23

1924-31

1932-38

1939-45

1946-May, 1948

35.1 100.0 Al 84.2 4.6 2.1 4.4

81.6 100.0 12.3 78.3 2.7 2.7 4.0

197.2 100.0 9.0 60.3 22.9 3.9 3.9

81.8 100.0 18.3 34.4 37.0 6.8 3.5

56.5 100.0 4.0 67.7 21.0 4.5 2.8

SOURCE: Sicron (1957), Table A8. Note: Registered immigrants only. a Excluding South Africa. U S S R , Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania. c Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. d Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia. O t h e r European countries, America, South Africa and Oceania.

38

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Table 2.8 Immigrants by Country of Origin and Period of Immigration, 1919-48 (Percentages) 1919-23

1924-31

1932-38

1939-45

1946-48

35.1 100.0 93.0 44.6 4.3 30.6 4.7 1.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.3 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.3

81.6 100.0 84.8 18.9 5.3 49.0 5.1 1.5 0.2 1.0 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.5 2.9

197.2 100.0 88.6 2.8 4.9 47.1 5.5 0.6 0.4 2.9 0.7 2.0 18.0 2.2 1.5 2.4

81.8 100.0 81.5 1.0 1.3 20.5 11.6 4.2 1.1 1.5 4.8 10.7 18.7 2.8 3.3 0.2

56.6 100.0 95.7 0.5 1.5 33.8 31.9 2.3 0.3 1.9 9.4 8.1 2.7 0.8 2.5 0.3

3.9 1.6 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.2

11.6 1.7 0.4 4.2 1.7 3.2 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.1

8.4 1.1 0.5 1.5 0.9 3.7 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.2

17.0 5.4 1.2 2.0 0.5 7.6 0.3 1.3 0.2 0.5 0.6

2.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.2

All countries: thousands percent Europe USSR Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Poland Romania Bulgaria Yugoslavia Greece Hungary Czechoslovakia Germany Austria Other countries America, South Africa, and Oceania Asia Turkey Syria and Lebanon Iraq Iran Yemen and Aden Other countries Africaa Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco Egypt Other countries SOURCE: Sicron (1957), table A8. Note: Registered immigrants only. "Excluding South Africa.

1.1

POPULATION CHANGE

39

Table 2.9 Immigrant Earners by Occupation Abroad and Period of Immigration 1919-47 Occupation

Abroad

1919-23

1924-31

1932-38

1939-45

1946-47

All earners: number percent

16,571 100.0 30.0 34.8 8.0 1.0 6.9 2.8 10.6 5.6

37,433 100.0 20.6 33.6 6.6 0.5 9.2 2.4 7.1 20.0

47,617

23,416 100.0 5.7 36.5 3.3 2.3 19.4 9.1 14.3 9.4

9,047 100.0 6.2 66.4 6.5 4.1 1.8 3.8 8.8 2.4

Agriculture & training farms Crafts & industry Building Transport Commerce Clerical Liberal professions Unskilled workers

100.0 11.6 32.4 8.0 1.2 15.8 3.8 14.2 13.0

SOURCE: Sicron (1957), table A26 (Jewish Agency figures).

Table 2.10 Immigrants by Sex, Age, and Period of Immigration, 1928-48 (Percentages) Total Period and Sex 1928-31 Total 1932-34 Total 1935-38 Total Males Females Males/1,000 females 1939-45 3 Total Males Females Males/1,000 females 1946-48 Total Males Females Males/1,000 females

Thousands

Percent

16.4 82.3 115.0 54.6 60.3 904

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

62.5 33.8 28.7 1,179 56.5 28.4 23.0 1,235

Note: Registered immigrants only. SOURCE: Sicron (1957), table A17. "Excluding illegal immigrants.

0-14 13.2 20.2 18.1 19.2 17.1

15-29

30-59

60 +

1,013

62.1 43.4 42.7 41.1 44.2 841

17.8 31.1 31.6 31.6 31.6 901

6.9 5.3 7.6 8.1 7.1 1,048

100.0 100.0 100.0

20.5 20.0 21.0 1,121

40.5 41.3 39.6 1,229

33.6 33.4 34.0 1,158

5.4 5.3 5.4 1,162

100.0 100:0 100.0

13.7 12.7 14.8 1,057

62.0 61.8 62.4 1,222

21.2 23.1 18.9 1,517

3.1 2.4 3.9 766

40

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Table 2.11 Immigrants by Country of Birth and Period of Immigration, 1948-75 (Percentages).

All

Countries

Asia Turkey Iraq Yemen-Aden Iran Other countries Africaa Morocco ) Algeria > Tunisia J Libya Egypt-Sudan Other countries Europe USSR Poland Romania Yugoslavia Bulgaria Germany-Austria Czechoslovakia Hungary Other countries America, South Africa & Oceania

1948

1949

1950

1951

101,819 100.0 5.1 4.8 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 9.0

239,576 100.0 30.8 11.3 0.7 16.3 0.8 1.7 16.7

7.7

7.5

1.2 0.0 0.1 85.2 1.3 32.1 19.6 4.6 16.8 2.0 2.4 3.8 2.6

6.1 0.0 3.1 52.0 1.4 20.3 5.8 1.0 8.5 3.0 6.7 2.9 2.4

170,215 100.0 34.4 1.5 19.3 5.4 6.3 1.9 15.2 2.6 0.3 2.9 5.3 4.0 0.1 49.8 1.6 15.8 27.5 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.4 1.6 1.2

175,129 100.0 59.2 0.8 51.1 0.5 5.4 1.4 11.6 4.4 0.2 2.0 3.8 1.2 0.0 28.9 0.6 2.1 23.0 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.8

0.7

0.5

0.6

0.3

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, Immigration a Excluding South Africa.

to Israel, various volumes.

POPULATION CHANGE

41

Table 2.11 Continued

1952-54

1955-57

54,065 100.0 25.2 1.7 3.6 1.6 10.8 7.4 50.6 29.7 0.8 11.3 3.0 5.8 0.1 20.4 1.3 3.2 7.2 0.2 1.8 1.4 0.3 1.0 3.9

164,936 100.0 6.1 2.4 0.3 0.0 1.2

3.8

1.7

1.8 62.1 42.9 1.5 9.3 0.2 8.0 0.0 30.0 3.6 18.2 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 5.2 1.1

1958-60 75,487 100.0 17.9 2.6 0.5 0.2 10.4 4.2 18.0 12.6 0.7 )

1961-64 228,046 100.0 8.8 2.3 0.2 0.3 3.8 2.2 51.8 44.0 c o o.y

3.0 ) 0.2 1.4 0.2 60.4 9.3 10.4 35.8 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.9 2.5

0.2 0.5 0.2 34.7 2.0 2.0 27.9 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.5

3.5

4.7

1965-67 60,793 100.0 17.6

1968-73 247,802 100.0 12.9

1974-75

4.2

7.9

52,007 100.0 4.3 0.6 0.1 0.0 1.1 2.5 4.9 2.5 0.9 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 71.3 49.6 2.4 10.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 7.2

8.8

18.7

19.5

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-

-

-

-

-

6.9 5.5 20.2

3.3 4.4 13.9

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.3 53.4 9.0 4.6 -

0.2 54.5 33.4 4.1 -

0.1 -

0.1 -

1.1 1.2 -

1.5 0.7 -

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48

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Table 2.15 Age-Specific Fertility Rates by Religion: Non-Jews, Israel, 1963/64-75 Age Group

1963164

Under 20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total Fertility

130.7 387.9 443.3 400.9 306.9 156.6 62.3 9.4

Under 20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total Fertility

48.5 241.8 271.9 203.8 125.5 40.9 4.7 4.7

Under 20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total Fertility

93.5 368.8 391.1 343.4 242.2 118.6 28.0 7.9

1965 Moslems 132.5 392.4 448.3 434.1 317.9 177.4 70.4 9.9 Christians 53.4 242.5 279.4 220.0 114.4 35.3 3.3 4.7 Druzes 87.9 345.4 406.1 326.2 235.5 103.9 16.9 7.6

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical

1966

1967

1968

120.8 402.4 447.8 427.7 308.2 168.4 62.5 9.7

102.4 378.2 405.8 383.6 281.7 135.6 39.2 8.6

78.6 342.8 438.2 404.5 302.3 164.7 57.0 8.9

54.0 218.8 266.3 201.5 93.3 27.2 7.9 4.3

47.3 216.0 246.0 167.8 96.9 27.1 1.8 4.0

28.9 209.7 239.0 184.5 109.9 32.1 7.3 4.0

80.5 345.8 346.4 326.6 354.9 103.0 26.3 7.9

55.3 313.3 347.9 296.6 171.2 75.9 18.5 6.5

42.5 295.8 380.7 381.8 245.2 128.7 36.4 7.6

Abstracts,

various volumes.

POPULATION CHANGE

49

Table 2.15 Continued 1969

7970

1971

134.8 403.6 416.5 384.8 279.1 128.4 49.7 8.9

106.5 385.0 425.7 378.5 294.7 154.5 44.7 8.9

130.2 388.3 423.5 361.0 278.2 117.5 44.0 8.7

43.9 236.5 247.0 184.1 86.7 26.4 1.5 4.1

32.8 184.4 221.1 167.7 91.9 22.0 (2.9) 3.6

36.6 190.0 193.9 150.8 82.0 21.3 (1.7) 3.4

73.4 338.1 380.2 334.0 216.1 113.0 24.7 7.4

58.8 339.6 372.8 352.3 237.8 101.5 28.9 7.4

73.6 336.1 368.9 335.0 216.7 69.8 29.8 7.1

1972 Moslems 122.0 368.1 399.0 346.4 253.0 120.4 33.5 8.2 Christians 40.7 219.3 239.3 175.0 78.0 17.0 (1.2) 3.9 Druzes 70.0 346.0 351.3 318.9 259.2 65.3 (11.5) 7.1

1973

1974

1975

117.3 378.0 402.3 353.6 266.9 106.3 32.4 8.3

116.6 376.9 398.8 356.4 253.0 109.8 31.0 8.2

104.8 345.5 383.3 348.4 242.8 96.1 28.6 7.8

47.0 210.4 226.0 158.2 86.1 23.9 (1.8) 3.8

42.8 220.2 218.0 150.9 71.9 24.0 (1.1) 3.6

37.3 198.3 199.5 139.2 76.7 17.3

64.7 327.1 385.6 357.4 267.2 75.4

60.8 326.7 378.9 311.5 247.3 72.9 (11.8) 7.0

64.6 298.2 396.2 316.9 210.5 76.4 (6.3) 6.9

(17.9) 7.5

(2.1) 3.4

50

BACKGROUND TO POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

Table 2.16 Non-Jewish Employed Persons (Males) by Occupation 1955-75 Total

Year 1955 1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Thousands 37.5 43.5 61.2 58.1 53.9 74.5 78.8 81.5 85.8 91.4 94.0 92.3 96.6

Agricultural Workers 1955 1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

48.0 45.5 33.6 35.8 38.4 28.1 24.6 21.6 21.8 14.7 14.5 15.4 15.1

Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Professional, Technical & Related Workers 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.1 5.7 6.7 7.7 Workers in Transport & Communication 4.3 4.4 5.9 6.6 5.3 6.0 6.4 5.4 6.6 11.1 10.7 8.8 8.6

Administrative, Managerial, & Clerical Workers

Sales Workers

3.7 2.5 1.9 2.6 3.4 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.7 4.8 8.1 3.7 3.8

Skilled Workers

7.7 6.7 6.1 5.9 7.0 8.9 8.1 7.6 8.0 8.7 7.3 7.8 6.9

Unskilled Workers

28.8 31.3 44.1 40.0 36.8 40.3 43.8 45.3 44.6 39.8 36.2 40.1 41.8

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, Labor Force Surveys, various volumes. Note: In 1972 the occupational classification was changed.

4.0 6.2 5.4 6.3 6.1 9.4 10.1 12.6 10.8 16.8 17.5 17.5 16.1

PDrô DD POPULATION POLICY: TRENDS AND PATTERNS

IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS IN PALESTINE

JEWISH I M M I G R A T I O N and settlement was a long-standing feature of Palestine. Small groups, families, and individuals moved to the Holy Land mainly for religious reasons, to study and die in the land of their forefathers. The majority of Jewish settlers concentrated in the four " h o l y " cities of Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safad, which were in turn divided into subcommunities and landsmanschaften according to country of origin. Most of these settlers spent their time in study and prayer, being sustained by monies collected from Jewish communities outside of Palestine. B y 1880, less than 25,000 Jews resided in Palestine.1

The Beginnings of Modern Immigration: The Turkish Period Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a major shift occurred in the volume, composition, and character of Jewish immigration to Palestine. Organized groups of Jewish pioneers immigrated to Palestine for secular, ideological, nationalistic reasons, to build a national Jewish homeland. This movement was extraordinary in several ways: first, unlike most international movements, Jews immigrating to Palestine, beginning in the 1880s, were in large part not responding to the " p u l l " of economic opportunity nor

54

POPULATION POLICY: TRENDS AND PATTERNS

attracted by the political environment. Social, economic, and political conditions in Palestine at the time were clearly not conducive to immigration. Second, immigration to Palestine was part of a substantially larger emigration of Jews out of Eastern European countries, mainly in the direction of America. The small segment of this exodus whose destination was Palestine was highly selective in terms of socioeconomic characteristics and motivation for migration. Jewish migrants did not come with the "appropriate" socioeconomic background to fit into their newly chosen society. The immigrants were relatively educated and urban-oriented and entered a different cultural milieu with the goal of developing barren wastelands. Third, Jewish immigration to Palestine was in opposition to the official immigration policies of the ruling Ottoman Empire. Immigration to Palestine during the Turkish period consisted of two major waves, referred to as the first and second Aliya.* The first Aliya during the period 1882-1903 represented the beginning of modern immigration to Palestine.2 An estimated 25,000 immigrants arrived, which represented a large volume in relationship to the small size of the local population and to the economic opportunities available. However, these accounted for only a small proportion of the Jewish masses of Eastern Europe who were on the move. Those choosing Palestine as their destination against the larger stream of movement to America viewed settlement and development of Palestine as a fundamental solution to the Jewish problem. It may be argued that migrants responded to the "push" from Eastern Europe following pogroms, and economic and political oppression in two ways: some Jewish migrants responded to the "pull" of economic opportunity in America, while others were attracted to nationalistic ideology. Zionism is the main clue for understanding not why Jews moved from Eastern Europe but why Palestine was chosen as the destination by a minority. 'Aliya literally means ascent and is used to describe immigration to Israel. Emigration from Israel is referred to as Yerida, literally descent. The ideological significance of these concepts is obvious.

IMMIGRATION IN PALESTINE

55

In the early period of the first Aliya, most of the settlers lacked funds, had little or no agricultural skills, and faced the hostility of the religious Jewish settlements in urban areas, who viewed the secular nationalists not only as religious offenders but potential competitors for the limited charity monies available. The real enemy of the pioneers, however, was their naïveté and lack of agricultural experience and the enormously harsh ecological and economic environment. They were rescued economically by outside capital—particularly from Jewish foreign investors. Over time, Arab laborers were hired extensively and many of the Jewish immigrants became administrators. Paternalism and inefficiency along with disillusionment and emigration became dominant features of the first Aliya period. The ideological foundation of the first Aliya developed in small groups throughout Europe which provided some agricultural training for potential immigrants, organized the migrants into groups, instilled the message of Zionism, and purchased land and homes in Palestine. Jointly with their sponsors in Europe, the surviving settlers of the first Aliya initiated modern agricultural settlement in Palestine, overcame enormous hardships, and laid the foundation for further immigration. By the turn of the twentieth century, almost 100,000 acres of land had been purchased and new villages were settled that were agriculturally productive and self-supporting. The Jewish settlement in Palestine despite emigration and high mortality had doubled to 50,000 in twenty years. (See data in tables following chapter 2.) On these demographic and economic foundations, a second wave of immigrants arrived. During the decade beginning in 1904, an estimated 40,000 to 55,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine from Eastern Europe. The immigrants of the second Aliya were also part of the growing organized Zionist movement in Europe, people who responded to sociopolitical and economic upheavals in Russia by migrating to Palestine and were more imbued with pioneering fervor than the first Aliya. More importantly, many were active socialists in Russia who were deeply affected by the failure of the Revolution of 1905. The thrust of their Zionist

56

POPULATION POLICY: TRENDS AND PATTERNS

orientation was to create a revolutionary movement on the basis of national revival. Their goal in Palestine was to create a new social order based on socialist principles and Zionist ideology. Settlers of the second Aliya expanded existing agricultural settlements and developed new types of settlements, urban and industrial, as well as communally based agricultural enterprises. They were educated, politically articulate, and organizationally skillful immigrants who laid the foundations for the labor movement, established political parties, kibbutzim, and Jewish cultural activities. The activities and principles of the second Aliya were at the heart of the social, political, and economic structure of the Jewish settlement in Palestine and subsequently of the State. By the outbreak of World War I, 85,000 Jewish settlers populated Palestine. Recruitment, organization, and financing of the immigrants by the expanding Zionist activities in Europe facilitated the movement of thousands; their economic accommodation was eased somewhat by funds made available for the purchase and development of the land. Jewish policies on immigration and settlement and implementation activities flowed from the general ideological foundations of Zionism. Given the economic conditions of Palestine, the availability of alternative more attractive destinations, and overall hardships associated with pioneering, these policies and activities were exceptionally successful. The immigration to Palestine of 65,000 to 80,000 Jews during the period 1880-1914 is even more remarkable when viewed against the background of the immigration policies of the Turkish power. In general, Ottoman policy opposed any Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine. As early as November 1881, the Council of Ministers of the Ottoman Empire announced that Jewish immigrants "will be able to settle as scattered groups throughout Turkey, excluding Palestine." 3 Hence, even before the major thrust of the first Aliya got under way, records indicate a general closed immigration policy of the Turkish Empire with regard to Palestine. Moreover, as the number of Russian Jews applying for visas

IMMIGRATION IN PALESTINE

57

to enter Palestine increased, a notice was posted outside the consular office in Odessa in April 1882 stating: The Ottoman Government informs all [Jews] wishing to into Turkey that they are not permitted to settle in Palestine. immigrate into other provinces of [the Empire] and settle as provided that they become Ottoman subjects and accept the to fulfill the laws of the Empire. 4

immigrate They may they wish, obligation

The reasons for this Turkish policy are complex: in part, immigration policy reflected the desire of the Ottoman Empire to avoid a problem of nationalism within her jurisdiction and to reduce the number of foreign subjects, particularly Europeans and Russians, within her domain. Europeans were disliked and distrusted by the Turks, since under the system of Capitulations, Europeans enjoyed extraterritorial privileges, including the right to trade, travel, and hold property freely throughout the Turkish Empire, were largely exempt from taxes, and not subject to Ottoman law. Opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine was in part, therefore, an attempt to control the influence of Europeans within sections of the Ottoman Empire. 5 This basic concern of the Ottoman Empire was reinforced by Jewish activities and Zionist propaganda. Institutions that organized many of the immigrants often made exaggerated claims to Turkish authorities about the number of potential Jewish settlers in Palestine. Turkish leaders became more sensitive to the implications of Jewish immigration through the political activities of Theodor Herzl in the Ottoman Empire and his declaration of Jewish nationalist aspirations. The statement adopted at the First Zionist Congress (1897) that the aim of Zionism was "to establish for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law" added alarm to the apprehensiveness of the Turkish leaders. 6 These Jewish and general factors account in large part for the restrictive immigration policies of the Ottoman authorities. These policies were totally ineffective as controls over Jewish immigration to Palestine. If entry restrictions were to be effective, they had to be accepted by the governments whose

58

POPULATION POLICY: TRENDS AND PATTERNS

citizens were involved. In general, governments resisted these restrictions because they violated one of the basic Capitulations. Moreover, Jews could always enter Palestine in the category of pilgrims, and sometimes as businessmen, rather than as immigrant settlers. Once in the country it was almost impossible to deport them. Formal restrictive immigration policies required a well-organized system of local control, regulation, and enforcement. Immigration rules and restrictions did not have much impact largely because the machinery for implementing the policy was so defective. World War I altered the power distributions in the whole Middle East region. The end of the Ottoman Empire was in sight and Turkish control in Palestine was being replaced by British military presence and subsequently by the British Mandate. The emergent political reality affected the evolution of immigration patterns and policies.

The Period of the British Mandate Two major documents represent the formal political context within which British immigration policy in Palestine was legitimated and evolved: the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Mandate of 1922. British immigration policies were ambiguous and imprecise largely because general British policy and political commitments were unclear and vague. Immigration policies became the symbol of controversy that plagued the British government throughout this period. The legitimation of British political commitments begins with the Balfour Declaration. A letter sent by Balfour to Lord Rothschild stated: I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet. "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their

IMMIGRATION IN PALESTINE

59

best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." I shall be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.7

The Balfour Declaration, internationally recognized, became the official basis for the British commitment to the Jewish national home. The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine charged the British with the responsibility of setting up the "political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home" (Article 2). More important in our context, Article 6 of the Mandate stated: The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions.8

Combined, the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate defined the political context within which British policy in general and immigration policy in particular operated. The Jewish Position A central theme in Zionist nationalist ideology was the emphasis on large-scale Jewish immigration to a national homeland. The first official Zionist proposal to the British Foreign Office stressed that the government to be set up in Palestine "shall recognize the desirability of large scale immigration and resettlement of Jews in Palestine." The argument was made that mass immigration was needed to alleviate the sufferings of Jews and as a means of the modern economic development of Palestine. Administrative steps were outlined, including a charter company to represent the Jews of Palestine and to encourage immigration and economic development.9 In the first official contacts and discussions between the British government and Zionists there was less than complete consensus among Jews about immigration to Palestine. Some

60

POPULATION POLICY: TRENDS A N D PATTERNS

argued that there should be no limit to Jewish immigration and that this should be organized and supervised by Jews. Herbert Samuel, among others, argued that there could not be unlimited Jewish immigration and that it should be encouraged only within the context of the economic capacity of the country. Moreover, he emphasized that the control of immigration should be vested in the sovereign power and not in Jewish hands. 10 This position was later to be converted into clearly formulated British policy. Other issues were also raised, particularly about the desirable ethnic and class composition of immigration. But these were of secondary importance. Questions about immigration were obviously tied to differing conceptions of Zionist goals. Political maximalists tended to emphasize the need for large-scale immigration while cultural Zionists were inclined to emphasize selective, planned immigration. (See the discussion in chapter 1.) Neither of these positions was dominant until the 1930s. The central issue was neither maximum immigration nor a Jewish demographic majority but economic growth that would attract and integrate immigrants. Subsequently, the position of maximum immigration became central as the conditions of European Jews worsened and the options of alternative destinations closed. Moreover, large-scale immigration became the means to achieve the Zionist goal of national independence. Ben-Gurion played a key role, starting in the 1930s, in emphasizing the centrality of population growth and immigration in Jewish national development. Others, particularly the Zionist revisionists and followers of Jabotinsky had also placed great emphasis on mass immigration. However, because of his dominant position within the Zionist movement and his political centrality within the Yishuv in Palestine, Ben-Gurion was clearly the most important personality in the emerging emphasis on maximum Jewish population growth. 11 The Arab Position The core Arab position was to reject totally the national Jewish homeland idea of the Balfour Declaration and the commitment to Jewish immigration. The opposition to large-scale Jewish immigration was to prevent the establishment of Jewish

IMMIGRATION IN PALESTINE

61

economic and political dominance. Emerging Arab nationalism was the basis for this core Arab opposition to Jewish immigration. This Arab position was long-standing. As early as 1891, on the heels of the growing wave of Russian Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine, one of the first Arab actions against Jewish immigration and settlement was organized. Arab notables in Jerusalem presented to the Turkish authorities a petition protesting Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews.12 Subsequent to the Balfour Declaration, a Syrian Congress claiming to speak for all Arabs declared, "We oppose the preterttions of Zionists to create a Jewish Commonwealth in the southern part of Syria known as Palestine and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country." 13 Several years later the formulation of the antiimmigration position found clear expression at the Third Palestine Arab Congress. Speaking in the name of the Arab people, resolutions were passed expressing dissatisfaction with the British government because the "Government proceeded with the application of the Zionist policy by allowing the admission of Zionist immigrants."14 In contrast, the only formal indication of Arab acceptance of Jewish immigration is the controversial agreement in 1919 between Emir Feisal and Chaim Weizmann. Article IV of that agreement stated: All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development. 1 5

Without entering into the political, historical, and ideological arguments about the nature of this agreement, the "acceptance" of immigration was based on the assumption that the number of Jewish immigrants would be small. Feisal believed that only 1,000 or 1,500 settlers could be absorbed economically into Palestine annually. Hence, he had no initial concern that the Arabs would

62

POPULATION POLICY: TRENDS AND PATTERNS

be overwhelmed demographically, politically, or economically by the Jewish population. As Jewish population size increased through immigration, and as Jewish political and economic presence became more conspicuous, the Arab reactions against further immigration became violent and more extreme. Demands for an immediate cessation of Jewish immigration increased as the volume of immigration and potential immigration grew and as Jewish political independence moved toward realization. The imprecision of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate regarding British commitments to Jewish and Arab interests created the dilemma of how to facilitate Jewish immigration and yet ensure that the rights of the local Arab population were not prejudiced. Jewish pressures for large-scale immigration and Arab counterpressures for the stoppage of Jewish immigration were the expressions of opposing national aspirations. Immigration patterns and policies became the central issue around which British politics revolved in Palestine for three decades. British Policy: Overview Two major immigration policies dominated the period of the British Mandate. During the first period, extending from the beginning of the British military occupation of Palestine through 1936, the guiding government policy was the regulation of selected types of Jewish migration. The number of immigrants brought to Palestine by the Zionist organization— subsidized migration—was adjusted to what became defined as the "economic absorptive capacity" of the country. Immigration that was not subsidized was in general not regulated. Subsidized migration was controlled only to the extent that the economic capacity of the country was not sufficiently expanding. British immigration regulation during this first period was flexible enough to permit the entry of over 150,000 subsidized Jewish immigrants and an equal number of nonsubsidized migrants. There was nothing in the policy of economic absorptive capacity to prevent wide annual fluctuations in the volume of immigration. The second period of the British Mandate (1937 to the declaration of Israeli statehood in 1948) was characterized by more restrictive government immigration policies. The objective of

IMMIGRATION IN PALESTINE

63

those policies was to control directly the total volume of Jewish immigration in accordance with political criteria. Despite the imposition of numerical quotas, a large number of Jewish immigrants entered Palestine during this period, the majority legally. However, these British policies prevented an even larger number of immigrants from entering, many refugees from Europe and the survivors of the European Holocaust. During the entire Mandate period, British immigration policy related only to Jewish immigration. There were no clear guidelines on Arab immigration to Palestine and a great flow of nonrecorded Arab immigration took place during the British period. Most of that immigration was labor mobility, often seasonal and temporary, in response to the economic growth differentials between Palestine and neighboring Arab countries. Immigration policies and patterns during the British Mandate will be examined in terms of three factors: (1) the ambiguous British political commitments to Jewish and Arab nationalism; (2) the emergence and strengthening of the Zionist ideological position with its emphasis on immigration, settlement, and development, and (3) the growing momentum of Arab nationalism.

Economic Absorptive Capacity

Neither the Balfour Declaration nor the articles of the Mandate specified guidelines for immigration policies. It was unclear how the mandatory power was to "facilitate Jewish immigration" and there were no criteria outlined to determine the "suitable conditions" for immigration regulation. The first clear formulation of British policy guidelines on immigration into Palestine was contained in the Churchill White Paper of 1922. The major theme of the Churchill White Paper centered on Jewish immigration as a means toward the implementation of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The policy stated: It is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot

64

P O P U L A T I O N POLICY: TRENDS A N D PATTERNS

be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. 16

The specification of economic absorptive capacity as the principle of immigration regulation did not represent an innovation or shift in policy. Formally, the emphasis on economic controls and regulatory mechanism deviated only in concreteness from the ambiguous, abstract formulation in the Balfour Declaration and the articles of the Mandate. Indeed as noted earlier, the principle of economic absorption had already been part of the conceptualization of immigration regulation deemed appropriate by the first High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, as early as 1916.17 The White Paper did not specify the mechanism of carrying out the policy of "economic absorptive capacity" nor did it indicate the administrative procedures to be used in determining economic controls. Moreover, the policy statement alone implies the regulation of the total volume of immigration using economic criteria. Such in fact was not the case. Controls over immigration were applied only to limited categories of immigrants, i.e., subsidized migrants. The first immigration ordinance in Palestine was enacted in August 1920, allowing free entrance of persons of independent means, those in religious occupations, and dependents of Palestinian residents. Immigrants whose "maintenance was guaranteed by the Zionist Organization for one year" (subsidized migrants) were subject to government limitation in relationship to the employment and housing accommodations available in the country. For the first year, a quota of 16,500 heads of families was assigned the Zionist Organization.18 This quota was difficult to meet as the Zionist Organization was hampered by lack of funds and inadequate administrative coordination. Subsequently, the regulation of subsidized migrants was redefined in more specific terms as those who "have a definite prospect of employment in Palestine." This category became

IMMIGRATION IN PALESTINE

65

known as the "labor schedule" and entrance was regulated by the following procedures: twice each year the Palestine Zionist Executive in conjunction with the department of immigration of the Jewish Agency prepared an estimate of the number of workers in specific occupations that could be absorbed during the following six-month period. The British High Commissioner made the final decision on the number of labor-schedule certificates that would be granted. The majority of these certificates were issued to the Palestine Zionist Executive which took responsibility for their distribution. A small number of certificates was retained by the chief immigration officer to be distributed at his discretion. The regulation of migration subsidized by the Zionist Organization was in effect a control over total immigration because few were willing to come to Palestine as nonsubsidized immigrants. Overall economic and social conditions of Palestine were poor and there were alternative destinations open to Jewish migrants, particularly the United States. The economic criteria specified by the legislation were vague and ambiguous. Combined with the fact that the final decision on immigration was left to the authority of the High Commissioner, the basic policy of economic absorptive capacity could be used in political maneuvering between Jewish and Arab pressures. The timing of the Churchill White Paper was not fortuitous. In 1921, the first public demonstration by the Arab population took place protesting against the concrete symbol of Jewish nationalism—immigration. An angry crowd of Arabs broke into Immigration House in Jaffa, which was used as a clearinghouse and shelter for newly arrived immigrants. The target of the Arab attack was a significant symbolic act. After a temporary suspension of Jewish immigration, the tensions and clashes did not subside, and both Jews and Arabs looked to the government for policy clarification. The commission that was set up to investigate the issues (Haycraft Commission) concluded that Jewish immigration was one of the prime causes of Arab discontent. 19 In particular, Arabs feared displacement by Jewish immigrants who had superior commercial and economic organizational skills and consequent unemployment. This was, of

66

POPULATION POLICY: TRENDS AND PATTERNS

course, the tangible evidence of the more deeply rooted conflict of nationalisms. Most importantly, the linkage by the commission of immigration to economic considerations became the formal justification of the policy specified by the Churchill White Paper the following year. The Palestinian Arab community responded negatively to the Churchill White Paper, demanding that Great Britain reject the Balfour Declaration as a precondition for negotiation. The Executive of the Zionist Organization resolved formally in June 1922 to conduct its activities in conformity with the official policy declaration. In fact the important issue for the Zionists was not the principle of economic absorptive capacity, which they did not reject, but the question of who was empowered to control immigration. Indeed, a year before the Churchill White Paper, the Twelfth Zionist Congress formulated its basic doctrine of Jewish immigration: The Congress declares before the entire world that large Immigration to Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) is an uncontestable right of the Jewish people of which under no circumstances it may be deprived. The Internal regulation of immigration into Eretz Israel, according to the economic capacity of the country, is a matter for the Jewish people, represented by the Zionist Organization, in agreement with the Administration of Palestine.20

What was the relationship between the policy of economic absorptive capacity and immigration patterns? Since the policy was so vague in formulation and did not control nonsubsidized migrants it was not likely to restrict total immigration. Moreover, an examination of immigration patterns during the first decade of the British administration in Palestine reveals that other factors were more important in determining variation in the volume of immigration. The first immigration wave during the British period is known as the Third Aliya, covering the period beginning in 1919 through 1923. In 1919, the Zionist Organization opened its immigration offices and the British military authorities permitted 1,000 artisans to enter. The real migration stream, however, gained

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67

momentum the following year, after the civilian government took over. In the four years to 1923, over 8,000 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine annually, totaling over 35,000 for the Third Aliya period, and contributing significant growth to the base Jewish population of around 60,000 in 1919. Most of these immigrants were young, single males from Russia and Poland, who had gone through agricultural training programs organized by the Zionist organizations in Europe. There was a strong ideological motivation among these migrants which accounts for the selection of Palestine over alternative destinations. Some growth of rural settlements, agricultural and small industrial expansion, and general socioeconomic progress and organizational development were additional determinants of this immigration. Three changes—external to conditions in Palestine—were to alter these immigration patterns. First, beginning in the 1920s, the American government established a series of immigration quotas that reduced substantially migration from Eastern Europe to the United States. Thus, the major destination of potential East European Jewish migrants was becoming more restricted. There were also changes in the politico-economic structure of Poland. Middle-class Polish Jews, small shopkeepers and businessmen, were being replaced by the rising Polish middle classes and a general boycott was declared on Jewish industry and commerce in Poland. The worsening of the situation of the large Jewish community in Poland was a major "push" factor in Jewish emigration. A third factor affecting migration during the late 1920s was the growing economic depression in Europe. Combined, these three factors set into motion the potential large immigration to Palestine. For the three years beginning in 1924, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased from an average of 8,000 per year for the prior four-year period to almost 14,000 in 1924, 34,000 in 1925, and 14,000 in 1926. With a total Jewish population size estimated at 92,000 at the end of 1923, this early stage of the Fourth Aliya increased the Jewish population by 67 percent and changed the ratio of Jewish to total population from 11 percent in 1922 to over 16 percent at the end of 1926. In contrast to the ideological

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Russian migration of the Third Aliya, half of the immigrants of the Fourth Aliya were from Poland and many were urban-oriented, "middle-class" families. In contrast to the earlier period, Palestine was the destination of about one-third of all Jewish international migrants from 1924 through 1926. The relatively large volume of immigration 1924-26 did not continue. The economic foundations of the Yishuv were not firm, were concentrated in agriculture, and could not absorb large numbers of urban-oriented migrants. Local economic setbacks, severe unemployment, and several natural disasters (drought, earthquakes, locust invasions) aggravated the situation. The worldwide economic depression began to be keenly felt in Palestine, slowing down the pace of immigration and resulting in a relatively large counter-stream migration out of Palestine. Starting in late 1926, Jewish emigration from Palestine gained momentum and compared to an immigration of 14,000, there was an emigration of 8,000. While almost 82,000 immigrants arrived in Palestine during the Fourth Aliya (1924-31), fully 23,000 Jews are estimated to have emigrated from Palestine. In the late 1920s, a series of Arab riots, economic strikes, and boycotts took place in Palestine. These disturbances were in large part responses to immediate economic difficulties and were reactions to the growing size of the Jewish population. Like the clarification of British policy in Palestine following Arab attacks on Immigration House, Arab-Jewish confrontations in the late 1920s were investigated and immigration policy clarified by setting up a commission. The Shaw Commission in 1929, made several important observations about patterns and policies of Jewish immigration:21 First, the commission reiterated conclusions of earlier reports that immigration was a central issue in the Arab-Jewish conflict and that "the object, the effect, and the control of the policy which governs [immigration] are all of vital concern to both parties" (p. 97). Just as Jews attached great importance to the policy of continued immigration, Arabs expressed "growing apprehension and alarm" and "anger and fear" over Jewish immigration patterns and policies (p. 98).

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Second, the Arab opposition to continued Jewish immigration was based on both economic and political considerations. The report saw in the economic crisis following the immigration of 1924-26 evidence that "immigrants have come into Palestine in excess of the economic absorbing power of the country" (p. 106). Politically, "the Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigrant not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future" (p. 151). These fears have been intensified by Zionist policy statements emphasizing the desire for greater Jewish political control, increased immigration, and an eventual Jewish majority and statehood. These considerations led to the recommendation that "some more suitable method of regulating the disposition of immigrant certificates under the labor schedule" be devised. Moreover, it was suggested that methods be developed to regulate total immigration including nonsubsidized migrants. Furthermore, administration mechanisms were recommended whereby "non-Jewish interests in Palestine could be consulted" regarding immigration matters. It is of interest to note that in discussing the implications of Jewish immigration policy, the Shaw report presented several graphs showing the time when Jewish and Arab population size would be equal. Given some simple assumptions about differential natural increase and levels of annual Jewish immigration, this demographic exercise was presented as the implied consequence of the Zionist position on immigration. The political message was clear: control over the total volume of Jewish immigration would be necessary to prevent the loss of an Arab majority in Palestine. A formal policy position in the form of a White Paper prepared in 1930 was based on the Shaw report and another survey that examined the economic and immigration potential of Palestine.22 Following closely the conclusions of these reports, the White Paper argued that no additional lands were available to settle new immigrants without displacing the Arab population and that further Jewish immigration would reduce the living standards of Arab laborers. Emphasis was placed on creating the administrative machinery necessary to register Arab unemployment so it

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could be included as a factor in determining the economic capacity of the country. The White Paper argued that immigration should be reduced or suspended when unemployment levels of Palestine were high. Hence, it concluded that immigration "should be more closely controlled," and "unrestricted immigration is to be strongly deprecated." Arab reaction to the general notion of greater immigration control was positive, although increased demands were made for the immediate cessation of immigration. Jews saw in the new policy direction a serious break in the British commitment to the Zionist idea. It was becoming clear to the Zionists that economic absorptive capacity was amenable to political maneuvering. Hence, the Jewish Agency declared that immigration should on principle not be subjected to "any restriction on political grounds" nor could any limitation be placed on "the ultimate percentage of Jews in the country." 23 These policy recommendations were, however, not implemented. Jewish political pressures along with negative public opinion in Britain and in the United States resulted in the rejection of the policy implying political and more severe economic controls on Jewish immigration. Only several months after the White Paper was published, British Prime Minister MacDonald sent an official letter to Chaim Weizmann (who represented Jewish interests) clarifying British policy and thereby reversing the policy direction recommended by the White Paper. The letter reiterated the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine and while insisting that government control of immigration must be maintained, noted that "the consideration relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations." 24 However, a clear recognition among the British of the need to introduce political criteria to regulate the total volume of Jewish immigration was emerging. The Prime Minister's letter delayed the development of that policy and its administrative implementation. It was only a temporary setback. The small number of Jewish immigrants eased the pressure toward immigration restriction and removed the immediate need to introduce

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additional criteria to control the total volume of Jewish immigration.

Political Quotas

The changing conditions of the European Jewish population, in particular the rise of Hitler and Nazism in the 1930s and the spread of anti-Jewish activities in Central and Eastern Europe, had a decisive influence on the volume and composition of immigration to Palestine. Beginning in 1932, the volume of immigration increased significantly: the number of immigrants in 1932 was four times the number in 1931, tripling again to 37,000 in 1933, increasing to 45,000 in 1934, and to over 66,000 in 1935. The large number of immigrants in 1935 was a record high, unprecedented since the beginning of modern Jewish immigration to Palestine. The thrust of immigration continued until 1936 when an additional 30,000 immigrants arrived. (See the data in the table at the end of chapter 2.)

The forces generating this immigration were clearly not the better economic opportunities in Palestine nor any change in immigration policy among British or Jewish agencies. Rather, again, external events, mainly the deteriorating political situation of European Jewry, were the "push" factors in the influx of almost 200,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine between 1932 and 1936. This volume of immigration is impressive, given the small number of immigrants during the prior five-year period and, most importantly, given an estimated Jewish population of Palestine at the end of 1931 of 175,000. This immigration resulted in the more than doubling of the Jewish population of Palestine in five years and an increase in the ratio of Jewish to total population from less than 17 percent in 1931 to close to 30 percent in 1936. Two additional features of this migration wave deserve attention: first, an important segment of the immigrants 1932-36 arrived from Germany—over 15 percent—representing a signifi-

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cant increase from previous levels. Before 1933, only several hundred immigrants had arrived from Germany and Austria; between 1933 and 1936 over 30,000 arrived from these two countries, and one-fourth of all legal immigrants arriving 1935-38 were from Germany or Austria. Nevertheless, the beginning of the Fifth Aliya, labeled a "German" immigration, was still dominated numerically by arrivals from Poland, where European Jews were concentrated. The most noticeable decline was in Jewish immigration from the USSR, which dwindled considerably during the 1930s, mostly as a result of the restrictions placed on Jewish emigration. The importance of this compositional shift rests with the fact that Central European Jews brought with them not only urban and organizational skills but middle-class backgrounds and capital for investment. A second related feature of the Aliya 1932-36 was the decline in the proportion of immigrants arriving as part of the labor schedule. In the period 1927-31 almost 60 percent of the immigrants were brought in on the labor schedule and the remainder was largely in the dependent category. However, during the five years 1932-36, less than half were brought in under the labor schedule, 25 percent arrived as "capitalists" and an additional 20 percent were classified as "dependents." As was characteristic of the earlier period, increases in the volume of Jewish immigration generated negative reactions among the Arabs and led to demonstrations, strikes, and attacks. These gained momentum beginning in 1936. Clearly the regulatory mechanisms of immigration based on economic absorptive capacity were not effective in controlling the total number of immigrants. Indeed, the government tried, unsuccessfully, to control total immigration by severely restricting the allocation of labor certificates for subsidized migrants. Out of Jewish Agency requests for almost 60,000 labor certificates during 1933 and 1934, the British allocated less than 18,000; only 1,800 certificates out of a request for 10,695 were granted in 1936.25 Nevertheless, tens of thousands of immigrants arrived in categories that were not regulated by the British administration. The categorization of nonsubsidized migrants did not inhibit Zionist organizations from bring-

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ing Jews to Palestine in these categories, even deviously. Obviously a more comprehensive British policy would be needed to control the total number of Jewish immigrants. Jewish pressures for continued immigration and Arab counterpressures to stop all immigration made this issue the master symbol around which Jewish and Arab nationalisms clashed. Against this background a Royal Commission (headed by Lord Peel) was appointed to investigate and propose solutions to the immediate problem of the Arab disturbances of 1936 and in general "to inquire into the manner in which the Mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to the obligations of the Mandatory towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively." 26 The Jewish position, as presented by the Jewish Agency, laid major emphasis on the immigration issue. Basing their position on the articles of the Mandate and the Churchill White Paper of 1922, the Jewish Agency submitted that the British government was obligated not only to permit immigration but to facilitate it; immigration was viewed as the core element in the government's commitment to the Jewish national homeland. The argument was that Jews are in Palestine by right, and they may immigrate to Palestine by right. The Jewish Agency agreed that the right of immigration was not unlimited; however, economic factors constituted the only valid basis for immigration regulation. The critical stand of the Jewish Agency was against the formalization of political criteria to restrict total immigration. Initially, the Arabs refused to present their view before the Peel Commission until immigration ceased. Subsequently, the President of the Arab Higher Committee agreed to present the Arab case, centering on the goal of Arab national independence and noting that Jewish immigration was detrimental to that goal. The Arab position was that the aspirations of Palestinian Arabs for self-government was frustrated by the growing Jewish presence in Palestine and in particular by continuous Jewish immigration. The Arabs proposed the abandonment and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration and the experiment of the Jewish national homeland, the immediate and total stoppage of Jewish immigration, and the establishment of an Arab State in treaty relation with

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Great Britain that would allow the Arab majority to determine the place of the Jews in Palestine. The new economic realities, implying Arab prosperity resulting from Jewish immigration, did not carry much weight. One Arab witness to the commission hearings stated: "You say we are better off: you say my house has been enriched by the strangers who have entered it. But it is my house, and I did not invite the strangers in, or ask them to enrich it, and I do not care how poor or bare it is if only I am master in it" (p. 131). The Peel Commission Report concluded, on the basis of the conflicting positions presented, that the Arab fear of Jewish population growth and national aspirations and the desire of Arab independence were the major factors underlying the Arab-Jewish conflict and the disturbances of 1936. Hence, the policy that should be adopted must have as its core the whole question of immigration and, of course, nationalism—Jewish and Arab. The Peel Commission noted that the total volume of immigration was never specified by the shapers of British policy and they could not have foreseen the large volume of immigration of the 1930s. The pressures from European Jewish populations seeking a place to immigrate and the large number of immigrants were recognized by the commission as factors accentuating the fears of the Arab population. Although the Arab population had increased by 50 percent in 17 years, the Jewish population had increased by almost 500 percent. Immigration they concluded was the crux of the matter: on the one hand, "the pace and extent of the development of the Jewish National Home must obviously depend on the rate and volume of Jewish immigration over a series of years"; on the other hand, "the Arabs watch the immigration figures with close and anxious concern" and they have a "real fear of being overwhelmed and therefore dominated by Jewish immigrants" (p. 280).

Thus, a major conclusion of the commission was that "the situation in Palestine is such that immigration must be reviewed and decided upon all considerations and not on economic considerations only" (p. 299). It emphasized that economic considerations are "inadequate and ignore factors in the situation which

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wise statesmanship cannot disregard. Political and psychological factors should be taken into account" (p. 300). Following a suggestion that had already been made by the Shaw Commission in 1930, the new commission prepared populations projections based on assumptions about natural increase and immigration rates of Jewish and Arab populations to show the year in which numerical equality would occur. For example, they showed that differential rates of natural increase plus an annual Jewish immigration of 60,000 would result in the equalization of Arab and Jewish sectors in mid-1947 at a population size of 1.21 million; an annual immigration of 30,000 would push the time of population equalization to the mid-1960s at a size of 1.56 million. These considerations provided the background for a central commission conclusion: a "political high level" (i.e., an upper limit) of Jewish immigration should be fixed at 12,000 per year for the next five years, which should not be increased under any circumstances but might be reduced if economic conditions should prove unfavorable. The figure of 12,000 Jewish immigrants was chosen since it was the number that, given some demographic assumptions about differential natural increase, would maintain the existing proportion between the Jewish and Arab populations (3:10). The sharp break of this suggested policy on immigration was not only the formal introduction of political criteria to regulate immigration. Rather, the focus of the policy shift was in controlling the total number of immigrants, thereby making the Jewish population a permanent minority in Palestine. An additional policy shift of major political importance was the recommendation to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish sectors. Describing the conflict between Jews and Arabs as "irrepressible," indicating that "there is no common ground between them" and predicting that the "situation, bad as it now is, will grow worse" (pp. 370, 372), the commission emphasized the futility of continuing with the system of British administration of Palestine. The plan for partition of Palestine noted that during the period of transition restrictions on Jewish settlement should be territorial, i.e., no Jewish migrants should be permitted to settle in

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the designated Arab area. The Government issued a White Paper adopting the three major recommendations of the Peel Commission Report: (1) Political quotas on immigration to maintain Jewish minority status permanently, regulated by economic absorptive capacity; (2) partitioning of Palestine into Arab and Jewish sectors; (3) settlement of Jews only in the Jewish sector. The Arab High Committee formally rejected partition and announced that one of the principles for solving the conflict would be an immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration. A similar conclusion was reached by a Pan-Arab congress held in Syria in late 1937, which reiterated the need for all Jewish immigration to cease and to allow Jews to continue to live as a minority population. Not unexpectedly, the Jewish response to the proposed policy of immigration restriction was hostile. At the Twentieth Zionist Congress27 protests were made against the fixing of a political maximum for Jewish immigration. The response to partition was divided; some argued for the acceptance of partition, since in its absence, Jewish immigration would be drastically curtailed. More importantly, an attempt was made to show that intensive economic development of the partitioned area could allow for as many as 100,000 Jewish immigrants per year, giving Jewish Palestine a population of 2.5 to 3 million in twenty years. Thus, even the acceptance of partition was premised on the ability of the Jewish sector to grow significantly through rapid immigration. Some objected to partition because they envisioned a larger Jewish State. Non-Zionists in the Jewish Agency opposed the idea of a State altogether. Nevertheless, all factions agreed to reject political quotas on total Jewish immigration. The conflict and disturbances between Jewish and Arab sectors did not diminish. The subsequent two years witnessed additional outbreaks of violence, new commissions of investigation (that raised questions about the practicality of partition) and another White Paper in 1938 rejecting partition and with it obscuring immigration guidelines. After the large volume of immigration in 1936, about 11,000 Jewish immigrants entered the country during 1937 and another 13,000 entered in 1938. Combined, the

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immigration 1937-38 was within the limits imposed by the political high level of 12,000 per year. In the following year, political quotas were apparently not operative, since over 30,000 immigrants arrived. The country of origin of the immigrants shifted continuously to Germany and Austria, from which about half of the migrants came. Palestine had become the major migration destination of world Jewry. One of the consequences of the immigration restrictions (in the face of increased pressure for migration) was the mounting illegal immigration movement. Before 1937 there was no conspicuous need for illegal immigration, since the policy of economic absorptive capacity was sufficiently flexible to allow large numbers of migrants into Palestine. However, once political quotas were established and the total number of Jewish immigrants scrupulously checked, illegal channels became the most important organized Jewish response to the enforced immigration restrictions. Illegal immigration was considered a rescue operation of European Jewry and over time was assigned the highest priority.28 Initially, the number of illegal immigrants was small, but their symbolic importance should not be judged by volume alone. Illegal immigration became a rallying point for Jewish political activities in Europe, America, and Palestine and was the most dramatic political weapon against the continuation of the restrictive immigration policies. The growing tensions between Jews, Arabs, and the British were becoming untenable. The formal rejection of partition as a solution to the conflict resulted in yet another British policy formulation. In 1939, a White Paper was presented containing the following major policy recommendations: 29 (1) Jewish immigration during the next five years should be allowed only to the point where the Jewish population will represent approximately one-third of the total population. Taking into account differential natural increase of Arab and Jewish populations and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants, this would allow the entrance of 75,000 immigrants over a five-year period. (2) This figure was an absolute maximum number of immi-

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grants, since it would be subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity. Assuming economic absorption was favorable, a quota of 10,000 immigrants per year would be allowed; as a contribution to the European refugee problem an additional 25,000 persons would be allowed to immigrate over the five-year period if the High Commissioner was satisfied that adequate provisions for maintenance were made. The limits of economic absorptive capacity would ultimately be decided by the High Commissioner in consultation with Jewish and Arab representatives. (3) After a period of five years, no further Jewish immigration would be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine were prepared to acquiesce to it. (4) In order to deal with illegal immigration, the White Paper recommended that the number of illegal immigrants entering would be deducted from the yearly quotas if they could not be deported. (Such in fact had been the administrative practice since 1934). The section on immigration policy concluded with an overall comment that the British government subsequent to the five-year period of controlled immigration would "not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population." Finally, when this phase of immigration ended a state was to be established in which the Arabs having a two-thirds majority would have political and administrative control. This policy statement clearly went beyond previous policy recommendations in restricting and curtailing immigration. It departed significantly in recommending Arab political control over all of Palestine. Obviously, the Jews rejected the recommendations of the 1939 White Paper, since they were viewed as a breach of the whole national Jewish homeland idea. The notion of becoming a permanent minority in Palestine was a cynical proposal to Zionism and anathema to the Zionist idea. The Arabs rejected the White Paper as well, demanding the immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration. Moreover, they threatened to

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review the status of every Jew admitted to Palestine since 1918 if additional Jews were permitted to immigrate. In the British Parliament, the White Paper of 1939 was assailed vigorously, most notably by Winston Churchill, but it was nevertheless approved by a slim majority. Moreover, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations argued that the White Paper policy was not in accordance with the accepted interpretation of British responsibilities under the Mandate.30 The declaration of war by Great Britain less than four months after the 1939 White Paper left Palestine in a position of uncertainty. The British administration in Palestine adhered to the White Paper with regard to immigration, taking into account illegal immigration in ascertaining yearly quotas. Toward the end of the five-year period, it became clear that the total number of Jewish immigrants would fall short of the quota allowed. The British government announced in late 1943 an extension of the time allowed to fill the 75,000 quota. By the date when immigration was to end entirely according to the White Paper, only about 50,000 Jews were estimated to have entered Palestine. The remaining 25,000 were to be regulated by the local administration and limited to refugees from Nazi-controlled countries. Following the war, during which the volume of illegal immigration was small (see chapter 2), there was growing activity in bringing immigrants to Palestine illegally. Tens of thousands of Jewish European survivors attempted to enter Palestine illegally, though after late 1946 most were intercepted and brought to Cyprus, where 56,000 were imprisoned. The continuing drama of the deportation of illegal immigrants added elements of tension and tragedy to an already volatile situation and exerted enormous political pressure on the British to alter their policies. From 1945 to mid-1948 almost 75,000 immigrants entered Palestine, most illegally. During this postwar period, American interests in the future of Palestine became an important political pressure point. Until that time American policy toward Palestine was largely one of

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indifference. America had given formal approval to the Jewish National Home idea and supported it through its endorsement of the Balfour Declaration. This indifference shifted toward the end of the war. In the summer of 1944, Republican and Democratic parties included planks in their political platform supporting the Zionist program and called for unrestricted Jewish immigration. At the end of 1945, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution recommending that Palestine be opened for the free entry of Jews to the maximum of its agricultural and economic potential. 31 Resulting from American interests and pressures, a joint Anglo-American Committee was set up in 1946 to examine the issues and propose solutions to the situation in Palestine. The two sides to the conflict presented their positions with but little change, except for emphasis, from prior declarations. 32 Two major Jewish positions were presented. The official Zionist position insisted on mass Jewish immigration as a first step toward the establishment of a Jewish State and a Jewish numerical majority. Other Jewish spokesmen did not support the Jewish majority or Jewish State idea but proposed instead the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews and a long-term policy to allow Jews to become 50 percent of the total population. Arab testimony rejected the idea of a Jewish State and expressed opposition to further Jewish immigration. The Anglo-American Committee proposed a number of measures regarding immigration policy. Among the important points in our context were: (1) A proposal for the immediate distribution of 100,000 certificates for refugee immigration; (2) a recommendation that Jewish immigration be facilitated by the Mandatory Government; (3) the suggestion that the number of Jewish immigrants subsequent to the first 100,000 should not be fixed in advance; and (4) the recognition that immigration cannot be unlimited nor can it be solely at the acquiescence of the Arab population. The basic principle was reiterated that immigration was an integral part of the development of the Jewish National Home that should be regulated, taking into consideration the wellbeing and interests of both populations. These recommendations were never implemented. President

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Truman expressed approval and urged implementation of the short-run plan for the admission of 100,000 immigrants, advising careful study of the long-range policy. The British government did not endorse without qualification the immigration recommendation and in effect rejected the conclusions of the Anglo-American Committee. Acts of violence between the Jews and the British reached a high level and were combined with accelerated activities to increase illegal immigration. Additional committees were established, schemes were proposed, conferences were held in London (where Jews and Arabs refused to participate), plans were presented and rejected, the tensions and violence increased and the 1939 White Paper policy remained in effect. As the political pressures escalated from all sides, the British government reached the conclusion that there was no prospect of reaching an agreed-upon settlement. The only course open to them was to submit the issue to the United Nations for a solution, arguing that the Mandate had proved to be unworkable in practice and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. The chapter of British regulation of Jewish immigration was coming to an end, as was the British administrative and political control of Palestine. The pressure of European Jewish refugees to immigrate was swelling, waiting until the floodgates were opened to stream to Palestine. This potential influx of Jewish immigrants was paralleled by the preparatory invasion of Arab forces as the British were packing up their government. With the declaration of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, a new chapter of the interplay of immigration policy and patterns begins.

(QtapfcirFmao3 IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS IN ISRAEL

THE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN the Jewish and Arab communities turned into a major war when the British Mandate ended in May 1948. The War of Independence involved, in addition to the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. One of the most conspicuous features of the war was the clear numerical imbalance between the Jewish and combined Arab forces. The need for human resources in developing the newly established State, in addition to the requirement imposed by the war, combined with the long-standing Zionist ideology to encourage large-scale Jewish immigration, resulted in the abolition of existing British regulations and ordinances restricting immigration. Hence, one of the most immediate consequences of the establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948 was the change in immigration patterns and policies. The long-standing Jewish insistence during the Mandate period on large-scale immigration became the basis of the new policy of Israel. Furthermore, Israel developed one of the most active proimmigration policy programs ever recorded—encouraging, stimulating, and assisting immigrants in all stages of the immigration process.

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Some of the forces shaping immigration after the establishment of Israel operated during the Mandate period. Nevertheless, the analysis of these processes in Israel requires a different emphasis, given the new political realities. Therefore, a general scheme will be outlined to place in perspective the broad factors involved. The components of the scheme hypothesized to be the most important in the processes of immigration to Israel are presented in figure 4.1. These include: specific immigration policies, Zionist ideology, means of implementing policies, conditions in Israel, conditions of Jewish communities outside of Israel (including potential alternative destinations available for Jewish emigrants), and the volume and characteristics of immigration. Immigration policies refer to laws, regulations, and policy declarations that focus on the goals of immigration. These include targets of the total volume of immigration and its demographic, socioeconomic, and ethnic composition. Zionist ideology with its emphasis on immigration and settlement continues to be the essential rationale for immigration patterns and policy. These ideological factors are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the implementation of proimmigration policies and activities within the State and in encouraging the support and potential immigration of Jews living outside of Israel. (See figure 4.1.) Given the intensity of the ideological factor and the general open-door policy of immigration, the propensity to immigrate to Israel is governed by the conditions in countries of origin ("push" factors), conditions in Israel ("pull" factors), and the potential availability of alternative destinations for migrants. These features operate in Israel in ways comparable to migration patterns in other countries. Included among the conditions in Israel are the availability of jobs and, generally, the means of securing a living for immigrants, adequate housing, and educational and health facilities. Two major conditions in Israel are of importance in influencing the propensity to migrate: the politicalsecurity situation in Israel and the attitudes of the receiving population. Similar sets of categories operate in countries of

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origin as "push" factors. In addition, attitudes and policies of governments regarding Jewish emigration are significant elements. "Push" and "pull" conditions limit under some circumstances the effectiveness of a general proimmigration policy. Hence, policy means have been developed in Israel to facilitate and to implement immigration goals specified by policy. Examples of these migration-facilitating means (at different times in Israel) include the construction of immigrant transition camps, monetary encouragements and loans for new immigrants, creation of public-works programs for migrants when unemployment was high, job placement and housing subsidies, and the rationing of consumer products to reduce inequality between migrants and the longer-settled population under conditions of extreme scarcity. These "policy means" affected and modified local socioeconomic conditions so that migrants would be more readily absorbed economically. Taken together, these factors are hypothesized to affect the volume of immigration and the characteristics of immigrants. In turn, immigration patterns may affect these factors and the relationships between them. The scheme is conceived as a dynamic system of interrelationships. The analysis that follows attempts, in a general way, to investigate the relative importance of the components and their interrelationships over time in Israel. By way of illustration, the patterns and policies of immigration during the first several years of statehood represent one example of the dynamics of the system. The very high effectiveness of the policy of mass immigration 1948-51 under extremely unfavorable conditions in Israel can only be explained in the context of socioeconomic and political conditions in European refugee camps and in Jewish communities in the Mediterranean area, massive investment in facilitating immigration and absorbing immigrants, and by underlying Zionist ideology emphasizing mass immigration. However, this mass immigration created economic and social conditions in Israel that resulted in the adoption of restrictive immigration policies in the subsequent period. Furthermore, the relative socioeconomic conditions in Israel and in

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Jewish communities elsewhere reduced immigration volume below that expected by the restrictive policy. Two dominant themes underlie the relationship between the volume and characteristics of immigration and conditions in Israel. First, immigration had an immediate impact and cumulative consequences for the economy. Migrants upon arrival have immediate needs for housing, education, and medical services that are acquired by the resident population over a relatively longer period of time. Hence, in the short run, mass immigration has a major impact on the demand for consumption items that tends to result in shortages and inflation. When some of these items are imported, immigration would result indirectly in the deterioration of the balance of payments. At the same time, migrants become producers and increase the labor-capital ratio. Depending on the employment situation, the increase of the laborcapital ratio may bring about a decrease in productivity and a reduction in the price of labor services. This cycle characterized the evolution of the Israeli economic structure following mass immigration.1 A second theme relates to the impact of immigration on the social structure. As waves of immigrants from different cultures and social origins arrived, a pluralistic mosaic of ethnic-class subgroupings emerged. Migrants from diverse sociocultural backgrounds entered Israeli society at different points in time and each new group of entering migrants helped "push up" earlier immigrant groups. An examination of Israeli society at any one point in time reveals a plethora of ethnic-cultural groups that cover an enormous range of heterogeneity in many social and cultural characteristics. Moreover, over time sociocultural ethnic groups adjusted to new societal conditions and underwent processes of rapid change. Hence, variations in rates of change and differential adjustment and integration emerge. Conflicts between newcomers of different immigration waves and between immigrants and the veteran population stem from these dynamics.2 Economic and social consequences of mass immigration remain the underlying themes of Israeli life. Immigration has not been a process apart from the emergence of Israeli society but has

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been inextricably intertwined with Israel's developing social and demographic structure.

The Institutional Context of Immigration Policy Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, Jewish immigration policy and regulation was formally assigned to the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Organization. These institutions continued to play a major role after the establishment of the Jewish State but this role obviously changed. The most conspicuous formal changes were the transferal to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) of power to legislate matters concerning immigration and the increasing role of the government in the implementation of immigration policy. Nevertheless, particularly for the transition period, most of the processes involved in immigration, including policy, regulation, and implementation, remained the responsibility of two departments of the Jewish Agency: Immigration and Absorption. The inclusion of a Ministry of Immigration in the first provisional government of Israel was more of symbolic importance than an indication of the transferal to the government of all matters concerning immigration. The existence of two major institutions dealing with immigration and the fact that an extragovernmental agency in large part controlled immigration, lead to a lack of clarity regarding the division of functions and resulted in institutional conflict. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that a coordination committee was set up in 1950 so that the planning, implementation, and allocation of resources for all phases of immigration could be handled jointly by the government and the Jewish Agency. 3 The composition of the coordinating committee—four cabinet ministers and four members of the Zionist Executive—attests to its importance. The working relations between the government and the Jewish Agency were formalized legally; the Jewish Agency was entrusted with specific powers to regulate immigration and absorption and settlement. 4

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Two documents are important sources for understanding the formal context of Israel's immigration policy: The Declaration of Independence (1948) and the Law of Return (1950). An integral part of the Declaration of Independence of Israel was the statement on May 14, 1948 emphasizing a policy of unrestricted immigration for Jews. The Declaration stated: "The State of Israel is open to Jewish immigration and the ingathering of Exiles." It further called upon the Jewish people outside of Israel to unite around the efforts of the State in immigration and in the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people. The first order enacted by the provisional government headed by Premier Ben-Gurion abolished the British restrictions on immigration and defined retroactively "illegal" Jewish immigrants as legal residents of Israel. These two acts, the Declaration and the first order, represented the foundation of Israel's immigration policy during the first two years. It was only after several hundred thousand Jews immigrated to Israel that the Law of Return was passed by the Knesset. On July 5, 1950, a law was passed granting to every Jew in the world the right to immigrate to Israel. Immigration permits were to be granted to every Jew desiring to settle in Israel with limited health and security exceptions.5 These formal laws and declarations do not convey the main thrust of Israel's immigration policy. The major expression of Zionist immigration ideology are the activities and actions taken to encourage the mass movement of Jews throughout the world to Israel. Jews were organized for Aliya through overseas missions, funds were allocated for the transferal of goods, travel arrangements were made, and the basic necessities of housing, food, and jobs were arranged upon arrival. Two major principles therefore characterized Israel's immigration policy from the beginning: first, the overall right of immigration for all Jews throughout the world who want to settle in Israel; second, government policy encouraged, assisted, and financed major phases associated with the migration process. Despite modifications, regulations, and restrictions that were introduced at various times after the estab-

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lishment of the State, Israel's overall immigration policy was governed by these two principles.

Mass Immigration: Patterns and Policies The formal declaration of national independence did not lead immediately to a major influx of immigration. The administrative structure of government and the organizational apparatus for the implementation of the mass-immigration policy was delayed by the Arab-Israel War immediately following statehood. The reorganization of the department of immigration within the Jewish Agency lasted several months, during which time immigration averaged around 10,000 a month. Beginning November 1948, the stream of mass immigration increased dramatically: with a base population of 650,000, over 170,000 migrants were added in seven months and an additional 520,000 arrived in the following twoand-a-half years. Hence, in a short period of three years, almost 700,000 Jewish immigrants entered the State of Israel. Beginning in mid-1951, immigration dwindled from an average of 25,000 a month to about 4,000 toward the end of 1951 and to less than 1,000 a month by the end of the following year. This brought to an end the period of mass immigration to Israel. The first wave of migration following the establishment of the State consisted of immigrants defined as illegal by the British and those who had been rerouted to Cyprus. Half of those imprisoned on Cyprus immigrated within the first three months, while the remainder were denied permission by the British to leave Cyprus and arrived early in 1949. This immigration received high priority but there was also pressure to assist others who were in refugee camps in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Competing with these various refugee groups were Jews in East European countries where the potential suspension of the right to emigrate was a constant concern. In addition, political considerations resulted in pressures to assist the immigration of Jews living in Middle Eastern countries where the Arab-Israel conflict had obvious repercussions.

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During the first six months of statehood, in addition to migrants from Cyprus, almost 30,000 immigrants from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia arrived, along with significant segments of the European Jewish refugee population. Toward the end of 1948, immigration from Yemen and Aden began, as did immigration from Algeria. By the end of 1948, 142,000 immigrants arrived. This pattern of immigration from different countries of origin continued during the following year. Immigration from Turkey and Libya in early 1949 was followed by the migration of the entire Jewish community of Yemen (35,000). The end of 1949 saw Poland and Romania opened up for Jewish emigration and these joined the continuous stream from the refugee camps. During 1949, about 250,000 immigrants arrived, averaging 20,000 monthly. These immigrants arrived during the period when Israel was fighting the War of Independence. Indeed, some of these immigrants were taken directly upon arrival to the war front, despite the lack of training and diversity of language. These diverse streams of immigration continued in 1950, with Romania, Poland, and North African countries dominating and accounting for 46,430, 26,500, and 25,000 immigrants, respectively. The following year, through August 1951, migration was largely from Romania and Iraq. From the latter, about 100,000 arrived in a concentrated period of time following an agreement between Iraq and Israel limiting the emigration of Iraqi Jews to several months. Thus, the pace and selection of immigrants during the period of mass immigration reflected the competing priorities among immigrant groups and policy choices that the Jewish Agency had to make. More importantly, there was an enormous reservoir of potential immigrants who had a high propensity to immigrate. The pressure among a large number of diverse Jewish populations to migrate combined with an attempt on the part of Israel to maximize immigration created the unique conditions for mass immigration in the first period of Israel's statehood. The extraordinary efforts to bring to Israel the largest number of Jewish immigrants possible within a concentrated period of time, despite the enormous hardships that would be generated, can only be explained

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by the unique combination of three factors: first, the recognition that increasing Jewish population size was the most direct way to create a viable Israeli society both in the short and long run. Second, the condition of war demanded an immediate increase in human resources for economic and military objectives that could only be met by rapid and large immigration. Third, mass immigration to a Jewish State was the most concrete fulfillment of a core theme in Zionist ideology. Mass immigration was organized and financed almost exclusively by Israel's immigration authority with financial sources mainly from Jews in communities outside of Israel. The regulation by country of origin and volume was in accordance with priorities determined by external conditions of the various Jewish communities and the resources available to allocate for immigration and absorption. Immigrants who could make their own travel arrangements and had financial resources to cover the costs of settlement in Israel could determine the timing of their own immigration. However, the absolute and relative number of those immigrants was very small. Despite the massive volume of immigration in a relatively short period of time, the government was at times criticized for regulating the flow of immigration. Criticism focused on the apparent conflict between the priorities established by the immigration institutions and the Law of Return. In fact, no such contradiction existed, since the Law of Return dealt with the right of all Jews to immigrate, while regulation was confined to immigration that was assisted and organized by government authorities. Nevertheless, the criticism reflects the strong proimmigration ideology that permeated selected segments of Israeli society. A small minority existed at the opposite extreme, arguing that mass immigration was dangerous to the survival of the new State, a position that gained momentum as mass immigration continued. To understand these pressures to restrict immigration, an examination must be made of the changing conditions within Israeli society. The War of Independence in 1948 created a series of eco-

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nomic strains, since a significant part of Israel's production was diverted for defense objectives. The resultant scarcity of supplies was compounded by the difficulties in importing goods as a result of the war and the shortage of foreign exchange. The inflationary pressures that followed were partly controlled by the government through an extensive system of rationing of commodities at official prices. The objective of this policy was to attempt to equalize access to goods of different strata of the population and, in particular, to reduce differences in the standard of living between new immigrants and veteran settlers. These economic conditions led to the formation and rapid expansion of a black market. Despite the bleak economic picture following statehood and early mass immigration, most of the initial migrants were accommodated economically. This accommodation was a function of the mass mobilization for defense that left jobs vacant for new immigrants plus the creation of employment through governmentsponsored public works. Generally, the economic problems were society-wide and not confined to the new wave of immigrants. Most immigrants stayed for a relatively short period of time in temporary immigration centers in Israel where, subsequent to receiving medical help and other necessities, they were assigned permanent housing. Housing was available in settlements and areas vacated by Arabs who fled the country during the fighting in 1948. This initial settlement in existing housing eased the economic integration of new immigrants and created new political conditions as former Arab areas in Israel were transformed into Jewish-populated settlements. In short, a large part of the necessary means to facilitate the first year of mass immigration was not specifically created for that purpose but was an indirect byproduct of the 1948 Arab-Israel War. As the war came to a close in mid-1949, demobilization of thousands of soldiers began to affect the labor market. The assignment of priority for available jobs to demobilized men aggravated employment problems. Combined with the high rates of immigration, unemployment levels increased and were particularly high among the newcomers. In response, the government

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created additional jobs through public works ; yet this represented but a partial solution to unemployment. Productivity was low and inflation rates increased. In addition to shortages of supplies, unemployment, and inflation, a major housing crisis was developing. Toward the middle of 1949, the availability of deserted Arab housing was exhausted and it became increasingly necessary to develop means to house new immigrants. The ma'abarot, or transit camps, became the main source of housing facilities for new immigrants. Over time, the absence of alternative housing and the slow rate of housing construction (relative to the rate of immigration) converted these transit facilities into semipermanent dwellings. These units consisted of tents and other light construction and, initially, services and food were provided for the population. By the end of 1949, the population in transit camps totaled 100,000 immigrants, and this was far from its peak. 6 Many immigrants were employed in nearby cities and in agricultural settlements that were, in part, sponsored by the public-works system and hence were poorly paid. A growing lack of motivation to work resulted from these conditions, in part because the needs of the migrants were supplied fully by the Jewish Agency. Since the population in the transit camps was increasing at about the same level as the monthly volume of immigration (about 15,000), it was decided to transform as many as possible of these transit camps into more permanent settlements. Some improvements were made in housing conditions, internal roads, and public facilities. A new emphasis was placed on establishing independent households within the ma'aborot to replace the communal kitchens organized and supplied by the government. Nevertheless, living conditions were most difficult in these settlements, high density was pervasive, and in many cases the extremes of winter made living intolerable, particularly with the harsh winters of 1950-51 and 1951-52. During this period, one of the major social issues to face Israeli society begins to emerge. Although from the beginning of mass immigration, migration streams were heterogeneous by country of origin, the period following 1950 was more character-

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ized by migration from Asian-African countries than the earlier phase. Hence, the transit camps were more populated by the less educated, occupationally unskilled, and less modern segments among the immigrant groups. Moreover, European migrants arriving during this period tended to spend less time in ma'aborot, as they were able to enter more easily into the mainstream of Israeli society. As a result of the timing of immigration and of the differential characteristics of immigrant groups, the overrepresentation of Afro-Asian immigrants in transit camps became even more pronounced over time. The coincidence of ethnicity, economic status, and propensity to mobility (social and geographic) led to the stigmatization of the "second Israel." 7 The immigrant population in transit camps and temporary settlements continued to increase, reaching a maximum of around 250,000 in mid-1952 and representing 17 percent of Israel's population. Thus, during the period of mass immigration, three main sets of problems dominated Israeli society as a direct consequence of the volume of migration: first, there were increasing shortages of supplies, an expansion of the government rationing system, and the development of a black market. Second, major unemployment, low-productive work, and inflation characterized the economy. Third, the severe housing crisis and the selective concentration within temporary settlements of socioethnic enclaves set the stage for the evolution of Israel's ethnic problems. In response to these problems resulting from mass-immigration patterns, negative reactions developed as further immigration occurred. Dissatisfactions and complaints among new immigrants, as well as the veteran population, were expressed vividly in newspaper accounts and in Knesset discussions. In the early months of 1949, immigrant demonstrations demanding jobs, housing, and better food in the camps increased in frequency. One expression, among others, of this conflict was reported in the newpaper, Ha'aretz (April 26, 1949): New immigrants were willing to work for less money (for example, in citrus groves) than the veteran population and the latter viewed the newcomers as competitors for limited job openings. The conflict and competition

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over differential wages and the difficult conditions in the transit camps were also discussed in public forums. In the Knesset (April 27, 1949), the political opposition argued that poor food, hygienic, and sanitary conditions were rampant in the camps. Even the Minister of Health had to admit that the conditions were poor. One opposition speaker claimed that the situation in transit camps was worse than the refugee camps in Europe from which many of the immigrants came. An important expression was given to the anti-immigration attitude that was emerging when it was argued in that Knesset meeting that "it is being said that new immigrants refuse to work and just want to receive public welfare." The option of restricting or planning immigration was aired even by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. An extreme view was presented by the head of the Manufacturer's Association who proposed an immigration quota of 10,000 per month instead of the 25,00030,000 that were arriving at that time. These discussions took place after only one-third of the mass immigration had arrived and before the major demobilizations from the army. Even the foreign press discussed the problems associated with mass immigration to Israel and the need to invest enormous resources, not then available, if immigration was to continue without restriction. A front-page report in the New York Times (July 18, 1949) noted that "the Israeli Government is fast approaching a crisis in its immigration problem." The desire on the part of Israel to "double the population in four years at the rate of 250,000 persons a year" was viewed as unrealistic and it was suggested that immigration should be "cut drastically and immediately." A visitor to the ma'aborot described "the general bitterness and appalling living conditions in these camps" that are "almost beyond belief." It was concluded that unless vast sums are mobilized there will be only one alternative, "closing the Gates of Zion." Employment and housing problems along with the clashes between the veteran and newcomer populations were accentuated in areas of population concentration, mainly the central coastal areas. In late 1949, a policy of population dispersal was adopted whose aim was to settle border areas primarily for political-

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security reasons. Clearly, the dispersal policy helped reduce the potential tensions between the new immigrants and the rest of the population. This policy was intimately connected with immigration policies in the sense that dispersal was viewed as one means for the absorption of immigrants. Moreover, immigration policy became an instrument to accomplish the political objectives of population settlement in outlying districts. This internal policy became a new source of dissatisfaction among migrants as most preferred to live in the more developed areas of the country, particularly the central region.8 As conditions in Israel deteriorated, debates and discussions about the future of mass immigration became more frequent. The obvious connections between mass immigration and severe austerity were made in political and public forums. More frequent and vocal demands were expressed to restrict immigration and bring to an end the mass-immigration policy. Even leadership of the United Jewish Appeal in the United States was reported to have demanded that immigration be slowed down for six months so as to enable the balancing of immigration budgets. 9 Others, at the same time, were arguing that restrictions on immigration were already in effect and that such policies violated basic ZionistIsraeli ideology. Both positions were strongly rejected. Ben-Gurion, who had fostered the policy of mass immigration, argued that "economic conditions should be adjusted to immigration volume rather than the reverse," a position he had maintained since the early 1930s. (Cf. chapter 3.) The ideological argument that Jews in the Diaspora should be encouraged and assisted in immigration to Israel, and the conception that Israel's future was tied to a larger population size, dominated his thinking and, in turn, Israel's policy. Despite the continuing economic austerity and pressure toward the adoption of immigration restrictions, a new plan was announced in 1950 with a target of an additional 650,000 immigrants for the following three-and-a-half years. The problems of the 200,000 migrants in transit camps in Israel and the larger economic burdens of the veteran population were not relieved in 1951. The debates about unlimited immigration continued at the same time that immigration volume was very

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high. Over 140,000 immigrants arrived during the first seven months of 1951, mainly from Iraq and Romania, the highest monthly volume recorded during the entire mass-immigration period. However, during the second half of 1951, immigration levels declined considerably, and in the last month of 1951, less than 4,000 immigrants arrived. Thus, the period characterized by the highest rates of immigration ever recorded in modern history came to an end.

Post-Mass-Immigration Period (1951-54)

Was the end of mass immigration the result of changes in immigration policy? The evidence available suggests that, at least in the early stages of the decline, no policy of immigration restriction was operating. Although a policy of immigration regulation was to be put into effect in 1952, the decline in the volume of immigration clearly preceded that policy by several months. Indeed, as the volume of immigration was in the process of decline and before the announcement of new immigration regulations, the head of the immigration department of the Jewish Agency stated (August 1951) that Israel needed and would welcome the 600,000 new immigrants expected during the following three-year period! The first hints of a policy change are contained in the immigration program of the Jewish Agency for 1952 (adopted on November 18, 1951) specifying for the first time "rules of selection" for immigrants brought to Israel under the sponsorship of the Jewish Agency. These rules were designed to reduce the number of immigrants who were chronically ill, nonproductive laborers, or unwilling to settle in agricultural areas (see figure 4.2).10 The rules of selection centered on three major items: (1) all immigrants would have to undergo a medical examination prior to immigration under the supervision of an Israeli medical officer; (2) no more than 20 percent of the immigrants were to be over age 35; (3) emphasis was placed on selecting immigrants committed to agricultural or semiskilled labor. This latter category was particularly complex and overlapped with the item regarding age restric-

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tions. No numerical quotas were specified in these rules. Except for the medical clause, the rules were stated in compositional terms, rather than in terms of individual characteristics. These selection rules were almost impossible to implement, since they were not clearly formulated and because no limit on volume was specified. The negative experience of immigration quotas under the British Mandate and the basic Zionist value emphasizing unrestricted Jewish immigration were clearly important factors preventing the clear specification of a policy of control over immigration volume. Although some regulation of immigration throughout the mass-immigration period was inevitable, it took the form of priorities assigned to various immigrant groups. The new rules were different in that additional criteria for immigration regulation were 4.2 Immigration Selection Rules (1952)

1. 80 percent of the immigrants shall be selected from candidates for Youth Aliya, pioneers, agricultural settlement groups, skilled workers up to age 35, and families where the major earner is less than age 35. 2. Immigrants—except for skilled workers and those who have the means to provide their own housing—are obligated to spend two years in agricultural work. 3. Certification for immigration for these candidates will be given only after a basic medical examination under the supervision of a doctor from Israel. 4. No more than 20 percent of the immigrants may be above age 35 if they are joined by families whose wage earner is capable of work or are cared for and absorbed by their family members in Israel. 5. Certificates for immigrants to be cared for by family members in Israel will be given through the immigration department only after the ability and willingness of the relative to absorb the immigrant is established.

SOURCE: Report of the Jewish Agency, Department of Immigration, September 1951 to March 1952.

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specified; namely, age, health, and occupation. The notion of "planned migration" began to emerge gradually as the government policy. The intention of the new rules was the indirect control of total volume, as well as the selective control of the composition of migration by age, health, and occupational status. An examination of immigration patterns 1952-54 places in perspective the impact of these selection rules. Following the declines in immigration in the last half of 1951 noted earlier, immigration levels continued to fall throughout 1952, averaging less than 2,000 a month, and during 1953 averaged less than 1,000 a month. Indeed, it was one of the few years since the beginning of modern immigration that the rate of emigration exceeded the rate of immigration. The main source of the 1953 immigration was from the Jewish community in Morocco. The following year immigration volume increased slightly to 18,000, mainly from North Africa. Apparently, the volume of immigration in this period was lower than expected or considered desirable. Under the assumption that the new policy was responsible, at least partly, for the low volume of immigration, a series of rule modifications began to be applied, easing immigration restrictions and, in the process, making the selection rules more operational. Modifications made in 1953 oriented the emphasis of the selectivity rules toward family characteristics. Families along with their dependents could migrate provided there was at least one wage earner below age 45 (raised from age 35). The following year, this age level was increased to age 50, and older persons were allowed to immigrate if they were supported by their relatives, or if they had at least $7,000, instead of the previous level of $10,000.11 The developing conditions in Israel must be examined to account for the dramatic reversal of immigration and to place the effects of the changes in selection rules in a broader context. After years of scarcity and rising prices, anti-inflationary measures taken by the government further aggravated the employment situation and unemployment levels reached a peak in 1953. Continuing economic problems, including balance of payment and low national per capita product, required the continuation of

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government rationing and implied a growing black market, covering almost the entire range of consumer goods. 12 Adding to the economic burdens and to the high proportion of nonproductive labor was the large proportion of migrants who were aged or ill, requiring medical treatment and institutional care. Housing problems remained a serious deterrent to immigration, as nearly 250,000 immigrants remained in transit camps early in 1952 and the reduction in the camp population did not get under way before the middle of the following year. Even migrants who had been settled in agricultural areas as part of the government's population dispersal policy faced grave hardships during the period of transition before agricultural production became selfsupporting. Location far from areas of population concentration prevented this segment from finding supplementary employment. Many of these settlers were of Afro-Asian origins with large families to support, which further accentuated their economic difficulties. Demonstrations for housing and jobs filled the press reports during this period. The situation was so difficult that extreme suggestions were cited in the press, including one that the State ought to finance selected emigration (Ha'aretz, November 21, 1952). These conditions were part of the continuing debate in the Knesset and hardly a month during 1952-53 passed where the topic of immigration and the situation of immigrants were not discussed. The supporters of immigration regulation and those arguing for renewed mass migration viewed immigration policy as responsible for the slack in immigration volume. Others recognized the connection between mass immigration in the previous period and its socioeconomic consequences as the primary factors in the decline in immigration propensity. As noted, the selection rules did not apply to those able to support their own immigration. Jews in Western countries (about 7 million), particularly in North America, represented a major source of potential immigration that had hardly been tapped. In view of the sharp decline in immigration volume and the potential economic and social benefits that might accrue from such immigration, the Jewish Agency and the government established a

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ministerial committee to encourage the immigration of Western Jews. However, immigration from Western countries did not increase. Nor should it have been expected, given the socioeconomic conditions in Israel during this period. Another potential source of immigrants was Jews in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (approximately 3 million). While representing a potential source from Israel's point of view, these Jews were, in large part, not permitted to emigrate from their countries of origin. The major realistic sources of potential immigrants were Turkey and Iran (about 130,000) and North African countries (about 500,000). The prospects of national independence in North African countries made the political future of their Jewish populations uncertain. Israel, however, was not the only possible alternative for the North African Jewish community; France represented an attractive alternative for a substantial number, particularly the middle and upper strata. Between 1952-54, only 30,000 Jewish immigrants came to Israel from these countries. Hence, in addition to the unattractive conditions in Israel, part of the decline in the volume of immigration may be attributed to the superior economic opportunities in Western countries, prohibitions against emigration in Communist countries, and attractive alternative destinations for North African Jewry. What, then, can be concluded about the effect of the selection rules on immigration during this period? The evidence available is partly circumstantial and largely indirect but sheds some light on the relationship between immigration policy and patterns. The first question is, What were the effects of the selection rules on the composition of the immigration stream? If the selection rules had been effective, a reduction in the proportion of migrants aged 35 and over and/or in dependency rates should be expected, as well as changes in the number of male immigrants who declared themselves "wage earners." A comparison of the composition of migrants before and after the selection rules were put into effect shows no significant change in these characteristics. Similarly, a comparison of the occupational structure of male migrants in 1952 with those 1950-51 shows no significant shift. Hence, the selective rules do not appear to have altered the

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composition of migrants—at least in terms of the above characteristics. Did the selection rules have an impact on the volume of immigration? Again, the evidence is not straightforward, but some points may be suggested. The decline in immigration preceded the implementation of the selection rules, which began in early 1952. Immigration from all North African countries, in fact, declined from 31,700 in 1949 to 18,000 in 1950, to 8,800 in 1952, and to 3,900 in 1953. Moreover, modifications in the selection rules had no apparent consequence on the volume in 1953. Changes in policy that eased the selection rules could have been responsible for the increase in immigration from North Africa in 1954. However, and these are the complicating factors, 1954 was the first year in which real improvements in Israel's economy began to emerge (including in part the reparations agreement with West Germany) and at the same time a significant deterioration of the sociopolitical situation of North African Jews had occurred. The evidence, while not conclusive, seems to suggest that the economic changes in Israel and the political changes in North Africa were more important factors accounting for changes in immigration in 1954, while changes in immigration policy contributed slightly, if at all. Finally, any system of selection rules that is designed to achieve a particular composition will tend indirectly to affect the total volume of immigration. The fact that the composition of immigrants before and after the introduction of the selection rules was practically the same suggests that the rules were not effective in controlling composition and not likely to have affected volume. On the basis of the partial and the indirect evidence available, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the reduction in the volume of immigration reflected in large part the conditions in Israel following mass immigration rather than the restrictive immigration policies that some political leaders and the general public associated with the decline. Hence, both restrictive immigration policies and the decline in immigration were more likely the consequences of conditions that resulted from mass immigration during the earlier period. Most likely the pattern was not that

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PATTERNS

4 . 3 A l t e r n a t i v e Patterns of t h e R e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n M a s s M i g r a t i o n , R e s t r i c t i v e P o l i c i e s , a n d the D e c l i n e in I m m i g r a t i o n PATTERN 1

the decline in immigration resulted directly from restrictive immigration policies. Schematically the pattern was more like Pattern 1 and not Pattern 2. (See figure 4.3.)

I m m i g r a t i o n Patterns a n d P o l i c i e s : 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 6 7 The decade beginning in 1955 represented a shift from economic austerity to rapid economic growth in Israel. Per capita gross national product in real terms increased by 4.5 percent per year in 1955-58 and by over 8 percent annually, 1958-65. Consumption per capita in real terms, increased by 67 percent between 1955 and 1967, having been almost constant and at a relatively low level up to 1953. Part of this economic upsurge was a function of importation of foreign capital, particularly German reparations, agreed upon in 1952 and increasing in impact over the years. Scarcity of consumer products and rationing of goods disappeared gradually during the period.13 Hence, Israel in the post-1954 era was becoming more attractive for immigration, compared to the period immediately following mass immigration. Although economic improvements were still not sufficient to attract potential Western immigrants, the economic "pull" of Israel was an increasingly important factor with regard to potential Jewish immigration from Afro-Asian and East European countries. Indeed, economic changes were among the most important factors influencing the shift toward a greater volume of immigration.

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Another set of factors associated with changing immigration patterns during this period were the repercussions of the 1956 Sinai campaign. The results of that military conflict improved Israel's political and military position in the Middle East and increased self-confidence and security within Israel. In turn, the propensity of Jewish communities in Arab countries to migrate increased. Immigration patterns during 1955-67 were concentrated in two subperiods—1955-57 and 1961-64—between and after which immigration volume was low. Following the period 1952— 54, when only 18,000 immigrants arrived annually, immigration in the following three years increased from 36,000 to 70,000. This shift reflected the changing internal conditions in Israel noted above, as well as changes in countries of origin. Political conditions in the Jewish community of Morocco were deteriorating as nationalism in North African countries began to emerge. Some relaxation of Jewish emigration restrictions from Poland began to have an effect, and in 1957 over 25,000 Jews from Poland arrived, along with several thousand from other Eastern European countries. Moreover, a large number of those in the Jewish community in Egypt were expelled in 1957, many of whom migrated to Israel. Variations and fluctuations in immigration from the two major sources—Eastern Europe and North Africa—reflected changes in the economic and political situation of Jews in these countries and the emigration policies of these governments. What was the role of immigration policies in Israel in the changing immigration patterns 1955-67? Three major developments in the selection rules characterized this period. First, a gradual process of direct control over the volume of immigration emerged. The change toward numerical quotas by country of origin gradually took shape as policy but at first was ambiguous, not clearly discernible. A second policy element was the continuation of a more direct screening of migrant families in lieu of specifying a desirable composition of immigrants. Selection rules deemphasized individual characteristics such as age and occupation and moved further in the direction of considering the family as the unit of migration, with a clearer emphasis on the ability of

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the family to support itself. Finally, standards of absorption were changing. During the mass-immigration period the criterion for delaying immigration from a particular country may have been the lack of tents available for newly arrived immigrants. In the postmass-immigration period, the criterion for slowing immigration was the absence of concrete housing. During the period following 1955, the availability of employment also regulated the flow of immigration. Hence, policies in the post-mass-immigration period became more restrictive over time, due to higher standards of immigrant absorption. Generally, these changes did not occur suddenly—nor were they clear-cut—but they developed slowly over a period of time.14 Restrictions were placed only on those requiring the assistance of the Jewish Agency or the State while the overall open-door policy remained the right of all Jews under the Law of Return. The implementation of immigration quotas was viewed by many as contradictory to Zionist ideology emphasizing maximum Jewish immigration. This is reflected in newspaper commentary, Knesset discussions, and debates at World Zionist Congress meetings. The precarious political situation of North African Jewry heightened the debate over immigration quotas. Illustrative of these debates was the report in 1955 of the Knesset Finance Committee. It was noted that even the monthly quotas of 2,000 immigrants from North Africa would require special funding not readily available.15 Implied in this was that the volume of immigration had been adjusted to economic conditions. This was a clear reversal of the prevailing opinion during the period of mass immigration. (See the earlier discussion in this chapter.) A more direct confrontation on this issue characterized discussions in the World Jewish Congress. Subsequent to political upheavals in Morocco, the whole issue of North African Jewish immigration and existing quotas was debated.16 Representatives from North African Jewish communities complained bitterly about the numerical quotas and selection criteria applied to Jewish immigrants from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The representative of the Moroccan Jewish community appealed for "an increase of the immigration quotas to 5,000 per month" and a

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change in the "rules of selection so that they will be limited to medical criteria only." His plea to the Zionist leadership was made "in the name of traditional Jewish solidarity and the emotional ties binding the Jewish people." He urgently demanded that "the request for increasing quotas be met, as had been done with the Iraqi and Yemenite Jewish communities, before emigration becomes more difficult." The demands for an increase in the monthly quota followed an estimate of 100,000 potential immigrants listed in Morocco and a demand of the North African Zionist Federation for a monthly quota of 5,000 for all North African Jewish communities. Other representatives at the meeting demanded that North African immigration be treated as "emergency-refugee migration," i.e., immigration that was outside the existing quota system. The Tunisian delegate cited a speech made at the United Nations by Israel's Ambassador Abba Eban declaring that Israel is a physical and spiritual refuge for all Jews. The delegate then challenged the Zionist leadership to accord the same right of refuge to North African Jewry. Most of the delegates did not demand the removal of all quotas but rather requested increasing the upper limit. Responses on the part of the Zionist leadership in Jerusalem reflected ambivalence and disquiet. While recognizing the "moral" and "ideological" obligation to encourage and assist the immigration of North African Jewry, shortages of funds and Israel's economic problems had to be faced realistically. Despite ideological lip-service to "mass immigration," and "self-sacrifice," a desire to return to nonrestrictive policies, and full recognition of the growing political difficulties facing North African Jewish communities, the Jewish Agency nevertheless reconfirmed the need to regulate and control immigration volume. Given the economic situation in Israel, which was still difficult as a consequence of previous policies of unrestricted mass immigration, existing immigration quotas were presented as necessary evils. Quotas on immigration volume and screening procedures were the accommodations to the conflict between immigration ideology and economic reality. The end of mass-immigration policies had become institu-

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tionalized and rationalized. Indeed a member of the Zionist Executive from the United States articulated the new mood when he stated at the meeting: This is p e r h a p s the first t i m e that leaders of a large, a n d important J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y have c o m e to Israel with the d e m a n d for i m m i g r a t i o n . . . A realistic i m m i g r a t i o n p o l i c y is t i e d to the d e m a n d for e x p a n d i n g i m m i g r a t i o n from M o r o c c o a n d North Africa. However, a q u e s t i o n may be posed: Is it n e c e s s a r y that this i m m i g r a t i o n stream arrive d u r i n g the c o m i n g year or in the next two years or p e r h a p s in the next several years? It s e e m s that the situation there is not that d e s p e r a t e a n d h e n c e d o e s not require a hurried, c o n f u s e d i m m i g r a t i o n pattern but a p l a n n e d , g r a d u a l pattern. This w i l l be g o o d for the potential i m m i g r a n t s a n d for the State of Israel.

In response to pressures from the North African Jewish communities, the Prime Minister (Sharet) reported to the Knesset that the quotas for North African immigration would be increased from 2,000 to 3,500 per month. In his presentation to the Knesset, he recognized explicitly the need for controlling the volume of migration to prevent the experiences of 1953-54 when immigration fell to low levels subsequent to mass immigration.17 The subsequent Knesset debate revolved around the selection rules and quotas. The Herat party (right wing) opposed all immigration restrictions, while all other parties tended to view restrictions and quotas as necessary measures, however unfortunate. The Knesset approved the notion of increasing the quotas and regulating the volume of immigration within the context of planned immigration. The similarity between this Knesset position and the British policy associated with the Churchill White Paper of 1922 did not go unnoticed by some Zionists. (See chapter 3.) Ben-Gurion often remarked that controls over migration based on "economic absorptive capacity" were the source of contention between the Yishuv and the British and had no place in the Zionist State. Nevertheless, economic criteria were precisely the basis of the emergency-immigration policies. When Ben-Gurion returned to power in 1955, the issue of North African immigration became central, but unlike his pre-

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vious public statements, there was no trace in his speeches of the policy of unrestricted or unplanned mass immigration. Nor did he reiterate his theme that immigration had higher priority than economic considerations. The quotas from North African countries, combined with the expected migration from other countries, particularly Eastern Europe, brought the overall annual immigration target to over 60,000.18 During 1957, over 71,000 immigrants arrived, the highest volume subsequent to 1951. However, the immigration boom was short-lived. Immigration averaged 25,000 annually between 1955 and 1960, mainly reflecting emigration policies in Romania and Morocco. The volume of immigration for the four years beginning in 1961 increased to 230,000 and reflected the continued immigration from Morocco and Romania. Movement from Argentina began to take place during this period as political tension and unrest mounted. Continued economic improvements in Israel were also responsible for the increase in immigration volume. In 1965, immigration volume again fell off in part due to the decline in potential immigrant population from East European and North African countries. The Jewish population in Romania and North Africa declined from 450,000 in 1960 to 200,000 in 1965, as large numbers had already immigrated to Israel. There was probably a lower propensity to migrate among those remaining, since immigration had already been selective of those prone to immigrate. Moreover, starting in 1965 and for a period of over two years, the economic recession in Israel was more noticeable and may have affected immigration volume. Some have argued that the economic recession prior to the Six Day War of 1967 may have been due in part to the decline in immigration.19 The interdependence of economic factors and immigration clearly emerges. An interesting point can be seen from both the 1958-60 and 1965-67 declines in immigration volume, which parallel the period immediately following mass immigration. When immigration declined from countries where Jews were under political pressure and "push" factors predominated, an emphasis was placed on encouraging the immigration of Jews from Western

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countries. Concessions to ease foreign currency exchange were made, housing and transportation costs were subsidized, and representatives of the Jewish Agency were sent to Western countries to provide information and assist in the preparation for immigration. Proposals to frame these special concessions into legislation with the intention of reaching the potential target of Western immigrants were outlined.20 These measures and discussions were not very successful during this period when judged by the few Jews from Western countries who immigrated.

Immigration Patterns and Policies in the Post-Six-Day-War Period: 1968-75

The period 1968-75 is distinguishable in several important respects from earlier periods. The most important single event shaping conditions in Israel and in Jewish communities around the world was the Six Day War of 1967. Israel emerged from the war with an impressive military victory that implied greater political-military security and extended her borders to remove the military threat from her population centers. The addition of over 1 million Arabs in areas administered and controlled by Israel did not appear initially to create a great concern.* Hence, a dominant feeling of security pervaded the country and there were no longer expressions of concern over the future survival of Israel. The psychological impact of Israel's victory extended to major Jewish communities around the world and increased somewhat their propensity to immigrate. The war of attrition 1968-70 did not substantially alter the sense of security within Israeli society. In addition, rapid economic growth characterized the postSix-Day-War period. The economic recession of 1965-67 was followed by the most prosperous period ever experienced in Israel's history. Gross national product, capital formation, and consumption increased significantly and full employment and labor shortages sharply contrasted with economic patterns imme*This is mainly because the government did not seem to have any intention initially of retaining these territories and hence the problem of a large Arab minority did not seem to be pressing.

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diately prior to 1967. New industries were developed, partly in response to the demands of Israel's military authorities. Housing and construction were in high demand, owing to the general security situation, economic prosperity, increases in standard of living, and the first phases of renewed immigration. Sources of potential Jewish immigration had changed as East European and North African Jewish populations had dwindled in size due to prior emigration to Israel. The major countries of potential Jewish immigration were Western countries (such as the United States, Latin America, and Western Europe) and the Soviet Union. Starting in 1969, the emigration of Jews from the USSR became noticeable and over time became the most important immigration source to Israel during this period. Within the Western world, the heightened propensity to immigrate stemming from the new sociopolitical conditions in Israel was strengthened by selected "push" factors in various countries. These included, for example, inflation and political instability in Latin American countries, selected unemployment, urban and race problems in the United States, and general economic conditions affecting middle-class Jews in Europe. Hence, three factors shaped the changing volume and source of immigration to Israel after the Six Day War: the decline in the size of Jewish communities in Middle Eastern and East European countries; the opening of the USSR to selective Jewish emigration; and the relative shift in the "pushpull" balance in favor of Israel for countries with large Jewish populations. Immigration volume 1969-71 averaged nearly 40,000 per year, increasing to nearly 56,000 in 1972-73. Composition changes show (1969-73) an increasing proportion coming from the USSR (37 percent), 20 percent from Western Europe, 12 percent from North America, and 6 percent from Latin America. In contrast to 1955-64 when immigration from Eastern Europe and North African countries constituted 90 percent of all immigrants, less than one-fourth came from these areas in 1969-73. This compositional change was accompanied by significant shifts in the occupational composition of migrants toward the more skilled and professional levels. The concentration of immigrants in high-status categories

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implied that the continuation of an effective proimmigration policy would require different approaches and orientations to maintain the immigration momentum. Improving economic conditions in Israel meant that the integration of migrants had to occur at higher standards of living compared to earlier migration waves. As early as 1964, the Jewish Agency published a review of laws concerning aid and subsidies to immigrants in various countries. It was suggested that Israel should adopt a law providing subsidies for housing, transportation, reduced taxes, and health insurance for immigrants. In 1968 these benefits were framed as regulations not requiring formal approval by the Knesset. Furthermore, a new Ministry of Immigrant Absorption was established, which was responsible for the enforcement and coordination of absorption in Israel within the context of these new regulations. This ministry assumed the functions of the department of absorption of the Jewish Agency. Efforts were made as far as possible to arrange housing and employment before immigrants arrived and to coordinate migrant absorption on an individual basis. Absorption Centers (far different from the transit camps) were established to assist in acquiring language skills, occupational retraining, and general assistance in the difficult early stages of adjustment to Israeli life. Additional examples of special provisions for encouraging individual migration were proposals for a new university to provide higher education for Jewish youth from the Diaspora and government financing salaries of special, highly skilled occupations for periods of up to three years. 21 Social interaction between migrants and veteran settlers was viewed as an integral part of immigrant integration. The entire process of absorption was treated as personalized and individually tailored. Discussions and debates in the Knesset reflect this new thrust of immigration absorption. For example, questions were raised in Knesset debate about the availability of higher education facilities for migrants, the availability of stipends for immigrant students, the availability of space in intensive language institutes (ulpanim) for teaching Hebrew language fluency, the time gap between declaration of intentions to migrate and provision of housing in Israel, the

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time allowed for olim to stay in Absorption Centers, and the availability of health insurance for older migrants. The tenor of these Knesset questions and discussions was radically different from that in the 1950s and 1960s.22 The changing immigration picture and the new emphasis placed on absorption had an impact on the general attitudes of Israelis toward immigrants and toward the new system of their absorption. Signs of dissatisfaction may be detected as early as the end of 1968. For example, a complaint was made in the Knesset that the government was investing IL 70,000 per immigrant, while there were hardly any investments in development towns populated mainly by earlier immigrants from Middle Eastern countries. Another type of discontent stemmed from the view of the middle classes that immigrants were competing with them for the limited apartments available, thereby increasing prices; that new job openings were going to immigrants, and that Israeli students would be seriously competing with new middle-class immigrants for limited admissions to universities in Israel. 23 Attitude surveys at the time showed that about one-third of the Israeli population felt that new immigrants were blocking the admission of veterans to institutions of higher learning and over one-third believed that Israel should not provide benefits or incentives to immigrants from affluent countries. 24 As immigration volume increased in 1971-73, the expressions of dissatisfaction became more frequent. Organizations and political parties representing socially deprived groups clearly expressed the imbalance between government investment in immigration and the inadequate actions taken by the government in closing the socioeconomic gap in Israel. The public advisory committee of the Ministry of Absorption devoted an entire session to the growing negative attitudes toward immigration among large segments of the Israeli public. The DirectorGeneral conveyed the general tone of the changed atmosphere in Israel in his opening remarks. He stated: The previous m e e t i n g (six months earlier) of the p u b l i c a d v i s o r y c o m m i t t e e met in an a t m o s p h e r e c o m p l e t e l y different t h a n that of today.

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Then we met in an atmosphere of general public support and encouragement of immigration and of improving procedures for the absorption of immigrants. Today we meet in an atmosphere of deep-rooted antagonism and hostility toward immigration. This atmosphere posits the socioeconomic gap versus immigration. 25

The general effects of these growing negative public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are difficult to assess. Historical events again intervened to complicate an already complex picture. The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 changed the political and economic situation in Israel and the stable, secure position that Israel experienced in the internar years, 1967-73. Immigration patterns responded almost immediately to the post1973 conditions in Israel as Western immigration came almost to a standstill following declines experienced in 1972. Russian immigration declined at a slower pace. Although the direction was clear, the question remains whether the reduction of immigration from the USSR was a voluntary response to the politico-economic changes in Israel following the war, to the problems associated with absorbing previous waves of Russian immigrants, to negative public reactions to some aspects of Russian immigration, or to changing Soviet policy regarding emigration. Even among emigrants from Russia, an increasing proportion was turning to alternative destinations in the Western world rather than immigrating to Israel. The rate of emigration and return migration from Israel to countries of origin increased in 1974-75 and the volume of net migration in 1975 was the lowest recorded since the bleak years following mass immigration.

Some Concluding Observations Israel has had one of the most active proimmigration policies in modern demographic history: a general open-door immigration policy providing for all Jews the right to settle in Israel and the encouragement of immigration, settlement, and absorption. These principles of immigration policy flow naturally from general Zionist ideology. Although Zionist proimmigration ideology and

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the principle of free Jewish immigration were present since the beginning of modern Jewish settlement, the implementation of immigration policy has varied over time. Israel's immigration policies emerged in four stages: (1) The first stage was to channel immigration during the period of mass immigration. (2) Attempts to regulate immigration through the imposition of selection rules focusing on age, health, and occupation characteristics occurred during the early post-mass-migration period (1952-54). (3) Specific numerical immigration quotas were imposed starting in 1955, in addition to regulations governing selected characteristics of migrants. These numerical quotas have at times been vague and ambiguous and have been applied only under special circumstances. (4) Standards of absorption have changed, particularly following the Six Day War in 1967 and the increase in immigration from Western countries. Generally, these changing immigration policies were largely responses to changing socioeconomic and political conditions in Israel and in countries of potential Jewish immigration. However, these policies have rarely, if ever, served as a basis for rational planning aimed at specific migration targets. This is because the relationship between immigration policies and patterns is clearly tied to socioeconomic contexts and these broader contexts have never been taken into consideration in formulating and evaluating immigration policies. Restrictive policies can limit the volume of immigration when the potential number of immigrants is large. In Israel, restrictive immigration policies (for example in the mid1950s) were successfully implemented, given the large number of potential immigrants from North African countries and the relative socioeconomic conditions in Israel compared to those countries. In contrast, immigration regulation in the immediate postmass-immigration period was largely irrelevant in terms of regulating the volume of immigration, since the poor socioeconomic conditions in Israel were not conducive to immigration. Similarly, immigration-stimulating policies, while always more problematic, can have an impact on immigration patterns only when the socioeconomic context is appropriate. The clearest illustration of this was the policies of immigration immediately

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following the establishment of the State and the subsequent mass immigration from a wide range of countries. However, initial attempts to stimulate immigration from Western countries in the early 1950s did not take into consideration the very poor socioeconomic conditions in Israel and were not successful. The same applies to the most recent period after the 1973 war. Despite "attractive" absorption incentives, the pattern of Western immigration has declined because of the relative changes in the balance of socioeconomic conditions in Israel and countries of origin. In contrast, immigration from Western countries increased in the period 1967-1973, partly in response to the new policies of absorption. Since the socioeconomic context has not been an integral part of the evolution of immigration policy formulation in Israel, such policies have not been the basis of a system of rationalized immigration planning. An examination of the total context of immigration patterns and policy suggests that it was mainly the changing balance of conditions in Israel and conditions in Jewish communities outside of Israel that determined variation in the patterns of immigration. In turn, immigration patterns significantly affected conditions in Israel, which had a further impact on immigration patterns. The power to stimulate migration directly does not appear to rest with a particular immigration policy that may be devised by Israel if the socioeconomic context is ignored. This is largely because immigration responds to the "push-pull" balance of conditions in Israel and in Jewish communities around the world. No feasible immigration policy can overcome the effects of the "push-pull" balance. Indeed, no realistic or practical policies could encourage mass immigration on the scale and intensity of the period immediately following statehood. This is the case because socioeconomic conditions that would rapidly follow from such a high volume of immigration would affect both the acceptance of immigrants among the resident Israeli population and the immigration propensity of potential immigrants. Hence, mass migration was a unique phenomenon in Israeli history not likely to be repeated. Paradoxically, it was under conditions of extreme deprivation that

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mass immigration could take place. As socioeconomic conditions improved, the upper limit to immigration became more circumscribed. Attempts to stimulate and encourage immigration from Western countries generally occurred when immigration from other countries declined. A real shift in developing an incentive system through a variety of means occurred only after the Six Day War. Most of these attempts were largely unsuccessful until conditions in Israel improved considerably. A very high correlation exists between the volume of Western immigration to Israel and economic indices.26 Immigration to Israel, despite the unique forces of nationalism, Zionism, ideology, and policy has responded in remarkably similar ways to socioeconomic "pushes" and "pulls" that have played the key roles in general processes of immigration to countries around the world.

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NATALITY POLICIES: TRENDS AND PATTERNS

GOVERNMENTS CAN RESTRICT the entry and exiting of potential migrants and can stimulate immigration within the limitations imposed by socioeconomic conditions. In contrast, government policies to manipulate fertility-either pronatalist or antinatalist— are much more problematic. Hence, natality policies are generally less specific, less clear-cut, and less likely to be effective than are immigration policies. Fertility targets are often ambiguous and the means of fertility policy implementation are less direct than for immigration. Most importantly, the system of variables determining fertility is complex and the specific processes of fertility regulation within the system are not very well understood. In addition, fertility patterns involve complex normative and value components that make government intervention most difficult. Natality issues have been ambiguous and unclear in their official expression in Israel. Neither classicial nor modern Zionism presents an unequivocal stand on ideal family size, family planning or fertility. The concern over natality has always had less consensus and less public interest in Israel when compared to immigration issues. Nevertheless, there seems to be a pronatal ideology or value pattern in Israel stemming in large part from the concern about the size of the Jewish population in Israel in absolute and relative numbers. A minor theme of considerably

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less importance underlying the pronatalist ideology in Israel relates to the demographic conditions of Jewish communities outside of Israel, in particular population losses in the Holocaust and low rates of contemporary world Jewish population growth. In addition, pronatalism developed in the demographic contexts of differential natural increase between Jewish and Arab communities and differential fertility within the Jewish community. (See the discussion in chapter 2.) Differences in natural increase between Arab and Jewish sectors have been widening since the early 1950s as a result of the increase in both expectation of life and fertility among Arabs and the decline in Jewish fertility. Fertility differences between the Jewish and Arab populations have significant implications for issues associated with the demographic composition of Israel, national political dominance, and the cultural character of the country. The fertility gap between Afro-Asian- and European-origin Jewish populations remains despite trends toward convergence, so that a continuation of these patterns implies that the less affluent, less educated, socially deprived sectors will increase more rapidly than the affluent, educated, "Western" sectors. These demographic and ideological contexts provide the framework for the emergence of pronatal attitudes in Israel.

The Origins of Pronatalism Population problems and the need for pronatal programs have been discussed by political and public figures in the press and in speeches for over thirty-five years. Open discussions and political pressures toward the formulation of an official pronatal policy in Israel during the 1950s and the 1960s were a continuation of discussions and public debates initiated during the period of the British Mandate in Palestine in the late 1930s and the 1940s. Pronatal policies were discussed almost always when the volume of immigration was low. Among some segments of the Jewish community, the possibility of increasing Jewish fertility to achieve more rapid population growth was an important consideration even during periods of heavy immigration.

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The earliest pronatal discussions that appeared in the literature were in the late 1930s and they were infrequent. These discussions increased over time and may be understood in three specific contexts. First, Jewish immigration declined considerably from the beginning of World War II, thus increasing the relative importance of natality in the growth of the Jewish population in Palestine. Second, the decline in the birth rate among Jews in Palestine beginning prior to World War II, combined with the decline in immigration during the war, resulted in a low rate of population growth during the war period. Third, in the early 1940s the first news about the destruction of European Jewry began to be publicized. It appears that David Ben-Gurion was the first to stress publicly the importance of increased natality. In the background was Professor Roberto Bachi (then statistician for the Hadassah Medical Institute, later Professor of Statistics and Demography at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and the Government Statistician) who drew Ben-Gurion's attention to the "problem." The fact was that the Jewish population did not have a particularly low birth rate. It was over 30 per 1,000 between 1930 and 1935, over 25 per 1,000 in the period 1935-40, and just over 20 per 1,000 in the early 1940s. (See chapter 2, table 2.5.) However, these relatively high birth rates resulted mainly from a very favorable age structure, while age-specific fertility rates were not high at all. The gross reproduction rate (G.R.R.) was 1.4 between 1931-35 and 1.2 between 1936-40. These G.R.R. values with mortality levels at that time implied birth rates well under 20, given a "stable" age distribution, and not of the order of nearly 30, as experienced. Thus, in a number of meetings in the late 1930s, Ben-Gurion's attention was drawn to the fact that the relatively high crude birth rates among Jews in Palestine by no means reflected high fertility levels. Birth and fertility rates of the Jewish population became one of the subjects discussed by Ben-Gurion during the subsequent thirty years. On many occasions Ben-Gurion called on parents to fulfill their "demographic duty" toward the nation and regarded the issue as one of the "highest importance." One of Ben-Gurion's early statements on the natality issue was at a conference in 1943

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on labor-force problems, organized by the socialist and largest Jewish political party in Palestine. Ben-Gurion posed the question whether the majority of the Jewish population of Palestine fulfilled their reproductive commitments to the nation. An average of 2.2 children per family, he argued, was inadequate and that such a fertility level, if there was no immigration (and there was only a small volume of immigration at that time), implied that the Jewish community in Palestine would die out. He added that the Jewish population in Palestine was, as Western European nations in general were, in a state of "demographic and moral decay." 1 On another occasion, Ben-Gurion pointed out that without a Jewish majority in Palestine, a Jewish State, and perhaps the survival of the existing Jewish community, would be impossible. Since the volume of immigration at that time was small and under strict British control, Ben-Gurion suggested that the number of births, which naturally was under the control of Jewish parents, should be increased. Although no attempt was made by the Jewish political organizations during those years to formulate policies with the object of increasing Jewish natality, Ben-Gurion, as well as some others, continued their interest in pronatal issues. In a series of articles published between 1939 and 1944, Bachi called attention to the implications of the continuation of differential natural increase between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine.2 He suggested that the Jewish authorities should take whatever action was necessary to encourage and stimulate families to have more than two or three children. At the same time, further attempts should be made to control mortality. He emphasized that the demographic and political survival of the Jewish community in Palestine was of prime importance. However, the demographic situation in Palestine was not favorable: the number of Moslem births was four times as high as the number of Jewish births, although the Moslem population was only a little more than twice as large as the Jewish. The result, it was argued, was that in many years with no significant Jewish immigration, the proportion of Jews in the total population declined. This was considered inconsistent with the political objectives of the Jewish community. Hence, the call for the formulation of a population

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policy to curb the fertility decline among Jews in Palestine. The argument was that the ideal number of children should be three to four and even more. Specifically, fiscal policies were suggested to allow easier credit facilities for families, family allowances, and the like. Several of these suggestions were considered some twenty years later, by the Natality Committee headed by Bachi and appointed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. The concern with differential population growth of Jewish and Arab segments and, in particular, the relative importance of fertility for Arabs and immigration for Jews as sources of population growth had been noted in various British White Paper reports starting in 1929. (See the discussion in chapter 3.) Political discussions about the ratio of Jewish to Arab population size and the growing control exercised by the British over immigration accentuated these concerns. It was therefore suggested that immigration restrictions imposed by the British could not prevent Jews from having larger families. In addition to this national-political position, there were others who viewed population objectives from a religious-nationalistic point of view. A good example of the religious attitude was the call made in 1943 by the Chief Rabbi of Palestine, I. H. Herzog, to Jewish families to increase the number of their offspring. After first mentioning the terrible news of the fate of European Jewry, he suggested that this might have been a consequence "of the Will of God" since the "modern" style of living had spread throughout the nation. One aspect of this life-style was family limitation, which he viewed as sinful. He argued that Jews should number not just 11 million but tens of millions; quoting the biblical injunction, he said that Jews should "be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth." 3 One of the earliest and widely publicized advocates of pronatalism from the orthodox religious section in Palestine was A. H. Fraenkel, a distinguished Professor of Mathematics at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. As a mathematician, he was concerned (even more so than demographers) with the demographic and political implications of the indefinite continuation of differential demographic patterns between Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

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In a number of articles published from 1942 through 1944, Fraenkel suggested that families ought to have more children and specified definite policies to achieve this objective. He proposed, for example, that a "total war" be declared against gynecologists performing induced abortions. 4 Not only was it immoral, a terrible crime and murder, according to Fraenkel, but it was a major reason for the low birth rate among Jews in Palestine. There was no doubt in his mind that controlling the number of abortions would automatically and effectively increase the birth rate. It is interesting that this inference was based on no other country than Nazi Germany. Fraenkel argued that "among the many means by which Hitler attempted in 1933 to increase the German birth rate, the one effective measure was the war against abortions." Fraenkel proposed, therefore, that heavy penalties be imposed on surgeons and other persons involved in an illegal act of induced abortion. 3 Naturally, Fraenkel objected to any kind of family limitation. These views on population could well represent those of the leadership of the orthodox religious section of the population in Palestine and Israel, while Bachi's views, representing the more liberal, secular approach, were more or less adopted by Ben-Gurion and perhaps a few others within the political establishment. These different approaches to the problem continued after the foundation of the State of Israel and may still be found in contemporary Israeli society. Although later developments were shaped mainly according to the more liberal pronatal view, they were supported, stimulated, and encouraged by public figures from the religious section.

Pronatalism in Israel: The First Fifteen Years

The establishment of the State of Israel in only part of the total area of Palestine, along with population changes among the Arab population, resulted in the creation of a Jewish majority. Combined with mass immigration the entire demographic balance shifted considerably (chapter 4). Although the major focus of policy after the establishment of the State was on immigration, the subject of pronatalism was not entirely dropped.

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An indication of population activities during the early period of statehood may be obtained by examining press reports. The frequency of appearance of population-natality subjects in the press in the early years of the State was much lower than in the years before Independence and the period after 1953. This is hardly surprising in view of mass immigration to Israel and a population growth rate of 24 percent per year that made the problem of population growth through increased natality more or less irrelevant. The variation in the frequency of the appearance of the population issue can also be found in discussions in the Knesset. Indeed, until 1953 the issue was raised in the Knesset only occasionally and then mainly by members of the religious parties. Beginning in 1953, the subject gradually received more attention, and no doubt this was associated with the decline in the volume of immigration to Israel. In general, members of the religious parties were clearly the enthusiastic advocates of granting pronatal incentives and to a lesser extent they were joined by a few members of the right-wing nationalist political party (Herut). Among members of the left-center, ruling Mapai party, there was not much active interest in the pronatal issue except, of course, for Ben-Gurion. During the period 1954-62, requests by Knesset members to the government to act more vigorously on the pronatal issue were made on about twenty occasions; fourteen were made by members of the various religious parties. When the population problem was raised or discussed by members of the left-wing political parties, it was in most cases from a social welfare rather than a pronatal perspective. Already in September 1948, when the new State was just four months old, the then Minister of Health (who was a member of the National Religious party) announced in the Knesset the appointment of a public committee to consider the population question. One-and-a-half years later, the same minister announced in the Knesset that this committee had studied various possible pronatal incentives and that a proposal had been submitted to the Prime Minister. However, this had no practical consequences. Of more importance, at least because of the wide publicity it received and the number of occasions it was discussed in the

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Knesset and in the press, was Ben-Gurion's initiative in paying a IL 100 prize (approximately $300 at the exchange rate at the time) to every woman bearing her tenth child. In 1949, the first prize was sent and a budget of IL 35,000 was allocated to enable BenGurion to proceed with his small-scale pronatal cash gift scheme. The Ben-Gurion prize was finally abolished in 1959, one reason being that apparently many Arab women received it. No statistics are available to show how many Jewish and how many Arab mothers received the prize during this period, nor is it of more than symbolic importance. No doubt, in relative and possibly even in absolute terms, Arab women received it more frequently. But one aspect was significant: in many cases, the fact that an Arab woman received the Ben-Gurion prize was reported more widely than its importance deserved. It has never been argued openly that Arab women should not have received the prize on the grounds that a population with a birth rate of over 50 per 1,000 hardly needed pronatal incentives; yet this was indeed the case. This anomaly arose because the prize that was clearly instituted as a symbolic act to encourage Jewish families to have more children was so frequently granted to Arab women. This is indicative of a more general and important problem, namely, the possible undesirable side effects that are likely to result from measures adopted to alter population patterns. Understandably, Ben-Gurion later suggested that any pronatal measures in Israel ought to be administered by the Jewish Agency (which is a Jewish, not a state, organization) and not by the government.6 Natality issues were raised on other occasions in the Knesset, mostly by members of religious parties. For example, one of these members claimed (July 15, 1959) that Israel's Women's Enrollment Act (whereby every woman aged eighteen is conscripted in the armed forces for a specified period) was a significant factor in the decline of the birth rate. As evidence, he argued that the birth rate had been declining since the Enrollment Act was passed. He asked the Defense Minister in what way the latter intended to act on this problem. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, serving also as Defense Minister, replied that the decline in the birth rate was causing much concern, although he did not share

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the view that the Enrollment Act was an important factor. He said that the demographic problem needed more discussion and, even more so, urgent action. Ben-Gurion did not forget to remind his audience that he had drawn attention to the demographic problem some twenty years earlier. It is interesting how the religious sector related various issues to the demographic problem as they saw it: campaigns against the existing abortion regulations, against women's national service in the armed forces, and against the establishment of public familyplanning services. Political pressures were exercised by the religious parties on all levels: on public opinion, in the Knesset and its committees, and, in particular, in the administrative machinery of government, in which they had considerable power as partners in most government coalitions since the establishment of the State. Members of the right-wing political parties also pressed for pronatal measures but not nearly as vigorously nor as frequently as the members of the religious parties. Members of other parties raised the population question but even less insistently than the right-wing members. Views were occasionally heard in the Knesset against the pronatal position but these were clearly exceptions. Discussions or questions in the Knesset occasionally focused on specific aspects of the "population problem." Two such aspects were social welfare for deprived large families and the declining Jewish birth rate. These two distinct (though certainly not independent) issues were often considered together, and over time, were hardly ever treated separately. (Indeed, as we shall discuss later, the Natality Committee appointed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was asked to deal with various aspects of both of these issues.) The integration of these two aspects into one "demographic problem" contributed much, though perhaps unintentionally, to the almost universal acceptance of the pronatal issue as one of the two aspects of the demographic problem that required governmental action. This is because there was never strong objection among Knesset members to pronatal action, although there was no general active interest on the question.

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However, there was general interest and strong support for social welfare policies to assist large families. This approach to the two issues seems quite widespread. Among key persons interviewed who have had some connection with these problems, some were in favor of pronatal action, while others were strongly opposed. However, all of them, without exception, strongly favored more governmental support for large families on social welfare grounds. In sum, there were persistent voices demanding the formulation of pronatal policies and activities, although these came from only a relatively small number of members, particularly the religious and the right-wing sections. There was practically no objection, except from one or two isolated members of the Knesset. Most members of the left-wing parties seemed to be more or less indifferent, though no doubt sympathetic, to the subject. The integration of the pronatal and the social welfare issues into a general population problem seems to have made pronatalism more palatable. Despite the discussions and debates in the Knesset, no concrete action was taken to formulate natality policies. The first major attempt to formulate specific natality policies was the product of the natality committee appointed in 1962. In part, the committee focused on issues related to birth control, abortion, and child allowances. For a better understanding of the context of the committee recommendations in these areas, a brief sketch of these issues will be presented.

Family Planning and Child A l l o w a n c e s

Generally, the entire range of contraceptives have been available in Israel, including most recently oral contraceptives and IUDs. Use of modern contraceptives requires consultation and regular examinations by a physician. Such consultations are generally available in Israel only on a private basis. Family planning services are conspicuously absent from general public health services, pre- and postnatal, although the latter include almost the entire range of medical assistance. There has not necessarily been

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a deliberate and conscious governmental policy against the provision of family planning services in Israel; rather, one consequence of political and religious factors that have been discussed earlier is that no ministry, governmental agency, or public organization of any importance has considered it of sufficient importance to change the status quo regarding the provision of family planning services. Because of the lack of nonprofit family planning services, only a relatively small percentage of families use effective contraceptives. As late as 1971, less than a majority of the adult urban population described themselves as users of modern contraceptives and there seems to be much public ignorance in Israel about family planning.7 At the same time, a family-limitation method used extensively is induced abortions, apparently because contraceptives in common use are so ineffective. Formally, induced abortions have been illegal in Israel, except for the "purpose of preserving the women's health," but in practice, they can be performed with relative ease, although their cost by local standards is relatively high. This has been the case since 1952, when the then Attorney General recommended that complaints concerning an induced abortion should not be brought to court with the exception of special circumstances, such as abortions terminating in the death of the woman. Consequently, the performance of induced abortions in Israel is generally under high medical standards. The frequency of induced abortions in Israel is believed to be high, but there are no direct statistics on their annual number. Various estimates of the frequency of induced abortions have been made. According to a recent survey, over a third of the urban Jewish women in Israel who had been married about twenty-five years had at least one induced abortion. Among Israeli-born women, 49 percent had at least one abortion compared to 28 percent of women born in Africa or Asia, and 38 percent of the European-born women.8 Israel is somewhat unusual in having a tolerant policy regarding abortion practices on the one hand, while maintaining a conservative approach regarding the provision of public familyplanning services. There have been various pressures to alter

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legally the regulations concerning induced abortions so as to restrict their number. The latest development is a new abortion law to take effect January 1978, to be discussed later. Israel has a system of family allowances, and these obviously vary with family size. A study of income-tax regulations shows clearly that income tax had, in the 1960s, neither a pronatalist nor an antinatalist effect. In terms of percentages of total income, marginal benefits for an additional child have been relatively low, that is, mostly in the range of 2 to 3 percent of total income. A similar conclusion may be drawn if national insurance allowances for children are examined; these also had no significant pronatal effect up to the late 1960s.9

The Natality Committee Report The Formation of the Committee The major pronatal activity during this period was the establishment of a committee to study fertility in Israel and to recommend policies. In particular, the committee was concerned about policies associated with abortion, and contraceptives and family planning, and their relationship to fertility. Ben-Gurion's long-standing interest in the population problem of Israel and his conviction that population was a major issue requiring policy formulation lead to the appointment in 1962 of this special committee. Of the eight members of the committee, at least three could be regarded as enthusiastic pronatalists and three more were sympathetic to pronatalism; Roberto Bachi was appointed Chairman of the committee. The charge to the committee was to inquire and advise the government on matters concerning natality policies and, in particular, to consider means by which having a large number of children could be reconciled with family welfare. The recommendations of the committee were submitted to the government in the form of a report in April 1966. The recommendations of the committee were placed in the context of an assessment of population patterns among Jews in communities outside of Israel and major demographic problems in Israel.10

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The Jewish Demographic Situation The report noted that in general the fertility of Jews in Western countries was highly controlled and low. The combination of low Jewish fertility, the Holocaust suffered by European Jewry, and the high frequency of marriages between Jews and non-Jews had led to a demographic crisis for Western Jewry. The demographic situation among Jews in the Soviet Union was said to be very similar. As for fertility levels of the Jewish population in Israel, different sectors were considered separately. The report states that, among women of European origins, family size was on the order of 2.3 to 2.4 children per woman. This leaves a very slight margin of population growth, which is problematic in itself and also indicative of the probable future fertility levels of the AfroAsian section of the population. Families of European origins control their fertility through the use of contraceptives and a very high frequency of induced abortions. In contrast, the report notes that women of Afro-Asian origins are in the first stage of fertility control that increases with length of residence in Israel. Consequently, the overall birth rate among Jews in Israel has been declining continuously, and at the time of the report (1966) was less than half the fertility level of the Arab community in the country. The socioeconomic problems of large families in Israel make up an important part of the report. It is shown that the frequency of large families is high among the Afro-Asian section, and that family size and school achievement of children in Israel are inversely related. Since some 44 percent of the total number of children grow up in large families, it follows that, on the average, the educational level of the population is likely to deteriorate. The fact that a high percentage of these large families are of AfroAsian origins makes this social problem even more acute. The report notes that, on the average, the level of educational achievement in the country as a whole is much lower than it would have been if there were no fertility differentials among the various sections of the Israeli population, that is, if the fertility of women of European origins had been higher.11 The report notes that differential fertility in Israel creates a very serious problem in

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terms of the quality of the younger generations and might have important bearings on the future development of the country. Major Demographic Problems in Israel A f t e r analyzing social a n d

demographic patterns in Israel, the Natality Committee concluded that three aspects of the demographic situation in Israel caused particular concern: first, a reduction in the rate of growth of the population in the future seems undesirable from several viewpoints. The demographic-economic condition is such that an increase in the present size of the population and a substantial rate of population growth might stimulate economic development. It was further argued that population growth would also increase Israel's capacity to absorb further immigration. Should there be no large-scale immigration, significant population growth can come about only through higher natural increase. Through higher birth rates, the Jewish population of Israel would make an important contribution toward the rebuilding of world Jewry, whose general demographic situation is very unfavorable. A high rate of population growth seems most desirable from the standpoint of political and national-security factors; however, while these factors are often dealt with by Israel's statesmen, the committee did not view itself qualified to consider them. Second, social inequality characterizes the demographic sphere. The affluent and the educated can more easily obtain information and have greater access to birth control. These families limit their fertility to a great extent and refrain from having large families, although they could raise and support more children under favorable economic conditions and without too great a sacrifice. In contrast, poor families with low levels of education have many children who are often raised in unfavorable economic conditions and constitute a heavy economic burden. These factors have important bearings on the quality of the younger generation growing up in Israel. Finally, the report noted that the means of birth control in Israel are largely primitive, unsophisticated contraceptives and induced abortions. According to the report, the extent of the practice of induced abortions in Israel has negative implications from moral, health, and demographic points of view.

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The report adds that future declines in natural increase might result from the gradual spread of family planning among families in Israel. After considering whether it would be desirable to attempt to restrict the spread of family planning in Israel, the committee concluded that such an attempt would not be feasible and would be also undesirable on moral and other grounds. It was argued that the transition toward controlled fertility in Israel should not bring about "exaggerated" reductions in fertility, but rather a trend toward "responsible parenthood" should be encouraged that would take into consideration "national interest" as well as private preferences. In accordance with these general considerations, specific suggestions were made by the Natality Committee: the first set of recommendations concerns the establishment of a special body, within the government framework, to deal with general questions of natality and with problems connected with family welfare. This body would be responsible for carrying out the demographic policy recommended by the committee and would coordinate the appropriate organizations to ensure the implementation of the recommended policies. Specifically, the tasks of the proposed unit would be to express opinion on new legislation proposed by the various ministries concerning population in general and the welfare of the family in particular; to examine and study demographic problems in Israel and to attempt to make the public aware of these through educational means, as far as possible, through existing governmental machinery; to propose action with the aim of closing the socioeconomic gap between children brought up in small families and those brought up in larger families; to initiate research on population problems and on family welfare; to advise the government, through the Prime Minister, on all matters concerning population and family welfare and encourage voluntary organizations to act in these fields. The offices were to be located within the Prime Minister's office, although at least one member of the Natality Committee suggested that the Jewish Agency might be a more appropriate location, since the policy was intended to increase Jewish fertility and not the fertility of the total population. The second recommendation of the Natality Committee con-

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cerned governmental action in initiating psychological stimulants designed to increase natality and to reorientate families toward having more children. The report states that the education of the public (and, in particular, those in the childbearing ages) to the responsibilities of the family for the welfare of their children and for the future of the nation is of vital importance. From a purely national point of view, each family should aim at having the maximum number of children that it can raise with the support of the State. But it is understood that the national interest is only one aspect of this very complex matter. Indeed, desired family size is determined according to the individual and legitimate preferences of each family. However, for information purposes, the committee considered that it might be advisable to state clearly that: "If all families bore only two children, a dangerous demographic decline would follow. Families of three children contribute marginally, and families of four or more children make a real contribution, toward the demographic revival of the nation." It was also recommended that education for "responsible parenthood" should be conveyed through various media, such as radio and television, at the public clinics for natal care and at the Kupat Holim Health Service clinics. Such education should also attempt to explain the "great risks" involved in performing induced abortions and provide as well information on birth control. However, when information on birth control and family planning is provided, the "national interest" in higher natality should be stressed. The committee also considered that social workers, physicians, and nurses working among families where further increases in family size would be a great handicap may inform them about the possibility of obtaining free family-planning advice.12 The third recommendation dealt with financial and economic incentives for natality. For various reasons, mainly of an economic and social nature, the committee concluded that it was not appropriate to allocate direct monthly family grants as natality incentives. However, it recommended other pronatal incentives. Considering the potential conflict between the aim of increased family size and the tendency among Israeli women to participate

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in the labor force, it was recommended that employers should enable women to work on a part-time basis and during convenient working hours. Suggestions regarding special facilities for employed women and their children were also considered. Appropriate housing conditions for growing families was another consideration. It was argued that families who wished to have additional children refrained from doing so because their housing conditions were inadequate. Since it is increasingly difficult for these families to acquire large apartments, the committee recommended that government assistance should be granted as a pronatal incentive.13 It was also suggested that tuition fees in high schools and at universities should be inversely related to family size. Furthermore, it was proposed that income-tax allowances should increase progressively from the first to the fourth child and remain constant thereafter. Another recommendation revolved around grants to improve the socioeconomic condition of large families in Israel. The committee expressed the urgent need for real assistance to large families. A subcommittee studied various forms of assistance and concluded that it was advisable to help such families through the provision of direct services for their children, in particular in education and housing. However, direct financial support was also recommended for such families according to the number of children and family income. Measures to reduce the number of induced abortions were part of the fifth recommendation. In view of the high frequency of induced abortions and the possible negative effects on health and family size, the committee agreed unanimously that abortions constituted a serious problem requiring attention. However, the committee's views were sharply divided in terms of specific recommendations. One view supported by four of the eightmember committee including the chairman (referred to in the report as the majority view) was that induced abortions should not be permitted except in authorized public hospitals and under strict control. Committees would be appointed at these hospitals to consider each case. The main aim of these committees would be to reduce considerably the number of induced abortions.

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However, they would act not only on medical indications but would take into account social and family considerations. In those cases where the request for an abortion was approved, it would be performed free of charge. The committees would have appropriate facilities and funds at their disposal to help and assist those women whose request for abortion was rejected. The performance of an abortion in any place other than in an authorized public hospital should be prohibited under penalty. Three members (out of eight) felt that, although there were certainly great advantages in restricting the performance of abortions to authorized public hospitals, "they could not support the restrictions proposed by the Natality Committee's majority." They felt that the majority proposal would tend to make illegal induced abortions more costly, rather than significantly to reduce their number, creating even greater inequality between the rich and the poor. Such new regulations, they argued, would tend to "push" the performance of abortions to the "back streets," while, at present, they were being performed under relatively favorable conditions. Another member of the committee who disagreed with the "majority" proposal was the Director-General of the Ministry of Health, who submitted his own proposal. He noted that the objective of reducing the number of abortions was to increase natural growth. He did not however agree that the frequency of abortions could be reduced through legislation. Experience in Israel showed that induced abortions were performed under satisfactory medical conditions, and this was probably the reason for the relatively low incidence of complications. He was convinced that induced abortions were unacceptable as a means of birth control and concluded that the best way to reduce the number of abortions in Israel was to educate the public in the use of effective and sophisticated contraceptives and to make these widely available. The sixth item in the Natality Committee recommendations focused on the financial problems connected with a population policy. The committee did not make a specific statement concerning financial requirements, but noted that there would be no hope

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for an effective policy without the allocation of substantial funds for this purpose. Israel had invested enormous sums of money in its immigration policies and there was no doubt that achieving population growth through immigration was much more costly than through increased natality.14 T h e D e m o g r a p h i c C e n t e r a n d P o l i c y I m p l e m e n t a t i o n One year

subsequent to the submission of the committee report, the first recommendation setting up an administrative unit to implement natality policies was carried out by the government. The Demographic Center, located within the Office of the Prime Minister, was "to act systematically in carrying out a natality policy intended to create a psychologically favorable climate such that natality will be encouraged and stimulated since an increase in natality in Israel is crucial for the whole future of the Jewish people.15 Hence, the official acceptance by the government of the report and the charge to the Demographic Center to carry out the natality recommendations were the foundation of the formal policy of Israel regarding natality. The administrative framework of the Demographic Center consisted of (1) a public committee of about 100 members to meet several times annually to exchange views and propose general policy; (2) an executive council of 20 members to direct the Center's activities (that included 6 of the 8 members of the natality committee); (3) committees of experts to advise on special topics, including research, abortion, communication, and information. The formal establishment of the Demographic Center did not occur until mid-1968. At the inauguration ceremony, Prime Minister Eshkol emphasized the importance of increased natality for the Jewish people as a whole because of the great Jewish population losses in the Holocaust and as a means to help solve the labor shortage in Israel, which demanded a higher growth rate. The director of the center, Zena Harman, noted that it was necessary to encourage an increase in the size of small families as well as to assist in the welfare of larger families. Moreover, she stated, "we cannot refrain from the necessity of deciding what should be the

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optimum number of children per family in Israel, taking into consideration the welfare of these children. We might decide on five or four children per family as the optimum average." In her view, "long-term policies should aim at the maximum number of children per family raised under favorable economic conditions." 16 Committees of experts already appointed, or to be appointed, included finance, housing, health and abortions, education, information, problems concerned with the employment of women, and research. The Israeli government formally accepted the recommendations of the Natality Committee. The activities of the Demographic Center have concentrated on selected research projects (e.g., attitudes toward the third and fourth child; attitudes of the medical profession and public attitudes toward family planning; family planning communication among couples), promotion of large families through radio and television and the initiation of a small-scale experimental program, through which couples intending to have another child may, under certain conditions, apply for low-interest loans to purchase a larger-sized apartment. In sum, pronatal values and ideology prevalent in sections of Israeli society were translated into general policy guidelines by the Natality Committee. The recommendations of that committee represent the clearest attempt to establish natality policies. Recent Developments In 1975, the Demographic Center was incorporated as part of the program of social welfare within the Prime Minister's Office. This was an attempt to shift the focus of activities within the Demographic Center toward a deemphasis on pronatalism and a greater concern for family planning among the lower socioeconomic strata. Indeed, activities of the Family Planning Association in Israel have received support from the Demographic Center. One of the recent goals specified by the Center has been the development of nationwide, public family-planning service. The Demographic Center has also advised and supported proposed legislation to change abortion laws. In view of the gap between the existing law and public practice, the Minister of Health in 1972 appointed a committee of experts to propose a new

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abortion law. In January 1975, a bill was proposed to the Knesset by several members of various political parties, based on the recommendations of that committee.17 According to this proposal, an induced abortion may be performed only in an approved medical institution after a medical committee has certified that one of the following conditions pertains: the pregnancy endangers the woman's life; an additional birth is likely to damage her physical or mental well-being; an additional birth is likely to cause hardship to the woman and/or her children due to their socioeconomic conditions. This last category includes cases in which such hardship is due to the fact that the woman has already a relatively large number of children living with her. Additional reasons for allowing an induced abortion include pregnancy out of wedlock and the likelihood that the infant will be retarded, physically or mentally. The proposal specified that the medical committee (which is to approve the abortion) will consist of two medical practitioners, at least one gynecologist, and a social worker. This proposed law does not reflect solely the recommendations of the Natality Committee or the Demographic Center, nor was it designed as a means to increase fertility. The sponsors of the legislation represented a wide spectrum of political and social interests, and the major common ground bringing these interests together was the concern over the inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of the existing abortion legislation. A more liberal bill, essentially allowing "abortion on demand" was proposed by another group of Knesset members. It recommends that a legally induced abortion may be obtained if performed by a gynecologist in an approved medical institution with the consent of the women concerned. It must be performed within twelve weeks of the beginning of the pregnancy and after the medical practitioner has been satisfied that one of three conditions pertains: there is a risk that the continuation of pregnancy will harm the woman physically or mentally; there is a likelihood of physical or mental retardation of the child; when the pregnancy occurred as a result of rape or incest or when the woman was less than sixteen years of age. Both these bills have been voted to the appropriate Knesset committee for final prepa-

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ration and submission to the Knesset. Some members of religious parties have proposed removing both bills from the agenda but they were in a minority. In January, 1977, a slightly modified version of the first proposal was adopted as policy to be implemented within a year. The outcome of this legislation on the level of abortions remains to be seen. The ultimate effect will depend on how the law is implemented by the Ministry of Health and the various committees. One final change that may have an indirect pronatal impact is the increases since the early 1970s in child allowances paid by the social security system. The allowances paid for additional children have increased considerably in comparison to the levels noted earlier for the 1960s. Payments for small families with higher than average wages remain a small percent of income. In contrast, large families with below-average wages receive a significant monthly payment. For example, as of 1974, child allowances represented about 9 percent of the average monthly wage of a three-child family and 30 percent of a six-child family, increasing to nearly 50 percent for a nine-child family. These payments were designed for welfare objectives and were not initiated by the Demographic Center. Nevertheless, these increases may have a significant indirect pronatal effect for population groups that have both low incomes and large families, primarily older Asian- and African-born families and Moslems. Although these increases in child allowances were consistent with the overall recommendations of the Natality Committee, those recommendations were directed toward the higher income, smaller families within the Jewish population. For these groups, child allowances represent but a small part of income. These latest developments that have involved the Demographic Center represent a significant shift in emphasis, if not yet in practice, from the recommendations of the Natality Committee. Nevertheless, the report of the Natality Committee remains the official document of natality policy in Israel. Therefore, an evaluation of its analysis and recommendations is necessary in order to understand the evolution of population policies and patterns in Israel.

[ F W ••• EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION GROWTH AND POLICY

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NATALITY POLICY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION

THE RECOMMENDATIONS of the Natality Committee, having been formally accepted by the government, continues to represent official Israeli policy. In general, the recommendations were vague and not sufficient to attain the pronatal objectives specified in the report. Moreover, the critical requirement of providing pronatal incentives has not been implemented. An evaluation of the fundamental issues discussed by the Natality Committee and their specific recommendations makes clear the basic inadequacies of current Israeli natality policies.

Omissions: The Issue of Immigration and Fertility Targets The Natality Committee was charged to advise the government on matters concerning natality policies and to consider means to assist large and economically deprived families. Keeping in mind the political, social, and demographic background against which the committee was appointed, this charge seems to have been too narrowly defined. At least some of the problems cited as justification for a pronatal policy in Israel were problems resulting from differential rates of population growth and not necessarily differential fertility. For example, differential growth rates between

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ethnic groups within the Jewish population or between national groups in the total population of the country can be reduced either through increases in natural growth—that is, in fertility (since expectation of life is high for all population subgroups in Israel) or through increases in net immigration. However, considerations concerning immigration policies were largely excluded from the committee's considerations. Thus, even assuming that the achievement of higher rates of population growth among Jews in Israel is a desirable goal (which in itself requires demonstration), the relative merits of immigration or fertility as possible means to achieving that goal should have been examined. Another important omission in the recommended policy was the specification of fertility targets that would alleviate or substantially reduce the sociopolitical and economic problems cited in the analysis. In its report, the Natality Committee reached the conclusion that "some aspects and problems in the demographic trends in Israel were causing concern" and these led to pronatal recommendations. In one section of the report, it was stated that for "publicity purposes it should be declared that, from a national point of view, every family should aim at the maximum number of children that it could bring up and educate properly. . . . Only families with four or more children make their full contribution to the demographic revival of the nation." 1 Was an average family size of "four or more" considered only for publicity purposes or was it a family-size target? The first director of the Demographic Center—a few years later—suggested an optimum family size of four-to-five children. Can this be taken as the family-size objective? Hence, if Israel's problems required adjustments in population growth rates and composition, then a policy should have been stated in terms of both fertility and immigration targets. Clearly, the effectiveness of policies cannot be evaluated if targets are not specified. Failure to Examine Fertility Trends More Fully

Implicit in the committee's report were a number of assumptions about fertility trends, differentials, and the possible future direc-

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tion of fertility processes within Israel. Some of these assumptions were empirical, but the committee did not test them adequately. These related to fertility trends and differentials among Jews and between Jews and Arabs. The report of the Natality Committee, in its analysis of fertility changes among Jews of European origins in Israel, stated that fertility was high in the period before the British Mandate of Palestine, declined during the 1920s, and reached a low level toward the late 1930s. Subsequently, there was a baby boom which lasted until the early 1950s. The report suggested that since then fertility has declined to its low pre-baby-boom levels. The report concluded that fertility has stabilized at a low level of 2.32.4 children per woman. This was one of the factors, according to the committee, necessitating a pronatal policy in Israel. However, fertility indices in terms of current cross-sectional, period measurements are inadequate for assessing whether or not higher fertility should be encouraged. For example, the fact that there has been a significant fertility decline among Jews of European origin since the early 1950s in terms of current-period measures cannot be accepted as convincing evidence of a significant decline in family size in recent years. The number of births per woman or per family of cohorts is the appropriate index for examining family-size changes. Unfortunately, the committee did not have the kind of data available to permit a cohort analysis of fertility trends in Israel. Cohort studies of modernized societies have demonstrated that fundamentally there has been one dominant trend in fertility and family size in the present century: the transition from a relatively large family size toward a relatively small family size. Such studies have demonstrated unequivocally that fertility patterns are subject to less variation around this main trend when cohort indices are used than when measures of current-period fertility are constructed.2 This has been shown to be true also for Israel through rough calculations of cohort fertility of the Israeli-born population in the late 1960s.3 This group is important, since it is not affected by the complications of immigration and is increasing in dominance from one generation to the next in Israel. Moreover, a recent retrospec-

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Table 6.1. Average Number of Children by Place of Birth, Period of Immigration, and Ethnic Origin, Jewish Women, Marriage Cohorts 1920-59 European Marriage Cohort 1955-59 1945-54 1935-44 1920-34

Born

Asian-African

Immigrated after before 1948 1948

_ 2.5 2.2 2.2

2.4 2.1 2.0 2.3

Born

Immigrated after before 1948

1948

-

4.9 5.8 6.5 7.0

3.7 4.8 6.2

Israel Born European Origins 3.3 2.6 2.8 -

AsianAfrican Origins 3.7 3.8 -

tive fertility survey shows clearly that the Natality Committee was incorrect in concluding that the fertility levels of European subgroups were declining in the late 1950s and 1960s. Table 6.1 shows that for immigrants from European countries, fertility was more or less stable for cohorts married between 1920 and the 1940s. Subsequently, for cohorts married in the mid-1950s, there has been an increase in completed fertility for all groups of European origins. Data based on incompleted fertility and evidence on family-size expectations confirm this increase for more recent cohorts. 4 Hence, at the time that the Natality Committee was discussing the decline of fertility among Europeans, fertility was actually increasing. Afro-Asian groups have, on the other hand, experienced continual fertility declines in their transition to lower levels.

Effects of Policy on Fertility To what extent can the fertility of the Jewish population in Israel be expected to increase through the pronatal policies that have been recommended? Although the relationship between policy and demographic change is obscure in general, some assessments are nevertheless possible. Such evaluations, however imprecise, are important. Indeed, if it is unlikely that the proposed policy will be effective, not only might there be no returns to investments in the proposed policies but there might be additional costs involved in not following alternative policies. Moreover, even if the policy

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is effective it does not necessarily follow that it will alleviate the socioeconomic and political problems that were the basis of the policy recommendations. Can Jewish fertility in Israel be increased substantially? Several sample surveys of the Jewish population have been taken in recent years in Israel to study, among other things, attitudes toward family-size ideals and preferences. In particular, attitudes toward increasing family size in response to fertility incentives have been studied.5 On the question of whether the respondent thought that pronatal policies of various kinds would affect fertility behavior, only a minority replied positively (25-30 percent of such groups that currently have low fertility). This indicates that Israeli families, as those in other societies, do not reproduce for the "benefit of the nation," even if the nation provides some assistance. It is, of course, possible that the number of people who are willing to respond positively to fertility incentives might increase following a pronatal publicity campaign. Let us assume, therefore, that as many as 50 percent of families might be willing to increase the number of their children in response to incentives. In order to achieve a national average family size of 4.5 children (the number mentioned as optimum by the Demographic Center), an average increase of about three children would be necessary for those families "willing" to increase their fertility. This would be in addition to the average family size of three children that approximates the first and second generation European, Jewish population. Even attaining a modestly large family size of only 3.5 children for this group would imply that those families who are willing to increase the number of their children would have to have more than one additional child on the average. Are changes of such a magnitude likely to occur? Taking as examples other countries that have had pronatal policies, it would be quite correct to state that there is no precedent for a long-term achievement of even one additional child on the average in a substantial portion of the population, certainly not two or three additional children. Thus, there seems to be a very substantial gap between present fertility trends in the Jewish population in Israel and the

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average family size that has been mentioned as "required" or as an "optimum" from the point of view of "national needs." The fact that only a minority of families in Israel say that they are prepared to change their reproductive behavior in response to fertility incentives implies that this minority would have to increase their fertility behavior enormously in order to achieve a significant increase in national average family size. It seems inconceivable that such family-size targets could be achieved with the policies proposed, or even with those fertility incentives that have been considered. There have been similar, though not identical, situations where very substantial economic incentives have been offered to raise fertility levels or where there were almost no economic barriers for families to have additional children. In all of these situations, long-term increments in family size seem to be insignificant or nonexistent. One such example is, of course, France. Clearly France has made heavy economic investments in her pronatal policies, and there is no doubt that Israel could not afford a pronatal investment on such a scale. According to calculations made for the Natality Committee, such investments would cost about 12 percent of Israel's gross national product in 1969.6 However, the available evidence indicates that pronatal policies in France have not been very effective. The smallest completed average family size was recorded for the 1945 marriage cohort in France, with a slight increase for the 1955 marriage cohort of about 0.20 children. This is not a very impressive increase, even if it can be wholly attributed to the policies. In general, it has been argued persuasively with regard to fertility in Europe in the post-World War II era that "even where fertility has risen somewhat as compared with the position of the marriages of the 1930s there is no evidence of a return to large families. On the contrary, the proportions of married women having four or more live births have generally continued to fall.7 The reference is to all European countries, irrespective of whether they had pronatal policies. Israel is unlikely to achieve very much more than France in terms of additional children per married woman with a very much lower pronatal investment. Of course, there are differences between Israel and European coun-

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tries that have attempted pronatal policies. However, even with the full implementation of policies recommended by the Natality Committee, major behavioral changes in family size are not like to follow. Another example of a situation in which pronatal efforts did not seem to affect fertility in a major way can be drawn from the kibbutz community in Israel. Until the early 1950s, the kibbutz community had somewhat lower fertility levels compared to the population at large. This phenomenon and the general roles and functions of the kibbutz family have been analyzed extensively.8 The traditionally relatively low fertility level in the kibbutz was consistent with both family functions and the economic situation in the kibbutz. However, since the early 1950s, radical social changes in the kibbutz have taken place. Kibbutz society has become gradually more differentiated and the functions of the family have expanded. One aspect of this change was that the raising of children began to occupy a more important place in the kibbutz family. Moreover, the whole ideology concerning reproductive behavior changed. In the early days of the kibbutz, children were a heavy economic burden on the community, since an increase in their number implied a dependency ratio that the kibbutz could not sustain. It was subsequently realized that high levels of reproduction were the major source of continuity and, indeed, of survival of the kibbutz community. Furthermore, rapid population growth became a vital issue in the kibbutz because of acute labor shortages and for other sociodemographic reasons. Consequently, various measures intended to reduce some of the burdens of women in pregnancy and after confinement were initiated. In an attitude survey, taken in the late 1950s, positive attitudes toward larger family size were expressed by the majority of the sample of kibbutz respondents. Among the reasons for the change in these attitudes were those relating to the kibbutz itself and more general national-political issues.9 Thus, fertility levels in the kibbutz might have been expected to increase over the last two decades for several reasons: a new pronatal ideology was substituted for the traditional antinatalist ideology that prevailed in the kibbutz for years; the burdens of pregnancy and parenthood eased, and children began to occupy a more central place in the

150

EVALUATION A N D IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

family as kibbutz family functions changed. In addition to these factors, there were, of course, the same ideological, national, and political factors common to the total Israeli population. It should also be noted that in the kibbutz an additional child does not constitute an additional direct economic burden on the family; this burden is collectively shared. What was the response of kibbutz families to these major changes? It is difficult to assess unequivocally changes in family size in the absence of a cohort fertility analysis. However, current fertility measures show definite increases starting in the 1960s. These increases were in the order of less than 0.50 children in terms of the total fertility rate. There are no signs so far of any large fertility increases, certainly not a return to the "large family" (table 6.2). Families in the kibbutz and elsewhere in Israel have in common the same national-political and ideological motivations to increase their reproductive levels. Families in the kibbutz, however, have some additional ideological and socioeconomic motivations for an increase in family size. Even if substantial pronatal incentives are granted fully in Israel, an additional child will still be a heavy burden on most families. This applies much less to families on the kibbutz, at least in its present structure. It is unlikely that more significant fertility increases will be achieved in the population at large than have been achieved so far in the kibbutz where pronatal incentives have been present. This argument lends some additional support to the hypothesis that fertility and family size in Israel cannot be expected to increase significantly in response to the pronatal policies that have been recommended, and there seems to be a low probability for a return to large family size among the Jewish population in Israeli society.

Effects of Restrictions on Induced Abortions on Family Size

In addition to efforts to influence family-size preferences and behavior, the Natality Committee made recommendations dealing

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151

with induced abortions. The committee felt strongly that the number of such abortions should be considerably reduced for "moral, health, as well as demographic reasons." The objective of this recommendation was clearly to increase fertility by reducing the number of abortions, i.e., through increased "unwanted" births. Are fertility and family size likely to be affected in the long run by restrictions on induced abortions.? Illustrations in other countries reveal that birth rates have been altered following changes in abortion regulations. Birth rates in Japan, for example, were reduced considerably following the liberalization of the abortion laws in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, this was at a time when the desire for small family size had already spread in Japan and the new abortion regulations were the only means to reduce the birth rate. This process characterizes many countries throughout the world. The recommendations of the Natality Committee were designed to achieve in Israel the opposite process; that is, effecting an increase in fertility and family size, against the preferences of women and their families. Romania is an interesting example, where current birth rates have twice changed substantially following alterations in abortion regulations, and restrictions on contraceptive distribution. As was typical of Eastern European countries, fertility in Romania in the 1930s was still high (crude birth rates were over 30 per 1,000) but subsequently fell quite rapidly. In September 1957, new regulations were issued allowing abortions to be performed upon request, regardless of indication. The birth rate continued to drop from 22.9 per 1,000 in 1957 to 15.7 in 1963 and to only 14.3 in 1966. In October 1966, a new regulation was issued, limiting abortions to a list that still contained over one hundred indications. As a result, the birth rate, which was only 14.5 per 1,000 in the month when the new changes were introduced (October 1966), reached a level of 39.9 per 1,000 ten months later (September 1967). Undoubtedly this is a very impressive and probably unprecedented increase in fertility in such a short period. If fertility remained at these high levels it would be a very encouraging case in support of the policy to restrict abortions so as to increase

152

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Table 6.2. Age-Specific Fertility Rates in the Kibbutz and in Israel at Large by Birthplace of Women, Jewish Population, 1960-72

1960-62 Age of Mother

Jewish Population

Kibbutz

Kibbutz

Jewish Population

All

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total Fertility 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total Fertility 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total Fertility 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total Fertility

Birthplaces 40.7 215.2 207.8 129.0 63.4 20.1 4.0 3.4 Born in Israel 12.4 15.3 166.7 157.4 168.4 179.7 104.2 101.9 84.0 52.1 20.5 16.9 2.9 3.9 2.8 2.6 Born in Asia or Africa 74.8 28.6 273.4 256.0 259.8 235.8 150.9 204.8 64.1 128.8 25.5 50.2 14.8 5.0 3.8 Born in Europe or America 24.1 28.6 215.7 185.4 197.0 153.7 109.5 75.3 59.8 31.3 12.4 6.8 0.7 0.5 2.4 3.1

1965-66

16.7 188.0 188.6 111.9 21.4 13.0 0.7 2.7

21.0 178.4 184.5 112.6 56.6 11.1 1.2 2.8

35.8 208.4 214.5 139.6 62.9 17.1 4.0 3.4

14.8 165.9 196.7 133.2 80.0 28.4 16.7 3.2

14.8 160.2 188.2 125.9 50.5 14.8 3.1 2.8

23.8 178.2 167.2 120.0 56.2 36.6 20.8 3.0

65.9 257.9 261.7 192.8 109.0 39.9 11.1 4.7

42.5 216.1 171.0 98.5 49.8 8.5

32.3 179.6 156.7 78.0 28.3 5.4 0.5 2.4

-

2.9

SOURCE: Various publications of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel.

NATALITY POLICY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION Table 6.2 Continued

1967-68

1972

Kibbutz

Jewish Population

18.8 176.7 208.3 136.9 66.4 7.6 0.6 3.1

28.7 184.5 213.6 143.7 67.6 15.1 2.9 3.3

12.9 166.8 219.9 178.6 100.9 10.3 3.4

13.2 149.8 190.6 127.8 58.9 13.2 1.7 2.8

37.2 178.2 172.3 125.3 53.0 14.7 16.1 3.0

59.5 227.2 240.0 181.0 101.6 31.1 7.4 4.2

49.6 204.4 197.5 102.9 58.1 6.6

35.4 160.8 179.8 92.2 32.4 4.9 0.5 2.5

Kibbutz Birthplaces 17.3 170.0 215.8 145.2 96.7 15.7 0.5 3.3 Born in Israel

Jewish Population

All

29.7 182.2 194.7 139.9 72.0 16.6 1.4 3.2

117.5

97.6

129.5

84.0 0.6

Born in Asia or Africa 180.2

182.7

94.7

96.3

-

3.7

Born in Europe or America

3.1

176.7

159.2

60.2

40.7 0.2

153

154

EVALUATION A N D IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

fertility levels in Israel. However, birth rates in Romania began to drop again after September 1967 and reached levels of just over 20 per 1,000 toward the end of 1968, fluctuating around that level until 1974 (see table 6.3).10 An evaluation of what would have been the actual fertility patterns in Romania without both government interventions (in first liberalizing abortion and then preventing abortions) is impossible. Moreover, it is clear that crude birth rates exaggerate the real family-size changes in Romania that would be reflected in cohort rates. Most importantly, the high level of fertility as reflected in the birth rate increase following the abortion restrictions was not sustained, and a sharp decline of almost 50 percent followed. While some slight gain in the number of births may have been achieved in the long run, it was at the cost of "unwanted" births for families and costly in terms of the socioeconomic and political implications of fluctuating birth rates. Hence, to date, there is no evidence anywhere, the Romanian example included, demonstrating conclusively that a susTable 6.3. Monthly Romanian Birth Rates, 1966-74 Month

1966

1967

1968

I II III IV V VI VII Vili IX χ XI XII

12.7 14.8 15.1 15.4 15.2 14.8 14.3 14.4 14.1 14.5 a 13.9 12.8

15.4 15.7 16.5 17.8 20.7 29.9 38.7 38.5 39.9 36.1 31.1 27.7

29.5 29.5 29.8 28.1 26.8 26.2 26.0 26.1 27.8 26.4 24.2 21.5

Year

14.3

27.3

26.8

SOURCES: Henry P. David, Family Planning and Abortions in the Socialist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Population Counncil, 1970) and United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (New York, 1974). a Abortion policy reversed In October 1966. Yearly birth rates for 1969-74 are as follows: 23.3, 21.1, 19.6, 18.8, 18.1, 20.3.

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155

tained increase in fertility has been achieved as a result of regulations restricting the performance of abortions. In sum, therefore, it seems that a substantial increase in longterm fertility and family size among the Jewish population in Israel as a response to pronatal incentives and/or restrictions on induced abortions recommended by Israel's Natality Committee is very unlikely. At most, small or short-run fertility increases can be expected that hardly affect social, political, or national problems in Israel which have been the justification for the policy recommendations.

Evaluating Moslem Fertility The Natality Committee examined the widening gap between Jewish and Arab natural increase and discussed its implications. The gap, as noted earlier, is the result of low and declining fertility among Jews and high stable levels of fertility among Arabs. The analysis of the implications of continuing differential natural increase between Jews and Arabs was based on an implicit assumption about the future retention of high fertility, particularly among Moslems. Is this implicit assumption realistic? The validity of this assumption is critical in examining the issues of Jewish majority status in Israel and, hence, in evaluating the policy recommendations of the Natality Committee. It has already been shown that the fertility of the Arab community in Israel is high. The Natality Committee stated that the fertility of Moslems has tended to increase for some time and was at a very high level. For example, according to the 1961 census, a Moslem women aged 45-49 at the time of the census had 8.2 children and a Christian woman had 7.2 children, on the average. Current fertility data used by the committee showed that fertility of Arabs in Israel was 2.2 times higher than Jewish fertility. 11 Such high levels of fertility combined with low mortality implied very high rates of natural increase and the doubling of the population every fifteen years.

156

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

The observation of the Natality Committee that Moslem women aged 45-49 at the time of the 1961 census had 8.2 children on average is not very revealing, since these data relate to the fertility experience of women who have long since completed their childbearing. Although current fertility rates are quite high (implying over eight children per woman), this measure is too crude to determine whether or not the Moslem population is in the early stages of a fertility transition. An abundance of evidence on social and economic changes that have been taking place in recent years in the Arab community in Israel can be cited that makes the assumption of a fertility decline in the near future more likely and the assumption of fertility stability unreasonable. Indeed such a fertility decline may already have started. From the foundation of the State of Israel until the late 1950s, there was very little interaction between the Jewish and the Arab economic sectors.12 After 1958, this situation began to change when regulations limiting the free movements of Israeli Arabs was altered by the Israeli authorities, leading eventually to total freedom of movement among the Arab subpopulation. One consequence of this new policy was the widening of the labor market open to Arabs. Arabs could now find temporary or even permanent employment in the Jewish economic sector. This development was not restricted to towns and cities with a mixed Jewish and Arab population. Many thousands of Arabs, formerly engaged in agriculture in rural villages, changed their employment to other industries, particularly building and construction. The pattern was one of labor mobility rather than rural-urban migration. Villagers commuted to work just for the day (or for the week), returning to their home village at night (or over the weekend). There was clearly a two-way interchange—not only was rural labor imported from the villages to the cities, but elements of modernization and urban life were exported from the cities to those villages. Arab labor mobility has intensified over time for two main reasons. The first was the continuous increase in the man-land ratio in the Arab rural sector which resulted from past rapid population growth.13 Consequently, the pressure to seek alterna-

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157

tive employment became increasingly strong. Second, such alternative employment also provided higher levels of income. This kind of labor mobility has increased and intensified particularly since 1967, and currently tens of thousands of Arabs, men and women, are employed in the Jewish economic sector. These changes in economic activity were associated with a significant shift away from rural agricultural to nonagricultural occupations. Indeed, the proportion in agricultural occupations dropped from 55 percent in 1954 to 19 percent in 1975, with a corresponding increase in nonagricultural employment. Such changes could be expected to have far-reaching consequences, not the least in family structure and functions. The high rate of labor migration that has developed among Arabs in Israel since 1958 may be viewed as a demographic response to the changes that had taken place in their economic structure in the 1950s and 1960s. Increasing densities and the developing of new economic opportunities were the factors underlying these changes. However, the basic question in the present context is: Was the increased labor migration among Arabs in Israel the only response to these changes? Have they also responded, as have other societies in the process of modernization, by raising age at marriage and by reducing marital fertility? Are there any signs that such responses are to accelerate in the near future? An attempt will be made to examine the little demographic evidence available in order to arrive at a tentative conclusion. It may be argued that fertility differences within the Arab community are first indicators of future change processes, although such data are far from conclusive evidence. Family size among Arab Christian women was, according to the 1961 census, only 70 percent that of Arab Moslem women. Considerable fertility differentials exist by rural-urban residence, educational levels, and other variables.14 This does not necessarily mean that in the very near future rapid and significant fertility reduction among Moslems in Israel is assured. It does mean, however, that fertility aspirations and family size preferences are responsive to changes in other demographic and socioeconomic variables. Indeed, the spread of such elements of modernization has a cumulative effect

158

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

and these should not be ignored in considering future fertility patterns. More direct evidence on fertility change among Arabs in Israel is available from current fertility data. For example, there has been a notable decline in age-specific fertility rates at the younger age groups for both Moslems and Druzes in recent years. Declines on the order of 50 percent over a period of five years for the 15-19 age group may be identified; declines on the order of 15 percent may be noted for the 20-24 age group. Did these declines result from the spread of family limitation within marriages, or did they result from a rise in age at marriage? An inference may be drawn from census and current registration data indicating that age at first marriage has been increasing in recent years. Estimates of marital status composition by age prepared by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics suggest that increases have taken place in the percentage single in the younger age groups among Arabs in Israel since 1961. Rough calculations based on these estimates have shown that much of the decline in age-specific fertility rates among these younger age groups resulted from changes in nuptiality only. More recent evidence based on surveys taken in 1974 indicate clearly that the decline in marital fertility among Moslem women has begun and is particularly noticeable after fifteen years of marriage. Moreover, the decline is most pronounced among urban, educated Moslem women.15 Hence, any projections or recommended policies that are based on the assumption of the indefinite continuation of the high fertility levels among Israeli Arabs ignore the powerful forces of social and economic change, as well as processes of modernization and demographic change that have occurred elsewhere. The question, How fast will fertility decline? is, of course, a vital one, and to that question no definite answer can be offered. Nevertheless, it appears that the assumption of a long-term continuation of contemporary differentials in natural increase between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority is totally unrealistic. In sum, the question remains whether an increase in Jewish fertility would eliminate or reduce substantially the socioeconomic and political-security problems cited by the Natality Com-

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159

mittee as justifying the recommended policy. The argument presented above has suggested that a substantial increase in longterm fertility among the Jewish population is not likely to result from policies recommended by the Natality Committee. Furthermore, fertility among the Arab population in Israel is likely to decline rapidly in the future. Even if the validity of these two arguments is challenged, it will be demonstrated that considerable increases in Jewish fertility cannot be instrumental in alleviating or reducing the societal problems cited by the committee. (See discussion in chapter 7.) Hence, the pronatal policies that have been recommended to the Israeli government need considerable revision. It is difficult to support a pronatal policy that has an almost zero probability of attaining its fertility targets; it is even more difficult to accept a pronatal policy that is unlikely to have an impact either on fertility or on the societal problems that it is designed to help solve. While the recommendations of the Natality Committee continue to be official Israeli policy, it is clear that its formulation and implementation were inadequate and ineffective. The full implementation of this policy would require heavy economic investments that have not been made in the past. The absence of official and public interest in pronatalism and the priority of political, social, and economic problems explain the failure to implement pronatal policies in Israel.

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS of a population at any point in time are the consequences of past population processes: the size, age-sex structure, and composition of a population result from changes in fertility, mortality, and migration experienced by society. In turn, demographic characteristics have implications for a variety of social processes. The size of population and its age structure, for example, have a direct impact on political and military systems, economic and social processes, and socioethnic composition. Hence, the adoption of population policies may be appropriate when population characteristics and processes are considered inconsistent with societal goals. Indeed, the adoption of a strong proimmigration policy in Israel was an attempt to meet the goal of increasing Jewish population growth in the short run, so that societal objectives would be more attainable. Hence, two sets of analytic questions may be raised regarding the implications (past and future) of population patterns and policies in Israel. The first set relates to demographic processes: for example, what are the past demographic consequences and future demographic implications of immigration policies and patterns in Israel? The second set of questions relates to the societal consequences of these population patterns: for example, What have been the social

162

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

and economic consequences of demographic patterns in Israel? What are the future societal implications of past population patterns? An analysis of the implications of past populations patterns provides one basis for evaluating Israel's population policies. In this context, the focus will be on immigration policies and patterns, because pronatal policies have not had demographic consequences.

Consequences of Past Demographic Patterns and Policies One of the consequences of Israel's immigration policy was that over 1.5 million Jews migrated to Israel between 1948 and 1975. The early mass immigration policy resulted in an extreme concentration of this volume in the first three years of statehood. This immigration pattern had an impact on the population dynamics of Israel, i.e., changes in population size and age-sex structure. The impact of immigration on population dynamics operates through several distinct effects. The first is the effect of the volume of immigration to Israel. The question may be asked: What would have been the population dynamics of Israel had there been no immigration? The actual population dynamics of Israel will be compared to the hypothetical population dynamics had there been no immigration. This will be referred to as the volume effect. Another issue may be raised: What would have been the population dynamics of Israel had the volume of migration been evenly distributed over time, rather than concentrated in the mass-immigration period? This hypothetical situation may be compared to the actual development of Israel's population dynamics. This provides a basis for evaluating the timing effects of Israel's immigration patterns and policies. There are other factors related to immigration that may have affected population growth and structure in Israel. In particular, fertility and mortality differences between immigrants and the Israeli population are important considerations. In Israel, initial mortality differences between these populations became insignificant in a very short period of time. (See chapter 2). Therefore, an

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

163

evaluation may be limited to the differential fertility effect. Fertility differences between immigrants and the Israeli population have already been documented and discussed. In the present context, it is important to note that because of the high proportion of total immigrants who came from Asian-African countries, the fertility level of immigrants to Israel was higher than the initial population of Israel (i.e., the population living in Israel in 1948). A final element in Israel's immigration experience that could affect population dynamics is the degree to which immigrants differed from the initial population in age composition. However, comparison of the age-sex structure of immigrants to that of the initial population does not reveal important differences. Although some differences appear for a few age groups, age selectivity of immigrants has no practical consequences for population dynamics. 1 Hence, the analysis of the implications of population policies and patterns in Israel focuses on three major elements: the volume, timing, and differential fertility effects of immigration on population structure and change, in the short and long run. 2 The investigation of the implications of these effects are critical for understanding central themes in the emergence of Israeli society. For example, one of the major political issues has been the impact of immigration on Jewish majority status and dominance. Another issue relates to the importance of immigration in manpower availability for the economic and military systems. The analysis to be presented enables the systematic evaluation of various effects of immigration on these societal processes.

The Volume and Timing Effects The examination of the impact of immigration on population size and structure begins with the most conspicuous elements—the intensity and concentration of immigration during the period of mass immigration, i.e., the volume and timing effects. In order to evaluate these effects, two population models were constructed. The first model is based on population projections assuming that there was no immigration to Israel since 1948 and will be referred

164

EVALUATION A N D IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

to as the "zero-immigration" model. A second model was constructed on the assumption that the volume of immigration to Israel was distributed equally between 1948 and 1972 rather than heavily concentrated during the mass-immigration period. This will be referred to as the "constant-immigration" model. Comparisons between these models and the actual development of Israel's population dynamics are the bases for evaluating the volume and timing effects of immigration. The three populations and their age-sex dynamics are presented in tables 7.1-7.3 and figures 7.1 and 7.2. The population pyramids in figure 7.1 represent the actual development of Israel's population dynamics and those in figure 7.2 represent the population dynamics of the constant-immigration model. The inner shaded areas of all the pyramids in both figures represent the population dynamics of the zero-immigration model. Impact on Population Size The analysis of the impact of immigra-

tion on population size is based on these models. The total size of the Jewish population of Israel according to various assumptions is shown in tables 7.1-7.3 and is represented as the total area of the population pyramids in figures 7.1 and 7.2. The effects of immigration may be seen by examining the unshaded areas of the population pyramids. Total population size as it evolved under Israel's proimmigration policy may then be compared to the hypothetical situations of zero and constant immigration. The enormous impact of immigration volume on population growth becomes evident. Comparing the actual population growth to the zero-immigration model, Israel's population size in 1972 would be less than 1 million compared to the actual size of 2.72 million (figure 7.1 and table 7.4). Hence, it is obvious that Israel's immigration policy, which was considered an essential condition for survival, was extremely effective. Examining the constant-immigration model (that is, assuming that the actual volume was distributed evenly over the period) shows that the timing effect was also a significant element in Israel's population growth, but has declined in importance over time (tables 7.2, 7.4 and 7.5).

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IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

167

Table 7.1. Jewish Population by Age and Sex according to the "Zero-Immigration" Assumption, 1947-72 (In Thousands). 1947

Age Group

Males

All ages 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 +

324.5 40.4 27.5 27.9 25.3 27.5 27.2 25.3 33.1 27.4 20.5 13.4 9.7 6.7 5.7 3.4 3.6

All ages 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75+

412.7 32.1 37.1 46.7 40.0 27.4 27.6 24.9 27.1 26.6 24.5 31.6 25.7

Females

Males

305.5 37.8 26.0 26.2 24.9 25.8 23.5 28.6 33.2 21.8 17.3 10.4 9.5 7.2 6.2 3.2 4.0

360.8 46.9 39.9 27.5 27.8 25.1 27.3 27.0 25.0 32.6 26.9 19.6 12.5 8.8 5.8 4.3 3.8

387.4 30.1 34.7 43.9 37.3 25.7 26.0 24.7 25.1 22.9 27.7 31.6 20.1 14.8 8.9 6.9 6.9

436.9 35.3 32.0 37.0 46.6 39.7 27.3 27.5 24.8 26.0 26.4 24.1 30.8 24.6 16.9 9.5 7.3

Females

Males

340.7 44.1 37.5 25.9 26.2 24.9 25.5 23.3 28.4 32.8 21.3 16.1 10.4 8.9 6.4 5.0 3.9

389.5 37.1 46.7 39.8 27.4 27.7 25.0 27.2 26.8 24.8 32.1 26.3 19.0 11.8 8.0 5.0 4.5

409.0 33.2 30.0 34.7 43.8 37.2 25.6 25.8 24.5 24.9 22.6 27.1 30.6 19.1 13.5 7.6 8.6

465.9 43.3 35.3 32.0 37.0 46.5 39.6 27.2 27.4 24.7 26.6 25.9 23.5 29.5 22.8 14.7 9.9

1967

1962

18.2 11.0 7.0 5.4

1957

1952

Females 366.8 34.9 44.0 37.4 25.8 26.1 24.8 25.3 23.1 28.1 32.3 20.7 15.5 9.8 8.1 5.5 5.5 1972 435.6 40.7 33.1 30.0 34.6 43.7 37.1 25.5 25.7 24.3 24.6 22.1 26.3 29.1 17.4 11.5 10.0

Note: The "zero-immigration" assumption is the implied development of the Israeli population assuming zero net immigration between Independence and the end of 1972 (see text).

168

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

Table 7.2. Jewish Population by Age and Sex according to the "Constant-Immigration" Assumption, 1947-72 (In Thousands) 1947

Age Group

Males

All ages 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 +

324.5 40.4 27.5 27.9 25.3 27.5 27.2 25.3 33.1 27.4 20.5 13.4 9.7 6.7 5.7 3.4 3.6

1952

Females 305.5 37.8 26.0 26.2 24.9 25.8 23.5 28.6 33.2 21.8 17.3 10.4 9.5 7.2 6.2 3.2 4.0

Males 480.4 58.7 51.8 37.6 39.2 37.1 38.6 36.5 33.5 41.0 34.0 25.4 16.9 12.0 8.0 5.6 4.6

1962 All ages 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 +

840.6 88.5 92.5 80.4 73.2 60.9 62.2 57.6 56.2 52.9 48.3 52.5 42.5 31.0 20.0 12.6 9.3

1957

Females 457.8 55.4 49.1 35.5 36.4 36.2 37.1 33.1 36.5 40.6 28.1 22.1 15.1 12.4 9.1 6.5 4.8

Males 658.1 80.8 70.3 61.9 49.0 51.0 48.2 48.0 44.8 41.6 47.6 39.1 29.0 19.3 13.1 8.1 6.5

1967 801.6 83.4 87.5 76.4 68.7 56.8 59.0 57.1 54.3 48.2 50.0 51.7 37.0 28.1 18.7 13.1 11.7

1,038.2 109.6 100.1 102.5 91.8 85.0 72.0 71.6 65.8 64.3 59.5 53.2 55.6 44.0 30.9 18.6 13.8

Females 627.9 76.2 66.9 58.5 45.6 47.6 47.6 46.6 40.8 43.8 46.7 33.3 26.0 17.7 13.7 9.0 8.0 1972

988.8 103.2 94.7 96.9 86.5 79.8 68.2 68.5 64.8 61.6 54.4 54.9 54.8 39.0 28.3 17.4 16.6

1,258.0 139.6 121.2 110.2 113.8 103.5 96.1 81.3 79.7 73.8 70.7 64.2 56.3 56.5 43.9 28.1 20.0

1,196.7 131.5 114.4 104.1 107.0 97.5 91.1 77.6 76.1 72.0 67.6 59.2 57.9 55.5 37.8 25.5 22.2

Note: The "constant-immigration" assumption is the implied development of the Israeli population assuming equally distributed immigration over the period between Independence and the end of 1972.

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

169

Table 7.3. Jewish Population by Age and Sex, 1948-72 (In Thousands) Age Group All ages 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75+

1947

7952 Females

Males 324.5 40.4 27.5 27.9 25.3 27.5 27.2 25.3 33.1 27.4 20.5 13.4 9.7 6.7 5.7 3.4 3.6

305.5 37.8 26.0 26.2 24.9 25.8 23.5 28.6 33.2 21.8 17.3 10.4 9.5 7.2 6.2 3.2 4.0

Males

1,047.3 115.9 121.0 124.4 100.1 67.4 67.1 62.9 62.3 63.7 54.7 64.3 51.1 37.9 24.2 16.0 14.5

Females

736.9 102.0 78.8 55.6 62.2 59.3 57.9 56.1 47.6 58.5 48.1 38.2 25.8 18.7 12.1 8.6 7.5

1962 All ages 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75+

19 57

713.3 95.8 74.5 52.4 56.7 59.0 60.9 53.0 51.4 57.7 40.8 35.9 22.5 20.0 13.8 10.1 8.6

1,200.9 127.6 122.7 129.0 132.9 106.2 68.7 68.0 64.6 64.7 66.1 56.8 65.4 50.7 35.6 21.1 20.8

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, volumes.

868.7 108.1 108.2 84.9 59.3 63.4 63.3 65.1 56.7 55.1 58.9 42.0 36.2 23.8 18.6 14.0 12.8

894.1 114.3 115.1 91.2 62.4 64.9 60.6 59.4 60.1 51.6 61.5 49.6 38.4 25.8 18.2 10.5 10.5

1967 1,021.5 110.3 114.2 116.5 92.4 64.8 67.7 67.0 70.1 61.4 58.1 61.5 43.3 36.6 23.2 16.9 17.4

Females

Males

1972 1,182.7 120.8 117.3 122.1 124.4 99.5 68.6 70.5 70.3 74.1 65.3 60.7 63.6 44.1 35.9 21.3 24.1

Statistical

1,366.5 156.5 132.6 128.6 135.1 137.4 109.1 71.2 70.6 67.2 67.0 67.5 56.7 63.1 46.4 30.2 27.5

Abstracts

of Israel,

1,357.1 148.7 125.6 123.2 128.4 131.8 105.3 72.3 74.0 73.8 77.4 67.4 61.6 63.0 42.3 32.0 30.4 various

Table 7.4 Total population 1943-72: Actual and according to the Zero-Immigration Model; the Volume and Timing Effect of Immigration

Actual population Total (000) Annual growth rate (%) Zero-Immigration Model Total (000) Annual growth rate (%) Volume and timing effect of immigration (000)

1947

1952

1957

1962

1967

1972

630.0 16.7

1,450.2 3.9

1,762.7 3.2

2,068.9 2.8

2,383.6 2.7

2,723.6

630.0 2.2

701.6 1.5

756.3 1.1

800.0 1.1

845.8 1.3

901.5

0

748.6

1,006.4

1,268.9

1,537.8

1,822.1

Table 7.5 Total Population 1947-72: Actual and according to the Constant-immigration model; the Timing Effect on Growth Patterns

Actual population Total (000) Annual growth rates (%) Constant-immigration model Total (000) Annual growth rates (%) The timing effect on population growth (000)

1947

1952

1957

1962

1967

1972

630.0 16.7

1,450.2 3.9

1,762.7 3.2

2,068.9 2.8

2,383.6 2.7

2,723.6

630.0 8.0

938.2 6.3

1,286.0 4.9

1,642.2 4.2

2,027.2 3.8

2,454.7

0

512.0

476.7

426.7

356.4

268.9

-

-

Table 7.6 Relationship between Jewish and Arab Population Size, and Percentage Jewish in Israel under Various Immigration Alternatives, 1947-72 Immigration

1947

1952

Jewish Population Actual Assumed: constant immigration Assumed: zero immigration

630.0 630.0 630.0

in

1,450.2 936.2 701.6

Arab Population

in

152.3

179.3

Actual

Percentage Actual Assumed: constant immigration Assumed: zero immigration

80.5 80.5 80.5

Jewish 89.0 84.0 79.6

1957

1962

1967

1972

2,068.9 1,642.2 800.0

2,383.6 2,027.2 845.8

2,723.6 2,454.7 901.5

262.9

392.7

476.9

88.7 86.2 75.3

85.8 83.8 68.3

85.1 83.7 65.4

Thousands 1,761.7 1,286.0 756.3 Thousands 213.2 Population 89.2 85.8 78.0

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

171

One important implication related 'to demographic growth patterns in Israel has been the relationship of Jewish to Arab population growth, and in turn, to Jewish political dominance. A comparison of the volume and timing effects of immigration on the changing proportion of Jewish population is presented in table 7.6. Again, the significant role of the volume of Jewish immigration is evident, despite the high fertility and growth of the Arab population. Had there been no Jewish immigration, the proportion Jewish within the State would have declined from 80 percent in 1947 to 65 percent in 1972; in fact, the proportion Jewish increased from 80 to 85 percent. In contrast, the timing of immigration was of little consequence in affecting the proportion Jewish in the total population. The issue of the relative size of the Jewish population became more important after the Six-Day War of 1967 when an additional 1 million Arabs were included under Israeli administrative rule. The continuation of a Jewish majority was an important issue in the political debates regarding the retention of the various territories occupied by Israel. These debates sharply divided major political parties and political factions within parties. These occupied territories may be divided into five major groupings: (within respective population sizes as of 1967): (1) East Jerusalem with a population of 66,000; (2) the Golan Heights-6,000; (3) the West Bank-600,000; (4) the Gaza Strip-360,000; and (5) Sinai Desert33,000. Data in table 7.7 show what would have been the population size consequences of various assumptions about the retention of territories had a settlement been agreed upon immediately after the Six-Day War. These range from minimum to maximum annexations, as seen from Israel's vantage point. While the minimum territorial annexation would have left almost unchanged total population size and the percent Jewish, the maximum territorial annexation would have added 1 million Arabs to the total and would have reduced the Jewish majority from 87 percent to only 64 percent. Clearly, the Jewish majority issue would have become more critical had Israel's proimmigration policy not succeeded as it had, and certainly under the extreme conditions of zero immigra-

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IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

173

tion. To illustrate the enormous contribution of immigration to population size and to the Jewish majority, it may be noted that had there been no immigration and assuming the maximum territorial annexation, an absurd situation would emerge where the proportion-Jewish population would be reduced to only 38 percent. 3 The timing effect is again of less serious consequences and reduces the Jewish majority only slightly under these conditions. The Impact on Age-Sex Dynamics In addition to the important

impact of the mass-immigration policy on population size are the effects on age-sex dynamics. An examination of the impact of immigration on age-sex dynamics in Israel involves types of comparisons similar to those that were made for population size: age-sex distributions that actually developed in Israel may be compared with the two hypothetical models of zero immigration and constant immigration (see tables 7.1-7.3 and figures 7.1 and 7.2). The population pyramid representing the actual population dynamics as they emerged in Israel not unexpectedly illustrates the increasing dominance since 1952 of the immigrant population (immigrants and their descendants), particularly in the younger age groups. For example, an examination of the 1967 age structure shows that up to age 20, a relatively wide rectangle has formed at the base of the age pyramid, contrasting sharply with the narrowness of the age groups above age 25. While the size of a five-year cohort under age 20 varies around 250,000 males and females, a five-year cohort over age 25 (up to age 55) varies around just half that size. Viewing these data over the twentyyear period 1947-1967, the younger age groups have multiplied over 4.5 times, while the older ones have multiplied only 2.5 times. This development may be followed by examining the 0-4 enlarged age group in 1951, adding to it in each quinquennium period the entering five-year enlarged age cohort. A comparison of the actual population dynamics and the dynamics of the zero-immigration model, i.e., the shaded and unshaded areas of the pyramids, shows clearly that this peculiar age structural development in Israel can be attributed in large part to immigra-

174

EVALUATION A N D IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

tion. The enlarged unshaded area accounts for almost the entire expansion at the younger ages of the pyramids. The question remains, To what extent did the uneven distribution of immigration, i.e., the timing effect, account for this pattern under the conditions of Israel's total immigration volume. Comparisons between the population dynamics of the actual population and the constant-immigration model (figures 7.1 and 7.2) show the more regular age structure of the constant-immigration model, i.e., the reduction of very large differences between consecutive age groups. Hence, the concentration of immigration in the early years of statehood, i.e., the policy of mass immigration, contributed substantially to the irregularity in the evolution of Israel's actual population dynamics and, in turn, has had major societal implications. It is clear that had Israel's policy been one of regulating the volume of immigration evenly over time, a more regular pattern of population dynamics would have emerged. Differential Fertility Effect In addition to the volume and timing effects, there is a third effect of immigration to Israel, i.e., the differential fertility of migrants compared to the Israeli population. Since immigrants had higher fertility, the resultant population dynamics may be expected to result in an expansion at the younger ages—other things remaining equal, To examine the differential fertility effect, population projections were made assuming no differential fertility between immigrants and the Israeli population. These projections were applied to both the constant-immigration model and to Israel's actual population. The population characterized by constant immigration and no differential fertility will be referred to as the constant immigration equal fertility model. The population of Israel assuming no differential fertility is referred to as the actual immigration-equal fertility model. Comparisons of these two equal-fertility models with the previous models allow for an evaluation of the differential fertility effect (table 7.8). The first conclusion that may be drawn from a comparison of these population models is that whenever the equal-fertility assumption is added, the lower part of the age pyramid is nar-

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

175

Table 7.8 Jewish Population by Age and Sex, Actual and Hypothetical according to Assumption on Volume-Time Variations in Immigration and Fertility of Immigrants in Israel—the Differential Fertility Effect, 1972 (In Thousands) Actual Actual

Equal Fertility

Fertility

Age Group

Males

All ages 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 +

1,366.5 156.5 132.6 128.6 135.1 137.4 109.1 71.2 70.6 67.2 67.0 67.4 56.7 63.1 46.4 30.2 27.4

1,357.1 148.6 125.6 123.2 128.4 131.8 105.3 72.3 74.0 73.8 77.4 67.4 61.6 63.0 42.3 32.0 30.4

All ages 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54

1,258.0 139.6 121.2 110.2 113.8 103.5 96.1 81.3 79.7 73.8 70.7 64.2 56.3 56.5 43.9 28.1 20.0

1,196.7 131.5 114.4 104.1 107.0 97.5 91.1 77.6 76.1 72.0 67.6 59.2 57.9 55.5 37.8 25.5 22.2

Females

Constant

55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 +

Immigration

Males 1,186.4 113.4 101.4 96.3 107.5 91.5 109.1 72.2 70.6 67.2 67.0 67.5 56.7 63.1 46.4 30.2 27.4

Assumption Females 1,180.0 106.6 95.4 90.7 100.9 86.8 105.3 72.3 74.0 73.8 77.4 67.4 61.6 63.0 42.3 32.0 30.4

Immigration 1,176.9 113.8 100.4 93.7 100.4 98.9 96.1 81.3 79.7 73.8 70.7 64.2 56.3 56.5 42.9 28.1 20.0

1,120.6 107.2 94.9 88.6 94.4 93.1 91.1 77.6 76.1 72.0 67.6 59.2 57.9 55.5 37.8 25.5 22.2

176

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

rower when compared to the appropriate model based on actual fertility differentials. This is not unexpected, given the fact that, on the whole, the fertility of migrants to Israel was higher than that of the receiving population. A second more specific conclusion emerges when a comparison is made between the actual age distributions and those of the actual immigration-equal fertility model. Had the fertility of migrants been the same as that of the initial population, a more regular age structure would have developed, even with mass immigration concentrated in the early period. Hence, the peculiar dynamics that developed in Israel would have been eliminated or reduced, other things being equal, if either (a) the same volume of immigration had been more evenly distributed or (b) if migrants had the same fertility levels as the initial population. Had both conditions prevailed, a fortiori the population dynamics would have been regularized. Thus, the uneven distribution of immigration volume and differential fertility have been jointly responsible for the evolution of Israel's irregular age structural dynamics. 4

Societal Implications of Age-Sex Dynamics Israel's mass-immigration policy has had a clear impact on population size and age dynamics. In addition to the immediate impact of mass immigration on Israeli society (see chapter 4), the effects of immigration on age structure and dynamics have in turn affected a variety of societal processes that are age-related. The entrance of expanded age cohorts since mass immigration has created fluctuations over time in the size of age groups (see figure 7.3). These fluctuations influence directly such age-related processes as the entrance of children into the educational system, entrance into the labor force and military service, marriage, and childbearing. Since the entrance of enlarged age groups into the population pyramid depends mainly on the number of annual births, this is the most important factor in the age dynamics of the population of Israel. The number of births 1948-52 was twice as large as the

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

177

178

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

number of births in the five-year period immediately preceding immigration. When compared to 1953-57, the number of births 1948-52 was almost three times as large. After increasing slightly 1958-67, a fairly large increase followed in the last five-year period 1968-72. The increase 1948-52 and 1953-57 were in large part the result of higher fertility among migrants and the high concentration of immigration up to 1951. As a result of this substantial overall increase in the number of births, new cohorts entering the age pyramid were enlarged relative to previous cohorts. The 1968-72 increase in births may be attributed in large part to the initial increase in births 1948-52. This increase in births 1968-1972 is called the "echo effect." It was in this period that the first expanded cohort of women reached childbearing ages, increasing the relative size of this age group from 7.1 percent of the total population to 8.7 percent. It is likely that such increases will continue well into the 1980s as subsequent expanded cohorts reach childbearing age, assuming no counterbalancing processes (see figure 7.3). The increase in the number of births in the 1970s will have its own "echo effect" around the year 2000, when the new expanded cohorts reach their stage of childbearing, all other things being equal. The long-term recurring impact of Israel's mass-immigration policy on population dynamics is clearly evident. Would such an increase in annual births occur under different immigration patterns and policies? Data in table 7.9 show that under the assumption of zero immigration, there would have been a decline in births during the period 1953-1967, followed by a recovery 1968-72. This is entirely consistent with the age structural dynamics for this model: during 1953-67 there was a relatively small number of women in the more fertile age cohorts, due to a considerable decline in fertility and birth rates during the late 1930s and the early 1940s. The recovery in the number of births 1968-72 would have been the consequence of the baby boom in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. The constant-immigration model shows a considerable increase in births over the entire period (1948-72). The number of births in the last quinquennium (1968-72) would have been, according to this model, slightly less

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

179

Table 7.9 Population Dynamics Implications Resulting from Actual Demographic Patterns and according to Two Immigration Assumptions: Israel, 1947-72 1947

1948-52

1953-57

1958-62

1963-67

A. Total Population Size at End of Period (in Thousands) Actual 630.0 1,450.2 1,762.7 2,068.9 2,383.6 Hypothetical according to assumption: Zero immigration 630.0 701.6 756.3 800.0 845.8 Constant immigration 630.0 938.2 1,286.0 1,642.2 2,027.0

1968-72

2,723.6

901.5 2,454.8

B. Average Annual Number of Births During the Period (in Thousands) Actual 16.2 33.9 43.2 44.1 49.9 Hypothetical according to assumption: Zero immigration 16.2 19.3 15.2 13.2 14.4 Constant immigration 16.2 21.2 30.3 33.4 42.1

60.8

17.8 54.4

C. Number of Children Aged 6 at End of Period—Approximate Entrance into Primary Education (in Thousands) Actual 10.5 31.1 45.0 47.1 47.8 51.3 Hypothetical according to assumption: Zero immigration 105 15.6 18.4 14.3 12.3 13.6 Constant immigration 1Û5 20.3 27.4 36.2 38.8 47.0 D. Number of Females aged 20-24 per 1,000 Males Aged 25-29 at End of Availability of Males for Females in Marriageable Ages. Actual 946 1,019 1,047 962 1,449 Hypothetical according to assumption: Zero immigration 946 912 1,042 932 1,363 Constant immigration 946 937 987 913 1,108

Period1,208

1,103 1,015

than the actual pattern. However, while recorded births in Israel have increased by 166 percent within a decade, an increase ofthat magnitude would have occurred only after more than two decades according to the constant-immigration assumption. Hence, while the increase in births in Israel has, in fact, been very much concentrated in the early years of the State, nearly the same increase would have been much more evenly distributed over the entire period had immigration been more evenly distributed. The effects of these expanded birth cohorts on the number of births is but one illustration of the long-term consequences of immigration patterns and policies on population dynamics in

180

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

Israel. Clearly these enlarged birth cohorts have socioeconomic implications as they move along the age scale. The implications for selected social processes associated with the life cycle are examined below. Variations in the annual number of children aged 6 in the actual population and the two hypothetical immigration models are presented in table 7.9. This number represents roughly the annual entrance of children into the primary school system. It may be seen that in Israel the number of children age 6 has tripled within the five-year period following the end of 1947 and more than quadrupled within ten years (up to 1957); thereafter, the increase in numbers has been slight.5 Had immigration been more evenly distributed, entrance into primary schools would have increased over the entire period by approximately the same total amount as it had actually. However, while about 85 percent of the actual increase occurred within a decade from 1957, such an increase would have occurred only within a period of well over two decades under the assumption of the constant-immigration model. Thus, the necessity of the educational system to adapt to these irregular increases in enrollments was one of the consequences of the mass-immigration policy. Another implication of the development of Israel's age dynamics relates to a later stage of the life cycle, marriage. Age at marriage of grooms is generally higher than that of brides. Since age structures have a pyramidlike shape, the number of potential brides is larger than that of potential grooms. The difference between these two groups depends on various factors including the youthfulness of the age structure, age at marriage, and the difference in age at marriage between males and females. In a stable population model, for example, with an expectation of life of seventy years, a growth rate of 2 percent, and a difference in age at marriage of three years exactly, there would be some 1,066 females available for every 1,000 males in the marriageable ages. When oversimplified measurements based on five-year age groupings are used instead of single years, the ratio between the number of females in the 20-24 age group to males in the 25-29 age group is 1,112 to 1,000. In a real population, there would, in

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

181

fact, be variations in annual birth rates and hence variations in the sizes of cohorts entering the age pyramid. If a new entering cohort is exceptionally large compared to previous cohorts, an excess number of females (i.e., potential brides) would be available some twenty years later; the reverse is true if the new cohort is exceptionally small. In Israel, it is reasonable to expect relatively high ratios of potential brides per grooms some twenty years after the first enlarged cohorts of women reach marriageable age (see figure 7.3). Since age at marriage of males is higher, the potential number of grooms will originate from relatively smaller birth cohorts born earlier. Actual ratios of females aged 20-24 to males aged 25-29 for the period 1947-72 and ratios according to the two hypothetical immigration models are presented in table 7.9. The actual ratio in 1962 was low (962 females aged 20-24 to 1,000 males aged 25-29) which was a result of reduced fertility and birth rates in the late 1930s and early 1940s. However, the ratios for both 1967 and 1972 were exceptionally high: in 1967 these were the result of both the baby boom in the late 1940s and early 1950s combined with the effect of mass immigration during 1948-51. The important contribution of the baby boom can be seen from the ratios for the zeroimmigration model: Even if there had been no immigration, there would have been 1,363 females aged 20-24 per 1,000 males aged 25-29 in 1967. In the constant-immigration model, these ratios show lower values than those obtained with a stable-population model. Thus, it may be concluded that had the high volume of immigration been more or less evenly distributed over time, the exceptionally high ratios would have been avoided and would have counterbalanced the effects of the baby boom. It is evident that the policy of mass immigration has had a major impact on the changing marriage market in Israel.6 The availability of human resources has always been considered a key issue in Israel in view of the politico-military context of her relationship to Arab populations and selective economic considerations. One dominant issue has been the changing size of the potential population available for regular military service. Variations in the average size of a single year cohort in the 15-24 age

182

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

Table 7.10 The Average Size of a Single-Year Male Age Cohort in the 1 5 - 2 4 Age Group, Actual, according to the Zero-immigration, and the Constant-immigration Models, 194772 (in Thousands)

Actual population Hypothetical: Zero immigration Constant immigration

1947

1952

1957

1962

1967

1972

5.2

11.9

12.5

16.2

23.2

26.6

5.2 5.2

5.2 7.5

5.4 9.7

6.5 13.0

8.4 17.2

8.1 21.1

group may be taken as an indication of the change in this potential. Before mass immigration, the size was slightly over 5,000 doubling within five years since then, quadrupling within twenty years, and increasing to nearly 27,000 by 1972 (table 7.10). Had there been zero immigration, the increase would have been from 5,000 to 8,000 in twenty-five years. The number would have increased at a slower rate and with greater regularity had immigration been constant. Changes in this age group allowing a delay of two to three years of military service, provide indications as well for the changing patterns of entrance into the labor force that resulted from Israel's immigration policy. These implications of the volume and timing of immigration demonstrate clearly the demographic and societal consequences of Israel's immigration policies. For theoretical reasons, we should consider the possible contribution of fertility increase to population growth and dynamics. What could have been the demographic and societal consequences of an increase in fertility (through effective pronatal policies)? Israel's population could not have expanded in the ways described with an increase in fertility, had immigration not occurred. To demonstrate this, data in table 7.11 show Jewish population size and annual growth rates with actual fertility and immigration-pattern experienced in Israel. For comparison, data based on an assumption of zero immigration and various hypothetical fertility levels are presented. It is evident that had the total fertility rate* of Israel increased substantially to 4.5 births per woman assuming zero immigration, rather than the declining trend actually experienced since the 1950s, *The total fertility rate is the estimate of the average number of children per woman based on current period birth rates.

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

183

population growth would have been significantly lower than actually occurred. Under the "maximum" fertility assumptions, the total population would have been less than 1.1 million; declining fertility combined with Israel's successful immigration policies resulted in a population size of nearly two-and-three-quarter million. Hence, the main conclusion from this comparison is that pronatal policies aimed at increasing population size would not be very effective in the short run, without immigration. (See chapter 6.) Moreover, if in addition to the population-size objective, the policy was to increase the population at military or working ages, pronatal policies would be even less effective. All this applies under the extreme conditions of large family size and no immigration. Table 7.11 Changing Population Size and Annual Growth Rates (r), Actual and Hypothetical under Various Assumptions, Varying Fertility Levels with Zero Immigration, Jewish Population, 1947-72 (In Thousands) 1947

7952 Actual

Actual fertility size r

630.0 16.7

1,450.2 3.9 Zero

Actual fertility size r Total fertility 2.6 size r Total fertility 3.0 size r Total fertility 3.5 size r Total fertility 4.0 size r Total fertility 4.5 size r

1957

1962

1967

1972

2,068.9 2.8

2,383.6 2.7

2,723.6

immigration 1,762.7 3.2 immigration

630.0 2.2

701.6 1.5

756.3 1.1

800.0 1.1

845.8 1.3

901.3

630.0 2.2

702.8 1.4

755.6 1.1

798.3 1.1

842.7 1.3

899.3

630.0 2.2

702.8 1.8

767.8 1.5

825.5 1.3

990.6 1.4

943.9

630.0 2.2

702.8 1.8

767.8 1.6

833.0 1.6

901.7 1.7

980.8

630.0 2.2

702.8 2.1

780.0 1.9

857.6 1.8

932.8 1.9

1,035.3

630.0 2.2

702.8 2.2

784.9 2.2

875.0 2.1

970.7 2.2

1,082,3

184

EVALUATION A N D IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

A g i n g : A n Illustration of t h e Future I m p l i c a t i o n s of Past P o p u l a -

tion Patterns A summary of the implications of Israel's immigration policy on age dynamics and, in turn, the societal implications of those dynamics may be seen in figure 7.3. The implications of past patterns may be divided into two components: (1) the implications to 1972; (2) the future implications of past patterns, assuming no counterbalancing trends. The diagram shows changes in the absolute size of age groups, 0-4, 10-14, 20-24 through 70-74.7 The timing of the initial increase in size can be traced for each group, i.e., around 1952 for the 0-4 age group, around 1962 for the 10-14 age group, up to an expected increase in the 70-74 age group around the second decade of the twenty-first century. The "echo effect" of this initial increase on the size of the 0-4 age group occurred around 1977 and another "echo effect" may be expected to start around the year 2000—all this under the assumption that no counterbalancing patterns occur. This diagram allows for the examination of past and future implications of the immigration policies and patterns that have characterized Israeli society. An interesting example of future implications is the changing size and proportion of the aged population. This age segment has undergone dramatic changes since mass immigration. The highest growth rate of the population 60 years of age and older was in the early years of statehood when it was increasing between 1948-50 at a rate comparable to nearly 300 percent per decade. During the 1950s the increase was 115 percent and during the decade of the 1960s, 80 percent. The proportion of the older population grew from 6.3 percent of the total in 1948 to almost 12 percent in 1970 (table 7.12). These changes were a direct result of mass immigration. However, the impact of mass-immigration patterns did not end in 1970. While the growth rate of this age segment will not be spectacular up to the year 2000 (17 percent and 12 percent per decade during the 1980s and 1990s), the population over age 60 will increase by 24 percent in the decade beginning 2010. Moreover, the proportion of the aged will increase to 15 percent, assuming no counterbalancing forces in the future.

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

185

Table 7.12. Growth Characteristics of the Aged Population, Israel, 1947-2040 Population

End of Year 1947 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040

Total in Absolute Numbers (000) 40.0 75.7 163.0 293.0 362.7 423.3 475.3 561.3 695.4 805.5 897.0

Aged 60 +

Growth Rate per Decade

(%) 298 115 80 24 17 12 18 24 16 11 -

Total

Percentage Aged in Total Population 6.3 6.3 8.5 11.5 12.4 12.7 12.5 13.1 14.4 15.0 15.0

Absolute Numbers (000) 630.0 1,203.0 1,911.2 2,541.0 2,923.7 3,345.2 3,807.0 4,294.9 4,819.5 5,376.6 5,961.7

Population Growth Rate per Decade

(%) 91 59 33 15 14 14 13 12 12 11 -

These patterns are the results mainly of the volume and timing effects of mass migration 1948-51. These conclusions have been drawn from projections assuming no future immigration and the continuation of current fertility and mortality patterns. In terms of actual size of this age segment, the projections show the considerable increase in the older population from 475,000 in the year 2000 to nearly 700,000 in 2020. This increase of almost 50 percent in two decades for this age segment compares to a projected increase of 25 percent for the total population. The volume effect is responsible for the prospective growth in the size of the aged population; the special characteristics of mass immigration are responsible for the irregular growth pattern over time. Thus, more gradual changes in the size and proportion of the older population would have resulted had immigration been more evenly distributed. In addition to the shift in the size and proportion of the aged resulting from Israel's immigration policy are related changes in Israel's ethnic composition that may be expected. As noted earlier, the majority of migrants prior to the establishment of the State of Israel were from European countries, while from the period of mass immigration, immigration from Afro-Asian coun-

186

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

tries dominated. These latter migrants had a younger age structure than European migrants. At the time of the 1948 population census, 80 percent of the aged were of European origins; this proportion declined to 72 percent by 1970. However, it may be shown that when the younger expanded cohorts, dominated by Afro-Asian ethnic groups, move up the age scale, the proportion of older people of Western origins will decline even further. A rough estimate suggests that in the absence of counterbalancing processes in the future (i.e., assuming zero immigration), the proportion of older people of Western origins in the early years of the twenty-first century will decline up to 47 percent. The importance of this ethnic shift lies not only in the changing cultural patterns of the aged but in the association between ethnicity and socioeconomic status in Israel as well. Assuming that the current educational and occupational status of adults in Israel will not change radically over the next thirty years, an assumption that is quite reasonable, a major shift in the socioeconomic status of older people will emerge in Israel. This major shift will be toward a greater heterogeneity in social status among the aged. In general, a slight increase (about one year) in the average number of years of schooling completed will characterize the older population by the year 2000. This increase is marginal in the context of the major educational achievements in Israeli society over the last two decades and those expected in the relatively near future. Most importantly, this average obscures a major shift toward educational heterogeneity of the older population. While about three-quarters of the current older population in Israel are located in the post-primary-school category and one-fourth are in the incompleted-primary-school category, by the year 2,000 these proportions will be more nearly equal (58 percent compared to 42 percent). 8 A similar picture emerges when occupational groups are examined and projected to the year 2000. The proportion of the older population having been in high white-collar occupations (professionals and managers) will decline from around 30 percent currently to only 24 percent by the year 2000. Currently, about 80

IMPLICATIONS OF PAST POPULATION POLICIES

187

percent of the population are in subgroups with high proportions in high-status occupations; by the year 2000 this will decline to 57 percent.9 These projected trends toward educational and occupational heterogeneity for the older population are clear reflections of the shifting ethnic composition and the association between ethnicity and social class. Thus, the policy of mass immigration will not only have an effect on the size of the aged population early in the next century but will alter the socioeconomic and ethnic composition of this population segment. Accompanying this compositional shift will be the major transitions in traditional family support, family structure, and family size for the Asian-African ethnic groups. This increasing segment of the aged population in the next thirty years will be left with a smaller number of adult children to support them when compared to earlier cohorts: an estimated decline of one-third in the number of potential family supporters. This shift will result from processes of social change that took place in the 1950s and 1960s wherein the transition to small family size was more rapid than socioeconomic transformations. Hence, the combination of a growing aged sector of the population, the shift in socioeconomic and ethnic composition of the aged, and the traditional dependence of the aged on family support will engender and accentuate a host of welfare and institutional problems early in the twenty-first century. Again, these problems stem in large from the successful implementation of mass-immigration policies in the early years of statehood.

FUTURE POPULATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS: ALTERNATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS

INCREASING JEWISH SETTLEMENT in a national homeland has been a major theme of Zionism since the late nineteenth century. This theme was converted into policies that were exceptionally successful in attaining rapid population growth unprecedented in modern demographic history. This growth rate was achieved largely through immigration, of which a unique feature was mass immigration. As has been demonstrated, this level of population growth could not have been achieved through any realistic increase in the level of fertility. What will be the role of policy in future population patterns of Israel? Moreover, What is the relative effectiveness of alternative immigration and fertility policies in the future? To provide answers to these questions, population projections were prepared for the different subpopulations in Israel and the administered territories, based on various combinations of future fertility and net immigration. These projections along with assumptions about specific fertility and immigration levels are described in detail in the appendix to this chapter. They cover a range of minimum, medium, and maximum fertility and immigration levels. An analysis of these alternative projections provides the likely range of future population growth in Israel and an evaluation of the effects and implications of alternative future population policies.

190

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

Several major issues will be examined to determine the implications of future changes in fertility and immigration. These issues have often served as a justification or rationale for particular population policies in Israel (for example, the Natality Committee). The objective will be to evaluate the relative impact of fertility and immigration alternatives on these issues.

Future Population Size and Dynamics The first set of implications of future population policies and patterns relates to changes in population size and population dynamics. Taking the medium assumption for fertility and immigration, an estimate of future population size emerges for the short and long run (1990 and 2010). In the short run, the population of Israel under medium assumptions will increase from 3 million in 1970 to 4.8 million in 1990 and the Jewish population will increase from 2.6 million to 3.9 million. Exceptionally high or low fertility and immigration will result in a 15 percent higher or lower population size by 1990. By the year 2010, the total population size of Israel according to the medium assumption will be 6.9 million, with a Jewish population size of 5.4 million. Under minimum or maximum assumptions, these figures will vary by about 30 percent in the long run. If the population in the administered territories is included in these projections, the medium assumptions will result in a total population size of 6.7 million in 1990 and over 10 million in 2010. In terms of population dynamics, one clear process emerges in the short and long runs for all subpopulations: a general increase in the proportion of the population in the upper ages. This is the consequence of the likely continuation of declining fertility among the Afro-Asian Jewish population and the Arab population of Israel. What is the impact of these future processes on key societal issues confronting Israeli society? The first issue to be examined is the relative size of Israel in the Arab Middle East.

FUTURE POPULATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS

191

Israel as a Demographic Minority in the Arab Middle East Israel's population constitutes a very small minority in terms of size in the Middle East region (see table 8.1). In view of the longstanding conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors, the fact that Israel represents less than 3 percent of the total population in the region has obvious political and national-security implications. Expressed differently, there are about 33 Arabs in the region to every Israeli, a ratio that is likely to change only slightly toward the year 2010 under the medium fertility and immigration assumptions (table 8.2). Even a considerable increase in fertility in Israel (from medium to maximum) that might be attempted through pronatal policies would reduce this ratio only slightly to 32.1 by the year 2010. The same conclusion emerges when maximum immigration is assumed: a net annual immigration to Israel of 40,000 changes the ratio of Arabs to Israelis to 29:1, all things remaining equal, by the year 2010. Assuming that population policies result in maximizing both immigration and fertility, the ratio of Arabs to Israelis would decline to about 27:1. These findings imply that whatever Israel invests in population policies to achieve high growth rates, and however effective such policies may be, the ratio of Arab populaTable 8.1 Population Size (1973) and Rates of Population Growth (1970-73) in Various Arab Countries Population (in Country Total Libyan Arab Republic Jordan Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic Saudi Arabia Iraq Algeria Sudan Egypt SOURCE: United Nations, Demographic

Size

Millions) 1973 101.7 2.2 2.5 3.0 6.9 8.4 10.4 15.8 16.9 35.6

Rate of Population Growth (%) 1970-73 2.7 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.3 3.2 2.5 2.2

Yearbook, (New York, 1973), table 2, p. 82.

192

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

Table 8.2 Population In Israel and In the Middle East, Actual 1970, and Projected to the Years 1990 and 2010, according to Various Projection Assumptions (in Thousands) Actual Demographic Immigration

Assumption

Population

Fertility

Projected

Population'

1970

1990

2010

2,561.6 2,561.6 2,561.6 2,561.6 2,561.6 2,561.6 2,561.6 2,561.6

3,307.7 3,400.4 3,493.5 3,768.1 3,872.7 3,976.3 4,212.9 4,327.3

3,809.4 4,373.8 4,710.9 4,769.7 5,348.1 5,829.0 5,684.6 6,443.4

East 143,661.2 125,295.1 125,295.1

213,473.0 186,181.9 168,754.3

Israel 0 0 0 20,000 20,000 20,000 40,000 40,000 0 0 0

Minimum Medium Maximum Minimum Medium Maximum Minimum Medium Arab Populations Slow decline 0 Moderate decline" Rapid decline 0

in the Middle 84,320.0 84,320.0 84,320.0

a

For an account of these assumptions, see the Appendix to this chapter. The projected population of Arabs in the Middle East has been made by assuming the following annual growth rates during 1970-90 and 1990-2010 respectively: 2.7 percent (the present growth rate) and 2.0 percent for the slow-decline projection, 2.0 percent and 2.0 percent for the moderate-decline projection; and 2.0 percent and 1.5 percent for the rapid-decline projection. b

tion in the Middle East to Israeli population will remain around 30 to 1. Thus, pronatal and/or proimmigration policies cannot alter the minority position of Israel in the Arab Middle East in the foreseeable future under almost the entire range of demographic alternatives.

Israel and World Jewish Population One of the issues discussed explicitly by the Natality Committee and implicit in the pronatal and proimmigration ideology in Israel has been the relationship of Jewish population size in Israel to world Jewish population. This issue has historical roots in Zionist debates (see chapter 1) and has gained in importance as a result of the loss of 6 million European Jews in the Holocaust. Moreover,

FUTURE POPULATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS

193

contemporary Jewish communities are characterized by high rates of marital assimilation and low rates of natural increase. Hence, these demographic issues of Jews outside of Israel were one basis for the pronatal policy recommendations of the Natality Committee. What contribution can population policies and patterns in Israel make toward the growth of the Jewish population of the world? Estimates show that the total size of world Jewish population was slightly less than 14 million in 1970, 18 percent of whom resided in Israel. 1 Projecting current growth rates of the Jewish population outside of Israel and Israel's growth rate based on the medium fertility assumption yields an estimated 17.5 million Jews in the world in 1990 and 21.8 million in 2010. Future world Jewish population trends can be affected indirectly by Jewish immigration to Israel, assuming that Jewish identity and continuity is stronger in Israel and overall rates of assimilation would be lower. However, the fertility of Jews in Israel has but a marginal effect on population growth rates of world Jewry. Under current fertility and growth levels of world Jewry, an increment of 0.5 percent in world Jewish population growth would require an increase of over two children per woman in Israel (i.e., in the total fertility rate). From projections presented in the appendix (table 8a) it may be calculated that a fertility increase in Israel from the medium to the maximum level would result in a supplement to world Jewish population size of 0.6 percent by the year 1990 and 1.8 percent by the year 2010. Clearly, any sociodemographic problems associated with the size and growth rate of world Jewry cannot possibly be affected by natality policies in Israel. Even the most effective pronatal policies in Israel will contribute marginally to the size and growth rate of the Jewish population of the world.

Israel's Population and Its Arab Minority The growth of the Jewish population relative to the Arab population and the issue of a Jewish demographic majority has been a

194

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

dominant theme since the renewal of Jewish settlement in Palestine. On the eve of Israeli independence, the Arab population formed the majority in Palestine, representing 66 percent of the total. Within the new borders following the War of Independence, the proportion Arab declined to 19 percent and further declined to 15 percent by 1975. (See tables in the appendix to chapter 2.) Earlier it was demonstrated how mass immigration was responsible for the increase in the proportion of Jews in Israel and how with zero immigration this proportion would have dropped to about 65 percent in 1970. (Cf. chapter 7; see figure 8.1.) Changes in the proportion Jewish in Israel in the future depend not only on Jewish fertility and immigration but on the future patterns of Arab fertility. Assuming the medium fertility assumption for Arabs, the percent Jewish in Israel will decline (although not drastically) under almost the entire range of assumptions about future demographic patterns of Jews (table 8.3). Under medium assumptions, the proportion Jewish by 2010 will be 75 percent; under maximum fertility and immigration assumptions for the Jewish sector, the proportion Jewish will decline from 85 percent in 1970 to 82 percent in the year 2010. Since the Jewish population has an older age structure than the Arab minority, the percent Jewish varies by age—for the younger age group the proportion Jewish is lower than the percent Jewish for the total population, and the reverse is true for the older ages. These projections were based on the population of Israel exclusive of the Arab population in territories administered by Israel since 1967. The annexation of those territories by Israel and the inclusion of the Arab population therein would obviously shrink the Jewish majority considerably. Projections based on minimum demographic assumptions for Jews suggest that by 2010 the Jewish population will become a clear minority (45 percent) if all the Arab populations in the administered territories are included. The maximum demographic assumption yields a majority Jewish of only 60 percent under these territorial conditions (table 8.4). Thus the annexations of all the territories and populations occupied by Israel since the Six Day War of 1967 implies either the loss of a Jewish majority by the year 2010 (the minimum

FUTURE P O P U L A T I O N POLICIES A N D PATTERNS

195

8.1 Percentage Jewish Population in Palestine and Israel, Actual (1922-76)

demographic assumptions) or the retention of a Jewish majority (the maximum demographic assumptions) at the cost of extremely rapid population growth—the addition of about 2 million people by 2010 to the population size projected under minimum assumptions. A settlement agreement between Israel and the Arabs does not necessarily involve the return or the retention of all the territories occupied by Israel. Indeed, a wide range of territorial

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EVALUATION A N D IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

alternatives may be imagined, each in combination with a variety of demographic alternatives, which allows for an examination of a much larger range of possibilities in terms of proportion Jewish and population size. For example, the annexation by Israel of East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and Northern Sinai with assumptions of a net annual Jewish immigration 1970-2000 of 15,000 and the continuation of low Jewish fertility and high Arab fertility results in a total population of over 6.5 million by the year 2000, two-thirds of which would be Jewish. In contrast, the return of all the occupied territories under the same demographic assumptions increases population size to less than five-and-a-half million with a Jewish majority of over 80 percent. 2 What emerges is that every demographic-territorial option has its cost to Israel either in high rates of population growth or in the reduction of the Jewish proportion in Israel's population.

Population and the Ethnic and Religious Composition of Israel A central theme in the evolution of Israeli society has been the changing ethnic mosaic. Changes in the ethnic composition in Israel have been the consequence of a series of complex demographic processes. These include variations and changes in the volume and composition of migrant streams, fertility changes, and differentials among migrants, and rapidly changing mortality levels (see chapter 2). It was noted earlier that the future trend in the socioethnic composition of the aged toward a larger concentration of Afro-Asian origins in large part reflects past demographic developments. To what extent can future developments in fertility and/or immigration influence these patterns of ethnic composition? Although the future volume of immigration cannot be assessed with any accuracy, the composition of potential immigrant streams is not totally unknown. In particular, the number of Jews remaining in Afro-Asian countries is relatively small, and

FUTURE POPULATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS

199

future immigration to Israel can, therefore, come mainly from European and American countries. It may also be assumed that ethnic differentials in fertility will continue to narrow and converge as fertility among the Afro-Asian groups continues to decline.3 The proportion foreign-born population within Israel will decline in the future under all assumptions considered. Under maximum immigration (40,000 annually) the proportion foreignborn declines from 54 percent in 1970 to 28 percent in 2010; under the zero-immigration assumption, the decline is to 12 percent in the long run. The future ethnic composition of the foreign-born population in Israel depends largely on the volume of future immigration. With no future immigration, the proportion of the foreign-born population that will be of Asian-African birth will increase from 44 percent to 67 percent in the year 2010. (See figure 8.2.) This reflects the relative older and aging structure of the European subpopulation compared to the Afro-Asian subpopulation, which in turn, reflects the history of immigration to Israel by origin.4 However, assuming a future annual immigration of 40,000, the proportion of the foreign-born population that will be of Asian-African birth will decline from 44 percent to 29 percent in 2010. This reflects the ethnic composition of potential Jewish immigrants in the future. The major difficulty in assessing the future ethnic composition of Israel is projecting the heterogeneous Israeli-born population that contains second and later generations of European and Afro-Asian subpopulations. A series of assumptions about future immigration and fertility yields a range of 50 percent to 60 percent of Afro-Asian origin (first and later generations) in the Jewish population in the year 2010. In 1970, this proportion was about 52 percent. These proportions obviously vary by age: almost the entire population below age 20 can be expected to be Israeli-born by the year 2010 (under any assumption of fertility or immigration) since the structure of this population is by definition young (see figure 8.1). However, a considerable increase of Israeli-born and Afro-

8.2

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Totals

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38.7

37.4

of P o p u l a t i o n

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0.7

~23.l

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37.6

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4

FUTURE POPULATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS

201

Asian born is expected among the over age 60 population. This, in large part, is a function of factors noted earlier, particularly the concentration of immigration during the first three years of statehood, the concentration of Afro-Asians in that migration, and their relatively high levels of fertility upon arrival. It is interesting to note that although future immigration may have some counterbalancing effect on the shift toward a larger proportion of AsianAfricans among the aged, no future demographic changes are likely to alter this ethnic pattern. The non-Jewish population is by no means homogeneous religiously or ethnically, nor are the demographic patterns of various subgroups within the non-Jewish population identical. Changes in the religious composition of the non-Jewish population of Israel have been slow: In 1949 the proportion of Moslems, Christians, and Druzes in Israel was 70 percent, 21 percent, and 9 percent, respectively; these have changed gradually, so that in 1970, 75 percent of the non-Jewish population were Moslems, 17 percent Christians, and 8 percent Druzes. Differential fertility accounts in large part for the trend of increase among Moslems and the decline of Christians, since mortality levels have been practically the same (see chapter 2). These trends are likely to continue in the future (see table 8.5), so that the Moslem dominance among the non-Jewish sector will increase to over 80 percent, with the proportion Christian reduced to 10 percent by the year 2010. The Moslem dominance will be particularly pronounced among the younger ages, since the Christian population experienced earlier fertility reductions. Hence, a more rapid aging process among Christians compared to Moslems may be expected in the future, other things being equal.

Population Change and Human Resources Historically, some periods of rapid population growth in Palestine and Israel were also periods of rapid economic growth. Undoubtedly, population growth can, under some conditions, stimulate

202

EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

Table 8.5 Non-Jewish Population, Actual and Projected, by Age Group, Religious Group, and Fertility Assumption, Percentages, 1970, 1990, and 2010 Projected

Population

1990 Age Group and Religious Groupa

Actual 1970

2010

Minimum Fertility

Medium Fertility

Maximum Fertility

Minimum Fertility

Medium Fertility

Maximum Fertility

All Ages Total figures (000) All (%) Moslems (%) Christians (%) Druzes (%)

439.8 100.0 74.7 17.2 8.2

878.9 100.0 79.6 12.1 8.3

895.0 100.0 79.1 12.5 8.5

942.5 100.0 80.1 11.8 8.0

1,261.0 100.0 81.5 10.2 8.3

1,466.1 100.0 81.2 10.0 8.8

1,855.1 100.0 82.6 10.0 7.3

Ages 0-19 Total figures (000) All (%) Moslems (%) Christians (%) Druzes (%)

263.2 100.0 78.3 13.6 8.1

483.7 100.0 82.9 8.7 8.4

499.8 100.0 81.9 9.4 8.7

547.3 100.0 83.4 8.6 8.0

459.1 100.0 83.5 8.1 8.5

648.4 100.0 83.1 7.7 9.3

993.0 100.0 86.7 6.4 6.9

Ages 20-59 Total figures (000) All (%) Moslems (%) Christians (%) Druzes (%)

151.6 100.0 69.9 21.8 8.2

358.0 100.0 76.5 15.4 8.1

358.0 100.0 76.5 15.4 8.1

358.0 100.0 76.5 15.4 8.1

722.1 100.0 81.3 10.4 8.3

737.9 100.0 80.7 10.8 8.5

783.2 100.0 81.8 10.2 8.1

Ages 60 + Total figures (000) All (%) Moslems (%) Christians (%) Druzes (%)

25.1 100.0 65.3 26.3 8.4

37.2 100.0 66.1 25.3 8.6

37.2 100.0 66.1 25.3 8.6

37.2 100.0 66.1 25.3 8.6

79.8 100.0 71.1 21.1 7.9

79.8 100.0 71.1 21.1 7.9

78.9 100.0 70.7 21.3 8.0

a

Druzes groups also contain others, but consist mostly of Druzes.

growth in various branches of the economy. In Israel, immigration has generally stimulated economic activity through capital importation and investments in building and construction industries, while the absence of immigration was frequently accompanied by an economic slump. The general positive relationship between immigration volume and economic activity in Israel explains in part the general Israeli belief and attitude that immi-

FUTURE POPULATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS

203

gration and high fertility are "good" for the economy. Indeed, one of the major arguments for a pronatal policy made by Israel's Natality Committee was based on the assumption that higher fertlity would stimulate economic development. Proponents of population growth in Israel have emphasized the benefits of rapid population growth without a systematic examination of the costs of population growth to society. In a country where population growth, in general, and immigration, in particular, have occupied such a central place, it is surprising that no systematic research has focused on the relative costs and benefits of population growth through immigration and/or fertility. In this section, attention is directed to the effect of changes in fertility and/or immigration on two major economic issues. First, it has been argued in Israel that small population size implies a small consumer market, preventing mass production and limiting industrial expansion. However, since in any economic system, people are not only consumers but also producers, population growth must be considered from the point of view of human resources. A second aspect of importance in our context is that Israel has for some years, particularly up to 1973, suffered from an acute labor shortage because of the relatively small population in the working ages. What would be the effects on these two economic issues of successful pronatal and/or immigration policies? The Jewish and non-Jewish sectors will be examined separately because of their dissimilarity. The total Jewish population in Israel was about 2.5 million in 1970 and the projected population, using the medium assumptions, was 3.9 million and 5.4 million in the years 1990 and 2010, respectively. These increases imply a 51 percent growth to 1990 and a 112 percent growth to 2010 (table 8.6). Assuming the medium-immigration assumption (20,000 net per year), an effective pronatal policy resulting in maximum fertility would increase the size of the population by 2.7 percent in the year 1990 and by 7.2 percent in the year 2010. Much of this growth would be among the younger ages, where consumption is relatively low. In contrast, policies that would result in maximizing immigration to

204

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40,000 net annually would add 12 percent over and above the population projected to 1990 under the medium-immigration assumption and 18 percent over the population projected to 2010. Moreover, population growth through immigration policies has the added economic advantage of being concentrated among the young, productive age groups. Hence, the effects on population size of increasing fertility as suggested by the Natality Committee is small in absolute terms and much smaller than the effects of increasing immigration to the maximum. In the short run (1990), it is practically impossible for policies to achieve a substantial increase in the population size of Israel—even the maximization of fertility and immigration adds no more than 15 percent to population size over and above the medium assumption. A more substantial addition to Israel's Jewish population (about 25 percent) can be achieved by the year 2010 under conditions of maximizing immigration (to 40,000 net annually) and high future fertility (to a total fertility rate of 4.5). This combination is highly unlikely over the next four decades. Thus, an increase in Israel's potential consumers' market as a result of almost any population policies that may be adopted is not realistic in the short run and most unlikely in the long run. The second aspect of the relationship between population and the economy that can be examined relates to changes in the active and dependent age groups within the population. The dependent age groups (0-19 and 60+) will increase (under the medium projections) slightly less than total population growth until the year 2010, declining in proportion from 53 percent to 49 percent. This results from a combination of a slight increase in the aged and a sharper decline among the young. Extending the projections another decade (to take into account the long-run effects of mass immigration) shows continual declines among the younger ages but a significant increase of the aged to 15 percent after the year 2020. Using minimum fertility or immigration assumptions increases the aged to 18 percent. Thus, the only demographic policy to counterbalance this development is through a shift to maximum net immigration of 40,000 per year or

FUTURE POPULATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS

207

a return to large family size. Both policies are unrealistic. Therefore, the conclusion remains that the aging developments noted earlier are inevitable in their general direction, irrespective of realistic future immigration or natality policies. The growth in the active population is expected to be more rapid than total population growth. Within these age groups, the younger segment, age 20-39, will tend to increase up to 1990, owing in large part to the "echo effect" of mass immigration; after 1990, the age groups 40-59 will grow relatively more rapidly for the same reason. It may be noted that changes in fertility and/or immigration toward minimum or maximum assumptions have almost no effect on this pattern (at most, 1 percent). The pattern of population dynamics among the non-Jewish sector of the population of Israel differs from that described for the Jewish sector. Forming around 20 percent of the total population by 2010, the most important change in the age structure of the non-Jewish population will be the increase in the active ages. In 1970, the proportion of the total non-Jewish population in the active ages was 34 percent; under the medium assumption, it will increase to 40 percent in 1990 and 51 percent in 2010. A sharper fertility decline to the minimum assumption increases this proportion to 58 percent in 2010. These changes in the active ages result almost entirely from the sharp decline in the young, dependent age groups, with hardly any changes in the older ages. Emerging from the analysis of the implications of population policies and patterns in the past and the future is the lingering effects of the mass-immigration policies and patterns in the early 1950s. The long-term implications of that policy extending well into the twenty-first century is one of the most significant demographic aspects of the Israeli experience. Indeed, it has been shown that no future variations in fertility or immigration stemming from policies that may be implemented can alter some of the major consequences of mass immigration to Israel. It has also been demonstrated that none of the population problems defined by Israel's Natality Committee as the basis for pronatal policy recommendations can be solved or reduced substantially by

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increasing fertility. In all cases, immigration is a much more decisive means of dealing with these problems, at least in the next several decades.

Appendix: Population Projections Population projections by age of the various subpopulations in Israel have been prepared, based on initial age structures in 1970 and alternative assumptions concerning future fertility and net immigration patterns. Mortality differences between the population groups considered in these projections are minimal, and, therefore, the same future mortality patterns have been assumed for all projections. This mortality assumption is based on the continuation of low mortality rates—ending with a life expectancy of seventy-three years, similar to level 23 of the CoaleDemeny model. 5 The various population groups that have been projected with the main assumptions are detailed in table 8A. The aggregation of the projected subpopulations to larger groupings (e.g., the total Jewish population) has been made assuming only one pattern (minimum, medium, or maximum) for all groups in the aggregation. For example, the total Jewish population projected to the maximum fertility and immigration assumes maximum patterns for all the subgroups (born in Israel, Afro-Asian countries, European and American countries). Zero net immigration has been assumed for all population subgroups except for the Afro-Asian and the European-and American-born in the Jewish population. Therefore, net immigration of these two populations forms the total assumed immigration. Total net immigration ranges from zero through 20,000 to 40,000 annually, according to minimum, medium, and maximum assumptions. The composition of immigration by origin (AfroAsian or European) varies with immigration volume. According to the medium projection (20,000), 25 percent of the migrants are from Afro-Asian countries, while according to the maximum projections (40,000) 12.5 percent of the total are from Afro-Asian

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209

Table 8A Projection Assumptions for the Various Population Groups in Israel and the Administered Occupied Areas Total Fertility Rate

Population

Group

Jewish

Changing Gradually toward 2010

Annual Net Immigration

Minimum Medium Maximum

2.8 2.8 2.8

2.0 2.5 3.0

Minimum Medium Maximum

4.0 4.0 4.0

2.0 3.0 3.8

0 5,000 5,000

Born in European and American Countries

Minimum Medium Maximum

2.6 2.6 2.6

2.0 2.6 3.2

0 15,000 35,000

Moslems

Minimum Medium Maximum

8.5 8.5 8.5

2.0 3.0 3.5

Minimum Medium Maximum

4.1 4.1 4.1

2.0 2.5 3.0

Druzes and Others

Minimum Medium Maximum

7.5 7.5 7.5

2.0 3.0 4.0

West Bank, Gaza and Sinai

Minimum Medium Maximum

8.5 8.5 8.5

2.0 3.0 3.5

Born in Israel Born in AfroAsian Countries

Arabs in Israel

Christians

Administered Occupied Territories

Assumption

Initially (during 1970-74)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

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countries. This proportional reduction of immigrants from AfroAsian countries as assumptions of total immigration increase reflects the small number of remaining Jews in Afro-Asian countries. In other words, large-scale future Jewish immigration will inevitably have to be of European and American origins—predominately from the Soviet Union or North America. 6 Future Jewish immigration rates to Israel are the most problematic to forecast. Past trends have often been poor guidelines, and there are many unknown and unpredictable issues involved.

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EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION

The first assumption is that over the forty-year period 1970-2010, no net immigration will occur. Basically, the objective of this model is not to approximate reality but to indicate the contribution of natural increase to population growth and to serve as a base line for measuring the contribution of some net immigration. The second assumption is that over the next four decades, there will be a net Jewish immigration of 800,000, averaging 20,000 annually. The third assumption posits an annual average of 40,000 net Jewish immigration, cumulating over a forty-year period to 1.6 million persons. The selection of 40,000 annual Jewish immigration as the maximum projection was based on the following considerations: (a) although we are dealing with an average of 40,000 annually, over the forty-year period this amounts to a large net immigration figure of 1.6 million—a significant volume and rate, given current social, economic, and political conditions; (b) an examination of the history of immigration after mass migration indicates that in thirteen of the nineteen years 1952-70, the number of immigrants arriving was less than 40,000, with an annual average of 35,000 for that period. Combining estimates from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics on emigration (about 168,000 for that period), there was an average of 27,000 net Jewish immigration annually for the nineteen years under study (195270). Hence, the maximum annual average exceeds the net annual immigration over the last twenty years by at least 50 percent; (c) a final consideration deals with the sources of Jewish immigration. The major Jewish populations outside Israel are in the United States and the Soviet Union. In terms of free immigration, there is no basis for postulating mass immigration from Western countries. The two Jewish populations that are potential sources of Jewish immigration are Jews in Arab countries and Jews in the Soviet Union. The former are small populations and hence represent a small potential number of immigrants; the latter population represents a big question mark. However, even a mass movement of one-fourth to one-half of Russian Jewry would still retain the reasonableness of our maximum projection of 1.6 million over a forty-year period.

FUTURE POPULATION POLICIES AND PATTERNS

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The main results of these projections are presented in tables 8B through 8F. The age groupings have been limited to four groups: 0-19 (children), 20-39 (highly active), 40-59 (active) and 60+ (aged). Actual population is shown for the year 1970 and projected for the year 1990 (short run) and 2010 (long run). Actual and projected figures in tables 8.1 through 8.5 are based on the projections described above.

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