The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO: Continuity and Change From The Cold War to the Rise of China 303130795X, 9783031307959

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The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO Continuity and Change From The Cold War to the Rise of China Chris J. Dolan

The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO

Chris J. Dolan

The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO Continuity and Change From The Cold War to the Rise of China

Chris J. Dolan Lebanon Valley College Annville, PA, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-30795-9 ISBN 978-3-031-30796-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch/shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

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Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy Toward NATO

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Public Perceptions and U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Europe

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Foreign Policy Elites and the National Security State

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Democracy Promotion and Euro-Atlantic Integration

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Nation-Building at Home and America First

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A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class?

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Conclusions

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Index

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CHAPTER 1

Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy Toward NATO

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 reinvigorated the U.S. role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after years of tepid and reduced American support. After Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine began, media and the American public followed every development in what became the biggest land war in Europe since World War II. The Biden Administration and the U.S. Congress extended tens of billions of dollars in U.S. security and economic assistance to Ukraine. At the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, members united around their opposition to the Russian invasion, pledged to update deterrence measures and increase military spending, and approved plans for Finland and Sweden to join NATO. However, the war took a toll on the global economy and supply chains already hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. The rising cost of food and energy and the potential for a recession hung over the American economy and challenged America’s position in NATO. Although most elites and the American public favored U.S. support for both NATO and Ukraine in the wake of the Russian invasion, events suggested caution for those assuming American support for both NATO and Ukraine would last forever. More than a year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and unprecedented American support for NATO, it was predictable that critics of America’s role in NATO would ask the same questions that were raised about the alliance since the U.S. ratified the Washington Treaty in 1949. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. J. Dolan, The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6_1

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Why should the U.S. support NATO, an alliance that was designed to contain the spread of Soviet Communism during the Cold War? What could the U.S. gain from coming to the defense of wealthy European countries across a very wide Atlantic Ocean? Shouldn’t the U.S. be more concerned with China than Russia? Most important, did Vladimir Putin’s strategic blunder in launching the invasion and the Russian military’s battlefield losses show that European NATO members can defend themselves against Russian aggression? The answers to these questions lie in the long history of America’s leadership role in NATO and the extent to which it is shaped by powerful domestic American political forces. It is also influenced by the historical evolution of America’s position within the alliance from the Cold War to today. With an American public deeply polarized, China now as America’s top competitor, and Russia’s war in Ukraine, America’s role in NATO is now being redefined especially as China and Russia are uniting to oppose the U.S. and its allies (Osnos, 2023). NATO is becoming less a conventional security alliance and more as a key asset in an American strategy to maintain balancing coalitions against China and Russia. In many ways, NATO is evolving into a transactional institutional mechanism for the U.S. to pursue its national security. This book highlights domestic political factors and the historical evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward NATO and Europe that shape those interests. It relies on theory and empirical research in foreign policy analysis, public opinion, neoclassical realism, liberalism, and constructivism to understand how domestic sources of foreign policy are driving the U.S. role in NATO. The election of Joe Biden as president is important for the future of NATO because it has led the U.S. to adopt a more cooperative approach with NATO. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated (quoted in Mulligan et al., 2021), the Biden Administration would pursue a humble foreign policy that combines “humility with confidence,” recommitting the U.S. to a foreign policy centered on diplomatic engagement and ending “forever wars.” When Biden announced in April 2021 that he would follow through on Trump’s promise to withdraw U.S. military forces from Afghanistan, this presented the U.S. with an opportunity to recalibrate America’s worldwide military commitments (Cooper et al., 2021). As the U.S. continues to downgrade its military presence in the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific and Europe will become even more significant in U.S. foreign policy calculations (Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2021). Even though most Americans prioritize domestic affairs, retrenchment

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from these regions would create opportunities for Russia and China to fill the void and overturn the U.S.-led world order. If Trump were re-elected in 2020, it is highly unlikely that NATO would have survived given his hostility to democracies and alliances and his embrace of authoritarian governments. With Trump, there were many reasons to think NATO outlived its usefulness. Trump’s views of NATO seemed to align with Kenneth Waltz’s (2000) argument that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transatlantic alliance was no longer needed. As Waltz (1993) asserted, “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are.” As it turned out, the alliance not only lasted for decades, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine revived NATO and forced the alliance to modernize and update its strategic orientation to some extent. And with likely admissions of Finland and Sweden, NATO will strengthen its defenses (Kirshner, 2021). Although Biden rallied behind NATO and Ukraine, before his election, American foreign policy was moving away from globalization and interdependence. Under Trump, the U.S. began embracing an intense security competition with China and a more protectionist industrial policy that placed America’s domestic interests ahead of everyone else’s. This was consistent with populist trends in the American electorate. The 2016 presidential election was a watershed moment. Donald Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders offered American voters new alternatives that criticized the foreign policy establishment and promised to highlight domestic needs, albeit for different reasons. As president, Trump disparaged traditional alliances, embraced autocrats and dictators, and pulled out of key multilateral agreements like the World Health Organization, Paris Climate Accords, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Senator Sanders was determined to halt the leading role of the military in U.S. foreign policy and end U.S. participation in multilateral trade and investment agreements he believed came at the expense of American workers (Friedman, 2020). When a hard nationalist and authoritarian in Trump was elected president and a socialist came close to winning the Democratic nomination for president in 2016, American voters were sending signals that the domestic political status quo in foreign policy was no longer tenable and significant attention was needed in domestic priorities. While the Biden Administration has promised to return the U.S. to more predictable and stable set of foreign policy preferences and behavior, it pursued a domestic-themed “foreign policy for the middle class.” Biden

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had to reconcile his internationalist intentions with realist goals and nationalist impulses in a world order shaped by an intense security, technological, and economic competition with China and an American public demanding greater public investments at home. His presidency continued Trump’s tariffs against China, slapped export controls on China’s access to American technology, and invested heavily in American industrial production and manufacturing. America has had a “love-hate” relationship with NATO since the U.S. ratified the Washington Treaty in 1949. While most American presidents have complained about European NATO members not shouldering more the financial and security burden, the U.S. has been committed to the alliance. Trump was different from his predecessors in that he openly chastised alliance members, warmed up to Vladimir Putin and other autocrats, and questioned the legitimacy of NATO. The Suez Canal Crisis, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the creation of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States defense arrangement has resulted in significant transatlantic disruption and debate. Despite what many would describe as an alliance of democracies, NATO has experienced as much tumult as it has unity. And much of this driven by domestic political concerns among the American people and U.S. foreign policy elites.

America’s Domestic Political Headwinds While critics highlight points of weakness and diverging interests among European NATO member states that could undermine alliance unity, the most significant threat to the alliance could from domestic American politics. NATO’s renewed confidence and legitimacy in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine could become a footnote in history if hyper partisanship and ideological divisions in the American political system expose critical weaknesses in American democracy and the alliance itself. Americans have generally supported maintaining the U.S. military presence in Europe. They also support sending more U.S. troops to NATO allies in Eastern Europe in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The U.S. Congress and domestic political pressures and public opinion can turn against Ukraine and undermine NATO unity. The far-right in the newly Republican-controlled House of Representatives will scrutinize U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, demand investigations into the departments of State and Defense, and question the benefits of American membership in

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NATO. In October 2022, Republican leader Kevin McCarthy (quoted in Elliot, 2022) stated, that Americans would no longer write a “blank check” for Ukraine. McCarthy was signaling to far-right Make American Great Again Republicans aligned with former President Donald Trump who announced his campaign for the Republican nomination for president in the 2024 election. Far-right MAGA Republican members of Congress and voters who oppose security assistance for Ukraine are aligned with some NATO allies who prefer that Ukraine negotiate with Russia and, quite possibly, cede territory to Russia taken by military force. But as President Biden (quoted in Santora et al., 2023) stated in a February 20, 2023 visit to Ukraine to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “For all the disagreement we have in our Congress on some issues, there is significant agreement on support for Ukraine.” At the 2023 Munich Security Council, Vice President Kamala Harris even accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity against Ukrainian civilians. Far-right MAGA Republican opposition to both U.S. security assistance for Ukraine and the U.S. role in NATO raises questions about the extent of America’s overall security commitment to Europe. When President Biden met with allied leaders in June 2021, he (quoted in Bennett, 2022) stated that “America is back.” However, in response French President Emmanuel Macron asked, “For how long?” (quoted in Bennett, 2022). The percentage of Americans who think the U.S. is providing Ukraine too much security assistance increased from 7% in March 2022 to 26% in January 2023 compared to 20% who prefer the U.S. provide more assistance and 31% who think it is the appropriate amount (Dunn, 2023). A February 2023 poll showed declining American public support for sending additional security assistance packages to Ukraine with 48% of Americans favoring and 29% opposing weapons shipments (AP-NORC, 2023). Although bipartisan support was maintained in early 2023, Democrats (84%) are more likely than Republicans (70%) to support U.S. security assistance packages to Ukraine compared to 91% of Democrats and 74% of Republicans in support in May 2022 (AP-NORC, 2023). Domestic political pressures could erode America’s commitments to Ukraine and NATO. While the Biden Administration rallied NATO members and led punishing new sanctions against Russia there is a sense that America’s renewed commitments to NATO may be vulnerable to

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domestic divisions in the American political landscape. Although Republicans fared poorly in the 2022 congressional midterm elections and Democrats increased their control of the U.S. Senate, far-right MAGA Trump-candidates feel very compelled and confident to publicly object to U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and even express sympathy for Russia. While there was a sigh of relief in NATO capitals when isolationist, election-denying Republicans did not overtake Congress in a so-called “red wave,” the Republican Party controls the House of Representatives and could weaponize national security budgets to investigate and undercut the Biden Administration’s efforts to maintain NATO unity in the face of Russian aggression. The 2024 presidential election will have significant implications for the U.S. role in NATO. There is greater urgency to lock in American support to NATO as much as possible in 2023 ahead of potential Republican victories in the presidential and congressional elections in 2024. Worries about an anti-NATO Republican nominee assuming the presidency in 2024 play into the hands of critics in Europe who argue that no matter the efforts made by the Biden Administration, European NATO members should no longer be dependent on the U.S. military to defend against Russian aggression. Should America’s attention shift away from Ukraine and NATO toward China and Taiwan, there is a possibility for Germany and France to push for increasing Europe’s role in NATO. But that may be too difficult as it could expose political differences with Eastern European members who have long called for greater American involvement and leadership in NATO. Moreover, four years of Donald Trump’s “America First” brand eroded America’s global leadership position among allies and partners. The former president’s appeals to authoritarian regimes and his very public hostility toward U.S. international commitments empowered China and Russia. If Trump or a far-right Republican nominee returns to power in 2024, then European militaries will be forced to enhance their logistical, land, air, naval, and cyber capabilities, all of which are provided by the U.S. If Trump wins the presidency in 2024, he will end American support for Ukraine, withdraw the U.S. from NATO and informal alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and end U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea. Aside from the outcome of the 2024 elections in the U.S., there is a small but not insignificant measure of support for Trump’s America First movement. NATO members cannot take U.S. security commitments

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for granted and simply assume the U.S. will continue to fill security gaps in Europe. NATO’s collective defense measures should be prepared to contend with both Russian aggression and American cynicism. And while NATO members have increased some defense expenditures in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO is now being shaped more by Eastern European states that demand more American leadership and pulled into America’s competition with China. With Sweden and Finland seeking NATO membership and with each already having close military cooperation with the U.S. in the face of renewed Russian aggression, the U.S. leadership position within NATO will strengthen. Therefore, vulnerable NATO members will become more attuned to America’s domestic political pressures and focused on maintaining America’s privileged membership status within the alliance. The irony is that NATO will become more U.S.-led in its strategic orientation even if Americans grow wearier of the alliance and critical of sending security assistance to Ukraine. France and Germany are now midlevel powers and less relevant in the security and defense realms. Besides, France and Germany prefer greater leadership roles within the E.U. as opposed to NATO. With Russia a now critical threat to the Baltics and Eastern Europe, NATO will defer more to the U.S. and will be sensitive to its domestic political machinations. In many ways, if Trump or another far-right Republican captures the presidency in 2024, their grievances against NATO will fall silent as more NATO members will consent to American demands (McTague, 2022). The challenge for the U.S. will be to convince them to follow the rebalance to China and the Indo-Pacific. Poor Republican performance in the 2022 congressional midterm elections due to Trump’s inability to step aside and his legal challenges show, however, that his hold on the Republican Party is not ironclad. At least in 2023, while the public was expressing greater discontent with sending aid to Ukraine, there remains bipartisan legislative support for direct U.S. security assistance for Ukraine in its fight against Russia. As Hamilton (quoted in Bennett, 2022) argues “If you really look hard, there is a consensus among the Republicans in the Senate and the House on lethal aid to Ukraine.” Consequently, strengthening America’s capabilities means the U.S. will continue to work with NATO partners at the same time it rebalances to the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. cannot contain China and Russia at the same time and on its own. America needs its NATO allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China does not dominate Asia

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and Russia does not dominate Europe. NATO has allowed the U.S. to build a strong degree of credibility and legitimacy with European allies and a basis for expanding critical alliance systems in the Indo-Pacific like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and pursuing the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense arrangement. NATO provides military, political, and economic resources, assets, and capabilities to prevent Russia from altering the strategic balance of power in Europe. Defending Poland and the Baltic States from Russian aggression can be accomplished but only with multinational deterrence measures provided by the U.S. and its NATO partners. For the U.S., NATO is one of the best bargains for advancing America’s security interests. While the U.S. has invested heavily in European security and its security guarantee is at the center of NATO’s political and security framework, that bargain has never really been one-way. NATO affords America a privileged strategic position of leadership has cements the U.S. within a transatlantic order that has provided economic prosperity and democratic stability for Americans. This security-economic connection provides the U.S. with an outsized role in trade and foreign investment, strategic basing privileges, access to defense markets to sell American weapons and military equipment, and cooperation on advanced technologies with military and civilian applications. As conventional domains become more blended and blurred and as government intersects with the private sector in critical infrastructure sectors in physical and cyber realms, established military and civilian issues will be upended. Consequently, Americans will be more vulnerable to hybrid attacks as non-traditional threats and adversaries and malign actors will play greater roles in undermining democratic institutions and values. Cyberattacks, disinformation, climate change, migration, terrorism, and pandemics mean that resilience measures and crisis management operations must be enhanced on both sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. cannot address these threats on its own and needs its NATO allies to tackle complex and dynamic problems that defy conventional and traditional solutions. The conundrum for U.S. foreign policymakers is less about adjusting the U.S. to these contemporary challenges and more about preparing the American people for keeping NATO and other U.S.-led alliance systems intact. The myriad of complex conventional and non-traditional threats shows just how much the U.S. needs NATO and other partners. If Americans are not fully prepared and the American political system not ready,

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the U.S. is at risk of losing its economic prosperity, technological superiority, and strategic leadership position within the international system. NATO is at the center of the rules-based world order the U.S. built and maintained since the end of the Cold War. McInnis (2022) argues, “In a very real way, the security of NATO allies is inextricably linked with American interests.”

Organization of the Book This book examines the domestic political factors shaping the U.S. role in NATO and assesses the historical evolution of U.S. foreign policy. Chapter 2 places the role of the U.S. in NATO and U.S. foreign policy toward Europe on the domestic level of analysis. It reviews the empirical research and theory on domestic politics and foreign policy, paying particular attention to the role of public opinion, elite-level and mass-level opinion, economic change, and bureaucratic and institutional factors that shape foreign policy. It also analyzes trends and patterns in the American economic and highlights the complexities of Americans’ foreign policy orientation and public opinion toward NATO and Europe. Chapter 3 examines the evolution of the powerful American national security state and assesses how the militarization of containment strategy structured American priorities toward NATO and Europe from the Cold War to today. It highlights how U.S. foreign policy became driven by NSC 68, which boosted defense spending and increased America’s nuclear arsenal, and the extent to which containment became important domestic determinants of the U.S. role in NATO. Chapter 4 focuses on the development of U.S. foreign policy anchored in the rules-based world order comprised of global institutions, norms, and formal and informal alliance networks premised on Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same time the U.S. was advancing a democratic agenda, China was rising and Russia resurrecting. Chapter 5 examines the domestic political implications of the Great Recession of 2008 and America’s deepening involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan with Americans more inclined to question the U.S. role in NATO during the Obama and Trump years. Chapter 6 focuses on conflicting patterns during the Biden Administration. Far-reaching domestic political convulsions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the extremist January 6th insurrection, and U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan limited the new administration’s ability to

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fulfill promises that “America’s back” in the world. In many ways, Biden’s “foreign policy for the middle class” rests on an industrial policy and Trumpian “protect agenda.” Biden also accelerated Trump era polices designed to contain China while also eschewing liberal globalization and interdependence. However, Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine led Biden to rally NATO allies and update the strategic orientation of NATO in ways that could keep the U.S. in Europe as its primary security guarantor even as the U.S. ramps up defense alliances in the Indo-Pacific to contain Chinese aggression. However, for many, Biden’s foreign policy actions did not match his lofty promises as he led the very chaotic evacuation from Afghanistan, pursued a new defense arrangement with Australia and the U.K. (AUKUS), expanded the U.S. role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and pursued a “foreign policy for the middle class.” Biden’s approach is centered on a U.S. industrial policy and a “Buy American” trade policy designed to counter China and an approach to NATO that views the alliance through a transactional lens. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has made it incredibly difficult at a time when the American people are polarized and weary of American involvement in conflicts abroad. Chapter 7 concludes that the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy toward NATO will be challenged by hard realities in American politics. Russia’s war in Ukraine will become a defining feature in American politics in the 2024 presidential election and an important fault line in American foreign policy preferences and behavior. American security assistance packages to Ukraine have also depleted U.S. domestic weapons stockpiles that will force the U.S. to increase military spending and defense investments. This is elevating domestic pressures on “just in time” defense production and manufacturing. Furthermore, America’s prioritization of the Indo-Pacific region and its competition with China is leading the U.S. to promote a largely protectionist industrial policy. The domestic politics of U.S. foreign making are at a cross roads. As America gets more engaged in a Cold War 2.0 security, economic, and technological competition with China, it is also becoming embroiled in Europe due to Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine. This has made NATO members, especially those along the Eastern flank, more vulnerable and dependent on the American security umbrella. The emerging “no limits” partnership between China and Russia has merged the Indo-China region and Europe in U.S. strategic calculations. As the U.S. continues rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific, it expects NATO to come along with it. But

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the credibility of U.S. leadership of a balancing coalition against China and Russia is dependent on domestic American support, as opposed to the structure of the international system. The legitimacy and effectiveness of U.S. strategy relies on American public opinion and perceptions and the extent to which Americans believe U.S. foreign policy benefits them. Internal challenges to its own democracy from political extremism in the wake of the January 6th attacks and the stability of its system of constitutional government will determine the credibility of America’s leadership of NATO in the struggle of democracies against autocracies.

References AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. (2023, February). Continuing support for U.S. involvement a year into the war between Russia and Ukraine. https://apnorc.org/projects/acontinuing-support-for-u-s-inv olvement-a-year-into-the-war-between-russia-and-ukraine-a/ Bennett, B. (2022, December 5). A volatile U.S. political landscape is spurring NATO to invest more in Europe’s defenses. Time. https://time.com/623 8447/nato-us-relationship-biden-trump-2024/ Cooper, H., Gibbons-Neff, T., & Schmitt, E. (2021, April 13). Biden to withdraw all combat troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/13/us/politics/biden-afg hanistan-withdrawal.html Dunn, A. (2023, January 31). As Russian invasion nears one-year mark, partisans grow further apart on U.S. support for Ukraine. Pew Research https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2023/01/31/as-russianGroup. invasion-nears-one-year-mark-partisans-grow-further-apart-on-u-s-supportfor-ukraine/ Elliot, P. (2022, October 20). Kevin McCarthy may actually be good at this. Time. https://time.com/6223513/kevin-mccarthy-ukraine-war/ Friedman, U. (2020, February 11). The Sanders doctrine. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/02/bernie-sanders-doc trine-america-military-foreign-policy/606364/ Kirshner, J. (2021, March/April). Gone but not forgotten: Trump’s long shadow and the end of American credibility. Foreign Affairs, 18–26 Kupchan, C., & Trubowitz, P. L. (2021, May/June). The home front. Foreign Affairs, 92–101. McInnis, K. (2022, June 28). Why Americans still need NATO. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/28/us-nato-alliance-madrid/

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McTague, T. (2022, June 2). The accidental Trumpification of NATO. The https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/07/ Atlantic. nato-europe-america-trump-strategy/661459/ Mulligan, K., Schmitt, A., & Cicarelli, S. (2021, May 6). The first 100 days: Analyzing the Biden administration’s foreign policy successes and opportunities for the next year. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprog ress.org/issues/security/news/2021/05/06/499245/first-100-days-analyz ing-biden-administrations-foreign-policy-successes-opportunities-next-year/ Osnos, E. (2023, February 26). Sliding toward a new cold war. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/03/06/slidingtoward-a-new-cold-war Santora, M., Baker, P., & Shear, M. D. (2023, 20 February). Biden visits Kyiv, Ukraine’s embattled capital, as air-raid siren sounds. New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2023/02/20/us/politics/biden-ukraine-visit.html Waltz, K. N. (1993). The emerging structure of international politics. International Security, 18(2), 44–79. Waltz, K. N. (2000, Summer). Structural realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), 5–41.

CHAPTER 2

Public Perceptions and U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Europe

Presidents are generally elected on promises they make to do more at home and less around the world. These include Bill Clinton’s “it’s the economy, stupid” to George W. Bush’s “humble foreign policy,” Barack Obama’s “nation-building at home,” Trump’s “America first” and “make America great Again,” and Joe Biden’s “build back better.” Such domestic-themed brands use populist rhetoric to appeal to an American public that questions the extent of America’s role in the world, especially NATO. This is consistent with Hal Brands (2017) who described a benign and constructive “better nationalism” that “would not dismantle the post-war order and America’s post war project, but that would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests.” In fact, significant gaps exist between the public’s preference for a restrained and reduced U.S. global role and the mostly internationalist views of America’s foreign policy leaders and elites (Fagan & Poushter, 2020; Hannah, 2019a, 2019b).

Foreign Policy Preferences and Behavior While the international system exercises significant influence over the foreign policy preferences and behavior of nation-states, purely systemic theories and concepts paint an incomplete picture as foreign policy is much more complex and dynamic. According to Hudson (2007, 4), © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. J. Dolan, The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6_2

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“One may be examining not a single decision, but a constellation of decisions taken with reference to a particular situation. Furthermore, decisions may be modified over time, requiring an examination of sequences of decisions.” Domestic political considerations should be integrated into understandings of foreign policy. The foreign policy analysis literature has a wide range of empirical research and theory that incorporates domestic determinants of foreign policy behavior and preferences. Hudson (2007, 2) argues that foreign policy should include the “explanandum of foreign policy analysis includes the process and resultants of human decision making with reference to or having known consequences for foreign policy entities” (Hudson, 2007, 2). As a subfield within international relations, foreign policy analysis focuses on the foreign policy decision-making process (Mintz & Derouen, 2010, 3–36). Bueno de Mesquita (2002, 7) argues “when we examine international affairs through the lens of domestic decision making, we provide a way to think about how properties of the international system are shaped by local considerations as part of the larger strategic fabric of politics.” Research demonstrates that foreign policy is shaped by individualand group-level factors, such as public opinion, identity and perceptions, and culture that operate within the domestic context of a nation-state (Hudson, 2007, 37–124; Kaarbo, 2015). Some contend that foreign policy leaders and elites perceive retain considerable influence over foreign policy preferences and choices (Hess, 1963, 542–559; Holsti, 1970, 233– 309). Others emphasize pressure groups (Chittick, 1970; Hagan, 1987), media framing tactics (Baum & Potter, 2019), and the power of public opinion in shaping the contours of foreign policy (Hayes, 2012; Holsti, 2002). The argument that foreign policy elites are immune from public opinion and popular influence has been dismissed (Holsti, 2002). Scholars have observed that public opinion on foreign policy issues can be stable over time even when it responds to elite cues (Mueller, 1973; Page & Shapiro, 1992). Others suggest that public perceptions are consistent with core values or orientations (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004; Mead, 2001). Moreover, foreign policy preferences factor into public evaluations of elites’ policy performance (Holsti, 2002) with leaders responding to alterations in public opinion (Foyle, 2004; Hayes, 2012; Sobel, 2001). Mass-level and elite-level distinctions in foreign policy preferences and behaviors are especially important in shaping the formulation and conduct

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of U.S. foreign policy. Roles and conceptions are also contested at the elite-level with conflicts among policymakers impacting foreign policy decision-making and foreign policy preferences (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012; Kaarbo, 2015; Lobell, 2009). This is consistent with Rogowski (1999) who maintains that differences in foreign policy behavior and preferences among the mass public and elites influence foreign policy orientation, credibility, and stability. Furthermore, political struggles among powerful groups and individuals with political influence in the foreign policymaking process shape U.S. foreign policy (Garrison, 1999). Allison and Zelikow (1999, chapter 6) argue foreign policy leaders and elites make decisions based on limited information and within a highly political context. As they observed in their research on the Cuban Missile Crisis, rational choices are limited by critical events, limited information. short-time frames, and impending threats. Organizational politics, which rests on standard operating procedures, bureaucratic culture, and routine and specialized processes and routines often limit the range of foreign policy choices. Different and competing interests in the foreign policymaking process and political games played by advisers upend, culture, and operational routine (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Moreover, foreign policymakers can misinterpret or misperceive international factors, fail to identify appropriate policy responses, and often do not adequately assess their own actions (Cottam, 1986; Herrmann & Choi, 2007; Jervis, 1976). Bureaucratic politics emphasizes the role of different interests in the foreign policy bureaucracy and organizational and organizational politics focuses on standard operating procedures and organizational cultures (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Halperin, 1974). Deeply entrenched and vested bureaucratic interests impede the conduct of U.S. foreign policy (Halperin, 1974). Foreign policy decisions flow from the push and pull among competing interests advanced by groups and individuals with domestic organizational cultures, advisory groups, individual-level cognitive factors driving the foreign policymaking process (Smith et al., 2008; Snyder et al., 1954; Sprout & Sprout, 1956). In the absence of an overarching theory of the foreign policymaking process, scholars highlighted the significance of bureaucratic and political factors (Allison, 1971; Jervis, 1976; Rosenau, 1966, 1968). It would be logical to assume that liberal approaches highlight domestic political forces in shaping foreign policy and international relations. As Doyle (2008, 59) states, “liberals pay more attention to

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domestic structures and individual differences than do realists.” Research also demonstrates that subnational political actors, namely interest groups, foreign policy elites, and individuals influence foreign policy decisionmaking (Morasevik, 1997). Moreover, Putnam’s (1988) two-level games integration of bargaining and negotiation on the domestic and international levels of analysis refocused attention on the domestic politics of international relations. Liberal approaches accept the conception of the state as a sovereign actor but reject its autonomy given that national interests change and evolve. Keohane and Nye (2001) developed the notion of complex interdependence to capture the dynamism and fluidity of states, institutions, and non-state actor interactions in international relations. Some maintain that soft power is a great source of influence, allowing a state a measure of attraction via legitimacy of its policies and values (Nye, 2004). Nye (2002) adds that strategic use of smart power, the effective combination of coercion and attraction can lead produce positive foreign policy outcomes. While democracy is a process of selecting leaders based on popular participation, liberal democracy emphasizes civil liberties and civil rights against abuses by autocratic leaders or majority rule as well as the rule of law by strong governing institutions (Zakaria, 2007). Political parties mediate, facilitate, and incorporate popular passions into public policy. However, for Zakaria (2007), in the absence of strong checks and balances on majoritarianism and authoritarianism, democracy can transform into illiberalism in which corruption, misinformation, attacks on political opponents, and violations of individual rights become routine practices (Applebaum, 2020). American political institutions were tested on January 6th, 2021, when Trump’s extremist supporters assaulted the U.S. Capitol to prevent the constitutional process of transferring power to incoming President Joe Biden. Constructivism focuses on social construction of order in the world as well as identity in understanding global politics (Reus-Smit, 2013; Wendt, 1999). Whereas liberalism and realism assume identity already exists, social constructivists contend that identity is raised and shaped by shared ideas from which we understand action and behavior in contemporary international politics (Wendt, 1992). While social constructivism is not one uniform theoretical approach and distinctions exist among critical and conventional constructivists, the broader school of thought emphasizes thinking about identity, ideas, social relations, language, and ideational

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factors (Checkel, 2008). Wendt’s constructivism (1992) maintained that norms, interests, and intersubjective identities shape international politics. These conceptions, however, were not focused on foreign policy and rested on the level of the international system. Constructivists have examined domestic political factors that condition international relations (Schimmelfennig, 2005). Some highlight normative and institutional structures (Cortell & Davis, 2005; Gheciu, 2005) and others focus on agency (Breuning, 2011). Research also suggests that elites and masses share roles and national identities (Catalinac, 2007). However, elites and masses diverge in their perceptions of national identity and role conceptions. The realist tradition holds that the state is a sovereign entity that acts as a unitary, rational, and autonomous actor. States exist in a self-help system characterized by the absence of clear world structures through balancing against others or conflict and war (Morgenthau, 1948). More powerful states rely on themselves to maximize their security because they can optimize material resources and exercise greater power and less powerful states seek alliances as a way of securing themselves threats in their environment (Morgenthau, 1948). States maximize their autonomy in an insecure and anarchical international system (Mearsheimer, 2014, 2018; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 2000). On the state level, Hans Morgenthau (1948) observed that sovereign states seek gains relative to one another and develop security advantages in a world defined in terms of a struggle for power. Morgenthau (1948) argued that politics are ruled by objective laws rooted in human nature. The struggle for power ultimately leads to a security dilemma, in which an increase in the power of one state leads others to respond by increasing their own power. The security dilemma can be managed through internal balancing, which involves a state building its economic and military power to protect against others, and external balancing, which involves states developing alliances with others to offset gains of more powerful states (Morgenthau, 1948). Neoclassical realism gained prominence in recent decades as a reconsideration of the classical realism (Dueck, 2009; Ripsman, 2009; Ripsman et al., 2009; Rose, 1998). Rose (1998) argues that in addition to national interests and systemic factors, domestic political considerations shape and drive the foreign policy behavior and preferences of states. Neoclassical realism was a major revision because classical realists like Morgenthau (1948) focused on states’ pursuit of power and structural realists like

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Waltz (2000) dismissed domestic politics in emphasizing the ordering principles of anarchy in the structure of the international system condition state behavior. Rose’s (1998) position was that both classical and structural realism’s ignorance of domestic politics was too simplistic. Zakaria (1998) combines domestic politics with realism. In From Wealth to Power, Zakaria (1998) argues that the rise of America’s national power and expansion of presidential power were the primary drivers of America’s much wider rise to global prominence. This undercuts structural realism’s ignorance of domestic politics with his argument that it was America’s response to external forces and changes in the international system that fueled America’s global rise to prominence. Zakaria’s (1998) focus on domestic politics and issues allowed realists some flexibility and complexity in understanding the foreign policy behavior and preferences of states. In addition, Zakaria (1992) argued that structural realists, especially defensive realists, were far too dismissive of domestic political forces that influence foreign policy behavior and preferences. In doing so, Zakaria (1992) suggests that structural realists wrongly assume that balancing occurs in response to international political factors. The international system conditions states through competition and socialization by suggesting that we cannot assume states will design the adequate foreign policies in response to systemic factors. Put simply, domestic politics determine, to a great extent, a state’s foreign policy. Rose (1998) and Zakaria (1992, 1998) combined classical realism with structural realism by emphasizing that domestic politics and the international system shape and determine national interests. While structural realism explains very broad macro-level trends in the international system, it failed to explain and understand the domestic variables and balancing (Schweller, 2004, 2006, 2009). While structural realism provides a use theoretical understanding of the distribution of power in the bipolar structure of the international system during the Cold War, it could not explain the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was caused by domestic political dynamics within the Soviet Union. A state’s position in the international system may be more important than the actual power and capabilities of the state in the world (Wivel, 2005). Neoclassical realism is more concerned with explaining foreign policy behavior as opposed to providing a grand theoretical explanation of the structure of power in the international system (Sterling-Folker, 2009). It navigates between Morgenthau (1948) and Waltz (2000) as a theory

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of foreign policy behavior. Neoclassical realism shifts the emphasis from the international system to the foreign policy behavior and preferences of the state while at the same time highlighting domestic politics. While neoclassical realism affirms security competition and anarchy, at the same time, it emphasizes leaders and perceptions in foreign policy choices and decisions and understanding balancing among states in the international system (Schweller, 2004, 2009; Walt, 1987; Wivel, 2005). The literature on domestic-level variables emphasizes that perceptions, beliefs, groups, and elites serve as important filters through which foreign policy preferences and behavior drive foreign policy agendas. The purpose is not to suggest a new theoretical direction. Rather, it is to synthesize and integrate existing empirical research and theory to identity the range of domestic political variables. Insights from theories are integrated into a broader perspective structure-agent connections and of continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy toward NATO and Europe.

Economic Inequality and the Decline of the American Middle Class How Americans view the world and NATO are shaped by economic stratification. Moreover, both the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic had a far-reaching negative impact on the American economy. The Great Recession forced millions of Americans into poverty and intergenerational mobility no longer seemed possible (Corak, 2013). Consequently, this led many to embrace the political rise of far-right populist Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election who promised to “Make America Great Again.” There has been little improvement in social mobility as the opioid crisis and economic dislocation worsened. Even though millions were lifted out of poverty by multiple and successive COVID-19 relief measures, the pandemic exposed the educational and digital divides and persistent economic inequality in the U.S. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic forever changed how Americans perceived work as the labor market experienced a “Great Resignation” driven by a demand for higher wages, need for advancement and respect, desire to spend more time with family, and flexibility in work modes (Parker & Menasce-Horowitz, 2022). The number of Americans who left their jobs between 2020 and 2022

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(between 2 and 4.5 million per month) during the pandemic was historically high even as the number of job openings (11 million per month) remained equally high (BLS, n.d.). Also, income inequality increased in 2008–2009 during both the Great Recession and in 2020–2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic (Semega & Kollar, 2022). Median-level incomes dropped during the Great Recession, and it was not until 2016 that they recovered to 2000 income levels ($70,200). At the same time, top income earners increased their wealth by 10% while those at the bottom margins earned much less (Horowitz et al., 2020). In the COVID-19 pandemic, top-level incomes were more than 13 times higher than incomes at the bottom. In 2021, Americans in the top 10% of income earners held 70% of wealth, an increase of 9% from 1989, compared to the bottom 50% that held just 2.5% of wealth (Siripurapu, 2022). While the per capita GDP growth rate has increased since 2000, it dropped significantly in the 2008 Global Recession and declined further during the COVID-19 pandemic, although it has increased from 2021 to 2023 (FRED, n.d.-b). The same trend can be observed for personal income growth rates in the U.S. since from 2000 to 2023 (FRED, n.d.-a). And even though wages rose fast from 2021 to 2023, inflation increased at roughly the same pace, canceling income gains (Furman & Powell, 2022). Price and Edwards (2020) observe that income growth for the population below the 90th percentile “would have been $2.5 trillion (67 percent) higher in 2018 had income growth since 1975 remained as equitable as it was in the first two post-War decades.” They point to the Great Recession, globalization, declines in labor union membership, technology, household structure, and demographics. Economic inequality in the U.S. has expanded significantly in recent decades with the 2000s experiencing little or even negative income growth and upper-income Americans growing faster than per capita GDP (Price & Edwards, 2020). The political consequences led to the election of populist Donald Trump in 2016 who embraced a “Make America Great Again” anti-immigration mantra and to Joe Biden whose presidency embraced a “Buy American” agenda centered on industrial policy.

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How Americans View the World Americans’ perceptions of the world are shaped by domestic political polarization and economic issues as well as perceptions of great power rivals, namely Russia and China. While national security and foreign policy do not receive the level of media attention that presidential and congressional elections get, when Americans perceive international relations, they often do so through the lens of domestic political concerns and partisanship. Shifting American attitudes and beliefs about America’s alliances and partnerships influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In Special Providence, Walter Russell Mead (2001, xvii) delineated four foreign policy orientations among Americans: Jeffersonian, Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian. The four orientations form the core of America’s foreign policy orientation toward the world (Mead 2001, chapter 1). They also help explain how principles, prosperity, peace, and power can at times leading to incoherence or dominance by one or more over the others. At other times they are in harmony and sustain a constructive consensus in U.S. foreign policy. The public’s preference for Jeffersonian notions of democracy and liberty at home are buffeted by elite preferences for Wilsonian internationalism resting on higher ideals of promoting democracy, rule of law, and human rights beyond America’s borders. Jacksonian nationalism and hardiness can be checked by the Hamiltonian belief in the free movement of ideas, people, and commerce. The Jeffersonian orientation values the protection and expansion of American democracy at home and the building of American democratic norms and civic institutions as examples for the world (Mead, 2001, xvii). A 2019 survey (Gray & Hannah, 2020) showed that 38.7% of Americans ascribed to a Jeffersonian foreign policy viewpoint, which holds the U.S. can attain peace by “keeping a focus on domestic needs and the health of American democracy, while avoiding unnecessary intervention beyond the borders of the United States.” The Hamiltonian orientation prioritizes the use of foreign policy instruments to expand American prosperity, world markets and trade, ensure freedom of navigation on the seas, and develop an international economic order to broaden commercial and financial interests (Mead, 2001, xvii). 15.3% of Americans express views consistent with Hamiltonians, which maintains that the U.S. can achieve peace by “establishing, encouraging, and reinforcing global economic integration, as well as the growth of free trade” (Gray & Hannah, 2020).

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The Wilsonian orientation prioritizes internationalism and prefers to make the world safe for democracy, human rights, freedom, and the rule of law, viewing American foreign policy as a powerful vehicle to improve people’s lives around the world by spreading liberal democracy and developing a strong system of global governance (Mead, 2001, xvii). 31.9% of Americans ascribe to the Wilsonian idea, which emphasizes that the U.S. can attain peace by “promoting and defending democracy around the world” (Gray & Hannah, 2020). The Jacksonian orientation values American military readiness and economic preparation for potential conflicts and responding to threats to the American homeland, harnessing nationalism and populism in their suspicions of leaders and elites and pessimism about building and sustaining world orders premised on Wilsonian and Hamiltonian principles (Mead, 2001, xvii). 14.1% of Americans ascribe themselves to the Jacksonian idea, which believes the U.S. can achieve peace by “maintaining overwhelming strength and deploying it only when America is attacked or our vital interests are compromised by another power” (Gray & Hannah, 2020). Most foreign policy elites are far more internationalist, expansive, and Wilsonian in their views of the world than the general American public. 49% of elites hold an internationalist Wilsonian worldview compared with 25% of the American public (24% gap). Only 11% of foreign policy leaders and elites ascribe to the Jeffersonian idea compared to 26% of the American public (15%) (Hannah, 2019a). Just 2% of leaders and elites are aligned with the Hamiltonian view compared with 8.5% of the American public (6.5% gap) and only 7% of leaders and elites ascribe to the Jacksonian view compared to 12% of the American public (5% gap). This reinforces the existence of a significant and widespread disconnect between elite-level American foreign policymakers and the public. Given that most Americans prefer that the U.S. focus on domestic needs, Wilsonian foreign policy elites are incentivized to connect U.S. foreign policy to Jeffersonian public sentiment (Haas, 2013). As Russia’s war in Ukraine dragged into 2022, the American public began evolving toward foreign policy preferences more aligned with Wilsonian elites. A 2022 Eurasia Foundation Group report revealed a 27% increase in the number of Americans who believe the U.S. has a “moral obligation” and an “important national interest” in spreading American values around the world and to defends the U.S.-led rules-based world order (Hannah et al., 2022). This includes projecting strong U.S. global leadership in defense of the world order in the face of China and Russia

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and their emerging partnership. Americans now express more Wilsonian views than in previous years. However, Democrats express greater willingness to support NATO to balance against Russian aggression and Republicans more likely to confront China and Iran (Hannah et al., 2022). Whether the trend toward a more Wilsonian American public continues will be determined by the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the extent to which Americans support generous U.S. security assistance packages for the Ukrainian military. Survey research shows that the best way to exercise American leadership is by setting a good example at home, supporting diplomatic engagement with others, and avoiding costly military interventions. A Eurasia Group Foundation 2019 report showed that more Americans hold an “Independent America” view, which maintains that “America must focus more on its own domestic challenges than on the challenges that come with international leadership.” The “Independent America” view is contrasted with an “Indispensable America,” which sees that “American leadership is necessary for global stability and therefore American peace and prosperity” or a “Moneyball America” view described as “foreign policy should be driven by a focused calculation of costs and benefits to the national interest” (Bremmer, 2016; Hannah, 2019a). Americans do favor maintaining an active role in the international system and have been, for the most part, broadly supportive of internationalism for number of decades (Smeltz et al., 2019; Tarrance, 2019). Overall, 56% of Americans support increasing U.S. diplomatic engagement and negotiation with other nation-states and in multilateral institutions on such issues as climate change, human rights, migration, nuclear non-proliferation, and trade. Interestingly, a plurality of Americans (44%) support decreasing the number of U.S. troops deployed around the world and favor reducing U.S. military and security commitments in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East (Gray & Hannah, 2020: 3–11). A 2020 Eurasia Group Foundation report showed that most Americans prefer American global engagement through multilateral agreements and diplomatic negotiations than military power. EGF survey results show that 39% of Americans prefer that the U.S. serve as a “Global Ambassador” in the world, a typology that embraces active diplomatic engagement in multilateral institutions, agreements, and treaties. This group also opposes U.S. military supremacy and favors the U.S. decreasing troop levels around the world. This is compared to 31% of Americans who believe

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the U.S. must maintain an internationalist role as a “Traditional Internationalist” in the world, a typology that emphasizes America’s conventional role as a supporter of international institutions and engagement and military supremacy to guarantee the security of the world order (Gray & Hannah, 2020: 9–10). Gray and Hannah (2020: 10) note, “Most Americans do support engagement of some sort – but U.S. foreign policy leaders should think twice before claiming that the American people are on board with the elite consensus they promote.” Also 11% were “Hard Power Primacists” or those who believe the U.S. should maintain military deployments and security commitments and reduce diplomatic engagement and 20% were “Genuine Isolationists” and oppose U.S. global involvement (Gray & Hannah, 2020). Americans do prefer that the U.S. actively engage with the world, but in a much less militarized way than it has in the recent past. For example, when the Trump Administration withdrew the U.S. from key agreements, 71% of Americans supported reentering the Paris Climate Accords, 66% rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and 71% reentering the World Health Organization (WHO) (Gray & Hannah, 2020). The 2020 presidential election exposed partisan elements among Americans. For example, 64% of Biden voters support reentering the Iranian nuclear deal compared to 43% of Trump voters who oppose it; 80% of Biden voters supported the U.S. in the WHO compared to 48% of Trump voters who did not even as COVID-19 spread throughout the U.S. in 2020; and 79% of Biden voters favored re-entering the Paris Climate Accords compared to 47% Trump voters who oppose it. Even though the pandemic, climate change, and nuclear non-proliferation are on the minds of American voters, politicization separated Biden and Trump voters in 2020 (Gray & Hannah, 2020). There are also noticeable gaps between worldviews held by foreign policy leaders and elites and the American public. Specifically, 44% of the American public hold an “Independent America” view and only 9% hold an “Indispensable America” view (35% gap) versus 47% of leaders and elites holding views consistent with an “Indispensable America” and only 9.5% with “Independent America” (37.5% gap) (Hannah, 2019a). Related to this breakdown is that more Americans believe that “America is exceptional because of what it represents” than those who “America is exceptional because of what it has done for the world” (Gray & Hannah, 2020). Even so, the number of Americans who believe the U.S. is exceptional because of what it represents declined by 7%

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from 2018 to 2019 (Gray & Hannah, 2020). This also breaks down according to partisanship with 43% of Democrats not believing the U.S. is an exceptional nation compared to 20% of Republicans (Hannah et al., 2022). The public values global engagement, but in a different way than foreign policy leaders and elites. EGF findings are consistent with those reported by the Center for American Progress, which found that the public believes that prioritizing domestic affairs and democracy at home are the best ways to improve U.S. foreign policy and America’s role in the world (Haplin et al., 2019). The Chicago Council on Global Affairs has suggested that Americans do not want to retreat or disengage from the world. CCGA reports that 69% of Americans believe that the U.S. should continue taking an active and engaged role in international affairs compared with 30% who think the U.S. should retreat from the world with 75% of Democrats, 69% of Republicans, and 64% of Independents supporting an active U.S. global role (Smeltz et al., 2019). While the American public opposed global disengagement, they prefer fewer military interventions (Hannah, 2019a; Gray & Hannah, 2020). The gap between the conventional internationalist bipartisan consensus among elites and the evolving foreign policy preferences of Americans has widened. As Robert Kagan (2018) stated, “The core problem in American foreign policy remains the disconnect between the establishment’s ambitious global agenda and the limited engagement that voters appear to support.” In particular, the American middle class, has questioned the extent to which U.S. engagement around the world helps their own economic prosperity (Fontaine, 2019; Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2021). One of the deepest partisan differences relates to how the American public perceives the greatest threats to the U.S. For example, 39.6% of Americans view the “greatest threat” facing the U.S. as the “rise in populist and authoritarian governments” that “threaten democracy, human rights, and the rule of law across the world” (Gray & Hannah, 2020) with Democrats and Independents much more concerned with these trends than Republicans (Hannah, 2019a). 26% of Americans believe the second greatest threat is that “Americans are becoming distrustful of democratic institutions and less committed to participating in civic life” (Gray & Hannah, 2020) with Democrats, Republicans, and Independents evenly distributed expressing roughly equal degrees of concern (Hannah, 2019a).

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Other divisive issues include trade, immigration, and climate change. Democrats and independents agree that “trade wars will damage America’s economy and trade relations with other countries” (Gray & Hannah, 2020) while Republicans rank it much lower (Hannah, 2019a). Ranked last at 15.9%, Americans believe the U.S. “losing its national identity due to high levels of immigration” (Gray & Hannah, 2020) with significantly more Republicans ranking it higher than Democrats and Independents (Hannah, 2019a). The Chicago Council found a very wide partisan split within the American public on immigration and refugees. Whereas only 19% of Democrats rate immigration and refugees as the least critical threat to the U.S., 78% of Republicans view it as the most critical threat facing the U.S. (59-point gap) with 23% of Democrats and 81% of Republicans supporting the use of U.S. troops to halt immigrants from Mexico. Another issue with a wide partisan difference is climate change with 54% of the American public believing it is a critical threat with 78% of Democrats, 54% of Independents, and 23% of Republicans concerned with climate change as a critical threat (Smeltz et al., 2019). A 2022 survey shows that Democrats prioritize U.S. funding for climate change initiatives, humanitarian programs, and COVID-19 relief compared to Republicans who believe climate change and COVID-19 relief are lower priorities (Hannah et al., 2022). After Biden was inaugurated as president in January 2021, most Americans were confident the new administration could effectively lead U.S. foreign policy. For example, 60% believe Biden has performed well in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine compared to 25% who think he has not made the right decisions (Hannah et al., 2022). Moreover, partisan differences on key issues between Democrats, Republicans, and independents narrowed. For example, 70% supported the Biden’s Administration’s foreign policy response with U.S. security assistance to the Ukrainian military, by avoiding a direct military conflict with Russia, and encouraging NATO members to boost European defense capabilities. Furthermore, 80% support America’s engagement with Iran in multilateral negotiations on the nuclear deal and 63% of Americans support the Biden Administration’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan (Hannah et al., 2022). Also, in a sign that Americans still express a strong preference for a foreign policy of restraint, 80% of partisans support more congressional oversight over the use of U.S. military force. In addition, while the U.S. far exceeds China and Russia on military spending, 46%

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of Americans favor maintaining current defense spending (Hannah et al., 2022). Also, today, general perceptions relate to how Americans view challengers in key regions of the world. Americans are trending toward a more muscular defense posture in the Indo-Pacific to counter China and follow through on its security commitments to Japan and South Korea. To contend with China’s growing military and economic power in the region, Americans are now more willing to increase U.S. troops in Japan and South Korea and boosts its naval capabilities in allied and partner countries. In 2022, one survey reported a five percent increase in the number of Americans who support increasing U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to 55% compared to 45% who oppose it (Hannah et al., 2022). The increase is driven by the belief that China is becoming more belligerent and expansionist. The status of Taiwan has made the U.S. strategic approach in the IndoPacific more complex and dynamic. With a series of communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. has long pursued a policy of “strategic ambiguity” and a “One China” position, which is centered on not endorsing Taiwanese independence while also selling arms and weapons to Taiwan. The goal of “strategic ambiguity” is to deter China from taking Taiwan by military force and preventing Taiwan from declaring independence (Mauldin, 2022). However, Biden began moving the U.S. away from this position by stating (quoted in Ruwitch, 2022) that the U.S. would use military force to defend Taiwan if China were to invade the island: “Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack” (see: Sevastopulo, 2022). Whether Americans would support using U.S. military force to defend Taiwan if it was invaded by China depends on knowing the costs and benefits. However, 42% of Americans do not know what American national interests at stake in case China invades Taiwan. The percentage of Americans who believe the U.S. should use military force to defend Taiwan declined from 43% in 2021 to 34% in 2022 and those who oppose increased from 16% in 2021 to 24% in 2022. The factors cited by Americans who do not know or oppose using U.S. military force include China’s military power and supplying Ukraine with security assistance (Hannah et al., 2022). Moreover, mass- and elite-level orientations relate to international views of the U.S. Prior to Russia’s invasion, America’s credibility as a reliable partner and ally was in serious doubt as Donald Trump’s divisive

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presidency, hyper-partisanship, the January 6th, 2021, insurrection, and bungled U.S. evacuation from Afghanistan damaged America’s reputation. While the Biden Administration’s bungled withdrawal of American military forces from Afghanistan eroded America’s credibility among its allies (Wike et al., 2022), 63% of Americans support the pullout (Hannah et al., 2022). However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine improved perceptions of the U.S. in key allied and partner countries. A 2022 Pew survey showed significant increases people viewing the U.S. as a reliable partner in South Korea, Sweden, Canada, Australia, Germany, the U.K., Belgium, The Netherlands, and Spain with confidence in President Biden remaining mostly positive (Wike et al., 2022). Categorizing and understanding U.S. foreign policy is a difficult endeavor. While elites have achieved some measure of consensus, there are significant gaps with the public on key issues. There are also considerable partisan and ideological divisions among the American people. Among the public, there are varying forms of interventionism found among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents as well as liberals and conservatives. There are also different elements of restraint and reducing America’s overall role in the world based on party and ideological orientation. The 2020 presidential elections showed that while Joe Biden defeated incumbent President Trump, bitterness, and division within the electorate harm the ability of the U.S. to speak with a moral voice and convey a global image of unity and confidence (Walt, 2019). Moreover, the January 6th insurrection by extremist supporters of former President Trump damaged American democracy and America’s credibility with allies and partners.

American Public Support for NATO and Ukraine In 1948, the Truman Administration approved the Marshall Plan to fund reconstruction and economic development in Western Europe to resist Communis Soviet Communist influence. Truman also helped Greece and Turkey to combat Communist resistance forces. This led the U.S. to support the creation of a transatlantic security pact to secure Europe from Communist influence and balance against Soviet attempts to dominate the continent. American public support for NATO is higher in 2022 (81%) than it was in 1974 (54%) during the Cold War with levels of support defined in terms of partisanship (Kafura, 2022).

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In the early years of the Cold War, most Americans supported U.S. participation in the NATO alliance. In 1948, one year before the U.S. ratified the Washington Treaty and the North Atlantic Charter, Gallup (2016) reported that 65% of Americans supported and only 21% opposed the position that “the United States and all the Western European countries participating in the Marshall should join together in a permanent military alliance” that would defend Europe from Communist influence. There was a very small partisan gap with 68% of Democrats and 66% of Republicans supportive of American membership in a military alliance with European governments (Gallup, 2016). American public support for NATO has remained high and stable ever since Americans expressed their initial support for U.S. entry in a mutual defense pact with Europe. A clear majority of Americans supported NATO and favored maintaining U.S. membership in the alliance during the Cold War. For example, in 1974, during the Watergate Scandal and in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, 54% of Americans supported increasing or maintaining America’s commitment to NATO with 60% of Republicans, 57% of Democrats, and 51% of independents favoring that position. Overall American public support for increasing or maintaining the U.S. commitment jumped to 71% in 1986 with 83% of Republicans, 71% of independents, and 65% of Democrats in support. This showed more intense Republican support for the Reagan Administration’s confrontational foreign policy strategy toward the Soviet Union (Kafura, 2022) (Chart 2.1). At the end of the Cold War, American public support for increasing or maintaining the U.S. security commitment to NATO dropped to 60% in 1990 with partisan differences still apparent (Republicans, 66%; independents, 60%; and Democrats, 59%) (Kafura, 2022). The percentage of Americans who supported maintaining NATO dropped at the end of the Cold War (1989–1991) as more Americans questioned the continued utility and legitimacy of the Cold War alliance. The percentage of Americans supporting NATO declined from 75% in 1989 to 62% in 1991 with the percentage of American viewing NATO as unnecessary increased from 15% in 1989 to 21% in 1991 (Gallup, 1991; Reinhart, 2019). However, as ethnic violence increased and the war in Bosnia raged, American public support for NATO recovered with the percentage of Americans favoring the alliance increased from 62% in 1991 to 70% in 1994 (Reinhart, 2019). American public support for maintaining NATO increased from 64% in 1995 to 80% in 2017 as the percentage of Americans viewing NATO as

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Public Support

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2019 2020 2022 Overall

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Linear (Overall)

Chart 2.1 American public support for NATO security commitment (Source Kafura 2022)

unnecessary dropped from a high of 22% in 1995 to 16% in 2017 (Reinhart, 2019). Although former President Trump stepped up his criticism of NATO and led with his “America First” foreign policy, American public support for NATO slightly dropped to 77% in 2019 and the percentage of Americans viewing NATO as unnecessary increased slightly to 19% (Reinhart, 2019). And while more Democrats (88%) supported NATO than Republicans (70%), this was not different than in previous years (Reinhart, 2019). In fact, American support for NATO was higher during the Trump years than it was at the end of the Cold War. Again, this may be due to much higher levels of support from Democrats who view NATO as essential to maintaining collective security and democracy promotion in the post-Cold War period. Strong Democratic support for NATO could also be an intense partisan reaction to Trump’s “America First” foreign policy. However, most Republicans continued supporting NATO during the Trump years, which most likely disrupted the former president’s attempts to withdraw the U.S. from the alliance. A division exists within the Republican Party between Trump’s far-right “Make America Great Again” base that drags down Republican support for NATO and other Republicans who remain supportive of the U.S. security commitment to NATO.

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Again, it should be emphasized that more intense levels of Democratic support for NATO was not simply isolated to the Trump years. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War increased Democratic support for boosting U.S. security commitments to NATO. This was the case for Democrats during both the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations. As Kafura (2022) observes, “Democrats have been more likely to favor maintaining or increasing the U.S. commitment to NATO.” Between 1990 and 2002, overall American public support for increasing or maintaining U.S. security commitments increased from 60 to 76% with Democratic support rising from 59 to 82% and Republican support from 66 to 76% (Kafura, 2022). And in the 20-year period from 2002 to 2022 American public support increased 76–81% with Democratic support increasing from 82 to 90% and Republican support remaining at 75%. However, during the Trump years between 2018 and 2022, American public support dropped slightly from 75 to 73% before increasing back to 81%, Republican support declining sharply from 71 to 60% before increasing back to 75%, and Democratic support slipping from 89 to 85% before increasing back to 90% (Kafura, 2022). While support for the U.S. security commitment to NATO is bipartisan, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to support increasing or maintaining that pledge. A 2019 survey found that 72% of Americans support NATO and 78% believe the U.S. should honor its collective defense commitments. However, partisanship plays a role in shaping American support for NATO. For example, in 2019, 86% of Democrats, 68% of independents, and 62% of Republicans think NATO is vital to American national security and (Smeltz et al., 2019). Also, 78% of the American public supports the U.S. maintaining or even increasing its current mutual defense commitments to NATO (Smeltz et al., 2019). These views were confirmed by Pew Research in 2021, which found that 61% held favorable views of NATO compared to a high of 64% in 2018 and 49% in 2013 (Poushter & Fagan, 2021). Another 2019 (Reinhart, 2019) poll showed that 77% of Americans believe that the NATO alliance should be maintained and 66% believe the UN plays a necessary role in the world. Gallup (Reinhart, 2019) also confirmed the significance of partisanship as a factor shaping U.S. public opinion of NATO as Democrats express the highest level of support for NATO at 88% followed by independents at 75% and Republicans the lowest level of support for NATO at 70%. The same was true for the

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percentage of Americans expressing positive views of the UN as 86% of Democrats, 66% of independents, and 49% of Republicans believe the UN is necessary in the world (Poushter & Fagan, 2021). The strong support from Democrats was also filtered through the lens of partisan opposition to Trump. A 2021 Pew Research survey showed that 77% of Democrats and independents held favorable views of NATO compared to just 44% of Republicans. Since 2009, there has been a very sizable partisan gap in positive assessments of NATO. While in 2021 71% of Americans believe the U.S. benefits from being a NATO member, there is a 30-point partisan difference between Democrats (85%) and Republicans (55%) (Poushter & Fagan, 2021). A 2021 Pew Research poll showed that 61% of Americans held favorable views of NATO. While Republicans are generally less supportive of NATO, Republicans believe it should be maintained. In a 2021 Pew Research poll, 77% of Democrats viewed NATO more favorably compared to 44% of Republicans and 85% of Democrats believe the U.S. benefits from being a NATO member compared to 55% of Republicans (Poushter & Fagan, 2021). However, general perceptions of NATO among Americans continue to be driven more by partisanship than any other factor. Democrats hold much more stable, steady, and favorable views of NATO than do Republicans. From 2009 to 2019, Democrats registered a 1-point increase in support for NATO (60 to 61%) compared to a 4-point decrease in support for NATO among Republicans (49 to 45%). The 16-point split among Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. shows there is a definitive and widening American partisan split regarding views of NATO, an indication that Democrats are more supportive and Republicans less favorable in their perceptions of NATO and America’s role in it (Fagan & Poushter, 2020). Also, 54% of Americans would support using U.S. military force to follow through on its article V mutual defense treaty commitments to defend Estonia against a hypothetical Russian attack. This is compared with 46% who oppose using force to defend its NATO ally (Fagan & Poushter, 2020). Partisan affiliation is a factor in support whether to use military force defend a NATO ally against a Russian military attack. Consistent with findings by other polling organizations, ESF reports that 66% were Democrats and most of the independents support using military force to defend a NATO ally against a Russian military attack compared to most

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Republicans who would oppose using military force under such a scenario (Hannah, 2019a). There are also significant gaps between American elite policymakers and the American public. A 2019 ESF report showed that while Americans are slightly supportive of using force to defend a NATO ally against Russia, an overwhelming 95% of America’s foreign policy leaders and elites are supportive of using U.S. military force to honor its Article V commitments (Hannah, 2019b). Moreover, a Reuters/IPSOS poll found that just 49% of Americans think the U.S. should not have to honor its collective security commitments to NATO allies if they do not spend more on their defense and were attacked by Russia (Stewart, 2018). This is in stark contrast to the late 1990s when 70% of Americans supported using U.S. military force to defend and protect a NATO ally from a military attack (see Hannah, 2019b). Although many questioned the future of NATO and America’s role after the end of the Cold War, today, a sizeable majority of Americans remain supportive of the transatlantic alliance. Also, Americans have confidence in NATO leaders to pursue and develop alliance policies that benefit the U.S. In 2022, 64% of Americans had confidence that NATO benefits the U.S. with more Democrats (77%) than independents (59%) or Republicans (54%) saying they are confident in alliance leaders (Kafura, 2022). While Americans generally support NATO and America’s continued role in the transatlantic alliance, gaps exist along partisan and ideological lines and between elite-level leaders and the American public (Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2021). In the immediate wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the American public increased its support of NATO and generally support an increase in the number of U.S. troops deployed in NATO member states to deter further Russian aggression, and the U.S. leadership role in the alliance. NATO, alliance conceived in the Washington Treaty in 1949 with a collective mission to contain the Soviet Union, receives higher levels of American public support today than during the Cold War. In 2022, much of this is driven by 9 in 10 Democrats supporting the U.S. security commitment to NATO, still more than 8 in 10 Americans and 3 in 4 Republicans support NATO. But the 15-point gap between Democrats (90%) and Republicans (75%) in 2022 under Biden is also the widest it has been since 1986 when the gap was 18 points under Reagan with more Republicans (83%) than Democrats (65%) favoring increasing or

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maintaining the U.S. security commitment to NATO (Kafura, 2022). This reflects levels of partisan support for the president’s political party controlling the White House. It also reflects the impact of Trump’s Jacksonian-style MAGA brand on the Republican Party. While American public support for NATO has remained relatively strong, more recent polling suggests that support surged after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to a September 2022 Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll, the level of American public support for NATO, including admitting new member states, is now at an all-time high. For example, the poll found 81% believe the U.S. should keep or increase security commitments to NATO compared to 11% who oppose. Also, 90% of Democrats, 78% of independents, and 75% of Republicans favor America’s NATO commitments (Kafura, 2022). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine not only boosted American support for NATO, it enhanced Americans’ perceptions of alliance credibility and legitimacy. For example, 64% of the American public have a great or fair amount of confidence in NATO benefitting U.S. national security interests and large majorities support the admission of Finland and Sweden (76%), Ukraine (73%), and Georgia (67%) (Kafura, 2022). A 2022 Pew poll confirmed these results with Americans increasing their levels of support for NATO in the wake of Russia’s invasion. 67% of Americans hold favorable views of NATO compared to 26% who have unfavorable views. The percentage of Americans holding favorable views of NATO increased from 60% in 2020 to 67% in 2022. Also, international perceptions and views of the U.S. are mostly favorable and held steady with 61% of people in 17 countries expressing confidence in the U.S. (Wike et al., 2022). Whether this remains the case in 2023 or beyond, one can argue that Russia’s war in Ukraine increased favorable views of the U.S. and boost American support for NATO. In fact, support for NATO in the U.S. is higher in 2022 and 2023 than in the decades since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. One Eurasia Group Foundation report showed that 65% of Americans should follow through on its NATO Article V collection security commitments and use U.S. troops to come to the defense of Finland if it were a NATO ally with 73% of Democrats and 61% of Republicans in support. Also, 60% of Americans support using U.S. troops to defend a Baltic NATO member, a ten-point increase from 2021 (Hannah et al., 2022).

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One of the most important developments after Russia invaded Ukraine was Finland and Sweden beginning the membership application process to join the 30-member NATO alliance. While each has maintained foreign policies of neutrality, in 2022 the U.S. Senate voted 95 to 1 to admit Finland and Sweden as NATO’s two newest members (Desiderio, 2022). A supermajority of Americans (77%) believes that Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO will benefit the U.S., but for different reasons. Most Democrats and independents maintain that the U.S. should pursue a foreign policy of promoting democracy, contending that the U.S. should support other democracies when they are threatened compared to most Republicans who think Finland and Sweden will help NATO defend vulnerable Baltic States (Hannah et al., 2022). Throughout 2022, American public support for Ukraine and sending U.S. security assistance to combat the Russian invasion was high. One poll showed 55% of Americans support increasing U.S. troops, with 61% of Democrats and 54% of Republicans backing additional deployments. Furthermore, 61% of Americans believe U.S. sanctions against Russia are worth the price of paying higher energy costs (Lange, 2022). In another poll, 52% of Americans preferred maintaining current levels of American troops stationed in NATO member states at roughly 100,000 (Sugden, 2022). In May 2022, Pew reported that 55% of the American public were extremely worried and 28% were worried about a potential Russian victory over Ukraine. Furthermore, 31% thought the U.S. was not doing enough to help Ukraine fend off Russia with 35% thinking the U.S. was providing an appropriate level of assistance for Ukraine. As Russia’s war dragged deeper into 2022, the percentage of Americans concerned about a Ukrainian defeat dropped. One February 2023 survey showed that the percentage of Americans concerned about Russia’s war in Ukraine declines from 82% in March 2022 to 68% in February 2023 with more Americans worried about inflation, crime, domestic political polarization, and opioid addiction (Blanton, 2023). Even though many far-right Republican candidates did not win elected office in the November 2022 elections and given that Trump-affiliated House members and senators constitute a small minority within Congress, they were vocal enough to shape media narratives. For example, by September 2022, percentage of the American public extremely worried about a Ukrainian defeat decreased by 17 points to 38% and those who believe the U.S. was not providing enough aid to Ukraine dropped 13 points to 18% (Daniller & Cerda, 2022).

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However, there are larger factors at play. Although the decline in American public support for Ukraine is concerning, the Ukrainian military made significant gains throughout 2022. In the early weeks of the war, when many expected Russia to subdue Ukraine and topple President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, there was an outpouring of American support for Ukraine. Toward the end of 2022 and beginning of 2023, Ukraine made significant territorial gains including retaking the key cities of Kharkiv and Kherson. And with Ukraine in possession of more advanced weaponry and given punishing U.S. and E.U. sanctions on Russia, Ukraine’s counteroffensives have nullified several Russian fronts in the war. However, the decline in American public support for Ukraine could be due to greater American confidence in Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia given that the U.S. is sending more weapons and increased Western sanctions on Russia. Evidence from additional opinion surveys support this observation. For example, in October 2022, a University of Maryland poll showed that 60% of Americans would “pay high energy costs to help Ukraine” and 48% believed that Ukraine was winning the war (Grahame, 2022). In December 2022, a Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll reported that 65% of Americans support U.S. lethal assistance and 65% support economic assistance to Ukraine with 73% supportive of Ukrainian refugees in the U.S. Although most Americans think the U.S. should provide as much assistance as possible to Ukraine, they are divided along partisan lines. 43% of Republicans and 19% of Democrats suppor a gradual withdrawal of American assistance to Ukraine over the long term (Smeltz et al., 2022). In January 2023, the Biden Administration announced it would send advanced M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. This was made in response to the U.K. sending Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine, which then led Germany to supply provide Ukraine with advanced Leopard tanks (Cooper & Schmitt, 2023). Other NATO members, Poland, Norway, and The Netherlands would also send battle tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and air defense systems to Ukraine (Cole, 2023). Germany’s decision to send tanks to Ukraine is noteworthy because those tanks are already in Europe and are used by several NATO members. For almost one year, the U.S. and NATO resisted sending Ukraine these and other advanced weapons out of fear of escalation of the war, spillover into NATO territory, or antagonizing right-wing ultranationalists inside Russia demanding more attacks against Ukrainian civilians

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and infrastructure. Moreover, both Democratic and Republican congressional members supported the Biden Administration’s decision to supply Ukraine with advanced weapons with Senator Mitch McConnell warning that failing to adequately support Ukraine could emboldened Russia (Gypson, 2023). By early 2023, Americans began showing diverging and more complex views regarding U.S. security and financial assistance to Ukraine. One poll showed that 64% of Americans supported additional U.S. weapons shipments and 63% supported additional financial assistance to Ukraine (Blanton, 2023). However, other surveys published in 2023 showed that the number of Americans who believe the U.S. is giving Ukraine too much security assistance increased from 7% in March 2022 to 26% in January 2023 compared to 20% who prefer the U.S. provide more assistance and 31% who think it is the appropriate amount (Dunn, 2023). A diminished level of support to Ukraine was reported in a February 2023 poll showing that 48% of Americans favor and 29% opposed additional weapons shipments to Ukraine (AP-NORC, 2023). Although bipartisan support was maintained in early 2023, Democrats (84%) are more likely than Republicans (70%) to support U.S. security assistance packages to Ukraine compared to 91% of Democrats and 74% of Republicans in support in May 2022 (AP-NORC, 2023). The Biden Administrations’ decision to send more advanced weapons to Ukraine could complicate that level of support as partisan divisions between Democrats and Republicans began widening in 2023. These trends are driven more by Republicans who think the U.S. is giving too much security assistance to Ukraine. The percentage of Republicans who think the U.S. is providing too much security assistance increased from 9% in March 2022 to 40% in January 2023. Also, the percentage of Democrats who believe the U.S. is providing too much security assistance has also increased from 5% in March 2022 to 15% in January 2023 (Dunn, 2023). Another survey showed more Democrats (79% respectively) than Republicans (55% and 51% respectively) supported additional weapons and financial support (Blanton, 2023). Moreover, 43% of Democrats compared to 29% of Republicans view Russia’s war in Ukraine as a major threat to the U.S. In addition, 61% of Democrats compared to 27% of Republicans approve of President Biden’s response to Russia’s war (Dunn, 2023). Relatedly, Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has accelerated a power shift from West to East within NATO away from “Old Europe”

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toward the countries of “New Europe.” Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many Western European NATO member states were less supportive of using their own militaries to defend and protect a NATO ally. In Italy, there was a massive fifty-point gap between those who prefer the U.S. take military action (75%) to defend a NATO ally compared to those who believe Italy’s military should (25%). Similar gaps were also observed in Greece (40-points), Spain (31-points), Germany (29-points), Slovakia (25-points), the U.K. (18-points), France (16-points), Turkey (14-points), and Canada (14-points) (Fagan & Poushter, 2020). But a 60% of those in NATO member states believe the U.S. would use its military might to defend a NATO ally if attacked by Russia compared to 29% who believe the U.S. would not (Fagan & Poushter, 2020). While the structure and distribution of power in the international system shapes U.S. foreign policy priorities, domestic political priorities determine America’s foreign policy preferences and behavior. Empirical research and theory in foreign policymaking demonstrates that domestic political factors influence America’s foreign policy agenda and how the U.S. pursues its national interests. Moreover, the American economic, the role of foreign policy elites, and how Americans view America’s role in the world and its role in NATO determine the extent of the U.S. global leadership role. Domestic politics drives American foreign policy and the degree of U.S. involvement in NATO.

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Nye, J. S. (2002). The paradox of American power: Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone. Oxford University Press. Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs. Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1992). The rational public: Fifty years of trends in Americans’ policy preferences. University of Chicago Press. Parker, K., & Menasce-Horowitz, J. (2022, March 9). Majority of workers who quit a job in 2021 cite low pay, no opportunities for advancement, feeling disrespected. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 2022/03/09/majority-of-workers-who-quit-a-job-in-2021-cite-low-pay-noopportunities-for-advancement-feeling-disrespected/ Poushter, J., & Fagan, M. (2021, June 10). NATO continues to be seen in a favorable light by people in member states. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/10/nato-contin ues-to-be-seen-in-a-favorable-light-by-people-in-member-states/ Price, C. C., & Edwards, K. A. (2020, September). Trends in income from 1975 to 2018 (Working paper: WR-A516-1). https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_p apers/WRA516-1.html Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460. Reinhart, R. J. (2019, March 4). Majority of Americans see the need for NATO and the UN . Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/247190/majorities-ame ricans-need-nato.aspx Reus-Smit, C. (2013). Beyond metatheory? European Journal of International Relations, 19(3), 589–608. Ripsman, N. M. (2009). Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups. In S. E. Lobell, N. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge University Press. Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2009). Conclusion: The state of neoclassical realism. In S. E. Lobell, N. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge University Press. Rogowski, R. (1999). Institutions as constraints on strategic choice. In D. A. Lake & R. Powell (Eds.), Strategic choice and international relations (pp. 115–136). Princeton University Press. Rose, G. (1998, October). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics, 51(1), 144–172. Rosenau, J. N. (1966). Pre-theories and theories and foreign policy. In J. C. Charlesworth (Ed.), Approaches to comparative and international politics. Free Press. Rosenau, J. N. (1968). Comparative foreign policy: Fad, fantasy, or field. International Studies Quarterly, 12(3), 296–329.

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Ruwitch, J. (2022, September 19). Biden again says US would help Taiwan if China attacks. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/09/19/1123759127/ biden-again-says-u-s-would-help-taiwan-if-china-attacks Schimmelfennig, F. (2005). Strategic calculation and international socialization: Membership incentives, party constellations, and sustained compliance in Central and Eastern Europe. International Organization, 59(4), 827–860. Schweller, R. L. (2004). Unanswered threats: A neoclassical realist theory of under balancing. International Security, 29(2), 159–201. Schweller, R. L. (2006). Unanswered threats: Political constraints on the balance of power. Princeton University Press. Schweller, R. L. (2009). Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: Expansionist ideology in the age of mass politics. In S. E. Lobell, N. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge University Press. Semega, J., & Kollar, M. (2022, September 13). Increase in income inequality driven by real declines in income at the bottom. United States Census Bureau. https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/09/income-inequality-inc reased.html#:~:text=The%20ratio%20of%20the%2090th,a%204.9%25%20incr ease%20from%202020 Sevastopulo, D. (2022, September 19). Joe Biden says US would defend Taiwan from Chinese attack. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ f1296dd0-9eb5-4e75-b986-b0e9e445076a Siripurapu, A. (2022, April 20). The U.S. inequality debate. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-inequality-debate Smeltz, D., Daadler, I. H., Friedhoff, K., Kafura, C., & Helm, B. (2019, September 6). Rejecting retreat. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. https:// www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/lcc/rejecting-retreat Smeltz, D., Kafura, C., & Sullivan, E. (2022, December 5). Growing US divide on how long to support Ukraine. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/gro wing-us-divide-how-long-support-ukraine Smith, S., Hadfield, A., & Dunne, T. (2008). Foreign policy. Oxford University Press. Snyder, R. C., Bruck, H. W., & Sapin, B. M. (1954). Decision-making as an approach to the study of international politics. Foreign Policy Analysis Project (Series No. 3). Princeton University Press. Sobel, R. (2001). The impact of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam. Oxford University Press. Sprout, H., & Sprout, M. (1956). Man-milieu relationship hypotheses in the context of international politics. Princeton University Press. Sterling-Folker, J. (2009). Neoclassical realism and identity: Peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait. In S. E. Lobell, N. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro

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CHAPTER 3

Foreign Policy Elites and the National Security State

The Political Emergence of Containment Immediately after World War II, the American impulse was to bring U.S. troops home, cut the size of the military down to pre-war levels, and return to civilian life. However, Soviet power was far too large and extensive to ignore, and America’s European allies were too badly damaged to defend themselves. It would have been devastating if Western Europe’s industrial and economic assets were taken over by the Soviet Union, which could use it to rebuild its shattered economy. After NATO was formed in the Washington Treaty in 1949, the Truman Administration began its slow and steady military buildup in Europe. During the Cold War, instilling continuity and a predictable pattern in foreign policy was key to binding the West to the U.S. This was especially the case with Western Europe. The Atlantic Charter, Bretton Woods, Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Charter would integrate Western nation-states within international institutional arrangements and promote shared norms (Ikenberry, 2020, 2022). A grand strategic bargain was struck in which the U.S. would restrain itself by reducing its freedom of action in exchange for others consenting to the preeminence of the U.S. dollar, U.S. leadership of bilateral and multilateral security alliances and partnership, and trade and investment (Ikenberry, 2020, 2022; Kissinger, 1994). After the Cold War, these systems were widened through EuroAtlantic integration. Others were included to participate in international © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. J. Dolan, The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6_3

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institutional arrangements but not to lead, namely China, Russia, and India (Ikenberry, 2009). There was a remarkable degree of continuity from one presidential administration to the next. This is largely a function of the professional civil service and rising defense spending that gave rise to the military-industrial-complex and permanent foreign policy bureaucracy. The National Security Act of 1947 which enacted a significant overhaul to the U.S. military and intelligence agencies in the wake of World War II. The NSA of 1947 reorganized U.S. defense into the National Military Establishment, creating a Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, a separate U.S. Air Force with nuclear forces placed under the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the National Security Council in the Executive Office of the President to coordinate the foreign policy bureaucracy and concentrate decision-making in the White House, the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 1949, the National Military Establishment was renamed the Department of Defense. Diplomat and later director of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff George Kennan (1946, 1947) provided the first set of critiques of Soviet intentions. In the “Long Telegram,” Kennan (1946) argued that the Soviet Union could not peacefully coexist with the U.S. and its allies because its “neurotic view of world affairs” stems from an “instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” Kennan held that Soviet security was driven by a “patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power” and a desire to extend their influence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Moreover, the only foreign policy the Soviets would respect was strength as it was “impervious to logic of reason,” “highly sensitive to logic of force,” and would only back down when “strong resistance is encountered at any point.” In “Sources of Soviet Conduct”, Kennan (1947) developed the principles of containment, arguing that Soviet Communism and American-style capitalism were two ideological systems that could not coexist. Kennan’s (1947) argument was that because Russia’s “sense of insecurity was too great,” U.S. foreign policy “toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” He added (1947), “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world” must be met by the U.S. with an “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting

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geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.” Containment would (Kennan, 1947) “promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” Kennan’s ideas gave the Truman Administration a way forward by allowing the president to staked out an anti-Communist stance while not having to militarily confront the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan, a $13 billion economic assistance package to Western Europe, provided relief and recovery to Western European economies and integrated West Germany into the recovery effort. The U.S. also pushed for a political communications strategy to counter Communist ideology by laying the foundations for what would become Radio Free Europe (Weiner & Crossette, 2005). The Marshall Plan marked the true beginning of the Cold War as helped create the pillars of the post-war order and tied Western Europe to the U.S. (Gaddis, 2011). Kennan (1996) would later criticize American leaders for allowing U.S. foreign policy to become dominated by skyrocketing defense spending and less centered on diplomacy. He argued his ideas were misinterpreted and that he did not intend endorse the militarization of containment (Menand, 2011). In a 1972 interview, he stated, “I concede, therefore, that there was a need for the creation of something resembling NATO in Western Europe. But I don’t think this was a reason for putting economic recovery and other constructive purposes into the background, nor was it a reason for pretending to ourselves, over two decades, that the Russians were longing to attack Western Europe, and it was only we who were deterring them from this mad purpose. Finally, I do not think the nuclear weapon was at all essential as a factor in the creation of this necessary balance” (Kennan et al., 1972, 14). However, the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb, the “loss” of China, and the Korean War justified NSC 68. Walter Lippmann criticized both containment and Kennan’s rationale for it, believing they could increase tensions between East and West (Lippmann, 1947). While Kennan’s analysis focused on Communist ideology as the primary source of Soviet behavior, Lippmann believed that Russian expansion in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean was not driven by Communism but by czarist ambition, Russian history, and culture. Although he agreed with Kennan that the Soviet Union would expand unless blocked by the U.S., Lippmann argued that the Cold War should be waged by the U.S. with pragmatic policies as opposed to a fighting a

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global crusade or risk “recruiting, subsidizing, and supporting a heterogenous array of satellites, clients, dependents, and puppets.” Lippmann (1947) suggested that the U.S. negotiate with Soviet leaders and place diplomacy at the forefront. Reinhold Niebuhr articulated a moral basis for confronting the Soviet Union. In his seminal Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932), Niebuhr argued that people were more capable of sinful actions as members of groups than as individuals. In subsequent work (1952) he viewed power and security in international politics as regrettable necessities in a world he believed was defined in terms of conflict and competition. In Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (2011), Niebuhr argued that fascism, Nazism, and Communism were the physical manifestations of evil, sin, and the fall of man. When confronting such malevolent forces, leaders of moral communities and nation-states should not sit idly or behave according to the same moral constrains as individual persons (Niebuhr, 1932, 1952, 2011). Niebuhr joined with Eleanor Roosevelt and John Kenneth Galbraith to form Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). ADA was an antiCommunist organization that combined a realist foreign policy of confronting Communism with a domestic policy agenda of modest federal regulation of the economy and development of the social welfare state. Niebuhr’s “Cold War liberalism” (1952, 1957) bridged the realist-liberal divide and build a Cold War Anti-Communist consensus in the U.S. For Niebuhr (1952), the Soviet Union was a major power rival to the U.S. that could be balanced with Truman’s Fair Deal economic programs. Niebuhr did not forcefully condemn the Truman Doctrine’s militarization of foreign policy and did not condemn America’s use of atomic weapons against Japan. However, he would later criticize the Eisenhower Administration’s objection to the U.K., French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis (Buhle, 2010). He also passively supported the U.S. military intervention and buildup in Vietnam, viewing seeing North Vietnam as a Soviet client as opposed to viewing the war in terms of anti-colonialism and national liberation (Niebuhr, 1965). Niebuhr’s Cold War liberalism was torn apart by the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the anti-war movement, and Nixon’s Watergate scandal, all of which gave rise to the political right and political left in the U.S. Influential figures and critics like Nitze, Dulles, Lippmann, Niebuhr staked out nuanced positions in response to Kennan and shaped Cold War America. As the Cold War unfolded, a diversity of opinion was

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determining the extent of America’s role. These early Cold War figures were shaped by crises, namely the Great Depression, Nazism, Fascism, and Communism, devastating global power wars, the Holocaust, and the dawn of the nuclear age. As Kagan (2018) stated, Kennan, Lippman, Niebuhr, Dulles, and Nitze “had seen firsthand what a world not shaped by American power, the world ‘as it is,’ really looks like.” In a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman requested $400 million in military assistance to prevent Communist takeovers in Greece and Turkey. In what became known as the Truman Doctrine, Truman (1947) stated that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” The doctrine introduced Americans to the Cold War and set forth the broad contours of U.S. containment. One of the first tests of Western resolve was the Berlin Airlift, which was launched by the U.S. and U.K. to deliver food and supplies to citizens of West Berlin after the Soviet Union blockaded the city between 1948 and 1949.

NSC 68 and Militarization of Containment With NSC 68, containment would become a highly militarized and aggressive strategy backed up by significant increases in defense spending and expansion of conventional and nuclear weapons. NSC 68 was a National Security Council memorandum was developed by Director of Policy Planning at the State Department Paul Nitze in association with officials at the Defense and State departments in 1950 and approved by President Truman in 1951 (Nitze & Nelson Drew, 1994). NSC 68 proposed increases in U.S. defense spending, advocated for research and development of the hydrogen bomb, and boosted security assistance to America’s allies (Hixson, 1994; LaFeber, 1994). Serving as a national security strategy, NSC 68 explained the Soviet Communist threat in dire terms: “The issues that face us are momentous, involving fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions” (NSC 68, 1950). Fearing a loss of its nuclear leverage and an alliance of the Soviet Union and China and with a climate of hysteria and paranoia sparked by U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy’s allegations that Communists infiltrated the

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U.S. diplomatic corps in the State Department, NSC 68 was the tool the Truman Administration needed to respond to the Communist threat. The introduction of NSC 68 stated, “The issues that face us as momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself… With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.” Rejecting isolationism, NSC 68 proposed the “rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength… in the free world.” The report also requested an increase in defense spending from a $13 billion request for FY 1950 to $40 to $50 billion per year (Bowie & Immerman, 2000, 17). Since NSC 68, defense spending increased from $52.5 in FY 1962 (earliest year) to $858 billion in FY 2022 (Budget, 2019; see: Burns, 2019; SIPRI, annual). Nonetheless, NSC 68 was a significant development that led to the creation of the U.S. national security state. The memo called on the Truman Administration to provide military aid to America’s Western European allies in NATO, which was created in 1949 with the ratification of the Washington Treaty. The reasoning was that Western Europe, which was still emerging from the devastation of World War II, would not be able to stand on its own against the larger and superior military forces of the Soviet Union stationed in Eastern Europe. With NSC 68 and NATO, the U.S. could support and provide military assistance to Western European governments under pressure from the Soviet Union (LaFeber, 1994). NSC 68 was also used to complement the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), which was helping rebuild allied economies (Cardwell, 2011; LaFeber, 1994). In addition, NSC 68 was a strategic response to the spread of Communism around the world (Gaddis, 2005). In 1949, after the Communist takeover in China, U.S. leaders worried that Communism could expand throughout Asia and the Pacific (Borden, 1994). NSC 68 reflected the views of Truman’s staunchest anti-Communist advisers, namely Nitze and Acheson, which stated that “the Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination (Mitchell & Newman, 2006; Nitze & Nelson Drew, 1994). The purpose of NSC 68 was putting U.S. military power and economic strength at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy (NSC 68, 1950). While Kennan’s (1947) version of containment proposed a multidimensional and comprehensive political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, and military strategy of to deter the Soviet Union, NSC 68 prioritized military

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and economic power. Unlike Kennan, who opposed a massive U.S. rearmament, NSC 68 called for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, defense of the Western Hemisphere from a Soviet attack, mobilizing U.S. conventional military forces, mitigating the Soviet Union’s capacity to make war, and providing security and economic aid to allies. The argument was that a military-driven foreign policy was essential to prevent the growth of Soviet military power. If it went unchecked, then the Soviet Union could become so powerful that the U.S. and it allies would be unable to defend themselves. Therefore, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy would help the survival of the U.S. itself; that is, the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union demanded a very strong and powerful U.S. military posture to prevent the destruction of the U.S. and its Western allies (Casey, 2005). Although NSC 68 did not set specific military spending targets or guidelines, the Truman Administration engaged in a massive defense buildup and boosted the defense budget in response to the Korean War. Between 1950 and 1953, the U.S. increased annual defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 5% to 14.2% (CEA, 1987, 1988). After the end of the Korean War, the Eisenhower Administration maintained defense spending in absolute dollars at levels higher than during World War II. While annual defense expenditures did not exceed $60 billion from 1951 to 1953, they would never again fall below $143 billion after 1953. To finance large defense expenditures and fight the Cold War, recommendations were made to cut domestic programs while at the same boosting spending on defense and foreign assistance (NSC 68, 1950).

Pushback, Ruptures, and Divisions in the U.S. and NATO NSC 68 would continue to shape the national security priorities of Truman’s successors. The Eisenhower Administration maintained the military-driven approach, but with a new look as the U.S. would focus on developing a massive nuclear retaliation that rested on boosting America’s ICBM capabilities led by the Strategic Air Command. At the London and Paris conferences in 1954, the Eisenhower Administration endorsed the Bonn-Paris conventions, which ended the military occupation of West Germany, but also supported rearming and bringing West Germany into NATO with the full authority of sovereign member state. Given France’s concerns about the return of West German military power, the United Kingdom brokered an agreement that would support West Germany’s

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membership in NATO. West Germany and Italy were also added to the Brussels Treaty of 1948 that created the West European Union (WEU), an intergovernmental military agreement. However, West German membership in WEU and NATO was conditioned on West Germany not developing naval warships, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs (Junker et al., 2013). WEU structures coordinated Western militaries and would later comprise the basis of the European Union’s military and foreign policy functions in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Duke, 2000, 13–14). In response, the Soviet Union and Eastern European nationstates formed the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance to check NATO and maintain Soviet dominance of the Eastern bloc (Herring, 2008, 651–652). Isolationist sentiment arose Congress at the same time an internationalist foreign policy was emerging to contain Soviet Communism. Congressional Isolationists maintained that U.S. entry in the Washington Treaty in 1949, which created NATO, would lead the U.S. to enter too many post-WWII treaties and could undermine American sovereignty. Isolationists feared that treaties like the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and other human rights conventions would force the U.S. to comply with certain social and economic requirements (Herring, 2008; LaFeber, 1994, chapter 4). Congress also made several attempts to limit presidential powers in foreign policy (Ciment, 2015, 173). In 1953, U.S. Senator John Bricker (R-OH) proposed the so-called Bricker Amendment that would limit the ability of the president to use executive agreements in foreign policy (Parker, 1954). Specifically, the Bricker Amendment proposed that executive agreements should not substitute for treaties (Spiro, 2001). Then, in 1954, the George Amendment asserted that international agreements should only become laws when passed by Congress (Herring, 2008; LaFeber, 1994). But like Bricker, the George Amendment would require both the Senate and House of Representatives to pass legislation before ratified treaties and executive agreements go into effect (Krutz & Peake, 2009). While the Bricker Amendment had 56 co-sponsors, it was eventually defeated in the U.S. Senate by a 42–50 vote. However, the George Amendment missed the 2/3 constitutional requirement by just one vote in the U.S. Senate (Herring, 2008). With legislative challenges effectively eliminated, Eisenhower signed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The act formalized the

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operational chain of command by placing individual military departments and military commanders under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense who would report to the president and created the Advanced Research Projects Agency (Bolton, 2017). Furthermore, Eisenhower made a series of unilateral decisions construed as not in coordination with NATO allies. He opposed intervening in the 1956 Hungarian uprising, which was crushed by Warsaw Pact troops (Herring, 2008, 664–668). After the uprising, the U.S. prioritized cultural diplomacy and economic pressures to resist Soviet influence in Eastern Europe (Herring, 2008, 664–668). Eisenhower also initiated diplomatic relations with Spain, which was under the control of Dictator Francisco Franco, and entered the Pact of Madrid that developed cultural and economic ties between the U.S. and Spain (Ambrose, 2012). Among the most significant deviations from NATO was Eisenhower’s move in 1956 not to support NATO members U.K. and France along with Israel, in their invasion of the Suez Canal (Mayer, 2010). Prior to the Suez Crisis, there was tacit support within the State Department to develop a U.S.-led, NATO-like alliance in the Middle East to counter the spread of Soviet Communism in the region (Burns, 1985, 11; Gaddis, 1998, 167). U.S. interests in the region were driven primarily by accessing energy and securing the transportation of oil. This meant the U.S. would entice governments in the region to align with the U.S. in exchange for American support. However, it also meant the U.S. would have to navigate between maintaining relations with Western European NATO member states, especially the U.K. and France who were struggling to maintain control of their colonial possessions in the Middle East and North Africa, and balance against expanding Soviet interests in the region (Neff, 1981, 18–19). Immediately after Nasser seized the Suez Canal, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet undertook military operations in Egypt to retake it and petitioned British Prime Minister Anthony Eden for his cooperation (Kyle, 2003, 145, 156). Mollet was also concerned that President Eisenhower did not feel the same sense of urgency and was therefore concerned that the U.S. would not support using military force (Kyle, 2003, 147–159). At the same time, France became deeply embroiled in the eruption of violence in Algeria and was withdrawing from Vietnam. Furthermore, earlier in 1956, the Soviet Union offered France a peace deal in Algeria whereby it would end its support for the armed resistance in exchange for France withdrawing from NATO and adopting a policy of neutrality

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in East–West tension (Kyle, 2003). Mollet kept France within NATO, which he assumed would be rewarded with Eisenhower’s support that never transpired following Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal (Kyle, 2003, 156). In the U.K., the Eden government was caught off guard and, consequently, came under tremendous pressure to respond. Nasser’s nationalization of the canal directly threatened U.K. economic interest and military interests and drew comparisons to appeasement policies in the 1938 Munich Agreement. Nasser’s actions also threatened British colonial prestige in the region and undermined the Commonwealth. In the absence of American support, the U.K. opted to take part in military operations to retake the canal (Kyle, chapter 3). While the U.K., France, and Israel achieved their military objectives, the Eisenhower Administration and the Khrushchev government forced them to withdrawal their forces resulting in a humiliating political defeat, especially for the U.K. and France. The Eisenhower Administration maintained that the invasion caused anti-Western backlash in the Arab world that would reverberate for years and could Arab states closer to the Soviet Union (Neff, 1981, 391). It was also concerned about providing U.S. support for the invasion at the same time the Soviet Union was about to invade Hungary (Mastny, 2002). According to Vice-President Richard Nixon (quoted in Borhi, 1999), “We couldn’t on the one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser.” The Soviet threats scared the U.S. and divided NATO (Gaddis, 1998, 237–240). If the Soviet Union did attack the U.K. and France, the U.S. was obligated by the North Atlantic Charter to come to the defense of its NATO allies. Eisenhower (quoted in Kyle, 2003, 458) told CIA Director Allen Dulles that “If the Soviets attack the French and British directly, we would be in a war and we would be justified in taking military action even if Congress were not in session.” However, the U.S. was not obligated by treaty to come to Israel’s defense (Alteras, 1993, 246). To avoid escalation, the Eisenhower Administration pressured the U.K., France, and Israel into withdrawing their forces (Turner, 2006, 368). After Saudi Arabia initiated an oil embargo against the U.K. and France, the U.S. refused to help its two NATO allies until each withdrew their military forces from Egypt. In addition, other NATO members followed the U.S. and opposed selling oil imported from Arab states to

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the U.K. or France (Love, 1969, 651). The Eisenhower Administration also threatened to inflict financial damage on the U.K. by manipulating U.S. Treasury holdings of the British Pound Sterling if it did not withdraw its military forces (Kyle, 2003; Peden, 2012; Smith, 2016). In the wake of the Suez Crisis, Egyptian control of the Canal was secured and British and French holdings in Africa were decolonized, hastening the decline of the U.K. and France as great powers. The Soviet Union took advantage of fissures within NATO. In 1956, it violently suppressed the Hungarian uprising and presented itself as a global leader against Western imperialism (Gaddis, 1998, 174–175). With nuclear threats proving to be effective foreign policy tools in the Middle East, the Soviet Union pursued other aggressive moves with its 1958 Berlin ultimatum, which demanded that the U.S. withdraw its military forces from the city (Gaddis, 1998, 236–239). Soviet nuclear threats against NATO members and the tacit American response in the Suez Canal Crisis convinced the French government that America was not reliable (Dietl, 2008, 273). It was already upset that Eisenhower did not support its military effort to maintain control of French Indochina, culminating in its defeat at Dien Bien Phu. France would also pursue its own nuclear weapons program and in 1966 President Charles de Gaulle withdrew from the integrated military command of NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1997, 84). While a formal European military autonomous from NATO never transpired, West Germany and France did lead the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, the precursor to the contemporary European Union (Dietl, 2008, 272–275). While British prestige in the Middle East was damaged, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan worked to restore relations with the U.S. In 1958, the two NATO allies signed the U.S.-U.K. Mutual Defence Agreement, which cemented bilateral security relations and resulted in the U.S. providing the British with advanced missile technologies it denied to France and other NATO members (Risse-Kappen, 1997). Although Macmillan’s successor, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, refused to commit British troops to help the U.S. in Vietnam, the U.S. and U.K. would maintain close ties. Unlike the U.K. and France, Israel largely escaped political humiliation (Pierre, 2014). The Suez Crisis had lasting effects on the transatlantic alliance. Not only did France withdraw from NATO’s military command and pursue its own a nuclear weapons program, it blocked U.K. membership in the European Economic Community. De Gaulle’s opposition to U.K.

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accession reflected the prevailing concern that the British would serve as American proxies inside Common Market. Former French Prime Minister Edith Cresson (quoted in Connolly, 2017) described De Gaulle’s opposition as: “It was his personal decision. He had a lot of experience of the British and he always thought they’d be on the Americans’ side… so I don’t think he believed that they’d play the game of Europe. Formally they’d be in, but actually they’d always be with the Americans.” The U.K. and France were forced to make binary choices between their European and transatlantic orientations. The Suez Crisis fractured transatlantic relations for decades as France and the U.K. would be faced with making binary choices over a whole host of issues involving the role of the U.S. in European security and around the world; for example, in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Koehane, 2016). Also, the question of maintaining nuclear deterrence in Europe would be a difficult task for the U.S. Although the U.S. tested atomic weapons and then used them against Japan in 1945, it wanted to maintain its advantage in nuclear weapons and long-range bombers with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union successfully tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1957 and then followed it up Sputnik in October 1957, both of which led the Eisenhower Administration to step up the development of the U.S. ICBM program. The U.S. successfully tested its first ICBM in December 1957 and then expanded ICBMs to include the Titan and Atlas programs and submarine launch ballistic missiles (SLBM) with the Polaris program in 1960 (Hitchcock, 2018, 169–175; Mieczkowski, 2013). In 1956, the U.S. Air Force deployed the PGM-17A Thor intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) and then shared it with the British Royal Air Force in 1958. This was the first time the U.S. shared its strategic nuclear weapons with another NATO member state (Patterson, 1996). The U.S. would also offer the GAM-87 Skybolt air launched ballistic missile (ALBM) to the U.K. to help build up the British nuclear deterrent (Pagedas, 2000, 184). At the same time, the Eisenhower Administration went to great lengths to limit Western Europe’s access to nuclear technologies. In 1960, it prevented the U.K., The Netherlands, and West Germany from acquiring gas-centrifuges, which could transform uranium into weaponsgrade uranium (Burr, 2015, 431–457). Eisenhower also rejected French requests for American nuclear technology because it was worried about political instability in the French Fourth Republic and feared France could use nuclear weapons in Vietnam or Algeria. French President Charles

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De Gaulle, however, sought to undermine American and British nuclear domination (Herring, 2008, 723–729). Interestingly, Eisenhower understood that competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was a marathon and believed the U.S. had a superior economy and open society that would be more appealing than anything the Soviet Union could offer. Eisenhower proposed several ideas he thought could reduce nuclear tensions with the Soviet Union, namely “Atoms for Peace” and “Open Skies” as well as positive dialogue Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev like the “Spirit of Geneva” and “Spirit of Camp David.” He also thought anti-Communism as “tragically stupid and ultimately worthless” (Sestanovich, 2016). Eisenhower even proposed a 20% reduction in U.S. troop levels in Europe and, in his now famous farewell address, warned Americans about the dangers of the “military-industrial complex” (Sestanovich, 2016). However, defense spending continued increasing during the Kennedy Administration moved to a more flexible nuclear response and fighting counterinsurgencies and limited wars to contain the spread of Communism. Between 1955 and 1965, U.S. annual defense spending fluctuated between $143 and $163 billion and from 1960 to 1965, defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP ranging between 7.2% and 8.6% (CEA, 1987; SIPRI, annual; World Bank, annual). Not only were new investments made in conventional and nuclear weapons systems, aerospace, procurement, and troop deployments in Europe and Asia, the U.S. considerable investments in the space program to keep pace with the Soviet Union. Shortly after John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1961, East Germany and the Soviet Union begin constructing the Berlin Wall, which physically separated West and East Berlin. Kennedy once referred to Berlin as “the great testing place of Western courage and will” and American and Soviet Union tanks even confronted one another at Checkpoint Charlie (Kempe, 2011, 478–479). The Berlin crisis forced the Kennedy Administration to boost the U.S. defense budget. Low military spending by European members of NATO at the time put additional pressure on the U.S. (Pagedas, 2000, 189). However, transatlantic fissures continued. In 1963, French President Charles DeGaulle rejected U.K. accession to the European Economic Community. De Gaulle distrusted British intentions and argued that the Common Market should be a counterweight to the U.S. U.K. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan viewed the “special relationship” with the

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U.S. as much more consequential to British security than France or West Germany (Davis, 1998). With the U.S. and U.K. moving closer to one another, France sought to pull West Germany away from the U.S. and separate Western Europe from the U.S. security umbrella with the Élysée Treaty (Marek, 2013). Furthermore, France opposed an American proposed multilateral nuclear force in favor of developing its own nuclear weapons program (Herring, 2008, 724–727). The treaty was an attempt at rapprochement between De Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and at assisting West Germany in building a nuclear weapons program. However, West German ratification required French and West German cooperation with the U.S. and West German military integration within NATO. Consequently, France became more incentivized to assert a foreign policy independent of the U.S. (Brinkley & Griffiths, 1999, 324). By the time Vietnam became a quagmire for the U.S., West European economies recovered economically from World War II. Moreover, others within NATO began openly pushing back against the U.S. The Johnson Administration request that NATO send military forces to South Vietnam were rejected by member states based on them having little to no strategic interest in Southeast Asia. Some objected to the America’s military buildup in Vietnam because of domestic public opposition to the war (Herring, 2008, 742–744). Tensions in Europe reached a reached a new height with the Warsaw Pact’s crushing of the uprisings in Prague in 1968. President Nixon made a concerted attempt to improve transatlantic relations. He traveled through Europe on a listening tour in February 1969. He called on NATO members to move from collective defense to collective security by with a new focus on social, cultural, and environmental concerns (Hanhimäki, 2013, 76). Also, NATO developed the Committee on the Challenges of the Modern Society (CCMS) to carry out such new initiatives in disaster assistance, road safety, and air pollution (Nichter, 2015, 13–17) consistent with expanded U.S. domestic roles in the areas of environmental protection and workplace protections (Nichter, 2015, 15, 18). The CCMS would later merge with NATOs Science for Peace and Security Programme (NATO, 2007). His administration signaled its support for expansion and greater integration in the European Community, which proceeded in 1973 with the entry of U.K., Ireland, and Denmark (Nichter, 2015, 5, 15).

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While Nixon reassured NATO that the U.S. was still committed to the alliance, he wanted key members to share more of the military and financial burden (Nichter, 2015, 12–14). By the early 1970s, Western Europe and Japan were building more advanced economies that competed with the U.S. and challenged global American economic dominance. Western European and Japanese exports were rivaling American exports, decreasing the U.S. share of global economic output and increasing the U.S. trade debt. Given the economic recovery and expansion of Western Europe and Japan, the Bretton Woods international financial system that fixed exchange rates on the U.S. dollar became untenable. In 1971, Nixon ended convertibility of the U.S. dollar from the gold standard, effectively ending Bretton Woods (Kannapel, 2016). Therefore, as Nixon viewed it, European NATO member states could now spend more on defense and shoulder a greater financial and military burden (Nichter, 2015, 12–14). Nixon was also forced to beat back several attempts in Congress to force U.S. troop reductions in Europe. In 1971, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield proposed the Mansfield Amendment, a non-binding measure that would reduce the number of US troops stationed in Europe from roughly 300,000 to 150,000 (Williams, 1985, 169–170). At the time, 215,000 U.S. troops were stationed in West Germany, 45,000 were attached to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the rest were in Italy, the U.K., Spain, and Turkey (Szulc, 1971, 9). The goal was to reduce the financial burden on the U.S. in NATO and stabilize the U.S. dollar at the same time the Bretton Woods monetary system was coming to an end. The Senate voted it down by 61–36. U.S. Senator Charles Mathias proposed a measure that would call on Nixon to enter negotiations with NATO and the Soviet Union for U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe, which failed in a 73–24 vote (Finney, 1971b). The Senate also rejected an attempt by U.S. Senator Frank Church to support a 50,000 reduction in U.S. troop levels in Europe, arguing that the U.S. needed to “chip away at the glacier of frozen positions that has characterized our policy in NATO. Many of these troops are so comfortable in Europe that they wouldn’t move out even if the Russians moved in” (Finney, 1971b). Nixon was worried that a reduction in the U.S. military commitment to Europe would weaken NATOs deterrent capabilities and negatively affect its legitimacy (Finney, 1971b; Williams, 1985). However, the attempts by Mansfield, Mathias,

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and Church were serious efforts to reduce the U.S. military commitment to NATO in the name of fiscal necessity (Finney, 1971a; Szulc, 1971, 9). As the U.S. was entangled in Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China were becoming virulent enemies. Soviet and Chinese militaries faced off with each other along their border, elevating the risk of dangerous exchanges and even war (Suri, 2009, 179–186). Confrontation between the two Communist powers drove each to reduce tensions with the U.S. and Nixon took advantage of the opportunity to play China off the Soviet Union (Goh, 2005, 475–502). When Nixon surprised the world with his unanticipated trip to China, it opened diplomatic relations between the two nation-states and moved the U.S. toward normalization of relations with China (MacMillan, 2008; Whiting, 1980, 334–341). Nixon also negotiated several arms control measures with the Soviet Union as part of the U.S. détente strategy (Hanhimäki, 2013, 76; Kissinger, 1994, 700–710; Litwak, 1984). The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT) led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, established limits on nuclear warheads, and restricted the number of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. The SALT I Agreements eventually led to the ratification of New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (New START) in 2011 (Tal, 2013, 1090–1116). By moving the U.S. closer to China and his overtures to the Soviet Union meant that the U.S. would move away from containment. After Gerald Ford became president following Nixon’s resignation in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the U.S. became less supportive of Western European positions. As Kissinger informed Ford “On CSCE - we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans...” (Ford et al., 1974). This led to criticisms that Ford was being sympathetic to Soviet opposition to less restrictions on the movement of people between East and West Europe. It also contributed to rising domestic opposition to Ford’s continuation of détente through the Helsinki Accords. Americans of Eastern European descent expressed their dismay over what they viewed as U.S. endorsement of Soviet control of East Europe and acceptance of the absorption of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania within the USSR (Snyder, 2010). Also, right-wing opposition grew within the Republican Party, emboldening former California Governor Ronald Reagan to launch a primary challenge to Ford in the 1976 presidential election (Brinkley, 2007; Snyder, 2010). President Jimmy Carter took office during a period of waning tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union. However, the rise of the political left

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and right and the collapse of the anti-Communist consensus in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal resulted in competing views over the role of the U.S. in the world. For example, Carter was a member of the Trilateral Commission, which emphasized human rights concerns in foreign policy, deemphasized dependence with Japan and Western Europe (Herring, 2008, 829–835). Also, internal divisions emerged as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance continued and expand détente and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski embraced a more aggressive approach to the Soviet Union and Communist governments in Eastern Europe (Rosati, 1987). While the Carter Administration emphasized human rights, democracy, and combatting poverty in U.S. foreign policy, Brzezinski influenced Carter to take a more strategic orientation on key issues (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2006, 40–47). Carter approved upgrading and expanding NATOs Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces. This was part of the NATO Dual-Track Decision in 1979, an overture to the Warsaw Pact that would limit, on both sides, the number of MRBMs and IRBMS. However, if there was disagreement, NATO would deploy additional the Pershing II MRBM and Gryphon BGM-109G Ground-Launched Cruise MRBMs and IRBMs in NATO states. These weapons contained multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) capable of hitting different targets within several warhead. Carter also approved equipping long-range strategic bombers with cruise missiles to keep pace with nuclear build-up in the Eastern bloc (Freeman, 2014, 331–355). This came at the same time SALT II was concluded, which limited arms control to strategic nuclear weapons and warheads, but did not include MRBMs and IRBMs, tactical nuclear weapons, and bombers (Auten, 2009; Keefer, 2017; McFadden, 2019). In addition, Carter continued the deployment of the MX Missile program, which later became the LGM-118A Peacekeeper and the first American ICBM to use a Cold Launch System that would fit inside Minuteman III ICBM silos (Wilson & Kaiser, 1979, 1). The worry was that the Soviet SS-20 Saber missile, a mobile IRBM with MIRVs and Tupolev Tu-22M, a long-range supersonic strategic bomber, would tip the nuclear balance against NATO (Cushman, 1988; NATO, 1979). U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War led to significant increases in defense spending. The Johnson Administration’s military escalation boosted defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 7.2% in 1965 to 9.1% in 1967. During the Reagan Administration, defense expenditures

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increased by $3.1 trillion over eight years with defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP increasing from 4.9% in 1980 to almost 7% in 1983 before falling back to 6% in under the George H. W. Bush administration (CEA, 1987, 1988; SIPRI, annual; World Bank, annual). From the end of the Second World War to Reagan’s second term, American leaders built and maintained a very large and extensive foreign policy bureaucracy that fed and served the U.S. military. From 1948 to 1986 defense spending totaled roughly $6.3 trillion and averaged $162 billion on annual basis with yearly increases averaging $2 billion (CEA, 1987, 1988). Several studies debate whether this level of defense spending improved U.S. national security or if significant portions of defense-related resources went to congressional patronage, padding costs, and boosting preferred defense contractors or were simply mismanaged, wasted, and bungled (Kaufman, 1986). During the Cold War, the U.S. deployed the bulk of its military forces to Europe to support NATO against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and in Asia to support Japan, South Korea, and other allies in the region. Not including the U.S., itself, from 1950 to 2000, 52% of U.S. troops were deployed in Europe and 41% were in Asia with more than one-third of the total or 10,000,000 troops deployed to West Germany/Germany alone (Kane, 2004). Today, the national defense establishment, foreign policy bureaucracy, and large segments of the defense-related economy have become intertwined into a complex political economy that would be incredibly difficult to disentangle. In other words, sizable portions of the private market economy have become dependent on government investments in national defense to contend with threats to U.S. national interests, defend U.S. allies, and ensure that challengers are checked and balanced. In many ways, Eisenhower’s warning about the “military-industrial complex” as become all to true (Sestanovich, 2016).

From the Beginning of the End to the End of the Cold War President Ronald Reagan departed from both Nixon and Carter with a more confrontational approach to the Soviet Union. Reagan approved National Security Decision Directive-32, which blocked Soviet access to advanced technology, decreased the production and value of Soviet commodities in international markets, and engaged in a massive U.S. military buildup of conventional, chemical, and nuclear forces (Posen & Van

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Evera, 1983; Reagan, 1982). NSDD-32 reaffirmed that Western Europe remained vital to U.S. national security, called on NATO members to boost defense spending and expand engage in commitments both within and beyond Europe, and prioritized U.S. energy access in the Persian Gulf. It also provided foreign aid to dictatorships in the Philippines and Chad, the apartheid government in South Africa, the Nicaragua Contras, the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, UNITA in Angola, and imposed sanctions against Poland for suppressing and imprisoning leaders of the Solidarity movement (Crile, 2003, 246, 285–302; Reagan, 1982; Schweizer, 1996). During the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, Reagan faced pressure from both the U.K., a NATO member and Argentina, an ally bound to the U.S. via the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. His administration was divided between those who supported the U.K. and others who believed that would undermine anti-Communist efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Given that it was Argentina that attacked British territory, the Reagan Administration eventually leaned toward the U.K. and imposed sanctions against Argentina (LaFeber, 1994, 87, 706). Reagan also approved new investments in U.S. general purpose forces, foreign security assistance and arms sales, and force integration. In addition, Reagan expanded the U.S. nuclear deterrent by increasing and improving nuclear weapons programs that could sustain a nuclear conflict, including modifications to the M-X missile and upgrades to land-based, strategic bomber, and submarine-based ballistic missiles. Reagan approved the deployment of Pershing II missiles in West Germany in accordance with NATO’s Dual Track Decision in 1979 and to extract concessions from the Soviets (Gelb, 1982; Posen & Van Evera, 1983). One of Reagan’s most controversial proposals was the Strategic Defense Initiative (Mowthorpe, 2004). SDI was a proposal to develop a missile defense system that included land and spaced-based lasers, particle beams, advanced sensors and computer systems, and satellites (Harper, 2019; Lambeth & Lewis, 1988). Put simply, it was an attempt to overcome the strategic logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD). After being criticized by the American Physical Society and dubbed “Star Wars,” the SDI budget was cut and renamed the Missile Defense Agency in 2002 (Glass, 2017; Mowthorpe, 2004). Reagan (1983) also used ideological and militant rhetoric to criticize Soviet actions. This was intensified after the USSR shot down a Korean Airlines flight in 1983. He called the Soviet an “evil empire” that would be thrown on to the “ash heap of history.” Reagan (1983) also

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believed Communist governments would eventually collapse: “I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whoselast pages even now are being written.” Inside elite Soviet circles, especially during Yuri Andropov’s tenure as General Secretary, there were concerns Reagan could launch a first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union (Gaddis, 2005, 231). By the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was experiencing significant internal economic problems. When Gorbachev was named Soviet Premier in 1985, 25% of Soviet GDP was devoted to defense while investments in civilian program were significantly cut (LaFeber, 2002). Also, the fall in global oil prices crippled the Soviet economy since energy exports were roughly 60% of economic production (LaFeber, 2002, 330–332). Meanwhile, the massive Soviet bureaucracy and incompetence and corruption were taking a toll on the economy. Soviet defense spending was based more on domestic bureaucratic interests and motivated by corruption and privileges than military strategy. According to LaFeber (1994, 734), Gorbachev was forced to seek “immediate relief for an economy staggering under Communist inefficiency, and that meant, in turn, imposing, some kind of controls on military spending.” It was bureaucratic and structural challenges as well as Soviet spending on defense, in support of nuclear arms and its conventional military campaign in Afghanistan, that contributed to the economic sluggishness that began under Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev (Gaddis, 2005, 212–214, 219–221, 224, 252; LaFeber, 1994, 649, 698, 733, 757; 2002, 330–335). To prevent the Soviet economy from collapsing, Gorbachev embraced policies to reorganize and liberalize the country through perestroika (restructure) and glasnost (openness). The goal was to reallocate Soviet resources away from costly military programs and bloated bureaucratic agencies to the private sector. Reagan believed the Soviets should simply look at the growing U.S. economy in the mid-1980s as evidence that free markets and democracy were superior to command economies and authoritarianism (Cannon, 1991). U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz even provided advice to Gorbachev on opening the Soviet economy and Reagan delivered a speech on capitalism at Moscow State University (Gaddis, 2005, 232–233). The U.S. and Soviet Union made several concessions in negotiations over conventional forces and nuclear weapons. In February 1987, NATO and the Warsaw Pact began discussing guidelines and limitations on

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conventional forces, calling for the elimination of disparities, preemptive capabilities, offensive military operations, and setting verification programs with the goal of developing a treaty on limiting conventional armed forces in Europe. Then in December 1988, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union planned to withdraw 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe and demobilize roughly 500,000 troops (FAS, n.d.-b). Gorbachev agreed to alter Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe (LaFeber, 1994, 733; 2002, 330–335). The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty banned U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles and launchers resulting in the elimination of roughly 2,700 missiles by 1991 and approved a 10-year verification and inspections process (Kramer & Specia, 2019). In the U.S., Reagan was under considerable political pressure given the Iran-Contra scandal, a scheme that secretly funneled profits from U.S. arms shipments to Iran to obtain the release of hostages to the Contras in Nicaragua. Then in 1988, the Soviet Union reversed the Brezhnev Doctrine and adopted a policy stating it would no longer intervene militarily in Eastern Europe. In 1989, Gorbachev withdrew military forces from Afghanistan (Greene, 2015, 119–123; LaFeber, 1994, 752–753). Reagan made no such commitments to NATO. By the end of Reagan’s presidency, it was clear that tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union were beginning to ease, but that Gorbachev made more concessions than Reagan. Reagan also instituted a significant defense reorganization in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The act overhauled the chain of command by placing commanders (four-star generals and admirals) under the Secretary of Defense who then reports to the president. Furthermore, the Act centralized military advice by establishing the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the primary military adviser to the president, created a vice-chair of the joint chiefs from a different military service branch, and downgraded other service chiefs to advisory roles and stripped them of operational control over the military services. Also, the Act improved interagency operations and designated that commanders have control over strategic, transportation, and special operations forces (Locher, 2002, 2017). When George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency, U.S. skepticism of Soviet intentions returned as the new administration began breaking with Reagan’s second term détente strategy (Greene, 2015, 110–112; Naftali, 2007, 67–68). Bush pressured the Soviets to pull back from the Central

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America, citing maintenance of U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere as among its most vital foreign policy interests (Bush, 1989a). Bush (1989b) stated, “fundamental facts remain that the Soviets retain a very powerful military machine in the service of objectives which are still too often in conflict with ours. So, let us take the new openness seriously, but let’s also be realistic. And let’s always be strong.” However, 1989 would be dominated by popular uprisings against Communist governments and Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany (Herring, 2008, 904– 908). As Eastern bloc states started buckling under popular pressure, Bush wanted to be on the side of popular movements (Bush, 1991). Bush visited Hungary and convinced Poland to hold elections in 1989 (Greene, 2015, 118–122; Halberstam, 2015, 9–12). Then in speech to a joint session of the Polish Parliament, Bush announced the U.S. would extend foreign aid and grant assistance to Poland and proposed funds to support Polish business investment and agriculture (Gaddis, 2005, 241– 243; LaFeber, 1994, 753). The U.S. and Poland also agreed to establish a Peace Corps program in Poland that included deploying Americans to the country to provide English language training to Polish students (Fitzwater, 1990a). Then in a 1990 meeting with President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, Bush endorsed Gorbachev’s proposal for peaceful change in Eastern Europe. They also secured Gorbachev’s support for the continued deployment of U.S. military forces to promote stability and security in Europe (Fitzwater, 1990b). It was during the first Bush Administration that the seeds of NATO expansion were planted (Sarotte, 2021a, 2021b). As democratic movements were emerging in 1989, Bush (quoted in Montgomery, 2019) declared U.S. support for a Europe both “whole and free.” The key elements included holding free and fair elections under the auspices of the Helsinki negotiations, uniting East and West Berlin, promoting a unified approach to environmental challenges across Europe, and reducing conventional military forces in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact through the Vienna negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe. The Bush Administration supported using existing Western institutions to integrate post-Communist governments and build stable institutions and opposed the development of new, all-European structures (Zantovsky, 2014, 49–53). NATO provided the institutional architecture for managing peaceful and democratic change. According to Secretary of State James Baker (1989), NATO was a useful and proven supranational

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institution that provided “new collective purposes” and lead a Post-Cold War European political order. Bush also supported of using the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to build democratic institutions, peaceful resolution of conflict, integrate national militaries, and protect human rights and the rule of law. To ensure political and economic development, former Communist governments would also be integrated into the European Community (EC). Using Euro-Atlantic institutions to integrate post-Communist governments was less risky and less disruptive than establishing new organizations during transition away from Communism. NATO was the most capable of promoting security and democratic political reforms in Europe and in hedging against political instability. NATO would also allow the U.S. to continue serving as a pacification force in Europe and influencing political change. To begin this process, NATO formed a decision-making group to reduce conventional and nuclear forces and to encourage former Warsaw Pact members to send delegations to NATO and establish standing liaison missions (Baker, 1995, 237). Then, at the July 1990 NATO Summit in London, NATO issued a “hand of friendship” to former Warsaw Pact members and invited them to form a new partnership, transform NATO to contend with new missions in the Post-Cold War era, and to build on collective security and cooperative military and political ties among with existing NATO members (NATO, 1990). The goal was to maintain momentum on integrating Central and Eastern European states into the transatlantic community of democracies to prevent reverting on democratic reforms and the return of nationalist and populist leaders and contain the spread of separatist movements in Yugoslavia. In 1991, the failed coup in the Soviet Union accelerated support for boosting ties with Western institutions, especially after the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. NATO and the EC would consider at some point endorsing the prospect of adding new members (Kennan, 1997; Sciolino, 1994). And given Soviet concerns about integrating the East with the West, some NATO states pushed back against moving too quickly. After the EC resisted providing economic assistance to Poland, to avoid provoking the Soviet Union into keeping its troops in former Warsaw Pact countries, Walesa (quoted in Haverman, 1991) warned that “the Iron Curtain could be replaced by a silver curtain separating a rich West from a poor East.” Moreover, both Walesa and Havel were insistent, especially later with President Clinton, that Poland and Czechoslovakia be invited to

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join NATO and the EC. If the Soviet Union and, later Russia, were to maintain a presence in Central and Eastern Europe, then the integration of new states into Euro-Atlantic institutions would be slow and cumbersome. Put simply, post-Communist governments viewed NATO membership as the primary vehicle for democratization and collective security and believed EC membership would accelerate their economic development (Sarotte, 2019). With the understanding that the collapse of Communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe could lead to conflict in post-Cold War Europe, the U.S. endorsed partnerships that would promote and sustain a peace transition toward democracy and collective security. NATO initially preferred that post-Communist governments make democratic reforms as opposed to submitting formal applications of NATO membership (Flanagan, 2019). This included establishing democratic rules and norms consistent with NATO objectives for promoting peace and stability in Post-Cold War Europe. At a June 1991 NATO meeting in Copenhagen, Baker argued that NATO needed to establish guidelines for liaison relationships between foreign ministers from NATO states and states aspiring for NATO membership. Although these relationships would not provide security guarantees to Central and Eastern European states, they were designed to be initial steps to foster and build norms cooperation, goodwill, and trust. The U.S. took the lead in advancing the following objectives: collaboration on technological capabilities to contend with common challenges such as civil emergencies, develop updated and modern instruments to adopt and integrate with NATO operations, promote political and military exchange programs, embrace open and flexible rules that reflect progress toward democratic improvements and peaceful resolution of conflict (Sarotte, 2019). These objectives became the guiding principles that would later form the basis of NATOs Partnership for Peace initiative. The meeting in Copenhagen was critical for providing former Communist states a path to join NATO and integrate into a transatlantic security order. It would frame discussions at the NATO Rome Summit in November 1991 where the U.S. and Germany proposed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to facilitate NATO discussions with Central and Eastern European states on collective security and cooperation (Baker & Genscher, 1991). NATOs Rome Declaration (1991) stated that transatlantic security would be “inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe,” and “common security can best be safeguarded

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through the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships.” NACC would expand its liaison program with the Soviet Union and later with the former Soviet republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States as well as post-Communist states in the Warsaw Pact (NATO, 2017). The Rome Declaration did not allay the worries about democratic backsliding among anxious Central and Eastern European states. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stated in December 1992 that the expanding dialogue “could contribute to transforming the composition of the Alliance itself” (quoted in Goldgeier, 1999, 18). Post-Communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe sought NATO and EC membership to maintain momentum toward building and developing democratic political institutions and upgrading security mechanisms to Western standards. They were also concerned and worried about the Soviet Union attempting to reconstitute itself, but after the coup failed to oust Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 NATO and EC memberships became the primary institutional vehicles to prevent backsliding toward authoritarianism and reticence. However, Bush did not embrace popular movements that sought to redraw borders of several Eastern European states. This was especially the case in Yugoslavia where Bush opposed secession and resisted supporting separatist movements. During the Cold War, the U.S. believed the best way to support Yugoslavia’s autonomy from Soviet Union was defending the unity and territorial integrity of the ethnically and religiously diverse state. The U.S. and its Western allies maintained that Yugoslavia could be held up as a model for Eastern European states seeking to move away from Soviet control and served as a geopolitical buffer for the West. But when the Cold War ended, Yugoslavia lost its geostrategic value to the West and its collapse seemed inevitable (Bennett, 1995). Secretary of State James Baker visited Belgrade in June 1991 and announced that the Bush Administration would defend the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. He warned against the “dangers of disintegration” and stated that the U.S. would not provide diplomatic recognition of breakaway states. Because of this, Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia believed that the U.S. would not object to the use of violence to prevent Croatian and Slovenian independence. The Bush Administration reluctantly provided diplomatic recognition of Croatia in April 1992, but only after thousands were killed and displaced (Ramet, 1992). Then, in late 1992,

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Bush signaled to France and the U.K. that the U.S. sought their support for the “creation of an international civilian force that could include Americans to monitor Serbian repression of the Albanian majority in Kosovo” (see Sciolino, 1991). While NATO membership for post-Communist states and maintaining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia were essential for the Bush Administration, the primary goal in Europe was the reunification of Germany. Bush supported German reunification and unified Germany’s membership in NATO, although there were concerns in Western Europe about a powerful and unified Germany playing an outsized role in NATO. The Soviet Union was worried given the potential of German rearmament and militarization if the U.S. was going to withdraw too many of its forces (Greene, 2015, 120–126; Naftali, 2007, 90–94). However, Bush was very much in favor of reunification and provided German Chancellor Helmut Kohl with the necessary support to speed up the process (Baker, 1995, 214–218; Greene, 2015, 116–119). Besides, the Soviet Union was too weakened to blunt reunification and viewed the use of military force to prevent the disintegration of East Germany as too risky (Greene, 2015; Herring, 2008). Bush and Gorbachev met at the Malta Summit in December 1989, declaring an end to the Cold War even though no formal treaty acknowledging its end was signed. Gorbachev stated (Bush & Gorbachev, 1989), “we would like our relations to develop in such a way that they would open greater possibilities for cooperation…. This is just the beginning. We are just at the very beginning of our road, long road to a longlasting, peaceful period.” Bush (Bush & Gorbachev, 1989) stated, “We can realize a lasting peace and transform the East–West relationship to one of enduring cooperation.” One year later, to bring the Soviet Union into the Western economic order, Bush endorsed special association for the USSR in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Bush, 1990a). German reunification and NATO membership were first steps toward membership for post-Communist systems (Sarotte, 2021a, 2021b). U.S. forces would remain in Europe to pacify an integrated and unified Germany and NATO would ensure Germany would adhere to collective security principles (Schmemann, 1990, 1). The Soviet Union preferred that the U.S. and NATO remain in Germany as pacification forces (Baker, 1995; Spohr, 2015, 221–229).

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In February 1990, NATO and the Warsaw Pact convened the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa and initiated the “Two Plus Four” process in which East and West Germany would hold internal negotiations on German reunification. France, the U.K., Soviet Union, and the U.S. would guide external negotiations on German accession to NATO that included reassurances to the Soviets that NATO would not expand further east and measures that would prevent Germany from rearmament (Burns, 2019). Bush was willing to collaborate with the Soviet Union on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which would set limits on conventional weaponry and military equipment in Europe and establish equal restrictions on both NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Bush, 1990c). Bush also agreed to reduce the number of U.S. warplanes and helicopters and limit the number of active-duty U.S. and Soviet military personnel stationed in Europe at 275,000. This would include imposing limits on conventional unified German military forces (Burns, 2019). U.S. foreign policy officials have rejected claims and assertions that U.S. and German diplomats offered informal assurances to Soviet and Russian leaders that NATO would not expand further east following German reunification and membership in NATO. According to Mark Kramer (2009), “Gorbachev did receive numerous assurances during the ‘2+4’ process that helped sweeten the deal for him, but none of these had anything to do with the enlargement of NATO beyond Germany.” However, U.S. officials made statements, not written commitments, that NATO would not expand beyond full unified German membership. Secretary of State Baker informed Gorbachev that “if somewhere in the course of events you feel that the United States is doing something undesirable to you, without hesitation call us and tell us about it” (quoted in in Bacevich, 2017). Baker promised Gorbachev that unified German membership in NATO would keep Germany from threatening Europe and the Soviet Union. But he added, “We understand that not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” Germany’s accession to NATO would not only pacify the country, but it would also “guarantee that Germany’s unification will not lead to NATO’s military organization spreading to the east.” He even asked Gorbachev, “what would you prefer: a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops;

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or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisprudence [jurisdiction?] or troops will not spread east of the present boundary?” While Gorbachev answered, “it goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable,” Baker replied, “We agree with that” (quotes in Bacevich, 2017; Shifrinson, 2016; Treisman, 2011, 316). But in the absence of a written agreement and with the Soviet Union economically and politically weakened, Gorbachev could not put up much resistance to a unified Germany in NATO. In September 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany approved German reunification and membership in NATO with full rights (German Tribune, 1990). It also required the Soviet Union to withdraw its military forces, allowed Germany to redeploy forces throughout the country, mandated that Germany reduce the overall size of its military forces, renounced the possession of all weapons of mass destruction, and reaffirm its commitment to the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (Greene, 2015, 133–138). Moreover, the U.S. pushed France to drop its opposition to the continued deployment of conventional missiles in Germany. The U.S. and U.K. maintained that eliminating the weapons would leave Europe vulnerable to the Soviet Union’s vast superiority in conventional military forces (Weinraub, 1989). The Treaty on the Final Settlement endorsed full membership for Germany in NATO although it did require Germany to pay financial remuneration to the Soviet Union and provide assurances on military deployments and conventional force levels. NATO did not agree to written commitments or guarantees to reject new members beyond Germany (Sarotte, 2014). The Bush Administration proposed decreasing the number of U.S. troops stationed in Western Europe but stopped short of a complete withdrawal as it would deprive NATO of a powerful deterrent. While Bush (1990b) stated “I agree with our European allies that an American military presence in Europe is essential and that it should not be tied solely to the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe,” he added, “our troop levels can still be lower. And so, tonight I am announcing a major new step for a further reduction in U.S. and Soviet manpower in Central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 on each side.” Bush (1990b) claimed this would “protect American and European interests and sustain NATO’s defense strategy. A swift conclusion to our arms

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control talks – conventional, chemical, and strategic – must now be our goal.” Although Gorbachev embraced non-intervention in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union suppressed uprising and nationalist sentiment within the USSR. This was evident in Ukraine as well as in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania where ethnic tensions and animosities brewed among various groups and Russian minorities since the Soviet annexation in 1940. The U.S. never recognized the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states. In 1990, in a move to prevent separatist movements from breaking out throughout the Soviet Union, Gorbachev ordered the Soviet military into Lithuania after it proclaimed independence (Greene, 2015, 118–121). The Bush Administration was in a very difficult position because it needed Soviet support for the reunification of Germany and NATO membership. It was also worried about “loose nukes,” a worrisome scenario in which the collapse of the Soviet Union could lose control of nuclear weapons or, event worse, sell them to terrorists or dangerous states (Lavin, 2008). Bush decided only to issue mild protest of Gorbachev’s intervention in Lithuania and resisted providing military assistance to Lithuanian separatists so the U.S. could secure Soviet consent to German reunification and membership in NATO (Herring, 2008). Bush (see Safire, 2004) issued a very tepid response to Ukraine’s declaration of independence in his so-called “Chicken Kiev speech,” in which he endorsed a policy of non-interference and criticized “suicidal nationalism.” But after the coup ultimately failed to remove Gorbachev from power due to a popular uprising and diplomatic pressure, the Communist Party’s hold on power rapidly gave way. With the cancellation of the 1922 Treaty of Union on December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated into 15 separate and independent nation-states (Greene, 2015, 204; Naftali, 2007, 135–139). However, violence erupted in former Soviet republics with Armenia and Azerbaijan fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh, separatist movements in Georgia and Moldova, violence between 1990 and 1992 in the breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova to resist closer ties with Romania, and the outbreak of the first Chechen War in 1994. Regarding nuclear weapons, the U.S. and Soviet Union entered the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in July 1991. START I (1991), which was first negotiated by Reagan and Gorbachev, reduced and limited strategic offensive missiles in Europe, barring both countries from deploying more than 6,000 warheads and 1,600 ICBMs and

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strategic bombers. It was the most significant arms control treaty signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union as it reduced nuclear weapons by 80% (START I, 1991). The treaty was replaced by New Start in 2010, which further reduced the overall number of nuclear weapons. In January 1992, new Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia would no longer target nuclear weapons at the U.S. (AP, 1992, 9). Then on February 1 at Camp David, Bush (1992) proclaimed “the end of the Cold War and the dawn of a new era. Russia and the United States are charting a new relationship.” The two leaders also negotiated START II, which banned MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) on ICBMs (START II, 1996). Even after he was defeated in the 1992 presidential election, Bush promised that the U.S. was going to follow through on its commitments and support the new yet fledgling Russian government by promoting democracy and freedom in the country (Fitzwater, 1992). Bush (1993) believed START II was evidence that the two former adversaries could now cooperate as friends and partners in a new era of democracy. The U.S. emerged from the end of the Cold War victorious and confident. It managed the transition to the post-Cold War environment with strategic patience and humility. The American people were confident in knowing that the U.S. was now the world’s only remaining superpower with few challengers and adversaries. However, the purpose and legitimacy of NATO was questioned given the collapse of the Soviet Union. Following the unification of Germany and its full integration within NATO, new challenges arose with the collapse of Yugoslavia, humanitarian crises, and a rising China. The U.S. began pursuing a foreign policy agenda of securing post-Communist in governments Europe through greater integration within NATO and promoting democracy in an expanding rules-based world order.

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Neff, D. (1981). Warriors at Suze: Eisenhower takes America into the Middle-East. Simon and Schuster. Nichter, L. (2015). Richard Nixon and Europe: The reshaping of the postwar Atlantic world. Cambridge University Press. Niebuhr, R. (1932). Moral man and immoral society: A study in ethics and politics. Westminster John Knox Press. Niebuhr, R. (1952). The irony of American history. Charles Scribner’s Sons. Niebuhr, R. (1957, November 11). Editorial notes. Christianity and Crisis, 17 , 147. Niebuhr, R. (1965). Vietnam: An insoluble problem. Christianity and Crisis, 25(1), 1–2. Niebuhr, R. (2011). The children of light and the children of darkness: A vindication of democracy and a critique of its traditional defense (G. Dorrien, Introduction). University of Chicago Press. Nitze, P. H., & Nelson Drew, S. (1994). NSC-68: Forging the strategy of containment. National Defense University. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (1979). Special meeting of foreign defence ministers (The ‘double-track’ decision on theater nuclear forces). https://web. archive.org/web/20090227173641/http:/www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ b791212a.htm North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (1990, March 3). 1990 summit: A turning point in ‘east west’ relations. https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news_1 16133.htm?selectedLocale=en North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2017, January 30). North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (Archived). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ topics_69344.htm Pagedas, C. (2000). Anglo-American strategic relations and the French problem, 1960–1963: A troubled partnership. Frank Cass. Parker, J. J. (1954, April). The American constitution and the treaty making power. Washington University Law Quarterly (2), 115–131. Patterson, J. (1996). Grand expectations: The United States, 1945–1974. Oxford University Press. Peden, G. C. (2012). Suez and Britain’s decline as a world power. Historical Journal, 55(4), 1073–1096. Pierre, J.-M. (2014). 1956 Suez Crisis and the United Nations. Tannenberg Publishing. Posen, B. R., & Evera, S. V. (1983, Summer). Defense policy and the Reagan administration: Departure from containment. International Security, 8(1), 3– 45. Ramet, S. P. (1992, Fall). War in the Balkans. Foreign Affairs.

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Reagan, R. (1982, May 20). National security decision directive-32. White House. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/ reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd32.pdf Reagan, R. (1983, March 8). Ronald Reagan, address to the National Association of Evangelicals ‘evil empire speech.’ Voices of Democracy: The U.S. Oratory Project. University of Maryland College Park. http://voicesofdemocracy.umd. edu/reagan-evil-empire-speech-text/ Risse-Kappen, T. (1997). Cooperation among democracies: The European influence on U.S. foreign policy. Princeton University Press. Rosati, J. A. (1987). The Carter administration’s quest for global community: Beliefs and their impact on behavior. Harper and Row. Safire, W. (2004, December 6). Putin’s chicken Kiev. New York Times, 23. Sarotte, M. E. (2014, September/October). A broken promise? What the west really told Moscow about NATO expansion. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 96–97. Sarotte, M. E. (2019, March 19). The convincing call from Central Europe: Let us into NATO, NATO enlargement turns 20. Foreign Affairs. Sarotte, M. E. (2021a). Not one inch: America, Russia, and the making of postCold War stalemate. Yale University Press. Sarotte, M.E. (2021b, November/December). Containment beyond the Cold War: How Washington lost the post-Soviet peace. Foreign Affairs, 100(6), 22–35 Schmemann, S. (1990, July 17). Evolution in Europe: Gorbachev clears way for German unity, dropping objection to NATO membership, 1. Schweizer, P. (1996). Victory: The Reagan administration’s secret strategy that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union. Atlantic Monthly Press. Sciolino, E. (1991, November 25). Bush asks France and Britain to back force of monitors in Kosovo. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/1992/ 11/25/world/bush-asks-france-and-britain-to-back-force-of-monitors-in-kos ovo.html Sciolino, E. (1994, December 6). Yeltsin says NATO is trying to split continent again. New York Times, 1. Sestanovich, S. (2016, January/February). The long history of leading from behind. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 2016/01/the-long-history-of-leading-from-behind/419097/ Shifrinson, J. R. (2016). Deal or no deal? The end of the Cold War and the U.S. offer to limit NATO expansion. International Security, 40(4), 7–44. Smith, S. C. (2016). Reassessing Suez 1956: New perspectives on the crisis and its aftermath. Routledge. Snyder, S. B. (2010). Through the looking glass: The Helsinki final act and the 1976 election for president. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 21(1), 87–106. Spiro, P. J. (2001). Treaties, executive agreements, and constitutional method. Texas Law Review, 79(5), 961, 1015.

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Spohr, K. (2015). Germany, America and the shaping of post-Cold War Europe: A story of German international emancipation through political unification. Cold War History, 15(2), 221–243. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I. (1991, July). Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) executive summary. https://web.archive.org/web/201 10106051804/http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/execsum.htm Also see: https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaties-betweenunited-states-america-and-union-soviet-socialist-republics-strategic-offensivereductions-start-i-start-ii/ Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II. (1996, May). Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. https://fas.org/nuke/control/start2/docs/ start-95.htm Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (Annual). Yearbook: Armaments, disarmament, and international security. https://www.sipri.org/ yearbook Suri, J. (2009). Henry Kissinger and the American century. Belknap Press. Szulc, T. (1971, May 12). Mansfield asks 50% cut in U.S. in Europe. New York Times, 9. Tal, D. (2013). ‘Absolutes’ and ‘stages’ in the making and application of Nixon’s SALT policy. Diplomatic History, 37 (5), 1090–1116. Treisman, D. (2011). The return: Russia’s journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev. Simon and Schuster. Truman, H. S. (1947, March 12). President Harry S. Truman’s address before a joint session of Congress. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp Turner, B. (2006). Suez 1956: The world’s first war for oil. Hodder & Stoughton. Weiner, T., & Crossette, B. (2005, March 18). George F. Kennan dies at 101; Leading strategist of Cold War. New York Times, 1. Weinraub, B. (1989, May 12). Mitterand backs U.S. idea for NATO. New York Times, 12. Whiting, A. S. (1980). Sino-American détente. China Quarterly, 82, 334–341. Williams, P. (1985). The Senate and U.S. troops in Europe. Palgrave-Macmillan. Wilson, G. C., & Kaiser, R. G. (1979, June 8). Carter decides to build the MX missile. Washington Post, 1. World Bank. (Annual). World development indicators. http://data.worldbank. org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators Zantovsky, M. (2014, November/December). In search of allies: Vaclav Havel and the expansion of NATO. World Affairs, 177 (4), 47–58.

CHAPTER 4

Democracy Promotion and Euro-Atlantic Integration

In the post-Cold War period, U.S. foreign policy became more predictably anchored in global institutions, norms, and formal and informal alliance networks. The goal in a more unipolar world was to maintain global stability and advance American national interests of underwriting global security, liberalizing trade, and globalizing economic prosperity (Ikenberry, 2009, 215–217). The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization became institutional pillars in a U.S.-led order. U.S. allies, especially NATO members, came to rely on America’s predictable pattern of foreign policy preferences and behavior. Any breakdown in the open yet rules-based international order would be met with a strong American response in association with America’s allies and partner states.

Clinton and Integrating Post-communist Governments Following the collapse of Communist governments in Europe and the Soviet Union, U.S. defense spending decreased even though it led the coalition effort in the first Persian Gulf War. From 1989 to 1992, defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP dropped from 5.5 to 4.6% and annual defense spending decreased from $375 billion in 1989 to $332 in 1992 (COW, n.d.; SIPRI, annual; World Bank, annual). During this time, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. J. Dolan, The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6_4

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the U.S. decreased the number of troops stationed in Germany to roughly 105,000 in 1993 and to 69,000 by 2000 (Kane, 2004) and withdrew tens of thousands of troops in the U.K. after 1990. Although it maintained troop levels in Italy, the U.S. also sharply reduced the number of troops stationed in Spain from 9,000 to 2,000 after 1989 and cut by 50% the number of troops deployed to Portugal, Iceland, Greece, and The Netherlands (Kane, 2004). However, the U.S. deployed roughly 15,000 troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 and boosted troop levels in Kosovo in 1999 (Kane, 2004). Unlike his predecessor, President Clinton lacked international and foreign policy experience prior to his election in 1992 (Harris, 2005). Clinton defeated Bush by accusing Bush of spending too much time and attention to foreign affairs. With his argument that “It’s the Economy, Stupid,” Clinton’s goal was to focus “like a laser beam” on the U.S. domestic economy and reestablish economic growth following the 1990– 1991 recession (Walt, 2000). Although Clinton relegated international affairs to the backburner during the 1992 campaign, he developed significant foreign policy interest and skill. He elevated international economics to a much higher level than many of his predecessors by successfully concluding negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement, supporting the Uruguay Round that created the World Trade Organization (WTO), normalizing trade relations with China and supporting its accession to the WTO, and intervening in the Mexican peso crisis and the Asian financial crisis. The Clinton Administration pursued an internationalist strategy of integrating post-Communist systems into NATO and endorsing the expansion of the European Community. The goal was to ensure that popular movements which brought down Communist regimes would maintain momentum and build stable democracies capable of peacefully resolving conflicts, strengthening the norm of collective security, and preventing the outbreak of another major power war. Clinton would be tested with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The Bush Administration believed that the end of the Cold War meant that Yugoslavia was no longer a major concern even as violence and ethnic conflict was raging in both Croatia and Slovenia. The initial view was that ethnic, religious, and nationalist violence should be addressed by Europeans, not the Americans. However, Clinton believed that the U.S. should in some way play a role in bringing the conflict to an end (Larres, 2004, 180). Bosnian Serbs wanted to stay within what remained of Yugoslavia

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and Bosnian Muslims favored separation and independence, and Bosnia Croats wanted to reunite with Croatia. However, Bosnian Serbs were supported militarily by Serbia and were in a much stronger military position. As the war in Bosnia was raging, the Clinton Administration focused on improving on the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and facilitating dialogue with Russia. Through a series of diplomatic negotiations and military and political assessments, states in the former Eastern Bloc, the Baltics, the former Yugoslavia, and Russia would be invited to partner with NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. PfP was proposed by the U.S. and launched by NATO in January 1994 at its Brussels Summit with the goal of building trust and understanding between NATO states and former Communist states in Europe including Russia (Borawski, 1994; NATO, 2009) in the areas of military-to-military cooperation, upgrading military hardware and technology, improving civil-military relations, promoting scientific, environmental, and policy cooperation, and ensuring that democracy would flourish. PfP guidelines were not very specific other than the aspiring state’s commitment to democracy, market economy, responsible security policies, and integration and interoperability with NATO forces. PfP was genuinely intended to construct a rules-based democratic order in Europe and strengthen the norm of collective security. Most important to Russia, was that PfP did not involve the article 5 security guarantee from the U.S. since post-Communist and post-Soviet states would not be formal NATO members (Borawski, 1994; NATO, 1994, 2009). However, the Clinton Administration quickly moved beyond PfP, opting to support new membership applications to NATO. Clinton described PfP as a “track that will lead to NATO membership” that “does not draw another line dividing Europe a few hundred miles to the east” (see Savranskaya & Blanton, 2018). For Clinton, developing a formal process for NATO membership was the only way to address the security concerns of former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO membership was a vehicle to integrate military and defense networks with existing NATO member states. It also incentivized postCommunist systems to build and maintain democratic institutions within a “Euro-Atlantic” order. The primary goal was not to threaten Russia although that would become the narrative after the 2008 South Ossetia War and the 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests that ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.

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In encouraging NATO membership, the Clinton Administration was balancing Central and Eastern European states worried about the return of authoritarianism and a security vacuum in Europe given the wars in the former Yugoslavia. It also wanted to prevent Russia from walking away from negotiations on nuclear weapons. A debate emerged between those who wanted NATO to promote collective security and serve as a democracy-building project and those concerned with adding new members too hastily and provoking Russia. According to Clinton, NATOs eastward expansion was not designed to embarrass Russia or undercut its interests. He stated, “I won’t support any change that undermines Russia’s security or redivides Europe” and even encouraged Yeltsin to participate in PfP (see Savranskaya & Blanton, 2018). Despite American reassurances, Russia opposed NATO enlargement beyond German reunification and membership. On September 15, 1993, Yeltsin wrote to Clinton conveying his “uneasiness” with NATO expansion and instead endorsed “a pan-European security system.” He even cautioned Clinton that “Not only the opposition, but moderate circles as well [in Russia], would no doubt perceive this as a sort of neoisolation of our country in diametric opposition to its natural admission into Euro-Atlantic space.” He added that “the spirit” of German reunification “precludes the option of expanding the NATO zone into the East” (see Savranskaya & Blanton, 2018). By the end of 1994, Russian opposition to new membership accessions was growing. At the CSCE Summit in Budapest, Yeltsin warned Clinton about the return of tensions with the West: “Why are you sowing the seeds of mistrust? … Europe is in danger of plunging into a cold peace …. History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital” (Sciolino, 1994: 1). Yeltsin later objected, expressing concern that “I see nothing but humiliation for Russia if you proceed …. Why do you want to do this? We need a new structure for Pan-European security, not old ones! …. But for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding towards those of Russia – that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people.” But Clinton insisted that “gradual, steady, measured” inclusion of new members would happen: “You can say you don’t want it speeded up – I’ve told you we’re not going to do that – but don’t ask us to slow down either, or we’ll just have to keep saying no” (see Savranskaya & Blanton, 2018).

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After NATO intervened in Bosnia against the Bosnian Serbs, Yeltsin condemned the Clinton Administration over NATO enlargement. He stated, “How do you think it looks to us… while the Warsaw Pact had been abolished. It’s a new form of encirclement.” Clinton informed Yeltsin that PfP was “the real thing now” and that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how” (Asmus, 2002; Goldgeiger, 1999, 57–58, 62–70). According to Clinton, participation in PfP was a “track that will lead to NATO membership” that “does not draw another line dividing Europe a few hundred miles to the east.” Clinton did concede to Vaclav Havel that “the reaction in Russia could be the reverse of what we want.” Whereas Walesa informed Clinton that “Russia had signed many agreements, but its word was not always good: one hand held a pen; the other a grenade,” Havel maintained that “it was neither possible nor desirable to isolate Russia” (see Savranskaya & Blanton, 2018). Yeltsin was adamant that NATO did not absorb former Soviet republics, especially those with large ethnic Russian populations. Such a move would be interpreted by Russia as an affront to its national security interests, especially in Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia, and Georgia. Yeltsin stated that NATO “should also not embrace the former Soviet republics. I cannot sign any agreement without such language. Especially Ukraine… Our relations with the CIS and with the Baltic countries should be like yours within NATO.” Yeltsin tried to reassure Clinton about Western concerns about Russian designs on former Soviet republics: “not going out to seize Sevastopol… We respect Georgia, Moldova, and other countries and have to claims on their territory.” But, he warned the US about Ukraine with his statement that “[we] need US restraint in dealing with Ukraine” (quoted in Mihkelson, 2018). The Clinton Administration’s endorsement of new NATO membership applications showed that the “Two Plus Four” process that was initiated during the Bush Administration was now dead. Under Clinton, the U.S. could use Partnership for Peace to pursue NATO membership for postCommunist states U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General George Shalikashvili ensured them that PfP was the “the best path’” for NATO membership (NATO, 1994). NATO accession would become associated with a Europe “whole and free,” beginning with Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in

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2004, Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia in 2020. Clinton’s use of PfP as the vehicle for NATO membership was premised on the argument that it, along with E.U. membership, was the only way of extending the zone of peace from Western to Central and Eastern Europe. That is, joining NATO meant securing collective peace and security under and conforming to conventional democratic standards. This optimism flew in the face of major power politics and realpolitik and was incredibly short-sighted. While Russia was too weak in the 1990s to object, once it was strong enough it would blunt Euro-Atlantic expansion (Sarotte, 2021). Yeltsin did warn the Clinton Administration as did Gorbachev warn the Bush Administration that NATOs eastward expansion would be interpreted as an encroachment on Russia’s sphere of influence. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan warned that NATO enlargement was a “Fateful Error” in 1997, arguing that “Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East–West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking” (Kennan, 1997). But the U.S. and NATO viewed Russia like as a defeated power that was too weak to push back. George Kennan (quoted in Drezner, 2008) who in 1996 warned that NATO’s eastward expansion toward Russia was a “strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions.” Kennan stated, “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war. I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else.” He then added that NATO “shows so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history. Of course, there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are – but this is just wrong” (quoted in Friedman, 1998, 15). With the 2020 admission of North Macedonia, the drawbacks of a large and sprawling Euro-Atlantic alliance with new yet weak members provide Russia with incentives to meddle, stir, exploit, and manipulate NATO’s many open and gaping holes.

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Accepting new NATO membership applications was a risky proposition not only for potentially provoking but stretching the alliance too alliance too thin with an open-ended process for integration and accession. No limits or parameters were placed on how far NATO would expand. Accession guidelines were vague and abstract, having emphasized military cooperation and democratization. Consequently, NATO membership was an open door that any European state could qualify for. This was a highly revisionist strategy that would continue and move forward that would become very alarming to Russia. The open-ended NATO membership process was sustained by American unipolarity and globalization and technological developments. In the 1990s, Americans were confident in the primacy of American power. Democracy was on the march and capitalism expanding to China, and India. It seemed like the U.S. is hitting that “end of history” moment that was suggested by Francis Fukuyama (2006). As Bill Clinton (quoted in Walt, 2000) stated in 1992, “the cynical calculus of pure power politics is ill-suited to a new era.”

The Clinton Administration’s Fight to Maintain Alliance Credibility: NATO Intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo The humanitarian crisis and war in Bosnia provided an impetus for Clinton to put his foreign policy into action. The war became intertwined with the process of NATO enlargement for Central and Eastern European states concerned with political instability and democratic backsliding. The same major powers in NATO driving enlargement had differing views on how to end the war. At first, the U.K., France, and Germany were opposed to military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the U.S. airlifted food and medical supplies to some areas under siege (Bethlehem & Weller, 1997). Clinton then embraced a more direct and aggressive approach, embracing a “lift-launch” plan that included lobbying the United Nations to lift the arms embargo on the warring sides and providing Bosnian Muslim militias with weapons and supporting them with NATO-led airstrikes. Secretary of State Warren Christopher petitioned the U.K., France, and Germany to support “liftlaunch,” however, they were opposed to the plan given their fears of being

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dragged into a quagmire (Christopher, 1998, 343–348; Hodge, 2006, 54–58). Given European opposition, Clinton resisted efforts in Congress to unilaterally lift the arms embargo (Larres, 2004). However, he ordered covert missions, developed secret channels, worked with Islamists to send weapons to Bosnian Muslims (Aldrich, 2002). He also did not object to Iran transmitting weapons to Bosnian Muslims through Croatia and Pakistan secretly sending arms and missiles to fighters (Wiebes, 2003, 195). The support helped Bosnian Muslims turn back Bosnian Serb advances in the face of opposition from European NATO members. NATO did intervene in 1994 after shooting down Serbian warplanes over Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of a U.N. no-fly zone (Economides & Taylor, 2007). The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) made requests for NATO air support and, after repeated denials, U.S. and U.K. warplanes in April 1994 targeted Serbian heavy equipment and artillery near the Goražde safe zone in the very first airstrikes in NATO history (Bethlehem & Weller, 1997; Krišto, 2011, 57; NATO, 2002). In November 1994, NATO extended air support operations to all of Croatia to protect U.N. personnel and attacked a Serbian-controlled airfield in Croatia and surface-to-air missile sites in Bosnia (NATO, 2002). Croatian and Bosnian forces then launched major military offensives that established control of western Bosnia (NATO, 2002; Tanner, 2001). In October 1994, Clinton signed legislation calling on Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their military forces near civilian safe zones. He also endorsed a UN Security Council resolution to lift the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims militias (Bethlehem & Weller, 1997). Then in November 1994, Clinton ordered U.S. warships in the Adriatic to stop intercepting arms shipments to Bosnian Muslims. However, other NATO states continued to enforce the embargo as they feared Serbian reprisals against their forces safeguarding civilians (Cohen, 1995, 1; Holbrooke, 1999, 102). The disagreement over whether to lift the arms embargo to supply Bosnian Muslims with weapons to resist attacks by Bosnian Serbs drove a wedge within NATO between the U.S. and European members. One account held that European NATO members were opposed to a sovereign Muslim-majority Bosnia. According to Branch (2009), “Clinton said U.S. allies in Europe blocked proposals to adjust or remove the embargo. They justified their opposition on plausible humanitarian grounds, arguing that

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more arms would only fuel the bloodshed, but privately, said the president, key allies objected that an independent Bosnia would be ‘unnatural’ as the only Muslim nation in Europe. He said they favored the embargo precisely because it locked in Bosnia’s disadvantage.” Even more, some NATO members opposed lifting the embargo because they feared revenge attacks against their own personnel in the country. Branch (2009) stated, “While upholding their peacekeepers as a badge of commitment, they turned these troops effectively into a shield for the steady dismemberment of Bosnia by Serb forces.” But Clinton was determined to push NATO into intervening and ending the violence in Bosnia. Branch (2009, 31) contended, “When I expressed shock at such cynicism, reminiscent of the blind-eye diplomacy regarding the plight of Europe’s Jews during World War II, President Clinton only shrugged. He said President Francois Mitterrand of France had been especially blunt in saying that Bosnia did not belong, and that British officials also spoke of a painful but realistic restoration of Christian Europe. Against Britain and France, he said, German chancellor Helmut Kohl among others had supported moves to reconsider the United Nations arms embargo…”. But all of this changed on July 11, 1995 when Bosnian Serb forces led by military commander Ratko Mladic massacred over 8,000 civilians in the worst mass killings in Europe since the Holocaust (Honig & Both, 1997). NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force, which involved airstrikes on Bosnian Serb forces to push them away from civilian areas and protect UNPROFOR peacekeepers (Gazzini, 2005, 68–71). NATO air attacks allowed Bosnian Muslim and Croatian forces to force the Serbs to the negotiating table (Rhode, 1997). However, American public support was not there to justify U.S. military action in Bosnia. The killing of U.S. troops in Somalia in October 1993 had a significant impact on U.S. involvement in humanitarian interventions (Lyon & Dolan, 2007). One 1992 poll showed that 39% of Americans opposed U.S. participation in such protecting relief deliveries (Saad, 1999). Moreover, 63% of Americans opposed any U.S. military role in the war in Bosnia (Rosentiel, 2009). Although the percentage of Americans opposed to U.S. military involvement in Bosnia jumped to 68% by 1994, after President Clinton launched airstrikes against Bosnia Serb targets, 65% of Americans approved U.S. military actions. Then following Serb massacres of more than 8,500 civilians at Srebrenica in 1995, 67% of Americans approved U.S. airstrikes against Bosnia Serb targets only if U.S. ground troops were not involved. When the Clinton Administration

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deployed troops after the airstrikes ended the fighting, just 33% of Americans approved the decision and 58% opposed using troops to enforce the peace (Rosentiel, 2009). A ceasefire was called in November 1995 and the war in Bosnia ended with the Dayton Peace Accords. NATO deployed a 60,000 strong implementation force (IFOR) that enforced the peace, delivered aid, rebuilt infrastructure, removed landmines, collected arms, and returned displaced civilians to their homes. Bosnia would be internationally recognized as an independent, multi-ethnic state with a federalist political system. After more than a decade of evading capture, Mladic was arrested in 2011, indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and convicted of multiple counts of genocide and crimes against humanity in 2017 (Bowcott & Borger, 2017; Chollet & Power, 2011). The Clinton Administration’s intervention in Bosnia revealed an incredibly selective approach to launching humanitarian missions. The Clinton Administration’s pullout from Somalia and non-intervention in Rwanda led it to intervene in Haiti under U.N. mandate to restore the elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. This led it to intervene in Bosnia to halt after the Srebrenica massacre (Lyon & Dolan, 2007, 68– 70). Furthermore, U.S.-led action in Bosnia established a precedent for the use of military force to intervene and end ethnic conflict and protect human rights. The intervention in Bosnia was consistent with Clinton’s “National Security Strategy for a New Century,” which was released in 1997. In addition to ensuring American national security objectives and economic prosperity, Clinton (1997) put forth a third objective “to promote democracy and human rights. The number of states moving away from repressive governance toward democratic and publicly accountable institutions is impressive. Since the success of many of those changes is by no means assured, our strategy must focus on strengthening their commitment and institutional capacity to implement democratic reforms.” Clinton’s so-called “democratic enlargement” agenda linked democracy with international security and legitimized humanitarian interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and in Kosovo in 1999 (Søndergaard, 2015). However, the Clinton Administration’s approach was highly selective given that it abandoned the mission in Somalia and did nothing to stop the genocide in Rwanda (Power, 2002). Clinton’s support for the NATO intervention in Bosnia was also driven, to a great extent, by an unfolding and evolving strategic foreign

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policy goal of lending American support for NATO credibility and legitimacy in the post-Cold War. As Chollet and Power (2011, 208) argue, “In less than six months during 1995, the U.S. had taken charge of the Transatlantic Alliance, pushed NATO to use overwhelming military force, risked American prestige on a bold diplomatic gamble, and deployed thousands of American troops to help implement the agreement. That the administration ran such risks successfully gave it confidence going forward. This success also reinforced the logic of the administration’s core strategic objective in Europe – to help create a continent ‘whole and free’ by revitalizing and enlarging institutions like NATO.” Even more, European security was prioritized and human suffering in Bosnia and Kosovo were given much greater attention than suffering in sub-Saharan Africa (Lyon & Dolan, 2007). Moreover, IFOR operations in Bosnia began the long process of expanding NATO into Central and Eastern Europe at a time when a weakened Russia could not effectively counter it. NATO did agree to the now defunct NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which created the Permanent Joint Council mechanism for dialogue and cooperation (NATO, 1997). The act also committed both NATO and Russia to not deploying additional military forces in Europe. The intervention and postconflict stabilization strengthened the hegemonic position of the U.S. in the international system and provided a new and much-wider purpose to NATO as it would later intervene in Kosovo and then beyond Europe in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Libya to promote democracy and human rights. NATOs intervention and post-conflict stabilization mission in Bosnia contributed to the Clinton Administration’s support for the NATO Intervention in Kosovo. Under Tito, Kosovo enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy within Yugoslavia as guaranteed by the 1974 constitution. Kosovo was also incredibly important to the Serbs as some of the most important Serbian churches and monasteries were in the Muslim and Albanian majority province. To check Serbian influence, Tito provided Kosovo with representation on the rotating presidency of Yugoslavia. But with the rise of the fiercely nationalist Slobodan Milosevic at the end of the Cold War, the Serbs began moving against the Albanian population in Kosovo. Albanians were stripped of their rights and their positions in government and education were removed. This caught the attention of several members of the U.S. Congress with large AlbanianAmerican constituents, namely U.S. Senator Alphonse D’Amato and U.S.

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Representative Joseph Dioguardi as well as U.S. Senator and Republican leader Bob Dole and U.S. Representative Tom Lantos who viewed Kosovo through the lens of democracy and human rights. While Ibrahim Rugova, leader of Kosovo’s resistance movement, favored a non-violent approach, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) engaged in an armed and violent campaign against the Serbian military and civilians. Some believed the KLA provoked Serbian atrocities against Albanians to goad NATO into intervening on their behalf. The violence escalated as both the KLA and Serbian forces engaged in violent reprisals against one another and civilians (Azrael & Payin, 1996). Although there was support for Kosovo in the U.S. Congress, there was no clear policy indication from Bush or Clinton that the U.S. was ready to intervene militarily on behalf of its Albanian population. While longstanding U.S. policy was to maintain the sovereignty and integrity of Yugoslavia, the ethnic wars in Croatia and Bosnia made that no longer tenable. As ethnic conflict intensified in Kosovo, thousands of Albanian civilians were displaced and many fled to neighboring countries. The challenge for U.S. foreign policymakers was to endorse independence and sovereignty for Kosovo or political autonomy from what remained of Yugoslavia (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). In the wake of the Srebrenica massacre and the NATO intervention in Bosnia, the case for preventing additional Serb atrocities against civilians was strong. However, this would put NATO on the side of the KLA. Like divisions within NATO regarding the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims, the U.S. and European members disagreed over how to address the widening conflict in Kosovo. European NATO members believed that if NATO was going to intervene in Kosovo, it should be on a very limited basis. Moreover, European NATO members demanded that they approve every target. However, NATO Supreme military commander General Wesley Clark wanted to lead the effort himself with little interference. He also endorsed a more extensive military campaign that included airstrikes against political and military targets in Belgrade. Others were concerned that if NATO were to intervene, Kosovo would push for full independence and sovereignty under NATOs protection. After Clinton was impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives and escaped removal from office in the U.S. Senate, his administration entered negotiations with the U.K., France, Germany, and Russia in Rambouillet to establish Kosovo’s autonomy. Serbia balked and the Rambouillet talks

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collapsed. Serbia was backed by Russia and NATO recently added the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as members. While Russia could not prevent NATO from moving ahead with a military operation, it did block the U.N. Security Council from authorizing the use of force to push Serbia out of Kosovo (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The acceleration of Serbian attacks on Albanians in Kosovo led NATO to launch Operation Allied Force on March 24, 1999. For 78 days, under the command of U.S. General Wesley Clark, NATO conducted air attacks against Serbian military targets in both Serbia and Kosovo. Russia protested and suspended its involvement in the NAT0-Russia Joint Council throughout the air campaign. Civilians in both Serbian and Kosovo were killed in collateral damage. NATO accidentally killed fleeing Albanian refugees, hit chemical and fertilizer plants in Serbia, and then struck the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, prompting a diplomatic feud between the U.S. and China. NATO ended Operation Allied Force on June 19 after Milosevic surrendered. However, the damage was extensive as tens of thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands were displaced. In the end, the U.S. conducted most of the air attacks against Serbia (Lyon & Dolan, 2007). Americans were generally divided on the question of whether the U.S. needed to be involved in Kosovo immediately before NATO airstrikes were initiated in March 1999. One poll showed that 37% of Americans believed the U.S. should be involved compared to 55% (Saad, 1999). Much of this may have had to do with previous cases of intervention involving the deaths of American troops, such as the humanitarian mission in Somalia in 1993 (Lyon & Dolan, 2007). But American public support for the U.S. leadership role in the NATO mission in Kosovo was 62% compared to 29% who opposed the mission in April 1999. This was almost identical to the level of American support (60%) in March 1999 compared to those who opposed (29%) (Saad, 1999). As the mission continued, the percentage of Americans who worried about American casualties increased from 55% in March to 66% in April 1999. At the same time, the percentage of Americans who believed that the war in Kosovo was a serious concern significantly increased from 38 to 57%. Also, as the airstrikes against Serbian targets intensified, President Clinton’s public approval suffered a decline from 56% in March to 51% in April 1999 (Pew Research Group, 1999). Furthermore, 53% believed that the airstrikes would stiffen Serbian opposition to a peace agreement. One of the more interesting data points was that 63% of Americans were

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concerned that U.S. ground troops would be involved in securing peace in Kosovo over the long term (Pew Research Group, 1999). If U.S. troops were not at significant risk on the ground in Kosovo, the American people supported the NATO air operation. It should be noted that only 36% of Americans paid close attention to the war in Kosovo compared to more than 80% who closely followed the Monica Lewinsky scandal (Saad, 1999). In June 1999, NATO ended the airstrikes and deployed the Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 to work with both the U.N. and the E.U. to stabilize and build peace initiatives in support of a fully independent and democratic Kosovo. At its height there were 50,000 KFOR troops deployed in the country and today there are roughly 3,500 troops from 28 countries. KFOR today ensures freedom of movement within Kosovo and is working to integrate it within the transatlantic security order. Russia, Serbia’s close ally, did not have the power to stop the NATO intervention or effectively check KFOR although it did deploy a small force as part of KFOR that was withdrawn in 2003. The NATO intervention in Kosovo was sustained by U.S. public opinion and resulted in no American casualties. However, NATOs role in Kosovo was and continues to be political because KFOR and post-conflict institution-building provided a framework for additional military interventions (Lyon & Dolan, 2007). The precedent established in Kosovo was legitimacy and credibility for NATO-led missions as an international norm premised on the responsibility to protect and backed up by American power. The consensus was that ethnic cleansing and mass human suffering would not be tolerated in the post-Cold War era (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). In another decision that Russia believed did not take its national security interests into account, Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. The law committed the U.S. to deploy missile defense interceptors “as soon as it is technologically possible.” Clinton’s support for the law demonstrated that the U.S. was willing to fuel an arms race with Russia and extend its influence in Europe at a time when Russia was unwilling or unable to push back (Walt, 2000). Clinton’s successor, President George W. Bush, would unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Bush’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty contributed to the buildup of ant-missile defense systems in Europe (Sanger & Broad, 2018). Both Bush and Obama moved forward

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with the deployment of missile defense in Europe, driving another further wedge into U.S.-Russia relations and continuing to provoke Russia.

The Freedom Agenda, 9/11, and Iraq During the Clinton years, NATO became a democracy-building political project. At the same time, the European Union adopted new members in Eastern Europe and developed capitalist economic systems that could integrate within the broader economic order premised on rules-based norms and rules. Approving new NATO membership applications and strategic NATORussia dialogue during the Clinton Administration were important pillars in the process of constructing a transatlantic security community that would realize a Europe “whole and free” articulated by President George HW Bush (Montgomery, 2019). However, NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo and the IFOR and KFOR missions convinced many in the Russian leadership that NATO had little interest in respecting Russian national security interests in Eastern Europe. President George W. Bush came to office ominously as he lost the popular vote in 2000 to Vice President Al Gore. His victory in the Electoral College was determined after the U.S. Supreme Court intervened to end the recount in Florida. His presidential campaign was premised on the domestic theme of “compassionate conservatism.” Although he had very little competence in international affairs and offered no new grand strategy in foreign policy, he developed a seasoned foreign policy team, led by Vice-President Dick Cheney, who compensated for Bush’s inexperience. It was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that placed Bush in a new light as he rallied the U.S. during the crisis and to war in Afghanistan and his popularity soared. On the domestic front, Bush signed the USA Patriot Act, which built a large domestic surveillance infrastructure and network of monitoring communications and created the Department of Homeland Security. The terror attacks brought some strategic vision and focus to his foreign policy approach in what become known as the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine asserted the U.S. was an unrivaled power, claimed the right to wage preventive war and preemptive military force to overthrow so-called rogue states sponsoring terrorism and seeking weapon of mass destruction, and reinforced America’s commitment to NATO and other global institutions.

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In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks and to sustain counterinsurgency campaigns following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. dramatically expanded both defense spending and surveillance programs. Both the Bush and Obama administrations used special operating forces, launched drone strikes, and reintroduced troops forces based on authorizations to use military force that were passed shortly after September 11th to target Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Under Bush, the U.S. rapidly increased defense expenditures from $315 billion in 2001 to $465 billion in 2007 and boosted defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 3.1% in 2001 to 4.6% in 2009 (SIPRI, annual). After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Charter and worked with U.S. military forces and the Afghani Northern alliance to search the country for Osama bin Laden, target the Al-Qaeda network, and help overthrow the Taliban regime. The U.S. and NATO remained in the country to fight a counterinsurgency against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. NATO assumed command of the U.N. mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 to train and develop Afghan security forces to prevent Afghanistan from returning to a haven for terrorist groups. The largest NATO-led military mission outside of Europe, ISAF deployed more than 130,000 troops from 51 NATO and partner states. It was not until 2011 when security for Afghanistan was slowly transferred to Afghan security forces, a process that was completed in 2014 and ISAF was concluded. ISAF was replaced by the much smaller Resolute Support force that would supply additional training and assistance to Afghan security forces (NATO, 2015). In his 2002 State of the Union speech, Bush contended that the primary threats to American power were non-state terrorists and rogue states, branding Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as members of an “axis of evil” (Bush, 2002a, 2002b). He also asserted common interests among the great powers, but on democratic grounds. His 2002 National Security Strategy stated, “Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only source of national greatness. America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations, because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order.” Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin moved Russia closer to the U.S. at the same time he was

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concentrating power in the Kremlin and building an authoritarian state. He was the first foreign leader to reach out to President Bush after the 9/11 attacks and empathized with Bush in claiming that both Russia and the U.S. share a common interest in rooting out terrorism. Russia was especially worried about foreign Islamic influence and radicalization of Muslims in Chechnya and Dagestan, the two brutal wars in Chechnya, violent separatist movements in the South Caucuses, and violence in Tajikistan. In May 2002, at a NATO-Russia Summit in Rome, NATO and Putin issued the joint Declaration on NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, which established the NATO-Russia Council to expand strategic dialogue and advance counterproliferation measures (NATO, 2002). Still, this could not prevent America’s relationship with Russia from deteriorating. In December 2001, Bush announced that the U.S. would withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). For decades, the ABM Treaty was the foundation for U.S.-Soviet nuclear stability in Europe. Bush justified the U.S. withdrawal on the grounds that the “outdated” ABM Treaty prevented the U.S. from defending itself against rogue states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. He (quoted in Engle, 2001) claimed, “I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.” Then, in November 2002 at the NATO Summit in Prague, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to join NATO. The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty freed the Bush Administration to establish a missile defense battery in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic. The Bush Administration’s plans were to integrate these sites into a much larger ballistic missile defense system that included sites in Alaska and California. However, the placement of ballistic missile defense interceptors close to Russia in Central and Eastern European NATO states threatened Russia’s second-strike capability. Also, despite assurances that the planned deployment of missile defense batteries was not intended to threaten Russia, Bush told Putin that Russia would not be able to block NATO Membership Action Plans for Georgia and Ukraine. Bush cited Ukraine’s participation in NATO missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo and highlighted its commitment to democracy while also contending that the ballistic missile defense would not be traded for Russia’s dropping of opposition to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine (BBC, 2008).

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Moreover, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and toppling of Saddam Hussein meant that the U.S. was willing to pursue regime change in the absence of a U.N. Security Council resolution and without NATO. While the invasion was first justified based on the argument that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring terrorist attacks, those arguments were later undermined when no evidence of WMD was found in the country. The Bush Administration then argued that the U.S. sought to transform Iraq into a beacon of democracy that could lead to domino effect throughout the Middle East (Hinnebusch, 2007, 210). Putin criticized the U.S. invasion as a “political blunder” that could jeopardize the international security system and cause long term damage to U.S.-Russia relations (CRS, 2003). Putin was maneuvering to drive the international system toward multipolarity, and his firm endorsement that the action be endorsed by the U.N. were designed to counter the American action (CRS, 2003; Interfax, 2003). Regime change at the hands of the Americans reminded Russia of the collapse of Communist governments in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 (Ioffe, 2018). Putin was convinced that regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, and later in Libya and beyond meant that his own position of power would inevitably be threatened by the U.S. and its NATO allies. The road to the U.S. invasion of Iraq triggered one of the most significant crises within NATO since the alliance was founded in 1949. Although there was an outpouring of sympathy for and unity with the U.S. after the September 11 terrorist attacks, that dissipated once the Bush Administration began targeting rogue states with the release of the Bush Doctrine in 2002 (Jenkins, 2015). However, as the U.S. turned from Afghanistan to Iraq, France and Germany began voicing opposition to the deployment of American and British troops in the Persian Gulf (Tagliabue, 2003). Chirac announced he and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (quoted in BBC, 2003) “have the same judgement on this crisis,” which was to oppose American military action at both the U.N. and in NATO. Prior to the U.S. invasion Chirac (quoted in Chappell & Beardsley, 2019) warned, “I’m telling my American friends beware, be careful. Think it over seriously before you take action that is not necessary and that can be very dangerous, especially in the fight against international terrorism.” France also used its position on the U.N. Security Council to block authorizations to use force against Iraq. Germany seemed no longer willing to be viewed by the U.S. as a reflexive, automatic ally. Schröder (quoted in Hooper, 2002) stated, “We are ready [to

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give] solidarity. But this country under my leadership is not available for adventure.” A split like the Suez Canal Crisis was emerging within NATO over the U.S. invasion of Iran. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed Franco-German opposition as “old Europe” and that the Bush Administration could rely on other NATO members he viewed as “new Europe” or post-Communist states that would support the U.S. Rumsfeld stated (quoted in Baker, 2003), “You’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s ‘old Europe.’ If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the East. And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently – what is it, 26, something like that? [But] you’re right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem. You look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They’re not with France and Germany [regarding Iraq], they’re with the United States.” The U.K., Spain, Italy, and Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic backed the U.S. and provided differing degrees of troop and logistical support. Although seven of the NATO states that would be admitted in 2004 did not oppose the American action in Iraq, five (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) were very tepid as each was also seeking E.U. membership at the time with Romania and Bulgaria hoping for E.U. membership by 2007 (Gordon, 2003; Higgins, 2003). Divisions within NATO were especially concerning when it came to Turkey. French and German Ambassadors to NATO initially denied American requests to use NATO resources in Turkey to plan for the invasion of Iraq. While the Bush Administration argued that NATO should defend Turkey in case of Iraqi retaliation, France, Germany, and Belgium were concerned that the U.S. intended to use Turkey to invade Iraq. France and Germany also believed that providing any logistical support to Turkey prior to the invasion of Iraq could be interpreted as a NATO endorsement of the U.S. military action. Germany and Belgium relented after Turkey made a formal request through NATOs Article IV consultation process that NATO deploy missile defense batteries, surveillance aircraft, and air defense systems in case Saddam Hussein attacked Turkey (Gordon, 2003). Moreover, the broader geopolitical implications of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq to the world order were quite significant. In

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opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Germany and France placed themselves on the very same side as Russia in their unwillingness to accept a U.S.-led international system. Furthermore, Germany, France, and Russia rejected the Bush Administration’s regime change policies and American rules about peace and war in the post-Cold War. While Germany and France viewed themselves as champions of both Europe and the European Union and believed in a multipolar world, the U.S. grew more suspicious of its European allies and became more skeptical about relying on NATO to pursue common transatlantic security interests in the future. It appeared that France and Germany were ready to pursue foreign policies independent of the U.S. at the same time the U.S. was growing more resentful of its outsized role in NATO (Ioffe, 2018). A wave of terrorist attacks take place across Russia between 2002 and 2004. While many of these attacks were launched by Chechen terrorists and Islamic radicals, Putin was convinced that the U.S. was behind them. This was especially the case in the 2004 Chechen terrorist attack on a school in Beslan. Explosions and fire ripped apart the school, killing hundreds. Putin blamed the attacks on the West, accusing the U.S. of fomenting chaos in Russia. He (2004) stated, “Some want to tear off a big chunk of our country. Others help them to do it. They help because they think that Russia, as one of the greatest nuclear powers of the world, is still a threat, and this threat has to be eliminated.” After the Beslan attacks, Putin consolidated more power in his hands, purged members from the Russian parliament, and targeted journalists. Then came the color revolutions between 2003 and 2005. The 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon in 2005 sparked peaceful calls for reform and democratic change (Mitchell, 2013). In the former Soviet republics, these movements were peaceful uprisings and protests that sought to facilitate the long transition away from Soviet Communist rule toward democracy institutions (Traub, 2008). The color revolutions were framed within Bush’s post-September 11th “freedom agenda,” which he (Bush, 2005) articulated in his second inaugural address in January 2005: “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.” The revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were particularly sensitive. In the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, a pro-Western and reform-oriented political leadership stormed into power, prompting Bush to visit Tbilisi in 2005 and state (2005), “You gathered here armed with nothing but roses

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and the power of your convictions, and you claimed your liberty. And because you acted, Georgia is today both sovereign and free and a beacon of liberty for this region and the world.” In Ukraine, protesting fraud in the 2004 presidential election thrust Viktor Yushchenko into the presidency in the Orange Revolution. It was thought that Yushchenko would initiate democratic reforms, combat corruption, and integrate Ukraine into the E.U. and NATO and push it further away from Russia. The Bush Administration praised the Orange Revolution as another event in the long transition toward democracy and support increasing U.S. financial assistance to Ukraine and extending permanent normal trade relations to Ukraine (Woehrel, 2005, 1–3). Russia viewed the color revolutions as coordinated operations by the U.S. to push former Soviet republics toward the West and undermine Russian national security interests (Haring & Cecire, 2013; Mitchell, 2013). The color revolutions challenged Russia’s influence and Putin concluded these were efforts by the U.S. to install anti-Russian regimes in its backyard and feared Russia could be next. Russia was convinced that the color revolutions were efforts by the Bush Administration and its Western allies to fund civil society groups and democratic activists, with the support of U.S. intelligence services, to take to the streets, protest, and demand regime change. In 2004, NATO added the largest number of new member states with the accession of the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the former Warsaw Pact members Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia. NATO had now expanded right up to Russia’s borders, surrounding it Kaliningrad enclave. U.S. warplanes would now conduct regular air patrols over the skies of the Baltics, near Russia’s northwest. To Russia, this meant NATO still viewed it as an enemy that needed to be contained (Myers, 2004, 3). According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (quoted in Myers, 2004, 3), “The Presence of American soldiers on our border has created a kind of paranoia in Russia.” But these were not the only factors that led Russia to conclude that NATO was a threat. The U.S. decision to deploy ballistic missile defense interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland, the U.S. regime change in Iraq, the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and terrorist attacks in Russia contributed to the deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations. Moreover, the U.S.-led mission in Kosovo in Operation Allied Force and the deployment of KFOR, which was opposed by Serbia, Russia’s ally, added to the narrative that the West had little interest in

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respecting Russian interests. For Russia, these events were destabilizing to the balance of power in Europe and based on a misperception that Russia had aggressive intentions toward NATO. Putin did not see the world in terms of Bush’s freedom agenda and axis of evil. Putin believed that overthrowing regimes and replacing them with democracies would be catastrophic (Hill, 2002). At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin challenged Western powers with his argument that “Only two decades ago, the world was ideologically and economically split, and its security was provided by the massive potential of two superpowers” that had become dislodged by a “unipolar world.” Putin claimed that a “world of one master, one sovereign,” “has nothing in common with democracy,” and will only lead to “new human tragedies and centers of conflict.” He also added that the time had come “to rethink the entire architecture of global security” (quoted in Ioffe, 2018). At Munch, Putin was echoing Soviet rhetoric from the Cold War in attacking the U.S. for making the world less safe with the invasion of Iraq and by encouraging the color revolutions in former Soviet republics. Putin’s statements at Munich meant that Russia could no longer work with the U.S. and intended to push back against the U.S. and NATO. The relationship was now broken and there was nothing Bush could do to steer Putin back to consenting to a U.S.-led international system. Also, NATO operations in Afghanistan were subject to heated discussion with the Bush Administration criticizing allies of not providing enough support for the counterinsurgency effort against the Taliban and asked NATO to deploy more military forces in southern areas of the country. The debate revealed rising U.S. resentment toward other NATO members leading to indirect American accusations of other NATO members free-riding on the U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates (quoted in Shanker, 2008) warned that NATO might be become a two-tiered alliance with “some allies willing to fight and die to protect people’s security, and others who are not.” According to Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns (quoted in Zellen, 2012, 128), “We face a crisis in Afghanistan that is extraordinarily difficult for our country and for the NATO alliance. For NATO, it may be an existential crisis.” However, at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, members approved membership action plans for Ukraine and Georgia. During the meeting, President Bush and Polish President Lech Kaczynski backed NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, although France and Germany were concerned about Russian opposition (Erlanger & Myers, 2008).

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While NATO stopped short of offering MAP to Georgia or Ukraine due to French and German opposition, it promised to review requests in December 2008 (BBC, 2008). NATO (2008) “agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO” based on their “valuable contributions to Alliance operations” and “democratic reforms Ukraine and Georgia.” As far as Russia was concerned, additional moves by former Soviet republics to accede to NATO would be met with pushback (Sarotte, 2021). NATOs decision to encourage Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO directly contributed to the South Ossetia War in August 2008. However, the U.S. and NATO did not respond beyond suspending the NATO-Russia Council, which was resumed by the Obama Administration (Larsen, 2012, 102). Before the 2008 Great Recession, optimism fueled the U.S. attempt to integrate the Euro-Atlantic order. NATO had become central to the consolidation and stabilization of post-Communist systems following the collapse of the Soviet Union. From an American standpoint, new NATO members were a check the U.S. did not have to cash because Article V of the North Atlantic Charter protected them from external attacks, serving as an effective deterrent against Russia. However, transatlantic divisions reemerged in the months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq and would widen with NATO’s intervention in Libya, Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics to interfere in the domestic politics of NATO states, rising American pressure on European NATO members to boost defense spending, and the U.S. rebalance to the Indo-Pacific and China.

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Economides, S., & Taylor, P. (2007). Former Yugoslavia. In M. Berdal & S. Economides (Eds.), United Nations interventionism, 1991–2004. Cambridge University Press. Engle, M. (2001, December 13). Bush tears up ‘outdated’ ABM Treaty. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/14/russia.usa2 Erlanger, S., & Myers, S. L. (2008, April 3). NATO allies oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 04/03/world/europe/03nato.html Friedman, T. (1998, May 2). Foreign affairs; Now a word from X. New York Times, 15. Fukuyama, F. (2006). The end of history and the last man. Free Press. Gazzini, T. (2005). The changing rules on the use of force in international law. Manchester University Press. Goldgeiger, J. (1999). Not whether but when: The U.S. decision to enlarge NATO. Brookings Institution. Gordon, P. (2003, February 24). The crisis in the alliance. Brookings. https:// www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/ Haring, M., & Cecire, M. (2013, March 18). Why the color revolutions failed. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/18/whythe-color-revolutions-failed/ Harris, J. F. (2005). The survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House. Random House. Higgins, A. (2003, March 18). ‘New Europe’ is as skeptical of Iraq war as ‘old Europe.’ Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1047936038 97470700 Hill, F. (2002, September 11). Putin and Bush in common cause? Russia’s view of the terrorist threat after September 11. Brookings. https://www.brookings. edu/articles/putin-and-bush-in-common-cause-russias-view-of-the-terroristthreat-after-september-11/ Hinnebusch, R. (2007). The U.S. invasion of Iraq: Explanations and implications. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 16(3), 209–228. Hodge, C. (2006). Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until the present. Routledge. Holbrooke, R. (1999). To end a war. Modern Library. Honig, J. W., & Both, N. (1997). Srebrenica: Record of a war crime. Penguin. Hooper, J. (2002, August 5). German leader says no to Iraq war. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/06/iraq.johnhooper Ikenberry, G. J. (2009). Liberalism in a Realist World. International Studies, 46(1–2), 203–219. Interfax. (2003, March 3). Most Russians oppose war in the Iraq, poll shows. Interfax [Moscow].

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Ioffe, J. (2018, January/February). What Putin really wants. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/putins-game/ 546548/ Jenkins, S. (2015). Mission accomplished? The crisis of international intervention. I.B. Tauris. Kane, T. (2004, October 27). Global U.S. troop deployment, 1950 to 2003. Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-ustroop-deployment-1950-2003 Kennan, G. F. (1997, February 5). A fateful error. New York Times, 23. Ker-Lindsay, J. (2011). Kosovo: The path to contested statehood in the Balkans. I.B. Tauris. Krišto, J. (2011, April). Deconstructing a myth: Franjo Tudman and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Review of Croatian History, 6(1), 37–66. Larres, K. (2004). Bloody as hell: Bush, Clinton, and the abdication of American leadership in the Former Yugoslavia, 1990–1995. Journal of European Integration History, 10, 179–202. Larsen, H. (2012). The Russo-Georgian war and beyond: Towards a European great power concert. European Security, 21(1), 102–121. Lyon, A., & Dolan, C. J. (2007, January). American humanitarian intervention: Toward a theory of coevolution, Foreign Policy Analysis, 3(1), 46–78. Mihkelson, M. (2018, November 28). Clinton archives confirm the need for NATO enlargement. International Centre for Defence and Security. https:// icds.ee/clinton-archives-confirm-the-need-for-nato-enlargement/ Mitchell, L. (2013). The color revolutions. University of Pennsylvania Press. Montgomery, M. (2019, April 3). Europe whole and free: Why NATO’s open door must remain open. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/03/europe-whole-and-free-why-natosopen-door-must-remain-open/ Myers, S. L. (2004, April 3). As NATO finally arrives on its border, Russia grumbles. New York Times, 3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (1994, January 10–11). Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NATO Headquarters, Brussels. Partnership for Peace: Framework Document. https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (1997, May 27). Founding action mutual relations, cooperation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France. https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/off icial_texts_25468.htm North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2002, May 28). NATO-Russia Council—Rome summit 2002. Rome Summit Declaration. https://www.nato. int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf

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Tanner, M. (2001). Croatia: A nation forged in war. Yale University Press. Traub, J. (2008, October 11). The freedom agenda. New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/books/chapters/chap-freedom-agenda. html Walt, S. M. (2000, March/April). Two cheers for Clinton’s foreign policy. Foreign Affairs, 79(2), 63–79. Wiebes, C. (2003). Intelligence and the war in Bosnia, 1992–1995: Volume I of studies in intelligence history. LIT Verlag. Woehrel, S. (2005, April 1). Ukraine’s orange revolution. Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32845.pdf World Bank. (Annual). World development indicators. http://data.worldbank. org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators Zellen, B. S. (2012). The art of war in an asymmetric world: Strategy for the post-Cold War era. Continuum.

CHAPTER 5

Nation-Building at Home and America First

Europe, NATO, and the Rebalance to Asia President Barack Obama inherited an unpopular war in Afghanistan, a very unpopular war in Iraq, and a financial crisis and Great Recession, all of which began during the Bush Administration. During the 2008 campaign, Obama promised “nation-building at home” and to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq by 2011. He campaigned against American hegemony, arguing for an agenda of “hope and change” for Americans (Rothkopf, 2014; Walt, 2012). As president, Obama pledged not to “do stupid shit” in foreign policy and was accused of “leading from behind” (Goldberg, 2016a). In his famous “A New Beginning” speech at Cairo University in June 2009, Obama (2009) distanced himself from the regime change policies endorsed by his predecessors. He (2009) stated, “I know there has been some controversy about the promotion of democracy in recent years, and much of this controversy is connected to the war in Iraq. So let me be clear: No system of government can or should be imposed by one nation by any other.” While Obama promised a foreign policy of not doing “stupid shit,” he did. Obama repeated the same decisions made by his predecessors. In the hope of limiting U.S. casualties in the war against terrorism, Obama dramatically increased the use of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, expanded domestic surveillance programs by the National Security Agency, and increased covert operations and the use of special © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. J. Dolan, The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6_5

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operating forces. He also ordered a temporary increase in American military forces in Afghanistan and participated in the NATO mission in 2011 in Libya that toppled Gadhafi in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings. Following the Libya intervention, he called on Russia’s client, Bashar alAssad, to step down in Syria. When popular uprisings broke out across the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010, beginning in Tunisia and expanding to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, after some hesitation, Obama (2011) embraced the Arab Spring and put the U.S. squarely on the side of the protesters. After NATO toppled Gaddafi and was killed, Obama was convinced that America’s European allies were too weak. He described them in the following light: “Free riders aggravate me. We don’t have to always be the ones who are up front. Sometimes we’re going to get what we want precisely because we are sharing in the agenda. The irony is that it was precisely to prevent the Europeans and the Arab states from holding our coats while we did all the fighting that we, by design, insisted” (quoted in Goldberg, 2016b). He also stated, (quoted in Goldberg, 2016b): “I had more faith in the Europeans, given Libya’s proximity, being invested in the follow-up. If we’re going to do something, obviously we’ve got to be up front, and nobody else is sharing in the spotlight…” Obama’s frustrations contributed to his decision in 2013 not to intervene in Syria and launch airstrikes against the Assad regime in retaliation for its use of chemical weapons against civilians. But Obama was confronting a very different situation in Syria than in Libya. In Syria, Russia and Iran were the primary backers of the Assad regime. In Libya, no significant power was willing to come to Gaddafi’s defense. After Russia intervened on behalf of Assad in 2015, millions of Syrians fled the country sparking a refugee crisis that Turkey and Europe had to absorb. While the Syrian Civil War killed more than 500,000 (SOHR, 2018) and witnessed the Asaad regime using chemical weapons against civilians and some of the most egregious human rights violations, the civil war in Yemen has been particularly devastating. The Obama Administration expanded the use of armed drone strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and supplied weapons and provided air support to Saudi Arabia to launch airstrikes against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. Yemen’s infrastructure has been completed devastated, resulting in an unimaginable famine and cholera outbreak. Yemen and Syria might be the worst humanitarian crises of the twenty-first century.

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Obama also sought to reorient U.S. foreign policy toward the Asia– Pacific, promoting his so-called pivot to Asia or rebalance. Essential to this approach was advancing U.S. membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateral agreement. While Congress never acted on TPP, and his successor Donald Trump would withdraw the U.S. from TPP negotiations, Obama did conclude smaller bilateral trade measures with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama. The Obama Administration also pursued normalization of relations with Cuba, entered the U.S. into the Paris Climate Accords, and negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan on Action with the European Union to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relaxing sanctions. The so-called “pivot to Asia” was one of Obama’s most important initiatives given the rise of China and its emergence as a security rival in East Asia (Clinton, 2011). During the Post-Cold War era, China is slowly becoming more integrated in the global economy. China’s impressive economic ascendency is facilitated by the U.S. and its Western European allies during the 1990s. By the time Obama becomes president, China looks like it has the potential to be a very powerful actor in both the region and around the world. The Obama rebalance to the Indo-Pacific is about developing a balancing coalition and containment strategy against China and limiting America’s position in the Middle East (Clinton, 2011). The Obama Administration would now prioritize China and concentrate economic and technological resources and military power on waging an intense security competition with China. It would also pursue new formal and informal multilateral and bilateral alliances with partners in the Indo-Pacific to project its power across the Pacific Ocean (Clinton, 2011). While this meant that the U.S. was now viewing China as a revisionist power, something that the U.S. would not tolerate, it also meant the U.S. may have to move its resources away from Europe and the Middle East toward Asia and the Pacific. It was the Obama Administration that initiated the long rebalance to the Indo-Pacific region. Engaging in an intense competition with China during the post-Cold War would not be very different from the competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. After WWII, the Soviet Union was committed to remaining in Central and Eastern Europe and holding on to the Soviet Empire because of its fear the Germany would reunite and rearm. The best and most effective way for the Soviet Union to survive after the end of the Second World War was to make sure there could never be a resurrection of German power. With

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China, the U.S. will have to devote a considerable number of resources and work with allies in the Asia–Pacific to prevent China from dominating the region just like the U.S. had to work overtime to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Europe. The rebalance to Asia was a signal to Europe that the Indo-Pacific was now the most important region in U.S. foreign policy followed by the Persian Gulf (Glaser, 2012). The risk in Obama’s pivot to Asia was that it could be interpreted as a pivot away from Europe (Schiavenza, 2013). Obama also moved to “reset” relations with Russia. Obama initially hoped to get move US foreign policy in a positive direction with Russia. It could be argued that the Obama Administration viewed the deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and Russia during the Bush years as a casualty of the neoconservative foreign policy pursued by Bush. With the reset, Obama wanted to repair relations with Russia. But developing constructive relations with Russia was a goal of previous administrations, dating back to the height of the Cold War. Obama placed responsibility for resetting relations to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and meets with Putin in Moscow in July 2009. The Obama Administration’s outreach to Russia was designed to reduce tensions. Obama’s reset included assisting Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization, ratification of the New START Treaty, and working with Russia within the P5+1 to negotiate the Iranian nuclear agreement (Deyermond, 2013; Rachwald, 2011: 117–126). It also included cooperation with Russia on counterterrorism, such as in the wake of 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, in which Chechen terrorists killed four people and injured hundreds (LaFranchi, 2015). Obama dismissed Republican opponent Mitt Romney’s claim that Russia was the “number one geopolitical foe” of the United States and that “resetting” relations with the country would harm U.S. interests (Willis, 2012). Romney also criticized Obama as the “most naïve president in history” and for having “faulty judgement about Russia’s intentions and objectives” (Shear & Baker, 2014, A8). Like his predecessors, Obama wanted to preserve the global status quo and ensure that Russia remained within it. But Russian foreign policy, like Chinese foreign policy, is driven by a strong cultural identity, historical interest to secure its borders from external threats, freedom of action within its near abroad, and a desire to restore its status role as a respected major power (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, 63–95). Fifty-six percent of Russians regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, evidence of lingering

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public nostalgia for the USSR (Levada-Center, n.d.). Assuming Russian President Dmitry Medvedev would accommodate the U.S., for Russia, the end of the Cold War meant that the U.S. had no intention of accommodating Russia. Many American presidents have entered office thinking they can improve ties with Russia only to be left frustrated later in their terms. But at the same time, the E.U. and NATO continued to expand and enlarge eastward and admit new members. In 2009, Albania and Croatia were granted membership in NATO and by 2013, most of Central and Eastern Europe had been admitted to the E.U. The further the E.U. and NATO moved east, the greater the likelihood that Ukraine and Georgia would actively seek membership in these institutions (Deyermond, 2013: 505). Part of the reset was cancelation of Bush’s plans for the deployment of a U.S.-led missile defense batteries in the Czech Republic and Poland. Instead, he approved a land and sea-based NATO-centric system known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) that focused on targeting incoming missiles from the Middle East (Sankaran, 2015). EPAA would deploy ground-based radar sites in Turkey, interceptors on American ships operating in the Mediterranean, interceptor sites in Romania and Poland in 2015 and 2018, and additional systems that could hit ICBMs by 2020 (Williams, 2019). The missile defense system capable of launching SM-3 missiles capable of striking short and medium range ballistic missiles (Browne, 2016). At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, member states announced that EPAA would be operated from its command-and-control center at Ramstein Air Base in Germany (Pifer, 2012, 10–15). In a sign that his administration was willing to trade away missile defense, Obama informed departing Russian President Medvedev in 2012 that it would be difficult for him to reach a deal with Russia on limiting missile defense during the 2012 presidential election. Obama stated that regarding the return of Putin to the Russian presidency, “On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this can be solved, but it is important for him to give me space.” Medvedev responded with, “Yeah, I understand. I understand your message about space. Space for you” and then Obama added, “This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility” (Goodman, 2012, A14). This led the Czech Republic and Poland to be “very concerned” that Obama would abandon Central and Eastern Europe and terminate the missile defense program.

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The concern for Russia was that the NATO system could diminish the strategic nuclear balance with NATO and wanted the U.S. to limit the range of the ballistic missile defense system. In 2013, Russia ended negotiations with NATO over its missile defense system after NATO failed to commit to limiting the extent of the system. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and intervened in Eastern Ukraine, the U.S. completed construction of interceptor sites in Romania and Poland and transferred command and control to NATO in 2018 (Browne, 2016; Pifer, 2012, 10; Rose, 2012). Although NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg attempted to reassure Russia that “Missile defense is for defense” and “does not undermine or weaken Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent,” Russia viewed the missile defense system in Europe as a “threat” and would take “protective measures” against it (quotes in Browne, 2016). Russia also accused the U.S. of deliberately withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty with the deliberate intention of installing a ballistic missile defense system and of violating the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (Browne, 2016). Russian accusations were made over repeated attempts by NATO to claim that ballistic missile defense was designed to protect against threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic region. By 2013, mutual distrust between the U.S. and Russia reached a new post-Cold War height. Although there were a considerable number of meetings between the Obama Administration and Russian leaders, both Medvedev and Putin were not convinced that Obama’s abandonment of Bush’s U.S.-led system and pursuit of a NATO-centric system was not directed at Russia. Russia had legitimate state security concerns about EPAA, which both Medvedev and Putin believed were not being effectively dealt with by the Obama Administration. When Obama canceled a meeting with Putin in September 2013, Putin cited “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” (quoted in Obama, 2013). However, the issue for Obama was his objection to Russia’s decision to grant temporary asylum to NSA-whistleblower Edward Snowden who the Obama Administration viewed as a threat to U.S. national security for making domestic surveillance networks public (Giles & Monaghan, 2014, 1). Moreover, Russia’s anxiety rose to new heights after thousands of Russians took to the streets to demand that Medvedev and Putin step down in some of the largest protests in Moscow and large Russian cities since 1991. Protesters were motivated by claims that the governing party stuffed ballot boxes and rigged the outcome of parliamentary elections in their favor with allegations of corruption having been filmed on smart

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phones and made viral on the internet and social networking outlets. Clinton (quoted in Shane & Mazzetti, 2018) cheered on the protesters by claiming, Russians “deserve the right to have their voices heard and their votes counted, and that means they deserve free, fair, transparent, elections and leaders who are accountable to them.” The Russian leadership was convinced Clinton was speaking directly to Russian protesters and was a signal from the U.S. Department of State that the U.S. was interfering in a Russian domestic parliamentary election by encouraging Russians to take to the streets. The official position of the Obama Administration was that the U.S. was supporting democracy, but to the Russian leadership, the U.S. went one step further to and attempted to influence the outcome of the election. Then came the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Russia used the Olympics as a vehicle to highlight Russian resurgence. Russia put on a vibrant show led by Putin to demonstrate the revival of Russian greatness on the global stage. The over-the-top pageantry was validation for Putin who portrayed himself as a modern yet powerful Czar who was making Russia great again. However, Russia’s Olympic show was spoiled by rising instability and anti-government Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. In November 2013, President Viktor Yanukovych’s rejected a 2012 E.U. Association Agreement and embraced a Russian aid package. The association agreement would reduce trade barriers with E.U. members and integrate Ukrainian political institutions with E.U. standards to fight rampant political corruption. Trade liberalization and political reforms would help steer Ukraine toward E.U. membership. In the Euromaidan movement, protesters sought to align Ukraine with European identity (Yekelchyk, 2015). The protests turned violent after security forces fired on activists resulting in the deaths of roughly 100 protesters and 17 soldiers and police. The demonstrations ended on February 22, 2014 after Yanukovych resigned and fled to Russia. For Ukrainian activists, Maidan was an incredibly significant event that would help establish Ukraine’s post-Soviet national identity as a pro-European and pro-democratic state. The E.U. and U.S. had different policy approaches to Ukraine. The E.U. viewed the country through the lens of trade and financial integration and the U.S. perceived it from a geopolitical vantage point. E.U. enlargement, especially with the incorporation of Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania, meant that its members needed to develop commercial and

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legal ties to facilitate economic expansion. The Obama Administration’s approach was driven by its goal of tackling corruption in the Ukrainian government, helping decentralize the national state apparatus, strengthening and supporting civil group groups and culture in Ukraine, building stable democratic institutions, and pulling it away from Russia’s geopolitical orbit. U.S. foreign policy sought to promote a shift in Ukraine’s non-aligned status to a Western orientation. The longstanding American effort of combating corruption was designed to deny Russia, which has a political system dominated by powerful oligarchs and is itself highly corrupt, a foothold in Eastern Europe. Lessening corruption in Ukraine would provide incentives for Ukrainian leaders to integrate its political and economic structures into Western institutions. After the protests broke out in Ukraine, the E.U. hesitated to back the demonstrators and the U.S. sided with them and threatened to impose sanctions on Yanukovych if his government launched a violent crackdown in response (Pilkington, 2014). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has moved in a decidedly American direction. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Reassurances, the U.S., Russia, and U.K. committed themselves to respect Ukrainian sovereignty. Russia’s 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine violated this multilateral agreement. After the end of the Cold War, Ukraine held the world’s third largest nuclear weapons arsenal that included strategic nuclear warheads, ICBMs, and strategic bombers that could hit the U.S. and Western Europe. At the encouragement of the Clinton Administration, Ukraine transferred those weapons to Russia, which destroyed those weapons and removed highly enriched uranium from the country by 2012. Then in 1998, Ukraine shifted its nuclear non-proliferation efforts from Russian to American standards. Ukraine also deployed 2,000 troops to support the American occupation of Iraq (Pifer, 2014). Putin viewed the Maidan protests as an attempt to defy Russia. Ukraine was also a reminder of Russian weakness and a symbol of the collapse of the Soviet Empire. As Putin (quoted in Kalb, 2017) stated at an earlier date, the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” and viewed Ukraine as vital to the stability of Russia and as a constant reminder of a bygone era of Russian dominance. Putin believed Ukrainians taking to the streets was another embarrassing repudiation of Russian power and influence in the region and a stain on

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the 2014 Olympics. The protests throughout Ukraine were also seen by Russia as opportunity to exploit policy differences within the West. An opening to drive a wedge between the U.S. and E.U. and exploit Western policy disarray came when Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland was seen among the protesters in Kiev’s Independence Square in December 2013, prompting Russia to accuse the Obama Administration of promoting regime change in Ukraine. For Russia, this was evidence that the U.S. was extending its democracy promotion project and that it was pulling the strings in Ukraine. Nuland was then quoted in a leaked phone recording expressing frustration at the E.U. for hesitating to embrace the anti-government protesters by saying “Fuck the E.U.” (quoted in Pilkington, 2014). Then U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt stated that the U.S. needed to move fast to provide American support by stating, “We’ve got to do something to make it stick together, because you can be pretty sure that if it does start to gain altitude the Russians will be working behind the scenes to try to torpedo it” (quoted in Pilkington, 2014). While the U.S. blamed Russia for creating conflict within the West with the leaking of the conversation to the media, the damage to U.S.E.U. relations had been done. It seemed to confirm the previously held American view that the E.U. was as weak in the face of Russian pressure. Nuland’s profane description of the E.U. and Pyatt’s concern about Russia moving in to fill the void in Ukraine led Senior German diplomat Helga Schmid to complain that American criticism of the E.U. was “unfair” (quoted in Smale, 2014, 6). Moreover, both Germany and the E.U. did not back up the American accusation that Russia was responsible for releasing the recording as each did not want to jeopardize Ukraine’s case for signing a trade agreement with the E.U. It was growing more apparent that the U.S., which speaks with one voice in foreign policy, held different and divergent viewpoints than the E.U. and individual European governments (Smale, 2014, 6). Although the leak was designed to expose divisions between the E.U. and U.S., it revealed something more ominous since Russia had the ability to not only intercept covert communications among U.S. diplomats, but to leak them to the public. Russia had the capability of listening in on sensitive communications, but in the past, it did not share those communications with others. Russia was now willing to deploy cyber techniques and engage in information warfare that disrupted the highest levels of foreign policymaking.

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When Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, Ukraine’s integration within Western institutions was impeded. Putin’s deployment of what Ukrainians called “little green men,” military personnel wearing combat uniforms without official Russian insignia, was a clear violation of international law. It was also a key component in Russia’s hybrid campaign to seize Crimea in a way that did not provoke a U.S. military response. This was followed up with Russia’s use of conventional military forces and support for paramilitary forces in Eastern Ukraine in the Donbas region, cyberattacks on Ukraine’s electrical grid, interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election to benefit Donald Trump, and support for right-wing groups in Europe during the Syrian refugee crisis. These hybrid tactics, in addition to others, were designed to attack America and its allies in ways that would not lead to a Western military response. They were also designed to create havoc and chaos that would make it Ukraine too much of a risk for entry into the E.U. and NATO. Acting President Petro Poroshenko assumed office in February 2014 and Obama immediately dispatched Vice President Joe Biden to attend his inauguration and later met with him in person. Russia believed the election of President Petro Poreshenko, along with pro-NATO and E.U. movements in Kosovo, Moldova, and Georgia were additional attempts to pull even more Eastern European states toward the West. The U.S. also helped Ukraine to access much-needed funds from the International Monetary Fund and provide it with energy assistance so that it could lessen its dependency on Russian oil and natural gas. However, the Obama Administration was very reluctant to be drawn into an open military conflict with Russia and opted not to provide Ukraine with lethal military assistance in the form of javelin anti-tank missiles. It did provide non-lethal security assistance in the form of night-vision equipment, communications, and other means of logistical support to Ukrainian troops (Pifer, 2014). On December 18, 2014, Obama signed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, which issued sanctions against Russian energy and defense companies. The sanctions, along with falling oil prices, accelerated the contraction of the Russian economy and collapse of the ruble. However, the E.U. was hesitant to impose sanctions because it did not want to provoke Russia into cutting energy supplies to member-states (Pifer, 2014). Furthermore, the act extended loans and funds to Ukraine to meet its energy needs, expand U.S. international broadcasting into Ukraine and Russia, and to support civil society and pro-democracy groups in Russia.

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Obama then dismissed Russia as a “regional power” that acts “not out of strength, but out of weakness” (quoted in Shear & Baker, 2014, A8). Obama contended, “They are a smaller country, they are a weaker country, their economy doesn’t produce anything that anybody wants to buy except oil and gas and arms. They don’t innovate” (quoted in Conway, 2016). Obama viewed the war in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea as a threat to the European security order and an attempt by Russia to undermine the prevailing international system. But for Russia, it was important to check and balance what it viewed as Western institutions encroaching into its geopolitical space. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (quoted in Talbot & Brandt, 2017) stated, Russia favors a “post-West order” and former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (quoted in Taylor, 2016) asserted, “The Soviet Union cannot be restored. But a new Union can be established.” According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Conley et al., 2016), “The White House has yet to fully acknowledge the shift in Europe today and the challenges that it faces. The European project has been placed into fundamental question.” After Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down by Russian-backed rebels over separatist territory the U.S. and E.U. slapped new sanctions on Russia and blamed rebels using Russian anti-aircraft missiles for the downing of the flight. To some extent, the U.S. bears some responsibility for Russia’s reaction to the Euromaidan movement and Yanukovych’s resignation. The U.S. played an important role in contributing to the crisis in Ukraine with Putin’s motivation focused almost exclusively on geopolitical concerns about American foreign policy since the collapse of the Cold War. The contributing factors were U.S. support for new NATO members, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the deployment of missile defense in Central and Eastern Europe, U.S. regime change policies in the Middle East, and endorsement of the color revolutions. For the most part, Russia was too weak to push back, especially the accession of Poland and the former Soviet states in the Baltics. Russia, however, had enough when NATO at its 2008 Summit in Bucharest issued the following statement: “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP

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is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP” (NATO, 2008). The Obama Administration’s move to support the protesters in the Maidan helped accelerate the overthrow of Yanukovych, who rejected the E.U. Association treaty and embraced a Russian economic assistance and led to the rise of a pro-E.U. and pro-NATO government in Kiev. Nuland’s very visible embrace of the demonstrators in the Maidan and undiplomatic statement about the E.U. were interpreted by Russia as a direct threat to its geopolitical interests. Also, there were significant differences in perceptions. Russia viewed both Georgia and Ukraine strictly through the lens of its core geopolitical interests while the U.S. perceived them through the lens of democracypromotion. Russia wanted the West to respect its national security interests and sphere of influence, which it views as consequential to its major power status. It expects Ukraine and Georgia to not move too closely to NATO and the E.U. or make any significant decision that would move them out of its geopolitical orbit. Given that the seizure of Russiandominated Crimea was an incredibly popular move for Putin, any effort to pull Ukraine back into its zone of influence will be well-received because of historical and cultural linkages. The reality is that Obama could not stop a newly emboldened Russia. Russia followed up its moves against Ukraine by shoring up Bashar alAssad in Syria and launching a far-reaching cyber and disinformation campaign to support candidate Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Herman, 2016). At the same time, Putin was willing to suffer under Western sanctions, which he used as a rally cry to ensure his autocratic hold on power and build nationalist resentment against the U.S. and NATO. At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, Obama endorsed a “Readiness Action Plan” to address worries among Eastern European NATO members. The plan prepositioned military supplies and equipment to Eastern European bases, launched more air force patrols, and boosted military preparedness but did not significantly increase the number of troops in the east (NATO, 2014). It also created a the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and established six command centers in Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the aim of supporting these forces troops and boosting its eastern defense. This was

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one of the most significant buildups in Europe since the end of the Cold War (NATO, 2014; Shanker, 2008). NATO members also agreed to boost military spending to 2% of GDP by 2024 in response to Russia’s seizure of Crimea, the 2008 South Ossetia War (NATO, 2014), and American criticism that NATO was overly reliant on U.S. defense. In 2016, the U.S. led NATO members in meeting the 2% threshold at 3.61% of GDP with only four others just over or at the agreed-upon requirement (Greece, U.K., Estonia, and Poland) (Bremmer, 2017). Obama’s Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned NATO members about NATO becoming a “two-tiered alliance” of “hard” combat members and others focused on “soft missions” (quoted in Shanker, 2008). American pressure on NATO would significantly increase during the Trump Administration. Trump’s Defense Secretary James Mattis stated, if NATO allies do not increase their military spending, the U.S. would “moderate its commitment to the alliance” (Economist, 2017a). The 2008 global financial crisis and Great Recession contributed to declines in defense spending with the U.K. and Italy reducing their military budgets faster than the U.S. (Cordesman, 2018; SIPRI, annual). With the escalation of tensions between NATO and Russia, the U.S. began boosting its military forces and participating in more military exercises in European NATO and non-NATO members (Emmott, 2015). In June 2016, NATO launched Anaconda 2016 in Poland, in which roughly 30,000 troops from 22 NATO countries and Finland and Kosovo conducted large-scale joint defense operations (Gibbons-Neff, 2016). Under Obama, the U.S. boosted its commitments to the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which rotates and repositions troops and military equipment in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to counter Russian military positions (Cancian, 2016). At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, member states increased defenses in both northeastern and southeastern Europe. NATO deployed additional response forces to the Baltics and Poland and Romania to balance against the Russian buildup near the Black Sea region (Dempsey, 2016). It also enhanced new programs to counter Russian cyberattacks and disinformation strategies as well counterterrorism operations (Dempsey, 2016). Under Putin’s leadership, Russia simply grew more powerful at the same time it grew more authoritarian. By 2014, the Russian economy was in a much stronger position and the country was extracting and exporting more oil and natural gas (Foy & Sheppard, 2017). In addition,

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the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, as well as the construction of Nord Stream 2, enabled Russia to weaponize energy exports to Western Europe (Gramer, 2017, 2021). The Obama Administration’s response was to increase U.S. oil and natural gas extraction and boost energy exports to Europe. Poland and Lithuania purchase U.S. natural gas shipments and the E.U. sought to interconnect its energy grids and pipelines, construct natural gas terminals, unbundle gas extraction from distribution and develop independent transit operations, and reverse flow pipelines to mitigate supply disruptions (Foy & Sheppard, 2017). Still, Central and Eastern European states were worried about Russian aggression (Sarotte, 2021a, 2021b). NATO membership would not only provide security guarantees to aspiring states vulnerable to Russian influence, it kept those states on track in making democratic reforms. However, states with disputed borders or domestic ethnic divisions, such as Ukraine, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO membership requires candidate members to find solutions to territorial disputes and border claims. Of course, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine sparked, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, and the erosion of Georgia’s borders make turn Ukraine and Georgia into liabilities, significantly reducing their prospects for NATO membership. Moreover, NATO has evolved into a global entity. It has expanded into a global security network of relationships across Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East and North Africa. With the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), NATO became connected to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) has developed partnerships with Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE. Furthermore, NATO has developed bilateral cooperative ties with Georgia and Ukraine and maintains close relations in the Pacific through the Quadrilateral Security with Australia, India, Japan, in addition to the U.S. The benefits of these biand multilateral relations include the facilitation of political and military dialogue, the raising and integration of national militaries with NATO members, raising military and diplomatic practices to NATO standards, multinational military cooperation, and the promotion of key norms such as regional security and stability across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia and the Pacific. NATO is now both a political project and a multinational alliance. But the consequences of the post-Cold War were felt during the Obama years. Not only did Euro-Atlantic expansion provoke Russia under Putin, the deployment of missile defense in Central and Eastern Europe,

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democratic movements in former Communist states and Soviet republics, and U.S.-led regime change policies in the Middle East backed Russia into a corner. The South Ossetia War in 2008 was the first test of American resolve and Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and intervention in Syria in 2015 paved the way for Russia to reassert itself on the global stage. Even though Obama participated in the NATO intervention in Libya, the U.S. became less interventionist during his presidency, something he promised to do with his commitment to do “nation-building at home” and “don’t do stupid shit” in foreign policy. For Xenia Wickett (quoted in Erlanger, 2016), a former National Security Council staff member, “Obama finally did what the United States has been saying for two decades, that given economics and the nature of global challenges it can no longer be the world’s policeman.”

Trump and America First When Donald Trump was elected president over Obama’s first Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, much of the world was in shock given the very unconventional positions he took during the 2016 campaign. In April 2016, Trump put forth an America First foreign policy by stating, “The world must know what we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old enemies become allies” (Trump, 2016). He promised to defeat the Islamic State and ordered the 2019 U.S. mission that killed IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Morgan & Toosi, 2019). He also promised to waterboard suspected terrorists, ban Muslims from entering the U.S., strengthen border controls, renegotiate NAFTA, withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Climate Accords and the JCPOA with Iran, impose tariffs against China and others engaging in what he believed were unfair trading practices, and pull the U.S. out of Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. Then, in his 2017 inauguration, President Trump declared, “We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations of the world – but we do so with the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first” (Trump, 2017a). Trump’s approach to Europe was framed through a largely transactional lens. During the 2016 campaign, Trump engaged in historical revisionism when he described (quoted in Jacobs, 2016) the creation of the E.U. as “the reason that it got together was like a consortium

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so that it could compete with the United States.” Quite the contrary, the entire purpose of European integration was to help reconstruct the economies of Western Europe and to promote peaceful resolution with the hope of preventing the outbreak of another world war. Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which evolved into the E.U. with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the U.S. supported European integration as a way of promoting peace and prosperity. In fact, contrary to Trump’s unfounded statements, longstanding U.S. foreign policy supported a “strong European market to consume American-made goods to help fuel American economic growth” (quoted in Schatz, 2016). Moreover, in May 2016, Trump publicly endorsed Brexit. He indicated that the U.K. was going to be “better off” by leaving the E.U. because of what he believed were problems in Europe brought on by migration. Trump’s anti-immigrant platform helped propel him to the Republican nomination and endeared himself to the populist, nationalist political right in the U.S. Trump stated (quoted in Levin, 2016), “I think the migration has been a horrible thing for Europe. A lot of that was pushed by the EU. I would say that they’re better off without it, personally, but I’m not making that as a recommendation. Just my feeling.” Trump was even more critical of NATO than Obama. In March 2016, Trump believed the U.S. should “rethink” its role in the alliance and that Americans were paying too much to protect wealthy European allies. He (quoted in RFE/RL, 2016) stated, “NATO is costing us a fortune, and yes, we’re protecting Europe with NATO, but we’re spending a lot of money.” He also called on the U.S. to decrease its financial contributions to NATO (Collinson, 2016). Trump (quoted in Collinson, 2016; Sanger & Haberman, 2016) also promised, if elected president, that he would raise “new questions about his commitment to automatically defend NATO allies” and even said he would determine whether the U.S. should respond to a Russian attack on NATO members only “If they fulfill their obligations to us.” Once in office, Trump reiterated American commitments to NATO but still criticized members for not following through on their military spending commitments (Pramuk, 2017). In a May 2017 speech dedicating the new NATO headquarters building in Brussels, Trump called on NATO members to boost their counterterrorism operations and limit immigration to their countries but stopped short in backing Article V of the North Atlantic Charter in defense of America’s allies (Pramuk, 2017). Furthermore, he criticized members who at the time were failing

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to increase defense spending to the minimum 2% of GDP. Even though back pay was not agreed to at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales and NATO members do not owe money to the U.S., Trump (quoted in Baker, 2017; Emmott & Holland, 2017) made certain implications by stating “Twenty-three of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying for their defense” and that “many of these nations owe massive amounts of money from past years.” Since the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, NATO members have boosted their defense spending commitments. From 2016 to 2018, Canada and European NATO allies have increased their defense spending by $41 billion and were projected to increase cumulative defense spending by $100 billion by 2020 (quoted in NATO, 2018, 2019c). The most significant percentage increases in defense spending from 2017 to 2018 were primarily in Eastern and Central Europe: Latvia (34%), The Netherlands and Lithuania (31% each), Bulgaria (30%), Montenegro (29%), Romania (28%), Slovakia (25%), and Hungary (24%) (NATO, 2018). As of 2018, the U.S., U.K., Greece, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania met the 2% of GDP in defense spending commitment with Romania approaching the threshold (NATO, 2018). In April 2019, at NATOs 70th Anniversary in Washington, Stoltenberg indicated that NATO members were on track to increase defense spending by up to $100 billion because “this has been the clear message from President Trump and this message is having a real impact” (Jackson, 2019). Most NATO members are allocating roughly 20% of defense budgets toward research and development and military equipment. However, the U.S. still accounts for 50% of NATOs combined GDP and roughly 70% of NATO defense spending. (NATO, 2018). Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative Christopher Skaluba (quoted in Atlantic Council, 2019) observed, “For all the hand-wringing around burden sharing, the results since Wales have been impressive, if still uneven.” NATO (2019a; Eckstein, 2019) also increased naval patrols in the Baltics, Mediterranean, and Black Seas and expanded operations in eastern NATO member states. Although both Obama and Trump focused on challenges to burden sharing in NATO, the U.S. and Europe were moving apart (Parker, 2016, A10). After describing Brexit as a “Great Thing,” (Parker, 2016, A10) Trump stated that if the British people were to vote to withdraw from the E.U. then the U.S. would still pursue a bilateral trade with the U.K (MacLellan, 2016). At his first White House meeting with a foreign leader, Trump conveyed his support for NATO to Prime Minister

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Theresa May (CBC, 2017). However, after Trump shared anti-Muslim images from a far-right British political party, he was condemned by May and Labor Leader Jeremy Corbyn (Booth & Karla, 2017). Following a visit to the U.K. in the summer 2017, British Ambassador to the U.S. Kim Darroch (quoted in BBC, 2017) made several unflattering judgments about Trump, referring to his leadership as “diplomatically clumsy and inept” and that the president “radiates insecurity” as well as accusing Jared Kushner as beholden to “shady Russian moneymen.” Trump also took sides in key elections and made very critical comments about specific leaders and their policies. While he did not officially endorse Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential election, he referred to her at the “strongest candidate” (Rubin, 2017, A19) even though Emmanuel Macron was victorious. In the 2016 campaign Trump (2016) criticized German Chancellor Angela Merkel, accusing her of mishandling the refugee crisis by stating, “Everyone thought she was a really great leader and now she’s turned out to be this catastrophic leader. And she’ll be out if they don’t have a revolution.” Early in 2017, Trump and Merkel publicly disagreed on a host of issues and concerns. These included “everything from immigration to free trade and the value of seeking multinational agreements” (Economist, 2017b). Trump criticized Merkel by arguing that “Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO and the United States” that “must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany” (quoted in Sharman, 2017). After Merkel refused to discuss U.S.-Germany bilateral relations with Trump, arguing that only the E.U. can negotiate such matters, Trump threatened to impose tariffs on German automobiles (Gilchrist, 2017). Merkel then claimed the E.U. and Germany could no longer depend on American leadership, claiming that “we Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands” (Osborne, 2017). While Trump was hostile to American allies in Western Europe, he took a much warmer and friendlier approach to Poland. Trump (2017b) stated, “Our strong alliance with Poland and NATO remains critical to deterring conflict and ensuring that war between great powers never again ravages Europe, and that the world will be a safer and better place. America is committed to maintaining peace and security in Central and Eastern Europe.” After reiterating U.S. support for NATO, Trump referred to Poland as a close U.S. ally (RFE/RL, 2017). After the Russian annexation of Crimea, Poland sought greater American security assistance to counter Russian influence in Eastern and Central Europe (Diamond,

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2019; Sharma, 2018). Trump and Duda signed a mutual defense agreement, in which the U.S. would deploy or redeploy to Poland additional special operations forces, armed drones, and other military equipment. Furthermore, Poland agreed to purchase American F-35 stealth warplanes and liquified natural gas from U.S. companies so it can lessen its energy dependence on Russia (BBC, 2019b; Diamond, 2019; Gardner, 2019). At the same time, Trump praised Vladimir Putin (Diamond, 2019). Throughout the 2016 campaign, Trump referred to Putin as a “strong leader” and “a better leader” than Obama. He also believed the U.S. and Russia would “get along very well” with Trump in the White House (Diamond, 2016a). In response, Putin described Trump as “a very bright and talented man, no doubt about that” (Walker, 2015). Moreover, when Trump was asked his thoughts about Putin ordering the killing of journalists and domestic opponents, he either implied the U.S. did the same or shrugged it off (Fisher, 2016; Pengelly, 2017). Trump also made a series of contradictory claims that he knew or did not know Putin before the 2016 presidential election (Cheng & Jilani, 2016). In addition, during the campaign, Trump considered the possibility of recognizing the Russian annexation of Crimea and removing U.S. sanctions. These unconventional moves were likely driven by his pro-Russia campaign advisers Paul Manafort, Carter Page, and Michael Flynn (AP, 2016; Crowley, 2016; Fisher, 2016). Although Trump openly embrace Putin and other autocrats, his administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy focused on so-called “revisionist powers” and “strategic competitors,” namely China and Russia, in a world of great power competition (Kramer, 2017). The 2017 NSS made narrow assumptions about America First nationalism through its discrediting of cooperation with allies. Instead of embracing its allies in Europe and Asia, to counter Russia and China, the Trump Administration criticized them and threatened to impose tariffs on both friends and rivals. Put simply, the 2017 NSS portrayed U.S. allies as liabilities as opposed to strategic assets (Kramer, 2017). In the absence of allies, the U.S. cannot implement any national security strategy because the combined powers of Russia, China, and their proxies are simply too great for the U.S. to contend with on its own. Given there is no meaningful alternative to NATO for Europe and that the U.S. needs NATO to counterbalance China and Russia, the only real option is to maintain transatlantic unity in a Cold War like rivalry (Cordesman, 2018; Osnos, 2023).

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The 2017 NSS helped Russia and China forge a “strategic partnership” with one another due to their shared opposition to a U.S.-led international system. In 2018, in response to the U.S. labeling them “revisionist powers” and “strategic competitors,” Russia invited China to participate in large-scale military exercises and war games to showcase their combined military might (Isachenkov & Grits, 2018). The U.S. deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in South Korea also helped push China, which is skeptical of military alliances and partnerships, toward Russia based on their mutually shared interest of checking American influence in East Asia (Page, 2019). China’s participation of several thousand troops and use of weaponry in the 2018 drills and games with Russia sent a very powerful message to the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan, that it was serious about defending its territorial interests in the South China Sea. The exercises also demonstrated to NATO that Russia’s military capabilities remain quite formidable and a deterrent in frozen conflict, such as in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, South Ossetia near Georgia, and Transnistria in Moldova. Even more, Germany’s participation in the Nord Stream 2 underwater pipeline project angered the Trump Administration. The U.S. position is that Nord Stream 2 will allow Russia to maximize its leverage over European natural gas consumption and cut out US. American liquified natural gas exports to America’s European NATO allies. As of 2019, Russian natural gas constitutes roughly 40% of E.U.s energy consumption, which is almost the same as Norway’s exports to the E.U. (BBC, 2019a). Tension and conflict within NATO revealed a growing rift between the U.S. and its allies that threatened to undermine the U.S.-led world order. A 2019 report by the Munich Security Conference found that “we seem to be experiencing a reshuffling of core pieces of the international order. A new era of great power competition is unfolding between the United States, China, and Russia, accompanied by a certain leadership vacuum in what has become known as the liberal international order.” The report also accused the U.S. of showing “disdain for international institutions and agreements” following the Trump Administration’s decision to withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran and the Paris Climate Accords. Vice-President Mike Pence even claimed that the U.K., France, and Germany were scheming to continue to do business with Iran by remaining in the Iranian nuclear deal (Estrin, 2019). Chancellor Merkel criticized the U.S. withdrawal of military forces from Syria because it would “strengthen Russia and Iran’s hand” (quoted in Estrin,

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2019). America’s European allies believe that the Trump Administration views them as rivals and maintain that relations with the U.S. will be strained for years to come (Erlanger & Bennhold, 2019). The rift between the U.S. and its European allies may run far beyond Trump to encompass shifts in geopolitics. The gulf between the U.S. and Europe was opening both sides of the Atlantic to Russian and Chinese malign influence. As Jan Techau (quoted in Erlanger & Bennhold, 2019, A1) states, “When that protection goes, the strategic space is up for grabs” with the U.S. under Trump confronting “a superpower dilemma… Trump does not understand the price he pays in strategic terms when he bashes his allies so publicly and openly.” By encouraging transatlantic division, Trump encouraged the very thing that NATO was created to defend against: Russian interference. NATOs relationship with Russia is not simply defined in terms of a conventional military confrontation. It is also underpinned by economic means. Russia’s economy is the roughly the same size as South Korea’s, although it is mostly dependent on oil and natural gas. Moreover, European NATO members dramatically outspend Russia on defense. Under Trump, the U.S. returned to higher levels of defense spending. In 2019, U.S. defense spending totaled $732 billion (including base, overseas contingency operations, and emergency funds), representing an annual increase of 5.3% and accounting for roughly 38% of world military expenditures (SIPRI, annual). It should be noted U.S. defense spending does not include funding for homeland security, counterterrorism, intelligence gathering, veteran’s programs, and arms sales. U.S. defense spending in 2019 far exceeded China’s defense expenditures, which stood at $261 billion (5.1% annual increase) and Russia’s at $65 billion (4.5% annual increase) (SIPRI, annual). In February 2019, the Trump Administration announced it would suspend U.S. participation in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) with Russia beginning in 2021. Beginning with the Obama Administration, the U.S. had accused Russia on multiple occasions of violating the 1987 agreement (Sanger & Broad, 2019). Even though Trump’s suspension of U.S. participation in the INF surprised America’s allies, NATO justified the U.S. decision by accusing Russia of breaching the treaty. Russia has flown bombers over Northeastern Europe and conducted military exercises near its borders with NATO members to intimidate former Soviet Republics while NATO has been rotating troops

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and military equipment in Poland and the Baltic states as well as in Southeastern Europe (Sanger & Broad, 2018). Meanwhile, the U.S. and China have been moving their naval forces into positions around reefs in the South China Sea that have been transformed by China into reclaimed and militarized artificial islands. The U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty came roughly at the same time as it withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), inducing Iran to pursue its own nuclear weapons program. With the Trump Administration planning to modernizing U.S. longrange nuclear weapons systems, Russia and China are likely to expand their own arsenals by investing their limited resources in cheap offensive weapons (Sanger & Broad, 2018). The U.S. has already been modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal and laboratories (Sanger & Broad, 2019). It has also been planning to modify existing weapons system and could deploy them to Japan and Guam. Then, during the 2020 presidential election, the Trump Administration announced it would withdraw 11,900 U.S. military personnel from Germany. The move was designed to pressure America’s allies to meet the 2%-to-GDP defense spending guideline agreed to at NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit. It was also intended to signal Trump’s opposition to continuing America’s security commitments to its NATO allies, especially Germany. While Defense Secretary Mark Esper justified the withdrawal as an element within a wider U.S. military reorganization of U.S. military forces, Trump (quoted in Large, 2020) publicly rejected that claim by arguing that “we don’t want to be the suckers anymore.” Trump was certainly not the first president to withdraw or threaten to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe. Former President Obama withdrew some U.S. forces from Germany that were redeployed to Afghanistan (Large, 2020). In the past, Trump had accused NATO of being freeloaders. For example, in 2018, Trump (quoted in Welna, 2018) stated, “Many countries owe us a tremendous amount of money from many years back, where they’re delinquent as far as I am concerned, because the United States has had to pay for them. So, if you go back 10 or 20 years, you’ll just add it all up, it’s massive amounts of money is owed.” This is consistent with Obama (quoted in Goldberg, 2016b) who once described America’s coalition allies as “free riders” and stated, “we don’t have to always be the ones who are up front.” And as former Defense Secretary Robert Gates (quoted in Memmott, 2011) warned, “there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic

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write large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently… unwilling to be serious.” By 2018, only nine NATO members were meeting the 2% guideline on defense spending (Large, 2020). Knowing that NATO feared the U.S. ending its security commitments, Trump threatened troop withdrawals to pressure U.S. allies to increase defense spending and contribute more to NATO. This was part of Trump’s contempt of the intelligence community and diplomacy. At the Helsinki Summit in 2018, Trump defended Vladimir Putin when asked about Russian intervention in the 2016 presidential election. Regarding evident corruption on Russia (WP/Mueller, 2019) and manipulation of the diplomatic corps in Ukraine, Trump sidestepped his cabinet and developed a shadow foreign policy network led by former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani (Vogel et al., 2019). Trump’s actions in holding up security assistance to Ukraine to pressure President Volodymyr Zelenskyy led to his impeachment by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2019. While the goal was to pressure European allies to begin shouldering more collective defense burden, Trump’s military withdrawal from Germany created a vacuum of uncertainty and undermined America’s longstanding credibility as a reliable NATO partner among alliance members. In the end, it would not be Obama’s frustrations with free-riders or Trump’s threats to withdraw U.S. military forces or his criticism of NATO that would transform the alliance. It was Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that would alter America’s strategic calculus in Europe and reinvigorate NATO. Russia’s violent invasion, which resulted in the largest and most significant war in Europe since World War II, did more to increase NATO’s post-Cold War credibility than anything else. But American public opinion regarding the extent of U.S. support for Ukraine would define whether could remain NATO united. Also, managing the American economy through the COVID-19 pandemic and the tumultuous 2020 presidential election would determine how the U.S. would orient its foreign policy Most important, the intensification of the security, economic, and technological competition with China and its emerging partnership with Russia would becoming defining features in the domestic politics of America’s orientation toward NATO.

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Conley, H. A., Mina, J., Stefanov, R., & M. Vladimirov, M. (2016, October 13). The Kremlin Playbook. https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook Conway, M. (2016, December 16). Obama dismisses Russia as a weaker country. Politico. http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/obama-russiaweaker-country-232759 Cordesman, A. H. (2018, June 27). The U.S., NATO, and the defense of Europe: Underlying trends. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https:// www.csis.org/analysis/us-nato-and-defense-europe-underlying-trends Crowley, M. (2016, August 3). Trump changed views on Ukraine after hiring Manafort. Politico. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/trump-man afort-ukraine-crimea-russia-226573 Dempsey, J. (2016, July 8). NATO comes to Poland. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/64043 Deyermond, R. (2013, December). Assessing the reset: Successes and failures in the Obama administration’s Russia policy, 2009–2012. European Security, 22(4), 500–523. Diamond, J. (2016a, July 29). Timeline: Donald Trump’s praise for Vladimir Putin. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2016a/07/28/politics/donald-trumpvladimir-putin-quotes/ Diamond, J. (2016b, March 6). Trump on torture: ‘We have to beat the savages.’ CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2016b/03/06/politics/donaldtrump-torture/ Diamond, J. (2019, June 12). Trump and Polish president sign new defense agreement. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/12/politics/donald-trumpandrzej-duda-poland-f-35-deal/index.html Eckstein, M. (2019, July 10). U.S. leading NATO maritime group amid renewed focus on northern Europe. United States Naval Institute. https://news.usni.org/2019/07/10/u-s-leading-nato-maritime-groupamid-renewed-focus-on-northern-europe Economist. (2017a, February 16). Daily chart: Military spending by NATO members. Economist. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/ 2017/02/16/military-spending-by-nato-members Economist. (2017b, March 18). Angela Merkel and her press corps show how big democracies are supposed to operate. Economist. https://www.econom ist.com/democracy-in-america/2017/03/18/angela-merkel-and-her-presscorps-show-how-big-democracies-are-supposed-to-operate Emmott, R. (2015, October 19) ‘A very clear message’: NATO is conducting its biggest exercises in years. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/ r-as-russia-reasserts-itself-nato-opens-biggest-exercises-in-years-2015-10

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Emmott, R., & Holland, S. (2017, May 24). Trump directly scolds NATO allies, says they owe ‘massive’ sums. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/art icle/us-usa-trump-europe/trump-directly-scolds-nato-allies-says-they-owemassive-sums-idUSKBN18K34D Erlanger, S. (2016, November 6). Europeans view Obama’s exit with a mix of admiration and regret. New York Times, 8. Erlanger, S., & Bennhold, K. (2019, February 17). Rift between Trump and Europe is now open and angry. New York Times, A1. Estrin, D. (2019, February 16). Munich Security Conference reveals a growing rift between U.S. and its allies. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2019/02/16/ 695438900/munich-security-conference-reveals-a-growing-rift-between-u-sand-its-allies Fisher, M. (2016, June 6). Donald Trump’s appeal to Russia shocks foreign policy experts. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/ world/europe/russia-trump-clinton-email-hacking.html Foy, H., & Sheppard, D. (2017, April 3). Rosneft takes key step in push into Middle East. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/5417e00413a4-11e7-80f4-13e067d5072c Gardner, T. (2019, June 12). Poland’s PGNiG to buy more LNG from U.S. company venture global. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-pol and-lng/polands-pgnig-to-buy-more-lng-from-us-company-venture-globalidUSL2N23J0MZ Gibbons-Neff, T. (2016, June 7). U.S., NATO countries begin largest military exercises in Eastern Europe since Cold War. Washington Post. https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/06/07/u-s-nato-countr ies-begin-largest-military-exercise-in-europe-since-cold-war/ Gilchrist, K. (2017, May 26). Trump reportedly calls Germans ‘very bad,’ Threatens to end German car sales. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/ 05/26/trump-calls-germans-very-bad-threatens-to-end-german-car-sales-rep orts.html Giles, K., with Monaghan, A. (2014). European missile defense and Russia. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College Press, 7 and 44. https:// apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a607174.pdf Glaser, B. S. (2012, April 13). Pivot to Asia: Prepare for unintended consequences. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/ analysis/pivot-asia-prepare-unintended-consequences Goldberg, J. (2016a, April). The Obama doctrine. The Atlantic. https://www. theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ Goldberg, J. (2016b, March 10). Obama unhappy with allies. Upset at free riders. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/ obama-unhappy-with-allies-upset-at-free-riders/

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Goodman, D. J. (2012, March 26). Microphone catches a candid Obama. New York Times, A14. Gramer, R. (2017, February 10). Is Europe caving to Russia on pipeline politics? Arctic Today. https://www.arctictoday.com/is-europe-caving-to-russia-on-pip eline-politics/ Gramer, R. (2021, July 23). The Russian pipeline that turned into a lightning rod. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/23/nord-stream-2pipeline-russia-us-ted-cruz/ Herman, S. (2016, October 7). US-Russian feud over Syria escalates with talk of war crimes. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/us-rus sian-feud-over-syria-escalates-talk-war-crimes Isachenkov, V., & Grits, S. (2018, September 11). Russia launches biggest ever war games involving China. AP. https://apnews.com/article/cf61a61c500e 4bad93fa99a05a888d83 Jackson, D. (2019, April 3). NATO leader tells Congress alliance is strong, plays down disputes with Donald Trump. USA Today. https://www.usatoday. com/story/news/politics/2019/04/03/nato-head-stoltenberg-plays-downdisputes-president-donald-trump/3351316002/ Jacobs, B. (2016, July 24). Donald Trump: EU was formed ‘to beat the US at making money. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 2016/jul/24/donald-trump-eu-was-formed-to-beat-the-us-at-making-money Kalb, M. (2017, November 28). What does Vladimir Putin fear? His own people. Time. https://time.com/5039688/vladimir-putin-fears-own-people/ Kramer, A. E. (2017, December 19). Russia and China object to new ‘America first’ security doctrine. New York Times, A10. LaFranchi, H. (2015, February 5). How Russia could escape rising American pressure on Ukraine. Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor. com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2015/0205/How-Russia-could-escape-risingAmerican-pressure-on-Ukraine Large, D. C. (2020, August 6). Auf wiedersehen to a mostly successful, sometimes rocky arranged marriage. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2020/08/06/auf-wiedersehen-to-a-mostly-successful-arranged-marriage/ Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses to U.S. primacy. International Security, 34(4), 63–95. http://www. jstor.org/stable/40784562 Levin, S. (2016, May 5). Donald Trump backs Brexit, saying UK would be ‘better off’ without EU. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/may/05/donald-trump-brexit-uk-leaving-european-union MacLellan, K. (2016, May 15). Trump says Brexit wouldn’t impact potential U.K.-U.S. trade deal if he is president: ITV . Reuters. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-britain-eu-trump-idUSKCN0Y60AY

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Memmott, M. (2011, June 10). Gates warns of NATOs dim future. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/06/10/137101238/ gates-warns-of-natos-dim-future Morgan, W., & Toosi, N. (2019, October 27). ISIS leader killed in daring U.S. raid in Syria, Trump says. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2019/ 10/27/islamic-statebaghdadi-dead-donald-trump-000300 Munich Security Report. (2019). The great puzzle: Who will pick up the pieces. Munich Security Conference. https://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dok umente/01_Publikationen/MunichSecurityReport2019.pdf North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2008, April 3). Bucharest summit declaration. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2014, September 5). Wales summit declaration. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_ 112964.htm North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2018). The secretary general’s annual report: 2018. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_publications/20190315_sgar2018-en.pdf North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2019a, April 2). Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jen Stoltenberg and US President Donald Trump during the NATO-US bilateral meeting in the cabinet room of the White House. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_165349.htm? selectedLocale=fr North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2019b, February). Key NATO and allied exercises in 2019. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/ pdf/pdf_2019_02/1902-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2019c, June). Defence expenditure of NATO countries (2012–2019). NATO Public Diplomacy Division. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_ 2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf Obama, B. (2009, June 4). Remarks by the president at Cairo university. White House. Office of the Press Secretary. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09 Obama, B. (2011, February 1). Remarks by the president on the situation in Libya. White House Office of the Press Secretary. https://obamawhitehouse.archives. gov/the-press-office/2011/02/01/remarks-president-situation-egypt Obama, B. (2013, August 7). Statement by the press secretary on the president’s travel to Russia. White House Office of the Press Secretary. www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2013/08/07/statement-press-secretary-president-s-tra vel-russia

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Osborne, S. (2017, May 28). Angela Merkel says Germany can no longer rely on Donald Trump’s America. The Independent. https://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/europe/angela-merkel-donald-trump-germany-us-no-lon ger-rely-european-union-climate-change-g7-a7760486.html Osnos, E. (2023, February 26). Sliding toward a new cold war. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/03/06/slidingtoward-a-new-cold-war Page, J. (2019, July 24). China promises further military cooperation with Russia. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-promisesfurther-military-cooperation-with-russia-11563973937 Parker, A. (2016, June 24). Trump says British vote is a ‘great thing.’ New York Times, A10. Pengelly, M. (2017, February 6). Donald Trump repeats respect for ‘killer’ Putin in Fox super bowl interview. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/ feb/05/donald-trump-repeats-his-respect-for-killer-vladimir-putin Pifer, S. (2012, May 12). Missile defense in Europe: Cooperation or contention? (Arms Control Series Paper 9). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/0508_MISSILE_DEFENSE_PIFER.pdf Pifer, S. (2014, June 5). Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. policy response. Brookings Pilkington, Ed. (2014, February 6). US official apologises to EU counterparts for undiplomatic language. The Guardian. Pramuk, J. (2017, February 6). Trump aims to reassure allies about US support but asks them to pay up more. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/ 06/trump-tries-to-reassure-allies-about-us-support-but-asks-them-to-pay-upmore.html Rachwald, A. R. (2011). A ‘reset’ of NATO-Russia relations: Real or imaginary? European Security, 20(1), 117–126. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). (2016, March 22). Trump says U.S. can’t afford to spend so much on NATO. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/donald-trump-says-us-can not-afford-spend-so-much-nato/27627522.html Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). (2017, July 5). In Warsaw, Trump reaffirms article 5 commitment, criticizes Russia’s ‘destabilizing behavior.’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-europetrip-poland-warsaw-visit/28597961.html Rose, F. A. (2012, June 9). U.S. to transfer operational control of some AEGIS ships to NATO for missile defense. https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natoso urce/us-to-transfer-operational-control-of-some-aegis-ships-to-nato-for-mis sile-defense/ Rothkopf, D. (2014, June 4). Obama’s ‘don’t do stupid shit’ foreign policy. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/04/obamas-dont-do-stu pid-shit-foreign-policy/

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Rubin, A. (2017, February 25). France’s president criticizes Trump over Paris remarks. New York Times, A19. Sanger, D. E., & Broad, W. J. (2018, October 19). U.S. to tell Russia it is leaving landmark INF treaty. New York Times, A1. Sanger, D. E., & Broad, W. J. (2019, February 1). U.S. suspends nuclear arms control agreement with Russia. New York Times, A1. Sanger, D. E., & Haberman, M. (2016, July 21). Donald Trump sets conditions for defending NATO allies against attack. New York Times, A1. Sankaran, J. (2015). The United States’ European phased adaptive approach missile defense system: Defending against Iranian missile threats without diluting the Russian deterrent. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RR957.html Sarotte, M. E. (2021a). Not one inch: America, Russia, and the making of postCold War stalemate. Yale University Press. Sarotte, M. E. (2021b, November/December). Containment beyond the Cold War: How Washington lost the post-Soviet peace. Foreign Affairs, 100(6), 22–35. Schatz, J. J. (2016, July 25). Trump’s EU jab ignores US role in Europe. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/trumps-eu-jab-ignores-usrole-in-europe-compete-foreign-policy-provocation/ Schiavenza, M. (2013, April 15). What exactly does it mean that the U.S. is pivoting to Asia? And will it last? The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic. com/china/archive/2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-piv oting-to-asia/274936/ Shane, S., & Mazzetti, M. (2018, September 20). The plot to subvert an election. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/ us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html Shanker, T. (2008, February 8). Gates defends U.S. NATO mission in Afghanistan. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/ world/middleeast/08gates.html Sharma, T. (2018, October 5). U.S.-Poland relations in the age of Trump. International Policy Digest. https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/10/05/u-s-polandrelations-in-the-age-of-trump/ Sharman, J. (2017, March 18). Donald Trump says Germany owes US and Nato ‘vast sums of money’ for defence. The Independent. https://www.ind ependent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-angela-mer kel-germany-owes-nato-money-united-states-defence-a7636686.html Shear, M. D., & Baker, P. (2014, March 25). Obama answers critics, dismissing Russia as a ‘regional power.’ New York Times, A8. Smale, A. (2014, February 7). Leaked recordings lay bare E.U. and U.S. divisions in goals for Ukraine. New York Times, 6.

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (Annual). Yearbook: Armaments, disarmament, and international security. https://www.sipri.org/ yearbook Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). (2018). Syria: 560,000 killed in seven years of war. SOHR. Talbot, S., & Brandt, J. (2017, March 2). What Putin is up to. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/putin-trumprussia-flynn-sessions-hack-kremlin/518412/ Taylor, A. (2016, December 13). Soviet leader Gorbachev says a new union could rise again. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ worldviews/wp/2016/12/13/soviet-leader-gorbachev-says-a-new-unioncould-rise-again/?utm_term=.6a6a5f5aade2 Trump, D. (2016, April 27). Transcript: Donald Trump’s foreign policy speech. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/tra nscript-trump-foreign-policy.html Trump, D. (2017a, January 20). The inaugural address. White House. https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/ Trump, D. (2017b, May 6). President Trump in Poland. White House. https:// www.whitehouse.gov/articles/president-trump-poland/ Vogel, K. P., Kramer, A. E., & Sanger, D. E. (2019, September 28). How a shadow foreign policy in Ukraine prompted an impeachment inquiry. New York Times, A1. Walker, S. (2015, December 17). Vladimir Putin calls Donald Trump a ‘very colourful and talented man. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2015/dec/17/vladimir-putin-donald-trump-very-bright-talentedman-russia-us-presidential-race Walt, S. M. (2012, November 27). Nation building at home: Why we need roads, bridges, and boring stuff like that. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/27/ nation-building-at-home-why-we-need-roads-bridges-and-boring-stuff-likethat/ Washington Post. (2019). The Mueller report (Vol. I). Scribener. Welna, D. (2018, July 11). Fact check: Trump’s claims on NATO spending. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2018/07/11/628137185/fact-check-trumpsclaims-on-nato-spending Williams, I. (2019, August 5). Achilles’ heel: Adding resilience to NATO’s fragile missile shield. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www. csis.org/analysis/achilles-heel-adding-resilience-natos-fragile-missile-shield Willis, A. (2012, March 27). Mitt Romney: Russia is America’s ‘number one geopolitical foe.’ The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldn ews/us-election/9168533/Mitt-Romney-Russia-is-Americas-number-onegeopolitical-foe.html Yekelchyk, S. (2015). The conflict in Ukraine: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 6

A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class?

President Biden centered his approach on a “foreign policy for the middle-class” that would connect U.S. foreign policy interests with domestic political priorities (Manson & Chazan, 2021). Biden adopted a “protect agenda” and industrial policy of investing in American research and development, advanced technologies, infrastructure, and sustainable energy as well as using export controls to safeguard domestic industries from competition. This was designed as a response to supply chain shortages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and part of a coordinated strategy of confronting China. Put simply. Biden would accomplish what Trump’s empty promises never did, which was setting the U.S. on a populist foreign policy course. Biden’s 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS, 2022) highlight several themes that reflected great power rivalry with China and to some extent Russia and acknowledged the role of domestic political considerations in U.S. foreign policy calculations. The new NSS recognized that a “competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next,” describing “the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” as “America’s most consequential global challenge” and the “only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” The 2022 NSS viewed Russia as “an immediate and persistent threat to international peace and stability” that “lacks the spectrum capabilities of the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. J. Dolan, The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6_6

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PRC.” To contend with both China and Russia, the Biden Administration would build on formal alliances like NATO and develop more informal arrangements like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) to serve as “a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships that prove democracies can deliver for their people and the world.” Biden’s NSS would also “integrate our alliances in the Indo-Pacific and Europe and develop new and deeper means of cooperation.” To support these strategic goals, the Biden Administration prioritized several policy initiatives. The U.S. would pursue an industrial policy centered on maintaining America’s technological advantages over China through a new “protect agenda” including centered on new subsidies in research and development in advanced technologies and export controls on semiconductors, microchips, and artificial intelligence (Knight, 2022; NSS, 2022). The U.S. would also provide Ukraine with military assistance to combat Russia’s brutal invasion, limit the price of Russian energy, and work to include U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific in sanctions against Russia (Lawder, 2022). The credibility of these lofty strategic goals would be tested by Biden’s emphasis on defending democracy against extremism and authoritarianism. As he stated, (quoted in Feldscher, 2023) the world was engaged in a “battle between democracy and autocracy.” Shortly after he was inaugurated in 2021, Biden (quoted in Madhani, 2021) declared at the Munich Security Conference that “America is back, the transatlantic alliance is back,” following four years of Trump’s “America First.” He stated, “I know the past few years have strained and tested the transatlantic relationship.” Biden stated, “America is back,” but as French President Emmanuel Macron asked, “For how long?” (Quoted in Bennett, 2022).

The January 6th Insurrection and American Credibility The groundwork for the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, was laid by Donald Trump well before the 2020 presidential election. While there were appeals and signals to his far-right MAGA extremists during his presidency and two campaigns, some were much more overt than others. For example, during a presidential debate with Biden, he called on the extremist Proud Boys group to “stand back and

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stand by” (Ronayne & Kunzelman, 2021). After hate groups and white supremacists engaged in violence in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017, Trump (quoted in Thrush & Haberman, 2017) white nationalist extremists against peaceful protesters by blaming “both sides” and claiming “you had very fine people on both sides.” The turmoil caused by Donald Trump who refused to acknowledge his defeat in the 2020 presidential election and his resistance to the peaceful transition of power highlighted vulnerabilities in America’s constitutional system and its democratic norms. The January 6th insurrection at the U.S. Capitol was inspired by Trump and designed to overturn his defeat in the 2020 election. His Stop the Steal movement was based on falsehoods, lies, and disinformation and a dangerous form of election-denialism that targeted the very foundations of American constitutional government. The extremist January 6 insurrection changed how Americans and the world think about the U.S. January 6 was symbolic moment of fracturing in American society and foreign policy because showed the world that there is a segment of America not committed to democracy, rule of law and civil society, and the constitutional process of succession. While Trump was impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives for the second time because of his actions to overturn the 2020 presidential election, he ultimately escaped conviction and continues to be eligible to run for president in 2024. Domestic and foreign policy interconnections are essential to U.S. grand strategy as well as America’s global credibility in serving as a reliable partner to its allies, especially NATO members. According to Hal Brands (2014, 3), this involves establishing an “intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy” and a “conceptual framework that helps nations determine where they want to go and how they ought to get there.” Unlike other nation-states, America’s ends are massive and sweeping (Brands, 2014). When America’s legitimacy was undermined from within in the January 6th insurrection, its formal and informal network of alliances and partnerships were at risk. President Biden was seeking to align and match domestic policy needs with foreign policy goals and take advantage of public support for domestic drivers that strengthen foreign policy. For example, at the height of the Cold War, when the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, the U.S. was losing the soft power battle against the Soviet Union because it could argue that if Americans were not living up to their own democratic

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ideas. How could other nation-states around the world follow America’s example if the Soviet Union could highlight its moral hypocrisy? In Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, Reinhold Niebuhr did not suggest that America was the moral equivalent of the Soviet Union. He argued that America needs to recognize its fallibility and should build institutional restraints that make it U.S. different from the Soviet Union or, China today. For example, the Nazi Party studied Jim Crow in the American South to understand how to build an institutional system of racial segregation and supremacy and categorize Jews, Slavs, and other groups (Katznelson, 2017). The U.S. was certainly not the moral equal of Nazi Germany, but repressive Jim Crow segregation was something the Nazis tried to emulate. For example, the Reagan Administration understood that intensive diplomacy and making America less threatening could create a political context that allowed the Cold War with the Soviet Union to thaw and loosen the Communist grip on Eastern Europe. With his focus on the “democracy versus autocracy” theme, Biden was injecting moral value into his foreign policy strategy. The challenge for Biden was ensuring that the U.S. could address the root causes of political extremism in the U.S. to lead the U.S. and other democratic allies in a balancing coalition against autocratic systems seeking to undermine a U.S.-led world order. For Biden, NATO and other alliance systems must be at the center of that order and strong and resilient enough to withstand challenges from revisionist powers led by Russia and China seeking to undermine it. U.S. grand strategy must play the long game by highlighting the power of America’s example. Eurasia Group surveys show that the number of Americans who think the U.S. is exceptional for what it represents has decreased by 7% in recent years. Likewise, the number of Americans who think the U.S. is not exceptional has increased by 7% (Hannah, 2019; Gray & Hannah, 2020). There is a sense that the U.S. no longer represents exceptional principles, and in the wake of the Trump presidency there is greater concern about would-be authoritarianism and the deterioration of the rule of law. These trends show that the U.S. is certainly not immune from broader global trends toward autocracy. The same battle is being fought today with authoritarian China and Russia accusing the U.S. of hypocrisy on the issue of police abuse against unarmed black Americans when American policymakers condemn the Chinese government repression against the Uighurs in Xinjian or the Russian government for cracking down on political opposition leaders.

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One of the best prescriptions for the Biden Administration is to inform foreign policy with rhetoric and policy substance that aligns with domestic realities. While this does not always match with public opinion, what the U.S. does at home determines the extent of its leverage with allies and rivals around the world. The Trump Administration was able to effectively and comfortably weaponize new immigrants by othering them with populist right-wing rhetoric and cruel policies. Trump knew that while economists believe immigration is a maximum advantage for the U.S., your average person or politician does not. Until the Biden Administration, and subsequent administrations, figure out how to triangulate public opinion on immigration, cultural identity issues will continue to prevent the U.S. from exercising strong global leadership and build its arsenal of soft power. Put simply, Biden was attempting to connect domestic policy with foreign policy and searches for places where there is real popular support for policies that will benefit Americans. A foreign policy for the middle class is one that is deeply informed by following through on domestic commitments, so allies, partners, and challengers see the interplay between the domestic and the international. Put simply, if the Biden Administration is going to rebuild America’s standing in the world, it must develop a grand strategy and U.S. foreign policy that is in touch with the needs of ordinary Americans. But, in many ways, U.S. foreign policy became disconnected from the American people in the wake of the collapse of the Cold War. The widening gulf between foreign policy elites and the American public was driven by humanitarian interventions, endless maintenance of U.S. basing agreements, and large-scale military interventions that led to the contemporary pushback against “forever wars.” On a domestic political and ideological level, what Democrat and Republican voters want to see is whether the Biden Administration can operationalize a “foreign policy for the middle class.” Voters want to know if investments in U.S. foreign policy benefit them at home. In effect, President Biden was making moves the Obama Administration was unwilling to do and that the Trump Administration was incapable or too incompetent to do. This is more difficult during and immediately after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Biden Administration is committed to a foreign policy driven by diplomacy and multilateralism as opposed to driven by a military-first logic. For example, purchasing and distributing 500 million Pfizer vaccines through COVAX reflect a foreign policy driven by soft

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power. The decision to pursue vaccine diplomacy along with other G7 nations-states that will provide another 500 million vaccines is one that can be sold to the American people. While it may be selfishly in America’s national interest, still, it means Americans can return to global travel, revitalize the global economy, and absorb tangible economic benefits in terms of tourism, trade, and investment in the U.S. On the one hand, the January 6th attacks showed that American democracy has an inherent set of challenges that make foreign policymaking difficult. On the other hand, getting buy-in from the broader American public will lead to international commitments that are both self-serving for the U.S. and better for the international system. The Eisenhower Administration provides the best parallels for the Biden Administration. Eisenhower’s Food for Peace program was not simply charity for the rest of the world. It was more about agricultural assistance benefiting American farmers and developing economic incentives for America to be more supportive of food assistance and relief efforts within the Cold War context. Biden’s multilateral vaccine initiative draws from Eisenhower in many ways and reflects the view that America’s rivalry with China can only be won with allies and partners. Just like the Cold War, the struggle against authoritarianism is a marathon, not a sprint. The Biden Administration’s commitment to a more diverse diplomatic corps and U.S. Foreign Service is essential. In addition, the Trump Administration devastated the foreign service, resulting in poor morale, high attrition, vacancies, and the exodus of experience professionals. Trump also cut U.S. foreign assistance and USAID to historically low levels. The Biden Administration must establish a more diverse U.S. Foreign Service and diplomatic corps that its broadly representative of the American people. If U.S. grand strategy is going to align with the real world, then a foreign service or top-level diplomatic corps that does not represent the American population is incredibly problematic and counterproductive in the long term. Therefore, the view that grand strategy and U.S. foreign policy are the exclusive domains of elites should also change. It is a simple fact that that Americans, by virtue of geography, have not had to cultivate multilinguistic skills or travel to other nation-states. However, this should not mean that the American people do not have core beliefs about foreign policy or have a sense about vital national interests. The 2016 presidential

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election proved that Trump was successful in tapping into this sentiment with his populist, right-wing rhetoric endorsing nationalism and anti-globalism. He effectively argued that a singular focus on American interests will provide better outcomes for the U.S. This is the same sentiment Biden tapped into with his “foreign policy for the middle class.” This means finding ways to connect with them will be Biden’s most difficult challenge. After the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, polling data showed that Americans appear more willing to exert active global leadership in commercial and cultural ways (see Chapter 2). Consequently, an effective U.S. grand strategy must be premised on soft power. The value of American culture and ideas in foreign policy is quite often understated. These can be operationalized by putting the State Department at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy and empowering USAID to emphasize democracy, human rights, civil society, and the rule of law. If the U.S. is serious about countering authoritarianism, extremist nationalism, and parochial visions of the nation-state then it must end a military-first grand strategy. If Biden and his successors can figure how to fit domestic priorities and soft power into grand strategy, then they can work through the competition with China and balance against the China-Russia partnership (Osnos, 2023). Biden’s democracy-themed foreign policy is intimately linked with American domestic politics. The stronger than expected performance of Democratic candidates in the 2022 midterm elections resulted in boosting their hold on the U.S. Senate and mitigated Republican gains in the U.S. House of Representatives. Exit polls from the 2022 elections revealed that concerns for democracy and the strength of America’s democratic norms and institutions were on the minds of American voters (Boak & Fingerhut, 2022). While many voters were worried about inflation and the high cost of food and energy as well as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, one survey showed that 44% worried that the future of democracy was at risk. Almost 60% of voters cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Dobbs case to overturn reproductive rights in Roe v. Wade as a primary concern about the erosion of democracy and civil rights (Boak & Fingerhut, 2022).

In the Shadow of Afghanistan After the Biden Administration announced it was withdrawing the last remaining U.S. military forces from Afghanistan in April 2021, a vigorous

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debate emerged about America’s role in the world, its commitment to allies and partners, and the limitations of U.S. military power. American foreign policy must consider the prices Americans are willing to pay to pursue stability and security in the world and whether military power should be more restrained. American expansion in the wake of the collapse of the Cold War has not made the U.S. more powerful and influential. Although some could argue that the use or threat of military interventionism advances American interests, the lack of humility among America’s foreign policy elites undermines its relationships with allies, harms its credibility, and does not promote American national security interests. In the wake of America’s exit from Afghanistan, the U.S. must reassess its foreign policy interests, determine the most important areas of interest, and recommit to its allies that America depends on for enhancing its security. The American military withdrawal from Afghanistan is reminiscent of the withdrawal from Vietnam. As in Vietnam, the value of maintaining U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan became negligible, especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011. What damaged the U.S. was attempting and ultimately failing to maintain U.S. military commitments to Afghanistan from 2011 to 2021. Walter Lippmann’s notion of “solvency in foreign policy” is important here. Lippmann argued that America’s foreign policy commitments must not be allowed to exceed American power. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially after September 11, 2001, the U.S. assumed a whole host of commitments that it could not meet and, in the end, turned out to be insolvent. America’s military and diplomatic commitments to the Afghan government are a case in which the U.S. and NATO did not have the power to defeat the Taliban and create and sustain a unified set of national institutions under the control of a government aligned with the West. Besides, after the death of bin Laden, Americans were no longer willing to pay the price to maintain U.S. and allied commitments to Afghanistan. Immediately following the chaotic withdrawal of U.S. military forces, an August 2021 poll showed that 62% of Americans believed that the war in Afghanistan was not worth fighting, although many are worried about the return of international terrorism (Boak et al., 2021). Likewise, a large majority of Americans believed the war in Iraq was too costly and not worth fighting. The consequences of the withdrawal from Afghanistan are difficult as it could lead to a surge of extremist groups into the country

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and witness the return of Al Qaeda. Endless wars in countries where threats to the U.S. and its allies are not obvious or spelled out clearly for the public to discern show real limits to the price people are willing to pay. Foreign policy elites must grapple with the consequences of an America that delays the consequences of its actions. Consider what could happen if Russia were to invade the Baltic States, which are NATO members, or attacks NATO warships in the Black Sea? Russia is keenly aware of the risks of those decisions and has decided that the costs are too high. So, it has invested in hybrid capabilities to interfere and disrupt in the domestic affairs of NATO member states and in states near NATO’s periphery. How would the U.S. and the Quad respond if China were to invade Taiwan? Like with Russia, China knows the costs and risks of such a move and has opted for a sustained pressure and hybrid campaign against Taiwan. Therefore, America’s foreign policy leaders must grapple with these very difficult possibilities and the hard challenges are directly connected with the limitations of American global power and influence in an increasingly competitive world defined in terms of a Cold War like struggle between democracy and autocracy (Osnos, 2023). Afghanistan has become, along with Vietnam, Iraq, and Syria, another tragic case where America’s military, diplomatic, and economic power, and ability to reshape the international system became hubristic. American foreign policy is fallible. U.S. foreign policy can be a force for positive change and contribute to some moral progress; however, in the absence of humility, restraint, and a measure of self-awareness about its flaws and limitations, U.S. foreign policy cannot be effective. After the collapse of the Cold War, the moral preening that should have been taking place within elite foreign policy circles was divorced from a disastrous set of domestic and international consequences associated with U.S. military interventions in areas of the world where national interests were not clear. There have been moments when the U.S. opted for restraint and inaction. When Eisenhower chose not to act in 1956 in Hungary and Johnson decided not to intervene in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, they did so even when the people in those two nation-states stood up to Soviet tyranny. Eisenhower and Johnson, who were aware that American power was checked and balanced by the Soviet Union in Europe, knew that America’s ability to influence those crises was greatly limited. Today, the U.S. and its allies confront similar realities. China has greatly curtailed freedoms in Hong Kong and has engaged in mass repression in Xinjiang

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against Uighur Muslims. North Korea has starved and killed thousands of people and amassed nuclear weapons. The reality is that the U.S. and its allies can do very little to address these challenges. Afghanistan, the longest war in American history, demonstrates that U.S. foreign policy must be conducted and implemented effectively in critical areas and regions and with American public support. One poll conducted immediately after the bungled evacuation from Afghanistan showed that 54% of Americans agreed with the U.S. military withdrawal compared to 42% who opposed it (Green & Doherty, 2021). The nature of American global influence is knowing exactly how it can be deployed. The most important element in American power is the power of America’s example. One action America should take in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan is to fight the rising tide of autocracy and authoritarianism in NATO member states, especially in Hungary and Poland. The U.S. must show its allies that the American government is bounded by the rule of law, limited by civil society, and can solve pressing social and economic problems. In his treatment of NATO allies and Europe in general, Trump was erratic. He often objected to America’s continued role in NATO but was highly confrontational with Iran. However, Trump did recalibrate U.S. foreign policy in ways that challenged longstanding foreign policy practices. He negotiated American’s exit from Afghanistan and implemented tariffs against China, both of which Biden continued. In fact, the Biden Administration has accused China of failing to live up to its commitments to purchase more U.S. goods under a 2020 with the Trump Administration and even launched an investigation into the international legal ramifications of China’s subsidies of state own businesses (Swanson & Bradsher, 2021). The Biden Administration and the E.U. also agreed to promote transatlantic technology and trade cooperation to counter China’s authoritarian, state-centered approach to industrial policy (Swanson, 2021). Moreover, Obama was very skeptical of America’s NATO allies, as was Trump. Skepticism about America’s role in the world has intensified since the 2008 financial crisis and questioning the U.S. role in NATO has occurred under almost every American president. The American people are now skeptical of escalating conflicts in areas where U.S. national interests were not obvious and where alternatives to American influence exist. While Obama, Trump, and Biden questioned America’s role in the world and its alliance, the only difference among them was that Trump was an incompetent unilateralist. Moreover, as

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presidential candidates all three had to face the American people about the massive expansion of America’s military footprint in the post-Cold War and address why endless wars did not make the lives of ordinary Americans any better. In addition, Obama, Trump, and Biden have made decisions that have irritated foreign policy elites, which are insulated from the American people. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and gains made by the Taliban raised the question of whether America’s backing for its NATO allies is limited. The American withdrawal came when America’s allies in NATO and Asia were expecting consultation from the Biden Administration after years of Trump’s unilateralism and grievances (Hirsh, 2021). America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has sown doubts about the reliability of the U.S. defending NATO allies, especially Poland and the Baltic states and in the Western Balkans. The U.S. has been pulling back from its security commitments since Obama. NATO must be prepared for an America that will hesitate to shoulder the burden of alliances and military deployments. American reluctance will be absorbed in the Baltic States, Poland, the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia, and Taiwan. For example, nonNATO Ukraine’s security could be at risk following America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan since it relies heavily on the U.S. for assistance in its eight-year war with Russian-backed separatists in Donbas. The U.S. views Ukraine as a security bargain, since American troops were never deployed to fight alongside Ukrainian troops against rebels and U.S. security assistance is far smaller than what was sent to Afghanistan (Kramer, 2021). In early 2021, the Biden Administration’s tepid response to Russia’s deployment of thousands of troops, tanks, and heavy equipment near the border with Ukraine and its acquiescence to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany were seen as concessions to Russia and signs that Biden could give up American support for the Ukrainian government. In addition, Russia could position its troops much closer to Ukraine following a treaty signed with Belarus. With Crimea fully absorbed by Russia and the ethnically Russian separatist region of Transnistria in Moldova, Russia could step it is hybrid pressure campaign against Ukraine, making it even more of a liability to the U.S. and NATO (Kramer, 2021).

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China and Russia were pleased with the bungled U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as it created uncertainty about America’s security commitments (Erlanger, 2021a). Since World War II, the U.S. would stand up for it allies against threats. The abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan after twenty years of war and investment by both the U.S. and NATO could lead allies and partners to debate whether to continue aligning with the U.S. Moreover, it could democratic governments to become more inward and nationalist. While Afghanistan was never a vital interest for Europe, NATO went to war with the U.S. to show solidarity with the U.S. following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The collapse of Afghanistan’s government and military and the U.S. withdrawal will remind NATO of what could happen if Europe continues outsourcing defense to the U.S. The Biden Administration has lessened its military commitments in the Middle East as part of its strategy of restraint and to balance national security interests with the public’s demand that domestic policy priorities are realized after twenty years of resource-draining military deployments. According to Emma Ashford (2021, 129), “there is a viable consensus, a path forward for restraint that can achieve the most important goals, alienate the fewest members of the coalition, and win new converts.” While the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan, it did not concede the central Asia region to Russia or China. In March 2023, the Biden Administration announced high profile trip by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Kazakhstan to meet with foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While these states will remain close with Russia, some central Asian leaders have expressed their objections to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Biden Administration hopes to exploit those objections as well as to promote energy interests throughout the region (Wong et al., 2023).

A New Atlantic Charter, the 2022 Strategic Concept, and Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led the Biden Administration to rally in defense of NATO and secure passage of sweeping security assistance for Ukraine. However, prior to Russia’s war, President Biden had to address damage to transatlantic relations that took place during the Trump years. Biden started by working with Prime Minister Boris Johnson to help lay the foundation for a new NATO strategic concept

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by updating and modernizing the Atlantic Charter. The 1941 charter developed by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill pledged transatlantic cooperation for the postwar era and the 2021 effort pledge multilateral cooperation to contend with the conventional and unconventional challenges of the twenty-first century. Biden and Johnson signed the new Atlantic Charter to renew and transform the transatlantic alliance to respond to authoritarian China and Russia, democratic backsliding in the West, and to maintain territorial integrity of nation-states. The updated Atlantic Charter was an attempt to show that Trump’s America First was a temporary aberration. It reinforced the significance of NATO, global governance, and international institutions, and focused on emerging and critical threats from disinformation, cyberattacks, the COVID-19 pandemic, economic instability, sustainable development, and climate change. The 2021 Atlantic Charter called for nation-states to adhere to “the rules-based international order” as a powerful political message that democracies, as opposed to autocratic China and Russia, can secure the international system, and contend with international crises (Sanger & Shear, 2021a). Biden’s first moves included reentering the U.S. into the Paris Climate Accords and the World Health Organization as well as committing the U.S. to finding multilateral solutions in cyber defense, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. In June 2021, in a sign of multilateral cooperation and to counter China’s vaccine diplomacy effort, the G-7 pledged to distribute 1 billion COVID-19 vaccine doses to developing countries with the Biden Administration providing 500 million vaccines of the total through the COVAX global regime (Miller et al., 2021; Parker & Cameron-Chileshe, 2021). While this is not nearly enough to vaccinate the entire world, the Biden Administration and other states in the G7 were showing the world that democracies can lead the world out of the COVID-19 pandemic better than authoritarian systems. Biden did add that vaccine distribution was inherent and central to the reassertion of diplomacy, soft power, and multilateral initiatives, even indicating that U.S. support for COVAX would be a “constant project for a long time” and pledged that the U.S. would donate more vaccine doses in the future (Sanger & Shear, 2021b). This is part of Biden’s multilateral, soft power initiative that high quality Western vaccines, namely the Pfizer-Bio-N-Tech and Moderna vaccines,

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are much more effective against COVID-19 than the Russian Sputnik V or the Sinopharm vaccines and the conditions that come with them. Previous G7 communiques did not reference China and the Trump Administration objected to multilateral commitments regarding climate change and other issues. However, the 2021 G7 had distinctly Cold War connotations, which reflects the expectation that Western powers are preparing for intense security competitions with both China and Russia (Osnos, 2023). For example, the G7 condemned China’s human rights crackdowns in Hong Kong and accused Putin of “destabilizing behavior and malign activities” (quoted in Adam et al., 2021). The G7 also framed international politics in terms of an ideological struggle between democracies and autocracies. In addition, to counter China’s Belt and Road, G7 leaders committed themselves to establishing an infrastructure investment program for developing countries called Build Back Better for the World (BBBW), playing off Biden’s 2020 campaign theme, and pledging to cut global emissions by 2030 (Sanger & Shear, 2021b). While the G7 may have appeared united on these and other fronts, the shadow of a return to populism and nationalism was cast over the 2021 meeting. Moreover, while there is an emerging consensus in the U.S. that China is a geopolitical rival to the U.S., a view shared by the U.K., Canada, and Japan, the E.U. does not necessarily view China in the same light (Adam et al., 2021). While America’s allies may appreciate Biden’s promise to return to a more predictable and stable pattern of global engagement, NATO and E.U. members believe transatlantic divergence could happen again. Biden may be a temporary interruption of a much longer and deeper shift in America’s political orientation toward populism and nationalism. In addition to his (quoted in Manson & Chazan, 2021) “America is back” rhetoric, Biden also has promised a “foreign policy for the middle class,” which sounds quite like Trump’s “America first” or Obama’s “nationbuilding at home.” Moreover, with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure and President Emmanuel Macron’s re-election being challenged by the far-right Marie LaPen, Biden’s may have a very short window of opportunity to act. Biden’s meetings with NATO and E.U. leaders as well as subsequent meetings with Putin and the G7 nations in June 2021 will have significant consequences for the future of transatlantic relations. Tangible results beyond a more cooperative tone must be produced in the wake of these meetings. According to former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daadler (quoted in Erlanger, 2021b), it is “important to show that

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alliances and partners matter, that we want to work with other countries and be nice to our friends.” At the 2021 NATO meeting in Brussels, President Biden reassured allies that after four years of doubt and grievances by the Trump Administration, NATO was “critically important for U.S. interests,” pointing to Article V as a “sacred obligation.” Biden wanted to show that NATO was not experiencing the “brain death” that President Macron once described and that it could manage the E.U. ambiguous notion of “strategic autonomy” (see Erlanger, 2019). They also agreed to complete a new NATO Strategic Concept by 2022 that would reorient the alliance to hybrid threats and emerging disruptive technologies in cyberwarfare, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing as well as anti-missile defense and disinformation. Also, the Biden Administration moved more heavily on NATO to develop conventional and unconventional capabilities to resist Russian aggression. NATO’s communique stated that “Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security,” namely its intermediaterange nuclear weapons. Biden (quoted in Birnbaum et al., 2021) highlighted that “we have Russia that is not acting in a way that is consistent with what we had hoped.” NATO members in Eastern Europe, namely Poland and the Baltic states, and in the Western Balkans, especially North Macedonia and Albania, prioritize strengthening NATO’s deterrence capabilities and security efforts against Russia’s destabilizing and damaging cyberattacks and disinformation targeted at domestic political institutions and rule of law. Among the most significant updates to NATO’s strategic orientation was developing a consensus-based response to so-called Russian gray-zone operations and hybrid attacks with a more expanded definition of Article V of the North Atlantic Charter. NATO (2021) members agreed “that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack,” which could invoke Article V’s self-defense clause on a case-by-case basis. A series of malicious Russian and Chinese cyber incidents and ransomware attacks in 2020 and 2021 against SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange, and Colonial Pipeline show just how much damage that can be inflicted by on U.S. critical infrastructure. NATO will be used as a platform for collaboration and intelligence sharing on technical issues concerning cyberattacks and utilized as a forum for collective responses.

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For much of the post-Cold War period, U.S. and NATO defense postures were based on a deterrence by denial system of maintaining adequate rotational deployments that served as a “tripwire” or “tip of the spear” for follow on forces that would be deployed later if Russia were to attack NATO members. This undergirded the ability of NATO to “rapidly reinforce an Ally that comes under threat, when needed, to counter all contingencies” with a new focus on cyberattacks under Article V based on a commitment to societal resilience and a whole-of-society approach to collective security (Monaghan, 2022). The Russian invasion of Ukraine presented NATO with a unique opportunity to redefine itself and modernize its defense posture in Europe. At its 2022 Summit in Madrid, NATO developed an updated 2022 Strategic Concept that advanced a new deterrence model. This included of increasing the number of permanent troops stationed in Eastern European member states that would serve as a massive retaliatory force to deter further Russian aggression. It would also invest heavily on advanced defense technologies, especially artificial intelligence, and increase its hybrid war defenses (NATO, 2022a). Also, the Madrid Summit was an opportunity for the U.S. to press NATO members into stepping up their commitments to deterrence and collective defense. Biden (quoted in NATO, 2022c) described the 2022 Madrid meeting as a “history-making Summit,” in which the alliance agreed to boost security measures in response to Russian aggression and develop a new strategic defense posture that would incentivize NATO modernization and adaptation. In addition, NATO allies committed themselves to increasing battlegroups to brigade formations “where and when required,” along with an increase in U.S. military forces in Romania, deployments to the Baltic States, and permanent U.S. basing in Poland (NATO, 2022d). Also, NATO will boost its high readiness forces to 300,000 troops based on a new two-tiered deterrence model. The first tier will place 100,000 troops on a 10-day readiness to deploy status and the second tier will place the other 200,000 troops on 30-readiness (NATO, n.d.-b). NATO will also pre-position equipment, stockpiles, and facilities supported by air defense command and control units along its northeast and southern flanks. The 2022 Strategic Concept was a serious departure from NATO’s previous strategic orientation. In its previous Concept, NATO (2010) perceived “the Euro-Atlantic at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO low.” NATO asserted in 2022, “the Euro-Atlantic

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area is not at peace” because Russia’s war in Ukraine means the alliance “cannot discount the possibility of an attack against sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Today, NATO believes that Russia is seeking to “establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression, and annexation.” NATO members also reframed their strategic orientation toward China. The 2022 Concept (2022a) stated that China poses “systemic challenges” to the alliance. China’s “ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” This includes China’s “malicious hybrid and cyber operations, and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation.” In response to American pressure to boost the U.S. rebalance to the Indo-Pacific, the 2022 Concept stated, “developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” Consequently, NATO will boost collaboration with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea (NATO, 2022a). The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led NATO to shift its strategic orientation away from rotating temporary rapid reaction forces along its Eastern flanks that would have to be supported later with follow on forces. At the Madrid Summit, NATO adopted a muscular deterrence model based on maintaining a larger and permanent military presence that would be mobilized and ready to repel a Russian invasion of NATO territory. Alliance members agreed to increase forward deployed forces in Poland and the Baltics and in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria from battalions to brigades. They also pledged to expand the number of combat troops under NATO command from 40,000 to 300,000, increase air and naval forces, and invest in advance defense technologies and cyber defense capabilities (Reuters, 2022). This deterrence framework enhances NATO’s collective defense mission, reduces the likelihood of another world war in Europe, and allows the U.S. to tap into alliance assets to pursue its security and economic goals in the Indo-Pacific. This new, revitalized deterrence model is a significant increase from the 40,000 NATO troops that were on high alert prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, if the bulk of this readiness force will not be from European NATO member states, then this could complicate America’s plans to rebalance its forces to the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the on-going debate within NATO regarding containing further Russian aggression in the wake of its war in Ukraine versus the U.S. position of prioritizing China and the Indo-Pacific will continue (NATO, 2022a). With the likely admission of Finland and Sweden as NATO members,

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NATO’s military strength and collective defense mission will improve (Euronews, 2022). Unfortunately, war is now part of NATO’s way of thinking in Europe. When it comes to defense spending and burden sharing, European NATO members will have to enshrine the 2%-to-GDP defense spending guideline in their military budgets to build up their own capabilities. From 2014 to 2022, military spending by NATO members increased 15% or roughly $140 billion (NATO, 2022b, n.d.). By 2022, nine of 30 NATO members reached the 2%-to-GDP guideline, an increase from three in 2014. American presidents since Truman and Eisenhower have asked European governments to increase their defense spending requirements. While a very strong European defense posture is much better for the U.S., it is difficult to foresee the establishment of European defense independent from NATO (Tocci, 2023). The decision by the U.S., U.K., and Germany to supply Ukraine more advanced weaponry and tanks reflects an accelerating and expanding military relationship between these major players in NATO with the Ukrainian government. While they are accepting and absorbing the risks, their decision to send heavier and more advanced weaponry to Ukraine means they calculated that the greatest risk is allowing Russia to get away with its war of aggression. But while Chancellor Olaf Scholz eventually relented and approved sending advanced Leopard tanks to Ukraine, Germany’s ability to shape and determine the European security will be diminished since it slowly came to that decision, which delayed America’s decision to send M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. But to make Germany’s decision possible, Scholz had to ask the U.S. to link sending American M1 Abrams tanks the Germany’s Leopard tanks to Ukraine, a clear sign that Europe depends on the U.S. (Eyal, 2023). Consequently, European security has been profoundly transformed because of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the power dynamic in NATO along with it. Consequently, the locus of power in NATO is shifting from West to East. Immediately after the collapse of the Cold War, Germany and France were committed to building and maintaining a strong and independent European identity. The centerpiece was developing a European foreign and security policy and defense industry autonomous and independent from the U.S. However, the euro crisis, the admission of new NATO members in the East, the color revolutions, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq split Western European NATO members from post-Communist NATO members in the East. The West’s tepid response to Russia’s illegal seizure

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of Crimea and the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany further split the alliance between West and East and angered the Trump Administration. After Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine began in 2022, France’s desire for strategic autonomy and an independent European defense policy now looks very weak. The U.S. has dramatically increased its security commitments to NATO, and after the 2022 Madrid Summit, the alliance has taken steps to reform and update its deterrence model, invest in advanced technologies, emphasize hybrid war threats, frame Russia as a direct threat, and recast China as a challenger (Erlanger, 2023a). But the potential for a ramped-up U.S. military presence in Europe will complicate America’s U.S. rebalance to the Indo-Pacific region to confront China.

The China Challenge China’s rising power and influence in the world presents both the Biden Administration and NATO with a much broader set of challenges. While there was some hesitancy to confront China at the 2021 G7 meeting, U.S. influence was felt in the NATO communique, which confronted China in a much more direct and unified way. NATO explained that “China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an alliance.” The communique (NATO, 2021) specifically identified China’s nuclear arsenal, actions in the Arctic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa, and in artificial intelligence and cyberoperations as “Stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges” to the “rules-based international order.” The Chinese government (quoted in Myers, 2021) protested NATO’s delineation by stating, “if someone wants to pose ‘systemic challenges’ to us, we will not remain indifferent.” The emerging concerns and worries about China demonstrate that NATO will take on even greater global responsibilities at the same time its members are challenged with America’s anti-China stance in other forums like the G7 (Erlanger, 2021b). China’s military investments and modernization are designed to push the U.S. out of the Asia–Pacific. In addition to developing cyber capabilities and expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal, China has tested hypersonic missiles and deployed missiles and aircraft carriers to deter the U.S. in the region, threaten Taiwan, and influence commercial shipping.

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China’s military spending is not on conventional weapons and troops; rather, it is in cyberoperations, intelligent machines, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and outer space. China preferred to blind the U.S. through a hybrid war of pressuring Taiwan first and then cutting the U.S. off from its allies and then pushing it out of the Indo-Pacific. NATO’s more direct challenge to China was being pushed by the U.S. Biden has cast the future of international system as a struggle between democracies and authoritarian systems. Biden (2021) stated, “We’re in a contest – not with China per se – but a contest with autocrats, autocratic governments around the world, as to whether or not democracies can compete with them in the rapidly changing 21st Century.” China has become more assertive with the Belt and Road, crackdowns in Hong Kong, human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and military threats against Taiwan. Biden’s general claim that democracies are in a “contest with autocrats” will have significant consequences for U.S. foreign policy and major power rivalries. The general idea of a world defined in terms of a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism reflects the driving force of American foreign relations. On the surface, it resembles an internationalist attempt to connect great power competition and transnational threats like COVID-19 to the rebuilding of American democracy at home. It is a way of revitalizing domestic priorities, such as infrastructure, research and development in intelligent technologies, and education and social programs and linking them to a “foreign policy for the middle class” that can withstand the appeal of authoritarianism and democratic decline. Hal Brands (2021) described this an emerging Biden Doctrine that “focuses the United States on a truly grand strategy of fortifying the democratic world against the most serious set of threats it has confronted in generations.” However, like the G7, not all NATO leaders agree on how forcefully the alliance should confront China and Russia. Some NATO members worry that too much focus on China distracts the alliance from its core mission of securing the Euro-Atlantic area against maligned Russian influence and interference. This is most pressing for Poland the Baltic States and NATO members in the Western Balkans and Black Sea region, which are most vulnerable to Russian hybrid actions and military maneuvers. The Biden Administration’s initial decision not to sanction the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which will deliver Russian natural gas directly to Germany through a twin pipeline under the Baltic Sea, its omission

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of Javelin anti-tank missiles within a U.S. security assistance measure to Ukraine, and its blocking of the “NATO-Ukraine” summit were diplomatic signals to Russia that the U.S. was willing to negotiate or even cede ground on several initiatives. Biden’s decision to suspend weapons shipments to Ukraine was made to entice Russia to draw down a massive Russian military buildup positioned near Ukraine that took place immediately before the Biden-Putin Summit in 2021 (Swan & McCleary, 2021). But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showed that Putin is working to chip away at American global power and NATO. This is consistent with the view that the U.S. views Russia a disruptor that needs to keep the U.S. as a threat for Russian domestic political consumption. The American view is that given asymmetry of power between NATO and Russia and since Russia is motivated more by preserving its influence and Putin invested in his own political survival, Russia will continue its maligned influence and cyber operations (Sanger, 2021b). Biden did warn that while the U.S. has hesitated to use cyber capabilities in the past because it worried about escalation, America has “significant cyber capability” that if Russia were to “violate these basic norms, we will respond with cyber.” Russia became the immediate and short-term threat and China the peer competitor and long-term adversary (Labbot, 2021; Osnos, 2023). Others have vital economic connections with China. Hungary has sought friendly relations with China and pursued lucrative Chinese investments. Greece and Italy have entered into Belt and Road agreements with China and Montenegro has accepted Chinese infrastructure deals to its financial detriment (Schmitz, 2021). Germany has sought a middle ground by working with China on climate change initiatives and maintaining its exports to the massive Chinese market while at the same time hoping to counter China’s rising global power. As Stotlenberg (Birnbaum et al., 2021) stated, “we need to address the challenges that the rise of China poses to our security even though many allies have a lot of economic ties with China.” Even though there is relief in the American effort to restore transatlantic relations, the centrality of China in U.S. foreign policy has implications for Europe, especially Germany and France who view China more as a partner than as a competitor and prioritize transnational issues like the climate crisis and pandemics (Sanger, 2021b). U.S. foreign policy is changing in ways that are now emphasizing the importance of both great competition with China and transnational threats. The Biden Administration devoted significant attention to a new

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generation of threats and challenges after twenty years, which the global war on terrorism dominated strategic national security and intelligence planning. This is an acknowledgment that the U.S. underestimated threats posed by China and Russia and was unprepared for the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. As Christian Brose (2020, 38) argued in the Kill Chain, “we have been blinded by the myths we have told ourselves – that, with the end of the Cold War, the world has transcended great power competition and conflict…” The reasons have less to do with the role of major power adversaries and transnational threats and more to do with the U.S. itself and technological competition (Osnos, 2023). For example, in October 2021, the Central Intelligence Agency reorganized its approach to intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting by creating two new mission offices. According to CIA Director William Burns (quoted in Barnes, 2021), the first will focus the CIA’s “collective work on the most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st Century, an increasingly adversarial Chinese government.” The second mission office will emphasize emerging technologies, pandemics, and climate change. According to Wright (2021, 200), China, the climate crisis, and COVID-19 have demonstrated that, “this is an age of transnational threats and great-power competition- one in which the two phenomena exacerbate each other.” Taken together, the focus on great power competition and transnational threats reflects a renewed effort to place China and the China-Russia partnership at the center of U.S. foreign policy (Osnos, 2023). The challenge for Biden will be keep Europe from drifting too closely to China and mitigate any consequences for U.S. national security interests and economic prosperity. While the E.U. views China as a strategic rival, unlike the U.S., there is no consensus among its member on whether China is a primary security threat. This is very different than the Cold War, when both the U.S. and Western Europe through NATO and the European Common Market, agreed that the Soviet Union was an existential threat that bounded both sides of the Atlantic together on political, strategic, economic, and ideological levels. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, there is no transatlantic unity on China as a security threat. In January 2021, just two weeks before Biden was inaugurated as president, the E.U. signed a large investment and trade deal with China, which would make it easier for E.U. and Chinese companies to operate in each other’s markets (Amaro, 2021). The E.U.-China deal was initially seen a diplomatic and geopolitical victory for China despite its forced labor

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policies and internment of Uighurs and Muslims in Xinjiang, crackdowns on democracy protesters in Hong Kong, hybrid threats against Taiwan, and its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The deal was a diplomatic priority for Chancellor Merkel given its importance to German businesses, namely automakers, with established operations in China. The deal would also relax restrictions on E.U. companies in China, allow for joint ventures and share sensitive technologies, and open China up to E.U. financial institutions. In exchange, China would be granted greater access to lucrative European markets and pledged to reduce carbon emissions (Ewing & Myers, 2020). The agreement risked strengthening transatlantic ties with the incoming Biden Administration after four years of deteriorating relations with Trump and faced opposition in the European Parliament with the authoritarian China that is both an economic rival and a massive market. The deal also showed that China, which was eager to sign the deal before Biden was inaugurated, would not face diplomatic or economic isolation over its human rights abuses and management of the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the agreement was even criticized as nothing more than a large economic benefit for select German companies (Ewing & Myers, 2020). Regardless, the E.U.’s decision to move forward with China before Biden assumed the White House revealed a deep level of transatlantic mistrust and showed that the relationship may not easily resume after Trump. By March 2021, finalization of the agreement was in doubt after the European Commission was criticized for moving forward with China in the absence of side agreements on forced labor and human rights protections. The E.U. then joined the U.S. and U.K. by imposing sanctions on China for its human rights abuses in Xinjiang and China reciprocated with its own sanctions against E.U. officials and businesses. However, the E.U. remains interested in working more closely with China on technology and communications, financial investment, trade, and infrastructure (Disis, 2021). Just a few months before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there were indications of a wider split between the U.S. and other NATO members over China. In September 2021, the Biden Administration agreed to supply Australia with nuclear submarines to counter China in the Asia– Pacific region. But to move forward with the U.S., Australia had to withdraw from a multi-billion-dollar deal with French defense companies to purchase less advanced conventional submarines. The result was the

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establishment of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense arrangement that included sharing nuclear technology, intelligence, cyber defense capacities, and other advanced weapons systems. France is a mid-level power struggling to balance its pursuit of a foreign policy independent of the U.S. and NATO while relying on its NATO allies at the same time. Maintaining an independent Gaullist streak, Macron has pushed the E.U. to assume responsibility for European security away from NATO. But that means convincing other NATO members that the E.U. is a peer competitor to the U.S., China, and Russia with France is its informal leader. According to Ben Judah (quoted in Fisher, 2021, A11), “France’s ask is a big one: It wants these countries to switch to seeing it and not the U.S. as their protector.” Besides in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there was no unifying call from NATO or E.U. member states to rally behind France’s case for European strategic autonomy from the U.S. Rather, NATO members rallied behind the U.S. as the Biden Administration stepped up its military assistance to Ukraine, increased the U.S. military presence in NATO states, and called for alliance unity against Russia. Biden has also met with the so-called “Bucharest Nine,” or the Eastern European NATO members seen as most vulnerable to Russia (Kim, 2023). France’s dilemma reveals a much greater dilemma for Europe. After World War II, Europe was open to much larger and more influential major powers. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia exercised significant influence over a divided Europe. Today, the U.S. is engaging in a massive rebalance of it military and economic resources to Asia to contain China. The U.S. now expects NATO to serve as key component in its global balancing coalition against China. Consequently, the U.S. views Europe through a more transactional lens. For example, America will exert tremendous pressure on Europe not to share dual-use technologies with China and to thwart rising Chinese influence in key regions. AUKUS also reflected conflicting responses within NATO to China’s rise in the Asia–Pacific. Whereas the U.S. has embraced confrontation with China, France and other NATO members have embraced a more conciliatory approach. While AUKUS is now central to the America’s long rebalance in U.S. foreign policy to Asia, Biden angered both France and China in the process. A French diplomat (quoted in Cohen, 2021) accused the U.S. of making a Trumpian “unilateral, brutal, unpredictable decision” that “looks like a new geopolitical order without binding alliances.” The acrimony between the two NATO allies was reminiscent of

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the split between the U.S. and France over America’s case for war against Iraq in 2003. However, the Biden Administration sent a clear message to NATO allies seeking to avoid confrontation with China that the U.S. is serious about providing Australia with advanced submarines to contain and confront China in the Pacific. For years, Australia and China had been engaging in a high-stakes diplomatic conflict over shipping and bilateral trade. Australia was also one of the first nation-states to ban Huawei from its networks. The deal would provide Australia with nuclear propulsion technology making its submarines difficult to detect. Before the deal, only the U.S. and U.K. operated submarines propulsion technology which use bomb-grade, enriched uranium like in Cold War era systems (Sanger & Kanno-Youngs, 2021). The deal would enable Australia to operate submarines with conventional cruise missiles in the South China Sea and in China’s exclusive economic zone near Taiwan. Australia would also become a far more powerful and influential player in a U.S.-led balancing coalition against Chinese economic, technological, and military expansion. Furthermore, this new and updated AUKUS (Australia-U.K.-U.S.) defense arrangement would enhance Johnson’s post-Brexit “Global Britain” strategy that emphasizes British interests in the Asia–Pacific. The arrangement could also bring rotations of American and British bombers and fighter jets to the northern Australian military installation in Darwin (Detsch & Gramer, 2021). AUKUS is more than just a huge submarine deal in terms of monetary value; it is a strategic agreement that alters the security equation over the next thirty years. Australia is now an important member of a close alliance with the U.S. and the U.K. to confront China in the Asia– Pacific. This will be the great geopolitical clash of the twenty-first century with Australia aligning with the U.S. and the U.K. in aggressive posture toward China. While AUKUS would significantly alter the strategic balance of power in favor of the U.S., U.K., and Australia and keep China off balance, it could lead to a security dilemma that might prompt China to rapidly expand its conventional or nuclear weapons arsenal (Cave & Buckley, 2021). However, the defense arrangement is an essential element in the Biden Administration’s broader containment and deterrence strategy that includes containing the spread of Chinese influence, thwarting Huawei, condemning China’s repression of human rights in Hong Kong

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and Xinjian, preventing it from access semiconductor production, and defending against Chinese hybrid cyberattacks and disinformation. But AUKUS is more than a nuclear submarine deal; rather, it is a broad and comprehensive security and diplomatic deal. AUKUS is based on an Australian proposal put forth in the early Spring 2021 that covers artificial intelligence, machine learning, cyber capabilities, undersea capabilities, as well as traditional diplomacy. The nuclear submarines will allow Australia greater freedom of action in the Asia–Pacific, primarily in response to China’s embargo against Australia in retaliation after Australia called for an investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and banning Huawei from its networks. The purpose of AUKUS is to contain China’s heightened capabilities and increasing capacity to exert naval power in support of its territorial ambitions in the Asia–Pacific. As Walt (2021) argued, AUKUS is designed to serve as a balancing coalition “to discourage or thwart any future Chinese bid for regional hegemony.” Armed with long-range nuclear propulsion submarines, Australia can engage in a more assertive role with the support of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Walt, 2021). When seen alongside the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the development of AUKUS is an important signal about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. It represents a broad and transformational shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities away from Europe and toward the Asia–Pacific that began with the Obama Administration’s rebalance or “pivot” to Asia. It is a significant upgrading of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which was a mostly diplomatic agreement between the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan. AUKUS is a significant upgrading of advance military technologies within the Quad arrangement involving the U.S. and Australia that could be expanded to other Quad members. In the absence of a formal NATO security organization, with AUKUS and the Quad, U.S. foreign policy prefers developing open and adaptable security and diplomatic arrangements and groupings implicitly aligned against China. Conflicting views within NATO and the E.U.’s conciliatory approach toward China are simply not aligned with America’s containment strategy. One could argue that AUKUS signifies that NATO is dysfunctional and debilitated because of the lack of trust among NATO members. In the absence of trust, the glue holding NATO together is weakening, and with the U.S. viewing it through a transactional lens means the transatlantic alliance is no longer a collective defense arrangement. But Macron’s

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notion “European strategic autonomy” is empty rhetoric because European nation-states do not agree with it. Poland, the Baltics, and Balkans NATO members dismiss French attempts at carving out a European foreign policy independent of the U.S. or NATO given their fears of Russian aggression in the wake of its 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moreover, France and Germany have enormous economic interests in maintaining good relations with China, which means aligning with America’s containment strategy is too much of a risk (Cohen, 2021). While doubts remain about America’s security commitments to NATO, France and Germany cannot serve as a viable security alternative to the U.S. The U.S. and France, as NATO members, have deep and divergent views regarding China. Whereas the U.S. has a vested interest in confronting China and preventing it from dominating the Asia–Pacific, the E.U., and France in particular, prefers to engage and maintain commercial ties with China. Moreover, in a post-Merkel E.U., France will continue pushing for independence as a strategic priority, viewing the E.U. as a superpower on equal footing with both the U.S. and China. According to French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire (quoted in Alderman & Cohen, 2021, A8), “means to be able to build more capacities on defense, to defend its own view on the fight against climate change, to defend its own economic interest, to have access to key technologies and not be too dependent on American technologies.” Le Maire (quoted in Alderman & Cohen, 2021, A8) also stated that alongside the U.S. and China it is important for the world to begin “recognizing Europe as one of the three superpowers in the world for the 21st Century.” Although French anger was larger than what the U.S. expected, the Biden Administration did not care and moved forward with AUKUS anyway. America’s competition with China and the great care with which it is putting together a powerful alliance to counter Chinese influence around the world are greater than transatlantic relations and NATO itself (Osnos, 2023). Furthermore, this shift in U.S. foreign policy is more than a change from one administration to another. It is structural and has been evolving and expanding since the Obama Administration’s announcement of the rebalance or pivot to Asia. And the U.S. does not mind roughing up its European allies in the process, especially France and Germany. The U.S. expected NATO to fall into its balancing coalition or risk being viewed as bystanders in the security competition.

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Then in 2023, the Biden Administration announced a flurry of military and technological cooperation agreements with Japan, India, and the Philippines to balance against Chinese military and technological initiatives. These includes military and space-based technology agreements with India in developing artificial intelligence, microchips, and quantum computing as well as joint production and manufacturing of advanced weapons (Sevastoulo & Reed, 2023). Furthermore, in response to enhanced Chinese air and naval operations, the U.S. boosted its missile capabilities and redeployed F-22 Raptors in Okinawa at the military base in Kadena (Carroll, 2023). These enhanced U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific came at the same time the U.S. opened a new military Marine base on Guam at Camp Blaz that will serve as a hub to counter China in the region (Youssef, 2023). Among the most significant U.S. military enhanced The Philippines granted the U.S. expanded access to strategic military bases near southeastern areas of the South China Sea close to Taiwan. The U.S. and the Philippines updated a 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement that would allow the U.S. to conduct rotational deployments of U.S. ground and naval military personnel and equipment to nine Filipino military bases. With the goal of countering China’s aggressive territorial claims and escalated tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. military agreement with the Philippines will deploy U.S. forces roughly 200 miles near Taiwan (Lendon & Hansler, 2023). Along with the U.S. military enhancements in Japan and Guam, the larger U.S. military presence in the Philippines would allow U.S. naval forces and Marines greater deterrence or military access to Taiwan if China were to launch a military assault on the island (Wong & Schmitt, 2023). The Biden Administration’s buildup showed that the U.S. may be moving away from America’s longstanding position of “strategic ambiguity.” In 2022, Biden (quoted in Ruwitch, 2022) stated that the U.S. would consider defending Taiwan against a Chinese military attack: “Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack” (see Sevastopulo, 2022).

The Protect Agenda: U.S. Industrial Policy and Technological Competition with China The roles of both NATO and the E.U. will be further tested if a decoupling of American and Chinese economies takes place. The U.S. and

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China have already moved away from one another in robotics, automation, big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. For the last four decades, China has taken advantage of its inexpensive and efficient labor force with little to no objections from Western nation-states. However, today, the Chinese labor force is becoming less relevant to China’s industrial productivity as information and technology now dominate economic sectors. Consequently, the same integrated global supply chains that once attracted Western multinational firms and their capital to China are now less interested in investing in the Chinese market. At the same time, advanced technology firms cannot access the massive Chinese market. U.S. firms, namely Google and Facebook, have little to no access to Chinese consumers, who constitute the world’s largest data market. The E.U. and U.K. do not even have those firms. This means an international system defined less in terms of globalization and more driven by national champions. Decoupling has already taken place in some areas. Over time, the belief that the world’s two largest economies were inextricably intertwined is changing to a new belief that the U.S. and China must be self-sufficient. For example, 5G telecommunications, data surveillance, biotechnology, and green energies are areas where the U.S. has blocked access and the E.U. has not. NATO and E.U. members Greece and Italy are part of the Belt and Road initiative and even accepted Chinese infrastructure investments. America’s fear is that China could turn off the very technologies Americans, U.S. companies, and the military have come to rely on. Or even reroute internet traffic in the U.S. through China itself via Chinese 5G telecommunications networks (Uchill, 2018). In 2018, malicious internet hacking took place, in which Google traffic was rerouted through China Telecom and a Russian ISP that disrupted service for two hours. Even worse, the U.S. could be forced to live with the fear that China might them off at any moment (Sanger et al., 2021). Malicious internet activity can disrupt critical networks vital to the U.S. economy and military (Newman, 2018). Although the U.S. pressured E.U. members not to purchase Chinese 5G telecommunications networks, it had no alternative to offer them since American companies do not have the capacity to produce them in large enough numbers to compete with Huawei. The U.S. has long accused Huawei of working with the Chinese government to collect intelligence, monitor users, coopt intellectual property, and pressure other governments. Moreover, after Huawei builds

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a 5G network in a country, the government tends to use Huawei for upgrades and exclude American companies. The Trump Administration’s response was to utilize American dominance in semiconductors to ban the sale of computer chips, which are essential to telecommunications companies like Huawei for wireless communications, data storage, and network security. As of 2021, the U.S. and eight other nation-states, including Australia, Japan, and the U.K. have banned Huawei. Others, like Canada, France, India, Vietnam, and Italy have phased out Huawei or do not renew contracts with the company and contract with Nokia and Ericsson to develop their 5G networks. However, NATO members Hungary, Iceland, The Netherlands, and Turkey have contracted with Huawei to build 5G infrastructure. Again, the primary reason the U.S. is powerless to influence its allies not to use Huawei is because there is no American company that can compete with China in developing 5G telecommunications or selling 5G products (Stacks, 2021). To address the concern that the U.S. could fall behind China, the $1.2 trillion U.S. Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021 (BIL) was passed. The law invested federal monies into improving American infrastructure projects, including domestic transportation networks, broadband, subsidies for electric vehicles and charging stations, upgrading the American electrical grid, new digital networks, and public works projects. Roughly half of the funding would support state and local governments over the coming years. Of the $1.2 trillion allocated by the legislation, about $550 billion is new spending that will be spread out over five years; the remaining funds are devoted to existing transportation programs (Tankersley, 2021). After adjusting for inflation, BIL is roughly equivalent to the cost of the Interstate Highway System. Given this technological competition, the Biden Administration largely continued and, in some areas, intensified the Trump Administration’s protectionist measures. Following decades of U.S. trade and investment policy to develop closer commercial ties with China, the period of economic globalization and cooperation came to end during the Biden Administration. While Trump pulled the U.S. out of several multilateral partnership programs, namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and imposed sanctions on China and the E.U., the Biden Administration reshaped America’s engagement with China. With the goal of limiting China’s economic and technological development, Biden embraced aggressive and forceful federal action to mitigate Chinese economic and military power. Biden

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escalated Trump’s tariffs and trade disputes by securing passage of new congressional legislation and issuing executive orders targeting China’s technology sectors that could lead to the decoupling of the world’s two largest economies. The Biden Administration’s “protect agenda” is a shift toward a U.S. industrial policy centered on using the federal government to advance American innovation (Tyson & Mendonca, 2023). It is also designed to mitigate competition with China’s “Made in China 2025” strategy of using state subsidies to protect its domestic industrial sectors and promote global economic and technological interests. The goal of Biden’s “protect agenda” is to maintain America’s technological edge while also eroding Chinese technological development (Bade, 2022). Biden’s actions are more than just an escalation with China; they represent a significant departure from a more than 30-year strategy of economic engagement to ensuring that American technology and commerce do not help Chinese economic development and military assets (Bade, 2022; Cassidy, 2023). Biden’s “protect agenda” rests on new congressional legislation and executive orders. Two of the most significant elements in Biden’s agenda are the CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act, both of which provide generous subsidies and incentives to American manufacturers and technology companies (Cassidy, 2023). The CHIPS and Science Act provides $280 billion in public funding to U.S. companies and research and development in advanced semiconductors. This includes $52 billion for chipmakers to construct new manufacturing plants in the U.S., $81 billion in National Science Foundation research projects, $24 billion in tax credits to chipmakers, $170 billion for research and development in advanced technologies, and $50 billion to the U.S. Department of Energy (Cassidy, 2023; Knutson, 2022a). The goal of the CHIPS and Science Act is twofold. First, it protects American technological expertise in building advanced computer chips. The cost of building semiconductors and computer chip factories is very high, especially in the U.S. where labor costs are lofty. Moreover, competing governments have been providing generous subsidies for years reducing costs in countries like China. Also, the Biden Administration views making computer chips in the U.S. is a national security issue. Taiwan, which is home to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), is vulnerable to Chinese military aggression (Ovide, 2022). TSMC supplies Apple with computer chips and manufacturers much of the world’s supply of advanced computer chips. With Taiwan

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at risk, the CHIPS and Science Act provides long-term investment in the growth of the domestic American semiconductor chip industry, including companies like Intel, Qualcom, Micron, Nvidia, and Broadcom. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provides $369 billion in subsidies and incentives to U.S.-based companies producing and manufacturing electric vehicles and sustainable energy and climate initiatives. The E.U. and Japan have objected to the IRA by claiming that European and Japanese companies will be at an unfair advantage because the law provides tax credits to Americans to purchase hybrid and electric vehicles manufactured with domestic batteries in North American factories (Shao, 2022). To avoid a trade war, the U.S. and E.U. established a task force to find a solution (Fleming & Bounds, 2022). However, the passage of the IRA was designed for domestic political purposes; that is, to boost Democrats in the 2022 congressional midterm elections and address voters’ concerns about energy prices in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and to contend with the effects of the energy transition away from fossil fuels. The Biden Administration also issued new executive orders to limit Chinese companies’ access to advanced semiconductors and computer chips and on American chips companies working with Chinese companies. In October 2022, the Department of Commerce imposed new export controls to prevent China from accessing advanced semiconductors for artificial intelligence and quantum-enabling computing. For decades, Chinese firms have depended on technology companies in the U.S., Taiwan, The Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea for access to advanced semiconductors. China can manufacture less advanced computers and the Chinese government has invested in domestic production. However, it does not have the capability to manufacture advanced semiconductor technologies (Bade, 2022). The precursor to Biden’s export controls was the Trump Administration’s severing of China’s Huawei’s access to advanced computer chips. It then widened those controls over Chinese firms that make military, media, and surveillance technologies (Swanson, 2020). The Biden and Trump administrations lobbied The Netherlands to prevent from purchasing tools to produce advanced computer chips (Kharpal, 2022). The Biden Administration’s Commerce Department rules added three new levels of restrictions on China. First, it shifted away from targeting Chinese companies and began targeting all of China. Any U.S. company

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that wants to sell advanced computers chips in China needs a U.S. government license and the Commerce Department has set a very bar on issuing approvals. Second, the Commerce Department will now prevent Americans, U.S. residents, and U.S.-based companies from collaborating with Chinese companies to make advanced computer chips. Third, the new rules target semiconductor global supply chains by preventing access to tools and components for semiconductor manufacturing equipment (Sheehan, 2022). The Biden Administration’s new export control rules will devastate Chinese technology fabricators and artificial intelligence and quantumenabled computing centers that depend on advanced semiconductors and computer chips. Put simply, the new rules will cut China off from accessing U.S. technology and set the Chinese semiconductor, biotechnology, and clean energy industries back decades (Schuman, 2022). Also, the new export controls will force E.U. and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific to choose to allow their companies to collaborate with Chinese companies on technologies with applications in civilian and military areas or follow the Biden Administration’s new highly restrictive export controls. Biden’s industrial policy measures were framed within a Cold War 2.0 context. They were designed to keep up with China and lessen U.S. dependence on China in the production and manufacturing of critical technologies. For years, the U.S. grew incredibly reliant on China in areas where U.S. firms were no longer investing, such as 5G networks and semiconductors. Biden’s protect agenda was a response to the “Made in China 2025” initiative, which is designed to establish Chinese self-sufficiency in semiconductors, autonomous vehicles, and artificial intelligence. Put simply, China no longer wants to rely on the U.S. or Europe to develop critical and disruptive technologies. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (quoted in Sanger et al., 2021) described passage of the measure as essential to democracy’s survival in a world of rising authoritarianism: “Around the globe, authoritarian governments smell blood in the water. They believe that squabbling democracies like ours can’t come together and invest in national priorities the way a top-down, centralized authoritarian government can.” The law was passed roughly at the same time President Biden issued an executive order preventing American companies from investing in Chinese businesses associated with China’s military or providing China with surveillance technologies used in government repression efforts.

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The intent was to infuse American government and industry with the overarching strategic security competition with China. From Obama to Trump to Biden, China’s rise has been framed as America’s twenty-first century challenge. As Biden (quoted in Knickmeyer & Mascaro, 2021) warned, if the U.S. does not regain its strategic competitive and technological edge, then China is “going to eat our lunch.” China was front and center in Biden’s, 2021 meetings with G7, NATO, and E.U. leaders and U.S. foreign policymakers worked overtime to develop a united front against China’s long-term challenge. Biden’s embrace of an industrial policy reflected a new consensus in the U.S. on maintaining America’s edge against China in the high technology economy and advanced military systems (Sanger et al., 2021). For almost twenty years, China has closed the gap with America on research and development spending. Between 2003 and 2017, China has increased R&D spending from $23 billion to $98 billion or by 330% compared to the U.S., which increased R&D spending from $121 billion to $124 billion or just 2% (Foote & Atkinson, 2019). Chinese businesses investments in R&D narrowed the gap with American businesses, almost erasing America’s advantage (Foote & Atkinson, 2019). In 2020, while U.S. government and private R&D spending represented 3.1% of GDP compared to China at 2.3%, China’s government and private R&D funding could overtake the U.S. by the end of the decade (OECD, 2021) While U.S. R&D legislation would address twenty years of China’s technological ascent and arrest the decades-long process of “crowding in,” in which the R&D burden fell on large private corporations. While the U.S., along with Japan, Germany, South Korea, and France were the world’s leading nation-states in R&D spending, China’s gross domestic R&D expenditures hit 80% of American gross domestic R&D spending in 2019 (OECD, 2021). The U.S. now believes that its dependence on core technological components from China and China’s rising economic and military prowess threaten to undermine America’s economy and military power (Bremmer, 2021; Edmondson & Swanson, 2022, A16). The U.S. made similar investments in certain industries to contend with the economic ascendency of Japan in the 1980s, when U.S. automakers lost out to Japanese companies and there was significant American backlash against Japan. However, the U.S. produced fuel efficient vehicles that helped the U.S. auto industry regain its footing and were popular with consumers. Investments in NASA-related R&D built

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the U.S. space program and enabled America to catch up to and surge ahead of the Soviet Union and later Russia not only in outer space, but also in military and commercial satellites and global positioning systems. However, if the U.S. continues underinvesting in R&D, China and Russia may develop capabilities in areas like satellites and outer space exploration that could outpace the U.S. and E.U.

U.S. Military Spending and the Defense Industrial Base In 2022, Biden signed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2022, which increased military spending from $808 billion to $858 billion by another 4.6% (Lipton et al., 2022). New spending included increasing pay for troops as well as additional warplanes, purchase for new naval ships, and conventional and cyber strategies for contending with geopolitical threats from China and Russia (Edmondson, 2021). The most significant increases included $7.1 billion in allocations for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a formal statement of support by Congress for Taiwan, and a ban on products made by forced labor in China’s Xinjiang (Singh, 2021). This was followed up in March 2022 with the passage of a $1.5 trillion federal spending package. This legislation included $13.6 billion in military, humanitarian, and economic assistance to Ukraine. New domestic spending priorities included billions desperately needed public investments in climate resilience measures, public education (school grants, Head Start, and Pell Grants), public health (pandemic preparedness and biomedical research, opioid epidemic, research on firearm injuries and mortality prevention) and childcare. In addition to raising assistance levels to help Ukraine, military spending priorities included billions of dollars of investments in new naval vessels, warplanes (F/A-18 Super Hornets) and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, new defense assistance for Poland and the Baltic States, funding to defend a “free and open Indo-Pacific” to counter rising Chinese influence, pay raises and subsidies for American service members (Cochrane, 2022). Although the U.S. has the world’s largest defense budget, it will experience significant military supply chain problems especially if a major power war were to occur with China and/or Russia. In 2023–2024, U.S. defense spending could increase from $858 billion in 2022 to more $1 trillion with Congress adding tens of billions more in supplemental programs

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(Lipton et al., 2022). The U.S. Congress will have to make tough decisions to approve new defense spending increases, which could have the unintended consequence of bringing together most Democrats who want to support the Biden Administration and Republicans who already call for military spending increases. Pressure to increase defense spending is already high with the U.S. allocating billions to its Ukraine Security initiative, new deployments to NATO member states, and ramping up defense posture in the IndoPacific region. Mark Cancian (2022) argues that “some U.S. inventories are reaching the minimum levels needed for war plans and training. The key judgement for both munitions and weapons is how much risk the United States is willing to accept.” Furthermore, the extent of the depletion in weapons stockpiles depends on the type of system. Some weapons cannot be as efficiently produced and manufactured as others in the U.S. defense industrial base. For example, the U.S. committed more than 800,000 artillery rounds to Ukraine for howitzers, which according to Cancian (2022) is “probably close to the limit that the United States is willing to give without risk to its own warfighting capabilities.” While NATO allies and partners could help meet Ukraine’s demand, their stocks would also have to be replenished by defense corporations on both side of the Atlantic. The U.S. must therefore develop an ability to scale defense production and increase production with non-competitive military contracts to backfill weapons and replenish equipment stocks sent to Ukraine. While the U.S. in 2022 drew down roughly $10 billion in weapons and equipment from its defense stocks, just $1.2 billion was on contract for replenishment (Cancian, 2022). According to the Department of Defense, $352 million was reserved in 2022 to replenish javelin antitank weapons to Ukraine and $624 million to replace Stinger missiles as well as $200 million to replenish the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) (Knutson, 2022b; Starr, 2022). These systems must be replenished, otherwise American and NATO military readiness will be significantly at risk (Rahman, 2022). Supply chain problems in the defense industrial base could inhibit the process of delivering weapons and equipment to Ukraine. In 2020 and 2021, significant supply chain delays and problems were caused by COVID-19 and unemployment in Aerospace and defense and critical components and materials. With supply chains under strain, the U.S. was forced to retool its defense industrial base to meet new defense

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challenges as the U.S. boosted shipments of ammunition, missiles, and anti-tank weapons to Ukraine. Also, the departments of State and Defense implemented security assistance shipments without permanent inspectors general in place to conduct appropriate oversight (Brian, 2022). By 2023, the Department of Defense was searching for ways to accelerate U.S. weapons contracts and sales to replenish stockpiles depleted from the Ukraine Security initiative. The U.S. no longer has the so-called “Detroit Deterrent” approach to defense industrial production. Much of this has to do with the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War era brought with it a perception that a significant war in Europe using tanks, artillery, and heavy weapons would be inconceivable. The Russian war in Ukraine beginning with its illegal seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale ground invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ended that (Erlanger & Jakes, 2022). The contemporary U.S. defense industrial base is premised on “just in time” deliveries and lean manufacturing of munitions, critical spare parts, and complex components (Jones, 2023). While the U.S. maintains weapons in stockpiles, the Department of Defense needs the industrial capacity to produce the items and parts to make them operate. Moreover, given the intense security and technological competition with China, the U.S. can no longer rely on China to build critical components for American weapons. The U.S. must have the capacity to quickly produce depleted weapons systems, shipbuilding and submarines, aircraft, electronics, communications, ammunition, and propulsion systems in efficient supply chains that may be hindered in case of a major war. At the same time, it should be able to meet defense orders from partners and allies. The U.S. should have ownership of those capabilities if a supply chain is stalled. The U.S. has the world’s most advanced defense corporations. Given that the U.S. is spending more on defense than almost the next ten countries, just in time defense industrial production and lean manufacturing should come to an end. Consequently, defense corporations will be the recipients of generous military contracts to replenish diminishing weapons stocks, improve defense supply chains, and export weapons to NATO allies. In 2023, to deal with the potential of contingency operations and to maintain security assistance to Ukraine, Army procurement spending will rise by 55% and Navy spending will increase by 47%. As William Hartung (quoted in Lipton et al., 2022) states, defense contractors will be “riding high

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again, and Ukraine gives them another argument as to why things need to continue onward and upward.” For example, to replenish weapons sent to Ukraine, the Department of Defense has $2 billion in contracts for missile systems with Raytheon and $950 million in contracts with Lockheed Martin. There will be even more inflation-adjust defense spending increases as U.S. defense contractors ramp up production and manufacturing contracts from NATO allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific increasing military spending in response to China (Lipton et al., 2022). While the Biden and Trump administrations agreed on almost nothing in domestic policy, they concurred on China. The U.S. and China are heading toward technological decoupling as each believes it must control their own critical technologies, especially artificial intelligence, robotics, and quantum computing. The Biden Administration’s public investments in research and development, protect agenda, and export controls limiting Chinese access to American technologies reflect this. While the two have shared interests and will likely cooperate on such issues as nuclear nonproliferation and climate change, on most other issues the relationship between the U.S. and China will determined by levels of competition and struggle (Prestowitz, 2021) rather than coexistence or so-called interdependence (Hass, 2021).

Domestic Consequences and Transatlantic Credibility Two of the most significant challenges that could undermine NATO’s credibility during the Biden Administration were Afghanistan and Ukraine. In Afghanistan, while NATO complained at times that the U.S. did not consult with members during the war, it provided the U.S. significant leeway to lead combat missions. In addition, NATO was committed to withdrawing its combined forces from Afghanistan by May 2021, following roughly the same timetable put in place by the Biden Administration (Siebold & Emmott, 2021). And, when it came to the withdrawal itself, NATO troops left Afghanistan with no eagerness to return. This does not mean the U.S. and its European allies are not worried about the consequences of the withdrawal. Both are concerned about Afghan migrants, Al Qaeda returning to Afghanistan, and a rise in international terrorism. While Biden was criticized for lack of consultation with NATO and following through on Trump’s withdrawal strategy, America’s European

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allies and partners will not abandon Biden on the bigger issues that matter on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO allies do not have leverage to resist U.S. influence because they lack alternatives to security system management. The E.U. is not a credible alternative to both the U.S. and NATO. These include China, Russia, the COVID-19 pandemic, hybrid warfare, and climate change. After the killing of bin Laden in 2011, NATO failed to identify and highlight clear-eyed interests in Afghanistan. These include geopolitical competition for regional stability, rare Earth elements and minerals, checking China’s Belt and Road initiative, and a surge of refugees and migrants that overwhelmed Turkey. The manner of the American withdrawal did create immeasurable suffering for those in Afghanistan who worked with the Americans. Biden was correct in following through with the withdrawal, but the extrication itself was rushed and haphazard. The State Department did not have an effective plan to administer special visas for Afghans at risk from Taliban reprisals. The Biden Administration is at fault for the bungled evacuation. However, the Biden Administration made a strategic decision to disengage from Afghanistan. There was very little hope that the U.S. was going to build a strong national political culture in Afghanistan. Moreover, there were no military solutions, and it was illusory to think the U.S. could develop a political system that would promote and sustain rule of law and combat corruption in government. Moreover, after Biden announced that he would follow through on Trump’s negotiated U.S. withdrawal with the Taliban, American defense and intelligence personnel wrongly assumed they had at least one year to complete the withdrawal and safely evacuate Afghans and Americans. The Afghan security forces proved to be ineffective over the long term and in the absence of American leadership, air power, and command and control. In addition, when the Afghan government knew that the U.S. would withdraw forces, it simply could not hold onto power and elements within both the government and security forces cut deals with the Taliban and the remaining institutions collapsed. Most important, the U.S. could not keep a small number of forces in Afghanistan at a low cost in resources and with the support of the American public. Nation-building in Afghanistan after the toppling of the Taliban in 2001 was a fools-errand. It is worth remembering that the Taliban have been making gains militarily and eroding the U.S.-backed Afghan government’s hold on territory since Obama announced in 2014 that the U.S. combat mission, Enduring Freedom, had ended. It was Biden who

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pushed Obama to completely withdraw American military forces at the time but was overruled by the president. However, a small number of U.S. forces remained in Afghanistan who were continuing to provide training, logistical, and air support to the Afghan national military. In addition, the U.S. continued providing political and financial assistance to an increasingly corrupt Afghan government that was not legitimate in the eyes of most Afghans. The Taliban made so many military gains on the ground that by 2016, it assumed control of a significant portion of the country. The question for both Obama and Trump in Afghanistan was whether the U.S. withdrawal would result in a slow and steady deterioration or a rapid collapse of the country? But the U.S. could never publicly admit that the Afghan government it stood up since 2001 was capable to withstanding the Taliban. Inside the Department of Department, communications published internal documents in the Washington Post showing that the war was, for the most part, unwinnable because of the corrupt Afghan government and determination of the Taliban to retake the country (Whitlock, 2019). This again reflects the wide gap between the American people and foreign policy elites. The collapse of the Afghan government and military showed widespread failure within the foreign policy establishment. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was one of Biden’s central campaign commitments, given his promise to end so-called endless wars. This argument provides a snapshot of Biden’s preference for a new U.S. foreign policy that would steer clear of military interventions and ground wars involving large numbers of American troops that do not advance critical U.S. national security interests. U.S. strategy now appears guided by an intense security competition with China and Russia involving cyberoperations, hybrid war, information, artificial intelligence and machine learning, military technology, and quantum computing. Maintaining a large contingent of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq do not serve those interests. Therefore, U.S. missions with clearer goals and framed within the broader security competition with China and Russia will be central to America’s new and emerging foreign policy goals (Shear & Tankersley, 2021). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revitalized America’s commitments to NATO and changed its orientation to allies and rivals alike. While the war tightened the transatlantic bond and boosted NATO resolve, America’s rebalance to the Indo-Pacific continued and expanded with the Quad,

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AUKUS, and new bilateral and multilateral security and economic agreements. Like the Cold War with the Soviet Union, American foreign policy confronts domestic paradoxes and dilemmas concerning values, democracy, and human rights in pursuing its core national interests of balancing against challengers in Asia and Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine felt like it confirmed the existence of a new Cold War 2.0 that now serves as prism through which domestic drivers of U.S. foreign policy will be filtered for years and perhaps decades (Osnos, 2023). Putin’s aggression helps Biden solidify his argument that democracy is at war with autocracy, which means American foreign policy is not only balancing against Russian hegemony in Europe with its NATO allies, but also supporting the young Ukrainian democracy. However, within NATO, are Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, which have experienced significant democratic backsliding and authoritarianism. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 following its military buildup along its border in 2021, there has been unprecedented unity between the U.S. and its NATO allies. First off, the Biden Administration coordinated an incredible level of intelligence sharing regarding the Russian military buildup and repeatedly publicized Russia’s military movements and efforts to develop false flag operations and a pretext to invade Ukraine. Second, the U.S. convinced NATO and non-NATO members alike to impose devastating sanctions against Russia in the wake of the invasion, including cutting Russian banks from the Swift financial transactions system, revoking Most Favored Nation status, and withdrawing Western businesses and credit card companies operating in Russia. Third, after years of lobbying Germany, the U.S. and NATO received guarantees from Prime Minister Olaf Scholz to increase defense spending, send weapons to the Ukrainian government, and abandon the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The U.S. also increased the number of American troops in NATO’s eastern flank. If Putin thought he could widen fissures and divisions within NATO, he achieved just the opposite. The Russian invasion of Ukraine had far-reaching consequences in the domestic politics of the U.S. and for U.S. foreign policy. Immediately following the invasion, oil prices increased to their highest levels since 2014 and food and other energy products spiked. From March 2021 to March 2022, Brent crude oil prices increased by 62%, natural gas prices by almost 80%, and gasoline by 50% (Trading Economics, March 2022). While the U.S. is not overly reliant on Russian energy imports, the Biden Administration’s decision to ban Russian oil was expected to raise prices

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even more. Releasing barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, suspending gasoline taxes, and pressing OPEC countries into increasing produce would not be enough to stem oil price increases. Even more, with the global supply chain still rattled by COVID-19 disruptions and rising demand for consumer goods and given that Ukrainian and Russian wheat production is 29% of the global market, inflation is expected to be an ongoing domestic challenge. Given these domestic worries, President Biden’s public approval increased following the persistent decline in popular support after the bungled evacuation of American forces from Afghanistan and rising COVID-19 infections during the Delta and Omicron waves. After his State of the Union address in late February when he committed security and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, opposed sending American troops to Ukraine, and pledged to boost support for NATO members, public approval of Biden increased 8 percentage points from 39 to 48%. Also, public approval of Biden’s handling of the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased to 52% compared to 50% who disapproved in an earlier poll (Santhanam, 2022). Most of this support came from Democrats and independents, key groups that defected from Biden in 2021. The Biden Administration has also responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine with dramatic increases in the number of American troops deployed in NATO member states, especially along NATO’s eastern flank. In total, the U.S. deployed large numbers of American troops in 17 NATO member states, boosting the total to 38,500 in Germany, 10,000 in Poland, and 2,500 in the Baltic States (Ignatius, 2022). While these are much larger military deployments, they are expensive and will draw resources away from the Persian Gulf and the Asia–Pacific. Biden has always referenced China as America’s top geopolitical competitor and often describes the security rivalry as a contest between democracy and autocracy. China is watching very closely to how the U.S. reacts to Ukraine given its designs on Taiwan. Moreover, his administration is committed to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, which has caused Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel to push back against the U.S. Challenging the U.S. and NATO is an emerging alliance between China and Russia. During the 2022 Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin pledged “no limits” in their bilateral cooperation and, for the first time, China opposed the addition of new NATO members in Europe. Xi and Putin also committed their governments to providing the world with

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strategic alternatives to the Western model of democracy and expansionism and blaming the U.S. for chaos in the world. China may have had knowledge about the Russian invasion of Ukraine ahead of time and ignored American appeals to China to help pressure Russia not to invade. As Russia became bogged down in Ukraine in 2023, the Biden Administration grew more concerned that China might supply Russia with military hardware and advanced dual-use military technologies for use in both military and civilian goods and equipment. This includes lethal military equipment, such as ammunition, drones, spare parts, and vehicles to replace Russia’s diminished military supplies as well as raw materials, mobile devices, microchips, aircraft parts, and medical equipment. Russia has been able to circumvent Western sanctions by accessing drones from Iran, exporting oil to China and India, and dual-use technologies. The Biden Administration sanctioned a Chinese company in January 2023 for providing Russia’s Wagner Group with satellite imagery (Swanson, 2023). The Biden Administration shared intelligence with allies about China supplying Russia with weapons and ammunition to aid Russia’s war in Ukraine. Secretary of State Blinken (quoted in Barnes & Entous, 2023) suggested, “we have information that gives us concern that they [China] are considering providing lethal support to Russia in the war against Ukraine.” By disclosing this information, the Biden Administration was attempting to deter China from delivering weapons systems to Russia and threatening economic penalties if China provided security assistance. Also, the intelligence disclosures were part of a coordinated deterrence strategy by the U.S. to share intelligence and classified information with allies and release it to the public. The Biden Administration declassified intelligence in 2021 and 2022 prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to convince skeptical NATO allies and encourage Ukraine to prepare itself. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the emerging alliance between China and Russia are not only redefining U.S. foreign policy over the long term and tightly binding the U.S. to NATO and Europe, but they are also shifting priorities and issues. The war and China-Russia partnership reinforced the Biden Administration’s push for energy self-sufficiency, export controls limiting China’s access to advanced technologies, and pressure on European allies to resist greater economic cooperation with China. When the Biden Administration banned imports of Russian oil after the invasion of Ukraine, it did so based on the justification that continuing to do so was akin to financing Russia’s aggression. And given that China and Russia are united against a U.S.-led order, American foreign

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policy is appears committed to engaging intense security competitions with both China and Russia. The revitalization of America’s commitment to NATO comes at the same time America is expanding its role in the Indo-Pacific through AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The connections between Asia and Europe in U.S. foreign policy are becoming more apparent and, at least under Biden, the U.S. is making a moral argument in its fight against autocracy and revisionist powers. These are the conditions for a new Cold War in the structure of the international system. Like its predecessors, the Biden Administration’s commitment to NATO after four years of Trump’s America First will be determined and judged by domestic political forces, especially the shape and structure of American public opinion. Biden’s ability to maintain NATO unity in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine and in balance against China will be judged by the American people and the level of support or opposition in the U.S. Congress. And the legitimacy of Biden’s leadership of democracies against autocracies will be judged based on the stability of the American constitutional system of government and rule of law in the wake of the extremist January 6th insurrection. The credibility of Biden’s argument that “America is back” and America’s reputation as a reliable partner rest on whether American democracy can withstand far-right domestic extremism.

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Barnes, J. E. (2021, October 7). CIA reorganization to place new focus on China. New York Times, A10. Barnes, J., & Entous, A. (2023, February 23). How the U.S. adopted a new intelligence playbook to expose Russia’s war plans. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/23/us/politics/intelligence-rus sia-us-ukraine-china.html Bennett, B. (2022, December 5). A volatile U.S. political landscape is spurring NATO to invest more in Europe’s Defenses. Time. https://time.com/623 8447/nato-us-relationship-biden-trump-2024/ Biden, J. (2021, June 13). Remarks by President Biden in press conference. Cornwall, United Kingdom. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ speeches-remarks/2021/06/13/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-confer ence-2/ Birnbaum, M., Gearn, A., & Parker, A. (2021, June 14). NATO expands focus to China, a win for Biden in his first trip to the battered alliance. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/disagreements-flare-amongnato-allies-despite-relief-at-bidens-arrival/2021/06/14/3b7b0f6c-cd0911eb-a7f1-52b8870bef7c_story.html Boak, J., & Fingerhut, H. (2022, November 9). VoteCast: Inflation top concern, but democracy a worry too. AP and AP VoteCast. https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-abortion-bideninflation-cf4dffe87a7c2fd1bdd58df0346e15dc Boak, J., Fingerhut, H., & Fox, B. (2021, August 19). Afghanistan war unpopular amid chaotic pullout: AP-NORC poll. AP. https://apnews.com/ article/joe-biden-asia-pacific-afghanistan-only-on-ap-503a50cd8074ced7bc 36d9c12e9fd2e4 Brands, H. (2014). What good is strategy? Power and purpose in American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Cornell University Press. Brands, H. (2021, June 29). The emerging Biden doctrine. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-29/eme rging-biden-doctrine?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=www-foreignaf fairs-com.cdn.ampproject.org&utm_campaign=amp_kickers&_gl=1*lottpn *_ga*b0IyVHBwZlpreXJwbVNycnYtTHFPMnJ3c0hnT2toQ2JzbldBRlJuSn RIME5KVDlUc0kwaHp4dm1VNGYwUEdDVQ Bremmer, I. (2021, November/December). Technopolar moment: How digital powers will reshape the global order. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaf fairs.com/articles/world/2021-10-19/ian-bremmer-big-tech-global-order Brian, D. (2022, May 13). There’s no oversight of billion in Ukraine aid-we need fiscal watchdogs. The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/3487430theres-no-oversight-of-billions-in-ukraine-aid-we-need-an-inspector-general/ Brose, C. (2020). The kill chain: Defending America in the future of high-tech warfare. Hachette.

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Cancian, M. F. (2022, September 16). Is the United States running out of weapons to send to Ukraine? Center for Strategic and International Studies. https:// www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-running-out-weapons-send-ukraine Carroll, C. E. (2023, February 3). What’s behind proposed changes to US Marine deployments in Okinawa? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/ 2023/02/whats-behind-proposed-changes-to-us-marine-deployments-in-oki nawa/ Cassidy, J. (2023, February 7). Joe Biden’s innovative attempt to reshape the American economy. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/ our-columnists/joe-bidens-innovative-attempt-to-reshape-the-american-eco nomy Cave, D., & Buckley, C. (2021, September 16). Why Australia bet the house on lasting American power in Asia. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2021/09/16/world/australia/australia-china-submarines.html Cochrane. E. (2022, March 10). House passes $1.5 trillion spending bill as Democrats drop COVID aid. New York Times, A1. Cohen, R. (2021, September 16). Biden announces defense deal with Australia in bid to counter China. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/ 09/16/world/europe/france-australia-uk-us-submarines.html Detsch, J., & Gramer, R. (2021, September 16). U.S. seeking basing in Australia after submarine deal. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/ 16/u-s-seeking-basing-in-australia-after-submarine-deal/ Disis, J. (2021, March 24). China may just have doomed its trade deal with Europe. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/24/economy/china-eu-inv estment-deal-sanctions-intl-hnk/index.html Edmondson, C. (2021, December 15). Senate passes $768 billion defense bill, sending it to Biden. New York Times, A17. Edmondson, C., & Swanson, A. (2022, February 4). House passes bill adding billions to research to compete with China. New York Times, A16. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/us/politics/house-china-com petitive-bill.html?referringSource=articleShare Erlanger, S. (2019, November 7). Macron says NATO is experiencing ‘brain death’ because of Trump. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/11/07/world/europe/macron-nato-brain-death.html Erlanger, S. (2021a, August 12). Afghanistan’s unraveling may strike another blow to U.S. credibility. New York Times, A1. Erlanger, S. (2021b, June 6). Biden is Embracing Europe, but Then What? NATO and the E.U. Have Concerns. New York Times. https://www.nyt imes.com/2021/06/06/world/europe/biden-nato-eu-trump.html?referring Source=articleShare Erlanger, S. (2023a, February 4). When it comes to building its own defense, Europe has blinked. New York Times, A10.

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Erlanger, S. (2023b, January 26). Ukraine war accelerates shift of power in Europe to the East. New York Times, A7. Erlanger, S., & Jakes, L. (2022, November 29). U.S. and NATO scramble to arm Ukraine and refill their own arsenals. New York Times, A1. Euronews. (2022, December 9). NATO: Sweden and Finland very close to joining alliance, Blinken says. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/2022/ 12/09/nato-sweden-and-finland-very-close-to-joining-alliance-blinken-says Ewing, J., & Myers, S. L. (2020, December 3). China and E.U. leaders strike investment deal, but political hurdles await. New York Times, B3. Eyal, J. (2023, January 29). Amid the smoke of war, power in Europe is shifting decisively to the east. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2023/jan/29/amid-the-smoke-of-war-power-in-europe-is-shi fting-decisively-to-the-east Feldscher, J. (2023, March 1). ‘Battle between democracy and autocracy’ leads Biden’s first state of the union. Defense One. https://www.defenseone.com/ policy/2022/03/battle-between-democracy-and-autocracy-leads-bidens-firststate-union/362643/ Fisher, M. (2021, September 22). France, striving for global power, still struggles to get it. New York Times, A11. Fleming, S., & Bounds, A. (2022, November 27). How does the EU respond to Joe Biden’s $369 bn green subsidies bill? Financial Times. https://www. ft.com/content/f16ddb43-818c-4c82-8700-0c710659d443 Foote, C., & Atkinson, R. D. (2019). Federal support for R&D continues its ignominious slide. Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). https://itif.org/publications/2019/08/12/federal-support-rdcontinues-its-ignominious-slide/ Gray, C., & Hannah, M. (2020, November 23). Diplomacy and restraint. Eurasia Group Foundation. https://egfound.org/2020/11/diplomacy-andrestraint/ Green, T. V., & Doherty, C. (2021, August 31). Majority of U.S. public favors Afghanistan troop withdrawal; Biden criticized for his handling of situation. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/ 31/majority-of-u-s-public-favors-afghanistan-troop-withdrawal-biden-critic ized-for-his-handling-of-situation/ Hannah, M. (2019, February). World’s apart: U.S. foreign policy and American public opinion. Eurasia Study Foundation. https://egfound.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/02/EGF-WorldsApart-2019.pdf Hass, R. (2021). Stronger: Adapting America’s China strategy in an age of competitive interdependence. Yale University Press. Hirsh, M. (2021, August 20). Lessons from Biden’s very bad week. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/20/lessons-biden-afg hanistan-withdrawal/

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Ignatius, D. (2022, March 9). Travels with Milley. Washington Post. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/08/ignatius-milley-ukrainenato/ Jones, S. (2023, January). Empty bins in a wartime environment. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws. com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3 OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88 Katznelson, I. (2017, November). What America taught the Nazis. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/11/ what-america-taught-the-nazis/540630/ Kharpal, A. (2022, December 4). A globally critical chip firm is driving a wedge between the U.S. and Netherlands over China tech policy. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/05/us-ramps-up-pressure-on-net herlands-to-fall-in-line-with-china-chip-policy.html Kim, V. (2023, February 2). President Biden will meet with the leaders of NATO’s east. Here’s what to know. New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/live/2023/02/22/world/russia-ukraine-biden-news#president-bidenwill-meet-with-the-leaders-of-natos-east-heres-what-to-know Knickmeyer, E., & Mascaro, L. (2021, April 6). Eating our lunch: Biden points to China in development push. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/art icle/joe-biden-ap-top-news-xi-jinping-china-united-states-31f1b3b51dcacaf 82c6400a03a6d7f71 Knight, W. (2022, October 12). U.S. chip sanctions kneecap China’s tech industry. Wired. https://www.wired.com/story/us-chip-sanctions-kneecapchinas-tech-industry/ Knutson, J. (2022a, August 9). Biden signs $280 billion chip funding bill. Axios. https://www.axios.com/2022/08/09/biden-chips-bill-signing Knutson, J. (2022b, May 28). U.S. awards $624 million contract to replenish Stinger missile stock. Axios. https://www.axios.com/2022/05/28/us-awardsreplenish-stinger-stock-ukraine Kramer, A. E. (2021, August 31). Ukraine’s leader, meeting Biden, seeks security assurances after Afghan pullout. New York Times, A8. Labbot, E. (2021, June 16). It’s Russia, stupid (for now). Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/14/biden-putin-russia-china-greatpower-competition/ Lawder, D. (2022, October 12). Yellen says Russian oil price cap in $60 range would allow Moscow some profit. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/mar kets/europe/yellen-says-russian-oil-price-cap-60-range-would-allow-moscowsome-profit-2022-10-12/

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Lendon, B., & Hansler, J. (2023, February 1). US military to gain expanded access to Philippines bases in effort to counter China. CNN. https://www.cnn. com/2023/02/01/asia/us-philippines-base-access-agreement-intl-hnk-ml/ index.html Lipton, E., Crowley, M., & Ismay, J. (2022, December 18). Military spending surges, creating new boom for arms makers. New York Times, A1. Madhani, A. (2021, February 19). Biden declares ‘America is back’ in welcome words to allies. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/biden-foreignpolicy-g7-summit-munich-cc10859afd0f542fd268c0a7ddcd9bb6 Manson, K., & Chazan, G. (2021, February 19). Biden tells world ‘America is back’ but warns democracy under assault. Financial Times. https://www.ft. com/content/0c29d1f1-e25b-47c5-b942-063b9cba0100 Miller, Z., Madhani, A., & Lawless, J. (2021, June 10). G-7 nations expected to pledge 1B vaccine doses for world. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/art icle/joe-biden-europe-africa-g-7-summit-coronavirus-pandemic-2a95a7f4da8f 8899d3039ad3a46ddd31 Monaghan, S. (2022, June 28). Resetting NATO’s defense and deterrence: The sword and the shield redux. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/resetting-natos-defense-and-det errence-sword-and-shield-redux Myers, S. L. (2021, June 15). China, its military expanding, accuses NATO of hypocrisy. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/world/ asia/china-nato-military.html National Security Strategy. (2022, October). National Security Strategy. https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Admini strations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf Newman, L. H. (2018, November 13). Google internet traffic wasn’t hijacked, but it was out of control. Wired. https://www.wired.com/story/google-int ernet-traffic-china-russia-rerouted/ Niebuhr, R. (2011). The children of light and the children of darkness: A vindication of democracy and a critique of its traditional defense (Dorrien, G., Introduction). University of Chicago Press. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2010.) Strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2021, June 14). Brussels Summit Communique. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2022a, June 29). 2022 strategic concept. Adopted by the heads of state and government at the NATO summit in Madrid 29 June 2022. https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2022b, June 27). Defence expenditure of NATO countries (2014–2022). NATO Press Release. https:// www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220627-def-exp2022-en.pdf North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2022c, June 29). Remarks by NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg and US president Joe Biden at the start of the 2022 NATO summit. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opi nions_197374.htm North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2022d, July 22). Madrid summit declaration issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid. https://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm?selectedLocale=en North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (n.d.-a). Defence expenditure of NATO countries (2014–2022). https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ass ets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220627-def-exp-2022-en.pdf North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (n.d.-b). New NATO force model. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/ 220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. (2021, March 21). OECD main science and technology indicators highlights on R&D expenditure, March 2021 release. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/sti/msti-highlightsmarch-2021.pdf Osnos, E. (2023, February 26). Sliding toward a new cold war. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/03/06/slidingtoward-a-new-cold-war Ovide, S. (2022, August 10). Taxpayers for U.S. chips. New York Times, B4. Parker, G., & Cameron-Chileshe, J. (2021, June 10). G7 leaders to pledge 1bn covid-19 vaccine doses for poorer countries. Financial Times. https://www. ft.com/content/000e6968-8ae4-4f00-9cb5-324b98aa779b Prestowitz, C. (2021). The world turned upside down: America, China, and the struggle for global leadership. Yale University Press. Rahman, K. (2022, August 31). Pentagon outlines $200 million plan to accelerate HIMARS production. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/pen tagon-outlines-200-million-plan-accelerate-himars-production-1738352 Reuters. (2022, June 27). NATO to boost troops on high alert to over 300,000— Stoltenberg. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-massiv ely-increase-high-readiness-forces-300000-stoltenberg-2022-06-27/ Ronayne, K., & Kunzelman, M. (2021, September 30). Trump to far-right extremists: ‘Stand back and stand up.’ AP. https://apnews.com/article/ele ction-2020-joe-biden-race-and-ethnicity-donald-trump-chris-wallace-0b3233 9da25fbc9e8b7c7c7066a1db0f

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Ruwitch, J. (2022, September 19). Biden again says US would help Taiwan if China attacks. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/09/19/1123759127/ biden-again-says-u-s-would-help-taiwan-if-china-attacks Sanger, D. E. (2021a, June 17). For Biden, Europe trip achieved two major goals. And then there is Russia. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2021/06/17/world/europe/joe-biden-vladimir-putin-usa-russia.html Sanger, D. E. (2021b, October 17). Washington hears echoes of the ‘50s and worries: Is this a cold war with China? New York Times, A1. Sanger, D. E., Edmondson, C., McCabe, D., & T. Kaplan. (2021, June 7). Senate poised to pass huge industrial policy bill to counter China. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/07/us/politics/senate-chinasemiconductors.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage Sanger, D. E., & Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2021, September 16). Biden announces defense deal with Australia in a bid to counter China. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/09/15/us/politicalnews#biden-australia-britain-china Sanger, D. E., & Shear, M. D. (2021a, June 10). Eighty years later, Biden and Johnson revise the Atlantic Charter for a new era. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/world/europe/bidenjohnson-atlantic-charter.html?referringSource=articleShare Sanger, D. E., & Shear, M. D. (2021b, June 13). G7 leaders offer united front as summit ends, but cracks are clear. New York Times, A1. Santhanam, L. (2022, March 4). More Americans approve of Biden’s leadership as Russia invades Ukraine. PBS News Hour. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ politics/more-americans-approve-of-bidens-leadership-as-russia-invades-ukr aine Schmitz, R. (2021, June 29). How a Chinese-built highway drove Montenegro deep into debt. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2021/06/28/1010832606/ road-deal-with-china-is-blamed-for-catapulting-montenegro-into-historic-debt Schuman, M. (2022, October 25). Why Biden’s block on chips to China is a big deal. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2022/10/biden-export-control-microchips-china/671848/ Sevastopulo, D. (2022, September 19). Joe Biden says US would defend Taiwan from Chinese attack. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ f1296dd0-9eb5-4e75-b986-b0e9e445076a Sevastopulo, D., & Reed, J. (2023, January 31). US and India launch ambitious tech and defence initiative. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ 0fad1ae7-07f8-44cc-9df6-c8e2e03d404f Shao, E. (2022, July 28). 7 key provisions in the climate deal. New York Times, A13. Shear, M. D., & Tankersley, J. T. (2021, August 31). Biden defends Afghan pullout and declares an end to nation-building. New York Times, A1.

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Sheehan, M. (2022, October 27). Biden’s unprecedented semiconductor bet. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment. org/2022/10/27/biden-s-unprecedented-semiconductor-bet-pub-88270 Siebold, S., & Emmott, R. (2021, April 14). NATO allies to leave Afghanistan alongside the U.S. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ nato-forces-will-leave-together-afghanistan-blinken-says-2021-04-14/ Singh, K. (2021, December 27). U.S. President Biden signs $770 billion defense bill. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-president-biden-signs770-billion-defense-bill-2021-12-27/ Stacks, D. (2021, March 29). China’s Huawei is winning the 5G race. Here’s what the United States should do to respond. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-huawei-5g Starr, B. (2022, September 7). US military working on analysis to shape and support Ukraine’s military in long term. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2022/ 09/07/politics/us-military-ukraine-analysis/index.html Swan, B. W., & McCleary, P. (2021, June 18). White House freezes Ukraine military package that includes lethal weapons. Politico. https://www.pol itico.com/news/2021/06/18/white-house-ukraine-military-lethal-weapons495169 Swanson, A. (2020, May 15). U.S. delivers another blow to Huawei with new tech restrictions. New York Times, B4. Swanson, A. (2021, October 3). U.S. and Europe announce new trade cooperation, but disputes linger. New York Times, B3. Swanson, A. (2023, February 22). China’s economic support for Russia could elicit more sanctions. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/ 22/us/politics/china-russia-sanctions.html Swanson, A., & Bradsher, K. (2021, October 4). U.S. signals no thaw in trade relations with China. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/ 04/business/economy/us-china-trade.html Tankersley, J. (2021, November 15). Biden signs infrastructure bill, promoting benefits for Americans. New York Times, A1. Thrush, G., & Haberman, M. (2017, August 15). Trump gives white supremacists an unequivocal boost. New York Times, A1. Tocci, N. (2023). The paradox of Europe’s defense moment. War on the Rocks, 6(1). https://tnsr.org/2023/01/the-paradox-of-europes-defensemoment/#_ftn7 Trading Economics. (2022, March). Natural gas, Brent crude oil, and gasoline. https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/natural-gas Tyson, L., & Mendonca, L. (2023, January 2). America’s new era of industrial policy. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ biden-industrial-policy-renewables-semiconductors-good-jobs-by-laura-tysonand-lenny-mendonca-2023-01

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Uchill, K. (2018, November 13). Google traffic suspiciously routed through China and Russia. Axios. https://www.axios.com/cybersecurity-google-traffic-rou ted-russia-china-9965eadc-a3b4-44ff-8eab-b2c041b7b231.html Walt, S. M. (2021, September 18). The AUKUS dominoes are just starting to fall. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/18/aukus-australiaunited-states-submarines-china-really-means/ Whitlock, C. (2019, December 9). At war with the truth. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghan istan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/ Wong, E., & Schmitt, E. (2023, February 2). Biden aims to deter China with greater U.S. military presence in Philippines. New York Times, A1. Wong, E., Troianovski, A., & Reed, S. (2023, February 27). In central Asia, Blinken will urge distance from Russia, and Ukraine war. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/27/world/asia/blinken-chinarussia-ukraine-war.html Wright, T. (2021, September/October). The center cannot hold: Will a divided world survive common threats? Foreign Affairs, 192–202. Youssef, N. A. (2023, January 26). New U.S. base on Guam is aimed at deterring China. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-u-s-base-onguam-is-aimed-at-deterring-china-11674731857

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions

Foreign Policy Is Domestic Politics There are important domestic political caveats that will limit the degree of American support. Biden’s democracy agenda is now tied to the ability of the U.S. to address domestic extremism in the wake of the January 6th attacks on the U.S. Capitol by Trump supporters. While the 2022 midterm elections largely rejected election denialism and farright Trumpian extremism, the threats to constitutional democracy in the U.S. are still present. Also, Biden’s domestic legislative accomplishments, most notably COVID-19 relief, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021, the CHIPS and Science Act, and bipartisan gun regulation showed that the U.S. political system is capable of meeting challenges. Moreover, the Inflation Reduction Act highlighted how the U.S. can make new investments in sustainable technologies and produce them in the U.S. While these were incredible achievements, challenges remain. The hasty and bungled military withdrawal from Afghanistan undermined the Biden Administration’s attempts to rebuild confidence in the U.S. as a reliable partner. And Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine showed just how vulnerable NATO members are without a strong American presence in Europe. Consequently, it will be difficult for the U.S. to pivot away from Europe at the same time it pivots toward the Indo-Pacific.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. J. Dolan, The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6_7

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But domestic political conditions will determine the extent of America’s role in NATO. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine led Americans to rally behind NATO and Ukraine, American public support for security assistance to Ukraine began to slip in early 2023. How Ukraine fares in combating Russia will be determined by U.S. military support, which in turn is intimately connected with U.S. leadership of NATO. The U.S. is also locked in an intense security, technological, and economic competition with China, America’s only peer-adversary. While Americans are concerned with NATO and European security, they are more worried about inflation and protecting jobs at home. There is tremendous pressure on the Biden Administration to fulfill the president’s “foreign policy for the middle class” and “protect agenda.” The president’s emerging industrial policy is a rejection of globalization and interdependence that will increase tensions with the very name allies and partners the U.S. needs to ensure strong balancing coalitions against China and Russia. Therefore, the U.S. leadership role in NATO will be judged by Americans themselves as much as it is led by foreign policy elites who govern the foreign policy agenda. The more resources the U.S. devotes to NATO and Ukraine, the greater the pressure on the U.S. to boost military spending and its defense industrial base if Russia’s war continues well into 2023 and beyond or spills over into NATO territory. Even worse, if China invades Taiwan, then the U.S. will be forced to extend its military, economic, and technological assets in unprecedented ways.

Domestic Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine The question of whether Ukraine can defeat Russia on the battlefield is fast becoming enmeshed with President Biden’s domestic political fortunes and his foreign policy emphasis on “democracy versus autocracy.” Biden’s summit on democracy in 2021 reflected his preference for a foreign policy premised on democracy as both a value at home and abroad. Moreover, the Biden Administration’s support for Ukraine and expansion of security assistance to include heavier and more advanced weapons fits this broad theme. As Biden (2023) stated in a speech in Poland in February 2023, the U.S. would “not tire” in supporting Ukraine by describing the U.S. security commitment to NATO and Ukraine as a battle for democracy and freedom against autocracy and

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aggression: “He [Putin] thought the world would roll over. He though autocrats like himself were tough and leaders and democracies were soft.” The Ukraine War will be an important campaign issue in future American elections, especially the 2024 presidential election. The war has no perceivable end in sight and threatens to hang over the White House even though the U.S. is not committed to using ground troops or air power in Ukraine. However, Russia’s war in Ukraine fits Biden and Democrats’ theme about the war serving as a winning issue in 2024 if it can be framed as a conflict or battle for democracy (Lemire et al., 2023). While this theme worked for Democrats in the 2022 congressional midterm elections, significantly mitigating their election losses in the House of Representatives and helping them expand their margin in the U.S. Senate, Americans tend to vote based on domestic policy. Massive security assistance packages sent by NATO members have depleted domestic weapons stockpiles that will have to replenished with new weapons and equipment. The U.S. has limited stocks of weapons Ukraine needs to fight Russia and the Biden Administration, and possibly the next presidential administration, will likely be unwilling to shift key weapons systems away from Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea to Ukraine given threats from both China and North Korea. Also, weapons transfers from much smaller NATO members, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and the Baltics, and Bulgaria, are a significant drain on their capacity and capabilities. These and other NATO members providing weapons and equipment expect that the U.S. will back them up and help replenish their defense stockpiles. Consequently, if the U.S. is going to replenish its depleted stocks, it needs to rapidly increase military spending on weapons and equipment and boost production. This will boost the influence of the already powerful set of defense contractors and companies in the U.S. defense industry (Erlanger & Jakes, 2022, A1). Furthermore, “just in time” and lean defense production and manufacturing will likely end. Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused a great awakening in U.S. weapons production as the U.S. has amped up its supplies of weapons and equipment to Ukraine. The U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared for the competitive security environment that now exists. It is currently operating at a tempo better suited to a peacetime environment. JIT and lean manufacturing operations must be balanced with carrying added capacity to enable a surge in case of a war with either China or Russia, or both. Added capacity is

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also important to deter adversaries, such as China, and credibly demonstrate that the United States and its allies and partners have the capability to conduct a sustained military campaign if necessary. Greater industrial capacity would also support the DoD’s efforts to provide additional capacity to NATO members and Indo-Pacific allies and partners (Jones, 2023). The U.S. should not have to inhibit its own production and manufacturing of munitions, microchips, and critical components by sending Ukraine and Taiwan weapons. Greater interdependence is needed between large defense corporations like Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrup Grumman, and Raytheon as well as firms in NATO member states. With China expanding its defense capacities, the U.S. and its allies may be sleeping walking into a disaster in the event of a major war with China or Russia. Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine is shifting power and influence within NATO from the West to the East (Erlanger, 2023a, A7). Since Russia’s invasion, Poland and the Baltic States, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Western Balkans are fast becoming more influential than France and Germany. They are sending weapons and equipment to Ukraine and absorbing more refugees than other NATO members. In addition, Norway and new membership applicants Finland and Sweden, are also sending significant security assistance to Ukraine. These alliance members and aspirants are taking security much more seriously than Western European members. Consequently, France’s push for strategic autonomy and an independent European security policy now appears hollower than ever. Within the alliance, the already powerful and outsized leadership role of the U.S. will continue to grow even if the American public grows more resistant to it (Erlanger, 2023b). In addition, vulnerable Northeastern and Southeastern NATO members are much more aligned with the U.S., not France and Germany. So-called “New Europe” values the American security umbrella and holds deep suspicions of Western Europe, which they believe views them with disdain. This will maintain or possibly increase the U.S. leadership role in NATO, leading to new rifts and divisions within the alliance. Larger numbers of U.S. troops will be stationed in Poland and Romania, which will boost their position within NATO’s command and control headquarters (Erlanger, 2023b). However, the U.S. will continue to prioritize its rebalance to the IndoPacific and its security, economic, and technological competition with

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China. Its newly emerging domestic industrial policy and government investments in research and development and sustainable energy sector will increase America’s use of export controls and subsidies as part of its “Buy America” initiative of building up American corporations. This will lead to more trade and manufacturing disputes within the West, especially with the E.U., Japan, and South Korea. With many Republicans continuing to falsely believe the 2020 election was stolen from Trump, worries about democracy and the election system will prove to be a major political issue in American electoral politics. After Donald Trump announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination in 2024, Republican fissures began to emerge. Some Republicans believed his intervention in the 2022 congressional midterm elections weakened their slate of candidates. This group would likely prefer to move on to other Republican nominees like Florida Governor Ron DeSantis. Others, namely the far-right Make America Great Again wing of the Republican Party, believe Trump is the only candidate who can defeat Biden in 2024. This group holds more extremist views by continuing to adhere to election denialism about the 2020 presidential election and embrace the January 6th 2021 violent attack on the U.S. Capital and U.S. Constitution. With concerns for democracy on the minds of American voters and as Russia’s violent war of aggression in Ukraine continued into 2023, the Biden Administration’s allocation of security assistance will be featured as part of Biden’s 2024 campaign. As Ivo Daadler (quoted in Smith, 2023) states, “In some ways this crisis is uniquely suited to this president. It is hard to see how anybody else could have done this or could have done it better. Who would have thought that the Germans were going to cut off their dependence on Russian energy after 45 years.” It should be noted that Americans tend not to prioritize foreign policy and international relations and Biden’s support for Ukraine may not be a factor in the 2024 presidential election. However, given the contrast with a Republican candidate who embraces election denialism and the January 6th insurrection, Biden’s democracy-themed foreign policy, support for Ukraine on the global stage, and embrace of strong U.S. global leadership will become important features in Democratic campaigns and important to American voters in 2024. If Trump is the Republican nominee in 2024, then Biden has an opportunity to starkly contrast Democrats as supportive of Ukraine and democracy with Trump and MAGA Republicans aligned with extremism and Vladimir Putin.

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American Politics and NATO Since the formation of NATO in 1949 in the Washington Treaty, U.S. presidential administrations, Congress, and the American people have, in general, supported the U.S. security commitment to NATO and friendly relations with Europe. The transatlantic relationship, which includes the U.S. role in the NATO alliance and U.S.-European Union relations, rests on deep and extensive economic, political, and security ties. Although these ties have been disrupted periodically, the U.S. has valued its partnerships with NATO and the E.U. for more than seven decades. For the U.S., NATO is essential to maintaining peace and stability in Europe and mitigating Russian attempts to recasting the balance of power. It was American leadership that launched the Marshall Plan, Berlin Airlift, and the Washington Treaty and encouraged the process of European integration that culminated in the E.U. During the Cold War, America’s role in NATO was vital containing the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations encouraged post-Communist governments in Eastern Europe to accede to NATO membership with Montenegro and North Macedonia joining in 2017 and 2020 respectively. The U.S. and NATO work together on a range of common security issues. These include military interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, coordination and cooperation on counterterrorism, and providing security and economic assistance to Ukraine. The U.S. and NATO also collaborate to mitigate maligned influence operations, cooperation on crisis management, and share intelligence and defense technologies to limit Russian and Chinese power. Furthermore, the economies of the U.S., Canada, the E.U., the U.K., Norway, and Switzerland are intimately and deeply interconnected in a $6 trillion transatlantic economy, representing 43% of global GDP (Hamilton & Quinlan, 2022; Zeneli, 2021). While the U.S. and its NATO allies are like-minded on many issues, they diverge on others. The Suez Canal Crisis, France withdrawing from NATO’s command structure, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq exposed fissures within the alliance. Today, as the U.S. is rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific to confront China, there are divisions within NATO regarding trade, investment, and sharing advanced dual-use technologies with China. Also, the U.S. has had a longstanding frustration with

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European NATO members over burden sharing and military spending. Moreover, the U.S. and E.U. have differed on key commercial issues, namely market access, regulatory barriers, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and semiconductor supply chains. These are among the most politically charged and sensitive issues in American politics because they lead to questions about the cost of the U.S. military presence in Europe to American taxpayers. America’s transatlantic partnerships were damaged and strained during the Trump Administration with the former president’s unrepenting criticisms of NATO on military spending, the E.U. on trade, and Germany on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Just a few years ago, Emmanuel Macron described NATO’s “brain death” and pushed for strategic autonomy from the U.S. (see Erlanger, 2019). While U.S. support for NATO and the Article 5 collective security provision was reiterated, the U.S. strategic orientation toward the alliance became very transactional. The Trump Administration viewed NATO through a strictly burden sharing lens, harming alliance unity and readiness, and undermining the view of America as a reliable transatlantic partner. Also, Trump as a presidential candidate supported the U.K.’s exit from the E.U. by endorsing Brexit, and as president attacked the E.U. for engaging in unfair trade and investment practices. Trump’s political allies interpreted this as a series of measures that pressured NATO members to boost their military spending (Davis, 2018). If Trump was re-elected in 2020, the U.S. could have withdrawn from the alliance altogether. Difficulties between the U.S. and Europe continued during President Biden’s first term. The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense arrangement resulted in Australia canceling a defense contract with France to build submarines in favor of U.S. nuclear submarines and a broader multilateral defense compact that would boost U.S. defense in the Indo-Pacific. There were questions as to whether the U.S. adequately consulted NATO allies ahead of the bungled U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. Moreover, climate provisions in the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act subsidize and incentivize domestic production of electric vehicles by automakers and assembly manufacturers in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico as well as domestic investments in hydrogen and renewable energy. Companies in Europe, Japan, and South Korea have viewed these “buy American” conditions as an attempt by the U.S. to limit free trade with allied and partner countries (Bergmann & Steinberg, 2022).

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In many ways, the Biden Administration has achieved what the Trump Administration could not, which is on domestic political considerations or a “foreign policy for the middle class.” The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was premised on Biden following through on Trump’s commitment to ending an increasingly unpopular war with the American people. Biden’s “Buy American” trade agenda is a response to the demands of Americans that foreign policy should serve domestic needs in the areas of research and development, semiconductors, advanced technologies, production, innovation, and manufacturing (Ruge & Shapiro, 2022). The passage of the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022 reflect the emergence of a U.S. industrial policy that ended decades of economic globalization and international commercial cooperation. The Biden Administration worked overtime to defuse tensions, rebuild transatlantic trust, and rejuvenate NATO. President Biden’s very first international trip was to meet with European allies in June 2021 to reaffirm U.S. security commitments to NATO (Erlanger, 2021). Biden also reentered the U.S. into the Paris Climate Accords and the World Health Organization. Ahead of the Russian invasion of Ukraine the following year, Biden promised not to negotiate with Russia on European security in the absence of consultation with NATO allies. U.S. and E.U. leaders addressed the longstanding dispute over subsidies on commercial aircraft and agreed to replace tariffs on key goods and services with a quota system (Patnaik & Kunhardt, 2022). In 2022, Biden issued an executive order limiting the power of U.S. national security agencies to access users’ personal information to strengthen a broader transatlantic data sharing and technology agreement with the E.U. (Ng et al., 2022). Even though Biden was committed to building stronger relationships with European allies, it was Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 that rejuvenated and united NATO. The reality is that despite tensions and disputes, NATO is the most powerful global alliance in history. What did they miss about NATO two years ago? NATO has been going strong since 1949 and those who have been questioning the purpose of NATO have been wrong for the very simple reason that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will increase the alliance from 30 to 32 members with the eventual addition of Finland and Sweden. Moreover, Russia’s battlefield defeats in Ukraine showed the extent of the rot and incompetence in the Russian military. One could argue that America’s commitment to NATO has been validated. More than a year after

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO is committed to containing Russian aggression and NATO leaders speak with confidence and purpose. But transatlantic resolve obscures the fact that Europe remains dependent on the American security umbrella to address Russian aggression. In the past, the U.S. has played the role of a security guarantor during and after the Cold War, America is enmeshed in deep domestic problems, a difficult energy transition, security and economic challenges from China, and an emerging China-Russia partnership united in its opposition to an American-led global world order. Germany is committed to increasing military spending by $106 billion over the next five years and other NATO members, namely Italy, Romania, and Norway are committed to boosting defense spending (Gehrke & Von der Burchard, 2022). But NATO’s collective action problems will persist, making it difficult to forge a common strategic purpose independent of the U.S. over the long term. First off, Germany’s defense spending pledge will spread out over many years and the German defense industry will struggle with bureaucratic inefficiencies. When Germany finally agreed to send Ukraine advanced Leopard tanks almost one year after the Russian invasion, it was forced to purchase American weapons to keep up with its defense investments (Erlanger, 2023b; Erlanger & Jakes, 2022). Germany also purchased American F-35 stealth warplanes, not European jets from the European Future Combat Air System, and initiated a missile and air defense program, the European Sky Shield Initiative, that uses American and Israeli systems. According to Fix (quoted in Erlanger, 2023b), “in the long run, decisions like these increase European dependence on the United States. People are placing their bets now on NATO and the U.S., and on equipment that’s already there.” Second, some NATO members have differing views on how Russia’s war in Ukraine should conclude and whether the alliance will reconstitute relations with the Kremlin (Erlanger, 2023a). Central and Eastern Europe view Russia as the most critical threat to European security, while others prioritize terrorism, extremism, refugees, and maritime issues. Divisions and disagreements show that there cannot be a significant European defense framework in the absence of alliance unity, reinforcing dependence on the U.S. Third, the most significant fault line within NATO is the division between Central and European member states aligned with the U.K. and Poland and the Baltics versus France, Germany, and Spain. France’s longstanding position in favor of “strategic autonomy” for the E.U. to develop

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a common defense policy independent from NATO and the U.S., has led to mistrust and among Eastern NATO members who call on the U.S. and the U.K. to play even greater roles in NATO and European security. Poland and the Baltic States, which warned NATO members about the potential of Russian aggression before Putin invaded Ukraine in February 2022, oppose France and Germany calling for a common European defense policy and welcome American and British security commitments to NATO (Higgins, 2023). Eastern members, formerly under the USSR’s domination as Warsaw Pact members or Soviet republics, view American security assistance to Ukraine and America’s deployment of missile defense batteries and nuclear weapons as central to deterring further Russian aggression. President Macron’s previous statements about including Russia in discussions about securing the European order and not humiliating Putin have not only worried vulnerable Eastern NATO members, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 they contradict his own statements about developing an independent defense policy (Barbero, 2022). Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (quoted in Erlanger, 2023b) stated that Macron “has undermined his own idea of European autonomy” with “his statements and behavior when it comes to Putin” himself. Consequently, NATO members already suspicious of France and Germany, namely Poland and the Baltics and Western Balkans countries as well as aspirant members Finland and Sweden, will be encouraged to look for ways to align more closely with the U.S. and the U.K. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, pursuing strategic autonomy from the U.S. will be incredibly difficult because of European NATO’s growing military reliance on the U.S. defense deterrent and advanced weapons systems. America’s strong leadership response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and organization of security assistance and intelligence sharing efforts leave Western European NATO members little incentive to build their own military capacities and provide vulnerable Eastern European NATO members more incentives to align with the U.S. According to Liana Fix (quoted in Erlanger, 2023b), “the perception is that there is no real leader in the European Union and the U.S. is doing to helicopter parenting with Brussels. This is a problem that can come back to haunt the U.S.” The reality is that in the absence of American military and economic power, NATO members do not have the capacity to defend themselves.

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Diverging interests and priorities among European NATO members will force Europe to become even more dependent on the U.S. to provide military assets, advanced technology, and diplomatic and economic. Deep domestic political divisions in the U.S. will determine and judge the extent of that support as a U.S. foreign policy consensus on containing China unfolds. This book has demonstrated that the America’s security commitments to NATO and its European allies are dependent not only on the structure of power in the international system, but also on American domestic politics. American public opinion as well as entrenched foreign policy elites, media coverage, and the state of the American economy exert significant impacts on the foreign policymaking process and the extent of America’s role in the transatlantic alliance. International crises like September 11th and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2008 Great Recession and global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had far-reaching implications on transatlantic relations and how the U.S. interacted with its NATO allies and partners. How the U.S. responded to these critical events and the ways in which it set foreign policies in the aftermath were determined by domestic political preferences and forces that evolved and changed. America’s security commitments to NATO will be shaped by the American people as much as actions taken Russia and China.

References Barbero, M. (2022, June 15). There’s a method to Marcon’s madness. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/15/macron-putin-france-russiaukraine-war/ Bergmann, M., & Steinberg, F. (2022, December 15). How to avoid a transatlantic trade war over climate. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-avoid-transatlantic-tradewar-over-climate Biden, J. (2023, February 21). Remarks by President Biden ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. White https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/ House. 2023/02/21/remarks-by-president-biden-ahead-of-the-one-year-anniversaryof-russias-brutal-and-unprovoked-invasion-of-ukraine/ Davis, J. H. (2018, July 2). Trump warns NATO allies to spend more on defense, or else. New York Times, A1.

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Erlanger, S. (2019, November 7). Macron says NATO is experiencing ‘brain death’ because of Trump. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/11/07/world/europe/macron-nato-brain-death.html Erlanger, S. (2021, June 6). Biden is embracing Europe, but then what? NATO and the E.U. have concerns. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2021/06/06/world/europe/biden-nato-eu-trump.html?referringSource=art icleShare Erlanger, S. (2023a, January 26). Ukraine war accelerates shift of power in Europe to the East. New York Times, A7. Erlanger, S. (2023b, February 4). When it comes to building its own defense, Europe has blinked. New York Times, A10. Erlanger, S., & Jakes, L. (2022, November 29). U.S. and NATO scramble to arm Ukraine and refill their own arsenals. New York Times, A1. Gehrke, L., & Von der Burchard, H. (2022, May 30). German government and opposition agrees on e100B defense spending bill. Politico. https://www.pol itico.eu/article/germany-government-opposition-agree-100bn-defense-spe nding-bill/#:~:text=BERLIN%20%E2%80%94%20After%20weeks%20of%20b ickering,to%20Russia’s%20war%20in%20Ukraine Hamilton, D. S., & Quinlan, J. P. (2022). The transatlantic economy 2021. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/upl oads/documents/TransatlanticEconomy2021_FullReportHR.pdf Higgins, A. (2023, February 22). No one in Europe is telling Poland to ‘shut up’ now. New York Times, A7. Jones, S. (2023, January). Empty bins in a wartime environment. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws. com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3 OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88 Lemire, J., Stokols, E., & Ward, A. (2023, January 26). Biden’s new 2 years: A brutal war and a rough campaign. Politico. https://www.politico.com/ news/2023/01/26/biden-brutal-war-rough-campaign-00079577 Ng, A., Manancourt, V., Scott, M., & Goujard, C. (2022, October 7). Biden signs executive order on EU-U.S. data privacy agreement. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/07/biden-execut ive-order-eu-data-privacy-agreement-00060872 Patnaik, S., & Kunhardt, J. (2022, August 30). Biden could reduce inflation, mitigate a recession, and strengthen democracy with a new EU-US trade agreement. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/research/biden-couldreduce-inflation-mitigate-a-recession-and-strengthen-democracy-with-a-neweu-us-trade-agreement/#:~:text=The%20Biden%20administration’s%20new% 20agreement,subject%20to%20a%2025%25%20tariff Ruge, M., & Shapiro, J. (2022, June 3). No laughing MAGA: What the next US presidential elections could mean for Europe. European Council on Foreign

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Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/no-laughing-maga-what-the-next-us-presid ential-election-could-mean-for-europe/ Smith, C. (2023, January 16). Biden’s delicate dance with Ukraine is becoming even more complicated. Vanity Fair. Zeneli, V. (2021, Spring). The transatlantic economy: It is time for a renaissance. In Transatlantic disruption: Challenges and disruptions. Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania.

Index

A advanced technologies, 8, 147, 148, 165, 177, 189, 208 America First, 6, 13, 30, 129, 133, 148, 159, 160, 190 article V, 32–34, 102, 109, 130, 161, 162

B Baker, James A., 68–74 Berlin Airlift, 51, 206 Bernie Sanders, 3 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021 (BIL), 176, 201 Blinken, Antony, 2, 158, 189 Bricker Amendment, 54 Bucharest Summit, 108 Build Back Better, 13, 160 burden sharing, 131, 164, 207 Bush, George W., 13, 31, 64, 67–69, 71–76, 88, 91, 92, 98, 100–108, 115, 118–120, 206

C Carter, Jimmy, 62–64, 133 Charlottesville, 149 China, 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 21–23, 26, 27, 48, 49, 51, 52, 62, 76, 88, 93, 99, 109, 117, 118, 129, 133–137, 147, 148, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 158–160, 163, 165–181, 183–186, 188–190, 202–206, 209, 211 China-Russia "no limits" partnership, 10, 188 CHIPS and Science Act, 177, 178, 201, 208 Clinton, Hillary, 117, 118, 129 Clinton, William J., 96 color revolutions, 106–108, 125, 164 containment, 9, 47–49, 51, 52, 62, 117, 171–173 COVID-19, 1, 9, 19, 20, 24, 26, 137, 147, 151, 159, 160, 166, 168, 169, 172, 182, 185, 188, 201, 211

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. J. Dolan, The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy and NATO, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30796-6

215

216

INDEX

Crimea, 120, 122, 124–129, 132–134, 157, 165, 173, 183 cyber operations, 163, 167

H Hamiltonian, 21, 22 hybrid war, 162, 166, 186

D defense contractors, 64, 183, 203 defense industrial base, 181–183, 202, 203 defense spending, 9, 27, 48, 49, 51–53, 59, 63–66, 87, 102, 109, 127, 131, 135–137, 164, 181, 182, 184, 187, 209 Democrats, 5, 6, 23, 25, 26, 28–37, 178, 182, 188, 203, 205 deterrence models, 162, 163, 165 disinformation, 8, 126, 127, 149, 159, 161, 163, 172 Dual-Track NATO system, 63

I impeached, 98, 149 impeachment, 137 Independents, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31–35, 188 industrial policy, 3, 10, 20, 147, 148, 156, 174, 177, 179, 180, 202, 205, 208 Inflation Reduction Act, 177, 178, 201, 207, 208 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 67, 120, 135 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 102 invasion of Ukraine, 1, 3, 4, 7, 26, 28, 33, 34, 38, 137, 153, 158, 162, 163, 167, 169, 170, 173, 178, 183, 186–189, 202, 208–211

E economic inequality, 19, 20 election denialism, 201, 205 election interference, 98, 124, 166 Euro-Atlantic integration, 9, 47 export controls, 4, 147, 148, 178, 179, 184, 189, 205 extremism, 148, 201, 205, 209

F foreign policy analysis, 2, 14 foreign policy for the middle class, 3, 10, 147, 151, 153, 160, 166, 202, 208 F-35 stealth aircraft, 133, 209

G German reunification, 72–75, 90 Goldwater-Nichols Act, 67

J Jacksonian, 21, 22, 34 January 6th , 9, 11, 28, 149, 152, 190, 201 Jeffersonian, 21, 22 just in time defense production, 10, 183, 203

K Kennan, George, 48–53, 92 Korean War, 49, 53

L liberalism, 2, 16, 50 Lippmann, Walter, 49, 50, 154

INDEX

M Madrid Summit, 162, 163, 165 MAGA, 5, 6, 34, 148, 205 Make America great Again, 13, 19, 20, 30, 205 Mansfield Amendment, 61 Marshall Plan, 206 Mead, Walter Russell, 21, 22 militarization, 9, 49–51, 53, 72 military-industrial complex, 59, 64 military spending, 1, 10, 26, 53, 59, 66, 127, 130, 164, 166, 181, 182, 184, 202, 203, 207, 209 missile defense, 65, 100, 103, 105, 107, 119, 120, 125, 128, 134, 210 MX Missile, 63

N National Defense Authorization Act of 2022, 181 National Security Act of 1947, 48 National Security Decision Directive-32, 64 National Security Strategy of 2017, 133 National Security Strategy of 2022, 102, 147 nation-building at home, 13, 115, 129, 160 neoclassical realism, 2, 17–19 New Atlantic Charter, 159 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 50, 51, 150 Nitze, Paul, 50–52 Nixon, Richard, 50, 56, 60–62, 64 NSC 68, 9, 49, 51–53

O Obama, Barack, 9, 13, 100, 102, 109, 115–131, 133, 135–137, 151,

217

156, 157, 160, 172, 173, 180, 185, 186, 206 Operation Allied Force, 99, 107

P Partnership for Peace, 70, 89, 91 populism, 22, 160 protect agenda, 10, 147, 148, 177, 179, 184, 202 Proud Boys, 148 public opinion, 2, 4, 9, 11, 14, 31, 100, 137, 151, 190, 211 Putin, Vladimir, 2, 4, 102–104, 106–108, 118–122, 124–128, 133, 137, 160, 167, 187, 188, 203, 205, 210

R Reagan, Ronald, 29, 33, 62–67, 75, 150 rebalance to Indo-Pacific, 7, 109, 117, 163, 165, 186, 204 Republicans, 5–7, 23, 25, 26, 28–37, 182, 205 reunification of Germany, 72, 75 Rome Declaration, 70, 71

S security assistance to Ukraine, 4, 7, 37, 137, 183, 202, 204, 210 September 11th terrorist attacks, 101, 102, 104, 158, 211 soft power, 16, 149, 151–153, 159 strategic ambiguity, 27, 174 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT), 62 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), 75 strategic autonomy, 161, 165, 170, 204, 207, 209, 210

218

INDEX

Strategic concept, 158, 161, 162 Strategic Defense Initiative, 65 Suez Crisis, 50, 55, 57, 58

T Taiwan, 6, 27, 134, 155, 157, 165, 166, 169, 171, 174, 177, 178, 181, 188, 202–204 tariffs, 4, 129, 132, 133, 156, 177, 208 Trans-Pacific Partnership, 3, 117, 129, 176 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 74 Trump, Donald J., 2–7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19, 20, 24, 27, 28, 30–32, 34, 35, 117, 124, 126, 127, 129–137, 147–153, 156–161, 165, 169, 170, 176–178, 180, 184–186, 190, 201, 205, 207, 208 Two Plus Four, 73, 91 2016 presidential election, 3, 19, 124, 126, 133, 137, 153

2020 presidential election, 24, 28, 136, 137, 148, 149, 205 U unified Germany’s membership, 72 U.S. invasion of Iraq, 4, 58, 104, 106, 109, 164, 206 W Walt, Stephen, 28, 88, 93, 100, 115, 172 Washington Treaty, 1, 4, 29, 33, 47, 52, 54, 206 Wilsonian, 21–23 withdrawal from Afghanistan, 4, 9, 154, 156–158, 186, 201, 207, 208 Y Yeltsin, Boris, 76, 90–92 Z Zakaria, Fareed, 16, 18