The Politics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Bangladesh [1 ed.] 9781032220901, 9781003271116

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The Politics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Bangladesh

This book examines contemporary issues and debates of terrorism in Bangladesh, including national and transnational terrorist outfits operating within the country, their narratives and counternarratives, ideologues, women and the youth, media representation, counterterrorism laws, and challenges. Bangladesh is a fascinating and often paradoxical case study for terrorism studies. The book examines major terrorist groups in contemporary Bangladesh and their international connections and narratives, as well as a case study of an influential ideologue who encouraged some Bangladeshis to engage in violence. The chapters discuss how women and youth play a role in Bangladeshi terrorism, how the internet is used for recruiting terrorists, the discourses of the media and state regarding terrorism, as well as the politics of law and counterterrorism initiatives, including critically evaluating non-state actors and government responses. In addition to providing an up-to-date analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism in Bangladesh, this book offers a balanced and unbiased perspective on this subject. It will appeal to academics and international policymakers who are researching violence and extremism in South Asia. Saimum Parvez is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA-COFUND) postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) in Belgium. Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman is a doctoral candidate at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University, USA.

Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics

3 Pakistan’s National Security Approach and Post-Cold War Security Uneasy Co-existence Arshad Ali 4 Political Theory and South Asian Counter-Narratives Maidul Islam 5 Islam and Democracy in the Maldives Zahir Azim 6 Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska 7 Human Rights Violations in Kashmir Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska 8 Law and Conflict Resolution in Kashmir Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska 9 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Contemporary Developments and Dynamics Edited by Ghulam Ali 10 The Politics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Bangladesh Edited by Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman 11 The Rise and Decline of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s FATA Shahzad Akhtar 12 Democratic Governance in Bangladesh Dilemmas of Governing Nizam Ahmed For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/asian studies/series/RSSAP

The Politics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Bangladesh Edited by Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Parvez, Saimum, editor. | Rahman, Mohammad Sajjadur, editor. Title: The politics of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Bangladesh / edited by Saimum Parvez, Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman. Description: 1 Edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. | Series: Routledge studies in South Asian politics; 33 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022030242 (print) | LCCN 2022030243 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032220901 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032220918 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003271116 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Terrorism—Bangladesh. | Terrorism—Prevention— Bangladesh. | Bangladesh—Politics and government—1971– Classification: LCC HV6433.4.B3 P65 2023 (print) | LCC HV6433.4.B3 (ebook) | DDC 363.325095492—dc23/eng/20220805 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022030242 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022030243 ISBN: 978-1-032-22090-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-22091-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-27111-6 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Acknowledgmentvii List of Contributorsviii List of Tablesxii Introduction

1

SAIMUM PARVEZ AND MOHAMMAD SAJJADUR RAHMAN

  1 Three Decades of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh

11

ALI RIAZ

  2 The Quintessential Ideologue: Rahmani and His Sermons

33

ASHEQUE HAQUE

  3 Female Terrorism in Bangladesh: Manifestations, Causes, and Consequences

49

JASMIN LORCH AND M ABUL KALAM AZAD

  4 Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh

70

BULBUL SIDDIQI

  5 How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?

84

SAIMUM PARVEZ

  6 Mediating terror: Framing the Dhaka attack in the Bangladeshi press

107

KAJALIE SHEHREEN ISLAM

  7 Under the State’s Securitized Gaze: The Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts BINA D’COSTA AND HANA SHAMS AHMED

128

vi  Contents   8 Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent

148

RIDWANUL HOQUE

  9 The Other Side of Counterterrorism in Bangladesh

169

MOHAMMAD SAJJADUR RAHMAN

Index

185

Acknowledgment

This volume is a collective enterprise, and we thank our contributors for sharing their works with us. Our gratitude goes to a number of experts who took the time to read and comment on various chapters. Additionally, we would like to thank our friend, Samuel Jaffe, who provided copyediting services. Dorothea Schaefter, Routledge’s senior editor for Asian Studies, has been an avid supporter of this project since its inception in 2020. Our thanks also go to her excellent team of professionals, particularly Saraswathy Narayan, for ensuring a smooth production process.

Contributors

Ali Riaz is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Illinois State University (ISU), Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council, and President of the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies. He was the chair of the Department of Politics and Government (2007–2017) and held the Thomas E. Eimermann Professorship (2018–2020). He also served as a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at Washington, DC. Prior to joining ISU in 2002, he taught at universities in Bangladesh, England, and South Carolina and worked as a broadcast journalist at the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in London. His areas of interest are South Asian politics, democratization, violent extremism, political Islam, and Bangladeshi politics. His recent publications include More than Meets the Eye (2022), Religion and Politics in South Asia (Routledge, 2021), Voting in a Hybrid Regime: Explaining the 2018 Bangladeshi Election (2019), and Nikhoj Gonotontro (in Bengali, 2021). Asheque Haque has been researching and writing on politics and security issues in South Asia for the past fifteen years. In Bangladesh, he has worked as a countering violent extremism professional with state and non-state organizations where he conducted research and analytical projects. He has also collaborated with several universities and institutes, and published research reports and book chapters on security and violent extremism. He holds a master’s degree in South Asia and global security from King’s College, London. His areas of interest include international security, identity politics, human rights, societal change, and digital spaces. He currently works at the intersection of security and human rights at a civil society organization. Bina D’Costa is Professor, Department of International Relations at the Coral Bell School, Australian National University (ANU). Her publications include Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia (Routledge, 2011), Children and the Politics of Violence (2017), and Cascades of Violence (coauthored with John Braithwaite, 2018). D’Costa is a member of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC). She has worked as a senior UN staff member, most recently at UNICEF to build its Migration and Displacement program at the Office of Research–Innocenti. As a frontline researcher and humanitarian

Contributors ix practitioner, she has contributed to Europe’s and Horn of Africa’s refugee emergencies and served in the UN Rohingya Emergency Response Team in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. She has provided inputs and technical advice to transitional justice processes, including witness protection and victim support mechanisms at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh, and civil society transitional justice initiatives in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia. She received the Distinguished Alumni Award, Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, USA, in 2020. Bulbul Siddiqi is Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at North South University (NSU). He is also serving as the Director of the Confucius Institute at NSU. Bulbul Siddiqi has completed doctoral research in anthropology from Cardiff University in 2014. He received an MA in global citizenship, identities, and human rights from the University of Nottingham, UK. His book Becoming Good Muslim: The Tablighi Jamaat in the UK and Bangladesh was published in 2018. He is currently researching various areas of the Rohingya crisis (social cohesion, identity, and intangible cultural heritage), understanding youth radicalization, Islamic sermon and piety, religious diversity and tolerance within Islam, the impact of COVID-19 on poverty and development, and mental health among the urban slum dwellers. Hana Shams Ahmed is a PhD candidate of social anthropology at York University and a graduate associate at the York Center for Asian Research (YCAR). She has an MA in sociocultural anthropology from the University of Western Ontario, Canada, and an MA in development studies from BRAC University, Bangladesh. Her research focuses on the Bangladeshi state, militarization, surveillance, decolonization, and Indigenous politics. In Bangladesh she has worked with the International CHTC for more than a decade. She has also previously worked as the assistant editor of the Forum magazine, a monthly news magazine of The Daily Star, and as a feature writer for The Star magazine, a weekly magazine of The Daily Star. Jasmin Lorch is an Annemarie Schimmel Scholar at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt and an Associate of the Institute for Asian Studies (IAS) of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg/Berlin. Her research interests include civil society, state weakness, democratization, and autocratization as well as Islamization and secular-Islamist relations in South(east) Asia and the Maghreb. She has also worked as a policy consultant, including for the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and has given policy briefings to foreign policymakers, including to representatives of the German Federal Foreign Office. Lorch has conducted extensive fieldwork in Bangladesh and has taken great pleasure in exchanging views and cooperating with local experts there. Her publications include Civil Society and Mirror Images

x  Contributors of Weak States: Bangladesh and the Philippines (2017) and “Islamization by Secular Ruling Parties: The Case of Bangladesh,” published in Politics and Religion. Kajalie Shehreen Islam is Associate Professor, Department of Mass Communication and Journalism, University of Dhaka. She completed her BSS and MSS from the same department and her MA in critical media and cultural studies and PhD in media studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Her research interests include political communication and gender and media. Her work has been published in the International Journal of Communication, Media, War & Conflict, Routledge’s Insights on Peace and Conflict Reporting, and The Palgrave Handbook of Women and Journalism, among others. Dr  Islam was also a journalist with the leading English-language newspaper in Bangladesh, The Daily Star, for over a decade, first as feature writer with the Star Weekend Magazine, covering human rights, gender, politics, and more, and later as in-charge of Forum, a monthly longform publication on sociopolitical issues. She is currently working on her first book on religion-based media discourses during the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh, to be published with Routledge. M. Abul Kalam Azad is a freelance journalist and founder of Factখুঁিজ, an independent fact-checking organization. He has been writing stories and essays on politics, corruption, and violent extremism for various newspapers and news agencies for the last twenty-three years. Azad holds a postgraduation diploma in mass communication and journalism from the University of Dhaka. He also studied violent extremism at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University under a fellowship program in 2016. He began journalism as a campus correspondent of the University of Dhaka for United News of Bangladesh (UNB) in 1997 and became the chief correspondent of The Daily Star in 2016 for two years. Azad wrote numerous reports on terror attacks in Bangladesh, most of them carried out by different radical Islamist groups. When Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) launched an overt campaign in the country’s northwest region to eliminate “evils from the society” in 2004, Azad spent a whole day with the group’s military commander Siddiqul Islam (alias Bangla Bhai) to witness how he maneuvered his armed brigade. He also covered the emergence of both pro-ISIS and al-Qaeda groups and their targeted killings in Bangladesh from 2013 onward. He is also the author of “Media Landscapes: Bangladesh” published by the European Journalism Centre (EJC) in 2018. Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman is a doctoral candidate at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Clark University. Rahman has taught international relations at the University of Chittagong for more than eight years. His research interests include international terrorism, mass violence, genocide, and political Islam. He graduated in international relations from the University of Dhaka. In 2009, Rahman completed his second master’s degree under the Fulbright Scholarship program in international policy studies from the Monterey

Contributors xi Institute of International Studies (MIIS), California, with a specialization in terrorism studies. He is the coeditor of the Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Bangladesh (Routledge, 2016) and Neoliberal Development in Bangladesh: People on the Margins (2020). Ridwanul Hoque, PhD (London), LLM (Cambridge), LLB Hons (Chittagong), was a professor of law at the University of Dhaka until February  2022. He is currently an independent legal scholar. Professor Hoque has held visiting research and teaching positions at Cornell Law School, Melbourne Law School, La Trobe University, Charles Darwin University, and National Law University, Delhi. He specializes in Bangladeshi and South Asian constitutional laws and has a special interest in citizenship law. He provided expert evidence in the UK courts in several cases involving citizenship deprivation of British citizens of Bangladeshi heritage. He has also written expert reports for the US and Australian courts. Professor Hoque has published widely in the field of constitutional and public laws and has worked as consultant in the areas of children’s rights, labor migration, and human trafficking. He is the author of Judicial Activism in Bangladesh: A Golden Mean Approach (2011) and coeditor of Constitutional Foundings in South Asia (2021). He is currently coediting a volume – History of the Constitution of Bangladesh: The Founding, Development, and Way Ahead (Routledge, 2022). Saimum Parvez is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA-IMPACT) postdoctoral fellow at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (VUB), Belgium. Before joining the VUB, he was a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University, Bangladesh. He also taught as an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations, University of Chittagong (2010–2013). Saimum Parvez received his PhD (2021) from the University of Sydney. The title of his dissertation is “Understanding Digital Media and the Lifecycles of Bangladeshi Violent Extremists.” He achieved his MA (2015) from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University under the Fulbright scholarship program. His recent publications were published in several scholarly journals, such as Democratization (2021), Perspectives on Terrorism (2019), and Terrorism and Political Violence (2018). He received the Center for Genocide Studies and United Nations Development Programme (CGS-UNDP) Peace Fellowship 2018. His research interests include the impacts of digital media on terrorism, South Asian migrants in Europe, and Bangladeshi politics.

Tables

1.1 Five Generations of Islamist Militants in Bangladesh 2.1 Rahmani’s Sermons 3.1 Women and Men Charged for Their Suspected Involvement in Terrorism

13 36 52

Introduction Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman

The terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers on September  11, 2011, commonly referred to as 9/11, left an enormous footprint on world politics. Using its vast resources and military power, the United States waged a perpetual war against terrorism, including operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. While these coercive counterterrorism measures temporarily restrained terrorist groups in some areas, their overwhelming brutality contributed to perpetuating cycles of violence. The contentious role of states in countering terrorism and the ensuing human rights violations, notably the well-documented torture and abuse of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisoners, have become central components of critical terrorism studies (CTS). The very concept of terrorism is also hotly debated. Numerous security agencies, think tanks, governments, and academics have defined terrorism and violent extremism for purposes of counterterrorism, policymaking, and academic study. Among them, two were notable for their efforts to reach a consensus. First, Alex Schmid sent a questionnaire to terrorism scholars, and 109 definitions were collected. He identified twenty-two common definitional elements that scholars use to define terrorism. Among them, he selected sixteen elements for a comprehensive definition: Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by a (semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat – and violence – based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main target (audiences(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid 2004: 382) In the second attempt to search for a consensus definition, Leonard Weinberg et al. (2004) analyzed three leading journals – Terrorism, Terrorism and Political DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-1

2  Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman Violence, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism – and found seventy-three separate definitions of terrorism. After analyzing the definitions, they proposed: Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role. (p. 786) However, there is undoubtedly a “definitional problem” associated with the use of the term as a means of describing the ideology and activity connected to the concept (Schmid 2004). Despite decades of terrorism research, scholars belonging to both traditional and critical schools have yet to agree on a definition of terrorism. Often, the term terrorism is also used interchangeably with violent extremism, extremism, Jihad, militancy, and insurgency. To illustrate the complexity associated with the concept of terrorism and underline the necessity of understanding its nature and how states respond to it, Jackson (2005: 4) notes: There is a genuine risk that we will end up worse off than when we started; that through misplaced and mis-guided policies we will make the world a more violent and unjust place, instead of making it safer and more stable. Terrorism is complex problem; it will require a complex solution based on clear thinking, informed analysis and realistic assessment. In contemporary reviews of terrorism research, scholars have often emphasized the need for more studies in multiple languages and different geographical areas (Conway 2017; Scrivens et al. 2020). In contrast, Bangladesh, a country with one of the largest Muslim populations globally, is comparatively understudied when it comes to terrorism. Even in comparison with other countries in South Asia, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, Bangladesh receives limited attention (Fair and Oldmixon 2015), and studies focused on Bangladesh continue to be an uncommon avenue of research in South Asia (Lewis and Schendel 2020). Nevertheless, the chapters in this volume will illustrate that Bangladesh is an exciting and often paradoxical case for terrorism studies in general. In this volume, several authors have highlighted the importance of CTS and expanded the scope by focusing on both state and non-state terrorism in Bangladesh. By exploring the areas neglected in the extant literature, the volume aims to better understand terrorism, particularly the dimensions related to understudied areas such as gender, support structure, state terrorism, and the limits of counterterrorism. In Bangladesh, the discourse of terrorism has evolved over the past five decades, from post-independence, left-wing terrorism to Islamist terrorism in the early 1990s. Terror outfits too have metamorphosed, and local groups have become affiliated with transnational networks. Terrorism and counterterrorism are currently among the most contested issues within contemporary Bangladeshi politics, and their implications are regional as well as global. Terrorist groups in Bangladesh have reorganized, regrouped, and re-emerged since 2013, a phenomenon we refer

Introduction  3 to as the “new wave of terrorism.” This new wave is more closely tied to a global terrorist agenda with the participation of tech-savvy youths. Between 2013 and 2017, as many as fifty terrorist incidents resulted in 255 deaths and wounded 942 people (Parvez 2019a). Several of these attacks were reportedly carried out by the followers of the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Among these attacks, perhaps the most gruesome was the Holey Artisan incident. On July 1, 2016, terrorists stormed into Holey Artisan Bakery, a restaurant popular among foreigners in an upscale neighborhood in Dhaka. They hacked and stabbed to death twenty hostages, including Indian, Italian, Japanese, and US citizens. The twelve-hour siege ended following an operation by Bangladesh’s security forces. The new wave of Islamist terrorism has caused the organizations and operations of Bangladeshi terrorist outfits to undergo significant changes. The traditional groups, such as Harkatul Jihad Bangladesh (HUJI-B) and Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), are more structured and centralized and based in religious educational institutions called madrassas. Most of the leaders of the traditional groups are well versed in Islamic rules and principles and have the titles of Shaikh or Mufti. Religious institutions, madrassa students, and mosque employees also form the basis of their recruitment. The majority of their foot soldiers come from rural areas with low economic status. In contrast, the new generational groups Ansar-al-Islam (AAI) and Islamic State (IS) Bengal are tech-savvy outfits with strong ties to the al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Most of the key coordinators or leaders of the new generational groups are educated in secular universities, either in Bangladesh or abroad. Although the spiritual leader of AAI, Jashimuddin Rahmani, is a madrassa-educated Islamic scholar, the majority of the group’s coordinators are educated in secular private universities. In addition, the new generational outfits are embracing international communication technologies in all aspects of their operations, from recruitment to offensive operations. The structures of these organizations are often decentralized, with smaller groups consisting of fewer than ten members that are loosely connected to their central leaders. Notwithstanding the considerable evidence detailing the local groups’ connections with transnational jihadi groups such as the al-Qaeda and Islamic State, and reportedly a high degree of support for suicide bombing, terrorism in Bangladesh remains an under-researched area (Lorch 2020; Fair et al. 2016). In Bangladesh, terrorism research is predominantly informed by traditional security approaches and focuses on the historical background of terrorism, its main actors, perpetrators, and causes (Riaz 2004, 2008; Mannan 2006; Sobhan 2008, 2010; Ahmed 2009; Hussain 2007; Khan 2011; Hasan 2011; Kabir and Osmany 2007; Khan 2017; Pattanaik 2008; Parvez 2016, 2019b). It is also worth noting that state agencies have shown increasing interest in funding collaborative research projects with local academics and think tanks.1 Although it is too early to judge whether such a phenomenon can be attributed to the lack of scholarly criticism against coercive state response to terrorism and human rights abuses, one can hardly ignore the possible ramifications. There are well-documented and serious allegations of human rights abuses against the anti-terror agencies in Bangladesh. It is true that security officials of these agencies can provide invaluable information for

4  Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman terrorism research and policy analysis (e.g., Ashraf and Islam 2021), but a close collaboration, both financially and academically, may well compromise moral and ethical standards when it comes to setting the agenda for research. In a 2020 article, Jasmin Lorch reviewed Bangladesh-related terrorism literature and identified factors that scholars found to be significant in terrorism in Bangladesh (Lorch 2020). These factors include Islamization, party conflict, authoritarian governance, institutional weakness, and various international dynamics. The literature, according to Lorch (2020), lacked sufficient evidence to prove that Islamization is a significant factor in the proliferation of terrorism in Bangladesh. There are also shortcomings to the arguments that bitter and violent political party conflicts (Munir 2015), the impact of authoritarian regimes (Milam 2007), and the influence of international actors on local terrorism (Roul 2014) generate terrorism in Bangladesh. The causal inferences between these factors and terrorism are primarily theoretical and not backed by empirical evidence. It is somewhat disappointing for terrorism research in Bangladesh that many causes and factors of terrorism have not been adequately examined at the individual, organizational, and state levels. Global studies of terrorism generally identify four broad factors that contribute to terrorism: ideologies, grievances, networks, and enabling environments and support structures (Hafez and Mullins 2015). First, ideology can offer the terrorists a master narrative to frame a societal or political crisis as well as solution to that crisis. Violence is justified by dehumanizing and demonizing enemies, endorsing suicide attacks as heroic, and promising martyrdom for the sacrifice (Jost et al. 2009). As noted before, even though greater religiosity and wider Islamization have been attributed to terrorism in Bangladesh, the existing literature does not provide any evidence to support that argument (Lorch 2020). The second factor, grievances, can arise from many different sources, such as economic marginalization, cultural alienation, a feeling of victimization, and a host of other things (Piazza 2011; Victoroff et al. 2012). On an individual level, grievances could also stem from the loss of a loved one, isolation, or a crisis that makes an individual more susceptible to extremist indoctrination. Although many works mentioned grievances in one form or another, only a few have attempted to analyze individual terrorist lives to find how and what grievances lead them to join in militancy in Bangladesh (see Riaz and Parvez 2018; Parvez 2021). The third factor that often plays a key role in the growth of terrorism is social networks, the preexisting kinship and friendship between ordinary people and radicals that help terrorist recruitment and extremist convictions (Sageman 2004; Campbell 2013). In his much-cited book, Understanding Terror Networks, Marc Sageman (2004) shows how the network of a small group of young individuals offers opportunities for socialization with radicals. The network also satisfies a quest for significance, entraps individuals by peer pressure and ideological encapsulation, which increases commitments to terrorism. Although there are numerous examples of terrorism in Bangladesh where social networks have played an important role – for example, the small groups of the private university students, alumni of cadet colleges (military-run institutions), women, and madrassah students – scholars have largely failed to acknowledge its importance.

Introduction  5 The fourth and final broad factor is the existence of specific physical and virtual settings that encourage terrorist ideas and activities to flourish (Hafez and Mullins 2015). Following the Holey Artisan Attack in 2016, some Bangladeshi newspaper reports and popular writings blamed educational institutions, particularly Englishmedium schools and private universities, for creating an enabling environment and providing support structures for terrorism. But prior to 2016, religious institutions, especially Qawmi madrassahs, attracted the majority of the blame for harboring terrorist organizations. As opposed to researching credible evidence, education institutions’ goals, motives, and support mechanisms, these accusations were solely based on where the terrorists studied when they were convicted or arrested. The critical enabling factors such as digital media and prisons that offer opportunities to indoctrinate and strengthen the commitment to terrorist causes are rarely studied.2 However, an encouraging exception to this lack of literature may be found in the small number of studies conducted using data-based analyses to identify sociodemographic characteristics of terrorist profiles and the factors that are common to their lives (Riaz 2016; Riaz and Parvez 2018). Scholars have also documented empirical evidence on the perception and acceptance of Sharia law, suicide bombing, and Jihad among the masses in Bangladesh (Fair 2016; Fair and Abdallah 2017; Fair and Patel 2020). Even though a handful of scholars have made remarkable contributions to researching political Islam and violent extremism in Bangladesh (e.g., Riaz 2004, 2008; Riaz and Fair 2011), and the broader discourse of security in South Asia (e.g., Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018; Ollapally 2008; Hasan 2019), the number of evidence-based studies remains very limited. The purpose of this volume is, therefore, to contribute to the existing literature by examining contemporary issues and debates concerning terrorism in Bangladesh, including critically evaluating the role of non-state actors and government responses. It fills in the lacuna by empirically exploring the general factors – grievances, ideologies, networks, and the enabling environment of terrorism – with a particular focus on youth, women, and marginalized communities.

Outline of the volume The volume comprises nine chapters. In Chapter 1, Ali Riaz details the origins of Islamist militant activities in Bangladesh and follows the development of various organizations over the last three decades, particularly since the 1990s. Islamist militants, in this chapter, are described as members of organizations that have embraced Islam as a political ideology and have used violence as a strategy to achieve their political goal of Islamization of society and the state. It suggests that Islamist militancy in Bangladesh has undergone significant changes since the 1990s. Ali Riaz explores these changes focusing on the ideology, organizational strategies, and tactics of various militant organizations. He argues that Bangladesh has witnessed five different generations of militants, starting with the participants of the Afghanistan War in the 1980s. In the subsequent decades, new organizations with the stated goal of turning Bangladesh into an Islamic State emerged and

6  Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman proliferated. In the 2000s, the situation began to shift as the Bangladeshi chapter of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) was founded. Consequently, by the mid-2000s, organizations inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki began to emerge and become active. In 2013, an organization linked to AQIS began killing secular bloggers and authors. Several Bangladeshis, both inside and outside the country, joined the Islamic State after it was formed in Iraq and Syria. In 2016, the most spectacular terrorist attack was perpetrated by IS-affiliated youths in Bangladesh. The chapter compares and contrasts these organizations, as well as the implications for the future of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. In Chapter 2, Asheque Haque describes how ideologues play a significant role in terrorist propaganda. The chapter analyzes the sermons of Jasm Uddin Rahmani, a religious leader, and looks at the messages he conveys. It demonstrates how he and his sermons are instrumental in successfully organizing, coalescing, and mobilizing a terrorist group, the Ansarullah Bangla Team, and how he continues to influence other subsequent terrorist groups and individuals. Rahmani, widely regarded as the most visible and prominent jihadi ideologue in the Bengali language, has successfully conducted a violent extremist radicalization campaign during his active public life and continues to inspire future generations. Haque suggests that Rahmani remains the quintessential ideologue for this audience due to the depth and breadth of his masterfully crafted narrative, which still stands unchallenged in Bengali. A comprehensive analysis of the manifestations, causes, and consequences of female terrorism in Bangladesh is presented in Chapter 3. Co-authored by Jasmin Lorch and M. Abul Kalam Azad, the chapter indicates that the manifestations of female terrorism in Bangladesh are predominantly a Salafist phenomenon that gained in importance with the rise of the IS. Nevertheless, the advent of the Caliphate ideology by the IS from 2014 onward did not result in Bangladeshi women becoming involved in terrorism. The JMB, which was ideologically close to alQaeda, recruited women and trained them to become terrorists from an earlier period. According to the chapter, the pull factors merit further attention as causes of female terrorism. Specifically, while it is true that many female terrorists marry male militants and are sometimes radicalized by male family members, a considerable number of female militants are self-radicalized and/or join terrorism because of their own ideological convictions. Security officials often overlook women’s agency due to patriarchal stereotypes, which prevents them from grasping all the causes of female radicalization. More systematic research is needed, however, to better understand the relative importance of push-and-pull factors in women’s radicalization. In terms of its consequences, the authors believe the increased involvement of women in terrorism may give terrorist groups a new boost while reinforcing existing social tensions. As discussed by Bulbul Siddiqui (Chapter 4), understanding “narratives” is a popular and effective method for analyzing and conceptualizing terrorism. He explores the perceptions of university-going (both public and private schools) urban youth from Dhaka with regard to their acceptance or rejection of terrorismrelated messages. The chapter shows that the use of “manipulated” and “manufactured stories” of the glorious past of Islamic civilization with the hope of getting

Introduction  7 their fortune back in modern days is becoming a key strategy to form a narrative. In order to sway Muslims toward their terrorist ideology, many extremist groups have used and formulated such popular narratives. But Siddiqui also suggests that while various terrorism narratives may influence the youth, that does not necessarily lead to violent acts. In Chapter  5, Saimum Parvez examines how Bangladeshi terrorists use the internet for recruiting by exploring the wealth of jihadi propaganda content found online, such as propaganda videos, sermons, social media accounts, chat forums, and jihadi websites. The chapter finds that the internet helps both recruits and recruiters to connect with each other, particularly to reach previously unreachable demographics, such as women and youth from Westernized and well-off backgrounds. Saimum explains how the internet offers new and previously unattainable opportunities for jihadist recruitment in Bangladesh. Using the unique features of the internet, Bangladeshi terrorist groups can now control their own propaganda content, in terms of both publishing and broadcasting, and build their own narratives. Besides providing technical affordances and opportunities, the chapter finds that the internet can also enhance the sense of belonging to a group and, in turn, increase possibilities for recruitment. Through the internet and exposure to online extremist content, individuals can also reach other like-minded individuals by increasing online social connectivity. Kajalie Shehreen Islam (Chapter 6) explores coverage of terror-related news in the Bangladeshi press, focusing on the Dhaka attack of July 1, 2016. The chapter analyzes three Bengali-language dailies for the way the incident is portrayed, comparing the main themes between them. A comparison is also made between news outlets and their perspectives on and processes for reporting on terrorism in Bangladesh. Islam reveals that episodic framing in the immediate aftermath of the event was based on official statements and focused on the incident. The episodic framing was also based on initial identification of the perpetrators and victims. The author observes that the thematic framing evolved toward a political blame game, some investigation and analysis of the incident, and a strong focus on the perpetrators as “the Other” – perverted youth from rich families and elite schools. While there was extensive media coverage of the terror attack and both episodic and thematic framing of the incident in the news, there was no comprehensive investigative news story, and the author reiterated the need for reduced reliance on official sources and more investigative journalism on terrorism. Based on CTS and criminology, Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed (Chapter 7) discuss how Bangladesh’s state has historically utilized the discourses of terrorism and counterterrorism for dealing with ethnic tensions within the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region. Their argument is that the military occupation of the CHT continues, and counterterrorism measures contribute to the maintenance of this occupation. This is done by carefully framing and maintaining a narrative that depicts Indigenous political activists and, oftentimes, human rights defenders as the nation’s internal terrorists and security threats. It is the authors’ contention that this narrative legitimizes the presence of military and other security forces in the CHT and that such presence creates a state of terror against people on the edges of the nation.

8  Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman In Chapter 8, Ridwanul Hoque analyzes the efficacy of counterterrorism laws in Bangladesh and indicates that these laws are often incompatible with national constitutional principles and international human rights standards. With traces of colonial legacy, these laws have overly empowered the executive authority in combating terrorism, and they lack sufficient provisions for effective judicial oversight. Of those accused of terrorism, many have been denied the right to a fair trial, especially the right to a speedy trial. Since the country witnessed a phenomenal rise in extrajudicial killings of suspects, the right to life of the accused has been arbitrarily violated in a number of instances. Lastly, Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman (Chapter 9) presents a critical analysis of some of the contradictions in counterterrorism measures in Bangladesh that have adversely impacted the civil and human rights of the citizens. It discusses how two of the most talked-about terror incidents from two different regimes demonstrate state agencies’ abusive tactics in the name of counterterrorism, and how the counterterror initiatives have been politicized. The author argues that the array of laws and regulations introduced over the last decade and the micro-surveillance systems put into practice in the name of counterterrorism are actually indicators of the intensification of authoritarianism in Bangladesh. As a final note, although this volume certainly does not claim to be a comprehensive anthology on terrorism or counterterrorism in Bangladesh, the diversity of the topics explored provides a valuable insight into the politics behind the phenomenon. With this volume, we hope to have contributed to balanced and unbiased scholarship about this subject, which is necessary both for a better understanding and for accountability.

Notes 1 For example, the two-volume Ensuring Life without Terror was an outcome of a collaborative project between the Counter Terrorism  & Transnational Crime (CTTC) of Bangladesh Police and the Centre for Genocide Studies (CGS) of the University of Dhaka. See Ahmed and Islam (2021). 2 A limited number of studies looked at the role of the internet in Bangladeshi terrorism, see Parvez (2019b). For more on the role of the internet in general, see Weimann (2006) and Klausen (2015).

Bibliography Ahmed, I. (ed.). (2009) Terrorism in the 21st Century: Perspectives from Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Ahmed, I. and Islam, M. (eds.). (2021) Ensuring Life without Terror: Responses to Terrorism in Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Ashraf, A.S.M.A. and Islam, M.S. (2021) Islamist Militant Groups and Crime-Terror Nexus in Bangladesh. Studies in Conflict  & Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576 10X.2020.1868099. Braithwaite, J. and D’Costa, B. (2018) Cascades of Violence: War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia. Canberra: ANU Press.

Introduction  9 Campbell, D.E. (2013) Social Networks and Political Participation. Annual Review of Political Science. 16. pp. 33–48. Conway, M. (2017) Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 40 (1). pp. 77–98. Fair, C.C. and Abdallah, W. (2017) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Research Series. Research Brief No. 4. Dhaka: Resolve Network. Fair, C.C., Hamza, A. and Heller, R. (2016) Popular Support for Suicide Terrorism in Bangladesh: Worse Than You Think. Lawfare. 4 September. [Online] Available from: www.lawfareblog.com/popular-support-suicide-terrorism-bangladesh-worse-you-think. [Accessed: 18 May 2022]. Fair, C.C. and Oldmixon, S. (2015) Think Again: Islamism and Militancy in Bangladesh. The National Interest. 13 August. [Online] Available from: https://nationalinterest.org/ feature/think-again-islamism-militancy-bangladesh-13567. [Accessed: 18 May 2022]. Fair, C.C. and Patel, P. (2020) Rational Islamists: Islamism and Regime Preferences in Bangladesh. Democratization. 27 (4). pp. 547–569. Hafez, M. and Mullins, C. (2015) The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 38 (11). pp. 958–975. Hasan, M. (2011) Democracy and Political Islam in Bangladesh. South Asia Research. 31 (2). pp. 97–117. Hasan, M., Isezaki, K. and Yasir, S. (2019) Radicalization in South Asia: Context, Trajectories and Implications. New Delhi: Sage. Hussain, M.S. (2007) Terrorism in South Asia: Bangladesh perspectives. Dhaka: Palok Publishers & Bangladesh Research Forum. Jackson, R. (2005) Writing the War on Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Jost, J.T., Chrisopher, M.F. and Jamie, L.N. (2009) Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities. Annual Review of Psychology. 60. pp. 307–337. Kabir, M.H. and Osmany, M.R. (eds.). (2007) Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective. Dhaka: Academic Press and Publishers Library (APPL) & Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Khan, M. (2011) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: Why it Failed to Take Root. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. 6 (1). pp. 51–64. Khan, S.E. (2017) Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 28 (1). pp. 191–217. Klausen, J. (2015) Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 38 (1). pp. 1–22. Lewis, D. and van Schendel, W. (2020) Rethinking the Bangladesh State. Contributions to Indian Sociology. 54 (2). pp. 306–323. Lorch, J. (2020) Terrorism in Bangladesh: Understanding a Complex Phenomenon. Asian Survey. 60 (4). pp. 778–802. Mannan, A. (2006) Militant Islamism in Bangladesh: Global Jihadist Connection? Perceptions. 11. pp. 27–48. Milam, W.B. (2007) Bangladesh and the Burdens of History. Current History. 106 (699). pp. 153–160. Munir, S. (2015) Into the Void: Political Impasse Threatens Bangladesh’s Peace. Jane’s Intelligence Review. August. pp. 20–25. Ollapally, D.M. (2008) The Politics of Extremism in South Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

10  Saimum Parvez and Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman Parvez, S. (2016) Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Bangladesh. In: Riaz, A. and Rahman, M.S. (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Bangladesh. Abingdon: Routledge. Parvez, S. (2019a) Explaining Political Violence in Contemporary Bangladesh (2001– 2017). In: Riaz, A., Nasreen, Z. and Zaman, F. (eds.). Political Violence in South Asia. Abingdon: Routledge. Parvez, S. (2019b) “The Khilafah’s Soldiers in Bengal”: Analysing the Islamic State Jihadists and Their Violence Justification Narratives in Bangladesh. Perspectives on Terrorism. 13 (5). pp. 22–38. Parvez, S. (2019c) Digital Media and Violent Extremism in Bangladesh: Profiles and Narratives. Journal of Bangladesh Studies. 21 (1). pp. 60–67. Parvez, S. (2021) Understanding Digital Media and the Lifecycles of Bangladeshi Violent Extremists. PhD thesis. University of Sydney. Australia. Pattanaik, S. (2008) Bangladesh: Islamic Militancy and the Rise of Religious Right. In: Chandran, D.S. and Chari, P.R. (eds.). Armed conflict in South Asia 2008: Growing Violence. Abingdon: Routledge. Piazza, J.A. (2011) Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination, and Domestic Terrorism. Journal of Peace Research. 48 (3). pp. 349–350. Riaz, A. (2004) God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Riaz, A. (2008) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web. Abingdon: Routledge. Riaz, A. (2016) Who Are the Bangladeshi ‘Islamist Militants’? Perspectives on Terrorism. 10 (1). pp. 2–18. Riaz, A. and Fair, C.C. (eds.). (2011) Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh. Abingdon: Routledge. Riaz, A. and Parvez, S. (2018) Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know? Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (6). pp. 944–961. Roul, A. (2014) Al-Qaeda Leader al-Zawahiri Urges Jihad against the ‘Anti-Islamic’ Government of Bangladesh. Terrorism Monitor. 12 (2). pp. 4–6. Sageman, M. (2004) Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Schmid, A. (2004) Terrorism – The Definitional Problem. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. 36 (2). pp. 375–419. Scrivens, R., Gill, P. and Conway, M. (2020) The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Suggestions for Progressing Research. In: Holt, T.J. and Bossler, A.M. (eds.). The Palgrave Handbook of International Cybercrime and Cyberdeviance. Cham: Springer. Sobhan, F. (ed.). (2008) Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Sobhan, F. (ed.). (2010) Trends in Militancy in Bangladesh: Possible Responses. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Victoroff, J., Adelman, J.R. and Matthews, M. (2012) Psychological Factors Associated with Support for Suicide Bombing in the Muslim Diaspora. Political Psychology. 33 (6). pp. 791–809. Weimann, G. (2006) Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. and Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004) The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence. 16 (4). pp. 777–794.

1 Three Decades of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh Ali Riaz

This chapter has two objectives: discuss the origin of the Islamist militants’ activities in Bangladesh and trace the developments of various organizations through the past three decades, especially since the 1990s, with particular emphasis on their ideological features and strategies. The organizations that have embraced Islam as a political ideology and adopted violent extremism as the strategy to implement their political goal of Islamization of society are described as Islamist militants in this chapter. Despite differences in their orientations and adherence to various interpretations of Islam, these organizations have two salient features: the rejection of the democratic rule of law and the rejection of the expression of individual human rights (Westenberger and Stehlik 2018). This chapter will examine how militant groups emerged and transformed in Bangladesh and explore the external links of various individuals and organizations. This chapter neither intends nor attempts to explore the causes of and conditions for the rise of these militant groups; in a similar vein, it does not list all the attacks perpetrated by various organizations; instead, it refers to those that reflect the strategies and tactics of these organizations. The origin of violent Islamist extremist groups in Bangladesh, interchangeably used with Bangladeshi Islamist militants, has two distinct points of origin. The first one was short-lived with no continuation but should be accounted for the broader understanding of the militancy in the country. The first strand was represented by a local pir Matiur Rahman in the 1980s. The second streak has remained present and metamorphosed over time, especially through external connections. It began with the involvement of local Islamists in the Afghan War in the 1980s, but since then there have been five generations of various organizations, including the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Ansar-al-Islam, and the members of the Islamic State. This chapter discusses the second strand of the emergence and proliferation of militant groups.

The Precursor The first instance of the presence of a violent extremist organization was noted in 1989 when police confronted a den of a locally know pir1 Matiur Rahman in Kishorgonj, a district about 109 miles north of the capital Dhaka. A major in DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-2

12  Ali Riaz the Bangladesh Army, Rahman was dishonorably discharged in 1976 and reportedly traveled to the Middle East. In 1986, he began building his compound in a village in the district. The compound had a madrassah and about 500 followers from various parts of the country joined him. His followers were known as members of the Muslim Millat Bahini (the Muslim Nation Force). In December 1989, when police raided his compound, they faced fierce resistance and took three days to capture him. At least twenty-one people died in the armed battle. Matiur Rahman was injured and arrested along with forty-one of his followers (Dainik Bangla 1989). Cases were filed against him, but he secured bail and absconded; the cases remained pending. While building a military-style compound with fortifications and 500 followers in the premises indicates strong support, the socalled Muslim Millat Bahini fizzled out, and Matiur Rahman was never caught or seen in public. As such, the first streak of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh came to an end with very little impact. The incident was never discussed until the mid-2000s.

Five Generations of Militants The second and most enduring streak of militancy emerged in the 1990s. Several organizations appeared over time, some converged, and many have metamorphosed during the following decades. I argue that these organizations can be divided into five generations (Riaz 2016). The term “generation” is used here to identify the distinct differences between these organizations in terms of strategies, goals, targets, and operational nature. Except for the fifth generation, when the militancy landscape is dominated by two transnational organizations, each generation has several organizations; however, I have highlighted the most prominent organizations of each category to discuss the features of the generations and will discuss the fifth generation in greater detail as this has implications for the future trajectory of militancy in Bangladesh. Although Bangladeshi media discourse on Islamist militancy used to highlight attacks and incidents that have taken place since 1999, I contend that understanding the pattern and pathway of the groups requires going beyond these incidents and exploring the defining features; consequently, I have adopted the “generational differences” framework. These generational differences show that militancy in Bangladesh survived and adapted to the changing circumstances (Table 1.1).

The First Generation Bangladesh’s first generation of Islamist militants can be traced back to those who participated in the war against the Soviet Union (1979–1989). The connection was established in 1984 when a group of volunteers traveled to Afghanistan. An estimated 3,000 volunteers joined the war in several batches in the following four years, of whom twenty-four died on the battlefield. Also, a group of ulama visited the country and reportedly met Usama bin Laden (Islamic Revolution 1998; Manik 2005).

Table 1.1  Five Generations of Islamist Militants in Bangladesh Name Generation 1 Harkat-ul-Jihadal-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)

Ideology/goals

Organizational aspects

Banned/ operational

1992

To establish Islamic rule through “Jihad”

Has regional connections; originated in Pakistan; reported to have links with al-Qaeda and some militant groups in Pakistan, published and distributed books; recruitment from madrassahs; most leaders were older, madrassahs educated, hailed from rural areas, and participated in the Afghan War (1979–1989); has both military/Jihad wing and non-military/Dawa and Irshad wing.

Banned on October 17, 2005

1998

To establish Islamic rule; end anti-Islamic forces and practices in the country; violent struggle for the state power replacing with God’s laws; consider democracy and judicial system as products of evil power To establish Islamic rule; eliminate judicial system and replace it with Sharia; adherents of Taliban ideology; engaged in elimination of leftwing extremists in northwestern districts

Local but has transnational connections; front-liners have been trained in Afghanistan; recruited youth in urban areas who were educated in technical and vocational training; close connections with HUJI-B; suspected to receive support from Laskar-e-Tayeba of Pakistan and funds from AHAB and Middle East charities

Banned on February 23, 2005

A front organization of the JMB; located exclusively in a few districts of southwestern Bangladesh; reported to have received funding from Saudi Arabian charities to build mosques and seminaries; close connections with the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB); used madrassahs which were built and maintained by the AHAB; mid-range leaders tend to be educated in technical vocational training colleges

Banned on February 23, 2005

1998

(Continued)

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  13

Generation 2 Jamaat-ulMujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)

Establishment

Name

Establishment

Ideology/goals

Organizational aspects

Banned/ operational

Tamir-ud-Deen

1999

To establish Islamic Sharia laws

Homegrown, founded by a HUJI-B leader; remained dormant for a while but resurfaced in 2010 and then merged with HUJI-B

Allah’ar Dal

1995

To establish Islamic rule through Jihad

Shahadat-iHiqma (SiH)

1996

Establish strict Islamic rule; believes in taking up arms to wage an Islamic revolution; considers Bangladesh independence as a terrorist act; believes that the “right use of the arms is the only way to check injustice”

Reportedly linked to JMB; merged with JMB in late 2004; resurfaced in 2009 after HUJI-B and JMB were facing adverse environment Claimed to have a fighter wing; began as a social welfare organization and changed names several times before being SiH; drew attention after a press conference on February 3, 2003

Officially not proscribed, but reportedly “backlisted”; inoperative in April 2021 Banned on November 6, 2019 Banned on February 3, 2003

2000

Establish a Caliphate under a Caliph through invitation and Jihad; propagate global jihadist ideology; suspected to have tried to stage military coup

Generation 3 Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT)

International in nature; urban-based middle-class and technically skilled university students as recruitment targets; distribute inflammatory leaflets

Banned on October 29, 2009

14  Ali Riaz

Table 1.1  (Continued)

Generation 4 Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) (later renamed as Ansar Al Islam; also known as Ansar Bangla 7) Generation 5 Ansar al Islam; AQIS affiliate

To propagate global jihadist ideology; inspired by the doctrines of Anwar al-Awlaki; eliminate or silence the critics of religious doctrines; stop publication of secular materials; kill atheists, apostates, and heretics

Emerged as the Jamaat-ul-Muslamin; claimed responsibility for many of the killings of bloggers; funding from external sources; largely used cyberspace for recruitment and mobilization; use of machetes and meat cleavers; target middle-class educated youth for recruitment; propagate jihadist ideology and disseminate training manuals online to plan and execute terror attacks

Banned on May 25, 2015

2014/2015

To adhere to the objectives of al-Qaeda; establish an Islamic State and society; adopt violent methods to propagate the ideology Killing and attack of foreigners; followers of other religions; religious minorities; those who allegedly committed blasphemy

Highlighting the perceived injustices of Muslims; relating the current “Jihad” to the history of nineteenth-century revivalist movements in Bengal; recruitment of educated, tech-savvy youth; focused operations against atheists, homosexuals Two organizations – Jund At-Tawhid wal-Khalifah and a faction of the JMB – merged and created the Dawatul Islam, which pledged allegiance to the ISIS. Penchant for spectacular attacks, members are drawn from the upper echelon and educated class; sent fighters to Iraq and Syria; and engaged in attacks inside the country since 2015; reorganizing after security operations weakened the network post-2016 attack; adopted “lone wolf” tactics

Banned on March 6, 2017

2015

Government to not acknowledge the presence of the ISIS’ describes it as Neo-JMB; JMB is a proscribed organization

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  15

Dawatul Islam: Islamic State

2007

16  Ali Riaz Between 1988 and 1992, Shafiqur Rahman, a returnee of the Afghan War, established contacts with a Pakistani Islamist organization called Harkat-ul-Jihadal-Islami (HUJI), and the Bangladesh chapter began its clandestine operations. It is widely reported in the press that Abdur Rahman Faruqi was the first to lead the Bangladesh chapter of HUJI but died while removing a mine in Afghanistan in 1989 (Sultan 2016). HUJI, the Pakistani militant organization, came into being in the early 1980s as a group of supporters of the Afghan resistance. Initially called Jammat-ul-Ansar of Afghanistan, the organization renamed itself Harkatul-Jihad-al-Islami in 1988. The organization received support from the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Zahab and Roy 2006). Between 1980 and 1988, it restricted its activities in Afghanistan. Over the following four years, it expanded its operation in other parts of the world, especially in South Asia. The expansion plan was guided by its ideological position – to initiate a struggle for Muslim rights in non-Muslim countries such as the Philippines and Myanmar. In this context, Myanmar was high on the priority list of the HUJI’s international organizers (Zahab and Roy 2006). On April 30, 1992, a week after the mujahideen emerged victorious in Afghanistan, the Bangladeshi participants of the war expressed their delight at a press conference in Dhaka where some of the speakers identified themselves as members of HUJI-Bangladesh (HUJI-B) (Manik 2005). In the first four years, HUJI-B’s activities were largely restricted to the southeastern hills close to the border, with Myanmar consistent with their initial objective of using Bangladesh as a launching pad to influence the Rohingya movement inside Myanmar.2 The presence of Rohingya refugees in the camps facilitated the process, and the organization was able to establish contacts within Myanmar too. The membership of the group was largely limited to those with connections to the Afghan War or links to organizations that had provided volunteers to the war. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the members of the leadership team were older, mostly madrassah educated, particularly in Deobandi, and hailed from rural areas. As for the madhab, the members of the HUJI-B belonged to Hanafi madhabs.3 The organization began to shift its operation from the southeastern hills in 1996 (discussed in the following section) and began its operations in various parts of the country. The name “Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islam Bangladesh” (HUJI-B) came to light in Bangladesh in January 1999 when a group of armed men attempted to kill leading poet Shamsur Rahman at his home. A  police investigation and confessions of the arrested youth connected to the incident on January 19 revealed that HUJI-B operatives were actively engaged in the planning of the attack and had also planned to assassinate some prominent intellectuals of the country (BBC News 1999). However, little attention was paid to the emerging organization and its network. Beginning in 1999, the HUJI-B engaged in a series of attacks, including one on a cultural event in Jessore, a town in southwestern Bangladesh in March 1999, and another on a mosque of the Ahmadi community in Khulna, a southern town, in October. An audacious operation of the HUJI-B was its attempt to kill the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on July 20, 2000, until its second attempt on her

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  17 life on August  21, 2004, at a rally in Dhaka. The 2000 operation was planned and executed under the leadership of Mufti Abdul Hannan, a leading member of the HUJI-B. Law enforcers recovered a 76 kg bomb planted in a public venue in Kotalipara in Gopalganj where Hasina was scheduled to visit (Huq 2005). The second attempt, which cost twenty-two lives, became a watershed moment in the history of Bangladesh. In between, the HUJI-B perpetrated bomb attacks: in 2001, at a traditional cultural event in Dhaka on the Bengali New Year, an attack on a church outside Dhaka, and another on a local office of the Awami League (AL). It also attacked the British High Commissioner in Bangladesh in 2004. It is also alleged that HUJI-B was behind the attack on a public meeting of the former finance minister in 2005. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government led by Khaleda Zia continued to deny that these attacks were perpetrated by militant groups. These attacks show that the organization was pursuing the goal of what they describe as an Islamic rule through “Jihad.” Their targets had been largely nonstate entities and those which have symbolic importance to secularists. Its attacks on Sheikh Hasina and the AL office, particularly the audacious attack in 2004, seem to show that by then it had gained enough confidence and likely received support from state actors. Court documents and verdict on the 2004 attack described it as “state-backed crime” (The Daily Star 2018). Leaders of the HUJIB, especially Mufti Hannan, have been convicted in various cases, including the attempted assassinations of Hasina in 2000 and 2004 (The Daily Star 2021a). Although the government initially denied the existence of the organization, it proscribed the HUJI-B in 2005 and started to apprehend its leaders.

The Second Generation The second generation of the militants emerged when the HUJI-B moved its bases to the northern and northwestern parts of the country and adopted the name “Qital fi Sabilililah” (Fighting in the way of Allah). Two factors contributed to the move and shift in its strategy and targets. The first is the raid on a HUJI-B camp in the southeastern hilly districts. Between 1992 and 1996, HUJI-B built several training camps in the southeastern hilly districts primarily to provide training to Rohingya militants. But the camps were used to train Bangladeshi militants as well. Intelligence sources came to know of this development on January 19, 1996 when fortyone militants with a huge arms cache were arrested in a village in the southeastern Cox’s Bazar district (The Daily Star 2009; Daily Ittefaq 2016). Of those arrested, only one was a Rohingya rebel, four came from the vicinity, and the remainder were from various parts of the country. The arrest exposed some of the HUJI-B operatives and their bases. The second development was the contact made with Shaikh Abdur Rahman, son of a deceased Ahle Hadith leader, and leaders of a faction of the Ahle Hadith Movement. They joined forces in 1998 and established the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). It is worth noting that the process of the establishment of the JMB began in 1996; Shaikh Abdur Rahman met several Alim and a few leaders of

18  Ali Riaz various Islamist parties. It is at this time that Sheikh Rahman and Mufti Hannan came to know each other. When the militants arrested in early January 1996 from the training camps were being tried at a local court in Cox’s Bazar, Shaikh Abdur Rahman was sent as the HUJI-B representative to monitor and help the accused (Palash 2006: 17). The new group’s focus shifted inward, as opposed to supporting militants outside. It defined its objective as transforming Bangladesh into an “Islamic State.” The inward shift of the HUJI-B, as described before, was a result of the gradual ideological merger of the JMB and HUJI-B. Although the JMB was reportedly formed in Jamalpur, a town in central Bangladesh, at the beginning the primary area of its operation was northern and northwestern Bangladesh. It later spread to other parts of the country. The JMB’s armed activities began in 2000 with the killing of an author and cultural activist of Tangail, for “indecent remarks about Allah and the prophet” in a book (The Daily Star 2006). In the subsequent years, JMB was engaged in a few operations, including the attempted assassination of an NGO worker in Joypurhat near Bogra and bomb blasts in movie houses in 2001 and 2002. According to the confessions of the arrested leaders of the JMB, in addition to several bomb attacks between 2001 and 2005, activists of the organization slaughtered at least fourteen people (Prothom Alo 2006) and clashed with police when raided in their hideouts (Prothom Alo 2003). Police arrested a few members of the group in various districts in the southwestern parts of the country (The Daily Star 2005). The JMB also attempted to kill renowned “secularist author” Professor Humayun Azad on February  27, 2004. Professor Azad survived the attack but was severely wounded. Traumatized and physically weakened, Azad died on August 11, 2004 in Germany. On August 17, 2005, the JMB carried out its spectacular bombing campaign; it exploded more than 450 bombs over a time span of an hour in sixty-three of sixty-four districts of the country. This was followed by attacks on courthouses in Chandpur, Laxmipur, and Chittagong districts and at least five suicide attacks in various parts of the country, mostly targeting the judges, lawyers, policemen, and journalists. These suicide attacks were unprecedented in the history of the country; about thirty people died in these attacks. This marked a significant shift in the tactics of the JMB. Notably, there was a change in the external connection of the militants as well. In about 1996, a connection was established between Indian citizen Syed Abdul Karim Tunda and Abdur Rahman. Tunda, who has been in Indian custody since 2013 on several terrorism charges, is alleged to be an operative of the Pakistanbased Lashkar-e-Tayeba (LeT). Indian intelligence sources insist that Tunda entered Bangladesh in 1994 and operated from there for quite some time. In any case, he was the bridge between Abdur Rahman of the JMB and the LeT and Hafiz Saeed. It is Tunda who organized Abdur Rahman’s trip to Pakistan and introduced him to Markaz-ud-wal-Irshad, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization founded in the 1980s, to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan. LeT emerged as the military wing of the Markaz (Palash 2006: 19). The primary goal of the JMB was to establish an Islamic State in Bangladesh. It considers the secular system and secular political forces “evil” and underscores

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  19 the need for a united effort to deal with the secular forces. JMB documents have never criticized any of the Islamic parties of Bangladesh. In several issues of its monthly publication Al Maghazi, the JMB spoke of the “unity of Islamic forces.” The December  2004 editorial of the publication said, “Islamic forces must be united now. Once they are united, the [evil powers] will be eliminated and the nation will be freed.” The pamphlet distributed after the August 17 blasts called for Allah’s law: Implement Allah’s laws, we will help you. We do not want power; rather, we want divine laws, instead of a temporal rule. Otherwise, the organization will resort to “kital” [all-out war] for the establishment of the rules of Allah on His land. The information on JMB activists arrested since late 2006 reveals that youth educated in technical and vocational training colleges, and born and raised in urban areas, were being attracted to the organization and elevated to leadership. In 2004, the JMB created a subsidiary organization named the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB, Awakened Muslim People of Bangladesh), operating in the northwestern region of the country, which unleashed a reign of terror in the region, killing and abducting twenty-two people (Manik and Ashraf 2006). The JMJB drew attention on April 1, 2004, with vows to eliminate clandestine leftist militants in the region. It was led by Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai. The connection between the JMB and the JMJB became public when Siddiqul Islam described the head of the JMB, Abdur Rahman, as his “spiritual leader,” and Rahman appeared with Bangla Bhai at a press conference held in Rajshahi on May 12, 2004 (Manik 2004; Jugantor 2005). Rahman moved to the area in April soon after the JMJB launched its operation. Despite overwhelming evidence of the activities of the JMJB, the BNP government not only continued to turn a blind eye but one of the ministers, who belonged to an Islamist party, described these as the “media’s creation” as well. The ideology of the organization was articulated by Siddiqul Islam to a journalist in May 2004: “Our model involves many leaders and scholars of Islam. But we will take as much ideology from the Talibans as we need” (Manik 2004). Islam insisted that the JMJB is a local social organization. Islam said: We would like to serve people and serve them in line with Hilful Fuzul (a social organization founded by Prophet Mohammad (SM) to serve the destitute). We try to awaken people’s religious feelings to establish their links with the creator. The government banned both the JMB and the JMJB in February  2005 after months of denial to acknowledge their existence. Although the JMB and the JMJB were the most important and lethal organizations, there were a few other organizations that belonged to this generation: for example, Allahr Dal (est. 1995), Tamir-ud-Deen (est. 1999), Shahadat-i-Hiqma

20  Ali Riaz (SiH, est. 1996), Islam-O-Muslim (est. 2009). These organizations’ emergence and pathway have been different, but their goals remained the same. Some of them emerged as a modest organization and gradually transformed – for example, SiH. Al Hiqma began as a modest organization on December 29, 1996, named the “Bangladesh Decoration Map,” with thirty-two members. The name of the organization was changed to Islami Samaj Sangskar Andolon (Islamic Social Reform Movement) in 1998. It received funding and worked closely with an obscure organization named Towhidi Janata (United People). The organizers of the Islami Samaj Sangskar Andolon launched “Hiqma Jihad” activities in Rajshahi in 1998 under the banner of Biswa Islamic Front (World Islamic Front). The name was changed to Shahadat-e-Hiqma in 2001 (Jugantor 2005a: 1). It was banned in 2015. Allahr Dal managed to maintain a separate entity, but it also reportedly merged with the JMB in 2004. In 2019, the government banned the Allahr Dal. The defining features of these organizations were described by DeVotta and Timberman in the following manner: While some Islamist groups in Bangladesh enjoy transnational ties, especially with radicals in Pakistan and Afghanistan, VIE [Violent Islamist Extremists] in the country is mainly a provincial phenomenon in that the groups there do not seek to perpetuate global (or external) jihad. Instead, their primary goal is to overtake and thereafter impose sharia law on the state, and they have thus resorted to an “internal jihad” by attacking civil society groups that especially empower women and government offices and institutions like the judiciary. Sensing that Bengali identity vitiates Islamic identity, the extremists have attacked cultural festivals. The AL, leftist parties, intellectuals, and NGOs associated with secularism and wary of Islamism have also been targets. (De Votta and Timberman 2012) Notwithstanding the ideological affinity, close active cooperation, and use of similar tactics, there is a significant difference between the HUJI-B and the JMB. The HUJI-B members are drawn from the followers of Hanafi Madhab and the Deobandi tradition, whereas JMB members came from the Ahle Hadith tradition, which does not follow any of the four schools of jurisprudence of Sunni Islam. Such difference has caused serious tension and often violent rivalry in Pakistan, but in Bangladesh it did not feature in the militant movement.

The Third Generation As the JMB and HUJI-B were gradually transforming, a new organization with international connections and a global agenda appeared on the scene: the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). I identify this as the representative of the third generation of militants. The Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB), the country chapter of the HT, a leading political actor/movement in Central Asia headquartered in London, was launched in Bangladesh in November 2001 (Houriya and Stuart 2009: 56).

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  21 The Bangladesh chapter of the HT was founded by a university professor who had studied in the UK as a Commonwealth Scholar. It envisions a Shari’ah-based Khilafah state. HT is the only Islamist organization to speak of Khilafat and to acknowledge its international connection. Interestingly, by 2005, the HT started to gain “most momentum through its activities at the country’s universities” (New Age 2005). What makes the HT distinctly different from other Islamist political organizations, including the clandestine ones, is that its political agenda is not confined to Bangladesh, but it is a global one. The final stage of the three-stage revolution envisioned by the HT, according to their documents, is “establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying it as a message to the world” (Hizb ut Tahrir n.d.). HTB was banned in October 2009 despite not being linked directly to any terrorism in Bangladesh. It is alleged to have supported the mutiny by the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) that took place in February 2009. There are allegations that the HTB has been trying to capture political power by influencing and infiltrating the Bangladesh Army. Such an allegation is made based on the record of the HT elsewhere and their propaganda inside Bangladesh. For example, in 1968–1969, HT led failed coup attempts in Syria and Jordan and was involved with attempted coups in 1974 (Taji-Farouki 1996: 27–29). Besides, HT has avidly supported suicide bombings against Western troops in Iraq (Harper 2007). The HTB denies these allegations. However, in a statement against the ban, it said, “The oppressive Awami League government, agents of US-India-Britain banned Hizb ut-Tahrir due to the party’s stance on the side of the defense forces of the country and leading the work for re-establishing the Khilafah (Caliphate)” (Ahmed 2009). Since its inception in Bangladesh, it has maintained a robust presence online and repeatedly urged the military to take action against the incumbent. For example, in a poster the HT asks: “Demand from the military officers to give Nusrah to Hizb ut Tahrir” (2021). The Bangladesh Army claimed in January 2012, a coup was planned by a group of HT-influenced officers, but it failed (Pattanaik 2012). The third generation is characterized by its technical skills, being students at universities, and being well-versed in global political events. The profiles of arrested activists indicate that they are largely from middle-class backgrounds and more urban-based than any other Islamist groups, including the mainstream Islamist parties.

The Fourth Generation The fourth generation of militants is represented by the organization Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), which emerged at a time when the government arrested and executed JMB leaders in 2006–2007. Strong counterterrorism efforts of the caretaker government (2007–2008), followed by the relative political stability in the early years of the AL government, kept the militant groups dormant. There was an impression that the menace of militancy had been tamed. The development beneath the surface was telling a different story. The HUJI-B and the JMB began to reorganize and rebuild their network. It is in this background that a new ABT began to be organized.

22  Ali Riaz The ABT first appeared under the name Jamaat-ul Muslemin (TRAC 2015; Sultan 2014). The group was reportedly funded by external sources and “ceased to operate when funding ended” (TRAC 2015). Inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki and led by local Mufti Jasimuddin Rahmani, the ABT began to attract new recruits in 2012 when its presence in cyberspace became prominent (Internet Archive 2013; Riedel 2011).4 Originally, the group used the Ansar al Mujahideen English Forum (AAMEF), an al-Qaeda-affiliated website, and later moved to another website, bab-ul-islam.net, launched in Pakistan. The group uses Bengali, Urdu, Arabic, and English for the dissemination of its message (Rashid 2014). The group, since its inception, used cyberspace extensively in propagating jihadist ideology and training manuals to guide terror attacks (TRAC 2015). In the early days of the organization, one of the videos produced by the groups was entitled “Eradicate Democracy” (Qitaltube.blogspot.com 2013). The ABT was thrust into the limelight in March 2013 after the arrests of five university students in connection with the killing of blogger and activist Rajib Haider. Haider, a self-proclaimed atheist, was hacked to death in February in the midst of the movement demanding capital punishment to those who were being tried by a special tribunal for committing crimes against humanity (Zaman 2018). The students, according to police, confessed to the killing and creating this new organization. The organization by 2015 renamed itself Ansar al Islam (AAI) in 2015. Between 2013 and 2015, the group was engaged in killing bloggers, publishers, and writers, which sent a shockwave through the country and drew international media attention. AAI, in an online statement, said that it was targeting writers, journalists, intellectuals, and artists who publicly insulted Islam, rather than unbelievers who kept their views private (International Crisis Group 2018). The group’s leader Rahmani was arrested with thirty followers in August 2013 and sentenced to five years in jail in connection with the murder of blogger Rajib (The Daily Star 2015; Bdnews24.com 2013). After his arrest, Major (discharged) Ziaul Huq reportedly took over the leadership. The group was banned in 2015. But by then, it had expressed its allegiance to al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) (see next section). The government, which continues to deny the presence of any transnational violent extremist organization, clamped down on the AAI. Members and leaders were arrested and tried. Members of the organization have been sentenced to death and awarded various terms of jail for killing a publisher (The Daily Star 2021b) and an author (Dhaka Tribune 2021). Yet the organization is in the process of reorganizing itself and attracting new members. It is reported to have a new spiritual leader and is attracting new members (Khan 2021). The fourth generation of the militants has a few distinctions. First, unlike the previous two generations, which were radicalized through organizational contacts and in-person meetings, AAI members have been primarily radicalized online. Second, the inspiration came from outside the country, although the followers did not immediately join the organization Awlaki represented. Third, the members of the organization are largely drawn from middle-class, educated youths, and they are proficient in using technology.

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  23

The Fifth Generation Although the Bangladesh government continues to deny the existence of any transnational terrorist organizations within the country, there has been ample evidence to suggest that a new generation of militants have emerged since 2015 who are inspired by and connected to two transnational organizations – al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL, commonly referred to as ISIS, and/or Islamic State). The defining feature of the new generation is that they are inspired by, and connected to, the transnational terrorist groups, intend to pursue their objective of establishing an Islamic State in Bangladesh, and participate in the global militant Islamist movements. The AQIS foray in South Asia began with the announcement of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in September 2014 that the organization was establishing a branch in South Asia, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) (The Guardian 2014). In February  2015, Zawahiri called upon the people of Bangladesh to “launch a massive public uprising (intifada) in defense of Islam against the enemies of Islam” (Bdnews24.com 2015a). In an essay published in the AQIS publication Resurgence, an author called upon Bangladeshis to revolt against the government and referred to a nineteenth-century movement called the Faraizi movement led by Haji Shariatullah. It says: No matter how harsh it sounds, a rebellion against this oppressive system is what the land of Haji Shariatullah needs these days. And as we do so, let us also revive the spirit of the Faraizi movement and return to our true roots. A revival of Islam in our individual and collective lives should be our answer to those who seek to stamp out Islam from Muslim Bangladesh. (Ahmed 2014: 79–81) In May 2015, AQIS chief Aasim Umar exhorted further killings of atheist bloggers in Bangladesh in a video release entitled “From France to Bangladesh: The Dust Will Never Settle Down” (Jihadology.net 2015). These calls notwithstanding, an organized presence of the AQIS in Bangladesh was not noticeable until mid-2015. In early July, the law enforcement agencies arrested Maulana Mainul Islam, the alleged AQIS chief coordinator in Bangladesh, and his top advisor Maulana Zafar Amin, along with ten other AQIS activists (Bdnews24.com 2015b). This came following a spate of killings of bloggers, for which the AAI claimed responsibility, and the AQIS affirmed that it is their operation. It was reported in the press that “ABT wanted to launch al-Qaeda in Bangladesh (AQIB) like al-Qaeda in Indian Sub-Continent. But the AQIS headquarters in Pakistan did not approve the idea and suggested Ansarullah be renamed Ansar al Islam and work as the Bangladesh chapter of AQIS” (The Daily Star 2017). By mid-2015, AAI began to refer to itself as the affiliate of the AQIS in Bangladesh. Between 2013 and 2016, the AQIS claimed responsibility for at least twelve attacks (Dhaka Tribune 2017). At least six bloggers have been killed

24  Ali Riaz by the organization (Beggin 2016). Its strategy has been described by analysts as deliberate: While violence is central to al-Qaeda’s strategy in Bangladesh, the group has been highly deliberate in its target selection. Al-Qaeda has avoided targeting Bangladeshi security forces or political figures, likely because it anticipates that doing so would trigger a crackdown. Instead, the group has, with one exception, exclusively targeted atheist activists and others associated with the secular movement in Bangladesh. The exception came in April  2016, when Ansar al-Islam killed two LGBT activists involved in the publication of Bangladesh’s only LGBT magazine. While the target was different, the justification for the assassinations was consistent with the rationale that the group had applied in its targeting of atheists – in a statement posted to Twitter, Ansar al-Islam claimed the two activists’ promotion of homosexuality was part of the ‘global military and ideological war on Islam. (Barr 2017) When the government banned the AAI, it publicly responded by delivering letters with death threats to public officials (NJOHSP 2016). An important aspect of the AQIS has been its emphasis on the perceived injustices of Muslims and protecting them from these injustices. The propaganda strategy adopted by the AQIS in Bangladesh highlights this aspect along with two others – as well as two other aspects – anti-Indian sentiments and credentials of the political leaders (Siyech 2020). Despite facing serious counterterrorism efforts of the government, especially since July 2016, the organization has managed to continue attacks on its targets and reorganize (Khan 2021). Evidently, the AQIS in Bangladesh, represented by the AAI, has tailored its strategies and propaganda to the sociopolitical context. This is what has now become effective in reaching out to youth –from both the middle class and poorer segments. The profile of the arrested and killed AAI members clearly shows that it has among its ranks people who are well educated, tech-savvy and from the middle and upper strata of the society on the one hand, while it has reached out to those who are educated in qwami madrassahs of the Deobandi tradition from poor families. These two factors provide the necessary materials for survival. Nathaniel Barr concluded that the AQIS in Bangladesh had adopted “a strategic patience,” an approach which is a defining characteristic of al-Qaeda. He cautioned that “with its Bangladesh network still largely intact, alQaeda’s outlook in the country is promising.” The second organization that has made its mark in Bangladesh since 2014 is the Islamic State (IS). Although its spectacular attack on a café in the capital’s upscale neighborhood on July 1, 2016, made the organization a household name in Bangladesh, there were quite clear indications that since mid-2014, the Islamic State was trying to expand its presence not only in the vicinity of Iraq but also beyond, and Bangladesh was one of the potential targets. In the first six months of 2015, according to the official count and reported by police, seventeen people were

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  25 arrested for their connections with the IS (Sultan 2016). These arrests include the alleged Bangladesh Coordinator of the IS, Mohammad Sakhawatul Kabir. He was arrested along with three other suspects in January 2015 in Dhaka. In May 2015, the police claimed that it had captured the “Bangladesh Coordinator” of the IS, Abdullah Al Galib. Galib is a former member of HT and a follower of ABT (The Strait Times 2015). Yet as I noted in 2016 (Riaz 2016), the government abruptly changed its tune soon after the murders of the foreigners in September and October. Not only did the government deny the presence of the IS in Bangladesh (The New York Times 2015), it also suggested that it was under pressure to admit its presence to taint Bangladesh’s image and create a situation like those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, and Syria (The Hindu 2015). The government accused the opposition, particularly the BNP, of these attacks. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina blamed the opposition for conspiring to tarnish the government’s reputation (Barry 2015). She also suggested that militants might be carrying out attacks in retaliation for the war crime trials (i.e., trials conducted by the International Criminal Tribunal established by the government in 2010 to try those who had committed war crimes during the war of independence in 1971) (The New York Times 2015). This was reminiscent of 1999, when the first large-scale attack was perpetrated by the HUIB in Jessore and a former minister of the BNP government was accused in a case for orchestrating the attack. The BNP rejected the charge (Dhaka Tribune 2015). The IS attacks began with the killing of an Italian aid worker in the diplomatic zone in Dhaka in September  2015. By July  2017, the IS claimed responsibility for thirty attacks (Labu 2017); between September 2015 and March 2017, at least forty-two people died in attacks perpetrated by the IS militants (Sultan 2017). As mentioned before, the most spectacular and consequential attack was staged on July  1, 2016. A  group of five militants took hostages and killed twenty-two civilians, of which seventeen were foreign nationals – nine Italians, seven Japanese, and one Indian; three Bangladeshis were also killed by the militants. Five gunmen and two police officials were killed during the security operation. A chef was mistakenly identified as an attacker and killed by the security forces. Another employee died in the hospital a week later in police custody allegedly after being tortured. The Islamic State not only claimed responsibility for the attack but also posted photographs online in real time, giving credence to its claim. This attack was followed by another attack, on July 7 outside Dhaka near a public congregation where hundreds of thousands had gathered for prayers to mark the Muslim Eid holiday. Four people – two policemen, a woman, and a suspected militant – died. An infographic published in the Rumiyah, a magazine published by the IS, showed that between 2015 and 2016, IS operatives conducted twenty-four attacks, and 42 percent of their targets were Hindus and Buddhists: 27 percent were Christians; 19  percent were atheists, and 12  percent were Shi’a (Rumiyah 2016: 7). The targets of the attacks of the ISIS were the Shi’a community, foreigners, and places of worship. Of the forty-two people killed between September  24 and March 2017, the number of foreigners was nineteen, religious minorities eleven,

26  Ali Riaz Shi’a four, police four, and others four, including a caretaker of a shrine, a housewife, a teacher and a disciple of Lalon, the mystic Baul saint. The organization of the IS came into existence as two separate strands of militant groups merged. Drawing on various sources and documents, Parvez mapped the emergence of the Bangladeshi unit of the IS. He writes: The IS affiliated group in Bangladesh was formed by a merger between two terrorist outfits; a faction of JMB (led by Sarwar Jahan) and the Jund AtTawhid wal-Khalifah – a group formed under the leadership of a CanadianBangladesh, Tamim Chowdhury. Together, these two outfits formed a new organization called Dawlatul Islam Bengal and pledged their allegiance to Islamic State. (Parvez 2019: 25) Parvez also delineated the workings of the IS Bangladesh saying: The operation of Islamic State in Bangladesh can be divided into two types: First, the Bangladeshi foreign fighters who travelled to Syria to fight for Islamic State; and second, the individuals of Islamic State’s affiliated group, Dawlatul Islam Bengal, who declared their allegiance to the “Khilafat” and operated inside the territory of Bangladesh on behalf of Islamic State. (Parvez 2019: 26) The operational nature of the IS in Bangladesh and their proclamation in the 12th Issue of Dabiq, published in November 2015, that the attacks in Bangladesh were part of the global strategy of fighting against “crusader nations” (Dabiq 2015: 41) clearly show that the agenda has been global rather than local. Bangladeshi Muslims’ position and the country’s political system were secondary issues to the IS; instead, it was staging the attacks to send a global message. Barr has quite aptly pointed out that the IS was employing a tactic that has been borrowed from elsewhere: The strategy that IS implemented in Bangladesh closely mirrors the approach it has pursued in Iraq, Syria and other theaters. For instance, IS attacks on religious minorities were intended to fuel sectarian tensions in Bangladeshi society, a tactic that had proved to be highly effective in Iraq. (Barr 2017) The members of the IS in Bangladesh in large measure came from the influential, well-off families. In a study on the profile of the militants in Bangladesh conducted in early 2016, before the café attack, I demonstrated that the majority of militants came from middle-class or upper-middle-class backgrounds; a significant number were educated in prestigious institutions of higher learning and/or had a background in technical education (Riaz 2016). The sample was drawn from newspaper reports published between July 2014 and June 2015 when

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  27 112 militants were arrested by various law enforcement agencies. Following the July 1 café attack, a follow-up study that included a qualitative exploration of the profiles of thirty-eight alleged militants reaffirmed the findings that “militancy in Bangladesh is young and male-dominated, with a growing number of individuals from well-off and well-educated backgrounds” (Riaz and Parvez 2018). After the 2016 café attack, the government adopted a strategy of decapitating the organizational structure and killing those suspected of being involved with the IS, which the government describes as the “Neo JMB.” By mid- 2019, at least eighty suspected militants, including five women and eight children, were killed by security forces. Among those killed were Tamim Chowdhury, allegedly the head of the Islamic State in Bangladesh and the organizer of the café attack, and seven others associated with the gruesome attack. Some of these alleged militants were killed by security forces, while few blew themselves up instead of surrendering during security operations. In November 2019, seven militants were sentenced to death by a special court (BBC News 2019). The gradual decline of the IS in 2018 and the fall of the IS in March 2019 precipitated the weakening of the IS globally, which also helped the Bangladesh government achieve major success against the IS affiliate in Bangladesh. But it is also worth noting that both globally and in Bangladesh, the ideology of the IS is yet to be defeated. It was anticipated that after the fall of Baguz, a central command structure may not exist but local groups identifying as ISIS will continue attacks (Katkov and Kaplow 2019). Since the beginning of 2019, the ISIS in Bangladesh seems to have adopted the strategy. Small-scale attacks on police and law enforcement agencies have taken place; analysts have described this as “lone-wolf/wolfpack attacks” (Bashar 2019).

Conclusion In the past three decades, as the preceding discussion has demonstrated, Islamist militancy has experienced dramatic shifts and transformed in various ways. Organizations have metamorphosed, and the local networks have established contacts with transnational groups. It is also evident that unlike the first generation in the 1990s, the fifth-generation militants are tied to a global agenda to fight both locally and globally. In recent years more tech-savvy youth have joined these organizations. They have traveled to war zones of Syria and Iraq and actively participated in the war. Some of them have returned home. Their use of cyberspace has increased phenomenally. As such, the menacing ideology has been subscribed, reproduced, and is being propagated. Thus far, the government has relied on kinetic measures and seems to have become complacent. But loopholes in the legal system are allowing the suspected militants to become free or jump bail with ease. There have not been any serious efforts to find the causes of and conditions for the allure of militancy. The efforts to prevent violent extremism have largely remained as lip service. These do not portend well for the future, especially in a country that has previously experienced a long hiatus in militancy which returned with more lethality.

28  Ali Riaz

Notes 1 Pirs, literally translated “saints,” are a very common feature of politico-religious life in Bangladesh. The tradition grew out of a specific mode of preaching Islam in the subcontinent. Some of these early preachers drew the attention of the local people irrespective of their religious beliefs through their spiritual power, morality, and principles of tolerance. These pirs originally represented mystic Islam and one or more mystic orders. Following their deaths their graves are turned into mazars (shrines) and are visited by their muridan (disciples). But over the years, the practice has degenerated and has created cult-like organizations, headed by pirs who exert influence over their disciples and whose residential-cum-worship compounds have become headquarters of complex social networks and places where patronage is exchanged between high-ranking people. 2 Rohingyas are members of an ethnic community in Myanmar. Muslim by faith, the members of the community face serious persecution in their homeland; they have been denied citizenship by Myanmar. Since the mid-1970s, thousands of them fled to southeastern parts of Bangladesh at various times, where they remained as stateless people. Some of the nationalist and Islamist insurgent groups had set up their bases within Bangladesh and have continued to fight the Myanmar regime. The latest wave of refugees, in 2017, reached 1.1 million. 3 Madhab is a school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence. In Sunni denominations, there are four schools of thoughts – Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hambali. Those who follows Ahle Hadith tradition does not belong to any of these four madhabs. 4 For earlier online presence of the group, see: https://archive.org/details/ShariahRulesOfJihadiForumUsersBangla; Accessed 25 July 2015. The ABT, in 2012, propagated translated versions of books by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. Azzam was a Palestinian from Jordan, who was among the first Arabs to volunteer to join the Afghan War against the Soviet forces in the 1980s. Azzam is considered to have been the mentor of Usama bin Laden and one of the founders of the al-Qaeda. He later founded the Pakistan-based militant organization Lasker-i-Tayeba. For a brief introduction to Azzam, see Riedel 2011.

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Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  29 Bdnews24.com. (2013) Ansarullah Chief, Others in Jail. 13 August. [Online] Available from: http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/08/13/ansarullah-chief-others-in-jail. [Accessed: 24 July 2015]. ———. (2015a) Al-Qaeda Chief’s ‘intifada’ Call in Bangladesh.  15 February. [Online] Available from: http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/02/15/al-qaeda-chief-s-intifadacall-in-bangladesh. [Accessed: 2 July 2015]. ———. (2015b) Two Top Leaders of Al Qaeda Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) Nabbed. 2 July. [Online] Available from:  http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/07/02/two-topleaders-of-al-qaeda-indian-sub-continent-aqis-nabbed. [Accessed: 2 July 2015]. Beggin, R. (2016) Secular Bangladeshi Blogger Slain, 6th since 2013. Global Journalist. 11 April. [Online] Available from: https://globaljournalist.org/2016/04/secular-bangladeshiblogger-slain-6th-since-2013/. [Accessed: 14 April 2021]. Dabiq. (2015) Just Terror. Issue 12 (1437 Safar). November 2015. Daily Ittefaq. (2016) Convicted 35 Huji Members Absconding for Long Time. 14 July. [Online] Available from: https://archive1.ittefaq.com.bd/print-edition/lastpage/2016/07/14/130980.html. [Accessed: 11 May 2021]. The Daily Star. (2006) JMB also Killed Writer of Tangail: Militant Commander Confesses in Court. 5 June. [Online] Available from: http://archive.thedailystar.net/2006/06/05/ d6060501128.htm. [Accessed: 21 March 2021]. ———. (2009) Rab Officially Discloses Huji Arrests. 2 August. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-99899’ [Accessed 4 February 2022]. ———. (2015) Blogger Rajib Murder: 2 to die, Ansarullah Chief Jailed for 5yrs. 31 December. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/country/rajib-murder-2-dieansarullah-chief-jailed-5yrs-194887. [Accessed: 10 April 2021]. ———. (2017) Blogger Rajib Murder: Convicted Planner, deported from Malaysia, Arrested. 21 February. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/bloggerrajib-murder-convicted-planner-deported-malaysia-arrested-1364539. [Accessed: 12 April 2021]. ———. (2018) August  21 Attack: ‘State-Backed Crime’ Punished. 11 October. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/august-21-carnage/21-august-grenade-attack-verdicttarique-rahman-awarded-life-1645090. [Accessed: 12 April 2021]. ———. (2021a) Kotalipara Bomb Plot to Kill Hasina: 14 Huji Men to be Executed by Firing Squad. 23 March. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/ law-news/news/kotalipara-bomb-plot-kill-hasina-14-get-death-sedition-case-2065441. [Accessed: 24 March 2021]. ———. (2021b) Dipan Murder Case: 8 Ansar Al Islam Members Sentenced to Death. 10 February. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/law-news/news/ dipan-murder-case-8-ansar-al-islam-members-sentenced-death-2042393. [Accessed: 14 April 2021]. De Votta, N. and Timberman, D. (2012) Violent Extremism and Insurgency in Bangladesh: A Risk Assessment. Washington, DC: USAID. [Online] Available from: https://msiworldwide.com/sites/default/files/additional-resources/2018-12/Violent%20Extremism%20and%20Insurgency%20-%20Bangladesh.pdf. [Accessed: 13 April 2021]. Dhaka Tribune. (2015) BNP: PM’s Statement Unexpected. 4 October. [Online] Available from: https://archive.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2015/10/04/bnp-pms-statementunexpected. [Accessed: 17 April 2021]. ———. (2017) AQIS Statement Confirms Top Bangladeshi Jihadist’s Death. 28 April. [Online] Available from: www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/04/26/aqis-hailsmartyrdom-bangladesh-chief. [Accessed: 14 April 2021].

30  Ali Riaz ———. (2021) Justice Triumphs, Eventually: Five to Walk the Gallows for Avijit Murder. 16 February. [Online] Available from: www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2021/02/16/ avijit-roy-murder-5-ansar-al-islam-men-to-walk-the-gallows-1-sentenced-to-life/. [Accessed: 14 April 2021]. The Guardian. (2014) Al-Qaida Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri Calls for Islamist Resurgence in India – video. 4 September. [Online] Available from: www.theguardian.com/world/ video/2014/sep/04/al-qaida-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-islamist-india-video. [Accessed: 6 September 2014]. Harper, T. (2007) Islamists ‘Urge Young Muslims to Use Violence. The Telegraph. 30 September. The Hindu. (2015) Dhaka under Pressure to Admit IS Presence: Hasina. 9 November. [Online] Available from: www.thehindu.com/news/international/hasina-says-dhakaunder-pressure-to-admit-is-presence/article7858606.ece. [Accessed: 11 March 2021]. Hizb ut Tahrir. (2021) (official website). [Online] Available from: www.ht-bangladesh. info/. [Accessed: 13 April 2021]. ———. (n.d.) [Online] Available from: http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def. [Accessed: March 15, 2022]. Houriya, A. and Stuart, H. (2009) Hizb ut-Tahrir: Ideology and Strategy. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. p. 56. Huq, A. (2005) Harkatul Jihad Banned – Crackdown on Militant Outfits. Independent (Dhaka). 18 October. International Crisis Group. (2018) Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh. Asia Report N°295. [Online] Available from: www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/295countering-jihadist-militancy-bangladesh. [Accessed: 28 February 2018]. Internet Archive. (2013) Shariah Rules of Jihadi Forum Users [Bangla]. [Online] Available from: https://archive.org/details/ShariahRulesOfJihadiForumUsersBangla.  [Accessed: 25 July 2015]. Islami Biplob (Islamic Revolution). (1998) (A bulletin published from Sylhet). Jihadology.net. (2015) From France to Bangladesh: The Dust Will Never Settle Down. As Sahab Media. Archived 2 May 2015. Jugantor. (2005a) Proscribed Al-Hiqma is Active Again in Rajshahi and Chapainawabganj. 29 August. ———. (2005b) Dateline 9 April 2004: Bagmara – Abdur Rahman Says the Constitution is Irrelevant. 29 August (reprint of an earlier interview with Rahman). p. 1. Julfikar A.M. (2004) Bangla Bhai Active for 6 years: His Outfit Spreads Tentacles to Establish Taliban-like rule. The Daily Star. [Online] Available from: http://archive.thedailystar. net/2004/05/13/d4051301022.htm. [Accessed 10 May 2021]. Katkov, M. and Kaplow, L. (2019) Analysis: The End of the ‘Caliphate’ Doesn’t Mean the End Of ISIS. NPR. 22 March. [Online] Available from: www.npr. org/2019/03/22/701266887/analysis-the-end-of-the-caliphate-doesn-t-mean-the-endof-isis. [Accessed: 15 April 2021]. Khan, M.J. (2021) Ansar Al Islam: Regrouping by Stealth. The Daily Star. 7 March. Labu, N. (2017) Is new JMB an Ideological Affiliate of Islamic State? Dhaka Tribune. 25 July. [Online] Available from: www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/2017/07/25/ new-jmb-ideological-affiliate-islamic-state. [Accessed: 15 March 2021]. Manik, J.A. (2004) Bangla Bhai Active for 6 Years: His Outfit Spreads Tentacles to Establish Taliban-like Rule. The Daily Star. 13 May. ———. (2005) HuJi Kingpins’ Coalition Link Keeps Cops at Bay. The Daily Star. 7 November. Manik, J.A. and Ashraf, S. (2006) Patrons Left out in Militancy Probe. The Daily Star. 11 March.

Three Decades of Islamist Militancy  31 The Method of Hizb ut-Tahrir. (2015) [Online] Available from: www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index. php/definition-of-ht/item/7988-the-method-of-hizb-ut-tahrir. [Accessed 4 February 2022]. The New Jersey Office of the Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJOHSP). (2016) AQIS and ISIS: Expanding in Bangladesh. 6 September. [Online] Available from: www. njhomelandsecurity.gov/analysis/aqis-and-isis-expanding-in-bangladesh. [Accessed: 24 March 2021]. The New York Times. (2015) Bangladesh Skeptical of Claims that ISIS Was Behind Shootings of Foreigners. 5 October. [Online Available from: www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/ world/asia/bangladesh-skeptical-of-claims-that-isis-was-behind-shootings-of-foreigners.html. [Accessed: 1 June 2015]. Palash, M.H. (2006) Militancy: Why Bangladesh is the Target? (In Bangla). Dhaka: Bangladesh Research Centre. p. 17. Parvez, S. (2019) The Khilafah’s Soldiers in Bengal: Analysing the Islamic State Jihadists and Their Violence Justification Narratives in Bangladesh. Perspectives on Terrorism. 13 (5). pp. 22–38. Pattanaik, S. (2012) Analysing the Failed Coup in Bangladesh. IDSA Comment. 23 January. [Online] Available from: https://idsa.in/idsacomments/AnalysingthefailedCoupinBangladesh_SmrutiPattanaik_230112. [Accessed: 13 April 2021]. “Pir” Matiur Rahman Arrested with Injury’. (1989) Dainik Bangla. 15 December. Prothom Alo. (2003) Police Raids Militant Den, Firefight, Arrested 19. 16 August. ———. (2006) Sayekh-Sani Brothers are Experts in Killing People: Reports TFI. 22 May. Qitaltube.blogspot.com. (2013) Ansarullah Bengali Team – Presents – Eradicate Democracy. [Online] Available from: http://qitaltube.blogspot.com/2013/02/ansarullah-bengaliteam-presents.html. [Accessed: 31 August 2015]. Rashid, M. (2014) Ansarullah BT Deeply Rooted in Al-Qaeda Ideology.  The Daily Observer (Dhaka). 7 November. Riaz, A. (2016) Who Are the Bangladeshi ‘Islamist Militants’? Perspectives on Terrorism. 10 (1). pp. 2–18. Riaz, A. and Parvez, S. (2018) Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know? Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (6). pp. 944–961. Riedel, B. (2011) The 9/11 Attacks’ Spiritual Father. Brookings. 11 September. [Online] Available from: www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/09/11-riedel. [Accessed: 8 July 2015]. Rumiyah. (2016) Operations in Bengal. Issue 2 (Muharram 1438). Sadiq, M. (2005) Islam’s New Face? New Age (Dhaka). 4 November. Siyech, M.S. (2020) Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: Comparing the Movement in India and Bangladesh. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. 15 (1). pp. 64–82. The Strait Times. (2015) Police Arrest Suspected ISIS “Coordinator” in Bangladesh. 31 May. [Online] Available from:  www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/police-arrestsuspected-isis-coordinator-in-bangladesh. [Accessed: 1 June 201]. Sultan, T. (2006) Militancy in Bangladesh: Founded in the Hands of the Afghan Mujihad, (In Bengali). Prothom Alo. 3 August. ———. (2014) New Address Jamaatul Mujahideen: JMB Militants Joining Other Organizations. Prothom Alo. 17 August. ———. (2016) IS Ideologues Come up with Extreme Atrocities. Prothom Alo. 7 August. Sultan, T. (2017) Neo JMB’s New Preparation. Prothom Alo. 18 March. Taji-Farouki, S. (1996) A Fundamental Quest – Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate. London: Grey Seal.

32  Ali Riaz TRAC. (2015) Anasarullah Bangla Team (ABT). [Online] Available from: www.tracking terrorism.org/group/ansarullah-bangla-team-abt. [Accessed: 7 August 2015]. Westenberger, K. and Stehlík, J. (2018) Islamic Extremism in Germany. Hans Seidel Foundation – Office in the Czech Republic and European Values Think-Tank. Zahab, M.A. and Roy, O. (2006) Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection. New York: Columbia University Press. Zaman, F. (2018) Agencies of Social Movements: Experiences of Bangladesh’s Shahbag Movement and Hefazat-e-Islam. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 53 (3). pp. 339–349.

2 The Quintessential Ideologue Rahmani and His Sermons Asheque Haque

A Mufti and an Imam who led a congregation at a mosque in Dhaka, Jashimuddin Rahmani is considered to be the spiritual leader of Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), a terrorist organization in Bangladesh. Rahmani is a prolific preacher, speaker, and writer of Salafi-Jihadi content in the Bengali language. For nearly six years, between 2007 and 2013, he openly preached violent extremist ideology and called for Jihad in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Police consider Rahmani as a terrorist leader and ideologue and describe him as a highly charismatic preacher who hypnotizes his audience by his electrifying sermons (Manik 2013). Understanding Rahmani and his legacy is important to understand modern terrorism in Bangladesh and among the Bengali-speaking people around the world. He made global jihadi ideological content easily consumable and accessible to the Bengalispeaking audience through his Salafi-Jihadi content. Rahmani was a prolific preacher and a dedicated ideologue who created hours of sermons and troves of books. This chapter presents only a highlight of Rahmani’s sermons regarding violent extremism. Following this, his framing of his messages to activate followers into violent extremism is analyzed, as well as his sacred authority as an ideologue who attains resonance with his audience and provides them with an identity and a pathway. Rahmani skillfully crafted his narratives so that they achieve high levels of impact among his audience and motivate them to undertake violent Jihad according to his guidelines. Rahmani is not just any other religious preacher in Bangladesh. His life achievements and his jihadi materials and their qualities make him the quintessential ideologue. His followers often call him the Awlaki of Bangladesh.

Rahmani’s Rise to Prominence Jashimuddin Rahmani grew up in South Heulibunia village in the southern coastal district of Barguna in Bangladesh. He started his education at a Qaumi madrassa and later completed Hafez education from the Barguna town. Afterward he went to the capital Dhaka to study at the prestigious Jamia Rahmania Madrassa. Upon completion of the First Dawra (Maulana) course from there in 1990, he added the “Rahmani” honorific title to his name denoting that his lineage comes from this madrassa. Rahmani later studied at the Deobandh Madrassa in North India and DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-3

34  Asheque Haque then completed Mufti (Fiqh) training from Darul Uloom Sabelus Salam Madrassa in Hyderabad, India. Upon the completion of his education, Rahmani started teaching at Jamia Rahmania in Dhaka and Mahmudia Madrassa in Barisal. He also flourished in his career as a preacher by becoming the Chief Khatib of Barguna Central Sadarghat Jame Mosque in 2004. Then Rahmani went to Saudi Arabia as a part-time teacher at a university in Medina. Around 2008–2009, after returning to Bangladesh, Rahmani became the Khatib of the Hatembagh Mosque in the affluent Dhanmondi area in Dhaka. Later he established his own mosque – Marqazul Ulum al-Islamia Mosque and Madrassa in Bosila – on the outskirts of Dhaka city (Daily Prothom Alo 2013a). It is from this mosque that Rahmani preached most of the radicalizing sermons with violent extremist ideological content. Rahmani’s followers consider him as an accomplished religious scholar with high credentials due to his many educational experiences and qualifications, briefly described earlier. He was known as Shaykhul Hadith Mufti Mohammad Jashimuddin Rahmani to them, titles and honorifics that alluded to his scholarly authority. Speaking came naturally to Rahmani because of this long training to become a religious leader and speaker. As an Imam and Khatib, he had years to hone his skills in persuasive speaking in order to lead and tend to his flock.

Involvement With Terrorism Rahmani actively guided the ABT for many years. Starting in 2007, ABT aimed to establish Sharia law in the country. According to intelligence agencies in Bangladesh, the main objectives of ABT are radicalizing young people, inciting active participation in Jihad, and capturing state ruling power. The group recruits young people with technological knowledge and a radical mindset to work against the democratic system and to propagate jihadi ideology to encourage terrorist attacks. The leaders of ABT utilize mosques, madrassas, and religious events to propagate their views. The organization is also responsible for threatening to kill secular bloggers, cultural activists, and important personalities in Bangladesh (Mamun and Khan 2015). During his career, Rahmani came into close contact with several high-profile terrorist leaders and jihadi ideologues around the world. ABT commenced operations in 2007, and Rahmani was one of five individuals who ran the organization (Islam 2013). Izaz Hossain, the son-in-law of Jamaatul Mujaheddin Bangladesh (JMB) Chief Saidur Rahman, and the sacked Major Ziaur Rahman were among them. Izaz was the Amir of Jamatul Muslimin in Bangladesh until his escape to Pakistan in 2008. Inspired by the ideology, Tehzib Karim, Rezwan Sharif, and his brother Mainuddin Sharif immigrated to Yemen in 2008, where they had contacts with Samir Khan, a close associate of Anwar al-Awlaki (Daily Prothom Alo 2013b). In 2013, Bangladesh Police arrested Rezwan Sharif, who acknowledged his close relationship with Rahmani (Raza 2013). Police believe that the JMB Chief Saidur Rahman had close contacts with Rahmani and had also received financial help through him (Manik 2013). Rahmani maintained connections

The Quintessential Ideologue  35 with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Bangladesh (HUJIB) leader Mufti Hannan, and Maulana Abdur Rauf, as well. Even though ABT did not have direct links with al-Qaeda, “its top leaders had contacted several leaders of al-Qaeda at different times,” noted Monirul Islam, the then Joint Commissioner of Police, and he added that “for the affiliation of al-Qaeda, the militant group is doing whatever is needed” (Islam 2013). In 2014, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) officially announced ABT affiliate Ansar-al-Islam as the Bangladesh branch of al-Qaeda (Sultan 2016). Jashimuddin Rahmani was arrested at the age of forty-three along with thirtyone of his followers in his village in Barguna on August 12, 2013 (Manik 2013). In his confessional statement in the court, Rahmani acknowledged that people may have been inspired by his sermons to commit violence (The Daily Star 2014). On May 25, 2015, the government of Bangladesh banned ABT as it was believed to be an al-Qaeda proxy in the country (Mamun and Khan 2015). Intelligence officials believed that ABT had been propagating al-Qaeda ideology in Bangladesh (Rashid 2014). In December 2015, Rahmani was sentenced to five years of imprisonment in the murder case of blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, as the court found his sermons inspired the intolerant young men who attacked and killed Haider and has been serving his sentence at Kashimpur High Security Prison in Bangladesh (Rashid 2016).

Rahmani’s Preaching Mufti Jashimuddin Rahmani practiced many forms of public communication to spread his message of Islamist extremism. He is the first Islamist preacher in Bangladesh to extensively embrace the digital space and the social media platforms. His works are available in multiple formats, including as books, e-books, and videos; but his digitally recorded audio sermons constitute his largest collection of works. An online search for “Sermons by Rahmani” produces a long list of websites. One single webpage in archive.org offered a list of 345 sermons by Rahmani that total some 431 hours of audio lectures. This particular list used a numbering system, which I used in this chapter in brackets to identify the sermons, such as Rahmani (1), Rahmani (146), and so on. Eighteen sermons from this list (Table 2.1) and one from YouTube (titled Rules of Takfeer Part 01) have been analyzed in this chapter. I have left the sermon names as they are spelled in that list. The exact locations of Rahmani’s works are not shared following the policy by the Global Coalition against Daesh on sharing active violent extremist propaganda.1 The large number of materials, which include violent jihadi ideology created by Rahmani throughout his active preaching life, remains easily available to this day. In addition to the audio recordings, Rahmani wrote twenty-five books dealing with various aspects of the religion, but mainly on Islamist politics and jihadi ideology (The Daily Star 2013). Many of Rahmani’s sermons focus on aspects of Islamic belief and rituals, but a lot of them openly discuss detailed understandings and explanations of the Salafi-Jihadi ideology as well. He discusses various

36  Asheque Haque Table 2.1  Rahmani’s Sermons Nm.

Serial number at the list of archive.org

Title of the Sermon

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

1 111 146 158 18 19 212 213 234 27 288

12.

289

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

331 338 67 7 75 79

A Message to Every Muslim Hortal Saro, Osro Dhoro Jihad is Compulsory Fard on Every Muslim at Present Tawheed 14–8–2009 and 31–7–2009 Alliance and Disavowal (Part 1) Alliance and Disavowal (Part 02) Reasons for the Lapse of Muslim Ummah Relations with Allah Shokol Bidhan Batil Koro, Ohir Bidhan Kayem Koro Ar Koto Mar Khabo The Present Problem of Muslim World and its Solution. Part 03 The Punishment of Insulter of Muhammad (SAW) and Advice for Shibbir Two Steps Victory in Islam Which Jamah we Support Duties After Ramadan Call for Tawhid Fake Salafi Fight Against Atheist Bloggers and Murtad Rulers

crucial concepts of Islamist terrorism such as Jihad, takfir, and al-wala wal-bara, and calls upon people to join the movement and take part in armed conflict. In addition to teaching Salafi-Jihadi concepts, Rahmani uses them to identify multifarious problems confronting the present-day Muslims, places blames on groups and institutions, to prescribe solutions to these problems based on the ideology, and to motivate his followers to take actions according to the ideology. Thus, Rahmani creates the guideline or the way for his supporters to mobilize and activate. The Salafi-Jihadi ideology provides legitimacy and justification for this way.

Discussion of the Global Salafi-Jihadi Ideology In order to understand the global Salafi-Jihadi ideology present in the sermons and works by Rahmani, the theoretical framework offered by Shiraz Maher in his book Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (2016) is used in this chapter. Maher argues that the Salafi-Jihadi movement consists of “five essential and irreducible features”: Jihad, tawhid, takfir, al-wala wal-bara, and hakimiyya. He claims that these five features are repeatedly presented, discussed, and promoted in SalafiJihadi ideology. An analysis of Rahmani’s works, particularly his sermons, shows that he has regularly discussed and taught these five features in detail to his audience. While Rahmani does not generally mention any name of any global jihadi ideologue during his sermons, the resemblance to the global jihadi ideology is unmistakable.

The Quintessential Ideologue  37 Of all the aspects of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, Jihad perhaps dominates the most in terms of volume of discourse and the potential for violence. Rahmani dedicates a large amount of time to discuss Jihad and encourages his followers to wage it, as well as to support those who are already actively fighting. Salafi-Jihadi scholars including Abdullah Azzam, Syed Qutb, and Ibn Nuhaas had previously claimed the primacy of Jihad and interpreted the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as having said that whoever dies of not having fought in Jihad, and not having the intention to do so, would die on a branch of hypocrisy (Maher 2016). Rahmani (1) also asks his followers to join Jihad with life and property to advance the rule of God. He states that “jihad fi sabilillah,” or Jihad in the path of God, is the ultimate pinnacle in religion and warns his followers not to stay away from it and let themselves die as munafiq (hypocrite). Abu Qatada, one of the leading Salafi-Jihadi scholars, argued that Jihad is the legislated, divine commandment for the establishment of God’s religion on earth, and as such it is the method to vanquish fitna (civil strife) (Maher 2016). Rahmani (331) also mentions this from Sura 8, verse 39, and points out that God gives specific commands for Jihad and that God commands to continue qital (armed battle) until fitna ends – that is, until the law of God is established, he argues. In another sermon Rahmani (146) states that Jihad is the best way to strengthen Islam and is the only pathway to establish the religion according to the sunnah (teaching) of the Prophet. Maher (2016) notes that Ibn Kathir had identified Sura 22, verse 39, of the Quran as the first verse of Jihad. Rahmani has often used this verse while arguing for Jihad. In that verse God gives fighting permission to those who were being fought because they have been wronged. In his sermon titled “Ar koto mar khabo” (How much more will we be beaten?) Rahmani (27) tells his followers that in the Sura 22, verses 39–40, God has given fighting permission to those who were attacked and killed. Rahmani explains that as long as man-made laws prevail, the kufr or disbelieving system exists, God’s constitution is not established, and God’s revelations are not given precedence, it is God’s command to continue fighting. Abdullah Azzam, another influential Salafi-Jihadi ideologue, posited that Jihad is the most excellent form of worship that can carry Muslims to the highest ranks of paradise. He also argued that neglecting Jihad is equal to abandoning prayers or fasting (Maher 2016). Rahmani (27) illustrates Sura 9, verse 111, where it is said that the mumin (the faithful) must undertake qital (armed fighting) in the path of God (fi sabilillah). They kill and they die, and these are the people who have purchased heaven with the price of their lives, Rahmani explains. Rahmani emphasizes that every mumin wants to die in the path of God. Both Awlaki and Zarqawi claimed that Jihad would continue until the Day of Judgment (Maher 2016). Rahmani (111) has often given the same message to his audience. Maher (2016) mentions that Awlaki further developed the concept of defensive Jihad among Salafi-Jihadi scholars by arguing that God was the only amir (leader) needed for Jihad, as it is done for God. Maher argues that during the Battle of Badr in Prophet’s time, Jihad became decentralized where legitimacy resided in the hands of individual actors. Rahmani (27) also argues that when Jihad becomes

38  Asheque Haque obligatory on the Muslims in a particular land, they do not need the permission of anyone else. The second aspect of the ideology is tawhid, and Maher (2016) denotes it as the central pillar in Islam and describes it as the doctrine of monotheism and the omnipotence of God, arguing it as the single most important characteristic of the faith. This view can be observed in the sermons of Rahmani (158) as he repeatedly refers to tawhid. In one of his early sermons in 2009, Rahmani asserts that tawhid is the most important aspect of the religion. In simplistic terms, he explains tawhid as loyalty to one and only God, preaching tawhid as the basis of iman in Islam to his followers. Maher (2016) suggests that Abd al-Wahhab broke the complex concept of tawhid into three parts, and the second part, which is tawhid-al-uluhiyya or the oneness of divinity or worship, claims that action is necessary on the part of the Muslims to fully demonstrate their belief. In order to establish tawhid-al-uluhiyya one must act in order to prove loyalty and acknowledgment to this form of tawhid. Rahmani (27) continuously calls for actions to be taken. He is vociferous about Jihad on the path of God, especially in his promotion of the term Qital (armed conflict). Maher (2016) maintains that the practical outcome of Salafi-Jihadi scholars’ rigid doctrine of absolutism means that they are incapable of compromise in politics, as that would bargain away tawhid. Based on this idea, Islamic political parties that operate within the country’s political mainstream are not considered Islamic, a point often mentioned by Rahmani (289) when discussing Jamat-eIslami Bangladesh. He remarks that it is not the sunnah of the Prophet to conduct protest rallies and meetings. Those party members who give their lives for this democratic process are following the method of the kafir, trying to please them. Rahmani points to Sura 6, verse 116, where God tells the Prophet not to follow the opinion of the majority, as it would lead him astray. Hence, Rahmani argues that the rule of Islam is to fight and to kill. Ayman al Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, argues that Muslims can only be saved from living on the periphery of the modern world by the renewal of tawhid (Maher 2016). All of Rahmani’s (213) actions, deeds, discussions, and energy spent on the Islamic movement have been devoted to establishing and instituting the tawhid of God in every aspect of human life. The third aspect of jihadi ideology takfir is, in a very basic sense, the process of declaring another Muslim, or group of Muslims, to be outside the fold of Islam, according to Maher (2016). It draws a line as to who is within Islam and who is deemed to have left the faith, either voluntarily or through their action. Rahmani thoroughly discusses the concept of takfir in his four-part sermon called “Rules of Takfeer.” In these sermons he states that if the four rules are not satisfied, then takfir must be pronounced on a person and he should be called a kafir. Rahmani’s understanding and teachings about takfir is important because this is the Islamic legal method of declaring a person kafir. In such a case, a deserving punishment is prescribed according to Sharia law. In one of his sermons Rahmani (213) declares that people who want to change the law of God do not have the

The Quintessential Ideologue  39 right to live in this world. Maher (2016) argues that takfir operates in a political environment with political and social implications when it is pronounced, making it useful to Salafi-Jihadis. Rahmani (27) is vociferous in pronouncing takfir on the tagut (transgressed rulers) and the murtad (apostates) in Bangladesh and uses this concept to justify his claims. Rahmani discusses the fourth aspect of jihadi ideology, the concept of al-wala wal-bara in several of his sermons. In the two-part sermon called “Alliance and Disavowal,” he says that the reason why there is a lot of fitna and fasad among the Muslims is because of their lack of understanding of al-wala wal-bara. Rahmani states that a mumin must love someone (wala) for God or maintain enmity for God; he further argues that if the mumin does not reject those who God has asked to do bara (disavow), then fitna and fasad will continue. He gives high significance to al-wala wal-bara and argues that Islam cannot be established until bara is done, which is to sever relations with the kafir and to maintain hatred toward them. He called it essential for Jihad because until people sever their relations with the kafir, they cannot hate them and hence they will not wage Jihad against them (Rahmani 18). Maher (2016) argues that al-wala wal-bara is a hugely important concept to the Salafi-Jihadi movement because it helps create a binary world of loyalty and disavowal; truth and falsehood; and the faithful and the disbeliever. Rahmani (18) argues that this concept is the strongest bond in Islam between God and the people. He states that al-wala wal-bara corresponds to the main part of tawhid that posits that a mumin person will only be loyal to God and the laws of God. He attaches this concept as a particular way of recognizing the concept of tawhidal-uluhiyya, referring to Sura Nur, verse 54, where God asks people to be loyal to God and the Prophet. Rahmani (19) claims that people who make new laws or take their trials or judgments to the judges of man-made laws are kafir. Hence, this means that the mumin hate the tagut (transgressed rulers) and must maintain a distance from the people who love the tagut. The mumin should neither cooperate with the tagut nor assist them, and this is the proper way to practice the concept of bara, he argues. He maintains that not only the mumin must keep no connection with the mushrikin; they must actively hate them, and hate those who love them, and openly call them bad, and maintain enmity with them. Finally, the fifth aspect of jihadi ideology, hakimiyya, is descried by Maher (2016) as “the securing of political sovereignty for God” in the Salafi-Jihadi ideology. It is about establishing political authority for Islam. While Rahmani does not specifically use the term hakimiyya, many of his sermons are on this issue, especially because he intends to bring about political change through the Salafi-Jihadi Islam. He discusses it from the angle of ensuring the right of God in governance of the country. He claims that the rule of God will continue from the kitchen of any house to the presidential palace in Bangladesh, including banks, courts, and all aspects of the state and society (Rahmani 75). Rahmani (234) claims that as long as Muslims had governed themselves with the Quran, they lived with honor and the kafir were scared of them; but the day the Muslims restricted the Quran inside their mosques and accepted man-made

40  Asheque Haque laws to govern themselves, they became oppressed. Rahmani argues that these Muslims called themselves the followers of the middle path, but God called them kafir. Rahmani refers to Sura 5, verse 44, which states that those who do not govern with the divine revelation are kafir. Rahmani also warns that by following two kinds of laws, and thus accepting two authorities, these people commit shirk, as God does not permit the acceptance of two Gods. As can be seen from this discussion on the global jihadi ideology present in Rahmani’s sermons, he strengthens these arguments by his regular use of the Quran and the Hadith as the authoritative source, without mentioning the names of the previous jihadi ideologues.

Frame Analysis of the Sermons Rahmani spread the global jihadi ideology in Bengali language for several years during his active preaching life. But his works do more than just transferring knowledge and concepts about the ideology. Rahmani is a master narrator and has composed his messages in such a way as to add further value to them. These can be understood utilizing the frame analysis method, described in the social movement theory (SMT). Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens (2011) claims that the frame analysis method is the most appropriate means of analyzing the influence of ideologues in Islamist movements. Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) states that frames created by movement leaders provide the way to understand the experiences and events in the world and adds that frames produce and disseminate meanings, which lead to the mobilization of movement participants. Snow and Benford claim that social movement leaders conduct three main framing tasks: constructing diagnostic frames that denote problems; constructing prognostic frames that offer solutions; and constructing motivational frames to mobilize participants to take action (Wiktorowicz 2004). Rahmani’s works are skillfully composed along these three kinds of frames, so much so that they can strongly influence an individual to commit extremist violence based on the global jihadi ideology that he teaches.

Rahmani Discusses Problems by Using the Diagnostic Frame Meleagrou-Hitchens (2011) proposes that social movement leaders or entrepreneurs, who articulate frames, first offer a diagnosis of the problems that are allegedly faced by the social movement supporters. He argues that the majority of the diagnostic frames have something to do with injustice, protest, or rebellion. Rahmani’s diagnostic framing matched closely with that of the existing jihadi groups. These include the idea of a clash between Islam and the secular-modern world, as well as a clash between Muslims and the Western countries aimed at destroying them. Within Bangladesh, Rahmani’s diagnostic framing focuses on the struggle between establishing a Sharia-based Islamic country and the existing secular, democratic, progressive government that is curbing Islamist politics. Rahmani (212) argues that the reason Muslims are oppressed around the world is because they lack strong iman (faith). He says that the Prophet had mentioned

The Quintessential Ideologue  41 two reasons for this eventuality: when Muslims love this world more and when they lose interest in dying on the path of God. Rahmani preaches that in the past the non-believers used to fear Muslims, but they no longer fear them because Muslims do not have the six characteristics of the Prophet’s companions within them anymore. These are – they love God, and God loves them; they are polite to the mumin but strict against the kafir; they wage Jihad and qital in the path of God; and they do not care about the insults and abuses by others while doing these things. In another sermon Rahmani (288) argues that lack of acceptance of tawhid is the reason for the existing problems in the Muslim world. He claims that various Sufi saints and pir have taken over the oneness of God and accuses them of having opened up an elaborate business of shrines to act as intermediaries between God and the Muslims. Rahmani (288) also blames the tagut rulers of Muslim countries who govern and judge with man-made laws instead of the laws of God and are, thus, rivals of God. Rahmani (75) asserts that the biggest shirk (polytheist act) is tagut (transgressed rulers), and this tagut is safeguarded and nurtured by the government, which is the basis for all other shirk in the country. Rahmani (331) states that in Bangladesh God’s law has been changed by the tagut through acts such as removing the clause “Faith in God” in the constitution of the country, by allowing interest on money as acceptable practice, by giving license to venues for selling alcohol and for prostitution, by nullifying the hudud laws, and, most importantly, by replacing the laws of God with man-made laws in the courts. Rahmani (288) is also harsh in his criticism of the scholars who are paid by the rulers and who in return support the tagut and change Islam to assist the tagut.

Rahmani Provides Solutions to the Problems Through the Prognostic Frame Meleagrou-Hitchens (2011) writes that after the diagnosis, a social movement leader begins to suggest solutions to the problems, called prognoses. The prognostic frame is about articulating methods of resolving contentions, or at least a plan to do so, he argues. Rahmani’s prognoses or solutions to the previously mentioned diagnostic or identified problems are often very clear and straightforward. Comparing the Muslim ummah as a single human body, he argues that just like when doctors operate and cut off a cancerous portion of the human body, Muslim ummah also needs to cut off the kafir, murtad (apostate), and munafiq – except that he literally means cutting the head off of these individuals (Rahmani 27). Possibly the most important sermon by Rahmani (1) that delineates his prognostic frame is titled “A  Message to Every Muslim.” Rahmani utilizes all five aspects of Salafi-Jihadi ideology to guide his followers into the tasks they must perform. Utilizing the concept of al-wala wal-bara, he preaches that Muslims in Bangladesh should not love their lives or properties more than God and suggests that they should find rightly guided groups and befriend them. Rahmani tells his followers not to love the kafir, nor to make friends with them, nor to love democracy, parliamentarians, modernists, and nationalists. He argues that

42  Asheque Haque Jihad is the ultimate pinnacle in religion and that people should not avoid it and risk dying as a munafiq. Rahmani mentions twenty-nine ways of supporting Jihad and says these are but some of the many ways of participating in Jihad. Utilizing the concept of takfir Rahmani instructs his audience to impose strictness in all matters of religion and to call a person who takes part in shirk as kafir. Rahmani strongly stresses upholding tawhid and implores his followers to reject and hate the tagut. Similarly, he beseeches his followers to find and join the Muslims who are fighting to remove the disbelievers from Muslim lands, giving their lives to reestablish the khalifat in which hakimiyya will be implemented. Rahmani tells his followers to openly express their religion and their aqida (creed) and to fear only God and regularly perform prayers, zakat, and other forms of worship. He appeals to them to be vigilant of the “Chief of the kafir,” America, and to find and join true Muslims who are fighting against them. He requests the audience to support the mujahidin who will do this. In another sermon titled “Two Steps Victory in Islam,” Rahmani (331) argues that there are two pathways to victory in Islam that are sanctioned by God and the Prophet: one is popular revolution based on the Medina victory and the other is a military campaign based on the Meccan victory. Rahmani argues that in order to have popular revolution they must first unite under one imam or khalifa. Under the leader work must be done to preach Islam, to inspire the Muslims, and to make them interested in the laws of God. He argues that unless all Bangladeshi Muslims unite, they will be annihilated. The second pathway is in the style of a military campaign that led to the victory at Mecca. He says that the Prophet gave military training and inspiration for Jihad to his companions who were determined to take control of Mecca. Based on this example, Rahmani designates military campaign as a pathway in Islam and argues that a group of well-trained, well-educated mujahids are required to ensure the victory of Islam in Bangladesh. He rejects the idea of commencing Jihad without adequate manpower and preparations but supports a long-term, broad-ranging, well-thought-out plan for Jihad in Bangladesh. He instructs the formation of two groups in Bangladesh: one that would emigrate and become the muhajir and the other that would become the supporter, or ansar. Rahmani emphatically makes the argument that fighting is the only method in order to establish Islam in Bangladesh. Rahmani (27) asks his audience to fight in the path of God, according to the rules of war sanctioned by God, and to never flee the battlefield, nor to surrender to the forces of tagut. He counsels that God asks that they make preparations for war, and the Prophet had explained this by stating that power is in throwing; therefore, they must take training in not only throwing arrows but also throwing bombs and grenades. He urges members of the military to ask their commanders to impose Islamic ideas in their daily routine and to support the mujahidin when they come to Bangladesh. He also asks Muslims in the police forces, the military, law enforcement agencies, and tax authorities not to support the tagut. Furthermore, Rahmani (67) instructs his followers to join the police or the army as a means of acquiring free military training for the coming Jihad.

The Quintessential Ideologue  43 Rahmani (146) stresses that Jihad is obligatory for every Muslim in Bangladesh and that the Quran asks them to fight against the leaders of the kafir, as well as to utilize guerrilla tactics against the enemy. He says that God has commanded armed war and not protest rallies and meetings, urging imams and Islamic scholars in Bangladesh to speak the truth and to explain Jihad correctly to the people (Rahmani 111). Rahmani (289) goes on to suggest the members of Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh to abandon their democratic path and embrace the Islamic method of victory. Rahmani (79) is adamant that people must fight against atheists and apostates in Bangladesh and, above all, kill anyone who insults the Prophet. Rahmani (213) also argues the importance of establishing a relationship with God, maintaining that even with proper jihadi planning, necessary military training, and adequate weapons and ammunition, a mujahid cannot become victorious unless God grants His support. The mumin should fully observe tawhid in every sphere of life, he instructs, in addition to maintaining al-wala wal-bara as God has commanded.

Rahmani Uses the Motivational Frame to Activate His Audience Meleagrou-Hitchens (2011) states that the third framing task, motivation, is centered on convincing followers of a movement to take action. Motivation is important in creating an enabling environment for actions that the movement’s leadership wants to achieve. Anwar al-Awlaki, one of the most influential proponents of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, convinced his audience of the “utility of participating in global Jihad,” as well as ensuring his followers that violent Jihad was the path to satisfy God. Wiktorowicz (2004) argues that “motivational frames transform bystander public into movement participants.” Rahmani’s sermons supply various pathways intended to trigger the emotions of his followers in order to motivate and inspire them. Rahmani (331) asks his followers to fulfil the commands of God. He argues that God has commanded those who are oppressed to wage Jihad and qital, according to Sura 22, verses 39–40, and instructs that God has given specific commands and also promises to assist Muslims; hence, Muslims should take the true path and follow God’s commands. In Sura 8, verse 39, he claims that God is ordering Muslims to fight until all fitna ends and the laws of God are established. Referencing Sura 9, verse 33, and Sura 61, verse 9, Rahmani proclaims that God sent the Prophet to establish the laws of God over all others. Invoking Sura 9, verses 14–15, Rahmani preaches that God asks Muslims to fight all kafir, and in so doing God will punish the kafir through Muslims. Rahmani recommends that his followers start fighting to comply with the commands of God, reminding them that in Sura 48, verse 29, God says that the characteristics of the Prophet and his companions are that they are strict toward the kafir but soft toward the mumin. Rahmani (7) tells his followers that God has asked them to conduct qital on the path of God and to kill and then die. He reminds them that true Muslims surrender to the commands of God and warns that those who neglect to follow God’s command cannot be called Muslim.

44  Asheque Haque Another motivational frame Rahmani uses is the narrative of Muslim oppression around the world and the conspiracies of the kafir to destroy all Muslims. Rahmani (7) cites Sura 4, verse 75, where God asks why Muslims are not fighting on the path of God while oppressed men, women, and children are pleading for safety, protection, and a savior. Rahmani (331) argues that if Muslims had possessed proper military training and weapons in Arakan, Burma, they would not have been killed, oppressed, and ejected from their lands as had unfolded in 2012. Rahmani (289) reminds the faithful of the Jewish-Christian conspiracy to bomb and destroy the Muslim world and urges his followers to save it. Rahmani (289) plays upon the emotions of his followers in upholding the honor of the Prophet in order to influence them for mobilization. He points to a group of so-called Muslim youth, trained by the Jews and the Christians, who are using profane, insulting, and abusive language about the Prophet, attacking the character of the Prophet, which even his enemies in Mecca had not done. He refers to these people as the kafir, murtad, and munafiq and urges his followers to avenge this insult to the Prophet by means sanctioned in Islam – to kill them. Rahmani (79) emotionally pleads with his supporters to follow the example of the companions and to slaughter the people who insult the Prophet wherever they may be found. Rahmani (1) appeals to his followers not to die as non-Muslims by identifying Sura 3, verse 102, from the Quran. He argues that Jihad is obligatory on the people and that Jihad in the path of God is the pinnacle of religion. He implores them not to avoid it and not to allow themselves to die as a munafiq or a fasiq. While everyone eventually dies, he asks followers if they are adequately ready and prepared for it. Rahmani (7) discusses the marvelous heaven and a terrifying hell to inspire his followers. Rahmani says that God has purchased the lives and properties of the mujahidin with heaven, and that the Muslims will fight under an imam or a khalifa and until they go to heaven. He mentions Sura 66, verse 6, and asks his followers to save themselves from the fire. These messages are designed so as to provide strong motivations for the audience in conducting the actions the speaker is asking them to perform. The understanding of these frames by a jihadi ideologue like Rahmani is important because it exposes the culturing work by him. In order to mobilize an individual into a radical social movement or group, the ideologues and their followers spend a large amount of time preaching, indoctrinating, debating, and, in general, socializing with a potential follower. This is often termed as Tarbiyyah (Education) by those Islamic groups. In jihadi groups the audience are “cultured,” so they accept the primacy of violence in their activities as divinely sanctioned and as such believe that “particular forms of activism are proscribed as fulfilling God’s will,” according to Wiktorowicz (2005). The jihadi ideology is used as the template in this “culturing” work to provide religiously sanctioned pathways for an individual to become a true Muslim through mobilizing and taking actions. Rahmani identifies problems and locates the causes of them, provides solutions to these which require action on behalf of the followers, and motivates them to do so, all so that they become the true Muslims and achieve salvation in the afterlife.

The Quintessential Ideologue  45

Rahmani Creates High-Impact Narrative There are about 265 million Bengali-language speakers around the world (Dhaka Tribune 2020). Comprehension of the Arabic language is not common among them, although many learn to read the Quran in Arabic. For many Bengali speakers, modest understanding of the English language can be a challenge too. But due to Rahmani, a vast pool of jihadi ideological content and materials are now available to this large group in their native language. Bengali is no longer limited to the Bengal region either. Millions of Bangladeshi migrant workers and generations of Bengali diaspora communities around the world also have some comprehension of the Bengali language. This is where the audio format of Rahmani’s sermons become very important as it makes the jihadi ideology accessible to all. Due to the preservation of Rahmani’s sermons in digital format, they remain within easy reach from anywhere around the world. There are more than 431 hours of Rahmani’s sermons available on the internet, on various platforms including very popular ones. In 2014, a member of ABT named Masum acknowledged operating 117 accounts on Facebook to promote and spread Rahmani’s sermons (Khan and Tipu 2014). The ideological depth and theological knowledge preached by Rahmani are more significant than any previously observed in Bengali. Previous Islamic leaders preaching in Bengali were predominantly from mainstream political parties and discussed establishing an Islamic country mostly from a democratic angle. Popular preachers such as Delwar Hossain Saydee or Mufti Fazlul Haq Amini were all involved in the democratic system, and both were members of Bangladesh national parliament at one point. Jihad was not their primary method for societal change even though they had talked about it in their preaching (Riaz 2008). Terrorist organizations in Bangladesh such as JMB or HUJIB had carried out attacks in the past but were unable or incapable of spreading jihadi ideology in the way that Rahmani has accomplished. Along with this already unique body of work, Rahmani adds further elements to fortify it. For his followers, Rahmani still is a revered religious figure, an authoritative source of religious guidelines and doctrines, and a persecuted leader who is a true Muslim. Much of this reverence comes from what Wiktorowicz (2005) describes as the “sacred authority” of a preacher. This is explained as the high level of trust often achieved by religious leaders or scholars among their audience due to their theological training and knowledge, and the paucity of it among their audience. Rahmani’s frequent references to main Islamic texts, along with his credentials as an imam and a mufti, confer on him his sacred authority in the eyes of his followers. This provides validity and legitimacy not only to him but also to his messages. It authorizes him to interpret complex religious theology and doctrine to his followers which are considered legitimate due to his authority. It also allows him to pass judgment over the authority and legitimacy of other scholars and thus control the knowledge sources of the followers. More importantly, with this sacred authority Rahmani went about to inspire, influence, build, and nurture his movement of the Bengali-speaking jihadis.

46  Asheque Haque Additionally, during his active preaching life Rahmani spent some time in discussing this idea of identity or Shaksiya. The importance of collective identity in movement mobilization and activism is discussed by Sageman (2017), who argues that “a shared social identity also transforms the relationship among members of an in-group to enable coordinated and effective collective action.” Rahmani’s thoughts on this collective identity are unique, which will have a lasting impact. Even though Rahmani (338) clearly acknowledges that he follows Mullah Omar as the Amirul Muminin, or the Leader of the Faithful, and Ayman al Zawahiri as the Amirul Jihad, or the Leader of Jihad, he refuses to ally with any particular organization or group in Bangladesh, or globally. This is most likely because Rahmani does not want to prioritize any person or group over the bigger cause of the religion. This fluidity in allegiance to a group is similar to Anwar al-Awlaki (Meleagrou-Hitchens 2011). Just like Awlaki, Rahmani also gives precedence to a Muslim identity and argues to establish that over any other. Needless to say, such a fluid approach allows for a timeless advice that can be applied in different places under different circumstances around the world. This fluidity can be observed in reality by Rahmani’s followers who were arrested in Singapore in 2016 on the charge of attempting to join the Islamic State even though most of his followers are al-Qaeda supporters (Bdnews24.com 2016). Additionally, Rahmani achieves frame resonance among his audience. Wiktorowicz (2004) terms frame resonance as the critical dimension for the mobilization of a movement. Meleagrou-Hitchens (2011) explains that, in a successful social movement, the frame articulator aligns the messages with that of the potential participants in order to reach a level of resonance. Rahmani is a master of frame alignment for the purpose of inciting extremist violence among Bengali-speaking audience. His oratory constantly shifts between the past and the present, connecting the experiences of the present-day audience with that of the Prophet and his companions. Rahmani revealed his mastery in being able to discuss present-day sociopolitical issues in Bangladesh and effortlessly providing a solution based on historical events or precedents. Rahmani (289) identifies reasons for the oppression of the members at the present time and identifies a solution in the past during the Prophet’s time. As such his solutions achieve a timeless manner with a sense of religious sanctity.

Conclusion Meleagrou-Hitchens (2020) wrote that a powerful feature of Anwar al-Awlaki’s messaging was encouraging violent extremism without being explicit. “Through his storytelling, which provided a skewed version of history, Islam, Western society, and geopolitics, he was able to take people to the edge of violence.” He added that Awlaki allowed a sense of personal agency in decision-making which seemed to be based on rational, fact-based thinking based on proper religious teaching. Rahmani followed this exact method of Awalaki and brought this powerful feature to the Bengali-speaking audience. He uses his speaking methods and emotions to influence the emotions of his audience in order to lead to them to the conclusions

The Quintessential Ideologue  47 he wants to suggest. He sounds logical as he presents information, concepts, and theology in such a way that they resonate clearly among his followers. Manik (2013) reports that other militant groups in Bangladesh read the publications of Rahmani-like textbooks. Rahmani creates the guidelines and norms for Bengali-speaking jihadis through the preaching of his ideology. Using his vast and detailed content of violent jihadi ideology, he establishes “the method” or “the way” for his followers. On the basis of this “way,” he then justifies his solutions and prescribes actions that his followers should take. That is why he was incredibly influential in successfully organizing, coalescing, and mobilizing the ABT and continues to influence other subsequent terrorist groups and individuals. In order to understand the history of violent extremism in Bangladesh, it is imperative to understand the arduous foundational work that jihadi ideologues such as Rahmani have carried out over the years in order to indoctrinate the population. The acceptance and loyalty to Rahmani’s brand of violent extremism did not take place overnight but rather is the culmination of years of radical views preached by ideologues like him. Waz mehfils of various mainstream Islamic preachers of the past form the foundation upon which Rahmani adds layers of violent jihadi ideology and hatred. Rahmani, undoubtedly the most vocal, visible jihadi ideologue in the Bengali language worldwide, has successfully conducted a violent extremist radicalization campaign during his active public life and continues to inspire future generations. The depth and breadth of his masterfully crafted narrative still remain unchallenged in Bengali, and he remains the quintessential ideologue for that audience.

Note 1 The Global Coalition against Daesh website is Available from https://theglobalcoali tion.org/en/mission/#countering-daeshs-propaganda. [Accessed: 20 December 2021].

Bibliography Bdnews24.com. (2016) 14 Bangladeshi Deported by Singapore Loyal to Ansarullah Bangla Team, Say Police. 21 January. Daily Prothom Alo. (2013a) Ansarullah Prodhan Jashim Shoho Greptar 31. 13 August. ———. (2013b) Jongi Shongothon Ansarullahs Kaj Chole Char Dhape. 26 August. The Daily Star. (2013) Geared Up for Armed Jihad: Ansarullah Bangla Team. 19 August. ———. (2014) Ansarullah’s Jasim Preached for Killing Atheists. 2 September. Dhaka Tribune. (2020) Bangla Ranked at 7th Among 100 most Spoken Languages Worldwide. 17 February. Islam, S. (2013) Ansarullah Led by Five: Son-in-Law of JMB Chief One of them. The Daily Star. 1 September. Khan, M.J. and Tipu, M.S.I. (2014) Tourists and Foreign Students to be Checked for Militancy Links. Dhaka Tribune. 7 November. Maher, S. (2016) Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea. London: Hurst and Company. Mamun, S. and Khan, M.J. (2015) Ansarullah Sixth Outlawed Militant Group. The Daily Star. 26 May.

48  Asheque Haque Manik, J.A. (2013) Preaching Militancy, Building Network: Ansarullah Bangla Team. The Daily Star. 14 August. Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. (2011) As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar Al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad. London: ICSR. ———. (2020) Incitement: Anwar al Awlaki’s Western Jihad. Boston: Harvard University Press. Rashid, M. (2014) Ansarullah BT Deeply Rooted in Al-Qaeda Ideology. Daily Observer, 7 November. ———. (2016) Blogger Rajib Killing: Two to Die, Six Get Different Jail Terms. New Age. 1 January. Raza, K.H. (2013) Ugrobadi Ansarullah Bangla Team. Sheershanews. 27 August. Riaz, A. (2008) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web. New York: Routledge. Sageman, M. (2017) Turning to Political Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sultan, T. (2016) Rise of Militancy Part 1: Rooted in Mujahids Returning from Afghanistan. Daily Prothom Alo. 6 August. ———. (2016) Rise of Militancy Part 2: Salafi Ideology Behind JMB’s Rise. Daily Prothom Alo. 6 August. ———. (2016) Rise of Militancy Part 3: IS Ideologues Come Up with Extreme Atrocities. Daily Prothom Alo. 7 August. Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004) Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ———. (2005) Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

3

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh Manifestations, Causes, and Consequences Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad*

The involvement of Bangladeshi women in terrorism has received growing attention in recent years. During a May 2017 police raid of a terrorist den in Rajshahi, two female militants attacked firefighters with machetes, killing one (Ali 2017; Liton 2017). On February 9, 2018, a 24-year-old expatriate Bangladeshi student stabbed the landlord of her homestay in Melbourne yelling Allahu Abkar (God is Greatest) while he was sleeping next to his little daughter (Farnsworth 2019; Oaten 2019). When Bangladeshi law enforcers tried to interrogate the woman’s 22-year-old sister in Dhaka three days later, the latter also reportedly attacked a police officer with a knife (Daily Star 2018). During her trial in an Australian court, the former young woman confessed the attack on her landlord and her deliberate intention to advance the cause of violent jihad (Farnsworth 2019). Such events have raised alarm among security officials, development practitioners, and policy analysts (e.g., BIPSS 2018; Mohsina 2017a, 2017b; Mostofa 2020; Roul 2018, 2021). Mostofa (2020: 27), for instance, writes that Bangladesh has “witnessed an escalation of female participation in jihadism since the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack,” while Roul (2018) worries that “an alarming number of women are taking up the cause of militancy.” These concerns are acute especially because Bangladesh’s terrorism landscape has undergone significant changes in recent years (Lorch 2020). The country experienced its first wave of Islamist terrorist attacks between 1999 and 2006, with the most well-known of these attacks occurring during the tenure of the four-party government led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (2001–2006). The most visible terrorist groups back then were the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B) and the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), which emerged as an Islamist vigilante group in northern Bangladesh and in 2005 conducted over 400 nationwide simultaneous bombings (ICG 2006, 2018: 2–3, 18–19). Although both groups had roots in the Afghanistan War from 1979 to 1989 and thus shared certain links to alQaeda (Bashar 2019; ICG 2006; Riaz 2007: 52, 58, 82), their agendas for action focused mainly on establishing Islamic rule in Bangladesh and hence remained predominantly national in character (ICG 2006). Rigorous security crackdowns from 2006 onwards ended open terrorist attacks for some time. Less than a decade later, however, Bangladesh started to be riddled by a new, more internationalized form of terrorism that appears to be more closely connected to the Islamic DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-4

50  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad State (IS) and al-Qaeda (Khan 2018: 191–192; Riaz and Parvez 2018: 944–945; Stratfor Worldview 2016). Starting from 2013, secular-Islamist contestations over the trial of Islamist war criminals culminated in the killing of secular bloggers by the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), later renamed Ansar-al-Islam (AI), which presented itself as the Bangladeshi branch of al-Qaeda on the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) (Riaz 2016: 2; Roul 2014). In July 2016, the Holey Artisan Bakery attack, the deadliest terrorist attack in Bangladesh’s history, killed seventeen foreign and five Bangladeshi nationals. While the Awami League (AL) government blamed a group it has since been referring to as Neo-JMB, the attack was publicly claimed by IS (Kugelman and Ahmad 2017) and terrorist propaganda about it was uploaded to IS’s websites in real time.1 Enhanced efforts by al-Qaeda and IS to recruit women, it is feared, would further strengthen the foothold of these transnational terrorist outfits in the country, while spurring more attacks. However, knowledge about the involvement of Bangladeshi women in terrorism remains extremely limited, with the existing research – much of it conducted by security analysts and journalists – displaying three major gaps. First, the existing accounts fall short of providing a detailed picture of the manifestations of female terrorism in Bangladesh. For instance, while press reports state that eightyfive female terrorism suspects were arrested between the aftermath of the 2016 Holey Artisan attack and 2020 (e.g., Alam 2020; Labu 2019), the existing publications remain unclear about which specific terrorist outfits these women belonged to.2 Regarding the concrete roles played by women in terrorist activities, several experts emphasize a shift from passive roles, such as conveying information or providing a home base to male militants, to more active ones, including the commission of attacks (Hasan 2016; Mohsina 2017a, 2017b; Mostofa 2020; Sultan 2017). Contrariwise, Khan (2019: 256) cautions against overestimating the roles of Bangladeshi women in terrorism, arguing that “the number of detained female terrorists or extremists is [still] miniscule.” Second, there is a dearth of research on the causes of female terrorism in Bangladesh (Khan 2019: 255; Mostofa 2020: 28). Local police officers and media reports tend to emphasize the push factors, arguing that most female militants are radicalized by structural conditions, such as poverty and socioeconomic marginalization, and are mostly radicalized by their husbands or other male family members, who even sometimes force them to join terrorist groups (Alam 2020; Khan 2019; Labu 2019; Selim 2017; Sultan 2017).3 Other sources, however, point more to the pull factors. Specifically, they indicate that wealthy and educated women are increasingly becoming involved in terrorism and that several women join terrorist groups out of their own ideological commitment, with many being selfradicalized through social media (Akhter 2018; Kollol 2016). More specifically, several experts attribute the rising involvement of Bangladeshi women in terrorism to the growing influence of IS in the country (e.g., Mohsina 2017b: 8), an interpretation that is in line with wider academic research, which shows that while IS clearly preaches the patriarchal subordination of women to men, its ideology of the Caliphate nevertheless ascribes women important roles in the establishment

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  51 of Islamic rule (e.g., Davis 2017: 123–130; Pearson 2015: 19; Spencer 2016). However, with regard to Bangladesh, the assumption that IS’s ideology acts as an important pull factor for women’s radicalization has not been sufficiently substantiated with empirical data as yet. Roul (2018, 2021) flags deficits in the Bangladeshi security apparatus as a major cause of women’s involvement in terrorism. Third, there is a severe lack of insights on the consequences that female terrorism may have for both Bangladesh’s security and the Bangladeshi society at large. Against this backdrop, we pursue three major aims. First, we seek to provide a more comprehensive picture of the manifestations of female terrorism in Bangladesh by tracing the roles of female terrorists within (and outside of) individual Bangladeshi terrorist groups. Second, we shed light on the multifaceted causes of female radicalization in Bangladesh, considering both push and pull factors. Third, we discuss the consequences of female terrorism for Bangladesh’s security and society. We conclude by identifying avenues for future research and flagging the need to respect human rights in counterterrorism. Our findings are drawn from three major types of sources. First, we synthesize the limited existing research, which mainly consists of press reports as well as some policy-oriented papers and articles, and present its most relevant findings. Second, we review selected police and court documents, including a compilation of status documentations of the judicial cases filed against terrorism suspects (both male and female) between 1999 and mid-2019.4 Third, and most importantly, we draw on our own ongoing interviews with local and international experts, family members and acquaintances of female terrorism suspects, police officers handling their cases, and, where possible, female militants and terrorism dropouts themselves (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). These interviews provide us with invaluable primary data that allows us to cross-check information obtained from police and press reports. This opportunity to draw from different sources is crucial because both the current AL government and the BNP as the main opposition party have politicized terrorism and counterterrorism and have frequently labeled their political opponents as terrorists (e.g., Milam 2016; Lorch 2020: 794). Similarly, we came across serious flaws and inconsistencies in police and court documents, especially in first information reports and charge sheets, which were sometimes directly linked to abusive police practices, such as illegal arrests (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). Lastly, media freedom in Bangladesh has often been hampered (Freedom House 2021), limiting critical reporting on terrorism and counterterrorism issues.

Manifestations of Female Terrorism When analyzing the manifestations of female terrorism, it is useful to focus on two aspects: first, the membership (or non-membership) of women in different types of Bangladeshi terrorist organizations and, second, the specific roles played by women within (and outside of) these terrorist groups and how and to what extent these roles have changed over time.

52  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad Women Militants in (and Outside of) Bangladeshi Terrorist Organizations Press articles based on police information have reported the arrest of eighty-five female terrorism suspects between the aftermath of the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack and 2020 (e.g., Alam 2020; Labu 2019). However, an analysis of a compilation of police documentations of the status of the judicial cases filed against terrorism suspects, including both men and women, between 1999 and mid-2019, updated with available press information on female terrorism suspects who were arrested after mid-2019, allows us to paint a more comprehensive and sophisticated picture. According to these sources (see Table 3.1), 119 of the altogether 4,050 terrorism suspects against whom judicial cases were filed between 1999 and mid-2022 were women, with eighty-six of these women charged with terrorism after Holey Artisan (if the number of women meanwhile acquitted is deducted). Out of these 119 women, eighty-nine belonged to the so-called Neo-JMB, while twenty-two belonged to the JMB, five to the ABT/AI, and three to the HUJI-B. In addition, the police compilation cited also includes eight women detained for their suspected membership in the Bangladeshi branch of the transnational Islamist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), which the Bangladeshi government lists as a terrorist group. However, while HT follows a highly orthodox version of Islam, it subscribes to non-violence (e.g., Ward 2009), and there are no indications that it has conducted any physical attacks in any of the countries where it is active. Consequently, we exclude HT from our analysis of terrorist groups. According to the Bangla Tribune, in addition to the women charged and/or arrested for their presumed involvement in terrorism, another eleven women died during police

Table 3.1  Women and Men Charged for Their Suspected Involvement in Terrorism Organization

Period

Women charged

Men charged

JMB

2001 to July 30, 2015

charged: 1,414

Neo-JMB

31 July 2015 to 24 August 2022

ABT/AI

July 2016 to 24 August 2022

HUJI-B

1999 to 24 August 2022

charged: 25 arrested: 19 acquitted: 3 absconding: 6 (specifications as of mid-2015) charged and arrested: 89 arrested before HA6: 9 arrested after HA: 80 charged and arrested: 6 arrested after HA: 6 acquitted: 1 charged: 3 arrested before HA: 2 absconding after HA: 1

charged: 1,766 charged: 351 charged: 400

Source: Own presentation, based on police compilation of status documentations of the judicial cases filed against the terrorism suspects (both male and female) between 1999 and mid-2019; updated with press reports.

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  53 raids of terrorist hideouts between 2016 and 2019 (Labu 2019), with all of these latter women allegedly belonging to the Neo-JMB.5 We include these women in the sample of female terrorism suspects, bringing the overall number of these women to 130. Undoubtedly, these figures are far from perfect. Owing to the strong impetus of Bangladeshi police officers to make arrests and publicize them in the media instead of collecting detailed information about terrorism suspects (Lorch 2020: 795), several of the apprehended men and women are bound to have been arrested on false suspicion. Similarly, the sample most likely contains cases of political persecution. In our ongoing broader study, we originally set out to investigate the cases of 59 women arrested on terrorism charges, but later dropped 20 from this initial sample, as our field interviews and inconsistencies in police and court documents led us to doubt their involvement in terrorist activities (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). For instance, we came across six female members of an Islamist opposition party who were arrested on terrorism charges but, in fact, seemed to have lobbied against the conduct of a Bengali festival through non-violent means. Conversely, women long remained outside the focus of Bangladesh’s law enforcement agencies (Selim 2017), meaning that the number of female militants might also be underreported.7 Nevertheless, the figures are interesting in at least three interrelated respects. First, the fact that 74.6 percent (97 out of 130) of the female terrorism suspects were legally charged with terrorism (86) or killed (11) after the Holey Artisan attack supports the assumption that the involvement of women in terrorist activities is mainly (though not exclusively) a recent phenomenon, whose rise coincided with the growing influence of IS’s ideology in Bangladesh. A senior police officer even opined that the enhanced involvement of women in terrorism had in fact begun with the rise of IS, adding that some of the women whom the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTC) of the Bangladesh Police had arrested between 2014 and 2015 had also already adhered to IS’s ideology.8 As elaborated further later, however, the assumption that the roles of women in Bangladeshi terrorist groups have radically shifted from passive to active warrants further qualification. Second, the distribution of suspected female militants across Bangladesh’s four major terrorist outfits likewise suggests that female terrorism in the country is linked to a particular type of jihadist ideology. According to the figures cited, 127 of the women charged with terrorism or killed due to their alleged involvement in terrorism between 1999 and mid-2022 belonged to the JMB (22), the Neo-JMB (100), or the ABT/AI (5) (again with the number of acquitted women deducted). All three of these groups follow a jihadist version of Ahle Hadith/Salafist ideology that is shared by al-Qaeda and IS (Ahmad 2006; Lorch 2020: 791).9 Only three of the women charged with terrorism allegedly belonged to the HUJI-B, which abides by a jihadist interpretation of Deobandi ideology,10 although a total of 400 suspected HUJI-B militants were charged between 1999 and mid-2022. Women’s involvement in terrorism thus seems to be predominantly a Salafist phenomenon in the Bangladeshi case. However, there are also marked differences within the Salafist camp. Notably, 100 of the suspected female terrorists facing trials (89) or killed (11) between 1999 and mid-2022 reportedly belonged to the so-called

54  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad Neo-JMB, while only five women charged with terrorism allegedly belonged to the ABT/AI. While the label Neo-JMB is mainly used for individuals and groups that are ideologically close to IS, the ABT/AI has openly portrayed itself as the Bangladeshi branch of AQIS (Riaz 2016: 2).11 In sum, the aforementioned figures hence reinforce the assumption that in Bangladesh as elsewhere the increasing role of female militancy was often linked to the growing traction of IS. However, the years of 2021 and 2022 saw the arrest of three suspected female AI operatives, including a 19-year-old woman who had reportedly self-radicalized on social media12 and actively supported AI by engaging in propaganda and spreading jihadist contents online (Dhaka Tribune 2021).13 This might indicate that AQISrelated groups are increasingly allowing women to assume more active roles, a possibility that is supported by the fact that Bangladesh has experienced a massive rise of gendered online propaganda by AQIS in recent years.14 What is questionable is whether all women that police has classified as members of the Neo-JMB really belong/ed to this group organizationally. As the AL government fears that an acknowledged presence of international terrorist outfits in the country might spark foreign intervention into Bangladesh’s domestic affairs,15 it generally describes all terrorism in Bangladesh as homegrown and categorically refers to all IS-inspired terrorists as belonging to the Neo-JMB (Bashar 2019). However, as Bashar (2019) writes, an important part of “IS’ current strategy in Bangladesh is to .  .  . promote lone-wolf/wolfpack attacks mostly in the capital,” while “recruit[ing] both from existing terrorist groups as well as youth with no prior record of engagement in violence.” Hence, several female terrorism suspects categorized as Neo-JMB by police might, in reality, have acted as lone wolves (or part of wolfpacks) inspired by IS’s ideology. Complicating matters further, our research indicates that local units of the law enforcement agencies frequently lack knowledge about the doctrinal differences between al-Qaeda and IS, while local Bangladeshi terrorist groups and individuals have often oscillated between al-Qaeda’s and IS’s ideology after IS’s establishment of its so-called Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, several women who are categorized as Neo-JMB in the aforementioned police compilation are categorized as JMB in other police documents, such as case documents. Similarly, in our research we found a number of women who consumed and, at times, spread both IS- and AQIS-related propaganda, making it difficult to determine their allegiance to a specific terrorist network (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). Third, with only around 2.9 percent (119 out of 4,050), or 3.2 percent (130 out of 4,050), if the women killed are included, the percentage of women among the terrorism suspects detected by the police is still very small (see also Khan 2019: 256), a discrepancy that is reflective of the patriarchal nature of Islamist terrorist ideology. Most of these women were charged with terrorism (86) or killed (11) after Holey Artisan, suggesting that women’s involvement in terrorism increased from 2015/2016 onwards. However, female arrests dropped sharply after mid2019, indicating that women’s involvement in terrorism has either decreased again or shifted to more covert forms.

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  55 The Changing Role of Women in Terrorism While the involvement of Bangladeshi women in terrorism is not a new phenomenon, the nature of this involvement seems to be changing. Much of the existing research concurs that women are assuming increasingly proactive roles in the preparation and conduct of terrorist activities (Hasan 2016; Mohsina 2017a, 2017b; Mostofa 2020; Roul 2018; Sultan 2017). Mohsina (2017b: 7), for instance, concludes that “[t]he role of female Bangladeshi ‘jihadists’ have [sic!] evolved from passive to active and from peripheral to central as suicide bombers and combatants.” Our analysis supports the notion that the roles of Bangladeshi women in terrorism have evolved over time but points to important nuances as far as women’s involvement in the commission of physical acts of violence is concerned. Already prior to the rise of IS and/or the Neo-JMB, Bangladeshi women formed part of terrorist organizations, providing a home base to male militants and, at times, taking part in missionary activities (da'wa).16 Moreover, both in the ABT/ AI and in the JMB women have reportedly acted as informants and couriers (Roul 2018). In the JMB, women also played an important, albeit purportedly passive, role in strengthening organizational networks. Specifically, the terrorist outfit arranged marriages between its male cadres and women born into its network to maintain secrecy and prevent infiltration and/or the leaking of information. In so doing, the JMB created its “own society” marked by a sense of mutual obligation among its members. Accordingly, male militants could only become part of the JMB’s majlis-e-shura (highest council) and other top tiers of the organization if they were married to a woman from within the group.17 However, already in the JMB women sometimes appear to have played more active roles than commonly assumed. For instance, female members of the terrorist outfit reportedly recruited other women into the group.18 What is more, however, the JMB apparently started training women for certain types of terrorist operations long before the rise of IS in Bangladesh. As a senior counterterrorism intelligence analyst explained, when police forces in 2006 encircled the hideout of Shaikh Abdur Rahman, the spiritual leader (amir) of the JMB, several women who had stayed in his den threatened to blast bombs,19 an information that was confirmed by a senior journalist present at the scene.20 Field interviews confirmed that the women had known that explosives had been stored in the house and that some of these explosives had in fact been kept in their rooms.21 When police raided a JMB hideout in Gazipur in February 2009, three women relatives of male JMB cadres swiftly and professionally destroyed SIM cards, documents, and other incriminating evidence (Manik 2009),22 leading Roul (2021) to conclude that these women “displayed the unique characteristics of highly-trained operatives to the astonishment of police officers.” When the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) apprehended a JMB explosives expert in Dhaka in May  2009, his wife reportedly resisted violently by setting off a bomb (Daily Star 2009). According to Bdnews24 (2009), she later told reporters that she had tried to kill both herself and her two children as per her husband’s instruction to avoid arrest. These episodes suggest that rather than sparking a

56  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad sea change in the roles of women in terrorism, the rise of IS’s ideology from 2014 onwards reinforced a pre-existing trend toward an increasingly proactive participation of women in violent jihadist activities that had started within the JMB at least half a decade earlier. Security agencies, however, have largely overlooked this legacy. For instance, as of late 2020, an Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police still maintained that the way in which the JMB had used women “was not worrying at all,” as women had mainly played support roles in the terrorist outfit.23 Nevertheless, the roles of women in terrorism seem to have expanded in recent years, as women have increasingly assumed key functions in recruitment and terror financing as well as vital organizational and communication tasks (Akhter 2018; Mohsina 2017b; Roul 2018, 2021). In April 2018, police forces arrested a woman who reportedly went by the organizational name of “Batwoman” within her terrorist network. According to press reports, the woman, whom police has labelled as the head of the Neo-JMB’s ‘sisters’ wing’, played an active role in financing terrorist attacks and had recruited both women and men, including her own husband, into the Neo-JMB (Akhter 2018; Labu 2018; Tipu 2020).24 In early 2020, security forces apprehended two other female terrorism suspects who, according to the CTTC and other investigating agencies, had played instrumental roles in managing the Neo-JMB’s communication network as well as in recruiting and training Neo-JMB cadres, including on social media. In so doing, both had reportedly communicated with top Neo-JMB leaders, while one of the women was also alleged to have arranged for the travel of terrorist recruits abroad (Roul 2021). The cases of the female Melbourne attacker and her sister as well as of the female militants who attacked firefighters in Rajshahi suggest that women are becoming increasingly involved in the execution of violent terrorist attacks. Even more than by these cases, however, public and expert perceptions about the violent potential of female terrorism have been shaped by another incident. On 24 December 2016, national and international media reported that a woman had committed a suicide bombing during a police raid on a terrorist hideout in Dhaka (BBC World 2016; Hasan et al. 2016; Manik 2016; Mukharji 2016). However, our field research furnished evidence that raises questions about whether a successful suicide bombing did in fact occur on that day. Specifically, two police officers stated that while the woman had indeed tried to detonate a suicide belt, which, however, had gone off only partially, she had also been shot by security forces.25 Moreover, a family member who saw the body recalled that he had only noticed one wound at one side of the abdomen26 (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). Reportedly, the so-called Neo-JMB since 2016 has developed the policy of instructing its female members to commit suicide to specifically avoid arrest and/or rape by members of the law-enforcement agencies,27 a policy that corresponds to tactics employed by IS-affiliated groups elsewhere.28 According to their confessional statements, one such woman who was reportedly arrested with a suicide vest stated that she had been told to commit suicide to escape police torture, while another

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  57 one claimed that she had tried (but failed) to press the switch of her suicide vest, because she had been afraid of being raped and killed by the police.29

Causes of Female Terrorism To illuminate the causes of female terrorism in Bangladesh, we first discuss the motives that might prompt Bangladeshi women to engage in terrorism. We then show how representatives of the security apparatus have often failed to fully understand these motives, thereby creating structural opportunities for female terrorists and terrorist organizations. Motives for Women’s Radicalization: Push or Pull? When it comes to the motives prompting women to engage in terrorism, security officials and local media reports predominantly emphasize the push factors, arguing that most female terrorists are radicalized by their husbands or other male family members and frequently join terrorist organizations out of socioeconomic deprivation and/or dependency (see e.g., BDNews24 2016; Daily Star 2016; Labu 2019; Rashid 2016; Selim 2017). This is exemplified by Monirul Islam, the head of the CTTC, who in 2016 told the press, “There is not one female in the Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh  who became a militant due to their own will. [.  .  .] They take up militancy due to their husbands and also their social circumstances” (BDNews24 2016). The assessment was shared by several police officers interviewed for this research.30 Citing the example of the wife of a high-ranking IS/ Neo-JMB operative, an Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police argued that women with little religious knowledge frequently obeyed their terrorist husbands out of fear, adopting the latter’s radical thoughts without questioning them. Similarly, the officer stated that women who were repressed, socially insecure or emotionally unstable were generally most susceptible to the narratives employed by terrorist organizations.31 Drawing on police information, an article published in the Dhaka Tribune argues that Neo-JMB cadres recruit female students by seducing them into love affairs and marrying them (Khan and Rabbi 2016). However, the assessment that women are always pushed into militancy by male family members can be challenged on various grounds. A counterterrorism intelligence analyst who interviewed several female terrorists stressed that women were radicalized in many ways, including ideological persuasion by friends, husbands, and other relatives, but also online Salafist jihadist propaganda available on Facebook, YouTube, WordPress and similar channels.32 Another local security expert who, according to his own accounts, analyzed the police records of over 500 apprehended terrorism suspects, both male and female, stressed that recruitment by relatives was not unique to female terrorists but that male terrorists were generally radicalized by family members as well. Similarly, even where women had first gotten acquainted with terrorist ideology through relatives, they nevertheless had their “own agency.” Just like men, women terrorists were “not robots,” he stressed, but also believed in what they were doing.33

58  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad The role of ideological persuasion as a pull factor is also underlined by Mostofa (2020) who identifies the “Islamist model of obedience to [the] husband” (ibid: 28) as an important push factor for women’s radicalization but also points to the crucial role played by “ideological conviction” and the desire of female terrorists to contribute to the realization of the Caliphate and other forms of Islamist utopia (ibid.: 29–30). This corresponds to the tendency that the growth of female terrorism in Bangladesh often seems to have been linked to the increasing traction of IS from 2014/2015 onwards. Regarding the roles attributed to women in IS’s ideology of the Caliphate, one of the above-cited experts further elaborated that many Bangladeshi women were denied opportunities for empowerment, making them susceptible to terrorist groups propagating that Muslim women were not simply mothers and wives but agents of change in the establishment of the global Caliphate. Some female terrorists, he concluded, were “real volunteers” who genuinely felt that every step they took was bringing them closer to Allah.34 This aligns with Huq’s research on non-violent forms of Islamic orthodoxy (Huq 2011, see also Huq and Rashid 2008), which shows that many upper-class women in Bangladesh adopt highly orthodox versions of the Islamic faith deliberately and, at times, even against the will of their husbands to lead what they perceive as pious lives. Somewhat paradoxically, the subscription to both jihadist and peaceful forms of Islamic and Islamist orthodoxy in this sense seems to be related to an emancipatory desire to oppose traditional, areligious forms of patriarchy. Similarly, it has been argued that female radicalization sometimes has “[f]eminist elements” related to the “appropriation of power” (BIPSS 2018: 12). Relatedly, Mostofa (2020: 30) argues that “[t]he perception of a community of sisters or sisterhood acts as a pull factor for female radicalisation” (ibid.: 30; see also BIPSS 2018: 11–14). Similarly, in our research we came across the cases of three young women who radicalized together while they were studying at a private university. Two of these women subsequently searched and found themselves militant husbands, while the third was trying to do so at the time when she was arrested.35 When it comes to the socioeconomic profiles of female terrorists, our own research suggests that female militants in Bangladesh are mostly materially welloff and educated. Specifically, many of these women seem to come from the middle class, including both the lower and the upper middle classes, and to have completed Secondary School Certificate (SSC), Higher Secondary School Certificate (HSC), or even university education (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). This aligns with research on male terrorists, which stresses that the new generation of terrorist men in Bangladeshi mostly comes from sufficiently affluent middle and upper middle-class families and has educational backgrounds in relatively expensive private education institutions (Riaz 2016; Riaz and Parvez 2018). The case of the women who was reported to have committed a suicide bombing during a police raid is sometimes cited as evidence that Bangladeshi women often join terrorist outfits out of economic hardship (Mostofa 2020: 30).36 Born into a rather poor (though definitely not a hardcore poor) rural family in southern Bangladesh, this woman was married to a roadside vendor in Dhaka before being able to complete her HSC at a college in her home district. Shortly after she gave

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  59 birth to a baby, her husband died of cancer. While she subsequently managed to get a job at a clinic, she was struggling to survive with her kid. According to police officers and press reports, it was in this situation that she was approached by NeoJMB operatives who provided her with financial and other support, while, concurrently, indoctrinating her with the Neo-JMB’s jihadist ideology. One month before the raid on the hideout in which she was staying, the CTTC arrested her second husband who was an alleged Neo-JMB operative (Prothom Alo 2016).37 What the existing reports neglect, however, is that the woman’s family had encouraged her to come back to her village home after the death of her first husband, meaning that she would have had a livelihood with her child even if she had not joined terrorism.38 In addition, the apprehended wife of another alleged leader of the so-called Neo-JMB reportedly told the police that the woman had married a Neo-JMB operative deliberately to be able to join the organization, raising further doubts about whether she was forced to join terrorism out of material need.39 The assumption that women are mostly pushed into terrorism by poverty and socioeconomic marginalization also stands in sharp contrast to the above-cited finding that women are assuming increasingly sophisticated roles within terrorist organizations, such as managing online platforms or financing terrorist activities, tasks that clearly require significant levels of education and, at times, even material resources. Accordingly, several female terrorism suspects apprehended in recent years not only came from middle and upper middle-class – or even from rich – families but also had educational backgrounds in expensive private schools and colleges. In August  2016, for instance, security forces arrested four young female terrorism suspects allegedly belonging to the Neo-JMB. Out of these four women, three studied at the private Manarat International University in Dhaka, while the fourth was a trainee at Dhaka Medical College (Mohsina 2017a; Roul 2021). “Batwoman,” the alleged former head of the Neo-JMB’s female branch, who is accused of terrorist recruitment and financing terrorist activities, is reported to be the daughter of a well-known local businessman and to have studied at the expensive private North South University in Dhaka (Labu 2018; Roul 2021). The expatriate Bangladeshi student who stabbed the landlord of her homestay in Melbourne came from an upper middle-class family and had likewise studied at the North South University (Bashar 2019; Prothom Alo 2018). She self-radicalized (Bashar 2019) in both online and offline encounters with other likeminded peers and was reportedly acquainted with several young terrorists who staged attacks from 2013 onwards, including Nibras Islam, who was involved in the Holey Artisan attack (Prothom Alo 2018). A university friend of the woman interviewed for this research described her as a brilliant student with excellent grades who had always remained within a closed circle of students discussing religious topics and isolating themselves from others. After the interviewee had befriended the later Melbourne attacker, however, the latter had increasingly tried to push her to pursue an orthodox religious life, inviting her, for instance, to attend talim (gathering focusing on religious discussion and education) and sending her voice clips with orthodox religious content through WhatsApp.40 Following the arrest of his daughters, their father reportedly told the police how the Melbourne attacker and her

60  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad younger sister had increasingly engaged in discussions about what was religiously right or wrong, while also attempting to get others to follow their instructions (Prothom Alo 2018). The above-cited university acquaintance of the Melbourne attacker further emphasized that she had looked extremely strong and composed following the death of her mother, shortly after which she traveled to Australia.41 Nevertheless, a systematic analysis of the motives and socioeconomic backgrounds of a larger sub-sample of the women arrested or killed for their (suspected) involvement in terrorism would be needed to properly assess whether female terrorists are radicalized predominantly by push or pull factors (see Lorch and Azad forthcoming). Deficits of the Security Apparatus: Structural Opportunities for Female Terrorism In addition, female terrorism has been enabled by structural deficits in the security apparatus that have reinforced both the pushes and pulls driving women’s engagement in terrorist activities. These deficits broadly fall into three categories: first, organizational conditions and the previously dominant underestimation of the female terrorist threat by leading security officers; second, a lack of understanding of the motives driving women’s radicalization at the individual level; and, third, severe human rights violations. In the past, the roles played by Bangladeshi women in terrorist activities went largely unnoticed by the law enforcement agencies. Roul (2021), for instance, argues that “[w]omen jihadists’ roles were previously downplayed by Bangladeshi security agencies, mostly due to gender leniency.” Police officials long failed to regard women as potential terrorism suspects, generally refraining from surveilling or checking them unless they looked suspicious (Khan and Rabbi 2016).42 Terrorist groups took advantage of this negligence by using women as couriers and informers to convey operational details (e.g., ibid.). In 2017, the Bangladesh Pratidin quoted a military analyst as saying, “[o]nce militants meant only men and thus they were always on the focus of the law-enforcement agencies. Now militants are engaging women to avoid suspicion and facilitate movement. This is a strategy” (quoted after Selim 2017).43 In addition, there was (and still is) a dearth of female police officers and male officers rarely body searched women due to cultural and religious barriers, potentially enabling female terrorists to escape scrutiny.44 In this regard, the enhanced reliance of terrorist groups on women somewhat paradoxically also appears to be due to the massive (and often brute) counterterrorism crackdowns following the 2016 Holey Artisan attack in which many male terrorist operatives were arrested or killed. Khan and Rabbi (2016), for instance, argue that the so-called Neo-JMB reinforced its efforts to recruit women “to dodge law enforcers [by] using security loopholes.” The lack of female officers and the previous underestimation of women’s roles in terrorism might have acted as pull factors encouraging radicalized women to engage in terrorist activities. Concurrently, these conditions also made the use of female operatives an attractive option for terrorist groups, which may have reacted to this opportunity

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  61 by either creating more incentives to pull women into their fold or by enhancing their efforts to push (or force) women into terrorist activities. However, given the arrest of a growing number of female terrorists, Bangladesh’s law enforcement agencies have become increasingly aware of the terrorist threat posed by women in recent years. For instance, an investigating officer handling the case of a female militant who had participated in manufacturing explosives stated that he had not been surprised to discover the woman’s involvement in terrorism as there were many women who joined terrorism for various reasons these days.45 On the negative side, this new awareness means that women have increasingly begun to fall victim to the same abuses that have long characterized counterterrorism efforts targeting men. Our ongoing research provides significant evidence of excessive, illegal arrests. For instance, we came across several women who credibly stated that they had been arrested because of their husbands’ (or other male relatives’) rather than their own involvement in terrorism, with inconsistencies in police and court documents and additional field interviews providing evidence for their claims (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). Concurrently, knowledge about the specific motives prompting women to engage in terrorism seems to remain low in police circles, limiting the capabilities of the security apparatus to counter female radicalization where it occurs. In particular, while individual security analysts and police officers have begun to study the causes of female radicalization,46 no concerted effort to systematically analyze the cases of all the women arrested or killed for their (suspected) involvement in terrorism has been undertaken so far. As noted, police officers have tended to emphasize the radicalization of women by male family members. However, the abovementioned cases of women who self-radicalized and/or played proactive roles in terrorist groups suggest that this presumption is often at least partly based on patriarchal stereotypes held by the respective counterterrorism officials themselves. For instance, a male police officer interviewed criticized patriarchal domination in society. The existence of (areligious) social patriarchy, he argued, was a major cause for the growing involvement of women in terrorism, because it facilitated the radicalization of women by male family members. Concurrently, however, he also argued that, owing to the pervasiveness of patriarchal norms, women also generally “want[ed] to be dominated by men.” Even educated women who were financially independent, he elaborated, would eventually ask their husbands or other male family members before taking decisions.47 Similarly, a female police officer opined that the inability of Bangladeshi women to think and take decisions autonomously was the main reason driving female terrorism. When asked about the case of the Melbourne attacker, who self-radicalized, the officer answered that the reasons for the woman’s radicalization had been “mixed” and that an important one had been the fact that she had been frustrated about failing to marry her boyfriend who had migrated to Turkey to join IS in Syria.48 While, as noted, the exact shares of women who self-radicalized and those who were radicalized by male family members remain unknown as yet, it is obvious that such preconceptions may prevent security officials from identifying cases of women’s proactive self-radicalization.

62  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad The problem is further aggravated by the fact that, due to the lack of female police officers, female terrorism suspects are often interrogated by men, potentially leading to further misconceptions about the motives driving female radicalization. Still more problematically, however, arrested female terrorism suspects are often subject to human rights violations, including the lack of quality food and medical care, the interrogation of pregnant women at night, verbal abuse, or even torture (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). Where orthodox but hitherto non-violent women are questioned and/or discriminated against by male officers or are even tortured, this may radicalize these women, along with other people in their social surroundings.

Consequences of Female Terrorism Given that the research on female terrorism in Bangladesh is still nascent, little is known about the implications that the growing involvement of women in terrorism may have for national security and Bangladeshi society. In the following sections, we summarize the scattered existing insights on this issue and complement them with our own analysis. Regarding national security, a growing engagement of women in terrorist operations could aggravate terrorism in Bangladesh for various reasons. Specifically, the enhanced employment of female operatives and the establishment of women branches may enable terrorist groups to further diversify their organization structures, rendering them more flexible. In addition, the growing involvement of women may allow terrorist groups to make deeper inroads into what is still a predominantly moderate and secularly oriented society (e.g., Hasan 2016). Many experts fear that, given the widespread prevalence of traditional family structures, women subscribing to jihadist ideology will often radicalize their children and other junior family members as well (Rashid 2016),49 ultimately leading entire extended families to succumb to terrorism. It is noteworthy, however, that this fear is largely at odds with the assessment, dominant in security and journalistic circles, that women are usually pushed or forced into militancy by their husbands, pointing to the need to further investigate the dynamics of radicalization that occur within families. Regardless of whether women actively radicalize other family members or are dragged into terrorism by relatives, the involvement of women in terrorist groups significantly enhances security risks for children and, at worst, child casualties. In March 2017, for instance, four children were killed in a reported suicide blast during the so-called Operation Maximus, a large-scale raid of a terrorist den in Moulvibazar (Bdnews24.com 2017). Given that women make up one half of Bangladesh’s population, jihadist groups under certain circumstances might need female support to capture state power and establish sharia law, a possibility that many terrorist groups have apparently just started to grasp.50 This consideration is especially relevant for IS and local IS affiliates, whose ideology of the Caliphate attributes women with central, albeit clearly not equal, roles in the establishment of Islamic rule (Spencer 2016). Finally, the occurrence of physical attacks by women inside the country

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  63 would clearly enhance the public visibility of terrorist groups, as such attacks tend to generate more media publicity than those conducted by men (Alam 2020; Mohsina 2017a). Female terrorism also has wider social implications. Specifically, it may add another layer of social insecurity, enhancing distrust among local communities in general and among women in particular. Similarly, female terrorism may further weaken Bangladesh’s interreligious community relations, which have been strained in the last two decades, owing to ongoing attacks on religious minorities and rising religious orthodoxy.51 On a positive note, the fact that female terrorism has laid bare many of the deficits that presently exist in Bangladesh’s counterterrorism infrastructure may lead to some reforms. Security officials and analysts, for instance, have begun to acknowledge the growing need for both more female security officers52 and for involving the latter more proactively in operational tasks,53 possibly prompting efforts to address these challenges. Moreover, while security officials still lack knowledge about the motives driving women’s self-radicalization due to patriarchal stereotypes, they generally acknowledge that the existence of patriarchal structures may constitute an important driver of female terrorism.54 On the negative side, however, increasing police attention on women’s involvement in terrorism may further enhance the victimization of women in the context of counterterrorism drives. In a nutshell, all of this points to the necessity to develop and implement counterterrorism approaches that respect human rights.

Conclusion In this article, we set out to provide a more comprehensive picture of the manifestations, causes and consequences of female terrorism in Bangladesh. Regarding its manifestations, female terrorism in Bangladesh seems to be predominantly a Salafist phenomenon that gained in importance with the rise of IS. However, the advent of IS’s ideology of the Caliphate from 2014 onwards did not start the involvement of Bangladeshi women in terrorism, as the JMB, which was ideologically close to al-Qaeda, had begun to recruit women, and, at times, train them for terrorist activities much earlier (Roul 2021). In addition, the recent arrest of an allegedly highly active female AI operative might signal that AQIS and its Bangladeshi affiliates are also increasingly involving women in more active roles. These findings also have implications for the wider research on women’s participation in terrorism, which has often stressed the role of IS in promoting female jihadism (e.g., Davis 2017: 123). Regarding the causes of female terrorism, our analysis suggests that the pull factors warrant further attention. Specifically, while it is true that female terrorists are often married to male militants and are sometimes radicalized by male family members, our research also provides strong indications that a considerable number of female terrorists are self-radicalized and/or join terrorism willingly owing to their own ideological convictions. Accordingly, several educated middle and upper middle-class women appear to have been pulled into terrorism by jihadist

64  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad appeals. Concurrently, terrorist engagement by women has also been structurally enabled by deficits in the security apparatus. Interestingly, a theme that cuts across all the causes of female terrorism identified in this chapter is patriarchy. Patriarchal patterns of male dominance are at play where women are persuaded or forced into militancy by male family members.55 Conversely, however, some women might also join terrorism to oppose traditional, areligious forms of patriarchy (e.g., BIPSS 2018: 11–14), even though the Islamist utopia that IS and other terrorist groups propagate is itself highly patriarchal. At the same time, patriarchal stereotypes often seem to have prompted security officials to overlook women’s agency, thereby preventing them from grasping the full panoply of causes driving female radicalization. However, more systematic research is needed to better understand the relative importance of push and pull factors in driving women’s radicalization. Regarding its consequences, the enhanced involvement of women in terrorism may give terrorist groups a new impetus, while reinforcing existing social tensions. Against this backdrop, future academic and policy-oriented research should systematically analyze the motives driving women to join terrorism by interviewing family members and acquaintances of female terrorists, the police officers handling their cases, and, where possible, female militants and terrorism dropouts themselves (Lorch and Azad forthcoming). In this regard, future studies should also explore the complex and often contradictory roles of patriarchy in pushing and pulling women into terrorism. In addition, future research should further investigate the social consequences of female terrorism. Given the limited feasibility of large-scale surveys in Bangladesh, such research could potentially start with ethnographic in-depth studies in the communities from which female terrorists have hailed. Ultimately, government efforts to prevent and counter female terrorism will only be successful if they respect human rights and, thereby, limit the risk of creating what terrorist groups can portray as female martyrs. Accordingly, foreign security and development policymakers engaging with Bangladesh should hold Bangladeshi security forces and the Bangladeshi government accountable to international human rights standards.

Notes * The field research for this article was supported by the Institute for Asian Studies of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and by the KonradAdenauer-Stiftung (KAS). 1 Interviews, Dhaka, March 2017. 2 Alam (2020) provides such an estimate, which, however, is contradicted by police reports (see below). 3 Interviews: two Additional Deputy Commissioners of the police, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. 4 All police and court documents used are on file with the authors. 5 Clarificatory telephone interview with Labu, 2 April 2021; interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 1, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. 6 HA is used in this table as an abbreviation for Holey Artisan. 7 Interview: terrorism expert, Berlin, May 2022. 8 Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 1, Dhaka, 19 October 2020.

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  65 9 South Asian Ahle Hadith thought is an orthodox Sunni ideology that can be considered as the ideological equivalent of Middle Eastern Salafism with which it shares its core tenets. Specifically, these tenets are the quest to go back to the ‘true’ version of Islam, the strict adherence to the oneness of God (tawhid), the recognition of the Qur’an and the  Hadith  as the sole sources of religious and judicial authority, and the rejection of the traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence (madhhabs). Similarly, both Salafists and followers of Ahle Hadith aim to cleanse Islam of innovations (bid’a) (Lorch 2018). 10 Interviews, Dhaka, March 2017. 11 Interview: terrorism expert, Dhaka, 4 March 2017. 12 Interview: family member of the woman, August 2019 13 Interviews: investigator of the woman’s case, Dhaka, September 2021; father of the woman, August 2021. 14 Interview: expert on online radicalization, January 2021. 15 Interviews, Dhaka, March 2017. 16 Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Interview: counterterrorism intelligence analyst, Dhaka, 15 December 2020. 20 Telephone interview: senior journalist, 15 January 2022. 21 Interviews with two lawyers and a local journalist, Sylhet, September 2021. 22 Cited after Roul (2021). 23 Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 2, 19 October 2020. 24 Police profile on the woman; on file with the authors. 25 Interviews: two police officers, Dhaka, December 2021; the information was corroborated in an interview with a third police officer, conducted in February  2022, who likewise indicated that the woman had died in a police operation. 26 Interviews: family member, November 2021, June 2022. 27 Confessional statement of a female Neo-JMB member; on file with the authors. 28 Telephone interview: international terrorism expert, August 2021. 29 Confessional statements of two women reportedly arrested with suicide vests; on file with the authors. 30 E.g., interviews: Additional Deputy Commissioners of the police 1 and 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. 31 Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 2, 19 October 2020. 32 Interview: counterterrorism intelligence analyst, Dhaka, 15 December 2020. 33 Interview: academic expert, Dhaka, 13 September 2020. 34 Interview: counterterrorism intelligence analyst, Dhaka, 15 December 2020. 35 Police profile of one of these women; on file with the authors; corroborated with interviews with police officers and relatives. 36 See also, interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 1, Dhaka, 19 October 2020 37 Ibid. 38 Telephone interview: family member, November 2021. 39 Police profile of the wife of an alledged Neo-JMB leader; on file with the authors. 40 Telephone interview: university friend, December 2020. 41 Ibid. 42 Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. 43 Author’s translation from Bengali, M Abul Kalam Azad. 44 Interviews: Additional Deputy Commissioners of the police 1 and 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. 45 Telephone interview: investigating officer, 25 October 2021. 46 Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020; counter-terrorism intelligence analyst, Dhaka, 15 December 2020. 47 Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 1, Dhaka, 19 October 2020.

66  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad 48 49 50 51 52 53

Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 1, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. Interview: counterterrorism intelligence analyst, Dhaka, 15 December 2020. Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. Interviews: police officers who handled cases involving female terrorism suspects, 13 October 2021, 4 December 2021 (two interviews), 13 February 2022. 54 Interviews: Additional Deputy Commissioners of the police 1 and 2, Dhaka, 19 October 2020. 55 Interview: Additional Deputy Commissioner of the police 1, Dhaka, 19 October 2020.

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Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  67 ———. (2018) Sister Follows Suit. 14 February. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar. net/city/cop-comes-under-knife-attack-1534435. [Accessed: 2 April 2, 2021]. Davis, J. (2017) Women in Modern Terrorism. From Liberation Wars to Global Jihad and the Islamic State. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Deutsche Welle. (2016) Looking Back 2018: From Neo-JMB to Suicidal Women. [Online] Available from: https://p.dw.com/p/2V57u. [Accessed: 29 November 2020]. [in Bengali]. Dhaka Tribune. (2021) Female Ansar Al-Islam Member Makes Confessional Statement. 2 September. [Online] Available from: https://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/ court/2021/09/02/female-ansar-al-islam-member-makes-confessional-statement. [Accessed: 8 September 2021]. Farnsworth, S. (2019) Bangladeshi Student’s Lone Wolf Terror Attack in Melbourne Left Daughter with Flashbacks, Victim Says. ABC News. 29 January. [Online]. Available from www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-29/islamic-state-inspired-mill-park-stabbingmomena-shoma/10758498. [Accessed: 2 April 2021]. Freedom House. (2021) Bangladesh Country Report 2021. [Online] Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/country/bangladesh/freedom-world/2021. [Accessed: 18 January 2022]. Hasan, M.K., et al. (2016) Mother and Child May Have Been Slated for Suicide Attack. Dhaka Tribune. 26 December 2016. [Online] Available from: https://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/2016/12/26/mother-child-may-slated-suicide-attack. [Accessed: 27 June 2022]. Hasan, S. (2016) Now Women Militants! Prothom Alo. [Online] Available from: t.ly/y52C. [Accessed: 18 October 2020]. [in Bengali]. Huq, S. (2011) Piety, Music and Gender Transformation: Reconfiguring Women as Culture Bearing Markers of Modernity and Nationalism in Bangladesh. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies. 12 (2). pp. 225–239. Huq, S. and Rashid, S.F. (2008) Refashioning Islam: Elite Women and Piety in Bangladesh. Contemporary Islam. 2 (1). pp. 7–22. ICG (International Crisis Group). (2006)Bangladesh Today.Asia Report No. 121. [Online]Available from: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/121-bangladesh-today.pdf. [Accessed: 2 April 2021]. ———. (2018) Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh. Asia Report No. 295. [Online] Available from: www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/295-countering-jihadistmilitancy-bangladesh. [Accessed: 2 April 2021]. Khan, M.J. and Rabbi, A.R. (2016) Women Being ‘Forced’ Into New JMB. Dhaka Tribune. [Online] Available from: www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2016/10/11/recruitingwomen-now-new-goal-terrorists. [Accessed: 19 November 2020]. Khan, S.E. (2018) Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 28 (1). pp. 191–271. ———. (2019) The Gender Dimension of Extremism: The Unfolding Links Between Women and Extremism in Bangladesh. In: Isezaki, M.H.K. and Yasir, S. (eds.). Radicalization in South Asia. New Delhi: SAGE Publications Pvt Ltd. Kollol, K. (2016) Are Women Getting Involved in Militancy in Bangladesh Under the Pressure of their Husbands? BBC Bengali. [Online] Available from: www.bbc.com/bengali/ 38443229. [Accessed: 19 October 2020]. [in Bengali]. Kugelman, M. and Ahmad, A. (2017) Why Extremism Is on the Rise in Bangladesh. Foreign Affairs. 27 July. [Online] Available from: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ asia/2017-07-27/why-extremism-rise-bangladesh. [Accessed: 20 November 2021].

68  Jasmin Lorch and M Abul Kalam Azad Labu, N. (2018) Nabila’s Decent into Extremism. Dhaka Tribune. 7 April. [Online] Available from: https://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/2018/04/07/nabilas-descentinto-extremism. [Accessed: 12 January 2022]. ———. (2019) Number of Women Involved in Militancy is on Rise. Bangla Tribune. [Online] Available from: www.banglatribune.com/598378. [Accessed: 19 October 2020]. [in Bengali]. Liton, B.A. (2017) Three ‘Militants’ Die in Suicide Blasts in Rajshahi’s Godagari Area. Bdnews24.com. 11 May. [Online]. Available from: https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/ 2017/05/11/three-militants-die-in-suicide-blasts-in-rajshahi-s-godagari-area. [Accessed: 2 April 2021]. Lorch, J. (2018) Trajectories of Political Salafism: Insights from the Ahle Hadith Movement in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In: Middle East Institute (MEI) (ed.). Middle East Asia Project (MAP) Series. 30 October. [Online] Available from: www.mei.edu/publications/trajectories-political-salafism-insights-ahle-hadith-movement-pakistan-andbangladesh. [Accessed: 2 April 2021]. ———. (2020) Terrorism in Bangladesh: Understanding a Complex Phenomenon. Asian Survey: A Bimonthly Review of Contemporary Asian Affairs. 60 (4). pp. 778–802. Lorch, J. and Chakroun, H. (2020) Othering Within the Islamist Spectrum: Ennahda and the Political Salafists in Tunisia. Middle East Law and Governance. 12 (2). pp. 198–221. Manik, J.A. (2009) Trained Female JMB Militants Appear on Scene for First Time. Daily Star. 21 February. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-76813. [Accessed: 18 January 2022]. ———. (2016) 2 Suspected Militants Detonate Suicide Bombs During a Police Raid in Bangladesh. New York Times. 24 December. [Online] Available from: https://www. nytimes.com/2016/12/24/world/asia/dhaka-terrorist-attack-bangladesh.html. [Accessed: 23 August 2022]. Milam, W.B. (2016) The Real Source of Terrorism in Bangladesh. New York Times. 16 May. [Online] Available from: www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/opinion/the-real-sourceof-terror-in-bangladesh.html. [Accessed: 18 January 2022]. Mohsina, N. (2017a) Growing Trends of Female Jihadism in Bangladesh. The Diplomat. 24 March. [Online] Available from: https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/growing-trendsof-female-jihadism-in-bangladesh. [Accessed: 20 November 2020]. ———. (2017b) Growing Trends of Female ‘Jihadism’ in Bangladesh. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 9 (8). pp. 5–11. Mostofa, S.M. (2020) Key Drivers of Female Radicalisation Bangladesh. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 12 (4). pp. 27–31. Mukharji, S. (2016) Bangladesh Can Not Go Soft on Terror. Dailyo. 29 December. [Online] Available from www.dailyo.in/politics/bangladesh-terror-attacks-suicide-bombingindia-border-is-jmb-sheikh-hasina/story/1/14793.html. [Accessed: 2 April 2, 2021]. Oaten, J. (2019) Bangladeshi Student Momena Shoma Sentenced to 42 Years for Terror Attack on Homestay Landlord. ABC News. 5 June. [Online] Available from: www. abc.net.au/news/2019-06-05/bangladeshi-homestay-guest-sentenced-for-engaging-interror-act/11180560. [Accessed: 2 April 2021]. Pearson, E. (2015) The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theory on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad. Policy & Internet. 8. pp. 5–33. Prothom Alo. (2016) Parents Unaware of Second Marriage of Suicidal Shakira. 19 December. [Online] Available from: t.ly/Bhy1. [Accessed: 18 January 2022]. ———. (2018) Melbourne Student Had Contact with Nibras: Police. 29 March. [Online] Available from: https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/Melbourne-student-had-contactwith-Nibras-Police. [Accessed: 2 April 2021].

Female Terrorism in Bangladesh  69 Rashid, A. (2016) Women Extremists and New Trend of Terrorism. Daily Samakal. [Online] Available from: https://samakal.com/todays-print-edition/tp-editorial-comments/article/ 1608232132. [Accessed: 17 November 2020]. [in Bengali]. Riaz, A. (2007) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web. London: Routledge. ———. (2016) Who are the Bangladeshi ‘Islamist Militants’? Perspectives on Terrorism. 10 (1). pp. 2–18. Riaz, A. and Parvez, S. (2018) Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know? Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (6). pp. 944–961. Roul, A. (2014) Al-Qaeda Leader al-Zawahiri Urges Jihad against the ‘Anti-Islamic’ Government of Bangladesh. Terrorism Monitor. 12 (2). pp. 4–6. ———. (2018) The Shifting Narrative of Women’s Role in Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh’s Islamic Jihad. Terrorism Monitor. 16 (22). [Online] Available from: https:// jamestown.org/program/the-shifting-narrative-of-womens-role-in-jamaat-ul-mujahi deen-bangladeshs-islamic-jihad/. [Accessed: 18 January 2022]. ———. (2021) Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh’s Female Members Further Islamic State’s Recruitment and Propaganda. Terrorism Monitor Volume. 19 (3). [Online] Available from: https://jamestown.org/program/neo-jamaatul-mujahideen-bangladeshs-female-mem bers-further-islamic-states-recruitment-and-propaganda/. [Accessed: 18 January 2022]. Selim, M. (2017) Why Women Are Becoming Militants. Daily Pratadin. [Online] Available from: www.bd-pratidin.com/first-page/2017/03/20/216386. [Accessed: 30 November 2020]. Spencer, A.N. (2016) The Hidden Face of Terrorism: An Analysis of the Women in Islamic State. Journal of Strategic Security. 9 (3). pp. 74–98. Stratfor Worldview. (2016) The Islamic State Seeks to Expand its Reach in Bangladesh. 20 April. [Online] Accessed from: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/islamic-stateseeks-expand-its-reach-bangladesh. [Accessed: 2 April 2021]. Sultan, T. (2017) Why Women in Militancy? Prothom Alo. [Online] Available from: t.ly/ Qwol. [Accessed: 20 November 2020]. [in Bengali]. Tipu, M.S.I. (2020) Three Years into Hotel Olio Blast: Trial Yet to Start. Dhaka Tribune. 14 August. [Online] Available from: https://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/ 2020/08/14/3-years-into-hotel-olio-blast-trial-yet-to-start. [Accessed: 18 January 2022]. Ward, K. (2009) Non-violent Extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Australian Journal of International Affairs. 63 (2). pp. 149–164.

4 Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh Bulbul Siddiqi

Understanding narratives has been a popular and effective approach among academics since 9/11 for a better conceptualization of terrorism in the global context. Yet there remains a sense of ambiguity in defining the concept of narrative within the violent extremism literature (Halverson et al. 2011). Similarly, this approach of using narratives in understanding violent terrorism in Bangladesh has been on the rise as the country witnessed several terror attacks during the last two decades. This received considerable attention from many academics interested in understanding the process of radicalization leading to violent terrorism. In particular, such work has focused on the urban youth as the recent trend shows that the number of cases among this group has increased (Siddiqi 2019; Riaz 2016). Besides, the use of narrative intervention has been useful and popular in countering violent extremism globally (Ferguson and McAuley 2019). Scholars also suggest applying the idea of narrative intervention to counter violent extremism in Bangladesh (Rahman 2019). Understanding narratives in conceptualizing the process of recruiting jihadists has been very compelling, although initially it remained confined within the context of al-Qaeda, the ISIS, the Middle East, and some parts of South Asia. Furthermore, studies on narrative suggest that the formation and use of narratives among various Islamist groups worldwide demonstrate significant similarities, which in most cases use a shared idea of narrative (Furlow and Goodall 2011). Thus, understanding and analyzing master narratives should be a priority area in understanding violent extremism in the global context (Raffie 2012). However, there remains a gap in understanding the phenomenon of narratives among Western academics, where in many cases the concept of narrative is used interchangeably with story (Halverson et al. 2011). This is no different in Bangladesh. This shows the ambiguity and risk in using this essential yet underdeveloped concept in understanding terrorism. Thus, the idea of narrative has to be clearly defined with its distinctiveness for a better understanding of violent extremism (Halverson et al. 2011). Thus, I consider the definition of narratives by Halverson et al. as the most convincing one. Before moving into defining the narrative, the meaning of the story has to be conceptualized in the first place. Halverson et al. describe a story as “a particular sequence of related events that are situated in the past and recounted for rhetorical ideological purposes” (2011: 13). In contrast DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-5

Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh  71 to this view, the narrative is a “coherent system of interrelated and sequentially organized stories that share a common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience expectations according to the known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical form” (Halverson et al. 2011:14). In most cases, academics fail to differentiate between the idea of story and narrative, which has been observed by Halverson et al. (2011). Furthermore, the use of narrative in violent terrorism has to be understood in the context of a particular culture. This mostly depends on how a narrative is constructed and embedded within a sociocultural context. There can be a universal definition of narrative, but the use of a violent extremism or terrorism narrative can be culture-specific. However, for a consistent understanding and discussion of violent terrorism narrative, this chapter will adopt the definition of narrative by Halverson et al. (2011). While discussing the rationality of using narrative in justifying violent extremism, Corman (2016) argues that extremists use an alternative form of rationality that is deeply rooted in their ideas of narrative related to stories to justify their actions. The struggle of defending Islam against the West is an essential element where branding people as the infidel, promoting an armed brotherhood, and the idea of sacrifices have been used to establish the notion of a true believer (Leuprecht et al. 2010). Narratives are also seen as a social product and constructed by respective ideological platforms that also act as a significant force for identity construction (Archetti 2017; Somers and Gibson 1994; Benwell and Stokoe 2006). The narrative helps people connect with their glorious past, motivating many to take guided actions based on their radical and extremist ideology (Lawler 2002). Before undertaking any violent act, radical groups make narratives accessible to their network to validate and justify their violent acts. This is how the construction of narratives serves as the basis for actions (Kruglanski et al. 2018). Various terrorist attacks in many places in Bangladesh in the last few years drew the attention of academics and practitioners of countering violent terrorism. Fifty violent extremist incidents took place between 2013 and 2017, killing 255 and wounding 942 (Parvez 2018: 54). In this context, using the concept of narrative in understanding violent terrorism in Bangladesh would be effective, although the local perspectives may bring a different perspective. In such a context, this chapter explores the perception of selected universitygoing (both public and private) urban youth in Dhaka on how they view accepting or rejecting different types of violent terrorism messages and narratives. This chapter shows that the use of manipulated and manufactured stories in hopes of getting the “glorious past of Islamic civilization” back in modern times (which popularly is defined as jahiliya or the age of ignorance) is a key strategy in narrative formation. Since the people in Bangladesh are generally sympathetic toward Islam, the use of texts and stories associated with their faith has become a prominent strategy that has a higher possibility of being accepted by many youths. “Popular narratives” have been repeatedly used to engender sympathy among Muslims across the globe on the sufferings of other Muslims. Finally, the chapter argues that various violent terrorism narratives in many cases influence the feelings of the youths, although it does not necessarily motivate everyone to adopt violent action.

72  Bulbul Siddiqi

Methods There remains a lack of qualitative data in understanding terrorism narratives in Bangladesh because of the challenging nature of researching the subject – that is, the sensitivity of the subject in Bangladesh. Also, there is no significant research about young people’s perceptions of terrorism narratives in Bangladesh with a focus on how they understand it from their sociocultural perspectives. This background inspired me to apply a qualitative research method to understand the impact of violent terrorism narratives on urban youths. Twenty-five in-depth interviews (IDI) were conducted among students from leading private and public universities in Dhaka. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the names of the institutions are not mentioned in the chapter. For the convenience of conducting qualitative data, only selected universities from Dhaka were considered. The age of the participants ranged from 20 to 24 years, comprising both male and female students. Data were collected from three public universities and three private universities. The socioeconomic background of students of public and private universities are significantly different as students from well-off families can afford to enroll in private universities due to its higher expenses. Although a good number of students prefer to go to public universities, the popularity of private universities is on the rise. This is why these two categories were included to see if there any differences exist in understanding violent terrorism. Nearly 50  percent participants were female students. Since this is a qualitative study, it does not represent the total population, but rather it aims to explore patterns from students from the selected universities. A semi-structured interview guide was used while carrying out in-depth interviews among the students. Besides, observation from the author’s long qualitative research in this area enriched the understanding of violent terrorism narratives further.

Perceiving Terrorism and Narratives Results of this research suggest that the students have been targeted for recruitment by various terrorist groups. Evidence also suggests that recruiters particularly target meritorious students with higher grades. Besides, people who are suffering from depression and viewed by the terrorists as mentally weak are also the target as there is a tendency to see them easy to convert. A paper on the Tablighi Jamaat Kepel (2000) referred that targeting people who suffer from disorientation, ethical crisis, loss of direction, and frustration with Western life is very common among the Tablighi Jamaat. However, there remains a debate on whether the Tablighi Jamaat is classed as a radical group (Roy 2006; Alexiev 2005) or a piety movement (Metcalf 2002; Siddiqi 2018). Some participants also mentioned that targeting students from the upper class has been on the rise at the present time, where the traditional view was to blame the students of conventional Islamic educational institutes which are known as madrasa (Nelson and Oldmixon 2018). However, there is a growing argument about the fact that the traditional idea of blaming students from madrasa is problematic as many recent militants come

Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh  73 mainly from better-off families with higher levels of education (Siddiqi 2019; Riaz 2016; Riaz and Parvez 2018). While exploring the perception of young students, all participants reported having ideas about terrorism. Very few participants in this research failed to share their ideas in defining terrorism clearly, although their explanation shows that they could understand the concept. Most participants understood religionbased terrorism while we were talking about the terrorism narratives. The participants used the following word and phrases while defining terrorism based on their understanding: extreme behavior, lack of mutual respect and love, forcibly imposing decisions and ideas on others, hurting emotions of other religious views, imposing one’s view on others using violent measures, violent and terror attacks. In this context, one participant (a master’s student from a public university) said: Terrorism is a condition when we see that people lack mutual respect and when a group wants to impose their views and ideology forcibly on others. This can be expressed through oppression, harassment and other forms of loss. For example, when people attacked Muslims and destroyed Babri mosque [a mosque located in Ayodhya, India] due to religious issues at that time. Although the concept of narrative is not very clear among many participants, most of them managed to articulate the idea of using various Islamic stories that were engineered to attract and motivate the youth. In many cases, recruiters use various concepts and stories in violent terrorism narratives to inspire and recruit the youth. Among them, the concept of Jihad, martyr, and the aspiration of heaven, establishing the rule of the Quran (which refers to the Sharia-based legal system), criticism of female leadership, use of the concept of kafir to refer non-Muslims in general, a radical interpretation of the idea of nationalism, and a glorious past of the Muslim civilization are the stories most frequently referred to by the participants.1 In this context, one third-year student from a leading private university said: They have many strategic plans to attract youth. For example, establishing Islamic rule in a country is a widespread strategy for them to attract the youth. In many cases, problematizing women’s leadership has been another common strategy. They also use the concept of Shahid [martyr] and the reward that they would get for it. One common interpretation is that a Shahid would be granted zannah [heaven]. So, they have direct afterlife benefits. They use this type of story as a concept on purpose. Sufferings of global Muslims and the romanticisms of getting back the glorious past of Islamic civilization are the two other popular approaches for them. In Bangladesh, “stories” and “myths” about martyrs are very appealing. They represent the belief that if someone is a martyr, they will attain heaven without

74  Bulbul Siddiqi any judgment on the Day of Judgment. Therefore, the aspiration to qualify as a potential martyr helps many people to be motivated by the propagation of many radical groups through their violent terrorism narratives. Particularly, when a radical group perceives to be threatened by an enemy, they inspire others with the idea of being a hero or martyr. They justify such violent acts with narratives of a glorified past (Kruglanski et al. 2018). Moreover, such sacrifices are regarded as a necessary pre-condition of being recognized as a “true believer” (Leuprecht et al. 2010). The process of generating and developing a narrative from various Islamic stories is very important. Most of the participants commented that the construction of the narrative is the key step for them to target the youth as the youth can easily be motivated using various social media. There are people in jihadi groups who can compose, memorize, and recite poems that they wrote in camps (Hegghammer 2015). It is not a fast process; instead, the recruiters follow a prolonged process while targeting the youth. A participant, a third-year student from a leading private university, mentioned: The younger generation can be easily motivated by seeing these from various social media platforms, particularly Facebook. You can easily find these types of Facebook posts. Sometimes people go to YouTube after seeing the sufferings of Muslims across the world to search more like these incidents. I  think these are the ways to motivate the youth into a violent extremist ideology. While looking at the target of violent terrorism narratives, it could be easily seen from this study that the youth are the main target of various types of violent terrorism narratives. All participants mentioned that the recruiters mainly target the youth as they are easy to motivate and manipulate, and they need the youth to increase their active followers. They also target people who are living in a financially challenging situation. Sometimes these youth hope to receive financial support in return for their active participation in their callings. It was evident that offline and online platforms have been used to attract youth. Offline platform refers to printed materials, including various jihadi books and pamphlets, wazmahfil, seminaries, informal gatherings, taleem sessions, or small congregations within a neighborhood and many more.2 Participants also talk about the impact of wazmahfil that has an effect on disseminating radical thoughts. Wazmahfil generally starts as a form of localized form of Islamic preaching (Stille 2016). This is an effective way of communicating the messages and stories in a narrative structure to attract people. However, it was found from the research that wazmahfil does not have much appeal among the urban youth, particularly university students. Since the youth, in general, are more into various types of social media, the recruiters also use these platforms very often as their key process of radicalizing them. Among different types of social media, Facebook is found to be very popular among them.

Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh  75

Fractured Stories, Manipulation, and the Glorious Past of Islam The use of stories from the time of the Prophet and his companion was a widespread strategy among many radicalized groups to attract new members (Siddiqi 2019; Lawler 2002). The use of Islamic poetry and songs to mobilize support for their violent activities is also a widely employed phenomenon (Hegghammer 2015; Saikal 2016). In such cases, fractured and manipulated stories of the glorious past of Islam are being used in the present time, as many of my participants reported. Motivating the youth on terrorism at the age of information technology and social media has become easier than ever. Online radicalization is also an effective approach for many (Riaz and Parvez 2018; Parvez 2017). However, one of my participants argues that people are moving away from targeting someone online as it may keep the record of their activities for a while. This was clear from what many young people who participated as interviewees in this study said: they are aware of using stories to attract the youth, but they are not very familiar with the types of stories that have been used for terrorism narratives, since they have not directly interacted with terrorists in any way. However, many of the participants mentioned several types of stories and narratives, which they believe that the terrorists frequently use to attract and recruit youth. Besides, they marked that these narratives are fractured and manipulated in a way so that they attract sympathy from their target group to motivate them to follow and join their terrorist ideology. Participants generally referred to the stories of war from the time of the prophet that is usually known as Jihad. Another common narrative is that the glorious past of Islam when Islamic rule was established. Such narratives of the historical past of Islam generate a desire to establish an Islamic society in the present day. In this context, a participant, a third-year male student of a public university, mentioned: They [terrorists] use the stories of “great” war that the prophet Muhammad (pbuh3) participated in justifying war and creating a sympathized mindset among the youths . . . while glorifying war they brought the example of jihad to protect Islam as they see the present time as a new era of Jahiliya [the age of ignorance]. Therefore, all types of jihad are justified now. A similar view was expressed by another third-year student from a leading private university: First of all, they target a particular group or a person and then they slowly motivate them to listen to their manufactured stories associated with religious narratives. Repeated and manufactured storytelling is a way of creating an impact on the target group. Previous study also shows that narratives of the glorious past of

76  Bulbul Siddiqi Islam are used by many as a method of connecting people (Lawler 2002). This is also evident in the present chapter. Storytelling, reading, and engaging in discussion on the various jihadist contexts that historically Islamic civilization went through was reported to be an effective approach. Repeated listening to such stories helps to form a sense of communal identity (Siddiqi 2018). It influences many youths to join. This is why it is essential to understand the process of repeated storytelling. The repeated use of narratives appears to be true for many people, and they fail to verify the sources and contexts of such stories. The entire purpose of propagating a piece of fractured or partial information in terrorism narratives is to create hatred and position others against Muslims. A typical example came through that Muslims are the target of all communities, which is a misinterpretation as one of the participants, a second-year female student of a private university, shares her opinion toward extremist narratives: The Christians and Hindus want to wipe out the Muslims entirely. According to them [radical groups], no community wants the good for the Muslims. They propagate a wrong interpretation of heaven and jihad to motivate and attract their targets. The purpose of such discussion and explanation is to create an urge to defend Islam from the West, which is a common element of constructing violent extremist narratives (Hegghammer 2015; Leuprecht et al. 2010). In propagating such fractured and particle information, comparison between Islam and other religions is another way of presenting Islam as a superior religion in the construction of narrative, where Muslims are portrayed as good Muslims over other people. Therefore, it is seen as the key responsibility for many radicalized people to establish an Islamic environment bringing back the glorious past of Islam. The main inspiration of coming with narratives is to bring back the glorious past of Islamic civilization and the rule of Islamic order in the present time to protect the Muslims who are suffering globally. In this context, Siddiqi (2019) also shows that there are many cases in Bangladesh where alleged extremist youth had been motivated using the narratives of the sufferings of Syrian refugees and the “Western oppression” toward them. There was a case where a young Bangladeshi man went to Syria to carry out Jihad. His eventual realization was that the terrorist group had conned him into becoming a so-called jihadist by exploiting Syrian Muslims’ suffering.

Sufferings of Global Muslims: A Process of Generating Sympathy Findings from the research indicate that dramatizing the concept of global Muslim suffering is the most common means of developing a soft corner among youth. They also create a sense of hatred against the Western world in general so that they can recruit people to join their so-called holy war as the protector of the

Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh  77 Islamic world. As a participant, a third-year undergraduate student of a private university, mentioned in this context: They spread their manipulated stories in many ways. It begins with dramatizing the nature of suffering and Western oppression of the Muslims across the globe. Mainly they draw examples from the contemporary crisis in Syria, Afghanistan, and so on. It was done repeatedly in various platforms.  .  .  . Propagating such news and messages has been used to create hatred and urge of revenge among their targets. Through this process, the oppressors are portrayed as kafir; thus, the Muslims should kill them to avail of heaven. Another participant, an undergraduate student of a private university in Dhaka, noted that the recruiters create a sympathized mindset among many youths using the sufferings of Muslims across the world in this way: I am not quite sure about the types of stories that have been used to motivate the youth, but I heard that many people use the idea of the suffering of Muslims around the world to create a sympathetic mindset. Many people cannot take this easily, which creates a problem [they have become radicalized]. While discussing the sufferings of Muslims across the globe, a female participant referred to the dramatized and exaggerated use of the sufferings of global Muslims. In creating such context, propagating rumors and hoaxes to fabricate an issue was also evident. Propaganda videos portraying the sufferings of the Muslims in various places and hymns make jihadists weep, which shows the impact of such narratives (Hegghammer 2015). In the process of doing so, the recruiters shift the focus of their discussion to motivate someone to join their cause. Besides disobeying the prophet and the Quran, news of abolishing mosques in other countries were frequently mentioned elements of the stories that have been used by many radical groups. In this context, a participant, a fourth-year male student of a public university, mentioned: People started to propagate with the stories that helped to build a strong identity as Muslims. They emphasize the fact that Islam is the only element for their identity. To motivate their target, they start to share the stories of destroying mosques, burning the Quran by others, or disobeying the prophet. These are exaggeratedly propagated among many people to create a perceived threat to their identity, which generates a sense of hatred to make people violent. In such a context, sometimes the recruiters also change the meaning of a verse in their translation purposefully to attract the sympathy of their target group. Another participant talked about how people can manipulate the various meanings of the Quran to attract youth. This has become an effective and straightforward approach to influence people who do not have sufficient knowledge about the text of the

78  Bulbul Siddiqi Quran for a particular or specific context (Razak et al. 2020; Shah 2018). This participant, an undergraduate male student from a private university, stated: Sometimes extremist groups target a person or a group by their manipulated text. For example, the use of the manipulated verses from the Quran by changing slightly. As the mass people do not have much idea about the meanings of many verses of the Quran, it has become easy to manipulate the targeted people. Once people are convinced, they start to propagate their cause to join the jihadi activities. An observation can be drawn in this context that most of the people who can recite the Quran do not have the skills to understand the meaning of it as this is how people were trained during their childhood by traditional Quranic scholars in Bangladesh. Most people do not have a sound understanding of the meaning of the Quran, and the recruiters seemed to be taking advantage of such an attitude and approach. Besides, radical groups like IS use selected verses and explain those without a context to justify jihadi actions, which is not guided by Islamic scholars (Razak et al. 2020). In many cases, they just misinterpret it for their purpose (Shah 2018).

Denial and Rejection of Terrorist Narratives Broader literature suggests that the youth are motivated by various types of violent extremism narratives (Kruglanski et al. 2018; Leuprecht et al. 2010; Khan 2013). Since this chapter is written from the perspective of some university-going students, it provides insights from their contextual understanding of terrorism narratives. It shows that they are aware of many processes of terrorism narratives, and they clearly described their position of denying such narratives. Most of the participants explained that they directly reject by not agreeing with the extremist narratives if they encounter any violent terrorist materials. They also related that they do not share such materials on their social media platforms. Besides, some also expressed that it impacts their thought processes to some extent. Although they do not act upon this and consciously avoid and reject such ideas, sometimes it creates a sense of frustration among a few of them. Although most of the participants mentioned that they do not feel attracted to these various types of narratives to convert their thoughts into action, one participant had expressed it differently. He became sympathetic while hearing the sufferings of many Muslims across the globe. Thus, he expects that the perpetrators should be punished. Another participant, a male master’s student from a public university, who looked very sympathetically toward these stories and was not very enthusiastic to talk about these issues mentioned: I do not really think about these too much; this is why there is no point in discussing rejection. However, I feel bad inside but do not want to think much about this.

Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh  79 Feeling bad hearing the sufferings of Muslims and disobeying the religion was expressed by many other participants. It hurts them emotionally; however, they never thought about doing anything. A participant, a second-year male student of a private university, mentioned in this context: I am human; I have emotions and feelings. Naturally, I would feel bad if anyone hurt me with my religion. When I see such incidents in different media, I feel terrible. At the same time, I got angry and thought they should be punished, but I could not do it because we have an administration to look at this. I could inform the law enforcement agency. A similar expression came from another student who believed that “as a citizen of an Islamic country [referred to Muslim majority country] and as a fellow Muslim, I do not feel good when I see any Muslim is suffering and I want to help them.” This statement has an important message where he thinks that Muslims should not suffer in a Muslim majority country. It shows his nationalistic view, which is based on his religious identity. Thus, identity becomes an integral part of his understanding terrorism narratives. Some other participants also shared that terrorism can spread due to conservative views on the idea of nationalism. Another participant, a third-year male student from a private university, who looked very enthusiastic to talk about religion, particularly the “sufferings of Muslims” worldwide, mentioned: I sometimes feel influenced by some of these stories when I see Muslims in India facing problems and being oppressed and tortured by the Hindus, who forced them to chant the phrase “joy sri ram” [Hail Lord Rama]. I  then realized that they should be punished. When I  see the sufferings of Muslims, I feel that I should also go there to protect them or to stay beside them. Some participants mentioned that they do not give any thought to this issue; instead, they prefer to be busy with their own lives. This is how they reject any attempt to use terrorism narratives. A participant, an MA male student of a public university, clarified his position precisely, where he believed that any act of violence would not bring positive change: I think hatred and the tendency to take revenge would not bring any solution for any of the groups. Since I entirely want to see the end of all types of terrorism, how could any of this extremism influence me? This idea helps me a lot to reject every justification for committing violent acts. I also believe that my religion has no way to support violence and teaches us to stay away from any type of violence. The idea of generating hatred through violent narratives was also evident among many other participants as they thought this would not bring a solution. A male

80  Bulbul Siddiqi participant from a public university expressed his frustration about using religion in justifying violent acts, which should not be the case. He mentioned that “I feel bad when I see that people have to face it for the sake of their religion. However, it does not create any hatred inside me.” Creating hatred seems to be an essential outcome of terrorism narratives that have been used to motivate the target to advance in the next step. In a similar context, another participant, a second-year female student of a public university, mentioned: I would listen to someone if this is logical, but if it is all about radicalization and extremism. Instead, I would reject their ideas . . . because, if I have become motivated with such initiatives, it will impact my family. She sees this issue in a broader way than many others as she thinks about the later impacts of terrorism. Many other cases suggest that families of extremists suffer from social stigma once they have become exposed to the broader society for a more extended period. Siddiqi (2019) discusses many such instances. In one case, a sister shared that the entire family was shattered right after her brother was shot down and killed by the law enforcement agency due to an allegation of being an extremist. In this case of accepting violent extremis narratives, youths act like selfish people who do not think of the consequences of their actions over their families. While discussing the process of rejecting terrorism narratives, some participants expressed that they feel bad if they see any portrayal of the sufferings of Muslims in different places around the globe and if they see someone misinterpret Islam However, none of my participants claimed that they would take any action. Throughout my researching these youths, I have commonly observed that they do not express any radical thoughts on social media, even if they feel badly about the suffering of Muslims across the globe. It is not unusual that many people engage themselves in various types of discussion on social media to prove and claim their position as the righteous one in any contemporary debate on Islamic ideology and practices. Many such narratives may not look directly linked with violent extremist narratives, but radical recruiters often keep a sharp eye on those people as potential recruits. However, propagating such thoughts by blaming the West in many cases looks effective to attract the attention of the youth (Raffie 2012). Besides, violent extremist narratives are particularly appealing to the youth for their simplicity, emotional appeal to fear and blaming of the West (RAN 2015). Extremists also skillfully reach the target audiences in a believable manner on various propaganda messages, text and videos (Khan 2013). This is also evident among the participants of this research where many of them actually started to believe the propaganda messages and information from various sources, although they did not show any activity in social media or anywhere else. In this context, Parvez (2019) in a study on Bangladesh shows that jihadists construct a perceived crisis, offer solutions and motivate their targets to take actions, which are in most cases, violent actions.

Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh  81

Conclusion The tendency to form narratives, and their usage in Bangladesh, is no different from other parts of the world. However, the construction of narratives in Bangladesh is deeply rooted in its cultural and religious perspectives, where religion is also rooted in the local culture. Most of the participants are aware of the concept of terrorism and many of them managed to articulate their views on Islamic stories that have now been used as narratives. Besides, since the people in Bangladesh are sympathetic toward Islam, the use of texts and stories associated with their faith has become an obvious strategy as it may have the higher possibility to be accepted by many youths. They generally pick up some topics that people do not have clear ideas about so that they can manipulate and interpret them in ways to motivate the youth to join their cause of promoting terrorism. One way of doing this is to encourage the youth to act immediately to counter the suffering of Muslims all over the world using fractured and manipulated narratives. Furthermore, this chapter shows that the use of manipulated and manufactured stories of the glorious past of the Islamic civilization with a hope of getting their fortune back in modern days (which popularly is defined as jahiliya or the age of ignorance) is becoming a key strategy to form narratives. There also remains an essential factor of misinterpretation of various Islamic contents, particularly Islamic stories and Quranic texts, which many extremist groups use to formulate compelling narratives. This is mainly fractured and manipulated in the hope of bringing back the Islamic rule in the present time. It is also evident that the youth generally reject the idea of violent extremist narratives. Still, some also sympathize with the essence of many of these narratives, mainly related to the global suffering of Muslims, where they do not appreciate the role of oppressors. They believe that these people should be punished. This also shows that these youth have already accepted these narratives of global sufferings to some extent. This is also an expression of showing their solidarity with other Muslims around the world, which in a way is connected with their understanding of the global Muslim ummah. Finally, “popular narratives” have been repeatedly used to instigate sympathy with the sufferings of many Muslims across the globe, which in turn isolate and withdraw many urban youths from their existing social life with a new social role.

Notes 1 Kafir is an Arabic word generally refers to ‘disbeliever’ or ‘infidel’. Sometimes this refers to a derogatory word for non-Muslim. 2 Wazmafil generally refers to the mass congregation where religious scholars are invited to talk about different aspects of religion. Apart from talking about fundamental aspects of religion, they also talk about various contemporary issues that requires religious interpretation and the audience particularly keen to learn about this, such as role and implications of purdah in a contemporary time, girl’s education and mobility, concept of halal and haram and many more. 3 The phrase pbuh is used to show respect to the Prophet Muhammad using it at the end of his name, which refers to peace be upon him.

82  Bulbul Siddiqi

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Terrorism Narratives Among the Urban Youth in Bangladesh  83 ———. (2019) ‘The Khilafah’s Soldiers in Bengal’: Analysing the Islamic State Jihadists and Their Violence Justification Narratives in Bangladesh. Perspectives on Terrorism. 13 (5). pp. 22–38. Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). (2015) Counter Narratives and Alternative Narratives.  RAN Issue Paper. 15. [Online] Available from: t.ly/FX4W. [Accessed 07 February 2022]. Raffie, D.A. (2012) Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism. Journal of Terrorism Research. 3 (2). pp. 13–31. Rahman, M. (2019) Developing Counter-Narrative for De-radicalization in Bangladesh: Issues and Challenges. In: Hasan, M., Isezaki, K. and Yasir, S. (eds.). Radicalisation in South Asia: Context, Trajectories and Implication. New Delhi: Sage. Razak, M.I.A., Ramli, M.A., Aziz, N.H.A., Rahman, M.F.A., Khalid, N.K., Noor, A.F.M. and Basir, M.K.A. (2020) An Analysis on Misconception of Fiqh Jihad by Religious Extremist Group. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences. 10 (4). pp. 262–267. Riaz, A. (2016) Who are the Bangladeshi ‘Islamist Militants’? Perspectives on Terrorism. 10 (1). [Online] Available from: www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2016/002-who-are-the-bangladeshi-islamic-militantsby-ali-riaz.pdf. [Accessed: 8 December 2018]. Riaz, A. and Parvez, S. (2018) Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know? Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (6). pp. 1–18. Roy, O. (2006) Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. Saikal, A. (2016) Women and Jihad: Combating Violent Extremism and Developing New Approaches to Conflict Resolution in the Greater Middle East. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. 36 (3). pp. 313–322. Shah, M.S.A. (2018) IS’ Changing Narrative: How to Counter It. RSIS Commentary, 188, Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. [Online] Available from: www.rsis.edu. sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/CO18188.pdf. [Accessed: 7 February 2022]. Siddiqi, B. (2018) Becoming Good Muslim: The Tablighi Jamaat in the UK and Bangladesh, Singapore: Springer. ———. (2019) Perception of the Pathways towards Radicalisation among Urban Youth in Bangladesh. In: Hasan, M., Isezaki, K. and Yasir, S. (eds.). Radicalisation in South Asia: Context, Trajectories and Implication. New Delhi: SAGE. Somers, M.R. and Gibson, G.D. (1994) Reclaiming the Epistemological ‘Other’: Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity. In: Calhoun, C. (ed.). Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. Stille, M. (2016) Conceptualising Compassion in Communication for Communication Emotional Experience in Islamic Sermons (Bengali waʿz mahfils). Contributions to the History of Concepts. 11 (1). pp. 81–106.

5 How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment? Saimum Parvez

The exponential growth of international communication technologies, particularly the internet, and its impact on society has been one of the most studied subjects in recent years. Among terrorism scholars, security experts, and policymakers, the internet’s role in radicalization, recruitment, and spreading terrorist ideology has become a widespread topic of discussion, research, and publication since 9/11. Many terrorism scholars argue for a very strong role for the internet in terrorism and believe that the internet is an enabler and driver of radicalization (Silber and Bhatt 2007; Stenersen 2008; Briggs 2011). These scholars, who think that the internet plays a maximal role, argue for its significant impact on almost every activity related to terrorism, from disseminating propaganda to recruitment and operational activities (Weimann 2004, 2015; Gendron 2006; Rudner 2013; Brandon 2008). The discussion on online social networks’ ability to substitute face-to-face interactions and have a significant impact on the process of radicalization has also been observed in the extant literature (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al. 2017; Pearson 2016; Bjelopera 2013; Briggs 2011; Conway 2012). However, many scholars remain skeptical about the internet’s power to influence individuals to participate in terrorism (Kenney 2010; Neumann 2013; Rieger et al. 2013; Benson 2014). Maura Conway (2016) identifies three arguments made by scholars against the notion that the internet has a significant role in terrorism. First, exposure to terrorist propaganda content on the internet does not necessarily develop an inclination toward violence: a large number of people other than extremists – that is, researchers and security officials – are exposed to such online content but do not get radicalized. In fact, rather than engaging in terrorism, they may develop more hatred toward it (Archetti 2015). Thus, the connection between the consumption of online jihadist content and engagement in violent extremism is not clear.1 Some scholars also argue that the internet can only reinforce the radical thoughts of an already radicalized individual; therefore, it is not the cause of their radicalization.2 Second, most online extremists have no real commitment or intention to take part in Jihad in real life, and their extremist activities are limited to social media posts only. Proponents of this view argue that no direct relationship exists between online extremists and real-life violent actions (Awan et  al. 2012). This phenomenon of participating in low-cost, low-risk action and obtaining satisfaction solely DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-6

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  85 by clicking on social media posts in the virtual world, without engaging in terrorist activities in the physical one, is known as “clicktivism“or “slacktivism” (Lee and Hsieh 2013). In a study of pro-Islamic State (IS) social media users, Wakeford and Smith (2020) find that a majority of social media account holders are likely to be clicktivists rather than activists (p. 158). Third, emphasizing the importance of in-person interactions for the recruitment, mobilization, and radicalization of terrorists, several scholars note that the internet will never replace face-to-face communications. Recruitment and terrorist operations are considered to be almost impossible without physical contact (Burke 2011; Rogan 2006).3 There are doubts behind considering “lone wolf” as a typology because, in most cases, lone wolves are not really “lone” but usually have “interpersonal, political, or operational ties” with terrorist outfits (Schuurman et al. 2019: 771). Despite this debate on the role of the internet and online propaganda materials in terrorism, existing research cannot deny the abundance of online propaganda materials and the increasing ability of communication technologies to reach potential recruits. Terrorists use the internet as a primary source of communication and for disseminating information and conducting propaganda (von Behr et al. 2013). The recruitment strategies of terrorist outfits have benefitted enormously from the advent of digital communication technologies (Bowman-Grieve 2013). This chapter intends to contribute to the existing literature by exploring the role of the internet in terrorist recruitment in Bangladesh. It analyzes two aspects: first, the availability of online propaganda materials and their contents; second, the changing dynamics of recruitment, in terms of both the recruiters and the recruits. Between 2013 and 2017, more than fifty terrorist attacks occurred in Bangladesh (Parvez 2019a). In the majority of these instances, it appears that the terrorists had used the internet in several ways. A Bangladesh Police study claimed in 2017 that around 82  percent of the arrested terrorists were radicalized through propaganda content on various social media platforms (Khan and Islam 2017). Although these factors clearly indicate the need for exploring the role of the internet in perpetrating terrorism, there are very few scholarly studies available.4 It is somewhat surprising too since Bangladesh is a country with 36 million active social media users and where digital media has arguably replaced traditional media (television, radio, or printed news) as the preferred source for news (Kemp 2020; Willis and Fellow 2017).

Data and Method I have collected the data for this chapter from three sources. The online jihadist propaganda contents are collected from publicly available online platforms and channels, including social media, websites, and chat forums. Besides these primary online data, press reports and court documents have proven valuable sources for this research. Finally, I conducted interviews with security officers, terrorism experts, and journalists.

86  Saimum Parvez Recruiters and recruitment processes analyzed in this chapter are primarily of the terrorist organizations operating in Bangladesh, particularly from the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and its local affiliates Ansar-al-Islam, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), and Harkat-ul-Jihadal-Islami (HUJI). There are also recruiters who operate for small groups and may or may not be directly connected with larger terrorist outfits. In this chapter, the scope of recruitment involves the process of joining a terrorist organization, or a small cell, that intends to participate in any kind of terrorist activities, including but not limited to conducting propaganda, providing logistic support, and participation in attacks. In the cases of the references of the individuals who are somewhat associated with the terrorists but not the subjects of analysis, only the initials of their names have been used. Terrorism research in Bangladesh is complex because of the inseparable amalgam between the violence committed by mainstream political parties in the name of protests and the violent incidents carried out by the terrorists. Frequent “politically motivated” arrests and the government’s accusations of the opposition’s involvement in terrorist attacks (Dhaka Tribune 2015) make it more challenging to discern between political activists and terrorists (Odhikar 2017; Siddiqui et al. 2018). To avoid this bias, I have identified the terrorists who have substantial ties with terrorism. These substantial ties include court convictions, the presentation of charge sheets against a terrorist in court, membership of a jihadi organization, and evidence from memoirs, confession statements, video statements, and extremists’ publications. One limitation of using confession statements as data sources is that there exist allegations that these confessions are made under duress by the security agencies. The confession statements used in this study are made at the courts, in front of a magistrate, not at the police stations. To ensure the authenticity of the data, I have also cross-checked the information with relevant newspaper reports, interviews, and online sources.

The Online Milieu of Terrorism in Bangladesh The diverse and complex online milieu of terrorism in Bangladesh includes numerous websites, social media, chat forums, and instant messaging apps. Online jihadi platforms in Bangladesh mainly translate the original Arabic, Urdu, and English sources into Bangla. Translated versions of the sermons, lectures, and writings of key figures in the jihadi world, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, are often found on jihadi websites. Videos produced by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are also broadcast with Bangla subtitling or subtitles. Some websites in the Bangladeshi cybersphere also function as online libraries or archives of videos, where the jihadis themselves share their own stories and call upon people to join for their cause. Among the online propaganda contents, propaganda videos and sermons are “popular” among the terrorists and their sympathizers. Amidst numerous internet platforms, social media (mainly Facebook and Twitter), websites, and chat forums are mostly found in the recruitment phases of Bangladeshi jihadist lifecycles.

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  87 Propaganda Videos There are essentially two types of propaganda videos: videos with a storyline or a theme and lectures/sermons of the ideologues. I  have found that several terrorists’ interest in terrorism was generated by online videos. For example, during his college years, Aslam Hossain Rashed’s interest in terrorism grew once he was exposed to online jihadi propaganda videos (Labu 2017). According to his confession statement, Rashed was radicalized and became an aspirant terrorist after watching the videos. He later contacted a fellow student at Rajshahi University and expressed his interest in joining Jihad. Here, online propaganda videos reached the recruit and motivated him to participate in terrorism. When he aspired to become a jihadist, he contacted an individual in-person to ensure his engagement. Like Rashed, several terrorists’ interests in Jihad were generated by the widely available propaganda videos in the internet. There are cases where reaching a recruit in person occurred concurrently with watching propaganda videos. In the case of Abdullah al Galib, the 27-year-old son of a military officer and key member of “Jund At-Tawheed Wal Khilafah” (an organization that later merged into IS Bangla) a Nigerian national first approached him in a mosque in Gulshan (The Daily Star 2015). The recruiter then suggested that he watch some IS online propaganda material to learn more about the organization’s agenda and activities. Galib followed his advice and watched several IS videos online. They both met a second time, and his active involvement in terrorism was initiated. In another instance, a female extremist was influenced by her friends, fellow jihadists, and online propaganda content (Dhaka Tribune 2018). Among the IS propaganda videos, a video titled “Flames of War” inspired at least two Bangladeshi jihadists into terrorist ideology (Pipes 2018). The propaganda video, which is fifty-five minutes long, glamorizes IS fighters for their victories against their enemies and warns the USA for fighting against the Islamic Khilafat. Experts believe that the propaganda video was especially aimed at English speakers because, at the close of the video, an IS fighter with a North American accent and perfectly spoken English orchestrated the mass execution of a group of men who were forced to dig their own graves (Castillo and Todd 2014). Among the ideologues, I found that two influenced the involvement stages of several terrorist profiles I analyzed: Jashimuddin Rahmani, a Bangladeshi cleric and spiritual leader of Ansar-al-Islam in Bangladesh, and Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American al-Qaeda ideologue. Rahmani is an influential ideologue who inspired several terrorists of Bangladesh. Rahmani is the first Jihadist preacher in Bangladesh to embrace the internet and employ social media platforms to recruit and motivate new members. Although arrested in August 2013, Rahmani continued to inspire many terrorists in Bangladesh through his widely available and fiery online sermons. In fact, his online sermons are the largest compilation of jihadi propaganda material in

88  Saimum Parvez Bangla. One journalist (interviewed on October, 20, 2018), who has been reporting on terrorism in Bangladesh for nearly a decade, shares his observation: I witnessed many cases where after consuming the content of Jashimuddin Rahmni, people joined ISIS. Though Rahmani is an al-Qaeda man, his followers are Ansar-Al-Islam members; many of his followers had also joined ISIS. Their target is to go to heaven and establish the Caliphate through Jihad. A number of Rahmani’s fiery sermons and lectures were recorded and uploaded onto YouTube, the Internet Archive, and Facebook pages, making his views accessible to a broader audience. Besides local preachers like Rahmani, the globally known ideologue, Anwar al-Awlaki, is also popular among Bangladeshi jihadists. In one instance, Aminul Islam Beg, a 38-year-old graduate in computer science and engineering from the Multimedia University of Malaysia, who became the IT Department Head of a multinational company after returning to Bangladesh following his graduation, became first exposed to terrorist propaganda material on the internet (Tipu and Shaon 2019). Sometime in 2012, he searched the internet to “learn about the explanation of dreams” (Tipu and Shaon 2019) and came across the YouTube lectures and sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki. He later joined a jihadi Facebook group. Awlaki’s preaching especially influenced the members of Ansar-al-Islam (AAI) who carried out several machete attacks on individuals – those who, according to AAI, had committed blasphemy against the Prophet. Their targets included bloggers, atheists, writers, publishers, and LGBT activists in Bangladesh. The attacks killed eleven people between 2013 and 2016 (Rabbi 2017). The jihadists often cited Awlaki in propaganda videos used to justify these killings. A group of Bangladeshi jihadists translated and dubbed the videos of Awlaki’s sermons and posted them to their internet outlets. One quote was particularly popular among the jihadists and is widely found in jihadi propaganda content. The quote states: If committing blasphemy to our Prophet is a part of your freedom of speech, then killing you is also a part of our Deen (religion/belief).5 In a eulogy of Ashikur Rahman Jilani published in the online IS magazine Dabiq, a young Bangladeshi who died while fighting as an IS jihadist acknowledged Awlaki’s influence on him: During his late teens, Abū Jandal (Jilani) received the true call of Islam. He began listening to the lectures of Shaykh Anwar al-‘Awlaqī (may Allah accept him) and other scholars who were upon the truth. He had a strong zeal for seeking beneficial knowledge. (Dabiq 2016: 50) Another ideologue and one of the spiritual leaders of AAI is Tamim Al Adnani. Security officials in Bangladesh claim that he preaches and broadcasts his internet

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  89 sermons from Malaysia (Rabbi 2017). His videos are often produced and distributed by Titumir Media, an online production outlet of the AQIS.6 Facebook and Twitter Propaganda on Facebook can also inspire individuals to become involved in terrorism. This can occur in several ways: through the dissemination of propaganda content; through Facebook pages, groups, and profiles; and via personal interactions using Facebook’s inbox or messenger chatting. Facebook can also be the first point of contact by providing opportunities to reach the recruits via interactions. For instance, a 19-year-old female, Jannatul Nayeem Mitu’s radicalization started online when she met a new friend via Facebook (News Narayanganj 2018). After several months of online interactions, her new acquaintance convinced her to do something to end the “global injustice” against the Muslims. The new friend, Mehedi Hasan Masud had a fake Facebook account called Allahr Sainik or “The Soldier of Allah.” After several days of online communication, Masud asked her whether she was ready to sacrifice herself to fight against Tagut: the Bangladeshi government and its forces. She agreed. During an interrogation with security officers, Mitu revealed that she was drawn to the prospect of martyrdom and received training to carry out attacks against the anti-Sharia rule in Bangladesh (News Narayanganj 2018). At the initial stage of her involvement, when she stayed at home, she worked mainly as a propagandist for Jihad in Bangladesh. In another two cases, terrorists established connections via Facebook and later joined in the terrorist groups (Robin 2018). Like the individuals, the terrorist organizations used Facebook groups and pages to propagate their ideology and reach their audience for recruitment. Most of the jihadist Facebook and Twitter accounts are transient in nature; sometimes, jihadists themselves delete their accounts for security reasons, or their accounts become blocked because they contain jihadi content. The temporary nature of jihadi social media accounts makes it difficult to collect data for analysis.7 Two Facebook pages, titled Allah’r Dike Ahoban (A call to the path of Allah) and Mujahider Torbari (The Sword of Mujahid) were active during the data collection.8 The Facebook page Allah’r Dike Ahoban had numerous posts in which jihadi ideology was relentlessly promoted. Analyzing the images, texts, and videos, I observed that the main goal of these pages was to incite people to join terrorist groups. One post stated: Look, both openly and covertly, Hindus [non-Muslims] of Bangladesh have been getting organized with arms with the help of the Bangladeshi administration of to kill Muslims. After preparing the ground for their argument, the jihadists then call on Muslims to “take action” by participating in violent Jihad: Will our Muslim brothers stay at home wearing bangles, or will they take weapons in their hands?

90  Saimum Parvez The use of the metaphor wearing bangles here is particularly interesting because, in predominantly “patriarchal” South Asian culture, this refers to weak, meek, and spineless women-like men. By attacking their stereotypical masculinity, the jihadists exploit the “male-ego” for their recruitment. However, it should be noted here that not all jihadi online materials employ this male-centric approach. In several online jihadi propaganda, women are treated as a significant force for Jihad. For example, an online jihadi magazine, Al-Balagh, has a dedicated women’s section (Mohilaangan) where women are extolled for their contribution to and active participation in Jihad.9 In another post, the Facebook page Allah’r Dike Ahoban called on aspirant jihadists to take arms, particularly against law enforcers. It stated: “Bangladesh, is there any problem if we kill ten to twelve atheist police?” The second Facebook page, Mujahider Torbari, called on Muslims to join Jihad irrespective of their social or financial situation because it is an “obligation” for all true Muslims: There is no death in Jihad. Ignore the luxury of the earth. Leave home, get a weapon, and join with us in Jihad. It doesn’t matter what your condition is; just come and join. This Facebook page stores a huge amount of information about Jihad; it shared jihadi news of several jihadist groups in the world, including the Islamic State. The page also suggests to users to join other jihadist Facebook accounts and provides links to jihadist online materials. Civilian killings, particularly jihadist attacks that occasion the death of Muslims, are often questioned, even by the radicalized Muslims. The Facebook comments and posts of these radicals demonstrated a willingness to join the Jihad, but causing the death of Muslims prevented them from being recruited. In response to the questions and confusion about killing Muslims for the jihadi cause, this Facebook page responded: “Why won’t jihadi groups attack Kafirs, just because the Muslims are beside them?” The Facebook page cited an ideologue (Ibn Taimiya) and justified Muslim killings: If it’s not possible to separate Muslims from the Kafir and Tagut, the killing of Muslims is legal. Compared to Facebook, Twitter is a less popular form of social media in Bangladesh. Most of the time, jihadist Twitter accounts often work as extensions of Facebook pages. One of the Twitter accounts, titled “Islamic State Bangla,” states in its handle “on behalf of the people of Bangladesh, we support Islamic State.”10 The Twitter handle mainly shares links to jihadi websites, YouTube videos, and jihadrelated national and international news links. Some of the videos this account shares are very graphic. For example, it shared the video of a beheading with the caption: “See, all praise to Allah, how lion Mujaheeds are sending kafir Shiites to hell.” This Twitter account is also affiliated with IS’ media outlet At-Tamkin media. The Twitter handle tweets links of At-Tamkin media website’s posts, including IS documents, online magazines, and infographics, all translated in Bangla.

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  91 Chat Forum Chat forums are important online platforms the terrorists use to propagate their ideology among supporters and sympathizers, as well as to disseminate propaganda content to wider audiences. A brief analysis of a chat forum will help us to understand how this functions. The forum, named, Dawahilallah, has 4,560 registered members as of April 19, 2020.11 Each webpage on the forum contains several chat threads. The threads are divided into two types: general threads and selected threads. There are at least 1,590 selected chat threads of a total of 106 web pages in the chat forum. The number of general chat threads is staggering: a total of 10,345 threads. The sheer quantity of chat threads shows how active members using this chat forum are, how lively the discussions are, and how often they interact with each other. Under the close monitoring of three administrators and two super moderators, the chat forum provides both the latest and older publications of jihadi media groups. Most of the propaganda content is either produced in Bangla or translated into Bangla from original Arabic, English, or Urdu sources. On March 27, 2019, a member posted an online magazine titled “Lone Wolf”; as of April 19, 2020, the post had received 66,590 views. This illustrates how these chat forums reach aspirant extremists with messages of Jihad. In one thread on the chat forum, a video titled “The Real Purpose of Life” has been posted via the username Al-Hikmah Media. A short paragraph was provided describing the content of the video: What is the real purpose of our life? Why are we rat-racing dusk to dawn in this concrete jungle? For what are we walking like lunatics? Why have we forgot our eternal afterlife and fell in love with this short-lived world? On the one hand, Muslim Ummah [community] is oppressed, persecuted, humiliated, and raped, on the other hand, our daily mundane life in these cities. We are always compelled to live in fear, in competition. We are compromising with our Deen every day to keep the balance between our Deen and Duniya. Is it the purpose of our life? Is this our destiny? This humiliation and cowardice? Or any other way? A way of respect, courage, strength, and honor? (Al-Hikmah Media n.d.) Just below this paragraph, a screenshot of the video was posted with the title of the video and an image of a jihadist holding a Kalashnikov and a black flag. The text reads: “We now have two paths to take – either establishing Deen [religion] in our society or perform Hijra.”12 Several members on the chat forum commented on the video. One member going by the username Abul Fida commented: All praise to Allah! How nicely is the purpose of life presented here! .  .  . Allah, please accept us in the path of Jihad and Hijra! Ameen! They, who have loved their Deens, purchased paradise in exchange for their lives.

92  Saimum Parvez Another member with the username Torun Mujahid expressed his interest in becoming a martyr: All praise to Allah! Very nice presentation. May Allah grant us all the opportunity to drink the nectar of Martyrdom. Chat forums like Dawahilallah play a significant role in terrorist recruitment by providing propaganda content and making it possible for sympathizers and potential recruits to interact with like-minded individuals. The online interactions, with the perceived anonymity of the users, enable easy and speedy communications among the potential recruits and strengthen their convictions to join a terrorist outfit. Martyrdom is often used as a motivational factor and considered as a “reward” for ultimate sacrifice for a “good cause.” The internet ensures continuous interaction and creates social bonding, which eventually creates an in-group identity for the terrorists (Parvez 2021b). Websites Besides chat forums, several websites contain propaganda content through which to reach aspirant jihadists and inspire them to participate in jihadi activities. Among these websites, three – Qital Tube, Bangladesh Jihadi group, and Gazwatul Hind – are significant for their numerous propaganda contents, a wide range of audiences, and interactions with aspirant terrorists. Qital Tube could be described as the “jihadist Netflix.” This website had a large number of videos that feature propaganda material, the sermons of ideologues, nasheeds (songs), and audio speeches. This website features the work of several jihadi production houses, including Titumir Media, Balakot Media, Al-Qital Bangla Media, and Guraba Media. Besides featuring this content, these websites also provide links to other online jihadi sources. Some of the popular videos go by the titles Return to Jihad, A Cluster of Bullets, and Reject Idolatry. In A Cluster of Bullets, the video portrays an animated blowing up of the National Parliament Building of Bangladesh (Sajen 2013). As of June 2018, Qital Tube had 149 propaganda items: seventy-six of these were video and thirty-five audio content. The remainder were online magazines, images, blogs, and small booklets in Word or PDF files.13 Another website called the Bangladesh Jihadi Group shares inspirational jihadi e-books, manuals for preparing explosives, and video tutorials on the use of weapons and explosives. The website also offers ways to keep one’s identity hidden and to undertake jihadism covertly. Gazwatul Hind emerged as one of the more noteworthy websites for the AQIS-affiliated Bangladeshi terrorists in recent times, most significantly in the past year.14 Content analysis of the website during data analysis shows that the home page alone contains a total of seventy-nine propaganda items: nine Tilawats and Nasheeds, eighteen items of Kashmir struggle, four online magazines, twelve video and audio files, four Al-Firdaws Media news bulletins, five

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  93 theme-based archives, fifteen items under the An-Nasr Media tab, seven articles, and five letters/correspondence. This wide-ranging content aims to reach aspirant Bangladeshi jihadists. The effectiveness of their propaganda content is reflected in multiple readers’ comments in the adjacent opinion boxes. One such comment states: Brother, I want to go to Afghanistan. I live in Malaysia. Is there any way to travel directly to Afghanistan and join Jihad? I want to perform Hijrat! Another website user commented on April 4, 2020: I am a student, and I live in Kishorganj (a district of Bangladesh). Please tell me how I can meat [meet] a Taliban? Also, numerous websites with small-scale operations furnish the recordings of jihadi sermons, propaganda videos, and audio files.15 Besides these jihadist internet outlets, instant messaging apps, such as Telegram, Wickr, and Protectedtext.com, are widely used by terrorists in Bangladesh. However, the use of these apps is more commonly found in the engagement phases. To reach individuals and to expose them to propaganda content during their recruitment phase, social media, websites, and chat forums are frequently favored by extremist groups and their recruiters. In the next section, I explore how the internet plays a role in the recruitment of terrorists in Bangladesh.

Online Terrorist Recruitment in Bangladesh The internet’s ability to provide opportunities to leaders, ideologues, and preachers to reach larger audiences; motivate new recruits; and incite violent Jihad is well acknowledged in extant literature (Conway 2012; Gendron 2017; Taylor and Ramsay 2010). Moreover, with the advent of cheap and available digital media technologies, terrorists are no longer dependent upon traditional media; they can disseminate their own propaganda messages and interact directly with audiences and motivate them for recruitment (Stevens 2009: 28; Betz 2006: 510). While observing the recruitment phases of terrorists in Bangladesh, I  have noted that the internet has facilitated connections between aspirant recruits and their recruiters. Both recruits and recruiters can reach each other in two ways. First, recruiters search for potential candidates across various internet outlets and communicate with individuals via the internet. After a considerable amount of interaction, recruiters meet the individual in person. However, there are a very limited number of cases where the entire recruitment process occurs online. Second, the individuals themselves search for recruiters to join in Jihad via internet outlets and express their interest in becoming a jihadist. Later, recruiters approach them on the internet to examine whether their interest is genuine or not.

94  Saimum Parvez Since Facebook is the most popular and widely used social media in Bangladesh, recruiters target it to search and recruit new members. One security officer (interviewed on 13/10/2018) explains how recruiters use Facebook to recruit members for their outfits: They target people after following the comments of users in the contents. They analyze the accounts and comments of the users who regularly comment on the post and follow the posts. They sort out who wanted to join in Jihad and who is quoting Islamic references in their comments. They will contact them in the inbox. They move to encrypted apps after initial communication in Facebook. Among the profiles analyzed for this study, I  found several instances where recruiters initiated contact via the internet. Aminul Islam Beg, who himself later became a recruiter, was initially a member of the Facebook group EX Cadets Islamic Learning Forum and approached by Saifullah Ozaki via Facebook after detecting his interest to fight against the repression of Muslims the world over (Tipu and Shaon 2019). Later, Beg recruited Sakib bin Kamal, whom he reached via Facebook (Tipu and Shaon 2019). In the case of Gazi Kamrus Salam Sohan, an electrical engineer who went to Syria to join the IS, online propaganda seen in a Facebook group sparked his interest in violent Jihad (Ahsan 2017). The Facebook group members regularly posted images, videos, and news reports on the plight of the Muslim community globally and in Syria specifically. According to Sohan’s confession statement, his first contact with these propaganda materials made him interested in terrorism as he wanted to do something for the “oppressed” Muslims (Ahsan 2017). Triggered by the online jihadist propaganda, he contacted his recruiter via social media and later joined in the jihadi outfit. The internet also facilitates locating probable aspirants for recruiters (Rudner 2013) and “spotting talent” (Bloom 2017) for recruitment. In the following section, I  will discuss how the internet has made it easier to reach and radicalize certain Bangladeshi demographics.

Reaching the “Unreachable” via the Internet Several scholarly works, such as Neumann (2013), argue that the internet has the ability to reach otherwise unreachable individuals. In a similar vein, Briggs (2011) argues that the internet increases the opportunity for women in conservative societies to become radicalized who otherwise would not. In the case of Bangladesh, I  found that the internet offers opportunities to reach at least two sections of previously unreachable Bangladeshi society, or at least less likely to be reached, and draw them to jihadist ideology. The two groups are women, especially those educated and living in urban settings, and Westernized youth, specifically educated in private, English-medium institutions, and from well-off, urban, and secular backgrounds.

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  95 The Female Jihadists In Bangladesh, recruiters discover an aspirant female jihadist on the internet, follow her online activities, and connect with her, mostly through Facebook. Another pattern shows that the aspirant recruit herself discovers a recruiter by expressing her interest in joining a jihadist outfit on internet platforms, such as Facebook groups or chat forums. In both cases, the internet helps the (mostly male) recruiters and female recruits to break traditional barriers in conservative societies and to connect. Also, instead of women’s previously limited public interactions, such as attending sermons in mosques or madrassas, the internet provides this group with anonymous and more private access to jihadist outfits. Female jihadists can now interact with fellow jihadists and actively participate in jihadist activities, often from their smartphones. Thus, I found that the internet has made it easier for women to listen to ideologues’ widely available sermons, to watch and spread propaganda videos, and for the strengthening of radicalization. I also observed that the women seemingly took a front seat in some of the cases; smaller and more all-female cells were created, while the wives of terrorists formed their groups and maintained connections with them, both in-person and with the help of the internet. Although women’s mobility in Bangladesh is not entirely restricted, there are still social taboos against meeting an unknown male. The internet has made it easier for women to break this barrier and to meet unknown like-minded “friends” online and discuss matters of common interest. There are ample cases where women have met friends or recruiters online and become motivated to join in Jihad through continuous internet interaction. The case of Mitu shows how the internet plays a role in the recruitment phase of female jihadists – that is, where completely unknown persons are able to reach, motivate, and radicalize these females on a scale that they leave their husbands or homes to join terrorist groups. After two years (2016–2018) of involvement in terrorism, Mitu was arrested along with two fellow jihadists in April 2018 (News Narayanganj 2018). Interestingly, her father turned her in by reporting to police that he had suspected his daughter of terrorism involvement (News Narayanganj 2018). The particular recruit (Mitu) is from Narayanganj, a river port city close to the capital. She passed her secondary school certificate exam in 2017 and was a higher secondary student at the time of her 2018 arrest. As a mother of a 2-year-old, it is assumed that she married very early, at 16 or 17, because having a baby out of wedlock is socially prohibited and very uncommon in Bangladesh. Although marriage before the age of 18 is legally prohibited, usually poverty-ridden and conservative families arrange early marriages to lessen economic hardship or as part of their assumed “family responsibility.” Following her arrest, a local newspaper published a photograph of a Burqa-clad young woman with only her eyes visible. It is interesting how this conservative woman broke the barrier of not talking or meeting with unknown males with the help of the internet. During her interrogation with security officers, Mitu revealed that she was drawn to the prospect of martyrdom and received training to carry out attacks

96  Saimum Parvez against the “anti-Sharia” rule in Bangladesh (News Narayanganj 2018). At the initial stage of her involvement, when she stayed at home, she worked mainly as a propagandist for Jihad in Bangladesh. Using two fake Facebook profiles, Esho Allahr Pothe and Alor Poth Islam, she circulated various jihadi images and video clips (News Narayanganj 2018). She also tried to radicalize her husband J (initial). However, J did not agree with the extremist version of Islam. Her recruiter, Masud, told her that she should leave her husband as he does not regularly pray, does not grow a beard, and, above all, does not believe in their jihadist interpretation of Islam. Mitu was so motivated by the online interactions with her recruiter and jihadi ideology that she decided to leave her home and perform Hijra. During the recruitment phase, Mitu never met her recruiter in person. She only met her after becoming a member of their organization and engaged in terrorism by working as a propagandist for their group. It is noteworthy how online communications alone can compel a person to become radicalized and to trust someone completely unknown over the family members. When Mitu decided to perform Hijra, the recruiter suggested that, according to the rule of strict and “authentic” Islamic interpretation, Mitu needed a Maharam (companion), since she, being a woman, cannot travel alone (News Narayanganj 2018). Masud offered his friend and fellow jihadist, Akbar Hossain Sumon, to be her Maharam. Thus, after failing to radicalize her husband, Mitu left her home and her 2-year-old daughter on March 31, 2018. She planned to divorce her husband and marry Sumon, as per the outfit’s decision. As part of the plan, she left for Chittagong where Masud and Sumon arranged a house for her. The trio were in Narayanganj’s Bandar area for an organizational meeting when they were arrested. In their confessions, Masud and Sumon informed police that they were active on social media and looking for potential members to recruit (News Narayanganj 2018). According to the security officials, they were assigned to recruit members from the Dhaka, Narayanganj, and Chittagong districts. Besides Mitu, the duo claimed that they managed to radicalize twelve to fifteen people, mostly teenagers (News Narayanganj 2018). Rubaiya Binte Nur Uddin alias Labiba’s story also demonstrates how the internet offers opportunities for a woman to become involved in terrorism. She is known as Hurer Rani or “Queen of the Hurs in paradise” by her Facebook ID (Robin 2018). The 20-year-old became one of the key members of the female unit of her jihadist organization before her arrest in May 2018 in Dhaka (Robin 2018). Her hometown is Mymensingh. She studied up to Grade VIII in a girls’ school in Mymensingh before her 2012 admission into a madrassa there. She lured her mother into terrorism. Rubaiya and her mother tried to inspire other family members to join in Jihad, but without much success. They were, however, successful in recruiting other women online. In 2016, Rubaiya became acquainted with her recruiter on Facebook (Robin 2018). Her recruiter motivated her to become a terrorist through continuous interaction. After her initial radicalization and involvement in terrorism, which occurred entirely on Facebook, Rubaiya was assigned to conduct propaganda on Facebook for their organization. She opened her fake account Hurer Rani. She posted regularly on religious issues to incite people to commit terrorist acts. Her active Facebook

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  97 involvement was successful enough to attract several young men and women to Jihad. Gradually, she became one of the core members of the propaganda team. Meanwhile, the recruiter and her online interactions were not limited to a recruiter–recruit relationship since they had planned to marry and perform Hijra (Robin 2018). But the plan was foiled following the recruiter’s arrest. The recruiter later managed to receive bail, and Rubaiya left home with him on March 16, 2018. The recruiter and Rubaiya maintained regular contact with their group leaders through encrypted messenger apps. Eventually, they were arrested. Like Rubaiya, Sadia Afroz Nina, a fourth-year university student from Rangpur, also came into contact with IS recruiters via Facebook (Daily-Bangladesh 2018). Also, several all-female small cells operated in Bangladesh, having met or communicated via the internet. For instance, Aklima Akhter Moni and her two friends, Khadiza Parvin Meghla and Israt Jahan alias Mousumi, formed a cell to propagate terrorism (Khan and Hridoy 2018; Rabbi et al. 2018). All three were in their senior year at a private university. Police relay that Moni and her female associates were campaigning on behalf of the IS Women’s Unit through the Ummah Tawhid and Ansar Islamia apps (Khan and Hridoy 2018; Rabbi et al. 2018). Police also claim that they were spreading extremist ideologies among women under the guise of teaching Arabic and that their objective was to strengthen the female unit and collect funds for terrorist activities. An analysis of life-stories of female jihadists in Bangladesh shows that the internet has provided them opportunities to ingest jihadist ideology by several means. Previously, reaching terrorists and their organizations was limited to physical interactions, attending and listening to ideologues’ lectures at waz-mahfils (religious gatherings) in public settings or in mosques. By providing more comfortable and anonymous settings, the internet offers opportunities for female jihadists to interact and actively participate. Notably, in the recruitment phase, online propaganda content and online interactions help women to be aspirants and enthusiast jihadists. Analysis of the life-stories of female jihadists in Bangladesh also shows that interactions with completely unknown individuals on social media, who would later become friends, fiancés, husbands, or simply remain their recruiter, enabled several women to become terrorists. Besides online interactions, recruiters almost always made their female recruits watch and read propaganda content on the internet. One observer (interviewed on October 20, 2018) concurs with the notion that women increasingly participate in Jihad and that internet has an impact on this phenomenon: The majority of the female militants were motivated by their husbands in the past. . . . Husbands or any other family members. . . . [They were influenced by] either father or husband or brother. . . . Now, you will find some different syndromes like self-motivation [by online]. Indeed, I have found profiles of women who have joined terrorist organizations on their own, without the initial support from their male partners. Women also

98  Saimum Parvez formed all-female jihadist cells. In these cells, they mostly used the internet for recruiting other female members and carrying on interactions in their group. Westernized Youths In recent years, individuals, especially youth from well-off families who were raised and educated in secular backgrounds, have been participating in Jihad in Bangladesh. An analysis of Bangladeshi jihadist profiles shows that the internet plays a significant role in the transformation of Westernized youth and careeroriented professionals into violent jihadists. The building of the jihadi identity in Bangladeshi individuals turns on the “similarity” they possess with the foreign fighters, most of whom traveled to Syria from Western countries to join up with IS forces. Because the propaganda videos and video statements of Western foreign fighters managed to reach Bangladeshi audiences, thanks to the internet and its easy access and broad dissemination features, Bangladeshi youths have become exposed to both messages and calls to Jihad. It is crucial to note here that Englishspeaking foreign fighters and ideologues attracted these youths more than did conventional Arabic-speaking clerics or local Bangla-speaking preachers, because of the youths’ proclivity toward Western lifestyles – namely, Hollywood movies, music, and sports. Most of these Bangladeshi youths attended English-medium private schools and universities, and British or American curricula are strictly followed; even speaking English in class and among the student body is mandatory. Thus, although these youths were raised in Bangladesh, they feel a sense of belonging and affinity toward English-speaking jihadists, ideologues, and their propaganda content. Therefore, the internet provides opportunities for terrorists to reach these “Westernized” jihadists using online content and to later help the jihadists connect, interact, and join mainstream organizations or form small, affiliated cells. Mohammad Shahzad Rouf Arko, a student in his twenties, was known as a “fun-loving, normal boy, who loved to sing and play musical instruments” (Kabir 2016). He belonged to one of the wealthiest families of Bangladesh. Most of his family members are US citizens and have settled in Chicago. His father was a millionaire and supplier of crowd-control gadgets and defense products to security forces in Bangladesh (Kabir 2016). His grandfather was a retired senior army officer and former Intelligence Services Chief in the armed forces. After his mother’s diagnosis with cancer, Arko’s parents moved to Dhaka from the USA. He began studying at an American International School in Dhaka, where he completed his International Baccalaureate. Then, he achieved a BBA degree and enrolled in an MBA at North South University. It is probable that his mother’s death in 2009 made him vulnerable and seek refuge in religion. He began praying five times a day; however, at this point, there was no sign of terrorism. After seven years, he went missing in February 2016. In July 2016, he was killed in a gunfight with police (Kabir 2016). Just prior to the gunfight, he and two other terrorists recorded their last audio statements. All nine terrorists of the jihadist cell made a video call to their fellow jihadists

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  99 and supporters to continue to fight against their enemies (Dhaka Tribune 2016a). The video also showed them burning documents and devices. Police informed that they took group photos before getting ready to fight against law enforcers (Dhaka Tribune 2016b). A senior security officer recounted that the jihadists sent the audio statements and video clips to several contacts in Bangladesh to disseminate their call to Jihad, propagate their ideology, and display their “determination” in the face of imminent death (Ahsan 2016). The security official also informed that these clips had since been used to motivate new recruits (Ahsan 2016). His statement, spoken in English, makes it clear how his sense of belonging and loyalty shifted from his family to his terrorist group. He acknowledged that he and his friends had had a stable upbringing, with the prospect of good jobs or inheriting the family business. But they left all behind for the call to Jihad received from the IS: We emigrated from our homes; we had everything . . . we had everything . . . all for the sake of practicing Jihad Fi Sabilillah [Jihad in the way of Allah]. That either we kill, or we get killed and paradise is for us. You have to understand the real thing here, that Jihad Fi Sabilillah is all about maintaining the Sharia. That’s exactly what we do. (Dhaka Tribune 2016a) He emphasized their affiliation with IS and argued that small cells like theirs, comprising nine jihadists, would bring about change: [R]emember small people . . . small groups like us will get victory over the large number of people. That’s exactly what’s going on. Small group of us . . . we are getting Nusrah [support] from Allah Subhanahu wa ta’ala [Allah most glorified, most exalted] and we are gonna defeat you, we are going to fight you until there’s no more Fitna [strife] . . . and Insha Allah [Allah willing] we are ready with our weapons right now. (Dhaka Tribune 2016a) It should be noted here that his last statement in life was in English. This clearly indicates his affluent, English-speaking target audience. Similarly, other terrorists who hailed from well-off backgrounds, like Nibras Islam and Rohan Imtiaz, two assailants of the Holey Artisan attack, also abandoned their family and embraced violent Jihad ideology. The internet played a significant role in the transformation of their lives. In the case of Islam, the internet provided opportunities to reach his role model. Of interest is how quickly and diversely the role models were able to influence the spread of their ideology via the internet. For instance, Islam chose his nom de guerre to be “Abu Muharib” because of “his love and admiration” for Abu Muharib al-Muhajir, also known as “Jihadi John” – infamous for the several gruesome beheadings he conducted for the Islamic State (Rumiyah 2016: 10). Jihadi John, a Briton in his mid-twenties, with his university education and British accent, appeals more to the new-generation Bangladeshi jihadists because

100  Saimum Parvez they more easily identify with his lifestyle and upbringing (Malnick 2015). Like Jihadi John, the Bangladeshi jihadist went to private schools and universities, where instruction was in English. Although the jihadist lived most of his life in Bangladesh, he was brought up following Western popular culture. A large number of foreign fighters like Jihadi John, who traveled to Syria from Western countries, mostly in search of heroism, inspired new-generation Bangladeshi jihadists like Islam to join the IS. It is known that Islam was a “fan” of Jihadi John, and he liked to watch the beheading videos of Jihadi John posted on the internet by the IS (Rumiyah 2016: 10). Rohan Imtiaz was another assailant of the Gulshan attack from a well-off family. His nom de guerre was Abu Raheeq al-Bangali. Imtiaz’s father was a political leader of the ruling political party of Bangladesh, Awami League, and the Youth and Sports secretary of the party’s Dhaka Metropolitan unit. His mother was a teacher at one of Bangladesh’s leading private schools (Rumiyah 2016: 10). Like Islam, Imtiaz also left Bangladesh after his school graduation to go to Malaysia. In December 2015, his father filed a diary entry that his son was missing. Following the attack on Holey Artisan in July 2016, when journalists and security experts started digging around on social media, it was found that Imtiaz’s Facebook profile contained several radical posts (The Daily Star 2016a). According to his father, Imtiaz was radicalized through the internet (The Daily Star 2016a). As with Arko, Islam, and Imtiaz, there are several cases where youth from affluent families, engineers, university teachers, IT professionals, lawyers, doctors, models, singers, and military officers left secure lives to join terrorist organizations (The Daily Star 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2012). In most cases, the internet helped them to connect with transnational jihadi content, globally known ideologues such as Anwar al-Awlaki, and to interact with recruiters (Tipu and Shaon 2019). In a sense, the internet has made Jihad more global in local settings. An analysis of the life stories of youth from Westernized backgrounds shows that the internet has provided terrorist organizations and their recruiters with opportunities to reach them in several ways. First, these Westernized youth imitate the trend of traveling to Syria by many foreign fighters of Western countries. By watching several IS propaganda videos, in which the “gallantries” of these Western youths are intentionally presented to manipulate targeted audiences, Bangladeshi “Westernized” youth desire to be like them. Second, with the help of the internet, these youth are easily exposed to the online sermons and lectures of English-speaking clerics and ideologues. They discuss Jihad on social media with like-minded individuals. The constant interaction with people who hold similar views and exchanging their radical thoughts among themselves reinforce and validate their extreme ideas (Neo 2016). Finally, when actively engaged in Jihad, they work as translators of AQ and IS-derived English propaganda content. Their work is highly valued inside their organizations and praised by ordinary users when they post in chat forums and websites. This gives them a sense of reward and meaning that often lacked in their previous “normal” life because they perceive they are working for a greater cause. The recruiters

How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  101 often use this kind of lure of recognition, reward, the honor of martyrdom, and heroism to motivate and recruit youth from affluent and secular backgrounds.

Key Findings and Concluding Remarks This chapter has examined the role of the internet in reaching and recruiting terrorists in Bangladesh. The first section of the chapter explored online jihadi propaganda content and found that online propaganda videos, sermons, social media accounts, chat forums, and websites play a significant role in recruitment. It also finds that the internet helps both recruits and recruiters to reach each other; it especially provides jihadists with opportunities to reach previously unreachable demographics, such as women and youth from “Westernized” and well-off backgrounds. This chapter has also shown that the internet offers new and previously unattainable opportunities for jihadist recruitment. Using the unique features of the internet, terrorist groups in Bangladesh can now control their own propaganda content, in terms of both publishing and broadcasting, and build their own narratives. Besides providing technical affordances and opportunities, the internet can also enhance the sense of belonging to a group and, in turn, increase possibilities for recruitment. Through the internet and exposure to online extremist content, individuals can reach other like-minded individuals by increasing online social connectivity. However, the mere exposure to the online propaganda content, such as watching propaganda videos, sermons, reading online magazines, or conversations in chat forums, does not necessarily transform an individual into a terrorist. This is only the beginning of the terrorist’s “career,” wherein the internet offers opportunities to reach targets, connect with ideologues and recruiters, and make aspirants and enthusiastic jihadists ready to take further steps in their journey of becoming a terrorist. From this initial involvement, the process of engagement requires gradual and slow socialization and a strong conviction toward terrorism. Future research on the internet and terrorism can look at what role the internet plays in strengthening this socialization, what messages the online propaganda content contains, and how online and offline terrorist activities interact and influence each other.

Notes 1 For more information on this connection, please see McCants (2011); Conway, 2016: 123; Rieger et al. (2013) 2 In his book, Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman (2004) discussed the internet’s role as a reinforcer, see p. 163. Similarly, Stevens and Neumann (2009) and Hussain and Saltman (2014) stated about internet’s reinforcing ability. 3 Burke (2011) argues that social media, such as Twitter, will never be a replacement for activism on the ground. Rogan (2006) asserts that in real life the jihadists need to be convinced by an actual recruiter in-person.

102  Saimum Parvez 4 For existing research on online radicalization in Bangladesh, see Parvez (2019b, 2021a, 2021b) and Riaz and Parvez (2018). 5 This quote is widely found in chat forums, such as in Dawahilallah, in propaganda videos and in online Jihadist magazines. One of these propaganda contents in which this quote has been used is a video titled Jiboner Uddessho (The purpose of life), produced by Al Hikmah Media, collected from the Dawahilallah chat forum. 6 Sheikh Tamim Al Adnani’s video lectures “Get back to your creator” and “The sign of Allah is present in every object of the universe” are produced by Titumir Media. The videos were collected from Qital Tube. 7 For example, the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), the media wing of Ansar-al-Islam, had a Facebook page with 3,000 followers. It was active in 2015, but currently is unavailable. The page uploaded a post with a threat to kill an atheist blogger. The post states, “Wherever he is found, he will be killed – this is declared on behalf of Ansarullah Bangla.” In another post, the group opposed celebration of Pahela Baishakh, the Bengali New Year. On March 2, 2015, the page demanded the release of a suspect for the killing of another blogger. It says: “We want release of our brother. If anything happens to our brother, the responsible person will be beheaded in public.” 8 Allah’r Dike Ahoban (A call to the path of Allah), [online] Available from: www. facebook.com/allahordikeahoban/ (Accessed: 6 August 2020) and Mujahider Torbari (The Sword of Mujahid), [online] Available from: t.ly/Si8p (Accessed: 6 August 2020). 9 See Al-Balagh (Issues 1–6), produced by Titumir Media of AQIS. Collected from a clearinghouse of jihadi content: Jihadology. 10 Twitter handle: “Islamic State Bangla,” [online] Available from: https://twitter.com/ masternooralam (Accessed: 6 August 2020). 11 Collected from jihadist chat forum, Dawahilallah. [online] Available from: www. dawahilallah.com/(Accessed: 6 August 2020). 12 Hijra, also spelled as Hijrah or Hejira, is an Arabic word meaning “Migration” or “Emigration.” The term is widely used for the Prophet Muhammad’s migration (622 CE) from Mecca to Medina in order to escape persecution. The Islamist terrorists use it to mean leaving home and participating in the terrorist activities assigned by their organization. 13 Data collected from Qital Tube in June 2018. The website is currently unavailable. 14 The jihadi website is Available from: http://gazwah.net/. (Accessed: 6 August 2020). 15 Some of these websites are Jumuarkhutba (http://jumuarkhutba.wordpress.com); Jasimuddin Rahmani https://jasimuddinrahmani.wordpress.com/about/; and Mujahideen Media (https://mujahideenmedia.wordpress.com/2012/12/05/power-is-for-allah-shaikh-tamimal-adnani/). Jumuarkhutba and Mujahideen Media are no longer Available online.

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How Do Terrorists Use the Internet for Recruitment?  105 Odhikar. (2017) Annual Human Rights Report 2017. [Online] Available from: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Annual-HR-Report-2017_English.pdf. [Accessed: 27 January 2022]. Parvez, S. (2019a) “The Khilafah’s Soldiers in Bengal”: Analysing the Islamic State Jihadists and their Violence Justification Narratives in Bangladesh. Perspectives on Terrorism. 13 (5). pp. 22–38. ———. (2019b) Digital Media and Violent Extremism in Bangladesh: Profiles and Narratives. Journal of Bangladesh Studies. 21 (1). pp. 60–67. ———. (2021a) How do Violent Extremists use Digital Media? An Analysis of Bangladeshi Extremist Lifecycles. [Online] Available from: www.voxpol.eu/how-do-violentextremists-use-digital-media/. [Accessed: 27 January 2022]. ———. (2021b) Understanding Digital Media and the Lifecycles of Bangladeshi Violent Extremists. PhD Dissertation. [Online] Available from: https://hdl.handle. net/2123/24377. [Accessed: 2 January 2022]. Pearson, E. (2016) The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theory on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad. Policy & Internet. 8 (1). pp. 5–33. Pipes, D. (2018) Melbourne’s Petite, Shy, Honours-Student Terrorist. Quadrant. pp. 24–28. Rabbi, A.R. (2017) Ansarullah Kingpin Held in Dhaka, Police Say they are Regrouping. Dhaka Tribune. 8 April. Rabbi, A.R., Ripon, A. and Khondokar, N. (2018) At Least Two Suspects Escape Madhabdi Militant Den. Dhaka Tribune. 19 October. Riaz, A. and Parvez, S. (2018) Bangladeshi Militants: What do We Know? Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (6). pp. 944–961. Rieger, D., Frischlich, L. and Bente, G. (2013) Propaganda 2.0: Psychological Effects of Right-Wing and Islamic Extremist Internet Videos. Wolters Kluwer GmbH. Available from: https://eucpn.org/sites/default/files/document/files/39._propaganda_2.0_-_ psychological_effects_of_right-wing_and_islamistic_extremist_internet_videos.pdf. [Accessed: 27 January 2022]. Robin, B.H. (2018) Rubaiya O Nayimar Jongi Howar Golpo [The Story of Rubaiya and Nayimar Becoming Extremists]. Manabzamin. 18 May. Rogan, H. (2006) Jihadism Online: A Study of How al-Qaida and Radical Islamist Groups use the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Available from: www.ffi.no/en/publications-archive/jihadism-online-a-studyof-how-al-qaida-and-radical-islamist-groups-use-the-internet-for-terrorist-purposes. [Accessed: 17 January 2022]. Rudner, M. (2013) Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 36 (12). pp. 953–980. Rumiyah. (2016 [Arabic Year 1438]) Muharram (Issue 2). Al-Hayat Media Center. Available from: https://jihadology.net/2016/10/04/new-release-of-the-islamic-states-magazinerome-2/. [Accessed: 15 January 2022]. Sageman, M. (2004) Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sajen, S. (2013) “Online Jihad”: Emerging Threats. The Daily Star. 9 September. Schuurman, B., Lindekilde, L., Malthaner, S., O’Connor, F., Gill, P. and Bouhana, N. (2019) End of the Lone Wolf: The Typology That Should Not Have Been. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 42 (8). pp. 771–778. Siddiqui, Z., Das, K.N. and Paul, R. (2018) Ahead of Bangladesh Vote, Opposition Says it Faces “A Reign of Terror.” Reuters. [Online] Available from: www.reuters.com/article/usbangladesh-election-violence-insight-idUSKCN1OR0KO. [Accessed: 15 January 2022].

106  Saimum Parvez Silber, M.D. and Bhatt, A. (2007) Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. New York Police Department. [Online] Available from: https://seths.blog/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/ NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. [Accessed: 15 January 2022]. Stenersen, A. (2008) The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp? Terrorism and Political Violence. 20 (2). pp. 215–233. Stevens, T. (2009) Regulating the ‘Dark web’: How a Two-Fold Approach can Tackle Peerto-Peer Radicalisation. The RUSI Journal. 154 (2). pp. 28–33. Stevens, T. and Neumann, P.R. (2009) Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s College London. [Online] Available from: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ ICSR-Report-The-Challenge-of-Online-Radicalisation-A-Strategy-for-Action.pdf. [Accessed: 10 January 2022]. Taylor, M. and Ramsay, G. (2010) Violent Radical Content and the Relationship Between Ideology and Behaviour: Do Counter-Narratives Matter. In: Countering Violent Extremist Narratives. The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb). [Online] Available from: www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Countering-violent-extremistnarratives.pdf. [Accessed: 8 January 2022]. Tipu, M.S.I. and Shaon, A.I. (2019) Bangladeshi IS Recruiters Among Eight Charged. Dhaka Tribune. 7 April. von Behr, I., Reding, A., Edwards, C. and Gribbon, L. (2013) Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of The Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism. RAND Corporation. [Online] Available from: www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/internet-andradicalisation.html. [Accessed: 3 January 2022]. Wakeford, L. and Smith, L. (2020) Islamic State’s Propaganda and Social Media: Dissemination, Support, and Resilience. In: Baele, S.J., Boyd, K.A. and Coan, T.G. (eds.). ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 155–187. Weimann, G. (2004) Www.Terror.Net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet. (Special Report 116). United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Available from: www.usip.org/ sites/default/files/sr116.pdf. [Accessed: 13 February 2022]. ———. (2015) Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation. New York: Columbia University Press. Willis, J. and Fellow, A.R. (2017) Tweeting to Freedom: An Encyclopaedia of Citizen Protests and Uprisings Around the World. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

6 Mediating terror Framing the Dhaka attack in the Bangladeshi press Kajalie Shehreen Islam

On the evening of July 1, 2016, five terrorists stormed into the Holey Artisan bakery and restaurant in Dhaka’s elite residential area and diplomatic zone, Gulshan. They held hostage the customers and staff, though, according to witnesses, their primary target was non-Muslim foreigners (Habib 2020). Twenty-eight people were killed in the attack, including two police officers, three Bangladeshi civilians, seventeen foreigners who were visiting or working in Dhaka, and, in the early hours of the next morning, the five perpetrators (The Daily Star 2016). One Bangladeshi victim died later in the week. As the saying goes in journalism, bad news is good news. Crime, therefore, is one of the major news values – factors which make an event or issue newsworthy – not only providing information but also helping to form societal perceptions about crime and justice (Dowler et  al. 2006). Terrorism is one of the most spectacular forms of crime, usually with multiple victims and perpetrators, drama, blood, and gore – a performance of destruction designed to reach an increasingly global audience, making the media key to its purpose (Semati and Szpunar 2018; Weimann 2005). Epkins (2017) suggests that the impact of an act of terrorism depends on its media coverage – “as a means to prevent, assuage, empower or condone violent or reactionary conflict, and to reconcile/rebuild the communities involved” – while Farnen goes as far as to say that terrorism could not exist in its present form without popular exposure and a mass audience and that terrorism is “a media creation; mass media define, delimit, delegitimize, and discredit events that we have not actually seen, but that we all instantly recognize as terrorist acts” (Farnen 2014: 252). This chapter explores coverage of terror-related news in the Bangladeshi press, focusing on the Dhaka attack of July 1, 2016. It explores the framing of news around the incident in three Bengali dailies, analyzing the dominant themes and how they compare between newspapers. It also includes interviews of journalists who covered the event and the topic of terrorism in their work, toward identifying the challenges in writing news on the subject. The chapter provides an understanding of media framing of terrorism in Bangladesh, providing a comparative analysis of news outlets and their perspectives on and processes of news reporting.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-7

108  Kajalie Shehreen Islam

Framing terrorism in the media Terrorism in the media According to McCargo (2003), the media as a political actor is capable of playing a number of political roles, including as an agent of stability, agent of restraint (through monitoring and challenging governments), and agent of change. “The news media relays messages beyond the immediate target of the violence to wider audiences, and also feeds back the reactions of government, victims and society to the perpetrators of the violence” (Cole 2006: 2). Wilkinson (1997) notes the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media, for terrorism as a psychological weapon depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society. Camphuijsen and Vissers (2012) have also studied the symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism, whereby terrorists use the media to publicize their cause and influence public opinion, but with the media also using these stories with their dramatic and emotional effects to meet the needs of their consumers and have an impact on the audience. Nacos (2016) uses the term “mass-mediated terrorism” to refer to “the centrality of communication via all kinds of mass media in the calculus of terrorism on the one hand and media gatekeepers’ preferences for shocking violence on the other hand.” Advanced communication technologies and the emergence of global media ecology since the 1990s have made terrorism more visible in both national and international media landscapes (Kampf 2014: 1). However, Farnen (2014) argues that while media perform gatekeeping and agenda-setting functions, providing knowledge and information, it provides discrete rather than in-depth knowledge about a controversy or public policy, which would require addressing causes and solutions and may be very divisive. Research on terrorism and the media falls into two broad categories: studies of media coverage of terror attacks and their perpetrators and studies of terrorist organizations’ use of the media. In the first category, Ross (2007), in his deconstruction of the terrorism–news media relationship, has identified selective reporting and self-censorship, editorial discretion, lack of specialist focus on terrorism, misinformation given to reporters by national security agencies, news media’s obstruction of counterterrorist efforts, and sensationalization as problems with media coverage. He also found that the media invoke fear, thereby justifying expansion of domestic control, and that they promote religious and racial stereotypes. For example, in a study on US media coverage of terrorism from 2011 to 2016, Powell (2018) found that while the media frame domestic terrorism as “isolated incidents of troubled individuals,” “Islamic” terrorism is depicted as “a larger problem from Muslims connected to international terror groups” (p. 10). In another study on the British media coverage of the Mumbai attacks of 2008, Iqbal (2015) found that British television news outlets focused primarily on images of terror and violence, death and injury, and the propagation of chaos and confusion. Broadly, the media have been criticized for glorifying terrorists, sensational coverage, irresponsible terminology, cooperation with terrorists and payment for interviews, irresponsible mediation, dangerous speculations, lack of homework

Mediating terror  109 and live interviews during crisis, live coverage, and staging events (CohenAlmagor 2005). In the second category, studies have shown the increasingly sophisticated use of media as a tool of terrorist organizations in promoting themselves and their ideologies, and in recruiting potential members. Terrorism is an instrument adopted to achieve multiple immediate and long-term political goals (Norris et al. 2003). Immediate goals include spreading fear among victims and the wider public, eliminating opponents and destroying symbolic targets. Long-term goals include publicizing issues, airing grievances and communicating demands, and mobilizing and strengthening support among sympathizers and potential recruits – “all designed with the ultimate objective of gaining political power, status, and legitimacy” (Norris et al. 2003: 8). Sometimes, the politically symbolic becomes more important than instrumental goals, where the goal is “simply to shock, demoralize or otherwise damage a political enemy.” Picard (1993) argues that while media coverage may not be essential to terrorist objectives, it confers status upon terrorists and their causes, whether by demonizing or glorifying them, and that public perceptions of terrorism are influenced by these rhetorical biases. More recently, social media platforms have become a major means of communication between terrorist groups, their followers, donors, and potential recruits (Hossain 2015; Rothenberger 2012) and calls for more research in the context of Bangladesh as well, but is beyond the scope of the current chapter. Framing terrorism Frames have been defined by Perloff (2014) as a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. Entman refers to framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (2004: 5). As such, frames are composed of a problem definition, a hypothesized cause, a moral evaluation and a proposed remedy. Norris, Just, and Kern describe news frames as “interpretive structures that journalists use to set particular events within their broader context .  .  . bund[ling] key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting developments” (2003: 11). In this way, reporters can prioritize and simplify their messages, the public can sort and make better sense of them, and political leaders can also use frames to respond to events and highlight community policy priorities. Frames suggest how politics should be thought about, encouraging understanding of events and issues in particular ways and what, if anything, should be done about them (Kinder 2007). Understanding the choices the media make in terms of selection and treatment of terrorism incidents “has significant consequences for how the public thinks about terrorism, how policymakers respond to terrorism, and how terrorists attempt to use the media to accomplish their objectives” (Chermak and Gruenewald 2006: 430). Research on media coverage of terrorism has found that the media tend to emphasize the most dramatic, violent, and conflictual terrorist accounts while

110  Kajalie Shehreen Islam ignoring historical, cultural, and social explanations for terrorism. The media’s tendency is to overemphasize and overdramatize terrorism at the expense of many other important social problems, and while domestic and international terrorism are important media events, acts of state terrorism are generally ignored (ibid). Jetter (2014) has found that suicide attacks receive notably more media coverage than non-suicide missions and that this is predictive of the likelihood of another attack in the affected country within seven days’ time, as well as being a possible explanation for the exponential rise in suicide attacks generally in recent years. Norris et  al. (2003) explore the journalistic standards of balance, truth and objectivity in news coverage of terrorism, questioning whether it errs on the side of terrorists, lending them legitimacy, credibility and encouragement; or whether they err on the side of governments, overly relying on official sources and versions of events and ultimately reinforcing support for political leaders and their security policies. They argue that conventional frames of selection, emphasis and exclusion become the mainstream in the news media, furnishing “consistent, predictable, simple and power narratives that are embedded in the social construction of reality” (2003: 5). Frames adopted by media to cover terrorism and those adopted by government to respond to such incidents influence the society’s perception of them, whereby frames can be used to identify main causes and responsible agents, make moral judgments, and suggest policy responses to the event (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). News frames are an important aspect of news storytelling, especially in times of political instability, conflicting accounts, and factual uncertainty (ibid). Framing theory “emphasizes the ability of any entity – media, individuals, or organizations – to delineate other people’s reality, highlighting one interpretation while de-emphasizing a less favored one” and thereby becoming “the central idea around which attributes of events are organized within individual schemata” (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008: 54). Ultimately, differences in coverage of terrorism news can be explained by government policy, institutional tendencies, and the dominant journalism paradigm in any country. Ross (2007) states that broader discussions of the power of the media, especially in conflict situations; the relationship among journalists, editors, authorities and terrorists; an empirical analysis of the media; and the connection between terrorism and public opinion must all be had in order to understand the relationship between violence and the media. This chapter is limited primarily to an empirical analysis of the media surrounding a conflict situation/terror incident through framing analysis, and touches upon the process of covering terror-related news through interviews with journalists. In future, a broader study encompassing and integrating the abovementioned aspects should prove useful in terms of understanding in depth the relationship between terrorism and the media in Bangladesh.

The Dhaka attack in the Bangladeshi press The present analysis examines frames in newspaper reports on the Dhaka attack of 2016. It focuses on front-page news published in Bengali-language national

Mediating terror  111 dailies Kaler Kantho, Prothom Alo, and Dainik Sangram. The first two newspapers were selected because they feature high readership, and all three newspapers were chosen for their broad coverage of the incident in question, as well as the fact that they constitute a fairly comprehensive representation of different political and newspaper ideologies. Kaler Kantho, which began publication in 2010, is owned by the East-West Media Group – a sister concern of the business conglomerate the Bashundhara Group – which also owns other Bengali- and English-language newspapers, online portals, and a radio channel. The paper is generally known to be progovernment. Prothom Alo, the highest-circulated Bengali broadsheet newspaper, was established in 1998 and is owned by Mediaworld, a major shareholder being the Transcom Group, which also owns the highest-circulated English-language daily in Bangladesh, The Daily Star. It may be mentioned that the grandson of the founding chairman and CEO of Transcom Group was killed in the terror attack being studied here. Prothom Alo is generally considered to be neutral. Dainik Sangram, established in 1970, is politically aligned with the right-wing, Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. A sample of 311 articles – 98 from Kaler Kantho, 72 from Prothom Alo, and 141 from Dainik Sangram – have been examined for this study. All are front-page news reports from the e-papers of Kaler Kantho and Prothom Alo, and the online version of the print edition of Dainik Sangram, on or related to the Dhaka café attack published between July 1 and July 31, 2016. The sample includes specificincident reports, as well as additional, general-incident articles which referenced the incident in relation to similar incidents, suspects, investigations, legislation, and so on. While one other significant terror attack took place in the same month, news solely on that have not been included, but several of the news examined here refer to both incidents. Along with a broad overview of the news published during this time, the study specifically examines news on the perpetrators, and analysis of their motives for engaging in terrorism as reflected in the three newspapers. The articles were read over multiple times in order to identify the frames. Notes were taken and the news was categorized in terms of focus of the article, thematic tendencies, language use, sources, and differences or similarities in the coverage as is discussed here. The most common areas of focus of the articles in the three newspapers examined can be categorized into the following broad themes – the incident; the investigation into the incident; the government’s response; other political parties’ responses; international response and diplomacy; stories about the perpetrators, suspects, and arrests; stories about the victims; and reports on counterterrorism operations, legislation, and long-term measures.

Immediate coverage – episodic framing and stating the “facts” In the month immediately after the incident, Kaler Kantho (hereafter referred to as KK) gave the most coverage to news of the incident and its follow-up and

112  Kajalie Shehreen Islam investigation. This was followed by news of different counterterrorism measures, including strategy, awareness campaigns, and monitoring of educational institutions and religious sermons. Other stories focused on suspects of the attacks, the perpetrators, victims, statements of the prime minister and other government ministers, increased security measures following the attacks, and a political blame game. It also ran a few semi-interpretive but more reflective pieces on the backgrounds of the perpetrators. Prothom Alo (hereafter referred to as PA) ran the greatest number of news reports focusing on the perpetrators, followed by the incident itself, security measures, stories on the victims, international reactions, government statements, and counterterrorism measures. It also ran a few analytical pieces on why youth get involved in terrorist activities. Dainik Sangram (hereafter referred to as DS) ran the greatest number of news stories on statements made by opposition and other political party leaders against the government in relation to the attacks. This was followed by news on international reactions, counterterrorism measures, and stories on suspects, government statements, stories on the incident, and stories on the victims and on security measures. Unlike the other two newspapers, DS also ran several front-page stories focusing on the need for religious education and national unity in countering terrorism and about the impact of the attack on the Bangladeshi economy. The immediate media coverage in the first week in the three newspapers can be categorized into the following themes: the incident, official statements, perpetrators, and victims. The incident Coverage of the incident on the first day comprised initial speculations about the attack, confirmation that two police officers and possibly multiple hostages had been killed, and initial witness accounts. Among the three newspapers, KK published the greatest number of front-page news reports on July 2, including news of the incident, a headline quoting the perpetrators as having shouted “Allahu Akbar” while shooting, and local terror group Ansarullah Bangla Team’s claim of responsibility. KK printed news on both the operation being quick and a success, according to the authorities, as well as on the lack of preparedness of the police as an intelligence failure. PA ran preliminary reports of the incident taking place, and a brief news with reassurance from the authorities that the situation was being handled with the greatest importance and that attempts were being made to establish communication with the attackers to find out their demands and to rescue the hostages. While PA also quoted a source as claiming that the attackers shouted “Allahu Akbar” in the story itself, it was not made the headline as it was in KK. Later, PA also ran a piece raising questions about the rescue operation and whether it had been done right. DS ran only one detailed news report on the incident that day, and subsequent follow-ups, including a piece based on the Indian media’s claim that Indian intelligence had warned Bangladesh about imminent attacks.

Mediating terror  113 Official statements From the second day, newspapers began to publish official briefings by law enforcement and statements made by the prime minister (PM) and other political leaders. The dailies focused on different aspects of the PM’s statement. KK focused on the PM’s reassurance that terrorism would be eliminated. PA focused on the PM’s statement that forces were trying to destabilize the nation. DS focused on the PM’s call to the people to resist the conspirators, and ran a separate story on the PM congratulating the forces that carried out the operation. DS also ran reports on the opposition party blaming the tyranny of the government for the terror incident, political leaders highlighting the need for free and fair elections, and other religious-political leaders calling for the need for religion and national unity to counterterrorism. All three dailies ran news on statements of condemnation of the attacks and support for the government from international leaders. In later days and weeks, both KK and PA covered the PM’s speeches in which she appealed to parents to spend more time with their children, to try and understand them, their needs, and to remain informed about what they do, who they associate with, etc. Perpetrators The immediate news coverage about the perpetrators was about identifying who they were – smiling photos of young men posing in front of an ISIS flag were published in both KK and PA, and names (which were later found to be incorrect) were given by official sources, along with the fact that they had military training. The main question was whether these men were homegrown terrorists or had links to international terror organizations, as well as whether they were in any way connected to the local Jamaat-e-Islami. Victims All three newspapers covered the victims – those who were killed, their nationalities and professions, and in the case of the Bangladeshi victims, their family connections. But while KK and PA focused on the hostages killed, DS placed particular emphasis on one of the police officers killed (later covering stories about his family and his funeral). PA published a regular column writer’s piece on the victims, news on the procedure of handover of the bodies, and translated pieces from the New York Times and The Guardian on the two Bangladeshi (one Bangladeshi-origin American) victims killed in the attack, based on interviews with their collegemates in the USA. All the papers also covered the tributes paid to the victims, including a state program to honor them.

Longer-term coverage – thematic framing and analyzing the Dhaka attack and terrorism in Bangladesh In later weeks, there was less specific-incident news other than follow-up on the investigation, the hunt for and arrest of potential suspects, and international

114  Kajalie Shehreen Islam reactions. Instead, there was more general news on the legal proceedings against terrorists previously in custody, counterterrorism measures being strategized and implemented, increased security measures, and investigations into the backgrounds of terrorists, their funding, training and coordination. There was also news on heightened fears and increased security in the country, particularly in the capital’s diplomatic zone and in English-medium schools which were delaying opening after the Eid holidays due to the fear of more attacks. The main themes during this time were the political blame game, and investigation into the perpetrators and analysis of the underlying causes of terrorism in Bangladesh. Political blame game In KK, throughout July  2016, several government ministers and leaders stated that the attacks were not carried out by ISIS or other international terror groups but by local organizations such as the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). There were also periodic statements from the PM and other government ministers suggesting that the opposition BNP and its coalition partner the Jamaat-e-Islami, members of whom were being tried for war crimes committed during the nation’s Liberation War of 1971, may have been involved in the attacks. DS, on the other hand, published several news items on a series of programs arranged by the opposition party BNP in different districts, apparently to pay condolences and tributes to the victims of the terror attack, but which largely involved criticism of the government, and responding to the government’s alleged repression of the opposition, blaming it for the growth and spread of terrorism in the country. According to opposition leaders, while the government blamed them, at least one of the perpetrators was the son of a ruling party politician. In general, too, they claimed that the autocratic rule which stifled any form of opposition was what caused terrorism to flourish as it had. Investigation and analysis Perhaps the most interesting coverage was surrounding investigation into the perpetrators and analysis of the underlying causes behind terrorism in Bangladesh. There was an obvious novelty in three of the five attackers coming from affluent, English-medium and private university-educated backgrounds, as opposed to the previous stereotypical madrasa-educated terrorist, and the media played up this aspect to the fullest. “Perverted youth in rich families” Three days into the attacks, KK, in a news titled “Perverted youth in rich families” (Alam and Tuhin 2016), published photos of the attackers with family and friends, taken from the attackers’ personal Facebook accounts. In this and other stories in later weeks, they were identified as English-medium school- and private

Mediating terror  115 university-educated men from affluent families, one of whose fathers was a local political leader belonging to the ruling Awami League government. KK described one of the men from a very rich family who had danced with an Indian actress at a party just the year before and posted the photo on Facebook, stating that his “modern, Western lifestyle” made it difficult for those who knew him to fathom his transformation into a terrorist. According to reports in KK, the attackers had been missing from home for months, and some of the families even suspected they had gone astray. But when they reported them missing, the police said the men were from rich families and had probably just gone off with their friends and would be back. The families claimed that if law enforcement agencies had taken them more seriously, the tragedy could have been averted. Emotional accounts of parents and relatives breaking down in tears were given, including their seeking forgiveness from the families of the victims, and demanding punishment of those who had put weapons into the hands of their children. PA also reported families claiming they had reported the men missing months earlier with nothing being done about it. However, PA reporters also spoke to the police, who said they had investigated the disappearances and even filed cases against one of the men on suspicion of terrorism, but were unable to find the missing men (Prothom Alo, 4 July 2016). While PA identified the perpetrators and the educational institutions they were attending, they did not repeatedly mention the economic class or affluence of the families, other than stating that one of the men was the son of a local political leader affiliated with the ruling party. On July 30, PA ran a story specifically on why children of the affluent are joining terror groups (Zayeef 2016), but unlike KK which only and repeatedly mentioned that these were men from rich families without any analysis, this piece quoted security and mental health professionals who pointed to the global trend of radical groups in recruiting educated individuals for their purposes which are largely served through the use of modern communication technologies. A faulty education system All three newspapers published news on private university teachers and officials being taken in for questioning on suspicion of terrorism. KK also published multiple news and analysis on private universities in Bangladesh as a haven for homegrown terrorists, where the lack of extracurricular and cultural activities made students engage in terrorism and drug abuse, and how these institutions must take responsibility for the actions of their students and teachers (Parvez 2016; Suman 2016; Tuhin 2016). While KK repeatedly pointed to the fact that young people from rich families were involved in terrorism, it did not attempt to explain why. There were multiple stories on the relationship between youth, terrorism, and drugs, yet there was no confirmation at the time of the perpetrators having used drugs, or analysis into why youth from such backgrounds would engage in terror activities. The newspaper also continued to focus on the three men from English-medium schools

116  Kajalie Shehreen Islam and private universities, and provided little to no information on the other two perpetrators, one of whom was madrasa-educated and one from a government college. Social scientists, mental health and IT professionals were quoted on the destructive effects of drugs and terrorism. The importance of family surveillance and attention were highlighted. The education system was described as divisive – other than Bangla medium education for the common people, English-medium education for the rich and madrasa education for the poor were not according to the country’s history, heritage and culture. They identified this as the reason for students from English-medium and madrasa backgrounds going astray. Experts concluded that children needed to be given proper religious education by their families in order to prevent being targeted by radical groups with distorted interpretations of religion. They also said that families needed to be aware of what their children were doing, especially using the internet. DS was quick to point out in their very first story on the perpetrators, that they were students of English-medium schools and private universities and not – sarcasm apparent in the quotation marks – “radicalized” madrasa students. Throughout the month, based mainly on official statements, the paper focused on the fact that they were highly educated members of affluent families and not madrasa students – even though one of the five attackers was later found to have been a madrasa student. Also based on statements, especially those made by religious leaders, DS emphasized on the fact that the perpetrators were enemies of Islam, humanity and the independence of Bangladesh, and had no relation whatsoever with the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. It also headlined a quote from US Assistant Secretary of State Nisha Desai Biswal who said that the terror attack was a result of adventure-seeking and not religious spirit. The forsaken Both KK and DS published news on the attackers’ bodies “lying in the morgue” with no one coming to identify or claim them. PA, on the other hand, reported that at least four of the families were trying to claim the bodies for burial – the police, however, were quoted as saying that no one had come to claim them (Prothom Alo, 10 July 2016). KK also published a news headlined “Terrorists aren’t humans, or Muslim,” quoting a government minister speaking at a youth rally (Kaler Kantho, 14 July 2016). She was also reported as saying that no one came to claim the bodies of the dead attackers, and that their mothers couldn’t cry for them out of shame, hatred and fear of the public. The news quoted her as saying that terrorists are devils in disguise and that they must be evicted from the soil of Bengal.

Media united The findings show that media coverage of the Dhaka attack in the newspapers studied here shifted from episodic framing in the first week to more thematic framing in the following weeks. There was a dearth of comprehensive investigative

Mediating terror  117 reports, with most news stories based on official briefings from law enforcement agencies and other government sources. There was also evidence of “othering” of the perpetrators as not belonging to the mainstream population of the country in terms of class and educational background, ostensibly causing them to go astray. The first week of news coverage on the Dhaka attack in all three newspapers illustrates episodic framing, that is, event or case oriented, focusing on hard news and concrete, isolated instances, “elicit[ing] individualistic rather than societal attributions of responsibility” (Iyengar 1991: 15–16). Episodic framing tends to be more “drama oriented, visually compelling, and compatible with the economics of the news cycle” (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008: 65). As such, there is detailed coverage of the incident, investigation, identification of the perpetrators, and identification of the victims and some human-interest stories on them. Typical of episodic framing, some of the news is written with a sense of drama, particularly in Kaler Kantho, for example, its highlighting through headlining of the attackers shouting “Allahu Akbar” while opening fire in the café and “Terrorists are not human, or Muslim.” These words were spoken, but it is worth considering whether the newspaper showed responsibility in drawing attention to them in eye-catching, dramatic headlines. In the second example, such blunt and strong language reveals a negative tone and dehumanizes the terrorist while creating a dramatic tone, emblematic of episodic reporting. It may be argued that highlighting such quotes from top political leaders may increase the hostility of terrorist elements, putting the leader/party and general public at greater risk. While the media has a duty to convey the message that terrorism is a heinous crime and will not be tolerated, it needs to be careful not to rile up sympathizers among its audience. News coverage in later weeks was evident of more thematic framing, which emanates from specific instances, but focuses on providing context and background for the issue at hand (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008: 65). In these weeks, more was written about the backgrounds of the perpetrators, a little about the context of terrorism in Bangladesh, history of other attacks, the legal status of other terror-related cases and convicted criminals, and the continued coverage of government statements, particularly from the Prime Minister, about what happened, speculations on how and why, and what must be done in future. Standing apart from the other two newspapers is Dainik Sangram, which highlighted the stance of the opposition party, their statements against the government, and the opinions of political-religious leaders about the role of religion in countering terrorism. For example, a leader of the opposition coalition termed the nation “a graveyard of democracy” which would obviously foster violence and terrorism. DS also ran news on statements made by opposition and religious leaders who blamed the “autocratic” government, the “absence of democracy,” and “atheism in the name of secularism” as being the reasons for youth being involved in terror activities. The paper published multiple news reports protesting the monitoring of religious sermons at mosques, claiming that these were not the problem. It emphasized the quotes of religious-political leaders who claimed that Islam did not permit such violence and proper Islamic education was the way to curb terrorism.

118  Kajalie Shehreen Islam Despite the wide media coverage of the terror attack and the combination of episodic and thematic framing of the incident in the news, there were no comprehensive investigative news stories. Almost all news was based on official briefings from the law enforcement agencies and government sources. Sources are important in any news, and particularly during conflict situations. Terrorism news frames in each society are shaped by three factors – the basic facts surrounding the terrorist event itself; the way these events are interpreted by official sources in the government; and communiques/manifestoes/press statements or interviews with spokespersons articulating the grievances or demands of dissident groups (Norris et al. 2003). “Credible sources” are expected to interpret and explain the events, and while some facts about any terrorist incident may be relatively neutral, such as the timing, the number of casualties, etc., others may remain highly contested, such as the motivation of the perpetrators or the underlying political grievances (ibid: 13). The latter were either not explored or not sufficiently analyzed and explained in the news reports examined here. While the perpetrators were identified and given detailed coverage, there was no detailed interpretive reporting on their backgrounds or why and how they got involved in terror activities, and the role of history, politics, culture and society in these. Neither was there any engagement with family, friends, or acquaintances of the perpetrators or other suspects in order to develop such an understanding. As such, while there is a move from episodic to thematic frames in coverage over the weeks, the latter is not done in detail or depth, and provides little other than superficial observations rather than constructive analysis. While vague connections are drawn – for example, that most of the perpetrators came from affluent families and were educated in English-medium schools and private universities, why these would be factors contributing to their engagement with terrorism, or what about these families and institutions might encourage such leanings and facilitate such actions, is not explored. Usually, in the reporting of crime and terrorism, the perpetrator is somehow framed as “the Other” – “it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks . . . that identity can be constructed” (Hall 1996: 5). In the classic example of reporting on 9/11 in the American media, for example, the terrorists were framed as Arabs, marginalized outsiders, who were threats to personal and national security (Altheide 2007). While this was difficult to achieve in a country where the majority population and the attackers were both Bengali in ethnicity and Muslim by religion, the media picked up on the one aspect that differentiated the attackers from the majority Bangladeshi population – their affluence and their English-medium and private university education backgrounds. This was not only a novelty but a class issue, something the media repeatedly emphasized, but without any convincing analysis as to why such a background would contribute to such tendencies. The media’s focus on the urban, upper-class, English-medium-private-university-educated backgrounds of the perpetrators also served to distract from the backgrounds of all other terrorists accused and convicted in the past, as well as others allegedly involved in the attack in question and the one which occurred within a week of the Dhaka attack.

Mediating terror  119 Such narratives result in the overlooking, normalization and even tacit acceptance of the stereotypical poor, madrasa-educated youth involved in terrorist activities, as well as the more subdued coverage of public university students who have also been known to have been engaged in such activities, while sensationalizing the involvement of the new or “Other” terrorist from an “elite” background. Overall, analysis of the news coverage showed that Kaler Kantho, with its red banner headlines, exclamation marks and sometimes hyperbolic language leaned toward a sense of drama, sensationalization, and emotional writing rather than professional detachment in several of its reports. Dainik Sangram demonstrated a form of bias, not toward the perpetrators but against the government in its coverage highlighting the stance of the opposition more than anything else. Prothom Alo displayed a more nuanced approach based on facts and interviews with greater cross-checking and some expert analysis. All the newspapers displayed an overreliance on official sources; and, at least in the first month of coverage studied here, limited in-depth, investigative, and interpretive reporting. The remarkable similarity in hard news coverage in three rather different newspapers in terms of editorial policy, and political and ideological orientations, can perhaps be explained by journalists who write the news, as discussed in the following section.

(Simply) “reporting” terror Journalists who cover the topic of terrorism “possess a substantial opportunity to influence global public opinion, policy, future media stories, and even future acts of violence through their framing choices” (Epkins 2017: 255). As such, it is important to understand the circumstances in which journalists cover terrorrelated news. According to Bangladeshi newspaper journalists covering terrorism who were interviewed for this study, while terror-related news is given great priority and generous coverage in both the print and electronic media, depth and quality are wanting. They agreed that the main problem is that the media primarily report the statements shared by law enforcement agencies, with little or no investigation of their own. This was the consensus among reporters from Prothom Alo and Kaler Kantho studied earlier, as well as two more journalists from the English-language daily New Age and the online news portal Bangla Tribune, both of whom were interviewed because of their considerable experience in covering terrorism. Reporters covering terrorism at Dainik Sangram did not agree to be interviewed for this work. Little scope for investigative journalism According to Huzaifa Muhammad,1 who covers crime and militancy as a staff reporter at Prothom Alo, a reporter’s own research and investigation should be primary, but “reporting on militancy is simply conveying the statements of the law enforcement agencies.”

120  Kajalie Shehreen Islam Nuruzzzaman Labu,2 senior reporter at Bangla Tribune, who has been covering terror-related issues for the media for over a decade, also said that other than news of the incident and arrests which follow, there is little investigation into why it happened, exploration of the root causes of terrorism, or countering terrorist propaganda and promoting deradicalization. There is a dearth of research on these issues, and very little time and resources are provided to journalists to conduct investigative reports. S. M. Azad,3 who covers the terrorism beat at Kaler Kantho, agreed that investigative reporting on terrorism is next to impossible. First, suspects, their families, and others involved in such cases cannot be reached as they do not get the chance to defend themselves and so do not come forward or speak up. Second, the law enforcement agencies do not like the media publishing anything other than the information provided by them. Third, the media houses do not provide adequate support or time to conduct terrorism-related investigative reports as they do with other beats. Reliance on official sources Muktadir Rashid,4 senior staff correspondent of the English-language daily New Age, covering terrorism, human rights, and judicial affairs, claimed that most media only retell or narrate what they get from their sources in the law enforcement and intelligence agencies without any verification. Another major problem is the understanding of traditional news managers who only wish to highlight extremist attacks and not the context, background, and what they consider to be “soft issues” which they feel do not merit coverage. According to working journalists, because all media simply relay official statements, there is little difference between coverage of terror-related news among the different media outlets. Presentation varies to an extent, with the print media’s capacity to write more in depth, while the electronic media need strong footage to establish a report. Huzaifa Muhammad said that the electronic media’s only intention is to break information, and not to report in depth. S. M. Azad also finds little difference in the news content between the different media. If there are differences in news treatment, they may be due to editorial policy, in terms of what a particular newspaper or television channel wishes to highlight. A reporter’s own ideology may also play a role in news coverage. However, Nuruzzaman Labu said that sometimes there are discrepancies in coverage across different media outlets due to misinformation provided by sources, rushed reporting which does not allow time for verification, as well as official sources not properly disseminating the information. Limitations to reporting on terrorism The major challenges to reporting on terror incidents, says Labu, are time constraints, political bias of the media, and the authorities’ own position in accepting or denying the presence of international terror networks, for political reasons.

Mediating terror  121 Among challenges for the individual journalist, is the lack of training on safety and security. Reporters also require training on reporting terror, what and how much information can be shared in the news, and how to do this without promoting terrorists and their ideologies. “Journalists’ dependence on law enforcement agencies makes stories powercentric and top-down, without focusing on the stories of individuals,” said Muktadir Rashid. Also, journalists do not possess adequate knowledge about terrorism. Rashid points out: Journalists lack knowledge and understanding of political Islam. Most journalists do not understand the difference between extremism and Islamic political parties, causing them to confuse political Islam with terrorism. They also need to be wary of replaying the propaganda of extremist groups so that sympathy towards them does not grow among the public. Reaching individual sources is a challenge, according to S.M. Azad: Bangladeshis are a pious people, and do not want to accept the notion that people carry out terrorism in the name of religion. They would rather believe it is an issue created by the government and media and are suspicious of journalists in the field who try to talk to them about these issues. Maintaining professionalism is difficult, stated Huzaifa Muhammad: All media are against militancy and no one promotes it, but few news managers understand the issue and this is a challenge. Information is strictly controlled by the investigative agencies who try to fabricate the information according to their needs, so getting authentic information is difficult. Activities of law enforcement agencies are not transparent, and they almost never allow any adverse information or criticism. Journalists also often play by their rules in order not to be shut out completely from official sources. The July  1 Dhaka attack was the first of its kind in the country in terms of a hostage crisis and involving the killing of foreigners. “The attack was wellplanned but the media were ill-prepared,” said Muktadir Rashid. Nuruzzaman Labu said that while informing the public was a major responsibility of the media, just how much information to share without endangering the situation was a prime consideration and media managers should formulate a policy on this. Because it was also a novel situation for the law enforcement agencies, at times, different sources shared different information and it was important for reporters to repeatedly cross-check their information. The government or law enforcement agencies should also have given regular updates to the media, something they did not do during the Holey attack, said Labu, but which they have handled better during terror incidents since then.

122  Kajalie Shehreen Islam S.M. Azad said that because the attack was the first of its kind in Bangladesh and because of the foreigners involved, Bangladesh was under extra pressure and scrutiny in the international media. It was an eventful time, with one of the key issues being the government’s initial denial that ISIS or other international terror networks were involved, claiming instead that these were local, homegrown terrorists. The government was only forced to acknowledge the ISIS connection after SITE Intelligence published the group’s claim of responsibility for the attack. In terms of sources, Azad said, “At the preliminary stage, we had reached out to different sources for news, but the law enforcement agencies claimed that this was causing confusion, and that we must publish only the information provided by them, thus censoring our reporting and preventing any investigative reporting on the issue.” The process of reporting any terror incident, including the Holey Artisan attack, is the same, said Huzaifa Muhammad cryptically: “The law enforcement agencies conduct operations, and reporters collect information.” Terrorism has become a separate news beat in Bangladesh, noted Nuruzzaman Labu. “Those who cover terror incidents need to understand the history of terrorism in Bangladesh, the ideologies of terror organizations and how they work, in order to avoid disseminating misinformation.” According to Labu, there should be more investigative reporting on terrorism in Bangladesh, particularly serialized stories on the causes, and why youth become involved in terror activities. The interview findings above show that Bangladeshi journalists who cover terrorism-related news are forced to rely on law enforcement agencies and other government sources. As such, they have limited freedom to pursue their own indepth and investigative stories, particularly those which may conflict with official versions. Access to subjects – perpetrators, suspects, their families – is also a barrier to reporting. Finally, journalists feel the need for greater knowledge of and stronger orientation in covering terrorism, and safety training for those who do, in order for them to be able to report safely, freely, and with awareness and sensitivity.

Reassessing media coverage of terrorism Understanding media attention to terrorism can inform security policy and inform the design of media relations and public diplomacy strategies of agencies responsible for counterterrorism (Walsh 2010). It can also guide the media in putting the problem of terrorism in an appropriate context and tone, as evidence suggests that media coverage of terrorism influences the attitudes and behaviors of mass publics – including voting behaviors and increasing fear and anxiety – and potential sympathizers with terrorist movements (ibid). This study focused on investigating frames employed when covering terrorism in the Bangladeshi media, specifically, in three national newspapers. The findings show that terror-related news gets wide coverage in the Bangladeshi media. Several characteristics increase the newsworthiness of terrorism incidents, such as death (Chermak and Gruenewald 2006). In the case of the Dhaka attack, which

Mediating terror  123 was the first of its kind to happen in Bangladesh, it involved not only death, but multiple casualties, both local and foreign, carried out in an elite and secure zone in the capital, thus ensuring its wide and persistent media coverage. Another novel and stark factor, which added significantly to the coverage and attempts at interpretive journalism, was the profile of the attackers – urban, affluent, Englishmedium and private university educated youth, as opposed to the stereotypical poor young men and boys educated in madrassas or religious schools. Due to the international profiles of the victims too, the international community and media took great interest in the incident, and their reactions also found a large place in the local media coverage. These, which were followed by the media reporting on security, and counterterrorism strategies and measures, resulted in over 300 frontpage news reports between the three newspapers analyzed here. Reducing reliance on official sources However, in terms of content, this coverage was little other than what government and law enforcement officials wanted the public to know. There was little, if any, exclusive news unearthed by journalists themselves. These findings are backed by interviews with journalists who claim that the main challenge of reporting terror in Bangladesh is the over-reliance on official sources, who often have their own political agenda. Research has shown an interdependent relationship between the press, the military, and the government in wartime, and the need for public opinion to favor the government and military, which can be promoted, and dissent discouraged, through the media. In times of crisis and a heightened sense of threat, journalists also offer their collaboration, either freely, or due to their dependence on government access in order to produce news. “News is ‘indexed’ to the policy debates of official or what journalists perceive to be ‘legitimate’ sources” (Norris et al. 2003: 297). This study suggests that this is true not only in wartime but also in times of conflict, such as the 2016 terror attack in Dhaka. The only exception to an extent was the Dainik Sangram, which, ostensibly due to its political (critical of government) and ideological (religious/Islamic) orientation, took a seemingly bold position in highlighting the voice of the opposition, in criticizing the allegedly autocratic government, emphasizing the need for an united political approach to counterterrorism, and claiming that this was denied by the government in power. In terms of hard news and information, however, for which all media outlets were dependent on official sources and not their own investigations, there was no deviance from the mainstream reporting in other newspapers. Research has also shown how news coverage that unquestioningly adopts government frames does not serve the public well, as these frames may not only exaggerate levels of terrorist activity, but also fail to explain the complex range of global economic and national issues (Norris et al. 2003). But whereas in an international and more so an American context, it is suggested that news organizations should take advantage of global resources in order to counter “the

124  Kajalie Shehreen Islam gun-barrel vision produced by political, military, and cultural frames at home” (ibid: 298) and not let domestic news frames of terrorism go unchallenged, this study has found that in the case of Bangladesh, the opposite may be happening. Here, in keeping with official news frames, the focus of the media has also been on homegrown terrorism, largely disregarding the dynamics of and links to international terror networks. Thus the repeated emphasis of sources within the government and law enforcement agencies on local terrorists having no connection to ISIS or other international terror groups, despite ISIS claiming responsibility for several attacks in the year preceding as well as including the Dhaka café attack (Hashmi 2017). An additional risk is the tendency of government elites and journalists to concur in their perceptions about the conflict and the most appropriate steps necessary to contain the threat, suppressing explicit criticism even if there is disagreement (Norris et al. 2003). As such, in the case of the Bangladeshi media, challenging official versions of terror attacks and terrorists may not only antagonize official sources, but be framed as sympathy toward terrorists, and opposition to the government and the state. As has been found in the news analyzed above, ruling party leaders had at different times linked the terror attacks to the main opposition party and to war criminals of the country’s Liberation War, effectively branding anyone supporting or associating themselves with the opposition, also as potential terrorists. Such a discourse inhibits the media as well as the public from challenging outright so-called security, counterterrorism and legal measures which may in fact infringe upon the rights of citizens, and justify the absence of due legal process, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, all of which are controversial issues in Bangladesh. Greater need for investigative journalism on terrorism Similar to research on terrorism and the media in other contexts, this study has found in the case of Bangladesh, too, the media tend to emphasize dramatic, violent and conflictual terrorist accounts while ignoring historical, cultural and social explanations for terrorism. It has also found similarities in the challenges faced by journalists who cover terror-related incidents, including misinformation given to reporters by national security agencies, selective reporting and self-censorship, editorial discretion, and lack of specialist focus on terrorism. While global research on terrorism and the media has explored whether the media err on the side of terrorists or governments, in Bangladesh, terror reporting is based almost solely on the information provided by government/law enforcement official sources, thus leaving little room for independent investigation or diverse perspectives. As such, while in other contexts, coverage may differ depending on government policy, institutional tendencies and editorial policy, and dominant journalism paradigms, in the case of reporting on terrorism in Bangladesh, the process is linear, top-down and heavily dependent on official sources, making the news simple, consistent and predictable to a great extent.

Mediating terror  125 In this context, while it is important for the government, law enforcement agencies and the media to work together in times of crisis, it is also crucial for the media to be given the freedom to pursue its independent investigations for the purpose of revealing the truth about terrorism. This also includes providing access to perpetrators and suspects in order to obtain their side of the story as well. The media also has a duty to check and balance the information being disseminated by official sources. It can also play a crucial role in creating awareness of terrorist threats and tendencies among the wider public. Media organizations need to provide their journalists with institutional, financial and logistical support to be able to pursue investigative stories on terrorism; training on covering terror; and safety training. It is also crucial for reporters and news managers to have a clear understanding of terrorism, militancy, political Islam, its global and national history and current trends. Allowing journalists to pursue independent, investigative and interpretive reporting on terrorism could result in diverse stories and perspectives being brought forth. These would contribute to the understanding of terrorism and its root causes, terrorists and their motivations, terror organizations and their operations, and aid in countering them preemptively, rather than after the fact, as so often occurs in news coverage following major acts of terror in Bangladesh and around the world.5

Notes 1 Huzaifa Muhammad. Personal interview. 21 August  2020, conducted over email. Huzaifa Muhammad (pen name Ahmed Zayeef) is Staff Reporter at Prothom Alo. 2 Nuruzzaman Labu. Personal interview. 24 August 2020, conducted over email. Nuruzzaman Labu is Senior Reporter at Bangla Tribune. 3 S.M. Azad. Personal interview. 22 August 2020, conducted over mobile phone. S. M. Azad is Senior Reporter at Kaler Kantho. 4 Muktadir Rashid. Personal interview. 26 July  2020, conducted over email. Muktadir Rashid is Senior Staff Correspondent at New Age. 5 The author acknowledges the contribution of research assistant Hojaifa Al-Mamduh to the collection of data for this study.

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126  Kajalie Shehreen Islam The Daily Star. (2016) Blood, Shock, Horror. 3 July. [Online] Available from: https:// www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/dhaka-attack/blood-shock-horror-1249471. [Accessed: 21 August 2022]. D’Angelo P. and Kuypers, J.A. (2010) Introduction: Doing News Framing Analysis. In: D’Angelo, P. and Kuypers, J.A. (eds.) Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives. New York: Routledge. Dowler, K., Fleming, T. and Muzzati, S.L. (2006) Constructing Crime: Media, Crime, and Popular Culture. Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice. 48 (6). pp. 837–850. Entman, R.M. (1993) Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication. 43 (4). pp. 51–58. ———. (2004) Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Epkins, H.D. (2017) Covering Acts of Terrorism. In: Robinson, P., Seib, P. and Frohlich, R. (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security. New York: Routledge. Farnen, R.F. (2014) Media and Terrorists. In: De Landtsheer, C., Farnen, R., German, D., Dekker, H., Sünker, H., Song, Y. and Miao, H. (eds.). E-Political Socialization, the Press and Politics: The Media and Government in the USA, Europe and China. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Habib, W.B. (2020) 4 Years of Holey Artisan Café Attack: Recalling the Night of Horror. The Daily Star. 1 July. [Online] Available from: https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/ news/night-horror-1923093 [Accessed: 21 August 2022]. Hall, S. (1996) Introduction: Who Needs Identity? In: Hall, S. and Du Gay, P. (ed.). Questions of Cultural Identity. London: Sage. Hashmi, T. (2017) ISIS Threats in Bangladesh – Denials and Delusions. The Daily Star. 28 March. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/opinion/stranger-fiction/isisthreats-bangladesh-denials-and-delusions-1382470. [Accessed: 24 November 2021]. Hossain, M.S. (2015) Social Media and Terrorism: Threats and Challenges to the New Era. South Asian Survey. 22 (2). pp. 1–15. Iqbal, M.Z. (2015) The Media – Terrorism Symbiosis: A Case Study of Mumbai Attacks 2008. Asian Journal of Communication. 25 (2). pp. 197–212. Iyengar, S. (1991) Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Jetter, M. (2014) Terrorism and the Media. IZA Discussion Papers. No. 8497. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Kampf, Z. (2014) News-Media and Terrorism: Changing Relationship, Changing Definitions. Sociology Compass. 8 (1). pp. 1–9. Kinder, D.R. (2007) Curmudgeonly Advice. Journal of Communication. 57 (1). pp. 155–162. McCargo, D. (2003) Media and Politics in Pacific Asia. London: Routledge. Nacos, B.L. (2016) Mass-mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism. 3rd edn. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Norris, P., Kern, M. and Just, M.R. (2003) Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public. New York and London: Routledge. Papacharissi, Z. and Oliveira, M.D. (2008) News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers. The International Journal of Press/Politics. 13 (1). pp. 52–74. Parvez, A. (2016) No Cultural Activities at Educational Institutions, Leaning Towards Terrorism-Drugs. Kaler Kantho. 15 July.

Mediating terror  127 Perloff, R.M. (2014) The Dynamics of Political Communication: Media and Politics in a Digital Age. New York: Routledge. Picard, R.G. (1993) Media Portrayals of Terrorism. Ames: Iowa State University Press. Powell, K.A. (2018) Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism from 2011–2016. Religions. 9 (257). pp. 1–15. Prothom Alo. (2016) Bodies of Five Terrorists Still at CMH. 10 July. p. 1. Ross, J.I. (2007) Deconstructing the Terrorism – News Media Relationship. Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal. 3 (2). pp. 215–225. Rothenberger, L. (2012) Terrorist Groups: Using Internet and Social Media for Disseminating Ideas. New Tools for Promoting Political Change. Revista Română de Comunicare şi Relaţii Publice. 14 (3). pp. 7–23. Schmid, A.P. (2020) Prevention of (Ab-) Use of Mass Media by Terrorists (and vice versa). In: Schmid, A. (ed.). Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness. The Hague, NL: ICCT Press. Semati, M. and Szpunar, P.M. (2018) ISIS Beyond the Spectacle: Communication Media, Networked Publics, Terrorism. Critical Studies in Media Communication. 35 (1). pp. 1–7. Suman, S.A. (2016) Authorities Must Take Responsibility for the Crimes of Students. Kaler Kantho. 17 July. Tuhin, A. (2016) Destructive Addiction to Terrorism and Drugs. Kaler Kantho. 5 July. Walsh, J.I. (2010) Media Attention to Terrorist Attacks: Causes and Consequences. Research Brief. Institute for Homeland Security Solutions. Available from: https://www. jamesigoewalsh.com/ihss.pdf. [Accessed: 25 August 2020]. Weimann, G. (2005) The Theater of Terror. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma. 9 (3–4). pp. 379–390. Wilkinson, P. (1997) The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment. Terrorism and Political Violence. 9 (2). pp. 51–64. Zayeef, A. (2016) Why are the Offspring of the Affluent in Terrorist Groups. Prothom Alo. 30 July.

7 Under the State’s Securitized Gaze The Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed Drawing on critical terrorism studies and criminology, this chapter explains how the discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism have historically been used by the Bangladeshi state while dealing with the ethnic conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region. While Bangladesh has been in the news for international as well as local terrorist activities through radical Islamist outfits, the recruitment for these groups targets young men and women from the Islamic faith who form the majority of the population of the country. The small minority of non-Muslim Indigenous Jumma youth are not usually part of these processes. However, the Indigenous Jummas1 have different forms of entanglements with the state’s terrorism narratives. Following the independence of the country, the Indigenous Jumma peoples have been fighting for their right to self-determination in a country whose constitution refused to recognize the different ethnic identities of the country. This led to the militarization of the region and a protracted anti-insurgency operation by the state. After more than two decades of this operation, a “Peace” Accord was signed in 1997 between the government and the rebel group. Military occupation of the CHT continues to this day, and the military continues to use counterterrorism measures in the CHT while constructing and sustaining a narrative of the Indigenous Jumma activists as the nation’s internal terrorists and security threats. During the 1970s and the 1980s, when the Shanti Bahini had taken up arms to explicitly fight for their right to self-determination, the term “insurgency” was used to describe the situation, but the terrorism narrative began to emerge following the signing of the CHT Accord and when disgruntled Indigenous Jumma activists began to take up arms to fight against the ongoing state aggression against the communities in various ways. We argue that this narrative helps to legitimize the presence of the military and the whole range of security forces in the CHT and that such presence results in state terror of people in the margins of the nation. We also argue that the security sector’s vast presence is also incentivized by an economic security motive – a dangerous and extractive process that involves exploitation of the CHT’s rich natural resources, deforestation, and depletion of Indigenous Jumma sociocultural practices that have a symbiotic relationship with the environment. Indeed, in Bangladesh, Indigenous Jummas are equally targets of state terror and framed as threats to the state. In this chapter, we offer some snapshots of the Bangladeshi state’s practices and policies in such contexts. One important DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-8

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  129 methodological and epistemological rationale that must be noted up front is that while both authors are scholar-activists working in the CHT, it is not possible to delve into granular details of certain examples of threats in the region due to security reasons and censorship that exists in this part of Bangladesh.

The State’s Securitized Gaze The CHT in southeast Bangladesh, consisting of Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Bandarban, is the home of eleven diverse groups of Indigenous peoples (Roy 2003).2 Known as Adivasis/Indigenous peoples/Paharis from the Hills they are easily distinguishable from the people of the plains in terms of their features, sociocultural practices, and economic activities (Adnan 2008). Because of their traditional practice of shifting cultivation, they are also collectively referred to as Jumma people (IDMC 2006). This self-identification is also used by various CHT political communities to frame their own Adivasi/Jumma nationbuilding strategies. The CHT has geopolitical and strategic significance for Bangladesh and South Asian security due to its location and proximity to India and Burma, and the porousness of the border; its richness in commercial natural resources; and historical, political, and social contexts that constitute the communities of the CHT as the “other” (in times of conflict also as internal enemies) within a Bangladeshi state. A lowintensity conflict that is deeply embedded in the struggle over land and existence in the CHT has contributed to massive internal displacement, officially 100,000 (Baer 2011) but unofficially much higher as there is no data on the ongoing internal displacement, over the years.3 In this chapter we look at the different counterterrorism tactics deployed by the Bangladeshi state against the Indigenous Jumma Peoples of the CHT. We conceptualize this as the securitized gaze of the state. First, we articulate, how in the nationbuilding and statebuilding constructions of Bangladesh, the Indigenous Jummas have been framed as threats. Second, we focus on militarization of the CHT and massive displacement that form the state’s terror strategies. Finally, we discuss how through liberal narratives of saving – in the name of saving refugees, saving environment, and saving “small ethnic minorities” the state rearranges the human security lens through tightening its grips in the CHT. Using a human rights lens and drawing on critical terrorism studies and human security scholarship, we develop our framework of securitized gaze in this chapter. The proliferation of the narrative of “preventing/countering violent extremism,” a new nomenclature, is being used often by states, alongside and sometimes indistinguishably from, that of counterterrorism and an overall expansion of security measures since 9/11 (ICRC 2022). In global governance, counterterrorism is often seen as a quick solution, but the global institutions fail to address the root causes of the production of violence and eventually fail to maintain safety and security. Counterterrorism measures are shrinking and choking communities and, in particular, political activists and human rights defenders in some cases. Richard Jackson (2016: 20) notes that the critical academic approaches to terrorism could be traced to the deep dismay at the Abu Ghraib scandal in April 2004

130  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed and how the war on terror generated an earlier literature of “terrorism industry.” Jackson (2016: 21) also argues that through deepening the research, conversing about the ontology and epistemology of terror/terrorism, particularly how knowledge is being produced and about whom, critical terrorism studies has sharpened its understandings of labels, definitions, categories, assumptions, media biases, and institutional relationships. In the context of Bangladesh, the constant othering of the Indigenous Jummas occurs because of the state’s denial of recognition of the communities as indigenous, multiple forms of prejudice and discrimination due to their non-Muslim identities, physical features, and cultural and traditional practices. This also has a direct correlation with Bangladesh’s position as a major contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations. The Bangladesh military benefits from maintaining the area in a conflict-like situation as it portrays itself as the “peacekeeper” of a region full of armed “terrorists” while also financially benefitting from a wide range of economic ventures in the region. At the same time, human rights activists have demanded that those military officers who carry out human rights violations in the CHT should not be able to go on foreign peacekeeping operations under the UN (Ahmed 2014). The military has constructed a narrative of Jummas as being disloyal to the nation and having separatist tendencies, and therefore distrustful. At the time of partition from India and before the news had formally reached the region, some CHT leaders in one part of the region had raised the Indian flag to signal their preference for staying loyal to India, while another group had raised the Burmese flag because the CHT was a 95 percent non-Muslim region (Buddhist, Hindu and Christian) and under the partition logics it did not fit in with Muslim Pakistan (Mohsin 1997). They backed the wrong side as the boundary commission forced the CHT to go with Pakistan under the guns of the Pakistan military (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018). In her writings about the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and Spain, Agata Serranò (2015) identifies two myths in counterterrorism research: the myth of the exclusivity of the state as the only legitimate player in counterterrorism and the myth of “peace as the end of violence” for victims of state terror (Serranò 2015: 2). For her, a human rights lens and facing up to past injustices are necessary responses if we need to engage with critical terrorism scholarship. In the CHT, as we detail here, even with the signing of the CHT Accord, a culture of impunity exists. David Mares (2001: 7) examines this as “violent peace,” and in his study of militarization of Latin America, he suggests that violent peace is the use of officially sanctioned military violence across national boundaries when war is not the intended result. War might occur, but as a result of escalation dynamics unknowable, unforeseen, or miscalculated by those who made the initial decision to use military force . . . the decision to use military force should be thought of as a bargaining tactic rather than a decision to settle an interstate dispute through war. The intricacies of objective political transition, healing, and reconciliation for communities and economic recovery are all closely interlinked with a wide range

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  131 of other security dynamics such as defusing spoilers of the peace process, integrating various factions, unprejudiced and appropriate demobilization of former combatants, and resettlement of the conflict-induced displaced population (Stedman 1997).4 The Bangladesh military views the CHT as a strategically important zone. It has repeatedly been a scene of heavy fighting in the history of wars of the region, including the war in 1971. As an insecure enough zone, the military can justify heavy state expenditure in keeping a large military presence there. It can thereby keep on the table the options of allowing insurgents from India and Burma/Myanmar to locate bases there if that suits its strategic interests, or the strategic interests of a potential ally such as the United States, China, or Pakistan. During the Pakistan era, the CHT was used this way, with the Mizo National Front (Van Schendel 2016), the Meitei rebels of Manipur, and the Tripuri rebels of Tripura being well entrenched in the CHT for the conduct of hostile operations in India (Mohsin 2003: 89). Insurgents from Burma/Myanmar still inhabit the CHT to a degree today. According to military sources at the tri-junction where the borders of Bangladesh, Burma, and India join, there were twenty-four known insurgent groups in 1990 (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018).5 The unique hilly geography of the region and the similar geography of the Indian northeast and Myanmar over the border have provided refuge for Indigenous Jumma groups carrying out their own movements for self-determination. At different times these three states have supported the groups from neighboring countries to manipulate the relationship with the neighboring states as a form of proxy war. Because Indigenous groups have had to resort to getting support from neighboring states to carry out their movements for self-determination, this has further helped to develop the narrative of the Hill people as the ethnic other and as the anti-state terrorists predisposed to separatism. As a zone that is not totally insecure, development of the considerable resource riches of the CHT is possible. Better still for the military, military leaders might personally cash in on such resource opportunities if it is insecure enough for them to be able to demand protection money from investors. The CHT is a land of opportunity and importunity. Extortion is already a reality with the military extracting healthy rents from illegal logging, tobacco, tourism, and other businesses that operate there. Wives of military officers have often ended up as beneficiaries of land stolen from those driven off their land in the CHT or by illegally buying national forest reserves (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018). A combination of the special conflict zone allowances that soldiers get for serving in the CHT with these protection racket and business opportunities means the CHT is the most lucrative place for postings in Bangladesh. In the past, the collection of protection money from Indian Naxalite and other insurgent groups permitted to use the CHT, especially from those groups trading drugs or arms under the Bangladesh military’s protection, has been a source of revenue for the military. The Awami League (AL) governments negotiated agreements to send Indian insurgents back to India. In some cases, the top leaders were pushed back, with others being allowed to say if they paid local Bangladesh military commanders enough. The CHT is also seen as useful training for peacekeepers. Bangladesh is currently the world’s largest

132  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed supplier of UN peacekeepers (military and police); UN peacekeeping is also seen as a good income opportunity for the security sector (Ahmed 2014). As we show here, displacement of the Indigenous Jumma and the subsequent categorizations of them as landless and refugees, and strategic settlement to alter the demographic terrain of the CHT, have marked the geographical area of the CHT as one of constant surveillance and terror. This is how the Bangladeshi state has produced its securitized gaze: armed with the technology of check posts, ID cards, internet restrictions, and mobile phone tracing.

The Historical Roots of the Terrorism Narratives of this Region and of Its Peoples In 2015, five allegedly armed Jumma activists were shot to death by the military in an encounter in the hilly region. The leading Bangla and English newspapers of the country, Prothom Alo and The Daily Star, reported the incident accordingly (The Daily Star 2015). The Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the intelligence wing of the military, quickly swooped upon these two newspapers for reporting this incident, specifically for the language they used to identify the dead. The main objection to the articles was allegedly because the dead were identified as “Indigenous” instead of “terrorists” (Bergman 2015). Not only did the DGFI send a warning to the newspapers, but they went further and took punitive action by asking major companies to withdraw their advertisements from the newspapers. Prothom Alo lost 35 percent of their advertising money and The Daily Star lost 25 percent (Bergman 2015). This framing of Indigenous activists as “terrorists,” especially during an encounter with the military, is nothing new. Ever since the 1970s when the Jummas began their movement for self-determination, the nationalist rhetoric has framed the movement as anti-nationalist and one that was a threat to the sovereignty of the state. This became a powerful way of constructing the narrative of Jumma “terrorists” as the nation’s existential threat. Wolfendale (2016) argues that the existential threat narrative helps to legitimize war and other military operations upon targeted communities. While the movement for self-determination, which began in the 1970s, is often used as a raison d’être for treating Jummas as the nation’s others and forever being looked at with suspicion, there are also moments in the region’s history that were used to build this narrative. In addition to that, the narrative of Jumma terrorism is a process that renders other threats upon the communities of the region invisible – including the fear and trauma caused by living in a militarized, securitized region, and the environmental harms caused to the region through harmful practices such as monoculture, logging, and hill-cutting and the Islamization of the Hills. In the case of the Hills Islamization has been engineered through various means – including the transmigration program of the 1970s and 1980s, proselytization, building of mosques and madrassahs to further attract majority Muslims to migrate and settle in the region, and even changing the names of various places in the Hills to Muslim names. The struggle against political domination is part of this region’s history and rooted in the anti-colonial movement of the twentieth century. Historian Tamina

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  133 Chowdhury (2016) has argued that colonial rule prompted the claims to Indigeneity in this region by the Jummas in the 1920s and developed through the interactions between the colonial powers and the Hill elite. Elsewhere, Qanungo (1998) documented how Chakmas fought against British domination in the eighteenth century. Therefore, when the Bangladeshi state refused to recognize Indigenous peoples in the nation’s first constitution, this came from the knowledge of the history of the Jumma movements against various forms of domination. The Bengali state saw this assertion and demand for recognition as a threat to the new nation’s control over the region. Several political moments during the Pakistan regime also added to the discomfort for the newly formed Bangladeshi state. Partitions and formations of new nation-states have always had a negative impact on the fate of the Indigenous Jumma peoples. The first is the flag incident during Partition, mentioned previously, which is often cited as an indication that the Jumma Indigenous peoples were not loyal to Bangladesh. The second is the Chakma Raja Tridiv Roy’s intimacy with the Pakistan government when the Bengali uprising began in the early 1970s and his eventual decision to go and live in Pakistan under the government’s protection following the independence of Bangladesh. The important point in both these incidents is that the narratives of both these and other incidents are discussed, deconstructed, and concluded upon by using a Bengali nationalist lens in public discourse and were never attempted to be understood from the perspective of the Indigenous Jumma leadership and the peoples. This nationalist lens also generalized the view of the Jumma and did not attempt to understand the nuances within the different Indigenous Jumma communities and classes and essentialized the political orientation of all Indigenous Jummas. Therefore, in the Bengali national imagination Indigenous Jummas became the disloyal other and therefore were not to be trusted to be Bangladeshis who deserved recognition under the constitution, forever looked at with suspicion, and thus needed to be controlled through military operations. The military must protect Bangladesh’s land from enemies both beyond the border and within. Accordingly, when Indigenous Jummas are killed in an encounter with the “patriotic” military, they must be identified as “terrorists” and not as “Indigenous peoples.”

The Beginnings of the Conflict: The Construction of the Kaptai Dam The massive dislocation caused by the construction of the Kaptai Dam in order to generate hydro-electricity in 1962 led to the seeds of conflict being sowed in the region, and along with the militarization of the region and its effect on the society, it led to huge economic costs of the conflict in the CHT. The construction of the dam flooded 54,000 acres and displaced 100,000 people, most of whom were Chakmas (IDMC 2006: 13). According to human rights organizations, more than 40,000 Chakmas left for Arunachal Pradesh in India, where a majority still remain as stateless persons (Amnesty International 2000). The construction of the dam led to the initial crisis of internal displacement, loss of control over natural

134  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed resources, threats of forced assimilation, construction of non-permanent army camps, and oppression by the Bangladeshi state, as well as an armed insurgency in the CHT in 1976. As a counter-insurgency strategy, the government relocated over 400,000 poor and landless Bengalis to the region between 1979 and 1983 (AITPN 1998: 20–21). Many of the Chakmas crossed the border to Mizoram and Tripura. By 1983, nearly 40,000 Chakmas had arrived in Mizoram, and by May  1986 another 50,000 Chakmas had taken shelter in five refugee camps in Tripura (Kharat 2003). This context of displacement is critical in understanding how war and guerrilla insurgency initially came to the CHT, when people lost their homeland. The armed conflict in the CHT created extreme vulnerability and economic insecurity. Further, the communities are marginalized/excluded from the mainstream political processes of the society. There are no accurate statistics on conflict-induced displacement in the CHT and the ethnic composition of the figures often cited. The government task force on internal displacement stated in 2000 that there were 90,208 tribal and 38,156 non-tribal families or 500,000–555,000 people (Baer 2011). The Bangladesh government also considers the Bengali settlers displaced and pushed for their resettlement in CHT. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Bangladeshi scholars, and indigenous leaders argue that this figure is inaccurate (IDMC 2006: 13). Amnesty International has estimated that 60,000 Adivasis were internally displaced between August 1975 and August 1992 (Amnesty International 2000).

The Accord of Dissonance The CHT Accord6 signed between the AL government and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) on December  2, 1997, was expected to empower people, withdraw non-permanent army camps from the region, and deal with the repatriation of the Indigenous Jumma (Roy 2003). While at the time of the signing this was considered internationally as a successful case of conflict resolution, it involved no third-party mediation or direct intervention by international actors, nor was civil society involved in the peace process. These factors contributed to the weakness and also failure of the Accord. While in 2007, only thirty-five of the 500 non-permanent army camps were withdrawn from the CHT, by December  2009, there were still around 300 military camps in the region.7 Deeply embedded distrust and vast power inequalities between the state (and the armed forces) and the Jumma communities made it impossible to achieve peace and stability in the region. Following the CHT Accord, the Indian government forcefully repatriated 70,000 Chakma refugees from Tripura (Baer 2011). Many of the families, upon their return, found their homes occupied by Bengali settlers and properties appropriated by either the army or the local administration. They became internally displaced. Various international and national human rights organizations pointed out human rights violations of the newly displaced Jumma communities. For example, the CHT human rights groups alleged that many of their leaders had been arrested and imprisoned during the state of emergency that was declared in Bangladesh in

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  135 January 2007 and the election in December 2008. They also alleged that during the period of the caretaker government, the army used the state of emergency as an excuse to increase oppression in the region (UNPO 2007; The Daily Star 2009). Even after the Accord was signed, an intense fear of the authorities as the source of internal displacement was still very real even after the rhetoric of peacebuilding by the state. The main political parties, the AL and the BNP, and the military elite repeatedly advocate that the state has to maintain a strong military presence in the area because of the risk of transnational crime networks operating in some of the impenetrable areas, illegal movement of people, drugs, arms, and other goods on the porous borderland, and the potential armed insurgency (Ahmed Forthcoming). It is also alleged by the opposition and at least some of the enforcement agencies that the internally displaced persons (IDPs) shelter armed groups and cross the border illegally to be trained in India. Consequently, it is not only the military but the functions of the police and border patrol as well that have been increased over the years in the CHT. The governments of Bangladesh, regardless of the political party, tacitly supported the military’s policy of Bengalization of the CHT through state-assisted transmigration of Bengali settlers, though through consolidation rather than escalation in recent years. One reason the major parties supported Bengalization was that the CHT is a strategically important region with resource riches that they believed should not be held hostage to indigenous “insurgents” who one day might decide again to work with India. “If we misbehave with India, the Chittagong Hill Tracts will be burning again.”8 Basically, all parties do not wish to implement the Accord because that would inflame the army as well as Bengali settlers, who now have strong majorities in CHT electorates. Stories of continuing “terrorism” in the CHT, from either the spoiler factions or others such as Bengali settlers, various extremist groups, and Rohingyas from neighboring Burma, have eroded support for implementation of the 1997 Accord in the wider Bangladesh electorate. District and regional councils were never given the autonomy from the central government agreed in the Accord, nor control over many of the specific domains of governance nominated in the Accord. Amnesties for insurgents provided for in the peace deal were generally honored, and refugees were provided with modest resettlement funding.9 While regimes changed hands, and the AL’s power became deeply entrenched and entangled with the security sector, the everyday insecurity of Indigenous Jummas has only increased. In this chapter, we therefore are focusing not on differences in generating threats during different regimes but on the overall situation in the region. The current AL regime of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, Sheikh Mujib’s daughter, assumed office on January 6, 2009, following its victory in the elections held on December 29, 2008. The election manifesto of the AL stated that it would implement the 1997 Accord if it came to power. However, the AL government had done very little in office except talk a great deal about implementation of the Accord. A confidential document marked no 2016/joint ops(a)/787 of 30 June 2010, which was shared with the authors, appeared to outline the strategic planning of the AL

136  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed government regarding the CHT.10 This involved further strengthening of strategic and economic interests, rather than demobilization of military operations in the CHT.11 It also stated the government’s plan to acquire more land for the army and some strategies to combine intelligence operations.12 This document demonstrates that the Bangladeshi state, through its own activities, has persistently failed to bring peace to the CHT. The document revealed the government’s strategy to gradually demobilize the regional Indigenous political parties and encourage mainstream national political parties in the region. While regional political parties and civil society and human rights groups in Bangladesh had demanded demilitarization of the CHT to achieve peace, the government repeatedly delayed the process of demilitarization and secretly planned to strengthen the military presence in all spheres, including development of the region. Strengthening military power and further imposition of military rule either through development work or in intelligence gathering can terrorize the CHT but not bring peace. Elsewhere Ahmed (forthcoming) has shown that government directives are used by the Bangladeshi state to oppress the Indigenous Jumma population by building a strong “othering” narrative about the Indigenous Jumma by normalizing everyday forms of military occupation, surveillance, and violence. This is done by giving militarized solutions to problems of civil administration.

State Terror and Human In(security): Militarization and Land Rights in the CHT Massive militarization by authoritarian and repressive states is often the response toward the indigenous rights movements in various parts of the world. The military is also linked to the highest ranks of the civil administration. The 24th Infantry Division had been in charge of the CHT for the last three decades. Many of the senior officials had also received counter-insurgency training in various parts of the world. Research on militarism draws our attention to three dimensions of the military’s impact on society: the economic and social structure, the legal and political system of the state, and the attitude of citizens toward the ideology and values of the military (Hook 2003). Militarism has also been interrogated through two perspectives. First, the Marxist approach describes militarism as a problem specific to the social and economic structure of a capitalist society that requires external expansion and internal repression as integral to the development of the capitalist mode of production and class system (Hook 2003). As such, militarism is viewed as a tool of the ruling/elite class, manipulated to serve their own interests. Rosa Luxemburg (1913, 2003), for example, notes that “militarism has a specific function in the history of capital. It accompanies every historic phases of accumulation.” She further writes, the imperialist phase of accumulation [is a] phase of the global competition of capital [which] as the entire world as theatre. Here the methods employed are colonial policy, the system of international borrowing, the policy of spheres

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  137 of interest and war. Violence, cheating and pillaging are openly employed, without any mask. For Luxemburg “political violence is also the instrument and vehicle of the economic process.” Second, militarism has also been analyzed through an interrogation of legal and political systems, largely by focusing on the functional and profit-based relationship between the military and the civilian sectors of the state. In such a liberal approach, the popularity of military services, uniforms, insignia, and songs are representative indicators of the extent to which militarism has taken root in the society. For liberals, militarism is also a product of the supremacy of state security forces over civilian state affairs. Militarization, in comparison to militarism, does not imply the formal supremacy of the military. It is a historical process that comprises a dynamic set of relationship between the society and the military. It is a multidimensional process through which a number of elements – such as military coups and regimes, authoritarian government, the dominance of patriarchy, powerful military and state apparatuses, war and armed conflict, rising military spending and arms imports, and external military intervention – become dynamically interlinked, both to each other and more widely to capital accumulation and projects of national and international hegemony.13 The rising military expenditure of Bangladesh has reflected the increased use of the military within state borders. The domestic high-security zones of the CHT, where communities live under state repression and continual denial of fundamental human rights and liberties, reveal that Bangladesh has often preferred resolving political challenges in the region through military means. With the presence of other state security forces such as the police, the intelligence agencies, the village defenses forces, and the para-military forces, militarization, in varying ways, has become a deeply embedded process in the CHT. Our individual and collaborative research in the CHT indicate that militarization produces gross imbalance of power between Indigenous Jumma communities and the Bangladeshi state, and often human security is undermined and human rights suppressed, in the name of national security. Following the 1997 CHT Accord, a large faction of the armed resistance groups have surrendered their arms. However, there were no appropriate disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) responses to their concerns.14 While the Accord briefly noted the importance of reconciliation and justice, and also pointed out the concerns of displacement, more than two decades since then, CHT advocacy voices point out that these have not been appropriately addressed. The Accord itself is deeply gendered and has no explicit plan of action toward the specific gendered experiences of women, men, and children of the Hills. While the armed conflict in the CHT officially ended following the signing of the Accord, Chakma and D’Costa (2012) observed that what remains in the region is a situation of violent peace. First, various regimes of Bangladesh have continued a strong authoritarian control over the region unlike the rest of Bangladesh. The army, the police, the border security forces, and the intelligence all have a

138  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed heavy presence, which contributes to a heavily securitized environment in CHT. Instead of demilitarization there has been massive remilitarization following the Accord in the name of maintaining peace. Soon after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the military administration took over the rule of the entire country in August 1975. Although the state went through many democratic and military governments, there has been little change of conditions in the CHT. The state also retained “Operation Uttaran” (meaning Operation Elevation/Uplifting), a de facto military rule, to allow the military and the para-military to intervene in civil or political matters in the CHT when confronted by protests from Indigenous political groups, local and national civil society, and human rights groups. It also retained the shantakaran, or “pacification,” program. Under this scheme, the military undertook some economic measures to pacify the dissatisfaction of the Indigenous peoples about the obstructions they faced in exercising their social, cultural, economic, and political rights. In 1991, a conservative estimate was made that there was one member of the security forces for every ten Indigenous peoples in the CHT (CHT Commission 1991). While public data are unavailable on exactly how many troops are deployed in the CHT, a rough estimate puts the figure somewhere between 35,000 and 114,500. Military officials state that onethird of the entire Bangladesh Army is deployed in the CHT, an area that accounts for one-tenth of the total territory of the country, making it one of the most heavily militarized zones of a “peaceful” area. The scenario of military presence in the post-war CHT has not changed either. In this excessive military presence, gross human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, harassment of rights activists, and sexual harassment, continued (Chakma 2010; Chakma and Hill 2013). Various NGOs, including the Survival International and Anti-Slavery International, gathered first-hand accounts of ill-treatment and torture, threats and killings, along with army destruction of houses and temples. One of the most comprehensive studies done on the human rights situation of the region is by the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC). It published a report in 1991 titled Life Is Not Ours, and three updates of the report have been published ever since. Upendra Lal Chakma,15 who was interviewed by the CHTC in 1991, was at the time a member of the Bangladesh parliament. He referred to the events after liberation as “genocide,” a “nightmare” (CHT Commission 1991). Many background reports and data received by the CHTC contain long lists of beatings, of forcible relocation to cluster villages, of detention without trial, torture, rape, and unlawful killings by the Bangladeshi security forces over the last two decades. They also contain information on arson, destruction of houses and villages, looting of property, curtailment of freedom of expression, reprisal attacks and combing operations by the security forces (CHT Commission 1992). The first Life Is Not Ours report states that looting, arson, rape, gang rape, torture to death, and murder had been used to evict Indigenous peoples from their land in 1990. It cited one such event on December  28, 1990, when three Chakma girls aged between 12 and 18 were gang raped by eight paramilitary officers of the Village Defence Personnel (VDP) posted at number 10 sentry post. They were mutilated

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  139 and killed along with a 10-year-old boy (CHT Commission 1991). While it is not clear if the boy was raped or not, the public nature of the killing and the mutilation suggest that the incident was used to create fear by the state. The report also cites other incidents of violence against children. The report cites interviews of refugee women taken in Tripura. Women recounted stories of rape, gang rape, and assaults committed in front of children and forced marriages. One of the women stated: About fifty army personnel came in the night and rounded up the whole village and gathered us in one place. In the morning all the men were arrested. I  was tied up hands and legs, naked. They raped me. There were three women there. They raped me in front of my father-in-law. After that we were tied up together, naked, facing each other. Then they left. Three other girls were raped in front of me. This happened in the month of Ashat (June/ July) of 1985. (CHT Commission 1991) The case of abduction of Indigenous Jumma women’s rights activist Kalpana Chakma in June 1996 by a military officer, a year before signing of the Accord, was also an indication of the violent strategy the state would take to deal with the Indigenous Jumma activists, particularly women (D’Costa 2011; Guhathakurta 2004). This enforced disappearance is of particular importance because not only was she abducted and disappeared in plain sight of her family but for the last 26 years an entire state machinery has worked tirelessly to protect the military officer and two paramilitary officers against whom the allegation of abduction was made. Their names have been categorically left out of all the investigation reports that were made by institutions of the state. It is clear that the trauma of sexual violence affected the men and children equally. This must also be understood in the context of perceptions of masculinity and hyper-masculinity. Sexual torture of children, who are usually perceived as the innocent and in some ways the most sacred subjects of the communities, forced the indigenous men to assume sexually subordinated and helpless positions against the hyper-masculine Bengali army.16 The “gender distortion” that happened during conflict has continued in various ways, even after peace, through the everyday violence in the Hills (D’Costa 2014). Women were displaced and dislocated through forced marriages to the Bengalis. While this was used as a strategy to change the demography of the CHT, it also created anxieties about religious identity. Many women reported that they were forced to convert to Islam. There were some reports of a secret memo circulating among the army officers encouraging them to marry the indigenous women (CHT Commission 1991: 88). One woman told the Commission: I was kidnapped in 1986. . . . I had two children with this man. One day he sent me to his father’s house and at a certain moment when I  saw no one around I  escaped. I  went back to the jouta khamar (cluster village) where

140  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed I had lived before, but when I arrived there, there were no tribals and it was occupied by Muslims. I arrived here in the camps in 1988. (CHT Commission 1991)17 While sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and other forms of violence resulted in state terror and also continued after displacement/dislocation, the situation had improved only slightly following the 1997 Accord. The military retains a huge presence, which has strained the fragile peace and led to violations of the Accord. Women’s and girls’ bodies are charged with metaphorical meanings profoundly rooted in a social and cultural structure that is outside the physical control of individual women. In times of conflict and violence, women’s bodies often become the carriers of violent messages between different ethnic or other groups. Their identity has repeatedly been an important symbol of nationalist movements and the construction of nation-states. Rape and other forms of SGBV have been used systematically in the CHT targeting Indigenous peoples as enemy of the nation-state. This process is particularly evident through the construction of women’s identity within nationalist myths. This is particularly so with regard to the positioning of women within four archetypal roles: as mother, as traitor, as sex object, and as target of rape. Over the past three decades, intellectual debates, especially in South Asian historiography, have addressed the limitations of nationalist and state narratives of struggle. In so doing, they have created an awareness of the significance of “histories from below,” from those living at the periphery of power and control (D’Costa 2012). Yet our argument is that not only are these histories critical to the “people from below,” but that they are equally important to the whole society. Sexual violence, torture, and enforced disappearances are used as strategies of terror and intimidation to crush resistance and to force people to leave their land. According to the Life Is Not Ours (update published in 2000), “no provisions have been made for a) proper investigation of massacres and other human rights violations of the past, b) the trial and punishment of perpetrators and c) compensation for those who have been affected by these human rights abuses” (CHT Commission 2000: 13) in the Accord. It further states, “Nor are there provisions for making publicly available the reports of the official inquiries into some of the massacres, human rights violations, disappearances and tortures, such as the official report on the 1993 Naniarchar massacre” (CHT Commission 2000: 13) and the report concerning the abduction and disappearance on June 12, 1996, of Kalpana Chakma, an activist of the Hill Women’s Federation from her home at Lallyaghona village, by the members of the Bangladesh Army. Kalpana’s disappearance generated the most united response by the CHT advocacy groups for the state to take some action. State responses were rather muted, and Kalpana Chakma is still missing; it is feared that she might have been killed if she did not agree to marry Lieutenant Ferdous, the army officer who led the abduction (CHT Commission 1997). There are also no provisions for monitoring any future incidents of human rights violations or for accountability regarding human rights abuses. In the absence of such attempts at justice, clarification, and reconciliation, and as long as the CHT remains militarized, there is no guarantee of any real peace in the CHT.

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  141 The CHT Accord signed in 1997 had also failed in terms of DDR. In compliance with the Accord, some 1,900 members of the JSS and Shanti Bahini surrendered in some highly publicized arms surrender ceremonies in 1998. With the exception of eleven of them, others received the promised Tk 50,000 (USD 700) (CHT Commission 2000). Sixty-two out of seventy-eight who were eligible have been reinstated in their jobs, and 681 have been absorbed into the police. Members of the Shanti Bahini claimed that the money was not enough, and soon poverty and the issue of land became central to their struggle. Also, many refugees who returned from India have not received their old land back, nor have they received any compensation as promised (CHT Commission 2000). The issues relating to land rights of the CHT peoples remain unresolved (Roy 2000), and Indigenous peoples continue to face further land-grabbing by the settler-population (MRG 2008). A delegation of the government of Bangladesh and the Jumma refugee leaders signed a repatriation agreement in Agartala, Tripura, India, on March  9, 1997. While the agreement included a twenty-point rehabilitation package, there was not attention given to the gender dynamics of displacements (CHT Commission 2000). Further, the government refused to agree to the demand of the refugees to involve the UNHCR and ICRC in their repatriation and rehabilitation. While the government sources stated that the total allocation for rehabilitation of the repatriated Jumma refugees was Tk 370  million, no figures were available for people who regained their land (CHT Commission 2000). A 1999 survey by the CHT Returnee Jumma Refugee Welfare Association suggests that 25 percent of all repatriated families had not received their lands back as promised, while forty villages, occupied by the Bengali settlers, had not been returned to the refugees (CHT Commission 2000).

The Breaking Up of a Movement Over the last decade the national political situation has changed quite dramatically. The AL government that came to power through an election in 2009 following a two-year military-backed caretaker government has strategically been taking a hardline against all forms of opposition toward them. First, this was against the political opposition from the BNP by filing cases against their leader Begum Khaleda Zia and then toward other political leaders of the BNP and forcing many to flee the country. The hammer then came down on activists and journalists who wrote about or spoke out against these and other forms of corruption and injustice. In the three national elections since 2009, there has essentially been no political opposition and the AL carried out the elections simply as routine acts performed for the purpose of documentation. Many citizens didn’t even bother to go to the voting station as they knew their votes would already be given by someone else. With this national political situation, the military-industrial complex in the CHT started taking further steps to fortify the narrative of the region as one that is under threat from internal enemies and manage the region’s political economy. Interestingly, while BNP and AL activists at the national level are constantly at loggerheads with each other, in the CHT the political activists often work together

142  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed to represent the Bengali settler groups and the different professional associations such as the transport workers and shopowners’ associations. These associations don’t represent the rights and vulnerabilities of poor Bengalis of the region but rather the interests of the well-connected middle class who maintain a good relationship with the military and political elite. While economic benefit is one of the main objective of these associations, these processes also actively marginalize the Jumma Indigenous groups from accessing these economic benefits. One of the important traits of the movement for self-determination in the 1970s and 1980s was that the Jummas were united, with some exceptions, particularly the Mros, through their membership and support of the JSS. When the CHT Accord was signed in 1997, there was a lot of discontent among many activists that the hurriedly signed Accord compromised with some of the core demands of the Jummas. Some members of the JSS who were not consulted and/or did not agree to the Accord stepped down from the JSS and formed the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF). Led by Marxist values of class struggle and against different forms of power and hierarchy, this group rejected the Accord and demanded for full autonomy of the region. The grievances of this group were never addressed, and the official narrative about UPDF quickly became one that framed the group as terrorists. The state successfully established this narrative about UPDF with newspapers, and the armed fighting between the two groups began to grow. Smaller regions within the CHT began to be identified by those areas that were under JSS control and those areas that were under UPDF control. Over the decades since the signing of the Accord, the violence between these two groups caused a lot of tension within the community. The state used this fighting as yet another evidence of the CHT being a security threat to the nation in order to manufacture consent of the masses about further fortifying surveillance and militarization in the area. In 2019 this led to the discussion about setting up a paramilitary body of Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) for the region. Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal at a press conference promised to bring peace to the CHT “at any cost” and issued an order to deploy a battalion RAB 15 in the area. According to the plan, it would be called the Parbotyo Battalion (Hill Battalion), including the three hill districts as well as Cox’s Bazar. RAB 15 would consist of 677 posts in the Hills in fifteen different positions (Ahmed 2019). The RAB is widely known for its extrajudicial killings throughout the country. Although the outfit was established by the BNP, its powers and impunity expanded during the AL period, and Human Rights Watch reported in 2014 that the RAB was responsible for at least 800 killings in the previous ten years (Human Rights Watch 2014). Labeled a “death squad,” the United States in December 2021 imposed sanctions on the RAB and seven current and former top officials of the agency (Human Rights Watch 2022). While the RAB was not set up in the CHT region, in the last five years many other conflict management strategies have been put in place to justify heightening the securitization of the region. After the two main regional groups UPDF and JSS agreed to a mutual ceasefire, the military began supporting the formation of more groups that would carry out armed fights. According to activists from the ground

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  143 that we spoke to, the UPDF-Gonotantrik (Democratic) was formed with military support to target activists of JSS and UPDF in order to invalidate the ceasefire agreed upon by the two Jumma groups. This breakaway faction of the UPDF is composed of former Jumma activists who were members of UPDF but were for whatever reason disgruntled with the party. Upon their departure from the party, the army swooped upon them and took advantage of the situation by recruiting them to fight against their former party colleagues. Since 2015, the UPDF-Gonotantrik has killed and targeted many Jumma activists of both UPDF and JSS. Many activists have since gone into hiding, many taking refuge in neighboring countries. The Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh has brought yet another dimension into this narrative. While there is much documentation about the Rohingyas’ arrival and settlement in the Cox’s Bazar area of Bangladesh following the genocide carried out by the Myanmar military, very little is known about the situation of the Rohingyas who have taken refuge in Bandarban, which also shares its border with Myanmar. We have gathered many anecdotes from activists in the Bandarban region about the presence of Rohingya refugees as well as individuals belonging to the Arakan Army (AA) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). This presence, along with the political significance of the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar, gives the military more munition to justify their heightened surveillance upon the CHT, especially the Bandarban region.

Conclusion As we articulate in this chapter, the state’s securitized gaze, manifested through the lingering and intense use of force by the Bangladeshi armed forces, has produced a culture of violence in the CHT, where Indigenous Jumma Peoples are more often under the state’s securitized gaze and sometimes, literally, under the boots of the military personnel. The accountability measures introduced through the traditional and national justice mechanisms could improve efforts to realize the rights of communities in the CHT and especially of women’s rights. These could involve considering a Commission of Inquiry to compile and respond to grievances and also institutional reforms. Land rights are integrated in the justiceseeking agenda of the CHT. Therefore, an open discussion of what it means to achieve economic justice would be key to peacebuilding and achieving security in the CHT as well. The analytical and normative framework in which Bangladesh’s security through a critical lens is based calls for a multi-pronged strategy: identifying threats, seeking to prevent them from materializing, mitigating harmful effects for those that occur, and supporting Indigenous communities cope with the consequences of widespread insecurities such as conflict, human rights violations, and massive underdevelopment. In the same way state-centric economic development paradigms and militarized security practices have failed to address the broader concerns of Indigenous Jummas. State-centric security discourses are no longer adaptable enough to address the new threats to safety and well-being of communities.

144  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed The legitimate concerns of Indigenous Jummas who sought security and dignity in their daily lives have been either forgotten or ignored for too long. Innovative discussion of insecurity in terms of its impact on political processes, the state’s security from internal and external aggression, and the protection of fragmented groups claiming political legitimacy now dominates the international security narrative.

Notes 1 The term ‘Jumma’ is derived from the word Jhum, a form of swidden cultivation that is historically done by the Indigenous communities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Those who do jhum cultivation would be known as Jummas. Later the term began to be used as a collective political identity by Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) as a signifier of the struggle for self-determination following the birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation. It is used as a collective term to refer to at least 11 different indigenous groups that have inhabited the Hills for generations. The term Jumma was used to assert the distinct identities of the peoples and as a protest against the assimilation attempts by the Bangladeshi state. The term “Indigenous Peoples” is used by the United Nations to recognize the identity and culture of peoples who are distinct from the dominant communities. The Bangladesh Government categorially refuses to recognize the Indigenous communities of the country. 2 Some authors have disputed the number and stated there are 13 groups, for example see, Panday, Pranab Kumar and Jamil, I. (2009) Conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: An Unimplemented Accord and Continued Violence. Asian Survey. 49 (6). 3 We use the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict dataset codebook to classify the CHT as a low-intensity conflict zone. [Online] Available from: www.pcr.uu.se/publications/ UCDP_pub/Codebook_v4-2006b.pdf. 4 In “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” John Stedman attempts to develop a typological theory of spoiler management and defines it as “. . . leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” He also lists position, number, type and locus as four major problems associated with spoilers. 5 Interview with retired Bangladeshi general, 2010 by Braithwaite and D’Costa. 6 See Roy, Devasish, note 1 and Mohsin, A. (2003) The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: On the Difficult Road to Peace. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 7 See IDMC Report, note 8. Also see, IDMC update on Bangladesh, 2009. [Online] Available from: www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/ E400CE5BE288D026C125772500686A54/$file/GO2009_Bangladesh.pdf 8 Interview with retired general, 2010; Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018. 9 Ibid. 10 Confidential document no. 2016/joint ops(a)/787 of 30 June  2010, Defense Department of the Prime Minister Office, Operation and Planning Commission of Dhaka Cantonment/Garrison. 11 Parbattya Chattgrame sahingsata bandha O Unniyane Byapak Parikalpana, Jugantar, 5 July 2010. 12 Combined Intelligence Works coordination, confidential document no 2016/joint ops(a)/787 of 30 June 2010. 13 For details see, D’Costa, Bina 14 Interview with UPDF and JSS activists with Braithwaite and D’Costa. 15 He was the head of the Parbatya Chatoogram Jumma (CHT Jumma) Refugee Welfare Association, which the government speculated to be one of the insurgent front organizations during the armed resistance.

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  145 16 It is indeed an irony of history that the Bengalis were considered weak and powerless by the Pakistani army, which terrorized the East Pakistani/Bangladeshi population during the war of 1971. The state terror and torture by the Bangladeshi army in the CHT indeed have uncanny resemblance to 1971. 17 The document does not refer to what happened to the children who were conceived through forced marriage.

Bibliography Adnan, S. (2008) The Political Economy of Border Control and Manipulation in the Context of Ethnic Domination and Capitalist Expansion in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. Paper presented at the Social Science Research Council Border Workshop, Dubai. Ahmed, H.S. (2014) Part-Time Peacekeepers. Himal Southasian. 10 November. [Online] Available from: www.himalmag.com/part-time-peacekeepers/. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. ———. (2019) A Death Squad Comes to the Hills. Netra News. 26 December. [Online] Available from: https://netra.news/2019/a-death-squad-comes-to-the-hills/. [Accessed: 20 August 2022]. ———. (Forthcoming). The Chittagong Hill Tracts as a State of Exception: Jumma Citizenship and Subjectivity on the borders of southeastern Bangladesh. In: Stamatopoulou, E., Lightfoot, S. and Bleie, T. (eds.). Indigenous Peoples and Borders: Decolonization, Contestation, Trans-Border Practices. Amnesty International. (2000) Bangladesh: Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/001/2000/en/. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. ———. (2013) Pushed to the Edge: Indigenous Rights Denied in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts. Available from: www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur05/9964/2019/en/. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. AITPN. (1998) Disguise Invasion and Ethnic Cleansing. Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network. April. New Delhi, India: AITPN. Arens, J. (1997) Foreign Aid and Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In: Bhoumik, S., Guhathakurta, M. and Chaudhury, S.B.R. (eds.). Living on the Edge: Essays on Chittagong Hill Tracts. Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights. Baer, L.A. (2011) Study on the Status of Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997. Available from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/699716. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. Bergman, D. (2015) Bangladeshi Spies Accused of Blocking Media Adverts. Al-Jazeera. 7 October. [Online] Available from: www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/10/7/bangladeshispies-accused-of-blocking-media-adverts. [Accessed: 10 March 2022]. Braithwaite, J. and D’Costa, B. (2018) Cascades of Violence: War, Crime and Peacebuilding across South Asia. Acton: ANU Press. Chakma, B. (2010) The Post-Colonial State and Minorities: Ethnocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. 48 (3). pp. 281–300. Chakma, K. and D’Costa, B. (2012) The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Diminishing Violence or Violent Peace? In: Aspinall, E., Jeffrey, R. and Regan, A. (eds.). Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific. London: Routledge. pp. 159–174. Chakma, K. and Hill, G. (2013) Indigenous Women and Culture in the Colonized Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. In: Visweswaran, K. (ed.). Everyday Occupations:

146  Bina D’Costa and Hana Shams Ahmed Experiencing Militarism in South Asia and the Middle East. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 132–157. Chowdhury, T.M. (2016) Indigenous Identity in South Asia: Making Claims in the Colonial Chittagong Hill Tracts. London: Routledge. CHT Commission. (1991) Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Amsterdam: Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. ———. (1992) Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. An Update of the May 1991 Report. Amsterdam: Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. ———. (1994) Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Update 2. Amsterdam: Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. ———. (1997) Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Update 3. Amsterdam: Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. ———. (2000) Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. Update 4. Amsterdam: Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. D’Costa, B. (2011) Protest, Political Terror and Personal Life. South Asia Citizens Wire. 12 June. [Online] Available from: www.sacw.net/article2137.html. [Accessed: 18 April 2022]. ———. (2012) Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia. London: Routledge. ———. (2014) Marginalization and Impunity: Violence against Women and Girls in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. Dhaka: Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. The Daily Star. (2009) Indigenous Rights Suffer for Policies: Amnesty Observes in its Report. 29 May. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-90374. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. ———. (2015) Five killed by Army. 16 August. Available from: www.thedailystar.net/ frontpage/five-killed-army-127579. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. Guhathakurta, M. (2004) Women Negotiating Change: The Structure and Transformation of Gendered Violence in Bangladesh. Cultural Dynamics. 16 (2–3). pp. 193–211. Hook, G.D. (2003) Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan. London: Routledge. Human Rights Watch. (2014) Bangladesh: Disband Death Squad: ‘Rapid Action Battalion’ Involved in Serial, Systematic Killings. [Online] Available from: www.hrw.org/ news/2014/07/20/bangladesh-disband-death-squad. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. ———. (2022) US Stands Firm on Sanctions on Rights Abusers in Bangladesh. [Online] Available from: www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/13/us-stands-firm-sanctions-rights-abusersbangladesh. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. ICRC. (2022) Interview with Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin. IRRC No. 916–917, February 2022. [Online] Available from: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/interview-withfionnuala-ni-aolain-916. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. IDMC. (2006) Bangladesh: Minorities Increasingly at Risk of Displacement. Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 28 March  2006. Norwegian Refugee Council. [Online] Available from: www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/ documents/200603-ap-bangladesh-bangladesh-minorities-increasingly-at-risk-of-dis placement-country-en.pdf. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. Jackson, R. (2016) A Decade of Critical Terrorism Studies. In: Jackson, R. (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 20–43. Kharat, R.S. (2003) From Internal Displacement to Refugees: The Trauma of Chakmas in Bangladesh. Paper presented at the International Conference on IDPs, 7–8 February, Trondheim: Norway.

Under the State’s Securitized Gaze  147 Lewis, D. and Van Schendel, W. (2020) Rethinking the Bangladesh State. Contributions to Indian Sociology. 54 (2). pp. 306–323. Luxemburg, R. (1913, reprinted 2003) The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge. Mares, D.R. (2001) Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America. New York: Columbia University Press. Minority Rights Group International. (2008) World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Bangladesh: Adivasis. [Online] Available from: www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/49749d5841.html. [Accessed: 5 August 2021]. Mohaiemen, N. (2010) Connecting Visible Dots (1997–2010). In: Mohaiemen, N. (eds.). Between Ashes and Hope: Chittagong Hill Tracts in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism. Dhaka: Drishtipat Writers’ Collective and Manusher Jonno Foundation. pp. 31–34. Mohsin, A. (1997) The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh. Dhaka: The University Press Limited. ———. (2003) The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: On the Difficult Road to Peace. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Qanungo, S.B. (1998) Chakma Resistance to British Domination 1772–1798. Chittagong: Shanti Press. Roy, D. (2003) The Discordant Accord: Challenges Towards the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997. Journal of Social Studies. Dhaka University. pp. 4–57. Roy, R.C.K. (2000) Land rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. IWGIA 99. Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. Serranò, A. (2015) Contemporary Spanish Anti-Terrorist Policies: Ancient Myths, New Approaches. In: Jarvis, L. and Lister, M. (eds.). Critical Perspectives on Counter-terrorism. London: Routledge. pp. 107–124. Stedman, S.J. (1997) Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. International Security. 22 (2). pp. 5–53. UNPO. (2007) Political Repression of Indigenous Leaders in CHT. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Belgium. 26 February. [Online] Available from: https://unpo. org/article/6380. [Accessed: 17 April 2022]. Van Schendel, W. (2016) A War Within a War: Mizo Rebels and the Bangladesh Liberation Struggle. Modern Asian Studies. 50 (1). pp. 75–117. Wolfendale, J. (2016) The Narrative of Terrorism as an Existential Threat. In: Jackson, R. (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies. London: Routledge. pp. 130–139.

8 Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent Ridwanul Hoque

In Bangladesh, terrorism has both pre-colonial and post-colonial (post-Independence) contexts. The so-called security laws of Bangladesh’s British (pre-1947) and Pakistani (pre-1971) colonial years largely operated outside the ordinary criminal justice systems. For example, the Indian Council Act 1861, which provided the governance framework for British India, authorized the Governor-General to issue emergency ordinances for the sake of India’s “peace and good government” (Kalhan et al. 2006: 126). This and other enactments led to rules for preventive/executive detention of people without a court warrant. During the internally colonial rule of Pakistan from 1947–1971, the government followed the same British technique of enacting security statutes beyond ordinary legal imperatives,1 providing for “preventive detention, the seizure of property and restrictions on the media” (Khurshid and Shah 2018: 289). In both colonial regimes, the term “terrorism” was usually meant to be serious crimes of an organized nature, including insurgencies, often committed for political causes.2 In the context of a rapidly deteriorating law and order situation and growing political violence or threats thereof in late 1973, for example, a special law was enacted in 1974 to prevent certain “prejudicial activities,” criminalize “sabotage,” and prohibit “subversive associations” including political parties.3 The new law, the Special Powers Act 1974 (SPA), also introduced an unprecedented mode of executing the death penalty by shooting.4 The SPA 1974 thus dealt with terrorism without using the nomenclature, but not with terrorism involving international elements.5 In other words, its concern was not with “terrorism” as understood in the modern post-9/11 sense of the term. At the time, terrorism used to be understood largely as violence against the state or its property. In the post1971 period, insurgency in the Chittagong Hill-Tracts region and armed violence against the country’s oligarchs by ultra-left communist groups in south-and-northwestern districts were also considered terrorism. Enacted in 1992 and 2000, respectively during the time of two different political regimes, Bangladesh had another two statutes in force for some years that aimed at combatting domestic terrorism or extreme political violence.6 Of these, the Public Safety (Special Provisions) Act 2000 (PSA) was declared unconstitutional by the High Court Division for being incompatible with the constitutional due process principles such as the right to bail and the principle of judicial DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-9

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  149 independence.7 The Court said that the legislative denial of bail until the investigation was complete under s 16 of the PSA was tantamount to a violation of article 33(2) of the Constitution.8 The PSA was repealed in 2002. In the aftermath of 9/11, when the massive terrorist attacks occurred in New York on 11 September 2001, there was a rise in counterterrorism laws in many countries,9 a phenomenon that was largely driven by the mandatory UN Security Council resolution 1373.10 The resolution calls on states to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism. Resolution 1373 is critiqued for giving states leeway in violating human rights while demonstrating compliance with the resolution “without simultaneously making sufficient efforts to ensure adherence with applicable human rights standards” (Kalhan et al. 2006: 98). Bangladesh, like India,11 joined the global community with its first specialist counterterrorism law during the 2007–2008 caretaker government, enacting, in a hurry, the Counterterrorism Ordinance 2008 (No. 24 of 2008) on 11 June 2008. When a new parliament was established in 2009, that Ordinance was adopted as the Counterterrorism Act 2009 (hereafter CTA).12 The CTA was informed by regional and international counterterrorism instruments13 as well as the UNSC resolution 1373, which it seeks to comply with.14 More importantly, section 6(1) of the CTA defines the commission or abetment of an offense under any international treaty cited in the first schedule of the Act as an offense of terrorism.15 Bangladesh has in the recent past experienced several terrorist attacks and incidents of terrorist financing linked with international terrorist groups, including ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or other so-called Islamic terrorist groups.16 One such terrorist attack was the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Gulshan, Dhaka, on 1 July  2016 when internationally linked17 local terrorists brutally killed 24 people, including 18 foreign nationals and two police officers. While this unprecedented terrorist attack led Bangladesh to adopt wide-ranging “legislative, judicial, administrative, and institutional counter-terrorism offensives” (Islam and Abedin 2021: 138), the trial of the terrorists and their financiers raises questions about the efficacy of the counterterrorism laws, the human rights of those under trial, and the accountability of law enforcement agencies. Apart from the legal responses, Bangladesh has responded to terrorism through institutional means such as the creation of special police units. Institutional responses other than the specialist judicial tribunal will remain outside the scope of this chapter except to the extent that a discussion is necessary.18 The efficacy of the counterterrorism laws, which is critical for an effective holistic response to terrorism, remains a question though. This chapter examines Bangladesh’s counterterrorism laws by assessing how, if at all, they provide an effective tool for fighting terrorism. With this objective in mind, the chapter also investigates whether those laws are compatible with the norms of the nation’s Constitution and international human rights standards. Comparative references will be made to international instruments concerning terrorism.

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Constitutional and International Human Rights Norms vis-à-vis Counterterrorism Law In post-independence Bangladesh, security and counterterrorism laws have followed the crime control model established by the British as opposed to a due process model contemplated in the Constitution of Bangladesh (hereafter “the Constitution”).19 The crime control model of criminal justice administration is aimed at punishing the offender and the police being able to obtain convictions. By contrast, the due process model’s primary goal is to achieve justice for all parties through the enforcement of criminal laws in a way that is compliant with due process principles of the concerned constitution or the international human rights norms (Hoque 2007: 47).20 The tendency to follow the British pattern of security lawmaking where extraordinary powers are given to the executive and the human rights of those accused are largely ignored or seriously undermined is also evident in the practices of India and Pakistan in this region. These laws largely stand at odds with, and sometimes in clear breach of, the Constitution and international standards. The following discussion captures this aspect to assess Bangladeshi counterterrorism laws in light of constitutional and international normative frameworks.

The Constitution The preamble of Bangladesh’s Constitution proclaims that the nation’s “fundamental aim” is to realize a society based on the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, and equality and justice. The Constitution incorporated “democracy” as one of the four fundamental principles of the State.21 The executive and the legislature are duty-bound to comply with these principles when discharging their function, while the judiciary must consider them when interpreting the law and the Constitution.22 The Constitution guarantees fundamental rights (in articles 26–47A) that are judicially enforceable.23 Importantly, the constitutional supremacy principle in article 7 establishes that any law inconsistent with the Constitution or one or more of its fundamental rights provisions is void. Further, the legislature is mandated not to make any law in violation of fundamental rights (article 26(2)). The Constitution entrenches the citizens’ right to equality and the right to equal protection of the law (article 27). Everyone has a right to enjoy the protection of the law and to be treated “in accordance with law” (article 31) and the right to life and liberty (article 32). With specific reference to the criminal justice system, it provides several guarantees safeguards as to arrests and detention. The more direct provisions in this regard are to be found in articles 33 and 35. Article 33 “guarantees to every arrestee or detainee the right to be promptly informed of the grounds of his arrest/detention, and the right to be produced before a magistrate [within] 24 hours of [. . .] arrest” (Hoque 2007: 53). The Constitution has also guaranteed that every person arrested has a right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice. This right arguably includes a constitutional right for accused people to receive legal aid at state expense when needed.

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  151 Furthermore, the Constitution categorically guarantees the right to a fair and just trial in article 35. Every accused person has the right “to a speedy and public trial by an independent and impartial court” (article 35(3)). Article 35(1) prohibits retrospective operation (ex post facto) of criminal laws and penalties and establishes the right against double jeopardy (repeated prosecution or conviction) and the right to remain silent or the right against self-incrimination.24 The Constitution has also prohibited torture and any form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment (article 35(5)). Based on these and other constitutional provisions, it can be said that any person accused of a criminal offense has a right to a fair trial per due process standards. Without importing the nomenclature, the Constitution has firmly entrenched the concept of due process in the criminal justice system,25 although the degree and nature of the due process may vary in specific circumstances.26

International Human Rights Norms At the time of its emergence as an independent nation in 1971, Bangladesh announced its commitment to international laws and rules. The Constitution, adopted on 4 November 1972, announced that “respect for international law and the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter” would be a fundamental principle of state policy (article 25). Under the constitutional system, international treaties do not become automatically binding on Bangladesh even after their ratification unless they are specifically incorporated into domestic law. No state can, however, breach any ratified treaty by using the excuse of an absence of a domestic law incorporating the treaty. On the other hand, norms of customary international law and the peremptory norms (jus cogens)27 from which no derogation by any state is permissible are part of Bangladesh’s laws, and their application is not dependent on incorporation or transformation of the concerned customary norm. All courts must apply customary international law rules until overruled by the Supreme Court in an appropriate case. In the adjudication of constitutional rights cases, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh increasingly relies on, invokes, and draws inspiration from international human rights instruments (Alam 2006; Hoque and Naser 2006; Khair 2011). Bangladesh has ratified or acceded to all major international human rights treaties, including, importantly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture 1984, which have created obligations upon Bangladesh “to ensure a fair, effective, accessible, and just criminal justice system” (Hoque 2007: 45).28 The right to a fair trial, in particular, is also one of the fundamental principles of customary international law.29 ICCPR has entrenched several fair trial rights and principles such as the presumption of innocence and the right to be tried without undue delay30 and has mandated that states provide an effective remedy, including reparations, for violations of human rights under the Covenant.31 On the other hand, the Convention against Torture obligates state parties (of which Bangladesh is one) to take effective legislative,

152  Ridwanul Hoque administrative, and judicial measures to prevent acts of torture and to ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under their criminal law.32 Although Bangladesh ratified both ICCPR and the Convention against Torture, there is no incorporating legislation integrating these and other major human rights instruments into domestic law. Since the Constitution of Bangladesh and the criminal law jurisprudence have embodied all international fair trial norms noted above, these international treaties are directly enforceable in the country’s criminal justice system.

Laws Against Terrorism As noted earlier, the Counterterrorism Act 2009 (in force from December 2008), is the principal counterterrorism law. Another two statutes have provisions dealing with terrorist acts, which are the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2012 and the Digital Security Act 2018. The following discussion captures the scope of these laws and analyses how they have been defined, criminalized, and provided for the trial of terrorist activities.33

The Counterterrorism Act 2009 The Counterterrorism Act 2009 (CTA),34 supplemented by the Counterterrorism Rules 2013 (CTR), is the principal law to prevent and suppress internal and domestic terrorism, enacted as a response to the impetus from the international community. Apart from defining “terrorist acts,” the CTA has incorporated offenses under certain international treaties as offenses under this Act.35 The CTA covers offenses both by individuals and terrorist entities, provides different punishments, empowers the administration to proscribe any organization/entity as a terrorist entity and to declare any individual as a terrorist,36 and establishes a specialist tribunal for the trial of terrorist acts.37 When a person or a legal entity is declared a terrorist or banned as a terrorist organization, there are certain civil consequences such as, in the case of an individual, the suspension or freezing of bank accounts.38

What Is Terrorism or “Terrorist Acts”? Section 6(1) of the CTA 2009 defines an offense of terrorism as any of a series of acts such as killing, arson, bombing, and so on, committed by way of “creating horror amongst the public or a segment of the public and with an intent to jeopardize the territorial integrity, solidarity, security or sovereignty of Bangladesh.”39 Among the offenses of terrorism is the commission or aiding, attempting, or enticing the commission of an offense provided in any Convention of the United Nations listed in schedule 1 of the Act.40 Any natural person or a legal entity involved in terrorist activities is amenable to prosecution. According to s 6(2), a natural person convicted of an offense of terrorism may be sentenced to death, or imprisonment for life, or, in some cases, rigorous imprisonment of not more than fourteen years and not less than four

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  153 years.41 Additionally, there is a compulsory fine for such terrorist activities. Any terrorist entity found to be guilty of an offense is liable to be banned and enlisted as a terrorist entity42 as well as to be fined an amount three times the value of the property involved or five million takas (approx. USD 58,000.00), whichever is higher.43 Moreover, people in charge of any such terrorist activity are liable to be sentenced to a prison term of not more than twenty years and a fine.44

Terrorist Financing The CTA was amended in 2012 to provide new rules to prevent terrorist financing which is defined as an offense.45 Section 7(1) provides that if any person or entity knowingly supplies or intends to supply money, service, material support, or any other property, of any lawful or unlawful source, to any other person and if these things are used, wholly or partly, for terrorist activities or by any terror or terrorist group/entity, then that person or entity is deemed to have committed the offense of financing terrorist activities. According to s 7(3), a natural person found guilty of terrorist financing is subject to be penalized with an imprisonment of not more than twenty years and not less than four years and with a fine of 1 million takas (approx. USD 11,700.00) or twice the value of the relevant property, whichever is higher. According to s 7(4), persons in charge of any terrorist entity are liable to be punished with an imprisonment of not more than twenty years and with a fine of 2 million takas (approx. USD 23,400.00), while the entity is liable to be banned under section 18. The Bangladesh Bank (central bank) is authorized to take necessary measures to prevent and suppress terrorist financing. It has the power, for example, to call for information or report from any reporting institution as to any suspicious transaction, to send the report so received to any law-enforcement agency for action, to detect transactions involved in the financing of terrorism, and to freeze any bank accounts held by any person or a terrorist entity pursuant to any request by a foreign state or the rules prescribed by any UN resolution or any applicable treaty.46 Law- enforcement agencies may, for the interest of the investigation, gain access to any bank document or record with the approval of any competent court, special tribunal, or the central bank.47 The Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) in the central bank is authorized to take civil measures to prevent or suppress terrorist financing. According to the ATR, every suspension or freezing order continues for thirty days, but the BFIU may extend the action for another six months.48 Section  16 of the CTA imposes a duty upon every reporting institution to report to the central bank, on their own motion, any suspected transaction.49 Noncompliance with this mandate or the supply by any institution of wrong or misleading information is subject to civil consequences such as the confiscation of a license and a criminal fine of a maximum of 1 million takas (approx. USD 11,700.00).50 The CTA requires the Government to freeze bank accounts or any other account and to attach all property of any organization banned as a terrorist entity, or any individuals listed/declared as a terrorist.51

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Investigation and Prosecution There are certain exceptional provisions in the CTA relating to investigation and prosecution. An investigation must be completed within sixty days, which is extendable up to a period of a maximum of another sixty days. The investigating officer may record a voluntary statement of any witness in writing, while a judicial magistrate can order any witness to depose/state in writing.52 Any electronic evidence containing communications by a person accused of terrorism is admissible in court.53 An accused person can be remanded to the police for fifteen days.54 Quite exceptionally, the investigating officer may with the approval of the district magistrate, who is a non-judicial officer, seize or attach any property suspected to be proceeds of terrorism.55

Trial by Counterterrorism Special Tribunal The CTA established a special tribunal, comprising a district and sessions judge, for the “prompt and effective” trial of terrorist acts, which became operational in May 2018.56 The process of trial is largely subject to the special rules provided in the Act. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies to the trial only if that is not inconsistent with the CTA.57 The Counterterrorism Special Tribunal (CTST) cannot accept any proceedings unless upon a written report of an authorized police officer, which means that citizens cannot directly lodge a complaint with the magistrate or the tribunal. The CTST has the power to proceed with the trial in the absence of any accused person, subject to complying with certain procedures. Any order or judgment of the CTST is appealable to the High Court Division of the Supreme Court, while the tribunal has to transmit the case documents to the High Court Division “without delay” for approval of any death penalty. The provisions relating to the grant of bails to those accused are relatively narrower, although the magistrate or the judge of the tribunal has the discretion to accept bails. While the tribunals have helped to reduce the caseloads in district-level courts, “they are now overburdened with a large number of cases with limited human resources and shortage of office premises” (Ashraf 2021: 23). Beyond the resource deficits, it is also the “ongoing deficits in Bangladesh’s judicial system [that] contribute to a decade-long backlog of terrorism cases” (US Department of State 2020). The wait for the conclusion of trials of terrorism cases is, therefore, often a long wait and there is no readily available record of the conviction rate, which is estimated at less than 15 percent (US Department of State 2020). One might wonder whether such a low rate of convictions is a factor behind Bangladesh’s allegedly extrajudicial killing of suspect terrorists. In the most discussed 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery case, the Special Tribunal in Dhaka handed down its judgment in 3  years in November  2019, sentencing seven individuals to death for terrorism. In other cases that drew less attention than Holey Artisan, the trial period is much longer. Ashraf (2021: 24) reports that “between 1999 and 2017, a total of 908 [terrorism-related] cases were filed [. . .] of which 619 (68 percent) were [under-trial] and 289 (32 percent) were under investigation.” This indicates

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  155 that in the first eight years after the enactment of CTA, there was not even a single concluded trial.

Administrative Measures and the Implementation of UN Resolutions The CTA empowers the government to declare individuals or any entities as terrorists for having been “involved” with terrorism, by entering their names in the schedules of the Act by a notification.58 What involvement with terrorism means is defined in s 17, which includes factors enunciated in the UNSC resolution 1373. The government may take several measures against any individual or entity declared as a terrorist or terrorist organization. For example, bank accounts of these individuals or entities can be suspended or frozen, publications and electronic equipment can be destroyed, and property can be confiscated pursuant to any court order. Most of the measures are arbitrary in the sense that there is no right to be heard or other procedural fairness requirements. Any member of any terrorist entity can be barred from leaving the country. Section 20A of the CTA prescribes procedures to implement the UNSC resolutions 1267 and 1373 by way of, among other things, seizing, attaching, or suspending any property or funds of any individual or entity suspected to be involved in terrorist activities without giving them any prior notice.59

The Money Laundering Prevention Act 2012 The Money Laundering Prevention Act 2012 (MLPA),60 enacted in line with certain international standards articulated in international instruments,61 seeks to prevent and criminalize money laundering and the financing of terrorism.62 As regards the suppression of terrorism, it supports the CTA. Money laundering has been defined in the MLPA very widely encompassing a myriad of activities including an act of “knowingly moving, converting, or transferring property involved in an offence for the [. . .] purposes [of] “assisting any person involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of such offence.”63 Terrorism or terror-financing has been defined as a predicate offense.64 As such, if anyone sends or supplies money/property to a member of a terrorist group or to someone else to commit terrorism, there is an offense of money laundering for terrorist financing. The offense can be committed by an individual terrorist or a terrorist organization. In addition to prison terms and fines, the offense of money laundering for terrorist financing has the civil consequence of confiscation of the concerned property/money in favor of the state.65 The MLPA requires certain financial institutions to take action to prevent money laundering for terrorist financing. These institutions are banks, non-banking financial institutions, insurance companies, money-exchangers, any company or institution dealing in the remittance of money, and any other institution doing business with approval of the Bangladesh Bank. The Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) of the central bank, established under section 24 of MLPA, is the

156  Ridwanul Hoque administrative unit in charge of the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. The offense of money laundering is to be investigated by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC)66 or by an officer of any other agencies authorized by the ACC.67 The anti-corruption court, which is the Court of Special Judge, is the forum of jurisdiction for the trial of money-laundering and terrorist financing offenses.68 But the court can take cognizance of an offense only upon the approval of the ACC.69 The special court is empowered to issue injunctions freezing and attaching property, wherever situated, connected with the commission of the money-laundering offense, and can also confiscate the property.70 The MLPA has been supplemented by subordinate legislation, namely the Money Laundering Prevention Rules 2019 (MLPR).71 These rules provide for certain preventive and remedial measures vis-à-vis terrorist financing, including the establishment of a national coordination committee and a working committee to prevent terrorist financing.72 Another prevention mandate has been a duty on non-government or not-for-profit organizations to check that their funds are not sourced from or disbursed to people listed by the United Nations under Security Council resolutions 1267, 1373, and 1718.73 There are over sixty “cross-cutting issues relating to terrorism” (Islam and Abedin 2021: 143) in the MLPR.

The Digital Security Act 2018 The Digital Security Act 2018 (DSA)74 is a special law with an overriding effect over any other laws. It was enacted in defiance of widespread concerns at home and abroad that the Act would stifle constitutional freedom of expression (Hoque and Shamin 2019).75 As its preamble announced, the DSA’s objective was to “ensure” national digital security, by criminalizing cybercrimes and the use of digital technologies to commit crimes. Major offenses (cybercrimes) created by the Act include unlawful entry into information infrastructure, “unlawfully accessing or damaging computers, computer systems, or computer networks,” destruction of computer source code, identity fraud, cyber fraud, or “digital or electronic forgery,” cyber terrorism, and hacking (Bari and Dey 2019: 613). The DSA has established a special tribunal to try these offenses and separate trial and investigation processes. The DSA furthers the objective of the CTA, in the sense that the use of digital technology for terrorism is an offense under it although there is no reference to terrorism except that “cyber terrorism”76 and an act to deteriorate law and order are defined as offenses. The DSA also applies extraterritorially vis-à-vis all cybercrimes.77 The Act allows the authorities, extremely arbitrarily, “to shut down any online portal any time and prosecute any person on the vague allegation of publishing or spreading [rumor] or ‘controversial’ information” (Hoque and Shamin 2019: 20). It also provides for harsher and disproportionate prison terms including life imprisonment, without clearly defining many of the offenses. For example, defamation is a criminal offense under this Act78 although the Penal Code 186079 has already covered the offense, while “spreading negative propaganda

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  157 or campaigning against the Bangladesh Liberation War, the spirit of the liberation war, the national anthem, and flag, or the Father of the Nation using digital devices” (Islam and Abedin 2021: 144) is an offense subject to a life term.80 The most notorious provisions of the DSA are sections 25 and 31.81 Section 25 says that the use of a website or any digital platform/medium to intentionally or knowingly send/transmit any offensive or intimidating information or send or publish any false information with the intent to annoy, insult, humiliate/harass or denigrate any person is an offense. Section  25 also makes it an offense “to tarnish the image of the country” or to bring it into disrepute by digitally using, sending, or publishing any falsified or distorted materials/information. Section 31 (1), on the other hand, says that the use, share, transmission, or production of any information on any website or through any digital platform to create hostility, hatred, or animosity in the minds of the public or to destroy communal harmony or deteriorate law and order is an offense. These open-ended and largely undefined offenses show that the DSA “has in fact ingeniously re-enacted” (Hoque and Shamin 2019: 20) the infamous section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology Act 2006 (ICTA). Section 57 of the ICTA, now repealed,82 used to be applied largely to silence online activists and the media mostly in the name of regulating ‘defamatory’ comments “against political higher-ups and anti-religious writing” (Hoque and Shamin 2019: 20). That the DSA has been a repressive law is evident in its massive abuse as noted in the recent report of the Centre for Governance Studies (2021), which reveals that a total of 1,128 cases were filed in 2020, most of them being against political opponents, activists, and journalists. Others who are routinely harassed through criminal cases under the DSA include dissenters, academics, students and general social media users.83 There is also some evidence that the DSA has been applied against people accused of terrorism. In this increasingly digital world, the concerns that terrorists will continually be using digital/electronic and social media are obvious. But that fear alone is no justification for using a law like the DSA in a flagrant breach of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. The Constitution guarantees an absolute right to “freedom of thought and conscience,”84 while the rights to “freedom of speech and expression” and “freedom of the press” are subject to “any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the security of the State.”85 There is no doubt that the State has the authority to make laws imposing reasonable restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, but the draconian provisions of DSA show that they are anything but reasonable restrictions.86 By contrast, those provisions are arguably in violation of the unrestricted constitutional right to freedom of conscience and thought.

International Law Against Terrorism and Bangladesh Since 1963, the international community has adopted nineteen international legal instruments (mostly of the United Nations) to prevent and deal with terrorist acts.87 In addition, there are multiple UN resolutions defining state obligations to combat terrorism domestically and globally. International law has not, however,

158  Ridwanul Hoque established any global jurisdiction and forum to try terrorism offenses at the level of the United Nations. The trial of terrorism offenses is based on state-jurisdiction, but multiple states may claim jurisdiction to try the terrorists based on the nationality of terrorists, place of terrorism, nationality of victims, and the authority to protect national security and sovereignty.88 The most notable lacuna of the international counterterrorism law (Guillaume 2004) is that no convention has defined terrorism, let alone there being any comprehensive counterterrorism convention.89 Instead, international conventions have defined certain acts as terrorist acts. Importantly, these instruments have not mandated that the state parties must adhere to international human rights standards. The most famous “legislative resolution”90 of the UN Security Council, resolution 1373 (of 28 September 2001), passed in the wake of the 9/11-attacks, calls upon states to refrain from supporting terrorism and creates two obligations for them. The first obligation requires “states to criminalize the collection of funds which support terrorism in any form, to freeze resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts, also freezing/suspending the funds of any entities controlled by such persons or acting on their direction, and finally to prevent [any person] on their territory from providing any form of financial or related service to terrorists” (Powel 2012: 25). The second mandate requires states to “refrain from providing any form of support to terrorists, and to prevent terrorist acts from occurring” (ibid: 26) by adopting certain measures such as the suppression of terrorist recruitment, prosecuting and punishing terrorists “in a manner that reflects the seriousness of their crimes” (ibid: 26) and preventing terrorists from moving between states. Like international counterterrorism instruments, UNSC resolution 1373 has not mandated that states implement measures in compliance with human rights norms. One might argue that such a mandate was not even necessary, given that international human rights instruments create such obligations. This would be a feeble argument. As Kalhan et al. (2006: 98) noted citing human rights advocates, “the Security Council and its Counter-Terrorism Committee have not been sufficiently attentive to human rights concerns in their efforts to monitor states’ compliance with [the] Resolution.” For Kalhan et al. (ibid), the Security Council in some cases appears “to have directly enabled human rights violations by pushing states to demonstrate compliance with the resolution’s counterterrorism mandate without simultaneously making sufficient efforts to ensure adherence with applicable human rights standards.” The force of these allegations is evident in the very language of resolution 1373 as well as in practice of dealing with counterterrorism reports from the states including Bangladesh.91 Bangladesh has been party to most of these counterterrorism conventions, and has incorporated into domestic law ten conventions through legislation.92 Bangladesh is also a party to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes, which, although it is not terrorism-specific, is a relevant instrument. Further, Bangladesh is a signatory to the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy 2006, which is non-binding.

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  159 While Bangladesh has an obligation to implement the above international counterterrorism instruments and resolutions, it also has an overriding obligation to comply with international human rights instruments to which it has been a party.

A Critique of the Counterterrorism Laws Bangladesh’s counterterrorism laws are fraught with several limitations and risks of human rights non-compliance. The first problem is overly broad and largely incoherent definitions of terrorism or terrorist acts. Section  6(1) of the CTA, for example, defines terrorism quite widely while tying the intention of the offender (mens rea) to jeopardize Bangladesh’s integrity or sovereignty or public safety to the definition of terrorism without defining these concepts. On the other hand, s 17 of the CTA defines when a person or an entity can be said to be involved in a terrorist act. This is a new (and vague) definition and is largely different from the s 6 definition. The definition in s 17 is aimed at proscribing terrorist entities and enlisting individuals as terrorists. The CTA defines the offense of terrorist financing and provides a harsh punishment for the offense (section 7), while the MLPA also provides a convoluted definition of money laundering for financing terrorism. As seen earlier, the DSA, the constitutionality of which is open to a serious question, can also be applied against people on flimsy grounds using the pretext of combatting terrorism. There is yet another major issue of disproportionality of punishments for terrorism offenses. For example, for the offense of attempting to abduct any person under s 6(1)(a)(i) of the CTA for the purpose of endangering the sovereignty of Bangladesh carries the death penalty or a life term. Although a long series of acts have been put under the umbrella of “terrorist acts,” Bangladesh’s counterterrorism law leaves out certain essential offenses. For example, the CTA “does not outlaw recruitment and travel in the furtherance of terrorism” (US Department of State 2020). While the country’s passport law gives the authorities discretion to refuse an application for a passport on the ground that the applicant may engage in terrorist activities overseas,93 the authorities in practice prevent citizens from leaving the country on grounds of state security or public interest, although such restrictions on personal liberty are not authorized by the law, but rather are violative of the constitutional right to freedom of movement.94 Under the CTA and the MLPA, the central bank and, in some cases, the district magistrate, who is an administrative officer, has the power to freeze/suspend the property of any person charged for terrorism or terrorist financing without the court’s approval. This power infringes upon the due process of law and the constitutional right to property of those accused in a terrorism case. Moreover, under the CTA, individual citizens do not have a right to lodge a case, which is a departure from the traditional criminal justice rule of open access to the court. Pre-trial procedures including investigation, detention, and remand of an accused person to police custody are in some cases violative of the due process.95 The enforcement of counterterrorism laws is fraught with application of abusive criminal law practices. For example, despite the constitutional and statutory

160  Ridwanul Hoque norms of production of any suspect before a court within twenty-four hours and the accused person’s right to consult a counsel,96 these norms are routinely breached by the police. This trend can be illustrated by reference to unlawful detention of two survivors of the Holey Artisan attack. Two foreigners of Bangladeshi heritage who, with their family and friends, were guests at the Holey Artisan café were picked up by police on 2 July 2016. After a thirty days’ secret detention, they were shown formally as arrested in early August. The detainees were also charged for disregarding a police subpoena to turn up at a police station during the time when they were under secret police custody. The formal arrest is critiqued by a commentator as “a piece of political and legal theatre to cover up the state’s illegal and secret [30-day] detention of these two men” (Bergman 2016).97 A further example of illegality in the law enforcement is that a few other suspects including the “mastermind” were killed by the security forces in late August 2016 (ABC News 2016) allegedly in the pretext of “gun-fight” or “cross-fire,” but there had been speculations that those terrorists were arrested long before. A closer look at the various provisions of Bangladesh’s counterterrorism laws reveals that they do not fully comply with constitutional norms and international human rights standards.98 The gravest concern is the flagrant breach of human rights through the actual criminal law practices followed by law enforcement agencies. On a different note, the approach of the CTA to terrorism is reactive (the crime control model) and not preventive or protective. Ashraf (2021) criticizes the Act for not dealing with the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extreme offenders or terrorists. Bangladesh is often praised highly for how it has tackled terrorism and is regarded as the best in South Asia. In the Global Terrorism Index 2020, for example, Bangladesh  was ranked 33rd out of 163 countries surveyed, portraying the country as having performed “better than all other South Asian countries” (Hassan 2021) in combatting terrorism. The US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2020 reports that “Bangladesh experienced a decrease in terrorist activity in 2020, accompanied by an increase in terrorism-related investigations and arrests” (US Department of State 2021: 154 ff). This praise studiously hides the costs paid by the principle of legality and the fundamental rights guarantees of the Constitution. As the US Report of 2019 interestingly noted, the Police “continued a campaign of arrests and raids against suspected militants,” many of who died in these operations as a result of “shootouts” or “crossfire” that are “often euphemisms for extra-judicial killings” (US Department of State 2020: 154). The US Department of State reports, however, do not usually critique the government for violation of human rights of terrorism suspects; they focus only upon human rights breaches by state agencies generally. In recent times, for example, the US Department of State reports questioned human rights violations by the police in the so-called war against drugs. In a dramatic turn of events, on the Human Rights Day 2021 (10 December), the US government announced sanctions on seven officials of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) as well as on RAB for “gross violation of human rights” during the RAB’s war against drugs (US Secretary of State 2021). Nor does the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee99 have

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  161 any mechanisms to monitor Bangladesh’s compliance with human rights standards when implementing UNSC counterterrorism resolutions, especially resolution 1373. Bangladesh has not submitted any report to the Committee since 2005.

Conclusions The Bangladeshi authorities generally tend to deny that acts of terrorism in Bangladesh are linked to any international terrorist groups. Contrarily, the available evidence suggests the other way round. In the Holey Artisan attack, for example, the involvement of the international terrorist group ISIS was immediately claimed.100 The reasons for terrorism in Bangladesh are a mixed bag of international terrorist influences, regional dynamics, and the country-specific social and political factors (Fink 2010) including the recent radicalization on a religious line that is traceable to “the country’s post-independence years” (Khan 2017). Yet, the immediate impetus for the nation’s counterterrorism law ensued from the international community and legal regime that urged all nations to enact legislation to criminalize international terrorism. The country has accordingly responded to terrorism by enacting the Counterterrorism Act 2009 and other ancillary laws. Terrorism in Bangladesh, like in any other country, is predominantly an issue of state security, which has been globally used as an overriding impetus for harsh and often draconian counterterrorism laws. In Bangladesh, lawmaking in this field has followed the British colonial legacy of authoritarian lawmaking being least concerned about the protection of human rights of those accused of terrorism. The efficacy of counterterrorism laws is critical for an effective response to terrorism. And the legal efficacy is dependent on how such laws strike a balance between the state’s prerogative to protect its security and sovereignty and the protection of the principle of legality and human rights of, especially, the accused people.101 Maintaining this balance is a strong challenge for the states in this age of global terrorism. This chapter has noted that Bangladesh’s counterterrorism laws have, in some cases, compromised the country’s constitutional imperatives and international human rights obligations. These laws have overly empowered the executive authorities in dealing with terrorism, with inadequate provisions for effective judicial oversight. Those accused of committing terrorism have often been deprived of their right to a fair trial, especially the right to a speedy trial. In many cases, the right to life of the accused people has been arbitrarily breached as the country witnessed a phenomenal rise in extrajudicial killings of suspects, a phenomenon that largely stayed outside of the Supreme Court’s interventions.102

Notes 1 See the Public and Representative Officers (Disqualification) Act 1949; the Security of Pakistan Act 1952; Defence of Pakistan Ordinance 1955; and the Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Order 1959 (Pakistan). See further, Khan (2000). 2 On this, see further Hossain and Afroze (2021); and Khan (2017).

162  Ridwanul Hoque 3 See the Special Powers Act 1974 (hereafter “SPA”). Under s 3 of the SPA, any person can be preventively detained by executive order for a prejudicial activity against the state. Sabotage is defined in s 15. According to s 19, an association is subversive if its activities are “prejudicial to the maintenance of public order,” and s 20 prohibits the formation of “subversive” associations. 4 See the SPA 1974, s 34A (inserted into the Act by an amendment in 1974). This is probably the only law that allows the execution of the death penalty by shooting, a method that is not consistent with the criminal law practice in South Asia. 5 Except to the extent that s 3 of the SPA authorized the deportation of a foreigner if alleged to be involved in prejudicial activities against Bangladesh. 6 See respectively the Suppression of Terrorist Offences Act 1992 (enacted during the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) regime) and the Public Safety (Special Provisions) Act 2000 (enacted during the Awami League regime). 7 Afzalul Abedin v Bangladesh (2003) 8 BLC (HCD) 601 (BLC  =  Bangladesh Law Chronicles). 8 Article 33 (2) provides that every person arrested must be produced before the nearest magistrate within twenty-four hours, which was interpreted as having empowered the magistrate to determine custody of an arrestee and grant them bail. On this decision, see for details Hoque (2007: 66–69). 9 On this concept, see generally Vedaschi and Scheppele (2021), who analyzed the complex and evolving interaction among the international, regional, and domestic level counterterrorism laws and policies. See further Ramraj et al. (2012). 10 See the UNSC resolution 1373/2001/28 September, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 11 India enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 (repealed and replaced in 2004) in the aftermath of the 9/11-attacks in the USA and terrorist attacks in India in 2001. For details, see Singh (2012); Kalhan et al. (2006). 12 Act 16 of 2009 (24 February 2009, with effect from 11 June 2008). See s 1(3) of the Act. An authentic version of the Act is Available from: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/ act-462.html [Accessed: 1 March 2022]. 13 Such as, for example, the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism 1987, and International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997. The Act cites international instruments and UN resolutions at several places of the text. For example, s 17(e) of the Act refers, among others, to the UNSC resolutions 1267 and 1373. 14 CTA 2009, s 17(e) (as amended in 2013). 15 CTA 2009, s 6(1)(e) (as amended in 2013). Thirteen conventions have been listed in the first schedule. 16 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on terrorist groups, local or international, that are active in Bangladesh. See, among other sources, Lorch (2020). 17 See, among others, Riaz and Parvez (2018). 18 For a general reference to these responses, see Ahmed and Islam (2021); Islam and Abedin (2021: 147–149); and Hossain and Afroze (2021: 31–32). 19 Adopted on 4 November 1972 by the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution came into force on 16 December 1972. Its latest version is available on: http://bdlaws.minlaw. gov.bd/act-367.html. 20 On different theories/models of criminal justice, see King (1981). 21 The other three fundamental cores are secularism, socialism, and nationalism. See the preamble and article 8 of the Constitution. 22 The Constitution, article 8. 23 When breached, fundamental rights are enforceable through the High Court Division of the Supreme Court. See article 102, read with article 44, of the Constitution.

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  163 24 See, respectively, clause (2) and clause (4) of article 35 of the Constitution. 25 Based on articles 27, 31, and 32 (the right to life) of the Constitution. Islam (2005: 16–18, 50) argues that the Constitution has provided for both substantive and procedural due process. 26 See Afzalul Abedin, note 9, at pp. 666–67 (Justice Huda’s comments). 27 For example, prohibition of torture has attained the status of jus cogens. On this, see further (de Wet 2004) and article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 28 See UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 (entry into force June 26, 1987). 29 There is, however, a debate as to whether the fair trial right is a norm of jus cogens. See Robinson (2009: 5–6). 30 See ICCPR, article 14. 31 Ibid., article 2(3). See also article 9. 32 See the Convention against Torture, respectively article 1 and article 3. Article 1(3) further states that an order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture. 33 Two other enactments, namely the Suppression of Offences Against the Safety of Aircraft Act 1997 and the Information and Communication Technology Act 2006 have bearing upon the prevention of terrorism, which will not be discussed in this chapter. The Act of 1997 was enacted to incorporate into domestic law the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft 1969, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 and the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970. Interestingly, the latter two conventions have also been specifically incorporated into Bangladesh’s domestic law by the CTA, schedule 1. See note 38 and the accompanying text. 34 As amended in 2012 and 2013 with a view to aligning the Act with international counterterrorism laws. 35 See the CTA, schedule 1, under which nine international treaties and protocols have been listed. 36 Ibid., schedule 2 (list of terrorist entities) and schedule 3 (list of terrorist persons). 37 Ibid., s 28. 38 Ibid., s 15. See further below. 39 The author’s unofficial translation. See further Hoque (2012: 262). 40 CTA, s 6(1)(e). 41 Rigorous imprisonment, as opposed to simple imprisonment, is a prison term with labor. In Bangladesh, a life term is always rigorous imprisonment. 42 See the CTA, s 18 and schedule 2. Five organizations (legal entities) have so far been banned under this law. 43 CTA 2009, s 6(4). 44 ibid. 45 See also the MLPA as in note 60. 46 Section 15(1) and (3). When the offense of terrorism occurs in a foreign country, the Bangladesh Bank initiates measures to freeze account of the concerned person/organization in accordance with any bilateral, regional or international treaty or any UN Convention or Security Council resolutions (s 15(3), CTA). 47 CTA, s 15(7) and rule 6 of the CTR 2013. 48 For further details, see CTR 2013, rules 3 to 5. 49 Reporting institutions are banks, non-banking financial institutions, insurance companies, money-exchangers, any company/institution dealing in the transferring or remittal of money, any other institution doing business with the approval of Bangladesh Bank. See ibid., s 2(20). 50 CTA, s 16(3).

164  Ridwanul Hoque 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

CTA, s 20(1)(b). Ibid., respectively s 21(1) and s 22. Ibid., s 21(3). Ibid., s 26. Ibid., s 23A. CTA, s 28 (before 2018, the offenses were to be tried by regular District and Sessions Judges). Ashraf (2021: 23) reports that, as of August 2021, there were seven Counterterrorism Special Tribunals operating in seven divisional cities. CTA, s 30 (1). Any person or entity enlisted as a terrorist can seek an administrative review of the decision within thirty days. The government has also adopted a guideline to implement these and other UN resolutions. See Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.). See also the Counterterrorism Rules 2013 (especially rules 10 to 29). Act No. 5 of 2012 (20 February 2012). [Online] Available from: http://bdlaws.minlaw. gov.bd/act-1088.html. [Accessed: 3 March 2022]. For a short commentary on this Act, see Hoque (2012: 156). See the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003. Both were acceded to by Bangladesh on, respectively, 26 August 2005 and 27 February 2007. An anti-money laundering legislation was first enacted in 2009. See the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2009 (repealed). MLPA, s 2(v)(i)(2). Ibid., s 2(cc)(21). Ibid., s4. See the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004 (Act No. 5 of 2004), available from: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-914.html. [Accessed: 12 February 2022]. MLPA, s 9(1). The court is established under s 3 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958, available from: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-277.html. [Accessed: 3 March 2022]. Ibid., s 12. Ibid., ss 10 and 24. Came into force on 13 February 2019. The Rules can be found on the Bangladesh Bank website: www.bb.org.bd/bfiu/openpdf.php. [Accessed: 3 March 2022]. MLPR 2019, rules 3 and 4. Ibid., rule 16(k). Act No. 46 of 2018 (18 October 2018), available from: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/ act-1261.html. [Accessed: 3 March 2022]. For a detailed analysis of the Act, see Bari and Dey (2019: 613–623). DSA, s 27 (cyber terrorism has not been defined as such, but subsection (1) says that it is an offense to obstruct access to the internet or computer network with an intent to create fear among the public or to jeopardize state sovereignty). DSA, s 4. Ibid., s 29. Available from: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-11.html. [Accessed: 3 March 2022]. Ibid., s 21. The Act was challenged in the High Court Division in 2019, and the Court issued a rule nisi in February 2020 asking the government to explain why sections 25 and 31 of the Act would not be declared unlawful. The case has since remained pending. See the Dhaka Tribune, “HC Issues Rule on Sections 25, 31 of Digital Security Act 2018,” Dhaka, February 24, 2020. [Online] Available from: https://archive.dhakatrib une.com/bangladesh/court/2020/02/24/hc-issues-rule-on-sections-25-31-of-digitalsecurity-act-2018.

Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  165 82 Section 57 is repealed by s 61(2) of the DSA. On abuses of the repealed s 57 of the ICTA, see Bari and Dey (2019: 602 ff). 83 See further Bari and Dey (2019: 621–623); and Singh (2021). 84 The Constitution of Bangladesh, article 39(1). 85 Ibid., article 39(2). 86 On how the DSA muffles freedom of expression, see Azad (2021) and Bari and Dey (2019). Bari and Dey (2019: 613) argues that “provisions of the DSA imposing restrictions on those fundamental rights are, in some respects, more draconian than those that had been prescribed by the repealed Section 57 of the ICTA.” 87 There are treaties elaborated and adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). See the information from the website of the Office of Counter-Terrorism: www.un.org/counterterrorism/international-legal-instruments [Accessed: 12 February 2022]. 88 These jurisdictional principles are called, respectively, nationality, territorial, passive nationality, and protective principles (Stephens 2004: 466–467). 89 In the post-9/11 era, India proposed to the General Assembly (Guillaume 2004: 540) that a comprehensive counterterrorism convention be adopted. Since the 1990s, there is, however, a Draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism (Stephens 2004). 90 In the sense that it is a mandatory resolution under article 39 of the UN Charter. See for details Powel (2012). Bianchi (2007: 917), however, thinks that the Security Council lacks “a formal and express entitlement under the Charter to produce lawmaking resolutions.” 91 Bangladesh has so far submitted three reports under UNSC resolution 1373 in January 2002, October 2002, and July 2005. 92 CTA 2009, schedule 1, incorporated nine conventions and the Act incorporated two conventions (of which one is common to the CTA). Hossain and Afroze (2021: 31) report that the number of conventions to which Bangladesh is a party are fourteen. 93 Per article 6(2) of the Bangladesh Passport Order 1973, the authorities must refuse an application for passport when the applicant is likely to engage outside Bangladesh in activities prejudicial to the sovereignty, integrity, or security of Bangladesh or when it is not in the public interest to issue a passport to that person. 94 See article 36 of the Constitution which states that “[s]ubject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout Bangladesh, to reside and settle in any place therein and to leave and re-enter Bangladesh.” 95 Kalhan et al. (2006: 97) report similar human rights concerns against the Indian counterterrorism laws. 96 The Constitution, articles 33(2) and 33(1) respectively. 97 For further reflection on the aspect of unlawful detention in this and other counterterrorism cases, see Chapter 9 in this volume. 98 One positive aspect of Bangladeshi counterterrorism law is that it has not provided for deprivation of citizenship on the ground of terrorism. There are several countries (Australia and the UK, for example) that have done this, subject to the condition that deprivation of citizenship does not lead to statelessness. 99 Established under paragraph 6 of the UN resolution 1373. 100 See, for a report, France 24, International Link Probed in Bangladesh Restaurant Killings. [Online], Available from: www.france24.com/en/20160703-bangladesh-attackdhaka-restaurant-islamic. [Accessed: March 8, 2022]. 101 For a case study on this aspect, see McGarrity and Santow (2012) studying the extent to which Australia, Canada, and the UK accommodate the right to a fair hearing where national security is at stake. 102 To give a detailed account of how the Court failed to remedy the constitutional violation through extrajudicial killings is not within the scope of this chapter.

166  Ridwanul Hoque

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Bangladesh’s Counterterrorism Laws and Their Discontent  167 Hoque, R. and Naser, M.M. (2006) The Judicial Invocation of International Human Rights Law in Bangladesh: Questing a Better Approach. Indian Journal of International Law. 46. pp. 151–179. Hoque, R. and Shamin, S. (2019) Bangladesh. In: Albert, R., Landau, D., Faraguna, P. and Drugda, S. (eds.). 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law. Boston: ICONnect and Boston College of Law Clough Center. [Online] Available at: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3471638. [Accessed: 15 March 2022]. Hossain, M. and Afroze, S.R. (2021) Non-state acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Bangladesh: A  Critical Review. In: Izarali, M. and Ahlawat, D. (eds.). Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia: National, Regional and Global Implications. London and New York: Routledge. Islam, M. (2005) Rule of Law in Bangladesh (Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed Memorial Foundation Lecture). Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. Islam, R. and Abedin, M.J. (2021) National Security, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Law, Policy and Practice in Bangladesh. Australian Journal of Asian Law. 21 (2). pp. 137–157. Izarali, M.R. and Ahlawat, D. (eds.). (2021) Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia: National, Regional and Global Implications. London and New York: Routledge. Kalhan, A., Conroy, G.P., Kaushal, M., Miller, S.S. and Rakof, J.S. (2006) Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security Laws in India. Columbia J of Asian Law. 20 (1). pp. 93–234. Khair, S. (2011) Bringing International Human Rights Law Home: Trends and Practices of Bangladeshi Courts. Asian Yearbook of International Law. 17. pp. 47–84. Khan, A.R. (2000) National Security Laws in Bangladesh. The Daily Star. 30 January. Khan, S.E. (2017) Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 28 (1). pp. 191–217. Khurshid, I. and Shah, N. (2018) Defining Terrorism in Pakistani Anti-Terrorism Law. Global Journal of Comparative Law. 7. pp. 272–302. King, M. (1981) The Framework of Criminal Justice. London: Croom Helm. Lorch, J. (2020) Terrorism in Bangladesh: Understanding a Complex Phenomenon. Asian Survey. 60 (4). pp. 778–802. McGarrity, N. and Santow, E. (2012) Anti-terrorism Laws: Balancing National Security and a Fair Hearing. In: Ramraj, V.V., Hor, M., Roach, K. and Williams, G. (eds.). Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 2nd edn. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Powel, C.H. (2012) The United Nations Security Council, Terrorism and the Rule of Law. In: Ramraj, V.V., Hor, M., Roach, K. and Williams, G. (eds.). Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ramraj, V.V., Hor, M., Roach, K. and Williams, G. (eds.) (2012) Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 2nd edn. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Riaz, A. and Parvez, S. (2018) Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know? Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (6). pp. 944–961. Robinson, P. (2009) The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, with Specific Reference to the Work of the ICTY. Berkley Journal of International Publicist. 3. pp. 1–11. Singh, S.B. (2021) Bangladesh: Digital Security Act Silencing Dissenting Voices: Analysis. [Online]. Available at: www.eurasiareview.com/23112021-bangladesh-digital-securityact-silencing-dissenting-voices-analysis/. [Accessed: 8 March 2022]. Singh, U.K. (2012) Legal and Institutional Responses to Terrorism in India. In: Ramraj, V.V., Hor, M., Roach, K. and Williams, G. (eds.). Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 2nd edn. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

168  Ridwanul Hoque Stephens, T. (2004) International Criminal Law and the Response to International Terrorism. UNSW Law Journal. 27 (2). pp. 454–481. US Department of State. (2020) Country Reports on Terrorism 2019. [Online] Available at: www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Country-Reports-on-Terrorism-2019-2. pdf. [Accessed: 10 February 2022]. ———. (2021) Country Reports on Terrorism 2020. [Online] Available at: https://satp.org/ Docs/Document/1196.pdf. [Accessed: 10 February 2022]. US Secretary of State. (2021) The United States Promotes Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses. Press Statement of Mr. Antony J Blinken. 10 December. [Online] Available at: www.state.gov/the-united-states-promotes-accountability-forhuman-rights-violations-and-abuses/. [Accessed: 10 February 2022]. Vedaschi, A. and Scheppele, K.L. (eds.). (2021) 9/11 and the Rise of Global Anti-Terrorism Law: How the UN Security Council Rules the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

9 The Other Side of Counterterrorism in Bangladesh Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman

During the last two decades, aside from probing the flaws and shortcomings of mainstream terrorism research methods, critical terrorism studies (CTS) has dealt with the injustices caused by the practices and techniques of the so-called global war on terror. Scholars have documented and analyzed how counterterrorism measures violate human rights even in nations with strong liberal democratic traditions (Workneh and Haridakis 2021; Dana and White 2021). There are also detailed studies available on several illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes where the discourse of counterterrorism is used to suppress political dissent (Edel and Josua 2018; Workneh 2019). By contrast, very little is written about how the ongoing war on terror in Bangladesh has contributed to the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling regimes and in establishing abusive practices. Much of the counterterror literature concerning Bangladesh uncritically describes the “success” of law enforcement agencies in curbing militancy in the country (Khan 2017; Islam and Abedin 2021). Nevertheless, none can deny that cases of illegal detentions, custodial torture, and extrajudicial killings are normalized in Bangladesh under the slogans of state security and counterterrorism (Human Rights Watch 2017). Mainstream media outlets hardly question the official narratives of arrests and detention of terror suspects or the stories of “encounters,” in which the law enforcers always kill alleged terrorists in “self-defense.” In addition, the politicization of terror investigation processes has damaged the credibility of various government agencies. This chapter presents a critical overview of some of the contradictions of counterterror measures in Bangladesh that not only have undermined the human rights of the suspected or alleged terrorists but have also adversely affected the political and civil rights of citizens in general. After analyzing two of the most talked-about terror incidents that occurred during two different regimes showing the continuity of abusive practices carried out by state agencies in the name of counterterrorism, the chapter discusses the politicization of the counterterror initiatives and the kind of surveillance state that the government now aspires to create. It suggests that the various laws and regulations that have been introduced over the last decade and the systems of micro surveillance that have been put into practice in the name of counterterrorism are actually indicators of intensifying authoritarianism in Bangladesh. DOI: 10.4324/9781003271116-10

170  Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman Officials in Bangladesh often claim that the country is a role model (UNB 2019) for other nations in combating militancy and terrorism and that this success is mainly due to the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the elite police force. However, since its inception in 2004, local and international human rights organizations have documented widespread allegations against the RAB’s notorious practices involving extrajudicial killings, abductions, torture, and enforced disappearances (HRW 2006, 2011). On December 10, 2021, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on this counterterrorism force and seven of its current and former officers for human rights abuses (Netra News 2021). Although a few observers within Bangladesh claim that this unprecedented decision by the US government was influenced by geopolitical considerations (Azad 2021) and remind us that the US and UK authorities (Karim and Cobain 2010) were the ones who trained and supported RAB officials for a long time, the fact remains that this counterterror force has long been used for political gains. It is also well reported that many victims of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings that took place in this current decade are affiliated with opposition politics (Bergman 2021). However, political rivalry alone cannot explain the extent and nature of the crisis. The manner in which various governments have armed and empowered the forces in the name of counterterrorism has ultimately sown distrust among people throughout the entire judicial system. Bangladeshi ministers (Samakal 2016) and even law enforcement officials often invoke slogans like “terrorists do not have human rights” (Bangla Tribune 2016) to justify and defend unlawful practices and human rights breaches. The following discussion of the 21 August (2004) attack and the Holey Artisan attack of 2016 will demonstrate that the investigation processes of even these highly publicized terror incidents were not only politicized but also marred by abusive practices that had ignored the basic human rights of victims and suspects alike. However, these two cases are not exceptions; rather, they are representative of the general trend of disregarding executive accountability and undermining the right to a fair trial. The chapter will also demonstrate that “terrorists” are not the only victims of such abusive practices.

False Confessions and True Lies On August 21, 2004, twenty-four people lost their lives in a horrific grenade attack at a rally held at Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka at the initiative of the then opposition party Awami League (AL). Its president, Sheikh Hasina, flanked by party leaders and supporters, was speaking at the end of the rally on a makeshift stage erected on a truck. The attack occurred at the end of her speech. She survived the attack with only minor injuries. Scores of people were wounded, and among the dead was Ivy Rahman, the then women’s affairs secretary of the AL and wife of the late President Zillur Rahman. The terrorist attack was believed to be intended to annihilate the party leadership. Many consider that this deadly incident further poisoned a deeply polarized political environment (Jamal 2020) rooted in a long-standing feud between the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the former Premier Khaleda Zia, who heads the opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

The Other Side of Counterterrorism in Bangladesh  171 Although the August 21 grenade attack was arguably the deadliest terrorist incident in the country’s political history, the investigation and trial process has been marred by controversy. The day after the grenade attack, the police sub-inspector (SI) of Motijheel police station, Sharif Faruk Ahmed, filed a case as a plaintiff. The station police began investigating the case first. Later, the Dhaka Metropolitan Detective Branch was tasked with the investigation, but it was eventually transferred to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the police. AL leaders Abdul Jalil and Saber Hossain Chowdhury had also filed two more cases. All these cases were later transferred to a special tribunal for trials. A  reward of 1 crore taka (about USD 11,6000) was announced by the government for anyone giving “correct information” about the grenade blast. Although the government was quite vocal about the investigation, the reality seemed very different. What was absent, one editor noted, was the political will itself to conduct a fair investigation into the incident (Rahman 2016). Following the terrorist incident, the BNP-led four-party coalition government started to propagate claims that the AL itself had carried out the grenade attack to gain sympathy and support. According to them, this grenade attack was planned in such a way that Sheikh Hasina would survive, while at the same time the incident would embarrass the coalition government. The MPs of the coalition government blamed the AL leaders in the national parliament for the grenade attack. Having failed to win the popular vote, the AL sought power through anarchy; they claimed (Rahman 2016). They also indicated that the attack was orchestrated by leading terrorists absconding in Kolkata with the assistance of Indian intelligence agencies. Newspapers that supported the coalition government circulated such fake news citing the four-party coalition government and intelligence sources. Writers and intellectuals sympathetic to the coalition government echoed the same lies in meetings and seminars and wrote editorials in newspapers (Rahman 2016). On August 22, 2004, the coalition government set up a one-member judicial inquiry commission with Justice Md. Zainul Abedin as its chairman. After just forty days, on October 2 of that year, the commission submitted a 162-page inquiry report to the government, allegedly containing fabricated information that was already propagated by the BNP regime (Islam 2019). Six different investigating officers conducted the investigation during the first seven years. The first investigation was conducted during the BNP-led coalition government, but no report was submitted. A  fresh investigation was ordered by the army-backed caretaker government, and on June 11, 2008, the CID filed its charges. Twenty-two people were charged, including Mufti Hannan – the leader of the Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami branch in Bangladesh (HUJI-B) and former BNP deputy minister Abdus Salam Pintu. But, when Sheikh Hasina formed a new government in 2009, the court ordered (August 3, 2009) a further investigation into the case following a request from the prosecution team, which argued that the source, bearer, and suppliers of the grenades used in the attack were not identified in the initial investigation report. The CID’s Special Superintendent Abdul Kahar Akhand then took over the investigation of the case. On July 3, 2011, the CID filed a supplementary charge sheet that included thirty new individuals. As a result of

172  Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman these new additions, the number of accused rose from twenty-two to fifty-two. Among the newly accused included BNP’s Senior Vice-Chairman Tarique Rahman (the eldest son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia), former Minister of State for Interior Lutfuzzaman Babar, Khaleda Zia’s political advisor Harris Chowdhury, Jamaat-e-Islami Secretary-General, and former minister Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid. Meanwhile, the opposition parties as well as Tarique Rahman’s lawyers rejected these allegations, calling them politically motivated. The trial against the fifty-two accused, including Tarique Rahman, began on Wednesday, March  28, 2012. After nearly fourteen years since the incident, the verdict was announced on October 10, 2018. Tarique and thirty-seven others were found guilty by the special court, and punishments ranged from death penalty to twenty years in prison. Among the guilty were the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and the DG of National Security Intelligence (NSI). Two former Inspectors General of Police (IGP) were also sentenced for harboring the offenders. Having been convicted just months before the national election of 2018, Tarique’s conviction was considered a heavy blow to the BNP (Liton et al. 2018). But one can hardly ignore the ways the investigating agencies initially rounded up innocent individuals, tortured them to produce manufactured confessions, and paraded them as terror operatives to conceal the true culprits. The story of Joj Mia, or what became popularly known as the “Joj Mia drama,” is a case in point. He was picked up from his Senbag home in Noakhali on June 10, 2005 (The Daily Star 2018a). He used to sell posters and cassettes near Gulistan cinema hall for a living. Initially, Joj Mia did not know why he was being arrested. His first stop was Senbagh Police Station. Then he was brought to the capital by CID officials who tortured him into giving a confessional statement in connection with the grenade attack. Six months into his confinement, the jail authority told him he had been convicted in the explosive case. The media later revealed that the police used Joj Mia’s story to conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators. It was also revealed that a few days after his arrest, police drove Joj Mia to a place named Maghbazar, uncuffed him, and told him to run. Joj Mia begged them not to kill him, terrified he would be shot from behind. In another interview, Joj Mia stated that “they [the police] told me that if I agreed [to confess], I would be sent abroad, and they would bear all the expenses of my family” (Mollah 2018). The police did provide a monthly allowance of about Tk 2,000 to Tk 2,500 to Joj Mia’s mother for several months. But it stopped when Joj Mia’s sister exposed the secret deal to the media. An investigation conducted by the then CID ASP Fazlul Kabir in 2007 found no evidence connecting Joj Mia to the attack, and he was subsequently released from prison in 2009. But, before Joj Mia, at least twenty others were arrested in connection with the case. One of them was Shaibal Saha Partha, who had just completed MBA from an Indian university and was visiting his sister in her Elephant Road house in Dhaka. On August 26, 2004, intelligence agents picked him up for allegedly sending an email from a cybercafé named Hearnet (also on Elephant Road) to the leading daily Prothom Alo threatening to kill AL chief Sheikh Hasina. Intelligence sources also disclosed to the media that he was also involved with the August 21

The Other Side of Counterterrorism in Bangladesh  173 grenade attack. The CID filed a case over the death threat on August 29, and Partha was produced before the court the following day. Although he was picked up from his sister’s house on August 26, he was shown arrested more than two weeks later, on September 14. He fell seriously ill after severe torture and was admitted to the hospital on court order. Partha was granted ad-interim bail by the High Court on March 15, 2005, and got released from jail on March 23, 2005, seven months into his arrest. Partha went to that cybercafé to submit his job applications to different organizations. But his Hindu identity and his education in India were enough for the local intelligence agencies to implicate him as an “Indian agent.” Later, Partha revealed to a journalist: Police kept me blindfolded for seven consecutive days. . . . I still do not know where they had kept me. . . . They poured water into my nose and mouth time and again. I felt my breathing would stop any moment and I would die . . . I repeatedly told them that I knew nothing about it, but they tortured me even more . . . I wouldn’t wish such [a] terrible ordeal even on my worst enemy. (Islam 2019) The police also enticed him to confess by promising to send him to a European country and to have him granted citizenship if he confessed (Islam 2019). The government has compensated neither Partha nor Joj for the injustice they endured. Although disputes over the August 21 attack investigation processes and subsequent verdicts are usually framed as blame games between Bangladesh’s two major political parties, the nature of the problem is much deeper and wider. The verdict of the August 21 grenade attacks case demonstrates how state intelligence agencies keep ties with terrorist groups, influence investigations, and commit atrocities on innocent people in order to secure false confessions. The much-needed debate on how state agencies should be held accountable, however, was ignored following the verdict. As a result, the discussion over the illegal practices by the anti-terror agencies is framed only from a partisan perspective. With every new terror incident and fresh arrests of suspects, grand narratives of partisan links surface in the media, enabling the state agencies to flout due processes in order to shield their wrongs and inefficiencies and to satisfy the ruling regime.

When Victims Become Suspects On the night of July  1, 2016, twenty-two people, including eighteen foreign nationals, were killed in an attack by militants at an elite restaurant, Holey Artisan Café in Gulshan, Dhaka. Two years after the horrific attack, often known as the 9/11 of Bangladesh, the Counterterrorism Unit, the investigating agency of the case, filed a charge sheet in the court after finding evidence of the involvement of twenty-one people. However, thirteen of the twenty-one people were killed in law enforcement operations, including Operation Thunderbolt, and eight of the survivors were charged. On November 27, 2019, the Anti-Terrorism Tribunal in Dhaka

174  Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman sentenced the seven convicts to death (BBC News 2019). But there are serious allegations about the investigation process of this terror incident too and the ways the law enforcement agencies responded to the Holey Artisan Café attack. Holey Artisan’s thirteen hostages, who had been allowed to leave the café before the commandos stormed in, were taken to the Detective Branch (DB) headquarters for questioning. All hostages, except for Hasnat Reza Karim, 47, a Bangladesh-born UK citizen working in Bangladesh and Tahmid Hasib Khan, 22, a student at Toronto University, Canada, were released on July 3, 2016. Both Hasnat and Tahmid’s families had little or no official information about their whereabouts. The Wire revealed in August 2016 that both of them were held in secret detention by Bangladeshi authorities (Bergman 2016). In the meantime, their photographs surfaced online, which showed they were apparently talking with one of the terrorists during the siege. Hasnat took his family to Holey Artisan Café to celebrate his daughter’s birthday where he unfortunately became a hostage along with his family. After much criticism, the police informed them a month later that they had arrested him under section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows arrest without a warrant. Although he did not return from DB’s office on July 3, he was shown arrested on a much later date, August 13. After two years of custody, he was finally freed in August 2018 when a court ordered his release. The investigators could not find his involvement with the attack. The other detainee, Tahmid, a student at Toronto University, went to visit Bangladesh on July 1, 2016, to celebrate Eid with the family. The day the siege took place, he went to the café to meet his friends and became a hostage himself. Tahmid was detained for three months while police investigated his involvement in the attack. When he was released from custody, the Dhaka Metropolitan Police Commissioner Asaduzzaman Mia told reporters that there was no evidence against him (Khandaker 2019). Despite being cleared of any involvement in the attack, police charged him with non-cooperation for failing to show up for two police interviews. Tahmid, in fact, was already in police custody when he was scheduled to be interviewed, according to his family and lawyer. Tahmid was acquitted of the charge in 2017 (Khandaker 2019). As both Tahmid and Hasnat come from elite backgrounds, it is to be expected that their families received a great deal of support from their friends and families during their ordeal. Unfortunately, not all victims and survivors of the attack were as fortunate as they were. Holey Artisan’s pizza baker Saiful Islam Chowkidar, 41, was “found” dead in the café after the siege. Police headquarters initially identified Saiful Chowkidar as “militant Akash,” and he was listed as a suspect too. Along with the bodies of the five militants killed in the operation, Saiful’s body was also buried as “unclaimed” at the Jurain cemetery in Dhaka in September 2016. Saiful’s body was never returned to the family. Police sources claimed at that time that Saiful’s assistant, Zakir Hossain Shaon, aged 22, died six days later, on July 8, 2016, as a result of injuries sustained during the siege. Shaon’s parents, however, alleged that he had been beaten in police custody because he too was seen as a suspect. They claimed there were marks of assault and swellings all over Shaon’s body. His mother, Maksuda Begum, who lives in a slum area of

The Other Side of Counterterrorism in Bangladesh  175 the city of Siddhirganj, about 22 km (13 miles) outside of Dhaka, where she sells cakes along the side of the road, complained on the third anniversary of the attack by saying “who will answer me why my son was killed . . . we didn’t get justice as we are poor” (The Daily Star 2019a). Eventually, Saiful and Shaon were not named in the charge sheets that the police submitted to the court in July 2018. Their families have received no condolences or compensation from the government. It is also not known whether those officers, who maliciously framed the innocents, were brought to justice. Regarding this, human rights activist Nur Khan Liton noted, “a mistake may occur during a major operation, but the government should have supported the families after it was proven that the pair were misidentified” (Foyez 2021). The Holey Artisan story reveals that while the government claims success in clamping down on terrorists involved in the attack, it is also a classic case to study about unlawful detention, death in custody due to torture, extrajudicial killings and collateral damage, the terms almost routinely denied by the law enforcers and the government of Bangladesh.

Weaponizing Counterterrorism Julia Hall, an Amnesty International expert, commented in 2021 that “for governments trying to silence their critics, counterterrorism policies provide invaluable tools with which to target critics and silence dissent” (Amnesty International 2021). But, apart from exploiting counterterror tools to suppress dissent, what has happened in Bangladesh is that regimes in power have routinely blamed the opposition parties for terrorist incidents. When the August 21 grenade attack occurred, the then ruling BNP regime flatly denied the existence of Islamist terrorists in Bangladesh. Instead, they blamed it on the opposition AL and manipulated the investigation process. The then government also accused the opposition for “tarnishing the image” of the country. Similarly, despite the fact that ISIS claimed responsibility immediately after the 2016 attack on Holey Artisan Café, the AL regime of Sheikh Hasina denied the presence of internationally connected terrorists and instead claimed that the local terror outfit Neo-JMB was involved. One reason for this denialism is that such an admission of the presence of the international terrorist outfits would weaken their claims that terrorists are local and proxies of the opposition BNP and its ally, Jamaat-e-Islam (JEI) (Comerford 2017). One minister, Hasanul Haq Inu, even claimed (India Today 2016) that the Pakistan government and its spy agency Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) were behind the attack – a popular strategy to invoke the prevailing anti-Pakistani sentiment in Bangladesh. While giving an interview to the Diplomat, Baki Billah, a prominent Bangladeshi activist commented: The reason for naming the terrorists neo-JMB and not Islamic State is not a trivial one. . . . The name decides who takes action against the organization and thereby who reaps the political fruits of its annihilation. . . . Call it Islamic State and the reins go into the hands of the international community. Naming

176  Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman it neo-JMB makes it home grown and therefore the reins stay in the hands of Sheikh Hasina. And when she keeps saying “BNP-Jamaat BNP-Jamaat,” it builds the ground for effectively annihilating the political opposition in the name of fighting terrorists. (Roy 2017) Instead of building political consensus, both major political parties of Bangladesh have exploited deadly terrorist attacks to discredit their rivals. Since 2009, the AL has been cleverly using the discourse of counterterrorism, in both the internal and external realms, to prolong and legitimize its repressive rule. AL’s counterterror discourse has essentially produced two meta-narratives: that there is a “localforeign conspiracy” to halt Bangladesh’s economic development and progress and that the main opposition party, BNP, sponsors and harbors terrorists. For instance, two days after the Holey Artisan attack, Prime Minister Sheikha Hasina said: When Bangladesh is emerging as a self-reliant and self-dependent country, a vested local-international quarter is conspiring to obstruct the country’s advancement . . . by holding innocent people hostage at gunpoint, they want to portray the country as a dysfunctional state . . . they have resorted to terrorism after failing to win the hearts of the people democratically. (The Daily Star 2016) Opposition party leaders in Bangladesh frequently complain that many of their activists are being falsely charged under the Anti-Terrorism Act (Sara Bangla 2021). Arguing ulterior motives behind the law, BNP staged walkouts from the parliament in 2009 when the original anti-terrorism bill was passed, and again in 2013 when the second amendment bill to the law was put to the vote (Khan 2013). In 2015, it was reported that the government had decided to set up special tribunals under the Anti-Terrorism Act to try opposition activists for their alleged involvement in political violence and vandalism (Hiron 2015). One can also easily find sensational stories of counterterror operations in print and electronic media, coupled with images of captured suspects with recovered “militant” books that are actually available in common marketplaces. While such phenomena can conveniently be portrayed as instances of Islamophobia, these rather expose the inefficiencies and corrupt practices of the law enforcement agencies who do not always want to take the pain of lengthy and arduous investigation processes to make a strong case in the court. Additionally, imprisoning thousands of non-militant Islamists belonging to different political parties and groups has only increased the threat of prison radicalization (Rahaman 2017). Just weeks before the Holey Artisan attack, 14,000 arrests were made following a spate of terrorist attacks that had claimed the lives of secularists, religious minorities, and gay activists (CNN 2016). The opposition BNP claimed at that time that the mass arrests were designed to detain opposition party activists. It is also not a secret in Bangladesh that mass arrests pave the way for illegal income for the police in the form of bribes from petty criminals, activists,

The Other Side of Counterterrorism in Bangladesh  177 and the innocents. But by portraying the major opposition party as merely a terrorist outfit, the AL regime and its supporters have been trying to delegitimize the opposition politics in general. Addressing BNP chairperson Khaleda Zia, Prime Minister Hasina commented in 2017 that “BNP is a terrorist and militant group and the democracy that the head of this party talks about is incongruous” (The Daily Star 2017). Just before the controversial general election of 2018, Professor Muntasir Mamun, a well-known historian, and pro-AL intellectual, wrote: The achievements of the youth in Bangladesh will be in vain if the United Front led by Mirza Fakhrul and Dr. Kamal Hossain wins the election. The journey towards Pakistan will start again, militant fundamentalism will thrive, and minorities and pro-liberation forces will not only be oppressed but will be subjected to strict restrictions. Many will have to leave the country. Terrorism will be used to undermine democracy. Prominent individuals will be killed using the state apparatus, an example of which is the grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina. There will be disruption in the course of development. Is such a Bangladesh desirable to the youth? (Mamun 2018) Opinion pieces are also plentiful that conflate political Islam with militancy due to shallow understandings of local Islamist groups and their ideology. It is, therefore, no surprise that the discourse of counterterrorism has provided the ruling regime a pretense to weaken democratic institutions and civil liberties. Commenting on this deeply politicized counterterror ecology, the Crisis Group reported: Notwithstanding the BNP’s mixed record of combating militancy while in office in the 2000s, the governments’ accusations of BNP support for such groups today have little credibility and serve mainly as a way for the ruling party to tarnish its principal political rival. Similar accusations against JeI [Jamaat-e-Islami] are equally politicised, as evidenced by the measures taken to force the party from politics and its base almost entirely underground. With the JeI weakened and many senior leaders executed following the war crimes trials, there is a risk that some supporters throw in their lot with harder-line groups, as avenues to pursue goals peacefully close. (Crisis Group 2018) The current AL regime has strategically used its domestic counterterror narratives in the international arena as well to secure support for its survival. Since 2008, a regional power like India has been an important addressee of anti-terrorism discourse of Sheikh Hasina’s government. In 2011, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh praised Sheikh Hasina for cracking down on terrorists and acknowledged “the immense cooperation India has received from Bangladesh in this area” (Singh 2011). In 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi also appreciated Hasina’s “zero-tolerance” policy on terrorism, and the Indian officials affirmed that there is “extraordinary real-time cooperation and collaboration between the

178  Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman security agencies of India and Bangladesh” (Business Standard 2019). Hasina has been able to portray herself as India’s only reliable partner within Bangladesh to combat terrorism and deter Islamists’ rise (Chaudhury 2018). However, it is now widely discussed that AL’s flirting with the Islamists (Parvez 2022) has also produced a “top-down process of state-led Islamization” (Lorch 2019).

Orwellian Surveillance The concept of Orwellian dystopia is often adduced to analyze and describe the nature of a surveillance state that undermines, among others, fundamental democratic rights, freedom of association and speech, privacy rights, and the right not to be detained without trial. During the last decade, the Bangladeshi government has placed a high priority on increasing the surveillance capability of state agencies as a means to counter militancy. Responding to a question in parliament (Kaler Kantha 2017) in June 2017, Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal announced that the surveillance of militant organizations’ online propaganda would be intensified. A special project was undertaken to increase the technical capacity of the National Telecommunication Monitoring Center (NTMC), the government agency in charge of monitoring telecommunication services and conducts, at least officially, Lawful Interception (LI). The minister said that criminal networks have become increasingly web-centric since internet communication has improved. He added, “by modernizing the monitoring center, we would be able to gather more information about the militants. And the law enforcers would be able to combat the militants more efficiently using that information” (BDNews24 2017). It is to be noted that, although the surveillance of phone intercepts and internet surveillance is under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the work was done from a monitoring Centre in the Directorate General of Defence Intelligence (DGFI). In January 2013, the NTMC became fully functional and started its operation from the DGFI building itself. Since 2017, the agency has been operating from its own office building (NTMC 2021). On June 13, 2018, it was reported that the Cabinet Committee on Public Purchase approved the home ministry’s proposal for acquiring modern surveillance equipment for NTMC from foreign firms, which would cost Tk 236 crore or about USD 27,230,798 (The Daily Star 2018b). On February 20, 2019, officials unveiled that the agency was implementing a “content blocking and filtering system” which would enable it to block and filter “anti-government propaganda” (The Daily Star 2019b). Later, Bangladesh’s cabinet approved the purchase of a vehicle-mounted mobile interceptor for NTMC in June 2021, which would cost USD 8 million. According to one specialist: The interceptor takes control of all the mobile phone towers of the area where it is placed . . . by controlling the towers, this device can access all conversations, messages, photos and videos [on mobile phones]. This device can even track conversations, messages, photos and videos exchanged via WhatsApp, Viber and other social networking apps. (Chowdhury 2021)

The Other Side of Counterterrorism in Bangladesh  179 Rights groups and civil society members fear that such a device could be used to clamp down on political dissent. Following the siege at the Holey Artisan Bakery, the government purchased a similar device justifying that the device would be useful for identifying and tracking militants. Although it is quite evident that law enforcement and intelligence agencies do use these devices to track the militants, the entire process lacks accountability and is susceptible to abuse. Moreover, state surveillance has become much more decentralized than previously thought (Khan 2022). For example, Privacy International, a UK-based surveillance watchdog, reported in 2014 that the RAB was in the process of acquiring “IMSI Catchers,” the portable devices used to covertly intercept mobile communications. But the shipment from Switzerland got stopped due to campaigns by human rights organizations. Nevertheless, RAB did not give up on IMSI Catchers. In March 2021, it was revealed that a Canadian tech company Octasic sold IMSI Catchers to RAB in 2019 with government approval (Omanovic and Anstis 2021). Tender documents show that in July 2018, the Bangladesh Police too sought to buy similar equipment. In February 2021, Al-Jazeera revealed that the Bangladesh Army procured the “P6 Intercept” from Israel, a country Dhaka does not even recognize diplomatically (Al Jazeera 2021). As the state’s surveillance capacity has increased, Bangladesh has also witnessed several leaked phone conversations over the last decade. A  strong allegation points to an intentional campaign to embarrass political opponents by disclosing their private telephonic conversations. For example, in February 2015, a phone conversation between Mahmudur Rahman Manna, the convener of Nagarik Oikya (Citizens’ Unity), and Sadek Hossain Khoka, the late mayor of Dhaka City Corporation, who was staying in the United States at the time of the conversation, was leaked. Both of them are leaders of opposition politics. Law enforcement detained Manna in Dhaka, and he was later released in 2016 after serving 21 months in jail on sedition charges (BDNews24 2016). While no state agency ever claimed responsibility for such leaks, there is no evidence that such modern spy tech has fallen into private hands either. What is certain is that surveillance tools are being used not only on the suspected terrorists but also on the political opponents and civilians in general. It is important to note that the Bangladeshi High Court rejected a writ petition in September  2021 that sought a court order directing the setting up of a committee to investigate the incidents of phone tapping involving twenty politicians and other professionals (New Age 2021). However, as stated in a previous judgment by the High Court, Article 43 of the Constitution guarantees citizens’ privacy rights in matters of personal and other communication, which cannot be violated by any vested interest group. According to the judges’ observations, the collection of call lists or call records (conversations) without formal written demand and without informing the customer must be prohibited. They also made it clear that Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) and telephone companies cannot provide any information about communication between their customers and citizens unless permitted by law (Ahmed 2020).

180  Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman Furthermore, the Bangladesh government also brought about significant changes in existing laws and enacted new laws to support surveillance activities. For example, the government amended the Information and Communication Technology Act, 2006 (ICT Act) in order to secure arbitrary power to record telephonic conversations. According to section 97A (1) of the 2006 Act, the government can authorize intelligence agencies, national security agencies, and law enforcement agencies to record any telecommunications in the interests of state security and public order, and if the telecommunication service providers fail to assist in this regard, it will be considered a punishable offense. Occasionally, the government has also justified the necessity of the draconian Digital Security Act 2018 as part of its counterterrorism efforts (Haque 2021). But recent studies show that the government officials and regime supporters have extensively used the law to silence detractors, particularly politicians and journalists (Riaz 2022). Similarly, while the ICT Act 2006 (amended in 2013) was supposed to prevent cybercrime, it was often used against a number of “secularist” bloggers (Amnesty International 2017). As one author noted: [A]s long as the push to get more people online and engaged with digital technology is paired with punishing them for online activities deemed as subversive or anti-government, Bangladesh will only slide further into authoritarianism. The government’s understanding of Digital Bangladesh includes not only increased internet access and digital services – policies that are lauded and supported as development goals – but also clear violations of human rights, with the government broadening its ability to surveil and monitor citizens, creating a digital space that is far from the equitable and democratic future that citizens were promised. (Rahman 2022) It is in this context of the creeping authoritarian landscape that we need to understand and unpack the politics of counterterrorism in Bangladesh. The ways the anti-terror agencies were given carte blanche to ignore due process and illegally detain, torture, or kill the suspects have ultimately paved the way for the ruling regime to use the same logic of counterterrorism against political opponents, using the same legal mechanisms, tools, and agencies. This complete disregard for human rights in countering terrorism may have temporarily weakened the Islamist terror networks, but the culture of impunity that comes with such abusive practice will only strengthen the elements of the “deep state” in the long term.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the unsettling questions of how the investigation process in pursuit of uncovering the most heinous terror plots in the history of Bangladesh is politicized so that the opposition party members can be implicated. It has also analyzed how the inefficient trial processes may lead to innocent people being harassed. What is even more troubling is that the anti-terror laws that were

The Other Side of Counterterrorism in Bangladesh  181 enacted, the counterterror agencies that were established, and the surveillance technologies that were acquired in the last two decades in the name of combating terrorism have eventually contributed to normalizing the violations of the privacy and human rights of citizens. Additionally, while the ruling regime strives to paint the principal opposition party as a mere terrorist group, it proclaims itself as the only reliable partner in the global war on terror in an effort to secure support for its survival from regional powers like India and Western powers in general. As such, the link between the politics of counterterrorism and the continuation of authoritarian rule in Bangladesh cannot be ignored. The laudatory discourse on Bangladesh’s apparent success in curbing terrorism, therefore, needs to be studied with caution. If the civil society members and the so-called terrorism experts remain compromised and fail to encourage rehabilitating the rule of law, state agencies will continue to use moral panic to erode due process and spread exaggerations about militancy and terrorism.

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184  Mohammad Sajjadur Rahman Rahaman, M. (2017) Prison Radicalization in Bangladesh Present Scenario and Threats. Proceedings of the RAIS Conference: The Future of Ethics, Education and Research. [Online] Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3086125. [Accessed: 9 July 2021]. Rahman, M. (2016) একুশে আগস্ট: এক কলঙ্কিত অধ্যায়. Daily Prothom Alo. 20 August. [Online] Available from: https://tinyurl.com/575b724m. [Accessed: 8 July 2021]. Rahman, Z. (2022) Unpacking Digital Bangladesh. Himal South Asian. 4 January. [Online] Available from: www.himalmag.com/unpacking-digital-bangladesh-2021/. [Accessed: 9 February 2022]. Riaz, A. (2022) Unending Nightmare: Impacts of Bangladesh’s Digital Security Act 2018. [Online] Available from: https://tinyurl.com/2p8jpbuf. [Accessed: 24 April 2022]. Roy, S. (2017) A  Year of Bangladesh’s War on Terror. The Diplomat. 6 July. [Online] Available from: https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/a-year-of-bangladeshs-war-on-terror/. [Accessed: 14 November 2021]. Samakal. (2016) মানবাধিকার লঙ্ঘন নয়, রক্ষা করে -পুলিশ: স্বরাষ্ট্রমন্ত্রী. 30 September. [Online] Available from: https://epaper.samakal.com/nogor-edition/2016-09-30/4/ 5832. [Accessed: 10 September 2022]. Sara Bangla. (2021) ক্ষমতায় টিকে থাকতে দমনপীড়ন: বিএনপি. 30 March. [Online] Available from: https://sarabangla.net/post/sb-535708/. [Accessed: 1 December 2021]. Singh, M. (2011) PM’s Address at Dhaka University. [Speech transcript] Available from: https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=1057. [Accessed: 18 November 2021]. The Daily Star. (2016) PM Blames it on Local, Int’l Quarters. 3 July. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/dhaka-attack/pm-blames-it-local-intl-quarters-1249486. [Accessed: 12 May 2021]. ———. (2017) বিএনপি’র মুখে গণতন্ত্রের কথা মানায় না: প্রধানমন্ত্রী. 10 January. [Online] Available from: https://tinyurl.com/4pxpfmb8. [Accessed: 2 October 2021]. ———. (2018a) Joj Mia Drama: ‘The Real Deal’. 9 October. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/august-21-carnage/news/joj-mia-drama-the-real-deal-1644658. [Accessed: 29 August 2021]. ———. (2018b) Govt Purchasing More Tools for Surveillance. 13 June. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/backpage/govt-purchasing-more-tools-surveillance1590292. [Accessed: 24 July 2021]. ———. (2019a) NTMC Will Soon be Able to Block Anti-Govt Propaganda. 21 February. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/city/online-anti-govt-propaganda-inbangladesh-ntmc-filter-1704910. [Accessed: 24 August 2021]. ———. (2019b) Who Will Answer Me Why My Son Was Killed. 1 July. [Online] Available from: www.thedailystar.net/city/dhaka-gulshan-caf%C3%A9-attack-who-will-answerme-why-my-son-was-killed-1765144. [Accessed: 25 November 2021]. UNB. (2019) Bangladesh Role Model in Curbing Militancy: Home Minister. 10 December. [Online] Available from: https://unb.com.bd/category/Bangladesh/bangladesh-rolemodel-in-curbing-militancy-home-minister/37610. [Accessed: 2 March 2022]. Workneh, T.W. (2019) Counter-terrorism in Ethiopia: Manufacturing Insecurity, Monopolizing Speech. Internet Policy Review. 8 (1). pp. 2–22. Workneh, T.W. and Haridakis, P. (2021) Counter-Terrorism Laws and Freedom of Expression: Global Perspectives. Lanham: Lexington.

Index

9/11 70, 84, 118, 129, 148 – 149, 158, 173 Abedin, Zainul 171 Abu Ghraib 129 activists: atheist 24; cultural 18, 34 Adani, Tamim al- 88 Adivasis 134 Afghanistan 2, 12 – 13, 16, 18, 20, 25, 77, 93 Afghan resistance 16 Afghan War 11, 13, 16, 28 Agartala 141 Ahle Hadith 53, 65 Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh 13 Ahmadi community 16 Ahmed, Sharif Faruk 171 Al-Balagh 90, 102 Allahr Sainik 89 al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent 3, 22 – 23, 35, 86 al-wala wal-bara 36, 39, 41, 43 Amin, Maulana Zafar 23 Amini, Mufti Fazlul Haq 45 Amnesty International 175, 180 – 181 Ansar-al-Islam 3, 11, 15, 22 – 24, 35, 50, 86 – 88, 102 Ansarullah Bangla Team 6, 15, 21, 33, 50, 112 Anti-Corruption Commission 156 Anti-Corruption Commission Act 164 anti-Indian sentiments 24 anti-Pakistani sentiment 175 Anti-Terrorism Act 176 Anti-Terrorism Tribunal in Dhaka 173 apostates 14 – 15, 39, 41, 43 Arakan Army 143 Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) 143 Arko, Mohammad Shahzad Rouf 98 Arunachal Pradesh 133

authoritarianism 8, 180 authoritarian regimes 4, 169 Awami League 17, 50, 100, 131, 162 Awlaki, Anwar al- 6, 14 – 15, 22, 33 – 34, 37, 43, 46, 86 – 88, 100 Azad, Humayun 18 Azzam, Sheikh Abdullah 28, 37, 86 Babar, Lutfuzzaman 172 Bandarban 129, 143 Bangali, Abu Raheeq al- 100 Bangla Bhai 19 Bangladesh Army 12, 21, 138, 140, 179 Bangladesh Bank 153, 155, 163 – 164 Bangladesh Nationalist Party see BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) 21 Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) 179 Barguna 33, 35 Barisal 34 Bashundhara Group 111 Beg, Aminul Islam 88, 94 Begum, Maksuda 174 Belgium 147 Bengali language 6, 33, 40, 45, 47 Bengali New Year 17, 102 Bengalization 135 Billah, Baki 175 bloggers 14 – 15, 22 – 23, 88, 102; atheist 23, 36, 102; secular 34, 50 BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) 17, 25, 29, 49, 51, 135, 141 – 142, 162, 170, 172, 176 – 177 Bogra 18 BRAC University 166 British India 148 BTRC 179 Burma 44, 129, 131

186 Index Caliphate 14 – 15, 21, 30, 50, 58, 63, 88 capital punishment 22 caretaker government 21, 135, 141, 149, 171 Chakma, Upendra Lal 138 Chakma, Kalpana 140 Chakmas 133 – 134, 137 – 138, 145 – 146 Chandpur 18 Chapainawabganj 30 Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission 138, 146 Chowdhury, Tamim 26 – 27 Chowkidar, Saiful Islam 174 CHT (Chittagong Hill Tracts) 7, 128 – 147 CHT Accord 128, 142 CHT Commission 138 – 141, 146 counterterrorism laws 8, 148 – 150, 152, 159, 161, 167, 182; international 158, 163 counterterrorism measures 7 – 8, 112, 114, 129, 169 Counterterrorism Special Tribunals (CTST) 154, 164 Cox’s Bazar 18, 142 criminal justice 126, 162, 167 criminology 7, 128 critical terrorism studies 2, 7, 128 – 130, 169 cyberspace 14 – 15, 22, 27 Dabiq 26, 88 Dawatul Islam 14 – 15 democracy 13, 150, 177 denial 19, 126 Deobandi tradition 20, 24 Detective Branch 174 DGFI 132, 172, 178 Dhaka attack 107, 110, 116 – 118, 121 – 122 Dhaka Medical College 59 Dhaka Metropolitan Detective Branch 171 Dhaka University 8, 147, 184 Digital Security Act 152, 156, 164, 166, 184 displacement 132, 134, 137, 141, 146 domestic terrorism 10, 108, 125, 148, 152 education 33 – 34, 44, 59, 73, 173, 184 enforced disappearances 124, 139 – 140, 170, 182 extrajudicial killings 8, 124, 138, 142, 154, 161, 165, 169 – 170, 175, 182

Facebook 45, 57, 74, 86, 89 – 90, 94 – 97, 115 fair trial 8, 151, 161, 163, 170 Fakhrul, Mirza 177 Faraizi movement 23 Faruqi, Abdur Rahman 16 female militants 6, 49 – 51, 53, 56, 61, 64, 97 financing of terrorism 153, 155, 164 framing terrorism 108 – 109, 126 France 23 Frankfurt 126 Galib, Abdullah Al 25 genocide 138, 143 Gopalganj 17 grievances 4 – 5, 118, 142 – 143 guerrilla insurgency 134 Haider, Ahmed Rajib 35 Hanafi madhabs 16, 20 Hannan, Mufti 17 – 18, 171 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami 3, 11, 13, 16, 35, 49, 86, 171 Hasina, Sheikh 17, 170 – 172, 175 – 177, 182 heaven 37, 44, 73, 76 – 77, 88 Hindus 25, 30, 76, 79, 89, 130 Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh 20 Hizb-ut-Tahrir 6, 11, 14, 20 – 21, 52 Holey Artisan 3, 52, 54, 64, 100, 107, 154, 160, 174 – 175 homosexuals 14 – 15 Hossain, Kamal 177 human rights violations 60, 62, 130, 134, 140, 143, 151, 168 Huq, Ziaul 22 identity 33, 46, 77, 79, 82 – 83, 92, 118, 126, 140, 144, 172; communal 76; ethnic 128; jihadi 98; non-Muslim 130; religious 79, 139; women’s 140 ideologues 6, 33, 40, 44, 47, 87 – 88, 90, 92 – 93, 95, 97 – 98, 100 – 101 imam 33 – 34, 42 – 45 IMSI Catchers 179 Imtiaz, Rohan 99 – 100 India 30 – 31, 34, 129 – 131, 133, 135, 141, 145, 148 – 150, 162, 165, 167, 173, 175, 177 – 178 Indian Subcontinent 3, 22 – 23, 31, 35, 50, 86 indigenous 7, 130, 132, 135, 138 – 139

Index  187 Indigenous Identity 146 indigenous women 139, 145 insurgency 2, 29, 128, 148 intelligence 9, 31, 82, 104, 136 – 137 Inter-Services Intelligence 16 internally displaced persons 135, 146 International Criminal Tribunal 25 International Law 10, 151, 157, 166 – 167 Internet for Recruitment 84 – 105 internet surveillance 178 interrogation 62, 89, 95, 137 Iraq 6, 14 – 15, 21, 23 – 27, 54, 149 Irshad, Markaz-ud-wal- 18 ISIS 14 – 15, 23, 25, 27, 30 – 31, 88, 103, 114, 122, 124, 127 Islam, Monirul 57 Islam, Nibras 59, 99 Islam, Siddiqul 19; see also Bangla Bhai Islamic rule 3, 13 – 15, 17, 50, 62, 75, 81 Islamic State 3, 5 – 6, 11, 14 – 15, 18, 23 – 26, 28, 30, 67, 69, 86, 90, 175 Islamist groups 20 – 21, 70 Islamist militancy 12 – 13, 15 – 31 Islamist militants 5, 10 – 13, 31, 69, 83 Islamist parties 18 – 19 Islamist terrorism 2 – 3, 36 Islamization 4 – 5, 11, 132, 183 Islamophobia 176 Israel 179 Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh 19 Jamaat-e-Islami 38, 43, 111, 113 – 114, 116, 172, 175, 177 Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh 13, 17, 49, 86, 114 Jamalpur 18 Jandal, Abū 88 Jessore 16, 25 Jewish-Christian conspiracy 44 Jihad 2, 5, 14, 17, 20, 33 – 34, 36 – 37, 39, 41 – 46, 50, 73, 75 – 76, 84, 87 – 100 Jihad in Bangladesh 33, 42, 89, 96, 98 Jihadi John 99 – 100 jihadist ideology, global 14 – 15 Jilani, Ashikur Rahman 88 Joj Mia 172 judicial system 13, 154, 170 Jummas 130, 132 – 133, 142, 144 Jund-At-Tawheed Wal-Khalifah 15, 26, 87 Kabir, Mohammad Sakhawatul 25 Kaptai Dam 133 Karim, Tehzib 34

Kashmir 92 Kathir, Ibn 37 Khan, Tahmid Hasib 174 Khoka, Sadek Hossain 179 Khulna 16 Kishorganj 93 Kolkata 171 Labu, Nuruzzaman 120 – 121, 125 Laden, Usama bin 12 Laskar-e-Tayeba 13 Latin America 130 laws of God 37 – 39, 41 – 43 Laxmipur 18 LGBT activists 24, 88 Libya 25 lone wolves 54, 85, 91 madrassahs 3, 12 – 13, 16, 33 – 34, 95 – 96, 123, 132 Malaysia 88 – 89, 93, 100 Mamun, Muntasir 177 Manarat International University 59 Manipur 131 Manna, Mahmudur Rahman 179 martyrdom 4, 89, 92, 95, 101 massacres 140 Mecca 42, 44 media coverage 7, 107 – 110, 112, 116, 122 Melbourne 59 micro-surveillance systems 8 Middle East 12 – 13, 70 militarism 136 – 137 militarization 128 – 130, 133, 137, 142 militarized zones 138 military occupation 7, 128, 136 minorities: religious 14 – 15, 25 – 26, 63, 176; small ethnic 129 misinformation 108, 120, 124 Mizoram 134 Mizo Rebels 147 money laundering 155 – 156, 159 Moulvibazar 62 Muhajir, Abu Muharib al- 99 Muhammad, Huzaifa 119 – 122, 125 mujahid 43, 89 Mumbai Attacks 108 Muslim Millat Bahini 12 Myanmar 16, 131, 143 Nagarik Oikya 179 Narayanganj 95 – 96

188 Index narratives: grand 173; popular 7, 71, 81; religious 75; violent 79 National Security Intelligence 172 National Telecommunication Monitoring Center 178 nationalism 73, 79 Naxalite 131 neo-JMB 14 – 15, 50, 52 – 57, 59, 67, 176 Nina, Sadia Afroz 97 Noakhali 172 non-Muslims 44, 73, 81, 89 non-violent 53 North South University 59, 82, 98 Nuhaas, Ibn 37 Omar, Mullah 46 online radicalization 65, 68, 75, 102, 105 Orwellian Surveillance 178 Ozaki, Saifullah 94 Pakistan 2, 13, 18, 20, 22 – 23, 25, 34, 130 – 131, 133, 148, 150 paradise 37, 91, 96, 99 Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) 134, 144 parliament 176, 178 Partha, Shaibal Saha 172 patriarchy 58, 64, 137 Peace Accord 128, 130, 134, 137, 141 peacekeepers 130 – 132 Pintu, Abdus Salam 171 political Islam 5, 9 – 10, 121, 125, 177 political parties 45, 86, 100, 111, 135 – 136, 148, 176 popular revolution 42 post-colonial 148 poverty 50, 59, 141 preachers 34, 45, 93 prison 5, 52, 172 propaganda 21, 24, 54, 85 – 86, 89, 121 propaganda videos 7, 77, 86 – 88, 93, 95, 98, 100 public opinion 108, 110, 123, 126 public universities 72 – 73, 75, 77 – 80 al-Qaeda 3, 6, 13, 22 – 24, 28, 35, 49 – 50, 53 – 54, 63, 70, 86, 88 al-Qaeda in Bangladesh (AQIB) 23 Qatada, Abu 37 Quran 37, 39 – 40, 43 – 45, 73, 77 – 78 Qutb, Syed 37

RAB (Rapid Action Battalion) 55, 142, 160, 170, 179, 181, 183 radicalization 62, 70, 80, 82, 84 – 85, 95, 104, 106, 161; female 6, 51, 58, 61 – 62, 64 Rahman, Abdur 18 – 19 Rahman, Ivy 170 Rahman, Major Ziaur 34 Rahman, Matiur 11 – 12 Rahman, Shaikh Abdur 17 – 18, 55 Rahman, Shamsur 16 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur 138 Rahman, Tarique 172 Rajshahi 19 – 20, 30, 49, 56 Rajshahi University 87 Rangamati 129 Rangpur 97 Rapid Action Battalion see RAB (Rapid Action Battalion) Rauf, Maulana Abdur 35 recruitment 3, 7, 13 – 15, 56 – 57, 72, 84 – 105, 128 refuge 98, 131, 143 refugees 28, 132, 135, 141, 146 rehabilitation 141, 160 reintegration 137, 160 repatriation 134, 141 reporting terror 119, 121, 123 Rohingyas 28, 135, 143 Salafi ideology 48 Salafi Jihadism 83 sanctions 142, 146, 170 Saudi Arabia 34 Saydee, Delwar Hossain 45 Secret Detentions 160, 174 secularism 20, 117, 162 Security Council 158, 165 sexual violence 139 – 140 Shahadat-e-Hiqma 20 Shahadat-i-Hiqma see SiH (Shahadat-i-Hiqma) Shanti Bahini 128, 141 Shaon, Zakir Hossain 174 Sharia 13, 62, 73, 99 Sharia law 5, 20, 34, 38 Shariatullah, Haji 23 Sharif, Rezwan 34 Shi’a 25 – 26 SiH (Shahadat-i-Hiqma) 14 – 15, 19 – 20 Singapore 46

Index  189 Singh, Manmohan 177 SITE Intelligence 122 SMT (social movement theory) 40 social media platforms 35, 74, 78, 85, 87, 109 South Asia 2, 5, 9 – 10, 16, 23, 67, 70, 82 – 83, 145 – 146, 160, 162, 167, 182 sovereignty 132, 152, 158 – 159, 161, 165 Soviet Union 12 Spain 130 state agencies 3, 8, 160, 169, 173, 178 – 179, 181 state-centric security discourses 143 state terrorism 2, 110 statements, confessional 35, 56, 65, 67, 172 storytelling 46, 76 suicide bombing 3, 5, 10, 56 sunnah 37 – 38 Sunni Islam 20 Supreme Court 151, 154, 162 Sura 37 – 40, 43 – 44 surveillance 136, 169, 178, 184 surveillance tools 179 suspicion 60, 132 – 133; false 53 Switzerland 179 sympathizers 86, 91 – 92, 109, 117 Syria 6, 14 – 15, 21, 25 – 27, 54, 61, 76 – 77, 94, 98, 100, 149 Syrian refugees 76 Tablighi Jamaat 72, 83 tactics, guerrilla 43 Taimiya, Ibn 90 takfir 36, 38 – 39, 42 Taliban 19, 93 Tamim, Sheikh 102 Tangail 18, 29 tawhid-al-uluhiyya 38 – 39 Telegram 93 terror-financing 155 terrorism: combatting 159 – 160; conceptualizing 6, 10; cyber 156, 164; defined 158 – 159; homegrown 124; international 110, 161, 168; left-wing 2; local 4; non-state 2; support 158 terrorism suspects 51 – 54, 160; female 51 – 54, 56, 59, 62, 66 terrorist financing 149, 153, 155 – 156, 159 terrorist ideology 7, 57, 75, 84, 87 terrorist recruitment 59, 85, 92, 103, 158

terrorists, homegrown 113, 115, 122 terror suspects 169 Toronto University 174 torture 62, 138, 140, 145, 151 – 152, 163, 170, 173, 175, 180; custodial 169 Torun Mujahid 92 training camps 17 – 18 Transcom Group 111 Transnational Islamic Movement 82 Transnational Organized Crimes 158 tribunal: judicial 149; special 22, 153 – 154, 156, 171, 176 Tripura 131, 134, 139, 141 Turkey 61 Twitter 24, 86, 89 – 90, 101 – 102 ulama 12 ultra-left communist groups 148 ummah 41, 81, 91 UNHCR 141 United Nations 152, 156 – 158 United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) 142 – 143 United States 131, 142, 179 urban youth 6, 70 – 72, 74, 81 US Department of State 154, 159 – 160, 168 violent extremist narratives 80 – 81 violent Jihad 33, 43, 89, 94 violent terrorism 70 – 71 volunteers 12, 16, 28 Wahhab, Abd al- 38 Wajed, Sheikh Hasina 135; see also Hasina, Sheikh war crimes 114 war crimes trials 25, 177 war criminals 124 war of independence 25 war on terror 130 Washington 10, 29 weaponizing counterterrorism 175 websites, jihadi 7, 86, 90 WhatsApp 59, 178 World Islamic Front 20 Yemen 34 YouTube 35, 57, 74, 88 Zarqawi 37 Zawahiri, Ayman al- 23, 38, 46, 86 Zia, Khaleda 141