The Politics of Migration: A Survey [1 ed.] 9781857437553, 9781857433654, 9781315728285

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THE POLITICS OF

MIGRATION A SURVEY

THE POLITICS OF

MIGRATION A SURVEY

FIRST EDITION

Editor Barbara Marshall

First Edition 2006 Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 0X14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA First issued in paperback 2015 Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© Routledge 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be photocopied, recorded, or otherwise reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN 13: 978-1-85743-755-3 (pbk) ISBN 13: 978-1-85743-365-4 (hbk)

Development Editor: Cathy Hartley Copy Editor and Proof-reader: Simon Chapman Typeset in Times New Roman 11/13 The publishers make no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may take place. Typeset by AJS Solutions, Huddersfield - Dundee

Foreword The Politics of Migration: A Survey aims to provide up-to-date information by leading experts in the field on one of the most important and complex issues of our age: migration. It will do this in several ways. In the first section the most salient aspects of migration are discussed: the economics of migration; the role migration plays in development and poverty reduction in countries of origin; irregular migration; questions surrounding asylum-seekers, refugees and internally displaced people; and migration and society. The second section gives an overview of some of the areas of the world which are most affected by migration: the Americas, the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, Africa and Europe. Each chapter concludes with a section entitled 'Further Reading', which lists some of the most useful titles for providing the reader with additional information. In the view of the editor, this combined approach of topic analysis with area surveys provides the best way of introducing the reader to the many facets of contemporary migration. The method adopted reflects the approach of the United Nations Global Commission on International Migration. Indeed, five of the Dictionary's 10 authors have worked for the Commission. The third section of the book provides an A - Z glossary with explanations of the most important terms used in the migration discourse. It also provides as much information as possible about the most important international conventions governing migration, and about organizations, research institutes, etc., active in the field, with links for further, more detailed information. Entries are crossreferenced for ease of use. Finally, a section of statistics gives the reader an overview of migrant stock, net migration, refugees and remittances. Barbara Marshall University of East Anglia November 2006

v

Contents

Acknowledgements The Contributors Abbreviations

viii ix xii

PART 1 - ESSAYS Introduction

3

Part la - Background Analysis The Economics of Migration Policies by THOMAS STRAUBHAAR

15

What Causes Migration? Poverty or Development? Or is it the Other Way Around? by ARJAN DE HAAN Irregular Migration by KHALID KOSER

30 44

Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and the Internally Displaced: the Politics of Forced Migration by HEAVEN CRAWLEY

58

Migration and Society by PONTUS ODMALM

75

Part lb - Regional Overviews Migration in Europe by CHRISTINA BOSWELL Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

91

by RICHARD BLACK

The Asia-Pacific Region by GRAEME HUGO Half a World in Motion: Migration Policy in the Americas by KEVIN O'NEIL

111

129 147

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East by MARTIN BALDWIN-EDWARDS

172

PART 2 - A-Z GLOSSARY by Barbara Marshall

193

PART 3 - STATISTICS International Migration

287

LIST OF MAPS Internally displaced people world-wide Principal migrations into Europe Number of persons born in Asian countries counted in the 2000 round of censuses in OECD countries Estimated net migration rates in the Americas The foreign born in the United States vi

65 94 133 149 154

CONTENTS The foreign born from Mexico in the United States Remittances Received [in Central and South America] Principal migrations into, from and within the Middle East and North Africa region Principal illegal migration routes in the Mediterranean region

155 168 175 186

Vll

Acknowledgements

The editor, authors and publishers are most grateful to the Cartographic Unit at the University of Southampton for drawing up some of the maps for this edition. They are also grateful to those organizations that allowed them to reproduce their maps, and use their data for statistical tables and for the creation of maps, in particular the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, the Inter-American Development Bank, the ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy Development), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC—www.internal-displacement.org), and the Migration Policy Institute.

Vlll

The Contributors

Barbara Marshall is a Fellow in the School of Political, Social and International Studies at the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom. She has published widely in the areas of European politics and migration and retired from full-time teaching in 2004. Martin Baldwin-Edwards is Co-Director of the Mediterranean Migration Observatory, University Research Institute for Urban Environment and Human Resources, Panteion University, Athens; and Associate Lecturer at the Open University, United Kingdom (Athens-based appointment). He has served as consultant to many international research institutes, the United Nations, the European Union and the Greek government, and is the author of more than 60 publications in the migration field. Richard Black is Professor of Human Geography and Co-Director of the Sussex Centre for Migration Research at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom. He has researched widely on refugees and migrants, with a focus on Africa and Europe. He is currently Director of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty, a five-country network of researchers funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development. Christina Boswell is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. She studied at Oxford (BA) and the London School of Economics (PhD), before taking up research positions at the UNHCR and Chatham House. Between 2003-05 she founded the Migration Research Group at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Germany. Her research focuses on European migration policy and the sociology of knowledge transfer. She is author of European Migration Policies in Flux (Blackwell, 2003) and The Ethics of Refugee Policy (Ashgate, 2005). Heaven Crawley is Senior Lecturer in the School of the Environment and Society at Swansea University, United Kingdom. She was previously head of asylum research at the Home Office, Associate Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Director of AMRE Consulting. Her research interests are focused on the experiences of refugees and asylum-seekers, particularly in relation to the conceptualization of the refugee experience in the asylum determination processes of the United Kingdom and other European Union member states. She is particularly interested in ensuring the use of research IX

THE CONTRIBUTORS evidence in policy making and is regularly asked to provide advice to governmental and non-governmental bodies on the direction and content of policy. Recent publications include No Place for a Child: Children in Immigration Detention in the UK (with Trine Lester) and States of Conflict: Causes and Patterns of Forced Migration to the EU and Policy Responses (with Stephen Castles and Sean Loughna). Arjan de Haan is Social Development Adviser at the United Kingdom Department for International Development, working in Beijing, People's Republic of China since September 2006. During 2005-06, when this paper was written, he was Visiting Professor at the University of Guelph, Canada. Graeme Hugo is Federation Fellow, Professor of Geography in the Department of Geographical and Environmental Studies, and Director of the National Centre for Social Applications of Geographic Information Systems at the University of Adelaide, Australia. His research interests lie in population issues in Australia and South-East Asia, especially migration. He is the author of more than 200 books, book chapters and articles in scholarly journals. In 2002 he secured an ARC Federation Fellowship over five years for his research project, 'The new paradigm of international migration to and from Australia: dimensions, causes and implications'. Khalid Koser is Fellow on Humanitarian Issues and Deputy Director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, USA. Before this appointment he was Senior Policy Analyst at the Global Commission on International Migration in Geneva, Switzerland, and prior to that he was Lecturer in Human Geography at University College London, United Kingdom. He is currently chair of the United Kingdom Advisory Panel on Country Information and has been Vice-President of the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration and a member of the Consultative Committee of the Information Centre on Asylum and Refugees (United Kingdom). Dr Koser has published widely on migration, asylum-seekers and refugees. He has been a consultant for the ILO, IOM, OECD and United Kingdom Home Office, UNESCO and UNFPA. Pontus Odmalm is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. His research focuses on citizenship, political participation and migrant organizations. He has recently published Migration Policies and Political Participation: Inclusion or Intrusion in Western Europe? (Palgrave). Kevin O'Neil is a doctoral student in population and public affairs in the Office of Population Research and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, USA. Previously, he was a Research Associate at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, DC, where he worked on North American and European migration policy and on migration and x

THE CONTRIBUTORS development. He was a Fellow of the Thomas J. Watson Foundation and is a graduate of Swarthmore College. Thomas Straubhaar is Professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg and Head of the Hamburg Institute of International Economics, one of the leading economic think tanks in Germany. He holds degrees, including a doctoral degree, from the University of Berne, Switzerland. He was a lecturer at the Universities of Konstanz and Basel and an Assistant Professor at the University of Freiburg in Germany before becoming Professor at the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg. He has published many books and articles on migration subjects. His book On the Economics of International Migration (1987) has been discussed widely in the scientific community.

XI

Abbreviations

APC

Asia Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations AU African Union c. circa Cent. Central DC District of Columbia Dem. Democratic Dr Doctor Ed Editor Edn Edition EUMC European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia FDA Foreign Direct Assistance FDI Foreign Direct Investment GAMP (proposal for a) General Agreement on the Movement of People GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GCC Gulf Co-operation Council GCIM (United Nations) Global Commission on International Migration Gen. General GLSS Ghana Living Standard Survey ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development ICMR International Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families ICPD International Conference on Population and Development ILO International Labour Organization INGO International Non-Governmental Organization IOM International Organization for Migration LAC Latin American and Caribbean countries m. million Maghreb Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia Mashreq Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Yemen MDC Medium Developed Country MDG Millennium Development Goals MENA Middle East and North Africa MERCOSUR Southern Common Market MNC Multinational Company Xll

ABBREVIATIONS MPG MPI NGO NIC OAU OCW ODA OECD OHCHR OLA OPEC Qmv RCO Rep. S. SAR SOPEMI TSMO UK UN UNCTAD UNDESA UNDP UNDP HDI UNESCO UNFPA UNGA UNHCR UNODC UNRWA US USA USCRI WFP WTO

Migration Policy Group Migration Policy Institute Non-Governmental Organization Newly Industrializing Countries Organization of African Unity (now AU) Overseas Contract Workers Official Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (United Nations) Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (United Nations) Office of Legal Affairs Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Qualified majority voting (in certain EU policy areas) Refugee Community Organizations Republic South Special Administrative Region OECD reporting system on migration Trans-national Social Movement Organization United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Development Programme United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Population Fund United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East United States United States of America United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants World Food Programme World Trade Organization

xiii

Essays

Introduction BARBARA MARSHALL

What exactly is migration and why has it become one of the most controversial issues in the world today? Migration, i.e. the movement of people, has occurred throughout history and as such contemporary migration is not new. The difference is mainly one of geographic and numerical scale. Migration today involves the entire world and huge numbers. This is due to new technology where world-wide information is easily available. This in turn raises the awareness of the large discrepancies between the wealth and relative order of the industrialized world and the standards of living, human rights1 violations and environmental degradation prevalent in many parts of the less developed world. Moreover, frequently a false impression is created of easy riches awaiting anyone who reaches the first world. Encouragement to migrate also results from lower transportation and communications costs. In other words, the relative ease of long-distance mobility has led to a constant rise in the numbers of people who are prepared to move. Migration is a multi-faceted, highly complex phenomenon, touching many aspects of modern life. It can be categorized in many different ways. For example, in earlier writing a distinction is made between push factors, i.e. involuntary or forced migration by people fleeing persecution, natural disasters or extreme poverty, and pull factors, i.e. migration induced by the availability of jobs in the developed world. Another distinction is made between 'rights driven' and economic migration, with the former category comprising family reunion, as well as refugees and asylum-seekers and the latter legal labour migration. In addition, and perhaps most controversial today, there is illegal/irregular migration, i.e. the clandestine movement of people to enter countries of destination for the purpose of protection and/or work. Moreover, whereas earlier migration tended to be 'linear' with permanent settlement at the destination, contemporary migration is often circular with short spells abroad, followed by return home and new, short periods abroad. This type of migration makes use of established 'networks' of friends and families who successfully migrated earlier. In this way diasporas of 1

Words in bold refer to entries in the A-Z Glossary.

3

ESSAYS nationals abroad can be found whose economic importance in the form of remittances to their home countries has been growing steadily. A migration industry has sprung up to service contemporary migration, ranging from facilitators to formal and informal support systems and to criminal gangs of traffickers. This 'industry' has been estimated to be more profitable than the oil industry. But who actually migrates and, more importantly in the current migration debate, what are the numbers involved? By definition migrants are the most mobile of any society, between 18 and 40 years old, frequently highly motivated and educated, as several contributions in Part lb of this volume demonstrate. In the past men predominated, but the share of women has been increasing steadily and in some parts of Asia and Africa is now about 50% of all migrants, a process which experts call 'the feminization of migration'. What these migrants have in common is the desire to better their lives by hard work, frequently well below their qualifications. They represent the bulk of legal economic and also of irregular migration, the benefits of which have now been widely accepted. Indeed, with ageing and declining populations in most developed countries, migration will become increasingly necessary and a certain competition between these countries for the recruitment of the brightest and the best of the less developed world is already under way, frequently leading to the loss of valuable skills in the sender countries, the socalled brain drain (see A. de Haan's contribution in Part la). But migrants nowadays are also frequently filling the most menial '3D' (dirty, difficult and dangerous) jobs which indigenous labour is often no longer prepared to accept. Moreover, irregular migrants are providing cheap and flexible services of all kinds and are thus fulfilling a vital role in the economies of the developed world. However, as T. Straubhaar points out in Part la, the economic benefits depend on the context in which migration takes place. Young, energetic migrants can displace native workers. The economic argument for and against migration needs careful calibration. Economic benefits also need to be balanced against the frequently negative popular perceptions of all migrants and the very real social costs of migration. These come in many guises. On a micro level, local communities have to share amenities such as housing, schools and health provisions with migrants, and tensions can flare up when native residents see themselves in competition with these newcomers for scarce resources. This in turn can result in xenophobic hatred and violence which media and politicians can exploit for financial and electoral purposes. In more general terms, citizens in Europe, North America and many other receiving countries have a fear of being overcrowded by unwanted supply-driven migration from all over the world.

4

Introduction

How large is contemporary migration in real terms? Here a note of caution is required: overall numbers are difficult to calculate. Statistical data are collected in different forms in different countries and frequently not at all. This applies particularly to Asia and Africa. Much irregular migration by definition remains unrecorded and figures are based on estimates which can vary widely. Moreover, what is measured exactly? A distinction can be made between internal and international migration, that is the movement of people within one country (e.g. from rural to urban areas) and that which crosses international borders. A further difference exists between migrant 'stocks', i.e. the numbers of long-term resident foreigners in any given country and of 'migration flows', i.e. the number of people actually and frequently shortterm 'on the move'. According to the United Nations, there were some 175m. migrants world-wide in 2004 (an increase from 76m. in 1960 and 100m. in 1980). Of these, 81m. were in the developed world (excluding the former Soviet Union) and 65m. in developing countries. Although these numbers appear huge, when compared to trade or financial flows, this movement of people is relatively limited. The share of the export of goods and the trade in services in the world's gross domestic product roughly doubled between 1960 and 2000, whereas the share of international migrants in the world population rose less dramatically, from about 2.5% to 3%. As most migrants move in search of a better life, the fastest growth in migration has been in developed countries. High-income countries have 16% of the world's workers, but more than 60% of the world's migrants. However, there are wide variations in their geographical distribution: migrant shares ranged from 1% in Ireland and Japan to 23% in Australia and to more than 30% in Singapore. A survey of the regions covered in Part lb shows that 13% of the North American population was born in another country, well above the global average (see K. O'Neill's contribution in Part lb). Europe now matches North America in its significance as a region of immigration. Net immigration in Europe in 2003 stood at 5.3 per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to 4.4 in the USA. The region hosts a foreign-born population of 31.6m. migrants (or 9.7% of the population), as compared to 34.6m. in the USA (12.3% of the population—see the essay by C. Boswell in Part lb). However, the world's highest share of migrant population is to be found in the Middle East. According to UN data for 2000, the highest ratio of migrants to total population is in the MENA2 region (see M. BaldwinEdwards in Part lb). As far as the Asia-Pacific region is concerned, its vast size and cultural, ethnic, political, religious and economic complexity makes it difficult to generalize about international migration there. But Asia is the 2

Middle East and North Africa. 5

ESSAYS largest supplier of emigrants to other parts of the world; to OECD countries alone the figure for 2005 was almost 17m. (see G. Hugo in Part lb). Figures for migrants from Africa vary: according to the UN, they were 17m., whereas ILO estimates 20m. and the African Union calculates that there are as many as 50m. African migrants world-wide (see R. Black in Part lb). Although precise figures are thus not available, there is evidence of substantial African migration to Europe (2m. in 2000/01) and North America (just under lm.). What conclusions can be drawn from these figures? From the perspective of developed countries, the effects of migration depend on the role it plays in the political, economic and social structures and traditions of the receiving country. Thus in the traditional countries of immigration, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand or the USA, immigration is an integral part of their identity, the myth of the 'melting pot' of all newcomers into new nations. On the other hand, Europe before the Second World War or parts of Asia until comparatively recently were regions of emigration. Characteristic of today's migration is the fact that Europe has become a continent of immigration and this transition from emigration to immigration has been even faster in some Asian countries (see G. Hugo in Part lb). It is therefore not surprising that these areas are facing the more serious challenges when it comes to the treatment of migrants, i.e. the form of their integration which, given their frequent cultural distinctiveness and growing assertiveness, goes to the heart of their sense of identity. More specifically, the concerns which migration arouses are linked to two categories of migrants: irregular migrants and asylum-seekers/refugees. As far as irregular migration is concerned, there is a dearth of precise information and some confusion in the terminology used, which ranges from 'illegal', to 'undocumented', 'unauthorized' and 'clandestine' migration. K. Koser in Part la suggests the use of 'irregular' migration because the other terms only highlight certain aspects of this type of migration. 'Illegal', for example, stresses the existence outside the law of these migrants, suggesting some form of criminality. However, the breach of the law often consists in no more than reaching the destination country by the use of smugglers, i.e. illegal entry, or unsuccessful asylum-seekers not leaving the country or the circumvention of immigration controls in the form of bogus marriages or fake adoptions. 'Unauthorized' or 'undocumented' means that migrants are not in possession of the required documents, but this term does not cover the whole range of possible migrants in this category. A further problem arises from the fact that migrants frequently change their status, for example when a student or tourist entered the country on a visa and subsequently overstayed. The term 'irregular' migrants therefore seems to reflect the special status of these 6

Introduction

migrants without casting them into the lawlessness of an illegal' and this term has therefore been adopted throughout this volume. As difficult as the nomenclature is the availability of definite numbers, as irregular migrants by definition hesitate to make their presence known to the authorities. There are also many methodological and practical difficulties in the collection of relevant data. The general consensus, however, is that the global scale of irregular migration has grown in line with the increase of international migration generally. In the USA, for example, it is estimated that more than 10m. irregular migrants make up nearly one-third of the foreignborn population and more than half of these are Mexican. Despite efforts to improve border controls, about 500,000 additional irregular migrants enter the USA every year. The figure for Russia is 3.5m.-5m., with irregular migrants there coming mainly from the Commonwealth of Independent States and South-East Asia. Up to 20m. irregular migrants live in India today. About one-half of all migrants in Africa and Latin America are thought to be irregular. For Europe, the OECD estimates that between 10% and 15% of its 56m. migrants have irregular status and each year around 500,000 more arrive. It is thought that, overall, between 2.5m.^lm. migrants cross borders in an irregular fashion each year. One of the most disturbing aspects of irregular migration is the trafficking or smuggling (see Glossary for the distinction between these terms) of between 600,000-800,000 women and children each year for the sex trade. Although numerically only a small percentage of irregular migration as a whole, it has caught public attention because of the appalling human tragedies hidden behind these statistics. Do these figures mean that the developed world is being 'swamped' by uncontrollable migration, as populist media and politicians claim? The above figures suggest otherwise: in the EU about 10% of all migrants are irregular and even the highest estimate puts world-wide irregular migration at no higher than 50% of total migration. Irregular migration is also far more common between less developed countries where borders are often less well defined. Most migration is regular. However, the political significance of irregular migration is of course much higher. It is the use and distortions of migration for often short-term political point-scoring which makes the management of complex migration realities even more difficult. Of all migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees are perhaps the most controversial for several reasons. Their status is 'rights-based', i.e. their presence is due to the application of international legal contracts, such as the Geneva Convention. All Western governments subscribed to this at the end of the Second World War in response to the horrors of the Third Reich. But in the emerging Cold War, refugee protection also assumed a political role: to give protection to those persecuted by communist regimes gave moral kudos to 7

ESSAYS Western democracies. The end of the Cold War has removed this most powerful political underpinning for the Convention. Moreover, wars are now largely fought outside the developed world and frequently not between two countries, but inside a single country. The continued application of the Geneva Convention therefore has lost its political function in the Western world. Moreover, it has to rely on the upholding of international laws by the participating governments, which in theory limits their control over who enters national territory, i.e. their sovereignty. Nevertheless, officially at least the Convention continues to be upheld. In Europe, for example, the right to asylum was incorporated into the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU as late as 1997. At the same time, governments throughout the developed world are engaged in limiting the numbers of asylum-seekers and one device has been the creation of mechanisms to prevent potential asylum-seekers from actually lodging an application. The Convention is thus upheld in principle but fewer people can benefit from it. The main reason for this restrictive approach is the apparent 'abuse' of the asylum system by economic migrants on the one hand, and by asylum-seekers' recourse to irregular entry into the country on the other. The latter is of course widely acknowledged: as open, 'legal' access to Western states has become increasingly difficult, desperate people in search of safety are forced into clandestine means of escaping conflict and persecution. As to the 'abuse' of the system by economic migrants: again this has occurred when legal avenues for immigration were closed, such as after the ban on labour recruitment in the wake of the first oil crisis in 1973. More important in this context is the strong correlation between international conflicts and the number of asylum-seekers. As H. Crawley in Part la demonstrates, their majority world-wide come from countries affected by conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, etc. An analysis of asylum-seeker flows to Europe between 1990 and 2000 shows that just 10 countries accounted for nearly 60% of all asylumseekers entering the EU during that period. More recently, the world has experienced a decline in armed conflict from a peak in the early 1990s, a drop in the number of autocratic regimes and of 'ethno-national' wars of independence. Overall, therefore, there has been a decline in numbers from nearly 18m. refugees world-wide in 1992 to just over 9m. in 2004. There has also been a sharp decline in asylum applications in the Western world. However, world-wide the distribution of refugees is extremely uneven, with nations with per capita income of less than US $2,000 hosting 71% of all refugees. By contrast, nations with per capita incomes of more than $10,000 host just 5% of the world's refugees. There is, however, an increase in the numbers of those who do not cross international borders but seek protection in other parts of 8

Introduction

their own country, internally displaced persons. World-wide there are now 23.7m. people either without humanitarian assistance from their governments and/or unprotected by their governments. These figures put the debate in the industrialized world about 'uncontrollable waves' of asylum-seekers into perspective. There is evidence that the rich first world is being increasingly ungenerous towards the world's victims of conflict and persecution. At stake in this development are the humanitarian values which until recently were central to liberal democracies throughout the developed world. In general terms, the question for liberal nation states is therefore: how should and how can they react efficiently to the growing complexity and seeming inevitability of contemporary migration? The question goes to the heart of states' ability to control events, to important issues such as sovereignty and—in view of the cultural diversity of migrants—also national identity. As far as the control of irregular migration is concerned, the receiving countries of the developed world have initiated intricate systems for keeping migrants out, ranging from changes to the availability of asylum as mentioned above, the setting up of a databank for asylum-seekers and irregular migrants, to the strengthening of land borders and the increasing deployment of maritime forces to curtail the arrival of migrants by sea. As K. Koser points out in Part la, in 2002 Canada, the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands spent a total of $ 17,000m. for this purpose. However, it has been widely acknowledged that this type of control has had limited success. On the one hand, migrants are needed, as outlined above. On the other hand, controls don't really work: migrants keep coming. To really control migration, a world-wide approach would be needed, in which the underlying causes of migration were acknowledged and whereby sending and receiving countries would co-operate in the 'management' of migration. So far this has been tackled at a binational level, such as in agreements between the USA and Mexico, or between Germany and Poland. However, to be more effective, a regional, multilateral approach would be needed and migration experts have recently put forward the concept of a world-wide GAMP (General Agreement on the Movement of People—see the contribution by T. Straubhaar in Part la) analogue to the existing GATT.3 In Europe, the European Union has taken the first, albeit modest steps with 'Framework Agreements' with, for example, North African states. It has also integrated migration issues into its external relations and development policies. At the same time, it is advocating the wider availability of temporary legal migration for the nationals of developing countries, in an attempt to alleviate migratory pressures from these areas and provide some form of development assistance in the form of remittances and 3

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

9

ESSAYS training. However, one of the main problems for developing countries for the time being remains the closed markets of the developed world and these have so far been tackled only to a limited degree. Moreover, there is evidence that even where modest progress in the conditions of a sender country is achieved, this does not result in an immediate decrease but, on the contrary, it leads to an increase in migration. Only when a critical stage in the development and prosperity of the sender country has been reached does migration decline. Development to reduce migration pressures is thus a long-term proposition (see the contribution by A. de Haan in Part la). But a beginning can be seen in the form of rising remittances, which in 2005, according to estimates by the IMF, amounted to US $230,000m., an amount which outstripped the level of ODA.4 To this can be added 'technical' remittances in the form of skills and knowledge which a returning migrant may have acquired abroad. In the short term, though, it seems that migration may need to continue or even increase to bring about improvements in the conditions of the developing world. Another aspect of a 'managed' migration is the status and treatment of migrants in the receiving societies. Here migration is often perceived as challenging national identity and this has caused renewed preoccupation with the issue of who 'belongs' and on what terms? Particularly in Europe, with its liberal traditions, this has been a dilemma. Because the continent was primarily an area of emigration before labour immigration started after the Second World War, the presence of numerous, culturally different and increasingly assertive migrants has been a particular challenge. As P. Odmalm points out in Part la, different models of integration of 'the other' have been tried in different parts of the Western world, including in the 'traditional' immigration countries, such as assimilation or multiculturalism, and so far none have worked entirely satisfactorily. More recently the emphasis has therefore moved from multiethnic, multicultural approaches to the duties which immigrants have to fulfil towards their host society in the form of language competence, the acceptance of the rule of law and the equality of women. It remains to be seen whether these initiatives will result in the desired integration and harmonious social interaction. Another solution put forward more frequently is the increasing use of temporary migration, as mentioned above, with numerous short spells of 'circular migration', i.e. a widening of legal access to an industrialized country as a means of reducing illegal migration. For the receiving country this would mean the recruitment of the necessary labour without the social costs normally attached to migration. This is essentially the old Gastarbeiter (guestworkers) system as practised in West Germany after the Second World 4

Official Development Assistance.

10

Introduction

War and in parts of Asia and the Middle East today where migrants enjoy few social rights and where no integration into the host society is intended. There can be little doubt that migration has challenged long-held values and assumptions as well as the traditional notion of cultural superiority in Western immigration countries. International migration is controversial and politically contentious because it highlights important questions about global equity, social justice and the universality of human rights. The picture is further complicated by the growing 'securitization' of migration, i.e. the notion that migration poses multiple threats. Migrants are seen as potential terrorists (physical security), as undermining the jobs of the unskilled (economic security), costing the taxpayer by being part of the asylum and welfare systems (financial security), importing diseases (health security) and threatening the identity of the host society (societal security), etc. These to a large extent unjustified fears contribute to the widespread negative image of migrants and migration. One of the first tasks of a more constructive approach to migration issues—the 'management' of migration—is to dispel these fears by greater accessibility to the facts, as against the myths, surrounding migration. It is hoped that the information provided in this volume will help the reader to a more balanced, sober view on these matters—the precondition for tackling the real challenges which migration represents. Further Reading (with coverage of the most important issues dealt with in this volume) Castles, S., and Miller, M. The Age of Migration. Third Edn, 2003.

11

Part la Background Analysis

The Economics of Migration Policies THOMAS STRAUBHAAR

INTRODUCTION How should and how could nation states react efficiently to the growing complexity of contemporary migration patterns? What are the criteria to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of migration policies? Politicians want the right answers. Economists want the right answers for the right reason. Although economic considerations alone do not determine migration policies, they can play a critical part in policy-making from a double perspective. First, economic arguments about the costs and benefits of migration provide a framework for determining the possibilities and limitations of a migration policy regime to regulate the impact of labour inflows. Second, the economic approach proved to deliver good tools for analysing the underlying mechanisms of national and supra-national migration policy-making as such. Who are the losers and winners of specific changes in migration policies? To what extent is a migration policy measure beneficial for which groups in the receiving country? Will a relaxation of migration restrictions harm the development in the sending countries? In what follows, some insights from economics will be presented in order to support this double perspective. First, conditions of an efficient migration policy will be discussed. Efficiency in this context means that political goals should be reached with minimal costs. Thus, the first step is to argue why, from an economic point of view, migration should be regulated at all and how. Second, economic analysis will be applied to migration policy-making. Using insights from the 'theory of clubs', national and international implications of migration policies are analysed. This will assist the understanding of why a supra-national framework to regulate international migration might be helpful in balancing the benefits and the controversial negative effects of free international migration. ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION Recently observers have pointed to a policy paradox, that while immigration policies nowadays are restrictive and trade policies liberal, the opposite was 15

ESSAYS the case a century ago. By the middle of the last century, both an anti-trade and an anti-migration legacy was in place. The puzzle stems from the ways in which the two policy regimes evolved, i.e. while a pro-trade policy reversed that legacy, no such reversal took place for immigration polices. From a political economy perspective one explanation for this paradox seems to lie in the spread of democracy and the decline of empires, which radically altered the constraints of international policy-making. Moreover, trade is usually considered a purely economic issue driven by group politics, while migration is viewed as a fundamentally social issue driven by diffuse democratic politics. However, while these arguments are valid, from an economic point of view most of this policy paradox can be explained by three sets of economic questions about the impacts of trade and migration. Only those related to the effects of migration are considered here. The first type of questions are related to the welfare impact of migration for the receiving labour market. Second, questions concerning the fiscal impact of migration are crucial for contemporary social-welfare states. Third, the way in which migration policies evolved over time is fundamentally shaped by the presence or lack of international co-operation. Answers to the first type of questions—i.e. Is migration good or bad? Are immigrants friends or strangers? Is unrestricted international migration positive or negative for the economic development of the sending or the host society? Is it beneficial for the migrants themselves?—differ according to subjective, individual evaluations. However, conditional to the way one approaches these issues, economics delivers a consistent toolkit for systematically answering some of these questions. The static neo-classical model predicts that migration increases economic welfare, because labour can move to wherever its productivity is greatest and thus the income workers can attain is the highest. This assumes mobility from less productive to more productive jobs. Such a process will continue until marginal productivity and thus wages (for the same work) have levelled world-wide. As a result, migration may lead to converging prices of the production factors between countries. In this context, migration acts as an arbiter that overcomes local surpluses or scarcities. In a world with no national borders and no limits to the internationally free movement of labour, migration is welfare improving for the world as a whole. This is one of the clear results of the positive theory of international trade. This is, however, a stylized and highly aggregated cosmopolitan view. The problem with such a perception is that it does not take the distribution of the gains from free migration into account. First, the impacts of international migration will differ according to the level of aggregation. Migration might be 16

The Economics of Migration Policies

welfare improving for the whole world (in a cosmopolitan view). However, when looking at sending and receiving countries separately, the implications might be asymmetric. Sending countries could be worse off after many workers left for working abroad, while the citizens of receiving countries might profit from this new reservoir of labour. Second, even this country-level view has to be refined since, at the individual level, the {micro)economic consequences are not the same for unskilled or skilled workers. Similarly, in this stylized model, capital owners in the receiving countries are gaining from immigration while those in the sending countries lose. The key issue in assessing the effects is whether the migrating labour force substitutes or complements local factors of production. If labour substitutes capital in the sending country, emigration will be neutral for those left behind. If skilled workers complement unskilled in the receiving country, the native workers will gain from immigration. Third, it is to say that macroeconomic effects of international migration vary not only with the level of aggregation, but also with time. The macroeconomic changes induced through migration crucially depend on the stage of economic development (of the sending or receiving country), on the fluctuations of the business cycles (internationally or in the respective countries), and on other non-economic factors which are extremely time variant. If the migration of labour takes place in a context of social change (like the migration from Eastern Europe in Germany post-unification), both public attitudes and policies will provide an environment for migrants which will impact on both their absorption and performance in the labour markets. However, from the perspective of the source country, the impact of return migration will be highly sensitive to the social changes induced by the initial migration: will the migrants return to a dynamic environment in which their work experience abroad is highly valued (like e.g. the returnees to Ireland by the end of the last century), or will they return to a country in a stage of development in which their skills accumulated abroad mismatch the demands of the labour market (as was partly the case of returning Greek guestworkers)? Overall, the impact of migration in the sending and receiving countries depends on different types of economic effects. Migration affects incomes in both emigration and immigration areas through the initial change in the relative availability of labour {quantity effect), through the altered efficiency of production {allocation effect), and through the changes in the relative distribution of output produced (distribution effect). Fourth, migrants' additional contribution to the financing of public services in the country of immigration and the reduction of net tax income in the country of emigration causes public transfer effects. Immigrants compete with the local people for the use of public goods. They have a demand for streets, hospitals and schools. Of course they also contribute to the 17

ESSAYS financing of public goods by their direct income taxes, by their indirect (consumer) taxes and by the payment oí userfees. However, it remains a caseby-case question whether the budget impact of immigrants is positive (i.e. whether they put more into the public coffers than they consume public goods). Finally, migration may alter the terms of trade1 of both countries {trade effects). Another channel to influence the short- to medium-term performance of the economies of countries of origin is opened up by migrants who bring capital with them or send parts of their income to the country of origin {remittances effect). The International Monetary Fund estimates that international migrant remittances have exceeded US $230,000m. in 2005, with $ 167,000m. flowing to developing countries. They were the second-largest source of external financing in developing areas and amounted to more than twice the size of official aid. Remittances have improved creditworthiness and have enhanced access to international capital markets for many developing countries. The effects of international migration on the employment situation in the area of emigration are generally perceived as positive. International migration can be seen as a safety valve for the sending countries' surplus labour. The flipside of the coin, however, is the absence of migration-induced structural changes in the labour markets. Consequently, migration essentially brings about short-term benefits rather than lasting development impacts. In a very simplified world scenario with assumptions such as economically identical people who act individually and independently from each other and with perfectly and fully competitive markets with no common or public goods and no redistribution of income by some taxes or social benefits, migration would be a positive mechanism. These assumptions and the beneficial evaluation of the migration impacts are standard in the so-called neo-classical economic analysis. In this simplified economic model, migration improves the allocation of labour. In the medium term this allows increased exploitation of the advantages of international specialization, which in turn increases aggregate wealth and wages in both locations. The positive evaluation of migration effects is much more complex if we leave the (neo-classical) framework from above. If we allow for unequal distribution of capital (wealthy and poor people), segmented labour markets (skilled and unskilled workers) and unemployment, or if we consider the existence of public goods, free migration of labour could also lead to negative effects—at least for some specific factors or groups. Just to give an example: imagine a blue-collar worker in the German 'Ruhrpot' area. Unlike the welltrained neo-classical economist, he is bound to express concern about 1

The terms of trade are defined as the value of export goods in terms of the value of import goods.

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The Economics of Migration Policies

immigration-induced unemployment, wage reductions and a general deterioration of national welfare. The opposing attitudes result primarily from differences in perspectives. While the economist's enthusiasm is based on the long-term benefits of improved allocation efficiency, the blue-collar worker's fears are based on a short-term, distribution-oriented perspective.2 An evaluation of migration impacts becomes even more complex if we include externalities of migration. In standard textbooks, economists differentiate between pecuniary and non-pecuniary ('technological') externalities.3 The pecuniary externalities of migration should draw attention to the fact that macroeconomic allocation efficiency almost always has some negatively evaluated consequences on an individual microeconomic level. While the (re)allocation effects of migration are clearly positive on the whole, there will be winners and losers in the immigration and emigration countries. To the degree that labour markets are segmented, competition between natives and immigrants for employment opportunities leads to distribution effects within the host country. Those who have invested capital in the immigration economy gain, because labour becomes less scarce and therefore the average wage level will fall and the capital rent will increase. The part of the native labour force that can be regarded as being complementary to the immigrating labour force might reach a higher productivity and could be better off with rather than without migration. However, the other part of the native labour force which is substitutive to the immigrating workers will become more abundant and their average wage level will fall. Finally, it is also possible that an immigrant will push a native out of the labour market and thus make him unemployed.4

2

Economists differentiate between allocation and distribution effects of migration. Allocation has to do with the geographical organization of production. It concerns the macroeconomic efficient mix and use of input-factors. Distribution refers to the different payments to the different factors of production (capital, skilled or unskilled labour). It concerns primarily microeconomic benefits and personal damages that are subject to more or less individual evaluations. 3

Positive externalities are the effects of subjects' actions that positively influence other subjects' actions without them having to do (or pay) anything for it. Pecuniary externalities are well taken by price-quantity market mechanisms. They occur by the competition of different individuals for the same good or factor. If a customer asks for some bread, another customer is affected just by this demand because prices of bread might go up if customers compete with each other. Non-pecuniary or technological externalities are not internalized by the market. They occur in the form of (indirect) spill-over effects on people not directly involved in specific market activities. 4

Most of these pecuniary externalities of immigration tend to be the other way around if we flip the coin and look at the impacts of emigration for the sending countries. Emigration also has (pecuniary) external effects on those left behind, because labour becomes scarcer and capital becomes relatively more abundant. Therefore the capital-labour-ratio increases in the emigration country.

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ESSAYS Of course, theoretically the winners from migration (i.e. the capitalists and the complementary domestic labour force) could more than fully compensate the losers (i.e. the unskilled). It could be argued that in most cases unemployment is the consequence of labour-market inflexibilities, wage rigidities and structural inefficiencies. It could also be convincingly demonstrated that all these deficiencies have not much to do with immigration and that immigrants actually contribute to cure these deficits. A good case could even be made that most of the labour market pressure of 'globalization' stems from the import of foreign goods and services and only partly from cross-border movements of persons. But all these valid arguments in favour of immigration do not outweigh the individual evaluation of those citizens who are directly concerned (the unemployed or the ones crowded out from well-protected jobs into strongly competed jobs or even into unemployment). Their perception is that a world with no immigrants would be a better world!5 In contrast to pecuniary externalities, technological externalities of migration arise if some neo-classical assumptions do not hold. It is a common feature of technological externalities that migration under such conditions has not only distribution, but also allocation implications. Summing up, on theoretical grounds there is a strong argument that the emigration of skilled labour will harm those left behind whereas the emigration of unskilled labour will in contrast be beneficial for the sending country. Depending on the extent to which the production and training of human capital (i.e. schooling and professional or academic education) has been financed by public subsidies, the emigration country loses human capital as soon as skilled or educated people leave their country of origin. This is the socalled brain drain loss of emigration.6 The dynamic analysis of the brain drain phenomenon implies that free movement of labour might increase the tendency towards polarization in economic development, with fast-growing centres and a slow-growing periphery. Actually, this is the polarization effect or vicious circle effect of migration. Centres may acquire absolute economic advantages because geographically concentrated, qualified labour may accumulate knowledge more efficiently and benefit from more learning-by-doing opportunities. Provided such absolute advantages exist, the more favourable conditions within the 5 The fight against immigration led by vested interest groups of people negatively concerned should not really surprise. The losers are a more homogeneous, smaller group with a lot to lose for the single member, while the potential winners are a much more heterogeneous, larger group with a relatively small gain for a single member. 6

The so-called 'brain-drain' discussion about the potentially deteriorating effects of emigration on the development of sending countries has been triggered by the observation that migrants frequently belong to the most highly skilled of their societies.

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The Economics of Migration Policies economic centres allow highly-qualified labour to be more efficient and productive than in the periphery. As a result, skilled workers may experience large wage increases by migrating to such centres. Because the centres' advantageous economic position is due to endowments of human-capitalintensive labour and location of knowledge-intensive production, immigration of highly qualified labour may increase wage differentials. A dynamic process would then lead to more and more emigration from the lower developed regions to the higher developed core. The migration of highly skilled labour might provoke a divergence dynamics between the centre and the periphery (the so called 'Mezzogiorno Problem' that happened in Italy with a relatively wealthy northern and a relatively poor southern region). Unless policy measures are introduced to offset the effects of migration of skilled workers, polarization effects may become self-sustaining and peripheral regions may find it very difficult to recover economically. There is a wide range of economic literature analysing the effects of migration on economic growth in sending and receiving countries. The theory reaches from neo-classical static models (explaining short-term growth effects), neo-classical growth models (that determine longrun growth rates by exogenous elements) and finally endogenous growth models. The last ones were developed in the last 20 years and explain longterm growth effects on the basis of the average skill level in the economy, human capital accumulation and human capital employment in research and development. Finally, there are some hardly correctable prejudices and myths about noneconomic externalities of migration. Some natives dislike more or less arbitrarily and subjectively the presence of foreigners. They (emotionally) feel negatively touched by some so-called social externalities of foreigners in their utility function.7 Consequently they lobby against foreigners even if immigrants would create positive economic benefits to the economy as a whole. Negative perceptions of immigration are also combined with regard to the impacts of immigrants on public coffers. Whether immigration is a financial relief or a burden for the social distribution system of the host country is not clear at all. Central to this point are the contributions of immigrants to social security and distribution systems and the amount of social security and welfare benefits migrants receive. The issue of 'who is financing or subsidizing whom' can therefore only be estimated empirically. But, the empirical 7 Social externalities of migration are a more or less completely arbitrary individual evaluation of personal feelings about immigrants. Consequently, they are hardly (if at all) measurable or comparable. 'Social externalities' is the term some economists use to encompass phenomena ranging from urban crowding to xenophobia.

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ESSAYS results are not clear-cut at all. Again economic business cycles, changes in politics and other non-economic factors make the impacts of immigration on public coffers extremely time variant. Furthermore, whether tax and social security payments of immigrants (government revenue) are set off against monetary and real transfer receipts (government expenditure) is very sensitive to the migration policy and to the process of selecting immigrants. It is obvious that the contribution of immigrants to the public coffers is the higher the younger and better educated they are and the worse, the more humanitarian arguments have been the reason for immigration. To summarize, we see that within a theoretical world of neo-classical models, migration is & positive arbitrage phenomenon. However, the more we relax the neo-classical assumptions (either by good theoretical reasons or by empirical evidence), we might see that migration does not lead to economic convergence, but rather to divergence between sending and receiving areas. Without political corrections, free movement of persons might lead to a polarized development process, with rich centres and poor peripheries. Consequently, it is wise to think about interventions that could avoid such an outcome of international migration. ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION The 20th century was the century of national migration policies. Nation states all over the globe have initiated rules and regulations to discriminate between members (citizens, nationals) and non-members (aliens, foreigners). It has become and is an undisputed basic principle of international law that national governments have the sovereignty to decide whom and how many nonnationals or non-citizens they allow to enter, to stay and to work within their territory. Ronald Reagan pointed out the strength of border controls very strongly by saying that 'a nation without borders is not a nation'. Nation states would lose one of their most fundamental constitutive rights if they resigned to set rules about what aliens are allowed to do (rights), what they are required to do (duties) or what they should do (orders). Consequently, politicians all over the world are very anxious to maintain control over entrance, residence and economic behaviour of non-nationals. They know exactly that their voters would just not like the idea of a migration policy that opens widely the doors to entry. 'Nation', 'Citizenship' and 'Community' are extremely sensitive values of human life. Being a member of a nation state is something very valuable. This is one reason why people are not willing to share their community with everybody and why they do not stand for open-door migration policies. Basically, national migration policies consist of combinations of regulations 22

The Economics of Migration Policies in four different areas which all influence the labour-market performance of immigrants: Entry rules influencing the selection of immigrants; exit and reentrance regulations for immigrants considering return; rules that regulate access to the labour market and allow foreigners to move or prevent them from moving from one employer to another or from one industry or region to another and policy measures targeted at the integration of migrants in the host society. Migration policies, and the rules of entry in particular, are important variables influencing the magnitude, the composition, and the direction of international migration. National migration policies on entrance may be liberal {'laissez-faire'), actively recruiting or restrictive. If it is restrictive, selection may be market-based or administrated. Selection criteria of administrated regulations may be economically motivated or undertaken on humanitarian or other policy-determined grounds. Economically motivated, selective entrance administration policies can be directed by actual demand of employers in the host country or by certain individual socio-economic features of migrants, such as education or occupation. The way exit and reentrance regulations are set either encourages or hampers return migration. Immigrants may be given support to return or incentives to stay. To the extent that re-entrance after return migration is difficult, immigrants lose acquired rights when returning. This creates incentives to stay even if immigrants become unemployed. Policy measures targeted at economic and political integration of immigrants on the one hand increase migrants' prospects to perform well in the immigrant society and on the labour market. On the other hand, they also reduce incentives to return and make immigrants more likely to stay even if they do not succeed in the host country's labour market. A country's choice of (active or passive) integration policy usually depends on whether its policy favours permanent or temporary migration. Policies to promote integration of immigrants may include, for example, language and cultural courses, access to vocational training, foreign enrolment in education, provision of housing grants, rights to stay, rights and encouragement of political participation and last but not least a country's naturalization policy. FROM NATIONAL TO MULTINATIONAL REGULATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION In today's globalized world, the concept of'nation' and 'citizenship' becomes much more blurred than ever before. Societies are confronted with tendencies towards individualization. More and more, the frontiers of economic relationships and emotional 'community' do not correspond with national territories. Solidarity and social responsibility can hardly be enforced any more by institutions such as (national) governments. People would just leave territories 23

ESSAYS when and where they feel they are being exploited by excessive governmental power. And the new dimension of globalization is that mobile factors of production can fulfil their wishes. They are enabled to search world-wide for locations which promise a maximum of life quality and a high standard of living. 'Globalization' might be the (macro)economic counterpart of (micro)sociological 'individualization'. It loosens traditional social obligations and provides people with a much higher degree of independence. It weakens the power of institutions and strengthens the position of the individual. The power of 'voting with one s feet ' rises and it protects increasingly individuals from governmental arbitrariness and discrimination. The possibility to leave generates a sort of permanent direct international democracy (of course only if there are other countries willing to accept emigrants as immigrants). In the view of mobile people, 'nation states' can be seen as 'clubs' * Like clubs, nation states compete for high-potential members. They have to offer attractive 'club facilities ' to catch and keep mobile people. They have to produce a bundle of common 'club' goods and offer them to their citizens for taxes, fees and direct payments. National governments have to provide efficiently (i.e. with minimal costs) those club goods which are being demanded by the majority of the club members (i.e. voters of national governments). The use of such goods is tied to certain conditions which are again set by the majority of the club members (i.e. citizens) and might be formalized in club rules (called constitutions, national laws or regulations). The analogy of 'nations' as 'clubs' gains special interest by looking at the admission procedure for new members. The access to (national) citizenship follows administrative rules as the jus sanguinis or the jus solis principle or specific bureaucratic selections. Citizenship gives more or less free and guaranteed access to all sorts of monetary and real transfers provided by nation states. These include all kinds of social networks, but also the use of socalled public goods. The financing of public services goes over direct and indirect taxes, fees and other contributions. 8

Theclub theory provides an evident framework to sharpen thoughts about the target of economic policy-making in a globalizing environment. The club theory complements the theory of 'pure' public goods. Club goods are distinguished from private goods by their general non-rivalry in consumption within a specific capacity (in this regard they are similar to public goods). However, after the capacity has been reached, they might be subject to congestion costs. But contrary to public goods (and similar to private goods), individuals (non-members) may be excluded from the consumption of club goods. Nations might be seen as territory-bounded clubs of people who share a certain homogeneity in their preferences. Using an available geographical endowment with fixed local attributes immobile club members have to offer complementary goods and services to attract and keep mobile parts of the value-added chain (especially skilled workers and capital). A successful club will try to maximize the per capita value of club members.

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The Economics of Migration Policies In the club analogy, citizenship becomes equivalent to a 'club '-membership. However, access rules to a 'club' follow fewer emotions but more economic rationality than access to a 'nation'. The 'golden rule' stipulates that new members should be allowed to enter and stay if their marginal contribution to the financing of the club goods (fees, positive external effects) is larger than their marginal (congestion) costs for the old members. It might now become more obvious why voters do just not appreciate an unrestricted immigration policy: immigrants and citizens basically compete for common national club goods and for pieces of the national redistribution cake. The effects of immigration on common national club goods turn out to be even more explosive if natives are crowded out from the use of the common club goods—what might be the case in social housing, basic medical treatment, recreation areas or public places (these effects might be called congestion or negative agglomeration effects). The situation is quite comparable to normal clubs, such as sporting clubs, etc. These would also not give free access to their facilities to new members. A large increase in the costs for common (national) club goods is mostly caused by the more intensive use and a corresponding rise in maintenance costs or by additional, necessary capital investment due to a newly immigrating population (demographic capital-widening). In such a case the old members will significantly increase the admittance fee to the 'club'. New members are accepted as far as marginal benefits of immigration (positive external spill-over effects, taxes, fees or other contributions to the financing of the common club goods) are evaluated to be higher than the marginal costs of new members (measured in negative external or congestion effects on old members). If potential new members' characteristics are very profitable and dwarf the additional costs from migration, a monetary incentive to join the club and to improve its welfare should even be given. Actually, we see such financial incentives to attract mobile factors in the case of foreign direct investments by multinational companies already. Such capital inflows are subsidized by cheap complementary immobile factors, such as real estate or by a waiver of taxation. Most of the club good effects described for the immigration country are mirrored in the sending country. Emigration countries lose some of their club members. This is economically harmless or even positive as far as emigrants have been unemployed. Then an old question remains still valid: is the most effective use to make of existing labour to employ it abroad, or to leave it unemployed at home? The emigration of unemployed, underemployed or easily replaced workers, who consume more than they produce, frees a part of the national income for alternative use. It saves the sending country the current and future social support of people not contributing to the national 25

ESSAYS product. Therefore, it leaves the national product unchanged, while the average product per capita of those remaining will rise. A great controversy exists about the appropriateness of these expectations on the positive labour-market effects of emigration. Briefly, it can be shown by most empirical evidence that emigrants are typically younger, better educated, less risk-averse and more achievement-oriented than the average population in the sending areas. Therefore, the assumption has a high probability that emigrants had been employed and that their marginal product was higher than the average product (that means that emigration lowers the average income per capita of those left behind). To the extent that (formerly employed) emigrants cannot be fully replaced by unemployed persons, emigration has a negative impact. This loss is even higher when the emigrants have generated positive externalities (this means that their private earnings have been lower than their social value added). For example: if a medical doctor leaves a hospital in India to go to the USA, the whole hospital might be in danger and the nurses, assistants, and even the bed-makers might lose their jobs because the key factor (i.e. the surgeon) is missing. Clubs losing their (best) members cannot survive economically in the long term, especially if the emigrants are the net payers (i.e. the rather younger, better qualified, skilled specialists and managers). So, emigration countries are challenged to keep their brightest minds. They have to avoid a brain drain and to offer attractive local club goods (low taxes and cheap complementary factors of production, such as infrastructure, construction sites, good business opportunities). The club analogy of nation states may be considered unrealistic. However, all over the world nation states regulate international migration according to their interests. Emigration countries have tried to keep their skilled citizens back home, immigration countries have tried to avoid front door immigration of lower qualified people, i.e. the legal entrance and residence of new members with a high probability of being net receivers of common club goods. In a world with national migration regimes, the varying strategies differ significantly. We find immigration barriers for some people (i.e. unskilled workers) and emigration restrictions for other people (i.e. skilled workers) and finish far from the unrestricted internationally free movement of people. But these nationally divided club policies lead to a polarized development and a sub-optimal human capital production. The countries of emigration might not invest as many public means in education and human capital production because they are afraid of the loss by a brain drain. The countries of immigration might have incentives for relatively low(er) human capital investments because they could profit from the brain drain and import human capital that has been publicly subsidized elsewhere. 26

The Economics of Migration Policies

Especially with regard to the lower skilled international movements of persons, immigration policies in the higher developed countries are largely (too) restrictive and (too) defensive. It is a common phenomenon that the restrictive attitude against blue-collar immigration is not very successful. In almost all major industrialized democracies a wide and growing gap between the goals of national immigration policy and the actual outcomes emerges. This 'gap hypothesis' of declining efficacy of immigration policies has been supported empirically for nine industrialized democracies. Very often national migration policies act according to a short-term 'muddling through' behaviour. This is mainly due to the fact that politicians for tactical reasons have to protect first the interests of their voters (i.e. the citizens). This often makes it necessary (from their view) to act immediately in favour of some vested interest groups.9 National politics has become more and more ineffective for a rising number of political and economic topics. The main reason for the failure of national migration policies is the loss of effective competence to control today's migration flows on a national level. Once national governments close the front door of legal immigration more or less strictly, most of the entrances happened through the side (asylum-seekers, refugees, family reunion) or back door (illegals). In many cases the petition for asylum constitutes a substitute for the stopping of legal, economically motivated immigration. Similarly, illegal immigration has been a response to the demand of the labour markets for cheap unqualified occupations that are not met by the domestic labour force for several reasons (regulations, minimum wages, insufficient qualifications). The inefficiency and inefficacy of national migration policies has made it more than obvious that an independent procedure by single nation states is no longer adequate. In a world with declining costs for international movements, 'national' clubs come under increasing pressure. Independently designed and performed national migration policies become more and more unfeasible. The fundamental challenge is that territory-bounded 'national' clubs are not transaction costs minimizing institutional solutions any more. They are replaced by functional' clubs. These new and sometimes spontaneous arrangements beyond nation states occur in many dimensions. In politics supranational organizations (such as the European Union) or international organizations (such as the UN) take over national competence. The WTO, the 9 National migration policies are the result of a complex political-economic powerplay. The players belong to the governments, the national bureaucracies and the political parties and all of them try to maximize their vested group-specific or individual interests. Without going into detail about the theory of the rent-seeking process of politicians, bureaucrats and lobbyist groups within the political process, we could take it as a rule of thumb that restrictions on immigration find the more political support the worse the current economic situation is.

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ESSAYS IMF and the World Bank and other international agreements replace national laws and regulations. In a microeconomic perspective, multinational firms try to internalize efficiently the advantages of globalization. In close neighbourhood to national borders, 'functional' local cross-border arrangements rule the daily life problems of commuting, environmental protection, waste dumping or medical treatment. What is labelled as 'globalization'—i.e. the increasing openness of goods and factor markets and the higher mobility of people— urges the political circles to react properly. Policies bound to their national territories are not sufficiently able to regulate activities with external effects that overlap several countries. What is needed is a supranational framework to balance the basic allocation benefits of free international migration with the controversial distribution and external effects of cross-border movements.

CONCLUSIONS There are good reasons to see international migration as an economically positive phenomenon. It helps to smooth business cycles. Emigration might decrease a labour-market surplus in one region and immigration might fill a need in some other areas. So, in most of the cases international migration is an arbitrage process. As such it is welfare improving and helps to reach an optimal allocation of production (or at least: a better one than without migration). In this regard, international migration generates the same such positive results as trade in goods and services or a free flow of capital. Under certain conditions, international migration might not produce the expected positive outcome. If relatively highly skilled people emigrate, those left behind will suffer from a brain drain. On the other hand, areas that are already confronted with surplus labour are not keen to receive additional workers who might increase further the problem of unemployment. Here lies the fundamental difference between migration, trade in goods or services or capital flows. Migration involves people and not only goods or anonymous factors of production. Furthermore, migration provokes diametrically opposed interests in sending and receiving areas: emigration countries prefer to export unskilled, unemployed workers to get rid of some labour-market pressure. But they are keen to keep their brightest minds in order to receive at least some social returns from former public investments in human capital. Immigration countries prefer to import skilled, human capital-rich workers. They hope that the local workforce could profit easily and cheaply from the knowledge and skills that highly qualified specialists from abroad bring with them. But they are very restrictive to the entrance, stay and work of lower qualified foreigners who would substitute local workers. 28

The Economics of Migration Policies

In view of these diverging national interests, we can recognize good reasons which justify an international framework for cross-border movements of people. It should intend to bring at least some convergence in the otherwise diametrically opposed national migration policies of sending and receiving countries. Otherwise, if we stay with national policies, we might end up with economically inefficient national interventions that restrict much too strongly the free entry and free exit of people. A General Agreement on Movements of People (GAMP) should be directed towards a liberalization of international cross-border movements, but should provide an instrument to internalize externalities provoked by international migration. In the last few years, the discussion about the need for a new international regime for migration has gained momentum. The NIROMP (New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People) study group has introduced a new international migration regime based on three central pillars: the establishment of a set of shared objectives; the development of an agreed and internationally harmonized normative framework to ensure coherence of action at national, regional and global levels; and the setting-up of a coordinated institutional arrangement, including a monitoring mechanism. The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) has taken up at least some of these ideas by analysing the options of an international regime for mobility and security. In its final report the GCIM proposes the immediate establishment of a high-level inter-institutional group to define the functions and modalities of, and pave the way for, an Inter-agency Global Migration Facility. This Facility should ensure a more coherent and effective institutional response to the opportunities and challenges presented by international migration. These opportunities and challenges are increasing. They need good internationally co-ordinated responses. Further Reading Dustmann, Ch., and Glitz, A. Immigration, Jobs and Wages: Theory, Evidence and Opinion. CEPR, 2005. Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2005): Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action. Final Report. Geneva. Hatton, T. J., and Williamson, J. G. Global Migration and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2005. IOM (International Organization for Migration): World Migration 2005 (Costs and Benefits of International Migration). Geneva, 2005.

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What Causes Migration? Poverty or Development? Or is it the Other Way Around? ARJAN DE HAAN

WHY DO VIEWS ON MIGRATION DIFFER? There are few topics in the study of development that are as controversial as migration, with greatly varying views on what causes it and what its impacts are. For decades, academic study and policy-makers have been divided on these issues. This polarization of views is reflected, for example, within the World Bank, where fairly recently there has been an enormous surge in interest in (international) migration and remittances. On the one hand there is an assumption that movement of labour—as part of a well-functioning, integrated labour market—would lead to the elimination of disparities and equalization of development. There are economic, technological and demographic reasons why labour mobility and migration flows across borders could and should be much larger than at present. In line with this optimism, World Bank analysts have begun to quantify the impact of migration and remittances on poverty. One conclusion indicated that the level of poverty would be reduced if the number of migrants was higher. It has been estimated that poverty could be reduced by 2% if the number of migrants increased by 10%. International remittances too are shown to have a strong impact on reducing poverty. But this optimism is by no means shared. For example, it is stressed that the long-lasting phenomenon of temporary labour migration, such as by Gastarbeiter in West Germany (from Turkey, for example), has not stimulated development in the sending regions. It is not impossible for such migration to be beneficial, but in many cases the 'best and brightest' are over-represented among migrants, although migration often also acts as a safety valve to relieve social pressures. Not all analysts agree that the positive impact of remittances has been well established, and it has been noted that migration carries significant risks and cost, and does not always reduce disparities as intended by the migrants. Debates on 'brain drain', and more recently on 'brain gain', similarly highlight the widely diverging views. Concerns about brain drain have emphasized that international migration leads to loss of human capital, 30

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particularly its most skilled population (who often received large public subsidies in their education). Over the last decades, moreover, international migration has become increasingly selective, reflecting changed demands for labour in richer countries, reinforcing trends towards increasing inequality between migrants and non-migrants. On the other hand, there are the potential benefits of this form of migration, and indeed internationally there are attempts to harness the potential of diaspora communities. For example, Nigeria's central bank has initiated a collaborative research programme for its diaspora. In India, since the period of liberalization of the 1990s, the government has made attempts to extend benefits and attract investment by Non Resident Indians (NRI), and more recently Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) which extend these facilities to descendants of Indian citizens. The liberalizing economies of China and Viet Nam have for a long time relied on investments by their diasporas and their networks. Beneficial effects could include remittances, return migration, creation of trade and business networks, and incentive effects on human capital formation and technology diffusion at home. Research on these questions comes to different conclusions, including—and this will be discussed further below—that the impacts may for example be larger for bigger countries with a smaller proportion of migrants. Studies on links between development and migration have focused on international migration. This surge has been spurred, partly by hopes for migration to contribute to development 'at home', by global security concerns particularly since 9/11, and the perception that migrants are central in addressing labour-market constraints in OECD countries, following technological and demographic changes with growing populations in the sending countries and declining or ageing ones in Western industrialized countries. But the questions are equally important at a national level, i.e. for internal migration. In respect of national migration, views on its importance, causes and impacts have been equally diverse, and government policies have varied from strict controls on population movements (as in China) and forced resettlement (e.g. in Ethiopia), to by and large official neglect of the existence of significant migration (as often in India), to a recognition that management of migration streams is key for development (as in China, relatively recently)—though the latter has received very little attention. SOME THEORIES OF MIGRATION AND HOW THEY SEE THE LINK WITH DEVELOPMENT Theories of migration are usually categorized in a similar way to those of development more generally, i.e. modernization theories, Marxism, and 31

ESSAYS dependency theory. They can further be classified according to the extent to which they emphasize economic and non-economic variables, and individual versus institutional or structural variables.

Individual Motives and Job Lottery Earlier theories of migration tried to explain volumes of migration, e.g. by reference to distance as the determinant of migration. During the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis shifted towards the motives of migrants from rural areas moving to cities. Migration was seen as a combination of 'push' and 'pull' factors. A prospective migrant was thought to weigh the difference between the expected earnings from formal-sector urban employment, an initial period of informal-sector employment, against the expected earnings in the village. Rural-urban migration would assist in providing labour for the urban economy, and reduce wage differences between urban and rural areas. This dualistic model of migration draws heavily on the surplus-labour model, focused on rural-urban migration, in which non-agricultural employment increases without real wages rising initially, until surplus labour is absorbed. But this model may have contributed to ignoring forms of migration that are at least as important as those related to 'modernization', particularly rural-rural migration (towards intensified agriculture, or rural non-agricultural activities). It has contributed to concepts of labour markets focusing on moves out of agriculture. This has made it less relevant for discussions of migration in large parts of the global South, at least the parts where urbanization has remained low (in much of Africa and South Asia), or for periods where returns to rural areas have dominated, often during economic crises, including the East Asia crisis of 1997-98, and in many 'transition countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Further, its focus on clearly differentiated markets makes it less suitable for the analysis of situations where the markets for labour (migration) are intertwined with markets for goods, for example when migration is for the sale of goods. Finally, the focus on individual incentives makes it suitable for use in individualistic types of poverty analysis, but has arguably removed it from its origin in debates on economic and societal transformations. More recently there has been greater emphasis on family and family strategies as crucial elements in migration decisions. The 'new economics of migration' emphasizes the family as unit of analysis. The family is seen as a coalition vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Family members share the costs and rewards of migration, and migration is seen as a form of contract: families invest in migrants, migrants invest in families, and both are expecting returns 32

What Causes Migration? Poverty or Development? from that. Its focus remains on the economic motives of families and their migrants. Economic models have also tried to explain remittance behaviour. These remittances act as insurance contracts between the migrant and the household left behind, as a means of coping with household risk. Migration and remittances are seen as a form of portfolio diversification, where options to receive remittances are weighed against what would be earned if the prospective migrant does not leave. A related model builds on the bequest motive: remittances are seen as investments in household assets that the migrant will later inherit. This is supported by analysis of differences in remittance behaviour between men and women, and by the influence that the right to inheritance has on women's remittances (they may send more money home if they have the right to inheritance). Using household rather than individuals as the central unit of analysis appears appropriate. It is much more in line with much sociological, anthropological and 'livelihoods' evidence. Also, it is much better placed to take account of the fact that much if not most migration is 'circular'—i.e. constituting continued interactions with areas of origins rather than a oneway and one-off move. However, while this unit of analysis is more promising than that of the individual in the job lottery, the new economics remains firmly grounded in an individualistic economic framework. Migration is seen primarily in terms of its economic function. Such theories do not pay much attention to non-economic factors that drive migration decisions. They also take households as given, while in fact migration is key to what constitutes a household, who belongs to it, and who does not, and how such norms influence patterns of migration. Migration is seen as solutions to market failures, emphasizing a functionality of migration that can provide only a very partial explanation of the actual movements of people, and how these impact on broader processes of development. Migration as 'Structured' For a broader understanding of migration and how it links to development processes we have to move largely—it seems—outside economics. Alternative explanations are manifold, including the view that social institutions structure migration, and critical theories that have linked migration to capitalist and colonial development. Many experts emphasize the way in which migration and social and other institutions are linked. They see migration decisions as part of continuing efforts, consistent with traditional values, to solve recurrent problems, often but not only related to resource scarcity. Migration processes are seen as 33

ESSAYS 'embedded' in social relations, rather than as a disruption or unravelling of social relations and norms. Finally, a focus on migration networks has played an important role in helping to see movements of people as a part not only of 'traditions of migration' but also as wider processes of social and economic development. Gender analysis has contributed greatly to broadening the understanding of migration. It has emphasized the need for a recognition of differentiated motivations for and impacts of migration, that men and women may migrate for different reasons and in different modalities (women are often seen as dependent despite their independent economic roles) and how migration may affect women staying behind. The impact of gender analysis has gone beyond emphasizing gender differences, and has helped to broaden an understanding of migration as processes which are structured by societal relations such as power and exploitation. Many explanations of the migration-development links have been from critical and Marxist perspectives. Southern African analyses, for example, have been engaged in continued debate about migration and its relations with apartheid, uneven capitalist development and rural change. Partly in the context of urbanization and the informal sector, but also with focus on movement of migrant workers within rural areas, these critical studies explicitly challenged the individualistic assumptions underlying earlier models. They have described migration as an inevitable part of the transition towards capitalism, and emphasized how employers often have tried to promote migration to undermine the bargaining power and organization of local labour. Similarly, international migration and remittances have been analysed in the context of advantages for global capital and richer nations, although their role in rising inequalities is disputed. Marxist models can be criticized for focusing exclusively on economic factors, in their case of exploitation. It is clear that some of the questions that seem pertinent for neo-classical models are also relevant for Marxist or structural models. In reality migration processes can be understood adequately only as the outcome of interactions of a diversity of factors, including social-cultural influences as well as economic forces, gendered norms and rules, and how migration in turn alters these.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS Even though large questions remain, and theories continue to differ, much knowledge does exist about the links between migration and development. This section gives a brief overview of the empirical knowledge about the 34

What Causes Migration? Poverty or Development?

migration-development relationship, divided into five sets of questions or issues. Who Migrates and Who Does Not? A first key question regarding the migration-development relationship is: who migrates? Characteristics of migrants reflect labour-demand structures and are important for the way migration affects livelihoods of families. Labour migration is usually by the young and 'able-bodied'. Migrants are often men, but by no means exclusively: gender patterns of migration relate to a range of political, economic and social conditions, and, globally, female migration has been on the increase. Migrants' backgrounds are varied. First of all, it is important to stress that the diversity of migrants often is at least as large as among the non-migrant population—which should be a warning against efforts to generalize. Different migrants have different motives. For some migration is an accumulation strategy, of improving economic and often social status. Saving for dowries is an important motive for female migrants in western Africa, and in other cases too migration may be linked to a particular period in the life-cycle. For the poorest, it tends to be a survival strategy: migration for the least-remunerating opportunities, often entailing reinforcement of exploitative structures like debt-bondage relationships. Such variations in characteristics depend on economic, political as well as cultural circumstances—changing over time, partly under the influence of migration itself. Migrants often are not the poorest or least skilled in areas of origin. Historical studies in India, for example, showed that sons of landowners were among the first to migrate to cities, and recent studies in India also showed that often the poorest were not able to make the move to cities— though they do migrate, but often towards the least rewarding opportunities. Similarly, a recent report by the United Nations' Global Commission on International Migration (see Further Reading at the end of this chapter for details) presented comprehensive evidence that international migrants from the South tend to be highly skilled. Nearly one in 10 tertiary-educated adults born in the developing world lives in North America, Australia or Western Europe, and between one-third and one-half of the developing world's science and technology experts live in the developed world. About 40% of all African professionals left in the post-colonial period. Indians working in the USA on working visas accounted for 30% of the Indian software labour force; and Jamaica loses about 20% of its specialist nurses annually, mainly to the USA or the United Kingdom. Proportions of tertiary-educated people amongst emigrants from some developing countries are much higher than those in the 35

ESSAYS resident population. In India, for example, 80% of emigrants have a tertiary education, while only 2.5% of the overall Indian population has this level of education. In the Philippines the migration rate for doctors is as high as 60% and that of IT professionals 30%-50% per year. This exodus of skilled workers may have an adverse impact on productivity and wages in developing countries, and could increase international inequalities and thus aggravate the very problems which caused the initial emigration. The effect which migration by highly trained professionals has on many developing countries is particularly noticeable in the health sector. The absence of key workers can adversely affect the general health situation and seriously threaten the delivery of health services. In Ghana, for example, which is estimated to have lost 50% of its nurses to the USA, the United Kingdom and Canada in the last decade, even a rise in the amount spent on the health sector of almost 30% in recent years has not made up for this loss. But migration by the highly skilled does not necessarily have a negative impact on the sender country or regions. Emigration can relieve economic and social pressures in areas with an over-supply of highly educated people. In the Philippines the unemployment rate for graduates in general is high (ranging from 12% to 16% in the 1990s). In Kerala in India—which has generally high levels of education but no concomitant job opportunities—migration to other parts of India and to the Gulf greatly contributes to the economy. In other words, if local labour markets do not absorb highly educated workers, migration is not necessarily a direct loss to the economy, especially when remittances, return migration, the creation of trade and business networks and incentive effects on human capital formation at home are taken into account. Does Development Reduce Migration? One conclusion of the above must be that 'pull' factors are widely relevant in explaining national as well as international migration movements. There are some doubts about the responsiveness of migrants from poorer areas, and there is evidence of a 'migration hump', suggesting that after initial migration the volume of migration first rapidly increases before reaching a saturation point. But most experience indicates that migrants do move in reaction to newly developing opportunities. However, there is much controversy about the relationship between migration and development in the areas of origin. Earlier migration models identified the less-developed areas as likely candidates for migration. Crisis in areas of origin tends to be associated with increased migration. Many development specialists have argued for rural development to reduce migration pressures. But empirical studies show a very diverse picture of reasons 36

What Causes Migration? Poverty or Development? for out-migration. As mentioned, people from the poorest areas often do not have access to job opportunities in urban areas or abroad—though they may migrate to activities nearby, for seasonal agricultural and less-rewarding work. Moreover, much evidence shows that development in areas of origin usually goes hand-in-hand with migration. Expectations that rural development will decrease out-migration may be unjustified (though it is likely to change the conditions of migration and composition of the migrants): poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy. For example, in the Punjab, the Green Revolution occurred simultaneously with both high rates of out-migration as well as in-migration from poorer Indian states, and in China the development of rural enterprises appeared to increase rates of outmigration. It is impossible to envisage development without migration: for example, while Japan was modernizing emigration was increasing. Networks A further important element for the understanding of migration-development links is 'networks' of migration streams. Migration streams, international and national alike, tend to be strongly 'segmented': migrants tend to come from specific areas, such as Sylhet in Bangladesh. Migration patterns are also structured by social divides, such as caste in India, religion, or ethnicity in Viet Nam. As mentioned above, while migrants are not necessarily the poorest from rural areas—better-off people may pave the way for migrants with fewer resources. As mentioned above, in Indian villages, the sons of wealthy landlords and others were the first to migrate for government service or education, taking along their servants and thus starting a pattern of internal migration among the less well-off. In international migration too networks play a vital role, particularly because the transaction costs of international moves can be high. The networks provide first contacts, information, accommodation and help with employment for new arrivals in the destination country. They also play an important role in maintaining the contact between the sender and receiving countries: networks can give vital support in areas of origin (see 'remittances' below), and can help people staying behind to retain control of migrants. They often sustain an emerging pattern of circular migration where migrants, rather than settling permanently abroad, work for a period of time in a developed country and then return home, possibly to migrate temporarily again at a later stage. This has several advantages in that temporary migrants are often more acceptable to the host societies, and return migration means that the sending country can benefit from skills learnt by the migrant and that human capital is 37

ESSAYS not lost. Indeed, returning migrants with overseas experience can be vital to the growth and success of the sector they left and returned to. Effects of Migration Evidence on the effects of migration is controversial. With respect to international migration and receiving countries, the consensus seems to be that immigration has improved economic welfare, including raising tax revenue— given restrictive immigration policies this is unsurprising as receiving countries allow mainly people with skills for which there is an excess demand in the labour market. There is evidence in both North and South that employers can attract migrants in order to reduce the wages and bargaining powers of local workers. However, most research seems to contradict the popular belief that immigration contributes to unemployment, or substantial decreases in wages in host societies, (see also 'The Economics of Migration Policies' in this volume). Less clarity exists about the effect of migration on the development of areas of origin, including in agriculture. Few studies trace the effects of migration on villages of origin, even in areas with long traditions of out-migration. There is evidence that migrants contribute to the building of schools or other community activities, and that migration can help to alleviate unemployment (see 'remittances' below). At the same time, out-migration can lead to a shortage of specific types of labour. For example, in villages in Jiangsu, Anhui, Sichuan, and Gansu Provinces in China, where out-migration was caused by land scarcity and rising costs of agriculture, migration caused a shortage of labour. In Europe historically, and the South, there are cases of innovation by migrants, and contributions to the modernization of the rural sector, both directly and indirectly. Similarly, there are many stories of the role of returning migrants in Africa, for example in building schools. But such positive impacts appear to depend on many factors, such as government policies, seasonality of movement, educational levels, length of time spent away, assets, and social structures and institutions allowing women and others to pursue activities previously reserved for men and household heads. Furthermore, while most analysis of migration focuses on the period when migration was relatively recent, its impacts can be long-term, and fortunes can reverse. An important example of this is the likelihood that migration opportunities decline. On the one hand, areas of origin function as a safety valve, as seen in Indonesia during the 1997-98 financial and economic crisis and in many transition countries when many migrants returned to their areas of origin. Other assessments, for example on the effect of changing South 38

What Causes Migration? Poverty or Development?

African policies on migrant communities in Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland are less positive. Generally optimistic views about the effects of oscillating labour migration in the region contrast with those which emphasize the effects of declining migration on households in rural Swaziland where limited employment possibilities exist. Relatively young households, with few working members, and a weak economic position, are among the most vulnerable in this context. There are also the negative effects of sudden barriers to international migration, such as the Gulf War, which had an enormous impact on sending countries. In general, thus, the knowledge of the impact of migration is relatively limited. This is partly due to the absence of panel data, on the way migration and remittances are recorded in general surveys, or longer-term field research in areas of origin. But the question is also theoretically difficult, as the assessments of impact should take account of the counter-factual, i.e. of what would have happened had migrants not left and contributed to development at home. In any case, the evidence shows that migration can have positive impacts, but that these are by no means guaranteed. Remittances Central in much of the thinking on the impact of migration has been the question of remittances, one of the new 'development mantras'. Again, findings differ: economic theories have different interpretations of remittances and data are difficult to interpret. Internal remittances have received less attention than international transfers, but are arguably of equal if not higher importance. An overview of the importance of rural non-farm income in Africa (covering 25 case studies) gives an idea of the magnitude and how this differs across locations. On average, 45% of total rural income was non-farm, differing between 22% and 93%. In areas not close to major cities, migration earnings constituted 20% of total non-farm earnings, whereas they accounted for as much as 75% in areas close to major cities. Studies in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi showed that the reduction of dependence on agriculture is a key way out of poverty, but that remittances played only a small part in this. Thus, across Africa about a quarter of total rural incomes may be derived from migration, but with wide variations, greatly depending on locations, and with different importance for different socio-economic groups. Recent analyses of international migration tend to focus on macroeconomic perspectives. According to official records, international remittances amounted to more than US $ 100,000m. annually; according to some sources even double that. According to the World Bank, remittances are approximately double the size of net official finance and are rising relative to Foreign 39

ESSAYS Direct Investment (FDI). Remittances are particularly important in certain regions and countries. In absolute terms Mexico, India and the Philippines are the largest recipients. But in relative terms they are particularly important and increasing in Latin America and the Caribbean, where remittances now exceed the combined flows of all FDI and net Overseas Development Assistance. Latin America and South Asia take the biggest share of remittances, while sub-Saharan Africa receives only 4% of total remittances. Remittances are particularly important for small countries with large diasporas. In some countries they represent as much as one-third of GDR Remittances represent an important source of income and foreign-exchange earnings for many countries, especially those with foreign-exchange controls. Apart from the financial benefits, they have the additional advantage of being less volatile than private capital flows and may even rise in times of recession and thus help stimulate vulnerable economies and those with little overseas investment. However, as migrants do not necessarily come from the poorest areas, it is not clear that they reach the poorest areas, and whether they do so more than official development assistance, for example. Knowledge about those who send remittances is fairly limited. Migrants seem motivated by a sense of responsibility for their home countries and consider sending donations as normal. Thus, seven out of 10 Latino migrants in the USA report that they send remittances at least once a year and 85% of Zimbabweans surveyed in South Africa and the United Kingdom said they remitted money. Remittances are mostly sent to close relatives and usually in small amounts (around US $200-$300 for US-Latin American remittances). Transfers are likely to be highest from temporary migrants whose links with their countries of origin are still close. However, they decline over time for permanent migrants, though a substantial proportion of long-term migrants still send money back to their relatives. Remittances are almost always legitimate private transfers of post-tax income. However, they are often burdened by disproportionately high transfer costs, though these differ greatly depending on country of origin, country of destination, means of transfer and amount sent, and recent private and public initiatives have helped to bring them down significantly. Migrants who remit relatively small amounts often pay the most: fees can account for 20% of the total sent. Remittances can be sent through many channels, with varying degrees of regulation and transparency: banks, money-transfer organizations, hand or courier delivery, or transfers that occur as part of other commercial or charitable activities. Some of the channels have been labelled as 'informal', and these have been estimated to account for about one-third of all remittances in the EU, and for as much as one-half of the flows out of some countries. Informal systems offer considerable advantages for migrants, while formal 40

What Causes Migration? Poverty or Development? transfer of remittances would benefit the receiving country's financial system, lead to accumulation of capital, availability of credits, and, in the long term, reduce the dependency on remittances. But the distinction between formal and informal is often blurred. Migration and remittances can stimulate economic activity both directly and indirectly, and lead to significantly higher levels of employment, investment, and income. Even very small amounts of remittances can be vital for poor people, affecting their food security (often, the proportion of income from remittances is more significant for the poor than the rich, even if the poor person's income from migration is small). On the other hand, studies on the impact of remittances have tended to place much emphasis on the 'conspicuous consumption' of migrants and their relatives. For example, in the case of the Chinese villages cited above, remittances benefited families but they did not contribute to village development or the establishment and maintenance of village services, including those for facilitating agricultural development— a finding reflected in many other field studies around the world. Too little is known about the role of migrants and remittances in enhancing efficiency in agriculture, while many descriptions of migrants' villages of origin describe investment in housing and luxury goods rather than investment in agricultural production. Increasingly, questions are asked about the conditions needed to secure the investment of remittances. Assessing the impact of remittances is complex. It needs to take account of the fact that remittance records usually count only successful migration, and there is a possibility that many migrants have not remitted despite having invested heavily in the process of migration. Also, data on remittances need to take account of reverse flows, of initial investment in the form of, for example, financing emigration, but also in internal migration, for example, food from villages of origin to cities. And, from a home country public policy perspective, remittances need to be offset against the public investment in education and other forms of publicly-funded investments. Finally, it is unlikely that remittances by themselves will make a significant impact on development. Surges in investment often coincide with policy reforms that supported private investment. The decisions by international migrants to invest which, like those of all investors, depend on expectations of returns. The conditions that make remittances helpful for development or poverty reduction are generally the same conditions that made migrants leave in the first place. Migration Can Be Beneficial, But for Whom? One of the key questions in assessing the impact of migration concerns inequality. While migration generally helps to increase the income of the poor, 41

ESSAYS migration and remittances can also lead to increased inequality within countries. The Indian Village Studies in the 1970s showed that rural-urban migration did not tend to equalize incomes, between or within regions, for a range of reasons: the selective nature of migration prevented equalization within areas of origin; there were costs and barriers associated with migration, the better-off were more likely to gain from migration; the absence of the most productive household members led to a lowering of labour-intensity; the volume of net remittances was usually low; and return migrants were likely to be the old, sick, and unsuccessful, and skills brought back of little help. However, this finding too cannot be generalized. Some forms of migration help to equalize income within regions, though not necessarily between sending and receiving regions. In some cases migration increases income inequality, in some cases it lowers it, and this relationship may change over time, for instance because established networks may lower the costs and risks of migration. The unit of analysis matters too: for example, increased male income does not necessarily translate into increased well-being of women. While in some cases migration and remittances have led to development, in other cases they may lead to undesirable dependency. A key issue appears to be not migration itself but the conditions—social, economic, sometimes even political—under which people leave and conditions for development generally which determine the impact of migration. A key conclusion of this—inevitably very selective—overview of evidence therefore is around context specificity. We should not expect generalizing conclusions, as the context in which migration, remittances and return occur are likely to be the key for the likelihood of success of migration, for the potential increases in inequality, and for the chances that remittances are invested in ways that enhance development and poverty reduction. CONCLUSIONS The evidence above leads to the conclusion that migration is and will continue to be important for patterns of development. And this is increasingly recognized by national governments and international organizations. The enhancement of the potential beneficial impacts of migration is an important and possibly cost-effective way of extending mainstream development policies. However, in contrast to the more positive or optimistic assessment, the conclusion of this essay is that the possibilities for generalizations about migration and development are limited. The conclusion that there are no clear links between migration and development is important in a number of ways. In the first place, it is essential to see migration as an integral part of 42

What Causes Migration? Poverty or Development? development, rather than as exceptional. Development objectives aimed at reducing out-migration are likely to be unsuccessful. It is crucial and in any case more equitable to focus on supporting livelihoods, whether this involves human mobility or not. Second, the conditions under which migration occurs are extremely varied. The problem in the migration-development question is not that we cannot establish links. However, these links are context-dependent, complex and multi-sectoral. The assessments depend on the choice of indicators of wellbeing, and the fact that different effects possibly offset each other. Migrants can be the poorest as well as the richest, in both sending and receiving areas. Conclusions and policy recommendations, thus, need to be very sensitive to such diversity, and—particularly as migration policies are so much subject to popular and political interests—generalizations can be extremely harmful. Third, and related, the impacts of migration are likely to be very diverse, and to a large extent unpredictable. It is important to assess the role of migration along its entire chain, and hence, for example, interpret the positive impact that remittances currently have on El Salvador, or the current contribution of returnees in Uganda against the reasons why these migrants left (i.e., to a large extent, civil war, in both cases). However, while the impact of remittances depends as much on the conditions for investment as on the migrants themselves, the conditions which matter for productive investment are likely to be the same conditions which made migrants leave initially. Further Reading de Haan, Arjan, and Rogaly, Ben, eds. Labour Mobility and Rural Society. Frank Cass, London 2002. Sriskandarajah, D. Migration and development. Global Commission on International Migration Report, 2005 (www.gcim.org).

43

Irregular Migration KHALID KOSER

INTRODUCTION Of all the various aspects of migration considered in this volume, irregular migration is currently perhaps the most topical—and probably the least understood. The concept is often used inaccurately—it can, for example, overlap with asylum—and the first section of this essay tries to explain exactly what irregular migration is. The essay then goes on to consider how many irregular migrants there are, emphasizing considerable data problems. The next section considers the causes of irregular migration, relating them to broader global economic and social processes. The essay then turns to the consequences of irregular migration. It introduces the concept of security, and suggests that just as significant as the threats to state security associated with irregular migration are those to the human security of the migrants involved. The essay then focuses on the issues of human-trafficking and migrantsmuggling, perhaps the aspects of irregular migration that have attracted most attention in recent years. The final section considers current and future policy initiatives and their likely outcomes. CONCEPTS The concept of 'irregular migration' is commonly used to describe a variety of phenomena involving people who enter or remain in a country of which they are not a citizen in breach of national laws. These include migrants who enter or remain in a country without authorization, those who are smuggled or trafficked across an international border, unsuccessful asylum-seekers who fail to observe a deportation order and people who circumvent immigration controls, for example through the arrangement of bogus marriages or fake adoptions. These different forms of irregular migration are often clustered together under the alternative heading of 'illegal migration'. This term has attracted considerable criticism. One reason is its connotation with criminality. Most irregular migrants are not criminals; rather they are in breach of administrative rules. Second, defining persons as 'illegal' is also regarded by some as denying their humanity: a human being cannot be illegal. A third reason is 44

Irregular Migration

the specific possibility that labelling as 'illegal' asylum-seekers who find themselves in an irregular situation may jeopardize their claim on asylum. The two other terms that are often used in this context are 'undocumented' and 'unauthorized'. The problem with the former is that it is ambiguous. It is sometimes used to denote migrants who have not been documented (or recorded), and sometimes to describe migrants without documents (passports and so on). Neither situation applies to all irregular migrants. Similarly, not all irregular migrants necessarily enter a country without authority—they may become irregular at a later stage. There are important regional differences in the way that the concept of irregular migration is applied. In Europe, for example, where the entry of people from outside the European Union (EU) is closely controlled, it is relatively easy to define and identify migrants with irregular status. That is not the case in many parts of Africa, in contrast, where borders are porous, ethnic and linguistic groups straddle state borders, some people belong to nomadic communities and many people do not have proof of their place of birth or citizenship. Another conceptual complexity arises because a migrant's status can change—often rapidly. A few examples include: a migrant can enter a country in an irregular fashion, but then regularize his/her status, for example by applying for asylum or entering a regularization programme. Conversely, a migrant can enter regularly then become irregular when he/she works without a work permit or overstays a visa. A significant proportion of irregular migrants in Australia, for example, are UK citizens—often students in their gap year—who have stayed beyond the expiry of their visa. Asylum-seekers can become irregular migrants when their application is rejected and they stay on without authority. More generally, a growing proportion of international migrants undertake long-distance journeys that take them from one part of the globe to another, transiting through a number of countries on their way to their final destination. In the course of a single journey, it is quite possible for a migrant to slip in and out of irregularity, according to the visa requirements of the countries concerned. DATA The analysis of irregular migration is further hampered by a serious lack of accurate data, making it difficult to identify trends or to compare the scale of the phenomenon in different parts of the world. One reason is conceptual—as we have seen, the term covers a range of people who can be in an irregular situation for different reasons, and people can switch from regular to irregular status, or vice versa. 45

ESSAYS Another reason is methodological. Counting irregular migrants is an imprecise science to say the least. People without regular status are likely to avoid speaking to the authorities for fear of detection, and thus go unrecorded. Most observers agree that the majority of irregular migrants are not recorded. Various methods have been used to try to estimate numbers of irregular migrants, although it needs to be emphasized that none of these is comprehensive. In some countries—though not the United Kingdom— amnesties are periodically declared, whereby foreign nationals residing or working without legal authority can regularize their status. Direct surveys of irregular migrants have been attempted, although access is difficult. It is possible to compare different sources of recorded migration data and population data to highlight discrepancies that might be accounted for by irregular migration. Finally, surveys of employers can indirectly reveal foreign workers without legal status. With the exception of those who are deported, it is likewise impossible to count how many irregular migrants return home. Research has indicated that it is a mistake to assume that all irregular migrants stay permanently. Many appear to come to destination countries with a specific—usually financial— target in mind, for example to earn enough money to build a house or educate children or pay off a debt. Another problem is access to data—however limited it may be—that has been collected. In many states such data are collected by enforcement agencies and are not made publicly available. Alternatively, information and data that may establish a person's irregular status are frequently dispersed between different agencies such as government departments, the police and employment offices, making co-operation and access to data difficult. International co-operation on data collection is even more problematic. There is no authoritative source on global trends and numbers in irregular migration, and the available sources are not comprehensive. Moreover, a distinction needs to be made between flows and stocks of irregular migration which give rise to different policy responses. Irregular flows pose challenges of control and management, as well as concern for the safety and dignity of migrants on the move. By contrast, the political responses to irregular stocks tend to focus either on channels for their regularization or their removal. There is, nevertheless, a broad consensus that, as the number of international migrants has increased, so too has the global scale of irregular migration. Most estimates of irregular migration are at the national level. It is thought, for example, that there are more than 10m. irregular migrants in the USA, accounting for nearly one-third of the foreign-born population there. More than half of these irregular migrants are Mexican; according to some 46

Irregular Migration

estimates half of the Mexican-born population in the USA are irregular migrants. Despite increased efforts at border control, about 500,000 additional migrants enter the USA without authorization each year. It is also estimated that there are between 3.5m.-5m. irregular migrants in the Russian Federation, originating mainly in countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and South-East Asia. Up to 20m. irregular migrants are thought to live in India today. Other estimates are provided on a regional or global scale. Perhaps one-half of all migrants in both Africa and Latin America are also thought to be irregular. Overall, an estimated 2.5m.^lm. migrants cross all international borders without authorization each year. It is estimated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that between 10%15% of Europe's 56m. migrants have irregular status and that each year around half a million undocumented migrants arrive in the EU. There are, however, considerable variations in the figures provided. Perhaps more important than speculating on numbers is to place irregular migration in its proper context. First, the political significance of irregular migration far outweighs its numerical significance. Even the most extreme estimates, for example, indicate that irregular migration accounts for no more than 50%) of all migration world-wide, and in the EU and most individual EU countries it probably accounts for no more than 10%. Second, it is important to emphasize that irregular migration is not just a South-North issue. There are very few estimates of the scale of either irregular flows or stocks in the developing world, but most irregular migration on a global scale certainly takes place between countries in the developing world. According to some estimates, for example, there are several million irregular migrants in South and South-East Asia, and between 3m.-5m. in South Africa alone. Third, irregular stocks are almost certainly far greater than irregular flows. There are few estimates of stocks of irregular migrants—no EU member state, for example, publishes official estimates of the size of its irregular population. There is no doubt, nevertheless, that in most countries stocks far outnumber new arrivals. In Australia in 1998-99, for example, 3,032 irregular arrivals compared with 13,485 people who overstayed their visas. Fourth, most migration is regular. The example of the United Kingdom is illustrative. Estimates of the number of irregular migrants entering the United Kingdom vary widely, but even the highest estimates are relatively small in comparison with regular migration to the United Kingdom. For example, 120,000 foreign students arrive each year and another 200,000 people enter legitimately to work. 47

ESSAYS IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION People who move in an irregular fashion leave their countries for exactly the same reasons as any other migrants. The causes of all international migration are increasingly embedded in the wider process of globalization. Put simply, there is a combination of increasing incentives to migrate, increasing awareness of opportunities elsewhere and increasing access to the means to move and enter another country, even without authority. The reason that growing numbers of migrants move in an irregular rather than legal way is because of increasing restrictions on legal movements, mainly in destination countries. More people than ever before want to move, but there are proportionately fewer legal opportunities for them to do so. One reason that there are greater incentives than ever before to migrate is growing global disparities in development, demography and the democratic process. The gap in human welfare between rich and poor countries has widened in recent years. Poverty and a lack of development are compounded by growing population pressure. While many of the world's more prosperous countries have declining populations, populations are burgeoning in many poorer countries: virtually all of the world's population growth currently takes place in developing nations. It is no coincidence that a good number of poor countries are also states where the democratic process is fragile, where the rule of law is weak and where corruption is rife. By migrating, people try to protect themselves and their families against the effects of a weak economy and volatile market, and from political crises, armed conflicts and other risks. One of the most powerful reasons to migrate is to find work. Although there are important variations, overall unemployment has reduced in the developed world in recent years. In contrast it has increased or remained at a stable but high level in most of the developing world. Being out of work is not the only dimension of what has been described as the global jobs crisis. Many people are underemployed. Usually they work in the informal sector, where employment is unpredictable; opportunities come and go according to the seasons and in some cases by the week or even by the day, and working conditions can be appalling. Even for those who are employed, wages are often barely sufficient for survival. Almost half of the world's 3,000m. workers earn less than US $2 per day. At the same time, limited work is available in richer countries. Highincome economies are increasingly becoming characterized by the segmentation of labour markets. This occurs where sectors of the labour market are eschewed by native workers because they are low-paying, have little security and are low status, and thus have become dominated by migrant workers. These are often described as '3D' jobs—entailing work that is dirty, 48

Irregular Migration

dangerous or difficult, and often a combination of all three. They are concentrated in sectors such as agriculture, timber, plantations, heavy industry, construction and domestic services. Often the migrants who work in these sectors are undocumented or have irregular status, for they more than others are willing to work for very low wages and in insecure conditions. In the last decade or so there has been a communications 'revolution' characterized by an explosion in hi-tech developments, such as email and the internet, electronic bulletin boards and satellite television stations, as well as lower-technology cheap international telephone calls. It has been estimated, for example, that between 1990 and 2000 the number of telephone lines world-wide increased from 700m. to 2,500m., while the number of internet users increased from scarcely lm. to more than 1,000m. This revolution has made people more aware of disparities; of what life is like in other parts of the world. It has also made them more aware of opportunities to move and to work abroad. Another 'revolution' often referred to has been in transportation. This refers, on the one hand, to the increasing range of options for international travel and, on the other, to decreasing costs. It has particularly arisen because of the proliferation of competition between airline companies. It is estimated that today it costs no more than US $2,500 to travel legally between any two places in the world. It can be far more expensive—but still possible—to travel illegally. If the communications revolution has made would-be migrants more aware of reasons to migrate, the transportation revolution has made migration more feasible. Most migrants move to countries where they have friends or family already established, forming what are often referred to as transnational 'migration networks'. It has been argued that one of the main reasons why migration is increasing today is migration networks, which establish a self-perpetuating cycle. Migration networks have been shown to encourage migration by providing information, financing trips by lending would-be migrants money and helping new migrants to settle, by providing an initial place to stay, helping them find a job and providing other economic and social assistance. The growth of migration networks has made it easier for people to move from one country to another in an irregular manner. Another way that migration is facilitated is by a wide range of individuals and agents, including labour recruiters, immigration lawyers, travel agents, brokers, housing providers, remittances agencies, immigration and customs officials. These have been described as comprising a new migration 'industry' or migration 'business' which, just like any other business, stands to make a commercial gain. The enormous profits that the migration industry generates, it has been argued, add considerable momentum to the migration process. 49

ESSAYS There is an illegitimate side to the migration industry, comprising humantraffickers and migrant-smugglers, which together are estimated to generate billions of dollars each year from the desire of people to move despite legal restrictions. STATE SECURITY AND HUMAN SECURITY In political and media discourses, irregular migration is often described as constituting a threat to state sovereignty. Put simply, the argument is that states have a sovereign right to control who crosses their borders, and that by undermining that control irregular migrants threaten sovereignty. It follows that stopping irregular migration is fundamental to reasserting full sovereignty. In certain, more extreme discourses, irregular migration has also been perceived as a threat to state security. Specifically, irregular migration and asylum, it has been suggested, may provide channels for potential terrorists to enter countries. Given the sensitivity of the current debate, extremely careful analysis of such potentially incendiary conclusions is required. First, it is important to consider the numbers involved. Inherent in the argument that irregular migration threatens state sovereignty is the perception that states are, or risk, being 'flooded' or overwhelmed by enormous numbers of irregular migrants. In reality, as discussed in an earlier section, the political significance of irregular migration generally outweighs its numerical significance. Irregular migration does occur in significant numbers, but in most countries it represents a fairly small proportion of total migration. Second, tainted intentions are often imputed to irregular migrants without any substantiation. Two particularly frequent assumptions are that irregular migrants participate in illegal activities and that they are associated with the spread of infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS. Both of these assumptions are gross generalizations. Some irregular migrants (and asylum-seekers) are criminals and some carry infectious diseases—resulting, for example, from long periods spent in transit—but most do not. Misrepresenting the evidence criminalizes and demonizes all irregular migrants. It can encourage them to remain underground. It also diverts attention from those irregular migrants who actually are criminals and should be prosecuted, and those who are diseased and should be treated. Third, focusing exclusively on terrorism has meant that other equally pressing threats associated with irregular migration—for states, societies and, importantly, for migrants themselves—have often been overlooked. It is true that irregular migration can threaten state security, but this is usually in ways other than by its association with terrorism or violence. Where it involves corruption and organized crime, irregular migration can also 50

Irregular Migration

become a threat to public security. This is particularly the case where illegal entry is facilitated by migrant-smugglers and human-traffickers, or where criminal gangs compete for control of the labour of migrants after they have arrived. When irregular migration results in competition for scarce jobs, it can generate xenophobic sentiments within host populations. Importantly, these sentiments are often directed not only at migrants with irregular status, but also at established migrants, refugees and ethnic minorities. When this receives a great deal of media attention, irregular migration can also undermine public confidence in the integrity and effectiveness of a state's migration and asylum policies. Irregular migration thus can impact on the ability of governments to expand regular migration channels. The importance for a government to be perceived by citizens to be in control cannot be overestimated. If irregular migration exists, it is not unreasonable for voters to ask why even more migration is required. It is clear that irregular migration can threaten state security, although the relationship is complex. Equally, however, irregular migration can undermine the human security of the migrants themselves. The negative consequences of irregular migration for migrants are often underestimated. It can endanger their lives. A large number of people die each year trying to cross land and sea borders without being detected by the authorities. It has been estimated, for example, that as many as 2,000 migrants die each year trying to cross the Mediterranean from Africa to Europe, and that about 400 Mexicans die trying to cross the border into the USA each year. Women constitute a substantial proportion of the many migrants with irregular status. Because they are confronted with gender-based discrimination, female migrants with irregular status are often obliged to accept the most menial informal sector jobs. Such can be the level of abuse of their human rights that some commentators have compared contemporary humantrafficking with the slave trade. Women in particular also face specific healthrelated risks, including exposure to HIV/AIDS. More generally, people who enter or remain in a country without authorization are often at risk of exploitation by employers and landlords. And because of their irregularity, migrants are usually unable to make full use of their skills and experience once they have arrived in a country of destination. Migrants with irregular status are often unwilling to seek redress from authorities because they fear arrest and deportation. As a result, they do not always make use of public services to which they are entitled, for example emergency health care. In most countries, they are also barred from using the full range of services available to citizens and migrants with regular status. In such situations, already hard-pressed NGOs, religious bodies and other civil 51

ESSAYS society institutions are obliged to provide assistance to migrants with irregular status, at times compromising their own legality. In sum, what is needed is more objective, evidence-based analysis and debate on the consequences of irregular migration. Avery real problem is that irregular migration has tended to polarize political and public debate and discourse. Where parts of the media and certain politicians have demonized irregular migration, the 'knee-jerk' reaction of some liberals, civil rights groups and asylum advocates has been to deny any wrongdoing whatsoever on the part of irregular migrants. Neither perspective is accurate. HUMAN-TRAFFICKING AND MIGRANT-SMUGGLING Human-trafficking and migrant-smuggling are probably responsible for a relatively small proportion of irregular migration world-wide, but they have attracted such attention recently that it is worth turning attention to these issues. Briefly, four questions are considered: What are human-trafficking and migrant-smuggling? What is the scale? What are the costs involved? And what are the consequences for the migrants themselves? Although the two concepts are often confused, even by policy-makers and academics, there is a legal distinction between human-trafficking and migrant-smuggling. The trafficking of human beings is defined by the United Nations as: 'The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat, or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.' The trafficking of women—and sometimes even of children—to work as prostitutes or in the sex trade has attracted most attention. It is hard to research trafficking, but what appears typically to happen is that young women are promised the opportunity to work abroad. A price is agreed which the woman will pay in instalments after she starts working. She is then transported, usually illegally, to a destination country, where she finds that she is forced to work as a prostitute, and that virtually all of her income is taken by the trafficker. There are also reports of young women and children being kidnapped from their homes and transported away against their will. The smuggling of migrants is defined as: 'The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.' In contrast to human-trafficking, migrant-smuggling is largely voluntary. It involves potential migrants, or more often their family, 52

Irregular Migration

paying a smuggler to move them to a destination country illegally. After they have arrived their association with the smuggler normally ends, so that they are not subsequently open to exploitation in the way that victims of trafficking are. In reality there can be a blurring of the boundaries between humantrafficking and migrant-smuggling. This occurs in particular where migrants do not pay a smuggler in full before migrating, which means they arrive in the destination country in debt to the smuggler. This in turn opens up the possibility of exploitation. Just as with irregular migration more generally, it is impossible accurately to enumerate either human-trafficking or migrant-smuggling. Figures usually provided relate to people who have been found and who admit to having been smuggled or trafficked. The problem is that no one knows what proportion of trafficked and smuggled people is actually found. It seems reasonable to assume that many are never known to the authorities. The US State Department does publish annual estimates of human-trafficking. It estimated that between 600,000 and 800,000 women, children and men were trafficked in 2004 alone. Of this total, about two-thirds of victims were trafficked within Asia (260,000-280,000) and within Europe (170,000-210,000). Similar inaccuracies surround estimates of the financial costs of migrantsmuggling. There appears to be a wide range of costs involved. It is important to emphasize just how much smugglers and traffickers can charge. The average cost reported for a journey from Asia to the Americas, for example, is more than US $26,000. One implication is that, increasingly, it is only the relatively wealthy who can afford to pay smugglers and to move. In a country like Pakistan, for example, from where many of the incidents of migration between Asia and Americas were reported to originate, $26,000 is a very significant sum of money. At the same time, a second observation is the wide range of costs involved. At the bottom end of the scale, the cost for being smuggled across a border in Africa is reported to be as low as US $203, although even this can be a significant sum given the income levels in very poor countries. In several cases reported, payments for smuggling between African countries were made not in cash but, for example, with bags of rice and other goods. By looking at reports on the costs of migrant-smuggling over a period of years, the overall impression is that costs gradually are decreasing. This would seem to be because there is increasing competition in the smuggling business, with smugglers constantly undercutting one another and adjusting their methods to attract more customers. There appear to be three main determinants of cost. One is the distance travelled—very approximately, longer journeys cost more. A second is the 53

ESSAYS mode of transport: flying is more expensive than travelling by sea or overland. A third main determinant is reported to be the number of people travelling. The more people who travel at the same time, the less each appears to be charged. It is important, at the same time, to emphasize that patterns and processes of migrant-smuggling appear to vary considerably in different regions of the world. By definition, human-trafficking has negative consequences for the people involved. Victims of human-trafficking are not free to decide on the activities in which they engage. They are often forced into low-paid, insecure and degrading work from which they may find it impossible to escape and for which they receive trivial or no compensation. While a great deal of recent attention has been given to the trafficking of women, it is important to note that this phenomenon also affects men and children. Migrant children with irregular migration status who are separated from their parents are a particularly vulnerable group, and may be trafficked into the sex industry. But it is equally important not to overlook the negative consequences of migrant-smuggling for those involved. Smugglers can charge many thousands of dollars to transport them from one place to another. Even where migrants do not owe smugglers money after they have arrived at their destination, they are often indebted to family, friends and money-lenders at home. Smugglers do not always inform migrants in advance of where they will be taken. The means of transport used by migrant-smugglers are often unsafe, and migrants who are travelling in this way may find themselves abandoned by their smuggler and unable to complete the journey they have paid for. Using the services of smugglers, many migrants have drowned at sea, suffocated in sealed containers or have been raped and abused while in transit. These observations go some way towards explaining why it is so hard to combat migrant-smuggling and human-trafficking. There are significant profits to be made, which provides an incentive for smugglers and traffickers to take increasing risks. Competition within the migration business means that prospective migrants have a wider choice of agents. Often it is difficult to return intercepted smuggled or trafficked migrants because they may be in debt in their country of origin and thus have an incentive to leave again straight away either to find work or avoid debt collectors. STATE POLICIES State policies on irregular migration can be broadly distinguished in two main ways. First, there is a distinction between policies targeted at reducing the arrival of irregular migrants and those concerned with dealing with irregular migrants who have already entered. The former include more border controls, 54

Irregular Migration biométrie tests and extended visa regimes. The latter mainly concern either return or regularization. The latter policy of regularization is particularly controversial. While some countries—for example the USA and several in southern Europe—use it occasionally, others, including the United Kingdom, are adamantly opposed to it. Their argument is that regularization programmes serve as a magnet to attract irregular migrants who know that sooner or later they will be given legal status. The counter-argument is that if migrants are already living and working in a country, then it makes sense to allow them to do so safely and legally. A second distinction is between short-term policies aimed at trying to stem irregular migration and longer-term policies concerned with reducing incentives to move in an irregular fashion in the first place. The latter include achieving development targets to increase security and livelihoods in origin countries, as well as increasing the opportunities to move legally. Several countries, including the United Kingdom, have recently expanded legal migration channels to fill particular labour-market gaps and as a partial response to the challenges of an ageing population. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that regular migration channels are very unlikely to be opened on a scale sufficient to satisfy total demand to move. This volume is not the place for an in-depth discussion of these and other specific state policies on irregular migration. It is, however, pertinent in this essay to understand the wider context for policy-making in this arena. It is important to acknowledge that states are confronted by a series of dilemmas that makes policy-making so difficult in this area. Politicallysensitive though it may be to acknowledge, and difficult though it may be to evidence, there is a consensus among many commentators that certain states lack the political will to address irregular migration. This applies in particular to states in certain countries of origin. Irregular migration can benefit some countries of origin—for example by removing a labour surplus and providing a source of remittances and overseas investment. Yet irregular migration cannot be managed on a unilateral basis by individual destination states. Without meaningful co-operation between countries of origin, transit and destination policies are unlikely to succeed. In certain parts of the world, it may be that the changing geography of irregular migration provides incentive enough for states to act, as their countries transform from countries of origin into countries that also receive irregular migrants. This would appear to be the case in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the Maghreb countries of North Africa. There is no doubt that most receiving states, especially in the industrialized world, do have the political will to act. It has been estimated, for example, that in 2002 alone Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 55

ESSAYS the USA together spent about US $ 17,000m. in trying to respond to the problem of irregular migration. What is undeniable, at the same time, is that from an economic perspective irregular migration is actually quite functional for many destination states. As a result of deregulation, liberalization and 'flexibilization', there is growing demand for various forms of unskilled and semi-skilled labour employed under precarious conditions. Irregular migrants provide a cheap source of labour and are often willing to work in sectors in which regular migrants and nationals are not. Unless its economic rationale is properly understood, efforts to manage irregular migration are unlikely to succeed. Whether or not irregular migration actually threatens state sovereignty is a moot point, as discussed above, but what is incontrovertible is that integral to the concept of sovereignty is the right of states to control their borders. But the respect of human rights is an equally important prerogative for states. One of the key dilemmas for policy-making in the realm of irregular migration is that at times these two principles are difficult to reconcile. This is particularly the case for asylum-seekers and refugees who move in an irregular manner. The challenge for states is to limit access to their territories without undermining the right to seek and enjoy protection. A final dilemma is strong divergences between different government departments within states; between governments, NGOs and civil society, and between governments and other stakeholders in origin, transit and destination countries. Deportation, for example, is viewed by many destination countries as an essential element in reducing irregular migration, yet in practice it is very difficult. NGOs and various elements of civil society regularly raise concerns about personal safety and dignity during the deportation process. Friends, family and colleagues or lawyers often fight deportation and religious organizations sometimes offer sanctuary to those threatened with deportation. Sometimes countries of origin are unwilling to admit returned migrants. These dilemmas are one reason why policies have often proved ineffective in combating irregular migration. A second is that the forces that determine the scale of international migration are powerful (for example, growing disparities in the level of prosperity and human security experienced by different societies) and the ability to modify them is very limited. Research shows, for example, that even in times of economic downturn, native workers are reluctant to work at '3D' jobs, and so demand for migrant workers continues to some extent irrespective of economic trends. It has also been demonstrated that migration networks continue to operate largely regardless of the level of economic prosperity in destination countries and that it is very difficult to disrupt the momentum associated with migration networks. 56

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Similarly, the increasing complexity of the migration business—linking highly organized groups with small operators and sub-agents in origin, transit and destination countries—makes it difficult for policy to intervene to reduce its impact too. Against this background, it is important to be realistic about the likely impact of state policies on irregular migration. It has also become clear that control measures alone are unlikely to reduce irregular migration in the long term, and that they need to be combined with more proactive measures that address the causes of irregular migration. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect states to dismantle controls and open their borders, as is sometimes advocated. Most commentators now acknowledge that irregular migration will continue for the foreseeable future. Further Reading There is still relatively little academic work in this area. The website of the International Organization for Migration (www.iom.int) contains good, up-todate reports and data with a global perspective, while the website of the Migration Policy Institute (www.migrationpolicy.org) is particularly good for reports on North America. Jordan, Bill, and Duvell, Franck. Irregular Migration: The Dilemmas of Transnational Mobility. London, Edward Elgar, 2003. This book contains a useful theoretical overview of irregular migration, placing it in the context of wider global structural economic changes. It contains a series of detailed and interesting case studies of irregular migrant populations. Its focus is the United Kingdom. Koser, Khalid. Irregular Migration, State Security and Human Security. Report for the Global Commission on International Migration. This report provides a comprehensive overview of the dilemmas and challenges for policy-making around irregular migration and a summary of current and planned policy initiatives. It has a global focus, http://www.gcim.org/ attachements/TP5 .pdf Kyle, David, and Koslowski, Rey (Eds). Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 2001. This edited volume contains a series of case studies in migrant-smuggling and human-trafficking world-wide. Although slightly dated, much of the information and analysis contained is still very relevant.

57

Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Internally Displaced: the Politics of Forced Migration HEAVEN CRAWLEY

The focus of this essay is on recent and current trends in forced migration and on the policy responses that have been devised to address the needs of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It is important, however, to acknowledge and recognize that forced migration does not take place in isolation from other population flows. As is noted in the recent review of the current situation facing these groups by UNHCR—the organization tasked with protecting and responding to their interests and needs—people are compelled to move within or out of their countries by a myriad of factors. Some are driven by poverty, fleeing to survive; others are drawn to real or perceived opportunities to better their lives away from home. The difficulty for policy-makers and politicians is that the distinctions between these groups are not always—and in some cases, rarely—easy to draw. These difficulties are compounded where individuals and families are displaced within the boundaries of their own countries and therefore do not fall within the scope or mandate of the international refugee regime. This is despite the fact that their needs may be identical to those who have crossed an international—but sometimes arbitrary—geographical boundary. THE COMPLEXITY OF CATEGORIES An economic migrant normally leaves a country voluntarily to seek a better life. Forced migrants, by contrast, leave because of the threat of persecution or other forms of harm that have affected, or will affect, themselves and their families should they remain. Unlike economic migrants, forced migrants are unable to return to their homes because they do not believe that the government of the country from which they originate will protect them. Forced or involuntary migrants include a number of legal or political categories. The core definition of a 'refugee' is contained in the 1951 UN 58

Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Internally Displaced Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ('the Refugee Convention') and its 1967 Protocol. The Refiigee Convention defines a refugee as an individual who: 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his [or her] nationality, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country'. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has developed its own definition that expands the Refugee Convention's narrow 'well-founded fear of being persecuted' standard by including other grounds for refugee status, including flight across borders caused by 'external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality'. The Cartagena Declaration, adopted in 1984 by a group of Latin American states, added massive human rights violations to this list. What unites all of these definitions is the principle that these migrants are forced to move across international borders in order to gain security, and the associated assumption that such security will be provided by a government other than the one in the country from which the individual or group has originated. The term 'refugee' can therefore cover a wide range of people with very different experiences. Whilst some of these people are recognized as 'Convention refugees' within the narrow legal definition of the term, many are not. Those who are able to apply for international protection under the Refugee Convention are generally known as 'asylum-seekers'. Many asylum-seekers and refugees who arrive in the industrialized countries do so irregularly or become irregular at some stage during their stay. This process is acknowledged in the recent report of the UN's Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), which recognizes that many of those who migrate in an irregular manner do so because their own countries are affected by armed conflict, political instability and economic decline. If an application for protection under the Refugee Convention is unsuccessful, forced migrants and their families may come to be described as 'failed asylum-seekers', 'overstayers' or 'illegal migrants'. There are a number of other large—and growing—groups of forced migrants that are not currently covered by the term 'refugee' but whose circumstances are none the less similar in many other respects. IDPs are those who have been forced to flee their homes because their lives were in danger, but who, unlike refugees, have not crossed an international border. While refugees are eligible to receive international protection under the Refugee Convention—at least in principle—the international community is not under the same legal obligation to protect IDPs. National governments have the primary responsibility for the security and well-being of all displaced people 59

ESSAYS on their territory, but often they are unable or unwilling to fulfil this obligation. Indeed, no UN agency has specific responsibility for addressing the needs of those who are internally displaced. As a result, the plight of IDPs receives very little attention, even though they outnumber refugees by nearly two to one. The international definition of a refugee also excludes those who are forced to move as a consequence of natural disasters, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 and the earthquake in South Asia in October 2005. Many more have been evicted from their homes as a result of development projects. Poor, indigenous and marginalized groups are frequently displaced without consultation to make way for national projects. According to the World Bank, 10m. people are forcibly displaced by development projects each year. Not only are the rights of such people ignored, they are rarely offered resettlement or adequate compensation. 'People in refugee-like situations'—such as the Bedouin in Kuwait and Iraq and Burmese in Thailand and Malaysia—who are stateless or denied the protection of the government in their countries or citizenship or habitual residence are similarly excluded from the international definition of a refugee. The complexity of these categories is not only a reflection of the desire to label and 'name' different groups for policy and analytical purposes, but also, more importantly, of the fact that the causes of forced migration are complex and overlapping. A mixture of fears, hopes and aspirations motivates both 'migrants' and 'refugees'. They often follow the same routes and are in constant contact with each other while travelling and after arrival. Asylumseekers and refugees may use the same modes of travel as undocumented migrants and resort to, or be exploited by, smugglers and traffickers. In some cases, refugees may use these channels to leave one country of asylum and move to another to escape insecurity or economic hardship. It is the failure to recognize the root causes of forced migration that, more than any other factor, leads the media and politicians to assume that asylum-seekers and refugees are not really the victims of persecution but rather economic migrants in disguise. CAUSES OF FORCED MIGRATION The factors that underlie forced migration flows are complex and diverse and usually comprise a mix of political, social and economic conditions, as well as individual psychological factors. As was noted in the previous section, it is important to recognize the overlap between political and economic factors that underlie the decision to migrate. Population flows are not homogeneous but of a mixed, composite character, sometimes leading to the use of the term 60

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'mixed migration'. The immediate causes of forced displacement may be identified as serious human rights violations or armed conflict, but these causes often overlap with, or may themselves be provoked or aggravated by, economic marginalization and poverty, environmental degradation, population pressure and poor governance. As a result movements from a single country may include some people who qualify for refugee status and others who do not, especially when that country is simultaneously affected by human rights violations, armed conflict, political instability and economic collapse. The majority of asylum-seekers and refugees world-wide come from countries affected by conflict, violence and human rights abuses. In recent years most asylum-seekers came from countries affected by conflict or widespread human rights abuses or both, such as Afghanistan, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia and Turkey. There is very strong empirical evidence of a relationship between conflict and forced migration to the countries of Europe. An analysis of statistical data on asylumseeker flows to the EU in 1990-2000 indicates that just 10 countries accounted for nearly 60% of all asylum-seekers entering the EU during that period. Repression of and/or discrimination against minorities and/or ethnic conflict are the only 'push' factors common to all of these countries. Evidence of the association between conflict, violence and human rights abuse and flows of forced migrants can also be seen more recently in the fall in the number of asylum claims in the countries of Europe, which appears to be closely related to the absence of emergencies on the region's borders. The largest reduction in asylum-seekers over recent years is associated with those countries where, for the most part, there were reductions in armed conflict, increasing stability, or changes in government that reduced domestic human rights violations. The world has witnessed a decline in armed conflict from a peak in the early 1990s. There has also been a dramatic drop in the number of autocratic regimes—and a corresponding reduction in repression and political discrimination against ethnic minorities. The number of 'ethno national' wars for independence—which dominated the decade following the end of the Cold War—is at its lowest since 1960. This does not, however, mean that forced migration is no longer an issue for the international community. Instead it has started to take different forms and new patterns are beginning to be seen. The post-11 September 2001 global 'war on terror' has introduced a new dynamic into a number of conflicts and refugee crises around the world, particularly where it has been used to justify new or intensified military offensives. This has been the case in Aceh, Afghanistan, Chechnya (Russian Federation), Georgia, Iraq, Pakistan and Palestine. People forcibly displaced by these conflicts have faced closed 61

ESSAYS borders, extremely hostile and insecure conditions in exile and/or accelerated or involuntary returns due to 'anti-terror' measures in asylum states. And whilst the number of international and intra-state conflicts has fallen dramatically since the end of the Cold War, this has not resulted in any reduction in the number of those who are internally displaced. Indeed, the changing nature of conflict may itself be responsible for the increase in the number of IDPs. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), civil war is the most important form of internal conflict causing conflict-related displacement. Civilians are arguably more likely to be drawn into these kinds of conflicts, including women and children who may be targeted to punish particular groups or individuals who have fled the country or are otherwise inaccessible. And other forms of internal strife play an important role, too, including attempts by governments to increase control over certain sections of the population through various forms of repression and human rights violations. A particularly clear example of this is the Zimbabwean government's 'clean-up' operation targeting urban populations. THE SCALE OF FORCED MIGRATION Statistics on the scale of forced migration and therefore the number of refugees, asylum-seekers and other uprooted people—globally and by country—are inexact and often controversial. In terms of the number of asylum-seekers, the growing complexity of asylum statistics reported by industrialized countries poses a challenge for analysing international trends. Areas in which the asylum data have become increasingly complex include appeal processes, those allowed to remain for reasons other than Convention grounds and reasons for formally rejecting claims. For the purposes of UNHCR statistics, people of concern include refugees recognized under the Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention, as well as those allowed to stay for humanitarian reasons or granted temporary protection. Those who have applied for asylum but have been refused status are not included even though they may remain in that country for some time, perhaps even permanently. Similarly, although the reliability of IDP data has improved enormously over the past few years—thanks largely to the work of the IDMC—there remain enormous information gaps. Not even the scope of the displacement crisis is known with any level of accuracy for most countries, let alone more specific information on the living conditions and needs of those who are internally displaced. The global population of those defined as refugees has fluctuated considerably over the past decade, although it declined significantly over recent years, from nearly 18m. in 1992 to just over 9m. in 2004 (Table 1). While it is 62

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true that globally the number of forced migrants has increased considerably in the last few decades in many areas, the concerns of individual states are relative. Many industrialized countries around the world believe they are being overwhelmed by asylum-seekers and refugees claiming to be in need of protection and therefore exerting their rights to remain under the international refugee regime. The bottom line is, however, that the overall weight of the socalled 'refugee burden' is borne overwhelmingly by the poorest countries in the world, especially when measured relative to overall wealth and population or in relation to the size of the existing population (Table 2). Some nations in Africa and Asia—states with far fewer economic resources than industrialized countries—sometimes host larger numbers of forced migrants for far longer periods of time. Although developed countries contribute most of the funding to assist refugees, developing countries host the vast majority of the world's refugees. Combined, nations with per capita incomes of less than US $2,000 host more than two-thirds (71%) of all refugees. Nations with per capita incomes of more than $10,000 hosted just 5% of the world's refugees. In many developing countries, refugees constitute a large proportion of the total population. Table 1: The global refugee population: 1995 to end-2004 Year

Number

1995

14,896,087

1996

13,357,087

1997

12,015,350

1998

11,480,860

1999

11,687,226

2000

12,129,572

2001

12,116,835

2002

10,594,055

2003

9,680,265

2004

9,236,763

Source: UNHCR 2006.

Given this fact, it is somewhat ironic that the most substantial declines in the number of forced migrants seeking protection from persecution have been those arriving in the rich industrialized countries. Following exceptionally 63

ESSAYS

large asylum flows in the early 1990s due to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and political crises in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Romania and other former Eastern bloc countries, asylum claims rose more gradually in Europe during the second half of the 1990s. The 25 countries of the EU received 46% fewer requests in 2005 compared to 2001. The non-European industrialized countries, however, reported the largest fall in asylum requests. Canada and the USA received 54% fewer requests in 2005 than in 2001, while asylum levels in Australia and New Zealand fell by 75%. Table 2: Refugees per 1,000 inhabitants: top 20 countries, end-2004 Country of asylum Armenia Chad Serbia and Montenegro Djibouti Congo (Democratic Republic) Tanzania Iran Zambia Guinea Denmark Sierra Leone Germany Gabon Saudi Arabia Norway Uganda Sweden Netherlands Namibia Kenya

Refugees per 1,000 inhabitants 78.0 26.7 26.3 22.7 17.1 15.7 15.0 14.9 14.8 12.0 11.8 10.6 10.0 9.8 9.5 8.7 8.1 7.8 7.3 7.1

A combination of factors has contributed to the shape of the historical asylum trends. First, most countries in Eastern and Central Europe were not destination countries in the 1980s, but, rather, sources of asylum-seekers. This 64

65

Source: The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC—www.internal-displacement.org, March 2006) Internal Displacement: Global overview of trends and developments in 2005.

Figure 1: Internally displaced people world-wide, December 2005

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ESSAYS situation changed during the 1990s, with countries in this region developing asylum regimes and some of them emerging as important asylum-seeker receiving countries. Second, armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia (in the early 1990s) in combination with the Kosovo crisis (in the late 1990s) established an unprecedented development, contributing significantly to the high number of asylum-seekers during this period. Conflicts in other parts of the world, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, the Russian Federation and Sudan, also played an important role. And third, the more recent introduction of restrictive asylum policies across the industrialized countries, together with improved conditions in some source countries, led to an overall decrease in the number of asylum applications submitted in industrialized countries during the last few years. It is important to note that, despite the reduction in the total number of refugees world-wide, the majority of those who remain live without any prospect of a durable solution to their plight. In 2004 there were some 33 situations of protracted refugee exile involving 5.7m. refugees. These figures do not include the millions of displaced Palestinians who come under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). It should also be noted that, although the overall number of refugees, asylum-seekers and others of concern to UNHCR has declined, the overall number of forced migrants has increased significantly over the past decade if internally displaced populations are included in the analysis. From the second half of the 1990 onwards, the global IDP figure increased dramatically, to reach 25m. in 2001, and then remained almost unchanged at that level until 2004. The number of those internally displaced fell slightly in 2005, but remains alarmingly high. According to the IDMC, a total of 23.7m. people were internally displaced as of December 2005. Figure 1 shows the most recent available estimates for each country affected by conflict-induced internal displacement. The figures come from a variety of different sources. In several cases, estimates have not been updated recently or do not cover all parts of a country or certain groups of IDPs. At the end of 2005, at least 50 countries were home to IDPs, the worstaffected continent being Africa, with a total of 12.1m. IDPs resident in 20 countries. The largest internal displacement situations are in the Sudan (5.4m. IDPs), Colombia (up to 3.7m.), Uganda (2m.), the DRC (1.7m.) and Iraq (1.3m.). The Centre estimates that as many as 14m. IDPs are at risk of death through violence and that a large proportion of all those internally displaced (at least 50%) are either without any significant humanitarian assistance from their governments and/or are unprotected by their governments. In a number of countries, including Burma (Myanmar), the Central African Republic, 66

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Colombia, Cte d'Ivoire, Mexico, Nepal, Russian Federation (Chechnya), Sudan (Darfur) and Zimbabwe, governments or occupation forces are directly or indirectly involved in displacing people. Women and children constitute a very large proportion—70%-80%—of all those who are internally displaced. These figures suggest that whilst the nature of flows has changed, the scale and nature of the overall needs of forced migrants have not. The so-called 'protection gap' is one of the main problems faced by millions of IDPs around the world. Little progress was made in 2005 with regard to preventing internal displacement and responding to the humanitarian and protection needs of the displaced in a timely and systematic manner. As a result, there is currently a widespread international debate under way on how this group of uprooted people can be better protected, and by whom. THE POLITICAL AND POLICY RESPONSE TO FORCED MIGRATION Although only a tiny proportion of the world's forced migrants ever reach the industrialized countries, the increase in the number of those claiming asylum over the past decade has driven the political and policy response to forced migration and, in turn, the pace and direction of policy change. Concerns that the asylum system is 'out of control', and that the perceived generosity of the international refugee regime is being systematically abused by those who are, in reality, in search of employment and welfare benefits rather than protection, continues despite the recent substantial drop in applications. Many politicians, policy-makers and members of the public believe that asylum is being (mis)used as a means of gaining access to the industrialized countries and that this reduces the efficiency of labour markets, involves substantial expenditure on processing and welfare and undermines public confidence in the ability of governments to control their borders. This is perceived to be a particular threat in the context of the global 'war on terror' and concerns about security. The irony of this assumption is not only that it flies in the face of what we see happening in the world—in Iraq, Sudan, Chechnya and elsewhere—but that many industrialized countries—including many in Europe— are desperately in need of both skilled and less skilled migrants to fill gaps in the diminishing labour force resulting from lower birth rates and changes in education and employment patterns. The result of this approach has been an emphasis on limiting access to the asylum system, narrowing the interpretation of the Refugee Convention and devising new mechanisms for determining the protection needs of refugees and asylum-seekers before they arrive. For many governments—including those in most EU member states, the USA and Australia—the standard for 67

ESSAYS judging performance on responses to forced migration is not the protection of the rights guaranteed under the Refugee Convention, but the achievements of immigration officials in driving down the numbers of applications. For example, the five-year strategy recently published by the UK Government boasts a 67% reduction in asylum claims from their peak in 2002. This approach is confusing for the public, who broadly agree that asylum is an important principle but are rarely, if ever, alerted to the connections between international events and levels of asylum applications. It also undermines the success of other policies (most notably in relation to integration). In recent years, many countries, particularly the more prosperous ones, have devoted billions of dollars to a variety of border-control techniques. These include the deployment of additional frontier guards and immigration officers, the construction of border fences and barriers, the interdiction and detention of migrants who are travelling in an unauthorized manner, the imposition of additional visa requirements, the introduction of machinereadable passports and, most recently, the use of biométrie data. Following substantial media coverage of the attempt by asylum-seekers, refugees and other migrants from the Sangatte refugee camp in France to enter the United Kingdom, an agreement was reached with the French authorities for UK immigration officers to be stationed at French ports in order to prevent wouldbe asylum-seekers from crossing the English Channel and accessing UK asylum procedures. In the USA, where concerns about security have led to increased border policing, the border with Mexico is currently patrolled by more than 11,000 immigration officials at a cost of more than US$ 1,000m. per year. Congress has recently debated building a fence along the entire south-west border that would cost roughly $9,000m. The USA and Australia continue to intercept would-be asylum-seekers at sea, and make it almost impossible for them to be accepted as refugees in the country which they were trying to access. Italy has also turned to interception at sea, and has on at least two occasions deported hundreds of people without allowing UNHCR to confirm that they had been adequately screened for refugee claims. Efforts to prevent or limit access to the asylum system have continued even where applications have been falling. In Switzerland, for example, there was one of the steepest declines in asylum applications from 2003 to 2004, a fall of 32.3%. Yet at nearly the same time that the asylum figures were made public, the country passed one of the most restrictive asylum laws in Europe. The financial costs of preventing access to the asylum system are high. So, too, are the human costs. A record 484 migrants died in the summer of 2005 as they attempted to cross the US-Mexico border. On the African continent, there were clashes in 2005 between security officials and migrants who had 68

Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Internally Displaced crossed the Sahara to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. A number of migrants were shot dead. It is estimated that more than 6,000 migrants died attempting to enter the EU between 1993 and April 2005, many of them perishing during attempts to cross the Mediterranean from North Africa. Given that there are currently no mechanisms through which forced migrants in search of protection are able to claim asylum from outside the country to which they are heading, the imposition of measures to prevent access to procedures of asylum determination have arguably undermined the Refugee Convention and the concept of protection at a time when it is more important than ever. Such measures have also, arguably, led to an increase in irregular migration and illegal entry. Many forced migrants move irregularly, often making use of migrant-smuggling networks, because they are unable to gain the documents they need to travel in an authorized manner. Indeed, a person who is being persecuted by his or her government may well find it impossible to obtain a passport, let alone a visa to enter another country. Efforts to tighten border controls may well make it more likely that refugees will need to become irregular in order to access the protection to which they are entitled under international law. In addition to measures designed to prevent access to the protection available under the Refugee Convention, governments have increasingly sought to narrow its application—and the rights with which Convention refugee status is associated—to an increasingly limited group of forced migrants. In some states there has been a gradual movement away from a rights-based approach towards more discretionary forms of refugee protection. This is reflected in the proliferation of alternative forms of protection other than that available under the Refugee Convention, which almost invariably offer fewer rights and a lower level of access to resources and security. In some cases the security context has been used to justify an extension to the scope of the exclusionary clauses of the Refugee Convention, enabling refugees to be excluded from having their applications for asylum considered with the determination process. At the same time, many receiving states have adopted an increasingly narrow interpretation of the Convention's provisions. The use of the term 'bogus' or 'abusive' in relation to applications for asylum which do not meet the Convention's criteria ignores the fact, well understood by governments but not by their publics, that only those forced migrants who fall within the very narrow and technical definition of a refugee will be granted that status and recognised as 'genuine' refugees in need of protection. The UN definition and its current interpretation by decision-makers excludes many others who by any moral or humanitarian standard might be considered to be genuinely in need of protection. Given that Convention refugee status has come to be most 69

ESSAYS strongly associated with those involved directly in conventional forms of political activity and resistance, for which they are then persecuted, those forced migrants whose experiences fall outside this, the predominant interpretation of 'political activity', are likely to be marginalized and excluded from the protection available under the Refugee Convention. Women whose applications for asylum do not fit a stereotypical male 'norm' appear to have lost out in this process because their political protest, activism and resistance may manifest itself in different ways. Most recently there have also been European proposals to find alternative ways to process applications for asylum before would-be asylum-seekers arrive in EU member states. The desire of countries to reduce the number of asylum-seekers for which they are responsible and the concerns of UNHCR that durable solutions be found to the causes of refugee flows have come together—in a rather unexpected and worrying way—in recent European discussions about so-called 'extra-territorial processing'. Early in 2003, the European Council received two proposals, one from the UK Government and one from UNHCR, each mapping out their ideas for a future European Asylum System, which included establishing 'transit camps' in countries outside Europe in which those hoping to travel to EU member states could have their applications for asylum processed. Although not entirely new, the UK proposals provided the catalyst for an intense debate within and outside the EU about the future of the international protection regime. This debate and the subsequent European Commission proposal for new approaches in handling EU asylum claims suggest that a fundamental shift is taking place in approaches to international refugee protection. The UK proposals provoked a public and political outcry because they were seen not as a genuine initiative to address the causes of forced migration, but as a populist attempt to be seen to be 'tough' on asylum. In the United Kingdom, as in many other countries in Europe, 'talking tough' on asylum has become very popular for politicians of all political persuasions. Recent developments in asylum policy and practice in Europe have a number of implications. A number of organizations, including Amnesty International and UNHCR, have expressed concern about the countries in which the transit camps are proposed to be located. Whilst they may be the most appropriate from a geographical point of view, several of the countries— most notably Libya and Algeria—do not themselves live up to international human rights standards and cannot therefore be expected to safely house asylum-seekers whilst a decision is being made. Moreover, experience shows that large-scale refugee camps, wherever they are located, often have their own internal difficulties in terms of both service provision and security, and in some cases lead to instability in the surrounding area. There are also concerns 70

Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Internally Displaced that the quality of decision-making may not be sufficient to ensure that those who are in need of protection are identified and not returned to their countries of origin. Even in European countries initial decisions are often wrong. Between 30%-60% of all people with refugee status in the EU are only recognized as such after appeals against initial decisions that have denied them refugee status. Alongside practical and ethical considerations, the proposals have raised concerns that the concept of extra-territorial processing itself undermines the principles of international protection and could spell the beginning of the end of any meaningful refugee protection in Europe. Many NGOs have commented that the United Kingdom's 'new vision' proposal bears striking similarities to the highly controversial Australian 'Pacific Solution', under which the Australian government persuaded Nauru and Papua New Guinea to permit the establishment of Australian-funded detention centres where asylum-seekers were held pending determination of their status. In the same way it is feared that camps in North Africa and elsewhere could be used by Europe to avoid its responsibility for dealing with refugees and asylum-seekers. At the very least, the current policy discussions and tone of the political debate send a very negative message to other countries in the world hosting much larger numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers than those in Europe. At the same time as industrialized countries continue to devote considerable financial resources—and not inconsiderable political energy—to preventing forced migrants from accessing the protection theoretically available to them under the Refugee Convention, the needs of the growing numbers of internally displaced remain firmly off the international political agenda. Indeed, it is likely that the political and policy response to forced migration is at least partly responsible for the increase in the number of IDPs who remain within their own countries. International obligations towards those who are internally displaced are defined by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Although heads of state and government recognized at the 2005 UN World Summit that the Principles are an important international framework and resolved to take effective measures to increase the protection of IDPs, this simply has not happened in practice. Because IDPs reside within the borders of their own countries and are under the jurisdiction of their governments, primary responsibility for meeting their protection and assistance needs rests with their national authorities. In reality, however, a disturbingly high number of governments not only fail to provide adequate assistance to IDPs on their territory but, worse still, are themselves responsible for the deliberate displacement of parts of their population in the first place. The international response to internal displacement meanwhile remains largely ad hoc and 71

ESSAYS suffers from a lack of political and financial support from UN headquarters and individual states. In countries experiencing large-scale crises of internal displacement, the international response remains characterized by lack of planning, failure to address critical protection gaps, inter-agency squabbles and inability to apply lessons learned. Recent experiences in Darfur, Liberia and Cte d'Ivoire are illustrative of these failures. The absence of long-term, meaningful solutions to the root causes of forced migration simply prolongs displacement, including that which occurs internally within countries. Even where peace agreements are reached, many of those who are displaced internally are unable or unwilling to return to their homes. Many of the world's refugees continue to live in long-term exile, with no prospects of a durable solution. Many of the conflicts that have led to refugee flows over the last 20 years remain unresolved. In addition to facilitating access to the asylum system and addressing the causes of forced migration, it is clear that there will need to be long-term or 'durable' solutions for the very many men, women and children—currently estimated to number around 6m.—who remain in an almost permanent state of crisis, unable to return to their homes or to continue with their lives in any meaningful way. Three durable solutions—voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of first asylum or resettlement in a third country—are the options available for the permanent resolution of the 'refugee cycle'. All three are regarded by UNHCR as durable because they promise an end to refugees' suffering and their need for international protection and dependence on humanitarian assistance. Until the mid-1980s, resettlement was generally seen by states as the preferred durable solution, with large numbers of refugees being resettled in the industrialized states from Hungary, Uganda, Chile and Viet Nam. Since the early 1990s, however, repatriation has begun to take centre stage and the number of arrivals of resettled refugees in industrialized countries remained fairly low, and indeed fell dramatically in the USA after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Yet resettlement arguably remains perhaps the most immediate and straightforward response to protracted refugee situations because it does not rely upon the resolution of long-standing conflicts. It also ensures that responsibility for meeting the needs of forced migrants and allowing them to rebuild their lives is shared far more equitably between so-called developing and industrialized countries than is currently the case. Large-scale resettlement, on the scale of hundreds—rather than tens—of thousands of refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs, will require a substantial shift in current thinking about the causes of (and solutions to) forced migration. It will also require an even greater shift in political will if it is to avoid simply undermining the protection available to those who arrive independently of such 72

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resettlement schemes. Resettlement schemes or other 'orderly entry' measures should be complementary to, not a replacement for, a full and fair system for dealing with spontaneous arrivals of asylum-seekers on EU territory. Any distinctions between 'good' resettled refugees and 'bad' spontaneous arrivals must be avoided, in rhetoric and in practice. CONCLUSION International migration is controversial and politically contentious because it highlights important questions about national identity, global equity, social justice and the universality of human rights. Many of these issues are highlighted far more starkly and controversially in relation to asylum and forced migration than they are in relation to labour migration. As a result governments will need to address the issue of asylum and the rights of refugees alongside those of labour migrants (who are often simply conceptualized as economic units of labour rather than as human beings with rights, responsibilities and aspirations). Success in managing international migration, both politically and in terms of concrete policy measures, will require governments to explicitly acknowledge and reinforce the principle that the ability to seek protection from persecution and human rights abuse is a fundamental human right, which should be facilitated rather than prevented. This will require national and international political leaders to argue for a more nuanced and sophisticated approach to the issues of asylum and forced migration which builds on and takes advantage of their powerful political and economic place in the world, acknowledges and addresses the root causes of international conflict and provides meaningful and long-term mechanisms for providing protection to those who are unable to obtain it in their countries of origin. The international community will also need to engage head-on with the current political and policy context that has been created by many national governments, some of which have opened up opportunities for labour migration to meet the needs of their own economies at the expense of principles of asylum, human rights and social justice. The world cannot and should not be divided into 'good' and 'bad' migrants or even inherently good and bad migration flows. The extent to which migrants and migration flows are associated with positive and negative outcomes for the countries from which they originate, the economy and society of receiving countries and for individual migrants themselves is as much—if not more—a reflection of the policies that are devised to manage these flows as it is of the nature and composition of the flows themselves. The sooner that governments and their publics come to terms with this reality and recognize that international 73

ESSAYS migration, in all its forms, is the clearest reflection of the interconnected world in which we now live, the sooner we will be able to benefit from the opportunities that it can potentially bring. Further Reading Castles, S., Crawley, H., and Loughna, S. States of Conflict: Causes and Patterns ofForced Migration to the EU and Policy Responses. London, 2004. Hathaway, J. The Rights of Refugees under International Law. Cambridge, 2005. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2005. Geneva, March 2006. Mooney, E. Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility. Bern, 2005. UNHCR. The State of the Worlds Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium. Geneva, 2006.

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Migration and Society PONTUS ODMALM

This essay examines the social, ethnic and political consequences of international and transnational migration from a comparative perspective, with a focus on Europe, North America and Australasia. After an overview of post-war patterns of migration, the essay discusses three interlinked areas on which migration has had an impact. First, how have immigration policies changed over time and what are the political underpinnings for this? This section initially discusses why more restrictive policies have replaced fairly liberal immigration controls, leading up to the current debate on 'managed migration', the introduction of a points system and the debate on asylum and refugees. Second, how have states dealt with the integration of migrants? The variance in terms of philosophies of integration (assimilation, multiculturalism, exclusionism) will be discussed in conjunction with traditions and interpretations of citizenship and belonging. The main modes of incorporation are then linked to current debates on whether states are (re)turning towards more assimilationist policies following perceived failures of multiculturalism. The final section focuses on the changing and contradictory context in which migration is discussed today. On the one hand, economic needs and demographic decline continue to prompt states to look beyond their borders in order to recruit labour to key sectors. On the other, the 'securitization' of migration in the post-9/11 era has radically altered immigration and integration discourse away from multicultural ideas. POST-WAR PATTERNS OF MIGRATION: FROM TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT TO TEMPORARY? Migration in the post-war period has typically been divided into two phases: first, the economically motivated migration from 1945-73, and second the post-oil crisis, asylum/refugee and family reunification migration. Added to these phases, scholars often refer to the diversification of migration from the 1970s onwards, which includes student, retirement, skilled, undocumented and return migration. A common distinction is furthermore made between 'countries of immigration' (e.g. Australia, Canada and the USA) and 'countries 75

ESSAYS of emigration' (e.g. those in southern Europe and North Africa). In contrast, many of the key receiving countries in Western Europe (e.g. the United Kingdom, France and Germany) have for a very long time resisted being labelled as receiving countries and instead considered themselves as countries of emigration. In these countries, legal structures were set up in order to maintain links with the emigrated population in the New World through jus sanguinis (or heritage) modes of citizenship. Although characterized as settler countries, Australia, Canada and the USA resembled their European counterparts in a number of ways. First, immigration control has been key in filtering out particular types of migrants. Australia adopted a 'White Australia' approach which included an early example of a citizenship test, in the form of a dictation test in a European language; Canadian policy distinguished between preferred and non-preferred migrants up until the early 1960s; and the USA introduced the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. Second, the New World countries also experienced immigration of displaced persons in the post-war period and invited labour migrants, as shown, in the case of the USA, by the large number of workers from Mexico and the Caribbean. The recipient countries in Western Europe have a long, but varied, history of both emigration and immigration, which reflects their historical and geopolitical involvement with the sending countries. Britain has been receiving migrants for almost 400 years, while France has experienced immigration since the mid-19th century. A colonial past, linguistic ties and the role of chain-migration help to explain the particular post-war immigration patterns, from the Caribbean and Indian sub-continent to Britain and from North and Central Africa to France. Although it was also a colonial power, the Netherlands experienced relatively little pre-war colonial migration and was instead characterized by large flows of emigration as a consequence of the density of the population and the country's small size. Germany was for a long time one of the main sending countries, especially to the USA, to which around 7m. emigrated in the period between 1820 and 1960. Simultaneously, internal migration was a very significant factor in the 19th century, as was the remarkably high number of resident foreigners (800,000 in the population census of 1900). Migration to Germany began to accelerate in the immediate post-war period with the arrival of 12m.-14m. refugees and expellees from formerly German territories which had been occupied by Soviet troops. Simultaneously, the migration of Aussiedler (i.e. ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) began and continued up until the early 1990s. The Aussiedler migration provides an illuminating example of the German understanding of citizenship. As these migrants were considered to be Germans, they automatically 76

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received German citizenship even though, in many cases, they had no immediate connection to Germany. Sweden, on the other hand, shares the German experience of being a key sending country in the 19th century and having a relatively late start as a country of immigration, although Finnish migration to Sweden has been significant throughout history. Even though these cases show that migration is part of a long historical pattern, the major inflows of people occurred throughout the reconstruction period after 1945. A number of Western European countries experienced severe labour shortages following the war and began to look beyond their borders for potential recruits. Initially these labourers came from southern Europe, but recruitment gradually shifted towards northern Africa (Morocco and Algeria), Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. The particular directions of these migrants can be explained by historical links (e.g. colonialism); bilateral agreements (e.g. between Germany and Turkey) and chain migration (e.g. from the Turkish village Kulu to Sweden). As demand for migrant labour increased, so too did the number of workers heading for Europe. Labour migration clearly dominated the migration flows in the first decades of the post-war period, with Germany absorbing a majority of these migrants. At its peak, Germany had almost 1.5m. guestworkers by the mid-1960s, compared to 800,000 in France and around 75,000 in Sweden and the Netherlands. The recruitment of foreign labour was driven by economic interests and the majority of the receiving countries (Sweden being a notable exception) did not consider it to be anything but temporary. Germany stands out in comparison to other European countries as a prime example of the rotation approach, whereby there were few rights for migrant workers and working conditions were sometimes appalling. Migrants were intended to stay for a short period of time and to depart once their contracts expired. This situation is exemplified by the German word for these migrants: Gastarbeiter (guest workers). In reality, this system proved to be unfeasible for both migrants and employers. In the long term, consequently, migration tended to be long-term to permanent, with many migrants opting to have their families reunite with them. An often overlooked aspect of international migration is that the guestworker principle is today also in use in many of the Gulf states and in Asia, but with much harsher conditions. In the Gulf states, labour migrants only receive a visa if they are sponsored by an employer and are furthermore tied to this particular employer, with few legal rights if a dispute arises. In addition, few labour codes exist and international labour conventions have rarely been ratified. In general, foreign labourers are excluded from other social spheres. The oil crisis of 1973, in combination with pressure from the trade unions, acted as a justification for the European recruiting countries to halt the flow of labour migrants. Attempts were made to encourage labour migrants to return, 77

ESSAYS which, paradoxically, coincided with the introduction of measures to improve the status of resident foreigners. Although immigration control became stricter and a number of entry requirements were put in place (e.g. visas, pre-existing employment, family connections), migration as such did not stop, it only changed appearance. Apart from patterns of family reunification, the major source of migration in the 1970s was asylum-seekers and refugees. Between 1950 and 1989,176,000 asylum-seekers from (mainly) South America and the Middle East obtained permanent residency in Sweden. Despite being a 'late starter', Germany received around 450,000 asylum claims in 1992. Alongside Austria, Belgium, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands, Germany has been one of the main destination countries in Western Europe for asylum migration. Today, migration is characterized by its diversity, both in terms of type (e.g. student, return, retirement, undocumented and skilled migration), duration (e.g. seasonal, short-, medium- and long-term) and motivation (e.g. economic, family reunification, asylum and refugees). IMMIGRATION POLICY: ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN AND PROTECTIONIST FORCES Immigration policy is one of the most pertinent issues facing nation states, as evidenced most recently in the American debate on Mexican migration. In order to understand why immigration policy and border control have undergone changes, one first needs to understand what the goals were of having liberal or more restrictive policies. For most of the post-war period, immigration policy was driven by economic needs, with nation states trying to regulate labour markets through the use of foreigners. In this sense, states viewed migrant labour as a commodity which could be admitted and repatriated, depending on the economic cycle. Immigration policies included elements that intended to find a balance between levels of immigration, employer demand and the state of the resident workforce. Failing to achieve this balance would result in economic instability, in the form of higher unemployment levels and loss of international capital. On the other hand, states were restricted to using the movement of people as an 'On/off switch by various international agreements, and by standards of treatment which concerned the treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees, and approaches to family reunion, student migration, etc. Immigration policy is furthermore closely connected with and impacts on processes of integration. The 'success' of integration depends on how states target recruitment, assess skills, enforce equal treatment and facilitate economic and social mobility. Whether migrants face restrictions on family reunion or not will thus contribute to the stability and level of integration 78

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in the host society. Here we can see a clear division between the old and new countries of immigration. Canada and Australia have, for example, put in place proactive immigration policies with so-called points systems, with the aim of attracting particular immigrants whose skills are needed. In countries where labour-market integration is viewed as the key area of integration, such systems, it is argued, will enhance migrants' chances of integration in other social spheres. This approach is echoed in the British policy of 'managed migration' and the introduction of a points system in the United Kingdom in 2007. A key objective of the managed migration programme is to attract and encourage migrant entrepreneurs who can start businesses, provide key services and employ more people. The Home Office has, for instance, developed a special visa scheme for migrants who can show proof of a business plan. An additional category within this scheme is the 'Working Holidaymakers' initiative for Commonwealth citizens, which allows a stay of up to a maximum of two years in Britain and permits the holders of this visa to take any work in the United Kingdom. For other non-EU nationals, very few opportunities existed to enter Britain legally, which prompted the government to introduce the Sector Based Scheme (SBS) in 2003. With its temporary nature and focus on low-skill jobs in hospitality and food processing, this pilot programme more than anything resembled earlier 'guestworker' ideals. Following the 2005 enlargement, the scheme was revised and the hospitality sector became closed to non-EU nationals since the expectation was that workers from the new member states would now be able and, more importantly, willing to fill these vacancies. Within the EU, one also finds differences in terms of how old members view the new member states, with only Britain, Ireland and Sweden allowing movement and settlement for labour purposes. The USA, on the other hand, faces the dilemma of needing to attract labour for particular market segments while at the same time having to clamp down on undocumented migrants and on firms and individuals found employing workers without a valid residency and work permit. Even though the door to labour migration closed after 1973, states have been unable to halt migration due to processes of family reunification and the admittance of asylum-seekers and refugees. The latter, especially, have been subject to both domestic and supranational dispute, in that the countries which signed the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol have a legal obligation to provide protection for persons fleeing prosecution, but may at the same time be unwilling to admit refugees. Nation states have thus been circumventing the Convention by adopting a number of measures in order to tighten their asylum procedures, such as suspending all but the UN Convention category of refugees. A number of EU countries, and especially those in which the Right and the Far Right have gained electoral power 79

ESSAYS (traditionally Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and, most recently, the Netherlands) have pushed for further immigration control and for the reinforcement of compulsory integration measures. The emphasis on integration has had further consequences for migrants, in that failure to comply with these schemes can have implications for long-term residence permits as well as for possibilities to naturalize. The tightening of asylum policies was under way following the economic crisis of the 1990s and has become an even more burning issue since 9/11 and the negative electoral responses towards migration throughout Western Europe. The effect of this political backlash against migration in general, and refugee and asylum migration in particular, has been that states have made more extensive use of the immigration controls at their disposal. In addition to wishing to prevent economic migrants through visa regimes, these tools are now being used more extensively to prevent the movement of people from refugee-sending countries. Again, variation between countries is vast, with Australia requiring visas for all foreign nationals, while the EU countries, the USA and Canada only require visas from countries said to produce large numbers of refugees. Similarly, through the harmonization effects of the Schengen Agreement, the access of citizens from about 120 countries to the EU is restricted. Following this development, immigration policy relating to asylum has prompted an intra-EU debate focusing, on the one hand, on reaffirming the policy that refugees must stay in the first safe country they reach and, on the other, on discussions about burden sharing. The latter can be seen as a consequence of the former, in that countries like Germany have been positive towards a policy of burden-sharing, arguing that their high net share of the 'asylum burden' was unfair, whereas low-intake countries like France and Britain have been negative. Similarly, the possibility of being granted permanent residency has become increasingly less likely for refugees since states are now more likely to adopt the use of temporary protection than before. In 1999, the Australian government adopted new legislation which made it virtually impossible for 'unauthorized' refugees to be granted permanent residence status. Similarly, many states have also introduced ways of preventing asylum-seekers from reaching their national territory, either by returning them to their country of origin or confining them to a third country while their claims for asylum are assessed—as in the infamous case of 2001, when Australia used the island of Nauru for this purpose. CITIZENSHIP AND INTEGRATION Citizenship is a key institution for contemporary societies in that it sets out the formal rules of inclusion and lies at the very core of national identity. 80

Migration and Society Citizenship is also, in many cases, closely linked to integration. The historical development of the concept of citizenship has come to mark the relationship between the state and the individual, in that the status of citizen sets out the rights and obligations which are appointed to those perceived as members of that particular society. Citizenship is thus a crucial indicator of how states define who is a citizen, how one becomes a citizen and what citizenship means. Since citizenship has traditionally meant loyalty to one nation state, the presence of people with another nationality, or more, poses challenges to the nation state in terms of how to deal with these issues. Different states have, however, opted for different interpretations due to particular historical developments and, consequently, one finds different philosophies of citizenship and integration when comparing countries. This has given rise to a classification scheme depending on the extent to which states facilitate or constrain naturalization and whether this is accompanied by additional cultural obligations. The first of these, labelled the 'exclusive' or 'ethnic' model, provides an institutional set-up which either denies or makes it very difficult for migrants to gain access to the political community through adopting a jus sanguinis principle of citizenship. Germany pre-2000 is often used as an illustration of this approach, but less 'famous' examples include Austria, Greece and Switzerland. Outside of Western Europe, the Gulf states and most Asian countries have adopted jus sanguinis as the main mode of citizenship acquisition, while naturalization, either through birth or residency, is extremely difficult to acquire. Second, there is the 'assimilationist' or 'republican' model, which provides easy access to naturalization through a jus soli principle and semi-automatic citizenship for children of immigrant parents. The flipside is that citizenship comes with strong pressures on migrants to assimilate culturally and with little recognition of difference in the public sphere. France is often cited as the prime example of this approach, as well as the 'melting pot'-era USA. Finally, there is the 'multicultural' approach, which provides relatively easy access to naturalization and some rights for cultural difference in the public sphere. Typical examples of this approach include Canada, Australia, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands. In reality, however, most countries display elements from all three models. Germany, for example, provides mother-tongue education for immigrant children, but this is not sponsored by the German state and was in fact intended to facilitate reintegration once these children returned to their country of origin. Britain, on the other hand, pursues a laissez-faire policy in respect of cultural preservation and is more concerned with racial equality on the housing and labour markets. As such, the models should be interpreted as ideal types to which countries can correspond more or less. The models do, nevertheless, give us some indication of how receiving 81

ESSAYS states perceive their new population, which has important consequences for processes of integration. Citizenship is not only a means by which rights and duties are allocated, but, more importantly, also marks the type of relationship that the state has with its newcomers. It is thus important to consider also the symbolic labelling that is placed on migrants. Again, one finds differences when viewing countries in a comparative perspective. Australia, France, Sweden and the USA have opted for the term 'immigrant', Germany refers to immigrants as 'foreigners' while Britain, Canada and the Netherlands use the term 'ethnic minority'. Despite using the same term, the interpretation and definition of, for example, 'immigrant' differs between countries. In Sweden the statistical definition refers to persons born abroad and to Swedish-born persons both of whose parents were born abroad. However, the generic term 'immigrant' is often used to denote persons of a non-Western, non-Christian heritage and is often used as a shorthand category for anyone who is not white. In contrast, an immigrant in France refers to persons born abroad but is at the same time used to indicate status prior to becoming French or of persons who are perceived as being unable to assimilate. Similarly, 'ethnic minority' in the British and Dutch contexts differs remarkably. In the former, the term is used to signify geographical or ethnic origin ('Asian', 'Black' and 'White' respectively) through self-identification in census surveys. In the latter, the term is based on objective criteria (place of birth of self and parents) and is used for socioeconomic monitoring of these groups by the Dutch authorities. As traditional countries of immigration, the North American and Australian contexts view all (legal) immigrants as potential citizens and display similarities with the French case. Canada, more so than Australia and the USA, resembles the Netherlands by also recognizing and supporting ethnic diversity ('visible minorities'). The USA monitors ethnic origin ('Asian', 'Black', 'Hispanics' and 'White') but does not actively support or encourage these ethnic categories to the same extent as in the Canadian case. Ideas of multiculturalism were for many years considered to be a paradigm and a preferred solution to the more negatively charged approach of assimilation. Similarly, national citizenship was for many considered obsolete, having been replaced by ideas of post-national membership and universal human rights. However, beginning in the 1990s and especially since 9/11, scholars and policy-makers have begun to discuss and critically assess the value of multicultural politics and to what extent states are starting to return towards more assimilationist policies. Comparisons have been made of the extent to which multicultural policies have been on the decline, with reference to both 'old' countries of immigration, such as the USA, Canada and Australia, as well as to more recent countries of immigration, such as Sweden, 82

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the Netherlands and Germany. In this light, the somewhat overlooked contradiction that discourses of multiculturalism display is thoroughly discussed. Official multiculturalism, in terms of the explicit recognition and protection of immigrants as distinct ethnic groups, is often absent in favour of a so-called de facto multiculturalism. This, it is argued, is not so much a distinguishing feature of multiculturalism as a requirement by the logic of liberal states regarding, for instance, the protection of rights. Citizenship has simultaneously undergone a re-evaluation in two ways. First, there has been a tightening of citizenship acquisition in traditionally inclusive citizenship regimes (the USA, Ireland); and, second, a trend towards more inclusive modes in the traditionally exclusive regimes of some European countries. Today, a number of EU countries display similar attitudes towards dual nationality, duration of stay before naturalization and the position of second and third generations, etc. More importantly, the trend indicates a move towards an American style of de-ethnicizing citizenship, making it dependent on residence, birth on territory and conforming to political values rather than ethnicity. Despite this relaxation, a number of receiving states in Europe (Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands) have introduced or are debating the introduction of (Germany, Sweden) various types of citizenship tests. This suggests that migrants are now to a greater extent under pressure to show that they conform to the receiving state's values, traditions and ways of life. SECURITY, MIGRATION AND LABOUR MARKET NEEDS: MIGRANTS AS THREAT AND NECESSITY The re-emphasis on citizenship and assimilation can be viewed as an effect of immigration's development into a security issue. Migration, it is argued, has become 'securitized' since it poses a threat to the state (or even, more generally, Western democratic values). This process has further meant that issues relating to migration have started to move beyond the established rules of the political game and are now framed as issues which require either special measures or are considered to be above politics. As a security threat, the state can thus justify the use of extraordinary measures, e.g. detaining terrorist suspects for long periods of time without charge or increasing the powers of state institutions to remove citizenship. Although most of the debate after 9/11 and 7/7 has been focused on migration as a threat to national security, the link between migration and security has a long history. Already in the early 1990s, a number of situations were identified in which migrants and refugees might be viewed as a threat to either the receiving country, the sending country or to the relationship between these countries. First, as a threat to the political regime of the host society 83

ESSAYS (e.g. refugees). Second, as a cultural threat (e.g. non-white, non-Christian migrants). And, finally, as a social and economic threat (e.g. undocumented migrants). Similarly, in the 1980s the debate on migration within the EU was not only concerned with co-ordinating asylum policy and restricting immigration, but also discussed migration as a threat to public order and domestic stability. Immigrants and asylum-seekers were, in other words, connected with terrorism, transnational crime and unsatisfactory border control. The move of migration from 'low polities' to 'high politics' after 2001 has led to further co-operation and co-ordination in terms of the much-debated common EU migration policy. Consequently, protecting and managing the EU's external borders has become a high priority for the supporters of the 'Fortress Europe' approach, as displayed in the further tightening of border controls and the striving to move asylum reception off shore. Similarly, the USA issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive Two that aimed to combat terrorism through immigration policies. This Directive has in effect locked immigration and security together bureaucratically. The Directive also gave further powers to federal agencies to co-operate and deny entry into the USA to aliens who are 'associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity' as well as to 'locate, detain, prosecute or deport such aliens already present in the United States'. These new developments have enabled the nation state to effectively bypass established liberal ideas and institutions of civil liberties and independent judiciaries. At the same time, problems of labour shortages and demographic deficits have paradoxically created a more rational and open approach to immigration, exemplified with the move towards managing, rather than controlling, migration. A managed migration approach can, however, be viewed as creating a sharper distinction between welcome (the highly skilled, students, entrepreneurs) and less welcome types of migration (the unskilled, asylum-seekers). The distinction between skilled and unskilled is usually further broken down into that between legal and undocumented migrants. The rationale behind this pairing is that low-skilled migrants are more likely to enter illegally since there are few legal entry channels available. This situation also comes with no access to basic entitlements, such as education and health services, and with the constant fear of expulsion. Similarly, the USA faces the contradictory situation of arguing for closed borders, due to large-scale undocumented migration and the security fears associated with this type of migration, as well as facing severe labour shortages. This approach is particularly confusing since studies suggest that during the 1990s, one-third of the US labour market would have contracted had it not been for the arrival of the non-citizen workforce. Attempts to resolve this contradiction were debated in the US Senate in early 2006 and were the cause 84

Migration and Society of large-scale protests by, primarily, the Hispanic population. The reason for controversy was related to the construction of a wall to stop migrants entering from Mexico, stricter measures to catch and remove undocumented migrants and a complete reinvention of the US guestworker scheme. FUTURE ISSUES CITIZENSHIP TESTS, STATUS OF THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS, EU CITIZENSHIP The most common way for first-generation migrants to gain citizenship of another state is through naturalization, whereas second-generation migrants can acquire citizenship either through birth (the jus soli principle) or if at least one parent is a national of the host society (the jus sanguinis principle). In the first case, receiving states display a number of commonalities in terms of the necessary requirements for migrants to naturalize. These most commonly include a minimum period of residence, no criminal record and sufficient financial resources. With regard to residency periods, these are by no means uniform but can be divided into short, medium and long categories. States in the first category include Australia (two years) Belgium (three years), Ireland (four years) and Canada (four years); the second category includes Britain (five years), France (five years), the Netherlands (five years), Sweden (five years), the USA (five years) and Finland (six years), whereas the third category encompasses Germany (eight years), Denmark (nine years), Austria (10 years), Italy (10 years), Luxembourg (10 years), Portugal (10 years), Spain (10 years), Greece (10 years) and Switzerland (12 years). In addition to these stipulations, states are also increasingly keen for migrants to show that they have integrated 'properly'. This can be in the form of passing basic language tests or, as is becoming increasingly popular in Western Europe, wider citizenship tests. On the other hand, the USA and Canada have had a longer history of quizzing their potential citizens. This test has, by and large, been perceived as unproblematic since it corresponds with the idea of migrants reinventing themselves as part of the migration experience in the New World countries. In contrast, the debate in Western Europe has been framed in terms of integration and multicultural failures, and the introduction of citizenship tests can be seen as an example of states beginning to place greater importance on citizenship as well as returning to ideas of assimilation. The reasoning behind these arguments falls broadly into two camps. On the one hand, there are those who argue that becoming a citizen should mean more than merely acquiring a new passport and who point to factors such as lack of social cohesion and problems of ethnic segregation. On the other, critics suggest that multiculturalism has had isolating effects and contributed to extremism. Behind these two lines of thought lies the view that citizenship 85

ESSAYS should be considered as a reward to individuals who show that they deserve it as opposed to being used as a way to integrate newcomers more effectively into the community. In the EU, Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands have introduced citizenship tests, while the introduction of tests has been high on the agenda in Sweden and in the German Lander of Hesse and BadenWürttemberg. The differences between the tests, however, are significant, with the British test being relatively easy compared to the Dutch one. The latter case is particular interesting in the context of the 'return of assimilation' debate. The Netherlands, alongside Sweden, was for a long time considered the epitome of multiculturalism, with liberal citizenship policies, support for ethnic and faith-based organizations and a variety of channels for ethnic minority representation. However, beginning in the 1990s and accelerating with the presence of populist politician Pirn Fortuyn and the assassination of film-maker Theo van Gogh, Dutch policy has now undergone a virtual U-turn in terms of abandoning the multicultural agenda. Recent changes include moving away from the 'ethnic minority' discourse in favour of an individualistic, civic integration approach and emphasizing that integration is a twoway process in which migrants, not only the host society, have to change and adapt. This new approach echoes the British view on race relations as well as corresponding to similar changes in Swedish policy during the second half of the 1990s. The Dutch citizenship test thus reflects these radical changes and places more importance on migrants showing a willingness to assimilate than before. Consequently, the previously high naturalization rates have dropped dramatically since many applicants are failing the test. The Swedish debate on citizenship tests has in some ways been more controversial compared to Britain and the Netherlands. Prior to 2002, citizenship was rarely debated in relation to issues of integration, but it became a heated political topic when the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) began to play the migration card in the 2002 election. The reason for controversy was its proposal to introduce language tests for migrants wishing to naturalize, as well as its suggested introduction of a Swedish version of the American 'welfare to work' programme, which was interpreted as a way of blaming migrants for their relatively higher levels of socio-economic exclusion. Even though many migrants wish and choose to naturalize in their new country of residence, many decide not to and fall into the category of thirdcountry nationals (TCN) or 'denizens'. In the EU in particular, these migrants face two types of limitation compared to EU nationals. First, they lack the right to work in other EU countries (other than the one in which they reside), and, second, they often lack political rights in their country of residence. Although a number of EU countries now grant legally resident non-nationals local voting rights and socio-economic rights (and, in the case of EU 86

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nationals, the right to vote in EU elections also), the rights of TCNs vary depending on the grounds, legality and duration of their stay. Securing the legal status of TCNs has been a major concern for the EU, given the different legal systems in place in member states concerning naturalization. Further problems arise when TCNs are reluctant to naturalise owing to the negative effects this may have in their country of origin. A proposed solution has been to facilitate dual nationality for migrants and TCNs. Currently, eight of the 'old' EU countries accept dual nationality (Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom), whereas four (Austria, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg) do not. Three (Germany, the Netherlands and Spain) do not accept dual nationality in principle, but offer a number of exemptions. In comparison, Canada and the USA accept dual nationality, whereas Australia has only recently (2002) made this option available. It is, however, reasonable to expect that the USA, especially, may in the future reconsider its lenient approach to dual nationality for two reasons. First, given the increased 'securitization' of migration, the USA is now also acknowledging that terrorism may very well come from within and may consequently introduce legal means, similar to those in Britain, to strip dual nationals of their US nationality. Second, important legal changes, such as the 1996 law which withdrew social rights for legal and illegal migrants, correspond to the re-emphasis on citizenship and assimilation which, in effect, serves as an encouraging factor for migrants to naturalize.

CONCLUSION Migration continues to be both a blessing and a curse for Western states. During the labour-migration era, migrants were invited to fill important gaps in the labour market. Today, with the population in the developed world growing older and facing a birth deficit, migrants are again used to fill positions in health-care, construction and hospitality. On the other hand, migrants are perceived as an economic, cultural and political threat, with discussions framed around securing borders (external as well as internal), the need for migrants to assimilate and the rediscovered importance of citizenship. This essay has discussed how states have responded to the impact of migration, with a focus on Europe, North America and Australasia. Their different patterns of migration reflect their different historical relationships with the sending countries as well as labour-market needs. The countries in focus also display a number of different approaches and attitudes to the new population in terms of immigration, integration and citizenship policies. It is therefore necessary to adopt a comparative perspective in order to understand 87

ESSAYS the extent of migrants' socio-economic and political inclusion in receiving states. Furthermore, tendencies to 'securitize' migration and view the presence of migrants as a threat raise questions about how notions of citizenship and integration have begun to change in the post-9/11 era. Current developments suggest that the distinction between citizens and non-citizens (as well as between EU and non-EU citizens) is becoming sharper, with receiving states beginning to view citizenship as a reward rather than as a tool of integration. Consequently, a number of states have introduced or are debating the introduction of citizenship tests for migrants as well as placing additional formal prerequisites on migrants before they are eligible to naturalize. This has further consequences for the rights of non-national, resident migrants in the EU, North America and Australasia. The EU faces a dual dilemma here. On the one hand, realizing the need to enforce its external borders and uphold 'Fortress Europe', while, on the other, struggling with the extent of rights that TCNs should enjoy once they have been legally admitted. One solution may lie with providing TCNs with a civic form of citizenship, first proposed in 2000 in a Communication of the Commission. Such a citizenship would come with very similar rights and obligations to those enjoyed by EU citizens. Adopting a civic citizenship can thus be viewed as a tool for gradually harmonizing the status of third-country nationals and providing a common legal framework for immigrants in the EU. Further Reading Castles, S., and Davidson, A. Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging. London, Macmillan Press, 2000. Hammar, T. Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration. Ashgate, Aldershot, 1990. Joppke, C, and Morawska, E. Towards Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2003.

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Part lb Regional Overviews

Migration in Europe CHRISTINA BOSWELL

INTRODUCTION European countries have on the whole been reluctant to recognize their status as immigration countries. Unlike the traditional settler countries of North America and Australasia, they have displayed a profound ambivalence about accepting large-scale immigration. Yet the reality is that most West European countries have experienced substantial immigration since the Second World War, and almost all European countries are now net immigration countries. Indeed, immigration flows into the EU totalled 2.8m. in 2004, compared to 1.2m. to North America. In 2003, the region hosted a foreign-born population of 31.6m. migrants (or 9.7% of the total population), compared to 34.6m. in the USA (12.3% of the population).1 There is every indication that Europe's importance as a region of destination will increase, as European countries recruit migrants to meet the labour and skills shortages that are predicted to rise in coming decades. What accounts for this relative antipathy towards immigration? While crossnational similarities should not be overstated, in almost all European countries issues of labour migration, irregular migration, asylum and integration have become highly politically contested. The result has been an onus on restricting immigration and asylum, in political rhetoric and practice. This restrictive agenda often runs counter to economic considerations, as well as to normative and legal commitments to immigrants and refugees. Moreover, many countries are becoming increasingly multi-ethnic, generating new pressures and incentives to incorporate ethnic minority interests. So there are awkward tensions between political forces in favour of restriction, and economic and rights-based pressures to remain open to at least some groups of immigrants. 1

The figures on foreign population in 2003 are drawn from OECD SOPEMI, Trends in International Migration (Paris, OECD, 2005). In all other cases, figures are drawn from the 2006 yearbook, International Migration Outlook (Paris, OECD, 2006). Europe in this case refers to members of the European Economic Area (EEA—all EU member states plus Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein) and Switzerland. For the rest of this essay, unless otherwise indicated, Europe will usually refer to EEA countries and Switzerland, plus the Central European accession countries Romania and Bulgaria. Where relevant, the discussion will also refer to associated countries in the western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Turkey.

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ESSAYS These national policy dilemmas also need to be understood in the context of complex regional dynamics. To begin with, EU co-operation has led to the elimination of restrictions on mobility between member states, as well as to a new agenda for a common immigration and asylum policy. These regional arrangements are sometimes viewed as a means of addressing national policy problems, but in some cases they can also exacerbate them. Equally significant are a number of regional geopolitical challenges, linked to the fall of the Iron Curtain. The removal of communist-era barriers to free movement, and the transition processes in Central and East European countries (CEECs), generated significant East-West migration and refugee flows. They also led to changes in the composition of flows, implying substantial refugee movements from the western Balkans, and increased irregular migration and trafficking from and through Central and East Europe. Again, these developments have posed new policy problems for individual European countries and for the EU as a regional actor. This essay outlines and assesses these experiences, and considers how European governments and the EU have responded to them. After providing a brief overview of migration trends, the essay explores the problems and policy dilemmas raised for European states. In a third part, it analyses how effective attempts at regional co-operation have proved to be in addressing these problems. MIGRATION TRENDS Migration and Refugee Flows All European states are now net immigration countries. For some host countries, such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark, this has been the case since at least the 1960s. Despite a relative decline in migration after recruitment stops in 1973-74, immigration flows have been continuous, for the most part taking the form of family reunion, refugee flows and labour migration. Most of these countries have experienced particularly high levels of immigration since the 1990s. A second category of European countries became net receiving countries in the 1980s, in large part because of growing economic prosperity (Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) but also because of a redirection of migration flows following the introduction of more restrictive policies in North European receiving countries. Third, a number of CEECs have more recently become host countries. After 1989, former socialist countries on the EU's eastern borders became important transit countries for migrants attempting to enter more prosperous West 92

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European countries. This pattern has persisted for many non-EU countries in Eastern and South-East Europe. But economic growth and political stability have rendered most of the countries that recently joined the EU destinations in their own right. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia all now have positive net migration.

Note: figures are from 2005, except for Belgium and Germany, which are from 2004. 93

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Data source: Trends in International Migration, OECD SOPEMI 2004. Note that all data are estimates, compiled from 2002 statistics. Due to missing data, figures for Austria and Great Britain are from 2001. Europe is defined as the then 15 member states of the European Union plus Switzerland and Norway. In the case of Ireland, detailed data concerning inflow of foreign population by nationality were unavailable.

Principal migrations into Europe

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Just as significant as quantitative changes, though, are shifts in the composition of these flows. While absolute numbers of family-related and protection-seeking migrations have remained more or less constant since 1999, the number of labour immigrants and their share in total flows has increased substantially. The national composition of recent flows varies for each European host country. Since 1990 there have been, among others, significant flows of Turkish and Moroccan nationals in the EU-15 countries, as well as of protection seekers from former Yugoslav countries, Iran and Iraq. Meanwhile, a number of commentators have observed new patterns of mobility. One important shift is the observed increase in short-term, circular migration, often as a household strategy for supplementing the income of families at home. A second is the increase in irregular migration, which can take the form of illegal entry or overstay, often organized by smugglers or trafficking networks. There have been some attempts to estimate the scale of the phenomenon. The EU, for example, suggested that 500,000 irregular migrants might be entering EU states annually. It has been estimated that there are 300,000 irregular migrants in France, 500,000 in Germany, 370,000 in Greece, 700,000 in Italy, 690,000 in Spain and 200,000 in the United Kingdom. Explaining Recent Trends Clearly, conditions in countries of origin are a major factor behind these changing patterns of mobility. But political developments in European host countries have also played a role. Since the late 1990s, a number of European countries have made themselves accessible to selected (especially highskilled) labour migrants, and this has contributed to the rise in labour migration. The expansion of possibilities for labour migration reflects problems of labour shortages and mismatch of supply and demand in many European countries. However, programmes remain limited in scope. They certainly cannot absorb all would-be labour migrants, nor are they sufficiently broad to fully meet domestic demand for foreign labour. The limited scope of these programmes therefore contributes to the continued trend of irregular entry, stay and employment. A second set of factors influencing migration flows over the past 15 years has been the changed relationship between the EU and its neighbours to the east and the south. To begin with, the removal of restrictions on travel for nationals of communist countries opened up multiple channels for regular mobility: intra-company transfers, possibilities for study, temporary labour migration programmes, and Aussiedler (ethnic German) resettlement, to name but a few. It also created possibilities for irregular migration, smuggling and 95

ESSAYS trafficking from and through Central East and South-East Europe. Some of these flows, such as the repatriation of Aussiedler, are now on the wane. Tighter control of the EU's new external borders to the east is also limiting the possibilities for mobility between new member states and their non-EU neighbours. Other types of flows are likely to continue or increase, given the labour-market and legislative trends mentioned above, and especially once temporary restrictions on the free movement of nationals from the new EU member states are lifted.

PROBLEMS AND POLICY CHALLENGES The Case for Labour Migration Unlike the self-proclaimed countries of immigration of the New World, Europe has found it difficult to come to terms with the fact of immigration. Anti-immigrant sentiment has manifested itself in public support for restrictive immigration and asylum policies, negative reporting on immigrants and asylum-seekers in the popular press, discrimination against resident ethnic minority groups, and racist or anti-immigrant harassment and violence. This hostility appears counter-intuitive, given the extent to which European countries have benefited from immigration in the past decades. Large-scale immigration in the 1950s and 1960s was a crucial component of post-war economic reconstruction in Western Europe. Today, labour migration fills critical gaps in the IT sector, engineering, construction, agriculture and foodprocessing, health-care, teaching, catering and tourism, and domestic services. According to many, ethnic diversity also contributes to the dynamism and economic success of international cities such as London, Amsterdam and Frankfurt. The economic case for labour migration is likely to become more urgent in the coming decades, for at least three reasons. First, European governments are increasingly recognizing the importance of skills in generating economic growth. Human capital has become the most crucial determinant of productivity and growth in an increasingly knowledge-based economy. This has made many governments keen to loosen up rules on labour migration, intracompany transfers and movement of service providers, in order to attract the best skills. Second, despite substantial structural unemployment in many European countries, European workers are often selective in their choice of occupations and locations, and are also more highly qualified than they were a decade ago. So although the portion of low- and semi-skilled jobs is declining (because of new production techniques and outsourcing), there are substantial gaps in a 96

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number of these occupations—especially in the agro-food industry, catering and domestic services. Third, ageing populations imply an increased dependency rate in European countries, i.e. a higher ratio of economically inactive to active population. This will place a strain on welfare systems, as health and pensions become more expensive. Ageing populations will also generate shifts in consumption patterns, in particular increasing demand for health-care and leisure activities, in turn creating additional demand for labour in these sectors. Thus, despite continued unemployment in many countries, problems of demand-supply mismatch and the need to attract high-skilled workers are likely to create serious labour shortages. Because labour migration is so politically sensitive, it is rarely the first choice of governments for filling labour gaps. The first line of response is likely to be measures to increase the participation rate of the domestic labour force, encourage higher birth rates among the domestic population, and promote increased flexibility and mobility of workers within the EU. However, these measures are unlikely to fully meet demand. Indeed, there have already been moves to liberalize labour-migration policies for particular skills, occupations or sectors in many European countries. As shortages become more acute, we can expect that governments will increasingly have recourse to labour migration as a tool for filling gaps. Pressures for Restriction Moves towards liberalization have been highly contested in national politics. This can be attributed in part to misconceptions about the economic impact of migration. Despite extensive research suggesting the contrary, many domestic workers are concerned about the possibility of displacement effects, especially where there is already high unemployment. There are also less tangible concerns about the socio-cultural impact of immigration, supported to some extent by an acknowledgement that the integration of previous waves of labour immigration has been far from smooth. Many Europeans are anxious about the 'ghettoization' of ethnic minorities in deprived inner cities, and the corresponding problems of inter-ethnic tensions and violence; the apparently poor educational and labour-market performance of many immigrants and ethnic minorities; criminality and even terrorist activism on the part of ethnic groups; and, more generally, the perceived decline in social cohesion as a result of cultural diversity. These fears are exacerbated by the growing challenge of migration control. Since the 1990s, rising numbers of asylum-seekers and an increase in irregular migration have fed alarmist tendencies in popular discourse. They appear to reinforce the notion that Europe is being flooded with migrants from 97

ESSAYS poorer regions, and that states are no longer able to control access to their territories and resources. Yet the attempt to reassure electorates through a (re)assertion of control is no straightforward task. Even if they wanted to restrict migration (which is not self-evident given its economic benefits), governments face a range of normative and institutional constraints. Liberal democratic countries are committed to norms of human rights and equal treatment of residents. These can often work to protect the rights of immigrants and refugees, especially where they are instantiated in national constitutions and judiciaries, as well as European and international conventions. Thus, for example, international refugee law and the European Convention on Human Rights have made it difficult for states to ignore norms of international protection. The extension of rights to non-nationals has also been promoted by welfare bureaucracies in European states, which are driven by a logic of equal treatment for residents.

Policy Dilemmas These rival pressures have been crystallized in a series of policy dilemmas, which can be grouped under four headings. • Labour migration In many countries there is a serious conflict between the economic and demographic case for expanded labour migration, and public resistance to increased migration. Many European governments have responded by 98

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introducing new provisions to increase labour migration, usually for highskilled and skilled migrants. These have typically taken the form of points systems, streamlined procedures for recruitment in particular sectors or occupations, or facilitating labour-market access for foreign graduates. However, explicit attempts to expand programmes have been politically controversial. One way of 'selling' them has been to accompany liberalization with promises of stricter control of other, non-economically beneficial migrants or refugees (for example, in the United Kingdom). Alternatively (or additionally), governments have placed the emphasis on temporary programmes, with the goal of avoiding permanent settlement (for example, in the case of the German Green Card). In other cases, governments have avoided political conflict by introducing liberalization by stealth, through acts and decrees that do not require parliamentary scrutiny and receive little media attention. Another tactic has been to tolerate substantial illegal migration, or to meet demand through periodic regularization programmes (for example in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). • Migration control European governments also face a number of dilemmas in their attempts to control irregular movement, residence and labour. Stringent border controls are expensive and can negatively affect tourism and trade. For Schengen countries, this form of internal border control is in any case ruled out by the abolition of internal border checks. Border and internal controls are also constrained by states' commitments to refugee protection. Where irregular entrants or residents apply for asylum, a range of rights begins to pertain, making it difficult for states to deport these claimants or exclude them from their territory. Attempts to control irregular labour face a rather different set of constraints: a conflict with business interests in securing a supply of cheap labour. There are also a number of political and ethical constraints to cracking down on illegal employment and stay. Watertight internal controls to prevent irregular stay would require a degree of state monitoring and intervention that is not acceptable in liberal democratic countries. Moreover, once people have been resident over a prolonged period, it is difficult to expel them for humanitarian and practical reasons, and there may be a strong case for regularizing their status. These considerations have often militated in favour of regularization programmes, or the 'adjustment' of status on a case basis. • Asylum systems Since the early 1980s, European states have virtually exhausted the repertoire of feasible restrictions to asylum systems—short of outright abandonment of 99

ESSAYS the 1951 Geneva Convention. Welfare and accommodation support for asylum-seekers has been radically reduced, and in some cases withheld altogether; asylum-seekers have been dispersed to specified regions, confined to reception centres, or detained; their applications have been assessed through special accelerated procedures; and visa restrictions and rules on 'safe countries' of origin or transit have limited access to asylum systems. Despite all of these changes, asylum systems continue to fail to meet their two major aims: supporting those in need of protection, and screening out or deterring those who are not. Thus they continue to be the object of criticism both from human rights and refugee groups concerned about gaps in protection; and from sections of the public and media which believe they are a 'soft touch' for immigrants abusing generous asylum and welfare provisions. • Integration This is one of the areas in which European approaches have shown the greatest degree of divergence. National approaches tend to reflect longstanding traditions of thought on identity, citizenship and the role of the state. At the risk of over-simplification, we can distinguish between three main approaches to integration since the Second World War: • the multicultural approach, implying tolerance of cultural and religious diversity, robust anti-discrimination legislation, and easy access to citizenship; • the social citizenship approach, offering immigrants a type of quasimembership in the form of full social and economic rights (denizenship), but restricted access to full citizenship; • the republican approach, which allows easy access to citizenship, but on the understanding that citizens divest themselves of particular ethnic or religious traits in the public sphere. However, all three models have attracted criticism over the past decade. One of the reasons for this critique is disappointment about the apparent 'failed' integration of many second- or third-generation immigrants. Many show disappointing levels of social interaction with non-coethnics, lack of affinity with the norms and values of host societies, and poor performance in education or the labour market. Concerns about failed integration partly explain the recent emphasis on language learning in many European countries. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom have all introduced new or reinforced measures to promote host-country language learning for immigrants or those acquiring citizenship. 100

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Source: Münz, R. and Fassmann, H. 'Migrants in Europe and their Economic Position: Evidence from the European Labour Force Survey and from Other Sources', Paper Prepared for the European Commission DG Employment and Social Affairs, July 2004. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_analysis/docs/migr_ in_europe4.pdf

A second reason for doubts about existing approaches to integration is the particular problem associated with the integration of Muslim residents in European states. Since the early 1990s, and especially since 11 September 2001, Islamic beliefs and practices have been singled out as incompatible with liberal democratic and human rights standards in European countries. This has resulted in the often populist targeting of Muslim communities in Europe. The issue has surfaced in debates about the wearing of headscarves in schools in Germany and France. It also came to the fore in the Netherlands following the Islamic fundamentalist-motivated murder of a prominent political figure in 101

ESSAYS that country, as well as in Spain and the United Kingdom after terrorist bombings in 2004 and 2005. On a more positive note, there has been a convergence towards more generous rules on naturalization in many European countries. This is likely to create more politically robust and civically engaged ethnic minority groups. EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION: OVERCOMING THE LIMITS OF DOMESTIC RESPONSES One strategy for overcoming the dilemmas described above has been cooperation between European countries, most notably in the framework of the EU.2 Since the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, EU co-operation on immigration and asylum has been developed within the area of Justice and Home Affairs (recently relabelled Freedom, Security and Justice). Regional co-operation on immigration and asylum has been viewed as potentially addressing three sets of problems. The first of these is migration management and control. European states have realized that they cannot manage irregular flows on their own, but are dependent on co-operation with neighbouring countries, necessitating common regional approaches. Second, some European states have seen EU co-operation as a means of promoting burden-sharing, or a fairer (re)distribution of costs between countries. Third, the so-called 'harmonization' of policies on asylum, immigration and integration has also been regarded as a means of standard-setting. The idea is that establishing common norms and approaches should improve the effectiveness of national policies in areas such as asylum, integration, or labour migration. Migration Control and Prevention EU co-operation in this area aims to reduce the incidence of irregular migration into EU countries, and to minimize irregular movements between European states. The rationale for co-operation is clear. Efforts to combat irregular border crossing almost by definition require common approaches. Moreover, the abolition of internal-border checks between Schengen countries, and weaker controls between all members of the European Economic Area (EEA), has lent such co-operation particular urgency. Participants in these regimes are dependent on their neighbours, particularly those with 2

There have also been attempts at multilateral co-operation on migration in other regional organizations, notably the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Inter-governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies (IGC), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, the EU presents by far the most developed example of transnational co-operation, and will be the focus of the discussion that follows.

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Migration in Europe external borders, for controlling irregular entry. Measures in this area can be categorized according to three main areas. • External border control Co-operation on external border controls has been developed as a corollary to the loosening of internal borders, which occurred through the Single European Act that established free movement of people between EU states, and the Schengen Agreement which abolished internal border controls.3 This area of co-operation became a priority in the early 1990s, as the EU's external borders to the east became more porous. Moreover, with the accession of Spain, Italy and Greece to Schengen in 1990, it became more important to reinforce external sea borders in the south. The subsequent enlargement of the EU to incorporate a number of Central European countries again prompted a series of measures to reinforce the Union's new external borders in East and SouthEast Europe. Most measures in this area have focused on capacity-building of bordercontrol infrastructure and staff, and better co-operation and information exchange between officials. Millions of euros have been invested in improving controls, especially on the borders of the new member states in Central Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Although they have been EU members since May 2004, these countries have yet to fulfil a number of infrastructural and technical requirements in order to become full members of the Schengen area. More recently, EU states have been developing plans for a common border control system, as well as for a European corps of border guards. Harmonization is not likely to be rapid: many states are anxious about pooling control and intelligence, especially given concerns about terrorism. These external border controls have almost certainly kept the number of irregular crossings into the EU lower than would otherwise have been the case. However, they have not prevented an absolute rise in the number of those entering Europe illegally—as was graphically demonstrated in the autumn of 2005 by the influx of irregular migrants through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. Moreover, tighter border controls have created a market for more sophisticated and dangerous smuggling practices, as well as driving many would-be migrants into the hands of exploitative traffickers. The reinforcement of borders between new EU member states and those countries left outside of the EU has also had negative repercussions for ethnic kin groups living on either side of the new EU external border. And visa requirements have created problems for commuters and cross-border trade. 3

Schengen includes all EU states except the United Kingdom and Ireland, as well as the non-EU states Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.

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ESSAYS These problems have provoked criticisms that the EU is simply creating a new wall between the East and the West. • 'Country-shopping ' and internal controls The loosening of internal border controls has also generated concerns among European states about the phenomenon of 'country-shopping': the propensity of irregular migrants or refugees to move between different states to seek out the best welfare and labour-market conditions. This generated concerns that transit countries would have little incentive to apprehend migrants on their way to other countries. This was the driving motivation behind the Dublin Convention,4 which established criteria for determining which country was responsible for assessing an asylum case. The criteria—which have since been revised in the so-called 'Dublin IF—place the onus on the states through which migrants or refugees (illegally) enter the EU, allowing destination countries to return people to these transit countries. In practice, however, the Dublin Convention has proved difficult to implement. Transit countries are reluctant to readmit those who crossed their territory, and it is often difficult to secure sufficient proof of travel routes. • The external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs Partly because of the limitations of these control-based approaches, the EU has increasingly sought to co-operate with third countries to combat irregular migration. This approach has been dubbed the 'external dimension' of cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). It received its first clear articulation in the conclusions of a special European Council in Tampere, Finland, in 1999, which stated that 'justice and home affairs must be integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union policies', especially external relations. In fact, there have been two rather different schools of thought on the external dimension. The first favours what the European Commission has characterized as 'repressive measures': the extension of EU-style control measures to third countries. This approach has been most forcefully pursued by the JHA Council, the forum for EU ministers from national justice and interior ministries, as well as by a special High Level Working Group established in 1998 under the auspices of the Council. These fora have promoted measures such as reinforced border control and migration management in countries neighbouring the EU; 'pre-frontier' control, whereby European officials assist with border control in third countries; and co-operation to combat smuggling and trafficking. Particularly prominent has been the drafting 4

The Convention was ratified in 1990, but only came into force in 1997.

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of readmission agreements to allow the return of irregular migrants and asylumseekers to countries of transit or origin. As some commentators have observed, this has had the effect of establishing a 'buffer zone' around the EU's borders. This 'repressive' agenda was reinforced during the United Kingdom's presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005. A new Strategy for the External Dimension was adopted in December 2005, which placed emphasis on three thematic priorities: terrorism, organized crime, and migration management. • Migration prevention The second type of approach involves 'preventive' measures, which aim to deter people from seeking to migrate through improving conditions in countries of origin. Proposals for this form of preventive approach were adopted by the 1999 Tampere Conclusions, which called for 'a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit'. Since then, the European Commission has launched a number of initiatives aimed at mitigating migration pressures. One example is the 2002-04 development strategy for Morocco, which included a series of measures targeted at the northern provinces, which are the source of an estimated 40% of Moroccan migration to the EU. More generally, the Commission Communication of 2002 on migration and development proposed co-operation based on 'shared interests' with sending and transit countries, dealing with issues such as brain drain and remittances, treatment of third-country nationals in EU countries, and problems with migration management. This agenda was further developed in Council Conclusions of May 2003 on migration and development. If we define migration prevention in a broader sense, then a number of other EU external policies can also been seen as relevant. Financial and technical assistance to CEECs since 1989, association agreements with potential EU member states, and the more recently conceived Stabilization and Association Process with the Western Balkans have all contributed to enhancing the prosperity and stability of Europe's neighbours, thereby addressing some of the causes of migration. The EU's proximity policy towards the former Soviet states and the Mediterranean region are also examples of development assistance and political co-operation that can contribute to migration prevention. Refugee and Asylum Policy One of the central aims of the 'common asylum policy' is to achieve a more balanced distribution of costs in receiving and protecting refugees and asylum-seekers. A second goal is to prevent country-shopping and increase 105

ESSAYS the efficiency of current procedures by creating common standards for reception and for asylum procedures. European states have also made use of regional fora to exchange ideas and experiences on (usually restrictive) asylum reception, processing or return practices. Again, we can categorize policies under three headings. • Harmonization of asylum policies Until the 1990s, European states diverged considerably in the generosity of their provisions for the reception of asylum-seekers, legal procedures for processing cases, and definitions of who qualified for refugee status. This discrepancy was perceived to explain why some countries received so many more asylum applicants than others. Many European countries have therefore supported attempts to harmonize asylum policies as a means of promoting a more balanced distribution of asylum-seekers between countries. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 set out ambitious goals for harmonization in the areas of temporary protection, asylum-seeker reception conditions, procedures for assessing asylum claims, and criteria on who qualified for refugee status. Much of this legislation has already been introduced, and plans for further progress were set out in the Hague Programme of 2004. The longer-term goal is to develop a common asylum system. According to the European Commission, this should include a uniform asylum and subsidiary protection status; a common procedure for granting and withdrawing status; and a common system of temporary protection. In addition to harmonizing national policies, EU countries have also been exporting European practice to other countries. In the 1990s, CEECs were obliged to adapt their legislation on asylum to correspond to the EU acquis, as part of the accession process. Other prospective EU members—including countries in the Western Balkans and Turkey—have been encouraged to adopt similar standards. This exportation of restrictive asylum policies has been criticized for ignoring the specificities of migration and refugee dynamics in other countries. • Burden-sharing Not surprisingly, it has been the EU countries receiving relatively greater numbers of asylum-seekers or refugees that have been at the forefront of proposals for EU burden-sharing. Those receiving fewer refugees have been reluctant to commit themselves to any fixed criteria for distribution. This probably explains why EU countries have thus far been able to agree to only vague principles of burden-sharing: the goal of promoting a 'balance of efforts' between countries in the reception of those seeking asylum or temporary protection. 106

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EU states had the opportunity to put this principle of solidarity into practice, in the context of the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme of Kosovar refugees who had fled to Macedonia. However, at an EU meeting in the spring of 2000, states could not agree on any binding distribution criteria, instead basing quotas on unilateral offers from individual states. The result was that some states ended up receiving more refugees than others (Germany agreed to host more than three times the number that the United Kingdom did). The EU has also made some attempt at financial burden-sharing. Since 1997, the European Refugee Fund has been providing modest financial assistance to EU states for the reception and integration of asylum-seekers and refugees. The fund's budget was recently increased to €687m. per year, for the period 2005-10. The bulk of the fund goes to countries with higher numbers of refugees. • Resettlement, protection in the region and prevention Over the last five years there has been a flurry of interest in proposals for refugee prevention, resettlement, and especially reception facilities for refugees in regions of origin. The United Kingdom has recently been at the forefront of such initiatives, in 2003 putting forward proposals for 'transit camps' in the Balkans or Ukraine, and subsequently 'zones of protection' in the Horn of Africa. In 2004, Germany and Italy forwarded a similar proposal for reception camps in North Africa. Such proposals have proved to be controversial, partly because of their perceived conflict with principles of refugee protection, and because of the immense legal, political and logistical obstacles to putting such schemes into practice. In 2005, the European Commission set out less controversial proposals for 'Regional Protection Programmes', which involved reinforcing the capacity of countries in regions of origin and transit to provide refugee protection. The Council has agreed to launch a pilot programme in the transit countries of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The concept in many ways represents a return to more traditional protection approaches, including making better use of programmes to resettle refugees in EU countries. Arguably, the EU has been relatively successful in its efforts at refugee prevention, but through instruments of foreign policy rather than JHA. The EU's neighbourhood policy aims to limit the spillover of ethnic conflict and instability in neighbouring third countries, which includes limiting large-scale refugee flows. This goal clearly underlay national and EU support for the NATO action in Kosovo, as well as the extensive role of the European Community Humanitarian Office in providing assistance to refugees in the region. 107

ESSAYS Labour Migration and Integration European home ministries have shown limited interest in adopting common policies on the admittance of labour migrants. In fact, much of the impetus for progress in this area appears to have come as 'spillover' from other areas of co-operation, especially in the areas of economic growth and employment: the 1997 European Employment Strategy, which includes measures on the labour-market integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities; and the 2000 Lisbon Strategy for economic, social and environmental renewal, which stresses the importance of labour migration as a means of addressing labour gaps. Co-operation on both labour migration and integration is in its infancy, and progress to date has been patchy. • Convergence of labour migration policies In 2000, the European Commission called for a common framework for promoting the convergence of European migration policies. The so-called 'open coordination method' aimed to set common guide-lines on migration policy, covering criteria and procedures for recruitment, and treatment of labour migrants. However, by the end of 2002 discussions on the proposed legislation had reached deadlock. Subsequent proposals in 2005 were more tentative, stressing the fact that decisions on admittance remain a national prerogative. In the mean time, the focus has been on gathering information and data, with the Commission now preparing annual reports on immigration and integration, the first of which was issued in July 2004. • Integration and anti-discrimination The rationale for co-operation on integration can be understood as a corollary of the agenda on employment and social affairs, as well as of provisions on free movement and JHA. It was almost certainly given more urgency by EU enlargement, and the perceived need to set standards for the treatment not just of immigrant groups, but also long-standing ethnic minorities with a history of discrimination, such as the Roma. However, while the EU has expressed the need for 'comprehensive integration policies', the measures taken in this area have been somewhat disparate. There have been some attempts to develop guide-lines for good practice on integration, although these are non-binding. In November 2004, the JHA Council issued a series of conclusions on 'common basic principles for integration'. The European Commission has meanwhile been supporting attempts to 'mainstream' integration into all areas of EU policy, and to develop a more coherent approach. It has been supporting efforts by the new 'National Contact Points on Integration' to develop best practice. In 108

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November 2004 the Commission produced a 'Handbook on integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners', emanating from a series of discussions with the National Contact Points. Two other areas of EU policy can be defined as relevant to integration. First, there has been some legislation on the treatment of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in EU countries. Legislation has been introduced allowing non-EU nationals who have been legally resident for more than five years to travel and work freely in other EU states. Similarly, new legislation on family reunion was agreed in January 2004, which expands the rights of the families of EU citizens to free movement within the EU. A second area of legislation is on anti-discrimination, with two anti-discrimination directives being agreed in 2000, under the rubric of co-operation on employment and social affairs.

CONCLUSION Migration has become a central issue in political debates in Europe. This can be partly attributed to the significant changes in the scale and composition of migration flows since the early 1990s. Concerns to manage these flows have prompted reinforced efforts to tackle irregular migration and trafficking, and a rethink of traditional approaches to asylum and protection. But the prominence of migration issues also has much to do with developments in domestic and international politics. On the one hand, established approaches to interethnic relations and integration have been increasingly questioned, as European societies recognize problems of second- and third-generation immigrants, and what is perceived to be the special problem of integrating members of the Muslim community. On the other, European governments are recognizing the economic case for labour migration, especially given the problem of ageing populations and the growing importance of highly skilled workers in a knowledge-based economy. This raises a serious tension between the economic case for increased immigration, and continued public concerns about the socio-economic and security impacts of migration in host countries. European governments and the EU have had a mixed record in responding to these challenges. There have been attempts to introduce balanced and forward-looking approaches in a number of areas—for example concerning labour migration programmes, naturalization, or EU co-operation with third countries. However, given public concerns about migration, there are considerable electoral incentives to place the programmatic emphasis on more restrictive and short-termist approaches to migration control. 109

ESSAYS This is likely to create difficult dilemmas in the coming years. Governments will be under pressure to fill rising gaps in labour supply. But at the same time, public concerns linked to the economic costs of immigration, socio-cultural integration and security show no signs of abating. The issue of how national governments and the EU will respond to this quandary will be one of the most important questions of European politics in the coming decades. Further Reading Boswell, Christina. European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion. Blackwell, 2003. This book offers a comparative analysis of recent migration policies in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and at EU level. Favell, Adrian. Philosophies of Integration. Palgrave, 1996. Not the most recent contribution, but this book remains extremely influential in its analysis of how conceptions of citizenship have shaped policies on integration in France and the United Kingdom. Geddes, Andrew. The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. Sage, 2003. This book provides a lively and lucid introduction to European and EU migration policies and the politics of migration, from one of the leading experts in the field. Lavenex, Sandra and Emek, Ucarer (Eds). Migration and Externalities of European Integration. Lexington, 2003. This is a very well-balanced collection of papers on the different ways in which EU immigration and asylum policies impact other countries.

110

Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa RICHARD BLACK

Migration is clearly a major issue across Africa. Indeed, migration—both within countries and across borders—can be regarded as having been an integral part of labour markets and livelihoods across much of the continent for at least the last century. Over time, and in different places, migration has taken a number of different forms. It has cut across class and skill boundaries, and exists in widely different geographical and demographic contexts. Migration represents an important livelihood strategy for poor households seeking to diversify their sources of income, but is also characteristic of the better off, and indeed of many African élites. In practice, however, the link between migration and poverty is often viewed rather more negatively. It is assumed across much of the continent that it is poverty that forces poor people to migrate, rather than migration being a potential route out of poverty. The poor are also generally seen as those worst affected by conflict-induced migration, itself a prominent feature in Africa. The movement of skilled and/or wealthy Africans is also generally viewed negatively (e.g. there is long-standing concern on the African continent about the impact of the 'brain drain' of African professionals). Taken together, these consensus views are consistent with the notion that migration is part of the problem of poverty in Africa, rather than part of the solution—that sometimes, literally, Africa is moving backwards. Only slowly, and in relatively few quarters, is understanding emerging of the potentially positive role that migration itself can play in reducing poverty, or of the possibilities for 'mobilization' of the African diaspora in the fight against poverty. Meanwhile, public policy remains a long way from building effectively on such understanding. This essay explores these issues, focusing on the emergence of migration— both international, and internal—as an issue in contemporary Africa, and considers patterns (including gender breakdown), its economic importance, and policy responses at national and multinational levels. Ill

ESSAYS

EXTENT AND PATTERNS OF CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION IN AFRICA There are conflicting accounts of the volume of migration in and from contemporary Africa, reflecting the paucity of data sources and their often poor quality. According to the most recent figures available from the UN's Population Division, there are some 17.1m. international migrants in Africa, out of 191m. migrants world-wide. In contrast, ILO figures put the number of African migrant workers at 20m., whilst the African Union (AU) estimates that out of 150m. migrants in the world, one-third are Africans. Others highlight only Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa as key countries of immigration on the continent; elsewhere, the size of foreign populations in African countries is either very small, or, in the absence of statistical systems to monitor flows, numbers are largely unknown. Thus we know relatively little of the volume of intra-regional migration in Africa, or of migration to the Gulf, or indeed of undocumented migration from Africa to Europe. None the less, what is clear is that there is substantial and growing migration from key African countries to Europe and North America. From Africa as a whole, over 110,000 people left each year to travel to Europe or the USA between 1995-2001, with the number rising from 93,000 in 1995 to nearly 140,000 in 2001. In terms of absolute numbers, data compiled from censuses suggest that there were more than 2m. African-born individuals in Europe, and just under lm. in North America in 2000-01 (Table 1). Key countries of current long-distance emigration include Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Somalia, Ethiopia and Senegal, whilst there are also significant numbers of Angola- and Kenya-born populations in Europe arising from post-independence migrations of Portuguese nationals and East African Asians respectively {see Table 1). The data presented in Table 1 show that the African countries with high volumes of migrants overseas are also those with the largest populations; however, quite a different rank order is produced if the number of migrants is expressed as a percentage of the population of each country, with small island states dominating the list (Table 2). On this basis, Nigeria and Ethiopia have lower emigration rates to Europe and North America than the African average; only the three North African countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia fall in the top 10 emigration countries on both counts {see Table 2). There is rather less available data on flows of migrants within African countries, though evidence from micro-level studies suggests that this form of mobility is very substantial across most African countries. Relevant data may be available from censuses, although recent censuses in some countries, such as Nigeria, Tanzania and Malawi, do not include information on internal 112

Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 1: Principal countries of origin of African-born residents in North America and Europe, 2000-01 Country Morocco Algeria Tunisia South Africa Nigeria Egypt Angola Kenya Ghana Somalia Ethiopia Senegal Congo, Democratic Republic of the Cape Verde Mozambique Uganda Madagascar Congo, Republic of the Zimbabwe Tanzania, United Republic of Mauritius Côte d'Ivoire Cameroon Sudan Liberia Mali Sierra Leone Eritrea Zambia Guinea-Bissau Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Guinea The Gambia Comoros Togo Rwanda Mauritania Malawi Benin Equatorial Guinea São Tomé and Príncipe Gabon Burundi

North America1

European Union 2

Total

66,380 32,270 12,410 105,970 150,885 154,420 7,060 64,390 84,260 56,765 86,730 12,725 16,175 27,410 2,980 23,215 3,160 5,275 15,925 32,185 8,270 9,460 14,745 27,840 41,615 3,680 22,380 22,755 8,775 510 11,275 6,535 6,280 169 3,775 4,795 2,395 2,200 1,555 319 70 930 3,320

1,366,878 1,311,801 364,094 188,034 122,055 107,156 199,966 137,559 81,151 98,587 36,150 97,577 93,298 74,235 82,291 60,424 75,283 68,690 55,288 37,664 60,872 51,579 45,593 21,181 6,634 44,242 22,794 11,684 24,718 32,073 15,323 15,426 15,267 19,660 15,697 13,537 14,141 13,164 13,116 13,649 13,050 11,427 8,614

1,433,258 1,344,071 376,504 294,004 272,940 261,576 207,026 201,949 165,411 155,352 122,880 110,302 109,473 101,645 85,271 83,639 78,443 73,965 71,213 69,849 69,142 61,039 60,338 49,021 48,249 47,922 45,174 34,439 33,493 32,583 26,598 21,961 21,547 19,829 19,472 18,332 16,536 15,364 14,671 13,968 13,120 12,357 11,934

113

ESSAYS contd Country Central African Republic Djibouti Burkina Faso Chad Niger Seychelles Botswana Namibia Saint Helena Swaziland Lesotho Réunion Mayotte

North America1

European Union2

Total

485 750

10,400 6,269 5,704 5,066 4,049 3,604 2,712 1,893 2,381 1,296

10,885 7,019 6,709 6,106 5,339 5,319 4,467 3,173 2,501 2,111 1,076

1,005 1,040 1,290 1,715 1,755 1,280

120 815 485 0 0

591 32 5

32 5

1. North America includes the USA and Canada. 2. European Union includes all EU25 countries except Germany, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia, for which country-of-birth data is not available. Source: Global Migrant Origin Database: http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/ typesofmigration/globalmigrantorigindatabase.html

migration. Thirteen sub-Saharan African countries have not held a census within the last 10 years; many others have held them so recently that preliminary results are not yet available. Special surveys that include figures on internal migration are available in some countries. Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) in Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania and Côte d'Ivoire provide fairly reliable measures of household livelihoods as well as basic migration data. Rural-to-urban migration has contributed to the growth of cities, but a series of national surveys conducted simultaneously in eight West African countries in the 1990s shows that urban growth rates have declined in the region compared to the 1970s. In Nigeria, there was considerable rural-urban migration, including both permanent and temporary moves for work, education and to escape drought conditions in the northern Sahel areas in the early 1970s and again in the early 1980s. A World Bank report in 1996 suggested that the pace of urbanization is such that 60% of the population will be urban by 2010. A report by an NGO, 'Cities Alliance', suggested that the population of Abuja triples every year, in the fastest process of urbanization in West Africa. In contrast, unlike many other countries of the region, there has been relatively little circular migration between rural areas, as Nigeria has a relatively underdeveloped plantation economy. 114

Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 2: African-born residents of North America and Europe as proportion of population of country of origin Country Saint Helena Cape Verde Seychelles São Tomé and Príncipe Mauritius Morocco

Algeria Tunisia Comoros Equatorial Guinea Guinea-Bissau Congo, Republic of the Somalia Angola Liberia Djibouti The Gambia Gabon Senegal Libyan Arab Jamahiriya South Africa Sierra Leone Eritrea Ghana Zimbabwe Kenya Mauritania Madagascar Mozambique Central African Republic Egypt Mali Cameroon Togo Côte d'Ivoire Zambia Uganda Botswana Ethiopia Chad Guinea Nigeria

International

Total population

% of population

migrants (2001)

(2001)

abroad

3,403 108,005 8,039 14,584 88,749 1,615,359 1,384,641 394,557 19,879 14,284 33,087 80,259 174,501 213,829 48,851 7,153 22,689 15,001 111,836 51,344 405,654 46,342 38,032 170,696 86,562 215,805 16,674 80,011 87,061 18,681 340,908 48,281 63,297 20,097 62,374 38,746 87,104 5,382 191,829 22,036 22,497 293,962

7,266 405,163 79,715 165,034 1,189,825 30,645,305 30,851,518 9,667,365 596,202 484,425 1,305,832 3,238,410 7,488,773 10,623,424 2,758,041 437,778 1,412,663 1,268,125 10,595,275 5,240,599 44,296,012 5,080,682 4,360,461 20,093,021 11,844,109 30,652,299 2,747,312 15,982,563 18,129,398 3,993,016 71,901,545 10,321,053 15,577,246 4,843,185 15,909,606 10,373,871 23,970,202 1,620,848 66,308,836 8,573,507 8,713,005 117,074,880

46.83% 26.66% 10.08% 8.84% 7.46% 5.27% 4.49% 4.08% 3.33% 2.95% 2.53% 2.48% 2.33% 2.01% 1.77% 1.63% 1.61% 1.18% 1.06% 0.98% 0.92% 0.91% 0.87% 0.85% 0.73% 0.70% 0.61% 0.50% 0.48% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 0.41% 0.41% 0.39% 0.37% 0.36% 0.33% 0.29% 0.26% 0.26% 0.25%

115

ESSAYS contd Country Rwanda Benin Swaziland Tanzania, United Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of the Namibia Burundi Sudan Malawi Burkina Faso Lesotho Niger Réunion Mayotte

International migrants (2001 )

Total population (2001 )

% of population abroad

19,378 14,909 2,502 73,281

7,673,062 6,824,931 1,121,699 33,831,342

0.25% 0.22% 0.22% 0.22%

14,071

53,682,112

0.21%

4,063 12,483 55,515 16,090 6,979 1,262 5,473 111 6

1,947,326 6,810,307 36,080,373 11,539,920 11,732,326 2,044,848 10,823,004 732,570 163,366

0.21% 0.18% 0.15% 0.14% 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 0.02% 0.00%

Source: Global Migrant Origin Database: http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/ typesofmigration/globalmigrantorigindatabase.html

Internal migration in Ghana is primarily from north to south, with inmigrants representing more than 40% of the population in the Greater Accra, Volta and Western regions. The role of migrant labour in the development of the cocoa and coffee industries in the 1960s and 1970s has been well documented, with Eastern, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions receiving internal migration mainly from Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions. There has also been substantial movement to mining areas, and rural-urban migration, especially to the major cities of Accra and Kumasi. The latter flow appears to have slowed, or possibly even reversed, in the last decade. The recent World Bank Voices of the Poor report on Ghana argues that urban and rural young people feel they have no choice but to leave home in search of work, since their remittances are likely to make the difference between food security or a lack of food security for their families. In the Upper East region in particular, infertile soils and lack of local services are seen as contributing to out-migration. However, it is also worth noting that in the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), 60% of migrants reported marriage or other family reasons as the cause of their migration, with only 25% reporting work reasons. This was partly because the GLSS includes as migrants not just household heads, but members of the family aged over 15 who moved with them, and also return 116

Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa migrants who might be less likely to move for employment reasons. None the less, if these two categories are excluded, still only 40% of in-migrant household heads were found to have moved for employment, with the majority citing other reasons. One area in which Africa has long been prominent is in the production of refugees. The continent accounts for one-third or more of global totals, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and has the highest proportion of refugees amongst all migrants of any region according to the UN Population Division. However, the numbers have been in steady decline since a peak of 5.9m. in 1995—the number has since fallen to 3.0m. at the start of 2004, largely as a result of significant repatriation to Rwanda from 1996. The main refugee-producing countries in Africa are now Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, although significant repatriations have occurred to all of these, with the exception of Sudan. There is also growing awareness of the extent of internal displacement in Africa, with an estimated 13m. IDPs dwarfing the number of refugees, and representing more than one-half of the global total of IDPs. These include an estimated 3m. in Sudan and 1.2m. in Uganda. Although there were some repatriations in 2003, new IDPs were created in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, Sudan, Liberia, and in the Central African Republic (CAR). CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN MIGRANTS African emigration to Europe and North America is dominated by flows of more educated, and by implication less poor, individuals {see Table 3). This evidence is provided by the US Census and the SOPEMI reporting system of migration statistics for OECD countries. Based on 1990 census figures, it has been calculated that 95,000 out of 128,000 African migrants in the USA at that time had received a tertiary education, whilst migration of those who had received primary education or below was 'virtually zero'. In contrast, whilst there is some movement of less educated Africans through clandestine routes across the Sahara, it also clear that at least a part of this undocumented migration is also of skilled people {see Table 3). None the less, in most African countries, it appears that only a relatively small proportion of tertiary-educated individuals (and few others) had migrated to the USA or Europe. The figure moving to the USA was calculated in 1999 at just over 5% in Mozambique, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe, a little over 10% in Kenya, Uganda and Ghana and around 25% in Sierra Leone, although a massive 60% of Gambian tertiary-educated individuals had moved to the USA. When migration to other OECD countries is added, rates for some 117

ESSAYS Table 3: Educational attainment of African-born population in USA, 2000 Country Nigeria Tanzania Cameroon Uganda South Africa Zimbabwe Kenya Africa total Sudan Africa, ns/nec Ghana Senegal Liberia Ethiopia Sierra Leone Eritrea US total Somalia

Proportion with 4 years' schooling or less

Proportion with over 4 years' tertiary education

7% 4% 6% 3% 8% 6% 10% 8% 15% 8% 7% 9% 8% 8% 9% 10% 18% 24%

47% 46% 45% 45% 44% 39% 36% 33% 28% 28% 26% 25% 25% 23% 23% 18% 16% 9%

Source: calculated from 5% sample of US census

countries rise: for example, it was estimated that more than one-quarter of Ghanaians with tertiary education had left Ghana in 1999, whilst the figure for South Africa was around 8%. In contrast, it is not possible on the basis of currently available data to generalize much about the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of internal and inter-regional migration within Africa. Patterns of internal migration appear to have been affected by economic crisis and structural adjustment, with some arguing that a long trend of urbanization across the continent has been stopped or even reversed. Predominant flows appear to be from rural to urban areas, although rural-rural migration is also significant in many countries, whilst only eight African countries have more than one-half of their population in towns. However, much of the evidence for both urbanization and counter-urbanization, remains anecdotal. 118

Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

GENDER Just as there is relatively little information about intra-African migration flows in general, there is also unsurprisingly relatively little information about the gender composition of migration flows, whether international or internal. Much academic work in the past has implicitly assumed that migrants are predominantly young men, with one recent study of migration from the Upper East region of Ghana showing that migration at any particular time takes around one-half of all working-age males, compared to just 15% of workingage females to southern Ghana for periods of at least a year. However, recent UN population figures suggest that the proportion of female migrants is large and growing—having risen from 46% of all African migrants in 1990 to 47% in 2005. There is also some evidence from countries such as Nigeria, Mali and Tanzania that the number of young female migrants has increased. Surveys of eight African countries reveal the prominent role played by female migration in contemporary urbanization processes. In sum, we can perhaps generalize only that African migration involves men, women, and children. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF MIGRATION A review of Africa-wide issues based on field studies in Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania conducted by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) notes that occupational diversification in rural areas is often inextricably linked to mobility, whilst 'migration has been a key factor in shaping Africa's settlement patterns and households' livelihoods'. A staggering 50%-80% of rural households had at least one migrant member, across all wealth categories, and with increasing involvement of women as independent migrants. Strong linkages between (rural) source and (urban) destination areas for migrants in Africa were maintained, which were found to promote significant flows of remittances, encourage community-level initiatives for the construction of public facilities and infrastructure, and help to link rural producers to urban markets. However, remittances had declined over a 15-year period, largely as a result of employment insecurity in destination areas, even though at the same time rural households had become more dependent on these remittances. Remittances represent perhaps the key economic component of migration flows in many academic studies and policy accounts, and are examined in more detail below. However, it is important to bear in mind that the economic importance of migration goes well beyond remittances—to areas such as the development of trade links, effects on labour markets, and broader exchanges of financial, human and social capital. 119

ESSAYS REMITTANCES The potential for remittances to contribute to national development priorities, including the reduction of poverty, is clearly a priority for policy-makers across the continent. However, it is worth noting—in contrast to comments globally that remittances constitute a 'stable source of external development finance'—that remittances in sub-Saharan Africa appear highly volatile, at least in terms of official IMF figures. The standard deviation from annual average remittance figures between 1980-99 was more than 50% in the cases of Cameroon, Cape Verde, Niger and Togo, and more than 100% in Botswana, Lesotho and Nigeria. In Burkina Faso, official remittances dropped from US $187m. in 1988 to just $67m. in 1999, a decrease of two-thirds, which also coincided with a sharp drop in GDP growth rates. If official figures are to be believed, international remittances are much smaller in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other world region, representing just 10% of external finance in 2001, compared to 63% in South Asia, and 56%o in the Middle East and North Africa. In part, this is because almost twothirds of sub-Saharan African countries simply do not report any data on remittances, suggesting that investment in monitoring systems would be of some value. Even if North Africa is included, only Morocco and Egypt amongst African nations appear in the top 20 remitters, and no African state is in the top 20 if remittances are measured as a percentage of GDP. None the less, a number of studies testify to the significance of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa, even if in official tables, African countries rarely figure prominently as major remittance receivers. For example, until the recent civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, around one-quarter of Burkina Faso's GDP came from remittances from that country. Evidence from a recent study of remittance behaviour by more than 800 immigrant household heads in Abidjan suggests that monetary transfers to family members both outside the country, and those living in other parts of Côte d'Ivoire remained substantial even during the civil war, and mainly take the form of cash transfers to support basic household expenditure. In Senegal, a country widely acknowledged to have benefited from migration, it is estimated that nearly US $lm. is transferred to the Banque de l'Habitat du Sénégal from Libreville every month, whilst somewhere between 30% and 80% of household budgets in Senegal are said to be comprised of remittances. These are transfers that affect all social classes. A study of the role of internal remittances sent by a sample of 1,500 rural out-migrants in Sierra Leone in 1981-82 found that remittances on average comprised only 12% of the incomes of rural households. Yet this rose to more than 40% of the income of the poorest households, with their overall effect 120

Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa being to reduce income inequality in poor areas. In turn, although remittances were mainly used in rural areas for consumption, about 16% were used for building or house improvement, whilst 6% were used to set up and/or improve export crop plantations in rural areas. The use of remittances is perhaps more important to focus on than their financial value, given the difficulties of estimating flows in many African countries. Path-breaking work in Western Kenya suggests that the decision to migrate, and remittance behaviour, are linked to a form of inter-generational 'migration contract' between a migrant and his or her parents, in which the (usually male) migrant moves and sends remittances in expectation of a subsequent inheritance. In terms of the consequences of migration for the poor, the problems of balancing the costs and returns to rural areas of ruralurban migration have been discussed in terms of loss of labour, the cost of supporting the move and establishment in the town and returns in the forms of remittances, both economic and socio-cultural and the eventual return migration. It has been argued that migration creates dependency in rural areas of Western Kenya on urban migrants and their remittances. However, recent work for DFID on remittances in Tanzania has found that intra-regional and domestic transfers remain costly as a result of limited money transfer options. Whilst bank transfers are competitive for sending larger amounts in a single transaction, of much greater importance for the poor is the service offered by bus companies, which are making some inroads into a largely untapped market. Informal means of transfer (e.g. sending money with relatives or returning with money to the home area) remain the most commonly used, especially for transfers of small amounts. It is worth noting that not just migrants, but also traders in rural areas, such as buyers of coffee, tea, tobacco, and other commodities, also tend to have to carry money to pay for the goods at the farm gate or trading centre where they purchase. It is also important to pay attention to those in rural areas who are not receiving remittances, since they are likely to be the most vulnerable of all. One study of rural-urban migration has focused on the extreme poverty of women who are on their own through divorce or widowhood, who may be cut off from remittances previously provided by a partner, but unable to return to their natal home. MIGRANTS' INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPMENT In addition to remittances, there are also a number of other ways in which migrants impact on economic development. Some of these are negative: for example, the FAO has argued that mobility of members of farming 121

ESSAYS households is partly responsible for seasonal labour shortages and an ageing of on-farm populations, with a negative effect on agricultural productivity. Trafficking in West Africa is seen by many agencies as 'pervasive and growing'. Meanwhile, according to one study in Nigeria, rural-urban migration has led to rural depopulation and loss of agricultural production, as well as strains on urban areas. Another notes how economic crisis and structural adjustment has dramatically reduced urban incomes, leading to declining remittances and weakening social ties, but without the urban-rural return migration that has occurred in some other regions of Africa. The World Bank's Poverty Assessment for Nigeria suggests that rural poverty is declining, and urban poverty increasing, largely due to rural-urban migration. The report suggests that there is a need 'to design growth policies which focus on [the urban poor], as well as measures to slow down the pace of migration'. However, other studies are more upbeat. A study by the IIED in the south east of the country found that investment of remittances in assets such as housing, land or livestock has been linked to intention to return, and has helped to fuel a construction boom that has stimulated local economic growth. The migration of Fulani pastoralists to south-western Nigeria is also stated by one study to have produced positive economic results, e.g. stimulating the trade in cattle. One negative feature of migration in Nigeria appears to have been its impact on the status and/or well-being of women. A study of migration in Bendel state in the 1980s found that migrant women had not gained economically from movement to Benin City, but had suffered a loss of status within the household in comparison with non-migrant women. There is also growing concern over a more direct attack on women's status and well-being in the form of trafficking of women and young girls to Europe, the Middle East and other parts of Africa. Nigerian women are believed to be sent into commercial sex work in various European countries as well as Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa, whilst children are sent into domestic labour within Nigeria and in neighbouring countries. Some 10,000 Nigerian prostitutes were stated to be in more than 300 brothels in Germany, Spain and other parts of Europe and South America. Children from Togo, Benin, Ghana and Cameroon are also believed to be brought to Nigeria for forced labour. The impacts of migration on the poor, and on poor regions, are the subject of some dispute. Ongoing work in Ghana funded from the Netherlands suggests that it may be the poorest groups in northern villages which benefit most from remittances, rather than the middle and 'secure' groups. A fairly optimistic picture is also painted by a recent analysis of GLSS data, which found a 'migration premium' in that migrants had statistically higher living standards than non-migrants, although this premium had declined by half 122

Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa between surveys in 1991/92 and 1998/99. It is difficult, however, in such analysis, to separate out cause and effect—in other words, it may simply be the less poor who are more able to migrate, rather than migration that makes people less poor. In contrast, Cleveland's study of the Upper East region of Ghana found that migration increased dependency ratios (the number of young and elderly dependent on each working-age adult) in sending areas, and that remittances and improvements in land and labour productivity were insufficient to compensate for this increased dependency. Internal remittances do appear to redistribute wealth from rich to poor regions, but this effect may not be sustainable in the face of the recent decline of the cocoa industry. In Ethiopia, interesting information on the relationship between migration and poverty is available from DFID-funded work on livelihoods. This has shown that the poor migrate more than the better off, in order to supplement income from the land, and repay or avoid incurring debts. Although permanent or semi-permanent migration were seen by most families as an option of last resort, temporary seasonal migrations were often actively encouraged as a right of passage for young men. However, it is those with some assets, rather than none, who were found most able to migrate. Migration may affect the poor, but the impact of migration on poverty is more difficult to determine. Thus, although migration plays a central role in the livelihoods of rural households and communities, rich and poor, migration may increase inequality. THE 'BRAIN DRAIN' One particular area in which concern is expressed about migration is the question of the 'brain drain' of African professionals. This is said to hit the sectors of health, education and technological development particularly severely. As African professionals leave the continent, an estimated US $4,000m. is spent each year, mostly through overseas aid programmes, on hiring some 100,000 skilled expatriates to replace them. The migration of health personnel in Africa has also received the attention of the World Health Organization, which conducted a study of more than 2,000 health professionals across Ghana, Uganda, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Senegal in 2002. This study found that availability of training, standard of living and working conditions were all significant factors encouraging health personnel to emigrate, and that their loss is having a significant impact in terms of increasing workload. This decreases motivation and quality of service provided by those who remain, who are often less skilled and unqualified to carry out specialist tasks. 123

ESSAYS However, even here, the picture is not completely straightforward. In many respects, the migration of African health professionals is more a symptom than a cause of poverty and underdevelopment; for example, where African doctors stay to work in hospitals or clinics that lack drugs or essential equipment, their potential contribution is 'lost' even without them migrating. Meanwhile, those who do migrate often do so to gain further training that ultimately could be put to the benefit of their home countries.

THE PLACE OF MIGRATION IN PUBLIC POLICY Across sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the position of governments towards migration generally remains either neutral or hostile. In a review by UNDESA, seven countries—Kenya, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Botswana, Namibia, Djibouti, and The Gambia—were reported as indicating in 2000 that levels of immigration were too high, whilst a further 11 reported that they had in place policies to reduce immigration. Meanwhile, four—Gabon, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Bissau—reported that emigration was too high, and that their policy was to reduce emigration. In its most recent review of the status of poverty in Africa, the African Development Bank refers to rural-urban migration as a source of urban poverty. A recent position paper of the ILO on Working out of poverty fails to mention migration as a relevant component of poverty or poverty reduction. In the UNDESA survey, only one country—Cape Verde—considered that its level of emigration was too low, and even then, there was no explicit government policy to promote it. A number of policy responses have been put forward to address the 'brain drain'. At one level, intergovernmental initiatives, including through the AU, have sought to improve the quality of tertiary education in Africa, and the circulation of students and professionals within Africa, to remove the necessity for Africans to go abroad for university training. The African Virtual University, established by the World Bank in 1997, also operates in 17 African countries and has so far educated more than 24,000 students. Where training does take place abroad, there are various mechanisms that might be put in place to encourage individuals to return. One positive example is provided by analysis of return amongst participants in AIDS Training and Research Programs funded by the Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, USA, where nearly 80% of African trainees returned, whether on master's, doctoral or post-doctoral training. The strategies used in this case included the building of health infrastructure in the trainee's home country, provision of re-entry research support and the use of short-stay visas and repayment agreements to discourage non-return. 124

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Another response at continent-wide level has been the development of links with Africans abroad, either to encourage them to return, or to utilize their skills, knowledge or financial capital in the promotion of African development. Online databases, which provide an opportunity for Africans abroad to advertise their skills, or for African companies or government bodies to advertise vacancies, have been advocated or established by organizations such as 'Africa's Brain Gain' (ABG), Africa Recruit and the Economic Commission for Africa. There are also initiatives focused on specific sectors, such as health and law, as well as databases of diaspora members maintained by particular countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, Benin, and Burkina Faso. The International Organization for Migration has also established a 'Migration for Development in Africa' (MIDA) programme, which aims to build partnerships between host countries and countries of origin of migrants, and encourage the return of African professionals on temporary assignments. In addition, some countries, such as Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda and Ethiopia, have organized meetings and conferences for members of the diaspora, whilst the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) of the AU organized the first 'AU-Western Hemisphere Diaspora Forum' in Washington, DC, in December 2002. At continent-wide level, the AU has established a 'strategic framework for a policy on migration', and a specific programme on migration within its Social Affairs Directorate. The programme's goals include addressing the causes of internal and international migration and the 'challenges posed by migration', but it also seeks co-operation between countries to 'make effective use of the opportunity presented by the phenomenon', and seeks to assist AU member states to work towards the free movement of people. Concern with the effects of migration has also filtered through into policymaking in specific sectors. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has not yet developed an overall policy or initiative on migration, but its strategy for the health sector does include proposed measures to mitigate the loss of health sector personnel, including the promotion of guidelines on ethical recruitment practices, and measures to improve conditions of service and work environments. It is worth noting here that the impact of migration on health outcomes for poor people is felt not only through migration of health personnel to northern countries, but also through regional migration flows (e.g. to South Africa, Namibia and elsewhere), rural-urban migration within countries, and through 'migration' from the public to the private sector. In this context, measures to promote improved telecommunications or the supply of drugs to rural clinics may have an impact in reducing movement of health personnel out of clinics 125

ESSAYS serving the poorest, but expansion of training in the health sector in general— both in Africa and in the 'north'—also clearly needs to be part of the solution. There is also concern in some quarters that rich nations should pay some sort of compensation for medical personnel recruited out of Africa, given the structure of African health sector training in which the bulk of this training is publicly funded and provided. However, the Joint Learning Initiative on Human Resources for Health (HRH), funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, has stressed that whilst health systems are suffering attrition from international migration and internal displacement, they also face significant challenges from deteriorating conditions of employment, reduced effectiveness of delivery systems, an increase in disease burdens and a lack of financing for the sector from African governments. A recent study of the movement of doctors and nurses from Ghana, Zimbabwe and South Africa to the United Kingdom critiques emerging WHO policy in this area. It stresses that data are poor, and might be better collected in destination countries. It also suggests that migration of medical personnel from Africa to the United Kingdom at least may be declining, whilst movement of nurses has recently increased dramatically. In contrast to this attention to the brain drain, there appears to be rather less interest amongst African governments in migration as a livelihood strategy, or in the welfare of migrants, despite the fact that this relates more clearly to the poor and to pro-poor policy. Rather, traditional countries of immigration such as South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon have become more intolerant of migrant workers. Regional blocs such as ECOWAS and SADC have generally failed to prioritize freedom of movement. Where attention has been paid to HIV/AIDS, this has tended to stigmatize migrants as potentially spreading the epidemic. There has also been little attention to date to policies on currency exchange or the improvement and extension of banking systems in a way that would facilitate the flow of remittances. In the field of forced migration in particular, there has been a tightening of policies towards refugees in a number of countries, reflecting growing global antipathy towards forced migrants. States have cited the economic burdens involved, declining support from international donors, and the potential security threats (e.g. camps being used as rebel bases, local insecurity and cross-border attacks). In addition to some cases of expulsion of refugees, a major consequence appears to have been the increased use of camps with severe restrictions on movement, even though these have often failed to guarantee security and limit refugees' ability to contribute to their own livelihoods and the local economy. None the less, 11 countries are signatories to the Migrant Workers Convention—more than in most other world regions. The ILO has designed and 126

Moving Backwards? Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

launched an 'African Labour Migration Policy Initiative' which seeks to enhance the knowledge base on labour migration and build capacity of labour ministries and others to deal with labour migration. IOM has conducted some preliminary work to identify and promote networking between initiatives to combat HIV/AIDS amongst migrant and mobile populations. Some sectoral organizations have also promoted mobility: e.g. the Association of African Universities has called on African governments to introduce legislation to promote the mobility of academic staff and students. There is also scope for the development of more co-ordinated regional policies on forced migration, given the prominence of forced migration across the continent. Although most African countries are signatories to the 1969 OAU Convention, and many in practice recognize refugees en masse, or devolve responsibility to UNHCR for the processing of refugee claims, there have been calls for a change of approach from some quarters (e.g. the mixed assistance and protection mandate of UNHCR has been called into question). Attention also needs to be paid to the problems of long-term protracted refugee crises, the related economic, security and protection issues and the lack of solutions up to now. The link to livelihoods is important here too, since a livelihoods approach to forced migrants may be just as valid as to poor people in general.

CONCLUSION It is likely that migration will continue to grow in importance in Africa, both as the awareness of public opinion and African governments is increased, and as the phenomenon itself grows. In particular, in so far as there is a poverty constraint on international migration—the journey to another country still costs too much for many poor people—any reduction in poverty might well lead to more migration rather than less. In addition, the ongoing debate of migration issues at an international level, which has included the involvement of an African co-Chair of the Global Commission on International Migration, and long-term funding of the Southern Africa Migration Project, is likely to continue to raise its profile. Within this context, however, a major concern remains the absence of reliable data across much of the continent on which to base sound academic research or policy-making. Too many of the available studies of migration in and from Africa are small-scale, lacking wider relevance, and censuses and representative sample surveys remain some way away from providing the kind of reliable evidence base on migration that is available for most other world regions. This is perhaps the most substantial challenge facing the 127

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discussion of the effects of migration on the poor in Africa—to move from conjecture and case study to a comprehensive overview of the problem. Further Reading Adepoju, A. 'Trends in international migration in and from Africa', in Massey, D. S., and Taylor, J. E. (Eds). International Migration Prospects and Policies in a Global Market. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. Tacoli, C. Changing rural-urban interactions in sub-Saharan Africa and their impacts on livelihoods. London, IIED, 2002. Van Dalen, H., Groenewold, G., and Schoorl, J. 'Out of Africa: What drives the Pressure to emigrate?, in Journal of Population Economics, 18 (4), 741— 778, 2005.

128

The Asia-Pacific Region GRAEME HUGO

INTRODUCTION The Asia-Pacific region comprises 57.7% of the current world population and is therefore of great importance to the discussion of global migration. International migration has a long history in the region, but only recently it has acquired an unprecedented scale, diversity and significance. This essay will trace the trends in the various types of international migration in the Asian region. It concludes that certain aspects of the existing system will lead to the perpetuation and indeed increase of international migration into the future. Some of the major issues emerging in the region in relation to migration between nations and some important policy issues are addressed. The cultural, ethnic, political, religious and economic complexity of the Asia-Pacific region as well as its vast size makes it difficult to come to general conclusions about international migration. Countries in the region range from tiny Niue (2,166 people) and Tuvalu (11,639 people) to China (1,300m.), India (1,010m.) and Indonesia (212m.), which are three of the world's four largest countries and account for more than 40% of the globe's inhabitants. It has some of the world's poorest nations, such as Nepal (per capita gross domestic product in 2001 of US $1,310), Bangladesh ($1,610), Pakistan ($1,890), Myanmar ($1,027) and Laos ($1,620), but also wealthy nations such as Japan ($25,130), Hong Kong-China ($24,850) and Singapore ($22,680). Two factors have been especially influential for international migration in Asia: the proliferation of social networks and the migration industry. Most Asian international migrants move to a place where they have social capital in the form of relatives or friends already living there. The vast migration industry comprises migration agents, recruiters, travel providers, immigration officials, etc., which connect Asian communities with overseas destinations. Unfortunately, the exponential increase in significance of international migration in the Asia-Pacific region has not been accompanied by a concomitant increase in the amount and quality of data collection regarding it. However, there have been efforts to bring together Asian international migration data in meetings organized by the Japan Institute of Labour, the OECD and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). 129

There has been substantial demographic change in Asia, both as a source and consequence of the social and economic transformation of the region. Overall the population of the region has almost doubled. At the same time, the annual growth rate of the population has almost halved due to a remarkable decline in fertility which has seen the average number of children born to Asian women fall from 5.4 in 1970 to 2.4 in 2003. Table 1 depicts what has been called the 'youth bulge', the result of a transition from high to low fertility about 15 years earlier. In 1960, Asia's youth population numbered 284m. and comprised 17% of the total population. Over the next two decades it grew very rapidly and by 1985 it had more than doubled in number and reached a peak of 21% of the total population. Subsequently, due to the effects of fertility decline, the Asian youth population reached 615m. in 2000 and its proportion of the population declined to 18%. The outlook for the future is for it to increase slowly to 658m. in 2040, when it would make up 14% of the total population. This of course has implications for migration, since youth are the most mobile age groups. Table 1: Asian population aged 15-24, 1960-2000 and projected 2020 and 2040* Population Aged 15-24 Year

Number ('000)

Percent

1960 1980 1985 1990 2000 2020 2040

283,539 489,013 565,195 610,458 615,201 669,315 653,518

17.34 19.43 20.52 20.25 17.64 15.60 13.79

Annual Percentage Growth

2.76 2.94 1.55 0.08 0.42 -0.12

* Excludes Western Asia. Source: United Nations, 2003.

CHANGING PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION Increased Levels of Mobility During the past 10 years the number of Asians moving between nations not only increased but mobility has become more complex and the movement has become less selective. According to calculations by the UN, 50m. of the 175m. people world-wide living outside their country of origin were in Asia. 130

While this is equivalent to only 1.4% of the total Asian population, it may be a significant understatement of the impact of international migration because the data are incomplete. Furthermore, migrants come from and concentrate in specific countries and certain areas within them, which magnifies their impact. Moreover, these data relate only to immigrants, but Asia is also the largest regional supplier of emigrants to other world regions. A closer analysis of Asia over the last two decades reveals the extent to which international mobility of one kind or another has entered the calculation of life chances of a much larger proportion of Asians. Some of the main types of mobility shaping Asian populations are: South-North migration, Overseas Contract Workers, Student Migration, Forced Migration, North-South Migration, the Feminization of Migration and Undocumented Migration.

SOUTH-NORTH MIGRATION Discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity or birthplace has been gradually removed over the last 30 years. Nowadays immigration selection is based mainly on skills and family reunion and, as a result, Asian South-North immigration has increased. At the same time, Europe and some Asian nations have become important destinations. These movements have been linked with previous colonial ties. A recent study found that the stock of Asian-born in OECD countries was 16.83m. at the turn of the century. The largest Asian communities in OECD nations are from China, the Philippines, India, Korea, Pakistan and Viet Nam, as Figure 1 indicates. Table 2: Stocks of Asian-born Persons in OECD Nations around 2000 Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Switzerland Czech Republic Germany Denmark Spain Finland France Great Britain

Asian-born 1,115,655 57,236 68,494 2,040,590 101,599 21,365 567,021 110,454 86,669 18,375 444,774 1,579,133 131

ESSAYS contd

Country

Asian-born

Greece Hungary Ireland Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands Norway New Zealand Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Sweden Turkey USA Total

75,854 10,730 27,768 969,799 116,732 4,382 10,765 367,987 100,274 175,302 9,479 16,859 1,400 244,246 83,657 8,402,240 16,828,839

Source: Dumont J., and Lemaitre, G., 2005. Counting immigrants and expatriates in OECD countries: a new perspective. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 25, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/59/35043046.pdf/ Table 2 shows that the largest concentrations are in the USA (8.4m.), Canada (2.0m.), Great Britain (1.6m.) and Australia (1.2m.), but there are substantial communities in each nation. While refugees and asylum-seekers make up a significant part of the flow, there is also a disproportionate number of highly skilled and highly educated migrants.

In all OECD countries the immigration rates are higher among the skilled. In them the largest Asian communities are from China, Philippines, India, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan and Viet Nam, as indicated. There is growing interest in these diasporas as their potential to assist in the economic and social development of home countries is being realized. OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCWS) Labour migration involving Asian Overseas Contract Workers (OCWs) can be divided into two systems. The first and by far the largest involves mainly unskilled and semi-skilled workers who are employed in low-paid, low-status, so-called '3D' (dirty, dangerous and difficult) jobs that are avoided by local workers in the fast-growing nations of Asia and the Middle East which suffer 132

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Figure 1: Number of persons born in Asian countries counted in the 2000 round of censuses in OECD countries

Source: Calculated from data in Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005.

from labour shortages. These workers come mainly from South Asian nations, such as Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, China, Burma and Viet Nam. The second group is much smaller in number but still significant and involves highly skilled professionals drawn mainly from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines who are attracted not only to fast-developing Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) and near-NICs, but also to laboursurplus nations like Indonesia where there is a mismatch between the products of the education and training system and the skilled labour demands of a rapidly restructuring and growing economy. Table 3 classifies Asian nations according to whether they have significant gains or losses of migrant workers. The larger nations of Asia in which the transition to low fertility did not commence until the 1970s or later remain labour-surplus areas. By contrast, Japan and the NICs, where fertility decline was earlier and economic growth has been more rapid and sustained over a 133

ESSAYS long period, are immigration countries. The shortage of labour in these countries has been such that even restrictive immigration regulations have not prevented major inflows of documented and undocumented workers. Moreover, while in the first 30 years after the Second World War these countries were mainly regions of emigration, they have recently been through a rapid transition to become substantial immigration nations. This transition has been much more rapid than the equivalent transition in Europe and is a distinctive feature of the Asian international migration situation. At present Malaysia and Thailand are at a stage with both substantial emigration and significant immigration of workers from nearby labour-surplus nations (Indonesia, Bangladesh and, especially, Myanmar (Burma)). However, all Asian nations are to some extent both emigration and immigration nations, with highly skilled workers even moving into labour-surplus nations because of shortages of skills in fast-growing economies and the spread of MNCs. The estimated stocks of migrant workers of Asian origin in foreign countries may be more than 30m. as indicated by Table 4. Table 3: Classification of Asian Nations on the Basis of Their International Labour Migration Situation Mainly Emigration Philippines China India

Bangladesh Sri Lanka Pakistan

Cambodia Indonesia Burma

Laos Viet Nam Nepal

Mainly Immigration South Korea Japan

Taiwan Hong Kong

Singapore Brunei

Both Significant Immigration and Emigration Malaysia Thailand Pre-eminent in South-East Asia is the Philippines, where it is estimated that the stock of temporary labour migrants was 3,599,257, that of irregular labour migrants 1,296,972 and that of permanent residents 3,187,586. The growing demand for labour migrants in the so-called Asian Tiger economies, where rapid economic growth and an associated growth in employment has been outpacing the rate of growth of the native workforce, has been an important trend over the last two decades. 134

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Table 4: Asian Countries: Estimates of Stocks of Migrant Workers in Other Countries Origin Countries South-East Asia Myanmar (Burma) Thailand

Number

Main Destinations

1,100,000

Thailand

340,000

Laos

173,000b

Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Myanmar, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia Thailand

Cambodia

200,000

Malaysia, Thailand

Viet Nam

400,000

Korea, Japan, Taiwan

8,083,815

Middle East, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan Japan, Taiwan

Philippines Malaysia

250,000 a

Singapore Indonesia

150,000 3,500,000a

Total South Asia India

14,196,815

Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Hong Kong

5,000,000

Middle East

Pakistan

3,180,973

Middle East, Malaysia

Bangladesh

3,000,000

Saudi Arabia, Malaysia

Sri Lanka

1,500,000

Middle East, Malaysia

Nepal

4,000,000

Middle East, India, Malaysia

Total North-East Asia China

Source of Year Information Migration News, December 2001 Migration News, March 2002; Scalabrini Migration Center, 1999 Migration News, January 2005 Scalabrini Migration Center, 2000 Migration News, October 2005 Go, 2006

2001 2002 2004 1999 2005 2004

Asian Migrant Center, 1995 1999 Yap, 2006 2005 Migration News, January 2004 2006

Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Scalabrini Migration Center, 2000 Migration News, July 2002 Migration News, October 2005 Asian Migration News, May 2003

2005 1999 2002 2005 2003

16,680,973 550,000

North Korea

300,000

Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Africa China

South Korea

632,000

Japan

Japan

61,000

Hong Kong

Total

1,723,000

Ma, 2006 2005 Migration News, June 2002 2002 Migration News, August 2002 2002 Stahl and PECC-HRD, 2000 1996; Iguchi, 2003

a. Documented b. Undocumented 135

ESSAYS One of the crucial questions relating to the emerging international labour migration impinging upon Asia is the extent to which the migration will remain temporary. The bulk of OCWs return to their homeland and policy-makers in destination nations are conscious of the experience with guestworkers in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, when temporary labour migration became transformed into permanent settlement. There are signs that some Asian labour migrants are settling more or less permanently at their destinations (e.g. Indonesians in Malaysia). But most of the labour migration is clearly circular and non-permanent migration is built in to the structure of economies and societies at both origin and destination. Perhaps the attempts by governments to impose greater border restrictions will prove counterproductive, forcing undocumented migrant workers who would prefer to circulate to settle in the destination countries because of the danger of being detected during multiple crossing of the borders. Student Migration Growing numbers of students from Asian countries are following programmes outside their country, especially in northern countries but increasingly also in other Asian nations. UNESCO data show that over the 1998— 2003 period these numbered some 2.6m., with the largest numbers being from China, Korea and India. Table 5: Foreign Students by Country of Origin, 1998-2003 Country of Origin 1998-2003 Bangladesh China Hong Kong (China), SAR India Indonesia Japan Korea, Democratic People's Rep. Korea, Republic of Malaysia Nepal Pakistan Philippines Singapore Sri Lanka Thailand Turkey Viet Nam Other Asia (incl. Western and Central) Total Asia (incl. Western and Central) Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: 5187&url_do=do_topic&url_section=201 136

Number 26,566 470,598 96,950 207,480 101,418 190,517 42,513 213,986 133,377 14,943 45,047 17,004 78,468 24,014 66,243 181,965 31,610 676,841 2,619,540 http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?url_id==

The Asia-Pacific Region This is an important part of the emigration of HRST (Human Resources in Science and Technology) out of Asia. Many students work while studying and for many of those students their move is a prelude to permanent settlement in the destination country. There is evidence that OECD nations are increasingly considering the recruitment of overseas students not only as financially beneficial, but also as an excellent source of future skilled migrants. In this way a potentially valuable asset to an Asian nation's human resources and a conduit of knowledge transfer has become a dimension of the brain drain. In Australia, for example, more than one-half of immigrants in the last two years who settled in the country had an Australian qualification. Another important training-related type of international movement is that of so-called trainees from more populous labour-surplus countries to Japan and South Korea. These temporary migrations are ostensibly to train employees of multinational companies located in labour-surplus countries during a period in Japan and Korea when in reality much of the training involves working in a factory of the company. Such programmes can be seen as a mechanism to recruit low-paid factory workers in situations where there are no legal channels to access low-skilled labour through migration. In Japan over the 1992-2003 period, 590,001 trainees entered the country, especially from China (278,964), Indonesia (60,336), the Philippines (43,468), Thailand (43,310), Viet Nam (22,188) and Malaysia (19,226). FORCED MIGRATION Large-scale forced migrations in Asia have been initiated by political conflicts, environmental disasters and huge construction projects. But much of this movement has occurred within nations. Forced migration which crosses international boundaries is that of refugees and asylum-seekers. During the post-Second World War period and until recently, Asia produced more refugees than any other world region. Figure 2 shows that the outflow of refugees from Asia reached a peak of around 7m. in 1991 but has subsequently declined and in 2004 fell to 3.08m. As the diagram shows, it is the massive displacement of people from Afghanistan into the neighbouring states of Pakistan and Iran which has been dominant throughout the period. For example, it has been estimated that there were more than 5m. Afghans in Pakistan in March 2002 at the time of the fall of the Taliban. This number fell as a result of large-scale repatriations so that in a census in 2005 the number of Afghans counted in Pakistan was 3.05m. Overall it is thought that between mid-2002 and late 2005 there was a repatriation of more than 4.4m. from Pakistan and Iran, making it one of the largest such flows in history. 137

ESSAYS

Figure 2: Asia: Refugees by Country of Origin, 1980-2004

Source: UNHCR Statistics.

North-South Migration Although increased movement from Asia into the OECD nations has been perhaps the major shift in global immigration over the last two decades, it is important to note that there has been a small but nevertheless significant flow in the other direction. In Asia the rapid growth and restructuring of national economies has been accompanied by an increasing influx of skilled workers and businesspeople from Europe, North America and Australasia on a mostly temporary, but long-term, basis. This has been in addition to significant movement of professionals and other highly skilled workers within the Asian region, largely from countries with education systems producing larger numbers of such workers than their own economies can currently absorb, especially India, the Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. This new influx of professionals, businesspeople and technical workers from MDCs is associated with two factors. First, the massive growth of investment by multinational operations in the region has resulted in the MNCs transferring large numbers of staff into Asia. By 2004 there were 961,307 Japanese citizens officially living overseas, many in other Asian countries. Second, the mismatches between the education and training systems and the requirements of the labour market in rapidly growing economies like Indonesia, where, despite high levels of under-employment and educated unemployment, substantial numbers of expatriate engineers, technicians, accountants, finance and management experts, etc., have had to be imported. 138

The Asia-Pacific Region

An important element in this north-south flow of migrants is the 'reverse brain drain', or repatriation of nationals and former nationals who have spent a considerable period living and working overseas. Several countries in the region adopted deliberate policies to attract back former emigrants who have particular technical, professional and business skills. FEMINIZATION OF ASIAN MIGRATION This has been one of the most distinctive features of the massive expansion of international migration in Asia. In several countries of origin, women are a major element, if not the majority, of out-migrants. International migration in Asia is a distinctly gendered process and is interlinked closely with changes in the role and status of women. Asian countries vary in the extent to which women are represented in labour migration. In two of the major migrant-sending nations, the Philippines and Indonesia, women constitute more than 70% of all migrants, and in Sri Lanka they account for 66%. In Bangladesh, by contrast, cultural factors have meant that women have not been permitted to be recruited as labour migrants. The Thai figures are a little misleading in that much female migration is undocumented. Among female migrants from Asia who move to work, unskilled women predominate. Much of the migration involves women, like men, taking up low-wage, low-status '3D' jobs that are avoided by local women at the destination, but there is greater occupational segmentation than is the case with men. Unskilled female migrants concentrate in a few occupations, especially as domestic workers, of which Asia is the world's largest supplier. Some of the occupations which unskilled female migrant workers take up in destinations make them vulnerable to exploitation, especially those who work in the so-called entertainment or sex industry from the Philippines and Thailand, as well as Indonesia and Myanmar. Other important occupations for unskilled migrant women include factory work and a range of informal sector activities. Women in many Asian countries have not enjoyed equal access to higher education with their male counterparts. Accordingly, they have not been as much a part of the movement of skilled workers in the region as males. Nevertheless, they have been an important component of the south-north migration. A significant type of female movement is marriage migration. There are substantial numbers of Asian women, especially from the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Thailand who move to northern countries as part of so-called 'mail order bride' schemes. Hence there are significant numbers of Filipino brides in Japan, Australia, North America and Europe and a flow of female 139

ESSAYS migrants from Asia has been arriving in countries in the north under the family reunion immigration programmes. Within Asia, too, international marriage migration is increasing. One-third of Taiwanese marriages involve a foreigner, compared with 5% a decade ago. The bulk of these marriages are of Taiwanese men to foreign brides. The implications are considerable. Taiwan has not been an immigration society and although there are differences between native Taiwanese and the Chinese mainland refugees, the increase in cultural diversity being brought about by marriage migration is substantial. Some 13.4% of births in Taiwan in 2003 were to mixed marriage couples. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION Undocumented and documented systems are not totally separate: undocumented flows often duplicate documented flows, some middlemen and officials are involved in both types of movement and the networks established by documented migrants are often used by later undocumented migrants. In the South-East Asian region alone there are around 2m. irregular migrants. It is estimated that Malaysia had 700,000 undocumented migrants as well as 1.94m. legal foreign residents and workers. Many Asian workers have adopted undocumented migration strategies partly as a response to the barriers being erected (legal and physical) by destination countries to labour migration, often in the face of a manifest demand for workers. In many origin countries, potential labour migrants bypass official labour migration programmes because they are more costly and slower than moving on an undocumented basis. One disturbing element in the official programmes has been the increased transaction costs which have to be borne by the migrants themselves, and the large profits which are being enjoyed by recruiters and other middlemen. Where countries have attempted to legalize migrations of workers, illegal operators have become so entrenched that it is difficult to persuade undocumented workers to replace their illegal strategies with legal ones. In some countries, the undocumented approaches have even come to be trusted while there are deep suspicions of governments. Moreover, there is a tendency to associate all undocumented migration with criminal trafficking. This is unfortunate because much undocumented migration is not criminal, as indicated above. There are also highly exploitative, corrupt and venal practices which occur in legal migration and which need to be the target of policy. However, it is a fact that there has been increased trafficking in Asia and that it is largely in the hands of organized crime, some of it involving diversification from the drugs trade. There are an estimated 150,000 foreign 140

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sex workers in Japan alone, most of them Thais and Filipinos. It is clear that there are South-East Asian women, especially Thais, living in virtual slavery in Japan. A study of one of many shelters for foreign wives of Japanese men found that of the 160 women helped by the shelter, 142 were Thais and 132 had been the victims of slavery. REMITTANCES The region is the pre-eminent source of the world's contract labour migrants. There is also a diaspora of permanent settlers from the Asia-Pacific region living in OECD nations. Both of these groups are an important source of remittances to Asian countries. However, their measurement is problematical because of the frequent illegality of movement, the isolation of home areas and the long history of remitting money through non-formal, traditional channels. In 2005 the World Bank estimated that there was an inflow of US $75,100m. into countries in the Asia-Pacific region—an increase of 122% over the $33,900m. recorded in 2000. Figure 3 shows some of the largest recipients of remittances among Asian countries Figure 3: Asia: Remittances in US $ and as a share of GDP by Country, 2004

Source: World Bank, 2006; World Bank Key Development Data and Statistics Online Database; Asian Migration News, 2005; Firdausy, 2005; Chalamwong, 2006; Asian Development Bank, 2005.

Remittances make up a significant proportion of total GDP in several nations. The impact of remittances is concentrated in the parts of those nations 141

ESSAYS which send out large numbers of migrants, often the poorest parts of their nations. However, with the recent massive increase in scale, there has been a growing recognition among policy-makers and researchers of their importance for economic and social development in the region. In examining redistributions of wealth between north and south countries, remittance flows received in Asia are greater than FDA flows, certainly when considered in net terms. Some also would argue that remittances are more predictable and stable than FDI and FDA flows, and that they are especially effective because they are received directly by families. Some policy intervention to improve the flow and impact of remittances includes efforts to reduce the often exorbitant transaction costs. For example, it has been estimated that Filipino remitters paid US $ 1.45m. in transaction costs to transfer $ 10,700m. to the Philippines in the first 10 months of 2005. BRAIN DRAIN VERSUS MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT A significant brain drain is part of many Asian countries' migration experience. Moreover, with the increasing global competition for talent and skilled workers, OECD nations have placed greater emphasis on skill in their selection of immigrants. A recent analysis calculated emigration rates of highly qualified persons (with a university education) from non-OECD nations. The rates are low for large nations such as Indonesia (1.9%), Thailand (1.9%) Bangladesh (2.0%), India (3.1%) and China (3.2%), but much higher for small nations. There is evidence that there is selectivity within this group, so that the 'brightest and the best' move out. Brain drain was originally seen as having a purely negative impact on developments in the origin nations. It deprived them of the scarce human resources required for achieving economic and social progress. But development organizations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International Labour Organization, US AID, DIFD and the IOM argue that MDC-based diasporas can play an important role in development, growth and poverty reduction in LDC-origin areas because north-south remittances are a more reliable and larger source of development funds than FDA. The diaspora can also be both a direct source of FDI and be effective 'middlemen' for channelling FDI towards the home country. Good examples of this are China and Taiwan, where the spectacular economic growth of recent years has been heavily influenced by investment from perhaps 30m. overseas Chinese. The diaspora can also be a bridgehead into the expansion of economic linkages with the home nation. Korean Americans were the bridgeheads for the successful penetration of the US market by Korean car, electronics and white goods manufacturers. Canadian-based studies have shown that a doubling of 142

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skilled migration from Asia led to a 74% increase in Asian imports to Canada. There can also be significant dividends to the home country if expatriates return, especially when they are highly skilled in areas in demand in the local labour market and have expanded their knowledge and experience while overseas and return with a network of overseas contacts that can benefit their work at home. Taiwan, China, and South Korea have developed initiatives to attract expatriates to return. While it is difficult to assess the role of these initiatives in the massive economic growth of Taiwan in the last two decades, it has undoubtedly played a role. The 'reverse brain drain' is a common term in Taiwan, and the 1990 census indicated that around 50,000 highly skilled expatriates returned to Taiwan during the 1985-90 period. Another important group are 'temporary returnees' or 'transnational workers' who work on both sides of the Pacific and play the role of middlemen linking businesses in the two regions together with their personal networks and technological and market know-how. INCORPORATION OF MIGRANTS INTO HOST SOCIETIES Almost all Asian nations continue to deny that they need permanent settlement of immigrants despite increasing labour deficits due to longstanding fertility decline, continuing economic growth and processes of labour-market segmentation. Only Singapore seeks to attract immigrant settlers and is highly selective of skilled groups. The more than 100,000 unskilled workers on a temporary basis are not given access to permanent settlement. However, this represents a substantial shift and maturing in Singapore migration policy, under which, until the 1990s, migration was regarded as a 'revolving reserve army of labour'. Elsewhere the model of migration is to oppose permanent settlement, and where migration is allowed, it is on a strictly non-permanent basis and there is a strong exclusionary ethos. As a result, immigrants' rights are considerably restricted. There is a ban on family reunion; immigrants are restricted in the jobs they can hold, usually being confined to their initial employer; they cannot travel freely in the country; there is no access to basic workers' rights, etc. There is also a high degree of stigmatization and stereotyping of migrants. They are often made scapegoats for a range of ills in the host society. This is facilitated by their 'otherness' and often readily observable ethno-cultural difference. It is exacerbated by media and national governments are also often implicated, since migrants can deflect criticism from other shortcomings. The reasons for the antipathy toward migrant settlement and the exclusion of migrants in Asian nations are manifold. Some countries fear that their 143

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cultural homogeneity would be diluted or compromised if there was significant immigrant settlement. Japan is a good example: it has resisted legal immigration as a solution to demographic and economic problems. Instead, it has resorted to a range of alternative strategies to meet the labour shortfall. All involve migration, such as the recruiting of third- and later generation descendants of Japanese settlers in Latin America, bringing in 'trainees' from South-East Asia to provide labour for factories and a large flow of undocumented migrants. Another contributory factor to the antipathy toward migration and settlement is the fact that many are young, ethnically diverse nation states due to historical migrations of Chinese, Indians and Arabs into the region, often under colonial auspices. Some nations (e.g. Indonesia) did not exist prior to colonialism and a number of disparate ethnic groups have been brought together under the nationalist banner. In such nations there are great sensitivities about the balance between ethnic groups. With a few exceptions, all Asian nations have restrictive citizenship policies, which make it very difficult for immigrants to obtain citizenship, at least legally.1 However, in recent years there has been an increase in the numbers of Asian countries recognizing dual citizenship. This has been a function of the growing recognition of the benefits to be derived from maintaining strong linkages with their expatriates. For example, the Philippine Congress passed the Dual Citizenship law in 2003 and in 2005 India extended Dual Citizenship rights to all overseas. REGIONAL CO-OPERATION ON MIGRATION The global trend toward regional organization development and regional cooperation can be seen in Asia in the development of organizations such as Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which have now been in existence for more than a decade. So far little has been achieved with respect to regional agreement on international migration issues. However, the events of 11 September 2001 have heightened the awareness of policy-makers and there are therefore some indications of change. There is a growing acceptance that migration can present a threat to security and that effective management of migration is an essential component of maintaining national security. There is also the recognition that effective management of

1 There is a substantial underground industry in document forgery and in some countries significant corruption.

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The Asia-Pacific Region migration cannot be achieved by a single nation state without the co-operation of other nations. The growing scale and importance of people-smuggling, trafficking and undocumented migration in the Asian region has led to a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives of co-operation to combat such activity. One of the most inclusive and significant has been the so-called 'Bali Process' which originated in meetings convened by the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Australia in Bali on 26-28 February 2002 and 28-30 April 2003, the Ministerial Conferences on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (MCPSTPRTC). The 'Bali Process' is intended to complement and strengthen bilateral and regional co-operation in this area. Since 1996, also, regional co-operation on refugees has taken place through the intergovernmental Asia Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants (APC). This is an informed consultative arrangement between countries in the Asia-Pacific region. However, it is non-decisionmaking and membership is voluntary and aims to promote dialogue and explore opportunities for greater regional co-operation on matters pertaining to population movements, including refugees, displaced persons and migrants. Despite these encouraging signs that multilateral co-operation on migration issues is increasing in Asia, so far little or no co-operation between sending and receiving countries on hard migration issues has been achieved. This applies particularly to the orderly recruitment of migrant workers; the protection of their rights; and the acceptance of asylum-seekers, etc. CONCLUSION It could be argued that one of the most pressing needs in the region is for migration in general, and international labour migration in particular, to be considered by national governments in a more objective way. It is clearly an emotional issue, but in many countries, especially in destination nations, there is widespread misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the nature, scale and effects of contemporary international migration of workers. Indeed, one of the concerns is that the international labour migration issue is not even on the 'radar screen' of both formal and informal discussion. Myths and half-truths about migrant workers and their effects abound. Stereotypes about involvement in crime, spreading disease, etc., need to be exposed as incorrect and there is a need for both governments and the public more generally to see migrant workers as a continuing and in some cases integral part of the local economy. Indeed, in many cases such workers are necessary for the long-term health of the economy. The failure to recognise these realities has led to, on 145

ESSAYS the one hand, unrealistic policies and programmes to replace migrant workers with local workers, and to overly restrictive entry policies on the other. These encourage the proliferation of underground migration, marginalize migrant workers and restrict their rights. There is a widespread view in destination countries that the whole migrant worker issue revolves around maintenance of national homogeneity, compliance with immigration regulations and border control. There are, however, also more positive aspects, such as the contribution of workers to the national economy. Moreover, most migrant workers wish to maintain strong contact with their home areas and eventually to return to their home country. There are also the social and cultural benefits of multicultural societies. What is involved here is a significant shift in culture and this is one of the most intractable barriers to improving the situation for migrant workers. It also prevents labour migration systems from working more efficiently and effectively, as well as equitably and justly. International migration will almost certainly continue to increase in scale, diversity and impact. It is 'here to stay' in Asia as a permanent structural feature of Asian economies and societies and must no longer be considered as a temporary, ephemeral phenomenon. There is a need for the élites of many Asian nations to make a 'conceptual leap' with regard to international migration policy, involving in part the recognition of the long-term significance of migration and settlement in the region. Further Reading Battistella, G., and Asis, M. B. (Eds). Unauthorized Migration in Southeast Asia. Quezon City, Philippines, Scalabrini Migration Center, 2003. Ellerman, D. Policy Research on Migration and Development, 2003, http:// econ. worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id-29100 Iredale, R., Hawksley, C , and Castles, S. (Eds). Migration in the Asia Pacific: Population, Settlement and Citizenship Issues. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2003. See also the following websites: http ://www. scalabrini. asn. au/atlas/amatlas. htm www.idrc.org

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Half a World in Motion: Migration Policy in the Americas KEVIN O ' N E I L

INTRODUCTION: WHO GOES WHERE IN THE AMERICAS Although international migration has shaped all of the world's societies, the American hemisphere has an extraordinarily long and strong history of migration. The region is capped by pairs of countries whose modern origins lie in immigration: Canada and the USA have a well-recognized role in world migration, while immigration to Argentina and Chile played an equally important role in those countries' formation. Post-colonial immigration to the rest of the region has been less celebrated, but also diverse and important, as immigrants from Western and Eastern Asia and Europe joined indigenous people and the descendants of Africans and Europeans who arrived during the colonial era. Recognizing this history is important to avoid simply caricaturing the region today as a North of immigration and a South of emigration. Certainly, North America continues to be one of the world's principal magnets for international migrants: the UN estimates that 13% of the North American population was born in another country, compared to the global average of 3% and 1.1% in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The USA occupies a position of undisputed importance in the hemisphere's migration system. Citizens of other countries of the Americas account for around 43% of the million or so legal permanent immigrants the USA admits every year and about one-third of their legal temporary workers, who generally total between 250,000-500,000 new admissions per year. Migrants from within the hemisphere are also thought to account for more than three-quarters of the estimated population of around 12m. unauthorized residents. Canada admits around twice as many immigrants relative to its population than does the USA, but draws a smaller proportion of its immigrants from within the Americas. Both countries continue their long-standing traditions of 147

welcoming migrants from around the world, but today, as in the past, immigration brings challenges and controversies. The USA, in particular, is struggling to deal with massive irregular immigration. In much of the rest of the Americas, emigration has become an important part of society and the economy. From 1995 until 2000, the net emigration rate for LAC was the highest of any region in the world. People born in the LAC countries now living in another country represent nearly 4% of the region's population. Most of these emigrants are thought to be in North America. However, there is vigorous migration among the countries of the LAC region and many of today's emigrants are reversing the historical flows, heading to Europe and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Mexico's size and proximity makes it the most important source of migrants to the USA and the vast majority of Mexico's emigrants are in the USA. Mexico is also a transit route and even a destination for Central American migrants. Although Central Americans most often look towards Mexico or the USA for work or the possibility of a new life, they also migrate in significant numbers within the region, most notably to Costa Rica. In Central America, Costa Rica is the major recipient of immigrants, followed by Belize and Panama. Their neighbours in Central and South America are the source of most immigrants to these countries. The Caribbean countries have emigration rates that average the highest in the Americas, with most of this migration destined for the USA, Canada, or former colonial powers in Europe. South America's traditional focal point of immigration from Europe, Argentina, is now a magnet for immigrants from within the continent. Argentina's economic crisis at the beginning of this century opened a four-year period in which immigration drastically slowed and an unprecedented number of Argentines left the country. The USA was a major destination, but European countries and Israel also received Argentine emigrants, many of whom were returning to ancestral homelands. Some of the same changes are observed, to a lesser degree, in the continent's other traditional destination countries, Chile and Uruguay. Venezuela's attraction as a migration destination waned as the oil boom years yielded to political instability, while Colombia's civil conflicts have created great emigration pressure. Brazil is both a significant source of and destination for migrants in the region and contributes a surprising number of Japan's immigrants, thanks to provisions in Japanese immigration law that allow descendants of Japanese citizens to return. The Andean countries are sources of large amounts of migration, with Spain and, in some years, Argentina rivalling the USA as primary destinations. 148

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Net migration rates are persons immigrating less persons emigrating per 1,000 residents.

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ESSAYS POLITICAL AND POLICY QUESTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY Policy and politics regarding migration in the Americas are naturally shaped by the direction of migration flows. The USA and Canada, despite their long traditions of immigration, continue to have robust political debates about which and how many people should be allowed to immigrate, and of how best to control their borders. LAC countries are not excused from dealing with difficult questions of border control and immigrant admission policy, but are relatively more concerned with how to relate to their nationals abroad and maximize the benefits they bring to their home countries. Across the hemisphere, the question of how national governments negotiate agreements on an issue that speaks directly to national sovereignty, yet is fundamentally international, remains. The USA The USA admits legal immigrants in three major 'streams'. The largest, accounting for about three-quarters of admissions, consists of people immigrating to join family members who are US citizens or permanent residents. The second comprises people admitted because an employer has sponsored them to fill a job, and the third, much smaller category, consists of resettled refugees and asylum-seekers. There is also a small visa 'lottery' programme. In addition, the USA admits a number of temporary workers at various skill levels and hosts more foreign students than any other country in the world. In recent years, most people granted permanent residency status have already been in the USA under some sort of temporary or unauthorized status. Sources of US Immigration inflow: Birthplaces of Persons Granted Legal Permanent Residency in 2004

Where Today's Immigrants to the USA Are From: The Americas are the most important source area for legal immigration to the USA today. These figures include 150

Haifa World in Motion: Migration Policy in the Americas people already living in the USA who convert to permanent status, and do not include temporary migration categories. People born in the Americas are also thought to compose a large majority of illegal immigration flows. (Source: Migration Information Source (www.migrationinformation.org) based on Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2004, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006.) Sources of US Immigrant Stock: Birthplaces of the Foreign-born Population in 2005

Where the US Immigrant Population Is From: Figures for the 'foreign-born' include all persons born abroad, whether they are naturalized citizens, legal permanent residents, temporary migrants, or unauthorized residents. The stock of immigrants in the USA differs from the make-up of new immigrant inflows, primarily because of the influence of temporary and unauthorized immigration (which explain the relatively greater importance of people born in the Americas among the foreign-born) and because of the legacy of past years' immigration. (Source: Migration Information Source (www.migrationinformation .org) based on the Current Population Survey.)

Recent Immigration to the USA: The number of people immigrating to the USA has been gradually increasing, driven by increases in the admission of the immediate family 151

ESSAYS members of US citizens. These figures include people already in the USA who receive permanent legal status. The spike in admissions from 1989 to 1992 is explained by a onetime legalization of unauthorized immigrants under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. In 2004, about 66% of immigrants were admitted to join family members who were already citizens or permanent residents, 16% were admitted to fill (mostly higher skill) jobs, 8% were admitted as refugees or asylees, and 10% were in other categories. (Source: Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2004, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006.)

Immigrants in the US Population: The foreign-born population in the USA is as large as it has ever been and is growing, but, as a proportion of the total population, it remains smaller than the peak levels seen during the last great year of immigration in the late 19th century and smaller than Canada's current foreign-born population. The foreign-born were estimated to number some 35m. people, or 12.1% of the population, in 2005. In 2004, 38% of the foreign-born were naturalized US citizens. (Source: Migration Information Source (www.migrationinformation.org) based on the Current Population Survey.) The USA remains the dominant country of destination in the Americas, home now to the largest number of immigrants in their history. The US Census estimated that, as of 2005, about 35.7m. foreign-born persons were living in the USA, representing about 12.4% of the entire population. This is up from 19.8m. in 1990, but as a proportion of the population, is still lower than the historic peak set in the 1890s. The source of that migration has changed profoundly, with entries from the historical source countries in Europe now playing only a minor role. Immigration from Latin America, in particular Mexico, dominates inflows, followed by immigration from Asia. 152

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One of the most visible effects of immigration from Latin America is a change in the country's ethnic make-up and its consequences on politics, society, and the economy. Hispanics became the nation's largest minority group in 2004 and the US Census projects that they will make up 24.4% of the US population by 2050. As yet, their impact on national politics is small: in the 2004 national elections, about 7.6m. Hispanic citizens—composed of naturalized immigrants and native-born persons of Latino descent—voted, accounting for only about 6% of those who voted. However, the 'Hispanic vote' is growing faster than other racial and ethnic groups, participation rates among those eligible are still lower than in other groups, 14m. Hispanics are not yet of voting age and 11m. do not have citizenship, but may yet naturalize.1 As a result, both political parties are concerned with positioning themselves to capture this perceived voting bloc in the future. It is questionable whether the 'Hispanic vote' is in fact cohesive or whether immigration policy will be a key issue among Hispanics. Still, political observers cite the growth of the Hispanic population as a primary reason for the interest of moderate Republicans in the regularization of unauthorized immigrants and temporary work programmes. The settlement patterns of immigrants in the USA have also changed. Traditionally, immigrants were concentrated in a few large urban areas in California, Texas, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and Florida. These five states still host two-thirds of the US immigrant population and continue to settle the absolute majority of new arrivals. However, in the past two decades growing proportions of immigrants have settled in medium-sized cities and suburbs and in the Southeast and Midwest, thanks to labour demand and everexpanding immigrant social networks that have attracted both new arrivals from overseas and secondary movements from within the USA. Thirteen states, most of which had previously received few immigrants, saw their foreign-born population more than double during the 1990s. Although this dispersion matches changes in the movements of the native-born, it creates a new challenge for governmental and non-governmental social service providers in these areas. Immigration Policy Reform in the USA Despite opinion polls that generally show that majorities of Americans favour reducing immigration, controversy over legal immigration has generally remained confined to specific issues, such as access to public benefits for 1

R. Suro, R. Fry, and J. Passei. Hispanics and the 2004 Election: Population, Electorate, and Voters. Washington DC: Pew Hispanic Center. 2005.

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Originally published on the Migration Information Source (www.migrationinformation.org), a project of the Migration Policy Institute.

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immigrants and the size of temporary work visa programmes. Concern about the fact that arriving immigrants are predominantly from one region (Latin America) and one country (Mexico) and that immigrants from this region are significantly less skilled on average than natives is largely subordinated to the dominant preoccupation with irregular immigration. High rates of poverty in immigrant households are a serious problem, but other indicators of success, such as English language acquisition and upward occupational and educational mobility of the second and third generation, contradict fears that immigrants from Latin America are failing to integrate into American society. This has not kept immigration from being politically explosive, particularly during periods of economic recession. The issue was particularly contentious in California, which has the largest foreign-born population in the country and was hit particularly hard by the recession of the early 1990s. Initiatives such as 'English only' bills were witnessed nation-wide and scepticism about immigration made its way into national welfare reform legislation in 1996 that barred unauthorized immigrants from most public benefits and limited the rights of even legal immigrants to social benefits for a period after their entry to the USA. For the near future, illegal immigration promises to be the most important issue concerning migration in the USA and perhaps the hemisphere. The most reliable estimates place the unauthorized resident population in 2005 at about 11.5m.-12m. persons. Thus, unauthorized immigrants may account for nearly one-third of the US foreign-born population. Over half of the unauthorized population is estimated to be Mexican. The unauthorized population is estimated to include 3.9m. adult women and 1.9m. children under the age of 182. Although unauthorized immigration has long occurred in the USA, the build-up of a significant unauthorized population really began in the last quarter of the 20th century. The end of legal temporary labour programmes with Mexico, strong demand at the lower end of the US labour market and Mexico's rocky economic transition drove the growth of the unauthorized population. Two major policy initiatives dealt with this growth in the past: the legalization of some 3m. immigrants and the prohibition of hiring unauthorized workers starting in 1986, and a build-up in border enforcement in the 1990s. Both efforts failed to slow the growth of the unauthorized population and had unintended effects. 'Employer sanctions' for employing unauthorized

2

J. Passei. The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the US. Washington DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2006.

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Haifa World in Motion: Migration Policy in the Americas workers were subverted by a false document trade and 'outsourcing' in hiring arrangements. The expensive border enforcement build-up had even more severe unintended consequences. The bulk of the evidence suggests that border enforcement had no deterrent effect on migrants entering the USA, but that it did discourage migrants from leaving. More difficult border crossings made strategies of repeated, circular trips less feasible, encouraging migrants to extend their stays in the USA and even to settle and bring family members. More tragically, the vigorous enforcement of the easiest, urban crossing points pushed migrant traffic through more remote, dangerous areas, where risks of death were higher. About 400 Mexican migrants died attempting to cross the border in both 2004 and 2005, according to Mexican consulates. This also increased the costs and level of criminality associated with smuggling and brought high levels of traffic into rural areas of Arizona and New Mexico. These areas began to see the local problems caused by unauthorized migration, and the political backlash, that had previous been confined to California and Texas. The unauthorized population continues to grow at rates estimated to approach 500,000 people per year. The costs of this unauthorized immigration, which include burdens on public health care (largely through the costs of emergency room treatment), law enforcement problems, and environmental destruction caused during the act of crossing the border, are particularly concentrated in the south-western states. Elsewhere, the visible signs of irregular immigration, such as lines of day labourers seeking work and increased numbers of students in public schools, keep illegal immigration in the public eye. Political discourse has been polarized and confused by language that describes illegal immigration as a 'tide' or 'invasion' and emphasizes the associated criminality, while simultaneously recognizing that most unauthorized immigrants are valuable workers and good neighbours. The costs of irregular immigration are at least partially mitigated by the fact that most unauthorized immigrants work 'on the books', generate tax revenues for all levels of government, are eligible for very few public benefits or services, and are an important component of the labour force and a significant consumer demographic for US businesses. However, the costs of immigration in general in the USA fall largely on local and state governments, while the revenue benefits accrue disproportionately to the federal government. This is arguably more the case for illegal immigration, creating an uncomfortable inequality: localities and states must bear most of the burdens created by irregular immigration while receiving few of the benefits and having no control over larger immigration policy.

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No clear solution exists to the problems of mass unauthorized immigration. Border enforcement resources have continued to grow, despite the lack of demonstrated success. The enforcement of immigration laws in workplaces has recently returned to favour after having been suspended completely during the economic boom of the late 1990s, but remains a little-used option due to the resulting burdens and disruptions imposed on US businesses. Mass internal enforcement is an unattractive prospect because of its impact on both employers and on individual US citizens. This is particularly evident in the case of 'mixed status' families in which the children are US citizens by birth but one or both parents are deportable unauthorized immigrants, a phenomenon that further demonstrates the complex nature of the issue. Around 3m. US citizen children are estimated to live in families headed by unauthorized immigrants.3 Unauthorized immigration has also found a sympathetic face in that of immigrants who migrated illegally as young children, have grown up successfully in the USA, and now find their options limited with regard to higher education and careers. Two political solutions have attracted significant support in the national 2006 legislative session and promise to be features of the political landscape for some time to come. One vein of proposals, which emanates primarily from the right wing of the Republican Party, focuses on law enforcement. This set of responses generally calls for increased penalties for illegal immigration, quicker and easier deportation of unauthorized immigrants, criminalization of aiding unauthorized immigrants, larger penalties for employing unauthorized workers, imposition of new identification and documentation requirements, requiring public agencies to report possible unauthorized immigrants, and involving local and state law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement, a role that they have thus far largely shunned. An 'amnesty' for existing unauthorized immigrants is fundamentally precluded by most advocates of such an approach. Further expansion of border enforcement is also a primary component of this approach, including the extension of walls on the USMexico border. A Congressional bill involving many of these factors inspired large-scale protests in early 2006. Another proposed set of responses that aims to accommodate labour market demands and restore circular migration patterns has been pushed forward by a loose coalition of pro-business moderate Republicans, some Democrats, employers, immigrant advocacy organizations, and labour unions. The most prominent of the current proposals would involve the regularization of existing unauthorized immigrants, almost certainly to a temporary status, and the creation of an ongoing large-scale temporary labour migration 3

J. Passei.

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Haifa World in Motion: Migration Policy in the Americas programme. These proposals would likely also have a more moderate law enforcement and border control component. Most would provide some way for regularized and temporary workers to eventually acquire permanent resident status, perhaps by 'earning' the status by demonstrating a record of good citizenship and integration. This pathway is demanded by unions, which favour permanent immigration but are highly sceptical of temporary work programmes. President George W. Bush has called for action along these general lines, but the Administration has so far been unable or unwilling to place much political weight behind the issue. Closely related in the political imagination to irregular migration, but only tangentially related in a practical sense, is the issue of terrorism. The attacks of 11 September 2001 made American policy-makers aware that the government had little ability to monitor and track even legal immigrants and visitors to the USA. It also inspired the largest reorganization of the US government since 1947, in an attempt to integrate the country's security-related services. The transformation split the portfolio of the old Immigration and Naturalization Service into two enforcement-oriented agencies and one services-oriented agency and moved both functions from the Department of Justice to the newly created Department of Homeland Security. At the policy level, the US response to terrorism in migration policy has three key elements: • Greater co-operation with North American neighbours on border control; • Much heavier and more continuous scrutiny of entrants to the USA before, during, and after entry, and; • Increased investment in technology for migration control. These changes have not resulted in permanent changes to migration flows to the USA. Delays in processing the applications of immigrants who were already in the USA contributed to a brief decline in permanent residency admissions in 2003. This burden has also led to difficulty in clearing a long backlog in applications for permanent residency and naturalization. More significant delays in processing, decreased entries, or less hospitable treatment were observed in the first years after the terrorist attacks for specific types of migrants—namely students, refugees, asylum-seekers, and temporary and unauthorized immigrants from Muslim countries. A 'special registration' programme for non-immigrant male visitors from a list of countries known to have terrorist activity led to mistaken detentions and drew particularly heavy fire from immigrant organizations and human rights activists. Increased scrutiny of refugees and asylum-seekers caused an initial reduction in the number of refugees resettled, but admissions have since partially recovered. A 159

ESSAYS programme to trace foreign students caused processing delays during its hasty roll-out, denting the country's valuable trade in the education of foreigners. Most of these problems have since been resolved and the use of biométrie fingerprint technology at consulates and ports of entry to track visa applicants and visitors has been launched on an impressive scale without causing the delays feared. Such measures have also created greater documentation and identification burdens for other countries and arguably increased co-operation with the USA's two immediate neighbours—although this has not been without friction. The balance between security on the one hand and immigrant and visitor rights, privacy, and civil liberties on the other hand will continue to be a major issue for the USA. Canada In 2001, Canada's foreign-born population was 19% of the total population and growing, giving it one of the highest proportions of immigrants in the world. As in the USA, the old source countries in Europe have yielded to immigration primarily from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as small numbers from Africa and the Middle East. Between 1961 and 2001, the size of the LAC-born population in Canada increased from 12,900 to 585,800. Canada admits immigrants in three streams of admissions roughly equivalent to those in the USA, for family reunification, humanitarian, and economic reasons. Family members joining persons already in the country are a smaller proportion of admissions than in the USA, thanks to an intentional effort to open the country to skilled immigrants. Nearly onequarter of the 235,808 people granted permanent residency in Canada in 2004 were selected through a 'points system' that tests them for skills, education and other attributes, and another large proportion consisted of their immediate family members. As in the USA, entering immigrants tend to be either very well educated or rather poorly so, depending on which administrative route they are admitted under. New immigration legislation in 2002 continued Canada's basic strategy of promoting high levels of high-skilled migration, but shifted the system away from a focus on occupational shortages and admission based on being sponsored to fill a job (as is the most common case in the USA) towards emphasis on long-term earnings potential as the basis of admission under the points system. Canada has also actively recruited immigrants in other ways, from expanding its bilateral agricultural temporary labour migration programme with Mexico and streamlining the temporary entry of professionals to 160

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stepping up its recruitment of new university students from abroad. Canada continues to give its territories and provinces some ability to choose migrants for admission. Sources of Immigration Inflow to Canada: Birthplaces of Persons Granted Permanent Residency in 2004

Where Today's Immigrants to Canada Are From: Asia (which includes the Middle East) is the most important source region for current immigration to Canada. Colombia, Mexico and Jamaica have been the most important source countries in the Americas in recent years. Colombia and Mexico were the top two source countries of refugee claimants in Canada in 2004. (Source: Migration Information Source (www.migrationinformation .org) from Citizenship and Immigration Canada statistics.) Sources of Canadian Immigrant Stock: Birthplaces of the Foreign-born Population in 2001

Where Canada's Immigrant Population is From: Figures for the 'foreign-born in Canada include naturalized citizens, permanent residents, and temporary migrants. The 161

ESSAYS source of the stock of immigrants in Canada is quite different from that of current inflows due to the change in the composition of inflows over time. (Source: Migration Information Source (www.migrationinformation.org) based on data from Canada's 2001 Census.) Immigration to Canada: Permanent Residency Approvals by Category, 1980 to 2004

Recent Immigration to Canada: The number of immigrants granted permanent residency in Canada increased in the late 1980s and the 1990s, primarily due to an increase in admissions of people in the 'Economic' category, under a 'points system' that assesses migrants' skills. (Source: Facts and Figures 2004, Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2006.)

While illegal immigration occurs in Canada, it does not approach the scale seen in the USA. As a result, the politics of immigration in Canada are considerably less contentious than in the USA. The fact that Canadian law places relatively more power over immigration policy under administrative, rather than legislative, control than is the case in the USA may also contribute to a more measured debate. Security has been a serious issue in Canada following the 2001 attacks in the USA. Bureaucratic changes to many security functions were made in the Canada government that roughly paralleled those in the USA. However, immigration services remained in their own department, separate from most security functions. Canada has also increased cooperation with the USA on control of their common border and on the processing of asylum claims. Mexico Migration between Mexico and the USA predates the growth of the Mexicanorigin population in the USA. This migration had historically been character162

Haifa World in Motion: Migration Policy in the Americas

ized by circular, seasonal labour migration in response to labour demand and active recruitment by US employers. Longer stays and permanent settlement became more common as Mexican families gradually developed deeper and broader ties to the USA, and especially as increased border vigilance and the end of post-war 'guestworker' programmes made repeated crossings of the border too expensive and perilous. Emigration is the dominant, but not the only, story in Mexico. Mexico's own foreign-born population has also grown, reaching 408,000 persons in 2000. Mexico's population bureau estimates that 63% of this population was born in the USA, the majority of them children and young adults born in the USA to Mexican parents, with US-born retirees a small but growing number. About 22% of the foreign-born population in Mexico comes from other Latin American countries. Guatemalans represent the majority of the Latin American immigrant population in Mexico, although their numbers declined in the 1990s following the end of the Guatemalan civil war. Despite the growing foreign-born population, Mexico is primarily a land of transit. Immigrants head by land to the USA from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, while others destined for the USA arrive by air and sea from South America and even more distant points. Mexico faces its own challenges in controlling migration from Central America and dealing with unauthorized immigrants, whether they remain in Mexico or continue toward the USA. Mexico's own human rights commission has harshly criticized the government's treatment of unauthorized migrants. Meanwhile, the smuggling and trafficking of people on the northern border, together with a violent drugsmuggling trade, remain intractable problems. The politics of emigration in Mexico have changed in the past 20 years as increasing numbers of its citizens have moved abroad and as the country's relationship with its northern neighbour has matured, in part enabled by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Historically, Mexican emigration was largely ignored or regarded as a source of embarrassment. Recently, great steps have been taken to engage Mexican expatriates in the economic, political, and social arenas. Mexican communities in the USA are now a common campaign stop for political candidates and expatriates have served in state legislatures. The federal government has established an Institute for Mexicans in the Exterior and worked with US school systems on co-ordinating education. State governments, closely followed by the federal government, have matched philanthropic contributions by expatriates and courted them as investors. Co-operation with the USA remains more difficult politically for Mexico, however. The two sides have co-operated on efforts to prevent migrant deaths along the border and to smooth the flow of remittances. This has opened 163

ESSAYS opportunities for more politically risky co-operation: Mexico, for example, cautiously allowed the USA in 2004 to experiment with the voluntary repatriation of unauthorized immigrants to the interior of Mexico, in an effort to discourage repeated attempts to cross the border, while the Bush Administration agreed in 2005 to a Social Security 'totalization' agreement between the two countries that would help workers earn credit towards a state pension while working in the other country. More ambitious levels of cross-border co-operation appeared possible a short time ago. In 2001, US President Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox initiated migration-related negotiations, which are at the top of Mexico's foreign policy agenda. The apparent rapport between the two former businessmen and border-state governors seemed to help advance discussions of a comprehensive solution to unauthorized migration. Prospects for a bilateral migration management strategy seemed strong until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 quickly halted all discussions. While there has since been cooperation on border control efforts that do not involve restricting the right of its citizens to leave their country, the Mexican government has been unapologetic about policy initiatives that have provoked criticism from the USA. One example of these is a 'guide for migrants' that the Mexican government published to avoid border deaths, but that US politicians regarded as an incitement to illegal migration. The difficulty of controlling the border for both sides has also generated more isolated disputes that have troubled the relationship. Thus, as discussion of immigration reform intensifies in the USA, the USMexico relationship is significantly more mature on the topic than it was even a decade before, but remains sensitive and has recently cooled. In the last year or so, Mexican officials have responded favourably but cautiously to moderate immigration reform proposals advanced by the Bush Administration and in Congress. Control of unauthorized migration and their common border remains a source of great tension in the bilateral relationship. Latin America and the Caribbean As described in the introduction to this chapter, Latin America and the Caribbean has transitioned from being a region of immigration to one of emigration. Those countries that do receive net immigration receive it primarily from other countries in the region. This generalization risks missing the complexity of movements in the region. In addition to the major points of attraction—North America, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and, to some extent, Brazil and Venezuela—all countries of the region also exchange large numbers of migrants. Often, these flows are circular or 164

Haifa World in Motion: Migration Policy in the Americas temporary and flow in both directions simultaneously as varying labour demands indicate. Often these movements occur outside of official channels. Unfortunately poor documentation of migration in the region is the norm, making precise quantification of migration there impossible. As a result, LAC countries face many of the same problems as do North American countries. Irregular immigration is a problem for all countries, but in Argentina and Brazil unauthorized immigrant populations have been estimated to number more than 500,000 people, and could be greater. This has prompted both countries to offer mass regularization programmes in the past decade, although these have not attracted many participants for a number of reasons. The dominant story in the LAC remains emigration, however, and understanding its causes and the effects on national politics and policies is crucial. Emigration: the Role of Crisis and Economic Change Much of the growth in emigration from LAC countries can be traced quite clearly to specific natural, economic, and civil crises, and, less clearly, to general economic changes. One of the most obvious crisis factors has been the role of natural disasters and conflict. 'Hurricane Mitch' in 1998 and earthquakes in 2001 have helped maintain emigration flows from Central America that began to grow as a result of earlier civil wars in the region. The total number of Central Americans in the USA increased threefold during 1980-90 and doubled between 1990 and 2000. The US government has recognized the fact that these disasters have left the economies of the region 'unable ... to handle adequately the return' of their nationals and accordingly has allowed Nicaraguans, Salvadoreans, and Hondurans of varying legal status to obtain temporary legal residence and work permission. Although civil conflicts in Central America ceased in the 1990s, eliminating a major source of forced migration, conflict has since sprung up in Colombia. There were an estimated 2.5m. internally displaced Colombians in 2002, according to the UN, one of the world's largest populations of internally displaced persons, and about half as many people are thought to have left the country since 1997. In Haiti, too, civil conflict and natural disaster have created pressure to migrate. Estimates place the number of Haitians in the Dominican Republic at more than lm. people. However, emigration from Haiti in this century has been limited by the restrictive policies of other nations in the region, including the Dominican Republic. The US policy of summarily returning unauthorized Haitian emigrants who are intercepted at sea and of mandatory detention of Haitians who request asylum while their claims are processed has been criticized by US human rights groups. They point out that the USA maintains 165

ESSAYS a more generous policy towards Cuban emigrants and asylum-seekers, who are supported by stronger political interests. Economic crisis has also played a strong role in the emergence of LAC countries as major international sources of migrants. Economic recessions, particularly those engendered by currency crises, have been an ail-too common feature in Latin American countries in the past three decades. Argentina's 2001 crisis is the most recent example of an economic event that engendered heavy emigration, and was particularly notable because it transformed the continent's strongest pole of immigration into a significant source of emigration. While the USA is always a popular destination, emigration following such crises often retraces old colonial or immigration ties to Europe or Japan, often taking advantage of policies that favour the descendants of nationals of those countries. It also changes with varying visa policies; the USA and European countries have at times restricted visitor admissions for countries in economic crisis in response to unauthorized immigration. Destinations are also affected by labour demand, and gender and skills may affect where a particular person goes. While crises may diminish the attractiveness of a country such as Argentina as a magnet for immigration, mass returns of intra-regional migrants are not usually observed; even as young Argentines went to Peru or Bolivia to ride out the crisis, most of the substantial number of Peruvian and Bolivian migrants in Argentina seem to have stayed. In the cases of crises where the value of the local currency drops, the exchange rate change further encourages migration by raising the value of remittances. Finally, while migration does slow with the end of a crisis and the gradual return of economic stability, the connections created and the shaken faith in the economy mean that emigration is likely to continue in the future. Crisis is not the only economic factor leading to Latin American and Caribbean emigration, however. Since the late 1970s, the countries of the region have, in general, transitioned from state-led, closed 'import substitution industrialization' economic regimes to open, liberal models of development. Although arguably inevitable and necessary, this transition to a more dynamic economy has made employment conditions more uncertain in many sectors as it disrupted outdated or state-supported industries, led to lower levels of formal-sector employment in some cases, and allowed for more rapid change in agricultural production. All of these changes have increased the perceived risk workers face and have created a need for capital investment in education and new ventures. Migration provides a way of mitigating this risk and for providing capital as families adjust to new economic structures. Thus, evidence from the region suggests that migration is a response not only to 166

Haifa World in Motion: Migration Policy in the Americas crisis, but also to development itself, and to the particular model of development observed in the region in the past three decades. A New Relationship With Emigrants As with Mexico, other countries in the LAC region have ceased ignoring their expatriates or regarding them as traitors and are increasingly regarding them as valuable resources and constituents to be served. In part, this attitude is a concession to reality: many of the region's human resources have left in a 'brain drain'. This problem is particularly grave for the Caribbean nations, especially Haiti and Jamaica. Roughly one-third of the Caribbean's collegeeducated and high school-educated citizens are estimated to live in the USA. Across the hemisphere, a college-educated LAC citizen is roughly two-and-ahalf times more likely to be living in the USA than his or her country of origin.4 Efforts to retain or attract the return of the highly skilled have proven largely unsuccessful. There is also credible fear that even among the less educated, emigration pulls the most industrious young workers out of the national workforce. However, the desire to cultivate closer relationships with emigrants is also the product of a broader understanding of the way migration can contribute to national economies. This realization has been driven by the economic importance of money sent home by migrants. In no other region of the world are remittances so important or so quickly growing. Remittances to LAC countries totalled US $56,300m. in 2005, according to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), thus exceeding foreign direct investment and net official development aid to the region. The IADB estimates the actual annual growth rate of remittances in the region to be about 10%, and that around three-quarters of these remittances originate in the USA. The remainder of these remittances comes primarily from Spain, Italy, Portugal, Japan, Canada and countries within the region itself. In part, catering to emigrants involves domestic programmes and policy changes. LAC countries have been more sympathetic to the need to expand competition in financial services, such as remittance transfers, and have taken steps—some more successful than others—to make voting, charitable donations, and investment more accessible and attractive to expatriates. However, it also means providing more services and outreach to expatriates while they are abroad. Increased volume of emigration and increased political attention to emigrants has placed pressure on consular officials to provide a larger 4

B. L. Lowell. "Skilled Migration Abroad or Human Capital Flight?" Migration Information Source. June 2003. www.migrationinformation.org 167

ESSAYS

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank.

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volume of traditional consular services, such as documentation of citizenship and marriage, and to provide an array of newer services. These include advocacy on the behalf of immigrants at both the local and national level, creating networks of expatriate businesspeople and professionals, and educational initiatives aimed at the children of expatriates. One such initiative that has been imitated by other countries was Mexico's distribution of millions of consulate-issued identification cards as security tightened in the USA following the 11 September 2001 attacks. The cards provided an easy way for Mexican citizens to identify themselves without revealing immigration status. The consulates aggressively marketed the card and its security features not only to its own citizens, but also to local governments, police departments and businesses, leading to its acceptance in law enforcement, in sending remittances and opening bank accounts, and in obtaining driver's licences. In such ways, source country governments are able to improve the lives of their emigrants abroad without having to undergo difficult negotiations with the governments of the destination country. International Politics of Migration Management A final component of migration politics and policy is international. Migration policy is generally considered a core part of national sovereignly, and migration policy in the Americas is largely made unilaterally. Co-operation on migration management in the Americas is difficult—although countries have a common interest in the well-being of migrants and in safe, orderly movement of people, the (sometimes artificial) juxtaposition of countries as 'senders' and 'receivers' of migrants can introduce an adversarial note to such discussions. The case of Mexico and the USA is the extreme example of the difficulty and potential of bilateral discussions. However, several more formal processes that seek to formalize and promote co-operation on migration, or to deal with it in the same forum as related subjects such as trade, are at work in the region. In general, these efforts seek to make existing movements of people more orderly, predictable and efficient, and to resolve specific problems—not to open up new migration flows or methods of movement. The region has a number of free-trade agreements, both intra- and interregional, which have very limited impact on migration. These generally secure the entry of business visitors and workers for specific trade-related functions, including the provision of a limited set of services, such as business consulting or servicing of equipment. The region's three major common markets—the Caribbean Community, Andean Community, and Common Market of the South (Mercosur)—have also made agreements to establish 169

ESSAYS temporary work provisions and have addressed the topics of transferring social benefits, allowing families to migrate with workers, recognition of professional qualifications, and even the regularizaron of unauthorized immigrants. Bilateral discussions occasionally result in formal agreements that are specific to migration, as well. According to the IOM, Latin American countries have signed more than 143 agreements on migration since 1948, both among each other and with countries outside of the region. These provide a way for countries to address specific problems and goals arising within established migration relationships, such as the readmission or régularisation of unauthorized immigrants and temporary worker programmes. Finally, Central America has a multilateral Regional Conference on Migration that allows countries regularly to discuss migration issues and establish common or harmonized policies, share data, and resolve disagreements. It initially tackled migration control issues, such as human smuggling, document security, border control technology, and readmission of unauthorized immigrants, but has diversified to 'softer' issues, such as the protection of workers' rights. A LOOK AHEAD The most important issue in migration in the Americas, now and for the foreseeable future, is unauthorized immigration and immigration reform in the USA. The issue has the potential to alter the fabric of the US society and economy. As the anchor of the American migration system, a change in US policy would have powerful secondary effects across the hemisphere. Although progress of debate there is impossible to foresee, quick resolution of the issue is unlikely. For LAC countries, migration policy issues are secondary to much larger issues of economic and political development. For these countries, the most important migration issues are not of migration policy per se, but of emigrant policy: that is, how they relate to their nationals abroad. Across the region, migration policy remains a sensitive topic to negotiate at the international level, a problem that is overcome largely by the fact that subnational governments, social networks, businesses, non-profit organizations and informal processes are as important to migration and the lives of migrants in the Americas as the decisions of national governments.

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Further Reading Fuchs, Lawrence. The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture. Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 1990. A history of the incorporation of immigrants into the political and civic culture of the USA. Massey, Douglas, Durand, Jorge, and Malone, Nolan. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era ofEconomic Integration. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2003. This research is fundamental to understanding the evolution of Mexican immigration, US-Mexico border policy and the origins of today's illegal immigration to the USA. Portes, Alejandro, and Rumbaut, Rubén. Immigrant America: A Portrait, Second Edition. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1997. A comprehensive survey of the 'new immigration' to the US and the process of immigrant integration. See also the following very useful online resources: The Metropolis Project Canada: www.canada.metropolis.net. Metropolis is an international network of academic and government researchers and community organizations studying migration and migration policy. The website of its Canadian branch contains many resources on immigration to Canada. Migration Policy Institute: www.migrationpolicy.org. The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is a non-partisan 'think tank' focusing on migration policy in the USA and globally. Its reports, available at the MPI website, are oriented toward policy analysis and will be especially useful for understanding the issues involved in US immigration reform. The Migration Information Source: www.migrationinformation.org. A project of the MPI, the Migration Information Source has a large collection of short articles about migration issues, country migration profiles, and summaries of migration data for countries across the world. It has strong data tools for the USA and its 'Policy Beat' feature provides brief reports on news in US immigration policy and politics. The Source is updated monthly, features special issues on specific topics, and is oriented toward data and description. Pew Hispanic Center: www.pewhispanic.org. Contains current resources on remittances, Latinos in the US labour market and population, and public opinion concerning immigration. 171

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East MARTIN BALDWIN-EDWARDS

INTRODUCTION The Mediterranean and Middle East is perhaps the most interesting region of the world with respect to migration movements. The whole gamut of migration types is to be found—ranging from the 1960s guestworker migration from the Maghreb and Turkey to Northern Europe to the oil-financed economic expansion of the GCC1 countries and their Arab guestworker programmes, later followed by mass expulsions of Arab guestworkers in the aftermath of two Gulf crises. Now, in the latest phase, according to the most recent UN estimate of 2006, the Arab region increased its migrant stock from 13m. in 1990 to nearly 20m. in 2005. Thus, in 2005 three Arab countries were among the top 20 countries of the world with the largest stock of migrants—Saudi Arabia (6.4m.), United Arab Emirates (UAE, 3.2m.) and Jordan (2.2m.). In all GCC countries, plus Jordan, Lebanon and Libya, migrants accounted for more than 10% of the population in 2005: in five of these, migrants represented 40% or more of the total population (Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan). Table 1 below shows the latest available data from the United Nations. The peculiarities of the region are not confined, however, to simple stocks of 'temporary' labour migrants in the Gulf countries. To these we should add the recent emigration histories of the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, along with their demographic pressures for continued emigration; the role of these as transit countries for illegal migrants from other regions; and the role of GCC states as a massive source of both recorded and unrecorded remittances to Asia and elsewhere, while Turkey and the Maghreb rely on remittances as a critical resource for economic stability. There is also a significant problem of refugees in the region, with summary data shown in Table 1. Jordan in particular has the highest refugee ratio in the world, but there is also a large stock of refugees in Lebanon.

1

The Gulf Co-operation Council, established 1981.

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Table 1: Migrant stocks in 2005 in the Middle East and North Africa region, in thousands and as a proportion of total population Country Qatar United Arab Emirates Kuwait Bahrain Jordan Saudi Arabia Oman Lebanon Libya Syria Yemen Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt

'000

% of total population

% refugees

637 3,212 1,669 295 2,225 6,361 628 657 618 985 265 242 132 38 166

78.3 71.4 62.1 40.7 39.0 25.9 24.4 18.4 10.5 5.2 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2

0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 81.0 3.8 0.0 61.4 2.0 43.7 26.0 69.7 1.6 0.2 54.9

Source: United Nations: 'International Migration in the Arab Region', Paper prepared for the UN Expert Group on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut, 15-17 May 2006. Ref: UN/POP/EGM/2006/14, dated 11 May 2006.

Countries in the north of the Mediterranean, despite their demographic decline and labour-market shortages, have shown a highly ambivalent attitude to receiving labour migrants from the south, with policy fluctuations and a lack of clear objectives in migration and labour-market management. As new Mediterranean members2 enter the 'club', they are forced rapidly to align their immigration policies with the exclusionary vision of Schengen and the EU: nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of Turkey, currently formulating immigration management techniques at a rapid pace. Nevertheless, the large informal economies of southern Europe continue to attract illegal migrants and illegal workers from the south and east. A cursory glance at the wide range of countries covered by this area would suggest that there are more differences than commonalities between them. Indeed, the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) places the five northern Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta) together with Israel clearly in the upper half of the first rank of the HDI, with gross 2

The latest additions are Malta and Cyprus.

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ESSAYS domestic product (GDP) per capita roughly corresponding with other indicators. Five Arab countries (Brunei, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE) are included in the lower half of the first rank, with their low ratings shown as inconsistent with their GDP per capita. Eleven countries from the region (Libya, Albania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia, Syria, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco) are classed as Medium Human Development, with all but Albania and Syria displaying low levels of other indicators compared with GDP per capita. Finally, one country (Yemen) is classed as Low Human Development, with its GDP per capita a tiny fraction of its poorest Arab neighbours, Syria and Egypt (UNDP, 2004). MIGRATION SYSTEMS AND PATTERNS Despite serious problems with data on migration and migrants, it is possible to discern several 'migration systems' operating in the region, although these are in flux and increasingly overlapping and becoming more complex. There are three broad systems, comprised of the Maghreb, GCC and Mashreq states. To these we must add two exceptional countries (Turkey and Israel), which have independent and important roles in migration in the region. Map 1 shows the most significant migration movements in the region over the decade of the 1990s, excluding Jewish immigration into Israel. We shall examine these regional migration systems in turn. The Maghreb Of the four Maghreb countries considered here (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya), Morocco has been the only one since 1968 with a consistent policy of encouraging emigration in order to manage unemployment levels. Even after the oil-shock and the closure of European labour markets to immigration in 1974, Morocco maintained its policy stance of promoting emigration, opposition to the integration of Moroccans abroad, and great emphasis on the remittances received from the Moroccan diaspora. Most migrants did not return, and massive family reunification to European countries in the 1970s and 1980s led to an increase in the number of Moroccans from 400,000 in 1975 to more than lm. in 1992 in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. By 1998, the number had risen to 1.6m. in northern Europe, and despite the opposition of the Moroccan state, 430,000 were granted EU nationality over the period 1992-2001. With new Moroccan migrations to Spain and Italy after 1990, the resulting diaspora by 2004 was measured at more than 3m. world-wide (more than 10% of the current population)—with 2.6m. in wider Europe and 280,000 in other Arab countries. 174

Source: Author's estimates from stock data. Transit migration is not shown here.

Map 1: Principal migrations into, from and within the Middle East and North Africa region, 1990-2004

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East

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Tunisia started with the same sort of approach as Morocco in the late 1960s, but by 1974 the state was encouraging the return of its nationals. Despite this official policy, the number of Tunisians abroad by 2003 was in excess of 800,000, around 9% of the current population, with more than 700,000 in greater Europe, mostly in France. Algeria from the outset was more ambiguous about emigration as a safety valve for the labour market, preferring to denounce migration as a postcolonial form of dependency and instead relying upon development of its oil and gas reserves. Its policy left the diaspora highly disconnected from the country, and also explains the relatively low rate of refugee flows during the civil war in the 1990s. By 2000, more than 800,000 Algerians were recorded, mostly in France—constituting just under 3% of the current population. Libya has a rather different history of migration policy. Owing to the development of its oil and a high per capita GDP, it was always a destination country for labour migrants. Some limited temporary emigration occurred, mostly of businessmen and students to Malta and Egypt; since Libya removed formal travel restrictions, there has been increasing travel by young people to Italy and Malta. However, the Libyan diaspora is very small. On the other hand, the number and proportion of immigrants in Libya is high: estimates range from 1.1m. up to 1.8m., of which only 600,000 are legal workers. With a total recorded population of around 5.5m., this means that the immigrant/ population ratio is of the order of 25%-30%. The majority of temporary workers traditionally have come from Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, although more recent visa-free entry for all of Africa resulted also in large numbers of sub-Saharan Africans. Thus, all of the Maghreb except Libya has exhibited mass emigration to Europe—primarily to the former colonial power, France, but more recently to Spain and Italy as well. Libya, on the other hand, has been the recipient of mass undocumented immigration from the region. The Mashreq The Mashreq countries of Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen3 have a migratory history between them dating back to the end of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, the important period of emigration to the oil-rich GCC states began in the 1970s: indeed, it was not until 1971 that Egypt openly permitted emigration of its nationals, and then rapidly embarked on a policy of linking emigration policy with the country's economic development. Although with different national 3

Although Iraq is also considered to be part of the Mashreq, it is not discussed here.

176

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East histories and specificities, all of the Mashreq has had extensive involvement with emigration over the last three decades. Most of this has been temporary labour migration to other Mashreq countries, and primarily to GCC countries. There has also been significant permanent emigration further afield—especially from Lebanon. The common characteristics can be summarized as the following: • Mass temporary and permanent emigration since the 1970s • Economic development strategies have been linked with diaspora and remittances • Forcible return of migrants [from the GCC states during the first Gulf crisis] has created serious economic problems • Demographic structure now requires even more job creation for young people • 'Brain drain' is significant for all Mashreq countries However, there are significant differences between the Mashreq countries, and it is necessary to examine each country individually. In particular, two (Egypt and Jordan) host very large numbers of refugees; three (Lebanon, Syria and Jordan) are importers of low-skilled labour from Asia; and one (Yemen) is at such a low level of economic development that its dependence on migrants' remittances is structurally problematic. Egypt Three phases of emigration from Egypt have been identified. The first was to Libya in the early 1970s, the second to Saudi Arabia in the second half of the 1970s, and the third to Iraq, peaking in 1984. Currently, Egypt is thought to host some 2.7m. emigrants (around 4% of the current population), of which one-third is permanent migration. It has also an estimated 3m. unrecognized Sudanese refugees plus numerous other nationalities, such as Somali and Palestinian—all predominantly located in Cairo. The total number of refugees could be as high as 5m., making Egypt clearly a country of net immigration. Egypt has just under 2m. temporary migrants in other Arab countries (of whom half are in Saudi Arabia), and an estimated 800,000 permanent emigrants elsewhere (about half in North America, and the remainder in various European countries). Temporary migration to neighbouring countries consists of an almost equal mix of skilled professionals and unskilled or semi-skilled workers. In 2002, scientists and technicians constituted between 41% (in Saudi Arabia) and up to 54% (in Kuwait) of migrants to GCC countries, and 57% and 69%, respectively, in Libya and Yemen; Egyptian unskilled migrants predominated in Lebanon (75%), Iraq and Jordan (63%). In previous decades, unskilled 177

ESSAYS migration had dominated, especially for construction work: currently, the major opportunities are for skilled workers. Jordan Jordan possesses the highest refugee ratio in the world, with a total population of 5m. out of which in 2002 there were 1.6m. Palestinian refugees, another 800,000 displaced Palestinians since 1967, and an estimated remaining 300,000 Iraqi refugees. The Palestinian refugees in camps administered by UNRWA4 have been considered historically a most important reservoir of manpower for the GCC countries (see Table 3, above, for the current stocks). Unlike Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Syria, those in Jordan were granted Jordanian citizenship in the 1950s, facilitating their incorporation into mainstream society. In the 1950s and 1960s, Jordanians (primarily of Palestinian origin) emigrated to the GCC countries to help establish infrastructure; entire families settled in Kuwait, Dubai and Saudi Arabia, retaining only loose connections with Jordan. By 1980, the emigrant workforce was placed at 250,000, or more than 50% of its workforce in that year. Strong economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s was based almost entirely upon emigrants' remittances, with little improvement in the domestic economy, especially as skilled workers had mostly emigrated. The return of migrant workers started in the late 1980s, and reached massive proportions after the 1990 Gulf crisis, with some 300,000 returnees increasing the population by 10%. By 1991, unemployment had peaked at 25% and remittances fell to 10% of GDP in 1993. In the mid-1990s new emigration routes opened up, and highly-skilled Jordanians began to migrate in large numbers: by 2000, 3,900 were resident in the USA alone. Remittances were thought to comprise 24% of GDP in 2001. At the same time as exporting skilled labour, Jordan imports mainly unskilled labour from the other Mashreq countries—especially Egypt and Syria. In 2002, the number of legal foreign workers was 127,000, with an estimated additional 275,000 working illegally. There is a small number of South Asians (from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) working legally, but there are no official data on numbers. There are also female domestic workers from Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Malaysia, but again there are no data. Syria For decades, Syria has experienced continuous waves of migration towards the USA, Europe, Africa and Australia, with temporary labour migration to the GCC countries occurring after 1960. These later migrations were of 4

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

178

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East

skilled workmen and technicians, and in the 1970s also included other professionals. However, Syria's net migration rate always remained lower than other Arab countries such as Jordan or Yemen. The current estimate of the number of Syrians working outside the country is 1.9m., although the Syrian diaspora is estimated at 20m.—more than the current population. There are thought to be large numbers of Syrians working in Jordan, although only 3,700 with work permits, and even more in Lebanon. In Lebanon, they were recorded as 600,000-700,000 in the mid-1990s, but the number fell to 250,000 in 2002. One commentator suggests that the displaced Syrians in Lebanon may have relocated to Jordan, although this is without substantive evidence. There is very limited information on both emigration from and immigration into Syria, although IOM estimates that there are some 10,000-15,000 foreign domestic workers in the country. Lebanon Inevitably, the civil war (1975-90) has played the most important part in migratory movements into and out of Lebanon in recent decades. During the fighting, an estimated 900,000 Lebanese left the country and some 800,000 were internally displaced: the Lebanese diaspora abroad may number anything from lm. to 14m. of Lebanese descent. Since the war, many émigrés have returned—but there are no data on this phenomenon, other than records of dual nationals who were attracted by the opportunities of the reconstruction programme. These include 40,000 Canadians, 30,000 French and 20,000 Americans. At the same time, even higher rates of emigration occurred, owing to economic depression—an estimated 690,000 people over the period 1992— 99. Now, with a population of only 3.6m., Lebanon hosts between 200,000 and lm. Syrian migrant workers, 100,000 Sri Lankans, 30,000 Ethiopians, 30,000 Egyptians, 20,000 Filipinos, and 11,000 Indians. Almost all are illegal workers, since only 87,000 work permits were issued in 2001. Lebanon had some 409,000 refugees and asylum-seekers as of 2002 (more than 10% of the population), the vast majority of whom are Palestinians. Unlike Palestinian refugees in Syria and Jordan, they are denied the right to work in skilled professions, to buy or inherit property, and most basic civil rights, and are highly dependent upon UNRWA. The Lebanese Constitution also forbids the 'implantation' of Palestinians in the country, on which basis they are denied healthcare and other social services, including attendance at schools or universities. Yemen Despite a ban on emigration in 1973, by 1975 some 300,000 Yemeni workers (20% of the labour force) were working in GCC countries; by 1980, the figure 179

ESSAYS for emigrant workers was estimated at lm., and by the mid-1980s at 1.5m. After the second Gulf crisis, some 850,000 were forcibly returned and found it impossible to integrate, resulting in the 'destitute communities' of Yemenis living to this day in camps—unemployed and reliant upon government assistance. The problem of poverty in Yemen is so great that UN and other estimates put its incidence as 38%-47% of the total population. Currently, 1.2m. Yemenis are thought to live abroad, of whom some 800,000 are in Saudi Arabia as well as in other GCC states, Africa, the USA and the United Kingdom. However, the current rate of recruited emigrants to the USA is the lowest in the region, and suggests that illegal emigration is a likely future strategy by the residents of Yemen. The GCC countries These consist of the oil-rich countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These countries now have massive stocks of foreign labour, but immigration into them is historically recent and explicitly related to the development of oil resources. Earlier migration flows had involved small numbers of seasonal workers for fishing and pearling, but over the 1960s increased oil revenues and economic development led to labour importation. By 1972 there were about 800,000 migrant workers in the Arab OPEC countries. With the oil price increases which followed, the entire region rapidly became dependent upon foreign labour, and by 1975 the foreign population in the GCC states could have been as high as 3.8m. people, or 40% of the total population. The reasons for this massive dependency on foreign workers include: • • • • • •

Low labour-force participation, especially of women (18%—25%) Small population sizes (6.1m. for the GCC region, excluding Iraq) Disinclination of nationals to work in the private sector Low literacy and educational levels High degree of non-labour income for nationals Growth of the 'Khafeel' system5 for recruitment, as an economic activity in itself

Three major transitional stages of the GCC countries can be identified, with enough commonalities to view these six countries together. The stages are: (1) The Major Influx, from the 1970s to the early 1980s, with each GCC country competing to attract US, European, Arab and some Asian workers. 5

See below, under Trends and Policies, for a description of the Khafeel system.

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The number of foreigners doubled in 1975-80, reaching 33% of the total population. Great reliance was placed on recruiting Arab workers from Egypt, Yemen and Palestine. (2) The Asian Presence, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. This was a period of austerity after falling oil prices, forcing public and private sectors to cut costs. Thus, a substitution of less skilled Asian workers for the existing Arab workers was begun, and the repatriation of massive numbers of Arabs. Additionally, in the wake of the 1990 Gulf crisis, it is estimated that 800,000 Yemenis were expelled from Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, 700,000 Egyptians returned from Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait, 200,000 Jordanians returned, and 150,000 Palestinians. The total is around 2m. Arab workers and their dependants who lost their employment in the GCC countries. (3) Open Unemployment of Nationals, which phase has prevailed for the last 10 years or so. It was the result of the external shocks of the two Gulf Wars, low oil prices and depleted foreign assets, together with an expanding labour supply through population growth. The private sector is unwilling to hire nationals with their low skills and high wage expectations; the public sector is unable to afford to do so, and relies upon laying off foreign workers in order to employ nationals—many of whom are first-time job-seekers with no work experience. The second Gulf War led to even more changes in the composition of the foreign workforce, as Iraqis and those supportive of Iraq (Palestinians, Jordanians, Yemenis and Sudanese) were forced to leave the GCC states. More than 1.5m. people were displaced: up to lm. Yemenis from Saudi Arabia, 200,000 Jordanians, 150,000 Palestinians, and 158,000 Egyptians. Thus, by 2002 the Arab share of the foreign population in GCC states had fallen to 25%-29%, compared with 72% in 1975. Current stocks of foreign workers are still extraordinarily high: Table 2 gives summary data derived from national sources. These data have been independently verified with national governments by Human Rights Watch.6 With a total of around 12.5m. foreigners in the GCC region, representing just under 40% of the total population, the range of immigrant to population ratios is 26%-80%, with the UAE and Qatar at 80%). The presence of foreigners in the workforce is even more pronounced for some countries, reaching 90% in the UAE and Qatar, and 60% in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. However, it should be noted that these figures do not include illegal immigrants, who (judging by

6

According to the Labour Minister, by 2004 there were 8.8m. foreign residents in Saudi Arabia, constituting 67% of the labour force. The 2004 Census, however, recorded only 6.15m. foreign residents.

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the number of expulsions carried out by Saudi Arabia and the UAE) may be numerous. Table 2: GCC countries' foreign populations, absolutes and as % of total population, 2001-02 Foreign residents

%

2,488,000 420,000 1,475,000 280,000 7,000,000 630,000 12,500,000

80 80 65 40 30 26 38.5

United Arab Emirates Qatar Kuwait Bahrain Saudi Arabia Oman GCC total

Source: Kapiszewski, A. 'Arab Labour Migration to the GCC States', pp. 115-133, in Arab Migration in a Globalized World, Geneva, International Organization for Migration, 2004.

Table 3: Major foreign communities in the GCC countries, 2002 (estimated)* Country of ongin

Bahrain

India Pakistan Egypt Yemen Bangladesh Sri Lanka Philippines Jordan/ Palestine Syria Iran Indonesia Sudan Kuwait Turkey Total

100,000 50,000

45,000

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

UAE

Total

295,000 300,000 100,000 1,400,000 1,000,000 3,200,000 100,000 70,000 70,000 1,000,000 450,000 1,740,000 275,000 15,000 35,000 1,000,000 130,000 1,455,000 1,000,000 35,000 1,035,000 160,000 110,000 450,000 100,000 820,000 160,000 35,000 350,000 160,000 705,000 60,000 50,000 500,000 120,000 730,000 50,000 50,000 270,000 110,000 480,000 95,000 80,000

170,000 20,000

40,000

250,000 250,000 120,000 100,000 280,000 1,475,000 630,000 420,000 7,000,000 2,488,000

265,000 145,000 250,000 250,000 120,000 100,000

Source: Kapiszewski (2004: 125, as above) * Only major nationalities are included, therefore the columns do not add up to the totals given.

Information on the nationalities of migrant communities is poor, and reliant upon estimates. Table 3 gives the most recent data available—all unofficial estimated data. As can be clearly seen, by 2002 the leading nationality of immigrants in the GCC was Indian, numbering 3.2m. persons. Second and 182

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East

third places are occupied by Pakistanis and Egyptians, followed by Yemeni. Overall, the region hosts some 3.5m. non-Gulf Arabs, compared with around 7.5m. Asians. Although the Arab share of foreign population in the GCC is around 28%, there is great variation between GCC countries. The highest proportions (37% and 34%, respectively) are in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, with Egyptians as the principal nationality. Qatar has 20% (Jordanians, Palestinians and Egyptians), the UAE 11% (Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians), while both Oman and Bahrain host a negligible number of Arab migrants. The Mediterranean Outliers—Israel and Turkey Israel Israel is a nation of immigrants, committed to the successful absorption of its Jewish immigrants. The Israeli Law of Return of 1950 gives Jews the right to immigrate into Israel, whilst the Israeli Law of Nationality gives them almost automatic Israeli nationality. Israel is an ethnically divided society, with 83% Jews and 17% Arabs, the latter who theoretically are equal citizens and in reality constitute a subordinate national minority. After the 1967 war, the state began to recruit non-citizen Palestinian workers from the West Bank and Gaza Strip as day-labourers, entering by day and leaving the country at night. By 1986, they comprised 7% of the Israeli workforce. The Palestinian uprising of 1987 created a shortage of labour, as the Palestinians did not report for work: the state in 1987 began to recruit foreign blue-collar workers—only 2,500 in 1987, but the number had increased to 9,600 by 1993. Then, the Israeli government sealed the border with the Occupied Territories, and actively sought to replace Palestinian workers with immigrants. These were recruited primarily from Romania (construction), Thailand (agriculture) and the Philippines (geriatric care, nursing and domestic services). Three years later, the number of legal workers had increased tenfold, to 103,000, plus a comparable number in the parallel informal economy. By 2003, there were an estimated 200,000 illegal workers plus 111,000 legal workers—totalling more than 13% of the labour force. Illegal workers are in a variety of economic sectors, but most obviously in housekeeping, childcare and restaurants: their nationalities include West Africans, South Americans and Eastern Europeans. In principle, Israel declares that it is 'not a country of immigration', and the actual state recruitment process is thought by most academic commentators to closely resemble the indentured or 'Kafala' system of the GCC countries, rather than the pattern to be found in West European democracies. The state grants permits to employers, thereby maximizing control by employers and 183

ESSAYS

the state over the entire foreign population; there is no right of family reunification; there is no access to social or medical care. In 2002, Ariel Sharon declared a goal of deporting 50,000 immigrants a year, later raised to 100,000—apolitical position directly linked with rising unemployment levels in Israel. Thus, Israel has effected a substitution policy whereby foreign indentured workers and illegal immigrants have replaced Palestinian workers. The policy followed has by all independent accounts been abusive of the basic human rights of migrants, and in many respects in breach of both Israeli and international law. With a temporary immigrant workforce of more than 13%, and following the indentured immigration policy and passport confiscation of the GCC Arab states, Israel replicates the 'modern slavery conditions' of immigrant workers in many Middle Eastern countries. Turkey For much of the 20th century, Turkey was a country of government-sponsored immigration for population reasons: this inflow of ethnic Turks and assimilable ethnicities from the Balkans (such as Albanians, Pomaks and Tartars) was governed by the Law on Settlement of 1934, and by 1997 more than 1.6m. had arrived. Largely, this was discontinued from the early 1970s, apart from 300,000 Turks and Pomaks who were expelled from Bulgaria in 1989: current legal immigration is at low levels. Emigration from Turkey started as late as 1961: by 2001, there were some 3.6m. abroad—mostly in the EU, with 2m. in Germany alone. There have been four distinct periods of emigration, each with quite different characteristics: • 1961-74: labour recruitment to Western Europe • 1974-80: cessation of labour migration to Europe (although family reunification, asylum-seeking and illegal migration existed), and the emergence of labour migration to MENA countries and Australia • 1980s: mass temporary labour migration to GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq) • 1990s: reduced labour migration to GCC countries and new labour migration to the former USSR countries Apart from labour migration, Turkey is also a source country of asylumseekers and illegal migrants: in the period 2000-02, Turkish nationals ranked third among those applying for asylum in industrialized countries, after nationals of Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. Many Turkish asylum-seekers are Kurds, but the precise proportion is not known: it seems that there is a 184

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East

downward trend in such applications, possibly because of recent improvements in the treatment of the Kurdish community in Turkey. For the last two decades, Turkey has been a country of immigration and transit with respect to both asylum-seeking and illegal migration, but there is an older history of asylum-seeking dating back to the Second World War and refugees from the Nazi-occupied Balkan territories. Subsequently, Turkey took an active role in the creation of the 1951 Convention, and for geopolitical reasons has not accepted the 1967 Bellagio Protocol concerning the restriction of asylum to those from European countries. Currently, UNHCR is responsible for the determination of asylum requests in Turkey. Irregular immigration, with Turkey as both a destination and transit country, has become a significant issue in the last decade: since 2001 the government has actively pursued a policy to address the issues. Over this last decade, some 500,000 apprehensions have been made: the principal nationalities are Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian, although more Turkish illegal migrants have been arrested than Iranian. The major regions of origin are the Middle East, the former Soviet Republics and Asia. Annual data on the number of arrests show a massive peak in 2000, at 95,000, declining to 56,000 by 2003: this seems to reflect the more aggressive policing of illegal migration by the Turkish authorities, and a diversion to other routes of international migration. Thus, there exists a highly complex picture of emigration, transit migration and immigration involving Turkey. In 2001, temporary labour migration of Turks to the CIS, the Gulf states, the EU and Israel stood at around 20,000 and family reunification flows at 60,000, totalling 80,000 per annum. Clearly, known labour emigration flows have been at very low levels for the last few years. To this can be added some 25,000 asylum-seekers, mostly transiting through Turkey. Inflows into Turkey are estimated at some 300,000 illegal entries in 2001; the stock of residence permit holders was around 140,000 in 2001, with only 36,000 for employment purposes.

IRREGULAR AND TRANSIT MIGRATION IN THE REGION For simple geographical reasons, the countries of proximity to the northern Mediterranean have been either source countries or, more recently, increasingly countries of transit illegal migration. These are Morocco, Tunisia and Libya in North Africa; and Lebanon and Turkey in the east. Three main illegal migration routes into southern Europe have been identified—the West African route, the North and East African route, and the Eastern Mediterranean route. These are shown in Map 2, below. 185

Map 2: Principal illegal migration routes in the Mediterranean region

ESSAYS

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Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East

For the West African route, the main points of arrival are the Spanish island of Fuerteventura (Canary Islands), the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and the southern Spanish coast adjacent to Morocco. Most departures are from Morocco, although some are from the Western Sahara and, recently, also from Mauritania. For the North and East African route, the main points of arrival are the Italian islands of Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Linosa and Sicily, and also Malta. The main point of departure is Libya, but also Egypt. For the Eastern Mediterranean route, the main transit country is Turkey. From southern Turkey, boats cross to Italy and Cyprus; from western Turkey, boats cross to the numerous small Greek Aegean islands; and from Istanbul, crossing the River Evros effects entry into Greek territory. What was once a tolerated income supplement for cash-starved Spanish fishermen with their pateras (small fishing boats), has turned since the mid1990s into a more serious phenomenon of organized smuggling or individual attempts to cross the Mediterranean and reach 'prosperous Europe'. One of the earliest accounts of 'Mediterranean Boat People' gives a figure of illegal migrants intercepted by Spain for 1996 of 1,573, but rapidly escalating to 15,000 in 2000. The figure peaked in 2003 at 19,176, and stood at 11,781 persons for 2005. In the case of arrivals in Italy, for 2003 Italy recorded 14,017 arrivals from North Africa; by 2004, this had decreased to 12,737 illegal migrants in 231 boats. Most arrived on the small island of Lampedusa, close to Libya and Tunisia. Malta recorded 1,369 boat arrivals in 2004, which, although a small number, is proportionately a larger problem for the island. ICMPD has estimated that 100,000-120,000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean every year, of whom 35,000 are of sub-Saharan origin, 30,000 from other countries of origin (e.g. Asian countries) and 55,000 from the south or east Mediterranean. Additionally, there is an estimate of lives lost in the Mediterranean crossings (based on detected corpses on the Spanish coastline) of some 2,000 persons per year. The eastern Mediterranean migration routes are less well known, and difficult to comment upon. However, the accession of Malta and Cyprus to the EU has clearly increased their attractiveness as destination or transit countries. Turkey is situated at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and Europe and over the last two decades has become a major staging post for irregular migration movements in the region. Entry points to Turkey are on the Iranian and Iraqi borders, but the migrants originate also from many other countries, such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine and Sri Lanka. The departure points from Turkey lie in the west, mainly in the coastal areas, such as Istanbul and Izmir, or close to the border with Greece. As noted above, there were some 500,000 arrests of 187

ESSAYS

illegal migrants in 1994-2004; however, as in the case of Morocco, the bulk of state activism has been since 2000. TRENDS AND POLICIES Previous times saw a synergy between the excess labour supply of the Maghreb and Turkey with the booming European economies of the 1960s, and between the Mashreq and oil-rich GCC countries in the 1970s. These phases were succeeded, in some countries, by family reunification migration to Europe, followed by illegal migration and/or asylum-seeking. Within the MENA region itself, the 1990 Gulf crisis led to the expulsion of 700,000 Egyptians from Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait; 800,000 Yemenis from Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries; and of some 150,000 Palestinians from the Gulf region. In total, an estimated 2m. Arab workers and dependants were removed from Gulf countries, with resultant massive shocks to labour markets and economies. Now, in the latest phase, we can identify some more or less common patterns: • High open unemployment across the MENA region • Increasing labour supply needs a doubling of jobs by 2020 • Weak private-sector employment alongside over-burdened state sector employment • Very large and increasing informal sectors (Maghreb, Israel, Turkey and Mashreq) • Emergence of the territory as 'transit zones' (Maghreb, Turkey) or Major recipients of trafficked persons (GCC, Israel) • Structural dependence on immigrant labour (GCC) or Structural dependence on remittances and emigration safety-valve (Maghreb, Mashreq) • Brain-drain issues (Maghreb, Mashreq) One common feature of the GCC and Mashreq states is their use of the Khafeel or Kafala system of temporary guestworkers. Since this has no clear parallel in the west, it is worth describing its most important features. Migrant workers receive an entry visa and residence permit only if a citizen sponsors them. The Khafeel, or sponsor-employer, is responsible financially and legally for the worker, and signs a document from the labour ministry to that effect. The worker is tied to a particular employer, and if the worker breaks the contract, he/she has to leave the country immediately at his or her own 188

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East

expense—otherwise the employer would cover the return fare. Typically, employers confiscate the passports of their workers, in order to control them better, and therefore circumscribe their freedom of movement. Whereas labour law generally confers strong rights on workers (with the major exception of domestic workers), aliens law governing the residence of foreigners does not do so. The immigration laws of the GCC and Mashreq countries predicate the legal presence of foreigners on sponsorship (Khafala); therefore, any dispute with an employer-sponsor leaves the immigrant without legal residence and the possibility of working, and effectively denies the possibility of gaining legal redress. The abuses by employers which have arisen out of this system are numerous and horrendous; despite extensive documentation by organizations such as Human Rights Watch, there appears to be little interest in reforming labour immigration mechanisms in most of the countries of the region. Whereas earlier Arab migrants had some limited protection, plus understanding of the culture and language, Asian migrants—now the majority—are more easily abused. To this should be added the non-protection of housekeepers by labour law, and the apparent linkage of recruitment with trafficking.

National Policy Trends The North African countries have tended until recently to emphasize their migrant communities, along with remittances, with such initiatives as Morocco's 2001 integrated policy for migration management of the Moroccan diaspora. A similar pattern can be found in Tunisia since 1988, with its Office for Tunisians Abroad, or Egypt's emigration section of the labour ministry, since 2001—the latter in collaboration with the IOM and Italy. However, the general consensus is that remittances were not effectively utilized for the promotion of economic development. More recently, several new trends of policy have emerged. First, there has been a recognition of the need for major labour-market reform for the purpose of economic development, and migration is only a small part of that process. Reform has yet to begin in a substantive way, but looks inevitable. Secondly, there is greater collaboration with northern Mediterranean countries, primarily in the combating of illegal migration flows, but also in seasonal and other labour recruitment efforts. Thirdly, and following from the second, a recognition of the need for immigration regulation in the Maghreb countries has arisen: this started with Morocco in 2003, is proceeding with Tunisia and Egypt and has even begun with Libya. 189

ESSAYS

The Mashreq countries generally seem not to have clear policy objectives, although there is a stated desire to reduce immigration levels. Emigration is still viewed as a desirable option by most of the Mashreq, although the possibilities seem very limited, and remittances remain important for all of them. The special case ofGCC countries The Gulf countries, for demographic and labour-market reasons, now try to limit the number of 'expatriate' or foreign workers (starting in 1998 with Bahrain) with restrictions on immigrant employment and subsidies for native workers. These efforts have been particularly intense in Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, and have recently been stepped up in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. The 2003 mandate of the Saudi Manpower Council determined that foreign workers and their dependants should not exceed 20% of the total population by 2013, which implies the removal of some 3m. immigrants by that date. These policies are judged to have produced tangible results: in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia, the share of nationals in employment rose between 1990 and 2000. In the public sector, the share increased from 65% to 80%, and in the private sector, from 25% to 32%. The number of immigrant workers in the public sector fell in both relative and absolute terms. The effect of this 'nationalization' of the labour force on Arab foreign workers in the GCC countries is not clear: low-skilled jobs could be the safest, and this would benefit mostly Asians. Some substitution of highly-skilled Arab foreign workers by natives will take place, but it is medium-skilled Arab workers who are most likely to lose out to natives through the nationalization programmes. One analyst predicts slow Arab out-migration in the GCC labour markets over the period 2003-07, with forgone remittances to neighbouring Arab countries totalling some US $ 1,550m., together with a bill for their costly national replacements totalling some $9,000m. The nationalization initiative in the UAE has included a ban on visas for unskilled workers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh since July 1999. This would suggest that Asian jobs are not secure, and again affirms the idea that medium-skilled work will be the most contested arena. Israel and Turkey It seems fairly clear that Israel will continue with its policies on immigrant labour, with a racially segregated approach and abusive working conditions for non-Jewish workers. Given the current climate of Israeli-Palestinian relations, it is likely that the use of temporary labour from Asia and the Balkan countries will persist, rather than facilitating Palestinian employment. 190

Migration in the Mediterranean and Middle East

Turkey, on the other hand, has already undergone significant transformation in its migration management since 2000, and is in the process of making even more adjustments to the acquis communautaire for the purpose of its application for EU membership. These will include the development of a more coherent immigration policy, removal of the geographic limitation on asylum applications, and revamping of visa requirements. It can be expected that these changes will massively increase Turkey's control over migration movements in the region. Further Reading IOM Archive of Migration Resources in the Middle East: an entire library online, linked to relevant material from around the world. It is in English and Arabic : http ://www.egypt.iom.int/eLib/ IOM: World Migration 2005. Geneva, IOM, 2005; Regional Overview (Africa and the Middle East), Chapters 1-4, pp. 27-72. Available from www.iom.org Baldwin-Edwards, M. Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean: a Regional Study prepared for the Global Commission on International Migration. Available from www.mmo.gr and www.gcim.org

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A-Z Glossary By Barbara Marshall

A African Labour Migration Policy Initiative Designed by the ILO, the African Labour Migration Policy Initiative seeks to enhance the knowledge base on labour migration and development in West Africa, especially in a regional integration context. It has been supported by the Netherlands and reflects the shift in emphasis of the international debate on labour migration, away from its narrow focus on asylum-seekers and refugees to a more broad-based view of the links between migration, globalization and development, and the sharing of benefits by both receiving and sending countries.

Amnesty In the context of migration, the granting of legal resident status to longer-term, irregular migrants in possession of employment and accommodation. Given mainly in countries with large-scale irregular migration, such as the USA, which grants amnesties to regularize migrants from Mexico. In Europe they have been used particularly in southern countries, such as Greece, Italy and Spain. They are not uncontroversial: while some experts consider them the best way of dealing with the reality of large numbers of irregular migrants present in these countries, others see in them only a temporary solution as they will become a 'pull factor' which will encourage further immigration. {See also Regularization.)

Amsterdam Treaty Agreement between EU member states (1997) to create an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'. Came into force on 1 May 1999. All affairs related to free movement of persons; controls on external borders; asylum, immigration and safeguarding of the rights of third-country nationals; and judicial cooperation in civil matters were 'communitized', i.e. they were brought under the legal framework of the first pillar of the EU institutions. To this effect, the 195

A-Z GLOSSARY Schengen Agreement was included in the Treaty. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark voluntarily stayed out and, therefore, retained the right of exercising controls on people at their frontiers.

Anti-immigrant Politics Based on populist perceptions of the 'national interests' in the context of large-scale immigration of, notably, asylum-seekers in most West European states in the 1990s. The presence in a given country of 'undeserving', culturally different immigrants raises issues of entitlement to scarce welfare resources and of national identity. Populist politicians who often already see sovereignty under threat from 'Europeanization' and/or globalization use the presence of 'bogus' asylum-seekers to reinforce their message, that not only national values but also local communities are in danger. Often fuelled by the media, anti-immigrant politics has resulted in new anti-immigrant parties in several European countries, Australia, etc. Although often not themselves successful in elections, their importance derives from the fact that they can put pressure on mainstream parties and politicians to adopt restrictive policies which often contradict internationally agreed human rights.

Asia Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants (APC) In existence since 1996, this is an intergovernmental, informal consultative arrangement between countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Assimilation Also called the 'republican' model. Provides easy access to naturalization through the yus soli principle and semi-automatic citizenship for children of immigrant parents. It is a multi-path process involving the incorporation of immigrants and their offspring into the economic, political and social institutions and culture of different segments of the host society. Three directions can be distinguished: mainstream middle and raising lower class (so-called upwards assimilation), struggling lower—and underclass—downwards assimilation and immigrant/ethnic enclave (also called 'adhesive') which can follow the intra-group middle- or lower-class pattern. Often co-existent with 'Trans-nationalism'. France is often held as the prime example of this approach, as well as the 'melting pot'-era USA. 196

Athens Migration Policy Initiative (AMPI)

Asylum The grant, by a state, of protection on its territory to persons from another state who are fleeing persecution or serious danger. Asylum encompasses a variety of elements, including non-refoulement (deportation), permission to remain on the territory of the asylum country, and humane standards of treatment.

Asylum-seeker An asylum-seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum-seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.

Athens Migration Policy Initiative (AMPI) The Athens Migration Policy Initiative (AMPI) was launched in the summer of 2002 as a joint project of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Migration Policy Institute in Washington. The mission of AMPI is to introduce thoughtful, innovative ideas on migration into the European policy debate. www.migrationpolicy.org/AMPI

197

B Bali Process The Bali Process brings participants together to work on practical measures to help combat people-smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Initiated at the Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime held in Bali in February 2002, the Bali Process follow-up is a collaborative effort participated in by more than 50 countries and numerous international agencies. The Bali Process is co-chaired by the governments of Indonesia and Australia. Monitoring and implementation of related activities and initiatives in these areas are guided by a steering group composed of the governments of Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR. The Bali Process follow-up is supported by financial contributions from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the USA, as well as in-kind contributions from numerous participating countries, www.baliprocess.net

Berne Initiative A Global Consultative Process for Inter-State Co-operation on Migration Management. It was launched in June 2001 by the Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, the Federal Office for Migration, and assists governments in identifying their different policy priorities. It offers the opportunity to develop a common orientation to migration management, based on notions of co-operation, comprehensiveness, balance and predictability. It does not aim at developing new legally binding norms and explicitly recognizes the sovereignty of states in the field of migration management. In 2003, a first draft of an 'International Agenda for Migration Management' (IAMM) was produced. 199

A-Z GLOSSARY The IAMM, a reference system on migration management, is based on a set of common understandings outlining fundamental assumptions and principles underlying migration management. The IAMM does not develop legally binding obligations, but gives due regard to applicable international and regional legal instruments to which some states are bound through national ratification procedures. Throughout 2004 consultations were conducted in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe which have increased the global interest in the Berne Initiative; they have furthermore ensured that the IAMM represents a balanced document that reflects the perspectives of all world regions, www.bfm.admin.ch

Bifurcation Refers to two different developments in international migration: that of highly skilled professionals and entrepreneurs on the one hand, which has been encouraged by governments in the developed world; and that of less advantaged groups on the other, for which increasingly insurmountable barriers are being erected, forcing them to adopt clandestine means. {See also Irregular Migration.)

Border Controls An essential element of a state's sovereignty and important in the efforts to keep unwanted migrants out. Unlike a completely sealed border, such as the Iron Curtain, the effectiveness of border controls of liberal states has been questioned, as evidenced by the continuous influx of migrants across the border between the USA and Mexico. There are plans to improve this border. At the same time, border controls are expensive to maintain and often hamper the flow of international trade. Controls between roughly homogeneous states as in the EU were therefore removed (in the Schengen Agreement). Internal controls were replaced by a strengthening of the external borders. The widening of the EU to take in the central European members of the former Soviet Union led to the creation of a 'buffer' of protection from unwanted migration into central Europe further east. There are also plans to improve maritime controls in the Mediterranean. In May 2005 a European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders (European border control agency), with dedicated funding, was established. Controls at sea are an essential element of controls for island states/continents, such as Australia. {See also SIS and SIS II.) 200

Burden-sharing

Brain Drain The loss of educated and skilled emigrants from developing countries. International migration results in a loss of 'human capital', i.e. of those in whom the state had invested in the form of education and training. But it can also help diffuse social pressure where not enough suitable employment is available for these groups.

Brain Gain The immigration of skilled and educated people from less developed countries. Industrialized countries 'gain' because the costs for education and training of these immigrants were borne by their countries of origin.

Budapest Process A consultative forum of more than 40 governments and 10 international organizations, aiming at preventing irregular migration and establishing sustainable systems for orderly migration in the wider European region. The process was established in 1991 after a German initiative. Since 1994 Hungary has chaired the forum of Senior Officials. ICMPD acts as its Secretariat. Since 1994 about 100 working sessions have been held on a variety of topics. The geographical remit has also been widened to take in irregular migration through and from Moldavia. Since agreements reached at the Rhodes Meeting (2003), the Process has tackled migration control problems in countries neighbouring the enlarged EU. Involved are Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have recently joined the Process. www.icmpd.org

Burden-sharing The attempt, notably in the EU, to promote a more even sharing of the costs of asylum-seekers and refugees. Pushed unsuccessfully by Germany in the early 1990s during the disproportionate influx from the Balkan conflict into the adjacent countries such as Austria and Germany. Britain, in those days the staunchest opponent, in turn promoted burden-sharing when confronted with large numbers of asylum-seekers after 2000. Burden-sharing has to some extent been achieved in the EU by the introduction of the Refugee Fund in 1997. {See also European Refugee Fund.)

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c CAHAR The Council of Europe's Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees and Stateless Persons.

Carrier Sanctions From the late 1980s introduced by most Western states. Fines ranging from 100 euros to around 7,000 euros (Germany) for each individual brought to the state's territory. An EU Directive harmonizing carrier sanctions was formally adopted in June 2001.

Cartagena Declaration on Refugees Adopted by a colloquium of experts from the Americas in November 1984. The Declaration enlarges the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee to include '... persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order'. While the Cartagena Declaration is not a treaty, its provisions are respected across Central America and have been incorporated into several national laws.

CDMG The Council of Europe's Committee on Migration. The CDMG is a forum within which government experts and representatives of non-governmental organizations give thought at pan-European level to migration, to the condition and social integration of populations of migrant origin and of refugees, to the various migratory movements and to the reasons for migration, www.coe.int. Committees functioning under the authority of the CDMG in 2005: • Committee of experts on countries of emigration 203

A-Z GLOSSARY • • • • •

Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee

of of of of of

experts experts experts experts experts

on on on on on

associations and co-development the minimum rights of irregular migrants the legal status of students access of migrants to employment integration of migrant children

CEME The Co-operative Efforts to Manage Emigration (CEME) project which, with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the USA and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, examines ways in which immigration destinations can work more effectively with source and transit countries to co-ordinate movements and reduce emigration pressures, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/ ceme/index.php

Cholismo Originated in Los Angeles, USA, in the 1940s, when Mexican immigrants expressed their Mexican traditions in dress, dance, etc., when confronted with North American racism and pressures to assimilate. Today part of Mexican youth culture on both sides of the border with the USA. It serves as an identification model for the socially disadvantaged.

Circular Migration Much modern migration is no longer 'linear' between a country of origin and of permanent settlement in the destination country, but temporary, with a 'circle' of return home and renewed periods of migration. {See also Temporary Migration and Migration Networks.)

Citizenship Membership of individuals in modern states giving them political, economic and social rights. The rights of citizenship are balanced by obligations to the community and the state. Ideally, citizens are meant to belong to one nation only, but, as a result of migration, dual or multiple nationality is common. Increasingly all nation states are host to groups of non-citizens or ethnic minorities with often different cultural traditions and their status in the host society is often controversial. {See Assimilation; Denizenship; Multiculturalism; Integration; Trans-nationalism; Nationality.) 204

Convention on Establishment

Client Politics The view associated with the American academic Gary Freeman, that decisions in migration policy are made by élites and interest groups which operate in favour of their 'clients', such as big business. This results in more (mainly economic) migration, despite the fact that the opponents of (asylum) migration are more numerous and outspoken. The latter are more disparate and less focused and hence less effective in getting their views adopted as policies.

Commission - see European Commission COMPAS The Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at Oxford University (United Kingdom). COMPAS aims to provide a strategic, integrated approach to understanding contemporary and future migration dynamics across sending areas and receiving contexts in the United Kingdom and the EU. COMPAS undertakes interdisciplinary research on key aspects of global mobility and migration. The Centre's approach is multi-levelled to understand relationships between international relations and global political economy, national policy regimes, and migrants' own perceptions and practices, www.compas.ox.ac.uk

Contract Migrant Workers Persons working in a country other than their own under contractual arrangements that set limits on the period of employment and on the specific job held by the migrant (that is to say, contract migrant workers cannot change jobs without permission granted by the authorities of the receiving state).

Convention on Establishment Under the auspices of the Council of Europe; agreed in 1952; in force since 1965. Each contracting party undertook to permit the entry into and prolonged or permanent residence in its territory for nationals of the other parties. Those nationals of any contracting party who were lawfully residing in the territory of another party could be expelled only if they endangered national security or offended against public order or morality. During their residence, nationals of any contracting party could exercise their private rights, whether personal or rights relating to property; they enjoy full legal and judicial protection and the right to gainful occupation on an equal footing with nationals. 205

A-Z GLOSSARY

Convention on Migrant Workers (1977) The European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers constitutes one of the body of conventions drawn up in the context of the Council of Europe which relate to the treatment of aliens on the territory of the member states of the Council. {See also European Social Charter (ESC); Convention on Establishment; and European Convention on Social Security). The Convention on Migrant Workers is based on the principle of according rights to aliens who are nationals of Council of Europe member states so as to ensure that as far as possible they are treated no less favourably than workers who are nationals of the receiving state in all aspects of living and working conditions. The material scope of the Convention focuses on the living and working conditions of migrant workers but is also intended to encompass the social advancement and well-being of migrant workers and members of their families, in particular the right to family reunification. Thereafter, the right to equal treatment in areas as diverse and important as conditions of work, housing, education and taxation are of critical importance to all migrant workers.

Convention Plus (CP) According to UNHCR, the CP is 'an initiative launched by the High Commissioner in October 2002 to improve refugee protection world-wide and to facilitate the resolution of refugee problems through the implementation of multilateral special agreements on such issues as secondary movement, resettlement, and the link between assistance and development'. According to observers, there is an additional agenda: while the UNHCR speaks the language of refugee protection, the state signatories to the Geneva Convention start from a different premise: the need to protect states from the growing international refugee burden. In the EU, the shift from protecting refugees to protecting states can be seen most clearly in the development of a common asylum policy based on set targets both to reduce the numbers of asylum claims and to increase removals of failed asylum-seekers.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, CED AW is often described as an international bill of rights for women. It consists of a preamble and 30 articles and defines what constitutes discrimination against women. It sets up an agenda for national action to end such discrimination. The Convention defines discrimination against women as ' ... any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of 206

Convention on the Rights of the Child impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field'. By accepting the Convention, states commit themselves to undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms, including: to incorporate the principle of equality of men and women into their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women; to establish tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination; and to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises. The Convention provides the basis for realizing equality between women and men through ensuring women's equal access to, and equal opportunities in, political and public life—including the right to vote and to stand for election—as well as education, health and employment. States parties agree to take all appropriate measures, including legislation and temporary special measures, so that women can enjoy all their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Convention is the only human rights treaty which affirms the reproductive rights of women and targets culture and tradition as influential forces shaping gender roles and family relations. It affirms women's rights to acquire, change or retain their nationality and the nationality of their children. States parties also agree to take appropriate measures against all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of women, www.un.org/womenwatch

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees - see Geneva Convention Convention on the Rights of the Child Adopted in 1989, the Convention is the first legally binding international instrument to incorporate the full range of human rights—civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. It sets out these rights in 54 articles and two Optional Protocols. The four core principles of the Convention are non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of the child. Every right spelled out in the Convention is inherent to the human dignity and harmonious development of every child. The Convention protects children's rights by setting standards in health care; education; and legal, civil and social services. Refugee children come fully within its scope. 207

A-Z GLOSSARY

Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and their Families 1990 (ICMR) Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1990 and entered into force on 1 July 2003. It is an important legal and human rights instrument; the most comprehensive international treaty to date on the rights of all migrants and members of their families. The Convention acknowledges the role which migrant workers play in the global economy and provides international standards for their treatment, welfare and rights, regardless of their status. It also sets out the obligations and responsibilities of states which host migrant workers and members of their families. The convention covers rights and protection for migrant workers at all stages of their migration, from their preparation in their country of origin, the period of transit, their stay in states of employment and their return to and resettlement in their country of origin. The entry into force of the Convention will reinforce and complete a series of other measures already taken by the United Nations to ensure adequate protection of all migrant workers and their families. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has been at the forefront of efforts to secure and maintain a fair deal for migrant workers and their families since the 1920s. Also, a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights has been looking since 1999 at ways and means to overcome obstacles to the full and effective protection of the human rights of migrants, including difficulties for the return of those who are 'undocumented'. The Migrants Rights Convention is considered by many to be the seventh major international human rights treaty. As such, it is a crucial addition to the international regime for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1984; entered into force on 26 June 1987. The term 'torture' is defined as 'any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed. Each State Party shall [also] undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined above. The Convention came to renewed prominence in the wake of the treatment of detainees at US-administered prisons in Iraq and at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 208

Creolization

Conviviality The emergence of common rules and values which provide the basis for equality, the conditions for cross-cultural communication and the development of a new sense of community. Conviviality can lead to a new form of citizenship, derived from residence in a state's territory rather than that based on 'belonging' to a nation state. {See Citizenship.)

Costs and Benefits The terms are used to describe the asymmetric impact of migration (mainly) on receiving countries. According to this concept, the complexity of migration can be explained by the fact that benefits can be identified relatively easily whereas costs by contrast are diffuse and more difficult to establish. Thus, the economic benefits of migration are evident in the form of either the recruitment of the highly skilled (such as IT experts), when migrants help to overcome skill shortages in the existing workforce, or in the provision of cheap and flexible labour. Migrants in this category frequently take on socalled '3D' jobs (i.e. those which are dirty, dangerous and difficult) for which indigenous labour is not available (fruit pickers, cleaners, etc.). However, the costs of migration fall disproportionately on public services (e.g. housing, health). There are also the 'social costs' for the less privileged of the receiving society when migrants compete for cheap housing and jobs with the low skilled. This often leads to hostility and even violence, with a rise in xenophobia which can be politically exploited. This in turn can prevent politicians from developing constructive migration policies. Furthermore, the cultural distinctiveness of many migrants can heighten a sense of insecurity in the host society and undermine its sense of identity.

Creolization The term is derived from linguistics and now also refers to the intermingling and mixing of two or several formerly discrete traditions or cultures. Although often criticized for essentializing cultures (as if the merging traditions were 'pure' at the outset), the concept helps make sense of a great number of contemporary cultural processes, characterized by movement, change and shifting boundaries.

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D Declaration of the Hague on the Future of Refugee and Migration Policy Issued in 2002 by the Hague Process on Refugees and Migration (THP). Its preamble expresses THP's approach: 'We believe that now is the time for a major change of focus. The patterns of migration are changing; the potential for international co-operation is increasing; demographic realities in the world are shifting; globalisation offers possibilities to manage migration more productively; the advance of human rights and democratic governance open us new perspectives.' The Declaration identifies 21 key Principles constituting a comprehensive approach to the issues and some ideas for innovative ways forward. A consultation process involved experts world-wide from governments, migrant and refugee organizations, NGOs, international organizations, faith groups, academia and business. The global THP network now has about 2,000 members. The document has been disseminated worldwide and made accessible in the six working languages of the UN. (See www.thehagueprocess.org or the official UN website—http://documents.un .org—for online versions.)

Denizenship A form of social citizenship, offering immigrants a type of quasi-membership in the receiving society in the form of full social and economic rights, but restricted access to full citizenship. An example is third-country nationals in the European Union.

Dependants Immediate relatives of the principal migrant who are normally admitted in the same migration category as that person. Although the definition of immediate relative varies from country to country, the spouse and minor children of 211

A-Z GLOSSARY a principal migrant usually qualify as dependants. (See also Family Reunification.)

Deportation The forcible removal of individuals from a country. For immigration countries, the deportation of unsuccessful asylum-seekers and irregular migrants is an important tool of migration control (see also Migration Controls). However, deportation is often difficult: the country of origin may be unknown or conditions there might prevent deportation on human rights grounds (see also Non-refoulement). Deportation is widely used for contract migrant workers in times of economic downturn, such as the expulsion of Asian workers from the Middle East after the first Gulf War (1991). In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the USA in 1993, detention and deportation without the usual judiciary review became part of the Counter Terrorism Law (1996). Since 9/11 deportations have been more widely used throughout the Western world. (See also Detention.)

Destitute Communities Term applied to forcibly returned emigrant workers who have been unable to reintegrate back into their countries of origin. For example, after the second Gulf crisis 850,000 Yemeni workers were expelled from GCC countries and have since lived in camps, unemployed and reliant on government assistance.

Detention Many countries practise some form of detention, such as in Germany in the form of 'reception centres' for asylum-seekers during the processing of the asylum applications, mainly to prevent the applicants' disappearance into the receiving country's population. It is used to control unsuccessful asylumseekers and irregular migrants prior to their deportation. This latter form of detention frequently takes place in ordinary prisons. Detention is also part of the receiving countries' strategy of deterrence of future migrants and is thus part of migration controls.

Deterrence Detailed information about conditions in the receiving countries, rejection at the borders after expensive journeys to the receiving country, the use of detention, the reduction or complete abolition of welfare benefits and health provisions, poor housing, lack of schooling for irregular migrants' children 212

Diaspora

and well-publicized eventual deportation are the main measures put in place to deter future migrants. Deterrence is thus another measure to control migration.

Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) A programming approach which aims to promote the inclusion of refugees and host communities in the development agendas through additional development assistance to improve burden-sharing with countries hosting a large number of refugees. It also aims to promote a better quality of life and selfreliance for refugees pending durable solutions and an improved standard of living for refugee-hosting communities. {See also UNHCR.)

Diaspora Of Greek origin ('to colonize'), the term until recently referred to a group of people who were linked by their common ethnic-linguistic and/or religious bonds and who were living outside their country of origin where they preserved a strong identity and developed mutual solidarity (e.g. the Jewish diaspora). Nowadays and in the context of international mobility, the term encompasses expatriate populations who are living outside their home countries. It extends to migrants who have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence (often losing their original citizenship in the process) and migrants' children born abroad, whatever their citizenship, as long as they retain some form of commitment to and/or interest in their country of origin or that of their parents. In some extreme cases, such as the Chinese diaspora, people may still feel part of a country's diaspora even though their family has been living in another country for several generations (http:// www.emigration.gov.eg). Common features are: collective mythology of and idealization of return to the homeland; and alienation from the host country stretching over several generations. Diasporas have also become increasingly important in economic terms and remittances from migrants outside their countries of origin play a significant and openly acknowledged part in the economy of the sending state. To optimize the great potential of diaspora engagement, special organizations have been set up such as the Africa Investment Forum (www.africadiaspora.com); Homecoming Revolution (www.homecomingrevolution.co.za); Jamaican Diaspora (www.jamaicandiaspora.org); Canadian Foundation; Kenya Development Network Consortium (www.kdnc.org); and the Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization (www.teedoc.org). A common type of diaspora organization is the Hometown Association (HTA), which is organized around 213

A-Z GLOSSARY links to a specific village. Villages connected to HTAs tend to have better roads, electricity, etc. This also reflects the fact that governments in the developing world can be persuaded to release 'matching funds' to those raised by the diaspora. The UK Somali community, for example, financed the University of Hargeisa in Somaliland which started work in 2000. It has significantly reduced the brain drain from that region. Co-operation between the diaspora, countries of origin and development agencies is also increasingly important for the knowledge transfer (e.g. the UNDP's Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) or IOM's Migration and Development in Africa (MIDA)).

Dispersal The geographic distribution of asylum-seekers and refugees to spread the costs more evenly throughout a country. In Europe this has always been the norm in a federal state such as West Germany, where each Land took in a certain number in proportion to its inhabitants and economic wealth. In states such as the United Kingdom, where London received a disproportionate number, dispersal was introduced in the 1980s and in the 1990s. There has always been controversy wherever the authorities have attempted to create new reception centres.

Diversity The ethnic and cultural mix of people, notably in large conurbations. {See also Homogeneity; Multiculturalism.)

Dublin Convention Signed in Dublin, Ireland, in June 1990; in force since 1997. The Convention determining the state which is responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the member states of the European Communities. The application of this Convention will ensure that every asylum-seeker's application will be examined by a member state, unless a 'safe' non-member country can be considered as responsible. This will avoid situations of refugees being shuttled from one member state to another, with none accepting responsibility, as well as multiple serial or simultaneous applications. In practice the Convention did not work as intended, which led to the adoption of Dublin II. 214

Durable Solutions

Dublin II In December 2002 the Dublin Convention was changed into a European Community Regulation. The new regulation, known as Dublin II, introduces some changes to the original Convention. For example, a member state's responsibility for an asylum-seeker who has illegally entered into EU territory is now restricted to 12 months. Beyond that period, if it is impossible to determine through which member state the asylum-seeker entered the EU, responsibility switches to the member state where that person has stayed illegally for more than five months. Several further improvements have been introduced into the Dublin II regulation, compared to the Dublin Convention: shorter delays so as not to leave asylum-seekers in a state of uncertainty for too long, and to speed up the processing of asylum applications; and new provisions making it easier to preserve the unity of family groupings.

Durable Solutions The concept put forward by UNHCR to resolve refugee crises. They consist of voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of first asylum or permanent resettlement in a third country. In the last three years alone, more than 5m. refugees have returned to their countries of origin in 27 large-scale repatriation programmes. Major destination countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Resettlement remains, perhaps, the most immediate and straightforward response to protracted refugee situations because it does not rely upon the resolution of long-standing conflicts. {See also Integrated Approach; Repatriation; Return.)

215

E Economic Migration Most of today's legal and irregular migration is undertaken for economic reasons, to better people's standard of living. At the same time, it fills gaps in the labour markets of receiving countries and, because migrants often work for lower wages, reduces the costs to employers and thus benefits the consumers of the immigration countries. The negative consequences are that some, notably the less skilled native workers, can be dislodged from their jobs and that migrants often compete for cheap housing with the least advantaged of the host societies.

Economics of Migration The impact of migration on the receiving country's economy depends to a large extent on the condition of the latter's economy: migration into an expanding economy is beneficial (e.g. Germany in the early 1990s). In a contracting economy, migrant workers can act as a buffer in that they are the first to be laid off. However, unemployed migrants will add to a state's expenditure in terms of welfare payments (unless they are deported). The overall effect of migration is thought to be beneficial at best and neutral at worst.

ECRAN The Advocacy Network of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE).

ECRE The European Council on Refugees and Exiles is a pan-European network of 76 refugee-assisting non-governmental organizations in 30 countries working towards fair and humane policies for the treatment of asylum-seekers and 217

A-Z GLOSSARY refugees. Nowadays ECRE is highly critical of the laws so far adopted at EU level as inadequate to ensure protection for refugees and asylum-seekers. It finds that the standards set are minimal, leaving member states too much opportunity for derogation, and lacking the necessary safeguards. It states that the 'absolute respect of the right to seek asylum', promised at Tampere, has been totally undermined. In view of the increasing harmonization of migration and asylum policies at EU level, ECRE has moved its headquarters to Brussels, www.ecre.org

ELENA The European Legal Network on Asylum is a forum for legal practitioners who aim to promote the highest human rights standards for the treatment of refugees, asylum-seekers and other persons in need of international protection in their daily counselling and advocacy work. The ELENA network extends across most European states and involves some 2,000 lawyers and legal counsellors.

Emigrants Individuals who live permanently outside their countries of birth.

ERLAI The network of local authorities in the European Union.

Ethnic Minorities Foreign-born citizens or residents in a country of immigration and their descendants. Members of the same ethnic background, language and culture form ethnic minorities. The status of ethnic minority provides 'group identity' (as opposed to individual identity). The positive side is that it is a sign of the official recognition of these groups within a society and often provides special legal protection, such as anti-discrimination legislation. The negative aspect is that members of ethnic minorities are regarded predominantly as such and that their individuality can become blurred. Policies based on dealing with different ethnic groups can also lead to competition between these groups (for resources, for example) and ultimately can further social disintegration rather than integration. (See also Multiculturalism.) 218

European Commission (EC)

EUROCITIES The network of European cities.

EURODAC Commenced operations on 15 January 2003. EURODAC consists of a central unit within the European Commission equipped with a computerized central database for comparing the fingerprints of asylum applicants and a system for electronic data transmission between member states. It was designed to improve the application of the Dublin Convention which makes it possible to determine the state responsible for examining the asylum application. In the case of asylum-seekers, data are kept for 10 years unless the individual obtains citizenship of one of the member states, when their particulars are immediately erased. Data relating to foreign nationals apprehended when attempting to cross an external border irregularly are kept for two years from the date on which the fingerprints were taken. Data are immediately erased before the end of the two years if the foreign national receives a residence permit, or has left the territory of the member states. In addition to fingerprints, data sent by member states will include in particular the member state of origin, the place and date of the asylum application if applicable, sex and reference number. Data are collected for anyone over 14 years of age and are encoded directly into the database by the central unit or the member state of origin. The costs of the national units, their connection to the central database and the cost of data transmission are borne by each member state. www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133081 .htm

European Commission (EC) From the 1980s onwards the European Commisssion (EC) has been involved in the promotion of more comprehensive migration and asylum policies, to some extent as part of the institutional competition with the Council where national governments jealously guarded an intergovernmental approach to this policy area. In 1991 the EC published two proposals, one for immigration and one for asylum, in which it advocated a 'global approach' beyond measures which related mainly to borders and controls. However, the Maastricht Treaty confirmed the intergovernmental tradition. In 1994 the EC in a further document stressed the necessity to consider the integration of migrants already inside the EU, which it saw as of equal importance to European societies as the usual emphasis on controls and security. The creation at the Amsterdam conference of the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' brought the transfer of matters relating to the free movement of people into the first pillar, i.e. under 219

A-Z GLOSSARY EU competence. Since then the EU has focused on temporary protection as the most suitable way for dealing with sudden influxes of refugees (opposed by national governments, which favour the concept of internal flight alternative). The EC has also promoted the rights of third-country nationals in the EU and has published documents relating to common standards in asylum procedures. In 2000, the EC called for a common framework for promoting the convergence of European migration policies. The so-called 'open co-ordination method' aimed to set common guide-lines on migration policy, covering criteria and procedures for recruitment and treatment of labour migrants. In 2005, the EC relaunched the earlier Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration (COM (2004) 811). This consultation led to the adoption in December 2005 of a 'Policy Plan on Legal Migration' (COM (2005) 669) which lists the actions and legislative initiatives that the Commission intends to take, so as to pursue the consistent development of the EU legal migration policy. The focus has also been on gathering information and data, with the Commission now preparing annual reports on immigration and integration, the first of which was issued in July 2004. The EC has also been supporting attempts to 'mainstream' integration into all area of EU policy, and to develop a more coherent approach. It has been supporting efforts by the new 'National Contact Points on Integration' to develop best practice. In November 2004 the Commission produced a 'Handbook on Integration for PolicyMakers and Practitioners', which emanated from a series of discussions with the National Contact Points. The impact of 9/11 and the general rise in migration pressures on the EU had led to EC initiatives to reduce migration to Europe such as the Commission Communication of 2002 on migration and development, which proposed co-operation based on 'shared interests' with sending and transit countries, dealing with issues such as brain drain and remittances, treatment of third-country nationals in EU countries, and problems with migration management. In 2005, the EC set out less controversial proposals for 'Regional Protection Programmes', which involved reinforcing the capacity of countries in regions of origin and transit to provide refugee protection. {See also EURODAC.)

European Committee on Migration (Council of Europe) - see Council of Europe Committee on Migration (CDMG) European Convention on Human Rights Adopted by the Council of Europe on 18 November 1950 with five protocols (1051-1963). Member states are obliged to respect the following: the right to 220

European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) life; the prohibition of torture; the prohibition of slavery and forced labour; the right to liberty and security; the right to a fair trial; No punishment without law; the right to respect for private and family life; the freedom of thought, conscience and religion; the freedom of expression; the freedom of assembly and association; the right to marry; the right to an effective remedy; the prohibition of discrimination. www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty

European Convention on Social Security The European Convention on Social Security consists of the four basic principles of international social security law: equality of treatment; a single set of applicable legislation; maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the course of acquisition; and the payment of benefits abroad. It applies to nationals living in another member state, as well as to refugees or stateless persons. Due to the complexity of different national legislation, the Convention has been designed to be complete and flexible at the same time. Most of the provisions, including the basic provisions particularly dealing with the adding together of periods of insurance, residence, employment or other occupational activity, are to apply automatically as soon as the Convention enters into force. The application of other provisions, relating notably to sickness, unemployment and family benefits, is subject to the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements.

European Migration Network (EMN) The European Migration Network (EMN) provides the Community, its member states and, in the longer term, the general public with objective, reliable and comparative information on the migration and asylum situation. Under the general direction of the European Commission (DG Justice, Liberty and Security) and co-ordinated by the Berliner Institut fur Vergleichende Sozialforschung, 17 National Contact Points (NCPs) are gathering, coordinating, exchanging and analysing information and data on migration and asylum, www.european-migration-network.org. For information on migration in Central and Eastern Europe, see www.migrationonline.cz.

European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) The objectives of the Centre are: monitoring racism and xenophobia by collecting, recording and analysing information and data from all EU member states; disseminating the results of its activities and its findings to policy221

A-Z GLOSSARY makers in the EU and an interested public; co-operation with EU institutions, member states, national and international organizations, and civil society organizations to support the development of practical policies against racism, xenophobia and discrimination. It produces annual reports which, for 2005, provided a comprehensive overview on racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim discrimination in all 25 EU member states. EUMC states that combating racial inequalities is central to speeding the integration of minority communities in Europe. The Roma emerge as the most vulnerable group to racism in the EU; they are regular victims of racial violence, and face discrimination in employment, housing and education. EUMC proposes several policies to combat racial discrimination, and to also promote better relations between majority and minority communities. These include further legislation in member states, and strategies to avoid social exclusion in education and employment. Also in 2005, it produced a report on policing racist crime in the EU. Based on EUMC's 'Rapid Response' data collection mechanism, it provides an overview of some of the challenges facing police forces if they are to effectively respond to racist crime in the EU. Together with the EUMC's report on 'Racist Violence in the EU15' (April 2005), the report presents a critical reading of policing responses. A picture of partial or non-existent responses to racially motivated crime is offered, which reveals how ill-equipped most police forces are to deal with racist crime. www.eumc.eu.int

European Network Against Racism (ENAR) The European Network Against Racism (ENAR) is financed by the AntiDiscrimination and Relations with Civil Society Unit of DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European Commission. It has highlighted the fact that immigrants across Europe are particularly vulnerable to homelessness and that action is needed at EU level to address this problem, www. enar-eu. org

European Refugee Fund (ERF) A fund established by the EU in 1997 to develop reception systems for asylum-seekers and refugees and to finance integration efforts. The Fund's annual budget has been increased to €687m. for the period 2005-10. The bulk of the fund goes to countries with higher numbers of refugees. 222

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European Social Charter (ESC) Adopted in 1961 and revised in 1996; under the auspices of the Council of Europe. The European Social Charter (ESC) guarantees social and economic human rights. These rights encompass access to adequate and affordable housing; accessible and effective health care; free primary and secondary education; legal and social protection, particularly of children and young people; in employment the prohibition of forced labour and the labour of children under the age of 15; the right to move and to family reunification; the right to non-discrimination, such as between men and women and natives and foreigners.

European Union With the provision of the 'free movement of people' in the Single European Act of 1985 migration became a part of the 'European project'. At the same time, the rise of the number of asylum-seekers and, particularly after the fall of the Iron Curtain, of migrants of all kinds persuaded member states that the complexities of migration were better dealt with on the basis of co-operation. This led to a wide array of meetings and agreements with slow progress as migration touched sensitive issues such as national sovereignty. Gradually an institutional framework emerged with immigration and asylum initially an intergovernmental policy area which with the Amsterdam Treaty moved into EU competence. While the European Commission has taken the lead in promoting further harmonization, national governments co-operate in the JHA Council. Realizing that a new approach to managing migration was necessary, the leaders of the EU set out at the October 1999 European Council in Tampere (Finland) the elements for a common EU immigration policy. The approach agreed in Tampere in 1999 was confirmed in 2004 with the adoption of the Hague programme, which sets the objectives for strengthening freedom, security and justice in the EU for the period 2005-10. As far as legal immigration was concerned, the Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification entered into force on 3 October 2003. Member states' legislation had to comply with the Directive not later than 3 October 2005. The Council Directive 2003/109/ EC of 25 November 2003 on a long-term resident status for third-country nationals who have legally resided for five years in the territory of a member state entered into force on 23 January 2004. Member states' legislation had to comply with the Directive by 23 January 2006 at the latest. A Directive on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of study, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service was adopted by 223

A-Z GLOSSARY the Council on 13 December 2004 (Directive 2004/114). It entered into force on 12 January 2005. Member states' legislation must comply with the Directive by 12 January 2007. A Directive for the facilitation of the admission of researchers into the EU was adopted by the Council on 12 October 2005 (Directive 2005/71). Its provisions had to be implemented by member states by 12 October 2007. On illegal immigration the EU Council of Ministers adopted a comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in the European Union on 28 February 2002. An important platform of EU policies has always been the emphasis on return. On 28 November 2002 the Council adopted a return action programme which suggested developing a number of short-, medium- and long-term measures, including common EU-wide minimum standards or guide-lines, in the field of return of illegal residents. Readmission agreements have been concluded with a number of countries (Hong Kong, Macao, Sri Lanka, Albania) and negotiations with several others are ongoing. On 10 March 2004 the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Regulation establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum (AENEAS). It contains a multi-annual programme for 2004-08, with an overall expenditure of 250m. euros. The common EU immigration policy does not apply to Denmark, which has decided to opt out of Title IV of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. The United Kingdom and Ireland decide on their involvement on a case-by-case basis (there is the possibility, also, of 'opting in').

European Union Citizenship The legal definition for the European citizenship can be found in Article 17 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community: 'Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.' The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, aimed to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its member states through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union. The European citizenship confers, notably, on every European citizen a fundamental and personal right to move and reside freely without reference to an economic activity. With this Treaty also came additional voting active and passive rights in European and local elections. It enhanced as well diplomatic and consular protection by giving the right to EU citizens to ask for the help of any member state represented in a third country if his/her own member state is not represented there. The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, extended citizens' rights/obligations by 224

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introducing a clause allowing EU institutions to take measures against discrimiation on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation to the Treaty. Amsterdam also reinforced the free movement of people by integrating the Schengen Convention into the Treaty. Furthermore, it affirmed the commitment of each member state to raise the quality and free access to education at national level to the highest level of knowledge possible with, in particular, the view to tackling unemployment. The Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, facilitated legislation relating to free movement and residence by introducing qualified majority voting for the decision-making in Council.

Exclusion - see Inclusion

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F Family Reunification Family life is one of the fundamental human rights, as enshrined in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It defines the family as 'the natural and fundamental group unit of society... entitled to protection by society and the State'. At European level, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that 'everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life'. Most developed countries have incorporated these principles into their national legislation, although variations exist with regard to the definition of the family unit, the legal status and level of socio-economic rights conferred to family members and the procedures applicants have to go through in order to reunite with family members. Migrants who first arrive without their families in a country of immigration have the right to bring their families in, once certain preconditions have been met (availability of accommodation; firm employment, etc.). Family reunification represents the largest group of the three forms of legal entry into a country (the other two are employment and refugees/asylum-seekers). For this reason, governments have attempted to restrict this right. The European Parliament has attacked, before the European Court of Justice, a measure on immigration on the grounds of its failure to respect the ECHR. The measure, a directive on family reunification for thirdcountry nationals, permits member states to restrict family reunification with children to those under the ages of 12 and 15 in various circumstances. It also permits the member states to place substantial waiting periods on the thirdcountry national before family reunification can be sought. The European Parliament considered these restrictions so severe as to be incompatible with the member states' human rights obligations.

Female Migration The number of women migrating has steadily increased over the last decade, notably in Asia and Africa. Experts talk of the 'feminization of migration'. (See also Sex Trade.) 227

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'Five Plus Five' Initiative The 5+5 Dialogue on Migration is a discussion forum on migration issues between ten countries of the Western Mediterranean: Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia.

Forced Migration This term is applied to those who flee all forms of human rights violations, as opposed to economic migrants who are deemed to be 'voluntary' migrants. However, in reality the demarcation between these different categories of migrants is fluid, http://www.forcedmigration.org/browse/thematic/ trafficking.htm

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G Gap Hypothesis Put forward by migration experts to explain the disparity between the rhetoric of migration control by politicians and the reality of continuing immigration.

GAMP General Agreement on the Movement of People. The attempt by migration experts to internationalize migration by creating a multilateral agreement for migration similar to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Geneva Convention The UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Adopted on 28 July 1951; entered into force on 22 April 1954. Together with the 1967 Protocol it forms the cornerstone of international refugee protection (http:// www.unhcr.ch/1951convention). The Geneva Convention was drawn up in response to the mass migration flows in Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. With European displacement firmly in mind, the Geneva Convention originally contained a geographical and time limit, which automatically banned people from certain countries from claiming asylum. The 1967 Protocol removed these restrictions and allowed people from any country to claim asylum. The Convention defines a refugee as an individual who 'owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country'. The Convention does not make the claim of asylum a right of the individual. The granting of asylum has always been (and remains) the right of a state. However, the universal recognition of asylum by states can be viewed as an implicit right of an individual to claim asylum. The Convention also covers the social and 229

A-Z GLOSSARY economic circumstances of refugees in countries of exile. Whilst stating that all refugees should adhere to the laws and regulations of their host country, the convention also states that refugees should receive benefits of equal measure to other 'aliens' residing in the country. These benefits extend to personal status, artistic rights and industrial property, right of association and access to courts. Additionally, non-discrimination and a minimum standard of religious freedom are also to be allowed. With reference to employment status, the Convention stipulates that refugees should be given the same rights as other foreigners in the country. In terms of welfare rights, the Convention states that refugees should be allowed equal access to elementary education, public relief and assistance and social security. Nowadays some experts consider the terms of the Geneva Convention outdated in the sense that it assumes that 'agents of persecution' are states. However, today refugees more often flee areas where there is no functioning government, or where they are victims of rebel movements or local militia. Moreover, people also flee their country due to foreign aggression, foreign domination, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order. Perversely, some EU governments have resorted to a strict interpretation of the Convention to deny asylum rights to refugees. For example, Germany did not recognize the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, and hence would not accept Afghani refugees. (See also Convention Plus.) Perhaps the most important provision of the Geneva Convention is found in Article 33, which sets forth the principle of Non-refoulement. (See also OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee problems in Africa; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.)

Global Cities Large metropolitan areas which, owing to their close integration into global markets, attract the highest number of migrants. It is in these cities that the highly mobile global élite of skilled professionals, managers and entrepreneurs concentrate. (See also Labour Market Segmentation; Glocalization.)

Global Commission on International Migration Established in December 2003 on the initiative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with a view to developing a framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to migration issues. It aims 'to promote debate among governments, international organizations, academia, civil society, the media and other actors', www.gcim.org 230

Globalization

Global Migration Group (GMG) The Global Migration Group (GMG) is an inter-agency group meeting at the level of heads of agencies, which aims to promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration, and the provision of more coherent and stronger leadership to improve the overall effectiveness of the United Nations and the international community's policy and operational response to the opportunities and challenges presented by international migration. The GMG grew out of an existing inter-agency group, the Geneva Migration Group, which was established in April 2003 by the heads of ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNHCR and UNODC. In early 2006 membership in the Geneva Migration Group was expanded to include DESA, UNDP, UNFPA and the World Bank. The Group was renamed the GMG. The GMG meets at regular intervals. It is developing a programme of work to focus its attention on priority migration issues that would benefit from more vigorous inter-agency consultation and collaboration. Members: ILO, IOM, UNCTAD, UNDP, UN-DESA, UNFPA, UNHCHR, UNODC and the World Bank, www.un.int/iom/global

Globalization The term covers a wide range of elements: the emergence of a global economy based on the activities of trans-national corporations and international markets for capital, commodities and services; the introduction of new information technologies which have revolutionized communication, production and trade and facilitate the world-wide dissemination of cultural values; the formation of regional economies and markets, characterized by the free movement of capital, goods and labour across national boundaries, such as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Area and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum; the development of supra-national institutions and legal norms which regulate economic and political relations (the EU, the World Court, the European Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization, etc.); the growing significance of democracy and human rights as norms of governance in the international community; the emergence of a global commitment to a common set of values and standards as a result of global information and cross-cultural awareness. Globalization has also brought a growing divergence between rising wealth and poverty; an increasing sense of insecurity and threat to dignity and identity resulting in a retrenchment to regional or local communities, to specific group identities or the 'self with the exclusion of 'the other'. 231

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Glocalization A process of local embodiments of global trends. One example is the global city of Miami, where the first wave of Cuban refugees over time gave way to émigré financiers and manufacturers with virtual control of South-North American trade.

Green Card Mainly known as the permit for indefinite work and residence in the USA which offers the possibility of naturalization. It was briefly also introduced in Germany in August 2000 for information and communication experts on fiveyear contracts. Terminated at the end of 2004 because of unexpectedly low take-up.

Guestworkers The system of temporary workers in West Germany after the Second World War who were recruited on short-term contracts. No integration was intended as the German term Gastarbeiter indicates. There are similarities to the Kafala system as practised in the GCC and in Asia today, but with much harsher conditions.

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement Although heads of state and government recognized at the 2005 UN World Summit that the Principles are an important international framework and resolved to take effective measures to increase the protection of Internally Displaced Persons, this simply has not happened in practice.

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H The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration (THP) THP is a foundation set up in 2000 to develop concrete proposals for sustainable refugee and migration policies that brings together a diverse range of stakeholders from the northern and southern hemispheres. THP started with the launch of a three-year project on the Future of Asylum and Migration by the Netherlands Chapter of the Society for International Development. Within its financial and administrative constraints, the annual meeting of the Club of the Hague advises on priorities and areas where real political impact is possible, focusing, where possible, on new approaches while avoiding duplication with other valuable initiatives. Initiatives are at present clustered in several main work streams, including the Business Initiative and the Big Cities Initiative. (See www.thehagueprocess.org for online reports.)

Hague Programme For the future of EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), adopted by the European Council in November 2004. A detailed plan for its implementation was approved at the JHA Council meeting in June 2005. The Hague Programme is a five-year programme for closer co-operation in justice and home affairs at EU level from 2005 to 2010. It aims to make Europe an area of freedom, security and justice. The Programme's main focus is on setting up a common immigration and asylum policy for the 25 EU member states. This new five-year Programme differs substantially from its predecessor (see also Tampere). The rule of law is no longer the core value. Instead, and reflecting the impact of 9/11, the area responds 'to a central concern of the peoples of the States brought together in the Union'. While guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and rights, the union should take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organized crime, as well as the prevention thereof. The co-ordination and coherence between the internal and 233

A-Z GLOSSARY the external dimension of security has been growing in importance and needs to continue.

Harmonization The attempt of EU member states to reach common asylum, immigration and integration policies to avoid greater pressure on individual member states and also in order to set minimum standards. Common norms and approaches should also improve the effectiveness of national policies in areas such as asylum, integration and labour migration. Harmonization has made some progress since the fall of the Iron Curtain with the rise in numbers arriving in Europe. But it touches policy areas that are of vital interest to each member state, such as national sovereignty. Too many countries are reluctant to pool control and intelligence (see also Justice and Home Affairs; Tampere; the Hague Programme; the Seville Council). The so-called 'harmonization' of policies on asylum, immigration and integration has also been regarded as a means of standard-setting. The idea is that establishing common norms and approaches should improve the effectiveness of national policies in areas such as asylum, integration or labour migration. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 set out ambitious goals for harmonization in the areas of temporary protection, asylum-seeker reception conditions, procedures for assessing asylum claims, and criteria on who qualified for refugee status. Much of this legislation has already been introduced, and plans for further progress were set out in the Hague Programme of 2004. The longer-term goal is to develop a common asylum system. According to the European Commission, this should include a uniform asylum and subsidiary protection status; a common procedure for granting and withdrawing status; and a common system of temporary protection. In addition to harmonizing national policies, EU countries have also been exporting European practice to other countries. In the 1990s CEECs were obliged to adapt their legislation on asylum to correspond to the EU acquis, as part of the accession process. Other prospective EU members— including countries in the Western Balkans and Turkey—have been encouraged to adopt similar standards.

Homogeneity The concept of a homogeneous cultural and racial composition of a society. Such countries, for example China, Japan and, to some extent, Germany in the past, do not favour immigration and consider themselves 'non-immigration countries'. In the case of Germany, this concept was changed after the change of government in 1998. 234

Human Rights Watch

Human Development Index (HDI) Introduced by the United Nations, the Human Development Index (HDI) measures a country or region's progress in terms of life expectancy, level of education and adjusted real income, www.hdr.undp.org

Human Rights Agreed international standards that recognize and protect the dignity and integrity of every individual, without any distinction. Human rights form part of customary international law and are stipulated in a variety of national, regional and international legal documents generally referred to as human rights instruments. The most prominent of these are the United Nations Charter, and the UN Bill of Rights, made up of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.

Human Rights Watch US-based information-gathering and campaigning organization to defend human rights world-wide. Country-based or issue-focused information. On migration specifically, see sections on refugees and the trafficking of women and children, www.hrw.org

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I ICMPD The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) is an inter-governmental organization based in Vienna, Austria. ICMPD was created in 1993 on the initiative of Switzerland and Austria. Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden have since also become member/participating states of ICMPD. In total, more than 30 governments actively support ICMPD in various ways. It was granted partial diplomatic status in 1997, and full status in 2000. The purpose of the Centre is to promote comprehensive and sustainable migration policies and to function as a service exchange mechanism for governments and organizations primarily on European migration issues. ICMPD is different from other inter-governmental organizations dealing with movements of people because it concentrates on policies and fosters a long-term approach, has a deep knowledge of issues, and concentrates on salient immigration management challenges confronting sovereign states. Humane migration policies cannot exist without enforcement measures, such as the repatriation of rejected asylum-seekers, or without efficient border control and other migration-regulating instruments. ICMPD actively supports the improvement of such measures. ICMPD co-operates closely with the UNHCR and the Council of Europe. The European Commission is a major partner and donor. ICMPD acts as Secretariat for the Budapest Process, www.icmpd.org

IDRC The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a Canadian Crown corporation that works in close collaboration with researchers from the developing world. A source of useful research papers and background information, www.idrc.org

Illegal migration - see Irregular Migration 237

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ILO International Labour Organization. ILO is the UN agency which specializes in the promotion of social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights. It was founded in 1919 and is the only surviving major creation of the Treaty of Versailles which brought the League of Nations into being. It became the first specialized agency of the UN in 1946. ILO formulates international labour standards in the form of Conventions and Recommendations setting minimum standards of basic labour rights: freedom of association, the right to organize, collective bargaining, abolition of forced labour, equality of opportunity and treatment, and other standards regulating conditions across the entire spectrum of work-related issues, www.ilo.org

Inclusion Inclusion and its counterpart, exclusion, are the terms of the treatment of migrants in receiving societies, notably in the context of liberal welfare states.

Integration In general terms, depending on the citizenship and immigration policies of receiving countries as well as the socio-cultural capital and general 'fit' of the immigrants into the host society, three main avenues can be distinguished: the conventional upward path into the middle class of the host society; downwards into the lower cultural and economic segments of the host society and the ethnic or bicultural path of integration. After the terrorist attacks in the USA and Europe, integration has become a means of challenging the apparent 'separateness' of immigrants which had been encouraged by past multicultural approaches to the customs and traditions of immigrants. In Europe, EU member states are considering the introduction of an EU-wide 'integration contract', either by way of a review of their current immigration procedures, or through the introduction of new provisions.

Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia (IGC) IGC is an inter-regional co-operation forum focusing on a range of migrationand refugee-related issues, ranging from short-term government concerns to long-term strategies. It is a forum for sharing intelligence on, and practical approaches to, migration and security issues. New Zealand is currently in the process of attaining membership, www.igc.ch 238

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre is the leading international body which monitors conflict-induced internal displacement world-wide. The Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive and regularly updated information and analysis on internal displacement in 50 countries. www.internal-displacement.org

Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) Also described as 'internal relocation' or the 'internal protection principle', the Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) is often raised as a reason not to recognize a person as a refugee when conditions in one part of a country are such that there is a serious possibility of persecution for a Convention reason if sent back there, but there are other parts of that country where the same concern would not arise.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) According to UNHCR, the term denotes 'those persons who, as a result of persecution, armed conflict or violence, have been forced to abandon their homes and leave their usual place of residence, and who remain within the borders of their country'. International obligations towards IDPs are defined by the UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The guide-lines provide an important international framework, but an increase in the protection of IDPs is hampered by the fact that they remain within the borders of their own countries. National governments are therefore responsible for their protection, despite the fact that they are often the cause of internal displacements. The international response to internal displacement remains largely ad hoc and suffers from a lack of political and financial support from UN headquarters and individual states. It remains characterized by lack of planning, failure to address critical protection gaps, inter-agency squabbles and inability to apply lessons learned. Recent experiences in Darfur, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire are illustrative of these failures.

International Centre for Migration Policy Development - see ICMPD 239

A-Z GLOSSARY

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1965; entered into force on 4 January 1969. In this Convention, the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life, www.unhchr.ch

International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) The International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR) is an international nongovernmental organization for the defence of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Created in 1922, it includes 89 national affiliates throughout the world. To date, IFHR has undertaken more than 1,000 missions for investigation, observation of trials, and mediation or training in some 100 countries. IFHR enjoys consultative status with the United Nations, UNESCO and the European Council; and observer status with the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights. Recently it called on the EU to renounce the readmission agreements it has made with third countries such as Morocco, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It does not believe that the human rights of such returnees can be protected, www.hrw.org/

International Organization for Migration (IOM) Established in 1951 as an intergovernmental organization to resettle European displaced persons, refugees and migrants, IOM has now grown to encompass a variety of migration management activities throughout the world; it has offices and operations on every continent. While not part of the United Nations system, IOM maintains close working relations with UN bodies and operational agencies. IOM partners a wide range of international and non-governmental organizations. Four times a year it publishes ajournai, Migration. It gives an update on the Organization's activities and international migration policy issues. Migration is available in English, French and Spanish, www.iom.int

Involuntarily Relocated Persons (IRPs) Persons who are forced to relocate to the country of their citizenship as a result of circumstances threatening their lives, such as armed conflict, internal 240

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disorder, inter-ethnic tension or systematic violations of human rights, and who are in need of assistance to resettle in their countries of citizenship.

Irregular Migration The concept of irregular migration is commonly used to describe a variety of phenomena involving people who enter or remain in a country of which they are not a citizen, in breach of national laws. These include migrants who enter or remain in a country without authorization, those who are smuggled or trafficked across an international border, unsuccessful asylum-seekers who fail to observe a deportation order and people who circumvent immigration controls, for example through the arrangement of bogus marriages or fake adoptions. Other terms used to describe irregular migration are illegal, unauthorized and undocumented migration.

Irregular Secondary Movements Irregular Secondary Movements refer specifically to asylum-seekers and refugees who move in an irregular fashion from a country where they have already applied for asylum or been granted refiigee status. The causes of secondary movements are manifold and include a lack of durable solutions, limited capacity to host refugees and provide effective protection for protracted periods of time, as well as lack of access to legal migration opportunities.

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J Jus Sanguinis Literally meaning right of blood, jus sanguinis makes descent from a family member the primary determinant of citizenship and nationality. It has been applied particularly by states with large diasporas outside the nation state, such as, until 2000, Germany. Less 'famous' examples include Austria, Greece and Switzerland. Outside of Western Europe, the Gulf States and most Asian countries have adopted jus sanguinis as the main mode of citizenship aquisition. Most states practice a mixture of jus sanguinis and jus solis, such as the USA, Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, etc. Even France, until recently the most determined advocate of jus solis, has adopted a mixture with jus sanguinis.

Jus Solis The 'right of the soil', i.e. the place of birth determines citizenship and nationality. Thus children of immigrants born in, for example, France would automatically become French citizens in a strict application of the republican principle. France has now modified this radical stance.

Justice and Home Affairs The EU policy area which generates about 40% of all EU legislation, signalling that migration is now one of the EU's most active policy fields. EU citizens have been ambivalent about EU co-ordination of measures in the migration area and until the early 1990s JHA operated strictly on an intergovernmental basis. Growing migration pressures deepened the need for more co-operation and with the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the three pillar system JHA was given its own, the third pillar (traditional EU business under the first and common foreign and security policies made up the second). The Amsterdam Council moved most of JHA, including asylum, migration and external border controls, to the first pillar. (Judicial co-operation in 243

A-Z GLOSSARY criminal matters and policing remained in the third). However, a basic distrust remains between governments: they have preserved decisions by unanimity instead of the customary qualified majority voting in pillar one matters. More recently, JHA has sought to co-operate with third countries to combat irregular migration. This approach has been dubbed the 'external dimension' of co-operation in JHA. It received its first clear articulation in the conclusions of a European Council in Tampere, Finland, in 1999, which stated that 'justice and home affairs must be integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union policies', especially external relations. JHA ministers have favoured 'repressive measures' as the extension of EU-style control measures to third countries, such as reinforced border control and migration management in countries neighbouring the EU; 'pre-frontier' control, whereby European officials assist with border control in third countries; and co-operation to combat smuggling and trafficking. Particularly prominent has been the drafting of readmission agreements to allow the return of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers to countries of transit or origin, a new Strategy for the External Dimension was adopted in December 2005, which placed emphasis on three thematic priorities: terrorism, organized crime and migration management.

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K Kafala System The Kafala or Khafeel system has been used for the recruitment of temporary foreign labour in GCC countries and, in a modified version, in Israel. The state grants permits to employers, thereby maximizing control by employers and the state over the entire foreign population. Passports of workers are confiscated. There is no right to family reunification or access to social or medical care.

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L Labour Market Segmentation Most prominent in large urban centres (see Global Cities). It is characterized by the creation of so-called '3D' jobs (i.e. those which are dirty, dangerous and difficult), low-status, low-income and low-security service jobs which are unpopular with native labour and which attract a greater percentage of migrants. (See also Diversity.)

Labour Migration The legal migration by individuals to work on the basis of official permits for a specified period of time in a given country, such as the contract workers in the Middle East or Israel. In Europe the Federal Repblic of Germany (West Germany) operated the Gastarbeiter scheme under which workers were recruited according to a two-year rotation principle. After recruitment ceased in the early 1970s, this labour migration turned into permanent immigration.

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M Managed Migration The introduction of a points system in the United Kingdom in 2007. A key objective of the managed migration programme is to attract and encourage migrant entrepreneurs who can start businesses, provide key services and employ more people. The Home Office has, for instance, developed a special visa scheme for migrants who can show proof of a business plan.

MIDA Established by the International Organization for Migration, the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme aims to build partnerships between host countries and countries of origin of migrants, and encourages the return of African professionals on temporary assignments

Migration Controls These lie at the heart of the contemporary migration issue. The seemingly uncontrollable arrival of irregular migrants challenges the right of sovereign states to control who enters their territory, and thus their sovereignty. A range of restrictive measures has therefore been implemented over the years, ranging from visa requirements, sanctions on carriers of potential migrants, rule changes for asylum applications, detention, reductions in or abolition of welfare payments to unwanted migrants and increasingly stringent border controls and involuntary returns. More recently in Europe, the EU has promoted Readmission Agreements with sender countries to facilitate the expulsion of unwanted migrants. It is also putting pressure on, notably, African states, to stop 'illegal emigration', and several African governments have adopted draconian legislation to counter it in exchange for funding. 249

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Migration and Demography The theory that, as populations in the developed world are shrinking, the future of their welfare systems will require substantial immigration. This view gained particular publicity after the publication by the UN Population Division of a report, Replacement Migration: Is It A Solution to a Declining and Aging Population? (2000). Its findings were disputed by experts, particularly in the EU.

Migration 'Hump' After the initial migration through networks, the volume of migration at first rapidly increases before reaching a saturation point.

Migration Industry The complex network of agents, brokers, lawyers, travel and housing providers who facilitate migration from the home country to the migrants' destination. It is increasingly playing a crucial role in the migration process. {See also Trafficking.)

Migration Management An initiative to supplement the emphasis on restrictive migration controls by a more constructive approach. For the potential receiving country, it means transparency, i.e. the public acknowledgement of its needs for immigration (demographic developments, lack of skilled and less skilled labour, etc.) and its humanitarian obligations. It also involves the integration of legal immigrants. When fully implemented, it would result in 'joined-up government', with all departments making an input into migration policies. Internationally it involves regional co-operation (e.g. in the EU) and with the sending countries.

Migration Networks Migrants use the network of families and friends already abroad for help with accommodation, information, and, often, also employment. Networks are thus an important element in the migration process.

Migration Policy Group The Migration Policy Group (MPG) is an independent organization committed to policy development on migration and mobility, and diversity and 250

Millennium Development Goals anti-discrimination by facilitating the exchange between stakeholders from all sectors of society, with the aim of contributing to innovative and effective responses to the challenges posed by migration and diversity. Based in Brussels, www.migpolgroup.com

Migration Policy Institute The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is a non-partisan think tank focusing on migration policy in the USA and globally. Its reports, available at the MPI website, are oriented towards policy analysis and will be especially useful for understanding the issues involved in US immigration reform, www .migrationpolicy.org

Migration Streams In migration research the analyses which assess the migration potential in an area and, on this basis, attempt to predict future migration streams from it. In migration policy three main migration streams are distinguished: family reunification, legal labour migration and asylum-seekers/refugees.

Migration Systems Theory Recent theoretical interest in migration systems calls attention to the functions of diverse linkages between countries in stimulating, directing and maintaining international flows of people

Migration Theory - see Push and Pull Factors; Economics of Migration; Migration Systems Theory Millennium Development Goals The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent a global partnership that has grown from the commitments and targets established at the world summits of the 1990s. Responding to the world's main development challenges and to the calls of civil society, the MDGs promote poverty reduction, education, maternal health and gender equality, and aim at combating child mortality, AIDS and other diseases. The MDGs are an agreed set of goals set for the year 2015. Poor countries have pledged to govern better, and invest in their people through health care and education. Rich countries have pledged to support them, through aid, debt relief, and fairer trade, www.undp.org/mdg 251

A-Z GLOSSARY

Multiculturalism A concept at the heart of contemporary migration, with wide variations of interpretation. In 'settler nations' such as Canada or Australia, which, as former colonies, lack 'national founding myths', it is directed at all members of society, who have all been immigrants at some point. In Europe it is aimed mainly at immigrants and signifies 'integration with retention of cultural identity'. To some observers, multiculturalism replaced assimilation as a way of immigrant integration. However, rising numbers of immigrants and the growing diversity within immigrant communities has led to fragmentation and division rather than integration. Moreover, observers have pointed to the fact that multicultural policies have always been less prevalent than assumed. There are widespread multicultural practices in liberal states which are based on commitments to individual and social rights, such as equality and nondiscrimination. But where multicultural policies were pursued explicitly, these have been reversed recently and replaced by greater emphasis on learning the native language and the values of the receiving society, e.g. in the Netherlands.

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N National Contact Points on Integration The attempt by the EU to develop a more coherent approach to the integration of immigrants is based on regular consultation with national contacts. These discussions resulted in the Commission's 2004 Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners.

Naturalization The act of making a person who was not born with that status a citizen. An application for citizenship is an application for naturalization.

Neighbourhood Policies The EU's neighbourhood policy aims to limit the spillover of ethnic conflict and instability in neighbouring and third countries, which includes limiting large-scale refugee flows. This goal clearly underlay national and EU support for the NATO action in Kosovo, as well as the extensive role of the European Community Humanitarian Office in providing assistance to refugees in the region.

NIROMP New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People (NIROMP). The theory that, as the system of migration controls is not working, a new approach should be tried, namely that of 'regulated openness'. This shuns the principle of exclusion but does not advocate free and unfettered movement of people across sovereign states. {See also GAMP.) 253

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Non-Derogable Rights While most human rights are not absolute and can be limited in their application, some rights are not derogable, i.e. know no limitations or exceptions under any conditions, including the following: the right to life; the right not to be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery and servitude; freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) An organized entity that is functionally independent of, and represent, a government or state. This term is normally applied to tions devoted to humanitarian and human rights causes, many implement their refugee-related programmes in partnership with and other agencies.

does not organizaof which UNHCR

Non-Refoulement A core principle of international refugee law that prohibits states from returning a refugee to countries or territories in which his or her life or freedom may be threatened 'on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion', unless there is a threat to the public safety or security by the refugee's presence in the country to which he or she relocated. The principle of non-refoulement is part of customary international law and is therefore binding on all states, whether or not they are parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention.

Non-State Agents of Persecution People or entities responsible for acts or threats of persecution, which are not under the control of the government, and which may give rise to refugee status if they are facilitated, encouraged, or tolerated by the government, or if the government is unable or unwilling to provide effective protection against them.

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o OAU (Organization of African Unity) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa The regional complement to the 1951 Geneva Convention, whose refugee definition is broader than that provided in the 1951 Convention. Adopted in 1969, in force since 1974, the OAU Convention expands the provisions of the Geneva Convention and provides that 'the term 'refugee' shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge' in another place outside his country of origin or nationality. The OAU is now called the African Union, www. africa-union. org

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Produces annual reports on trends in international migration, with valuable statistics on all aspects of migration, www.oecd.org

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p Pacific Solution The approach by the Australian government to asylum. It persuaded Nauru and Papua New Guinea to permit the establishment of Australian-funded detention centres where asylum-seekers were held pending determination of their status.

Persecution The core concept of persecution was deliberately not defined in the 1951 Geneva Convention, suggesting that the drafters intended it to be interpreted in a sufficiently flexible manner so as to encompass ever-changing forms of persecution. It is understood to comprise human rights abuses or other serious harm, often, but not always, with a systematic or repetitive element.

Persons of Concern to UNHCR A generic term used to describe all persons whose protection and assistance needs are of interest to UNHCR. These include refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention, persons who have been forced to leave their countries as a result of conflict or events seriously disturbing public order, asylumseekers, returnees, stateless persons, and, in some situations, internally displaced persons. UNHCR's authority to act on behalf of persons of concern other than refugees is based on General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions.

PICUM The Platform for International Co-operation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) aims at promoting respect for the human rights of undocumented migrants within Europe, www.picum.org 257

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PNR Passenger Name Record (PNR). Developed by the USA to allow the prescreening of all air travellers to that country. Agreement on exchange of data between the EU and the USA, but recently invalidated by a judgement of the European Court of Justice. Planned to be extended to Canada and Australia

Point System A system practised notably in the old immigration countries such as Canada and Australia which have put in place proactive immigration policies with the aim of attracting particular immigrants whose skills are needed. In countries where labour-market integration is viewed as the key area of integration, such systems, it is argued, will enhance migrants' chances of integration in other social spheres. (See also Managed Migration.)

Political Engagement In countries where migrants have citizenship, they play an important role as activists and potential voters. Often the politics of the sender and the receiving nations become interconnected: Algerian Islamists in France; Turks in Germany. Increasingly also trans-national activities in international non-governmental organizations and in trans-national social movement organizations.

Post-national Membership Rights The theory that a new form of citizenship or membership has emerged in which rights extend across national borders. Accordingly, supranational institutions and global legitimizing discourses have superimposed their authority on that of the nation state, with the effect of rendering national citizenship increasingly irrelevant as a source of rights for migrants.

Principal Migrant Within a family group, the person who is considered by immigration authorities to be the head of the family and upon whose admission that of the other members of the family depends.

Protection Gap While refugees and asylum-seekers (in theory at least) can find protection under international refugee regimes such as the Geneva Convention, this is not the case for the growing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), 258

Push and Pull Factors

i.e. refugees in their country who do not cross international borders {see Internally Displaced Persons; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre). Frequently IDPs are left either without significant humanitarian assistance from their governments and/or are unprotected by their governments. In a number of countries, including Burma (Myanmar), the Central African Republic, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Mexico, Nepal, the Russian Federation (Chechnya), Sudan (Darfiir) and Zimbabwe, governments or occupation forces are directly or indirectly involved in displacing people. Women and children constitute a very large proportion—70%-80%—of all those who are internally displaced.

Push and Pull Factors One of the main models to explain the causes of migration: the 'push' of intolerable conditions in the country of origin on the one hand, and the 'pull' of a better and safer life in the receiving countries on the other. In reality the motives for migration are more complex.

259

Q Quick Impact Projects UNHCR's Quick Impact Projects attempt to address immediate needs in return communities. However, they often do not function as a long-term investment in development. In fact, some critics have suggested that Quick Impact Projects often have a detrimental impact on long-term development.

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R Readmission Treaty Readmission agreements are bilateral agreements between the EU and a nonEU country and are designed to facilitate the expulsion of illegal immigrants and unsuccessful asylum-seekers. To facilitate the readmission of thirdcountry nationals to their country of origin, the EU member states decided in 1994 to use a common specimen agreement as a basis for negotiation when a member state wished to establish this type of relation with a third country. They introduce an obligation on the non-EU country to readmit, without any formalities, its own nationals and people coming from or having lived in that country. In return, non-EU countries would receive funds to take back and resettle these people. Four readmission agreements exist at present, with Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Macao and Albania. Negotiations continue with Morocco, Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine, Algeria, China and Turkey, www.europa.eu.int

Reception Centre A location—often secured—with facilities for receiving, processing and attending to the immediate needs of refugees or asylum-seekers as they arrive in a country of asylum.

Refoulement - see Deportation and Non-refoulement Refugee Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. 263

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Refugee Camp A plot of land temporarily made available to host refugees fleeing from an armed conflict in temporary homes. UN agencies, particularly UNHCR, and other humanitarian organizations provide essential services in refugee camps, including food, sanitation, health, medicine and education. These camps are ideally located at least 50 km away from the nearest international border to deter camp raids and other attacks on their civilian occupants.

Refugee Fund - see European Refugee Fund Refugee Status Determination Procedures Legal and administrative procedures undertaken by UNHCR and/or states to determine whether an individual should be recognized as a refugee in accordance with national and international law.

Refugees Sur Place Persons who were not refugees when they left their countries of origin, but who become refugees at a later date, owing to intervening events. Refugees sur place may owe their fear of persecution to a change in the country of origin, such as through a coup d'état, or to political activities undertaken in the country of refuge. They are given protection for humanitarian reasons and are recognized under UN mandate.

Regional Refugee Instruments International legal documents relating to refugees that are adopted by states or intergovernmental organizations within a geographical region or sub-region. Such instruments normally complement the 1951 Geneva Convention and reflect the peculiar character of refugee issues within the particular geographical area. Notable examples of regional instruments are the OAU Convention of 1969 and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 1984.

Regularizaron The legalization of the status of irregular immigrants. {See also Amnesty.) 264

Returnee

Remittances Flow of resources from migrants back to their home communities The economic/development benefits are disputed as much of the finance is often spent on personal consumption by the receiving families without benefiting the wider community. However, in Africa remittances are often vital for the survival of those left behind. Female migrants are often better at sending remittances. Besides financial resources, migrants can also transfer social capital ('social remittances'), knowledge and skills ('technological remittances') and even political identities and practices ('political remittances'). The total amount of remittances for 2004 was US $ 104,000m.

Repatriation This term is used in connection with individuals returning after having attempted to seek asylum abroad. In principle, this category includes persons who return after their asylum cases have been decided negatively as well as persons who may not have been able to apply for asylum but who stayed abroad under temporary protection for some time. The term also applies to refugees returning under internationally assisted repatriation programmes and those returning spontaneously. {See also Return.)

Replacement Population The population that is necessary to offset declines in the general population, the population of working age, as well as to make up for the ageing of a population.

Resettlement The transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another state that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized citizens. For this reason, resettlement is a durable solution as well as a tool for the protection of refugees.

Returnee Returnees are refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are able to return to their original places of residence. Compared to the total number of refugees, asylum-seekers/recipients and IDPs, only a 265

A-Z GLOSSARY small percentage are ever able to return to their homes, and if they do so, their return takes place several years after their original departure.

Return The return of internally displaced persons, refugees and asylum-seekers has become a major preoccupation for UNHCR, its supporting governments and the EU. Post-conflict return is a highly politically-charged process in a number of contexts, both for returnees and those who did not migrate or flee, leading many observers to question the notion of an unproblematic return 'home'. Specifically, there are doubts both about the conditions and voluntariness of return and the ability of individual returnees to reintegrate in their home countries and regions. The absence of adequate infrastructure, social services, land and natural resources often poses a challenge to the sustainability of returns. The arrival of large numbers of returnees can reduce residents' access to already meagre natural resources and public services, and create communal tension. The resulting impoverishment often hinders the establishment of law and order. A crucial aspect of making returns sustainable is creating or reviving accountable governance institutions that represent all members of society on an equitable basis. According to current thinking amongst humanitarian practitioners, sustainable return requires a co-ordinated transition from humanitarian assistance to long-term development that benefits not only returnees but also other community members in return areas.

Return Migration Return migration has become an important part of contemporary migration and can involve repeated, relatively short periods abroad, followed by returns. The evidence of this migration pattern is often used in favour of more relaxed border controls.

Rotation Principle A system of temporary labour recruitment practised in West Germany after the Second World War. Workers were recruited on short-term contracts (often no longer than two years) at the end of which they had to return home to be replaced by new recruits. The system was designed to prevent immigration and integration. Workers came without their families. Working conditions were often poor. The system also proved unworkable for employers who lost valuable trained labour after a relatively short period. {See also Guestworkers.) 266

RSD

RSD Refugee Status Determination, carried out by UNHCR in dozens of countries. In 2004 it dealt with 70,000 cases. There is no formal scrutiny or appeal against decisions. (See www.RSDWatch.org.)

267

s Safe Areas/Safety Zones/Safe Havens Areas, zones, or locations established within the country where the conflict takes place to protect civilians during a time of conflict. The terms and conditions of establishing safety zones are governed by the law of armed conflict. The real level of protection is often questionable. It is favoured by Western governments as it reduces the number of potential refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing the country.

Safe Country of Origin Rule Introduced in the EU with the Maastricht Treaty as a means to limit the number of asylum-seekers. It has since been implemented by all EU member states. The EU draws up annual lists of countries where conditions are deemed to be 'safe'. Asylum-seekers from these countries have their claims rejected as 'manifestly unfounded' without any consideration of their individual case. Appeals are not possible. Asylum-seekers therefore often disguise their country of origin, making eventual deportation difficult.

Safe Third Country Rule Introduced EU-wide simultaneously with the Safe Country of Origin Rule. It applies where asylum-seekers have passed through another country which has signed the Geneva Convention and is therefore deemed to be safe. Asylum-seekers in this category find their claims rejected as 'manifestly unfounded' without consideration of their individual case. Appeals are not possible. Asylum-seekers trying to reach the EU by land will have passed through a 'safe third country' and are therefore not able to apply for asylum in the EU. This rule is therefore part of the efforts by EU member states to reduce the number of asylum-seekers and thus of their migration control system. 269

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Schengen Agreement The agreement between the founder members of the European Communities signed in 1985 to remove the borders between them. Italy joined in 1990 and, with the exception of the United Kingdom, all EU members have joined the Schengen area. The Schengen acquis was incorporated into the EU with the Treaty of Amsterdam {see Amsterdam Treaty). The long period between the original agreement and its implementation by member states in 1995 (the five original Schengen members plus Portugal and Spain), 1997 (Italy and Austria), 2000 (Greece) and 2001 (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) indicates the tensions among member states. This applied particularly to those members whose external borders would be difficult to control, such as Italy and Greece.

Security With the increase in the number of migrants arriving in industrialized countries and the rise of terrorism came the perception of migration as a potential security risk, i.e. the 'securitization' of migration. According to this view, migrants can be seen to pose political, economic and societal security risks; they can endanger the health of the receiving country or even its cultural identity.

Segmentation of Labour Market Certain sectors of the labour market are eschewed by native workers because they are low paying, have little security and are low status, and thus have become dominated by migrant workers. These are often described as '3D' jobs, entailing work that is dirty, dangerous or difficult. They are concentrated in sectors such as agriculture, timber, plantations, heavy industry, construction and domestic services. Often the migrants who work in these sectors are undocumented or have irregular status, for they more than others are willing to work for very low wages and in insecure conditions.

Settlement Permission to stay permanently in a country.

Seville Council 2002 The deliberations and conclusion of the Seville Council 2002 reflect the extent to which, in the wake of 9/11, irregular migration had moved to the 270

SIS II centre of the political agenda in all EU member states. The emphasis now was on the control of illegal migration, a move away from the 'rule of law' at the centre of the EU, as expressed at the Tampere Council.

Sex Trade Young women and girls, often from underprivileged backgrounds, are lured abroad by the promise of well-paid employment and are trafficked into the sex establishments of the Western world where they are held in conditions of servitude and exploitation. (See also Trafficking.)

SIS The Schengen Information System (SIS) originated in the mid-1980s as a means to compensate for the removal of internal borders between France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Those countries' police, intelligence, immigration and customs services exchanged information about individuals to be refused admission, i.e. immigration offenders or security risks, people wanted for arrest, extradition or to testify in court, fugitives, persons to be placed under surveillance; and stolen objects (vehicles, works of art, identity documents, etc.). By March 2003, and now under the auspices of the EU, the SIS covered 13 of the 15 EU member states, plus Norway and Iceland, which together had created records on 877,655 people, a further 386,402 aliases, and more than 15m. objects. EU officials estimate that there are 125,000 access terminals to the SIS.

SIS II The Schengen Information System II will allow the United Kingdom and Ireland and the 10 accession states to participate in the SIS. A host of new functions are planned. These include the addition of biométrie identification data (photographs and fingerprints); new categories of'terrorist suspects' and 'violent troublemakers' (who are to be banned from travelling to demonstrations or football matches); and the linking of individual records. A second database (see Visa Information System) is to share a technical platform with SIS II. Under finalized proposals, access to the SIS is to be extended to Europol, Eurojust, national prosecutors and vehicle licensing authorities. SIS II is scheduled to be operational by 2007. (See www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/ leg for information from the EU; see www.statewatch.org for an assessment from a civil rights perspective.) 271

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Smuggling 'The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state Party of which the person in not a national or a permanent resident.' (UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 2000, Article 3.)

Social Networks The network of family, friends and contacts which enable a migrant to settle relatively easily in the country of immigration while maintaining contacts with home.

Social Rights Despite the exclusionary rhetoric of politicians, the courts and officials in Western countries have extended the social rights of migrants, such as welfare and non-discrimination based on international conventions.

Statewatch A pressure group to observe states' policies and practices and their compatibility with international and national norms. Also reports on the EU. http:// www.statewatch.org/asylum/obserasylum.htm

Supply-driven Migration Supply-driven migration may refer to humanitarian migration, such as family reunion, asylum-seekers and refugees and illegal migrants. Unlike demandbased economic migration, it cannot be controlled and regulated by traditional national laws of the immigration country.

272

T Tampere Programme The first special European Council meeting (held on 15-16 October 1999 in Tampere, Finland) to determine the parameters of the 'area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union'. The Council stressed the shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law. It committed the EU to respect the 'full and inclusive application' of the Geneva Convention. The central place of rule of law at the heart of EU common values was an important signal in 1999 that the political leadership demanded that action in this field move into proper legislative channels and out of the shadow world of intergovernmental quasi agreements and operational co-operation without clear, or indeed any, legal basis. The programme adopted at Tampere for the following five years was to focus on a Common European Asylum System; the fair treatment of thirdcountry nationals; the management of migration flows; better access to justice in Europe; the mutual recognition of judicial decisions; greater convergence in civil law; preventing crime at the level of the Union; the stepping up of co-operation against crime; special action against money-laundering; and stronger external action. The five-year programme finished on 1 May 2004 after which there has been a consultation period towards the second fiveyear programme, which has resulted in the Hague Programme. (See also Amsterdam Treaty.)

Temporary Migration Much of contemporary migration is temporary, for business purposes, by students, for training, by tourists or for temporary work both by legal and irregular means. Experts believe that the improved availability of temporary work both for the skilled and less skilled may relieve the pressures of irregular migration. As temporary workers would not integrate into the 273

A-Z GLOSSARY host society, this would alleviate some of the societal pressures associated with migration.

Temporary Protection An arrangement developed by states to offer protection of a temporary nature to persons arriving en masse from situations of conflict or generalized violence, without prior individual status determination.

Third-country Nationals Legally resident foreigners in a country, or 'denizens'. Their rights have been widely discussed in the EU because their status in the country of residence does not automatically transfer to other EU member states. In the EU in particular, these migrants face two types of limitation compared to EU nationals. First, they lack the right to work in other EU countries (other than the one in which they reside), and, second, they often lack political rights in their country of residence. Although a number of EU countries now grant legally resident non-nationals local voting rights and socio-economic rights (and, in the case of EU nationals, the right to vote in EU elections also), the rights of third-country nationals vary depending on the grounds, legality and duration of their stay. Securing the legal status of TCNs has been a major concern for the EU, given the different legal systems in place in member states concerning naturalization. Further problems arise when third-country nationals are reluctant to naturalize owing to the negative effects this may have in their country of origin. A proposed solution has been to facilitate dual nationality for migrants and third-country nationals. Currently, eight of the 'old' EU countries accept dual nationality (Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom), whereas four (Austria, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg) do not. Three (Germany the Netherlands and Spain) do not accept dual nationality in principle, but offer a number of exemptions. In comparison, Canada and the USA accept dual nationality, whereas Australia has only recently (2002) made the option available.

Trafficking According to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, people-trafficking is 'the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits 274

Trans-national Rights to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation. {See also Smuggling.) http://fmo.qeh.ox.ac.uk/fmo, with links to further information, campaigns and legislation.

Trans-nationalism The multiple ties and sustained, regular interactions linking immigrants and their children with their home countries across geographic, cultural and political boundaries. The steep rise in numbers, easier communications and global media have resulted in the emergence of new social structures which are producing a new consciousness (dual or multiple identifications). Frequently co-existing with different levels of assimilation.

Trans-national Identities Migrants often form their identity as part of the resident society into which they immigrated, without giving up the identity of their country of origin. These 'multiple identities' are accepted in some receiving states in the form of dual nationality. The country of origin has a vested interest in keeping alive the migrants' links with their home country, particularly with remittances in mind. Often this is reinforced by law when migrants would lose out on inheritance if they gave up their original nationality (e.g. Turkey).

Trans-national Rights The emergence of international conventions protecting migrants and refugees independent of nation states. To some observers, they pose a challenge to national sovereignty. However, these conventions need to be adopted and implemented by national governments. Observers therefore think that their limitation of national autonomy has been exaggerated. {See also Geneva Convention; Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and their Families (1990).)

275

u UN Migrants Rights Convention 1990 -see Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and their Families (1990) UNHCR The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established in 1951. It is mandated and financed by governments to provide protection to the worlds' refugees. Amongst its activities, it decides who is entitled to protection and runs refiigee camps. These take place on a massive scale and affect the lives of millions: UNHCR single-handedly conducts refugee status determination in 80 countries world-wide and during 2004 it had at least 75,000 asylum applications to deal with, making it the largest single status determination body in the world. In 2002 the total number of people in camps administered by UNHCR was well over 4m., with UNHCR exercising or superintending many administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial powers in these camps. Its work has helped millions. But its role is ambiguous in that it is dependent on the support of governments whose priorities nowadays are the reduction of refugee numbers. This partly explains UNHCR's emphasis on the return of refugees to their countries of origin wherever possible (see Return). The enormity of UNHCR's task has also led to claims of institutional 'overstretch'. During refiigee status determination, appeal rights and other elements of due process are often limited, and in UNHCR camps, numerous violations of the human rights of refugees have occurred. UNHCR's accountability is being investigated in order to limit the negative aspects of its work, www.unhcr.ch

United Nations Commission on Human Rights The UN human rights monitoring body established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. An intergovernmental body composed 277

A-Z GLOSSARY of 53 state representatives, with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights functioning as its secretariat. The Commission is responsible for co-ordinating the human rights activities of the UN and is the main forum for dealing with human rights violations. Since the Commission generally meets only once a year, most of its work is conducted through 'mechanisms' (either an individual, called a rapporteur, or a working group) which deal with a specific theme or country, www.unhchr.ch

United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) Commission consisting of 45 members, with the broad mandate of promoting the advancement of women and gender equality. The UN Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) functions as its secretariat. It meets annually for two weeks, and works on reports, studies, and recommendations on a diverse range of women's human rights issues. A special Communications Working Group of the Commission also reviews, in confidence, accusations relating to violation of women's rights, www.un.org/womenwatch

United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) The common strategic framework for UN operational activities at the country level that provides a collective, coherent and integrated response to national priorities and needs, www.un.org.in/undaf

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Established in 1993, this official (appointed by the General Assembly) is responsible for co-ordinating human rights activities throughout the entire UN system, and has overall responsibility for the activities of the UN Centre for Human Rights. This broad mandate enables the Commissioner to be actively engaged in addressing almost any human rights issue/violation around the globe. He or she has the role of promoting respect for human rights, co-ordinating and rationalizing the UN human rights programme, rendering UN human rights machinery more effective, and preventing human rights violations, www.ohchr.org 278

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) A relief and human development agency, providing education, health care, social services and emergency aid to more than 4m. refugees living in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, www.un. org/unrwa

279

V Visa Controls One of the ways to control legal migration. Prior to departure, the prospective migrant applies for permission to enter a specific country for a certain purpose by submitting a visa application in the country of origin to the representation of the destination country. A lengthy and, often, also costly process for the migrants which allows the authorities of the destination country to check migrants' personal details and to deny them access in case of concerns of any kind.

Visa Information System (VIS) Database which will contain the extensive personal information supplied by people from around the world in an estimated 20m. visa applications to the EU member states every year. Like SIS II, VIS will contain biométrie identification data.

Voluntary Repatriation Return to the country of origin based on the refugee's free and informed decision. Voluntary repatriation may be organized (i.e. when it takes place under the auspices of the concerned governments and UNHCR), or spontaneous (i.e. refugees return by their own means, with UNHCR and governments having little or no direct involvement in the process of return).

281

w Welfare The entitlement to welfare and questions of exclusion and inclusion in Western welfare states lie at the centre of the modern migration dilemma. On the one hand, economic (i.e. wanted) migrants are entitled to full social rights and benefits. On the other, asylum-seekers (i.e. unwanted migrants) in many countries are partially or completely excluded from welfare benefits which thus are used as a deterrent and become part of migration controls. The issue of welfare for immigrants is part of the wider re-assessment of the future of the welfare state in liberal democracies at a time of diminishing resources.

Work Permits The issuing by administrative authorities of permits to employers to 'import' foreign workers for limited periods of time to fill a specific job. They can also be issued directly to foreign workers for whom they will bring limited resident rights, depending on the regulations of the particular state.

283

Statistics

Africa Eastern Africa Burundi Comoros Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mauritius c/ Mozambique Réunion Rwanda Seychelles Somalia Uganda United Republic of Tanzania

World More developed regions Less developed iregions Least developed countries

Country, Territory or Area

International Migration

0 250 602

50

1

4

18 4 116 240

3,023 1,515 49

1.9 1.6 1.3 8.4 2.6 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.3 2.2 1.7 2.1 18.1 1.3 6.1 3.4 1.8 2.1

17,069 4,516 100 67 20 15 555 345 63 279 21 406 142 121 5 282 518 792

905,936 287,707 7,548 798 793 4,401 77,431 34,256 18,606 12,884 1,245 19,792 785 9,038 81 8,228 28,816 38,329 B B I I B B C B B B B B B I B B

13,469 2,701 10,768 2,405

2.9 9.5 1.4 1.4

2004

2000-2005

-455 -41 38 -2 -2 56 -30 -M 0 -A 0 -4 1 9 0 34 -3 -69

0 2,622 -2,622 209

Remittances

-0.5 -0.2 5.5 -2.7 -2.6 14.1 -0.4 -1.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 1.325 1.055 0.0 4.5 -0.1 -1.9

0.0 2.2 -0.5 0.3

291 7

7 2

46 494 16 1 215 58

12

19,155

225,810 80,803 145,007

2004

4 0

0 0

1 3 0 0 3 1

4

2

1 0 2

Total b/ Rate per (Millions Percentage of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands) (thousands)

190,634 115,397 75,237 10,460

2005

Letter Code

6,464,750 1,211,265 5,253,484 759,389

2005

Population Number (thousands) (thousands)

Total

Migrant stock

Statistics

287

288 1,791 56 137 76 437 288 539 6 245 7

109,641 15,941 16,322 4,038 9,749 3,999 57,549 504 1,384 157

190,895 32,854 74,033 5,853 31,478 36,233 10,102 341 54,055 1,765

Central Africa Angola Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo Congo, Dem. Rep. Equatorial Guinea Gabon São Tomé and Príncipe

Northern Africa Algeria Egypt Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Morocco Sudan Tunisia Western Sahara

Southern Africa Botswana 1,381 80

1,838 242 166 618 132 639 38 3

275 511

2005

Total Population Number (thousands) (thousands)

11,668 13,010

Zambia Zimbabwe

contd Country, Territory or Area

C

C B C C B C I

B B C B B BC C C C

B B

2005

Letter Code

2.6 4.5

1.0 0.7 0.2 10.5 0.4 1.8 0.4 1.0

1.6 0.4 0.8 1.9 4.5 7.2 0.9 1.2 17.7 4.8

2.4 3.9

46 3

415 169 90 12 2 142 0

14

639 14 59 25 260 69 199

174 7

2004

2000- 2005

-1 -1

-294 -20 -90 2 -80 -104 -4 2

6 29 3 -9 54 -3 -64 0 -3 0

-13 -10

Remittances

0.0 -0.7

-1.6 -0.6 -1.3 0.4 -2.6 -3.0 -0.4 6.2

0.1 1.9 0.2 -2.3 6.0 -0.8 -1.2 0.0 -2.3 -2.7

-1.2 -0.8

0 1

27

2,460 3,341 8 4,218 1,403 1,432

6 1

0 11

2004

0

3 4 0 8 7 5

0 1

Total b/ (Millions Percentage Rate per of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands) (thousands)

Migrant stock

STATISTICS

7,543 175 773 11 2,371 232 1,669 406 19 50 46 66 124 971 1 326 119 183

263,636 8,439 13,228 507 18,154 1,517 22,113 9,402 1,586 3,283 13,518 3,069 13,957 131,530 5 11,658 5,525 6,145

Western Africa Benin Burkina Faso Cape Verde Côte d'Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Saint Helena d/ Senegal Sierra Leone Togo C B B CB B B C B B C C B C B B C B

C B B B

6 143 1,106 45

1,795 2,031 47,432 1,032

Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland

Letter Code 2005

Total Population Number (thousands) (thousands) 2005

contd Country, Territory or Area

2.9 2.1 5.8 2.2 13.1 15.3 7.5 4.3 1.2 1.5 0.3 2.1 0.9 0.7 24.8 2.8 2.2 3.0

0.3 7.1 2.3 4.4

21 65 11

72 7 42 139 8 15 11 0 0 8

407 5 0

15 28 1

2004 2000-2005

-125 20 20 -1 -74 6 2 -60 0 -A9 -27 6 -2 -34 0 -20 88 -1

-7 -1 10 -1

Remittances

-0.5 2.5 1.6 -2.1 -4.3 4.4 0.1 -6.7 0.2 -15.4 -2.1 2.1 -0.2 -0.3 -14.9 -1.8 17.5 -0.1

-4.0 -1 0.2 -1.2

7 2 7

3 0 1 4

154 2 25 2,751 511 26 149

2 1 10 1 2 1 1 8

26 0 0 3

84 50 92 148 8 82 42 23

355 13 521 62

2004

Total b/ Rate per (Millions Percentage of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands) (thousands)

Migrant stock

Statistics

289

290

3,905,415 1,524,380 1,315,844 7,041 460 22,488 128,085 2,646 47,817

1,610,896 29,863 141,822 2,163 1,103,371 69,515 14,825 5,264 329 27,133 157,935 20,743 6,507 4,833 26,593

South-Central Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Iran (Islamic Republic of) Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

2005

17,776 43 1,032 10 5,700 1,959 2,502 288 3 819 3,254 368 306 224 1,268

53,291 6,497 596 2,999 257 37 2,048 9 551

Total Number Population (thousands) (thousands)

Asia Eastern Asia China e/ China, Hong Kong SAR China, Macao SAR Korea, Dem. People'sï Rep. Japan Mongolia Korea, Rep.

contd Country, Territory or Area

I B I B B B B I B B C B B B

I B B I C C B

2005

Letter Code

1.1 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.5 2.8 16.9 5.5 1.0 3.0 2.1 1.8 4.7 4.6 4.8

1.4 0.4 0.0 42.6 55.9 0.2 1.6 0.3 1.2

125 961 0 3 13 44

163 1,046 16 4

2,395 0 20

0

2

7,704 303 299 2

2004 2000-2005

-878 428 -70 0 -280 -276 -120 -15 0 -20 -362 -32 -69 -2 -60

-1,297 -300 -390 60 2 0 54 -10 -16

Remittances

-0.6 16.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 ^1.1 -8.0 -2.9 0.0 -0.8 -2.4 -1.6 -10.9 -0.4 -2.3

-0.3 -0.2 -0.3 8.8 4.4 0.0 0.4 -3.9 -0.3

5 3 1 0 9 0 12 4 8 13

3,372 21,727 1,032 167 189 3 785 3,945 1,564 252

0 4 0

1 0 21,283 240

931 56 832

1 85,854

2004

Total b/ (Millions ]Percentage Rate per of GDP 1,00C)pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of ' population (thousands) (thousands)

Migrant stock

STATISTICS

5,664 124 304 6 160 25 1,639 117 374 1,843 1,050 21 23,355 235 182 295 116 191 28 2,661 2,225 1,669 657 1,680

555,815 374 14,071 947 222,781 5,924 25,347 50,519 83,054 4,326 64,233 84,238

214,323 3,016 8,411 727 835 4,474 28,807 6,725 5,703 2,687 3,577 3,702

Western Asia Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Cyprus Georgia Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Occupied Palestinian Territory

2005

Total Number Population (thousands) (thousands)

South-Eastern Asia Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Dem. Rep. of Timor-Leste Indonesia Lao People's Dem. Republic Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam

contd Country, Territory or Area

B B C B B C B C C B B

B C I C C B C C B C C

2005

Letter Code

10.9 7.8 2.2 40.7 13.9 4.3 0.1 39.6 39.0 62.1 18.4 45.4

1.0 33.2 2.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 6.5 0.2 0.5 42.6 1.6 0.0

1 3 46 1 1,778 2 401 1,635

4,856 235 9

0 0 121 2

25

0 0 0

149

2004 2000-2005

213 -20 -20 0 6 -50 48 32 20 48 -7 -8

-333 1 -2 16 -200 -1 30 14 -180 40 -10 -40

Remittances

1.0 -6.6 -2.4 0.0 7.1 -10.8 1.8 4.9 3.7 19.5 -2.0 -2.3

-0.6 2.0 -0.1 19.2 -0.9 -0.2 1.2 0.3 -2.3 9.6 -0.2 -0.5

1 7 1,622 3,200

2 6 0 21 14 20

242 303 398 2,287 2,700 692

9 3

1 0 1 1 13

1,700 1 987 78 11,634

336 228

3

138

2004

Total b/ (Millions Percentage Rate per of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands) (thousands)

Migrant stock

Statistics

291

292 95,792 149 5,431 1,330

728,389 297,328 9,755 7,726 10,220 10,098 38,530 4,206 21,711 143,202 5,401 46,481

Europe Eastern Europe Belarus Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Republic of Moldova Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Ukraine

Northern Europe Channel Islands Denmark Estonia

2,567 813 24,573 19,043 73,193 4,496 20,975

2005

8,950 68 389 202

64,116 22,378 1,191 104 453 316 703 440 133 12,080 124 6,833

628 637 6,361 985 1,328 3,212 265

Total Number Population (thousands) (thousands)

Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syrian Arab Republic Turkey United Arab Emirates Yemen

conta Country, Territory or Area

B B B

B B B B B B B B B B

B C C

C

c c c

2005

Letter Code

9.3 45.8 7.2 15.2

8.8 7.5 12.2 1.3 4.4 3.1 1.8 10.5 0.6 8.4 2.3 14.7

24.4 78.3 25.9 5.2 1.8 71.4 1.3

65 0

491

2,068 23 1 5 1 8 3 0 2 2 0 2

0 0 241 437 3 0 66

2004 2000-2005

232 1 12 -2

1,083 -105 -2 -10 10 10 -16 -8 -30 80 1 -140

-32 30 50 -6 -50 192 -20

Remittances

2.4 3.4 2 -1.5

1.5 -0.3 -0.2 -1 1.0 1.0 -0.4 -1.9 -1.4 0.6 0.2 -2.9

-12.8 42.3 2.2 -0.3 -0.7 49.6 -1.0

941 164

0 1

1 0 0 0 1 27 0 0 1 1

244 103 454 307 2,709 703 132 2,668 425 411

10 1,283

1

3 0 803 804

72,958

0 40

2004

Total b/ Rate per (Millions Percentage of GDP 1,00CIpop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands) (thousands)

Migrant stock

STATISTICS

Total

47 5,249 295 4,148 77 2,307 3,431 4,620 9,041 59,668

149,389 3,130 67 3,907 4,551 28 11,120 1 58,093 402 10,495 28 10,503 1,967

Southern Europe Albania Andorra Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Gibraltar Greece Holy See il Italy Malta Portugal San Marino Serbia and Montenegro Slovenia

2005

11 764 9 512 167

2,519

83 52 41 661 7 974 1

10,713

1,117 5,408

5 156 23 585 37 449 165 344

Population Number (thousands) (thousands)

Faeroe Islands Finland Iceland Ireland Isle of Man Latvia Lithuania Norway Sweden United Kingdom

contd Country, Territory or Area

C C I B B C I B C B B B B

B B B B B B B B B B

2005

Letter Code

4.9 8.5

33.5

4.3 2.7 7.3

277 0

16 2 0

2 8.8 100.0

14.5 26.4

22 4

330 0

0 0 44 73 289

11 0 7

1.0

77.9

7.2 2.6

9.1

12.4

4.8 7.4

14.1 48.3 19.5

3.0 7.8

11.4

2004

2000-2005

4.1 -6.5 0.0 2.1 4 0.0 3 11.5 2.1 2.8 4.8 7.3 -2 1

2

2.6 3.5 2.3

-1.0 -1.2

0 1.6 1.2 9.8 0

600 -20 0 8 20 0 36 0 120 1 50 0 -20

0 8 0 39 0 -2 -A 12 31 137

Remittances

267

4,129

2,172 16 3,212

1,242

1,824 1,222

889

6,350

229 308 392 578

672 112 358

2004

1

18

0 0 2

1

23 4

11

2 1 0 0 0

0 1 0

Total b/ Rate per (Millions Percentage of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands) (thousands)

Migrant stock

Statistics

293

294

561,346 39,129 12 81 99 323 270 22 45 11,269 79 6,631 1,149 5 18 24 32 26 8 16 74 5 B B B B B B B B B

1.2 2.9 41.8 22.4 24.6 9.8 9.7 38.3 35.8 0.7 5.7

1

36 1

127 48

1,224 18 14 140 877 0 2

Latin America and the Caribbean Caribbean Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda Aruba Bahamas Barbados British Virgin Islands Cayman Islands Cuba Dominica

22,075 1,234 719 6,471 10,144 12 174 25 1,638 1,660 11.9 15.1 6.9 10.7 12.3 33.9 37.4 69.9 10.1 22.9

185,879 8,189 10,419 60,496 82,689 35 465 35 16,299 7,252

Western Europe Austria Belgium France Germany Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Netherlands Switzerland B C B C C C B B B

6 1

11.1 6.0

B B

4,790 121

43,064 2,034

Spain TFYR Macedonia g/

2000-2005

-804 -109 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 -32 -1

356 20 13 60 220 0 4 0 30 8

405 -2

Remittances

-1.5 -2.8 2 0.0 5 1.3 -1 0 16.525 -2.9 -9.4

2 2 1.3 1.002 2.7 6 8.7 10.5 1.9 1.1

10 -1.0

0 0

1,522 1,760

1

4 113

4

2 1

11 16

2

3 951

40,770

1 2 1 0

1 3

2,475 6,840 12,650 6,497

6,859 171

2004

Total b/ Rate per (Millions Percentage 1,000 pop. of US dollars) of GDP

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands ) (thousands) 200 4

Letter Code 2005

Total Number Population (thousands) (thousands) 2005

contd Country, Territory or Area

Migrant stock

STATISTICS

Central America Belize Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama

Dominican Republic Grenada Guadeloupe Haiti Jamaica Martinique Montserrat Netherlands Antilles Puerto Rico Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and Grenadines Trinidad and Tobago Turks and Caicos Islands United States Virgin Islands

contd Country, Territory or Area

B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B

B B B B B B B B

156 11 93 30 18 65 0 48 418 4 9 10 38 3 37 1,359 41 441 24 53 26 644 28 102

147,029 270 4,327 6,881 12,599 7,205 107,029 5,487 3,232

2005

Letter Code

8,895 103 448 8,528 2,651 396 5 183 3,955 43 161 119 1,305 26 112

2005

Population Number (thousands) (thousands)

Total

0.9 15.0 10.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 3.2

1.8 10.5 20.8 0.4 0.7 16.3 2.5 26.5 10.6 10.4 5.4 8.7 2.9 11.9 32.7 18 1 10 0 1 0 4 0 2

2004

2000-2005

-475 0 17 -8 -60 -6 -400 -20 2

-28 -1 -1 -21 -20 -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -4 1 -1

Remittances

-3.4 -0.8 4.1 -1.2 -5.0 -0.9 -3.9 -3.8 0.5

-3.3 -11.7 -1.6 -2.6 -7.6 -2.0 14.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -3.8 -8.5 -3.1 43.8 -7.2

0 1 1 1 1

5 4 4 3 79

2 2 16 10 15 3 12 1

22 16

876 1,398

21 320 2,564 2,591 1,142 18,143 519 127

10 6

2,471 23

2004

Total b/ Rate per (Millions Percentage of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands) (thousands)

Migrant stock

Statistics

295

296

375,187 38,747 9,182 186,405 16,295 45,600 13,228 3 187 751 6,158 27,968 449 3,463 26,749

330,608 64 32,268 57 6 298,213 33,056 24,184

North America Bermuda Canada Greenland Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon United States of America

Oceania Australia/New Zealand

2005

5,034 4,739

44,493 19 6,106 12 1 38,355

4,123 1,500 116 641 231 123 114 2 84 1 168 42 5 84 1,010

Total Number Population (thousands) (thousands)

South America Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Falkland Islands (Malvinas) French Guiana Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela

contd Country, Territory or Area

B B B B B

B B B B B B B B B B B C B B

2005

Letter Code

15.2 19.6

13.5 29.3 18.9 21.5 23.3 12.9

1.1 3.9 1.3 0.3 1.4 0.3 0.9 70.2 44.9 0.1 2.7 0.1 1.2 2.4 3.8

76 69

421

141

562

0 1 0 0 0

17 3 1 3 1 0 8

2004 2000-2005

103 116

1,370 0 210 0 0 1,160

-219 -20 -20 -26 6 ^10 -50 0 1 -8 -5 -60 -3 -2 8

Remittances

3 5

4.2 0.0 6.7 -3 -15 4

-0.6 -1 -2 -0.1 0.4 -0.9 -3.9 -2.1 4.6 -10.7 -0.9 -2.2 -7.2 -0.6 0.3

4,035

1

0

8 4 2 1 0 0

64 260 1,123 9 32 20

3,038

0 2 1 0 3 5 288 158 3,575 13 3,190 1,604

2004

Total b/ (Millions Percentage Rate per of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Percentage refugees a/ Number of population (thousands) (thousands)

Migrant stock

STATISTICS

70 20 3 34 0 0

655.532 64.869 17.954 256.603 1.445 0.067

Polynesia American Samoa Cook Islands French Polynesia Niue Pitcairn i/ B B B B I

B B B B C B B

134 113 3 2 4 5 5 3

556 170 99.35 61.963 110.487 13.635 80.801 19.949

Micronesia Guam Kiribati Marshall Islands Micronesia (Federated States of) Nauru Northern Mariana Islands Palau 10.7 31.4 17 13.1 7.6 9

24.2 66.9 2.6 2.7 3.2 36.1 6.5 15.2 0

0

8

8

1.2 2.0 18.2 0.4 0.7 0.5

B B C B B

90 17 43 25 3 1

63 5

20.3 15.9

7,661 848 237 5,887 478 211

Melanesia Fiji New Caledonia Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Vanuatu

Australia h/ New Zealand

B B

2004 2000-2005

-4.4186 0 -0.4 0.5256 -0.0514 0

-1 0 -0.2 0 -2 0.112 1.2 0

-7 -7 1 0 0 -1

100 16

Remittances

-6.936 0 -21.749 2.133 -33.65 0

-2 0 -2.117 0 -18.384 8.672 15.943 0

-1 -8.4 5 0 0.0 -6

5.099 4.0

7

6 2 9

24

2,744 1,132

2004

8.860759

0 1 3

1

0 1

Total b/ Rate per (Millions Percentage of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

Net migration (average annual)

Number of Number Percentage refugees a/ of population (thousands) (thousands)

2005

Letter Code

4,097 642

2005

Total Number Population (thousands) (thousands)

20,155 4,028

contd Country, Territory or Area

Migrant stock

Statistics

297

298

184.984 1.378 102.311 10.441 15.48

2005 9 0 1 0 2

Total Population Number (thousands) (thousands)

B B B C B

2005

Letter Code

5 12.5 1.1 3.1 13.4

2004 -2.8 -0.0236 -1.4292 -0.1 -0.14

Remittances

-15.45 -17.003 -14.115 -9.696 -9.191

12.43094 33.50254

45 66

2004

Total b/ (Millions Percentage Rate per of GDP 1,000 pop. of US dollars)

2000-2005

Number of Number Percentage refugees a/ of population (thousands) (thousands)

Net migration (average annual)

The less developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan) and Latin America and the Caribbean and the regions of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. The least developed countries as defined by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2003, include 50 countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. a/ Data refer to end of year; zero indicates that there are less than 500 refugees. b/ Credits only; Remittances include workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers. Regional aggregations have been prepared by the United Nations Population Division. c/ Including Agalega, Rodrigues and Saint Brandon. d/ Including Ascension and Tristan da Cunha. e/ For statistical purposes, the data for China do not include Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of China. il Referring to the Vatican City State. g/ The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. h/ Including Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Norfolk Island. i/ The population of Pitcairn was 67 persons in 2005. Sources and Definitions: Total Population: The total mid-year de facto population. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables, Sales No.E.05.XIII.5. Data available online at: http://www.unpopulation.org.

Samoa Tokelau Tonga Tuvalu Wallis and Futuna Islands

contd Country, Territory or Area

Migrant stock

STATISTICS

Migrant stock: Number: The mid-year estimate of the number of people who are bom outside the country. For countries lacking data on place of birth, the mid-year estimate of the number of non-citizens. In either case, the migrant stock includes refugees, some of whom may not be foreign-bom. The letter code indicates the type of data underlying the estimates: B (Birth place): indicates the data refer to the foreign-bom; C (Citizenship): indicates the data refer to non-citizens; I (Imputed): indicates no data were available and estimated by a model. Percentage of population: The migrant stock as a percentage of the total population. Source: A5. Data available online at: http://www.unpopulation.org Number of Refugees: Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, or under the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those granted refugee status in accordance with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Statute; and those granted humanitarian status or temporary protection by the State in which they find themselves. Also included are Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency (UNRWA). Sources: UNHCR, 2004 Global Refugee Trends: Overview of refugee populations, new arrivals, durable solutions, asylum seekers and other persons of concern to UNHCR. Figures as of 31 December 2004. Data available online as of 30 September 2005, at: http://www.unhcr.ch/ statistics, UNRWA in Figures as of 31 December 2004. Data available online as of 30 September 2005, at: http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/index.htm. Net migration: Number: Net average annual number of migrants, that is, the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens. Rate: The net number of migrants, divided by the average population of the receiving country over the period considered. It is expressed as the net number of migrants per 1,000 population. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables, Sales No.E.05.XIII.5. Data available online at: http://www.unpopulation.org. Remittances: Total remittances as reported by the World Bank include three types of transactions: Workers' remittances are all current transfers from migrants staying in a country for a year of longer to households in another country. Usually they are regular transfers from members of he same family resident in different countries. Compensation of employees include the wages, salaries and other remuneration earned by migrants staying in a country for less than a year and paid by residents of that country. Migrants' transfers are the net worth of migrants who are expected to remain in the country for more than a year. They are not transactions but rather contra-entries toflowsof goods and changes infinancialitems that arise from the migration of individuals. All data are reported in current US dollars. The main sources of these data are the Balance of Payment Statistics compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For countries that do not report remittance data to the IMF, the World Bank produces estimates base on either data from central banks or information provided by World Bank country desks. See Dilip Ratha, 'Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance', Global Development Finance 2003, World Bank. Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. International Migration 2006 (United Nations Publication number E.06.X111.6.

Statistics

299

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