The Politics of Memory in Post-Authoritarian Transitions, Volume Two : Comparative Analysis [1 ed.] 9781443869379, 9781443812702

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The Politics of Memory in PostAuthoritarian Transitions, Volume Two

The Politics of Memory in PostAuthoritarian Transitions, Volume Two: Comparative Analysis By

Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa, Patryk WawrzyĔski and Anna Ratke-Majewska

The Politics of Memory in Post-Authoritarian Transitions, Volume Two: Comparative Analysis By Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Patryk Wawrzyński and Anna Ratke-Majewska This book first published 2017 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2017 by Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Patryk Wawrzyński and Anna Ratke-Majewska All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-1270-6 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-1270-2

CONTENTS

Introduction .............................................................................................. viii Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa and Patryk WawrzyĔski PART ONE: RESEARCH PROJECT Chapter One ................................................................................................. 2 The Politics of Memory as the Constitutional Factor of New Identity during the Transition from Authoritarian Regimes: An Overview of the Research Project Anna Ratke-Majewska and Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa The General Assumptions of the Project ............................................... 2 The Selection of Cases ........................................................................... 6 The Significance of the Project .............................................................. 8 Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 10 The Overview of the Methodology of Research on the Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions Anna Ratke-Majewska and Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa The Analysis of the Transitional Politics of Memory .......................... 10 The Comparative Analysis of the Transitional Remembrance–– Towards a General Model .............................................................. 16 The Selection of Sources ..................................................................... 25 Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 31 The Politics of Memory and Political Identity: A Theoretical Overview Anna Ratke-Majewska and Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa Identity in Theoretical Considerations ................................................. 31 Political Identity as an Element of Universal Human Identity ............. 34 The Politics of Memory ....................................................................... 41

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PART TWO: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 50 The Comparative Aspects of Using Remembrance Narratives to Construct a New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition Patryk WawrzyĔski and Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa General Remarks.................................................................................. 50 The Relationships within the Research Categories .............................. 52 Relationships between Research Categories ........................................ 65 The Relationships between the Categories and the Source, Course and Scale of the Transition ................................................. 80 The Relationships between the Categories and the Cause of Change .. 89 The Relationships between the Categories and the Authoritarian Identity ........................................................ 93 The Relationships between the Categories and the Democratic Identity ........................................................... 98 Summary ............................................................................................ 106 Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 114 The General Model of Using Remembrance Narratives to Construct a New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition Patryk WawrzyĔski and Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa The Nature of the Transitional Government’s Remembrance Policy.................................................................... 114 Using Remembrance Narratives to Construct the New Political Identity ............................................................. 120 Similarities and Differences in the Transitional Remembrance Policy.................................................................... 143 The General Model of the Structure of Transitional Remembrance Policy.................................................................... 154 Summary ............................................................................................ 167 References ............................................................................................... 172 Annex One ............................................................................................... 181 Table of Detailed Results of the Remembrance Policy in Chile Annex Two .............................................................................................. 183 Table of Detailed Results of the Remembrance Policy in Estonia

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Annex Three ............................................................................................ 186 Table of Detailed Results of the Remembrance Policy in Georgia Annex Four .............................................................................................. 188 Table of Detailed Results of the Remembrance Policy in Poland Annex Five .............................................................................................. 190 Table of Detailed Results of the Remembrance Policy in South Africa Annex Six ................................................................................................ 192 Table of Detailed Results of the Remembrance Policy in Spain

INTRODUCTION BY JOANNA MARSZAàEK-KAWA AND PATRYK WAWRZYēSKI

The past does matter. The past makes us who we are. This basic truth was an inspiration for the three-year-long research into the transitional government’s remembrance policy. Our objective was to understand how the past, during democratisation, becomes a political asset. Being aware of the fact that the past does matter, we were keen to see the consequences of its influence on the state and society. We were interested in the stories that were promoted by the governments of six countries during great transformations and the construction of a new order on the ruins of overthrown dictatorships. Not only did we seek to find out what they concerned, but we first of all wanted to discover what they were aimed at, and what role the new leaders had assigned to them. Our work resulted in a book consisting of two volumes. In the first one, we described six cases of the transitional remembrance policy–– Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Spain, Poland, and South Africa. It is a collection of some fascinating academic narratives, which lead the Reader through the twists and turns of telling about the past, the remembering and forgetting on different continents, in different cultures, and under different political circumstances. The second volume uses cases to create a theoretical model aimed at understanding the role of the government in the transitional politics of memory. It is a precise lecture which allows the Reader to get to know the relations between democratisation, remembrance policy, and the reconstruction of the society’s political identity. It is a piece of research work that considerably enriches political science, significantly extending our knowledge about the function of the past during the transformation of a political system. In the first place, however, it discusses and clarifies a number of scientific discoveries which completely change our understanding of the government’s remembrance policy. While working on the book, we were focused on its future utility as the key lecture on the transitional remembrance policy. That is why we

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divided the volume into two complementary parts. The first one explains the research assumptions of our project, taking the Reader through the basics from which we derived our hypotheses and through the measures which we used to verify them. The first part consists of three chapters. The first serves as the introduction to our project––it shows its basic assumptions, discusses the posed research questions, and explains the theoretical assumptions which we were guided by while designing the research. In the next chapter, we provided a framework for the adopted research methodology: both at the level of the analysis of the cases of using remembrance narratives in particular countries and at a universal level, where, thanks to comparative tools, we constructed an overall model. It also presents the sources of our study and indicates what we were guided by in selecting them. Chapter three concerns the most important theoretical aspect of our project––the relationship between the politics of memory and the political identity of the society. It explains basic categories and expressions that we used in our research, and presents the key inspirations which gave rise to our understanding of the role of the transitional remembrance policy. The second part of this volume continues the lecture, presenting the results of the comparative study of the six cases of using remembrance narratives during democratisation. It is made up of two chapters (chapter four and five) that are the essence of our research and which provide answers to the questions we asked. They show what the transitional remembrance policy is like, what its universal features are, and what it is that most impacts its ultimate shape. Those chapters are not merely a precise lecture––they are also a fascinating road from the observation of the role of remembrance narratives in six countries to the construction of a theoretical model which makes it possible to understand the structure of this phenomenon. They are the result of the application of a complex methodology and the accomplishment of the research team that undertook the pioneering task to explain why, during political transformations, telling about the past does matter. The presented results are innovative within the scope of social sciences––our aim was not to describe what was already commonly known, but to select one direction in which we would push the boundaries of our understanding of the remembrance policy. Hence, those who want to see this book as an academic handbook confronting different theories and discussing various approaches will be surprised. There are a number of other publications which fill this gap in the publishing market. Our proposal is a journey through some important scientific discoveries, with the destination being the understanding of what remembrance policy is and what functions it fulfils during the course of democratisation.

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In chapter four, we focused on the relationships between the particular elements of the model. We show what it is that links the use of the interpretations of the past within and among the eight categories on which we focused our attention––the legitimisation of the new elites, the presence of the previous regime’s representatives, the transitional justice, the social costs of transformations, the adoption of new social and political standards, symbolic roles of democratisation, the historical need for national unity, and the change of the state’s identity in international politics. Furthermore, we also examined their significant relationships with the source, course and scope of the transition, the internal and external change factors, as well as the shape of the identity of the authoritarian society, and the promoted vision of the democratic community. As a result, the Reader can understand not only how particular elements of the transitional remembrance policy influence each other, but also what aspects exert a significant impact on its shape. Chapter five provides an even more detailed picture of the use of remembrance narratives during democratisation. It begins with confronting theoretical hypotheses with overall observations and the results of the analysis of the intensity of relationships. It enables the Reader to understand the significance of the questions we asked, and how our research made it possible to answer them. Owing to this, the description of the most important similarities and differences between the countries under study becomes clear. The next subchapter is devoted to this description. It deals with the issue from two different viewpoints, i.e. the universal one, the starting point of which is the question of what the transitional remembrance policy is like, and the individual one, which makes it possible to emphasise the similarities and differences from the perspective of a particular country––Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Spain, Poland, or South Africa. It is exactly in this part of the book where we present the Reader with our most important discoveries and explain how much our findings change from the previous beliefs about the role of the interpretations of the past. The final stop of our scientific journey is the creation of the general model of the post-authoritarian remembrance policy, which consolidates all collected data, and which we built using all analyses. Not only does it indicate the most important features of the use of remembrance narratives, but it can also serve as a simple and precise tool for other researchers in their research into the significance of the past during democratisation. Why is our study important? Firstly, it explains how the remembrance policy leaves its mark on the post-authoritarian transformation. Secondly, it identifies common features for all the cases of the use of remembrance

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narratives and highlights the key differences between the countries. Thirdly, it shows the complex structure of the transitional remembrance policy––its shape, intensity, dynamics and relationships within it. Fourthly, it provides valuable and reliable theoretical models, which not only enrich our knowledge but, outright, lay the foundations for a new direction in studies of democratisation. Fifthly, an effect of the research is the creation of a number of research tools which make it easier to examine the importance of remembrance narratives during political transformations. Sixthly, our research was a pioneering attempt to turn the relations between the government’s remembrance story-telling, the change of a political system, and the reconstruction of the political identity of the society, into a subject of study within the framework of political science. Our research provided some very interesting findings. Reading this volume is the best way to get to know and understand them. They are the first step towards formulating the theory of remembrance policy in an orderly manner, based on empirically verified claims. In our work, we present hard data only, using them to build a model of using remembrance narratives during the course of democratisation. We avoid any speculations––our aim was to create a precise lecture, and we are confident that what is more important for the Reader is reliable knowledge about the transitional remembrance policy rather than some interesting, but lacking any scientific confirmation, assumptions, as offered by a number of other authors. We are also convinced that reading this volume will be an interesting experience; that it will help the Reader to better understand why the past does matter; and how history becomes a political resource and effective weapon in the struggle for a better, democratic future. *** We should like to thank the National Centre of Science in Kraków, Poland for awarding us research grant DEC-2012/05/E/HS5/02722 which enabled us to finance our work. Without the support it would not have been possible to answer the questions we asked in our project, and our knowledge about the transitional government’s remembrance policy would be less developed. We also express our gratitude to the authorities and administration of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in ToruĔ, who supported our research and the work of the research team. We are grateful to our partners in Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Spain and South Africa, who helped us collect the necessary sources and understand the political uniqueness of these countries. We should like to thank our associates and colleagues who provided us with advice, help and invaluable comments.

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Professor Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa would like to additionally thank her parents, Halina and Adam Marszaáek, husband, Daniel Kawa, and daughters––Zuzanna and Marianna––who make each day a brighter one, and also her friends, who are an inspiration to me in both my private and professional life. The invaluable support of the close ones gives me heart and encourages me to undertake new challenges. It also helps to dispel doubts which sometimes arise. I am unable to find sufficient words to express my gratitude to the late Professor Czesáaw Mojsiewicz and his wife Emilia, who opened the door for me to the world of science, my masters––Professor Jan Wawrzyniak, Professor Marek Chmaj, Professor Jacek Sobczak, and Professor Krzysztof Paáecki. I also thank Professor Andrzej Antoszewski, who is an unparalleled exemplar of an academician, but who has remained a wonderful human being in the first place, always surrounded by a bunch of admirers. And last but not least, I should like to give my honours to a number of persons who stood by me in difficult times for me and my family. My thanks go to Piotr Plecka M.D. and Professor Tadeusz Dmochowski––thank you for staying close and turning a blind eye to my imperfections. Dr. Patryk WawrzyĔski wishes to thank his wife Alicja StaĔcoWawrzyĔska for her support during the research and the countless talks on the interpretations of the findings, the colleagues from the research team for their hard work, involvement and discussions, and the University of Cape Town who welcomed me during my research visits to South Africa. I am also grateful for the inspiration, ideas, arguments and counterarguments provided by my friends, colleagues and associates: Marek A. MuszyĔski, Gabriela Czarnek and Ralph Schattkowsky, as well as Filip CyuĔczyk, Magdalena Hoáy-àuczaj, Adam Jarosz, Zwelethu Jolobe, Vita Jukneviciene, Irina Kantor, Felipe Kipreos, Jerzy Koronkiewicz, Jacek Knopek, Kamil àuczaj, Sabine Marschall, Monika Nalepa, Krzysztof Olszewski, Daniel Oross, Heiko Pääbo, Alicja PalĊcka, Anna Quirin, Clara Sarmento, Anette Seegers, Karen Smith, Marek Wojnar, Izabela WoĨniak i Michaá Zabdyr-Jamróz. Dr. Anna Ratke-Majewska also wishes to thank her husband Kamil Majewski for his invaluable support, undisturbed patience and understanding during the research, as well as her parents Barbara and Stanisáaw Ratke for their help, dedication, and time. I also thank my friends and colleagues, and my mentors––you are my inspiration, support and role models.

PART ONE RESEARCH PROJECT

CHAPTER ONE THE POLITICS OF MEMORY AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL FACTOR OF NEW IDENTITY DURING THE TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT1 BY ANNA RATKE-MAJEWSKA AND JOANNA MARSZAàEK-KAWA

The General Assumptions of the Project The main objective of the project was to discuss the issue of the impact of the politics of memory on the new political identity of societies in the period of transition from the authoritarian regime to democracy. In other words, the fundamental assumptions which referred to the issue of the influence––through the pursued politics of memory––of the structures and institutions of the post-authoritarian state on its society’s political identity. The goal of the project formulated in this way––which focused on the identification of the role of remembrance narratives in the process of the reconstruction of the state and society––was reflected in two basic research problems. The first of them refers to the question to what degree new remembrance narratives were used in the transition period, while the other addresses the issue of the models of the politics of memory used for building a new political identity during transformations. The first problem had to be solved in order to accomplish the other research

 1

The project, headed by Professor Joanna Marszaáek-Kawa (Nicolaus Copernicus University in ToruĔ, Poland), was funded by the National Science Centre, under decision no. DEC-2012/05/E/HS5/02722. The project team consisted of Dr. Patryk WawrzyĔski, Dr. Anna Ratke-Majewska and Dr. Joanna Piechowiak-Lamparska. The project was realised in the years 2013-2016.

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task, which not only mirrored all issues discussed in the project, but also determined the manner and design of our research. Consequently, the key task––necessary for solving the main research problems of the project–– was to conduct a thorough qualitative analysis of the cases of the application of the remembrance policy as an element of the state’s efforts to develop its citizens’ new political identity in the period of transition from the authoritarian regime to democracy, with due consideration given to diverse cultural, social, economic and political circumstances. What became the main axis of the project was the activity of the state. This assumption was based on the common perception of the politics of memory as a sphere under the influence of state authorities, which is exclusively shaped by state institutions.2 Analyses carried out during the implementation of the project were thus aimed at identifying mechanisms through which the state applies remembrance narratives for justifying democratic changes and for increasing social support for the democratisation of the political system. Moreover, the aim of the research was to discover the phenomenon of supervenience3 occurring between the

 2

The politics of memory is the issue that has been thoroughly and widely discussed in the literature on the subject, both Polish and international. Among Polish authors dealing with this area are such scholars as: Marek A. Cichocki, Marcin Król, Dorota Malczewska-Pawelec, Lech M. Nijakowski, Tomasz Pawelec or Jacek Sawicki, although this list is a lot longer [see, for example: Cichocki, 2005; Malczewska-Pawelec, Pawelec, 2011; Nijakowski, 2008; PamiĊü jako przedmiot…, 2008; Sawicki, 2005]. The members of the research team that implemented this project, have also contributed to the academic discussion on remembrance [see, among others: Ratke, 2011; WawrzyĔski, 2012; WawrzyĔski, Ratke-Majewska, Marszaáek-Kawa, 2015]. 3 Let us quote here the words of one of the leading theoreticians of the concept of supervenience, Jaegwon Kim: “First, the possibility of human action requires our mental states––beliefs, desires and intentions––to have their effects in the physical world. Acting in accordance with our will, our beliefs and desires, intentions and decisions, they have to somehow make our limbs––moving in a specific way–– cause changes around us. It is owing to this that we are able to cope with our surroundings, write philosophical papers, build bridges and towns, as well as make gaps in the ozone layer. Perception, our only window to the world, requires physical objects around us to be causes of perceptive experiences and beliefs. The reasoning thanks to which we obtain new knowledge and beliefs on the basis of the already existing knowledge, assumes the causal determination of the new belief by the old one… Memory is a complex causal process assuming interactions between experiences, storing them physically and reproducing them in the form of beliefs. By giving up perception, memory and reasoning, we renounce almost all human knowledge” [2002: 41].

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entire national cultural memory and political processes. What is also important is the fact that in the process of building the features that describe relations between the memory of the past, political identity and the authorities’ activity in the transition period, individual circumstances of each case under study––which formed a unique context of the ongoing changes––were taken into account. We posed a number of hypotheses on the basis of the research issues established in the project. The main hypothesis, which constituted the essence of the problems under study, was the statement about the universality of the model of transition from the authoritarian to democratic system at the level of the state’s use of remembrance policy to create a new political identity of the society. It meant having to study areas that were common for two unilateral relations of the transformation period. The first of them was the relation between the state and the memory of the past, while the other one was reflected in the link between the state and the political identity of the society. This required adopting two research perspectives at the same time. The holistic perspective saw transition as a political phenomenon with a homogeneous set of instruments, tools and manners of action of the state, and it was best reflected in the comparative analysis method applied in the study. The individual perspective, in turn, addressed the particular cases of transition, taking into consideration local circumstances, including specific economic, ethnic and national conditions, as well as geopolitical, cultural and social ones. It also considered the issue of international relations. It was reflected in a thorough analysis of case studies in the project. What is also important is the fact that the fundamental research hypothesis presented above––referring to the universality of the applied tools of the remembrance story-telling during the transition, which enabled the state to construct a new political identity of citizens and build social support for democratic transformations––gave rise to the necessity of formulating additional hypotheses to supplement the main assumption. The first of the auxiliary hypotheses was expressed in the statement that countries––considering their specific local circumstances, including economic, cultural and national conditions––to a large extent use new remembrance narratives for shaping the political identity of their societies in the transition period, first of all through references to the historical or cultural legacy of a given community. These references are in turn aimed at: firstly––justifying democratisation processes, secondly––incorporating democratic values into the society, and thirdly––preventing social conflicts triggered by a wave of changes. To this end, remembrance narratives focus on the presentation of the

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ongoing processes as changes which are the continuation of national tradition and which are non-conflicting historic events, as well as an expression of the implementation of the intergenerational contract, based on desired attitudes rooted in the glorious history of the nation. According to another auxiliary hypothesis––which is connected with the one mentioned above––the state during the democratic transition significantly reduces its interest in the authoritarian past and in the transitional justice. It was assumed that the motives behind such an attitude include the willingness to minimise a risk of exacerbating conflicts and divisions within a community and a threat of refusing to grant legitimacy to the new authorities both by the economic and political elites of the previous regime and by social groups supporting authoritarian structures. This means giving up the rhetoric which would create an impression that the new state elites aim to take revenge on the representatives and adherents of the old regime, its officials and functionaries, which would meet with strong opposition from a large part of the society and lead to the destabilisation of the emerging political system. What appears in the place of narrative calling for the settling of all accounts with or punishing crimes of authoritarianism are cautious and balanced actions, which involve seeking compromise, forgiveness, and–– first of all––reconciliation. Moreover, we also verified a hypothesis according to which the efforts to prove that the right way of democratisation was chosen constitute the most important field of the state’s activity in which the memory of the past is used in the transition period. Therefore, democracy was presented as a manifestation of national tradition or an expression of the important features of a nation, inseparably linked with its existence. It may also be seen as a tribute paid to the victims of repressions and to the heroes of a struggle for independence. In this way, the social costs of transformations, especially those of an economic character, become justified. The construction of a new identity through references to the important elements of national memory is thus to ensure: (1) social legitimacy for the time of reforms crucial for the system; (2) the unification of the society around shared ideas; and (3) strengthening the position of the new political elites. Hence, identity and memory should motivate the society to follow the chosen path towards democracy, even if it means losing some of its privileges, giving up some ambitions, or the deterioration of material status. It plays the role of a historical incentive of a higher level, adding meaning to sacrifices one made. This is why remembrance is used by the state to formulate the idea of the

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intergenerational contract and is combined with other significant factors constituting cultural legacy.

The Selection of Cases To solve research problems specified in the project––which centred on multi-aspect relations between memory, national identity and democratisation––we needed to select diverse cases so that they would encompass the broadest possible range of historical, territorial and problem experiences. On the basis of the selected sample, we had to formulate some general conclusions. Moreover, what was also important from the angle of the relevance of the project, we needed to come up with some recommendations for practitioners who deal with establishing priorities for the politics of memory in the state. We made it easier to accomplish this task by selecting such a wide range of varied cases. This is why the case studies concern the transitions in Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, South Africa and Spain. The research thus involved countries in which––at a different time, pace and to a different degree (complying with the research proposal of Lavinia Stan, the author of numerous publications on the issues of transition justice and the politics of memory4)––a democratic transformation took place. What is important is that the selected cases represented different geographical and civilisation regions, political traditions, cultures and historical experiences, which allowed us to come up with reliable general conclusions, going beyond the framework of phenomena specific to a particular area of the world. Moreover, since transitions of the system took place in different socio-political conditions, transformation goals and visions of the post-authoritarian state and society also varied. Therefore, Chile was an example of the political change from the authoritarian regime established after a military coup d’état; Estonia–– an example of the first wave of post-communist democratisation; Georgia––an example of the second wave of post-communist democratisation (one of colour revolutions); Poland––an example of transition from the communist regime aimed at fast integration with the West; Spain––an example of changes from the authoritarian system established after a civil war; and South Africa, in turn, was an example of post-colonial democracy-making and, at the same time, a transition from a repressive racist regime based on the exclusion of a part of the society and on limiting human rights. Thus, the selection of countries to be studied was well suited to the goals of the project.

 4

See, among others: Stan, 2013; Transitional Justice…, 2009.

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It should also be mentioned that, apart from their diversity, there was yet another advantage of such a selection that was of high relevance for our research. It was the representativeness of each transition, viewed not only at the regional scale, but also in the field of the character of the ongoing changes, including the features of the system that was vanishing as a result of democratisation. That is why we excluded some cases of transformation, especially those considered to be single changes of the system (not fulfilling the condition of representing features typical of a larger community) or those which could not be seen as completed. Firstly, we decided to leave out German transition, which many researchers find to be the model transformation, thus it is often seen as an obvious choice when it comes to discussing a number of issues related to democratic changes. Nevertheless, the specific character of the process of democratisation in this country (both in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, where the democratic system adopted after World War II was imposed by the anti-Nazi coalition, and in the case of the German Democratic Republic, where the unification of two German states meant the extension and instant adoption of the solutions developed by the Western neighbour) made this case exceptional and unique, incomparable to others. This is why we did not treat it as a universal and representative example in the studies on transition. Secondly, our analyses did not include the democratisation of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, or the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, where democratic changes––quoting a popular view often appearing in publications concerning the internal situation of the above-mentioned countries––did not come to an end and their political systems began to adopt features of authoritarian-democratic hybrids.5 Similar arguments were raised for the non-inclusion of Arabic states in the discussion. Democratic changes in this region, initiated by the Arab Spring, had not been completed when we started work on this project, and their direction and scope were difficult to predict. Thirdly, we recognised the cases of Poland (as the only satellite state of the USSR) and Estonia (as a former Soviet republic) as representative of the whole area of Central and Eastern Europe, which meant that we did not include other examples of democratic transition in the region in our research. The assumption we adopted in the project was based on the conviction (which was widely accepted in the scientific discourse) that

 5

It must be emphasised that our opinion on the condition of democracy in the above-mentioned countries was valid both during the preparation of the assumptions of the project (2012) and in the period of implementing them (from 2013 to 2016).

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democratic changes in this part of the world––despite some slight differences determined by the specific nature of a given case––each time reflected a single phenomenon: the post-communist transformation [see: Huntington, 1995]. Fourthly, in our project we did not deal with partial transitions (or semi-transitions), such as the political and civil equalisation of African Americans in the United States and indigenous people of Australia and New Zealand. These problems were only partly related to the issues under study, and if we had included them, the research field of the project would have become hard to define. This is why we ignored them in our research. It must be noted, however, that we were fully aware of the fact that there is a widely-held belief in the literature according to which changes in the above-mentioned countries are seen as transition from the authoritarian regime to democracy due to a significant change of the society’s influence on the government (the extension of democratic legitimacy).

The Significance of the Project The main assumptions of the project included the identification of similarities and differences in the sphere of the remembrance narratives used by post-authoritarian governments in the transition period, the explanation of relations between the remembrance story-telling and the political identity of the society, as well as the presentation of the origins of the narrative and their influence on the democratisation of the state. The above areas––specified by the framework of our analysis––reflect the project’s expected contribution to the development of the scientific discipline. The first volume of the publication––based on the studies we conducted––shows six local models of the remembrance policy used by the state in the period of democratic changes, while the second one presents a general overview of the model of the politics of memory used by post-authoritarian governments in the period of transition from the authoritarian to democratic system. Thus, the publication––based on the research fields defined by the problems solved in the project––has filled a gap existent in the scientific discourse. Although the issues of democratisation, remembrance and political identity have been present in the Polish and global science for years, no research into the above issues has been done with an emphasis on their interrelationships within the scope and direction specified in the project. In this way, the project has offered a chance of looking at the problem of political transformations from a different angle, at the same time determining a new field of research into the process of democratisation.

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Therefore, the publication, representing an important opinion in the discussion on the importance of the politics of memory, provides an opportunity to stimulate academic debate. By verifying our hypotheses we may also reflect on the efficiency and purposefulness of the implementation of the government’s remembrance policy. Another important issue, which enhances the relevance of our research, is its interdisciplinary nature, both in the sphere of the assumptions formulated and the results achieved. The analyses combine a number of various fields in social and political sciences, thanks to which they may be interpreted at many layers of scientific activity. Moreover, the innovativeness of the project contributes not only to the theory, but also to the practice of political action. The presented attitude may constitute a basis for the formulation of multi-level strategies, representing a useful tool ready to be used by institutions shaping the nation’s politics of memory or dealing with the optimisation of memory management. The main target group of the publication is the academic community, interested in the issues of democratisation, political identity and the politics of memory. The research shows a completely new perspective from which relations between these phenomena are considered, owing to which they may arouse curiosity among researchers in the field of social science and humanities. Moreover, it can be a rich source of knowledge for people outside academic circles, who are interested in the issues of political transition and differences between the state’s interpretation of the past and processes occurring within the society.

CHAPTER TWO THE OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH ON THE REMEMBRANCE POLICY AND POLITICAL IDENTITY DURING TRANSITIONS BY ANNA RATKE-MAJEWSKA AND JOANNA MARSZAàEK-KAWA

The Analysis of the Transitional Politics of Memory The first problem that needed to be addressed when dealing with the research subject was the study of transitional remembrance in the six countries selected for the project: Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, South Africa, and Spain. Its aim was: first of all––to discover the remembrance narratives a given state uses in the transition, secondly––to what extent they were used in each case, and, thirdly––the features of the posttransitional political identity determined by the state’s narratives. The key issue was thus to identify the principal determinants of the authoritarian political identity on the one hand, and the democratic political identity on the other in order to capture changes in their contents occurring during transition. The comparison of these identities and the identification of differences between them were in turn made on the basis of the analysis of the state’s policy of commemoration, seen as their constituent factor. In other words, by studying particular cases we were able to identify the type of remembrance narratives applied by the state during democratisation and the degree to which it was used, as well as their role in the development of the post-authoritarian identity of the society. The main task that had to be undertaken in the project, and which became crucial for the examination of the politics of memory in the selected countries during the transformation of the political system and its role in the process of changing the citizens’ identity, was the distinction of common and universal solutions––related to the issue of commemoration–

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions

11

–used in the period of transition to democracy. In this way, we established eight research categories that reflected the application of remembrance narratives in the transition for justifying the basic challenges for democratisation. These categories constituted the foundation for designing tools for the analysis of particular cases and for comparative analysis. They were as follows: 1. The legitimisation of coming to power by new political elites––a category reflecting the role of remembrance narratives used during the transition for justifying the exercise of power by new political elites, which takes into consideration the following aspects: the past as the legitimisation of new elites, exploiting the idea of the state’s continuity for the legitimisation, the use of the idea of the state’s continuity, the continuity vs. the change of national symbols and the pantheon of heroes as a source of legitimisation, the reconstruction of the landscape of memory, preventing internal conflicts and the historical legitimisation of the new elite, and memory as a source of reconciliation and forgiveness administered by new elites and within boundaries set by them; 2. The presence of the former regime’s representatives in public life––a category reflecting the role of remembrance narratives used during the transition for justifying the presence of the representatives of the previous regime in democratic life, which takes into consideration the following aspects: justifying the necessity of the presence of the regime’s representatives in public life as a way to prevent conflicts, the political presence of past elites as the legitimisation of democracy and political pluralism, defining pluralism and democratic equality through the presence of former elites, historical justifications for constructing a new political identity, and the historical justifications of the separation of the past from the present day and the boundaries of that division; 3. Procedures of the transitional justice––a category reflecting the role of remembrance narratives used during the transition for justifying a selected formula to hold accountable or not accountable the apparatus of the authoritarian regime, which takes into consideration the following aspects: transitional justice as a form of legitimising the rule of law, transitional justice as punishing the culprits, transitional justice as a source of forgiveness, and the limited scope of transitional justice as the effect of preventing an increase in social divisions; 4. Social and economic costs of transformations––a category reflecting the role of remembrance narratives used in the transition

12

Chapter Two

for justifying the social costs of changes, especially of an economic transition: the past vs. the future dichotomy as the justification of the necessity of the costs of transformations (and the comparison of the amount of sacrifice of those who struggled for freedom with the smaller sacrifice of those who suffered during the transition), the historical justification of new economic attitudes (as private initiative, entrepreneurship, self-organisation and responsibility), the historical sources of economic stratifications, and the past as the justification of capitalist ideas; 5. The adoption of new social and political standards––a category reflecting the role of remembrance narratives used during the transition for justifying the adoption of new, often culturally distant, social and political standards, which takes into consideration the following standards: the significance of the need for transformations as the consequence of historical events, the significance of the intergenerational agreement for the adoption of new standards, the significance of new national heroes as role models of new attitudes, the balance between tradition and modernisation, and memory as a myth-motoric inspiration in a new definition of patriotism; 6. Symbolic roles of democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational agreement and a tribute to the victims of the authoritarian regime and to repressed opposition––a category reflecting the role of remembrance narratives used during the transition for explaining symbolic roles of democratisation as more than just a regime change. It took into consideration the following aspects: emphasising the historical necessity of democratisation (the intergenerational character of democratisation), showing democratisation as a tribute to the victims of the authoritarian regime, pro-democratic selection of narratives and their heroes, national heroes as role models of democratic and civic attitudes, and the new organisation of time (public holiday calendar) as a way to transfer ideas from elites to the society; 7. The historic need for national unity––a category reflecting the role of remembrance narratives used in the transition period for justifying national unity, which reflects the following aspects: the past as the justification of national unity, the historical justification of reconciliation and forgiveness, the transformation of the landscape of memory from authoritarian to pluralist, and the reconstruction of the pantheon of national heroes towards diversity;

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions

13

8. The new state’s identity in international politics, including membership of inter-governmental organisations, alliances, and associations––a category reflecting the role of remembrance narratives used during the transition for justifying the change of the state’s foreign policy, which takes into consideration the following aspects: the experience of the past as the justification of membership of organisations and international alliances, membership of international organisations to complement the transformation and a historical challenge, (re-)gaining the right and due position in the international community as the realisation of the new political identity, and the past as the justification of new standards implemented in the face of the accession to international organisations. The categories discussed above enabled us to devise and conduct research on the transitional politics of memory in the six countries selected for the project. However, we would not have been able to carry out this task, had we not established a catalogue of applicable methods. The research methodology of the project was thus based on mutually complementary and interpenetrating methods of analysis. They included: 1. The statistical and descriptive analysis––which enables a detailed presentation of the phenomenon of transition in a limited and short period of time. Such a presentation accurately reflects events occurring then and corresponding to the research field of the project; 2. The processual analysis––which enables capturing a change (considered in terms of a complex process), including the case of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and the transformation of the authoritarian political identity of citizens into a democratic identity; 3. The narrative analysis––which enables the identification of elements of remembrance narratives used during the transition, in order to discover the functions they fulfilled; 4. The content analysis––which enables the identification of goals and values conveyed by the messages sent by state institutions in the transition period; 5. The institutional and legal analysis––which enables the presentation of principles which govern the functioning of the state’s political institutions and the political system at the stage of political changes;

14

Chapter Two

6. The analysis of social networks––which serves the purpose of reconstructing the complexity of social relations, considering the issue of the transfer of commemoration contents and the diffusion of ideas between state institutions and the society. It enabled us to reflect on the issue of the influence of the promoted remembrance narratives on the society and on the problem of the internalisation of this content in the sphere of political identity. As mentioned previously, the analysis of the particular cases of the transitional politics of memory was based on the distinguished universal research categories and with the application of the selected methods. Therefore, each of the countries under study was analysed in the same manner, which allowed us to confront the results in the subsequent phase of the project. In order to build the foundation for discussing each given case, we established the time framework of the transition, identified the period of political transformations in history, and focused on the elements constituting the content of the authoritarian political identity. Then, we examined remembrance narratives applied in the transition period. In each case, not only did we discover instances of a given aspect of a narrative, but we also identified their degree of relevance within the framework of a specific category. The complexity of our research field was reflected in rich and multi-layered descriptions, which enabled us to draw conclusions regarding the features and shape of the post-transition political identity adopted during democratisation. It should also be added that designing each case study was made easier by the creation of a unique tool for the sake of the project––a list of research categories, which enabled us to draw conclusions concerning the relevance of aspects that it included. This list––the graphic representation of which is found below––not only made it possible to systematise the results of our studies and to put conclusions in order, but significantly facilitated a description of each transition case. It also became the basis for constructing a tool for conducting a multi-aspect comparative analysis, particularly owing to the fact that it could be used for devising uniform summaries of each case study.

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions

Research Category

The legitimisation of new elites

Ite m

Field of impact

1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5

The past as a legitimisation of new elites Use of the idea of the state’s continuity Use of national symbols and heroes New landscape of memory Counteracting internal conflicts Remembrance as a source of reconciliation Counteracting internal conflicts As a legitimisation of democracy As a definition of pluralism Building a new political community Division between the past and the present Transitional justice as a legitimisation of the rule of law Transitional justice as a punishment for human rights violators Transitional justice as a source of forgiveness Limited scope of the transitional justice The necessity of social costs of change New economic attitudes and behaviours The past as a source of stratifications The legitimisation of capitalism The historical necessity of changes The role of the intergenerational agreement National heroes as role models Balance between the tradition and modernisation The past and a new definition of patriotism The intergenerational character of changes Democratisation as a tribute for victims The pro-democratic selection of narratives National heroes as examples of behaviours New organisation of time

1-6

The justification of the presence of former elites

2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 3-1

The transitional justice

3-2 3-3

Social costs of transformations

3-4 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 5-1 5-2

Adaptation of new social and political standards

5-3 5-4 5-5 6-1 6-2

Symbolic roles of democratisation

6-3 6-4 6-5



15



Chapter Two

16

7-1 Historical need for national unity

7-2 7-3 7-4 8-1

New state’s identity in international relations

8-2 8-3 8-4

The past as a legitimisation of national unity Reasons for reconciliation and forgiveness Diversity of the landscape of memory Reconstruction of national heroes’ pantheon Reasons for membership of IGOs New identity as a fulfilment of transformations (Re-)Gaining an appropriate position in IR Adaptation of new standards

Table 2.1. The research tools used in the analysis of the transitional remembrance policy Note. The scale of the level of significance used in the table above consists of the following degrees: very low (1), low (2), moderate (3), high (4), very high (5).

The Comparative Analysis of the Transitional Remembrance––Towards a General Model One of the main tasks of the project, expressed at the level of articulated problems and constructed hypotheses, was an attempt to devise a universal model of the application of remembrance narratives by the state for the sake of building a new political identity of the society in the period of transition from the authoritarian to the democratic system. Hence, our aim was to design a general pattern that would mirror the way in which state authorities pursue the remembrance policy during democratisation––what tools they apply and what ways they follow––with the intention of ensuring lasting social support for changes of the system through the incorporation of desired values into the political identity of citizens. What served as the foundation for the construction of such a general model were the analyses of particular cases––of Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, South Africa and Spain, i.e. single models of the transitional politics of memory in the countries under study. We found comparative analysis to be essential for building a universal model as it allowed us to confront the results obtained at the earlier stage of the project. This method was based on recognising the role that every single aspect of narrative––forming part of particular research categories––played in the pursued policy of commemoration, taking into consideration the extent of significance of each of them. It enabled us to come up with a general

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions

17

description of the assumed political identity of democratic postauthoritarian states. In order to create a universal pattern, we needed to focus on relations between commemoration, political identity and democratisation, but we had to do it from the angle of the whole set of cases rather than from the perspective of individual countries. It was a multi-stage task, which needed to be carried out in the consecutive phases of our comparative analysis. Thus, we constructed the universal model in the following order: 1. Firstly, it was necessary to show similarities and differences between six case studies with regard to eight research categories distinguished in the project; 2. Secondly, we needed to observe relations between variables: (1) within the framework of research categories; (2) between research categories; (3) between research categories and sources, paths and scopes of transition; (4) between research categories and external and internal factors of transformation; (5) between research categories and features of authoritarian identity; as well as (6) between research categories and features of post-authoritarian identity; 3. Thirdly, on the basis of the above analyses, we were able to construct a model of relations between the government’s policy of commemoration and political identity in the conditions of transition to democracy. At this stage, we also provided recommendations concerning the application of the constructed pattern, targeted mostly at policy-makers and people of science. The systematic and reliable comparative analysis would not have been possible without a proper tool which facilitated the implementation of the task. At this stage of our research, the tool for analysis was based on a tool constructed for the particular cases of the transitional politics of memory, and, additionally, was supplemented with additional variables, such as: a source of transition, a course of transition, a scale of changes, internal and external factors, the authoritarian identity, and the post-authoritarian identity. The reason for introducing additional, extended variables was that we wanted to show interrelationships not only within the categories of the transitional politicized remembrance, but also between the events preceding a transformation, including those accompanying the changes of the political system. Hence, by placing transformation processes in the reality specific to particular cases, we were able to consider the issues under study from a broader perspective, which contributed to the creation

18

Chapter Two

of the model of the remembrance policy, applied for building a new political identity during the transition. For the sake of the comparative analysis, we converted the data obtained at the stage of case studies into numerical data, with the following figures corresponding to the extent of significance: very high = 5, high = 4, moderate = 3, low = 2, and very low = 1. This enabled us to calculate average values within each category. Owing to this, we were able to summarise the results of the studies at the general level. For supplementary variables, the occurrence of a given category in a specific country was coded as 1, while the non-occurrence of it was 0. By attributing numerical labels in this area, we managed to average the results by extending the area of the comparative analysis.

External factors

Internal factors

Variable

Scale of changes

Course of transition

Source of transition

Variable

De-legitimisation of a regime Liberalisation of dictatorship Developed opposition Social protests Human rights violations Economic crisis Inefficient economy International pressure Economic sanctions Support for opposition

Research Category

Unilateral reform Bilateral agreement Multilateral negotiations Political revolution Peaceful change Threat of conflict Political violence Armed conflict Political system Economic system Organisation of the state Reconstruction of the society

Research Category

Chile

Chile

Estonia

Estonia

Georgia

Georgia

Poland

Poland

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions

South Africa

South Africa

Spain

Spain

Average

Average

19



Inclusive Exclusive Discrimination of a part of the society Acceptance of violence Revolutionary Conservative Nationalist Fear of others Dominance of one ideology Dominant position of the army Dominant position of religion Dominant position of a party Alliance with a superpower

Authoritarian identity



Research Category

Changes in the international system Collapse of alliances Loss of superpower’s support Presence of foreign armed forces Conflicts with neighbours Border conflicts Armed conflict

Variable

20

Chile

Estonia

Chapter Two

Georgia

Poland

South Africa

Spain

Average

Post-authoritarian identity



Inclusive Exclusive Reconciliation Forgiveness National unity Democracy Rule of law Pluralism Human rights Capitalism Social justice Inevitability of conflicts Nationalism Multiculturalism National tradition National martyrdom Return to the roots Dominant role of religion Modernisation Regional integration Imitating the West



Research Category

Variable

Chile

Estonia

Georgia

Poland

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions

South Africa Spain Average

21

Variable

Transitional justice

Presence of the former elite

Legitimisation of new elites

22

The past as a legitimisation Use of the idea of the state’s continuity Use of national symbols and heroes New landscape of memory Counteracting internal conflicts Remembrance as a source of reconciliation Average Counteracting internal conflicts As a legitimisation of democracy As a definition of pluralism Building a new political community Division between the past and the present Average As a legitimisation of the rule of law As a punishment for human rights violators As a source of forgiveness Limited scope of the transitional

Research Category

Chile

Estonia

Chapter Two

Georgia

Poland

South Africa Spain Average

Symbolic roles of democratisation

Adaptation of new social & political standards

Social costs of transformations

justice Average The necessity of social costs of change New economic attitudes and behaviours The past as a source of stratifications The legitimisation of capitalism Average The historical necessity of changes The role of the intergenerational agreement National heroes as role models of new civic and democratic attitudes Balance between the tradition and modernisation The past and a new definition of patriotism Average The intergenerational character of changes Democratisation as a tribute for victims The pro-democratic selection of

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions 23

Chapter Two

Table 2.2. The research tool used in the comparative analysis of transitional remembrance policy

narratives National heroes as examples of behaviours New organisation of time Average The past as a legitimisation of national unity Reasons for reconciliation and forgiveness Historical need for Diversity of the landscape of national unity memory Reconstruction of the national heroes’ pantheon Average Reasons for membership of IGOs New identity as a fulfilment of A new state’s transformations identity in international (Re-)Gaining an appropriate relations position in international politics Adaptation of new standards Average General Average

24

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions

25

The Selection of Sources The analysis of the transitional remembrance policy in Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, South Africa and Spain (followed by the comparative analysis) would not have been feasible without a detailed selection and division of sources, necessary for gaining insight into the situation of the selected countries in the authoritarian and post-authoritarian eras, as well as for examining national interpretations of the past at the stage of transition to democracy and capturing the elements that built the authoritarian and democratic political identities of societies. Thus, we used a variety of sources in our research. The main group consisted of official state documents, published documents, strategies, statements, speeches and addresses of political leaders, as well as reports prepared by institutions responsible for implementing the policy of remembrance formulated by the authorities of a given country. We also used a number of press articles to complement the material we had gathered. Moreover, spatial forms of commemoration (monuments, plaques, and memorial sites, which we were able to study during research trips) as well as official websites of government departments and institutions were invaluable sources of information. Additionally, we used an extensive body of literature, which enabled us to get deeper into the subject of our research and, on this basis, identify relationships between events and processes, and formulate conclusions. The table below presents the division of sources used in the project, taking into consideration the significance of publications in the course of our analyses. Item

Type of source Law

P

P1

Legal acts

P2

Documents of transitional justice institutions

P3

Academic papers

P4

Press materials

Education E

E1

Monuments and plaques

E2

Academic papers

E3

Press materials

Chapter Two

26

E4

Textbooks and educational curricula

Political Leaders L

L1

Academic papers

L2

Speeches of leaders

L3

Interviews with leaders

L4

Press materials

Table 2.3. The division of source materials used in the research It should be noted that in order to improve the efficiency of our search for and selection of materials for each case, we introduced a uniform division of sources during the preparation for specific studies. It consisted of three categories: materials from the sphere of law (including sources that were essential for examining politicised remembrance, such as: legal acts, documents of institutions dealing with settling accounts with the past, as well as other primary and secondary sources: press materials and scientific studies), educational sources (such as spatial forms of commemoration, scientific studies, and press materials, as well as school course books and educational strategies), and sources referring to political leaders (including––apart from scientific studies––speeches and interviews, as well as press materials, especially coverage of the speeches and activity of leaders). The presented division of the material base was in turn used for building the research sheet of a single source, which made it easier for us to gather data for analyses. Not only did it unify the research process, but it was also extremely helpful in the process of arranging the collected sources and formulating preliminary conclusions regarding the policy of memory for all cases discussed in the project. As a result, the research was conducted in a uniform manner, which prevented neglect in the first phase of the implementation of the project, thus ensuring the successful solution of all the research problems and the verification of our hypotheses. The research sheet we devised is presented in the table below.

Legitimisation of new elites

The political identity of a society

Tools of the remembrance policy

The description of transition

Type of source:

Time framework:

Country related:

Bibliographic data

Use of the idea of the state’s continuity Use of national symbols and heroes

1-3

The past as a legitimisation

1-2

1-1

Part Three. Detailed questions concerning the contents of a source

Post-authoritarian identity:

Authoritarian identity:

Not applied:

Applied:

Internal and external factors of transition:

Sources, course and scale of transition:

Part Two. General questions concerning the contents of a source

Part One. The register of a source

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions 27

28

Transitional justice

Presence of the former elite

Limited scope of the transitional justice

3-4

As a punishment for human rights violators

3-2 As a source of forgiveness

As a legitimisation of the rule of law

3-1

3-3

Division between the past and the present

2-5

As a legitimisation of democracy

2-2

Building a new political community

Counteracting internal conflicts

2-1

2-4

Remembrance as a source of reconciliation

1-6

As a definition of pluralism

Counteracting internal conflicts

1-5

2-3

New landscape of memory

1-4

Chapter Two

Symbolic roles of the democratization

Adaptation of new social and political standards

Social costs of transformations

Democratisation as a tribute for victims The pro-democratic selection of narratives

6-3

The intergenerational character of changes

6-1

6-2

The past and a new definition of patriotism

The role of the intergenerational agreement

5-2

5-5

The historical necessity of changes

5-1

Balance between the tradition and modernisation

The legitimisation of capitalism

4-4

5-4

The past as a source of stratifications

4-3

National heroes as role models

New economic attitudes and behaviours

4-2

5-3

The necessity of social costs of change

4-1

The Remembrance Policy and Political Identity during Transitions 29

Historical need for national unity

New organisation of time The past as a legitimisation of national unity Reasons for reconciliation and forgiveness Diversity of the landscape of memory Reconstruction of national heroes’ pantheon Reasons for membership of IGOs New identity as a fulfilment of transformations (Re-)Gaining an appropriate position in IR Adaptation of new standards

6-5

7-1

7-2

7-3

7-4

8-1

8-2

8-3

8-4

Part Four. Notes

National heroes as examples of behaviours

Chapter Two

6-4

Table 2.4. The research sheet of an individual source

A new state’s identity in international relations

30

CHAPTER THREE THE POLITICS OF MEMORY AND POLITICAL IDENTITY: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW BY ANNA RATKE-MAJEWSKA AND JOANNA MARSZAàEK-KAWA

Identity in Theoretical Considerations The politics of memory and political identity are two key concepts which needed to be considered in depth in order to discuss the issues involved in the project. This step was indispensable in making an effort to construct a universal model of how the state uses remembrance narratives aimed at constructing a new political identity of the society during the period of democratic transition, developed on the basis of the analysis of the transitional politics of memory in the six selected countries in the project, i.e. Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, South Africa, and Spain. In other words, without considering the significance, on the one hand, of the notion of political identity, and on the other hand––of the politics of memory, it would not have been possible to either distinguish the research categories (reflecting the use of remembrance narratives during the transition) and analyse particular cases (taking account of the transformations in the sphere of political identity and making an analysis of the degree of significance of each of the narrative’s aspects), or to carry out a multidimensional comparative analysis. Thus, the theoretical issues regarding the understanding of political identity and the politics of memory became a guarantee of conducting reliable research, providing the basis for analyses at all stages of the process of the project implementation. In order to understand the issues taken up, it became vital not only to define the mentioned key concepts, but also to consider them in many dimensions, to see the dependencies between them, and to pay attention to

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the issues which complement their substance. The theoretical basis built in this way could now become fully useful in answering the questions asked in the project. The notion of identity was considered on the grounds of social sciences and humanities by numerous researchers who considered its multiple aspects and meanings and analysed these from many, often different, points of view. In this way, the literature on the subject became abundant in publications presenting deliberations on individual, mass, social, cultural, ethnic and political identities [see, for example: Mizgalski, 2008; NiedĨwiedzki, 2003; PaweáczyĔska, 2012; PL: ToĪsamoĞü…, 2013; ToĪsamoĞü spoáeczna…, 2009], and this list is not exhaustive. However, it does not mean that the distinguished identity forms were dealt with by the authors in completely separate ways. On the contrary, elements of one identity were presented in literature as components of other identities, interwoven and forming an inseparable whole [see, among others: Cultural Identity..., 2004; Smith, 1991]. This assumption was also the essence of political identity the understanding of which indicated the scope of the issues of this project. The forerunner of the studies on identity is Erik Erikson, an American psychologist and psychoanalyst [Kroger, 2007: 7-8]. Despite the fact that his views contributed mainly to the development of psychology, psychiatry, sociology and anthropology, they were also reflected in other scientific fields and disciplines, including political science. Therefore, it is worth quoting his words which are echoed in the many theoretical works on the issue of identity. Erikson claimed that: Identity formation, finally, begins where the usefulness of identification ends. It arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications, and their absorption in a new configuration, which in turn, is dependent on the process by which a society (often through sub-societies) identifies the young individual, recognising him as somebody who had to become the way he is, and who, being the way he is, is taken for granted. [...] While the end of adolescence thus is a stage of an overt identity crisis, identity formation neither begins nor ends with adolescence: it is a lifelong development largely unconscious to the individual and to his society. [...] In my attempt to circumscribe the problem of identity I have been ‘all over the map’. I do not propose to leave that matter in this condition: as far as is possible, studies taking into account the specific dynamic nature of selected media (life history, case history, dream life, ideology) will follow [...]. In the meantime, and in summary: identity, in outbalancing at the conclusion of childhood the potentially malignant dominance of the infantile superego, permits the individual to forgo excessive self-repudiation and the diffused repudiation

The Politics of Memory and Political Identity

33

of otherness. Such freedom provides a necessary condition for the ego’s power to integrate matured sexuality, ripened capacities, and adult commitments. The histories of our young patients illustrate the ways in which aggravated identity crises may result from special genetic causes and from specific dynamic conditions. Such studies, in turn, throw new light on those more or less institutionalised rites and rituals, associations, and movements through which societies and sub-societies grant youth a world between childhood and adulthood: a psychosocial moratorium during which extremes of subjective experience, alternatives of ideological choice, and potentialities of realistic commitment can become the subject of social play and joint mastery [1959: 113, 164; see also Ibid., 1994].

Even though Erik Erikson’s deliberations concerned only a specific field of science, they allow us to draw some general conclusions, which help us to understand the phenomenon of identity as such, without distinguishing its types. The reflections of the researcher allow us to see that identity is nothing constant; it is always subject to change, and it is created by various, constantly self-transforming factors6 [Giddens, 2001; 2001; Jacobson-Widding, 1983: 13–32; Skarga, 1997]. This property of identity noticed by Erikson makes it possible to deepen the interpretation of this phenomenon, and to observe the features and elements which form its various manifestations. As a result, the research on identity can still develop, taking the form of interdisciplinary in-depth analyses. Importantly, the assumption that identity is subject to constant transformations due to the modification of the content and the intensity of factors creating it, became one of the foundations for determining the issues discussed in the present research project. What became the basis for the indicated research direction was the viewpoint that authoritarian political identity is different from democratic political identity as the elements forming it change. The views on the gist of political identity and the factors influencing its formation in turn provided the theoretical foundation for this approach.

 6

The changeable character of identity was emphasised by a great number of authors. For instance, Anthony Giddens noted “the identity of an individual is not simply something given as a continuity of his actions, but something that must be [...] generated and maintained by the reflectively thinking individual” [2001: 74]. According to Barbara Skarga, in turn, identity “transforms incessantly and incessantly constitutes its own self by concentrating within and then dispersing, for it is easily subjected to what is different trying to subordinate that otherness at the same time” (1997: 27).

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Chapter Three

Political Identity as an Element of Universal Human Identity7 When attempting to define political identity it is worth recognising the approach of Jerzy Mizgalski (2008). In his opinion, it is part of a greater whole, dubbed by him as the universal human identity which he explains in the following way: The universal human identity is the identification of an individual and a collectivity with the human kind at the level of the natural and community bond, and within these collectivises the identification of individuals with those collectivises, while at the same time feeling different from the other individuals within a particular collectivity, namely: 1) the biologicalspecies identity, 2) the procreative-genealogical identity, 3) social and 4) cultural. [2008: 19]

Importantly, the author did not restrict himself to providing a concise definition of the universal human identity, on the contrary––he deepened his descriptions. He distinguished very clearly the components of this identity (where the four-element structure of the universal human identity was formed by the before quoted: biological-species identity with the function of the preservation of the biological survival of the species; procreative-genealogical identity with the function of maintaining the unilineal system of kinship; social identity with the function of generating the coordination of individual actions, interactions and developing interpersonal bonds; and cultural identity with the function of creation) from its types (2008: 20-23), locating political identity amongst them: The structure of the universal human identity indicates the process of the self-determination of the human being in the face of the natural, social and cultural identity of the world, allowing one to distinguish oneself as: a biological being from other beings, a human being from other beings, and the man as a social being within a group from others in this group, one’s “own” group from the “others’” group, and to take a due place in the natural, social and cultural space. From the above defined universal human identity we can derive the following types of universal human identity: 1) biological, 2) social, 3) cultural, 4) national-historical, 5) religious, 6) individual, 7) generational, 8) family, and also political [2008: 20]

Hence, political identity can be considered through the universal human identity. However, it is worth focusing on its more detailed features which can be derived from the general understanding of identity, taken as

 7

An expression borrowed from the considerations of Jerzy Mizgalski (2008).

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the conscious and accepted membership of an individual or a collectivity in a determined relationships system, arising from a natural bond and/or due to various interests, values or objectives. Therefore, the focal point of identity is the belief in what we are, and also in what obligations and relations we share with others. In this approach, political identity is, in turn, also a membership of a system of relations the basis of which are on the one hand the bonds with the community considered in the political dimension (conceived as the “us”––“them” opposition), and on the other hand––the interests, values and objectives which can be set and achieved through connections with an organisation or a political collectivity. This is, in other words, the feeling of being determined politically, which takes into account the possibility of achieving certain objectives [Mizgalski, 2008, PaĔkow, 2005: 99-131; see also: Ford, 2005: 53-57; Joireman, 2003; Mackenzie, 1978]. Moreover, it is crucial that the notion of political identity comprises permanence and continuity, as well as change, which consists of transformation and creation. Importantly, political identity functions in a determined space and time, being a characteristic feature of the given stage. This approach is in line with the trend of deliberations on the inconstancy and processual character of identity. This feature was also noticed by Jerzy Mizgalski who made a detailed description of that aspect: The crystallisation of identity consists in the developing by a human or/and a group (a community) of a determined, and at the same time constant and changeable in pursuance of the situation and political events or events of a political aspect, relational system of political identity. By saying ‘a relational system’ I mean an identity structure made up of a network of relations between relatively constant components of that historically layered (time) and space dynamic (territory, place) structure. Briefly speaking, the crystallisation of identity insisted in the emergence of that identity of an individual or/and a collectivity from an unlimited number of its aspects (i.e. sub-identities––aspect identities) as a consistent whole and integrated in the form of autonomous identity, partially stereotype (to a certain degree constant, stabilised), but which is balanced by the creative identity factors. Identity crystallised repeatedly anew during the lifetime of an individual, a collectivity (social groups). Therefore, it is possible to distinguish ultimate identities, characteristic for particular stages in the life of an individual and the historical eras of human collectivises (groups, social classes, etc.). The crystallised ultimate identity of a given life stage or a historical stage comprised not only all the significant identifications, but it also transformed them so as to use them to form a new, unique and sensible, coherent whole (a complete identity) [...]. Identity is defined in many ways (as a value, a stable structure of the system of regulating human behaviour––certain states, i.e. constant levels of distinguishing

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Chapter Three identity forms). However, it is about such ways of defining identity according to which this notion comprises both the process and the states which are subsequent results of that process. Then, accentuated are the answers to the question about the ways of the forming, lasting and changing of the identity (and its variations, e.g. cultural, religious) of individuals and social groups or communities, not only about what that identity is. From this point of view, exposed are the circumstances or situations in which visible is the process of becoming, lasting, selecting, changing of various identifications, integrations; exposed are those ‘others’ who constitute the indispensable benchmark for the identity processes. [...] Important to the grasping of the change process is, constitutive for the sense of identity, the relation between ‘the same one’ and ‘the different one’. That sense of identity can be strong and weak. Self-determination before the relatively constant values or the clearly marked ‘places’ is conducive to the ‘strong’ sense of identity which involves the separation, the exclusion, of what is different. It is formed during the process of differentiation and division, drawing the boundaries. The ‘weak’ identity, scattered in the multitude of roles and the patterns offered by the culture, is expressed in the sense of not being permanently assigned to any of them, in the ease of crossing those boundaries [...]. Thus, the question about political identity refers, firstly, to the phenomenon of remaining ‘someone permanent and constant’, secondly, to the phenomenon of remaining ‘identical to the different’, which means as much as maintaining ‘the bounds’ or/and ‘separateness’. Political identity is a kind of structure which is made up of relations between the identity of the society, the country, its authorities and political identity [2008: 45-46, 243-244; 247].

The characteristics of the factors influencing the shape of political identity are another important issue––particularly from the point of view of the theoretical foundation of the project. What determines the content of the variable appropriate for the particular place and time identity allows us not only to discover in full its substance and features, but also draws attention to the multitude of aspects of interpretation, firstly, of its own self, and secondly, of the phenomena connected with it. Thus, it becomes possible to select the perspectives of the analysis of political identity, its transformations and formation, which are part of the assumptions of the present research project. Researchers of identity, including political identity, have paid special attention, on the one hand, to the determinants of the phenomenon described by them, and on the other hand, to the dimensions of its construction taking account of the micro- and macro-scale. In existing publications, the most important role amongst the factors forming identity (identity-forming) was played by both the elements of culture and the components of reality, including the realities of the given time in a given

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space and the transformations going on in the environment. However, this does not change the fact that the list of determinants of identity was often significantly longer. Therefore, it is now a good idea to put in order and summarise all the issues present in the literature on the subject, in order to refer the deliberations to the subject undertaken in the subject project, and to expand on the key issues within this area. The first important factor influencing the shape of political identity must be––as many authors argue––the culture, which is understood as the spiritual and material achievements of the human kind [PaweáczyĔska, 2012: 69]. Hence, political identity can be formed by the elements of the cultural heritage, both of one’s own, home culture, and that of other communities interacting with a given community or an individual. The importance of the cultural factor in the creation of identity is emphasised by the fact that the contact of a man with the culture of a collectivity in which he or she lives, takes place as early as the initial stage of socialisation. Therefore, we can speak––following Mizgalski [2008: 32]–– of “dipping” a child in culture through the learning of the mother tongue, fables, legends, songs, customs, rites, rituals, norms and symbols. Thus, culture is part of a man’s life from the outset, forming his or her identity. Similarly, in referring the above issue to a collectivity, it impacts the form and content of identity––also political––of the human kind. Another key element co-creating political identity is the reality in which a given individual or collectivity functions. This factor does not only concern the “here and now” reality, i.e. the present day, but also the past and future. In other words, the shape of political identity is influenced by both: the events contemporary to a given group or an individual, and the (historical, lifetime) experience which impacts preferred patterns of attitudes or behaviour, and also expectations about the future, and the attitude towards future events. And although the inconstancy of political identity means that it is specific to a certain time and space,8 it does not

 8

“Political identity––in political science––functions in a given time and space. For instance, with reference to the past of the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe it is a characteristic feature of that past. In industrial societies, the basic indicator of the identity of an individual was his or her workplace and the income they obtained from that work. The identification of an individual with a social group was connected with the interests of both the individual and the community (the social group). It resulted from a number of factors, namely: 1) the actions of some to the benefit of others (parents), 2) raising one’s satisfaction through identifying oneself with the successes of other people, 3) from a common experience (especially a dramatic one), 4) from the dependence on others, 5) from violence and a threat to life” [Mizgalski, 2012: 67].

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mean that its construction is only affected by the present day––history and visions of the future existing in the consciousness9 can be equally important factors of its formation [NiedĨwiecki, 2003: 104; Mead, 1978]. The above presented general determinants of political identity must now be specified in detail to account for the levels at which identity can be formed. The views of Marian Golka on the constructing of identity may serve as an introduction to their selection. His reflections refer to the above discussed aspects which they mirror, develop and complement. Then, the conclusions derived from them can be used and transferred to the research ground of political identity, so it is worth quoting the key fragments of his analyses: Nowadays, the creation or actually the discovering of our identity involves almost every aspect of our lives, our environment and our experience, as it is simply one of the aspects of our ‘becoming oneself’. Having said that, identity is not a simple outcome of the conscious actions of an individual or a group, although it is created and maintained by both the individual and the group [...]. The process of the formation and functioning of identity, both individual and collective, includes a number of factors: x x x x x x

the perception of one’s own physical, social and cultural features in the auto-reflection process; the analysis of one’s own needs, inclinations and motivations–– becoming aware of one’s own aspirations, expectations and ideas about one’s own fortunes; categorising, including placing oneself in the structure of the world (mainly social) and adjusting oneself to that structure; differentiating between ‘me’ (‘us’) and ‘him/her’ (‘them’) and the contact with otherness; ‘testing’ identity through contacts with others and through ‘experiencing’ one’s own self; responding to the impact of different social, political, and religious forces;

 9

“Temporariness of identity also refers to time orientation, resulting from identification, in the actions of a man. It occurs in the variants [...]: 1. orientation on the present day where the relationships are stressed, the participation in the life of a particular community, where attention is paid to daily events; 2. orientation on the past, manifested by emphasising the significance of tradition and the lasting value of culture through which a man is socialised; 3. orientation on the future within which self-identification is constructed on the basis of openness to the changes going on in culture and the social structure” [NiedĨwiecki, 2003: 104].

The Politics of Memory and Political Identity x x

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‘collecting’ information about oneself––mainly through the reproduction of individual and social memory resources; ‘nursing’ identity and maintaining it and ‘boosting’ through the functioning in a particular social-cultural environment [...].

Identity alterations happen through the taking on of new social roles, and religious [...], national [...], ideological [...] conversions. Thus, the process of forming identity is the process of becoming oneself, and only sometimes of becoming aware of who one is (as an individual or/and a collectivity) through extracting one’s own qualities and past experiences from the collective memory, and also the entering into the memory of those qualities and experiences which have been forgotten or ousted [...]. The autobiographic memory (experiences, achievements, failures), along with the manifestations of its recovery, can obviously be mythologised and complemented with implants of an ideological background with the tendency to maintain and strengthen the interests of an individual or a group. Sometimes, this really consists in ‘inventing memory’ that is conducive to generating the ‘desired’ individual or group identity. The same way as how the hiding or not emphasising one’s own identity is sometimes manifested, as a means of self-defence, so is identity (or let alone identification) also regarded as a moral reference, as an ethical commitment to the ‘own people’, which in extreme situations takes the form of weapons in the competition or struggle with the ‘others.’ [2012: 210, 212-213, 218-219]

The above presented deliberations and approaches are a great help in moving on from the description of the factors determining political identity considered at the general level to the presentation of the detailed elements creating the identity phenomena. Thus, we can observe that political identity is formed by cultural and historical contents (where a big role is played by tradition, religion and the language), the ongoing events and social, economic and political processes, experiences, aspirations, technological advances, civilisation conditionings, and also––relating to the above factors––by education of various types and various levels and the philosophical issues. Yet, the list can be easily extended, and the factors creating identity––more fragmented.10

 10 Jerzy Mizgalski pointed out, when discussing the political identity of individuals and social collectivises, that: “An individual or a social group, can participate in the political life in an active or passive way. Active participation in the political life can be articulated in the following ways: 1) membership of social and political organisations (e.g. in parties, associations, societies, trade unions, etc.); 2) active participation in political campaigns;

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The formation of political identity can happen at different levels–– within different types of social groups, starting from the most basic and smallest, ending with those that are very numerous and complex. Thus, political identity can be formed within a family, through religious, ethnic and national groups, cultural, political and vocational associations, or through various types of institutions and state structures. And it is the state or its political elites––reinforcing or eradicating certain cultural or historical contents, devising educational programmes, constructing the beliefs of the society, impacting its political commitment, and influencing the community’s attitude towards political, social, cultural and economic events (of the past, present and the future)––that deserve special attention from the perspective of the present research project. State authorities exercising the home and foreign policies of the state, including the creation of its politics of memory, to a great degree impact the shape of the political identity of the society functioning within the framework of the state organisation [Golka, 2012: 216; Mizgalski, 2008: 249].11

 3) active participation in the work of representative bodies (the parliament, local governments, etc.); 4) activity in local governments, religious and other organisations of cultural character (e.g. educational, creative, cultural-social societies, etc.); 5) participation in the decision-making groups of the economic life (e.g. in administration, supervisory boards of corporations, partnerships, companies, etc.). Passive participation in the political life is articulated in taking a vote in e.g. referendums, local government, parliamentary, presidential, the European Parliament elections, etc. The political identity of an individual is formed by: family life, education, the social environment, civilization-cultural conditions, views, beliefs and religion, material status and one’s place in the social hierarchy, political awareness (including formal education, permanent education and political intuition), the ability to interpret information (including acquiring, reading, analysing and processing information) and it is expressed by relationships: (1) me––history, (2) me––the state, (3) me––the nation, (4) me––religion, (5) me––tradition and culture, (6) me––lifetime experience, (7) me––participation in political life, (8) me–– current political reality, and (9) me––electoral decisions [2008: 218-220; also: ibid., 2010: 195-196]. 11 “What also plays a part in the creation of identity is any type of authority, and on the other hand, the submission of those entangled in the social and political life who are disciplined by it [...]. The role of the state in giving people or taking away from them their identity cannot be ignored (constitutional regulations, bilateral treaties, the protective regulations of international organisations). Those processes may include: teaching the languages of ethnic minorities or denying the right to it;

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The Politics of Memory The first issue which had to be dealt with––as early as at the stage of selecting the issues of the research project––was the scientific deliberations on whether the terms used by researchers of “politics of memory” and “remembrance policy” are equivalent and whether they can be used interchangeably, or on the contrary––it should be decided that either of them is more appropriate and proper [see Polityka pamiĊci...]. Many of the authors who conduct the analyses of political phenomena find the terms “politics of memory” and “remembrance policy” synonymous [Borowiec, 2013: 213; cf. Nijakowski, 2008]. Others in turn argue that they must be clearly distinguished from one another, with the “politics of memory” being part of “historical politics” [Leszkowicz, 2015]. They argue that a clear distinction must be marked between the two terms, where “the politics of memory” is a coherent and unequivocal notion, while “historical politics” is ambiguous, assuming manipulations and having negative connotations [Dr M. Korkuü..., 2015]. There are also opinions claiming that the “politics of memory” is a term better suited to the presenting of the phenomena it describes [Malczewska-Pawelec, 2011: 18; Nijakowski, 2008: 29]. 12

 allowing the use of native names or denying the right to it; the acceptance of religious practices; the acceptance of organisations and societies; the consent to keeping contacts between members of a given ethnic minority at home and abroad, or no state acceptance of it. A similar role is played by powerful religions (state religions, in particular). And last but not least, we must recognise the role of the economic, political and cultural power in the specific “attraction of identity” (or in identifying oneself). And also, the role of the more powerful entities in classifying the weaker ones and attributing identity to them [...]. Various “ideologies” imposing certain beliefs and ideas on what one should be like are also significant here (for instance, the ideas of pan-Slavism, the Illyrian movement, or the “Yugoslovianity” in the states of the former Yugoslavia, or the “Afrocentric ideas” in the seeking of their identity by the Afrikaners), which can be accompanied by acts of the forced mobilisation of such and no other identity” [Golka, 2012: 216]. 12 Such a standpoint was presented in the publication A Revolution in the Historical Memory. A Comparative Study into the Practices of Manipulation of Mass Memory: “Speaking of the politics of the historical memory what we mean is the measures taken by the representatives of the elites in order to intentionally model the collective historical memory and to exercise control over it; in other words, wielding it so as to achieve particular ideological and political objectives (typically, connected with the broadly taken intention to legitimise that authority and the social order supported by it). Effectively, such measures usually take the form of the conscious creation, transformation and deconstruction of specific memorial places [...]. The above enumerated actions are usually referred to as

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It is in the very title of the present research project that priority was given to the term “politics of memory”. However, it does not mean that in order to realise the undertaken issues, the boundary between the two terms was the focal point of the research. On the contrary, the most significant issue for conducting a reliable analysis was to observe the gist of the issue which ruled out the rejection of any approaches to the subject only because of the used terminology. Thus, the terms “politics of memory” and “remembrance policy” were treated equally in the project. The basic reason for taking such a standpoint was the need to facilitate drawing homogenous conclusions, while resisting the divisions of ambiguity at the same time. What is more, the practical role of this assumption was confirmed (used during the course of research actions) by the works of authors from many parts of the world, in which––for the description of the phenomena included in the issues of the present research––the terms “politics of memory” or “politica de la memoria” were used alongside terms such as “remembrance policy”, “politicised remembrance”, “historical politics” or “politica de la historia”. Using the notions of primarily the same denotation during the course of the analyses, without focusing solely on a homogeneous name, consequently facilitated greatly the implementation of the project and helped to evade getting entangled in discussions on the terminological ambiguity. The term “politics of memory” comprises two elements key to the understanding of the notion––“memory” and “politics”. The memory of a human being concerning a particular event can be built on the basis of his or her own experiences, but it is only one possible way to construct its content as to be familiar with certain events one does not have to experience them in person, but be part of the given culture. Thus, cognition is an intercultural experience, and memory can be formed on the basis of the tales of the past that are present in the culture in which a given individual functions [see: Zybertowicz, 2001: 118-134]. Importantly, the stories of the past events must not be regarded as exact reflections of reality for the remembrance narrative reflects not the past itself, but the interpretations of the past or the ideas of the past events. Hence, it is a tale conceived by its author who presents a self-constructed image of a given history element [McCullagh, 1984: 394; Tokarz, 2005: 4-

 historical politics. The expression is a calque of the German Geschichtspolitik and in our opinion it does not seem to be well fitted. After all, it is not about what history (i.e. the past) was like, but about what (and how) will be learnt and remembered from it. That is why we advocate the expression “politics of historical memory” [Malczewska-Pawelec, Pawelec, 2011: 18].”

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11; Topolski, 1996]. This issue can be summarised with the following words: A historian plays an active role in the process of changing facts into tales. Each history is marked with an imprint of its author’s individualism. A historian starts work with given baggage of experience. His mind is not a blank piece of paper. Images present in narrations are often a derivative of particular assumptions (of the world, the man, the past) taken up in a more or less conscious way by their authors. Through narration, a historian not only presents his idea of the past, but also passes on (yet, usually not directly) his or her own view of the world and the man. To him, narration is a tool of intellectual, ideological, aesthetical expression. [Tokarz, 2005: 9]

The above presented extract refers to the work of historians, yet the gist of the presented dependences must not be attributed solely to the message conceived by scientists as it is proper to all the other forms of telling the past, including scientific papers, media coverage, journalism, arts, legends, the accounts of the witnesses of historical events, and also–– to the politics of memory. The causes of such a state of affairs must be sought in the very character of memory which does not perpetuate records in the form of a film, primarily due to its limited resources [Maruszewski, 2001: 79, 117-118]. This view is confirmed by the reflections of Daniel L. Schacter. In his opinion: We do not record our experiences the way a camera records them. Our memories work differently. We extract key elements from our experiences and store them. We then recreate or reconstruct our experiences rather than retrieve copies of them. Sometimes, in the process of reconstructing we add on feelings, beliefs, or even knowledge we obtained after the experience. In other words, we bias our memories of the past by attributing to them the emotions or knowledge we acquired after the event. [2003: 22]

Schacter’s remarks refer to a very important property of memory which involves not only remembering, but also forgetting, i.e. selecting the content in order to store useful information and reject useless information. It is worth adding that the remembered experiences include both the moments of joy and success, and the moments of suffering and sadness. In this way, the data are reinforced, on the one hand, concerning those behaviour patterns which give positive results, and on the other–– regarding actions giving negative results [Singer, Conway, 2008: 279-285; Reisberg, Hauer, 2004: 3-41]. The presented deliberations on the ways of constructing and the nature of memory, as well as on the relation of remembrance narratives with

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reality can be referred to both the individual memory of human beings, and to the collective memory. This view is supported by the words of Barbara Szacka,13 who, considering the notion “collective memory”, stated the following: The collective memory of the past is the ideas of the past of one’s own group, constructed by individuals from the information remembered by them [...] derived from a number of sources and reaching them through a number of channels. The information is understood, selected and transformed in accordance with one’s own cultural standards and viewpoints. The standards are in turn generated socially, which means they are shared by all members of a given collectivity. This leads to the unification of the ideas of the past, which thereby allows us to speak of the collective memory of the history of one’s own group. The collective memory [...] is not static, but changeable and dynamic. It is also an area of incessant encounters, clashes, and also of a mixture of images of the past constructed from different perspectives and different elements. Three kinds of elements refer to the most recent past. The first group involves the memory of individuals of their own experiences. The second one––the memory of the collectivity grown from shared, personal experiences of many individuals, and the collectively agreed symbolic language of communicating them. The third group refers to the officially communicated image of the past and the official celebrations commemorating the past events. [2006: 44-45]

The above extract, by drawing attention to the impact of official actions of the state authorities on the content of memory (collective, and consequently––individual), enters the field of the analyses of the comprehension of the memory of politics. However, what should be a vital introduction to the analysis of the phenomenon is the reflection on the first of the elements which make up the term––the word “politics”, alongside the above considered “memory”. However, we ought to consider not what politics is as such, but how “politics” ought to be understood in the politics of memory. An interesting approach was put forward by Eugeniusz Ponczek who stated: Minding the previously articulated thesis which claims that historical politics is undoubtedly politics in full respect, it must be stressed that the former is one of ‘detailed politics’ such as for example economic politics, social politics, educational politics, cultural politics, publishing politics [...], scientific politics, or foreign politics. It often happens that historical politics as ‘detailed politics’ can be dealt with as an important component of the relatively broadly understood didactic politics or educational

 13

On collective memory see also: Kwiatkowski, 2008.

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politics (particularly with regard to the preferred syllabuses and history course-books, or pedagogical teleology) and cultural policy (for example in supporting a particular tradition or artistic output, which can be a kind of vehicle of historical contents and reflections [...]) [...]. We must not forget about publishing politics (certain political entities and thus certain institutions strive to publish those historical works were certain events and their heroes are presented in a proper, desired manner, especially as regards contemporary history), and also about teleological politics (e.g. when in many temples the faithful get to hear about e.g. the Christian heritage of the nation and its historical mission), or perhaps even about propaganda politics (when it is about identifying oneself with the authoritarian or democratic regimes which use legitimacy justified by the references to tradition, or such or another ideology referring to the past). [2013: 9]

Ponczek’s deliberations seem to oscillate around the two meanings of the word “politics” in the politics of memory––the activity of state institutions, based on the strategies of making tales of the past, as well as all forms of exploiting historical aspects in politics, where each and every reference to the past is an element of the politics of memory. However, following the main line of reasoning presented in the above extract, i.e. that shaping remembrance is one of “detailed politics”, we can state that the politics of memory does not concern the whole of what refers to history in the political discourse, but the activities of some specific state institutions. Thus, the remembrance policy can be considered on a par with economic, social or foreign policies, being––as the other ones––the strategies and means of achieving the objectives set by the state authorities. Therefore, the politics of memory is part of the activity of state institutions. Even though this statement must be put at the focal point of defining its essence, it does not fully reflect all of its characteristic features, the outline of which emerges from the issues presented in this chapter. The politics of memory can be regarded as a means by which state authorities influence the cultural content shared within the collectivity by promoting those interpretations of the past which have been regarded by them as proper and vital for the permanence of the community. Therefore, the politics of memory––through its focus on the community in terms of politics––impacts the political identity of the society. Its ordering function is also vital. By systemising norms, values, behaviour patterns, and ideas, the politics of memory obliges an individual to take, but also to avoid taking certain actions. Therefore, it is capable of guiding the community when making political choices (at times of change and uncertainty). What is more, although it shows connections between the past and the present

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and the future, it is primarily future-oriented. Thus, it is a complex system of managing collective memory based on arousing emotions and the arbitrary decisions of the authorities on what will be remembered and what will be forgotten [see: Hoskins, 2007: 246-247; Koczanowicz, 1997: 259270; ibid., 2009: 26-33; Labanyi, 2008: 119-125; Nijakowski, 2006: 5462; Roseman, 1996: 836-860, Uldricks, 2009: 60-82]. Another important feature is that it is non-scientific, which means that the content of narratives used in it cannot be strictly identified with scientifically acknowledged historical facts [Le Goff, 2007; Werner, 2006: 52; Kula, 2006: 40-48].14 The above presented description of the politics of memory is widely supported by the views of numerous researchers. It must be added that in many cases––among the key issues we dealt with in the discussion––we include reflections on the tools of the politics of memory (particularly, the landscape of memory, or the calendar of public holidays), their effectiveness and place in the public space [Kula, 2006: 48; Nijakowski, 2006: 54-62]. Hence, it is worth––in order to sum up––referring to the views of Lech Nijakowski, who, while analysing the phenomena within the politics of memory, reflected its most significant––and already mentioned––features: .

The specific nature of (social and biographical) memory is determined by its character, i.e. it is not merely neutral knowledge of the past. Memory is closely linked with the concept of authority. What people remember, and what emotions they have about those memories, has an influence on their decisions, attitudes and behaviour. Therefore, we shall define the politics of memory as any intentional actions of politicians and officials which aim at reinforcing, removing or redefining specific contents from the collective memory. Those actions can take the form of innovations as well as routine practices. Hence, the politics of memory does not refer to all processes of social remembering and forgetting, but to intentional actions which can

 14 The subject of the non-scientific character of the remembrance policy was also dealt with by Andrzej Werner who stated: “active participation in the implementation of ‘historical politics’ must be perceived by historians as an act nearing professional suicide, at least within the framework of research work. For a political historian or a historical politician, the view of history is frozen, immobilised, in the recognised and desired form. The only research questions which can be asked concern the details which confirm the ready, before-assumed vision, and even they would not necessarily function in the political-historical system as it is the principal foundations rather than the petty details of the construction that are presented, the aim being the right and expected attitude of the society to its own past, strengthening the collective (national) bonds rather than knowledge” [2006: 52].

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obviously be subject to structural conditioning and which can provide unintentional results (this is what usually happens). The public historical discourse can be made by the representatives of various professions, but conducting the politics of memory requires public legitimisation. The politics of memory sometimes resorts to violence––both direct, e.g. through an administrative decision––against the public’s will––on changing a street name or removing a monument or some other symbols unaccepted by the authorities [...]. The symbolic violence consists in [...] imposing, primarily in the educational process, those cognitive categories which make the dominated ones unable to denominate their subordination or rebel against it. Their place in the society seems ‘natural’ and ‘obvious’ to them, and a higher social status seems ‘not right to them.’ A change in the social memory makes people perceive the social reality in accordance with the schemes beneficial to the domineering group, they exclude themselves from the competition to acquire power. Thus, the politics of memory is the high stakes game. [...] The elites can decide about the politics of memory only indirectly, devising educational programmes (in the media, in particular) and teaching the history of the nation at schools, for the ultimate shape of memory is conditioned on the one hand by family memory, and on the other by the mediatised mass culture and the commercialised history promoted by it. [Nijakowski, 2006: 54, 56]

The understanding of the politics of memory as a sphere of activity of the state authorities, as implied by the deliberations presented in this chapter, which consists of the interpretation of the past by the authorities in order to impact the political identity of the society, the values and ideas shared by the community, and to form social attitudes and behaviour patterns, has provided the basis for the implementation of this project, indicating the direction of the research work. Thus, the theoretical deliberations became an indispensable element on the way to solving the established research objectives, being an integral part of each of the tasks we set ourselves.

PART TWO COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

CHAPTER FOUR THE COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF USING REMEMBRANCE NARRATIVES TO CONSTRUCT A NEW POLITICAL IDENTITY DURING THE POST-AUTHORITARIAN TRANSITION BY PATRYK WAWRZYēSKI AND JOANNA MARSZAàEK-KAWA

General Remarks Over the past four decades, democratisation has become one of the most popular categories used in social sciences. It has become a process which fascinates researchers of politics and law. Numerous attempts at recognising its sources, overall features and rules––which make it possible to effectively move on from the authoritarian order to democracy––have made us much more aware of its specifics and complexity [Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010; Armony and Schamis, 2005; Grugel, 2003; Geddes, 2009; Blind, 2014; Kadivar and Caren, 2016]. It still remains a valid question though, as expressed by Barbara Geddes [1999] in her scientific query, of how much we know about democratisation in the light of the increasingly numerous and versatile cases of transition from the authoritarian regime to democracy. The interest of political sciences in the democratisation process and the remarkable popularity of this category do not mean, however, that all the aspects of the transformation of a political regime have been examined equally. Until now, little interest has been paid to the role of remembrance narratives during the reconstruction of the political identity of the postauthoritarian society. This was not even changed by the dynamic growth of studies on collective memory during the first decade of the 21st century. It is surprising that it is common to use the interpretations of the past as a source of legitimising a strategy, decision, or actions of political leaders, and the very remembrance narratives appeared to be a powerful tool for

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51

mobilising citizens or manipulating their involvement in the dealings of the state [Khalili, 2007: 222; Westen, 2008: 41-49; WawrzyĔski and Schattkowsky, 2015]. The awareness of the significance of stories on the past as a valuable political resource has made us ask an important question: how can the government’s remembrance policy be used in the process of reconstructing the political identity of a society during the course of democratic transformations? Our interest in answering this question resulted in the research we conducted on the use of remembrance narratives during the post-authoritarian transition. It provides answers which allow us to better understand the relationships between a government’s remembrance policy and the democratisation process and its effectiveness. Our work makes it possible to show the transformation from another, previously neglected, perspective which indeed is related to the fundamental task of democratisation: the reconstruction of the political and social reality and legitimising the new vision of the community. With the use of eight basic research categories referring to the transitional remembrance policy, we discovered correlations between their elements, and also their relationship with the features of the transition, the causes of change, the authoritarian identity, and the vision of the democratic-to-be society as envisaged by the state. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the diverse cases of Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Spain, Poland and South Africa enabled us to make some valuable observations on the qualities of democratisation as such, and to formulate more theoretical hypotheses serving as the foundation of the general model––discussed in the next chapter––of the post-authoritarian remembrance policy. The preliminary research we conducted allowed us to distinguish eight research categories which determined the basic functions of the transitional politics of memory. Next, they were divided further into thirtyseven issues aimed at nailing down the fields in which the interpretations of the past could be used to reconstruct the political identity of the postauthoritarian society. It was both the categories and fields of impact that served to collect and process data, and to recognise the overall features of the transitional remembrance policy and the observed dependencies between its individual elements. As a result, the present chapter is a discussion on the most important relationships between the categories and fields of impact of remembrance policy on the political identity of the society, which we discovered during the course of the comparative research that we conducted. We divided our observations into six groups of important relationships: (1) within the research categories, (2) between the research categories, (3) between the categories and the source, the progress or the extent of the

52

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transition, (4) between the categories and the internal and external causes of the change, (5) between the categories and the properties of the identity of the authoritarian society, and (6) the envisaged identity of the democratic society. Thus, the first two groups co-create a map of dependencies between the particular aspects of the government’s remembrance policy; the next two highlight the relationships between the remembrance policy and the conditioning of the transition; while the last two define the position of the different aspects of using remembrance narratives to reconstruct the society’s political identity during the democratisation.

The Relationships within the Research Categories The first of the distinguished functions of the transitional remembrance policy is the use of it as a source of legitimising the taking over of and exercising power by the new political elites (the pro-democratic opposition or a reformist movement) at the expense of the previous authoritarian regime elites. This aspect played an important role in the construction of remembrance narratives in five countries in the study, while it was only in Spain where it was of secondary importance and played a less significant role in the politics of memory. The significance of this issue is best illustrated by the cases of Chile, Estonia and South Africa where the augmentation of the position of the new leaders through promoting certain interpretations of the past was a far-reaching objective of the transitional remembrance policy. Hence, we must stress that we observed a strong correlation between the average result for the category and the three fields of impact: preventing internal conflicts as the historical legitimisation of the new elites (r=0.88), past experience as the legitimisation of the political position of new elites (r=0.86), and the change of national symbols and of the pantheon of national heroes as the justification of the leadership of the new elites (r=0.80)––it is the extent to which remembrance policy is used so as to achieve those three objectives that allows the very precise determining of the extent of using the interpretations of the past to account for the dominance of the new political elites during the democratic transformation. Moreover, we also noticed an important correlation between two fields of this category––the significance of the past, as the legitimisation of the position of the new elites, was related to the intensity of using the reconstruction of national symbols and the pantheon of national heroes (r=0.82)––while in all other cases (as can be seen in Table 4.1) the relationships between fields were noticeably weaker.

Remembrance as a source of reconciliation

Counteracting internal conflicts

Use of national symbols and heroes

Use of the idea of the continuity of the state

The past as a legitimisation

53

The past as a legitimisation 0.26 0.25 0.60 0.63 0.82 0.86 Use of the idea of the continuity of the state 0.26 0.00 0.66 0.77 -0.13 0.54 Use of national symbols and heroes 0.00 0.27 0.56 0.55 0.82 0.80 New landscape of memory 0.25 0.66 0.27 0.60 -0.13 0.60 Counteracting internal conflicts 0.60 0.77 0.56 0.60 0.34 0.88 Remembrance as a source of reconciliation 0.63 -0.13 0.55 -0.13 0.34 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.56 Average 0.86 0.80 0.88 Table 4.1. Legitimisation of new elites––the strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between fields of impact and the category average (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Legitimisation of new elites

New landscape of memory

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Average

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A somewhat less important function of remembrance policy in democratisation is the justification of the presence of the representatives of the authoritarian regime in the political life of the transformed state. The collected data highlighted the difference between the transformations in Poland and South Africa, where the undisputed electoral win of the pro-democratic opposition put a significant curb on the position of the past elites during the transformation, and the transitional model in the other countries, where the active participation of the members of the authoritarian apparatus in managing the transformation, was a safeguard of its permanence and stability. This strategy is best seen in the cases of Georgia and Spain, where the legitimisation of the position of the past elite in the new democratic order was more important than using remembrance narratives to give credibility to the new political leadership. We observed a strong correlation in the average result for the category in the case of two fields of impact of transitional remembrance: defining the political pluralism and the equality of the democratic competition through the presence of the representatives of the past regime in the state’s new political system (r=0.96), and their involvement in the formation of democracy as a form of the legitimisation of the very process of the transformations, the new order, and the idea of political pluralism (r=0.89). We can see that the strength of those relationships indicates the fundamental importance of those two aspects to the extent of using remembrance narratives as the transitional justification of the position of the representatives of the authoritarian regime. What is less important in this respect is the connection with the need to avert internal conflicts, while the application of the symbolic separation of the past from the present has a negative effect on this very function of the remembrance policy of democratisation. Additionally, we identified strong relationships between the two pairs of fields of impact––the presence of the past elites as the legitimisation of democracy and pluralism correlates to the defining of pluralism and equality through their involvement (r=0.94) and the legitimisation of their presence through resorting to the historical need to extinguish internal conflicts and stop the vision of the society (r=0.89); the remaining relationships are presented in Table 4.2. We achieved valuable results for the third category––legitimisation of the applied model of transitional justice. Overall, this function was marginalised by authoritarian governments, yet in Estonia and South Africa the construction of the model of dealing with the past was one of the prime objectives of remembrance policy set by the new authorities. What is more, the cabinet of Nelson Mandela turned it into the foundation of the reconstruction of the society’s political identity, ultimately turning

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the adopted model of transitional justice in South Africa into the most important function of the transitional remembrance narratives. A radically different approach was adopted by the authorities of Georgia, where this aspect was of negligible importance in the course of democratic transformations. The distinctive differences between countries do not imply, however, that we failed to discover some vital connections between the average result for the category and fields of impact––a very strong correlation can be seen in two cases, between the average and the settling of accounts as a form of legitimising the rule of law (r=0.96) and presenting it as a source of forgiveness and reconciliation (r=0.96). In the remaining two cases, the relationships, although weaker, still allow us to assume there is a dependency between the significance of this function of the transitional remembrance policy and the role of its particular elements. At the same time, the research helped recognise two pairs of strong relationships between fields as we noticed a correlation between the transitional justice as a form of legitimising the rule of law; firstly, presenting it as a source of forgiveness (r=0.98), and, secondly, presenting it as a means to punish those responsible for authoritarian crimes and the violation of human rights (r=0.85); all of the results are presented in Table 4.3. Another category––the justification of social, especially economic, costs of democratic transformations––in all of the six cases, was of secondary importance, which means that this function did not enjoy a lot of attention on the part of the transitional remembrance policy. What is interesting is the fact that––with regard to this function––we failed to observe any strong correlations within the category, which can also be seen in Table 4.4. The most significant of the recognised ones was the relationship between the average result for the category and using memory as the justification of the new social and economic attitudes of citizens (r=0.79). The fifth of the distinguished functions of the remembrance policy of the transition––the legitimisation of the adoption of the new social and political standards, even if they are regarded as culturally different–– shows only too well the different roles a government can attribute to the transitional remembrance narratives. On the one hand, in Estonia, Spain and South Africa, this objective was achieved to a moderate degree, which proves that remembrance policy can be used to account for the transformations of the standards and patterns of civic behaviour. But then, on the other hand, in Poland, Georgia and Chile this function played by far a less important role, and the interpretations of the past scarcely served to promote the new political behaviour.

Division between the past and the present

Building a new political community

As a definition of pluralism

As a legitimisation of democracy

Counteracting internal conflicts 0.74 -0.22 -0.30 0.67 0.89 As a legitimisation of democracy 0.00 -0.33 0.89 0.94 0.89 As a definition of pluralism 0.74 0.23 -0.41 0.94 0.96 Building a new political community -0.22 0.00 0.23 -0.74 0.45 Division between the past and the present -0.30 -0.33 -0.41 -0.74 -0.60 0.67 0.45 -0.60 Average 0.89 0.96 Table 4.2. Presence of the former elite in the nation’s public life––the strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between fields of impact and the category average (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Presence of the former elite

Chapter Four

Counteracting internal conflicts

56

Average

Limited scope of the transitional justice

As a punishment for human rights violators

As a legitimisation of the rule of law

57

As a legitimisation of the rule of law 0.52 0.85 0.98 0.96 As a punishment for human rights violators 0.71 0.29 0.78 0.85 As a source of forgiveness 0.71 0.57 0.98 0.96 Limited scope of the transitional justice 0.52 0.29 0.57 0.73 0.78 0.73 Average 0.96 0.96 Table 4.3. The transitional justice––the strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between fields of impact and the category average (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Transitional Justice

As a source of forgiveness

A New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition

Average

Social costs of transformations

Chapter Four

The legitimisation of capitalism The past as a source of stratifications

New economic attitudes and behaviours

The necessity of social costs of change

The necessity of social costs of change -0.32 -0.46 -0.68 -0.25 New economic attitudes and behaviours -0.32 0.29 0.68 0.79 The past as a source of stratifications -0.46 0.29 -0.09 0.76 The legitimisation of capitalism -0.68 0.68 -0.09 0.20 -0.25 0.79 0.76 0.20 Average Table 4.4. The social costs of transformation––the strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between fields of impact and the category average (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

58

Average

The past and a new definition of patriotism

Balance between the tradition and modernisation

The role of the intergenerational agreement

The historical necessity of changes

59

The historical necessity of changes 0.22 0.76 -0.17 -0.27 0.60 The role of the intergenerational agreement 0.22 -0.17 0.15 0.68 0.88 National heroes as role models 0.76 -0.17 -0.49 0.21 0.57 Balance between the tradition and modernisation -0.17 -0.49 0.14 0.39 0.88 The past and a new definition of patriotism -0.27 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.48 0.60 0.68 0.57 0.39 0.48 Average Table 4.5. The adoption of new social and political standards––the strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between fields of impact and the category average (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Adaptation of new social & political standards

National heroes as role models

A New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition

Average

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The existence of two different models of using remembrance policy to legitimise the new standards did not contribute to observing a greater number of significant correlations between individual elements. What is more, none of the relationships of the average result for the category can be deemed significant, and the recognised dependencies were rather weak. The only exception is the correlation between the indication of the intergenerational dialogue as the justification of new civic behaviours and the balance between tradition and modernisation (r=0.88). The findings presented in Table 4.5 indicate how distinctively this relationship stands out among all the dependencies characterising this category. Differences between countries are also noticeable when using remembrance narratives to justify symbolic roles of the democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract and a tribute paid to the victims of the oppression and the heroes of the opposition. In Chile, Estonia, Spain and South Africa this function was the key aspect exercised by the government’s remembrance policy, while the promoted interpretations of the past were to support the recognition of democratisation as a result of historical processes and the involvement of people in the struggle for freedom. In Poland and Georgia, however, this task was deemed less important, which resulted in the significantly lower level of using remembrance policy to justify the transformations as the common heritage of all the generations striving to overthrow the authoritarian order. The collected data helped us see a strong correlation between the average result for this category and the following two fields of impact of remembrance narratives: a selection of the narratives in such a way that it allows the adjustment of their content and the heroes to the challenges of democratisation (r=0.91), and the promotion of the memory of the heroes as a source of the patterns of civic and democratic attitudes (r=0.90). Furthermore, we recognised a strong correlation between those very fields, i.e. the adjustment of the selection of narratives to democratisation and presenting the heroes as the role models of attitudes and behaviour (r=0.87). In the other cases––as can be seen in Table 4.6––the observed dependencies were weaker and they do not allow us to assume that there are any lasting relationships in the intensity of implementing particular tasks of the transitional remembrance policy. Another interesting case is the use of remembrance narratives as an argument promoting the historical need for national unity. This function was the key to the democratisation of Chile, moderately important to the transformations in Estonia and Spain, less important in Georgia and South Africa, and almost insignificant in the case of Poland. Such a big diversity

Democratisation as a tribute for victims

The intergenerational character of changes

The intergenerational character of changes -0.13 0.77 Democratisation as a tribute for victims -0.13 0.39 The pro-democratic selection of narratives 0.77 0.39 National heroes as examples of behaviours 0.60 0.20 0.87 New organisation of time -0.20 0.27 0.13 0.55 0.52 Average 0.91 Table 4.6. The symbolic roles of the democratisation––the strength of Pearson’s correlation of impact and the category average (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Symbolic roles of the democratisation

The pro-democratic selection of narratives

A New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition

National heroes as examples of behaviours -0.20 0.27 0.13 0.35

New organisation of time

0.55 0.52 0.91 0.90 0.49

61

0.35 0.49 0.90 coefficient between fields

0.60 0.20 0.87

Average

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of results for this category came as a surprise––not only is the promotion of national unity an important function of remembrance policy, but it is also a fundamental task of talking about the past during the course of the democratisation process, and the basic challenge for the politics of transformations [Kuzio, 2001; Kolstø, 2006; Laplante, 2009; Paauw, 2009; Onslow, 2011]. Apparently, as the Polish transition shows though, national unity and the consolidation of the society are not always inseparable elements of the democratisation process. It does not mean, however, that there are no significant relationships between the individual aspects of this function of remembrance narratives. We observed strong correlations of the average result for this category with two fields of impact: showing the experience of the past as the direct justification of the need for national unity (r=0.89) and using the historical justifications of the need for reconciliation and forgiveness (r=0.83). Additionally, those fields were strongly related (r=0.88), which shows that these elements must be regarded as an interrelation. We recognised a similar correlation in the case of the remaining two fields of impact––the transformation of the landscape of memory into a pluralistic and nationwide one, and the reconstruction of the pantheon of national heroes towards diversity (r=0.87), making this category unique. As the only one, it contains all the significant correlations between all the tasks which can be carried out through the transitional remembrance policy. The remaining results are presented in Table 4.7. A qualitative distinction of the researched countries was provided by the last of the categories––the legitimisation of the membership of international organisations, or international blocs/groups. Overall, this function played a role in the case of those countries which aspired to join the political and economic structures of Western Europe, namely: Estonia, Georgia, Poland and Spain. At the same time, this aspect was of negligible importance to the remembrance policy of the non-European states, thus, being played down in both Chile and South Africa. This shows that the appeal of international organisations determines whether transitional remembrance narratives are used or not to justify the change of the state’s identity in international politics or regional integration processes. With regard to this function, we observed strong correlations of the average result for the category and the following fields of impact: presenting the membership of international organisations as the historical complement of the transformation and the historical challenges of the nation (r=0.93), and also between directly showing the experience of the past as the justification of the integration aspirations and the change to the state’s identity in international politics (r=0.90). At the same time, there is

0.89

Average

0.83

-0.38 -0.13

0.88

Diversity of the landscape of memory 0.10

0.87

-0.32 -0.38

0.43

0.09 -0.13 0.87

Reconstruction of national heroes’ pantheon 0.89 0.83 0.10 0.43

63

Table 4.7. The historical need for national unity––the strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between fields of impact and the category average (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

0.88 -0.32 0.09

The past as a legitimisation of national unity

The past as a legitimisation of national unity Reasons for reconciliation and forgiveness Diversity of the landscape of memory Reconstruction of national heroes’ pantheon

Historical need for national unity

Reasons for reconciliation and forgiveness

A New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition

Average

New state’s identity in international relations

Chapter Four

Adaptation of new standards

(Re-)Gaining an appropriate position in IR

New identity as a fulfilment of transformations

Reasons for membership in IGOs

Reasons for membership of IGOs 0.43 0.63 0.80 0.90 New identity as a fulfilment of transformations 0.73 0.46 0.80 0.93 (Re-)Gaining an appropriate position in IR 0.43 0.73 0.16 0.68 Adaptation of new standards 0.63 0.46 0.16 0.72 0.68 0.72 Average 0.90 0.93 Table 4.8. The new state’s identity in international relations––the strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between fields of impact and the category average (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

64

Average

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also a strong bond between those two fields (r=0.80), which shows that the intensity of the implementation of those tasks is interdependent. The strength of all the correlations for this category is presented in Table 4.8. The research we conducted on the role of remembrance policy in the transitional reconstruction of the political identity of the society allowed us to identify thirteen significant relationships between the average results for the category and fields of impact of remembrance narratives. We recognised most correlations––three––in the case of the legitimisation of the exercise of power by the new political elites, while none with respect to the justification of the social costs of transformations and the adoption of new social standards. The other five categories are characterised by two similar dependencies. In addition, we also observed ten other significant relationships between fields of impact, which failed to occur only in the case of using remembrance narratives to account for the social costs of democratisation. The correlations within the category were the most important to the overall relationships with the following categories: the transitional justice (22.22% of the whole), the historical need for national unity (20.00%), the presence of the representatives of the authoritarian regime (19.05%), and the membership of international organisations (16.67%). Jointly, these relationships accounted for less than 15% of all of the recognised strong correlations between fields of impact of the transitional remembrance narratives.

Relationships between Research Categories The discussed relationships within functions of the transitional remembrance policy allow us to show the role of remembrance narratives from a previously unknown perspective. The relationships between the research categories, however, accounted for more than eight out of ten significant correlations recognised during the course of our research. They can be divided into three basic subgroups: (1) the correlations of the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy with individual variables, (2) the correlations of the average result for categories with the other elements, and (3) the correlations of fields of impact with the other aspects of using stories on the past during the democratisation process. Each of them provided some other form of knowledge about the significance of remembrance narratives in the process of the reconstruction of the political identity of the post-authoritarian society, and contributed in a different way to the construction of the general model of this phenomenon.

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The conducted research showed that the use of remembrance policy during the transition is most strongly linked to two categories, i.e. showing democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract and paying tribute to the victims of the repressions and to the heroes of the struggle for freedom (r=0.96), and also the justification of the social costs of transformations as an inevitable consequence of historical processes (r=0.91)––thus, it is the intensification of the fulfilment of these functions through transitional remembrance narratives that is strongly correlated to the greater role of remembrance policy in the process of the reconstruction of political identity. The legitimisation of the transitional justice plays a considerably lesser role (r=0.71), and so does the justification of the adoption of the new standards of the social and political life (r=0.67), while yet weaker correlations concern the historical need for national unity (r=0.56), the legitimisation of the presence of the representatives of the previous regime (r=0.46), and legitimisation of the coming to power by new political elites (r=0.31); and lastly, a slightly negative and a very weak correlation was observed with regard to the last category––the legitimisation of the membership of international organisations (r=-0.04). At the same time, we recognised two significant relationships between the general shape and fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy. One of the them was assigned to presenting democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract––the adjustment of the selection of narratives to support the need for the reconstruction of the political system and the society (r=0.84), which shows that the intensification of using the interpretations of the past to that end was strongly correlated to an increase in the significance of the transitional remembrance policy as such. The other was the presentation of the transitional justice as a strategy aimed at effectively punishing those responsible for the abuse or violations of human rights (r=0.81), which shows that the fulfilment of such a function of the transitional justice is linked to the more intensified use of remembrance narratives in the process of the reconstruction of the political identity of the postauthoritarian society. What proved to be less significant was the relationship between the general shape of the policy and the use of the remembrance of heroes as a source of the pattern of democratic and civic attitudes (r=0.75), which was also assigned to presenting democratisation as an intergenerational accomplishment. Then, the strongest negative correlation occurred with regard to the use of the historical justification of the separation of the past from the future (r=-0.66), which was one of the fields of impact for justifying the presence

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of the representatives of the previous regime in the public life of the nowdemocratic state. This shows that the factor most responsible for the weakening of the impact of remembrance narratives during the transition is the use of the strategy of the imaginary demarcation line between the experience of authoritarianism and the development prospects of the democratic state. The fulfilment of this desideratum is an obvious form of deferring the need for settling accounts with the past and healing the postauthoritarian trauma––such a strategy is an escape into the future, which by its nature results in the reduction of the role of remembrance narratives in favour of future-oriented stories, which co-create a picture of the society through the vision of a community which might be constructed [WawrzyĔski, 2015]. It comes as a surprise that a weak negative correlation to the general shape of the policy was also characteristic for the reconstruction of the landscape of memory (r=-0.36) as an element of the legitimisation of the exercise of power by the new elites––the vector of this relationship seems to be contradictory to the colloquial understanding of the role of the transformation of the symbolic space as the foundation of the reconstruction of the post-authoritarian identity. Another subgroup of the recognised relationships helped us to improve our understanding of the structure of the transitional remembrance policy. First, it is worth discussing relationships between average results for the category, which are presented in table 4.9. The result for the justification of the presence of the representatives of the previous regime was correlated to the use of the justification of the historical need for national unity (r=0.81), and as for the transitional justice the result was strongly related to the justification of the social costs of transformations of the political system (r=0.85). At the same time, for the social costs of transformations, this correlation also occurred with regard to showing democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract (r=0.83)––thus, it was only in these three cases that our research indicated strong correlations, which can be deemed important from the perspective of the construction of the general model of the transitional remembrance policy. However, appearing to be only slightly weaker was the relationship between the justification of the social costs of transformations and the justification of the adoption of the new political and social standards (r=0.79), and this confirms the special position of the function of explaining the negative consequences of political transformations through referring to the past as a significant factor regulating the intensity of the transitional remembrance policy. Thus, the recognised relationships between functions of the transitional remembrance policy allow us to divide the categories into central and

0.71

0.46

0.31

0.56 -0.26 0.85 0.67 0.69 0.06 -0.50

-0.33 -0.26 0.09 0.07 0.50 0.81 0.35

Legitimisation of new elites -0.33 0.56 0.39 -0.18 0.16 0.13 -0.50

Social costs of transformations 0.91

0.79 0.83 0.21 -0.05

0.39 0.09 0.85

Adaptation of new standards 0.67

0.71 -0.06 0.11

-0.18 0.07 0.67 0.79

Symbolic roles of the democratisation 0.96

0.63 -0.18

0.16 0.50 0.69 0.83 0.71

Historical need for national unity 0.56

-0.19

0.13 0.81 0.06 0.21 -0.06 0.63

-0.04

-0.50 0.35 -0.50 -0.05 0.11 -0.18 -0.19

New state’s identity in IR

0.31 0.46 0.71 0.91 0.67 0.96 0.56 -0.04

Table 4.9. The strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between average results for categories and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Legitimisation of new elites Presence of the former elite Transitional justice Social costs of transformations Adaptation of new standards Symbolic roles of the democratisation Historical need for national unity New state’s identity in IR The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy

Category

Presence of the former elite

Chapter Four

Transitional justice

68 The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy

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peripheral ones, i.e. such that their use determines the greater intensity of using remembrance narratives to reconstruct the political identity of the post-authoritarian society, and that they are less correlated to the general shape of the policy of a particular state. The former group includes the selected formula of settling accounts with the past, the social costs of transformations, the adoption of the new political standards, and presenting democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract. The latter involves the exercising of power by the new elites, the presence of the former regime’s representatives in the public life, the historical need for national unity, and membership of international organisations. The peripheral functions for the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy are intersected by the axis of the strong relationship between the legitimisation of the presence of the representatives of the previous regime and support for the need to unite the society during transformations. This relationship complements the network of the most important correlations between categories. The recognised strong correlations between fields of impact of remembrance narratives and some other variables in our research were much more numerous. In total, apart from the previously discussed relationships within categories, we identified another forty-nine strong positive correlations and twelve negative ones. This allowed us to outline the General Model of Correlations between transitional remembrance policy’s fields of impact which is presented in Image 4.1. In the model, we can see the fields where the relationships between fields of impact are intensified, as well as fields where the concentration of significant correlations is noticeably smaller. Besides, we can also see that two of the tasks which relate to the remembrance narratives during the democratisation phase are not correlated to any result for any other variable, namely––the use of the idea of the state’s continuity for the legitimisation of the taking over of power by the new elites, and the symbolic presentation of the separation of the past from the future as the justification of the presence of the authoritarian elites in the state’s public life. Therefore, we can say that the significance of those two fields of impact is of a marginal character and that they can be excluded from the construction of the general model of the transitional remembrance policy. This picture also shows which of the categories can be ascribed to the greatest impact on the formula of using remembrance narratives in the construction of political identity during the transition. On average, the biggest number of significant correlations was observed in one field of impact in the case of the historical need for national unity (5.00), a slightly smaller number for the transitional justice (4.50), the presence of the

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representatives of the previous regime in the state’s public life (4.20), and the symbolic functions of democratisation (4.20). Lower average results were identified for the social costs of transformations (3.75), the adoption of new standards (3.60), membership of international organisations (3.00), and the taking over of power by the new elites (2.83). This means that the categories with most significance to the general shape of remembrance policy––determining the symbolic role of democratisation and justifying the social costs of transformations––did not necessarily have the greatest impact on the detailed form of the transitional remembrance policy. The above model also shows disproportions in the distribution of significant negative correlations. Their greatest concentration was in the case of membership of international organisations where for one field of impact we identified an average of 1.75 such relationships. We observed a distinctly smaller number of negative correlations in terms of the taking over of power by the new elites (on average, 0.83 per one field), the implementation of the new standards (0.80), the social costs of transformations (0.75), the transitional justice (0.50), the historical need for national unity (0.25), and the presence of the representatives of the authoritarian regime in the public life and the symbolic role of democratisation (0.20 each). Thus, as many as seven out of twelve relationships of this kind involved functions assigned to the legitimisation of joining international organisations––three times with the fields characteristic of the taking over of power by the new elites, twice with those characteristic of settling accounts with the past, and once each for the social costs of transformations and the adoption of new standards. What is more, the negative correlations connected the position of the new elites with the symbolic role of democratisation and the implementation of the new behaviour patterns, the presence of the elites of the previous regime with the social costs of transformations, and the adoption of the new standards with the social costs and the need for national unity. Now, let us take a close look at the identified significant negative correlations between particular tasks of the transitional remembrance policy. Presenting the accession to international organisations as a symbolic complement of the transformation (item 8-2) is connected, in this way, with memory as a source of reconciliation driven by the new elites (item 1-6), and with the limited range of dealing with the past as a means to prevent social conflicts (item 3-4). Yet more relationships of this kind occurred in the case of justifying integration as the regaining of the proper and due position in international politics (item 8-3), which is connected with the past as the legitimisation of the new elites (item 1-1), national symbols and the pantheon of heroes as a source of the justification of the

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position of the new elites (item 1-3), the transitional justice as a source of forgiveness (item 3-3), the historical justification of economic disproportions during transformations (item 4-3), and the significance of the new national heroes as role models for new attitudes and political behaviour patterns (item 5-3).

Image 4.1. The General Model of Correlations between the transitional remembrance policy’s fields of impact, including correlations stronger than r=0.80. In black––positive correlations, in red––negative correlations (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

At the same time, a negative correlation occurred between the past as the legitimisation of the new elites (item 1-1) and the balance between tradition and modernisation (item 5-4), the reconstruction of the landscape of memory as the justification of the taking over of power by the new elites (item 1-4) and the memory of heroes as a source of democratic and civic attitudes (item 6-4), the justification of the presence of the

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representatives of the previous regime as a means of preventing social conflicts (item 2-1) and the past as the justification of capitalist ideas (item 4-4), the dichotomy of the past and the present as a reason for the need to incur, on the part of the citizens, the inevitable costs of the transformations (item 4-1) and the significance of the necessity of transformations and the implementation of new standards as the consequence of historical processes or events (item 5-1), and between––for the second time––the necessity of transformations (item 5-1) and using the historical justification of reconciliation as an element of developing national unity during transformations (item 7-2). However, four times as often, we observed significant positive correlations between particular tasks of the transitional remembrance policy. Their overall distribution and the intensity of important relationships connecting fields of impact assigned to categories are presented in table 4.10. Like the correlations model presented in the image above, the table shows the dominance of the following three functions of remembrance narratives in the process of the reconstruction of the political identity of the society––presenting the symbolic role of democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract and a tribute paid to the older generations, the justification of the presence of the representatives of the previous regime in the public life of the now-democratic state, and a reason for the historical need for national unity. The use of the stories on the past to give credibility to the integration processes was strongly connected three times only with the fields assigned to the other categories only three times. The remaining four functions were characterised by a moderate and similar degree of intensity of the observed correlations, but it is crucial that in the case of the legitimisation of the position of the new political elites it meant a distinctly lower average of such relationships per one field of impact compared with the case of the other categories. It shows that this task, which is characteristic of the transformation of remembrance policy, is characterised by a relatively weak influence on the overall use of remembrance narratives in the process of the reconstruction of the political identity of the society. Thus, although the legitimisation of the new political leadership is the fundamental function of the transitional stories on the past and an indispensable element of identity politics, its impact fails to determine the intensity of carrying out the other tasks of the transitional remembrance policy. It is particularly noticeable with regard to the relationship of this category with the legitimisation of the role of the authoritarian regime elites, characterised by the lack of any significant correlations between fields of impact––a rare phenomenon, according to our observations.

Adaptation of new standards

Social costs of transformations

Transitional justice

Presence of the former elite

Legitimisation of new elites

+ - + - + - + - + - + Legitimisation of new elites 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 2 1 1 Presence of the former elite 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 4 Transitional justice 3 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 3 Social costs of transformations 1 0 3 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 Adaptation of new standards 2 1 1 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 4 Roles of the democratisation 1 1 4 0 3 0 2 0 4 0 1 The national unity 3 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 New state’s identity in IR 0 3 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 Table 4.10. The general distribution and the intensity of the significant correlations impact for research categories (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Research category

New state’s identity in IR The national unity

73

- + - + + 1 3 0 0 3 11 5 0 6 0 2 0 18 1 0 0 0 0 2 14 2 0 1 0 1 1 12 3 0 1 1 0 1 13 4 0 4 0 0 0 19 1 0 2 0 0 0 17 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 7 coefficient between the fields of

Roles of the democratisation

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It is now worth discussing in detail all of the recognised strong correlations between fields of impact. They co-create––apart from the previously discussed relationships within the categories and the significant negative correlations between the categories––a network of mutual relationships which is presented in Picture 4.1. Let us begin from the above discussed function of the legitimisation of the political dominance of the new elites. The past as the legitimisation of their position (item 1-1) is positively correlated to the significance of the new national heroes as the role models for social and political behaviour (item 5-4); the use of the idea of the state’s continuity (item 1-2) is lacking in such relationships whatsoever; the change of the national symbols and the pantheon of heroes (item 1-3) is connected with the transitional justice as the legitimisation of the rule of law (item 3-1), settling accounts as a source of forgiveness (item 3-3), the historical sources of economic disproportions (item 4-3), and the significance of the new heroes as role models for social behaviour (item 5-3); the reconstruction of the landscape of memory (item 1-4) is correlated to the transformation of space into a pluralistic and nationwide one as an element of constructing national unity (item 7-3), the same as the role of historical legitimisation of the new elites in preventing conflicts (item 1-5), which is also linked to presenting democratisation as a tribute paid to the victims of the authoritarian repressions (item 6-2); and finally, memory as a source of reconciliation driven by the new elites (item 1-6) is strongly correlated to a limited range of the transitional justice as an element of avoiding the escalation of internal conflicts (item 3-4). As for the next function––the legitimisation of the presence of the representatives of the previous regime in the new democratic conditions––as we stressed before, there were more such relationships. The first field of impact of this category––presenting the participation of the past elites in the public life as a means of preventing internal conflicts (item 2-1) is strongly correlated to the dichotomy of the past and the future as the justification of the costs of transformations (item 4-1), the new definition of patriotism (item 5-5), the memory of heroes as a source of democratic and civic attitudes (item 6-4), the past as the justification of national unity (item 7-1), and the historical premise of the need for reconciliation and forgiveness (item 7-2). Equally numerous relationships are observed when it comes to the presence of the representatives of the authoritarian regime as the legitimisation of democracy and political pluralism (item 2-2), which is also correlated to the dichotomy of the past and the future (item 4-1), the past as the justification of national unity (item 7-1) and the premises of reconciliation and forgiveness (item 7-2), while also showing the historical need for democratisation (item 6-1) and

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adjusting the selection of the narratives and their heroes to the purposes of the transformations (item 6-3). Another task, defining pluralism and democratic equality through the presence of the representatives of the previous regime (item 2-3), is strongly related to the dichotomy of the past and the future (item 4-1), the historical need for democratisation (item 61), the past as the justification of unity (item 7-1), and the premises of reconciliation and forgiveness (item 7-2). At the same time, the use of historical arguments for the purpose of constructing a new political community (item 2-4) is correlated to the experience of the past as the justification of international integration aspirations (item 8-1) and memory as an argument in favour of implementing new standards resulting from the accession to international organisations (item 8-4), while the historical justification of the symbolic separation of the past from the present (item 2-5) is lacking in any significant relationships with the other tasks of the transitional remembrance policy. Using remembrance narratives as the justification of the implemented model of the transitional justice and punishing the authoritarian crimes is characterised by a somewhat lighter intensity of such relationships. Dealing with the past as the legitimisation of the rule of law (item 3-1) is strongly correlated to the use of national symbols and heroes to account for the political dominance of the new elites (item 1-3), the historical reasons for economic disproportions (item 4-3), the significance of the new heroes as role models (item 5-3), and the new organisation of time as the strategy of the transfer of ideas from the elites to the society (item 6-5). The transitional justice as the punishment of those responsible for the violations of human rights (item 3-2) is also connected with the significance of the new heroes as role models (item 53) and the new organisation of time (item 6-5), while a strong relationship also links this field with the historical argumentation of the new social or economic attitudes and behaviour under the transformation conditions (item 4-2). The first two correlations (with items 5-3 and 6-5) were also observed in the case of the transitional justice as a source of forgiveness (item 3-3), and its relationship with the historical reasons for economic disproportions (item 4-3) was characterised by a complete correlation which shows how strongly a relationship links the need for the cause of the social stratification with the implementation of the procedures of the transitional justice––indeed, we can actually assume that the more significant the problem that economic inequalities pose in the process of the reconstruction of the political identity of the society, the greater is the importance of the role transitional justice plays in the democratisation process. Finally, the last of the fields of impact for this category––the

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limited scope of the transitional justice as a result of the need to prevent internal conflicts (item 3-4)––is strongly related to the use of memory as a source of the reconciliation scheme driven by the state’s new elites (item 1-6). The relationships of the next category––justifying the social costs of transformations, especially economic ones––follow a similar pattern, and it is worth paying special attention to it for one of the two functions is strongly correlated to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. The dichotomy of the past and the future as the symbolic justification of the need to incur the costs of the transformation (item 4-1) is strongly correlated to the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as a means to prevent conflicts (item 2-1), their participation in public life as the legitimisation of democracy and political pluralism (item 2-2) and the source of the definition of these categories (item 2-3), and also to showing the historical need for democratisation (item 6-1) and the historical justification of reconciliation as an element of developing national unity (item 7-2). In turn, the historical argumentation promoting the new social and economic attitudes (item 4-2) is connected solely with the transitional justice as a means of punishing the human rights violators (item 3-2). The historical causes of the social stratification (item 4-3) are characterised by numerous significant relationships with other fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy––using national symbols and heroes as the source of the legitimisation of the new elites (item 1-3), the transitional justice as a form of the legitimisation of the rule of law (item 3-1), the transitional justice as a source of forgiveness (item 3-3; a complete correlation), the significance of the new heroes as role models (item 5-3), and the new organisation of time (item 6-5). Meanwhile, the past as the justification of capitalist ideas and free market principles (item 4-4) has a significant positive correlation only to the use of the past as the justification of the implementation of the new standards resulting from the accession to international organisations (item 8-4). What should be seen as a particular case is another function of the use of remembrance narratives during the transformation––legitimisation of the adoption of the new social and political standards––where the density of important relationships was determined by the significance of one single field of impact––a situation never observed as far as any other category is concerned. Its predominant task was the use of the new national heroes as role models for new attitudes and behaviour patterns (item 5-3), which was strongly correlated to as many as seven other fields: the past as the legitimisation of the new elites (item 1-1), the symbols and heroes as a source of the credibility of the new elites (item 1-3), the

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transitional justice as a means of legitimising the rule of law (item 3-1), as a means of punishing wrongdoers (item 3-2), and as a source of forgiveness (item 3-3), and also the historical causes of the social stratification (item 4-3) and the organisation of time (item 6-5). What appeared to be of lesser significance was memory as the myth-motoric inspiration for the future and the new definition of patriotism derived from it (item 5-5), in the case of which we discovered some important relationships with: accounting for the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as a means of preventing conflicts (item 2-1), the adjustment of the selection of narratives and their heroes to the requirements of democratisation (item 6-3), the memory of heroes as a source of democratic and civic attitudes and behaviour patterns (item 6-4), and the past as the justification of the need for national unity (item 7-1). At the same time, the significance of the need for transformations, as a consequence of historical events (item 5-1), is related to the new organisation of time (item 6-5), while the significance of the intergenerational dialogue for the adoption of new standards (item 5-2) and the role of the balance between tradition and modernisation (item 5-4) are not characterised by any strong positive correlations outside their own category. We observed the biggest number of positive correlations in the case of the sixth of the categories––showing the symbolic role of democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract and a tribute paid to the victims of the regime and the oppressed opposition––which itself, as we stressed before, was strongly correlated to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. Presenting the historical need for the transformations as the intergenerational task (item 6-1) is connected with the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as the legitimisation of democracy and pluralism (item 2-2) and the source of their definition (item 2-3), the dichotomy of the past and the future as the justification of the costs of transformations (item 4-1), the past as the justification of national unity (item 7-1) and the historical arguments for reconciliation and forgiveness (item 7-2). Presenting democratisation as a tribute paid to the victims of the human rights violations and the crimes of the authoritarian state (item 6-2) is strongly correlated to preventing internal conflicts as an element of the legitimisation of the new elites’ dominance (item 1-5) and the reconstruction of the pantheon of national heroes towards diversity (item 7-4). The adjustment of the selection of remembrance narratives and their heroes to the challenges of the transformation process (item 6-3) is connected with the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as the legitimisation of democracy

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and pluralism (item 2-2), memory as the inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (item 5-5), and also the past as the justification of the need for national unity (item 7-1)––yet, what remains the most important feature of this field is its strong relationship with the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. The memory of the heroes as a source of the behaviour patterns and attitudes promoted by the government (item 64) is strongly related to the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as a means of preventing conflicts (item 2-1) and the new definition of patriotism (item 5-5). In turn, the last of the fields of impact of this category––the new organisation of time as a mechanism of the transfer of ideas from the elites to the society––is strongly correlated to the transitional justice as a means of legitimising the rule of law (item 3-1), as the punishment of wrongdoers (item 3-2) and as a source of forgiveness (item 3-3), the historical reasons for economic disproportions (item 4-3), the significance of the need for the transformation of the society as a consequence of historical events (item 5-1), and the role of heroes as role models of new civic attitudes (item 5-3). An important role in the overall network of correlations between particular tasks of the remembrance policy during the democratisation process is also played by justifications of the need for national unity. The past as the justification of the need for the consolidation of the society in the face of the transformations of the political system (item 7-1) is connected with the participation of the elites of the previous regime as a means of preventing conflicts (item 2-1) and their presence as the legitimisation of democracy and pluralism (item 2-2) and a source of their definition (item 2-3), and also with memory as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (item 5-5), showing the historical need for democratisation (item 6-1) and the adjustment of the selection of narratives and their heroes to the challenges of the transformations (item 6-3). History as an element of justifying the need for reconciliation and forgiveness (item 7-2) is in relation to the same fields as for the presence of the representatives of the previous regime (items 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3), the dichotomy of the past and the future as a reason for the need to incur the costs of the transformations (item 4-2) and showing the inevitability of democratisation (item 6-1). The transformation of the landscape of memory from the authoritarian one into the pluralistic and nationwide one (item 7-3) is strongly correlated to the reconstruction of the landscape of memory as a means of legitimising the new elites (item 1-4) and pointing to the prevention of conflicts as the historical source of their position (item 1-5). It is the latter of the mentioned tasks (item 1-5) that was characterised by complete correlation with the reconstruction of the

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pantheon of national heroes towards diversity (item 7-4), which was also connected with presenting democratisation as a tribute paid to the victims of the authoritarian repressions (item 6-2). Finally, we shall discuss using remembrance narratives to account for integration aspirations and membership of international organisations, which provided the greatest number of significant negative correlations. The share of this category in all of the recognised strong positive correlations pool was far smaller and included only three relationships, i.e. the correlations between the experience of the past as the justification of the integration aspirations (item 8-1) and the use of historical arguments to construct a new open political community (item 24), and also between memory as the justification of implementing new standards arising from membership of international organisations (item 84) and the before-mentioned construction of the new political community (item 2-4) and the past as legitimisation of capitalist ideas and free market principles during transformations (item 4-4). The limited scope of this category’s fields of impact is augmented by the lack of any significant positive correlations which would link the remaining two tasks: membership of international organisations as the complement of transformation and the historical challenge (item 8-2) and integration aspirations as the pursuit of regaining the state’s due position within the international community (item 8-3). The research on the relationships between the government’s remembrance policy and the reconstruction of the political identity of the post-authoritarian society realised by a government allowed us to recognise multiple significant correlations linking particular elements of the transitional remembrance policy model. We identified those functions and tasks which have the biggest influence on the general shape of the use of remembrance narratives by governments during the democratisation, we outlined the most important correlations between individual categories, and we identified another sixty-one significant relationships linking fields of impact. They complemented the ten described strong correlations within the categories and allowed us to develop a general model of relationships between the elements of the transitional remembrance policy which presents a network of correlations, their intensity, and the most important vectors. Subsequently, we can use the model as a map which makes it possible to navigate safely in the space of the use of remembrance narratives in the process of the reconstruction of the political identity of the society and which helps us understand the relationships between particular tasks or functions played by remembrance policy during the

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democratisation. Thus, our findings enabled us to outline a draft structure of the transitional use of stories on the past.

The Relationships between the Categories and the Source, Course and Scale of the Transition The first set of variables to which we referred the findings concerning the use of remembrance narratives in the process of the reconstruction of the political identity of the post-authoritarian society included the features characterising the sources, course and scale of democratic transformations. After excluding those properties which were identical for all the six countries, the number of considered variables dropped to nine––three for each of the research questions. Their relationships with the functions and tasks of the transitional remembrance policy enhanced our understanding of the role of stories on the past during the democratisation. Furthermore, they showed how different features of transition have the potential to impact the adjustment of remembrance policy to the specific nature of a country, society and political processes. Firstly, we considered the question of the source of transition––we discovered that in the countries under research, the initiation of transformations can be linked to one of the following three models: a unilateral reform, a bilateral agreement, or multilateral negotiations. It was only in the case of South Africa that the change arose from both the bilateral agreement between the government and the most powerful opposition movement and the multilateral negotiations involving all the sides of the argument over the nation’s future. What is more, in none of the countries under study were the transformations initiated by a political revolution which, in our opinion, can largely affect the form, intensity and scope of the transitional remembrance policy––however, the data we collected do not let us confirm this theory. The strength of the relationship between those features and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy and its most important functions are presented in Table 4.11. At the outset, we can see that––in general––the source of the transformation of the political system was of negligible importance for the general shape of the transitional remembrance narratives. In turn, the only strong correlations included: the positive relationship between the bilateral agreement and the use of stories on the past as a means to legitimise the exercise of power by the new elites, with a coincident, mirrored, negative relationship with unilateral reform. This result comes as no surprise––the participation of the opposition in initiating change most often results in the

The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy New state’s identity in IR

Roles of the democratisation

Adaptation of new standards

Social costs of transformations

Transitional justice

Presence of the former elite

Legitimisation of new elites

Unilateral reform 0.53 -0.34 -0.16 0.34 0.19 0.18 0.33 -0.01 -0.93 Bilateral agreement -0.53 0.34 0.16 -0.34 -0.19 -0.18 -0.33 0.01 0.93 Multilateral negotiations 0.30 -0.52 0.78 0.39 0.49 0.30 -0.28 -0.65 0.22 Table 4.11. The strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the sources of the transition and average for categories and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Variable

The national unity

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0.41 0.41 0.41 results

Standard deviation (SD)

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formation of a new elite whose political position and dominance must be accounted for somehow, and remembrance policy can serve as a source of such justification. Furthermore, the collected data let us spot a few features of the use of remembrance narratives during the course of democratisation of lesser statistical significance––we saw that a bigger number of actors co-initiating transition results in the lower intensity of the use of the interpretations of the past to account for the presence of the representatives of the previous regime in the nation’s public life, the historical need for national unity, and membership of international organisations. A reverse relationship characterised the use of remembrance narratives to legitimise the transitional justice and to account for the social costs of democratic changes. These findings can be regarded as a rough indicator of how an increase in the number of organisations co-creating the preliminary conditions for the democratic order results in a shift of priorities of the transitional remembrance policy. Undoubtedly, however, the existence of these relationships must be regarded as a justified assumption rather than a confirmed thesis. We also observed the existence of some significant correlations between those features of the transition and some fields of impact of the remembrance policy of the transformations. The unilateral change is strongly correlated to calling for the balance between tradition and modernisation so as to account for the adoption of new standards (r=0.91) and showing the historical need for democratisation (r=0.80)–– Coincidentally, the bilateral agreement is linked to them by a mirrored negative relationship. In turn, the bilateral agreement is connected with the more intensified use of the transformation of the memory landscape into a nationwide and pluralistic one as a strategy aimed at promoting national unity (r=0.80)––whereas the unilateral change is connected with it in a negative way. What is more, we distinguished three significant relationships of the multilateral negotiations which are correlated to the transitional justice as a source of forgiveness (r=0.88), the use of remembrance narratives to show the historical source of the economic disproportions during the course of transformations (r=0.88), and, negatively, to justifying the state’s integration aspirations as a means of regaining the state’s proper and due position within the international community (r=0.91), which shows that this variable, too, had a limited influence only on the intensity of the implementation of particular tasks. Generally speaking, we must state though that the sources of transition cannot be regarded as a key factor enabling the differentiation of the cases of using the interpretations of the past in the reconstruction of the political identity of the post-authoritarian society.

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Secondly, we asked the question about the course of the transition from the authoritarian system to the democratic one––all of the analysed countries can be regarded as examples of a peaceful change, they largely differed, however, in terms of the other three features: a threat of a domestic conflict, the presence of political violence and the risk of its escalation, and the existence of military conflicts, in which the countries under research were directly engaged. Two cases differed from the overall characteristics of a peaceful change threatened with a conflict and exposed to the negative consequences of the presence of political violence–– Poland, where democratisation was not threatened with a domestic conflict or any violence, and Georgia, where despite the lack of domestic political violence the country was threatened directly with an ongoing military conflict resulting from the break-up of the Soviet Union, separatist aspirations, and the direct involvement of the neighbouring superpower. The differences in the strength of the relationships between these features and the general shape of the remembrance policy and its functions are presented in Table 4.12. Our findings drew our attention to two very important observations. They showed that the presence of political violence during the democratisation process is characterised by a strong positive correlation to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy––that means that the anticipated response to the occurrence of this feature is the intensified use of remembrance narratives during the process of the reconstruction of the political identity. Thus, we can risk a thesis that the response of the government to violence augments remembrance policy as a tool of the strategy aimed at the reconstruction of the society. Additionally, the same feature is even more strongly linked to the indication of the symbolic role of democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract and a tribute paid to the victims of the repressions and the heroes of the struggle for freedom, which show the existence of the relationship between the occurrence of political violence and that extremely important function of using the interpretations of the past. Coincidentally, the collected data show a negligible significance of the course of the transition to the role of remembrance narratives in the legitimisation of exercising power by the new elites, which shows that the intensity of realising this function has nothing to do with the threats that the democratisation process is exposed to. It is also worth noticing that, overall, the involvement of the state in a military conflict is correlated rather negatively to the role of the transitional remembrance policy (apart from the membership of international organisations which can be perceived as a safeguard of safety and stability)––however, due to the construction of the research sample

The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy New state’s identity in IR

The national unity

Roles of the democratisation

Adaptation of new standards

Presence of the former elite

Legitimisation of new elites

Threat of conflict 0.04 0.67 0.34 0.43 0.39 0.72 0.59 0.00 0.70 0.41 Political violence 0.06 0.49 0.62 0.68 0.62 0.69 -0.34 0.52 0.96 0.83 Military conflict -0.04 0.04 -0.44 -0.43 -0.39 -0.49 -0.28 0.43 -0.35 0.41 Table 4.12. The strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the course of the transition and average results for categories and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Variable

Transitional justice

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Social costs of transformations

84

Standard deviation (SD)

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and the presence in it of only one case of such characteristics, our observations are only of an indicatory and preliminary character and require verification through further research. We also observed the existence of only a few relationships between those features and fields of impact of remembrance narratives. The threat of a domestic conflict is correlated positively to the history as the justification of national unity (r=0.81), while negatively in terms of the separation of the past from the present as an element of accounting for the presence of the representatives of the authoritarian regime in the nation’s public life (r=0.89)––as long as the former of the cases is rather obvious and anticipated, the latter is worth paying attention to. The findings of our research show that the presence of a real threat of a domestic conflict results in the tendency to evade the symbolic separation of the experience of the past from the present state, and thereby, it makes the strategy of “forgetting” lose ground to the strategy of “remembering” [J. Assmann, 2008: 84-87; A. Assmann, 2009b; Walzer et al., 2009; Misztal, 2010; Singer and Conway, 2008; Gillis, 1994]. This seems to be an exceptionally valuable discovery which enables us to better understand the sources of the shift of remembrance policy between forgetting and remembering. In turn, the presence of political violence and the risk of its escalation during the democratisation process are strongly correlated to three fields of impact, namely: the myth-motoric function of remembrance narratives as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism as an element of promoting new social and political standards (r=0.92), the adjustment of the selection of the narratives and their heroes so that they correspond to the requirements of the democratisation process (r=0.92), and the memory of national heroes as a source of democratic and civic attitudes, connected with showing the symbolic role of transformations (r=0.94). This makes it possible to outline the vectors of actions taken by the transitional government in the light of the escalated violence; while at the same time, these relationships show which of the functions of remembrance policy are perceived as feasible corrective measures against that threat. Hence, the response to political violence is the new definition of patriotism and the intensification of using heroes as role models. Thirdly, we were interested in the scale of transitional transformations which were planned by the new democratic elites–– obviously, in all of the analysed cases, the transformation involved the political and legal system; however, we observed some differences with regard to the three other variables. The reconstruction of the economy and proprietorship was not planned in Chile and Spain, where the authoritarian governments promoted the development of capitalist and free market

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relationships. A significant transformation of the organisation of the state was not an objective set in the democratisation of Poland, neither was the reconstruction of the society, which was also absent from the set of priorities of the transformation in Georgia. Thus, those variables differentiated noticeably the analysed cases of the transitional remembrance policy, the interrelationships of which are presented in Table 4.13. What appears to be a particularly important, statistically significant, correlation in the above table is the positive relationship of the society’s reconstruction with the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. This means that it is this very feature of the transformation that makes it possible to differentiate the countries in which the use of remembrance narratives to reconstruct the political identity of the postauthoritarian society will be more intensified, and those where the use will be less intensified. At the same time, this feature is strongly related to the intensified use of the interpretations of the past to show the symbolic role of democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract and a tribute paid to the victims of repressions and the heroes of the struggle for freedom (as in the case of the risk of political violence escalation). Less attention should be paid to the reconstruction of the organisation of the state, while it is completely insignificant whether the transformation also involves the economy. It is interesting that the presence of the economic goals of the transition impacts the noticeable weakening of the two functions of telling about the past: accounting for the presence of the representatives of the previous regime and the need for national unity–– this can be accounted for by the ideological clash between the foundations of those goals and the competitiveness principle which is the basis of the idea of the neoliberal free market economy in the democratisation process. What is more, it is the very transformation of the economic system that is the least related to using remembrance narratives to account for the social stratification and the disproportion between citizens during the transformations, which can be deemed as an attempt at avoiding the issue causing social tensions and the possible weakening of the promotion of the democratisation process. It is also interesting that two categories––the legitimisation of the taking over of power by the new elites and the justification of the membership of international organisations––effectively, are unrelated to the scale of the transformations. The significant relationships between the range of the transitional goals and fields of impact were much more numerous. The reform of the economy is positively correlated to the significance of the need for transformations as a consequence of historical events, serving as a means

The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy New state’s identity in IR

Roles of the democratisation

Adaptation of new standards

Social costs of transformations

Transitional justice

Presence of the former elite

Legitimisation of new elites

87

The economic system 0.41 -0.72 0.32 0.25 0.16 -0.30 -0.77 0.17 -0.09 0.52 The organisation of the state 0.04 0.67 0.34 0.43 0.39 0.72 0.59 0.00 0.70 0.41 The reconstruction of the 0.06 0.49 0.62 0.68 0.62 0.69 -0.34 0.52 0.96 0.83 society Table 4.13. The strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the scale of the transition and average results for categories and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Variable

The national unity

A New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition

Standard deviation (SD)

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to justify the adoption of the new social and political standards (r=0.88), and it is negatively correlated to as many as five tasks of transitional narratives on the past: the legitimisation of the presence of the authoritarian regime representatives as a means to prevent conflicts (r=0.85), their presence as a form of legitimising democracy and political pluralism (r=-0.93) and a source of the definition of those values (r=0.87), a reason for the need for reconciliation and forgiveness as an element of forging national unity (r=-0.97) and the use of the historical justification of the need to incur the costs of the transformation (r=-1.00)––we shall now pay special attention to the last of the above relationships. The observed complete negative correlation means that remembrance narratives as the justification of the inevitability of the incurring of the transformation costs by citizens is used by those states which fail to reform the economy, i.e. by such states whose actual costs of the transformation ought to be lower than when reconstructing the political and economic system simultaneously. This observation comes as a paradox––those governments which need interpretations of the past the most in order to accomplish this task, avoid using them due to the potential risk of intensifying social unrest and, subsequently, they weaken the support of the democratisation. Therefore, the leaders’ apprehension leads to avoiding this controversial and politically unsafe issue. The transformation of the organisation of the state has only two significant correlations––it is positively related to the use of the past as the justification of the need for national unity during the democratisation process (r=0.81) and negatively, to the symbolic separation of the past from the present as an element of legitimising the presence of the representatives of the previous regime in the nation’s public life (r=-0.89), which shows that the transitional government––as in the before-mentioned case of the threat of political violence––evades the implementation of the strategy of “forgetting”, when its goal is an extensive transformation of the functioning of the state and its organisations. In turn, the reconstruction of the society––apart from more general relationships discussed earlier––is strongly correlated to three fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy, namely: memory as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (r=0.92), the adjustment of the selection of narratives and their characters so that they can conform to the challenges of the transformation (r=0.92), and the memory of national heroes as a source of democratic and civic attitudes aimed at enhancing the awareness of the symbolic role of the transformations process (r=0.94)––hence, we can state that it is these very tasks that are the most important ones for the use of the transitional remembrance policy for such a reconstruction of the

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political identity of the post-authoritarian society which will promote the government’s programme of the comprehensive reconstruction of the society. Referring the intensity of using remembrance narratives during democratisation to the features characteristic of the transition itself made us aware of several valuable observations. Firstly, it enabled us to see that the following are the most strongly related to the shape of the transitional remembrance policy: the presence of political violence and the risk of its escalation, and recognising the reconstruction of the society as the prime objective of transformations. Secondly, we noticed that these two features outright are significantly correlated to the intensity of using the past to show the symbolic role of democratisation and its explicitly intergenerational character. Thirdly, our research showed that the bilateral negotiations, as a source of transition, impact the intensity of the use of remembrance narratives to legitimise the taking over of power by the new elites, while the unilateral change is strongly negatively correlated to this category. Fourthly and lastly, we also recognised another twenty-five significant relationships between these very categories and fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy. All of this enhances our understanding of this phenomenon, its specifics, and the factors influencing its course.

The Relationships between the Categories and the Cause of Change The second set of variables which we used to better understand the relationships between democratisation and the use of remembrance narratives to reconstruct the political identity of the post-authoritarian society comprised of the internal and external factors which were pointed to as the direct cause of the change of the regime. Our aim, hence, was to check whether the causes which led to the collapse of the authoritarian rule and to the initiation of the reconstruction of the political system were significantly correlated to the shape that the government gives to the transitional remembrance policy. Therefore, we asked if the causes of the transition, in a different way than its sources, can determine the way in which the new elites speak about the experience of the past. The existence of such relationships would provide a preliminary argument for the intuitive hypothesis about the constitutive impact of the change factors on the way the government manages the society’s collective memory during democratisation. We can assume that the use of remembrance narratives is dependent on the political, social and economic

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processes which triggered the change of a regime. This is suggested by the chronological nature of talking about the past and the significance of the cause and effect relationship in constructing the narrative––different factors should result in different ways of talking about it. Therefore, different causes of the deconstruction of the authoritarian order and different processes preceding the democratisation process should determine the existence of different types of transitional remembrance policy, which would reflect the most important differences in the roots of change. To verify those assumptions we used nine variables in the case of which we observed some differences amongst the analysed cases. The similarities of the causes of democratisation made us exclude most of the internal, or domestic, factors of change––the de-legitimisation of the authoritarian regime, the liberalisation of the dictatorship, the existence of the established and consolidated opposition, social protests, reported cases of human rights violations, and an economic crisis––and two more external, or foreign, factors of change––the support for the opposition from abroad, and some substantial changes in the structure of the international system. Consequently, we correlated the following variables to the results for the transitional remembrance policy: the permanent inefficiency of the economy, the international pressure exerted on the regime, international sanctions imposed upon the regime, the collapse of alliances, the loss of support to the authoritarian regime from a superpower, the presence of foreign troops in the country, conflicts with neighbouring countries, border disputes, and military conflicts. The results are shown in Table 4.14. The collected data allow us to tentatively challenge the validity of the above stated hypothesis. Not even once did we observe any significant correlation between a change factor and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. What is more, they were either weak or very weak relationships. This means that the government’s use of remembrance narratives to reconstruct the political identity of the postauthoritarian society is not determined by the chronological understanding of the process of change and of the dominance of the cause and effect relationships. Thus, telling about the past during democratisation is very much of an ahistorical character, and to a noticeable extent, it remains similar for different cases of democratisation. In the face of the previous result for the sources of the transition, these results let us assume that the way in which the change of a regime comes about does not impact significantly the shape that the government gives to the policy (certainly, these results could be quite different if the research sample had taken into

-0.29 -0.07 0.34 0.04

0.17 0.50 0.29 -0.04

-0.39 -0.44

0.21

-0.28

0.34

-0.53

0.93

Legitimisation of new elites

-0.28 0.44 0.56 -0.02

Presence of the former elite -0.29 -0.04 -0.18 0.22

Transitional justice

0.17 0.04 0.41 0.20

Social costs of transformations -0.47 -0.43

-0.15

-0.05

0.16

-0.05 0.43 0.56 0.29

Adaptation of new standards -0.74 -0.39

-0.33

-0.22

-0.34

-0.22 0.39 0.44 0.08

Roles of the democratisation -0.24 -0.49

0.00

-0.51

-0.19

-0.51 0.49 0.25 0.03

0.40 -0.28

0.17

-0.52

-0.18

-0.52 0.28 -0.29 -0.08

New state’s identity in IR -0.09 0.43

-0.57

0.65

-0.33

0.65 -0.43 0.16 0.69

-0.18 -0.35

-0.01

-0.25

0.01

-0.25 0.35 0.44 0.29

The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy

0.52 0.41

0.55

0.55

0.41

0.55 0.41 0.55 0.52

91

Table 4.14. The strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the factors of the change and average results for categories and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Inefficient economy International pressure International sanctions The collapse of alliances Losing the support of a superpower The presence of foreign armies Conflicts with neighbouring countries Boundary disputes Military conflict

Variable

The national unity

A New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition

Standard deviation (SD)

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account the case of a political revolution resulting in the democratisation of the state). Thus, the reasons for differences in using remembrance narratives must lie in some other factors––among other things, in the previously discussed scope of the transition and its course. It does not mean, however, that we did not observe any relationships that failed to catch our attention. What is interesting is a strong correlation between the loss of support from a superpower and the use of stories on the past to legitimise the taking over of power by the new elites and their position in the new order, with a simultaneous and moderately strong negative correlation of this factor to the legitimisation of the presence of the representatives of the previous regime. Another interesting issue is the negative influence of border disputes aimed at supporting the adoption of new political standards, which is difficult to justify rationally. Additionally, change factors definitely have the biggest influence on the legitimisation of the change of the state’s identity in international politics, which is moderately strongly influenced by the collapse of alliances, an inefficient economy, and the presence of foreign troops in the country–– this does not come as a surprise for each of these causes can provide a strong motivation to intensify integration aspirations in the area of political, economic and military cooperation, aimed at providing a young democracy with a relative stability. We also recognised thirteen significant relationships of change factors with fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy––seven positive and six negative. The inefficiency of the economy is correlated positively to using the past as the justification of capitalist ideas (r=0.96) and implementing new standards arising from the accession to international organisations (r=0.87), while negatively to the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as a means of preventing domestic conflicts (r=-0.90) and using memory as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (r=-0.87)––this shows that an inefficient economy can lead to the shift of the core of the new identity from the shared idea of the community to free market competition, adjusting to the standards set by the international community. The collapse of alliances is strongly related to the adoption of new standards arising from international integration (r=0.96) and using historical justifications to build the new political community (r=0.92) as a means of legitimising the presence of the representatives of the previous regime. The loss of a superpower’s support is significantly positively correlated to the reconstruction of the landscape of memory into a nationwide and pluralistic one (r=0.80) as a means of inspiring national unity, and negatively to the balance between tradition and modernisation (r=-0.91) and showing the historical need for

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democratisation (r=-0.80), whereas in yet another five cases we recognised relatively strong relationships. In turn, the presence of foreign troops in the country is positively correlated to using remembrance narratives to justify capitalist ideas (r=0.96) and the implementation of new standards arising from the accession to international organisations (r=0.87), and negatively to the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as a means of averting conflicts (r=-0.90) and memory as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (r=-0.87), hence, this factor came together in our research sample with the inefficiency of the economy which resulted in quite surprising correlations for the variable in question. Meanwhile, in the case of the other five change factors there were no important correlations to the transitional remembrance policy. The comparison of the results of the analysis of using remembrance narratives in the process of the reconstruction of the political identity of the post-authoritarian society with the factors which led to the change of the regime enables us to propose a hypothesis of the lack of any significant influence of the causes of the collapse of the authoritarian order on the shape of the transitional remembrance policy, even though it seems logical to assume its existence. As we said before, this leads to a sort of ahistorical and non-chronological character of remembrance narratives during the democratisation, in which showing the relationships of the cause and effect gives way to justifying those issues which play a major role in the scope of the transition as planned by the government. Therefore, regardless of what brought about the transformation of the political system, it is the transitional goals that provide the framework for the management of the society’s collective memory by the government––that is, it is not the experience of the past that will determine the shape of remembrance policy, but the vision of the past which is shared by the new political leaders of the state.15

The Relationships between the Categories and the Authoritarian Identity Our reflections on the variables which can show the similarities and differences between individual cases of the use of remembrance narratives to legitimise the new vision of the society during the transition could not neglect the question about the relationships of remembrance policy with the contents of the authoritarian identity. Since we are interested in the change in the substance of political identity and the role of stories on the

 15

See Koczanowicz, 2009: p. 31; Hoskins, 2007: pp. 246-247.

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past in conducting it, it is crucial that we determine the significance of the preliminary conditions for the transitional remembrance policy. This became possible through such a selection of the research sample that included different cases of democratisation, i.e.: the transition from the right-wing military regimes in Chile and Spain, the transformation of the communist system in Estonia and Poland, the reconstruction of the postcommunist oligarchy in Georgia, and the change of the racial separation system in South Africa. The selection of different types of authoritarian regimes meant that we dealt with different authoritarian identities which were reconstructed by new governments towards the vision of a democratic society. We recognised eight variables in the research sample in the case of which some differences occurred. They are the following features of the authoritarian identity: occurring in separable pairs, inclusiveness and exclusiveness (along with repressing a part of the society) and the revolutionary spirit and conservatism, and also the recognition of the dominant position of the army, religion or a party, and the lasting alliance with a superpower safeguarding the endurance of the regime. The results for these factors are presented in Table 4.15. As in the case of the cause of change, the features of the authoritarian identity are also of negligible significance for the shape of the transitional remembrance policy. What is more, the correlations for all the variables must be considered to be very weak. Hence, it is likely that the preliminary conditions have no influence on the way the democratic government manages the collective memory of the post-authoritarian society. Therefore, we can state once more that it is not the experience of the past that is key to the selection of remembrance narratives and the intensity of telling them during the course of democratisation, but it is the promoted vision of the future that determines which functions will be fulfilled and which events will be commemorated by the new remembrance policy. Our observation provides an important argument in the discussion on the very substance of remembrance policy and its orientation vector, which––in the light of the above presented findings––is unambiguously future-oriented. Thus, we can assume that the government is to a certain extent autonomous in its telling about the past with respect to the entirety of the politics of memory: in the transitional circumstances, the transformation of the social memory framework will depend on the goals set before the transformation rather than on the contents determining the preliminary conditions of change. Only in the case of the component of lasting friendship and allied relations with a superpower, which safeguard the existence of the

0.72 0.01 -0.38 0.11

-0.41 -0.50 -0.41 -0.56

Legitimisation of new elites -0.29 0.29 -0.29 0.29

Presence of the former elite

0.17 -0.17 0.17 -0.17

Transitional justice -0.57

0.06

0.34

-0.32

-0.28 0.28 -0.28 0.28

Social costs of transformations -0.18

0.16

0.18

-0.25

-0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.05

Adaptation of new standards 0.04

0.54

0.66

-0.16

-0.22 0.22 -0.22 0.22

Roles of the democratisation -0.39

-0.19

0.39

0.30

-0.51 0.51 -0.51 0.51

-0.40

-0.79

-0.08

0.77

-0.52 0.52 -0.52 0.52

New state’s identity in IR 0.94

0.54

-0.26

-0.17

0.65 -0.65 0.65 -0.65

-0.27

-0.12

0.17

0.09

-0.25 0.25 -0.25 0.25

The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy 0.52

0.41

0.52

0.52

0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55

95

Table 4.15. The strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the features of the authoritarian identity and average results for categories and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

The inclusive identity The exclusive identity Revolutionary spirit Conservatism The dominant position of the army The dominant position of religion The dominant position of the party The alliance with a superpower

Variable

The national unity

A New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition

Standard deviation (SD)

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authoritarian regime, did we observe a significant correlation to individual functions of the transitional remembrance policy––the occurrence of this feature impacts the higher intensity of the use of remembrance narratives to justify the state’s membership of international organisations. Arguably, those countries pursued the filling of the gap in the political identity of the society, which came about as a result of severing relationships with the authoritarian elites’ powerful guardian. Slightly less powerful relationships occurred in the case of justifying the historical need for national unity which is positively correlated to the army’s dominant position in the society, and negatively to the leading role of one political party. It comes as an interesting fact that the experience of a military dictatorship tended to inspire the new elites to stress the need for national unity, while the dominance of political parties translated into the weakening of such actions. The final relationship worth noting is the correlation of the dominance of the army to the use of remembrance narratives more often to legitimise the presence of the officials of the authoritarian regime in the public life of the now-democratic state––which seems to be an obvious consequence of the need to secure safety and stability that must remain (even if only temporarily) to be guaranteed by the army. Let us take a look now at the strong relationships of the authoritarian identity features with the fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy. The inclusive and revolutionary character of the authoritarian society is positively correlated to the use of the past as the legitimisation of capitalist ideas (r=0.96) and the implementation of new standards arising from the accession to international organisations (r=0.87), and negatively to the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as a means of preventing conflicts (r=0.90) and memory as the myth-motoric inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (r=0.87)––in the case of the exclusive and conservative component these relationships are outright opposites. Thus, we can state that these two completely different types of authoritarian identity did not imply two different strategies of the use of remembrance narratives to reconstruct the vision of the society. Besides, in more than half of the cases, the correlations of these features with the tasks of the transitional remembrance policy were weak or very weak, which confirm our earlier observation of the rather insignificant role of the preliminary conditions for the government’s strategy of managing the collective memory of the society. Additionally, we recognised yet another eleven significant correlations for the remaining four features of the authoritarian identity. The dominant position of the army is positively correlated to the use of: the dichotomy of the past and present as the justification of the need to incur the costs of

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transformations (r=1.00), the historical justification of reconciliation and forgiveness as a source of national unity (r=0.97), the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as the legitimisation of democracy and pluralism (r=0.93) and a source of their definition (r=0.87), and also to showing their place in the new order as a means of averting conflicts (r=0.85), whereas it is negatively correlated to showing the inevitability of transformations and the implementation of new standards as a consequence of the historical events (r=-0.88)––in turn, slightly weaker was the correlation of this feature to showing the historical inevitability of democratisation (r=0.79) proving the symbolic importance of this process. The dominant position of one religion is strongly negatively related to using the idea of the state’s continuity (r=-0.92) and the reconstruction of the landscape of memory (r=-0.88) to legitimise the taking over of power by the new political elites, and slightly weaker is the relation of this feature to the reconstruction of the landscape of memory into a nationwide and pluralistic one (r=0.79), the purpose of which is to promote national unity. Finally, the alliance with a superpower, as a feature of the authoritarian identity, is positively correlated to showing the membership of international organisations as the symbolic complement of democratisation (r=0.97), whereas negatively to using remembrance narratives as the source of the reconciliation driven by the state’s new elites (r=-1.00) and limiting the scope of coming to terms with the past as a consequence of averting the increasing social disproportions (r=-0.93)–– thus, as we can observe, the previous reinforcement of the substance content of the relationship with a superpower safeguarding the endurance of the regime leads to the less conciliatory remembrance policy during the course of democratisation, yet fails to strengthen the will to implement some stricter procedures of the transitional justice. Unambiguously, we can assume that the shape and contents of the authoritarian identity are not significant factors affecting the way the state exercises the transitional remembrance policy. What is more, it seems that––in general––the government’s management of the collective memory of the post-authoritarian society is in isolation from the preliminary conditions set by the vision of the society shared by the regime’s elites. What is an interesting issue is the coming to terms with the past in which the contents of the authoritarian identity are correlated weakly or very weakly––this means that it is not the features of the dictatorship that have an influence on the implementation of the transitional justice procedures, their scope and their strictness––instead, the fulfilment of this function of the remembrance policy depends primarily on the goals which are to be achieved during the course of

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democratisation and the vision of the state which the new elites endeavour to implement. This observation makes it possible to challenge the explanation often given by politicians that failing to settle accounts with the past is a consequence of the complexity of historical processes and the troubled experience of the past––in reality, the existence or lack of transitional justice procedures seems to be the result of decisions made solely by the democratic government, and the character of the overthrown dictatorship does not significantly impact the scope of actions taken by the new authorities. The confirmation of this hypothesis would be of great help to fully understand the transitional remembrance policy.

The Relationships between the Categories and the Democratic Identity The last group of relationships that we looked at in our project was the relationships between the transitional remembrance policy and the features of the promoted new projection of the society. We wanted to check whether the way in which the democratic identity is constructed can influence the intensity of the fulfilment of the individual functions and tasks of using remembrance narratives. Five components recurred in all of the analysed cases, showing that democracy, the rule of law, political pluralism, human rights protection and modernisation were those elements around which the new identity was built in each of the analysed countries. When it comes to the other fifteen features, we observed significant differences which enabled us to differentiate the analysed cases. They are as follows: inclusiveness, reconciliation, forgiveness and national unity (all of which were deemed to be the basic components of the democratic identity), as well as capitalism, social justice, the inevitability of conflicts, nationalism, multi-culturalism, the attachment to national tradition, national martyrdom, going back to the roots, the dominant role of religion, the pursuit of regional integration, and emulating the Western World (all of which were deemed to be elements complementary to the democratic identity). As far as the first group of features is concerned, the most interesting fact is that the new democratic community was not intended to be inclusive in each of the researched countries––in post-communist Poland the new identity was defined neither as integrating the whole society, nor as excluding one or another part of it. This aspect remained unidentified. As a result, also in the case of Poland only, the new democratic community was not to be characterised by the overriding position of the idea of national unity. Generally speaking, it was the post-communist

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states that usually gave up the basic components of the new identity–– Estonia, Georgia, and Poland did not take account of forgiveness, whereas Georgia and Poland additionally failed to take into consideration the reconciliation.16 Thus, we can see that the presence of reconciliation as the fundamental element of the new vision of the society coincides with the reconstruction of the society as the purpose of the political transformation, which shows that the incorporation of this feature is not merely a strategy aimed at averting social conflicts, but it is also an indispensable element of the future-oriented policy. Thus, what appeared to be even more interesting was the reference of the basic identity components to the findings of our research over the scope and intensity of the transitional remembrance policy. The strength of relationships between elements is presented in Table 4.16. At the same time, we can state that the most important of these components is the presence of reconciliation among the fundamentals of the new vision of the society. This feature is strongly correlated to the shape of the transitional remembrance policy, and also to the significant function of showing the symbolic role of democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract and a tribute paid to the previous generations. What was of moderate importance for the management by the government of the post-authoritarian society’s collective memory, were inclusive identity and national unity, which to a similar extent were also related to the symbolic role of democratisation and the presence of the representatives of the previous regime. This also occurred in the case of the relationship between reconciliation and the historical need for national unity, the social costs of transformations, the selected formula of settling accounts with the past, and the adoption of new political and social standards. In turn, a moderately negative correlation occurred in the case of forgiveness and the membership of international organisations. It is an interesting fact that the basic components of the new identity were weakly related to the use of remembrance narratives to legitimise the taking over of power by the new elites, which may provide an argument confirming the statement that the fulfilment of this function is a natural consequence of exercising the transitional remembrance policy, and it is to a great extent autonomous with regard to the changes and the goals of the transformation.

 16

This can be interpreted in two ways: we can either decide that transformation of the society’s political identity in the post-communist countries was merely partial, or we ought to distinguish the post-communist transition as a unique subtype of the democratic transformations.

The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy New state’s identity in IR

The national unity

Roles of the democratisation

Adaptation of new standards

Presence of the former elite

Legitimisation of new elites

The inclusive identity 0.04 0.67 0.34 0.43 0.39 0.72 0.59 0.00 0.70 0.41 Reconciliation 0.06 0.49 0.62 0.68 0.62 0.69 -0.34 0.52 0.96 0.83 Forgiveness -0.17 0.29 0.28 0.05 0.22 0.51 0.52 -0.65 0.25 0.55 National unity 0.04 0.67 0.34 0.43 0.39 0.72 0.59 0.00 0.70 0.41 Table 4.16. The strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the basic components of the democratic identity and average results for categories and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Variable

Transitional justice

Chapter Four

Social costs of transformations

100

Standard deviation (SD)

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Furthermore, we recognised eleven significant correlations between the basic features of the promoted vision of a democratic society and fields of impact of remembrance narratives. The inclusive identity and the highlighting of the importance of national unity are positively related to using the past as justifying the need for the unity of the whole society in the light of the ongoing changes (r=0.81), whereas negatively to the historical justification of the need for the symbolic separation of the past from the present (r=-0.89) which is meant to legitimise the presence of the representatives of the previous regime. Therefore, the pursuit of the consolidation of the nation does not have to mean relinquishing the memory of the crimes and abuse by the authoritarian government, but it implies the application of the strategy of commemorating without dealing with the past and punishing those responsible for human rights violations. It is in line with our predictions, which assumed that as long as the transitional remembrance policy is a choice between remembering and forgetting, both strategies refer––to a certain extent––to the implementation of transitional justice procedures. Reconciliation was positively correlated to two fields of impact of the symbolic role of democratisation––the memory of the heroes as a source of the new democratic and civic attitudes (r=0.94) and the adjustment of the selection of stories to the needs of democratisation (r=0.92)––and to the use of memory as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (r=0.92), which is assigned to supporting the implementation of new standards. In turn, the indication of forgiveness as one of the components of the new identity is positively related to recognising the presence of the representatives of the previous regime as a means of averting domestic conflicts (r=0.90) and to the use of memory as a source of the new definition of patriotism (r=0.87), which increases only a little less than in the case of reconciliation. At the same time, this feature is negatively correlated to the use of the past as the justification of capitalist ideas (r=0.96), and to calling for historical arguments for the implementation of the new standards which are the consequence of the accession to international organisations (r=-0.87). This can be regarded as the result of the limited role of forgiveness in the construction of the post-communist identity, to which these very aspects––capitalism and regional integration––are of particular importance. The second group of the analysed features included the additional components of the democratic identity. They had the least importance in the case of the non-European transitions––the new vision of the South African society included only one such feature, while that of the Chilean society––only three. In Georgia, in turn, there were as many as ten such

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elements, nine in Poland, eight in Estonia, and six in Spain. Thus, the European model of constructing a new political identity seems to be based on a greater number of complementing components which specify the vision of the society in the spaces loosely connected with democracy itself. This does not mean, obviously, that those identities are less (or more) democratic, but it must be deemed as an indication that in Europe the reconstruction of the post-authoritarian society cannot be derived merely from democratisation itself, but that the legitimisation of its authenticity requires some additional arguments and justifying stories. It is interesting that capitalism, private property and free market competition were part of the post-authoritarian identity in the postcommunist countries only, despite the fact that in both Chile and Spain those ideas defined economic cooperation even before taking the path of democratisation. Similarly, only the governments of Estonia, Georgia and Poland united their societies around the idea of regional integration and supported the pursuit of the Western World. Other interesting cases are the inevitability of conflicts, which was part of the identity of the Georgians and the Polish, and the dominant position of religion which we recognised within the visions of the Spanish and Polish societies. On the other hand, three features––social justice, the appeal to the national tradition, and the call for the return to the roots––occurred in all of the cases except South Africa. While failing to redistribute wealth was the outcome of the compromise necessary to overthrow the apartheid regime, the national tradition and the return to the roots might have resulted in dividing the nation and breaking national unity. Particular ethnic groups might have seen them as appealing to different, often contradictory, contents. It comes as a surprise though that also in Chile the new identity did not involve the martyrdom component, which means that referring, during the course of democratisation, to the suffering of the nation is a characteristic feature of the European post-authoritarian transformations. There is no doubt that these differences had an influence on the shape of the relationships between the transitional remembrance policy and the additional components of the democratic identity which are presented in Table 4.17. We can spot at least a few interesting correlations between the variables. In the first place, we recognised a strong negative correlation between the inevitability of conflicts and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy, and also, an even stronger relationship of this feature with the low intensity of the use of remembrance narratives to show the symbolic role of democratisation. In turn, the presence of the martyrdom component correlates significantly positively to accounting for integration aspirations and the pursuit of the change of the state’s identity

0.17 -0.30 -0.06 0.20 -0.50 -0.30 -0.56 -0.30 -0.76 0.17 0.17

Capitalism Social justice The inevitability of conflicts Nationalism Multiculturalism National tradition National martyrdom Return to the roots The dominant role of religion Regional integration Imitating the Western World

Presence of the former elite -0.29 0.52 -0.49 0.22 0.04 0.52 0.11 0.52 -0.11 -0.29 -0.29

Transitional justice -0.28 -0.78 -0.62 -0.02 0.00 -0.78 -0.57 -0.78 -0.54 -0.28 -0.28

Social costs of transformations -0.05 -0.39 -0.68 0.29 -0.15 -0.39 -0.18 -0.39 -0.47 -0.05 -0.05

Adaptation of new standards -0.22 -0.49 -0.62 0.08 0.33 -0.49 0.04 -0.49 0.04 -0.22 -0.22

Roles of the democratisation -0.51 -0.30 -0.96 0.03 0.00 -0.30 -0.39 -0.30 -0.42 -0.51 -0.51

-0.52 0.28 -0.69 -0.08 -0.29 0.28 -0.40 0.28 -0.32 -0.52 -0.52

New state’s identity in IR 0.65 0.65 0.34 0.69 0.08 0.65 0.94 0.65 0.26 0.65 0.65

-0.25 -0.22 -0.83 0.29 -0.11 -0.22 -0.27 -0.22 -0.56 -0.25 -0.25

The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy 0.55 0.41 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.41 0.52 0.41 0.52 0.55 0.55

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Table 4.17. The strength of Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the additional components of the democratic identity and average results for categories and the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Legitimisation of new elites

Variable

The national unity

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Standard deviation (SD)

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in international politics. Among the moderately strong relationships, we should indicate the negative influence of religion on the need to legitimise the taking over of power by the new elites, the importance of social justice, national tradition, and the return to the roots, all weakening the actions aimed at coming to terms with the authoritarian past, the disadvantageous influence of the inevitability of conflicts on explanations of the social costs of transformations, the adoption of new standards, and the historical need for national unity, and also––extremely surprisingly–– the positive correlation between nationalism as an element of the democratic identity and using remembrance narratives to account for the membership of international organisations. It is also interesting that the additional components of the new vision of the society remain rather indifferent when it comes to the way in which the presence of the representatives of the previous regime is legitimised. Moreover, the collected data allowed us to recognise numerous significant relationships between those features and fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy. Capitalism, regional integration and the imitation of the Western World (i.e. components characteristic of the postcommunist transformations) are positively correlated to the use of history to promote capitalist ideas (r=0.96) and the implementation of new standards as the result of the integration with international structures (r=0.87), whereas negatively to showing the presence of the authoritarian regime as a means of averting conflicts (r=-0.90) and the use of memory as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (r=-0.87), which makes it possible to recognise perfectly well in which areas democratisation in the post-communist states was different from those in the other analysed cases. In turn, social justice, the appeal to national tradition, and the idea of the return to the roots (which characterised all the countries but South Africa) are related positively to justifications of the integration aspirations as a means of regaining the proper and due position within the international community (r=0.91), whereas negatively to presenting the model of the transitional justice as a source of forgiving those guilty of the crimes of the authoritarian regime (r=-0.88) and using narratives telling about the historical roots of the economic disproportions in the transformation conditions (r=-0.88). This in turn enables us to define the dissimilarity of the intensity of the fulfilment of particular tasks of the transitional remembrance policy in South Africa. What is interesting–– though not surprising––is the fact that it was so important in that country to combine the transitional justice with forgiveness, and to present social stratification as a consequence of the long-drawn-out historical processes.

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Let us now have a look at the additional features of the democratic identity. Acknowledging the inevitability of conflicts is negatively related to the following three fields of impact: the memory of the national heroes as a source of the democratic and civic attitudes (r=-0.94), the adjustment of the selection of narratives to the needs of democratisation (r=-0.93), and the use of the experience of the past to construct the new definition of patriotism (r=-0.92), i.e. the elements which can be regarded as the basic tasks of the transitional remembrance policy. Nationalism is connected with showing the historical justifications aimed at developing the new political identity, which will also include the representatives of the previous regime (r=0.92), and support for the implementation of new standards as the historical result of the integration aspirations (r=0.96)––in both cases it is a somewhat surprising relationship but possible to account for. As far as the former is concerned, the explanation could be the existence of some external threats to the survival of the nation, which force the community to consolidate and forget the harm of the authoritarian period; while in the case of the latter, nationalism can be an inspiration for breaking up with the previous identity of the state in international policy and accepting the changes which result from the attempts to regain the due position in the global community. In both cases, the cause could be the counter-present character of the nationalist mythologies. Meanwhile, multiculturalism is strongly correlated solely to the transformation of the landscape of memory into a pluralistic and nationwide one (r=-0.89), which would not be surprising if it was not for the vector of that relationship. The negative relationship may result from the difficulty in the reconstruction of exploiting the symbolic space which the government must face in the environment of the multi-ethnicity and diversity of the people––therefore, it seems that in that case it is safer to leave the reconstruction of the landscape of memory to the grassroots initiative, the civil society, or to the local authorities, so as to avoid the accusation of favouring one part of the society. The national martyrdom is very strongly related to showing the change of the state’s identity in international policy as the regaining of the due and proper position in the world (r=0.96), whereas negatively to the recognition of memory as a source of reconciliation driven by the new elite (r=1.00) and to limiting the scope of the transitional justice as a means of preventing the escalation of conflicts (r=0.93). Hence, the awareness of the suffering of the nation inspires politicians to weaken the will to forget the authoritarian trauma, but––again––it does not imply the intensity of the government’s implementation of the transitional justice procedures. Finally, the

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dominant role of religion (which we identified in the cases of Spain and Poland) is negatively correlated to the use of the past to legitimise the taking over of power by the new elites (r=-0.88), at the same time failing to strengthen significantly any other task of the transitional remembrance policy. The reference of the features of the democratic identity implemented by the new elites to the overall shape of the government’s management of collective memory during democratisation made us recognise a number of important issues, supporting our assumption of the greater significance of the orientation on the future with regard to the use of remembrance narratives. Two of the discussed features were strongly related to the shape of the transitional remembrance policy––the presence of reconciliation, as the pillar of the new community, increased its intensity, while coming to terms with the inevitability of conflicts and the likelihood of the disintegration or polarisation of the society co-occurred with the weakening of the use of remembrance narratives. This enables us to imagine the hypothetical axis for the vision of democratic identity, which is limited by the will to reconcile and by the recognition of the inevitability of conflicts––it is this very axis that may have the constituting influence on the transitional remembrance policy, indicating that it is remembering that is related to the will of agreement and cooperation, while forgetting occurs along with the acceptance of the conflicts as the foundation of the social life and the democratic order. It is by far one of the greatest discoveries of our research project. It makes it possible to better understand the factors shaping the government’s management of collective memory during the course of democratisation. It seems to be very important to confirm this observation, as well as to check whether this axis also occurs in periods other than the transformation, and whether in the circumstances of the political system consolidation and the consolidated democracy any relationships defining it are also observed.

Summary What is it that makes the transitional remembrance policy take a certain shape? Which factors enable remembrance narratives to be used in constructing the democratic identity of the society? Our research brought us closer to answering the above questions and to understanding the relationship between the government’s management of collective memory and the promotion of the new vision of a political community. Our observations put this relationship in a new light––thanks to them, remembrance policy is becoming an indispensable element of democratic

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transformations and an important tool for removing the remains of the authoritarian order in the symbolic space. Furthermore, the findings of the research show that perceiving it as being the result of the unique conditions of a particular country or a response to the specific experiences of a community is no longer valid. The use of remembrance narratives in the future-oriented transitional politics is a phenomenon shared in each of

Image 4.2. The General Model of Correlations between the shape of transitional remembrance policy and its objectives and aims. In black––positive correlations, in red––negative correlations (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

the six analysed cases. Each of the new democratic governments made a decision to use the interpretations of the past so as to legitimise, through their content, the new order and the conducted reforms. The collected data enabled us to construct two models of relationships. One of them is the before-mentioned model of correlations between fields

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of impact of the transitional remembrance policy. The other is the General Model of Correlations between the shape of transitional remembrance policy and its objectives and aims. It is presented in Image 4.2. The model reflects the disproportion in the significance of categories––we can see that the tasks to be undertaken by remembrance narratives in terms of the legitimisation of the transitional justice, the social costs of transformations, the implementation of new social and political standards, and the symbolic role of democracy, influenced the transitional remembrance policy more significantly than the other four categories (the legitimisation of the taking over of power by the new elites, the justification of the presence of the representatives of the previous regime, the historical need for national unity, and membership of international organisations). This means that it is precisely those four most significant fields that regulate the intensity of using remembrance narratives, constituting the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. And it is exactly the implementation of those tasks that should be of prime interest for both democratisation researchers and the politicians responsible for the reconstruction of the political system of the state. The model of the intensity of correlations confirms our earlier observations about the key roles of two categories––the social costs of transformations, and the symbolic role of democratisation––which are most strongly correlated to the general shape of the government’s management of collective memory. It is the very analysis of these two functions that enables us to predict most precisely the way in which the transitional elites endeavour to use remembrance narratives to alter the political identity of the society. Therefore, it seems that those elements which are significantly related to the intensification of the implementation of these functions are very important, and, thus, they impact what most strongly constitutes remembrance policy of the democratisation. The relationships which are of interest to us are presented in Table 4.18. Let us now take a closer look at them. We can see a strong correlation between these functions, which shows that they are related not only to the final result, but that their intensification occurs simultaneously. We should also note that while the social costs of transformations are not significantly correlated to the features of the democratic transition, the authoritarian identity, or the promoted vision of the new community, in the case of the symbolic role of the transformations we recognised four such relationships: two each for the features of the transition and the components of the democratic identity. What is an interesting fact is that in both cases we recognised three strong correlations to the fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy, although they do not

Category

The correlated element

Correlation strength

109

Transitional justice 0.85 Symbolic roles of the democratisation 0.83 The transitional justice as a legitimisation of the rule of law 0.87 Social costs of The transitional justice as punishing human rights violators 0.96 transformations Field The new organisation of time as a tool of the transfer of 0.84 ideas Feature Category Social costs of transformations 0.83 The past as an inspiration for the new definition of 0.84 patriotism Field Pro-democratic selection of narratives 0.91 Symbolic roles of the National heroes as examples of civic behaviours 0.90 democratisation The threat of political violence during the transition 0.96 The reconstruction of the society as a goal of the transition 0.96 Feature Reconciliation as a component of the new identity 0.96 Inevitability of conflicts as a part of the new identity -0.96 Table 4.18. The strongest correlations of the key functions to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

The key function of the transitional remembrance policy

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overlap even once––this means that it is those very six detailed tasks put before telling about the past, which should be regarded as the most significant ones. They are: the transitional justice as the legitimisation of the rule of law (item 3-1), as punishing the wrongdoers (item 3-2), memory as the myth-motoric inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (item 5-5), the adjustment of the selection of narratives to the needs of democratisation (item 6-3), the memory of the national heroes as a source of the new democratic and civic attitudes (item 6-4), and the new organisation of time as a tool of the transfer of ideas from the elites to the society (item 6-5). Let us then check the significance of those six fields of impact. We learned from the model of correlations that two of them are strongly related to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. Thus, we know––at least with regard to the transitional justice as punishing the human rights violators and the adjustment of the selection of narratives to the needs of democratisation––that they co-occur along with the greater intensification of the use of remembrance narratives. As far as the remaining four tasks are concerned, the strongest correlation characterises the use of the heroes as a source of new attitudes (r=0.75), weaker ones–– transitional justice as the legitimisation of the rule of law and memory as a source of the new definition of patriotism (r=0.67 each), and the weakest one––the new organisation of time (r=0.59)––however, only three other fields were characterised by a more significant relationship with the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy than the last of the discussed tasks, and only one other field––the use of the historical justifications of the new economic attitudes under the social transformations (r=0.72)––is more significant than the last three discussed. Hence, apart from the six indicated elements and the promotion of new economic attitudes, the particularly important tasks also include presenting democratisation as a tribute paid to the victims of the repressions in the authoritarian period (r=0.64), and the past as a reason for national unity (r=0.63), and also the strongest negative relationship is the separation of the past from the present as a means of justifying the presence of the representatives of the previous regime (r=-0.66). Let us now look at the matter from a different perspective so as to determine even more precisely which fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy are indeed significant to its general shape. Just as we presented the relationships of the key functions, it also seems worth discussing the most important tasks undertaken by the government with regard to the use of remembrance narratives to reconstruct the political identity of the society. They are presented in Table 4.19.

Feature

Field

Category

Feature

Field

Category

Social costs of transformations The transitional justice as the legitimisation of the rule of law The legitimisation of new economic attitudes The new organisation of time as a tool of the transfer of ideas Symbolic roles of the democratisation Historical need for national unity Presence of the former elites as a legitimisation of democracy The past as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism National heroes as examples of civic behaviours The past as the justification of national unity The threat of political violence during the transition The reconstruction of the society as a goal of the transition Reconciliation as a component of the new identity The inevitability of conflicts as a part of the new identity

The correlated element

0.96 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 -0.96

Correlation strength

111

Table 4.19. The strongest correlations of the key tasks to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Pro-democratic selection of narratives and their heroes

The transitional justice as punishment of human rights violators

The key tasks of the transitional remembrance policy

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In both tables, six fields of impact recur––transitional justice as a means of legitimising the rule of law and punishing human rights violators, the memory of the heroes as an inspiration for the new definition of patriotism, the adjustment of the selection of narratives to the challenges of democratisation, the memory of the heroes as a source of democratic and civic attitudes, and the new organisation of time as a tool of the transfer of ideas from the elites to the society. There is no doubt that this group of elements must be deemed as crucial to transitional remembrance policy. The role of the four other tasks whose correlation was also moderate on the use of remembrance narratives is less evident–– two fields were repeated in another table, two other fields were not included in it, yet one other field was included. Therefore, we decided that the key elements should also include those tasks which were repeated, i.e. the historical justification of the new economic attitudes in the transformation reality, and the past as the legitimisation of the need for national unity in the light of the challenges of democratisation. It is the very eight fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy––in the light of the collected data––that have the most significant influence on the use of remembrance narratives as a means of reconstructing the political identity of the post-authoritarian society. It is much easier by far to determine which of the transition features or visions of the society are of any significance for the phenomenon under research. The following ones are strongly correlated to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy: the threat of the escalation of political violence as a feature of the transition course, the reconstruction of the society as a goal set before the implemented changes, and reconciliation as a component of the new democratic identity, whereas acknowledging the inevitability of conflicts is strongly negatively related to remembrance narratives. The findings of our research show that it is those four features which constitute the conditions in which the implementation of the tasks of the remembrance policy in the time of transformations is significantly intensified (or weakened, in the case of the inevitability of conflicts). These observations confirm the results of the correlation to the function and the key tasks for the use of remembrance narratives during democratisation––in both cases, which can be seen in the above tables, it was only these four features that were strongly correlated to the results recognised for the variables, whose significance was greater than that of the other ones. This knowledge enables us to close off the draft model of the factors which determine the form that the transitional remembrance policy will take, and how its stories will be used to construct the post-authoritarian political identity.

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Not only do the results we obtained inform us about the forms of the government’s management of collective memory, but they also say a lot about democratisation itself. Political researchers often assume that the pursuit of turning an authoritarian state into a democratic one implies the quasi-revolutionary break with the past and the legitimising of the new political identity with the very idea of democratic rule [Held, 2010: 297298]. However, our research shows that both assumptions are probably not true. Democratisation does not have to mean a sudden and violent change in the understanding of the relationships between the past and present––the dichotomy of the causes of memory and forgetting leads to the gradual reconstruction of the interpretations of this relationship, which means creating new stories, the elimination of the existing ones, and also the adoption and transformation of the stories which were promoted by the authoritarian leaders [WawrzyĔski, 2015]. The difference in the understanding of this phenomenon may arise from the fact that, generally, political researchers observe the revolutionary change of institutions and political procedures, failing to notice that the radical transformation of the state’s structure or the provisions of law do not automatically imply the transformation of the society’s identity and the nation’s political culture. What is also problematic is the hypothesis of legitimising the new vision of the national community with the mere idea of the democratic order. It is obvious that our research confirms that it is a very important component, and that the reference to democratic values occurred in each of the analysed cases, yet this element does not seem to be a decisive one, and even more––an exclusive one. The model of correlations which we built indicates that showing the symbolic understanding of democratisation is the most important function of the transitional remembrance policy, but it is equally important to account for the social costs of transformations, while slightly less important is the justification of the selected formula of the transitional justice and the adoption of new political and social standards. It is in those very areas that the new identity is simultaneously legitimised. Similarly, the comparison of the features of the promoted vision of the post-authoritarian society shows that the following values are as important as the very idea of the democratic order: the rule of law, political pluralism, human rights protection, and the pursuit of modernisation. This shows that democracy not only often fails to be a reliable source of the legitimisation of the implemented reforms, but also the very proposal of launching the democratic order may require legitimisation with some other contents.

CHAPTER FIVE THE GENERAL MODEL OF USING REMEMBRANCE NARRATIVES TO CONSTRUCT A NEW POLITICAL IDENTITY DURING THE POST-AUTHORITARIAN TRANSITION BY PATRYK WAWRZYēSKI AND JOANNA MARSZAàEK-KAWA

The Nature of the Transitional Government’s Remembrance Policy Every human, by his nature, has the will to remember the past. Memory is important. Its core is the individual experience and participation in those events which have left an imprint on what we are, or what we consider ourselves to be. At the same time, our memory goes further back––we know and remember those events in which we did not take part (from the ancient times until the 20th Century), and still we consider them to be important to our identity and understanding of the world. We also experience the past in a symbolic way: our participation in narrating it results from the technology of social communication and the multitude of interactions which allow us to reconstruct, interpret, and imagine the past [Mead, 1917]. We take part in remembrance narratives not only through our own experience, but also through participating in culture, which enables us to symbolically experience the past [Zybertowicz, 2001; Luhmann, 1995; Taschwer, 1996]. In both situations––the individual experience, as well as being part of the culture––remembrance takes the form of a narrative and it becomes an interpretation of events through the prism of the current knowledge. The constructed narratives are not a perfect reflection of the events; rather, they are the images of the past drawn by particular authors and their subjective visions of what happened [Tokarz, 2005: 4-9; McCullagh, 1984: 394;

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Ankersmith, 1983]. However, the internal dualism of remembrance narratives causes them to be conceived not only in the context of the present-day, but also in relation to the vision of the future and the paths which may lead us to realise the long-term projects of the social change [Crawford, 2006: 226; Engel, 1999; Koczanowicz, 2009: 31]. Another dichotomy of memory is the permeation of the strategies of remembering and forgetting, through which it is possible to tell about all that is important to us––the pleasant moments of joy and the bitter moments of suffering [Uldricks, 2009]––and to interpret those events, and provide them with a specific meaning which designates our position in the social environment [Misztal, 2004: 77; Perkins, 1997; Sztompka, 2000; WawrzyĔski, 2013]. Thus, memory mirrors our identity and ensures the survival of our relationships with the community [Hoskins, 2007: 246247; Kattago, 2001: 28-30]. The nature of memory has some significant consequences in terms of the understanding of the government’s remembrance policy. Firstly, we must agree that the government’s use of remembrance narratives is meant to influence shared cultural contents. Secondly, remembrance policy is a set of stories and interpretations of those experiences which the state considers to be the proper and true coverage of what happened in the past. Thirdly, it influences a society’s political identity through telling those stories which are essential for the community. Fourthly, it defines and labels political behaviour, obliging the citizen to take certain actions; it organises ideas, norms, or values through explaining the relationships of the past with the present and the future [Koczanowicz, 1997: 259-260; Smith, 2003: 56-59]. Fifthly, it is orientated on the future. Sixthly, it is a mechanism which allows the arbitrary selection of narratives by the government, deciding what will be remembered and what will be forgotten. Seventhly and finally, remembrance policy influences the emotions of the recipients in such a way that the symbolic experience of the past and the participation in the story are possible [Labanyi, 2008: 120121]. To sum up, its basic function is to provide the simplified visions of the reality, which can be used by the citizens when taking important political decisions [Westen, 2008: 41-49]. The above-mentioned features are particularly important to the transitional remembrance policy, when using remembrance narratives is meant to support transformations of the political system and safeguard the endurance of the promoted vision of the democratic community. Then, remembrance policy can become the key tool, fully controlled by the new elites, for transforming the political culture. To the society, it is a source of knowledge about how the new leaders will interpret and tell about the past,

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and, at the same time, it makes clear what, in the new order, will be regarded as the proper coverage of historical events. Furthermore, it aims to make clear to the citizens what behaviour, attitudes, ideas, norms or values are expected and required under the new circumstances, and what ought to be eradicated, offering, concurrently, their comprehensible definitions, confirmed by the examples of heroes of remembrance narratives. Coincidentally, it channels the citizens’ emotions, focusing their attention on those issues which can consolidate the new political order and prevent the escalation of internal conflicts. However, the other two features of remembrance policy are of fundamental importance. Democratisation makes its orientation on the future even more significant––it is so that remembrance narratives can be used by the government to justify, explain and promote the new vision of the future or long-term plans which need to be carried out. This means that democratisation itself can be legitimised by stories selected by the elites conducting the transformation of the state. The transitional orientation on the change matches the remembrance policy’s orientation on the future–– these two phenomena complement each other, providing conditions conducive to the long-drawn-out reconstruction of the culture of politics and the binding standards of political behaviour. Then, the selection of narratives becomes a tool of direct influence on citizens, though significantly limited by the framework of cultural memory. Democratisation constitutes conditions in which the imaginations of the past and the future must remain for the citizen in a comprehensible relation with the present-day––the ongoing changes can be legitimised by remembrance narratives or the vision of the new order. As for the former, the authenticating factor is the authority of experiencing the past, and as for the latter, the hope for a better future. Both aspects are indispensable to the stability and endurance of the implemented reforms. It seems that even more significant is the influence of the transitional government’s remembrance policy on the political identity of the postauthoritarian society. As much as the legitimisation of the change can be implemented with reference to the past or the future, so much of the reconstruction of the vision of the society must be based on showing the historical roots, tradition and experience which constitute it. Remembrance enables the process of constructing the new community, transforming the authoritarian society into a democratic one [Ingimundarson, 2007]. It is memory that determines whether the new community is going to last or whether it will become subject to internal separatisms that fight about the inheritance from the authoritarian regime [Fonchingong, 2005]. Permanence, which can be safeguarded by the political identity promoted

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by remembrance narratives, is the key aspect during the transition. The referral to the past minimises the risk of the citizens declining the new vision of the community as it provides them with the apparent obviousness and inevitability of the new identity. The change in the society, proposed by the elites, is presented as the intrinsic consequence of the nation’s historical heritage, its successes and sufferings; thus, it is not presented as one of those reforms that can be ceased or negotiated. Memory provides a new identity of authority which cannot be challenged by the citizens––the use of remembrance narratives emerges as an act that is partially authoritarian, which is meant to help the state to achieve democratic standards. It is worth confronting our theoretical hypotheses with the observations we discussed in the previous chapter. The General Model of the Intensity of Relationships between the functions and tasks of the transitional remembrance policy and its general shape shows that the most influential are two types of using remembrance narratives––aimed at presenting symbolic roles of democratisation as the realisation of the intergenerational contract and the tribute paid to the heroes of the struggle for freedom, and justifying the necessity of social costs of transformations. Certainly, these functions serve the legitimisation of the political system reconstruction and explain to the citizens the roots of the future-orientated reforms. They enable the comprehension of the direction in which the state is heading, which is set not so much by the elites as by the historical processes initiated by the previous generations. In both cases, remembrance regulates the political processes, and at the same time safeguards the unstable democratic order against an escalation of social conflicts or the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the results of the reforms. However, the other function––defining the society’s political identity through telling about what is important to the comprehension of its existence––seems to be of even greater significance. Both, presenting symbolic roles of democratisation and justifying the social costs of transformations, show unequivocally that the collapse of the authoritarian regime is not solely the triumph of one particular generation, but the accomplishment of the efforts of a number of generations, and the heritage that will be passed on to the successive generations. They position the nation and the citizen in a remarkably broader historical perspective which makes it possible to show the new community what the heroes were like, why they ought to look up to them and what sacrifices they had to make to overcome the tyranny, which also explains why the very democratisation of the state will require sacrifices on the part of the citizens. The relay of the generations is a distinctive tool for transitional story-telling––it allows

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the relativizing of the current costs or sufferings, the gains or merits, through referral to the mythologised interpretations of the past, where the sacrifice is always the greatest and virtues most clearly visible. Thus, remembrance narratives set new goals for the community, which must be achieved in order to do the will of the previous generations. In reality though, that will is the political identity promoted by the new elites, and a representation which makes possible the stabilisation of the country during the implementing reforms. The General Model of the Intensity of Relationships also shows that to the transitional remembrance policy it is important to use the interpretations of the past to legitimise transitional justice and to justify the need to adopt the new social and political standards. Their relationship with the future-orientation of the transition and with the objective to reconstruct the political identity of the society is easy to recognise. Transitional justice is not only a procedure enabling the cleansing of the state’s structures and overcoming the post-authoritarian trauma––it is also a political rite showing which ideas and values are to constitute the new community and the principles of its functioning. It seals the deal between the old and new elites, reinforcing the terms of the contract to reform the political system, and to the society it becomes a show of the rule of law, in which the symbolic cleansing of the improprieties of the authoritarian regime takes place. In turn, the implementation of the new standards contributes to the gradual realisation of the long-term plans of the democratic government in reconstructing the political culture and the framework of the accepted behaviour (e.g. political violence, corruption, or nepotism). At the same time, promoting them can be regarded as an important element of educating the society in what it should be like under the new democratic circumstances––then, national heroes become role models, the balance between tradition and modernisation sets the scope of the ongoing changes, and remembrance becomes the direct inspiration to provide a new definition of patriotism, which will correspond to the new post-authoritarian identity. Let us also consider the significance of the eight fields of impact which we decided were the most important to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. The above discussed symbolic significance of transitional justice comes down to two fundamental tasks: the legitimisation of the rule of law and punishing those guilty of human rights violations. Both are important to the new identity––their implementation aims to educate the citizens about the rule of law, respect for rules, and the inevitability of punishment. At the same time, they design the future society, defining the new legal order within which the society is to function in the

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future. A similar role is played by referring to the historical justification of new economic attitudes during transformations––on the one hand, remembrance narratives keep citizens informed about the most important components of the new political identity of the society (entrepreneurship, the individual initiative, the need for self-organisation, and the responsibility for one’s own fate), and on the other hand, stories promote the vision of the community as envisaged by the state’s new elites. Another field of impact which, to a similar degree, connects these two basic features of the transitional remembrance policy is in using the commemoration of national heroes as a source of civic and democratic attitudes. The remaining four tasks that remembrance story-telling should fulfil, are more strongly focused on constructing the new identity. Their orientation on the future is more of a consequence of the very nature of democratisation than as a result of some intentional actions taken by the political leaders. A good illustration is the example of using remembrance narratives as the inspiration for the new definition of patriotism––the basic motivation is reconstructing the society and creating the new citizen who will be well suited to participate in the life of the democratic country. The new definition of patriotism is meant to clarify to all members of the nation how they ought to act in the transformed political environment, and who they should feel themselves to be after the collapse of the authoritarian regime. The accomplishment of this task is backed by the other three fields of impact: the pro-democratic selection of narratives, the new organisation of time and the past as the legitimisation of the need for national unity. The first of these allows the limiting of the impact of those remembrance narratives which the authorities consider to be inconsistent with the new vision of the society, and thus, it allows the consolidation of the new order. The second field of impact which is promoted by the leaders enables the flow of the new interpretations and representations of the past to the social masses through ritual commemoration––thus, the new organisation of time becomes the festival of the new identity, and public holidays can be regarded as the time when the new society is created. Finally, the third serves to unify and consolidate all the citizens into a new community which the new elites lead towards democracy. Our model of the transitional remembrance policy confirms the earlier observations describing the nature of this issue. The General Model of the Intensity of Relationships confirms that the key features of remembrance story-telling during transformations are future-orientation and influencing the society’s political identity. Hence, the use of remembrance narratives by the transitional government is none other than a tool for exerting social influence and a means to control the transformation of the political culture.

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Thus, we can emphasise outright that remembrance policy is an important element of the technology of power during democratisation and a method enabling the streamlining of the course of the implemented reforms–– however, the intensification of using remembrance narratives is conducive not so much to the new political order as to the stability of the promoted vision of the post-authoritarian society, which is a superstructure of the democratic regime. The interpretations of the past, promoted by the new leaders, can be regarded as the safeguard for the stability of the designed political identity of the society.

Using Remembrance Narratives to Construct the New Political Identity The objective of our research was to analyse thoroughly six different cases of the transitional remembrance policy. The collected data enabled us to outline the most important functions and tasks which were to be fulfilled by stories of the past during democratisation. Each of the researched countries––Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Spain, Poland and South Africa––was characterised by the different specifics of the transformation’s conditioning, historical experience, political tradition or the culture of politics, yet––as the conducted research shows––it is possible to point to spaces which are common to all the cases. However, before we discuss the most important similarities and differences between the particular countries, it is necessary to present the general results of our research. In general, each particular field of impact of the transitional remembrance policy obtained on average barely 2.63 points (out of a maximum of 5) which indicates rather a low degree of using remembrance narratives during democratisation. This means that remembrance story-telling cannot be regarded as the government’s priority during transformations, yet it plays an important role in the process of reconstruction of political identity, becoming a tool for influencing citizens. This observation does not come as a surprise––certainly, remembrance policy is a significant function of the government, yet in democratic conditions, it must not become a space on which the political leaders of the state should focus their attention. The varied intensity of using remembrance narratives characterises the average results for research categories, which are presented in Table 5.1. We can see that four functions of the transitional remembrance policy differ significantly in their intensity with respect to the average for its general shape––two categories are characterised by distinctly higher results, and two by distinctly lower results.

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Legitimisation of new elites 2,72 Low 0,74 Presence of the former elite 2,60 Low 0,65 Transitional justice 2,17 Low 1,31 Social costs of transformations 1,83 Very low 0,30 Adaptation of new standards 2,73 Low 0,67 Symbolic roles of the democratisation 3,07 Moderate 0,86 Historical need for national unity 2,71 Low 0,80 New state’s identity in IR 3,00 Moderate 1,13 The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy 2,63 Low 0,43 Table 5.1. Using remembrance narratives to reconstruct the society’s political identity in the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Research category

Average result

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Standard deviation (SD)

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In the research sample, remembrance narratives were used most intensively to discuss symbolic roles of democratisation as the realisation of the intergenerational contract and the tribute paid to the heroes of the struggle for freedom. Besides this function, it was only in the case of justifying the membership of international organisations that the use of the interpretations of the past reached a moderate degree. That means that, in practice, these two objectives are outright the most important to the transitional remembrance policy––yet, the high degree of the standard deviation for the latter category makes us sceptical about the universality of the significance of using remembrance narratives to legitimise the new international position of the state. At the other extreme is the justification of the necessity to incur the social costs of transformations, which is the only research category characterised by a very low degree of using remembrance narratives. The insignificance of this function to the transitional remembrance policy is additionally highlighted by the low value of the standard deviation, which shows that the intensification level was similar in all of the six researched cases. A slightly better result was achieved for the legitimisation of transitional justice, which was characterised by a low level of using the interpretations of the past. It is more important though that this category was most varied––and the intensification of using remembrance narratives oscillated, in this case, between a very low and a high level, which confirms our earlier observations on the particular significance of transitional justice as an element of the government’s management of collective memory. The legitimisation of exercising power by the new political elites, the justification of the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the country’s public life, promoting new social and political standards, and showing the historical need for national unity––all of these are characterised by a result that is close to the average for the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. It does not mean though that in all the cases, the intensification of using remembrance narratives is homogeneous, and that the realisation of these functions does not elicit controversy. The degree of using interpretations of the past as the justification of the need for national unity oscillated from very low to high, whereas in the cases of the position of the new political elites and the presence of the representatives of the authoritarian elites––from very low to moderate. This means that the differences between the conditioning of transformations and the socio-cultural specifics of the countries can impact significantly the detailed shape of the transitional remembrance policy. It is those very factors that can account for the differences in the

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relationships between the average result for the category and the span between the highest and the lowest of the observed results, as shown in Image 5.1.

Image 5.1. Using remembrance narratives in the transitional remembrance policy, considering the span between the highest and the lowest results for research categories (Author: P. WawrzyĔski).

Let us also consider the results obtained for the particular fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy. On average, remembrance narratives were used most intensively to show democratisation as a means of gaining the due and proper, international position of the state (item 8-3; the average: 3.83). Of slightly lesser significance were: the past as the legitimisation of the position of the new elite (item 1-1), the historical justification of the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the country’s political life (item 2-1), and showing the historical need for democratisation as the result of its intergenerational character (item 6-1), which all gained 3.67 points on average. Further, interpretations of the past were most intensively used to: exploit national heroes as the role models for democratic and civic attitudes (item 6-4; the average: 3.50 points), justify the need for national unity (item 7-1; the average: 3.50 points), legitimise the membership of international organisations as the complement of the transformation and the historical challenge (item 8-2; the average: 3.17 points), and exploit the idea of the state’s continuity to legitimise new political elites (item 1-2; the average: 3.17 points). Another five tasks of the transitional remembrance policy obtained three points on average, implying that they were realised to a moderate degree. They include: using national symbols and the pantheon of national heroes to justify the taking over of power by the new political elites (item 1-3), showing the political presence of the elites of the previous regime as the source of legitimising democracy and political pluralism (item 2-2), the limited scope of transitional justice as the consequence of the need to

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prevent internal conflicts (item 3-4), the past as myth-motoric inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (item 5-5), and the pro-democratic selection of narratives and their heroes (item 6-3). Hence, as we can see, only four tasks were realised to a moderate degree out of the eight fields of impact most strongly related to the general result of the transitional remembrance policy. This means that the use of remembrance narratives to promote the new definition of patriotism, the adjustment of the selection of narratives, presenting national heroes as role models, and showing the historical need for national unity are those fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy which not only define its shape most distinctly, but are also the most intensively realised tasks during democratisation. Another two tasks that most strongly correlated to the general shape of the government’s narratives on the past are to be found among those fields of impact which are characterised by, on average, a very low degree of using remembrance narratives. The historical justification of new economic attitudes (item 4-2; the average: 1.17 points) turned out to be the least significant task that can be ascribed to the transitional remembrance narratives. Only slightly better was the presenting of transitional justice as punishing those guilty of human rights violations (item 3-2), which––like the historical justification of the separation of the past from the future (item 2-5) and accounting for the historical causes and conditioning of the economic disproportions during democratisation (item 4-3)––obtained, on average, 1.5 points. The last of the least effectively realised tasks was the use of remembrance narratives as the source of reconciliation and forgiveness led by the new elites within the scope set by them (item 1-6; the average 1.67 points). The other two significant fields of impact were also to be found among the less significant tasks of the transitional remembrance policy––transitional justice as a legitimisation of the rule of law (item 3-1) obtained, on average, 2.17 points, whereas the new organisation of time as the mechanism of the transfer of ideas from the elites to the society––2.50 points. The results for all the tasks are presented in Table 5.2.

Field’s signature

Counteracting internal conflicts As a legitimisation of democracy As a definition of pluralism Building a new political community Division between the past and the present

2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5

Presence of the former elite

1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6

Legitimisation of new elites

The past as a legitimisation Use of the idea of the continuity of the state Use of national symbols and heroes New landscape of memory Counteracting internal conflicts Remembrance as a source of reconciliation

Field of impact

3,67 3,00 2,00 2,83 1,50

3,67 3,17 3,00 2,67 2,17 1,67

Average result

A New Political Identity during the Post-Authoritarian Transition The degree of using remembrance narratives Moderate Moderate Low Low Very Low

Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Low Very Low

1,21 1,67 0,89 0,98 1,00

1,03 0,98 1,41 1,03 0,75 1,03

Standard deviation (SD)

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3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4

4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4

2,33 1,17 1,50 2,33

2,17 1,50 2,00 3,00

The historical necessity of changes The role of the intergenerational agreement National heroes as role models Balance between the tradition and modernisation The past and a new definition of patriotism

5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5

2,83 2,33 2,67 2,83 3,00

Adaptation of new social & political standards

The necessity of social costs of change New economic attitudes and behaviours The past as a source of stratifications The legitimisation of capitalism

Social costs of transformations

As a legitimisation of the rule of law As a punishment for human rights violators As a source of forgiveness Limited scope of the transitional justice

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Low Low Low Low Moderate

Low Very Low Very Low Low

Low Very Low Low Moderate

1,17 1,03 1,51 1,17 1,26

0,52 0,41 0,84 0,58

1,83 0,84 1,67 1,67

6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5

7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4

3,50 2,83 2,33 2,17

3,67 2,67 3,00 3,50 2,50

8-1 8-2 8-3 8-4

2,83 3,17 3,83 2,17

Low Moderate Moderate Low

Moderate Low Low Low

Moderate Low Moderate Moderate Low

1,33 1,72 0,98 1,47

1,52 1,72 0,82 0,75

0,82 1,21 1,26 1,64 1,22

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Table 5.2. Using remembrance narratives within the fields of impact of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

Reasons for membership of IGOs New identity as a fulfilment of transformations (Re-)Gaining an appropriate position in IR Adaptation of new standards

New state’s identity in international relations

The past as a legitimisation of national unity Reasons for reconciliation and forgiveness Diversity of the landscape of memory Reconstruction of national heroes’ pantheon

Historical need for national unity

The intergenerational character of changes Democratisation as a tribute for victims The pro-democratic selection of narratives National heroes as examples of behaviours New organisation of time

Symbolic roles of the democratisation

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Average point scores for particular fields of impact enabled us to create the General Model of the Intensity of Transitional Remembrance Policy which is presented in Image 5.2. It shows to what degree remembrance narratives performed particular tasks in the process of reconstruction of the political identity of the post-authoritarian society. This model enables us to depict some significant deviations from the average, set by areas of significantly higher or lower intensity of using the interpretations of the past. The above average results characterise the legitimisation of the coming to power by the new elites (albeit, partially only, and with the significant exclusion of the last two fields of impact of this category), showing symbolic roles of democratisation and the justification of the state’s integration aspirations. Close to the average for the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy are the results for promoting new social and political standards, in which case there are no significant deviations.

Image 5.2. The General Model of the Intensity of the use of remembrance narratives (Author: P. WawrzyĔski).

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Greater amplitude of results––like in the case of the position of the new elites––characterises the legitimisation of the presence of the previous regime’s representatives and the historical need for national unity, where results are both notably higher and lower from the average. Different from the average are also the results for using remembrance narratives to transitional justice and to explain the necessity of costs of transformations. In this case though, we discovered that the intensification of the remembrance policy was below the average, which indicates the evasion of these issues by the transitional authorities. We must stress again that it is a phenomenon––partially––paradoxical in the context of the before described strong relationships between these functions and tasks and the general shape of the government’s management of collective memory during the democratisation. Let us compare the General Model of the Intensity to the results for the particular cases included in our research. Using remembrance narratives during the Chilean democratisation was focused on publicising the information about the crimes of the military dictatorship and on commemorating their victims who, jointly, were to contribute to the promoted, by the new government, ideas of forgiving the faults, reconciliation, atonement, and creating the conditions for the democratic development of the Chilean society. The main objective of the transformation though was the stabilisation of the state and economy, and its ideological foundation was the vision of the country’s development and the improvement of the living standards of the whole nation, which was aimed at prompting the citizens to renounce revenge and to consolidate in the wake of the unavoidable transformations. An unexpected consequence of limiting the role of history in the country’s public life was discouragement, a drop in the citizens’ involvement, and falling interest in the affairs of the state among the younger generation. At the same time, the expectations of the families of the victims, who called for punishment of the perpetrators of the dictatorship period, remained unsatisfied. The intensification of using remembrance narratives in the postauthoritarian Chile is presented in Image 5.3. We can see a slightly different from the General Model distribution of the priorities of the transitional remembrance policy. There, of greatest importance was the justification of the need for national unity which was to safeguard the country with stabilisation and prevent conflicts that might lead to another dictatorship. Slightly lesser important in Chile were those stories which explained to the citizens symbolic roles of democratisation, legitimised new elites, and justified the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the country’s public life after the change. Significantly

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below the average were the selected formula of transitional justice and the adoption of the new standards, whereas, the Chilean remembrance policy to an outright negligible degree served to account for the accession to international organisations and to justify the social costs of transformations.

Image 5.3. A model of the transitional remembrance policy in Chile (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis of research findings by A. RatkeMajewska, discussed in Volume One).

The leaders of the Estonian transformation pursued quite different priorities. Their primary objective was to regain the independence and sovereignty and to build the foundations for the future integration of Estonia with the West. A challenge the government faced was to transform the ethnically diverse and internally conflicted society into a civic community, where obedience and subordination were to be replaced by partnership, freedom, and respect. The lack of the actual punishing those guilty of human rights violations in Estonia, protected by Russian politicians, meant that remembrance policy became an instrument of the symbolic coming to terms with the past (the epilogue of which, after all the years, was the struggle with the memory of the heroism of the Red Army and the liberation of this Baltic state by the Soviets). Thus, the specifics of the Estonian case result to a great extent from the concurrent

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necessity to prevent the polarisation of the diverse society and the need to rebuild the foundations of the nation after the long-drawn Soviet occupation, as well as to adjust the nation’s identity to the challenges of the European integration.

Image 5.4. A model of the transitional remembrance policy in Estonia (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis of research findings by J. Piechowiak-Lamparska, discussed in Volume One).

The unique shape of the Estonian transitional remembrance policy is presented in Image 5.4. Its intensity, to a certain degree, reflects the structure of the General Model––as the key function there was played by showing symbolic roles of democratisation and legitimising the new state’s identity in international politics (to which remembrance narratives were used to a high degree). An important role was also played by the legitimisation of adopting the new social and political standards. Narratives on the past were used less intensively to justify the applied formula of dealing with the Soviet crimes, the legitimisation of the coming to power by the new elites, justifying the need for national unity, and supporting the presence of previous regime’s representatives in the democratic state. The least important to the Estonian remembrance policy

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was accounting for the inevitability of costs of transformations––though it is worth stressing that still it was the case in which this function was of greatest importance among all the researched ones. The transitional use of remembrance narratives in Estonia was notably different from the other analysed cases. The point average per one field of impact was higher by almost a quarter with respect to all the six countries. As for transitional justice in Estonia, remembrance policy was used almost by half more intensively, losing out only to the South African transformation, where transitional justice became the foundation of the implemented changes. Furthermore, it was only five out of thirty-six fields of impact that the result for Estonia was lower than the average result for the whole sample. Paradoxically though, not even once, in the case study, did we recognise a very high degree of using remembrance narratives, and once only did we observe a very low degree––this means that the transitional remembrance policy model in this country is uniquely flattened and, basically, it does not include extremes. We can assume that this very form of the government’s management of collective memory is most conducive to achieve the political stability with the intensive influencing citizens’ political identity by the new elites. Despite its effectiveness, the Estonian model was not copied in Georgia––the other post-Soviet state included in our project––where democratisation came about much later, being a result of social protests, colloquially known as the colourful revolutions. Obviously, it resulted from significant cultural differences, different political traditions, and the degree of the development of political culture. However, it seems that in this case, the key role was played by different priorities which the democratic leaders of Georgia had set to achieve. The foundation of transformations was the pursuit to separate the Soviet heritage–– corruption, nepotism, and dependencies––from the vision of the future which was to be built on the pillars of equality, pluralism, and social solidarity. The new Georgia was to imitate the Western world, implement its standards and rules of conduct, and transform the strictly hierarchical society into a civic community. Historical stories played an insignificant role, while commemorating the past was marginalised in favour of the politics orientated on the future and the vision of an ideal political order which was to provide inspiration for the Georgian society. The geopolitical conditions of the country also caused the objective of the transition which was neither to deal with the Soviet experiences, nor to punish those in the authoritarian regime who were guilty of abuse, after 1991.

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Image 5.5. A model of the transitional remembrance policy in Georgia (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis of research findings by J. Piechowiak-Lamparska, discussed in Volume One).

Although the Estonian political identity reconstruction––which can be regarded as a very effective strategy of breaking away from the state’s Soviet past––was strongly backed by the systematic plan of using remembrance narratives, in Georgia, the past as the political resource was exploited in a chaotic way. Those fairly accidental intensifications of the use of the interpretations of historical events by the new elites are clearly visible in Image 5.5. Only in the case of two functions of the transitional remembrance policy in Georgia can we see a systematic intensification–– remembrance narratives were an important tool for legitimising the pursuit of integration with the Western world organisations, and also, slightly more strongly than in the other researched cases, they were used to justify the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the country’s public life after the changes (which is no surprise as, to a great extent, the new Georgian elites came from the reformist wing of the authoritarian regime elites). Less important were: the legitimisation of new elites, showing the need for national unity, presenting symbolic roles of democratisation, and justifying the adoption of the new standards––for the three latter categories the average results were slightly lower than the

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average for the overall Georgian remembrance policy. Of negligible importance were those stories which explained to the citizens the necessity of the costs of transformations, and the transitional justice.The case of the latter function is particularly interesting. As much as we can understand the total lack of transitional justice mechanisms, so much eliminates this issue entirely from remembrance policy that it is downright unusual, and it may serve to explain the later impermanence of the democratic order in Georgia. It is so that transitional justice is not merely a means to punish those guilty of human rights violations, but it also performs the symbolic function of breaking away from the authoritarian past. It separates the democratic stage of the nation’s history and accounts for the elimination of those attitudes and behaviour which are disadvantageous to the new order. Therefore, the entire elimination of the idea of transitional justice from the public debate may result in the lack of a line separating what was accepted by the leaders of the authoritarian regime from what is a safeguard of the support for the new democratic elites––as a result, the standards of the previous regime are not clearly distinguished from the new order. A particularly interesting example of using remembrance narratives to reconstruct the identity of the post-authoritarian society is the transformation of Poland, the results of which continue to mark the most important lines of political division in the country. The Polish road to democracy is a story of determination in the pursuit of freedom and sovereignty, the unusual mobilisation of the society in the struggle with the imposed communist system, and of the undeniable success of the agreement of the Round Table Talks, which caused a gradual democratisation of the state. It is a story of triumph over foreign dominance, the effective integration with the European Union and NATO, and stable economic growth and development. Coincidentally, the transformation of Poland is characterised by the lack of any planned politics of the reconstruction of the society and the building of a new identity, which continue to influence country’s political life. Poland serves as an example where the framework outline of the new vision of the community, in which the roles of the pillars are played by symbolic key words that are very often contradictory to each other, can bring a shortterm stabilisation which will over time transform into a vivid conflict between the supporters of tradition on the one hand, and modernisation on the other. It is an argument against the belief in the efficiency of the politics orientated on the future, which in Poland strengthened the transitional feeling of temporariness and contributed to the progressing atomisation of the society.

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Of all the researched cases, the transitional remembrance policy in Poland was of the least importance to the political identity of the society, and its low intensity is well presented in Image 5.7. It shows that in the face of the dominance of the politics orientated on the future, the lack of a structured strategy of the reconstruction of the national community, and the belief of the democratic leaders in permanent social support, the role of remembrance narratives was completely marginalised, only in the case of three fields of impact reaching an intensification degree higher than moderate. As in the case of the other two post-communist states, not even once did we observe a very high degree of using narratives on the past, which may imply the existence of a factor linking these two features of post-authoritarian transitions. Having said that, it is not possible––at the current state of knowledge––to decide which aspect of post-communist transformations may determine the democratic leaders’ reluctance towards the very strong use of remembrance narratives, irrespective of how intensively the remembrance policy itself is conducted.

Image 5.6. A model of the transitional remembrance policy in Poland (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis of his own research findings, discussed in Volume One).

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In Poland’s case, the interpretations of the past were used most intensively by the new authorities to promote the integration aspirations of the state with the Western world––it was only in this case that a moderate degree was recognised. Remembrance narratives were used to a small degree to legitimise the coming to power of new elites and to justify the implementation of the new social and political standards. They were then of even less importance as regards the justification of the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the country’s public life, showing symbolic roles of democratisation, justifying the historical need for national unity, and explaining the social costs of transformations. Coincidentally, interpretations of the past performed a negligible role–– though still slightly more important than in Georgia––with respect to the legitimisation of the adopted mechanisms of punishing the perpetrators of the authoritarian era. Failing to implement the mechanisms of transitional justice had, to the Polish society, far-reaching political consequences, i.e. it resulted in shifting the focus of attention from settling accounts with the apparatus of the communist state to tracking down secret collaborators of the special services within the circle of the democratic opposition, which led to the further polarisation of Poles, and to the decomposition of the new elites. A valuable example of democratic transformations, which is well researched in the abundant subject literature, is the transformation of the racist regime in the Republic of South Africa into an egalitarian state of law and common civil liberties. The narrative appeal of this case is strongly connected, on the one hand, to the scale of the antagonisms between the dominant white minority and the oppressed black majority, and on the other, to the symbolic status of Nelson Mandela, who became a commonly recognised icon of the struggle against injustice and racial inequality. Moreover, the democratisation in South Africa was absolutely unique. Firstly, the state’s new leadership decided to found transformations on the ambitious programme of building the non-racial Rainbow Nation which was to unite the divided ethnic groups which were on the verge of a civil war and a violent conflict over the dominance over the country. Secondly, the pillar of the South African transformation was the programme of reconciliation based on the truth, i.e. a programme aimed at implementing transitional justice that would render possible the suppression of vengeance from the oppressed majority and ease the anxiety of the privileged minority which was included in the project of building the new community of citizens. Thirdly, the democratisation of South Africa was a very sensitive process, conducted in the wake of the escalating political violence, growing chaos, and the real threat of civil

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war which would annihilate any chances for a peaceful decomposition of the racist regime of apartheid. The uniqueness of the democratisation of South Africa is reflected in the model of the transitional remembrance policy, which is presented in Image 5.8. In this, we can see great amplitude of results, also within the category, which makes the transformation of this country like the cases of Chile and Spain. Besides, we can see in it that coming to terms with the past in South Africa became the foundation of democratisation––the intensity of using remembrance narratives in this space deviates distinctly both from the average for all the cases, and from the individual results which we recognised with respect to the other five countries. This confirms that the implemented procedure of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission distinguishes the case of this country from the other cases of deconstruction of the authoritarian order, and the extent of its influence on the politics of memory is unique. Generally, in South Africa, interpretations of the past were used to a high degree to legitimise the implemented mechanisms of transitional justice––yet, only in the case of transitional justice punishing human rights violators, did we observe a degree lower than the very high one, which we recognised for the other fields of impact.

Image 5.7. A model of the transitional remembrance policy in South Africa (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis of his own research findings, discussed in Volume One).

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The South African remembrance policy was of moderate significance in terms of presenting symbolic roles of democratisation, justifying the adoption of the new political and social standards, and the legitimisation of the taking over of power by the new elites. Those four tasks were a priority to Mandela’s government, and they safeguarded the stability of the young democracy, concurrently enabling the promotion of the new vision of the community and suppressing the existing inter-group conflicts. Decidedly less important were remembrance narratives in terms of explaining the historical need for national unity, where they were marginalised by the politics orientated on the future and by the symbolic visions of the Rainbow Nation under construction. They were also used to a low degree to justify the presence of the representatives of apartheid in democratic public life, and to explain the social costs of transformations by the South African society. Decidedly, the interpretations of the past were the least important as for the legitimisation of the state’s identity change in international politics, which can be regarded as a fairly superficial turnabout of the new leaders towards regional and pan-African cooperation, which has never become the priority of South Africa’s foreign policy. Other conditions formed democratisation in Spain, which for many other countries across the world became a model example of how peaceful transformations can be conducted in a divided country. It is so as the Spanish society had to cover the distance from the brutal civil war, which had deepened the previously existing ethnic and ideological differences, to the reforms which made the country a role model for reconciliation and forgiveness, and an example of the success of democratic reforms. The priority of transformations was the combination of diverting the society’s attention from the past and orientating the citizens on the future––the recent history and the experience of the dictatorship divided the Spanish, while the stabilisation of the country and its integration with the European structures required an immediate extinction of antagonisms. Obviously, this meant giving up transitional justice and implementing procedures which might lead to punishing those guilty of human rights violations. Still, orientating politics on the better tomorrow did not lead to utter resignation to using remembrance policy to rebuild the political identity of the Spanish society. The promoted remembrance narratives supported the new vision of the state and nation, but their selection required keeping a balance between the evasion of bitter subjects on the one hand and exposing Spain’s European traditions and the importance of reconciliation on the other. The moderate aspirations of the state’s leaders are reflected in the shape of Spain’s transitional remembrance policy, presented in Image 5.6. Still, it

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Image 5.8. A model of the transitional remembrance policy in Spain (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis of research findings by A. RatkeMajewska, discussed in Volume One).

was not paradox free. On the one hand, the general intensity of using remembrance narratives to rebuild the society’s political identity was almost identical to the average for the General Model of the Intensity. Then, on the other hand, the below presented model shows radical differences between the particular fields of impact, the functions of remembrance policy, and a high amplitude of the results obtained. Generally, during the Spanish democratisation, interpretations of the past were used in either of the following two ways––they were either characterised by a moderate degree and significant differences between particular tasks, or by a very low degree and the lower amplitude of results. One group includes the legitimisation of the state’s membership of international organisations, justifying the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the democratic country’s public life, showing symbolic roles of democratisation, promoting new social and political standards, and justifying the historical need for national unity. The other group includes justifying the inevitability of incurring the costs of the transformation by the society, the legitimisation of new elites, and legitimising the selected formula of transitional justice. Thus, we can see that the source of the transformation left a distinctive mark on the promoted

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interpretations of the past––remembrance policy was deprived of the mechanisms of transitional justice, which were eliminated on the pretext of the pursuit of reconciliation and forgiveness and the avoidance of revenge for the crimes committed in the past. Without doubt, the later Spanish disputes over history may have their roots in this very omission of the transition. The above discussed results of using remembrance narratives and the General Model of the Intensity, as well as the models of applying narratives on the past in the six countries––Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Spain, Poland, and South Africa––all show the different forms that the government’s management of collective memory can take. Its basic objective may be the justification of the new elites’ aspiration to integrate their state with the international structures, discussing democratisation as the symbolic complement of the intergenerational contract, and paying due tribute to the victims of the struggle for freedom, as well as the legitimisation of transitional justice which is to safeguard the reconstructed community with reconciliation, forgiveness, and the renunciation of vengeance. Coincidentally, during transformations, the same functions can be marginalised and regarded by the leaders as insignificant. The differences in the researched cases do not prompt us though to support the hypothesis of the lack of universal features of the transitional remembrance policy. On the contrary, the General Model of the Intensity shows which of the functions and tasks of remembrance story-telling are, on average, more important than others. It also serves to depict the general shape of the transitional government’s remembrance policy which consolidates the models of high amplitude of results within the category (such as Chile, Spain, and South Africa) with the flattened––though not always similar to each other–– models of the post-communist states. Without doubt, it constitutes another stage in our constructing of a general model of the post-authoritarian remembrance policy, indicating which of the spaces of using remembrance narratives are more intensively used to transform the political identity. Moreover, it is worth referring the constructed models for the particular countries to the before discussed general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. This is enabled by a chart juxtaposing the overall use of remembrance narratives with the results we recognised for the particular countries, as presented in Image 5.9. In the chart, as we can see, the countries characterised by high amplitude of results, during transformations, within the category tend to reach a general result close to the average for the whole sample, whereas the more flattened models of conducting remembrance policy may result in a more diversified general shape of the government’s management of collective memory. That means

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that the particular cases of using remembrance narratives can differ not only in the intensity or their general role assigned to remembrance policy, but the detailed results for fields of impact can enable us to assign the given case to one of the before mentioned groups.

Image 5.9. The use of remembrance narratives in the transitional remembrance policy in the particular countries, considering the scope between the highest and lowest results for particular research categories (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis of the results discussed in Volume One).

Let us consider how important it is to our understanding of the transitional remembrance policy. Firstly, we can decide that smaller differences in the utilisation of the particular fields of impact characterise those cases where remembrance narratives are used either to a significant degree, or to a low degree (i.e., when they are either an important element of the transitional politics, or their role is marginalised by the state’s leaders). Secondly, a greater differentiation between the tasks results in the general result being closer to the average for the whole sample––which, in turn, can be regarded as an argument in favour of the claim that a greater amplitude of results is conducive to the moderate character of the transitional remembrance policy). Thirdly, the conditions of transformations and the defined, on their basis, priorities of democratisation exert a particularly big influence on the shape of the management of collective memory, also through defining the features of the new political identity (which are promoted by new elites). Thus, the dependence between the government’s use of interpretations of the past and the reconstruction of the community must be considered bilateral as it is not only remembrance policy that influences political identity; the imagined ideal shape of the community also indicates how politicians will tell about the past. Until now, in our theoretical considerations, we have focused our attention solely on one side of this relationship––using remembrance narratives to construct, transform, or sustain the society’s political identity. However, the selection of features being assigned to the imagined ideal self

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of the community can have a decisive influence on the selection of the tools of remembrance policy, on defining its priorities, and the method of realisation. It is very well illustrated by the case of justifying the need to sustain national unity––this function aligned with the basic objective of Chilean transformations, which resulted in a high intensification of using the interpretation of the past in this respect; in Estonia and Spain, it was an important element stabilising the new order, hence its moderate importance; whereas in Georgia and South Africa its role was small, while in Poland–– even smaller. The Chilean and South African cases provide us with a very valuable perspective of the relationship––in both the countries, the fundamental challenge was to stabilise the country, suppress internal conflicts, and reduce political violence, yet in Chile, it was realised on the basis of calling for national unity by the citizens, whereas in South Africa, the leaders decided to apply the strategy of reconciling the conflicted groups through the implemented mechanisms of transitional justice. Thus, the assessment of the available resources and the evaluation of the potential chances and threats resulted in the fact that in those two countries the transitional remembrance policy took, in this respect, such different forms. In the previous chapter, we focused our attention on the strength of the relationships linking the elements of the model of the transitional remembrance policy which we are building. Identifying the connections between them and their impact on the general shape of using remembrance narratives during the changes brought us decidedly closer to understanding this phenomenon. In the present subchapter, we took another step, i.e. we recognised the intensity of using particular elements and the scope of their influence on the reconstructed political identity. The General Model of the Intensity shows the basic shape of the government’s management of collective memory in this period, while the discussed research findings allow us to understand the broader context of the significance of its functions and tasks. Thanks to the General Model of the Intensity of using remembrance narratives we know more and can extend our theoretical predictions––it is the very model that enables us to state that the most significant categories are as follows: showing symbolic roles of democratisation and justifying the state’s integration aspirations, and concurrently indicating that the least important are: justifying the social costs of transformations, and––to a slightly lower degree––legitimising transitional justice. Thus, we can perceive a dimension of transitional stories other than the one shaped by the analysis of the relationships intensity model. This observation prompts us to emphasise the importance of the other elements of the General Model, indicating that the strength of the relationships does not have to relate to the

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intensity of using the given element of the transitional remembrance policy. On the contrary, the strongest relationships may characterise such functions and tasks which play a marginal role during transformations, the examples of which are: justifying the social costs of transformations, as well as presenting transitional justice and punishing the guilty ones.

Similarities and Differences in the Transitional Remembrance Policy Developing the general model of the post-authoritarian use of remembrance narratives to reconstruct the political identity requires answering further questions, i.e. to what degree were the researched cases of the transitional remembrance policy similar to one another, and which of the elements taken into account allow the differentiation of the particular countries? It is not coincidental that we turned this question into the major scientific issue of our research, which allows us to question whether (and if so, to what degree) the use of the interpretations of the past during the democratisation is of universal character, and if it is common for all the researched countries despite the considerable differences between them in terms of culture, the society, and politics. Giving credence to this theoretical hypothesis would prove that the decomposition of the authoritarian regime may impose a specific shape on remembrance policy, and may determine its role in the society’s reconstruction process. The ANOVA, the results of which are presented in Table 5.3, proves that at the general level, that is for the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy, the recognised differences between the results are statistically significant for p=0.001. It means that the use of remembrance narratives to promote the new vision of the civic community in the researched six countries was so different in each of the cases that we cannot speak of one, universal, shape of the transitional remembrance policy. It does not mean that a model, which we are building, is losing value––it only comes as proof that the General Model of Intensity cannot be used outright to describe the phenomenon, and that based on this, it is not possible to predict the scope of using the interpretations of the past during democratisation. Still, it remains of great importance to the very understanding of the nature of remembrance policy as it shows that it is a technology of the government’s social influence on the citizen, which is affected by the environment and the cultural, social, or political conditioning, concurrently lacking in a general shape that could not be changed by the democratic elites. Thus, the collected data allow us to

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F

ANOVA

Value-p

Legitimisation of new elites 2,72 2,9495 0,027 Presence of the former elite 2,60 1,2370 0,325 Transitional justice 2,17 5,8857 0,002 Social costs of transformations 1,83 0,5136 0,762 Adaptation of new standards 2,73 1,8444 0,142 Symbolic roles of the democratisation 3,07 3,2941 0,021 Historical need for national unity 2,71 1,7428 0,176 New state’s identity in IR 3,00 4,0800 0,011 The general shape of the transitional remembrance policy 2,63 4,2563 0,001 Table 5.3. The ANOVA for the use of remembrance narratives in the reconstruction of the political identity of the society in the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski)

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assume that there is no single, universal scenario of the government’s management of collective memory, which would be activated at the time of deconstructing the authoritarian regime. However, the existence of statistically significant differences at the general level does not determine the lack of similarities within particular research categories. Generally, the realisation of half of the transitional remembrance policy functions proceeded, in the researched countries, in a similar way, while in the other cases, the results were notably different. The former group will include the justification of the social costs of transformations, the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the country’s public life, the historical need for national unity, and the adoption of the new social and political standards. The latter is made up of the following functions: the legitimisation of the exercising of power by the new elites, showing symbolic roles of democratisation, the justification of the membership of the international organisation, and legitimising transitional justice, for which we have recognised the least similarities among the researched countries. Thus, we can state that despite the lack of a universal scenario, certain common features do exist for the various cases of the transitional remembrance policy. Let us now consider the recognised similarities. We obtained the most similar results for the least used function of remembrance story-telling–– explaining the social costs of transformations. Hence, the common feature for the researched cases is avoiding the subject of the disadvantageous, to the citizens, consequences of the changes, even if they could be accounted for by the suffering of the previous generations or the commitment of the heroes of the struggle for freedom. The costs of democratisation are hidden from the citizens by the new elites so as not to lose social support for the reforms and to avoid the radicalisation of the public (or only to postpone it until the new political order has been fairly consolidated). Remembrance policy, too, plays a role in this particular propaganda of success by eliminating those narratives which draw attention to the groups incurring the major costs of the implementation of the reforms, or which have been deprived of compensation for the losses suffered as a result of the struggle against the authoritarian regime. In general, the transitional use of the interpretations of the past is characterised by rather a lesser interest in the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the new reality. Remembrance policy is sometimes used to legitimise their participation in the democratic rivalry, but it primarily happens so as to avoid the escalation of internal conflicts and the deepening of social division lines. Moreover, for the features of the government’s management of collective memory during

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democratisation the degree of using narratives is similar––slightly higher than the average for all categories––to justify the historical need for national unity and the adoption of the new social and political standards. It means that the individual cases of the realisation of these functions are similar to each other regardless of the conditions of transformations, and their intensification is in line with the general scenario of the postauthoritarian society reconstruction. Why did we then observe, in the other four cases, statistically significant differences between countries? Firstly, the legitimisation of new elites may be lacking in historical justification, or this function could be marginalised so as to hide the provenance of the democratic leaders who derive from the authoritarian elites. Secondly, justifying transitional justice depends on the very decision of whether the transitional justice mechanisms will be implemented in the country––as our research shows, the governments’ decisions in this matter can be dramatically different, and they span from building a new democratic community based on coming to terms with the past in South Africa, to the complete elimination of this issue from the public debate as in the case of the Georgian transformation. Thirdly, the intensification of presenting symbolic roles of democratisation––as we indicated in the previous chapter––is strongly related to three factors, including: the threat of political violence, stating the reconstruction of the society as the objective of transformations, and regarding the inevitability of conflicts as an element of the postauthoritarian identity. Particularly important is the relationship of this function with the pursuit of a complex reconstruction of the community, which can be regarded as the cause of the differences between the researched countries. The fourth factor, using remembrance narratives to justify the integration aspirations is a result of the new leaders’ great efforts to change the state’s position in international politics––deprived of this factor the realisation of this function of the transitional remembrance policy loses a lot of its appeal, and, subsequently, a lot of its intensity, too. The results of the standard deviation for particular categories allow us to make similar conclusions. The least clustered results characterise the selected formula of transitional justice (SD=1.31), indicating that in this case, the various transitional remembrance policies differ the most. We also observed a significant dispersion of results for the membership of international organisations (SD=1.18). We discovered distinctly shorter distances for symbolic roles of democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract (SD=0.86), and––despite the lack of any distinctive statistical differences––for the historical need for national unity (SD=0.80). Yet a smaller value characterises the adoption of the new

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social and political standards (SD=0.67), and the presence of the previous regime’s representatives (SD=0.65), while the greatest concentration of results around the average goes with the necessity of the social costs of transformations (SD=0.30), the negligible significance of which is the basic element shared by the transitional remembrance policies of the researched countries. Let us have a look now at the most interesting results of the standard deviation for particular fields of impact (all the results are presented in the previously discussed Table 5.2). We recognised the greatest dispersion of results in the case of presenting transitional justice as a legitimisation of the rule of law (item 3-1; SD=1.83), a little lower in the case of using the historical justifications of reconciliation and forgiveness as a means to build national unity (item 7-2; SD=1.72), and presenting the membership of international organisations as the symbolic complement of transformations and a historical challenge (item 8-2; SD=1.72). A small concentration of results also characterises: justifying the presence of the representatives of the authoritarian regime in the democratic life as a form of legitimising democracy and pluralism (item 2-2; SD=1.67), legitimising transitional justice as a source of forgiveness (item 3-3; SD=1.67), explaining the limited scope of transitional justice as a strategy aimed at preventing the escalation of social divisions (item 3-4; SD=1.67), and using national heroes as role models for democratic and civic attitudes (item 6-4; SD=1.64). Also noteworthy are the results for the past as the justification of the need for national unity (item 7-1; SD=1.52) and the importance of national heroes as role models for new attitudes following the adoption of the new social and political standards (item 5-3; SD=1.51). At the opposite extreme, there is the use of remembrance narratives to justify new economic attitudes (item 4-2; SD=0.41) the intensity of which surpassed a very low degree in Estonia only. Then, the use of the dichotomy of the past and the future as an explanation of social costs of transformations (item 4-1; SD=0.52) was a little more important in Chile and Spain, where it was realised to a moderate degree. The results were concentrated around the average also in the cases of presenting the past as the justification of the promoted capitalist ideas (item 4-4; SD=0.58), the reconstruction of the pantheon of national heroes towards diversity as a tool of consolidating the community (item 7-4; SD=.075), and the use of preventing internal conflicts as an element of the historical legitimisation of exercising authority by the new elites (item 1-5; SD=0.75). We must also note the relatively small results for another four tasks of the transitional remembrance policy, i.e.: showing the historical and intergenerational need for democratisation (item 6-1; SD=0.82), the

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transformation of the landscape of memory from authoritarian into a pluralistic and nationwide one (item 7-3; SD=0.82), the legitimisation of transitional justice as punishing those guilty of human rights violations and abuse in the past (item 3-2; SD=0.84), and the use of remembrance narratives to show the historical sources of economic stratifications revealed during the democratisation (item 4-3; SD=0.84). We have already stated that we observed some statistically important similarities for four functions of the transitional remembrance policy. On top of that, the results of the standard deviation allow us to assume that a similar degree of using remembrance narratives can be recognised in the case of slightly more than a third of the fields of impact. Having said that, what is the provenance of the recognised differences between the researched countries? Is it possible to account for their existence referring to the categories discussed in the previous chapter? It seems unjustified as in none of the four variable groups has the ANOVA allowed us to recognise any statistically significant differences, as presented in Table 5.4. Hence, the conditions in which the democratic reforms were carried out were––overall––very similar, which means that they are not the source of differences between the particular countries. The similarities between the features of the post-authoritarian transition, the vision of the community promoted by the authoritarian government, and the imagined democratic identity show that the varied intensification of using interpretations in the particular countries is not determined by external factors. As we emphasised before, the research findings prompt us to support the hypothesis of the key importance of the new leaders’ evaluation of the conditions and available resources, as well as opportunities and threats. It is the very scenario of the reconstruction of the society’s political identity, the balance between the orientation of politics on the future and using remembrance narratives, and the vision of how the democratic reforms should be carried out that must be regarded as the factors constituting the shape of the transitional remembrance policy. It is these very elements that are the source of the observed differences, while the general character of the government’s management of collective memory as the technology of social influence accounts for the recognised similarities. Those assumptions are confirmed by one of the greatest discoveries of our project. The lack of confirmation of the hypothesis of a universal way to conduct the transitional remembrance policy urged us to verify some other theoretical assumptions which could support the existence of differences between the particular cases. The result of the conducted statistical analyses was the observation that the criterion which puts in

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Value-p

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The source, course and scope of transition 0.9428 0.459 The causes of the political system change 1.7032 0.141 The most important features of the authoritarian identity 0.4844 0.787 The most important features of the post-authoritarian identity 1.4729 0.204 Table 5.4. The ANOVA for the characteristic features of the post-authoritarian transition and the authoritarian and post-authoritarian identities (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

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order similar examples of using remembrance narratives is the recognition of the reconstruction of the society as the objective of the transition. On the one hand, Chile, Estonia, Spain and South Africa, i.e. the countries whose new elites decided to realise this task, are characterised by the lack of any statistically significant differences in the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy (F=1.4904; value-p=0.219). On the other hand, we also failed to recognise such differences between Georgia and Poland, where a structured society reconstruction was not a priority during transformations (F=1.7623; value-p=0.188). The discovery of the constituting role of the reconstruction of the society as the objective of democratisation allowed us to draw up two models of the transitional remembrance policy, to which––in the light of the findings we obtained––it is possible to assign all of the cases of the government’s management of collective memory during transformations. One model, showing the shape of using remembrance narratives in the case of the planned, structured reconstruction of the national community, is presented in Image 5.10. The other, being the visualisation of the intensity of remembrance story-telling in those countries where it was not an objective, is shown in Image 5.11. Both models allow the division of the researched cases of the transitional remembrance policy through a referral to a credible criterion, the selection of which was justified empirically. Moreover, they group the ways in which the government manages collective memory within some comprehensible theoretical categories. And even though both the types are set around a low degree of using remembrance narratives to reconstruct post-authoritarian political identities, the countries characterised by the objective of the structured transformation of the national community were on average much closer to the moderate level, and only in the case of one research category did they reach an average result lower than the result for the other two countries. Undoubtedly, this confirms the significance of the differences between them. Let us now examine the most important differences between the two models. The reconstruction of the society––as we have noted––is conducive to greater intensification of using the interpretations of the past. However, in some cases, the difference between the two types is dramatic. It is most evident with respect to the justification of transitional justice: the governments which pursue to reconstruct the national community will have more interest in implementing the transitional justice procedures, and will be more eager to use remembrance narratives to justify them. We recognised a similar disproportion for showing symbolic roles of

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Image 5.10. A model of the transitional remembrance policy for the countries pursuing the reconstruction of the society (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis on the findings discussed in Volume One).

Image 5.11. A model of the transitional remembrance policy for the countries not pursuing the reconstruction of the society (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis on the findings discussed in Volume One).

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democratisation and justifying the historical need for national unity. As for the implementation of the new standards, costs of transformations, and the presence of the previous regime’s representatives, the observed differences were less notable. Effectively, identical averages for both the models characterise the legitimisation of the exercise of authority by the new elites, whereas the justification of the state’s position in the international relations is more important to those governments which do not strive to reconstruct the society. The differences in the intensity for particular fields of impact are presented in Image 5.12. It makes it possible to see the difference between the vertically flattened model as for the lack of reconstruction, and the more branchy shape of the other model.

Image 5.12. The comparison of the models of transitional remembrance policy, considering an objective to reconstruct the society (Compiled by P. WawrzyĔski on the basis on the findings discussed in Volume One).

Finally, let us look at another aspect of similarities and differences between the examples of the transitional remembrance policy. We have identified the functions and tasks of remembrance story-telling where the results for particular countries differ significantly from the other results. In this respect, the cases of Chile and Georgia are interesting, as the observed intensification of using remembrance narratives not even once differed from the sample’s general result. In the case of Estonia’s democratisation, we recognised three cases when remembrance policy was realised much more intensively than in all of the other countries, i.e.: the justification of transitional justice as punishing those guilty of the crimes (item 3-2), using

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the historical justifications for new economic attitudes (item 4-2), and pointing to the experience of the past as the legitimisation of capitalist ideas (item 4-4). In the case of Poland’s transformation, the result for the historical justification of the need to separate the past from the future (item 2-5) was significantly higher than in the other countries, whereas, for using the past as the argument supporting the historical need for national unity (item 7-1), it was significantly lower. From this perspective, the transformation of the political system in Spain looks very interesting––it differed from the other transitions in as many as four cases. The results for the significance of the balance between tradition and modernisation (item 5-4), and showing the historical need for change and its intergenerational character (item 6-1) were distinctly higher than in the other countries. Still, for the transformation of the landscape of memory from the regime to the nationwide one as an element of developing national unity (item 7-3), and––primarily––for the very legitimisation of new elites as a function of the transitional remembrance policy, the recognised results were notably lower. In turn, in the case of South Africa, the greater intensity of using narratives on the past characterised the showing of transitional justice as a source of forgiveness (item 3-3), and showing sources of economic stratifications (item 4-3). At the same time, those narratives were used a lot less intensively by the South African democratic elites to justify integration aspirations in the international arena for regaining their proper and due position (item 8-3). The discussed results of our research prompt us to assume that there are some common features connecting all the cases of transitional remembrance policy, yet the possibility to observe those similarities is not a decisive argument in favour of the hypothesis of the universal shape of this phenomenon. In our opinion, the government’s remembrance storytelling is a technology of social influence on citizens, and its shape depends on the way the leaders want to capitalise on their privileged position within the framework of the politics of memory. Hence, the significant differences between the countries result from the evaluation of opportunities and threats, and they are a derivative of the available resources which can be used to reconstruct the political identity of the post-authoritarian society. It is so as there is no common scenario of using interpretations of the past, which would be shared in various countries, regardless of different cultural, social, or political conditions––as much as the very technology of the government’s remembrance policy and the imagined democratic identity features were similar in the researched cases; they were so dramatically different in terms of the conviction of which of

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the tools might lead to those effects, and in terms of the means applied to prevent internal conflicts and the decomposition of social bonds.

The General Model of the Structure of Transitional Remembrance Policy The basic objective of our research was to comprehend how remembrance narratives are used to reconstruct political identity during democratisation. The realisation of the project enabled us to identify the most important features of the transitional remembrance policy, the significant relationships connecting its particular elements, and the intensity of using the interpretations of the past. It is those same three sets of data that make it possible to outline the mechanisms of the government’s management of collective memory during transformations; it is also those that provide us with the knowledge of the nature of the post-authoritarian remembrance policy and the role of its individual elements. Yet, the extra challenge that we decided to face was the construction of the General Model of the Structure of using remembrance narratives, which would allow the setting in order of the functions and tasks of remembrance story-telling, with respect to their significance and the scope of impact on the shape of transitional remembrance policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the strength of the relationships between particular categories or fields of impact and their relationships with the general intensity of using remembrance narratives urge us to pay special attention to the showing of symbolic roles of democratisation as the fulfilment of the obligations of the intergenerational contract and the tribute paid to the heroes of the struggle for freedom, as well as to the justification of the necessity to incur the social and economic costs of transformations by all citizens. They also indicate the outstanding importance of adopting the pro-democratic selection of narratives and their heroes, and presenting transitional justice as punishing those guilty of the crimes of the past. Coincidentally, they also highlighted the spaces in which the recognised correlations were very weak, as in the case of the legitimisation of new elites, or in legitimising the state’s integration aspirations in the international arena. In turn, the intensity of using remembrance narratives, which takes up most of this chapter, enables us to distinguish the two most exploited categories: presenting the symbolic roles of democratisation and supporting the membership of international organisations. Moreover, the results for this feature enabled us to recognise thirteen fields of impact characterised by a moderate degree of using interpretations of the past, and

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another eight with a result above the average for the general sample. Thus, our observations served to set in order the particular elements of the transitional remembrance policy and to structure them in terms of exploitation intensity during the democratisation. Concurrently, the research results allowed us to notice that explaining the costs of transformations and the legitimisation of transitional justice were the least significant functions of remembrance story-telling, and as many as five tasks were of marginal importance (including transitional justice as punishing the guilty ones, which was strongly correlated to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy). Let us now carry out a preliminary consolidation of those results. The product of the correlation strength with the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy and the intensity of using remembrance narratives enables us to determine the Significance Factor (SF) for the particular functions of remembrance story-telling. We recognised its highest value––as shown in Table 5.5––for discussing the symbolic roles of democratisation characterised by both the strongest relation with the general shape and the largest use of the interpretations of the past. Without doubt, it is this very function that ought to be considered as the most important one to understand the significance of remembrance narratives in the reconstruction process of the political identity of the post-authoritarian society. Presenting transformations as the fulfilment of the symbolic commitments of the intergenerational contract and the tribute paid to the heroes of the struggle for freedom, the victims of repressions, and those persecuted by the authoritarian regime, is a priority to the transitional remembrance policy, as an element which most strongly influences its general shape. Thus, it is this very category that we consider fundamental in the created General Model of this phenomenon. We obtained a decidedly lower value of the Significance Factor for the justification of the adoption of the new social and political standards. Another function, in terms of significance, of the transitional remembrance policy––strongly correlated to its general shape––was the use of remembrance narratives to explain the social costs of transformations. The high rank of this category comes as a surprise as it is characterised by decidedly the lowest intensity among all of the elements. The Factor was of a very similar value to the justification of transitional justice and indicating the historical need for national unity. Notably less important–– mainly due to the weak relation linking these categories to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy––were the legitimisations of the presence of the previous regime’s representatives in the country’s public life and of the taking over of power by the new elites; whereas the

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Use intensity

Correlation strength

Legitimisation of new elites 0,31 2,72 0,842 Presence of the former elite 0,46 2,60 1,197 Transitional justice 0,71 2,17 1,534 Social costs of transformations 0,91 1,83 1,669 Adaptation of new standards 0,67 2,73 1,839 Symbolic roles of the democratisation 0,96 3,07 2,931 Historical need for national unity 0,56 2,71 1,527 New state’s identity in IR -0,04 3,00 -0,120 Table 5.5. The strength of correlations, the intensity of use, and the Significance Factor for individual research categories of the transitional remembrance policy (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

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significance of justifying the change of the state’s identity in international politics was minimal, which allows us to assume that using remembrance narratives as a tool for giving credence to the transitional foreign policy is irrelevant to the shape of remembrance policy. Furthermore, as the Model of Correlations between particular fields of impact shows (as discussed in the previous chapter) this function is also weakly related to other categories. Thus, it seems that its relations with the entirety of the promoted remembrance narratives and the society’s political identity reconstruction are irrelevant, and (possibly) its intensity is more related to the foreign policy or the international situation. We have already discussed the intensity of using remembrance narratives in terms of eight tasks most strongly impacting the shape of the government’s management of collective memory––let us look into this issue again, now making use of the Significance Factor. Four of these tasks obtained results that were decidedly different from the other elements. This means that using the past as inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (item 5-5), the pro-democratic selection of narratives (item 6-3), using stories on national heroes as the source of democratic attitudes (item 6-4), and referring to the past as the justification of national unity (item 7-1), are both highly correlated to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy and often referenced in terms of remembrance story-telling. Thus, it is this means of implementing these four tasks that provides us with the most significant information about the role of narratives on the past in the process of political identity reconstruction during democratisation. The catalogue of the most important fields of impact can be extended– –in terms of the value of the Significance Factor––with another four tasks, i.e.: justifying the limited scope of transitional justice with the necessity to prevent internal conflicts (item 3-4), using stories on national heroes to promote the new social and political standards (item 5-3), showing the historical and intergenerational need for democratisation (item 6-1), and presenting the system transformation as the tribute paid to the victims of the authoritarian regime (item 6-2). Therefore, it is possible to create a simplified evaluation tool for the transitional remembrance policy which would include eight research questions concerning these fields of impact. A better solution though would be to consider another eight tasks which are also characterised by a high value of the Significance Factor, i.e.: using the past as the legitimisation of the new elites’ position (item 11), using national symbols and heroes to legitimise the state’s new leadership (item 1-3), justifying the presence of the previous regime’s representatives with the necessity to prevent conflicts (item 2-1), using

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their presence to legitimise democracy and pluralism (item 2-2), presenting transitional justice as a legitimisation of the rule of law (item 31), punishing the guilty ones (item 3-2) and as the source of forgiveness (item 3-3), and also using the new organisation of time as a mechanism of the transfer of ideas from the elites to the society (item 6-5). Jointly, it is

Image 5.13. The General Model of the Significance of the transitional remembrance policy’s objectives and aims (Author: P. WawrzyĔski).

those very sixteen elements that allow us to comprehend most accurately how the transitional remembrance policy is conducted, and also how it influences the reconstruction of the post-authoritarian political identity. The difference between their significance and the role of the other field of impact can be clearly seen in the structure of the General Model of the Intensity of the elements of the government’s management of collective memory during the democratisation, shown in Image 5.13. It distinctly sets

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out the directions which ought to become of interest to the researchers of this phenomenon. However, solely considering the correlations’ strength and use intensity can be deemed as a solution which neglects an important feature– –the differences between the particular cases of the government’s management of collective memory. Therefore, we also propose to use the General Impact Factor (GIF), the value being the product of the Intensity Factor and the Standard Deviation, which allows the consideration of the role of differences between cases. Thus, it takes account of all three features on which we have focused our attention, and which we diagnosed in our scientific research. Hence, it is a more detailed tool which allows us to indicate the most important elements in the transitional remembrance policy structure, and identify the key directions for using remembrance narratives to reconstruct the post-authoritarian political identity. Once more, we observed the highest value of the Factor in the case of showing symbolic roles of democratisation. Yet, the difference between this result and the next was not so dramatic––what is more, the legitimisation of transitional justice only has a slightly weaker impact on the transitional remembrance policy. It seems to be these two functions that define the shape of remembrance story-telling and regulate its intensity and the dynamics of using particular remembrance narratives. Their dominance is highlighted by the comparison of the Factor’s value for all the functions presented in Table 5.6. Obviously, we must not depreciate the significance of the justifications of implementing the new social and political standards, and of the historical need for national unity, but their role is much smaller. It results, primarily, from the distinctly smaller differentiation of the means of implementing these functions, which impacts their predictive value. In turn, the other four categories––the legitimisation of exercising authority by the new elites, the presence of the previous regime’s representatives, explaining the social costs of transformations, and justifying aspirations to become a member of international organisations––can be regarded as lacking in any significant influence on the general role of remembrance narratives in the process of the post-authoritarian political identity transformation. Hence, research on this phenomenon can be limited to the first four functions, which are characterised by the observable influence on the way the government manages the contents of collective memory during democratisation. Just like the Significance Factor, the General Impact Factor, too, allows us to distinguish the most important fields of impact. Nine of them reached the value that indicates a particularly important role for the shape

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Standard Deviation (SD)

Significance Factor (SF)

Legitimisation of new elites 0,842 0,74 0,619 Presence of the former elite 1,197 0,65 0,781 Transitional justice 1,534 1,31 2,010 Social costs of transformations 1,669 0,30 0,501 Adaptation of new standards 1,839 0,67 1,224 Symbolic roles of the democratisation 2,931 0,86 2,532 Historical need for national unity 1,527 0,80 1,217 New state’s identity in IR -0,120 1,13 -0,136 Table 5.6. The Significance Factor, the Standard Deviation, and the General Impact Factor for individual research categories (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski).

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of the transitional remembrance policy. They are as follows: presenting the presence of the previous regime’s representatives as the legitimisation of democracy and political pluralism (item 2-2), showing the transitional justice of the past as a means to legitimise the rule of law (item 3-1), justifying the limited scope of the transitional justice mechanisms as the consequence of the need to avert internal conflicts (item 3-4), placing national heroes as role models for new social and political attitudes (item 5-3), using the past as the inspiration for the new definition of patriotism (item 5-5), showing democratic transformations as the tribute paid to the victims of the authoritarian repression (item 6-2), the pro-democratic selection of narratives and their heroes (item 6-3), using national heroes to promote democratic and civic attitudes (item 6-4), and finally, indicating the experience of the past as the justification of the need for national unity (item 7-1). Focusing our attention solely on these nine tasks of remembrance story-telling still makes it possible to reduce the evaluation sheet to merely a quarter of the research questions, which increases its usefulness significantly, without decreasing either its usefulness in the description of this phenomenon of our interest, or its predictive properties. As in the case of the Significance Factor, we can extend the catalogue of the most important elements with more fields of impact, for which the General Impact Factor value was slightly smaller, but it still indicated the existence of the relationship between the variable and the shape of the transitional remembrance policy. This would mean taking into account another ten tasks, which can be realised through the promotion of the interpretations of the past, namely: using the past to legitimise the exercising of power by the new elites (item 1-1), using, to that same end, national symbols and heroes (item 1-3), justifying the presence of the representatives of the authoritarian regime with the need to prevent conflicts (item 2-1), presenting the historical arguments for the symbolic separation of the past from the future (item 2-5), showing transitional justice as punishing those guilty of the authoritarian crimes (item 3-2) and as the source of forgiveness (item 3-3), emphasising the role of democratisation as the fulfilment of the intergenerational contract (item 61), using the new calendar of public holidays to transfer ideas from the elites to the society (item 6-5), showing the historical justification of the need to reconcile and forgive (item 7-2), and finally, showing the membership of international organisations and alliances as the symbolic complement of transformations and the historical challenge (item 8-2). Thus, in the evaluation sheet, the number of research questions would be reduced by almost half; but still, their scope would be varied enough to holistically present the transitional remembrance policy.

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As a result, the General Impact Factor enabled us to create the General Model of the Structure, which is presented in Image 5.14. Most certainly, it allows us to regard two functions of remembrance story-telling as lacking in any significant influence on the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy, i.e.: explaining the social costs of transformations, and justifying the state’s integration aspirations in the international arena. Questionable, too, is the role of using remembrance narratives to legitimise new elites and the continuing presence of the representatives of the authoritarian regime in the country’s public life. Thus, another four research categories remain within our interest, namely: transitional justice, the implementation of the new social and political standards, the symbolic roles of democratisation, and the need for national unity.

Image 5.14. The General Model of the Structure of Transitional Remembrance Policy (Author: P. WawrzyĔski).

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Does this mean that the interest in the government’s management of the contents of collective memory during democratisation can be reduced to four functions? The results we obtained confirm that it is precisely those very areas that are most relevant to the shape, intensity, and dynamics of the researched phenomenon. However, we have two important reservations. Firstly, apart from these categories, there also exist fields of impact which influence strongly the way of using remembrance narratives, and only explaining the social costs of transformations––despite its strong correlation to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy–– can be effectively eliminated from further considerations. Secondly, the ANOVA shows that as for implementing the new standards and emphasising the historical need for national unity, there are no statistically significant differences in the research sample. Thus, we can state that those two functions can also be regarded as less important, for their low–– but still a little higher than the average––degree of intensity characterises, as such, the government’s management of collective memory during democratisation. Hence, we must stress again that key to the researched phenomenon are the following two areas: the legitimisation of the implemented transitional justice mechanisms, and presenting changes as a process which aims to fulfil the intergenerational contract, with tribute paid to the heroes of the struggle for freedom. It means that it is possible to create at least four simplified models of the phenomenon. They are as follows: x The two-factor model (MTR2), which reduces the use of remembrance narratives to justifying transitional justice and explaining the symbolic roles of democratisation. However, its basic weakness is the excessive exposure of the role of transitional justice, which would be particularly visible in terms of South Africa, where the result would shift from a low degree to a moderate one, close to high. Coincidentally, it would also result in a shift towards a very low degree for Georgia and Poland, where this function was absolutely marginal; x The eight-factor model (MTR8), which can be created on the basis of the fields of impact of the highest values of the Significance Factor (SF). Its application though means a complete connection of the shape of the transitional remembrance policy with presenting symbolic roles of democratisation, with the latter category being dominant in this model. This results in a situation in which the cases of the steady use of remembrance narratives (Estonia) lose their advantage over those countries where the interpretations of the

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past were used more intensively, but in some areas only (Chile and South Africa); x The nine-factor model (MTR9), which can be derived from the value of the General Impact Factor (GIF) for particular fields of impact whose importance to the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy is the greatest. However, it replicates the weak points of the previous models––it identifies unequivocally narratives on the past presenting symbolic roles of democratisation and justifying transitional justice, diminishing the importance of some other significant elements which co-create the relationship between remembrance narratives and the process of the postauthoritarian political identity transformation. In effect, this model strengthens the polarisation between the researched cases, concurrently favouring the scenarios of the intensive, but unstructured, use of the interpretations of the past––again, it results in a relatively lower assessment of the transformation in Estonia, where remembrance policy was conducted in a moderate but steady way; x The nineteen-factor model (MTR19), which can be constructed by considering a higher number of fields of impact of the highest value of the General Impact Factor (GIF). It allows a complete mapping of the cases’ hierarchy, only slightly altering the final results for the researched countries––the use of remembrance narratives in Chile and South Africa shifts towards a moderate degree, while in Poland it drops to a very low degree. Thus, this model seems to serve as an alternative and less complicated way of researching the transitional remembrance policy and it can be applied successfully to determine its role in the process of political identity reconstruction. Obviously, it does not allow for the presenting of the specifics of the realisation of the particular tasks of remembrance story-telling, but it can serve to show the general shape, intensity, and dynamics of using remembrance narratives during democratisation. Of all the above presented possible simplified models, the greatest research value––in our opinion––characterises model MTR19, which not only maintains the differences between the particular cases of the transitional remembrance policy, but also, to the smallest degree, replicates the mistake of fully linking the shape of the government’s management of collective memory to the given function of these actions. Obviously, it assigns a special role to showing the symbolic roles of the democratisation and legitimisation of transitional justice; still, it diversifies

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their influence through considering fields of impact characteristic for: the legitimisation of exercising authority by the new elites, the presence of the previous regime’s representatives, the implementation of the new social and political standards, and showing the historical need for national unity, as well as one task assigned to legitimising the integration aspirations of the state in the international arena. Thus, this model can be deemed as more diversified and connected with a greater number of various areas, in which the interpretations of the past can be used, as shown in Image 5.15.

Image 5.15. The Simplified Model of the Structure of Transitional Remembrance Policy (Author: P. WawrzyĔski).

However, the Simplified Model MTR19 is not the only solution. The application of different models leads to somewhat different research results, but they are not differences which might change our understanding of the transitional remembrance policy completely. Various approaches favour different scenarios of the government’s management of collective

MTR2

Chile 2,70 4,00 3,78 3,16 2,75 3,38 Estonia 3,62 3,75 3,67 3,56 3,28 3,56 Georgia 1,60 2,13 1,89 2,17 2,33 2,12 Spain 2,32 3,38 3,11 2,95 2,64 3,01 Poland 1,52 1,63 1,33 1,84 2,03 1,69 South Africa 3,92 3,88 3,89 3,53 2,83 3,50 Total 2,62 3,13 2,94 2,84 2,63 2,88 Table 5.7. The application of the Simplified Models of the Transitional Remembrance and the value of the General Factor for individual countries (Author: Patryk WawrzyĔski). The General Factor (GF) is the fourth root of the product of the results for models MTR8, MTR9, MTR19, and MTR37.

Country MTR8

Models based on fields of impact MTR9

Model based on research categories MTR19

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The General Factor (GF)

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memory, but what is fundamental remains the division––of key importance to our research––into those countries that looked for a structured reconstruction of the society during democratisation, and those that failed to consider this task to be the transformation objective. What is more, the application of the simplified models makes those differences even more significant, which is very visible in the summary of results in Table 5.7. At the same time, those results also show why the most credible of the simplified models is––in our opinion––MTR19. Let us also look at an additional value which we can calculate thanks to the creation of the Simplified Models––the General Factor (GF) of using remembrance narratives to transform the post-authoritarian political identity. The consolidation of the results for the four models based on the fields of impact makes our understanding of the shape of transitional remembrance policy more objective. It allows us to see the influence of pursuing the reconstruction of the society as the transformation objective– –the countries assuming such a result of transformations are characterised by a moderate degree of using remembrance narratives, whereas in the cases lacking this element, the degree is low or very low. Coincidentally, it prompts us to revise the earlier observations concerning the cases of Chile and South Africa––it is so as the application of the simplified models shows that in these two countries, remembrance policy was intensified in the key areas, playing an insignificant role in the realisation of those tasks which are less important to the structure of remembrance story-telling. Therefore, the elimination of the secondary elements from our area of interest results in acknowledging the greater intensity of using remembrance narratives by the new authorities in Chile and South Africa (and to a smaller degree, in Spain, too).

Summary The interpretations of the past are an important political resource and a powerful tool for mobilising the citizens. Democratisation creates conditions conducive to making remembrance narratives a valuable instrument allowing the vision of the new order, but they can also become a source of social resistance and a factor that destabilises the country’s political situation. It is so, as the past is not only capable of legitimisation, but sometimes it also incites people to destroy the old world and build a new and better future on its ruins. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that some leaders of transformations make the decision to escape from the future, forget to remember, and urge the citizens to re-orientate transitional politics on the imagined ideal vision of the future. It is so as the past can

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be an unreliable pillar of the community, while an escape from the past–– as shown by the example of post-war Germany––can be an effective strategy for building democracy, wealth, and a modern society. Yet, sometimes history cannot be forgotten. Suppressed trauma will come back redoubled, at the least expected moment, causing havoc in the unconsolidated political system, and pushing the nation to the verge of a civil war. The experience of authoritarianism––the suffering of victims and their families, the fear of terror and insecurity, the hidden hatreds, and unhealed wounds––gives rise to trauma, the healing of which requires, if only in a symbolic way, coming to terms with the past. It is not possible to eliminate the heritage of violence and enslavement without a debate over the traces that history has left on the present-day, and how much authoritarianism has changed the society’s mentality. The new democratic citizen must not hate his recent enemies, suppress his emotions, or await delayed vengeance. Transformation means reconciliation. Anger and failing to deal with the past inspire social frustration, and the lack of trust in the new elites or the instability of the political order consequently brings the country ever closer to the verge of a ruthless revolution. That is why the transitional remembrance policy is important. Its effective realisation is a safeguard that a peaceful transformation will not turn into a bloody civil war. It enables the citizens to gradually overcome the post-authoritarian trauma and find their own place in the redefined national community. It gives the new leaders influence on the reconstructed political culture; it secures their interests in the long-term by providing the new founding myths––the narrative on the beginning which gives transitional leaders the position of founders of the new order, the founding fathers of democracy. The past legitimises the new order, constitutes its roots, and shows its relevance. It supports the fragile construction of the democratic political system which is threatened by radicalism, unsatisfied vengeance, and the past elites’ fear of losing their privileged position. Thus, the realisation of the transitional remembrance policy is in the art of keeping a balance between the experience of authoritarianism and the vision of the democratic future, between tradition and modernisation, and between the martyrdom of the victims of the repressions and the triumphalism of the winners. It is a technology allowing governments to control the citizens’ mobilisation––to activate them when democratisation calls for it, and to cool down emotions when the country is losing stability. Sometimes it requires intensive narration about the commitment of the democratic opposition, who risked their lives in the struggle for freedom, while at some other times, showing the citizens examples of reconciliation

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and forgiveness. The interpretations of the past inspire the citizens to change, encouraging them to make the dreams of the past generations come true and to honour their commitment to the nation. They indicate man’s place in grand historical processes and define his role as a participant in historical transformations. Democratisation creates conditions under which remembrance narratives can be either the pillars of the new order, or factors destabilising the fragile political system––it depends on the government only if it can capitalise on the situation and use the interpretations of the past to consolidate democracy and the society’s new political identity. The research we conducted on the transitional remembrance policy allows an even deeper understanding of its nature. It confirms a great number of theoretical hypotheses which account for the intensity and dynamics of the remembrance policy during democratisation. It shows that the fundamental function of using remembrance narratives presents symbolic roles of the transformation as a means of fulfilling the intergenerational contract and the tribute paid to the victims of the struggle for freedom. Thus, we must stress that the interpretations of the past aim to turn democratisation into something more than merely a transformation of the political system––the vision of transformation success as the end of history is to legitimise the process itself and constitute a community that will strive to achieve that aim. Without doubt, the other pillar of the transitional remembrance policy is transitional justice. The effective use of remembrance narratives is not possible without coming to terms with the past, even if the implemented procedures are of a symbolic character only– –failing to make it possible is really to punish those guilty of authoritarian crimes. Furthermore, the results we obtained allow us to understand that the reconstruction of the post-authoritarian political identity also requires the intensive use of remembrance policy to justify the implementation of the new social and political standards, and to give credence to the need for national unity. Hence, the promoted stories must provide role models and teach how a good citizen and patriot should act. At the same time, they ought to present the nation as a strong and consolidated community which, thanks to its strong bonds within, is capable of overcoming difficulties and facing the challenges of transformations. The other four functions are of secondary importance, yet their different features still exert some influence on the general shape of the transitional remembrance policy. However, we know that this influence is not defining, and that the significance of those factors for the technology of the government’s management of collective memory is simply lower.

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The research we conducted enabled us to identify numerous, significant relationships between the elements of the structure of remembrance story-telling during democratisation. We discovered the importance of setting society reconstruction as the goal of transformations, with the accompanying dichotomy of reconciliation and the inevitability of conflict as the components of the imagined political identity. Adopting this criterion allows the division of categories into two similar groups, which are characterised by the similar intensity and dynamics of using remembrance narratives. Thus, rejecting the hypothesis of the existence of a universal model of the transitional remembrance policy, we preliminarily verified the validity of the claim of the existence of two types of remembrance story-telling during transformations, i.e.: a model in which countries pursue the reconstruction of the society, and a model in which countries do not intend to achieve this goal. The implementation of the former scenario results in a greater intensity of using remembrance narratives and a more even distribution of the government’s interest between all the functions of remembrance policy, while in the latter case, the interpretations of the past are not promoted as intensively, with part of the space remaining effectively not utilised. These models differ completely––which is crucial––in terms of the two most important tasks, i.e.: showing symbolic roles of democratisation and the legitimisation of transitional justice. After all, does the shape of the transitional remembrance policy really matter? Of course it does. Our research proves that remembrance narratives play the important role of the regulator of transformations, which enables the channelling of the emotions of citizens, and explains the most important changes to them. New national heroes become new role models whom the citizens endeavour to imitate; the new landscape of memory and the new organisation of time educate the society about the new political order; the new interpretations of the past legitimise the foundations of democracy––the rule of law, political pluralism, human rights protection, or the pursuit of modernisation. Primarily though, the transitional remembrance policy provides the opportunity to overcome the post-authoritarian trauma and gives a credible answer to the following question: why did we experience enslavement and repressions? Thus, it helps to transform the society-victim into a community of committed citizens who pursue the building of their country’s better future: the hidden emotions get channelled, and the hatred between groups is replaced by the will to reconcile and develop national unity. The deficiency in using remembrance narratives results in the deficiency of the post-authoritarian

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identity, which translates into the potential instability of the political order or the political culture. It is precisely for those reasons that transitional remembrance policy matters. That is why it is worth the research; getting to know its structure, trying to understand what makes it such an important tool for shaping the post-authoritarian society. The research we conducted has provided a great number of answers, yet it has also provoked us to ask more questions. Is the division with respect to the objective to reconstruct the society the only way to determine the types of this phenomenon? Does the shape of the transitional remembrance policy determine the way in which remembrance narratives are later used? How do the promoted interpretations of the past influence the mid- and long-term stability of the political order? We could ask questions endlessly as the relations between democratisation and remembrance policy––despite the discoveries covered in this book––still remain an area poorly utilised by political sciences. We hope that the direction set by us will be inspirational to other researchers, and prompt them to ask more questions about the role of remembrance narratives.

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