The Politics of Crime in Mexico: Democratic Governance in a Security Trap 9781626370913

Citation preview

To the millions of Mexican citizens on the front lines of state-building—police officers, justice and regulatory officials, military personnel, human rights defenders, lawyers, technicians, and support staff—and to the law-abiding individuals who support them in the project to build a more just society

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Preface

ix xi

1

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

1

2

Foundational Crime: Tax Evasion and Informality

31

3

Common Crime and Democracy: Weakening vs. Deepening

51

Organized Crime: Theory and Applications to Kidnapping

85

4 5

Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance

115

6

State Responses to Organized Crime

143

7

Escape Routes: Policy Adaptation and Diffusion

181

List of Acronyms Bibliography Index

203 207 225

vii

Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1 Crime, Regime, and State

24

2.1 Low Satisfaction with Basic Services

35

2.2 Tax Compliance and Citizenship Obligations

37

2.3 Central Government Tax and Nontax Revenue as Percentage of GDP

38

2.4 Academic Reports about Tax Evasion in Mexico, 2004–2006

40

3.1 Victimization Rates for Selected Crimes in Mexico City and the State of Mexico, 2005–2009

63

3.2 Perception of Insecurity, Mexico, 2004–2008

65

3.3 Attitude Mixes about Democracy and State

67

3.4 Crime Victimization, Security, Participation, and Attitudes in Mexico, 2010

71

3.5 Participate in a Party or Movement, Mexico, 2010

72

3.6 Participate in a Protest or Manifestation, Mexico, 2010

73

4.1 Modes of Interaction between Criminal Organizations and the State

94

4.2 Kidnapping Types, Targets, and Political Effects

101

Figures

1.1 Confidence in the Judiciary in Selected Latin American Countries

ix

21

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

1.2 Confidence in the Police in Selected Latin American Countries

22

1.3 Citizen Compliance with the Law in Selected Latin American Countries

22

3.1 Intentional Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants in Mexico, 1997–2012

54

3.2 Armed Robbery per 1,000 and Kidnapping per 100,000 in Mexico, 1997–2012

55

3.3 Crime Victimization and Perceptions of Insecurity in Mexico

57

3.4 Perception of Insecurity and Crime Victimization in Mexican Cities

60

4.1 Levels and Interrelations of Crime

91

4.2 Civil Society, City Government, and Organized Crime in Tijuana, 2000–2009

98

Preface

Crime competes with inequality, unemployment, and slow economic growth as Mexico’s leading policy problem. Political science as a discipline, however, doesn’t equip us very well to understand the ways in which crime influences democratic governance. This book analyzes the dynamics of crime as a principal driver in contemporary Mexican politics. This subject is touchy. A focus on crime and corruption by an outsider will inevitably grate on the nerves of the many Mexicans who view the United States as the prime source of booming drug markets, rivers of illicit cash and weapons, tiresome sermonizing about issues only superficially understood, and a zest for military solutions. My purpose here is not to criticize but to try to analyze problems of crime and corruption in a broader comparative context. All countries experience these problems to one degree or another, and perhaps an outsider can offer a useful perspective. My analytical approach is grounded in comparative politics and policy analysis. While coworkers in the mainstream of these fields hammer away on the upper floors of the polis on topics such as party-electoral systems and federalism, and on positive programs, like health care and education, somehow I was drawn into the sewers of crime, corruption, and violence. The path included memorable side visits to a Mexico City police station to complain about my stolen car, the Reclusorio del Norte prison to interview a former head of Pemex, a police training academy in Tijuana to observe teaching techniques, and Guadalajara’s city morgue to consult with forensic staff. The trip started in a project I codirected with Sergio Aguayo in the early 1990s in which we assessed security relations between Mexico and the United States in the post– Cold War context (Bailey and Aguayo 1996). I began to grasp the significance of crime, especially organized crime, for Mexico’s political system. Unfortunately, to continue the unhappy metaphor, crime increased exponentially, and the sewage was rising toward the main floors. The analysis that unfolds in the following chapters reflects my apprehension that Mexico’s democracy is gravely threatened by crime and corruption, as well as my conviction that government and society are fighting back.

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Policy analysts trespass across various fields. We know general things about institutions and processes and learn policy substance as needed. Typically, the substance takes us from “low-altitude analytics” deep into the weeds of laws, bureaucracies, interest groups, and the like, to middle-range comparisons, and then to stratospheric, long-wave historical speculation. There’s no single theory or method here; we borrow or make it up as we go. Usually the specialists and practitioners who really know the substance welcome us policy trespassers onto their turf and readily share their experience. So, this book is the product of a twenty-year tutorial on citizen security, and I’m indebted to a number of generous teachers. Beginning with coeditors and coauthors who also served as partners and tutors, I thank Sergio Aguayo, Jorge Chabat, Marc Chernick, Wayne Cornelius, Lucía Dammert, Gustavo Flores Macías, Juan Carlos Garzón, Roy Godson, Tonatiuh Guillén López, Richard Hartwig, Ricardo Martínez, Daniel Ortega Nieto, Pablo Parás, Dinorah Vargas, and the dozens of contributors to several books that I coedited over the years. Thanks also to those who answered my questions and gave good advice along the way: John Ackerman, Dudley Althaus, Arturo Alvarado, Sigrid Arzt, Bruce Bagley, Miguel Basáñez, Ulises Beltrán, Raul Benítez Manaut, José Luís Calderón, Gabriel Farfán, Rafael Fernández de Castro, Bernardo González-Aréchiga, Samuel González Ruiz, Michael Layton, Ernesto López Portillo, Antonio Lozano Gracia, David Mares, Marcos Pablo Moloeznik, Moisés Moreno, Eric Olson, Tony Payán, Armand Peschard, José María Ramos, Andrew Selee, María Eugenia Suárez de Garay, Jorge Tello Peón, Eugenio Wiegand, and Leo Zukerman. In addition, I lost some wise and generous friends along the way: Rafael Ruiz Harrell (2007), Dan Lund (2010), Jorge Carpizo (2012), and Larry Dever (2012). Extra thanks go to those who not only answered questions but also commented on early drafts of chapters: Peter Andreas, Arturo Arango, Marcelo Bergman, Fernando Castillo Tapia, James Creechan, David Crow, Diane Davis, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Desha Girod, George Grayson, Chappel Lawson, José I. Lobo, Mary Malone, Stephen Morris, Vidal Romero, Mauricio Ruiz Vega, Daniel Sabet, David Shirk, and Matthew Taylor. Needless to say, I am fully responsible for what stayed in the book. My research assistants patiently dealt with vague instructions to find data, repair tables and figures, and fix details: Hamutal Bernstein, Enrique Bravo, Rachel Fedewa, Arantxa Guillán Montero, Kate Henvey, Adriana Kocorinik-Mina, Luis Felipe Mantilla, and Michael

Preface

xiii

Paarlberg. Bridget O’Loughlin did the heavy lifting to help bring the project to closure. Several foundations helped finance my tutorial: William and Flora Hewlett, Smith-Richardson, and McArthur. Georgetown University’s Center for Democracy and the Third Sector, Government Department, Graduate School, and School of Foreign Service all dropped coins in my tambourine. Finally, the author’s lament: I thank my family for their support and tolerance. One cheerfully suggested that “I need to focus on finishing this book” should be inscribed on my tombstone.

1 Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

“We either sort this out or we’re screwed. Really screwed.” —Javier Sicilia, April 2011.1 “May the Mexican politicians forgive me, but the very first thing is to construct a state policy. The fight against drugs can’t be politicized.” —Former Colombian President Ernesto Samper, June 2011.2

The son of Javier Sicilia, a noted Mexican poet and journalist, was among seven young people found murdered in Cuernavaca, Morelos, in late March 2011. The scandal triggered mega-marches in 37 cities throughout Mexico to protest violence and insecurity. Like others before him, Sicilia vented his rage at the political class. “We’ve had legislators that do nothing more than collect their pay. . . . And that’s the real complaint of the people. They’re not just complaining to [the governor of Morelos], it’s to the entire political class, because they behave like a bunch of imbeciles. We’re completely fed up with this [hasta la madre de eso], because that’s the word. Fed up.”3 Sicilia laments the first part of the problem, the one that former-president Samper cites in the Chapter epigraph: Mexico’s political parties need to form a pact and stop using security for partisan advantage. With such a pact, the country could focus on the second challenge: the construction of an ethical, effective police-justice system. With these measures in place, Mexico might begin to find an exit strategy from its security trap. Taking office on December 1, 2006, President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) recognized that the Mexican federal government was losing control over significant pieces of national territory to drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). Since the 1980s, some of the organizations had acquired enough money and political savvy to corrupt numerous local

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

governments, several state governments, and key federal agencies. Trafficking organizations also drew strength from the country’s rapidly expanding internal drug markets and from diversifying into extortion and other criminal as well as licit activities. By the early 2000s, the strongest DTOs had amassed enough manpower, weaponry, mobility, and leadership to confront and intimidate local and state police forces, mainly in drug producing areas and along the principal smuggling corridors in Mexico’s northern states. The ominous novelty was that some DTOs were increasingly willing to confront the army, the last wall of protection of the Mexican state.4 Gambling the success of his presidency, Calderón launched a major offensive against the trafficking organizations in his first days in office, sending some 25,000 federal soldiers and police to several border cities and rural areas embroiled in gang violence. The government’s initiative exacerbated inter-gang violence. Some DTOs pushed back against the government, generating still more violence. After the midterm elections in July 2009, the president faced an increasingly difficult situation. According to Mexican government data, killings attributed to gang violence since Calderón’s inauguration in December 2006 had surpassed more than 47,500 by September 2011 (Seelke and Finklea 2013, p. 1). Another estimate puts the number killed in gang violence in the range of 60,000 to 65,000 over Calderón’s term (Molzahn et al. 2012, p. 15). The violence escalated from vicious to bestial. In January 2008, for example, a gang fixed a “hit list” to a police monument in Ciudad Juárez (across from El Paso, Texas) and, by mid-May, had killed half of the 17 police officers on the list, despite the deployment of 3,000 troops and 500 federal police across Chihuahua state.5 In May 2008, hired gunmen (sicarios) struck at the top of federal law enforcement, murdering three of the top operational officers of the Federal Preventive Police.6 Mass media and innocent civilians were targeted for terrorist-type attacks as well.7 On September 16, 2008, two sicarios threw grenades into a crowd celebrating Mexico’s Independence Day in the provincial capital of Morelia in the president’s home state of Michoacán, killing seven and injuring scores of others.8 In December 2009, family members of a marine killed in an operation against a top trafficker were murdered in retaliation.9 Two employees of the US consulate in Juárez were murdered in March 2010, and explosive devices were detonated outside the US consulate in Nuevo Laredo the following month. A car bomb exploded in Juárez on July 15, killing two police officers and a paramedic.10 The leading gubernatorial candidate in Tamaulipas state was gunned down in a gangster “operation” (operativo) in June 2010, and the mayor of a town near Monterrey, Nuevo León, was abducted

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3

and murdered in another operation two months later.11 By October of that year, 11 mayors had been murdered. In April 2011, some 145 bodies were recovered from so-called “narco-graves” in Tamaulipas state.12 In September 2011, 53 persons died in an arson attack on a gambling casino in the northern industrial city of Monterrey. In May 2012, 49 bodies, essentially butchered, were found in Nuevo León. Calderón’s declared “war on crime” was producing gruesome media images that sowed deep anxiety throughout the country. Corruption accompanied the violence. High-level officials in the Ministry of Public Security and the Attorney General’s Office fell under investigation for collaborating with DTOs. Whether the accusations were valid or constituted disinformation planted by trafficking gangs added still more uncertainty to the fog of smoke and mirrors.13 Equally grave, four Army generals were detained in May 2012 and charged with collaborating with criminal organizations. In May 2008, an opinion poll question about whether the federal government “has the reins of the country, or are things getting out of hand” tipped into negative territory for the first time since Calderón’s inauguration.14 In the following four years, politicians both from the opposition and the president’s own party, as well as civic leaders, grew increasingly alarmed about the violence and called for a rethinking of the government’s anti-crime strategies. Recovering control of territory demanded priority from the outset of the President’s term. Calderón understood well that the violent DTOs were but the most urgent symptom of systemic problems of corruption, criminality, and distrust of—if not contempt for—the state’s system of law enforcement and justice administration. As a matter of statecraft, the most the president could do in a single six-year term was to stave off the DTOs’ attacks on Mexico’s nascent democracy and lay the groundwork for reforms that would take years, if not decades, to show positive results. In addition, Calderón faced a credibility problem. He had won the presidency in July 2006 by less than one percent of the popular vote. His main opponent, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, from the left-center Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD), refused to concede defeat. An accomplished populist campaigner, López Obrador claimed the title of “Legitimate President” and mobilized his followers to occupy key sites in Mexico City. The tense stand-off lasted into December of 2006. Thereafter, López Obrador launched a nation-wide grassroots campaign as the “Legitimate President,” denouncing Calderón as illegitimate. In the view of many, Calderón had politicized the security issue to win popular

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

support, militarizing the war on crime as a tactical political maneuver to benefit from the armed forces’ high prestige. Another recurring criticism was that Calderón launched a “war on drugs” without sufficient planning or consultation. Inevitably, citizen security figured prominently in the July 2009 midterm congressional elections. After asserting that a broad consensus was necessary to combat insecurity, the head of President Calderón’s National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) aggressively attacked both the PRD and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) as involved with organized crime. Two months before the election, the federal government intervened in the President’s home state of Michoacán, arresting 10 city mayors and 25 other local officials for collusion with an important DTO. Of the mayors detained, eight were members of the PRI or PRD; two were of the PAN. The government claimed the arrests were aimed to pierce the political protection of organized crime. Michoacán was chosen because its problems were worse than those of other states. Skeptics, however, saw crude partisan maneuvering. Skepticism deepened as 34 of those arrested were eventually cleared by a judge due to lack of evidence. A subsequent opinion survey reported that 86 percent of those interviewed believed the officials arrested were indeed involved with drug traffickers but that the government lacked sufficient evidence to convict.15 President Calderón’s party was routed in the midterm election of July 2009. PRI won nearly 37 percent of the vote and 237 of the 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, more than doubling its 2006 result.16 An alliance with the Green Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, PVEM), with 17 seats, gave PRI a working majority and thus effective control over legislative agenda and the budget. PRI also won five of six contested governorships, including the key industrial state of Nuevo León. PAN won 28 percent of the vote and 147 seats in the Chamber, a loss of 59 over 2006. PRD also lost ground, with 12 percent of the vote and 72 seats, a loss of 54 over 2006.17 The deteriorating economy and dissatisfaction with a perceived lack of progress against crime were key factors in the PAN’s defeat. With a fixed six-year term and no reelection, a Mexican president needs to build sufficient support and momentum by the midterm election to carry his programs into the fourth and fifth years, at which point the presidential succession dominates policy-making. By this calculation, President Calderón had become a lame duck with a weak economy and a floundering anti-crime program. Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora, a key architect of the federal government’s citizen security

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

5

strategy, resigned in September 2009. The following month, former PAN president Vicente Fox called for removing the army from anticrime operations in order to reduce the violence. Fox was joined by a former president of the PAN, who was dismayed about the mayhem in Chihuahua. With its working majority in the Chamber of Deputies, PRI became more assertive, positioning itself to capture the presidency in 2012. Policy would be shaped more by calculations of partisan advantage than by devising a coherent strategy to exit the country’s security trap. President Calderón confirmed the impression of a partisan agenda with the arrest of a former PRI mayor of Tijuana in May 2011, shortly before the gubernatorial election in the State of Mexico.18 Skeptics would note that the four army generals, under investigation since 2010, were detained just weeks before the July 2012 presidential election. Their skepticism was vindicated when charges against all four were dropped due to insufficient evidence a year later.19 By 2010, the main contours of the security debate were taking shape. In multiple speeches and press statements, the Calderón team argued that past administrations had not effectively confronted criminal organizations and that the threat had reached a tipping point in perhaps six or so of Mexico’s 32 states. Armed criminal groups were overtly controlling pieces of national territory. If the government did not respond vigorously, the problems would escalate and the national capital would be threatened. Given the weakness—if not complicity—of police forces and intelligence services, the government needed to use the military on a short-term basis. With time, the government could reform the police-justice system and step up provision of social services to affected regions. In effect, the government sought to pulverize the larger, more aggressive DTOs and transform a national security threat into a citizen security problem to be dealt with by the police-justice system at the state and local levels. With sufficient effort, the government could make the “balloon effect” work to its advantage by pushing trafficking routes elsewhere, perhaps out into the Pacific Ocean. According to the government, record seizures of drug shipments, weapons, vehicles, and illicit profits, along with record levels of arrests and incarceration demonstrate that the policy is working. Further, government spokesmen rejected notions of Mexico as a failed state, or of “Colombianization.” Violence is lamentable, they argued, but it is also a sign of decomposition of criminal gangs. The absence of violence, in contrast, too often means that criminal gangs have consolidated control and can rule through corruption and intimidation. Human rights abuses by government security forces are an important issue, they conceded, and the government is giving it priority

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

attention. Also, decriminalization of drugs is a worthwhile debate, but the issue will take time to resolve and to produce results. The country cannot wait.20 Opponents of the government’s policy were generally united in their criticism about violence and the use of the armed forces but were mute or divided about alternative policies. They argued that the costs of confrontation were unacceptable. Also, by 2010, signs were emerging of a “dirty war” involving paramilitary forces against criminal groups. Complaints were filed with human rights organizations that some persons apprehended by government security agencies had disappeared. Reliance on the armed forces appeared to them as open-ended, and the government was making little apparent progress in reforming the policejustice system. Hundreds of army officers, either retired or on leave from active duty, were filling law enforcement jobs at all levels across the country. In fact, the availability of the army appeared to take pressure off efforts to reform the police-justice system. Critics argued that tools other than repression are more effective against organized crime, such as better intelligence, tax administration, asset forfeiture, and the like. Human rights and decriminalization of drugs were immediate and top-priority issues.21 Both camps stuck to their respective positions throughout 2011. Politicians and the public looked toward the 2012 presidential succession as the likely chance for significant change. The presidential candidates emphasized reducing the violence. They spoke in general terms about partial measures, for example, to rely more on intelligence than force, to focus on crimes that most affect the public, such as kidnapping and extortion, or to promote job creation and education. President Calderón’s party suffered an even worse defeat in the July 2012 presidential elections. Enrique Peña Nieto, presidential candidate of a coalition of the PRI and PVEM, won with 38.2 percent of the vote, giving him a margin of 6.6 points over López Obrador, candidate of the PRD in a center-left coalition. Josefina Vázquez Mota of the PAN finished a distant third with 25.4 percent, continuing the party’s slide downward from the 2006 presidential election (35.9 percent) and the 2009 midterms (28 percent). PAN’s poor showing was due largely to public fatigue with criminal violence, continuing high unemployment, and a weak campaign. PRI fell short of a majority in congress, however, and would need to form a governing coalition or ad hoc policy coalitions. The stage was set for three more years of divided government. What was really at stake in the debates about escalating violence and government anti-crime strategies? A complex and inefficient federal

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7

system of government, further divided among competing parties and penetrated by criminal interests, was engaged in a contest with even more fragmented criminal groups for the support of civil society in various regions of the country. This ongoing process of competitive state-making will shape the nature of Mexico’s emerging democracy.22 What will be the balance of influence between formal legality and an ethical, effective police-justice-regulatory system versus a corrupted and ineffective system manipulated by particular interests, especially criminal groups? Mexico is a large, complex country, and we should expect a variety of different patterns to emerge in different regions. But if the overall balance tips against legality, Mexico’s security trap will deepen. The Nature of Security Traps

This book is about the politics of crime in Mexico. Politics is about power and choice. Power consists of many different properties, including violence, intimidation, money, votes, knowledge, propaganda, and legitimacy, among others. Apart from violence and intimidation, criminal groups employ power in a variety of ways to influence government agencies and the public. Governments have numerous power capabilities that can be expressed in policies and programs. The consequences of those actions, in turn, shape decisions that guide the behavior of citizens as individuals and as members of groups in civil society. The struggle plays out in many arenas. Short term politics is highly uncertain, with clashes among armed groups, widespread criminal violence, and corruption. In the long term, the question is what kind of democracy will take shape in Mexico? The focus is on “citizen security” as a subset of the broader notion of “human security.” “While human security addresses forms of vulnerability that compromise the enjoyment of human rights in general, citizen security refers to specific types of vulnerability—those caused by violence and dispossession—and to the protection of a ‘hard core’ of fundamental rights” (Casas-Zamora 2013, p. 2). The main concern is the ways that crime and violence erode the bundle of rights that citizens ought to enjoy in a democracy. In comparative perspective, Mexico in the early 21st century confronts a potent mix of crime, violence, and corruption, with an unusual degree of open confrontation among DTOs and between these groups and the government’s security forces. But variations on the mix present significant challenges to countries throughout the region. The transitions toward markets and democracy in Latin America and the

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Caribbean in the last quarter of the 20th century were accompanied by a third transition toward heightened public insecurity. With some notable exceptions, varieties of crime and criminal violence increased significantly in most of the countries in the region from the early 1980s into the 21st century. In terms of homicide rates as of 2010, Latin America and the Caribbean rank as the world’s second most violent region.23 Of the nineteen Latin American countries evaluated in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perception Index, sixteen ranked in the bottom two-thirds, with only Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica appearing in the top quarter.24 My sense is that the citizen security situation in the region continued to deteriorate in the first decade of the 21st century. The widely-followed Latinobarómetro, an annual opinion survey, reports that two issues have dominated in the region since 1995: unemployment and crime (delincuencia). The 2007 Latinobarómetro, for example, reported that crime tied with unemployment as the public’s leading concern (20 to 18 percent). The perception that crime was the principal problem in the region rose from nine percent in 2004 to a peak of 27 percent in 2010 (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2010, p. 12), reflecting perhaps the severity of the 2008-09 economic recession. With 35 percent citing crime as the most important problem, Mexico ranked sixth from the top among the 18 countries surveyed, below fifth-place Argentina (37 percent) and tied with Guatemala (ibid., p. 17). Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project series also suggests deterioration. Its crime victimization item asks, “Have you been the victim of a criminal act in the past twelve months?” With 25.9 percent responding affirmatively in the 2010 poll, Mexico stood as third-worst among the 18 countries surveyed, above only Peru and Venezuela (31.1 and 26.2 percent respectively) and slightly below El Salvador and Ecuador (24.1 and 24.5 percent respectively). Sixteen of the countries surveyed showed deterioration between 2008 and 2010. Only Chile and Uruguay showed improvement.25 In the World Economic Forum’s periodic global surveys of businesses conducted between 2008 and 2011, most of the Latin American countries ranked in the bottom one-third with respect to the cost burden imposed by ordinary crime and ranged between six and nine of the 10 lowest countries. A similar pattern appeared with respect to organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering or extortion). Mexico consistently figured among the bottom 10 countries on both items, ranking 136th of the 139 countries surveyed in 2011 with respect to organized crime. The central puzzle is: Why are many of the region’s countries mired in “security traps” in which crime, violence, corruption, and impunity

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become mutually reinforcing in civil society, state, and regime, and override efforts to build ethical democratic governance? Viewed in the regional context, in what respects do democracy and markets both ameliorate and reinforce the traps? Related questions include: Why is there such a strong inertial quality to security traps? That is, once caught in a trap, why do so few countries find escape routes while the majority do not? What are some visible symptoms of a security trap? • Young people join the police less to serve the public than to get opportunities for illegal incomes; • Police cadets receive training in ethics and human rights but are socialized into corrupt, abusive behavior on the job; • The public distrusts the police, which hampers the police’s effectiveness, which further undermines public trust; • Informal markets that sell stolen or counterfeit products are generally tolerated, even supported, by the public; • Vehicles smuggled into a country on a large scale are “legalized” with license plates stolen from government inventories; • Taxpayers evade taxes because of poor services, which undermines state capacity to improve services; • Journalists wear ski masks at public presentations of alleged criminals for fear the criminals will be released and the government can’t protect them; • Journalists who expose corruption are silenced by violence or intimidation; • Powerful politicians go unprosecuted even for egregious misconduct; and, • US diplomats receive bonus payments to serve in a conflict zone and tend to validate the insecurity through their reporting. I’ll use a “map” to guide the analysis of the interactions of crime, violence, corruption, and impunity, and the links between these phenomena and democracy as a political regime and the state. I focus on Mexico, with comparisons drawn to other countries in the region to help identify what is distinctive and what is typical about the Mexican case. In capsule form, my argument is that the majority of the Latin American countries are trapped in a low-level equilibrium in which problems of insecurity interact with weak, inefficient—even predatory—judicial and regulatory institutions and constitute major causes of poor quality democracy. Of course, insecurity is not the only cause of poor quality

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governance. Other factors include party-electoral arrangements that insulate policy-makers and disrupt policy continuity, inefficient bureaucracies, and clientelism. In framing these issues, I try to explain the equilibrium between citizen security and democratic governance.26 Each of the components that make up the equilibrium is also a complex set of variables. As with any analysis, we need to draw boundaries to make the scope of inquiry manageable. In the case of citizen security, I emphasize crime, corruption, violence, and impunity. With respect to democratic governance, I refer not only how power is achieved and the rules of the game (democratic regime) but also the exercise of power within a legal framework to address issues of priority concern to the citizenry (Mazzuca 2010). Put positively by Mainwaring and Scully (2010, p.1), “Successful democratic governance is successful governance within a democracy; it refers to the government’s and state’s ability to deliver goods and guarantee rights that are important for citizen well-being, within the rules and institutions of a democracy.” Among the most important of these goods is citizen security. These complex variables interact in an equilibrium in which causation flows both ways: crime, corruption, and violence affect behavior of regime and state; and, in reverse direction, regime and state behavior can both foster and deter crime, corruption, and violence. Mexico and most of the Latin American countries function at varying levels of a low equilibrium in which symptoms of insecurity operate on a comparatively large scale and interact with civil society, regime, and state to produce a degraded, poor quality democratic governance. Further, the low-level equilibrium is characterized by strong inertia. Once events start a country along a low-equilibrium path, a variety of mechanisms operate to reproduce negative behavior and to resist significant reforms. Focusing on Mexico, the principal comparisons are drawn with “upper-end” cases in Latin America that have stronger institutions and a higher equilibrium of citizen security, such as Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, and those at the lower end, a larger set including, for example, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Ecuador, and Paraguay. Mexico tends toward the middle on various measures. What sets it apart is comparatively low public confidence in the police-justice system, higher levels of perceived non-compliance with the law, and the destructive force of wealthy, savvy, hyper-violent DTOs. My emphasis on crime and insecurity addresses the broader conversation about rule of law. As Larry Diamond (2008, p. 183) notes in his global survey of democracy, “More than anything else, democracy

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in Latin America continues to be degraded and disfigured by weak rule of law.” Democratic rule of law includes various elements: government agents and institutions are bound by the law and held accountable by courts, regulatory agencies, and civil society; citizens have access to courts or arbitration mechanisms to resolve conflicts among themselves; a culture of lawfulness, in which citizens value legality and participate in making and implementing laws, holds. Above all, there is respect for the state’s law and a disposition to comply with it. “It is far from a tautology to say that the rule of law is the rule of rules, an equilibrium reached by players who accept governance by rule, regardless of their effects” (Bergman 2009a, p. 238). Legal compliance is fundamental. But we should recognize as well that the state’s law is a product of politics and thus biased in favor of some groups over others. To some degree, the bias is written into the law itself. To an even greater extent, the bias emerges in the administration of justice, where the wealthy and powerful can manipulate justice for personal, partisan, or group purposes. Here, I underline the central importance of impunity, a term with two connotations. First, the wealthy, politically influential, military, and police-justice agents typically are above the law. Second, the justice system does not work. Only a tiny fraction of those who commit criminal acts are prosecuted and sanctioned; and the system also imprisons many who are awaiting trial and may be innocent. Citizen security is central to democratic governance and rule of law because some minimal level of order and legality is required to promote trust among citizens that rules apply to all and are enforced universally. Without this threshold level of order and legality, the incentives to defect, that is, to evade taxes, ignore regulations, and break the law can easily override an ethic of compliance and civic virtue. Procedural democracy may function in the limited sense of elite competition in periodic elections that are run transparently. But as Diane Davis (2010, p. 36) bluntly puts it: “Forget big ideas about democracy and about how the electoral rules of the game will lead to improvement in people’s everyday lives.” Whole series of additional routines are played out in daily life that involve making a living, protecting family and friends, and navigating the labyrinths of public and private bureaucracies. In the absence of general rules that are perceived to be universally enforced by a competent police-justice system, these routines reward cheating and deceit. At some point, the gap between democratic ideal and daily life can reach a point that citizens may defect in a variety of ways or be willing to surrender something of the democratic ideal for promises of greater security.27

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

Students of citizen security quickly find that the literatures on crime, corruption, and violence are unevenly developed and not systematically interconnected among themselves, or with democratic governance. Violence has long been of considerable scholarly interest, with excellent work on state formation, guerrilla movements, and authoritarian repression, for example.28 Some recent scholarship offers useful analytical frameworks to understand more subtle uses of violence in everyday politics.29 We also have a robust literature on corruption, with a new generation of scholarship on the region (Morris and Blake 2009). Crime in the mainstream is largely dealt with in the extensive work on “rule of law,” usually focused on judicial reform (Carothers 2006). However, we lack useful studies on the political effects of crime in the sense of widespread, diffuse acts or as organized enterprises, whether violent or nonviolent, in relation to civil society, regime, and state. The task remains to integrate aspects of these literatures in a systematic way with democracy as a regime embedded in state institutions and civil society. Another challenge is scarcity of useful data. To paraphrase sociologist Marcelo Bergman: We don’t have a lot of information about these topics, and much of what we have is wrong.30 By their nature, corrupt exchanges are typically hidden, although their consequences may be evident. Crime and violence may be hidden or visible, but their manifestations and measurement can be distorted, often deliberately. If definition and measurement of crime tendencies within a country is challenging, efforts to measure trends across countries is even more daunting. Legal definitions are inconsistent; governments manipulate their crime statistics; and media coverage distorts “real” trends. Ironically, however, if we lack good data on crime and criminals, we know arguably less about uniformed (preventive) police and next to nothing about investigative (plain clothes) police, prosecuting attorneys and judges, or criminal defense attorneys.31 The universe of private security agencies and personnel, typically more numerous than their public counterparts, is least explored. Apart from their appalling degree of overcrowding and violence, we also know little about prisons. Perversely, these institutions are often the best organized link in the criminal justice system due to inmate control. They play important roles in day-to-day criminal enterprises, and in socializing and networking prisoners to take up more “advanced” types of criminal pursuits upon their release. For these reasons and others, citizen security is problemdriven work; we lack sufficient data and mainstream theory to build on, and our “epistemic community” is only recently emerging.

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

13

The Argument Summarized

History matters. The story about security traps hardly begins with the rise of populism in the 1940s and 50s, or with the dual political and economic transitions in the 1970s and 80s. I locate the origins of low equilibrium at the founding of Latin American nation-states in the early 19th century. Furthermore, at certain critical junctures in their histories, it was reinforced by structural factors, such as extreme inequality of wealth and income, widespread poverty, unemployment and informality, and poor-quality or corrupt leadership. Weak formal institutions were penetrated by robust but negative informal institutions, especially personalism and clientelism, that undermined norms of citizenship and legality (O’Donnell 2001). Memories and attitudes that reinforce distrust in government have been reproduced across generations through childhood and adult socialization. Path dependence helps explain the inertia of institutions and behavior (North 1990; Pierson 2000). In general terms, the new nationstates gained independence with low levels of what might be called democratic civic culture and engagement, and high levels of political instability and internal violence. These states were weak, with quite limited government penetration of civil society, high levels of corruption, and weak republican virtues in both civil society and political leadership. The region experienced limited interstate war but extensive internal violence. Also, by and large, the region played marginal roles in the major social revolutions: liberal, scientific, technological, industrial and financial. These eras marked significant transformations that shaped modern economies, bureaucracies, and state practices elsewhere in Asia, Europe, and the North Atlantic. Mexico, and most of the Latin American states, was unable to extract resources at sufficient rates to fund basic public functions: infrastructure investment, education, health, and welfare. Mine is not so much the too-familiar cultural argument, but rather a case in which varieties of institutional mechanisms reproduced learned ways of coping by diverse societal groups. In contrast to cultural arguments, my interest is to account for variations across countries in the security-democracy equilibrium. Politics, markets, institutions, and values account for low equilibrium. Mexico benefits enormously from a general public commitment to democracy, a coherent party system, and a capable, experienced political class. Its broad populist consensus of the 1940s70s, however, was shattered by the profound transitions of the 1980s and 90s, and a new consensus has not yet emerged. Crime and corruption appeared to escalate in the last years of the PRI-government hegemony

14

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

(roughly 1976-2000), and then to accelerate further in the democratic transition (Davis 2010). With respect to illicit drug markets, Mexico has been a major supplier of marijuana and opium to the United States since the 1930s. Beginning in the mid 1980s, it became the major transshipment route to the United States for cocaine from South America. In the 1990s, it became a principal supplier of synthetic drugs. The most important developments of the 1990s and 2000s are the rapid growth of Mexico’s internal market for these substances, the penetration by DTOs into the formal and informal markets, and their diversification into other forms of criminality, such as kidnapping, extortion, and human trafficking. The power of the DTOs feeds on resources that grow out of this context, including enormous flows of money, weapons, and skilled specialists such as gunmen, communications experts, lawyers, and the like. The key state institutions that confront criminality are the police and justice system. The police are indeed the “state on the streets” (Hinton 2006). They are the agents the public interacts with on a daily basis. They are charged with protecting citizens and maintaining legal order. The criminal justice system, taken as the interacting chain from police, prosecuting and defense attorneys, through judges, prison administrators, and rehabilitation workers, is the law in practice. If the public perceives the police and justice system as effective and lawregarding, a sense of confidence contributes to citizen security. If the system’s “referees” do their job to detect and punish defectors, then citizens have greater incentives to play by the rules. In the case of Mexico, more than most other Latin American countries, the police and justice system are held in low esteem. The result is widespread attitudes of distrust and of weak compliance with the law. The remainder of the introduction focuses on three core problems and on two central “deficits” that form the foundations of low equilibrium in the case of Mexico and other countries in the region. The first problem is that, in the wake of dual political-economic transition of the 1980s, Mexico lacks an effective “political settlement” or a social pact about the role of government in promoting economic development and distributing wealth and income. The lack of such fundamental agreement undermines government legitimacy. The second problem is that the party-electoral system effectively insulates governing elites from public pressures to address insecurity. The third is the slow pace of reform of the police-justice system. We shall find repeated cycles of citizen protest against violent crime—often on massive scale—that run up against an unresponsive party-electoral system. And even when

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

15

elected officials respond, they encounter an unresponsive police-justice system. The two deficits are in compliance with the law and confidence in institutions, especially the police-justice system. The absence of a basic social pact undermines the public’s voluntary compliance with the state’s law and reinforces distrust of the police-justice system. These factors, in turn, create conditions in which armed criminal organizations can acquire the power to corrupt and confront state authorities. Problem 1: The Missing Social Contract

Bresser Pereira and Nakano (1998, pp. 21-22) propose what they call the “missing-social-contract-hypothesis.” They suggest that “in developing countries, where [the social contract] is weak and reflects limited social consensus, a development-oriented political pact is required as a substitute.” Mexico, along with other countries in Latin America, is experiencing the trauma of a dual political-economic transition away from an authoritarian regime and closed economy toward political democracy and greater openness to external trade and investment. Mexican political elites have not succeeded in forging a neo-liberal political pact to replace the long-standing populist contract. The absence of a new contract contributes to limited public confidence in political institutions and to low compliance with the state’s law. Limited confidence and compliance create incentives for alegality (indifference toward the law) and illegality (intentional law-breaking). With respect to a fragile political settlement, Mexico is typical of much of the region. Perry et al. (2007, pp. 12-13) suggest that a weak social contract in Latin America is seen in: . . . the inability of the state to redress the long-standing high inequality, in the weak rule of law, in the sometimes large share of undocumented citizenry, or in the recurrent bouts of macroeconomic instability. For example, high inequality of incomes and power is correlated with informality and is often associated with weak institutions and state capture by both elites and organized segments of the middle class. State capture leads to the generalized perception that the state is run for the benefit of the few, and thus it reinforces a social norm of noncompliance with taxes and regulations, what might be dubbed a “culture of informality.” Noncompliance is then further compounded by the suspicion that others are not complying either—an absence of what is termed “strong reciprocity”—which, in turn makes enforcement even more difficult.

16

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

In brief, from the 1930s into the 1970s, Mexico’s political elites developed a potent form of populism in which a powerful presidency ruled through a hegemonic party, the PRI, and an extensive central government bureaucracy.32 The “state project,” to put it that way, was to stabilize the political system and centralize rule in the aftermath of the catastrophic Revolution of 1910-29. Much simplified, the mechanics of rule involved presidential control over the PRI, which in turn monopolized access to elected and appointed offices through managed elections. The development strategy centered on import-substitution industrialization (ISI), through which the central government administered a lengthy menu of instruments, including tax incentives, import quotas, and subsidized credit, to promote domestic industry and commercial agriculture. The state project and development strategy delivered stability with robust growth from the mid 1940s into the mid 1970s. Success, in turn, bolstered a potent legitimacy formula of “revolutionary nationalism”: economic growth, modernization, social justice, patriotism, and competent governance. The social contract was based on acceptance of authoritarian rule in exchange for progress and a better future in a viable, coherent country. Beginning in the mid 1970s, Mexico—like other countries in the region—began to experience the limits of ISI. For example, due to population size and income inequality, the internal market was too small to support economies of scale in basic industries. This challenge, and the absence of a robust research and development capacity, led to inefficiencies, limited innovation and poor quality products, and the general inability of Mexico’s industries to compete in global markets. In fiscal policy, light taxation—also part of the populist pact—meant that the central government was unable to finance ambitious development and welfare projects, and it relied increasingly on oil revenues and foreign borrowing. In effect, the populist project of revolutionary nationalism was unviable by the time the financial crisis of 1982 erupted and Mexico entered the “lost decade” of nearly zero annual GDP growth. The tectonic shift to open Mexico’s markets began under President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and was accelerated under Carlos Salinas (1988-94). Countries that make the shift typically experience dislocations as protected industries are downsized or fail and as government workforces are pared and social subsidies reduced in order to bring fiscal deficits under control. Mexico’s trauma was multiplied by the so-called “Tequila crisis” of 1994-96, in which the overall economy contracted by 6.2 percent and the 2009 recession, in which it contracted by 6.5 percent.

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

17

Mexico’s transition to political democracy progressed more slowly than the market transition. Though its roots can be traced to limited electoral reforms in the late 1970s, the process gained momentum under Salinas, who was pressed by civil society and the specter of instability in 1994. That year witnessed the Zapatista rebellion in January and highprofile political assassinations in March and September. By good fortune, the creation of an independent Federal Electoral Institute and the administration of credible elections provided a political escape valve. An opposition party coalition won a majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, and Vicente Fox of the PAN won the presidency in 2000. Both the market and democratic transitions are incomplete. Change proceeds at different tempos in both realms, creating tensions and contradictions. Sales of state-owned enterprises, for example, transitioned in some cases into private sector monopolies or oligopolies. Education reform, essential to increase productivity, was blocked until 2013 by the massive teachers’ union, itself a vestige of the old regime. Mass media scramble to compete for survival in the marketplace. With their new freedom, they report audacious corruption and horrific criminal violence. The police-justice system, however, lags far behind. The public perceives that scandals and crimes go uninvestigated or that cases crawl through the courts, often disappearing altogether. In terms of a legitimacy formula or social pact, the old populist settlement that provided nationalism, growth, welfare, and the image of competent governance lingers strongly in some sectors of the population. The new credo of modernization and democracy appeals in the abstract, but broad and deep adherence requires effective leadership and performance, especially with respect to economic growth, job creation, and the provision of public safety. Nostalgia for strong leadership was a factor in Peña Nieto’s victory in 2012. Also, the perception that the Fox administration had manipulated the 2006 elections reinforced alienation. As the frustrated loser, López Obrador could denounce the government as corrupt and decrepit (caduco) and tell his followers, “To hell with their institutions!”33 Problem 2: The Party-Electoral System Disconnect

In principle, the party-electoral system in a democracy ought to serve as a kind of transmission belt to convey voters’ concerns to elected officials and to hold them accountable. With the PAN, PRD, and PRI at the center of its strong three-plus party system, Mexico benefits from more coherent and stable arrangements than, for example, Ecuador,

18

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

Peru, or Bolivia. On the other hand, a number of legal-institutional and attitudinal factors act to distance policy-makers from the electorate. At the legal-institutional level, the most important factor is no reelection for mayors, governors, the president, or members of assemblies. Those serving three-year terms (mayors, municipal and state assembly members, and federal deputies) face steep learning curves with uncertainty about their short-term futures; those with six-year terms (state governors, federal senators, and the president) fare slightly better. The effects of no-reelection at the municipal level are especially evident. Incoming mayors (presidentes municipales) typically install their own teams, including the head of the municipal police, usually disregarding the experience and reform attempts of their predecessors. New police chiefs, in turn, generally organize their departments on the basis of personal loyalty rather than professional merit (Sabet 2012). State governors operate with a similar logic and effect. There is also a kind of “double disconnect” at the level of issue representation. Bruhn and Greene (2009, p. 110) report that the three main parties “. . . have been ideologically polarized since at least 1979, two years after electoral reforms helped intensify partisan competition.” Based on survey data, they found that in the run-up to the 2006 national elections, PAN and PRD candidates for the chamber of deputies were polarized along the same issue-dimensions as their respective presidential candidates and that their issue stances were important to their decision to run under one or the other party label. They also found that party elites are much more polarized than voters, whether measured by national-level differences or issue stances within congressional districts. They conclude that candidates for the chamber of deputies lack popular mandates for their issue positions (ibid., pp. 110-111). Three other factors help explain the weak connections between voters’ concerns and the policy-making machinery. First, until 2012, the parties held a legal monopoly on access to the ballot. They didn’t worry about a voter rebellion through write-in candidates or referendums. Voter discontent registered as abstention or blank ballots was not an obvious concern to elected officials. In the blunt words of Luis Rubio (2013, p. 20), “Once they are voted in, politicians feel neither obliged to cater to the voters nor do they care what happens to their constituents.” In principle, the political reforms of 2012 authorized independent candidates and referendums, but their implementation and adoption by the states remain to be seen.34 Second, party leaders at the national and state levels wield considerable influence through control over the generous subsidies provided by national and state electoral institutes and over nominations to proportional representation seats.35 Ambitious

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

19

politicians run a risk if they stray too far from the party line. Those elected by proportional representation, for example 200 of the 500 federal deputies, are even less accountable to their constituents than those elected from single-member districts. The effect is even greater at the municipal level, where the mayor and council members run as candidates on the same ballot. Third, Mexico’s electoral calendar scatters state- and local-level elections throughout the sexenio, and the national-level leaders’ focus on winning the next election frequently complicates negotiations on substantive policy. For example, a possible PAN-PRD alliance in a particular state to defeat a PRI gubernatorial candidate can block compromises on tax reforms in the national congress. The overall effect is that party politics is less about problem-solving than about successful maneuvering to win elections to reward party loyalists. It remains a game run by party leaders largely for their own benefit. Efforts to elevate citizen security above party maneuvering by making it a “state policy” (política de estado), typically fail. And the capacity of government to act effectively without such a pact is substantially limited. An entrenched party-electoral system has the effect of reinforcing interest group and clientele support webs that link local-level actors to national party organs and these in turn to congressional and executive policy-makers. At least some of these webs reach into criminal organizations. Further, entrenched parties effectively block independent candidates who might have incentives to cultivate alternative bases of support in competition with existing clientele webs. Independent candidates in turn might have greater incentives and possibilities to pursue reform agendas (Moncada 2013). Problem 3: Slow Reform of Police-Justice System

Police and justice officials are the front-line actors in citizen security. They’re absolutely necessary, even if they aren’t sufficient to address the problem. In a complex federal system, Mexico’s 40,000 or so national-level police focus mainly on organized crime of various types, while the roughly 350,000 state and local police deal with the whole range of crime, from traffic infractions to homicide. Given the decades of neglect and impunity, the very scope of the challenge to create an ethical, competent, and reliable force is overwhelming. Setting aside all the technical complexities, the key challenges stem from institutional culture and market forces. Anthropologist María Eugenia Suárez de Garay (2006) uses the concept “parallel institutionalism” (doble institucionalidad) to contrast the informal culture that guides police

20

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

behavior as opposed to their public face. The informal culture promotes personal loyalty of officers to their superiors and tolerates illegality and corruption. That culture resists efforts toward professionalism. Thus, for example, police cadets may be adequately trained in techniques and proper ethics but typically are “resocialized” into the internal culture.36 Market incentives toward corruption operate strongly as poorly paid officers with meager job benefits respond to bribes. But given the force of inertia, it’s not evident that even substantial salary increases would offset culture and markets. Justice reform is a catch-all term to refer to chain of agencies that begins with the pivotal role of the prosecuting attorney (ministerio público). This executive branch official combines the functions of investigator and prosecutor and operates with considerable autonomy. Farther along the chain, and in its own constitutional branch, are judicial staff and judges, and technical specialists of various types. Prison administration and social rehabilitation are executive branch functions. It’s a vast understatement to say that the world of justice reform is dense, with lots of moving parts and varieties of deeply ingrained cultures. To attempt to reform selected pieces of the police-justice system in normal conditions in a few locales and on a pilot basis is a formidable task. To launch a whole-scale reform of the system in the midst of a security crisis, which the Calderón administration attempted after 2007, merits the term “perfect storm,” in the words of a supreme court justice.37 Deficits in Trust and Compliance

Central to citizen security is the citizenry’s trust in the police and judiciary, as well as their overall compliance with the law. Figure 1.1 reports the percentage of respondents in the Latinobarómetro in 2005 and 2010 who indicate some or a lot of confidence in their country’s judicial system.38 Uruguay and Costa Rica rank high, as we would expect; Venezuela is a surprise. On confidence in this institution, Mexico ranks just below the regional average but ahead of four other countries. Confidence in the police, however, is a different matter. As Shown in Figure 1.2, Mexico ranks near the bottom, just ahead of Guatemala. Again, Uruguay fares well, as does Chile. Colombia's high ranking probably reflects perceptions of the police reforms implemented there in the 1990s. Honduras is the surprise.

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

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Figure 1.1 Confidence in the Judiciary in Selected Latin American Countries

70

Percentage

60

2005 2010

50 40 30 20 10 0 Uruguay

Brazil

Costa Rica Venezuela

LatAm Average

Mexico Guatemala Nicaragua Ecuador

Peru

Country/Region

Would you say that you have a lot, some, a little, or no confidence in the (judicial power) in your country? Percentage who indicate “a lot” or “some.” Source: Latinobarómetro 2005, 2010.

The point to underline is the critical role of the police and judiciary as arbiters of civil society and the political system. With a few notable exceptions, the region as a whole shows relatively little confidence in these two institutions, and Mexico scores toward the lower end of the countries surveyed. We may find that Mexicans’ negative perceptions of their police and judiciary are at odds with other objective measures, but perceptions shape attitudes and behavior. Weak trust and confidence in the police and judiciary reinforce a civic culture of alegality, which, in turn, creates a context that tolerates illegality.39 Weak trust in police and judiciary is consistent with Mexico’s ranking near the bottom with regard to citizens’ compliance with the law, as shown in Figure 1.3. Here again we’re dealing with perceptions, and Mexicans were telling interviewers that they saw relatively little legal compliance by their fellow citizens. Uruguay and Chile again ranked at the top and showed substantial increases between 2005 and 2010.

22

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

Figure 1.2 Confidence in the Police in Selected Latin American Countries

60

2005 2010

Percentage

50 40 30 20 10 0 Uruguay

Chile

Venezuela Panama

LatAm Average

Argentina

Bolivia

Mexico

Peru

Country/Region

Would you say that you have a lot, some, a little, or no confidence in the police? Percentage who indicate “a lot” or “some.” Source: Latinobarómetro 2005, 2010.

Figure 1.3 Citizen Compliance with the Law in Selected Latin American Countries 70

Percentage

60

2005

2010

50 40 30 20 10 0 Chile

Uruguay

Colombia

Honduras

LatAm Average

Domnican Republic

Bolivia

Mexico

Guatemala

Country/Region

Do you comply with the law a lot, some, a little, or never? Percentage who indicated “a lot” or “some.” Source: Latinobarómetro 2005, 2010.

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

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As we proceed to examine varieties of crime and their relationships to democratic governance, I would emphasize the negative attitudes in Mexico with respect to judiciary, police, and compliance with the law weigh upon governments that try to implement institutional reforms to improve citizen security. Institutions need to outperform citizens’ expectations for some time in order to raise the equilibrium. Plan of the Book

Table 1.1 is an analytical “map” of the book. It depicts linkages between types of crime and corruption (violence is implied in many of these) and the society and political system. The horizontal axis left to right depicts the political nature of the criminal act. The act may affect civil and economic society (e.g., blue-collar offenses such as auto repair fraud, violent crimes such as armed robbery) with little apparent political relevance. An act becomes “political” as it affects behavior by public officials in terms of specific decisions or applications of a policy (e.g., bribery). Political salience increases as the act affects the regime and state. Thus, in successive levels, crime can affect the individual state agent or agency and a particular decision or policy; at a higher level, crime can damage the regime through its effects on the procedural guarantees; and in its most serious forms, it can undermine the state through its effects on basic state institutions and functions.40 The vertical axis depicts the organizational complexity of the act, from simple-individual to complex-organized. Note that Table 1.1 refers to criminal acts and not to specific actors. Further, I have in mind here the intended target of the act and not possible wider effects of the act. We shall find a rough correspondence between the nature of acts and types of actors that commit them. Organizationally, simple acts are typically carried out by single individuals or by small, spontaneous groups. Diffuse crime, however, should not be considered somehow less important for the polity. If the behavior is widespread, e.g., tax or regulatory evasion, their cumulative effects can be quite significant. Criminal acts at the middle range of complexity tend to be committed by larger and better-coordinated, continuous groups, taking us into the terrain of organized crime. The most complex crimes, in the sense of extension of organization, occur at the national and transnational levels. Also, the figure is composed to differentiate between nonviolent financial and regulatory offenses (far left column) and those that suggest violence against persons or institutions (the second column).

POLITICAL NATURE OF CRIMINAL ACT!

Simple

ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF CRIMINAL ACT!

Complex!

Source: Author’s elaboration

Public Official/ Public Party

Democratic Regime

State

Economic

Civil Society

Informal Underground, Tax & Regulatory Evasion, White Collar, Blue Collar, Capital Flight

Domestic Violence, Homicide, Assault, Rape, Armed Robbery, Theft, Traffic Violations

Simple Bribery, Intimidation, Police Regulatory Extortion, Agent Corruption

Intimidation, Corruption, Election Violation, Individual Civil Disobedience

Terrorism, Treason, Assassination, Individual Intimidation / Corruption of Judiciary, Army, Police

Informal / Underground, Tax & Regulatory Evasion, Money Laundering, Corporate Crime, Capital Flight

Gambling, Prostitution, Drug Distribution, Cargo Hijacking, Carjacking, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery, Extortion / Protection

Complex Bribery, Intimidation, Civil Disobedience, Police Regulatory Extortion

Intimidation, Corruption, Election Violation, Group Civil Disobedience

Terrorism, Sedition / Treason, Regional Rebellion, Vigilantism, Corruption / Intimidation of Regional Judiciary, Army, Police

National / International Cartel Price-Fixing, Tax & Regulatory Evasion, Money Laundering, Capital Flight

International Smuggling, Extortion / Protection

Complex Bribery, Intimidation, Group Corruption

Election Violation, Large Scale Corruption / Intimidation, Large Scale Civil Disobedience

Terrorism, Sedition / Treason, Vigilantism, Mutiny, Corruption / Intimidation of National Judiciary, Army, Police

bailey-p24-qu_Layout 1 12/10/13 3:39 PM Page 1

Table 1.1: Crime, Regime, and State

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In a security trap, problems of crime, violence, and corruption originate both in civil society and in state and regime. Thus, we need to read Table 1.1 in both directions: from left to right to consider criminality that originates in economic and civil society and affects state actors; then in reverse direction to consider how regime and state actors might affect civil society. To illustrate, we might differentiate among three main clusters of criminal acts: (1) crimes that “cross the line” and directly target regime and state; (2) crimes that imply strongly corruptive or intimidating effects on elected or appointed officials or on police, regulators and judiciary; and, (3) crimes that do not attack regime and state directly, nor seek to bribe or intimidate, but whose cumulative effects undermine democratic governance. Crimes against the regime attack the logic and mechanics of electoral competition, responsiveness of governments to electorates, and protection of essential rights. The acts, running from simple through complex, are the corruption and/or intimidation of elected or appointed officials with respect to electoral processes, rule-making, and the policyrelevant levels of rule-implementation, the level of administrative appointees that connects elected officials to the administrative apparatus.41 The most common problems are intimidation and/or corruption, which can take multiple forms and can be carried out by single individuals or by continuous and coherent groups of widely varying dimensions. The corruption can be technically illegal or fall in some ethical gray zone. Their common targets are voters, candidates for office, election processes, legislators and legislative procedures, and higher-level elected or appointed officials. The targets can range from villages and special districts to the national government. Civil disobedience is particularly interesting and complex, as we’ll see in Chapter 3. Where formal political institutions lack strong legitimacy, compliance with the law is low, and governments fail to “deliver the goods” in terms of economic growth, employment, and the like, citizens routinely disobey in a variety of ways. They take to the streets, stage sit-ins, throw rocks, block highways, burn buses, and take public officials hostage. Governments routinely define these acts as criminal, and some quarters of civil society might agree with their governments. But those who engage in disobedience typically view it as normal politics by other means. Votes and petitions don’t produce the desired results, so direct action is justified. In effect, if the city won’t supply water to our neighborhood, let’s block the main highway or bathe our kids in the fountains of the central plaza. Civil disobedience becomes highly contested terrain where a variety of claims with varying validity are registered. Further, civil disobedience can easily become

26

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

connected to other forms of criminality. Street thugs can be useful rockthrowers in the front ranks of a protest march; criminal organizations can finance human rights protests in order to impede repression by military and police forces; and politicians typically maneuver to manipulate civic protests to the disadvantage of their adversaries. Crimes against the state involve acts aimed to undermine or destroy state attributes (e.g., national boundaries, sovereignty) or functions (e.g., monopoly of internal coercion; administration of justice). Terrorism is a repertoire of acts intended to undermine or destroy the state; sedition is the encouragement of rebellion and treason is its commission. The crimes can be directed to support enemy states or to mobilize violent oppositions internally. They can be authored by single individuals or complex-continuous groups, be these citizens, foreigners, or transnational combinations. Corruption and/or intimidation can be crimes against the state when they target the state’s coercive forces (army, police, and intelligence) or its agents of justice (regulators, prosecutors, courts, public defenders, and the like). Vigilantism is a special case of extra-legal coercion. It can be spontaneous or organized and can take various forms: “popular justice” meted out in shantytowns or hinterlands, death squads that target political or social “undesirables,” or private armies or varying size and strength. Rebellion concerns concerted violence against the state. This can take the form of spontaneous resistance, e.g., urban riots, or irregular warfare, such as guerrilla movements. Finally, mutiny is the special case of rebellion by the state’s armed forces. The second category, crimes that imply strongly corruptive or intimidating effects on elected or appointed officials or on police, regulators and judiciary, differ from crimes against regime and state. The purpose of these second-category crimes is not to affect regime or state but to protect or promote informal, underground or illegal activities. Simple exchanges suggest single individuals or small, spontaneous groups who bribe or intimidate police or regulators. The category also includes rogue police and regulators who extort civil and economic activity, be this legal, informal, underground or illegal (in the terms discussed above). Due to its greater corrupting capacity, the category becomes more significant at the intermediate and complex levels. Informal and underground activities become larger, more visible, and more attractive targets of exploitation by police and regulators. Illegal activities become better organized, more continuous, and more profitable. Since they are larger-scale and continuous, the bribery or intimidation affects police and regulatory agencies more broadly. At this level, law-breakers who

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are arrested or cited have greater potential to corrupt the successive stages of judicial or regulatory administration. The third category of interest from Table 1.1 is crimes that do not attack regime or state directly, nor seek to bribe or intimidate, but whose cumulative effects undermine governability. Here I have in mind the disregard for law by large numbers of citizens in the course of the ordinary activities of their daily lives. Among the cumulative effects, governments may be chronically underfunded due to tax evasion, buildings collapse due to code violations, forests are harvested regardless of environmental restrictions, and traffic is snarled and hazardous. This category of behavior takes us back to civic culture, with its focus on socialization and values, and to perceptions of the regulatory capacity of the state. Table 1.1 is our guide through discussions of specific themes in subsequent chapters. Beginning in the “upper northwest,” Chapter 2 examines two “foundational” types of diffuse, nonviolent crime at the grassroots: informality and tax evasion. They are foundational because they distort the formal market economy, limit the capacity of government to implement significant reforms, and promote citizen indifference to the state’s law. Chapter 3 takes up diffuse violent crime, especially homicide, robbery, and assault, and examines civil society responses. By diffuse, I mean crimes committed mostly by individuals or by groups of two or three. Citizens can defect from the political system in different ways or they can pitch in to press for constructive change. Moving toward the south and east on the map, Chapters 4 and 5 analyze organized crime, which interacts with diffuse crime but is a different social creature that poses special threat to democratic governance. Chapter 4 covers basic analytical issues about the interactions between criminal organizations and the government, and then focuses on kidnapping as a particularly high-impact form of criminality. Chapter 5 analyzes DTOs as significant political actors. Rather than a detailed narrative of multiple trafficking gangs, I undertake a functional analysis of how trafficking works and the resulting implications for the political system. Mexico, like virtually all the countries in the region, attempts various responses to improve security, usually involving civil society in one way or another. In some cases, civil society takes the initiative, but it quickly confronts the poorquality police-justice system as the key obstacle to progress. The main reform strategies with respect to organized crime are analyzed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 identifies key variables that will promote or hinder change, considers Colombia as a model, and discusses strategies to exit Mexico’s security trap. The connecting thread through the discussion is

28

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

competitive state-making. Can state and civil society actors construct an ethical-effective police-justice system to contain the dynamic evolution of crime and corruption?

Notes 1 “O replanteamos esto o nos va a llevar a la chingada; verdaderamente la chingada.” Javier Sicilia, quoted in “Es un pleito contra la clase política,” ElUniversal.com.mx, April 8, 2011. 2 Former President Ernesto Samper, quoted in “Lucha anti-drogas no debe politizarse,” ElUniversal.com.mx, June 23, 2011. 3 “Hemos tenido legisladores que no han hecho nada más que cobrarnos y hay que mantenerlos. Y ahí está el reclamo de la gente. No nada más le reclamaban a Adame, a toda la clase política, porque se comportan como verdaderos imbéciles. Y ya estamos hasta la madre de eso, porque esa es la palabra. Estamos hasta la madre,” ElUniversal.com.mx, April 8, 2011. 4 In late December 2008, for example, the decapitated bodies of eight soldiers were discovered on the outskirts of the provincial capital of Guerrero. The “narco-sign” left behind read: “For each one [of ours] that you kill I’m going to kill 10 soldiers.” (“Decapitan en Guerrero a 9 personas,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 22, 2008). 5 “Drug Gangs Pin Up Police Hit List in Northern Mexico,” NYTimes.com, May 27, 2008. 6 ElUniversal.com.mx, May 9, 2008. 7 In a commando-style raid, hooded gunmen fired at the front doors of the Televisa affiliate in Monterrey and lobbed a hand grenade into the parking lot. No one was injured; the point was to leave a message: “Stop reporting only about us, also report about the narco-officials. This is a warning.” (“Gunmen Attack TV Offices in Mexico,” The Washington Post, January 8, 2009, p. A9) 8 “Iban contra funcionarios, dice hipótesis,” ElUniversal.com.mx, September 20, 2008. 9 “El narco mata a familia de marino,” Informador.com, November 25,2011. 10 “Cae autor de coche bomba en Juárez,” ElUniversal.com.mx, October 21, 2010. 11 An operativo usually means a group of armed men in one or several vehicles carry out a planned action in a coordinated manner. The men and vehicles may be disguised in police or military uniforms and markings. 12 “Suman ya 145 cadáveres hallados en Tamaulipas,” ElUniversal.com.mx, April 15, 2011. 13 The top anti-organized crime official of the Attorney General’s office was charged in November 2008 for aiding a DTO run by the Beltrán Leyva brothers (“Detienen a Noé Ramírez por supestos nexos con el cártel de los Beltrán Leyva,” Jornada.unam.mx, November 21, 2008), and the Federal Preventive Police’s top crime investigator was charged a month later with aiding the Sinaloa Cartel (“Amplían arraigo contra ex subdirector de la PFP, ElUniversal.com.mx, December 4, 2008”).

Security Traps and Mexico’s Democracy

29

14 In December 2006 the balance was 47/26 percent that the government had the reins; the May 11, 2008, response showed a 41/47 balance that things were getting out of control. BGC telephone survey (www.bgc.com.mx) reported in ZEMI Communications, “Mexico, Politics, and Policy,” May 20-27, 2008 (www.zemi.com). 15 Carta Paramértica, November 2010, available at: http://www.parametria. com.mx/DetalleEstudio.php?E=4252 (last accessed on November 19, 2010). 16 National-level elections are held every six years for the presidency and senate and every three years for the chamber of deputies. 17 Results from the Federal Electoral Institute reported by the Georgetown University Political Database of the Americas, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ Elecdata/Mexico/leg09.html (last accessed on October 14, 2009). 18 President Calderón emphatically denied that he authorized or even knew about army’s operation to arrest Jorge Hank Rhon in Tijuana in May 2011. “Entrevista a Felipe Calderón por Ciro Gómes Leyva,” Milenio.com, June 28, 2011. 19 “PGR se desiste de acusar al general Tomás Ángeles,” ElUniversal.com.mx, April 17, 2013. 20 The government’s position is elaborated in Chapter 6. 21 The main points of the debate are covered in de la Concha and Pina (2010) vs. Villalobos (2010). 22 See Felbab-Brown (2010) on competitive state-making. 23 According to the UNODC (2011, p. 9) “The homicide rate in Africa and the Americas (at 17 and 16 per 100,000 population respectively) is more than double the global average (6.9 per 100,000), whereas in Asia, Europe, and Oceania (between 3 and 4 per 100,000) it is roughly half. By the year 2000, the region’s homicide rate reached 27.5 (per 100,000), which is more than three times the world average of 8.8, and even higher than that of war-torn countries of Africa (22.2). Casas-Zamora (2013, p. 16) cites homicide data from 2004 that show Central and South America as slightly behind Southern Africa. 24 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009.” (http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_20 09_table) (last accessed on November 18, 2009). 25 The wording was changed in the 2010 survey, as noted in Chapter 3. 26 Bailey (2009) is an extended discussion of these issues. 27 This is the essence of Bo Rothstein’s argument (2005). 28 On state formation, see Centeno (2002), López-Alves (2000); on guerrilla movements, Wickham-Crowley (1992); and on authoritarianism, Linz (2000). 29 Auyero (2007); Arias and Goldstein (2010). 30 Conference held at the US-Mexico Center, University of California-San Diego, October 2009. 31 Dammert et al. (2007) is an important exception in providing crossnational data on the security sector of the Latin American countries. 32 Garretón et al. (2003) provide a useful general discussion of what they call the “statist-national-popular” socio-political matrix of the 1930s-1980s in Latin America. 33 “¡Que se vayan al diablo con sus instituciones!” “AMLO: Era trampa para justificar la represión,” ElUniversal.com.mx, September 2, 2006.

30

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

34 The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that congress had passed a technically flawed law. “Señalan falta en candidituras ciudadanas,” Reforma.com, November 26, 2012. 35 At the national level, 200 of the 500 members in the chamber of deputies are elected from five multi-state districts on a closed-ballot, proportional representation basis. The 32 states and Mexico City are uni-cameral systems that use hybrid single-member districts and proportional representation. Party leaders determine the placement of candidates on the PR ballots. 36 I recall in June 2008 in Monterrey, Mexico, hearing a young police cadet comment that he understood and supported legal ethics but he wondered whether his supervisors would support those ethics on the street. 37 “La tormenta (judicial) perfecta?” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 12, 2011. 38 The question asks, “Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following groups, institutions or persons mentioned on the list: a lot, some, a little or no confidence?” 39 As discussed in Chapter 2, alegality refers to citizen indifference toward the state’s law. 40 Once again we confront difficult boundary issues. One can argue that virtually all crimes have political implications. Rape can be about power; theft can be about capitalism and property; tax evasion can be civil disobedience. Ultimately the boundary rests on findings from interviews with law-breakers: What was the motivation and target of the act? Another type of boundary issue concerns the exclusion of private life (family and friendship groups) from our scope of inquiry. Caldeira (2000) makes a plausible argument that one must include, indeed emphasize, private life (e.g., domestic violence) to understand the nature of crime and violence in civil and economic society. 41 For the sake of argument, let’s assume that there is a policyadministration gradation (if not dichotomy) and that there is an identifiable layer of policy-level officers who connect the bureaucracy to the elected officials.

2 Foundational Crime: Tax Evasion and Informality

“The truth is that we have a [tax] collection rate that’s still very low…Really low. I think it’s among the lowest in Latin America in terms of GDP. It’s probably 10, 11 percent of GDP compared with an average of 17 percent in Latin America,” —President Felipe Calderón, June 20111 ”Tania Vázquez Muñoz was a businesswoman until she was wounded in a bomb explosion last Friday in Colonia Roma. Her booth on Corregidora Street carried two stocks. The visible one was cosmetics and the hidden one was drugs. Close family members knew about the double activity, but they dared not confront her “because of her strong character.”2

Why have Mexico and other Latin American countries become mired in security traps in which varieties of crime, corruption, and violence significantly degrade democratic governance? In this chapter, I take up two forms of diffuse, nonviolent crime that complicate governance: tax evasion and informality. These overlapping problems are foundational, permeating state and society in multiple ways. In a direct sense, tax evasion limits governments’ abilities to fund programs necessary for public safety and welfare. Low pay and inadequate resources create incentives for corruption, a recurring theme with respect to the policejustice system. Poor-quality public services, in turn, undermine public support, creating a negative feedback loop that reinforces low equilibrium. As mediated by perceptions, the impression that many citizens are evading their fair share of taxes undermines legal compliance more broadly. Conversely, effective tax administration serves useful ends. It can finance good quality public services, convey

31

32

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

key information about the behavior of the economy, and provide an essential regulatory instrument to shape incentives for a wide range of market and societal behavior. It can also be a useful legal tool against criminal organizations, as tax evasion may be easier to prosecute than conspiracy or money-laundering (Guerrero 2013, p. 132). Informality in a narrow sense refers to unreported, off-book economic exchanges. Much oversimplified, where the formal economy fails to provide enough good-quality jobs, the informal sector plays an essential role. As such, it is present to some degree in virtually all economies. But beyond some point informality can also hinder state regulation of substantial portions of the economy, create incentives for corruption, and provide organic linkages from organized crime to the broader society, as criminal groups provide stolen, counterfeit, and smuggled goods to informal outlets.3 Most importantly, the informal economy is a structural phenomenon, that is, a driver of multiple forms of illegality embedded in the broader economy (Bergman 2010). Recall the analytical “map” of relationships between criminal acts, democracy, and state, set out in Table 1.1. In this chapter I operate in the “upper northwest” territory, discussing diffuse acts carried out continuously on a mass scale by individuals or small groups. I argue that the variable scope of tax evasion and informality has both direct and mediated effects that undermine democratic governance. By mediated, I mean effects that result from people’s perceptions. Where widespread, tax evasion and informality directly reinforce the chronic fiscal crisis of Mexico and most other Latin American governments and blunt the reach of regulatory agencies, permitting practices that can endanger the public. Their most significant mediated effect is to reinforce widespread norms and attitudes of illegality, intentionally violating formal law, or of “alegality,” an indifference to formal law. We might hypothesize that, at some point, tax evasion and informality become sufficiently widespread that they reinforce expectations for extra-legal exchanges throughout society. Such expectations support a predisposition to tolerate, or even promote, corrupt practices. This culture of civic non-compliance appears in Chapter 4 as the base that supports other “layers” of criminality. With regard to the inertia of security traps, we should note the strong positive correlations between inequality of wealth and income with informality. The inequality-informality nexus is also “. . . negatively correlated with ‘tax morale’—society’s disposition toward tax compliance—which, in turn, depends inversely on perceptions of ‘state capture’ and positively on perceptions of the quality of public spending” (Perry et al. 2007, p. 13). Put another way, the broad public, excluded from government and suffering the brunt of poor-quality

Foundational Crime

33

public services, feels greater justification in evading taxes and avoiding regulation. The syndrome includes distrust of state institutions, leading to “ . . . the possibility that Latin America is locked, in fact condemned, to a bad social equilibrium where entrenched elites have no interest in responding to the voiced petitions of those seeking full participation” (ibid.). An additional factor in Mexico’s case is the “resource curse” of oil revenues. Citizens wonder why they should have to pay taxes from their own pockets to finance poor quality public services when the government has oil income. It isn’t clear whether widespread norms of illegality and alegality also facilitate forms of diffuse violent crime, such as homicide or assault, except indirectly. The cases of Peru and Nicaragua, with high levels of informality alongside relatively low homicide rates, do not support the existence of a linkage. It’s clear, however, that informal markets are organically connected to national and transnational organized crime groups, which may threaten and use varieties of violence (Bergman 2010). Also, to the extent that inadequate resources and corruption reduce the effectiveness of police-justice systems, violent offenders can operate with greater impunity. Conceivably, contexts in which alegal attitudes predominate can create conditions that tolerate criminal violence. Diffuse and organized violent crime, in turn, can undermine public involvement in and support for democratic government. These issues, however, are subjects of later chapters. This chapter primarily treats tax evasion and informality as related to ordinary individuals in everyday life. I begin with tax evasion and then take up informality, locating Mexico in the broader regional context and drawing comparisons with other Latin American countries. In the regional context, Mexico’s federal government is an outlier with respect to light taxation, with the luxury (or curse) of petroleum wealth and a complex and generous menu of deductions, exemptions, and the like. Rates of evasion are significant, but on this score the country compares favorably with others in the region, including even Chile. Informality is a significant and increasing problem in the wake of economic liberalization, but here as well Mexico ranks near the middle in regional terms. Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Populism, and the Resource Curse

Tax collection is a basic measure of state capacity, and tax compliance is a basic measure of citizen support. The key issue is the degree to which citizen-taxpayers believe the overall political settlement is just and inclusive enough to be supported. Everest-Phillips (2009, p. 19) refers to

34

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

“political settlement” as “the informal and formal ‘rules of the game’ over political power. . . . [The] perceived fairness of and trust in a credible state, with the tax system representing a legitimate and effective exercise of state power; and efficiently providing public goods that benefit both taxpayers and ordinary citizens.” Put another way, political settlement refers to the state’s ability to include fiscal legitimacy within a broadly accepted “equity contract,” as discussed in Chapter 1. “Taxpaying is tied to the equity or fairness of the system: rulers must convince taxpayers that the system is fair, that there is equity in taxation, and that the burden of taxpaying is shared” (Bergman 2009a, pp. 10, 13). Mexico’s long-standing equity contract under the PRI regime (1930-2000) was based on light taxation with substantial reliance on funding from Pemex, the state oil monopoly, amounting to roughly a third of federal government income in the early 2000s. The shift in macro-economic policy toward a neo-liberal agenda beginning in the mid-1980s fractured the old populist contract but failed to create a new settlement. The effects of this transformation manifested themselves in the bitterly disputed 2006 presidential election, in which a populist candidate lost by less than one percent of the vote. The decline in petroleum output, although partially offset by rising international oil prices, along with a sharp recession in 2009, put additional pressures on social consensus. The October 2012 announcement of significant additions to petroleum reserves from discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico was bad news for fiscal reformers.4 A key clause of the equity contract is whether the government is perceived to use tax revenues efficiently to administer worthwhile programs. One indicator of governance quality is satisfaction with basic services. Table 2.1 shows responses of “low satisfaction” (as opposed to “medium” or “high” satisfaction) in selected Latin American countries in 2008 with respect to government provision of water, trash collection, public transportation, paved roads, municipal services, and parks and open spaces. With a three-year average of 48 percent of respondents indicating low satisfaction, Mexico approximates the regional average of 49 percent. At 26.6 percent, Uruguayan respondents appear least dissatisfied with basic services, while Peruvians at 68 percent are an unhappy outlier. If satisfaction with basic services is the key indicator, Mexico “ought to be” close to the average in the region in tax compliance, which in fact it turns out to be. In the following section I compare attitudes about taxation in Mexico and other countries, moving on to examine some of the features of Mexico’s tax regime that affect citizen compliance. For a variety of reasons, Mexico falls substantially below the regional average with

Foundational Crime

35

respect to tax effort and citizen compliance as measured by opinion surveys. Its performance as measured by evasion behavior, however, appears much better. In effect, Mexicans’ opinions appear more negative than their performance. Table 2.1 Low Satisfaction with Basic Services Country

2006

2007

2008

Average

Mexico

49

53

43

48.3

Chile

41

47

35

41.0

Colombia

43

43

37

41.0

Costa Rica

46

46

49

47.0

Guatemala

46

58

46

50.0

Peru

68

72

64

68.0

Uruguay

22

29

29

26.6

Latin America

49

50

48

49.0

Survey respondents were asked, “Would you say that you are very satisfied, more or less satisfied, not satisfied, or not satisfied at all with the sewage system, trash collection, public transport, roads and pavement, municipal services, and the availability of green areas and public space?” The responses were compiled into an index. Percentages who indicated “not satisfied” and “not satisfied at all.” Source: Latinobarómetro 2008.

Attitudes about Taxation: Mexico and the Region

Tax morale, or the willingness to comply with tax obligations, is a useful indicator of tax compliance. Based on data from the World Values Survey and Latinobarómetro, Torgler (2005, p. 141) comments

36

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

that “the descriptive analysis shows that Mexico is a special case, indicating a very low tax morale in both data sets.” The reasons for low morale at the time had less to do with attitudes about fellow citizens than with perceptions about government. More than respondents in other countries, Mexicans did not see the point in paying taxes and indicated less concern about being punished for evading taxes. They also expressed a greater sense that taxes are ill-spent and are too high, as well as a greater concern about corruption. Chileans, in contrast, indicate a negative assessment of fellow citizens’ ethics (e.g., lack of honesty) to explain failure to pay taxes rather than aspects of government performance. Survey data from 2007 generally echo this pattern. The first row of Table 2.2 reports the percentages of respondents in selected countries who perceive that fellow citizens pay the taxes they owe. On this score, the proverbial glass appears half empty, and Mexico is close to the average. The following three items in the table are a series of questions about things one must do to be considered a citizen. With respect to obligation to vote, Mexico is above average. But Mexico and Peru are below average with respect to obeying the law and paying taxes. As expected, Costa Rica and Uruguay (more than Chile) score high on these items. The point to underline before we turn to some specifics of tax administration is that Mexico ranks below the regional average with respect to compliance with the law and overall tax morale. These negative attitudes, however, are not reflected in actual behavior, at least on some important indicators. Features of Mexico’s Tax Regime

A country’s equity contract includes its tax effort, defined as the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that the government collects in the form of taxes. Taxes, transfers from public enterprises, and borrowing, make up the bulk of government’s income. According to the OECD, Mexico was the member country with the lowest tax effort (general government tax collection as a percentage of GDP, including oil income), equal to 19.8 percent in 2005 (Reyes Tépach 2007, p. 3). If we shift to the Latin American context and focus on central (as opposed to general) government revenues, Table 2.3 shows that Mexico ranks last among the selected cases with respect to taxation and relies heavily on oil as a non-tax revenue. Just under a third of central government income was generated by oil production and related oil activities.

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37

Table 2.2 Tax Compliance and Citizenship Obligations

Citizens perceived to pay taxes 1 owed Obligation as citizens to obey 2 the law Obligation as citizens 3 to vote Obligation as citizens to pay 4 taxes

Mexico

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Peru

Uruguay

Latin America

56

58

58

57

46

56

55

37

52

48

57

44

56

48

74

65

65

80

64

79

71

43

49

49

59

45

59

52

Source: Latinobarómetro 2007 1 From what you know or have heard, on a scale from 1 to 100 where ‘1’ is ‘nobody’ and ‘100’ is ‘everybody,’ How many (nationality) that have to pay taxes pay them properly?” (Average). 2 “Which of the following things do you believe that a person should not stop doing if they want to be considered a citizen? Obey all laws” (Percentage who agree). 3 “Which of the following things do you believe that a person should not stop doing if they want to be considered a citizen? Vote” (Percentage who agree). 4 “Which of the following things do you believe that a person should not stop doing if they want to be considered a citizen? Pay taxes” (Percentage who agree).

Recognizing the restraints on tax effort, Farfán Mares (2010, pp. 45) identifies other negative effects of the “commodity curse” on the quality of public policies. Oil rents underwrite a large and costly payroll of public employees. The rents create incentives that impede the development of a merit-based bureaucracy, encouraging instead clientelist networks in public welfare policies at all levels. These policies, in turn, tend to favor current spending over capital investment. Furthermore, in terms of both bureaucracy and policy, oil income transforms the state apparatus. The central government’s control over oil rents reinforces extreme centralization of public finances, which undermines planning at the sectoral level, as—for example—in health or

38

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

education. Reliance on oil rents also weakens efforts to introduce new public management techniques, such as results-based planning. And oil income subsidizes the budgets of state and local governments, undermining their accountability to local residents. Table 2.3 Central Government Tax and Nontax Revenue as Percentage of GDP (Selected Countries and Years) 1990

1995

2000

2005

2006

2008

Mexico Tax

9.78

8.46

9.66

8.81

8.64

8.28

Nontax

4.75

5.45

4.76

6.54

6.49

8.77

Chile Tax

14.65

16.56

17.86

18.31

18.34

20.09

Nontax

6.89

4.87

3.69

5.48

7.44

6.31

Colombia Tax

6.99

8.63

10.00

12.60

13.38

13.50

Nontax

.33

0.29

0.30

0.10

0.07

0.14

Costa Rica Tax

11.02

12.34

12.28

13.59

13.99

15.62

Nontax

0.42

0.23

0.10

0.26

0.23

0.24

Guatemala Tax

7.66

9.14

11.51

11.49

12.11

11.57

Nontax

1.2

0.76

0.82

0.49

0.61

0.49

Uruguay Tax

13.85

13.97

16.14

17.93

18.60

17.25

Nontax

1.45

2.75

3.31

2.95

2.56

2.14

Source: CEPALSTAT, 2009.

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39

Normal political processes determine provisions of the tax code that set out deductions, credits, variable rates, exemptions, and the like. These are the tax expenditures that governments make to promote or discourage various types of behavior, or simply to accommodate political power. Tax expenditures are defined by Mexico’s federal treasury as: “Those amounts that the federal treasury does not collect because of differential rates of various taxes, exemptions, subsidies, special treatments, and regimes established in the various tax laws that apply at the federal level” (Reyes Tépach 2007, p. 4). The ability of individuals and groups to legally gain some benefit from the tax code refers to tax avoidance (elusión). The construction of the tax code to facilitate such avoidance tells us much about the mixed blessings of populism, oil income, and a hegemonic party system, but it’s a story too long and complicated to rehearse here. Suffice it to note that total tax expenditures over 2002-2007 averaged 5.84 percent of GDP (ibid., p. 6). If added to Mexico’s average total tax income between 2000-2008 (8.85 percent of GDP, as shown in Table 3.3) the average of 14.69 percent would put the country in the regional mainstream with respect to overall tax effort. Economist Daniel Álvarez Estrada (2009, p. 4) notes that “The use of the tax system to promote economic activities, or to subsidize consumption or the production of given sectors or products, has shown its inadequacy at an unsustainable fiscal cost over time.” To these generous tax expenditures, we should add the weak tax effort of state and local governments, which rely heavily on revenue-sharing funded by the central government. My interest is tax evasion, or the ability of individuals and firms to evade some or all of what they legally owe in taxes. To simplify, I focus on the federal level and on the two main revenue generators: the ValueAdded Tax (VAT) and the personal and corporate income tax. Estimates of tax evasion differ significantly, depending mainly on the methodology used. One approach uses national income accounts and calculates the difference between taxes actually collected versus the sums legally owed given the menu of deductions and exemptions allowed in the tax code. Another approach estimates evasion through household surveys or by auditing samples of actual tax returns. Often a combination of approaches is used. Mexico’s federal tax authority contracted out studies on tax evasion to several leading academic institutions in the mid-2000s. Their findings (Table 2.4) indicate a rate of evasion between 20 and 35 percent with respect to the VAT and between 15 and 80 percent with regard to income tax.

40

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

Table 2.4 Academic Reports about Tax Evasion in Mexico, 2004–2006 Source

Year

Estimated Evasion (% GDP)

CIDE

2004

35

ITAM

2006

20

Wages and Salaries

COLEF

2005

15

ITAM

2006

15

Rental Income

COLMEX

2006

64

ITAM

2006

70

Business and Professional Activity

COLMEX

2006

77

ITAM

2006

80

Business Income

CIDE

2006

33

ITAM

2006

26

Value-Added Tax Income Tax

Source: SAT, reported in Alvarez Estrada (2009, p. 30).

The VAT in its simplest form is a tax that is added to each step of production and processing with the last one applied at the retail sale. Each agent in the production chain can deduct the VAT paid at that particular step from her income or corporate tax, with the burden falling on the final consumer. Mexico’s VAT in principle is 18 percent, but— like the income tax—it is loaded with multiple exemptions and special rates. For example, businesses in the border region pay a lower rate to better compete with US firms. Furthermore, producing the correct receipt can be a problem, and it isn’t easy to deduct the VAT amount from the income tax owed, all of which reinforces the incentive to evade the VAT. “How  many  times  have  we  accepted  a  final  price  reduction   of   15   percent   in   exchange   for   not   getting   a   receipt   for   the   good   or   service   received?   Here   we   see   how   the   administration   of   a   tax   can   generate   evasion   even   in   the   formal   economy   if   the   rules   promote   incentives  that  favor  evasion”  (Hernández Trillo, et al. n.d.,  pp.  4-­‐5).   Individuals evade income taxes mainly by underreporting or failing to file a return. Among types of income, Mexico’s evasion rates are

Foundational Crime

41

lowest for formal wage earners and salaried employees (15 percent) and highest for income from property (64-70 percent) and for business and non-salaried professional activity (77-80 percent). In effect, blue- and white-collar workers subject to payroll deduction pay much more of what they owe than do property owners or business-professional workers. The United Nations ECLAC sponsored a series of case studies on tax equity and evasion, which permit some rough regional comparisons (Jiménez et al. 2009). The estimated “collection gap” includes both evasion and avoidance of income taxes owed as estimated by national income accounts and individual-level surveys. With a 41.6 percent gap, Mexico’s avoidance and evasion ranked lowest among the seven cases examined. Ecuador (63.8) and Guatemala (63.7) were the lowperforming outliers, followed by Argentina (49.7), Peru (48.5), Chile (47.4) and El Salvador (45.3). On this score, Mexico’s revenue problems pale in comparison with others in the region. I underline two points with respect to the politics of taxation. First, reliance on the petroleum subsidy puts the fiscal system on shaky ground, as oil prices fluctuate in normal times, and strands the system in quicksand if petroleum reserves are drawn down. Natural resource income tends to centralize power in the national government (Farfán Mares 2010). State and local governments can free ride on federal tax administration, enjoying the largess of revenue-sharing and avoiding the stress of administering property, and other, taxes. Second, Mexico’s tax system reinforces inequality. Setting aside the regressive nature of the value-added tax and the menu of benefits granted to business and finance, our brief overview of evasion shows that business, non-salaried professional workers, and property-holders evade taxes at higher rates than do wage and salary workers. At some point, the petroleum subsidy will likely diminish. The inevitable tax adjustment that lies ahead will aggravate tensions along class lines and between the central government and the states. Informality and Alegality

To reiterate, we need to differentiate informality from tax evasion and other forms of illegality. My purpose is not to isolate informality as a form of economic activity, as do some authors, but rather to analyze its multiple relationships with tax evasion and criminality. In doing so, I’m treading on normative hot coals by potentially “criminalizing” poverty. Rest assured that I don’t view as criminals street youths who wash windshields at stop lights or poor children who sell candy on sidewalks.

42

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

Rather, informality is an enormous and heterogeneous world, with some activities closer to criminality than others. Castells and Portes (1989) differentiate informality from other forms of criminality in order to treat it as a separate economic behavior. They correctly note that notions of criminality are variable and determined by social institutions. They suggest that income-earning activities labeled “criminal . . . specialize in the production of goods and services socially defined as illicit” (ibid., p. 15). Informality, in their view, refers to licit goods generated by illicit production and distribution. This approach, however, confronts three sorts of problems. First, assuming we can distinguish between licit and illicit processes and products in some abstract sense, in the marketplace the activities and goods are intermingled. That is, there are relatively few completely licit processes of production and distribution, and we should think of a continuum from fully compliant to completely off-book. Firms are regulated by myriad laws and rules. The most licit firms, usually the larger and more modern, employ staffs of lawyers and accountants to try to abide by most of the rules. Even so, such firms operate in complex production and distribution chains, relying on various companies and individuals for inputs and services. Not all, or even most, of these firms and individuals are as conscientious as the largest firms about paying their taxes and abiding by regulations. Also, the informal and criminal economies overlap in several ways. Consider two examples. Final products are typically intermingled at the retail level. Street vendors and many small retailers usually do not distinguish between smuggled or counterfeit items and those that are legal but that are produced illicitly, e.g., windshield wipers made in an off-book shop (Aguiar 2008). We should expect to find vendors marketing a mix of both types of products, as Ms. Vázquez Muñoz, mentioned in the epigraph, did in her street booth. Also, informal merchants and workers typically borrow from informal lenders, portions of whose capital are generated by criminal activities such as gambling or extortion and whose loan portfolios often finance both criminal and informal activities. The second main problem is that both informal and illicit activities alike generate corrupt exchanges as they come into contact with government regulators. Regular police and specialized regulatory agents such as tax collectors, public health or building inspectors confront the incentive to negotiate bribes to permit, or even protect and promote, both illegal and informal activities. The question is, under what circumstances do police and regulators collude with those who break formal rules? Thus, whether the informal workshop produces firewarms or baby strollers, predatory building inspectors, police and fire officials

Foundational Crime

43

will extort bribes to permit continued operation. And these officials may in turn pay off supervisors or elected officials, who are not usually overly concerned whether the products extorted are licit or otherwise. The third problem is one of perception and attitude. To both informal and criminal agents, the state’s law is a potential problem to be evaded. And as informality and criminality interact, first with each other and then with society, the citizenry at large—even if they can draw gross or even fine-line distinctions—is drawn into illegal or alegal exchanges. For example, half-price on a new set of brand name tires of dubious origin at a street-side auto repair shop is hard to pass up. Two-thirds off on a fashionable handbag, whether smuggled or a domestically produced “knockoff,” is tempting. The key point is: just as informals and criminals sharpen their skills of law evasion, so too do mainstream citizens. And as informal exchanges increase as a proportion of total exchanges, attitudes about legality in the society at large can tip toward indifference, assuming such attitudes had previously been law-abiding. Informality in Mexico and the Region

I first put Mexico in a comparative perspective and then focus on the relationships between informality and criminality.5 To simplify, informality can be viewed from two perspectives, both of which are fraught with conceptual and measurement problems. The first views informal activities and exchanges as a proportion of GDP and the second as a proportion of employment in the Economically Active Population (EAP). Schneider (2007, p. 4-5) estimates the “shadow economy” of 145 countries, taken to mean all market-based production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to avoid taxes and social security contributions, labor market regulations such as minimum wage or safety standards, and reporting requirements. He excludes criminal activities (e.g., robbery, drug-dealing) and household services and production, so the estimates are on the low side.6 In the 31-33 percent range, Mexico’s shadow economy over 19992005 is close to the average that Schneider estimates for 145 countries (34-36 percent). Japan, Switzerland, and the United States are outliers on the low side (8-11 percent), and Georgia, Panama, and Zimbabwe are outliers on the high side (60-66 percent). Among the Latin American examples, Chile and Costa Rica rank on the low side, and Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru appear on the high side, all as expected. Uruguay, in the 50-percent range, is surprisingly high (Schnieder 2007, Table 6.3, pp. 34-37).

44

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

When we shift from GDP to the labor force perspective, the weight of the informal sector appears greater. Focusing on urban estimates, Mexico is closer to a stable forty-percent range of EAP between 1992 and 2004. In the low-thirty percent range, Chile remains substantially below Colombia (mid-60’s), Guatemala, and Peru (70-percent range).7 To reiterate, the informal sector is quite heterogeneous, complicating our effort to tease out the difference between commonsense informal employment (pay the gardener in cash) and commonsense criminality (sell hijacked goods in a street market). The analytical distinctions dissolve at the levels of markets and neighborhoods. Operating outside the legal regulatory regime, informal activities can generate corruption wherever they come into contact with state agents, depending on the ability and disposition of the police and regulators to negotiate bribes. This may appear trivial as, for example, sidewalk vendors, windshield washers, and panhandlers pay “rent” to police for use of a public space. As the scale of the activity grows, however, the size of the “rent” and its corrupting effect increases. Of particular interest is the larger street markets that typically provide smuggled, counterfeit, or stolen goods along with licit products produced illicitly.8 Police agencies often protect the market, even directing the traffic, on a scale that typically ascends through the police hierarchy, in some cases to reach top-level elected and appointed officials.9 These markets operate in large volume, service large segments of the public, and are organically integrated into organized crime. Besides the licit products supplied to informal markets, be they from illicit production or from legal producers who direct some portion of their output to untaxed retail outlets, there are three main streams of goods: (1) smuggled; (2) counterfeit; and, (3) stolen. We can imagine various combinations of overlapping categories, for example, counterfeit purses that are stolen in country A and smuggled into country B. I am not aware of supply estimates for these types of goods for Mexico, but business and trade associations depict a quite robust market. A spokesperson for the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico (hardly unbiased) stated in July 2007 that Mexico ranked fourth in the world in the sale of pirated goods, behind only Russia, China, and Italy. He indicated that in 2006 contraband (counterfeit and smuggled) goods sold in Mexico figured in “eight of every 10 movies, seven of 10 music CDs, 65 percent of the software, 60 percent of cable television, 30 percent of satellite television, half of the clothing, 30 percent of books, 20 percent of tennis shoes, 30 percent of wine and liquor, half of the cloth, and 20-40 percent of the jewelry.”10 A survey conducted by the same organization in four principal cities in September 2008 found that

Foundational Crime

45

76 percent of the respondents had acquired contraband goods. Most of the product was music CDs (63 percent), followed by movie DVDs (38 percent). The main rationale was lower price (75 percent of respondents) and availability (38 percent) (AmCham 2008, p. 6). As to awareness of negative effects, 82 percent believed that informal sales promoted crime, and 84 percent indicated that it undermined the economy (ibid., 7). A survey by Carta Paramétrica (2013) reported that 67 percent of a national sample agreed with the statement that “[informal] street commerce is positive because it generates employment, combats poverty, and lower prices for products,” rather than “street commerce is negative because it promotes illegality, unsanitary conditions, and disorder.” Sixty-eight percent opposed the notion that the government should remove street vendors from their towns. It’s easy to see the multiple points of retail sales, but it is more interesting to consider where these goods come from. Examples from press accounts illustrate types of sources. Smuggled goods: The Attorney General’s Office in May 2004 estimated that one-third of total imports into Mexico were irregular. It estimated that 58 percent of clothing was of illegal origin, principally from China.11 Mexican Federal Ministerial Police seized 3.5 million counterfeit cigarettes during an operation in Ensenada, Baja California, in 2009. Mexican authorities confirmed that the merchandise, coming from China, arrived in over 17,500 boxes with the Marlboro logo.12 Of the 45 million pairs of shoes imported in 2005, an estimated 30 percent were contraband.13 More than 13 million false Marlboro and Montana cigarettes, as well as 108,000 counterfeit baseball caps with trademarks like “Von Dutch,” “America,” “Playboy,” “Louis Vuitton,” among others, were seized during an operation by Mexican federal authorities at the marine customs compound in Ensenada, Baja California in 2008. According to federal authorities, the shipment arrived at the port marked as plastic goods.14 Eighty million cigarettes (four million packs), smuggled from China and India, were confiscated in July 2012 at the Port of Mazatlán. A total of 150 million cigarettes were seized between 2008 and 2012.15 Stolen goods: About forty percent of the wood production in the country comes from illegal logging. According to estimates by PROFEPA and the National Forestry Commission (Comisión Nacional Forestal, CONAFOR) the

46

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

annual national wood production in 2007 was nine million cubic meters. Of this amount, at least 3.5 million cubic meters was harvested illegally and processed in household sawmills, artisanal workshops, medium and large enterprises, and in the construction industry.16 A Greenpeace spokesperson in July 2008 estimated 5-7 million cubic meters of illegal logging in Mexico at a market value of P$ 4.2 billion (US$ 380 million) per year.17 Pemex, the national oil company, has suffered increasing rates of illegal “milking” in recent years. It reported 224 thefts from oil pipelines in 2006; that number rose to 323 in 2007, along with 10 illegal connections on gas lines. From January 1 to June 12, 2008, it reported 152 illegal penetrations of gas and oil lines.18 The public utility “Luz y Fuerza del Centro” reported in 2008 that about half the electrical power generated for the central zone of the country was stolen by households and industries, at a value of about P$13.3 billion pesos (US$ 1.2 billion).19 Organized crime groups have constructed a network for the theft and sale of medical supplies. In 2007-2009 the federal government confiscated 75 tons of goods stolen from suppliers and government medical services and marketed in street markets and from private homes.20 Tijuana police arrested a ring of "chop-shop” criminals who profited by taking apart stolen cars and then selling them to recycling companies. All of the 20 cars found were late model vehicles.21 Pirated and counterfeit products: Greenpeace estimated in 2007 that Mexico consumed about 600 million batteries per year, of which about 40 percent were smuggled or counterfeit. The lack of effective quality control presented environmental contamination problems.22 Increasingly, for reasons explained in Chapter 5, DTOs are participating more in informal markets, integrating their production and sales with other market activities. To return to the example of illegal logging, trafficking groups operated in forests in the states of Mexico, Morelos, and Michoacán in 2008 where they cultivated marijuana plants and provided protection to illegal loggers.23 In the state of Michoacán, the DTO “La Familia” in 2009 reportedly controlled 180,000 sales outlets in gas stations, truck stops, street markets, school, movie theaters, and the like, that generated daily earnings of 27 million pesos (US$ 1.9 million).24 “La Familia” and “Los Zetas” reportedly extorted street vendors in Michoacán, Mexico, and Guerrero, forcing (or franchising) them to sell drugs.25

Foundational Crime

47

Spatially Fixed Markets

A closer look at spatially fixed markets helps us grasp important linkages between informality and criminality. The San Juan de Dios market in Guadalajara consists of about 3,000 booths that sell a broad range of licit goods; also readily available are sexual services, illegal drugs and firearms, pirated goods, and contraband. About half of the market’s booths sell some type of pirated material, with movies and music making up the main volume.26 Wholesale merchants connect retail vendors with local, national, and transnational criminal groups that produce and/or traffic illicit goods. The wholesalers also sell to retail merchants a form of “insurance” against raids by federal police. The insurance derives from information about impending raids that former police (so-called madrinas) get from friends still on active duty. Although payment by retailers is virtually mandatory, the insurance provided may not be entirely reliable. Yañez Romero (2005, pp. 2-5) analyzed informality in the case of the Mexico City borough of Iztapalapa within the broader context of the expansion of illegality. He depicts a dynamic within which criminal behavior grows and constitutes a sort of counter-culture, which then influences private spaces. The local community responds by protecting criminals. The informal economy plays a key role in promoting community solidarity with criminal groups by providing consumers basic goods at discount prices. Neighborhood street markets involve transporters, wholesalers, retailers, and customers who are excluded by the formal economy. The exchanges are illegal in some abstract sense, but criminal groups provide more affordable goods. Consumers are perfectly aware that these markets, which have been operating for over twenty years, provide a mix of licit and illicit products. Further, some national and multi-national companies evade taxes by selling products through these markets. Some neighborhoods are characterized by a particular type of illegal economy or a broad mix of legal and informal (including illegal) activities. The activities are of a scale that attracts customers from beyond the immediate neighborhood. Neighbors depend on the markets for employment and cheap products and actively protect vendors and other workers from the police. A well-known example is the Tepito neighborhood of Mexico City, and several neighborhoods in the Borough of Iztapalapa. In addition to connections with organized crime, the neighborhoods constitute the political base for elected officials of city government.27

48

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

Tax Evasion, Informality, and Capital Flight

“In absolute terms, no country has suffered more capital flight than Mexico,” according to the 1985 World Development Report.28 Though there may be other reasons to illegally transfer funds out of a country, tax evasion is significant. Total illicit outflows from Mexico over the period 1970-2010 amounted to approximately US$871.9 billion, of which trade mispricing made up about US$642.9 billion.29 Over that period illicit outflows generally increased as an annual percentage of GDP: 3.8 percent in the 1970s; 6.1 percent in the 1980s; 4.8 percent in the 1990s; and 6.1 percent in the 2000s (Kar 2012, p. 5). As we shall see in Chapter 5, these figures dwarf the estimated inflows of profits from illicit drug sales. The main drivers of capital flight were macroeconomic instability, trade opening, and the growth of the informal economy. Illicit flows were found to be “positively and significantly related to the size of the underground economy. This result is intuitively meaningful in that one would expect increasing outflows of illicit capital to require a larger underground economy to sustain them” (ibid., p. 31). Political Implications of Tax Evasion and Informality

Tax evasion and informality are foundational types of crime because they are relatively widespread and enduring, and both are organically built into the broader economy and society. Both types of crime blunt the regulatory capacity of the state. Mexico ranks quite low among Latin American countries in terms of tax effort, but it does comparatively well in controlling tax evasion. Issues of limited tax income become important when we examine state responses to organized crime in Chapter 6. We shall see that Mexico spends comparatively less on citizen security out of smaller budgets than comparable middle-income countries. Also, oil rents create distortions, such as weak tax effort by states, centralization, and large public payrolls. Informality is one of many impediments to tax collection but its more significant impacts are felt in two other ways. First, informality is organically woven into varieties of criminality, most importantly in the criminal organizations that supply informal markets through theft, smuggling, and counterfeiting. Second, informality is widely tolerated, which conditions public opinion to indifference toward the state’s law. Mexicans are well aware of the multiple costs of tax evasion and informality, but the surge of criminal violence during Felipe Calderón’s administration led them to focus on violent forms of crime. We turn to

Foundational Crime

49

this issue, first in the form of diffuse violent crime in Chapter 3, and subsequently in relation to organized crime in Chapters 4 and 5.

Notes 1 “La verdad es que tenemos una recaudación todavía muy pobre, Ciro. Pobrísima. Creo que es de las más bajas de América Latina en término del PIB debe ser 10, 11 por ciento del PIB comparado con un 17 por ciento en promedio en América Latina.” President Felipe Calderón, quoted in “Entrevista a Felipe Calderón por Ciro Gómes Leyva,” Milenio.com, June 28, 2011. 2 “Tania Vázquez Muñoz era comerciante hasta antes de que resultara herida en el estallido de un artefacto el viernes pasado en la colonia Roma. Su puesto en la calle Corregidora tenía dos giros. El visible era el ramo de cosméticos y el oculto, la venta de drogas. Familiares cercanos conocían la doble actividad que realizaba, pero no se atrevieron a confrontarla ‘por su carácter fuerte,’” “Tania, en la red de droga,” El Universal.com.mx, February 20, 2008. 3 We lack a specific term for off-book property arrangements. For example, the president of Mexico City’s College of Notaries reported that 60 percent of the capital’s residents have not regularized their properties (secured the proper documentation of ownership), and only 10 percent have their title (testamento). (Milenio, April 28, 2010, p. 33) See Grajeda and Ward (2012) on inheritance practices in informal settlements. 4 “Mexico Announces New Deep-Water Find,” Latin American Herald Tribune, October 7, 2012. 5 Readers interested in the conceptual challenges of informality, or its multiple causes and effects on the broader economy, or in why workers may choose to enter or exit the informal market should consult Perry et al. (2007). Those interested in informality in the class structures of Latin American countries over the past few decades should consult Alejandro Portes (1985) and Portes and Kelly Hoffman (2003). 6 Schneider uses the DYMIMC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiplecauses) and the currency demand methods for his estimates. 7 The data are drawn from the Inter-American Development Bank’s Sociómetro (http://www.iadb.org/sociometro/; last accessed on May 28, 2005). 8 Press items suggest nontrivial quantities of goods. For example, local and federal police confiscated 35 tons of pirate and contraband goods in a market in Iztapalapa, a Mexico City borough (ElUniversal.com.mx, May 7, 2008). Federal police confiscated 34 tons of medical supplies from private pharmacies and informal markets in Michoacan and Jalisco. Some of the supplies had been stolen from public health agencies and some were counterfeit products. One federal agency had confiscated 180 tons of illegal medical supplies over the previous four years. (Ibid., May 14, 2008). Police raids on illegal markets outside subway stations in Mexico City netted 10 tons of pirated goods. (“Aseguran 10 toneladas de piratería en Tacuba,” Jornada.unam.mx, October 12, 2008). 9 Cross (1998) is a useful discussion of linkages between street vendors and political authorities in Mexico City.

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

10 “México, cuarto lugar mundial en venta de piratería y contrabando,” Jornada.unam.mx, July 4, 2007. 11 “Illegal, un tercio de la mercancía importada,” ElUniversal.com.mx, May 9, 2004. 12 US Consulate-Tijuana News Summary, Frontera (p. 2A), El Mexicano (p. 3A), September 17, 2009. 13 “Piden diputados a SHCP frenar contrabando de calzado chino,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 31,2006. 14 US Consulate-Tijuana News Summary, Frontera (p. 17A) September 1, 2008. 15 “Incautan 80 millones de cigarrillos ilegales,” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 31, 2012. 16 “Talan ilegalmente 40% de la madera,” ElNorte.com, June 24, 2007. 17 “La tala ilegal un negocio que genera al año $4 mil 200 millones,” Jornada.unam.mx, July 1, 2008. 18 “Gas natural el nuevo botín,” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 1, 2008. 19 “Medio DF usa energía robada,” ElUniversal.com.mx, May 2, 2008. 20 “Medicinas, nuevo nicho del crimen,” ElUniversal.com.mx, March 2, 2009. 21 US Consulate-Tijuana News Summary, Frontera (p. 13A), May 16, 2008. 22 “Pilas ‘pirata’, un peligro ambiental,” ElUniversal.com.mx, January 7, 2007. 23 “Vínculos del narco con tala clandestina en Edomex, Morelos y Michoacán: Profepa,” Jornada.unam.mx, July 2, 2008. See Pérez (2011) for an extended discussion of organized criminal penetration of Pemex. 24 “Piratería, el otro frente del narco,” ElUniversal.com.mx, March 1, 2009. 25 “El narco utiliza a ambulantes para cometer ilícitos, dice PGR,” Impreso.milenio.com, July 23, 2009. 26 This illustration draws on Aguiar (2008). 27 For example, Mexico City police raided 247 shops in the “Ford” neighborhood, which specialized in stolen auto parts. (“Expropian ‘zona eblemática’ de vente de autopartes robadas,” Jornada.unam.mx, March 21, 2007) 28 Quoted by Kar (2012, p. 5). The discussion of capital flight draws extensively on his study. 29 An example of capital flight through trade mispricing is to over-invoice the cost of exports. The importer can deduct fees and expenses and deposit the balance in the exporter’s bank account.

3 Common Crime and Democracy: Weakening vs. Deepening

“More than the murders, it’s extortion and kidnapping that make the collective perception one of desperation. What we have in the community is the Russian roulette metaphor: let’s see when my time is up.” —Ciudad Juárez resident, December 20091 After suffering two robberies and four robbery attempts, Federico installed an electronic entry to his office, which he reinforced with multiple locks. He installed bars on the windows, closed off doors, roofed the patio, bought a handgun, and embedded bars in the top edges of the exterior walls. His last additions were an infrared alarm connected to the police station and the hiring of a permanent security guard. (Regalado Santillán 2002, p. 186).

The dual economic-political transition of the 1980s and 90s coincided with increased criminal violence in Latin America. Most countries in the region followed a pattern of political liberalization and market opening accompanied by increases in violent crime. Rather than neo-liberalism, I would point to the disruption and uncertainty in a context of limited compliance with the law, increased access to firearms, and growing drug flows as causes of the violence. Further, each country and city has its own combination of specific factors to account for crime trends. This chapter characterizes trends in criminality and explores the linkages between perceptions of violent crime and citizens’ responses relevant to democratic governance. Homicide is a key indicator, but it is less threatening to the average citizen than are armed robbery, street assault, home invasion, car-jacking, extortion, or kidnapping. Also, crime rates, including homicide, vary enormously across Mexico’s states and municipalities and over time. In terms of the conceptual “map” set out in Chapter 1, I focus on diffuse behavior and the linkages located in

51

52

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

the top half of Table 1.1. We should think of “common” and “organized” crime along a continuum, with overlaps and interactions. About three quarters of the crimes discussed in this chapter were reportedly committed by three or fewer assailants, which is my notion of common crime. Violence related to two types of more complex organized crime, kidnapping and drug-trafficking, is analyzed in the following two chapters. I argue that the fear induced in part by perceptions of rising crime, especially violent crime, and the frustration and anger generated by a corrupt, ineffective police-justice system, led to mass changes in attitudes and personal behavior. I say in part because fear and anxiety can have numerous causes, and crime can be the “face” attributed to anxiety and insecurity (Dammert and Malone 2003, 2010; Dammert 2012). Survey findings consistently show that feelings of insecurity are linked to self-reported changes in personal behavior, such as daily routines and modes of transportation. They also suggest that insecurity correlates positively with distrust of key institutions, such as the policejustice system. The widespread sensation that Mexico’s political parties appear unresponsive to citizens’ demands and that institutional reforms are slow and incomplete only add to this sense of insecurity. Thus, victimization and fear lead most Mexicans to opt for varieties of selfhelp, such as Federico’s self-defense strategy cited in the epigraph above. That noted, the linkages between insecurity and erosion of support for democracy or rule of law are complex. Experience shows that, at least in the short term, crime scandals can provoke massive public protests. At the micro-level, crime victims are less likely to vote, but they report significantly higher rates of participation in political parties and movements and in voluntary associations than non-victims. In effect, non-victims and victims can speak up and pitch in rather than opt out. The issue is whether the party-electoral system and police-justice machinery respond. This chapter first examines variations in crime over time at the national level and in different states and cities of Mexico, with special attention to the Mexico City metropolitan area. I then note a gap as respondents report greater perceptions of insecurity than warranted by trends in crime victimization. With this background, I explore the causal chain that connects perceptions of crime and impunity with feelings, attitudes, and statements about political behavior as reported in opinion surveys and as observed. The central question is whether, on balance and in the relative short term, citizen responses to crime tend to weaken or deepen democratic governance.

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Crime and Perceptions, 1990–2012

In this section I make the following points: • • •

Crime in Mexico spiked upward after 2006 and appeared to level off by 2012; There is considerable sub-national variation in crime rates; and, Perceptions of insecurity are consistently greater than justified by self-reported victimization rates.

Recall that information about crime trends typically is incomplete and distorted for a variety of reasons. Arturo Arango, a specialist on Mexico’s criminal information system, traces the various steps between the commission of a crime and the rendering of a judicial verdict as points at which data are collected for eventual publication by the National Public Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SNSP) or the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI). He catalogs 38 types of problems, omissions, and errors in data collection, concluding that “the process of generating statistics is tainted from the outset. Therefore one can reject the ‘objectivity’ that statistics might present and show that they’re neither valid nor trustworthy. Thus, any analysis, conclusion, or decision based on such statistics is not useful” (Arango 2011, p. 34).2 Even if we supplement official information with data from victimization surveys, which have their own problems3, the best we can hope for is a general picture of magnitudes and trends. In terms of the politics of crime, bad information arguably feeds anxiety, promotes rumors, and undermines trust in government and fellow citizens. On the other hand, false or exaggerated information serves the interests of various actors. Mass media can gain viewers (and sponsors) with grisly images and little context. Governments can repress or distort information and dispute findings to defend their record. Security forces can clamor for more resources without showing effective results. Private security companies can manipulate images to bolster their sales. Awareness may be growing about how to improve data collection; but many in government still perceive more cost than benefit in doing so. Crime in Mexico Spiked Upward after 2006

While most countries in Latin America experienced rising homicide rates in the 1990s, Mexico’s rate consistently fell up to 2006. After that,

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

the rate spiked upward, more than doubling over four years before leveling off in 2012 (Figure 3.1). Thus, while some would correctly emphasize that Mexico’s rate remains below the regional average, the abrupt change shocked Mexicans. Other forms of violent crime, such as armed robbery and kidnapping, also spiked upward after 2006 before leveling off in 2011-2012 (Figure 3.2). These data are based on formal complaints filed by citizens before investigating attorneys (ministerios públicos) at the state level. Formal complaints, however, substantially understate “real” crime. Figure 3.1 Intentional Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants in Mexico, 1997–2012 25.0

Homicide Rate

20.0

15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Year

Sources: SNSP and CONAPO.

There Is Considerable Sub-National Variation in Crime Rates

Fernando Escalante (2009, 2010, and 2011) presents useful analyses of intentional homicide (homicidio doloso) from 1977 to 2009, using data from INEGI.4 To oversimplify, he finds two broad trends in the period of declining rates. First, steep declines in homicide rates in rural areas of the five more densely populated central and southern states accounted for about 40 percent of the overall reduction. Second, the rates of decline in the northwestern states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Sonora were less pronounced. These were states with rates below the national level in the early 1990s but which rose above national levels in the 2000s (Escalante 2010, pp. 310-11). While all the states (except Yucatán) showed increases between 2007 and 2009, the

56

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

all cases we see a substantial gap between victimization and perception of insecurity. The national average of crime victimization over 20042008 was stable at 11 percent. Mexico City and the State of Mexico appear on the high side, along with several northern states and the State of Aguascalientes. Over the period 2004-2008, 11 of the 30 states surveyed reported declines in victimization, three remained the same, and 16 reported increases.7 Most of the crimes reported in the 2008 survey (78 percent) involved various types of robbery. In percentage terms the targets were vehicles (31), homes (6), pedestrians (30), and ATMs (3). Extortions made up 10 percent of crimes, and kidnapping about one-half percent. Respondents indicated that weapons (more handguns than knives) were involved in a quarter of the crimes, with most used in kidnapping (81 percent), ATM robbery (65 percent), assault (lesiones) (62 percent), and street robbery (62 percent). Use of weapons was most reported in the State of Mexico (44 percent) and Mexico City (37 percent). In cases where weapons were used, about a third of the victims were injured (ICESI 2009a, pp. 25-30). Figure 3.3 shows that at the national level the gap between victimization and perception of insecurity increased from 43 to 54 points between 2004 and 2008 (ICESI 2009a, p. 38). (To interpret, the difference between 11 percent “victim” and 54 percent “perception” in 2004 yields a 43 percent gap.) Apart from the figure, perceptions of insecurity increased in 26 of the 30 states covered in the survey between 2004 and 2008. Mexico City reported greatest insecurity (85 percent), and Coahuila, Quintana Roo, and Durango reported increases in insecurity of over 25 percent. Chihuahua is a special case, rising from 57 to 83 percent who indicate their state as insecure. We also find disconnects in several states between victimization rates and the percentages who report that their state is insecure. The 2008 survey also found a “black number” (cifra negra) of 85 percent, which included those victims who did not report the crimes to the authorities (78 percent) and cases that were reported but not investigated (7 percent) (ICESI 2009a, p. 34). ICESI’s survey of selected cities (Figure 3.4) shows a stable and higher rate of victimization in 2008: 17 percent versus the national average of 11 percent. Looking at the 13 cities covered in both surveys, victimization rates rose in three between 2004 and 2008, most dramatically in Chihuahua (from 13 to 20 percent).8 Even more than the national sample, percentages of those who considered their municipality

73

71

56 44

44 43

40

35

54

48

42

45

34 33

30

22

*&'&"+,-'./%)

14

11

National

4

Veracruz

3

Chiapas

Oaxaca

8

5

Yucatan

7

Zacatecas

11

Tlaxcala

8

Campeche

9

Guerrero

12

Durango

Sinaloa

Hidalgo

7

6

Puebla

14

12 6

San Luis Potosi

9

Morelos

8

7

Nayarit

14

Nuevo Leon

14 11

Jalisco

7

Colima

Estado de Mexico

Sonora

9

Victimization

56 41 41

39

19 11

9

10 0

20

15

Baja California

13 14

Coahuila

19

35

Michoacan

32

Aguascalientes

57

20

37

Baja California Sur

42

40 30

53

49

50

58

Guanajuato

60

57

Quintana Roo

62

Queretaro

70

Distrito Federal

!"#$"%&'(")

80

Figure 3.3 Crime Victimization and Perceptions of Insecurity in Mexico: Panel A, 2004 (Percentage of Respondents) Perception

86

Chihuahua

90

ff-art-blankp_Layout 1 12/10/13 4:06 PM Page 1

100

Source: ICESI 2009a

0 Jalisco

*&'&"+,-'./%)

8 8

71 54 61

6 6 6 6 5 5 4

National

34 34

Veracruz

45

Chiapas

52

Oaxaca

64

Yucatan

7

Zacatecas

7

Tlaxcala

44

Campeche

75

Guerrero

67

Durango

8

Puebla

16 15 15 15 15 14 13 13 13 12 12 12 11 11 11 10 9

Hidalgo

70

Sinaloa

65

San Luis Potosi

70

Morelos

64 62

Nayarit

71

Nuevo Leon

Guanajuato

58

Quintana Roo

37

Queretaro

47

Baja California Sur

40

Colima

10 76

Michoacan

50

Chihuahua

19

Figure 3.3 Crime Victimization and Perceptions of Insecurity in Mexico: 83 Panel B, 2008 76

Baja California

70

Coahuila

58

20 74

Estado de Mexico

60

Sonora

80

Aguascalientes

90 85 Perception

69Victimization 65

45 52 53

38

11

Source: ICESI 2009a

ff-art-blankp_Layout 1 12/10/13 4:05 PM Page 1

30

Distrito Federal

!"#$"%&'(") 100

Common Crime and Democracy

59

(or borough in Mexico City) to be insecure in the same time period rose in all cases (except Culiacán), again most notably in Chihuahua (by 40 points). The point to underline is that changes in victimization rates varied but perceptions of insecurity generally increased. Various forms of robbery make up 87 percent of the crimes reported in the 2008 urban survey, with street robbery more prevalent than at the national level (42 versus 30 percent). Kidnapping made up one percent and extortion seven percent of reported crimes. Weapons (again mostly handguns) were used in 32 percent of the crimes reported; of these 30 percent of the victims reported injuries. Use of weapons was reported most in Acapulco (49 percent of the crimes) and in the Mexico City metropolitan area (45 percent). About a quarter of the crimes were committed by a single person, and slightly more than half by groups of two or three. At 86 percent, the “black number” of unreported crimes was virtually the same as the national figure (ICESI 2009b, pp. 21-24, 27, 45). In sum, national and urban crime victimization rates over 2004-2008 are relatively stable on average but with considerable variation across states and cities. Overall, victimization is accompanied by increasing rates of respondents who consider their states and cities to be insecure. Given the general nature of the pattern, it is unlikely that particular events—for example, a high-profile kidnapping or assault—account for the disconnect in specific locales. A more likely cause is media coverage, especially of high-profile violent crimes. To be expected, after 2006 crime became the central topic of political debate. I turn now to examine the Mexico City metropolitan region, which is especially important because of its size (21.2 million residents in 2009, or about one-fifth of the national population) and because it serves as the political and media center of the country. Trends in the national capital region are magnified through their effects on political and social elites and broadcast throughout the country. The television viewer in a relatively safe provincial town watches at least part of her daily news through the capital region’s lens. Crime trends spiked upward in the region in two periods roughly a decade apart: 1994-96, which marks the onset of the perception of a crisis of insecurity, and 2007-2008. In both cases, sudden and deep economic recessions probably contributed to the hikes in crime. Marcelo Bergman found a moderate upward trend in criminal activity in both Buenos Aires and the Mexico City metropolitan region beginning in the mid-1980s, followed by a “sharp increase in both cities

90

Figure 3.4 Perception of Insecurity and Crime Victimization in Mexican Cities: Panel A, 2004 Perception

72

70

!"#$"%&'(")

81

80

80 62

66

65

61

Victimization

59

60 50

57

54 47 42

40

40

40

60

30

30 20

ff-art-blankp_Layout 1 12/10/13 4:07 PM Page 1

100

19 13

19

20

22 15

20 15

18

21 14

16 8

10

18 11

0

*&'&"+,-./"+,0'/1%) !

Source: ICESI 2009b

90

Figure 3.4: Perceptions of Insecurity and Crime Victimization in Mexico: Panel B, 2008 82

82 77

80 66

70

!"#$"%&'(")

ff-art-blankp_Layout 1 12/10/13 4:08 PM Page 1

100

66

Perception

78

73

Victimization

65 53

65

62

59

60

78

57

53

57 49

50 40

61

30 20

20

19

19

19

18

17

16

15

15

14

13

13

13

17 12

12

11

10 0

*&'&"+,-./"+,0'/1%) ! ! !

Source: ICESI 2009b

!

62

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

in 1994-1996. According to different measures, criminal activity in 1997 was at least double that of 1994. . . . Although crime fell slightly between 2003 and 2007, it has never returned to the relatively low levels of criminality that existed before the 1990s” (Bergman 2009b, p. 63). In the case of Mexico City, public perceptions of insecurity also rose sharply after 1995. The percentage of respondents who cited public safety as the main problem rose from near-zero in December 1995 to over 30 percent in 2001, surpassing both the economy and unemployment (ibid., pp. 72-73).9 The subsequent jump in 2007-2009 coincided with a six percent contraction of the economy. The Program for Studies on Public Security and Rule of Law at CIDE, a Mexico-City based university, has done extensive annual surveys since 2005 in both Mexico City and the State of Mexico. Data on crime victimization are based on households (interviewees report on crimes against members of the household), and data on attitudes are based on responses by the interviewees themselves. The overall pattern of victimization shows relative stability between 2005 and 2007, with substantial increases in 2008 and 2009. Table 3.1 reports household responses in the first four rows (theft, burglary, and robbery) and individual responses (threat or use of force, kidnapping, and assault) in the last three. For households, increases in reports of robbery are especially striking. Overall, the most important finding is that violent crime (cases in which violence is threatened or used) more than doubled from 2007 to 2009, from 10 to 22 percent (CIDE 2010, pp. 17-18). What can we make of all this? The overall picture of crime and insecurity appears in varying degrees of focus, with time delays and inconsistencies. Patterns of homicide are clear and startling, with rates virtually doubling in 2008-2009, most dramatically in the north, before leveling off in 2011 and 2012. Kidnapping and robbery also rose sharply after 2006 and also leveled off. However, crime victimization surveys report stable trends at the national level over 2005-2008, but with substantial variation by state. A similar pattern holds for large cities. More significant is the widening gap between victimization and increasing perception of insecurity at the state level and even more so in the thirteen selected cities. The point is that we’re not sure how “real” crime behaved, although it appeared to increase sharply after 2006 and to level off by 2012. We are more certain that reports of feelings of insecurity rose substantially in most of the states and cities. How might heightened insecurity affect attitudes and behavior relevant to political life? I turn now to examine the connections between crime, attitudes,

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63

and behavior, looking first at survey data and then at reports about behavior. Table 3.1 Victimization Rates for Selected Crimes in Mexico City and the State of Mexico, 2005–2009 (Percentage of Respondents) Crime

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

4.7

5.1

3.7

5

7.1

Theft or Attempted Theft of 1 Car Parts

19.0

20.0

12.9

21.0

24.9

Burglary

2.5

2.5

2.1

3

3.5

Robbery

5.8

6.4

7.1

12.8

30.9

Robbery with Threat or Use of 2 Force

11.5

11.5

10

17.5

22

Kidnapping

.45

.2

.2

.45

.6

Assault

3.1

2.4

2.3

3.6

6.3

Car Theft

1

Source: CIDE 2010, pp. 17, 20. 1

For homes with cars Author’s estimate based on Table 1.4 p. 24

2

Crimeà Perceptionsà Fearà Attitudesà Behavior

In this section I make the following points: • • •

Fear due to perceived crime can promote behavior that both weakens and deepens democratic governance; Crime victims participate in politics more than non-victims; and, Where political parties are perceived as ineffective or unresponsive, other forms of participation become significant.

Several recent studies identify connections between diffuse violence and democracy. Caldeira (2000), Dammert and Malone (2003), and

64

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

Smulovitz (2003) establish fairly clear tendencies in perception and in the attitudinal and, to a lesser degree, the self-reported behavioral effects. At least two points seem interesting. First, perceptions of personal vulnerability to violence are usually greater than justified by apparent risk, as we saw in the ICESI surveys. Mass media, especially television, and other communications networks such as family and friends play complex roles in sensitizing audiences to the risk of violence. Also, fear of violence may be a manifestation of varieties of other personal fears and insecurities, and individuals react differently to the same kinds of messages (Dammert and Malone 2003, 2010; Dammert 2012). Second, while the causal linkages from perceived increases in violent crime through behavioral effects are plausible and empirically demonstrated to one or another degree, the effects on democracy and the state are usually inferred. That is, the fear induced by violent crime may increase distrust and defensive reactions, as well as support for extra-legal suppression of crime. But fear might also produce “pitch-in” behavior to support democracy and the state. Surveys typically report trends in personal adjustments in daily routines in response to fear of crime. As seen in Table 3.2 the ICESI 2009 national survey shows a variety of such adjustments in 2004-08. For the most part such evasive behavior tended to increase over time. A survey reported in September 2011 for the Monterrey metropolitan region found even more pronounced evasive behavior in daily routines, as reflected in percentages of respondents who had stopped carrying valuables, 84.5; going out at night, 84.6; getting together with family or friends, 67.0; or going to large public events such as sports or concerts, 65.1 (Carrillo et al. 2011, p. 33).10 We’ve seen that the Mexican public perceived an increase in insecurity and judges the police-justice system to be ineffective and untrustworthy, and we’ve also noted some effects of insecurity in personal routines. What are attitudinal and behavioral effects on democracy and the state? As shown in Table 3.3, it’s possible that all good things might go together, where fear and victimization exert positive attitudes about both regime and state (“liberal democrats” in cell 1). All bad things might go together, with negative attitudes about democracy and the state (“marginalized indifferents” in cell 4). We might also find mixed patterns, for example, the “hardened statists,” (cell 3) who combine reduced support for democracy and increased support for state institutions. In fact, the findings point more to the “hardened democrats,” those who support both democracy and extralegal justice (cell 2).

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Table 3.2 Perception of Insecurity, “For fear of being a victim of crime, during the year did you stop…?” 2004 Allowing your youngest children to go out Wearing jewelry

43

Going out at night

2007

2008

53

56

48

51

42

49

Carrying credit and/or debit cards

33

40

42

Carrying cash

28

33

35

26

31

Going out walking Taking taxis

25

23

28

Visiting relatives or friends

23

23

26

Going to the movies or theater

22

23

Going to the stadium

18

21

Going out to eat

17

20

15

18

2

2

Using public transportation Other activity

13

Source: ICESI 2009a

A tricky issue concerns participation in politics. Declines in participation at some point undermine democratic governance, by, for example, undercutting the legitimacy of elected officials. Active participation, on the other hand, can take institutional or contentious forms (Crow 2009). That is, protest can be channeled loyally through political parties and votes or through peaceful demonstrations. Alternatively, protest can take contentious forms like blocking streets or invading properties. And protesters can vary their behavior, for example, voting in the morning and blocking traffic in the afternoon. Also, contentious forms might over time create conditions that open doors for participation through institutional channels. Our hypothesized causal chain begins with perceptions. The hypothesis is that citizens perceive increases in crime through a variety of lenses, but especially through the mass electronic media; the

66

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

perceptions incite fear and anxiety; fear and anxiety, combined with a negative assessment of the police-justice system, generate attitudes of distrust of the government and of others; the distrust leads to a variety of behavioral adjustments (altering schedules and modes of transportation; increasing self-protection by employing private security; restricting access to neighborhoods; supporting vigilante groups, and the like). The Crime à Perception link is itself subject to considerable distortion. The irony of democratic transition is that competing parties, more active civil society organizations, and free and competing communications media bring heightened attention to crime and impunity, and can reinforce the perception that democracy itself fosters greater insecurity. The ways in which politicians frame issues also shape attitudes. Perceptions themselves become a kind of reality. What people say they believe to be happening will have more influence on their attitudes (and probably their behavior) than does the “real reality,” if we could somehow measure it. Thus, we might speculate that increases in defensive behavior would remain “sticky,” even if “real” crime were to decline. As noted, media behavior is central. The great majority of Mexicans rely on television as their main source of news. According to a national survey conducted by Consulta Mitofsky in November 2006, 78.5 percent of respondents watch TV to learn about the latest events, followed by a distant 7.9 percent who listen to the radio as their main source. Newspaper readers constitute 6.1 percent of the total. This survey also reports that the audience’s main interest when watching the news is in politics, sports, crime, the economy, and other, in that order. The ICESI 2009 survey reports that 93 percent indicated that they got their news about citizen security from television, with 73 percent indicating they watch television a lot, and 64 percent indicating that the media give a lot of coverage to crime (ICESI 2009b, 62-64).11 The content of Mexican news programs responds to these preferences. Originating in the capital, the news carries a heavy Mexico City component, with emphasis on politics, sports, and crime. This content supports the hypothesis that the media contribute to the divergence between perceptions of crime and reported rates. Even if television did cover the leveling off in national homicide rate after 2011, that story would appear dry and abstract alongside live coverage of a multiple homicide crime scene. Bad news, for example, the arson attack on a Monterrey casino in August 2011 that killed 53 persons would likely get more vivid coverage.12

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Table 3.3 Attitude Mixes about Democracy and State Support State/Legal Institutions

Support Regime/Democracy

Yes

No

Yes

1. Liberal Democrats. Support democracy & civil rights; police should follow legal procedures

2. Hardened Democrats. Support democracy; police may exceed law to control crime

No

3. Hardened Statists. Low support for democracy; police may exceed law to control crime

4. Marginalized Indifferents. Low support for democracy and indifference about police behavior

Source: Author’s elaboration

The key intervening variable between perception of violence, criminal or otherwise, and attitude is fear. Warr and Stafford (1983) suggest a rational actor hypothesis, that the fear of victimization is a function of the perceived seriousness of an offense and the perceived likelihood that the offense may occur. Thus, while murder is far more serious than theft, the likelihood of its occurrence—at least in the society at large—is low, and thus fear of victimization in this instance should also be low. Residents are likely to be more sensitive to street robbery, car jacking, assault, and the like. On the other hand, Díaz Cayeros et al. (2011, p. 9) report the opposite: a national survey taken in Mexico shows no relationship between fear of a particular crime and the likelihood of its occurrence.13 CIDAC, the Mexico City think tank, devised a methodology that estimates the impact of different types of crime on perceptions of insecurity. It finds a mixed relationship. In descending order, the crimes with greatest impact were: kidnapping, homicides related to organized crime, armed assault, extortion, violent street robbery, non-violent street robbery, violent auto theft, non-violent

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

auto theft (CIDAC 2012, p. 17). The first two are low probability events, while the others are higher. Our particular interest is the Attitude à Behavior linkage effects on democracy and the state. How do fear and victimization take on political forms, whether positive or negative for democratic governance? As noted previously, one typical line of reasoning is that fear of victimization in settings in which violent crime is perceived as increasing leads to changes in attitudes (greater distrust of others) and behavior (measures for self-protection, support for restricting civil rights and for more repressive law enforcement). Caldeira (2000, p. 2), for example, reports ethnographic research showing that fear restricts public interactions and public spaces in the case of Sao Paulo. These restrictions tend to heighten suspicions among social groups, which in turn erode trust.14 A political sociologist reaches similar conclusions about Argentina, based on survey data. “When fear and mistrust affect the majority of social relationships, individuals refrain from participating in public activities and retreat into their own private lives” (Smulovitz 2003, p. 141). Individual national and local political contexts shape political effects. Miguel Cruz (2003) compared the effects of insecurity on regime support in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. He used 1999 survey data that measured the effects of (1) having been a victim of violent crime and (2) feelings of insecurity on (3) diffuse political support for the political system. He found that being a victim of a violent crime was a statistically significant negative predictor of regime support in all three countries, but more so in El Salvador and Guatemala than in Nicaragua. Feelings of insecurity are a negative predictor of support in El Salvador and Guatemala, but less so in Nicaragua, where other variables are more important than violence and insecurity in predicting regime support (ibid. pp. 27-28). In the case of Mexico City, Pablo Parás (2007; 2013) examined the interconnections between crime victimization (including both violent and property crime and defined more broadly to include both direct victims and members of their households), social capital, and changes in attitudes and behavior. Using a specially designed questionnaire in a representative sample survey (1006 respondents), he found that crime victimization correlates significantly with the erosion of social trust and diminished support for democracy. Mary Malone (2013) analyzed a 2008 national sample of Mexicans for relationships between crime victimization and fear of crime with respect to support for democracy and for rule of law.15 She found what I’ve labeled as hardened democrats: “(P)ersonal victimization has a

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significant impact on support for the rule of law, but not support for democracy. Victims are no less likely than non-victims to support democracy, but they are less likely to support the rule of law. That is, victims are more likely to allow authorities to act on the margins of the law to catch criminals” (Malone 2013). With respect to fear of crime she found a “neighborhood effect” and a “national effect.” Those who report feeling insecure in their immediate neighborhoods are less supportive of democracy and more likely to condone authorities’ acting outside the law. On the other hand, “respondents who were more fearful that crime was a threat to the country were more likely to state that authorities should always respect the law” (ibid. emphasis in the original). Malone speculated that the national effect may reflect respondents’ concerns about police-justice agents’ collusion with criminals. These analysts make plausible connections between the “middle links” (i.e., Fear à Attitude) in the hypothesized chain. We find a complex picture of the hardened democrat, who supports both democracy and extra-legal behavior by the police. The Attitude à Behavior connection poses additional challenges. Can we make connections to political behavior in a more direct and systematic way? With respect to self-reported political behavior in the LAPOP 2008 survey of Mexico, Malone (ibid.) found that crime victimization is more important than fear of crime with respect to respondents’ willingness to vote. Crime victims are less likely to vote for either incumbents or opposition candidates, thus indicating voter apathy. On the other hand, crime victimization (but not fear of crime) is significantly correlated with participation in legal protest activity. She notes, however, that we cannot draw a causal link, as protest might be caused by any number of factors. I extended this analysis to the LAPOP 2010 survey of Mexico, which repeats the items that Malone analyzed. The crime victimization item for the 2008 survey asks whether the person has been the victim of a crime during the past twelve months. The item in the 2010 wave goes on to specify seven specific types of crime, leaving an option of “some other type.” Twenty-six percent of the 2010 sample reported being the victim of a crime, considerably higher than the number reported for 2008 by ICESI in Figure 3.3 (above). For fear of crime, the survey asked about the person’s fear of being a victim of assault or robbery in his/her neighborhood.16 A majority (59 percent) in 2010 indicated a sense of security. The survey also asked whether the present level of criminality presents a threat to future welfare of Mexico.17 This item is less helpful, as the overwhelming majority (90 percent) answered “some” or “a lot,” in effect reproducing the whole sample. With these items we can

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

investigate some clues. Who are crime victims? What is the effect of victimization on fear? Do “insecure” differ from “secure,” and do victims differ from non-victims with respect to the mixes of attitudes about democracy and the state set out in Table 3.2? First, who are the crime victims in the LAPOP 2010 sample? They tend to be younger and male (33 percent in the 18-25 group compared with 24 percent in the sample), urban, and better educated (more with secondary or technical school completed or university study). They express about the same party preference as the overall sample: 72 percent favor no party, and the remaining 28 percent resemble the partisan preferences of the sample. Table 3.4 reports Chi square results that provide clues about whether crime victims and those who indicate fear of crime differ from non-victims and those who express a sense of security with respect to a series of items related to democracy and the state. Chi square tells us about the likelihood of the co-occurrence of nominal-level variables; it doesn’t tell us much about the strength of association, but it does orient us to what to look for in a regression analysis. As shown in Column 1 (Victim/Non-victim), crime victims are significantly more likely to indicate insecurity and to express dissatisfaction with the way in which democracy functions in Mexico.18 They are more likely to participate in a political party or movement, but are slightly less likely to vote. Victims are significantly more likely to express lack of confidence in the police and justice system and to support vigilante justice. Victims are significantly more likely to participate in protests, but both victims and non-victims generally reject contentious forms of protest, like blocking streets or invading property. Column 2 (Secure/Insecure) shows that the fearful are significantly more likely to express dissatisfaction with Mexico’s democracy but are not more likely to participate in a party or movement. They are significantly less likely to vote or to express confidence in the police and justice system and more likely to support vigilante justice. Unlike crime victims, the fearful are not more likely to participate in protests, and— like the majority of Mexicans—they generally disapprove of blocking streets or invading property What about the victims who are also fearful (Column 3)? They are significantly more dissatisfied with Mexico’s democracy, but they are less likely to participate in a party or political movement. They are less likely to vote or express confidence in the police or justice system, but not at a significant level. Fearful victims are significantly more likely to support vigilante justice and to participate in protest. But they, like the majority, disapprove of blocking streets or invading property.

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Table 3.4 Crime Victimization, Security, Participation, and Attitudes in Mexico, 2010 Victim/ Nonvictim

Secure/ Insecure

Insecure Victims

Secure /Insecure

(47.428) .000*

Satisfaction democracy

(13.959) .000*

(31.296) .000*

(10.769) 001*

Participate party or movement

(7.548) .006*

(.468) .494

(6.899) .009*

Intention to vote

(1.051) .305

(7.850) .005*

(1.221) .269

Confidence in police

(17.054) .000*

(22.958) .000*

(4.254) .119

Confidence in justice system

(10.455) .000*

(16.623) .000*

(4.534) .104

Take law in own hands

(11.569) .040*

(6.921) .009*

(5.508) .019*

Participate in protest

(11.569) .001*

(.100) .752

(10.167) .001*

Approve block streets

(.513) .474

(.011) .915

(.006) .939

Approve invade property

(.016) .900

(1.121) .290

(.192) .661

Pearson chi square in parentheses; * = significant at the .05 level. Data from Latin American Public Opinion Project, Mexico survey, 2010.

Up to this point it seems clear that crime victims express little confidence in the police-justice system and support vigilante justice. The more interesting question is: What forms might their participation take? Unfortunately, the survey lumps together participation in “a party or political movement,” which blurs what we need to know. Virtually all registered parties are pro-system and represent institutional channels of participation, while “movement” casts a broader net. When we use “participate in a party or movement” as the dependent variable in a

72

The Politics of Crime in Mexico

logistic regression model (Table 3.5) the crime victim variable remains significant, but insecure washes out. Other significant variables are “urban” (surprisingly, rural respondents participate more) and interest in politics (coded so that higher interest gives a minus sign). The strong correlation with participation in protest might suggest that participation is more related to movement than party. Table 3.5 Participate in a Party or Movement, Mexico, 2010 B

S.E.

Wald

Df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Crime Victim

.343

.170

4.071

1

.044*

1.409

Insecure

.030

.158

.037

1

.848

1.031

Satisfied with Democracy

.127

.154

.682

1

.409

1.135

Vigilante Law

.072

.155

.218

1

.640

1.075

Urban

-.387

.169

5.226

1

.022*

.679

Female

.193

.151

1.626

1

.202

1.213

Age

.110

.081

1.845

1

.174

1.116

Income

-.099

.056

2.180

1

.075

.905

Personal Econ

-.101

.099

1.031

1

.310

.904

Interest Pol

-.529

.083

40.637

1

.000*

.589

Partic Protest

1.678

.230

53.074

1

.000*

5.357

Constant

-.021

.537

.001

1

.969

.908

Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project.

*=Significant at the .05 level.

Common Crime and Democracy

73

Table 3.6 Participate in Protest or Manifestation, Mexico, 2010 B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Crime Victim

.540

.249

4.707

1

.030*

1.716

Insecure

.166

.244

.463

1

.496

1.181

Satisfied with Democracy

-.268

.240

1.245

1

.265

.765

Vigilante Law

.392

.231

2.883

1

.090

1.480

Urban

-.182

.259

.491

1

.483

.834

Female

-.073

.230

.102

1

.750

.929

Age

.409

.122

11.329

1

.001*

1.506

Income

.179

.087

4.268

1

.039*

1.196

Personal Econ

.097

.146

.436

1

.509

1.102

Interest Pol

-.323

.122

6.951

1

.008*

.724

Partic Party

1.691

.230

53.886

1

.000*

5.424

Constant

-.354

.862

25.541

1

.000

.013

Source: Data from LAPOP. *=Significant at the .05 level.

Crime victimization also holds up when we use “participate in a protest or manifestation” as the dependent variable, but insecure does not (Table 3.6). Here, older and wealthier are significant, as is interest in politics. Again, the strong correlation between participation in party or movement and in protest hints that movement is more important. My findings agree with Regina Bateson’s broader analysis of a larger sample of Latin American countries using data from both LAPOP and the Latinobarómetro: “Most strikingly, victimization is positively and significantly associated with nearly all forms of political engagement and participation in all the years of the Latinobarómetro and LAPOP surveys. This finding is sufficiently strong to suggest a causal relationship between victimization and mobilization” (Bateson 2009, p.

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The Politics of Crime in Mexico

13). Further, Bateson also found that victimization explained participation more than did fear of crime. She concludes that, “The consistency and robustness of these results indicate that there may be a true causal relationship between victimization and political mobilization in contemporary Latin America” (ibid., pp. 15-16).19 As to why victimization is associated with higher levels of participation Reynaldo Rojo-Mendoza finds that the social networks of crime victims, as well as responses from government officials, may be the keys. Based on extensive interviewing in Baja California, he reports that “Changes in their social network, specifically an increase in interactions with other-regarding individuals, may drive victims’ propensity for displaying more prosocial behavior after potentially traumatic life events. In addition, positive interactions with the criminal justice system (i.e., responsiveness) may result in increased prosocial orientations and, somewhat surprisingly, political participation” (RojoMendoza 2013, pp. 19-20; emphasis in the original). Bateson cautions against venturing beyond the victimizationparticipation relationship. “This analysis neither proves nor rules out any relationship between victimization and opinions about democracy, dictatorship, and policing tactics, and drawing any firm conclusions would require further investigation using other data or methods in the future” (ibid., p. 17).20 Opinion surveys give us blurry snapshots. But the findings support a hypothesis that victimization is associated with support for democracy in the abstract but dissatisfaction with Mexico’s democracy and a willingness to participate in a party or movement. The stronger associations with participation in protest and negative correlation with intention to vote suggest that the participation runs more toward movements than parties. The lack of confidence in the police-justice system and willingness to take the law into one’s own hands clearly points toward negative effects on the state. Also, we find no evidence of support for contentious forms of participation, like invading property or blocking streets. Thus, we have hardened democrats, those who support democracy in the abstract but are dissatisfied with how Mexico’s democracy works, who are less likely to vote but are disposed to participate in politics through lawful civil society activities. These findings are consistent with mobilized civil society that confronts a party-electoral system that insulates policy-makers from societal concerns and blunts demands to reform the police-justice system.

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Civil Society Responses: Exit and Voice

Just as the self-reported behavior in the LAPOP samples, Mexico’s civil society responded in complex ways to the challenge of insecurity. Up to the early 2000s society broadly differentiated between two different types of criminal threats: violence against ordinary people versus violence associated with organized crime, especially drug trafficking. Street assault, home invasion, and carjacking afflicted ordinary people; and kidnapping struck deep fear in all social groups, sparking mass protests and launching several anti-crime NGOs. Drug trafficking, however, was viewed differently. The violent aspects were seen as distant from ordinary life, the “settling of accounts” among traffickers and corrupt police. Top officials routinely claimed that the great bulk of drug-related violence was concentrated in the criminal community.21 Extreme cases of trafficking violence, in cities such as Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juárez, Culiacán, or Tijuana, were the exception, places where daily routines were disrupted, as we also saw with Monterrey. Over time, however, fear of DTOs permeated more widely as the public saw them diversify their activities into extortion and kidnapping and as internal drug markets expanded. With respect to voting behavior, Sandra Ley (2013) combined an aggregate dataset on the 2012 presidential election with a post-election survey and an original dataset on criminal violence to test the hypothesis that voters living in settings of high levels of criminal violence are less likely to turn out to vote than those living in counties with lower levels of violence. Her main finding is that “violent criminal activity deters voters from going to the polls on election day” (ibid., p. 2). We can explore other types of civil society responses to insecurity on two levels. One is individuals, households, and business firms and another is collective expressions ranging from neighborhood groups through national-level associations. Varieties of Self-Help

Self-help is a rational response to perceptions that government is incapable of providing adequate security. Individuals and groups “abandon” government and turn to self help. The most typical responses are to “harden the target” by changing personal routines, self-arming, and adjusting the immediate physical setting (armored vehicles, better street lighting, home alarm systems) or engage in forms of citizen vigilantism by using force against perceived criminals.

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Self-help can entail physical flight, within or out of the country. Portes and Hoffman (2003) cite emigration from Latin America as a response to insecurity. Wood et al. (2010) take the analysis a step further. Using Latinobarometro data from 2002-2004, they report that bring a crime victim has a positive and statistically significant effect on intentions to migrate. “Other things being equal, respondents who declared that they or a member of their family had been a victim of a crime in the year prior to the survey were 1.304 times more likely to have seriously considered the possibility of leaving their home country and moving their family to the United States compared to those who did not report that a family member had been victimized” (ibid., p. 18). We lack systematic surveys on emigration from Mexico due to fear of crime and rely on press accounts. One report estimated that 230,000 Mexicans were displaced as of 2010, about half to the US.22 Victor Clark Alfaro, head of the Human Rights Binational Center in Tijuana, stated that, “According to business organizations, more than 1,000 families have fled Tijuana for fear of becoming kidnapping and violence victims.”23 Mexican Employers’ Federation President Ricardo Gonzalez stated that, "a significant number" of businessmen working along the US-Mexican border have transferred their offices to US cities to escape crime and extortion threats in Mexico. Some business owners in the border cities of Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez have moved their operations to San Diego and to El Paso, Texas.24 In short, some substantial number of Mexicans effectively voted with their feet. With respect to urban design, Regalado Santillán (2002, p. 186), for example, reports that Zapopan, a suburb of Guadalajara, approved 75 gated neighborhoods, with new applications arriving daily. Backyards, large windows, and patios are slowly disappearing from Guadalajara houses, replaced by high walls and exterior bars. Houses are becoming fortresses, with a stark construction style and reflect a sense of fear. Building security has become an important element of building plans. The prototype of a secure house has many elements of a jail . . . (ibid.).

In general, this basic pattern reproduces itself on a daily basis, especially in parts of the country in which common crime is perceived as escalating.25 With respect to large-scale economic enterprises, the American Chamber/Mexico found that 45 percent of the companies responding to a questionnaire indicated that their company was less secure in 2011 than the year before (up 10 percent over the year before). Fifty-eight

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percent cited the strengthening of organized crime as the principal reason. Assaults on employees were the main problem cited, followed by attacks on the transport system of supplies and products. Improvement in security was due to the companies’ own actions (80 percent) as opposed to government initiatives (20 percent). About 40 percent indicated they spent roughly two percent of their operating costs on security, which is relatively less than in other countries (cf. seven percent in the United States). Most of their investment went to control over access to facilities, training, closed-circuit television, alarms and guards. About one-third of the transnational companies had cut back on visits to Mexico due to the situation of insecurity (American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico 2011). Markets responded to effective demand for self help with a robust expansion of the private security industry. This largely unexplored industry ranges from “high-end” national and multi-national firms that provide a wide range of services to “low-end,” unarmed watchmen working below the minimum wage.26 Police officials in August 2008 estimated that about 80 percent of some of 10,000 private security firms (PSFs), employing about 40 percent of the personnel, operated informally nationwide. The majority of the private firms were run by exmilitary personnel or former police officials from the federal or state levels.27 Given the perceived shortcomings of the regular police, the PSFs provide an essential service. At the same time, the firms can also create serious problems. Knowledge about families and businesses, routines, and vulnerabilities, give private security personnel opportunities to extort their employers. PSFs also can provide a means to pursue private justice. In one reported case, for example, a businessman hired a PSF to confront bodyguards who were extorting him. Business groups learned over time to create protection units (“células de protección”) to do investigation and settle accounts.28 Also, PSFs can be created or penetrated by DTOs, which can use them to train their personnel, legally acquire weapons and technology, launder money, and gather intelligence about police-justice agencies and operations.29 The Calderón administration reportedly stepped up efforts to investigate, license, and supervise the PSFs in 2007-2008.30 In contrast to self-protection, negative “market solutions” include social cleansing and contract justice, when PSFs or individual contractors are hired to settle disputes or eliminate targeted groups. Press reports provide some extreme examples. A group calling itself the Pro-Juárez Citizen Command (“Comando Ciudadano pro Juárez”) and claiming financial support from the local business community announced that it would execute a criminal each day, inviting the public

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to email information about targets. In Tijuana a report indicated that some families of kidnap victims (successfully rescued) subsequently ordered the execution of the kidnappers. A restaurateur in Mexico City reportedly hired sicarios to kidnap and murder an associate who refused to pay a debt. Also in Mexico City, two sicarios who broke from a DTO (“La Familia”) hired themselves out as contract killers. According to them, an intermediary contacts them, provides a photo of the target, and the sicarios guarantee service within 48 hours.31 To be expected, the privatization of dispute settlement and justice administration raised profoundly troubling issues. Informed Mexicans were aware of Colombia’s unhappy experience with self-defense forces created to combat kidnapping. In effect, most of those forces mutated into violent criminal enterprises. The issue became a national polemic in Mexico in October-November 2009. Mauricio Fernández, the outspoken PAN mayor of a suburb of Monterrey stated that he was assembling a “cleaning crew” (“grupo de limpieza”) to act extra-legally to expel kidnappers from his city. His statement resonated when four men were found murdered in Mexico City. Messages left with the bodies indicated that the men were kidnappers. In this case, Mayor Fernández commented publicly on the deaths before Mexico City authorities had made a public statement. The mayor indicated that he was interested in the case because one of the men was supposedly seeking permission to kill him. The federal interior minister issued a statement condemning extra-official justice, and the mayor was supposedly chastised by the president of his party.32 Comparing the Mexican case with Russia’s PSFs in the 1990s is instructive. According to Volkov (2002) the collapse of the Soviet system in the late 1980s created a Hobbesian world of lawlessness in which private protection evolved over time from extortion to protection rackets to “enforcement partnerships” to more sophisticated and multifaceted PSFs. The latter appeared toward the end of the 1990s with the reemergence of a more coherent state. They were able to displace the cruder forms of protection because of their competence and connections with state agencies.33 As a preliminary hypothesis, it would seem that Mexico remained at a low equilibrium in which a weak state was unable to form alliances with PSFs to suppress cruder forms of extortion. Pitching In

Individual citizens and groups actively voiced dissatisfaction with Mexico’s government performance in citizen security. Protest can also be muffled or distorted in a context in which organized crime can both

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intimidate and corrupt media and civil society. Reporters can be coerced or bribed, and protests against anti-crime initiatives can be hired and paid for by criminal organizations. An important factor is violence directed against the media. The International Federation of Journalists in 2007 graded Mexico as the most dangerous Latin American country for journalists who report on crime and corruption. The Federation’s report cited the murders of 10 investigative reporters, putting Mexico well ahead of second-place Colombia (five cases) and Venezuela. In addition, four reporters were reported missing, on par with Paraguay as worst in the region.34 As to elite protest, leaders of the major national business and industrial associations issued blunt denunciations of government performance. For example, the Employers Confederation of Mexico (Confederación Patronal de México, COMPARMEX) took out newspaper ads in 2008 questioning the government’s anti-crime performance, and its president declared, “Our authorities are always tardy.” The president of National Chamber of Commerce (Cámara Nacional de Comercio, CANACO) denounced police corruption and said that “the power of criminality has succeed in overwhelming the leadership of the police forces.” The president of the Nacional Chamber of Transformation Industries (Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación, CANACINTRA) said that security expenses add 3-4 percent to the costs of finished goods. The business leaders’ tone was harsh: “The private sector insisted that every time they raise their voice and demand accountability, the answer is rejection (descalificaciones), more bureaucracy, political alibis, blame-gaming, humiliations, and—of course—more crime, more brutality.”35 Beyond complaining, with the notable exceptions of Monterrey and Ciudad Juárez, it wasn’t obvious that businesses or business organizations took significant concrete actions to work with government for broader solutions. Voice also includes street protest, and—given the unresponsiveness of government to citizens’ demands during the long PRI hegemony and the limited responsiveness in the current democracy—Mexicans have a lively tradition of taking to the streets. Street protests against crime and impunity can take pacific forms, such as prayers for peace, or disruptive forms, such as blocking highways. These have been held at the local, state, and national levels.36 The problem has been to maintain the momentum of mass marches by, for example, creating effective NGOs and to force responses from political parties and the police-justice system. The parties, however, are institutionally “cushioned” from public pressure, and reform of the police-justice system is a slow and erratic process.

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Conclusions: Give up or Push on?

My analysis captures something of the political responses of a society experiencing serial shocks beginning in the early 1980s, with a sudden spike in violent crime after 2006. We find mixed tendencies for citizens to opt out or to pitch in with regard to supporting democratic governance. Following general trends in the region, crime victims tend not to opt out in all respects. They tend to vote in lesser proportions than non-victims, but they participate in parties and social organizations more than non-victims. Furthermore, judging from sustained levels of electoral turnout in recent years some aspects of Mexico’s democracy appear resilient.37 The unknown factor is the extent to which crimerelated insecurity will generate contentious forms of participation that spill outside conventional party-electoral and interest-group activity. A virtue of presidentialism is regular elections, with renewed hope and expectations that a new team can push on to improve citizen security and maintain efforts to strengthen rule of law. In this regard, Enrique Peña Nieto signaled his intention to modify some aspects of Felipe Calderón’s strategy, but also to build on the accumulated investments and knowledge. For our interest in competitive statemaking, the main finding is that some sectors of civil society remained actively engaged in civic life.

Notes 1

Hugo Almada, miembro del Observatorio Juarense de Seguridad Pública, “Empresarios denuncian extorsión de militares,” quoted in: ElUniversal.com.mx, December 6, 2009. 2 “…el proceso de generación de estadísticas está viciado de origen; por ello, se podría rechazar la ‘objetividad’ que puedan presentar las estadísticas, y señalar que no son validas ni confiables. Y, así, todo análisis, conclusión y decisión tomada a partir de dichas estadísticas, no serán útiles.” Mexico’s datacollection problems are typical of the Latin America region. See Dammert et al. 2010. Van Dijk (2008, pp. 15-40) essentially dismisses police reports of crime more generally as useless or even misleading. 3 Some of the limitations of victimization surveys stem from how and where they are conducted. Normally, surveys are performed through face-toface interviews with adults age 18 and over, conducted in homes selected from a representative sample. They ask respondents, among other things, whether they were victims of criminal activity during a period of time, usually the previous year. Thus, this methodology tends not to capture crimes against minors, crimes against businesses or corporations, crimes that may have occurred at home but which the victim does not feel comfortable reporting in the presence of relatives, and even “victimless” crimes in which the respondent may have

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participated, such as drug abuse. Victimization surveys also might overestimate the occurrence of criminal activity when the respondent reports a crime that occurred outside of the survey period, or when an event is cited but does not legally constitute a crime (Bailey and Flores-Macias 2007, p. 16). 4 Homcidio doloso is the term for intentional homicide; homocidio culposo is unintentional homicide. The SNSP data record the homicides as reported to police and prosecutors, while the INEGI data are those reported by death certificates in the civil registry and validated by health authorities. INEGI provides more information about homicide victims (gender, age, occupation, residence, and place of death) than does the SNSP but with a time lag of two years. 5 As discussed in Chapter 6, joint operations were special deployments of military personnel and federal police after 2006 to targeted areas for relatively short periods. 6 INEGI has also done national victimization surveys, which cover 2011 and 2012. 7 Tabasco (technical problems) and Tamaulipas (insecurity) were not included in the 2008 survey. 8 The Mexico City metropolitan area (ZCMex) was not included in the 2004 survey. 9 Bergman emphasizes structural factors to account for the rapid increase in crime. “[The data] clearly suggest that the major changes in employment structures are strongly associated with criminality. The two-fold rise in unemployment among young males parallels the two-fold increase in reported crime. This robust evidence suggests that adverse labor market conditions have a significant causal effect on crime” (ibid., 86). Bergman had access to the office of the presidency’s survey data. 10 The survey by telephone was carried out June and July 2011 with a sample of 3275. Telephone surveys usually over represent middle and upper strata respondents. 11 Data provided by Consulta Mitofsky, November 2006; data on content ratings provided by IBOPE, Mexico, November 2006. 12 “Atacan casino en NL; 53 muertos,” ElUniversal.com.mx, August 26, 2011. 13 They write: “Individuals' estimation of their likelihood of becoming a victim seems to be independent of the victimization rate. For instance, citizens are equally afraid of being kidnapped than of being blackmailed over the phone, even though the prevalence of those two incidents is very different: according to the SPSGM survey, 1 percent of Mexicans have been kidnapped, and 1 out of every 4 has been extorted over the phone. If we suppose that the ‘objective’ probability of being victim of a crime is related to the current victimization rate, then, the gap between the actual rate of victims and the proportion of individuals who are afraid of being a victim could be thought of as the ‘subjective’ probability of becoming a victim, which we arguably can approximate to fear.” 14 Villarreal and Silva (2006, p. 1725) “…examine the effects of social cohesion and neighborhood disorder on crime using data from a survey of neighborhoods in Brazil. We find that lower-income neighborhoods, including irregular settlements known as favelas, have higher levels of social cohesion. Contrary to the results of research in US urban areas, we find that greater cohesion among neighborhood residents is not significantly associated with

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lower levels of crime, and it is in fact associated with a higher perceived risk of victimization. By contrast, neighborhood social and physical disorder increases violent victimization, but does not affect residents’ perceived risk of being victimized. We argue that the effect of social cohesion on risk perception is explained by the greater spread of information regarding crimes occurring in more cohesive neighborhoods where residents interact more frequently with each other.” 15 Malone uses data from Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project. The victimization item asks: “Were you the victim of a type of crime in the past twelve months?” The sociotropic item asks: “Now speaking of the country as a whole, how much do you think that the level of crime we have currently represents a threat to our wellbeing in the future?” The local item asks: “Now speaking of the neighborhood in which you live, and thinking of the possibility of being a victim of an assault or robbery, do you feel (l) very safe; (2) somewhat safe; (3) somewhat unsafe; (4) very unsafe”? For democracy: “With which of the following statement do you agree the most? (1) For people like me, a democratic regime is the same as an undemocratic one; (2) democracy is better than any other form of government; (3) in some circumstances an authoritarian government can be better than a democratic one.” For rule of law: “To capture criminals, do you think that authorities (1) should always respect the law or (0) on occasion act on the margin of the law”? 16 “Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a), o muy inseguro(a)?” I recoded options 1 and 2 as 1, and options 3 and 4 as 0. 17 “Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro?” I recoded in the same way as the fear item. 18 The question put this way is more useful than the Churchillian version: Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government. Over 80 percent of Mexicans in the 2010 sample agree. 19 Mary Malone checked for multicollinearity and found that “The logistic regression results in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 are not compromised by problems with multicollinearity. In some cases there are relatively high levels of correlation among the independent variables; for example, the Pearson’s r between victimization and fear of crime is -.175 and significant at the .001 level. However, these relatively high correlations among the independent variables do not shape the results of the logistic regression analyses reported here. The variables that are insignificant in the multivariate logistic regression models are also insignificant at the bivariate level, as measured by Pearson’s r. Furthermore, when fear of crime was included without the victimization variable in logistic regression models, fear of crime remained insignificant” (personal communication, August 12, 2013). 20 In a subsequent study, Bateson (2012, p. 570) found: “Analysis of survey data from five continents shows that individuals who report recent crime victimization participate in politics more than comparable non-victims. Rather than becoming withdrawn or disempowered, crime victims tend to become more engaged in civic and political life.” 21 For example, then-secretary of interior Fernando Gómez Mont initially dismissed the massacre of 16 young persons in Juárez in January 2010, as a

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gang dispute. (“La masacre en Juárez, pleito entre pandillas: Gómez Mont,” Proceso.com.mx, February 2, 2010) 22 “La ‘guerra’ ha expulsado de sus hogares a 230 mil personas,” Jornada.unam.mx, March 26, 2011. 23 Frontera January 22, 2009, (pp. 1, 2A). As another example, security problems in 2008 prompted at least 60 gas station owners to flee Tijuana for fear of criminal violence. “There are only 15 or 17 owners, and the employees, remaining. It’s a tough situation. Large companies like Marinero de Guaymas and Grupo Eco have moved their main offices to other states,” asserted Joaquin Aviña, head of the Tijuana Gas Station Owners’ Association.” (Frontera, January 22, 2009, front page, 2A) 24 “Mexican businessmen flee to US to avoid crime,” The Associated Press, April 1, 2009. 25 Residents in the downtown neighborhood of Mitras Centro in Monterrey reportedly took a series of measures to protect themselves from a spike in home robberies, including distributing professional referees’ whistles to signal the presence of suspicious characters. (“Preocupa inseguridad a vecinos de Mitras,” ElNorte.com, March 15, 2009) The manager of a local Tijuana armoring company reported that the demand for armored vehicles had increased 30 percent in the last year. Most clients are Tijuana businessmen, who request level ‘four’ and ‘five’ protection against kidnappings. Six to seven vehicles are armored every month in Tijuana. (Frontera, front page; El Mexicano , p. 17A), June 11, 2008] Some businessmen in Rosarito were reportedly investing more in their personal safety than in their enterprises, and those who can manage their businesses from San Diego. “We businessmen live in fear of being kidnapped. You don’t know when it might happen to you. We are now investing more in security than in our own companies,” stated a local hotel owner in Rosarito. (El Mexicano, p. 17A, November 16, 2007).2 26 Regalado Santillán, 2002. For example, an Israeli company was contracted to train anti-kidnapping police in Baja California Norte. (“Grupo israelí capacitará agentes de BC in anti-plagio,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 9, 2007) Some wealthy businessmen in Tijuana reportedly spend up to $80,000 USD per year on safety, according to former president of the Tijuana Maquila Association, Alberto Arce. (El Mexicano, front page, October 19, 2007) The growth of private security to confront increasing insecurity is a general trend. See, for example, “Security Guards Become the Front Line in India,” NewYorkTimes.com, March 2, 2009. 27 “Al margen de la ley, casi 8 mil empresas de seguridad privada,” Jornada.unam.mx, August 6, 2008; “Para bajar costos, los negocios sacrifican calidad y utilizan companñías patito, admiten,” ibid., April 25, 2008. 28 “’Vigilantes’ contra la delincuencia,” ElUniversal.com.mx, January 29, 2009. 29 “Cárteles penetran seguridad privada,” ElUniversal.com.mx, May 30, 2010. 30 “’Limpian’ empresas de protección privada,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 1, 2008. The organized crime division of the Attorney General’s office has investigated PSFs in various states on suspicion of money laundering. (“Realiza la SIEDO investigación y cateos de compañías sospechosas en el norte del país,” Jornada.unam.mx, June 16, 2008)

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31

2009.

“‘Vigilantes’ contra la delincuencia,” ElUniversal.com.mx, January 29,

32 “‘Grupo de limpieza’ de San Pedro, ilegal,” Impreso.milenio.com, November 4, 2009. 33 Gounev and Bezlov (2008) find a similar pattern with respect to auto insurance companies in post-Communist Bulgaria. Criminal groups selling “protection” to auto owners were displaced by regulated insurance companies, which applied enough informal coercion to take control. 34 “Mexico, país mas peligroso para informar sobre crimen y corrupción,” Jornada.unam.mx, January 3, 2007. 35 See “Reprueba Coparmex combate anticrimen,” ElUniversal.com.mx, August 12, 2008. 36 For example, a group of residents, led by three homemakers, organized a campaign called “A Safe Baja California: United in Prayer for Peace.” On February 29 at 7:00 p.m., thousands of Baja households will light a white candle as a sign of peace. The organizers say that it is organizing a joint prayer to reestablish peace and tranquility in Baja California. They plan at least four massive ‘actions for peace’ during the year. (La Frontera, front page, February, 21, 2008) The Catholic Church in Durango, the PRI in Aguascalientes, and the Youth for Peace movement in Chihuahua held silent marches on the same day to protest against violence and insecurity. (“Marchan contra la violence en tres estados,” Jornada.unam.mx, June 23, 2008) In January 2009 hundreds of residents of Villanueva, Zacatecas, blocked the federal highway to Guadalajara to protest local police complicity in a wave of kidnappings and to demand greater presence of the army. (“Ola de plagios subleva a zacatecanos,” ElUniversal.com.mx, February 2, 2009). 37 At 63 percent voter turnout the 2012 presidential election was slightly above the average since 2000, and at 45 percent the 2009 midterm election was about 6 points below the average since 1997. See “Voter Turnout Data for Mexico,” Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (available at: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=157#pres; last accessed on June 26, 2013).

4 Organized Crime: Theory and Applications to Kidnapping

“Because, perhaps what most accelerated and detonated kidnapping is not just action by criminals, along with a police officer or prosecutor unable to stop them. It’s much worse: actions by criminals covered up, carried out, and exacerbated by the police itself. When the police itself nurtured criminality, the problem of insecurity in the country was exacerbated.” —President Felipe Calderón, September 20091 “The enemy is inside the police.” —Former police officer sentenced for kidnapping2 “If crime is organized, why aren’t we?” —Banner hung by an NGO over a busy Mexico City avenue, November 20103

In November 2007 a PAN representative from Baja California on the floor of the federal Chamber of Deputies received a cell phone call and heard what she thought was the voice of her son weeping and pleading for help because he had been kidnapped. She burst into tears, called out for help, and then fainted. In a period of 15 hours at least 25 PAN representatives received similar extortion calls. The family members of the representatives alleged to be kidnapped were confirmed safe. These weren’t politically-motivated threats. They were “virtual” kidnappings, well-rehearsed telephone calls made by practiced criminals in order to extort money from vulnerable family members. In this case the caller simply changed the last two digits of the phone numbers in a sequence of calls.4 The threats were false but the terror was quite real, and virtually everyone is a target. Security traps significantly undermine the quality of democracy in Mexico and most Latin American countries. The traps are situations in which crime, corruption, violence, and impunity become mutually

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reinforcing in their interactions with government and civil society and reinforce low equilibrium in the form of poor quality democratic governance. The result is an ongoing struggle between criminal elements and the ethical agents of the state and civil society to shape the quality of democratic governance. Mexico is a “middle tier” country on most measures of citizen security in the regional context but ranks at the low end with respect to confidence in the police and compliance with the law. Mexico also ranks at the extreme, along with Colombia in the 1980s-90s and present-day Guatemala, with respect to organized crime, especially kidnapping and the powerful, hyper-violent drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), Chapters 4 and 5 form an integrated pair. In this chapter I treat two topics. First, with respect to theory, I discuss organized crime in functional terms, differentiating between enterprise crime and protection-extortion. In practice, the two types typically reinforce each other. I then consider networks and territory-bound groups as organizational forms that interact with common crime and with governments in different ways. Finally, I apply the framework to examine kidnapping as a high-impact form of organized crime that has significant political implications. Why focus on kidnapping among the many different types of organized crime? First, along with armed robbery, it is the most feared by the public in general and by elites in particular.5 In December 2012, President Enrique Peña Nieto included kidnapping as one of the top five offenses to be targeted in his citizen security program. In political terms, kidnapping may have the capacity to mobilize elites to demand effective government security policies. It may also reinforce “exit” strategies whereby elites seek self-protection. Second, former and active-duty police are frequently involved in kidnapping, underlining the problem of impunity as a key factor of insecurity. Third, some kidnapping scandals have sparked mass mobilizations, energizing government anti-crime initiatives. Fourth, some incidents remind the public that anti-system groups continue to operate on the fringes of Mexican political life. Finally, kidnapping is interrelated in complex ways with DTOs, with some relying on it as a revenue source more than others. I orient Chapters 4 and 5 according to the following questions: What forms of organized crime under what circumstance most undermine Mexico’s democracy and state capacity? Furthermore, what factors influence criminal groups’ decisions to opt for evasion, corruption, or confrontation in their dealings with governments? Although violent confrontation is at the center of current debates, corruption ought to be considered the gravest threat to regime and state, in two senses: first,

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corruption can penetrate the police-justice system to a degree that significantly undermines public trust; second, corruption can penetrate beyond the police-justice system and reach into electoral politics and higher levels of policy-making to approach state capture. Both senses of corruption operate as negative feedback loops to reinforce low equilibrium, or a security trap. Apart from corruption, criminal groups may also opt to confront the state. Violent DTOs have intimidated a number of Mexico’s municipalities,6 and may exert sufficient violence long enough to force the federal government to retreat from efforts to repress them. In terms of the framework set out in Table 1.1, the focus of this chapter shifts from the top half (diffuse crime) toward the bottom half, with more complex forms of crime acting on regime and state. Organized Crime and Criminal Organizations

Like cancer or heart disease, the terms common crime, organized crime, and criminal organizations cover multitudes of diverse phenomena. In the narrowest sense, crime is behavior of commission or omission that violates formal rules established by governments. Such rules and their applications in the justice system are not neutral but rather are products of political processes that reflect power dynamics in a society. I use “common crime” in this narrow sense to refer to violations of formal rules by individuals or by small groups. The violations can be spontaneous or calculated, nonviolent (e.g., embezzlement or tax evasion) or violent (e.g., homicide or robbery). In a broader sense, we also know that crime is socially constructed, the types of behavior that are considered to be criminal. As we saw in Chapter 3, about threequarters of violent crime in Mexico as reported in victimization surveys was committed by a single person or by groups of two or three. Organized crime assumes many different forms, and its meanings are strongly contested, but it is qualitatively different from common crime on two crucial dimensions: time and numbers.7 Organized crime involves planned actions over time by multiple colluding actors whose objectives are illegal and warrant substantial penalty.8 Organized crime refers to illicit activities. Insurance fraud, for example, may involve doctors, lawyers, administrators, and “victims”; migrant smuggling may combine recruiters, transporters, and employers; retail distribution of illegal drugs can be managed by large, multi-neighborhood bands or small groups of associates. The point is that the broad notion of organized crime allows for many different types of criminal organizations, ranging from tight vertical hierarchies of members with long-term commitments, to looser, more ephemeral and non-hierarchical

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networks, and a range of various mixes in between (Bailey and Ortega 2010, pp. 1-2). The line between common and organized crime can be blurry or clear. For example, three friends out for the evening spot an unlocked car and decide to steal the packages in the back seat. Alternatively, a dysfunctional family carries out a dozen kidnap-for-ransom operations over a period of eighteen months. Or, a core group of five individuals coordinates a changing cast of fifty associates in a drug-trafficking enterprise over a period of three years. The first example illustrates the typical boundary of common crime, while the latter two examples fall clearly in the terrain of organized crime and illustrate the diversity of organizational forms. So, we should think of along two continuums: one or a few assailants to many; and a one-time act to long-term associations. Further, these types of crime overlap and interact in complex ways. Two types of organized crime are most important for our interest in democratic governance. One type is enterprise crime, which engages in profitable lines of illicit business, such as kidnapping, drug distribution, auto theft, gambling or prostitution. The goal is crime for profit. Our interest is when some of the profits are paid in order to corrupt public officials. Again, the key issue is the extent to which the corruption penetrates beyond police and street-level regulators and extends into democratic processes, such as elections, higher-level appointments, and policy-making; and state functions, especially justice administration. The least studied forms of enterprise crime in Mexico involve the whitecollar business and professional world, with activities such as fraud, counterfeiting, money-laundering, price-fixing, tax and regulatory evasion, and the like. White-collar crimes are highly significant in terms of quantities of money and involvement of socio-political elites, as we saw with respect to tax evasion and capital flight in Chapter 2.9 A second type of organized crime is more significant for its ability to intimidate and extort in particular regions. With respect to Central America, the UNODC (2012, p. 21) calls these “territory-bound organized crime groups,” which I’ll call territorial gangs or groups. They appear in Mexico as well, often interacting with transnational smuggling networks. Territorial gangs may generate income through enterprise activities, but their main attribute is their ability to control a given territory through coercion or intimidation and to “tax” both licit and illicit activities. With control through intimidation, they share one key quality of what Gambetta (1993, p. 227) suggests distinguishes the Sicilian mafia from other forms of criminality. Gambetta (1993, p. 155), however, includes some traits that the Mexican gangs usually do not

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show, characterizing the mafia “as that set of firms which (1) are active in the protection industry under a common trademark with recognizable features; (2) acknowledge one another as the legitimate suppliers of authentic Mafioso protection; and (3) succeed in preventing the unauthorized use of their trademark by pirate firms.” Further, Sicilian mafia clans tended to put down roots in particular locales. We shall find that the Mexican territorial groups in the first decades of the 21st century are highly fluid and can be intensely competitive; in many cases, however, they cannot prevent common criminals from using their “trademarks” to intimidate victims. Also, rather than the nuanced forms of protection that the Sicilian mafia provided, the Mexican gangs more typically employ outright extortion. Territorial groups that acquire enough force to intimidate state and federal levels of government present the gravest threat, because they can challenge the state’s claim to monopolize coercion. Whereas most forms of enterprise crime evade or corrupt state agents, territorial groups claim turf and may opt to confront. As we shall see, dedicated kidnapping gangs are much less likely than DTOs to evolve from enterprise to territorial status; but territorial groups frequently engage in kidnapping for profit or as a violent tool with multiple applications. Criminal organizations can assume a variety of forms. In addition to stationary hierarchies, the notions of networks and markets are useful.10 Toine Spapens (2010) suggests three concepts that help organize our analysis. First, the criminal macro network, or “the set of individuals who have the motivation, the skills, and the access to the resources needed to engage successfully in organized criminal activity.” Second, the criminal collective, is the “subset of members of the criminal macro network who are, at a given point in time, actively executing a criminal business process.” Finally, the criminal business process is a “collection of related and structured activities designed to produce a specific illegal product, service, or other output prohibited by law, such as theft or fraud” (Spapens 2010, p. 195). In practical terms in the Mexican case, one might think of the criminal macro network as relationships formed in prison, service in the police or armed forces, family and friendship ties, or youth gangs. The key is useful skills and sufficient trust among individuals to allow communications and joint action. The criminal collective is the group that an organizer assembles from the macro network to carry out specific tasks. It consists of skilled and unskilled workers and entrepreneurs who can finance the criminal activity. The collective operates with two types of internal relations: “business relations,” or interactions among the entrepreneurs; and “working relations,” or dealings between the

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organizer, workers, and facilitators (Spapens 2010, pp. 202-205). Those at the business-relations level try to insulate themselves from the working-relations level. A collective may engage in a one-off operation and disband or it might mutate over time with an evolving cast of characters. We might think of the criminal business process as the phases of activities involved in illegal enterprises. It varies according to the type of crime. At a simple level, “express kidnapping,” as discussed below, the process can be small-scale and straightforward: two friends acquire a vehicle (steal a car, coerce a cab driver), select a target (a well-dressed woman walking alone), seize and subdue the target, force the victim to withdraw funds from an ATM and call family or friends for more money, release the victim once the money is gathered, and dispose of the vehicle. The skill set is rudimentary; weapons and equipment are basic (knife, handgun, disposable cell phone); and there’s no need to launder the assets. The main political effect is to generate anxiety in the public. Transnational drug trafficking takes us to the other end of the continuum of scale and complexity. Here we need to think in terms of the “industrial organization” and “economic geography” of the business process. But the basics remain the same. There is a macro network strung out over several countries, and organizers assemble criminal collectives to carry out specific operations. Some of the participants are highly skilled and others are unskilled; entrepreneurs try to insulate themselves from organizers and workers. As we’ll see in Chapter 5, cocaine trafficking likely involves scores of criminal collectives engaged in hundreds of criminal business processes in a given year. Network theory gives us a useful image but it has a number of problems. Network boundaries are hard to define; data are difficult to gather; the theory can’t predict specific situations. Rather, the main contribution of network theory is to organize our thinking about the possibilities of types of criminal organizations in relation to different business processes. How might we conceptualize the different types of criminal organizations and their interrelationships? As a stylized simplification, Figure 4.1 depicts three levels of crime and their interactions as a kind of static layer cake. A more accurate depiction would look like an animated marble cake, as the various layers flow into one another. The top layer represents transnational smuggling organizations, the middle depicts territorial groups, and the bottom depicts the more diffuse types

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of common crime committed by single assailants or small groups. The layers, in turn, are influenced by cultures of legal non-compliance. To the extent possible, transnational criminal organizations (the alpha groups) prefer methods of evasion and corruption in their dealings with law enforcement. Violence and confrontation are bad for business. If overland routes are taken, they need the support of territorial gangs (beta and gamma groups), which can provide logistical support, protection, and tactical intelligence, for example, how much specific officials need to be bribed in order to move products without interference. If maritime routes are used, the alphas still need territorybound groups at the ports and for transshipment to border-crossing points. But these territory-bound crime groups often engage in violent conflicts among themselves, and some of them attack TCOs to steal their products. These dynamics interact with diffuse common crime such as robbery, assault, and extortion on streets and in communities. As noted, the layers rest on a base of widespread legal non-compliance by the citizenry as a whole, a civic culture which facilitates illegality. Geographically, criminal organizations can operate along a spectrum from a specific neighborhood to the regional, national, and transnational levels.11 The notion of transnational crime takes on a distinctive character in border zones where local groups operate across national boundaries on a routine basis. The fourteen major twin cities (e.g., Tijuana-San Diego, Juárez-El Paso) along the US-Mexico border, and the Tri-border Region that conjoins Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, are examples. Both enterprise and territorial forms of organized crime generally operate within the existing political order and exert an overall “conservative” effect. This is the case of youth gangs or auto thieves, in contrast to guerrillas or terrorists, who pursue more political goals such as regime change or destruction of state institutions. The latter can converge with organized crime, however, when they operate as enterprise or protection-extortion organizations to raise money to finance their political activities. More striking in Mexico’s case is the adoption by some DTOs of terrorist tactics, such as beheadings or grenade attacks on television stations or at patriotic celebrations, as measures to intimidate rival gangs, police, and the general public. But we should avoid lumping traffickers together with terrorists under a label of “narco-terrorism.” The techniques may overlap, but their agendas are quite different. Traffickers operate within a low-equilibrium political system and reinforce it; insurgents operate against the regime and state. Both may use terror tactics. This distinction becomes relevant when we look at government responses to organized crime in Chapter 6.

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The relationships between criminal organizations and governments are dynamic. The goals and methods of the organizations change as a function of markets, civil society pressures, and public policies. Gangs may evolve from neighborhood-level, solidarity-type organizations focused on turf-protection to more complex forms of organization and interactions with political authorities from the local to the transnational levels.12 Criminal organizations can attack democracy through the logic and mechanics of electoral competition, responsiveness of governments to electorates, and protection of essential rights. They do so through direct physical assaults upon, or the corruption or intimidation of, elected or appointed officials with respect to electoral processes, rule-making and the policy-relevant levels of rule-implementation (i.e., the level of administrative appointees that connects elected officials to the administrative apparatus). Violent confrontation merits attention here, but intimidation and corruption are more common. Their common targets are voters, candidates for office, election processes, legislators, and higher-level elected or appointed officials. The targets can range from municipalities to the national government. The issue of organized crime involvement in the state elections in Michoacán in November 2011 touched a nerve and shaped debates in the 2012 presidential elections.13 Crimes against the state target state attributes such as national boundaries, sovereignty, or military forces, or state functions such as administration of justice. Terrorism by DTOs, for example, is a repertoire of acts intended to sow fear and undermine public confidence in the state. Corruption and confrontation can be crimes against the state when they target the state’s security apparatus or its agents of justice or regulation. Toward a Stylized Model of Criminal and State Interactions

As depicted in Table 4.1, in analytic terms we have three overlapping sets of complex actors: criminal organizations (discussed above), along with what I’ll call “disloyal” state actors and agencies engaged in criminality, and “loyal” state actors and organizations that attempt to behave ethically and legally.14 At the core of the disloyal state is a subset of police as individual officers, units, or whole agencies acting illegally. Disloyal police can defect separately as criminal actors or in alliance with criminal organizations as part of a macro network, criminal collective, or criminal business process. Similarly, they can operate mostly independently of the loyal state or in alliance with such formal

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actors as mayors or governors. Another subset of police and collections of agencies and individuals in the loyal state behave mostly legally (bottom row). Cooperation between defecting police and formal state actors indicates that corruption has penetrated policy-making levels. It is possible, however, that loyal state actors such as mayors and governors might insulate themselves in order to avoid collusion. Table 4.1 Modes of Interaction between Criminal Organizations and the State Stable Equilibrium

UnstableTransitional

Evasion

Corruption

Confrontation

Disloyal State Actors/Agencies

Limited Defection: individuals, units

Extensive Defection: units, systemic

Limited or Extensive Defection

Loyal State Actors/Agencies

Tolerance (Disruption)

Collusion (Cooptation)

Repression

Criminal Organizations

Source: Author’s elaboration

Patterns of interactions between criminal organizations and government agencies can be simplified as variants on three possibilities: evasion, corruption, and confrontation by the criminal groups (top row), and tolerance, collusion, and repression by the loyal agencies (bottom row). Column 1 of Table 4.1 depicts a high equilibrium in which criminal organizations evade, loyal state actors tolerate, and disloyal actors defect in limited ways. Column 2 suggests a low equilibrium in which criminal organizations corrupt, loyal state actors defect and collude with criminal groups, and disloyal actors defect more extensively. Column 3 shows an unstable-transitional equilibrium in which criminal groups confront the loyal state and disloyal state actors can choose limited or extensive defection. Evasion is typically the least costly strategy for criminal groups. For their part, loyal agents often tolerate the robust markets for illicit goods and services, and—given the high costs of repression—may be content with episodic disruptions. These reinforce police dominance and provide

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symbolic reassurance to the public. At some points in most criminal enterprises, however, evasion is impractical. Advertisement of illicit products, maintenance of stable venues, routine government inspections, aggressive policing, or a tip from a rival gang may alert state officials to criminal activities.15 Some disloyal police may defect and accept bribes in exchange for non-enforcement, but the state retains its capacity to repress. The equilibrium rests on community norms of what constitutes acceptable types and levels of crime and police corruption. For example, after-hours liquor or discreet prostitution may be tolerated; kidnapping or child pornography may not be. Evasion and tolerance mark a high equilibrium. The corruption-collusion equilibrium is different. Here criminal groups operate more extensively and openly and employ corruption as a standard method to co-opt loyal state actors. Fluid networks involved in kidnapping, drug distribution, gambling or prostitution work out stable relationships with individual officers, groups of police, or with whole units.16 More significant are criminal organizations that operate across several neighborhoods or even citywide. These forge corrupt arrangements with disloyal police and regulators. To the extent that the government defects and opts for collusion the corruption reaches into policy-making processes, and another stable, but low, equilibrium is possible. The police and government exercise at least enough power in the corruption-collusion equilibrium that criminal groups find it rational to pay bribes. The power relationship can vary, however. Criminal groups can negotiate tolerance for their particular enterprise; or gangs can control police operations more extensively. Where gangs exercise control, police are not paid bribes for protection but rather wages for services. On the other hand, disloyal state agents can co-opt and control gangs, extorting payments and directing their activities.17 Criminal organizations and loyal governments may thus employ mixes of collusion/corruption and tolerance/evasion to co-exist in equilibrium relationships in which each continually adjusts to the other’s perceived evolution. Within the equilibrium, criminal groups adjust their behavior as a function of their own goals and resources in relation to the dynamics of markets, public policies, and other criminal groups. Loyal agents adjust their behavior in response to varieties of pressures applied by interest groups, civil society protests, and the mass media. Also important are electoral dynamics, expectations of other governments, and the perceived behavior of criminal organizations. Interactions between criminal organizations and governments can occur on a number of levels.

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The remaining combination, confrontation by criminal groups and repression by governments, is least frequent. At the individual level, confrontation is not that rare: the intimidation of individual police, prosecutors or judges, for example. But far rarer are direct, sustained confrontations by criminal organizations against the state’s policejustice system of the type seen in Mexico after 2006 when the federal government launched its offensive. Sustained confrontation is rare because of its difficulty and potential costs. It requires organizational capabilities in intelligence gathering, communications, coordinated action, and effective weaponry. Criminal groups can use terror tactics, choosing their targets and timing for maximum effect. The potential costs, however, are extremely high, and may include (1) external costs such as greater public awareness of criminal activities, higher levels of government repression, and public repudiation; and (2) internal costs, such as members’ defection, disruption of business, and risks to members’ personal security. Moreover, there is a collective action problem here: Why should a particular criminal organization assume the costs of financing armed groups to confront the state when competing organizations might also benefit? And why pay if rival groups can free ride on the benefits of successful confrontation and opt for evasion if it is unsuccessful? More to the point, why provoke government repression which cedes greater operating space to competing gangs? Disloyal state actors/agencies may defect to one or another degree in the disequilibrium of confrontation and repression. If the defection is limited and passive, loyal governments may repress more effectively. The restored equilibrium should favor the government. If the defection is extensive and active, the power relationship tilts in favor of criminal groups, and the restored equilibrium favors criminal organizations. I return to this point in Chapter 7 in the discussion of competitive statemaking. The stylized model assumes that both the state and organized crime are aggregations of smaller groups and individual members. As in other countries in the region, Mexico’s police, as individuals or entire units, frequently defect to criminal gangs and may even direct and promote them. Also, the model assumes that power relations between governments and criminal organizations are dynamic, and that criminal groups may hold the upper hand. At this point note that I am setting aside the very significant problem of the state’s abusing its loyal status by using criminal state actors or criminal organizations in order to repress opposition movements or elements of civil society. Schatz (2006), for example, documents the violence that PRI state officials directed against the PRD

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in the late 1980s and 1990s. Decentralization since the mid 1980s has strengthened the power and autonomy of state governors, and several have been accused of repressing opposition parties or civil society. What kinds of events or conditions might trigger disequilibrium and the possibility of change in modes of interaction between criminal organizations and the state? Criminal groups themselves experience varieties of expansion and decline, leadership struggles, and competition with other groups, which might disrupt equilibrium. Three such key events discussed in Chapter 6 are, first, the arrest and subsequent extradition of Osiel Cárdenas Guillén in January 2007, which further disrupted the Gulf DTO and sparked an offensive by the Sinaloa DTO to control northern Tamaulipas state; second, the subsequent defection of the Zetas from the Gulf DTO in early 2010 and their evolution to become a new type of territorial gang; and third, the arrest of Alfredo Beltrán Leyva in January 2008 and the death of his brother, Arturo, in December 2009. Also, criminal groups typically react to government initiatives. Three types of triggering conditions can result from political institutions and processes as well as internal and external pressures arising from markets and civil society. Periodically, election campaigns in which crime figures as an issue can create incentives for governments to repress criminal gangs. Changes in command of police-justice agencies can also disrupt equilibrium. Aggressive lobbying by anti-crime groups can prompt government initiatives, as can external pressures, usually applied by the United States. Scandal is the broadest category of leastpredictable trigger. Three typical forms that can provoke government repression include: a spike in inter-gang violence; the overt presence of gang activity as in vehicles carrying armed men in urban areas in daylight hours; and gang violence against a prominent citizen or a particularly sympathetic figure. The relevant question is whether the government initiative is transitory and largely symbolic, or whether it is positive, substantial, and sustained. The answer involves whether triggering conditions coincide with effective police-justice agencies and competent leadership. To illustrate, Daniel Sabet (2010) applied a version of this framework to the case of Tijuana, Baja California, in 2000-2009, a period when the Arellano Felix gang experienced decline and internal division. As sketched in Figure 4.2, Sabet’s analysis brings out the complexity of interactions as the Arellano Félix organization suffered both internal schisms and attacks by rival gangs at the same time that civil society actors exerted pressure on the city bureaucracy and top police officials. While rank and file police could insulate themselves

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organizations is in a stable state of high or low equilibrium. The governance problem arises when corruption and collusion become pervasive and systemic at a city-wide or regional level. In these circumstances, actors’ expectations become firmly entrenched and override short-term reform efforts. The costs of directly confronting the state, in terms of personal security, economic well-being, and the overall health of criminal networks, should be too high to sustain for long periods. Violent confrontation with the state ought to be sporadic and isolated, aimed at weakening or eliminating specific obstacles to criminal operations, in a short-term corrective fashion. High-profile and/or sustained confrontation between criminal groups and the state is far more rare and indicates disequilibrium, as one or the other sets of actors attempts to create a new status quo more to its advantage, as happened in Mexico in the early 21st century. I turn now from a stylized discussion of state-gang interactions to examine kidnapping, a type of high-impact crime that can assume several forms. Kidnapping in a setting of near-complete impunity is significant because the general population feels utterly defenseless. The impunity, in turn, lowers barriers to entry for additional kidnappers, activating another negative feedback loop. The crime itself sows widespread fear, because anyone can be targeted and abductors often use excessive violence. Kidnapping can also be a violent tool wielded by DTOs and territorial gangs for various purposes. In the Mexican case, kidnapping can assume transnational forms through abduction of thirdcountry migrants who are transiting the country or by extension of the crime into the United States or Central America. Though unusual, kidnapping gangs that operate with territorial groups can also confront the state. Drug trafficking, analyzed in the following chapter, and kidnapping exhibit a variety of organizational forms and dynamic change over time, and they are interrelated in complex ways. Kidnapping gangs operating independently may need to evade both state agents and territorial gangs. Trafficking organizations engage in kidnapping as a routine method of getting information from competitors or state agents or of “settling accounts” (ajuste de cuentas) for debts owed or in reprisal to rival groups. DTOs may also use kidnapping for ransom as a way to raise ready money to finance drug trafficking or as one of several enterprise activities.

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Kidnapping: Preference for Evasion and Corruption

Kidnapping in the generic sense means to deprive someone the freedom of movement or communication against that person’s will. Table 4.2 summarizes the principal types of kidnapping in Mexico.18 It also illustrates why kidnapping is so difficult to classify in law or crime statistics and why comparisons across jurisdictions are risky. I treat only the first five types in this section, since the social/familial and economic types can occur on a large scale and have catastrophic personal impacts, but only marginal political effects.19 In the following sections I discuss current trends and their political implications. Express kidnapping means to abduct someone who displays signs of wealth and rob the person, usually forcing him/her to withdraw money from cash machines, purchase items of value, or request payments from friends or family.20 This form of kidnapping grew rapidly after the 1980s with the expanded use of credit and debit cards and the proliferation of automatic teller machines. Kidnappers may operate with stolen vehicles or conspire with taxi drivers (ICESI 2008a). Virtual kidnapping involves phoning someone, often at random, and extorting money based on the claim that the caller has abducted (or is about to abduct) a family member or loved one.21 To increase fear and the likelihood of compliance, the caller may claim to be a member of a violent gang, such as the Zetas. Again, we lack good information on the incidence of this crime, but as we saw in Chapter 3 the numbers are comparatively high. A Mexico City NGO reported receiving 7,702 complaints about threatening calls in a 10-day period in December 2007. The Mexico City daily El Universal reported a December 2007 survey which found that 48 percent of those interviewed had been threatened by phone or knew of someone who had received threats.22 Both express and virtual forms have low barriers to entry, as individuals and small groups can easily engage in the activity. Organization is simple, often ephemeral; both rely on evasion. As evidenced by the large numbers of complaints and threats reported, their main political effect is to instill diffuse fear. The “heist” (levantón) usually refers to abducting a rival gang member, drug dealer or customer in arrears, or someone with useful information, for the purpose of forcing payment, extracting information, or settling accounts (by threatening, beating, or murdering the individual).23 Police-justice agents may also be targeted, either because they are involved in gang activities or as a form of confrontation with

Table 4.2 Kidnapping Types, Targets, and Political Effects (Author’s elaboration) Captivity

Organization

Mode of Interaction

Political Effects

Express

Immediate opportunity; displays signs of wealth

Short: hours

Minimal: sporadic or ephemeral

Evasion

Diffuse fear

Virtual

Random telephone contact

None

Minimal: may be single individual

Evasion

Diffuse fear

“Heist” (levantón)

Gang member; delinquent dealer or customer; police-justice agent

Variable: hours or days

Variable: depends on size of gang or network

Evasion and corruption: confrontation against police-justice agents

Lesser diffuse fear: perceived as confined to criminal arena

Ransom

Ransom potential (personal wealth or commercial value)

Medium to long: weeks or months

Complex, continuous: dedicated organization or one of several activities of a DTO

Evasion and corruption

Diffuse fear: vigilante selfprotection, private security, occasional scandal and mass mobilization

Political

Symbolic or substantive value

Variable

Variable: small, independent gang; official or extra-legal state agencies

Confrontation: extra-legal repression

Diffuse fear: state repression and occasional related protest

Social/ familial

Social or family value; custody dispute; interfamilial dispute; bride abduction

Variable: often lengthy

Simple: small group or single person

Evasion

Marginal: perceived as confined to social/ familial arena

Economic

Productive laborer

Lengthy: months or years

Variable: family, small firm, larger organization (e.g. drug cultivation)

Evasion in family or small firm; corruption in large organization

Marginal: perceived as confined to social/ familial arena or to drug arena

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Target

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Type

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government. This is a typical practice by various types of criminal gangs. It relies on both evasion and corruption, depending on whether the gang is operating on hostile turf or on home ground. To the extent that the targets are perceived as connected to the criminal arena the main political effect of the levantón is to remind the broader population that the state cannot control criminal violence. The torture inflicted and frequently grotesque forms of murder, often reported graphically by the media, instill a lesser degree of diffuse fear because victims are often seen to be involved in crime or law enforcement. Kidnapping for ransom (secuestro extorsivo) targets persons of wealth or commercial value, such as undocumented migrants. There is a broad range of wealth and persons from the lower-middle or working classes may be targeted by simple organizations, held for a short time and for modest ransom.24 With respect to wealthier victims, the criminal organization is typically more complex and of at least two main types: one dedicated solely to kidnapping, and another engaged in kidnapping as one of several criminal activities of a parent territorial gang. A dedicated kidnapping organization is typically a tightly-knit group, united by ties of family and friendship. The group is often led by a relatively young male, who “moves up” to kidnapping from lesser crimes such as theft and robbery. Here, however, we find competing images of the organization and behavior of dedicated gangs. One image depicts a complex organization that operates with compartmentalized cells. These perform the functions of selecting the victim (ascertaining wealth, obtaining photographs), stealing the necessary vehicles, abducting the victim, renting a house or apartment, provisioning the victim and guards, negotiating the ransom, and releasing or murdering the victim. This complex form often involves active-duty or former police officers, who have both skills and useful contacts.25 In contrast, a high-level Mexican law-enforcement official dismisses the complex-sophisticated version of the dedicated gang as a media invention. The various tasks of targeting the victim, abduction, and the like, are carried out by the gang with little compartmentalization. Often the kidnapping gang is a highly dysfunctional extended family. Such a group relies on evasion. The strong sense of gang cohesion and the belief in a near-zero chance of arrest and prosecution create conditions for extreme violence against the victim, e.g., amputating body parts in order to terrify the family into paying a large ransom. The same belief in impunity may increase the likelihood that the gang will murder rather than release the victim. These gangs are typically unsophisticated and operate in a limited geographic area. Their effect is amplified by media coverage and produces fear in the broader population.26

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Apart from the dedicated gang, the second main type of kidnapping organization operates with the protection of territorial gangs, typically a DTO with a strong presence or an established hegemony in a given region. Kidnapping is one of several enterprise activities, which may also include extortion, auto theft, production and distribution of pirated or genuine goods to informal markets, illegal logging, and even theft of public goods such as crude oil or medicines. Since the heist is a standard operating tool for the gang, the evolution to kidnapping for ransom is a natural step. The territorial gang may detect a kidnapping gang operating in its territory and extort payment from it (derecho de piso). Experienced kidnappers may voluntarily ally with the dominant DTO to form a member cell. Alternatively, an existing DTO cell may be directed to kidnap for ransom or allowed to do so on its own. With a complex organization and experience with complicated activities, the DTO may employ a division of labor to compartmentalize the various functions necessary for kidnapping. The usual mode of interaction with government is evasion and corruption. With weaponry and organization, however, a DTO engaged in kidnapping can also confront police and civil society self-protection groups.27 As with the dedicated gang, former and active-duty police officers are frequently involved in the more sophisticated forms of kidnapping, and money from ransoms may be paid to higher-level police-justice officials. Are some territorial gangs more likely than others to rely on kidnapping for revenue? The Zetas appeared to be an extreme case of extensive extortion and large-scale kidnapping to finance their organization, including their trafficking activities.28 In contrast, the Sinaloa group is sometimes characterized as a DTO that targets kidnapping on police or adversaries and generally spares civil society. Baja California, especially Tijuana, provides an extreme case of the dynamic evolution of kidnapping by a stationary bandit, in this case the vestiges of the so-called Arellano Felix Organization. There kidnapping evolved into more aggressive forms. Kidnap victims, for example, were tortured to provide information about other wealthy targets, leading to serial abductions.29 Cases of multiple kidnapping, in which entire families were seized, have been reported.30 Abductions have occurred in daylight hours in public spaces by gangs operating commando-style in multiple vehicles; they have also occurred in pre-dawn home invasions.31 To cite one press report: “Five persons were kidnapped in broad daylight yesterday by armed commandoes in Tijuana, in front of Pacific Industrial Park. The victims, four men and one woman, were traveling in two separate vehicles, a pick-up and a compact car. The

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assailants, wearing bullet-proof vests and armed with rifles, left behind one witness, who was beaten before the attackers made their escape.”32 In another example, police officials and former colleagues of four policemen slain outside a convenience store revealed that the officers were murdered for presumably disrupting the kidnapping of a student in Playas de Tijuana. Police stated that on the morning of the attempted kidnapping, there was a report about six suspicious vehicles with armed men outside a school, which prompted the deployment of several police vehicles to the area since, presumably, the men were going to attempt a kidnapping. The kidnappers listened to the police radio frequency and fled to avoid the police response. “No one thought that the retaliation would be carried out so soon,” said Julian Leyzaola, then serving as Tijuana Public Safety Secretary.33 If true, the press reports depict criminal organizations capable of planning and executing complicated operations. Rather than simpler family-type structures, these actions suggest the planning, weaponry, logistics, and communications of an experienced territorial gang. To be expected, some wealthy Tijuana families fled to Chula Vista and San Diego, California. However, Tijuana-based kidnapping gangs followed them there to carry out more abductions.34 Multiple types of kidnapping groups operate simultaneously in different locales throughout Mexico. As the sense of criminality and impunity increases, varieties of groups enter the activity. In some cases, stationary bandits detect and extort kidnappers; in other cases kidnapping gangs successfully evade both the police and territorial groups. Local residents may not be able to specify the numbers or types of abductions but they perceive the multiple disappearances from their communities.35 As gangs compete for control over territories, violent crime, including kidnapping, quickly escalates. A recent example is the state of Guanajuato, where, reportedly, five criminal groups, including the Familia Michoacana and the Zetas, fought among themselves and against state and federal police from 2007 to 2010. During this time period, more than 1,100 “high-impact” homicides and 163 kidnappings were reported. The state attorney general reported that, in 2010, 10 gangs dedicated to kidnapping were dismantled, with 113 subjects arrested. Of these 37 were affiliated with the Zetas and 43 with the Familia, while the rest denied involvement with a particular gang.36 Kidnapping of individuals for ransom has several political effects. Even though most cases go unreported to the authorities, rumors about or news coverage of kidnapping for ransom sows widespread fear. In addition, both the dedicated gang and territorial group types of

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kidnapping can promote forms of citizen self-protection (vigilantism; private security) where the kidnapping is perceived as significant and government is seen as ineffective.37 Also, some so-called “high-impact” cases have resulted in major scandals that have mobilized large protests and have accelerated reforms. In some cases (as noted below) the incidents resulted in the creation of anti-crime NGOs whose leaders could focus pressure on government to improve law enforcement. Kidnapping of undocumented migrants for ransom has occurred on a massive scale, but with little domestic political effect. Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDH) reported in July 2009 that 9,758 Central American migrants had been kidnapped in Mexico the previous six months by various types of gangs. The ransom demanded ranged between US$2,500 and $5,000 per victim. The largest number of abductions took place in Tabasco and Veracruz. In February 2011 a CNDH report documented 214 cases of “massive kidnappings” between April and September of 2010 of a total of 11,333 migrants, of whom three-quarters were from Central America. The number might be higher given the hidden nature of the crime and the vulnerability of the migrants (Plascencia Villanueva 2011, p. 4).38 Kidnapping on such a scale implies well organized gangs, with the capacity to seize and detain scores of victims and communicate with their families, including in other countries, in order to extort payments. Political kidnapping in the sense of radical or terrorist organizations that target government officials or prominent citizens was practiced in the 1970s and 80s, but is rare in contemporary Mexico. A major exception is a former PAN presidential candidate, Diego Fernández de Ceballos, kidnapped in May 2010 (discussed below). More frequent is the reverse sense as state security forces (formal or extra-legal) illegally capture and hold persons considered as threats to the government. Most of this activity takes place at the state level in Mexico, although federal forces, including the army, are frequently accused of illegally detaining individuals. Recent Trends in Kidnapping

In terms of recent trends, Max Morales, a Mexico City-based lawyer specializing in kidnapping-related negotiations, suggests an evolution in general terms from politically motivated (1970s-80s), to enterprise crime that first targeted small business owners (1980s-90s), to an “industrialization” of the crime in the 1990s, and—most recently—to the extensive involvement of the police. Several leftist groups, e.g., the

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Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario) and Poor People’s Party (Partido de los Pobres), used kidnapping to finance their organizations. The most notorious episode in the industrial phase refers to the Arizmendi crime wave, a series of kidnappings carried out in the 1990s by a gang led by Daniel Arizmendi (alias, “Ear-chopper”), a particularly vicious criminal, who avoided capture for nearly a year. “Mexico’s problem from 1997 on,” according to Morales, “is not organized crime; rather it is the police organized in crime. There is a before and after Arizmendi.”39 Due to the overlap of types of kidnapping and the high margin of underreporting, it is difficult to estimate tendencies over time. Reports point in different directions, although all agree that the incidence of kidnapping increased in step with other forms of violent crime in the mid 1990s and again after 2006, as we saw in Chapter 3. A study prepared for the Federal Chamber of Deputies reported that kidnapping increased in the wake of the economic crisis of 1994. Following a steady decline after 2001, the number again spiked some 130 percent (from 325 to 751 per year) between 2005 and 2007. The PGR announced that in the first five months of 2008, some 323 kidnappings were reported nation wide. Ninety-two of these (28 percent) were attributed to organized crime. States with the highest incidence included Mexico City, State of Mexico, Baja California, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Guerrero. With respect to DTOs, the PGR reported that of the 273 members of kidnapping gangs sentenced (auto de formal prisión) between 2007 and May of 2008, 64 had links to the Gulf Cartel and 44 with the Tijuana Cartel. While we think of kidnapping as a subnational form of organized crime, linkages were alleged between Colombia’s FARC and Mexican gangs. Also, evidence suggests a spillover of gangrelated kidnapping into Arizona (Arellano Trejo 2009, pp. 1-7), and—as we saw earlier—into Southern California. The CNDH estimated that between 2001 and November 2008 about 20,000 kidnappings took place, or about 2,500 per year. Similar to the PGR, the CNDH data show a decline between 2001 and 2005, with a fairly sharp increase between 2006 and 2007 (from 1,692 to 3,140) (Arellano Trejo 2009, pp. 7-9). For its part, the PGR reported a total of 1,001 kidnappings in 2008 (231 in federal jurisdiction and 770 in state jurisdiction), for a monthly average of 83.4. In the first six months of 2009, 584 kidnappings were reported (181 federal; 403 state), or a 2.4 percent increase in pace since 2007. Again, most of the crimes were committed in Mexico City, the State of Mexico, Michoacán, Coahuila, Baja California, and Veracruz (Mexico. PGR 2009).

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If we consider victimization survey results we find similar patterns but much higher numbers. Over a million and a half crimes were officially denounced to authorities in Mexico in 2007. ICESI’s 2008 crime victimization survey, however, reports some 13.2 million crimes, which suggests a “black figure” of unreported crimes on the order of 88 percent. Using survey and official data, ICESI estimates that about 6,500 kidnappings (both express and ransom) occurred during 2007, or more than 17 per day. ICESI suggests that the numbers of kidnappings are probably even higher, given the greater tendency to underreport this type of crime. Families are often reluctant to report kidnappings because of the perception that police officers are frequently involved and a formal complaint would seriously jeopardize ransom negotiations (ICESI 2008a).40 Virtual kidnapping, threats communicated by telephone, seems particularly prevalent. The CIDE 2009 victimization survey of the Mexico City metropolitan area found that 15.4 percent of households polled (3,024) and 11 percent of individuals interviewed reported incidents of telephone extortion. Of these extortion calls, 89 percent claimed to have kidnapped a family member. Ransoms demanded ranged between P$200 and P$200 million (US$14.80 and $14.8 million), with an average of P$77 million (US$5.7 million) (CIDE 2010, pp. 85-87). The actual sums paid are unknown. Kidnapping makes up a relatively small fraction of total crimes, however calculated, but its political effects are significant. Apart from sowing generalized anxiety, kidnapping—under certain circumstances— can activate civil society and promote conditions to support reform. Elites are vulnerable as well, and a key issue is whether they lean toward self-protection, as discussed in Chapter 3, or opt to pitch in by joining with the government to improve law enforcement. Kidnapping can also remind elites and the public that anti-system groups hover on the fringes of Mexican political life. High-Profile Cases: Impunity and Mass Mobilizations

The Mexico City metropolitan region is the political, cultural, economic, and mass media center of the country. High profile cases have particular resonance nationally. This section discusses two such cases. One involves a particularly sympathetic figure, and the other a prominent politician. The first case resulted in mobilization of public opinion and new leadership in anti-crime civil society organizations. The second was surrounded by mystery and speculation, leaving public opinion confused and uncertain.

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Fernando Martí Haik, the fourteen-year old son of a prominent businessman, was abducted on June 4, 2008, en route to his school. His bodyguard was left for dead, and his chauffer was found murdered the following day. The boy’s body was discovered on July 31, even though his family attempted to pay the ransom demanded. The ensuing investigation led to a gang known as “The Flower” (La Flor), which was implicated in several other kidnappings as well. Of the seven members arrested, four were active-duty or former police officers. The agents used their status to acquire information and to stage roadblocks at which victims were abducted.41 The gang relied on evasion, and there was no apparent link to higher-level government officials. “The Martí Case” sparked tensions between President Calderón and Mexico City Mayor Marcelo Ebrard, a prominent PRD politician and close ally of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Calderón criticized the lack of coordination between City and federal police, a charge that Mayor Ebrard rejected. The case also triggered a mass mobilization called “Let’s Light Up Mexico” (Iluminemos México) on August 30, 2008, in Mexico City. Organized by a prominent NGO, Mexico United against Crime, some 80,000 persons peacefully marched with lighted candles into the Zócalo, the central city square. Francisco Martí, the victim’s father, issued a challenge to government officials that was echoed for days after: “If you can’t do your job, resign!” Iluminemos México evolved into an anti-crime NGO, and Martí became an active spokesperson and civil society leader.42 The movement was particularly noteworthy in lending energy to President Calderón’s anti-crime strategy. Politicians at various levels of government, many of whom were skeptical about the President’s motives in citizen security, began to shift toward cooperation. Iluminemos México allied with other anti-crime groups, such as Mexico United against Crime and Halt Kidnapping (Alto al Secuestro), to press for state reforms that might promote effective anti-crime initiatives. A different type of high-profile case points to the use of kidnapping as a tool of anti-system political groups. Diego Fernández de Ceballos, the PAN’s presidential candidate in 1994, was abducted on May 14, 2010, at his ranch in the State of Querétaro. A few days later a group calling itself the “Mysterious Disappearers” (los Misteriosos Desaparecedores) contacted the family and began negotiations. After a flurry of high-level government activity, the case receded in media attention. On December 20, 2010, Fernández de Ceballos reappeared in Mexico City. He asked that his case not be given any special attention and suggested that his captors were driven by both economic and political motives. A spokesperson for something called “The Other

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Campaign” (La Otra Campaña) assumed responsibility and released a communiqué claiming connections with the Zapatista movement and criticizing the government’s social policies and anti-crime campaign. In reality, the kidnappers’ identities and motives were shrouded in fog. Two things were abundantly clear, however. First, anyone, regardless of prominence, was vulnerable to abduction, and the government could neither prevent nor successfully investigate or prosecute kidnappings. Second, anti-system political forces may still operate at the fringes of Mexican politics, raising questions about whether some of the proceeds from kidnapping may finance other types of political activity. Conclusions: Political Implications of Kidnapping

Kidnapping in contemporary Mexico underlines the country’s high degree of impunity and generates fear among the populace. It cultivates the perception that anyone can be victimized and that the police-justice system is ineffective. Even worse, repeated evidence that police officers, either active-duty, retired, or purged, are among the principal culprits further undermines confidence in the police-justice system, heightens distrust of government, and reinforces the imperative of self-reliance. Along with fear, we saw that kidnapping in certain cases produced reactions in civil society that sparked mass mobilization, the creation of new anti-crime NGOs, and leadership by new citizen activists focused on improving law enforcement. Political institutions at the partyelectoral and policy-implementation levels, however, appeared less responsive. A key unknown, to be explored in Chapter 6, is whether positive changes are underway in the arena of police-justice agencies, particularly the implementation of anti-kidnapping units at the state level. The best-case scenario involves the anti-crime movement and associated NGOs combining with other interests, especially the business community, to promote state reform. The key tipping point may occur when political reforms increase the responsiveness of government to societal demands and the police-justice system reaches an effective level of ethical competence

Notes 1 “Porque, quizá lo que más aceleró y detonó el secuestro, no es sólo la acción de los criminales, no es sólo la acción de los criminales, combinada con una policía o un Ministerio Público incapaz de hacerles frente, sino peor aún,

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acción de los criminales cubierta, realizada y exacerbada por la propia policía; cuando en la propia policía se incubó la delincuencia, se exacerbó el problema de inseguridad en el país.” (Speech at the closure of the Foro Víctimas del Secuestro, September 30, 2009) 2 Statement by an ex-police officer sentenced for kidnapping to Azaola Garrido and Ruiz Torres (2009, p. 15). 3 “Pone Estemos Unidos Mexicanos manta en Periférico y policía la retiran,” Milenio.com, November 26, 2010. 4 “En San Lázaro, 25 plagios virtuales,” ElUnversal.com.mx, November 28, 2007. 5 A March 2010 poll commissioned by MUCD reported that 77.8 percent feared armed robbery and 72 percent kidnapping; 81 percent of the highest socio-economic group feared kidnapping versus 72 and 54 percent in the middle and lower strata. Tracking Poll Roy Campos/Consulta Mitofsky. CIDAC (2012) finds that kidnapping is the most-feared crime. 6 Municipality (municipio) is the rough equivalent of a county in a US state. There is a county seat (cabacilla municipal) and a surrounding area, which may contain other towns and villages. 7 The discussion of organized crime draws on Bailey and Taylor (2009). See, for example, Finckenauer (2005), for a discussion of the many different definitions and conceptions of organized crime. UNODC (2002) provides an especially useful analysis of the links between organizational variations of transnational organized crime and patterns of violence and corruption. 8 I exclude cases of organized crime as a one-time event. Legal definitions of organized crime typically include notions of conspiracy (affiliation with an organization that commits a crime is itself a crime) and specify the types of activities covered (e.g., kidnapping, counterfeiting, and the like). 9 The only substantial report on fraud in Mexico that I have found is KPMG (2008). Kar (2012) analyzes capital flight. 10 As Reuter (1983) notes in his study of the American bookmaking, numbers, and loansharking markets, the stylized view of a centrally-controlled, hierarchical organization is almost certainly false in these markets. These are instead guided by an “invisible hand,” which interconnects individuals in a variety of illicit but market-driven interactions. Reuter argues that the common view of a monopolized or centrally controlled criminal group is largely misleading, and “it does public policy no good to make a mockery of the term ‘organized crime’ by assuming that all crime that requires organization induces enduring conspiracy”(Reuter 1983, p. 187). A useful discussion of criminal networks is Williams 2001. 11 According to the United Nations convention, a crime is transnational if: “(a) It is committed in more than one state; (b) It is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; (c) It is committed on one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or (d) It is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state” (UN 2002, p. 5). 12 Peter Lupsha (1996, pp. 30-33) posits three stages in gang evolution: predatory, parasitical and symbiotic. Predatory groups are rooted in a particular area and much of their violence is defensive turf protection; their criminal acts are opportunistic rather than strategic; and the gangs are servants of the

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established order, whose police can exercise control. Parasitical gangs “…develop a corruptive interaction with the legitimate power sectors, and meld their control of a territorial base with the power broker’s need for illicit services” (ibid,. p. 31). The gangs corrupt the police and justice systems and extend their presence into legal business and social organizations, using these as “fronts.” At the symbiotic stage established political order comes to depend on the webs of criminal groups to sustain itself. At this stage, “the traditional tools of the state to enforce law will no longer work, for organized crime has become a part of the state: a state within the state” (ibid., p.. 32). Presumably, then, the most serious effects of organized crime on democratic governability would be seen at the parasitic and symbiotic levels. This is the case in a number of Mexico’s municipal and state governments, as well as in some federal-level agencies. 13 The state and local elections held in November 2011 in the state of Michoacán were allegedly marred by voter intimidation by La Familia gang members. (“Mexico’s 2012 Vote is Vulnerable to Narco threat,” Washingtonpost.com, January 15, 2012) 14 An earlier version of the model appears in Bailey and Taylor (2009). 15 Prostitution, gambling, and retail drug sales are typical examples. 16 Hinton (2006) is an excellent discussion of street-level dynamics in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. 17 Sain (2010, pp. 21-23) describes the case of greater Buenos Aires as one in which the provincial police organize and orchestrate criminal activities in auto theft, drug trafficking, and prostitution. Criminal groups lack autonomy or the capacity to confront the police. 18 The discussion draws in part on ICESI 2008a. 19 I should underline the catastrophic personal effects of kidnapping in the discussion that follows. I once gave an academic lecture on kidnapping, only to discover that the brother of an audience member had been kidnapped and murdered. 20 The perceived wealth may be modest. In Juárez, for example, youths formerly in drug trafficking had turned to express kidnapping of middle-class women in early 2009. Abductions were up some 38 percent over the first quarter of 2008. (“Del feminicido al secuestro exprés en Juárez,” ElUniversal.com.mx, April 21, 2009) 21 As a variation, “According to police, the way [the extortionists] operated was by dialing a phone number and telling whoever answered that a family member had been injured in an accident, and that by immediately depositing money they would offer their help.” (US Consulate News Summary, Frontera, August 28, 2009, p. 8 A) 22 “Perciben leve alza en inseguridad,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 13, 2007. 23 A federal police official had a confiscated “gang-punishment” paddle leaned against a wall in his office. About three feet long, it was riddled with small holes to increase its impact. (Author interview, Mexico City July 2009) 24 In the so-called “minisecuestros” the victim is targeted similar to the “secuestro exprés” and held only a few days. (“El el DF, una 100 cases cotidianos de ese ilícito en su variedad exprés, señalan,” ElUniversal.com.mx, August 10, 2008)

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25 “Cinco células conformaban la banda de La Flor: PGJDF,” Milenio.com, July 22, 2009. For example, Mexico City airport police were implicated in the “high-impact” kidnapping of Fernando Martí, son of a prominent businessman. (“Investigan a judiciales del AICM por secuestro,” ElUniversal.com.mx, August 5, 2008) See also, “Policías secuestradores, una constante en ese delito,” Ibid., August 5, 2008. 26 Author interview, Mexico City, July 2009. See also “SSP: están en el DF los grupos de plagiarios más peligrosos,” Jornada.unam.mx, February 7, 2009. “’Mapa genético’ del secuestrador,” ElUniversal.com.mx, August 2, 2009, reports on an SSP study based on 685 kidnappers detained over a 31-month period. “Padres fríos y severos engendran a raptores,” Excelsior, July 30, 2009, p. 15, gives a thumbnail 27 An armed group murdered a Mormon anti-crime activist and a relative in Chihuahua, apparently as punishment for the activist’s leadership role to resist kidnappers targeting the community. (“Plagiarios castigan a pueblo en rebeldía,” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 8, 2009) The mayor of Santiago, Nuevo Leon, testified that organized crime had literally done away with his municipal police. Six officers had been kidnapped and sixteen killed between August and November 2010. (“Santiago enfrenta situación crítica: Bladamiro,” Milenio.com, November 26, 2010) 28 See, e.g., “Los Zetas ahora se financian con plagios y extorsiones en le llamada Frontera Chica,” Jornada.unam.mx, April 10, 2011. 29 US Consulate News Summary, Frontera, September 25, 2007, p. 14A. 30 US Consulate News Summary, Frontera, July 16, 2008, p. 6A. 31 US Consulate News Summary, El Mexicano, April 8, 2008, p. 1. 32 US Consulate News Summary, Frontera, September 26, 2007. 33 US Consulate News Summary, Frontera, p. 5A; El Mexicano, front page, September 22, 2009. 34 “17 charged in suburban crime wave; San Diego area kidnappings and slayings are described as a spillover of Tijuana gang violence, “Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2009. See also “Secuestradores mexicanos operan en EU,” ElUniversal.com.mx, May 25, 2008. 35 According to Miguel Angel Garcia Leyva, legal advisor for the Tijuanabased Asociación Esperanza contra Desapariciones Forzadas y la Impunidad Civil AC (EDFIC), approximately 1,200 people vanished in Baja California between 1995 and 2007. Garcia suggested that the disappearances or kidnappings in the region are the result of a link of criminal groups with law enforcement agencies. “Death squadrons or commandoes have been operating here for a long time, groups of paramilitaries where police agencies and organized crime team up. Many of these abductions are the carried out by these same groups,” said Garcia. (US Consulate News Summary Frontera, front page; El Mexicano, p. 2A, November 9, 2007) 36 “Crecen secuestro y ‘cobro de piso’ en Guanajuato,” ElUniversal.com.mx, March 23, 2011. 37 For example, three bodies were discovered in Torreón, Coahuila, and one in Chilchota, Michoacán, with signs warning kidnappers and extortionists. (“Ejecutan a tres y dejan mensajes a plagiarios,” ElUniversal.com.mx, May 22, 2009) Legislators and civil society leaders expressed concern about selfprotection groups’ using violent methods. (“El Grupo pone en riesgo la gobernabilidad,” Milenio.com, March 19, 2009.) Baja California attorney

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general Francisco Blake Mora said that Baja police agents and bodyguards assigned to businessmen would receive anti-kidnapping training by US and Israeli experts. (US Consulate News Summary, La Frontera, p. 2A; El Mexicano, front page, May 13, 2008.) 38 “Plagian a 9,758 migrantes en seis meses,” ElUniversal.com.mx, June 16, 2009. The 2011 report did spark diplomatic protests from Brazil and several Central American countries. 39 “Secuestro: historia de impunidad,” Enfoque, October 3, 2010. 40 Another NGO, MUCD, reported that kidnapping increased 154 percent after 2004, rising nine percent from August 2008 to April 2009. (“Creció 154% el plagio en México en 5 años,” Impreso.milenio.com, August 3, 2009) 41 “Recuento: El caso Martí,” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 17, 2009; “Facilita complicidad policiaca actividades de banda ‘La Flor,’” ElPorvenir.com, February 1, 2009. 42 “Calderón y Ebrard chocan por plagio,” ElUniversal.com.mx, August 6, 2008; “Los diez momentos destacados de Iluminemos México,” ElUniversal.com.mx, September 1, 2008. See the organization’s webpage at: http://www.iluminemosmexico.org.mx/ (last accessed on April 13, 2011).

5 Drug Trafficking Organizations and Democratic Governance

“Narco-politics is the greatest threat to Mexico’s incipient democracy. If federal authorities don’t fight it now, the damage will be irreversible.” —Manuel Clouthier Carrillo, PAN federal congressman, July 3, 20101 “These folks behave like a monopoly, and they don’t want competition. Instead of beating the competition with price and quality, they kill each other. That’s what’s generating chaos in our regions.” —President Felipe Calderón, April 17, 20122

Lucas de la Garza comes from a family long prominent in Nuevo León’s political life. His father served as governor in the 1940s and Lucas was a founder of the PRD in the state in the late 1980s. In January 2011, his brother was forcibly removed by a gang from a cattlemen’s meeting and murdered; a nephew was kidnapped and held for eleven days by a Zetas cell; Lucas’s ranch in Tamaulipas was invaded by armed gangs; another brother was searched by a gang at a highway checkpoint; and, finally, a cousin was stopped at a checkpoint manned by 20 vehicles of a Gulf cartel cell. De la Garza was understandably pessimistic in a press interview. “There is no solution. The government has failed,” he answered reporters, “the police and military haven’t learned how to develop the intelligence to confront the problem. The narcos know where the military and police are, but they don’t know where the criminals are. And they settle for capturing the small fry (segundones y tercerones).”3 Mexico fits in the middle tier of Latin American countries with respect to informality, tax evasion, and corruption. It’s distinctive with respect to its low levels of confidence in the police and in compliance with the law. It also suffered a systemic shock with the spiral of violent

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crime after 2006. And it is an outlier with regard to the threats presented by politically savvy, hyper-violent DTOs.4 These gangs present multiple, severe challenges to democratic governance in a half-dozen or so of Mexico’s 32 states, including Nuevo León. The corruptive capacity of the DTOs extends into civil society, governments, and the police-justice system at all levels. In some localities, DTOs can intimidate and inhibit media freedom and societal activism. They recruit young men and women to their service and seek support more broadly. They influence language, music, and lifestyles to cultivate social acceptance. Most seriously, some of the DTOs are also territory-bound organized crime groups as discussed in Chapter 4 and can confront and intimidate local and state police forces. Under some circumstances, some of them can confront national police agencies and even the armed forces. We need a perspective on Mexico’s DTOs somewhere between the “high-altitude” analyses of the political economy of drug trafficking and the “in-the-weeds” narratives about particular people and events. The former give satellite views of the main flows, rather like weather patterns. The latter draw on the public record and interviews to tell highly-detailed stories. This granular approach, often taken by journalists, typically produces a bewildering narrative of high-impact murders and shootouts, gang vendettas, leadership struggles, corruption scandals, and reams of statistics about seizures of drugs, arms, vehicles, money and weapons. Like frames from a movie running on fast-forward, the details mostly reproduce the chaotic interactions among the DTOs and between them and the police and armed forces.5 Vadim Volkov encountered similar problems in analyzing the chaotic world of Russian organized crime in the early 1990s. He found a kaleidoscope of diverse groups of different ethnic, territorial, and institutional origin competing in overlapping territories. Although groups often claimed control over certain territories, the subjects of their divisions, rivalry, and cooperation were opportunities rather than territories or spheres of the economy as such. Hence there was no single feature common to all criminal groups except the means available to them, that is, organized force. Explanations of the activities of criminal groups, therefore, should be sought not in the groups themselves, in their legal status, or in the people that compose them, but in their interrelations and practices, determined by the opportunities opened by the emerging market and failing state (Volkov 2002, p. 76).

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Thus, rather than focusing on particular gangs competing for given territories, we need to focus more on markets, institutions, and opportunities. In this chapter, I briefly summarize the main junctures that shaped government – DTO interactions from the mid 1980s to the end of President Felipe Calderón’s term in December 2012. I then offer a grainy “snapshot” of the main “name” DTOs. With this background, I present a functional analysis of DTOs, connecting the various tasks and phases of drug production and distribution to the types of criminal organizations and their interactions with governments and markets in the first decades of the 21st century. The purpose is to assess their resources and interactions with the political system. My orienting questions are: Do trafficking organizations have political agendas beyond protecting their businesses? Do they cooperate with insurgent or terrorist organizations? My conclusions are that, for the most part, Mexican DTOs operate politically to protect or promote their business operations and there is little evidence that they cooperate with insurgents. Continuing the theoretical discussion of Chapter 4, we find a situation of disequilibrium in which “criminal collectives” (subsets drawn from a macro network) are evolving in response to inter-gang competition and market opportunities, while—at the same time—they are under stronger attacks by government forces. This chapter lays the groundwork necessary to assess the government-civil society responses to organized crime developed in Chapter 6. Junctures and Tipping Points in Government-DTO Dynamics

What were the main junctures in the road toward violent confrontations among the DTOs and between these and the state?6 The initial equilibrium in the 1970s and early 1980s was maintained by a centralized hegemonic party and a strong presidency whose police organizations essentially regulated drug trafficking. Given the politicaladministrative centralization of that time, the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad, DFS) played a key role. Rather than a detailed narrative, the following are tipping points since the mid 1980s that led to disequilibrium in the early 2000s.7 •

1985-88: Dissolution of the DFS and the failure to establish a genuine cartel capable of regulating markets. High-profile murders in 1984-85 exposed the DFS’s extensive involvement in drug trafficking, leading to the agency’s elimination.8 Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo subsequently attempted to form the

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•

•

•

•

Guadalajara cartel and to allocate territories among lieutenants in order to organize the market and avoid conflicts. Defections from the attempt led to the formation of “second generation” fragments of the Guadalajara DTO, including the Tijuana, Juárez, and Sinaloa DTOs in Northwest Mexico. The Gulf DTO, centered in the east-coast state of Tamaulipas, evolved separately. The period coincided with the shift of cocaine trafficking routes from the Caribbean to the Mexican mainland. Conflicts among DTOs intensified during the latter 1980s, as state controls weakened. 1988-97: The continued erosion of the PRI hegemony coincided with the strengthening of the Gulf DTO and the Juárez DTO under Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Allegedly, some members of the Carlos Salinas administration (1988-94) protected the Gulf group. 1997-2002: The PRI’s hegemony collapsed, giving way to the acceleration of decentralization and party competition throughout Mexico. In 2000, PAN candidate Vicente Fox won the presidency, the first non-PRI president since 1929. Fox used the military in a “decapitation” strategy against DTOs. Joaquin (“El Chapo”) Guzmán Loera escaped from prison in 2001 to rejoin the leadership of the Sinaloa DTO. The Gulf DTO, under the leadership of Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, contracted elite military defectors (“Los Zetas”) to serve as armed enforcers. The Milenio DTO appeared in Michoacán, as conflicts escalated among rival DTOs. 2002-06: Gulf DTO leader Cárdenas Guillén was detained in January 2003 and Joaquin Guzmán Loera launched an offensive against the Gulf cartel. Some of the larger DTO’s transitioned from ordinary gangsterism to paramilitary organization and militia tactics.9 “La Familia” DTO based in Michoacán State also emerged. 2006-12: PAN president Felipe Calderón significantly accelerated the state’s fight against DTO’s. The president deployed 45,000 soldiers and federal police to priority regions by the end of 2008. DTOs escalated their own conflicts, with particular intensity in Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Baja California, and Nuevo León. The Zetas broke away from Gulf DTO and expanded rapidly. Violence was directed against civil society, state authorities, and prominent political figures (e.g., murder of a PRI gubernatorial candidate in Tamaulipas, June 2010; mayor of a Monterrey suburb August 2010). Government repression

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resulted in the deaths of four “kingpins” and the capture of 26 others on its most-wanted list, producing a proliferation of smaller organizations (Guerrero Gutiérrez 2012). At this point we should heed the reminder by Fernando Escalante (2012) that the quality of information about criminal groups provided by the government and mass media is poor. Our need to apply labels to trafficking gangs helps us imagine order in a chaotic world. But the correspondence between the labels and real-world gangs is shaky at best. As noted, interactions among DTOs and between these and the government at any point in time are fluid, and often chaotic.10 Minor DTOs may pose as “name” organizations in order to evoke fear. Police or media may attribute particular crimes to a particular gang, but often without evidence.11 DTOs plant both genuine and false messages through crude signs attached to bodies, particular forms of torture and execution, banners attached to highway overpasses, or images on the Web.12 In one documented case, the police confiscated a large quantity of drugs and cash from a suspect who lacked apparent connections to any prominent DTO.13 Journalists struggle to decipher DTO presence and interactions, and academics rely heavily on media accounts.14 I organize my summary of the main DTOs with reference to three broad levels of organization and activity, as was shown in Figure 4.1. The top “layer” of alpha networks has the resources to manage transnational drug smuggling. They operate as networks, and their preference is to rely on evasion and corruption. The second level contains two broad types of territory-bound gangs. Beta groups are larger and better armed, and operate at the city or regional levels; gamma groups are smaller gangs at the neighborhood and street level. These can employ confrontation, as well as evasion and corruption. Criminal organizations interact with diffuse common crime, for example, by recruiting young men and women to their service. The varieties of criminality operate in cultures of legal non-compliance.15 As suggested in Figure 4.1, we should think of the layers as overlapping and interacting. The Sinaloa DTO, for example, would have both alpha networks and beta groups, either as core parts of the organization or as gangs to be contracted for specific operations. Some gamma groups aspire to beta status.

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Transnational Cartels: Tier One Alpha Groups

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•

Sinaloa: Known at one time as the Pacific DTO and the main component of the so-called “Federation,” this is arguably the strongest group in the country. Joaquín Guzmán Loera and Juan José Esparagoza Moreno are its main known leaders. At different times its allies have included the Milenio DTO, based in Michoacán, and the Sonora and Colima DTOs, all significantly weakened by government repression. The Sinaloa DTO has deep roots in several communities in the “Golden Triangle” states of Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa. It is active in several South and Central American countries, as well as in the United States, and in Europe. The US Department of Justice calls the Sinaloa Cartel “preeminent—its members traffic all major illicit drugs of abuse, and its extensive distribution network supplies drugs to all region of the United States” (USDOJ/NDIC 2011, p. 2). Los Zetas: Formed originally by deserters from elite Army units to serve the Gulf DTO, the Zetas have shown impressive organizational capacity. They have operated in several states in Mexico and also in Central and South America, the United States, and other countries.16 Their main asset is organized violence (as opposed to transnational smuggling). They are both more aggressive and violent than other DTOs and have branched out into varieties of illegal activities, such as kidnapping and extortion. After the death of Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano in October 2012, the organization appeared to lose coherence, a process accelerated by the capture of Miguel Treviño Morales in July 2013. Gulf: Based in Tamaulipas but with operations in several other states, this cartel was the Sinaloa group’s main competitor for control over trafficking routes. Under Osiel Cárdenas, it showed political talent in organizing social protests to defend prisoners’ rights and to mount social protests against alleged Army violations of human rights. Despite the defection of Los Zetas, and a struggle for leadership after Cárdenas’s extradition in 2006, the Gulf DTO remains relevant as a transnational smuggling organization. Gulf agents allegedly are present in Central and South America.17

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Regional DTOs: Tier Two Beta Groups

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Juárez: A powerful gang in the 1980s and 90s, remnants of the group remain active as a “tollgate” organization struggling to maintain control over the smuggling corridor between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, Texas. Its enforcement arm, “La Linea,” figured prominently in the violence in Juárez and elsewhere in Chihuahua. Tijuana: Another tollgate operation, this group competes to control the smuggling corridor from Baja California Norte into southern California. The leadership of the Arellano Felix organization, known as the “AFO,” was severely repressed by Mexican and US authorities in the early 2000s, and the group splintered into competing factions. Once allied with the Sonora DTO, some remnants cooperate with the Gulf organization.18 La Familia: Centered in Michoacán, with operations in other West-Central states, Mexico City, and the US, the Familia originated as a vigilante force, initially against the Zetas, and evolved into a drug trafficking organization. It is also active in extortion and kidnapping. It has deep roots in various communities in Michoacán but was severely weakened by the arrest of its principal leaders. Effective government repression led to schisms in the gang, with the Knights of the Templar (los Caballeros Templarios) emerging as the ascendant faction (Grayson and Logan 2012; Finnegan 2010). Pacífico Sur: One of several gangs that survived the 2010 breakup of the Beltrán Leyva organization, as of 2011 “the Pacífico Sur Organization is the most consolidated of them and is fighting against the other factions to control criminal activities in Cuernavaca, Acapulco, and some municipalities of the State of Mexico surrounding the Federal District” (Guerrero 2011a, p. 37).

Local Organizations: Tier Three Gamma Groups

In addition to the national and regional groups there are hundreds of local gangs engaged in retail drug distribution and varieties of extortion and enterprise crime. Guerrero (ibid.) identified 64 of these as disbanded cells from large cartels and cites examples such as La Resistencia, Cártel de Jalisco-Nueva Generación, and Cártel de Charros. Others emerged from the thousands of youth gangs in cities throughout the country. Much local-level violence stems from competition among these gangs to

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control territory and to act as the local branches of Tier Two organizations. José Yáñez Romero (2009, p. 16) suggests that the usual list of DTOs identified by the Mexican government and media is incomplete and mainly symbolic. He claims that, in the first decade of the 21st century, there were some 30 powerful DTOs and 130 lesser organizations solely dedicated to drug trafficking, operating mainly in the northern parts of the country. Yáñez suggests that the powerful major cartels provide organization and coherence to their cells, which are the grey, invisible groups of traffickers, who do the real work. “These small and medium-sized Mexican organized crime groups are the main underwater mass of the iceberg” (ibid.). Michael Braun, career officer and former head of the DEA, agrees that DTOs subdivide tasks among cells. DTO leaders provide instructions on a daily basis to direct their cells, and these issue instructions to subordinate cells. In that way, if a DTO operative is detained he or she knows only the associates in a particular cell. Cells, according to Braun, typically specialize in a particular activity, e.g., transport, money laundering, enforcement. They use both ordinary (internet chat rooms) and advanced (satellite telephones) technologies for communications and navigation.19 Yáñez also suggests that the official explanation of the heightened violence is incomplete. DTOs compete for territories in order to smuggle product into the US and to control domestic markets. US and Mexican government pressures complicate the competition. The heightened violence benefits the stronger organizations, which have better connections with police agencies and political authorities. In this situation, the weaker DTOs employ even greater violence to gain access to routes and markets (Yañez Romero 2009, p. 17). A related hypothesis is that gamma groups use extreme violence in order to signal their control over territories so that beta DTOs will distribute product through the gang that demonstrates control.20 Also, once started, violence takes on its own dynamic due to vendettas and to the proliferation of diverse types of criminality. An extortion gang may use extreme violence to coerce a competing group and to intimidate public opinion. As government repression removes more experienced gang leaders, younger and more aggressive elements take their place. With high attrition rates, gangs employ untrained recruits who lack the skill to use weapons efficiently. Actors other than traffickers can take advantage of the disorder to use violence for their own ends. For example, some sort of self-defense force was evidently involved in the massacre of 35 presumed Zetas in Veracruz in September 2011.

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Toward a Functional Analysis of DTOs

We have no information about Mexico’s drug gangs that matches the clear, detailed picture painted of Colombia’s Cali organization in the mid-1990s by Chaparro (2005) and Kenney (2007) or the heroin distribution organizations in the United States by Natarajan (2000; 2006) and Díaz-Briseño (2010). We have glimpses from academic analyses, journalistic accounts, and government documents, which give us a sense of dynamic change, an impressive capacity to recruit and train new personnel, dispatch squads of gunmen over considerable distances, and manage safe houses in various locales. Uniform factories, training facilities and armories, sophisticated tunnels, and drug-cultivation and processing operations indicate that some of the larger DTOs can mount complex and costly enterprises in relatively secure environments.21 Smuggling tunnels are an indicator of organizational capacity. “Nearly a hundred tunnels under the US-Mexico border” were discovered “between FY2005 and FY2010” (USDOJ/NDIC 2011, p. 15). Most of these were found in Arizona and California. “Two tunnels discovered in San Diego in late 2010 had advanced rail, electrical, and ventilation systems. One of the tunnels was half a mile long and reached a depth of 90 feet” (ibid.). A 400-yard long tunnel was discovered in November 2011, equipped with lighting and ventilation, running from near the Tijuana airport to the Otay Mesa light industrial area in San Diego County. Authorities seized 17 tons of marijuana, allegedly connected to the Sinaloa organization.22 Only a few days later, another tunnel—this one nearly a half-mile long—and complete with lighting, a motorized rail cart, and elevator was discovered in the same vicinity. Authorities confiscated 32.4 tons of marijuana, with a street value of about $65 million. Varieties of signs suggested that the tunnel had been active for months. “At that rate, hundreds of tons of marijuana worth hundreds of millions of dollars would have moved through this one tunnel during its life span. “23 Given the rates of return on investment, an alpha group could easily finance construction projects contracted out to beta groups.24 In sum, we have varieties of types of organizations, some of which demonstrate impressive capacity. With only limited, and often distorted, information, how can we put together a useful picture of the DTOs’ organizational dynamics, resources, and goals to get a sense of their effects on Mexico’s democratic governance?

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Functional Dynamics: Fragmented vs. Integrated Organizations

Drug-trafficking involves multiple products, each with various stages of production, processing, transport and warehousing, wholesale and retail distribution. The stages typically involve money laundering.25 Largely because of the associated violence, we know most about Mexico’s DTOs at the wholesale-smuggling stages, especially with respect to cocaine. There is less on the production and processing stages for marijuana, heroin, and chemical drugs, such as methamphetamine, and more on their wholesale and retail distribution. We have mostly journalistic items about Mexico’s domestic drug markets and the financial flows of drug-related money into the informal and formal economies. With the exception of Allen (2005) on the economic geography of cocaine we lack an industrial-organization analysis of illicit drugs in the Mexican case and must rely on US and Mexican government documents and media reports for partial descriptions. It’s remarkable that an industry that nets annual revenues on the order of billions of dollars generates so little useful empirical analysis. As Thoumi (2005, p. 185) aptly puts it: “Let’s all guess the size of the illegal drug industry.” These gaps limit our ability to analyze the power capabilities of DTOs, their methods of engagement and goals, their targets with respect to Mexico’s political system, and their channels into the economy and society. DTOs have both direct and mediated effects on democratic governance; that is, they corrupt or intimidate specific political and societal actors, and their direct actions also affect broader audiences, especially as amplified by mass media. Government and some DTOs compete to influence the media because public opinion shapes public policy and societal behavior. The gaps also permit some dubious, even farfetched, guesses about drug flows and finances. For all types of illegal drugs, there is a basic sequences of transnational trafficking: Cultivation/productionàProcessing/ packagingàTransportation to and within MexicoàSmuggling into the US (or other markets)àWholesale transactions at or near the US borderàWholesale transactions at distribution points within the USàRetail sales at the neighborhood and street levels. Money is laundered at various steps in the sequence. From the perspective of an organizational analysis of DTOs the key variables are incentives and constraints. To simplify, I begin with transnational cocaine trafficking and then briefly consider marijuana. I set aside heroin and chemical drugs, which—although significant— make up smaller shares of quantities and income. The key questions are:

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To what extent does the necessary decentralization of trafficking constrain the capacity of the participating organizations to influence the broader political system? For example, to what extent does the segmentation of functions break up the total income earned from trafficking into lesser amounts received by some number of organizations? To what extent do the organizations coordinate or compete with respect to their political activities? With regard to cocaine, alpha DTOs have strong incentives to integrate backward to cultivation and production in northern South America in order to control supply, and to integrate forward to streetlevel retail markets in the United States in order to capture maximum profits. Backward integration implies control over farm- and lab-level operations in producing countries, as well as control over the subsequent steps of packaging the product, transporting it to Mexico, smuggling it into the US market, and transporting and marketing it at the street level. The fully integrated model would indeed maximize profits, but it also maximizes risk of exposure and creates almost insuperable levels of operational complexity. An alpha would need to carry thousands of employees on its payroll and maintain detailed, real-time intelligence about constantly-changing production conditions, law enforcement capabilities, and local contingencies along hundreds of miles of transport corridors through dozens of different jurisdictions, and have the capacity to intervene effectively and instantaneously. The constraints on the fully-integrated model argue for varying degrees of decentralization and of contracting functions out to specialized organizations. Thus, an alpha would more likely purchase finished products at points of export from the producing country or points of entry into Central America or Mexico. The transshipment of loads across Mexican territory can be contracted out to beta organizations, which can take responsibility for on-the-spot problemsolving. Betas, in turn, contract support as needed from gamma groups, police forces or local gangs, at the ground level to service local drug markets and assist betas in transporting product through their territories. Payment to the gammas for services would likely be a combination of cash and drugs. Contracting out insulates the alphas (and to some extent the betas) from law enforcement and helps cope with complex and dynamic logistics.26 The alpha group has the knowledge, contacts, and cash on hand to purchase product in bulk amounts in producing countries and finance the transshipment of product by sea or across Central America and through Mexico. A key asset is its knowledge of the macro network from which criminal collectives can be flexibly formed to manage operations. It can

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negotiate cooperation from national and local authorities and state-level law enforcement through one or more transit corridors. The alpha needs effective communications as well as some number of gunmen on its payroll or available by contract to protect shipments and enforce discipline. Finally, the alpha must have access as needed to other specialists along transit corridors.27 At the point of smuggling the product into the US, the beta has the option of contracting out the operation to a specialized gamma cell or entrusting it to one of its own cells, perhaps paying a fee if a tollgate DTO has sufficient force to oblige it. Once loads are reassembled in stash houses on the US side, the beta has the option to sell the product to one or more organizations at or near the border, settling for the substantial markup of the cross-border smuggling and avoiding the risk of more intensive US law enforcement. Conversely, the beta can collect higher profits by transporting the product to points of wholesale distribution farther into the US interior. Buyers at these points can resell the product to intermediaries, eventually reaching the street-level outlets where the highest profits are realized. How far forward into the US market do betas operate? Accounts differ. A recent RAND Corporation study suggests that those who smuggle drugs across the border “typically sell to importers, who sell to wholesalers, who may sell to midlevel wholesalers or to retailers, who sell to users” (Kilmer et. al. 2010, pp. 9-10). The prices rise at each point in the chain. “For example, the kilogram of cocaine that costs $2,000 in Colombia and is worth $10,000 within Mexico might sell first in the United States for $14,000-$18,000 per kilogram but retail for the equivalent of $100,000-$150,000 per kilogram when broken down in $5 and $10 rocks of crack” (ibid., p. 10). This account suggests that beta’s main “pay day” is the cross-border markup. On the other hand, some news accounts claim that the Sinaloa and Zetas DTOs are present in scores of US cities. Richard Marosi of the Los Angeles Times reports that, in the mid-2000s the Sinaloa organization moved cocaine from the US-Mexico border at Calexico, California, to Los Angeles and from there to distribution points throughout the country. According to his reporting, the Sinaloa group collected the markups in value to the point of sale to distribution gangs, who diluted and prepared the cocaine for retail sale at the street level. The highest profits are generated at this stage.28 Profits from the sale of cocaine in the US, either at the border or at some point of a wholesale transaction, are typically smuggled back by a beta organization into Mexico, often in the form of bulk cash. The beta keeps some portion of the money for its fee and delivers another

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(probably larger) portion to an alpha both in bulk cash and as laundered through banks, peso exchange houses, real estate transactions, casinos, professional sports teams, and the like.29 It is reasonable to assume that the drug is smuggled and delivered in order to fill specific orders from US bulk purchasers; alternatively, bulk purchasers may depend on availability from wholesalers. In either case, it is likely that some quantity of product is warehoused on the US side in advance in order to smooth out the distribution flow and avoid the price swings of surplus and scarcity. We can do a rough calculation to get a sense of how many smuggling operations the beta groups might carry out in a year. We can estimate US cocaine demand at 252 metric tons (MT) per year in the mid 2000s and calculate that 80 percent, or 202 MT was smuggled through Mexico (Kilmer et al. 2010, pp. 30-31).30 Some quantity of this product is seized by Mexico law enforcement (9.8 MT in 2010)31 or by US law enforcement along the US Southwest border (17.8 MT in 2010) (USDOJ/NDIC 2011, p. 50). Also, some of the product is paid in kind for services along the way or directly sold into the Mexican domestic market. With no way of knowing, we might guess that twenty percent of the quantity smuggled into the US (i.e., 40 MT) is paid out for services rendered in both countries. These calculations give us a gross estimate of roughly 270 MT cocaine traversing Mexico in a given year. We can only guess at the load size of individual cocaine shipments. The key is risk tolerance: how much can an alpha afford to lose if a load is interdicted, stolen, or otherwise lost? Maritime shipping can handle large loads: a go-fast boat might carry a ton, as might a tube fixed to the hull of a vessel; a semi-submersible or a commercial fishing vessel perhaps up to five MT; a standard cargo ship perhaps up to 30 MT.32 On land, within Mexico, a load of one to 1.5 MT (imagine 1,000 to 1,500 standard construction bricks) would be physically manageable in commercial and private trucks and within reasonable risk parameters. Related to the 270 MT figure calculated above, a “ballpark” estimate therefore is about 180 to 270 shipments per year to the US-Mexico border. If a beta group can oversee 10 such shipments per year perhaps something between 18 and 27 betas are active in the cocaine trade alone. How many gammas are needed per year for cocaine trafficking? Here we have too many unknowns to hazard a guess. The number depends, for example, on where the alpha purchased the product and then on the entry of the cocaine into Mexican territory. With greater radar surveillance, smuggling by air is less frequent. “According to [US] estimates, 330 tons of cocaine left Guatemala and entered Mexico in 2010, with 267 tons of this having previously transited Honduras, and so

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on down the line” (UNODC 2012, p. 43). Entry into Mexico might be at the border with Guatemala or Belize, or at points along either coast. The actual cross-border smuggling of cocaine into the US appears fairly labor intensive. Marosi’s reporting on the Mexicali/Calexico crossing in 2006 suggests that cocaine loads were limited to 100-200 pounds per vehicle to manage risk. The smuggling coordinator at the border employed about 40 drivers, lookouts, and coordinators, as loads were closely monitored at each step along the way. The drugs were moved “to stash houses and staging areas around Los Angeles. There, scores of distribution cells take over, packaging the cocaine and concealing it in tractor-trailers headed across the United States in 300-600 pound lots.”33 Marosi estimates that 40 tons of cocaine passed through the Mexicali/Calexico border crossing over a three-year period, or about 13.3 tons per year. Estimating an average of 150 pounds per vehicle suggests that about 176 crossings took place per year at a port of entry that handled more than six million vehicles in 2006.34 Assuming no losses on the shipments from the border to Los Angeles, we might estimate about 59 tractor-trailer loads dispatched across the country. To put this information in perspective, the Calexico cell filled about five percent of US national cocaine demand in a given year. I’m not suggesting that we multiply the transportation numbers by 20. My point is that the cocaine industry in itself is highly complex, meaning that, to keep the industry operating, a number of beta groups closer to my upper estimate of 27 are most likely required. In contrast to coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking, cannabis is cultivated and processed in Mexico, where the marijuana industry is locally rooted and more complex. There is a wide range of production possibilities, from small plots scattered and hidden in mountainous regions, to larger, better-capitalized farms, to sophisticated greenhouse and hydroponic production facilities. To estimate the amount of marijuana trafficked into the US each year, we need to tease out the quantity of product produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States and the quantity that remains in the Mexican market. Supply-side estimates by official sources “have long been inconsistent and sometimes implausible” (Kilmer et al. 2010, p. 6). If we begin with the estimate of 21,500 MT of marijuana potentially produced in Mexico in 2008 and net out the Mexican and Southwest border seizures, distributing the remainder according to estimates of market demand, “this would suggest that US consumption of Mexican marijuana is 16,730 MT, or a total consumption of 21,500 MT,” assuming that onethird of the product is produced in the United States (ibid.). The absurd implication of these supply-side estimates is: “That is just about enough

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for one joint every two hours for every waking hour of the year for every past-month user” (ibid.). Demand-side estimates are probably more accurate. Based on the RAND study (ibid., p. 16), we might estimate the quantity of marijuana smuggled into the United States (on the high side) as between 1,780 and 3,280 MT per year. Given that marijuana consumption in the US has remained relatively stable over the past 10 years, we might guess that the amounts smuggled are also stable. If we add to the 3,280 MT the higher estimate of border seizures (1,500 MT) plus seizures within Mexico (about 1,650 MT), we guess that smugglers transported about 6,430 MT of marijuana to the border. We have no way of knowing the “average” weight of a load of marijuana delivered to the Mexico-US border. Bulk size is more important than weight for shipping and smuggling. On the low side, a standard half-ton pickup truck (picture a generic Ford-150) could easily fit 140 “bricks,” each weighing 2.5-kilograms (or a load of 350 kilograms) into its bed; on the high side, an 18-wheeler could haul more than a metric ton. Setting aside for the moment other modes of transportation such as ships and railroads, these estimates suggest quite a high volume of road traffic, somewhere in a range of about 6,000 to 18,370 vehicle-trips to connect the producing areas to the border. At the cross-border smuggling stage itself, we have several images. The elaborate tunnels described above, which could reasonably accommodate scores of tons of product, are the exceptions. More prevalent are smaller, shallower tunnels through which individuals might smuggle one-kilo packages that are passed through small openings in the ground on the US side.35 Another frequent mode of smuggling is by individual migrants carrying marijuana compressed into backpack loads of about 60 pounds. If we estimate 10 backpackers in a group, 600 pounds might fetch about $300,000 on the Arizona side, minus $5,000 or so in wages. We know little about the reassembly of loads on the US side and the organization of shipping and sales to interior states and cities. Shifting from the export perspective, how large is Mexico’s internal market for marijuana? This question has not been not well studied. Guerrero Gutiérrrez (2010, Table 3) summarizes findings from the 2002 and 2008 surveys of illicit drug use in Mexico. Absolute numbers of users remain low but rates of increase are significant. If we return to a supply-side approach, potential marijuana production in Mexico for 2008 is estimated at between 15,800 and 21,500 MT produced on 12,000 hectares.36 It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to estimate the varieties of inputs (labor, machinery, seed, fertilizers, herbicides, and

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the like) needed for cultivation, processing, packaging, etc., all of which would give us a sense of the “footprint” of the cannabis industry in Mexico. Our proxy for complexity is transportation of finished product. If we use the lower production estimate (15,800 MT) and subtract the higher estimate of product smuggled to the United States (3,280 MT), along with a higher estimate of border seizures (1,500 MT) plus seizures within Mexico (about 2,350 MT) we might calculate that just over 8,600 MT remained in the Mexican market (ibid., pp. 7-8). Citing Mexican official sources, Guerrero Gutiérrez (2011a, p. 82) puts potential marijuana consumption in Mexico’s internal market (year unspecified) at 514.9 MT. Discarding the 8,000 MT estimate as quite unlikely, let’s err on the conservative side and guess that Mexico’s internal market in 2008 was approximately 1,000 MT. Even this low-side number generates road traffic at between 1,000 and 2,860 vehicle-trips to service the internal wholesale market. We have thus created images of complexity and high levels of activity in the cocaine and marijuana industries. In what ways are the two businesses interrelated? In important respects they are fundamentally different. Cocaine is produced offshore and is transported as a fairly compact finished product in a large number of conveyances through constantly shifting smuggling corridors. One political implication is the corruption option: a hefty flow of payments in cash and kind to “buy off” whatever control agents might interdict or impede transit. To some extent the payments might reach fairly high up into the bureaucratic apparatus or into elected office, even governorships. It is important to note the flow of cocaine into Mexico’s domestic market, either sold to consumers or as payment-in-kind to gamma cells along the way. The growth of the internal market spreads further corruption among municipal police and can promote violence in a variety of ways. Also, once the domestic market puts down roots it takes on a dynamic independent from smuggling-related payment in kind.37 Cannabis, in contrast, is produced by thousands of Mexican farmers in greenhouses or on an estimated 12,000 hectares (or nearly 30,000 acres), if we believe the US government number for 2008. For perspective, this amount is about one-quarter of the land devoted to tomato cultivation. Guerrero Gutiérrez (2011a, pp. 75-76) lists 10 states, mostly in Western Mexico, as the main cannabis producers. He cites Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Nayarit, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas as principal producers and distributors of marijuana (ibid., p. 78). The obvious point is that the cannabis industry continues over time and comes to be woven into the fabric of local economies. Given depressed economic conditions in many rural areas, flows of income

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from those economies would make local authorities reluctant to interfere, regardless of whether they were bribed. Resa Nestares (n.d., pp. 405-418) describes the overlaps and interactions between the cultivation of cannabis and amapola (source of heroin products), which can grow in similar terrain and climates. In contrast, without empirical studies we can only speculate about the interactions of the cocaine and cannabis industries. It may be that alphas target the export market (e.g., financing production), leaving the smuggling operations and internal market to betas and independent operators. Smuggling cells at the border probably handle both cocaine and marijuana. Financial Flows vs. Net Income for DTOs

The main point of the preceding analysis is to gain perspective on flows of money through various types and levels of groups and organizations. Official estimates vary enormously about the amounts of money generated by domestic and transnational drug-trafficking, and it’s unclear what sums in what forms remain in the US and what flow back to Mexico or elsewhere. Further, we don’t have a clear sense of how many alphas and betas receive shares of the income that either stays in the United States or returns to Mexico. Also, we can’t estimate very accurately the routine expenses that DTOs incur in, for example, corrupting the various types of officials who influence transit. Nor do we know the ordinary expenses of traffickers to maintain their lifestyles. Official estimates are not helpful. “It is estimated that DTOs’ annual gross revenue ranges between $15-30 billion from illicit drug sales in the US Most of these proceeds are returned from the US primarily through bulk currency shipments and laundered through legitimate Mexican businesses” (US Department of State 2010, p. 432). Another government report put the number at between $19 and 29 billion from drug sales entering Mexico; between 75 and 90 percent of the money was in cash; less than half was laundered through financial institutions.38 Still another report “estimated that approximately 18-39 billion dollars annually is moved from the interior of the US to the Southwest Border on behalf of Mexican and Colombian DTOs” (US Department of Justice 2010, p. 2). If we use an upper-end estimate of $30 billion, drug income made up 1.9 percent of the Mexico’s GDP for 2010.39 For perspective, recall that Kar (2012, p. 5) estimated capital flight from Mexico at 6.1 percent of GDP per year in the 2000s. The methods and data behind official estimates are not spelled out, and the numbers take on a life of their own to be repeated in press

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accounts and Congressional testimonies (Thoumi 2005). Alejandro Hope (2011b) could find no evidence that the upper-end estimates of drug income affected Mexico’s balance of payments, stock exchange, currency exchange rates, or real estate markets. In fact, most of the more prominent trafficking states were below the national average with respect to average annual real growth in the housing index in the period 2005-2010. In contrast to official estimates, the RAND report cited above uses a transparent demand-based analysis of US drug markets from wholesale to retail and estimates the shares of product smuggled from Mexico for the period approximately 2002-2005. The authors put annual gross revenue from marijuana exported to the US from Mexico in the range of US$1.1 to 2 billion, “with a best estimate close to $1.5 billion” (Kilmer et al. 2010, p. 17). They also estimate income from exports of other illicit drugs (in billions of dollars): cocaine (3.4); Mexican heroin (0.4); Colombian heroin (0.7); and methamphetamine (0.6) (ibid., p. 30). Their total of $6.6 billion is less than half of the official low-end figure and equals .42 percent of the 2010 GDP. As to cash flows, Mexico’s then-Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora testified before his congress in October 2007 that “Mexican banks receive about $1 billion from their US counterparts annually, but return up to $16 billion, of which about $10 billion ‘does not have an explanation and could be attributed to the flow of drug trafficking money’” (Farah 2010, p. 25). When we consider the extent of the dollarization of the Mexican economy, i.e., the use of US dollars for ordinary transactions as well as for major purchases, the $10 billion estimate very likely is substantially less than the total stock of US currency in Mexico’s economy, some portion of which is derived from drug sales. To date we lack a scholarly overview of the stocks and flows of US currency. With respect to income from Mexico’s internal market, a report by the Secretariat of Public Security estimated the income from domestic wholesale distribution at US$432 million. Although more Mexicans consume marijuana, the larger share of income ($207 million) derived from methamphetamines.40 On the high end, SSP Secretary Genaro García Luna testified in January 2010 that the value of the wholesale drug market was US$811 million, although it is unclear how the estimate was calculated.41 Beyond the income from illicit drugs, some DTOs collect substantial revenues from horizontal integration into diverse types of legal and illegal activities. We have no way to estimate the amounts.

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In sum, we do not have a clear picture of the total revenues generated by drug-trafficking, and we know even less about distributions of income among DTOs and their profit margins. We do know that their income can finance large payrolls, including advanced expertise, complex organization, and ample weaponry and equipment. It can also finance extensive corruption. But the point to underline is that two or three alphas are not divvying up $30 billion per year which they can employ to shape Mexico’s political life. Rather, it is more likely that several dozen groups are dividing up some $6-7 billion per year, out of which they must pay substantial operating expenses. Even at this diminished level, however, some number of alphas and betas have tens or hundreds of millions of dollars with which to influence the political system, much of which is in the form of cash that can be easily introduced into a highly dollarized economy. For example, Mario Villanueva was convicted by a US federal court in June 2013 of money laundering during his term as governor of Quintana Roo. The amount cited in the sentencing was 19 million dollars, allegedly paid by the Juárez cartel to allow the transport cocaine through the state.42 We assume that traffickers are rational corruptors, focusing their payments on the police and other agents involved in controlling aspects of their business. Such agents make up a complex network stretching from the central government to the municipal levels. In securing political influence, traffickers’ business savvy comes into play. They need to know who precisely needs to be paid and how much. Where traffickers operate unimpeded, we don’t know the mix of corruption and intimidation at work. It makes sense that traffickers in spatially-fixed industries (i.e., cannabis and amapola) would have incentives to invest in local-level elections. DTOs and the Political System

As to modes of engagement by DTOs with the political system, corruption and intimidation by beta and gamma groups are most studied. We know little about “upper world” business alliances, community engagement, or media manipulation. The organizations’ main goal is to protect business operations. With respect to corruption, betas and gammas practice extensive, targeted corruption of police and other control agents along smuggling corridors and in internal markets. Alphas have operated for some time at what Buscaglia and van Dijk (2003, pp. 23-24) call the fourth level, with the focus on controlling state and federal law enforcement. The central issue is their degree of advance

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with respect to the fifth level: state capture in order to influence law making, law enforcement, and judicial decisions. Thus, we need to ask: What degrees of control do DTOs exercise over law-making and top-level executive and judicial decisions? Do they have political agendas beyond their specific business operations? Can these agendas be satisfied within the existing system, or are there incentives for possible DTO-terrorist organization collaboration? After noting goals and targets of pressure, I focus on the police-justice system, the military in law enforcement, and DTO influence over elected officials. We have ample coverage of these themes in the news media but very little scholarly research. The main target of DTO corruption or intimidation is the police, taken broadly to include customs agents and other regulators, and the justice system. DTOs focus their corruption and intimidation on the preventive and investigative police at all levels. Some of the estimated 319,000 municipal and state police serve as spies, protectors, and enforcers. At the state and national levels, the investigative and highway police are useful for their control over inter-city and regional service.43 Competing DTOs employ different police agencies or different officers in the same agency, and officers may switch allegiances or attack colleagues who are protecting rival organizations, all of which contributes to the violence and confusion, as we saw in the discussion of Tijuana in Chapter 4. To the extent that DTOs succeed in controlling the police, there is less incentive to target subsequent phases of the justice system, although DTOs are a corruptive presence throughout the chain. Especially weak links in the justice system are the prosecuting attorneys, who decide whether to bring cases before judges, and the court administrative staff, who control the flows of paper (Fernández Menéndez 2007). Also important is DTO influence within the prison system, especially to recruit new members and to expand networks of contacts. As we’ll see in Chapter 6, the Mexican army and navy have become important actors with respect to intelligence-gathering and operations against DTOs. Media have reported numerous incidents of corruption reaching from the lowest to the highest levels in the case of the army. There are fewer allegations with respect to the navy. Finally, we have little information about organized crime in the mainstream work on congress, executive branch policy-making, or parties and elections. There is ample news coverage of alleged DTO intimidation of city mayors and even state governors. There is also considerable coverage of alleged DTO contributions to political campaigns, mainly at the municipal level, with some allegation of

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involvement in state governor and federal deputy races, and even the presidency.44 Curzio (2000) recounts a number of drug-related financial scandals and argues that Mexico’s comparatively generous public financing of campaigns was due to then-president Ernesto Zedillo’s concern about the potential influence of criminal groups on political campaigns.45 In sum, there is a good deal of speculation about DTOs in campaign financing at the federal level but little concrete evidence. In stark contrast to the Colombian case, little to date suggests that DTOs influence Mexico’s federal congress. Are there connections between DTOs, insurgent groups, and terrorism? There have been several recent and significant terrorist acts in the country.46 Both the Mexican and US governments put priority on terrorism as a national security threat, and opinion polls report that Mexicans are concerned about possible terrorist attacks on their territory, all of which suggests the political sensitivity of the issue.47 The problem is sorting out the relationships among DTOs and insurgent groups and determining their uses of terror, understood as a tactic of violence and intimidation deliberately aimed against civilian audiences for political purposes, for example, to force changes in government policies. Rollins el al. (2010, p. 1) note three primary overlaps between terrorism and crime: “(1) through shared tactics and methods, (2) through the process of transformation from one type of group to the other over time, and (3) through short-term or long-term transactionbased service-for-hire activities between groups.” To date we have seen ample evidence that DTOs use terrorist methods but very little transformation from one type to another or service-for-hire activities between groups. It’s possible that some insurgent groups might participate as gammas in trafficking. Velasco (2005, p. 32) suggests that insurgent groups were active in 20 of the 32 states, mostly in South and Central Mexico. Although small in numbers of militants, they exercised political influence in left parties and social movements. He also analyzes the presence and significance of DTOs at some length, but he does not take the obvious next step to sort out the relationships among the two types of groups. This may be because those relationships were unimportant. The EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) is Mexico’s most prominent insurgent group. It is concentrated in southern Chiapas, a border zone with Guatemala that lends itself to trafficking. Unlike Colombia’s FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), however, there is no evidence that the EZLN engages in trafficking. To date, Mexico’s DTOs employ terror against each other, the civilian population, and the government in order to intimidate and thereby undermine resistance.

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Their political goals are business-oriented, e.g., to control appointments of police and security officials or to influence public opinion against the use the military in law enforcement (Rodríguez Sánchez Lara and Arroyo Juárez 2008).48 We know very little about about DTO infiltration into the formal and informal economies, which limits our understanding about how criminal influence might be expressed through firms or individuals, or— conversely—how business firms might affect criminal behavior. If, for example, drug-trafficking income is invested in construction and services in coastal resorts, to what extent does that industry communicate traffickers’ interests to various levels of government?49 As we saw in Chapter 3, the informal economy is a key structural interface between organized crime and the political system. Organized crime feeds the supply chains of products through forms of theft, robbery, clandestine factories, and smuggling; it figures as well in financing transactions and providing protection for informal merchants. Some of Mexico’s DTOs penetrate informal markets as both an enterprise activity and as a target for protection-extortion. Conclusions: Was Clouthier Right?

We started the discussion of DTOs with an ominous quote from Manuel Clouthier: “Narco-politics is the greatest threat to Mexico’s incipient democracy. If federal authorities don’t fight it now, the damage will be irreversible.” Clouthier is from Sinaloa, a state long at the epicenter of trafficking activity, so his perspective might be biased. DTO’s operate in the bottom third of the “map” presented in Table 1.1, and they “cross the line” to influence the regime and state in multiple ways. They have been significant players at the local level since the 1940s and became increasingly visible and potent after the 1970s. By 2006 the trafficking gangs became increasingly aggressive and violent, first among themselves and then against the government’s security forces. By the 2012 presidential campaign the debate included both trafficking-related violence and the potential for DTOs to play a significant role in the presidential election itself. Fortunately, the PRI’s Enrique Peña Nieto won by sufficient margin to put that fear to rest. I argued in this chapter that alpha-level DTOs need to decentralize their activities by delegating functions to numerous second- and thirdtier groups, resulting in hundreds of organizations. We saw also that the likely range of annual income from trafficking was quite significant. It is not, however, on the order of US$19-29 billion as some US government sources suggest, but probably closer to US$6-8 billion and divided

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among scores of organizations that must pay hefty operating costs to purchase product, manage transportation, purchase weapons and pay out wages to varieties of employees before we even consider the flows of bribes to police and political authorities. We have, then, a potent set of interest groups that can wield significant influence targeted mainly at the local level and at the police-justice system, especially in producing areas (for marijuana and heroin) and trafficking corridors (to include cocaine). I would endorse a qualified version of Clouthier’s warning. “Narcopolitics” is the greatest threat to democratic governance in some cities and regions of Mexico as of late 2012. The threat in the form of violence and intimidation can be managed through improved police and justice administration, especially if combined with development and social welfare programs. If successful, the violence can be contained to specific spaces, such as neighborhoods, and managed by state and municipal preventive police. “Narco-corruption,” however, will remain a serious threat at the regional and local levels for years to come. One of the most serious vulnerabilities is the infusion of cash into increasingly competitive state and local elections. This problem calls for more sophisticated methods of monitoring campaign finance and requiring candidates to account for their direct expenditures as well as spending done on their behalf. The strategy will work, however, only if electorates punish candidates who are linked to unexplained cash. The threat, in part, concerns the election and circulation to higher office of politicians who benefitted from drug corruption at some point in their careers. Would they, in higher office, be likely to promote significant reform?

Notes 1 Quoted in Tracy Wilkinson and Ken Ellingwood, “Suspicions of drug ties don’t hurt candidates,” Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2010. 2 President Felipe Calderón quoted in “Impone el narco su ley y cuotas,” Eluniversal.com.mx, April 18, 2012. 3 “El narco ha suplantado el Estado; ya no espero justicia, afirma Lucas de la Garza,” Jornada.unam.mx, February 20, 2011. I became acquainted with de la Garza in 1991 during his quixotic gubernatorial campaign in Nuevo León. 4 I prefer DTOs to other labels, e.g., Transnational Criminal Organizations, because the incomes generated by drug trafficking are substantially greater than those from other forms of crime, and many of the trafficking groups operate locally. 5 There is a substantial journalistic literature of variable quality. See, for example, Beith (2010), Hernández (2010), Osorio (2009), Riveles (2009), and Pérez (2011). InsightCrime.org provides good-quality periodic coverage.

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6

This section expands and updates Bailey (2012a). These are drawn from Astorga (2005, 2007, and 2008) and Astorga and Shirk (2010), who provide the most complete descriptions of the DTOs and their interactions with law enforcement and military agencies. Fernández Menéndez and Ronquillo (2006), Grayson (2010), Grayson and Logan (2012), and Guerrero Gutiérrez (2011b; 2012) are also useful. The role of the state in regulating trafficking from the 1930s to the 1990s is well established in the literature (e.g., Bailey and Godson 2001; Flores Pérez 2009a; 2009b; 2010; Yáñez Romero 2009). 8 Prominent journalist Manuel Buendía was murdered in May 1984 and DEA agent Enrique Camarena and his pilot, Alfonso Zavala, were killed in February 1985. A good treatment of the DFS and the events of 1985 is Aguayo Quesada (2001, pp. 227-249). 9 “The events [of 2003]—including an assortment of spontaneous and planned firefights, raids, and assassinations—marked the greater maturation of drug cartel paramilitaries. It highlighted an increase in their armaments and capabilities to the point where they could openly challenge organized security forces, and an overlay of corruption and compromise that continues to taint domestic and international cooperation in fighting the power of cartel leaders and organizations” (Turbiville, 2010, p. 133). 10 Most of the work is descriptive. We lack efforts to link analytics, e.g., network theory (Williams 1998, 2001), with empirical case studies. Kenny (2007) on Colombian trafficking is an exception. Bunker and Sullivan (2010) offer a framework that differentiates three “phases” of DTO evolution. 11 Guerrero Gutiérrez (2010) reports the government’s tally of arrests of personnel from the various DTOs over 2007-2009. Resa Nestares (2004, p. 7) is dismissive of the government’s methodology to classify arrests by DTO. 12 Bunker et al. (2010) analyze varieties of forms of torture and executions (e.g., beheadings), and Maihold (2012) discusses “narco-banners” as used in communications strategies. 13 Astorga (2007, pp. 140-147) relates the capture of Zhenli Ye Gon and US$205 million in cash in Mexico City in March 2007. The money was associated with the importation of chemical precursors for illegal drugs. Police puzzled over Zhenli’s connections to Mexican trJoaffickers, and Astorga wonders how such a large operation could exist independently. 14 Astorga (2007) provides a historically-grounded interpretation of news accounts; Grayson (2010) gives us a snapshot of DTO alliances in early 2010. Proceso, the Mexico City weekly news magazine, provides extensive coverage, often citing police intelligence sources. See, for example, “La guerra del narco: primera parte,” Proceso (edición especial no. 28, abril 2010). 15 The following summary of the main DTOs as of fall 2012 draws heavily on the excellent reports by Eduardo Guerrero (2011a; 2011b) and Alejandro Hope (2011b). 16 Campbell (2010), Grayson (2009), and Grayson and Logan (2012) give detailed descriptions and assessments of the Los Zetas. 17 Flores Pérez (2010) analyzes the political protection that promoted the growth of the Gulf DTO since the 1950s. Alfredo Corchado of the Dallas Morning News has provided good coverage of Nuevo Laredo, a key border city, which is especially useful given the media censorship imposed in Mexico by local DTOs. 7

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18 On Tijuana, see especially Blancornelas (2002) and Sabet (2010). Jones (2011) analyzes the state’s successful repression of the AFO. Zeta, the weekly newspaper, provides excellent coverage. 19 “Toma narco rasgos terroristas, alertan,” ElUniversal.com.mx, January 14, 2011. 20 Author interview, Mexico City, May 2011. 21 Blancornelas (2002), Fernández Menéndez and Ronquillo (2001), and Scherer García (2009) can be mined for images. The US Treasury Department provides partial diagrams of the top leadership of several Mexican and Colombian DTOs under “Charts on Organizational Structures and Financial Networks” (available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ programs/narco/narco.shtml; last accessed on August 27, 2010). Bunker and Sullivan (2010) provide an interesting general framework to differentiate “phases” of gang evolution; Campbell (2010) and Grayson and Logan (2012) provide useful descriptons of the Zetas. 22 “Marijuana confiscated in raid on Tijuana-to-San Diego tunnel,” Latimes.com, November 17, 2011. 23 “Raids Don’t Keep Tunnel City from Humming Underground,” NYTimes.com, December 1, 2011. Reportedly, the larger DTOs, e.g., the Sinaloa group, contract arquitects, engineers, and other skilled personnel to build increasingly sophisticated tunnels. “Usan a expertos para narcotúneles: informe,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 12, 2011. 24 See “Los narcotúneles de Tijuana,” ElUniversal.com.mx, February 23, 2012. 25 Mares (2006) is a useful general political-economy overview. 26 See Anthony Maingot (2009) for a discussion of the “decentralization imperative” in the case of trafficking in the Caribbean. 27 See “The Zetas Take to the Air,” InSight.Crime.org, December 9, 2011, for a description of the communications equipment of an alpha group. 28 See Richard Marosi, “Inside the Cartel,” Latimes.com, July 24, 2011. 29 HSBC, a major commercial bank, was accused by the US Justice Department in December 2012 of laundering $881 million for the Sinaloa and Norte del Valle DTOs. “Mexican traffickers used boxes specifically designed to the dimensions of an HSBC teller’s window to deposit cash on a daily basis.” “HSBC to pay $1.9 billion US fine in money-laundering case,” Reuters.com, December 11, 2012. 30 Cocaine demand was relatively stable in the US in the early 2000s, so the specific year of the estimate is not crucial. 31 Quinto Informe de Gobierno de Felipe Calderón, Indicadores del Programa Sectorial de Procuración de Justicia 2007-2012, p. 4 (available at: http://quinto.informe.gob.mx/archivos/anexo_estadistico/pdf/p_ind_estado_de_ derecho.pdf) (last accessed on November 21, 2011). 32 A “go-fast boat” is essentially a large speed boat with two or three highpowered outdoor motors and extra fuel tanks; a semi-submersible is a vessel powered by a diesel motor and that travels just below the surface of the ocean. 33 Marosi, “Inside the Cartel.” 34 US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, “Border Crossing/Entry Data: Query Detailed Statistics,” (available at: http://www.bts.gov/programs/ international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html; last accessed on December 19, 2011).

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35 Border county sheriff Larry Dever once pointed out to me the nondescript house trailer on the Arizona side that received drugs smuggled via a tunnel from Mexico. Naco, Arizona, January 2012. 36 USDOJ/NDIC (2011, p. 29) shows 21.5 MT of marijuana produce in 2008. If we extrapolate production from net cultivation (17,500 hectares) the estimate for 2009 would be on the order of 30 MT. 37 It’s conceivable that the evasion option might hold as well. That is, traffickers might invent techniques to elude police altogether. 38 Press item on a binational study done by US Department of Homeland Security and Mexico’s Treasury: “Cada año llegan hasta 29 mil mdd ilegales desde EU,” Jornada.unam.mx, June 3, 2010. 39 Based on a GDP of US$1.567 trillion in 2010 (purchasing power parity). Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html; last accessed on October 9, 2011). 40 “De 17 mil mdd al ano, el narcomercado de EU,” Milenio.com, August 30, 2009. 41 “Estrategia antinarco funciona: García Luna,” ElUniversal.com.mx, January 22, 2010. 42 “Narcogobernadores,” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 15, 2013. 43 Uniformed municipal police are assigned to neighborhood patrol duties (policía preventiva) or to street traffic (policía de tránsito). States and the federal government have highway police (policía de caminos) and investigative (plain clothes) police, sometimes called policía ministerial, who work closely with the prosecuting attorneys (ministerios públicos). The estimate is drawn from Zepeda Lecuona (2009a, 42), which is based on a June 2007 report by the SSP. 44 Velasco (2005, 113-117) discusses the relationships between increased costs of political campaigns and DTO involvement. In early 2009 CISEN, Mexico’s principal intelligence agency, publicly raised the issue of DTO finance in federal deputy campaigns, which led to harsh denunciations by the principal opposition parties. 45 Curzio (2000, p. 100) quotes President Zedillo: “’We do not want Mexico, as has unfortunately occurred elsewhere, to be a place where parties or candidates become vassals of people or organizations which, in fact, could be criminal.’” 46 The most serious were attacks on Pemex pipelines in July and September 2007 by the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario, which resulted in substantial economic dislocations in several states. 47 In a 2010 survey, 57.9 percent of Mexicans surveyed answered in the positive when asked, “How worried are you that there will be a violent attack by terrorists in Mexico in the next 12 months?” Mexico ranked sixth among the 24 countries surveyed, well above the US (47.7 percent) at 14th. (Zechmeister et al. 2010, 1). 48 The only case that I’m aware of that connects terrorists with criminals in Mexico is the convoluted conspiracy in which an Iranian-American citizen allegedly contracted a sicario from a Mexican drug cartel to carry out an assassination in Washington, D.C. See “US-Iranian citizen pleads guilty in scheme to kill Saudi ambassador in Washington,” The Washington Post, October 18, 2012, p. A9. There are several allegations of collaboration between

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the Colombian FARC and Mexican trafficking organizations in Colombia and Central America. 49 Loret de Mola (2001) attempted an early overview of the impacts of illegal drugs on the Mexican economy.

6 State Responses to Organized Crime 1

Any analysis of the Mexican criminal justice system must start from a certainty: It is so flawed we can say without fear of exaggeration that it is completely bankrupt (Carbonell and Ochoa Reza 2007, p. 20). It’s practically a rule. In each important crime committed in this country at least one federal, state, or local policeman is involved. . . . With the enemy within there’s no way to make progress in the fight against organized crime, much less possibilities of winning. —Editorial in Mexico City’s El Universal, April 15, 2011.

With degrees in law and economics and a master’s in public administration from Harvard, President Felipe Calderón revels in the details of government. As he told a reporter, “I am someone who gets into the stuff of government. It’s a defect, it’s a virtue, it’s the way I am. What do they want me to do? That’s the way I am. I like to look into things.”1 When asked late in his term what he might do differently with respect to anti-crime policies if he could start over again, he stressed institutional development, especially at the state and local levels. “That is to say that the degree of corruption, or at least institutional weakness, at the state and local levels was so profound, according to what we found as we went along, that perhaps . . . we might have done institutional development in a much more aggressive and determined way from the start.”2 In the event, Calderón dispatched federal security forces to several states and cities in his first days in office. This decision,

An earlier version of this chapter was published as Bailey 2010, and a revised version was presented at the 54th International Congress of Americanists held in Vienna, Austria, July 2012.

1

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his critics insist, unleashed a spiral of gang violence that produced more than 60,000 deaths by late 2012. Mexico’s security trap deepened after the mid 1980s with the changing dynamics of organized crime, especially drug-trafficking, the collapse of the PRI hegemony, and the acceleration of a dual politicaleconomic transition. Neither government nor civil society could mount an effective short-term response. The security crisis deteriorated still further in the first decade of the 21st century as internal drug markets expanded and other forms of criminality increased, and as trafficking gangs diversified their activities into kidnapping and extortion. Even more menacing, some trafficking gangs aggressively intimidated police forces and civil society in various localities, and even confronted federal police and military forces. Successful government and civil society responses to crime require at least three ingredients: policy knowledge, responsive government, and effective tools. Knowledge is needed to design programs that can improve citizen security. Responsiveness entails a party-electoral system that attends to citizen demands and a bureaucratic apparatus that can implement them. Key tools include an effective and law-abiding policejustice administration, supplemented with social development strategies, at all levels of government. A primary gauge of government and civil society success is perception; that is, success can be measured in a variety of objective ways, but the public’s evaluation is the ultimate judge. Following the July 2009 midterm congressional elections, after three years of escalating violence, support for PAN wavered, and a lame duck president was increasingly on the defensive. The public’s negative verdict was confirmed with the PAN’s 2012 defeat in the presidential election. Growing violence and insecurity, like a worsening drought, were widely perceived in Mexico during Calderón’s term, but—like meteorologists reporting bad weather—policy-makers lacked the knowledge and tools to respond effectively, in turn undermining political will. In effect, with reelection legally barred, why should presidents or governors take on the political challenge of confronting insecurity absent a coherent short-term strategy and shackled with a corrupt and incompetent police-justice system? Incentives pointed more toward symbolic responses such as announcing major initiatives and creating new bureaucracies, or renaming existing ones; increasing budgets but neglecting program evaluation; and purchasing expensive hardware, with dubious effect on reducing crime. Politicians resorted to “punitive populism” by advocating harsher penalties, including capital punishment—regardless of the likelihood of effective policing or

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competent justice administration.3 They played the “blame game,” state governors blaming the federal government for inadequate effort, and federal officials reminding governors that ninety percent of crime falls within states’ jurisdiction and that decentralization delivers bigger budgets, while everyone blames his or her predecessors for doing too little.4 Finally, many blamed the United States for causing much of the problem in the first place, and responding with stale rhetoric and halfmeasures. Some went further than others, suggesting that some US public officials colluded with traffickers.5 Civil society protests to push for effective government responses during the Calderón administration were mostly unsuccessful. Votes, protest marches, and lobbying proved frustrating because, even when officials devised strategies against organized crime, they lacked effective tools to implement them, and the no-reelection rule meant policy-makers could evade accountability. Thus, even though many remained engaged, incentives for civil society pointed more toward selfdefense, as we saw in Chapter 3. Those with more resources had more options, including the services of the booming private security industry. Ordinary folks could change their routines; the more aggressive could opt for vigilantism. Ultimately, both rich and poor could migrate internally or leave the country. In contrast to former-president Vicente Fox, who seemed at times disconnected and uninterested in the details of governance, Calderón was energetically involved in day-to-day administration (“a details guy” as one participant put it).6 His grasp of the challenges of organized crime and his strategic thinking evolved over the course of his administration. Calderón’s presidential campaign in the spring of 2006 coincided with the worsening of criminal violence. Candidate Calderón elevated citizen security to the top of his agenda, on par with economic growth and job creation.7 Acting decisively, in his first three months as president Calderón deployed more than 27,000 federal police and Army personnel to eight states.8 However, the protracted and bitter dispute surrounding his razor-thin electoral victory over PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador created an impression that the new president was using the security crisis as a crutch to prop up his fragile legitimacy. This skepticism hampered anti-crime cooperation between the federal and state governments. Also, Mexican presidents since the 1970s typically began their terms with campaigns to eradicate crime and corruption, only to subsequently retreat. Calderón’s reliance on the armed forces to repress the DTOs produced mixed results. On the one hand, the President could report impressive numbers. Between 2007 and July 2011, the government

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claimed to have seized 103,488 kilograms of cocaine, 7,959,218 kilograms of marijuana, 1,379 kilograms of heroin, 107,136 firearms, and 48,810 vehicles, and detained 133,643 persons for traffickingrelated offenses.9 On the other hand, the violence produced when government repression exacerbated existing conflicts among the DTOs reached record levels. Independent experts estimated that more than 60,000 had been killed in gang-related violence during Calderón’s term (Molzahn et al., 2013, p. 15). Those advocating a different (usually unelaborated) strategy against organized crime gained ground when the PRI won a majority coalition in the Chamber of Deputies. Even prominent members of the president’s PAN called for a retreat from confrontation.10 In the 2012 presidential election campaign, all the candidates agreed on the priority of reducing the violence but none laid out a substantial strategy. The PRI’s Peña Nieto advocated a focus on the types of crime that afflict ordinary Mexicans in their daily lives, such as extortion and kidnapping. In the bigger picture, the government’s battle against criminal organizations was one of several arenas of “competitive state-making” (Felbab-Brown 2010), the struggle by state and civil society actors attempting to foster formal legality against de facto powers acting to avoid or bend the law to their interests. Following the transition to electoral democracy in 2000, the de facto powers, for example the teachers union and the two main media conglomerates, among others, aggressively protected their interests. Criminal organizations, especially the stronger DTOs, joined this struggle as one more de facto power, corrupting or confronting state agents and civil society to shape democracy to accommodate their interests. Recall from Chapter 5 the example of La Familia crime organization in Michoacán. Successfully repressed by the government, a faction reemerged in altered form in 2011 as Los Caballeros Templarios to continue anti-government propaganda, intimidation, and corruption of political campaigns.11 This chapter argues that Mexican civil society repeatedly mobilized to demand effective government responses to escalating violent crime in the 1990s and first two decades of the 21st century. Governments responded with new laws, ambitious plans, and high-profile campaigns. An anti-organized crime strategy evolved during Calderón’s term, but implementation was uneven and incomplete. At the political level, conflicts among the main parties hampered implementation. At the operational level, lack of inter-agency and inter-governmental communication and coordination and weak support from civil society presented obstacles. Above all, success required an effective and ethical police-justice system. Failure by the police-justice system drew the

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armed forces deeper into internal security, exposing them to corruption, human rights abuses, and political controversy. The core challenge was how to cope with the short-term security crisis while laying the groundwork for long-term reform. Calderón’s government launched numerous projects and invested enormous sums to confront criminality. The projects remained works in progress as Calderón left office in December 2012. On a brighter note, the incoming government appeared disposed to build on Calderón’s efforts. Put another way, the Calderón government embarked on a reform process in which agency performance descended first into a “valley of transition” of uncertainty and subpar results. The hopeful optic is that, at some point, performance will bottom out and begin an ascent toward performance that exceeds the pre-reform level.12 The challenge is estimating when the bottom is reached and whether an ascent has begun. An assessment of Mexico’s overall police-justice system goes much beyond this chapter’s scope (Guerrero Gutiérrez 2011a; Olson et al. 2010). The nature of the immediate crisis puts priority on violent criminal organizations. Given their political salience, I focus more narrowly on state responses to the two high-impact forms of organized crime discussed in Chapters 4 and 5: kidnapping and drug-trafficking. Perception of state success in suppressing these high-impact forms of criminality could help tip the public’s expectations about success more broadly. Positive expectations, in turn, should help generate political support to sustain the state-building project. I characterize the Calderón administration’s general security strategy as stated rather than as implemented and then examine its implementation with respect to organized crime generally and to kidnapping and drug trafficking specifically. An important theme in Mexico’s federal system is deeply ingrained presidentialism and centralization. In effect, organized crime is viewed as the president’s problem. Even after two decades of decentralization that devolved substantial authorities and resources, state and local governments remained generally passive and ineffective in anti-crime programs. Two other interrelated themes are distrust and corruption, both of which assume many forms. We can’t measure the degree of corruption in the police-justice system but it’s reached a point that some officials distrust the accuracy of their own data.13 In confronting organized crime, state agents wield potent tools, such as wiretaps, asset seizure, preventive detention, and criminal conspiracy. These matters are sensitive, even in long-established democracies. Given Mexico’s authoritarian legacy and highly competitive party politics, the public is wary about how the government uses such tools. Opposition parties are

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leery about the government’s use of security policy for partisan advantage. The public is deeply distrustful of the police and courts. Police agencies have little confidence in each other, and individual officers in particular agencies often lack confidence in one another. A retired army general decried “the war between the army and navy” over security policy.14 Corruption breeds more distrust, which fundamentally undermines the cooperation needed for sustained reform. The first section of this chapter traces the evolution of declaratory policy on organized crime, the second examines police-military joint operations, the third takes up topics of police reform, the fourth looks at operational intelligence and response capacity, the fifth reviews aspects of judicial reform, and the sixth analyzes aspects of international cooperation. The conclusion holds that Mexican security reform remains somewhere in the “valley of transition.” Evolution of Strategies to Combat Organized Crime

In my usage, a citizen security strategy includes goals (more or less clearly formulated, some even measurable) that are logically interconnected and linked to agency missions and resources over some defined time period, along with notions of priorities and sequences. Common and organized crime are particular threats in a broader citizen security agenda that ranges from petty theft to climate change. Strategy typically includes a stated set of aspirations and some real set of priorities to be implemented given time and resource constraints. A president may list a dozen goals, for example, but in reality can focus on only a fraction of them. The president’s preferred goals may not be shared by some, or even most, of his administration. A basic strategy to combat organized crime evolved over the course of the Calderón presidency. It was embedded in a broader set of policies to promote citizen security and justice reform more generally. At the declaratory level, the strategy identified various state responses to organized crime, some to be coordinated with civil society. Analogous to the US military “surges” in Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2010) and the strategy to “take, hold, build,” the Mexican government sought to contain the immediate crisis posed by the high-impact criminal organizations while implementing a long menu of institutional reforms. In the short term, the government would have to rely on the armed forces. At some point, the military would stand down when a reformed police-justice system was stood up. The strategy ran grave risks. First, the armed forces were pushed into a fight against an “enemy” poorly understood, dispersed throughout

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the country, and in some cases organically linked to civil society. The military had extensive experience with rural operations but were now called on to operate in urban settings as well. There, corruption, human rights abuses, and operational failure were exposed under intense media coverage. Second, the dynamic of confrontation with criminal gangs brought the risk of “dirty war.”15 The military, by unspoken doctrine or by rogue units, was tempted to operate extra-judicially, using torture and disappearances. Third, even assuming short-term success, the scale and complexity of the institutional reforms needed to create a competent police-justice system and repair the social fabric required decades, not a six-year presidential term. The rapid deployment of the armed forces created a dilemma. The presumption that these forces would operate on a temporary basis delayed and diluted the institutional adjustments that were needed to improve their effectiveness against an unconventional adversary, while also blunting the government’s urgency to pass the legal reforms needed to regulate the armed forces’ involvement in law enforcement. Worst of all, the use of the armed forces reduced pressure to reform the civilian police. In effect the message to the armed forces was: Do the best you can with what you’ve got. Repress the violent gangs, even in dense urban neighborhoods. But don’t use too much force, and avoid human rights abuses. A coherent anti-crime strategy evolved during the Calderón presidency. In his inaugural address in December 2006, the new president put the recovery of citizen security and legality at the top of his three main priorities, above reducing extreme poverty and creating jobs.16 As one of the promised “100 actions in the first 100 days,” the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) produced a “Crusade against Crime” strategy paper in March 2007. The document set out eight ambitious goals. First among these was the consolidation of police forces (Federal Preventive Police, Federal Investigation Agency, National Migration Institute, and the Customs and Tax Inspection Center) under a single command in order to improve communication and coordination. The strategy also emphasized crime prevention and citizen participation, institutional development through measures to professionalize the police, efforts to combat corruption, the development of standardized record management among police agencies, and improvement of communications and coordination.17 Beyond the general anti-crime strategy, Calderón laid out the main goals of a strategic response to organized crime in a speech on Navy Day, June 1, 2008. He conveyed a clear sense of the threat that organized crime was more than trafficking: “[organized crime] also

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seeks to put the entire structure of illegality at its service,” he said, referring to contraband, counterfeit products, auto theft, kidnapping, and the like. His stated goals included: • • • •

Joint military-police operations to regain territory and support local authorities; Justice reform, to better equip the judicial system to deal with organized crime; police reform, to purge corrupt personnel and create a new professional police; Implementation of “Platform Mexico,” (Plataforma Mexico), a nationally integrated information system intended to improve police intelligence; and “Clean up Mexico,” (Limpiemos México18), a package of initiatives to create secure public spaces, safe schools, and promote drug prevention and rehabilitation.

As Guerrero Gutiérrez (2012) notes, however, these goals don’t constitute a strategy; rather, they are means toward a strategy. Events also drove the evolution of declaratory policy. The kidnapping and murder of young Fernando Martí in June 2008 (described in Chapter 4) galvanized the country and created the momentum to produce a major policy statement, the “National Pact for Security, Justice, and Legality,” the following August 22.19 The Pact became the core policy and enumerated some seventy-four commitments by the three branches at the federal and state levels, the mayors, and civil society groups to promote citizen security.20 Other pieces of the policy evolved thereafter. In October 2008, the Law of the National Public Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SNSP) was adopted. In May 2009, the detailed National Security Program (Programa para la Seguridad Nacional) was released. By summer 2009 the overall declaratory strategy against organized crime, aimed essentially at the more aggressive DTOs, took the following shape.21 •

Deploy federal police and armed forces in the most seriously affected areas. The aim of these joint police-military operations (operativos conjuntos)22 was to confront armed gangs, reclaim territory, and prop up local security forces and municipal governments. The intent was to apply targeted pressure to disrupt criminal groups’ capacity to spread. The operations took place mainly in the North and a few internal locations such as

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•

•

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Michaocán. The state of Chihuahua was most affected, but joint operations were conducted in several other states as well. Attack criminal organizations’ operational networks, especially their finances. Officials made progress on creating a legal framework (e.g., asset seizure), and Treasury (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, SHCP) provided information on suspicious transactions to the Federal Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR). The PGR, however, lacked sufficient trained attorneys to prosecute the cases. The banking system developed measures against money laundering, but numerous other channels, such as currency exchanges, hotels, casinos, race tracks, and professional sports, remained vulnerable. Dismantle political protection for criminal enterprises. Several mayors and a governor of Quintana Roo were imprisoned for protecting trafficking while two former governors of Tamaulipas fell under suspicion of collusion with traffickers. Calderón dramatically stepped up the pressure in a joint policearmy operation in his home state of Michoacán in May 2009. Rather than a “wake-up call” to the political class, however, many viewed the operation as another partisan maneuver to strengthen the government’s hand in the July mid-term elections.23 The episode also showed the disconnect between police operations and judicial process, as virtually all of those detained in Michoacán were subsequently released due to lack of evidence.24 Promote extensive institutional reform, with priority to intergovernmental cooperation, reform the police and justice systems at all levels, and improve intelligence capabilities. The administration encountered delays in organizing itself at the federal level, but the bigger problem proved to be enlisting effective cooperation from the 32 states and 2,140 local governments. Until the Martí kidnapping scandal of June 2008, many state and local officials were skeptical of Calderón’s motives, suspecting a ploy to gain legitimacy after the contested 2006 presidential election. By summer 2009, however, the federal government had developed a “3X3 plan,” that is, cooperation among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches at the federal, state, and local levels to promote anticrime measures. Ideally judicial reform would move in tandem with other measures, but the congress had stipulated eight years (until 2016) to complete the process. In effect, the government

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•

•

launched a barrage of reform initiatives, each one complicated in itself. Generate grassroots support and repair the social fabric. In places where federal forces could disrupt criminal activities, the objective was to deliver basic social services to build public support for the government. At the policy-making level, the social cabinet (including the health, education, and social development ministries) created special programs for the targeted areas. The programs included health care, “Safe Schools,” and safe spaces. The US government participated in pilot projects through the “4th Pillar” of the “Beyond Merida” initiative. Promote international cooperation, primarily with the United States, but also with other governments in the region, especially Colombia and Guatemala. A priority was to improve cooperation between US and Mexican intelligence services. This tactic proceeded well, but Mexico’s government expressed growing frustration with weak compliance by the US with respect to demand reduction for drugs, weapons trafficking, and money laundering. In the midst of delicate bilateral negotiations, the so-called Wikileaks scandal of late 2010 led to the resignation of US Ambassador Carlos Pascual, a significant source of ideas and pressure in the Merida initiative (described below).25

These elements made up Calderón’s declaratory policy, in effect what the government said it wanted to do. As a list of goals, the strategy was sensible and coherent, but the government struggled to explain it clearly to the Mexican public. In my view, Joaquín Villalobos (2010; 2011), the former Salvadoran guerrilla commander, explained and defended the government’s anti-crime policy more effectively than did official spokespersons. Alejandro Poiré, appointed technical secretary and spokesman to the National Security Council in August 2010, subsequently polished and simplified the strategy for public consumption.26 If these were the declared goals, the President’s National Security Program 2009-2012 (Programa para la seguridad nacional 2009-2012) went into considerable detail about two “special objectives,” 13 “strategic lines,” and 148 “action lines” designed to link the security program to the National Development Plan 2007-2012 (Plan nacional de desarrollo 2007-2012), as required by law. The National Security Program identified threats and listed varieties of activities, but it did not

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link the activities to particular agencies nor set out performance metrics.27 The limited scope of this chapter rules out an evaluation of each point of the declaratory strategy. I focus on issues especially relevant to combat drug trafficking and kidnapping. A central theme here is the strengthening and reworking of mazes of bureaucratic stovepipes to confront networks of criminal organizations that were becoming more agile and lethal. The broader point about competitive state-making is that government initiatives were uneven in quality and incomplete in implementation. On balance, the government’s pursuit of multiple goals with diverse tactics and a weak communications strategy sowed confusion in the public’s mind. Joint Police-Military Operations

Given the power of DTOs and the weakness of federal and state police forces, joint police-military operations were the key short-term tactic against criminal organizations. Over the longer run the police and armed forces needed to evolve effective working relations to confront the especially potent gangs, because even the expanded Federal Police would lack the manpower and mobility to cover sufficient territory. Use of the armed forces posed difficult political and operational issues. One of the signal accomplishments of the Mexican Revolution (1910-29) was to remove the armed forces from civilian politics as a major power contender. A prominent police role for the military opened the door to political involvement in multiple ways. The army lobbied actively in Congress to defend its budget and expand legislation to regulate its policing role.28 The Secretary of Defense and some zone commanders recommended specific military officers to serve as police officials at the state and local levels. Further, the army became more active in publicizing its anti-DTO roles, in calling for an inter-party pact to promote citizen security, and even in issuing public safety messages.29 Such political involvement carried risks. For example, army investigations inevitably found politicians connected to criminals. Some politicians, in turn, enjoyed high-level protection. Who should decide what findings should go to prosecutors? Also, criminal groups could easily hire or coerce demonstrators to denounce human rights abuses by the armed forces, or they could infiltrate real demonstrations and cause disruptions. In either case, military prestige would be diminished. Most serious was the detention of four general officers in May 2012 on charges of collusion with trafficking organizations, even though all were subsequently released due to lack of evidence.

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Drawing on press accounts, Donnelly and Shirk (2009, 29) list fourteen deployments to ten different locales between December 2006 and July 2009, totaling more than 43,000 personnel. Michoacán (with two deployments) and Chihuahua (with four) got special attention. The authors lack a precise breakdown between numbers of police and military, as well as information on the length of the deployments. The Mexico City daily El Universal cites nine “joint operations” up to October 2011, with the last to Veracruz in response to massacres of 95 persons the month before.30 Did the joint operations over time improve coordination among federal agencies and between these and state-local forces? Did a division of labor emerge, and were issues of command, coordination, and accountability resolved? In its original design, the military planned the deployments, which were to be implemented by SSP and the PGR. On the ground, however, military officers commanded the operations. At the operational level, the military preferred not to work with police agencies, especially state and municipal forces, because of their corruption and unreliability. Also, civilian police did not usually adhere to the command structure. At least one press account was generally negative about interagency cooperation at the outset. “The failure of the deployments against organized crime and the need to restructure them was because the federal police commanders never subordinated themselves to military command—as originally agreed—and often acted to protect drug traffickers, alerting them to actions planned against them.”31 As a result, military forces found themselves isolated in a climate of confrontation with other federal, state, and local authorities.32 There was no single model of joint operations; the interventions varied across time in the employment of security forces, so we might expect different outcomes in the various locales, depending on the mix of personalities and circumstances. Based on field interviews in early 2010, Eric Olson (2010, p. 5) found that coordination between military and police forces appeared better in Tijuana then in Ciudad Juárez. According to a US Embassy cable, lack of police-military cooperation at about the same time was evident in Matamoros, in the northeastern State of Tamaulipas. “When asked about whether the varied government forces conducted joint patrols, the General said that while SEDENA, SEMAR, and PFP were all present in Matamoros, each operated independently.”33 In a limited scope, I can comment on only a few examples of joint operations. Ciudad Juárez might be considered a mixed model, employing both military forces and federal police, which evolved over

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time. Michoacán hosted mostly federal police, Monterrey mostly police and army, with greater involvement by the state government, and the navy played the major role in Veracruz.34 “Joint Operation Chihuahua” began as an especially high-profile deployment launched in March 2008 with some 2,000 military personnel and nearly 500 federal police, prosecutors, and technicians. It was mostly focused on Ciudad Juárez and commanded by the head of the Fifth Military Zone based in Chihuahua City. In the first months, the military and federal police largely took over the day-to-day policing in Juárez. By September 2009 a second phase of the joint operation redeployed the military to the outskirts of the city and to a limited number of checkpoints; it would continue to support police as needed. The federal police remained on patrol and the municipal police returned to regular duty.35 A third phase came in January 2010 when the military were replaced by federal police and the exercise was renamed “Coordinated Operation Chihuahua.” The first and second phases coincided with the explosion of violence in Ciudad Juárez. In the third phase the Federal Police became more adept at using tactical intelligence and in cooperating with state and local police, as well as other government agencies and civil society, in confronting criminal gangs and in implementing policies of prevention. By late 2011 and early 2012 the rates of criminal violence began to stabilize and decline. Was the operation successful? The violence subsided in the first weeks of the initial deployment, as the gangsters took measure of the new situation. They soon returned in force, however, and the homicide rate quickly escalated, surpassing previous levels. Other forms of crime increased as well. Complaints about human rights abuses by the military and Federal Police increased dramatically. The initial operation revealed several weaknesses. Federal forces in the field relied on guidance from their central headquarters in Mexico City and largely ignored state and local agencies. An October 2009 US Embassy cable noted: “We have seen in Ciudad Juárez what happens when federal entities try to accomplish their mission alone. Without locally-based intelligence sources, SEDENA and SSP operations led and conducted from a centralized and compartmentalized command structure in Mexico City often result in blunt force confrontations with cartels that augment the brutal violence statistics in Juárez.”36 In 2010 Ciudad Juárez became a top priority for the federal government, which gave the lead role to the Federal Police and invested greater effort in inter-agency coordination.

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The federal police took the lead in 2009 in Michoacán, but with the continued presence of the army. There the police made progress in combining tactical intelligence with greater mobility and force. Nuevo León became more violent in 2008-2009, aggravated by escalating conflicts between trafficking organizations in neighboring states. Here the army played the lead role, but with support from the federal police and the navy. In early 2011 the state government took the lead and formulated a citizen security plan as well as created a new state police, the Civil Force (Fuerza Civil). Veracruz was relatively quiet in 20062010 but turned violent with the arrival of Javier Duarte as governor in December 2010. Duarte sought close cooperation with the federal government and—as Veracruz is a coastal state—the lead role went to the navy. In this case the navy developed an integrated program of intelligence, tactical mobility, and street-level policing. The main lesson I draw about joint operations is that, with the exceptions of Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez, the armed forces, police, and PGR operated mainly as separate entities. The presidency coordinated with each of the ministries for a particular assignment in a given territory and the agencies focused on their tasks with little effort to coordinate with other agencies. Coordination with state and local agencies remained a constant challenge. In effect, the urgency of responding to multiple and simultaneous threats outweighed the longterm benefits of institutionalizing better inter-agency coordination. The National Public Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SNSP),37 the main consultative framework, played no role in operational coordination. Police Reform

Was an effective, ethical federal police stood up by the end of the Calderón administration? Police reform was the top priority in the institutional reform agenda. In President Calderón’s words, “I would start with the federal police. I want to deliver to my people, when I finish my presidency, a new and cleaner police corps at the federal level.”38 The main architect-engineer and policy entrepreneur for this goal was SSP Secretary Genaro García Luna, whose career trajectory is central to understanding the design of Calderón’s police reform. García Luna, like many others in the citizen security apparatus, began his career in the Center for Research and National Security (Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, CISEN), which was founded in 1989 to replace the disgraced Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad, DFS).39 Trained as a mechanical engineer, with

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graduate study in strategic planning, he joined CISEN early in his career and departed with the diaspora from that agency that fanned out to SSP, the PGR, and several state governments in the last months of Ernesto Zedillo’s administration (1994-2000). He first helped organize the intelligence unit of the Federal Preventive Police before moving on to the PGR in 2000. There he designed and built the Federal Investigation Agency (Agencia Federal de Investigación, AFI), which served as the investigative arm for the PGR. Some thought President Calderón’s appointment of García Luna as SSP secretary and Eduardo Medina Mora as Attorney General at the outset of his term might calm the inter-agency feuds that hampered security policy during the Fox administration. But conflicts between the ministers continued up to Medina Mora’s resignation in September 2009. While never publicly aired, the conflicts resulted from differing visions about the role of police in justice administration and García Luna’s bare-knuckle style of bureaucratic infighting. As to conflict, a leading student of citizen security questioned why Calderón tolerated the infighting: “(D)uring the first three years of this government, we had an impressive conflict between the Attorney General’s Office and the Secretariat of Public Security. On par with a problem that has led to 14,000 deaths, the war among narcos, we’ve seen a basic conflict and a mistaken management of the federal government to allow the secretary of security and the attorney general to be fighting on practically all fronts.”40 Judging from policy statements and press accounts, García Luna’s vision of police reform was to consolidate the various federal police forces into one national organization, develop an effective intelligence apparatus to guide police operations, and devise an effective coordination framework to integrate police operations at the federal, state, and municipal levels. The new federal police would operate under his control as SSP secretary. Central to his thinking was to grant investigative powers to the preventive police. Under long-standing convention, criminal investigations were supposed to be conducted only by plain clothes police working under agents of the prosecutor’s office, while preventive (uniformed) police could make arrests only of persons caught in a criminal act. In practice, investigative police often operated independently from the prosecuting attorneys, and the distinction between types of police was frequently ignored. By April 2008, García Luna proposed integrating the AFI and PFP under the SSP into a new Federal Police (Policía Federal) composed of six functional divisions and approximately 30,000 officers distributed between central operations and 34 regional police stations (Justice in Mexico Project

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News Report, April 2008). In effect, García Luna would commandeer his old organization (AFI) and fuse it with his new one (PFP). Even with President Calderón’s strong support, however, García Luna’s vision of police reform was blocked by corruption scandals, including the top officers of both AFI and the PFP, and by congressional opposition.41 Some members of congress pointed to constitutional provisions that assigned public safety functions to the municipalities and the mandatory subordination of investigative police to PGR attorneys, who were charged with preparing cases for formal prosecution. In a truncated version of reform, the PGR was left with a hollowed-out Federal Ministerial Police, essentially the vestiges of the erstwhile AFI. García Luna got a new Federal Police to replace the Federal Preventive Police. He also acquired a potent intelligence capacity and investigative powers, including wiretaps. Medina Mora saw no alternative to resignation. García Luna also proposed the creation of 32 state police forces which would unify preventive and investigative agencies at the state level and absorb the municipal (preventive and transit) police.42 Police reform has operational dimensions but is also eminently political. A consolidated state police with investigative powers might foster professionalism and specialized services (e.g., to combat kidnapping or money laundering), and could improve coordination within and across the states. A counter-argument was that municipal police presumably know their towns and can adjust their practices to suit local needs, including those of the mayors. However, the disparities in size and capabilities among the more than 2,000 municipal police forces are enormous. Politically, a consolidated state police could strengthen the hand of the already-powerful governors and potentially exacerbate partisan conflicts with mayors from opposing parties. Responding mainly to municipal pressures, the Chamber of Deputies blocked García Luna’s reform proposal in May 2011. President Calderón’s commitment to the federal police was reflected in the budget. “Between 2006 and 2009 the Ministry of Public Security SSP expenditure grew by 232%” (Montaño and Palma 2012, p. 12). Over half of the money allocated to SSP between 2006 and 2011 went to the Federal Police, with the remainder to federal prisons, the Mexico Platform, subsidies, and miscellaneous. The Federal Police expanded from 12,880 officers in 2006 to 39,562 in 2010. Initially, the Federal Forces, a heavily armed reaction force, grew fastest; after 2009 the research, scientific, and intelligence areas were expanded. SSP’s budget in 2007-2011 grew by 150 percent in real terms over the previous administration (ibid., pp. 13-14). Even with increases of this magnitude,

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however, Mexico’s spending on citizen security represented only 0.4 percent of GDP in 2008, well below the OECD average of 1.6 percent. In effect, spending was ramped up quickly but from a comparatively low base.43 We should note here that investment was unbalanced in two senses. First, SSP and the federal police received the lion’s share of new money. Though key players in making the justice system work, the PGR and its prosecuting attorneys’ office were relatively neglected. In effect the capacity to investigate and detain gained considerable muscle (and fat), while the capacity to prosecute lagged behind. Spending for judicial reform, the capacity to judge and sanction, brought up the rear. Second, while subsidies increased to state and local police reform, the bulk of the money stayed at the federal level.44 As noted, the August 2008 “National Pact for Security, Justice, and Legality” was the government’s most complete policy statement and committed all three levels of government to 74 specific objectives. Third among these was to help the states to combat the most sensitive crimes, like kidnapping and extortion. Better functioning state governments could take some pressure off the overloaded federal anti-organized crime unit (SIEDO). “In particular, the formation or strengthening of state units to combat kidnapping will be supported.” The implementing document, “The National and Integral Strategy against the Crime of Kidnapping” (September 2008), reported that 16 of the 32 states claimed to have such units in operation. Ideally, a unit would combine technical services, victim assistance, and specialized police officers and prosecutors all linked into the Mexico Platform. All personnel should be vetted (i.e., polygraph, financial background checks, drug testing, and the like), and thus the importance of creating vetting centers (Centros de Control de Confianza) in all the states. Most of the strategy paper dealt with the types of skills and training required. It also described a basic framework law and the sequences to be followed in investigation and prosecution of kidnapping. Finally, it recommended the incarceration of convicted kidnappers in special units of high-security prisons. Using data provided by the states, the PGR reported on the progress of the specialized anti-kidnapping units at the May 2011 meeting of the National Public Security Council. Seventeen of the 32 states received a grade of unsatisfactory. The main problems were shortfalls in training and vetting unit leadership, investigative attorneys, and forensic technicians. Police training was marginally better (Mexico, SNSP 2011, p. 4). Isabel Miranda de Wallace, president of the NGO Halt Kidnapping (Alto al Secuestro), reprimanded the assembled state governors: “The anti-kidnapping units, governors, you promised to install them more

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than two years ago and today we’re talking about exactly the same thing. That’s why, I repeat, you need to realize that this is a fundamental topic that you have put to one side and have forgotten.”45 She also underlined the poor quality of information provided by state governments. ICESI, the Mexico-City based NGO, published in May 2011 its own evaluation of the implementation of the anti-kidnapping units over the period 2007-2010. Only 15 of the 32 state attorneys general offices provided enough information to permit a judgment. Of these, four were graded as “good,” six as “average,” and five as “bad” (ICESI 2011, p. 17). Poor quality information was again noted, with marked discrepancies between the information provided by the states to the SNSP and that provided to ICESI (ibid., p. 21). ICESI examined whether the implementation of the anti-kidnapping units, along with other judicial reforms, produced positive results against kidnapping. Only seven states provided information, mostly partial, so ICESI also used information from the Coordination Council for the Implementation of the Penal Justice System (Consejo de Coordinación para la Implementación del Sistema de Justicia Penal, SETEC). With this information, the NGO created four categories of implementation: initial (legislation in progress; information outreach), planning (initial planning; infrastructure; training), begun (legislation largely completed; personnel training; administrative reorganization), and operating (training; reorganization; information and communications technology). Seven states were at the initial stage; fourteen were at the planning stage; four had begun; and seven were operating. By May 2011, 21 of the 32 states had reached only the initial or planning stage, so assessing the effects of new units on reducing kidnapping in those cases was premature. Nationwide, and with respect to all crimes, about six percent of preliminary investigations led to an indictment (consignación); in contrast, about 50 percent of investigations of kidnapping result in an indictment. Overall, about 82.3 percent of those indicted and tried for kidnapping were convicted (ICESI 2011, p. 31). Of the sixteen states surveyed by ICESI over 20082010, investigations of kidnappings rose from 471 to 608 per year, and indictments increased from 82 to 169 (or from 17 to 28 percent). Did the reforms improve the rate of indictments? Overall, the ICESI study concluded that, “There does not appear to be a relation between the degree of advancement in legal reform and the rate of preliminary investigations that result in indictments” (ibid., p. 39). Some states with minimal implementation showed high rates of performance, while others with advanced status showed low rates. Intermediate states showed mixed results.

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This brief assessment of progress in implementing anti-kidnapping units at the state level tells only part of the story of government response. We also need assessments of the anti-organized crime units in the PGR and Federal Police. Unfortunately, such assessments are not available. At this point, the available findings underline the weak institutional response by the states to kidnapping as a high-priority criminal threat. There is no clear explanation, however, for the lack of urgency. Operational Intelligence and Response Capacity

Coordination of strategic and tactical intelligence linked to effective response is essential to combat organized crime. Without tactical intelligence, police and armed forces operate in the blind, as we saw in most of the joint police-military operations. Unless tactical intelligence is integrated with strategic intelligence, reactive and uncoordinated operations add up to little. In effect, if you don’t know where you’re going you don’t usually get there. And unless tactical intelligence is linked to effective response you mainly know what you missed. President Calderón gave a starkly negative appraisal of disorganization of the police-intelligence apparatus in his defense of the General Law for the National Public Security System submitted to congress in September 2008. He pointed to a “wrongheaded fragmentation” of commands that produced divisions among police agencies, hindered coordination, and even produced a “logic of rivalry” that blocked intelligence sharing. These factors had led to the disorganization of state capacity to confront crime. According to the president, “Organic dispersion means duplicating functions and spending, not to mention the gradual loss of the ability to ensure an adequate scheme for protecting classified information, as well as a complete lack of coordination, congruent and uniform protocols, systems, organizational forms, ranks, and police functions….”46 Five main intelligence agencies operate at the federal level. First, CISEN, under the Ministry of Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación), focuses mainly on political and internal security issues; its role in counter-drug activities has varied over time. CISEN’s founders sought to separate it from counter-drug operations to protect it from infiltration and corruption, and assigned the counter-drug role to the Planning Center for Drug Control (Centro de Planeación para el Control de Drogas, CENDRO) in the Attorney General’s office. CISEN’s operational arm (mainly anti-kidnapping units) was spun off to the PFP in the late 1990s. Operating under the PRI system in the 1990s, CISEN

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was deeply distrusted by opposition parties. Following a period of relative neglect and slim budgets during the Fox administration, the agency regained status and resources under Calderón. Given the penetration of DTO activity throughout the society and political system, it is difficult to see how CISEN could avoid some type of counter-drug role. The Calderón administration reportedly directed the agency to focus on drug trafficking and kidnapping, presumably at a strategic level.47 Also, the agency apparently enjoyed considerable trust from the US government.48 CISEN also has the lead role in inter-agency coordination both internally and internationally (e.g., in the National Security Council, Public Security Council, and the SNSP). A significant problem, from the US Embassy’s perspective in late 2009, was that “CISEN lacks the resources to effectively direct the inter-agency process, particularly when it includes such institutional giants as SSP, which bureaucratically overshadows CISEN in budget, personnel, and other resource issues. CISEN’s inability thus far to serve as a real leader on intelligence operations and analysis has effectively left Mexico without an effective interagency coordinator.”49 Second, the PGR’s National Planning and Intelligence Center (Centro Nacional de Planeación e Inteligencia e Información para el Combate a la Delincuencia, CENAPI), the successor agency to CENDRO, has more of an analytical than operational role. It provides intelligence directly to the Attorney General and presumably to the Deputy Attorney General for Specialized Investigation on Organized Crime (Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, SIEDO) for use by the Ministerial Police. (Note that in October 2012 SIEDO was renamed SEIDO, Deputy Attorney General Specialized in Investigation of Organized Crime, Subprocuraduría Especializada en Investigación de Delincuencia Organizada). Third, SSP’s Undersecretariat for Strategy and Police Intelligence (Subsecretaría de Estrategia e Inteligencia Policial) and the new Federal Police Intelligence Center (Centro de Inteligencia de la Policía Federal, CIPF) have more operational roles, with access to multiple data-bases and the Mexico Platform (Plataforma México).50 A work in progress throughout Calderón’s term, the Platform was intended to be a nation-wide network of data bases with information on vehicle registration, weapons, public and private security personnel, prison censuses, arrest records, and the like. In principle, federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel provide continuous updates, and realtime information is available to authorized users throughout the country.

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By late 2012, pieces of the Platform functioned in most of the states, but it remained incomplete. With its size, resources, and authorities, SSP loomed over the other intelligence agencies with respect to anti-crime issues. Fourth, the Secretariat of Defense (Secretaría de Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) plays a leading role in combating DTOs. We know little about its intelligence services. SEDENA’s Second Section deals with general defense-related intelligence, and its Seventh Section focuses on anti-drug intelligence. In recent years, the Secretariat has decentralized more of its intelligence-gathering to its twelve military zones.51 On the other hand, US Embassy reporting depicted military intelligence against DTOs as centralized and seldom shared with field units. “Locally deployed SEDENA forces rarely develop or utilize tactical intelligence. In fact, they have no true intel units that collect information, nor do they have professional intel corps.”52 As a result, field units operated in the blind, relying mainly on tips. Finally, the Naval Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia Naval, UNI) appeared to take on greater roles in actions against criminal organizations after 2007. Legislation permitted the navy to deploy its marine units to internal Mexican states, and they were able to operate in a more agile and effective manner than the army. The intelligence unit also participated actively with US and other Latin American intelligence agencies (Mexico SEMAR 2011, pp. 40-41). A key point missing from official descriptions of the intelligence field is the use of counter-intelligence as an offensive weapon. That is, given the penetration of police and military agencies by criminal organizations, a useful tactic is to track the activities and communications of compromised staff and officers. Information from these sources should help counter-intelligence officers to identify at least one set of criminal interlocutors. The goal is to link operational and tactical intelligence with effective response. That is, can appropriate police and/or military units respond immediately guided by timely intelligence? Besides the Federal Forces (Fuerzas Federales), the heavy operational unit of the federal police, several innovations relevant to an anti-organized crime role for the armed forces should be noted. Among the most important for SEDENA are:53 •

Centralized planning and decentralized execution. Adopted by SEDENA in 2007, the initiative aimed to give region and zone commanders the autonomy to plan and carry out operations against criminal organizations.

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•

•

•

Training appropriate for small-scale operations. The new training program was divided into five phases. The first three focused on individual combat training, small team tactics and battalion-level operations, and were actually implemented. They pertain to urban operations, establishing roadblocks, and conducting patrols around small towns, all useful for anti-crime purposes. The last two pertained to conventional warfare operations and were not implemented. Creation of permanent community liaison offices. Created in June 2010, this program aimed to improve communications and constructive links between SEDENA and civil society. “It is designed to solve problems and minimize the negative effects of prolonged presence of troops in the streets” (Guevara Moyano 2011, p. 14). Procurement of equipment. Instead of heavier, Humvee-type vehicles, SEDENA procured nearly 2,000 4X4 pickup trucks to provide units with the speed and agility needed to operate against criminal organizations. The air force, organizationally located in SEDENA, took over aerial eradication duties from the PGR, and shifted its focus to acquire light aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and improved radars explicitly for counterdrug purposes (ibid., pp. 22-24).

In the 2006-2011 time frame, the navy “reorganized its command structure, rebuilt its marine infantry force, created a naval intelligence agency (UIN), reinforced its naval aviation, and formed a network of coast guard-style stations to enhance [search and rescue] and law enforcement presence” (ibid., p. 26). Relevant reform examples include: •

•

Improving maritime interdiction. SEMAR acquired ocean patrol vessels equipped with helicopters to offset the advantages of fast-boat smugglers. It also acquired 17 interceptor boats capable of speeds over 50 knots (ibid., p. 26). Marine Corps revitalization and special units. The goal was to create 30 marine infantry battalions of about 650 troops each to be based in the coastal states to provide internal security, including operations against criminal organizations. The units were equipped with light vehicles, infantry weapons, and communications equipment. In addition, SEMAR created a special forces unit based in Mexico City, with detachments throughout the country. These detachments played leading roles in hunting down prominent traffickers (ibid., p. 31). In

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sum, even with its temporary mandate to confront criminal organizations while the federal police was developed, the armed forces made significant practical adjustments. Due to its clandestine nature, we can’t probe very deeply into the progress made in developing an operational intelligence capacity. From time to time, kingpins were caught or killed, and top US policy-makers said positive things about intelligence sharing, which may suggest some advances. But we can’t gauge how much. Judicial Reform

More than just police and courts, the justice system spans crime prevention at the “front end,” through investigation, prosecution, sentencing, and (usually) incarceration, to social re-adaptation at the “back end.” Each of the successive phases involves complex webs of agencies, actors, and processes. For example, even in a narrow sense, crime prevention includes attention to youth and at-risk populations through education, recreation, and employment programs; drug counseling and rehabilitation; urban design, neighborhood lighting, and the like; and varieties of forms of community policing. In the broadest sense, prevention is a comprehensive whole-of-government agenda in itself. Ultimately, the best crime prevention policy is robust economic growth and full employment. In Mexico’s federal system, organized crime falls under the jurisdiction of both the federal and state governments. Federal law emphasizes conspiracy and specifies particular types of offenses (e.g., drug-trafficking, human trafficking, reserved weapons, and counterfeiting). In areas of overlap with the states, the case with kidnapping for example, there are no protocols that spell out when federal or state authorities should take the lead. In practice, federal officials can commandeer the cases that interest them and the states usually defer. But more usual is cooperation and negotiation. A complainant, for example, can denounce a kidnapping before a federal investigative attorney to have the case investigated by the Federal Police. These forces, in turn, can deliver their findings to a state prosecuting attorney for action in a state court. Federal law provides basic measures to act against organized crime; the problem lies with administrative and judicial implementation.54 These tools are potent, and it’s little wonder that civil-rights advocates view them with great concern. Among other things, the organized crime law:

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• • •

• • •

Treats membership in a criminal organization as a crime, akin to the US notion of conspiracy; Specifies tougher penalties for higher-ups in criminal organizations or for public officers engaged in organized crime; Authorizes a special unit in the Attorney General’s office to investigate organized crime (SIEDO) and specifies how the unit should work with financial units to investigate financial irregularities; Permits police infiltration of criminal organizations and protects their identity; Provides for protection of witnesses and others who might be at risk in criminal investigations; and, Sets out rules for police searches, communications intercepts, uses of intercepted information, asset seizure, anonymous tips, rewards or sentence reduction for cooperation with investigators; pretrial detention to develop evidence against suspects; and special prison assignment and treatment.

The thrust of Mexico’s broader criminal law reform launched in 2008, centers on the presumption of innocence and on oral trials in an adversarial, as opposed to an inquisitorial, system. These priorities would likely improve transparency and, possibly, protection of defendants’ civil rights with respect to criminal trials in general. The time period for implementation was eight years, or 2016. As a Supreme Court judge noted, however, there is not a or the judicial reform in progress but rather several underway at the same time. “The subjects and jurisdictions in which the changes are (or ought to be) occurring are very different. There are diverse tempos, advances, and directions of change.” Taken together, they are producing a veritable “judicial perfect storm.”55 Oral trials alone represent a tectonic shift in the justice system at both the federal and state levels. In the inquisitorial system, the case file was managed by the court staff, winding its way through various steps, with a verdict decided by the judge in the solitude of her chambers. The prosecuting attorney essentially managed a check list of the documents and procedures mandated by the law, and the defense presented its case in written form. In an oral trial, the prosecuting attorney needs to develop a theory of the case, assemble the evidence, call witnesses, and convince judges in oral presentations in a matter of days or weeks that the government’s case is stronger than that mounted by the defense. Prosecuting attorneys are a weak link in the current justice system, and the eventual transition to oral litigation poses formidable challenges.56

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Even so, based on a comparative study of several Latin American countries, Luis Pásara (2009) cautions against expecting that judicial reform in general will have significant effects on crime. Whatever the case, a judicial reform law requires implementing legislation, or a criminal code (código procesal penal). This bill, however, remained frozen in Mexico’s congress as of December 2012, which took pressure off state governments to push forward. Beyond generic criminal justice, Guillermo Zepeda (2009a, pp. 2728) suggests reforms especially applicable to organized crime, including specialized judicial units with limited workloads, professional investigators, technical auxiliary units, elite police units to serve judicial orders, specialized courts with reduced workloads, protection for victims and witnesses, better quality maximum security prisons, and follow-up and social re-adaptation programs. Relatively little had been accomplished on this front by late 2012. A practical priority, given the military’s lead role in anti-DTO policing, is to improve coordination among the army, the federal police, and investigative attorneys so that persons apprehended in joint operations enter directly into the criminal justice system. Above all, the armed forces need a framework law to authorize and delimit their roles in law enforcement. International Cooperation: The Role of the United States

President Calderón actively promoted regional cooperation to combat transnational organized crime. His main priorities were the United States and Central America, especially Guatemala. Mexico also sought to learn from the experience of Colombia in combating criminal organizations. In this section I discuss US–Mexico relations at the federal level, focusing on the Merida Initiative and the Southwest border region. I begin with three points about context. First, much of bilateral security relations evolve through the hundreds of daily interactions of US state, local, and tribal governments with their cross-border counterparts. Though beyond the scope of this chapter, there were numerous significant innovations in bilateral cooperation at the state and local levels along the border. We have glimpses of specific cases; however, no one—to my knowledge—has produced a comprehensive analysis of trends in this zone of 630,000 square kilometers, 41 major border crossings, and 12 million residents.57 Second, the US government has no strategic framework to guide security policy with Mexico, or with the rest of Latin America for that matter. The US has historically projected its global goals and fears (e.g.,

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anti-Fascism, anti-Communism, anti-terrorism) onto the region. Unlike the European Union, the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a thinner focus on commerce and finance, with side agreements on labor and environment. Efforts to build on NAFTA, for example, the Security and Prosperity Partnership, came to naught, and the Agreement itself lacks broad support in both Mexico and the US. The border agreements negotiated by the United States with Canada and Mexico shortly after September 2001 hewed to historical trends. The Canadian government used the agreement to deepen its overall security integration with the US, whereas Mexico largely limited the agreement to border issues. The Mexican military was a reluctant partner in the US Northern Command until very recently. In short, bilateral security relations make up one of several “baskets” of issues that are juggled separately and pragmatically between the countries.58 Third, from the US perspective, security policy after September 2001 was driven by anti-terrorism. Priority went to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and to other regional concerns in the Middle East and Asia. Policy-making “oxygen” was consumed by fires elsewhere. The concern about terrorism, however, injected a controversial element into debates about whether DTO-related violence in Mexico constituted a “criminal insurrection” and whether traffickers should be viewed as “terrorists.” The main implication is that the absence of a strategic framework and the relative neglect of US-Mexico bilateral relations meant that policy was crafted in the middle layers of bureaucracy and negotiated with the relevant Congressional committees. There was no strategic vision guiding the process, just problem-solving negotiated among the bureaucratic stove pipes and Congress.59 That noted, and despite occasional irritants, overall US-Mexican bilateral security relations steadily improved from the late 1980s through the Felipe Calderón administration. The main innovation in Calderón’s presidency was the Merida Initiative, first announced in October 2007 and subsequently revised in March 2010.60 At the declaratory level, Merida was a significant advance in terms of US material assistance, policy targets, and commitment to shared responsibility. Before Merida, drug supply reduction and interdiction was the focus of US security policy toward Latin America. The declared policy targets in the original Merida, however, were broader: “(1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations [not just DTOs]; (2) assist the Mexican and Central American governments in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and, (4) curtail gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish the demand for drugs in the region” (Seelke 2010, p. 2).

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With respect to shared responsibilities, the US government committed to do more to reduce drug demand, deter southbound weapons trafficking and bulk cash shipments, and curtail money-laundering. Under the label “Beyond Merida,” the Obama administration introduced significant adjustments in March 2010. The scope of the original Merida included Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. At the urging of Congress, the Obama administration shifted from a combined regional perspective to one with the three separate subregions. Beyond Merida also introduced the concept of four pillars: “(1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) building a 21st century border , and (4) building strong and resilient communities” (Seelke and Finklea 2013, p. 7), all of which were consistent with Mexico’s policies. The first three pillars relabeled programs already in progress. The fourth pillar was new. For decades, Mexico had resisted US involvement in its internal affairs. Community development broadened such involvement in new ways.61 “Perhaps most importantly for Mexico, as part of the Mérida Initiative, both countries accepted a shared responsibility to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime, including US drug demand” (ibid., emphasis in the original). As to financial commitment, “from FY2008-FY2012, Congress appropriated more than $1.9 billion in Merida assistance for Mexico, of which 1.1 billion had been delivered by November 2012. The Obama administration asked for an additional $234.0 million in Merida assistance for Mexico in its FY2013 budget request” (ibid., Summary). The funds were not transferred directly to the government of Mexico but rather went to purchase equipment and support varieties of training. During the first years, a big share of the spending centered on acquiring modern equipment, especially high-performance helicopters and information technology; in later years the priority shifted to training and institutional development, especially in Mexico’s police-justice system. Three problem areas merit attention. First, funds appropriated by Congress encountered lengthy delays in implementation. Skeptics noted that the Merida funding was a tiny fraction of monies allocated to citizen security by the Mexican government, or that the US government allocated to Plan Colombia, and the US bureaucracy moved at a glacial pace to spend it. Second, the US Congress tied a small portion of the Merida funding to the human rights performance of Mexican security agencies. This requirement was especially neuralgic with respect to Mexico’s sovereignty concerns and the criticism of its armed forces. A third problem was the lack of policy evaluation, or at least evaluation made available to the public. For example, the US State

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Department’s “FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic” (September 2008), goes into detail about general and specific objectives and illustrative actions. It also itemizes thirty-one specific performance measures. Some of these are fairly general, e.g., “acquisition of the infrastructure and capabilities to enable full-time operation of the Government of Mexico’s strategic communications system,” but most are specific and quantifiable, e.g., “percentage change in the Mexican federal criminal case backlog.” The State Department was supposed to submit its progress report, presumably including hard numbers, to Congress in April 2010. To my knowledge, no such report was made nor was any evaluation subsequently made public. This becomes relevant when we try to judge policy success. With respect to the US-Mexico land border, in June 2009 the Obama administration updated the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (from the original version published in 2007). At the declaratory level, the strategic goal remained drug-centric: “Substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border” (US ONDCP 2009, p. 2). The document set out six “strategic objectives” (e.g., “enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the Southwest border”) and then catalogued how dozens of US agencies and programs relate to nine themes (e.g., “money,” “weapons,” “technology,” etc.). With recurring reference to good intentions (e.g., expand, enhance, expedite, ensure, encourage, and the like), the strategy should be read as a statement of how a very complicated bureaucratic apparatus might be deployed to improve coordination (internal and bilateral) to reduce northbound flows of drugs and southbound flows of weapons and bulk cash. As an inventory it displayed the various agencies and programs with respect to a series of themes but without any sense of what office, agency, or person was in charge of setting priorities and managing operations on the ground. Possibly the classified version of the report goes into detail on these matters. The 2011 update of the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy restated the strategic goal and added four more “strategic objectives.” A new chapter, for example, discussed US agency involvement in drug abuse prevention in relation to Merida’s Pillar Four on strong and resilient communities. Another spelled out counter-drug cooperation with Mexico. The updated strategy document also specified an indicator for each of the ten substantive chapters in order to measure progress. Some of these are straightforward. For example, drugs, money, and weapons seized at the ports of entry. Others are murky and

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convoluted. The indicator for “investigations and prosecutions,” for example, is “number of Attorney General’s Mexico-based Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) linked drug trafficking organizations disrupted or dismantled having a Southwest border-nexus” (US ONDCP 2011, p. 6). To my knowledge the results were not made public. At the declaratory level, the two countries’ strategies fit together well but contained tensions. Though strongly committed to combat trafficking, Mexicans were generally more interested in reducing criminal violence than in staunching transnational drug flows. The US government lauded President Calderón’s campaigns against drug trafficking organizations, but did little to curtail southbound weapons trafficking. The adoption by Mexico’s DTOs of grotesque terrorist tactics seemed to qualify these criminal groups as terrorist organizations. This characterization resonated with anti-terrorist currents in the United States but complicated anti-DTO initiatives in Mexico.62 Notions of anti-terrorism dovetailed with rhetoric about “criminal insurrection” and opened the door to counter-insurgency doctrines and measures, which, in turn, indicated increased roles for military forces, a sensitive topic in Mexico, made even more sensitive by implying greater US-Mexico military cooperation. That noted, the leadership levels of both governments actively sought ways to harmonize their strategic visions and to work together more closely. The US government claimed to follow Mexico’s lead in policy design, and this is consistent with the adjustments made in Merida to expand the scope beyond drug trafficking to include organized crime generally, promote institutional reform, and to experiment with new forms of social development.63 At the operational level, significant gaps remained in inter-agency coordination within and between the two countries. Mexico’s federal system is undergoing a rapid decentralization, which has strengthened the 32 state governors while complicating policy coordination generally. With respect to intergovernmental coordination in security policy on Mexico’s northern border, Olson (2010) reported that a “lack of coordination and political infighting between political parties, political leaders, and government agencies has crippled Mexican anti-crime efforts.” Local authorities stated that their opinions are often ignored by state and federal actors, and federal agencies appeared unable to coordinate their tasks adequately. Further, “. . . there does not appear to be a tradition or culture of inter-agency cooperation or joint task forces that result in a well coordinated policy amongst the various ministries and levels of government” (ibid.).

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Problems of coordination are also built into the US federal bureaucracy in the sense that cabinet-level agencies operate with equal standing and their various bureaus and programs have specific statutory authorities and report to different authorization and appropriations committees in the Congress. Law enforcement programs must be coordinated through hundreds of federal, state, local, and tribal police and justice agencies. The standard solution was to set up interagency mechanisms and to work out memorandums of understanding where missions overlapped. The Southwest Border strategy, for example, describes a variety of such coordination mechanisms, some well established (e.g., Border Enforcement Security Task Forces), others new (e.g., Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center).64 A significant recent development was increased cross-border coordination in law enforcement and intelligence. At the central government level, Mexico’s government stepped up the pace of extraditions to the United States. Also, a bilateral inter-agency group to oversee the implementation of Merida-related programs began operations in April 2010. Located in Mexico City, the group—estimated at some 70 officials—was intended to facilitate the administration of programs by the various participating US and Mexican agencies.65 Though beyond the present scope, there were advances in intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation in Mexico and along the US-Mexican border as well.66 Did the strategies work? We need to address this sensitive issue by differentiating between short- and medium-term perspectives and between political and technical policy criteria. Beginning with politically relevant criteria in Mexico’s case, the key issue was that gang-related violence continued to rise throughout Calderón’s presidency. Reminiscent of the erosion of public support in the United States during the Viet Nam war, public opinion focused on the body count despite the government’s emphasis on impressive results on a variety of indicators. The government could plausibly argue that increasing violence showed that DTOs were fighting among themselves in response to heightened pressure from the armed forces and law enforcement. At some point, however, and especially as more ordinary citizens were affected, the violence undermined support. Beyond these indicators, both governments developed numerous technical measures. For Mexico, the numbers measure outputs of anticrime operations in terms of persons detained, products confiscated (e.g., drugs, currency, vehicles), weapons and munitions seized, public spaces recovered, schools opened, and the like, rather than outcomes, or the effects of programs on crime itself. The numbers indicated that the

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Calderón government was much more effective in the first half of his term than were his two immediate predecessors. On various measures, the Calderón government accomplished more in three years than previous administrations accomplished in full six-year terms.67 By late March 2010, public opinion appeared negative with respect to the government’s strategy.68 A government spokesman cited Colombia’s experience to argue that much more time was needed to reverse negative trends, which was plausible in the abstract but unpersuasive in the public debate.69 In substantive terms, the Mexican government’s strategy will be judged over the longer term by whether significant progress was made by 2012 to train and deploy a federal police of acceptable professional competence and ethical character. Also important is the public’s verdict about whether judicial reform was having visible effects in reducing public insecurity. With respect to the United States, the strategies could be viewed as “working” in the short term in the sense that the quality and price of illegal drugs remained relatively stable in major urban markets.70 The scope of spillover violence along the Southwest border was unclear; the problem remained potentially salient but analysts struggled to identify and measure it (Lake et al. 2010). Public opinion had not been activated and targeted on the issue. As to longer-term judgments, my sense is that much depends on the performance of the agencies and programs that were being assembled and implemented in Beyond Merida. For example, perceived success of the innovative pilot projects in the “hard cases” of Juárez, Monterrey, and Tijuana could create positive expectations elsewhere. Progress in bilateral, interagency cooperation by the group assembled in Mexico City in March 2010 would be noteworthy as well. Also important are continued innovations in cooperation at the state and local levels along the border. Conclusions: Somewhere in the Valley of Transition

A declaratory strategy against organized crime in Mexico emerged in more or less complete form by mid 2009, although the government struggled initially to explain the strategy to itself and the public. The federal government launched a number of initiatives to repress criminal gangs and to reform the police and justice system. One can say that the Calderón administration achieved substantially more than its predecessors. Implementation of the reforms, however, remained incomplete, unbalanced, and largely unevaluated by late 2012.

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Most importantly, citizen security remained a partisan wedge issue, especially as used by the government against the PRI and PRD. In the presidential election campaign of summer 2012 the government and PAN candidate stirred fears about the return of the PRI and the resumption of collusive arrangements with criminal gangs. PRI’s candidate repeatedly rejected any such possibility. The government’s strategy was unbalanced in two important senses. The bulk of the new spending for citizen security in 2007-2012 remained at the federal level, and it flowed more to SSP and the federal police than to other justice agencies. State and local governments received new money for citizen security, but the results were not clear. For a federal system to operate effectively in citizen security and justice administration the kaleidoscopic maze of agencies at all levels needs to invent supple coordination mechanisms. This did not evolve in the Calderón administration. Results were mixed. For our focus on organized crime, the government made greater advances in repressing high-profile trafficking gangs than in activating anti-kidnapping units at the state level. The valley of transition is an apt metaphor for citizen security reform. One can’t determine whether most or all of the initiatives have begun the ascent to higher levels of performance or continue to struggle near the bottom. Whatever the case, President Peña Nieto could build on the substantial investments and learning bequeathed by the Calderón administration.

Notes 1 “Calderón lleva las riendas de política interna: experto,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 22, 2011. 2 “The Complete Interview with President Calderón in Spanish (La Entrevista Completa en Español),” NYtimes.com, October 17, 2011. 3 Sefchovich (2008, pp. 251-280) explores deceptive public discourse with respect to public security and justice reform in Mexico. 4 Calderón was harsh about his predecessors in a December 2008 speech. He rejected any sort of negotiation with DTOs and stated that there had never been a frontal offensive against organized crime like that of his administration. Further, ignoring or attempting to administer crime, instead of confronting it, brought negative consequences for Mexico. But Mexico is planting seeds that will bear fruit in the future. “FCH: mi gobierno no negociará con narcos,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 21, 2008. His pointed criticism of the Fox administration created tension within the PAN. It also raised the stakes of his own commitment to attack criminal organizations.

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5 Mexicans are rightly incredulous that somehow corruption apparently doesn’t reach north of the US-Mexico border while tons of drugs do flow. News stories about corruption on the US side appear in Mexican media and frequently are elaborated on by commentators. See, for example, “EU reconoce que narco corrompió su frontera,” and “El tráfico de armas y personas es también negocio millionario,” ElUniversal.com.mx, October 22, 2009. 6 Author interview, Arlington, Virginia, May 2009. 7 See, for example, his December 1, 2006, inaugural address. (“El diálogo no puede esperar,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 2, 2006). 8 “Cumulatively, the four deployments in Michoacán, Guerrero, Baja California, and the “Golden Triangle” [Chihuahua, Durango, Sinolao] have involved 24,000 troops and federal police, according to an Associated Press estimate. Combined with the developing joint-force operations in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, the deployments represent one of the largest concerted military and police actions in recent Mexican history” (University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, Justice in Mexico, News Report, January-February 2007, p. 3). 9 Felipe Calderón, Quinto informe de gobierno, p. 48. 10 “Critica Manuel Espino estrategia anticrimen,” Economia.terra.cl, July 15, 2009. 11 See “’Templarios’ reeditan violencia de ‘La Familia,’” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 10, 2011. The “Knights” ordered businesses closed and a demonstration against police presence in Apatzingán, Michoacán, in July 2011. “Templarios organizan marchas …y difusión,” Milenio.com, July 15, 2011. 12 Montaño and Palma (2012, p. 6) draw on Przeworski (1991) for the imagery. 13 Author interviews, Mexico City, June 2013. 14 Jorge Carrillo Olea, “La guerra entre el Ejército y la Marina por el poder,” Jornada.unam.mx, August 26, 2010. 15 See Steven Dudley, “Uptick in Mexico 'Confrontation' Deaths Strikes Disturbing Pattern,” for an analysis of the sharp increase in 2009 and 2010 in deaths related to “confrontations” between presumed gangsters and the armed forces. InsightCrime.org, August 24, 2011. 16 “Palabras al pueblo de México desde el Auditorio Nacional,” December 1, 2006 (available at: http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/prensa/discursos/ ?contenido=28316; last accessed on July 16, 2009). 17 “Estrategia integral de prevención del delito y combate a la delincuencia,” SSP, March 2007. See also “Cruzada contra la delincuencia,” ElUniversal.com.mx, January 23, 2007. 18 Limpiemos Mexico should not be confused with Operación Limpiemos, which was an effort to weed out corrupt police-justice officials. 19 Mexico. SEGOB. “Acuerdo nacional por la seguridad, la justicia, y la legalidad,” Diario de la Federación, August 28, 2008 (available at: http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5057719&fecha=25/08/2008; last accessed on July 12, 2013). 20 “Acuerdo Nacional por la Seguridad, la Justicia y la legalidad,” ElUniversal.com.mx, August 28, 2008. 21 Author interview, Washington, D.C., May 2009.

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22 The term was subsequently changed to coordinated operations (operativos coordinados). 23 Sigrid Arzt (2002, pp. 137-38) points to a three-prong strategy against organized crime: first, identify and attack the criminal group’s operations; second, eradicate the group’s financial base; and third, dismantle its politicalinstitutional protection. The last is both the most difficult and the most important. On the Michoacán operation, see “Histórico: PGR pega al gobierno en Michoacán,” ElUniversal.com.mx, May 27, 2009. 24 “Por falta de preubas liberarán a 12 exfuncionarios de Michoacán,” Milenio.com, January 31, 2010. 25 Ambassador Pascual was a high-energy player in bilateral security cooperation. The Wikileaks scandal was the release of hundreds of US government classified documents. 26 See “Es dificil explicar estrategia contra el crimen,” ElUniversal.com.mx, March 10, 2010. By Poiré, “La integralidad de la Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad,” ElUniversal.com.mx, April 7, 2011. 27 The strategy document goes part of the way to address a basic criticism by RAND Corporation analysts, who claim that the Calderón administration failed to develop a cohesive national security strategy. “While Calderón has made fighting the drug cartels, crime, and corruption a cornerstone of his administration, a cohesive national security strategy has, again, yet to be articulated. Such a national security strategy would identify the nature of new security threats, describe how the country is responding to the threats, and delineate responsibilities across agencies and levels of government. Calderón has articulated his National Development Plan; however, there is no explicit link between national security priorities and that plan or among the various national security institutions” (Schaefer et al. 2008, p. 14). 28 The armed forces sought amendments to the National Security Law to establish a legal basis for their involvement in law enforcement. Mexico’s senate passed legislation that specified the president’s authority to declare a “state of exception” to justify use of the armed forces. Governors and state legislatures could petition the National Security Council to use the armed forces. The legislation required that armed forces be accompanied by civilian authorities to ensure protection of human rights and conduct legal arrests. Further, the armed forces could not be used to repress social movements or resolve electoral disputes. See “Limitan a Ejecutivo en uso de las Fuerzas Armadas,” ElUniversal.com.mx, April 28, 2010. The topic was so sensitive, however, that the bill subsequently died in the Chamber of Deputies. 29 See, for example, the army’s account of its police activity in “Sedena ha detenido a 17 mil delincuentes en el sexenio,” Impreso.milenio.com, October 28, 2009; its advice to landlords to monitor renters, “Sedena pide a casero vigilar a inquilinos,” ElUniversal.com.mx, March 7, 2010; and Defense Secretary Galván’s complaints that the PGR and SSP are not doing enough about money laundering, police reform, and justice reform, “Galván exige en contra el ‘lavado’ de dinero,” ElUniversal.com.mx, March 3, 2010. 30 “Mapa operativos conjuntos en el país,” ElUniversal.com.mx, October 5, 2011. 31 “El ejército lucha casi en solitario contra el hampa,” Jornada.unam.mx, January 20, 2009. The problem of poor (or nonexistent) coordination between

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the army and police was emphasized by US and Mexican officials in author interviews in Mexico City (April 26-27, 2010). 32 See “Policías y militares se amagan en Monterrey,” Impreso.milenio.com, January 14, 2010. 33 US Embassy cable, October 19, 2009. Wikileaks reference ID 09MEXICO3018 (available at: http://www.wikileaks.ch/origin/81_0.html; last accessed on July 12, 2011). 34 Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of joint operations draws on author interviews, Mexico City, November 14-15, 2012. 35 “Lanzan operación conjunta anti-crimen en Chihuahua,” ElUniversal.com.mx, March 28, 2008; “Comienza segunda fase del Operativo Conjunto Chihuahua,” ibid., September 16, 2009. 36 US Embassy cable, October 27, 2009. Wikileaks reference ID 09MEXICO3093 (available at: http://www.wikileaks.ch/origin/81_0.html; last accessed on July 12, 2011). 37 The SNSP is the institutional mechanism for the coordination of public security agencies at the federal and state levels. The Public Security Council is the federal counterpart to the National Security Council. SNSP and the Council are the primary national-level policy making bodies. A priority of the SNSP is collection of data and integration of data bases on weapons, vehicle registration, stolen vehicles, public security personnel, prison populations, citizen identification, and the like. For a critical appraisal see “Seguridad: 10 años de propuestas y ninguna política de Estado,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 28, 2006. 38 “My Goal Is to Transform Mexico,” The Washington Post, February 7, 2010, B1. 39 CISEN was formed from the General Directorate for Research and National Security, which operated briefly after the collapse of the DFS. An interesting official history is CISEN (2009), in which the founders tell their stories. Torres (2009) draws extensively on the history for his broader discussion of the Center. “Investigación” (research) is used deliberately in the agency title in order to avoid the term “intelligence,” which creates unease in public opinion. 40 “Perdemos ante el crimen: Samuel González Ruiz,” Siempre, September 13, 2009. 41 The cases of Noé Hernández and Santiago Vasconcelos are the most important. 42 Ricardo Ravelo, “Las policás: Improvisación, caos, desastre,” Proceso 1659:17 (August, 2008). 43 For a critical appraisal of spending on SSP, see Bergman and Arango (2011). 44 At a conference on public security in Mexico City in April 2011 I listened to an acid exchange on this point between the head of public security in the State of Mexico and the administrator of the SNSP. 45 “Reclamos de Wallace hacia los gobernadores,” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 1, 2011. 46 See “Calderón señala fallas en sistema de seguridad,” ElUniversal.com.mx, October 2, 2008. 47 See “Reforman el Cisen; entrará de lleno al combate contra bandas del narcotráfico,” Jornada.unam.mx, January 28, 2009.

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48 A significant sum in the Merida package was invested in CISEN. See “EU inyectará 17 millones de dólares al Cisen,” ElUniversal.com.mx, October 6, 2008. 49 US Embassy cable, November 10, 2009. Wikileaks reference ID 09MEXICO3195 (available at: http://www.wikileaks.ch/origin/81_0.html; last accessed on July 12, 2011). 50 The Center is described in “’Cerebro’ tecnológico enfrentará criminales,” ElUniversal.com.mx, November 25, 2009. 51 Aguayo and Benítez Manaut (2012) is useful for varieties of information on security and defense. 52 US Embassy cable. November 10, 2009. Wikileaks Reference ID 09MEXICO3195 (available at: http://www.wikileaks.ch/origin/81_0.html; last accessed on July 13, 2011). 53 This section draws heavily on Guevara Moyano 2011. 54 The organized crime law can be found at: http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/Proyectos/aspectosmetodologicos/clasif icadoresycatalogos/doc/federal/LFCLDO.pdf. 55 Op-ed by Supreme Court Justice José Ramón Cossio D., “La ‘tormenta (judicial) perfecta?’” ElUniversal.com.mx, July 12, 2011. 56 Azaola and Ruiz Torres (2009) describe “paper investigators” fixed on filling in boxes on forms, and Magaloni (2009) provides a detailed analysis of the formalistic style of the prosecuting attorneys offices. Pérez Correa (2008) gives an excellent case study of two prosecutors’ offices in Mexico City. 57 Wikipedia, “Mexico-US Border,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Mexico_%E2%80%93_United_States_border (last accessed on March 12, 2010). Zamarripa (2010) analyzes recent state-level innovations in security cooperation; Taboada Villasana (2009) provides a useful overview. 58 The Security and Prosperity Partnership (2005-2009) was an effort to rebalance trilateral policy to bolster attention to economic competitiveness. The Northern Command is one of nine unified combatant commands of the US military and covers the homeland United States, Mexico, and Canada. The Southern Command covers the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean. 59 Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano commented at an event at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on September 17, 2012, that a stronger conceptual framework was needed to guide the bilateral security relationship. 60 My discussion of the Merida Initiative draws heavily on Seelke (2010) and Seelke and Finklea (2013). See the edited volume by Velázquez Flores and Prado Lallande (2009) for Mexican perspectives. Carlsen (2011) is a critical appraisal. 61 The State Department’s fiscal year 2011 budget justification states that, “Funding will support critical efforts to implement specialized assistance in one or two Mexican border cities with an aim of synthesizing the four pillars into a positive demonstration of local effectiveness, which can then be replicated elsewhere by the Government of Mexico. This effort would also highlight increased emphasis on expanding assistance from the federal level to state and municipal levels” (US Department of State 2010, p. 70). 62 For example, DTOs can either create or take advantage of antigovernment street protests in order to cast blame on the police and army for

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human rights abuses. The anti-terrorism lens can depict such protesters as terrorists or terrorist sympathizers. 63 See, for example, the transcript of a press conference, “US Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual and Mexican Ambassador to the United States Arturo Sarukhan,” September 26, 2009, in which Ambassador Pascual stated: “And Arturo speaking first is not just symbolic, it's real, in that the strategy has to come from Mexico. And the way that the United States plugs into that is what makes it effective” (available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/sept/ 129672.htm; last accessed on March 12, 2010). Joint responsibility and the fourpillars strategy were reiterated following the Second Meeting of the High Level Group in Mexico City in March 2010. See “Declaración conjunta sobre cooperación bilateral contra la delincuencia organizada transnacional,” March 23. 64 See US GAO (2009a) for a discussion of coordination problems (e.g., ICE and DEA with regard to drugs seized by CBP between ports of entry) and an evaluation of coordination mechanisms. US GAO 2009b discusses coordination problems with respect to controlling weapons trafficking. As important as coordination problems was the delay in moving funds through the appropriations pipelines. 65 “Mexico y EU afinan apertura de oficina sobre la iniciativa Mérida,” Impreso.milenio.com, March 21, 2010. 66 In addition to Zamarripa (2010), see “México y EU concretan policía transfronteriza,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 2, 2007, which describes the formation of an “International Trans-border Police” made up of Mexican and US federal-state-local agencies and modeled on the successful Sonora-Arizona International Police. See, for example, coverage of “Operation Luz Verde” (green light) conducted by the multi-agency San Diego Cross-Border Violence Task Force, which used the powerful RICO tool to prosecute 43 defendants connected to a branch on the Tijuana Cartel (“Tijuana Cartel Survives, Despite Decades-long Onslaught,” InSight Crime.org, June 20, 2012). 67 See, for example, Mexico. Presidencia (2012). 68 See, “Gana el narco guerra contra el gobierno federal, piensa 59% de los mexicanos,” Impreso.milenio.com, March 23, 2010. As to strategy, 47 percent indicated the government was pursuing the wrong course. Even though we should not rely too much on a single telephone survey (N=600), the results themselves become “facts” in the public debate. 69 Remarks by Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan, Georgetown University, March 26, 2010. 70 Administration officials suggest that supply reduction and/or interdiction have important effects to raise drug price and reduce quality. Walsh (2009) reports on a study by the Institute for Defense Analysis that used the DEA’s “System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence” database and RAND’s 2004 methodology. A main finding is that cocaine prices in US markets continued to drop over this period while purity remained relatively constant.

7 Escape Routes: Policy Adaptation and Diffusion

“I’ll use the lessons of Colombia,” —President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto, July 2012.1 “The parties ought to learn how to form political alliances with other ideologies and stop thinking that this undermines their identity.” —Colombian ex-president César Gaviria in Toluca, State of Mexico, April 20102

The upsurge in criminal violence during Felipe Calderón’s administration produced lasting changes in Mexico’s economy and society. The most serious criminal violence was confined to perhaps six or so of the 32 states. Even so, perceptions of rising insecurity led many to alter their daily habits and routines, for example, to stop wearing jewelry, hailing cabs, or going out in the evening. Markets responded to insecurity by providing a wide array of products and services intended to protect clients. Private security firms, from rent-a-guard to transnational, full-service enterprises, expanded their activity. Military personnel, retired or on leave, took up posts in state and local police and private security forces. Households and businesses purchased monitoring devices and other equipment. Demand increased for armored vehicles, and even armored clothing. School children were instructed about selfprotection, for example, what to do if guns were fired close by. Universities adopted codes of responses to physical threat. “Narco” became widely used as an adjective and “narco-war” was added to the lexicon. Can Mexico find an escape route from its security trap? Will the recent upsurge in diffuse violent crime subside? Will the gang violence and confrontations that escalated after 2007 decline? The immediate

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challenge is the violent struggle between the Mexican state and criminal organizations, especially DTOs. Trafficking organizations, however, are embedded in systemic problems of crime, corruption, and impunity, which are driven by local, national, and transnational forces. The central challenge for government and civil society is to cope with insecurity in the short term while implementing effective policies for the future. Are there signs that the Mexican state and society in the current struggle are planting “anti-bodies” for long-term well-being? Calderón strengthened institutions, notably the federal police and intelligence agencies, while sowing the seeds for a broad reform to the justice system. The state underwent a smooth transition in December 2012 as President Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI took office, allowing his administration to build on advances inherited. Many of those advances were in “installed capacity” of equipment and technical skills. Much remains in order to transform organizational cultures, accelerate change at the state and local levels, and improve coordination among government agencies and with civil society at all levels. In this concluding chapter I first review four factors that will facilitate or complicate the possibilities for significant change. I then review Colombia’s experience with an eye to its relevance for Mexico. Finally, I examine President Peña Nieto’s first steps toward a citizen security strategy with an eye toward escape routes. A key question is what kind of polity and society will emerge from the current phase of violent confrontation? Colombia’s experience suggests that, under special conditions, the state can reassert control and repress criminal violence to an important degree. But the country’s strategy remains incomplete while corruption deepened and criminal interests penetrated and reconfigured the state. I conclude that escape routes for Mexico require a stronger bottom-up effort by state and local governments. Policy knowledge and tools are at hand and the President has laid out a coherent agenda. The issue is implementation. Four Levers of Change

The central metaphor in this book is security trap. The dynamics of crime, corruption, violence, and impunity override reform efforts by elements of the state and civil society and trap democratic governance in low equilibrium. The metaphor predicts inertia for the foreseeable future. But security policy is also events-driven. If criminal groups ramp up their violence to exceed some tolerance level, government responses might accelerate. For example, much of the worst inter-gang violence has occurred in the provinces, and Mexico City remained an island of

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relative calm. A gang attack in the capital against prominent citizens or a cabinet-level official could trigger a tipping point. Rather than predictions or scenarios, I suggest that the interactions of four sets of variables will promote or impede change. The first of the four variables is the “crime problem” itself. What is it and where is it going? Second are the more potent civil society actors, especially business associations and anti-crime civil society movements. Will they bring more effective pressure to bear on government? Third are reforms of the party-electoral system. Will these reforms make policy-makers more responsive to citizen demands? Finally, is a more competent and ethical police-justice system taking shape? The interaction of these variables, as evaluated by the Mexican public, creates dynamics that will affect which escape routes open to Mexico. Since we’re analyzing a large federal system, we should look especially at interactions between the central government and the states and cities. Future of the “Crime Problem”

Crime is a broad universe, and in the current context violent crime is most salient politically. So, for purposes of this analysis, I set aside important issues of nonviolent crime such as tax evasion and capital flight as analyzed in Chapter 2. We can picture the problem of violent crime as a much-simplified “layer cake,” as was depicted in Figure 4.1. The top layer represents transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), the “alpha” groups discussed in Chapter 5; the middle layer is territorybound criminal organizations, the “beta” and “gamma” groups; and the bottom layer is diffuse violent crime on the streets and in the neighborhoods, as analyzed in Chapter 3. The “cake” rests on a base of civic culture of limited legal compliance. Transnational smuggling is driven by market forces, mostly by US demand and Mexico’s internal market. TCOs typically favor evasion and corruption in their dealings with government forces, typically the military and the Federal Police and justice system, as violence is bad for business. Their networks are agile and resilient, adjusting as necessary to changes in law enforcement. To the extent that smuggling networks use overland routes they need the collaboration of the well-armed and mobile territory-bound organizations to handle logistics and provide intelligence and protection. Given the weaknesses of federal and state police, the armed forces will be needed for some time to come. The territory-bound groups also comprise one of the accelerants of common crime, such as robbery and extortion. Important here is the degree to which the recruitment of (mostly) young men into crime has been

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facilitated by social learning in recent years and whether the speed of advancement in criminal careers, from petty theft to organized crime, has been accelerated. Finally, the civic culture of legal non-compliance forms a supportive base for criminality. Important in Mexico’s case was the systemic shock and initial disorientation due to the suddenness of the escalation of criminal violence after 2006. We might expect that the shock was subsequently absorbed and that the Peña Nieto administration can operate with a different sense of normalcy. Although there is inertia in crime, we also know that circumstances can bring rates down significantly. Significant declines in homicide rates in Sao Paulo, Medellín, and Bogotá are recent cases in point (Goertzel and Kahn 2009; Casas-Zamora 2013, pp. 1536). In Mexico, Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana registered declining homicide rates in 2011 and early 2012. We don’t know, however, whether the declines are explained by government interventions or by other factors, such as the consolidation of control by one or another criminal organization or a negotiated equilibrium between law enforcement and criminal groups. In sum, we have a problem set that is too complex and dynamic to permit much by way of prediction. Some long-term tendencies, including sustained economic growth and the emergence of a stronger middle class, ought to reduce some forms of criminality and increase political participation. The imperative in the short term is to reduce the violence. Even if levels of violent crime are brought down, however, issues of criminal penetration into the economy and society well remain, as will the continuing influence of a culture of limited legal compliance. I return to this point in the discussion of Colombia below. Civil Society Mobilization

Mexico experienced a number of mass protests that were triggered by gruesome episodes of violent crime, and such protests can generate change. One of the protests, for example, led to the adoption of the National Pact for Security, Justice, and Legality by the Calderón government in August 2008. Public revulsion over the massacre of 13 young people in Ciudad Juárez in January 2010 prompted the important community development initiative known as “We Are All Juárez” (Todos somos Juárez). Crime victims organizations, for example, the Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity (Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad), formed in 2011, pushed for legislation to attend to victims’s grievances. Criminal outrages and societal protest can also generate non-governmental organizations focused on improving

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citizen security. As they become woven into the political fabric, some of these NGOs make useful contributions to improve the quality of available information about crime and societal participation in policymaking. Apart from the protests and appearance of anti-crime NGOs, a continuing puzzle is why Mexico’s robust business community apparently reacted slowly and with a low profile to the challenge of criminal violence, at least at the national level. Business firms opted for self-defense rather than overt political pressure. One likely reason is a collective action problem, as individual businesses focused on their own security needs to the relative neglect of the broader society. Firms and associations appeared much more active at the local level in the cases of Monterrey and Ciudad Juárez (Conger 2012). Similarly, the Catholic Church and other religious organizations appeared relatively passive at the national level.3 As we’ll see below, in Colombia in the early 2000’s, insecurity was seen as a major barrier to investment and growth, and business leaders were key players in the negotiation of the “war taxes” that significantly strengthened the state. If elite groups and civil society can maintain or increase pressure on government, effective responses are more likely. Party-Electoral Reform

A variety of rules and practices insulate Mexico’s party-electoral system from public demands. Examples include the prohibition of write-ins and independent candidates, which reinforces party control over access to the ballot; generous public subsidies to established parties; and a noreelection rule that reinforces party discipline. Party leaders influence the ranking of candidates in the closed-list ballot for proportional representation offices, making politicians beholden to higher-ups to survive and move from one post to another. Taken together, these rules and practices operate to reinforce the existing webs of clienteles and to create incentives for local-level politicians to deliver votes in order to rise to higher levels. Eduardo Moncada (2013) emphasizes the role of clientele networks to account for patterns of success or failure in dealing with criminal violence. Decentralization and the direct election of mayors in much of Latin America led to the fragmentation of traditional parties and the introduction of independent candidates in local contests. Both traditional and independent candidates need support from clientele networks to win elections. The difference is that traditional politicians with access to established clientele networks are more likely to favor status quo

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policies, whereas independent candidates need to cultivate new networks and are more open to innovative policies. In countries that have not experienced decentralization and independent candidates for city elections, the role of local politicians is to construct clientele networks to win votes for the dominant national parties and thus strengthen their chances to move up to higher political offices. The overall effect of these traditional arrangements is to reinforce the status quo and discourage innovation. Moncada does not analyze the case of Mexico, which combines fiscal and administrative decentralization with a strongly centralized party system that discourages independent candidacies. Local-level politicians improve their chances to move up in the ranks by amassing votes through established networks. It follows that a winning candidate at the local, state, or national level, especially in a narrow election, has incentives to reward existing clientele networks. In effect, it makes little political sense to disturb the status quo with innovative policies. On the other hand, permitting write-in candidates can strengthen the influence of de facto powers, including criminal interests, who can help shoulder campaign finance burdens. Mexico’s 2012 political reforms opened the door to independent candidacies and plebiscites at the federal level. The details about implementation remain pending, however, as does the potential adoption of similar reforms at the state level. Several reform items were included in the “Pact for Mexico,” negotiated among the three main parties only days after Peña Nieto’s inauguration in December 2012. Even so, we should assume that implementation and the potential for independent candidates remain several years in the future. Police-Justice Reform

The Calderón administration invested substantial political and financial capital in a wide array of institutional reforms, as we saw in Chapter 6. Key among the institutions targeted was the Federal Police, which grew from roughly 6,000 to 36,000 officers and support personnel, and the federal and state judicial systems. Peña Nieto’s initial statements and actions indicate policy continuity, along with a broadening and rebalancing of the reforms. The details for a proposed gendarmerie are vague but this entity will eventually be a paramilitary police force along the lines of Colombia’s National Police or France’s Gendarmerie Nacional. Mexico’s Gendarmería will operate as a division of the Federal Police and is intended to serve as a mobile force in the countryside to support villages and small towns, leaving the larger urban

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locales to other divisions the Federal Police. Overall, police reform has advanced significantly at the federal level, but the state and local forces generally lag far behind. Also, we lack an independent evaluation of the professional competence and ethical fitness of the Federal Police. The larger legacy is unbalanced reform. More resources by far have gone to the uniformed police than to the investigative police and prosecutors, or to judicial reform. The PGR was largely neglected in the Calderón administration, and its investigative police was hollowed out in the formation of the uniformed Federal Police. Justice reform proceeds at different paces at the federal and state levels, and there is little evidence that the system can deal effectively with complex forms of crime. Reform of the prison system lags even farther behind. In sum, the crime problem is too complex to predict, although rates of violent crime appear to be stabilizing. Civil society remains engaged and anti-crime NGOs will likely play more important roles in the future. Limited political reforms were passed in 2012, but the party-electoral system will continue to insulate policy-makers in the medium term. Broader reforms to citizen security, including the police-justice system, can proceed in a rebalanced way, building on the advances by the Calderón administration. A stronger state, in turn, can tip citizen security toward a higher equilibrium. What Are the “Lessons of Colombia”?

Since President Peña Nieto stated that he will use the “lessons of Colombia” and appointed as special advisor a former commander of the Colombian national police, we ought to review the case. Like the proverbial “Rorschach test” Colombia reflects the viewer’s fears and hopes. In my judgment, much of the conversation about lessons learned focuses on tools and techniques that governments can bring to bear to confront insurrection and criminal violence.4 It emphasizes, for example, specialized training for police and military forces, real-time intelligence and rapid response, the development of strategic planning rather than tactical reactions, and the improvement of inter-agency coordination at a variety of levels. If the Mexican government gets the right implements for its citizen security toolbox and learns the right techniques, it can bring criminal violence under control. There’s much to be said for the toolbox-techniques approach to lessons learned, and Mexico can benefit in this sense from Colombia’s experience. But, in the larger sense, Colombia is an object lesson about how violence and repression have fundamentally distorted democratic governance. As María Clemencia Ramírez (2010, p. 85) puts it:

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“Militarism and repression constitute the hidden face of Colombia’s democracy.” In a much narrower sense, various factors converged in Colombia in the early 2000s that contributed to advances in controlling criminal and insurgent groups; however, some important factors remain missing in Mexico’s case. Victoria Llorente and Jeremy McDermott analyze points of similarity and difference in the Colombian and Mexican cases, and emphasize the latter. They want to avoid over-simplification and politically-motivated comparisons. [W]hile Mexico and Colombia share most, if not all, of the symptoms of drug-fuelled violence, the conditions that create this violence are very different. The solutions, however, may be very similar: a strong presence of state institutions throughout the country, an effective justice system and law enforcement, educational and economic opportunities to provide alternatives to illegality, all combined with transparency to undermine the corrupting influence of drug money. However, Colombia does not yet have these conditions in place, and therefore is no model for Mexico (Llorente and McDermott 2012, p. 2).

The main difference in conditions that create violence is the central role of the political insurgency in the Colombian case, which is absent in Mexico. The overall solution to drug-related violence is a multi-faceted, whole-of-government approach, but Colombia has not yet achieved this as a working strategy. Reform of the country’s justice system, for example, lags far behind advances in its security apparatus. Time, Seriality, and Policy Learning

In drawing lessons, we are too often prisoners of the present. The history of Colombia’s violence stretches back into the early 19th century and includes such horrific episodes such as the War of the Thousand Days (1899-1902) and La Violencia (1946-58). Thus, whether we take the origins of the FARC in 1964 or the assassination of justice minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 1984 as arbitrary beginning points of the contemporary manifestations, Colombia experienced extraordinary violence over most of its history. Mexico also had an impressively violent 19th century, up to the stability imposed by the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1876-1910). The Revolution of 1910-29 took perhaps a million lives. But there followed the seventy years of peace of the PRI, which makes the current spike in violence so unsettling. In sum,

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Colombia’s policy-makers were habituated to extreme violence, whereas Mexico’s struggled with an unanticipated onslaught of carnage. Also, the political-ideological motives that drove the leftist insurrection of the FARC and the ELN, especially in the early years, make Colombia’s case much more complex than Mexico’s, where organized criminal violence is mostly profit-driven. Political motives drew thousands of insurgents in the Colombian case. The FARC at one time could field approximately 16,000 combatants in dozens of “fronts” and could amass some 1,500 fighters against a provincial capital. If we make a crude population adjustment, a similar insurrection in Mexico would equate to about 38,000 insurgents, and 3,600 fighters arrayed against a state capital.5 The roughly 30,000 fighters in Colombia’s selfdefense forces would equal some 72,000 in Mexico. To put it mildly, Mexico’s government and society would react much more energetically to armed conflicts of these dimensions. Whatever the case, the left insurgency and the self-defense forces are the main drivers of violence and state response in the Colombian case, and this is too-easily overlooked in comparisons with Mexico. Seriality refers to the sequence of events relevant to policy-making. Successful responses usually don’t emerge full-blown on the first or second try but rather are the product of trial and error. Responses at one point shape subsequent possibilities. In Colombia’s case a sequence of five different types of events illustrates the point. •

• • •

The constitutional reforms of 1991, among other things, eroded the foundations of a party system dominated for many years by the Liberals and Conservatives and accelerated the pace of decentralization. The electoral reform subsequently opened the way for Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) to win the presidency as an independent and to put together a majority coalition in the congress to support his security policies. The viciousness of Pablo Escobar’s war on the Colombian state in the late 1980s and early 1990s laid bare the weakness of the state and shocked society and the political system. Ernesto Samper’s presidency (1994-1998) vividly illuminated the degree of corrupt penetration by traffickers into his presidential campaign and the national congress. Andrés Pastrana’s presidency (1998-2002) showed the limits of negotiating a peace with the FARC and accelerated the build-up of the government’s security forces, with substantial support from Plan Colombia.

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•

Álvaro Uribe won the presidency in 2002 on a pledge to combat the armed insurgencies and could benefit from strengthened security forces and the US priority after 9/11 to fight terrorism.

Over time, Colombia’s insurgent forces and criminal organizations also evolved and adapted to changing circumstances. As ideological motives declined, insurgent groups came to resemble Mexico’s profitoriented criminal organizations. The lesson is that Colombia’s struggle is prolonged, the protagonists adapted and evolved, and it took time and events to promote learning and create openings. Mexico’s case suggests more partial measures and limited learning from the mid-1980s to 2006 in response to escalating problems of violence and corruption related to DTOs. We can point to a number of positive steps, for example, the creation of the National Public Security System in 1995. But there wasn’t a sense of real urgency until Calderón took office in December 2006. In turn, Calderón’s advances in institutional reform strengthen President Peña Nieto’s hand in security policy-making. Presidential Statecraft and Security Policy

Colombia is a unitary political system in which the central government exercises more authority over the departments and cities than in the case of Mexico’s federalism. The Colombian National Police, along with the armed forces, forms part of the “public force” (fuerza pública) under the jurisdiction of the defense ministry. The president, therefore, has bettercoordinated instruments and greater jurisdiction to employ them. Politically, Álvaro Uribe could draw on a solid security policy coalition in the Colombian congress to support a coherent strategy, the two-pronged Democratic Security Policy. The strategy set targets, priorities, and sequences, and was adjusted to respond to changes in insurgent and criminal groups. He persuaded public opinion that sustained economic growth depended on improving the security situation of the country. He levied a substantial “war tax” on wealthier Colombians, which helped finance the security program. He also adroitly used symbols such as patriotism, narco-terrorism, and insurgency to his advantage both internally and in forging a strong partnership with the United States. The strategy produced mixed results, arguably working better against the FARC than against the self-defense forces or criminal organizations. Homicide rates and kidnapping also declined substantially up to 2008 before beginning to creep back up. The

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record against drug trafficking is complex, but the government could claim success in reducing the acreage under coca cultivation. We should not, however, ignore the dark side and negative lessons of Uribe’s presidency. Apart from human rights abuses by the Colombian security forces, noted below, Uribe’s office allegedly used the national intelligence service, the Administrative Department for Security (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad—DAS), to spy on political adversaries and other government agencies, including the Supreme Court. His congressional coalition included numerous legislators with ties to the self-defense forces. President Calderón’s security policy was less successful, at least as perceived by Mexican public opinion. His deployment of 25,000 Army personnel and federal police to several states to confront criminal organizations within days of taking office took the public by surprise. His critics could credibly attribute the decision to an effort to legitimize his presidency in the wake of his sliver-thin electoral victory. The policy also ran into severe obstacles to implementation, as discussed in Chapter 6. The president was unable to quell the infighting between his secretary of citizen security and the attorney general and among the police and armed forces, and he complained frequently about the indifference or opposition of governors and mayors. Further, his long list of institutional reforms showed few tangible results by the end of his term. But most of all, Calderón’s policy was overwhelmed by the continuous escalation in organized-crime related violence that led to perhaps 60,000 deaths over the course of his term. On the political side, Calderón was unable to build a strong coalition to support his security policy. In contrast to Uribe’s skillful use of symbols to mobilize support, Calderón called for a “war” against organized crime and once donned military garb to review the troops. But he resisted using “insurgency” or “terrorism” to characterize the struggle, even though he described the August 2011 fire-bombing of a casino in Monterrey an "act of terror and barbarism.” The result was confusion as the public, and some analysts, tended to conflate criminal violence with insurgency and terrorism, which tacitly or explicitly supported further militarization of the fight against organized crime.6 Calderón frequently called for a “state policy” against crime, but he used security as a wedge issue against opposition parties on several occasions. In a federal system of 32 state governors and over 2,000 city mayors, partisan interests regularly trumped effective cooperation. The main lesson, according to former Colombian president César Gaviria, as cited in this chapter’s epigraph, is that Mexican politicians need to put security policy above partisan advantage. Calderón failed in that respect.

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Tools and Tactics That Can Travel

There is ample support for three points: the Colombian government significantly improved its tools and tactics to repress insurgent groups and criminal gangs; the US government played a central role in providing funds, equipment, training, and on-the-ground assistance; and Mexico can put many of these tools to good use to repress criminal organizations. US financial assistance to Colombia was more than three times that provided to Mexico as of 2010 (Bailey 2011, p. 151). Also, Mexico’s cooperation with the US government is more complicated than is Colombia’s. The central fact is that, after 1992, the Colombian government built a bigger security toolbox and developed more effective tools. As Benítez (2012, p. 11) points out, Colombia in 2010 spent more on its armed forces (2.3 percent of GDP and 8.16 percent of the central government budget) than any other country in Latin America, in contrast to Mexico, which spent .49 percent of its GDP and 2.65 percent of the budget on its armed forces. One result is that Colombia’s armed forces were 2.3 times larger per capita than Mexico’s. Part of the funding for Colombia’s buildup came from “Democratic Security Taxes” levied on wealthy firms and individuals. “When the tax was first adopted, it covered a gap of COP$2 billion (US$797 million): about 5% of total government revenue or 1% of the country’s GDP. Since then, the tax revenue as a share of the government’s total has fluctuated between 2.4 and 5%” (Flores-Macías 2009, p. 5). The additional funds allowed Colombia to add more than 100,000 personnel to its armed forces, an overall increase of 36 percent and an increase of 45 percent in combat forces (ibid., p. 6). To put these numbers in perspective, one percent of Mexico’s 2011 estimated GDP of US1.155 trillion is about US$11.6 billion7, an amount that would nearly triple Mexico’s current outlays for defense. Beyond the bigger toolbox and better hammers, as positive lessons from Colombia underline: • • •

Efforts to plan in strategic terms with respect to priorities and sequences; The use of a pilot project of integral action before scaling up to larger efforts8; Improvements in inter-agency coordination, both among the armed forces and between these and the police, particularly in tactical operations9;

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Creation of a ministry of defense under civilian leadership to better coordinate the police and armed forces; Creation of an independent national prosecutor’s office (fiscalía); Professionalization and strengthening of the National Police to improve effectiveness and achieve a presence in every municipality and major urban center; Specialized training and organization of armed forces units to use against insurgent and criminal organizations10; and, Significant improvements in intelligence and mobility.

As to negative examples, I would note: • • •

Priority to “high-value targets,” rather than the middle rungs of trafficking organizations, which increased the violence and spread it new areas11; Weakness of the justice system to deal with serious crime and complex forms of organized crime; and Absence of a long-term citizen security policy that gives priority to prevention.

Another factor complicating easy adoption of Colombia’s lessons is that Mexican political elites are much more wary of US involvement in internal security matters. For example, a neuralgic point for years has been Mexico’s prohibition against US law enforcement agents’ carrying weapons. As Benítez (2009, p.16) notes, “In Colombia there isn’t an anti-US ‘military nationalism.’ In Mexico there is.” Mexicans are also leery about the presence of US intelligence agents, especially those from the Central Intelligence Agency. That said, there’s been significant progress in US-Mexico bilateral cooperation in criminal investigations and in granting extraditions. Colombia used the US justice system to offset the weaknesses of its own system in many cases of complex prosecutions; that option may figure more prominently as well in the US-Mexico relationship. Also, US intelligence agencies have apparently operated discreetly and effectively within Mexico, for example, in cooperating with Mexico’s marines in apprehending or killing drug kingpins. Dirty War and a Human Rights Catastrophe

I won’t try here to summarize the extent of the human rights violations perpetrated in Colombia by the left insurrection and the self-defense

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forces especially, and also by government forces. Millions of Colombians have been assaulted, kidnapped, robbed, driven from their homes, or murdered since the mid-1980s.12 To illustrate the calculated nature of this brutality, Llorente and McDermott (2012, p. 16) relate the “false positives” episode in which the Colombian army murdered “up to 3,000 victims” to present to the public as insurgents. As to the scope of suffering, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC 2011, p. 21) cites the Colombian government’s estimate that 3.8 million citizens were registered as internally displaced between 1997 and 2011.13 In sum, human rights are a major issue in any calculation of Colombia’s relevance to Mexico. Colombia is also distinctive in Latin America for the extent to which the political left has been repressed. The Patriotic Union Party, with ties to the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party, was essentially exterminated in the 1980s by murky combinations of drug gangsters and self-defense forces, with credible allegations of support from elements of Colombia’s military and intelligence apparatus. The involvement of politicians and elements of the security apparatus with paramilitary, self-defense forces in repressing labor and peasant leaders, known as “parapolitics,” continued into the 21st century. Repression of the left exists as well in Mexico, but on a much smaller scale and usually at the hands of a few state governors or local strongmen.14 A positive lesson is that Mexico opened channels of legal participation for the left that reduced incentives for political insurgency. Criminal Penetration and Transformation of the State

Beyond lessons about controlling violence, we should focus on the ways in which government agents and criminal organizations interact over time in particular settings to shape the evolution of democratic processes and the state, or what Vanda Felbab-Brown (2010) calls “competitive state-making.” The basic idea is that government agencies compete with “de facto powers” (poderes fácticos), including criminal organizations, about the rules of the game with respect to how democracy and the state will function. The process is especially volatile in settings of ongoing political and economic transitions. Colombian academics developed the field of “violentology” (violentología) in the 1980s and 90s and produced valuable work on the causes and consequences of multiple forms of violence. Since then, their agenda has shifted to study the ways in which different types of insurgent and criminal groups evolved over time in close interaction with government, the economy, and civil society. Claudia López

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Hernández (2010) edited an especially useful book that provides conceptual contributions and extraordinary case detail.15 A central concept in the book is “reconfigured cooptation” (“la Reconfiguración Cooptada”), that is, both legal and illegal actors collaborate with agents of the state in order to change the constitution, laws, and decrees from inside the state in ways that specifically benefit both legal and illegal actors. An example is changes that make it easier to legalize land transfers that occur under questionable circumstances. Three broader examples illustrate lines of inquiry in the book. First, the self-defense forces were generally more successful than insurgent groups, such as the FARC, in penetrating the state, due in part to their close interactions with landowners and other conservative interests. Second, electoral reform and political decentralization made it easier for criminal groups to penetrate and even control municipal and departmental governments and to project influence up to the national level. Third, in many cases the established political elites reached out to criminal organizations to form alliances while maintaining room for maneuver and self-preservation. The book goes into considerable detail to describe and analyze trends throughout the country, an important element because the fragile equilibriums between government officials and criminal organizations vary widely from one locale to another. Obviously, Mexico differs from Colombia in important respects, and I’m not trying to force the comparison. Much oversimplified, however, there is a shared dynamic in both countries. Violent criminal organizations emerge as real forces in the midst of fundamental economic and political transitions. The criminal organizations are dynamic and resilient and seek alliances with actors in the economy and political system. In turn, some interests in the economy and political system seek alliances with criminal organizations. These alliances collude and compete with government agencies and pro-democracy elements of civil society to configure the state as it evolves in different forms and locales throughout the country. It is clear in Mexico that criminal organizations have penetrated the police, armed forces, and justice system from the local to the national levels. There is also evidence that criminal groups have infiltrated local and state governments.16 We have numerous allegations that drugrelated contributions have influenced local elections, and the federal government’s intelligence agency raised concerns about money flowing into the 2009 congressional campaigns.17 In contrast to Colombia, however, we have little evidence that trafficking-related corruption has reached into Mexico’s federal congress. Thus, we need to move beyond press accounts and begin to analyze trends more systematically. At this

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point, we lack the information to assess the nature and degree of criminal penetration. Escape Routes: Policy Adaptation and Diffusion

The multi-layered challenge of violent crime requires that the multiple dimensions of government and civil society responses be coordinated and sequenced. We should think about policy-making from the top down, bottom up, and outside in. Some responses should be tailored against transnational smuggling, others against territory-bound criminal organizations, and still others against common crime and for the promotion of a culture of lawfulness. The challenge is not so much the tools and techniques as it is to create incentives to adapt effective policies and methods to local needs. The most important requirement is committed leadership at the state and local levels. Successful initiatives can be diffused to other states and communities. Top down

Calderón’s unbalanced reform put priority on the federal police over a more balanced attention to broader justice reform and more agile interagency coordination. The central government began quickly under Peña Nieto’s administration to propose a more balanced package of initiatives in security policy. Also, unlike Calderón, the new administration ranked security among several other priorities, so it will not be judged for performance on security alone. We might summarize Peña Nieto’s announced priorities for security in terms of policy goals and institutional adjustments. Without abandoning the efforts against transnational smuggling, he intended to concentrate on crimes that affect Mexicans in daily life: kidnapping, assault, extortion, robbery, and homicide. In most cases these are crimes that fall in the jurisdiction of the states, but they are also fostered by organized crime, especially the territory-bound gangs, which correspond to federal jurisdiction. Policy responses call for strengthening state and local governments and promoting coordination with the federal government. One ambitious commitment is to reduce homicides by 50 percent over the course of his administration. Peña Nieto’s main institutional adjustment to improve coordination was to strengthen the Secretariat of Government (SEGOB). The National Public Security System and its executive secretariat and council, as well as the National Center for Crime Prevention and Citizen Participation (Centro Nacional de Prevención del Delito y Participación

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Ciudadana), remained in SEGOB. The former Public Security Secretariat, with its Federal Police and Mexico Platform, were transferred to become an undersecretariat to SEGOB. Also, a proposed fusion center may give SEGOB a coordination role over the various intelligence agencies. Finally, the new Gendarmerie, made up from existing army and marine units, was to be placed under civilian control as a division of the Federal Police. The government’s initial policy statement (Mexico SEGOB 2013) emphasized crime prevention. It stressed inter-agency coordination through the creation of five regions and priority attention to 57 highviolence communities. As a framework document it mostly lists types of proposed activities and goals that will be tailored to suit the needs of particular localities and types of risk factors. It does not address the particular challenges presented by high-impact criminal organizations and the ways in which coercive policing needs to be coordinated with the introduction of prevention policies. An authorized budget of P$118.8 billion (roughly US$9.1 billion) created expectations for significant results. It is less clear how the PGR and its anti-organized crime unit (SEIDO) would be revived and strengthened to play their critical roles in the investigation and prosecution of complex crime. Also, although the new government was committed to judicial reform, it said little about strategies of implementation. The main commitment was to support a uniform penal code (código penal único) to better coordinate federal and state judicial processes. Bottom up

There is growing awareness in Mexican public opinion that crime is not just the “president’s problem” and that state and local officials need to take more initiative. Despite the insulation provided by the partyelectoral system, the PAN’s 2012 election victories in Tamaulipas and Nuevo León in the context of an otherwise poor performance might be read in part as a vote to punish especially weak anti-crime records by PRI governors. This shift in opinion and electoral incentives may prompt governors and mayors to promote their own security initiatives and to cooperate more effectively with the federal government, especially if they have the necessary tools and policy knowledge. In terms of policy learning and capacity, the Calderón sexenio helped prepare the way with substantial investments in training and equipment. State and local governments need effective agencies and instruments to confront the distinct challenges of organized and common crime. The

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quality of police and justice agencies has greater relevance to controlling organized crime than common crime, which is driven by a variety of causes (Van Dijk 2008, pp. 278-282). In this respect, we find again that police reform shows greater short-term potential than does reforming the rest of the justice system, although the courts need significant adjustments to be able to handle complex cases. Transnational smuggling networks lie beyond the reach of state-level police, and some of the larger and more heavily armed territory-bound criminal organizations will continue to require assistance from the Federal Police, and even from the Armed Forces. But state police organizations can handle smaller groups engaged in kidnapping, extortion, and violent robbery, especially given the potential of the “unified command” (mando único) concept. Originally promoted by SSP Secretary Genaro García Luna in 2007, the rationale for the unified command is that the hundreds of municipal police forces in the vast majority of cases are poorly trained, equipped, and paid, staffed through patronage, and vulnerable to varieties of corruption. By creating a unified command, each state government can raise standards of recruitment and training and also organize specialized units to deal with, for example, kidnapping, money-laundering, or crimes against women and vulnerable groups. Police forces under unified command are also better situated to cooperate with federal agencies. As noted in Chapter 6, a number of interests converged in congress and among the mayors to block the implementation of the concept. President Peña Nieto indicated support for the initiative, and a variety of different models can be tailored to suit the preferences of governors and mayors.18 However, similar to the imbalance at the federal level, judicial reform lags behind at the state level. The goal is to promote oral trials, which may bring more transparency and efficiency to routine types of criminal prosecution and dispute resolution. It remains unclear, however, whether states are making progress to prepare their courts to handle the complex cases related to prosecution of organized crime. More important than creating new agencies or redesigning protocols of cooperation among levels of government is the challenge to begin a cultural transformation in public service. Electoral incentives need to reward governors and mayors who invest political capital and effort in improving citizen security. Institutional incentives need to reinforce stronger professionalism of police and justice personnel. The state and municipal levels are best suited for the types of prevention policies that can deter common crime. There is a rich literature on prevention, and Mexican governments at all levels have

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experimented with varieties of interventions. It should be fairly straightforward to devise a “toolkit of best practices” and form a corps of skilled implementers from both the public and private sectors to assist state and municipal governments. Also needed is a set of political/financial incentives to promote policy adaptation and evaluation as well as the diffusion of successful initiatives among the states and cities. Outside in

External actors can facilitate escape routes by serving as policy entrepreneurs and facilitators with respect to ideas, technical assistance, and intergovernmental cooperation. As noted, Mexican policy-makers developed close ties with Colombian counterparts such as Cali’s mayor, Rodrigo Guerrero, as well as Sergio Fajardo, former mayor of Medellín, and Antanas Mockus and Enrique Peñalosa, former mayors of Bogotá, all of whom developed successful prevention policies at the municipal level. The policies became widely known in Mexico and influenced the development of programs in Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana, and other locales. General Oscar Naranjo, former head of the Colombian national police, brought extensive experience in intelligence and investigations of complex organized crime to his job as personal advisor to President Peña Nieto. Naranjo also established a research program on citizen security at ITESM-Mexico City in August 2012. Leoluca Orlando, noteworthy as the former mayor of Palermo, Sicily, who mobilized public opposition to the Mafia, visited Mexico to emphasize the need to promote a culture of lawfulness to complement other types of reforms. A number of international organizations also serve as facilitators. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime formed a partnership with INEGI in September 2011 to establish a Center for Excellence in statistical information on government, crime, victimization, and justice. USAID is actively engaged in providing technical assistance and expertise. The World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Organization of American States have become more active in citizen security programs and have included Mexico in several new programs and networks of specialists. Two areas are especially important with respect to intergovernmental cooperation. Most obviously, the United States acknowledges its shared responsibility to lower drug consumption and to limit the flows of weapons and of illicit money. US government efforts as of 2013 fall far short of Mexicans’ expectations. Second, Central America, and especially Guatemala, has become more deeply penetrated

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by criminal organizations. Mexican officials are deeply concerned and are cooperating directly with other governments and through the Central American Integration System (SICA) to provide assistance.19 Adaptation, Diffusion, and Scaling up

The discussion to this point has mostly focused on assembling tools and techniques. The challenge is implementation, finding what works to counter different types of crime, diffusing these solutions and adapting them to the specifics of each locale. The National Center for Crime Prevention and Citizen Participation in SEGOB can serve as the clearing house to disseminate ideas throughout the country. One missing piece is a policy evaluation center, like the CONEVAL in the area of social development policy that can assess implementation and provide guidance on how to improve results. Carefully evaluated pilot projects can help identify what works with respect to reducing insecurity. President Peña Nieto included evaluation and policy adjustment as a key point in his security policy.20 Reform implementation is one of the arts of governance. From the top down, reformers need to identify suitable sites. As noted, the Peña Nieto administration initially chose 57 sites based on the severity of criminal violence. Apart from severity, a key criterion is the willingness of the governors or mayors to give high priority to citizen security and to embrace cooperation. The more likely candidates for reform are governors in the first or second year of their six-year terms. The governor of Jalisco, for example, took office in March 2013. Baja California elected its governor in July of that year, and the other states are scattered over the six-year presidential term. Reformers also need some quick and visible successes in order to build support. In this vein Alejandro Hope suggested ten specific priorities as candidates for special attention, for example, focused action against kidnapping, undercover operations against extortion, and measures against vehicle theft. As to kidnapping, he writes: “In the five states most affected by the phenomenon, reinforce the anti-kidnapping units and assign special units from the Federal Police to those states. . . . These measures should be widely publicized in the chosen states in order to raise the sense of risk felt by potential kidnappers.”21 In passing, Hope mentions a key policy instrument: heightened publicity of reform efforts. The point to underline is that important aspects of Mexico’s security trap can be addressed through accumulated knowledge and skillful policy design and implementation. In a positive sense, the shocks of the

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past decade are producing anti-bodies that can begin to strengthen democratic governance. The big “if” remains skillful, committed implementation.

Notes 1

“Usaré las lecciones de Colombia,” Jornada.unam.mx, July 5, 2012. “Los partidos deben saber hacer alianzas políticas con otras ideologías y dejar de creer que esto mina su identidad.” Quoted in Cruz Jiménez (2010, pp. 20-1). 3 We find occasional bland messages from the Church, for example, “Pide iglesia seguir lucha al crimen,” ElUniversal.com.mx, December 3, 2012. 4 The discussion of the Colombia lessons draws on Bailey (2012b), used with permission. 5 Mexico’s population of 112 million is about 2.4 times larger than Colombia’s 47 million. 6 Killebrew and Bernal (2010) is one of several examples of such conflation. 7 Using official exchange rate. CIA, The World Factbook (available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html; last accessed on September 21, 2012). 8 The Plan for the Integral Consolidation of the Macarena. Llorente and McDermott (2012, p. 6). 9 On the other hand, Llorente and McDermott (2012, p. 14) underline the continuing problem of coordination between the police and armed forces. They cite, for example, “the difficulty in defining roles and missions for the military and the police in the current strategic scenario, where insurgents and criminal bands share territories and increasingly work together in the interests of the drug trade.” 10 Vargas Velázquez (2011) provides useful analysis on Colombia’s armed forces. 11 See “Delincuencia en Colombia: bandas desbandadas,” Semana.com, December 1, 2012, which describes the spread of violence to various regions of Colombia in the wake of the destruction of the Norte del Valle Cartel, the last of the large DTOs. 12 Isacson (2010) and Wilkinson (2011) describe these and other abuses. 13 This would equal about 8.1 million persons displaced in the Mexican case. Given the 2,000-mile shared land border a significant fraction would seek refuge in the US 14 Aguayo (2001) details the repression of the left in Mexico in the 1970s by the DFS. 15 A useful collection available in English is Garay and Salcedo-Albarán (2011). 16 Former governor Mario Villanueva of Quintana Roo was extradited to the US on charges of money laundering. Former Tamaulipas governor Tomás Yarrington is under investigation for suspicion of money laundering and 2

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extortion. There are numerous allegations of collusion between local authorities and criminal groups. 17 As Benítez (2011, p. 8) notes, “. . . organized crime penetrates political forces through financing to have government officials under their control.” 18 See “Texto completo del ‘Pacto por México,’” AnimalPolitico.com (December 3, 2012), and the President’s speech at the “II sesión extraordinaria del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública,” (December 17, 2012). 19 President Peña Nieto met early in his term with the Central American presidents in order to negotiate an anti-crime agenda. “México y CA pactan frente anticrimen,” ElUniversal.com.mx, February 21, 2013. 20 “II sesión extraordinaria del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública.” 21 See Alejandro Hope, “Algunas ideas para el primer año de Peña Nieto,” AnimalPolítico.com, October 3, 2012, and Eduardo Guerrero (2013) for proposals for the short term.

Acronyms

AFI CANACINTRA CANACO CASEDE CENAPI

CENDRO CEPALSTA

CIDAC CIDE CIFA CIPF CISEN CNDH COLEF

Agencia Federal de Investigación (Federal Investigation Agency Cámara Nacional de Industrias de la Transformación (National Chamber of Transformation Industries) Cámara Nacional de Comercio (National Chamber of Commerce) Colectivo de Análisis de la Seguridad con Democracia (Collective for Analysis of Security with Democracy) Centro Nacional de Planeación e Inteligencia e Información para el Combate a la Delincuencia (National Center for Planning, Intelligence, and Information for Combating Crime) Centro Nacional contra las Drogas (National AntiDrug Center) Bases de Datos Comisión Ecónomic para América Latina y el Caribe (Databases and Statistical Publications of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo (Center for Research for Development) Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (Center for Economics Research and Teaching) Centro de Inspección Fiscal y Aduanera (Customs and Tax Inspection Center) Centro de Inteligencia de la Policía Federal (Intelligence Center of the Federal Police) Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (Center for Research and National Security) Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Human Rights Commission) Colegio de la Frontera Norte (College of the Northern Border)

203

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COLMEX CONAFOR CONEVAL COP COPARMEX CPB CPOT DAS DEA D.F. DFS DTO EAP ECLAC EDFIC

EGAP ELN EZLN FARC FFN GDP IBOPE ICE ICESI

Colegio de México (College of Mexico) Comisión Nacional Forestal (National Forestry Commission) Consejo de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (Evaluation Council for Social Development Policy) Colombian Pesos Confederación Patronal de México (Mexican Employers’ Confederation) Customs and Border Protection Consolidated Priority Organization Target Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Department for Security) Drug Enforcement Administration Distrito Federal (Federal District, Mexico City) Dirección Federal de Seguridad (Federal Security Directorate) Drug-Trafficking Organization Economically Active Population Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Asociación Esperanza contra Desapariciones Forzadas y la Impunidad Civil (Association for Hope against Forced Disappearances and Civil Impunity) Escuela de Graduados en Administración Pública y Política Pública (Graduate School for Public Administration and Public Policy) Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) Fundación Friedrich Naumann (Friedrich Naumann Foundation) Gross Domestic Product Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics Immigration and Customs Enforcement Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad, A.C. (Citizen Institute for Studies on Insecurity)

Acronyms

INEGI INM ISI ITESM MT MUCD NAFTA NDIC NGO OAS OECD PAN Pemex PF PFP PGR PRD PRI PROFEPA PSF PVEM SAT SEDENA SEGOB SEIDO

205

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (National Institute of Statistics and Georgaphy) Instituto Nacional de Migración (Nacional Migration Institute) Import Substitution Industrialization Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (Monterrey Technological Institute for Advanced Studies) Metric Ton México Unido contra la Delincuencia (Mexico United against Crime) North American Free Trade Agreement National Drug Information Center Nongovernmental Organization Organization of American States Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party) Petróleos Mexicanos (Mexican Petroleum) Policía Federal Policía Federal Preventiva (Federal Preventive Police) Procuraduría General de la República (Federal Attorney General’s Office) Partido Revolucionario Democrático (Democratic Revolutionary Party) Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolution Party) Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (Federal Environmental Protection Procuracy) Private Security Firm Partido Verde Ecologista de México (Green Party) Sistema de Administración Tributaria (Tax Administration Service) Secretaría de Defensa Nacional (National Defense Secretariat) Secretaría de Gobernación (Secretariat of Government) Subprocuradoría Especializada en Investigacón de Delincuencia Organizada (Deputy Attorney General Specialized in Investigation of Organized Crime)

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SEMAR SETEC

SHCP SICA SIEDO

SNSP SPSGM SSP TCO UNI UNHRC UNODC USDOJ USONDCP USGAO ZCMex

Secretaría de la Marina (Secretariat of the Navy) Consejo de Coordinación para la Implementación del Sistema de Justicia Penal (Coordination Council for the Implementation of the Penal Justice System) Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Secretariat of Treasury and Public Credit) Sistema de Integración de Centro América (Central American Integration System) Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada (Deputy Attorney General for Specialized Investigation on Organized Crime) Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (National Public Security System) Survey on Public Safety and Governance Secretaría de Seguridad Pública (Secretariat for Public Security) Transnational Criminal Organization Unidad de Inteligencia Naval (Naval Intelligence Unit) United Nations Human Rights Commission United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United States Department of Justice United States Office of Drug Control Policy United States Government Accountability Office Zona Conurbana

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Index Army: and Calderón’s security strategy, 145, 153-156, 191; in Colombia, 194; confrontation with DTOs, 2, 6, 141, 151, 153156; corruption, 3, 5, 134, 146; human rights, 5, 105, 120; and the navy, 134, 148, 163; and Peña Nieto, 197; and private security firms, 6; recommendations, 167, 197; role in the security trap, 26; and the Zetas, 120; See also joint operations; navy Assault: public perception , 59, 67, 69, 75, 77, 196; rates, 56, 62-62; and the security trap, 27, 33, 51, 92 Attorney General’s Office, 3, 106, 151, 154, 162, 164, 166, 187, 191, 197; and police reform, 156161

2009 midterm elections, 2, 144; corruption, 195; results , 4, 6 2012 presidential election, 18; campaign, 146; results, 6; runup, 5-6, 17, 93, 136, 144 Acapulco, 59, 60-61, 121 AFI. See Federal Investigation Agency Aguascalientes, 56, 57-58 Alegality: role in the security trap, 15, 21; and tax evasion and informality, 32-33, 41-42 Alpha groups: definition, 91-92; and drug trafficking, 119,, 123, 125128, 131, 133-134; Mexican DTOs, 120. See also criminal groups; drug-trafficking organizations; organized crime Alto al Secuestro, 108, 159; See also anti-crime NGOs Amapola. See heroin Anti-crime NGOs, 75, 84, 105, 108109, 159, 184, 193. See also Alto al Secuestro; Citizen Institute for Studies on Insecurity; Iluminemos Mexico; Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad; Todos somos Juárez Arellano Félix organization, 97-98, 103, 121 Argentina, regional comparison 8, 41, 68, 92 Arizona, 106, 123, 129 Armed forces: and Calderón’s security strategy, 4, 145, 148-149, 150, 153-156, 164-165, 191; in Colombia, 190-193; confrontation with DTOs, 116, 179; corruption, 89, 145, 195; human rights, 6, 145, 146-147, 169; recommendations, 167, 183, 198. See also army; joint operations; navy

Basic services. See public services Baja California, 45, 54-55, 57-58, 74, 85, 97, 103, 106, 118, 121, 130, 200 Baja California Sur, 57-58 Beltrán Leyva, Alfredo, 97 Beltrán Leyva, Arturo, 97 Beltrán Leyva cartel, 121 Beta groups: definition, 91-92, 119; and drug trafficking, 122, 123, 125, 126-128, 131, 133; Mexican DTOs, 119, 121. See also criminal groups; drug-trafficking organizations; organized crime; territory bound organized crime groups Beyond Merida, 152, 169, 173 Black number, 56, 59 Caballeros Templarios, 121, 146. See also la Familia Calderón, Felipe, 1, 4; and 2006 presidential election, 3; and 2009

225

226

Index

midterm election, 4; and 2012 presidential election, 6; accusations of partisanship, 5, 108; administration evaluation, 144-146, 172-174, 181-182, 190191, 197; comparison with Enrique Peña Nieto, 80, 147, 174, 196; cooperation with the United States, 168; governing style, 143, 145; and kidnapping; 85, 108; intelligence reform, 161-165; and Merida Initiative, 167-173; neglect of judicial reform, 186187; offensive against DTOs, 2, 3, 5, 48, 108, 115; police reform, 20, 156-161, 186-187; and taxation, 31 Calderón, Felipe, security strategy, 45, 48, 80, 118, 143, 145-153, 172174, 191 Calexico, 126-128 Cancún, 60-61 Cannabis. See marijuana Capital flight, 48, 131, 183 Cárdenas Guillén, Osiel, 97, 118 Car-jacking, 51, 63 Carrillo Fuentes, Amado, 118 Catholic Church, 185 CENAPI. See National Planning and Intelligence Center CENDRO. See Planning Center for Drug Control Center for Research and National Security, 156-157, 161-162 Chamber of Deputies, 85, 106; and policymaking, 4-5, 17, 18, 146, 156 Charros cartel, 158 Chiapas, 57-58, 121 Chihuahua, city of, 60-61, 161 Chihuahua, state of , 57-58, 118, 120, 121, 130; offensive against DTOs in, 2, 151, 154-155; violence in, 5, 55, 56, 59 Chile, regional comparison, 8, 10, 20-22, 33, 35-38, 41, 43-44 Cifra negra. See black number CIPF. See Federal Police Intelligence Center

CISEN. See Center for Research and National Security Citizen Institute for Studies on Insecurity, 55-61, 64-65, 66, 69, 100, 107, 160; See also anticrime NGOs Citizen security, 10-11, 14, 19-23, 198; vs. human security, 7; in Colombia, 193; in Latin America, 8, 48, 86; and the Merida Initiative, 169; vs. national security, 5; Peña Nieto policy, 80, 86, 182, 187, 199, 200; public perceptions of, 4-5, 66, 78, 86; role in the security trap, 10-13; strategy, definition of, 144, 148 Ciudad Juárez, 2, 60-61, 75, 76, 77, 79, 184-185; offensive against DTOs in, 154-156, 173 Civil disobedience, 25-27 Civil Force of Nuevo León, 156 Civil society: response to organized crime, 66, 74-79, 86, 93, 95, 9698, 103, 107-109, 116, 144-147, 148-150, 155, 164, 182, 183, 184185, 187, 194-196; role in the security trap, 7, 9-13, 21, 25-26, 27-28 Clientelism, 10, 13, 19, 37, 185-186. See also party-electoral system Coahuila, 55, 56, 57-58, 106 Cocaine, transshipment of, 14, 90, 118, 124-133, 137, 146 Colima cartel, 120 Colima, state of, 57-58 Colombia: comparison with Mexico, 135, 185, 186, 188-190, 192-193, 195; and cooperation with Mexico 152, 199; and drug trafficking, 126, 131, 132; lessons learned, 78, 167, 173, 181-182, 187-196; regional comparison, 20-22, 35, 37-38, 43-44, 79, 86 Colombianization, 5; 187-196. See also Colombia Common crime, 52, 53, 81, 86, 8788, 91-92, 119, 183, 196, 197199; perceptions , 53, 56-66; rates, 54-55; role in the security

Index 227

trap, 63-74. See also crime continuum Competitive state-making, 7, 27-28, 80, 96, 146-153, 194 Coordinated Operation Chihuahua. See Joint Operation Chihuahua Corruption: criminal gangs, 92-95, 119, 130, 133-137, 146, 190; Calderón’s strategy against, 143, 145, 149, 161, 198;exposure, 79; and informality, 44; and kidnapping, 100-103; security forces, 20, 31-33, 92, 133-135, 146-149, 154, 158, 204; and the security trap, 3, 5, 7-9, 9-13, 17, 25-28, 85-88, 92-95, 98-99, 115116, 182-183, 195; and tax avoidance, 36 Costa Rica, regional comparison, 8, 10, 20, 35-38, 43 Counterfeit goods, 9, 32, 42, 44-46, 48, 150 Crime, gap between perception and reality, 56-63. See also fear of crime Crime continuum, 52, 88-92, 119, 183, 196, 197-198 Criminal business process, 89-90, 93 Criminal collective, 89-90, 93-94, 117, 125-126 Criminal macro network, 89 Criminal procedures code, 167 Crusade against Crime policy, 149 Cuernavaca, 1, 60-61, 121 Culiacán, 59, 60-61, 75 Decentralization of Mexican political system, 97, 118, 125, 145, 147, 171, 185-186, Decriminalization of drugs, 6 de la Garza, Lucas, 115 Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Special Investigations on Organized Crime, 159, 162, 166 Democratic governance, 9-12, 200201; in Colombia, 187-188; and DTOs, 116, 123-124, 136-137; and security trap, 25-27, 31-34, 86-88, 99, 182; and perceptions of crime, 51-52, 63-74, 80

DFS. See Federal Security Directorate Dirty war, 6, 149; in Colombia, 193194 Drug-trafficking, 123-136 Drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs): confrontation with the state, 1-3, 5, 145-146; diversification of activities, 46, 75; finances, 131-133; history, 117-119; and kidnapping, 86, 89, 99, 101, 103, 106; organization, 119, 122; role in security trap, 7, 10, 14, 92-93, 116, 133-136; and trafficking , 124-126; terrorist tactics, 2, 92-93, 162, 171, 191. See also alpha groups; beta groups; criminal groups; gamma groups; organized crime; territory-bound organized criminal groups DTOs. See drug trafficking organizations Dual transition, 13-15, 51, 144 Durango, 55, 56, 57-58, 120, 130 Ebrard, Marcelo, 108 Ecuador: party system, 17-18; regional comparison, 8, 10, 2122, 41 El Salvador, regional comparison, 8, 10, 41, 68 El Paso, 76, 92, 127 Ensenada, Baja California, 45 Enterprise crime, 86, 88-90, 92, 95, 99, 105, 121, 136 Equity contract, 34 Escape routes, 9, 182-187, 196-201 Esparagoza Moreno, Juan José, 120 Extortion: as enterprise, 103, 142; and criminal groups, 2, 8, 14, 75, 107, 120-122, 144, 183, 198; and informal markets, 42; and Peña Nieto, 146, 200; as protection, 86, 89, 92, 136; perception, 67, 196; rates, 56, 59, 159; role in the security trap, 24, 51 Extradition, from Mexico to the U.S., 172, 200

228

Index

Familia, la, 46, 78, 104, 118, 121, 146 FARC. See Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Fear of crime, 9, 52, 53-74, 86, 93, 99-105, 109; and migration, 76; responses , 75-79. See also crime, gap between perception and reality Federal Forces, 158, 163 Federal Investigation Agency, 155, 163 Federal Minsterial Police, creation, 158 Federal police, 2, 47, 98, 104, 108, 118, 144, 144-145, 150, 153-156; and Calderón’s security strategy, 173-174, 191, 196-197; recommendations, 167, 198, 200; reform, 156-161, 173-174, 182, 186-187 Federal Police, 153, 155, 157-159, 158-159, 161, 165, 183, 186-186, 197-198, 200; creation, 157-158 Federal Police Intelligence Center, 162 Federal Preventive Police, 2, 149, 157, 158 Federal Security Directorate, 117, 156 Félix Gallardo, Miguel Angel, 117118 Fernández de Ceballos, Diego, 105, 108 Flor gang, 108 Fox, Vicente, 5, 17, 118, 145, 157, 162 Gamma groups, 119, 121-122, 133, 135; definition, 92; and trafficking, 125, -128, 130; See also criminal groups; drugtrafficking organizations; organized crime; territory-bound organized crime groups García Luna, Genaro, 132, 156-158, 198 Gendarmerie, 186-187, 197 Green Party, 4, 6 Guadalajara, city of, 47, 60-61, 76

Guadalajara cartel, 118 Guanajuato, 57-58, 104 Guatemala: and drug trafficking, 127128, 135; regional comparison, 8, 10, 20, 35, 38, 41, 43, 44, 68, 86; security cooperation, 152, 167, 199 Guerrero, state of, 46, 57-58, 106 Gulf cartel, 97, 106, 115, 118, 120, 121 Guzmán Loera, Joaquin “El Chapo,” 118, 120 Hardened democrat, 64, 67, 68-69, 74 Hardened statist, 12, 67 Heist. See, levantón Heroin, 123, 124, 131, 132, 137, 146 Hidalgo, 57-58 Home invasion: perception , 75; role in the security trap, 51 Homicide rate: in Latin America, 8, 53-54, 190; in Mexico, 54-55, 62, 66-67, 155, 184, 190; perception, 67, 104; role in the security trap, 24, 35, 51 Honduras: and drug trafficking, 127; regional comparison, 10, 20 Human rights, 7, 153; abuses in Colombia, 191, 193-194; activism, 6; and Merida Initiative, 169; policy debate, 5; role in the security trap, 9, 26; state violation, 120, 147-149, 155 Human security, 7 ICESI, See, Citizen Institute for Studies on Insecurity Iluminemos Mexico, 108, See also anti-crime NGOs Impunity: and kidnapping, 99, 102, 104, 107-109; and the Merida Intiative, 168; and the security trap, 8-11, 19, 33, 52, 66, 79, 8586, 182 Income tax, 39-41 Informality, culture of, 15, 19-20, 32 Informal markets: definition, 32-33, 41-43; and DTOs, 14, 15, 103, 124, 136; measurement, 43-47; and private security firms, 78;

Index 229

role in the security trap, 9, 13, 24, 26-27, 33-34, 48-49; and tax evasion, 48 Institutional Revolutionary Party, 4, 5, 6, 17-18, 19, 118, 146, 174, 197; and Enrique Peña Nieto, 6, 136, 146, 182; and government hegemony, 13-14, 16, 34, 79, 9697, 118, 144, 161-162, 188 Intelligence, 6, 121; and Calderón’s security strategy, 150-152, 156159, 161, 163-164, 182, 197; and Colombia, 187, 191, 193, 194; and corruption, 27, 195; of DTOs, 26, 77, 96, 125, 183; operational, 167, 163-165; services, 5, 134, 157-158, 162-163, 163-165; strategic, 167; tactical, 92, 155156, 167, 163-164; and the United States, 165, 170, 172, 193 Inter-agency relations, 146, 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 171-172, 187, 192193, 196-197 Internal drug market, 2, 14, 16, 75, 129-132, 133, 134, 183 International cooperation against organized crime, 152, 167-173, 192, 193, 199-200. See also Colombia; Guatemala; United States of America Intimidation: and DTOs, 5, 88, 93, 96, 132-135, 137; role in the security trap, 7-9; as a tactic, 2426 Iztapalapa, 47 Jalisco, 57-58, 200 Jalisco-Nueva Generación cartel, 121 Joint Operation Chihuahua, 154-156 Joint operations, 55, 148, 150-151, 153-156, 161, 167 Journalists: accounts of crime 116, 119, 123, 124; rights in Mexico, 79; role in the security trap, 9 Juárez cartel, 118, 121, 133 Juárez, city of. See Ciudad Juárez Judicial system, 53, 93, 157; and Calderón’s security strategy, 3, 148, 150-151, 158-159, 164-167, 173, 186-187, 195-198; in

Colombia, 193; and corruption, 27-28, 87-88, 93, 134; and DTOs, 140; perception , 20-21, 70-74; reform, 17, 19-20, 150, 151-152, 158, 165-167, 168, 186-187; role in the security trap, 9, 11-12, 1415 Kidnapping: and Calderón’s security strategy, 6, 144-145, 149-153, 158-162, 165, 174, 204; in Colombia, 190; and DTOs, 14, 75, 86, 89, 99, 103-105, 120121; in Mexico, 85-109; and Peña Nieto, 146, 196, 207; and public perception, 51-52, 67, 7576; rates , 55, 56, 59, 62-65, 105107; recommendations, 198-200; role in the security trap, 24, 86, 109; types, 90, 100-102, 105; and vigilantism, 78, 105 Kidnapping, express, 90, 100, 101. See also kidnapping Kidnapping for ranson, 99, 101, 102105, 107. See also kidnapping Kidnapping, political, 105-106. See also kidnapping Kidnapping, virtual, 91, 100, 101, 107. See also kidnapping LAPOP. See Latin American Public Opinon Project Latin American Public Opinion Project, 8, 69-70, 73-74 Latinobarómetro, 8, 20-22, 35-37, 73 Lazcano Lazcano, Heriberto, 120 Levantón, 100-102. See also kidnapping Levers of change, 182-187 Liberal democrat, 67, 73 López Obrador, Andrés Manuel, 3, 6, 17, 108, 145 Madrid, de la, Miguel, 16 Marginalized indifferent, 66-67 Marijuana: cultivation , 46, 128, 137; market, 14, 123, 124, 128-131, 146 Martí Haik, Fernando, 108 Matamoros, 154

230

Index

Media, 146; effect on perception, 3, 12, 17, 53, 59, 64, 65-66, 102, 107-109, 124; and information about criminal groups, 119, 122123, 133-134; reporting on corruption, 141, 149; targeted, 2, 83, 116; See also, journalists Mediated effects: of DTOs, 124; of public perception, 31; of tax evasion and informality, 32 Medina Mora, Eduardo, 132, 157; resignation, 4, 158 Merida Initiative, 152, 167-173 Methamphetamine, 124, 32 Mexicali, 60-61, 128 Mexico, city of, 47, 52, 55, 56, 5963, 66, 68, 78, 107-109, 121, 121, 182-183 Mexico, federal district of, See Mexico City Mexico, state of, 5, 56, 57-58, 62-63, 106, 121 Mexican drug market, See internal drug market Michoacán, 2, 4, 46, 57-58, 93, 106, 118, 120, 121, 146, 151; offensive against DTOs in, 154156 Migrants: and drug trafficking, 129; kidnapping, 99, 102, 105 Milenio cartel, 118, 120 Miranda de Wallace, Isabella, 159 Modes of interaction between the state and criminal groups, 93-99 Money laundering, 88, 90: and DTOs,77, 122, 124, 127, 131133; role in the security trap, 24; and state confrontation of DTOs, 32, 151-152, 158, 169, 198 Monterrey, 2, 3, 57-58, 64, 66, 75, 78, 79, 118, 155, 173, 185, 191 Morelos, 1, 46, 57-58 Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad, 184-185. See also anticrime NGOs Naranjo, Oscar, 199 National Action Party, 4, 5, 6, 17, 18, 19, 78, 85, 105, 108, 115, 118, 144, 146, 174, 197

National Development Plan, 152-153 National and Integral Strategy against the Crime of Kidnapping, 159 National Pact for Security, Justice, and Legality, 150, 159, 184 National Planning and Intelligence Center, 162 National Public Security System, 53, 156, 160, 161, 190, 196; Law of, 150 National Security Program, 150, 152 National Southwest Border Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 170172 Naval Intelligence Unit, 163 Naval Secretariat, 154, 164-165 Navy: and the army, 134, 148; and Calderón’s security strategy, 155, 156, 163-164; and corruption, 134. See also, armed forces Nayarit, 57-58, 133 Neo-liberalism, 15, 34, 51 Network theory, 90 Nicaragua, regional comparison, 33, 68 No-reelection, 4, 18, 144-145, 185 Nuevo Laredo, 2, 75 Nuevo León, 2, 3, 4, 57-58, 115, 116, 118, 156, 197 Oaxaca, city of, 60-61 Oaxaca, state of, 57-58, 106 Obama, Barack, administration, 169170 Oil: theft of, 45, 103. See also, resource curse Opium trade, 14 Oral trials, 166, 198 Organized crime, 86, 91, 92, 96, 98, 196-199; state response, 143-179, 171, 173-174; See also alpha groups, beta groups, crime continuum, criminal collective, criminal business process, criminal groups, criminal macro network, drug-trafficking organization, gamma groups, territory-bound organized crime group Organized crime law, 165-166

Index 231

Pacífico Sur cartel, 121 Pacific cartel. See Sinaloa cartel PAN. See National Action Party Paraguay: and border issues, 92; regional comparison, 10, 79 Party-electoral system, 10, 14-15, 1719, 52, 74, 80, 109, 144; reform, 185-186, 187 Party of the Democratic Revolution, 3, 4, 6, 17, 18,19, 96, 108, 115, 145, 174 Path dependence, 13 Peña Nieto, Enrique, 182, 184, 190; announced policies, 88, 86, 146, 181, 186, 187, 196-201; and Pact for Mexico, 186; recommendations, 174, 196-201; victory, 6, 17, 136 Perception of crime. See crime, gap between percepton and reality Peru: party system, 18; regional comparison, 8, 10, 33, 34, 35-39, 41, 43-44 Petroleum. See oil, theft of; resource curse PFP. See Federal Preventative Police PGR. See Attorney General’s Office Pirated goods. See counterfeit goods Plan Colombia, 169, 189 Planning Center for Drug Control, 161 Platform Mexico, 150, 158, 162-163, 197 Police, 12, 18; and avoidance/evasion, 47, 104; in Colombia, 193, 196, 198, 205;confrontation with DTOs, 2, 92, 103, 115-118, 144, 145, 153156; and corruption, 5, 9, 42-44, 47, 79, 93-99, 102, 103, 105-108, 109, 122, 125, 130, 133-134, 136, 137, 195; delayed reform , 19-20, 149-152, 156-161, 165-167, 173, 182, 186-187, 196-198; and human rights, 147, 155; and intelligence, 161-165; and levantón, 100-101; and political system, 18; and PRI hegemony, 117-118; and private security firms, 77-78; perception , 20-23,

67-79, 86, 88, 89, 148; role in the security trap, 9, 14, 24-28. See also, federal police; police-justice system Police-justice system, 1, 5-7, 144, 189; assessment, 146-149; and confrontaiton with DTOs, 77, 9697; and corruption, 11, 31, 33, 86-87, 103, 116, 134-137; delayed reform, 6, 14-15, 19-20, 27-28, 79, 169, 183, 1860187; and levantón, 100-102; perception, 10-11, 17, 20-23, 52, 64- 66, 69-74, 109. See also, police, judicial system Political settlement, 14-15, 33-34 Populism, 13-17, 33-41, 144 PRD. See Party of the Democratic Revolution Presidentialism, 80, 147 PRI. See Institutional Revolutionary Party Private security firms, 12, 53, 66, 7778, 101, 105, 145, 162, 181 PSFs. See private security firms Public perception of crime. See crime, gap between perception and reality; fear of crime Public services: and Calderón, 152; role in the security trap, 5, 9, 198; and tax evasion, 31-33, 34-35 Puebla, 57-58 PVEM. See Green Party Querétero, 57-58, 108 Quintana Roo, 56, 57-58, 133, 151 Reconfigured cooptation, 194-195 Resistencia, la, 121 Resource curse, 16, 33-41, 48 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 188-189, 190, 194, 195; and alleged li nkes with Mexican DTOs, 106 Robbery: and criminal groups, 136, 183, 198; percption , 67, 69, 86, 92, 196; rates , 54-56, 59, 62-63; role in the security trap, 23, 24, 27, 51

232

Index

Rule of law: and the Merida Initiative, 169; public support for, 68; role in the security trap, 1012, 15, 52

Statecraft, 3, 190 State policy, 1, 19, 191 Stolen goods, 45-46 Synthetic drugs, 14

Salinas, Carlos, 16-17, 118 Samper, Ernesto, 1, 189 San Diego, 76, 92, 104, 123 San Juan de Dios Market, 47 San Luis Potosí, 57-58 Secretariat of Government, 196-197 Secretariat of National Defense, 154, 155, 163-164 Secretariat of Public Security, 3, 149, 154, 156-159, 162-163, 174 Security trap, 31-33; and argument, 13, 25, 27-28; and democracy, 85, 87; in Mexico, 1, 5, 144, 181182, 200-201; nature of, 7, 8, 9; symptoms of, 9 SEDENA. See Secretariat of National Defense Sedition, 24, 26 Self-defense groups, 77-78, 122, 145; in Colombia, 78, 189, 190-191, 193-194, 195. See also vigilantism SEGOB. See Secretariat of Government SEMAR. See Naval Secretariat Seriality, 188-190 Sicilia, Javier, 1 Sicilian mafia, and similarities to territorial gangs, 88-89, 199 SIEDO. See Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Specialized Investigations on Organized Crime Sinaloa cartel, 97, 98, 103, 118, 119, 120, 123, 126 Sinaloa, state of, 54, 55, 57-58, 118, 120, 130, 136 Smuggled goods, 45 Social services. See public services Sonora cartel, 120, 121 Sonora, state of, 54, 57-58, 130 SNSP. See National Public Security System SSP. See Secretariat of Public Security

Tamaulipas, 2, 3, 57-58, 97, 115, 118, 120, 130, 151, 154, 197 Tax avoidance. See tax evasion Tax compliance, 33-36 Tax evasion, 31-33;and capital flight, 50;and enterprise crime, 88; and informality, 43-44, 48; in Mexico, 34-41; role in the security trap, 9-11, 15, 23-24, 27, 48 Tax expenditure, 39 Tax morale, 32, 34-35 Television, 59, 64, 65-66; See also, media Tepito neighborhood, 47 Tequila crisis, 16 Territorial gangs/groups, 97; definition, 88-92; and kidnapping, 99, 102-105; and trafficking, 116. See also beta groups; criminal groups; drugtrafficking organizations; gamma groups; organized crime Terrorism: and Calderón, 191; and Colombia, 190-191; definition, 24, 26; DTO use of tactics, 2, 9293, 96, 135-136, 171; and the United States, 168, 171 Terrorist groups: contrast with DTOs, 92, 105; cooperation with DTOs, 117, 135-136 Tijuana cartel, 106, 118, 121 Tijuana, city of, 5, 46, 60-61, 75-76, 78, 92, 97-98, 103-104, 123, 134, 154-156, 173, 184, 199 Tlaxcala, 57-58 Todos somos Juárez, 184. See also anti-crime NGOs Toluca, 60-61 Treason, 24, 26 Treviño Morales, Miguel, 120 Tunnels, 123, 129 Undersecretariat for Strategy and Police Intelligence, 162

Index 233

UNI. See Naval Intelligence Unit Unified command, 198 United States of America, 97; and Colombia, 190; comparison with Mexico, 43, ; drug flows to, 14, 123-131, 145-146, 206; migration to, 76-77; and security cooperation, 152, 167-173, 199; spillover of Mexican crime, 99, 120 Uribe Vélez, Álvaro, 189-191 Uruguay, regional comparison, 8, 10, 20-22, 34-38, 43

Vetting centers, 159 Victimization, and support for democracy and rule of law, 5152, 63-74 Victimization surveys, 8, 53, 55-63, 87, 107 Vigilantism: and kidnapping, 101, 104-105; in Mexico, 70, 75, 121, 145; perception, 70, 71-73; role in the security trap, 24, 26, 66. See also private security firms; self-defense groups Violentology, 194

Valley of transition, 147-148, 173174 Value-Added Tax, 39-40 VAT. See Value-Added Tax Vázquez Mota, Josefina, 6 Venezuela, regional comparison, 8, 20-22, 79 Veracruz, 57-58, 105, 106, 122, 154, 155, 156

War tax, 185, 190 Yucatán, 54, 57-58 Zacatecas, 57-58 Zapatista movement, 17, 109, 135 Zetas, los, 46, 97, 100, 103, 104, 118, 120, 121, 122, 126

About the Book

What kind of democracy will emerge in Mexico when the current levels of violence are brought under control? Will democratic reformers gain strength in the new equilibrium between government and criminal organizations? Or will corruption tilt the balance toward criminal interests? In the context of these questions, John Bailey explores the "security trap" in which Mexico is currently caught—where the dynamics of crime, violence, and corruption conspire to override efforts to put the country on a path toward democratic governance. John Bailey is emeritus professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University. His most recent books include Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas and Transnational Crime and Public Security: Challenges for Mexico and the United States.

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