The Political Process in Canada : Essays in Honour of R. MacGregor Dawson [1 ed.] 9781442615083, 9781442651357

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THE POLITICAL PROCESS I N CANADA Essays in honour of R. MacGregor Dawson Edited by J. H . AITCHISON The influence of the late R. MacGregor Dawson on political thought in Canada is still with us and will, indeed, be with us for a long time to come. It is fitting therefore that a book should be conceived in his honour and that this book should reflect the high qualities of analysis and writing that he inspired in his many students. A l l the contributors to this volume, except Professol Clokie who is Professor Dawson's generation, were his students in Saskatchewan or Toronto; all provide articles of interest and importance for a most useful volume on the political process in Canada. There are eleven essays, covering many aspects o f Canadian political life. From a historical study of the federal government's relations with the press, we move to consideration of the early ballot and the "swings" in federal elections. The next four essays are devoted to various topics connected with the general theme o f political parties, and the next three to some problems of federation, including an account of the federal government's administration of the North. Professor Clokie's contribution, "Political Retrospect," provides a suitable closing chapter. PROFESSOR J. H. AITCHISON, editor of the volume and a contributor to it, is Head of the Department of Political Science at Dalhousie University.

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THE

POLITICAL PROCESS IN CANADA

Essays in Honour of R. MacGregor Dawson

EDITED BY

J. H. Aitchison

University of Toronto Press

© UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS 1963

Printed in Canada

PREFACE

IT WAS WITH THE DESIRE to honour the late Professor R. MacGregor Dawson that the University of Toronto, and in particular the Department of Political Economy and the University of Toronto Press, invited me to undertake the preparation of a volume of essays written by some of his former students. Professor Dawson had been from 1936 professor of political science at the University of Toronto. At the time of his death he was on leave of absence from the University, engaged in writing the biography of W. L. Mackenzie King. He had brought great distinction to the University of Toronto. For me it was a great honour to be asked to edit a volume of essays in Professor Dawson's memory. Dawson had once been my teacher; he remained to the time of his death a dear friend and valued colleague. I owed him much, as did a great number of other Canadian scholars, many of whom, like myself, had once had him as their teacher. All of the essays in this volume, with one exception, are written by former students. The essay by Professor Clokie fittingly brings the volume to a close; Clokie and Dawson, then two young Canadian political scientists, one a graduate of the University of Saskatchewan and the other of Dalhousie University, began their teaching careers together at the same university in the United States. At the time when Dawson, freshly returned from graduate work at the University of London, sought a university appointment in political science there were few such openings in Canada and it was at Rutgers University that he began his long and distinguished teaching career. But his primary interest remained in Canada, in the study of the Canadian political process, and at the earliest opportunity he returned to the

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Preface

country, accepting an appointment as professor of political science at the University of Saskatchewan. From there he moved to the University of Toronto. R. MacGregor Dawson was no philosopher of politics. His Nova Scotia upbringing had not only endowed him with a voice able to rise above the roar of the sea; it had given him an over-powering interest in the way governments and political parties operate in real life. He knew well the system of government of the United States—while at Rutgers much of his teaching had to do with this system—but he remained always a staunch and enthusiastic admirer of the British parliamentary system. In his teaching, the government of the United Kingdom provided him with some of his most telling examples of the working of the parliamentary system, but his research interest remained strongly directed to the study and understanding of the political institutions of Canada. The Civil Service of Canada, Constitutional Issues in Canada, The Government of Canada, and William Lyon Mackenzie King indicate by their very titles where his absorbing interests lay. The Development of Dominion Status could not have been written entirely in Canadian terms nor could The Principle of Official Independence', but the latter, his first major work, was written, characteristically, "with particular reference to the political history of Canada." It is fitting, therefore, that the essays in this volume, diverse in character though they are, should all deal with aspects of the political process in Canada, past or present. Dawson's own scholarly interest provides a unifying theme, a feature not always possessed by volumes of essays in honour of renowned scholars. His scholarly output is his own enduring monument. How enduring it is, is indicated by the extent to which his earlier works dominate discussion when the question arises today of issuing reprints of Canadian political studies. Everything he wrote was very much of a piece. Though his greatest interest perhaps was in the operation of the cabinet and in the relationship of the cabinet minister to the senior civil servant, it extended out to include the role of parties in the political process, the structure and functioning of the two legislative bodies, and the relationship of the federal to the provincial governments. A growing interest in provincial forms of government was only strengthened by the work he did as a one-man Royal Commission for the government of Nova Scotia. His contribution to Canadian scholarly life reached far beyond his published work. No teacher was more demanding than he and none was more able to bring out the best in his students. As an undergraduate teacher he was highly popular and at the same time a little frightening.

Preface

vii

As a graduate teacher, his enthusiasm knew no bounds and few students could escape the feeling of exhilaration which came from working under his direction. He was one of those who could communicate his enthusiasm via the printed page; he wrote, as he talked, with gusto. He did much to develop post-graduate studies at the doctoral level in the University of Toronto. Six of the essays in this volume were written by scholars who did their doctoral theses under his direction. Some of his students later became his colleagues, and, as colleagues, came to owe as much to him as they had owed as students. One of the more eminent of his former students wrote: "I feel both a desire and a duty to participate in a tribute to Dr. Dawson." Forty years ago the state of political science in Canada was such that R. MacGregor Dawson had to go outside the country to secure a teaching appointment in this field. The very considerable strengthening of Canadian work in political science in the years since is very largely owing to his efforts. A special survey in political science which he undertook for the Social Science Research Council of Canada provided him with an opportunity to press upon university authorities the need for paying greater attention to the claims of this social science and he made the most of his opportunity. When he felt his cause was a good one, no one could be a more vigorous champion. We who have joined together in the writing of this volume will not quickly forget his warm friendliness, his generous interest in our lives and careers, his unstinting praise of our work when he thought it good and his severe criticism when he thought it bad, his prodding of the lethargic, his encouragement of the diffident, his booming voice, and the gusto with which he faced life. We would like to think that he would not have considered the following essays entirely unworthy of him. I am deeply indebted to Dean Vincent W. Bladen who suggested that I be the editor of this volume. Throughout its preparation he and Professor S. D. Clark have been unstinting in giving advice and assistance. I owe many thanks, also, to the officers of the University of Toronto Press and particularly to Mr. Marsh Jeanneret and Miss Francess Halpenny. To these and to the contributors I am very grateful. Publication was made possible by a contribution from the Publications Fund of the University of Toronto Press. J.H.A. Dalhousie University

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

V

CONTRIBUTORS

xi

The Press and the Patronage: An Exploratory Operation NORMAN WARD

3

The Ballot in the British North American Colonies JOHN GARNER

17

The Democratic Process at Work in Canadian Federal Elections J. MURRAY BECK

36

s. D. CLARK

64

PAUL w. FOX

79

M. s. DONNELLY

99

Group Interests in Canadian Politics Early Socialism in Canada The Political Ideas of J. W. Dafoe

The Paradox of Power in the Saskatchewan C.C.F., 1944-1961 EVELYN EAGER

118

The Evolution of Territorial Government in Canada Interprovincial Co-operation in Canada

R. G. ROBERTSON

136

J. H. AITCHISON

153

Legislative Power to Implement Treaty Obligations in Canada Political Retrospect

W. R. LEDERMAN

171

HUGH MCD. CLOKIE

182

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CONTRIBUTORS

j. H. AITCHISON, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia j. MURRAY BECK, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario s. D. CLARK, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario H. MCD. CLOKIE, Petaluma, California M. s. DONNELLY, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba EVELYN EAGER, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan PAUL FOX, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario JOHN GARNER, Carleton University, Ottawa w. R. LEDERMAN, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario R. G. ROBERTSON, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Ottawa NORMAN WARD, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

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THE

POLITICAL PROCESS IN CANADA

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The Press and the Patronage:

N O R M A N WARD

An Exploratory Operation

"AT THAT TIME, in the history of the world," Principal G. M. Grant wrote of the first decades of the nineteenth century, "it was almost impossible to be an editor without being a politician also."1 Grant was writing of Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia, but in terms of both time and persons his generalization has a far wider application. Some editors tarried so short a time before they abandoned the field for politics that their days among the scribes are almost forgotten: Alexander Mackenzie with the Lambton Shield, David Mills with the London Advertiser, W. S. Fielding with the Halifax Morning Chronicle, David Laird with the Charlottetown Patriot. Others left an enduring mark on a paper, or a region, or an era: Brown of Ontario and the Globe, Bowell of Ontario and the Belleville Intelligencer, Anglin of Saint John and the Morning Freeman, Sifton of Manitoba and the Free Press, Davin of everywhere and the Regina Leader, de Cosmos of British Columbia and the Daily British Colonist, Chapleau of Quebec and La Minerve. An important handful avoided elective politics and chose the public service: Griffin of the Mail, who became Parliamentary Librarian; de Celles from Quebec, who did the same on the French-speaking side of the library; Bourinot, who founded the Halifax Herald and ended as Clerk of the House of Commons. The foregoing is but a sample from a list so long that it suggests that journalism once vied with the practice of law as a stepping-stone to the assumption of power. The connection between journalists and politics meant more than that scribes became Pharisees. "It is but justice here," the president of the 1G. M. Grant, Joseph Howe (Halifax, 1904), p. 2.

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The Political Process in Canada

Canadian Press Association observed in 1868, "to refer to the able and united assistance rendered our efforts in this matter [postal rates on newspapers] by the editors who have the honour of seats in Parliament. They were prompt and untiring in their opposition to the bill until it was modified to suit thef*r just demands."2 As the quotation suggests, newspapers were not only amenable to the law in sundry ways, but also in a strong position to do something about it. There are, indeed, a multitude of ways in which the law can affect the periodical press, and thus a multitude of places in which influence can be useful. A tariff or a sales tax on anything used in the printing of newspapers, for example, can affect circulation or costs adversely, and may even discriminate between types of periodicals, as numerous editors and publishers have complained since before Confederation. When the Postmaster General announced in 1897 his intention of reimposing a postal rate on newspapers, which had passed free through the mails since 1886, the Canadian Press Association, after some division and grumbling, decided to accept the new postage, "but favoured a rearrangement of the tariff on printers' supplies as a condition indispensable to the re-imposition of postage." In 1923, faced with an increased sales tax on newsprint, a representative committee of publishers waited upon the government and, after one rebuff, "succeeded in obtaining the passage of an order-in-council which reduced the sales tax by 50 per cent." This partial exemption lasted until 1931, and saved the publishers, on their own estimate, $1,500,000.3 Direct monetary considerations are not the sole preoccupation of newspapers; there are other areas of legislation and regulation which interest their proprietors and editors. The monotony with which the Senate of Canada has declined to pass bills that would oblige newspapers to disclose their ownership is well known. The provision of a free press gallery in Parliament (for which a small staff of clerks is provided at public expense) is so taken for granted that it is not now popularly regarded as involving a parliamentary favour for the press, but rather the contrary. When the House of Commons proposed in 1914 to delegate its power over newspaper postal rates to the postmaster general, representatives of the press vigorously opposed the change and the Senate refused to pass the offensive legislation; at its next annual meeting the Canadian Press Association entertained a resolution expressing its "deep 2 A History of Canadian Journalism in the Several Portions of the Dominion with a Sketch of the Canadian Press Association, 1859-1908, edited by a committee of the Association (Toronto, 1908), p. 98. 3 See ibid., p. 100; and W. A. Craick, A History of Canadian Journalism (Toronto, 1959), vol. II, pp. 190 and 206.

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5

gratitude to those members of the Senate of Canada who rendered valuable assistance to the officers of this Association in their fight for retaining the control of newspaper postal rates in the hands of Parliament," but after debate discreetly dropped it.4 By far the most important of the non-economic legislative interests of newspapers concerns the libel law. The significance of libel law as a potential instrument of control over newspapers could hardly be more clearly demonstrated than by the fact that in Britain until the early eighteenth century "any criticism of the government was held to be a libel," which the Post Office "was forbidden to circulate and ordered to detect."5 Even where the state was not a party, endless libel suits could be encouraged by stringent legislation, and the law has complicated the life of many Canadian journalists. Joseph Howe succeeded in turning to his own advantage a suit arising from his publicized opinion that the magistrates of Halifax in the 1830's were guilty of neglect, mismanagement, and corruption; but a libel suit in 1854 over a similar matter contributed to the demise of the Lambton Shield, which Alexander Mackenzie was editing, and William Lyon Mackenzie consoled his colleague with the intelligence that "for many years the knaves in authority in this infant colony harassed me almost to death with libel suits."6 It is hardly surprising that on numerous occasions Canadian newspaper proprietors and editors have shown as lively a concern over the libel law as over postage rates. None of the foregoing evidence of the need for newspapers to maintain a continuing curiosity about many aspects of law and government is so interesting as the irrefutable evidence of a subsidized press in Canada until well after Confederation. Professor Aspinall, in his detailed study of the relations between the government and the press in Britain down to 1850, has itemized a number of ways in which political parties, in and out of power, influenced both the contents and the distribution of newspapers.7 Among these the following have the most direct relevance to Canada: the expenditure of secret service money; government advertising; purchase of subscriptions; direct payments to journalists; places and pensions for journalists; assistance from the Post 4 Craick, History, II, chap. xn. See also debates in the Parliament of Canada, 1914, on Civil Service Act (Post Office) Amendment Bill. 5 Kenneth Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1958), p. 51. 6 Grant, Joseph Howe, p. 50; William Buckingham and George W. Ross, The Hon. Alexander Mackenzie, His Life and Times (5th ed., Toronto, 1892), pp. 118-20. 7 A. Aspinall, Politics and the Press, c. 1780-1850 (London, 1949).

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The Political Process in Canada

Office; and official intelligence for friendly newspapers. Since so many Canadian journalists and politicians came from Britain or took their cue in public behaviour from British precedents, the translation to Canada of many of these practices was a natural process. Certainly Professor Aspinall's conclusion that "the great majority of the London newspapers accepted subsidies either from the Government or from the Opposition, and were tied in various other ways to party organizations,"8 has its Canadian counterpart. The president of the Canadian Press Association, addressing his colleagues in 1878, tacitly admitted as much: In another important respect the press of Canada has made remarkable progress. It has, we may say, nearly altogether got from under the control of the politician. We mean by this, that a paper now-a-days very rarely, and to a very small appreciable extent, depends for its existence or support on any individual or party . . . Government advertising has come to be largely a business arrangement, and it is right that it should be so. It is no longer looked upon as the means of bolstering up a weakly sheet, and is scarcely thought of by the publisher in his estimated revenue. . . . Scarcely one can now be found who is mean enough to go around hat in hand begging for support, or who will so debase his profession as to play the sycophant to some political magnate for a few dollars.9

The quotation, though true in its emphasis on the growing independence from politics of newspapers, is none the less at least as much an expression of pious hope as of fact. It was several years after the speech was made that the Toronto Daily Mail (towards whose founding Sir Charles Tupper has said he "had to contribute $500"10) so displeased its Conservative sponsors that they forthwith founded another and more sympathetic journal, the Empire, and the Mail lost all its government advertising.11 Much later, in 1902, John Willison, who was originally suggested for the Globe's editorial chair by Laurier,12 left the paper because he found irksome the continuing necessity to please, or at least refrain from displeasing, supporters and leaders of the Liberal party, even though the Globe was by that time financially independent of the party. "The Globe owes the Liberal politicians nothing," he wrote to his friend Clifford Sifton nearly two years before his resignation. "The ., p. v. ^Quoted in A History of Canadian Journalism, etc., p. 89. Tupper to John Willison, May 21, 1903, quoted in A. H. V. Colquhoun, Press, Politics and People: The Life and Letters of Sir John Willison (Toronto, 1935), p. 118. n See, in Reports of the Auditor General of Canada for relevant years, the annual statements of governmental expenditures on advertising. 12 Laurier to Willison, June 26, 1890, quoted in Colquhoun, Press, Politics and People, p. 27. 10

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1

Liberal politicians do not contribute one dollar to its support. They hold little of its stock. They receive, however, absolutely without fee or reward the service of one of the very best newspapers in Canada. I think I could prove to you that within the last five years between three and four hundred thousand dollars of party money, or what amounts to party money, has been put into Liberal papers in Canada, and every cent of these investments The Globe as a purely commercial property has had to fight."13 The direct and indirect influence of parties and politicians on the founding and maintenance of newspapers (the most recent example of which at the national level appears to be Mackenzie King's unsuccessful sponsorship of a Liberal organ in Ottawa in 192314) is one of the better known aspects of the connection between journalism and politics, and needs little expansion here.15 Equally overt, because they involved legislation, have been the direct subsidies from the state to the press in general, which are worth mentioning here because they emphasize the differences between state subsidies to the press as such, and state or party subsidies to individual newspapers. During the First World War, for example, Western Canadian newspapers petitioned the Dominion government (through a deputation) to assume, in the national interest, "the cost of a state-owned or state-controlled telegraph line from Ottawa to Winnipeg . . . available for the free transmission of news between East and West for twenty-four hours a day." Somewhat to their surprise the regional prayer became national, and thanks to the earnest interest of politicians in the dissemination of news, the petitioners received more than they asked for.16 For some years prior to this grant a separate subsidy (though it came to be covered by the same item in the government's Estimates) had facilitated the transmission to certain papers of the services of the Canadian Associated Press. Both grants were teriswillison to Clifford Sifton, Jan. 29, 1901, ibid., p. 98. M. E. Nichols, (CP) : The Story of the Canadian Press (Toronto, 1948), p. 15 175; Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1923, p. 4728 (hereafter Debates). For another little-known example, see the correspondence between Sir John A. Macdonald and J. A. Chapleau over the plight of La Minerve, in Macdonald Papers, Public Archives of Canada, vol. 205. "The assistance you said you would try and get for the paper is most needed," Chapleau wrote in 1887; and in 1890, "How can you support a strong association when all the resources of the party are sacrificed to feed two hungry newspapers?" See also Alexander Mackenzie to George Brown, Nov. 14, 1877 (Mackenzie Papers, Queen's University) for an instance in which a party was unable to support its paper because none of the party's leading members were solvent. 16 Nichols, (CP), pp. 128-30. "In preparation of the petition to the Government," Mr. Nichols wrote, "there was discreet avoidance of the ugly word *subsidy', or its somewhat less comely next-of-kin, 'government grant'." 14

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minated in 1924, by an interesting coincidence just after Mr. King's sponsorship of a Liberal organ had collapsed when the projected paper failed to receive a Canadian Press franchise.17 It will be seen from parts of the foregoing that an energetic newspaper lobby, assisted on occasion, on the one hand, by the presence of former and continuing newspapermen in Parliament and, on the other, by a wholesome respect on the part of politicians for the possible consequences of overly aggravating the press, has been in existence for many decades. Many of its activities are public knowledge and have been written about by newspapermen, not one of whom has used the term "lobby" or "pressure group" as a succinct way of characterizing any of the associations being described. The relations between the press and the government become somewhat more obscure when one begins to examine some of the more roundabout ways of subsidizing and otherwise supporting newspapers. It is now impossible, for example, to discover how Sir John A. Macdonald used parliamentary grants for secret service money, though one is tempted to speculate since Sir John's own accounting was extremely unsatisfactory,18 and Professor Aspinall has recorded in detail how secret service money was used to subsidize newspapers in Britain.19 Fortunately there is an abundance of other material to demonstrate that even in the unlikely event that all Canadian secret service money was spent properly, newspapers could obtain public funds in other ways. "Conservative papers were liberally dealt with in getting official advertisements," the official history of the Canadian Press Association reports, "the Government check often paying the paper maker."20 One James Moylan, who conducted a newspaper in the Conservative interest, actually anticipated official advertisements by publishing them on his own initiative, subsequently submitting bills to the various departments. "Mr. Moylan's paper received strong support from the Government," Sir John A. Macdonald averred in 1878, "and the matters he advertised I knew would be cheerfully paid for by the heads of the different Departments."21 Mention has already been made of the disciplining of the Toronto Mail by the withdrawal of government advertising after it had offended ^Debates, 1923, pp. 4727-9; Nichols, (CP), p. 175. See Norman Ward, The Public Purse: A Study in Canadian Democracy (Toronto, 1962), chap. iv. 19 Aspinall, Politics and the Press, chap. HI. 20 A History of Canadian Journalism, etc., p. 179. 21 Canada, House of Commons, Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1878: First Report. 18

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the administration. The actual allocation of official advertising among newspapers from 1883 to 1929 can be found in the relevant reports of the Auditor General of Canada, for after the House of Commons' public accounts committee showed an interest in the subject in 1882, the Auditor General promptly provided a complete list of advertising costs, and the statement did not disappear from his report until the general financial reorganization that came with the choice of R. B. Bennett as Prime Minister in 1930. The sample in Table I of statistics on official TABLE I FEDERAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES IN Two NEWSPAPERS, 1883-88 AND 1895-1900 Fiscal year

Mail $

1883-4 1884-5 1885-6 1886-7 1887-8

1,279 1,297 1,241 3,623 2,590

5 —11 56 37

1895-6 1896-7 1897-8 1898-9 1899-1900

2,744 907 — 5 5

— 1,765 2,205 2,530 3,123

Globe $

advertising, wholly typical of practices that prevailed until at least the First World War, hardly needs comment; the first series covers five years of Conservative administration, the second a change to the Liberals. By modern standards the amounts are small, but they were far more significant for the comparatively small newspaper circulations of the period, when a few dollars in official advertising could mean even more to a small rural or weekly paper than to an urban daily. In any event, advertising could be, and often was, supplemented by contracts for job printing: the Regina Leader, for example, received only $340 for advertising in 1888-9, but over $6,000 for printing. The same Moylan cited above importuned the Hon. A. Campbell for assistance for his paper in 1872: "A few thousand dollars worth of printing is a small thing in your Department, yet it would go far to assist me, and through me the Government."22 The practice of awarding printing contracts to supporters was so widespread, indeed, that when in 1877 the Speaker of the House of Commons was found to be holding a contract and was thus ineligible to sit in Parliament his defence was that "everybody did it." 22

Moylan to Campbell, July 15, 1872, Campbell Papers, Archives of Ontario.

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The Political Process in Canada

The practice of favouring only sympathetic newspapers, wherever possible, with advertising and printing became institutionalized to such an extent that by 1905 the Laurier government was printing a confidential booklet listing the newspapers with whom the King's Printer was permitted to deal, supplemented by a form letter beginning: "The Secretary of State has added to the list of newspapers authorized to receive Government patronage. . . ,"23 It is perhaps not without significance that in 1916 Sir John Willison, who knew whereof he spoke, told Arthur Meighen: "In office the Liberal party made its press strong. It supported its newspapers with extraordinary energy and complete organization. As a result Liberal newspapers became strong alike in circulation and in advertising patronage .. ,"24 Allied to advertising and job printing as patronage is the purchasing of subscriptions. Successive Auditors General have been less generous in providing data about subscriptions than about advertising and printing, and the single fiscal year for which complete data are available, 1887-8, during which $20,535 was spent on periodicals, indicates that while the government usually purchased at least one subscription to every journal available it naturally favoured its supporters. In Halifax, for example, it expended $240 on the Herald, but only $93 on the Chronicle^ in Montreal, $586 on the Gazette and $268 on La Minerve, and but $61 on the Star, in Saint John, $196 on the Sun, but nothing on the Freeman. In Toronto an unusual situation existed, for the government bought as many Globes as Mails, possibly because it could not afford not to keep abreast of the Globe. These statistics for a single year are admittedly inconclusive, for 1887 was an election year and purchases of subscriptions may have been abnormally high. There is nothing inconclusive about a letter from J. B. Plumb, a member of Parliament from 1874 until his appointment to the Senate in 1882, who in the latter year advised Macdonald that Bengough, the celebrated cartoonist of Grip, was not very "reliable"; Plumb intended to warn Bengough to behave himself or release Conservatives from their subscriptions to the magazine.25 Equally established is the patronage of the Ottawa Times. Before 1875, when a semi-official Hansard was begun, the Conservative government bought altogether several thousand bound volumes of the Times' parliamentary reports, which were excellent; in 1872 and 1873 the Queen's Printer also pro23See Laurier Papers, P.A.C., #98840 and #92477. 24 Willison to Meighen, July 27, 1916, Willison Papers, P.A.C., #21450. 25Plumb to Macdonald, Aug. 23, 1882, Macdonald Papers, P.A.C., vol. 387, p. 374.

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vided the Times with free storage for volumes of the unofficial Hansard, at the paper's own risk.26 Alexander Mackenzie's Liberal government, it is to be noted, did not purchase the Times' reports for the second parliamentary session of 1873, or the regular session of 1874. With governments having favourites among newspapers in sordid commercial traffic, it is but natural that they should also have their favourites when it came to releasing news. Willison perceived that as a parliamentary correspondent he was in fact a Liberal scout in a Conservative camp, and he felt his position so keenly that he found it necessary to obtain his superiors' permission to dine with Sir Charles Tupper. He has recorded his own problems in the 1880's: "It was difficult, if not impossible, to secure information from the public departments. All appointments and statements of policy were reserved for the party organs. Very often the correspondents of friendly journals had access to blue books and returns before they were submitted to Parliament. Thus their despatches would be in the telegraph office before less favoured rivals could examine the reports."27 Edward Blake complained to Macdonald in 1883 that even members of Parliament on the Liberal side were not getting their share of blue books, and that in constituencies represented by government supporters blue books "reach no one in Opposition."28 Martin Griffin, while editing the Mail, introduced his parliamentary correspondent to Sir John A. Macdonald in 1882 by bespeaking for him "a measure of your confidence," and in 1883 asked Sir John for points from the Speech from the Throne, "so that we can make the customary article hinting at the contents."29 By the turn of the century, thanks largely to the efforts of Willison with the friendly co-operation of Laurier, the practice of giving sympathetic journals a priority on news was dying out, and the Globe's Ottawa man was able to write that "there are some antiquated people around here who seem to imagine that a paper supporting the Government . . . should never publish ministerial information until it is told to do so. My idea on the other hand is to publish information as soon as I can do so. . . ."30 The favouritism that marked the dissemination of information also carried over into the treatment accorded journalists. For many years the 26Brown Chamberlin to Macdonald, ibid., vol. 301, pp. 220-32 (several letters). 27 J. Willison, Reminiscences: Political and Personal (Toronto, 1919), p. 121. ssfilake to Macdonald, Feb. 17 and 22, 1883, Macdonald Papers, vol. 188, p. 166. 29Griffin to Macdonald, Feb. 2, 1882, ibid., vol. 381, p. 523; Feb. 1, 1883, ibid., vol. 391, p. 8. 3( >W. H. Dickson to Willison, Nov. 21, 1901, quoted in Colquhoun, Press, Politics and People, p. 71.

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The Political Process in Canada

curious custom whereby members of Parliament regularly gave themselves trunks full of stationery, cutlery, leather goods, hardware, and other bric-£-brac was extended by parliamentary courtesy to include the press gallery, though whether on a non-partisan or a discriminatory basis is not revealed by the records. Having failed during the long session of 1903 to wrest any concessions from the Speaker on the floor of the House in regard to another matter, several members petitioned the Speaker for a special bonus from the public treasury for members of the press gallery, at first suggesting $500 each but on mature consideration settling for "a suitable grant." The Speaker forwarded the petition to the Prime Minister, who agreed to present it to the Privy Council, "but I can make no promise." No item to cover this largess appears in the relevant Estimates, but the flexibility (to use a charitable term) of public accounting in several branches of the government was then such that it may well have been distributed. In any event, what is really remarkable about the episode is that it occurred to members of Parliament at all to pay a substantial subsidy to the gentlemen of the press, and that the Speaker and the Prime Minister considered the proposal so seriously.31 There is abundant evidence that journalists received places on the public payroll, both to subsidize current journalistic enterprises, and to reward writers for past services. Few editors ended up as snugly as Martin Griffin of the Mail, who privately told Sir John Thompson in 1882: "What my fate is to be, I have no idea yet; but I look to be the Librarian at Ottawa, a position that will greatly suit me. . . . My pockets are full of flattering letters from the Cabinet since the last campaign."32 (Griffin had to wait for his plum, as the incumbent librarian, Alpheus Todd, inconsiderately lingered on until 1884.) Nicholas Flood Davin received a more fleeting reward in 1884: having founded the Regina Leader in the Conservative interest at considerable trouble and expense, he successfully sought official assistance in the form of the secretaryship of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration. The Prime Minister defended his choice in a letter including these words about the West: "From the depressed state of things there the paper does not pay and I fear he will be obliged to close it. Now it is of some importance to the government to be able to keep that paper going and Davin's employment will give him some very needful pecuniary assistance."33 There is no ^Debates, 1903, pp. 14114-15, 14242; Marcil to Laurier, October 19, 1903, and Laurier to Marcil, October 21, 1903, Laurier Papers, #77970-2. 32Griffin to Thompson, July 21, 1882, Thompson Papers, P.A.C., #2977. 33Macdonald to Chapleau, July 8, 1884, Macdonald Letterbooks, P.A.C., vol. 22. See also Norman Ward, "Davin and the Founding of the Leader," Saskatchewan History, vol. VI, no. 1, Winter, 1953, pp. 13-16.

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The Press and the Patronage

13

evidence to suggest that the appointment of John W. Dafoe to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations in 1937 or that of Mr. Grattan O'Leary to the Royal Commission on Publications in 1960 rested on similar considerations. None of the numerous instances of individual newspapermen receiving public positions and funds are so striking as the practice, which prevailed for many years after Confederation, of staffing the House of Commons at least partly with journalists who had the confidence not of Parliament but of the government. While serving as sessional clerks, these men also acted as their papers' Ottawa correspondents. Numerous letters in Macdonald's correspondence indicate that journalists expected appointments to the parliamentary staff almost as a matter of right.34 When a leading Liberal member, David Mills, asserted in 1879 that "it should not be tolerated that gentlemen connected with the press, who were here for the purpose of representing hon. gentlemen opposite, should be employed at the public expense, under the designation of sessional clerks, for the purpose of advocating the views and acting as the exponents of hon. gentlemen on the Government benches," he was met with the inevitable tu quoque: the Liberals, Sir John A. Macdonald said, had done it too.35 An interesting by-product of this custom was that the Opposition not only had no confidence in the parliamentary staff; they also had no clerical or stenographic assistance, since the clerks worked only in the "public," i.e., the Government's, interest. As late as 1891 the Clerk of the House, John Bourinot, objected to assigning clerks to the Opposition's service, on the grounds that "their duties are to be political and personally confidential, and not for the public service in the true sense"; any clerks given to the Opposition, he suggested, should not be considered as being regularly on his staff, "as is the case of those employed in the rooms of the Conservative Whips."36 Though the view still lingers that the assistance to be permitted the Opposition must be limited in ways that do not apply to members on the Treasury benches, most of the kinds of patronage described above have either all but disappeared or profoundly changed their form. Increasing circulation, and the rise of newer and more lucrative forms of advertising, have freed the press from its ancient reliance on political (and patent medicine) insertions. The decline in the number of newspapers, combined with the development of news-gathering associations (and par34

See, e.g., A. Rowe to Macdonald, Jan. 28, 1884, Macdonald Papers, vol. 92, p. 339; W. Dingman to Macdonald, April 1, 1884, ibid., p. 402; J. White to Macdonald, April 10, 1887, ibid., vol. 93, p. 35. ^Debates, 1879, pp. 1542-3. 3 «Bourinot to Thompson, March 9, 1891, Thompson Papers, #18650.

14

The Political Process in Canada

ticularly the Canadian Press), has obliged newspapers to assume in their news columns an impartiality that is not yet found on all editorial pages. A handful of newspapermen and politicians, led by Willison and Laurier, began as early as the 1890's to foster the theory that a good newspaper reported the news, and a good government supplied the news to all newspapers. In some ways, indeed, the past half -century has seen political reporting turn full circle: newspapers now object to "press releases" handed out impartially by governments, preferring to get the news in their own way, while the governments are free to buy any amount of advertising space, on a strictly business basis.37 In recent times, newspapers that felt that they were not getting their fair share of the business have even been known to complain—not, it must be emphasized, about being patronized by the state, but about not being patronized in a nondiscriminatory manner. In other ways, the traditions of subsidizing the press are still with us. It is still the custom, for example, for journals to charge more for political than for commercial advertising. It is not only custom, but law, for periodicals, including newspapers, to pass through the mails at a charge lower than is sufficient to pay for the service provided. The history of newspaper postage rates has been told elsewhere, and needs no recapitulation here.38 What emerges from the history is that periodicals (including newspapers), whether the postage was paid by subscribers or publishers, have always been carried through the mails at a subsidized rate, and still are. In July of 1960 the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts, in one of the latest of a long series of comments from many sources on the postage rates paid for periodicals, cautiously reported: "The Committee was informed that the handling of second-class mail was estimated by the Post Office Department as having cost $28,000,000 in 1958-9 (up $4,000,000 from 1956-7) while revenues were $6,000,000 (the same as in 1956-7) . . . The Committee is disturbed at the annually increasing cost of handling second-class mail. However, having in mind the desirability of continuing to assist the distribution of Canadian publications, the Committee recommends that the Department review the problem to the end that a more realistic policy be adopted."39 3?See the unanimous resolution adopted by the Canadian Daily Newspaper Association in 1951, in Craick, History, II, 247. 38 See, e.g., William Smith, The History of the Post Office in British North America, 1639-1870 (Cambridge, 1920); A History of Canadian Journalism, etc.; Craick, History, II. 39 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Minutes of Proceedings, 1960, no. 15, p. 526.

WARD

The Press and the Patronage

15

To the periodical press, a "realistic policy" has always included the fiction that favourable postage rates did not constitute a subsidy. The official history of the early Canadian Press Association goes so far as to refer to postage charges on newspapers as a "grievance."40 Those sections of the Auditor General's report which refer to second-class postage rates have never received from the press the same attention as, say, the annual "deficits" of sundry public enterprises. On the other hand it might be expected that if the subsidized postal rate, instead of assisting in the distribution of newspapers and periodicals, were to assist, say, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the newspapers would be among the first to call it a subsidy and to see that it was conscientiously brought to the public's attention. But, as Professor Currie has recently written, "The loss on newspapers and periodicals, which seems always to have existed in the Canada Post Office, has been justified on the ground that these publications promote national unity, provide political information, and are the most popular medium of adult education and entertainment."41 Newspapers, and politicians supporting them in Parliament, have always liked to refer to the newspaper postal rate as "a tax on knowledge." Whether it is or not (and in 1898 the proprietor of the Toronto Telegram, John Ross Robertson, turned on his fellow publicists to argue in the House of Commons that even coal oil has an educational aspect, for it provided light, and "newspapers without coal oil would have no more educational value than coal oil without newspapers"42), it is clear that the protective attitude towards the press which it involves no longer depends on the same factors that once governed it. Until after the turn of the century (it is difficult to give a precise date), when even small cities and towns were supporting several newspapers, the splendid variety of patronage described above could always be defended on the ground that many small dailies and weeklies genuinely needed help. Some of this help, in one form or another, continues; the recent Royal Commission on Publications noted that "rural newspapers . . . when published in any place with a population of not more than 10,000, enjoy free postage to the extent of a circulation of 2,500 copies to regular subscribers and newsdealers residing within a ^A History of Canadian Journalism, etc., p. 95. For parliamentary comment and further figures on newspapers carried by mail, see, e.g., Debates, 1898, pp. 5520 ff.; Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1958, pp. 355 ff.; Craick, History, II, 205. 41 A. W. Currie, "The Post Office since 1867," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. XXIV, no. 2, May, 1958, p. 248. ^Debates, 1898, p. 5551.

16

The Political Process in Canada

distance of 40 miles from the place of publication"; and recommended the extension of a similar, though broader, privilege to non-profit cultural and "little" magazines.43 The Royal Commission on Publications unfortunately excluded the daily press from its considerations, and thus we do not have the benefit of its astute observations on topics such as those surveyed in this essay. The Commission did, indeed, go so far as to state in general terms that successive Canadian governments, through "careful regulatory and protective mechanisms," have provided national policies of support for several industries; but "such has not been the case with publishing, which, though measurably more important to the nation than the others, has avoided government interference."44 The generalization would seem to require substantial qualification. The subsidy on second-class mail alone has cost the taxpayers over the years an unknown but undoubtedly large number of millions of dollars. Further, its leading beneficiaries today include some periodicals of a type not even thought of when the subsidy was first employed to assist small newspapers and magazines struggling with vast problems of communication and distribution. The Post Office is now obliged to provide services of a type not contemplated when second-class mail was first subsidized;45 "it is estimated," the Royal Commission on Publications observed, "that nearly $6 million of the 1960 deficit in second class operations resulted from American publications mailed and postage paid in the United States."46 But even in Canada the subsidy has its anachronistic aspects: its continuance in its present undiscriminating form suggests that while the daily press, at least, has long since emancipated itself from dependence on partisan and official favouritism, parties and governments have not yet emancipated themselves from the press. 43 Royal Commission on Publications, Report (Ottawa, 1961), pp. 90-1. "Ibid., p. 7. 4 5See, e.g., Debates, 1955, pp. 4135-7. 46 Royal Commission on Publications, Report, p. 87.

The Ballot in the

•

JOHN GARNER

British North American Colonies

A HALIGONIAN, scanning the pages of the Acadian Recorder of July 25, 1857, would, among the advertisements for puncheons of molasses from the West Indies, wine from Madeira, and tea from Hindoostan, have noted with wry amusement the following: ELECTIONS sometimes attended with disastrous circumstances, a blow results in a cut or wound received from an opponent, and is proportionally severe and serious as the depth and length are deep and wide; for the purpose of healing those wounds and all others, such as scalds, cuts, sores, has Redding's Russia Salve been prepared. It is sold at 25 cents a Box by most country stores, and by all vendors of Patent medicines.

At this distance in time, it cannot be ascertained if this advertisement brought the apothecaries of Halifax an increase in sales; but it is certain that many Nova Scotians had personal experience of the physical as well as the verbal abuse associated with elections. The elections in Nova Scotia, as in the other British North American colonies, were characterized by a rowdy enthusiasm which, abetted by money and bountiful supplies of liquor, often degenerated into brawls. Add to the foregoing ingredients personal, racial, or sectarian rivalries, and the brawls could acquire spectacular proportions. To illustrate the atmosphere surrounding colonial elections, the following three extracts have been drawn (in recognition of Robert MacGregor Dawson's robust affection for his native province and the frailties and foibles of his countrymen), from Nova Scotian newspapers of the time. The first, a report of a Shelburne election, was carried in the July 4,

18

The Political Process in Canada

1829, issue of the Acadian Recorder and illustrates the zest which characterized colonial elections. Early the next morning the town began to exhibit a much more animated scene than that of every day. About 8 o'clock several sails of schooners, shallops and boats were seen entering the harbour, which on their arrival were found to be crowded with freeholders. At 10 o'clock Mr. Barry set out for the Court House from the residence of Mr. Charles Roche about which a large concourse of people had collected. Preceded by music and the display of colours, supported by a number of friends, and surrounded by a large portion of the inhabitants, he was received at the Court House door with a discharge of cannon amid loud and enthusiastic cheerings of the populace. The second is a letter from an irate reader to the Novascotian of January 11, 1837, in which, outraged by the "hospitality" afforded the electors, he called upon the Nova Scotian public to reflect, for one moment, on the drunkery which Mr. Stewart kept in Amherst where the fiddle played night and day, and which exhibited a continued scene of the most disgusting and brutal excess; at the exhibitions at the hustings; to which his myrmidons hurried the miserable wretches reeking from his open house, the sink of abomination; their sense stupified by intoxication. The electoral zest ceased at times to be playful and culminated in a first-class donnybrook. A correspondent of the Acadian Recorder of October 2, 1830, relates, for our third example, such an episode at an election at Pictou in that year. We arrived in Pictou at 12 o'clock at the time the poll commenced and drove through the town. A strong party with the flags of Messrs. Blackadar . . . appeared, armed with bludgeons as thick as a catstick, and seemingly determined to crush everything before them. I was well pleased to see the opposite party towards the afternoon, in a body, respectfully standing by our boarding house, without a stick in their hands. Blackadar's party came along, the others gave them half the road, and they passed by. Having gone a few yards they returned by a street below and came up a short street opposite the standing party when the war commenced, and such a confusion I never saw; one poor man was knocked down and beat when down, carried home, and died at two o'clock. The Reverend Messrs. M'Kenzie . . . were seen haranguing the Kirk party, and telling them that their Kirk was in danger if Archibald . . . were elected . . . The poll commenced this morning when the Kirk party took possession of the hustings and kept it till the steamboat arrived from East River with about 300 voters, who formed themselves into a close column about 15 in front and came up with a determination to get to the hustings when a desperate combat took place. I got on to the hustings which is erected outside the Court House and I saw the poor fellows fall in every quarter from the blows of sticks . . . I fear, before it is ended, that there will be more fighting.

GARNER

The Early Ballot

19

The above episodes must not be taken to mean that all elections were intemperate and riotous; but such elections were sufficiently common that there was always some agitation for the adoption of reforms that might induce sobriety and order in these contests. Reforms that were proposed and in some cases adopted, ranged from the subdivision of constituencies into a multitude of polling subdivisions, the multiplication of penalties against corrupt practices, the introduction of simultaneous elections, the creation of voters' registers, to the adoption of vote by ballot. This last reform, although sought and agitated for in all the British North American colonies, was only adopted during the colonial period for parliamentary elections in one colony, New Brunswick. The other colonies were content to continue to use viva voce methods to record the votes of electors, although several of them did introduce the ballot into their municipal elections. The ballot advocated during the colonial period was not the ballot as it is known in Canada today. The present Canadian ballot is the Australian ballot which was first adopted in the state of South Australia in 1858. The Australian ballot is an official paper, uniform in size, colour, and texture, on which is printed the names of all candidates in a specific electoral contest; printing and distribution is arranged at public expense; and it is accompanied by a polling procedure designed to secure secrecy. The ballot, as understood by the colonists of British North America, was a slip of paper which an elector deposited in a ballot box after he had written or printed on it the name of the candidate of his choice. The colonial governments did not undertake the responsibility of providing an official ballot. The movement for the ballot in the British North American colonies can be assigned to two periods: the decade of the 1830's and the decade of the 1850's. These two periods coincided with upsurges of agitation in Great Britain for the adoption of the ballot. While there were, as previously indicated, ample incidents to justify an independent campaign by colonial reformers, the colonists were so accustomed to fashioning their agitation on the reform patterns current in the Mother of Parliaments that the course of agitation for the ballot in the colonies exactly parallels the agitation in England. Nova Scotia and Upper Canada, alone of the colonies, had additional periods in which the adoption of the ballot received some support. In Nova Scotia this period preceded the American Revolutionary War and in Upper Canada the War of 1812. In 1759 the Nova Scotia Assembly approved the ballot by resolution and in 1775 adopted it by bill, and when the Legislative

20

The Political Process in Canada

Council refused to concur, the Assembly included a request for the ballot in a petition to the King.1 The members of the Assembly appear to have been primarily interested in copying the political forms of their place of origin, the colony of Massachusetts, where the ballot had been in use since 1636 in the election of deputies to the General Court (Assembly) of the colony.2 When the influence of New England in Nova Scotian political life disappeared with the American Revolution, references to the ballot also disappear from Nova Scotian records; they reappear only when the agitation surrounding the First Reform Bill brought the ballot to the fore in English politics. Prior to the 1830's the Upper Canada agitation for the ballot was, as far as records reveal, confined to the year 1812. In that year four identical petitions reached the Assembly from townships in Leeds, Grenville, and Frontenac counties requesting the adoption of the ballot in order to terminate the undue influence and intimidation of electors at the polls.3 These petitions came from an area which had been sending over the years a series of reformers to the Assembly (men such as Buell, editor of the Brockville Recorder, and Peter Howard) and which had close contacts with upper New York State where vote by ballot had been extended to municipal elections three years before. The short life of what appears to have been the beginnings of an organized campaign for the ballot may be attributed to the outbreak of hostilities with the United States in the summer of that year. No further agitation for the ballot is heard until 1831 when Buell and Howard, members for the County of Leeds introduced a ballot bill into the Assembly.4 By this time the agitation for the ballot in England had made respectable a reform until then blighted by the Yankee stigma. The agitation in England had been sparked by Jeremy Bentham and his disciples, the Philosophical Radicals. In 1817 Bentham had published A Plan of Parliamentary Reform in the Form of a Catechism and in 1819 had published a Radical Reform Bill, both of which had *Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Journals, Feb. 13, 1759, June 16, July 11, 1775. See also N.S., Unpassed Bills, 1775, "An Act for regulating elections of members to serve in the General Assembly of this Province, and for the preventing irregular proceedings of the Provost Marshall, Sheriffs and other officers, in electing and returning such members and for other purposes therein mentioned," Public Archives of Nova Scotia; and "An Address of the Assembly to His Majesty June2 24, 1775," P.A.C., N.S. A94 11. E. C. Evans, A History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States (Chicago, 1917), p. 1. 3Upper Canada, Legislative Assembly, Journals, Feb. 18, 27, 1812, and the Colonial Advocate, Oct. 17, 1833. 4 U.C., Ass. /., Jan. 12, 18, 1831, and Kingston Chronicle, Feb. 5, 12, 1831.

GARNER

The Early Ballot

21

advocated universal suffrage, equal representation, annual parliaments, and vote by ballot.5 Following these publications the organ of the Philosophical Radicals, the Westminster Review, had carried during the 1820's and 1830's article after article in favour of the ballot. This campaign had the effect in the 1830's of enlisting two London newspapers, the Morning Chronicle and the Examiner, to the support of the ballot and of giving a popular cast to the agitation. The result was the inclusion of the ballot in the first draft of the Reform Bill prepared for the Grey Administration by the "Committee of Four" chaired by Lord Durham.6 While the ballot had to be dropped from the Reform Bill at the insistence of the King, the war of pamphlets continued and during the remaining years of the decade a motion or bill in favour of vote by ballot was annually introduced into Parliament by George Grote, member for the City of London.7 In the 1840's, in face of the vigorous campaign to secure repeal of the Corn Laws, the agitation for the ballot declined. Following the repeal of those laws, the agitation revived and in 1853 the proponents of the ballot banded together to form the Ballot Society. The society was patterned after the Anti-Corn Law League and under its aegis the agitation for the ballot reached a new height. Immediate success was, however, to elude the society. Public and parliamentary attention was to be diverted by the Crimean War, the American Civil War, and the agitation for the further extension of the franchise; it was, therefore, not until after the Second Reform Bill in 1867 and the return of the Gladstone administration that a government was elected in England which espoused the ballot. Following the usual investigations by parliamentary committee and the inevitable tussle with the House of Lords, legislation establishing vote by ballot in parliamentary and municipal elections was passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1872.8 As we have mentioned, the agitation in England in the 1830's had released a burst of agitation for the ballot in Upper Canada. The bill that had been introduced into the Upper Canada Assembly in 1831 5

III.

John Bowring, ed., The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh, 1843), vol.

6 Stuart J. Reid, The Life and Letters of the First Earl of Durham (London, 1906), vol. I, p. 234. 7 See Joseph H. Park, "England's Controversy Over the Secret Ballot," Political Science Quarterly, vol. XLVI, 1931, pp. 51-86. 8U.K., Stat., 35-36 Vic. c. 33 (1872). See U.K., Parliamentary Paper, no. 286, on "The System of the Ballot in the Colonies" which was prepared for the parliamentary committee investigating the ballot. U.K., Papers and Accounts, 1871, vol. XLVII, pp. 317-35.

22

The Political Process in Canada

by Buell and Howard, passed second reading, but had failed to be reported from Committee. The debate and divisions on this bill had revealed support for the ballot among Reformers such as Bidwell, Perry, Jesse Ketchum, and W. L. Mackenzie, and opposition from such Family Compact members as Attorney General Boulton, Jarvis, Robinson, and Hagerman. The Reformers had supported the ballot on the grounds that it would reduce intimidation of the electors by the local minions of the Executive Council, the magistrates, postmasters, militia officers, the excise and customs officers, as well as free these officials from the dangers of executive reprisals; that it would reduce what was popularly called the "ledger influence" (the influence of the merchants over their debtors) and the influence of Ogle Gowan and his Orangemen. It had also been alleged that it would reduce corruption, violence, and intoxication at elections and thereby do much to eliminate disputed returns. For in the words of the member for Lincoln (B. C. Beardsley), "Liquor was often given away in large quantities at the elections in this country. He had often seen barrel after barrel distributed among the electors, many of whom were people of weak minds, who were induced to vote for particular candidates merely from being treated in this way."9 The opponents of the ballot had based their opposition on two points: the ballot was un-British, and it was a device unsuited to men of independent and manly virtues; for, as Solicitor General Hagerman had argued, "The viva voce system was more in accordance with the institution of the empire to which we belonged and more congenial to the manly spirit of the British people; and he would not therefore consent to abandon it in favour of the underhand and sneaking system of vote by ballot."10 The arguments for and against the ballot that had been revealed in this debate were essentially the same arguments that were to be repeated on each occasion that the ballot was proposed in any of the colonial assemblies of British North America. The advocates of the ballot saw it as a device to reduce the undue influence exerted on the electors by the executive, by the well-to-do, and by gangs of bullies and ruffians of every description. It was a device of moral uplift, eliminating the corrupting influence of money and drink and restoring to the electors the right to cast their vote as their consciences dictated. As might be suspected, the temperance influence in support of the ballot is seen in every debate and in each colony. Legislators who were temperance advo$Kingston Chronicle, Feb. 12, 1831; for further report on the Assembly discussion see the Canadian Freeman, Jan. 27, 1831. ^Kingston Chronicle, Feb. 12, 1831.

GARNER

The Early Ballot

23

cates could almost without exception be counted among the supporters of the ballot; Buell was himself an officer of the Brockville Temperance Society. The arguments of the opponents of the ballot were equally similar in each colony; the ballot was un-British, it was unmanly, and it was demoralizing. The defeat of the ballot bill in 1831 was only the beginning of intensive activity to secure the adoption of the ballot in Upper Canada. The Reformers used every device to secure their objective. Bills were introduced to secure the ballot in general elections; amendments were moved to bills incorporating towns to require the ballot in their municipal elections.11 When each attempt *was frustrated by opposition in the Assembly, the Reformers turned to the country. Reform meetings began to endorse the ballot, Reform conventions to nominate candidates by ballot, Reform associations to pledge their candidates to support of the ballot; and groups of municipal ratepayers to petition for it in municipal elections.12 The Canadian Alliance Society formed by the Reformers in York in December, 1834, as a political vigilance committee had as one of its objectives the attainment of the ballot; the Colonial Advocate carried reports of the conversion of eminent Englishmen, such as Macaulay, to the support of the ballot; Mackenzie, following his inauguration as the first mayor of Toronto, had the City Council petition the Assembly for an amendment to the city charter to require vote by ballot in civic elections.13 Following the general election of 1834, the Reform campaign for the ballot moved back into the Assembly. The Reformers were determined to use their majority to secure legislation they had long desired, and certain incidents in that election confirmed them in the opinion that vote by ballot was essential. Buell and Howard had been defeated in Leeds in a bruising battle with gangs of Orangemen who had seized the polls and forced all and sundry to vote for the Tory candidates, Attorney General Jameson and Ogle Gowan. The Select Committee on Grievances established by Mackenzie and chaired by him at the commencement of the new Assembly promptly reported a resolution in favour of vote by ballot and the Assembly, on n For a bill designed to secure use of the ballot in parliamentary elections, see U.C., Ass. /., Nov. 20, 1833. For attempts to add the ballot to municipal charters in Kingston, Brockville, and York, see U.C., Ass. /., March 9, 1829, and Feb. 18, 1831; Kingston Chronicle, March 5, 1831; and Colonial Advocate, Jan. 26, 1832; Feb. 13, 1834; and Oct. 2, 1834. ^Colonial Advocate, Jan. 11, March 13, May 31 (Supplement), June 12, Aug. 21, Oct. 2, 1834. 13 See Charles Lindsey, The Life and Times of Wm. Lyon Mackenzie (Toronto, 1862), vol. I, p. 319; Colonial Advocate, Jan. 18, 1834, and U.C., Ass. /., Jan. 19, 1835.

24

The Political Process in Canada

a division of twenty-eight to six adopted the report.14 A select committee was established to draft a ballot bill and within three weeks the Reform majority had carried the bill through every stage in the Assembly and sent it on to the Legislative Council.15 The Tory Legislative Council immediately and without division gave the bill the three months' hoist.16 While the Reform majority made a further and immediate attempt to secure the ballot by incorporating it in special legislation to govern the by-election called in Leeds following the Assembly's voiding the general election in that county, the Legislative Council remained adamant, and that bill was also given the three months' hoist.17 In 1836 the Reformers lost the general election; as they now no longer dominated the Assembly, the proponents of the ballot suffered a major setback.18 But there was yet to come another damaging blow to their cause, this time from the Reformers themselves and not the Tories. Mackenzie incorporated the ballot in the draft constitution for a provisional republican government in Upper Canada which he published in November, 1837.19 The enemies of the ballot were thereby enabled to claim that the words of Ogle Gowan in the Assembly in 1835 were prophetic when, in opposing the ballot bill, he had said: Sir, I will oppose the bill in toto—I think it is an endeavour of the friends of the United States Government to put our institutions on the same footing as theirs, to destroy our principles of government, for I say, the ballot system is hostile to the principles of the British Constitution—it destroys British freedom. . . . The ballot is a sneaking mode of voting, it is an anti-British mode, and never can be brought into operation in this province, and no good man who is a lover of the freedom of elections, and above all, a friend to his country and His King would entertain it.20

The agitation by the English Philosophical Radicals for the ballot had less effect on the people and politicians of the other British North American colonies during the 1830's. In Lower Canada there was no discussion of the ballot in the press or in the Assembly. In Prince Edward Island a petition urging the adoption of vote by ballot did reach the Assembly, but public support was such that the select commit14U.C., Ass. /., March 6, 9, 1835. i*Ibid., March 10, 21, and April 1, 2, 1835. 16U.C., Legislative Council, Journals, April 4, 1835. See P.A.C., Q385.2, p. 370, for a copy of the bill. i^U.C., Ass. /., April 10, 11, 1835, and U.C., Leg. Co. 7., April 11, 1835. igSee U.C., Ass. /., Feb. 13, and Dec. 8, 1836 for further futile attempts to introduce ballot bills. i^Lindsey, Wm. Lyon Mackenzie, vol. II, p. 349. 2Q Brockville Recorder, April 17, 1835. See U.C., Leg. Co. J., 1836, Appendix K, for the Legislative Council's justification of its rejection of the ballot bill in 1835.

GARNER

The Early Ballot

25

tee appointed by the Assembly to consider the petition never reported.21 In New Brunswick a discussion of the ballot was precipitated on the occasion of the Assembly considering in committee a bill to reduce the days of polling to four and the introduction of simultaneous polling in each county.22 The discussion revealed the supporters of the ballot to be few and the leading members of the Assembly to be vehemently opposed to the ballot. In Nova Scotia the press rather than the politicians first promoted the ballot. The Acadian Recorder and the Novascotian both reported at length the discussions in the Imperial Parliament on Grote's annual attempt to secure the adoption of the ballot in British parliamentary elections; and an editorial in the Novascotian in 1833 came out in support of the ballot.23 The press agitation had its impact and from 1836 on petitions to the Assembly and letters to the editor began to appear in favour of the ballot.24 The growing public interest in the ballot led Joseph Howe, editor of the Novascotian, to attempt to secure the addition of the ballot to the Quadrennial Election Bill when that bill was before the House in 1837.25 But in spite of Howe's prestige and following in the Assembly he found his party divided on the issue and in order to avoid the loss of the quadrennial bill he had to sacrifice the ballot. While dilatory attempts continued to be made by individual members to secure the ballot, the close of the 1830's witnessed in Nova Scotia, as in the other colonies, a decline in the agitation in favour of the ballot.26 Undoubtedly the decline in interest was a reflection of the decline in interest in Great Britain, but, in addition, the political attention of the colonies was turning towards the struggle for responsible government; and it was not until this issue had been satisfactorily resolved that interest in the ballot revived. In the British North American colonies and in Great Britain, the 1850's witnessed a renewal of the struggle for the ballot. That decade saw the adoption of the ballot in municipal elections in several of the British North American colonies, its adoption in New 21P.E.L, Ass. /., Feb. 10, March 14, 16, 1835. %2New Brunswick Courier, Feb. 18, 1837. 23 See Acadian Recorder, June 8, Oct. 13, 1832; April 15, 1837; and the Novascotian, Feb. 7, 1833; Aug. 20, Sept. 23, 30, 1835. 24 See N.S., Ass. J., Feb. 15, 1836; Feb. 14, 28, 1838; and the Acadian Recorder, May 6, 1837. ^Acadian Recorder, Feb. 11, 18, 1837. In a letter to Blanchard, M.L.A. for Halifax, Howe as early as 1835 expressed his desire to see the Reform party press for adoption of the ballot. See Howe to Blanchard, Oct. 26, 1835, Howe Papers, P.A.C., vol. VI, p. 2. For Reformers who opposed the ballot see N.S., Ass. /., 1836, Appendix 68. 26 N.S., Ass. /., Jan. 23, 1839; Acadian Recorder, Jan. 26, 1839.

26

The Political Process in Canada

Brunswick, and in the Australian colonies for elections to the legislatures. The agitation for the ballot was first renewed in Nova Scotia and with immediate success. The occasion was the introduction in 1849 of a bill into the Assembly to extend the municipal franchise in Halifax.27 On this occasion Attorney General Uniacke, the nominal head of the Liberal Government and a former opponent of the ballot, was insistent that this extension of the franchise must be accompanied by vote by ballot. The bill sought to confer the municipal franchise on Haligonians who paid taxes on personal property, and Uniacke insisted that the franchise should only be conferred on the "operative classes" after steps had been taken to ensure that such persons would not be subjected to the influence of their employers when they exercised the franchise. While Howe supported the amendment on the grounds that it would remove party politics from municipal elections, he and Uniacke were unable to muster unanimous support for the ballot among members of their party and the amendment was narrowly passed on the support of some leading Conservatives such as Johnston, the leader of that party. Several prominent members of the Liberal party, such as the Speaker and his brother, George Young, opposed the ballot. (The latter opposed it on the theoretical grounds that the franchise was not a private right but a public trust which should be exercised not for the individual's benefit but for the benefit of the public, and that for this reason the public had a right to know how each elector used that trust. It was on this theoretical basis that somewhat later John Stuart Mill was to break with the Philosophical Radicals in England to become an opponent of the ballot.28 However, the Nova Scotian Assembly did approve the ballot for use in Halifax municipal elections and thereby the ballot became a reality for the first time in any municipal or legislative election in a British North American colony.29 The 1849 achievement was the high-water mark of the ballot movement in Nova Scotia. While agitation continued until the issue of confederation pre-empted public attention, all attempts to apply the principle of vote by ballot to legislative elections were unsuccessful. The majority of the members of the Assembly were hostile. In the years immediately after the inclusion of vote by ballot in the Halifax City 27Acadian Recorder, Feb. 10, 1849. See J. S. Mill, On Representative Government (ed., R. B. McCallum, Oxford, 1947), chap, x; similar sentiments to those expressed by Young are to be found in a letter to the editor in the Novascotian, May 16, 1839. 2QN.S., Stat., 12 Vic. c. 14 (1849). 28

GARNER

The Early Ballot

27

charter, its advocacy, strange to say, passed to the Legislative Council where a majority of its members, after observing the effect of the ballot on Halifax civic contests, favoured its adoption in provincial elections. On three occasions in the early 1850's the Legislative Council considered adding the ballot to Assembly bills which sought to extend the franchise. On the first of these in 1851, it finally demurred when a number of councillors felt such a fundamental change in election procedure should not originate in the non-elective chamber.30 Two years later the Legislative Council overcame these scruples and added the ballot to an Assembly Bill which had unanimously passed that body and which sought to establish manhood suffrage,31 but when the Assembly refused to accept the bill as amended, a majority of the Legislative Council was unprepared to shoulder the responsibility of preventing the adoption of manhood suffrage. And in the following year, 1854, the amendment to add the ballot to the manhood suffrage bill was lost on division in the Upper House.32 The agitation for vote by ballot then passed back to the Assembly which was influenced by the ballot campaign of the temperance forces in New Brunswick. In 1855 a petition in favour of the ballot reached the Assembly from the Baptist County of Kings and the junior member for that county secured the introduction into the Assembly of a bill to establish vote by ballot.33 The bill was stifled in a select committee; but a member of the committee, McLelan of Colchester, undertook annually until his death to introduce a resolution in the Assembly in favour of the ballot.34 With McLelan's death in 1858 the advocacy of the ballot ceased in the Legislature of Nova Scotia and was not renewed until after Confederation. While the leaders of the two Nova Scotian political parties, Howe and Johnston, had been favourable to the ballot, there was in each party a knot of prominent men who were resolutely opposed. As there was no great popular response to the agitation for the ballot and as the ballot was not accepted in Westminster, the stand of its opponents In Nova Scotia could not be effectively challenged. The colonial period closed in Nova Scotia with voting by ballot occurring only in the Halifax civic elections. ^Acadian Recorder, April 5, 12, 1851. siN.S., Leg. Co. /., March 26, 1853; see also N.S., Unpassed Bills, 1853, "An Act concerning the Elective Franchise," P.A.N.S. 32 Acadian Recorder, March 11, 18, 1854. 33N.S., Assembly Debates, Feb. 10, 1855; see also N.S., Unpassed Bills, 1854-5 "An Act to establish vote by ballot," P.A.N.S. 34N.S., Ass. /., Feb. 26, 1856, April 2, 1857, and Feb. 8, 1858; see also N.S., Ass. Debates, Feb. 26, 1856, and Acadian Recorder, Feb. 16, 1856.

28

The Political Process in Canada

In New Brunswick the decade of the 1850's opened more auspiciously, largely through the efforts of the New Brunswick Colonial Association, a group of merchants and traders who sought to overcome the depressed state of the New Brunswick timber trade following the repeal of the Corn Laws either by a restoration of their privileges in the British market or independence for the British North American colonies and reciprocity with the United States. Support of the ballot was one of the matters for which this group sought pledges from the candidates for the City and County of Saint John.35 The inclusion of vote by ballot in the programme of a commercial organization would seem unusual and seems to have been a reflection of the all-pervasive temperance sentiment that was sweeping New Brunswick at this time.36 Indeed S. Leonard Tilley, who was treasurer of the Association, was to become in 1854 the Most Worthy Patriarch of the Sons of Temperance in North America. The temperance movement of this period had wider appeal and support in New Brunswick than in any other of the British North American colonies. The proximity of New Brunswick to Maine where the first prohibitory liquor law in America was enacted in 1851, the extent of the New Brunswick timber industry, and the excesses usually associated with lumbermen all aroused widespread interest in temperance. But the New Brunswick temperance movement was different from that in the other colonies in that the movement was supported actively by the churches and clergy of all faiths, and not only by Baptists and Methodists as it was in Nova Scotia. This wider support led to candidates running for public office on a temperance ticket and, in the general elections of 1850 and 1854, New Brunswick presented the unique spectacle of candidates publicly pledging themselves to support a prohibitory liquor law, triennial parliaments, a voter's register, and vote by ballot. The temperance advocates looked on the ballot as a device which would help to reduce the disorders, riots, and treating that characterized New Brunswick elections. When the 1850 general election returned such leading temperance advocates as Tilley and William H. Needham (a Saint John alderman and vice-president of the Saint John Roman Catholic Total Abstinence Relief Society) the Assembly was in a frame of mind to give consideration to reforms advocated by the temperance movement. 3 5See the Chronicle, June 14, 1850 and the New Brunswick Courier, June 8, 1850. 36For a discussion of the temperance movement in New Brunswick see J. K. Chapman, "The Mid-Nineteenth-Century Temperance Movement in New Brunswick and Maine," Canadian Historical Review, vol. XXXV, 1954, pp. 43-60.

GARNER

The Early Ballot

29

In the first session of the new Assembly, petitions were presented to both Houses from the counties of York and Carleton advocating a voter's register, annual parliaments, and vote by ballot.37 The petitions fell on sympathetic ears and when the Assembly was dealing with a bill to establish municipal institutions in the province, the supporters of the ballot moved an amendment to require vote by ballot in the election of parish officers. The amendment was carried by a large majority when the Attorney General, J. A. Street, indicated that the Government would allow a free vote and when John R. Partelow, ranking member of the Government and a former opponent of the ballot, voted for it.38 As the act establishing municipal institutions in the province was an optional act, in that the municipal institutions were only established if a county requested to be brought under the legislation, the inclusion of the amendment did not mean that the election of all municipal councillors in the province need be by ballot. In fact as Carleton, York, and Sunbury were the only counties to avail themselves of the legislation, the ballot was only to be found in the municipal elections in those counties.39 As the Assembly had also added the ballot to a bill amending the incorporation of the City of Fredericton, the ballot came into immediate effect in the municipal elections in that city and was reported to have elected "a most respectable and proper person as Mayor of Fredericton."40 These achievements at the municipal level did not mark, as in Nova Scotia, the end of enthusiasm for the ballot. The leading newspaper, the New Brunswick Courier, came out in favour of the ballot in general elections; petitions continued to reach the Legislature in its favour; Partelow, Provincial Secretary, declared himself for it, and Gray, another Executive Councillor, reported that as the members "had almost unanimously declared in favour of the ballot, the only question was that relating to the details."41 37N.B., Ass. /., March 15, 19, 1851, and N.B., Leg. Co. /., March 26, 1851. **New Brunswick Courier, March 29, 1851. 39N.B., Stat. (Local), 14 Vic. c. 38 (1851). The act became operative in Carleton in 1852, in York in 1855, and in Sunbury in 1856. **Ibid., 14 Vic. c. 15 (1851); Head to Grey July 2, 1851, P.A.C, CO. 188, vol. 205. 41 Afew> Brunswick Courier, Feb. 28, 1852. In the October 4, 1851, issue of the paper, the editor had written that: "As to vote by ballot the public, we think, are quite decided that it ought at once to be adopted. There is no possible reason why it should not. No man has a right to know how another man votes, and its adoption can only be hindered by those who desire, by intimidation or bribery to interfere with the free right of choice of the people. Voting by ballot is practised by every club of gentlemen, and by every private and social company; and open voting, a relic of feudal times and instituted for the purpose of keeping the serf

30

The Political Process in Canada

When the temperance forces in the next session took the initiative from the Government and secured the passage of legislation to prohibit the manufacturing of intoxicating liquors in the province, some of the exuberant members, taking Gray's remark at its face value, informed the Government that unless it introduced legislation at the following session they would do so.42 Notwithstanding Gray's remark, the Executive was sharply divided over the ballot. While Partelow and Gray might favour it, the Attorney General, John A. Street, and the Surveyor General, R. D. Wilmot, were resolutely opposed. The Executive sought by ignoring the challenge to avoid a decision. The proponents of the ballot were not to be so easily put off. The Executive was pressed to declare itself in the Debate on the Speech from the Throne and was further pressed when a request from the City Council of Saint John for an amendment to the city charter to establish vote by ballot in civic elections was before the Assembly; but, by allowing the necessary bill to pass without discussion, they were able to avoid any declaration.43 The Assembly was not to be diverted, however, and when the Executive introduced a bill to amend the election laws which did not contain the ballot, the issue was joined. The proponents of the ballot moved an amendment to incorporate the ballot into the government bill and pressed the amendment to a vote. The Executive, split on the amendment, suggested an open vote, and the amendment carried 18 to 17 with members of the Executive voting both for and against.44 The divided Executive then dropped the election bill and the Assembly prorogued without any further consideration of the measure; but it was mindful of the admonition of the New Brunswick Courier that the issue was regarded as a question of first importance, for it was believed that the bribery, intimidation and drunkenness which now accompany and influence our elections, can only be prevented or lessened by vote by ballot; and as we believe this opinion is universally prevalent, we have no doubt the constituency will watch the opinions and votes of their members with the view of ascertaining who will deserve support at the next election.45 under the influence of his lord, is only retained in political elections, from a love of ancient habit and a fear of change." In the January 3, 1852, issue the editor had expressed the opinion that no party could long remain dominant in New Brunswick which did not adopt a ratepayer's franchise, biennial elections, and vote by ballot. 42N.B., Ass. /., April 6, 1852. ^New Brunswick Courier, Jan. 8, March 5, 26, 1853; and N.B., Stat., 16 Vic. c. 37 (1853). For a report on the first civic election in which the ballot was used see44New Brunswick Courier, April 8, 1854. New Brunswick Courier, March 19, April 16, 1853; also see Chronicle, Nov. 3, 1854. 45March 19, 1853.

GARNER

The Early Ballot 31

While the next session of the Assembly witnessed the receipt of the same series of petitions in favour of the ballot as had its predecessor, the ballot was not to be a serious item of legislative discussion. The temperance forces, chagrined at the failure of the liquor manufactory prohibition bill to reduce intemperance, moved for total prohibition not merely of manufacture but of importation and sale. Strengthened by thirty-two petitions, one of which boasted over twenty thousand signatures, the prohibitionists took the offensive, but the Executive, supported by moderates in the Assembly was successful in substituting for total prohibition a measure limiting the sale of liquor to licensed premises. The Assembly had misjudged the intensity of the prohibition sentiment and in the general election that followed hard upon the close of the session, the Executive and their Conservative followers were defeated in the country. The new Assembly was to establish responsible government, enact prohibition, and adopt vote by ballot. With the ballot incorporated into its election law, New Brunswick could have claimed pride of place in the procession of colonies of the British Crown that were to adopt it, but there were many New Brunswickers who did not take pride in this by-product of a moral crusade. To some the ballot was, of couse, un-British; to others it was as likely to debase as to uplift the morals of the electors.46 Its close association with prohibition made it an anathema to many and was particularly dangerous as the election act incorporating the ballot was not to go into effect until January 1, 1857, by which time the sponsors of the bill could be confronted with the hazards of a general election.47 And so it transpired. The Lieutenant-Governor, alarmed at the calamitous effect of prohibition on provincial revenues, forced the resignation of his ministers and the dissolution of the Assembly. On party labels of "Rummies" and "Smashers" the election was fought and won by the former who immediately convened a special session which repealed prohibition and restored the licensed outlets. The interval between the close of the special session and the next regular session of the Legislature may in all probability be credited with saving the ballot. During that interval the "Rummies" disintegrated and, when the Assembly reconvened, the Government survived a vote of confidence only on the casting vote of the Speaker. They were thereafter not prepared to challenge the ballot. They merely delayed its operation a year in those 4

«See N.B., Ass. Debates, Feb. 24, 1855. 47N.B., Stat., 18 Vic. c. 37 (1855). The operative date of the statute was delayed in order to allow time for the preparation of the voters' registers which had also been authorized by the legislation.

32

The Political Process in Canada

counties where the voters' registers had not been completed;48 in the general election which followed the electors of only five counties, York, Carleton, Sunbury, Albert and Restigouche voted by ballot. The ballot in New Brunswick proved a disappointment to its friends and less disruptive of old election practices than its enemies had feared. The reason lay in the legislation. The Governor-in-Council had been made responsible for the provision of a ballot box and lock at each poll, but no one had been charged with the responsibility of providing the ballots. The statutory admonition that, "Every ballot shall have the names of the persons voted for written or printed on white paper"49 may indicate that the legislators expected the candidates to supply the ballots. Certainly this is what occurred. Enterprising candidates soon organized their workers and ballots bearing the candidate's name were shoved into the hands of electors as they approached the polls. The varying size, shape, and texture of the ballots made secrecy impossible. By the general election of 1861, the first in which vote by ballot was operative in all counties, the Lieutenant-Governor had to confess in his report to the Colonial Secretary that while "this election was the first that had taken place under the new law of ballot; and though I have myself advocated that method of voting; I am bound to confess that, as conducted here, it has wholly failed either to ensure secrecy or to check bribery."50 While some of the friends of the ballot were so disillusioned that they advocated its repeal, others urged that the province should go on to adopt the Australian ballot. The motivation for reform was spent, however, and as the ballot's enemies no longer feared it, nothing was done in that or succeeding generations. Although New Brunswick has since specified the size and texture of the ballots to be used in provincial elections, the onus to provide the ballots still rests on the candidates themselves; and the province that pioneered vote by ballot in British North America retains today the ballot in a most archaic form.51 Considering the lack of any agitation for the ballot in Lower Canada and the popular association of the ballot with disloyal elements in Upper Canada, it was not to be expected that the united Province of Canada **Ibid., 20 Vic. c. 2 (1857). **lbid., Vic. c. 37 s. 35 (1855). 5Gordon to Newcastle (Confidential) Dec. 31, 1862, P.A.C., C.O., 189, vol. 8, p. 262. See N.B., Ass. Debates, May 3, 1865, where a member reports that in a subsequent general election "some ignorant persons got ballots that they supposed were all right, when they were really those of parties for whom they did not intend to vote." siN.B., Rev. Stat., 1952 c. 70.

GARNER

The Early Ballot

33

would be fertile ground for ballot agitation. It was not; but the violence that characterized many elections in that province forced some members of the Legislature and the public to reflect that the ballot might be a means to reduce such violence. In the first general election the violence of the Orangemen in the second riding of York County led the Reform member from the adjacent riding to sponsor a ballot bill in the first session of the Parliament of the Canadas; but it was not until the Fourth Parliament that a sponsor of vote by ballot appeared from among the French-Canadian deputies in the person of Louis Joseph Papineau.52 There had been some petitions to the Legislature in the intervening years for the ballot (usually in municipal elections), but legislators had shown no interest in it either for municipal or provincial elections.53 The ballot did not arouse public interest until Peter Perry, a pre-union advocate, had it accepted as a plank in the platform of the Clear Grits at that party's founding convention at Markham in March, 1850.54 This opened a decade of agitation for the ballot in the Canadas. Municipal bodies, in addition to Toronto and Montreal, began to petition the Legislature for the ballot; Mackenzie, the old rebel, began annually to introduce a ballot bill into the House and was supported, once Papineau had endorsed the ballot, by members of the parti rouge; and the ballot became an item of controversy in the press.55 The agitation did not bear fruit, for both large political groupings, Reform and Conservative, remained unconverted. Support for the ballot was least likely to be found among the Conservative element. Their ultra-loyalist, anti-republican background made them suspicious of any electoral device which was common in the American states but unknown at Westminster. The remarks of the member for Essex, as reported in the Montreal Gazette of August 14, 1841, on the ballot bill introduced into the Parliament of the Canadas in that year may be taken as representative of Conservative opinion. Colonel Prince observed that, if this measure had been introduced by any other than a countryman of his own, he would have felt less astonishment; but that an Englishman, in an English province, should have the temerity to bring forward a measure, so completely hostile to British institutions, was a matter not only of astonishment but of regret. He admitted that, in the Old Country, vote by ballot might in some cases be useful; but if there was 52 Can., Ass. /., June 28, 1841, and Sept. 30, 1852. Mlbid., Aug. 30, 1841; April 6, 27, 1846. ^Examiner, March 20, 1850. 55See Can., Ass. /., May 16, 1853; Oct. 26, 1854; April 28, 1855; Feb. 29, 1856; April 20, 1857; April 9 and May 12, 1858. The counties of Wentworth, Halton, and Peterborough and the towns of Brantford and Peterborough petitioned the Assembly for the ballot.

34

The Political Process in Canada

a country in the world to which such an observation would not apply, it was Canada, where every man was as independent as the lord of the land, and beyond control in the exercise of the election franchise. He would never acknowledge that the Canadian freeholder had any necessity of resorting to this underhand mode of giving his vote; on the contrary, he might go boldly forward to the hustings and defy any human being to injure him if he gave an honest vote. Reform support was more likely. Certain leading members of the party, such as Baldwin and Price, had long indicated their personal support and the Reform party was very sensitive to the political inroads any plank in the Clear Grit platform might make into its natural following. The obstacle to Reform endorsation was the Globe and George Brown. While the Globe and its publisher could envisage the utility of the ballot in Canada East where they saw it as a device which might foil the influence of the priesthood, they saw no need for it among the sturdy and independent yeomanry of Canada West.56 When Brown at the great reform convention in Toronto in 1857 killed a motion from the floor to add the ballot to the platform of the Reform party, he killed the movement in Canada for a generation. Railways, government instability, the American Civil War and then union of the British North American colonies were to occupy fully the minds of the Canadian politicians and people in the years remaining before Confederation. If George Brown had had less success in his elections, one cannot help speculating that the outcome might have been different. For in its issue of September 8, 1858, the Globe, commenting on the Toronto byelection in which Brown had been the successful candidate, remarked: "If the coercion brought into play by ministerial employers during the late contest in Toronto is to become general, the ballot will soon obtain advocates in Canada." In the remaining British colonies on the North American continent that were soon to form the Dominion of Canada, there was little interest in or agitation for vote by ballot. Gestures were made in Prince Edward Island towards securing it as a device to protect the tenant electors from the political intimidation of their proprietors or the proprietors' agents.57 The subject was never pressed with any vigour and does not seem to have awakened any popular support. In Vancouver Island and British Columbia, the ballot was on occasions lukewarmly espoused by Amor ^Globe, Oct. 9, 1852, and Jan. 16 (Supp.) 1857; and the Examiner, March 20, 27, 1850. WRoyal Gazette, March 16, 1847; P.E.I., Ass. /., April 16, 1851, and April 6, May 5, 1854.

GARNER

The Early Ballot

35

de Cosmos, the leading politician and editor in those parts, and on other occasions opposed by him. De Cosmos did not suffer from a fixity of principles and his position with respect to the ballot seems to have been influenced by his immediate personal experiences. In 1865 after he had fought a bitter by-election in Victoria against the gold and vigour of the anti-union forces, a letter appears in his old paper, the British Colonist, advocating vote by ballot; in March, 1871, the paper editorially confessed a preference for the manly British system of open voting, and de Cosmos declined to press his motion in favour of the ballot which he had some days earlier introduced into the Legislative Council of the united colony of British Columbia.58 The united colony on the Pacific Coast entered Confederation with little interest in or experience of the ballot save that acquired by the residents of Victoria in the elections for their fire department.59 ^British Colonist, March 1, 1865; March 18, 19, and 24, 1871. wibid., Oct. 2, 1860.

The Democratic

* J. M U R R A Y BECK

Process at Work in Canadian General Elections*

EVEN IN COUNTRIES with homogeneous populations the existence of consensus, or sufficient agreement on fundamentals to permit democratic institutions to operate smoothly, cannot be taken for granted; in the diversity that is Canada the likelihood of consensus would appear more remote. In any particular election multifarious groups, disagreeing markedly in their ideas of what is significant, are asked to register their opinions at the polls. Does the over-all result reflect anything more than the wishes of that combination of groups which happens to be numerically the strongest? If not, any reasonable balance between conflict and consensus would seem to be tipped strongly in favour of the former. Yet one thing is certain; with rare exceptions a Canadian election gives one party a clear mandate to govern and the decision is accepted without question. This paper attempts to show what light the statistics of twenty-five general elections throw upon the political behaviour of Canada's four regions and to reach some conclusions upon the relatively smooth functioning of Canadian political institutions. *The percentages of the popular vote in the tables which form part of this article can only be roughly accurate for the period up to 1896 because of the difficulty in attaching a party label to many of the candidates. By an examination of the candidates' positions in the newspapers of the day and the voting records of members elected every attempt has been made to ensure accuracy. The tables indicating members elected by party and popular vote reflect only the returns of the returning officers and not the results of controverted elections, which were numerous in the early years and affected the over-all results somewhat. Except in the more recent elections the author was occasionally compelled to use his discretion in compiling the results, but any other compilation would not require the conclusions reached in this essay to be altered. Independent Liberals, Independent Conservatives, and other Independents are included in the "others" column in all tables.

BECK

General Elections

37

Ontario How did the dominantly Grit Ontario of pre-Confederation days become what is generally regarded as the stronghold of Canadian Conservatism? Nothing more can be attempted here by way of answer than a general description of the salient developments, accompanied by suggestions of the forces which may serve to explain them. The observer cannot but be impressed by the close division of the electorate in the early elections; up to 1911 no more than six percentage points ever separated the Liberals and Conservatives in the popular vote (see Table I). But, as usual, the first-past-the-post system1 tended to magnify these TABLE I ONTARIO: PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE BY PARTY Election

1867 1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904 1908 1911

L.

C.

Others

Election

L.

48.0 50.6 52.8 48.3 49.0 49.2 48.7 39.7 48.5 49.5 47.1 43.1

51.4 49.1 46.6 51.4 50.4 50.7 49.4 44.8 49.7 50.3 51.4 56.2

0. 6 03 0. 6 0.3 0..6 0.1 1 .9 15 .5 1 .8 0.2 1 .5 0.7

1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

33.7 30.3 31.8 38.9 43.4 42.4 50.9 40.5 45.7 46.9 37.3 32.6 41.8

C.

C.C.F. Prog. (N.D.P.) Others

62.7 39.2 27.5 56.9 8.8 54.2 4.1 54.8 0.9 35.8 42.7 41.7 37.4 40.3 48.8 56.4 39.3

8.0 3 .8 14 .3 15 .2 11 .1 12 .1 10 .5 17 .0

3.6 3.0 2.5 2.8 0.9 13.8 2.6 3.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 0.5 1.9

NOTE: In 1896 the Patrons of Industry won 8.1 per cent of the vote; in 1935 the Reconstruction party 11.0 per cent.

small margins out of all proportion as far as the distribution of seats was concerned (see Table II). Furthermore, the parties' strength was by no means evenly distributed throughout the province. Before 1867 John A. Macdonald's Conservatives showed their greatest strength in the counties east of Toronto, while George Brown and his Clear Grits, with their pro-democratic, anti-French-Canadian and anti-Catholic planks—and to a degree their annexationist tendencies—were highly popular in the rural areas north and west of the capital city. Normally the west overbalanced the east and the Grits were in a majority. These political differences were perpetuated into the Confederation era (see Table II). Except for the Pacific Scandal election of 1874, when the Liberals swept all Ontario, and the National Policy campaign !The system of single-member constituencies in which the candidate with the greatest number of votes wins the election.

TABLE II ONTARIO: SEATS WON REGIONALLY BY PARTY Ontario Election

L

C. P. (:.C.F. o. (*J.D.P.)

L.

Eastern Ontario C. P. O.

1867 1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904 1908 1911 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

33 50 66 25 37 37 44 43 38 38 37 13 8 21 11 26 22 56 57 34 56 51 21 15 44

49 38 22 63 55 55 48 43 54 48 48 73 74

10 16 24 7 7 10 10 13 12 13 13 4 3 7 2 5 6 18 16 9 13 11 6 4 9

25 19 11 28 28 25 25 20 23 16 16 25 22 10 20 17 17 5 7 14 8 9 14 16 11

6 1

37 24 68 2 53 2 59 1 25 1 25 48 25 33 61 67 35

1 1

1 1 3 3 6

1

2

8

1 1

1

Western Ontario Ontario T, C. P. O. 20 30 34 17 28 25 32 27 23 19 22 9 5 11 7 16 12 25 28 14 24 19 6 3 15

21 15 11 28 21 24 17 17 24 24 21 34 34 15 13 29 2 20 2 25 1 9 1

7

21 11 16 29 32 20

Toronto and York Co. T, C. C.C.F. O. (N.D.P.;)

2 3 6

3

2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 4 4 2 8 9 1 12

1 1 2 1

3 3 6 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 8 10 9 12 12 11 11 11 13 6 8 17 18 3

Northern Ontario L. C. P. (nrp (I^.D.P.)

1 1

1 1 3

1 2 4 1 2 2 5 3 9 9 9 11 12 8 8 8

1 1

2 2 2 2 1 2 5 6 8

3 7

3

4 6

1 1 1

3 3 3

NOTE: Eastern Ontario is taken to include all counties to the east of York and Simcoe. Muskoka, when associated with Ontario County, is included in eastern Ontario; otherwise in northern Ontario.

BECK

General Elections

39

of 1878, in which the Conservatives were equally successful, the best the latter might hope for was an even break in western Ontario, while the Liberals fared even worse in the eastern counties. At the other extreme the Liberals might obtain almost double their opponents' representation west of Toronto, just as the Conservatives might win four times as many seats as the Liberals in their own area of strength. This generally ensured Conservative successes in the whole province, but not by lopsided majorities. To all appearances the same forces which moved western Ontario before 1867 were still continuing to operate after Confederation. Thus in 1882 Macdonald did as well in eastern Ontario as he had done in his avalanche victory four years earlier. But not so in old Grit territory, where Edward Blake's diatribes against the evils of corruption, extravagance, and high tariffs must have awakened memories of George Brown himself. Five years later, after Macdonald had spurned French-Canadian pleadings and let Louis Kiel hang, it was a different story; western Ontario elected almost as many Tories as Liberals. But it wanted none of Macdonald in 1891 when he campaigned on "A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die," supposedly to counter the "veiled treason" of his opponents, who favoured closer commercial relations with the United States; this time it strongly supported the Liberals, who were firmly in the Grit tradition of freer trade.2 Laurier's first victory in 1896 was to have far-reaching effects in Ontario. In that election the normal divergence between east and west continued, but in the province as a whole the result was a stalemate.3 Four years later, however, the Conservatives won a signal victory in Ontario; they held their own west of Toronto and won twice as many seats as their opponents in the eastern ridings. Ontario, it is true, had voted Conservative in every federal election since 1878, but this was the first time it had run counter to the national result. Then, in the 1904 and subsequent elections, an even more radical departure occurred— .

2

In this election appeals to "the Old Man, the Old Flag, and the Old Party" were astonishingly unsuccessful in the loyal province of Ontario, which gave the Conservatives a majority of only four. Macdonald, in fact, owed his last electoral triumph to Canada's outermost areas, east and west. 3 The Conservatives ought to have been satisfied with this result since, to bolster their position in Quebec, they had recently attempted to force separate schools upon Manitoba by Dominion legislation, hardly a popular course of action in Ontario. The intrusion of the Patrons of Industry in this election complicated matters. The Liberals ran only seventy-four candidates to the Conservatives' eighty-eight, allowing the Patrons to provide the opposition where they did not choose to run. This accounts for the disparity in the popular vote of the old-line parties.

40

The Political Process in Canada

the disappearance of the marked political divergence between eastern and western Ontario.4 One can only conjecture that the old Grit strongholds in western Ontario tended to become Conservative as Quebec became more and more the preserve of the Liberal party after 1896.5 Certainly the pronounced Conservative bias in Ontario may be said to date from this period when it failed to conform to the national outcome in three successive elections.6 Since Quebec was becoming even more Liberal at the same time, a new rule of thumb was introduced into Canadian politics: a nation-wide Conservative victory is dependent on the party winning at least two-thirds of the seats in Ontario. That is what happened in the reciprocity election of 1911 when even western Ontario accepted the cry of "no truck nor trade with the Yankees," which it had rejected in 1891, and gave the Liberals a resounding defeat. Another Grit attitude had passed out of the political consciousness of western Ontario. Meanwhile a third region of Ontario—Toronto and the Yorks—had become a growing source of Conservative strength.7 The English immigrant population which settled there before and after the turn of the century naturally accepted the pro-British Conservative party as the vehicle through which to express itself politically; the area became a solid Tory enclave.8 When Samuel Factor defeated "Tommy" Church in the West Centre riding in 1930, he was the first Liberal member of Parliament elected from Toronto since 1896. The strength of the Conservatives in Ontario was forcefully demonstrated in 1921 when, despite their debacle elsewhere, they returned more members than either the Progressives or the Liberals. Four years later, in the general reaction of English Canada against King and the Liberals, Ontario was the ringleader. Those who scorn Meighen's political talents ought at least to remember that his victory in Ontario was the greatest on record,9 surpassing even that of Diefenbaker in 1958. Even when he lost fifteen seats in 1926, his victory was impressive by ^Except in 1926. 5 Another factor contributed to the uniformity of voting results between east and west: the eastern counties of Prescott, Glengarry, Russell, and Stormont, and the city of Ottawa tended more and more to elect Liberals after 1896 as their French-Canadian populations increased. 6Jn 1900, 1904, and 1908. Provincially Ontario went Conservative in 1905 for the first time in thirty-four years, and it has tended to remain the same ever since. Their representation increased from seven at the turn of the century to twelve after 1921 and eighteen after 1951. 8 Except for the occasional Liberal elected in York County. 9 Except for the abnormal war-time election of 1917.

BECK

General Elections

41

normal standards. Nor was the King-Byng constitutional issue principally responsible for his losses. After all, no party can remain at the very peak of its fortunes for long; the disintegration of the Progressives threw additional votes to the Liberals; Meighen's offer of "sops"10 to French-Canada did not go down well in ultra-loyal Ontario. In 1930 Mr. Bennett, although he was victorious nationally in the early months of the depression, did little better in Ontario than Meighen had done in 1926. Apparently his "Canada First" slogan was not as appealing to the Ontario voter as the Liberal plank of British preference. The question may well be asked, in view of major Liberal triumphs in Ontario in 1935,11 1940, 1949, and 1953, whether the province is still Conservative in the same sense as before. One factor that contributed to these Liberal victories was their success in the province's fourth region, northern Ontario. Until 1935 it had been good fighting ground for both parties; then the Liberals won all its nine seats. Since that time Conservative success in the North—which now elects twelve members—has been confined to winning Parry Sound-Muskoka in 1957, 1958, and 1962. The constituencies with large French-Canadian populations have become staunchly Liberal; the others, because of their geographical isolation, are moved by different considerations from those which operate in southern Ontario. But a more basic reason for the Conservative defeats was the unfortunate face which they presented to the electorate in these elections. In 1935 it was the repellent picture of a party unable to cope with the ills of the depression; in 1940 the distasteful one of winning the war with "Bob" Manion and National government. In 1949 and 1953 the guise was somewhat less unattractive, but George Drew simply could not cope successfully with Uncle Louis and unprecedented prosperity, and suffered the ignominy of seeing the Conservatives lose Toronto and the Yorks for the first time since 1874. Yet, despite its steady attenuation, Ontario still has a Conservative bias. Liberal successes never reach the peaks of Conservative triumphs and the ebbs in their fortunes are much more pronounced. Let the Conservatives present a reasonably attractive image and they are likely to do well in Ontario. In 1957 John Diefenbaker appeared eminently satisfactory to the ordinary Ontario voter, who sensed that all was not well in Ottawa after twenty-two years of one-party rule and who felt, 10 Such as his promise in his Hamilton address and in the Bagot by-election that the sending of Canadian troops overseas would, in future, be contingent upon the approval of the Canadian people in a general election. n The first Liberal victory federally since 1874.

42

The Political Process in Canada

perhaps, that it was time for one of his own, rather than a French Canadian, to lead him.12 The result was two resounding Conservative victories in Ontario in 1957 and 1958. On the second occasion Toronto became "Solid Tory Toronto" for the first time since 1926. Nevertheless, the Conservatives are no longer assured of success federally in Ontario as they were before 1935. Like other provinces it has been experiencing the phenomenon of a large increase in the floating vote and consequently sharp and rapid swings in voter preferment, especially in the new suburban areas. With the arrival of a new immigrant population unattached to traditional Liberalism or Conservatism the tendency will become more marked in the future. Both these factors had full play on June 18, 1962, when Toronto and York County returned only three Conservatives from their eighteen ridings. Apparently Tory Toronto has disappeared, and henceforth the Conservatives will have to compete on more equal terms with the Liberals and the N.D.P. for its electoral support. Conservative strength in the rural sections of "old" Ontario remains much more stable, but these areas will be playing a steadily decreasing role in determining the over-all result. Quebec Quebec's political behaviour in federal elections is capable of simpler explanation than that of Ontario, for, despite the added complications of race and religion, a wider measure of uniformity has normally prevailed throughout the province. To be successful, a party must build up the over-all impression that the peculiar rights of French Canadians are amply secured at its hands. If this confidence is once forfeited, it may take decades to rebuild a favourable image. In 1867 the Conservatives, as inheritors of the pre-Confederation tradition of the Bleus, started out with an advantage over the Liberals, who were still tainted with the stigma of the anti-clerical Rouges. Yet the political struggle was not hopelessly one-sided. For while in terms of seats the electoral system usually distorted the Conservative advantage out of all proportion, the Liberals were always strong contenders in terms of popular vote; in the Pacific Scandal election of 1874 they were actually supported by 51.7 per cent of the voters and won thirty-five of the province's sixty-five seats (see Table III). By the mid-eighties the forces had been set in motion which were to produce a radical change in Quebec politics. A continuing series of racial and religious issues made it increasingly difficult for even John A. 12

Apparently the same phenomenon operated against Laurier in 1911.

TABLE III QUEBEC: SEATS AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE BY PARTY Election

1867 1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904 1908 1911

Seats

L.

C.

0.

18 28 35 18 12 29 37 49 57 54 54 38

46 37 30 47 52 36 28 16 8 11 11 27

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Percentage of popular vote L. C. 0.

Election

54.4 50.9 47.4 55.8 53.4 49.6 50.8 45.8 43.5 43.4 40.8 48.1

1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

45.0 48.2 51.7 43.6 44.2 48.9 47.5 53.6 55.9 56.4 56.7 50.2

0.6 0.9 0.9 0.6 2.4 1.5 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.2 2.5 1.7

L.

Seats C.

0.

62 65 59 60 40 56 61 51 68 66 62 25 35

3 0 4 4 24 5 0 1 2 4 8 50 14

0 0 2 1 1 4 4 13 3 5 5 0 26

NOTE: In 1962 the Social Crediters received 26.0 per cent of the popular vote; the N.D.P. 4.4 per cent.

Percentage of popular vote L. C. 0.

72.7 70.2 58.4 62.3 53.3 54.4 63.4 48.7 60.4 61.0 57.6 45.7 39.1

24.7 18.5 33.7 34.3 44.6 28.2 19.8 8.8 24.1 29.4 30.6 49.6 29.6

2.6 11.3 7.9 3.4 2.1 17.4 16.8 42.5 15.5 9.6 11.8 4.7 31.3

44

The Political Process in Canada

Macdonald to keep his two-horse team from Quebec and Ontario moving in the same direction. By permitting Louis Kiel to be executed in November, 1885, he touched French-Canadian sensibilities to the quick; as a result, his party's margin in the popular vote in Quebec was practically wiped out in 1887 and his hold on the Quebec members of Parliament was seriously reduced.13 The Conservative position in Quebec was further weakened by the choice of Wilfrid Laurier as Liberal national leader in June, 1887. While just over half the voters supported the Conservatives in 1891, they could win only twenty-eight of sixty-five seats. Not until 1958 were they again to poll more votes in Quebec than the Liberals or take a majority of its seats. The stage had been set for the great Liberal triumph of 1896. Upon electoral success in Quebec the Conservative Tupper gambled everything; certainly he invited defeat elsewhere by attempting to force separate schools upon Manitoba. But his candidates polled only 45.8 per cent of the Quebec vote and the first-past-the-post system did the rest; the Bleu contingent in the Commons dropped to 16. Ecclesiastical intimidation may have had some success in the Quebec of the 1870's, but in 1896, when the hierarchy told the French-Canadian voters they must chose between the bishops and Barrabas Laurier, they unhesitatingly chose Laurier. No French Canadian, guessed ex-Conservative J. Israel Tarte, who was master-minding the Liberal cause in Quebec, would deem it a mortal sin to make one of his compatriots prime minister.14 Nor could he be made to believe that Laurier would willingly sacrifice French-Canadian interests elsewhere. Yet neither in 1896 nor in Laurier's three subsequent triumphs were the Conservatives utterly routed, for their percentage of the popular vote on no occasion fell below forty.15 But since Liberal strength was fairly evenly distributed throughout the province, the not abnormal operation of the electoral system meant the return of few Conservatives from Quebec—sixteen in 1896, eight in 1900, and eleven in both 1904 and 1908. Since 1896 it has become almost a truism that the French Canadian will support unswervingly a national leader of his own race, except possibly when his chief opponent in Quebec is a compatriot of somewhat 13 Both the popular vote and the party standings are difficult to determine in this election, since many candidates ran and were elected under a Nationalist label of some kind or another. When the situation stabilized, thirty-six of the sixty-five members appear to have supported Macdonald, but not as consistently as before. i*O. D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto, 1921), vol. I, pp. 484-5. 1545.8 in 1896, 43.5 in 1900, 43.4 in 1905, and 40.8 in 1908.

BECK

General Elections 45

equal stature. To date, the one illustration of the latter phenomenon was Bourassa's very considerable success against Laurier in 1911. This partial break-through16 by a Conservative-Nationalist alliance— the only Liberal reverse in Quebec between 1896 and 1930—occurred because many French Canadians were persuaded that Laurier's naval policy constituted a surrender of Canadian, and especially FrenchCanadian, interests to Imperial interests. For the Conservatives—whose arguments elsewhere were in direct contradiction with the ones used in Quebec—the alliance was little more than an affaire de convenance. The Nationalist Bourassa soon found himself at odds with the Borden administration; the French-Canadian cabinet ministers were, to all appearances, nonentities and presented their compatriots' special viewpoint quite ineffectively. Certainly there was little of that sympathetic understanding of opposing viewpoints which permits cabinet government in Canada to be worked without friction. So when the conscription issue arose in 1917 the solution appeared to be utterly one-sided in favour of the English-Canadian viewpoint. Conscription was inevitable, but the unsympathetic and tactless method of its adoption and enforcement in French Canada evidenced a complete unawareness of the realities of Canadian politics. To many French Canadians the Ontario Conservatives who were restricting the use of French in the schools were a greater menace than the Germans. Arthur Meighen, whose task it was to pilot the Military Service Act through the Commons, became French-Canadian enemy number one. The result was to divide Canada along racial lines as never before; in the elections of 1917, 72.7 per cent of the Quebec voters supported Laurier non-conscriptionist Liberals, while 63.6 per cent of the voters in the other provinces cast ballots for the Unionists, that is, the Conservatives and conscriptionist Liberals. None of the four Conservative members from Quebec was a French Canadian, and an Irish Catholic cabinet minister became the province's principal spokesman. For the first time since Baldwin and Lafontaine, the French Canadians were not participating in the government of Canada; for the first time since Confederation a national party had completely alienated them. The cost was to be heavier for the Conservatives than anyone could have anticipated. For, as in the 1840's, the English-speaking combination soon disintegrated, while the French-Canadian phalanx remained united and inflexible. In the disturbed economic conditions of 1921 even the Anglo-Saxon voters of Quebec deserted the Conservatives; they secured only 18.5 per cent of the popular vote and elected none of their 16

48.1 per cent of the popular vote and 27 of the 65 seats.

46

The Political Process in Canada

candidates. In 1925 and 1926 they did somewhat better, but even with the support of one-third of the voters they could elect only four members, all Anglo-Saxons. By this time the Liberals had learned to exploit the repugnant image of the Conservatives to the full; their propaganda, crudest in the back concessions, pictured Meighen as still anxious to send French Canadians to fight in the trenches of Europe. Modified to meet the circumstances, these tactics were still being practised in the election of 1958. Once, in 1930, the Conservatives effected another break-through. But the circumstances were distinctly special. Bennett had replaced arch-enemy Meighen; the Catholic hierarchy, perceiving dangers in an excessive identification of the French-Canadian race with one party, lent some encouragement to the Conservative cause; economic recession hurt the incumbent Liberal government; above all, an increase in the British preference had encouraged imports of butter to the detriment of the St. Lawrence Lowlands dairy producer. "A pound of New Zealand butter was made to look as big as a house," one Liberal organizer is reported to have said. In these circumstances 44.6 per cent of the Quebec voters supported the Conservatives and elected twenty-four of their candidates. That triumph was short-lived. Beset by serious economic depression, Quebec returned strongly to the Liberal fold in 1935. The Conservative losses there, however—their popular vote fell from 44.6 to 28.2 per cent—were no more marked than in the rest of Canada. But with the outbreak of the Second World War the Conservatives again became suspect, and in 1940 their popular vote tumbled still further to 19.8 per cent. As the war progressed and as Conservative politicians outside of Quebec criticized its war effort, their party's fortunes ebbed even lower. The Liberals also experienced difficulties when, in 1944, they were forced to introduce limited conscription for overseas service. In 1945, therefore, the party system seemed to be disintegrating in Quebec; Conservatives polled only 8.8 per cent of the votes, a new low for them, while Independents of one kind or other obtained 42.5 per cent. But the province soon returned to the old order in which two parties got most of the votes, and one got twice as many as the other. Under Mr. Drew the Quebec Conservative vote increased to 24.1 per cent in 1949 and 29.4 per cent in 1953; meanwhile Mr. St. Laurent had reestablished Liberal pre-eminence in his native province. Mr. Diefenbaker was little more successful in 1957 than Mr. Drew had been in the two previous elections— 30.6 per cent of the votes and a meagre eight seats.17 irrhe chief Conservative strategist, Gordon Churchill, advised the use of a minimum of the party's resources on the hopeless campaign in Quebec.

BECK

General Elections

47

But the picture had again altered in 1958. Mr. St. Laurent had given way to Mr. Pearson, who had no special appeal in Quebec. Liberal advertisements which pictured Mr. Diefenbaker as another in a long list of Conservative enemies of the French-Canadian race contained little in the way of concrete evidence to back their claims; his government had done nothing to alarm Quebec during its first year of office and four of his English-speaking ministers campaigned in French in Quebec. But above all, the French Canadians sensed that defeat in the election of 1957 had demoralized the Liberals, and they had no desire to be isolated from the rest of Canada at a time when a Diefenbaker sweep appeared likely. In 1962 the Island of Montreal—long a Liberal stronghold—turned once more to the Liberals, who won twenty of its twenty-one seats. Elsewhere in Quebec, disillusionment with both old-line parties had produced a vacuum which Real Caouette's Social Crediters filled by winning twenty-six seats to the Liberals' fifteen and the Conservatives' thirteen. Time alone will tell whether this is a temporary aberration, or whether Quebec's steadfast adherence to the traditional parties in federal politics has finally been broken. The Atlantic Region The Maritimes have shown some distinctiveness in federal elections; Prince Edward Island has exhibited a strong Liberal bias, Nova Scotia a distinct Liberal bias, while New Brunswick has bestowed its political favours more evenly. Yet since 1872 their political behaviour has closely paralleled the national behaviour, and in this respect Nova Scotia, except for 1926, has been a particularly excellent bell-wether (see Tables IV andV). The region showed the usual abhorrence of the Pacific Scandal in 1874, then swung back to Macdonald and the Conservatives when they advocated the National Policy in 1878.18 In Laurier's triumph in 1896 the Conservatives retained a majority of the Maritime seats, although it dropped from nineteen to five;19 in his defeat in 1911 he still had an edge of three seats in the Maritimes—down from seventeen three years earlier—but the trend was against him in all three provinces. In this election one might have expected the Maritimes to look even more favourably upon free trade in natural products with the United States, 18 In members elected New Brunswick seemed to deviate from the national trend, but that was largely a quirk of the electoral system, for the Liberals lost heavily in the popular vote. 19 In this election Prince Edward Island voted contrary to the national trend.

TABLE IV ATLANTIC PROVINCES: SEATS WON BY PARTY Election

L.

The region C. Prog. C.C.F. (N.D.P.)

1867 1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904 1908 1911 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

27 20 35 19 18 20 12 17 27 26 26 19 10 25 6 9 6 25 19 19 26 27 12 8 14

7 17 8 24 25 23 31 22 12 9 9 16 21 5 23 20 23 1 6 6 7 5 21 25 18

1

1 1 1 1 1

L. 18 11 18 7 7 7 5 10 15 18 12 9 4 16 3 2 4 12 10 9 10 10 2

2

Nova Scotia C. C.C.F. (N.D.P.) 1 10 3 14 14 14 16 10 5 6 9 12 11 12 10

1 2 2 1 10 12 9

1 1 1 1 1

New Brunswick L. C. Prog.

9 9 11 11 7 7 3 5 9 7 11 8 4 5 1 4 1 9 5 7 8 7 5 3 6

6 7 5 5 9 9 13 9 5 6 2 5 7 5 10 7 10 1 5 3 2 3 5 7 4

1

P.E.I. L. C.

6 1 4 6 4 2 3 1 3 2 2 4 2 3 1 4 4 3 3 3

Newfoundland L. C.

5 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 4 4 4

5 7 5 5 6

2 2 2 1

TABLE V ATLANTIC PROVINCES: PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE BY PARTY Nova Scotia L.

1867 1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904 1908 1911 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

58.1 50.04 57.6 45.0 47.0 47.2 45.5 48.9 51.7 52.9 51.0 50.8 45.5 52.4 42.0 43.5 47.5 52.0 50.6 45.7 52.6 53.0 45.1 38.4 42.4

C

P.

40.9 49.,96 42..4 53.,0 51,.4 49 .7 53 .1 50 .4 48 .3 44 .5 49 .0 48 .9 48 .4 32 .3 11.8 56 .4 53 .7 52 .5 32 .1 39 .8 36 .7 37 .5 40 .1 50 .4 57 .0 47 .3

C.C.F. 0. (N.D.P.) 1.0

2.0 1,.6 3.1 1,.4 0.7

2.6 0.3 6.1 3.5 1 .6 2.8 6.3 16.7 9.9 6.7 4.4 4.6 9.4

P.E.I.

New Brunswick

Election

15 .9 3 .3 0 .9

0 .2 0 .1 0 .9

L.

52.7 50.9 57.2 50.5 49.3 49.9 43.2 44.3 51.9 51.0 53.8 50.8 40.6 49.4 40.3 46.1 40.7 57.2 54.6 50.0 53.8 52.7 48.0 43.4 44.4

C.

P.

44.7 46.4 42.7 45.1 48.6 49.6 56.0 49.0 47.8 48.8 46.2 49.2 59.4 39.4 10.4 59.7 53.9 59.3 31.9 43.4 41.4 39.4 41.9 48.7 54.1 46.5

C.C.F. O. (N.D.P.) 2.6 2.7 0. 1 4.4 2 .1 0.5 0.,8 6.7 0.3 0.2

0.8

0.4 7.5 4.2 3.0 0.9

1.8 5.3

10 .9 1 .6 1 .1 2 .6 2 .4 2 .4 0 .7 3 .8

L.

74.3 43.2 50.1 53.5 51.5 49.3 51.8 49.1 50.4 48.9 50.2 45.7 52.0 52.7 50.0 58.2 55.3 48.4 49.2 51.1 46.6 37.5 43.3

C.

P.

Newfoundland

C.C.F. 0. (N.D.P.)

25.7 56.8 49.9 46.5 48.5 49.0 48.2 50.9 49.6 51.1 49.8 37.2 12.3 48.0 47.3 50.0 38.4 44.7 47.4 48.4 48.1 52.3 62.2 51.3

L.

C.

C.C.F. O. (N.D.P.)

1.7

4.8

3.4 4.2 2.4 0.8 1.1 0.3 5.2

0.2

71.9 67.3 61.9 54.5 59.0

27.9 28.1 37.8 45.3 36.0

0.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 4.9

4.0 0.1 0.1

50

The Political Process in Canada

a basic platform of the Liberals. Like the rest of English-speaking Canada, the Maritimes elected conscriptionists in 1917, although the seats in Prince Edward Island were divided. Four years later they overwhelmingly rejected Meighen and the Conservatives, then joined the country as a whole in a swing back to them in 1925. By taking over the Maritime Rights agitation, the Conservatives enhanced this success, particularly in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; yet this did not prevent a slight reaction against them in 1926. Economic conditions accounted for the Maritimes' support of Bennett in 1930 and his overwhelming rejection in 1935. For the next twenty-two years King and St. Laurent held the Maritimes in sway until Diefenbaker built up a more favourable image of Canadian Conservatism. Then, for the first time in their history, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia elected clean slates of Conservative candidates.20 Increased federal grants, subsidies to shipbuilding, a promise to build the Prince Edward Island causeway, and generally sympathetic treatment helped the Diefenbaker government to retain control of the region in 1962, but it won only eighteen of the thirty-three seats, a loss of seven. These twenty-five general elections indicate that the Maritimes will support old-line parties through thick and through thin. Despite these provinces' periodic dissatisfaction with their economic position,21 only two constituencies have ever looked for Utopia in a new-fangled party. Victoria-Carleton elected a Progressive in 1921 when the Liberals failed to contest the seat and Cape Breton South returned the C.C.F. candidate, Clarence Gillis, four times between 1940 and 1953, and the N.D.P. candidate, Malcolm Maclnnis, in 1962. Otherwise, the best the Progressive, Reconstruction, and C.C.F. parties were able to do was to poll about 10 per cent of the popular vote for an election or two. Electorally New Brunswick presents an interesting picture as an evergrowing French population seeks to work out a mutual accommodation with the English-speaking Canadians. In 1867, only Kent elected an Acadian and, as subsequent events proved, this did not establish a precedent. Gloucester, on the other hand, for a long time returned an Irish Catholic; this was the same type of compromise that English Protestants and French Catholics often adopted in the Eastern Townships of Quebec on lower levels of government when the French were in the process of becoming predominant. In Laurier's first victory in 1896 Kent returned an Acadian Conservative and Gloucester an Irish20Prince Edward Island in 1957 and 1958; Nova Scotia in 1958. 21 Provincially Nova Scotia voted for Fielding and the repeal of Confederation in 1886, but federally it gave strong support to Macdonald a year later.

BECK

General Elections 51

Catholic Conservative; in his second in 1900 both elected Frenchspeaking Liberals and have tended to do the same ever since. From this time dates the Liberal bias of the Acadians and French Canadians of New Brunswick, a bias only slightly less pronounced than that of their compatriots in Quebec. In 1917 Restigouche-Madawaska commenced to elect a French-speaking member, usually Liberal; at the present time Westmoreland and Northumberland, both with growing French populations, usually elect Irish Catholics, normally Liberal. Today the five ridings of northern and eastern New Brunswick display such a strong Liberal bias that three of them—Gloucester, Northumberland, and Kent—were able to withstand the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958. In contrast, the four Anglo-Saxon ridings in the St. John River Valley exhibit a somewhat slighter Conservative bias. In the provincial election of 1960 and the federal election of 1962 the Liberal and Conservative areas conformed rigidly to their normal voting pattern, while the bell-wether constituency of Charlotte returned Liberals on both occasions. To date, the political behaviour of Newfoundland is easy to analyse. In three of five elections the two St. John's ridings, where anti-Confederate sentiment was strong, have elected Conservatives; nevertheless, the contests are genuine and the Liberals were successful in electing two members in 1953 and one in 1962. The five outport ridings, gratified beyond all expectations by the scope of Canadian welfare benefits, have rewarded their Liberal benefactors by returning nothing but Liberals. But in 1958 the Conservatives made a respectable showing in three of these constituencies. Western Canada While western Canada can hardly be considered a political entity, it has broadly observed the national trends in its voting behaviour (see Tables VI and VII). Manitoba, an excellent bell-wether, has failed to pick the winner only twice since 1900. In 1908 it returned strongly to the Conservatives, three years earlier than the country generally; in 1921 it reacted strongly against the Unionist government, but like the other prairie provinces elected Progressives rather than Liberals. Until 1921 the political behaviour of British Columbia in federal elections resembled that of Manitoba. Then its isolation from the rest of Canada seemed to be reflected in its voting. Despite the overwhelming defeat of the Conservatives nationally in 1921, 47.9 per cent of the province's voters supported them and elected seven of their thirteen candidates. British Columbia joined the national trend to the Conservatives in 1925, but, unlike the rest of Canada, continued it in 1926 by

TABLE VI WESTERN CANADA: SEATS BY PARTY

L. C. P. C.C.F. S.C. 0.

L. C. P. C.C.F. 0.

1

9

1

2 1

1887 1891 1896 1900 1904

9 3 8 1 14 1 14 9 7 12 5 21 7

1908 1911 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

18 17 1 6 23 33 23 37 44 19 43 27 10 1 7

1882

1 1

g

1 1

1

2 4 7 2 2

17 18 56 8 21 14 31 9 8 11 7 9 21 66 49

42 23 18 11 7 7 27 11 21 22 5 12

Saskatchewan

L. C. P. C.C.F. S.C. 0.

L. C. P. C.C.F. S.C. 0.

17 10 13 10 15 19 4

1 2 4 4 2 3 2 1

3 ii

1i

3 2 4 4 4 3 3

1

2

8 8 15

12 2 1 7 7 11 4 4 11 14 1 15 1 10 2 12 1 8 3 1 8 14 1 11

4 4 7

1 2 2 2 2 1 5 3 3 5 2

6

N.W.T.

6

L. C.

6 6 2 2

4 4 1

4

3 4 7 9 9

5 7 13

3 7 3 3 10 1 1 12 5 7 6 5 10 4 5 5 11 3 8 3 2 7 18 6

Alberta

L. C. P. S.C. 0.

Yukon & N.W.T. L.

C.

(N.D.P.)

(N.D.P.)

(N.D.P.)

(N.D.P.)

1872 1874 1878

British Columbia

Manitoba

All Provinces

1 2 2 1 2 1

3 1 4 3

7 7

4 6

4 10

2

1 15 18 11 16 12 2 14 5 4

3

1

1 1 16

4 3 6 1 1 11 15 6 3

8 1 2 1 1 1 3 16

1 16

1

12

2 2 5 18 5 11 10 1

2 2

4 3 3 1 7 2 5 4 1

3 9 1 11 1 4 9 1 15 10 2 13 2 10 2 11 3 13 17 15 2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 2 2 1 1

1 1

TABLE VII WESTERN CANADA: PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE BY PARTY Manitoba Election

L.

C.

1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904

44.7 45.5 50.4 53.3 48.5 46.9 35.0 51.8 49.7

49.5 41.7 49.6 45.7 51.5 53.1 47.0 48.2 41.8

1908 1911 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

45.4 44.8 20.1 16.4 20.3 37.9 34.9 42.3 47.8 34.7 48.0 40.3 26.8 21.5 31.1

P.

C.C.F. S.C. (N.D.P.)

P.

0.

L.

C.

5.8 12.8

8.5

11.8 34.4 31.5 33.9 28.4 28.4 49.2 45.9 49.5

88.2 63.7 65.1 55.3 55.9 71.6 45.0 40.9 38.8

51.5 3.1 51.9 3.3 79.9 27.0 43.7 41.3 27.1 42.2 11.2 46.8 6.4 26.9 25.9 24.9 22.0 27.0 35.8 56.7 41.6

35.9 37.5 25.6 29.8 34.7 37.0 40.9 31.8 37.4 27.5 36.7 30.9 20.5 16.1 27.3

46.8 58.8 68.3 47.9 11.7 49.3 8.7 54.3 49.3 24.6 30.5 30.0 27.9 14.1 32.6 49.4 27.3

1.0

18.0

19.4 19.4 31.5 25.9 23.6 23.7 19.6 19.7

Saskatchewan

British Columbia

2.0 0.6 3.2 6.3 13.2 1.8 6.8

12.9 11.3 8.7 11.9 9.4 6.3 5.7 4.1 2.8 0.5 0.4 0.8

C.C.F. S.c. (N.D.P.)

0.

1.9 3.4 10.8 15.7

33.6 0.6 28.4 0.1 29.4 2.3 31.5 0.5 26.6 26.1 22.3 24.2 24.5 9.6 30.9 14.2

L.

C.

P.

5.8 13.2 11.7

L. .30.7 25.6 46.1 55.1 58.2

N.W.T. C. 0. 58.4 10.9 65.3 9.1 43.9 10.0 44.9 41.5 0.3

17.3 3.7 6.1 10.6 7.3 8.7 9.8 9.4 3.6 10.8 3.4 2.3 0.4 0.4 0.3

56.6 59.4 28.0 20.8 41.9 56.8 45.5 40.8 43.0 32.7 43.4 37.7 30.3 19.6 22.8

36.8 39.0 72.0 16.7 60.9 25.4 31.8 27.6 15.6 37.6 8.1 18.8 14.2 18.8 14.4 11.7 23.1 51.4 50.4

Alberta

C.C.F. S.C. (N.D.P.)

0.

L.

C.

6.6 1.6

50.3 53.3 35.5 15.8 27.6 24.5 30.0 21.2 37.9 21.7 34.5 35.0 27.9 13.7 19.4

44.4 42.5 60.9 20.4 31.8 31.5 33.9 17.7 13.1 18.7 16.8 14.5 27.7 60.0 42.8

1.6 0.9 20. 1 28. 6 44.,4 40. 9 44.2 36. 0 28 .3 22 .1

17.8 3.0 0.9 5.3 10.5 0.5 4.6

8.8 2.5 14.2 1.1 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.1

P.

C.C.F. S.C. 0. (N.D.P.)

60.3 31.5 38.7 30.4 11.3 46.7 13.0 34.5 18.4 36.6 9.3 37.4 6.9 40.8 6.3 37.9 4.3 21.6 8.4 29.2

5.3 4.2 3.6 3.5 9.1 5.3 5.7 3.1 1.5 4.6 2.0 2.8 0.2 0.4 0.2

54

The Political Process in Canada

increasing their share of the popular vote from 49.3 to 54.3 per cent and their members elected from ten to twelve. In 1930 these figures were reduced to 49.3 per cent and seven, again not in keeping with the national trend. Apparently a province with a strong British tradition was not overly enthusiastic over Bennett's "Canada First" slogan. Subsequently, in the six general elections between 1935 and 1957, British Columbia exhibited an unusual phenomenon—a fairly even division of the electorate among three and later four parties.22 Only in the case of the Liberals in 1940 and 1949 did one party win half of the province's seats. In 1958 British Columbia climbed on the Diefenbaker bandwagon with alacrity; the C.C.F., with 24.5 per cent of the vote, was the only other party to win seats. But four years later the province resumed its highly individualistic course, and the N.D.P., Liberals, and Conservatives all received fairly equal shares of the popular vote. Both Manitoba and British Columbia were early in the Canadian federation, settled principally by people acquainted with Canadian or British Liberalism and Conservatism; accordingly the old line parties were strongly implanted in the voters' consciousness. In contrast, Alberta and Saskatchewan were not created until 1905 and were peopled to a large extent by immigrants to whom Canadian Liberalism and Conservatism were foreign. Because Laurier accorded them generous terms at the outset, they voted Liberal provincially and federally until the end of the First World War.23 The Conservatives, on the other hand, developed no real roots in either province, have never elected a bona fide provincial government of their own (the Anderson government in Saskatchewan in the late twenties needed help from other groups), and until 1958 never returned more than four members to the Commons at any one time from Alberta. The election of 1921 ushered in a new state of affairs for both provinces as 60.9 per cent of the Saskatchewan, and 60.3 per cent of the Albertan, voters turned to the new panacea of Progressivism to solve their economic ills. No Conservatives and only one Liberal survived the deluge; twenty-seven Progressives became the provinces' spokesmen at 22

1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957

L.

C.

31.8 37.4 27.5 36.7 30.9 20.5

24.6 30.5 30.0 27.9 14.1 32.6

C.C.F.

33.6 28.4 29.4 31.5 26.6 22.3

S.C. 0.6 0.1 2.3 0.5 26.1 24.2

23 Except that the West voted strongly Unionist in 1917 especially because of the defection of much of the Liberal leadership.

BECK

General Elections

55

Ottawa. The reliance of the provinces upon a single crop subject to wide variations in price, their "quasi-colonial" dependence upon the financial and commercial interests of central Canada, the inability of the old-line parties to establish firm foundations—all these factors account for the unorthodox political behaviour of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1921 and ever since. Federally, however, Saskatchewan has tended to move with the rest of Canada, except in 1945 and 1953. In 1945, when the Liberals secured a bare majority in the Commons, most of the Saskatchewan seats went to the C.C.F., who were undoubtedly assisted by their provincial success two years earlier. Again, in 1953, the C.C.F. won eleven out of seventeen seats, this time despite the impressive St. Laurent triumph throughout Canada. But Alberta is the real political maverick. From 1921 until 1935 its branch of the Progressives—the United Farmers of Alberta—controlled the province federally and provincially. Then, moved by the evangelical fervour of William Aberhart, Albertans turned to the panacea of Social Credit. Provincially it has not yet been dislodged; federally it returned a majority of the province's members until 1958, although the popular vote always showed some tendency to follow the national pattern. Then, in 1958, Alberta went for another panacea of another political evangelist in no uncertain fashion; the Conservatives secured all of the province's eighteen seats and 60.0 per cent of its popular vote, their most impressive performance in all Canada. How do these results add up regionally? The West has contributed to the defeat of every government voted out of office since 1896, but it has seldom supported the winning party as decisively as the rest of Canada. That was clearly understandable in 1911 because Saskatchewan and Alberta could hardly have been expected to spurn reciprocity with the United States. But when the West rejected Meighen and the Conservatives in 1921, it turned, not to King and the Liberals, but to Forke and the Progressives; in 1926 and 1930 it gave neither winning party a majority of its seats; even in King's decisive triumph of 1935, it elected only thirty-seven of seventy-two Liberal candidates. In 1925 and 1957, when the national results were indecisive, the West was equally undecided. But it was also undecided in King's narrow victory in 1945 and St. Laurent's decisive triumph of 1953. Then, to reverse its normal behaviour, in 1958 it accorded an even greater victory to Diefenbaker than the overwhelming one he won elsewhere. His government's successful sale of wheat, and its popular grain and oil policies kept the Prairie Provinces strongly Conservative in 1962, but

56

The Political Process in Canada

British Columbia reduced its contingent of Conservative M.P.'s from eighteen to six. Conclusions Critics of Canadian elections concentrate on the infirmities which are usually associated with the first-past-the-post system. The basic ill of this system, wherever used, is that the parties' representation in the legislature often diverges markedly from their popular support in the country. The party with the largest popular vote tends to win an excessive number of seats, and the greater its popular vote the more this preponderance is likely to be exaggerated. The second party, on the other hand, usually gets fewer members than its popular support warrants, and as its popular vote drops its representation diminishes out of all proportion to its electoral strength. At the same time third parties tend to be squeezed out altogether in getting their candidates elected. Some of these alleged ills appear to be fully applicable to Canada (see Table VIII). After March 1, 1958, the standing in the House of Commons, according to the popular vote, should have been: Conservatives, 142; Liberals, 89; C.C.F., 25; and Social Credit, 7; it actually was: Conservatives, 208; Liberals, 49; and C.C.F., 8. But this disproportion in representation was nothing new. Between 1935 and 1957 the Liberals generally enjoyed overwhelming majorities in the Commons, although they normally polled less than half the popular vote. The under-representation of the combined opposition parties is demonstrated in Table IX. The continued weakness of the opposition parties has undoubtedly constituted one failing of the Canadian parliamentary system. Some English students of the first-past-the-post system profess to have discovered a cube-law relationship between the popular vote and the parliamentary representation of the two leading parties. Thus, if the victorious party polls 1.2 times as many votes as the second party, it will win 1.23 times as many seats. However, this law is supposed to need corrections when the voting strength of the two leading parties is not spread reasonably evenly over the whole voting area and when third parties poll a substantial part of the vote. Table X would seem to indicate serious difficulty in applying this law to Canada's twenty-five elections, even with corrections. The tendency of the system to under-represent third parties has not been especially marked in Canada (see Table VIII). The Progressives and the Social Crediters (until 1958) actually secured more members than their vote warranted because their support was regionally concentrated. The C.C.F., on the other hand, although it had considerable

TABLE VIII CANADA: PERCENTAGES OF POPULAR VOTE AND SEATS BY PARTY Election

1867 1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904 1908 1911

L.

Election

C.

Seats %

Pop. vote %

Seats %

43.1 49.5 67.0 30.6 33.2 40.5 43.7 55.4 62.9 65.0 61.1 39.4

48.9 49.7 54.0 46.5 47.9 48.8 47.3 44.9 51.2 52.0 50.4 47.7

56.3 50.5 32.5 69.4 66.4 59.5 56.3 41.3 37.1 35.0 38.5 60.6

Pop. vote % 50.3 49.6 45.4 52.6 50.9 50.2 51.1 46.1 47.4 46.9 47.0 50.9

L.

Seats % 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

34.5 49.8 40.4 52.5 37.1 71.0 73.9 50.2 73.7 64.5 39.6 18.5 37.7

Pop. vote % 40.0 41.2 40.0 45.8 45.1 45.0 51.6 40.4 49.6 48.9 42.3 33.6 37.2

Seats % 65.5 21.3 47.4 37.1 55.9 16.3 15.9 26.9 15.6 19.3 41.9 78.5 43.8

C.C.F.(N.D.P.)

P.

C.

Pop. vote % 57.0 30.4 46.5 45.3 48.8 29.8 30.7 27.6 29.5 31.0 39.1 53.6 37.3

Seats %

Pop. vote %

28.5 10.2 8.2 4.9

23.6 8.9 5.3 2.9

S.C.

Seats 07 /o

Pop. vote %

Seats %

Pop. vote %

2.9 3.3 11.4 4.9 8.7 9.4 3.0 7.2

8.7 8.5 15.5 13.4 11.3 10.7 9.5 13.5

6.9 4.1 5.3 3.8 5.7 7.2 0.0 11.3

4.1 2.7 4.1 2.3 5.4 6.6 2.6 11.6

58

The Political Process in Canada TABLE IX NON-CONFORMITY OF REPRESENTATION OF OPPOSITION PARTIES TO VOTING STRENGTH

Actual Representation Representation on the basis of popular vote

1935

1940

1945

1949

1953

71

64

122

69

94

135

119

146

132

135

TABLE X RATIO OF SEATS TO POPULAR VOTE

Election

1867 1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904 1908 1911

Ratio of Cons, to Lib. L =1 Popular Seats Vote

1.03 .99 .84 1.13 1.06 1.03 1.08 1.03 .93 .90 .93 1.07

9

1.30 or 1 .03 1.02 or .99~2

.49 or .84*

2 .27 or 1 .13712

2.0 o r l .0613 1,47 or 1 .03 I ..29 or 1 .08310 ,75 or 1 .03-7 ,59 or .936 54 or .90 .63 or .9376 ll 54 or 1 .07

Election 1917 1921 1925 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962

Ratio of Cons, to Lib. L =1 Popular Seats Vote

1.43 .74 1.16 .99 1.08 .66 .60 .68 .60 .63 .92 1.60 1.02

1.90 or .43 or 1.17 or .71 or 1.50 or .23 or .22 or .54 or .21 or .30 or 1.06 or 4 .25 or 1.16 or

1.4323 .74 1 1.16 99325 1.08 .664 .603 .682 .603 .633 1 .921.6073 1.02

success in electing its candidates in 1945, 1953, and 1957, has generally fared worse than the preceding two parties because its popular strength has tended to be more dispersed. The Canadian electoral system might also be criticized because on three occasions—in 1925, 1957, and 1962—it produced indecisive results or because in 1896 and 1957 a party with a larger popular vote secured a smaller number of seats. Specific abnormalities—even absurdities—might be singled out at will. In 1926 the Liberals, with 45.8 per cent of the popular vote, won a comfortable working majority; in 1930, with 45.1 per cent, they lost decisively; in 1935, with 45.0 per cent, they won the most one-sided victory up to that time. Equally bizarre were the results in Manitoba in 1925 and 1926. In the former year the Conservatives polled 41.3 per cent of the vote and elected seven members; the next year they polled 42.2 per cent—more than any other party—and failed to return a single member. But ought Canadian election results to be impugned simply because the distribution of seats in the Commons is not a reasonable replica of the distribution of votes in the Canadian electorate? Is there not another criterion for assessing these elections? Are the results assured of general

BECK

General Elections

59

acceptance, and, what is about the same, do they permit effective government to be carried on? The regional studies might seem to indicate that various groups move in opposite directions at any one time for a variety of reasons. But actually the movements in any one election tend to follow a more orderly pattern than is readily apparent. Perhaps the most significant fact is that an incumbent government is usually difficult to dislodge; once in office a party tends to retain power until a major scandal, economic recession, or the cumulative weaknesses which attend long periods in office convince the public that a change is overdue. Sixty-five of the country's ninety-five years have been passed under administrations lasting twenty-two, eighteen, fifteen, and ten years. With this state of affairs the Canadian people seem eminently satisfied; they are satisfied because the governing party has proved to be a successful arbiter of the competing claims of the significant groups within the country. What happens electorally when the public finally wants a change? Table XI indicates that, when power was transferred—as it was in 1874, 1878, 1896, 1911, 1921, 1930, 1935, and 1957-5824—each region swung away from the governing party on each occasion. Sometimes, as in the Maritimes in 1896 and 1911, or in Quebec in 1911 and 1930, the swing might have been insufficient to give the victorious party a majority of the regions' seats, but it was none the less clear-cut. Sometimes, as in western Canada in 1921, the victorious party might not have been the chief beneficiary of the governing party's losses, but it nevertheless improved its position. Table XII strongly reinforces this point. With a few minor exceptions—Prince Edward in 1896, Alberta in 1911, Nova Scotia in 1911 and 1930, and British Columbia in 193025 —every province has moved in the direction of change when change did occur. Once in power, and while it retains power, a party usually improves its position in about half the provinces and suffers losses in the other half in any one election (see Table XII). On this basis the Liberals might have been expected to win the election of 1882, for they did better everywhere except in New Brunswick. The explanation is that the Conservatives had won overwhelmingly in 1878 and the slight reaction against them four years later cost them few seats. Much more remarkable was the election of 1925, which, on the basis of a large increase in popular vote in all regions, the Conservatives ought to have won hands down. But while their fortunes were at a peak in Ontario and the Maritimes, their impressive proportionate increases in 24 1925-26 25

is not considered to involve a real transfer of power. In the last three cases the swing had actually occurred in a previous election.

60

BECK

The Political Process in Canada T A B L E PARTY

X I

REPRESENTATION

BY

REGIONS

Canada

Election

i v i c u i ueisuJ p • of Commons

C.

P.

Ontario

C.C.F.

S.C.

181

78

102

1872 1874

200

99

101

206 206

67 143

1

1878

1.18 03

1882

211

70

140

1887

216

1S91 1S96

215 213

1900 1904

87

128

94

121 88

213

P.

214

139

221

135

1911

221

87

85 134

235

81

154

235

1925 1926

Quebec C.C.F.

L.

O.

C.

33

27

7

37 30

20

17

1

35

8

2

25

63

24

1

9

37

55

47 52

19

1

18 12

18

25

3

8

29

36

20

23

1

14

44

48

37

28

12

31

I

14

7

43

43 54

49

16

57 54

8 11

17 27

22 12

26

9

9 12 21

7

54

11

26

9

18

17

38 62

27 3

19 10

16 21

17 1

56

25

5

6 9

23 20

6

23

37

55

38 38 1

6

48 48

37 13

1

73

8

74

21

37

116

25

5

11

68

2

1

59

4

91

20

6

53

2

1

60

4

40

24

56

5

39

12 I

40

123

5

26 22

59

1

7

17

25

1

10

6 7

50

S

57

25

13

15

34

48

5 5

25 S3

1 1

IB

5

61

3

208

25 8

56 51 21

3

19

30

15 44

67

116

35

6

00 41 51

1957

265

1958 1962

265 265

105 49 100

HI

T A B L E POPULAR

61

10 15

193 171

BY WHICH VOTE

VARIED

P.

C.C.F. (N.D.P.)

51 68

1

66 62 26 35

1 2 4 S

2 1 1 4

25

1

4

19

6

1

19

6

1

7 5 21

1 1

5

20 27 12 S 14

25

26

13 3 5

50 14

1

1

1

7 5

18

6

8

42

1

23

21 14

23

2

33

18

4

23

31

11

4

37

9

7

17

2

44

8

7

10

3

19 43

11

13

2

10

1

27 10 7

1

27 11

7 9 21

21 22

19

66 49

5 12

4

FROM

TO

ELECTION

1872

1874

1878

1882

1887

1891

1896

1900

1904

1908

1911

1917

1921

1925

1926

1930

1935

1940

1945

1949

1953

1957

-

8 5

+

15.9

-

3.2

—

+

-

S.8

+

2.8

-

8.3

+12.0

-46.7

+

7.7

-38.9

+

3.0

-10.1

— 5 .1

-

1.9

+

0.6

-

2.6

-

9.3

+

10.9

+

1.2

+

9.3

+11.6

— 4.7

-34.7

+

19.3

-

5.1 7.8

+ +

26.1 21.1

-

-

4.3

-

7.1

+

2.4

-

8.8

-

5.0

-

0.2

-

6.0

+17.9

—48.6

+82,2

-36.8

-29.8

-55.5

+25.0

-

3.0

-

3.3

+

6.8

-

5.1

-

4.2

-

7.9

+

10.1

-

0.2

-33.3

+74 6

-38.8

+24.0

-

7,8

4.1 25.7

+

+

5.6

+

7.8

12.9

-12.5

-

2.4

+

2.1

-

5.3

+

6 5

-33.7

+51.5

— 9.7

+ 10 0

-46

+36.1

-

4,6

-

4.8

+

18.9

-

7.8

S.l 12.7

+

-16. 8 - 2 7 .8

+ +

1.0 +20.7

173.9 2 2

New Brunswick

-15. 1 - 8 0

+ +

+22.0

N o v a Scotia

+ 1.8 — 4 8

+ 1.1 +30.0 — 2.2

+ +

6 4 +22 2

-37.5 —25.1

6.9 10.3

-

10.3 17.7

+ —

Quebec

+ +

+53.0 +45.2

— 2.6

-

2.1 2.2

+

Ontario

+ +

+

3.1

-11.5

+

2.6

-13.3

+23.2

+

0.8

+51.0

— 66.2

+

53.0

+

+ 10 9

-42.5

-

-

3.9

-

11.6

+

2.2

-15.0

1.1 6.8

-37.1

-

9.1

-

5.1

+20,6

+25.6

2.6

-12.1

+ -

+28.1

+121.0

+

+

-

1.6

+

5.6

-

Manitoba

4 .5

3 8

6 8

1.4

1.8

1.1

+16.2

-29.9

+

+

3.0

-

2.5

-25.3

Saskatchewan

+

6.0

+84.6

-76.8

+29.0 +52.1

Alberta

-

4.3

+43.3

-66.5

+55.9

-

British Columbia Prince E d w a r d Island

Newfoundland

15

PROPORTION OF T H E

ELECTION

-13 9

Canada

O.

7

1

18

S.C.

XII

T H E CONSERVATIVES'

HAS

1

65

28

245 262 265

PERCENTAGE

24

13 23

1945 1949 1953

9

46

99

137

C.

18

128 91 174

C.

28 35

245

181

O.

38

245 245

Western Canada

C.C.F.

22

1

245

P.

49

67

245

C.

50

50

1935

L.

(N.D.P.)

117

1940

Atlantic Provinces O.

66

79 75

1957 1921

1930

C.

(N.D.P.)

1867

1908

L.

O.

(N.D.P.)

118 134

61

General Elections

4.3

1.0

2.6

2 2

2

3 7

2.3

1962

37.1

-30.5

+ +

15.6 62.1

-30.4

+

13 1

-17.1

+

6.9

+ +

+

6.3

+

16.2

+

11.1

-14.1

+22.7

+

32 6

+

58.4

-26.7

+

+10.1

-

9.2

-50.1

+23.9

-

1.6

-

131.2

+

51.5

-44.7

-

1.5

+ 5.7 +36.2

-23.2

+

+

6.0

+

2.1

+

8.7

-50.0

-24.5

+32.4

-

23.4

-18.7

+

97.4

+ +

18.9 122.5

-17.6

8.7 0.9

+

-47.8

-26.0

+42.7

-

10.2

-13.7

+

97.7

+

116.6

-28.7

+

+

31.5

+

19.8

-20

7.6

-49.5

-40.1

+

16.4

7.0

1958 +

-

0.6

0.7

-

1.9 5

62

The Political Process in Canada

Quebec and the Prairies started from too weak a base. In Quebec they had lost half of their previous support in 1917 and a quarter of what was left in 1921; hence an increase of four-fifths in their percentage of the popular vote in 1925 was insufficient to put them in a position where they might win many seats. In less extreme fashion the same situation existed in western Canada. The result was stalemate; the Canadian people had a second chance to make up their minds. In 1926 the Quebec voters held their ground, while those of the other regions moved away slightly from the Conservatives. Thus the conditions needed to effect a change in government were not fully met in the mid-twenties. The election of 1957 was a remarkable reproduction of that of 1925. The Conservative successes in the Maritimes and Ontario were almost as pronounced as in 1925; in Western Canada they won twenty-one of seventy-two seats as compared with twenty-one of sixty-nine in 1925; in Quebec eight of seventy-five as compared with four of sixty-five. In the latter province the swing to the Conservatives was much less in 1957 than in 1925, partly because the state of their fortunes was already higher in 1957, and partly because the Quebec voters were reluctant to desert a French-Canadian leader. The story was a completely different one in 1958; all four regions moved even more strongly Conservative, with Quebec in the vanguard. Even in northern Ontario and the outports of Newfoundland, where the Conservatives failed to win seats, the swing in their direction conformed to the national pattern. The two atypical elections are those of 1917 and 1962. In the former year three regions moved strongly to the Conservatives (i.e., Unionists), while Quebec swung even more violently to the Liberals. Quebec lost out for the moment, but the party whose leaders failed in the politics of compromise had more than three decades in which to rue its shortcomings. In 1962 it was only natural that there should be a swing away from the Diefenbaker government in all regions, in view of its overwhelming victory four years earlier. But the extent, unevenness, locale, and beneficiaries of the swing were sometimes bewildering. As Professor S. F. Wise put it, Canada seemed to become "four or five countries electorally." It was perhaps "paradoxical and ironic," but certainly not "ludicrous," that the traditional areas of protest—the Maritime and Prairie provinces—remained Conservative, for John Diefenbaker, more than any prime minister, had consciously identified himself with the "havenot" provinces. More surprisingly, Quebec and Ontario each spoke with two voices. At a time when the island of Montreal was once again becoming the most Liberal part of Canada, the rest of Quebec largely

BECK

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63

repudiated both old line parties for the first time in its history. In rural Ontario, except for the seats along Lake Erie, the Conservatives fared reasonably well, but in their erstwhile bastion of Toronto and York County they were the victims of a real revolt, and the Liberals were the principal gainers. In British Columbia, on the other hand, the chief beneficiary of Conservative losses was the N.D.P. The alleged evils of deficit financing and dollar devaluation, and the prospect of an increase in the cost of living, appeared to play particular havoc with the government's candidates among the allegedly sophisticated middle-class urban and suburban voters of Canada's largest metropolitan areas. Never had so many segments of the Canadian electorate behaved so differently at any one time. If the results of 1926 and 1958 repeat themselves, an early election will show either a recovery of Conservative strength, particularly in Ontario, or a continuance of Liberal resurgence, sufficient in either case to enable one of these parties to control the House of Commons. To permit this outcome, one political leader will have to create the impression that his party alone can win and thereby save the country from the ills of minority government. What, then, is characteristic of Canadian politics, at least up to 1962? For one thing, it is a tolerance of and reluctance to get rid of the government in office. But sooner or later a large proportion of the floating voters in all regions—and they, an increasing number in recent years, are the ones who decide the elections—somehow reach the conclusion that the time is ripe for a change. The number may be insufficient to give the victorious party an over-all majority in each of the four regions, but the trend will be unmistakable. Special regional or local factors— personal, economic, religious, racial, the fact that an opposed political party has recently won a provincial election—may serve to dilute the trend in some provinces, but will not arrest it significantly. Simultaneously the floating voters in all regions have found the image of the incumbent party repellent and that of its major opponent more attractive. Under these circumstances no region can complain that it is having its governmental leaders dictated by another region, and the results of any election are generally acceptable. Those who feel that democratic politics ought to be interesting, even exciting, are naturally critical because political apathy seems to settle over the nation during a prolonged period of one-party rule. But perhaps this is comparatively a small price to pay for the comparative ease of carrying on democratic government in Canada. Few countries of such complexity can so easily keep conflict and consensus in balance.

Group Interests in

•

s. D. CLARK

Canadian Politics*

THE GROWING INTEREST in the study of the voting behaviour of the Canadian people reflects an increasing maturity in the science of politics in Canada. By means of such study we are on the way to knowing a good deal more than we now know about the kind of forces in our society that determine people's political preferences and attachments. In particular, it may be expected that from the study of voting behaviour will come a much greater recognition of the part played in Canadian political life by such group interests as nationality, religion, and social class. The student of politics, of course, has for long been interested in the question of what it was that caused people to behave politically in the way that they did, and no account of a Canadian election of the past has failed to offer some kind of assessment of the reasons for the political alignments that occurred. With no precise knowledge of how *This paper might be considered an answer to some of the criticisms made in reviews of my Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840 (Toronto, 1959). I have studiously avoided in this paper the use of the term "frontier" because of the misconceptions the term gives rise to. I hope this paper, however, makes clear that there was nothing whatever deterministic about the thesis set forward in Movements of Political Protest or in the earlier Church and Sect in Canada (Toronto, 1948) where frontier was meant to indicate nothing much more than "area of change." I would not find it easy to acknowledge, in writing this paper, the precise extent of my debt to a number of people. My obligation to Professor Reinhard Bendix in particular is a heavy one. Some of the things I have tried to say here he has said much better in "Social Stratification and Political Power," American Political Science Review, 1954, pp. 357-75. A number of other papers of his might be cited. Mention should also be made here of S. M. Lipsefs Political Man (New York, 1960) and William Kornhauser's The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, 1959).

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different members of the population actually voted, however, it has been a matter, to a considerable degree, of guessing at the reasons for political action from the nature of the public discussion of political issues and from the way in which different areas of the country voted. The effect has been to bias explanation in favour of the importance of certain influences in political behaviour. People's party loyalties or attachments to particular political programmes found ready expression in public debate. Thus the great moving forces in political life have appeared to be the play of leaders and ideas. If the examination of the way in which different parts of the country voted prompted consideration of factors other than the purely political, it has been interests of a regional character which attracted greatest attention. The geographical distribution of voting strength of the different parties across the country appeared to indicate some sort of relation between people's regional and political affiliations. The fact that a good deal of public debate in almost every election touched upon issues of a regional character gave emphasis to the importance of these influences in political life. People were prepared to talk about, and urge consideration of, their interests as members of regional groupings. Indeed, the very character of party leadership and party programmes seemed to be determined in good part by the conflicts and compromises of such interests in political life. Neither the examination of the character of public debate nor of the geographical distribution of the voting strength of the different parties throughout the country, however, prompted serious consideration of the part played by such interests as those of nationality, religion, and social class in political behaviour. People do not ordinarily talk about interests such as these or offer them as a reason for their actions. Thus such interests find no clear expression in public debate. Nor do they reveal themselves in any clear fashion in the geographical distribution of the voting strength of the different parties; divisions of the population along regional lines tend to a considerable extent to hide any differences in the way people vote as a result of their attachments to particular ethnic, religious, or social class groupings. Thus a good deal of Canadian political history has been written as if divisions of the population along such lines as these did not exist.1 Political leaders, anxious to broaden the group interest basis of support of the parties they led, have joined with the student of politics in this conspiracy of silence. Only within such !Not all Canadian historians, of course, have failed to recognize the importance of such group interests in politics. F. H. Underbill and A. R. M. Lower have given a good deal of attention to the influence of such interests and a number of other historians could be mentioned.

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aberrant political movements as the early socialist parties, the United Farmers of Alberta, and the Communists have political leaders been prepared to make an open appeal to particular group interests. We have come near, in Canada, to forming political parties on the basis of social class but never on the basis of ethnic identity or religion. The study of people's voting behaviour gains significance from the fact that it is those very forces in political life least revealed through the public discussion of political issues which are made the most apparent.2 By means of such study it becomes possible to discover the group affiliations and attachments of people and how they voted and, with the building up of a substantial sample and particularly over a number of elections, to seek out distinctive patterns of voting behaviour. Thus can be searched out possible relations between how people vote and their group interests. It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt any general evaluation of the findings of voting behaviour studies with respect to the part played in Canadian politics by such group interests. The concern here is with the role of these interests in situations of rapid political change, and interest in the findings of voting behaviour studies is limited to the examination of the assumption that it is possible to explain why people behave politically as they do by viewing their behaviour as taking place within the context of an order of group interests. There can be no questioning the existence of such an order nor can there be any questioning the fact that in the day-in-and-day-out routine of living the way people behave is largely determined by their position within such an order. This is as true of political as other forms of behaviour. It does make a difference in how he votes what nationality, religion, and social class a person is. Indeed, if this were not the case, organizations like those engaged in the business of election forecasting would long since have ceased to exist. Once attention, however, is shifted to the phenomenon of change in forms of political organization, exemplified in the rise of new political movements, the interest no longer can be in the discovery of the way in which people's behaviour is related to their position within an order of group interests. What now requires explanation is not why people go on behaving politically in certain predictable ways but why they suddenly cease doing so and become caught up in new forms of political action. Political change implies a break from established patterns of 2 There can be no attempt here to indicate the extensive literature on voting behaviour. See Lipset, Political Man. Of Canadian studies, mention should be made of John Meisel's "Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour: A Case Study," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Nov., 1956, pp. 482-96.

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political behaviour, a change in people's political loyalties, beliefs, and commitments, and such change comes about through the appeal of new political leaders and new ideas and the forming of new group political affiliations. The effort to relate voting behaviour to people's established and recognizable group interests, such as those of nationality, religion, and social class has the effect of diverting attention away from this dynamic quality of the political process. The political group, that is to say, becomes an interest in itself and one which, in times of disturbance and change, replaces to some extent those other group interests which in ordinary times largely determine how a people behave politically. The historian, in seeking an explanation of political developments of the past, was not so far wrong in placing the emphasis he did upon the public discussion of political issues. By doing so, he may have failed to give sufficient emphasis to the nature of the forces maintaining order in political life, but he came closer than it is possible to come by the study of voting behaviour to the explanation of how political change takes place. It is to the uncommitted that the appeal of the new political movement is made and the uncommitted are the people least a part of any existing order of group interests. It is not thus in the discovery of the relationship of people's political behaviour to their interests as members of particular ethnic groups, religions, or social classes that is to be found the explanation for political change. Such an explanation, rather, can only be found by an examination of the nature of those forces developing outside rather than from within an existing order of group interests. The problem of political change is not one of comparative sociological analysis but of sociological history. This becomes apparent if an attempt is made to examine any of those periods of Canadian political history when there were far-reaching changes taking place in the character and forms of political organization. At any one of these periods it would not have been difficult to have discovered among the population clear divisions of group interests along ethnic, religious, and social class lines and no great amount of investigation would have been required to have shown that those people who had certain particular group interests were heavily committed to the maintenance of the existing political order. Thus Toryism, under whatever name it may have gone, has been able to rely almost throughout the country's political history upon the support of people who have been highly conscious of their Anglo-Saxon ethnic identity, have been Protestant and usually Anglican in religious affiliation, and belonged to the more privileged social classes of the community. But the developing movements bringing about change in the political order had no such

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clear basis of support in group interest. In terms of particular ethnic, religious, social class or other such affiliations there simply was no way of distinguishing between those people who became caught up in such movements of political change and those who did not. Thus in Upper and Lower Canada in the troublous political years of the 1830's there were no ethnic, religious or social class interests represented in the rebellion movements, with the possible exception of that relatively small closely knit group of Scottish Secessionist Presbyterians, which were not represented in the parties opposed to rebellion as well.3 There were, of course, significant differences between the people who aligned themselves on the side of rebellion and the people who tended to the support of the Tory cause but, except for the small privileged class whose interests were clearly identified with the ruling party and that equally small Scots group which brought from overseas its liberal principles, these differences were not of an ethnic, religious, or social class sort. Members of the governing bureaucracy, the well-to-do merchants, the military, important personages belonging to the Churches of England and Scotland, and people who were intensely pro-English and anti-American and anti-French in national sentiment almost unanimously lent their support to the tory cause. But whether those people who did not belong to this tight little ruling clique aligned themselves with the parties of conservative political views or joined political movements growing increasingly radical in their appeals depended less upon their particular ethnic, religious, and social class attachments than upon the extent to which they had been caught up in forces of social disturbance and change and had lost almost all sense of group attachment of any sort. It was, in Upper Canada, in those areas most recently settled, and by a population for the most part which had brought with it no strong sense of ethnic, religious, or social class identity, where the rebellion movement attracted the greatest support. In Lower Canada, the seat of the rebellion, as of the political disturbances of the 1770's and 1790's, was in that triangular area south and east of Montreal where the traditional culture of the people was most fully exposed to outside influences. The habitant population of the lower St. Lawrence, like the farm population in the eastern counties of Upper Canada and in the area about Peterborough, did not join in the rebellion though in terms of group interests it might have been thought to have had greater reasons to do so than the part of the population which did. What would seem apparent in both Upper and Lower Canada was that it was those people 3

Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, chaps. 15 and 16.

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with the least stake in the established ethnic-religious-social class order who became most fully involved in the rebellion movements. Such people might well have turned to other forms of social expression, and, in Upper Canada, many of them did become caught up in new evangelical religious movements.4 What made political radicals out of some people and religious sectarians out of others may be accounted for in part by the differing cultural heritages of people and in part by the sheer accident of whether movements of a political or a religious character arrived first on the scene, but considerations such as these only give emphasis to the importance of ideas and leadership in giving shape to forms of organization and in determining the effectiveness of their appeal. In neither Upper nor Lower Canada was there anything within the existing order which clearly prescribed what course of action would be taken. To discover the determinants of action in a situation such as developed here involves looking outside rather than within the existing order. The same is true, it may be argued, if attention is directed to a very much more recent example of change in the Canadian political community represented by the sweeping Conservative victory in the federal elections of 1957-58. It would be foolhardy to attempt here anything in the way of a complete explanation of what happened in 1957-58.5 There is far too much that we do not know. It does seem possible to suggest, however, some of the things which ought to be looked for if a satisfactory explanation is to be found. In particular, it would appear that no attempt to relate voting behaviour to people's group interests would offer a means of fully accounting for what occurred. It is perfectly true, of course, that in 1957 and 1958 the vast majority of Canadians voted as they had always done and any analysis of the voting behaviour of these people would clearly reveal a close relationship to group affiliations. Certainly, the Conservatives in 1957-58 lost little of their character as a party appealing to people of strong proBritish sentiment, Protestant in religion, and upper or upper middle class in social status. As well, it would seem obvious that important shifts in voting took place in 1957 and 1958 as a result of a redefinition of their political position on the part of a number of groups in the population, ethnic groups in particular.6 Yet something more than this, it would 4

Clark, Church and Sect in Canada, chap. HI. Professor John Meisel's study, The Canadian General Election of 1957 (Toronto, 1962), which will be published while this work is in press, will add greatly not only to our understanding of what happened in that election but of the election process in general. 6 And, even more particularly, in 1958, in French Canada. 5

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appear, happened in 1957-58 to account for the phenomenal victory achieved by the Conservatives and it is this something more that needs to be examined. To explain what happened in terms of the rise of what has been called "the new middle class" has a certain plausibility in view of the heavy vote polled by the Conservative party in suburban areas. By 1957-58 there had grown up on the outskirts of the larger Canadian cities a number of smart new residential areas housing a population intensely conscious of its British, Protestant, and upper middle class identity. These were the "organization men" Whyte wrote about, people who, escaping the nondescript society of the big city, succeeded within the protected suburban social environment in realizing their aspirations for higher social status.7 Such people could be expected to shift heavily to the support of the Conservative party. To describe what occurred in the suburbs generally, however, as a drift to political Conservatism and to account for this drift in terms of strengthened feelings of ethnic, religious, and social class identity is to almost completely misjudge the character of forces of suburban development.8 Among the great mass of people who settled in the suburbs in the years after the Second World War, numbered in areas like that of Toronto in the hundreds of thousands, only a small fraction was influenced in its choice of place of residence by status considerations of any sort, ethnic, religious, social class, or other. People moved to the suburbs because it was only here they could find the type of house they wanted and could afford. Their savings used up with the purchase of a house and its furnishings, and faced with the responsibilities of rearing a family, there could be little thought on the part of these new suburban residents of improving their social position. The energies of people were largely directed to the struggle to get established.9 It is perfectly true that the people who settled in the suburbs were predominantly British in background and Protestant in religion and, in terms of their income and occupation, they could be described as middle class. But these were negative rather than positive qualities. To be British in origin, Protestant in religion, and to have an income ranging between $4,000 and $10,000 a year was to be just like everybody else, ^William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York, 1956). spor a very excellent discussion of the politics of suburban areas see Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics (Boston, 1959), though with his interpretation I do not wholly agree. 9 What is here said is developed at length in my paper, "The Suburban Community," in S. D. Clark, ed., Urbanism and the Changing Canadian Society (Toronto, 1961).

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or so it seemed to those people settled in the vast, spreading suburban areas beginning and ending nowhere that could be clearly seen. Suburban settlement gave emphasis to the importance of primary group associations, the family and neighbourhood in particular, but in the early experience of suburban living secondary group associations largely broke down.10 Such could hardly fail to have been the case considering the kind of people caught up in the mass movement to the suburbs: young families with one or two children, just nicely started out in life to make a living and now faced with the task of making a home for themselves. What this meant among the great mass of new suburban residents was a general indifference to matters of politics. The suburbanite did not become an active participant in political organizations as, indeed, he did not become an active participant in any organization which was not directly and immediately related to the problems he faced as a new home-owner. There was lacking on his part any strong social group consciousness; he was one of many thousands of persons who had found their way into the suburbs in search of a home and there could be no feeling on his part of being different from his fellow residents or, on the other side, of having a great deal in common with them. His was a society centred largely on family and neighbourhood. There was thus a good deal of feeling among suburban residents of being cut off from the outside world. Such a feeling did not make political radicals out of them but it did not make political conservatives out of them either. If it did anything, it was to foster an attitude of being against the powers-that-be. Suburban residents, in their first years of settlement in the suburbs, had little good to say about governments of any kind. The people who governed were "they," whether such people were the local township authorities or the persons responsible for the administration of provincial or federal affairs. There was here no wellinformed public opinion, no deeply imbedded sense of political loyalty, no "world" view of public affairs. There was rather an intense isolationism, an urge to avoid involvement in any undertaking that promised no immediate reward. There could be nothing surprising, therefore, in the fact that while suburban residents harboured strong feelings of grievance towards government, and particularly the local township government, many of 10

The significance of this divorce between primary and secondary forms of association is developed at length by Kornhauser in The Politics of Mass Society, though, unfortunately in my view, he equates much too closely mass society with the society of totalitarian countries. American society is not wholly lacking the character of a mass society.

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them did not bother to vote at election time. The conviction was strong that they had nothing to vote for. Governments were something belonging to the world outside which could not be changed or made over by any effort of the suburban resident. This conviction persisted even when, with respect to local township affairs, the suburban home-owners outnumbered the old residents. Indeed, no matter how strong in numbers he became within the local community, the suburban resident could not escape for a very long time the feeling of being something of an outsider, almost an interloper. How this isolationism, this sense of grievance against the powers-thatbe, found expression depended very much upon how it was appealed to and given direction. A good deal of it found expression in such ephemeral forms of activity as vigorous backyard complaining among neighbours, the signing of petitions to the local township government, the organization of mass demonstrations at township council meetings, or, at most, the formation of ratepayers' associations. Where suburban areas had developed at different times, problems which were of very much concern to some areas were often of little moment to others, and as a result there could be no easy channelling of grievances all in one direction. This was particularly the case with respect to matters of township government. Where, however, the sense of grievance of suburban residents could be directed at governments further removed it was less difficult to arouse a common response. All suburban residents were alike in one respect: they lived outside the big city and had some feeling of being distinct from it. Local township leaders were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered to channel the suburban residents' sense of grievance in the direction of blaming the government of the big city for most of the ills they suffered and where such local township leaders possessed demagogic qualities there developed what in effect assumed the character of a mass crusade against the city. What is significant about these local, intensely isolationist, movements which grew up in the suburbs was that they had no clear group interest basis of support. All sorts of people became caught up in these movements. They gave expression to no recognizable ethnic, religious, or social class interest of the population. On the other hand, however, they had an unmistakable regional basis of support. A sense of having something in common developed out of these movements of protest directed against the city. Such clearly was the accomplishment, for instance, of Mr. Oliver Crockford in the years he was Reeve of the Township of Scarborough. By building up the image of "my people," Crockford was

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able to give his following a sense of social belonging, of being joined together in a common endeavour. There could be no such appeal as this to the suburban population by Mr. Diefenbaker in the federal elections of 1957 and 1958. Mr. Diefenbaker was the leader of an old and established national party and what clearly was of first importance was the maintenance of that solid core of Conservative support which could be counted upon to return across the country a substantial number of members to Parliament. So small in numbers had the party faithful become, however, that there was in 1957 little hope of attaining power even with a successful appeal to the socalled floating vote. If the hold of the Liberal Government in Ottawa was to be broken it could only be done by arousing across the country a great mass movement of protest against it. It was this that Mr. Diefenbaker succeeded in doing and nowhere was he more successful than in the new suburban areas. In terms of what interests they may have had, as members of particular ethnic, religious, or social class groups, it is not easy to see what suburban residents had against the Liberal party and the way it had governed the country. Not many of the ills they suffered could in any clear way be attributed to what the government in Ottawa had done. Indeed, their very ability to move into the suburbs and buy a home for themselves was largely due to those conditions of economic prosperity closely associated with the long rule of the Liberal party. Certainly, if any group interests had been slighted by the Government those interests were not to be found in any large way in the suburbs. The kind of government offered by the Liberals was precisely the kind of government suburban residents might have been expected to favour. On the other hand, there was little Mr. Diefenbaker had to offer which could have been expected to appeal to a suburban population acting in terms of the kind of group interests it was supposed to have. The campaign promises made by Mr. Diefenbaker meant the spending of great sums of public money and for the development of projects, such as the South Saskatchewan River dam and roads into the Arctic, in which suburban residents had little interest. There was certainly too much of the crusader about Mr. Diefenbaker, with his vision of national development and limited understanding of the complex problems of the national economy, for him to inspire among suburban residents who may have been influenced by their middle-class interests strong feelings of confidence. Nor in ethnic background or religious attachments was he the person to appeal to the kind of people suburbanites were made out to be. It was not those suburban residents highly conscious of their status as persons of Anglo-Saxon origin, Protestant religious affiliation,

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and middle-class social position who gave, it would seem, Mr. Diefenbaker the huge majorities he obtained in suburban areas. For the great mass of suburban residents in 1957-58 his appeal was of a very different sort. If the suburban residents who voted for Mr. Diefenbaker had any one set of social characteristics in common it was that they were almost all young, had only recently become home-owners and settled members of a community, and many were being called upon to vote in 1957 and 1958 for the first time in their lives. Thus, for instance, in the largely suburban constituency of York-Scarborough, the number of voters doubled between the election of 1953 and that of 1958. In 1953 the Liberal candidate in this constituency had won by a narrow majority. In 1958 the size of the Conservative majority almost exactly equalled the size of the increase in the electorate. Almost one-half of the electorate fell in the age-group 21-34, if Canadian census figures for 1956 can be used as a guide.11 It cannot be concluded, of course, that the whole of this new electorate supported the Conservatives in 1958 but there would seem little doubt that most of it did. Nowhere else in Canada was there such a sweeping gain made by the Conservatives in 1958 as in York-Scarborough and nowhere else was there such an intrusion of new voters. Voters such as these did not have many group interests of an ethnic, religious, or social class sort to protect. What they were seeking was a meaning or purpose in their lives, a sense of social belonging or mission, and this they found in identification with the movement Mr. Diefenbaker headed up and in the campaign to defeat the Liberal Government. In a number of other areas in Canada the kind of forces which led to the shift of support of the population to the Conservatives were probably not so greatly different from those which led to the Conservative victory in suburban areas. Such at least would seem the case in the rural and small town areas of western Canada. Here, what appears remarkable was the close similarity between the movement which put Mr. Aberhart in office as Social Credit Premier of Alberta in 1935 and the movement which led to the almost complete Conservative sweep of the two western provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1958.12 The appeal of Mr. Diefenbaker could scarcely develop into the character of a crusade in the same way as did the appeal of Mr. Aberhart. The n ln a constituency such as York-Scarborough, made up of parts of four municipalities, there is no easy way of determining the age composition of the electorate. In 1956, however, of a total adult population of 85,211 in the township of Scarborough, 38,870, or over 45 per cent, belonged to the age group 20-34. 12 See J. A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto, 1960).

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economic plight of the West was not nearly as desperate in 1958 as it had been in 1935. But with the end of the post-war boom in farm prices and the growing cost-price squeeze there was among the population the same general feeling of uncertainty about the future, the same sense of being "done in" by forces beyond its control, the same searching for a scapegoat. In the federal election of 1958 Mr. Diefenbaker, of course, could rely upon the support of people who had been lifelong Conservatives; there was in 1935 no body of voters owing a traditional attachment to the Social Credit party. But the kind of people who gave the Conservatives their victories in 1958, in Alberta and Saskatchewan, were probably not greatly different from the kind of people who gave the Social Crediters their victories in Alberta in 1935: those people the least well informed about public affairs, the least politically minded, the least active in their local communities, the least involved in organizations at the local, provincial, and national level, the least economically and socially secure. The Diefenbaker campaign in Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1958 has yet to be studied, but from what is known about the candidates and their performances during the election, and from the type of appeal made by party campaign managers with their careful playing down of the name of the party and stress upon the name of the leader, it is hard to believe that the Conservative victory reflected any strong sense of ethnic, religious, or social class consciousness among the population.13 Just about everybody seemed to vote for Mr. Diefenbaker in 1958 as just about everybody had voted for Mr. Aberhart in 1935; everybody, that is to say, except those people whose very clear group interests served to maintain them in their traditional party attachments. What the elections of 1957-58 would appear to demonstrate, at least in such areas as the suburbs and western Canada, is that people can be relied upon to behave in terms of their established group interests only so long as nothing has happened to upset the existing order of things. Society is never without people who feel they do not quite belong, who are lacking a sense of status or position within the social order. Among such people life tends to be centred almost wholly within associations of a primary group character. Where people like this are few in numbers the effect politically is not greatly felt; the random type behaviour which results can be accounted for at election times in terms of the "floating vote." Where, however, there develop widespread areas of social disturbance and, as Kornhauser would put it, a very con13 But the regional interest remained strong and the shift which occurred in Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1958 may in part be accounted for in the same terms as the shift which took place in Quebec; that is, the shift in party allegiance of a whole population group.

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siderable divorce between the primary and secondary group structure of society, the behaviour which results may no longer assume a random form. It can become channelled along non-political lines and have as a consequence no impact upon political development. Such is the case where there arise new forms of religious expression. But given an effort to exploit politically the forces of disturbance within the society, the development can take a political form and result in the radical departure of great masses of people from established patterns of political behaviour. This is one of the things which happened, it would seem, in the elections of 1957-58. The trouble with the effort to relate people's political behaviour to their group interests is that it assumes a greater order in the structure of group relationships than in fact exists. Voting behaviour study gives emphasis to the static rather than dynamic qualities of society. That is not to say that there is no recognition of the importance in political life of forces of group conflict; indeed, sociologists such as S. M. Lipset have built their interpretation of American political society very largely around this notion of warring interest groups within the structure of political relationships. But it is easy to move from the position taken by Lipset to the position taken by David Riesman and view this warring as taking place between interest groups whose opposing influences are cancelled out within the larger political society. Certainly it is hard to become excited about the kind of struggle which goes on between the different established political parties, economic associations or religious denominations, even, indeed, when there is a lining up of interests on opposing sides, Conservatives against Liberals, employers against trade unions, Protestants against Catholics. None of these struggles is likely to cause any serious upset in the existing order of things. But situations do occur where whole societies are torn with strife and far-reaching changes in the structure of political relationships take place, and this has happened in American political society as well as others. The concentration upon the analysis of group determinants of behaviour diverts attention away from the examination of these situations of disturbance and change. It is perhaps not a little curious that while his background has made the sociologist something of a political radical, the methods of study he has employed has made him something of a political conservative. Voting behaviour study, certainly, can scarcely be expected to give emphasis to the importance of revolutionary forces within society. There is probably more than a little truth in the charge that American sociology has been largely devoted to the task of disproving the Marxist theory. Such a task has not been difficult since Marx was as much wrong as

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have been those building up the sociological case against him. Like the sociological theory of group conflict, the Marxist theory errs from the effort to fit everyone into an interest grouping, the only difference being that the Marxist would have us believe that, in the working out of the struggle between groups, there emerges an irreconcilable struggle or conflict between two major groups, capital and labour. This has not happened. Yet the stubborn fact remains that revolutions do occur of various sorts. Professor C. B. Macpherson studied one such example of revolution in his examination of the forces giving rise to the Social Credit movement in Alberta,14 but there was here certainly no war between capital and labour. Resort thus had to be had to an explanation of the conduct of the Alberta people in terms of the absence of class consciousness of the petit bourgeois and the false consciousness of society and themselves of such a class. What Professor Macpherson, however, seems unwilling to concede is that it is just such a population lacking in a class consciousness which has been one of the chief forces in history bringing about political change. Thus it is that the working classes in society may go on voting Tory while the social masses bring about revolution. What Mark looked for among the new working population created by industrial capitalism was a developing consciousness of class, but when such a consciousness developed the worker became less ready for revolution, not more. Thus, for instance, in the first twenty years of the present century, there could develop a strong radical, almost revolutionary, movement among western Canadian labour. What was painfully being created here in these years was a proletariat out of people of various ethnic attachments, religions, and occupational backgrounds who had no understanding of the situation in which they found themselves. To such people the ideas of socialism, industrial unionism, and the general strike could make a strong appeal, and able leadership was available in persons with a background of old country experience in trade union agitation. There was in the organization of the One Big Union and in the Winnipeg General Strike all the appearance of a movement giving expression to a proletarian class consciousness, but this was not because such a consciousness existed but because the ideology of the movement was based upon the assumption of its existence. Once the consciousness of class did in fact develop, and stable forms of trade unionism became established, the western Canadian labour movement of protest quickly disintegrated. This is not to suggest, of course, that the kind of class conflict Marx talked about does not exist in society. Workers when organized are not ^Democracy in Alberta (Toronto, 1953).

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made to love their employers, and much of the struggle which goes on in the political organization of society can be traced to class and other forms of group conflict. But such conflict takes place within an ordered social system of some sort. This is necessarily the case because the very existence of organized groups depends upon such a system. It is when the system breaks down that people find themselves acting not out of their group interests but as persons who have no clear relationship to the existing power structure of society and are placed in a position of opposition to it. They are made a part of the social masses. The Marxist theory perhaps comes nearer social reality than does the sociological theory of social organization by at least recognizing, if not approving, the important role which has been played in history by those people who have been lacking a class consciousness. Such people have turned out to be the chief dynamic force in society and this has been so because of their very lack of a class consciousness. They have been people who through force of circumstances have been placed outside the established power structure of society and in a relationship which at least potentially is one of conflict. So long as the behaviour of such people is given no clear direction, it assumes nothing more than a character of randomness, finding expression in a general attitude of apathy, in various deviant forms of activity, or in sporadic collective outbursts. If effectively channelled, however, it can take on a shape and dimension of sufficient force to topple the thrones of emperors and make over the nations in which men live. The Alberta of Mr. Aberhart was not so greatly different from the Germany of Mr. Hitler. We can now return to the position taken in the opening paragraphs of this paper. There is no quarrel here with efforts such as those represented by the study of voting behaviour to search out the forces at work in society securing its integration and cohesion. We may well marvel at the toughness of that network of group attachments, of an ethnic, religious, social class and other sort, which give meaning to the structure of social relationships. It took the anthropologist looking at primitive society to make us wholly aware of how much society is an order or system. The political historian and perhaps as well the political scientist have been too little prepared to see politics as something taking place within a social context and nothing but a gain in understanding can come from the effort to "sociologize" the study of politics. The sociologist, on the other hand, however, has been too little an historian, and there is the very real danger that in the comparative analysis of political systems he will think of his task as complete. Politics is an order but it is also a process, and in its analysis as a process there is no short cut past history.

Early Socialism

PAUL w. FOX

in Canada

so LITTLE is yet known about the history of early socialism in Canada that it is not safe to give its origins a specific date.1 To do so would also require positing a definition of socialism which was acceptable to those concerned, and if the history of Canadian socialism proves anything, it demonstrates that there has never been any consensus on the essential principles of the belief. From its infancy to the present, socialism in this country has been interpreted by its followers in various fashions, ranging from broad ethical generalizations such as "socialism is a way of life; it implies brotherhood" to specific definitions like the classic canon, "the development of a society which would own and control the means of wealth production and distribution."2 !G. D. H. Cole dismisses the entire early period of socialism in Canada with the remark that "there was very little significant development up to 1914". A History of Socialist Thought: vol. Ill, The Second International 1889-1914 (London, 1956), part II, p. 819. This is a facile generalization which merely obscures the origins of Canadian socialism. The problem is not that there were no significant developments but that they have never been studied in any detail, a deficiency which this essay attempts to remedy partially by providing a rudimentary survey. 2 These quotations are from septuagenarian Canadian socialists whom the author interviewed for an original history of Canadian socialism presented on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's radio programme "Wednesday Night" on July 12, 1961. The author would like to acknowledge his indebtedness to the C.B.C. for allowing him to use some of this material in this article. He is also indebted to the veteran socialists to whom he talked. These included in Winnipeg Fred Tipping, James Aiken, David Orlikow; in Edmonton Elmer Roper, Alfred Familo, William Irvine; in Regina T. C. Douglas; in Vancouver Wallis Lefeaux, John Harrington, Robert Skinner, Arthur J. Turner, Dorothy G. Steeves, Angus and Grace Maclnnis; in Toronto Tim Buck, Joseph Salsberg,

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The highly individualistic nature of socialist belief in Canada has sprung in part from the strong "inner-directed" personalities and dogmatic attitudes of many of its adherents, and in part from Canadian geography which abetted these inclinations. Like so many Canadian institutions, socialist parties have found it extremely difficult to overcome the barrier of distance and establish a viable national organization. Localism prevailed for decades, with pockets of socialists pursuing their isolated courses and theories. Though a number of attempts were made to create a national party, it was not until 1932 that the effort met with any lasting success, and even since then the endeavour has been so faltering that the contemporary challenge to its survival remains what it has been in the past: the difficulty of integrating the parts throughout the country into a functioning national party with an ideology that is acceptable to the general membership. In the period under study in this appraisal—from the origins of the movement to approximately 1920— the challenge was never successfully met. Discrepancies in doctrine stemmed partly from the different seeds of socialist theory which took root in local soil. These were all imported, carried in literature or in the minds of immigrants who flooded into the country at the beginning of this century. No evidence has yet come to light of any indigenous Canadian socialist speculation, though the public may have been conditioned to collectivism by the paternalism of the French regime and the underwriting by later governments of national projects like the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Three external sources of socialism stand out: Britain, the United States, and Europe. The last, of course, fertilized the other two and thereby indirectly influenced Canada. It also had some direct effect, notably amongst groups of European immigrants in this country. Fred Tipping of Winnipeg has commented: "A number of socialists came from Germany . . . and I used to find in travelling across the West that there would be groups of people from Scandinavian countries, Swedes and Danes and so on, who were very ardent social democrats."3 David Orlikow, a former C.C.F. and New Democratic party member of the Manitoba legislature and now newly elected N.D.P. member of Parliament, recalled that he was influenced by the Jewish parochial school he attended in Winnipeg. It was run by "European socialists" who pursued "a Marxian or semi-Marxian approach." Contrary to what might be David Lewis, Millar Stewart, Frank Underbill; in Kitchener John Walter; in Guelph Fred White; and in Gait Wilson C. Glaspell. Transcripts of the interviews are in the author's possession, sinterview, April 23, 1961.

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expected it was not preponderantly German since there was "a good deal of attention [paid] to Russians and French and some others."4 But the continent of Europe was less of a direct influence in moulding Canadian socialism than either Britain or the United States, as might be imagined in light of the proximity of the U.S.A. and the large number of British immigrants to Canada. Among the thousands of English and Scottish working class newcomers were many convinced socialists, a number of whom had picked up their beliefs through their trade unions. As an apprentice in the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Tim Buck, who later served as head of the Canadian Communist party for thirtythree years, came under the spell of Tom Mann, the socialist general secretary of the Society.5 James Aiken of Winnipeg joined the Socialist Club in Aberdeen when he was an apprentice compositor.6 Alfred Familo of Edmonton was a mason in England when he was led to read Marx.7 Keir Hardie, the founder of the British Independent Labour party in 1893, also made converts. Tim Buck had joined the I.L.P. before coming to Canada, and Fred Tipping was swayed by hearing Hardie speak and by a long conversation with him during a memorable walk from Islington to Highbury. Other socialist and labour leaders mentioned by early Canadian socialists included John Burns, Cunninghame Graham, H. M. Hyndman and his Social Democratic Federation, and the Fabians, though the last had less impact on the working class than on intellectuals. Religion played a role as well. The implication of the remark made several years ago by Morgan Phillips, then secretary of the British Labour Party, that "British socialism owed as much to Methodism as to Marx" has been corroborated by the experience of several Canadian socialists. Tipping, Aiken, and William Irvine8 acknowledged their own youthful evangelical persuasions and the part these had played in conducting them to socialism. But the mass of British working class converts to socialism was drawn in by emotion rather than by intellect or spirit. By far the most popular proselytizer was Robert Blatchford, whose appeal was almost wholly sentimental rather than cerebral. A gifted journalist, Blatchford devoted interview, April 23, 1961. Interview, May 23, 1961. Interview, April 23, 1961. An incident in Mr. Aiken's youth is illustrative of the by-ways of socialism. He recalled a visit to his home in Aberdeen by Prince Kropotkin whose book was being published by Mr. Aiken's father's firm. ^Interview, April 24,1961. Interview, April 24, 1961.

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his talents to the cause, editing the sprightly journal, the Clarion, and turning out socialist best-sellers like Merrie England? His name was the one most frequently mentioned by early Canadian socialists in interviews, for virtually all of them had read him and been swept away by his fervent pathos. Several recalled that they had been converted in England by Blatchford and had not read Marx until later in Canada.10 Blatchford himself had never read Marx; he was overcome by another romantic socialist, William Morris, whom he worshipped.11 Britain thus nurtured many Canadian socialists, and not always on her own shores. Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald, secretary of the Labour Representation Committee which became the British Labour party in 1906, visited Winnipeg personally, Hardie lecturing there with great effect in 1907. The United States also played a major role in the formation of Canadian socialism. Henry George's single tax doctrine and his book, Progress and Poverty, which appeared in 1879 and drew Englishmen like George Bernard Shaw towards socialism, were not referred to by any of the Canadians questioned, but Robert Skinner of Vancouver remembered reading Edward Bellamy's Utopian Looking Backward some years after its publication in 1887,12 and the works of Upton Sinclair and Jack London were also recalled, particularly by socialists in British Columbia. Wilshire's Magazine, a socialist periodical from New York City, had subscribers as far away as Gait, Ontario, in the first decade of the twentieth century, and the five-cent Marxist booklets and the monthly International Socialist Review published by Charles H. Kerr and Company, a co-operative in Chicago, found buyers in the same place.13 But undoubtedly the best-selling American socialist periodical in Canada was the Appeal to Reason, published weekly since 1895 by Julius 9 The Clarion was a penny socialist weekly founded in Manchester in 1891. The tract Merrie England was published two years later. It sold 750,000 copies in one year. There can be little doubt of Blatchford's enormous influence among the British working class. Holbrook Jackson said Blatchford was the greatest living danger to the existing social system. See Laurence V. Thompson, Robert Blatchford: Portrait of an Englishman (London, 1951), p. 9. 10 Irvine, and Harrington, interview, April 26, 1961. By his own account Tim Buck had not read Marx until after his arrival in Canada and "did not understand it fully until the nineteen-twenties." ^Thompson, Robert Blatchford, p. 109. ^Interview, April 25, 1961. 13 Interview with Glaspell, June 5, 1961. Wilshire's Magazine, published by millionaire Gaylord Wilshire, modestly declared itself "the greatest socialist magazine in the world." In 1907 it stated it had a circulation of 300,000 and ran a testimonial from Upton Sinclair saying "Wilshire's editorials made me a socialist."

FOX Early Socialism 83 Wayland in Girard, Kansas. Wilson Glaspell of Gait said he sold hundreds of subscriptions to it at fifty cents a year. In 1906 it had 14,000 Canadian subscribers out of a total circulation in North America of approximately 350,000.14 One of its most frequent contributors was the most popular American socialist of the period, Eugene V. Debs, a founder of the Socialist Party of America. Between 1900 and 1920 he ran for the American presidency five times, and in 1912 secured 897,000 votes—six per cent of the total poll. Debs spoke in Berlin (subsequently Kitchener), Ontario, in February, 1906, to a public meeting which attracted eight hundred people, though there were probably "not more than 25 or 30 or 50 who were in sympathy with what he was saying."15 Debs' propaganda speeches were heard also in Gait by means of phonograph records distributed by Wilshire's Magazine as gifts for selling subscriptions. Debs' influence in Kitchener was strengthened by a link provided by a local resident, John Walter, who had been sent as a young man to study an industrial process in Syracuse, New York. Walter, the son of a German-American social democrat, was influenced by his father, and also by George H. Strobell, the electrical wizard Charles Proteus Steinmetz who was the socialist mayor of Schenectady, and by Eugene Debs, whom Walter met in Syracuse. Walter joined Debs' party about 1912 and carried its thinking back to a small social democratic group in Kitchener on his periodic visits home.16 Debs was probably even better known in western Canada. Tipping recalled meeting him personally and being very impressed. This Winnipeg socialist commented: "I think the west was more influenced by the socialist movement in the western States. . . . Victor Berger [Debs' colleague] and Eugene V. Debs were men of great influence at that time." Some Americans, migrating from mid-west farms to homesteads on the Canadian prairie, had read the Appeal to Reason, and British Columbians had both read Debs and heard him speak in person.17 Debs 14 Dorothy G. Steeves, The Compassionate Rebel: Ernest Winch and His Times (Vancouver, 1960), p. 18. Way land's Monthly was also published in Girard. Issue no. 13, May, 1901, announced on its back page that "The Appeal to Reason has a larger circulation than any exclusively political publication in the world." 15 Glaspell, interview. 1 Interview, June 5, 1961. 17 Harrington, interview. Debs officiated at the dedication of the Labour Temple in Vancouver in 1899, "on his second visit to Vancouver that year." William Bennett, Builders of British Columbia (Vancouver, n.d., likely 1937), p. 38. Bennett participated in many of these early events. If American socialism was more influential in British Columbia than British

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and Berger may have inclined western Canadian socialists to political participation since both belonged to the American socialist faction favouring political action, Berger being elected to the House of Representatives as its first socialist Congressman in 1911 and Debs being the continual S.P.A. candidate for the presidency. Berger was the more moderate of the two. Though both were pragmatic reformers and rejected syndicalism, Debs firmly believed in the necessity of the class struggle and ardently advocated industrial unionism, a course which led him to support the Industrial Workers of the World. The I.W.W.'s influence in Canada, however, was transmitted through a more representative exponent of its radicalism than Debs, namely Daniel De Leon. Supporting first Henry George and then Edward Bellamy, De Leon deserted both in succession and captured the Knights of Labor, which, having failed to achieve an industrial One Big Union, turned to political action. Meeting with an equal lack of success in this realm, the Knights disintegrated, and De Leon moved on to the Socialist Labor party, of which he soon became the leader. As editor of the party's organ, the People, he developed distinctive socialist ideas which later earned high praise from Lenin. Embracing Marxian views, he opposed reformist socialism and waged war on the constitutional trade unionism of Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor. Creating a Trade and Labor Alliance as his instrument, he preached revolutionary industrial unionism, urging his followers to join and capture reformist unions in order to establish a militant union movement of their own. Shunning all reforms as temporizing with capitalism, this movement was to engage in politics and the industrial struggle for the purpose of educating the workers in revolutionary Marxism. This line of reasoning carried De Leon into the Industrial Workers of the World, which having been founded in 1905 subsequently split into a De Leonite faction centred in Detroit and a more important wing under William D. Haywood in Chicago.18 The latter, like De Leon, did not repudiate political action but subordinated it to the achievement of industrial unionism, the goal of One Big Union which in true syndicalist fashion would rule the world. socialism, it was no doubt connected to the fact that between 1904 and 1919 B.C. derived 45 per cent of its immigrants from the U.S. and only 30 per cent from Britain (compared to 60 per cent from Britain in Ontario). The percentage of American immigrants to Saskatchewan and Alberta in this period was even greater than to B.C. See Lloyd G. Reynolds, The British Immigrant: His Social and18 Economic Adjustment to Canada (Oxford, 1935), p. 51. See Cole, History, vol. II, Marxism and Anarchism, 1850-1890 (London, 1954), chap. xm.

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85

De Leon's influence was greater in British Columbia than elsewhere in Canada, by virtue of the impact of his ideas and through the model of his Socialist Labor party and his membership in the I. W. W. The latter established its first branch in Vancouver in 1906 and quickly absorbed the Canadian locals of the American Labor Union, including the Western Federation of Miners, a significant force in B.C. at the time since it was vying with the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council for the leadership of the local labour movement.19 The I.W.W. made considerable headway not only with miners in B.C. but among loggers and others as well. "By 1911 it claimed a following of 10,000 on Canadian soil, largely in British Columbia and Alberta."20 Though more orthodox Canadian socialists derided its extremism, they were impressed by the dedication of its members. An early British Columbian socialist, John Harrington, remarked: "We were opposed to them. . . . [we] condemned the general strike as general nonsense. . . . But the I.W.W. really had a great effect on the working class movement, especially in the west." Its effect, however, was registered more in the realm of continual labour disturbances than in the formation of Canadian socialism. The threads of development of the latter were knit together from other sources, located for the most part in British Columbia and Ontario. Both had active socialist groups by the commencement of this century, though B.C. took the palm as the most vigorous socialist centre in the country. Whatever the final answer to the question so frequently posed as to why B.C. has tended traditionally to be more radical than the rest of Canada, the explanation in this period certainly was related to several factors. There were, for instance, relatively large-scale coal- and metal-mining and logging industries with a high ratio of labour often of a semi-skilled and volatile nature. Working conditions were poor in these industries and there was competition from cheap Oriental labour. There was no sizable agricultural industry to act as a stabilizing counterbalance. A large number of immigrants were arriving, particularly from Britain and the United States, and the province was especially vulnerable to western American radical ideas.21 ^Bennett, Builders of B.C., pp. 40-1. H. A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development and Functioning (Toronto, 1948), p. 299. 21 See Ronald Grantham, "Some Aspects of the Socialist Movement in British Columbia," an unpublished Master of Arts thesis at the University of British Columbia, 1942, Introduction. The writer is greatly indebted to Mr. Grantham for lending him this enlightening thesis which is one of the rare pieces of research into the early history of Canadian socialism. With the author's permission a microfilm has been deposited in the library of the University of Toronto. 20

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Thus industrial conditions in British Columbia invited trade union organization, and the province became a hotbed of labour activity at a time when craft unions in Britain were being permeated by socialism and industrial unionism in the United States was associated with leftwing radicalism. This is not to imply, of course, that all trade unionism led to socialism or to the creation of a political party. Far from it, since the largest labour body in Canada, the Trades and Labour Congress, was linked closely to Gompers' A.F. of L. which eschewed both. Though founded in 1886, the T.L.C. did not turn a tolerant eye on political action until the mid-nineties, and then the initiative was left to provincial and local affiliates. However, some labour groups had entered politics years before that date. In 1874 the Ottawa Trades Council succeeded in electing to the Ontario legislature one of the fathers of the Canadian labour movement, D. J. O'Donoghue, who at this time was the president of the capital's typographical union and first vice-president of the Canadian Labour League. Described as the "Workingman's candidate" and an "Independent in politics," O'Donoghue was re-elected in 1875 but defeated four years later.22 In 1876 the Congress of his Canadian Labour Union passed a motion recognizing that working men should have their own representatives in the House of Commons.23 In the next decade, two years after the establishment of its first local in British Columbia at Victoria in 1884, the Knights of Labor, a moderate reformist industrial union movement from the United States, ran four candidates, later described as "the first labour candidates in the west," for the provincial legislature under the rubric of the Workingmen's party, but without success.24 In 1890 a candidate sponsored jointly by the Workingmen's League of New Westminster and the T.L.C. was elected to the legislature, but he was a disappointment since he turned out to be "one of the most dyed-in-the-wool Conservatives." A more genuine representative of labour, a carpenter by the name of McPherson, was elected from Vancouver to the Victoria house in 1894 by dint of the exertions of the Nationalist party, a newly formed political creation which bore the union label. At the same time labour candidates were being entered also in municipal contests with occasional success, notably in Montreal and Vancouver in 1892. In 1896 G. R. Maxwell ^Canadian Parliamentary Companion (Montreal, 1874), p. 351. For these developments see also E. A. Forsey, "History of the Labour Movement in Canada," Canada Year Book, 1957-58 (Ottawa, 1958), pp. 795-802. ^Proceedings of the Canadian Labour Union Congresses 1873-77 (Montreal, 1951), pp. 20 and 74. 24 Bennett, Builders of B.C., pp. 29-30. See also Harold Griffin, British Columbia: The People's Early Story (Vancouver, 1958), pp. 65-7.

FOX Early Socialism 87 of Vancouver was nominated by labour and running as a Liberal he won a seat in the House of Commons. A more distinctive victory was achieved in the B.C. legislature in 1898 when the national president of the T. L. C., Ralph Smith, who was a member of the Miners' Union at Nanaimo, was elected as an Independent Labour candidate. Two years later, running on the same ticket though he frankly called himself a Liberal, he secured a seat in the federal Parliament. The members of the Nanaimo I.L.P. that Smith represented joined with other trade unionists from Victoria and Vancouver in 1899 to form a Labor party which advocated the eight-hour day, public ownership, a single tax, and government control of the medium of exchange; but it did not last long, since the Victoria faction soon read the Nanaimo I.L.P. out of the party. Undaunted, the latter continued its electoral success by sending another of its miners, J. B. Hawthornthwaite, to the provincial house in 1900. Despite the multiplicity of parties and the fact that candidates were being entered in Dominion, provincial, and municipal contests, the platforms on which most of these labour nominees ran in British Columbia were much the same. The eight-hour day was the most outstanding plank though demands for the initiative and referendum and public ownership of utilities were also common, the latter winning the support of even the T.L.C. in its 1898 "Platform of Principles." While this plank had obvious socialistic implications, practicality rather than ideology was the inspiration of most demands. Labour was thus becoming increasingly active in politics in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, but it was not until 1900 that the link was forged between labour representation and socialism. That year witnessed, as previously noted, the election provincially of J. B. Hawthornthwaite as a labour candidate, but within four years Hawthornthwaite joined the Socialist Party of Canada which he continued to represent in the legislature for some years. The federal connection between labour and socialism was also made apparent in the same year by the election to the House of Commons of A. W. Puttee, a printer by trade who was the editor of the People's Voice, the socialist-tinged organ of the Winnipeg Trades and Labour Council. However, Puttee did not speak officially for socialism in parliament. He was listed in the Parliamentary Guide of 1901 as "Labor (Ind.)," a description which could have applied also to Alphonse Verville, a plumber from Montreal who was sent to Ottawa in 1906 to represent the constituency of Maisonneuve.25 25 Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J. S. Woodsworth (Toronto, 1959), p. 153, n. 50, and Logan, Trade Unions, p. 56.

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Although Puttee and Verville did not sit for specific socialist parties, the latter were already in existence by the beginning of this century. However, they were tiny, unsubstantial, and ephemeral. A bewildering array of party names and continual changes in relations between groups testified from the first to the highly individualistic, volatile, and confusing nature of Canadian socialism. As early as the 1880's a Socialist Labor party had appeared in industrial centres in Ontario, but tying itself too closely to trade unions it had succumbed under their weight and had been succeeded by the Canadian Socialist League, organized by G. Weston Wrigley, publisher of Citizen and Country?® The League, which advocated a reform programme emphasizing government ownership, had more than sixty branches, most of them in Ontario but a few in the west and British Columbia. These all rapidly dwindled away after Citizen and Country was moved to Vancouver in 1902; the paper became the Canadian Socialist and the Socialist Party of Canada absorbed three or four of the existing branches of the league. There was also in existence a Canadian Socialist Federation whose headquarters were in Berlin, Ontario, though its organ called Cotton's Weekly, which had considerable circulation as far away as B.C., was published in Cowansville, Quebec. Some notion of what these early socialist groups believed in can be garnered from their B.C. platform in 1901. It consisted of demands for direct legislation, proportional representation, abolition of the property qualifications for voters and candidates in municipal elections, abolition of cash deposits in provincial elections, adult suffrage, a minimum wage of two dollars a day, a 44-hour week, provincial ownership and operation of coal mines, a graduated land tax, free medical attendance, scientific and practical management of fisheries, forests, and waterways, employment of the unemployed, extension of the powers of municipalities, free secular and compulsory education to age 14, free text books, meals, and clothes when necessary, municipalization and public control of the liquor traffic, abolition of the poll and personal property taxes, and no more bonusing of private individuals or corporations with land grants or cash subsidies.27

In view of these excessively reformist planks, it is no wonder that among the doctrinaire socialists "there was a desire to develop a programme in line with that of the international socialist movement." The Socialist Labor party in eastern Canada had an even more direct impact on the western scene through one of its adherents, Arthur 26 For what follows see Grantham, "Some Aspects," chap. I, and Bennett, Builders of B.C., pp. 136-40. 27Grantham, "Some Aspects," pp. 13-14.

FOX Early Socialism 89 Spencer, an employee of the Canadian Pacific Railway in Hamilton who secured a transfer to British Columbia and in December, 1898, organized a branch of the S.L.P. in Sullivan Hall, Vancouver. True to the teachings of Daniel De Leon, the Vancouver group established a Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance. However, neither organization amounted to very much. The Alliance found that its revolutionary views were not acceptable to orthodox trade unionists when the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council refused its request for affiliation in 1899 while "the S.L.P. was never more than a sect and a very insignificant one at that . . . their sole contribtuion being to hold meetings to which few came, in which they expounded the theory that the ballot box supported by the strike of the 'economic' arm was to bring the revolution, which should be in every respect quiet and orderly."28 Weak tactics of this sort provoked a segment of the S.L.P. to break away and form the United Socialist Labor party in 1900. At its first convention, held jointly with the Socialist League in a hall the members had built in Vancouver, the new party flew the Red Flag despite police protests, urged its members to join unions to educate their comrades in socialism, and nominated "the first socialist candidate in a Canadian election," Will MacClain, who was, perhaps significantly, an Englishman and a member of the Machinists' Union. He was also an official of the local Trades and Labour Council and its delegate to the Canada Trades and Labour Congress. Although he failed to win a seat in Victoria, he got a third as many votes as the victor.29 The extent to which socialism was spreading in the province was indicated by the fact that this convention drew delegates from New Westminster, Nanaimo, Revelstoke, Nelson, Rossland, the Delta, and Victoria, as well as from Vancouver. Representation from mining areas revealed the particular interest of miners in socialism. Almost every local of the sizable Western Federation of Miners had its corresponding socialist club or party, but since these were not connected with one another in any parent body, the result was a wide variety of parties and beliefs. Such sectarianism on the part of the miners was characteristic of the growth of socialism in this country. In this period, in addition to the miners' clubs, a Revolutionary Socialist party was founded in Nanaimo with branches in Vancouver, Northfield, and Ladysmith, while Christian socialism was preached in Nelson by the Rev. A. E. Smith and in Victoria by the Rev. Elliot S. Rowe, who also organized a Socialist League there and in Sandon. The U.S.L.P. itself 28Bennett, Builders of B.C., p. 136. 29/foW., pp. 134-8.

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in its first year formed branches in several provincial centres and adopted as its semi-official journal the Lardeau Eagle, published at Ferguson by R. P. Pettipiece. While the origins of socialism were sectarian, there was from the beginning a counter-tendency towards consolidation of the movement. Sometimes this was provided externally from the United States; for example, the Canadian locals of the American Labor Union, including the Western Federation of Miners, were given a sense of common direction when the A.L.U. at its Denver convention in 1902 adopted the entire programme of the Socialist Party of America. Four years later a more militant centripetal force appeared when the Industrial Workers of the World entered British Columbia and captured the locals of the W.F.M., sweeping up as well the remnants of the Socialist Labor party there. More important in the long run were internal Canadian attempts to achieve working class unity in a political party. After twenty-five years of repeated but inconclusive efforts to seat their own representatives in legislative bodies, trade unions found themselves courted politically by socialists almost as soon as the latter appeared on the scene. But marriage of the two was a long delayed and difficult process, still imperfectly realized more than half a century later in 1962. Yet the attempt to consummate this union and propagate the birth of a national political party is one of the basic themes in the history of Canadian socialism. An effort made as early as 1902 was typical of the trials to come. In April of that year District 6 of the W.F.M. called a convention to meet in Kamloops. It was the first large labour conference ever held in British Columbia and delegates came to it from every part of the province from Fernie to Vancouver Island. The sixty-five persons in attendance represented fifty-one organizations composed of eighteen miners' locals, fifteen other unions, seven trade councils, five socialist parties, three labour parties, two socialist leagues, and one single tax association. This melange divided into a labour wing which struggled manfully to prevent the socialists from taking control and a socialist faction which fought hard to adopt a title that was broader than mere "Labor party." The outcome was the creation of a Provincial Progressive party (P.P.P.) and a programme not very different from that offered by other labour parties of the day in B.C. To the usual planks were added demands for government ownership of railways, smelters and refineries, female suffrage, compulsory arbitration of labour disputes, compulsory education to the age of sixteen, the gradual shift of all

FOX Early Socialism 91 taxes from producers to the land, and the proposal that non-payment of wages should be made a criminal offence.30 Despite this formidable programme and the catholicity of the party's beginning, the P.P.P. collapsed within a year, another victim of the endemic socialist malady of war among members. The following year the United Socialist Labor party took a step which led to a more significant development. Calling a convention of its twenty-one locals which extended from Cumberland to Fernie, the U.S.L.P. converted itself into the Socialist party of British Columbia and nailed its revolutionary flag clearly to the mast by declaring undying opposition "to the introduction of palliatives or immediate demands in propaganda work" and standing firmly "upon the one issue of the abolition of the present system of wage slavery."31 However unrealistic and hopelessly doctrinaire this sounds to the modern ear, it was characteristic socialist talk of the day, symptomatic of the revolutionary wing's uncompromising position. Though the language was Utopian, the convention was sufficiently practical to discuss the possibility of founding a national party. Moreover, the next year when the same group considered affiliating to the International Socialist Bureau, it decided against it for the very mundane reason that the fees were too high. However it did secure representation at the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International in 1904 by means of a delegate who was sent by the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council. It was at its convention of 1904 that the S.P. of B.C. fulfilled its destiny as an integral link in the chain of Canadian socialism by transmuting itself into the Socialist Party of Canada. Since this party is still in existence today, albeit feebly, it can legitimately claim to be the oldest extant socialist party in the Dominion. Its real claim to fame, however, is the fact that it was the seminal force in the growth of socialism in Canada in the initial years of the movement, from 1904 to the First World War. The accomplishments of the party were attributable to the quality of its leaders who formed a compact and extraordinary group in Vancouver, distinguished for the intelligence, energy, and colourfulness of its members. D. G. McKenzie, one of the inspirations of the movement, had been born in India and had come to Canada where he took up prospecting and mining. He was a self-educated philosopher who, in the words of one of his colleagues, "was the most widely read man I have ever met."32 He was a devoted Marxist, as was W., p. 138. siGriffin, British Columbia, p. 79.

32

Lefeaux, interview.

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also E. T. Kingsley, who had arrived in British Columbia after working as a railway employee and printer in California where he had been a member of the Socialist Labor party. Kingsley, who was a double amputee as a result of a railway accident, was a brilliant speaker and writer. The same could be said of John Harrington, who served as the party's professional organizer in 1908 and 1909. The most gifted popular speaker of this talented coterie was undoubtedly W. A. Pritchard, the son of a Lancashire coal miner. Pritchard was active in the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council and later played a prominent role in the Winnipeg General Strike. Another leading figure in the S.P. of C. was J. G. Morgan, a trade union plumber who had emigrated from Edinburgh where he had been a member of Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation. In Vancouver Morgan found his true vocation in running Marxist study clubs and the bookstore at the university, where he qualified in his spare time for the degrees of bachelor and master of arts. His talents as a Marxist theoretician were matched by those of Wallis Lefeaux, who had emigrated from England as a youth and had become a lawyer in Vancouver. It was men of this calibre who founded the Socialist Party of Canada. Most of them looked upon it in true Marxian and De Leonite fashion as an educational device for preparing for the revolution. They studied Marx's theories earnestly, in private and together, diligently pursuing the master's doctrines like devoted pupils, though not without differences of opinion. They also proselytized the public from street corners and on Sunday evenings in Vancouver's theatres where they delivered learned and impassioned lectures preaching dogmatic, revolutionary, "scientific" Marxian socialism applied to the British Columbian scene. These sessions attracted large audiences, as did Geordie Morgan's Sunday evening instructional classes on Marx's Capital, which often drew as many as 150 people. The party also took over and sponsored the Western Clarion, named after Blatchford's famous paper.33 Under the pugnacious direction of Kingsley, McKenzie, and Pettipiece, the journal quickly became a resounding Marxist trumpet, blasting out revolutionary marches to more than two thousand wage-earning subscribers every week. On September 33 The files of the Western Clarion are a fertile source of much information of the early socialist movement in B.C. A complete set for the years 1905 to 1925 (when it terminated) is located in the provincial library in Victoria. The Western Clarion was the product of the merger in 1903 of the Canadian Socialist and the Clarion. The latter was a socialist paper in Nanaimo while the former was the offspring of the union of Wrigley's Citizen and Country and R. P. Pettipiece's Lardeau Eagle.

FOX Early Socialism 93 2, 1905, when Vancouver had a population of 45,000, the Clarion printed 14,000 copies of a Labour Day souvenir edition.34 The party also promoted socialist education by selling and publishing at modest prices a good deal of classical socialist literature, for the most part Marxian.35 Though the doctrinaire Marxists in the S.P. of C. considered this preparatory didactic function to be the proper role of the party, there were other members who favoured political action designed to achieve practical reforms. This was particularly true of the labour members of the legislature who had joined the party—J. B. Hawthornthwaite, for instance, and also Parker Williams, who, having been sent to Victoria in 1902 as a representative of the Revolutionary Socialist party, gave his support to the S.P. of C. after its creation. In the 1906 provincial election both men were re-elected and the party got 24 per cent of the total vote in the ten ridings it contested. In the same year the party ran four candidates in the Vancouver school board elections, but without success. Five socialists were entered also in the federal election of 1904 and made a relatively good showing. In 1907 the party won three seats in the provincial legislature, and two years later, though it elected only two of eighteen candidates nominated, it reached its zenith in popular support with a total of 5,681 votes.36 The party's popularity at the polls was accompanied by a growth in individual membership and the establishment of a number of locals, chiefly in British Columbia but also nationally. The Socialist Party of Canada, as its title indicated, had had from the beginning national aspirations. Prior to its founding convention in 1904 negotiations had been conducted with socialist groups in Manitoba, Ontario, and as far away as Fredericton, New Brunswick. The Toronto Socialist League threw in its lot with the new party and the local in that city became the most active in Canada outside British Columbia. By 1910 there were branches scattered across the Dominion from the Yukon to Newfoundland, including every province except Prince Edward Island.37 There was a national executive and a modest treasury, but beyond that there was virtually no activity as a national party. British Columbia remained the vital centre and the only province in which the party had any real political significance. British Columbia alone had several dozen S.P. of C. branches, including so-called "language locals" like the Finnish 34

Grantham, "Some Aspects," p. 28. For a representative list, see ibid., Appendix 4. wibid., pp. 45-62. 37 See ibid., Appendix 3, which lists the locals. 35

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group in Sointula and the Lettish association in Vancouver. Altogether, at its peak, the party probably acquired three thousand individual members throughout Canada. Yet despite its numbers and the enthusiasm of its adherents, the party never got beyond the point of electoral success attained in British Columbia in 1907 and 1909. The cause is not hard to discern. Apart from the difficulty of building a viable national organization, which was simply beyond the limited resources of the movement of that day, the party even in British Columbia was hopelessly divided within itself between the doctrinaires and pragmatists. Marxian and De Leonite idealists rejected political participation as an illusory bourgeois attempt to prop up a disintegrating capitalist system, a fruitless effort which could only delay the revolution. On the other hand, reformists saw some virtue in striving for ameliorative legislation, and they may also have had a personal hankering for political power. This problem, which was typical of socialist parties, had beset the movement in the United States and weakened its impact, and in Canada it had the same result. The S.P. of C. never quite decided why it was running candidates. Interviews with survivors of the period reveal that some of them believed that the party could win power constitutionally while others looked upon campaigning simply as a golden opportunity for spreading propaganda to the public and preparing for der Tag. Sometimes individual members were of two minds; for example, one candidate who ran regularly in elections occasionally concluded his campaign addresses by telling his listeners that it did not really matter whether or not they voted for him since the revolution was coming anyway. The unresolved conflict between the gradualists and the revolutionaries manifested itself in other crippling ways also. Though the party's members in the legislature continually sponsored practical reform measures such as workmen's compensation, safety regulations for miners, the eight-hour day, and more liberal trade union legislation, their more ideological colleagues were not above criticizing them for palliation and their ignorance of what Marx decreed on the subject. Similarly, though the doctrinaires pursued De Leon's tradition of encouraging party members to join trade unions, they had no faith in the value of trade union action in itself and looked upon membership in it merely as a means of educating the working class and taking over its direction. The Western Clarion did not hesitate on occasion to censure trade union efforts to raise wages, on the grounds that these were selfish attempts to benefit the lot of one group of organized workers at the expense

FOX Early Socialism 95 of the bulk of the proletariat. Not surprisingly, much of organized labour was rather cool to the S.P. of C. A similar air of unreality pervaded the party's programme.38 Though it is not fair to say that the party disdained all reforms, it insisted on assessing each proposal by asking the often unanswerable question, "Will this legislation advance the interests of the working class and aid workers in their class struggles against capitalism?" This sort of language, which was typical of the programme, revealed that party stalwarts were more interested in their classical terminology than in real issues. The programme was full of dogmatic statements such as "The irrepressible conflict of interests between the capitalist and the worker is rapidly culminating . . . in a class struggle," "the wage system must be abolished," and "the revolutionary working class" is to take under collective ownership "the means of wealth production." As an exercise in Marxist theory the programme may have been exemplary, but as a practical document it was virtually meaningless. Whether or not the party's rhetoricians believed such glorious phrases is an interesting speculation. From encounters with some of the survivors, one is tempted to conclude that they were carried away as much by emotion as by logic. But this may be to see the past through the highly pragmatic eyes of the present, and such a view is no doubt quite unfair to some of the most serious members of the movement. In any case, it is clear from voting statistics that such doctrinaire language had limited appeal for the public. This did not disturb those members of the party who conducted its affairs as if it were a semi-private club of Marxist philosophers. There was a distinct element of intellectual snobbism and arrogance amongst the brilliant leaders, a fault not unknown to socialists in general. These members had no desire to create a mass party, and they achieved their goal quite easily by imposing on applicants an examination in "scientific Marxian socialism."39 The concern for orthodoxy was so acute that though the S.P. of C. periodically considered the possibility of affiliating with the Second International, it rejected the idea on one occasion at least because it held that there was too much reformist influence in the International.40 This kind of puritanical obsession led to expulsions and splintering, of course. Parker Williams was read out of the party for supporting Liberal candidates in an election, the Clarion commenting on his depar38 For 39

examples of their programmes see ibid., Appendix 2, and p. 26. Harrington, interview. 40 Grantham, "Some Aspects," p. 67.

96 The Political Process in Canada ture, "Parker Williams is a decent old plug . . . but he was never a Socialist."41 Another member was expelled for giving a speech at a reception to the lieutenant-governor. In 1907 two charter members of the S.P. of C., Mr. and Mrs. Ernest Burns, were suspended for being too sympathetic to reformism. They then assisted in founding the rival Social-Democratic party whose difference from the S.P. of C. was apparent in this sentence in its platform: As a means of preparing the minds of the working class for the inauguration of the co-operative Commonwealth, the Social-Democratic Party of Canada will support any measure that will tend to better conditions under capitalism, such as : (1) reduction of hours of labour, (2) the elimination of child labour, (3) universal adult suffrage without distinction of sex or regard to property qualifications, and (4) the Initiative, Referendum, and right of Recall.42

The moderation of this approach, which was reflected in the link the S.D.P. soon established with Debs' and Berger's Socialist Party of America, attracted many sympathizers, and the S.D.P. developed numerous locals across Canada, of which those in British Columbia, Winnipeg, and Toronto became notable. British Columbia elected several S.D.P. members to the legislature, Winnipeg had not only an English local (which Fred Tipping, for instance, joined when he came to that city in 1908) but also German, Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian locals, while Toronto had a Finnish local. By 1918 the S.D.P. had more than sixty Finnish locals and even more Ukrainian branches, according to C. H. Cahan who complained that the party "with headquarters in Toronto . . . [has] branches in nearly every industrial centre from Montreal, through a chain of Ontario towns to the Sudbury and Porcupine mining districts, in Fort William and Port Arthur at the head of lake navigation, into Manitoba, and through other similar associations into the Prairie Provinces and into British Columbia."43 It was in that year that the S.D.P. merged into the Federated Labor party which subsequently joined the One Big Union in 1919. The S.D.P. was not the only rival to the S.P. of C. The Independent Labor party, for example, continued to exist in British Columbia until 1907, and the name reappeared later in the 1920's both in that province and elsewhere in Canada. In Alberta a Dominion Labor party, founded 4 iQuoted 42

in ibid., p. 106. From the "Platform of the Social-Democratic Party of Canada," quoted in C. H. Cahan, "Socialistic Propaganda in Canada: Its Purposes, Results and Remedies," an address delivered before the St. James Literary Society, Montreal, Dec. 12, 1918, p. 5. 43I d., p. 4; see p. 23 for figures.

FOX Early Socialism 97 in 1917 by Alex Ross, Elmer Roper, and other Calgary trade unionists but including also William Irvine, a socialist, proved more popular than the S.P. of C., which had been represented in the provincial legislature by Charlie O'Brien, a socialist miner from B.C.44 The D.L.P. subsequently transformed itself into the Canadian Labor party, but the unravelling of these confused relationships belongs to a later period than that under examination. The great schism in the Socialist Party of Canada, from which it never recovered, occurred immediately after the First World War, which was in itself a stunning blow. Although the party was not proscribed, the Western Clarion was suppressed at one point, and the libraries of some party members were ransacked and partially destroyed by police in their search for subversive literature. More shattering, however, to idealists was the decision of German socialists to break international working class solidarity by supporting the Kaiser. Yet the S.P. of C. was still sufficiently internationally minded to welcome enthusiastically the Russian Bolshevik revolution of October, 1917. Then fell the second blow. The Third International, in its Second Congress in Moscow in 1920, issued the Twenty-One Points as obligatory conditions for the affiliation of all socialist parties. Ironically, to many of the doctrinaire members of the S.P. of C. these were too impossibly doctrinaire to apply to the Canadian scene. They could not see that they must make special efforts to win peasant support or create "a clandestine organization capable at the decisive moment of fulfilling its duty towards the revolution," and they rejected them. On the other hand, a portion of the party fought for their adoption. After a protracted wrangle, the greatest split in its history cracked the S.P. of C. in two. Hawthorathwaite was expelled by his own Victoria branch for criticizing the Bolshevik establishment while admirers of the Revolution were infuriated by the pious comment in the fifth edition of the S.P. of C.'s Manifesto that "If they [the Bolsheviks] have sinned against the Holy Ghost by revolting before the evolutionary alarm clock called them, we freely forgive them, and humbly hope that those who await the appointed hour will bear themselves as valiantly."45 It seems likely that the real source of division between the two factions was less the doctrinaire nature of the Twenty-One Points than the question of the independence of the Canadian socialists and the matter 44 Interviews with Roper and Irvine, April 24, 1961, and with Fred White, June 5, 1961. 45 Quoted in Tim Buck, Our Fight for Canada (Toronto, 1959), p. 23. Mr. Buck, of course, is scarcely an impartial critic.

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of who was to control their party. Both groups were doctrinaire, but when put to the test, the Canadian socialists asserted their independence, which was simply another example of the individualism of the socialist movement in this country. In any event, after conducting a referendum amongst its members, the Vancouver veterans in the S.P. of C.— Pritchard, Harrington, Lefeaux, Morgan, and Skinner—refused to accept the majority decision in favour of affiliation with the Comintern. Thereupon the communists in the party departed, taking with them about half the membership, and the S.P. of C. was reduced to a shambles of depleted, dispirited, and disorganized local groups. The breakaway section, led by William Bennett and Jack Kavanagh, formed the Workers' Party of Canada, which at a conference in Toronto in December, 1921, absorbed the Socialist Party of North America and other elements to become the Communist Party of Canada. The S.P.N.A., under the leadership of Tim Buck and others, had broken with the S.P. of C. a few years previously on the grounds that the latter did not insist on adequate examinations for Marxist purity and was insufficiently active in permeating the trade union movement with Marxism.46 It was a wry comment on a party which had driven itself to the wall by its own obsession with orthodoxy and independence. But the wheel of socialism had once more spun full circle. It did not stop there; the evolution of Canadian socialism continued by the process of division and multiplying cells, but that account belongs to a period beyond the compass of this analysis. The history of socialism in Canada from its origins to 1920 thus reveals several characteristics that are still apparent today: absence of any indigenous theory, the extensive influence of Britain and the United States, the lack of consensus on definition and function, the independence of adherents, and the supreme difficulty of constructing a viable national party. What is less obvious today is the degree to which the early movement fed on classical Marxism, and to some extent its interpretations by De Leon and Debs. The battle in the bosom of socialism between doctrinaires and reformists ended effectively in 1921 with the schism in the S.P. of C. and the departure of the communists to their own fold. Thereafter the battlefield of socialism, as distinct from communism, was left for the most part to pragmatic reformers, and a new generation, led by J. S. Woodsworth, appeared in the lists to renew the struggle. **Ibid., pp. 24-30. Also interview, May 23, 1961.

The Political Ideas of J. W. Dafoe

M. s. DONNELLY

IN OVER SIXTY YEARS as a journalist and editor, forty-three of them spent as editor of the Winnipeg Free Press, J. W. Dafoe produced something like fifteen million words of copy—the equivalent of fifty very substantial books. As editor of the Free Press from 1901 until his death in 1944 he enjoyed a remarkable freedom from control and supervision and for the last twenty-odd years of this period he had complete and unrestrained editorial independence. He "became" the paper and its editorial page was the vehicle for his almost daily sermons on Canadian or world affairs. There was no limit to the amount of space he could take up, and when he wished to draw particular attention to something he had written he put the leader on the front page. Content was decided solely on the basis of his own opinion, conscience, sense of values, and integrity as a journalist and editor. From what principles did this torrent of words flow? There were three primary ones and many derivatives or by-products. Dafoe was both a Liberal and a liberal. He was always and above all a Canadian with a deep pride and a profound faith in the country. He was, especially in his later years, an internationalist. Two very strong antipathies also operated: he hated imperialism and economic nationalism. Early in his career1 he was a politically active Liberal, making iLegend has it that Dafoe was converted to Liberalism after being brought up in a Tory family by listening to a speech by Edward Blake in the Canadian House of Commons in 1885. When a friend inquired what might have happened had he listened to a persuasive Tory Dafoe replied: "I recall that a year earlier I had reacted rather violently to Tory political doctrine as set out ad nauseam in Allison's History of Europe. I had run across these volumes which had been left behind in

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speeches and attending nomination meetings and back-room conferences of all kinds. While he never ceased to revel in the excitement of elections and always gave his principles their political application, he stopped being a journalistic servant of the Liberal party in 1911 when the Conservatives were elected on the anti-reciprocity issue. Dafoe's "small 1" liberalism was derived in part from his reading, but owed more to his experience, sense of values, and intuitive outlook on life. He wrote nothing about the rationality of man, his perfectibility, or the inevitability of progress. He had more ideas in common with Graham Wallas than with John Stuart Mill. His views on man are well summarized in his own words: Most of the problems and dangers of the world are manifestations in countless forms of the anti-social bias of the human mind which is the product of past experience. That bias is towards selfishness—we are selfish as individuals, as families, as groups, as classes, as nations. And because it is a necessity of man to disguise his nature from himself we make virtues and idols of our exclusiveness, our pride, our acquisitiveness and all the other mental inheritances which create these anti-social feelings and prejudices.2

Free trade and laissez-faire lay at the heart of Dafoe's liberalism. In a letter to Frank Underbill he labelled himself: "I have to admit I am a Cobdenite . . . of course Cobden's failure arose from his too naive faith in the applicability of his doctrines to a world not even able to understand his views let alone apply them."3 The conceptual framework from which he wrote was that, given economic freedom and competition, there could be harmony between individual interests and group or national welfare. Given free trade the same harmony could exist between national and the wider world interest and welfare. But only free trade could lift the competitive struggle out of the narrow bounds of pure selfishness and cancel out the privileged positions of those who were protected by a tariff. The tariff, wrote Dafoe in a characteristic utterance, "appeals to greed, selfishness, the sense of national superiority and most of the other wretched weaknesses of human nature."4 Laissez-faire combined with free trade was justified both morally and economically. Richard Cobden had in fact claimed a relationship a backwoods home by a school teacher who had died . . . In default of something better I read these volumes from first to last . . . I think they did the business. Perhaps Blake only revealed my mind to me." Dafoe to Judge Jackson, Oct. 31, 1943. Public Archives of Canada, Dafoe Papers. 2 Convocation Address, University of Manitoba, May 17, 1923. 3Dafoe to F. H. Underbill, Oct. 7, 1932. 4 Dafoe to W. W. MacLaren, Jan. 2, 1931.

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between the Golden Rule and free trade in that the latter gave to mankind "the means of enjoying the fullest abundance of earth's goods."5 Dafoe was more inclined to speak less emotively, in terms of comparative economic advantage. Both believed that protectionism led to class legislation——in Britain of 1840 legislation on behalf of a privileged group of landowners and in Canada of 1878 on behalf of financiers and manufacturers in the central provinces. Both men saw free trade as an international force for good and as a means of breaking down national barriers built on exclusiveness, racial superiority, pride, and jealousy. Free trade, internationalism, liberty, and a kind of postindustrial revolution morality were synonymous. Dafoe carried on an editorial crusade against the protective tariff throughout his career. He was prepared to quarrel with his publisher, Clifford Sifton, over the Reciprocity issue of 1911, and owner and editor fought on opposite sides. When Dafoe's side lost he wrote George lies: "I think the decision of the people of Canada on the issue submitted to them was idiotic and will be so adjudged by history."6 He thought of R. B. Bennett as a scourge sent to punish Canadians for their stupidity and regarded any proposals for a Commonwealth supertariff with bilateral preferences as combining the worst features of national selfishness and imperial exclusiveness. The growth of protectionism in Britain after 1930 saddened him: I have sought to find something of promise in the situation by suggesting that this is an instinctive rallying and getting together of the powers and principalities of the world of yesterday in a last desperate bid to stave off, for another generation or so, the coming of the new world of human brotherhood and international peace; and that the violence of the reaction is the measure of the strength of the movement they seek to block.7

Dafoe seems never to have faced the fact that Cobden's theory was not necessarily valid for other countries even if one admits that it was logical for Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. He could not demonstrate, even to his fellow liberals, that free trade was ever possible in Canada and was often forced to employ such phrases as "a moderate tariff," "a revenue tariff," or "a low tariff." Canada's existence was, as John A. Macdonald had recognized in 1878, hinged around a protective tariff. The country was built on a foundation of eastern secondary industry, a superstructure of east-west transportation, and staple products for export. Dafoe was reduced to complaining not so much about the 5

Cobden's Speeches I, p. 385. «Dafoe to George lies, Sept. 27, 1911. 7 Canada an American Nation, Julius Beer Foundation Lectures (New York, 1935), p. 104.

102 The Political Process in Canada principle of the tariff as about its regional incidence. Even here he was inclined to exaggerate, likely to be more specific than was possible, and prone to ignore facts that did not fit his case. For example, prior to 1914 the federal government obtained over eighty per cent of its revenue from tariffs and certainly some of this was spent ta the direct and selective benefit to western Canada. Such facts were never mentioned. Dafoe's writings about laissez-faire illustrate the dilemma which a liberal faced (and still faces) in the twentieth century, and many of his actions illustrate the particular problem of a Canadian liberal. The main stream of liberal thought with which he was familiar through his reading was made up of many ideas all of which are so well known as to need only the barest recapitulation here. Individualism was central to the liberal creed and this meant that the free and full development of the individual personality was the highest social good. The theory of free and full development assumed that a rational man would take a responsibility for society and that society as represented by the state and its government would provide a uniform base of justice and order and essential public works. The state, as Dafoe's favourite political philosopher, R. M. Maclver,8 put it, was only one of the many "associations" created by man and not necessarily more important than the others; the government was simply a temporary caretaker. The basic difficulty was that the moral and idealistic basis of liberal thought tended to break down when individualism was extended to the economic organization of a society that was industrialized or on the way to becoming so. The privilege and power associated in times past with nobility and landowners could be transferred to manufacturers and financiers and wage-earners could become serfs. A liberal had to reject, as Dafoe did, "the theory of the state as keeper of the ring within which interests fight out their battles under a general rule that it is nature's way that the race should always go to the swift and the battle to the strong."9 Rejection of laissez-fair was easier than prescription of alternatives within the framework of liberalism. Where should the line be drawn between private enterprise and collectivism? How far should the regulatory functions of the state go? What part should the state play in re8

R. M. Maclver came to Canada from Scotland to lecture at the University of Toronto in the Department of Political Economy; in 1922 he took an appointment at Columbia University in New York. The two of his books familiar to Dafoe were The Modern State and Leviathan and the People. ^Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, 1939, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1939, pp. 285-99.

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lieving poverty, cushioning the shock of illness for wage-earners, and reducing economic inequality? Dafoe thought very earnestly about such questions and wrote about them in his editorials. He believed that it was the duty of an editor to point the way and chart the path. The fact that many of the signposts he erected seem, in retrospect, misleading, and that some seem to point the wrong way is a reflection both of the difficulty of applying nineteenth century liberal doctrine to the twentieth and an indication of certain blind spots and prejudices in Dafoe's own mind. His thought followed a pattern. When things were going well for Canada, the West, and the Liberal party he was confirmed in a liberal faith; when they were not, he probed, examined, expressed private doubts, entertained new and even radical ideas, but returned, sometimes in dismay and confusion, to the same faith. His comments on the Winnipeg General Strike, leftish parties, the depression and the New Deal illustrate this pattern. On the editorial page he was not prepared to admit that the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 was anything but a Bolshevik plot to be crushed and, except for the punishment of its leaders, forgotten. Privately he recognized that it was a warning that industrialists must cease to think of labour as a commodity on the market and to consider "a vast modification of our existing individual system by which all permanent workers in an industry will become both wage earners and profit sharers."10 The strike caused him to re-examine the relations between capital and labour. About this time he began writing editorials advocating state action to control monopoly capitalism and the exploitation of many natural resources through public ownership. "For the future," he wrote in an editorial of 1919, "it should be impossible for any person to monopolize the benefits accruing from the natural resources of the country. If there is to be a monopoly in such resources (e.g. water power, oil deposits, natural gas pockets, coal, mineral ores) it is inconceivable that it should be other than a public monopoly."11 Dafoe's attitude to leftish parties was one of pugnacious hostility. While he recognized that twentieth century liberalism must include a relatively high level of state action and intervention he could never tolerate those who generalized beyond a particular case or attempted to provide any theoretical framework to justify collectivism. He suffered from a fear of Marxism and communism which was increased to nightmare proportions by an unwillingness to find out what these doctrines meant. The result was that he lumped all forms of socialism together lODafoe to J. W. Stewart, Aug. 12, 1919. ^Manitoba Free Press, Oct. 20, 1919.

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as communism or dictatorship or both. He continually judged the British Labour party, the Manitoba Labour party,12 and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation by the statements of their most radical members—even by those statements coming from the lunatic fringe. Whenever one who called himself a socialist appeared before the public as a moderate and made many points that Dafoe could have agreed with, he pinned the hammer and sickle on him. For example he wrote with reference to a speech made by F. L. Dixon, a moderate British trade unionist and Fabian socialist who had emigrated to Canada: The intellectuals of the Winnipeg Labour Party are hard at work explaining the inwardness of Communism to an interested world. They are doing it with a large brush and a copious bucket of whitewash. With this equipment they hope to paint out the spots on the Leopard's hide and give the Ethiopian a purer and more innocent appearing hue . . . They seek to prove that Communism is not really Communism but only another name for something quite tame and manageable. But however they may file its claws and whitewash its tell-tale spots, the leopard is still a leopard, and will retain its nature despite the thickest coat of kalsomine and despite even the skilful handling of the brush.13

"As a practical policy," he wrote by way of comment on the Regina Manifesto, "Socialism and Communism are the same thing, the divergence is with respect to the tactics by which the obliteration of individualism and the transforming of men into ants can best be brought about. The Communists are all for bloody revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, while the socialists hope to gain the same ends by more ordinary means."14 Later in 1933 he published a long, polemical, and misleading editorial on the C.C.F., seizing on a statement of W. A. Pritchard of Vancouver that the aim of the party should be "to establish a planned socialistic Commonwealth just as the government of the Soviet Union is attempting to do." Other parts of the statement quoted in the editorial were that the party would have to take control of the newspapers and indoctrinate the children in the proper ideology. Dafoe termed this real candour and concluded: "Though the C.C.F. candidates in B.C. may suffer from this refusal to protect themselves by camou12 The Manitoba Labour party was founded in 1910 but at that time was split into two groups. The moderates, following a Fabian line, advocated "the collective ownership of all industries in which competition had ceased to exist, such as railways, telegraphs and telephones." The radical group, called Social Democrats, were Marxist. In 1912 the two groups co-operated for electoral purposes through the Labour Representation Committee and in 1914 Labour elected three members. By 1921 Labour had seven members in the provincial legislature, but after that its strength declined rapidly. ^Manitoba Free Press, Sept. 29, 1920. ^Ibid., June 20, 1933.

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flage they are to be commended for their honesty. The C.C.F. is a socialist party; it ought to avow its principles whenever and wherever it seeks the support of the public."15 Throughout the depression he preserved a front of journalistic selfassurance and towards its end wrote: Among the things made clear by the depression is that there is a solid body of doctrine which is rightly termed liberal and that it holds the field against all the political isms. Its principles are poison to Bolsheviks, Communists, Fascists, monetary miracle men, economic nationalists and all believers in the regimentation of mankind. It is getting plainer every day that human freedom and freedom of trade, which are at the bottom the same thing, are dependent for their preservation on the ascendancy of Liberalism.16 Privately he did his best to find out what the "monetary magicians and miracle men" were getting at. Could it be that the state could regulate the swing of the economic pendulum by deficit financing, manipulation of interest rates, and taxation policy? He could find no convincing answer either way and on New Year's Day, 1934, he wrote Harry Sifton offering to resign as editor: Apart from struggling for half-an-hour with that very temperamental bit of machinery the Iron Fireman this is my first sign of activity for 1934. . . . Some things have been weighing heavily on my mind . . . to be quite frank I have been wondering whether or not there is any foundation for what my young friends say that I am too rigid in my thinking for this generation which is showing a partiality for revolutionary experiment. For the past 2 or 3 years I have been giving 50 per cent of my reading time and more than that percentage of my thinking capacity, such as it is, to the consideration of these so called radical policies. . . . I spent a hard day yesterday with "Keynes' Treatise on Money" reading it not admiringly but critically in the mood to give him an occasional kick in the behind . . . he is rather stimulating.17 Dafoe, with his highly developed political sense, had no difficulty in diagnosing the difficulty of the Liberal party but, despite his protestations to the contrary, he could not accept a solution which involved moving so far left as to include moderate socialists and western radicals. Just before the crucial convention of 1919 he wrote his publisher: There is the eastern liberalism that in its regard for financial and manufacturing interests is not easily distinguishable from Conservatism. There is the Quebec brand which is largely clerical in its direction and is identified with the bilingual movement. . . . The Western liberals are not in sympathy with either form of eastern liberalism. Their ambition is to build at the i*Ibid., Oct. 30, 1933. i*Ibid.9 May 17, 1935.

i?Dafoe to Harry Sifton, Jan. 1, 1934.

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convention to be held next month a policy which will absorb all the radical elements in the West and Ontario.18

Dafoe gave little support to radicalism within the party and continued to prefer Liberals to all others even when the party became what he himself feared it would: "an organized hypocrisy dedicated to getting and holding office."19 At first Dafoe, in common with many others, was confused by Franklin Roosevelt's opening moves to counter the depression. His only comment on the Agricultural Adjustment Act was that its complexity would make it difficult to administer. But as, with characteristic thoroughness, he worked his way through the masses of legislation, executive orders, and codes that poured from Washington and read the reports of Tom King, his man on the spot, his confusion changed into a firm conviction that the New Deal and Liberalism were antithetical. He likened the controls imposed to those found in the Soviet Union and suggested that Roosevelt was well on his way to becoming a dictator. When the Supreme Court decided that the National Recovery Act was unconstitutional20 he hailed the decision as a blow for freedom: The Court says in effect that the plan of rigid economic controls imposed by a central government is impossible within the framework of democracy. To introduce the plan is to create a Fascist state on the Italian model. The Supreme Court killed a measure which was going to die anyway from lack of public support. The N.R.A., the Judges find, does not fit with the constitution. No more does it fit with the temper of a country used to economic and political freedom.21

In private letters he expressed even stronger convictions: There are three schools among the new dealers . . . they might thus be roughly described. The N.R.A. people are in fact for big business and might be termed fascists; Tugwell and Co. are at least potential communists; while Landis and his lawyer associates are liberals who believe in dealing with evils by enacting appropriate laws. . . . Then of course there are the inflationists, silverites, and monetary magicians who alternately gain Roosevelt's ear and lose it.22

There was never anything equivocal or contradictory about Dafoe's stand on freedom of the press or freedom of speech. Freedom of the press was particularly close to his heart and he defended it whenever necesiSDafoe to Clifford Sifton, June 21, 1919. i*Ibid. ^Passed on June 16, 1933 (U.S. Statutes at Large, XLVIII, p. 195), the Act was declared illegal in 1935 in the decision of Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S. (95 U.S. 495). ^Manitoba Free Press, May 29, 1935. 22Dafoe to A. E. Zimmern, May 29, 1934.

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sary, sometimes in phrases worthy of Barnes, Delane, Scott, or any of the other greats of journalism past or present. Only one example from among many can be quoted—a reply to an irate complaint from his friend Edward Beatty, president of the Canadian Pacific Railway, that the Free Press had obtained, by devious means, confidential information about the C.P.R. and published it without even asking permission. Dafoe wrote to Beatty with measured words: Between newspapers which publish news inconvenient to governments, corporations, interests, etc. and the parties thus inconvenienced there are often differences of opinion as to the propriety of these publications; but that the public interest is, as a general rule, better served by the newspaper being the judge in these matters, subject always of course, to its responsibility to the law, is a view which I am prepared to defend.23

Freedom of speech was defended on many occasions. Much as he hated and feared communism he consistently defended the right of Communists to speak and agitate. In 1929 when Mayor McBride of Toronto proposed a licensing system for public meetings as a method of controlling Communists, Dafoe condemned the proposal and termed it a demonstration of "the extraordinary confusion and timidity of the official mind in Toronto."24 Duplessis's Padlock Law of 1937 was described as: "the most savage assault on freedom which Canada has ever seen."25 In 1919 just after the Winnipeg General Strike a section was added to the Canadian Criminal Code extending the definition of unlawful association to cover meetings which proposed violence to achieve political change. The Free Press supported any and every move for the repeal of this clause on the grounds that it could be used "for practically terroristic suppression of free speech and that it exposes law abiding citizens to grave injury at the hands of frightened or bullying bureaucrats."26 Dafoe is the real father of Canadian nationalism. The future of Canada as a viable international entity with national identity and integrity is the most consistent theme of his writings. If he sounded a strident note occasionally or, less often, turned with malicious fury on what he called the "colonial Canadians" it was because of a frustrated pride in a country which during most of his life seemed to have great potential but slight reality. Divisive forces within the country were natural, based as they were on the artificiality of the east-west economy and the biracial nature of the federalism. The forces of unity had to be created. 23Dafoe to Edward Beatty, Nov. 22, 1938. ^Manitoba Free Press, Oct. 19, 1939. 25/foW., March 27, 1937.

**lbid., Sept. 16, 1938.

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Shortly after Dafoe went to Ottawa in 1885 as parliamentary reporter for the Montreal Star, Goldwin Smith wrote in his magazine: "The Bystander has the heartiest sympathy with those who strive to make Canada a nation . . . But there is no use in attempting manifest impossibilities and no impossibility can be more manifest than that of fusing or even harmonizing a French and Papal with a British and Protestant community."27 Dafoe had strong views on the proper relationship between the French and English in Canada—views that were grounded on three principles: first, he admitted that the French in Quebec occupied a special position within the federal system and were entitled to constitutional protection; secondly, he refused to admit that Canada as a whole was a bilingual country or that pockets of French-speaking people outside Quebec could legitimately claim these protections; and finally, majority rule for the country as a whole had to prevail even on such questions as compulsory military service. The constitutional protection which the French in Quebec actually had under the British North America Act (1867) he regarded as slight and as based on the legal fiction that the Act was a treaty between two races. He argued with consistency and force for a system of constitutional amendment that would put the French civil code of law and educational rights in an entrenched position with all else based upon a two-thirds majority principle. Dafoe was a reporter on the Manitoba Free Press when the famous Manitoba School Question28 arose in the last decade of the nineteenth century. He became, and remained, a vigorous opponent of the sectarian schools and saw the attempt to maintain separate schools for French Roman Catholics as part of a plot to extend French-Canadian nationalism throughout Canada through the medium of the Catholic church and to keep the ranks solid by indoctrinating the young. Looking back on the issue he wrote: They undoubtedly dreamt of making Canada a bilingual country, from one end to the other, giving the French language an equal status with the 27

Cited in W. S. Wallace, The Growth of Canadian National Feeling (Toronto, 1927), p. 6. 28 The Manitoba School Question began in 1890 when the provincial government abolished the system of separate schools and substituted a standard curriculum. The statute was challenged and its validity upheld by the Privy Council. The Roman Catholic minority then sought redress from the federal government. A special session of parliament was called in 1896 to enact a remedial bill which would have compelled Manitoba to restore the separate schools. The legal duration of Parliament expired while the bill was still being debated. Laurier, whose party won the ensuing election, worked out a compromise with the Manitoba government.

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English, even in the newer provinces . . . It was the ambition of the French bishops, who are the real founders of the nationalist movement to fill most of the positions of authority of the Church in Canada with French Canadian clerics.29

Dafoe's support for the secular school system in Manitoba and his vigorous opposition to any compromise of this principle in other provinces where the issue arose, was based on much more than a Protestant suspicion of Roman Catholic power. He saw English as the only possible common denominator of nationality and fired off his editorial ammunition against Mennonite or other claims to special treatment as well as against the French. He also had a profound faith in the educational values to be found in English literature and while his editorials were often turgid he was at his best when expressing himself on this subject; for example: English literature, in substance, in variety, in extent, in genius, in style, in historic continuity is unmatched. The English speaking child brought into intelligent contact with this living force will learn from its history, manners, politics, the moralities of our race, and our civilization; if he has but a spark of imagination it will blow it into a flame that will light his way through the dusty patches of life; it will give the first requirement of true education, facility of self-expression. It will put into his hands the tools of life.30

Nothing aroused the editor's ire more than the idea that French Canada had a veto over the decisions that the majority party in parliament might make. This came out very clearly when he went to Ottawa in 1917 to help lay the foundation for a Union government that was to enforce compulsory military service. He found the group he was working with checkmated at every turn by the suggestion that Quebec must not be alienated otherwise Bourassa and "Laurentianism" would replace Laurier and federalism. Dafoe was all for a show-down—the province would have to face the fact that if Canada was at war Quebec was also. He wrote in strong terms to those in French Canada who refused to accept compulsory military service: Make no mistake about it, the English-Canadians will administer Canada and the French-Canadians will be a futile, sullen, minority . . . Do not flatter yourself that the English-Canadians are disturbed by your attitude of injured innocence or your threats of reprisals. You can do precisely as you please; and we shall do whatever may be necessary. When we demonstrate, as we shall, that a solid Quebec is without power, there may be a return to reason along the banks of the St. Lawrence.31 2 »Dafoe to William Maxwell, Dec. 29, 1910. ^Manitoba Free Press, March 9, 1923. siDafoe to Thomas Cote, Jan. 1, 1918.

110 The Political Process in Canada The attention that Dafoe gave to the problems of French-English relations or the structure of federalism was minor compared to the attack he mounted on the question of Canadian autonomy within the Empire. The attack began in 1901 and continued until the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, reaching a peak in the early twenties. As a Canadian, which he was first, last, and always, he believed passionately that the country could never amount to anything without a high national spirit and that this could never develop without autonomy in foreign policy as well as in domestic affairs. As a liberal he shared with Mill the belief "that there is not and never can be such a thing as the legitimate rule of one people over another." A nation, like an individual, could never be real unless it stood on its own feet, made its own decisions and was self-reliant. Liberalism and imperialism were, in his mind, antithetic. The names of Milner and Curzon called up visions not of the white man's burden or of British justice but of Chinese labour in the South African mines, oppression, privilege, and arrogance. British rule in North America was, as Defoe read the record, a sorry performance. He wrote: "One of the commonest historical mis-statements is that the second empire succeeded where the first failed because British statesmen had profited by the lesson of the American revolution. Nothing could be wider of the mark."32 The whole aim of the British in Canada and of the Colonial OfiBce in London, while it was in control, was to create a replica of English society with an established church and a class system. This could hardly fail to clash with the "North Americanism" and the "democratic instincts" that were natural for Canadians. Throughout his career Dafoe was continually on the look-out for opportunities to strike a blow for Canada or to goad or cajole her citizens into attitudes of pride and confidence. When in September, 1925, his eye lit upon a report of a Canadian Club convention in Port Arthur, at which numerous speakers had lamented the slow growth of a Canadian spirit, he seized his pencil and wrote: Well, what does the Canadian Club expect? Isn't the crop that has been ripening the result of the sowing? For forty years we have been teaching in Canada everything but Canada and Canadianism and if generations are now growing up who are not particularly concerned about Canada, her future, her ideals, her national life and her destiny who is to be blamed? . . . the guilt rests upon those who have done the teaching. To begin with our school books have been all wrong. For many years the only thing Canadian about them was the name on the cover . . . The trouble in Canada is that the ^Canada and the British Empire, Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation Lectures (Chicago, 1927), p. 4.

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emphasis on national life has never been placed where it should have been placed—at home. We have decided that our own Supreme Court was not good enough for the people of Canada, we have never had enough national spirit to provide ourselves with a distinctive national Flag, we have people in Canada objecting to standing up when O Canada is sung, we have trifled with the question of nationality and citizenship until the young Canadian is never quite sure whether he is a Canadian or a Hottentot because he had a Hottentot grandmother; we have put enthusiasm into every national day but our own and we have those who spoke up for Canada denounced as traitors.33 Dafoe was impatient with the slow growth of a body of distinctively Canadian literature and refused to accept the stock excuses that Canada was a young country with a small population pointing out that Ralph Waldo Emerson and Nathaniel Hawthorne were writing great literature in the United States when the population was just over ten millions, as was Burns in Scotland when the number of people there was about a million. Such excuses, as he put it, just "didn't wash." If Canada is in their bones and their hearts they will write Canadian books . . . It will not be an imitative annex of English or American writing. If it is a book of literary art the writer has to feel pretty intensely all the influences of environment and heredity out of which the subjects of his book emerge. Sky, soil, climate, people; a man or a family or a community at work amid surroundings peculiar to themselves, surroundings which mould habit and form character . . . It is such books we want in Canada.34 He was continually irritated by the practice of the Canadian census in listing the nationality of citizens as Irish, French, Dutch, and so on but never as Canadian and produced dozens of editorials on this topic. He wrote whenever something reminded him of it—a decennial census or the sight of a census volume on the shelves or conversation with an immigrant. For example, here is part of a typical editorial: No other country is so poor in spirit as to ask its citizens to be known by some other name than that of the country which has given them birth or to which they give allegiance . . . The whole tendency is to disparage Canadianism . . . no nation attains ever to its natural development unless it is conscious of being a nation made up of citizens who rejoice in a common citizenship, a common nationality and a sense that they are building not only a new country, but also a new race in which their children may glory.35 Canada, as he put it with intended irony, had "nestled too long at the feet of a Majestic Mother." The Governors General as representatives of the "Majestic Mother" came in for consistent and sustained attack. ^Manitoba Free Press, Sept. 17, 1925. d., Nov. 29, 1923. *$lbid., March 20, 1928.

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Very soon after Dafoe assumed the position of editor of the Free Press he complained of the way Lord Minto handled the question of honours and warned against the "revival of a good old Stuart custom which looked upon honours as things to be handed about in the way of good fellowship."36 The trouble was the dual nature of Minto's office in one part of which he was a constitutional governor accepting the advice of his responsible ministers and in the other a representative of imperial interests. Canadians must insist that the latter function be abolished.37 In 1921 as the Duke of Devonshire's term came to an end there was speculation in London that the choice would be between Lord Burnham, Lord Byng, and the Earl of Athlone. Lord Northcliffe aroused Dafoe's anger by announcing that his papers would support Burnham. Worse still: Lord Northcliffe declared that he was acting on a suggestion made to him by the Canadians—presumably members of the Canadian colony in London. It would be much more in keeping with our dignity and our interests . . . if the Dominion government representing all the people of Canada and not merely a group in London were to make recommendations direct to the King without enlisting the services of Lord Northcliffe.38

Lord Byng was chosen and, as is well known, his action in refusing to grant Mackenzie king a dissolution in 1926 precipitated a constitutional crisis. Dafoe's comment on the crisis both at the time and subsequently when Eugene Forsey's book The Royal Power of Dissolution was published indicates that he allowed his nationalism and his party sentiments to overcome his very substantial knowledge of constitutional practice. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into the details of **Ibid., Oct. 18, 1901. 37 Forty years later Raleigh Parkin sent Dafoe a copy of a letter written by Lord Minto in 1904 to George Parkin in response to a request for some comment on the office of Governor General to assist him in a book he was preparing. Minto stated among other things that in purely Canadian questions he did little more than express his opinion but on Imperial matters: "I have always claimed the right to assert myself, i.e. to put my foot down if I suspected anything detrimental to Imperial interests." In acknowledging the letter Dafoe commented: "It is really a little humiliating to think that as recently as the first decade of this century an appointee of the British Government should have felt it proper to exercise or attempt to exercise a control over the Government of Canada to the extent indicated in this letter. This was more than thirty years after the Fathers of Confederation had created what they had hoped to be a co-ordinate if sub-ordinate Kingdom of Canada. I am happy to think that I had some part in destroying the relationship which Minto thought should exist between the Governor General and the Government of Canada." Dafoe to Raleigh Parkin, Feb. 3, 1941. Later he wrote John A. Stevenson: "I read it [Lord Minto's letter] long after the age of colonialism had passed, but I burned with anger at this recital of past humiliation." Feb. 12, 1942. ^Manitoba Free Press, Jan. 14, 1921.

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the lengthy and vigorous debate between Dafoe and Forsey. One of Dafoe's arguments was that the Royal power to refuse dissolution in Britain had lapsed because of a century of disuse. It therefore followed that Byng had acted unconsitutionally or had treated Canada as a colony. Yet a few years before when the question of the reserve powers of the Lieutenant-governor of Manitoba was being debated he wrote and advised on the assumption that the powers had not lapsed. An editorial of January 31, 1921, stated that the lieutenant-governor could decline to accept the advice of his advisers but before doing so "he must be confident that he can call to be members of the Executive, persons who will command the support of the majority in the legislature." A few months later he wrote: "I have said to the Ministers of the Crown with whom I have spoken that they could not expect a dissolution under the circumstances, but that it was within the power of the Lieutenant Governor to grant them one if he chose to take the responsibility."39 It is impossible to be precise about Dafoe's influence on the growth of Canadian nationalism and the definition of Dominion status. It is, however, safe to say that it was very substantial and certainly greater than that of any other Canadian editor. He carried on the battle on two fronts; he goaded the Canadian public and their representatives, and he attempted to shoot down all ideas and plans aimed at a centralized empire. His attitude towards the Round Table movement40 was typical; he put it in a letter to G. M. Wrong: We cannot be a nation in Canada if we are simply a province of Empire, and if we are not a nation with a high national spirit, we can never solve the problems which are before us. A permanent alliance of British nations dedicated to the cause of civilization and progress appears to me to be a sublime conception, but this project of a centralized Empire, adjusted to a symmetrical pattern, with a strong probability that it would become militarized, not only leaves me cold but actually fills me with deep apprehension that if carried out would ruin the race.41

The early twenties brought Dafoe's thought on the question of 39

Dafoe to Clifford Sifton, Feb. 26, 1921. The circumstances referred to were the unstable nature of the Liberal government after the election of 1921 when they won only twenty-one of the forty-seven seats, the balance being divided between Conservatives, Labour, and the United Farmers. The government was defeated one year later. 40 The Round Table movement was started in London in 1910 by the group that had formed Milner's Kindergarten in South Africa and had later been active in achieving Union. Ostensibly an organization for free inquiry into the proper relationship between Britain and the colonial possessions and dominions, the group actually put forth and pushed a scheme of federal union with a central parliament in London. G. M. Wrong was a member of the Toronto Branch. 4iDafoe to G, M. Wrong, Oct. 16, 1916.

114 The Political Process in Canada "Empire or Commonwealth" into sharp focus. After the Imperial Conference of 1921, Lloyd George, the Round Table, and The Times all announced that the British Foreign Secretary would in future be the agent of a joint Empire foreign policy. Dafoe refused to accept this, falling back on a doctrine of plebiscitary parliamentary democracy which both he and Mackenzie King used when it suited them to do so. If Meighen, who had represented Canada in 1921, had accepted a joint foreign policy, he had no right to do so since the Canadian voters had never given his government any such mandate. Such a plan was seen as a complete reversal of Canada's development—a development that had already been recognized by the country's participation in the Peace Conference and subsequent signing of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1923 Dafoe was given a chance to do more than write editorials about autonomy. In that year King took him to an Imperial Conference, officially as a publicity officer, but actually as an adviser. In some ways this was an unfortunate conference for Dafoe to have attended. Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, who was rarely in close touch with opinions other than his own and stated these in a first-chapter-of-Genesis manner, assumed that a joint foreign policy was the only possible approach. Mackenzie King, assisted by Dafoe, O. D. Skelton, and R. H. Coats, refused categorically to accept this policy. In fact, they refused to accept plans for centralized machinery of any kind (not even a central statistical bureau), and in so doing made inevitable the kind of Commonwealth that emerged in 1926. Dafoe's ideas on the Commonwealth were typically liberal and were derived not from any broad concept of what force it might have in world affairs but from Canadian conditions. The Commonwealth was a politically viable solution to the problem of the relation between Britain and Canada in that it pacified the nationalists of the country without offending any substantial number of loyalists. Since it was completely without formal organization, duties, responsibilities or power, Canada's national interests would never be threatened. The most important of these was a close association with the United States. Early in the twenties Dafoe had not really faced up to the question of collective security—a cause which he defended in the thirties with great vigour. He could write glibly in 1924: "All this worrying about how the British nations are going to co-operate to defend themselves against aggression is based on a pre-war conception of international polity . . . the world is moving steadily and rapidly to the point where the security of each nation will be the concern of all."42 Yet he came ^Manitoba Free Press, Oct. 2, 1924.

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back from Paris in 1919 in a completely isolationist frame of mind and was writing editorials in this vein as late as 1929. A suspicion that the League would be used cynically by scheming British and European politicians led him to express some very ambivalent opinions about Canada's attempt to redefine Article 1043 of the League Covenant. He was very lukewarm about the Geneva Protocol44 and wrote: The whole scheme is plainly devised for stereotyping the status quo in Europe . . . we would say from our observation of the performance of European statesmen that with the present passion for documents and the indifference to human feelings, the chances are given to protocol, they would stand pat and call upon members of the League to aid them in suppressing any country which refused to accept the permanency of the situation. . . . We say that Canada has the right to take time to make very sure that she is not being involved in commitments to assist in perpetuating wrongs in Europe. The preservation of Poland's Eastern frontier is not worth the bones of a single Canadian soldier."45 Other illustrations of the same point of view appeared from time to time of which the following is an example: Europe is far gone on the road to destruction and there are no signs of a readiness to stop short on the journey. Incurable hatred, ambitions, national egoisms that exalt the country and ignore the world, a blind and obstinate refusal to face the inevitable, make difficult if not impossible the political and economic reconstruction of Europe. Our policy towards Europe should be one of aloofness. We Canadians would do well to have nothing to do politically with the continent of Europe. We should not entangle ourselves nor should we permit ourselves to be entangled by our political associations.46 Dafoe's isolationist side has now been largely forgotten and rightly so. He abandoned it completely with the rise of militarism and dictatorship in Japan, Germany, and Italy and achieved for himself and his paper 43 Article 10 reads: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." Canada attempted to have an explanatory clause added to this article which would have meant that the geographical position of a nation would have been considered in determining its "obligation." The proposal failed to carry by only one vote. 44 The Geneva Protocol was an attempt, made in 1924, to supplement the Covenant of the League of Nations by an agreed procedure of arbitration and collective action. If a nation went to war without resorting to arbitration all signatories were obliged to join in collective action unless there was a unanimous vote to the contrary. The Protocol passed the League Assembly but was repudiated by the Baldwin Government in Britain. ^Manitoba Free Press, Feb. 28, 1925. **Ibid., March 29, 1929.

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a remarkable record of early, consistent, and vigorous advocacy of collective action against international pirates and marauders. Editorials began appearing about Mussolini in the early twenties, but the Italian situation was not taken seriously at first. II Duce was described as perched on a tight rope "waving his arms, red in the face; defying the lightning . . . a spectacle of political futility of dictatorship in a world saturated with democratic thought."47 It was a different matter when Japanese militarism began to be obvious. Dafoe looked the bleak facts full in the face and recommended collective action: "It would be far better that the League should be blown to pieces in an attempt to vindicate the principle that nations can no longer be judges in their own cause in such matters as the capture of territory and the making of war than to survive as the agent and apologist of imperialism."48 Hitler's speeches were from the first, and over the loud protests of the German consul, labelled for what they were—blatant assertions "that a state is above the laws of God and man; and is justified in all its actions by the fact of achievement."49 The failure to impose oil sanctions against Italy in 1936 was for Dafoe the end of the League and the renewal of international anarchy: "The resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations by which the League abandoned Ethiopia and threw collective security on the scrap heap . . . is a worthy addition to the extensive literature of pretence, humbug and hypocrisy which has grown up around the League—a literature made up of speeches, resolutions, dissertations and declarations oily with adulations . . . and reeking with treachery."50 Dafoe was ashamed of his own country: "In Canada no public man— not one—in the government or any political party has so much as emitted a sound that could be interpreted as meaning that this country has any obligation under any circumstances to help in shoring up the League . . . We appear to have quit cold."51 Mackenzie King's comment that Canada must put internal unity ahead of internationalism was dismissed as beneath contempt and his lengthy speech at Geneva in 1936 was said to mean, when stripped of its verbal camouflage, that the League should be permitted to continue only if "it agrees not to recognize or act on the principle that is the reason for its existence," and that Canada should continue to recognize her obligations "provided it is understood that she can repudiate them."52 The morning after Munich nibid., Jan. 8, 1925. ^Winnipeg Free Press, Oct. 4, 1932. 49/foW., March 17, 1936. wibid., July 6, 1936. Bi/foW., Nov. 1, 1936,

**Ibid., Oct. 1, 1936.

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Dafoe wrote an editorial which he called "What's the Shouting For?" and predicted war within a short time. His paper was one of a few anywhere to take such a definite stand. He was then over seventy, but he threw himself wholeheartedly into the war he had striven to prevent. He died before it was over. J. W. Dafoe was by any standards a great journalist and editor. His ability as a reporter, demonstrated early in his career, was first class but he did not stop there. His capacity to discharge the executive tasks that go with getting out a daily paper was high but he went well beyond them. He regarded his newspaper as part of an educational process with the functions of reporter, commentator, and critic. News and events were in themselves ephemeral; it was the lessons to be drawn from them that were significant and the function of the editorial page was to draw the moral and chart the course. At first his compass was the Liberal party; this was found to be fallible and became in his mind a means but not an end. Then there was Canadian nationalism and autonomy from Britain, a worthy but limited cause that led him to his finest hour as an internationalist and a defender of collective security. Underlying his stand on all these causes were the values of a liberal and a democrat and it was these that he attempted to apply to day-to-day comment on public affairs. His career testifies to the supreme difficulty of doing this as it does to the significance of the attempt.

The Paradox of Power in the Saskatchewan C.C.F., 1944-1961

*

EVELYN EAGER

THE C.C.F. during the Douglas regime in Saskatchewan achieved an unique juxtaposition of two opposing principles: the operation of party democracy when in power and adherence to the traditions of parliamentary government. Party democracy as proclaimed by the C.C.F. demanded rank and file control of the party leadership; parliamentary responsible government required that same party leadership, as the government, to be responsible to the legislature. Such conflict is inevitable when any party which upholds the principles of internal party democracy comes to power. To the extent that the party emphasizes its democratic nature, the sharpness of the conflict and the degree of adjustment necessary to overcome it are intensified. Political parties normally effect the necessary reconciliation by abandoning certain aspects of one or the other of these principles. It is to enhance party democracy that the Australian Labour party disregards the conventional method of forming a cabinet and instead permits members of parliament to choose ministers by ballot. The British Labour party on the other hand curtails internal democracy when the party comes to power. It frankly and specifically eliminates certain rules and practices, of which the most notable is the annual election of the leader, and reintroduces them when again in opposition. The Saskatchewan C.C.F. admitted no such concessions in either direction. The government staunchly proclaimed its adherence to the principles and forms of British parliamentary government. At the same time, it was the deliberate policy of the C.C.F. to maintain an identical structure of party democracy whether in power or in opposition.

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[They] believe [d] that the same control which the rank and file of the party have when they are in opposition should continue to be effective even when the party has been elected to office. . . . that if the rank and file of the party need to have some control over their elected leaders in opposition, it is even more essential that they should be able to exercise this control when their leaders have the responsibility of public office.1

The establishment of democratic relations between the party organization and the C.C.F. legislative group was a major concern from the early years of the party. There was a mutual exploring of means, by party and legislative members alike, to achieve a workable and desirable relationship between the two groups. With the exception of an initial incident, described below, these discussions in the main were cordial, and such clashes or disagreements which occurred were on an individual basis on particular points. There was not the struggle for power between groups —parliamentary against party—which has been such a prominent and unhappy feature of the British Labour party. Another contrast with the British counterpart, which may well stem from the first, was the remarkable consistency in the conclusions reached by the C.C.F. party. Unlike the frequently conflicting statements from different sections within the British party, all decisions, resolutions, and statements of the C.C.F. proclaimed the supremacy of the party over members of the legislature and over the government. Although this supremacy may have been moderated in practice, no contrary pronouncement emanated from any section or individual of the party to challenge the principle. Furthermore, it is even more remarkable to note, the most emphatic and frequent of these pronouncements of party supremacy came, not from party organs, but from the government side, over which this supremacy presumably was to be exercised. The relationship between the party organization and the M.L.A.'s became an issue immediately after the election of the party's first members, in the 1934 contest; it arose out of the necessity to choose a leader for the legislative group. The Provincial Leader, M. J. Coldwell, had failed to secure a seat. The party's five members-elect, at a meeting in Regina on June 28 called by one of their number, George Williams, who was also Chairman of the Political Directive Board,2 chose Mr. Williams as their House Leader. It transpired that Mr. Williams not only had called the meeting without the knowledge of Mr. Coldwell, who was out iLetter from T. C. Douglas, Nov. 3, 1960. The Political Directive Board was responsible for the direction of party affairs between conventions. It was superseded by the Provincial Council after the party was reorganized and its name changed from "Farmer-Labour" to "Co-operative Commonwealth Federation" in 1935. 2

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of the province for a rest, but also without Mr. Williams' four colleagues being aware that Mr. Coldwell was ignorant of the action. Subsequently, on July 26, immediately before the party's annual convention, Mr. Coldwell called a meeting of the Political Directive Board, successful and defeated candidates, and campaign managers, at which the main item of business was a pointed enquiry into the calling and the events of the earlier Regina meeting. A motion was passed, and was adopted by the convention the following day, to accept the "generous offer" of the members-elect "to rescind all matters dealt with at Regina on June 28th. . . ."3 The convention resolved future procedure by the sweeping resolution: "That whenever it becomes necessary to select a Premier, Cabinet, Leader of the Opposition, House Leader, or members of the legislature4 the Directive Board shall be summoned by the chairman of the Board within 21 days of the election and shall deal with the problem; when such meeting is held following a general election defeated candidates shall also be summoned." At another meeting of the Directive Board, M.L.A.'s, candidates, and campaign managers, Mr. Williams was elected "Leader in the House."5 Significantly, neither the mover, M. J. Coldwell, nor the seconder, were members-elect. Although the result was unchanged, the party nevertheless had established its right to determine the means whereby the leader in the legislature should be selected. Furthermore, with an unusual show of humility, "in accepting the leadership in the House, Mr. Williams requested that the Directive Board would outline to him his duties, responsibilities and privileges in this connection and requested that the other elected members be present when this was done."6 The convention on the same day instructed the Political Directive Board to set out the relationship between the elected members and the organization, and specified that "the decision of the 3

"Minutes of Conference of the elected members, defeated candidates, campaign managers and members of the Directive Board held in the Y.M.C.A. July 26th, 1934," p. 18, and "Farmer-Labour Group Convention Minutes," 1934. Archives of Saskatchewan (hereafter A.S.), U.F.C. papers. inclusion of "members of the legislature" in this context is meaningless and obviously a mistake, although it is repeated in the minutes of the July 26 meeting, where the motion originated, and in those of the convention. What the motion doubtless intended to state was that members of the legislature were to meet with the Directive Board to make selection of the various leaders. 5 "Synopsis of a meeting . . . on July 27th for the purpose of appointing a House Leader of the C.C.F. Members in the provincial legislature," included in Political Directive Board Minutes, July 28, 1934, p. 4. A.S., C.C.F. papers, "Minute Book of the Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour Group, 1932-1935." (The Minutes, cited later in this paper, of various C.C.F. bodies are all in A.S., C.C.F. papers.)

Vbid.

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Directive Board shall be binding upon the elected members and upon this organization until it can be ratified or amended by another convention."7 Demonstrating a quick mastery of the techniques of delegation, the Directive Board in turn passed the matter on to the two men most directly concerned, Mr. Coldwell and Mr. Williams, and on December 8 approved the memorandum which the two leaders drew up. It set forth unmistakably that Mr. Coldwell was Provincial Leader; Mr. Williams was Leader of the Opposition. "The Members of the Opposition," it was understood, were to be "recognized as having the right to decide their own policies and tactics, subject to the platform of the group."8 This principle of party ascendency, both in choice of a legislative leader and in party programme, was thenceforth maintained. Even when practical considerations required the legislative group to act on its own initiative in specific instances the principle was not relinquished. Following the 1938 election the Council took care to record its continued vigilance, even though it was only to "endorse the appointment of Mr. Williams as Leader of the Opposition made by the C.C.F. elected members."9 In 1941 when Mr. Williams' resignation became necessary as he had enlisted just before the opening of the session, the legislative group chose J. H. Brockelbank as the new Leader of the Opposition. The Council, in reporting to the convention that year, contented itself merely with "recording" the appointment. Those most closely connected with the incident, however, report that the independent action of the legislative members was tacitly agreed to only because of the emergency situation. Otherwise, it is indicated, the party would have acted in making the selection. The party constitution makes no provision for choosing a house leader, as such, but assumes that the provincial leader, elected at the annual convention, will be in the legislature to undertake his duty of leading the C.C.F. legislative group. When the leader of the opposition was selected in 1938 and 1941 the office of provincial leader was not occupied, under circumstances described in later pages. The party's authority over the programme to be supported by M.L.A.'s was asserted from time to time in annual conventions. A resolution at the 1936 convention, referring to conflict which had occurred in Alberta between U.F.A. legislative members and U.F.A. policy as laid down in their convention, specified that M.P.'s and M.L.A.'s should advocate the C.C.F. programme "as set forth by national and provincial conven7

Convention Minutes, 1934, p. 5. Williams to T. E. Scriver (Campaign Manager, Wolseley), Dec. 21, 1934. A.S., C.C.F. papers, Box 10. Italics mine. ^Council Minutes, June 18, 1938. 8

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tions."10 Premier Douglas, speaking to the convention in 1947, reminded M.L.A.'s that each "must keep in mind his dual responsibility both to his own constituency convention and to the C.C.F. movement as a whole."11 In subsequent years he reiterated each of these responsibilities. "It should never be forgotten," he told the 1953 assembly, "that C.C.F. provincial policies are made here by this sovereign body and it is to this convention that your elected members must report regarding the progress they have made in carrying out the policies you have laid down."12 In 1954 he stressed responsibility to the respective constituencies when he stated, "Each year your elected members have returned to meet your Constituency Conventions to report on their work and to receive your directions for the coming year."13 The C.C.F. extended this principle of party control even to advising caucus, upon occasion, with respect to its own organization and procedure. Following the 1938 election the Council and Executive were active in deciding whether the C.C.F. caucus should co-operate with other parties in the legislature, and Council reported to the 1939 convention that "the C.C.F. group acting under instructions from your Council caucussed independently as the official opposition."14 Similarly in 1944, in seeking to control a recalcitrant member, the Council issued instructions to M.L.A.'s respecting attendance at caucus meetings and the procedure to be followed if a member disagreed with caucus decisions. In 1952 the convention paternally advised the newly elected members to "conduct themselves during their term of office in the same vigilant manner as if their member margin was near the majority line."15 The most extreme form of control employed by an individual constituency over its member was the recall. Although this device was soon discontinued, in early elections at least some candidates placed signed resignations in the hands of their respective constituency organizations, and the provision remained in the party constitution. Even without the recall the constituency organization still endeavoured to keep close control over its member. He was, theoretically, required to report at the end of the session, although this was not always enforced. He was nevertheless expected to be present at constituency meetings and to be available for questioning and for information. The party at the 1934 convention declared its intention to share actively in government affairs whenever it assumed office, by including 10

Resolution no. 23, Convention Minutes, 1936, pp. 18-19. Convention Minutes, 1947. uibid., 1953. uibid., 1954. 14/fcY/., 1939. 15/fcY/., 1952. n

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the Premier and cabinet ministers among those whose selection was to be determined by party leaders, in the resolution described above. This provision dropped into oblivion, though, and there was no question of employing it when the C.C.F. secured a majority in 1944. In the meantime the party had taken other steps preparatory to coming to power, motivated by a concern over the concentration of power in one person. After Mr. Coldwell's election to the House of Commons in 1935 and his subsequent resignation from the post of Provincial Leader, George Williams acceded to the request of the Directive Board to act as Provincial Leader until the next convention, as well as being Leader of the Opposition. The 1936 convention rejected a proposal that the legislative members and Council, rather than the convention, should select the Leader. Instead, the office as such was allowed to fall into abeyance; George Williams was elected President of the C.C.F. party and in that capacity assumed the duties and powers both of Provincial Leader and of President. In 1940 proposals to separate the two positions or to limit the term of president were defeated. Efforts in 1941 were more successful. Early in the year the Council established a committee which was to bring proposals for constitutional amendments to the next convention embodying the principles: 1. That there should be division of responsibility with a view to ensuring the continuation of an aggressive C.C.F. organization when a C.C.F. government is formed in this province. 2. That provision be made to ensure the necessary collaboration between the C.C.F. organization and the elected M.L.A.'s and M.P.'s. 3. Provision for collaboration between the C.C.F. organization and a C.C.F. Government in the formulation of legislation and in selecting a Cabinet.16

Circumstances favoured implementation of the first principle of "division of responsibility." Mr. Williams resigned from his party posts in February of 1941 to leave for overseas service, Mr. Brockelbank became Leader of the Opposition, and the Rev. T. C. Douglas was elected President at the 1941 convention. Although it was generally assumed that the office of president incorporated the duties and position of provincial leader, an incident the following December emphasized the need for further clarification of the party offices. Mr. C. M. Fines, speaking publicly, referred to Mr. Douglas as the next premier, the C.C.F. M.L.A.'s protested this assumption, and the matter was referred to the 1942 convention. The office of provincial leader was thereupon again separated from the presidency. The leader, it was specified, was 16

Council Minutes, Jan. 5, 1941.

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to have supervision of all political and legislative matters, was to lead the C.C.F. group in the legislature,17 and to head the government if the party came to power. Considerable discussion and differences of opinion centred on the method of election of the leader, with a variety of proposals (should the choice be made by the M.L.A.'s, or by M.L.A.'s in conjunction with other groups?), all of which finally were rejected in favour of election by the convention body. The second and third principles of the Council resolution, to ensure "collaboration" between the party and elected members, and between the party and a C.C.F. government, were incorporated into the constitution at the 1941 convention. A Legislative Advisory Committee was established which was to provide liaison between the party and M.L.A.'s, and was also to exercise a voice in the selection of cabinet ministers. Section 1 of the article creating the new body stated that the Committee, "composed of three members appointed by and from the Provincial Council, and two members elected by the M.L.A.'s from their number, shall from time to time assist the C.C.F. Legislative Group in preparing legislation in conformity with C.C.F. policies." Section 2 provided that "Whenever the C.C.F. House Leader is called upon to form a Government, he shall submit the names of the proposed cabinet ministers to this committee, which shall act in an advisory capacity, realizing that final responsibility for ministerial appointments must rest with the premier." This provision was one of the rare instances of direct influence from the British Labour party, which in 1933 had adopted a similar ruling with respect to the prime minister's selection of cabinet ministers. In 1949 the C.C.F. dropped the two M.L.A.'s from the Committee, to eliminate the embarrassment of members of the legislature advising the premier on cabinet appointments from among their own number, with members themselves potentially eligible for office. After the C.C.F. assumed power in 1944 there was no question of relinquishing the principles which the party had so ardently and painstakingly evolved. On the contrary, they were reaffirmed and means were explored for their implementation. Policy statements without exception proclaimed the supremacy of the party over government, with the most explicit and often repeated of these coming from the very person who traditionally might be expected to show the greatest opposition to the concept, the head of the government. In 1944, shortly after becoming 17 This was not immediately effective since Mr. Douglas, who was elected Leader, did not have a seat in the Legislature, and the election which was expected shortly did not occur until 1944. Mr. Brockelbank therefore continued to lead the C.C.F. group in the house until that time.

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Premier, Mr. Douglas assured the party convention "that there will be no deviation from the programme which has been drawn up by you the people of the Convention Assembly."18 In reporting to the convention in 1950 he stated, "If we are to retain the democratic control of our elected representatives we must apply ourselves to the task of setting up the kind of machinery that will allow every C.C.F. member the opportunity and the responsibility of having some part in formulating government policy."19 And in 1953 he declared, "It should never be forgotten that C.C.F. provincial policies are made here by this sovereign body and it is to this convention that your elected members must report regarding the progress they have made in carrying out the policies you have laid down."20 The party itself made similar pronouncements. In 1952, in a vigorous protest against "a breach of faith," the convention reiterated the authority of the party in a resolution declaring that Whereas the Provincial Convention of the C.C.F. is our policy-formulating body, and a directive body to our Legislature, this Convention feels that the action of our Minister of Municipal Affairs in stating on the floor of the Legislature that the Public Revenue Tax was to be removed and thus committing the Government to a policy directly contradictory to that agreed to by the Provincial Convention of 1951, was an unwarranted breach of faith on his part and deserving of severe censure.21

Another resolution, in 1954, re-affirmed "the responsibility of the C.C.F. Government, and the C.C.F. caucus, to the Provincial Convention of the C.C.F."22 Following the 1956 election, The Commonwealth, the organ of the party, proclaimed in headline that "CCF Convention will direct govt. policy for new term," and the party secretary, in making a call for members to attend the convention, reminded them that, "The people themselves decide the policies and programs which the government is to institute."23 Premier Douglas consistently emphasized the annual election of the political leader by the convention as the final and most complete control which the party exercised. At conventions, on election platforms, and in other public statements he stressed this opportunity which the party had of rejecting his leadership if members were not satisfied with the government's performance in carrying out party wishes. He assured them that the annual election was no formality, and proudly proclaimed that he was the only head of government in Canada required to come back each year to be endorsed by his party. ^Convention Minutes, 1944. 20/foW., 1953. 22/foW., 1954.

™lbid.9 1950. **lbid.9 1952. &The Commonwealth, July 4, 1956.

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The Legislative Advisory Committee was the only formal agency established by the C.C.F. constitution specifically to effect liaison between the party and the elected representatives. Following an initial trial and error period as to the best means to carry out its functions, the problem was resolved by permitting it to sit with caucus when legislative proposals were under discussion. It exercised mainly a watch-dog function, reminding caucus of party wishes, observing the fate of convention resolutions and reporting back to its parent body, the C.C.F. Council. The Committee also exercised its duty of acting in an advisory capacity in the selection of cabinet ministers, conveying suggestions to the premier, and serving as a party sounding board for his proposals. Additional means of consultation were developed between the party and the government. They were informal in that they were not provided for in the party constitution, but they were procedures which nevertheless became well established and were regularly exercised. These provided for discussion of legislative proposals, investigation into proposed administrative appointments, and consideration of other government matters. At the C.C.F. Council meetings held in November or December, and again in February just before the legislative session, cabinet ministers outlined legislative proposals to the Council. The financial situation and the background and reasons for proposed new legislation and for amendments were explained to Council, which discussed the proposals and recorded its assent or disapproval. Council members (of whom there was one from each provincial constituency) could refer proposals to their respective constituency executives, and from there, possibly even to a constituency meeting. It was the party Executive, considerably smaller in number than the Council, which considered appointments, and expressed its views to the government both as to general policy and also in the making of specific appointments. From time to time it urged the cabinet to abide by the principle of appointing to key positions only persons known to be in sympathy with party aims. On the other hand it enquired into and recorded its approval or otherwise of individuals proposed for specific appointments, including chairmen of boards, commissioners, deputy ministers, and numerous other administrative officials. The Executive was jealous of what it considered its right to scrutinize such appointments, and upon occasion when it was not consulted reminded cabinet of the agreement between them that the "policy of discussing appointments be adhered to in the future, whenever possible."24 Such other matters as election dates, appointment of additional cabinet ministers, allocation of responsibility between cabinet and M.L.A.'s, 24 Minutes, Joint Executive Meeting with Cabinet, May 6, 1950.

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distribution of budget expenditures, closing of court houses, and strikes and labour relations in Crown corporations were discussed from time to time between the government and the Executive or Council. Upon occasion special committees were established to effect liaison between the party and the government for particular purposes or in special areas of activity. In 1948 the Council established a "Problems Committee," whose duty it was to accept "in writing all problems of government administration, deal with these problems with the proper departments, see that action is taken and that an answer is sent to the party concerned."25 In 1952 the Council established a committee to assist the Department of Natural Resources by studying the matter of payment for surface rights and to recommend regulations for handling them.26 Informal consultation and discussion between individuals likewise was highly prized within party ranks, such as the custom which developed of frequent consultation between the party president and the premier. At the same time that the C.C.F. organization sought to establish its influence over M.L.A.'s and the government, it carefully protected itself against possible control which elected representatives might exercise within the party. The constitution prohibited M.L.A.'s and M.P.'s from becoming president or vice-president, and they also could not be chosen as the Council member representing a constituency. M.P. and M.L.A. groups were both represented in Council, by one and two members respectively, and others of their number could be chosen among the three members-at-large elected by the convention. Even a maximum possible selection of M.L.A.'s and M.P.'s, however, would have left them hopelessly outnumbered in Council. While thus safeguarding its voting power, the Council on the other hand encouraged the attendance of the elected representatives at its meetings "so that the Council when it wishes may ask them for information and advice."27 They were always invited to Council and allowed a voice in proceedings, and meetings were well attended by both cabinet ministers and private members. The premier, as political leader, was included as an ex officioO member both of the Council and the Executive, but this was the only exception to the party's disinclination to allow legislative members to hold official party positions. Even here, it was in his capacity as political leader that he was included, not as premier. It is significant too that the duty which was assigned to the political leader in 1942 "to have supervision of all political and legislative matters" was dropped from the constitution 25Council Minutes, Nov. 20, 1948. 26/foW., Dec. 12, 1952; Executive Minutes, Dec. 13, 1952. 2 ?Council Minutes, July 27, 1946.

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following the party's accession to power. The reason, it was explained, was that the "legislative" part was now unnecessary, and the "political" aspect was incorrect, since political matters really belonged within the realm of party jurisdiction. Against this picture of party autocracy the reality of government action presents a stark contradiction. From the time that the C.C.F. came to power in 1944 the administration exercised the traditional prerogatives of government of the British parliamentary system. Premier Douglas was no more restricted in his actions than was his counterpart in any other party. He made his own choice of cabinet ministers, and, had the occasion arisen, would have exercised his power of dismissal. He set the election dates and maintained his traditional right to dissolve the legislature without consultation, had he wished to do so. The cabinet accepted the necessity to initiate a cohesive and unified legislative programme, based on its knowledge of the circumstances of government operation, its appreciation of party goals, and such other factors as it considered pertinent. Similarly it assumed responsibility for administration, making appointments of its choice and exercising the discretion and authority required and expected of governments in the variety of areas in which they are required to function. Was the elaborate structure of party control, then, merely a sham? For any realistic examination, it is necessary to understand why, even if the reality of complete control might have been modified, its form and appearances had to be kept intact. There are two main reasons. The first lies in the background of suspicion and distrust of political leaders which the C.C.F. inherited from the Progressive movement. Early organizers of the C.C.F. (or Farmer-Labour party) were confronted with assertions that it was useless to attempt to build a farmers' party, since its leaders would desert as soon as they were elected to power or had attained positions of influence. It is significant that in 1957, in paying honour to Mr. Coldwell's twenty-five years of leadership in provincial and federal politics, Mr. Douglas referred to the earlier movement in order to make particular reference to this point. "The Progressive party had been formed," Douglas recalled, "but the leadership of that group had sold out by accepting offers from the Liberals. But when Mr. Coldwell [was] elected leader of the Farmer-Labour group he ... made two promises, 'I will do my best,' and, 'I will never betray you.' Mr. Coldwell has kept these promises. . . . He could be neither bought nor bullied nor bribed throughout his twenty-five years of leadership."28 When Mr. Coldwell left the provincial field in 1935 though, the personality of his successor ^Commonwealth, July 24, 1957.

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did much to reinforce the long-standing conviction that party leaders must be controlled. Of an aggressive and ambitious nature, the threat which George Williams presented was less that of betrayal than of concentration of power in himself. Despite his very considerable contribution to the movement, his personality and activities nevertheless served to arouse the distrust and uneasiness which was the legacy from the Progressives, and enhanced the determination of party followers to keep control in their own hands. A second, and positive incentive to party control, was the undoubted idealism of rank and file members. This motive in many instances could not be clearly separated from the negative aspect of distrust, since each frequently reinforced and strengthened the other. Nevertheless, the idealist element was clearly evident, and doctrinaire members staunchly and even rigidly supported democratic procedures in all aspects of the party's activities. To them, the democratic control of government leaders was but a logical and necessary part of the operation of party democracy; one was meaningless without the other. The accession of the party to power therefore was not, in the eyes of C.C.F. democrats, a time for relinquishing any measure of control over its leaders. On the contrary, it presented the very opportunity for which they had been striving to apply their principles and beliefs. Furthermore, the lesson taught by the Progressives was that this was just the time, when their leaders assumed positions of authority, that party control needed most to be increased and reinforced. Against this intensity of feeling, any discernible effort in 1944 and succeeding years to diminish rank and file control could have served only to tear the party apart. To maintain the form and reality of party democracy sufficiently to satisfy the doctrinaire and the suspicious, while at the same time to dilute it enough to enable a strong and independent government to function, represented a rare and delicate feat of political accomplishment. Furthermore, this was essentially the achievement of one man, Mr. Douglas. He satisfied both the doctrinaire and the realist by upholding the principle of party control of government, while at the same time employing the practices of parliamentary government. His strategy to prevent conflict between party and government was simply to keep them moving in parallel lines, without sufficient divergence in policy for them to clash. The tactics employed were mutual consultation and explanation. Of all the pronouncements which, while Premier, he made on relations between party and government, undoubtedly the one which most accurately describes his working method was his exhortation to the 1947 convention. "In a people's Government," he declared, "the Cabinet must

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work closely with the elected members. They must also keep in touch with the Provincial Executive and the Provincial Council. Care must always be taken to see that the elected representative of the people on the one hand and the C.C.F. organization on the other, work together as a team striving for a common objective."29 Both party programme and government policy were formulated only after the respective leaders engaged in extensive and careful consultation with representatives of the other group. This resulted, inevitably, in a considerable overlapping of participants. Those who were officials during discussion at one time would be present as consultants or visitors when the same question was considered by the other body. Means through which the party shared in the determination of government policy have already been described. It was a two-way process, however. Even while the party was influencing, it was being influenced. The submitting of cabinet proposals to C.C.F. Council members provided opportunity for a full and immediate expression of their opinion. At the same time, they exposed themselves to explanation and persuasion from cabinet ministers as to the direction of government policy. Similarly members of the Legislative Advisory Committee attending caucus were in a position to learn something of difficulties unforeseen by the party which might appear in the implementation of certain legislation. Within the party, the annual convention admirably illustrated this reciprocal process, nowhere more than in the panel discussion of party resolutions. Prior to the presentation of resolutions to the convention, delegates were divided into panels, each panel considering and voting on the resolutions relating to a particular group of topics. Cabinet ministers were present in each panel and party enthusiasts hailed this as a democratic means of bringing the views of the rank and file to the direct attention of ministers. On the other hand, the closed panel offered an admirable opportunity for the minister to encourage or discourage proposals, to explain policies, and in general to educate panel members in the direction of the government viewpoint. Appeals from the panel vote might be made to the full convention, where resolutions were presented for final decision. If a minister had been overruled in panel, he might receive support in the plenary session from other ministers, if there was danger of the convention approving a resolution which would be embarrassing to the government. Such weight brought to bear was frequently effective. At the 1960 convention for example, a resolution which called for compensation to farmers for damage caused by big game was defeated in panel, was raised in plenary session by its supporters but was 2»Convention Minutes, 1947.

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opposed both by the minister in charge of the department and another minister, and was again defeated. The reverse, however, may also be true, and far from government members being able to carry a point, the rank and file may instead strongly hold to a contrary viewpoint. This was well illustrated also in 1960 when a determined convention voted down a major resolution in the face of strong support given to it by a senior cabinet minister. The contentious resolution "that when the medical plan is implemented, a deterrent fee be imposed" was defeated in panel. On the convention floor the provincial treasurer designate spoke strongly in its favour, but various delegates made heated and impassioned pleas against it, some even quoting the Premier's election statements that such a fee would not be levied, and the resolution was lost. This was repeated in 1961 when a resolution with the same import once more was defeated, again after receiving ministerial support. The government enjoyed the two usual safeguards for dealing with resolutions which, for one reason or another, might be embarrassing to it. First, resolutions frequently were expressed in general terms, asking the government to "consider," "give study to," "intensify their efforts," or "endorse the principle of." Secondly, timing was the prerogative of the government. It might accept the principle of a resolution, without considering it advisable to implement it "at the present time." When consultation failed and the convention passed resolutions which the government could not accept, the reasons for rejection were explained to the party. Mr. Douglas described the procedure thus: The government considers it is bound by convention resolutions insofar as they are constitutionally and financially possible. . . . At our first Caucus in the fall, Cabinet Ministers go over the convention resolutions and indicate what action they propose to take regarding them. Members of the Legislative Advisory Committee are always invited to sit in at Caucus meetings, having a voice but no vote. If there are resolutions which the Government cannot implement it states the reasons for its position to the Caucus and the Legislative Advisory Committee. The latter report to each meeting of the Provincial Council and in their report indicate that certain resolutions have been found by the Government to be impossible of fulfilment at that particular time. The Council in turn conveys this information to the respective constituencies and if, at their constituency conventions, they feel the matter is of sufficient importance they will pass resolutions and forward them to the next Provincial Convention. In this way, all resolutions are either implemented or, in the event that they are not, the reasons are made known to the Provincial Council and to the constituency conventions, each of which are represented on the Provincial Council.30 The consequence of this technique of mutual consultation was to 30Letter from T. C. Douglas, Nov. 3, 1960.

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obscure the locus of power. The commonly held view of those in party and government was that claims of party "control" were subject to the necessities of the parliamentary system, with the government afforded a considerable latitude in its interpretation of what was "constitutionally and financially possible." In this way, it was pointed out, party wishes were not mandatory; but they were nevertheless more than advice. Some members, however, even in the cabinet, interpreted the government's obligation much more strictly, holding to a literal meaning of party supremacy. They maintained that party pronouncements were directives to the government, and had to be carried out unless circumstances rendered it completely impossible. This duality of viewpoint was aided by the human tendency to interpret general statements in the light of one's own predilection. Broad declarations of party policy, meaning different things to different people, served to confirm the respective views of each. Furthermore, no major disagreement developed throughout the period to test the location of power. With general agreement on all important issues having been achieved through consultation and conciliation, the policies which were carried into effect were jointly those of party and of government, with the precise degree of responsibility of each indefinable. How then did C.C.F. practice differ essentially from that in other parties? When any party comes to power, the government formulates its policy within the general framework of the party programme, not necessarily adopting it in toto, but nevertheless keeping a careful eye on its basis of support. The significant differences in the C.C.F. lay in its specific commitment to a policy of party control, and the setting up of machinery for that purpose. Despite considerable flexibility in the interpretation of "control," the explicit and often repeated declarations of intent provided a theoretical basis which was lacking in other parties. This specific commitment rendered more difficult any flagrant violation of the general principle. Also, the means developed for liaison between party and government, and the faithfulness and enthusiasm with which they were employed, resulted in a degree of consultation, over more than a decade and a half, unapproached by any other party in thoroughness and extent. The provision for the annual election of provincial leader, though hailed by the C.C.F. as the ultimate in party democracy by allowing a means of replacing the incumbent, was never used for that purpose. By contrast the record of the provincial Liberal party during this time demonstrated that the lack of formal means was not necessarily a deterrent to removing leaders. With no machinery for the purpose until it was provided in a constitutional amendment in 1960, the party from the

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time it went into opposition in 1944 replaced leaders with a frequency which made even its own members quip that "ill health" was an occupational hazard of the Liberal party leadership. The merit of a government maintaining close relationship with the rank and £ie of the party and the existence of such a relationship in the C.C.F. cannot be denied. A less reassuring aspect is whether the position of the party has been overemphasized to the extent of endangering an optimum constitutional balance. Ernest Barker, writing on the parliamentary system,31 points not only to the necessity of four elements which compose it; electorate, party, parliament, and cabinet, but also stresses the continual striving for a desirable balance and spirit among them. Every human institution, he points out, seeks to encroach, tending to exaggerate itself and claim predominance over others. An undue enhancement of the C.C.F. party, permitting it to encroach upon the other three components, tends to hinder a desirable balance for the best working of parliamentary government. This natural tendency from within the organization could not help but be given increased impetus by statements from the government side proclaiming the prior position of the party. Despite such declarations, and although exposing itself to a maximum of party advice, the cabinet nevertheless in practice maintained its independence and authority. Any potential danger to the electorate of an imbalance lay in the possibility of equating the party with the people, and thus of circumscribing the appreciation which a parliamentary government must have of itself as the government of the entire province, and not merely as a party agent. C.C.F. cabinet ministers and M.L.A.'s alike have been quick to recognize and voice their broader responsibility. In practice, nevertheless, to whatever extent real party control over the government was effective, it was a denial of true democracy in that it ignored the rest of the population. Ironically, having introduced a very real element of democracy into its own organization, the party, by a full application of its theory, would have denied to those outside the party membership the basis of democratic responsible government. Although this is true of political parties generally, the emphasis which the C.C.F. placed on its democratic nature rendered more conspicuous any possible reluctance to extend the principle beyond its own circle of supporters. The safeguard against this exclusiveness was the presence within the party of political realists who, whether from principle or expediency, kept a shrewd political eye on those who outnumbered avowed party supporters many times over. 31

Ernest Barker, "The Parliamentary System of Government," in Essays on Government (Oxford, 1945).

134 The Political Process in Canada Of the three areas, the legislature appeared to suffer the greatest danger of usurpation. The government, it is true, affirmed that its first responsibility was to the legislature, not the party. Nevertheless, not only did the C.C.F. employ the practice of caucus discussion to an even greater degree than is usual in parliamentary government, but they extended the privilege of such deliberation even beyond the party's legislative group to a non-responsible body, the C.C.F. party council. All legislative matters and budgetary proposals were submitted to caucus, and representatives were kept informed as to the preparation of government programmes even during the planning stage. With C.C.F. council discussions paralleling those of the caucus, it was inevitable that wide areas of decision were concluded before proposed legislation ever reached the legislature. Also, the emphasis which was placed on the annual election of the leader by the party convention tended to diminish the prior position of the legislature. If the C.C.F. premier failed to be re-elected leader at the annual convention, the party would have expected him to resign as premier, even if he still enjoyed the support of a majority in the legislature. A refusal to resign would, according to party precepts, clearly have outlawed him from C.C.F. ranks, and brought into sharp relief the claims of party against legislature which previously had been reconciled. The C.C.F. claim to their right to change party leaders as they wished cannot be denied, but the emphasis given to it tended to ignore the deeper responsibility which the premier owed to the legislature and, beyond it, to the province. The boast of Mr. Douglas that he was the only head of government in Canada who had to have his leadership reaffirmed by his party each year may have been true in letter, but not in spirit. Every premier in Canada every year must have confidence in his leadership affirmed, and in the only place where it should have significance, the legislative assembly. In an era when a major concern of parliamentary government is the diminution of the position of parliament compared with the cabinet, any effort from another direction to diminish further its effectiveness serves only to enhance the disbalance. Just as the past strength of the C.C.F. party has rested upon a balance achieved mainly by one individual, so its future vulnerability lies in its extreme dependence on the personal factor. Mr. Douglas reconciled opposing principles, but he did not eliminate the dilemma of conflict between party democracy and the traditions of responsible government. On the contrary, this dilemma has been intensified for his successor. The original determination to control party leaders has now been reinforced by apparent success, since the doctrinaire can point to what they see as

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an accomplished fact of complete party control. They have repeatedly been assured of this, all party pronouncements confirm it, and the machinery of party democracy continues to operate as it has in the past. It is difficult to see how any apparent aspect of party supervision can now be withdrawn without serious repercussions. This dependence on one man's skill establishes high requirements for succeeding leaders. Ironically, it tends also to have the very effect which the party seeks most to avoid, that of placing extensive power in the hands of the leader. If he is required to continue the delicate balance of party control, with its varying degrees of interpretation, on one hand, and on the other to uphold the principles of parliamentary government, his very duties as mediator place him in a position of considerable strength. Failure to maintain the required balance could lead the party to conflict within itself, and with its leaders in the government, with serious consequences both to the party and the province. Those active within the party have expressed confidence that the political maturity of the active membership will always lead it to suitable choices of leaders. Undoubtedly a high degree of political maturity is required to take account of the intricacies involved in choosing leadership capable of maintaining the precarious balance between party demands and parliamentary principles. The greater test of maturity, which the party has given no indication of facing, would be to confine its demands within the bounds of parliamentary principles; to recognize that when a party has the advantage of office it must also accept the limitations imposed by the constitutional system under which it operates.

The Evolution

^

R. G. ROBERTSON

of Territorial Government in Canada

MACGREGOR DAWSON opens his book The Government of Canada1 with a short survey of the development of "Representative and Responsible Government" in the British colonies in America, particularly in those that later joined to form the present Canada. He deals briefly with the growth of government in each province. It would not have contributed to the work he was embarking upon to have taken a side glance at those vast, thinly settled areas that were not in 1867 and are not now within provincial limits. Dawson was interested in the way that the problems, first of representative institutions, and later of executive responsibility, had been so mishandled as to terminate in a British disaster in the first Empire, and then, with true British stubborness, mishandled again and barely solved in time to avoid a second disaster in the colonies of Canada. His zest for enquiry and his enjoyment in observing the efforts of humanity to cope with constantly recurring problems would have led him, had he directed his attention there, to be greatly interested in the attempts to meet the same questions in the territorial regions of Canada. These have, perhaps, a special interest for Canadians because the process is not over. We can look at ourselves as dealing today with the basic issues that were of such moment a century and two centuries ago in other places. We can also see, in living process, the interaction of political, economic, institutional, and geographic factors in a new setting, in new terms and in new proportions, and yet with much the same character and significance that they had in pre-revolutionary America or in our own colonial days. iThird ed., rev. (Toronto, 1957).

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An underlying distinction was made at an early date in British law between the rights of British subjects in colonies acquired by settlement and those in colonies acquired by conquest. In the former the right to representation in the process of legislating and taxing was regarded as inherent and inalienable. In the latter it was a matter within the discretion of government or Parliament to determine. The provinces of Canada have, on the whole, exemplified the distinction, although representation came at an early stage in Quebec as well. The inherent right to representative institutions and legislative participation seems not, however, to have impressed itself very deeply on the governments or parliaments of Canada when they came to determine the arrangements appropriate for the administration of their own colonies—the territories of Canada. In no case was representation accorded in the initial stage and over much of the territorial areas of Canada it does not exist today.2 It would require a sublime confidence to assume that the ministers, legislators, and officials responsible for the governmental dispositions of the territories have at all times been guided by a deep and penetrating appreciation of constitutional practice or historical perspective. It would be equally unjust, however, to impute a wilful disregard of recognized principle or a voracious appetite for bureaucratic power. Problems of geographic scale, of sparsity of population, and of inadequate communication could not be ignored, whatever the dictates of principle or judicial precept might be. More frequently, however, one is forced to the conclusion that pragmatism had a pretty unbridled run. With occasional distinguished exceptions, there seems to have been little weight given to principle or theory. As often as not it is fair to suspect that there has been little appreciation that territorial or "colonial" government has been involved at all, rather than simply the exercise of federal administration in a somewhat awkward and troublesome field. The two main themes that have run through our experiments in territorial government have been the conventional ones to which Dawson refers:3 the problem of popular representation in legislation, finance, and the discussion of public affairs, and the problem of control of the executive. In the early years, the question of representation was un2 The reference here, and throughout this paper, is to representation in territorial government. Representation in the federal parliament was accorded to the Districts of Assiniboia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan in 1886, to the Yukon in 1902, and to the District of Mackenzie in 1951. In March, 1962, the boundaries of the electoral district of Mackenzie River were enlarged to include the whole of the Northwest Territories, and the name changed accordingly. ^Government of Canada, chap. I.

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cluttered by any concern for the proportionately large native population. They were assumed to have neither the wit nor the wish to be represented and the possibility of their having a status as citizens, as distinct from federal wards, apparently did not occur. It may, in part, have been an extension of this invincible belief in the monopoly of political rights and capacities by those of pure white strain that led the Macdonald government to ignore the informal but effective institutions for local government that had existed in the Red River settlement under the Hudson's Bay Company prior to 1869. More probably it was a complete failure to appreciate the character of the problem involved in the government of the new area that came with our acquisition of Rupertsland. We faced, for the first time in our history, the task of arranging a form of government for a dependent area. The semi-autonomous "District of Assiniboia" had been governed, under the Company, by an appointed council presided over by the Governor of Rupertsland. Of approximately twenty councillors, three were ex officio, including the two bishops; the others were selected from among the long-term residents of the settlement, both metis and white. In the transfer to Canadian control, and in the initial arrangements for the area, no attempt was made to build upon these basic elements of self-government. The result was the unrest and disturbance of 1869, the exclusion of McDougall from the colony, the "List of Rights" adopted by the informal assembly of that year, and hurried attempts by the federal government to adjust the ill-thought and unplanned provisions of the Temporary Government Act.4 Democracy in the area—and suspicions of the intentions of the federal government— proved to be equally vigorous and in the end provincial status, with both representative and responsible institutions, had to be accorded. Our first effort at territorial administration collapsed because of a failure to appreciate the sense of community and the desire for selfgovernment that existed in the Red River colony at the time. Subsequent arrangements for territorial government in Canada have in no case had to cope with an established community, living within a compact area with relatively good communications and possessing a sense of identity and common interest. The areas west of Manitoba in 1870 were sparsely settled, contacts and communications were extremely difficult, and the white population did not in any way comprise a social, economic, or political entity. As a result, while the arrangements for 4

"An Act for the Temporary Government of Rupertsland and the NorthWestern Territory when united with Canada," 32-33 Viet., c. 3; see also L. H. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, 1870-97 (Toronto, 1956), pp. 24-44.

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government there, once Manitoba had been created, gave no sign of having received much consideration, and while no provision was made for any representative institutions whatever, there was no objection and none of the difficulty that had been encountered in the Red River affair. It was not until the white population had grown substantially and articulate spokesmen had emerged that pressure developed for some provision for self-government. From 1870 to 1897, when responsible government was finally achieved in the "old" North-West Territories, the adjustments of government were highly pragmatic. There is no evidence that the federal government—whatever its political persuasion—or the federal Parliament, gave much consistent thought to the principles that should underlie the constitutional arrangements, to a careful adjustment of them to the circumstances of the area, or to an orderly process of development.5 At almost every stage the Canadian government found itself with no clear programme, and it had to be prodded and shoved into conceding the changes demanded by the steadily more numerous and more vocal settlers of the west. There was a reluctance to surrender power and an unwillingness to plan for the developments that must have been reasonably obvious as the settlement of the prairies proceeded. The contrast between the ready acceptance in 1870 of a government lacking even the element of representation, and the total unwillingness in 1897 to be satisfied with anything less than a fully responsible executive, is a striking demonstration of the change that can result from increased numbers, improved communications, and the presence of intelligent and articulate leadership.6 All of these together created a 5 One possible exception to this general statement was the provision in the North-West Territories Act of 1875 which provided that where any district or portion, not exceeding an area of 1,000 square miles, contained 1,000 adults, exclusive of aliens and Indians, the Lieutenant-Governor could establish it as an electoral district to return one member to the Council for a two-year term. As soon as there were twenty-one elected members, the Council was to become the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories. Like other sections of this Act, the provision for a Legislative Assembly does not in retrospect appear to have been fully thought out; Thomas comments (Struggle, p. 76) that "had the probable intention of the Mackenzie Administration been more clearly expressed the later constitutional development of the Territories would have been very different." 6 Popular interest in government can be dated from the late 1870's. Thomas (ibid., p. 87) comments: "The contrast between the administrations of Morris [1872-76] and Laird [1876-81] is not in the degree of discontent with federal "colonial policy" but rather in its expression. In the former it was the Governor and Council who were dissatisfied with their powers; in the latter it was the people themselves who initiated the complaints and requests which Laird and his Council supported with varying degrees of vigour. "The dawning of popular interest in territorial affairs was promoted by the influx of several thousand new settlers and the appearance of newspapers ..."

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steadily growing sense of community in problems, interests, and possibilities. With a greater spread in time, the same has been demonstrated in our later experiences in territorial administration. By 1897, the major battles had been won in the struggle for responsible government and provincial status in the provisional districts of Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Athabaska. The full fruits of success were not to be gathered until the establishment of the new provinces in 1905, but the broad lines of development were clear, and progress along them was rapid and inevitable. But only a few months before responsible government came to the prairies, the Klondike gold strike of 1896 started a chain of events leading to the establishment of a new territorial government. The Yukon provides a series of contrasts with the development of institutions in the Northwest Territories, both "old" and "new." The Yukon was established as a separate district of the North-West Territories in 1895, and as a separate territory in 1898. It is interesting that William Ogilvie, the first Commissioner appointed under the Yukon Act, is usually regarded as the second Commissioner of the territory. The previous year, the federal government had appointed Major J. M. Walsh, a retired Mounted Police officer of considerable reputation, as Chief Executive Officer of the Dominion government in the District, with the title of "Commissioner." The use of this designation for the senior territorial official, rather than "Lieutenant-Governor" as had been the earlier practice, apparently dates from this appointment. Major Walsh could not be styled "Lieutenant-Governor," since the Yukon was still a District of the North-West Territories, with its lieutenantgovernor at Regina; with the passage of the Yukon Act, the newer title was retained, and subsequently carried over in the Northwest Territories Amendment Act of 1905.7 Commissioner Walsh arrived in the Yukon armed with considerable arbitrary powers, including complete authority over the North-West Mounted Police, who had been established in the District since 1895. By special commission, he held the very unusual power to alter or amend any of the mining regulations issued at Ottawa under the authority of the Governor in Council. This authority was extensively used fThe significance, if any, of the changes in usage from "North-West" to "North-west" to "Northwest" is nowhere apparent. It may simply be further evidence of the casualness with which everything connected with the territories appears to have been handled. The Amendment Act of 1905 has "North-west"; "Northwest" appears in the revised statutes of 1906, and has become standard since that time. In this paper, for convenience, "North-West" is used for the territories prior to 1905, and "Northwest" for 1905 to the present.

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to reduce the royalty on placer gold from 20 per cent to 10 per cent, to provide machinery for the settlement of disputed claims, and to provide incentives to prospect in the more remote areas.8 As Commissioner, Major Walsh was not required to seek the advice or approval of any council, although it is reported that he "frequently called in council a number of other officials who had been appointed to positions in the service, in the persons of the Judge, the Crown Prosecutor, the Gold Commissioner, the Mining Inspector, and one or two others."9 Though there was apparently some doubt in the District about Major Walsh's integrity when it came to certain disputed claims,10 there can be little question that in vesting one man with considerable authority and discretion, backed by adequate force through the N.W.M.P., the federal cabinet had provided for the Yukon the only type of government that could have dealt effectively with the chaotic conditions of early 1898. The Ottawa government showed itself quite prepared to modify constitutional arrangements as conditions changed, as demonstrated in the Yukon Act of 1898 which established a separate territory with an appointed council of five officials in addition to the Commissioner, and the amendments of 1899 and 1902 which added first two, and then five elected members to the Council. The same amendments broadened the powers of the Council following generally the pattern established earlier in the North-West Territories. During this period the Commissioner presided over the Council ensuring, by his presence, a measure of co-ordination between executive and legislative decisions.11 In 1908, the Yukon Act was further amended to provide for an elected council of ten members, choosing their own speaker and sitting separate and apart from the Commissioner. This clear division of executive and legislative responsibility—reminiscent of United States terri8 Major J. M. Walsh, Report respecting the Yukon District (Ottawa, Government Printing Bureau, 1898). 9 J. N. E. Brown, "Evolution of Law and Government in the Yukon Territory," in S. M. Wickett, ed., University of Toronto Studies, History and Economics, vol. II (Toronto, 1907), p. 199. Mr. Brown was the first Territorial Secretary of the Yukon. 10 See discussion in Pierre Berton, The Klondike Fever (New York, 1958), pp. 329 et seq. n The first Yukon Council received no federal grant. It is amusing—though perhaps not surprising—to read in Commissioner Ogilvie's report of September, 1899 (Sessional paper 33u, 63 Victoria, p. 33), the following comment which, in one form or another, has been echoed by territorial officials down the years from his day to to the present: "You will see from this account of expenditure that the cost of the roads to the mines has been set down as local. This is because it has, so far, been paid out of the local revenue though I have your assurance, which is very gratifying to the people of this Territory, that the expenditure in connection with the highways to the mines will be met by the Federal Government."

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torial practice—was a new, though apparently unrecognized, departure from Canadian precedents, and from the principles of parliamentary government. With fifty years hindsight, the 1908 amendments seem to demonstrate serious misjudgment, especially since they came at a time of rapidly declining population and income in the Territory. If this assessment is valid, it is interesting to speculate on the factors which allowed the apparently consistent lines of policy of 1897-1902 to fly off on a new tangent in 1908. Perhaps it is significant that for the five years following 1897, the Yukon was much in the news, and events there were followed with great interest. Sir Clifford Sifton, then Minister of the Interior, visited the District in 1896, and may well have retained an insight into local conditions. During this same period, the whole question of territorial government in Canada was of lively interest, stimulated by the constitutional questions being debated in the western plains. By 1908 on the other hand, the Yukon was well into the decline which was to last until the completion of the Alaska Highway in 1942, the Klondike was no longer news in the seats of power to the south, and the theory and practice of territorial government seemed only of academic interest—and precious little of that—following the creation of the new provinces in 1905. Perhaps also the fact that the Honourable Frank Oliver had replaced Sir Clifford Sifton as Minister of the Interior may have had some significance; Oliver had been on the "territorial" side of the negotiations prior to 1905, while Sifton had represented the federal viewpoint in those years. Pressure from the Yukon undoubtedly also had a bearing on the situation.12 In the parliamentary debate on the 1908 amendments, the Conservative Opposition raised the possibility of disagreement between Commissioner and Council, but did not press the matter.13 The amendments passed the final three stages in a day and, despite later changes, they have had a major influence on the character of government in the Yukon down to the present. Representative government in the Yukon thus arrived only ten years 12

See, for e.g., Brown, "Evolution," p. 211: "The people's desire for a wholly elective Yukon Council has not yet been granted. . . . More or less political unrest may be expected in the Yukon until a wholly elective Council is granted; for the struggles of this youngest territory are but the repetition of the struggles of Ontario, Quebec, and the North-West for fully responsible government." ^Hansard, 1907-8, col. 10528 et seq.\ see esp. comments of Hon. R. L. Borden and Hon. G. E. Foster in cols. 10540-1. The bill provided that the Commissioner might at any time dissolve the Council; the Government apparently intended this provision as a means of resolving deadlock. Since the Commissioner was to remain a federal official, acting on instructions from Ottawa, this device would appear useless where the people of the territory were prepared to support the Council in opposition to the policies of the federal government as represented by the Commissioner.

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after the first inrush of population. Like a hothouse plant exposed to a cold wind, it then stopped developing for over forty years. The continuing decline in population led the government of the day to provide in 1918 for the abolition or consolidation of many federal offices, including even the office of Commissioner, in amendments to the Yukon Act which gave authority to the Governor General in Council to abolish the elected Council and replace it with a small appointed body. The government apparently had second thoughts the next year, for amendments were again introduced to maintain the elective principle with a Council of three. The debate14 on these amendments, which occupies less than six columns in Hansard, clearly illustrates how little interest and insight there was into the processes of territorial government in this period. In any event, the Territory continued to rub along with its resident Commissioner and Council of three through the hiatus of the twenties and thirties.15 During the same period, executive and legislative institutions in the Northwest Territories were no more active than in the Yukon. After the creation of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905, what was then left of the North-West Territories had virtually no white population. "Government" was purely administration, and it in turn was largely limited to the maintenance of law and order for the next thirty years. While legislative authority for a council existed from 1905, none was in fact appointed until 1921. From then until 1946 it consisted entirely of federal officials resident and meeting in Ottawa. It is doubtful if any country has provided a more bureaucratic regime than the one that then governed the Northwest Territories; even the appointed Council of the '70's, the short-lived Council of Keewatin,16 and the first Council of the Yukon at least drew their members from officers who lived and worked in or near the Territories concerned. With the discovery of oil in 1921, of radium in the 1930's, and of i*Hansard, March 18, 1919, p. 592. 15 There has been virtually no investigation of the developments in government and administration in the Yukon over the period from 1908 to the Second World War. This is almost the only example we have had in Canadian history of an area so sharply in decline that substantial reductions in the apparatus of government had to be made. It would be rewarding to have a study of this particularly agonizing type of adjustment. 16 Keewatin was established as a separate territory in 1876, with the lieutenantgovernor of Manitoba as ex officio lieutenant-governor. A Council of six was forthwith appointed to deal with a smallpox epidemic; it was dismissed, never to be reconstituted, in 1877. The territory was reunited with the Northwest Territories in 1905, and disappeared as a separate entity. See Thomas, Struggle, p. 84. Possibly the experience in Keewatin before 1905 formed a precedent for government inactivity in the Northwest Territories, 1905-21.

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substantial gold deposits just before the war, the white population grew —but slowly and in a silent isolation through the tremendous area of the Territories. As in the years immediately after 1870, so in the "new" Northwest Territories, there was little serious demand for local participation in any aspect of territorial government, up even until 1951. Morris Zaslow has summarized the situation well in his contribution to the Royal Society symposium of 1958 on The Canadian Northwest: Its Potentialities: For most of the inter-war period the system of government encountered little opposition by reason of the extreme backwardness of the Territories and the low level of its economic and social development. The lands "north of sixty" attracted only a few hundred white residents dispersed among numerous isolated posts along the shores of Hudson Bay, the Arctic Ocean, and the waterways below Fort Smith. The census recorded only 1,007 white people and metis of a total population of 9,316 in 1931. The white settlers formed very minute groups amid the larger mass of natives and never numbered more than a few dozen in any one locality. Most were adults with few dependents in the Territories, and most were transient rather than permanent settlers. They were agents of large corporations or institutions, and it was to these rather than to a distant government that they looked for the provision of their various needs while in residence. Their primary function, whether as fur traders, mission workers, or government employees, was to serve the aboriginal population and, like the administration, they were little disposed to support innovations which tended to disturb the existing pattern of living. Small grants for education and health to assist the missions' welfare work, a considerable police establishment, a network of wireless stations, measures to protect the wildlife industry—these were the chief aids demanded and secured from the government. In truth, the absolute necessity of assistance by government or the large corporations for survival in the hard environment of this northern frontier bred dependence rather than independence among the settlers.17 Whether support from government was an important element in the situation seems doubtful. This dependence was in fact small, for the services of government were few and its hand was light. Of much greater moment was the fact that, as on the prairies in 1870, the white population was so small, so scattered, and so out of touch from one settlement to another that the realistic possibility of achieving much change in the machinery of government did not present itself. Such spasmodic demands for improvement as did emerge fell into the silence of the northern forest and evoked no response from others who might have been expected to support them had there been any sense of community or any active leadership to stimulate the desire for a part in government. i^Zaslow, "A Prelude to Self-Government: The Northwest Territories, 19051939," in Frank H. Underbill, ed., The Canadian Northwest: Its Potentialities (Toronto, 1959), p. 92.

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It is perhaps significant that the first measure of representation—the appointment of a resident of the Territories to the Council in 1946— appears to have been less in response to a clear demand from the area itself than to a growing awareness by the administration that some measure of local participation should be provided. If the people of the Northwest Territories were apathetic about having a share in their own government, it is clear that the officials of the day were largely unaware that they were handling something different from a purely departmental responsibility within the area of federal jurisdiction. The place of the Council as a legislative body in a "provincial" role had been forgotten since the exciting days of the 1890's. Ordinances to establish or amend laws of a provincial character were extremely few: the legislative fabric of 1905 designed for an agrarian community of that day survived largely unchanged. Revised ordinances of the Northwest Territories were not published until 1956. Lingard mentioned in 194718 that the Council "has held since 1939 as many as eighteen regular and numerous special sessions in a single year." Far from being the commendable sign of vigour that the administration apparently believed, the frequency of meeting reflected the fact that the Council was little more than an interdepartmental committee of federal officials advising the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner—also federal officials—on functions that they did not really distinguish from the ordinary range of federal administrative problems. The first real change towards "government" as distinct from routine administration came with the provision for three elected representatives in legislation passed in 1951. In the same year the first elections were held in the Territories. Appointed members still outnumbered the elected ones by five to three, but the stage reached some seventy years before in the "old" Territories had once more arrived. In 1954 the number of elected members was raised to four, continuing to provide representation for all the District of Mackenzie, but not for Keewatin or Franklin. Since 1951 the character and awareness of the administration as being "territorial," and of the Council as being the embryo of a legislative assembly for a future province have steadily grown. The legislative fabric of the Territories was completely overhauled; the institution of a debate on the Commissioner's address provided the conventional means to air grievances and discuss all problems that might afflict a member's constituents; the holding of one session each year in different places in the Territories was used as a means of making the Council better known to the people of an area still largely lacking newspapers and 18 C. C. Lingard "Administration of the Northland" in C. A. Dawson, ed., The New North-West (Toronto, 1947), p. 22.

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the normal apparatus of communication. A conscious effort was made, and is today substantially completed, to put the legislative, financial, and administrative arrangements on a basis that would lend themselves, over the years, to a smooth evolution into provincial status. The next major step in the administration of the Northwest Territories has been indicated in a resolution19 passed by the territorial Council at its session in January, 1962, calling for the division of the present Northwest Territories into two parts: a Territory of Mackenzie, comprising the more settled and better developed western area, and the remainder, as yet unnamed, to the north and east. The purpose is mainly to render more feasible the establishment of the executive and administrative elements of the government on the ground within the confines of the Territory, and to lead gradually towards fully elected councils. After citing recent growth and development, especially in the western part of the Territories, the resolution states that: Whereas it is increasingly desirable, in the light of these conditions, to have a territorial government and administration in closer touch with the area and its people, so that it may be more responsive to the needs of the changing situation; And Whereas in past years the achievement of a closer relationship of the government to the regions and the people of the north has necessarily been made difficult by the great size of the Northwest Territories and a close relationship is especially important because of the diversity of conditions within the area, which must be considered by a territorial government and reflected in legislation, policy and administration; And Whereas there would continue to be a problem in achieving a sufficiently close relationship if there were only a single territorial government for the entire area; And Whereas the western region of the Territories is a natural economic and social entity, which is now capable of more rapid development towards responsible government than the eastern and far northern regions; And Whereas laws and policies which are necessary or desirable in some parts of the Territories may be inappropriate for other parts; And Whereas the Council of the Northwest Territories, after extensive consideration of these questions, has reached the conclusion that the good government of the Territories would be facilitated, and the interests of the residents advanced, by certain changes; Therefore...

If any evidence of the growing political maturity of the far north were wanted it is apparent in the impressive string of "Whereases"! Greater evidence, however, is in the substance of some of the recommendations. It has been traditional at every stage of our political development for the people and their elected representatives to resent appointed 19 Included in Votes and Proceedings of the Northwest Territories Council, First Session, 1962.

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councillors—the embodiment of the popular failure to have government and legislation fully under popular control. The legislative and executive councils and councillors of Canada prior to 1849 were usually regarded as the enemies of the people and the emblems of privilege. The appointed members in the Council of the "old" North-West Territories were regarded as a badge of political immaturity, and abolished as quickly as popular pressure could achieve that happy result. In the Yukon Territory appointment of Councillors came to an end, in response to the repeatedly expressed wishes of the people, as early as 1908. In contrast with this experience it is interesting to note that members of the Council of the Northwest Territories in the 1962 resolution expressed themselves unanimously of the view that, in the new Mackenzie Territory: the Council should consist of nine members of whom initially five should be residents of the Territory elected by the residents of the Territory, and four should be non-residents appointed by His Excellency the Governor General in Council to provide experience and knowledge of administration, business and other affairs that may not be readily available within the Territory.

It is even more noteworthy that this view has been accepted implicitly by the leading paper of the Territories—the Yellowknife News of the North2®—and expressed in interviews by a number of northern citizens recorded by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in November and December, 1961. In no case was there any indication of hostility to these traditional targets of democratic disapproval. While it could be argued that the attitude of the people and their elected representatives on the Council reflects an apathy and unwillingness to assume responsibility, this is belied by the vigour with which pressure has been applied for fully elected municipal councils, locally controlled school districts, and other arrangements for self-government in particular spheres. Two other explanations suggest themselves. One is that the appointed members, being from outside the Territory, are not in a position to be interested parties in the results of their legislation or decisions, and cannot be suspected of being beneficiaries of the positions they hold. In these respects they stand in marked contrast to their predecessors in earlier "colonial" regimes in Canada. Moreover they are, with the exception of the Deputy Commissioner and one other councillor, no longer civil servants. The time-honoured custom of resenting bureaucrats has been deprived of its normal exercise. The lack of apparent sin 20 See, for example, editorial comment in vol. 16 #38, Jan. 19, 1961, and vol. 17 #9, June 29, 1961. The News of the North has consistently pressed for an elected majority on the Council, and for the selection of appointed members from among the residents or former residents of the Territories.

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and the reality of positive virtue have both been realized and appreciated by the residents and representatives of the Territories. The second explanation is to be found in the difference in the character of government now from what it was in the happy years when the ordinary man on any street could be expected to move into a legislator's chair and cope with all the problems of responsibility with full comprehension and sound judgment. The problems of government and the subjects of legislation have become notoriously more complicated and, whatever the North may once have been, it is no longer a refuge from the complexities of administration and regulation that extend into the most detailed aspects of our tightly woven society. In 1947 Lingard could refer to simple regulatory ordinances as being evidence of an awakening need for any legislation at all.21 Since then, the character of government has been reflected rather in the conclusion of involved financial agreements with the federal government, the introduction of hospital insurance with special problems beyond those of any province, ordinances on child welfare, co-operative associations, municipal affairs, intestate succession, reciprocal enforcement of judgments, and, indeed, the whole gamut of normal provincial functions in a field in which sparsity of population, distance, and the mingling of races with different social and economic problems, have all added complications and difficulties of their own. It is a tribute to the maturity of the people in the Territories and their elected representatives on the Council that they realize the limitations that a small population must face in providing the range of knowledge, experience and background needed to cope successfully with the unavoidable technicalities that modern government is heir to. The contrast in the current and historic attitudes on the question of appointed legislators raises the question of the degree to which the change in the nature of government has altered the character of the growth towards representative and responsible institutions. It was probably not too difficult for the settlers at Massachusetts Bay to assume the responsibilities of government: they were simple, light, and inexpensive. In diminishing degree those objectives were still applicable to Canada in the mid-nineteenth century and the prairies in the early twentieth. Even in the latter case, however, the fear of financial consequences was a deterrent. Thomas cites the comment by one of the Parliamentary representatives of the North-West Territories in 1888: If this Parliament will grant us a sufficient sum of money so that we shall not have to resort to direct taxation, of course we will accept responsible government. But I believe the present system, with some slight amend21 Lingard, "Administration," p. 21.

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ments, is the system that will suit the great majority of the people up there best.22

A similar caution is reflected in the resolution of the present Council of the Northwest Territories referred to earlier: ... as in the immediate future neither territory will be able to meet the costs of government entirely from local taxation, appropriate financial arrangements should be made on the pattern established by the financial agreement recently approved by the Governments of Canada and the Northwest Territories;

Comments by the press and public in the Northwest Territories since passage of the resolution have reflected an active fear that the acquisition of a greater degree of self-government could bring with it a measure of financial responsibility and cost that would inhibit the growth and development of the Territories. When emotional pressures towards autonomy and independence have the strength of racial resentment or "anti-imperialist" hatred behind them, the fear of the burdens of modern government, administrative or financial, can be brushed aside. This may be particularly the case when there is little experience of "big government" on the North American model, and where there is no real comprehension of what is or will be involved in making it work. Where these pressures do not apply, however, our current experience appears to confirm what reason would suggest—that the character and scale of government today have a profound effect in tempering the ardour with which the historic attitudes towards representative and responsible government might otherwise be assumed. A glance at the changes in costs is sufficient to indicate why there should be real caution about rushing too fast to assume the burdens that go with autonomy. Thomas23 refers to the budget of the North-West Territories in 1893-94 of $199,200 and in 1894-95 of $200,534. In the latter year the population of the Provisional Districts "exclusive of Indians" totalled 73,506. By 1941 the administration of the new Northwest Territories had achieved such an amiable chaos that the Deputy Commissioner was able to inform Lingard that "it is almost impossible to compile reliable statistical information on revenues and expenditures in the Territories,"24 but some unknown blend of federal and territorial expenditures is listed as having amounted to precisely $293,935.19 in 1940-41. The modesty of these figures stands in sharp contrast with the 22 Thomas, Struggle, p. 156. The representative was W. D. Perley, then member of Parliament for Assiniboia East, and a former member of the Territorial Council. 24 Mlbid., pp. 236-7. Lingard, "Administration," p. 30n.

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budget adopted by the Northwest Territories Council in January, 1962, of $7,224,920. As with the provinces, much of the bill is met by federal grants for particular purposes. Much more is met under the financial agreement which, while parallel to those with the provinces, embodies special provisions to help meet the extra costs and compensate for the limited economy of the Territories. About one-third is met from territorial sources, including taxes on gasoline and fuel oil and the revenues of the liquor system. When one reflects that the population of the Northwest Territories at present is estimated at only 23,000, of all cultures and conditions, the measure of the deterrent to hasty action is apparent. In fact, some of the electors of Yellowknife in December, 1961, sent off a word of admonitory caution to cool any possible ardour in the Territorial Council for too much increase in the activities or responsibilities of government. The bill for proposed improvements in health services— along with the other territorial costs—would, they felt, have to be borne by them alone since they saw little revenue coming from the Indian and Eskimo trappers and other residents of the North.25 The costs and the scope of government are undoubtedly a new factor of substantial weight in the nature and rate of institutional development. In the Yukon Territory, the completion of the Alaska Highway in 1942 marked the end of the long dormant period. Population started to rise again—from 4,900 in 1941 to over 9,000 ten years later.26 In response to this growth, the membership of the Council was increased to five in 1951, and to seven in 1960. The amending act of the latter year also reached back to a precedent established in the old North-West Territories in 1888, to meet in a degree the need for co-ordination between the executive and legislative functions of government. The new clause provides that: (1) There shall be an Advisory Committee on Finance consisting of three members of the Council to be appointed by the Commissioner on the recommendation of the Council. (2) Two members of the Committee constitute a quorum. (3) The Commissioner shall consult with the Committee in the preparation of the estimates of the expenditures and appropriations required to defray the charges and expenses of the Public Services of the Territory for each fiscal year.27 25

See Votes and Proceedings of the Northwest Territories Council, First Session, 1962. 26 The census figures for 1921 and 1931 were 4,517 and 4,230 respectively; present population is estimated at about 14,500. 27 The parallel clause of the 1888 act read "The Lieutenant-Governor shall

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The establishment of this committee implies no formal change in the functions of the Commissioner or the Council. The Committee is purely advisory; nothing in the Act empowers its members to commit the Council, nor is the Commissioner required to follow their advice. However, it is reasonable to expect that the Committee will lead to more effective co-ordination between the executive and legislative branches of government. While the recent relationship between the Commissioner and Council had been close and cordial, the amendment implicitly recognized that a more formal procedure would be useful to develop further the working arrangements which already existed. Beyond this, while it is in no sense a cabinet, the Advisory Committee does represent a first step in the transition towards a normal parliamentary pattern of government. The same amending Act of 1960 at last removed the statutory provision of 1908 that required the Council to sit separately from the Commissioner. This makes it possible under the Act for the Commissioner to attend Council meetings, and to contribute his advice, as chief executive officer, to the discussions there. It is still too early to assess the effects of these most recent changes. The first meeting of the Advisory Committee was not held until early in 1962, pending the territorial elections, and the inaugural session of the newly elected Council in the autumn of 1961. While the amendments offer wider possibilities for constitutional development than previously existed under the statute, the body of conventional practice which has developed over more than sixty years of territorial government in the Yukon will certainly have an important bearing on future institutional changes. It seems unlikely, in the light of established custom, that the Commissioner will come to play the same role in the deliberations of the Council that his counterpart does in the Northwest Territories. Perhaps one can more reasonably expect that the Advisory Committee, sitting with the Commissioner, will over the years come to perform executive as well as advisory functions. It is clear that the tests of our political ingenuity in devising appropriate procedures of government for territorial areas are by no means over. The experience, stretching now over nearly a century, has witnessed many interesting experiments and innovations. In many ways the flirtaselect from among the elected members of the Legislative Assembly four persons; to act as an advisory council on matters of finance, who shall severally hold office during pleasure; and the Lieutenant-Governor shall preside at all sittings of such advisory council and have a right to vote as a member thereof, and shalll also have a casting vote in case of a tie." Quoted in Thomas, Struggle, p. 154. As practice has developed to date in the Yukon under the new amendment, the Commissioner does not sit as chairman of the Advisory Committee.

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tion in the Yukon with the American separation of executive and legislative functions is the most unusual. As in the United States, the system works mainly because of informal expedients designed to achieve a measure of co-ordination and co-operation that the constitutional provision belies. It may, however, yet prove a problem in the gradual evolution toward a parliamentary system. At some stage the effective head of the executive arm must be introduced into the processes of the legislature if the essentials of responsibility are to be achieved. The Yukon Territory has, however, two substantial advantages: a very real sense of community and identity on which the cohesiveness of a successful political entity must be based, and a population of which the great majority understand the processes and principles of self-government. In the Northwest Territories as a whole, both of the Yukon's advantages are lacking. If a Territory of Mackenzie is established, as recommended, it will before too long achieve a sense of its own personality and the processes of education and experience will gradually produce a familiarity with representation and government among the Eskimos, Indian, and mixed peoples who at present constitute the majority of the population. As for the unbaptized territory that is proposed for the residue of the north, it has before it the entire process that began with the purchase of Rupertsland in 1870. It is too early to tell what the stages will be or when they will be achieved. The process of growth may well be the most difi&cult that any of the regions has undergone. The educated population that could be expected to provide early and articulate leadership is small and for the most part transient. There are great problems of language, and of cultural diversity. The Eskimos, who at present constitute about 75 per cent of the population, have no background of political organization of their own and no experience of our ideas or processes of government. We may face the task of gradually establishing a viable and operating government—ultimately with complete responsibility—in an area in which, for the first time in our experience, the white race constitutes a permanent minority. On the whole, the Canadian record in the provision and development of territorial government, after an unpropitious start and with some shaky intervals, has been a creditable demonstration of practical adjustment to differing circumstances and widely varying needs. The three experiments still to be completed promise to be not less interesting and instructive than those that have gone before.

Interprovincial

*

j. H. A i T c H i s o N

Co-operation in Canada

"THERE ARE two main areas in which there is room for inter-governmental co-operation in a federation," writes Professor K. C. Wheare. "There is the area of relations between the general and the regional governments, where, through the effect of the division of powers, cooperation is needed to ensure that co-ordinated and complete administration of the divided fields is attained. Then there is the area of interregional relations, the relation of state and state, or province and province." With respect to the latter in Canada he states that "it has been the practice . . . to hold inter-provincial conferences from time to time" at which "the Dominion does not participate, or does so only by invitation."1 It has hardly been a practice. There are many interprovincial meetings and conferences—at the ministerial level, the deputy ministerial level, the two levels combined, and the sub-departmental level—and an increasing number of these take place on a regular annual basis. But in most of them federal ministers or departmental officials play important or even leading roles. Moreover, it is clear from Professor Wheare's context that he had chiefly in mind the summit conferences of provincial premiers. Despite the solemn resolution of the 1906 Conference that "a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the several Provinces of Canada be held each year to consider matters of common interest; and that every such meeting be convened by the Prime Minister of the Province of Ontario and the Prime Minister of the Province of Quebec," there were before 1960 only five purely inter-provincial meetings at this level —those of 1887, 1902, 1910, 1913, and 1926. ^Federal Government (3rd ed., Oxford, 1953), pp. 241, 242, and 244-5.

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The 1906 Conference does not itself qualify. Though the representatives of the Dominion withdrew after the opening ceremonies and did not again attend "the Conference," it was called by the federal Prime Minister, its subject was federal subsidies to the provinces, and "the Conference" was suspended four times during its six days' existence to enable members to meet with the representatives of the federal government.2 The 1918 Conference qualifies even less. It, too, was called by the federal Prime Minister; its principal subject was the federal-provincial one of the transfer to the prairie provinces of their natural resources; it was chaired throughout by a federal cabinet minister; and only on one occasion did the representatives of the provinces meet privately by themselves in a "Special Conference." The 1910 Conference met merely to discuss inconclusively for less than four hours Maritime representation in the House of Commons—a question that would now be considered a purely federal one. The Conferences of 1887, 1902, and 1913 met to discuss matters of Dominionprovincial concern and that of 1926 differs from them only in devoting some of its time to matters of interprovincial scope; it, too, waded deep into federal-provincial waters. These conferences are therefore "interprovincial" only in their composition and not by reason of their agenda. The 1926 Conference ended by agreeing that it was highly desirable to hold a conference of members of the provincial governments at least once each year, that the conference for the next year should be called by the premiers of Ontario and Quebec, and that if possible it should be held in the West. But this agreement was even less fruitful than the resolution of 1906. It is possible, however, that it will now become the practice to hold biennial, if not annual, meetings of Canada's provincial premiers. After praising the work of the Council of State Governments in promoting interstate co-operation in the United States and in establishing "a counterpoise to the strong centralizing tendencies of the day," Corry and Hodgetts asserted that a comparable association of provincial governments in Canada would help to serve the same purpose but noted that one had not yet been established.3 In the fall of 1960 the Premier of Quebec, M. Jean Lesage, referring to Wheare but taking his cue from Corry and Hodgetts, invited the premiers of the other provinces to assemble in Quebec City in December of that year to consider the establishment of such a council in Canada. ^Dominion-Provincial and Interprovincial Conferences from 1867 to 1926 (Ottawa, 1951), pp. 53-63. ^Democratic Government and Politics (Toronto, 1959), p. 569.

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Only one federal official attended the Quebec Conference of 1960. He attended as an observer and is reliably reported never to have spoken a word. Although press coverage of the Conference was scanty and highly speculative it is clear that M. Lesage expected two principal benefits to flow from the establishment of a council of provincial governments. It would be a valuable piece of machinery of co-operation, first for the exchange of information, and secondly for common action. Having the same jurisdictional sphere provincial governments are confronted over a great range of their activities with substantially the same problems. Each should be able to learn much from the experience of others, and a central clearing house of information would assist them to do so. But there are many areas where the only effective solution of a problem calls for a common approach and a large measure of uniformity. Close collaboration is required for the devising of solutions in such areas and for their subsequent implementation. To discover the areas where a measure of uniformity is desirable and to promote it to the extent to which it is desirable would be the second function of the council. By helping the provinces in both ways, but particularly in the second, to carry out more effectively their constitutional responsibilities, it would retard, if it did not halt, the tendency for the federal government either directly or through its spending power to assume control. It is conceivable, for example, if not likely, that an adequate interprovincial scheme for unemployment insurance could have been devised if interprovincial co-operation had been closer. A council of provincial governments might, therefore, be productive of a healthier Canadian federalism. During and after the Conference it was repeatedly avowed that there was no threat to the federal government from the premiers' convening to discuss the prospects and methods of closer co-operation; the premiers had no intention, it was reported, of "ganging up" on the federal government. In the brief statement released at its close the Conference desired to emphasize "that in no sense could a Premiers' Conference substitute in whole or in part for a Federal-Provincial Conference." It was "unanimous in emphasizing that in no way should it be other than helpful to any Federal Government in office." As if to make all this abundantly clear they agreed to confine their attention to "subjects which are purely provincial and inter-provincial in their effects and which would in no way impinge on the area of federal-provincial collaboration and action." By some means or other they were able to determine that there is a "large range" of such subjects. All this is clear. But it is also clear that the majority of the premiers

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came to Quebec with no very great enthusiasm either for premiers' conferences or for new interprovincial bureaucratic machinery. They did agree to the statement in the official press release that it was "the feeling that there should be very much to be gained by periodical meetings and exchanges of views and discussions of inter-provincial and provincial problems," and that this "would seem to be a logical step hi the collaboration required in these days not only between various levels of government but within the respective levels themselves." And they agreed to assemble again in Charlottetown in August, 1961. That was all. It is doubtful whether they were much more enthusiastic at the close than at the beginning of the Quebec Conference, or whether they would have agreed to as much as they did if the initiative had come from some other province than Quebec.4 In at least one respect they did better than their predecessors of 1906 and 1926: they followed through on their decision to meet the following year. By the time they reassembled in Charlottetown they had developed much greater confidence in the usefulness of periodic premiers' conferences but no greater desire than at Quebec to set up a permanent secretariate of any kind, much less anything comparable to the Council of State Governments. While the premiers now contemplate convening periodically, the indefinite continuation of their periodic meetings is by no means assured. Much will depend on the proved usefulness of their meetings in promoting "co-operative federalism" and on whether the premiers themselves think their meetings are worth while. In the United States the Governors' Conference has been meeting annually since 1908 and the Council of State Governments, established in 1935, is universally acknowledged to have become an effective instrument of interstate co-operation. It does not necessarily follow that a premiers' conference in Canada, lacking the support of a permanent secretariate of any sort and confining its attention to purely provincial and interprovincial (and hence mainly noncontroversial) matters "that in no way impinge on the area of federalprovincial collaboration and action," can make a sufficient contribution to Canadian federalism to be worth while. Neither does it follow that there is in Canada anything like the same need and scope for a permanent secretariate or central co-ordinating agency. Although the criminal law is provincially administered, its content is federally determined and is uniform throughout Canada, whereas in the United States there are now fifty state systems of criminal law. It is significant that the Council of State Governments early concen4 When Mr. Leslie Frost was Premier of Ontario, he had earlier tried, without success, to arouse interest in a premiers' meeting.

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trated on promoting uniformity of the criminal law and that this is a matter which has always received and still receives a great deal of its attention. The very fact that there are fifty units in the United States and only ten in Canada is important since the greater the number of units the more difficult it is to achieve co-operation and uniformity and the greater, therefore, is the need, if they are to be achieved, for formal arrangements and powerful and elaborate machinery. The degree of disparity in human and material resources among the units probably has the same effect and there is even greater disparity in these respects among the several states of the American Union than there is between Ontario and Prince Edward Island. More important than all these factors, however, is the difference in the systems of government. In every Canadian province the cabinet initiates almost all legislative proposals and can normally count on their being approved by the legislature without serious alteration. In formulating them the cabinet has the assistance of an expert civil service, organized into departments each headed, under a cabinet minister, by a deputy minister. If a question arises at the cabinet or ministerial level about the experience and practice of other provinces with respect to a particular activity, it should not be difficult to obtain the information wanted either by the minister's phoning or writing to the other nine ministers concerned or by his directing the deputy minister to have enquiries made at the deputy's or some lower level. Questions arising at the ministerial level concerning the desirability, possibility, and exact modes of attaining uniformity and common action might take longer to explore but they can be explored in the same ways. But senior civil servants need not, and normally should not, wait on direction from the political level. If competent they are anxious to borrow good ideas from other jurisdictions and to promote co-operation and uniformity where these serve the interests of good government and good administration. The competence of provincial civil servants in Canada is unquestionably high on the average—higher than that in at least some of the American states—and at any level there are at most only nine opposite numbers to consult. Once agreement has been reached at the official level, officials have in most cases only to carry their ministers; the cabinet's majority can be counted on to secure legislative approval if it is needed. The American system and the place of the Council of State Governments within it require more extended examination. Executive leadership and influence in American state governments have undoubtedly become more important in recent decades, but their importance varies from state

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to state and the basic three-way split of the law-making power between an independent executive and two independent branches of the legislature remains. If the legislative branches have become more dependent on the executive for the formulation and initiation of legislative proposals they still retain their own right to initiate and more importantly their right to reject. "Proposals emanate from many sources, and the major role of the legislatures is to balance, compromise and decide."5 It is still an active role. The proposals emanating from many sources are not always thoroughly sifted and ordered in terms of priority by the executive branch and, even when they are, either branch of the legislature may disagree with the sifting and the ordering. It has long been recognized that because of their independence American legislatures require the kind of expert assistance normally provided for the executive in both Canada and the United States by the civil service.6 Much has been done in the last thirty years to meet this need through the provision of state legislative bureaux of one kind or another to assist legislatures and their members either directly or through various types of legislative councils. But the situation is by no means wholly satisfactory even now and it was much less so when State Senator Toll of Colorado formed his American Legislators' Association in 1925. Senator Toll saw that legislators, with their power to originate some, and to determine the fate of all, legislative proposals, needed to be better informed and that the need was all the greater if effective interstate co-operation were to be achieved. He was impressed, for example, by the lack of continuity in the negotiation of the Colorado River Compact. "The legislators of the compacting states had not once participated in a conference during the long years of negotiation. Yet it was the legislators of those states that had to pass on the compact." He feared that the states were being seriously weakened by the expanding role of the national government and thought that inadequate lines of communication between state legislatures were partly responsible. Professor F. L. Zimmerman, who was one of Senator Toll's closest associates and who relates these facts, himself spells out the need with great clarity.7 National organizations of state officials had already made attempts to sponsor uniformity of state laws and regulations in their 5 William J. Siffen, The Legislative Council in the American States (Bloomington, 1959), p. 22. 6 It is now becoming increasingly recognized that oppositions in the British form of legislature require such assistance too, but for different reasons, and with somewhat different results. 7 "Fourteen Creative Years," State Government, vol. XXXII, 1959, p. 165. Italics in the quotation at the end of this paragraph are added.

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particular fields but they were (and are) specialized in their approach and "handicapped by lack of organic relation to the legislative process." The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, established in the 1890's to promote co-ordination on a broader front, has few direct roots in state governments: its members are often not drawn from the ranks of operating state officials and it "is oriented to uniformity and is more adapted to the writing of law than to negotiation." The Governors' Conference represents a broader approach and is also at the "summit" level. "Even so, as in American intergovernmental relations generally, our separation of powers posed a problem. The potential of a conference representative only of executives even when these executives are the Governors has some limitations." Zimmerman sums up as follows: While there were national associations of state administrative officials, there had never been an association of legislators. The legislators were the most numerous category in state government—and the most difficult to organize. Other associations of state officials, based on something akin to professional interests, had been organized and conducted, meantime, along the most primitive lines, usually with no activity beyond sparsely attended conferences once a year. The legislators had no pretensions to professional status; they were the amateurs in government. And their interests, being representative of many constituencies, necessarily were divergent.

It was because Senator Toll soon perceived that a legislators' association did nothing in itself to bridge the separation of powers that he brought about its transformation in 1935 into the more broadly based Council of State Governments.8 Self-described as "a joint governmental agency of all the states—created by the states, entirely supported and directed by the States," the Council is composed of commissions on interstate co-operation ("Cicos") or similar official bodies established by state law in each state. Most of them are patterned on the New 8

Professor Wheare apparently believes that the Legislators' Association is still in existence. "In addition to the Council," he writes, "there may be mentioned the American Legislators' Association which represents officially the state legislatures and arranges conferences and research on matters of common concern. The Association is naturally a more unwieldy body than the Council, but it has a function to perform in promoting co-operation between the states." Federal Government, p. 246. Senator Toll, however, tells us that for several years after 1935 there was a curious schizophrenic existence with some activities carried on under the aegis of the Legislators' Association and some under that of the Council but that "ultimately, by a process of osmosis, all of our activities and assets passed into the Council, and the American Legislators' Association atrophied and ceased to function as a separate entity." "The Founding of the Council of State Governments," State Government, vol. XXXII, 1959, p. 162. The nameplate of the American Legislators' Association is retained at the entrance to the building at 1313 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago, for sentimental reasons only.

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Jersey model and consist of five members from the executive appointed by the governor and five members from each of the houses of the legislature. Its Board of Managers consists of one member from each supporting state. It holds a biennial General Assembly composed of three delegates from each state (representing the chief executive, the upper and lower houses of the legislature) and organizes regional interstate conferences. It has a full-time staff of about forty-five distributed among its headquarters in Chicago and five regional offices. It is the secretariate not only for the Governors' Conference but for eight particular interstate organizations9 and for all these it provides research services. It publishes the biennial Book of the States, the quarterly State Government, the monthly State Government News, and a spate of other publications. Its Index to Suggested State Legislation Programs for 1941-57 runs to 44 pages and contains 234 items, while its Program of Suggested State Legislation for 1961 is a book of 153 pages. It is, in short, an elaborate and high-powered organization engaged vigorously in promoting in every possible way interstate and federalstate co-operation. Professor Leonard D. White, like Professor Zimmerman, was not impressed by the achievements of the Governors' Conference and the numerous particular interstate association before 1935, but he has nothing but praise for the Council of State Governments which he calls "a triumph of organizing skill which for the first time in our history gave the states a mechanism for action."10 What has been said here shows that the Council needed to be elaborate, high-powered, and extremely well organized. The basic facts are that in the United States party lines are by no means as firmly held in either house of the legislature as they are in Canada and that each house is independent of the other and of the executive, which is itself loosely structured. There, the need is first to supply legislators, separated as they are from the political executives, with something like the expertise made available to cabinet ministers by the civil service, and secondly to obtain co-operation and agreement between the executive and legislative branches. At the federal level the first need has been largely met by the Legislative Reference Service and the provision of staffs to congressional committees, and the second has been left to be filled, as well as might be, by 9

These are: the National Legislative Conference, the Conference of Chief Justices, the National Association of Attorneys General, the National Association of State Budget Officers, the National Association of State Purchasing Officials, the Parole and Probation Compact Administrators' Association, the Juvenile Compact Administrators' Association, and the National Conference of Court Administrative Officers. ^Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (New York, 1948), p. 150.

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the free play of the art of politics. At the state level there is a third, very real need for a large measure of co-operation among fifty units. It is not only that in any one state three independent and loosely structured bodies must be brought to move together in the same direction; they must be brought to move together with three independent and loosely structured bodies in all the other states. It is no wonder that little progress was made in interstate co-operation until an impressive organization like the Council of State Governments was devised to promote it. That its parent body was a legislators' association, that it itself is comprised of representatives of both the legislative and executive branches, and that its inspiration and mainspring are to be found in a staff devoted energetically, constantly, and exclusively to the creation of both ambience and agenda, are the most significant facts about it. There is, however, one perception of Senator Toll's as reported by Professor Zimmerman that is prima facie doubtful. The establishment of Colorado's Legislative Reference Office, for which Senator Toll was responsible, "made him all the more conscious of the fact that even if every state had such a bureau it still would not make the legislative experience of any one state readily available to the legislators of other states undertaking to tackle similar problems."11 Provincial civil servants in Canada, if so inclined or so directed, can make the experience of other provinces available to provincial ministers. What is to prevent these legislative reference bureaux in the United States from making the experience of other states available to legislators in the same way? The larger number of units in the United States would seem merely to involve a larger staff. Competence, by definition, comprehends a dedication to good government, and a competent and sufficiently large staff would, by definition, search out the experience of other jurisdictions and promote co-operation where it serves the interests of good government. Considerations of economy and the unlikelihood of all states providing themselves with competent and sufficiently large bureaux probably account partially for Senator Toll's reservations. But more important in removing the prima facie doubt are two facts that would seem to lie at the root of the case for premiers' conferences in Canada. The first is the psychological fact that bureaucrats, however originally enthusiastic, are disinclined to continue to assemble and arrange materials for which there is little demand and of which little use is made. The second is the plain political fact that utilizing the experience of others, co-operating with others, and establishing uniformity with others, often yield low political dividends. "The individual legislator cares little about much of the ""Fourteen Creative Years," p. 165.

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legislative grist (particularly when he has ascertained its irrelevance to his own concerns)."12 The legislative council in the American states is not, as in the British Empire and Commonwealth, a legislature or the second chamber of a legislature, but merely a large committee of the legislature expected by means of intersessional meetings and more effective use of reference bureaux to bring more cohesion into the legislature and higher quality into the legislative programme. Here again, high quality entails by definition the infusion into the legislative programme of all desirable interstate aspects politically possible at the moment. The fact that after the Second World War the Cicos were overshadowed by the broader device of the legislative council suggests that interstate aspects were coming to be adequately looked after. There had been substantial improvements to which the legislative councils no doubt contributed, but there were other reasons for the decline of the Cicos13 and the legislative reference bureau movement and the legislative council movement are far from rendering the Council of State Governments superfluous. On the contrary, neither would have made the progress it has during the last quarter of a century had the Council not thrown its weight behind them and without the Council's continued backing both would likely retrogress. The present positions of these movements are but two of the many results the Council has helped enormously to produce. More significant than the decline of the Cicos is the fact that they never were very strong. Only in a few of the States did they show any real signs of filling the ambitious role envisioned for them. In terms of appropriation the parent legislatures set a low value on them; some of them never even used the small amounts made available to them; they met seldom and submitted the scantiest of reports. There are two reasons for this disappointing performance. First, the more interesting and politically rewarding area of federal-state relations was largely taken over by other organizations such as the Governors' Conference. Secondly, there has persisted a real scarcity of persons on the legislative side with sufficient interest in and sufficient imaginative grasp of the potentialities of interstate co-operation to work hard to secure its benefits. On the legislative side the Council of State Governments has always had to rely mainly on a relatively few enthusiastic supporters. Yet the role of the Cicos is potentially great. The pressure on state legislatures and the very indifference of the average legislator to the 12 Siffen, 13

Legislative Council, p. 22. For these reasons see F. L. Zimmerman and R. H. Leach, "The Commissions on Interstate Cooperation," State Government, vol. XXXIII, 1960, pp. 235-6.

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interstate aspects of policy and administration give them their opportunity and justification. The establishment of a legislative council did not usually mean that control of the legislative output fell into the hands of a small group and it was seldom that the legislative council monopolized for long the services of the reference bureaux. Even where these developments did take place it did not necessarily follow that the legislative council or its leading members were any less indifferent to interstate aspects than the average legislator. Two close students of the subject, Professors Zimmerman and Leach, call for both a strong legislative council and a strong Cico on the ground that interstate aspects will be adequately looked after only if a strong commission is specifically charged with responsibility for them. They doubt whether a legislative council will be sufficient even where, as has already happened in six states, it has formally assumed the functions of the Cico. Conceding that the combination may be justified for small states with financing and staffing limitations, they do not approve it as a general device because they perceive that "the pressures of circumstance" often deny the possibility of bringing the intergovernmental approach to bear through the legislative council. What is needed, at least in many states, rather than a fusion of the two bodies, is the side-by-side development of each. What is needed is recognition that the Cico, like the legislative council, is a service agency in its own right, established to assist the legislature and the Governor in one important particular area of concern. Properly conceived, the Commission on Interstate Cooperation can emerge as a specialized agency equipped to conduct research and make recommendations in the broad field of intergovernmental cooperation. And it can do more. Cicos already have demonstrated their usefulness in a number of states as action agencies—negotiating, contracting, reviewing and encouraging interstate activities and programs. Used with imagination, Cicos can become powerful instruments for solution of state problems.14

The Council is now considering the desirability and ways and means of reviving and reinvigorating the Cicos. If this movement is successful it will owe its success, as in so many other cases, largely to the energizing influence of the Council. The Council here means its staff and its nonstaff supporters and enthusiasts who sometimes inspire the staff and upon whose services the staff can usually call. Ironically but none the less significantly, the Cicos may now be strengthened by the very superstructure they were intended to underpin. This is not the first time this not uncommon phenomenon has appeared in the history of the Council. In the early days by far the most active Cicos were those of New Jersey, New 14Ibid,.p. 240.

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York and Pennsylvania, a fact which Professors Zimmerman and Leach attribute partly to the establishment of the Council's first regional office in New York City. Although the executive branch is usually represented in them, the Cicos have been predominantly legislative bodies, and the current move to rehabilitate them is in part due to the feeling on the part of the Council that by concentrating too much on the executive branch through the Governors' Conference it has unduly neglected the legislative side. Closer intergovernmental co-operation and what Canadians in their naivete would simply call better government are not the only reasons for paying more attention to the legislative side. Commitment to the doctrine of the separation of powers also plays a part. A committee of the National Legislative Conference notes that "the objective of this socalled 'separation of powers' was to safeguard the people's liberties and not to obstruct needed governmental accomplishments or to produce disharmony among the various branches." It nevertheless insists: It is a fundamental thesis of this Committee that the Founding Fathers were wise in establishing the coordinateness of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; and that the survival of responsible representative government in our country requires coequality of the legislative branch! Only thus can government continue as "one of laws and not of men." Every sound effort to reemphasize the primacy of the legislature in evolving public policy should be encouraged, therefore, and restrictions which inhibit the achievement of that end should be eliminated.15

Hence the Council (which provides the secretariate for the National Legislative Conference) is not content to achieve intergovernmental cooperation at the cost of weakening the separation of powers. It must be achieved in the teeth of the separation of powers; and if at any time the activities of the Council or other forces result in the subordination of the legislature, it must call a halt and seek to restore the legislature's equality with the executive. It exists, after all, to serve state governments and service must include the attempt to maintain the reification of the traditional and prevailing conceptions of the requirements of good government. The existence together of a firm commitment to the separation of powers and of a full realization of the need for co-operation ^American State Legislatures in Mid-Twentieth Century (Chicago, 1961) pp. 4 and 5. Organized in 1948 as an association of legislative service agencies, the National Legislative Conference is now an association of state legislators and state legislative staff members; legislators and non-legislators are equally represented on its executive committee; the presidency alternates between them; and the Council is its secretariate. This body compensates in part for the relative ineffectiveness of the Cicos and to some extent it takes the place of the American Legislators' Association.

AITCHISON Interprovincial Co-operation 165 between the executive and legislative powers will in itself be sufficient to provide the Council with a full agenda. This fairly lengthy exposition of the context, genesis, and methods of operation of the Council of State Governments has been a necessary preliminary to the consideration of the relevance of the American experience to the quite different political system of Canada. I have suggested that Canada with its simpler, more tightly structured governmental system and its smaller number of units might not need an organization nearly so elaborate and powerful as the Council of State Governments. Does the evidence suggest that the provincial governments of Canada are functioning as effectively in the area of interprovincial co-operation as they might reasonably be expected to do? The government of Saskatchewan produced a list of no fewer than seventy-five particular organizations for the Quebec Conference of 1960 and Mr. T. C. Douglas, then Premier of Saskatchewan, has remarked that Canada had probably achieved more in the way of interprovincial co-operation than has the United States in interstate co-operation. In the summer of 1961 I discussed the adequacy of existing machinery with many provincial ministers and senior civil servants and with officials of a few of the particular organizations that have permanent staffs. The general consensus was that the existing complex of particular organizations was fairly adequate and with some strengthening could become almost fully so. The strengthening suggested was usually that of enlarging the budget and the permanent staff of organizations that had them or providing a single permanent secretary in cases where the secretaryship was passed around from year to year among civil servants of different provincial governments. Greater willingness on the part of seniors to allow subordinates to attend interprovincial meetings would also help, but there were few complaints about the lack of such willingness. On the whole, provincial governments are remarkably generous in this respect and more than one minister said that it was seldom that one or more members of his department were not away attending an interprovincial meeting of one kind or another. In addition to formal arrangements much emphasis was placed on the extent and value of informal consultation. Again and again a minister or civil servant pointed out that he was on a first-name basis with his nine opposite numbers across Canada and that seldom a week (or even a day) went by without his consulting one or more of them by letter or telephone. The view was expressed that there is little left over for a premiers' conference to do except to give a general blessing to the large amount

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of consultation already going on, and it was doubted whether there is much point in the premiers' meeting formally every year or two merely to reiterate the blessing. The decision of the Premiers' Conference of 1960 and 1961 to exclude from their agenda matters impinging on the area of federal-provincial collaboration is a severer limitation to the usefulness of the conferences than might at first appear. The Council of State Governments is deeply involved in federal-state relations.16 Co-operative federalism has reached a stage in Canada where despite the formal distribution of powers there is a heavy federal-provincial mix in nearly every activity of government. The federal government is represented in nearly all the seventy-five organizations referred to above. Even a system of portable pensions, which the Charlottetown Conference decided to take up, would be more useful if it included federal civil servants. The attempt to find matters which can be dealt with by interprovincial collaboration exclusively might have the effect of withdrawing from federal-provincial collaboration matters that ought to be subject to it. It can, I think, be fairly concluded that there is little need for a central general clearing house for information. The generalists of the Council of State Governments do provide at first hand out of their own files an amazing amount of information. But so vast is the range, so varied and complex the detail, of government activities today that no single agency can expect to have all the answers on tap. Even a specialist organization like the American Public Welfare Association does not itself attempt to provide the answer to every enquiry but merely to inform the enquirer where to apply. Every particular enquiry falls within some particular field and can be best dealt with by experts in that field. Existing formal and informal arrangements, strengthened where need be, can be relied upon to effect the exchange of information. Every proposal for uniformity or common action also falls within a particular field and, as every critic of direct legislation knows, unavoidably becomes imbedded in a mass of detail. Much of the collaboration preparatory to uniformity and common action must be left to specialists working through their specialist interprovincial organizations and contacts. The need in the United States recognized by Senator Toll and Professor Zimmerman for a generalist organization acting on a broad front probably arose from massive attitudinal inertia and institu16

Professor Glenn E. Brooks writes that between 1943 and 1959, 60 per cent of all resolutions passed by the Governors' Conference were addressed entirely or in part to the national government and only 17 per cent to state governments. When Governors Convene (Chicago, 1961), p. 53.

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tional obstacles to collaboration as such rather than from inherent limitations of particular organizations in the absence of such hindrances. Where a programme of uniformity or common action requires the collaboration of several departments, the problem would seem to be one to be resolved by interdepartmental co-ordination within each provincial government rather than by a supra-provincial co-ordinating agency. Is there, therefore, no useful role in Canada for a generalist organization capped by a Premiers' Conference? Are there no institutional obstacles and no attitudinal inertia in Canada? In answer to the first of these questions, it should be said that not everyone is satisfied that interprovincial co-operation in Canada is all that it might be. Officials of the Council of State Governments are sceptical of the claim that Canada is more advanced than the United States and they can point to problems that have been more effectively tackled in the United States than in Canada. The formation of the Canadian Educational Association was inspired in 1891 by a convention held in Toronto of the National Education Association of the United States17 and the provincial civil service commissioners were brought together by being members of the American Public Personnel Association. And not all provincial ministers and civil servants take a dim view of the usefulness of a premiers' conference; one civil servant went so far as to say that the fact that the premiers were meeting was "a ray of hope." The use of this term "ray of hope" suggests that, as answer to our second question, both attitudinal inertia and institutional obstacles exist. Premiers and ministers are first of all politicians and some of them at least can be expected, like American state legislators, to be primarily interested in issues politically more rewarding than measures of interprovincial co-operation. An ambitious politician may feel with justification that his ambition is better served by being different than by following a common rule. More than a few civil servants thought that one inhibiting factor was the difficulty of arousing the interest of ministers and premiers and of getting a place for a proposal on a crowded legislative agenda. The delay shown by some provinces in adopting the model acts prepared by the Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation bears out this contention. "We seem to be getting on well enough under the existing legislation" or "There is no urgency about it" are plausible excuses for doing nothing until something seriously goes wrong under the existing legislation. The fact that heads of departments are politicians, 17

Freeman K. Stewart, Interprovincial Co-operation in Education (Toronto, 1957), p. 9.

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the tighter structure of the executive, and its tighter control over the legislature, may well be institutional obstacles to effective collaboration. To the extent that they are, a periodical premiers' conference would be of value if it did no more than to keep to the forefront of the premiers' minds the desirability of co-operation and to make them more receptive to proposals emanating from below. The change in attitude between the Quebec and Charlottetown conferences is an example of the infection of interest among the premiers themselves. The survival of the conference, however, will depend on its playing a more positive and energizing role, which it can do, possibly even without a permanent secretariate, provided it succeeds in maintaining the interest of the premiers. If the impetus comes from the top, the tighter articulation of the executive and its tighter control over the legislature can be a positive help.18 Being the most general of generalists, the premiers themselves cannot be expected themselves to work out the details of proposals or even in all cases to judge correctly whether the details can be satisfactorily worked out. But they can select from a list of promising subjects those next to be followed up. The prior collective approval in principle of all the premiers should do much to overcome the indifference of a minister or deputy minister (and it is possible for a deputy as well as a minister to belong to the do-it-yourself, go-it-alone school); and to inspire with more hope such ministers and civil servants who are not indifferent. But can it do so without a permanent secretariate? Until 1938 the Governors' Conference "had no staff services except a small part of the 18

I have included the looser structure of the American executive among the institutional obstacles which the Council of State Governments had to be invented to overcome. Professor Corry, on the other hand, suggests that the looser structure of command better promotes co-operative federalism by freeing state officials to develop satisfactory arrangements for federal aid programmes. "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," in Robert M. Clark, ed., Canadian Issues: Essays in Honour of Henry F. Angus (Toronto, 1961), p. 21. The two views are not necessarily irreconcilable. An American state administrator (often more a professional administrator than a politician) may get little opposition from other segments of the executive or from the legislature when he is flush with federal funds. But he may encounter inertia from the legislature for a programme of interstate cooperation whose benefits are less tangible than hard cash. The structure of state governments is so loose that some administrators are unaware of the existence of the Cicos and hence fail to utilize them. I cannot cite an instance where the loose command of a governor over the executive has hindered the carrying out of a programme agreed upon by the Governors' Conference. But the possibility clearly exists. It has been observed that the prime minister of Canada is more powerful and influential vis-a-vis his cabinet colleagues than British prime ministers. If anything, provincial premiers are normally more powerful within their cabinets than the federal prime minister.

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time of one gracious gentleman, former Governor Gary A. Hardie of Florida, a retired bank president living in Washington. It had no office except his, no files, no working committees."19 And it accomplished virtually nothing. "When reference is made to a resolution passed by the conference, to a statement made before a congressional committee by the conference executive committee, or to a major study undertaken by the governors," writes Professor Glenn, "the professional work of the Council staff is usually visible behind the scenes."20 Governor J. Caleb Boggs of Delaware, then Chairman of the Governors' Conference, said in 1960: "Although I have known Brevard Crihfield for many years, I never realized just how efficient he is. Let me tell you, there would be very little accomplished without him and his very able staff."21 That able staff inspires much of the agenda of the Conference and the other organizations it serves. The detailed study of a subject selected by the premiers could be carried out by the appropriate particular interprovincial organization; or it might be farmed out to the particular department of a single provincial government. In some cases the setting up of a kind of interprovincial royal commission of outside experts might be warranted. While these methods might be tolerably effective in themselves they would be made much more effective by the appointment of at least a single permanent secretary detached from all provincial governments and, like the American Cicos, having no other responsibility than the promotion of interprovincial co-operation. By keeping in contact with all provincial governments he could inspire most of the agenda of the premiers' conference; by announcing at the close of one conference the possible agenda of the next could help keep the premiers continuously interested; while not responsible for preparing studies and reports he would be responsible for seeing that they were produced; he could act as secretary to any interprovincial royal commission that might be appointed; if attached to the staff of the Institute of Public Administration, of which nearly all senior provincial civil servants are members, he would strengthen that body. And as occasion warranted it, he could be provided with assistants. The expansion of an interprovincial secretariate is, however, just what the premiers fear. There seems to be a new kind of Parkinson's disease stalking the land—a tendency to take Parkinson's Law too seriously. It is not sufficiently realized that one step does not 19 Toll, 20

"Founding of the Council of State Government," p. 163. When Governors Convene, p. 38. ^Proceedings of the Governors' Conference, 1960 (Chicago: Council of State Governments), p. 4.

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necessarily lead to a second and third; that control would be in the premiers' hands; that it is just as foolish to refuse a justified increase as it is to permit one that is unjustified. The expansion of the staff of the Council of State Governments has paid big dividends. Finally, there is no reason why the premiers' conference should be so pure as to refuse to deal with some matters involving federal-provincial collaboration. There is a sincere desire to avoid partisan politics and issues that might embarrass the federal government, but these would probably be excluded anyway by the different party affiliations of the premiers. In some cases it would be helpful and not embarrassing to the federal government, and good for the country into the bargain, if the provinces were to agree among themselves on the manner in which they would like the federal government to collaborate. One well-known provincial deputy minister believes the federal-provincial aspects are so important that a permanent secretary, if appointed, ought to be stationed in Ottawa so that provincial governments could be promptly informed of the winds of change stirring in federal departments. Another wellknown deputy thought that the results of a periodic premiers' conference could be expected to be worth while but not earth-shaking. If it is nurtured with care and directed with sense, there is no doubt that its results will be worth while.

Legislative Power

w. R. LE DERM AN

to Implement Treaty Obligations in Canada

PRINCIPALLY during the decades from 1920 to 1940, Canada achieved complete independence as an international juristic person. This came about by a legal process of conventional constitutional development which has been well described and documented by the late R. MacGregor Dawson.1 But not long after Canada had thus taken her separate place in the community of nations, it became quite clear that this was a shrinking world where international obligations were growing rapidly and must continue to grow and multiply. The position now is, quite simply, that there must be a great flowering of international law with its attendant obligations, or the war of atomic fusion and fission will come when nothing much will matter anyway. Assuming the better alternative, the essential growth of international obligations emphasizes sharply for Canada a problem always inherent in federal constitutions. To what extent, if at all, can a centralized power to perform treaty obligations be permitted to contradict the normal domestic division of legislative powers between the national Parliament on the one hand and the provincial legislatures on the other? In terms of a particular example, the dilemma is this: standards for maximum hours or minimum wages in factories are normally provincial matters within the provincial property and civil rights clause, but if the federal cabinet adheres to an international treaty or convention specifying basic standards in these matters, does the federal Parliament thereby acquire over-riding legislative competence to perform or implement these obligations? Certainly a strong central treaty-performing power seems neces!R. MacG. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936 (Oxford, 1936).

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sary for proper participation in the life and progress of the international community; yet such power could threaten fields of jurisdiction that are unquestionably provincial ones under the constitutional division of legislative powers within the country. While one may disagree with Lord Atkin's solution of the problem, certainly he describes it accurately enough in the following passages from the Labour Conventions Case:2 It will be essential to keep in mind the distinction between (1.) the formation and (2.) the performance, of the obligations constituted by a treaty, using that word as comprising any agreement between two or more sovereign States. Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action. Unlike some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law.. .. Once they are created, while they bind the State as against the other contracting parties, Parliament may refuse to perform them and so leave the State in default. In a unitary State whose Legislature possesses unlimited powers the problem is simple. . . . But in a State where the Legislature does not possess absolute authority, in a federal State where legislative authority is limited by a constitutional document, or is divided up between different Legislatures in accordance with the classes of subject-matter submitted for legislation, the problem is complex. The obligations imposed by treaty may have to be performed, if at all, by several Legislatures; and the executive have the task of obtaining the legislative assent not of the one Parliament to whom they may be responsible, but possibly of several Parliaments to whom they stand in no direct relation. The power to contract international obligations on all subjects now rests with the federal government, the Governor General in Council.3 But the constitutional position in Canada as to legislative performance of treaty obligations thus assumed is uncertain. This obscurity is relatively new because the issue for the older type of Empire treaties is specifically settled by Section 132 of the British North America Act.4 The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries. 2 A.-G. for Canada and A.-G. for Ontario and Others, [1937] A.C., 326, at 347-8. 3 There seems little doubt now that this is the position respecting the power of the federal executive. Though Lord Atkin did say in the Labour Conventions Case that he was not deciding the point, nevertheless he seemed to assume this result in favour of the federal executive. The case for the federal executive in this respect is made (in my view conclusively) by G. J. Szablowski, "Creation and Implementation of Treaties in Canada," (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev., 28, at 30-5. 430 and 31 Victoria (Imp.), c. 3.

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Thus those who drafted the B.N.A. Act of 1867 did intend the Parliament of Canada to have plenary treaty-performing power respecting the only type of treaty in contemplation at the time, treaties affecting Canada concluded in the name of the Crown on the advice of the United Kingdom cabinet or ministers. But after the development of Canada's international independence, the courts construed Section 132 strictly as reaching only the now obsolete Empire treaty, so that in this literal sense the section is largely spent. Nevertheless, it still has some indirect significance in the present situation. It does show that some sort of a central treaty-performing power was intended. And what is the present situation? Uncertainty about the situs of power to perform treaty obligations now obtains because two Privy Council judgments of equal authority contradict one another, taking respectively the two opposite and extreme positions that are possible in the circumstances. It is true that the Supreme Court of Canada now has the last word on the meaning to be given to the B.N.A. Act, but that tribunal has not yet been called upon to speak with clarity and finality on the treaty issue. The Supreme Court of Canada naturally strives to pay proper regard to Judicial Committee precedents, but when it does come to deal with the treaty-performing power the Court will face the contradictions mentioned, which we shall now examine. On the one hand, the Radio Case of 1932,5 speaking of the new Canadian independent international obligations, holds that the treatyperforming power of the Federal Parliament is still plenary. In other words, the decision was that assumption of an international obligation by the federal government thereby confers on the federal Parliament legislative power to perform that obligation so far as domestic legislation is necessary to that end. This is so even though the subject of the treaty obligation is one that, in the absence of a treaty, would be exclusively within provincial legislative jurisdiction under Section 92 of the B.N.A. Act. On this view in the latter event the coming into existence of the treaty obligation in itself makes all the difference. The International Radiotelegraph Convention, 1927, was the international agreement in question in the Radio Case and had been separately concluded by Canada. After insisting that there was still a single treaty-performing power, Viscount Dunedin continued as follows:6 Canada as a Dominion is one of the signatories to the convention. In a question with foreign powers the persons who might infringe some of the stipulations in the convention would not be the Dominion of Canada as a 5 In re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, [1932] A.C., 304. «[1932] A.C., 312. (Italics added.)

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whole but would be individual persons residing in Canada. These persons must so to speak be kept in order by legislation and the only legislation that can deal with them all at once is Dominion legislation. This idea of Canada as a Dominion being bound by a convention equivalent to a treaty with foreign powers was quite unthought of in 1867. It is the outcome of the gradual development of the position of Canada vis-a-vis to the mother country, Great Britain, which is found in these later days expressed in the Statute of Westminster. It is not, therefore, to be expected that such a matter should be dealt with in explicit words in either s. 91 or s. 92. The only class of treaty which would bind Canada was thought of as a treaty by Great Britain, and that was provided for by s. 132. Being, therefore, not mentioned explicitly in either s. 91 or s. 92, such legislation falls within the general words at the opening of s. 91 which assign to the Government of the Dominion the power to make laws "for the peace order and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the Provinces." In fine, though agreeing that the Convention was not such a treaty as is defined in s. 132, their Lordships think that it comes to the same thing. In spite of this, the opposite position was taken in the Labour Conventions Case of 1937.7 The conventions of the International Labour Organization in question were also of the new type of independently assumed Canadian international obligations. An attempt to implement them had been made by general maximum hour and minimum wage legislation of the federal Parliament. Lord Atkin in his reasons for judgment denied that, beyond the strict confines of Section 132, there was a single treaty-performing power on all subjects to be found in the B.N.A. Act, and held the statutes in question to be ultra vires of the federal Parliament.8 For the purposes of sections 91 and 92, i.e., the distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion and the Provinces, there is no such thing as treaty legislation as such. The distribution is based on classes of subjects; and as a treaty deals with a particular class of subjects so will the legislative power of performing it be ascertained. No one can doubt that this distribution is one of the most essential conditions, probably the most essential condition, in the inter-provincial compact to which the British North America Act gives effect. It follows from what has been said that no further legislative competence is obtained by the Dominion from its accession to inter-national status, and the consequent increase in the scope of its executive functions. It is true, as pointed out in the judgment of the Chief Justice, that as the executive is now clothed with the powers of making treaties so the Parliament of Canada, to which the executive is responsible, has imposed upon it responsibilities in connection with such treaties, for if it were to disapprove of them they would 7[1937] A.C., 326. 8[1937] A.C., 351-4.

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either not be made or the Ministers would meet their constitutional fate. But this is true of all executive functions in their relation to Parliament. There is no existing constitutional ground for stretching the competence of the Dominion Parliament so that it becomes enlarged to keep pace with enlarged functions of the Dominion executive. If the new functions affect the classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92 legislation to support the new functions is in the competence of the Provincial Legislatures only. If they do not, the competence of the Dominion Legislature is declared by s. 91 and existed ab origine. In other words, the Dominion cannot, merely by making promises to foreign countries, clothe itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution which gave it birth. It must not be thought that the result of this decision is that Canada is incompetent to legislate in performance of treaty obligations. In totality of legislative powers, Dominion and Provincial together, she is fully equipped. But the legislative powers remain distributed, and if in the exercise of her new functions derived from her new international status Canada incurs obligations they must, so far as legislation be concerned, when they deal with Provincial classes of subjects, be dealt with by the totality of powers, in other words by co-operation between the Dominion and the Provinces. While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the water-tight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure. The two extreme positions are then plain enough. In 1932 Viscount Dunedin said that the making of a treaty conferred in full the relevant legislative treaty-performing powers on the federal Parliament. In 1937 Lord Atkin said that the making of a treaty could add nothing at all to the legislative powers of the federal Parliament. It is true that Lord Atkin purported to distinguish the Radio Case. He dismissed the remarks of Viscount Dunedin on the treaty-performing power as obiter dicta and said that the one true reason of that decision was the finding that regulation of radio communication was within the federal legislative powers anyway even if there were no treaty. But this is simply not a legitimate interpretation of Viscount Dunedin's reasons for judgment. If one reads what Viscount Dunedin said, obviously he was resting his decision on both grounds: (a) that the general power of Section 91 gave full legislative jurisdiction to the federal Parliament to perform treaties on any subject; and (b) that radio communication was under federal jurisdiction anyway in the absence of a treaty because radio was a connecting undertaking under Section 92(10) (a) of the B.N.A. Act. As Lord Chancellor Simonds remarked in a leading case in the House of Lords:9 There is ... no justification for regarding as obiter dictum a reason given by a judge for his decision, because he has given another reason also. If it ^Jacobs v. London County Council, [1950] A.C., 361, at 369-70.

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were a proper test to ask whether the decision would have been the same apart from the proposition alleged to be obiter, then a case which ex facie decided two things would decide nothing. . . . If a judge states two grounds for his judgment and bases his decision on both, neither of those grounds is a dictum.

So the Radio Case cannot be dismissed as Lord Atkin purports to dismiss it. The Radio Case speaks for itself as a precedent to the Supreme Court of Canada in the words of Viscount Dunedin. As such it is in direct conflict with Lord Atkin's reasons for decision in the Labour Conventions Case. Two inconsistent propositions may both be wrong, but they cannot both be right. Meanwhile, neither of these cases stands ahead of or above the other as a precedent for the Supreme Court of Canada. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court is free as a matter of the principles of precedent to overrule one of these cases and follow the other, or, indeed, the Court is free to strike out on a new line that is not complete approval or disapproval of either of the extreme positions involved. Certainly, it would seem that the extreme position of the Labour Conventions Case will have to be modified substantially if Canada is to be able to proceed with confidence in the international sphere. Fortunately, there are some signs that this will occur. Lord Wright, who was one of the five judges on the Privy Council Board for the Labour Conventions Case, has made it clear since that he dissented and in fact agrees with the doctrine of the Radio Case.10 Also, in Francis v. The Queen in 1956,11 Chief Justice Kerwin in the Supreme Court of Canada said that the Labour Conventions Case might well have to be reconsidered. But the most important development of recent years has been the case of Johanneson v. Rural Municipality West Saint Paul in the Supreme Court of Canada in 1952,12 in which the matter of international obligations in aerial navigation came up for a second time. In the earlier Aeronautics Case of 1932,13 Section 132 of the B.N.A. Act was decisive because an Empire treaty of 1919 was involved. But in the Johanneson Case the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation was the international agreement in issue, and of course to this convention Canada had adhered separately and independently. In the Johanneson Case the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada all agreed that aviation fell under the federal general power, treaty or no treaty, and hence there !See Lord Wright's obituary tribute to Chief Justice Sir Lyman Duff, (1955) 33 Can. Bar Rev., 1123 at 1126-8. n[1956] S.C.R. 618 at 621. 12[1952] 1 S.C.R., 292. 13 In re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1937] A.C., 54.

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was no doubt of the power of the federal Parliament to perform the obligations of the convention. But also the statements of Lord Sankey in the first Aeronautics Case and of Viscount Dunedin in the Radio Case about the scope of the treaty-performing power gained some approval as alternate reasons for decision. Chief Justice Rinfret explicitly approved and followed the Radio Case:14 [T]he convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944, has since become effective; and what was said in the Radio Reference by Viscount Dunedin . . . applies here, although the convention might not be looked upon as a treaty under s. 132 of the British North America Act, "it comes to the same thing."

Also, Justices Estey and Locke15 approved the similar statement by Lord Sankey in the Aeronautics Case of 1932. Further, their Lordships are influenced by the facts that the subject of aerial navigation and the fulfilment of Canadian obligations under s. 132 are matters of national interest and importance; and that aerial navigation is a class of subject which has attained such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion.

Mr. Justice Kerwin (now the Chief Justice) did not commit himself on the treaty-performing power as such, but he did uphold the jurisdiction of the federal Parliament over aviation by virtue of the general power in Section 91, saying that aerial navigation was a matter of national dimensions and that the terms of the Chicago Convention were evidence of this national character.16 Now, in accepting as he does the terms and nature of an international agreement as some evidence of the national dimensions within Canada of the matter dealt with, Chief Justice Kerwin modified one of the worst features of the Labour Conventions Case—the part where Lord Atkin had made it painfully clear that he considered the existence of an international obligation to be completely irrelevant to issues of the distribution of legislative power within Canada. Lord Atkin said such power remains distributed in the presence of a treaty exactly as if there were no treaty at all. This plainly means that the distribution of legislative powers is to be determined by domestic considerations within the country, and that the existence or nature of a relevant international obligation means nothing even though the issue is how to perform that obligation within Canada. 14[1952] 1 S.C.R. at 303. 15[1952] 1 S.C.R. at 317 and 328. ie[1952] 1 S.C.R. at 308.

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At least Chief Justice Kerwin's remark suggests a new line of reasoning. If the existence and nature of international obligations can be factors in invoking the federal general power, then we have indeed moved away from the extreme position taken by Lord Atkin. On this new line of reasoning, some international obligations of Canada could be of such character as to confer on the matters with which they were concerned national dimensions and national importance within Canada sufficient to invoke the federal general power. It is possible to maintain that some international obligations would have this effect without insisting with the Radio Case that ail international obligations must have this effect. There are many types of international obligations, with endless variety of subject-matters. Moreover, power gained in this way by the federal Parliament would be concurrent with provincial power and not exclusive of it except in the event of inconsistency between the federal and provincial statutes concerned. The governing definition of the federal general power is now that of Viscount Simon in the Canada Temperance Act Case of 1946.17 [T]he true test must be found in the real subject-matter of the legislation: if it is such that it goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests and must from its inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole . . . then it will fall within the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a matter affecting the peace, order and good government of Canada, though it may in another aspect touch on matters specially reserved to the provincial legislatures. . . . Nor is the validity of the legislation, when due to its inherent nature, affected because there may still be room for enactments by a provincial legislature dealing with an aspect of the same subject in so far as it specially affects that province. No doubt this suggested use of the federal general power means going a long way towards the doctrine of the Radio Case, but it does not go all the way. To repeat, the latter doctrine was that the mere existence of an international obligation—any obligation on any subject—automatically invoked the federal general power in favour of the national Parliament. What I am now suggesting is that the federal general power is to be used somewhat selectively in this regard—that it would in many matters domestically provincial confer treaty-performing powers on the federal Parliament, but that this result would not follow in every case. It would not follow respecting certain matters of fundamental significance for provincial autonomy even though a relevant international obligation was in existence. The range and variety of international obligations is actually 17 ,