The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi 9781463211530

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The Platonic Theology of

Ioane Petritsi

Gorgias Eastern Christian Studies 4  

The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi

Levan Gigineishvili

Gorgias Press 2007

First Gorgias Press Edition, 2007 Copyright © 2007 by Gorgias Press LLC All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. Published in the United States of America by Gorgias Press LLC, New Jersey ISBN 978-1-59333-395-9 ISSN 1539-1507

Gorgias Press

46 Orris Ave., Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA www.gorgiaspress.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gigineishvili, Levan. The Platonic theology of Ioane Petritsi / Levan Gigineishvili. -- 1st Gorgias Press ed. p. cm. -- (Gorgias Eastern Christian studies ; v. 4) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Petrici, Ioane, 11th/12th cent. I. Title. B4765.P474G54 2007 189--dc22 2007025691 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standards. Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents....................................................................................................v Foreword .................................................................................................................ix Preface.....................................................................................................................xv Acknowledgments ..............................................................................................xxiii 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................1 1. A Short Presentation of the Gelati Monastic School ...........................1 i. Foundation ...................................................................................................1 ii. Subjects Studied..........................................................................................5 iii. Scope of Interest, Literature Translated and Major Tendencies .......6 2. A Biography of Ioane Petritsi ................................................................12 3. Petritsi’s Works.........................................................................................20 i. The Certain and Extant Works of Petritsi ............................................20 ii. The Works Ascribed to Petritsi by Eighteenth-Century Scholars....21 4. Overview of Petritsian Studies...............................................................23 2 The One .........................................................................................................31 1. The One of Petritsi ..................................................................................31 2. Summary of Proclus’ Teaching on the One.........................................33 3. Petritsi’s Teaching on the One...............................................................39 i. The One of Petritsi and Three Aspects of the One’s Goodness ......39 ii. The One and the Multitude: the Nature of Providence.....................43 iii. The Cryptic Transcendence of the One ..............................................51 iv. The One and Matter, and the Problem of the Relationship between the Ideas and Matter ...........................................................56 v. The Eros towards the One .....................................................................60 3 The First Limit and the First Infinity ........................................................65 1. Limit and Infinity in Proclus ..................................................................65 2. Petritsi’s Theory of Limit and Infinity ..................................................71 i. Neither One nor Many.............................................................................71 ii. Limit ...........................................................................................................74 iii. Infinity.......................................................................................................81 iv. The Unitary Triad: Different Functions of the One, Limit and Infinity...................................................................................................84 v

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI The Henads .................................................................................................101 1. Henads in Proclus ..................................................................................101 i. A Short Prelude .......................................................................................101 ii. Henadic Ranks........................................................................................103 iii. Henadic Providence..............................................................................113 2. The Henadic Theory of Ioane Petritsi................................................125 i. A Short Prelude .......................................................................................125 ii. The “Gods by Virtue of Participation” ..............................................126 iii. The Hierarchy of the Henads and the Mode of Their Activity .....135 iv. The Analogy of Light ...........................................................................141 v. Henadic Theory and the Christian Worldview..................................142 Intellect.........................................................................................................145 1. Summary of Proclus’ Theory of Intellect...........................................145 2. Petritsi’s Theory of Intellect .................................................................150 i. The Image of the One ............................................................................150 ii. Aspects of Existence .............................................................................154 iii. Immediate and Mediated Effects of Intellect...................................156 iv. Intellectual Hierarchy ...........................................................................158 v. “Creation” and the Concept of Intellectual Motion.........................164 Soul ...............................................................................................................177 1. Summary of Proclus’ Teaching on the Soul.......................................177 2. Petritsi’s Theory of the Soul.................................................................187 i. A Short Prelude .......................................................................................187 ii. A Link between Eternity and the World of Flux ..............................188 iii. Soul as a Place of Ideas ........................................................................192 iv. Adam’s Fall in a Platonic Framework................................................195 v. The Hierarchy of Souls .........................................................................205 vi. Critique of Aristotle ..............................................................................207 vii. The Role of Logic ................................................................................209 viii. The Course of the Soul’s Reversion.................................................211 ix. The Soul’s Ceaseless Striving ..............................................................212 Time and Eternity.......................................................................................215 1. Prolegomenon to the Problem ............................................................215 2. Summary of Proclus’ Propositions on Time and Eternity ..............223 3. Petritsi’s Theory of Time and Eternity ...............................................225 i. Creation or Emanation? .........................................................................225 ii. A Frozen World .....................................................................................242 iii. The Idea of Eschatology......................................................................261

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Conclusion...................................................................................................265 General Remarks ........................................................................................265 1. Petritsi’s Doctrines in the Commentaries on the Elements of Theology ...266 i. The Doctrine of the One .......................................................................266 ii. The Doctrine of Limit and Infinity .....................................................267 iii. The Doctrine of the Henads ...............................................................268 iv. The Doctrine of the Intellect ..............................................................269 v. The Doctrine of the the Soul ...............................................................270 vi. The Doctrine of Time and Eternity...................................................270 2. Petritsi’s Immediate Predecessors .......................................................271 3. Petritsi’s Worldview: a General Estimation .......................................277 9 Sources and Bibliography..........................................................................283 Primary Sources ..........................................................................................283 Petritsi...........................................................................................................283 Proclus..........................................................................................................283 Other ............................................................................................................284 Secondary literature....................................................................................288 On Petritsi ...................................................................................................288 On Proclus and (Neo)-Platonism ............................................................292 Other ............................................................................................................295 Index......................................................................................................................297

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FOREWORD Once, when I visited Tbilisi, I met a fresh university graduate who had earned her MA in Old Georgian Philology; I had the opportunity to discuss with her questions relevant to the history of philosophy. I happened to ask her: ‘could you tell me who Proclus was and when he lived?’ She answered: ‘Proclus was a fifth-century Christian philosopher.’ Although I remained astounded at her response, at least, by then, I had grasped Georgian intellectual history well enough to understand what had happened to my gifted and intelligent young interlocutor. She had read Proclus’ Elements of Theology in the Georgian translation and with the commentaries of Ioane Petritsi, this outstanding and mysterious figure of Christian Neoplatonism, and from this reading she got the impression that Proclus had been a philosopher who had elaborated a thoroughgoing and complex Christian philosophical system, giving a Christian answer, conforming to the revelation of the Bible, to the great questions of philosophy: what is the origin of the objective world, what is the origin of consciousness, what is it that says ‘I’ in us, what is the relationship between the perceiving subject, the perceived reality and perception, between truth, error, knowledge and ignorance, between mind and body and what will happen to us after the death of the body? That Proclus was in fact one of the last great representatives of pagan intellectual resistance in a world where Christianity had obtained the status of imperial religion, that he was a philosophical systemizer of the pagan pantheon, an initiate into all the pagan mysteries, that he could not be more scornful of Christians than he was and that the Christians, when finally allowed to enter the defunct Proclus’ house, felt compelled to practice a thoroughgoing exorcism and to draw large red crosses over the thresholds to chase away the harmful spirits of the pagan gods, these thoughts had not passed and possibly could not have passed through the mind of my young interlocutor. In fact, through the pen of Ioane Petritsi, sometime in the eleventh or twelfth century, perhaps in a monastery called Gelati in Georgia, a new Proclus was born. This new Proclus possessed all the philosophical qualities of his namesake, but professed another religion. He was a dedicated Christian, confessix

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ing and philosophically understanding the mystery of the Trinity, speaking about the Son, His Incarnation and His work of redeeming the world, and about the Holy Spirit inspiring both philosophers and saints. This Proclus could be best understood through the Bible and the Christian Patristic tradition, namely St Basil the Great and St Gregory of Nyssa, but also Origen, Nemesius of Emesa, Evagrius of Pontus and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Still, this Christian Proclus was a metaphysician handling the pagan Proclus’ intricate and difficult concepts of the One, of Limit and Infinity, the henadic gods, of Being, Life and Intelligence, of Intellect and Soul, with as great an ease as the original Proclus. So Petritsi’s Christian Proclus was going to be the Proclus enriching Georgian culture. Odd as this phenomenon may look at the first sight, it is to be understood in a broader framework. As is well known, the long process of baptizing Proclus and, on a broader scale, making him a prominent representative of monotheism, began as early as the end of the fifth century, with PseudoDionysius the Areopagite, who composed his work as a loose, plagiaristic paraphrase of Proclus’ treatises. I believe that Pseudo-Dionysius had been a personal, Christian disciple of Proclus and that it was Proclus whom he addressed, in his Seventh Letter, under the pseudonym Apollophanes, urging him to “ascend” through philosophical knowledge “to the Cause of both the beings and their knowledge,” that is, the Creator God. 1 Proclus’ Elements of Theology later, in the ninth century, found their way to Abassid Bagdad and a re-elaborated version of this work, perfectly compatible with Muslim monotheism, formed the Arabic Pseudo-Aristotelian Book on the Pure Good, whose Latin translation, made in the twelfth century under the title of the Book on the Causes (Liber de Causis) represented true metaphysics for generations of Scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages. Finally, we have a great revival of interest in Proclus in eleventh-, twelfth-century Constantinople in the Magnaura Academy, with Michael Psellus and, following him, John Italus as Consuls (hypatoi) of the philosophers. For both Consuls, Proclus’ Elements of Theology were of the greatest importance. For ninety years Georgian historians 2 believed that this intellecPseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Seventh Letter, Corpus Dionysiacum II, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, De coelesti hierarchia-De ecclesiastica hierarchia-De mystica theologia-Epistulae /PTS 36/ (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 166,14167,2. 2 The impressive list of scholars holding this theory includes Niko Marr, Simon Kaukchishvili, Shalva Nutsubidze, Kornelie Kekelidze, Mose Gogiberidze, 1

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tual milieu must have been the one in which Petritsi received his education and that Petritsi was a personal disciple of John Italus, who even wrote a letter to an “Abkhazian [that is, in this context, West-Georgian] Grammarian.” 3 However, recent linguistic research into the language of Petritsi seems to show that his work is to be dated much later, to the late twelfth, early thirteenth century. 4 Not being able to judge the linguistic and philological arguments in favour or against the early versus the late dating, I can only observe the thoroughgoing similarities between what can be known or inferred about the doctrines of Italus and those of Petritsi. On the basis of these similarities one can safely consider Petritsi as a direct or indirect disciple of the Byzantine philosopher. So whatever Petritsi’s true dating may be, he is coming from a Byzantine Christian Neoplatonist intellectual milieu, whose main figure was Italus. However, writing in a state belonging to the Byzantine Commonwealth but not in Constantinople, and in a language inaccessible to outsiders, he must have felt much freer than his Constantinopolitan teachers to express his views and, also, posterity was much more generous to his oeuvre than to those of Italus or other, later representatives of the same school. So, while from Italus we possess only fragments, from Petritsi we have an entire work of systematic metaphysics. Therefore, Petritsi’s work is also valuable as an indirect testimony to a little-known trend of Byzantine intellectual history. The aim of Levan Gigineishvili’s book, The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi, is to trace, through a thorough philologico-philosophical analysis, the way the Georgian Christian Proclus was created. This is the first comprehensive monograph in English about Ioane Petritsi and his work of transposition of Proclus’ Elements of Theology to the Georgian language. 5 For this reason, the author of the present book had to face a number of heavy challenges. He had to give a wideranging picture of Petritsi’s rewriting of Shalva Khidasheli, Guram Tevzadze and others. The hypothesis that Petritsi was a disciple of John Italus was first proposed by Niko Marr in 1906. 3 Ioannis Itali Opera, ed. Grigol Tsereteli and Natela Kechagmadze (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1966), 64, 161. See also below, p. 17 in the present monograph. 4 I mean here the research of Edisher Chelidze and that of Damana Melikishvili, referred to below on p. 18-19. 5 The only other such monograph in a Western language is Tengiz Iremadze’s German monography: Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter: Dietrich von Freiberg— Berthold von Moosburg—Joane Petrizi (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 2004). However, the two monographs are different in their scope and aims.

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Proclus, while also going into meticulous in-depth textual analyses. Besides presenting Ioane Petritsi’s own thought, the author also had to render understandable how Proclus could be read by his Georgian translator and commentator in the very way he was read. So Levan Gigineishvili makes a unique experiment: first to try to read Proclus in the original, but with Petritsi’s eyes, and only then to report on what Petritsi has done, with his originally perceived Proclus in mind, in order not only to translate but also to ‘baptize’ him. For this purpose, first, Levan Gigineishvili had to give us the necessary historical background about medieval Georgian intellectual life, about the little that we can know about Ioane Petritsi’s life and work and the very much that can be known about his reception and immense influence in Georgia. Second, the author chose to follow the “geometric method” serving as a model for Proclus to write the Elements of Theology and, naturally also, for Petritsi to create the Christian, commented counterpart of this work. So in this monograph Levan Gigineishvili gives a parallel presentation of Proclus’ system—with the natural scholarly bias of somebody who had first read Petritsi before turning directly to Proclus—and of that Christian Platonist system that Petritsi has derived from Proclus’ original thought. He starts with the first ‘Element,’ the One, whom Petritsi, as a Christian commentator of Proclus, identifies with the Father of the Trinity; he continues with the highest principles of the manifestation, innermost to the transcendent One—Limit and Infinity, the twin principles that Petritsi identifies with God the Word and the Holy Spirit, and, starting from these ‘Elements,’ he reconstructs the intellectual universe of the Georgian philosopher. In contradistinction to all previous attempts to understand Petritsi, Levan Gigineishvili does not study the Georgian philosopher merely from the philosophical point of view. Rather, he meticulously establishes the Christian theological value of every metaphysical principle either taken over by Petritsi from Proclus, or newly created by him on the basis of the system of the Athenian Diadochus. So when he shows how the Proclian One becomes the Father in Petritsi, the Limit the Son and the Infinity the Spirit, how the henadic gods of the pagan pantheon—the late pagan Neoplatonists’ greatest innovation—end up in Petritsi’s world as the preexistent models of the creatures in the Divine Substance, how the metaphysical principle that Petritsi calls the “True Being” is identified by him with Christ’s pre-existent intellect in the Evagrian sense and how the Universal Soul serves as Jesus’ pre-existent soul, Levan Gigineishvili is opening up new paths in Petritsian scholarship. He is also the first to adduce an impres-

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sive number of Patristic parallels that Petritsi could have read and used, to show how, in the mind of the Georgian philosopher, the philosophic tradition, represented by Proclus, and the Patristic tradition, represented by such authorities as the Cappadocian Fathers on the one hand, and as Origen and his tradition on the other hand, constituted one and the same tradition for Petritsi who, apparently, was happy to correct the one by the other, while maintaining the theory of their complete unity. I believe that if the present monograph had not served any other purpose than the one to shed light, in a purely scholarly manner, on a littleknown but fascinating chapter of the history of philosophy and of philosophical theology, it would already deserve much attention. However, the book also possesses another merit. In fact, what Levan Gigineishvili presents is not simply a dialog between two persons, namely Proclus and Ioane Petritsi, nor is it merely a dialogue between Platonic philosophy and Christianity. There is always present a third trend in the conversation, represented by the author of the monograph himself who, time and again, enters a dialogue with Petritsi, his hero. So he is far from pretending that his vantage point would be entirely neutral. Rather, while struggling to uncover the content of these difficult texts, he also tries to quench his own desire to understand the relationship of theology and philosophy, in our modern world and for ourselves. Therefore, after having clarified a given doctrinal point in Petritsi’s reinterpretation of Proclus, he cannot refuse himself to ask the question what all this means for him, that is, for a young Christian scholar from post-Communist Georgia trained in various Georgian, Central- and West-European institutions, how all this contributes to his own comprehension of the reality. This he does in a discrete, almost imperceptible manner; yet this remains a strong underlying current that runs throughout the whole book, and that makes it personal and intense beyond the mere interest of the material presented. So Levan Gigineishvili’s book does a most welcome service to English scholarship by providing a first and thoroughgoing introduction to Ioane Petritsi’s thought. The German public is better served, not only by Tengiz Iremadze’s aforementioned monograph, but also by Lela Alexidze’s many articles on Petritsi and her translation, prepared in collaboration with Lutz Bergemann, of Petritsi’s Commentaries to Proclus, which is forthcoming with John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, Philadelphia. It is Levan Gigineishvili’s aim to publish a complete English translation of Petritsi’s translation of and commentaries on the Elements of Theology, for which endeavour I wish him all success. István Perczel

PREFACE The aim of this book is to present a comprehensive picture of the philosophy of Ioane Petritsi, a twelfth-century Georgian Christian philosopher, as accounted for in his commented translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology (Stoiceivwsi9 qeologikhv), and to establish the philosophical and historical setting of Petritsi’s metaphysical doctrine. Ioane Petritsi, according to the commonly accepted tradition, was educated in Constantinople, in the philosophical school founded in 1045 by Emperor Constantine IX Monomachus, the first rector of which was the famous Byzantine humanist, philosopher and politician Michael Psellus. Psellus and his successor in the post of the rector, John Italus, were principally responsible for fostering the philosophical studies in their contemporary Byzantium. They created an intellectual environment in which Greek philosophy, and especially Neoplatonism—represented by Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus, and the later “Academicians” Proclus and Damascius—as well as the so-called “Chaldean wisdom,” 6 played a prominent role. Even after the closure of the philosophical school in 1082, 7 the interests cultivated there and the spirit of devotion to the Antique intellectual legacy continued to be at the forefront of Byzantine society for many years to come. Petritsi was a bearer of this tradition, having breathed in full the air of freedom of philosophical thought in a culture where such a freedom was hardly given first place in the hierarchy of values, but on the contrary was considered to be an intellectual temptation. On the basis of both ChrisOn the “Chaldean wisdom,” see Hans Lewy, Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy (Cairo: Impremerie de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1956; reprint: Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978). 7 On this event, see F. Uspenski, “The Theological and Philosophical Movement in Byzantium in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” in Essays on Byzantine Education (St. Petersburg, 1891) [Ф. Успенский, Богословское и философское 6

движение в Византий XI и XII веков. В: «Очерки по истории византийской образованности». Санкт Петербург, 1891].

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tian and philosophical (primarily Neoplatonist) sources, Petritsi developed an original philosophical-mystical system, which had no precise analogue in his contemporary Christian world—either in Byzantium or in Western Europe. In his country Petritsi holds the exceptional position of being the only philosopher whom the Old Georgian culture has preserved for us. In the Old Georgian sources he is referred to as “our wonderful philosopher.” In fact, even Petritsi himself does not shy away from calling himself truly a “Platonic philosopher.” He wanted to create a center for the study of philosophy in Georgia, while clearly cognizant of the audacity and singularity of his enterprise. Petritsi, in fact, viewed himself as a certain grand master or guru of philosophy, who wished to train successors worthy of him. In his commentaries on Proclus, apparently addressed to his students, he puts himself in the position of the old Parmenides and his reader in that of the young Socrates, who has only just started studying philosophy. However, Petritsi’s dream of establishing a solid philosophical foundation, one that would have lasted long after his death, was not realized. This was firstly because the Mongol invasion almost put an end to scholarly life in Georgia; certainly, in the situation of political oppression there was no room for the extravagance of the study of a subject such as Neoplatonist philosophy. At the same time, the reason for the oblivion of Petritsi’s legacy can be sought also in the opposition to philosophical studies—in the fashion in which they were offered by Petritsi—on the part of the Georgian intellectuals themselves. In fact, even in his lifetime, Petritsi did not enjoy ready acceptance either among the Greeks or among his compatriots. As is evident in his reproaches, he was deprived of normal working conditions by his uneducated kinsmen, who did not duly estimate his talent and philosophical skills and criticized his theories without understanding them. The discontinuity of the philosophical tradition serves as an answer to the question why Petritsi’s commentaries on Proclus remained for centuries in Georgia as an artifact of unusual mystical-philosophical thought, as much revered and admired as they were not properly understood. It was not by accident that Petritsi chose precisely Proclus’ Elements of Theology for the teaching of Neoplatonist philosophy to his students. The work, which, as E. R. Dodds remarks, holds a “unique position as the one genuinely systematic exposition of Neoplatonist metaphysic which has come down to us,” 8 must have been most fit for this purpose. On the one 8 E. R. Dodds, trans. and ed., Proclus, The Elements of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, second edition 1963), ix. As well as quoting from Dodds’ own

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hand, the Elements of Theology embraces the entire order of metaphysical reality—from the One to the Soul—and on the other it describes with almost mathematical rigor the general metaphysical laws of the relations between the entities of different levels of reality. Petritsi certainly tried to provide his inexperienced audience with works that do not have a fragmentary, but rather a fundamental, character. That is why before translating the Elements of Theology, he translated also Nemesius’ On Human Nature (PeriV fuvsew" ajnqrwvpou) 9—the first comprehensive anthropological treatise in Christian literature. We can imagine how Petritsi, despite the fact that he was closely familiar with Proclus’ other works, or with those of other Neoplatonists, took pains to obtain a manuscript of precisely the Elements of Theology, at a time when manuscripts were very expensive and difficult to obtain. In fact, Proclus’ treatise was of interest to our philosopher not only for its own sake—as a superb outline of the whole of metaphysical reality—but also as first-rate material for teaching philosophy in general. Now let me say a few words about the methodology that I have chosen to follow during my study of Petritsi’s major work. In writing a work on Petritsi’s philosophy, I had to choose between two alternatives. The first alternative was to select one specific aspect of his philosophical system— for instance, the doctrine on the soul—and to provide an in-depth analysis of this particular aspect. This would have meant tracing the development of the ideas, for example, on the soul from Plato and Aristotle to their different Neoplatonist interpreters and the Byzantine philosophers, thus identifying sources and providing a precise setting for Petritsi’s ideas. The other option was to provide a general picture of Petritsi’s philosophy, of the entire realm of his metaphysics. The first option, together with its manifest advantages, had the unavoidable deficiency of giving a rather focused view, in which the general perspective on the philosopher’s worldview would have suffered. The second option, on the other hand, risked giving my work too much of an encyclopedic character, preventing me from entering into intriguing details, and thus forcing me to avoid, if one may use this expression, those pitched intellectual battles without which discoveries commentaries upon Proclus, occasional recourse will be made to Dodds’ translations of Proclus. All such citations will be made from this, the standard edition. Very occasional changes have been made, and will be indicated. 9 Greek text: Nemesius Emesenus, De Natura Hominis, ed. M. Morani (Leipzig: Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, 1987). Old Georgian translation by Ioane Petritsi: Nemesius of Emesa, “On Human Nature”, ed. S. R. Gorgodze (Tbilisi: Church Museum Editions No. 17, 1914).

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hardly ever occur and any study loses its attractiveness. However, from the two alternatives, I opted for the second, primarily because the present study is the first monograph written in English on Petritsi’s philosophy. I thought that for a reader who knows very little, or even nothing, of Georgia’s national philosopher, it would be more appropriate to get a general view of the thought of Petritsi. Furthermore, although I tried to escape the dangers just mentioned of such an enterprise, my work could not altogether remain free of having an encyclopedic character. Finally, the fact that I could not go into an extensive comparative study of each separate aspect in Petritsi’s system makes my work emphatically Petritsi-centered. Although I have attempted to identify Petritsi’s sources and provide a philosophical and theological background to his various doctrines, this attempt does not have a truly systematic character in my work, but rather serves to provide some clues—material for further, more focused and detailed investigations. In this respect, one of the most promising fields of research is a comparison of Petritsi’s philosophy with its immediate Byzantine sources—the philosophy of Psellus and that of John Italus. Particular aspects of Petritsi’s thought require comprehensive studies on the background of various Neoplatonist authors, for Petritsi fed on different Neoplatonist sources, providing his students with a rather unhistorical, eclectic view of Neoplatonist philosophy. Furthermore, Petritsi drew his inspiration not only from philosophical but also from Biblical and Patristic sources, the identification of which represents an important milestone in the study of his thought. All the aspects mentioned above can be found in the present work, although not in a fully developed way. Yet the present study, as it is, has highlighted a few formerly unconsidered aspects of Petritsi’s philosophy and has arrived at some results that are novel also for the Georgian scholarship. I have structured the chapters on Petritsi’s philosophy according to the metaphysical levels of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. Thus the five successive metaphysical levels starting from the transcendent One, proceeding down through the pair of Limit and Infinity, to the divine units (henads), to the intellectual world, 10 and ending with the Soul, are covered, respectively, in 10 I avoid saying “intellect” insofar as Proclus distinguishes between Being and Intellect; however, both Being and intellects are included, generally speaking, in the intellectual world. In the following, when speaking about the Universal/Monadic Intellect or Universal/Monadic Soul I shall write simply “Intellect” and “Soul” with the initials in capital letters without any article, whereas when speaking about particular intellect(s) or soul(s) I shall refer to them with lower-case initial letters both with and without articles, as with any common noun. These capitalization conven-

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the first five chapters of my work. The last philosophical chapter concerns the question of time and eternity. I have included this chapter in my work because the divergent understandings of the concepts of time and eternity marked a fundamental tension between the Neoplatonist and the Christian thinkers, a tension of which both sides were fully conscious. Thus I have found it most interesting to observe how our Christian philosopher did or did not reflect those tensions in his system. For each of the chapters I first provide a summary of Proclus’ teaching about his various metaphysical levels, primarily according to the Elements of Theology, but also according to his other works—for instance, the Platonic Theology (PeriV th~9 kataV Plavtwna qeologiva9) and his commentaries on the Parmenides and the Timaeus—because Petritsi attentively read those also. The summaries are aimed at providing a general background to Proclus’ thought, in relation to which we can more clearly see to what extent Petritsi is faithful or unfaithful to Proclus’ doctrines, and can more conveniently think about the reasons for his possible divergences. Of course, Proclus’ doctrines themselves are not always clear and self-evident, there being no consensus among the scholars of Proclus on different points of his thought. Thus my summaries may also suffer from my subjective interpretations of Proclus’ doctrines. However, I hope that I have presented carefully the general fabric of the Greek philosopher’s ideas, having avoided entering into intricate controversial issues. The most difficult summary for me was that on the henads. In this summary I have tried to muse upon a difficulty in maintaining Proclus’ theory itself and to observe whether Petritsi’s peculiar henadic theory has any objective foundation, if not in Proclus’ mind, then at least in his texts—that is to say, whether Petritsi’s apparently un-Proclian interpretations were occasioned by an ambiguity in some of Proclus’ expressions themselves. One must remember that all the different realms of Neoplatonist ontology are closely interrelated, so that one metaphysical realm can be fully understood only in relation to the other realms. Thus, while discussing one metaphysical level I was compelled to discuss also the other levels, which sometimes resulted in necessary repetitions. The basic Neoplatonist law—

tions are followed for adjectives too, when they are placed in the attributive position before these nouns, usually (but not always) with an article, whether a universal or a particular entity is meant.

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which, in fact goes back to Anaxagoras 11—“all in all, but in a proper way in each,” 12 is in a certain way true also of my chapters. I must note one methodological point of my work on the philosophy of Petritsi: rather than saying that Petritsi commented on Proclus’ Greek text, we may with more justice say, in fact, that Petritsi commented on Proclus’ text according to his own translated version. The translation is basically very faithful to the original, but sometimes it provides an interpretative reading, which changes the emphasis or even the entire meaning of Proclus’ sentences. Thus, in my discussions I occasionally provide also a comparison of Petritsi’s interpretative translation with the original Greek, in those cases where the differences represent a philosophical-theoretical interest. In the present work I do not go any further into philological research. One of my crucial interests in studying Petritsi’s philosophy was to observe the way in which he tried to reconcile Neoplatonist teaching, of which he was so fond, with Christian doctrine, and to what extent Petritsi’s synthesis justifies his basic assumption of a certain compatibility between the Neoplatonist and the Christian points of view. Thus, alongside more detached theoretical discussions, I focus my attention on precisely this point. The “metaphysical” chapters are preceded by an introductory chapter concerning the Gelati Monastic School, which aims at presenting Petritsi’s contemporary Georgian intellectual milieu. In the introductory chapter I have also included sub-chapters on Petritsi’s biography, his real and alleged works and on the scholarly literature about him. In the last, concluding 11 Cf. fr. B11–12: ejn pantiV pantoV" moi~ra e[nesti plhVn nou~, in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Franz Joseph Weber (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1988), 190. 12 Cf. Proclus, Elements of Theology, prop. 103: Pavnta ejn pa`sin, oijkeivw" deV ejn eJkavstw/. Henceforth, in the main body of this study, all direct references to primary source material, either Proclus’ works (including the Elements of Theology and his commentaries on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides) or those of Petritsi (including his own commentaries on Proclus) will be given in the text (noting in parentheses the exact proposition or place within the work, and the page and line number, in the case of E. R. Dodds’ edition of Proclus, and the standard 1937 Georgian edition of Petritsi by Shalva Nutsubidze and Simon Kaukchischvili, as detailed below in note 24) rather than the footnotes. However, for the purposes of comparison, occasional reference to those works will be made in the footnotes also. Furthermore, almost everywhere when Proclus is quoted I shall use Dodds’ English translation (with occasional emendations, which will be noted); I shall employ my own English version of Petritsi’s translation only for the purpose of the theme. Naturally, all Petritsi’s Commentaries will be rendered in my own translation from the Old Georgian.

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chapter I have recapitulated the results achieved in the previous chapters; I have compared Petritsi to his immediate Byzantine predecessors, and his possible teachers, Psellus and Italus, and given a very general estimation of Petritsi’s worldview. I have entitled my work “The Platonic Theology of Ioane Petritsi,” because he himself called the Neoplatonists the “true theologians and pillars of wisdom,” and, following Proclus’ teaching, considered Neoplatonist philosophy to be “the truth coestablished with reality.” The best part of man is his logos and the contemplation of the Blessed Nature and of everything created by Him. And if man directs his activities to this aim, he will be free of all errors. Ioane Petritsi, The Epilogue

Levan Gigineishvili

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my great gratitude to Professor Istvan Perczel for his six-year-long intensive and enthusiastic work both as my teacher and as a supervisor of my doctoral thesis, for showing me what should be “the breadth, length, depth and heights” of a supervisor’s collaboration with his student, which I will always keep as an example. I have the pleasant duty of thanking my external supervisor, Dr. Ben Schomakers, for his lively interest taken in my study, for sober criticisms— which forced me to rein in to a certain extent the looseness of my way of presentation of philosophical ideas—and for his most valuable remarks and corrections coming out of his expertise in and love of philosophy. I thank Professor Damana Melikishvili, my Georgian supervisor, who has transmitted to me her great fondness for the medieval Georgian philosopher, and whose help was crucial especially for the historical and philological aspects of my study. Without the assistance and encouragement received from Professor Carlos Steel my philosophical culture would have remained insufficient for carrying out the tasks involved in writing the present monograph. I offer my gratitude for his friendly assistance to Dr. Basile Markesinis, who, being versed in the vast sea of writings of the Fathers of the Church, provided me with most precious references to Petritsi’s Patristic sources, thus doing work that would have taken many years for me. I offer my gratitude also to Professor Péter Lautner, a careful reader of the “Proclian” parts of this book, for his criticisms, corrections and suggestions, which were of much benefit to me. Next my thanks go to Mr. Matthew Suff, who helped me with organizing the frightening chaos in my footnotes and bibliography, corrected the English of my thesis, making my sentences look more fluent and elegant, and more than that, asked to-the-point and intelligent questions concerning the ideas expressed there, making me think them over again and helping to present them in a clearer fashion. I also thank Matthew for suggesting some very appropriate allusions to modern philosophers whose ideas enter in a lively dialogue with those of the ancients. I thank Dr. Katie Stott, a true professional, who has done meticulous editorial work, having brought the text to the beautiful shape it has now. And finally I express my gratefulness xxiii

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to Dr. George Kiraz and the editorial board of the Gorgias Press for taking interest in and kindly providing me an opportunity for publishing my work.

1 INTRODUCTION 1. A SHORT PRESENTATION OF THE GELATI MONASTIC SCHOOL i. Foundation The twelfth century was a most prolific period in the scholarly life of Georgia. The stabilization of the political state caused by King David’s 13 success in repelling the Seljuk invaders, 14 and the realignment of internal affairs through his victory over certain non-obedient magnates, produced a favorable ground for cultural development. Before we begin to speak of education in Georgia and its center, the Gelati Monastic School, the founder of the monastery, King David IV the Builder—certainly the most remarkable of Georgian kings—should first be mentioned. Like Charlemagne, King David, with his most successful political activities, directed much of his efforts towards revivifying and spurring on Georgian scholarly life. The chronicler of his life emphasizes the king’s great interest in knowledge and education. Even during military campaigns he did not cease reading, always keeping beside him camels loaded with his whole library. An amusing passage in the chronicles of an anonymous historiographer relates that once he was so absorbed in reading a book of Gregory the Theologian that he forgot the battle that his army was fighting, and had he not been “awakened” in time, the battle would most likely have been lost. 15 According to the chronicler’s words, he read with assiduity, not in a superficial manner, but understanding the inner meaning of the text. He always kept with him a so-called “Apostolic Book,” which included the On King David, who reigned in Georgia from 1096 to 1124, see Roin Metreveli, King David IV (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1986). English renditions of titles of works and quotations from the original Georgian are my own translation. 14 The chief battle was won by David against a huge Seljuk coalition led by Sultan Il Ghazi—according to a somewhat exaggerated account of some Armenian sources the Turks numbered 400,000—and took place at Didgori field on August 21, 1121. 15 Unknown chronicler, The Life of the King of Kings David, in The Georgian Literature vol. 2, ed. R. Siradze (Tbilisi: Nakaduli, 1987), 239–276. 13

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Acts of the Apostles, and the epistles of Paul, James, Judas, Peter and John, 16 and every time that he read the book from the beginning to the end he drew a short line in it, so that finally twenty-four such lines were found. We can form a picture of King David’s theological culture from the chronicler’s story of the Church council where the Armenian and Georgian theologians quarrelled over some sophisticated theological issues. When they found no solution, King David asked for permission to put forward his opinion, and his speech astonished everyone, to such a degree that the Armenian theologians confessed “We believed him to be their [the Georgian theologians’] disciple, but he excels them all.” 17 Not only Christian books fell into his field of interest, but also pagan philosophy, a fact that we know from his famous Prayers of Repentance, although here, echoing St. Paul, he estimates pagan philosophy as insufficient to gain true knowledge. 18 It is not difficult to determine how important it must have seemed to the king to encourage the development of education in his country. He must certainly have tried to base the Georgian educational system on the most advanced educational pattern of the known contemporary world, that of Constantinople. In fact, during the centuries of its existence, Constantinople was perceived by Georgians as the center of cultural and spiritual life, so much so that, for instance, a tenth-century Georgian writer calls Constantinople “the second Jerusalem.” 19 Although Georgians took much care to preserve their originality, at the same time they tried to raise the level of their own culture 16 The “Apostolic Book” was translated by Eprem Mtsire at the end of the eleventh century. At the beginning of it, Arsen Ikhaltoeli—another theologian of the time—wrote the following acrostic (the acrostic in Georgian reading “The Apostolic Book”): “Receive this purifying treasure; smell the fragrance of its myrrh. It will be for you a thing more brilliant than gold. Look at its constitution: first Luke will tell you deeds of the disciples of the Word; from him you will proceed to James, the Lord’s wise brother; the latter will send you to the ‘son of a dove’ [i.e., Peter, ‘bar Iona’]; after you pass those two, the logical sky and the head of theologians [i.e., John] will converse with you; Judas will complete in number seven the seven catholic epistles of the four preachers; when you proceed deeper, you will find fourteen precious stones, the epistles of the instrument of God [i.e., Paul]. Let all of them be light to your place!” See Korneli Kekelidze, A History of Old Georgian Literature, vol. 1 (Tbilisi: Mecniereba, 1980), 276. 17 Unknown chronicler, The Life of the King of Kings David, in The Georgian Literature, vol. 2 (Tbilisi: Nakaduli, 1987), 270–71. 18 King David the Builder, Prayers of Repentance (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1992), 35. 19 Giorgi Merchuli, The Life of Gregory of Khanzta, in The Georgian Literature, vol. 1, 524–638.

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to that of Constantinople, which was considered to be the ideal pattern. Most interesting in this respect are Byzantine-Georgian literary relations. Georgian translations from Greek embrace numerous aspects of Byzantine literary life: homilies, exegetical writings, ascetic writings, historical writings, hymnology, hagiography and philosophical writings. Already in the tenth century, the prolific literary contact with the Greek Christian literature incited Ioane Zosime, a Georgian hymnographer from the Opisa Monastery, to compare metaphorically the Greek and the Georgian languages to the sisters of Lazarus—Mary and Martha. 20 One should not neglect the fact that Georgia was under the political dominion of the Byzantine Empire and that a tendency towards cultural competition was inherent in the activities of Georgian scholars, traces of which it is not difficult to find in the ancient sources. On the other hand, we cannot speak of any significant cultural contacts with Western Christendom, although there are a few facts indicating such relations. First of all, in the seventh century, Katholikos Kyrion of Georgia maintained correspondence with both the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Pope of Rome—Gregory the Great—concerning the burning dogmatic and ecclesiastical questions of his time. Gregory’s response to one of Kyrion’s letters has survived until today. This was the period of the schism between the Armenian and the Georgian Churches, the Georgians having adopted the Chalcedonian dyophysite Christology. The schism produced fiery debates between the two parties, and Kyrion evidently saw it as necessary to rely on the authority of some of the most important centers, besides Constantinople, of Christianity: Jerusalem and Rome. One should, in passing, mention a theory of the tenth-century Georgian monk and scholar, John of Mount Athos, trying to establish a possible kinship between the Georgians, also called Iberians, and the Spanish Iberians. 21 We have an interesting anecdote in the Life of another tenth-century Georgian monk from Mount Athos, Giorgi (the author of a translation of the Gospels, until now considered to be the canonical version), which is regarded by some scholars as evidence of Georgian–Byzantine antagonism and for a 20 The Georgian Literature, vol. 1, 47. It is difficult to say with certainty which language Ioane Zosime related to Mary and which to Martha, but it is most likely that it was Georgian to Mary and Greek to Martha. 21 “John has heard that not a few Georgian relatives and nations live in Spain.” Giorgi the Athonite, Life of Our Blessed Fathers John and Evtyme. Monuments of Old Georgian Literature (Tbilisi: Sabchota Sakartvelo, 1978), 234.

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desire, on the Georgian part, to establish contact with the Latin West. 22 Delivering a speech in the presence of the Byzantine Emperor and of Roman legates, Giorgi described the Byzantines as having frequently shifted to heresy, whereas, he asserted, the Latins and Georgians had never strayed from Orthodoxy. In the same speech he vindicated the Romans in their usage of the unleavened and unsalted bread in the liturgy. 23 After this speech, the Roman legates promised him an audience with the Pope, which was hindered by the Georgian monk’s death. As regards the sympathies of the Georgians towards the Latin Christians before the schism, the amicable relations between the Georgian and the Benedictine monks on Mount Athos should also be mentioned. The Georgian Athonite monks suggested to the Benedictines that they build their monastery in the vicinity of Iviron, and supported them with money. This happened against the background of strained relations with the Greeks, who sought to deprive the Georgians of their right to the Iviron Monastery. 24 However, all these factors constituted rather marginal phenomena in medieval Georgian culture, and provide no sufficient grounds to speak of any influential cultural relations with Western Europe. The educational system implanted in the Gelati school was influenced by the contemporary Byzantine model. This could be said about the external organization of the Gelati school as well. Archaeological research of the 1930s explored a huge complex around the Gelati Monastery, which remains in very good shape. Researchers proved that the complex was destined to serve an educational purpose. The ornament discovered at the faAkaki Bakradze, “The Forgotten Idea,” a preface to Georgian Literature, vol. 5 (Tbilisi: Nakaduli, 1988), 5–30. 23 Giorgi explained to the Emperor that because many heresies had encroached upon the Church in Byzantium, the fathers of the Church at the councils resolved to use yeast and salt in indication of the Lord’s soul and intellect, against the heresy of Apollinarius, who considered the flesh of Christ to be without human soul or intellect, the divine Word having taken the place of both. The Church of Rome, however, did not need such liturgical innovation, because it was not affected by any heresy, so that it retained the habit of the Eucharist as initially offered by St. Peter, and, moreover, by the Lord himself at the Last Supper. “This is not a point for divergence [between the East and the West]”—adds Giorgi—“if only the faith is Orthodox.” See Giorgi Mtsire, Life of Giorgi Mtatsmindeli, in The Georgian Literature, vol. 2 (Tbilisi: Nakaduli, 1987), 127. 24 See Giorgi Mtatsmindeli, Life of Ioane and Ekvthyme Mtatsmindeli, in The Georgian Literature, vol. 2 (Tbilisi: Nakaduli, 1987), 54. 22

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cade of the complex—an open book with the solar disk drawn inside—has become a popular symbol. The kseno-i (a medieval Georgian scribe just transliterates the Greek oJ xenwvn—“guest chamber” or “guesthouse”) mentioned in the chronicles of King David the Builder is likely to have been a part of the complex, and thus we have in Gelati a replica of the Byzantine model: monastery, educational center and xenon. 25 The external resemblance can be also considered in this light: in Georgia, as well as in Byzantium, the head of the monastic school or “Academy” was a high-ranking official, who had the right of audience with the king. The Georgian term for what was at that time the minister of education, “the Teacher of Teachers,” is a direct translation of the Greek didavskalo9 tw'n didaskavlwn. 26 In the document concerning the organization of the king’s court, we read that the “Teacher of Teachers” came into the king’s audience accompanied by two students, which gives us grounds for supposing that the Georgian court followed the practice of Byzantium, where the most excellent students were invited to participate in disputes under the guidance of the government’s high official, the Logothete. ii. Subjects Studied The subjects studied at the Gelati school included the list of disciplines universally accepted in the medieval Christian educational system in Western Europe, as well as in Byzantium. This is the system of the seven liberal arts, or trivium-quadrivium. 27 The trivium comprised the humanities, such as grammar, rhetoric and logic. The corresponding term for these in Greek was aiJ tecnaiV tw'n lovgwn or hJ logikhV paideiva. The quadrivium comprised mathematical subjects: arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. Besides the preserved books probably used as school textbooks, the fact that there existed a distinct Georgian term for each of the aforementioned disciplines indicates that they were taught in the Gelati school. For example in the socalled Epilogue of Ioane Petritsi’s commentaries on Proclus’ Elements of Theology (henceforth Commentaries), which might have been used as a school textbook, to explain the dogma of the Trinity the Georgian philosopher uses

25 See Simon Kaukchishvili, Gelati Monastic Complex (Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1948). 26 Simon Kaukchishvili, Gelati Academy (Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1948). 27 According to Boethius’ terminology, which was not used in Byzantium, although the same curriculum was in use.

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arithmetical, geometrical and musical analogies, that is, metaphors taken from the first three disciplines of the quadrivium. Let me quote this text here: Geometry posits the three as the basis for everything else, and two of it come of the one; as the Son and the Spirit are from the one Father, so the line and the epiphaniai [Greek: ejpifavneia—“surface”], that is surface, come from one simiai [Greek: shmei`on—“a mathematical point”] which is the point; for when the point stretches itself, it produces the line, which is its firstborn son, and as the line is expanded it develops the surface, which is the power—as if the spirit—of its perfection 28 by which all the other figures are constituted, such as first the triangle, the square, and the circle which has no beginning or end (Epilogue, in Commentaries). 29

In the Epilogue we also find speculations on astronomy, the fourth mathematical discipline. iii. Scope of Interest, Literature Translated and Major Tendencies The interests, manners and the main trends of Georgian intellectual life were greatly influenced by those of contemporary Byzantium. At this time, the Byzantine scholars reveal strong rationalist tendencies, and an acute interest in pagan philosophy marks the period. Michael Psellus, one of the instigators of this revival of intense philosophical interest, relates how he “used not the flowing waters of the easily accessible knowledge, but looked for the lost and forgotten sources and with much effort uncovered the hidden springs.” 30 These were hidden springs of the pagan knowledge, not 28 To understand this rather uncertain sentence in this Trinitarian analogy, it can be noted that here the term “power” is an equivalent of the Greek duvnami", and the latter might define the Holy Spirit as a duvnami" of Christ, or of the Father. However, the latter definition seems more appropriate to our case, because a few paragraphs earlier Petritsi describes the Holy Spirit as the hypostasis in which the Trinity becomes perfect, calling it “strength” or “might”; e.g., “by virtue of the Spirit, which is the power/might by which other beings are held in existence…” See the Epilogue to Petritsi’s Commentaries, 209. Here as in the main text, I cite from the only published edition of Petritsi’s Commentaries, that of 1937 as detailed immediately below. Page numbers are given, as are line references when necessary. 29 Ioane Petritsi, Commentaria in Procli Diadochi STOICEIWSIS QEOLOGIKH, in Ioannis Petritzii, Opera, Tomus II, ed. Shalva Nutsubidze and Simon Kaukchischvili (Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University Press, 1937) (henceforth Commentaries), 215. 30 Michael Psellus, Chronographia VI. 37. Greek text edition and modern Greek translation, introduction and commentaries by Vrasidas Karales (Athens: Vivliopoleio Ariadnē, 1992).

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only of Greek, but also—in the words of Psellus, repeating the standard Neoplatonist terminology—Chaldean and Assyrian. The Constantinople school of philosophy at the Magnaura Academy (in the Magna Aura, an abandoned part of the Imperial Palace), renewed by Constantine IX Monomachus in 1045, of which the first rector, then called hypatos (Greek: u{pato"—“consul”) was Michael Psellus, became a center of rationalist pursuits at such a rate that at the time of the second hypatos, John Italus, it represented the heart of dissident reasoning, hardly, if at all, appreciated by the clergy and the Emperor, who eventually closed it by a special edict. Italus himself and several of his followers were excommunicated. A spirit of the intense philosophical pursuit similar to that in Mangana Academy was also transmitted to the Gelati Monastic School. Concerning the establishment of the Gelati school, the same anonymous chronicler mentioned previously tells us that “David gathered the men of decent life, marked with all virtues, not only those of his kingdom, but if he found anyone full of dignity and goodness, even from the end of the world, he brought him to Gelati Monastery.” Regarding the monastery built by David, the chronicler writes as follows: “Now it stands as a second Jerusalem for the whole East, for the study of everything good, as a center of education, another Athens and even higher than Athens by its godly constitution.” Gelati’s correspondence to Athens and Jerusalem calls for an understanding as a combination of the spiritual or ecclesiastical life with philosophical interests, as in the same annals we read that in the Gelati Monastery “multitudes of Georgians were being educated in philosophy.” The intellectual interests of the Gelati scholars are of a Byzantine character. As is witnessed by the extant texts, Plato and Aristotle, and the “Platonic Successors,” that is, the heads of the Athenian Neoplatonist school, for example Proclus, as well as the earlier Neoplatonists Porphyry and Iamblichus—the objects of intense interest on the part of the prominent contemporary Byzantine philosophers such as Michael Psellus and John Italus—were included in the curriculum of the Gelati school. In the Gelati school, great attention was paid to the logical works of Aristotle, his Alexandrian commentators, and the work of Proclus, whose translations and commentaries, written by Petritsi, were probably used as manuals for the students of the Gelati school. Also noteworthy are the translations of the head of the Alexandrian school, Ammonius, son of Hermeas, by Ioane Tarichisdze: Concerning the Five Words (Voices) of Porphyry the Philosopher, and

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Concerning the Ten Categories of Aristotle. 31 These works are bound together with the famous compendium of medieval logic, the Dialectic of John Damascene, translated by Arsen Ikaltoeli. 32 The fact that all these treatises were united in a single book points to its use as a manual. Although we have no surviving manuscripts, Ioane Petritsi, according to the extant sources, may possibly have translated the Categories (Kathgorivai) of Aristotle and the On Interpretation (Peri Hermeneias, PeriV eJrmhneiva"). Concerning the latter, Petritsi makes the following aside to his audience: “As we have learned in Peri Hermeneias…” As regards the logical works of Aristotle known in the medieval world under the name of the Organon, Ioane Petritsi mentions it several times. For instance, before he begins to comment upon Proclus’ Elements of Theology, he acquaints his students with the apophatic method of the philosopher and presents the syllogistic rules with an auxiliary scheme. Together with these, he also provides a whole apparatus of the terms in his own elaboration. Petritsi states, before explaining the Aristotelian method, that “these few [points] summarize the rules of the Organon, without which it is impossible for a logical soul to understand anything.” Among Ioane Petritsi’s translations is listed also Nemesius of Emesa’s psychologicalanthropological treatise On Human Nature. The several translations of John of Sinai’s treatise Ladder (Klivmax) or The Ladder of Virtues accomplished by the Gelatian scholars point to their particular interest in ethical and spiritual issues. Translations of the Chronography of George Hamartolus and of the Jewish Antiquities of Josephus Flavius must have served as textbooks of world history. One should mention the Georgian scholars’ special emphasis on the translations of the Biblical exegetical literature. In the Gelati Monastery the translation of the whole corpus of the Biblical books supplied with commentaries or glaphurae (Greek: glafuraiv) was begun and probably accomplished. Unfortunately, the extant manuscripts are heavily damaged. For instance, both surviving manuscripts lack significant parts. Among the surviving exegetical parts are full commentaries on Ecclesiastes by Bishop Metrophanes and the interpretation of the same text by Olympiodorus of Alexandria, the translations of the commentaries on the Gospel of Mark, 31 The data concerning the literature translated in Gelati are taken from Damana Melikishvili, “The Gelati Monastic and Literary School,” Bulletin of Kutaisi University 1–2 (1993). 32 John Damascene, Dialectics (with parallel translations of Eprem Mtsire and Arsen Ikaltoeli), ed. Maya Raphava (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1976).

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Luke and John by Theophylact of Ochrid, 33 the exegesis of the Song of Songs by an unknown Byzantine author, and Michael Psellus’ commentary on a passage of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. Regarding the translations, the novelty of Gelatian works, in comparison with the previous samples, is conspicuous. The scholars did not merely attach the translated commentaries to existing versions of the Biblical books, but also revised the latter, making them more appropriate for the new needs. This is the hellenophile period of Georgian scholarly life. 34 The translations of theological literature by Ekvtime and Giorgi of Mount Athos made in the tenth and eleventh centuries lacked precision, that is, in Gelatian eyes they lacked a thorough formal resemblance to the Greek texts. In Sebastian Brock’s words, these were “reader-oriented” and not “textoriented,” that is to say, sensus de sensu and not verbum de verbo translations. 35 Having been educated in Byzantium, the Athonite theologians knew perfect Greek, so it was rather an intentional deficiency on their part, insofar as their primary concern was the immediate spiritual needs of the audience, primarily the simple monks for whom the translations were made, and not scholarly precision. In Eprem Mtsire’s metaphor, they were providing milk to those who were not yet prepared for solid food. 36 However, those translations were already insufficient for the new pursuits of such scholars as Eprem Mtsire—the translator of the Corpus Dionysiacum—or Ioane Petritsi. The new trend was first developed in the Georgian Monastery of the Black Mountain in Syria, with Eprem Mtsire as one of the most influential figures. The Gelatian theologians, such as Arsen Ikaltoeli and, as some scholars think, also Ioane Petritsi, seem to have gained their translating skills from Eprem, lending him, in return, their expertise in philosophy. Thus Arsen assisted Eprem in translating John Damascene. The Gelatian school of translation pursued an extreme degree of exactitude, sometimes following the Greek original word for word, often in defiance of the natural flow of the Georgian language. The extant translation of St. Maximus’ works is one such example. This, of course, is helpful for the philologists in defining the In medieval Georgian sources this author is usually referred to as Theophylact of Bulgaria. 34 For a detailed analysis of this particular issue, see Damana Melikishvili, “The Gelati School and Problems of Development of Georgian Scientific Language,” Linguistic Studies 10 (1986). 35 Cf. Sebastian P. Brock, Aspects of Translation Technique in Antiquity. Variorum collected studies series, CS199 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), 74. 36 Kekelidze, op. cit., 264. 33

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family of the manuscripts from which the translation derived, and sometimes even in reconstructing the original Greek. Acceptance of the new translating methods was a painful process, especially when it meant the revision of previous versions of the Biblical texts considered to be the most authoritative. This is apparent, for instance, in Eprem’s apologies to the reader for having taken on the audacious task of revising the old translations according to the Greek texts. On the other hand, Ioane Petritsi harshly criticizes the former translations for not following the precise meaning of the Biblical texts. Achieving accuracy was even more difficult as regards the philosophical translations, because the Georgian language had not yet properly developed the complex terminology necessary for philosophical discourse. Before the eleventh century, it seems, abstract philosophical speculations were not the primary concern of the Georgian monks and scholars. For instance, Eprem remarks, concerning his translation of John Damascene’s Dialectics, that “those 50 chapters are from profane books and philosophical teachings… nothing of its kind has ever been translated into our language.” 37 The Gelati school had to undertake this task. For instance, Petritsi states that he “zealously desired for the people of his country” that they develop a philosophical language different from that of the common people. 38 The twelfth-century translators, in their efforts to raise the Georgian language to the level of Greek flexibility, wished at the same time to make translations accessible and easily readable. They tried to follow the rules of the native language, yet sometimes this was impossible, as the exactitude of the Greek text demanded to be consistently followed. For example, Arsen notes “If there is some darkness and defects in my translation, this is due to the accordance with Greek and not due to the fact that I cannot make the Georgian speech beautiful,” and Ioane Petritsi states “I am eager to follow all the simplicity of our language up to the point when too great a simplicity would misrepresent the meaning.” 39 As I have already mentioned, the absence of a rigorous philosophical terminology had previously made proper translation of the philosophical texts impossible. Ioane Petritsi’s reproach testifies to this predicament: “Everything [every concept] in the Greek eloquence has its own term, in accordance with its nature, but among us not a single translator examined this, and now I am terribly hindered, for our translators have applied the John Damascene, Dialectics, 66. Epilogue to the Commentaries, 220. 39 Ibid., 222. 37 38

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same terms for everything [for different concepts].” 40 Petritsi and the followers of his method faced a twofold task: to translate the philosophical works and to establish a new, lucid scientific terminology. It must be mentioned that Georgian scholars did not merely use the Greek terms without translating them, but tried to establish a terminology entirely based on the Georgian language following the rules and the affix system inherent in it. 41 That is the reason why the terms for the same concepts are differently coined in the works of different translators. An interesting example of how the Gelatian scholars dealt with the problems of terminology is Petritsi’s translation of the very first word of Proclus’ treatise, the Elements of Theology. As an equivalent of Elements (Greek: stoiceivwsi"—“the elements”), he established a new, purely philosophical term by deriving it from the Persian käfšir (“to agglutinate,” “to solder” or “to braze”). Thus he successfully substituted all previous Georgian terms, which also combined everyday common meanings and were, as a result, ambiguous and polysemantic. 42 For instance, kavshiri nowadays is a common Georgian word for “union.” The extent to which the Gelatian scholars succeeded in their language reform can be appreciated from the fact that, as in the case of the last example, the forms and terms elaborated in the monastery are even today constituent parts of the Georgian language. The Gelati scholars set for themselves the task of revealing the abilities of the native language and raising it to the level of Greek, which, according to Petritsi, was “apt for philosophical contemplation.” Actually, Greek served as an example not only for Georgians, but for the Latin West as well. As is known, the Latin translators also faced the same problems concerning the rigor of philosophical terminology. As a modern scholar notes, “antiquity handed to the early Middle Ages no clear Latin terminology for philosophical concepts; the distinctions for vocabulary suggested by authorities such as Boethius gave the illusion of clarity to conceptual confusion.” 43 Concerning the estimation of the role of philosophy and Antique legacy, different and controversial attitudes stirred the minds of the Georgian Preface to the Commentaries, 6. For a thorough analysis, see Damana Melikishvili, “The Gelati Monastic and Literary School.” 42 Tinatin Tskitishvili, “On Some Ancient Terms Defining a Certain Philosophical Notion,” in Investigations on Areopagitica, ed. Guram Tevzadze (Tbilisi: Tbilisi University Press, 1986). 43 John Morenborn, Early Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1 (London and New York: Routledge, 1988). 40 41

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theologians just as they did those of Byzantium. Thus, in the Gelati Monastic School, one can examine the presence of different trends concerning these issues. For instance, for Eprem Mtsire—as he writes in the preface to his translation of Damascene’s Dialectics—pagan philosophy, namely the Aristotelian art of reasoning, was just a tool, “a thorny fence by which the beauty of Christ’s garden is preserved.” Neither does Arsen, who shortly after Eprem translated the same work anew, accord much worth to the Greek philosophy, rejecting totally “the mad wisdom of the Greeks,” “where not a single word has to do anything with truth.” This is a very common attitude in medieval times, when the contribution of Aristotle was accepted by Christianity merely as a technique for thinking, which was more neutral to religion, while Plato was held suspect as a promoter of an alternative religious system. Thus the role of philosophy is only of an auxiliary and unnecessary character for Christians, so that, in Eprem’s words, the philosophical chapters were included by John Damascene in his The Source of Knowledge (PhghV gnwvsew"), in order to help “the sons of the Church to oppose the pagan philosophers and to pierce them with their own arrow.” 44 In contrast, in Ioane Petritsi’s case we witness a totally different approach. He grants Neoplatonist philosophy a spiritual value in itself, as we shall see in the following discussions.

2. A BIOGRAPHY OF IOANE PETRITSI We do not possess precise data on Petritsi’s life. Accordingly, the scholarly opinions are equivocal on the matter. The traditional data on the philosopher’s biography belong to the eighteenth century—the time of a scholarly renaissance in Georgia, led by Katholikos Anton Bagrationi—when Petritsi became an object of special attention and veneration. The data provided by different authors of this century are, however, very contradictory. They contain anachronisms and arbitrary statements, if not sheer fiction. According to Katholikos Anton, he was of a royal lineage, and one who as the sun proceeds through the zodiac, so proceeded through grammar, rhetoric, geometry, astronomy, music, physics and metaphysics, and learned the art of Greek eloquence. Then he abandoned high theological schools for poverty in the Monastery of Opisa, having rejected the

44

Kekelidze, op. cit., 254–255.

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shadows of the material world and in great humility and strict obedience achieved the crown of salvation, and so departed to God. 45

According to this information Petritsi had acquired a full education in the liberal arts. Anton further states that Arsen Ikaltoeli and Eprem Mtsire were his disciples, “who were worthy to be students of such a great master.” The last data are anachronistic and are based upon a misunderstanding, as we shall see later. More information is provided by Hieromonk Germane, who copied one of the manuscripts of Petritsi’s commented translation of the Elements of Theology. “According to our information,” the author says, “he was educated in Athens, where he became closely familiar with the Greek wisdom, to which his works—the Elements of Theology commented by him being one of them—bear witness, for they are full of wisdom and eloquence.” 46 That Petritsi studied in Athens is also stated by David the Rector, a famous intellectual and scribe. According to him, Petritsi was of noble origin, sent to Athens by King Bagrat I, in order to study Greek and acquire experience in philosophy and theology. Petritsi fulfilled all these expectations, succeeding so much that at the age of thirty he became a teacher in the royal city, Constantinople. The same author then provides an etymology of the name “Petritsi,” according to which petra (pevtra) means “stone” in Greek, while the suffix stands for “scratching,” and that Ioane was nicknamed thus for his vigorous scrutiny of books: “Petritsi” would thus mean “a scratcher of stones.” David also makes the interesting, yet obscure, remark that Petritsi introduced the conjugation of verbs and means for derivation of verbs, infinitives and participles, and also for the shortening of sentences in the Georgian language. 47 The same etymology for the surname of the philosopher is provided by Ioane Bagrationi, who says that “Ioane was sent by the king to Athens, where he studied mathematics, astronomy, astrology and All eighteenth-century data concerning the life of Ioane Petritsi are accurately collected and presented by Ivane Lolashvili in his edition of the translation in verses of John of Sinai’s Ladder, a translation that the scholar believes to belong to Petritsi’s pen: The Ladder of Virtues. A Georgian Translation, ed. with introduction by Ivane Lolashvili (Tbilisi: Sabchota Sakartvelo, 1969). 46 Hieromonk Germane, quoted in ibid. 47 This odd statement may refer to a tradition that Petritsi wrote a Georgian grammar textbook (no longer extant), or it may be a loose or exaggerated account of Petritsi’s linguistic innovations as presented in his translation and commentaries. See ibid. 45

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other liberal arts and physical sciences.” 48 Also he states that Petritsi “undertook efforts to make the Georgian language as succinct as is Greek.” 49 It seems that Ioane Bagrationi’s information derives from David the Rector, or that both come from an independent source. The information of the eighteenth-century authors is hardly certain and sometimes contains grave anachronisms. For instance, in David the Rector’s account Petritsi was a teacher of David the Invincible, an Armenian philosopher of the sixth century, while, at the same time, David also makes Petritsi a contemporary of Chalcedon! Anton Bagrationi considers him to be a teacher of Eprem Mtsire, while Ioane Batonishvili believes him to be the latter’s disciple. Also, the information that he was educated in Athens is apparently completely arbitrary, for as Korneli Kekelidze has noted, at that time there was no philosophical school in Athens, but only in Constantinople. According to one source of information (from Katholikos Anton) he became a monk, while according to another he stayed as a monk in a monastery, yet was not consecrated (David the Rector). 50 Despite those discrepancies, all the sources agree on Petritsi’s having been educated in Byzantium and having returned to Georgia with a weight of learning. The standard scholarly and popular tradition concerning Petritsi’s biography is that he studied in the Constantinople philosophical school under Michael Psellus and/or John Italus. After the school was closed upon an edict of Alexius Comnenus in 1182, Petritsi fled together with the other disciples and arrived at the Petritsoni Monastery, founded in the same year by Gregory Bakuriani. There he stayed until King David the Builder summoned him to the newly opened Gelati Monastic School. At some point in between Petritsi stayed also in Syria, on the Black Mountain, and aided Eprem Mtsire in translating the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. This standard opinion has been challenged by various scholars. First, the idea that Petritsi stayed in the Petritsoni Monastery is based on nothing but the coincidence of the names. Therefore, some scholars, from Niko Marr onwards, even interchanged the names “Petritsi” and “Petritsoneli,” that is, “from Petritsoni.” However, as we have seen, the earlier authors of the eighteenth century give quite a different etymology for the name. MoreIoane Bagrationi, quoted in ibid. Ibid. 50 According to David, he was accepted in the monastery as a mtsiri. Mtsiri in Georgian means a man who leads an obedient life in a monastery and is preparing to become a monk, but is not yet consecrated, that is to say, a novice. 48 49

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over, we possess a typicon of the Petritsoni Monastery, where there is mentioned a monastic school for novices, which consisted of Biblical and liturgical education only, without any trace of philosophical pursuits. Unfortunately, the information provided by Petritsi about his own biography is very terse and does not provide precise data on the epoch in which he lived. The only solid grounds for the scholars to suppose that he worked in Gelati during the reign of King David the Builder were the philosopher’s words, according to which he, regardless of oppression and criticisms from opponents, who lacked any expertise in grammar and philosophy, still undertook his work, relying on both God’s and David’s help. Thus it was taken for granted that this David was King David the Builder, and that the enlightened monarch protected the beleaguered scholar from the assaults of conservative and dogmatic minds. However, some doubts also arose, because Petritsi mentions David by name without any title, which for instance Ivane Javakhishvili, the father of modern Georgian historiography, finds quite strange. 51 Recently, Edisher Chelidze proved that the Epilogue, where Petritsi mentions David, is in reality a preface to his translation of the Psalms—apparently a commented one. Therefore, he established beyond any reasonable doubt that David of this passage is actually the Biblical personage, to whom (as the author of the Psalms) Petritsi appeals for help in his work. 52 In addition, we may say that it is rather unlikely that King David the Builder patronized the liberal and anti-dogmatic (Platonist) wing among the contemporary Georgian intellectuals—of whom Petritsi was supposed to have been a leader—against the traditionalist and dogmatic (Aristotelian) wing—represented by Arsen Ikaltoeli. This is so firstly because the king shows great veneration for Arsen, writing “I am a man of that time when Arsen wrote the Dogmaticon and read Gregory of Nyssa.” Secondly, the king’s attitude to Greek philosophy as such, in its own right, is quite in line with Arsen’s vigorous censure—in his Prayers of Repentance the king even repents of having studied Greek wisdom. Nevertheless, it is possible that Arsen and Petritsi worked in Georgia at the same time, and that there was tension between them. Arsen could have been one of the critics mentioned 51 A reference to Ivane Javakhishvili’s misgivings on this point may be found in the introduction to Ioannis Petritzii. Opera. Tomus I, Procli Diadochi STOICEIWSIS QEOLOGIKH, versio Hiberica, ed. Simon Kaukchishvili (Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1940), xxxi. 52 See Edisher Chelidze, “Life and Literary Activities of Ioane Petritsi,” Religia 3–5 (1994) and 1–3 (1995).

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by Petritsi, and Arsen might have translated anti-Origenist works in response to some of Petritsi’s ideas. We shall touch upon this issue later. The opinion that Petritsi was on the Black Mountain together with Arsen, either as a teacher or as a disciple of Eprem Mtsire, whom he helped in translating Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, proved to be as vulnerable as the previous one. “Ioane the Divine Philosopher,” who aided Eprem in this translation, was most likely not Petritsi, for this surname in Georgian sources belonged not to him but to another Ioane, Ioane the Former Patrick, mentioned in the life of George of Mount Athos, who was a famous compiler and scribe of theological books. Edisher Chelidze, however, thinks that this Ioane was a Greek ecclesiastical figure in Antioch, one of those to whom Eprem usually applied for elucidation of the intricacies of the Greek texts translated by him on the Black Mountain. Furthermore, the scholar supposes this Ioane to be Patriarch John of Antioch himself, who helped him once in understanding a passage from John Damascene. Also, notes the same scholar, the complete absence of specifically Petritsian terminology in Eprem’s translation of the Corpus Dionysiacum permits us to exempt Petritsi from being his “mouth, intellect, and word” during this translation. However, one of the two Ioanes mentioned among Eprem’s “helpers and sustainers” may yet turn out to be Petritsi, but this is nothing more than an innocent supposition. What is left to a modern scholar is to create the most plausible supposition based on the material that we possess. I shall try to present my opinion as concerns the life of the philosopher. We can safely suppose that Petritsi translated Nemesius in Gelati, accepting the testimony of a gloss of one of the manuscripts: “translated by our marvellous philosopher, Ioane surnamed Petritsi, in the cellium of Gelati.” The Gelati monastic complex was not completely finished by 1124, when King David died, yet several years earlier it had already become an educational center. The Elements of Theology had apparently not yet been translated when Petritsi translated Nemesius: firstly, Petritsi mentions the translation of Nemesius in his preface to the Psalms, while saying nothing about the translation of Proclus; secondly, in the same preface he complains that were it not for the criticisms and misunderstanding on the part of his contemporary Georgians, he would have philosophized (literally: “Aristotelized”) and would have presented a “theology that concerns no material things”; 53 however, in his commentaries on Proclus’ Elements of Theology he 53

Epilogue to the Commentaries, 222.

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finally fulfilled this wish; thirdly, the language of his commented translation of Proclus is far more fluent, and the terminology more elaborate, which bears witness to a development of his translating skills. So between Nemesius and Proclus there should be posited the translation of the Psalms. Thus we may posit his three works in this order: the translation of Nemesius, the translation of the Psalms and the translation of Proclus. The first work cannot have been written earlier than the beginning of the twelfth century, when the Gelati complex began to be built. Petritsi could as a young man have studied under Italus, although this would have been possible for him only before 1082. It should be noted that we cannot say whether they actually knew each other or not, and whether the addressee of Italus’ Letter to an Abkhazian Grammarian is indeed Petritsi. 54 In fact, the tradition that Petritsi studied in the Magnaura Academy under Italus is based on nothing more than a supposition of scholars of our century. If, however, this is true, we may put Petritsi’s life approximately between the second half of the eleventh and the first half of the twelfth century. Thus he studied in Constantinople as a youth and came to Gelati as a mature scholar. The only corroboration for this supposition is the systematic and methodical character of Petritsi’s education. The philosopher’s stress on the importance of grammar and logic, and his knowledge of music, astronomy and mathematics and of philosophical traditions, compel us to think more of the confines of an official school than of a private or dissident type of learning. As G. Litavrin writes, “to acquire knowledge of those disciplines [i.e., theology 54 Italus 64, 161. For all references to John Italus, see Ioannis Itali Opera, ed. Grigol Tsereteli and Natela Kechagmadze (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1966), henceforth referred to simply as Italus. Edisher Chelidze made the following objection to the hypothesis that the “Abkhazian grammarian” might have been Petritsi. Firstly, as he writes, the epistemological genre requires the mention of the name of an addressee, so that “Abkhazian” in the heading is not an ethnonym but a personal name. This is, according to Chelidze, corroborated by the grammatical structure of the title of the letter: ProV" toVn jAbasgoVn toVn grammatikovn, which he translates as “To Abazg, the grammarian.” Yet it is quite possible that Petritsi was nicknamed “Abkhazian” among the Greeks, as, for instance, John Italus himself was nicknamed “the Italian.” Interestingly, Petritsi’s language shows features of the western Georgian dialect (and, by then, “Abkhazian” simply meant “western Georgian”), as proven by modern linguistic research. Also, traditionally he was believed to have been from Guria (in western Georgia). Besides, Petritsi’s extant works provide us with evidence of the great importance that he accorded to the study of grammar, and his expertise in it. In fact, he may well qualify for being that “Abkhazian grammarian” so respectfully addressed by Italus. See Chelidze, op. cit.

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and the liberal arts] privately was possible only in exceptionally favorable conditions. The first of those conditions was the presence of necessary books, which were very expensive at that time.” 55 However, there was hardly another official school in contemporary Byzantium, except the Constantinople philosophical school, where he could have acquired such learning. The most untraditional and provocative opinion as to the biography of the philosopher was promoted recently by Edisher Chelidze. Having made a thorough philological analysis of the medieval Georgian texts from the great Athonites, Ekvthyme and Giorgi, to Eprem Mtsire, Arsen Ikaltoeli and translators of the Gelati catena Bible and Petritsi’s authentic texts, he came to the conclusion that Petritsi’s language and terminology are markedly original, and so those who worked on the edition of the Gelati Bible could not have belonged to his school. At the same time, there is a terminological layer common to the Gelati texts and Petritsi, which must indicate that our philosopher was familiar with the works of his predecessors at Gelati. If this is true, it gives a dramatically different perspective on the time of his literary activities, putting them after the 1150s. The scholar goes on further to state that the frequent occurrence of specifically Petritsian terminology at the beginning of the thirteenth century, for instance in Shota Rustaveli’s famous poem Knight in a Panther’s Skin—written before 1213, the date of Queen Tamara’s death—makes us think that he was a writer of the second half of the twelfth or the beginning of the thirteenth century. Edisher Chelidze also thinks that Petritsi is the author of a famous historical work of the beginning of the thirteenth century, History and Praise of the Crown-holders. The similarity of the language of the last work to Petritsi’s language was noticed long before by Simon Kaukchishvili, who indicated the resemblance of even the ideas of the historiographer to those in Petritsi’s commentaries on the Elements of Theology. The train of Chelidze’s argumentation is very convincing. Damana Melikishvili also agrees with Chelidze’s conclusion, saying that “the language of the translation of the Elements of Theology stays quite far from the epoch of King David the Builder, inclining more to the second half of the twelfth century,” and that

55

G. Litavrin, How the Byzantines Lived (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 1997)

[Литаврин, Г. Как жили византийцы. Санкт-Петербург, «Алетейя», 1997].

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the “chronology of Petritsi’s literary activities requires reconsideration.” 56 However, she does not transfer the time of Petritsi’s activity too far from the epoch of King David, supposing that Petritsi could have been a victim of the second strong reaction against the adherents of the Platonic philosophy and particularly of Proclus’ philosophy, during the reign of Emperor Manuel I Comnenus—that is, in the 1140s. 57 Furthermore, the same scholar does not exclude the possibility that Petritsi, due to his extraordinary giftedness (and perhaps, I would add, regarding himself as more suitable a person to deal with the translation of philosophical texts than those before him) did not deem that compliance with the existing linguistic norms was unavoidable, and thus introduced a revolutionary stream into the Georgian language. For instance, she observes the abundance of dialectical elements in Petritsi’s language. In fact, Petritsi attempted to provide his compatriots with access to the hitherto foreign intellectual kingdom of Neoplatonist philosophy, which, accordingly, spurred him on also to develop a language so drastically distinct from that of his contemporaries. Indeed, Petritsi himself is aware of the pioneering character of his linguistic enterprise. Thus, in this light, the hypothesis that Petritsi worked in Gelati at the beginning of the twelfth century deserves to remain in existence among the other hypotheses. However, if Chelidze’s supposition is true, and Petritsi did not have direct contact with either Psellus or Italus, having acquired philosophical education from someone else in Byzantium, he is still closely linked to them spiritually, sharing the same interest and affection for the Greek intellectual legacy that was ignited by Psellus. In fact, this interest did not vanish after 1082. In the middle of the twelfth century, Nicholas of Methone wrote his Refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. As the editor of this text, Athanasios Angelou, remarks, after having illustrated how much twelfth-century Byzantium’s intellectual life was influenced by Neoplatonist philosophy, “Nicholas is not fighting imaginary enemies but responding to a challenge.” 58

Damana Melikishvili, “On the Question of the Unity and Individuality of the Linguistic Style of the Gelati Literary School,” Transactions of the Gelati Scientific Academy 2 (1996): 65–74. 57 Ioane Petritsi, Explanation of Proclus Diadochus’ ‘Elements of Theology’. New Georgian translation, commentaries by Damana Melikishvili (Tbilisi: Tbilisi University Press, 1999), xix. 58 Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus’ ‘Elements of Theology’, ed. Athanasios D. Angelou (Athens: The Academy of Athens; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), lxi. 56

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3. PETRITSI’S WORKS i. The Certain and Extant Works of Petritsi These comprise translations of Nemesius of Emesa’s On Human Nature; the commented translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology; the preface to his translation—apparently, a commented one 59—of the Psalms. Concerning the last, the preface ends with a verse of which the first lines read thus: Translating those 150 melodies of soul I, an imitator of word, 60 cut bonds…

This must mean that Petritsi either translated the Psalms or had the intention of doing so. 61 Unfortunately, neither this translation nor any part of it has been transmitted to us. Only those Psalm verses, translated by him 59 Petritsi writes, “I undertake this work [i.e., the translation of the Psalms] according to my power and capacity, relying on God’s mercy, as well as on the mercy, the understanding and the support of David. It is a custom among our translators, when they translate easy and customary texts, to ornament and adorn the language. When translating intellectually difficult and philosophical texts, I shall also try to follow all the features and simplicity of the Georgian language, yet not beyond the point where too much simplicity will destroy and harm the meaning. For all my ideas in them are for intellect and contemplation, be they logical, epistemological, or physical and metaphysical.” Here I quote from the Epilogue to the Commentaries, 222. There are two possibilities: either Petritsi speaks only generally about his translating method, or also specifically about the translation of the Psalms. If the second is true, then the words “my ideas” make us think that he provided the text of the Psalms with his own philosophical commentaries. And, indeed, he does so in the preface itself, drawing parallels between the Psalms and philosophers such as Proclus, Plato and Aristotle. 60 Which probably means an “imitator [i.e., translator] of Greek word [i.e., of Greek text].” 61 In my recent conference paper “Philosophic Method of Ioane Petritsi,” presented at the 2nd International Symposium Christianity in Our Lives: Past, Present, Future, I have argued that Petritsi’s commented translation of Psalms was probably intentionally destroyed by rigorist clerical circles. The reason for that could be concern that presentation of this Biblical text—so crucial for all Church services— from the perspective of Neoplatonic metaphysics could be harmful for nonphilosophizing believers. Levan Gigineishvili, “Philosophic Method of Ioane Petritsi.” International Symposium: Christianity in Our Lives—Past, Present, Future. Short Papers. Ed. Tamaz Chkonia. International Center for Christian Researches of the Apostolic Autocephalic Orthodox Church of Georgia. November 25–26, 2005 (Tbilisi: Mematiane), 179.

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anew, that we find in the preface itself testify to Petritsi’s translating skills. The grammar of the verse also does not provide an answer to this question, for Petritsi uses a continuous tense and not a perfect. ii. The Works Ascribed to Petritsi by Eighteenth-Century Scholars Petritsi’s name became very prominent in the eighteenth-century Georgian scholarly renaissance. Various works were ascribed to him at that time.

a. Philosophical Among the philosophical translations ascribed to Petritsi are Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias and Topics (TaV topikav). The source for ascribing the first to Petritsi may be the philosopher’s own words: “As we have learned in Peri Hermeneias.” But this sentence may be understood differently, and it does not necessarily mean that Petritsi had translated and taught it to his students, but it may simply mean “as is written in Peri Hermeneias.” Neither of the works is extant. Katholikos Anton writes that Petritsi translated also the commentaries of Ammonius, son of Hermeas, on Aristotle, but linguistic analysis does not corroborate the information, and according to other sources its translator is Ioane Tarichisdze.

b. Other The tradition of the eighteenth century credits Petritsi with the authorship of many translations of hagiographical, liturgical, ascetic, and historical texts. It seems that the fame of the philosopher prompted the intellectuals of the time to put his name on empty headings of the ancient texts. Of some of them we may definitely say that they do not come from the philosopher’s pen, as proven by contemporary linguistic analysis. For example, there are the following: the aforementioned commentaries of Ammonius, son of Hermeas, on Aristotle; the translation of John of Sinai’s Climax in prose, the author of which is, in fact, Peter the Gelatian; the translation of Theophylact of Ochrid’s commentaries on the Gospels of Luke and Mark. However, the translation of John of Sinai’s Climax in verse may belong to Petritsi, but was most probably ascribed to him by the eighteenth-century scholars due to the fact that the translator’s name was also Ioane. As for George Hamartolus’ Jewish Antiquities, which eighteenth-century tradition also relates to Petritsi, the implausibility of this supposition was demonstrated both by Damana Melikishvili in her dissertation in 1967 and by Nino Melikishvili’s recent study. As for liturgical works, Katholikos Anton writes that he has seen hymns for the Church feasts by Ioane the Philosopher in a small but densely written book. The book itself has not been pre-

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served until our days, yet Anton introduced some hymns from it in a monthly prayer-book compiled by him. We cannot judge the authenticity of this datum. According to Ioane Batonishvili, Petritsi also translated “lives of many saints.” However, this assumption seems as arbitrary as his other information that Petritsi translated commentaries on the Gospels of Luke and Mark (apparently, by Theophylact of Ochrid) and the theology of PseudoDionysius the Areopagite. Edisher Chelidze, in the article mentioned above, on the basis of comparative study of terminological structures, states outright that “none of the extant texts ascribed to the philosopher by the tradition, except the two [the translations of Nemesius’ and Proclus’ works] belongs to Ioane Petritsi.” 62 Damana Melikishvili, having carried out similar investigations, basically agrees with Chelidze’s opinion, saying that the statistics of terminological, customary-lexical and grammatical differentiating features must draw one to the univocal conclusion that those doubtful translations cannot belong to the person whose unquestionable works are the translations of Nemesius and Proclus. On the other hand, all those traditional data are taken by Korneli Kekelidze in his fundamental “History of the Old Georgian Literature” as facts serving for him to prove, on the contrary, that “there is not the faintest digression from Christian dogmas” in Petritsi’s commentaries on the Elements of Theology. The same scholar continues thus: It would have been unsound and surprising to expect such a thing from a man who translates Biblical books into Georgian in order to establish their precise variant; who translates lives of saints and composes liturgical hymns for official liturgical books; who translates in verses a work of a mystical character, the Ladder, which has thirty steps of the approximation of the human soul to God, like the thirty years of Christ’s life. It would have been surprising and awkward for the eighteenth-century scholarship, renowned for its “ultra-dogmatic” standpoint, to grant such a high esteem to Petritsi, had he diverged from the Christian dogmas. 63

However, this is rather an argument ad verecundiam than a proof. Petritsi’s ideas can only be studied through an analysis of his authentic works: the translation of Nemesius, with a few commentaries by the translaChelidze, op. cit., 81. Kekelidze, op. cit. This quotation is taken from an earlier edition of the work: The History of the Old Georgian Literature, vol. 1 (Tbilisi: Rustaveli Institute of History of Georgian Literature, 1960), 305. All subsequent references, like the earlier ones, are taken from the 1980 edition. 62 63

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tor himself, the preface to the Psalms and, most importantly, the commented translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology.

4. OVERVIEW OF PETRITSIAN STUDIES The book Ioane of Petritsi—the Georgian Neoplatonist of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries 64 by the celebrated Niko Marr, published in St. Petersburg in 1909, was the first scientific work concerning the philosopher, at a time when his works were available only in manuscripts. This monograph, which has not ceased to be important even today, begins with the following words: Ioane Petritsi is a great name; he enjoys the glory of a great Georgian philosopher, but it is uncertain what this glory is based on… In his works very little is exciting, still less anything that is easy to understand; that is why those who paid attention to the philosopher were interested in his name rather than his works. 65

Now, after almost one hundred years, the situation is very different. Petritsi’s works were first edited in 1937, and today we may enjoy a body of numerous works about the philosopher, from which the Georgian publications are first to be mentioned. As regards the language of the philosopher, we are fortunate to have a quite comprehensive analysis by Simon Kaukchishvili 66 and, recently, one by Damana Melikishvili. 67 The certainty achieved in this field was until recently not matched by philosophical analysis. Shalva Nutsubidze and Simon Kaukchishvili first discussed the philosophy of Petritsi in the preface of the first edition in 1937. The philosophical introduction of Shalva Nutsubidze, its evident assets and interesting insights notwithstanding, falls short of doing justice to Petritsi in several important points. 68 The second volume of 64 Niko Marr, Ioane Petritsi: A Georgian Neoplatonist (St. Petersburg: Russian Imperial Archeological Society, 1909) [Марр, Нико: Иоанн Петрицский—Грузинский

Неоплатоник. Санкт- Петербург: Императорское Русское Археологическое Общество, 1909].

Ibid., 1. Ioannis Petritzii. Opera. Tomus I, Procli Diadochi STOICEIWSIS QEOLOGIKH, versio Hiberica, ed. Simon Kaukchischvili. See the chapter “The Language of Petritsi” in the introduction. 67 Damana Melikishvili, The Language and Style of Ioane Petritsi (Tbilisi: Ganatleba, 1986). 68 For instance, the idea of the scholar that Petritsi is a propagator of the ancient Georgian paganism is based on a sheer misunderstanding: Nutsubidze took 65 66

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the edition, which contained the text of the Old Georgian translation of the Elements of Theology, was supplied with a splendid introduction by Professor Mose Gogiberidze, who gave a sound criticism of the authors of the first edition and provided quite a correct historical account of some aspects of Petritsi’s philosophy. However, the spirit of the age unfavourably influenced this edition too (viz. the scholar’s criticism of Christianity, which at the time of the strict Communist regime was not merely welcome but even required). After Mose Gogiberidze, there were other scholars who dedicated monographs to the philosopher, such as Tamara Kukava 69 and Shalva Khidasheli. 70 Some specific aspects of the philosopher’s works were discussed in numerous different articles. Guram Tevzadze provides a comprehensive analysis of the method of analogy in Petritsi’s exposition. 71 Regarding some Aristotelian aspects of his philosophy we have a discussion in the article of Lela Alexidze, 72 to whom also belongs a work on prop. 129 of the Old Georgian translation of the aforementioned treatise of Proclus, not extant in any surviving Greek manuscripts. 73 Maya Mamatsashvili renders a concise account of the philosopher’s treatment of the planetary spheres. 74 Anna Kharanauli 75 and Lela Alexidze 76 specifically treat the philosophical sources of Petritsi’s commentaries, while Damana Melikishvili discusses

the Greek a[rti(that is, “immediately”)—transliterated by Petritsi as “ardi”—to mean the ancient Georgian sun deity Ardi. 69 Tamar Kukava, The Outlook (Weltanschauung) of Ioane Petritsi (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1971). 70 Shalva Khidasheli, Ioane Petritsi (Tbilisi: Mecniereba, 1956). 71 Guram Tevzadze, “The Principle of Analogy in the Philosophy of Ioane Petritsi,” in Problems of the History of the Medieval Philosophy (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1981). 72 Lela Alexidze, “For the Sources of Chapter 41 of Petritsi’s Commentaries,” Matsne, Series on Language and Literature 2 (1983). 73 Lela Alexidze, “Das Kapitel 129 der ‘Elementa der Theologie’ des Proklos bei Ioane Petrici,” Georgica (Zeitschrift für Kultur, Sprache und Geschichte Georgiens und Kaukasiens) 17 (1994). 74 M. Mamatsashvili, “For Understanding One Passage of Ioane Petritsi’s Commentaries,” Matsne, Series on Language and Literature 1 (1972). 75 A. Kharanauli, The Methodology of Using of the Sources in the Philosophical Works of Proclus Diadochus and Ioane Petritsi (Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1990). 76 Lela Alexidze, “Griechische Philosophie in den ‘Kommentaren’ des Joane Petritzi zur ‘Elementatio Theologica’ des Proklos,” Oriens Christianus (Hefte für die Kunde des christlichen Orients), Band 81 (1997).

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some Patristic sources of Petritsi’s so-called Epilogue. 77 W. Offemanns 78 compares Petritsi’s and Thomas Aquinas’ doctrines of causality. Magda Mchedlidze has written an article on the reflection of Plato’s doctrine of recollection in Petritsi’s explication of the soul’s reversion and selfcognition. 79 In foreign scholarship until recently very little was known about Petritsi. The first important figure to become acquainted with and develop great affection for the philosopher was the Russian scholar Alexei Lossev. In his words, This Georgian philosopher of the twelfth century provided a creative elaboration of this treatise of Proclus [i.e., the Elements of Theology] and has managed to combine the deepest knowledge and understanding of Proclus’ philosophy with his extraordinary originality and the depth of his own philosophical theories. 80

The popularity of Petritsi in the former Soviet Union was greatly enhanced after the Russian translation of the Commentaries was published in the well-known series of Philosophical Heritage in Moscow in 1984. 81 This edition, supplied with a proper philosophical apparatus, is of lasting importance. However, there is a significant methodological point, which the editors of the text did not take into consideration: Petritsi’s Commentaries should be studied together with his translation of the Greek text. Unless we examine the exactitude of his interpretation and his deliberate alterations of Damana Melikishvili, “Concerning the Contents and Some New Sources of the ‘Epilogue’ of Ioane Petritsi’s Commentaries,” in The Transactions of the Cathedra of the Old Georgian Language (Tbilisi State University, 1988). 78 W. Offermanns, “Concerning the Five Causes in Ioane Petritsi and Thomas Aquinas,” Matsne, Series on Philosophy 3 (1972): 55–65. 79 Magda Mchedlidze, “Platonic Theory of ‘Anamnesis’ and the Notion of Remembering in Ioane Petritsi’s ‘Commentaries’,” in 0HWDvQRLD (Collection of Articles Dedicated to the 130th Anniversary of the Birth of Grigol Tsereteli), ed. Rismag Gordeziani and T. Japaridze (Tbilisi: Logos, 2001), 123–162. 80 Proclus, Elements of Theology, ed. and trans. A. F. Lossev (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1972) [Прокл, Первоосновы Теологии; перевод и примечания А. Лосева. История античной эстетики, высокая класика. Москва, «Искусство», 1972], 23. 81 Ioane Petritsi, Consideration of Platonic Philosophy and Proclus Diadochus, ed. G. V. Tevzadze and N. R. Natadze, trans. I. D. Pantskhava (Moscow: Progress, 1984) 77

[Иоанэ Петрици, Рассмотрение Платоновской Философии и Прокла Диадоха; ред. Н. Натадзе, Г. Тевзадзе; русский перевод В. Панцхавы. Серия: «Философское Наследие», том 91. Москва, «Прогресс», 1984].

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the Greek text, the important points of his philosophical system will elude us. Regarding the textual comparison of the Georgian version to the original, there is one important work by Natela Kechagmadze. In her predoctoral dissertation of 1948 this scholar made a thorough linguistic analysis of the Greek and the Georgian texts. 82 However, this work has not yet been edited. Kechagmadze’s interests are purely philological; that is why she does not go into an investigation of the philosophical and theological reasons for and implications of the changes introduced by Petritsi. The student of Petritsi needs to harmonize the linguistic and theoretical-philosophical research, for neither of the two can be fully understood in isolation from the other. Until recently, knowledge of “Ioane the philosopher” could hardly have been worse in Western scholarship. Only a few years ago, in 1996, the “Orthodoxes Forum” published Lela Alexidze’s German translation and critical study—in collaboration with Werner Beierwaltes—of some of Petritsi’s commentaries, which was the first Western publication of the Georgian philosopher’s work. 83 E. R. Dodds, the editor and translator of the Elements of Theology into English, treated only in passing some propositions translated by the philosopher, without dealing with his commentaries at all, since Dodds’ main purpose was the reconstruction of the original Greek text. The opinion that he formed as a result of this study was very unfavorable to Petritsi, because Dodds maintained that Petritsi permanently fails to follow the course of Proclus’ reasoning and that he misrepresents him. 84 It should be noted that English translations of the Old Georgian text were furnished to him by David Lang. In the only example that Dodds adduced as an illustration of Petritsi’s transgression from the Proclian system, we view the apparently mistranslated Old Georgian text, while the correct reading makes Dodds’ criticism groundless. 85 Unfortunately, we have no access to the text of David Lang’s translation of some fifty propositions, which would be worth examining. Dodds’ offhand verdict as to the importance of Petritsi’s translation and commentaries seem to have halted for decades the Western interest in this philosopher. Regarding the mistakes or 82 Natela Kechagmadze, Old Georgian Translation of Proclus Diadochus’ ‘Elements of Theology’. A Philological Study. Pre-doctoral dissertation. Tbilisi State University, 1948. 83 Joane Petrizi, Kommentare zur ‘Elementatio Theologica’ des Proklos (Orthodoxes Forum, Zeitschrift des Instituts für Orthodoxe Theologie der Universität München, 1986), 141–171. 84 Dodds, op. cit., 343. 85 On this, see Lela Alexidze’s article “Das Kapitel 129” mentioned above.

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misinterpretation in Petritsi’s translation, a correct stance should be taken: it is important to distinguish the cases where he simply fails to follow Proclus’ train of thought, and the cases where he makes deliberate alterations for certain purposes. 86 I will now mention a few noteworthy recent publications that are available in European languages. Guram Tevzadze discusses the philosophic notion of subjectivity in Ioane Petritsi’s commentaries indicating the medieval Georgian philosopher’s tendency to equate Neoplatonic and Christian understandings of the notion; as shown by Tevadze, both for Petritsi and the Neoplatonists man acquires his true subjectivity only in union with the transcendent God, which is achieved through abandoning rational, discursive thought for the super-rational, mystical thrust. 87 Nana Kiladze compares the terminology in the Arabic Liber de Causis (the medieval Arabic elaboration, vastly important for the Western scholas-

86 There is also one very important matter connected with the mistakes found in the Old Georgian text, in both the translation and commentaries (for the two are not separated in any of the manuscripts): the Gelati philosophical school ceased its existence in the thirteenth century, after the Mongol invasion, while most of the extant manuscripts are from the seventeenth century, furnished by scribes mostly ignorant of Neoplatonist philosophy. This is why the majority of them have many scribal errors. The text (referred to above in note 24) published in 1937 (commentaries) and in 1940 (the translation) was established by the editors as a result of examination of and selection from ten different manuscripts. Sometimes the version that the editor deems correct is erroneous and is to be substituted by the correct version, to be taken from the footnotes. The best manuscript of the thirteenth century—which was taken by the government of independent Georgia to France after the Red Army invasion in 1921—was not available for the first editors. This manuscript is now available in Tbilisi, but still remains unpublished. This manuscript must serve as the best witness according to which the correct readings can be established. Indeed, it is quite unpleasant to blame Petritsi for the errors which are most probably the result of miswriting. 87 G. Tevzadze, “Die Kategorie der Subjektivität in Joane Petrizis Kommentar des Proklos,” in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch and O. F. Summerell, eds., Selbst— Singularität—Subjektivität. Vom Neoplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002), 131–154.

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tic philosophy, of Proclus’ Elements of Theology) with the Georgian terminology coined by Ioane Petritsi. 88 Magda Mchedlidze investigates Petritsi’s concept of eros 89—which plays a fundamental metaphysical role in the Georgian philosopher’s system—having compared the functioning of the same concept in the thought of Plotinus, Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius. H.-C. Guenther 90 and G. M. Browne 91 have conducted meticulous comparative studies on Petritsi’s translation. As I have mentioned, this is a promising field of research for establishing the best readings of Proclus’ text. Tengiz Iremadze’s recent monograph on Dietrich von Freiberg, Berthold von Moosburg and Ioane Petritsi is a milestone in the popularization of Ioane Petritsi in the West. 92 The author basically focuses on the theory of thought (cognition) in medieval German and Georgian philosophy, while at the same time providing a comprehensive description of some basic aspects of Petritsi’s system. Lela Alexidze’s article on the relationship of philosophy and Christian theology in Petritsi’s philosophy deals with the difficulty of expressing the Christian tenets (for example the Trinitarian dogma) in philosophical terms and how Petritsi tries to handle this predicament. 93 Finally let me mention a few English articles of mine: on the henadic theory of Ioane Petritsi, and how he tries to remodel this polytheistic doc88 N. V. Kiladze, “On the Terminology of the Liber de Causis,” in Proceedings of the 14th Congress of the Union Européenne des arabisants et islamisants, ed. A. Fodor: The Arabist (Budapest Studies in Arabic) 15–16 (1995): 61–73. 89 Magda Mchedlidze, “L’Explication de la Théorie Platonicienne de l’Amour par Ioané Petritsi,” Phasis (Journal of Greek and Roman Studies) 2–3 (2000): 295–299. 90 H.-C. Günther, “Zu Ioane Petrizis Proklosübersetzung,” Georgica (Zeitschrift für Kultur, Sprache und Geschichte Georgiens und Kaukasiens) 22 (1999): 46–55. 91 G. M. Browne, “ Notes on the Georgian Proclus,” Muséon 112 (1999): 73– 78 92 Tengiz Iremadze, Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter: Dietrich von Freiberg— Berthold von Moosburg—Joane Petrizi (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 2004). 93 Lela Alexidze, “Zum Verhältnis zwischen Neuplatonischem und Christlichem im Prokloskommentar des Ioane Petrizi,” in Theo Kobusch and Michael Erler, eds., Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des Spätantiken Denkens. Akten des internationalen Kongresses vom 13.-17. März 2001 in Würzburg. BzA 160 (Munich/Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2002), 429–452.

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trine in terms acceptable for a Christian audience, 94 on the function of soul in Petritsi’s ontology, 95 on Petritsi’s Trinitarian interpretation of the One, Limit and Infinity, 96 on possible Origenist-Evagrian influences on Petritsi’s theory of Intellect and Logos, 97 and, jointly with Gerd van Riel, on Petritsi as a witness of Proclus’ works in the Constantinopolian philosophical school of Michael Psellus. 98 The absence of an English translation of the entire corpus of Petritsi’s work is a major inhibition for any full-scale participation on the part of Western scholars in Petritsian studies. Therefore Georgians remain the basic voice in this field. And yet Petritsi is hardly only a national philosopher. Indeed, through his creation of a systematic philosophical language he made it possible for the Platonic philosophy to be aired among Georgians in their native tongue. However, the intellectual and mystical experiences, the theories and visions, which Petritsi aimed to gain and to which he wanted to provide access through this language transcended all boundaries of nation. The translation of Petritsi into English has become a timely task, which the author of this monograph intends to fulfill.

94 Levan Gigineishvili, “Henads in Philosophy of Ioane Petritsi,” Bulletin of Kutaisi University 4 (1995). 95 Levan Gigineishvili, “Soul in Ioane Petritsi’s Ontology,” Orientalia Christiana Periodica 1 (2000): 119–145. 96 Levan Gigineishvili, “The One, the Limit and Infinity in Philosophy of Ioane Petritsi,” Phasis (Journal of Greek and Roman Studies) 2–3 (2000): 141–146. 97 Levan Gigineishvili, “The Doctrine of Logos and Intellect in the Philosophy of Ioane Petritsi: Evagrian-Origenist Influences,” in Origeniana Octava, Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition; Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress, Pisa, 27–31 August, 2001. Vol. 2. Ed. L. Perrone (Leuven University Press, 2003), 1140– 1148. 98 Levan Gigineishvili and Gerd van Riel, “Ioane Petritsi: A Witness of Proclus’ Works in the School of Psellus,” in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Actes du Colloque International de Louvain (13 – 16 mai 1998), ed. A. Ph. Segonds and Carlos Steel (Leuven: Catholic University of Leuven Press; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2000), 571–588.

2 THE ONE 1. THE ONE OF PETRITSI “Only silence could respect It/Him 99 by ceasing from words” Commentaries, 46, 6

Petritsi would not have appreciated it if we said that the One holds the principal place in his philosophy; 100 he would have objected that the One cannot hold any place anywhere, and cannot be circumscribed by anything, by any being, conception or philosophy. Actually, while considering the matter of philosophical endeavour, we ourselves could ask the following 99 Since in the Georgian language there are no gender distinctions, the subject pronoun igi can correspond to “he,” “she” and “it,” and the relative pronoun romeli to both “who” and “which,” and so it is impossible to tell which of the two—“He” or “It”—Petritsi implies when speaking of the One. Were he only a Neoplatonist, without being also a Christian, the question would be easily decided in favour of “It,” but evidently Petritsi entertains notions of both the impersonal God of the Platonic tradition and the personal God of the Christian faith. Therefore, while quoting Petritsi I shall use the It pronoun, whereas in my own discourse I shall use the personal and impersonal pronouns interchangeably (hopefully according to context). 100 The ambiguity in this sentence cannot be helped. As opposed to a straightforward ontological reading whereby a principal place is posited for a real entity in an objective, “non-intentional” cosmology (less ambiguously, cosmos, or totality of all that is), the “intentional context” or “non-extentional context” reading inherent in any talk of something’s place in a philosophy (that is, in a belief system or belief state) will not solve the dilemma: even the mental (epistemological or doxastic) status of the idea (non-Platonic, but internal, in the modern sense) of the One will not be amenable to circumscription any more than it is to description, in this apophatic approach—even if we make the unwarranted assumption that Petritsi (or Proclus) could have appreciated the difference between things “in the world” and things “in the head” when their dialectical methods lead them to the doxastic and epistemic certainty that the truth of one guarantees the truth of the other.

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question: what is any philosophy, or a philosophical system, if not an attempt by the human mind to understand reality as a whole and its details? However, thinking in Petritsi’s spirit, every mind is produced by the One and has an implicit affinity for, or urge towards, its Cause, an urge that it can mistakenly direct to some other object, not the One Itself, but Its image or resemblance. Philosophy, understood in this light, is not an optional intellectual entertainment, or the craft of some professional experts, but is of vital importance for all souls: they should all come to know the reality, the multiplicity of beings of which it is constituted, and the One that is the transcendent Cause of all being, in order not to channel their innate inclination towards the One towards anything else. Therefore, true philosophers are those who give a correct account of the place of man in this world, give a just estimation of the multiplicity of beings, and thus are able to arrange them according to their appropriate hierarchy. They possess a kind of cosmic map, which describes both the perceptible and spiritual realms, following which they will not get lost or led astray to any dead end on their journey to the One. Those who do not philosophize, who do not use such a map, are more vulnerable to taking that which is not the One for the One; however, in a certain sense everyone is a philosopher, because the urge for the One is not anyone’s monopoly, but an ontological necessity within every soul. And a soul that is misled and carried away from its journey to the One cannot gain an alternative satisfaction, but will suffer from the toils of its misled desire, which Petritsi would have called idolatry. No other kind of philosophy is possible, given that there is no alternative reality to reality, but only that one that concerns—ad intra—the One and the soul, or—ad extra—the One and the whole multiplicity of beings with their innate inclination towards It. Any other philosophy with no such aim is a false philosophy, an object of Petritsi’s vehement attack, such as for instance that of Alexander of Aphrodisias or that of the Epicureans. As Petritsi states in the opening words of the introduction to his commented translation, the purpose of the treatise at hand, the Elements of Theology, is to find out what the One is in the true sense of the word, and to prove the existence of the supreme One by the compelling force of syllogistic rules:

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Since many beings claim to be One, although they are not, this is why Proclus by syllogistic rules searches for and finds the purity of the flawless One… (Preface to the Commentaries, 3. 9–11). 101

According to him, not only the Elements of Theology, but the whole of Proclus’ philosophy aims “at uncovering what was ‘locked’ and cryptic in Plato’s dialogues and at showing how Plato thirsts in them for the unimaginable One 102 and for all the intelligent and supra-intelligent cosmos” (Preface, 5. 6–12). This is no academic exercise; it is also an act of veneration: Let us respect [this book], for great is its importance and the one with whom it is concerned (Commentaries, prop. 17. 52. 25–27).

2. SUMMARY OF PROCLUS’ TEACHING ON THE ONE The presence of unity in the universe as a whole as well as in its parts is a cardinal intuition of Neoplatonist philosophy, and it is not by chance that Proclus’ Elements of Theology, the most systematic and concise presentation of the whole Neoplatonist ontology ever made, starts with the problem of the relationship between unity and multiplicity. In accurate reductiones ad absurdum Proclus demonstrates the necessity of unity in order that multiplicity may exist. We can escape infinite regression only if we accept that every multiplicity or plethos (Greek: plh`qo"—“multiplicity,” “multitude,” “manifold” or “plurality”) has two sorts of unity: unity as a whole, and unity in each of its separate constituents, because otherwise such a constituent will be either infinite or nothing. But there can be no multitude from nothing, because from nothing there may come only nothing (ex nihilo nihil fit) whereas multitude is something. Will this constituent, then, be infinite? Nei-

101 Here, as henceforth, quotations from the Preface or Epilogue will indicate the page (and here the line) of the Georgian edition. 102 In this assertion Petritsi follows the Neoplatonist lead rather than that of the historical Plato. As David A. Kolb writes in his account of the different attitudes of Plato and the Neoplatonists to the Supreme, “Unlike the Neoplatonists, Plato does not make mystical union [with the One] the express goal of philosophy… The activities of the philosophers who have escaped the cave look more like discussions in the Academy than Plotinian rapture. They are exploring the world of Forms, not staring at the sun.” See David A. Kolb, “Pythagoras Bound: Limit and Unlimited in Plato’s ‘Philebus’,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983) 4: 510– 511.

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ther can anything infinite be a part of anything, because there can be nothing more than infinite (prop. 1. 2. 2–14). 103 A multiplicity is a plurality that must possess unity, being thus simultaneously one-and-not-one, for it is not simple unity—that which does not possess unity but itself is Unity. Any complex unity contains in itself something other than One. Besides saying that such a complex unity is One, we may say also something else of it. For instance, to furnish a mechanical example, 104 we say that a car is “one” in the sense that it is unitary and singular, but we also can say that it is white, large, has wheels and windshields, that it moves and stops, while of the One we can say nothing other than that It is One. We arrive at some mysterious object that escapes any description. That is why Proclus calls the One agnostos (Greek: a[gnwsto9— “unknowable”) and arretos (Greek: a[rrhto9—“unutterable”). 105 In prop. 2 Proclus says concerning the complex unity that it has to suffer or undergo (pavscein) unification. This seems to imply a notion of dynamism and duration: it happens just in the way in which, to switch to a new, less mechanistic, simile, bricks, windows, doors, and so on “undergo” the work of the masons, in order to become united in the one orderly multiplicity of the house. By this, Proclus assumes that the unity of a plurality-as-a-whole should be logically preceded by the unity of each of its constituents. Now, prop. 6 remarks that the parts of something multiple can themselves be multiple—as (to finally employ an organic simile) the arm is part of a body, but itself is multiple, containing the hand, fingers, nails, and so on—but in order that we may again escape infinite regression, it is necessary for the very first multitude to be composed of atomic units, which Proclus calls in this proposition henads. From this it is evident that only the One does not have 103 Proclus repeats similar arguments in the Platonic Theology. Here, as henceforth, I shall refer to the following edition of H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink: Théologie Platonicienne, ed. and trans. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, 6 books (Paris: Société d’édition “Les Belles Lettres”, 1968–1997), henceforth Th.Pl. All book, proposition, page and line numbers will be given, as with all Proclus’ works. Here one may look at Th.Pl. II. 1. 4. 22 – 5. 9. 104 Mechanical similes (or metaphors, or here synecdoches) are highly appropriate, despite the apparent anachronism, given the similarity between Petritsi’s Neoplatonic conception of the universe and the well-ordered, well-constructed watchmaker’s world or clockwork cosmos of both the Rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza and especially Leibniz) and Empiricists (Boyle and especially Locke) of early modern times. 105 See props. 123 and 162.

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to undergo the unifying action of the light of Unity. Prop. 4 proves that the One cannot be along with multitudes also simultaneously One-and-not-one, because then the “Unity” element in it would again be “One-and-not-one” and so ad infinitum. This proposition is just the obverse of the first proposition: prop. 1 states that multiplicity should possess unity, and prop. 4 says that the Unity proper should not possess multiplicity. Proclus provides a logical demonstration of the intuition that the elusive Principle (ajrchv) 106 of the unity of all things, of everything, cannot be one of those things (the ontological furniture of the world), but must be something qualitatively different. From this it is clear that the Unity is not in need of multiplicity, but on the contrary multiplicity is in need of unity. Therefore Proclus goes on to prove in prop. 5 that the One is prior to multiplicity. After the first six propositions Proclus starts his discourse about the ultimate Good or Goodness-Itself. First in prop. 7 he states that “every being by nature desires Good” (prop. 7. 8. 23–24). In fact, this statement, as it will turn out, is analogous to, and has a certain symmetry with, the first proposition (“every multitude in some way participates in Unity”), expressing actually the same thing. In fact, as is proven in prop. 13, the desire for Good is the same as desire for self-preservation, and this is nothing other than the desire to possess unity. Thus the Good, that is, the ultimate source of all goodness in beings, and the One, that is, the ultimate source of all unity, will in this light be identical. However, the new statement (“all things desire good”) affirms the same thing from a different angle: the first proposition has provided a more schematic or skeletal view of the metaphysical law, and now this proposition, as it were, is fleshed out. The difference between the two Principles (ajrcaiv) is somewhat comparable to the difference between these statements: “The parts of something are moving at a higher speed” and “Something is getting warmer.” Goodness Itself cannot desire anything, because, as Proclus explains, the very word “desire” means desire for Good, so it would be a tautology to say that Good desires Good. From this it follows that Good must be higher than the beings, because if all beings desire good, so that this desire is their essential feature, then the Good Itself is deprived of this feature and thus transcends beings. The Good can-

“Principle” has been capitalized for most of this work, to emphasize the dynamism and hypostasis of this metaphysical entity the ajrchv, a rather reified concept in Neoplatonism. Occasional lower-case letters imply that the ordinary sense of the word—“rule” or “law” or “(cause of) regular phenomenon”—is intended 106

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not be anything other than Good, and if we add to It something else we only diminish it, as is affirmed in prop. 8. The tenth proposition—in which Proclus states that any self-sufficient entity is filled with good and is thus inferior to that which has filled it, that is, the unqualified Good—seems to be the obverse of prop. 7, in which he says that the producer that produces an effect and provides it with appropriate power is superior to the effect. Prop. 7 and prop. 10 in turn seem to be symmetrical to prop. 1 and prop. 4 respectively, with the difference that in the latter two propositions Proclus is concerned with unity and in the former two with goodness: prop. 1 says that every multitude should participate in unity, and in prop. 7 it is stated that all beings desire good; prop. 4 says that the One proper is not one-and-not-one, and in prop. 10 it is stated that the Good proper is not filled with goodness. It is tempting to think of an intentional symmetrical correlation between those two series, each consisting of six propositions (from 1 to 6 dealing with Unity, and from 7 to 12 dealing with the Good), united in prop. 13, which proves the identity of the One and the Good—a kind of a geometrical symmetry like that of ornaments in ancient Greek vases. 107 In prop. 11 Proclus proves that there must be a unique first cause, and in prop. 12 he proves that such a cause can only be Good. The first thesis is proven by the necessity of existence of knowledge (ejpisthvmh), which means knowledge of causes: the One in this sense is not only the Principle of ontology, but also of epistemology—the two, actually, always being linked in Neoplatonism. The second thesis is proven by the argument according to The symmetry noted above may be detected further: the thesis of prop. 1 is repeated in terms of the Good in prop. 7; prop. 2 matches prop. 8, for the former asserts that there are unities by virtue of participation in the Unity, and the Unity proper Itself, which is nothing other than unity, and the latter that there are participants in the Good, and the Good proper, which is nothing other than Good; prop. 4 is matched by prop. 10, on the grounds stated above; prop. 5, which demonstrates the priority of the One over the manifold, is matched by prop. 11, which deals with the necessity of causal sequence—in fact, the thesis of prop. 11 (“All that exists proceeds from a single first cause”) is roughly repeated by the concluding sentence of prop. 5 (“From the One Itself every multitude proceeds”), and conversely, the thesis of prop. 5 (“Every manifold is posterior to the One Itself”) is repeated in the concluding sentence of prop. 11 (“subsistence of any manifold is posterior to the One”). Those parallelisms are, of course, quite tentative, insofar as props. 3 and 9, and 6 and 12 fall out of this symmetrical structure. However, it is expedient to suppose that Proclus followed a certain prethought pattern in those first propositions. 107

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which if there were some higher cause than Good, then the beings would have in themselves something better than Good, this being absurd, because the word “better” itself means to be full of the Good. In prop. 13, as we have said, the reflections on the One and the Good are united, the identity of the two having been proved by a double syllogism. Prop. 13 in this way unites the “barren” henological account with the “bountiful” agathological account. The One is the most universal thing to be imagined. It is present in all things alike, insofar as everything exists by virtue of having (or possessing) unity, for without unity there is either nothing or infinite regression. In this sense the One is amethektos (Greek: ajmevqekto"—“imparticipable”): no being may participate in It directly, because It is present in everything in the very same way. 108 It is the cause of the “simple existence” (toV aJplw~9 ei\nai) (prop. 137. 120. 35) of beings, and does not have in this sense any particular area of influence, like, for instance, other universal monadic causes, such as Soul and Intellect (props. 20 and 100). While providing simple existence to others, It does not have the same sort of existence as the others, because each of the beings “is a unified [thing],” whereas the One simply is: Proclus’ prop. 115. 102. 1 states oujdeV taujtoVn toV e[sti kaiV toV h{nwtai (emphasis mine)—in Dodds’ translation, this reads “it is one thing to say ‘it exists’ and another thing to say ‘it has unity.’” 109 The One is higher than Intellect, because InOn the same grounds, in Proclus’ system also the monads of the horizontal series are “imparticipable” in a relative sense, because they are also identically present in all members of their series, just as for instance the distinguishing feature of the Monadic Soul is likely present in the entire stretch of the souls. Those imparticipable features that mark the origin of a qualitatively different metaphysical stratum have asymmetrical relationships, for the lower terms presuppose the higher but not vice versa—as Soul presupposes Being, but Being does not presuppose Soul, and similarly, Being presupposes Unity but Unity does not presuppose Being. Robert Brumbaugh provides the following algebraic expression for this fundamental law of the Proclian ontology: “Forms retain their self-identity; thus, from the standpoint of F, FA and FA1 are equally F; and, similarly, FA is self-identical in FAB and FAB1.” See Robert S. Brumbaugh, “Cantor’s Sets and Proclus’ Wholes,” in The Structure of Being, A Neoplatonic Approach, ed. R. Baine Harris. International Society for Neoplatonic Studies (Norfolk, VA: International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, 1982), 108. 109 Dodds, op. cit., 103. Dodds’ translation is precise, but I have worded it differently to distinguish (in a sort of Russellian fashion) between the “is” of existence and the “is” of identity (or predication). As to whether the absolute self-identity of the One counts as predication, space does not permit further consideration. 108

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tellect is a unification of a subject and an object (prop. 20) and hence is not simple. Intellect cannot reach further down than the material objects, whereas the One can go down to formless matter. In prop. 57 it is apparently the formless matter that is rendered in terms of stereseis (sterhvsei9) or “privations,” that is, privations of all forms and definitions (prop. 57. 56. 15). The usage of the plural in relation to the prime matter probably indicates that matter too is “one-and-not-one,” in other words a certain unity of multiplicity, like the unity of a multiplicity of privations/potentialities. An important metaphysical point is that the closer terms are to the One, the less multiple they are. This principle should be understood in two ways: on the one hand, the lower hierarchical strata are more multiple in number (there are more souls than intellects), and, on the other, each separate entity higher up in the hierarchy, closer to the One, is a less complex multiplicity. Less complexity in turn means greater power, while the multiplication and increase of complexity in beings brings about diminution and limitation of power. We may think that the One Itself is pure productive power not belonging to anything, but transcending all things. However, Proclus places the pure transcendent power below the One and calls it the First Infinity—the cause of all things (prop. 92). The One is the measure even of this transcendent power. We may adduce here (as twice later in this work!) the Aristotelian simile of a sculpture being carved: the model of the sculpture that a sculptor has in mind is comparable to the One and his activity or dynamism comparable to the Infinite power. The way in which Infinite power is “measured” by the One can be compared to the way in which a sculptor’s activity is governed by the model in his mind, which is prior to this activity. The One, as I have said, is the Universal Cause of all, but specifically It is also the monad of the henadic series, a question that will be discussed in the chapter concerning the henads. We may end this short, and rather inadequate, summary with an identification of both the One and Good with God, which Proclus does for the first time in prop. 113: God is One in the sense that there is nothing beyond It (evidently, because there exist only unity and multitude through possession of unity, and thus anything else can be either nothing, or infinite in the negative sense, 110 but not in any way something transcendent to the One), The concept of “the negative infinity” or “the bad infinity” or “the spurious infinity” (schlechte Unendlichkeit) entertained by Hegel, denotes the progression to infinity beyond any assigned determination, an indefinite accumulation, hence cer110

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and God is Good in the sense that It is desired by everything. Prop. 114 also indicates that “One” and “Good” give an account of two undivided implicit aspects of God: Its simple unity and Its freedom from any need.

3. PETRITSI’S TEACHING ON THE ONE i. The One of Petritsi and Three Aspects of the One’s Goodness Petritsi identifies the One and the Good—called by him “Goodness”— already in the introduction of his commented translation: “the strange One and Goodness 111 that transcends all.” In doing this, he does not follow Proclus’ double series of two times six propositions, to which I have referred above. The term “Goodness” applied to the ultimate source has, first of all, a double significance. First, it indicates the transcendent Principle’s produc-

tainly “unbounded” and “limitless” but always doomed to inchoate deficiency, since no completion—that is to say, the ultimate infinite magnitude—can be attained, comprehended or envisaged. To Hegel, the very notion of an infinite magnitude is self-contradictory, since a magnitude to which nothing can be added drops out from the very concept of magnitude. To this deficient idea of infinity he contrasts the idea of the positive infinity—the determined, the qualitative one, or infinity within the fixity of a ratio. To give an example (albeit one that oversimplifies the matter as compared to the Hegelian intricacies): a game of chess has potentially infinite combinations of moves latent within it; however, this infinity will be bounded, circumscribed (and hence some moves will be unavailable, proscribed, from the outset) by the limits of 64 squares, the set rules of the game, and, moreover, the “structured” pressure of making not just any move, but only the optimal one(s) that may serve the definite goal of winning the game. 111 For Proclus “goodness” or ajgaqovth" is usually a henadic name: qeoiv—pavnte" eJnavde" kaiV ajgaqovthte" (as can be found in Dodds, op. cit., 104). But Petritsi may be—directly or indirectly—influenced by Wisdom 7. 26: Wisdom, that is, Christ, is eijkwVn th`" ajgaqovthto" aujtou`, that is, of God. The expression “image of His goodness” has been amply used in Patristic literature; among others, it was very important for Origen. See Origen, Contra Celsum III. 72. 10 and Contra Celsum V. 11. 34, In Iohannem VI. 57, In Matthaeum XV. 10. 71, and so on. Besides the profound theological reasons, Petritsi’s usage of “goodness” instead of “good” may have linguistic grounds: there are no articles in Georgian, and thus one cannot add the definite article to the adjective ket-il-i (“good”) so that one obtains a substantive out of it. However, it is possible to change the adjective into a substantive by adding the suffix -oba: thus one obtains ket-il-oba, “good-ness.”

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tive role, representing It as the Producer 112 of the whole reality, as unfailing Abundance, which “fails” only in that It could not contain Itself in Itself, but has produced also beings in order to share Its excess with them (Epilogue, 210. 21–23). 113 Of course, It does not need those beings. We can speak of a certain downward-tending, primordial, supra-ontological desire of Goodness for the beings—to be sure, an unnecessary (needless, and non-essential in the ordinary non-technical sense) desire, something like (if this simile is allowed) a brave man’s unnecessary desire for heroic deeds. It is a providential, unnecessary desire to have the multiplicity of otherness and to bestow goodness upon it. On the other hand, the source is rendered as “Goodness” as the desired and needed object, as the reality necessary for the subsistence of all beings. Goodness may be said to have the unnecessary urge to become needed by and necessary for the beings. Hence, “Goodness” can be a characteristic of the ultimate source from two polar drives: the drive of the Supreme to give way to Its abundance, and the drive of the beings to preserve their existence and to revert to the source. Those two aspects are expressed in the following passage (the Commentary on prop. 11), where Petritsi basically follows Proclus’ argument: Were not Goodness the First Source, then there would have been something better and something above Goodness as the Root and Cause of the procession of beings; and the beings would have received bestowals from that, as from the First Cause. And, again, it would have been the object of reversion and re-eros for all the beings, as the fountainhead from which they get bestowals. However, the constitution of beings makes it evident that all beings desire Goodness, having It as the object for reversion and for the thirst of their pains (Commentaries, prop. 12. 43. 31 – 44. 4). 114

112 “Producer” seems to beg fewer questions than a translation such as “Creator” at this point. 113 Cf. Plotinus in the Enneads V. 2. 1. 8: oi|on uJpererruvh kaiV toV uJperplh`re" aujtou` pepoivhken a[llo. Cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 29. 2. 1–27, in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27–31 [Discours théologiques], ed. Paul Gallay and Maurice Jourjon, SChr 250 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1978), 178–180, and Oratio 38. 8. 12–20, in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 38–41, ed. C. Moreschini and Paul Gallay, SChr 358 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1990), 118, and St. Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Ioannem (PG 91, 1288 D1 – 1289 B2). 114 In this and in all subsequent quotations from Petritsi’s Commentaries, the number of the proposition commented upon is given first, followed by a number denoting the page of the first and only Georgian edition of the Commentaries (that of

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The “source that has nothing else from which It would come out” (Commentaries, prop. 145 ( = 144). 115 173. 31), is characterized as the “Universal Goodness.” Petritsi draws a non-existent, Neoplatonist-sounding distinction between agathon (ajgaqovn) and tagathon (tajgaqovn)—transliterating those Greek terms into Georgian—translating the first as “good” and the second as “goodness,” saying that tagathon holds the position of universality in relation to agathon, that is, Its particular manifestation in beings. The “Goodness proper” (tagathon) is beyond “good” (agathon) in the same way as It is beyond perfection and self-sufficiency. The last three terms fit primarily the True Being, which is “the first beauty and good” (Commentaries, prop. 8. 34. 9–10). Petritsi later explains: One thing is to say “good” and another thing is to say “Goodness.” In fact, “good” is part of “Goodness,” the Goodness being like a boundless sea consisting of goods, and they are distinct from each other as parts are distinct from the whole (Commentaries, prop. 10. 38. 1–5).

Petritsi then compares Goodness to the sky, which comprises all the spheres, itself holding a universal position in relation to them, and then immediately corrects the simile, saying that all other universals are composed of parts, whereas If we dare to apply the term “universal” to the First Goodness, it should be taken in the sense of being simple, partless and imparticipable. And as the One is just One and requires nothing adventitious, so is to be unNutsubidze and Kaukchischvili, dating from 1937, as detailed above in note 24), and finally a number denoting the number of a line or lines. The three numbers will be separated by points, spaces and dashes, following the same pattern as in the case of quotations from Proclus, where Dodds’ edition is used as the standard. If the quotation is from the Preface or the Epilogue, this will be stated in place of the proposition number, and then page numbers will follow as normal, occasionally supplemented with line numbers when the reference is important enough to warrant their inclusion. 115 The Old Georgian translation of the Elements of Theology contains an additional 129th proposition; therefore, from this proposition onwards, each proposition in Petritsi’s text bears a number higher by one than the number of the corresponding proposition of the Greek text in Dodds’ edition. However, because in the Old Georgian text there is no 149th proposition, from this proposition onwards the number of the Georgian and the Greek propositions again coincide. We have in both texts 211 propositions. In the following, when the number of the Georgian proposition does not correspond to the Greek, I shall indicate the Greek proposition in parentheses in the manner above.

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI derstood the universality of the Goodness (Commentaries, prop. 10. 38. 10–18).

We have hitherto considered the “Goodness” as (in terms of its nature) the source of beings and as their epheton (Greek: toV ejfetoVn—“the object of desire”). Now we should inquire whether we can speak also of the third aspect, namely of Goodness as pertaining to the transcendent nature of the Ineffable Itself, without any relation to beings. In fact, the statement that Goodness “failed to be contained in Itself, in solitude” (Epilogue, 210. 21) can be understood as meaning that It did not become “Goodness” either only for the sake of Its fecundity—for the production of beings—or for the sake of Its becoming in this way their epheton; rather, Its essence was good in itself, without any relation to them. This question makes sense in the light of Petritsi’s understanding of the One’s causality, which he seems to have understood in terms of a volition—or, as I have termed it, an “unnecessary desire”—on the part of the One rather than in terms of the Neoplatonic necessary emanation. In the case of the latter the One is the transcendent part of reality as a whole, being Itself involved in the eternal necessary and non-reciprocal relationship with the rest of the beings. However, from the Christian perspective, which must have influenced Petritsi, the One will not have a necessary relationship with the rest of the world; rather, again the relationship will be volitional. Now, if this is so, can we say that the One in this case could reserve Its innermost unrelated transcendence for Itself, being in a way intentionally partially “closed off” to the beings? Can we speak of any such “private” aspect of the Ineffable, which would make It transcendent in the ultimate sense? In fact, Its relation with beings is in any case not direct but detached and transcendent. However, the third aspect of the “Goodness,” as Its private innate nature, could be thought of as being completely unrelated to anything, being abstracted also (even) from the transcendent relationship. Then it will be tempting to understand Petritsi’s epithet for the Ineffable as “beyond even transcendence” precisely in this light. However, this does not seem to be the case, for if it were true, there would be a division within the nature of the Good, an internal duality or multiplicity, insofar as, on the one hand, It reserves some inward, unrelated supreme transcendence for Itself, and, on the other, It maintains Its outward transcendent relation with beings. Surely, according to Petritsi, the “First Blessed Nature” (Epilogue, 214. 15) is good by Itself, regardless of anything else, but insofar as It produced (or created) beings, It is henceforth related to them—in a singular way: without having anything “inward,” but only the outward, providential relationship with the beings, as only their

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Producer and epheton. 116 There cannot be any unrelated private goodness in the One, because Petritsi understands the natural goodness of the One in terms of the natural mercy of God the Father (Epilogue, 218. 15–16), and mercy cannot be unrelated, the very notion of mercy implying relation and reciprocity. Thus the third aspect, that is, the private Goodness of the One, is inseparable and indistinguishable from the other two aspects, because now there exists a multiplicity of beings. All this may be compared, using the language of contemporary philosophy’s analysis of relational properties, to the situation of a man who becomes a father, and who therefore (or thereby) cannot be considered in his relationship to his son separately as a man and separately as a father, but only as a father (even though being a man is intrinsic to and essential to being a father). ii. The One and the Multitude: the Nature of Providence In the first chapters Petritsi discusses Proclus’ ideas concerning the relationship between the One and multiplicity. In sharp contrast to Proclus, who makes a clear-cut separation between the Unity proper and multiplicity, which is the “one-and-not-one,” he states that there exists a kind of multiplicity within the One Itself, in a “unitary” way. 117 He draws a sharp demarcation between the terms “unitary” (ertebri) and “unified” (sheertebuli), this clearly corresponding to Proclus’ distinction between eJniai~o9 and hJnwmevno9. From this perspective, the correct understanding of the expression “beyond transcendence” will be that the supremacy of the Good is of a qualitatively different supra-essential nature from the essential supremacy of any cause over its effect. In fact, the Georgian zest, which means “above,” has a double semantic force, on the one hand indicating transcendence and detachment, and on the other simply superiority without implication of transcendence. In the present case the expression should be translated rather as “beyond supremacy.” 117 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, who in the De Divinis Nominibus speaks about the multiplication of the divine Unity, and the unity and distinction of the unrelated (a[scetoi) divine bestowals: Eij deV kaiV qeiva diavkrisiv" ejstin hJ ajgaqoprephV" provodo" th~" 116

eJnwvsew" th~" qeiva" uJperhnwmevnw" eJauthVn ajgaqovthti plhquouvsh" te kaiV polaplasiazouvsh", hJnwmevnai mevn eijsi kataV thVn qeivan diavkrisin aiJ a[scetoi metadovsei", in Corpus

Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, PTS 33 (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), pp. 128, 15 – 129, 1, and Dwroumevnh gaVr pa~si toi~" ou\si, kaiV uJpercevousa taV"

tw~n o{lwn ajgaqw~n metousiva", hJnwmevnw" meVn diakrivnetai, plhquvetai deV eJnikw~", kaiV pollaplasiavzetai ejk tou~ eJnoV" ajnekfoithvtw". oi|on, ejpeidhV w[n ejstin oJ QeoV" uJperousivw" dwrei`tai deV toV ei\nai toi~" ou\si, kaiV paravgei taV" o{la" oujsiva", pollaplasiavzesqai levgetai toV e}n o]n ejkei~no th~/ ejx aujtou~ paragwgh~/ tw~n pollw~n o[ntwn in ibid., pp. 135, 14 –

136, 3.

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The first sphere of the “unified” multitude is the True Being, which is a unity of multiplicity of ideas, the first unification of the “unitary” elements, that is, the henads. This unified unity is of the most “undivided” mode. In fact, if even in the Soul the ideas are in a spaceless harmony, not prevailing one over another, how much more is this so in the Intellect, the Soul’s cause, which possesses a higher degree of unity. In a like way, in the One multiplicity exists in a qualitatively different mode, so much so that it is inconceivable to the mind. This multiplicity, it seems, belongs to the transcendent nature of the One Itself. Therefore, the One and multiplicity are not in opposition to each other, which is just the contrary of what Proclus asserts in the fifth proposition (prop. 5. 4. 21–35). In translating this proposition Petritsi considerably modifies Proclus’ thought, presenting the latter’s hypothetical statements as ontologically affirmative ones, and thus even affirming the ontological truth of those assertions to which Proclus himself apparently denied that status. For instance, Proclus’ last argument in this proposition is to deny that the One and the multitude, as independent principles, communicate in like terms with each other (such that multitude would become unified just as the One becomes pluralized). Proclus’ intention is to demonstrate the invalidity of this supposition by rejection of two conditions only through which that supposition can be ontologically maintained. The first possible condition is that the One and multiplicity are brought together and communicate with each other through some third Principle, which unifies them and is prior to them, and so the danger of infinite regression again looms before us. The second possible condition is that the One and the multitude come to each other by themselves, being not, thus, in opposition to each other. This hypothetical statement, which for Proclus apparently does not express a metaphysical reality, is taken by Petritsi as a valid metaphysical affirmation. Thus Petritsi claims that the One and the multitude do indeed participate in each other, being not, accordingly, in opposition to each other. Of course he does not imply here the absurdity that the imparticipable One participates in plurality, but, as is evident from the immediate sequel of this sentence, Petritsi gives “participation” the looser sense of “interrelation.” Thus, Petritsi renders eij ou\n toV e}n kaiV toV plh`qo9 ajntidih/vrhtai by: “if the One and the multitude were excluded from a mutual relationship.” The continuation of this sentence in Petritsi’s translation presents the Greek text in a completely different light. Let me present Proclus’ Greek sentence and Petritsi’s Old Georgian translation in parallel columns. For the sake of convenience of demonstration, I shall underline those statements of Proclus that he wishes to ontologically affirm, and present what he ontologically denies in italics. Petritsi’s entire translation of the

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sentence is intended to be ontologically invalid (while remaining logically valid, in other words as a counterfactual conditional hypothesis), and so is rendered in italics also: eij ou\n toV e}n kaiV toV plh`qo9 ajnIf the One and the multitude were tidih/vrhtai, kaiV toV plh`qo9 h/| plh`qo9 excluded from a mutual relationship, the oujc e{n, kaiV toV e}n h/| e}n ouj plh`qo9, multitude as multitude would not be one, oujdevteron ejn qatevrw/ genovmenon, e}n and One as One would not be multiple, a{ma kaiV duvo e[stai. and, therefore, the first [i.e., the multitude] would not raise Itself up in the second [i.e., the One]. As we see, Petritsi assigns a different meaning to the eij ou\n toV e}n kaiV does not, in Proclus, say anything about the relationship between the One and the multitude, but simply states that they are different things. 118 More importantly, Petritsi altogether omits Proclus’ hypothetical conclusion—e}n a{ma kaiV duvo e[stai (“they will be at the same time one and two”)—and represents the second (hypothetical, counterfactually conditional, and not in fact entertained by Proclus) premise for this conclusion—oujdevteron ejn qatevrw/ genovmenon (“neither arising within the other”)—as the conclusion itself. This conclusion is, of course, wrong for Petritsi, who in the commentary explains that according to the proposition the One and the multiple are not opposed to each other and that the multitude arises from—that is to say, is produced by—the One. Now, the idea that multiplicity arises from the One corresponds also to Proclus’ doctrine, which he just hypothetically rejects here for the sake of building an ontologically invalid argument. The most significant difference lies in the middle clause—kaiV toV plh`qo9 h/| plh`qo9 oujc e{n, kaiV toV e}n h/| e}n ouj plh`qo9—which is just an extension of the first premise, insofar as it explains the term ajntidih/vrhtai (distinguishing the multitude and the One under their respective descriptions, to use the language employed in the theories of reference inspired by Russell, Frege, Strawson et al.). However, in Petritsi’s rendering, this premise—“the multitude as multitude would not be one, and One as One would not be multiple”—appears to be a sub-conclusion derived from the first premise (that is, “If the One and the multitude were excluded from a mutual relationship”) and itself serves as a premise for the last conclutoV plh`qo9 ajntidih/vrhtai—which

For instance, Dodds translates the clause as “Now on the supposition that the One and the manifold are contradistinguished…”—with no suggestion of any mutual relationship between the One and the multitude. Dodds, op. cit., 7. 118

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sion. 119 Now, by means of a feigned acquiescence to this hypothetical (that is, ontologically invalid) sub-conclusion Petritsi seems to affirm the opposite, namely that the multitude must be one, in the sense that otherwise it will be either nothing or a “bad infinity,” and that the One must be multiple, in the sense that It has multiplicity in Itself in a transcendent mode! My interpretation of Petritsi’s translation is justified in the light of Petritsi’s commentary on this proposition itself, for he explains that everything is multiple and everywhere is multiplicity: in corporeal reality a mutually exclusive and extended multiplicity, in Soul a unified and harmonious multiplicity, and in the One the same unified and harmonious multiplicity “in the most incorporeal and transcendent way” (Commentaries, prop. 5. 29. 15–19). Let us follow Petritsi’s explanation of how multiplicity and the One are not opposed to each other, and see a different perspective on how multiplicity arises from the One. Here Proclus inquires about the question whether the One and the multitude are contrary to each other. Now, those that are in mutual opposition also vanquish and destroy each other and they are not in communion with each other, so that one might be produced by the other. Let us explain this with the help of the Lord: first, figure out that there are two kinds of oppositions—mediated and immediate. For instance, black and white are mediated opposites having other colors between them; whereas darkness and light and death and life are immediate oppositions. However, if the One and the multitude are opposed to each other, of which of the two kinds is this opposition? If it is of the mediated kind of opposition, then what is the mediate term? (Commentaries, prop. 5. 13. 12–19)

119 The overall structure of Proclus’ and Petritsi’s arguments are quite different: Proclus argues that on the supposition that (P[remise] ‘i’) the One and the multitude participate in each other (this premise can be sifted from lines 7–13 of the Greek text of prop. 5, /Dodds, p. 6/), and that (P ‘ii’) they are not one and the same thing (the Greek quote above starts with this very premise /lines 13–14, ibid./), and that (P ‘iii’) neither arises in the other (C[onclusion] ‘i’) they will be both One and two, whereas Petritsi argues that (P ‘i’) if the One and the multiplicity are bereft of mutual relationship, then (Sub-Conclusion ‘i’ = P ‘ii’) the multiplicity will not be one and the One will not be multiple, and (C ‘i’) the first will not arise in the second. Thus, Proclus has three premises and one conclusion, whereas Petritsi, in a quite Neoplatonist fashion, has a triad of “the premise—the premise-conclusion— the conclusion.”

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Here, Petritsi makes a cunning move by reducing the notion of “opposition” to only those two types, and then inferring that the One and the multiplicity cannot oppose each other: the One cannot be in immediate opposition to the many, because the very notion of multitude implies possession of unity; nor can they be in mediate opposition, for there exists nothing in the world besides the One and multiplicity. 120 He continues: Moreover, all things that oppose each other fall under the same temporal measure, like the four elements, and thus they cannot produce each other, but instead fight and vanquish each other. But in the case of the One and the multiplicity it is the other way about (Commentaries, prop. 5. 13. 12–19).

Unity and multiplicity are not in opposition for Petritsi, because, as we have seen, all that is, including the One, turns out to be a multiplicity on different levels of unity. When a multiplicity reaches a stage of contraction and unity that is already not conceivable to the mind, then we obtain the supra-intellectual, supra-essential unity of the henads and, ultimately, of the One. Petritsi provides a helpful simile: a plant represents a multiplicity of root, leaves, stem, and so on, and this multiplicity can be seen by the eyes, but a seed of this plant already represents a multiplicity of the same things, in a mode indiscernible to our sight. Thus the whole multiplicity is implicit in the One just as all the numbers are implicit in the number one, 121 or as 120 Cf. Parmenides 159B10–C2: o{ti pou oujk e[sti paraV tau`ta e{teron, o} a[llo mevn ejsti tou` eJnov", a[llo deV tw`n a[llwn. pavnta gaVr ei[rhtai, o{tan rJhqh`/ tov te e}n kaiV ta[lla.

121 Cf. “The One has with Itself everything without mixture and confusion, and also without division; just as in the number one are present all the multitude of the numbers, although without mixture and confusion, and also without division and separation” (Commentaries, prop. 51. 113. 14–17). The “number one” could indicate here either (i) the mathematical number one—in accordance with a similar analogy drawn between the transcendent One and the mathematical number one in Petritsi’s Epilogue (p. 216)—or (ii) Limit, insofar as Limit is simultaneously the First Number and the second One: thus, it can be also the number one. If the second option is correct, then Petritsi’s comparison of the One with the number one (in other words, Limit) is very similar to a comparison that Iamblichus makes between the Good and the One—not identical for Iamblichus—both of which have in themselves plurality: [ jIavmblico" oJ filovsofo"] periV deV th`" diafora`" tou` ajgaqou`

levgwn kaiV tou` eJnov", fhsiVn o{ti w{sper hJ tou` ajgaqou` fuvsi" govnimo" oujsa kat– aijtivan prohgoumevnh tw`n ajgaqw`n o{lwn ejn eJauth/` proveisi kaiV plhquvetai, ou{tw dhV kaiV tou` eJnoV" hJ pantelhV" aijtiva plhroi` pavnta ajf– eJauth`" kaiV ejn eJauth/` sunevcei taV o[nta kaiV ejn eJauth`/ plhquvetai (“New Fragments from Iamblichus,” ed. D. J. O’Meara, American Journal

of Philology 102 (1981): 38); The Iamblichean distinction between the Good and the

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the line and the surface are implicit in the point, because two points will produce a line, and three points a surface, from which all the multiplicity of geometrical figures derive. In a like way the One, through Limit and Infinity—the first assimilated to the line, the second to the surface—produces a multiplicity of beings, making manifest the hidden plurality within Itself. In holding this doctrine Petritsi must have followed some Christianizing Platonic tradition. 122 As Patrick Atherton writes, in contrast to the Neoplatonist One, the Trinitarian arche appears as an attempt to reconcile the requirement of unity with that of difference within the principle itself: heterotes 123 is now recognized as a moment within the unity, as belonging to the principle as unity. Such a position requires a very different interpretation of the relation between the principle and its derivatives than that found in Neoplatonism: the manifestation of the arche in the sensible and intelligible orders belongs to its essential nature as principle—the principle is essentially self-revealing. 124

From this perspective also Petritsi’s doctrine of the One is decisively opposed to one of the fundamental tenets of Proclian Neoplatonism, so that if in Proclus multiplicity arises in the One in some mysterious way, for Petritsi, it arises from the One as a manifestation of something hidden, for One is, however, far from being a clear one. John M. Dillon thinks that the “Good” in this passage stands for the indefinite Dyad, while the One stands for the “lowest One in Iamblichus’ system” which “pluralizes itself in henads.” See John M. Dillon, “Iamblichus and Henads Again,” in The Divine Iamblichus, ed. H. J. Blumenthal and E. G. Clark (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1993), 52. 122 In fact, he may have been directly influenced by John Italus, who posits a multiplicity of ideas in the One Itself: o{sw/ gaVr toV e}n ajfevsthken u{lh", tosouvtw/ kaiV tw`n a[llwn aijtiwvterovn te kaiV ajrcikovteron: kaiV h{nwtai ejn aujtw`/ taV ei[dh. Italus, op. cit., 182. Yet, in contrast to Italus, Petritsi posits in the One not ideas but henads in a causal way. 123 Heterotes (Greek: hJ eJterovth9—“the otherness” or “the difference”). Vladimir Lossky also pits the Christian idea of different hypostases within one divine nature against the Classical philosophical idea of the absolute impersonal Unity. The “difference” in Christian understanding acquires as absolute a status as the “unity,” since “the divine nature is not beyond Personhood; on the contrary, the fullness of this nature is in communication of the Divine Persons.” Vladimir Lossky, Dogmatic Theology, in Mystical Theology (Kiev: Put’ k Istine, 1991), 265. 124 J. Patrick Atherton, “The ‘One’ and the Trinitarian ‘Arche’,” in The Significance of Neoplatonism, ed. R. Baine Harris (Norfolk, VA: International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, 1976).

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all the multiplicity is, so to say, “folded up” in the One in a transcendent way: The unimaginable One has in Itself all things: those supra-ideal [that is, henads], those ideal [that is, the intellects], those paradigmatic [that is, the souls], those image-like [that is, the material things], and that deprived of ideas [that is, matter] (Commentaries, prop. 6. 30. 4–7).

However, in the more specific sense, the multiplicity within the One comprises henadic numbers in the kat’ aitian (Greek: kat– aijtivan— “according to the cause”) mode: “In the One are all the Principles of the numbers [henads] but in a causal and transcendent mode” (Commentaries, prop. 30. 81. 11–12); “There is no activity in the henadic number [i.e., multitude], but it transcends all as a multitude of gods within the God, and of ones within the One, and as of good ones within the Good” (Commentaries, prop. 1. 14. 20–22). At this point, it is worth mentioning the very important fact that Proclus speaks about the three fundamental ways of existence in which each ontological entity can be considered. These are (i) “according to the cause” (katÊ aijtivan), meaning that an entity is viewed as remaining in its cause, (ii) “according to existence” (kaq– u{parxin), meaning that an entity is viewed according to its proper way of existence, and (iii) “according to participation” (kataV mevqexin), meaning that an entity is viewed as a cause in its effect, which participates in it (cf. prop. 65). Petritsi emphatically calls the attention of his audience to this fundamental metaphysical law of Proclus. The One is the ultimate Principle of Providence, and even Providence Itself for all reality. And the henads, that is, the “Principles of numbers,” are at the same time “Principles of Providence.” 125 In his commentary on the Elements of Theology prop. 11, interpreting the expression from the opening sentence of the Platonic Theology (Th.Pl. I. 1. 5. 9–10: ajlhvqeia oJmou~ toi~" ou\si sunufestw~sa), Petritsi says that the Providential Principles are “coexistent with beings.” In the eleventh proposition Proclus demonstrates the necessity of the existence of one single first cause of the universe. In his commentary on this proposition, Petritsi expands Proclus’ theory and speaks of two orders: the first is the “supra-essential” or “archetypal” order in the One Itself—that is to say, the kat’ aitian henadic order—which is called “pre-eternal” and identified with Providence; the second is the “essential” order of beings, which is already eternal. 125

Cf. props. 120 and 122.

50

THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI If you abolish the First Cause of the beings, you will abolish the entire order of the beings. Let us consider what the “pre-eternal order of beings” is: when you hear “the order,” do not think of the order of the sky, which moves and changes, which weaves imarmenes [one of Petritsi’s hellenizing neologisms from the Greek: eimj armevnh—“fate”], but conceive of the order that subsists together with beings. Consider this order even as supra-essential, and call it also “Providence,” where truth subsists together with beings. And it is not the case that it [Providence] has the order or truth in an adventitious way, and nor is it the case that the truth and the order are different things. This is, in fact, the holy Providence, and the Principles of Providence are established within the Ineffable, whence it [Providence] subsists together with beings, composing and adorning their natures, providing them with their proper order of existence. But if someone annihilates the unique cause of beings, then the order and adornment of the beings will be also eradicated and annihilated (Commentaries, prop. 11. 39. 32 – 40. 13).

Petritsi does not specifically discuss whether the second eternal order had a beginning—which would have been the only way to maintain the Christian doctrine of creation—or whether the pre-eternal “blueprint” within the One was always together with the eternal world—which would be in tune with the Neoplatonist doctrine of the eternity of the world. He also differs from Proclus in that the latter does not identify Providence with the One, but places it below the One along with Limit and Infinity, as observed, for instance, by Lucas Siorvanes. 126 For Petritsi Providence is identical with the nature of the One, representing Its pre-eternal implicit unitary-plurality. The same is expressed also in the preface to the translation of the Psalms, the so-called Epilogue, where Petritsi draws a parallel between the Psalms and Platonic philosophy: “In his dialogues Plato posits it [Providence] in the One and Monad, whom we call Father, as the summit from which flow the currents of goodness” (Epilogue, 210. 12–15). In the sequel, Petritsi counters the Epicureans who deny Providence, by citing Plato (or Proclus?): “Plato says that the intelligent monads of Providence [cf. henads] are established in the first blessed One Itself, whence all heavenly patterns are adorned and set according to their proper essences and activities” (Epilogue, 211. 13–16). Providence can be compared also to the divine namegiving:

126 Lucas Siorvanes, Proclus, Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), 176.

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God does not give names [in a human way] like “Peter” or “John”; but if we conceive of the Simplicity beyond all simplicities, then we should understand the naming as simply the essence of a thing, for the names allotted to things, according to God’s Providence, became their essences (Epilogue, 211. 24–30).

Understood in this way, Providence, that is, the One, is given ontological status, for It represents the world’s ordering Principle, which, paradoxically, while detached from the necessity of the world order, that is, from the “indissoluble fetters of Zeus,” 127 at the same time provides this order to the world. This order is necessary and changeless in an absolute sense, being itself an image of the innate nature of the One. The lower manifestation of Providence is “Fate” (imarmene), which is, again, understood in ontological terms, as an eternal ordering movement of the sky and the planetary spheres. Evidently because of the character of Proclus’ treatise, in his commentaries Petritsi does not treat the problem of Providence from a different, subjective perspective: not as the ontological monologue of God, but rather as the reciprocity and dialogue—not, though, in like terms—between the benevolent Creator and His creatures, a relationship in which, together with the divine grace and foreknowledge, the created freedom of man also plays a crucial role. iii. The Cryptic Transcendence of the One Petritsi is unable to find expressions sufficient or even adequate to characterize the transcendence of the One, that is, Its total freedom and detachment from “nature” (which implies both the physical and the metaphysical worlds). The One is “ineffable,” “supra-perfect,” “supra-strange,” “wonderful,” “inconceivable,” and so on. When we try to describe It and say “He,” we are already led astray by the inadequacy of human language, because the One cannot be rendered as “He” or “Him.” As Petritsi says, the One is “Himless Him,” because in referring to anything as “he” a certain deixis or pointing is involved, but the One cannot be pointed at or “picked out” in this way. The deictic or indicative pronoun, even an ordinary pronoun, is applicable to It only from the point of view of subsequent beings: that must mean that we cannot indicate It in any positive, descriptive way; instead, insofar as we learn that the other beings are not the One, we may say of the latter what It is not, and (via this via negativa) the more we know what It is not, the clearer will be our idea of Its transcendence, without any affirma127

For Zeus’ ajdiavluto9

desmov9,

see Proclus, In Timaeum II. 314. 13–18.

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tive definition. That is why one of the epithets of the One is “[He who/That which is] preached in many ways” or “said in many words,” meaning that the One is described in many apophatic statements (Commentaries, prop. 11. 39. 1–25). 128 Petritsi writes as follows: When you hear “The One,” do not connect it to any power or activity, or to anything that sounds noble to the ears, like “light,” like “everlasting” or like “birth-giving,” 129 because Proclus says that if you add something of those to the One, you will diminish It and will no longer have the flawless One (Commentaries, prop. 11. 39. 4–7). 130

The One, as Petritsi explains, is even “beyond being unattainable” (Commentaries, prop. 162. 182. 28); every cause is in a way unattainable for its effect, but the One’s unattainability is of a completely different quality, because It transcends all cause-effect relationships. Furthermore, the expression may mean, if Petritsi would allow us to supplement his explanation, that the “unattainable” implies a certain firm concept of the object that is unattainable, but the elusiveness of the One’s transcendence does not give us grounds for any definite apophatic description either. At one point the One is even described as something “beyond transcendence.” 131 Thus, even 128 What Petritsi says here, in fact, corresponds to a Dionysian thought widely accepted in the Byzantine theological literature. See, for example, De Divinis Nominibus I. 6, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, pp. 118, 2 – 119, 9. This is not a Proclian idea, although it can also be found in a Hymn to God, often attributed to Proclus: polluvloge, pw~9 se kalevssw. However, as Martin Sicherl has convincingly shown in his “Ein Neoplatonischer Hymnus unter den Gedichten Gregor von Nazianz,” in “Gonimos.” Neoplatonist and Byzantine Studies Presented to Leendert G. Westerink, ed. John Duffy and John Peradotto (Buffalo, NY: Aretusa, 1988), 61–84, the hymn was only quite recently attributed to Proclus—by Cardinal Bessarion—and could not have been written by him. Sicherl has submitted the text tradition of the hymn to a careful philological analysis, and has come to the interesting conclusion that it must be attributed to the author of the Pseudo-Dionysian Corpus. 129 The idea that the One is higher than the generative principle stems from Iamblichus (krei`tton kaiV patrikh`" aijtiva" aJpavsh" kaiV gennhtikh`"), an idea that Proclus also approves in his In Parmenidem 1150. 22. Cf. John M. Dillon, “Porphyry and Iamblichus in Proclus’ Commentary on the ‘Parmenides’,” in “Gonimos,” Neoplatonist and Byzantine Studies Presented to Leendert G. Westerink, ed. Duffy and Peradotto, 36. 130 Cf. Enneads III. 8. 11. 13; V. 5. 4. 9. 131 The idea seems to be of Pseudo-Dionysian inspiration. See, for example, the closing words of the De Mystica Theologia V, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, p. 150, 5–9.

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the apophatic descriptions should be applied in a kind of a dynamic, “unfixed” mode. Any positive name is safe only if preceded by the Georgian adjective zest, which means “transcendent” or “supra-abstract,” indicating the separation of the One from the rest of reality. Even the names “One,” “Goodness” and “Father” cannot properly be applied to the One, but are only appropriate from the point of view of beings: Consider all the monads as created and images of the Image, 132 and as different from the One proper, which is even beyond unity, 133 but only the desire of the subsequent beings dared to call it the “Unity,” because It unifies all the series, and “Goodness,” because It creates the flower 134 of the beings, and “Father,” because It is the cause of the beings’ existence (Commentaries, prop. 22. 62. 4–9). 135

By all those expressions the philosopher simply indicates that man cannot go beyond language, and language is not sufficient for the One. 136

132 That is to say, all the subsequent monads are the images of the True Being, which is at the same time the first Image. 133 Cf. De Divinis Nominibus II. 11, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, p. 136, 7–11. 134 The “flower” of beings apparently indicates the henad. 135 As John M. Dillon notes, “Attributing anything to the One was a constant problem, as we know, for Platonists from Plotinus on, since any epithet one might wish to attach to it, such as goodness or perfection or consciousness, is properly predicable only of Intellect; any characteristic attached to the One seems to introduce a suggestion of duality and less than absolute simplicity.” Dillon, “Porphyry and Iamblichus,” 27. 136 Petritsi’s apophatic language is very similar to that of Pseudo-Dionysius and other Christian writers. Cf. De Divinis Nominibus I. 1: kaiV pavsai9 dianoivai9 ajdianovhtovn

ejsti toV uJpeVr diavnoian e{n, a[rjrJhtovn te lovgw/ pantiV toV uJpeVr lovgon ajgaqovn, eJnaV9 eJnopoioV9 aJpavsh9 eJnavdo9, kaiV uJperouvsio9 oujsiva, kaiV nou`9 ajnovhto9 kaiV lovgo9 a[rjrJhto9, ajlogiva kaiV ajnohsiva kaiV ajnwnumiva, kataV mhdeVn tw`n o[ntwn ou\sa kaiV ai[tion meVn tou~ ei\nai pa~sin, aujtoV deV mhV o]n wJ" pavsh" oujsiva" ejpevkeina kaiV wJ" a]n aujthV periV eJauth~" kurivw" kaiV ejpisthtw~" ajpofaivnoito, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, pp. 109, 11 – 110,

1; also see St. Basil the Great, who after discussing different names related to God in the Scriptures, such as fw~9, a[mpelo9, and a[rto9, says KaiV ou{tw9 a[n ti9 tw`n ojnomavtwn e{kaston ejfodeuvwn poikivla9 eu{roi taV9 ejpinoiva9 eJnoV9 eJkavstou tou` kataV thVn oujsivan toi`9 pa`sin uJpokeimevnou, in Basile de Césarée. Contre Eunome suivi de Eunome, Apo-

logie, ed. B. Sesboüé, G.-M. de Durand and L. Doutreleau, t. I, SChr 299 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982), 190. The same idea had already been expressed by Origen, who elaborated the doctrine of the ejpivnoiai.

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On the one hand the One is the root and Principle of all beings, but on the other It is also beyond being a Principle. This is repeated several times. In the commentary on the first proposition Petritsi writes as follows: The One has been demonstrated as the Flawless, the Pure, the Unity proper and as [something] beyond being Principle, insofar as every Principle is [directly] participated in by its products, as a carpenter is in direct relationship with the product of his work, and nature is directly participated by the products of nature. 137 This is not the case with the One, because It possesses all things, but all things together are not enough to possess the One (Commentaries, prop. 1. 16. 22–27).

In this way, Petritsi reduces the meaning of “principle” to something innate in, or directly related to, its effects. This may be further explained by his assimilation of the One to the mathematical number one. For him the mathematical one is not yet a number: it is the cause of all numbers, but is not counted among them. Two is a means for the production of the numbers, and three is the first number. Three (not one) is therefore also the first odd number, and three is the Principle of numbers, while one is detached from them. Similarly, in ontology, in the production of the beings there is the transcendent One and there is the pair of Limit and Infinity—the first related to three, and the second to two, according to Pythagorean teaching, as Petritsi says. Limit is called both the First Number and the second (or immanent) One. Thus Petritsi assimilates Limit, the Pythagorean three and the second One, which, similarly to Iamblichus’ second One, acts as a mediator between the transcendent One and the beings. For this reason the transcendent One, although identical with Goodness, is called the “Goodness beyond One” or “the One beyond One,” which means that the One is beyond the function of giving unity to beings and circumscribing them within a certain idea: that is the function of Limit. While saying that the One is “beyond being Principle,” Petritsi also calls It the “transcendent” or “detached” Principle; while It is called the “transcendent First,” the One is also referred to as something “beyond being first.” This is simply another expression to say that the One is absolutely detached from the continuum of created reality. Petritsi reduces the term “first” exactly as he did with “principle.” He says that something may be considered “first” if it is first among all the things that are co-natural with it; this means that it is numbered among them and belongs to the same continuous cause-effect chain, 137 For the “products of nature” Petritsi puts a plural passive participle, “natured”—na-buneb-ebta—of a non-existent verb “to nature.”

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such as the first man among men, or the first horse among horses. In this sense, the term “first” cannot be applied to the One. As Petritsi says, The One does not multiply along with beings, lest It abandon Its unity, and It is not to be connected with nature, because everything that is connected to nature is tied by the indissoluble fetters of Zeus, 138 but the One transcends them all and is even beyond transcendence (Commentaries, prop. 11. 39. 22–25).

In his commentary on a sentence of prop. 40 (taV deV suggenevstera kaiV oJmoiovtera tai`" aijtivai" proV tw`n ajnomoivwn uJfevsthken ejk th`" aijtiva"), Petritsi also explains that the “Cause” is that which transcends all the causes, and the “causes” are the monads of the vertical series. As a matter of fact, the One is the Universal Cause detached from all the causal relationships, whereas all the inferior causes (that is, the monads) subsist through Limit and Infinity, which issue from the One: From the One issue two creative sources: the First Limit and the First Infinity, through which all the causes subsist. And the more effects a cause has, the more akin it is to the Universal Cause of all, the Uncaused Cause. With regard to the supra-power of the One, I attune my voice to Socrates, Parmenides and Zeno, for they call the One not the cause but the transcendent cause. Thus Parmenides says to Socrates that the notions of cause and effect are not applicable to the One, for they are not sufficient notions. In fact, everything that is ikanos 139 is sufficient; those notions, however, are not ikanos for the Supra-sufficient 140 [one]. Actu138 139

tology!

Cf. note 122 above. Greek: iJkanov9—“sufficient”: the borrowing via transliteration leads to tau-

The reference to the Parmenides is quite strange, for such a quote cannot be found in this dialogue. One would propose a guess that it must be from Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides. However, there is no such thing in the extant parts of the commentary, either in the Greek text edited by V. Cousin, or in the last part extant only in Latin translation—the one used here is Proclus—In Parmenidem, ed. R. Klibansky and C. Labowsky, in Plato Latinus, vol. III (London: Warburg Institute, 1953). The text referred to sounds nevertheless very Proclian. In fact, Proclus interprets the passages of two Platonic dialogues—the Phaedo 101 d–e and the Philebus 20d, 22b, 66–67—as giving the name iJkanov", iJkanovn to the Good. See In Parmenidem 622. 29–34 and 655. 30, and Th.Pl. I. 22. 101. 14–16: jEn dev ge tw/` Filhvbw/ 140

stoicei`a paradivdwsin hJmi`n oJ Plavtwn th`9 tou` ajgaqou` fuvsew9 triva taV kuriwvtata, toV ejfetovn, toV iJkanovn, toV tevleion. In the article written jointly by Gerd van Riel and my-

self the references to the commentary on the Parmenides were not yet found and

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI ally, every effect bears an image and property of its cause; the One, on the contrary, retains Its properties in a transcendent way and does not mingle them with the effects. As the true word said to you, O Socrates, “had the One mingled Its properties with the effects It would not have remained flawlessly in Its Unity, but It would have been like a multiplied one,” as the true word [of Parmenides] said to you, O Socrates (Commentaries, prop. 40. 95. 33 – 96. 12).

There is, however, a unique case when the One is a Principle in a direct manner, as a Principle of Limit, which exists in a supra-essentially coessential unity with It (Commentaries, prop. 29. 78. 25–27). However, we shall deal with this question at greater length in the following chapter on the pair of Limit and Infinity. iv. The One and Matter, and the Problem of the Relationship between the Ideas and Matter According to Petritsi, who, at this point, faithfully follows Proclus, the One is in (I write “is in” rather than “has” or “partakes in” or even “occupies” to avoid—syntactically at least—predicating anything more than existence of the One!) a special relationship with matter. Matter occupies the lowest position in the Neoplatonist hierarchy of existence, and the One, which (or who) occupies the highest rank, is the only Principle whose influence reaches as far down as matter. Thus matter is neither perceived nor influenced by Intellect. However, Petritsi is, again, eclectic in his doctrine on matter. While the idea according to which the higher a Principle is, the further down its influence reaches is Proclian, Petritsi’s definition of matter as “non-being” obviously comes from Plotinus. Thus, combining the two doctrines, Petritsi asserts that matter is produced as “unimaginable from the Unimaginable,” and as non-being from the Non-being: The One produced also the beingless matter, which the discourse also called “non-being” 141… and it cannot escape the One, even if the other beings are not sufficient to stretch their influence as far down, such as Soul—for that reaches only down to the living beings—or Intellect—

indicated. However, Gerd van Riel has found a Pseudo-Dionysian text—another possible source of Petritsi’s passage—in which Pseudo-Dionysius says that our notions are not iJkanoiv to grasp the One. See De Divinis Nominibus III. 3, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, pp. 142, 13 – 143, 2. 141 Cf. Plotinus: skovto" u{lh" kaiV mhV o[n (Enneads V. 1. 2. 26–27).

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for that reaches as far as the things informed with ideas (Commentaries, prop. 20. 58. 30 – 59. 4).

Matter also participates in the universal longing (eros) for the One. Insofar as any kind of eros is produced through similitude, matter can only desire the One, because it is also one: Matter is similar to the One by virtue of its unity; however, the One is transcendent and supremely abstracted from all and identical with the Goodness, while the unity of the idealess matter is deprived of all limits and ideas, and is altogether patternless and unstable (as Plato says about it, that it is only imagined in a blurred, that is, a “bastard” reasoning). 142 However, by its unity it resembles the One, and as far as it resembles It, it desires It and loves It and gets its good from the One’s transcendent goodness (Commentaries, prop. 32. 83. 25–34).

In another place it is said that the eros of matter towards the One is revealed in Its desire to adopt some traces of the ideas, that is to say, to adopt a defined form of existence. From a certain point of view, matter’s eros ontologically may be reckoned as the most “devoted,” because the whole of matter’s potency is directed only to the reversion to the One, insofar as matter has no power to produce anything. But, from this perspective, also all the entities between human beings and matter can be counted as the “most devoted,” because the direct ontological production ends with the human soul—after the human soul has been produced, the production of the lower ontological stages, the animals and plants, is conducted by the Universal Soul alone without the participation of the human souls—and thus, all the realities that are posited below man have but to return to the One. However, in contrast to matter, the realities (the entities in the ontological hierarchy) above it have the capacity for horizontal non-ontological reproduction, while matter is deprived of this faculty. From this point of view, matter is the most alienated from the One, because the more things an entity generates, the more akin it is to the One, which generates all (Commentaries, prop. 62. 128. 14–16). Also, the monads of the horizontal series are in this respect affiliated to the One in a singular fashion, because even if, for instance, a particular intellect is ontologically higher than the Monadic Soul, the latter is more akin to the One, because just as the One produces everything, so also does Soul produce everything on its own level. The One is the transcendent cause of the simple existence of everything. It cannot be said, though, that the One Itself participates in this sim142

Timaeus 52B, quoted also by Plotinus (Enneads II. 4. 10. 8–11).

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ple existence—which would have abolished Its primordial character, putting something like “simple existence” beyond It; rather, the One Itself is this “simple existence.” And, conversely, although the One provides all things with their simple existence, bringing them from non-existence to existence, it seems that it cannot be said that this simple existence of other things is of the same nature as that of the One—for if they were the same, then there would have been a direct participation of beings in the nature of the One, which cannot be the case. In the commentary on prop. 157 Petritsi explains the theory of two causes: the paternal and the demiurgic. In contrast to Proclus he affirms the existence of only one paternal cause, the One Itself, 143 and the demiurgic causes probably are applicable to henads: “The simple existence is provided to all the beings by the Transcendent One, but the particular properties and ‘quiddities’ [or ‘whatnesses’] 144 of the properties are provided by the particular supra-essential ones” (Commentaries, prop. 138. 170. 7–10). Then Petritsi establishes the following hierarchy: the paternal cause “reaches as far as the simple existence, bringing something from non-existence to existence,” whereas the demiurgic reaches only as far as the things informed by ideas. It is interesting to see what the phrase “brings from non-existence to existence” means. If it means that matter is brought into existence from non-existence by the One, we shall get the Christian tenet of creation of matter ex nihilo. This seems to be the case, as the continuation of the passage shows: “the simple existence only receives being from non-being, but transcends all the ‘ideic’ definitions” 145 (Commentaries, 143 He must have known, to be sure, that Proclus spoke of several paternal causes. For instance, in the commentary on prop. 22 he explains that the term “all” at the beginning of the theorem indicates that Proclus speaks not of the unique One, but of several monads. 144 The terms used here—“quiddity” and “whatness”—are calques, or mirror translations (including the relative pronominal stem), of the Georgian romeloba-i, which itself seems to be a translation of the Aristotelian toV tiv h\n ei\nai (cf. Metaphysics 1032 b14). 145 The Petritsian idea of the “simple existence”—as yet without any formal, “ideic” definition—as opposed to “non-existence” is similar to Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between “essentia” (the essence of a thing) and “esse” or “existentia” (the very fact of existing of this thing). As Aquinas writes, “Now, any designated form is understood to exist actually only in virtue of the fact that it is held to be.” I use here the translation of James F. Anderson from An Introduction to Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated with a preface by James F. Anderson (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1989), 22.

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prop. 157. 180. 5–7). But in other places it is said that matter is “nonexistent”: “Even the non-existence of matter cannot escape the fetters of Unity” (Commentaries, prop. 57. 124. 12–14). According to this second use, “brings from non-existence to existence” would mean that the One makes things exist from the non-existence of matter, which would be more in accordance with Platonic teaching. 146 Matter’s relation to the One is of a special kind. Insofar as Intellect does not reach down there, the complete passivity of matter cannot be reached by any activity save the “universal unitary activity of the One” (Commentaries, prop. 77. 137. 30–35). Matter, as was said, is not provided with any active power for production, but only a passive one for reversion. It is a desiring substrate, not an inert hyle (in Aristotelian terms). At this point, a problem of ontological continuity arises: in which phase does Intellect influence matter? In which phase does it give form to it? The formless matter in its striving towards the One adopts forms—the “down-to-up” singular motion of reversion—and the ideal lights from Intellect preserve matter in the form that it has adopted (Commentaries, prop. 40. 98. 28–30), thus influencing it. Where then is there a demarcation that separates intellectual activity from matter? We get the following picture: matter has to make an initial move of reversion to the One, and only then can Intellect touch it. The solution may be found in the notion of stereseis, the essence of which is found, as Petritsi affirms, in matter. Matter is a unity of the multiplicity of privations of ideas, and so is the One, but in the transcendent sense of the word. However, if Intellect cannot reach matter, henadic illuminations radiating from the One can. Actually, the establishment of the henads precedes the “budding” 147 of ideas, which show up only after this primary influence of the “unitary lights”: “First, the one is established by the One, and after this seed of the transcendent One is established, it creates around Itself a certain idea of being” (Commentaries, prop. 15. 48. 31 – 49. 1). From this perspective, the henadic influence on ideas is not only “from up to down,” but also “from down to up.” If the henad, as it seems, is given as a “flower” to each being (Commentaries, prop. 25. 69. 1), then we may compare Intellect to a bee, which only then flies towards and alights upon a plant when a flower 146 I provide my solution to this problem below, in the chapter on time and eternity. 147 This translates a Petritsian term, tsarmo-butko-eba. Cf. “The One is beyond ideas… and the budding of ideas occurs in the realm of existent things” (Commentaries, prop. 10. 37. 25–28).

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blooms from it. The gradation must have the following pattern (we shall put the symmetrical terms of the upper order as Un, and those of the lower order as Ln): the One (U1) is in polar opposition to matter (L1), for both are “untouched” by ideas. But after the One there follows the series of the henads (U2), which are also supra-ideal, but already in touch with ideas in the sphere of the True Being (U3). Those henads reach matter (L1) and drive it to a condition (L2) that may be reached by Intellect’s activity. 148 The reverse symmetry will be of the following pattern: up there, the ideal world (U3) is “in-touch-with-and-preserved-by” the supra-ideal unitary sphere of henads (U2), which are lower than the supra-Unity (U1); down here, the material ideas (L3) are “in-touch-with-and-preserving” the infra-ideal unitary matter influenced by henadic illuminations (L2), which is higher than its condition when not yet influenced by henads (L1). It is as if the henadic lights projected to the ideas a hidden diversity, hidden particular potencies within matter, and only after this may the ideas find their proper material substrates. v. The Eros towards the One Everything participates in the eros towards the One, for everything wants to have a share in the Good, and the One and the Good are identical. On the one hand, unity (or the Unity) is good for any entity as the means of its preservation, and in this sense the two are identical for any being. From this perspective, an entity’s desire for unity means an urge towards the selfenclosed possession of its own goodness, which is simply the preservation of self-identity. But together with the moment of “staying” there is also the moment of “reversion.” Something is introduced as if from outside, which drives a being to return to the One—a certain “nectar” 149 or “ambrosia,” 148 In fact, the henads, in the way in which they introduce differentiation into matter indiscernible to our sight, are comparable to St. Augustine’s notion of the “seminal reasons” or the “invisible seeds” that are seeds of the visible seeds and are concealed in the corporeal elements of this world. Compare St. Augustine, De Trinitate III. 8. 13, and also De Genesi ad litteram, IX. 17. 32. 149 Cf. Symposium 203 B5. The direct source must be Proclus, Th.Pl. IV. 46. 7– 14. Cf. also Enneads VI. 7. 35. 25: nou`" ejrw`n o{tan a[frwn gevnhtai mequsqei`" tou` nevktaro". About the interpretation of this passage in Plotinus, see István Perczel, “L’Intellect amoureux et l’‘Un qui est’. Une doctrine mal connue de Plotin,” Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 15 (1997) 2: 223–264. On p. 228 Perczel gives a list of later Neoplatonist references to this passage. The list, to which now one should also add this Petritsian locus, is far from being complete.

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which intoxicates the beings’ akme-s (Greek: ajkmhv—“acme” or “summit”). They are not content with only the preservation of their self-identity, but go beyond it and make a self-transcending move towards the Unity, caring no more for self-preservation, even discarding their proper essences: All beings strive for the Good and revert to It as to the object of thirst of their pains, leaving behind their desires and even existences, and as if mingling again with It, in Dionysiac inebriation, being unified by the One and made good by the Goodness (Commentaries, prop. 12. 44. 2–6).

The last part of the sentence means that the beings’ discarding of their proper essences involves an aspiration to a higher kind of unity and goodness, the worse being destroyed for the better. It is an important question whether this “nectar,” this urge for self-transcendence, is introduced from outside, or whether it is in the nature of all things, whatever they may be— souls or intellects. To make the question more precise, let us first employ a simile (another mechanical one). Different types of cars have fuel containers of this or that content. Fuel is introduced in them from the outside, so we can speak about a car without fuel, for a car is not abolished by the privation of fuel, which is not its essential feature. To translate the question of selftranscendence into an ontological language that likewise refers to the activity of filling, there are two possible explanations, only one of which can be correct: (i) does the “nectar” fill a being from the outside (accidentally, so to speak, in both Aristotelian and modern terms concerning properties)? or (ii) does this “nectar” pertain to the essential or ontological quality of a being, so that it cannot be deprived of the “nectar” and still remain the same being (as a battery ceases to be a battery if the electrical charge leaves it)? (There is an additional question: does the apportionment of the “nectar” depend on the ontological status of the being, as different cars have different amounts of fuel, depending on the essential or structural quality of a car, namely the size of its fuel container?) If the first explanation above is true, we may translate “nectar” in terms of “grace,” of course, not in the Christian sense, but in an ontological sense, yet with a certain openness for contingency and freedom: a being may not have nectar at a certain moment, and have it at another, which may depend on its free will, and even on the free will of the One. If the second is true, then we lose the possibility of contingency and get a necessary upward tendency to the One, a tendency in which all beings must participate without the possibility of deliberate choice. However, there is no definite answer to this question in Petritsi’s writings. It is possible that the “inebriation” is also inserted in the general cause-effect chain, for we read that the sky is “inebriated” by its immediate ontological neighbor—the

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Universal Soul—and becomes a slave to desire, and to the pursuit of the One. Thus the eros may be rendered in terms of the general transmission of processive and revertive powers from causes to effects. However, Petritsi’s emotional, mystical language does not allow such a schematic understanding of the eros. The One is the “unfathomable abyss,” the “abyss of goodness,” the object of infinite striving of a soul caught up by enthusiasm. The souls and intellects are surprised by, and marvel at, the One, which is the “transcendent object of hope” (Commentaries, prop. 28. 76. 22), the hope of the satisfaction of the unavoidable craving for the source. The One is the object in which “everything dies” or “everything strives to die” (Commentaries, prop. 14. 48. 2). This expression may indicate the desire to be overcome by the bliss of the unattained attaining of the One, to stop there in helplessness; the reason for such helplessness is the fact that every private faculty, everything that is proper to soul or intellect, fails there. The One is also the “pain for the extinction of theories.” 150 What can this expression mean? It seems to give an account of the fact that the soul ascends to the One through gradual stages of contemplation, but in contemplation there is a certain satisfaction and appeasement, insofar as the contemplator can grasp the object contemplated. In contemplation one may be comforted by the perception of embracing something: something is clear and can be uttered. However, at the highest point the soul attains a stage where it cannot find any solid ground or any comfort of clarity, a stage where it cannot rest and cannot be satisfied by understanding. 151 Contemplation and theorizing are extinguished in face of the Ineffable, and what remains there is a pain of dissatisfaction, a desire always partly unsatisfied: 150 The expression “extinction of theories” seems to be borrowed from St. Gregory of Nazianzus, who in his Oratio 21 (In Laudem Athanasii) 1. 25–26 writes thus about God: Tou`to gavr ejsti toV tw`n ojrektw`n e[scaton, kaiV ou| genomevnoi9 pavsh9 qewriva9 ajnavpausi9, in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 20–23, ed. J. Mossay and G. Lafontaine, SChr 270 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1980), 112. 151 Petritsi could have taken the idea of the absolute ungraspability of the Divinity by the human mind not only from the philosophical, but also from the Christian sources. Cf. St. Maximus Confessor, Mystagogia V: QeoV9 gaVr hj ajlhvqeia, periV o}n

ajkatalhvktw9 te kaiV ajlhvstw9 kinouvmeno9 oJ nou`9, lhvgein oujk euJrivskon pevra9 e[nqa mhV e[sti diavsthma. ToV gaVr qaumastoVn a[posovn tiv ejsti kaiV ajmereV9 kaiV pantelw`9 ajdiavstaton, gnwsqh`nai, o{ tiv potev ejsti katÊ oujsivan, fqavnousan aujtoVn mhV e[con diavsthma h] katavlhyin kaq– oJtiou`n, oujk e[sti tiniV

14).

e[cei poteV th`9 kinhvsew9, mhV mevgeqo9 th`9 qeiva9 ajpeiriva9, kaiV thVn oiJanou`n proV9 toV oujk e[con katavlhyin. ToV deV peratovn (PG 91, 677 A5–

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“thirst after thirst, and ongoing passion for taste, and desire after desire” 152 (Commentaries, prop. 8. 35. 14). The activity of the soul and the intellect should end in silence before the One, 153 but this is not a static silence of satisfaction and serenity, because the craving still remains there. If this craving had a relative consolation in the images and idols (Greek: taV ei[dwla) of the One, that is, in contemplation of metaphysical and physical realities, now it is deprived of this consolation and is overwhelmed by desire for the supra-interesting simultaneous presence and absence of the One. The “divine Beloved” (Commentaries, prop. 8. 35. 13) that the soul pursues—and pursues not as if in persecution, but with the purpose of getting from It Its goodness—never “marries” the soul. The only comfort that It gives to the soul is the perspective of eternal marveling in this unrest of the soul’s ceaseless, hopeless supra-lust.

152 At this point Petritsi seems to reflect upon the theme of the ejpevktasi9, so prominent in the spiritual theology of St. Gregory of Nyssa and especially in his Commentary on the Canticle VI, in Gregorii Nysseni In Canticum canticorum, Gregorii Nysseni Opera VI, ed. H. Langerbeck (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), p. 174. 1–20. 153 Compare the following: Proclus, Th Pl. II. 9. 58. 22–24: h] gnw`nai toi`" deutev-

roi" qemitoVn h] lovgw/ dielqei`n, ajllaV sigh`/ toV a[rrhton aujtou` kaiV proV tw`n aijtivwn pavntwn ajnaitivw" ai[tion ajnumnei`n; Th.Pl. II. 7. 30. 7–8; Plotinus, Enneads V. 1. 11–23 quoted

by St. Basil the Great, in De Fide, 1 (PG 31, 465 A-B) and by St. Augustine, in Confessiones IX. 10. 25 and Proclus, Th.Pl. II. 11. 109. 64–65. See also Michael Psellus: [oJ qeovv"] krei`tton gaVr pantoV" kaiV rJhvmato" kaiV nohvmato" wJ" pavnth/ ajnennovhton kaiV ajnevkfraston, kaiV sigh`/ ma`llon timwvmenon h] qaumasivai" fwnai`" semnunovmenon, in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara (Leipzig: Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, 1989), p. 145, 17 and 19–21.

3 THE FIRST LIMIT AND THE FIRST INFINITY 1. LIMIT AND INFINITY IN PROCLUS Only a few propositions especially concern the metaphysical place of Limit and Infinity in the Elements of Theology. However, the question is dealt with at greater length and in a more detailed way in Proclus’ other works, and so it would be appropriate to supplement the scarcity of the Elements of Theology with data taken from other sources. In this respect the Platonic Theology is of major interest for us, insofar as this work was Petritsi’s direct source in dealing with the problem. When the Georgian philosopher describes the nature and functions of Limit and Infinity, he remarks as follows: “In the Great Theology [that is to say, the Platonic Theology] a vast amount of space is devoted to the discussion of this issue” (Commentaries, prop. 151. 176. 32–33). The following summary is based on both the Elements of Theology and the Platonic Theology. First, in Proclus’ Elements of Theology “Limit” and “Infinity” are mentioned as necessary constituents of the True Being (prop. 89), which has Limit as being undivided and one-like, and Infinity as possessing infinite power. Thus Limit is responsible for and indicative of the static aspect of any being, its structural unity, while Infinity is related to a being’s dynamic aspect, its power or ability, as we shall see, in both the active and the passive sense. Proclus makes an important move when he states in the sequel (prop. 90) that Limit and Infinity are not just abstract categories or innate aspects to be discerned by the mind’s reflection in existent things; they also exist by themselves, in separation from beings, and predating beings as their causes. Proclus states the same thing in the Platonic Theology: that the nature of all beings is constituted of a mixture of Limit and Infinity, and that each of the pair preexists in an unmixed way. Accordingly, given that the nature of any being implies an implicit mixture, while, on the contrary, Limit and Infinity are unmixed, the latter do not fall under the essential definition of beings and are supra-essential. As far as the Elements of Theology is concerned, in all its remaining propositions, Limit somehow disappears from the discussion, and our attention is directed towards the different degrees and 65

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modes of the First Infinity’s revelation in beings. Prop. 91 depicts a threefold hierarchy between the limited power, the infinite power and the First Infinity, the limited power deriving from the infinite power and the latter from the First Infinity. Furthermore, the proposition explains that all the eternal beings necessarily possess an infinite power, and that only temporal beings have a limited power. Next we learn that also the First Infinity is power, or rather the first imparticipable monad of the series of powers, belonging to none of the dunavmena, that is, those things “possessing power.” 154 This is another way of saying that the First Infinity is not a being in which existence in a static sense can be distinguished from power; rather, it is simply power, not belonging to anything but existing by itself and causing everything. It is distinguished, though, from the One, which is superior to it and is the measure even of Infinity. Thus all other powers belong to beings, and insofar as there are different eternal beings, so there must be different infinite powers associated with them. However, is not the expression “different infinite powers” a self-contradictory one? As Proclus states elsewhere, “there cannot be anything more than infinite” (prop. 1), and so if we qualify the infinite it will no longer be infinite. Proclus explains this contradiction in prop. 93, which teaches us that any power below the First Infinity is infinite, but only in a relative sense, in other words only in relation to subsequent ontological entities. Any power is infinite in comparison to a subsequent being, due to the fact that it cannot be entirely grasped by the latter, but something of the cause, which is more universal than its effect, will remain hidden from the effect. 155 Prop. 94 teaches us that infinity is a broader notion, and therefore ontologically higher, than eternity, because eternity indicates something’s perpetual existence, so that in this particular case it has only an adverbial significance: something exists eternally. But infinity is not reduced to the mode of something’s existence from a “verbal” point of view, but can also be applied both to a quantity of things and See Th.Pl. III. 21. 74. 13–18, where Proclus speaks about the first power, which is before Being and in which Being participates. The first power is only duvnami9, whereas Being—and apparently all the subsequent beings—may be said to be both duvnami9 and dunavmenon: DioV kaiV toV o]n wJ" meVn metevcon th`" dunavmew" 154

prosagoreuvetai dunavmenon, wJ9 deV sunhnwmevnon aujth/` kaiV kat– aujthVn taV o[nta paravgon pavnta, duvnami9.

It is a rather specific usage of the term “infinite,” as Nicholas of Methone observes (commenting on Proclus’ Pa`sa duvnami" eJnikwvtera ou\sa: th`" plhqunomevnh" ajpeirovtera): Oujk e[dei levgein ajpeirovtera (tou~ gaVr ajpeivrou ajpeirovteron oujdevn) ajll– h] meivzona ei[toun dunatwvtera (Refutation, p. 93). 155

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to the mode of existence in a static sense, for instance, to matter, which is infinite because, on the one hand, it is perpetual, and, on the other, its essence is deprived of all definitions. The next proposition (prop. 95) says that the closer a power is to the One, the more unified and infinite it is; so, accordingly, the further a power proceeds from the One, the more multiple, that is to say the less concentrated, and the weaker it becomes. The last proposition dealing with infinity (prop. 96) is concerned with the problem of the existence of an infinite power in finite bodies, proving that if there were such a power in a body then this power would be incorporeal. Proclus has it in mind here that the eternal bodies—planets, stars, the sky—have this feature not qua bodies, but by virtue of some other, immaterial aspect of their existence. The infinite power present in a body must be related to the eternal soul of that body. We can fill the lacunae left in the Elements of Theology by consideration of the material found in the Platonic Theology. According to the latter, Limit and Infinity are two immediate Principles (ajrcaiv) after the imparticipable One. They are causes of all things, themselves transcending them, being established in nothing other than themselves and emitting from themselves the series of henads. At one point Limit and Infinity are also called henads (Th.Pl. III. 9. 36. 13–14). Limit and Infinity reveal their unknowable and imparticipable cause—the One. From this fact we may infer that there is a certain hidden diversity also in the One, because Limit reveals Its (the Deity’s) unifying, preserving and “collecting” aspect, while Infinity does so with Its ability to proceed and multiply (Th.Pl. III. 8. 32. 13–19). Limit is responsible for unity, integrity, measure and association or harmony (koinwniva) for all beings, while Infinity governs division (multiplication), originative production and procession towards multiplicity. Any being must have both unity and multiplicity, and the first is due to Limit, the second due to Infinity. The multiplicity necessary in any being is called also the “not-one” element in them. Unlike the Elements of Theology, which does not maintain any explicit hierarchical ranking of Limit and Infinity, the Platonic Theology grants Limit a more principal position: Infinity there appears to be the power of, or a power within, Limit. This is, therefore, at variance with the Elements of Theology; the latter states the complete independence of the two from each other according to their own existence—oujk a[ra dei` peratoeideV" eij'nai toV prwvtw" a[peiron kaiV ajpeiroeideV" eij~nai toV prw~ton pevra"

(prop. 90. 82. 14–16)—whereas the Platonic Theology makes Limit the Principle of Infinity. The latter is presented as an “extension” (ejktevneia) or procession of Limit (Th.Pl. III. 8. 31. 22–23). However, the superiority of Limit may also be inferred in an indirect way from the statement of the Elements of

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Theology that the One is the measure of all—mevtron gaVr pavntwn ejkei~no, (prop. 92. 82. 32–33)—and, therefore, also of Infinity. One may, however, assume that the One must impose a measure through Limit. Also, in prop. 95 it is stated that the First Infinity is the closest power to the One, and that the multiplied powers abandon “onelikeness” (toV eJnoeidev9), which implies that the term “one-like” applies to the First Infinity as well. But if something is “one-like” it is not completely infinite, since it participates in a unitary measure. The Platonic Theology provides also a more complete picture of how Limit and Infinity unite in the first mixture—Being—which has Its “onelikeness,” existence (u{parxi9) and steadfast identity from Limit, and the infinite hidden power for the production of beings from Infinity. We learn that the cause of the unity of the two in Being is the One, from which Being has the “hypostasis of the whole” (hJ o{lh uJpovstasi"), which, I think, indicates the most principal unity of Being as undivided into Its static hyparxis (Limit) and the dynamic (Infinity) aspects. But, to ask together with Proclus, how can Limit and Infinity, which are supra-essential entities, and therefore “non-essences,” act as constituents of the Essence/Being (Th.Pl. III. 9. 38. 15–16)? It turns out that Limit and Infinity as such do not unite but remain in their transcendence above beings; however, what are unified in Being are their secondary processions. Thus it is not they themselves but their bestowals (dovsei9, doseis) that make the first mixture of Being. In all the subsequent entities, which are the secondary mixtures, the same process must be involved: that is, the bestowals from the higher terms will unite to make a fresh entity. Therefore, through those gradual bestowals, the two Principles are united and revealed in all strata of reality in different modes. Even the material things possess a mode of Infinity in their matter and a mode of Limit in their form (Th.Pl. III. 8. 34. 5–7). From this it is clear that the Limit-Infinity mixture in the descending scale must contain a greater apportionment of the “Infinity” element, because if the first mixture of Being contained the bestowal of Limit in the purest way, the “matter-infinity” is not already formed by the sheer Limit, but by an “idea-limit,” which is itself a mixture of Limit and Infinity. It is interesting to reflect on the bestowals of Limit and Infinity in beings. Proclus says that Infinity is itself an extension or procession of Limit and that the First Being has this procession as Its (the Being’s) power. Yet Infinity as such cannot be the power of Being, because it is separable from beings and has existence by itself (although not completely by itself, as we have seen, because it is the power of Limit). We may compare the Platonic Theology:

tajgaqoVn uJpavrcon kaiV e{n

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toV meVn pevra" ejstiV qeov" ejp– a[krw/ tw`/ nohtw`/ proelqwVn ajpoV tou` ajmeqevktou kaiV prwtivstou qeou~, pavnta metrw~n kaiV ajforivzwn kaiV pa`n toV patrikoVn kaiV sunektikoVn kaiV a[cranton tw~n qew~n gevno" uJfistav", toV deV a[peiron duvnami" ajnevkleipto" tou~ qeou~ touvtou (Th.Pl. III. 12. 44. 24 – 45. 4).

The expression tou~ qeou~ touvtou here must apply to Limit and not to the One, because Limit is the subject of the preceding clause. Therefore, there must be a procession or extension also of Infinity, but this extension must be governed by some measure, because although Being contains an infinite power, It does so only within a measure. However, this measure is not Limit itself, but again its bestowal. Therefore, the bestowal or procession of Infinity should be mediated by that of Limit. We shall get the following sequence: 1. Limit; 2. the first extension of Limit—Infinity; 3. the second extension of Limit—the structure of Being; 4. the extension of Infinity—the power of Being; 5. the mixture of the second extension of Limit and the extension of Infinity—the integrity or hypostasis of Being. We see that there happens a gradual extension/multiplication of both the measure—which is responsible for the structure or static essence of any being—and the power. This is a symmetrical process, and therefore Proclus may say that for each ontological structure (hyparxis) there is a power conatural with this structure: pa`n toV o]n kaiV hJ oujsiva pa`sa dunavmei" e[cei sumfuei`", metevcei gaVr th`" ajpeiriva", kaiV thVn meVn u{parxin ejk tou` pevrato" komivzetai, thVn deV duvnamin ejk tou~ ajpeivrou. KaiV oujdeVn a[llo ejstiV toV o]n h] monaV" dunavmewn pollw`n kaiV u{parxi" plhqunomevnh, kaiV diaV tou`to e}n pollaV toV o[n (Th.Pl. III. 9. 39. 15–

20).

Proclus then compares this relation of the structure (hyparxis) and power to the Plotinian concept of the idea and the intelligible matter from which the hypostasis of Being is constituted. Yet he makes the qualification that this comparison must be only an analogy and not an identification, because “matter” implies something passive and formless, which cannot be a part of the intelligible realm. Proclus emphatically claims that Infinity in the intelligible sphere is not Limit’s matter, but Limit’s power, so that the two cannot be thought of in separation, just as—to use an earlier example—the structure and chemical contents of a battery (if new, for if old and depleted it is no longer a battery stricto sensu) cannot be thought of without the presence of an appropriate electrical charge. Therefore, in Proclus’ paradigm an intelligent being is not created by an imposition of an idea-limit on some

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indefiniteness of intelligible matter, but there is always a co-natural power for each of the idea-limits, and any power in the intelligible sphere exists only in a hypostatic unity with its appropriate idea-limit. Proclus avoids calling the power in the intelligible sphere “matter,” because the power of the intelligible entities is an active one, which gushes forth to produce something else. The interaction of the modalities or bestowals of Limit and Infinity happens on all ontological levels, but there is a greater producing capacity in higher realities, a capacity that Proclus calls the “complete power,” but further down the “complete power” gradually diminishes in the mixture of beings to give way to the static or incomplete power: Tou`to deV oij~mai sumbaivnein ajnavgkh diovti tw`n prwvtwn ajrcw`n aiJ dovsei" kaiV mevcri tw~n ejscavtwn dihvkousi, kaiV ouj movnon taV teleiovtera gennw`sin ajllaV kaiV taV ajtelevstera kataV thVn uJpovstasin (Th.Pl. III. 10. 41. 11–15). Only at the furthest reach of the

procession of the two Principles do we reach a completely passive mode of power—the polar opposition of the completely active power of Infinity: ejkei~ meVn gennhtikhV tw`n pavntwn hJ duvnami", hJ deV th`" u{lh" duvnami" ajtelhV" kaiV th`" tw`n pavntwn kat– ejnevrgeian uJpostavsew" ejndehv" (Th.Pl. III. 8. 34. 8–10).

Matter is no longer in a hypostatic unity with its appropriate structure, but requires structure or limitation from outside. I shall end this incomplete summary with an indication, without going into details, of the functions of Limit and Infinity in the intelligible triads. Each being, according to Proclus, has a triadic structure containing Limit, Infinity and the mixture: ejn eJkavsth/ gavr ejsti pevra9, a[peiron, miktovn (Th.Pl. III. 13. 47. 19–20). The first triadic mixture of the intelligible triad is Being (Th.Pl. III. 13. 48. 11–13); the second is Life (Th.Pl. III. 12. 46. 18–22); the third, in which first was revealed the intelligible multiplicity and order, must be Intellect. As Proclus writes, KaqÊ oJmoiovthta gaVr ajpoV tou` eJnoV" th`" proovdou tw`n o[ntwn ajpoteloumevnh" toV meVn eJnoeidevstaton hj~n (i.e., Being), toV deV wjdi~non toV plh~qo" kaiV diakrivsew" ajrcovmenon (i.e., Life), toV deV hjdhV panteleV" kaiV plh`qo" nohtoVn ejn eJautw/` kaiV eij~do" ejkfai`non (Th.Pl. III. 14. 49. 24 – 50. 4).

The three are related to Plato’s categories in Philebus 64 A 7–65 A 5: Being to symmetry, Life to truth, and Intellect to beauty (Th.Pl. III. 13. 48. 15–22). In turn, Being is related to Limit, Life to Infinity, and Intellect to the mixture. So in all three intelligible hypostases there is a unity of the three aspects—Limit, Infinity and mixture—but the modality of mixture gives a name to each of the hypostases, for, as Proclus says, in the second intelligible hypostasis, Life, the first constituent is Limit, the second is Infinity, and the third—that is to say, the mixture—is “Life.” This means that the prevailing of the Limit-aspect in a mixture characterizes Being, the prevailing

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of the Infinity-aspect characterizes Life and, finally, the equilibrium of those two aspects in the constitution of the third intelligible hypostasis characterizes Intellect, which appears to be the most balanced mixture, or the mixture proper of Limit and Infinity.

2. PETRITSI’S THEORY OF LIMIT AND INFINITY i. Neither One nor Many In the preface to his commentaries on Proclus, Petritsi gives some terminological guidance to his reader, explaining the Greek term noeton (Greek: toV nohtovn—“object of understanding”), saying that the noeton, as an object of understanding, is always more exalted than the subject of understanding, the entity that comprehends it. Thus, in the hierarchical structure of reality, each superior level functions as a noeton for its inferior, which in turn functions as a noeton for the next entity in the descending scale. Accordingly, the intellect is the noeton for the soul, 156 the True Being the noeton for the intellect, the henads the noeton for the True Being, and the First Limit and the First Infinity the noeton for the henads. Finally, the ultimate object of understanding, the noeton for the First Limit and the First Infinity, is “the supreme One and Good, 157 whom/which our desire to honor It has called also Father” (Preface, 7. 24 – 8. 7). 158 Here, as well as in other passages, Petritsi definitely identifies Proclus’ One with the Father in the Christian Trinity.

156 We are speaking of particular souls and intellects here, hence the lower-case initial letters. 157 Petritsi here differs, at least from the terminological point of view, from Proclus, who does not apply the term noeton to the One: [toV e{n] oujdeV nohtoVn h] noerovn, ajll– uJpostatikoVn kaiV tw`n nohtw`n kaiV tw`n noerw`n eJnavdwn (In Parmenidem 1069. 22–23). Cf. also Michael Psellus, Opusculum phil. 38 ( jExhvghsi" tw~n Caldaikw~n rJhtw~n): plhVn oJ qeoV" kaiV tou` nohtou` kaiV tou` aujtonohvtou ejpevkeina, in Michaelis Pselli— Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, p. 145, 17–18. Petritsi may follow Plotinus, who describes the One as nohtoVn for the subsequent entity, that is to say, for the nou`" (Enneads V. 4 (7). 2. 2– 11). 158 In calling the One “Father,” Petritsi is in tune with Plotinus and Porphyry, and diverges from the later Neoplatonists, such as Proclus and Damascius, who reserved the name “father” for the prime aspect of the intelligible triad, “the highest point of nou`".” See J. M. Rist, “Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism,” in Platonism and Its Christian Heritage (London: Variorum, 1985), 218.

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From the Christian point of view it is most interesting to see how Petritsi attempts to reconcile the Trinitarian doctrine with Proclian metaphysics—all the more so, since the passage just quoted seems to state the ontological priority of the One-Father over the rest of reality. In fact, simultaneously with the assertion of the equality of the Persons in the Trinity, Christian theology also recognizes a certain priority of the Father over the Son and the Spirit. For instance, St. Basil interprets Christ’s words “my Father is greater than I” (John, 14. 28) as meaning that the Father is greater than the Son according to the order of causality. 159 However, Petritsi’s words quoted above imply a more pronounced difference, approaching a kind of subordinationist theory. Students of Petritsi have not remained unaware of the theological problem raised by this text. To solve this difficulty K. Kekelidze has proposed the idea of an interiorization of the Trinity within the One. 160 This is a widely accepted view, since such an interiorization is, in fact, not an uncommon way for Christian theologians to assimilate the Neoplatonist concept to their own notion of the Godhead. In what follows I shall demonstrate only the irrelevance of Kekelidze’s hypothesis to the case of Petritsi. We have seen in the chapter on the One that for Petritsi, unlike Proclus, plurality is precontained in the One, for the Principles of plurality, that is, the henadic numbers, are viewed in the One kat’ aitian (“according to their cause”), just as the parts of a plant are precontained in a seed. Petritsi warns that this analogy is not quite adequate, because the parts of a seed grow from possibility into perfection, but the henads are in the One in a supra-perfect state (Commentaries, prop. 1. 14. 4–15), that is, in a more excellent way than in their own existence (Commentaries, prop. 118. 159. 15–18). According to their own existence (kaqÊ u{parxin) the henads are under the One and do not have direct access to It. They do not participate in the One immediately, because the One transcends any participation: first, there is nothing higher than the One, in which the One could participate; second, It does not fully communicate Its unattainable properties to the henads. The participation that the One allows to the henads is of a peculiar character, which Petritsi expresses in the following way: “It gives participation without participation and has all the henads with Itself without giving Itself to St. Basil of Caesarea, Adversus Eunomium I. 25. 28–44, in Basile de Césarée. Contre Eunome suivi de Eunome, Apologie, ed. B. Sesboüé, G.-M. de Durand and L. Doutreleau, t. I. 262. 160 Kekelidze, op. cit., 304. 159

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them” (Commentaries, prop. 116. 157. 27–30). Realizing the difficulty in understanding how the One communicates Itself to the henads, while remaining transcendent, Petritsi applies his usual method of analogy: the relation between the One and the henads is comparable to that between the sun and the earthly creatures, because the sun gives birth to all creatures on the earth—and hence enables them to participate in itself—and enlightens them all, but at the same time remains impassible, unaffected by their changes and passions, because “it gives participation without relation” 161 (Commentaries, prop. 122. 161. 29). That is why Petritsi metaphorically calls the One “the Sun of the henads” (in Commentaries, prop. 14. 48. 3; prop. 23. 63. 14). Besides the uncreated One and the plurality of henads and beings that are all considered as “created,” there is also a tertium quid that constitutes the link between the two. This link is the pair of artios (a[rtio9) and perittos (perittov9), even and odd (Commentaries, prop. 5. 29. 6–8). In fact, according to Petritsi, given that plurality is number, and number is either even or odd, plurality should therefore be preceded by the Principles of “evenness” and “oddness.” Those Principles are Limit and Infinity, serving as monads of the henadic numbers: Before the origin of all the henads, there were produced two heads of the henads, namely the First Limit and the First Infinity, who begin two henadic series and proceed throughout all beings (Commentaries, prop. 159. 180. 29–30).

Or again: In the sphere of henads one can see the heads and origins of the series—the First Limit and the First Infinity. They originate two series, one of the genus of Limit, the other of Infinity (Commentaries, prop. 146 (= 145). 174. 8–14).

Limit and Infinity are the means through which the henads unite with the transcendent One:

161 According to Petritsi’s doctrine of participation, which is different from that of Proclus, to give birth necessarily implies also participation (cf. Commentaries, prop. 23. 64. 7–11). At the same time the expression “participation without relation” (Georgian: uziareblad eziarebis) echoes the Pseudo-Dionysian term a[sceto" metavdosi". See De Divinis Nominibus III. 3, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, pp. 128, 17 – 129, 1.

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI All henads join the transcendent One and the two sources that issue from the One. In fact, all the created ones [henads] join the unoriginated One through them [that is, the “two sources”] (Commentaries, prop. 2. 21. 28 – 22. 2).

Petritsi calls the First Limit and the First Infinity “two transcendent Gods,” which are above all beings and above even the supra-essential henads (Commentaries, prop. 90. 143. 9–11); they are separated from the rest of reality by the fact that, as we have said, all the others, henads included, are “created,” a term that is not applicable to Limit and Infinity. 162 This is why the relation between the One and the pair of Limit and Infinity is qualitatively different from that between the One and the rest of reality. 163 Limit and Infinity are within the One in a state of supra-power (Commentaries, prop. 5. 29. 9). Petritsi calls them “creative sources,” which means that Limit and Infinity are not merely tools in the hands of the One, but share in Its creative nature (Commentaries, prop. 37. 90. 28–30). Let us now more closely treat the role of the two fundamental Principles. ii. Limit The First Limit in Petritsi’s system is several times called “the idea of ideas.” As a source for this expression he refers to Aristotle, in his phrase “The First Limit of beings, called by Aristotle ‘the idea of ideas’” (Commentaries, prop. 10. 37. 19), to an unspecified source, called by him “The philosopher” (most probably Plato) (Commentaries, prop. 29. 78. 14–15), 164 and to the Eleatic Stranger from Plato’s Sophist, when he refers to “the First Limit, the transcendent idea, or as the Eleatic Stranger calls it, ‘the idea of all ideas’” 165 (Commentaries, prop. 95. 145. 9–11). Limit is “supra-idea” and the 162 Only once is Limit said to be the “created One” (Commentaries, prop. 116. 158. 3–4), most probably due to carelessness in his choice of terminology. 163 Cf. Th.Pl. III. 9. 36. 3, where Proclus also distinguishes different ways of procession from the One, (i) the “shining forth” (toV ejkfaivnein) and (ii) the “creation” (toV poiei`n), of which the first has a higher metaphysical purport (toV poiei`n tou` ejkfaivnein katadeevsteron kaiVJ hJ gevnesi" th`" ejkfavnsew"). The two Principles—Limit and Infinity—are characterized precisely by the first sort of procession, enjoying thus a privileged status. 164 Cf. De Anima III. 4. 432a2: kaiV oJ nou~9 ei\do9 eijdw~n: “The intellect is the form of forms.” 165 Cf. Sophist 253 D-E: “… Then who can do that intuitively perceives a) one Form extended everywhere throughout many, where each one lies apart, and b) many forms differing from one another included within one Form” The translation

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used here is that of John Warrington: Plato—Sophist, trans. with an introduction by John Warrington (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1961). Cf. also In Parmenidem: zhtei`n thVn tw`n ijdew`n monavda mivan (887, 18); kaiV gaVr plh`qo" tw`n ijdew`n ejn tw`/ eJniV o[nti thVn uJpovstasin e[cein, wJ" ejn monavdi toVn oijkei`on ajriqmovn (636. 21–23); this means that the monad of the ideas is the One Being. This indicates a different interpretation of the Sophist, and thus Petritsi’s source here is not Proclus but somebody else, presumably Origen, who defined the Son as ijdeva ijdew`n in Contra Celsum. Moreover, in the Chaldean Oracles, quoted by Proclus in In Parmenidem 800. 20 – 801. 5, we find the following expressions (1) Nou`" patroV" ejrjrJoivzhse nohvsa" ajkmavdi boulh/` pammovrfou" ijdeva", phgh`" deV mia`" a[po pa`sai ejxevqoron… (13) e[nnoiai noeraiV phgh`" patrikh`" a[po… (15) ajrcegovnou" ijdeva" prwvth patroV" e[bluse tavsde aujtotelhV" phghv. Petritsi, who knew Proclus’ In Parmenidem, must have also known those logia, and have interpreted the “paternal source” as Limit in his system (as for instance in his commentary on prop. 151). This, however, is quite different from the interpretation of Proclus, who identifies the “paternal source” with the Demiurgic Intellect— holding quite a low rank in the intellectual realm. Petritsi’s interpretation or usage of the Oracle is radically different, for he interprets the nou`" patrikov" and the phghV patrikhV as the Word of the Father, the second One, that is, the highest possible principle after the Absolute God. The reasons for that may be that (1) for a Christian the Demiurge who creates the world is the highest God, and thus His nou`" or phghv will be the Son; (2) Petritsi may have been influenced by the Biblical and Patristic sources, more precisely, by the interpretation of the Cappadocian Fathers, who interpreted the Psalmic verse o{ti paraV soiV phghV zwh`", ejn tw`/ fwtiv sou ojyovmeqa fw`" from Psalms 35. 10, according to which interpretation “you” (paraV soiV) means the Father and the “Source of Life” the Son, who is also the Light of the Father, and in this Light shall we see Light, that is the Holy Spirit. See the following: St. Basil, De Spiritu sancto, 18. 47. 12–17, in Basile de Césarée, Sur le Saint-Esprit, ed. B. Pruche, SChr 172 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1968), 412; St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 31 (De Spiritu Sancto). 3. 17–22, in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27–31 [Discours theologiques], ed. Paul Gallay and Maurice Jourjon, 280; St. Gregory of Nyssa, In laudem sancti Stephani, ed. O. Lendle, Encomium in sanctum Stephanum Protomartyrem (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 36. 5–13, and so on. This Cappadocian interpretation is taken over also by Petritsi in his Epilogue. Thus, if a Christian combines the two “Revelations”—the pagan logia and the Jewish-Christian logia—it is only logical to interpret the “paternal source” as the Son. Interestingly, Michael Psellus, who may have directly influenced Petritsi, identifies in his Opusculum phil. 38 ( jExhvghsi" tw~n Caldaikw~n rJhtw~n) the “paternal intellect” of the Oracles with the Biblical Creator God. See Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, p. 140, 10–18. Also see Oracles chaldaïques, ed. E. Des Places (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1971). Furthermore, in De Civitate Dei, Augustine refers to Porphyry’s commentary on the Oracles and identifies the pa-

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limiting Principle of everything, first of all of the henadic numbers. The different orders of henads receive their properties through participation in this limiting Principle. Any number would be infinite, were not “the light of the One sown in it” (Commentaries, prop. 1. 15. 25–26). The transcendent One is described as the giver of limit to all, and It does so through the First Limit, viz. the second One 166 that It begets: “The One that derives from It is the Principle of the series of henads” and “the participable cause in the series of henads,” while the One, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is referred to as [something] “beyond Principle” 167 and is posited above the henadic series (Commentaries, prop. 116. 158. 7–15). 168 We read that “before the multitude the One engenders the One and only then does there follow the series of the henads” (Commentaries, prop. 29. 78. 27–28). Limit is called the “First Number” (Commentaries, prop. 30. 81. 23–24), which generates the henadic series. The scheme corresponds to that held by the later Pythagoreans and Platonists, for, as W. K. C. Guthrie remarks, “the monistic theory, involving as it does a distinction between the ideal One and the unit which begins the number series, is surely Platonic in character.” 169 The One terna mens, that is, nou`" patrikov", with God the Word. Thus, Petritsi relied on a very longstanding tradition in the Christian theology. 166 I here use italics for emphasis, to distinguish the “second One,” that is, Limit, from the absolute One. 167 In his commentary on the Parmenides, in that part which is extant now only in the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke, Proclus refers to Speucippus’ interpretation of the “view of the Ancients” concerning the placing of the One beyond the Principle: “Et ut Speusippus—narrans tamquam placentia antiquis— audit. quid dicit? ‘Le unum enim melius ente putantes et a quo le ens, et ab ea que secundum principium habitudine liberaverunt’” (emphasis mine). I quote here from an article of Leonardo Tarán: “Proclus and the Old Academy,” in Proclus—Lecteur et interprète des Anciens. Actes du colloques international du C.N.R.S Paris (2–4 octobre 1985) (Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S., 1987), 229. 168 In this identification of the second One with Limit, which is only implicit in the Elements of Theology (cf. prop. 89), Petritsi follows the Platonic Theology of Proclus: ToV meVn toivnun e}n toV prou>pavrcon th`" dunavmew" kaiV prw`ton aJpoV th`" aJmeqevktou kaiV aJgnwvstou tw`n o{lwn aijtiva" prou>postavn, pevra" oJ ejn Filhvbw/ Swkravth" ajpokalei`, thVn deV gennhtikhVn tou` o[nto" duvnamin ajpeirivan (Th.Pl. III. 8. 32. 2–5). 169 As Guthrie further observes, it is more likely that initially Pythagoreans did not hold the conception of the ultimate One as the arche of all, but rather that their doctrine was dualistic: in other words, the One derived from the two initial Principles—Limit and Unlimited. See W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 249. Cf. also Proclus’ Th.Pl. III.

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is broader than the unifying Principle (the second One that it produces); that is why Petritsi declares the One to “transcend even unity” (Commentaries, prop. 56. 123. 16–17). That the One goes beyond Limit is evident, for instance, in a beautiful passage where the perpetually moving sky is described as a lover of the One: the movement of the sky has no end because its Beloved cannot be attained, due to the fact that It “is above Limit and Principle,” 170 for if the beloved had had a border or if It were confined in limit the sky would have also stopped its ceaseless voyage (Commentaries, prop. 13. 45. 23–28). Petritsi, of course, never says that the One is beyond Limit for Limit itself, in other words that the One is unattainable in full also for Limit. Moreover, he alludes twice to St. Paul, saying that “the Father manifests in the Son the entire fullness of His Divinity.” 171 However, Petritsi’s adherence to the hierarchical patterns and language of Neoplatonist ontology can lead to a kind of subordinationist view in his system. 172 The One produced by the One is the unifying Principle and cause of all (Commentaries, prop. 56. 123. 17–18). Being the supra-idea, it imposes idea upon all: “The First Limit eternally unifies, gives unity and idea” (Commentaries, prop. 151. 176. 20–21). Limit is three lines earlier in the same commentary called the “paternal source”: 173 “This paternal being 174 is produced 12. 44. 23 – 45. l2, where he refers to the God-Limit as deriving from the highest unparticipated God. 170 I capitalize Limit and Principle, thinking that Petritsi refers here precisely to the First Limit and does not speak merely in general terms. 171 Cf. Colossians 2. 9: “For in him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily.” Here, as henceforth, all quotations from the Bible in English will be given in the form to be found in the Authorized (King James) Version. 172 Cf. Michael Psellus, who in his Opusculum phil. 38 ( jExhvghsi" tw~n Caldaikw~n rJhtw~n) commenting on a Chaldean logion—oJ pathVr eJautoVn h{rpasen… (Oracula Chaldaica 3)—criticizes from the Orthodox-Trinitarian viewpoint the pagan idea of the supreme Deity as unapproachable even to “His own power,” that is to say, to His Son: oJ meVn nou`" tou` logivou toiou`to", wJ" oJ ejpiV pavntwn qeov", o}" dhV kaiV pathVr wjnovmastai, ajkatavlhpton eJautoVn poiei` kaiV ajperivlhpton, ouj movnon tai`" prwvtai" kaiV deutevrai" fuvsesi kaiV tai`" hJmetevrai" yucai`", ajllaV kaiV aujth`/ th`/ ijdiva/ dunavmei. duvnami" deV tou` patroV" oJ uiJov". ÊeJautoVnÊ gavr fhsin Êh{rpasen oJ pathVrÊ ajpoV pavsh" fuvsew". oujk e[sti deV toV dovgma ojrqovdoxon. ejn tw`/ uiJw`/ gaVr par– hJmi`n oJ pathVr dedogmavtistai, w{sper kaiV oJ uiJoV" ejn tw`/ patriv. kaiV o{ro" tou` patroV" oJ uiJoV" kaiV qei`o" lovgo" uJperfuhv", in

Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, p. 141, 15–22. 173 See note 160 above. 174 The term “being” is used here in a general sense and not in its technical sense, insofar as Limit is a supra-essential principle.

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before all the others by the Father of all,” and it “constructs all henads giving them limit and unity” (Commentaries, prop. 151. 176. 25–29). To elucidate the meaning of this last sentence, it is appropriate to examine Petritsi’s commentary on prop. 3. Here he teaches us that everything that has unity but is not the One Itself is composed of parts, which participate in each other in order to constitute a certain essence: for example, parts of “five” participate in each other and compose the essence of five. “Five,” as well as any other number taken in its counting function, denotes the number of units that it counts, and thus is viewed in relation to those units. As “fiveness,” however, it no longer has a counting function and is not related to other things, but is already an idea and essence. Parts of the “fìveness” are now not simple arbitrary units, five in number, to be readily applied to any other multitude; each of them receives a certain qualification, a “label” of that genus, that is, the “fìveness.” So each number appears in this sense as a certain integral structure. Petritsi makes an analogy with the term “man,” for this definition also must consist of several parts: “animality,” reason and mortality. Those parts are in man not in a simple and autonomous way; rather man possesses a man-type “animality” pertaining precisely to his genus (Commentaries, prop. 3. 24. 14 – 25. 10). This act of defining of a multitude of units and parts according to a certain genus is the property of Limit, which provides idea to all. This act takes place on different levels, because as Petritsi says, there are three orders of numbers: natural, arithmetical and theological (metaphysical). 175 The natural numbers are likely to refer to numbers viewed in nature: for example, everything in nature, let us say a tree, is a number of roots, stems, branches, leaves, and so on; the arithmetical numbers probably denote numbers taken as devices for numbering, that is, in their counting function; the metaphysical numbers could be applied to numbers taken in their essence, an integral “three” or integral “seven.” Metaphysical numbers, which seem to denote the henads—just as, in fact, they denote some kind of henadic Principles in Petritsi’s probable source, Iamblichus 176—are the Principles of metaphysical ideas that have essential This very much resembles a doctrine of Iamblichus, who also divides all reality hierarchically according to the corresponding levels of numbers. Those levels for Iamblichus are physical numbers, ethical numbers (related to the soul) and theological numbers. See here “New Fragments from Iamblichus,” ed. D. J. O’Meara, 35–38. 176 Interestingly, Proclus’ master, Syrianus, also must have followed Iamblichus at this point. As D. J. O’Meara observes, “In distinguishing many levels or sorts of number—physical, mathematical or psychic, intellectual, intelligible, henadic or divine 175

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existence in the sphere of the True Being, called by Petritsi “the place of ideas” (Commentaries, prop. 57. 125. 2). 177 Henads in fact are simpler than ideas, because the ideas are preceded by, and composed of, henadic numbers. In the words of Lossev, “the henads are Principles of ideality itself.” 178 This superiority of the henads is confirmed also by Petritsi: “The Good can be viewed either in ideas or in composition of beings, or above ideas, that is, in the henadic sphere” (Commentaries, prop. 28. 76. 24–25). All the other entities are numbers of something other than indivisible units—for example, the human body is a number of hands, eyes, fingers, and so on, which are not themselves simple—whereas “divine numbers” (as Petritsi calls the henads) are composed of simple, indivisible units, which Limit, being “the first and supra-idea of ideas” (Commentaries, prop. 90. 142. 31–32), constructs and qualifies within proper numbers. Let us take any number of multitude, let be it a hundred: each separate [unit] of the monads and numbers 179 in the hundred is one [unit], but the “hundredness” imposes an idea on those units and makes them belong to its genus. And also “hundredness” is one and one-like. Look, [emphasis mine]—Syrianus follows Iamblichus’ example and also emphasizes Iamblichus’ point that this expresses the transposability of mathematicals to other domains”; O’Meara states further that “Syrianus, like Iamblichus, finds in mathematics distinctions and relationships that can be used to describe the characteristics of Forms, the structure of the realm of Forms, and its relation to a higher order, that of ‘henads’, which is also approached in mathematical terms.” See D. J. O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived. Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 140; see also Gerald Bechtle’s conclusive remark, “für Jamblich sind ja auch überseiende Monade und Dyade als henadische Zahlen bzw. Henaden, anders als für Proclus, in Endeffekt Transpositionen von mathematischen Zahlen im göttlichen Bereich,” in Gerald Bechtle, “Göttliche Henaden und platonischer Parmenides. Lösung eines Mißverständnisses?” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 142. Band, Heft 3–4 (1999): 391. 177 Cf. De Anima III. 4. 429a27, on the soul as tovpo" eijdw~n, and also In Parmenidem 930. 11: tovpo" gaVr aujtw`n [i.e., tw`n ijdew`n] ejstin oJ nou`". 178 A. F. Lossev, “Commentary on Proclus’ Treatise The Elements of Theology,” in The History of Antique Aesthetics, the High Classics (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1974) [Прокл, Первоосновы Теологии; перевод и примечания А. Лосева. История античной эстетики, высокая класика. Москва, «Искусство», 1974], 448.

Those “monads and numbers” must be taken as atomic units—for otherwise there will be an infinite regress and, hence, nothing to be circumscribed for the idea of “hundred.” I shall return to this question in more detail in the next chapter. 179

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI how the One gave Its property to all—both to each of the parts and to the wholeness (Commentaries, prop. 1. 11. 15–20).

Shortly below Petritsi writes that this participation in unity is possible for everything through the “unitary limit”: “Everything has both its wholeness and parts from the One, and all are circumscribed by the unitary limit” 180 (Commentaries, prop. 1. 15. 34–36). Limit in Petritsi’s system is explicitly identified with a hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, the Son. In his commentary on prop. 29 he alludes to St. Paul, who called the Son the image of the One 181 (here again the One is identified with the Father), and, Petritsi so continues, the philosopher (Aristotle) calls this firstborn Word, which precedes all beings and henads “the idea of ideas” (Commentaries, prop. 29. 78. 8–15). In the following commentary again Petritsi returns to Limit, the “first Number and the head of ideas,” citing Socrates’ words at the start: “‘The first measure measured all and the First Limit limited all,’ 182 and we have just [that is, in the previous commentary] called that Limit the Son.” 183 We also read that “the First Word of the One established the ideas in the dimension of eternity,” the latter meaning the realm of ideas (Commentaries, prop. 24. 68. 6–7). All the corporeal ideas are just reflections of lights issuing from the “head of ideas Here Petritsi uses the term in a general sense, rather than speaking explicitly about the metaphysical entity Limit. That is why I refrain from writing “limit” in capital characters—although, metaphysically speaking, the last choice would also have been warranted, since the transcendent One imposes unity upon all through Limit, which is immanent in the particular henads. 181 Cf. 2 Corinthians 4. 4: “Who is the image of God”; Colossians. l. l5: “Who is the image of the invisible God.” 182 Cf. Philebus 25b: “And what of… anything else which has the ratio of number to number, or measure to measure? All these, I believe, we should do well to reckon as in the class of Limit.” Here I use the English translation by A. E. Taylor: Plato, ‘Philebus’, ed. R. Klibanski, trans. A. E. Taylor, Plato: ‘Philebus’ and ‘Epinomis’ (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1972). Cf. also Philebus 64d–e (where Socrates says that no mixture can be sustained if it lacks measure) and Laws Book IV, 716c4: “In our eyes God will be the measure of all things.” Here I use the English translation by R. G. Bury: Plato ‘Laws,’ ed. and trans. R. G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). However, the last two passages do not apply directly to the pevra". 183 In the identification of the metaphysical Limit with the Son, Petritsi may have been influenced by Patristic sources. For instance, in his Ambigua ad Iohannem St. Maximus Confessor refers to Christ as the o{ro", periochv and pevra" of beings (PG 91, 1400 B12 – C6). 180

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[Limit] that is born from the One as One and as the Principle of henads” (Commentaries, prop. 41. 98. 18–20). When those lights draw back and diminish, matter darkens and changes one shape into another. Limit, whose attributes are the “Head of the Ideas,” “Supra-Idea,” “Idea of Ideas” and “First Idea,” should be distinguished from the True Being, which is called “Place of Ideas,” “First Intellect,” “Sky of Intellects” and “the First Essence” (in contrast to Limit and the henads, which are supra-essential). Limit constructs henads, and the henads in turn, by mutual participation, form the pattern of the True Being, the union and the unity of all the ideas. According to this model, Limit (together with the henads) clearly transcends the sphere of ideas. From this perspective, the term “Idea of Ideas” appears to be not just a random superlative; rather, it bears the distinct meaning that Limit is the ratio or the Principle of the ideas. iii. Infinity If the One and Limit are the Father and the Son respectively, it is only plausible to suppose that Infinity, which has a parallel ontological status to Limit, refers to the Holy Spirit. 184 Although Petritsi never makes this identification explicit, the text provides good grounds for this assertion. In fact, Infinity appears as the Principle of multiplication and birthgiving (Commentaries, prop. 151. 178. 18–19; prop. 152. 179. 4–5). In contradistinction to Limit, which is the “paternal cause,” Infinity is the “maternal source” and “the infinite power for the multiplication of all things” (Commentaries, prop. 152. 179. 4–6). Unlike Limit, Infinity is the Principle of even (artios) henads. Alluding to Pythagoras, Petritsi says that “two [even] is always a cause of infinity, whereas three is a cause of limit” 185 (Commentaries, prop. 152. 177. 7–9). In contrast to Limit, which is the shaping and, so to 184 In order to maintain the Trinitarian model, Petritsi makes Limit and Infinity parallel Principles. In this he differs from Proclus, who posits Limit explicitly above Infinity (cf. Th.Pl. III. 8. 32. 2–5); also, In Timaeum I. 176. 6 – 177. 2: kaiV mhV [diav]

tou`ton oijhqw`men toVn lovgon, o{ti dhV taV" ajrcaV" tw`n pragmavtwn dih/rhmevna" qetevon, kaiV gaVr taV" duvo tauvta" sustoiciva" oJmognivou" famevn: prohgei`tai gaVr toV e}n aJpavsh" ejnantiwvsew", wJ" kaiV oiJ Puqagovreioiv fasin. ajll– ejpeiV kaiV metaV mivan aijtivan hJ duaV" tw~n ajrcw~n ajnefavnh, kaiV ejn tauvtai" hJ monaV" kreivttwn th`" duavdo". 185 In Pythagoras’ teaching, “two” was a symbol of difference, division, whereas “three” was one of perfection, for three components—beginning, middle and end—make a thing perfect. See Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras; the edition used here is Porfirio ‘Vita di Pitagora,’ ed. Giovanni Reale (Milan: Rusconi, 1998), §§. 49– 51, 176–178.

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say, status-giving source, the First Infinity is the dynamic Principle, the cause of ceaseless change. 186 In his commentary on prop. 29 Petritsi speaks about the two causes of derivation of effects from their causes—likeness and difference. The “likeness” in this passage applies to the First Limit, and in the “difference” that is the “birth-giving cause” (Commentaries, prop. 29. 79. 4) by virtue of which each of the series is differentiated and multiplied (as stated in the following ten lines), we can recognize the First Infinity. The same thought recurs in the commentary on prop. 125, where we read that henads proceed through the two causes, that is, likeness and difference, of which the first is the one that sustains the effects within their causes, while the second is the “multiplier” (Commentaries, prop. 125. 163. 15–19). Petritsi constantly calls the First Infinity “power”: it is a “nondiminishing and limitless power” (Commentaries, prop. 10. 37. 20) and the “analkestati power, ceaseless by virtue of its infinity” (Commentaries, prop. 90. 145. 12). It seems strange that Petritsi characterizes Infinity with the Greek adjective analkestati, which in fact means “the most powerless.” A clue to the reason for this might be found in the philosopher’s discourse about the One or the Good; he makes an allusion to the Timaeus 187 and states that the One poured itself out like an overfilled cup, 188 with the purpose of enabling others too to have a share in Its goodness, for “Goodness is free of envy, and It is not to be confined; and the reason why it cannot be confined is its powerlessness, that is to say, its transcending [all] powers,” (emphasis mine) (Commentaries, prop. 25. 68. 26–30). The usage of “powerlessness” in a laudatory sense probably points to the fact that any power has a measure, and measure is a limitation that does not apply to the One. Thus “powerlessness” seems to imply that the One acts without effort, for which an analogy could be provided in the effortless shining of the sun. In this light the adjective analkestati with reference to Infinity can be interpreted as “the most effortless.” At this point it seems that we encounter a clear superiority of the One over Infinity: the One is absolutely “power-free,” while the First Infinity is already a power, albeit an analkestati power. The First Infinity appears to be the “first power,” generating the series of infinite powers: “The first infinite power excels all other powers, the latter having their existence by virtue of 186 Cf. e[sti deV kaiV qeiva duaV" duvnami" a[peiro". zwh`" provodo" ajnevkleipto". See “New Fragments from Iamblichus,” ed. D. J. O’Meara, 39. 187 Timaeus 29e. 188 See Enneads V. 2 [11]. 1. 8–9: oi|on uJpererruvh kaiV toV uJperplh`re9 aujtou` pepoivhken a[llo.

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the former” (Commentaries, prop. 90. 143. 31–33), but the One, as Petritsi emphasizes, is higher than any series, thus over and above being the first (cf. Commentaries, prop. 56. 123. 17; prop. 60. 127. 20), 189 and thus, also over and above the series of powers. As we have said, Petritsi never identifies the First Infinity with the Holy Spirit directly, but in the Epilogue, where he writes about the vision of the Trinity in the Psalms, he refers to the Holy Spirit in a language very similar to that applied to the First Infinity in the commentaries. The specific, personal characteristic of the Holy Spirit in the Epilogue is “power.” At the very beginning of the Epilogue Petritsi states that the Father “will give us the kingdom of His hand, which is the Son, and will communicate to us the power that proceeds from Him, which is the Spirit” (Epilogue, 207. 16–17), or, in another passage, states that “the ‘power’ denotes the transcendent Holy Spirit, which gives holiness to the heavenly powers” (Epilogue, 210. 8– 9). In the commentaries Petritsi describes the First Infinity as “the nondiminishing power for the preservation of beings” (Commentaries, prop. 90. 143. 2–3), and in the Epilogue as follows: “The essence of the beings is preserved and maintained in the Son by the Spirit of God, which is Power” (Epilogue, 210. 8–14). The two ultimate Principles—Limit and Infinity—permeate the whole universe; their activity starts on the level of the henads, then proceeds to the True Being, which possesses “infinite power as established by the First Infinity, and is one, but not a particular idea, given that it is unified and perfected by the First Limit” (Commentaries, prop. 89. 142. 19–22). From there on the two sources go down to the intellects and intelligent beings, to souls, to nature and finally to corporeal (bodily) essences (Commentaries, prop. 159. 180. 29 – 181. 3). For instance, Infinity is present in perishable beings in their faculty of reproduction, and it is perceived even in the prime matter, insofar as it is something deprived of all limits (Commentaries, prop. 94. 144. 30 – 145. 2). Every essence should contain those two elements, but in some of them the infinite Principle prevails, in others the limiting Principle. For example, each of the henadic numbers must participate in Limit, for the very essence of number is the imposition of limit on an indefinite multitude of units, but some henads (the even numbers) are of the genus of Infinity, while the others (the odd numbers) are of the genus of Limit. This pattern As we have noted in the previous chapter, for Petritsi the adjective “first” implies that an entity is first among other entities in the same rank, on the same level, without transcending this level (cf. Epilogue, 219. 16–18). 189

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goes down to the corporeal essences; even among the four qualities of the elements two are passive and two active: heat and coolness are active and forming Principles, which means that they are of the paternal and limiting genus, whereas humidity and dryness are receptive and maternal, and hence belong to the genus of Infinity (Commentaries, prop. 152. 177. 9–15). Finally, the prime matter has also a certain kind of limitation, being confined in the “fetters of Unity” (Commentaries, prop. 57. 124. 12), while it is infinite as deprived of any definable essence. Below I provide a summary list of the properties and faculties applied to Limit and Infinity in the text of the commentaries: Infinity Limit similarity/identity difference odd even paternal maternal definition/unification multiplication/division rational (principle of ideas) dynamic (principle of powers) active passive iv. The Unitary Triad: Different Functions of the One, Limit and Infinity In this chapter I shall describe the specific roles of the One, Limit and Infinity, and also try to shed light on some aspects of Petritsi’s doctrine of causation. In prop. 35 Proclus speaks of three indispensable aspects of the existence of a series: remaining (mevnein), proceeding (proievnai) and reverting (ejpistrevfein). Petritsi discusses these three aspects in several commentaries (those to props. 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, etc.). He relates the first two—remaining and procession—to Likeness (Limit) and Difference (Infinity) respectively. He seems to contradict Proclus, insofar as in prop. 29 Proclus says that “it is likeness that generates the product out of the producer,” 190 whereas Petritsi says that “Likeness does not generate the products, but rather maintains their property and identity” (Commentaries, prop. 29. 78. 35 – 79. 2). This contradiction is only apparent, because Petritsi explains that it is not the case that Likeness generates, but rather that generation is accomplished through or by means of Likeness. Its specific faculty, though, is to keep the effects within their causes: “That which maintains the property and identity unmoved is different from the cause that multiplies.” Furthermore, Likeness “assimi190

This is Dodds’ translation. See Dodds, op. cit., 35.

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lates the effect to its cause and in no way separates the one from the other” (Commentaries, prop. 29. 79. 13–14). Procession, which is the same as generation, is possible and is the result of the activity of Difference—the opposite cause. Were it not for the differentiating cause, the effect would have always remained in the cause as “a property in its identity” (Commentaries, prop. 30. 80. 8); that is to say that it would have been viewed only kat’ aitian, in its cause, or in accordance with it or according to it. Each entity appears kath’ hyparxin, in a proper or emphatic way, only when separated from its cause through Difference, and that is why each effect is more multiple than its cause, for it contains both Likeness (with/in its cause) and Difference. Petritsi argues that when an effect is still within its cause “the one [that is, henad] of the cause is not bent and multiplied” (Commentaries, prop. 30. 80. 8–9). This sentence indicates the central role of henads in the process of causation. Namely, the separation of the effect from cause (in other words, the procession) corresponds to the procession of henad from henad. This interpretation seems warranted, for Petritsi’s text provides sufficient evidence that the causation of beings corresponds to that of henads. For example, Petritsi clearly speaks about the hierarchical, causal relations among the beings and among the henads that form the centers, or certain identities of those beings: Those henads that shine in the True Being are most divine, as is also the essence of the True Being Itself, and after the True Being the henads spread again and again, and originate beings, and in the way in which there is a hierarchy among the beings, there is also a similar hierarchy among the henads engrafted in them (Commentaries, prop. 164. 184. 9–10).

As there are universal and particular beings, so too are there henads universal and particular: “The particular intellect participates in the highest One through the Universal Intellect and its own particular henad” (Commentaries, prop. 109. 153. 25–28). Thus the statement that before the intervention of Difference the “one [henad] of the cause is not multiplied” indicates the causal relations between more universal and particular henads. To provide an example, let us project a figure of a cone. We can “multiply” this figure by vanes and thus get a figure of a windmill. Cone and windmill are already two distinct entities (cf. henads). Of course, it is not a very precise image, for we added vanes to the cone from outside, but each of the henads is composed by Limit and Infinity, and by virtue of the latter each one has the cause of multiplication within itself. The example may also be demonstrative of the reason why the simpler causes (henads) are more universal: to a cone we can add not only vanes but also a handle and obtain a form of

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a certain vessel, or a stick and get a form of an umbrella, but the form of a windmill has already fewer opportunities for further augmentation or transformation. The universal causes (henads), according to Petritsi, precontain the particular ones. That is why the One, which, as we read, has all numbers within Itself, appears to be the most universal henad, being called “the monad of henads” (Commentaries, prop. 21. 59. 16). All the monads, heads of the series in the lower degrees of reality, should have as their centers or kernels the similar universal henads. For example, Petritsi says that the center or henad of the True Being is the One Itself and all the other monads are also established by the One, yet through the aid of the higher adjacent monad. In the same way, Universal Soul is established by the One through the True Being (the Universal Intellect), the First Nature by the One through the first Soul, the first Body (Sky) by the One through the first Nature (Commentaries, prop. 40. 95. 5–8). The higher monads serve the lower ones as certain filters that mitigate the power of the One, adjusting it to the lower ontological levels. The monads act as gods of their own series, so the True Being, the first existent monad, appears as “a god for all that exists” (Commentaries, prop. 160. 181. 14–15); the sky, the first body, acts as a god for all that is corporeal (Commentaries, prop. 165. 181. 14–15). The monads are thus substitutes for, and representatives of, the One on their ontological levels, all of them having one common feature in precontaining, or foreshadowing, all the different members, different properties manifested in a stretch of the series under their sway, although in a unitary and undifferentiated way. In these terms, for instance, white may be considered as a monad of spectral colors, containing all of them in an undifferentiated way. Those universal causes are different according to their power and their degree of purity, which suffer a gradual decline due to their alienation from the One. The differentiation of the properties that are still indistinguishable in the monads coincides with the procession of the series the cause of which is Difference. As Petritsi says, Had it been so that the cause [i.e., the monad] only remained in itself, then the procession of the series would not have started and the particular beings would not have been formed, 191 whereas if the effect sepaLiterally: “The monads of the beings will not be appropriated.” This sentence means that without procession the different properties will remain in their monad in a unitary way and will not be revealed in particular beings. The term “monads” in this sentence does not have a technical meaning as the head of a se191

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rates from the cause the separation will be simultaneous with the procession

and further, [the effect] will be both similar and other—similar through Likeness, and other through Difference (Commentaries, prop. 35. 87. 33–34).

We read also the following: “Were it not for the differentiating cause and power, neither the series of henads nor the series of beings could have been maintained” (Commentaries, prop. 29. 79. 9–10). Here comes a crucial metaphysical reminder: in Proclus’ and Petritsi’s system the multiplication of, and separation from, a cause does not annihilate the cause itself—unlike a seed, which is annihilated at the very moment that it starts to grow—but the cause, while it engenders its effects, remains in itself unchanged. Both the cause of remaining (Likeness) and the power and cause of engendering and multiplication (Difference) are within the One Itself, as well as within all the monads that are the imitators of the One. We have already quoted Petritsi’s statement that “the Odd [Limit] and the Even [Infinity] are in the One in a state of supra-power.” Similarly, all the monads subsist by virtue of these two causes: “The center [i.e., the henad] of the true Being is the One Itself, and those two causes of the beings [Limit and Infinity] are means consubstantially [that is, consubstantially with the One]” (Commentaries, prop. 10. 37. 22–24); that is to say that they are means for the procession of the series. Petritsi repeats the same thought in the Epilogue: When the One starts generating numbers the two [even] serves as a means for It [the One], because It has been set in motion, while the three is the Principle of the generation of other numbers. Therefore two is not a number, but a means for the One, and so is three [a means], for the latter is the Principle of the generation of numbers (Epilogue, 216. 21–24).

Petritsi also mentions three aspects by which the monads on their ontological levels imitate the One: a) by birth-giving; b) by giving properties to units within a number; c) by giving to the different members of the series participation in one another and by providing a synthesis to the whole series (Commentaries, prop. 21. 60. 20–25). We can attribute the first faculty to Infinity (Difference), and the second faculty, that of giving property to units ries, but rather denotes different particular members of a series. I have chosen to make a simplified translation, without—I hope—damaging the meaning.

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within a number, to Limit (Likeness), while the last faculty, that is, the unification of the whole series, pertains to the transcendent center of the monad that has the same function for its own series that the transcendent One has for all series. The last faculty characterizes only monads, whereas other, subsequent, causes in the series also possess the two other faculties: in fact, their centers (henads) are already more or less particular, for which reason they cannot embrace the whole of a seirav (Greek for “series”), but since they also contain Limit (Likeness) and Infinity (Difference)—the One having created all essences through a unification of these two Principles (Commentaries, prop. 90. 143. 9–16)—they can both remain in their identity and produce their effects. Now we have arrived at a crucial metaphysical moment concerning the simplicity of the One: in fact, if the essential feature of the One or the Good is to give birth, and if to say “give birth” is just another way to say “proceed,” and if procession and causation are necessarily rendered possible by Limit and Infinity, then both of them must be parts of the essence of the One Itself, so that the One cannot at all be imagined in separation from them. That is why Limit and Infinity are also called “powers of the One.” The analogy of a point, a line and a triangle—adduced also by Petritsi in the Epilogue as a geometrical analogy for the Trinity 192—is most appropriate: the point (cf. the One) has potential for infinity, because two points will make a line, which is the model of infinity in that it has infinite potential for continuation in both directions (and that is why the number two must be related to infinity); the point also has the power to impose limitation, for the third point will necessarily curb the line’s infinity by the creation of a triangle, which is the first geometrical figure and the first model of complete finality. In fact, nothing can be added to a triangle, because if it is, we will not “continue” the triangle—instead there will be “a triangle and something else”—whereas when we add something to the line it is simply continued and still remains a line. This is also why the number three must be related to Limit. Now, the point itself is neither a line (Infinity) nor a triangle (Limit), but has in itself the potential to be both. Thus Petritsi’s statement that Limit and Infinity are in the One, each in the mode of a “supra-power,” can be understood in these terms. The One appears to be a kind of a hypermixture of Limit and Infinity—although Petritsi, to be sure, never uses the

192 Although not in the same terms as I will use them now, because in the Epilogue Petritsi compares the line to the Son, and the surface to the Spirit.

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term “mixture” in relation to the transcendent One—and only in this sense are the monads, which are mixtures proper, Its images. 193 Limit and Infinity are inseparable Principles: “Neither is Likeness without Difference nor Difference without Likeness” (Commentaries, prop. 35. 88. 1–2). This inseparability is necessary, because any effect is a multiplication of the cause, which means that it contains both elements, that of Likeness and also an additional, differentiating one. However, the specific cause of multiplication is not Likeness but Difference. For the sake of clarity let us use the following example: when a man becomes a drunkard he retains the element of man and gains also an additional element, that of a drunkard. The latter cannot be completely split from the man, and indeed should remain in him, for nothing but a man can be a drunkard. 194 But it is not manhood (cf. Likeness) that makes a drunkard, but rather habitual drinking (cf. Difference). It is from this perspective that we can understand Petritsi’s assumption that “the essence of each effect is grounded and fixed like a motionless pole within its cause” (Commentaries, prop. 35. 87. 26–27): a differentiating element can be added only to a subsisting identity. Finally, after the procession of the series through Likeness and Difference there remains the need for a unification of the appropriated, particular members of the series. This unification is accomplished through reversion, the third process. Just as Likeness and Difference were the specific causes of remaining and procession respectively, so it could be said that the specific cause of reversion is the transcendent One. Talking about the monads as counterparts of the One, Petritsi states that only such a “transcendent

According to Dodds’ analysis of Proclus’ commentaries on the Timaeus, the causes of monhv (remaining), provodo" (procession) and ejpistrofhv (reversion) are respectively related to pevra" (limit), ajpeiriva (infinity) and miktovn (mixture). Dodds, op. cit., 278. This pattern is very similar to that of Petritsi, with the difference that in Petritsi’s system the first mikton, or better, the supra-mikton, causally and transcendently containing Limit and Infinity, seems to be the transcendent One Itself. 194 This should be reminiscent of the earlier example of a father, whose manhood may be essential to his fatherhood but cannot be considered separately as a relational property when the father is considered in relation to his son—however, here we are looking at a property that could be considered to be intrinsic or nonrelational (assuming that drunkenness is considered as a state in its own right and not merely as it is in the next line, as a saturation with a substance with its own extrinsic and relational properties of inebriating an imbiber) and we are not considering the drunkard under a description. 193

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One 195 of each series makes their multitude one, that is, unifies the properties of numbers” (Commentaries, prop. 23. 65. 18–20). The monad gives unity to its whole series and conditions the different particular terms to belong to the same series, in this way imitating the transcendent One, which unifies all the series. In the process of reversion Likeness again plays a crucial role, because reversion, according to both Proclus and Petritsi, is accomplished through Likeness. Let me adduce here Petritsi’s explanation: Proclus says that Likeness is the means for the origin of the engendered from their engenderer and states that the birth of an effect from its cause and its reversion to the cause are both conducted through Likeness, for Likeness is the cause of both generation and reversion towards the origins (Commentaries, prop. 29. 77. 35 – 78. 5).

Here it is appropriate to mention Petritsi’s theory of the “three Ones” in explaining props. 23 and 24. Again, in this explanation Petritsi takes the hypothetical statements of the Lycian philosopher as valid ontological statements. In prop. 23 Proclus maintains the imparticipability of the monads of each series, rejecting both the idea that a monad can be participated in by any particular member of its series (toV deV metecovmenon pa`n, tinoV" genovmenon uJf– ou| metevcetai, deuvterovn ejsti tou` pa`sin oJmoivw" parovnto" kaiV pavnta ajf– eJautou` plhrwvsanto". toV meVn gaVr ejn eJniV o]n ejn toi`" a[lloi" oujk e[stin) and the idea that it is multiple and viewed in all (ajllaV toV meVn ejn pa`sin o]n merisqeVn eij" pavnta, pavlin a[llou a]n devoito tou` toV merisqeVn eJnivzonto").

But both statements that are rejected by Proclus are reaffirmed as true metaphysical statements by Petritsi, who, out of Proclus’ words, creates his own theory of the “three Ones”: [Proclus says] “Either it is in all, or in one of all, or prior to all”—we need to scrutinize this theory: Proclus says that the One is viewed in three ways: first, as prior to all; second, as in all, that is to say, dispersed and divided in all; third, as preserving each number in its [i.e., the number’s] own order and viewed in its properties, as in “two-ness,” “threeness,” “six-ness,” “seven-ness,” that is to say, in only that numerical monad in which it is present. Now, see that the One that is divided to all cannot unite and gather the whole composition of series, because It

195 In this sentence “the transcendent One” is used in a relative sense, standing for a monad.

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is Itself divided to all through katakermatisis. 196 But such a One, which is divided in all and dispersed in all, can unite neither Itself nor, moreover, the others. Again, neither can the One of proper [entities] gather and unite the whole series, because it is appropriated by particular monads, such as “six,” “seven,” and so on. Therefore, it is necessary that there be the One prior and transcendent to all, which can both remain in Itself without diminution and also produce others (Commentaries, prop. 23. 64. 23 – 65. 10).

In the next chapter Proclus establishes a threefold hierarchy of the imparticipable, the participated (in) and the participating, of which the first is one, the second is one-and-not-one, and the third is not-one-and-one. Petritsi sticks to his theory of the “three Ones” also in the explanation of this proposition: “In the previous chapter Proclus divided the One into three and said that the two Ones derive from the transcendent One.” He then proceeds to explain Proclus’ statement toV mevn ejstin e}n proV tw`n pollw`n: toV deV metecovmenon ejn toi`" polloi`", e}n a{ma kaiV oujc e{n: toV deV metevcon pa`n oujc e}n a{ma kaiV e{n in the following way:

[Proclus says] “There is the One prior to all, and another One participated [in] in all, which is simultaneously one and not one”—that is to say, that which is sown in and dispersed among many—“while the participants are not one and one.” You have heard that the One can be viewed in three ways: the One transcending all, staying beyond the whole dimension of numbers, neither participating in anything higher nor giving participation to anything lower so that It would become proper to it; 197 there is another One in the multitude, co-divided with the multitude and still another One viewed only in the properties of each [particular entity]. Therefore, they have appropriate names: the first “transcending the many,” the second “within the many” and the third the One “in the properties of the ideas,” which [ideas] the First Word of the transcendent One established in the dimension of eternity (Commentaries, prop. 24. 67. 31 – 68. 7).

196 Cf. Parmenides 144B-C: katakekermavtistai a[ra [hJ oujsiva] wJ9 oi|on te smikrovtata kaiV mevgista kaiV pantacw`9 o[nta; or, rather, 144 E: toV e}n a[ra aujtoV kekermatismevnon uJpoV th`" oujsiva" pollav te kaiV a[peira toV plh`qov" ejstin.

That is to say, if It were participated in by any being, It would be particularly related to, indeed “appropriated” by, this individual being, and not be equally present in all. 197

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In the last quotation the third One, that of the proper entities, is related to the First Word, in other words the Son or Limit. 198 The First One, that One beyond all the numerical series, is clearly the transcendent One. And the “multiplied One” must be the First Infinity. Accordingly, we get a peculiar Trinitarian theory, a fact that was well intuited by one of the medieval readers of Petritsi—if the inscription does not belong to Petritsi himself—who has written a gloss on the margin of the page: “Learn about the Holy Trinity.” The entire theory of the “three Ones” seems to be a very laborious interpretation of the second hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides, where Parmenides discusses theories concerning the existent one (tov e}n o[n). In fact, Petritsi could have derived his “three Ones” from Plato’s distinction between three elements in the existent one: (i) one, (ii) existence and (iii) the other (through which the one is different from existence and vice versa). Moreover, in the immediate sequel each of the three is called one: eij deV e}n e{kaston aujtw`n ejstiv, sunteqevnto9 eJnoV" oJpoiouou`n hJ/tiniou`n suzugiva/ ouj triva givgnetai taV pavnta; (Parmenides 143 C-D). In the same discussion, Par-

menides speaks about “the one split up by existence,” which is “many and infinite in number”: toV e}n a[ra aujtoV kekermatismevnon uJpoV th`" oujsiva" pollav te kaiV a[peira toV plh`qov" ejstin […] ouj movnon a[ra toV o]n e}n pollav ejstin, ajllaV kaiV aujtoV toV e}n uJpoV tou` o[nto" dianenemhmevnon pollaV ajnavgkh ei\nai (Parmenides

144 E). Petritsi must have translated this one as his “multiplied One.” Next, Parmenides speaks of the one that is in each individual part of the whole: proV" a{panti a[ra eJkavstw/ tw`/ th`" oujsiva" mevrei provsesti toV e{n (Parmenides 144 C8–9), a one that Petritsi must have interpreted as his “One of proper [particular] natures.” This distinction is not, of course, Parmenidian, because for the latter the one that is divided and the one that is present in each part of the whole are identical—they represent, actually, the same grammatical subject: memerismevnon a[ra, ei[per mhV o{lon, a[llw" gavr pou oujdamw`" a{ma a{pasi toi`" th`" oujsiva" mevresin parevstai h] memerismevnon (Parmenides 144 D3–5). According to the last quotation, the one divided into parts is distinguished from the whole. However, in the following arguments Parmenides also identifies the one with the whole (cf. Parmenides 144 E10–145.A5; 145 C3– 4), saying that this whole includes all the parts, and since those parts are 198 Cf. “The proper natures are numbered by the First Number and Limit, which we have called the Son” (Commentaries, prop. 30. 81. 23–25), and “The First Limit, the first transcendent Idea of all ideas, defines, informs with idea and circumscribes everything in its proper property” (Commentaries, prop. 90. 142. 31 – 143. 1).

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one, and since also the whole is one, so one is included in one—that is to say, one will be in itself (Parmenides 145 C5–9) Shortly thereafter, Parmenides draws an elusive distinction between two perspectives on the whole: on the one hand, the whole as that which consists of all its parts, and thus commensurate with those parts, and on the other, the whole as that which is in something other than the parts of which it consists (and in fact, although Petritsi did not comment on precisely this passage in the Parmenides, if he had done so, it seems very likely that he would not have refrained from the Neoplatonist temptation to consider this whole in terms of “transcending its parts”): mhV o]n d– ejn plevosi mhd– ejn eJniV mhd– ejn a{pasi toi`" mevresi toV o{lon oujk ajnavgkh ejn eJtevrw/ tini ei\nai h] mhdamou` e[ti ei\nai; […] h|/ meVn a[ra toV e}n o{lon, ejn a[llw/ ejstivn, h|/ deV taV pavnta mevrh o[nta tugcavnei, aujtoV ejn eJautw`/

(Parmenides 145 D-E).

Petritsi could have interpreted the “whole one” (toV e}n o{lon), which comprises all parts and yet can also be distinguished from those parts, as his transcendent One, which unites the whole of the series in a transcendent way. Thus Parmenides’ dialectics could receive full ontological significance in Petritsi’s interpretation, carried out in a patently Proclian fashion. The identification of the “multiplied One” with the First Infinity raises a problem: if Infinity is the Principle of multiplication, how can it be the multiplied One Itself? It is helpful to remember that the number two is related to Infinity, which is not a number proper but, as Petritsi says, the “bending of the One.” That is to say that two, being the Principle of multiplication, is itself the One in a bent or multiplied mode. If we bend a sheet of paper in order to get two parts, we need two points between which the line that divides the two parts of the paper goes. Just as two divides the paper, and the parts of the divided paper are also two in number, so in the same way we can understand that Infinity both divides the One and is the divided One Itself. Our analogy should be supplemented with the metaphysical caveat that although the cause proceeds and becomes multiplied, nevertheless it remains changeless in itself; thus the One does not discard Its transcendent unity. Continuing our metaphor, we can project a gradual bending of the One into two, into four, and so on; from this process there arises a multitude of atomic units forming a kind of hyper-matter for Limit to construct first of all the henadic numbers, which are therefore the “created ones” (Commentaries, prop. 2. 22. 1–2). How then can we avoid “negative infinity”? In fact, if bending is an infinite process, then we cannot get atomic units but we shall get some “nega-

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tive infinity” or “bad infinity” (to use the words of Hegel): total privation of unity, a total effusion in which nothing can be discerned. However, such “negative infinity” is avoided by the fact that the division of the One does not happen randomly, as if division were an independent destructive Principle, in which case division would have meant the annihilation of unity. On the contrary, the One is not annihilated but multiplied, due to the fact that the division itself is measured by the One, being Its self-unfolding and selfrevelation. Limit should not only impose unity on the units that emerge after the division/procession of the One, but necessarily should also govern the process of division, and thus in a certain sense must be prior to Infinity—although Petritsi, apparently in order to preserve the ChristianTrinitarian view, does not repeat this fundamental point of Proclus. To sum up, Limit unites the units that arise with the division of the One in systematic constructions in which there is no more infinite division, the Heraclitean balance and tension of structure preventing unity from being ruined. Perhaps we can make this clearer by means of a modern parallel, quoting a verse of the American poet Richard Wilbur, “Seed Leaves”: Here something stubborn comes, Dislodging the earth crumbs And making crusty rubble. It comes up bending double, And looks like a green staple. It could be seedling maple, Or artichoke, or bean. That remains to be seen. Forced to make choice of ends, The stalk in time unbends, Shakes off the seed-case, heaves Aloft, and spreads two leaves Which still display no sure And special signature. Toothless and fat, they keep The oval form of sleep. This plant would like to grow And yet be embryo; Increase, and yet escape The doom of taking shape; Be vaguely vast, and climb To the tip end of time With all space to fill, Like boundless Igdrasil That has the stars for fruit.

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But something at the root More urgent then that urge Bids two true leaves emerge, And now the plant resigned To being self defined Before it can commerce With the great universe, Takes aim at all the sky And starts to ramify.

The verse describes the tension and interplay between the plant’s striving for boundlessness on the one hand and the necessity of finality and definition on the other, and the finality is rendered in terms of the “more urgent urge” than the infinite striving, which may supplement our explanation of Proclus’ positing Limit as higher than Infinity. One more point for consideration. I have said that after the division/procession of the One there appear atomic units, which Limit unifies in proper numbers/genera. But it is probably wrong to think that those atomic units are uniform, that is to say, identical to each other—as they are in geometry, for instance, where a triangle and quadrangle are different figures, but in both the angular points (not the angles but the points themselves) between which the lines of their sides are stretched are completely identical. However, with the division of the One the units themselves cannot be such point-units; there is a difference: the first division of the One is two, Limit circumscribing two atomic units in the idea of “two-ness.” The “two-ness” proceeds and divides—while at the same time remaining unchanged in itself—and we get four atomic units unified by Limit in “fourness,” and so on. The atomic units of the “two-ness” must be different from the atomic units of the “four-ness”—just as the paper bent in two parts has bigger parts than the same paper bent in four parts. A lower number of partitions indicates a less dispersed and more unified power, so that each part of the structure will be more powerful than more multiple parts of their effects, as a sheet of white paper bent once has more white (and indeed more size) in each of its parts than a sheet of paper (of the same size) bent twice. 199 Accordingly, instead of speaking of “point-units,” it is rather more appropriate to speak of “power-units.” Those “power-units” are multiplied with each subsequent entity, until the point when the power This image must be corrected somewhat, for in the case of a sheet of paper the quantity of white will be the same in both papers (if of the same size), but in ontology a cause as a whole has more power than its effect as a whole. 199

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of each unit is so diminished that it can no longer be divided. It is precisely at this point that we reach the prime matter. This inner division and multiplication happens first on the level of the henads, and then in all other beings. As I have said, the division does not lead to “negative infinity,” because the world is finite, and there is no infinite, but only a limited procession, superseded by a reversion through love to the transcendent One. First of all each thing desires, and reverts to, its own identity, in other words its own essence or idea, which is the same as “longing for its own one (henad) given that each genus is a unity (one), and the longing for one’s own henad is at the same time longing for, and love towards, the transcendent One” (Commentaries, prop. 39. 92. 25–29). However, first each effect reverts to its immediate cause, in which the identity of the effect dwells in a higher mode, kat’ aitian. Petritsi says that for an effect to know its cause means to know its own property in a more exalted manner (Commentaries, prop. 167. 185. 27–32). No being can make a leap to the higher cause, bypassing its immediate cause, from which it has received its essence and wellbeing, for the “unlike” cannot revert to the “unlike,” just as a child cannot immediately become a man without first becoming an adolescent—a mean term that contains the elements of both. This is why Likeness is a necessary means for the reversion: “Whatever number of causes an effect has in its own series, it is through the same number of mean terms that it will revert to the first cause [here: the monad of the series]” (Commentaries, prop. 38. 91. 24–25). The beings first desire the monad of their series. But insofar as the ultimate cause is the One, all other causes, including the monads, may be considered as mean terms or intermediate causes: “No matter how many intermediate causes a being has, after each reversion it desires to revert with love again, and so on, up to the First Cause and the First Source” (Commentaries, prop. 38. 91. 28–30). It seems to me that this Petritsian scheme corresponds to F. M. Cornford’s opinion of the Pythagorean conception of the One and the many, namely that “the antagonism of the Many is harmonized and held together by philia (that is, the bond of kinship) in this unity” 200—the “unity” in this quotation applies to the ideal One, which in Cornford’s interpretation contains both elements, Limit and Infinity, corresponding, in fact, to Petritsi’s transcendent One. 200

Guthrie, op. cit., vol. I, 250.

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The immediate cause of reversion is love, or eros, 201 which acts through Likeness, for the unlike cannot desire the unlike (Commentaries, prop. 32. 83. 13–14). Likeness, however, is not just an instrumental cause in the reverting process—as a ticket is a mere instrumental cause of entering an opera house, the desire to listen music being the active cause—but is also the active cause: “The activity of Likeness is twofold: it maintains the effect within its cause and also instigates [draws] the effect to turn back in love towards its origin” (Commentaries, prop. 38. 91. 33–35). According to the last sentence, the beings ascend to the higher terms both by and through Likeness. Insofar as the henads are centers of each being (or “seeds of the One” in each being) it is through them that a being ascends to the final cause of reversion—the transcendent One: “When the effect participates in its cause first it participates in its own henad, through this henad it participates in higher henads and causes, and so on, and from henad to henad it returns to the One that is above the henads” (Commentaries, prop. 42. 101. 9–14). Petritsi alludes to Socrates, who said that eros is the “anagogic” power through which souls ascend to their Father, 202 and “through this blessed eros,” adds Petritsi, “all beings aspire to the Father of the beings” (Commentaries, prop. 31. 83. 5–8). In a way, reversion through love may be considered as a process of the effect’s overcoming its own particularity and of identifying itself with its causes, for as Petritsi writes, when beings are surprised by, and marvel at, the One, they discard their properties, being altogether preoccupied with the Goodness that is above eternity (Commentaries, prop. 32. 84. 25–28). Petritsi is more outspoken in adjusting Proclian metaphysics to his Christian, Trinitarian model in the Epilogue, where he attributes a Trinitarian confession to Plato himself (or, rather, to Plato as quoted from the Platonic Theology of Proclus). 203 In the Epilogue Petritsi repeats the traditional Trini201 In the commentaries, Petritsi, in reference to soul’s longing for the One or for the intelligible beauty, usually uses the word trpiali, which is a translation of ejfivetai and ojrevgetai, and only once the word sikhuaruli (Commentaries, prop. 15. 49. 32), which corresponds to the Greek ajgavph. 202 See Symposium 203–204a. 203 Petritsi is not a pioneer in claiming that the Trinitarian perception of God was present in pagan thought. For instance, Cyril of Alexandria maintains that the Trinity was known in an imperfect (oujc uJgiw`9) way also by philosophers. Commenting on a passage from Porphyry, fragm. XVI, [Acri triw`n uJpostavsewn thVn tou` Qeivou

proelqei`n oujsivan, ei\nai deV toVn meVn ajnwtavtw QeoVn tajgaqovn, met– aujtoVn deV kaiV deuvteron

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tarian interpretation of Psalm 36 (35): “In thy light shall we see the light” (Psalms 36 (35). 9). In this interpretation this means “In your Spirit shall we see the light—thy Son.” 204 At the same time Petritsi states that Plato—the summit of the philosophers and the myrrh of theology—in his Timaeus and Parmenides attunes his voice to King David: He [Plato] says: “The monad [or the One] moved from the origin and stayed [i.e., returned to stability] at three,” 205 where the monad denotes the Father, and the means for movement and procession denotes the Son, and the “returning to stability in three” applies to the Holy Spirit. 206 [Plato] also says “the One, the Being and the Power”; the “One” applies to God the Father, “Being” to the Son who comes out from the Father, for the Father brings about the entire fullness of His toVn dhmiourgovn, trivton deV kaiV thVn tou` kovsmou yuchvn, a[cri gaVr yuch`9 thVn qeiovthta proelqei`n, here cited from Porphyrii opuscula selecta, ed. A. Nauck (Leipzig: 1886), 14— Cyril in his Contra Julianum I. 47, 10–16, says the following: jIdouV dhV safw`9 ejn touvtoi9 a[cri triw`n uJpostavsewn thVn tou` Qeivou proelqei`n oujsivan ijscurivzetai ei|9 meVn gavr ejstin oJ tw`n o{lwn Qeov9, kateuruvnetai deV w{sper hJ periV aujtou` gnw`si9, eij9 aJgivan te kaiV oJmoouvsion Triavda, ei[9 te Patevra, fhmiV, kaiV UiJoVn, kaiV a{gion Pneu`ma, o} kaiV yuchVn tou` kovsmou fhsiVn oJ Plavtwn. Zwopoiei` deV toV Pneu`ma, kaiV proveisin ejk zw`nto9 PatroV9 di– UiJou`, kaiV ejn aujtw/` zw`men kaiV kinouvmeqa, kaiV ejsmevn, here cited from Cyrille

d’Alexandrie. Contre Julien, t. I, Livres I et II, ed. P. Burguière and P. Évieux, SChr 322 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1985), 200. Similar commentaries can be found also in Didymus’ De Trinitate (PG 39, 760 B). 204 That is how the Church Fathers St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil the Great had interpreted the passage. See Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 31. 3. 19–22, in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27–31 [Discours theologiques], ed. Paul Gallay and Maurice Jourjon, 280, and Basil the Great, De Spiritu Sancto, 18. 47. 12–17, in Basile de Césarée, Sur le Saint-Esprit, ed. B. Pruche, 412. 205 Cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 29. 2. 13–15: monaV" ajp– ajrch`" eij" duavda kinhqei`sa mevcri triavdo" e[sth: kaiV tou`tov ejstin hJmi`n oJ pathvr, kaiV oJ uiJov", kaiV toV a{gion pneu`ma: in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27–31 [Discours theologiques], ed. Paul Gallay

and Maurice Jourjon, 180. In the previous clause Petritsi alluded to Gregory’s Trinitarian interpretation of the Psalmic verse, and immediately in the next clause he, quite oddly, puts Gregory’s words in the mouth of Plato. Had he simply confused in his memory the Patristic and philosophical sources, or is there a more profound reason? 206 It is curious why Petritsi ascribes here, on the one hand, movement and procession to the Son and on the other, returning to stability and perfection to the Holy Spirit. In the commentaries it is just vice versa: the even number (two) is the cause of change, whereas the odd (three) is the cause of perfection and stability. It seems that in the Epilogue Petritsi conducts a looser metaphysical discourse than in the commentaries.

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divinity in the Son, as also my Paul accords to it, 207 and the “Power” applies to the Holy Spirit (Commentaries, prop. 209. 24 – 210. 1). 208

It is unclear whence Petritsi derives such identifications. Is it from his own mind, or does he follow a certain tradition? The source of this interpretation cannot be Michael Psellus, Petritsi’s possible teacher, because Psellus rejects the existence of Limit and Infinity as separate hypostases. 209 Neither can John Italus be considered as the source for Petritsi’s theory, because in Italus’ interpretation the Neoplatonic One is not only the Father but the Trinity. 210 Petritsi’s schematic and functional description of the Trinity—not only an assimilation but a total identification of the Christian dogma with a modified Proclian Neoplatonic scheme—does not seem to reflect the traditional Orthodox teaching. 211 207 208

Cf. Colossians 2:9. Cf. Th.Pl. III. 12. 44. 22 – 45. 12. and III. 24. 84. 20–23:

TriaV" ou\n ejstin au{th tw~n nohtw~n ajkrovth", toV e{n, hJ duvnami", toV o[n, toV meVn paravgon, toV deV paragovmenon, hJ deV ejxhrthmevnh meVn tou~ eJnov", sumferomevnh deV tw/~ o[nti. It is not un-

common for Petritsi to ascribe to Plato (and also to Socrates) the words of his remote successor. Of course, in this case Proclus interprets the Parmenides itself (142 B–C). Apparently, Petritsi takes the Proclian interpretation to be the meaning of Plato’s text. See also Th.Pl. III. 9. 38. 3–7, where Proclus speaks of the monad as having three aspects. 209 Psellus, Opusculum phil. 35: (PeriV qeologiva" kaiV diakrivsew" dogmavtwn JEllhnikw~n)=: Memavnteutai dev moi kaiV tou` kefalaivou touvtou hJ e[nnoia. &pavntwn* gavr fhsi &tw~n ejk pevrato" kaiV ajpeiriva9 uJpostavntwn prou>pavrcei kaq– auJtoV toV prw`ton pevra" kaiV hJ prwvth ajpeiriva: peperasmevna" meVn gaVr ou[sa" kaiV ajpeivrou" kaiV ajpoV tw`n hJmetevrwn logivwn memavqhka kaiV taV pevrata kaiV taV" ajpeiriva" ejn aujtoi`" toi`" peperasmevnoi" kaiV ajpeivroi" e[gnwka, pevra" deV kaiV ajpeirivan cwristaV w|n tau`ta ou[pw suneivlhfa, ejpeiV mhdeV fuvsin e[cei uJposth`nai tau`ta kaq– eJautav, in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II.

Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, 119, 14–20. Nicholas of Methone also criticizes on Christian grounds the Proclian theory concerning Limit and Infinity as self-standing principles: Pevra9 prw`ton kaiV ajpeiriva prwvth toV

qei`on, toV meVn wJ9 toV e}n kaiV pavnta eJnivzon kaiV sunevcon kaiV peratou`n, toV deV wJ9 uJpeVr pavnta kaiV mhvte tiniV tw`n o[ntwn mhvte a{ma pa`si periorizovmenon h] perigrafovmenon. e{teron deV paraV toV qei`on pevra9 h] a[peiron aujtoV kaq– auJtoV uJfestwV" oujdeVn e[stin, eij mhV scevsei tau`ta yilaiV kaiV dianoiva" ajnuvparkta ajnaplavsmata ejn toi`" ou\si parufistavmena kaiV plevon eij" toV mhV o]n h] toV o]n ajpoklivnonta (Refutation, 90). 210 Cf. John Italus: tou~to deV aujtoV (i.e., toV e}n) kaiV trisupovstaton lektevon, ajrrhvtw" a{ma kaiV ajkatalhvptw". Italus, op. cit., 156.

It is not by chance that one of the seventeenth-century readers of Petritsi’s commentaries, a certain Christephore, who, in the opinion of M. Djanashvili, is Katholikos Christephore Udrubegashvili, placed a leaf with his remark in one of 211

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Much more pleasant is Petritsi’s musical analogy in the Epilogue, with which I end this chapter: Our beloved [book] [i.e., the Psalms] is altogether a music embellished by the Holy Spirit, and in music there are also three phtongs, 212 that is to say, tonalities that make one whole. They are “mzakhr” [strained, high pitch], “jir” [middle] and “bam” [lower tension, bass], and all arrangements of strings and voices make a beautiful melody by those three, for any composition is beautiful through its irregularities. You would perceive the same in the number of the Holy Trinity, for we speak about the Father being unborn, the birth of the Son, the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the unity of the Nature, with the difference of the Hypostases. Similarly in different musical tonalities—“mzachr,” “jir” and “bam”—we perceive the unity of a whole (Epilogue, 217. 1–14).

the manuscripts of the commentaries, just on the page where Petritsi identifies the metaphysical Limit with the Christian Son: “Here Paul is born as a witness who said… The philosopher calls [Him] Limit of Limits and Idea of Ideas, as Paul calls [Him] the unchanging Image who has in Himself the richness of the Father. This chapter reveals the blasphemy even more.” See the introduction to Ioannis Petritzii. Opera. Tomus I, Procli Diadochi STOICEIWSIS QEOLOGIKH, versio Hiberica, ed. Simon Kaukchischvili, lxxii. 212 Greek: fqovggo9—“voice.”

4 THE HENADS 1. HENADS IN PROCLUS i. A Short Prelude Henadic theory is commonly regarded as a basic innovation in postPlotinian Neoplatonism. Although we find the first systematic presentation of the henadic theory in Proclus, the innovation does not seem to have originated from him. It was E. R. Dodds who first raised serious doubts as to whether Proclus could have been the author of the theory, on the grounds that Marinus does not say anything about it when treating Proclus’ personal contribution to the doctrinal development of the Athenian Neoplatonist school. According to Dodds, it is highly improbable that Marinus would have passed over such an important contribution in silence. Moreover, henads are found in Syrianus as well, and thus Dodds attributes this innovation to the latter. 213 Today the most important representative of this view is H. D. Saffrey. 214 Another candidate is Iamblichus, as suggested by John Dillon and after him H. J. Krämer, and recently Carlos Steel. 215 Henads play an important, even cardinal, role in the structure of Neoplatonist ontology, because they give an account of the connection between the transcendent One and the multiplicity of beings; as Dodds puts it, they bridge “the yawning gulf which Plotinus has left between the One and real-

Dodds, op. cit., 258. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, Th.Pl. III, op. cit., “Introduction,” ix-xi. 215 See the following: John M. Dillon, “Iamblichus and the Origin of the Doctrine of the Henads,” Phronesis 17 (1972): 102–106 (reprinted in Iamblichi in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973], 412–416); id., “Iamblichus and Henads Again,” 48–54; H. J. Krämer, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik (Amsterdam: P. Schippera, 1964); Carlos Steel, “Iamblichus and the Theological Interpretation of the Parmenides,” Syllecta Classica 8 (1997): 13–28; Gerald Bechtle, “Göttliche Henaden,” 358–391. 213 214

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ity.” 216 They are the Principles of immanence of the Unity in the world, the measuring Principles of everything that is not immediately one. Speaking about the structural role of the henads, we should not forget the following: henads are not simply auxiliary concepts devised by the human mind in order to maintain the consistency of metaphysical structures. Rather, they are at the same time gods, enjoying all aspects of divinity: eternity, changelessness, ultimate simplicity and self-subsistence. Proclus identifies them with the gods of the Greek pantheon, thus accomplishing a marriage of mythology and ontology; this marriage is indicated by the interchangeability of the terms “henads” and “gods” in Proclus’ vocabulary. On the one hand, by his henadic theory, Proclus converts the imaginative dimension of mythology into the “scientific” domain of ontology, but on the other he not only philosophizes about the henads, but also prays to them. His hymns and prayers to the henadic deities—Athena, Hermes, Zeus, et al—have been preserved for us. Furthermore, insofar as there is a presence of henads not only in the intelligible, but also in the visible world, and since Proclus grants full divinity to each of the henads, through the henadic theory we get a semipantheistic picture of reality, because there is a presence of the gods also in those material things that, according to Neoplatonism, are eternal—planets, stars, and so on. It is not a completely pantheistic picture, however, because in the lower material things there are no gods proper but—as we shall see later—only their echoings. 217 216 Dodds, op. cit., 259. Still, Dodds may not be right in denying the existence of a kind of a continuity between the One and the rest of reality in the system of Plotinus; one may note, for instance, the way that the latter speaks about an “intellectual power” (noeraV duvnami") which is not the One Itself, but runs around the One (periqeouvsh"); moreover, neither is this “intellectual power” the Intellect—rather, it acts as the archetype of the Intellect (Enneads VI. 8. 18. 25–30). On this issue, see the following: Werner Beierwaltes, Procklos. Grundzüge Seiner Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965), 380 ff.; G. J. P. O’Daly, Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1973); K. Corrigan, “Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being. A Reappraisal,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt 36/2 (1987): 973–993; Perczel, op. cit., 223–264. 217 C. J. de Vogel proposed the interesting idea that the development of the henadic theory may have been influenced by the Christian tenet concerning the divine immanence. He writes as follows: “I think, this development [i.e., of the henadic theory] may be due to the discussion with—or rather apology against, Christian theism: confronted with the Christian idea of an almighty Creator these Greek philosophers [i.e., Syrianus and Proclus] may have felt the need of formulat-

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In accordance with St. Athanasius, who distinguishes between different grades of pagan idolatry—from the worship of plants and animals to that of the stars—it may be said that, from the Christian point of view, Proclus was the noblest sort of idolater, because when he offered daily worship to the sun and the moon, he did not worship their visible, physical bodies, but rather the invisible Principles of their existence: the henads. In the following, before presenting Petritsi’s version of the henadic theory, I shall analyze and reflect upon (i) the henadic ranks in Proclus’ Elements of Theology, (ii) Proclus’ henads as Providential Principles and (iii) the nature of the henadic unity, namely how the henadic unity may act as a bridge between the supreme Unity and the multiplicity implicit in any being. ii. Henadic Ranks The henadic multiplicity consists of two basic orders: (prop. 64) the “selfperfect hypostases” or “self-completed hypostases,” the autoteleis hypostaseis (aujtotelei~" uJpostavsei"), which need no substrates for their existence, and the illuminations or ellampseis (ejllavmyei"), which are not gods proper, and need substrates for their existence. This should not be understood as meaning that some henads are not participated in by beings and stand apart, in the same way that some intellects are not participated in by souls and bodies and remain apart. 218 Rather, the self-perfect gods are not immediately participated in by any being. Dodds provides the following scheme of the henadic distribution: 219 ing more clearly the actual influence of the First Cause on everything derived from it. Thus, they may have reconstructed their system so as to offer a polytheistic counterpart to Christian monotheism.” C. J. de Vogel, “Some Reflections on the Liber de Causis,” Vivarium IV (1966): 76. Carlos Steel has a different theory on a possible Christian influence on the henadic theory: “Apart from its evident structuring role in the Neoplatonist system, it is probable that the focus on unity as the essential character of the gods must also be explained as a defence against the criticism of pagan polytheism by Christian intellectuals.” Steel, “Iamblichus and the Theological Interpretation of the Parmenides,” 19. 218 This point is not made explicit in Proclus. As Dodds notes, “Nor is Proclus always consistent about their [the henads’] participability; in the In Timaeum it is both affirmed of all henads other than the One (I. 226. 18) and denied of the supra-mundane gods (III. 204. 16 ff.).” Dodds, op. cit., 262. 219 Ibid., 282. The scheme’s top row shows the ranks of henads in accordance with the beings that participate in them. In fact the terms nohtaiv (“intelligible ones”), noeraiv (“intellectual ones”), uJperkovsmioi (“supra-cosmic ones”) and ejgkovsmioi

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toV e{n € eJnavde" nohtaiv € eJnavde" noeraiv € eJnavde" uJperkovsmioi€eJnavde" ejgkovsmioi     € meqevktw" o[n toV ajmeqevktw" o[n € meqevktw" o[n € meqevktw" o[n    q. nou`" meqektov" qei`o" nou`" ajmevqekto" € q. nou`" meqektov" €   qeiva yuchV ajmevqekto" € q. yuchV meqekthv  qei`on sw`ma

That there is a chain of such relations among the henads is stated explicitly in numerous propositions of the Elements of Theology (e.g., prop. 126). Henads are responsible for the specific forms of existence, while all things receive simple existence, the most general sort of existence, from the One. 220 Henads in this light appear as sieves or funnels that channel and particularize the unitary radiation of the One. The first particularization is conducted by the “paternal” ranks of the henads, which give simple existence a qualification of intellectual existence or psychic existence. By the feature of universality they hold the position of the One in their own series. Therefore, the paternal henads must be linked with the monads of the horizontal series: the Universal Being, the Universal Soul, and so on. To the next order belong the “demiurgic” henads, which provide a formal specification to the general existence that the paternal causes have bestowed on each order of the gods (props. 150 and 157). In this light, Dodds’ scheme— which, because of its most general and summary character, does not clarify all the difficulties connected with the question of the henadic hierarchy— should be supplemented by further qualifications. First, if there are different paternal henads related to the monadic beings, then there must be also different demiurgic henads related to particular beings with a demiurgic func(“intra-cosmic/intra-mundane ones”) rather indicate the character of the beings that participate in the henads, and not the henads in themselves. Thus, the “noetic”, that is, intelligible henads are not themselves intelligible, since they are by definition beyond any grasp of intellect, but bestowers of a divine quality on intelligible beings that participate in them. As Dodds nicely puts it, “Proclus’ intelligible gods are not nohtav but the transcendent source of what is divine in the nohtav; his intra-mundane gods are not aijsqhtav but the transcendent source of what is divine in the aijsqhtav.” Ibid., 283. I use the terms “supra-cosmic” and “intra-cosmic,” whereas Dodds prefers to add such prefixes to “mundane”: “supra-mundane” and “intra-mundane.” No additional or alternative nuance is intended. 220 In his commentaries on the Parmenides Proclus distinguishes between the aJplw`" e{n, that is, the transcendent One, and the e{n ti, that is, the henads (In Parmenidem VI. 1069. 21–23).

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tion in different hierarchical strata, and, similarly, also the “revertive” and “elevative” henads will be present on different levels of beings—for example, in intellectual and psychic series. Thus, if we present henadic ranks not in one horizontal stretch, as Dodds does, but in different horizontal series, they will look like the following (where “hi” stands for intellectual henads, and “hs” for psychic (soul) henads): hi(paternal) hs(p) -

hi(demiurgic) hs(d) -

-

hi(revertive) hs(r) -

hi(elevative)… hs(e)… etc.

The henads are as we read, Principles of particular properties revealed in beings. One henadic property is revealed differently on different levels (prop. 125): the further down we go in the ladder of being, the more multiple and dispersed the given property becomes. Thus the henadic property is one both in intellect and soul, yet the mode of manifestation of this property is different in them. For instance, a demiurgic supra-cosmic 221 henad (one of the eJnavde" uJperkovsmioi, as seen in Dodds’ scheme above) is not present in its relevant soul immediately but through the mediation of intellect, whereas a demiurgic noetic henad (one of the eJnavde" nohtaiv, as seen in Dodds’ scheme above) is present in its relevant intelligible intellect without the mediation of any other beings. Here follows another difficulty: the demiurgic henad of soul is still directly participated in by some lower, intellectual intellect (noeroV" nou`"), and only then is this intellect participated in by soul. But if, as we read in prop. 135, each henad is participated in without mediation only by one real-existent (Pa~sa qeiva eJnaV" uJf– eJnov" tino" metevcetai tw~n o[ntwn ajmevsw"), or as we read in the Platonic Theology, “neither are the beings more numerous than the henads nor the henads more numerous than the beings, but each procession of Being participates in one [henad]” (ou[te gaVr taV o[nta pleivw tw~n ejnavdwn, w{" fhsin oJ Parmenivdh", ou[te aiJ eJnavde" tw~n o[ntwn pleivou", ajll– eJkavsth provodo" tou~ o[nto" metevcei tou~ eJnov"), then it seems that the psychic demiurgic henad properly belongs not

to Soul, but to Intellect, which “touches” it immediately. Accordingly, following the enlarged Doddsian scheme, there will be two intellects that participate in demiurgic henads: the intelligible intellect that participates in a noetic demiurgic henad, and another, lower, intellect that participates in a demiurgic supra-cosmic henad. Then how will the soul be divine in the proper sense? Or how will any body be divine in the proper sense? As already mentioned in the notes above, I use the term “supra-cosmic” (and “intra-cosmic”) whereas Dodds prefers to add such prefixes to “mundane”: “supra-mundane.” 221

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A passage from Proclus’ In Parmenidem (VI, 1045, 9–18) seems to provide an insight into this difficulty. 222 In this passage we read that to the divine body of the sun there corresponds on the intelligible level the intellect of the sun. Primarily, the henad of the sun is established “before the intellect of the sun” (tauvth" deV th~" eJnavdo" proV tou~ nou~ hJliakou~ tetagmevnh"…). Let us call it “henad 1.” The offspring from this henad, which itself is “one” (e{n), is present as a seed (oiJ~on spevrma) in the intellect of the sun. Let us call it “ellampsis 1.” The intellect participates in the “henad 1” through its proper “ellampsis 1.” Furthermore, there is the second henadic offspring from the highest sun-henad in the sun-soul—the “ellampsis 2.” The sun-soul participates in the “henad 1” through its proper “ellampsis 2,” through the mediation of the intellectual “ellampsis 1.” And, finally, there is the ultimate offspring of the “henad 1” in the body of the sun as well; however, this offspring is the terminal manifestation, no longer called “one,” but only an “echoing” (cf. also prop. 129: diaV deV yuch~" ajphvchma th~" oijkeiva" ijdiovthto" kaiV tw/~ swvmati divdwsin). Here another problem arises: the “henad 1,” as we have seen, is not possessed directly by any being—neither by intellect, nor by soul, nor by body. Then, apparently, Proclus distinguishes among the unities a special rank, which is not directly participated in by beings and remains apart. It is precisely those indirectly participated unities that must be the aujtotelei`9 eJnavde9, autoteleis henades, that is to say the “self-completed henads” of prop. 64, 223 while all the other immanent unities are ellampseis. Thus even the highest intelligible beings participate in the god-henads not directly, but through their proper ellampseis. Therefore, none of the beings can be called properly “god,” but only the henads can: in Dodds’ words, “the henad is immediate deity, the intelligence is most divine, the soul divine, the body deisimilar” (prop. 129). 224 Accordingly, the picture of the henadic distribution is much more complicated than it seems in the way in which Dodds has presented it. As the passage from Proclus’ commentary In Parmenidem suggests, the H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink have corrected—on the basis of William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation—translated and analyzed this passage in Th.Pl. III, “Introduction,” lx-lxii. 223 In this proposition Proclus states that in the chain of being each monad originates two types of existences: (i) the self-complete existences, and (ii) “irradiations,” that is to say, those which have their existence in something other than themselves. The rule applies also to the One (which is the highest monad) and the series of henads that It originates. 224 Dodds, op. cit., 115. 222

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different modes of manifestation of the supreme henad (“henad 1”) in intellect and soul do not belong to the wholeness of this archetypal henad as its parts, and are not simply quasi-real reflections of it; rather, the duller manifestations—the ellampseis and the apechemata 225—are to be taken as the root Principles, or as the summits of different really-existent beings. Thus the Proclian ontological analysis of the sun-phenomenon presents us with three discrete ellampseis—the last of which could be classified as an apechemaellampsis—and one proper henad. Therefore, the henadic hierarchy could be viewed in this manner: a henad of the highest rank, let us say that of an intelligible intellect (nohtoV" nou~"), has only one ellampsis—the “one” of this intellect—whereas the lower henads have more such ellampseis. If we compare the henads to planets and their irradiations to satellites, it may be said that the “higher” planets have fewer satellites and the “lower” planets have more. As appears in the light of this analysis, it is not correct to say that the proper god related to the body of the sun, the intellect related to the body of the sun, and the soul related to the body of the sun are, respectively, the “henad of the sun,” the “intellect of the sun” and the “soul of the sun”—as if the sun were something more principal and the center to which the henad, the intellect and the soul would be related. Rather, we must call those entities “sun-intellect,” “sun-soul” and “sun-body,” all the three being distinct hypostases centered around their proper god—the “sun-henad.” The sun-body is a hypostasis distinct from the sun-soul, just as for Proclus the human body is a hypostasis distinct from the human soul. The only difference is that the sun-body always attends to the sun-soul, and that is why it is eternal. In fact, just as we do not say “the John of the portrait” (cf. “the henad of the sun”), but rather “the portrait of John” because man is more principal than his image, so also, when we say “sun,” we should think primarily of the sun-henad and not of the visible sun. The visible sun is only a final manifestation of the real sun-god. The visible luster of the sun is just a dim window beyond which there is hidden the greater invisible brightness of the psychic, the intellectual and the divine realities.

225 Greek: hJ ajphvchma—“an echoing”; this term describes an “outshining” of henadic illumination and its reflection in lower beings (cf. Elements of Theology, prop. 129, 114, 26–28); thus, the ajphvchma is not a proper henad but a “token” (to use a modern term derived from semiology that will be used twice later in different contexts, as will be seen) derived of its presence, just as, for instance, an emperor’s statue in Athens is not a presence of an emperor in Athens, but “an echoing,” a “token” of this presence.

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Accordingly, we can draw the following scheme of the revelation of henadic properties, where the “In” are those henads related to intellects (both intelligible and intellectual), the “Sn” are those henads related to souls, and the “Bn” are those henads related to bodies: 226 I1 I2 I3 I4 | | | | S1 S2 S3 S4 | | | | B1 B2 B3 B4 The scheme shows that the henads constitute not only a vertical hierarchy of particular properties, but also a horizontal hierarchy of more or less universal properties. For instance, the revertive property is more general than the elevative, because it includes self-reversion and reversion to the higher, whereas the elevative includes only the second. In the same way, the life-giving (zwogovnon) property is more specific than the generative property, and the purificatory more specific than the protective property. We must keep it in mind that henadic properties are not accidental but pertain to their supra-essence itself, because there is nothing adventitious in the henadic gods. The henads possess their properties causally and properly (prop. 118). The highest in them, which is goodness, constitutes their very existence (u{parxi9) or supra-essence (prop. 119). When the henads reach the corporeal (bodily) world, the henadic property, as we have seen, is revealed in a mode that cannot be called a proper henad, but only an apechema or ellampsis (prop. 129). In prop. 125 Proclus represents the revelation of a henadic property on different levels as the revelation of one henad. In the light of the previous consideration, this statement, I think, must be taken in the sense that there is the highest intelligible god-henad of, for instance, purification—abbreviated here as PIH— related to its relevant intelligible (nohtov") intellect. At the same time there is also a psychic (soul) god-henad of purification—abbreviated here as PSH— related to a soul through the mediation of an intellect, so that on the psychic level there is not a direct presence of the purificatory god in the soul that belongs to it, but only the presence of an irradiation. In fact, there are no proper gods on the psychic level; that is to say that souls do not possess The “n” in the “In” (“Sn” and “Bn”) is a variable; the numbers in this scheme indicate a horizontal succession of henads that corresponds to a horizontal succession within different strata of all reality, that is, a succession of henadic intellects, henadic souls and henadic bodies. 226

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gods directly. Therefore, the psychic revelation of the same divine purificatory property, that is, the “one” of the soul, must not be viewed as a separate henad. This psychic “one” may be viewed, in Proclus’ terms, as a seed sown in the soul (oi|on spevrma katabeblhmevnon) from the psychic henad proper—the PSH. Furthermore, we shall have also a corporeal (bodily) god-henad of purification—abbreviated here as PCH—revealed in body through the mediation of soul(s) and intellect(s). Thus we shall get the following hierarchical pattern, where the EPI(S or C)H stands for the Ellampsis of the Purificatory Intellectual (or Psychic / Soul, or Corporeal / Bodily) Henad: PIH → ↕ EPIH (in the intellect)

PSH → ↕ E1PSH (in the intellect) ↕ E2PSH (in the soul)

PCH ↕ E1PCH (in the intellect) ↕ E2PCH (in the soul) ↕ E3PCH (in the body)

Thus the revelation of the one highest purificatory intellectual henad—PIH—happens through the mediation of more particular purificatory henads—PSH and PCH—and of different ellampseis that are also in a hierarchical relationship. The psychic ellampsis or the psychic “one” can be considered as a tongue or procession from the divine fire of the PIH— through the mediation of PSH and E1PSH—“inflaming the soul and linking it to the [divine] intellect” (prop. 129), but still this fire is not a “part” of the PIH, but must be understood as a separate unity in soul—E2PSH. And so must be understood the unity in intellect—E1PSH. And neither the PSH nor the PCH is part of the supreme PIH, but the first two are also separate aujtotelei`9 eJnavde9, although generically belonging to the PIH because of the common P. Accordingly, beings of different levels—intellectual, psychic or bodily—related to the unique divine faculty of the highest purificatory henad—PIH—participate respectively in intellectual, psychic or bodily purificatory gods through their proper ellampseis that they directly possess, yet, roughly speaking, all participate in one highest henad of purification—the PIH.

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Furthermore, if the proper henads are the root principles and centers of the divine beings 227 (cf. prop. 144: kaiV pavnta ejndevdetai kaiV ejnerrivzwtai toi`9 qeoi`9 kaiV swvzetai diaV tauvthn thVn aijtivan) and those beings are participated in and echoed by the non-divine beings, the henads of the divine beings must also be echoed and viewed in the last, “profane” beings. And in order to maintain the ontological symmetry, those echoes of henads in the lower beings must also be considered as their centers and roots. That is to say that the apechemata of the henads are not like accidental lights for the lower beings, but the principal, seminal or causing lights within them. Thus, if the lower beings represent a reality different from the higher beings, so also their ellampseis or apechemata-centers are realities different from the henadic centers of the divine beings. Just as the moon is not a planet properly speaking but is the satellite of the earth, yet nevertheless represents a separate reality, so also the apechemata, while being not properly gods, nevertheless represent separate realities. Could we assert on this basis that when Proclus says in the Platonic Theology (Th.Pl. III. 3. 13. 4–5) that “before beings the One produces the henads of beings” (ProV tw`n o[ntwn taV9 eJnavda9 tw~n o[ntwn uJfivsthsi toV e{n), he also implies, on the basis of the ontological mirroring, that before the perceptible images—phantoms or “idols,” eidola (Greek: ei[dwla)—of the (real spiritual) beings, the One produces the seminal henadic echoes of those images? In fact, a careful observation reveals two kinds of ellampseis-apechemata: on the one hand the different supra-essential henads are manifested in the lower hierarchies in their vertical ellampseis, which form the kernel-unities of the divine intellects, the divine souls and the divine bodies. Let us call those ellampseis the “divine ellampseis,” directly (vertically) belonging to their supraessential sources. However, it is not only divine beings that constitute each level of ontology, but also non-divine beings, and those also must have as their kernel-unities the henadic ellampseis. Yet those ellampseis (let us call them “non-divine ellampseis”) are no longer connected to the supraessential henadic sources directly, but through the mediation of the higher divine beings of their own series. Thus in this case the connection of each being is first horizontal, to the divine being of its own level, and only then vertical, to the proper henad. Now, because intellects are less numerous than souls, and souls in turn are less numerous than bodies, the apportionThis should be taken with the caveat that henads are not immediately possessed even by the highest beings; rather, only the “participations” (taV metecovmena) of henads are possessed directly by beings. 227

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ment of the divine-proper on each ontological level will lessen with simultaneous increase of apechemata. Here is the rough scheme, where the white stars in black circles indicate proper henads, and the simple stars with black shading on their exteriors indicate the apechemata or ellampseis of henads in those beings that directly belong to them (that is, divine intellects, divine souls and divine bodies). The black stars stand for the subsequent ellampseis in those beings that are not properly divine (that is, non-divine intellects, non-divine souls, non-divine bodies). Intellectual henads: ›-›-›-›-Õ-Õ-Õ-Õ- Psychic henads: › - › - › - › - Õ- Õ- Õ - Õ - -  Encosmic henads: › - › - › - › - Õ - Õ - Õ - Õ -  -  -  As concerns the hierarchy of henads, Proclus mentions an interesting dialectic between the “transcendence” and “connection,” saying that the more a cause transcends its effect, the greater is the upward connection of the latter with the former (prop. 130); conversely, as the transcendence gradually diminishes, the effects have less upward connection with the causes, and those same effects, qua causes, have a greater downward connection with their own immediate effects. The following scheme shows this proportion: the “T” signifies the degree of transcendence of cause, the “UpC” the degree of upward connection of effect with the cause, and the “DwC” the degree of downward connection of the cause with its effect:

This may be compared to the situation of a scientist. The better he knows a subject of his interest, the more problems and mysteries the subject reveals to him, becoming in a way more transcendent, more removed from him, due to its complexity and the recognition of that complexity. Furthermore, a scientist in such a position will become more and more detached from those who have only a general grasp of the subject, and less and less interested in, let alone influenced by, this common knowledge. E. R. Dodds explains this prop. 130 in terms of immanence of, on the one

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hand, cause in the effect (through procession) and, on the other, effect in the cause (through reversion). There is always an interplay of this mutual cause-and-effect immanence, while the ratio of this interplay changes throughout the hierarchical chain of being. Thus, as writes Dodds, from the perspective of immanence of the cause in the effect, “the soul is more definitely ‘in’ the body, i.e., conditioned by it, than intelligence is ‘in’ the soul,” whereas from the perspective of immanence of the effect in the cause, “body cannot identify itself fully with soul in the manner in which soul can identify itself with intelligence.” 228 In the sense of ratio, then, it must be the case that the revertive powers of successive effects diminish to the advantage of the apportionment of the processive powers. And the last hierarchical point, curiously, is that, during reversion, the first term of a lower henadic rank reverts to the last of the higher rank, and hence the most universal of the second rank reverts to the most particular of the first rank. In the following scheme, the “IH” indicates the most universal paternal henad of the intellectual series, the “SH” the similar henad of the psychic series, and the “hn” the particular henads in each series: IH n h1 n h2 n h3 n h4 n hn

o SH n h1 n h2 n h3 n h4 nhn

As Proclus states in this proposition, this reversion is accomplished through the likeness of the first of the lower with the last of the higher (prop. 147. 130. 2–3). We must assume that this likeness of the “SH” to the “hn” of the higher series can be viewed only according to power and not according to a specific henadic function or property. This could be expressed also in the following terms: 1,0H - 1,1H1 - 1,2H2 - 1,3H3… 1,9H9 2,0h - 2,1h1 - 2,2h2… The 1,0H and the 2,0h stand for the monadic or paternal henads of, respectively, the intellectual and psychic henadic series, “1” and “2” indicating a monadic, so to say, generic faculty that is equally present in any member of the relevant series: that is to say, the very last soul in the psychic series is no less a soul, in the generic sense, than the Universal Soul is. The “1,1H1 - 2,1h1,” “1,2H2 - 2,2h2,” and so on make symmetrical pairs of the higher and lower series. If my mathematical simile is valid, then only a drop, 228

Dodds, op. cit., 269.

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0,1, added to the last and the most particular member of the higher series is enough to give birth to the most general henad of the lower series. It seems to be an instance of the Engelsian law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa: for instance, to switch to a musical metaphor, not all who have bass have exactly the same bass, but some “more” bass and some “less” bass, but if this lesser quantity becomes still less, it turns into another quality: baritone; similarly, baritone can be more and less baritone, and further quantitative lessening will result into a qualitatively different type: tenor, and so on down (up, here, in pitch at least!) to soprano. iii. Henadic Providence Henads are the Principles of Providence, which they exercise not intentionally or deliberately, but simply by the fact of their existence. It is a conatural Providence in terms of ontological necessity, and not at all volitional. This Providence is the same as henadic knowledge, which is, as Proclus puts it, “cryptic” and “unitary,” inconceivable for intellects and all the subsequent strata. Actually, three things are necessary for any knowledge: (i) a knowing subject, (ii) an instrument of knowledge and (iii) a knowable object. All three of them in Proclus’ Neoplatonism must have the same ontological status in each reality—intellectual for intellects, psychic for souls. Intellect cannot know the henads, because it has no appropriate instrument for this. If there is something self-transcending in any being, it is not to be related to any sort of knowledge—to soul’s discursive faculty or intellect’s intellection—but, as expressed in Kantian terminology, to an a priori perception of unity and the perception of goodness of the sheer fact of existence present in all beings. This insight is expressed in prop. 134, where Proclus states that everything desires the Good, but not everything desires intellection, even those beings—for instance lazy pupils—who have the capacity for intellection. Besides the fact that it is necessary, the henadic Providence has one more peculiarity—it is unrelated to things on which the henads exercise Providence, in other words things that participate in them. The henads lose nothing by beings’ participation in them; they are not interested in or directed to those beings, but are like divine automata—indeed, if we may extend another mechanistic simile forwards (rather than backwards to the more materialist atomists), they are less like elements of the wellordered watchmaker’s world posited by Robert Boyle that finds echoes in the work of later “mechanical philosophers” such as Locke and Leibniz, and more like the feebler (albeit less impassible) fictional creations of Anthony Burgess: divine clockwork oranges. This unrelated Providence may be compared to yet another mechanical phenomenon: in the case of a

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tramway moved by an electric current, the tramway gradually wears out, its wheels get stained and deformed, but the electric current does not suffer any of those changes. This is expressed in the words “that which acts according to being also acts without relation” (prop. 122). That is to say that there is not the least effort or concern in henads, for effort would already mean that they were influenced by beings and took an interest in them. This is comparable to the difference between truth and falsehood: truth is always autonomous and “according to existence”; it exists for and speaks for itself and is unrelated to accidental things. Conversely, falsehood is always related to, and dependent upon, something accidental—ideology, passions, and so on—because it is not self-speaking, but speaks “in relation to” something. The lie is not a natural and existential but an intended (“intentional” in two senses) phenomenon, and, insofar as it is intended, it is adventitious. A famous tale by Hans Christian Andersen comes to mind, where a child shouts out “But the king is naked!” The child symbolizes the autonomous and selfstanding truth not related to any such accidental things as fear of the king or the passion of flattery. In this light, henads are eternal, changeless, unrelated Principles, psychologically quite similar to the impassible Epicurean gods, with the only significant difference that not only do the latter not care for the beings, in their apatheia, but also the beings are not affected by them. Conversely, Proclian gods, even if unintentionally and necessarily, foreshadow and govern everything in the world below them. In Proclus’ system contingency may have only a negative impetus, there being no trace of contingency in henads but only necessity. Moreover, theoretically, provided that the metaphysical scheme is maintained consistently, there must be no contingency in beings either. However, probably because this so evidently contradicts the evil and violence seen in the world, Proclus seems to feel obliged to admit the possibility of a “fall,” which may happen only in the lower orders of reality. That fall means that a being can temporarily lose its ability to accept the henadic illumination. In the Elements of Theology Proclus does not discuss whether this ability can be recovered by dialectical exercises or by theurgic practices. Whatever the case may be, henads immediately appear to a being able to accept them, and on their appearance all that is non-henadic disappears (prop. 143). This may be well compared to radio waves and a radio receiver: if the antenna of my radio is not well adjusted, I will not receive music broadcast on a certain frequency properly, but at the very moment when I arrange my antenna the music will be heard clearly and all the other hindering sounds will disappear. We may say that henads are eternal Principles of clarity and health in the eternal world, where some

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lower elements can become corroded or corrupted, or fall ill just temporarily, only later to join again the eternal necessary health of the universe.

iv. The Nature of Henadic Unity In this sub-chapter I shall discuss problems that are connected to Proclus’ theory of the henads with regard to the nature of henadic unity. In fact, Proclus’ leitmotif and underlying intention concerning the henads is to establish that they are absolutely simple and absolutely one. While there is difference and plurality of henads, there is no difference and plurality in henads (cf. Th.Pl. III. 3. 12. 23 – 13. 5; III. 4. 14. 22 – 15. 5). The henads differ from the One only due to the fact that they are participable by beings; that is to say that they are so distinguished only by the feature of immanence and by nothing else. In the following I shall consider the difficulties implicit in this theory, which, I think, were not explicated by Proclus in a satisfactory way. This consideration is most proper before we turn to Petritsi’s interpretation of the henadic theory. In fact, my question is this: is Petritsi completely unjustified in providing his peculiar explanation of henads, or is his explanation occasioned by the inherent ambiguity of Proclus’ texts on the issue? Henads are presented by Proclus as one unitary light (cf. Th.Pl. III. 4. 17. 2–4), as being not different from each other, but seen as different only through the beings that participate in them. But, to repeat the question asked by L. Siorvanes, are they then just “clones”? And if they are “clones” or “tokens” of some one “type,” how then can their multiplicity be accounted for? The difference, then, will be only on account of beings, which receive the unitary divine light differently due to and in accordance with their different particular capacities. In this case, the consequence will be the fact that it is for beings to give qualification to henads and not vice versa. Thus henads will cease to be the root of each being’s particularity, but will be exterior to beings. This is surely not the case, because beings are not the measures of henads, but vice versa (prop. 117). Indeed, henads are like a unitary light, everywhere and in all, but this unitary light has different intensities at its source and at its last reaches. Henads are nothing other than hypostasized refractions of different intensities and modalities of the unitary divine light. In this way, there is an explicit differentiation and hierarchy among henads as henads, and not only as revealed by beings that participate in them. But we become aware of this fact only by observing the diversity of beings. Above I have discussed the question of henadic hierarchy and tried to show that the henads are Principles of particularities as revealed in beings.

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The question follows: are the henads Principles of particular properties in beings or the Principles of particular beings themselves? Or are there some ranks of henads responsible for accidental properties in beings and others responsible for their particular essences? The last supposition does not seem to be the case. The henads are rather Principles of essences of beings, of properties that belong to beings essentially. If there is, for instance, a henad of “redness” in the vertical hierarchy of properties, it will be properly revealed in “the red intellect,” “the red soul” or “the red fruit”; that is to say that redness in all those beings will not be an accidental character, but their essential feature, by virtue of which they are different from all the other beings in their own horizontal series. So for each property there is also a being specifically responsible for this property that enters its essential constitution: for a purificatory henad, there is an intellect responsible for purification, and a stone related to the henadic function of purification; 229 for a war-henad, there is a warlike intellect and warlike planet (Mars) and warlike earthly beings (soldiers). But empirical observation indicates that not everything is reduced to one property in different beings; rather, beings have a bundle of them, even if one of the properties predominates over the rest. Now, can the same be true of the henads? Should each of the henads be reduced to only one property, or do they, besides the dominant property, in some way contain other properties as well? It is precisely this that must be the case: prop. 150 reveals that the higher and more universal henads precontain all the powers and features of the lower and more particular henads, and conversely, the lower henads, although unable to contain all that the higher do, still possess certain powers of the higher, although in a different fashion. The fundamental Proclian formula “all in all but in a proper way in each” must be true also of the henads, in this case, it will be difficult to avoid the conclusion that the henads, although simple and unitary, still possess plurality in themselves! Let us use another example: the henad of stubbornness is revealed as an apechema in a donkey, and as this henad contains in itself, in a certain diminished mode, a property of a higher henad, perhaps, say, courage, so also a donkey faintly reveals some features of a lion in itself, while stubbornness, nevertheless, remains its specific feature. One may think of a higher, inconceivable plurality in each henad as henad; that is Actually, Late Antique theurgical practices implied that the purificatory features of material objects—stones and plants—could act, via sympathy with their immaterial “referents,” as a means for the soul’s ascent to the intelligible reality. Cf. Proclus, In Timaeum, II. 314, 24–29. 229

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why it is not the One but only “unitary.” Let us take a closer look at the problem. As was said before, the One appears to be the imparticipable monad of henads, and those henads are said to differ from the One only by the fact that they are participable. Otherwise they are gods—they are not in need of anything else, being autoteleis (that is to say, “self-completed”) or authypostatoi (aujqupovstatoi, “self-creating” or “self-substantiating”), and that is why they are “good” and are not “unified” but “unitary”; that is to say that they do not have a derivative unity but themselves represent simple units. By virtue of both features they are gods. Only their participability makes them different from the highest God. The emphatic claim concerning the simplicity of henads (props. 119 and 127) notwithstanding, the fact that they are participable indicates that they are not completely simple, for otherwise they would have been the One, in no way different from It. We know from prop. 2 that there exists in reality only the simple One and the one-and-not-one, and prop. 116 states that henads are also the one-and-not-one, that they possess an element that is not a simple unity. The pivotal question comes: what is this not-one, ouch hen (Greek: toV oujc e{n—“the not-one”) element? Does the ouch hen belong to the wholeness of henad as henad, or is the “unity” element a proper henad and the “not-one” element the being that participates in it? The proposition seems to opt for the second solution: kaiV toV meVn aujtoteleV9 toV e{n, w/~J sunavptei proV9 toV aujtoevn, w{ste tou~to pavlin oJ qeov9, h/~J qeov9, tov dev oujc e}n uJposta~n ejn meqevxei tou~ eJnoVV9 uJfevsthke. So it

seems that the “not-one” element must be a being that comes into existence by participation in the self-complete one, that is, the henad. In fact, the term mevqexi9 cannot be applicable to a henad’s relation to the One—a relation that is expressed by the term sunavptein (“to bind together”; “to have intercourse with”)—but to a being’s relation to a henad. However, the passage also states the difference between the self-complete one and the One Itself, and therefore, to the self-complete one some otherness must pertain, to distinguish it from the One. Without this otherness the henad too would have been imparticipable and the ouch hen element (that is, being) would not have been able to be united with it. Rather than assuming arbitrarily that the participability of a henad does not imply the otherness or the “not-one” element in it, I would propose the two levels of the ouch hen as a solution for the problem of the henad-being connection: first of all there is a hidden, supra-essential ouch hen element in henad as henad, in henad as the self-complete one and not the One Itself; then there is the essential ouch hen element “accrued” to henad, which is a being that participates in, or is eternally linked to it. I wonder whether those two levels are not indicated also

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by the dialectics of the terms methektos (Greek: meqektov9—“apt for being participated in”) and metechomenos (Greek: metecovmeno9—“that which is participated in”): that is, henads first should be of such a feature as to allow something to take a share in them and only then do they become “shared.” In this way, the henad as methektos must precede the henad as metechomenos— logically speaking, not temporally: there is no suggestion of a real sequence with any time, or condition, when a henad stayed apart, ready to be participated in, and alter time when this or that being took advantage of that readiness. To sum up: before being participated in, the henad should already be different from the One, if different, then one-and-not-one; only by virtue of this fact, through similitude, a “being-plethos” (i.e., “being-multitude,” since all beings consist of a multitude of elements) is able to participate in a henad, the latter appearing to be a “supra-being-supra-plethos.” To make it clearer, let us reflect upon the notion of “participation.” This crucial notion of Proclus’ ontology is at the same time one of the most difficult. When we read that an effect participates in its cause or a cause makes an effect participate in it, as it turns out, this cannot imply an immediate relation. As Laurence Rosàn observes, “since a soul-possessing-a-mind also implies a mind-possessed-by-a-soul, logical implication alone cannot be the only factor that constitutes a relationship for Proclus.” 230 That is to say, if the relation is conceived without mediation, then the aforementioned mind and soul will be one and the same metaphysical entity, two sides of one coin. On the contrary, in Proclus’ system each metaphysical entity as a whole is clearly distinct from another entity, its effect, which is said to participate in it. Rosàn himself develops a very ingenious scheme, which includes six intermediary steps between any cause and effect in general, in order to explain and render possible the relation between them. The basic idea is that it is not the cause as such that is participated in, but some influence or power of the cause, which stays between the cause and effect and is not the cause itself. This alone provides a reason why the cause “remains in itself undisturbed and unaffected, and is not at all weakened by having been a cause, since it was not itself that gave rise to effect, but only its power, its activity and power of its activity,” writes Rosàn. 231 L. M. De Rijk says basically the same without such an elaborate scheme: “What is actually commuLaurence Rosàn, The Philosophy of Proclus: The Final Phase of Ancient Thought (New York: Cosmos, 1949), 69. 231 Ibid., 72. 230

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nicated is the Principle’s irradiation (katavlamyi", more precisely ‘radiation from above’),” 232 and, as he further states, the “participated” or metechomenon is “the transmitted duvnami" or spark (e[llamyi") deriving from the cause rather than its source,” so that “the term metecovmenon is always used to stand for the immanent power (duvnami") or the inherent ontic Principle in all that is and, consequently, is found at every level of the universe.” 233 P. A. Meijer goes on with greater subtlety and provides a corrective addition to De Rijk’s explanation, distinguishing two meanings in the term metecovmeno": “I” and “II.” The metecovmeno" I has the same meaning as it was explained by De Rijk, that is, an immanent share belonging to the effect. But the metecovmeno" II already relates to the very entity, the cause that is participated in; in this case “we are not dealing with ‘what is participated’ as the immanent form (sense I), but what is ‘participated’ as metecovmeno" II, i.e., [that which is] causing immanent forms but remaining hypostatized.” 234 Meijer asserts that henads that are autoteleis cannot be metechomena in the first sense, because then they would be said to belong to effects that participate in them, and therefore will be in need of substrates and no longer autoteleis. Meijer, as far as I understand, does not mean that the henads, and in general all the metecovmena II, are participated in directly, but he speaks about different perspectives on the same issue. Proclus is not very rigid in his terminology, and furthermore in the metecovmeno" II it is implied that the entity is not actually possessed by an effect, but that the entity provides its effect with some power coming out from itself, a power that can be called, in Meijer’s own terminology, also metecovmeno" I. But it is important now for our purpose not to discuss what happens in between the participant and the participated entities, but rather to attend to the cause and effect themselves, taken as separate entities. “Participation” from a certain general perspective means that a higher entity, a cause, is in some manner to be recognized also in the lower entity, its effect—as a father is recognized in his son. In the hierarchical framework of Proclus’ ontology this principle may apply to two different relations: horizontal and vertical. In the horizontal dimension, let us say, a more universal soul causes 232 L. M. de Rijk, “Causation and Participation in Proclus, the Pivotal Role of Scope Distinction in His Metaphysics,” in On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy, ed. E. P. Bos and P. A. Meijer (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 10 ff. 233 Ibid., 16–17. 234 P. A. Meijer, “Participation in Henads and Monads in Proclus’ Theologia Platonica, CHS. 1–6,” in On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Bos and Meijer, 77.

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a more particular soul, while in the vertical dimension a member of the higher series causes its relevant member in the lower hierarchy, for example, the Universal Intellect causes the Universal Soul, and particular intellect its relevant particular soul. Thus any effect has two proper causes: the nearest cause in the horizontal hierarchy, and the relevant particular cause in the higher adjacent series. Both causes are reflected in the effect, but the reflections of the two distinct causes are of qualitatively different characters. Let me express those differences by means of a scheme. The horizontal reflection of the cause in the effect is of the following nature: Abcd — ABcd — ABCd — ABCD

The different letters indicate the inner complexity of each ontological entity, for example, intellect with different, more or less particular, ideas in it; the capital letters in bold fonts indicate the component possessed in a proper or emphatic way (i.e., kath’ hyparxin), the lower-case letters indicate properties possessed in a causal way (i.e., kat’ aitian), and finally the italicized capital letters indicate the properties contained according to participation (i.e., kata methexin). We see that the first member (Abcd) is copied in the second (ABcd) in such a manner that something changes in the configuration of the inner structure itself, so that the difference between the cause and effect is conspicuous through the interior particularization. Now, of what character is the vertical causation (participation)? Let us take the second member of the above hierarchy as the second intellect in the series of intellects and express it as “I(ABcd).” It will have as a participant in the lower adjacent horizontal series of souls the second soul, which may be expressed as “S(ABcd).” As we see, this is a completely different sort of copying: there is no change in the interiority, in the inner configuration, but only in exteriority: the same configuration is revealed in intellect intellectually and in soul psychically. This may be compared to different colors at different times of the day: at midday when the sun is at the zenith we see a multitude of earthly colors in the brightest way, but in the evening when the angle of the sun’s rays is more oblique we see the same multitude of colors in a dimmer way. The change of the angle of the sun’s rays can be compared to the difference between the higher and lower monads: the midday sun is like the intellectual monad and the multitude of different bright colors are different particular members (intellects) belonging to this monad, and the evening sun is like the psychic monad and the multitude of the dimmer colors are comparable to the multitude of souls. However, these are the same colors, just revealed in different ways. Therefore, copying of the vertical cause in the effect does

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not affect the inner structure, but only the mode of manifestation of this structure or configuration as a whole. Now comes the question: to which type of participation must we relate the way in which beings participate in henads, to the horizontal or the vertical? To the vertical, beyond any doubt. But if the inner structure of any being consists of a plurality of a certain configuration, then its vertical cause, its paradigmatic referent of which it is a copy, must also have the similar plurality and configuration in a higher, a brighter, mode. And so each of the henads, accordingly, will consist of a structured plurality, despite the fact that this henadic plurality is of such a unitary mode that Proclus shies away from calling it “plurality,” reserving the term for the level of beings, and even if this plurality is of such a brightness that not only the physical eyes of perception and the psychical eyes of discursive comprehension, but also the intellectual eyes of intuition, are blinded by this light, failing to distinguish anything but unity in it. Proclus may be thought to point indirectly or incidentally to the plurality in henads when he compares their order or series to—but does not identify it with—that of the mathematical numbers, among which some are closer to the Principle, others further, the first being simpler and the second more complex, having been increased in number and weakened in power: Tavxin gaVr ajnavgkh tw~n eJnavdwn uJpavrcein, w{sper dhV kaiV tw~n ajriqmw~n oJrw~men touV" meVn ejggutevrw th~" ajrch~", touV" deV porrwvteron, kaiV touv" meVn aJploustevrou", touV" deV sunqetwtevrou" kaiV tw/~ meVn posw/~ pleonavzonta", th/~ dunavmei deV ejlassoumevnouÇ (Th.Pl. III. 5. 17. 18–22).

It is a rather risky simile, for here Proclus says that in numbers there is a synthesis, and as he compares henads to numbers, we may suppose an implicit, even if unintended, hint that there is to be found a sort of synthesis or orderly diversity in henads as well. This is an important point to be remembered later, when we treat Petritsi’s theory on the henads. Let us note a further point: if the “participation” is taken in the most general sense as a certain presence or reflection of the higher in the lower, then also the imparticipable One is participated in by all beings, for all enjoy a simple, undefined existence in Parmenidian terms, having acquired it from the One. From a certain perspective, the One is imparticipable in the sense that it is not specifically reflected or copied by any of the beings; as Proclus says “If It were participated in, It would thereby become the unity of a particular” (prop. 116). 235 In a relative sense, so are also the imparticipable monads, because the Monadic Soul gives the psychic qualification equally to all 235

Again, this is Dodds’ translation. See Dodds, op. cit., 103.

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souls and is not linked specifically to any of them. From the same perspective, the henads, in turn, are participable in the sense that their modality of unity is specifically manifested in different beings. Thus by the fact of their naked existence beings copy the One, whereas by the “not-one” element in them, that is to say, by specification of the simple existence, they can be thought to copy the supreme paradigmatic “not-one” element in the henads. But, we should ask, what more precisely is this “not-one” element? Certainly plurality, the Principle of which is Infinity. 236 In anticipation of the demonstration we may intuit that the “one” element in the henadic structure must be related to Limit and the “not-one” element to Infinity. This can be corroborated by another passage from the Platonic Theology. The passage, admittedly, concerns the True Being and not the henads, but I think that it can be freely said of the henads as well: o{lw" gavr, ejpeiV e{n ejsti kaiV oujc e{n, toV meVn e}n aujtw/~ kataV toV pevra" uJpavrcei, toV deV oujc e}n kataV toV a{peiron, hJ deV touvtwn ajmfotevrwn suvmmixi" kaiV oJlovth" ejk tou~ prwvtou (Th.Pl. III. 9. 37. 28 – 38. 3).

As we shall later see, each of the henads is also presented as a “mixture” of Limit and Infinity in the Elements of Theology. Proclus seems to avoid speaking about plurality in henads in order to underline their “stainless” unity. Yet what seems to be a slip of his pen in prop. 132 reveals that there must be a supreme mode of unification also in henads: o{sw/ dhV kaiV hJ tw~n qew~n u{parxi" ejn tw~/ hJnw~sqai tw~n o[ntwn ma~llon uJfevsthke (in Dodds’ words, “and as the gods are more essentially unified than existents…” 237). Let us also look at prop. 128, where Proclus discusses the degrees of unification in different ontological strata and a threefold hierarchy between (i) the pure henads, (ii) the unified manifold, which must be the ideal world and (iii) the discrete manifold, which must be the material world. Thus the two distinct adjectives are related to the manifold on two hierarchical levels: the hJnwmevnon plh`qo" (intellectual world) and the dih/rhmevnon plh`qo" (corporeal According to the Pythagorean doctrine, embraced by the Neoplatonists, the notions of the Indefinite Dyad and heterotes (“difference” as explained in note 118 above) describe the same principle of generation of multiplicity of numbers. Sextus Empiricus described this Neopythagorean doctrine, stating that the highest monad contains in itself the principles of both sameness (Greek: aujtovth9) and otherness (Greek: eJterovth9), relating the term to the Indefinite Dyad, which is not yet a number, but a principle of division and numbers’ origin (cf. Adv. Phys. II 261ff). This source may be found in John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London: Duckworth, 1996), 342. Petritsi proposes the very same theory (cf. Epilogue, 216, 22–23). 237 Dodds, op. cit., 117. 236

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world). In the previous propositions Proclus applied to each of the henads the adjective heniaios (prop. 117), and from the perspective of the parallel structure of prop. 128 this adjective calls tacitly to be supplemented by plethos! 238 The new scheme describing the participation of beings in henads will be then of the following mode: {ONE + NOT ONE} = henad ↕ {one + not one} = being A further corroboration of an implicit intra-henadic complexity in Proclus’ system can also be provided. As stated above, everything, even prime matter, receives simple existence from the One, the henads being responsible for the specific forms of existence. Henads particularize the universal and transcendent presence of the One in beings. It is interesting to ask what this “simple being” (toV ei\nai) can mean in terms of ontology. In the case of the material beings we may say that the simple undefined being applies to the formless matter and that the particular bodily henads shape it into particular material bodies. But what about the spiritual beings? Would Proclus have implied that there is a “simple undefined existence” also in the higher world in the mode of a spiritual matter, on which henads put their particular imprints? This is a plausible supposition, because even if Proclus does not accept teaching on spiritual matter in precisely Plotinian terms, he too admits the existence of matter in the higher realm in the mode of power. L. Siorvanes notes the following on Proclus’ doctrine on matter: Corporeal matter is distinct from general matter as an incorporeal power. Although at first sight this appears to follow Plotinus on intelligible and sensible matter, Proclus really distinguishes between the fundamental nature of Matter itself and the lowest of its many modes… Proclus extends his sentiments on the continuity of Matter to his view of it as a mode of infinitude. Matter (that is to say, physical matter) is one of the many modes of the Unlimited, which is the power of the One. 239

Therefore, henads introduce measure and apply it to the power that emanates from the One. Now the crucial question: can the same be said of Proclus also uses the term heniaios plethos in relation to henads as a group (prop. 113), but in this proposition he speaks of a singular henad. 239 Siorvanes, op. cit., 184–185. 238

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henads? And, indeed, the power of the One does not proceed only below henads, but first of all in them and along with them, gradually diminishing, so that different henads have unitary power in different modes (prop. 132). Accordingly, there occurs the specification and limitation of infinity (i.e., power) also in the henadic realm. That there is such an interplay of Limit and Infinity in each of the henads is clearly stated in prop. 159, where each of the henads is described as a “mixture” of the two. And a further point in this respect: power in Proclus’ philosophy is never in isolation, but applies to the metaphysical entities; the essence of each being (with only that of the First Infinity as an exception, it being “sheer power”), that is to say, the whole of each being, consists of unity of its essence and power, so that in the course of procession the diminution (e[lleiyi") of power passes on simultaneously with degradation of the essence (cf. Th.Pl. III. 2. 10. 10–14: dunavmew" gaVr e[lleiyiv" ejstin hJ tw~n ejlattovnwn poivhsi", oujsiva" deV u{fesi" hJ th~" dunavmew" e[lleiyi"). Henads do not have essences, as they are higher

than essences, but they are not sheer powers either, and they too have the counterpart of the essence or ousia (Greek: oujsiva—“substance” or “essence”) on their supra-essential level, that counterpart being hyparxis. Each of the henads has its own proper hyparxis (Th.Pl. III. 4. 17. 5–7). Therefore the twin change of the essence and power in the procession of beings must be paralleled by the twin change of hyparxis and (supra)-power in the procession of henads. Now, Proclus says that each being has hyparxis from Limit and dynamis from Infinity (Th.Pl. III. 9. 39. 17–18). Thus, although Proclus does not say that explicitly about the henads, we may infer that also in them the hyparxis or structure is from Limit and the power of this structure from Infinity. To sum up, it can be supposed that the henads are participated in, that is, copied, by beings that are one-and-not-one only because they, the henads, too are one-and-not-one in the paradigmatic and the most unitary way. But from this perspective our comprehension of the transcendent One will suffer a dramatic change. More precisely, the henads cannot enrich the simple mode of existence bestowed upon all by the One, because if they could so enrich it, they would possess something that the One does not. On the contrary, they only differently specify the simple existence, and it is this specification that brings about the plurality. And, therefore, the plurality could be thought of as precontained in the One Itself in the unspecified mode. But shall we not get, then, “negative infinity,” because in the One the plurality should also be united by some other Principle, and so on? The simile of the rainbow may help to provide a solution to this difficulty: when we see a rainbow, we see the different spectral colors united in the rainbow

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by some Principle of unity. This Principle of unity is the invisible air, because the invisible air marks the margins of the rainbow providing unity to it. But now, when the colors coincide and become united in the most elevated mode, then we shall see nothing on the horizon, but only the invisible air, due to the fact that the Principle of unity and the supreme unification of plurality of colors completely coincide. Therefore, we shall get a marriage of the Parmenidian abstract concept of the One 240 with the ontological One as the source of the plural world, through this identification and coincidence of the Principle of unity with the supreme seminal unification of all plurality. It is possible to suppose that this was also Proclus’ tacit idea; however, the existence of the seminal, cryptic plurality in the One-Cause—as distinct from the Ineffable—is actually Iamblichus’ idea, flatly rejected by Proclus in In Parmenidem (VI. 1107, 10–20). 241 Then Petritsi in his understanding of the One could follow Iamblichus directly, by presenting the transcendent One as the unitary, paradigmatic supra-plurality of the totality of reality.

2. THE HENADIC THEORY OF IOANE PETRITSI i. A Short Prelude In the previous two chapters, treating the One and the pair formed by Limit and Infinity, I have already partially discussed Petritsi’s henadic theory. The present chapter will focus more on the distinctive features of Petritsi’s presentation of the problem. Of course, for a translator who presents Proclus’ doctrines to his Christian audience as true philosophy, Proclus’ genuinely polytheistic theory must have posed a real predicament. Apparently, it is for this reason that in the commentary on the twelfth chapter, immediately before starting his explanation of the “henadic” chapters (props. 113–165), Petritsi, in anticipation of his readers’ possible astonishment at hearing such a theory, veheThe Platonist Origen, for instance, denied that for such a concept of the One, because of this concept’s purely abstract character, there was any possibility of its having any actual ontological referent. Cf. In Parmenidem 1065. 1 – 1066. 16. See also Steel, “Iamblichus and the Theological Interpretation of the Parmenides,” 14–15. 241 Iamblichus at the same time asserted that the One (or the First Principle) contains the beginning, middle and end in a hidden mode (krufivw"), as Proclus attests: cf. In Parmenidem 1114. 1–5. 240

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mently attacks polytheism on the authority of the polytheist philosopher himself: This theory says that all the first terms [i.e., the supreme terms of each series] resemble their own superiors [i.e., monads] by the purity of their essences, and the divine number [ = henad] is one-like because God is one. Where are, then, those who accuse the philosophers in proclaiming polytheism and thus obtain delight from their own untrue utterances?! See that here he [Proclus] proves that there is one Above-One and from it spring the two creative sources [Limit and Infinity]; the supra-existent ones 242 are from the One and the gods from the Above-God, and the holies from the Above-Holy (Commentaries, prop. 12. 155. 19–26).

It is a habitual trend of the Georgian philosopher to discern in Proclus’ words a meaning not initially intended by them, which even leads Petritsi to give alternate readings of the Greek text in accordance with his own system or intention. One of the exemplary cases in this respect is his rendering of the terms “henads” and “gods.” In his text, he permanently attaches to the “gods” the adjectives “divine” and “divinized,” 243 forming in this way a curious tautology that Proclus would never have written. The Christian philosopher feels compelled to emphasize insistently that the henads possess divine quality by virtue of the transcendent One. From the same intention springs also another translation of Proclus’ “gods” as “gods by virtue of participation.” ii. The “Gods by Virtue of Participation” At this point first I shall make a slight digression, and see what sense Petritsi attributes to the difficult term “participation.” In his commentary on the first proposition he provides some guidance on the subject. According to this text, the philosopher entertains three notions in the term, expressed by three different Georgian words with the same stem: 1) i-ziar-nes, 2) e-ziar-a and 3) i-ziar-a (the word ziari meaning “common” or “something shared”). The first term, i-ziar-nes, denotes the mutual participation of two equal things, when they give to and receive from each other, as is the 242 In the following, when citing the Georgian text, I shall put for henads ones italicized, but in the discussion and paraphrases I shall leave “henads.” 243 Yet, at least once, Proclus uses the term teqevwntai (In Parmenidem 1043. 9– 29), that is, “they are divinized,” as it seems, precisely in relation to henads. This is due to the looseness of his usage of the term, with no implication of the absurdity that “gods are made gods.”

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case with, for instance, the four elements: fire can be found in earth and earth in fire, and the same holds true for air and water. The two remaining terms, eziara and iziara, express opposites. The first term in this pair of opposites, eziara, obtains when the lower and caused thing (the effect) participates in the higher, its cause, itself giving nothing, but receiving and becoming like the cause (but not identical with it, for in virtue the cause always excels the effect). The second term, iziara, may be translated as “let something participate in itself,” and refers to the situation when a higher/better thing, the cause, allows the lower and caused thing to participate in it, communicating to the lower something out of its “unitary and not-diminishing” existence (Commentaries, prop. 1. 12. 20 – 13. 3). With this explanation in mind, let us see in what sense Petritsi applies the term to the henads. For instance, in the translation of prop. 116 “Every god is participable except the One,” 244 which Petritsi phrases as “Every god by virtue of participation [adj.] participates in [something], except the One,” the term “participates” is expressed by the term e-ziar-ebis, the present verbal form of eziara (past perfect). Thus this means that the gods participate in something higher. But of course Proclus here implies that they are participated in by something lower. Petritsi also acknowledges this other aspect in the henads when, in the same proposition, he correctly translates methektos as ziar-ebit-i (“participable”) and metechomenos by the passive participle ziarebul-i (“participated”). 245 It turns out that the henads for Petritsi both participate in something higher and are participated in by the lower terms. But what “higher” thing can they participate in, and how? Surely they cannot participate in the transcendent One, which is imparticipable. I think that I answered this question already in the previous chapter when I pointed to the fact that, according to Petritsi, Limit, that is, the second, the immanent One, acts as the participable monad of the henadic series. Now, let us make another useful linguistic digression and find out what meaning Petritsi gives to the term “imparticipable.” According to him, this one term—u-ziar-ebeli (“imparticipable”)—may receive different meanAs stated earlier, everywhere when Proclus is quoted I shall use Dodds’ English translation; I shall employ my own English version of Petritsi’s translation only for the purpose of the theme. 245 Cf. also his translation of prop. 123 itself (for which see Ioannis Petritzii. Opera. Tomus I, Procli Diadochi STOICEIWSIS QEOLOGIKH, versio Hiberica, ed. Simon Kaukchischvili, 76. 9–10), where we read that the henadic properties, inconceivable in themselves, are knowable from (that is, through knowledge of) those who participate in them (misda zialeb-ul-tagan). 244

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ings in accordance with the levels of the realities to which it is applied. In Proclus’ system “unparticipated” applies both to the transcendent One and the monads—the heads or hegemons of each horizontal series. But when Petritsi applies the term to the monads, this term has for him only a relative sense; when speaking literally he reserves this quality uniquely to the transcendent One. In his commentary on prop. 24 with the title “Cause, Caused, Uncaused,” when he speaks of the monads’ “imparticipability,” he explains: When you hear “unparticipated,” do not think that it is unparticipated on the part of the subsequent members, for this faculty pertains only to the unattainable One, which is above all ones. But here “unparticipated” indicates the head of a series, which engenders all the subsequent members in this series, but itself has nothing before itself in the same series. So it is called “imparticipable” in the sense of having no prior (Commentaries, prop. 24. 65. 29 – 66. 3).

Such an understanding of the term, if it is not due to some variant readings of the Greek text that he has used, explains why Petritsi makes significant alterations in his translation of prop. 23: He translates toV meVn gaVr ajmevvqekton… ajpogenna'/ taV metevcesqai dunavmena (prop. 23. 26. 25) as “The selfsufficient [where the term corresponds to the Greek aujtavrkh"]… originates those capable of receiving its participation,” whereas Dodds’ precise translation reads “The unparticipated generates terms capable of being participated,” which means participated in by the subsequent members. According to his own preconception, the translator has substituted “self-sufficient” for the Greek “unparticipated”; more importantly, by adding its, he makes a substantial digression from Proclus’ general metaphysical framework. In fact, Petritsi presents the monad as one of the members of the serial chain and not as something transcending this chain, as Proclus has it. The confusion of these two terms—“self-sufficient” and “imparticipable”—and the conception that the imparticipable monad is participated in by the subsequent members must be necessary in his system, according to which the production of anything is impossible without “participation.” This is evident from his words about the monads: The monad resembles the transcendent One and Father of all by the fact that it also, while remaining in its not-diminishing property, engen-

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ders the others and constitutes their existences, 246 while the effect has this existence through participation (Commentaries, prop. 23. 64. 7–11).

In his article “Participation in Henads and Monads in Proclus’ Theologica Platonica” P. A. Meijer discusses the difficulties and different meanings connected with the term “participable.” Dealing with monads, in the same article the author distinguishes in the text of the Platonic Theology two types of them: unparticipated and participated, the latter being produced by the former. It is useful to cite the following: Proclus explains that each ajmevqekton (unparticipated) precedes metecovmena (the participated) which turn out to be monads… [and] states that the secondary beings participate in the entities which are cognate with the cause, which is the original unparticipated monad. This clearly implies that the monads as metecovmena are participated by the secondary beings. For those cognate entities cannot be other then those monads which are participated; [participated monads turn out to be] produced by the original [i.e., unparticipated] monad and are on the same level. 247

Then Meijer quotes Proclus’ text, where the latter directly states that “before participated monads there are unparticipated monads.” As we have already observed, in Petritsi’s system there is a different situation, the first unparticipated monad being such only in a relative sense, and hence needing not any second, participated monad to function as a second head of the series. But there is a difference between the rest of the monads and the supreme and unparticipated monad of the henads (prop. 21)—the One. In the relation of the One and the henadic series the situation resembles that observed by Meijer in the Platonic Theology, in that the One, while remaining “enthroned in the transcendence of non-participability” (Commentaries, prop. 116. 157. 22–23), produces “two participated monads” of the henadic series, which are the First Limit and First Infinity. Those two are For Petritsi the cause gives to the effect first of all existence: “It is not the case that it [effect] first was and then participated in, for the cause first gives existence [to the effect].” It should be mentioned that, for example, Dodds in prop. 18 makes an unjustified correction in the Greek text itself: for pa'vn toV toV ei\nai corhgou'n a[lloi" (i.e., “everything that gives existence to the others”) he provides his own reading pa'n tw/' ei\nai corhgou'n a[lloi", and translates it as “everything which by existence bestows a character on others”; this “character,” absent in the Greek text, Dodds adds because in his reading the object of the sentence disappears. Dodds, op. cit., 20. 247 Meijer, op. cit., 71–73, n. 57. 246

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already participated in by the henads, some of which belong to the genus of Limit, others to that of Infinity. The doctrine that henads acquire divinization through participation in Limit and Infinity is of course absent in Proclus. Although this may be structurally or virtually implicit also in Proclus, as our discussion of Proclus’ henads showed, Proclus would have never claimed the ontological truth of this theory, the very term “gods” excluding the notion of stages in henadic deities. On the contrary, Petritsi ontologically affirms this stage of henads’ receiving divinity. He clearly states that the henads are “created ones” (Commentaries, prop. 2. 22. 1–2) and that Limit “constructs” them (Commentaries, prop. 151). The henads for him are “selfperfect” only in the relative sense, being “perfected by the One” (that is, through Limit) (Commentaries, prop. 153. 177. 27–28). This Christian Neoplatonist philosopher provides a less “frozen” picture of the henads than does Proclus. He maintains a certain dynamism in them, stating that they also undergo divinization through the activity of Limit. It is only necessary, then, that this tenet leads him to the affirmation of a certain kind of plurality in the henads. As I have tried to demonstrate, this concept is implicit also in Proclus, whose first intention, however, is to stress the simplicity and unity of the henads rather than their implicit complexity. Still, Petritsi has radically reelaborated and transformed the Proclian theory. Some more examples can be provided for the demonstration of how Petritsi alters Proclus’ letter and thought in order to accommodate it within his Christian framework. For example, the theorem of prop. 138 ( = 139 in the Old Georgian text), Pavntwn tw~n metecovntwn th~" qeiva" ijdiovthto" kaiV ejkqeoumevnwn prwvtistovn ejsti kaiV ajkrovtaton toV o[n—which Dodds renders as “Of all the principles which participate in the divine property and are thereby divinized, the first and highest is Being” 248—is translated by Petritsi as follows: “Among all those who participate in God’s 249 property and are hence divinized, the first and the highest is True Being.” For Petritsi the “divinizer” in its ultimate sense is only the absolute One through the mediation of Limit. We find the same idea in prop. 165 as well, where Proclus affirms that things are divinized through unity with the henadic gods, and that, for example, bodies become divine through them and not through Soul, “which is not primarily divine,” as Dodds puts it. As regards Petritsi’s Dodds, op. cit., 123. I write “God” here with a capital letter, although in Georgian there are no capital letters, because Petritsi systematically avoids using “god” for the henad and it is unlikely that it slipped from his pen in the theorem of the proposition. 248 249

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translation of the same proposition, this is one of the rare cases when he translates qeov" (in the phrase ouj gaVr prwvtw" au{th [i.e., hJ yuchv] qeov") as its Georgian equivalent gmerti, and not as gmrtivi (“divine”) as he habitually does. This apparently indicates that he takes qeov" as the one absolute God, and not as a henad. A similar situation is found in prop. 139, where Proclus states that deities existing on the corporeal, psychic and intellectual levels possess divine character by virtue of participation. Dodds’ translation of the Greek kaiV dh'lon o{ti pavnta tau'ta qei'a kataV mevqexin, toV gaVr prwvtw" qei'on ejn tai'" eJnavsin uJfevsthke runs as follows: “… evidently by participation in each case, since deity in the primary sense is proper to the henads.” But because for Petritsi deity in its primary sense is in no way proper to the henads—which are also gods by virtue of participation—he in pavnta tau'ta (“all those”) seems to include not only intellects, souls and bodies, but also the henads, maintaining that they are divinized in practically the same manner as the former. This must be the reason why he mistranslates the second clause of the sentence (toV gaVr prwvtw" qei'on ejn tai'" eJnavsin uJfevsthke) thus: “For the divine light [i.e., the light of the One] was manifested first in the one-like number [= henad].” The “light,” which means in Petritsi something that illuminates the henads, is, of course, absent in all the extant Greek manuscripts. This “light” may, actually, be a synonym for Limit. From this different understanding there follows also a verbal inconsistency of Petritsi’s system: Proclus for instance states in prop. 138 that among the divinized the highest is Being, a sentence that the Georgian philosopher translates as it is. However, if in his system the henads are also divinized— cf. his term “divinized through participation” by which he translates Proclus’ qeov" (vol. I. prop. 120. 73. 25)—and if in the same system the henads are higher than the True Being, how can the latter be “the first among the divinized”? Petritsi states that every number by definition implies participation in Limit. Yet henads also are called by him “numbers,” which indicates both their participation in Limit and their plurality—any number being many. Now, Proclus does not call the henads “numbers,” even if this thought is implicitly there. When he applies the term arithmos (Greek: ajriqmov9— “number”) to the henads, he means the whole order, the whole multiplicity of henads, and does not mean that each henad is a number. It is another example of Petritsi’s interpretative translation that he renders the henads frequently as “divine numbers,” in this way making it known that each of

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them is a number. 250 Petritsi may have based his theory on a passage from the Platonic Theology: KaiV mhVn kaiV ajriqmoV" oujdeiv" ejsti tw~n o[ntwn, eij mhdamw~" e[sti toV e{n, ajllaV pavnta kaiV e{kaston oujc e{n. KaiV gaVr toV tou~ ajriqmou~ movrion, hJ monav", e{n, kaiV aujtoV" e{kasto" tw~n ajriqmw~n: eij gaVr pevnte monavde", kaiV pemptav", eij deV trei~" monavde", kaiV triav": ajllaV kaiV hJ triaV" aujthV kaiV hJ pemptaV" eJnav" tiv" ejstin: w[ste eij mhdevn ejstin e{n, ou[te movrion oujdeVn ou[te toV o{lon e[stai tw~n ajriqmw~n (Th.Pl. II. 1. 8. 5–11).

Proclus in this passage says that any number consists of parts, which he calls here monads, not, of course, in the technical meaning of this term, that is to say, in the meaning of the head of a horizontal series, but in the meaning of, as I termed it before, atomic units. Petritsi says precisely the same, that the One unifies the monads (Old Georgian: mxolo-ni), that is to say, the atomic units, within proper numbers (cf. Commentaries, prop. 1. 13. 15–18). Now, in the passage just quoted, Proclus calls those numbers “henads,” not meaning of course the supra-essential metaphysical entities, but mathematical numbers. On the contrary, Petritsi must have understood the term “henads” in this passage as bearing its full ontological significance. For him the metaphysical henad-gods also contain in themselves monads, that is to say atomic units, units that Limit constructs in different henadic numbers: “[Limit] was generated before all the others by the Father of all,

250 It is interesting to note that A. F. Lossev, who translated the Elements into Russian and commented upon it, similarly to Petritsi, interprets henads in terms of “number-gods,” translating the Pa`" oJ qei`o" ajriqmoV" of prop. 113 as “Every divine number” (or “Each of the divine numbers”) For this, see A. F. Lossev, “Commentary on Proclus’ Treatise The Elements of Theology,” 446–448. In fact, Lossev was familiar with parts of Petritsi’s text; thus the possibility is not excluded that the latter influenced him. Dodds seems to be more faithful to Proclus’ intention in translating the passage as “the whole order of gods.” It is possible that Petritsi knew of a Pythagorean Nicomachus of Gerasa, who identified numbers with the traditional Hellenic gods, as Wallis notes. See R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 1972), 32. Interestingly, Proclus believed himself to be a reincarnation of this Nicomachus, as noted in Marini Vita Procli, ed. J. D. Boissonade (Leipzig, 1814), chapter 28. It is possible that the doctrine of the henadic numbers originated from Iamblichus. For instance, John M. Dillon, commenting on the Iamblichean fragments presented by Michael Psellus, says “the term kreittones phuseis here must, by process of elimination, refer to the divine or henadic realm, since they transcend all being, and the numbers which characterise them must also be henadic.” Dillon, “Iamblichus and Henads Again,” 52.

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in order that He may construct all the monads of henads-gods” (emphasis mine) (Commentaries, prop. 151. 176. 24–27). Just as numbers are even and odd, so for Petritsi there are two henadic genera, one belonging to Limit and the other to Infinity. At this point it will be appropriate to make a short digression on a problematic point concerning the notion of Infinity as a monad. How can it be a monad if it is the Principle of division? How can henads participate in it? Infinity is related to the number two, which is the Principle of evenness and starts the even numbers. But in order to be a number, the number two must participate in Limit. Let us quote Petritsi here: Everything participates in unity. Let us take any number, let it be two, which serves as a means for the One when it produces other numbers. See that the “two-ness” is different from the One, and it is made one, and is, thus, one-and-not-one: one as “two-ness” and not one because it is two (Commentaries, prop. 2. 19. 21–25).

The passage logically implies that Infinity also participates in Limit, appearing not as a parallel Principle to the latter, but subsequent to it. This is, obviously, not stated directly by Petritsi anywhere. A further point in this respect: the One, Limit and Infinity are related respectively to the mathematical one, three and two. Those three are paradigms of all numbers. But if the number three is after the number two, how can it be more principal than that which precedes it? How can three impose limit on two? I have partly examined this question in the chapter on Limit and Infinity, concerning the necessity of Limit’s governing the dividing action of Infinity. The Aristotelian analogy that I have already adduced in the chapter on the One (and shall repeat once more) will be helpful here as well: a sculptor acts according to a certain finality in his mind, and the final product of his work is posterior to his activity temporally, but essentially it is prior to this activity and governs it. The final cause can be compared to Limit, activity to Infinity and the subject of the sculptor to the One, because a subject cannot be reduced either to his ideas or to his actions, but transcends both. Henads are identified with numbers, and just as numbers are more or less complex, so too are henads more or less one-like and more or less close imitators of the transcendent One (Commentaries, prop. 126. 164. 1–6). They are the first “flawless” and “changeless” images of the One (Commentaries, prop. 119. 159. 24–25; prop. 136 ( = 135). 169. 13–14), which is understandable in the light of the fact that in Petritsi’s system the One also contains the multiplicity of all numbers in seminal form. As less complex numbers have greater potentiality for the generation of other numbers, so they are closer images of the One. The simpler number-henads are paradigms of the

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higher ontological entities in the hierarchy of being, the henads under ten appearing as paradigms of the True Being and those above ten as paradigms of the lower entities. Yet also all those complex henads are gathered in the True Being, because it is the most universal monad of all the existent things and must contain all of them in the causal way. 251 Petritsi’s idea must be that, although the True Being is the place of union of all henads, only the “principal henads” (Commentaries, prop. 165. 184. 20) belong to it properly, while others do so in a supra-potential way. The True Being is explicitly a lower rank than henads; indeed, it is even less than the least of them, as all composite and “unified” entities are lower than “unitary” ones (Commentaries, prop. 164. 184. 2–5). The True Being is composed of the henads, which form the first “seeds” and stoicheions 252 of the beings (Commentaries, prop. 40. 97. 1–3), but, as the Gelatian philosopher warns his students, we should not be deceived by the analogy into thinking that the True Being by virtue of being whole is more principal than its supra-essential parts. On the contrary, the constituents, the “parts” of the True Being, that is, the henads, are neither particularized parts of, nor fragments of, nor something less than the whole; rather, each one of them is itself unitary and whole. The seed analogy is also misleading, for a seed grows from imperfection to perfection, but the elements of the True Being, the henads, are on the contrary, hyper-perfect (Commentaries, prop. 40. 97. 5–6). From this perspective, each of the henads must necessarily contain (or better to say precontain) all the divine attributes or properties, just as the True Being contains them, but on a higher level. In fact, if even one single property or attribute were excluded from any of the henads, it would cease to be hyper-perfect, and the True Being would necessarily excel it from the point of view of fullness, because in the True Being, as Petritsi asserts, there is the union of all henads 253 (Commentaries, prop. 160.

That monads participate in the group of henads is stated also by Proclus (prop. 162). Dodds, however, finds this problematic: “We have learned that for each henad there is a particular real existent and for each real existent a particular henad (prop. 135): how, then, can a group of henads be participated by toV ajmeqevkto" o[n or by the unparticipated Intelligence or Soul which should (by prop. 21) be single principles?” Dodds, op. cit., 282. 252 Petritsi transliterates the Greek: stoicei'on (“element”). 253 In this sense, Petritsi’s True Being, as a container of henads kata methexin, is somewhat similar to the Iamblichean One-Being (toV e}n o[n), which John M. Dillon identifies with the first member of the triad Being–Life–Intellect, and which, as the 251

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181. 15–16). In this, again, Petritsi differs from Proclus, for whom the henads are not elements of Being, those elements being “participations” or “traces” of the transcendent henads. In Proclus’ case it would be equally unwarranted to assert, at least explicitly, that each henad contains on a higher level the same fullness of attributes or properties that is contained by Being Itself. iii. The Hierarchy of the Henads and the Mode of Their Activity Petritsi devotes a great deal of space to the theories concerning the hierarchical disposition of the henads and the structure of their activity. The following is an attempt to present the picture of the philosopher’s exposition. As we have observed, the procession of the henads derives from the heads and monads of the henadic series—the First Limit and the First Infinity—in two respective series, and among them there is also primacy and subsequence: those closer to the One are more god-like, and those further from the One are less god-like (Commentaries, prop. 146 ( = 145). 174. 13– 15); the henads revert to the heads of their series (that is, to the pair Limit/Infinity) through their middle terms (Commentaries, prop. 133 ( = 132). 168. 10–14). Petritsi illustrates the correspondence of the hierarchy of the henads with that of the beings: from the higher henads who “give from themselves” (that is, are participated in), their posterior henads are produced, emanating from them as a radiance of the former, so that some of the henads are in the True Being, which is the First Intellect, others in particular intellects, still others in the unitary Soul, and so on (Commentaries, prop. 164. 183. 27 – 184. 2). The henads are distributed according to the natures to which they are related: those henads that “shine” in the True Being are the most divine (Commentaries, prop. 164. 184. 7–8). Down the transverse series, the henads spread upon all and in the same way as there is superiority and inferiority among the beings; there is also a hierarchical structure of the henads “implanted” or “engrafted” in them. Hierarchy is evident in the different grades of revelation of the same properties according to different strata of reality. This we learn from the commentary on prop. 146 ( = 145) where Petritsi just repeats after Proclus 254 same scholar observes, “just is the sum-total of the henads.” Dillon, “Iamblichus and Henads Again,” 50–51. 254 This is a rather exceptional chapter in the Elements of Theology, for in it Proclus refers to an example and applies his abstract construction to the concrete existences. Conversely, this is the normal method of exposition for Petritsi. As Proclus

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that the same properties are in stones in an inanimate manner, in plants in a psychic manner, in animals in an appetitive manner (as he puts it, in the fashion of “striving-for”), in intellects in an intellectual manner, and so on. The hierarchy is constituted not only according to the modes in which the properties are revealed, but also according to their more or less explicit manifestation in the different strata: for instance, when I vaguely see an object from a far distance and identify it with an animal, on closer inspection it not only appears to be a sheep, but at the same time appears to be a sheep not vaguely but by now already clearly. That is to say that the change of perception happens both in a “substantive” sense, my sight substantiating the animal as a sheep, and in an “adverbial” sense, which is to say that the animal is seen more clearly. Thus on their level the henads are altogether beyond conception; they are first revealed in the True Being, but in a “most/more hidden” manner, and then more clearly in Eternity and the Living Being-Itself, 255 and so on; we can more and more easily distinguish the divine properties according to the declining order of reality (Commentaries, prop. 162. 182. 15–25). Why is this so? The answer, I think, lies in Petritsi’s discourse about the difference between corporeal (perceptible) and incorporeal (imperceptible) reality. In corporeal reality we always witness opposing “whatnesses” (or “quiddities”), and the corporeal is limited by spatial and temporal dimensions (Commentaries, prop. 27. 74. 16–18). But “whatnesses” or properties inside the incorporeal realm do not oppose, or fight with, each other. At this point it is appropriate to cite the philosopher’s example concerning the soul: the soul contains all “whatnesses,” that is, forms, colors, and so on, but they are in harmony, not fighting. The fact that the Empedoclian law of strife governs corporeal reality (Commentaries, prop. 29. 79. 22–23) is necessary: any corporeal reality, insofar as it has a certain “whatness” or property, by that very fact already excludes the other “whatnesses” and properties. A wooden chair cannot at the same time be a wooden cup, because it is subject to space and time, 256 the form of a cup at does this for him here, Petritsi just repeats him, making only slight emendations for precision. 255 This translates Proclus’ term “toV aujtozw/`on”. On the Proclian notion of the aujtozw/`on, see Jan Opsomer, “Deriving the Three Intelligible Triads from the ‘Timaeus’,” in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Actes du Colloque International de Louvain (13 – 16 mai 1998), 351–372. 256 And subject to logical constraints too: such laws as Aristotle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction (first found in Plato, of course!) and Leibniz’s Indiscernibility of Identicals (or, better, one of its converses, the Non-Identity of Discernibles), the

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this moment being “suppressed” by that of the chair. However, in the soul, as Petritsi explains, “one kind of idea does not oppress the other kind” (Commentaries, prop. 27. 74. 21–23). The different things, properties, and so on concur in different degrees of reality, but concurrence in the corporeal realm by necessity ensues in opposition and struggle, while concurrence in the incorporeal world remains peaceful. On this point Petritsi appeals to the authority of Empedocles, in whose mouth he puts the following words: “‘The intellectual cosmos is ruled by love,’ which is unity, but this imitator of being, I mean perceptible reality, is ruled by the law of domination” 257 (Commentaries, prop. 29. 79. 21–23). The fact that the henadic properties are revealed with different clarity according to the ontological order should be considered in this light: just as the soul is more unitary and “all-embracing” than the body, so is the intellect in relation to the soul. Insofar as there are successive degrees of unity and simplicity—the two being the same (Commentaries, prop. 127. 164. 11–13)—so must there be successive degrees in the modes of revelation of the particular henadic properties: the True Being is more unitary than the rest, and therefore those properties are revealed in it in the most hidden way (Commentaries, prop. 162. 182. 19–21), and so on. The following scheme shows, for example, how the same numbers can be differently represented on different levels:

Principle of Bivalence and (more tangentially) the Law of the Excluded Middle will ensure that nothing can be a chair and a cup at the same time, even if the underlying material substrate, here wood, endures. To pursue modern analogies, it seems that the logic of the soul is somewhat fuzzier as well as less strifeful! 257 See Empedocles, Fr. B. 26, 5–6 (about filiva and nei`ko"). Petritsi’s interpretation seems to presuppose that of Plotinus in Enneads V. 1 [10]. 9. 5–7: Tw`/ deV jEmpedoklei~ toV nei`ko" meVn diaivrei, hJ deV filiva toV e{n—ajswvmaton deV kaiV aujtoV" tou`to [sc. fhsivn]—taV deV stoiceiva wJ" u{lh.

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The scheme shows that, for instance, the number two can be presented in the simplest way as two points, next in the two-dimensional world as a line, which has two ends, and finally in the three-dimensional world as a cone, which has two surfaces. Similarly, three points are revealed in the two-dimensional world as a triangle, which has three lines, and in the threedimensional world as a cylinder, which has three surfaces. The four points are revealed respectively as a quadrangle with four sides and a pyramid with four surfaces. The two-dimensional world can be compared to the ideal world and the three-dimensional to the corporeal. The number one, which brings forth the circle (one line) and the sphere (one surface), is a special case, because both figures are infinite—a line without beginning or end, and a surface without borders. Those figures model the unity of infinity in the purest, most paradigmatic way. Furthermore, the circle and sphere potentially contain all members of their respective dimensions: the infinite multiplication of the outer angles of two-dimensional shapes will culminate in the creation of a circle, and the infinite multiplication of the surfaces of three-dimensional shapes will end by forming a sphere. So the point and the figures deriving from it can be compared to the One and the monads of the horizontal series. The groupings of points can be compared to henadic numbers as Petritsi understands them: nothing can be said about them, unless it be that they are not one, but are, at the same time, also one in the sense that each of the point-groups has a distinct identity by means of which it differs from the other point-groups. Thus their different potentialities remain “hidden” in themselves, being revealed on the lower levels, only in which do we discern that they are Principles of different shapes. Henadic numbers are called the “unitary paradigms” (Commentaries, prop. 28. 76. 35), because they are the seminal pluralities, prefiguring the pluralities in all the other realms of existence. Underneath the henadic

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sphere, there are three successive orders of numbers: ideal, mathematical and natural, for “the composition of beings is divided in three” (Commentaries, prop. 3. 24. 3–5). Those three orders must apply, respectively, to the ideal, the psychic and the natural worlds. Thus the copying will be of the following pattern: 1. henadic numbers (or the “theological numbers”)

q

2. ideal numbers (intellects)

q

3. psychic numbers (souls)

q

4. natural numbers (bodies) After this short account of the hierarchical order of the henads, let us proceed to a discussion of Petritsi’s exposition of the structure of the henadic activities. The case is examined especially in a commentary on prop. 165: the principal henads fill the True Being immediately, but to the intellects they spread through the mediation of the latter; to Soul through the mediation of Intellect and to the celestial bodies through the mediation of Intellect and Soul. In the commentary on prop. 123 we read that all the powers that are in the divine bodies (stars) are also in the “psychic sky and cycle,” the powers of the psychic sky are in the “intelligent sky,” and the powers of the intelligent sky preexist in the intelligible sky, or True Being. Finally the powers of the True Being preexist in the sphere of the henads (Commentaries, prop. 123. 162. 15–20). The powers and properties of the henads are revealed to the existences of their corresponding series through the mediation of existences of the higher adjacent horizontal series. From Petritsi we also know that the henads of each order engender—and hence, following his system, are participated in by—the head of the series: a monad (Commentaries, prop. 125. 163. 15–16). The members of each series receive their simple existence from the transcendent One and the particular properties and identities (literally, “whatnesses”) of those properties from the particular henads (Commentaries, prop. 138 ( = 137). 170. 9–10). Petritsi mentions three criteria for the classification of each being: 1) The most general is how far it is from the One. 2) The next is its role in “mutual participation,” that is to say, the fate that is allotted to it: does it

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belong to artioi (hence to Infinity) or to perittoi (to Limit)? 258 3) The last is its place in the horizontal series, that is to say, its relation to the whole to which it belongs, that is to say, to the head or monad of its own series, as species to its genus (Commentaries, prop. 21. 60. 29 – 61. 3). This threefold distinction must mean, respectively, the following: 1) to which series, to which level of reality, the existent belongs; 2) what general function it has inside the series: that of preservation (the predominance of Limit) or that of production (the predominance of Infinity); 3) how this general function of a particular entity is related to its monadic cause, in other words, its place in the hierarchy within the horizontal series. According to this model, the monad appears as an indicator of the level of existence for each being, whereas the henads reveal the particular properties inside this level. As Dodds puts it, the monad furnishes the generic character of the existence, but the existent’s specific character comes from its immaterial exemplar. 259 The role of henads also can be expressed in those terms: to bestow a specific character upon the existents in different series. The henads in Petritsi’s exposition appear as root principles of the discrete existences: “The seeds [or semen] 260 of the One and the Good are sown in all the beings” (Commentaries, prop. 43. 102. 20). They are compared to “sources” (Commentaries, prop. 14. 48. 29), “poles” and “axes” for each being: 261 “First the ones are driven in by the First One as seeds of the beings and, having created around themselves a certain genus of existence, are like motionless poles for their genera, as is the axis [he uses the word kentro-i, derived from the Greek kevntron] for the sphere” (Commentaries, prop. 15. 48. 30 – 49. 3). They are called also the “first abysses of unity and goodness” (Commentaries, prop. 134 ( = 133). 168. 27–28) and the “unitary lights” that the One sows everywhere as causal seeds (Commentaries, prop. 15. 48. 37–31). The henads are to be seen in every stratum of reality, being present in all that in any respect enjoys the possession of a genus and idea. They build up a Insofar as in each existence is a mixture (Greek: miktovn)—in Petritsi’s translation a “definition,” i.e., that of Limit and Infinity—it is not the absence of the one that determines the fate of the existence but the prevailing of a characteristic element (or “whatness”) of the one over the other (Commentaries, prop. 159. 181. 3–7). 259 And this must be conducted with the aid of its mirroring/congenial existence in the upper adjacent series. Dodds, op. cit., 255. 260 Cf. In Parmenidem 1045. 11–12: toV e}n uJp– aujtou~ metecovmenon, oi|on spevrma katabeblhmevnon eij" aujtovn… 261 I think that the two other expressions of Petritsi are applied to the same realm: the “flower” and “acme” (Greek: ajkmhv—“acme” or “summit”). 258

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hierarchical order, as do the beings that participate in them. The hierarchy can be viewed from two angles: a) according to the different strata of existence—for instance, we can distinguish between a henad of an intellect and that of a soul—and b) according to the being’s place inside a stratum—thus we have the henads of unitary souls and those of particular souls (Commentaries, prop. 15. 49. 5–10). Insofar as the henads in Petritsi’s system represent a kernel of each being, it is through them that the beings can strive for the supra-existent. Let us adduce Petritsi’s interpretative allusion to the passage of the Phaedrus (249e) concerning the soul, in which he states that the soul first embraces its innate one and god through which it gets in touch with the “ineffable Sun of the ones” (Commentaries, prop. 15. 49. 29). The higher ontological entities, the incorporeal ideas, strive too first of all to their proper henads—the supreme Principles of their identities—which are “causes of their existence and gods and seeds of the One in them” (Commentaries, prop. 43. 102. 18–26). As lower existences are caused by the higher, correspondingly their “centers”—or henads—have the same relationship. iv. The Analogy of Light Henads are said by Petritsi to pervade the composition of all beings and divinize everything by their divine light (Commentaries, prop. 143 ( = 142). 172. 19–27). Being distinct, they are at the same time unitary, but are conceived as different only due to the lack of ability of the recipients (Commentaries, prop. 143 ( = 142). 172. 24). Here Petritsi establishes an analogy with the rays of the sun: they are thought to be distinct (in the spectral colors) from the point of view of the recipients, but in themselves they are unitary, “as ones from the one disk.” Similarly should be taken the supra-essential and unitary suns—the henads, as they are shed or shot forth from the unique and supreme One (Commentaries, prop. 143 ( = 142). 172. 25–27). The passage indicates that, although there is a real distinction in henads, in their own realm the distinction is neither perceivable nor of any use. This is as if beings compelled henads to acknowledge their differences, which otherwise they would not be inclined to do: when there is no war, all the soldiers may be seen as one mass, but as soon as war starts, different soldiers are assigned to discrete functional groups; as war reveals the hidden diversity of soldiers; so may beings be said to reveal the hidden henadic differences. The analogy of the unitary light shows that the unity of all the henads is incomparably more principal a thing than their difference. The notion of hierarchy vanishes on their own level, as there is no hierarchy between older

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and younger, or more and less gifted brothers, insofar as they are all sons and share one undivided love of their parents. The failure of beings to reflect the whole henadic fullness implies two aspects: 1) In the more general sense, beings belonging to a certain ontological level are unable to understand the “frequency” of those henads that divinize another level, as souls are unable to receive the radiation of intellectual henads; 2) On the particular level, that members of a series corresponding to the order of henads with this or that frequency (e.g., of intra- or supra-cosmic) can “hear” only certain overtones within this frequency, which brings about the intra-series differences. v. Henadic Theory and the Christian Worldview Finally, having tried to depict the henadic theory of Petritsi—although not, admittedly, exhaustively—it is appropriate to ask the following question: to which realm of the Christian universe does Petritsi apply his henads? In the last part of the Epilogue, which most probably is not from Petritsi’s pen, we read Pseudo-Nonnus’ commentaries on Gregory of Nazianzus’ epitaph on Basil the Great. According to this text, St. Basil adopted from mathematics those things that were proper from the Christian point of view, but rejected as futile such ideas as that numbers are divine powers and that God is governed by them, or that the created things are created according to numbers (Epilogue, 225). Yet all those ideas are maintained by Petritsi, with the exception of the notion that “God is governed by numbers.” He would rather have said that “God governs through numbers,” because henadic numbers are at the same time Providential Principles in his and Proclus’ metaphysics. Because henads are eternal Principles of individual classes of being, this will necessarily bring us to the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of genera and species. Moreover, which is most conspicuous, insofar as in Petritsi’s account each soul possesses an innate god-henad, this will lead to the assumption of the implicit divinity of each soul. Petritsi, similarly to Proclus, grants that man can fall short of his own henad if he does not lead a worthy life, making himself blind to the divine illumination. However, if the henadic god individually represents the very root of his existence, then any fall will be only temporary and relative. Henadic theory, actually, implies a necessary apocatastasis. In the “henadic light” the notions of eschatology and the last judgment lose any sense. The only way of Christianizing the theory would be to assume that an individual man can be deprived of his

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henad 262—as if of the divine grace—but this will introduce an absurdity, because individual man will then be some being external to the henad, but any individual being is such by virtue of the henad, so to fall short of the henad will be the same as to fall short of itself. Or does Petritsi imply that the supreme cause of individual identity is something preeternal and does not belong to an individual, and even if he is destroyed, his divine exemplar will always be intact? According to the last supposition, the henads could have been translated into Christian terms as divine plans for each person, with the freedom of the person to receive or to reject this plan. This, of course, cannot be the case, because henads are not simply divine thoughts, but themselves are hypostases, or, as Petritsi calls them, “supra-blessed gods and fathers.” Henadic theory both in Proclus and Petritsi is, as we have said above, on the one hand an attempt to solve the mystery of how the ultimate simplicity and unity of God can be connected in a causal way with the multiplicity of the world, and on the other an attempt to safeguard the transcendent Divinity’s real relation with and presence in the rest of the world. The same problem has been encountered and tackled by various Christian authors. It is especially important for Petritsi’s case to mention St. Maximus Confessor’s concept of logoi (that is, divine determinations) of beings preexisting in the Logos, 263 which can be paralleled to Petritsi’s henads as participating in their monad—Limit (that is, the Logos). The parallels could be drawn between Petritsi’s henads and St. Augustine’s notion of the eternal seminal ratios (as Augustine translates the Greek logoi 264) in the divine intelligence, or Eriugena’s notion of the “primordial causes” in the Word. 265 One can also call to mind St. Gregory of Palamas’ distinction between the oneness of divine essence and the multitude of the divine energies or operations. I cannot make a detailed comparison of these doctrines with Petritsi’s 262 In fact, Proclus seems to state in prop. 144 that individual being can be deprived of henad and turn to non-being: in Dodds’ translation, “If anything falls away from the gods and becomes utterly isolated from them, it retreats into nonbeing and is obliterated, since it is wholly bereft of the principles that maintained its unity.” Dodds, op. cit., 127. 263 Cf. St. Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Iohannem (PG 91, 1081 BD). 264 Cf. St. Augustine, De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, q. 46. 2. 265 On this, see Robert D. Crouse, “‘Primordiales Causae’ in Eriugena’s Interpretation of Genesis: Sources and Significance,” in Iohannes Scotus Eriugena, The Bible and Hermeneutics, ed. Gerd van Riel, Carlos Steel and James McEvoy (Leuven: Catholic University of Leuven Press, 1996).

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theory in the present study. At this moment one can only point to the similitude of the problems treated, but not to any identity of the solutions.

5 INTELLECT 1. SUMMARY OF PROCLUS’ THEORY OF INTELLECT The specific chapters concerning Intellect in the Elements of Theology start from prop. 166 after the series of propositions concerning the henads. Those eighteen “intellectual” propositions can be divided into three major groups, which may be termed thus: (i) hierarchical propositions (props. 166; 172; 175; 178; 181; 182; 183), (ii) propositions describing the dynamic property of intellects, that is to say, the property of intellection (props. 167; 168; 170; 174; 179), and (iii) propositions describing the static aspects of intellects, their structural or essential features (props. 169; 171; 173; 176; 177; 180). The basic hierarchy of intellects consists of the following ranks: the divine imparticipable intellects, the divine participable intellects, and the non-divine participable intellects (prop. 181). According to the general Proclian metaphysical rule, only the higher terms of a series have direct access to the higher adjacent series, while the rest can enjoy the same only through the mediation of the higher terms of their horizontal series (prop. 110). In relation to the lower hierarchy this means that the divine participable intellects are participated in by divine imparticipable souls (prop. 182), 266 whereas the non-divine participable intellects are participated in by non-divine, but eternal, souls (props. 175 and 183). This hierarchy must be supplemented by that described in prop. 166, where we read that the participated intellects are divided into two classes, some being participated in by imparticipable souls, the others by souls that are participated in by bodies. Two more propositions (props. 172 and 178) can be added to the list of the hierarchical propositions, as they state that intellect produces only eternal beings, However, it is not said in this proposition that the divine souls participating in the divine participable intellects are themselves imparticipable, but I think that this must be so, because in each order of being the imparticipable terms precede those participated in. 266

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from which it is evident that a perishable body cannot be produced directly by intellect but only through the mediation of other Principles. Let us first discuss the dynamic intellectual properties. The activity of the intellect consists of cognition, which for the Universal Intellect implies only self-cognition, whereas for particular intellects it implies both selfcognition and the cognition of their causal intellects (prop. 167). Cognition is necessarily accompanied by a reversion to itself and to its cause; the selfreversion may even be just another name for the same activity of cognition. Proclus denies the intellect knowledge of its effects on the grounds that higher terms cannot revert to the lower. Even if there were a hypothetical possibility of knowing the lower terms, the intellect would not know them objectively, but only according to imprints “suffered” (pevponqen) from them, that is to say, only in its own interiority (prop. 167. 144. 29–32). It is as if the intellect’s eyes are open only when it looks up (to cause) and within (to itself), but automatically shut when it looks down (to effects). It seems that the sequence of knowledge of particular intellects consists firstly in knowing their causes and, then in knowing themselves, for Proclus says that if an effect knows its cause it also must know that of which it is the cause, and so, through the knowledge that this is its own cause, it will also know itself (prop. 167. 146. 6–8). This must be not only a hypothetical proposition showing the logical impossibility of the knowledge of one’s cause without self-knowledge, but must describe a sequence of metaphysical events, as is evident from prop. 186 (although the last proposition concerns the soul and not the intellect). Prop. 168 proves that self-knowledge has three simultaneous aspects: (i) the knowledge of a thing, (ii) the awareness of the act of thinking and (iii) the knowledge that the thing known is itself. The last two aspects must involve a notion of self-transcendence of the thought, for intellect does not only automatically know the object of its understanding but can at the same time look at itself as if from outside and objectivize the act of thinking. A similar jump of abstraction is needed also for the third aspect—the identification of the thing seen with the self: I see an image in a mirror and then must make the further step of understanding that it is my image. A fourth step of abstraction of which Proclus does not speak is also possible, namely the objectivization of the thinking subject himself, the subject looking at himself as at an object, that is to say, when he knows not only that he thinks (ii), and not only that what he thinks of is himself (iii), but also that it is he who thinks, in terms of the Husserlian notion of a transcendental subjectivity. Prop. 169 makes it clear that all these aspects of knowledge must be taken as a simultaneous whole; if we have above indicated the logical se-

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quence needed for the abstraction of thought, we must not take this sequence as being temporal. Prop. 170 deals with the first aspect of cognition, that of its innate contents. All intellects know all things, and if we remember that intellect cognizes everything in its interiority, then it will follow that all intellects also contain all things in themselves. The differentiation of intellects conforms to the mode of the knowledge of things: particular intellects know everything from some particular aspect. Let us now move to the “static” propositions, which describe the constitution or, so to say, the essential features of the intellects—as we would examine a car before it starts moving. First of all, any intellect is an indivisible being, free from all of the following three features, according to which any entity can be divided: from magnitude, being incorporeal; from multiplicity, containing multiplicity in a simultaneous and unified mode; from any difference of the moments of operation, knowing all things at once. From the privation of all sorts of division it follows necessarily that intellect is an eternal being, a being changeless in all respects, and as we have seen above, the immediate effects of such terms should also be eternal. Prop. 173 repeats that the intellect contains in itself intellectually both its priors and its subsequents, from which it follows that intellect knows also its subsequent terms, not properly, but causally, that is to say, again in its interiority. By analogy we may suppose that it knows also its causes not properly but according to bestowal or participation of the causes possessed in itself, that is, also within itself. If above we have read that each intellect contains all things, that is, ta panta, now prop. 176 explains that these ta panta are ideas, among which there are more general and more particular ideas. The difference of the intellects is conditioned by the fact that to each of them properly is allotted one of the ideas, more or less universal, whereas all other ideas, which also must be in every single intellect, receive the qualification of this particular idea. This supplements the “dynamic” prop. 170, for now we see that to know according to a particular aspect is to know according to a particular idea properly contained. If all intellects can be described as “labeled” according to one particular idea, and if the ideas themselves are finite—lest there be an infinite regress within the intellects—then it will follow that intellects also are finite in number and their number must correspond to the entire number of the ideas. That intellects are finite in number is stated in prop. 179, yet Proclus applies another argument for proving this, saying that since there is in the lower strata of reality a greater number of entities—for what is further removed from the One is more multiple—the intellects

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must therefore be exceeded by the number of other beings, and that which is exceeded already cannot be infinite in number. Before we turn to Petritsi’s theory of Intellect we must consider the first intelligible triad of the Proclian universe. Proclus makes a significant change in the Plotinian universe by dividing the latter’s second hypostasis, which is simultaneously Being and Intellect, into three hypostases of Being, Life and Intellect. 267 Thus, the Intellect appears to be only the third entity of the spiritual universe. Being is the source of the initial definition of everything, the source of the most basic thing that can be said about any being. The dialectical system of the threefold hierarchy maintains that in order for something to intelligize, or “to intellect,” first it must be a living being (it is implied that there are two sorts of lives, intellectual and psychic). Conversely, for a living being there is no need for intellection. However, in order for something to live, it must first be “something,” that is to say, to have some definite form of existence. Life and Intellect appear as further specifications of the most basic form of existence, the hierarchy going down from the most general— Being—to the least general—intelligent beings. Prop. 103 states that each intellectual order contains members of the other orders in the mode appropriate to each. Being causally has in itself the other two; Life, acting as the middle term between Being and Intellect, has Being by virtue of participation and Intellect causally; finally, Intellect has both Being and Life by virtue of participation. Prop. 102 provides further clarification on this point, stating that in order for anything to exist, it must be a composite of Limit and Infinity. Insofar as Being is the first composite of Limit and Infinity, everything therefore derives this essential feature of composition from Being, given that every imparticipable Principle bestows upon the others its character. Life in turn appears to be the Principle of self-movement, because Life itself was first set in motion, that is to say, proceeded from Being. Insofar as it was first set in motion, Life is the proper Principle of any movement. Eventually, the third member of the triad, Intellect described as the first “thinker”; that is to say that its proper or principal function is thinking. This does not mean that thinking, noesis, Yet it was not Proclus who first introduced this division. As John M. Dillon writes, “From Porphyry onward the realm of Nous becomes a triad, o[n—zwhv—nou~", of which Nous itself is the outgoing principle, while toV o}n is the object of intellection.” See John M. Dillon, “The Concept of Two Intellects: A Footnote to the History of Platonism,” Phronesis 18 (1973): 180. 267

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is absent in Being and Life. On the contrary, there is an act of thinking in all three: “existential” thinking in Being and “life” thinking in Life. However, thinking proper, so to say, “thoughtful” thinking, pertains only to Intellect. To understand the difference we must call to our mind the two aspects characterizing every existence: the static aspect and the dynamic aspect. The first implies the most fundamental notion of a structure of existence, and the second its activity. Being is such a uniform reality that its activity, although it is not identical with its existence, still coincides with it; that is to say that it acts by its own existence. In Life there occurs the first change, which is a separation of the activity from the existence. We cannot separate the sun (cf. Being) from its shining, but we can separate a cloud (cf. Life) from its raining. Finally, in Intellect the activity, which was separated from the existence already in the reality of Life, receives further division and qualification, as we learn that the activity in Intellect is thinking. So, while in Life the activity of thinking coincided with, and was indistinguishable from, the activity of living, in Intellect they can be conceived as distinct operations. The “thought” of Intellect, the “life” of Life and the “existence” of Being describe their ontological positions, indicating the quality or mode of their existence, yet otherwise all three aspects are present in all three of them. If Life is the outcome of the first change of Being, Intellect is the outcome of the further change of Life, and precisely those two levels of the changes of Being are termed respectively “Life” and “Intellect.” To make it clearer how, for instance, thinking can exist on all three levels, let me apply a simile: when a man is healthy, his private doctor is not concerned about him, keeping him in his mind as if without thinking. Let us say that the man at this stage is in the doctor’s mind “existentially.” Yet when the man unhappily “moves” from health to illness, the doctor will already have him differently in his mind, because with the change of the man’s health some move will take place also in the doctor’s mind. This first move could be translated into ontological terms as the origin of Life, which according to the Platonic Theology first “shows forth” (profaivnein) the multiplicity that remained hidden in Being (Th.Pl. III. 12. 46. 7–10). In fact, Proclus himself compares this move to a certain pain or anguish: toV deV wjdi~non toV plh~qo" kaiV diakrivsew" ajrcovmenon (Th.Pl. III. 14. 50. 1–2). When, moreover, the illness reveals its definitive symptoms, so that the doctor may know already what precisely the illness is, so to say, the “pattern” of illness, a further move will occur in his mind as he starts thinking of precisely what treatment to apply to the illness. This last stage can be compared in ontological terms to the level of Intellect, the level on which, as we read in the

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Platonic Theology III. 13. 48. 19–20, there is first explicitly revealed (ejkfaivnein) the inner structural diversity, order and beauty of the intelligible essence, in which also the ideas are firstly formed (Th.Pl. III. 14. 51. 20). In fact, that which is hidden cannot yet be thought, and the revelation of the hidden is immediately followed by thinking of what is revealed.

2. PETRITSI’S THEORY OF INTELLECT i. The Image of the One Intellect in Petritsi’s philosophy holds the fourth rank, after the One, the dyad of Limit and Infinity and the henads, in the ladder of reality. It is the world of the intelligible, of the eternal ideas and the first monad of beings. It is constantly referred to by a hendiadys (e}n diaV duoi`n—a rhetorical tool expressing a single idea by two nouns instead of a noun and its qualifier) expression: “the First Essence and the First Being.” It is the first thing to which the term “being” can be applied. All the ideas, and primarily the five mevgista gevnh of the Sophist, 268 exist in Intellect, thenceforward illuminating and indeed causing the subsequent ontological strata. Being the most unitary compound of the multitude of ideas, it contains the totality of the ideas in a distinct and, at the same time, undivided and unmixed way. That is why Petritsi calls his Intellect the purest image of the transcendent One, which is its supra-essential paradigm and which also contains the multitude of numbers, but in a seminal, non-discriminated form (cf. Commentaries, prop. 55. 121. 33–36). However, in contrast to the One, Intellect is composed of a certain multiplicity, whereas the One is absolutely simple. Although the One prefigures in Itself all things, It does so not in a “unified” (she-ert-ebul-i) but in a “unitary” (ert-ebr-i) way (Commentaries, prop. 1. 13. 31–32), without any distinction. Intellect is the first order of reality in which composition occurs. As we have seen, for Petritsi there is a certain higher composition also in the henads, for they are constructed numerical units (cf. Commentaries, prop. 151. 176. 25–29), construction implying a composition. However, henadic composition is such a unitary one that it is not distinguishable for the mind. Intellect is the place where the supra-essential henads unite in order to be participated in by beings, for they are participable gods (cf. Commentaries, prop. 40. 97. 5–7; prop. 90. 143. 14–16). The intra-henadic distinctions are manifested only through the difference of beings that participate in them. The henads in themselves are beyond description, whereas 268

Cf. Sophist 254 d4 – 255 a2.

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Intellect is the first thing to be described in a positive way. It is continually called by Petritsi “the first order” (Commentaries, prop. 34. 87. 9), “the first beauty and the first adornment” (Commentaries, prop. 161. 182. 9–10), “the first alignment and the first composite” (Commentaries, prop. 8. 34. 9) and “the first pattern” (Commentaries, prop. 190. 196. 19). It is the icon of the One also in this respect: the One contains the multitude of henads in a unitary and “causal way” (kat’ aitian), while Intellect contains them only in a unified way “according to possession” (kata methexin; Petritsi sometimes translates the term as “according to participation,” tan-ziareb-it, and sometimes as “according to possession,” tan-qoneb-it). Accordingly, metaphysically speaking, the multitude proper, that is to say, the multitude kath’ hyparxin, is constituted by the henads themselves. Limit and Infinity, which are in the One consubstantially as transcendent supra-powers, constitute the First Intellect and are revealed in the latter in an immanent mode, that is to say on the plane of existence. Limit, or the creative Word of the One, constructs the structure and pattern of the True Being, whereas Infinity provides Being with infinite power for the generation of beings (Commentaries, prop. 32. 84. 20–23; prop. 89. 142. 21–24). Moreover, even the supra-existent and transcendent One Itself—and this doctrine is, significantly enough, at variance with Proclus’ system—is established on the plane of existence in the True Being. In fact, the One represents the center of Being: “Consider as the center of the True Being the One Itself” (Commentaries, prop. 10. 37. 21–22). Petritsi is not, however, consistent on this point, for in another place he says that not the One Itself, but one of the highest henads, closest to the One, is the center of the True Being: Not one and the same henad is implanted in all beings, for the henad of the True Being is different, being closest to the First One, the henads of the intellectual beings are different, and also the henads of souls, natures and corporeal beings are all different from each other (Commentaries, prop. 15. 49. 5–9).

Intellect is a unity of essence, potency and act, that is, intellection. Its essence comprises the eternal changeless actualization of cognitive potency. Intellect does not think something outside itself, but its own structure, consisting of the orderly and hierarchically arranged multitude of ideas. To compare, as our ears hear sounds around us involuntarily or essentially, so that we cannot not hear them unless we block them, so it is ontologically natural for Intellect to know. My simile is, however, not exact, for sounds come from the outside, whereas Intellect’s cognition is directed inwards. Thus in the hypostasis of Intellect there is unmixed essential unity in two ways: (1) first, in the static and structural sense: the indivisible unity of its

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innate ideas, which build up its structure or “essence”; (2) second, in the dynamic and hypostatic sense: the indivisible unity of its essence and operation. The following passage from the commentary of prop. 20 gives an account of both aspects of unity and of plurality in Intellect. Petritsi comments on Proclus’ nou~" gaVr eij kaiV ajkivnhto", ajll– oujc e{n: noei~ gaVr eJautoVn kaiV ejnergei~ periV eJautovn (prop. 20. 22. 24–25), “For the Intelligence, although unmoved, is yet not unity: in knowing itself, it is object of its own activity,” 269 as follows: Proclus says that “Intellect acts within its property” [noei' gaVr eJautoVn kaiV What does this mean? In fact, the expression “acts within itself” indicates motionlessness, for Intellect is not in need of anything outside itself, in order that it might revert to it, but has all the ideas of the beings in itself. Moreover, it has them not like the soul, in a psychic way, but in an intellectual and ideal way. However, by this very fact, it is deprived of the honor and power of the Unity, for by having the ideas within itself it becomes a place of ideas and is multiplied. In fact, all the activities of Intellect reach as far as the beings that possess ideas. It observes the plurality of ideal ornaments in itself and turns its activity back to itself. Thus it is, so to say, doubled, and is deprived of, and divided from, the Unity (Commentaries, prop. 20. 58. 11–21).

ejnergei' periV eJautovn]

From the theological point of view there is an interesting question to ask: to what reality of the Christian universe does Petritsi equate the First Intellect? In the Epilogue Intellect is unambiguously called the Son, that is, the second hypostasis of the Trinity: “The First Intellect and Being, which is the Son, the place of all ideas” (Epilogue, 212. 7–10); “Through God’s Power, which is the Spirit, the essence of all the beings is maintained in the Son, who is Essence and Being” (Epilogue, 210. 9–11). However, in the commentaries, the Son, the Creative Word of the One, is Limit, which is not Being, but a reality above it. Moreover, Limit is not “the place of ideas,” but their Principle—“the Idea of Ideas.” How can this apparent contradiction be accounted for? The following passage may suggest a solution to this problem: Proclus says: “Everything that participates in the One is one and not one” [Elements of Theology, prop. 2] that is to say, such an entity is a created one. However, anything that is created needs, as Parmenides explained to Socrates, three [aspects]: first, that one towards which it is made, that is to say, whence it impressed in itself the image of the One; second, 269

This is Dodds’ translation. See Dodds, op. cit., 23.

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that by which it is made and unified; third, the parts of which it consists. In fact, [Parmenides] meant in the first (i) that [one] that has shone out from the One and has been established as Its property and likeness, as Its ekmageion or impression, which afterwards becomes an image—for, in general, impressions precede images that come after those impressions. In the second (ii) (he meant) the Power that proceeds from the One that makes patterns and parts of the Composed Essence and assimilates it to Its [i.e., the One’s] own uncreated unity, and in the third (iii) he meant precisely the parts from which it [i.e., the True Being] is composed. And he [Parmenides] sums it up in those words: “Everything is perfected by three” (Commentaries, prop. 1. 17. 6–20).

In a recently published study, “Ioane Petritsi: a Witness of Proclus’ Works in the School of Psellus,” 270 Gerd van Riel and I gave a preliminary analysis of this passage. The attempt to find its precise sources in Proclus’ works was unsuccessful. However, some similar elements were discovered in the Platonic Theology, in Th.Pl. IV. 25. 76. 9–20 and V. 34. 126. 11–17. In that study we examined the text and explained the fact that the doctrine that Petritsi attributes to Parmenides displays more similarity with the Platonic Theology than with In Parmenidem, by the hypothesis that Petritsi might have considered the Platonic Theology as the continuation of the extant part (Books I-VII) of In Parmenidem. However, at present, another hypothesis seems to me more plausible: Petritsi might refer here to the lost part of In Parmenidem, which—as is also the case with the extant part—might have resembled at many points the explanation in the Platonic Theology. Now let me turn to the theological interpretation of this text, which we have only tangentially treated in the study mentioned above. By the first aspect out of the three, Petritsi apparently understands the Son (Limit), which he calls elsewhere also “image and ekmageion of the One” (Commentaries, prop. 29. 78. 7–9), by the second, the Power proceeding from the One, he understands the Holy Spirit (Infinity), and by the third—the parts of the True Being—the henads. For our inquiry the most interesting point is that an ekmageion or imprint is the Principle of the image, and that the Son first is ekmageion, which then becomes image. Now, “the image of the One” is the usual epithet of the True Being throughout the commentaries. So it may be that Limit is the Principle of the True Being in the same way that ekmageion is the Principle of image. And if the ekmageion becomes, as we have read, image, then it may be that in the same way Limit becomes the True Being. We will get a unity of Logos and Intellect in the reality of the True Being. 270

Gigineishvili and van Riel, op. cit., 571–588.

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This will raise a problem, for Limit and Intellect are clearly different hypostases in the commentaries. How, then, will the two distinct hypostases constitute the one hypostasis of the Son? And what does it mean to say that the Logos creates for itself its eternal Intellect? In fact, if my interpretation of the passage is valid, Petritsi’s idea very closely resembles the EvagrianOrigenist doctrine on the preexistent intellect of Christ, which was condemned at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in Constantinople (553 AD). And there is another difficulty in this respect: the True Being according to Neoplatonist hierarchy is lower not only than Limit, but also than the henads, which are its noetoi. What will this subordination mean from the theological point of view? ii. Aspects of Existence If the One is the supra-existent transcendent cause of the whole of reality, the First Being is a kind of a vicar or deputy of the One on the level of existence, that is to say, “it is the god of all the existent things” (Commentaries, prop. 139 ( = 138). 170. 27). In this sub-chapter I shall adduce a lengthy passage from Petritsi’s commentary describing the different meanings of the notion of “existence.” The passage enlightens us as to why the True Being is called “Being,” and shows the specific function of this term in relation to the more general aspect of existence deriving from the One. The polysemantism of the concept of “existence” is well illustrated by the way in which Petritsi translates the eighteenth proposition of the Elements of Theology: Pa'n toV tw'/ ei\nai 271 corhgou'n a[lloi" aujtoV prwvtw" ejstiV tou'to, ou| metadivdwsi toi'" corhgoumevnoi". Petritsi’s translation is as follows: “Everything that gives existence (a-oba) to the others first itself is (ars) being (mkhop) and existence (a), which [properties] it gives from itself to the recipients.” As we see, Petritsi expands the reference of the pronoun tou'to so that it may refer to the notions of “being” and “existence” (mkhop and a). Moreover, although ejstiV is translated by him as a copula, still, as the commentary makes us understand, it also includes in itself the notion of existence, just as if the stress were on the first syllable: e[sti. Accordingly, if we retranslate the Georgian text generated by Petritsi’s creative interpretation into Greek, we get a text that surely never existed: Pa'n toV toV ei\nai corhgou'n a[lloi" aujtoV prwvtw" e[sti, kaiV ejstiV o]n kaiV u{parxi", ou| metadivdwsi toi'"

At this point, toV tw/` ei\nai is Dodds’ emendation of the text transmitted by the entire manuscript tradition as toV toV ei\nai. Clearly, the latter is also the variant that Petritsi read in his manuscript. 271

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corhgoumevnoi".

As is evident from the commentary, Petritsi needed the insertion of the three Georgian terms (ars, mkhop and a) related to “being” not for the sake of the explanation of Proclus’ text but for the sake of an independent discourse on three different shades of this notion. As he writes, Existence (a), essence (ars) and being (mkhop) are distinguished from each other. In fact, (i) “essence” (ars) carries with itself its definition, and is self-subsisting essence, not in need of anything else that may have sustained its subsistence. That is to say, it is not in need of anything adventitious, called “accidents” by the Peripatetics, who considered only the natural bodies. On the contrary, the great Plato says that all things that appear as accidents here are essence in the sphere of the True Ornament and the True Being. In fact, the pattern there is essence, whereas here it appears as accident. And there the three dimensions, colors and shapes are incorporeal essences, whereas here they exist accidentally and adventitiously. Plato distinguishes there five genera: essence, identity, difference, rest, motion; 272 and he says that all essences derive from the First Essence, all ideas and identities of ideas from the first Identity, all divisions and differentiations from the first Difference, all remaining in its proper identity from the first Rest, and all creative and generative motion from the First Motion. In fact, all things that you see as accidents here, in the contemplation of nature, are essences and genera there. However, when you say (ii) “being” (mkhop), it marks the common name for the essence and the accident, as Aristotle says. Therefore, being is a broader notion than essence, insofar as it contains more. Now, (iii) how is the “existence” divided from essence and being? Conceive, O contemplator, that when you say “essence” or “being,” you immediately project a certain idea of a thing contemplated. However, when “existence” (a) is the sole signifier, it only separates something from non-existence, and introduces that thing into the class of the things existing, but yet without an idea and definition. Only after “it exists” is predicated of something may one ask the question “What does exist?” And the answer may be “fire,” “air,” “intellect” or “soul,” that is to say, any idea whatsoever of beings. We have considered this most important matter in passing (Commentaries, prop. 18. 54. 3 – 55. 4)

As we see, these three notions mean, respectively, (i) the eternal Platonic ideas, to which Petritsi, a staunch realist, grants independent substantial existence, (ii) an individual being, a unity of matter and idea (simply, the Aristotelian tovde tiv), and (iii) the existence in its simplest sense, that is to say, the totally undefined “being.” 272

Cf. Sophist 254 d4 – 255 a2.

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Now, first the One is the transcendent source of this simple existence for all beings. Not in the way in which the One Itself participates in this simple existence, let us call it u{parxi"; rather, it is beyond even that. In turn, the True Being is the source of “whatness” in u{parxi". There are some inconsistencies in Petritsi’s language and expressions, for sometimes he says that each effect has its very existence or “is-ness” (a-oba) through participation in its proximate cause. Ultimately, though, the proper cause of existence cannot be anything other than the One, because even the highest Being, the True Being, cannot reach matter, which exists without any definable “whatness.” Thus, the True Being, which is the storehouse of the Platonic ideas, is the source of all the definable things, or of everything that has an idea and that is a subject for description and dialectical analysis. iii. Immediate and Mediated Effects of Intellect Insofar as the First Being is unmoved and eternal, the things produced by it without mediation are also changeless and eternal, at least in some respect. Such are all the particular intellects, souls—which are eternal in a special way, by virtue of their essence, but temporal with regard to their operation—and, which is curious, also the physical bodies of stars and the planets and the immaterial ochemata of intelligent souls. 273 As for the mediated causation, the ideal intellectual lights pass through all the strata of reality down to the stones and minerals. According to the general ontological law, the higher terms stretch their activities longer: for instance, the soul and nature do not reach down to the minerals and the four elements. But this does not mean that the motionless material objects are produced immediately by the intellects. Were this the case, they would be eternal, changeless monuments of their archetypal causes. This is clearly refuted by empirical observation. What happens, in fact, is that the illumination of the intellect passes through the mediation of all the subsequent degrees, and the further down it goes, the more darkened and multiple it becomes. This happens due to the gradual change of proportion between the two parallel Principles—Likeness and Difference—in the construction of beings: There is neither Likeness without Difference, nor Difference without Likeness. 274 However, in some spheres there is a domination of Like273 274

I shall discuss this question in the next chapter. Cf. Parmenides 148 A5–7; 148 B3–4.

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ness, as in the intellectual and intelligent universe, in other spheres that of Difference, as in the perceptible beings. In fact, where matter intervenes, there the light of the Identity and Likeness darkens (Commentaries, prop. 35. 88. 1–6).

This intervention of “matter” happens in all the strata of reality. Insofar as the term “matter” in this passage is semantically linked with the metaphysical notion of the “Difference,” the word should be understood not exclusively in its basic meaning, as prime matter, but as the general Principle of separation and multiplication. The smaller the degree of unity, the greater the dispersion. The ultimate degree of dispersion occurs when the separate things cannot occupy the same place at all. At this point we reach the perceptible material world. For instance, when we imagine two spheres one placed within another, in our imagination we do not consider any coarse matter, but only some imaginary fine or subtle matter, which allows our spheres to occupy the same place. 275 But when the Difference divides the two spheres, they will occupy already different and coarser places, which will not allow them the previous interpenetration without ruining, or mixing with, each other. In the same way, the intellectual properties, which are in unity and mutual harmony in the higher spheres, are in a dispersed and shadow-like mode in the corporeal reality. Thus writes Petritsi on stones and minerals: Learn that the corporeal ideas imitate the intelligent ideas, for they possess different distinctive properties and powers. For, as we have studied, there are different distinctive powers and activities also in stones: for instance, in the jacinth and the amethyst, or in the diamond and the mag-

275 In fact, this image is quite warranted in the light of Proclus’ metaphysics, according to which bodies can interpenetrate. For instance, R. Sorabji notes that in space, which for Proclus is the body of the supra-celestial light, there is implanted the whole spherical cosmos: “Proclus seems to have been the only person in antiquity to have made place a body.” R. Sorabji, “Proclus on Place and the Interpenetration of Bodies,” in Proclus—Lecteur et interprète des Anciens. Actes du colloques international du C.N.R.S Paris (2–4 octobre 1985) (Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S., 1987), 297. Petritsi seems not to follow Proclus on this point, but to adopt, on the contrary, the teaching of Iamblichus on the incorporeality of space: “As Iamblichus says, the parts of an incorporeal entity are also incorporeal, for an incorporeal entity cannot consist of corporeal parts, whereas, on the contrary, a body can consist of incorporeal [things], as any body has epiphaneia and other dimensions” (Commentaries, prop. 17. 51. 16–20).

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI net. How could those differences exist, if not due to the Principles and causes? (Commentaries, prop. 57. 125. 5–11).

iv. Intellectual Hierarchy For Petritsi, the hierarchy of the intellectual sphere consists of the triad of (i) the First Intellect, that is to say, the True Being (toV o[ntw" o[n), (ii) the Living-Being-Itself (aujtozw/~on) and (iii) Eternity (aijwvn). Petritsi, in contrast to Proclus, identifies the True Being with the First Intellect. On the one hand it might seem that the divergence is only of a terminological character. In fact, even in Proclus the First Being is the first term of the intellectual world being a part of this world, and not outside it. For instance, in prop. 57 of the Elements of Theology, Proclus, without going into details of threefold discrimination inside the intellectual sphere, presents an ascending hierarchy of Soul, the Nous and the One. 276 Yet, on the other hand, we may observe that Petritsi significantly simplifies Proclus’ system, insofar as he has no imparticipable causes in the intellectual sphere other than the True Being. At the same time, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, the “imparticipability” of the True Being, as well as of all other monads, is understood by him in terms significantly different from those of Proclus. According to Petritsi the True Being is imparticipable in the sense that it has nothing higher in the intellectual sphere in which it could participate, while all the subsequent intellects participate in the True Being. Accordingly, Petritsi omits the concepts of imparticipable Living-Being-Itself and imparticipable Eternity (Intellect) in his system. Petritsi applies the following expression, inspired by the Timaeus 30 d 1–2 (simply transliterating the Greek words into Georgian letters) ton onton ariston kai ton noumenon kaliston to the True 276 The unknown author of the Liber de Causis makes a move similar to that of Petritsi in identifying the First Being with the First Intellect (“ens autem creatum primum, scilicet intelligentia”—Liber de Causis XVI). See A. Pattin, ed., “Le Liber de Causis, Edition établie à l’aide de 90 mss. avec introduction et notes,” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 28 (1966): 90–203. As Leo Sweeney remarks on this point, “Hence in IV, 164, 3 (‘esse est… supra intelligentiam’) what our author meant to say is, most likely, that the First Created Being is above every lower intelligence (‘supra [inferiorem] intelligentiam’). Perhaps, though, the problem cannot be solved so easily, since Proclus, too, is caught in a similar inconsistency. At times Being is above intelligence, because Being is intelligible (nohtovn) and prior to Nous. More commonly, however, Being and Intelligence are identical (e.g., Dodds, op. cit., 22 on prop. 20, 114 on prop. 129, etc.).” Leo Sweeney, “Research Difficulties in the ‘Liber de Causis’,” The Modern Schoolman 36 (1959): 112, n. 27.

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Being itself (Commentaries, prop. 8. 34. 11–12), whereas Proclus uses similar expressions for the third member of the third intelligible triad, Intellect: ejkei~ gaVr toV nohtoVn plh~qo" kaiV hJ tavxi" kaiV hJ kallonhV prwvtw" ejkfaivnetai, dioV kaiV kavlliston ejkei~no toV o]n tw~n nooumevnwn aJpavntwn (Th.Pl. III. 13. 48. 20–22). 277

Since the expression in Proclus refers to the paradeigma of Plato’s Timaeus (cf. Th.Pl. III. 15. 52. 23 – 53. 4), we can safely infer that Petritsi equates the First Being with the Paradigm. It seems that it happens only once that Petritsi is obliged, by the unequivocal text of prop. 101 of the Elements of Theology, to make a distinction between the True Being and the First Intellect, identifying the latter with the third term of the intellectual triad, Eternity (Proclus’ theorem reads thus: Pavntwn tw'n nou' metecovntwn hJgei'tai oJ ajmevqekto" nou'", kaiV tw'n th'" zwh'" hJ zwhv, kaiV tw'n tou` o[nto" toV o[n: aujtw'n deV touvtwn toV meVn o]n proV th'" zwh'", hJ deV zwhV proV tou' nou'):

These theories draw a clear distinction between the First Being and the First Intellect. Understand as the First Being the True Being, for it is the first entity that got its being from the Power that transcends all the beings and powers. And it was established as the First Being and as the cause of all the beings, as the image of the First One. The Ineffable and the Transcendent-of-all has established the True Being as its image and as the paradigm of all the beings; logical proofs do not suffice for grasping the divine luster of its patterns… Life was established after it—in fact, the essence of Life is contained in the True Being—and the essence of Intellect was established after Life. That this is so is revealed by their participants and subsequents: as was said in the first commentaries, the further a cause reaches in its production of effects, the more powerful it is and the higher its essence is established. Now, the True Being stretches further its creative power [i.e., further than the First Life and the First Intellect], for it is the cause of all things that can be called “be277 Petritsi sides rather with Plotinus in this identification of Being and Intellect and in the ascription of the notion of “beauty” to the First Being (cf. Enneads I. 6. 6. 26–27; V. 9. 2. 22–23). Significantly, Michael Psellus in his Opusculum phil. 33 (PeriV tw~n ijdew~n a}" oJ Plavtwn levgei) describes the highest intellect (oJ pantavpasi cwristoV" kaiV tw`n a[llwn novwn uJperkeivmeno") in Plotinian terms, as the “intelligible beauty,” and similarly to Petritsi identifies it with the First Being: aujtoV dhV toV prwvtw" o]n kaiV kurivw" kaiV ajrcevtupon o[n, in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, p. 113, 19–20. Moreover, both Psellus and Petritsi (Commentaries, prop. 130. 166. 27) follow Plotinus in describing the intellect as posited at the “threshold” of the One: ejn proquvroi" tajgaqou` (Enneads V. 9. 2. 18–26).

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI ings,” that is to say, that have some share in ideas, no matter whether they are animate or inanimate. However, Life stretches its processions until the animate beings, and again, Intellect just until those that participate in Intellect—there are, actually, many animals that possess life but are deprived of intellect (Commentaries, prop. 101. 148. 1–24).

The quotation raises difficulties, for from it follows an apparent contradiction as regards the general metaphysical rule. Precisely, how can it be that Eternity (that is to say, Intellect), which is a part of the intellectual sphere, falls short of reaching the unintelligent animate beings, whereas Soul and even Nature, while ontologically lower than Eternity, can reach them and animate them? We ought to find the solution to this difficulty in the fundamental Neoplatonist doctrine that “everything is in everything, but properly in each.” That is to say that Life or the Living-Being-Itself is the intelligible archetype specifically for all the things that are alive; Eternity or Intellect, in like manner, is the intelligible pattern properly of all the things that enjoy the capacity for intellection, and the True Being is the Universal Cause of everything that exists in a definable way. That is why LivingBeing-Itself and Eternity are called “particular intellects” by our philosopher. To put it more clearly, the True Being properly contains (kath’ hyparxin) the most general existential ideas, while it contains the ideas of life and intellectual life in a causal way (kat’ aitian); the Living-Being-Itself is already particularized, and hence properly contains (kath’ hyparxin) the ideas of the animated beings, according to possession (kata methexin) the most general existential ideas of the True Being, and in the causal way (kat’ aitian) the even more particularized ideas of intelligent life. Finally, EternityIntellect contains both the existential and animal ideas according to possession or participation (kata methexin), and the ideas of the intelligent life properly (kath’ hyparxin). To sum up, it is not the case that Eternity does not influence Soul and the unintelligent ensouled beings—this would demolish all metaphysical continuity—but that its specific area of influence involves intelligent beings: the souls. Thus we get another expression of the usual Neoplatonist reverse hierarchy between the visible and the intellectual worlds: the simplest and the lowest entities in the visible world are the material objects—stones, minerals, and so on—because they possess only material substrates and existential ideas; a step higher are plants and animals, which are more complex and participate also in Nature and in psychic ideas; the highest and the most complex among the visible beings are human beings, who, in addition to all the preceding gifts, enjoy also participation in intellection. In this way, what is highest in the visible world is specifically linked to what is lowest in the intellectual world.

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Next to the first triad follow the particular intellects, some of which should be divine insofar as they are attached to henads, others not (cf. Commentaries, prop. 181). This is so, because, according to the Proclian view, the henads are fewer in number than the intellects, the intellects fewer than the souls, and so forth. Thus not all the intellects are divine, and not all the souls are simultaneously divine and intellectual, but some of them just intellectual, still others simply souls without proper henads or intellects eternally allotted to them (cf. Commentaries, prop. 184). There arises a question concerning the hierarchy: which is higher, a non-henadic intellect because it is placed on the higher ontological level, or a henadic soul because it possesses a henad? There seems to be an inconsistency in Petritsi’s system at this point: the end-terms of the intellectual cosmos in his universe are the planetary intellects, or, as he calls them, “intelligent intellects”: Proclus asserts the whole space of the intelligent composition to be motionless and eternal. Start from the True Being and proceed through all the intellectual essences: Eternity, the Living-Being-Itself, then simultaneously intelligible and intelligent (noeroiV kaiV nohtoiv), then simply intelligent, among which at the lower extreme of the intelligent beings are manifested the intelligent Cronos, Zeus and Rhea (Commentaries, prop. 14. 46. 29–32).

Now, if they are at the lower extreme, that is to say, if they are the last ones, then they should be without proper henads. However, Petritsi calls them “divine bodies” (Commentaries, prop. 141 ( = 140). 172, 4–5), with an apparent implication that they also possess henads. This inconsistency remains even if we assume on good textual grounds that the planetary intellects are not really the very last intellects. Next to them should be the intellects of other particular souls, some of which—those of the gods and heroes—must always be attached to their appropriate intellects, and the others—those of ordinary human beings—sometimes attached to their appropriate intellects and sometimes not. However, in Petritsi’s system, in contrast to that of Proclus, the human souls are also divine, in the sense that they possess their proper henads. Obviously, this inconsistency has to do with Petritsi’s relativizing of the status of henads, which in his system are no longer proper gods. Those last planetary intellects are called “intelligent intellects,” which is a translation of Proclus’ noeroiV nove". It simply means that those intellects are eternally attached to their appropriate souls, which are, hence, inherently intelligent. Indeed, only the soul can be intelligent and not an intellect, so “intelligent intellect” just means an intellect in a sort of a hypostatic unity with its soul. Those are Saturn (Cronos), Jupiter (Zeus), Earth (Rhea), Mer-

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cury (Hermes), Sun (Apollo), Mars (Ares), Venus (Aphrodite) and Moon (Artemis). All of them have different functions, which depend on different modes of their movements, and those differences, in turn, reflect the paradigmatic differences of the higher intellectual spheres: There are different natures of time in the great sphere of time [i.e., the sky], different in Cronos, different in the great Zeus, different in Ares, different in the great Apollo, different in the insights of Hermes and different in the joyful love-movements of Aphrodite, still different in the movements of Artemis. In all of them there are different spans of time, that is to say, different modes of movements. Actually, whence could have they obtained all those different powers, unless from the primordial causes, which are the everlasting eternities [i.e., intellects]? (Commentaries, prop. 53. 117. 14–22).

The planetary movements make different music. The sun, as Petritsi writes, “makes a golden music by its movements” (Commentaries, prop. 51. 112. 5–10). All types of music, as he says, are related to different planetary genera (Commentaries, prop. 2. 22. 16–27). The music of the planetary spheres has also a causative property, for the stars’ and planets’ “creative attraction” constructs the earthly bodies, even the human bodies, fit for the reception of souls (Commentaries, prop. 189. 196. 7–8). The planets themselves build up a hierarchy. For instance, the sun is “the image of the intellectual Zeus” (Commentaries, prop. 51. 112. 9–10). Petritsi mentions only in passing the precise functions of the heavenly bodies. For instance, he says that the sun “first constructs matter, then parts, and then the integrity of all the temporal beings” (Commentaries, prop. 51. 112. 5–7). He also says that “Ares maintains the property of the perishable corporeal ideas without mixture—how else can the fact that the corporeal ideas do not mix with each other be accounted for?” (Commentaries, prop. 51. 112. 11–14). The different planets reflect different higher intellectual powers; different corporeal beings, even the stones, metals and minerals with different properties, should, in their turn, on the basis of the ontological continuity, reflect the planetary differences (cf. Commentaries, prop. 57. 125. 5–11). In this way, we get the universal law of cosmic sympathy. 278 278 For this subject, see the excerpt from Proclus’ Commentary on the Chaldean Oracles, preserved among Michael Psellus’ writings, in Oracles chaldaïques, ed. E. Des Places (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1971). It seems that “cosmic sympathy” and the connected theurgic practices were a major concern among the Platonizing circles of eleventh-century Constantinople.

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As was said above, the True Being is the first term of the intellectual world, but Petritsi sometimes gives the name of “True Being” generally to the entire intellectual universe. In this sense, the term indicates that everything, even the very last intellect in this sphere, is eternal, a true being. This means that they have all their parts in the eternal “now” and that their operation and essence are not divided. They have no need of an external substrate in order to sustain their being. Being concentrated in themselves in such a way, they are tvit-mdgomare or “self-standing” entities. 279 It is in this sense that Petritsi—commenting on prop. 88 of the Elements of Theology— describes the True Being in three different ways: Proclus divides the composition of the god, the True Being, into three: (i) the First Intellect proper, which is the first image and first composite of the henads and gods. In this mode, it is higher than Eternity, and is the father and cause of Eternity. The First Intellect produces the essence and pattern of Eternity, which is already (ii) at the same time both Eternity and True Being, as being derived from the True Being. (iii) So are all the intellectual and intelligent ornaments and compositions that come after Eternity. Therefore, we have the True Being in three modes: as prior to Eternity, as Eternity proper, and as a participant in both Eternity and the True Being (Commentaries, prop. 88. 142. 5–13).

We notice here the absence of the Living-Being-Itself, which, according to Proclus, should be situated between the True Being and Eternity. This may be explained by the fact that in this passage the hierarchy is viewed from a different angle, as suggested also by the commentary of the previous proposition, in which Petritsi explains the superior status of True Being in relation to Eternity in the following way: “There are many beings about which the term ‘being’ can be predicated, but which are at the same time deprived of eternity—as are all the perishable beings” (Commentaries, prop. 87. 141. 29–31). As we see, here the term “being” includes not only the lifeless material things in their constant flux, but also the perishable living things, that is, animals and plants, which are the sphere of influence of the Living-Being-Itself. So, as it seems, this “True Being” has here a 279 As will be demonstrated also later, in the chapter on the soul, by the term tvit-mdgomare Petritsi translates the Greek authypostatos (aujqupovstato9, “self-creating” or “self-substantiating”), but he gives this term the weaker meaning of “selfstanding”, or “being its own substratum” rather than “self-creating.” Perhaps the reason for this is the fact that for a Christian there is only one Creator God, and the notion of “self-creation” may thus have had dubious or even dangerous connotations.

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broader reference: it refers both to the True Being and the Living-BeingItself. If this is the case, then the True Being will not have its usual technical meaning as indicating only and exclusively the hypostasis of the First Monadic Intellect. As regards the True Being proper, or the First Intellect, it is called by Petritsi the “sky of intellects,” the “monad of all beings,” the “temple of the unattainable One,” called by the “great theologians and sages” 280 also the “intellectual altar” by means of which all the intellects act as high priests (Commentaries, prop. 130 ( = 129). 166. 20–25). It is the place of the mutual participation of all the henads, so all the beings whose centers are henads have access to the One through the True Being, which is the “yard and threshold of the One” (Commentaries, prop. 130 ( = 129). 166. 27). v. “Creation” and the Concept of Intellectual Motion The whole intellectual sphere is the realm of eternal logical relationships devoid of any change. 281 Petritsi says that “all the ranks of the monads— bodies, souls and intellects—are created” (Commentaries, prop. 22. 62. 1). This may mean that all the monads, with all the eternal relationships between them, are created by God (the One) ex nihilo. If this is so, then we encounter here a clear-cut theory of the created eternity. However, this point is not discussed specifically by Petritsi. And, as we shall see, we find passages in support of the theory of eternal emanation. In a variety of expressions Petritsi says that all the beings below the henads are “constructed,” “established,” “fixed” or “composed,” and that, as we have seen, even the henads are constructed by Limit. But it is not clear what the precise meaning of all these terms is. Does this mean a crea280 One of those “great theologians and sages” may be Evagrius: “The nou`9, as Evagrius tells us, is the temple (naov9) of God whose altar is the contemplation of the Holy Trinity.” See Hieromonk Alexander Golizin, Et introibo ad altare Dei: the Mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita, with Special Reference to its Predecessors in the Eastern Christian Tradition, Analekta Vlatadon 59 (Thessaloniki: Patriarchikon Hidryma Paterikon Meleton, 1994), 335. 281 Steven Gersh’s Kivnhsi" ajkivnhto"—A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973) provided to me the basic insights with regard of the concept of the “spiritual motion” helping me greatly to posit Petritsi’s ideas in the appropriate setting. I explain the applicability of the concept of the “motionless motion” to Petritsi’s ideas and provide similes for further explication of the concept in this chapter, for the very existence of which in this book I am grateful to Steven Gersh’s excellent study.

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tion out of nothing or eternal generation? Petritsi’s explanation of the term “creation” does not give a clear answer to this question either, as he discusses only two meanings in this term. The first is that of something coming into existence from non-existence. Under this category fall all those things that undergo physical birth, including works of art, as well as the accidental properties of material things, such as colors, shapes, and emotions or passions: They were not beings but they were created and established as beings. And then, those established things that possess ideas pass away and are created as other things, as we perceive it in all the accidental properties. Such an event is called “creation,” but accidentally and adventitiously, and not essentially (Commentaries, prop. 3. 25. 20 – 26. 2).

The other meaning of the term is precisely that “essential creation” that indicates simply the eternal relationships in the intellectual and intelligent spheres. Petritsi writes thus in the same commentary: Any sort of creation falls either under the measure of time or under the measure of eternity. And nothing can escape those two Principles, for any composition is either among the temporal beings and linked with nature and flux, or among the eternal beings and linked with the eternal order of reality (Commentaries, prop. 3. 26. 8–12).

Thus, we have two sorts of creation: the “passible creation” of the sublunary world, and the “impassible creation” of the intellectual sphere. But Petritsi does not especially consider “creation” in terms of deliberate divine generation of all things—physical and metaphysical alike—out of nothing. I shall discuss this question in the last chapter, but let us concentrate now on the second type of creation, the one within the changeless intellectual world, and try to understand its mechanism. The eternal logical creation in the changeless intellectual sphere is called in Petritsi’s work also “creative motion”: The measuring of Eternity is not comparable to the measuring of such a Principle as has dimensions and implies priority and subsequence. On the contrary, in eternity there is only a creative motion of order [series] (Commentaries, prop. 51. 112. 15–18).

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This motion or activity of the intellect is called also the “motionless motion” 282 in the passage where Petritsi distinguishes psychic and intellectual activities in this way: All the intellectual and intelligent beings create their effects in a motionless manner. You will find such a motionless activity neither in the essence of the soul nor, moreover, in the essence of the sky. In fact, the soul first moves itself and only in this way does it then move the movable objects. Contrary to this, the intellect’s motion is motionless. Let you conceive this priestly mystery: what does it mean that the soul moves when it acts, whereas the intellect does not? Learn that soul changes from one state into another: it shifts from activity to idleness, and also turns from one sort of activity into another, and, furthermore, even its singular activity may have different degrees of intensity: sometimes dense and advanced, sometimes darkened and lessened, due to the shift of activities.

This is contrasted to the intellectual activity: The True Being is a motionless and immovable paradigm for all the subsequent beings and the image of the One, which is highest of all. In the entire intellectual sphere consisting of the intellects and intelligent beings the activity is immovable, identical, motionless and ageless. It is constantly rejuvenated and flourishing, its intellectual asphodels always bloom, and there is neither time, nor any trace of motion. May it be, O student, your philotimia [Greek: filotimiva—“ambition”] to study those things! (Commentaries, prop. 26. 70. 34 – 71. 5).

Intellect should not only act without motion in an intransitive sense, but should also in the transitive sense act upon the lower beings in the same motionless manner. Thus it is also the “unmoved mover” (miudreklad mimdreki 283—ajkinhvtw" kinou'n) (Commentaries, prop. 26. 71. 16). 284 282 kivnhsi" ajkivnhto", Proclus’ term. See Stephen E. Gersh, op.cit. Cf. Th.Pl. II. 8. 3 and V. 69. 8; Elements of Theology, prop. 175. 152. 23: kaiV gaVr hJ ejnevrgeia tou` nou` ajkivnhto". One may also look at In Parmenidem 773. 23–24. 283 However, the participle mimdreki may have both transitive and intransitive meanings. 284 See Proclus’ theory on the unmoved mover of the whole universe being its Demiurge. Although Petritsi’s expressions are reminiscent of Proclus, his doctrine has undergone a radical shift from the Proclian position: in Proclus the Demiurge occupied a rather modest rank in his complicated universe. In fact, the demiurgic function is distributed in three intellectual spheres (see John M. Dillon, “The Role of Demiurge in the Platonic Theology,” in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Actes du

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The activity and causation of the intellect is nothing other than its intellection, as we read in Proclus’ prop. 174: Pa'" nou'" tw'/ noei'n uJfivsthsi taV met– aujtovn, kaiV hJ poivhsi" ejn tw'/ noei'n, kaiV hJ novhsi" ejn tw'/ poiei'n. At the same time the intellect’s intellection is that of itself and of the higher causes, and according to Petritsi “knowledge through causes and Principles provides something with knowledge of its own property and properties of the subsequent beings even more divinely” (Commentaries, prop. 167. 185. 24–28). A difficulty follows: if the intellect “intellects” only itself and its causes, then it will be a closed system not related by knowledge to the subsequent beings. It will know them causally (kat’ aitian) and not directly. Proclus states three hypothetical types of the intellect’s cognition: h] gaVr eJautoVn noei' pa'" nou'" h] toV uJpeVr eJautoVn h] toV meq'– eJautovn (prop. 167. 144. 26–27). He leaves only the possibility that the intellect should know both itself and its cause, rejecting the last supposition, that the intellect may know also its subsequent: ajll– eij meVn toV meq– eJautovn, proV" toV cei'ron ejpistrevyei nou'" w[n. kaiV oujdeV ou{tw" ejkei'no aujtoV gnwvsetai, proV" o} ejpevstreyen, a{te oujk w]n ejn aujtw'/, ajllÊ e[xw aujtou', toVn deV ajp– aujtou' tuvpon movnon, o}" ejn aujtw'/ gevgonen ajp– ejkeivnou: o} gaVr e[cei, oi\de, kaiV o} pevponqen, oujc o} mhV e[cei kaiV ajf– ou| [ouj] 285 pevponqen

(prop. 167).

On the contrary, Petritsi gives a very different picture, and understands those three virtual suppositions as positive metaphysical statements, granting that the intellect also thinks (and reverts to) its effects! Learn that every intellect acts in three ways: (i) its action is equal to its essence (that is to say, when it “intellects” 286 its own essence); (ii) also it Colloque International de Louvain (13 – 16 mai 1998), 344–345), but even the highest Demiurge, Zeus, is only the third in the intellectual hebdomad. However, Petritsi gives the demiurgic functions to his True Being, that is, the first metaphysical principle after the Petritsian Neoplatonist-Christian Trinity. For an appropriate parallel passage in Proclus to Petritsi’s description of the True Being as the “unmoved mover,” see also In Parmenidem in the edition of Cousin, In Platonis Parmenidem, ed. Victor Cousin, Procli Commentarium in Platonis Parmenidem (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1961), col. 790. 18–38, where this function apparently is attributed to the Proclian Demiurge. 285 Dodds has—correctly—omitted ouj as destroying the meaning of the text. 286 I have here chosen to introduce this non-existent English verb “to intellect” in order to convey more precisely the Georgian pair of goneba (“intellect”) and gagoneba (“to think” or “to comprehend”), which corresponds to the Greek pair nou~9 and novhsi9.

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This substantial divergence is also seen in Petritsi’s translation of the following passage of the same proposition, eij ou\n tiv" ejsti nou'" nohtov", ejkei'no" eJautoVn eijdwV" kaiV toV nohtoVn oi\de, nohtoV" w[n, o{ ejstin aujtov", e{kasto" deV tw'n met– ejkei'non toV ejn aujtw'/ nohtoVn noei' a{ma kaiV toV proV aujtou' (prop. 167.

146. 20–22): “If something is an intelligible intellect, when it knows its property, it will know the intelligible intellect, which is itself, and it will know in its intellection all the subsequent beings and also its prior cause” (vol. I. 167. 100, 28–31). This is a completely different meaning: Proclus says that the noetic intellect knows itself, and that all those intellects that come after it know both themselves (toV ejn aujtw'/ nohtovn) and their priors (toV proV aujtou'). However, Petritsi understands e{kasto" deV tw'n met– ejkei'non not as a subject of the next clause, but as the direct object of the verb governed by nou'" nohtov", the subject of the previous clause, reading it as e{kaston. It is possible that the mistranslation of Proclus’ text caused its erroneous explanation, and not that the translator deliberately mistranslated the text due to his preconceptions. Another possible explanation still remains. Interestingly enough, e{kaston was also Creuzer’s reading, 287 apparently without any manuscript supporting it. 288 Or did Creuzer base this reading on a manuscript not used by Dodds? In the event that this latter supposition would turn out to be true, perhaps we should be more careful in attributing all divergences of Petritsi’s translation from Dodds’ printed text to mere “mistranslations” on the part of the former. Whatever the solution to the present philological problem may be, both the variant e{kaston given by Creuzer and Petritsi’s translation are erroneous from the point of view of the philosophy of Proclus, who many times states that the intellect knows its effects only kat’ aitian, by knowing itself. A similar corruption seems to have occurred in the text of Plotinus VI. 9 [9]. 3. 33–39, where according to the editors, P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, the scribe must have added to Plotinus’ text the suggestion that the intellect can also see those things whose cause it is. 289 Before Henry and Schwyzer, Dodds had accepted this Plotin-

287 288

Creuzer, Plotini Opera, (Oxford, 1835). Cf. Dodds’ apparatus criticus ad locum.

289 Duvnatai deV oJra`n oJ nou`" h] toV proV aujtou` h] taV aujtou` [h] taV par– aujtou`]. The editors of the text have omitted the last phrase on the basis that according to Plot-

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ian sentence as genuine. 290 In any case, it seems closer to the Christian paradigm, where the older intellects, that is, angels, know and care for their younger brothers, that is, human intellects. 291 To return to my earlier question, how can Intellect cause the subsequent stages of being by means of self-intellection? We must remember that, according to the general metaphysical law, all sorts of creation and multiplication occur through the activity of Infinity, which is the “infinite power of the production of beings.” It is the first infinite power, the transcendent cause of all the powers, penetrating all the levels of reality and being revealed in them in different modes and intensities. Causation may be then understood in these terms: the simpler a being is, the less hindrance it makes for the infinite power to go through it and to cause something else. The True Being, being the simplest of all the composite essences, is, so to say, the most “untainted window” for conducting the excessive causative power of the First Infinity, which in company with Limit—the formative Principle—forms a fresh reality. The next intellect is not as simple as the True Being, but more particularized. Therefore, its selfintellection is more complex than that of the True Being. Once more the basic Neoplatonist Principle should be called to attention, according to which “all is in all but in a proper way.” The First Intellect, the storehouse of all ideas, generates the subsequent, more particularized and multiplied intellect. This intellect must possess everything that its cause had, yet in a different mode. Multiplication accompanies causation. This should not be understood in the sense that there will be more ideas in the subsequent intellect than there were in the True Being. If this were so, the new intellect would be broader and richer than the first. The basic structure and the inus intellect does not care for the subsequent entities (“intellectus enim non curat quae post eum”). 290 Dodds remarks on this as follows: “The Neoplatonists followed Aristotle in making the intelligence its own object; but they were nevertheless reluctant to cut it off from all knowledge of the spatio-temporal universe. Plotinus asserts that intelligence can contemplate (oJra~n) h] taV proV aujtou~ h] taV aujtou~ h] taV par– aujtou~ (Enneads VI. 9. 3 [II. 511. 29]), but without explaining how such contemplation of the lower is possible to it.” Dodds, op. cit., 289. 291 Interestingly, the author of the Liber de Causis produces a very similar reinterpretation of Proclus and asserts like Petritsi that every intellect knows both its causes and its effects: “Ergo ipsa discernit quod est supra eam et quod est sub ea, et scit quod illud quod est supra se est causa ei et quod est sub ea est causatum ab ea” (Liber de Causis VII, VIII, 14–17). See Pattin, op. cit., 64.

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number of the innate intellectual ideas must remain the same in all intellects. What changes is the mode of existence of those ideas on different hierarchical levels. A question follows: if not ideas, then what is multiplied? The answer will be power. A simple simile may help: let us imagine a man putting a seal on a wax board. The first time he does so with his utmost strength, the second time less powerfully. The second image on the board will be of the same shape but in a different mode, for it has been impressed with less concentrated, more dispersed, or, as Proclus calls it, more “multiplied” power. Actually, everything in a cause is also in its effect, in a mode of, as Petritsi would have said, a “weakened or reflected light” (Commentaries, prop. 64. 129. 31). The simile of the wax board does not give a full account of the metaphysical event, for we observe in it only some sort of “clouding” and weakening of a shape, but not any sort of the particularization of that shape. However, in intellectual causation, there are two simultaneous and correlated processes: that of particularization of intellects (ideas) and that of multiplication of power. So it was not completely right to say that no change happens in the structure of ideas. Even if it basically remains the same, a certain change occurs in it, which is implied in the notion of “particularization.” This may be explained in the following way. As was said above, the most general idea, the True Being, is contained in the succeeding intellect—the Living-Being-Itself—differently (kata methexin). In this intellect the idea of the True Being is, so to say, less pronounced, less emphasized. The third intellect—Eternity—will already have two more general ideas—the True Being and Life—in a less emphatic way, and so forth. This greater or lesser degree of emphasis on different ideas within different intellects gives what may be termed a “structural change.” We get two basic simultaneous metaphysical events—the change of the emphasis and the dispersion of power—the first of which is related to Limit and the second to Infinity. With this consideration in mind, we can make a further step and inquire what Petritsi means by “creative movement.” On the one hand, the commentaries are univocal that the movement first appears on the level of the soul. This level marks the first division of essence and operation, which in turn is the father of time and movement. The following analogy may be helpful: for an eagle flying high in the sky a football stadium will be visible as a single spot, and it will see all the football players in an instantaneous glance. A hawk, which does not fly as high as the eagle, will see all of the players similarly, in an instantaneous glance, but already from a more particular angle. Similarly, a sparrow flying even lower will see all the players at once from a still more particular angle. But let us

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now imagine a hen, which does not fly at all, staying on the field itself. It will see only one football player at any given moment, and in order to see them all it will have to use its legs and run from one player to another—this is the origin of motion. So let us take the flying birds from eagle to sparrow as intellects in a descending scale, the hen as the soul, and football players as innate ideas. The simile is not, of course, entirely satisfactory, for the birds look outwards, whereas the intellects look inwards, and they do not watch the same ideas, but each watches its proper ones, which constitute the essence of each of them. Let us focus now on the horizontal series of intellects and forget the soul for a moment. We may return to our simile of the eye: the eye sees objects involuntarily, and likewise the intellect thinks ideas involuntarily and essentially. However, each intellect does so differently according to a degree of particularization. More precisely, the secondary intellect (Life) sees all ideas at once and directly, with the exception of only one idea, the most general one (i.e., the True Being), which it has kata methexin. This idea is seen by it, so to say, obliquely or vaguely. The last of the intellects, then, will see all the ideas obliquely, except for one, the most particular idea, which it has kath’ hyparxin. Accordingly, a secondary intellect will need to make a certain move in order to see the “vague” idea directly, to direct its glance to it. And the more particular an intellect is, the more such moves will be necessary for the direct apprehension of its innate fullness. That is what Proclus calls the “intellectual cycle,” which must be the same as Petritsi’s “movement in eternity.” To sum up, the movement in its proper sense starts on the level of the soul. But, in fact, there is movement everywhere, even in the eternal intellectual world, which may be termed “remembering without forgetting” or “movement without movement.” The notion of multiplication of power can be explained more clearly in the light of the preceding discussion. In fact, power is multiplied, because it is partially halted by a secondary intellect, in the sense that some part of the power is not transferred further, but consumed by it for a private purpose. This purpose is the direct seeing of the “vague” kata methexin ideas. Thus the secondary intellect is not a totally transparent conductor of the infinite power, but it “catches” some of it, using it in order to remedy a certain private deficiency: to make the intellectual cycle and revert to its cause. Accordingly, in the descending scale power is being more and more “used,” as much as the “egotism” of intellects increases in inverse proportion to their transparency. The degree of transparency, in turn, is conditioned by the number of the “vague” ideas. So the multiplication of power in the Neoplatonic context means not the increase of power, but on the contrary, slack-

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ening or dilution of intensity of unitary, concentrated power through its ever-weakening apportionment to more and more entities that emerge in the course of the universal procession of being. Thus, we have obtained a good basis for understanding the problem of two kinds of power—the active and the passive: Learn that Proclus distinguishes two sorts of power, and says that there is a power which is [always] accompanied by action and is, thus, a complete [i.e., fulfilled] power. And there is another power, which is in the state of sheer power, that is to say, a possibility, having no action in itself, but coming to action in a successive way, just as is the case with regard to the essences of the soul and the sky, for they are being completed by the action of Intellect, which acts perpetually (Commentaries, prop. 78. 138. 5–12).

In this passage, Petritsi does not say that incomplete power can also be found in the intellectual sphere; he only says that the soul’s potency for cognition, that is, for moving from idea to idea in a cyclical way, is actualized by the intellect. But the same thing must happen in a more exalted way also in the intellectual sphere: a secondary intellect having its potency for making the intellectual cycle actualized by a higher intellect. Indeed, in another place the actualization of the effect’s potential power by its cause is presented as a general ontological law, when our author interprets Proclus’ passage: eij gaVr proveisin ajf– eJautou' movnon, mhV ejpistrevfoito deV proϊoVn eij" eJautov, oujk a[n pote tou' oijkeivou ajgaqou' ojrevgoito kaiV o} duvnatai eJautw'/ parevcein. duvnatai deV pa'n toV ai[tion tw'/ ajf– aujtou' didovnai metaV th'" oujsiva", h|" divdwsi, kaiV toV eu\ th'" oujsiva", h|" divdwsi, suzugev" (prop. 42. 44. 14–18).

Again, Petritsi translates this sentence in an interpretative way: If it only proceeds and does not revert, then it will not desire its goodness. And every cause that is able to sustain itself can give from itself [to its effects] the essence, which it gives, and also the goodness of the essence, which it has given to its relatives (vol. I. prop. 42. 31. 17–22).

As we see, Petritsi ends the first sentence with oujk ojrevgoito and links the remaining clause of this sentence with the next sentence and reads it somehow like this: kaiV o} duvnatai eJautoV sunevcein, duvnatai deV pa~n toV ai[tion ajf– aujtou~ didovnai metaV th~9 oujsiva9, h|9 divdwsi, kaiV toV eu\ th'" oujsiva", h|9 divdwsi suzuvgoi". Then he explains the text in the following way:

Proclus says that a cause that has such a power as enables it to sustain its own identity establishes first the essence of its effect and then makes this essence good. Nevertheless, it is not the case that the essence was

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not initially good and was made good later. What does the expression “makes good” mean, then? It means that the cause brings the effect to completion, that it moves powers within the effect to action, and makes it return in love to itself (Commentaries, prop. 42. 101. 17–24).

In the light of these theories, the division of power in the process of causation may be viewed in terms of a gradual increase of potential power and decrease of the active power in the subsequent beings. The active causative power, in turn, has a double function: first, to create its effect; second, to actualize the effect’s potential power. In terms of the causation of intellects this means that the higher intellects help the lower to perform the intellectual cycle and see the ideas in the way in which they see them themselves. This simply means the reversion of the effect to its cause. The same is expressed in another passage: Every created thing needs two powers: the first power is its capacity for receiving the activity of the higher active power. Second is the active power itself, which actualizes the potential power. The first is to be seen as a higher creative cause, the second as its substratum and matter. And the active power generates that entity which has only potential existence, as Intellect generates the sky (Commentaries, prop. 79. 138. 5–13).

The potential power, thus, is that power which an intellect needs for performing the “selfish cycle.” From the Infinite Power, which pervades the whole reality, each intellect reserves for itself such an amount as is needed for the completion of that inner movement. The more ideas are in the intellect kata methexin, the more complex is its inner cycle, and so the more power it will appropriate. In contrast, the completed power is that power which is not “appropriated” and not used for the inner cycle, but is poured out through the gap of transparency allowed by a degree of universality of this or that intellect, giving birth to another intellect. What A. C. Lloyd terms “force” probably accounts for the completed power: “The Neoplatonist concept of a cause is not that of a power but that of what may be called a force, or a power exercised.” 292 In this light, we may say that each metaphysical entity has incomplete power qua effect and complete power, or “force,” qua cause: The causation is to be understood in a completely timeless meaning, for in the incorporeal beings fatherhood and “sonhood” are imperishable 292 A. C. Lloyd, “The Principle that the Cause Is Greater than Its Effect,” Phronesis 21 (1976): 153.

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI and eternal, not successive and flowing—as in the case of those things that have being from non-being. But the things that are truly beings are always existing, both the causes and the effects (Commentaries, prop. 33. 85. 25–28).

Creation may be understood in these terms: the role of a causeintellect in the generation of an effect is merely that it leaves a part of its “screen” unstained, and allows the infinite power to radiate through it. The simpler the intellectual cycle is, the less multiplied is the power, and the more causative is the intellect. Yet it is not precise to say that the intellect’s role is to simply transmit the infinite power that does not belong to it, and thus participate in causation only passively. In fact, we have hypostatized causes in the hierarchy of beings, so that the active and the passive powers represent systematic constituents of this or that hypostasis, so we may speak of active and passive powers as belonging to each of the causes. The proportion and ratio of those two powers within each entity, which are determined by Limit, mark the definable essence of various ideas, thus being their essential indicator. 293 We shall get quite a complicated picture of motion in the metaphysical universe, a kind of a multiform spiritual dance: the First Intellect after the True Being will have only one “vague” idea (that is to say, the idea of Being itself, which is its immediate cause). The third intellect will have two “vague” ideas in different ways: one twice as vague than the other; the fourth intellect will have three vague ideas: the first three times as vague, the second twice as vague, and so forth. If we, further, call to mind the fact that it is not only one idea that is properly contained by each of the intelStephen E. Gersh puts this point very clearly in his difficult and comprehensive study of Proclus’ theory of spiritual motion and power: “Power could be understood as a continuum between the complete and incomplete, and that this continuum stretched from the highest levels of the spiritual world down to the lowest regions of the sensible… The spiritual hierarchy may be held to consist of a series of degrees, a, b, c, d, e, f, etc. Each of these will then be placed at a different level in the continuum of power, and so a will have maximum complete power and minimum incomplete power, whereas f will have maximum incomplete power and minimum complete power, and all the intermediate degrees b, c, d, e, will have intermediate levels of both types of power. … Thus in cycle a–b maximum complete power is only partially transformed into incomplete power, in cycle c–d intermediate complete power is transformed into intermediate incomplete power, while in cycle e–f minimum complete power is totally overwhelmed by incomplete power.” Gersh, op. cit., 67–68. 293

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lects but some group of them (cf. prop. 177), in only a few more steps we shall get a great complication of different rhythms and musics of movement. They are called by Petritsi the “intelligible patterns.” It is a colorful mosaic of threefold change, for all intellects contain three types of ideas, kat’ aitian, kath’ hyparxin and kata methexin, and in each intellect there is their different combination and apportionment. The goal of a metaphysician is to hear this music and to be able to see and marvel at the beauty of these ornaments, to raise his soul to them and to become part of them. Being a philosopher is to dare and make a leap into these infinite musical patterns, into these “intellectual daylights not susceptible of the darkness of ignorance” (Epilogue, 220. 23–24).

6 SOUL 1. SUMMARY OF PROCLUS’ TEACHING ON THE SOUL Before treating Petritsi’s theory on the soul, first I shall review Proclus’ corresponding teachings in the Elements of Theology, according to the pattern followed in the chapter on Intellect. Thus the propositions dealing with the hierarchical arrangement of souls will be the first to be treated. Next to be discussed will be the essential characteristics of souls, both in their static and in their dynamic aspects. Some aspects of the psychic hierarchy have already been discussed in the chapter on Intellect; the present chapter will complete the picture. Among the propositions that especially deal with the soul, props. 184 and 185 specifically concern their hierarchical arrangement. The basic distinction is threefold: divine souls, intellectual souls and “metabolic” or shifting souls. The souls of the first rank enjoy direct participation in the henads, and at the same time they always participate in intelligence; we may term these the “henadic intellectual souls.” The souls of the next rank, although they do not have direct access to the gods, nevertheless constantly participate in intellect and also always attend the divine souls; we may term these the “perpetually intellectual souls.” The last rank has neither perpetual access to the gods nor uninterrupted intelligent life, but is constantly shifting from intelligence to unintelligence and back again; 294 we may term these the “occasionally intellectual souls.” The relationships between those three particular ranks are symmetrical to those, on the more general level, between the henads, the intellects and the souls (prop. 185). Thus, curiously, it is not the higher divine souls, but the souls of the lowest rank that are representatives par excellence of their psychic level, evidently because they are less “contaminated” by the presence of the higher, intellectual and divine features in The distinction of these three ranks of souls comes from Plato’s Phaedrus 248 A, as already noted by Dodds in his commentary on prop. 185. Dodds, op. cit., 296. 294

177

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them, and hence they exhibit the specific soul-identity in a more naked and emphatic way. Prop. 202 does not add much to the hierarchical picture, but only explains that the third rank of souls is called the rank of particular souls (merikaiV yucaiv), and that the souls of the intermediate rank are not divine, because they do not participate in divine, but only in simple intellects. Prop. 203 speaks about the different numbers and powers pertaining to the different psychic ranks, following the basic ontological law according to which the closer a series is to the One, the more unified and the greater is its power and the smaller its number; conversely, the further a series is removed from the One, the more its power diminishes and its number increases. Accordingly, divine souls are fewer and more powerful, whereas particular souls are more numerous and weaker. The next proposition provides a closer focus on the psychic hierarchy. We read that each of the divine souls governs some group of souls of the second rank and a larger group of souls of the third rank. In turn, each of the souls of the second rank governs a group of the souls of the third rank, although fewer in number than each of the divine souls does. Interestingly, the horizontal psychic series on closer view appears to consist of different vertical hierarchies in which the divine souls act as monads for their particular groups. From this perspective, henads appear to be at the same time also monads for the vertical series within a horizontal series. The map of the psychic hierarchy will be the following: {

HISn* PISn**

{

{

{ {

OISn*** { { { { { {

{

{

{ {

{ {{ {{ {

{ {

{

{ { { {{ {

* HISn—Henadic intellectual souls; ** PISn—Perpetually intellectual souls; *** OISn—Occasionally intellectual souls. 295

Prop. 205 may also be included in the list of the hierarchical propositions, although it does not provide any new insight into the hierarchical structure proper, given that we simply learn from it that the souls’ eternal immaterial bodies have the same relationship with each other as their respective souls do.

The perpetually intellectual souls are those attached to intellect always, whereas occasionally intellectual souls are those that can fall from the communion of intellect (cf. Elements of Theology, prop. 184). 295

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Now, let us turn to the propositions that describe the essential features and the activity of the souls. The first essential characteristic of the soul is its incorporeality and complete separability from the body (prop. 186). This is proven by the following syllogisms: the soul reverts to itself, an activity impossible for the body; its reversion to itself is derived from the fact of the soul’s self-cognition, for that which cognizes itself at the same time reverts to itself; finally, the self-cognition is derived from the fact that the soul knows the superior Principles, from which one can infer that the soul must know the effects of which these Principles are the causes, and hence it must know itself. However, the last premise, that is, that the soul knows the higher Principles, is apparently plucked out of thin air, as if it were a selfevident fact for all the putative readers whom Proclus envisaged. The next essential attribute is the ontological indestructibility of the soul (prop. 187), which is a consequence of its incorporeality and separability from bodies, for whatever can be destroyed must either be corporeal, so that its parts may dissolve, or must exist in a substrate, the separation from which will destroy it; however, the soul escapes both conditions. In prop. 188 Proclus draws further conclusions from the theorem of the soul’s selfmovement and separability from a substrate and states that the soul is the Principle of life, and at the same time is a living thing. The first assertion is proven again by an axiomatic assumption, or simply an observation, namely that those things in which the soul is present are necessarily animated. If the soul is the Principle of animation for everything, can it at the same time also be an animate thing itself? This is both denied and asserted by Proclus. The soul cannot be, in fact, self-animating, since that would imply that it contains some lifeless element in need of being animated. This, in turn, would mean that the inanimate part of the soul does not know itself and does not revert to itself, which would ruin the very essential Proclian quality of the soul. Therefore, the soul must consist entirely of life and be the Principle of life. But Proclus then says that it is also a living being, in the sense that it participates in the life of the intellect. Thus we get two levels of life: first the life of the soul, which is the essential nature of the soul itself, inseparably from it, and next the higher life of the intellect, 296 in which the soul participates, so that it also becomes a living being, besides being the Principle of life. In the same proposition we learn that the ultimate Principle of life is 296 Proclus makes a hierarchical distinction between the life of the soul and that of the intellect in Th.Pl. III. 6. 22. 12–15: KaiV yuchV meVn gaVr aujtovzw" ejstivn,

eJauth/` corhgou`sa toV zh`n, kaiV oJ nou`" ajrivsth zwhV kaiV telewtavth kaiV w{sper ei[pomen aijwvnio".

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the Intellectual Life (noeraV zwhv), while the soul apparently acts as the representative of this intellect in the lower realm. In any case, the proposition is not very clear, because Proclus identifies the life of the soul with its cognition (that is, its self-reversion), but, as we have earlier read in the discussion about the triad of Being–Life–Intellect, not everything that lives enjoys also cognition. So, as it appears, the soul’s life must be distinguished from the cognitive life (self-reversion), which would mean, in turn, that there must be a kind of life or activity in the soul that is not cognition. However, Proclus does not make such a distinction in this proposition, which makes things obscure: on the one hand we read that the soul animates everything in which it is present, but if this animation by the soul is at the same time identified with cognition, then how can we explain the fact that not everything that lives does so cognitively? The difference may be pointed out in prop. 189, which distinguishes two features of the soul: (i) its self-substantiation, and (ii) its essential vitality or life-in-virtue-of-itself. But again the previous difficulty remains, because the self-substantiation is once more inferred from the fact that the soul is self-revertive, that is to say, cognitive, and its life-in-virtue-of-itself is not, at least explicitly, contradistinguished from its self-substantiation and self-reversion. Only in the next proposition (prop. 190. 166. 20) do we get the information that cognition does not pertain to the soul qua soul, that “there are souls ignorant of the beings that yet remain souls” 297 and that the soul must have cognitive life through participation in the higher Principles to which cognition essentially belongs. From this information we may infer that there are two lives in the soul: the life essentially pertaining to it and not related to knowledge—let us call this Principle “life (i)”—and another, higher, kind of life, which it has through participation in the higher Principles—“life (ii).” Those two aspects are expressed, I think, in prop. 191. 166. 26–27 in terms of “substance” or ousia (oujsiva) and “activity” or energeia (ejnevrgeia). The essence of the soul is eternal; however, it is, I think, eternal not only in a static and structural sense; rather, “life (i)” must be co-essential to it, and thus this life must be also eternal. To make my idea clearer, let us imagine an insect, a firefly, which always, indivisibly from (or co-essentially with) its organic constitution, emanates some warmth from itself, as does any insect. Without this emanation it will cease to be an insect. Thus to the essence of the soul in its structural 297 I have slightly altered Dodds’ translation, as it is to be found in Dodds, op. cit., 166.

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sense there also belongs its dynamic aspect—“life (i)”—without which the soul will cease to be a soul. To continue the same simile, the firefly may emanate not only warmth; it is of such a natural potency that through participation in the light of the sun, it can acquire a loftier activity and together with warmth also radiate light. Now, this second activity does not pertain to all insects qua insects, but only to such insects as fireflies, qua fireflies; likewise, cognitive activity does not pertain to souls qua souls simpliciter, but to souls as intelligent souls. The concept of “self-motion,” which is introduced in that same prop. 119, justifies, as it were, this difference: that is to say, it justifies the difference of the “self-motion” of the soul from its reversion to itself, that is, self-cognition. Yet, even if this difference is implied here, it is not done so in any clear manner. 298 Moreover, elsewhere Proclus emphatically claims that knowledge essentially pertains to souls, because life without knowledge characterizes not souls proper, but only their lower imitations, “the lives involved in matter” (prop. 197. 172. 18–19: tai`" ejnuvloi" zwai`"). The same is clearly stated in the Platonic Theology, according to which a soul in the proper sense is the soul that has the capacity for rational discourse, whereas the souls deprived of this faculty, those of non-rational creatures, are not souls proper, but only “mirror-images” (ei[dwla) of souls (Th.Pl. III. 6. 23. 16–23). Therefore, we are on rather shaky logical ground when we distinguish two lives within the soul: on the one hand, the life of the intellect consists of an instantaneous intellection and nothing else, which means that its essence is inseparable from intellection—although not identical with it. If, on the other hand, the soul, as we read, derives both its essence and activity from the intellect, then the activity of the soul must correspond to the intellect’s activity, which is cognition. The soul’s mode of cognition, of course, only resembles and is not identical to (let alone identical with, in the more technical philosophical sense covered by Leibniz’s Law, in more modern times) that of the intellect, being, as we read, subject to a temporal process. Carlos Steel discusses the question of soul’s self-motion with reference to John Philoponus, who held that “when Plato says that the soul is perpetually in movement, he does not mean that the human soul enjoys perpetual intellection as Plotinus asserts. The term ‘movement’ does not refer here to the intellectual activity of the soul, but rather to its power to produce life (zoogona potentia). The soul does not always enjoy intellection but is always the principle of life.” Carlos Steel, The Changing Self: A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus (Brussels: Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, 1978), 47–48. 298

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The difference between the soul and the intellect is that the soul does not cease to be a soul even when bereft of intellection; thus its epistemological activity is separable from its essence. However, the essence bereft of this activity must still retain some activity, otherwise it will be a dead structure and no longer the Principle of animation. The solution may be that while cognition essentially pertains to the soul, insofar as any soul by definition is rational (cf. Th.Pl. III. 6. 25. 13–14: [hJ yuchv] toVn meVn lovgon kataV thVn eJauth~" ijdiovthta lacou~sa), yet this is not a necessarily, or essentially, actualized cognition, but a necessary capacity, which must be actualized by the soul’s participation in intellect. That is to say that the soul can be deprived of the activity of cognition, but never of its logos (Greek: lovgo9—“reason”) and its capacity for cognition. Thus a soul bereft of knowledge could be understood as a soul bereft of the actualization of its essential cognitive capacity. This is clear also from prop. 20, where Proclus says that the soul is not by its essence eternally cognitive, but has this feature through participation in the Intellect, whereas its proper, eternally changeless activity is the “selfmovement.” Accordingly, the soul without the actualization of its logos is still alive, and thus it still has some activity. But where does this essential, indivisible activity, which is not the activity of intellectual cognition, stem from? We can indeed say that every soul qua soul is, just like an intellect, an indivisible unity of always changeless essence and always changeless activity, if this activity is taken in its first—“life (i)”—sense. I think a clue for the answer to this puzzle is to be found in the teaching of Proclus that the soul, as we have seen above, being the Principle of motion and animation of bodies, is a lower representative of the supreme monadic Principle of motion and animation, the Life-Intellect. As I discussed in the summary about the intellects, the Life-Intellect also “thinks,” but this activity on its level is carried out in the mode of living. That is to say that the Life-Intellect has thinking in a causal way (kat’ aitian)—so to say, an “animated thinking”—while its proper activity is living. The immediate effect of the Life-Intellect, the Intellect-Intellect, 299 has already thinking proper or “thoughtful thinking.” Now, the soul’s inseparable changeless activity is “living,” which is the image of the supreme “living” of the LifeIntellect, but the soul can be separated from the actualization of the discurSince the members of the triad Being–Life–Intellect are all part of the intelligible, “noetic” universe, the term “intellect” can loosely act as a generic index for all three; that is why I have put the “intellect” as a suffix here. 299

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sive thought, which is the image of the “thoughtful thinking” of the Intellect-Intellect on the psychic level. Furthermore, when the soul is separated from the intellectual activity proper, it still has some kind of thinking, just as the Life-Intellect has “living thinking”: for instance, animals are called “clever” although they are bereft of discursive reason; 300 this is firstly because they have, so to say, “living thinking,” in other words, an animal intuition, and secondly because they have sense-perception, which, in fact, is also a certain cognitive activity. 301 Yet the soul’s proper faculty is not this intuition but a sheer animation without knowledge—actually, the animal must first breathe before it may intuit something. 302 To complete the picture, we can add that the static aspect of the soul’s eternal essence, its construction or constitution—an aspect, I think, that is expressed by the term hyparxis employed by Proclus in prop. 192. 168. 14—must be related to the Being-Intellect. One may discern that the different genera in the psychic In Th.Pl. III. 23. 25 – 24. 1 among the cognitive capacities of the nonrational animals, Proclus mentions imagination (fantasiva), memory (mnhvmh) and perception (ai[sqhsi"). 301 Sense-perception, of course, is not knowledge in the sense of a logical or inferential knowledge. However, as one can gather from the doctrine attributed to Iamblichus (by Priscianus), a certain “rational” activity—a trace of the higher, properly logical-inferential cognition—must be present also in the unintended and natural process of sense-perception: as Carlos Steel puts it, “First of all there is the similar impression which is engendered in the sensory organ by the object. This impression is, however, not purely passively endured as the organ always reacts as a living body. Through this life which is present in the body, the impression acquires a specific ‘form’ (eidos). Perceiving occurs, however, only when the soul produces an idea (logos) from itself in accordance with the eidos that it receives from the outside.” See Steel, The Changing Self, 10. 302 Yet Proclus’ discourse in the third book of the Platonic Theology does not warrant this interpretation, because there Proclus reserves the name “soul” only for rational beings (that is, human beings, angels and daimons) and argues that the cognitive and living capacities present in the lower beings do not belong to them qua souls, but qua bodies that participate—with regard to their cognitive capacities—in the ellampseis (irradiations) of the Intellect (cf. Th.Pl. III. 6. 21. 27 – 22. 1) and—evidently, with regard to their vital capacities—in the ellampseis of Life (cf. Th.Pl. III. 6. 24. 8–15). Maybe the main cause of our present difficulty is the fact that Proclus sometimes uses the term “soul” to refer exclusively to a rational soul, as in the Platonic Theology, and sometimes in more general terms, as related to the principle of movement in bodies, as, for instance, in prop. 20 of the Elements of Theology. 300

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hierarchy mirror the First Intellectual triad of Being–Life–Intellect: the intellectual souls mirror the Intellect, by the actualization of the innate logos in discursive thought; animals mirror Life, for they have breathing or vitality properly, while thinking is present in them only instinctively, as a sort of trace; finally, plants could be related to Being, for they may be said to have properly only the definable essence, but vitality just as a trace, in the mode of vegetation. Accordingly, from the perspective of the soul as the Principle of motion, the genus of animals—in spite of the fact that according to Proclus their souls are perishable—makes a golden mean, serving as the most proper representative of the always actualized activity of souls: their living or animation. Together with its essential features, prop. 190 introduces the soul’s proper metaphysical function, which is to serve as a middle term between the indivisible essences—that is to say, eternal ideas—and that which is divisible in bodies. The last indicates, as Dodds observes, 303 the lower representation of ideas, or images or phantoms (ei[dwla) in the visible world. 304 So eternal ideas that are in a contracted and unified mode in intellects are already dispersed and separated in the sensible domain. The soul acts as a middle term between the two, because, as an incorporeal essence, it transcends the material ideas, but, having its existence separable from its knowledge and not both together as is the case with the intellects, it falls short of the indivisible essences. However, all this explains merely that the soul is situated in the middle of the two, so how does it function as a mediator? The first part of the clue is provided in prop. 192, which takes a closer look at the soul’s activity and describes it as a temporal process, insofar as this activity does not form a simultaneous whole. Prop. 198 makes the further clarification that this process must be periodic, because everything of which movement is measured by time and which at the same time has this movement eternally—on the basis of the eternity of its essence—must move in periods identical to each other. Therefore, we may say that such an entity indeed reverts to itself as coinciding with itself in all aspects. AccordDodds, op. cit., 298. This is a Neoplatonist explanation of Plato’s tou` kataV taV swvmata meristou` (Timaeus 35a6). Among modern scholars there is no consensus on the question whether Plato himself implied a hierarchy between transcendent and immanent ideas. For instance, such scholars as Rist, Ross and Cornford believe that the ideas visible in the material things are ontologically on a lower level than the archetypal ideas; on the contrary, Guthrie maintains the presence of the very archetypal Forms in particular things. See Guthrie, op. cit., vol. V., 48. 303 304

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ingly, as Proclus writes, such movement cannot stretch like an infinite straight line. We get the following dynamic hierarchy: a changeless or simultaneous activity of intellects, a periodic activity of souls, and finally the infinite flux of the material world. Geometrically it can be expressed by a point, a circle and a straight line. So the mediation of the soul will be viewed in the following terms: (i) changeless (intellects); (ii) changing and changeless (souls); (iii) changing (bodies). The periodic perpetual movement of souls necessarily implies their cyclical “reinstatements” or instances of apocatastasis (prop. 199. 174. 8: ajpokatastavsei"). Those reinstatements are different for different souls. As we read in the next proposition (prop. 200), the movements of the souls participate in different times or different temporal measures. There is also the universal temporal measure that embraces all the particular temporal measures, and accordingly there is the soul of the universe, whose allencompassing period of reinstatement will be that of the time of the universe itself. 305 The particular souls make several reinstatements, while the Universal Soul makes only one. The time in which the soul participates must surely be some higher Principle. In fact, “time” is a Principle, which has the rank of intellect. This intellect is called “time” because it measures the soul’s movement. 306 The cycle of reinstatement for some particular souls may consist of infinite periodic descents to the material world of process and ascents to the spiritual world of Being (prop. 206). The final proposition (prop. 211) specifies, in implicit objection to Plotinus, that the descent of the soul is entire and no part of it remains in the higher world. Props. 194 and 195 give an account of the static aspect of the soul’s essence, that of its constitution. We are taught that the soul contains all the forms that the intellect also possesses in a primary mode. More precisely, the soul does not contain those forms, as if its structure had also something apart from them, but the soul is all those forms (prop. 195). Those forms in the soul are not already forms proper but only their emphases, which are called by Proclus “essential words” or “reasons” (prop. 195. 168. 33: oujsiwvdei" lovgoi). 307 Prop. 195 presents the soul’s status as that of a mediator between the intellectual and sensible worlds, although already in static Cf. Proclus, In Timaeum II. 289 ff. Cf. Proclus, In Timaeum III. 17 ff., according to which time is “intellectual number” (noeroV" ajriqmov"), a “god” according to the theurgoi (that is, the authors of the Chaldean Oracles). 307 “Rational notions,” as Dodds puts it. For this translation, see Dodds, op. cit., 168. 305 306

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terms: the soul has the intellectual ideas according to participation (kath’ hyparxin), or as images, and it has those ideas revealed in the physical world causally (kat’ aitian), or in an exemplary mode. There is a gradual change in the degree of unity of the presence of ideas on three different ontological levels: on the level of the soul the unified ideas exist in a manifold way, the undivided ideas in a divided, yet still incorporeal, way. Those two features are further increased in the corporeal reality. The soul’s mediation from a “static” perspective will be viewed in the following terms: undivided incorporeal (intellects); divided incorporeal (souls); (still more) divided corporeal (bodies). Finally I shall be concerned with the indivisible “chariots” or ochemata of souls. First in prop. 196 we read that every participable soul has a perpetual body, which has no temporal origin and is exempt from decay. This is proven from the statement that the imperishable soul ensouls some of the bodies by its very existence and, insofar as the existence is always invariable, it must do so always; therefore, also the body that receives this essential, eternal activity of ensoulment must be eternal and imperishable. The same idea is repeated in prop. 207, which states that the “chariot” or ochema of each soul, insofar as it is co-naturally and essentially attached to its soul, is created by an unmoved cause, given that all that is created by moving causes must be changeable in its essence. Moreover, the next proposition (prop. 208) affirms, on the grounds of the same Principle of motionless creation and eternity of the ochemata, also their immateriality, impassibility and indivisibility. The following proposition adds that the impassibility and indivisibility apply only to the ochema’s essence, whereas they undergo passion together with souls, and that their movement is, similarly, divided, as they imitate the life of the souls allotted to them, and this life consists in movement. In the same proposition we learn that with the descent of the souls down to the material world different and increasingly material “garments” or chitons (Greek: citwvn) are accrued by their immaterial ochemata, whereas the ascent is accompanied by a successive stripping off of those garments. However, as prop. 210 explains, the ochema itself remains unaffected by all those additions, retaining one magnitude and shape eternally. In empirical terms this will mean that one and the same ochema can dwell in human beings of different appearances, or—why not—also of different genders, nationalities, and so on, according to different incarnations. Thus, despite the physical fact that man’s body grows from infancy to maturity, we should know that his ochema-body has nothing to do with these changes. There is at least one apparent ontological problem with this ochema theory. This problem is raised by the affirmation that the ochema is created

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by an unmoved cause and in an unmoved act of creation. In prop. 193 Proclus states precisely the same about the soul, when he affirms that its immediate cause is the motionless intellect, by virtue of which the soul has an eternal and changeless essence. In prop. 174 we read that intellect creates by its activity—that is, intellection—an activity that is of course motionless. Now, the ochema evidently holds the next rank after the soul, because it immediately participates in the soul; however, the soul’s activity is not motionless but changing. Therefore, if the soul, similarly to intellect, also produces by its activity, then its immediate effect, that is, the ochema, will not have eternal existence but a changing life (cf. prop. 76). However, Proclus escapes this conclusion by the paradoxical assertion that the soul creates not by its activity but by its essence, which is eternal and motionless. From this affirmation, it follows that the soul’s act of creation or demiurgia (prop. 208) has nothing to do with its activity, but applies completely to its essence. This seems quite inconsistent, because if activity according to the Proclian model is something subsequent to essence, then the effect, before it participates in the essence of something, must participate in the activity of this essence. However, the soul’s activity is changing, and therefore the essence of the ochema will not be eternal. Thus it may seem that Proclus first had in mind an a priori idea about the eternity of the ochema and then built up an argument to enable him to prove this theorem. Yet it is still possible that here we encounter not a metaphysical but rather a terminological inconsistency; perhaps Proclus implies here the Plotinian distinction between two sorts of activities in the soul: 308 first, a changeless activity, by which the ochema is produced, and second, a changing one. In fact, according to Proclus, the intellect creates by its being (tw/` ei\nai), which, in this case, coincides with its activity. Clearly, in the case of the soul, the paradox is introduced by the fact that Proclus distinguishes between the soul’s eternal essence and its changing activity.

2. PETRITSI’S THEORY OF THE SOUL i. A Short Prelude The problem of the soul in Petritsi’s philosophy has not hitherto been the subject of any separate study in Georgian scholarship, although the issue

308

Cf. Enneads 5. 4[7]. 2. 27–33.

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has been treated tangentially by a few scholars. 309 Among them we should first mention Natela Kechagmadze, who tried to show similarity between Petritsi’s and John Italus’ ideas. 310 However, this scholar treats the issue very briefly (devoting only one page to it) and rather inconsistently. Ivane Lolashvili, in his edition of John of Sinai’s Ladder, 311 which he believes to have been translated by Petritsi, presents an objective account of Petritsi’s ideas on the soul in the commentaries on Proclus’ Elements of Theology. However, he tries to combine the ideas on the soul in the explanation of the Elements of Theology with those that are found in the translation of the Ladder and considered by the editor to be the ideas of Petritsi himself. The attempt at such a combination results in an apparent contradiction. Surprisingly enough, the contradiction remains inconspicuous to Lolashvili. It should be noted that the translation of the Ladder is ascribed to Petritsi only by a later, eighteenth-century tradition, the reliability of which, as has already been mentioned, has been denied by some modern scholars. The most accurate and objective, although brief, discussion on the soul belongs to Guram Tevzadze in his preface and commentaries on the Russian translation of Petritsi’s explanation of the Elements of Theology. 312 Tevzadze indicates in a lucid way Petritsi’s tendency to identify patently Platonist doctrines with the Biblical tradition. Tevzadze’s interests are predominantly philosophical, and he does not treat the problem of whether such an account was plausible from the standpoint of contemporary Christian theology, although from the historical point of view, this would have been the most pertinent question to ask. ii. A Link between Eternity and the World of Flux The soul’s principal role in Petritsi’s Platonic universe is that of a link between the intellectual (intelligible and intelligent) and corporeal realms. As stated in the previous discussions, there is a triad of realms in the existent orders. The first is that of Intellect, which is the domain of the intelligible ideas in changeless eternity. The last is the material reality, which is comCertain parts of this chapter were published as a separate article: Levan Gigineishvili, “The Soul in the Philosophy of Ioanne Petritsi,” in Orientalia Christiana Periodica. 310 Natela Kechagmadze, “John Italus and Ioane Petritsi,” in John Italus’ Writings (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1970), 74–75. 311 John of Sinai, The Ladder of Virtues, ed. Lolashvili, 158–163. 312 Ioane Petritsi, Consideration of Platonic Philosophy and Proclus Diadochus, 19–20; 268. 309

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pletely deprived of stability and is subject to flux. In fact, the material realm is an imitator (Commentaries, prop. 29. 79. 23) of the real or authentic being of the changeless and eternal ideas, and thus can be called “being” only figuratively. Matter is dark in itself and enlightened from above through the illumination of the forms. For matter this means an acquisition of a certain idea or property. It is, in fact, the ideal light that sustains all being; therefore it is not as if material being first existed and then adopted an idea in an adventitious way, and not as if material being encompassed an idea. On the contrary, the idea encompasses matter just as a cause does its effect (Commentaries, prop. 41. 100. 14–15). Should the ideal light retreat, matter would change its shape into another (Commentaries, prop. 41. 98. 30–32) (Petritsi also uses a Platonic image of a woman permanently changing her lovers) 313 (Commentaries, prop. 27. 72. 33 – 73. 4). Moreover, the intellectual and the sensible worlds are totally divergent from the point of view of unity. Intellect according to Petritsi is a unitary manifold, containing a multiplicity of ideas in a unitary way. The particular properties (or ideas) are neither divided from each other nor mingled or blurred in the intellect. The seed analogy applied by Petritsi to the case of the One and the multitude is appropriate here also: a seed contains all the parts of a plant in a unitary and unmixed way (Commentaries, prop. 1. 14. 4–7). No spatial image, however, is adequate for the demonstration of this phenomenon; the simile is used only for giving some hint of what the unmixed and undivided unity of properties means: it must be so, because in the spatio-temporal realm properties are completely divided, since one spatiotemporal moment can contain either only one corporeal property or a mixture of several ones (for instance one taste made of many separate tastes, or one color made of many separate colors), but it cannot contain all of them simultaneously without any mixture. As we see, there is a double rupture between the two realms: the first in terms of stability and flux, and the second in terms of undivided unity of parts (intellect) and completely divided multiplicity (corporeal). The soul acts as a middle term between the two. It resembles the intellect by the eternity of its essence, which is proved after Plato, on the grounds of the notion of the soul’s self-movement. 314 However, the soul also differs from Probably an allusion to the “Receptacle” of the Timaeus, which is pandevch", i.e., “all-receiving” (Timaeus 51a). 314 Cf. Phaedrus 245e 2–4. Themistius, among others, has a totally different understanding of the notion of “self-movement”: ejdeivcqh gaVr wJ" aujtokivnhto" movno" oJ 313

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the intellect in its operation, which is cognition. The soul’s cognition is temporal, that is, successive and thus divided, whereas the cognition of the intellect is unitary and thus instantaneous. Here, Petritsi provides the Porphyrian image of the man proceeding step by step, which describes the dianoia (Greek: diavnoia—“thought” or “discursive thought”) of the soul, contrasted to the immediate radiation of the sun describing the noesis of the intellect (Preface, 7. 6–15). 315 Thus by the eternity of its immortal essence the soul resembles the intellect, although by the division of its operation it differs from the latter. In the same way, by its division it resembles the flowing material world, while by the eternity of its essence it is separated from the latter (props. 104 and 152). 316 In this way, the soul sustains the symphony of the universe linking totally divergent extremes. The idea finds its origin in the Timaeus, where the soul is depicted as being constituted of complicated interrelations between three aspects: being, identity and difference. Its construction includes two circles: that of identity and that of difference (the latter having been divided into seven circles in accordance with numerical ratios). By the first circle the soul cognizes toV logistikovn, that is to say, the world of forms, and by the second toV aijsqhtovn, or the flowing material world, 317 uniting in this manner

nou'", eij thVn kivnhsin ajntiV th'" ejnergeiva" nooivhmen (Themistius, De Anima [opp.ed.Ven. 1539], f. 90b [t.II, p. 196, 21 Spengel]). Thus, he identifies selfmovement with operation, that is to say, cognition, and therefore reserves immortality only to the intellect. For Petritsi, however, as for Proclus, the movement of the soul is separated from its operation, and the former is not related exclusively to cognition but represents the principle of life, which is as indigenous to the soul as heat is to fire. 315 Cf. Porphyry, Sententiae. The edition used here is Sentenze sugli Intellegibili, ed. Giuseppe Girgenti (Milan: Rusconi, 1996), § 44, 164–166. The source was identified by Lela Alexidze, in her Antiquity and Christianity. Greek Philosophy in the Commentaries of Ioane Petritsi and (Pseudo)-Maximus the Confessor (Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1997), 20. 316 Cf. prop. 191: Pa'sa yuchV meqekthV thVn meVn oujsivan aijwvnion e[cei, thVn deV ejnevrgeian kataV crovnon. Michael Psellus in his Opusculum phil. 11 (PeriV yuch`", in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, 22–23), mentions this and some other Proclian ideas on the soul in the Elements of Theology, and does not hesitate to call them “mythological” (Greek: muqologikwvteron) and “old women’s tales” (Greek: grawdevsteron). 317 Cf. Timaeus 37 B-C.

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the two opposites. 318 But Petritsi’s theory is, as we see, different, for he does not distinguish the different types of cognition of the soul and never mentions its circles. True, once he says that the soul, as well as all other realities, is constituted by Limit and Infinity—the first being the Principle of identity, the second that of difference—but hardly with regard to the different cognitive parts of the soul. “Being” can be attributed to the soul with full justice, because the soul “remains always in its unity and property,” and thus it transcends the world of flux. “Being does not become” 319 (Commentaries, prop. 3. 26. 5), writes Petritsi, and explains this by the example of a house: when a house is being built it is becoming, but when it is finished it is already a being, that is to say, an idea and completeness, and thus it is no longer in becoming (Commentaries, prop. 45. 105. 6–7). Here “being” is used in a figurative way, for the house is material and destructible, whereas the soul is immaterial and selfmoving and, therefore, an eternal real being. However, this applies only to the essence of the soul, because the soul falls under the terms of becoming from the point of view of its operation, due to the fact that the latter is not the same all the time. 320 The principal distinction between the soul and the intellect is the fact that the intellect is characterized by the indissoluble unity of its essence and operation. As Petritsi affirms, operation, that is, intellection, is the intellect’s very essence, so that essence and operation are always co-present in it (Commentaries, prop. 20. 57. 31 – 58. 1). Essence, potency and energy form a unity there. The intellect implies, in fact, possession of such a potency as is always eternally actualized at its best. Conversely, the soul’s potency for cognition may change its objects, may change its intensity, or even may cease altogether. By its essence the soul should always remain within its cause, the intellect, in the eternal realm. However, insofar as its operation is not always co-present with its essence, that is to say that its cognitive potency is not necessarily actualized, it may be divested of this faculty and fall into forgetfulness, which means that it will need a material Cf. Timaeus 35a: kaiV kataV taujtaV xunevsthsen ejn mevsw/ tou'' te ajmerou''" aujtw'n kaiV tou' kataV taV swvmata meristou'. 319 Cf. Parmenides 155 A7–8: eij gaVr gevnointo, oujk a]n e[ti givgnointo, ajll– ei\en a[n. 318

320 John Italus holds the very same doctrine as Proclus and Petritsi: he says, as concerns the human souls, proV" meVn toV ei\nai swmavtwn ajnendeh', prov" deV toV ejnergei'n ouj pefuvkasin ajeiv, ajllÊ o{per potev, swmavtwn deovmena. Italus, op. cit., 101. In this short treatise Italus argues that only the human soul is immortal; thus his theory of metempsychosis (suggested also here by the expression potev) must have been reserved only for human beings.

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substrate, a body (Commentaries, prop. 41. 99. 13–16). Cognition, accordingly, is a feature that the soul possesses by virtue of participation in the faculty of Intellect, in the same way that diligence is not an inseparable feature of a pupil, but something in which he has to try to participate. Accordingly, the fall of the soul is caused by nothing other than by the interruption of its participation in the faculty of intellect. 321 iii. Soul as a Place of Ideas After considering the ways of cognition of the intellect and the soul, let us treat now their objects of cognition. The objects of cognition of both appear to be ideas woven in them. Speaking about the soul, Petritsi makes an allusion to the Timaeus, saying that the Creator has gathered the “hypostatical reasons” (or “words”) of beings in the soul, so that it may observe all of them within itself. 322 In the Timaeus, however, this is not stated directly. The soul is said there just to be composed according to a certain harmony, proportion or numerical ratios. Plato uses the word lovgo" in the meaning of ratio when he speaks about relationships between the four elements (Timaeus 32b), whereas for the ratios of the soul he uses the expression o}roi (Timaeus 36b). Petritsi apparently follows a tradition that understands Plato’s ratios as particular ideas or integrities. That is what the expression “hypoIn embracing Proclus’ idea and granting the intellect a separate hypostasis, Petritsi simultaneously follows Italus and differs from Psellus. For the latter, according to his Opusculum phil. 2 (De anima et mente), the intellect is not distinct from the soul but is its highest part: Nou'" ejstin e{xi" yuch'" hJ teleiotavth, yuchV deV aujto321

kivnhto" oujsiva ei[tÊ ou\n ajqavnato": toiou'ton gaVr pa'n toV aujtokivnhton. oujc e{teron dev ti nou'" ejstin, e{teron deV yuchv, in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula

psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, 2. 3–5. Italus, on the contrary, attributes separate being to the intellect: w{sper kaiV thVn yuchVn nou'n ei\nai levgomen,

pollavki" kaiV yuchVn toVn nou'n, ajll– hJ meVn yuchV nou'", wJ" ejx aujtou' taV" ejllavmyei" decomevnh kaiV gegonui'a o{per ejkei'no", ouj mhVn deV ou\sa: oJ dev ge nou'" oujc o{per hJ yuchV levgetai ei\nai, ajll* wJ" ai[tio" tauvth" kaiV ejn eJautw/' e[cwn o} gegevnnhke kreittovnw" kaiV qeiotevrw". Italus, op. cit., 49. 322 In Proclus’ commentaries on the Timaeus, which were familiar to Petritsi, we find the expression taV gevnh taV uJpostatikaV (In Timaeum III. 166. 17), and also lovgou" e[cousa" (taVÇ yucavÇ) pavntwn tw'n ejgkosmivwn kaiV dunavmei" uJpostatikav" (In Timaeum III. 266. 1–6). Cf. also the following passage from Th.Pl. III. 15. 53. 15–18: kaiV ouj monogeneV" [oJ dhmiourgov"] w{sper toV aujtozw/~on ejn toi~" ou\si parhgmevnon, ajllaV metaV th~"

zwogonikh~" aijtiva", meq'– h|" kaiV uJfivsthsi taV deuvtera, mignuV" ejn tw/~ krath~ri taV gevnh tou~ o[nto" eij" thVn tw~n yucw~n ajpogevnnhsin. In a sharp distinction from Petritsi, Pro-

clus in this passage does not equate the Demiurge with the highest God, but with a secondary cause in the intellectual universe.

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statical word” suggests. Those “hypostatical words” are identified by the Georgian philosopher with the soul’s innate ideas, and both are identified with “the essential numbers” (cf. Commentaries, prop. 198. 200. 20–21: “The soul’s cognition proceeds from numbers to numbers, that is to say, from ideas to ideas”), that is to say, numbers not in the meaning of countable numbers, but in the meaning of a structure, a systematic numerical relation. Both the soul and the intellect in Petritsi are places of ideas. All the shapes, colors, dimensions and so on have substantial existence in them, but Intellect has those ideas primarily, in a pure mode, the soul’s ideas appearing as reflections and images of the archetypes. In turn, the soul’s ideas appear as paradigms of the corporeal, perceptible shapes. 323 The Soul, and likewise (or hence) each particular soul, is the cause and father of the sensible reality, and itself is born before the sensible reality. 324 It is the ruler of the sensible beings: the Universal Soul in relation to the entire corporeal universe, and particular souls in relation to the concrete bodies that they animate. The soul’s cognition of a concrete material being by the soul consists in finding the idea of this being in itself, which means remembering this idea. This is contrasted to the soul’s perceptive faculty: It is not the case that the soul returns back from the outer objects—it is a characteristic of mortal beings to perceive only and not understand— but when the soul understands something, it evokes its innate ideas and finds the meaning of the outside object within itself (Commentaries, prop. 17. 52. 3–9).

This sentence probably means that while in perception there is a simultaneous reciprocity between the faculty of sense-perception and the material object perceived, the soul can, in contrast, understand its ideas without any relation to the material world. The latter, actually, is just an impulse or aid for waking up the forgotten ideas and is not necessary for the soul’s cognition. 325 Cf. props. 194 and 195. We find the same doctrine in the Timaeus, where Plato says that the worldsoul is older than the physical world, but for the sake of clarity of discourse first describes the creation of the latter (Timaeus 34c). 325 Aristotle has quite a different understanding of the soul’s cognitive faculty. For Aristotle the soul is also a “place of ideas” (De Anima III. 4. 429a), but in a different sense: it is a place of ideas only potentially, as a “tabula rasa,” which may attain its potential fullness through actualization. It did not have this fullness before, so it needs ideas in a material mode, just as the potential capacity for percep323 324

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As was said above, both the soul and the intellect are “fullnesses of forms,” but intellect contemplates all of the forms in an instantaneous intuition, whereas the soul cognizes cyclically, for at one instance it can be concerned with no more than one object. The idea of circularity is necessary if we speak about the “fullness of ideas,” for fullness means that they are finite. If they were infinite, they would be stretched like a straight line. Accordingly, in the commentary on prop. 199 Petritsi writes that “the soul grasps everything one after another, 326 and understands them according to measures and according to essential numbers, then turning back, having completed a sphere. This is the sphere and cycle of the soul” (Commentaries, prop. 199. 201. 2–3). 327 The expression “according to measures and essential numbers” in this sentence indicates the soul’s innate cognitive numerical Principles or the ideas of beings. However, this explanation stems from an interpretative and incorrect translation of Proclus’ kat– ajriqmoVn poreuvetai (prop. 198. 172. 26) as “is driven according to numbers.” Petritsi identifies those “numbers,” rendered in the plural instead of Proclus’ singular, with the plurality of the soul’s innate ideas. Yet Proclus in those two propositions (props. 198 and 199) that concern the cyclical movement of the souls provides another theory. His idea is simply that if the soul’s movement is everlasting, and if movement is a change from one condition into another (prop. 198. 172. 28–29: ajf– eJtevrwn eij" e{tera), and, moreover, if this change of conditions proceeds according to one measure/number, then there will happen periodic coincidences or reinstatements of the changing conditions (prop. 199. 174. 5–6: ajnakuklei~tai kaiV ajpokaqivstatai ajpoV tw`n aujtw`n ejpiV taV aujtav). We can say that, according to Petritsi’s understanding, a concrete and material object reminds the soul of a general and immaterial object. Will this not create a problem of cognition of an individual thing, which is a mixture of a general concept and a material substrate, and a problem concerning the tion of the taste of an apple needs a real apple for its actualization. There is a decisive difference: for Petritsi, ideas in the soul have essential existence and the soul can have full knowledge of them simply by participation in the intellect. Therefore Petritsi affirms the complete independence and separation of the soul from the material world in its normal state. On the contrary, according to Aristotle’s doctrine, the material world is necessary for the soul. For Petritsi, as a Platonist, the whole soul is separated from the body, whereas for Aristotle only the nou'" is (De Anima III. 5. 2–25). 326 Cf. Enneads V. 3. 17. 23–24: a[llo kaiV a[llo labei`n. 327 Cf. Timaeus 37a: aujthv te ajnakukloumevnh proV" auJthvn…

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value of an individual thing? Namely, if I love my horse and it suddenly gets lost, no other horse will replace it for me; however, if we accept Petritsi’s doctrine, which is, of course, that of the Platonists in general, my soul can be reminded of the innate idea of “horseness” by any other horse with the same success. 328 iv. Adam’s Fall in a Platonic Framework The teleology of the soul for Petritsi consists precisely in its eternal, cyclical self-cognition. Self-cognition implies not only knowledge of the innate ideas, but also knowledge of the archetypal ideas of the intellectual sphere—for Petritsi, an effect’s knowledge of its cause implies knowledge of its own self in a higher way, that is to say, kat’ aitian. While the soul possesses its “intellectual eyes,” it contemplates both the intellectual ideas and its own psychic ideas, rejoicing in them. 329 However, when it leaves Intellect In fact, Petritsi expressly denies the existence of the ideas of individuals, saying that “as the great Plato proves, there are neither ideas nor paradigms of individuals and particular accidents in the intellectual cosmos, but only the eternal ideas” (Commentaries, prop. 3. 26. 18–20). This difficult epistemological question puzzled the Platonist philosophers themselves. Plotinus devoted a treatise to the issue of whether individuals have ideas or not. As H. J. Blumenthal observes, Plotinus seems to deny their existence on the level of the intellect (Enneads VI. 4. 14) and accept it on the level of the soul (Enneads VI. 5. 12). Yet the same scholar admits that the question is too complex to be decisively solved. See H. J. Blumenthal, “Nous and Soul in Plotinus: Some Problems of Demarcation” and “Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals?” in Soul and Intellect, Studies in Plotinus and Later Neoplatonism (London: Variorum, 1993). 329 In holding that the objects of soul’s cognition are both the archetypal ideas and its innate ideas, Petritsi radically differs from Proclus and at the same time, displays a greater affinity with Plotinus. As Carlos Steel writes, “[according to Proclus] it is impossible to consider the intelligible forms themselves as the object of science. Indeed, they surpass all discursive activities and all attempts at definition and demonstration (cf. In Parmenidem 895, 38–896, 36).” See Carlos Steel, “Breathing Thought: Proclus on the Innate Knowledge of the Soul,” in Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism, ed. J. Cleary (Leuven: Catholic University of Leuven Press, 1997), 304. In the same work, Steel further states that “For Plotinus the intellective soul always remains in contact with the intelligible world, whereas Iamblichus, and Proclus following his lead, insisted that no such direct contact was possible for the soul. If they admit a perpetual activity in the soul, it is an activity related to its own psychic reasons, not the ideal forms which remain themselves inaccessible.” Ibid., 307. Petritsi, though, does not share the Plotinian idea that some part of the soul always 328

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and falls, it loses the intellectual eyes, so that it can no longer view the pure ideas. It falls and enters the corporeal world. Proclus and Petritsi would say that, now, through the bodily eyes, which are the coarse resemblances of those intellectual eyes, the soul watches dim material shadows of the archetypal ideas that glare in eternity. I think that there should be something like an image-archetype relation here: before the fall the soul understands the fullness of its ideas through Intellect’s illumination from outside, or, as Petritsi says, thurathen (Greek: quvraqen—“from without”), 330 like a current of the sun’s rays coming from a window; similarly and conversely, the fallen soul receives by perception the imprints of the material forms again from outside, but already from the lower, perceptible reality, through the windows of sense-perception. Thus the fallen soul becomes too weak to be illuminated directly by Intellect and needs impressions from the world of matter. Intellect should now evoke the soul’s innate ideas not directly but through the help of those impressions. Petritsi, though, does not discuss the mechanism of this interaction. We may imagine also the following analogy: viewing its own ideas is for the soul like walking for a healthy man; viewing the eternal intellectual ideas is like running—that is to say, a higher activity; finally, viewing the perceptible objects for the fallen soul is like walking with the help of crutches for a lame man, the crutches signifying a material body. Evidently, according to this tenet, the soul in this world is in a process of rehabilitation. That rehabilitation involves studying and reacquiring the wings of theoretical knowledge and of virtue (props. 51. 122. 28–31; 206. 204. 9–10). Thus the visible world may be considered as a school where the soul’s task is to purify itself by theories. It is a good question whether such a teaching about the soul is optimistic or pessimistic. On the one hand, the soul is fallen in this world; however, on the other, it is said to be sent here in order to bring order to the world: For wherever the power [or “meaning”] of logos is sown, it adorns and beautifies, and embellishes the formlessness of matter, and, similarly to the kind God, it shapes the mixture and composition of the four elements remains in contact with the intelligible realm even after the fall, but, on the contrary, follows Proclus’ doctrine on the complete fall of the soul. 330 Petritsi transliterates the Greek quvraqen into Georgian characters. Cf. Aristotle’s De Generatione Animalium 736b: leivpetai dhV toVn nou'n movnon quvraqen ejpeisievnai kaiV qei'on ei\nai movnon.

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by means of knowledge. For which reason one of the sages said that the Creator of all has sent down an essential logos, 331 which is the soul, with a task of equipping and adorning the surface of the earth (Commentaries, prop. 39. 93. 26–32).

The sage in this passage is probably Plotinus. As A. H. Armstrong writes, Plotinus follows older Platonic tradition in calling Intellect “the true demiurge and maker” of the universe: but it is so only in so far as it provides the soul with logoi which direct its making and produce the embodied forms of the things that it makes. The soul is always the immediate maker, operating directly on the material universe with what it receives from Intellect… A logos in this sense is an active formative Principle (not a static and lifeless pattern) which is the expression or image, on a lower level of being, of a Principle that belongs to a higher level. Soul is the logos of Intellect and the forms are logoi of those in the intelligible world. 332

Petritsi’s doctrine is very similar, for the passage just quoted suggests that the influence of the world of ideas on the material world proceeds through the soul. That is why the soul is called by Petritsi also the “father of the perceptible universe” (Commentaries, prop. 195. 199. 8–9), and “logos and ruler of the beings” (Commentaries, prop. 17. 52. 9). 333 So, on the one hand, the soul has the ontological task of joining the visible and the invisible, yet, on the other, its descent to the world is the soul’s fall, because in its healthy state the soul does not need matter. We get a kind of a paradox, because the music and harmony of the whole universe—the visible and the invisible—cannot be evil, God being its composer, but, at the same time, the sensible world appears not as a necessary 331 In the terminology of John Damascene the expression applies to Christ, the Logos of the Father. Cf. Expositio fidei, 8, 40–42: …lovgo" oJ ejnupovstato", hJ oujsiwvdh" kaiV teleiva kaiV zw'sa eijkwVn tou' ajoravtou qeou', in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damascus, ed. B. Kotter, II, Patristische Texte und Studien 12 (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 20. However, in this context it is hardly so, for here Petritsi clearly speaks about the soul holding an intermediate position between the intellect and the body, so it cannot be the Father’s Logos here. 332 A. H. Armstrong, “Plotinus,” in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 252. For Plotinus’ theory of the soul as logos of the intellect, see Enneads IV. 3. 5. 17; V. 1. 3. 8 etc. 333 Cf. Enneads V. 8. 13. 1–2: oJ ou\n qeoV" eij" toV mevnein wJsauvtw" dedemevno" kaiV sugcwrhvsa" tw`/ paidiv (i.e., th`/ yuch`/) tou`de tou` pantoV" a[rcein.

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part of this harmony, but as God’s mercy to the fallen soul, just like crutches for a lamed man. In this respect, it is interesting to observe Petritsi’s fusion of philosophical and Biblical motifs, and namely his understanding of Paradise in immaterial terms. In one place he says, in a Platonic way, that the blessed soul dwelled in the bosom of its Father-Cronos. Cronos is a planet—all the stars and planets are intelligent and psychical for Petritsi (cf. Commentaries, prop. 166)—so it may be the case that here he affirms that the soul before its fall dwelled in the planetary sphere of Cronos. But it is also possible that Cronos is just a metaphor for God, or for the True Being, because Petritsi gives the etymology of the word, ”fullness or satiety of intellect,” 334 saying that “the blessed divine soul is made drunk by the intellectual fullness of Cronos” (Commentaries, prop. 129. 165. 30–31). The latter is more likely to be the case, for “Cronos” and “the dimension of the intellectual sky” in this passage are mentioned together and have, evidently, the same semantic force (Commentaries, prop. 26. 70. 18–20). Soul in this state is rastonin, autarkes and ikanon (from Greek rJastwvnh, aujtarkev" and iJkanovn), which means that it delights in the full cognition of ideas, yet still in a psychic manner, that is to say, not by instantaneous intuition. 335 In addition, Petritsi identifies the soul with Adam, understanding the plants of Paradise symbolically, as the plenitude of ideas, which the God-Father has sown and planted in it. From this perspective, it is not a surprise that Petritsi calls this visible world and environment a “hell” (Commentaries, prop. 123. 162. 14), where all is caught up in a struggle (a Hobbesian, Darwinian or Freudian one, we might say today) for existence.

334 Cf. Enneads V. 1. 4. 9–10: kaiV touvtwn toVn ajkhvraton nou'n prostavthn, kaiV sofivan ajmhvcanon, kaiV toVn wJ" ajlhqw'" ejpiV Krovnou bivon qeou' kovrou kaiV nou'' o[nto" and Enneads V. 1. 7. 35: … kaiV mu'qoi oiJ periV qew'n aijnivssontai Krovnon meVn qeoVn sofwvtaton proV tou' Diva genevsqai a} genna/' pavlin ejn eJautw/' e[cein, h/| kaiV plhvrh" kaiV ejn kovrw/. Cf. also Th.Pl. V. 3. 15. 6–13, where Proclus calls Cronos nou~ diakorhv".

At this point Petritsi diverges from Plotinus, according to whom, as H. J. Blumenthal notes, a soul turning to Nous becomes itself Nous: nou'" genomevnh aujthV oi|on nowqei'sa kaiV ejn tovpw/ tw'/ nohtw'/ genomevnh (Enneads VI. 7. 35. 4–5). For Plotinus soul in this status lacks even discursiveness (H. J. Blumenthal, “Nous and Soul in Plotinus: Some Problems of Demarcation,” in Soul and Intellect, Studies in Plotinus and Later Neoplatonism, 215–216). On the contrary, in Petritsi’s system the discursive reasoning remains there for the soul also when it is in the blessed state; that is to say that the soul does not change into Nous. 335

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Petritsi does not explain what causes the soul to fall. In the commentary on prop. 189 he only intimates that deliberation and choice is not involved when souls animate bodies, but the souls, as it seems, automatically enter the bodies capable of receiving them: Proclus says that the soul does not vivify the animated things deliberately and according to choice, but appears to the bodies that are capable [of receiving them] and vivifies them. And if you ask “Whence do the bodies acquire this capability?” you will find that the creative magnetism [or “attraction”] of the stars makes, so to say, a clay-forging and constructs the bodies putting in them capacities that they may accept the vivifying power [i.e., the animal soul] or even the rational soul, that is to say, the human soul (Commentaries, prop. 189. 196. 2–10). 336

Thus, according to this passage, as it seems, the soul’s fall is an ontological necessity, because the stars eternally and necessarily construct bodies, which souls must also eternally vivify out of necessity. Would Petritsi have subscribed to this crudely mechanical picture? The answer to this question must be negative, on the basis of two suppositions: firstly, the entry of the soul to the perceptible world is expressly its fall and a certain ontological failure, notions that will hardly fit into the mechanical picture of the world; secondly, Petritsi, as we have seen above, maintains also the Providential aspect of human birth: at least some human souls may enter bodies with a special divine mission. For instance, Petritsi speaks of Proclus as one of such souls (Preface, 4. 14–19). But what about the other souls? Petritsi does not make it explicit whether a fallen soul is liable to a moral responsibility. For instance, Plotinus, while denying—as Petritsi does—the notion of deliberation in the event of the soul’s fall, maintains the notion of sin (aJmartiva) in it, a notion that implies a moral responsibility. 337 Petritsi’s 336 Petritsi’s comment on this proposition gives a different turn to Proclus’ intention. Proclus here speaks about the ontological nature of souls, saying that living is their essential feature, and that if a soul is present in a body, it does not vivify the body by choice or deliberation, but by its very being. In contrast, Petritsi, seems to intimate that souls do not enter bodies by choice and deliberation, but “automatically” enter the capable bodies. 337 See J. M. Rist on this point: “Plotinus associates the fall and descent of the soul not with the concept of prohairesis but with that of wishing. … There is no rational choice made by the soul when it falls. What it does is allow itself to be seduced by pleasure, or by the wish to be self-supporting. Plotinus does not say that it deliberately chooses pleasure, or that it deliberately chooses a false idea of selfsufficiency,” and further, “It is not a deliberated choice of evil, not a rationalization

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parallel of the soul’s fall with the Biblical original sin brings him close to the Plotinian tenet. Yet it is not entirely clear whether the moral sins of souls in the intellectual world brought about the bodily births, or a necessary ontological degradation—that some number of people must necessarily be born in this or that millennium—is described figuratively, in “anthropomorphic” terms, as sin. For Petritsi the soul in the fallen, material state is in misery. Similarly to Proclus, our philosopher also maintains that the soul falls in its entirety, and is affected by bodily passions. In his commentary on Proclus’ statement of prop. 80 (kaiV mhVn kaiV taV ajswvmata paqw~n metevcei ejn swvmati ginovmena, sundiairouvmena swvmasi kaiV ajpolauvonta th`" meristh~" ejkeivnwn fuvsew", where the Old Georgian reads “and also the incorporeals let passions have a share in them 338 when they are among bodies being co-divided with bodies, and receive from their ‘splittable’ and divisible essence”), Petritsi understands taV ajswvmata as souls (although, as remarks Dodds, “Proclus here rather implies not the souls proper but the organic functions and the e[nula ei[dh”). 339. Petritsi further explains: Proclus says that incorporeal essences too are vulnerable to passions through association with the body, as we observe with regard to the essence of the soul. In fact, the soul is sometimes affected by bodily passions, so that when powerful passions are transmitted to it through the body, the soul becomes stuck to the coarseness of the body (Commentaries, prop. 80. 139. 6–9).

The expression “sometimes” seems to indicate that the soul’s eternal identity cannot be fundamentally damaged by the bodily association, but only temporarily and relatively. Moreover, in the commentary on prop. 187 Petritsi asserts that “the soul’s essence is completely above all passions that affect changes [in the corporeal world]” (Commentaries, prop. 187. 195. 4–6). Despite the fact that the soul’s essence is fundamentally invulnerable, still after the fall the soul in its entirety is in misery and nothing in it dwells in a blessed state. In maintaining this position, Petritsi displays, on the one

of instinctual desire, but a willed abandonment of rationality as such.” J. M. Rist, “Prohairesis: Proclus, Plotinus et alii,” in Platonism and Its Christian Heritage, 111– 112. 338 For the Greek metevcei Petritsi puts the term iziara, a term that, as has been already said, denotes a higher term letting a lower participate in itself. 339 Dodds, op. cit., 243.

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hand, affinity with Iamblichus and Proclus, 340 and, on the other, variance with Plotinus, who held a doctrine of the soul’s impassible part’s remaining undescended in the intellectual realm enjoying uninterrupted contemplation. 341 Petritsi describes the soul’s fallen condition also by the Phaedrian image 342 of the lost wings (he transliterates the Greek word pterorjrJuou'sa into Georgian characters) (Commentaries, prop. 206. 204. 7). Education and exercise in theories and virtues brings its wings back to the soul—which is rejoining the intellect (cf. “the wing of the soul is intellect,” in Commentaries, prop. 206. 204. 8). Such a soul ascends back to the riches of the Father (Commentaries, prop. 206. 204. 10–11). Petritsi understands the Biblical story of Adam precisely in this Neoplatonist context. Not that he has two discourses, one Biblical or historical and the other philosophical, so that he would only have given a Biblical metaphor to the philosophical theory. Rather, he has one discourse and one system in which he tries to combine the Bible and the “true Platonic theology,” suspecting not even a possibility of conflict between them. That is why he literally affirms that in Adam’s story Moses also expresses the same ontological truth about the soul, although in a veiled manner. Petritsi understands the Biblical “Adam, where are you?” as a rhetorical question and gives the paraphrase “that is to say, from what [ideal] glory to what [material] misery have you descended?” 343 (Commentaries, prop. 211. 206. 13–14), taking no heed of the fact that the words were said to Adam while still in 340 However, as notes Dodds, “Proclus’ view is far from clear. In the Timaeus commentary he says, like Plotinus, that the pavqh arising from the vegetative and perceptual functions are attributed by the soul to itself only through an illusion, the soul mistakenly identifying itself with those functions (III. 330); yet on page 333 he objects to the view of Plotinus and Theodore of Asine, ajpaqev" ti fulavttonta" ejn hJmi~n kaiV ajeiV noou~n.” Dodds, op. cit., 243. 341 On this point, see Steel, The Changing Self, 38–41. 342 Cf. Phaedrus 246c. 343 As Vladimir Lossky remarks, “St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Maximus the Confessor have turned their attention particularly to the physical side of sin: instead of following its natural disposition towards God, the human mind turned towards the world; instead of spiritualizing body, it gave itself to the material world.” See Vladimir Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1978), 134. In this respect, Petritsi’s account of the Fall is also remarkably similar to that of St. Gregory and St. Maximus, with the significant distinction that for the former in Paradise Adam was in a bodiless state, while for the latter Adam had his body also in Paradise.

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Paradise, before the expulsion, and so, in Petritsi’s paradigm, before his acquisition of the material body. The Fall of Adam (and Eve, although the latter is never mentioned by Petritsi) appears in this system not as a unique event in the history of humanity, but as a metaphor for the birth of any man. In this way, we see that Petritsi calls “Adam” not a man, that is to say, a hypostatic unity of a rational soul and a material body, but a rational soul alone. 344 However, even in the paradisiac state this soul is not bodiless, for it possesses an ochema 345—an immaterial chariot of the souls: 346 I find it appropriate now to discourse on the subject of the chariot. In fact, it is said that particular souls eternally have an ochema, which is a chariot of a kind of a light, 347 like those of the heavenly bodies. And this ochema is not attached to them by any temporal cause, for they are not built up in time… Everything that is originated by the motionless cause [i.e., intellect] is eternal and imperishable, as is the ochema of the soul (Commentaries, prop. 207. 204. 18–28).

Petritsi here again diverges from Proclus, because for the latter the cause of the ochema is not the intellect but the soul, which he also takes as a motionless cause, in the sense that its essence is motionless. After the Fall this ochema is wrapped in a coarse material body, which Petritsi calls chiton, making again a Biblical allusion. He says, in fact, that the animal-skin garments given to Adam after the expulsion are a metaphor for the material 344 We find a similar idea in Petritsi’s notes to his translation of Nemesius of Emesa’s On Human Nature, where he writes as follows: “Plato taught not to love bodily desires, for they do not belong to man but to animals—bulls, horses, dogs. But man is higher than animals, having within himself both animal and rational soul. Now, Plato calls “man” only the soul, that is to say, him who lives according to logic. On the contrary, he does not deem worthy of being called “men” those who live irrationally.” Petritsi, Nemesius of Emesa, “On Human Nature”, ed. Gorgodze, 6. 345 Petritsi transliterates the Greek o[chma. 346 The word appears in the Timaeus 41e only in a remotely similar sense, for Plato, unlike Petritsi, says that the stars are chariots of human souls. It should be noted that from the Proclian perspective the immateriality of the ochema should be taken in a relative sense, for, as remarks Lucas Siorvanes, “Proclus admits degrees of materiality, and can define immaterial and material kinds of body.” Siorvanes, op. cit., 250. Thus, the immaterial ochema should be understood as a subtle matter and a subtle body. 347 Cf. Greek: aujgoeidev" or fwtoeidev".

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body. 348 The corollary of such an assumption would be that out of the clay and the earth God made not a material body but an immaterial ochema. 349 This whole tenet implies the preexistence and eternity of souls. 350 It is, in fact, a consequence of the assumption of the essential eternity of souls. According to Petritsi it is an ontological necessity, because, as he thinks, all those things that are not destructible do not have any beginning in time; Origen seems to be a direct source for such a theory. In Contra Celsum IV. 4 he asserts the following: “And the expulsion of the man from paradise, and their being clothed with tunics of skins (which God because of the transgression of men, made for those who had sinned), contain a certain secret and mystical doctrine (far transcending that of Plato) of soul’s losing its wings (pterorjrJuouvsh"), and being borne downwards to earth, until it can lay hold of some stable resting-place.” Here I use the English translation of Frederick Crombie. See Contra Celsum, trans. Rev. Frederick Crombie, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (New York: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995), 516. 349 Cf. Procopius of Gaza refuting, on the basis of Patristic authority, those who allegorize the Biblical story of creation by saying that kat– eijkovna denotes the soul, which in the paradisiac state possesses a subtle body—toV leptomereV" sw'ma— whereas the animal-skin garments given to Adam after the fall signify the earthly human body. See Procopius, In Genesin (PG 87, 221 A-B). 350 It is important to remark that Nemesius of Emesa, in his On Human Nature, rejects the possibility of a human soul’s coming from non-existence into existence with the birth of a man, holding, on the contrary, the idea of souls’ preexistence. Nemesius interprets Moses’ words about God’s resting from all His deeds as meaning that all the souls were created by that point, so no new souls are created any more (from Genesis 2. 2–3). He interprets the passage from St. John’s Gospel, “My Father acts to this day and I act” (from John 5. 17), in this light, and so does not take them to mean that God makes new souls—such an explanation would have ruined, in Nemesius’ opinion, the truth of Moses’ words—but sees them as referring to God’s Providence for them and for the whole created world (Nemesius Emesenus, De Natura Hominis, ed. Morani, 31, 25 – 32, 2). Petritsi seems to share this ancient Christian reconciliation of the Neoplatonist doctrine of the eternal world and the Christian doctrine of creation. There is extant a manuscript of a translation of an unknown Byzantine author’s anti-Origenist treatise, “Against Those Who Claim Human Souls’ Preexistence,” by Arsen Ikhaltoeli, that famous theologian of the twelfth century, which ends with the rhymed gloss of a scribe: “Let Arsen be of blessed memory forever. Here is ended the abrogation of the Greek teaching of the preexistence of souls, and [the abrogation] of the seduction of the two dragons of the abyss, Origen and Manentosi” (as quoted by Kekelidze, op. cit., 279). The possibility is not to be excluded that Arsen made this translation in response to Petritsi’s ideas. 348

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therefore, if the soul is immortal and not destroyed together with the body, it should have no temporal beginning and should dwell in eternity. 351 The soul enters time only with the birth of a man, which is at the same time a diminution of its glory. The commentary on prop. 210 suggests that Petritsi does not exclude the possibility of many births of one and the same soul. This, probably, is not a surprise in the framework of this doctrine, in which only the soul that acquires “theoretical wings” can return to eternity. But what if the soul fails to do so during its earthly life? As it cannot fly up without wings, it seems, therefore, that after death it must take another material body. The last supposition, however, is quite absurd, because then the birth of a new man will no longer be the fall of a soul—for it is already fallen—but rather another opportunity for it. If, on the other hand, any soul after leaving the body necessarily or automatically ascends up to the spiritual sky only to fall down again, then what need is there for a virtuous life and philosophical training? 352 The following passage makes it apparent that Petritsi accepts the theory of metempsychosis: An ochema of the soul is eternally one and the same, because it is constructed by the unmoved cause of the soul [i.e., Intellect], but it appears, and is supposed, to differ and differ again, because it is in need of different bodies composed of material elements; thus it [the ochema] appears sometimes as being of this or that type and form, and sometimes 351 In contrast to Proclus and Petritsi, Michael Psellus in his Opusculum phil. 23 (PeriV tou~ pw~" hJ yuchV tou~ swvmato" eijskrivnetai kaiV pw~" dialuvetai) apparently upheld the teaching of the soul’s coming from not being to being, having explained this Orthodox position in a philosophical language: kaiV prw'tovn ge thVn ei[skrisin mhV

swmatoeidh' uJpolavmbane, mhdeV oi[ou thVn yuchVn feromevnhn a[nwqen ejx ajnavgkh" tw/' swvmati sunduavzesqai … ajll– i{na soi paradeivgmati crhvsomai, w{sper hJ ajpoV tou' mhV o[nto" eij" toV ei\nai provodo" ajqrova tiv" ejsti kaiV a[neu kinhvsew", in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica

Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, 98, 16– 17 and 24–26. 352 According to Laura Westra, the same question can be posed to Proclus: “The question that arises then is to what extent the will can be involved in this ‘cyclical path’ of return: no entity needs will in order to unfold to its perfected, or actualized state. Thus, on one hand the combination of formal/final causality may appear to tie the soul to the Cause far more strongly than in the Plotinian scenario, whereas, on the other, the prerequisite for the ethical behaviour (i.e., ‘free choice’) appears to be missing from the ascent in Proclus.” Laura Westra, “Proclus’ Ascent of the Soul towards the One in the ‘Elements of Theology’: Is It Plotinian?” in Proclus et son influence, ed. G. Boss and G. Seel (Zürich: Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, 1967), 133.

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of another. It happens so because it adopts the coarse, idol-like bodies, through which it appears as being of different types and forms. When, however, the soul remembers itself and reenters the intercourse with its father, Intellect, it will get rid of all the idol-like bodies in which it had been wrapped and will join the God and the Father (Commentaries, prop. 210. 205. 23–32).

The teaching of metempsychosis, which I think is expressed in this passage, is to be viewed only on the human plane, because Petritsi emphasizes, as we shall see, the essential difference between the human soul and that of animals or plants. 353 v. The Hierarchy of Souls We now move to the issue of a hierarchy of the souls in the commentaries. The highest place is held by the monad of souls, the Universal Soul. 354 This is the only soul that has no ochema 355 (Commentaries, prop. 2. 21, 16–17). FurThe doctrine of metempsychosis was held by John Italus, Psellus’ successor as the rector (hypatos) of the philosophical school of Constantinople. As Anna Comnena writes about Italus, h[dh deV kaiV metemyucwvsei" suneskiasmevnw" pw" kaiV a[lla tinaV oJmoiovtropa… (Alexiad VIII. 8. 37. 27–28). Eventually, though, Italus renounced this doctrine, together with other ones, and was reconciled with the Church. More important for our discussion is to mention the fact that Nemesius of Emesa in his On the Human Nature, while repudiating the idea of a human soul’s reincarnation in an animal’s body, at the same time he seems to accept Iamblichus’ idea of the human soul’s reincarnation in a human body: *Iavmblico" deV thVn ejnantivan 353

touvtoi" dramwVn kat– ei\do" zw/vwn yuch~" ei\do" ei\nai levgei, h[goun ei[dh diavfora. gevgraptai gou~n aujtw~/ monovbiblon ejpivgrafon o{ti oujk ajp– ajnqrwvpou" aiJ metenswmatwvsei" givnontai ajll– ajpoV zw/vwn eij" zw/~a kaiV ajpoV ajnqrwvpwn eij" ajnqrwvpou". Kaiv moi dokei~ ma~llon ou|to" e{neka touvtou kalw~" katestocavsqai mhV movnon th~" Plavtwno" gnwvmh" ajllaV kaiV th~" ajlhqeiva" aujth~", wJ" e[stin ejk pollw~n meVn kaiV a[llwn ejpidedei~xai, mavlista deV ejk touvtwn. oujdemivan gaVr tw~n logikw~n kinhvsewn ejmfaivnesqai toi~" ajlovgoi" zw/voi", in Neme-

sius Emesenus, De Natura Hominis, ed. Morani, p. 35, 7–15. 354 Michael Psellus in his Opusculum phil. 35 (PeriV qeologiva" kaiV diakrivsew" dogmavtwn JEllhnikw~n) rejects Proclus’ conception of a Universal Soul and maintains that there exist only particular souls: paraV gaVr toi'" hJmetevrai" logivoi" (i.e., Christian teaching) ou[te o{lh yuchV ou[te ti" o{lh fuvsi" paraV taV" merikaV" dedogmavtistai, in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, pp. 119, 30 – 120, 1. 355 It is interesting that when quoting Plato’s Timaeus Petritsi says that the sky according to Plato is an ochema of the Universal Soul, but in his own discourse he adheres to Neoplatonist speculations and says that the body of the sky has its own sky-soul, whereas the Universal Soul has no ochema at all. Yet the commentary on

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ther on Petritsi speaks about the souls of “gods and heroes” (Commentaries, prop. 129. 165. 24–25). Next to these comes the soul of the sky and those of the stars and planets, among which there is a hierarchy, because “Cronos has ideas differently, and the Sun differently” (Commentaries, prop. 194. 163. 19–20), which means different degrees of purity. Now, the last mentioned are already bodies, but not ordinary ones. These bodies are indestructible, because they are built up by the eternal unmoved cause—the intellect. They are therefore material ochemata, inseparable from their respective souls. In turn, the stars and planets construct bodies on the earth. The soul, actually, enters a body constructed by the stars’ “creative attraction” (Commentaries, prop. 169. 196. 7–10). But insofar as the stars and planets are not unmoved causes, the bodies constituted by them are necessarily destructible. All the aforementioned souls have one common feature: they are always attached to Intellect and cannot fall. Human soul already does not have the necessary, eternal unity with Intellect, so it falls. From this perspective, it follows that the human soul is of a lower rank than the souls of the planets and stars, if stability is taken as a criterion for evaluation. 356 It is clear also that the Universal Soul is enthroned over the human souls. After the human soul there follow the souls of animals and plants. However, they are not souls in the proper sense of the word, appearing merely as reflections of the Universal Soul. They do not have any share in intellect and eternity. That is why they can only resemble eternity by continuous reproduction. For this reason, reproduction and the bodily eros connected with it constitute perfection for animals. Animals’ souls are deprived of the capacity for cognition, because the latter is connected with reason. As the philosopher says, “God has separated the rational soul from the irrational” (Epilogue, 207. 13–14). Here Petritsi quarrels with Alexander of Aphrodisias, who, as he thinks, maintained that the human soul was also a reflection of the Universal Soul. Petritsi says that the human soul is a

prop. 109 suggests that Petritsi distinguishes between the Universal Soul and that of the sky, and that the sky-soul is the same as the Universal Nature (Commentaries, prop. 109. 154. 1–8). 356 Petritsi would have apparently shared in Plotinus’ sarcasm against, as it seemed to the latter, an absurd idea of the Gnostics, that the pure heavenly bodies do not possess the ability to understand intelligible reality, and that only human beings possess immortal souls, being thus more principal than the stars (cf. Enneads II. 9. 5. 1 ff.).

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“self-standing” entity, 357 an intelligent being prior to mortals, and it is the agalma [Greek: a[galma—“statue”] of the Intellect (Commentaries, prop. 64. 130. 1–10). In the context of this radical difference Petritsi’s metempsychosis applies exclusively to human beings. In fact, what we see is that a corporeal man is just an accident of the changeless self-produced being that is the eternal soul (and its inseparable immaterial ochema). So personality can be ascribed only to the soul and ochema, and not to the born, corporeal human being in his integrity. 358 It is namely for this reason that Petritsi attacks Aristotle’s doctrine that the soul is the body’s entelechy, that is to say, its actualization. vi. Critique of Aristotle In Petritsi’s understanding, the Aristotelian entelechy means that an idea is an implementation of a material thing and is not separated from it. 359 Thus, Cf. Michael Psellus, Opusculum phil. 11 (PeriV yuch~"): pa'sa yuchV … kaiV aujquin Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, p. 22, 14–16. In this short treatise, as I have said above, Psellus gives an account of and repudiates Proclus’ doctrines. 358 We find a similar disparagement of the material body in John Italus’ short treatise Pw'" ajnasthsovmeqa metaV tw'n oijkeivwn swmavtwn tw'n pacevwn kaiV uJlikw'n, (“How shall we resurrect with our own bodies that are coarse and material”) where the philosopher denies to matter, just as to the mhV o[n or oujk o[n, any relation to human identity, reserving the latter completely for the ei\do", which in this context should mean the soul: ejpeiV deV mhV o]n hJ u{lh, wj" devdeiktai, o]n deV toV ei\do", e[stai oJ a[nqrwpo" ajlhqw'" toV ei\do" (Italus, op. cit., 208–209). Furthermore, Italus, while denying the transmutation of the human soul into that of animals, asserts that as there is no difference between the matter of human beings and animals, the matter of the human body after its dissolution may change into an animal’s body: ouj gaVr toV hJmetev357

povstato"…,

ron ei\do" eij" levonta metabalei`n h] kuvna h] eij" e{terovn ti tw~n a[llwn qhrivwn, ajll– hJ u{lh i[sw", h}n oujk o]n oJ lovgo" ajpevdeixen (ibid.). As Natela Kechagmadze notes, according

to this treatise, “Italus rejects the Church dogma that resurrection will happen in the same body in which human beings lived.” See Kechagmadze, “John Italus and Ioane Petritsi,” 51. Petritsi seems to hold the same tenet, for also for him matter is a “non-being” and our earthly body is just a chiton wrapping man’s eternal identity—soul and the immaterial ochema. 359 Petritsi apparently understands the entelechy in terms of energeia, as a certain dynamic finality of a substance predicable of this substance, as, for example, cutting is a dynamic finality predicable of a knife, or, to quote Aristotle’s example, “as teachers think they have achieved their end when they have exhibited the pupil at

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when the material thing is destroyed, so too will the idea be (Commentaries, prop. 41. 100. 22–26). In this way the idea appears to be an accident of the body—and not its cause, which would not necessarily require a body, just as (to return to the simile utilized twice before) a sculptor can well get by qua sculptor without making a statue (of which, if made, he would be the cause). On the contrary, for Petritsi, the idea is the constructor of the body and at the same time it is separable from it. The idea is “self-produced.” It is the idea that encompasses the body and not vice versa. The idea is not destroyed together with the body, but when the body is destroyed it is destroyed too, because the ideal light withdraws from it (Commentaries, prop. 41. 98. 30–32). There is distinction and hierarchy among the ideas, all of which come down from the Limit, the head of the ideas, “which is born from the One as One and as the originator of the henads.” The bodily shapes are destructible, because only the reflections of the eternal ideas reach here; the stars and planets, however, are eternal, because they are held by the “principal ideas” (Commentaries, prop. 41. 100. 33). work, so also does nature… For the action is the end, and the actuality is the action. Therefore even the word ‘actuality’ [ejnevrgeia] is derived from ‘action’ [e[rgon] and points to the fulfillment [ejntelevceian]” (Metaphysics 1050 a19–23). I use here and in the following quotations the English translation of W. D. Ross. See Aristotle— Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). In this sense also soul is the energeia of a body (cf. Metaphysics 1043 a35)—insofar as the dynamic finality of a body is to be a living or an ensouled body—without implication, of course, that this energeia can exist separately from a body. But Aristotle uses entelechy also in a different sense, as “the primary essence” which “has no matter; for it is fulfillment [ejntelevceia]” (Metaphysics 1074 a36). The “primary essence” that is the entelechy is no longer a predicate of some substance (in the sense of a unity of a formulable essence and a material substratum), but of a substance that is sheer thinking, such thinking that “can in no way be otherwise than as it is” (Metaphysics 1072 b8). In this case the entelechy stands for a necessary actualization of thinking, and this eternal entelechy of thinking is Aristotle’s god. See also Michael Psellus, who in his Opusculum phil. 13 (SullogaiV diavforoi kaiV poikivlai) distinguishes two ways in which soul is an entelechy of the body: non-rational soul as inseparable from the body and perishing together with the body and the rational soul—probably as the entelechy of the brain—which is separable from the body and survives its death: JH ejntelevceia ditthv: toV tou` swvmato" ajcwvriston ei\do" kaiV toV kecwrismevnon wJ" oJ plwthVr tou` ploivou. o{tan ou\n ejntelevceian levgei thVn a[logon kaiV futikhVn yuchvn, toV ajcwvriston ei\do" levgei, o{tan deV thVn logikhvn, toV kecwrismevnon, in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II.

Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, p. 44, 22–25.

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The same relation applies to the soul-body relationship. The soul for Petritsi can be altogether separated from the body, so that it can be neither an entelechy nor an accident of the body. Soul will need a body, as a material substratum, only in the case of its fall, and not as a fulfillment of this body, but as that which sustains a body. It can go without the material body when attached to intellect. vii. The Role of Logic Cognition of the soul is the same as its reversion to its cause—Intellect. That is why the soul that is capable of reversion can be called intelligent. Logic plays an indispensable role in this process. Logic holds the principal position in Petritsi’s philosophy, as a means for transition from physics to metaphysics. Without the aid of Aristotle’s rules of inference, he writes, it is impossible for an intelligent soul to understand anything 360 (Commentaries, prop. 1. 11. 1–2). Knowledge means remembering the fullness of the innate ideas, and remembering is nothing other than restoration of different members and putting those members again in a harmonious whole. We may assume that ideas in the soul make up a system and hierarchy, so that there are general and particular ideas in it. Soul understands its fullness by means of analysis and synthesis, which is possible with the use of syllogisms. In this way the problem of cognition is also a linguistic or terminological problem, and that is why “plebeian language” (or “ordinary language,” as we may call it after Russell) makes it impossible for Petritsi to fulfill the task of a philosopher (Epilogue, 220. 24–25). As he writes, it is by means of terms and definitions that we actualize our “inner word.” That is to say that just as a book written in a foreign language is dumb until we study the words, similarly the ontological structure of the soul will remain hidden if we do not apply the adequate terminology. Terminology is a tool for cognition. As 360 It should be noted that Petritsi does not discuss the distinction between the syllogistic method of Aristotle and the Parmenidian dialectic, which Proclus found to be superior to the former. As John M. Dillon writes, “Proclus sees it as a weakness of the syllogistic method, that it only considers what follows or does not follow if something exists or is the case. To get the complete picture of reality, however, we must also consider what follows if something is not the case.” See John M. Dillon, “Proclus and the Parmenidian Dialectic,” in Proclus—Lecteur et interprète des Anciens. Actes du colloques international du C.N.R.S Paris (2–4 octobre 1985) (Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S., 1987). In fact, following Proclus, Petritsi also practices Parmenidian negative arguments such as “if there is not One,” yet he does not distinguish them from the general Aristotelian pattern of argumentation.

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there are things with different properties, so there is a corresponding multitude of definitions. The structure of reality implies a network of causeeffect relations, and the soul’s discourse is a process of rising from the effect to the cause by means of syllogisms: The soul searches for its essence and finds it in two ways: in itself and in its cause (Intellect); for in fact, to find oneself in the cause is more excellent than to find oneself in oneself; actually any inferential knowledge is knowledge of origins and the first causes (Commentaries, prop. 186. 194. 21–26). Definition is a necessary condition for building a syllogism. The soul can make analysis and synthesis, that is to say, distinction and connection of different classes and categories, only by means of definitions. Without them “a rule of the necessary inference of syllogism would be impossible, and where this necessity is absent, there can be maintained neither physical nor metaphysical theories.” Petritsi states that “through our innate word we get connected to the activities of the intellect and God, as voyagers from the knowledge of beings to the supra-being” (Epilogue, 221. 1–4) (that is to say, from physics to metaphysics), which, I think, means that by means of logic the soul cognizes both itself and its causes. Henads play a key role in the process of reversion (or cognition). As we said at the beginning, henads represent Principles or centers of this or that being. They are seeds or lights of the One, and the beings return to the One through them. Petritsi alludes to the Phaedrus and says that “the soul first turns to its essence and observes the multitude of all kinds of beings there, and then it goes deeper and gets rid of the particular ideas.” Afterwards the soul “first embraces the henad within itself and then through the henad it embraces the ineffable Sun of the henads” 361 (Commentaries, prop. 15. 49. 23–29). So after gathering or remembering the innate polymorphy of its ideas, the soul embraces the simple Principle of its essence, which is its henad. 362 The entire fullness of the ideas in the soul, which it cognizes in a 361 It is likely that the henad of the soul is the same as the logos of the soul. For example, Petritsi writes that “the best portion of man is his logos and contemplation of the first blessed Nature and all that is made by Him” (Epilogue, 214. 14–15). Further on he states that “the perfection of man is his logos and eros towards God” (Epilogue, 214. 18). Still again, he states that “God placed within us the innate logos, by which we judge the conduct of our souls” (Epilogue, 207. 1–6). 362 See Proclus, in Th.Pl. I. 3. 15. 24 – 16. 7: sunneuvousa gaVr eij" thvn eJauth`"

e{nwsin kaiV toV kevntron th`" sumpavsh" zwh`" kaiV toV plh`qo" ajposkeuazomevnh kaiV thVn poikilivan tw~n ejn auJth~/ pantodapw~n dunavmewn, ejp– aujthVn a[neisi thVn a[kran tw~n o[ntwn periwphvn. KaiV w{sper ejn tai`" tw~n teletw~n ajgiotavtai" fasiV touV" muvsta" thVn meVn prwvthn polueidevsi kaiV polumovrfoi" tw~n qew~n probeblhmevnoi" gevnesin ajpanta~n, eijsiov-

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successive way, seems to be an unfolding of a unique systematic unity—a henad. By the successive cognition soul rebuilds its integrity. It is as if it gathers the colors of a rainbow in a unique white color, or as if it puts into an orderly way different characters of its inner code or “password” so that it may get access to the One. The same should happen also in intellects, for their centers are also henads. But the intellect grasps its henadic integrity not through logic, but by cognizing the whole fullness of its ideas in an immediate intuition; that is why the intellect must embrace its henad in a simpler way (Commentaries, prop. 32. 84. 18–19). viii. The Course of the Soul’s Reversion Soul’s reversion to the One does not happen directly even through its henad, but passes through a step-by-step process. All the particular souls join higher causes through their monad—the Universal Soul—and their relevant particular intellect in the higher contiguous series (Commentaries, prop. 109. 153. 25 – 154. 4). We may imagine an intellectual series as a domain of noblemen with their leader (the Universal Intellect), while the psychic series is a domain of vassals with their own leader (the Universal Soul). In their own hierarchy souls commonly are subjected to their monad, and in the higher hierarchy all of them have their private masters. The soul’s ascension to the One finally proceeds through the True Being, which is called the “yard and threshold of the One” and “the intellectual altar” (Commentaries, prop. 130 ( = 129). 166. 22). Here is a translation of a charming passage about the sky’s striving for the One: The fact that it is a body notwithstanding, the sky shines in the eternal light of the intellect and directs all its theories, aspirations and desires towards the transcendent One. The sky, a philosopher and the wisest sage, constantly pursues and craves for the True Being and its Father— the One, through a Dionysian frenzy of eros and desire towards the One. It yearns for the One with passion, and unites with It through the soul and intellect, is made immortal by It and is established as a god above the order and nature of mortals, as an attainer of a lot of the blessed, having transcended mortal misery (Commentaries, prop. 63. 128. 33 – 129. 9).

The ultimate place of the souls’ ascent is the henadic sphere. This is affirmed in the commentary on prop. 23, again in very lofty language. Petritsi nta" deV ajklinei`" kaiV tai`" teletai`" pefragmevnou" aujthVn thVn qeivan e[llamyin ajkraifnw`" ejgkolpivzesqai kaiV gumnh~ta", wJ" a]n ejkei~noi fai~en, tou~ qeivou metalambavnein.

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translates Proclus’ statement: pa'sai aiJ metecovmenai uJpostavsei" eij" ajmeqevktou" uJpavrxei" ajnateivnontai, in the following manner: “All the nonself-sufficient hypostases ascend to the daylight of the self-sufficient being.” This is a characteristic example of Petritsi’s treatment of Proclus’ text. For ajnateivnontai (that is, “they stretch themselves up”) he uses a self-invented Georgian verb ag-i-cisk(a)r-ebs. Ciskari in Georgian is a noun and means the “Morning Star,” “dawn” or “daylight.” The word is composed of two words ca (“the sky” or “heaven”) and kari (“door”), and literally it means “the gate of heaven.” So Petritsi creates a new verb, which may be tentatively translated as something like “to ascend to the daylight,” and with all those notions makes a pun, presenting his own theory: Do you hear, O lovers of contemplation, that Proclus affirms that the souls are of the color of the daylight? He speaks about an ascent to that Day of which the sun is neither this sun that enlightens the perceptible beings, nor psychic heaven and the psychic sun, nor even intellectual, that is to say, the True Being, but the first One and the first Good, the Sun of the Day of the henads and gods; this Day is an object of desire for all. Everyone who has contemplated that place has ascended to that Day. It is the origin of any day and daylight. And the language justly named it as “the gate of heaven”; that is, if emanation of light starts from the sky [heaven], then where there is the principal light, there will be also the principal sky [heaven] (Commentaries, prop. 23. 63. 9–21).

Petritsi here communicates his own theories rather than explaining Proclus. Indeed, he most probably thought that this explanation was faithful to Proclus’ teaching and mysticism, but it is impossible that he thought that the explanation was textually faithful to this very place of the Elements of Theology. ix. The Soul’s Ceaseless Striving Even in its healthy, intellectual state the soul is not self-sufficient, because, as we saw above, in the passage about the sky, it constantly craves for the One. Petritsi is emphatic about the soul’s eros towards the One, and his style ceases to be sober when he speaks about it. In this way, the highest in the soul is not something static, but an insatiable craving. One may hear tragic tones in the commentaries, for only the One can heal the pains of the contemplators, but at the same time the thirst for the One always remains there. The eros of the One is an impulse for education. Petritsi understands philosophy as striving towards something higher than oneself. This is why a being that strives for the One completely forgets itself in fascination and

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wonder, and, so to say, discards its own essence (Commentaries, prop. 32. 84. 23–28). We find in the commentaries the Platonic distinction between image and archetype also in the sphere of desire. In Petritsi’s definition eros is nothing other than an intensification of desire, but the authentic or archetypal desire is only that which is insatiable. If a desire can diminish or be satisfied—the two, in fact, being the same—this means that it was an idollike desire. With better justice such a desire should be called a base passion, which will eventually destroy its own designs (Commentaries, prop. 31. 82. 9– 17). The authentic desire, as the philosopher explains, is desire for that which cannot be grasped either by the intellect or by the soul. So archetypal desire applies only to the One: “Any desire or will can be claimed as authentic if it escapes the soul’s discursive grasp” (Commentaries, prop. 31. 82. 10–12). The same idea is expressed in another place: Socrates says about the transcendent and unattainable One that It stirs the desire of all lovers towards Itself and gives them Its properties, puts in them an intention for grasping and obtaining It, makes the beings drunk with nectar and fixes their acmes by ambrosia. 363 Moreover, the One is not altogether unattainable, lest the lovers forsake the desired object due to the frustration. 364 However, It does not give the conception or grasp of Its supremacy and supra-essence, in order not to make attainable Its property-less property. In fact, as Socrates says, it pertains to the soul and intellect that as soon as they understand something for which they strive, and grasp it by the faculty of understanding, after363 Cf. Phaedrus 248e: (… parevbalen ajmbrosivan te kaiV ejp– aujth/' nevktar ejpovtisen). Also see In Parmenidem 1047. 364 Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, who in De virginitate 10, while asserting the incognoscibility of God, at the same time warns about the danger that one may become altogether frustrated when trying to cognize Him. Thus, the divine transcendence does not lead Gregory into a pit of agnosticism and pessimism, but rather to a supreme optimism: ToV gaVr ajeideV" pavnth, kaiV ajschmavtiston, kaiV phlikovthto" pavsh"

ajllovtrion, kaiV pavntwn o{sa periV sw`ma kaiV ai[sqhsin qewrei`tai, povrjrJwqen iJdruvmenon, pw`" a[n ti" diaV tw`n movnh/ th`/ aijsqhvsei katalambanomevnwn gnwrivseien; Ouj mhVn diaV tou`tov ge ajpognwstevon hJmi`n th`" ejpiqumiva" tauvth", o{ti uJyhlotevra faivnetai th`" katalhvyew", ajll– o{sw/ mevga toV zhtouvmenon oJ lovgo" ajpevdeixen, tosouvtw/ ma`llon uJyou`sqai crhV thVn diavnoian kaiV sunepaivresqai tw`/ megevqei tou` zhtoumevnou, mhV pantelw`" e[xw genevsqai th`" tou` ajgaqou` metousiva": kivnduno" gaVr ouj mikrov", mhV tw`/ livan uJyhlw`/ te kaiV ajrJrJhvtw/, pantavpasi th`" periV aujtou` ejnnoiva" ajpolisqhvswmen, mhdeniV gnwrivmw/ thVn katanovhsin aujtw`n ejpereivdonte", in De virginitate, ed. J. P. Cavarnos, in Gregorii Nysseni Opera ascetica,

Gregorii Nysseni Opera VIII. 1, ed. W. Jaeger, J. P. Cavarnos and V. W. Callahan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952), pp. 290, 25 – 291, 12.

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI wards they in a way bypass it and strive already for another object. But, in the case of the striving for the One, there is a mixture of both, for, on the one hand, It gives [something of] Its property and awakens Its lovers with thirst towards It, yet, on the other, He simultaneously estranges Itself from them 365 (Commentaries, prop. 8. 34. 20–33).

This situation is compared to a midwife who tries all the time to deliver a child, while the child, that is to say, the conception and understanding of the One, is never born (Commentaries, prop. 8. 35. 1–14).

Petritsi here wants to say that in the case of the One, neither the soul nor the intellect can ever bypass the object, for it endlessly remains mysterious and “interesting” in itself. 365

7 TIME AND ETERNITY 1. PROLEGOMENON TO THE PROBLEM The understanding of the problem of time and eternity belongs to the very beginnings of philosophy, when human thought first went beyond the changes of the phenomenal world to search for a permanent, eternal substratum underlying all changes. The permanent substance is not, in fact, an empirical phenomenon itself, but rather an abstraction of mind, like, for instance, Anaximander’s apeiron (Greek: a[peiron—“unbounded” or “infinity”) or Democritus’ atoms. It is an abstraction of mind even if such a substrate is believed to be water or air, as with Thales and Anaximenes: there is no water or air in the world that does not change in its phenomenal nature, since water may evaporate, or water vapor in air may deliquesce. When man thinks of any of those things as the arche (Greek: ajrchv “beginning”) underlying the world, he cannot base this assumption on any empirical observation, but only on belief and conviction. The variety of ideas of the first philosophers on the subject is indicative of the non-empirical, abstract character of those convictions. The quest for permanence appears to be naturally deeply rooted in man; the idea of a most fundamental, eternal substance must always have provided him with a certain intellectual standpoint and consolation. For a modern atheist and materialist, such an underlying idea will be that of the everlastingness of the material world, for, to paraphrase Parmenides, sheer nothingness cannot be imagined at all. From the Biblical perspective, only God the Creator could have acted as the basis for such a fundamental permanence, while any other application of the idea would have been seen as granting a divine feature to creation—in other words, idolatry. 366 This, and In the thought of the early Greek philosophers the notion that a material thing is everlasting makes the existence of this thing fundamentally necessary, indeed as necessary as the existence of God. As W. Kneale writes, “There is a sense in which a sempiternal (i.e., everlasting) thing may be described as a necessary exis366

215

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not just polemical fervor, is the reason why St. John Chrysostom states that the first of the Greek philosophers (Thales) proclaimed water to be God, whereas another philosopher (evidently, Heraclitus) deified fire, still another air. 367 In the history of the development of the idea in Greece we perceive its subsequent refinement. Plato’s notions of the eternal intelligible paradigm and the immortality of soul had its more ancient counterparts, particularly in the teachings of Pythagoras. For the first philosophers—if we are to trust Socrates’ story in the Phaedo about his dissatisfaction with those who looked after the causes of nature in nature itself (Phaedo 96. b1–4) 368 and Aristotle’s account in the first book of Metaphysics (Metaphysics 983. b6–18)—the idea of permanence was founded on something less than rational. Then Anaxagoras introduced the notion of nous, and Heraclitus that of logos; the Pythagoreans, meanwhile, had based their perception of reality on changeless orderly numerical relationships, including even the idea of the immortality of the soul. Aristotle most probably denied personal immortality, reserving it to the creative intellect only. His ultimate rational Principle, called by him “divine” or “god,” is not, however, the Creator of the world, but that which eternally governs it through an unrelated and unintended attraction—which may sound odd for a modern man who is accustomed to the Christian understanding of God the Creator. In the pagan world there did not exist any such notion as that of God the Creator-out-of-nothing. Even Zeus, the highest god of the Greek pantheon, is not the creator of the tent, provided that it is covered by an a priori principle of conservation. But this can scarcely be of any use to theologians who wish to argue from the contingency of the existence of the world the necessity of the existence of God, unless they can first prove that the world is not, as Democritus and Aristotle thought, itself sempiternal and therefore necessarily existent in this sense.” See W. Kneale, “Time and Eternity in Theology,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61 (1961): 107–108. 367 See St. John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Gospel of St. John LXVI, 3: “For instance, the first of them said that water was God, his successor fire, another one air, and they descended to things corporeal… and if they did ever gain [the thought of an incorporeal God] afterwards, it was after conversing in Egypt with our people.” I use here the English translation of Philip Schaff. See St. John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Gospel of St. John, ed. and trans. Rev. Philip Schaff, in Nicene and PostNicene Fathers (Oxford: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995), 247. 368 As Cornford writes, the explanation of natural phenomena by other natural phenomena offered just “a more detailed picture of how the event came about; it does not, Socrates thought, tell why the event came about.” See F. M. Cornford, Before and after Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 2.

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world, not even preexistent himself, since he is himself an offspring of the more primordial deities (who later sank lower in the divine hierarchy). Christianity, with its notion of creatio ex nihilo, was a radical contrast to the whole pagan conception of reality. As R. Sorabji writes, “many pagans would have accepted that the present arrangement of matter had a beginning. What, with very few exceptions, they all thought absurd was that matter itself should have had a beginning.” Sorabji also remarks that the notion of creatio ex nihilo was not defined clearly in the Old Testament, some passages in which even suggest the opposite, and that, moreover, also in Christian theology time had to pass before the idea was unanimously accepted. 369 Besides the denial of the concept of preexistent matter, later to be regulated by God, Christianity at the same time denied the pagan idea of the cyclical eternity of the world, whether in terms of Empedocles’ cycles, Stoic recurrent conflagrations or Aristotle’s idea of the infinity of the past and future of the world, of which the eternal Principle is not the creator but the regulator and mover. Plato is equivocal on the point whether the world is to be held to be eternal or not. On the one hand, the visible world is an eternal living being, through its eternal soul, and so are the individual souls. However, the Timaeus suggests a notion of creation, although not out of nothing, as it is stated that the Demiurge worked upon preexistent disorderly elements. So Plato’s eternity of the world, as he perceived it, may have been interpreted as a created eternity, which, as some scholars suggest, does not exclude its destruction. 370 Plato’s ambiguity created room for contradictory interpretations among his followers. For instance, some of the Middle Platonists, such as Plutarch and Atticus, 371 took the account of the Timaeus in the literal sense, which was later deemed sacrilegious by the Neoplatonists. In the case of the Christian interpretations of the Timaeus, the dialogue was understood in the light of the Book of Genesis. Christian thinkers did not

Richard Sorabji, “Infinity and the Creation,” in Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1987), 166. For a discussion of the concept of creatio ex nihilo in the Bible, see P. Gibert, “2 M(accabee) 7, 28 dans la ‘mythos’ biblique de la création,” in La création dans l’Orient ancien (Lectio divina 127) (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1987), 463–481. 370 “Plato entertains as a physical possibility the dissolution of the celestial clock back into a state of chaos at some future date (38b7, cf. Plt. 273c–e).” Richard D. Mohr, “Plato on Time and Eternity,” Ancient Philosophy 6 (1986), 41. 371 See Wallis, op. cit., 30–31. 369

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hesitate to posit the eternal Platonic ideas in the mind of the Demiurge 372— as did before them Philo and the Middle Platonist Albinus 373—and by doing so they could protect themselves from the objection of pagan philosophers, for instance Proclus, that changeless ideas must always have exerted the same influence and activity on the visible world. That is to say that in the light of the eternity and the indivisibility of the essence and operation of the ideal pattern, 374 it is an ontological necessity that the visible world should also be co-eternal with it. However, Christians in the long term had no other choice, if they wanted to remain within the terminology of the Timaeus, than to identify the Demiurge, the ideal pattern and the mind who sees the ideas, and to then identify all three with the highest God; in contradistinction from Neo-Platonists, such as Proclus, who ontologically separates those notions assigning to them different hierarchical strata. By this token, they subordinated the objective and necessary character of the existence and the activity of ideas to the Person of, or rather to the three Persons in, God. Thus, through introducing this new dimension, they provided room for the contingency of creation, 375 depending not on the necessary Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, who speaks about the “paradigms” identified by him with creative words (oujsiopoiouV9 lovgou9) or “predestinations/prefigurations” (proorismouV9) and “wills” (qelhvmata) in De Divinis Nominibus V. 8, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, 188, 6–10. After him, St. Maximus Confessor, in Ambigua ad Ioannem (PG 91, 1085 A7–9), identified the “paradigms” with the logoi of beings preexisting in God, and again identified the logoi with the “predestinations” and “divine wills” about the beings, “divine will” being more of a Biblical than a philosophical concept. In Ambigua ad Ioannem (PG 91, 1085 A10–12) Maximus also cites Pantainos, a teacher in Alexandria, among those witnesses who identified the logoi with the Biblical notion of “divine wills”: qei`a qelhvmata th`/ Grafh/` fivlon kalei`sqaiv fasi. 373 Cf. Wallis, op. cit., 30. 374 It is important to note that Christian authors have more of a tendency to distinguish between essence and operation. For example, Cyril of Alexandria distinguishes between “giving birth,” which pertains to the essence of God, and “making,” which pertains to His operation. See St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, ch. 18: 372

{Oti mhV tautoVn ktivsma kaiV gevnnhma, mhdeV tw/~ ktivzein toV genna/~n ejpiV Qeou~: kaiV a[lla diaV th~" eij" a[topon ajpagwgh~" e[conta toV sumpevrasma (PG 75, 312 C7 – 313 A2), and also note in particular jAllaV toV meVn poiei`n, ejnergeiva" ejstiv, fuvsew" deV toV genna/`n. Fuvsi" deV kaiV ejnevrgeia ouj tautovn, oujk a[ra tw/` genna/`n toV poiei`n tautoVn e[stai elsewhere in

the Thesaurus (PG 75, 312 C8–10). 375 On the notion of contingency in Orthodox Christian theology, see John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (especially Chap-

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activity of the independent ideal Principles, but on a voluntary divine act, an act that can pertain only to reality, so tangible and anthropomorphic, and at the same time so mysterious, of the Persons in God. 376 Thus, the text of the Timaeus is not clear on whether the story of the Demiurge’s making or ordering the world is a mythological example giving an allegorical account of the eternal order of the universe—as Plotinus, Proclus and all the Neoplatonists understood it—or whether it should be taken as a veridical account of a real event and a unique change—as it was by Christians, backed by some of the Middle Platonist philosophers. It is, therefore, uncertain whom we should consider to have done better justice at this point to the historical Plato. 377 For so systematic a mind as Proclus, the idea of a voluntary creation out of nothing could not sound tenable, not being concordant with any rational scheme and explanation. Proclus puts God Himself in his ontological scheme, identifying the divine volition with His essence and operation, more precisely, granting divine will ontological status, in this way excluding all contingency. 378 Thus, if it is a pious idea concerning God that His nature ter X, “Creation”) (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983). Commenting on George Florovski’s words (“we have to distinguish, as it were, two modes of eternity: the essential eternity in which only the Trinity lives, and the contingent eternity of the free acts of Divine grace”), Meyendorff says “Actually, on this point, Byzantine theology reached a direct sense of the difference between the impersonal philosophical notion of God as an absolute, and the Biblical understanding of God personal, transcendent, and free.” John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), 131–132. 376 Cyril of Alexandria, distinguishing the eternal, essential birth of the Son from the voluntary act of the creation, says: jEpiV meVn gaVr tw`n gegonovtwn paraV Qeou`, prohgei`tai qevlhsi9, wJ9 ejn tw/`, Poihvswmen a[nqrwpon, kaiV ejn tw/`, pavnta o{sa hjqevlhsen, ejpoivhsen. jEpiV deV tou` Qeou` Lovgou oujdamou` qevlhsi9 h[toi bouvlhsi9 prohghsamevnh faivnetai. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus VII (PG 75, 85 A9–13; see also ibid., 85 A14 – B1, C7–10 and D5–6). See also John Damascene, Expositio Fidei, 8. 69–70: JH deV ktivsi" ejpiV Qeou~, qelhvsew" e[rgon ou\sa, ouj sunai?dio" ejstiV tw/~ Qew/`, in Die Schriften des

Johannes von Damascus, ed. B. Kotter, II, 21. 377 Cf. H. J. Blumenthal: “[Philoponus’] by then unorthodox view that the world had a beginning in time is a perfectly possible interpretation of the Timaeus, and one that can be taken seriously now: another unsolved problem in Plato.” H. J. Blumenthal, “Platonism in Late Antiquity,” in Soul and Intellect, Studies in Plotinus and Later Neoplatonism, 21. 378 In fact, Proclus argues that God is essentially eternal perfect actuality, which implies the eternal production of the world (cf. argument III, 44), and furthermore

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and activity are changeless, and if His nature and activity are indistinguishable from His volition, then He must have always willed and affected the world to exist as it is now—the world, from this perspective, being necessarily co-eternal with Him. Therefore, Proclus does not refrain from calling Christians “the most impious people,” 379 who by their idea of creation jeopardize divine immutability. 380 In Christianity, though, piety was understood differently. The paradox of the Creation was not to be rejected on the grounds that it could not be digested by the limited capacities of human speculations, but was to be accepted by faith. 381 Augustine’s famous, and probably unfair, answer to the question “What was God doing before creating the world?” is often referred to: He was making hell for those who quibble upon such issues. In all probability, a more precise, and a safer, answer would be that He was not creating the world before creating it. However, Augustine finds fault with the question itself, for “before” applies to time, which co-emerged with the world. 382 Therefore, there was no “before” before the creation of the world. That we need to use “before” twice is, again, indicative of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reaching a rational understanding of the problem.

the will of God is not to be distinguished from this actuality: th~" ou\n boulhvsew" aujtw/~ tw/~ ei\nai poiouvsh" oJ bouvletai, eij ajeiV eJkatevra, ajeiV tw/~ ei\nai poihvsei (argument XVI, 126) See Proclus, De Aeternitate Mundi, ed. and trans. Helen S. Lang and A. D. Macro. The Joan Palevski Imprint in Classical Literature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 379 Ibid. 380 Cf. St. Augustine, who in De Civitate Dei XII. 14 presents a rhetorical question of his pagan adversaries, who like Proclus, deny the idea of the world’s creation precisely on the grounds of divine immutability. 381 Augustine simply finds it proper to capitulate before, and accept, the mystery. Also in De Civitate Dei XII. 14 he states “Thou hast multiplied the children of men according to the depth of thy wisdom, which no man can comprehend. For this is a depth, indeed, that God always has been, and that man, whom He had never made before He willed to make in time, and this without changing His design and will.” Here I quote from the English translation of Marcus Dods, from The Essential Augustine, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishing Company, 1974), 244. 382 See St. Augustine, Confessiones XI. 30. 40; also see St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XI. 5–6, as quoted in note 438 below. Cf. also Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus VII (PG 75, 88 A6–7): jAll– e[sti crovnwn poihthv9 [oJ UiJov9]. \Hn a[ra, kaiV oujdevn ejsti proV th`9 gennhvsew9 aujtou`.

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Both sides conceived the fundamental character of the conflict between the two—pagan and Christian—views on the question of the world’s creation and eternity. The discussion, far from being a learned intellectual conversation, bore a strong emotional impetus. It did not only involve the intellectual elite, for the outcome of the debate would have brought about decisive consequences for the life of every man in the late Roman Empire. Christianity posed a radical challenge to the whole Antique conception of the world. The heart of the matter, from the Christian point of view, was that the pagans still fundamentally accepted the world as it was, whether blessing it or cursing it, either being satisfied with it or having been reconciled to it. Conversely, the Christians gave a warning: the world is fallen and sick as it is, and it should be changed, converted, lest it die in its sickness. The redemptive act of Christ was for them the only means of raising up that which had fallen. Therefore, for Christians, the way in which pagans loved the world and lived in it was, to use the Pauline expression, “hatred towards God,” insofar as the acceptance of, or reconciliation to, the world’s fallen condition contravened the divine desire to save it. 383 The theoretical question directly concerned the two attitudes towards, and two modes of, life. In fact, if the whole world is to be understood in terms of Christian eschatology and soteriology—which implies the universal notions of the Creation, the Fall, redemption through the Incarnation, and the Last Judgment—there is no room for the Neoplatonist eternity of the world. And, conversely, if the world is eternal, in the fashion understood by the Neoplatonists, all the aforementioned Christian notions prove untenable. Christianity claimed to be the way of salvation—but in the light of the eternity of the world there can be no need for salvation, at least in the Christian 383 I have chosen to say the sickness of the “world” rather than “human nature,” even though from the Christian perspective, it was the fall of man, the crown of creation, that caused the sickness of the rest of the visible world. Andrew Louth thus comments on the cosmic dimension both of the fall and of the redemption in Christianity (most conspicuously present in the Pauline letters to the Colossians and to the Ephesians): “The interlocking realities of human being and cosmos implied by such ways of thinking encouraged interpretation of the biblical story of the human race, leading from Fall in Adam to Redemption in Christ the Second Adam, that saw reflected in that story a cosmic disaster as the consequence of the Fall and the restoration of the cosmos as the final purpose of Christ’s saving work.” See Maximus the Confessor, trans. and ed. Andrew Louth (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), 64.

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sense. 384 We may say that the saints of the early Church who chose death rather than worship the “immortal gods” of the Roman Empire were not in spirit different from John Philoponus writing treatises against Aristotle’s and Proclus’ doctrines concerning the eternity of the world. Similarly, the vigor of Simplicius’ counter-attack on this question against the apostate metaphysician Philoponus is again indicative of the radical character of the issue. 385 Pagans, for their part, also had their own martyrs and saints, such as the Alexandrian lady philosopher Hypatia, killed by an enraged Christian mob, and their own philosophical avatars, such as the divine Pythagoras, or the similar Iamblichus, and—again—Proclus, who radiated during his lectures, as it appeared to one of his exhilarated listeners. The elementary moral and religious sentiments on both the pagan and the Christian side were, actually, as important as the rational arguments for and against the eternity of the world themselves. Those circumstances form an important background to any consideration of Proclus’ and his twelfthcentury Christian translator and commentator’s treatment of the same problems, because the religious and historical issues underpin, from the first, any more abstract or neutral metaphysical considerations.

384 Especially in Late Antique philosophy and religiosity the need for redemption and salvation was accentuated. Yet, due to their views on time and history, pagans understood those notions in a different way from Christians. Oscar Cullman notes the following on this point: “Because time in Hellenism is not conceived in a rectilinear manner, the scene of the working of providence (provnoia) can never be a history as such but only the fate of the individual. History is not under the control of a telos or end goal. From this standpoint, in so far as the need of man for revelation and redemption is to be satisfied, it can take place only in the direction of timeless mysticism, which thinks in spatial concepts.” See Oscar Cullman, Christ and Time. The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1949), 54. 385 Gérard Verbeke remarks thus on Simplicius’ critique of Philoponus’ teaching concerning the Creation: “One is immediately struck by the violence of tone adopted by the Athenian professor.” Gérard Verbeke, “Some Later Neoplatonist Views on Divine Creation and the Eternity of the World,” in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. D. J. O’Meara (Norfolk, VA: State University NY Press, 1982), 45– 53.

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2. SUMMARY OF PROCLUS’ PROPOSITIONS ON TIME AND ETERNITY

Proclus looks specifically at the issues of time and eternity in six propositions of the Elements of Theology; however, the topic is central in his philosophy insofar as the whole universe is divided by this crucial metaphysical demarcation. As Rosàn writes, the distinction between time (crovno") and eternity (aijwvn) marks a dualistic principle of Proclus’ philosophy, “because it divides the universe into two separate realms standing in eternal opposition to each other and characterized by different attributes.” 386 There are two ways in which we can speak of eternity and time: eternity of essence and eternity of operation. Accordingly, we get three possible combinations of those characteristics in the metaphysical entities: (i) eternal according to both essence and operation; (ii) eternal according to essence but temporal according to operation; (iii) temporal according to both essence and operation. The possibility of an entity’s being “eternal according to operation but temporal according to essence” must be excluded: all things’ essences are prior to their operation; thus, if the quality of essence is temporal, then the operation (which is secondary, posterior to the essence) cannot have a quality superior to that of the essence. The three characteristics apply respectively to the intellectual world, the psychic world and the material world of becoming. However, in those six propositions Proclus does not make this identification, and only considers the naked parameters according to which something can be regarded as eternal or temporal. Let us review those propositions. In prop. 50 Proclus says that under the measure of time fall those things that have a past and future aspect, that is to say, of which the “now” is not always identical, but is different at every moment. From this it can be seen, therefore, that such a thing has its being in becoming, or as Proclus says, it “moves with the movement of the time that measures it” (prop. 50). 387 This sentence implies that there is an absolute passivity in the essence of such beings, for the essence is totally subjected to the movement of the higher Principle: time. This proposition concerns only those entities that have their essence in becoming, that is to say, only the material world. Prop. 51 states that entities that can in any way keep their essential integrity by themselves, that is to say, entities of which the essential integrity in any way is not conditioned by the movement of time, transcend the world of 386 387

Rosàn, op. cit., 94–95. This is Dodds’ translation. See Dodds, op. cit., 49.

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becoming. Such are the authypostatoi entities, those that are “self-creating.” The term authypostatos may have different ontological applications, but here it seems to indicate the most general meaning, that there is not a complete passivity on the being’s part, but rather that it preserves to a certain extent an autonomy from time and from the necessity of change. There is a greater autonomy in the higher intellectual realm, less in the lower realm of Soul, and complete passivity in the material world. However, not only the hierarchical and structural aspects, but also a subjective one, may be concerned here, if Dodds is correct in relating the notion of being authypostatos to the freedom of the human will. 388 More precisely, while my body as a whole changes according to necessity, beyond my volition, totally subjected to the motion of time, it also has unnecessary movements, some of which may be beneficial and some harmful, or neither of the two. Yet it is I who decide to make this or that movement. Now, my decision itself is not yet movement of my body that it may be subject to time. The decision or deliberation appears to transcend time, 389 and accordingly, it may be said that also the movement, although visible in time but caused by the supra-temporal phenomenon of my free decision, transcends the necessary changes subjected to time. Prop. 52 describes as eternal proper those things that have, on the one hand, the parts of their essence, and, on the other, their operation in the mode of a simultaneous whole and devoid of any change. Entities so described—which apparently comprise those of the intellectual world—fall under the measure of eternity. In prop. 53 we are taught that eternity and time are not simply abstract concepts or abstract measures characterizing distinctive qualities of certain ontological entities, but are themselves ontological entities, there being the archetypal Eternity and archetypal Time in which the eternal and temporal things respectively participate. The proposition speaks of a pair of threefold hierarchies between the unparticipated Eternity/Time, the particular participable eternities/times, and eternal/temporal things, which participate in their proper participable eternities/times. Prop. 54 simply intimates that Eternity and Time are the only measures of “life and movement” of all things, since all things are either Dodds, op. cit., 224. For instance, Plotinus speaks of the power of the freedom in terms of parÊ aujtou` (Enneads VI. 8. 21), which can be coupled with the authypostatos in Dodds’ interpretation of the term, and then speaks of this freedom as something beyond action (pravxi") and established still in Intellect (Enneads VI. 8. 34–37). 388 389

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eternal or temporal or a combination of both. I think that the terms “life” and “movement” in this proposition are not synonymous as they are in other cases, but stand for “essence” and “operation” respectively, for—as we saw above—things can be eternal or temporal either according to essence or according to operation. The last of the six propositions distinguishes again the threefold hierarchy of the things eternal and those measured by time. The latter are further differentiated as the things of to aei ginomenon, or a perpetual becoming (Greek: toV ajeiV ginovmenon—“that which eternally comes into being”) and the things of to en merei chronou ginomenon, or a temporal becoming (Greek: toV ejn mevrei crovnou ginovmenon—“that which comes into being in part of time”). The to aei ginomenon means that a being in its essence is eternal, because it has a certain identity that remains perpetually, and ginomenon, therefore, applies not to this identity but to some faculty of this identity, which is operation. Conversely, the to en merei chronou ginomenon means that a thing exists only in a part of a time, that is to say, that its identity does not have any perpetual subsistence. In the last case the ginomenon applies not only to its possible faculties, but also to the essence itself. Accordingly, this is simply a repetition of the same hierarchy between the intellects, the souls and corporeal reality.

3. PETRITSI’S THEORY OF TIME AND ETERNITY i. Creation or Emanation? From the perspective of my discussion in the introduction of this chapter, the central question will be to know how Petritsi treats the ideas of both creation and eschatology in the face of the Neoplatonist conception of the world. In the following first I shall treat Petritsi’s doctrine of creation. Next I shall consider the Neoplatonist understanding of the interrelation between the timeless and the temporal realms, an understanding to which, as we shall see, Petritsi wholeheartedly adhered. I shall return to the question of eschatology only at the end of the chapter. In the whole body of the text preserved by different manuscripts, only one passage directly rejects the doctrine of the co-eternity of the world with God. The passage, however, does not belong to Petritsi, but is a part of Pseudo-Nonnus’ commentary on St. Gregory of Nazianzus’ epitaph of St. Basil the Great: St. Basil rejected and abrogated all the madness of the philosophers, who think that because the heavenly bodies move in a circle, and because it is impossible for us to conceive the beginning of a circle, there-

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The passage clearly contradicts Proclus’ doctrine. However, does it contradict Proclus as understood, or rather as interpreted, by Petritsi? I tend to think that the answer to this question should be negative: as I shall try to demonstrate, Petritsi maintains the ideas of both creation and eschatology, although in his peculiar way. God for Petritsi, as we have seen, is posited beyond all natural necessity. God thus creates the world out of sheer abundance of His goodness. Of course, this is also the doctrine of Plato in the Timaeus. Let us see how Petritsi understands the story of the Timaeus concerning the Demiurge’s 390 creation or arrangement of the world. Commenting on Proclus’ sentence in prop. 25—ejkei`no [i.e., tajgaqovn] deV pavntwn h\n uJpostatikovn (prop. 25. 28. 29) 391—Petritsi says the following: Here Proclus posits the goodness of God, who sees everything, as the cause of the creation [Old Georgian: agh-km-n-isa 392] of beings. This was said by the philosopher [Plato] in the Timaeus concerning the procession of beings from Him who sees everything. He inquires: what urged Him who transcends all the natural necessity and anagke [Greek: ajnavgkh— “necessity”] and who is above all the heights to create beings? And he posits as the means and as the cause of the creation [Old Georgian: shesa-km-e] the goodness of the Generator towards the things generated. For he [Plotinus] says that He had poured out like an overfilled cup in order to make also the others take a share in His goodness (Commentaries, prop. 25. 68. 20–30). 393

390 Contrary to Proclus, who posits Plato’s Demiurge below the One in the intellectual hebdomad (Th.Pl. III. 9. 37. 10–15), Petritsi identifies the Demiurge with the Christian God-Creator and also with the One. 391 In Dodds’ translation “Now we saw that the Good was constitutive of all things.” Dodds, op. cit., 29. 392 In Georgian, km-n-a (the root of the verb is km) means “making.” The prefix agh indicates a direction upwards like the Greek a[na. The usual word for “creation” in Georgian is she-km-n-a, the prefix she indicating a direction inwards. The normal translation of the Book of Genesis in modern Georgian is in fact the Old Georgian term she-sa-km-e. 393 Cf. John Damascene, Expositio fidei, 16, 2–6: jEpeiV ou\n oJ ajgaqoV" kaiV uJperav-

gaqo" qeoV" oujk hjrkevsqh th`/ eJautou` qewriva/, ajll– uJperbolh`/ ajgaqovthto" eujdovkhse genevsqai tinaV taV eujergethqhsovmena, kaiV meqevxonta th`" aujtou` ajgaqovthto", ejk tou` mhV o[nto" eij" toV ei\nai paravgei kaiV dhmiourgei` taV suvmpanta, ajovratav te kaiV oJratav, kaiV toVn ejx oJratou`

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As we see, on the one hand Petritsi uses the term “creation,” and on the other the expression “what urged Him” seems to give an account of the instantaneous character of creation, 394 which would be absent from the perspective of eternal emanation. However, the last expression may be a mere metaphor, and the terminology as such can give no decisive answer to the problem at stake, because such a term as “creation” (poivhsi") was not uncommon among the Neoplatonists either, although they applied it within their own frame of thought. 395 The passage just quoted raises a question: while God is exempt from natural necessity, at the same time there seems to be another necessity in Him, namely that He is necessarily good. This is a different type of necessity, which does not challenge His freedom, as, in Augustinian terms, the necessity that man possesses free will does not impair his freedom, but is, in fact, the condition for it. 396 However, a distinction should be made between kaiV ajoravtou sugkeivmenon a[nqrwpon,

in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damascus, ed. B. Kotter, II, 45. 394 For the instantaneous character of the creation, see St. Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae in Hexaemeron I. 6: “ ]H tavca diaV toV ajkariai`on kaiV a[cronon th`" dhmiourgiva" ei[rhtai toV: jEn ajrch/` ejpoivhsen, ejpeidhV ajmereV" kaiV ajdiavstaton hJ ajrchv” “…{Ina toivnun didacqw`men oJmou` th/` boulhvsei tou` Qeou` ajcrovnw" sunufestavnai toVn kovsmon, ei[rhtai toV, Ejn ajrch/` ejpoivhsen,” in Basilius von Caesarea. Homilien zum Hexaemeron, ed. E. Amand

de Mendieta and S. Y. Rudberg, Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller Neue Folge 2 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 11, 15–16 and 11, 23 – 12, 2); see also St. Gregory of Nyssa, Apologia in Hexaemeron: kaiV ajntiV tou` eijpei`n o{ti ajqrovw" pavnta taV o[nta oJ QeoV" ejpoivhsen, ei\pen ejn kefalaivw/, h[toi ejn ajrch/` pepoikevnai toVn QeoVn oujranoVn kaiV thVn gh`n (PG 44, 72 A1–3); pavntwn tw`n o[ntwn taV" ajformaV" kaiV taV" aijtiva", kaiV taV" dunavmei", sullhvbdhn oJ QeoV" ejn ajkarei` katebavlleto, kaiV ejn th/` prwvth/ tou` qelhvmato" oJrmh/` hJ eJkavstou tw`n o[ntwn oujsiva sunevdramen (PG 44, 72 B5–9). 395 Lucas Siorvanes thus comments on the term “creation” in Proclus’ vocabulary: “This is not a creation occurring in time, nor is it from nothing. It is ‘setting in order’ by imparting of determinate form: a fashioning by copying onto a suitable recipient the eternal Forms of the intelligible Model, the Paradigm (developed from Plato’s ‘Timaeus’). For Proclus standing in the Greek philosophical tradition, this is a timeless process, since the appearance of time is part of the act of creation. So, although the vocabulary overlaps Judaeo-Christian, the Neoplatonic conception differs radically from the religious doctrine of genesis and apocalypsis as Beginning and End Times.” Siorvanes, op. cit., 154. 396 Cf. De Civitate Dei V. 10. As J. Decorte writes on this point, Augustine maintains that according to God’s “eternal will and infallible prescience, man has to be free, man necessarily possesses freedom—the necessity bearing on man’s possessing, and not destroying the freedom itself.” See J. Decorte, “‘Sed Modum Ex-

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Goodness as divine essence and God’s volition, 397 that is to say, an instantaneous voluntary act without any change in God. Only this inexpressible distinction provides room for contingency. If we discard this distinction, there will remain hardly anything more than eternal necessary emanation, in line with the Neoplatonists. 398 However, Petritsi does not reflect upon this primere Nescio.’ Franciscan Solutions to the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents,” Franziskanische Studien, heft 2–4 (1988): 123–175. 397 This distinction is sharply highlighted in Pseudo-Justin Martyr’s Quaestiones Christianorum ad Gentiles, to be found in “Quaestiones christianorum ad gentiles,” ed. J. C. T. Otto, in Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi, vol. V (Wiesbaden: Sandig 1969), 176B–179B, where the author considers and objects to both the pagan idea that the will of God is indistinguishable from His being and the idea—in fact a Plotinian idea, as will be seen in the following note—that He brings Himself into existence by His will (diaVV toV aujtopavrakton ei\nai toVn Qeovn). The author presents the following Christian objection to this idea (translation by István Perczel): “If one thing is to exist (toV uJpavrcein) and another to exist in something (toV ejnupavrcein), so that God’s substance exists and the will exists in the substance, then per consequent, one thing is the substance of God and another is the will. If the will is from the substance, but the substance is not from the will, then, one thing is the substance of God, another is the will. The substance of God is not liable not to be substance, but the will of God is liable not to will” (emphasis mine). 398 Proclus and Plotinus, it seems, are not completely in accord on this issue. Significantly, Plotinus applies to the One such expressions as thelesis (Greek: qevlhsi9—“a willing”) and boulesis (Greek: bouvlhsi9—“a will,” “a wish”) (Enneads VI. 8. 18. 42 and VI. 8. 18. 50)—although on other occasions he denies the notion of boulesis to the One (Enneads V. 1. 6. 25–27). It seems that he posits the One as being beyond all necessity, even beyond the necessary emanation. In fact, Plotinus’ language suggests that the One even transcends Its nature, that is to say, that the freedom in the One is in a sense more primordial than Its (His) essence: ajllaV kaiV au{th par– aujtou~ ejleuqevra kaiV u{stera, kaiV aujtoV oujk e[con oujsivan (Enneads VI. 8. 12. 21– 22)—although, admittedly, he sometimes identifies the substance of the One with Its (His) will (for example, in Enneads VI. 8. 13. 5–11). Let us quote another example of the way in which he seems to present the One’s will as preceding Its (His) essence: “[The One] is not what in a way chanced to be, but what he in a way wished to be, [emphasis mine] since he wishes what ought to be, and what ought to be and the active actuality of what ought to be are one; and it is not what ought to be as a substrate, but as the first active actuality revealing itself as what it ought to be (Enneads VI. 8. 18. 40–53).” Here I use the English translation of A. H. Armstrong. See Plotinus—Enneads, trans. and ed. A. H. Armstrong, in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). We may distinguish three crucial aspects in this sentence: (i) the wish of the One, which comes before (ii) the necessity

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matter. Furthermore, the Plotinian simile of the overfilled cup is more appropriate to the emanationist view. As we saw in the first chapter, the One as the “transcendent creative cause” (Commentaries, prop. 40. 95. 15) is abstracted from the web of universal cause-effect relationships: The First Number [i.e., Limit] and moreover the unimaginable One transcend all the powers and operations, even those of generation, because all the powers and operations are linked with nature, whereas He, the transcendent First, is entirely detached from nature (Commentaries, prop. 1. 18. 25 – 19. 2).

This having been taken into consideration, one should not imagine reality as one uninterrupted continuum of the network of processionreversion relationships starting from the One and ending with matter, and again returning to the One. On the contrary, there is a qualitative rupture, a gap between the Creator and the universe, so that applying here such a term of the way of existence of the One—and, in fact, of the rest of reality, since the way of existence of the One implies the emanation of the world—and (iii) the idea that the necessity of the way of existence of the One (and the world) is not something that is to be carried out, but is identical with the “active actuality,” that is to say, with the actual ontological state of affairs. Plotinus may have tried to respond to Christian objections by emphasizing the freedom-aspect of the One. Nevertheless, the Plotinian thelesis is to be distinguished from the thelesis in the Christian understanding. First, from the Christian perspective, it is not correct to say that the divine will is in any way superior to the divine essence, thereby bringing this essence into existence (cf. Pseudo-Justin’s criticism in the previous footnote). Moreover, according to Christian teaching, there was an actual “situation” or life of the Trinity without the world; thus the thelesis of the Trinity, which brought about the world-order and which really preceded it, differs from the thelesis and freedom of the Plotinian One: the freedom of the One is, even if not identical, still simultaneous and co-eternal with the necessity of existence of the order of reality. Indeed, Plotinus makes a remarkable move by introducing a certain subjective feature in the One, the “wish,” which is absent in Proclus. Yet from a certain general perspective both Proclus and Plotinus present basically the same view of the changeless world, the same timeless ontological history, since the Plotinian “wish” (that is, the freedom-aspect) of the One is co-eternal with the necessity of existence of the One and the world, and the actual existence of the One and the world. Conversely, from the Trinitarian perspective neither the intellectual nor the corporeal realms are the eternal “active actuality,” but are contingent—mysteriously and inexpressibly contingent, and not contingent in the sense that “Contingency” and “Chance” are principles independent of the Creator, or even hold a superiority over Him.

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as “reality,” in the sense of a certain general idea of existence, is itself misleading—firstly because there is nothing more general than the One, and secondly because the One does not have coextensive existence with the rest of reality. We can, therefore, speak of the world in terms of absolute otherness. However, paradoxically, this absolute otherness is in a primary sense rooted in the One, because its very existence is derived from the One. How can the world emerge from, and be established in, that which is so radically other? Let me adduce here a lengthy passage concerning the origin of the world, where Petritsi provides a peculiar Trinitarian theory: he discusses here Proclus’ statement in prop. 37: eij gaVr aiJ ejpistrofaiV givnontai kataV kuvklon, kaiV ajf– ou| hJ provodo", eij" tou~to hJ ejpistrofhv, ajpoV deV tou~ teleiotavtou hJ provodo", hJ ejpistrofhV a[ra eij" toV teleiovtaton (Petritsi’s translation goes as

follows: “If the reversions occur in a cyclical manner, then whatever term it is from which comes the first procession, to the same will go the first return; if the procession is from the supra-perfect term, then the reversion also will be to the supra-perfect term” (vol. I. prop. 37. 28. 33 – 29. 2)). He then discusses this as follows: Here Proclus says that whence the first outflow of procession had started, thither is also the first reversion. And it is clear whence it started: from the supra-perfect and transcendent One. In fact, before all the Principles two sources flew down from the One, which are the causes, nay, the transcendent Creators of beings. They are not instrumental causes—and so lower than the efficient causes—rather, they are supra-perfect creative causes. Not instrumental, for Plato does not call instrumental causes “causes” in the proper sense of the word, but he calls them “joint causes” [sunaivtia]. 399 In fact, cause and joint cause are distinguished in this way: for instance, the skill of a physician is the cause of healing, but the composition of a medicine is a joint cause; or, again, the cause of writing is a writer, whereas a pen is a joint cause. Accordingly, see that any effect is lower than cause, but it is higher than instrumental or joint causes. 400 Thus, those two sources of the constitu-

Cf. Timaeus 46 C7–D3. Petritsi here means, I think, that even if the instrumental causes are ontologically higher than proper causes, the former are still lower than the latter, because of the absence of the feature of proper causation in them. Here we use the adjective “proper” not in the absolute sense (which applies only to God). Let us give an example. A golden fork may be considered an instrumental cause of eating rice. This golden fork can be said to be more excellent than rice, but since human 399 400

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tion of beings were produced by the Ineffable as the transcendent causes of the ones and beings, and not as joint causes, so that they may be accounted for as lower than the effects [which possess the capacity for proper causation]. Nor are they ordinary causes, but they are transcendent and supra-perfect. In fact, every cause gives to its effect something of its own essence; however, they retain their property transcendent from the composition of beings, and are established in supraabstracted fashion within their cause, the One, which is the highest of all causes. From Him are all “from”-s [i.e., effects], and from Him beings receive goodness, and again, all return to Him, in order that the process of the beings’ procession and reversion be rendered ceaseless and infinite (Commentaries, prop. 37. 90. 23 – 91. 14).

Petritsi adds “first” to the translation of the “procession” and in his explanation then reformulates Proclus’ sentence as “whence the outflow of the first procession had started,” putting the verb “started” (itskho) in the past perfect tense. Apparently, he wants to stress the starting moment or instance of the procession, whereas Proclus’ purpose is rather to provide the view on the eternal process. 401 The passage is interesting also in another respect: despite the fact that Petritsi states the supra-transcendence of the One, Limit and Infinity, at the same time the One and not the Trinity is presented as the source of procession and the end term of reversion, and the procession is preceded and initiated by the “flowing down” or “outburst” of Limit and Infinity. Accordingly, the passage suggests a certain structural change in the Trinity before the creation: the creation of the world is preceded by the procession of Limit and Infinity, since the One first originates the two sources, and then through them the world is originated. This suggests subordination within the Trinity in the context of the Proclian system of causation. If, as seems to be the case, the Trinity too is placed by Petritsi within this system, of which three basic aspects in the process on causation are kat’ aitian, kath’ hyparxin and kata methexin, then it seems that firstly Limit and Infinity are in the One kat’ aitian, then they proceed to become kath’ hyparxin, and only then is the world created. However, subsistence is brought about by rice and not by the fork, rice is therefore higher, in spite of the fact that it is a thousand times cheaper. 401 A similar turn, and probably more explicitly, is made by the unknown author of the Liber de Causis, who, as Leo Sweeney remarks, substitutes creation for the atemporal overflowing: “The First Cause no longer produces by overflowing: He creates, He gives being to the Intelligence.” Sweeney, “Research Difficulties in the ‘Liber de Causis,’” 110.

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it is not only Limit and Infinity that are contained in the One kat’ aitian, but all the other realities, for instance the henads. If so, is there a qualitative distinction between the causation of Limit and Infinity and the causation of the rest of reality? Where is that borderline that demarcates to us the first occurrence as “issuing,” “origination” or anything save creation, and the second occurrence as “creation”? This is one of the crucial difficulties in the harmonization of Proclus and Christianity. Nicholas of Methone was careful to observe this tension and to signal that Proclus substitutes his One for the Trinity: kaiV ouj metevcei [hJ triav"] tou~ eJnov", ajllÊ aujthV ejstiV toV e{n. 402 As a Christian, Petritsi must have noticed the same problem, and so he tries to escape this outcome. For this reason, contrary to Proclus, he interiorizes his Limit and Infinity in the One Itself, saying that they are “to be viewed within the One not according to activity but according to supra-power, that is to say, not such a power as requires coming from imperfection to perfection” (Commentaries, prop. 5. 29. 9–11). This means that Limit and Infinity are in a perfect state, without any activity in the One. Let us say they are viewed there from the perspective of “theology.” However, we can speak about their activity only from the perspective of “economy,” that is to say, the perspective of their creative and causative relatedness to the world. The same interiorization of Limit and Infinity in the One is echoed also in the comparison of the Trinity to the mathematical one in the Epilogue—which is, in general, a less metaphysically loaded text. Petritsi says that no number can subsist without one, but one can endure without other numbers, and Similarly is to be viewed the transcendence of the Trinity. Because, as in all the multitude of numbers there is in some way sown the power of one, so in all beings there is Power and Being, 403 and as It [i.e., the Trinity] is called “being” and “transcendent being,” so all the other beings are called beings; however, It is so called essentially and properly, the others as images and accidents (Epilogue, 216).

Petritsi claims on the one hand that Limit and Infinity are “consubstantial” with the One, the One making nothing without them, and on the other that they are the only realities along with Him to possess the creative ability properly. All others, even the henads, as we have seen above, are given the status of created entities. Thus the question to ask is whether the “economy” aspect of Limit and Infinity is essential to them. More precisely, Nicholas of Methone, Refutation, 5. The first applies to the Holy Spirit and the second to the Son, as stated in the text immediately preceding this passage. 402 403

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do they leave the “theology” state within the One not out of “good pleasure,” but out of supra-natural necessity? In fact, given that, as Petritsi elsewhere maintains, also the henads are contained in the One in a causal way, then only his arbitrary assumption concerning the divinity of Limit and Infinity and non-divinity of the henads vouchsafes the doctrine of creation. Moreover, if the world comes into being after the One first issues Limit and Infinity, then the moment of the creation is preceded by some metaphysical change in the Trinity, namely that Limit and Infinity turn from being kat’ aitian in the One into kath’ hyparxin, thus becoming transcendently immanent Principles in the world, whereas the One remains abstract and transcendent in the singular sense. 404 On the one hand this view introduces a clear-cut delineation of the moments of procession from the One, quite illegitimate from the Neoplatonist perspective, and on the other it presents a rather untraditional Trinitarian view. After the three properly speaking creative causes—the One, Limit and Infinity—the rest of the causes are creators only in a derivative and qualitatively different sense. The radical breach between the divine and the created is most evident in the following passage of the Epilogue, where Petritsi considers the Athonite translation of the opening words of the Gospel accord404 It is not clear in the text of the commentaries whether Petritsi maintains that kat’ aitian-kath’ hyparxin-kata methexin applies to Limit and Infinity as well, but it seems to be so. As we have already seen above, he definitely maintains a certain superiority of the One over Limit and Infinity, saying that noeton (Greek: toV nohtovn—“the object of understanding”) is superior to an understanding subject, and that the One is a noeton for Limit and Infinity (Prologue, 8. 4–7). Limit and Infinity are immanent, at least for the henads who participate in them, whereas the One is completely transcendent. The following passage, I think, may indicate that Limit and Infinity also fall under the aforementioned three aspects of causation: “You have heard that there are three views: kat’ aitian, that is, ‘in a causal way’; kath’ hyparxin, that is, ‘according to (proper) existence’; kata methexin, that is, ‘according to possession.’ Let us provide an example to demonstrate what ‘according to possession’ means: behold, the One, which is praised in many ways, in which are [posited] all the principles of numbers, but in a causal and transcendent way. And from the One are two and three. Now, this ‘three’ is viewed in three ways: causally in the One, existentially in itself, possessively in the subsequent numbers” (Commentaries, prop. 30. 81. 16 – 20). The “many-ways-praised One” in this passage is the One transcendent, and if the “two” and “three” here apply to Limit and Infinity—as he elsewhere states, in “‘Two’ is always the cause of Infinity, whereas ‘three’ of Limit, as Pythagoras says” (Commentaries, prop. 152. 177. 7–9)—then the answer to our inquiry will be positive.

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ing to St. John: “In the beginning was the Word.” In St. George of Mt. Athos’ translation 405 this reads “From the first was the Word.” Petritsi offers his own version of the same verse: “In the Principle was the Word,” understanding the “Principle” as the Father-God. He then severely criticizes the previous translation, which used the expression “from the first”: The word “first” means that something is first among the others, that it is in no way different from others according to essence, being of the same essence—as we say “first man among men” or “first horse among horses”… Now, if we say that the Word is first among the things generated and produced, this will mean that He is of the same essence as them, and that He is one among the other things generated and produced. Thus He will no longer be apprehended as the one who before all eternities is in the Father, the latter being the Principle of His inherent Word, as the sun-disc is the Principle of rays (Epilogue, 219. 10– 20). 406

Petritsi places greater emphasis on all beings’ dependence on the One, in contrast to Proclus, for whom the metaphysical order as such is also divine. In fact, the very title of Proclus’ treatise, the Elements of Theology, reveals this attitude of the Greek philosopher, for “theology” does not concern only the source of the world, but also the eternal orderly relationships between different strata—spiritual, psychic and corporeal—of this world. This difference accounts for the fact that Petritsi places greater emphasis on all beings’ asymmetrical relation to and dependence upon the One. In this respect, it will be interesting to see how Petritsi understands the Proclian term authypostatos. Lucas Siorvanes writes as follows concerning the notion of the “self-substantiation”: this [i.e., the rendering of “authypostatos” as “self-substantiation” rather than as “self-subsistence”] makes better sense of Proclus’ clarification that the self-x’s are not the x-substances in themselves. Something supplies attributes and properties, including sufficiency, perfection and substantiation, to something else. In the “self” cases, we dispense with external agents but still deal with a transitive activity. The same thing sup405 This translation is still today accepted as canonical and read in church in Georgia. 406 One can, however, defend the Athonite translation from this criticism, because the Georgian term pirvel-it-gan (pirvel-i—“the first”) is not necessarily to be reduced to the meaning that Petritsi gives to it. In a broader sense it may be understood as “from the beginning,” or “originally.” Petritsi’s translation, however, linguistically more precisely transmits the ejn ajrch`/.

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plies itself with attribute. So, the self-x thing is truly a complex. It consists (logically) of a giver, a receiver and a gift, all bound in one. 407

Petritsi does not include the notion of these three aspects in the term. Petritsi translates Proclus’ statement in prop. 41, Pa~n meVn toV ejn a[llw/ o]n ajp– a[llou movnon paravgetai: pa~n deV toV ejn eJautw~/ o]n aujqupovstatovn ejsti. ToV meVn gaVr ejn a[llw/ o]n kaiV uJpokeimevnou deovmenon eJautou~ gennhtikoVn oujk a[n pote ei[h

(prop. 41. 42. 30 – 43. 1): “All that is in other is produced only by another. But all that is in itself is self-standing [Old Georgian: tvit-mdgomare]. 408 In fact, that which is in other and in need of substrate is never a producer of itself” (prop. 41. 98. 1–4). He then explains: [Proclus] separates corporeal ideas from the incorporeal ideas and considers the incorporeal ideas in terms of “self-standing” entities, as those entities that are the non-diminishing source for their own existence. In fact, he [Proclus] states them to be causes of their own very properties due to their natural immortality and ceaseless life, putting them beyond all changes and alterations, beyond the temporal motion and the spatial confinement. He states them to be “unoriginated from the others,” because [by this formulation] he distinguishes them even more from the corporeal ideas, because any corporeal idea obtains existence through something else being unable to stay by its own power, even if this idea belongs to heavenly bodies, because it is in need of matter as of a substrate acting as an accident of this substrate (Commentaries, prop. 41. 98. 5–15).

We see that Petritsi uses on the one hand the strong expressions “the non-diminishing source of its own existence” and “causes of their very properties,” which indicates that he correctly comprehends Proclus’ idea; however, in the following clauses he immediately relativizes the full significance of those notions, claiming that Proclus uses such statements for the purpose of sharpening the distinction between the intelligible and the corporeal ideas. It turns out that the meaning of authypostatos in Petritsi’s perception is just the same as that of the choristos (Greek: cwristov"— “separable”), which means that a term can be separated from the underlying effects or substrates—as the soul can be separated from the body, or intellect from soul. Accordingly, Petritsi translates authypostatos not as “selfcreating” or “self-substantiating” (tvit-magvamovnebeli), but as “self-standing” (tvit-mdgomare), which means that such an entity can exist without underlying Siorvanes, op. cit., 84. The mirror-translation of the term tvit-mdgomare—by which Petritsi translates authypostatos—is “self-standing.” 407 408

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substrates, but does not indicate that it provides itself with existence, or substantiates itself. He writes thus: When you hear [such a term as] “produced by themselves” let you not think that they are not produced by the One, but, in fact, Proclus implies the heads [i.e., monads] of each of the series… for [Proclus maintains] that the Firsts and monads of the series produce their own essence in the sense that none among their subsequent terms produces them (Commentaries, prop. 40. 94. 15–16 and prop. 40. 96. 28–30).

Thus, Petritsi stresses the dependence of all on the Imparticipable One and does not adhere to the Proclian concept of the self-encapsulated, self-providing metaphysical entities, which are in themselves as “effects in the causes” (wJ" ejn aijtivw/ aijtiatovn) (prop. 41. 44. 6). Proclus raises his “selfsubstantiated” entities to the rank of divinities, and even though divinities are causally related to other divinities in the timeless Neoplatonic theogony, they cannot be said to be in need of them, enjoying their own divine subsistence. Apparently, this is the view that Petritsi consciously or unconsciously modifies, stressing the need of all beings for their transcendent source. His Christian modifications notwithstanding, sometimes Petritsi speaks the pure Platonist language of emanation, positing the Supreme Cause in the network of the necessary metaphysical order. For instance, translating prop. 115, Pa`" qeoV" uJperouvsiov" ejsti kaiV uJpevrzwo" kaiV uJpevrnou", as “Every god-by-participation [i.e., henad] is a supra-essential existence 409 and above intellect” (prop. 115. 156. 31–32), Petritsi says the following: Here Proclus describes the procession of the henads and gods according to the laws, which were discussed before, [stating] that of whatever kind a head of series is, of the same kind are the number of beings originated by it, and the first of the originated are more similar to it. Therefore, by virtue of the immutability of those laws the One produces ones, God the gods and the Supra-Essential the supra-essential ones (Commentaries, prop. 115. 157. 1–6).

According to this quotation, Petritsi makes the necessity of the general metaphysical law as much a principal thing as is the One Itself. Apparently, Petritsi’s way of philosophizing, in that he does not abandon the framework and terminology of Proclian metaphysics, leads him into conIt is probable that Petritsi’s Greek manuscript was damaged, for he reads the uJpevrzwo" as “existence.” His Greek manuscript might have read uJperouvsiov" ejsti u{parxi". 409

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scious or unconscious difficulty in consistently expressing the Christian doctrine of creation. 410 Despite this ambivalence, there are, I think, clear indications in the text of the Commentaries that Petritsi did not believe in a necessary co-eternity of the world with God, and that he translated the eternal emanation in terms of a created eternal emanation. For instance, commenting on the theorem of prop. 11 Pavnta taV o[nta proveisin ajpoV mia~" aijtiva", th~" prwvth" (prop. 11. 12. 8), which he translates as “All the beings proceed from the One Cause, the First Cause” (Commentaries, prop. 11. 38. 27–28), he says the following: Do you see how Proclus vanquishes the assertions of those who have removed the Creative Cause from beings, as the Stagirite and the philosopher from Aphrodisias and his fellow students did, for when Proclus says “all beings proceed,” what else may he mean, if not the Creative Cause, which is the first power of constituting, that is to say, of starting [of beings]?! (Commentaries, prop. 11. 38. 28–34). 411

Here he criticizes Aristotle’s idea that the Unmoved Mover eternally organizes and attracts to Itself the world, which for Aristotle is co-eternal with It, and hence uncreated. 412 In another passage, our philosopher obvi410 Evidently, the ambiguity of Petritsi’s language and expressions motivated Shalva Khidasheli to affirm that “according to the viewpoint of the philosophical system adhered to by Ioane Petritsi, it is impossible to introduce a moment of time in reference with the aforementioned ontological strata, and therefore, the world is coeternal with the supreme One or God” (Khidasheli, op. cit., 77). I would not agree with this radical statement; I maintain a different view in the following discussion. 411 However, in another passage, in the Epilogue, Petritsi, in defence of monotheism, appeals to the authority of Aristotle as well: “Aristotle attuned his brilliant voice to Proclus when he taught his logical and physical sciences, and post-physical science, which is his theology, saying that there is one Lord of all” (Epilogue, 214. 28 – 215. 2). This quotation will not contradict the previous quotation from Petritsi only if the “Lord” of the second quotation is understood as the unmoved mover and not as the Creator. 412 Cf. Gérard Verbeke: “It is quite true that according to the Stagirite the first heaven is what is moved immediately by the Unmoved Mover; through the regularity and eternity of its movement it expresses the perfection of the moving principle. It would, however, be wrong to state that Aristotle’s theory concerning the eternity of the world was based on the nature of creative causation. The concept of an integral causation was foreign to the mind of the Greek master.” See Verbeke, op. cit., 68. In the light of Verbeke’s citation, one can speak of the “creative causation” also in the view of the eternity of the world—the Principle eternally creating things of the world—however, this does not apply to Aristotle, because his God only attracts

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ously intentionally mistranslates prop. 22, providing a creationist explanation of his own version of the text. Proclus’ text reads thus: “Pa~n toV prwvtw" kaiV ajrcikw~" o]n kaq– eJkavsthn tavxin e{n ejsti, kaiV ou[te duvo ou[te pleivw duei~n, ajllaV monogeneV" pa~n.” Petritsi renders the ajllaV monogeneV" pa~n as “however, every monad is created” (as if it were “ajllaV monav" gennhthV pa~sa [ejstiv]”) com-

menting on it thus: Hear that “every monad is created,” whatever those monads may be— either the sky, or the intellectual monad, or monads of souls and natures—all of them are created and are images of images of the proper One, which is beyond even unity (Commentaries, prop. 22. 62. 1–6).

In those passages we have again a clear indication of a qualitative difference and discontinuity between the One and the rest of reality through the notion of the creation. The following text of the Commentaries gives evidence of a doctrine of creation of the world out of nothing, although a peculiar one: The proper One, who has no properties, equally transcends both nonbeing and being. 413 For a polar opposite of the non-being is the First Being, that is, the True Being. However, the Supra-henadic One has nothing to oppose. In fact, even non-being cannot escape the bonds of the Unity, for insofar as it is non-being it is, still, one. Therefore, the supra-power of the One of the ones governs non-being as well. This is, in fact, what my Paul means, when he says “who called non-being as being” [Romans 4. 17] (Commentaries, prop. 139 ( = 138). 170. 27 – 171. 3).

the world to Itself without intention or relation from Its side to the world. In this sense, the Neoplatonist One also has the feature of the Aristotelian God, for neither is the One related to the world. However, in difference from the Stagirite, the world of the Neoplatonists as such is not independent from the Principle, but on the contrary fundamentally dependent, representing the Principle’s emanation. Petritsi Christianizes the difference of the Neoplatonists from Aristotle, understanding the emanation in terms of creative causation of the One, which/who, albeit being transcendent in his system, is at the same time related to the world “looking upon all.” 413 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, IV. 19: ToV meVn ou\n ajgaqoVn e[stai kaiV tou` aJplw`" o[nto" kaiV tou` mhV o[nto" pollw`/ provteron uJperidrumevnon. ToV deV kakoVn ou[te ejn toi~" ou\sin ou[te ejn toi~" mhV ou\sin, ajllaV kaiV aujtou~ tou~ mhV o[nto" ma~llon ajllovtrion ajpevcon tajgaqou~ kaiV ajnousiwvteron, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla,

163, 23 – 164, 3.

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The “non-being” in this quotation, as is confirmed also from other places of the Commentaries, refers evidently to matter, 414 the “non-being” as privation of all ideal definitions. 415 Let us, further, listen to Petritsi’s discussion on privations. Commenting on Proclus’ statement “Of the number of things of which the Intellect is a cause, of the same number also the Good is the cause, but not vice versa” (o{swn nou`" ai[tio", kaiV toV ajgaqoVn ai[tion, oujk e[mpalin dev) in prop. 57. 56. 14–15, Petritsi writes as follows: Do you hear that Intellect reaches as far as the ideas? However, the stereseis, that is, privations, are not ideas. In “privation” you should understand difference of ideas; that is to say that this idea is deprived of being that idea. Aristotle maintained that stereseis possessed essence, 416 the fact that they are deprived of idea notwithstanding. In fact, also in the first matter one may conceive the essence of the stereseis. Now, those privations cannot be reached by any other cause, save the Supra-Cause, the One (Commentaries, prop. 57. 125. 12–23).

From this clue, we may understand Petritsi’s exegesis of the Apostle Paul’s words “Who calls non-being as being”; that is to say that God creates both potentialities/privations and actualities, and therefore both of them have essence, 417 so that what we non-philosophizing mortals see and refer

414 However, Petritsi could apply the term “non-being” also to the One in a positive sense, as in his Commentaries, prop. 11. 43. 10–11; Proclus too, in his original Elements of Theology, does the same. See his prop. 138. 122. 19–20: toV mhV o]n wJ" krei~tton tou~ o[nto" kaiV e{n. Cf. also Porphyry calling the One toV uJpeVr toV o]n mhV o[n (Sententiae, 26 p. 15, 9 and 12), and Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus I. 1: kaiV ai[tion meVn tou` ei\nai pa`sin, aujtoV deV mhV o[n, wJ9 pavsh9 oujsiva9 ejpevkeina, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, p. 109, 15–16. 415 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus IV. 7: Tolmhvsei deV kaiV tou`to eij-

pei`n oJ lovgo", o{ti kaiV toV mhV o]n metevcei tou` kalou` kaiV ajgaqou`, tovte gaVr kaiV aujtoV kaloVn kaiV ajgaqovn, o{tan ejn qew/` kataV thVn pavntwn ajfaivresin uJperousivwÇ uJmnei`tai, in

Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, p. 152, 10–11. 416 Cf. Metaphysics 1071 a8–10: “For the form exists actually, if it can exist apart, and so does the complex of form and matter, and the privation, e.g., darkness or the diseased” (the translation here is that of W. D. Ross, op. cit.); cf. also Metaphysics 1032 b3–4. 417 A similar doctrine might be found in Italus, in his treatise Whether There Are Two Unoriginated Principles (Eij duvo eijsiVn ajrcaiV ajgevnhtoi), of which only the beginning remains. On the basis of the principle that anything must exist in opposition to its contrary—as light exists as opposed to darkness—Italus asserts the substantiality of evil (Italus, op. cit., 144). “Evil” in this context should not be understood in a moral

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to as “non-being” He sees as essence and being. 418 Non-being and being, then, appear to be different modes or levels of essence—and in Petritsi’s case those of a created essence—in this context. Accordingly, in Petritsi’s paradigm for the transcendent “existence” of the One, there is not a corresponding “non-existence,” but rather the One creates both non-being and being out of sheer nothingness. More precisely, He creates out of Himself, because according to Petritsi’s theory, the One precontains all the henads— the roots of all the beings—in Himself in a causal way. We can remember Petritsi’s notion of the most general sense of existence (a-oba), which each being, including matter, has from the One: When “existence” [Old Georgian: a] is the sole signifier, it only separates something from non-existence, and introduces that thing into the class of the things existing, but yet without an idea and definition (Commentaries, prop. 18. 54. 30 – 55. 1).

This quotation must indicate that even the thing without idea and definition, that is, matter, is “introduced” or “made present” (Old Georgian: tsarmo-chen-a 419) from the absolute absence (“non-existence”) by the One. Let us listen further: “The One makes [things] exist from nonexistence, and introduces them 420 [into existence]” (Commentaries, prop. 39. 92. 5–6) and “the transcendent and strange One introduces (Old Georgian: tsarmo-a-chen-s) [to existence] also the pattern-less and property-less matter, which we call ‘non-being’” (Commentaries, prop. 11. 43. 20–22), which means that the “non-being” of matter is not something primordial, but secondary, posterior to the more fundamental notion of absolute non-existence. Thus, paradoxically, the One introduces out of complete nothingness, or rather out of complete private superabundance, the otherness of the world, an otherness that is both absolutely identical to (and identical with) Him, since it has nothing that is not from Him, and absolutely other than Him, since

sense—as if Italus claimed that devils were evil substances and not fallen angels— but in a metaphysical sense, in the sense of privation. 418 Cf. Th.Pl. III. 6. 26. 6–11: DioV dhV kaiV tw/~ eJniV pavntwn ejstiVn oJmoiovtaton kaiV thVn ejn auJtw/~ tw~n o[ntwn periochVn sunhvnwse th/~ prwtivsth/ tw~n o{lwn ajrch/~, di– h}n kaiV taV o[nta pavnta kaiV toV mhV o]n uJpevsth tav te o{la kaiV taV mevrh tav te ei[dh kaiV aiJ touvtwn sterhvsei", a} dhV tou~ meVn o[nto" metevcein oujkevti, tou~ deV eJnoV" pavntw" ajnagkai~on. 419 The root “chen-a,” from which Petritsi coins the term, in Georgian means “to be visible,” “to be present.” 420 Or “makes them present” (tsarmo-a-chen-s).

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there is the unbridgeable gap between the existence of the One and that of the world. An elusive, yet pivotal, difference between Petritsi and Proclus seems to be the fact that for the Greek philosopher matter and all the rest exist in no different sense from the One Itself: just as, for instance, the imparticipable Soul is soul in exactly the same sense as all the rest of the souls under it, so the One being the highest imparticipable monad for everything is in no other sense than any of the rest of the beings are. On the contrary, for Petritsi, the “is” of the rest of reality is granted and produced by the One and is not, thus, to be identified with the “is” of the One: When you hear that “everything is from the First Cause,” let you not think that It gives something out of Its supra-essential existence [Old Georgian: a-oba] to the beings (Commentaries, prop. 11. 39. 8–9).

Leo Sweeney comments thus on this, the fundamental point in Proclus’ philosophy: Proclus appears not to have had a genuine doctrine of creation. Not only does The One produce necessarily rather than voluntarily and freely, but the product is not really distinct in any genuinely adequate way from the producer, and therefore the product is not caused to actually exist. … The One no more causes it to exist then or now than it causes itself to exist. 421

In this light, Proclus’ concept of the detachment of the One, the exairesis (to be derived from the Greek: ejxh/rh~sqai—“be abstracted from”) from the rest of reality appears to be less radical than it is in the thought of Petritsi, who, being imbued also with the Biblical tradition, introduces a paradoxical idea of absolute discontinuity of the One and the world. However, the doctrine of the creation, evident in Petritsi’s system, does not exclude the co-eternity of the world with God. In fact, one can think also of eternal creation of the world by God—God by His eternal will, without any natural necessity, eternally creating the world. Petritsi’s commentaries do not give a definite answer to this question. Nevertheless, 421 Leo Sweeney, “Participation and the Structure of Being in Proclus’ ‘Elements of Theology,’” in The Structure of Being: a Neoplatonic Approach, ed. Baine Harris, 154. The scholar further notes the following on this point: “Of course, if the effect is really distinct from the cause, if matter is really other than the One, if Proclus’ Weltanschauung is not a monism, then the One would seem to create matter by making it actually exist” (ibid. 179).

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it can be asserted with great probability that he had an idea of the world as created not eternally, but at a certain moment. The basis of my confidence in this is the belief that Petritsi took Nemesius of Emesa’s On Human Nature to be a textbook of sound Christian teaching—a pretence that this treatise indeed has. Petritsi would not have translated a work of spurious epistemological value. Furthermore, Petritsi occasionally makes some comments on the translation of Nemesius, and in a very few cases even corrects Nemesius’ text itself. For instance, he omits that passage in Nemesius’ treatise where the latter states that Origen sacrificed to the pagan deities, evidently because of his sympathies towards Origen, or because he thought Nemesius was not telling the truth. 422 If Petritsi took On Human Nature to be a reliable teaching, then he must have followed Nemesius’ teaching on such a fundamental matter as the creation of the world. Now, Nemesius clearly speaks about the creation and completion of the world at a certain moment, understanding in quite a literal sense Moses’ words that “God reposed from all His deeds” (Genesis, 2. 2–3) as that God had finished the whole world and brought it to its perfect state. This gives Nemesius also a basis for assertion that all souls were already created in the act of creation, and therefore, in the words of Christ, “My Father works until now and I work” (John, 5. 17). Nemesius excludes the possibility that God can create new souls, but understands this “work” as the divine Providence for the things already created. Thus Nemesius distinguishes in God an activity or act of creation—an act that happened at some moment and then ceased—from an activity of Providence, which He always exerts on the created world. Such must be also Petritsi’s comprehension of the creation of the world. ii. A Frozen World On the basis of what was said, we may assume that both eternity and time, which in Petritsi’s system will simply coincide with the eternal and temporal entities respectively, are created by the One, which Itself is beyond eternity: There are two measures for everything, but the third is beyond; in the “two” I mean eternity and time, and in the “third” the One that is higher than all the highs (Commentaries, prop. 51. 111. 25–28).

“Eternity” appears to be a technical Neoplatonist term indicating the ontological status of being, the status of the created universe, and so likewise appears time. The entire subject of time and eternity in Petritsi’s sys422

Cf. Petritsi, Nemesius of Emesa, “On Human Nature,” ed. Gorgodze, 128.

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tem, as we shall see, belongs to the fundamental metaphysical structure of the relationships between causes and effects. It is nothing more than a specific view on the general system of causal relationships. Petritsi opposes the Aristotelian explanation of time, as a measure of movement, with a loftier understanding of the Platonist philosophers: Aristotle says that chronos is the measure of movement, that is to say, that the measure of the first movement and the first movement applies to the first body, 423 which is called ouranos by the Greeks, meaning “something at which we look up” [Greek: oJravw a[nw] or “the upper limit” [Greek: o{ro" a[nw]. However, this is the Aristotelian and Peripatetic definition. Yet the great Plato and all the theologians—the great Plotinus the Egyptian, the teacher of Porphyry, and the great Iamblichus the Phoenician intellect—say that chronos is the image of eternity (Commentaries, prop. 50. 107. 23 – 108. 2).

Cf. Physics 219 b1. Aristotle does not say that time specifically applies to the sky’s first movement. Petritsi may have understood Aristotle’s “movement” in the sentence “the time, thus, is measure of movement in itself, of other things accidentally” (Physics 221 b25–27) as properly the movement of the sphere of the sky. Aristotle, on the contrary, is concerned in this sentence with the most abstract sense of time as measure of movement, for as he says shortly afterwards: “Time is simply the number of continuous movement not of any particular kind of it” (Physics 223 a32–33). Petritsi’s explanation may also be based on the following sentence of the Physics: “While the movements are different and separate, the time is everywhere the same, because the number of equal and simultaneous movements is everywhere one and the same” (Physics 223 b10–12). Petritsi might have understood the universal number of different simultaneous movements as the number of the most universal orderly movement of the sky. He might have also combined the account of the problem of time in the Physics with passages from the Metaphysics where Aristotle claims the necessity of the existence of movement and time and ascribes the first movement to the circular motion of the sky (cf. “But it is impossible that movement should either come into being or cease to be; for it must always have existed. Nor can time come into being or cease to be; for there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which is time. For time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of movement. And there is no continuous movement except movement in place, and of this only that which is circular is continuous” (Metaphysics 1071 b6–12, where I use Ross’ translation as already cited). For all the passages here I quote from the English translation by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in Aristotle—Physics, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 423

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Petritsi does not reject the Aristotelian definition, but claims that it is only a partial explanation, which applies only to the movement seen in the natural world. 424 It only explains the relation of physical movement and time, which attends and measures it, but does not explain the higher significance of this movement. On the contrary, for Platonists, as Petritsi thinks, the patterns of motion in nature have the iconic function of signification of the eternal intelligible patterns. So the Platonists viewed time as indigenous, intrinsic and necessary to the very essence of temporal things, because if the archetype is necessary and eternal, the same must be true, in a qualified way, also of the image. 425 Yet this perception of movement of visible bodies as a signifier of a higher and immaterial reality is not absent in Aristotle either, because he comes to an idea of the existence of several immaterial unmoved movers on the basis of the different kinds of circular motion of the different planetary spheres (Metaphysics 1073 a26–34; 1073 b15–17). In this light, also in Aristotle the motion of physical entities can be perceived as related to the stillness of metaphysical entities: gods. Time is the image of eternity in no other sense than any effect is an image of its preceding cause or causes. Eternity and time form a single descending continuum of the network of cause-effect relationships. As in the eternal world there is a hierarchy of more universal (that is, less extended) and more particular (more extended) causes, the same hierarchy is copied in the temporal dimension, where we have entities with simpler and more complex types of movements and, hence, of different and hierarchically arranged timespans. The basic metaphysical pattern of causation a—ab—b where the middle term links the extremes, applies also here. Eternity, where there is no change, and the world of becoming, completely deprived of stability, are mediated by the “everlasting” or “perpetual” (sa-niadag-o 426), that is to say ceaseless, circular and orderly movement of the planets and stars. By their permanence, in that they always remain what they are, and by their The Aristotelian concept of time is considered and criticized by Plotinus in his treatise On Eternity and Time, cf. Enneads III. 7, chapters 9, 12 and 13. 425 Cf. Enneads III. 7. 11. 59–62. 426 Interestingly, in Georgian the adjective niadag-i, which means “eternal” or “everlasting,” also has the meaning of “soil” or “earth.” Thus, in contrast to the first Greek philosophers, in the mentality of the people who made such a transformation of the semantics of the term, the idea of an eternal substratum was related to the earth. Petritsi uses the term niadagi in a technical sense, to mean a perpetual periodic recurrence. 424

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recurrence of movement, they resemble eternity, whereas by the same fact of movement they are extended or separated from it. They are linked in a similar way, but conversely, with the world of flux. As regards Petritsi’s system, to say that eternity causes eternities, which in turn cause times, in the descending scale will be the same as to say that the eternal beings cause eternal beings and they in turn cause temporal realities, which, again, cause the other temporal realities. Therefore, it is not a mere mistake caused by the Byzantine pronunciation, as Simon Kaukchishvili thinks, that Petritsi translates, or better interprets, the Parmenidian phrase ejoVn gaVr ejovnti pelavzei 427 (“being approaches being”) as “eternity goes round, that is to say, encompasses eternity” instead of “being encompasses being.” He does so insofar as the two—the eternities and the eternal beings—are the same thing in his system. Petritsi speaks of the Universal Intellect, the True Being, as of the cause of particular intellects, and the particular intellects are identified with particular eternities. “The First Eternity is established in the First Intellect [i.e., the True Being]” (Commentaries, prop. 53. 117. 4–5), Petritsi writes. This means that the First Eternity and the True Being are distinct things, and that Eternity as a more particular intellectual entity is established in the True Being, as is any other intellect. The True Being measures Eternity, being the most universal Principle of the intellectual world: “The First Being, which we call the True Being and the True Essence, is the cause of all the others: Eternity, Self-Living-Being, intellects, souls and natures” (Commentaries, prop. 11. 42. 27–30). Or, again, “the great Parmenides posits the True Being as the cause and father of Eternity, insofar as it [Eternity] is within it [the true Being] as two is within one” (Commentaries, prop. 53. 116. 14–15). 428 The Eternity-Intellect and the whole intelligent cosmos are included in the sphere of the True Being:

Parmenides fr. 8. 25, in H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Weidmann,1952). 428 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 37D6: mevnonto" aijw`no" ejn eJniv; Jan Opsomer comments thus on Proclus’ explanation of this Timaean passage, an explanation that according to Proclus derives from his master Syrianus: “Syrianus holds that since Eternity is a dyad it must be preceded by the monad of Being, toV e}n o[n. Eternity remains in this unity, since prior to being a dyad, it is a monad, insofar as it does not leave unity.” J. Opsomer, “Deriving the Three Intelligible Triads from the ‘Timaeus,’” in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Actes du Colloque International de Louvain (13 – 16 mai 1998), 368. 427

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI Proclus divides the design of the god-True Being into three: in fact, the First Intellect proper, that is, the first image of the One, and the first composite of the unitary numbers and gods [henads] is above Eternity, being its father and cause. Thus it originates essence and composition of Eternity, which is already both Eternity and True Being; and so are [true beings] all the intelligent patterns and compositions that originate from the True Being and come after Eternity. Thus we have the True Being in three modes: pre-eternal [i.e., True Being proper], Eternity proper and participants in the True Being and Eternity [i.e., particular intellects]” (Commentaries, prop. 88. 142. 5–13).

Yet this distinction of Being and Eternity is only Neoplatonist jargon, for in more general terms we can apply the adjective “eternal” to each of the members of the entire intellectual dimension: all of them are characterized by unity of essence and activity, which marks their belonging to the realm of eternity. Thus, one eternity encompasses another eternity in the intellectual sphere as any cause encompasses its effect. The same can be said about time, because everything in the Neoplatonist universe mirrors the higher order. As the True Being is the Principle and monad of eternities, so is the sky the monadic cause of times. There is not only a quantitative extension between time and eternity, but also a qualitative one. The descending scale of particular intellects (ideas) denotes quantitative change or extension that happens within the one level, but the temporal realm is characterized by an additional element, which marks the beginning of the fresh level. This crucial moment of demarcation is the separation of essence and operation. The unity of the two is the condition for a reality to be still and eternal, or as Petritsi says, to remain “as a motionless pole” (Commentaries, prop. 32. 84. 21). Otherwise, the purpose of operation of the eternal ideas is simply to be that idea, whereas operation of the temporal entity, so to say, “looked for something other” than that. This shift gave birth to the division of the essence and operation and to the emergence of the qualitatively different realm. This is also how Plotinus understands the origin or descent of soul: For since the soul possessed an unquiet power, which always wished to transfer what it saw in that realm to something else, the soul did not wish to have all of it be present in it at once. Just as logos unfolding itself from a quiet seed makes an advance, as it thinks, towards largeness, but actually destroys largeness by making it to be divided and instead of

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maintaining its unity within itself expends its unity outside itself by going forward to a weaker extension. 429

Also in Petritsi’s paradigm, such an entity in which we first find the separation of the essence and operation is the soul. Thus the soul appears to be a qualitative extension of the eternal idea. This separation gives origin to movement, and time comes about together with this movement. Different souls have different movements, more or less complex, so they have different times as well. If in Plotinus soul is the origin and cause of time, Proclus provides a more complicated picture, hypostatizing time and positing it above soul. For him it is time that regulates soul’s movements, time being a more primordial Principle: “The relation of the intellect to the soul is the same as the relation of eternity to time, and—permutando—time ranks before the soul, as eternity before the intellect” (In Timaeum III. 27. 25– 27). 430 Petritsi is closer to Plotinus in this respect, for time in his philosophy is innate in the realities of the sky, the planets, and so on. He does not go into Proclian subtleties concerning the imparticipable and participable times, but simplifies this system considerably. If only the soul is the cause of movements, then the sky, the planets and stars, and actually everything that moves must have soul, or at least some resemblance of soul. That is why Petritsi adopts ideas about the psychical nature of the heavenly spheres and says that perishable essences share in the Universal Soul’s radiations, through which they move. Similarly to Enneads III. 7. 11. 20–30. Here I use the translation of J. E. McGuire and Steven K. Strange, from their “An Annotated Translation of Plotinus’ Ennead iii 7: On Eternity and Time,” Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988): 262. 430 Cf. also a passage from Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus where he distinguishes between that which is moving through participation in time, and the time itself, which has the same property or definition as intellect, for it acts while itself remaining motionless: tou` toivnun ejn meqevxei crovnou ejn kinhvsei o[nto9 diaV toV 429

sumparateivnesqai th/` kinhvsei dei` ti mevnein proV touvtou, kaiV tou`to, eij meVn ajnenevrghton, ajduvnaton, eij deV ajkinhvtw9 ejnergou`n, tou`t– e[sti toV wJ9 ajlhqw`9 ijdivwma tou` crovnou (In

Timaeum III, 32. 10–16). As W. O’Neill writes on this point, “In giving this exalted position to time, Proclus was influenced by the attributes of the Chaldean, and perhaps Orphic, god Chronos. He disagreed with Plotinus on two counts a) because whatever is given to the world subsequent to its constitution must be superior to it, and time is given to the world by the demiurge as its regulator b) if the soul requires time, it cannot generate it, since in that case it would both possess and lack a perfection at the same time.” W. O’Neill, “Time and Eternity in Proclus,” Phronesis 7 (1962): 163.

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Plotinus, he speaks even of the souls of the four elements: “All the souls— those of the earth, water, air and fire, and of all the spheres—are parts. The soul of the unerring sphere, that is to say, the Universal Soul, which is without ochema, represents their idea and monad” (Commentaries, prop. 2. 21. 14– 18). Thus the illumination of the Universal Soul goes down to the first elements and they have, accordingly, specific modes of movements. Petritsi calls the soul logos, conveying in this term the meaning of the image of an idea (intellect/eternity) that had extended and moved. Time is simply a more complex numerical ratio than the eternal idea. When we speak about the eternal idea of something, let it be a blade of grass, we understand that it has a certain orderliness or construction expressible in number. However, time applies to a physical blade of grass, which shoots up from its seed and should reach its perfection and telos. Time enters the story only in the case of the physical blade of grass, and it applies to the development that proceeds from the seed to perfection and from perfection to destruction. Now, a question: is this cycle, this span of the blade of grass’s life, included in its eternal idea or construction of “grassness”? For instance, different batteries are more or less long-lived because of their chemical contents and construction, so this cycle seems to be a part of the construction itself. But this is not so, for actually the intelligible idea of the grass will contain only its perfection, which is eternally actualized or, as Petritsi puts it, which “always blossoms” (Commentaries, prop. 26. 71. 3), does not need any procession from imperfection to perfection, and therefore is still: “Eternity has its property without flux, established in its sameness and the blessed identity” (Commentaries, prop. 54. 118. 12–14). However, the idea of movement is added to the ideal “grass” on the lower stratum, which Petritsi would already call the “soul” or more precisely the physis (Greek: fuvsi"—“nature”) of grass. The physis is already a complex extension, which contains both the telos of grass and the cycle of its life from origin to destruction, although in a unitary, indivisible way. Just as we cannot imagine, for instance, a butterfly without wings, so we cannot imagine a butterfly living 100 years: such a lifespan would for us disqualify an entity from inclusion in the extension of lepidoptera and therefore such attributes (or the possibility of such) will be excluded from its intension also. Man’s soul is directly an image of the True Being; it is, therefore, not physis but logos. This extended idea, which is logos in the case of human beings and physis in the case of animals and plants, contains both the number of the ideal construc-

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tion and the number of the lifespan simultaneously. 431 Insofar as the lifespan of a blade of grass can be imagined only in material, spatial categories, the extended idea therefore links the ideal idea with the material world. The temporal ideas are specifically participated in by the material world, which is regulated through them. As far as the sky and the heavenly bodies are concerned, they do not go from imperfection to perfection. They are, in a way, perfect constructions—spheres—of which the movement, in contrast to the movement of a blade of grass, does not have the teleological function of fulfilling its own shape. Accordingly, the specific or professional function of the visible body of the planets and stars is to depict a cycle of time. If the number of the change of grass contains the cycle of its growth from imperfection to perfection and thence to decay, on the contrary, the stars manifest a greater clemency in the Platonic worldview in that they do not need movement for their own sake—their movement in this sense being more “altruistic.” That is why their movements and not those of plants or animals are the temporal measures per se, and that is why they are called the “instruments of time” (Commentaries, prop. 51. 112. 10). By the circular movement “they [planets] imitate intellect,” says Petritsi. It is not, of course, by movement as such that they resemble intellect, but rather by the recurrence with which they “impress an image of eternity in themselves.” The visible circular movement of a material body (planet) indicates or imitates also the invisible movement of the planet’s soul. In fact, it is primarily the invisible recurrent movement of soul that imitates intellect. The stars’ visible movement is only an icon betraying the invisible and incorporeal movement of the stars’ souls. Besides the recurrent motion of the stars and planets, there is one more image of eternity in the temporal world. This is the moment of “now”: The “now” in the temporal dimension and point in the spatial dimension are both instantaneous and atemporal. For, in fact, any time needs a stretch [dimension], whereas that which is not stretched is beyond time and motion. For all atemporal activities are above motion, because there

For the human soul (that is, the logos), this lifespan is not origin and destruction, but eternal self-cognition, which in contrast to idea (intellect) proceeds in a cyclical way. But physis must also be the human lot in one’s earthly life, since one’s body develops and dies. 431

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI everything is in “behold!” and in “instantly” and not like one [stage] after another (Commentaries, prop. 52. 114. 20–28).

The “now,” in fact, contains in itself all: the past, because the very essence of “now” is constituted in direct contact with the past; the future, because the very essence of “now” is constituted in direct contact with the future; the present, because the simultaneous touching of the future and the past constitutes the essence of the present—in a motionless instance; as such, the “now” imitates the changeless intellectual plenitude. Time and the soul in Petritsi are, as we have said, constituents of one integral reality. Time, hence, does not have the function of measuring something only in an accidental way; rather, measuring in this Neoplatonist scheme also maintains causation: In fact, time measures all the composed and destructible beings, in that first it equips their parts and provides them with appropriate material and second it constructs them by the parts and gives measures of life linking those measures with the cycles of its organa. 432 The organon [instrument] of time is the sky itself, for it perfects its life through movement, and likely all the spheres, for example, Apollo (the sun), which makes a golden music by its movement, for it knits essences of all the composite and destructible entities, and also other planets along with Apollo” (Commentaries, prop. 51. 111. 31 – 112. 11).

The following passage also indicates the causal nature of time: Insofar as the celestial matter is being conquered by the supreme power of Zeus, a lot of immortality has united its essence, and he [Zeus] made it [the sky] an agalma of the intelligent sky, and the supra-essential Logos [the Son] sowed there intelligent ideas, as agalmata [of the intelligible ideas]. In fact, the Timaeus in the person of the Generator of all says to the stars and their ornament: “Imitate my power, constitute animals and plants, nourish and bring them up, and, again, receive back the dead.”433 And he, thus, makes them [stars] immortal and unchanging as regards their proper ideas, and posits it them essential numbers for all the perishable and flowing natures (Commentaries, prop. 27. 73. 4–14).

That is to say, the stars and planets, which are instruments of time, possess essential numbers of perishable beings and do not only measure their life accidentally but also cause their nature and govern them.

432 433

Petritsi transliterates the Greek word o[rganon—“instrument.” Cf. Timaeus 41a7–d3.

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Time, thus, applies to the innate nature of the soul, and hence time and the soul are not arranged in the cause-effect mode, as is the case in Proclus. For the latter, as we have seen, time is the intellect 434 in which the soul participates. With Petritsi, we find a simplified system, which has him approximating to Plotinus. We have seen that the movement of the sky or stars is not the time itself but a visual representation of it, just as a clock is a visual representation of the periodic span of a movement and not the span of movement itself. Time, in fact, relates to movement, but movement of what? That of a thing as a whole or its part? That of the entire activity of a thing or only of some aspect of this activity? Before trying to answer these questions, let us advance a further problem: how can a Neoplatonist like Petritsi avoid a vector-like or linear perception of time, even if the movement of the stars and the planets is circular and recurrent? Because, indeed, the stars return to their initial condition and do this perpetually: The past of the sky is linked with the future and united with it, and its end becomes a beginning and Principle of another [cycle], and, thus, it is established eternally and imperishably (Commentaries, prop. 50. 110. 13– 16).

However, one might object, there are many changes on the surface of heavenly bodies—for instance, meteorites fall on the moon, pockmarking its surface with craters—so they are not exactly the same as they were before throughout the cycles. We get, accordingly, rather a linear perception of the flow of time, with a series of discrete events and unique changes permanently happening. But Platonists will have a ready counter-question to this objection: even if the moon’s surface changes, what measures this change of the moon’s surface? This change on the moon’s surface may well be measured by the moon’s period itself, as any other change may. Or, to take another example, the golden arrow of a watch’s hand (second, minute or hour) and a similar golden arrow lying idly nearby will both eventually corrode in the same way. However, the periodic movement of the first arrow measures the scale of change in both. Therefore, for the Neoplatonists the change occurring on the surface of the moon or on the clock arrow does not matter at all, insofar as they remain always the same as measures, as ideas. As Richard D. Mohr writes, concerning the Platonic understanding of time, 434 Proclus finds a Neoplatonist etymology for the “dancing intellect” (In Timaeum III. 27. 32 – 28. 4).

crovno"

as

coreuvwn nou`",

or

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI the Demiurge, in making part of the world into a giant clock, removes that part of the world in its aspect as a standard from being subject to judgments of dates and durations. In failing to fall within the category of things that are subject to temporal judgments, the time that the Demiurge creates is said to be eternal…

and further, I suggest that the Forms and Platonic time are eternal in the same sense and that this sense is that of falling outside the category of things of which it is intelligible to make temporal judgments of dates and duration. 435

Accordingly, time is rather a measure of change of a material thing, being itself beyond the change of the material thing. Furthermore, if we hypostatize this measure and put it in the soul as its essential constituent— saying that the material body of the moon just participates in the constant, invisible movement of soul, having no subsistence by itself—then we obtain an exact Platonic or Pythagorean picture of the eternal cyclical world. The movements of material things—stars, satellites, hands of clocks, flowers and horses—seen from such a perspective are only visual representations of certain numerical relationships, which apply to the mode of movement of the invisible souls, and which are themselves immaterial, ideal and changeless. We have arrived at an important insight: time is, as we have said, a more complex numerical relationship than that pertaining to eternity (that is, changeless ideas), but essentially it is also a motionless and eternal number. Time, then, which applies to the activity of the soul, is a specific type of eternity, called by Petritsi a “temporal eternity” (Commentaries, prop. 198. 200. 17–18): From the number within the One, which is the paradigmatic number, 436 derive numbers under ten, which we call image-like numbers, which exemplify the True Being, whereas the numbers over ten we call “images of image” and “composites of composite.” One can perceive the same thing throughout the entire cycle of beings (Commentaries, prop. 6. 30. 17– 21).

Mohr, op. cit., 39–46. By the “Paradigmatic Number” Petritsi probably implies the First Limit, which elsewhere he calls the “First Number” (Commentaries, prop. 30. 81. 23–24). 435 436

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According to this passage, the created universe is a network of hierarchically arranged numerical relationships from the more to the less extended numbers. Paul C. Plass writes as follows: As we approach the phenomenal universe from intelligible being we can say that Mind expands “down” to all-soul; as we approach the universe as a whole from its lower, partial levels we can say that soul contracts “up” to the world soul. Extension and contraction—time and eternity— overlap…

and further, Temporal order preexists without temporal succession; the flow of temporal happening is coordinated to an abstract static series or “genetic code” that guides it. 437

Time seems to describe a relation between space and a density or mode of change in/of this space. We may use Petritsi’s simile and compare Intellect (or Idea, or Eternity) to a seed that has within itself everything all at once, undivided. The very moment when the seed shoots up into a plant, it extends, and there appears division, bringing about space. Time in turn accounts for the mode, density or order of this division. The division, in fact, does not proceed in an entirely aimless manner, so that we would get an indefinite space, comparable to the Platonic chora (Greek: cwvra— “matrix”) but according to a certain pattern. In this light, the change in (or of) space, on the one hand, and time, on the other, appear to be twins. Space has the potential for dynamism and movement, and time is the ratio of this movement. Space, then, is of the genus of Infinity and time of the genus of Limit. Now, there are different degrees of unity and division also in the intelligible sphere, so that there are more or less universal eternities in a descending and extending scale. Also, in temporal reality there are simpler and more complex movements. Therefore, we may assume that essentially the same occurrence of measuring and ordering of change is called “eternity” in the intelligible realm, but “time” in the psychic and material realms. If in the material universe any movement is a characteristic of some corporeal thing, so that we can imagine this thing without the movement, on the contrary, in the spiritual universe, the realm of incorporeal things, the movement is not related to some incorporeal thing just accidentally: movement is indivisible from this thing, while the measure of this incorporeal 437 Paul C. Plass, “Timeless Time in Neoplatonism,” The Modern Schoolman 55 (1977): 3.

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motion is eternity. Thus eternity is a kind of an intelligible time, regulating the motion of intelligible space. And one may add one further, very interesting, ontological point: we may discern, in fact, two sorts of movement in the intellectual universe: motion (i), the movement from the perspective of the inner activity of an eternal essence—that is, the inner self-reversion of an intellect—and motion (ii), the movement from the perspective of the outward activity of producing another eternal essence, that is to say, a subsequent and more extended intellect. The motion in the second sense— “motion (ii)”—will no longer be a characteristic of change belonging to the causal intelligible essence, but will coincide with and be identical with the occurrence of the fresh intellectual space, in other words the fresh intellect. Let me use an example for clarification: a little stream has its proper motion, flowing in a straight line—“motion (i)”—but it also expands, and we get a river from this expansion; but the expansion-motion—“motion (ii)”—is no longer a motion belonging to the little stream, because the expansion-motion from the very moment of its occurrence abolishes the little stream, turning it into a river. Thus this sort of movement coincides with the change of space, or rather gives birth to a new space. The example is fitting, because the little stream is not abolished when its expansion brings about the river, but until it reaches that geographical point it also remains a little stream—as any cause remains changeless as a cause when its extension brings about an effect. Now, as the little stream does not immediately turn into a lake or sea, but first turns into a river, similarly, an extension of a more universal intellect does not immediately bring forth soul, but first brings forth a particular intellect. That is to say that the extension-motion also has its measure and limit, that is to say, its “time” according to which it proceeds. 438 From this perspective, the First Limit, called by Petritsi the

438 The “extension-motion” in the eternal world, as we have seen above in the chapter on the Intellect, is to be viewed both statically and dynamically. One might cite an interesting observation of David A. Kolb concerning the Aristotelian account that according to Plato the forms are generated out of the One and the Indefinite Dyad: “While the details of this doctrine are far from clear, enough can be made out to show that the picture of Plato positing brutely given Forms is wrong. It is not enough to claim that the Forms are interrelated and mixed with one another in the fashion described in the Sophist. There is an order of generation involved as well. It is true that the Forms are eternally what they are. Yet this is not a brute fact. The Forms are as they are because they are harmonious modulations of unity into multiplicity. They could no more be different than thirteen could cease to

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Idea of Ideas, may be called also the Time of Times. The First Infinity, the Indefinite Dyad, on the same grounds, may be called the Space of Spaces. It is not, though, explicitly stated as such in the text of the Commentaries. However, according to Proclus the Principle of time is the “first number”: “It (time) proceeds according to certain intellectual forms, but foremost according to the first number itself” (In Timaeum III. 18. 19 – 19. 14), and for both Proclus and Petritsi the First Number is Limit. On the other hand, every change, or multiplication, that is the cause of extension happens through Infinity. So, eventually, the discussion concerning time and eternity has brought us back to the primordial Principles—Limit and Infinity—that pervade the whole of reality. What we get out of it is a Pythagorean picture of a frozen reality: the entire world is a network of the eternal numerical harmonious relationships, an eternal divine symphony. God, as Petritsi says, composes the ontological order, as a “beautiful music” (Commentaries, prop. 106. 152. 18). The causal relationships in the eternal sphere are atemporal, or, as Petritsi says, Where all are simultaneously, and all are in all simultaneously, there notions of priority and posteriority do not apply and time is absent; however, priority and posteriority are perceived there in terms of powers and operations—similarly to the way in which we say that a man’s soul purified by theories is prior to another man’s soul that has not yet gained theoretical wings, but we say this not in the meaning of temporal priority (Commentaries, prop. 51. 112. 24–32).

Those invisible, immutable differences of the eternal ideas are copied in a tangible manner by the lower realities—the celestial spheres: There are different natures of time in the great sphere of time [i.e., the sky], different in Cronos, different in the great Zeus, different in Ares, different in the great Apollo, different in the insights of Hermes and different in the joyful love-movements of Aphrodite, still different in the movements of Artemis. In all of them there are different spans of time, that is to say, different modes of movements. Actually, whence could have they obtained all those different powers, unless from the primordial causes, which are the everlasting eternities [i.e., intellects]? (Commentaries, prop. 53. 117. 14–22). be a prime number. But thirteen is not a brute fact; it arises from the generation of the numbers by the mixing of unity and the indefinite dyad.” Kolb, op. cit., 507.

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However, visible movement appears to be an illusion, a shadow-like occurrence, from this perspective. Different planets, for instance, move in different timespans that may be put down on paper in the form of numerical ratios. And those numbers of movement are not themselves moving but stay frozen on the surface of the paper before us. Similarly, the notation of a symphony is itself silent and not perceived by our ears. To summarize: the One creates the eternal world, with a petrified system of numerical relationships. Here even a breeze does not move the leaves of a tree just so, contingently or accidentally. No wonder if in fact, the Providential Principles, the henads, have “undivided knowledge of things divided, and a timeless knowledge of things temporal,” and know “the contingent without contingency, the mutable immutably” (prop. 124). 439 Yet how can we escape the linear perception of time? That the notation of a symphony is the same is evident, but the musicians themselves change, and the instruments become worn-out and are replaced. However, in Platonism individuals are devalued, while ideal patterns are hypostatized, even elevated to the dignity of divinities. Individuals prove evanescent before the eternal patterns. Likewise temporary states of affairs and events: 440 for instance, an important event, such as Armstrong’s landing on the moon, will be completely erased from the metaphysical perspective, because it has no significance in comparison with the monolithic eternal cycles of this changeless body. In fact, it is no part of metaphysical aims to notice the irreversible change that occurs in human minds, in the human attitude to the moon after someone has walked on its surface. In Neoplatonism, we get one annotated symphony of being. Neither do musicians change in the proper sense, insofar as human souls are co-eternal with God and the world (for Petritsi only with the created world), so that a change of musicians, or the advent of a man in this world, is merely a recurrent substitution of the same souls.

This is Dodds’ translation. See Dodds, op. cit., 111. Both individuals (that is, individual substances) and events (particular like individuals, even if immaterial) must lose all properties, including existence, in the end, as they change and (thereby) cease to be, saving only temporally indexed properties, linking them to and relating them to their proper time (properties that may in a way survive their original bearers)… and such properties may only be considered as anything more than meagre and etiolated, barely consolatory (like the penumbrous quality of the Homeric Hades and its shades) if viewed, like the bearers, sub specie aeternitatis: the Neoplatonist view par excellence! 439 440

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One objection might be that, even if the notation of a score is the same, it is played differently by different musicians (and by the same musicians on different occasions) so that the attitude of the musicians (whether the same ones or their successors) to the symphony always changes, as will the timbre of each “token” of the “type” of each note. It is questionable what is more important: the notation of the symphony itself (conveying an intrinsic property of the symphony), or that which happens in individual musicians or listeners when they hear it (a relational or extrinsic property of it)? Music as a notation remains, but all other things change. In contrast to the Neoplatonist conception of the frozen eternity, one may project a dynamic or contingent eternity—a breathing eternity not encapsulated in itself, but in a living dialogue with the irreversible flow of the unique, unprecedented and non-repeated occurrences. We see the same Egyptian hieroglyphs that the ancient Egyptians saw, but the way in which we are interested in them and their influence on us is infinitely different. Cannot we then say that in a certain way there is a change—at least a relational or extrinsic one, a “Cambridge change,” as it is termed today after P. T. Geach 441—even in the eternal thing if it does not exert the same influence? The idea of the “breathing eternity,” that is to say, of a dynamic interaction of the eternal and temporal, is most emphatically present in the Christian, Biblical worldview. Conversely, from the Neoplatonist perspective we see the following pattern of a non-reciprocal, asymmetrical relationship of the source with beings: the eternal changeless source is changeless both in Itself and in Its activity on behalf of, and in relation towards, beings. In fact, beings can make no change whatsoever in any aspect of the Supreme Divinity. They can make changes only in themselves, either through conscious effort of acquisition of fullness of the spiritual life, or through negligence ensuing in what Proclus and Petritsi would have called parhypostasis (Greek: parupovstasi"—“standing beneath one’s proper staOr a “mere-Cambridge change,” as it is disparaged by Sydney Shoemaker, for whom (unlike Geach) it is no change at all. The term “Cambridge change” describes a type of change in a thing that does not involve any intrinsic, essential alteration of this thing, but a relational alteration with regard to other things: for instance a bitter medicine seems evil for a patient, yet as the convalescent patient comes to know that it brought him health, the medication will “turn” from evil to good, without any intrinsic change in it (more precisely, it changes from “perceived as evil by patient X” to “perceived as good by patient X”). I thank Mr. Matthew Suff for suggesting the parallel with Geach’s “Cambridge change” in relation to the notion of the “unchanged change” in God. 441

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tion”), that is to say, falling short of one’s proper, natural way of existence. 442 However, these changes do not in any way affect the source. The Neoplatonist One, if I may use these figurative expressions, on the one hand cannot “hear” anything happening here down below, and on the other cannot “say” anything new to reality. Christianity introduces a personal dimension to the relationship between God and conscious beings. The asymmetrical relation of God and beings is perceived in a different light: the knowledge and love of beings to the source is matched with, nay, transcended and preceded by, the love and knowledge of the source towards the beings (cf. Galatians 4. 9: “after ye have known God”). 443 We may look upon this phenomenon as a kind of asymmetrical reciprocity. Only through this personal dimension in Christian perception, which of course, drags us out of the limits of metaphysics, is there a paradoxical possibility that the absolutely perfect and absolutely changeless God can in a literal sense say new things, give out a New Testament, new commandments, according to His will, and according to the condition of men: “Thou shalt not kill” to the people of the Old Covenant and “do not get angry” to those of the New. Thus God can change the mode of His revelation to beings, and also (hu442 Although Petritsi does not transliterate this term into Georgian, his explanation of the insubstantiality of evil is in line with the basic Proclian tenet: evil is simply a deviation from one’s proper way of existence, and therefore it does not have any natural subsistence (cf. Epilogue, 14). Of course, Proclus could not have been the only source for Petritsi. The term parhypostasis was used by Petritsi’s great Christian predecessors in the sense of a non-ontological, parasitic subsistence of evil, which has its origin not in the nature of things, but in an abused volition of conscious beings (demons, men); cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De Opificio Hominis 12 (PG 44, 164 A6–8) and De Oratione Dominica, De Beatitudinibus, Gregorii Nysseni Opera VII, 2, ed. John F. Callahan (Leiden, New York, Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1992), 49, 27 – 50,1; Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, IV. 27; IV. 31, in Corpus Areopagiticum, I, ed. B. R. Suchla, 173, 20 – 174, 2; 176, 16 – 177, 2; Scholia in Corpus Areopagiticum (John Scythopolis) (PG 4, 297 C7; 304 D10; 365 D1–5); St. Maximus Confessor, Opusculum I: Ad Marinum Presbyterum (PG 91, 24 B10–11). 443 For an opposite view, see R. T. Wallis, who, while denying any notion of “descending” love in Plotinus’ philosophy, at the same time asserts the following with regard to Proclus: “Proclus’ account on love strikes a disconcerting note for those who would draw a neat opposition between Platonic erōs and Christian agapē, since it distinguishes two forms of love, the formal Platonic, ‘ascending’ form, motivating lower principles to aspire towards their superiors, and a ‘descending’ or ‘providential’ form (erōs pronoētikos), promoting those superiors to care for their products (In Alc. 54–6).” Wallis, op. cit., 154.

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man) beings can in a way effect a change in God without violation of His absolute immutability. From this perspective we can already speak about a linear history. Moreover, since the changes in the temporal order are introduced by the Supreme Himself, that history obtains not a quasi-real but a real value and significance. Eternity deliberately shines forth, and is incarnated in the concrete historicity, with the intention of intervening and introducing changes there. However, when we speak about the linear time of Christianity, it must not be understood in the sense that there is any absolute linear time to measure everything, a kind of reality independent or co-eternal with God. On the contrary, prominent Christian thinkers conceived of the atemporality of God. For instance, St. Augustine is emphatic on the point that there are no spaces outside the world and there is no time outside the created world, both time and space belonging to its very fabric. Thus, from this perspective, it would be an error to say that there is a certain infinite time that can go along with, or measure, the life of the Creator. 444 Nor does historical time proceed independently from the Creator, according to a certain logical sequence of events; rather, the historical time and the moment of its consummation are fundamentally grounded in divine mercy and forebearance (cf. 2 Peter, 3). Furthermore, according to other ancient Christian authors, such as St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. John Damascene, in whose texts Petritsi must have been versed, neither is the life of the created beings measured by some infinite abstract time, but the angelic orders have their own measure of life, which is eternity, as the earthly beings have their own measure of life, which is time. 445 However, only God is eternal in the full sense; therefore Damascene calls Him, as do also the Platonists, and as does also Petritsi, pre-eternal. 446 Thus, wonderfully, the ontological condition, the state of life, of a being conditions the time of that being, so that we can speak about the abolition of time from the eschatological perspective, since “But if they say that the thoughts of men are idle when they conceive infinite places, since there is no place beside the world, we reply that, by the same showing, it is vain to conceive of the past times of God’s rest, since there is no time before the world” (“cum tempus nullum sit ante mundum”). St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XI. 5–6. 445 St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 38. 8. 7–11, in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 38–41, ed. C. Moreschini and Paul Gallay, 118; St. John Damascene, Expositio fidei, 15. 9–13, in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damascus, ed. B. Kotter, II, 43. 446 Ibid. 444

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the condition there will be different. 447 In understanding time in those qualitative terms, the great Platonist and the Christian thinkers have one basic insight in common. 448 From the Christian eschatological perspective, however, not only man but the visible world as a whole is also understood as something that has become infected by diseases and death through Adam’s primordial sin, and as something that at the end of history will undergo a radical qualitative change, for there will be a “new heaven and new earth.” Now, in Neoplatonism this is unthinkable, because the visible world, understood as a perfect image of the invisible changeless world, cannot undergo any radical or any qualitative change. For instance, the idea of the Gnostics that the visible world is a product of a certain change in the order of things sounded awkward and barbaric to Plotinus. 449 In fact, if the sun always enlightens a motionless pole from a certain angle, it will always have the same shadow, the latter being, in a way, just as changeless as the pole itself. Similarly, the visible world, despite changes occurring there, remains, in quite a radical sense, always the same, representing a shadow of the psychic and intellectual realms, which are themselves enlightened by the One. In this light, it is only logical that from the Neoplatonic perspective the ultimate good for the soul should be sought in its detachment from the visible. Although in Neoplatonism the visible is understood as fundamentally good, it is also a degradation of the spiritual, and as such has in itself infirmities, intrinsic violence, the latter acquiring an eternal value with no prospect of change. The soul, in order to achieve its ultimate good, must thus separate itself from this realm and ascend to the spiritual, where it truly and primordially belongs. 447

OujdeV gaVr metaV thVn ajnavstasin hJmevrai" kaiV nuxiVn oJ crovno" ajriqmhqhvsetai: e[stai deV ma~llon miva hJmevra ajnevspero" tou~ hJlivou dikaiosuvnh". John Damascene, Ex-

positio fidei, 15. 32–34, in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damascus, ed. B. Kotter, II, 43. 448 Of course, Christian thought is not monolithic on this question, and there are Christian thinkers who uphold an idea of a “down-to-earth” abstract temporal measure. Vladimir Lossky, criticizing Oscar Cullman on this point, states the following: “Thus, Oscar Cullman in his book Christ and Time aspires to reject as Platonic or Hellenic all problems of eternity and to bring the Bible down to its bare text… Then eternity becomes linear, like time; one thinks of it as an indefinite line! And the temporal existence of the world, from creation to the parousia, is but a finite portion of this line. Eternity, thus, reduces to a time without beginning and end, the infinite reduces to the indefinite.” Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, 60. 449 Cf. Enneads V. 8. 12. 20–26.

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Petritsi’s idea of the eternal intellectual world, of the visible reality as the image of the latter, and of soul’s status in the world reflects in its basics purely this Platonic tenet. However, the eschatological perception is also present in his thought. iii. The Idea of Eschatology How can Petritsi reconcile the idea of Neoplatonist eternity with the essential idea of Christianity, that of eschatology, the two being obviously and ineluctably in conflict? What may the importance of the Word’s Incarnation be in Petritsi’s created Platonist eternity? On the one hand Petritsi, as we have seen, modifies the Platonist system by introducing the notion of creation. However, as soon as the world is already created, henceforth all seems to happen there in tune with Platonist theology, which is, as Petritsi says, “the truth coexistent with reality,” repeating Proclus’ ajlhvqeia oJmou~ toi~" ou\si sunufestw~sa (Th.Pl. I. 1. 5. 9–10). We have already seen Petritsi’s story of the Fall presented in a metaphysical framework, Moses appearing before us as Pythagoras in disguise, just hinting at the same eternal ontological truths by figurative stories. Interestingly enough, Petritsi understands also the names of the Biblical books in a philosophical light: Moses the head of the prophets, having perceived in his divine contemplation the instability of our constitution, titles his books accordingly. The first is titled the “Book of Genesis (Becoming),” the second the “Book of Exodus (Leaving),” names by which he describes our nature: in fact, we receive becoming through the act of birth, 450 and, behold, after a short while we leave those bodies of flux through death (Epilogue, 218). 451

Christ’s role in Petritsi’s philosophy is given a metaphysical dimension along with a historical one. Let us see how he interprets Isaiah’s prophecies: 452 Isaiah, the pursos [transliterated from the Greek: pursov"—“torch”] of divine firebrands, says “A child is born for us.” He calls [the Logos] “child” as originating from the Father, and “for us” indicates the fact that He is 450 This, in the context of soul’s preexistence, means that it falls under the measure of becoming through the physical birth. 451 In this interpretation Petritsi may have been influenced by Olympiodorus of Alexandria, in PG 93, 508D (the source found by Edisher Chelidze, op. cit., 85). 452 Isaiah 9. 5.

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THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI known and understood by us only now. 453 In addition, [Isaiah also says] “His origin [Principle] is on His shoulders,” where by representing the Father on His shoulders he implies His inseparability from His cause— the Father. Moreover, this too is a parable, because shoulders are the place of power. Therefore, by saying “on His shoulders,” he means “on His powers,” for effects receive all powers from the causes. Not, though, in an accidental way, but in essential way and in this case even in a supra-essential way, through unity with the One. Actually, before [He generates] the ones, the One [Father] generates the One [Son] and only then does there follow the series of the ones. In addition, [he also calls Christ] “the angel—that is to say, the preacher [an explanation of the polysemy of the original Hebrew and Aramaic, derived from “(royal) messenger”]—of the great mystery.” Here the “great mystery” relates to the entire creation of the constitution of beings and our initiator to this mystery is the theory of the philosophers of the Daylight (Commentaries, prop. 29. 78. 16–28).

Both the Biblical translations and the exegeses are extremely metaphysical. It is interesting that, for instance, the word “child” in Isaiah’s expression “a child is born for us,” which in a standard Christian exegesis naturally calls to be understood as the prophecy of the historical Incarnation, is understood by Petritsi as an indication of the eternal generation of the Logos from the Father. Of course it will be not do justice to truth if we say that Petritsi makes a metaphysical reduction of Christianity. Christ for him is not only the metaphysical First Limit, but is also “life-giver of his theories” (Epilogue, 220), to whom Petritsi personally prays, asking Him to aid his philosophical discourses (Preface, 6) to whom Petritsi gives thanks when he succeeds in a clear exposition of philosophical thought (Commentaries, prop. 17. 52. 24–25), before whom he is ashamed, if he does not present correctly the metaphysical ideas (Commentaries, prop. 50. 108. 26–32). From this perspective it is not a surprise that he thinks that the Greek philosophers were also enlightened by Christ, insofar as the “theory of incorporeal things” is a religious activity for Petritsi. For instance, in the previous quotation we have read that the “philosophers of the Daylight” (that is to say, of Christ) initiate us into the mystery of creation and constitution of beings, that is to say, into metaphysical theories, the latter being identi-

453

Cf. St. Paul, in Colossians 1. 26 and 2 Timothy 1. 9–11.

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fied with the “great mystery” of the Bible. 454 Who are those “philosophers of the Daylight”? Petritsi calls Plato the “summit of the philosophers of the Daylight” (Epilogue, 209). The “true Platonist theologians,” to use Petritsi’s language, are therefore unconscious Christians, through the fact that they investigate the same “great mystery” of reality and aspire to its ultimate Principle. The notion of eschatology is present in Petritsi’s Christology, and the faith in the historical Incarnation is clearly there in his expressions, such as “[Christ’s] passions undertaken on our behalf, His divine courage and virtuous deeds, which give life to souls” (Epilogue, 208. 30–32). Petritsi speaks of the advent of Christ as the crowning of all human knowledge, which altogether yielded to Him as disciples to their Teacher. Christ in this paradigm fulfills not only the Law, but also the philosophers’ endeavors. Petritsi writes thus: “all of them”—the prophets and philosophers alike—“did raise souls up, but at last the Son sent by the Father elevated our souls higher than any highest among them” (Epilogue, 208).

Interestingly, Petritsi translates the megavlh boulhv of the Bible not as the “great counsel” but as the “great mystery” and relates this to the toV musthvrion toV ajpokekrummevnon ajpoV tw~n aijwvnwn of St. Paul’s letter to the Colossians (Col. 1. 26). 454

8 CONCLUSION GENERAL REMARKS In this concluding chapter I shall first recapitulate the results achieved in the previous chapters. Next I shall discuss the relation of Petritsi’s philosophy to his immediate predecessors—Psellus and Italus—and, finally, provide a very general estimation of the character of Petritsi’s philosophy. As we have seen above, Petritsi often does not give an entirely faithful or correct account of Proclus’ ideas and philosophy. Petritsi has an eclectic picture of Neoplatonist philosophy, and sometimes explains Proclus through use of other Neoplatonist sources (Plotinus, Iamblichus et al). Besides, Petritsi’s interpretations are influenced by his Christian convictions, through which he is sometimes obliged to present what is, historically speaking, a distorted view of some of Proclus’ fundamental ideas. It is a good question whether Petritsi was always aware of the divergences that he made. In some cases he evidently was, as for instance in the case of the henads-gods—a polytheistic doctrine, which he converted and incorporated into the monotheistic model. In other cases he might have read Proclus through spectacles tinted with the views of other Neoplatonist philosophers, or with preconceived notions, and thus, might have produced an unintended synthesis of competing ideas. Also, he might have simply followed his own train of thought, provoked by the difficulties of Proclus’ propositions. Sometimes Petritsi appeals to God for help in understanding what is griphos (Greek: grivfo"—“enigma”) in the text with which he struggles, and he might well have thought that some of his insights were vouchsafed from above and tallied with the ideas and mysticism of the Lycian philosopher. Although those insights do not always provide an entirely comprehensive or even relevant explanation of Proclus’ intentions, they nevertheless represent a genuine metaphysical thought, of no little interest in itself. Let us summarize Petritsi’s views on the metaphysical entities of all levels as discussed in the chapters of the thesis, and pinpoint his deviations from Proclus. 265

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1. PETRITSI’S DOCTRINES IN THE COMMENTARIES ON THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY

i. The Doctrine of the One Petritsi wrought a significant distortion of Proclus’ theory on the transcendent One by introducing seminal plurality into It. While being absolute Unity, and beyond any composition, at the same time Petritsi’s One contains in a causal way a blueprint of the pluralistic (multiple, manifold) world, albeit in a cryptic and inconceivable way. Just as every monad under the level of Being contains in a universal way all the plurality of series under its sway, so the One, being the monad of the henadic series, contains the henads in a causal and universal way. By introducing such an ineffable unitary plurality into the One, Petritsi must have followed other Neoplatonists, such as Plotinus or, more likely, Iamblichus, whose ideas on this matter were refuted by Proclus. However, Petritsi’s theory is not precisely Iamblichean, because Iamblichus introduced cryptic plurality into the OneCause, which was according to him the subject of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. Apparently, this notion was not applicable to the Ineffable, which in Iamblichus’ system was beyond the One. On the contrary, Petritsi follows Proclus’ lead in not making any distinction between the One and the Ineffable. With the introduction of plurality into the One, Petritsi must have intended to emphasize the point that despite its absolute abstraction from the rest of reality, the One is not to be associated with a notion of emptiness, but on the contrary with supreme bounty and richness. Thus soul’s striving for the One is not simply a question of philosophical curiosity about the mysterious, but (if a mixture of modern psychology and formal logic may be permitted as an explanation) a subconscious, a priori ontological longing to leave poverty and nakedness for “the richness of the Father.” The last quotation marks another significant digression from Proclus’ system, insofar as Petritsi calls the One “Father” identifying It (Him) with the Christian God the Father, whereas Proclus does not apply to the One the word “Father,” reserving this name for the lower realities, that is, the first member of the intelligible triad. Petritsi may also be influenced by Plotinus, who like himself applies the name “Father” to the One. 455 Moreover, Petritsi identifies the One with the Demiurge of the Timaeus, which fits well with the Christian notion of the Creator-God. For Proclus, however, the Demiurge 455

Cf. Enneads II. 9. 2. 3–5.

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is only a lower cause, belonging to the intellectual sphere (insofar as the paradigm, at which the Demiurge gazes, according to Proclus, must be higher than Him). ii. The Doctrine of Limit and Infinity Petritsi’s doctrine of Limit and Infinity is largely influenced by his Trinitarian interpretation of those metaphysical Principles—Limit and Infinity being identified respectively with the Son-Logos and the Holy Spirit, both being in a consubstantial unity with the One-Father. It is worth noting that Petritsi, while explicitly identifying Limit with the Son in his commentaries, does not make any such identification with regard to Infinity and the Spirit. The last identification forms, though, a necessary inference, corroborated also by some passages from the Epilogue. The reason for this silence may have been that Petritsi shied away from making his identifications too explicit, in order not to immediately frighten the unprepared audience. Another reason may have been that in Georgian both pneuvma and yuchv are expressed by one word, suli, and therefore Petritsi avoided a vast metaphysical confusion through this lexical coincidence. Evidently, those identifications compelled Petritsi to deviate from Proclus’ subordinationist view on the two Principles—that Limit holds a metaphysical superiority over Infinity—and to present them as parallel realities. As regards Limit, Petritsi develops an un-Proclian theory of Limit as the second or the immanent One as distinct from the transcendent OneFather (in this he might have been influenced by the Iamblichean distinction between the Ineffable and the One-Cause). Limit reveals the limiting aspect of the One in all strata of reality. While having simplified the general pattern of the Proclian metaphysics and denying any distinction between the unparticipated and participated monads for each series of being, Petritsi applied this pattern to the relationship of the One with the series of henads. He presents the One as the unparticipated monad, and Limit as the participated monad of the series of henads. Proclus, of course, would have never applied such a pattern to the supra-essential indescribable relation of the One and the henadic gods. Moreover, Petritsi reformulates Proclus’ ideas—sometimes presenting Proclus’ hypothetical (counterfactual conditional) extrapolations and excursi as valid ontological statements—and presents a peculiar Trinitarian theory of the “three Ones.” The First One, according to this theory, is the transcendent One. The second One (Limit) is called “the One of proper natures,” that is, immanent particularly in every individual being as well as in

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every individual henad. The third One (Infinity) is the “One-multiplied,” which represents both the means for and the product of the division and multiplication of the One. From the theological point of view Petritsi’s identifications are more than contentious, insofar as they suggest subordination inside the Trinity. The transcendent One for Petritsi is the Father alone and not the Trinity, and although Limit and Infinity belong to the One essentially and share Divinity with the One, at the same time they have the One as their intelligible aspect (noeton) whereas the One has none. The One has a certain superiority over Limit as being “beyond unity”; that is to say that the One is beyond the feature of providing unity to particular beings, which is the proper function of Limit. The One has a certain superiority over Infinity as being “beyond powers,” 456 while Infinity is the “First Power.” Moreover, it seems that the ultimate epheton for the soul in Petritsi’s system is the One and not the Trinity. Yet the other Trinitarian passages, especially those in the Epilogue (for instance Petritsi’s musical analogy), do not fit into the subordinationist view. iii. The Doctrine of the Henads Petritsi’s henadic theory demonstrates his most conspicuous divergence from Proclus’ system. In order to safeguard monotheism Petritsi denies henads divinity in their own right. Henads in his system are no longer gods but “divine,” although in a few cases he calls henads “gods” in a relative sense. Despite the fact that the henads are “supra-essential,” in Petritsi’s system they still belong to the realm of creatures, being termed the “created ones.” The henads get divinized through participation in the God-limit. This is in drastic opposition to the Proclian model, according to which the henadic gods enjoy full divinity and not a derivative one, and do not participate in anything higher—rather, beings participate in them. Furthermore, Petritsi does not follow Proclus’ doctrine about the participation of henads by the beings. According to Proclus the henads proper are not directly participated in by any of the beings. The beings possess only their “participations” or innate shares, which are not properly gods. Due to the fact that Petritsi has done away with the notion of henads as gods, he sees no hindrance in making them directly possessed by the beings. Thus even the human soul has its “innate god” through which it strives towards the 456

Cf. Th.Pl. II. 7. 51. 7–8:

ejnergeiva".

Movnon ou\n tajgaqoVn e[stw kaiV proV dunavmew" kaiV proV

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One. In Proclus’ system such an assertion would have amounted to the absurdity that every man is an immediate deity. Furthermore, Petritsi introduces another significant metaphysical digression from Proclus in developing the “numerical theory” of henads. For him henads are metaphysical numbers, each of them being circumscribed by the First Number—Limit. This is, in fact, the meaning of the statement that henads participate in Limit. This in turn implies the notion of plurality in each of the henads: there must be a plurality of elements, which Limit must circumscribe in proper henadic numbers. Those henadic elements themselves must be indivisible in each particular henad, lest we arrive at a “negative infinity.” The atomic units that Limit molds into proper henads are the product of the “bending” or multiplication of the One through/in Infinity—the Dyad—which is the “multiplied One.” Thus, Petritsi’s theory may be also called an “atomist theory,” where in each of the henads there is an interplay and different modulations of Limit and Infinity. In the subchapter on Proclus’ theory of henads I have tried to demonstrate that the notion of the cryptic innate multiplicity in each of the henads could be— apparently falsely—theorized on the basis of some Proclian texts and expressions. But of course Proclus’ underlying idea was to deny any multiplicity in henads and present each of them as a unity proper. Petritsi’s account, nevertheless, could be regarded as a logical development of the henadic theory as presented by Proclus, and as an indication, whether conscious or unconscious, of the innate difficulty and inconsistency in the doctrine of the Greek philosopher. iv. The Doctrine of the Intellect In his teaching on Intellect Petritsi introduces Plotinian elements in his interpretation of Proclus’ ideas. The Georgian philosopher deviates from Proclus in identifying the First Being (which in Proclus’ system is the noeton of the Intellect) with the First Intellect (which is the noeton of itself). This can be compared to the Plotinian identification of the intelligible substance with Intellect. Generally, Petritsi does not follow the Proclian subtleties concerning the intellectual world, considerably simplifying the map of this world. Petritsi grants Intellect knowledge of the inferior realities, which is also bound up with his Christianizing attitude towards Platonist metaphysics. The next important point to consider is Petritsi’s identification of the First Intellect with the Son in the Epilogue. This contradicts the text of the commentaries, where Limit (or the “Creative Word”) is the Son, and where Limit constructs the First Intellect. This might be ascribed to the different

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times and themes of the two texts, or merely to a terminological inconsistency. However, in the light of one passage of the commentaries, which I have discussed above, it is plausible to suppose that Petritsi maintained the Evagrian distinction between the Son-Logos (Limit) and the Christ-Intellect (the True Being). v. The Doctrine of the the Soul In his teaching on the soul Petritsi again makes a synthesis of the ideas of Proclus and Plotinus. In contrast to Proclus, he makes the link between the soul and the intellectual world much more intimate. Petritsi describes the relation of the soul with the intellectual world in Plotinian expressions, such as “touch” and “tasting of.” Like Plotinus, he calls the soul logos. In Petritsi’s paradigm the soul cognizes also the eternal Ideas and not only their reflections in itself—that is to say, the innate reasons or logoi—as Proclus has it. Yet Petritsi is not guilty of blurring the distinction between the two hypostases, the intellect and the soul, as Plotinus is: according to the Georgian philosopher, even in the perfect intellectual state, soul remains soul, not losing its distinctive feature, discursiveness. The next important point to consider is Petritsi’s Biblical parallels with Proclus’ metaphysical account of the soul. Petritsi provides a spiritual interpretation of the story of Genesis, describing Paradise in immaterial terms. According to this interpretation the plants of Paradise are the innate Ideas sown by the Creator in the soul. The human soul is identified with Adam, and the Fall of Adam is understood as falling from the intelligible world to the sensible. The acquisition of the material body is, according to this tenet, the result of the Fall. Petritsi holds the Platonist doctrine of the soul’s preexistence and, most probably, also that of reincarnation. In this he follows an Origenist tradition, presumably through Nemesius of Emesa, whom Petritsi translated before he started working on the Elements of Theology. vi. The Doctrine of Time and Eternity Petritsi’s doctrine on time and eternity is essentially Neoplatonist. However, here too he deviates from Proclus’ sophisticated views, presenting a less “crowded” design. For instance, he does not make time an intellect and a cause of the soul, but relates time to the reality of the soul itself, which, again, brings him closer to Plotinus. Yet, at variance with the latter, Petritsi does not affirm that time is the result of the soul’s “fall” from intellect, a fall that gives birth to the visible world, but time (that is to say, succession) according to him, is there in souls also in the intellectual stage. Eternity and time appear to be technical Neoplatonist terms describing the mode of exis-

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tence of entities respectively of the intellectual and psychic realms, “eternity” standing for beings with undivided essence and operation, and “time” standing for beings with divided essence and operation. Therefore, the term “eternal” is inapplicable to the One, which transcends those realms and is pre-eternal. Both eternity and time are measures of change, otherwise considered as motion, in different ontological strata: a motionless motion in the intellectual sphere and proper motion in the psychic and the corporeal spheres. The lower forms of motion are iconic reflections of the higher intellectual forms of motion. As a Christian, Petritsi introduces a doctrine of the creation of the world, thus deviating from one of the fundamental Neoplatonist teachings on the necessary emanation of the One and the eternity of the world, or more precisely, the co-eternity of the world with its transcendent Cause. However, the created world of Petritsi shows all the features of the Neoplatonist eternity. After the creation it is in fact a Neoplatonist eternal changeless world. A similar teaching is found in Nemesius, and Petritsi must have followed the latter’s attempt at reconciliation of Christian faith and Greek metaphysics. Moreover, as a Christian Petritsi believes in the historical Incarnation of the Word and in the singular significance of this fact, yet at the same time it seems that for him the Incarnation does not introduce a qualitative change in the existing order of the universe—the abolition of the power of sin and death, and procession of the remaining history under the sign of expectation of the Second Coming and the end of the world—but rather the change is understood in a quantitative and spiritual sense, as the greater elevation of souls. Thus Christ, in Petritsi’s paradigm, is the crown of all human knowledge, whether that of the Greek philosophers or the Biblical prophets. I think, in the light of Petritsi’s paradoxical synthesis of Neoplatonist eternity and Christian historicity, that the notions of the Last Judgment and the end of the world can be interpreted only in a figurative or spiritual sense. However, Petritsi does not discuss those questions, and does not reflect upon the implicit tensions between the rival worldviews; thus we can only attempt a guess on the basis of the logical development of Petritsi’s ideas, while we must refrain from claiming that this was precisely how Petritsi himself thought.

2. PETRITSI’S IMMEDIATE PREDECESSORS Michael Psellus and John Italus are generally regarded as the immediate predecessors of Ioane Petritsi. Indeed, Petritsi belongs to the spirit of the so-called Byzantine humanism, of which probably the most characteristic figure is the polymath Psellus. Was Petritsi a direct follower of either Psellus

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or Italus, and may we establish with certainty who precisely was his teacher? Let us compare him to both philosophers. Petritsi shares in full Psellus’ love of Greek philosophy—Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Psellus found much benefit in Greek philosophy also for Christians. Already as hypatos of the philosophical school, Psellus defended his interest in the Greek philosophy before the criticism of a friend of his youth, John Xiphilinus, who was the head of the law school in Constantinople and by this time had become Patriarch. Psellus writes thus to his friend, whom he reproaches as a “hater of Plato and of reason”: Why, after all, do you not criticize the great fathers, for they also threw out syllogisms defeating the heresies of Eunomius and Apollinarius? Were not Plato’s words on justice and on the immortality of souls inspiring to us when we started to think about those things?! 457

In another letter to the prince Andronicus Palaeologus he writes thus: “one should not take Plato’s books with unclean hands.” 458 He applies a whole set of compliments to the Greek philosophers, such as qaumavsioÇ (Plotinus), mevga" (Syrianus), teratolovgo" (Proclus), qespevsioÇ and qei`o" (Plato), and so on, calling them, as also does Petritsi, theologians. He praises Plato, “who has risen to the contemplation and has seen also that which is beyond intellect, having stopped [his attention] at the One.” Psellus respected genuine spiritual value in the theories of the Greek philosophers; thus, while commenting on the Biblical passages, he could allude also to the ideas of Plato and of the Neoplatonists. According to Psellus, the best of the Greek philosophy could have been used against such barbaric pseudo-teachings as, for instance, astrology. Psellus goes as far as to grant a degree of divine inspiration or Providence to the eminent Greek tradition, thus closely approximating it to the Christian revelation: “that which drew the great and most prudent souls to the Hellenic teaching, the same has

This may be found in C. Sathas, Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi, V (volumes IVII) (Venice and Paris: 1872–1894; Reprint: Hildesheim; NY: Olms, 1972), 444, 11–17; however, I quote this text from Monuments of Byzantine Literature from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century, ed. L. A. Freiberg (Moscow: Nauka, 1969) [Памятники 457

Византийской Литературы IX-XIV вв. Ред. Л. А. Фрейберг. Москва, «Наука», 1969], 154–155.

Psellus, Opusculum phil. 29 (Tivna trovpon oJ Plavtwn oi[etai eijsoikivzesqai taV" in Michaelis Pselli—Philosophica Minora, vol. II. Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica, ed. D. J. O’Meara, 106. 458

yucav"),

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raised me up to the faith of our teaching [i.e., Christian teaching].” 459 When he rejects the idea of fatalism, Psellus does not rely only on Christian authority, but makes use of the pagan Greek tradition also. Psellus appeals to the authority of St. Maximus to corroborate his confidence that Greek philosophy has self-standing value: “Maximus regarded the physical theory as a second virtue after the praxis,” he writes to Xiphilinus. One can only agree with the words of N. Granstrem, that “Psellus regarded theology as the first science and envisaged his task in harmonization of the Antique philosophy with Christianity, and of the syllogistic discourse with the Faith.” 460 With regard to those features and sentiments Petritsi is very close to Psellus. In the Georgian philosopher we perceive the same fascination with the “divine Plato,” the “great Plotinus and Iamblichus” and with Proclus, the “worthy successor of Plato.” Petritsi also finds Neoplatonism a useful ally of Christianity against heretical doctrines such as that of Mani. But Petritsi goes further than Psellus in this attitude, lacking the reserve and carefulness of the man who was possibly his professor. In contrast to Petritsi, Psellus displays much caution, and holds as a measure of truth the teaching of the Church, or “our teaching” as he calls it. For instance, when affirming that God ceaselessly effects the production of beings, he immediately wards off the accusation that he makes created things co-eternal with God. 461 Through the measure of faith he can reject or mock some Neoplatonist ideas, calling them “old women’s tales” or “mythology.” Sometimes he partially accepts and partially rejects the views of the Neoplatonist philosophers, cleansing them through the filter of the Church’s teaching. Even in Plato he “loved only the clean water and separated it from the filth.” 462 On a deeper level, though, he seems to have accepted the Neoplatonist mystique of the soul’s ascent to the One.

459 toV katabibavsan meivzou" kaiV gnwmikwtevra" yucaV" proV" thVn tou` eJllhnikou` lovgou paradochVn, ejmeV pievzon ajnavgei proV" thVn tou` hJmetevrou lovgou pivstin te kaiV bebaivwsin.

Psellus, Chronographia VI. 12. 5–11. 460 N. Granstrem, “Byzantine Science and Education,” in History of Byzantium, vol. II, ed. A. P. Kazhdan (Moscow: Nauka, 1967) [Н. Э. Гранстрем, «Наука и образование», История Византии, т. 2, ред. А. П. Каждан, Москва, «Наука», 1967, гл. 16, ст. 362].

Michael Psellus, Opusculum theol. 79 (Eij" toV “oJ pathvr mou e{w" a[rti ejred. P. Gautier, Michaelis Pselli Theologica, vol. I (Leipzig: Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, 1989), p. 320, 111–113. 462 See Freiberg, op. cit., 154. 461

gavzetai”)

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However, this is not the same as embracing Neoplatonism as true theology, as does Petritsi, and presenting it as a uniform doctrine compatible with Christianity, passing over the points of obvious discordance between the two traditions. For Petritsi, Proclus is more than a thinker. In the preface to his translation, Petritsi briefly presents the life of Proclus as that of a philosopher-saint who through the exercise of virtues and by passing through different steps of education—physical, mathematical, and so on— achieved the true goal of life—the mystical perception of the One. He follows Proclus’ account of the Pythagorean-Orphic and Neoplatonist mystical tradition (Th.Pl. I. 5. 25. 24 – 26. 4). This tradition according to Petritsi represents a spiritual truth and forms a standard according to which other teachings, not agreeing with it, can be reckoned as heterodox. For instance, one such heterodox doctrine for Petritsi is that of the Peripatetics, who thought of Ideas as only immanent in (and to a large extent dependent upon) material bodies, and thus severed themselves from the tradition of the “Ancient theologians.” According to the Georgian philosopher, the truth of the Orphic-Neoplatonist philosophy is an objective, scientific truth “co-established with reality”—although this “science,” at variance with the modern understanding of the word, concerns both the physical world and the spiritual one. Petritsi wants nothing to do with the theory of the “double truth.” For him the truth of the Faith and the truth of philosophy are one, and the mystical experiences of a Neoplatonist and of a Christian are one. Accordingly, the Bible is a Jewish variant of the true Platonic theology, presenting the same truth in a different genre. Petritsi is remarkably sincere in his attitude, and allows that the Greek wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit, relying on the authority of the “teacher of our Church,” St. Paul. However paradoxical it may be, he easily attributes two specifically Christian elements—the Trinity and the Incarnation—to Neoplatonist philosophy, in which those two elements are manifestly absent. And more dramatically, he finds compatible with Christianity those elements of Neoplatonism that cannot be valid according to the former, and, moreover, had by the twelfth century already been openly rejected by Orthodox theology for centuries. In this attitude, Petritsi reveals a greater affinity with John Italus, who also refused to reject those ideas of the Greek philosophy that were not in accord with faith, for which he was condemned. Interestingly, Italus did not object when he was corrected in some mistakes of expressions concerning the Trinity and Incarnation, or concerning the veneration of icons—that is to say, in matters specifically connected with Christian theology. He allowed the members of the council to change everything that they would have

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found heretical in his properly Christian-theological formulations. However, the situation changed when a certain Kaspakis introduced ten accusations against Italus that concerned his philosophical views incompatible with the teaching of the Church (Kefavlaiav tina devka th~" eJllhnikh~~" ajqeovthto" gevmonta… wJ" uJgievsi protivqesqai kaiV mevcri tou~ nu~n eJp– aJlhqeiva/ touvtou" pisteuvein). Italus rejected only the last of those accusations—that he had thrown a stone at the icon of Christ—but attested that the other nine theses were his and that he was ready to defend them. 463 Those nine theses, apparently, were included in the eleven chapters of the Synodicon. This fact indicates that, like Petritsi, Italus took philosophical ideas to be the objective truth, defense of which truth, even in defiance of the teaching of the Church, he regarded as a matter of conscience and sincerity. In this respect, it is appropriate to adduce a remark of F. Uspenski: “Italus was not properly speaking a theologian and cannot be considered as guilty in creating some religious sect. Rather, he was a thinker and was excommunicated by the Church because he did not adjust his philosophical system with the teaching of the Church.” 464 If we compare the ideas of Petritsi and Italus according to the eleven chapters—although not all those ideas in precisely this form belonged to Italus himself—we shall find a few important meeting-points. For instance, Petritsi also believed in the independent existence of the Platonic Forms; however, he introduced a significant change by identifying the True Being, the storehouse of those Ideas, with the created Intellect of Christ. Petritsi also believed in the preexistence of souls and, in all probability, also in their reincarnation. He also believed in Greek ideas about the “sky and earth,” namely holding that the sky and the planets have proper souls. In the context of Petritsi’s idea of the material body as a garment, which is wrapped around the fallen soul, we can assume that he also rejected the doctrine of resurrection in the same body in which man lived. We cannot affirm with certainty whether Petritsi also held that the sufferings of hell are finite. This may be the case, because it seems according to the commentaries that the punishment of the soul is to come down from the spiritual universe to this material universe, which Petritsi calls “hell,” but this “hell” is not, of course, eternal. However, Petritsi is not culpable of holding one of the fundamental doctrines of Italus, that of the doctrine of the “unbeginningness” of matter, that is, its independence from and coexistence with God, for he introduces the Christian notion of creatio ex nihilo. (In 463 464

Kechagmadze, “John Italus and Ioane Petritsi,” 5–12. F. Uspenski, op. cit.

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fact, even in Proclus matter is not independent from the One but eternally emanates from It, yet Petritsi, paradoxically, adopts the idea of a created eternal emanation.) About the other ideas listed in the Synodicon, we cannot say with certainty what Petritsi’s response to them would have been. A major distinction between Italus and Petritsi is the fact that Italus revered Aristotle more than he did Plato, and could even correct Plato through the Stagirite. On the contrary, Petritsi’s Plato is the “chrism of theology” and enjoys prophetic authority. For instance, Petritsi and Italus held diametrically opposite views on the relation of soul and body, for Italus adopted the Aristotelian idea of soul as body’s entelechy, 465 whereas, as we have seen, Petritsi rejected this idea, maintaining a Platonic stance concerning the independence and separability of soul. And there is another difference: according to the narration of Anna Comnena, Italus did not pay sufficient attention to grammar and rhetoric (ajllaV periV thVn grammatikhVn ejcwvleue tevcnhn, kaiV tou~ rJhtorikou~ nevktaro" oujk ejgeuvsato). 466 Conversely, Petritsi gives principal significance to grammar and to the “elimination of everything barbaric from the language,” as well as to the “attunement and embellishment of the language and fluency of discourse.” Comparing Petritsi to Psellus and Italus, we cannot say that he was a “faithful follower” of either of the two. In his respect for and love of Plato and the Neoplatonists, and his belief that Neoplatonist mysticism and philosophy have genuine spiritual value, Petritsi fits the picture of a disciple of Psellus rather well. In his attitude to philosophical truth and the Christian teaching, Petritsi strongly reveals features of Italus, although there are also a few significant differences between the two. Certainly, Petritsi fully imbibed the freedom of philosophical and rational studies initiated in the Magnaura School, in which Psellus allowed each of his disciples to “be original and preserve features peculiar only to him,” 467 and it should come as no surprise if this creative mind made an original synthesis of what was most dear for him both in Christianity and in philosophy.

Italus, op. cit., 124–125. The same is attested by Michael Psellus about the young Italus, who at that time was his disciple. While praising Italus for his persuasive logic and philosophical knowledge, at the same time Psellus admits that “he is not brilliant in rhetorical art, his speech is not rhythmic and the composition of his words does not issue sweetness.” See “Praise to Italus,” in Monuments of Byzantine Literature, 145. 467 Ibid., 147. 465 466

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3. PETRITSI’S WORLDVIEW: A GENERAL ESTIMATION Nietzsche has described Christianity as “Platonism for the people.” This seems to be a rather crude and evidently a derogatory expression. However, this expression also contains the deep insight that there is some fundamental affinity between the two worldviews. Let us observe the common traits on which this affinity is based, and note how it is reflected in Petritsi’s philosophy. The alliance of both doctrines is obvious first of all in that underlying perception of goodness of the world which is common to both Neoplatonists and Christians. It is not a surprise that it was the Neoplatonists who helped St. Augustine to overcome his early attachment to Manichean dualism, thus paving his way to Christianity. The world has one Cause both in Neoplatonism and in Christianity, and in both doctrines the Cause is naturally, or rather supra-naturally, good. It may be said that the whole Petritsian enterprise of harmonization of Christianity and Platonism is based on this pivotal meeting point. Petritsi not only compares but identifies the Neoplatonist One with the God of Abraham and David: As if Plato has heard from the holy prophet [that is, David] in saying that the Goodness Itself is the cause of production of beings. And he [Plato] says daringly and openly that the Goodness of the God-of-all failed to be contained in Him isolated, but was transmitted from the transcendent height, 468 in order to make also others His companions and sharers in His Goodness, for the Goodness is free of jealousy. 469 Thus the Attician attunes his voice to our Orpheus, the king David” (Epilogue, 210).

As the Neoplatonist One naturally emits the world from Itself, so the God of David naturally radiates “currents of pleasures” and “eternal lights” into the world created by Him. Petritsi equates the natural emanation with the Christian idea of God’s natural mercy. Thus there can be no judgment and punishment in God: even “punishment” is the outward revelation of 468 Here Petritsi seems to attribute Plotinus’ thoughts to Plato. Cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 29. 2. 18–22: Ouj gaVr dhV uJpevrcusin ajgaqovthto" eijpei`n qarjrJhvsomen (o} tw`n par– @Ellhsi filosofhsavntwn eijpei`n ti" ejtovlmhsen, Oi|on krathvr ti" uJpererjrJuvh, safw`" ouJtwsiV levgwn, ejn oi|" periV prwvtou aijtivou kaiV deutevrou filosofei`), in Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27–31 [Discours théologiques], ed. Paul Gallay and Maurice Jourjon, 180. Thus, Plotinus’ “temerity” is met with caution by Gregory and with praise by Petritsi. 469 Cf. Timaeus 29 d7–e2.

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His innermost mercy (Epilogue, 218). Petritsi introduces the Creation in the Platonic framework without conflict, as if the tension did not exist, or as if this point, from the Platonic side, were merely a superficial divergence, insignificant in the light of the fundamental agreement between the two doctrines. Petritsi rightly teaches of concordance between Neoplatonism and Christianity on the insubstantiality of evil. However, he goes too far in this, mitigating the disastrous consequences that the primordial fall had for man, and from the Christian point of view appears to be over-optimistic concerning the capability of man to purify himself through philosophy and practice of virtues. As we have noted, the Incarnation has for Petritsi the significance of a supreme elevation of the soul rather than that of providing a fundamental cure for man’s damaged condition. Another important point of agreement between Neoplatonism and Christianity, which Petritsi does not fail to observe, is the clear-cut division between the body and soul. Both teach that soul is separable from body, and both agree on the point of the immortality of the first and mortality of the second. Yet there are significant differences: in Platonism the soul is eternally immortal out of natural necessity, whereas in Christianity it is created and immortal not necessarily, but by an act of divine mercy. Moreover, in Christianity the material body is only relatively mortal, insofar as together with the immaterial soul it is part of a human being’s eternal identity— therefore, Christ is the Savior not only of the soul but also of the body 470— whereas in Platonism the body is deprived of this status. Therefore, it is not a surprise that all Neoplatonists have preexistence and reincarnation as fundamental constituents of their teaching. This was such a natural conception of the soul for the Late Antique philosophers that even after their adoption of Christianity they carried on, in a modified form, with those ideas—as, for instance, in the case of Origen and Nemesius of Emesa. In this respect, Petritsi belongs to this ancient spiritualistic direction in Christianity, which was later, namely at the Fifth Ecumenical Council, canonically rejected. The next profound similarity between Platonism and Christianity is the attitude to the visible and the spiritual worlds. There is apparently a feeling common to both Platonists and Christians that the true home of the human soul is not the visible world, and that the visible world has a relatively low value in comparison with the spiritual world. It was, evidently, not only a theoretical speculation, but also a conclusion that was the result of a lifetime’s experience of frustration on the part of eminent minds, that nothing 470

Cf. Ephesians 5. 23–24.

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material can satisfy the soul’s needs, and that the restored relation with and contemplation of the immaterial is the soul’s true fulfillment. The perennial value of Platonic philosophy must have lain in this truly religious conviction and perception of the beauty of the invisible world, incomparably more solid and real than the reality perceived by physical senses. There are higher senses, through which the soul contemplates the intelligible and participates in the bliss therein. Yet in Christianity, if the visible world reveals also its evil aspects and is, thus, opposed to the ideal and the virtuous, this is only the consequence of the primordial fall and not an indication that the world contains an intrinsic evil Principle in itself. Thus, from the Christian perspective, the visible world is to be saved and restored for eternity, rather than forfeited for the sake of union with the eternal realm in the manner of the Plotinian aphairesis. In fact, Neoplatonism appears to be quite dualistic and “gnostic” in its treatment of the material world, in that the eternal blessedness of soul is viewed in its separation from body and the visible world. On the contrary, Christianity stresses the harmony between the visible and invisible, evidently due to the fact that the material is not perceived as a diminution of the spiritual and as the last reach of the emanation, but as the creation of the One God. Thus, from the Christian perspective, to use St. Augustine’s expression, spirit hates body only out of love, in order that the lower may not govern the higher. 471 In this respect, Petritsi seems to be rather in the camp of the Platonists, for his love for the lustrous intelligible designs is too passionate to allow him to be led into the “occult” disregard of the earthly world. The other point of divergence between Platonism and Christianity in this respect concerns the way and method of relation to the spiritual. For the Neoplatonists, who followed the Parmenidian lead, 472 the dialectical exercises are a necessary preliminary for the perception of intelligible reality. Access to the metaphysical world is understood as a privilege of those who undertake hard intellectual labor: the doors of the Academy are open only to geometers. On the contrary, according to Christianity, philosophical-theoretical studies are not necessary for the spiritual St. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, I, ch. xxiv: “The spirit does not resist in hate but in a desire for domination, because it wishes what it loves to be subjected to something better.” Here I use the English translation of D. W. Robertson. See St. Augustine—On Christian Doctrine, trans. and ed. D. W. Robertson (Indianapolis, IN, and New York: The Library of Liberal Arts. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958), 21. 472 Cf. Parmenides: ajgnoou`sin gaVr oiJ polloiV o{ti a[neu tauvth" th`" diaV pavntwn diexovdou te kaiV plavnh" ajduvnaton ejntucovnta tw`/ ajlhqei` nou`n scei`n (136E). 471

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vision: it is not dialecticians but the “pure of heart” who are blessed with the vision of God (Matthew 5. 8). The author of the so-called “Eighth Letter of St. Basil the Great,” that is, Evagrius of Pontus, expresses the Christian attitude in his comparison of the spiritual contemplation with senseperception: God who created us made the natural sense faculties to be independent of a teacher. For no one teaches sight—how to apprehend colors or shapes—nor hearing—how to apprehend sounds and voices… No more could anyone teach the mind how to lay hold upon things mentally perceptible (toi`" nohtoi``"). And just as the senses, if they take on an ailment, need care only, and then readily fulfil their own peculiar activities, so too the mind, being imprisoned in the flesh and filled with the phantasies therefrom, needs only faith and right conduct, and these “make its feet like the feet of harts and set it upon high places” [Psalms 17, 34]. 473

In this respect Petritsi’s attitude is in tune with that of the Neoplatonists. Petritsi’s mystic is a scientific or scholarly mystic: one has to philosophize and go through painful intellectual labors if one wants to acquire “wings of contemplation,” and the soul ascends to the intellectual reality through the dialectical actualization of its “inner word.” To sum up, Petritsi created a doubly eclectic system. First, he molded different Neoplatonist sources in a uniform system; next, he harmonized this system with Christianity. While he reveals the features of both Psellus and Italus and belongs to their intellectual milieu, yet, in his synthesis, as well as in the outspokenness of its presentation, he is unique and original. The truth of his undertaking seems to be self-evident for Petritsi. In fact, we can claim that the Georgian philosopher did not take pains in order to adjust Christianity to Platonism or vice versa, but, rather, that he had a primitive intuition, not to say a prophetic vision, concerning the basic compatibility of both teachings. Thus it is rather unintentionally that Petritsi baptizes the detached Neoplatonist One in the merciful Christian God, who looks upon and cares for His creatures. In fact, the “Platonic Theology” presented by the Christian philosopher Ioane Petritsi portrays a rather heterodox teaching both from the Ps. Basil of Caesarea ( = Evagrius of Pontus), Ep. 8, 12, 29–41, in Saint Basile—Lettres, vol. 1, ed. Y. Courtonne (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1957), 36–370; the English translation is taken from Roy J. Deferrari, Loeb Classical Library 190 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 91. 473

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point of view of Neoplatonism and from the point of view of the tradition of his Church.

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SECONDARY LITERATURE On Petritsi Alexidze, Lela. “Chaldean Oracles in the Commentary of Ioane Petritsi.” In Philosophy – Theology – Culture: Problems and Perspectives, ed. Tengiz Iremadze, Tamar Tskadadze, Giorgi Kheoshvili. Tbilisi: Nekeri; Arche, 2007, 52–65. ________. “Zum Verhältnis zwischen Neuplatonischem und Christlichem im Prokloskommentar des Ioane Petrizi.” In Theo Kobusch and Michael Erler, eds., Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des Spätantiken Denkens. Akten des internationalen Kongresses vom 13.-17. März 2001 in Würzburg. BzA 160 (Munich/Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2002), 429–452. ________. Antiquity and Christianity. Greek Philosophy in the Commentaries of Ioane Petritsi and (Pseudo)-Maximus the Confessor. Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1997. ________. “Bild Gottes in den Kommentaren des Ioane Petrizi zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos.” Stimme der Orthodoxie 3 (1997): 131–132. ________. “Griechische Philosopie in den ‘Kommentaren’ des Joane Petritzi zur ‘Elementatio Theologica’ des Proklos.” Oriens Christianus, Hefte für die Kunde des christlichen Orients Band 81 (1997). ________. “Das Kapitel 129 der ‘Elementa der Theologie’ des Proklos bei Ioane Petrici.” Georgica (Zeitschrift für Kultur, Sprache und Geschichte Georgiens und Kaukasiens) 17 (1994). ________. “Ioane Petrizi, Kommentare zur ‘Elementation Theologica’ des Proklos.” Orthodoxes Forum, Zeitschrift des Instituts für Orthodoxe Theologie der Universität München, 1986. ________. “For the Sources of Chapter 41 of Petritsi’s Commentaries.” Matsne, Series on Language and Literature 2 (1983). Bezarashvili, K. “For Understanding of Some Passages of Ioane Petritsi’s So-called ‘Epilogue’: the ‘Victories of Olympians’.” In 0HWDQRLD (Collection of Articles Dedicated to the 130th Anniversary of the Birth of Grigol Tsere-

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teli), ed. Rismag Gordeziani and T. Japaridze. Tbilisi: Logos, 2001, 48– 63. Browne, G. M. “Notes on the Georgian Proclus.” Muséon 112 (1999): 73– 78. Chelidze, Edisher. “Life and Literary Activities of Ioane Petritsi.” Religia 3– 5 (1994); 1–3 (1995). Gigineishvili, Levan. “The Doctrine of Logos and Intellect in the Philosophy of Ioane Petritsi: Evagrian-Origenist influences.” In Origeniana Octava, Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition; Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress, Pisa, 27–31 August, 2001. Vol. II. Ed. L. Perrone. Leuven University Press, 2003, 1140–1148. ________ and Gerd van Riel. “Ioane Petritsi: A Witness of Proclus’ Works in the School of Psellus.” In Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Actes du Colloque International de Louvain (13–16 mai 1998), ed. A. Ph. Segonds and Carlos Steel. Leuven: Catholic University of Leuven Press; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2000, 571–588. ________. “The One, the Limit and Infinity in Philosophy of Ioane Petritsi.” Phasis (Journal of Greek and Roman Studies) 2–3 (2000): 141–146. ________. “Soul in Ioane Petritsi’s Ontology.” Orientalia Christiana Periodica 1 (2000): 119–145. ________. “For Understanding of One Passage of Ioane Petritsi’s ‘Commentaries’.” Annual of Gelati Academy 1 (1998). ________. “Henads in Philosophy of Ioane Petritsi.” Bulletin of Kutaisi University 4 (1995). ________. “Harmonisation of Neoplatonism and Christianity in Gelati Monastic School: Ioane Petritsi’s Commented Translation of Proclus’ ‘Elements of Theology’.” Annual of the CEU Medieval Studies Department, (1994–1995): 124–139. Gogiberidze, Mose. “Ioane Petritsi and his Philosophy (Weltanschauung).” In Ioannis Petritzii. Opera. Tomus I, Procli Diadochi STOICEIWSIS QEOLOGIKH, versio Hiberica. Ed. Simon Kaukchischvili. Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1940. Günther H.-C. “Zu Ioane Petritzis Proklusübersetzung.” Georgica (Zeitschrift für Kultur, Sprache und Geschichte Georgiens und Kaukasiens) 22 (1999): 46–55. Iremadze, Tengiz. “Die Philosophie der Selbstreflexivität bei Joane Petrizi.” In Philosophy – Theology – Culture: Problems and Perspectives, ed. Tengiz Iremadze, Tamar Tskadadze, Giorgi Kheoshvili. Tbilisi: Nekeri; Arche, 2007, 66–78.

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________. Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter: Dietrich von Freiberg – Berthold von Moosburg – Joane Petrizi. Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 2004. Kaukchishvili, Simon. “Introduction.” In Ioannis Petritzii. Opera. Tomus I, Procli Diadochi STOICEIWSIS QEOLOGIKH, versio Hiberica. Ed. Simon Kaukchischvili. Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1940. Kekelidze, Korneli. “Ioane Petritsi.” In History of the Old Georgian Literature, vol. 1. Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1980. Kechagmadze, Natela. “John Italus and Ioane Petritsi.” In John Italus’ Writings. Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1970. ________. Old Georgian Translation of Proclus Diadochus’ ‘Elements of Theology.’ A Philological Study. Pre-doctoral dissertation. Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, 1948. Kharanauli, Anna. “Die Bibel in den Kommentaren Ioane Petricis.” Georgica (Zeitschrift für Kultur, Sprache und Geschichte Georgiens und Kaukasiens) 19 (1996): 71–76. ________. The Methodology of Using of the Sources in the Philosophical Works of Proclus Diadochus and Ioane Petritsi. Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University Press, 1990. Khidasheli, Shalva. Ioane Petritsi. Tbilisi: Mecniereba, 1956. Kiladze, N. V. “On the Terminology of the Liber de Causis.” In Proceedings of the 14th Congress of the Union Européenne des arabisants et islamisants, ed. by A. Fodor: The Arabist (Budapest Studies in Arabic) 15– 16 (1995): 61–73. Lolashvili, Ivane. Ioane Petritsi, “The Ladder of Virtues”, ed. with introduction by I. Lolashvili. Tbilisi: Sabchota Sakartvelo, 1980. Mamatsashvili, Maia. “For Understanding of One Passage of Ioane Petritsi’s Commentaries.” Matsne, Series on Language and Literature 1 (1972). Marr, Niko. Ioane of Petritsi: A Georgian Neoplatonist. St. Petersburg: Russian Imperial Archeological Society, 1909. [Марр, Нико: Иоанн Петрицский – Грузинский Неоплатоник. Санкт- Петербург: Императорское Русское Археологическое Общество, 1909].

Melikishvili, Damana. From the History of Old Georgian Philosophical-Theological Terminology. Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University, “Logos”, 1999. ________. “Ioane the Divine Philosopher, Surnamed ‘Petritsi’: the Enlightener of the Georgian Language.” In Ioane Petritsi, ‘Explanation of Proclus the Diadochus’ ‘Elements of Theology’ (translation into modern Georgian, introduction and commentaries by D. Melikishvili). Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University Press, 1999.

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INDEX

Alexander of Aphrodisias, 32 Alexidze, Lela, 24, 26, 28 Ammonius, son of Hermeas, 7, 21 Aristotle, 7, 74, 207, 209, 216, 237 Armstrong, A. H., 197 Atherton, Patrick, 48 Augustine, St., 220, 259 Bagrationi, Anton, 12, 14, 21 Bagrationi, Ioane, 13 Bakuriani, Gregory, 14 Batonishvili, Ioane, 14, 22 Beierwaltes, Werner, 26 Being, 148, 149, 154, 184, 185, 246 biblical literature, 8, 10 Brock, Sebastian, 9 Browne, G. M., 28 Byzantine Empire, 2–4 causation, 84, 156, 173, 231 Chelidze, Edisher, 15, 16, 18, 22 Christ, 261, 262, 271 Comnena, Anna, 276 Constantinople, 2 school of philosophy, 7, 14, 18 Cornford, F. M., 96 Cronos, 198 Damascene, John, 8, 9, 10 David the Builder, King, 1–2, 15, 18 David the Rector, 13, 14 De Rijk, L. M., 118 Demiurge, 217, 218, 219, 226, 266, 267 demiurgic causes, 58 Difference, 84, 87, 89, 156 Dillon, John, 101

Dodds, E. R., 26 authypostatos, 224 Being, 130 Creuzer, 168 henads, 101, 103, 104, 106 imparticipable, 128 procession and reversion, 111 Soul, 184 Epicureans, 32 eros, 97, 212, 213 Eternity, 242, See Chapter seven Father, the, 6, 43, 50, 53, 71, 80, 266 First Being, 154, 156, 269 First Infinity, 38, 82, 83, 92, 93, 129, 169, See Chapter three First Intellect, 158, 164, 169, 174, 269 First Limit, 129, 262, See Chapter three Gelati Bible, 18 Gelati Monastery, 4 Germane, Hieromonk, 13 Gogiberidze, Mose, 24 Goodness, 35, 60 Granstrem, N., 273 Guenther, H.-C., 28 Guthrie, W. K. C., 76 Hamartolus, George, 8, 21 henads, 28, 49, 67, 71, 72, 73, 177, See Chapter four causation, 85, 86 demiurgic causes, 58 Infinity, 81 Intellect, 150

297

298

THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI

Limit, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83 Limit and Infinity, 96 Proclus, 34 reversion, 210 the One, 47, 49, 59 True Being, 44, 60, 153 Holy Spirit, 6, 81, 83, 153, 267 Iamblichus, 78 Ikaltoeli, Arsen, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16 Incarnation, 221, 261, 262, 263, 271 Infinite Power, 173 Infinity Holy Spirit, 81, 83 monad, 133 Intellect, 29, 37, 56, 59, 70, 85, 120, 139, 253, See Chapter five Soul, 195, 206, 209 the Son, 152 Iremadze, Tengiz, 28 Italus, John, 7, 14, 17, 19, 99, 271 Javakhishvili, Ivane, 15 John of Sinai, 8, 21 Josephus, 8 Kaukchishvili, Simon, 18, 23, 245 Kechagmadze, Natela, 26, 188 Kekelidze, Korneli, 14, 22, 72 Kharanauli, Anna, 24 Khidasheli, Shalva, 24 Kiladze, Nana, 27 Krämer, H. J., 101 Kukava, Tamara, 24 Lang, David, 26 Life-Intellect, 182 light, 189 Likeness, 84, 87, 89, 90, 96, 97, 156 Limit, 127, 130, 169, 267 henads, 131, 269 light, 131 the Son, 80, 92, 152 True Being, 153 Limit and Infinity, 122, 133, 170, 231 henads, 133, 135 inferior causes, 55 Intellect, 151

Providence, 50 Soul, 191 Space, 253 the One, 48, 54 Time and Eternity, 255 Litavrin, G., 17 Lloyd, C., 173 Logos, 154, 248, 262 Lolashvili, Ivane, 188 Lossev, Alexei, 25 Mamatsashvili, Maya, 24 Manuel I Comnenus, Emperor, 19 Marr, Niko, 14, 23 matter Difference, 157 henads, 123 Infinity, 67, 68, 69, 83 light, 189 Limit, 81, 93, 96 sun, 162 the One, 38, 123, 241 True Being, 156 Mchedlidze, Magda, 25, 28 Meijer, P. A., 119, 129 Melikishvili, Damana, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24 Melikishvili, Nino, 21 Mohr, Richard D., 251 monad, 86 atomic units, 132 causation, 55 First Infinity, 66 henads, 86, 104 Limit and Infinity, 73, 87 Providence, 50 the One, 38, 57, 89, 117 True Being, 86 Mtsire, Eprem, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16 Nemesius of Emesa, 8, 16, 20, 242, 270 Neoplatonist philosophy, 12, 19, 33, 265, 274 Nicholas of Methone, 19, 232 non-being, 239, 240

INDEX Nutsubidze, Shalva, 23 Offemanns, W., 25 One, the. See Chapter two Creation, 236, 238 henads, 72, 73, 104, 115, 117, 123, 139 Infinity, 82 Intellect, 147, 150, 151 Limit, 76, 77, 130 Limit and Infinity, 88, 133, 232 participation, 127, 129 simple existence, 156 Soul, 211, 212 the Father, 43, 50, 53, 71, 80, 266 Time and Eternity, 229, 271 Trinity, 231 pagan philosophy, 6, 7–8 Paradise, 198, 270 Parmenides, 92, 98, 266 paternal cause, 58 Peter the Gelatian, 21 Phaedrus, 210 Philoponus, John, 222 Plass, Paul C., 253 Plato, 7, 33, 74, 192, 216, 217 Platonic Theology, 65, 68, 110, 129, 132, 149, 150, 153, 280 Plotinus, 56, 246, 260 polytheism, 126 power, 171 Proclus, 7, 16, 19 Creation, 219 Elements of Theology, 8, 11, 20, 33, 65, 67, 103, 104, 114, 122, 158, 159, 163, 177, 212, 223, 234 Eternity, 222, 226, 231 Gelati School, 7 henads, 101, 102, 103 in Non-Georgian scholarship, 28 In Parmenidem, 106, 125, 153 Limit and Infinity, 232 Petritsi’s misrepresentation of, 26 Soul, 194, 200, 202 Psalms, 20

299 Psellus, Michael, 6, 7, 14, 19, 99, 271, 272 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, 14 Pythagoras, 81, 216, 222, 261 reversion, 89, 96, 97, 209, 210, 231 Riel, Gerd van, 29, 153 Rosàn, Laurence, 118, 223 simple existence, 57 Siorvanes, Lucas, 50, 115, 123, 234 Socrates, 97 Son, the, 6, 72, 92, 153, 154, 267, 269 Sorabji, R., 217 Soul, 37, 44, 46, 57, 62, 86, 120, 130, 139, 158, 160, See Chapter six Logos, 270 Steel, Carlos, 101 Sweeney, Leo, 241 Tarichisdze, Ioane, 7, 21 Tevzadze, Guram, 24, 27, 188 Theophylact of Ochrid, 21 Timaeus, 82, 98, 158, 190, 192, 217, 218, 219, 226, 266 Trinity, 71, 72, 83, 88, 97, 99, 230, 231, 268 True Being, 154 causation, 169 Cronos, 198 Goodness, 41 henads, 60, 122, 134, 137, 139, 153 Intellect, 158, 163, 164, 170, 174, 245 Limit, 81, 151, 153 Limit and Infinity, 65, 71, 83 Logos and Intellect, 153 monad, 86 Soul, 211, 248 the One, 86, 153 unity and multiplicity, 44 whatness, 156 Unity, 34, 35, 43, 47, 60, 61, 266 unity and multiplicity, 33, 67

300

THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF IOANE PETRITSI

Universal Cause, 38, 55, 160 Universal Intellect, 211, 245 Universal Soul, 185, 193, 205, 206, 211, 247

Uspenski, F., 275 Xiphilinus, John, 272, 273 Zeus, 216