The Philosophy of Church Fathers, Volume 1 [3]

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THE PHILOSOPHY

OF THE CHURCH VOLUME

FAITH, TRINITY,

I

INCARNATION

FATHERS

——S

Harvard University Press takes pride in publishing a work whose depth, scope, and wisdom will be honored ‘everywhere. Harry Austryn Wolfson,

world-renowned

scholar

and

most

lucid of scholarly writers, here presents in ordered detail his long-awaited study of the philosophic principles and reasoning by which the Fathers of the Church sought to explain the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

Professor Wolfson first discusses the problem of the relation of faith and reason. Starting with Paul, who, differentiating between the wisdom of God and the wisdom of the world, averred that he was not going to adorn his teachings with persuasive arguments based on the wisdom of the world, Professor Wolfson describes the circumstances and influences which nevertheless brought about the introduction of philosophy _into matters of faith and analyzes the various attitudes of the Fathers toward philosophy. The Trinity and the Incarnation are Professor Wolfson’s next concern. He analyzes the various ways in which these topics are presented in the New Testament, and traces the attempts on the part of the Fathers to harmonize these presentations. He shows how the ultimate harmonized formulation of the two doctrines was couched in terms of philosophy; how, as a result of philosophic treatment, there arose with regard to the Trinity the problem of three and one and with regard to the Incarnation the problem of two and one; and how, in their attempts to solve these problems, the Fathers drew upon principles which in philosophy were made use of in the solution of certain aspects of the problem of the one and the many. In the final part of this volume, entitled “The Anathematized,” he deals with Gnosticism and other heresies which arose during the Patristic period with regard to the Trinity and the Incarnation.

‘/ "THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS VOLUME

I

Faith, Trinity, Incarnation BY

HARRY NATHAN

AUSTRYN

LITTAUER

AND

PROFESSOR

PHILOSOPHY

WOLFSON

OF HEBREW

IN HARVARD

LITERATURE

UNIVERSITY

Rae mn

DERE

4Soa

ait| iii)

= = | ee

Uy

CAMBRIDGE, HARVARD

MASSACHUSETTS

UNIVERSITY 1956

PRESS

© coPyYRIGHT, 1956 BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE

Distributed in Great Britain by GEOFFREY OXFORD

CUMBERLEGE

UNIVERSITY

PRESS

LONDON

56-5116

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER 56-5176 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE In Philo, published in 1947, we have tried to show how, starting with the assumption that the Greek

philosophers

dis-

covered by reason certain truths which are presented in Scripture as divine revelations, Philo has recast the principles of

Jewish religion in the form of a philosophy and thereby produced also what may be called a Jewish version of Greek philosophy, the nature of which we have described in a chapter entitled, ““What Is New in Philo?” The work on Philo has also the subtitle “Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.” In the Preface to that work, we have explained the meaning of the subtitle in the following paragraph: “Primarily this is a study of Philo, and as such it is an attempt to build up, out of suggestions, a systematic structure of his thought and also to piece together, out of allusions and implications, the story of its growth. But the work is also designed to serve as a general prolegomenon to the major problems of religious philosophy for the seventeen centuries fol-

lowing Philo. The structure of the problems as herein presented will provide a general framework for the same problems as they appear in the works of later philosophers. The texts from various sources brought together in the story of their growth will furnish the most fundamental texts which will come into play in the subsequent history of these problems. The section in each chapter of this book under the heading ‘Conclusion, Influence, Anticipation’ furnishes a

brief forecast of the general lines of development of the essential points of the Philonic philosophy in later philosophies down to Spinoza. In the volumes to follow, the story of this development will receive a fuller and more formal treatment” (I, p. vi). In the present work, we try to show how a similar con-

vi

PREFACE

ception among the Church Fathers with regard to the relation of certain teachings of Greek philosophy to the revealed truths

of both the Jewish and the Christian Scripture resulted similarly in a recasting of Christian beliefs in the form of a philosophy and thereby producing also a Christian version of Greek philosophy. The material with which we had to work here is of the same kind as that in Philo — terms, formulas, and analogies scattered throughout the writings, in this case, not of one man but of many men of successive generations. These we tried to piece together into a unified and continuous system. The method which we have employed in trying to integrate these scattered terms and formulas and analogies

is that which we have chosen to call the hypothetico-deductive method of text study. We have described it in Philo (I,

pp. 102-107) and before that in The Philosophy of Spinoza, 1934 (I, pp. 20-31) and in Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle, 1929 (pp. 24-29) and shall describe it more fully in a general introductory chapter to be included in the first book of the entire series of studies of which the present study of the Church Fathers is the third book. We may quote here the concluding remarks in our description of this method in Philo: “Briefly stated, the basis of this method is the assumption that every philosopher in the main course of the history of

philosophy either reproduces former philosophers or interprets them or criticizes them. Now if every philosopher in the past did actually tell us the processes of his own reasoning from the very inception of his thought to its complete maturation, then the history of philosophy would be simply a matter of collecting and classifying philosophic data. But philosophers rarely give expression to the full content of their mind. Some of them only rhapsodize; some of them veil their

thought underneath some artificial literary form; some of them philosophize as birds sing, without being aware that they are repeating ancient tunes. Words, in general, by the very limitation of their nature, conceal one’s thought as much as they

PREFACE

Vil

reveal it; and the uttered words of philosophers, at their best and fullest, are nothing but floating buoys which signal the presence of submerged unuttered thoughts. The purpose of historical research in philosophy, therefore, is to uncover these unuttered thoughts, to reconstruct the latent processes of reasoning that always lie behind uttered words, and to try to determine the true meaning of what is said by tracing back the story of how it came to be said, and why it is said in the

manner in which it is said” (I, pp. 106-107). The development of Philonic problems into Patristic problems, which we promised would receive fuller and more formal treatment in this work, is a development which is only

partly due to internal growth; for the greater part it is due to external accessions. Similarly the Philonic framework in which we promised to cast these problems is an expansible framework, serving only to determine the form of the inquiry, but not to limit its scope. The first volume of the work on the Church Fathers now before the reader corresponds to three chapters (I-IV) out of the twelve which constitute the first volume on Philo, and of the three problems dealt with in this first volume, only the first — Faith and Reason — may

be considered as a direct development, with some variations, to be sure, of the problem as presented in Philo; the other two problems — Trinity and Incarnation — have an origin and history apart from Philo. Still these last two problems, though of non-Philonic origin, are not altogether outside the Philonic framework. For

when the Pauline conception of the preéxistent Christ, which is of non-Philonic origin, was given by John the name Logos, which is of Philonic origin, the development of the doctrine of the Trinity and of the Incarnation was either in accordance with the Philonic conception of the Logos or in departure from the Philonic conception of the Logos. Thus the identification of the Logos and the Holy Spirit by the Apostolic Fathers, and with it also the conception of the Trinity as beginning only with the Incarnation, is non-Philonic; but

Vill

PREFACE

the differentiation of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, which appears with thé Apologists, and withal the conception of the Trinity as existing prior to the Incarnation, is Philonic. Equally Philonic is the twofold stage theory of the preéxistent Logos and Holy Spirit, which appears, again, with the Apologists and lingers for some time after them. Non-Philonic, however, is the elevation at first of the Logos and then also of the

Holy Spirit to the status of God; non-Philonic also is the new conception of the creative activity of God which has logically led to this elevation. A further departure from Philo is the transition from the twofold stage theory of the Logos and the Holy Spirit to the single stage theory, which corresponds to the transition, in the general history of philosophy, from the Philonic interpretation of the Platonic ideas to the Plotinian interpretation. And so also the problem of Triunity, which arose as a consequence of the elevation of the Logos

and the Holy Spirit to the status of God, is solved by the Fathers on the basis of a new conception of the unity of God, which is advanced by them in direct opposition to Philo. Not exactly a departure from Philo but only an addition to him is the doctrine of the Incarnation, for in its ultimate formulation the Incarnation became a new stage in the history of the Philonic Logos ——a Logos made immanent in a man after its having been immanent in the world. Similarly the elaborate Christological discussions growing out of the Incarnation have their starting point in the Philonic analogy between the relation of the immanent Logos to the body of the world and the relation of the human soul to the body of man. Even the heresies are not unrelated to the Philonic framework. Gnosticism, which was never admitted into catholic Christianity, was an attempt to interpret the Pauline preexistent Christ in terms of paganism, in opposition to the

Johannine interpretation of it in terms of Philonism. The other heresies, those which arose within catholic Christianity and were banished from it, had their origin in an attempt to restore the Philonic conception of the unity of God.

PREFACE

1x

The formal structure of this work follows a uniform plan. Each problem opens with a general analysis and forecast, which the reader may regard as a working hypothesis. This is followed by a study of various texts culled from various Fathers, which the reader may regard as proof for the worka-

bility of the hypothesis. The texts, of course, are not exhaustive; they are representative. As a rule, the first texts brought into play are those in which the views under consideration make their first appearance. Then follow miscellaneous texts selected either because they introduce some new shades of difference of opinion or because they contain some difficulty or obscurity which calls for clarification or because they are of some historical significance or, as in some instances, simply for the purpose of showing the currency of the view under discussion. The list of these illustrative texts is usually concluded with a quotation from Augus-

tine or from John of Damascus or from both. Undoubtedly an exhaustive list of texts would bring out some further refinement of philosophic or doctrinal opinions. While the work is primarily a study of the Church Fathers, chapters on the New Testament seemed to be necessary as background. A friend, on reading these chapters, commented: “As a Christian who believes in the teachings of the Church as transmitted by tradition, I cannot accept the view that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation as contained in the New Testament had a human origin and a piecemeal development. However, I am prepared to concede the propriety

of such inquiries into these New Testament teachings, provided they are taken not as dealing with the true origin of these teachings but with what may appear to the human mind with regard to their origin from the verbal expressions in which these teachings were made known.” To which I answered: “Even

in the study of nature,

philosophers

often wonder

whether the laws discovered by science, upon which men ultimately rely for the building of bridges and the flying of airplanes, are based upon a knowledge of nature as it really is or

Xx

PREFACE

only upon appearances. No historian investigating texts of

Scripture, whether of the Jewish or of the Christian Scripture, should therefore object to being considered by theologians as dealing only with appearances.” For their generous help and advice I am grateful to Pro-

fessors Henry Joel Cadbury, Robert Henry Pfeiffer, Arthur Darby Nock, Milton Vasil Anastos, and George Huntston Williams, all of Harvard; Professor Francis Howard

Fobes,

of Amherst; Professor Ralph Marcus, of the University of Chicago; and Dr. Leo Roberts, of Cambridge, Mass. For the care with which she saw the book through the press thanks are due to Mrs. Marion Hawkes, of the Harvard University Press Editorial Department. The publication of this work was made possible by the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation.

H. A. WoLFrson

October 25, 1955

CONTENTS VOLUME

I

PART ONE FAITH

AND

REASON

CHAPTER

I

“THE WIspoM oF Gop” AND “THE WISDOM OF THE WorLD” -The beliefs of the early Christian — How these beliefs assumed a Paul’s attitude toward paganism, Greek philosophy, 7.— The rise among the Fathers of the Church

community in Jerusalem, 1. new form with Paul, 3.— 6.— Paul’s attitude toward

of philosophic Christianity

and the reasons for it, 11. — Philo and the Fathers on (1) the limitations of philosophy as

compared with Scripture, 14.— (2) the evidence of the truth of the teachings philosophy, 20.

of Scripture,

19.—and

CHAPTER Tue

ALLecoricaL

(3) the origin of

II

MretHop

I. Background of Paul’s Allegorical Interpretation . Various types of rabbinic non-literal or midrashic interpretation of Scripture, among them the predictive, subdivided into

historical and eschatological; the moral; the preéxistential, 24. —Philo’s introduction of the philosophical non-literal interpretation of Scripture described by the term “allegory” and other Greek terms, among them the terms “type,” “shadow,” “parable,” and “tropical,” 29.— Two essential characteristics

of Philo’s allegorical interpretation, 33.— Question whether Philo’s term “allegory,” or its equivalent terms, can be applied to the non-philosophical rabbinic midrashic kind of interpre-

tation, 36.— How in Paul we find the use of the Philonic terms “allegory,” “type,” and “shadow” as a description of the non-philosophical rabbinic midrashic kind of interpretation of

the Old Testament, 38.— The use of the Philonic term “para-

Xl

CONTENTS ble” in the Epistle to the Hebrews as a description of the nonphilosophical rabbinic midrashic kind of interpretation, 4o. —Four kinds of non-literal interpretation of the Old Testament used in the New Testament, the predictive, subdivided into adventual and eschatological; the moral; the preéxistential, 41.

II. The Allegorical Interpretation in the Church Fathers .

43

How at first the Fathers, following the example of the New Testament, continued to apply the non-literal interpretation

of a non-philosophical kind to the Old Testament, 43.— How then they extended the non-literal interpretation to the New Testament, 45.— How Clement of Alexandria began to interpret the New Testament philosophically; how in his interpretation of the Old Testament he combined the philosophical interpretations found in Philo with the adventual, eschatological, moral, and preéxistential interpretations found in the New Testament; how his various classifications of the nonliteral interpretations are traceable to Philo; how the terms by which he designated these various classifications are also traceable to Philo, 46. — How these classifications of the nonliteral interpretations and the terms by which they are designated continued to develop, with certain modifications, in Origen, 57.— Jerome, 65.— Augustine, 68.— and Cassian, 70, but were deviated from by some Antiochians, 64.— Conclusion, 71.

CHAPTER SCRIPTURAL

III

PRESUPPOSITIONS

The allegorical interpretation of Scripture maintained by the Fathers in opposition to the extreme denial of literalism by some people and to the extreme adherence to literalism by

others, 73.— General agreement by the Fathers on the use of allegorical interpretation, 76.— Reason and the Rule of Faith as criteria of the literal acceptance of texts of Scripture, 77.— How the Christian Rule of Faith embodied six of Philo’s eight Scriptural Presuppositions, 80.— How these six Philonic Scriptural Presuppositions were understood by the Fathers: (1) Existence of God, 80.— (2) Unity of God, 89.

— (3) Creation of the world, 90.— (4) Divine providence, 90.— (5) Revelation of the Law, 91.— including a Christianized conception of the Unwritten or Oral Law, 94.— (6) Existence of ideas, 96.

ie

xiii

CONTENTS

CHAPTER HANDMAIDEN

IV

OF SCRIPTURE.

o7

Subordination of philosophy to siieonte in Philo A us: Fathers, 97.— Difference between Philo and some of the Fathers as to the meaning and extent of that subordination, 99. — Three views among the Fathers with regard to the subordination of faith to reason traceable to two different views with regard to the meaning of the term faith in Scripture, Iol.

CHAPTER

V

SINGLE FarirH THEORIES

102

I. Tertullian His criticism of philosophy, 102.— His conception of the selfsufficiency of faith, his prohibition to search after philosophic

demonstrations for faith, and his judgment on the uselessness of such demonstrations, 102. — His own use of philosophy in the explanation and demonstration of faith and his own state-

ment that philosophers have arrived by reason at some of the truths of faith, 104. How these apparent contradictions may be reconciled, 105.

Origen

106

~The superiority of rationalized faith to simple faith, and why, 106. — Still simple faith is not without merit, 108. — Tertullian and

Origen

as exponents

of two

types

of the single faith

theory, 109.

CHAPTER

VI

DovuBLe FairH THEORY .

,

I. The Aristotelian “Faith” and aac eee “Faith” in Aristotle as a judgment of the truth of the various kinds of knowledge, 112.— which various kinds of knowledge are (1) immediate knowledge, such as sensation and pri-

mary premises, and (2) derivative knowledge, such as opinion

and scientific knowledge,

114.— How

the term “assent” as

used by Aristotle refers only to judgments by the practical reason as to the desirability and goodness of a thing, 115.— How the Stoics substituted the term “assent” for Aristotle’s “faith” as a judgment of the truth of immediate and deriva-

tive knowledge, 116.

112 I12

XIV

CONTENTS

We Clement

of Alexandria

.

f

poet

galt

120

Clement of Alexandria the first to combine ne Aristotelian “faith” with the Stoic “assent” and to define “faith” as an “assent” with reference to both immediate knowledge and

derivative knowledge, 120. — How, by his application of this philosophic conception of faith to religious faith, the latter became with him an assent to the teachings of Scripture

whether taken as a kind of immediate knowledge not rationally demonstrated or as a kind of derivative knowledge rationally demonstrated, 122. — Assent to rationally demonstrated teach-

ings of Scripture described by him as “gnosis” or as “scientific faith” or as “exact faith,” 123. His contention for the equality of simple faith and rationally demonstrated faith against both those who opposed philosophy and those who depreciat-

ed simple faith, 124.

127

Ill. Augustine The permissibility and deseo i ae use es ohileecnby in matters of faith, 127.— Meaning of reason and faith, 128. —Faith defined as an assent, 129. — Evidence of Augustine’s belief in the equality of simple faith and rationally demonstrated faith, 130.— Evidence of Augustine’s belief that faith in its technical sense means both simple faith and rationally demonstrated faith, 132.—Conclusion and general characterization of the discussion of faith and reason by other Fathers of the Church, 138.

PART TWO

THE TRINITY, THE LOGOS, AND PLATONIC IDEAS CHAPTER ORIGIN OF THE TRINITARIAN

THE

VII

FORMULA

141

.

Unipartite, bipartite, and tripartite confessions a faith in the New Testament and why the tripartite confessions, men-

tioning the Holy Spirit by the side of God and Christ, need

an explanation, 141.— The three kinds of tripartite confessions of faith in the New Testament: mula:

its origin and

history,

(1) the baptismal for-

143.— (2) the closing saluta-

tion in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians:

its origin and

CONTENTS

XV

history, 147.— (3) tripartite formulas used for admonitory and hortative purposes in the Epistles of Paul, which point to a new significance which the Holy Spirit acquired with him, 153.

CHAPTER VIII Tue Hoty Spirir as THE PREEXISTENT CHRIST.

.

.

.

155

The life of Jesus, and prologues and epilogues to it, in the various parts of the New Testament, 155.— How certain common conceptions of the preéxistence of the Messiah and of the preéxistence of wisdom or the Law, which are found in various types of Jewish literature, are reproduced by Paul in his prologue of the life of Jesus, that is, in his statements on the preéxistent Christ and the preéxistent wisdom, both of which are identified by him, 156.— The two reasons implied

in the writings of Paul why the expression “son of God,” primarily applied by him to the preéxistent Christ, is also applied by him to the born Christ, 161. How the combination

of these two reasons leads to the conclusion that, in Paul, the

Holy Spirit is identified with the preéxistent Christ or wisdom, 163.— How as a result of this identification, the Holy Spirit in Christianity succeeded to the function of the Law in Judaism and hence was placed by the side of God and Christ in the confessions of faith, 165.— The role of the Holy Spirit after the resurrection of Jesus, 166.— No evidence in Paul of a trinity prior to the birth of Jesus, 167.

CHAPTER

IX

Tue Hoty Spirir AS THE BEGETTER OF JESUS... The Holy Spirit as the begetter of Jesus in the Reethyie of Matthew and Luke, 168.— How Paul’s Holy Spirit, taken to be identical with his preéxistent Christ, was transformed into the begetter of Jesus, 169.— Question as to whether that transformation was effected by Jews or by non-Jews, 170.—

Showing that, while among non-Jews the belief of men being born without human paternity was common, among Jews, whether Palestinian or Hellenistic, no such belief existed,

171. — How Paul must have conceived of the transition from the preéxistent Christ to the born Christ, but still how

his language may have lent itself to the interpretation of a supernatural birth, 174.— No trinity in Matthew and Luke prior

to the birth of Jesus, 176.

168

XV1

CONTENTS

CHAPTER Tue

Locos As THE

PREEXISTENT

X

CHRIST

Kia

Logos and Holy Spirit in Philo, 177.— John’s aeration of Paul’s preéxistent Christ and wisdom with Philo’s Logos and the Wisdom of Solomon’s wisdom, 178.— Vagueness of John’s statement as to how the Logos became flesh, 179.— No definite statement in John as to the distinctness of the

Holy Spirit from the Logos, 181.— No definite statement in John of a trinity prior to the birth of Jesus, 182.

CHAPTER XI Tue IDENTIFICATION OF THE LoGos AND THE Hoty

Spirit .

183

How in Ignatius the preéxistent Christ is both the Logos and the Holy Spirit, 183.— How the identification of the Logos

and the Holy Spirit is implied also in the Apology of Aristides, 186.— and in the First Epistle of Clement, the Epistle of Barnabas, the Second Epistle of Clement, and the Shepherd

of Hermas, mentioned

187.—No

trinity prior to the birth of Jesus

during the period of the Apostolic Fathers, and

how the trinitarian formulas in the First Epistle of Clement, the prayer of Polycarp, and the Didache may be interpreted

accordingly, 190.— How a trinity prior to the birth of Jesus appeared with the Apologists as a result of their differentiation of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, 190.

CHAPTER Tue DIFFERENTIATION

I. The Twofold

XII

OF THE LOGOS AND THE Hory

Spirit

Stage Theory of the Logos

192 192

How Greek Fathers give expression to their belief in the twofold stage theory, 192. How Latin Fathers give expression

to their belief in the twofold stage theory, 195.

How those

who believed in the twofold stage theory had two different interpretations of John’s “In the beginning was the Logos,” 197.

Il. The Single Stage Theory of the Logos . (a) Irenaeus and Origen—How

self on the single stage theory,

Irenaeus

198.— Why

198

expresses

Irenaeus

him-

re-

jected the twofold stage theory, 200.—How Origen expresses himself on the single stage theory, 201.— Origen and Plotinus, 202.

(b) The Case of Clement of Alexandria— Arguments ad-

CONTENTS

XVii

vanced to show that Clement of Alexandria believed in the

single stage theory and refutations thereof, 204. to show

that he retained

the twofold

Arguments

stage theory of the

Apologists, 207.— How to explain the single stage theory in the Latin translation of his lost commentary on the First and Second Epistles of John, 215. (c) “Eternal Generation,’ “by Will” and “by Nature”—

The twofold stage theory never anathematized; its abandonment on purely psychological grounds, 217.— How “eternal generation” is to be taken to mean both an eternally continuous process of generation and a completely generated being from eternity, and how Alexander of Alexandria, Marius Victorinus, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and John of Damas-

cus express themselves on that point, 219. — How the generation of the Logos is described as an act of will by Philo and

the Apologists, 223.— How

the question of the appropriate-

ness of this manner of describing it is fully discussed by Origen, 224.—and by Athanasius, 227.—and briefly discussed by others, 230.

His ine Holy Spirit: Why, with the appearance

.

232

of tis poll

stage eee oe

Logos and the Holy Spirit were differentiated, 232.— The exceptional cases of Tatian and Lactantius, 235.— How with reference to the Holy Spirit there was also a transition from a twofold stage theory to a single stage theory, 236.— The three ways by which the Fathers, after differentiating the Logos and the Holy Spirit, tried to reconcile the statement about the Logos becoming flesh, in John, and the statements

about the Holy Spirit begetting Jesus, in Matthew and Luke,

237 — Examples of lingering survivals of Paul’s identification of the Holy Spirit with the preéxistent Christ even after the Holy Spirit was differentiated from the Logos and hence also from the preéxistent Christ: (1) the application of the term God to both the Logos and the Holy Spirit, 242.— (2) the application of the term wisdom to both the Logos and the

Holy Paul’s Spirit, Spirit:

Spirit, 245.— (3) the ascription preéxistent Christ to both the 247.— Distinctions between the verbal distinction and distinction

CHAPTER

of the functions of Logos and the Holy Logos and the Holy of causal relation, 251.

XIII

Tue Locos AND THE PLaTonic IDEAS...

Sahih

Two questions posed: What was the view of ae Fathers ane

regard to an intelligible world and ideas? Which of the three

257

XVlil

CONTENTS

interpretations of the Platonic theory of ideas current in their time, the Aristotelian, the Albinian,

and the Philonic,

was followed by the Fathers? 257.— Analysis, with respect to these two questions, of the views of Justin Martyr, 261. — Tertullian, 263.—Clement of Alexandria, 266.— Origen, 270,

and Augustine,

280.— Conclusion and general charac-

terization of the theory of ideas in other Fathers, 285.

PART THREE THE THREE

MYSTERIES

CHAPTER

XIV 287

Tue Mystery OF THE GENERATION . The application of the term mystery by Fie Pavel to the generation of the Logos, the Trinity, and the Incarnation, 287. — God as begetter in Greek mythology and God as artisan in the Hebrew Scripture, 288.— The transition in Christianity

from God as artisan to God as begetter, 292. - Warning by the Fathers against confusing the generation of the Logos with the pagan belief in the birth of gods, 294. — Their rejection of

the Gnostic views that the Logos came into being either by “prolation” or “from things nonexistent,” 295.— Their attempt to explain the generation of the Logos by certain physical analogies and the question raised by some of them as to the aptness of the analogies of the uttered word and the

light of the sun, 298.— The origination of the Holy Spirit like that of the Logos and the use with reference to it of the

same kind of analogies, 301.— Athenagoras and the implication of his use of the analogy of a “beam of the sun” with reference to the Holy Spirit, 302.— Why

the generation of the Logos is a mystery despite the analogies advanced in its

explanation, 304.

CHAPTER Tue Mystery oF THE TRINITY.

I. The Problem and Its Two

XV :

Solutions .

How, when the description of the preéxistent Christ as bee

equal with God or as being God began to be taken literally and the Holy Spirit began to join them as God, first in dignity only and then also in name, there arose the problem of how to reconcile the inherited belief in one God with the new

3% 395

CONTENTS

belief in three beings each of them God, 305.— Rejection by the Fathers of an early attempt to solve the problem by denying the reality of the preéxistent Christ and of the Holy Spirit, 310. — How the Fathers undertook to solve the problem on the premise that, while the members of the Trinity are each a real individual species, their unity is only a rela-

tive kind of unity, 310.— Two kinds of relative unity advanced by the Fathers: (1) unity of rule, 312.— (2) unity of substratum or genus or species, 313.— Residual mystery, even when the problem of the Trinity, as posed in philosophic terms, has been solved by philosophic analogies, 316.

II]. The Two Solutions in Origen and Tertullian . How the members of the Trinity are conceived of by Origen as being each real and individual and how he uses various

317

Greek terms, among them the term hypostasis, in describing their reality and individuality, 317.— How the common unity of the members of the Trinity is conceived of by him as a common specific genus described by the term ousia and hence the use by him also of the term homoousios, 321.— How

unity in the sense of unity of rule is used by him as a second solution of the problem, 322.— How also Tertullian conceives of the members of the Trinity as being each real and individual and how he describes their reality and individuality by various Latin terms, among

them the term persona, 322. — How he conceives of the common unity of the members of the Trinity as a common substratum which he describes by the term substantia whence he could have also used the term consubstantialis, 325.— How he uses unity in the sense of unity of rule as a second solution of the problem, 327.— How he restates these two solutions in a set of three pairs of contrasting terms, 328.

Ill. The Two Solutions in Basil . A fixed orthodox view of the Trinity, without a fixed vocabulary, 332.— Vagueness of vocabulary and existence of heresies leading to a war of suspicion, 333.— No special term used in the Nicene Creed as a description of the reality and individuality of the members of the Trinity but the terms hypostasis, ousia, and homoousios used as a description of their common unity, 334. — Vagueness of the use of the term homoousios in the Nicene Creed leading to the use of the

term homoiousios, with further complications, 335.— Establishment by Basil of a fixed vocabulary as a designation of the reality and individuality of the members of the Trinity as well as of their common unity, in his first solution of the

o32

Xx

CONTENTS problem, Analysis

337.—His and.

“principle

explanation

of differentiation,”

of the

Basil and Apollinaris, 342.— How

correspondence

338.— between

unity in the sense of unity

of rule is used by Basil as a second solution of the problem,

346. IV.

The Two Solutions in John of Damascus and Aupustine eee es

ed

The Damascene’s two solutions, 347. Augustine’s first solution, 350.— How Augustine’s use of the analogy of the unity of substratum as an explanation of the common unity of the three members of the Trinity differs from its use in the same capacity by other Fathers before him, 352.— Discussion of the question whether the difference in Augustine’s use of the analogy of the unity of substratum led to other differ-

ences between him and his predecessors with regard to their conception of the Trinity, 355.— How unity in the sense of unity of rule is used by Augustine as a second solution of the problem, 359.

V. Sundry Analogies

.

.

.

which is to follow the Second Coming. It is also in both these senses of the preéxistential and the eschatological

that he uses the term “mysteries” in a passage in which the spiritual or mystical sense of scriptural interpretation is described as dealing with “the secret of the mysteries of the wisdom and knowledge of God on which are nourished and fed the souls of the saints not only in this life but also in the hereaitere °°

In the description of the spiritual quoted above, in which he enumerates the topics dealt with by him in his De Principiis, Origen has indirectly included under it philosophical interaa Did. Me ent. aS Heb. rit:

pa COLM els 36 te * In Num. IX, 7 (PG 12, 632 D). 1 In Psalmos, Homil. I in Psal. XXXVI (PG 12, 1319 B). ZUR O11 O25 561) CORR 27.

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pretation, for many of the topics in De Principiis are dealt with by him philosophically. More directly does he include philosophy under the non-literal interpretation in his other writings. Answering Celsus’ ridicule of the verses, “And the

Lord caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam . . . and He took one of his ribs . . . and the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, made He a woman,” 7° he maintains that this passage “is to be interpreted allegorically” and quotes

Celsus himself as saying that “more reasonable Jews and Christians . . . try somehow to allegorize them.” *** The “reason-

able Jews” undoubtedly include Philo, in whose writings these

verses are interpreted allegorically.** Again, quoting Celsus’ disparaging remarks about the allegorical interpretations of the Mosaic laws, he says: “He seems to refer in these words to the

works of Philo, or to those of still older writers, such as Aristobulus. But I conjecture that Celsus has not read their books, since it appears to me that in many passages they have so successfully hit the meaning that even Grecian philosophers would have been captivated by their explanations.” 1° He explicitly approves of the allegorical interpretations, all of them of a philosophical nature, which are to be found in Philo’s Legum Allegoria,** Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat,© and De Somniis.1°° Sometimes, like Clement,!®** he adds a Philonic philosophical interpretation to an Old Testament text, even when that text has already been explained in the New Testament in some other allegorical manner. Thus, taking Hagar and Sarah, which are allegorized by Paul to mean the Old Covenant and the New Covenant 1*8 and which 109 Gen. 2:21-22.

* Cont. Cels. IV, 38. ™ Leg. All. II, 7, 19-11, 39; Heres, 51, 257; Qu. in Gen. I, 24-27. = Cont, Gels. iNest. “In Matth. XVII, 17 (PG 13, 1532 A), where the title of Philo’s work is mentioned. * [bid. XV, 3 (1260 A), where both the name work are mentioned.

Philo and the title of his

* Cont. Cels. VI, 21; cf. Somn. 1, 22, 133 ff. In this case, neither the name Philo nor the title of his work is mentioned.

™ Cf. above pp. 49-52.

8 Gal. 4:24; cf. above p. 39.

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allegorical interpretation is reproduced by Origen himself,!* he adds to them also Philo’s philosophical allegorization, making Hagar to mean the encyclical studies '7° and Sarah to mean virtue.“ When, therefore, Porphyry says that Origen’s “metaleptic mode” of interpreting Scripture, whereby he “introduced Greek ideas into foreign fables,” was adopted from “Chaeremon the Stoic and Cornutus,” who had employed it “in the Greek mysteries,” *’? he is not testifying to a fact of which he had direct knowledge but rather expressing an opinion based upon a combination of unrelated things which he happened to know. With Clement and Origen the non-literal method of interpretation in Christianity reached its fullest development. The something else which a text was interpreted to mean came to include not only the four kinds of non-literal interpretations found in the New Testament but also the philosophical kind of interpretation found in Philo. Various attempts were made by Clement and Origen at formal classifications of the senses of scriptural interpretation. All of them, however, were based upon Philo’s main twofold division of literal and non-literal and his twofold subdivision of the non-literal into physical and ethical. Various attempts were also made by them at the establishment of a fixed vocabulary which would describe the difference between the literal and the non-literal and under the non-literal between what Philo called the physical and the ethical. Through all these attempts, however, certain basic

terms used by Philo:as designations of the non-literal, such as allegory (dddnyopia) and tropical (rpoms«ds), retained

their original Philonic meaning as a description of the nonliteral in general. Similarly the term “anagogy” (dvaywyy), which does not occur in Philo, is used by Origen in the general sense of non-literal interpretation, as when, for instance,

he contrasts the anagogical sense (ra rijs dvaywyjs) with the 19 De Princ. IV, 2, 6 (13); In Num. XI, 1 (PG 12, 643 D). 10 In Gen. XI, 2 (PG 12, 222 D-223 A); cf. below p. 98. SUT bid INA, 1 (12 19578). 2 Busebius, Hist. Eccl. V1, 19, 7-8.

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historical sense (ra Hs Kata tov rérov iotopias).1™ It would seem, however, that Origen uses this term also in two other senses.

First, in the expression

“mystical

anagogy”

(dvaywyh pvotun),' he would seem to take the term “anagogy,” which literally means “leading up,” as the equivalent

of the term

“exegesis”

(ééjynous),

which

literally means

“leading out,” and use it in the sense of interpretation in general. Second, in his statement that “the allegories according to anagogy” (ras Kara dvaywynv dddnyopias) are to be contrasted

with “the truth” (rij ddjOevav) of the stories of the Old Testament,’ he would seem to use the phrase “according to anagogy” as a description of a special kind of allegory, that Be cial kind which he elsewhere calls‘poe or “mystical”1 contradistinction to that which he calls “moral.” Nothing new happened thereafter among the Fathers with regard to scriptural interpretation. Among the Greek Fathers some slight stir was created by those Antiochians,'*° who somehow got the impression that the term allegorical meant an interpretation which always discarded the literal meaning. Some of them, on that account, rejected the use of the term alle-

goria altogether and tried to substitute for it the term theoria.*“’ John Chrysostom did not reject the use of the term allegory altogether but, drawing arbitrarily a distinction be-

tween the term “allegory” and the term “type” and declaring that Paul’s non-literal interpretations are not allegories but types and that Paul used the term allegory only in a catachrestic sense,!“* he himself continued to use that term but “8 Cont. Cels. IV, 21.

™ De Princ. IV, 3, 6 [21]; ed. Koetschau, p. 331 ll. 6 ff. “In Joan. VI, 2 (PG 14, 205 a); ed. Preuschen, VI, 4, 22. “° Cf. Ph. Hergenrother, Die antiochenische Schule und ibre Bedeutung auf exegetischem Gebiete (1866); H. Kihn, Die Bedeutung der antiochenischen Schule auf dem exegetischen Gebiete (1866). ™ A, Vaccari, “La dewpia nella Scuola Esegetica di Antiochia,” Biblica, I (1920), 1-36; H. N. Bate, “Some Technical Terms of Greek Exegesis,” JTS, 24 (1923), 59-66. “8 In Epist. ad Gal. (PG 61, 662).

THE ALLEGORICAL METHOD

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only in a catachrestic sense.’® Among the Latin Fathers attempts were made to reshuffle old classifications and to give new meanings to old terms. As illustrations we shall mention

here Jerome, Augustine, and Cassian. Like Origen, Jerome **° favors a threefold division, in support of which he quotes Origen’s scriptural proof-text, the verse “Write them for thyself triply.” **! The three parts of his threefold division are described by the terms (1) literal (juxta litteram), (2) tropological (per tropologiam), and (3) mystical (mysticus),‘*? or by the terms (1) historical (juxta

historiam), (2) tropological or moral (juxta tropologiam, juxta moralem), and (3) spiritual (juxta intelligentiam spiritualem, in spirituali Bewpia) .1** What Jerome includes under spiritual or mystical may be gathered from two passages. In one passage,*** he tries to explain the term mystical by reproducing Paul’s quotation of the verse, “For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother,” **° together with Paul’s own comment thereon, “This mystery is great: but I speak in regard of Christ and of the church.” *** Now elsewhere in his

writings, Jerome explains this comment of Paul on the verse quoted to mean that thereby “the first man and first prophet, Adam, prophesied this concerning Christ and the Church, namely, that our Lord and Savior would leave his Father, God, and his mother, the heavenly Jerusalem, and would come

down on earth.” 1®7 In other words, Jerome takes Paul’s com"9 In Matth. Hom. 52,1 (PG 57, 519); 1m Joan. Hom. 85, 1 (PG 59, 461); cf. Lubac, op. cit., pp. 182, n. 5; 202, n. 87. Cf. J. Forget, “Jerome (Saint): L’Inspiration de lEcriture,” DTC, 8, 0.

18 Proy. 22:20; cf. Jerome, In Ezech. V, 16, 30-31

(PL 25, 153 D); Epist. 120, 12, ad Hedibiam (PL 22, 1005): cf. above nn. 50, 134 and below nn. 200, 201. 182 In Ezech. V, 16, 30-31 (PL 25, 147 C). 18 F-pist. 120, 12, ad Hedibiam (PL 22, 1005). 18 In Ezech. V, 16, 30-31 (PL 25, 148 A). * Gen. 2:24; Matt. 19:5; Eph. 5:31. a Ephiesc32.

87 In Epistolam ad Ephesios Ill, 5, 32 (PL 26, 535 c).

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ment to be an allegorical interpretation of the verse in Genesis as referring to the first coming of Christ. Consequently, when here in explanation of the mystical interpretation he quotes that comment of Paul, he undoubtedly means thereby that the mystical interpretation consists in the discovery in the Old Testament of predictions of the first coming of Christ or what we have called the adventual interpretation. In fact, in

another passage, the third part of his threefold classification, contrasted by him with that which is “according to history” (secundum historiam) and that which is “according to tropol-

ogy” (juxta tropologiam), is described by him as that which is “according to prophetic prediction” (juxta vaticinium prophetale).** It is to be recalled that also in Clement of Alexandria the adventual interpretation is described as prophety.

In another passage the spiritual sense is explained by him as that by which we abandon the come and about our present life

“we are transported to more sublime regions, earth, we speak about the bliss of things to heavenly things, so that in meditation during there is a shadow of future bliss.” °° In this

passage, such expressions as “bliss of things to come” and “future bliss” quite clearly show that the term “spiritual” is explained by him to mean eschatological allegory. A somewhat different threefold classification is given by

Jerome in another passage. “We must interpret the sacred Scriptures,” he says, “first, according to the letter (secundum

litteram), by doing all that is prescribed in the way of moral conduct; second, according to allegory (juxta allegoriam), that is, the spiritual sense (intelligentia spiritualis); third, according to the bliss of things to come.” **t Now, of these three modes of interpretation, the first quite obviously is a combination of the literal and the moral, meaning thereby, as main* In Isaiam IX, 28, 1 (PL 24, 315 B). J. Forget (op. cit., col. 960) overlooked that juxta vaticinium prophetale is a third type of interpretation and hence takes this passage to contain only a twofold classification. *° Cf. above at nn. 39, 79, 115, 119. Epist. 120, 12 (PL 22, 1005). ™ In Amos Il, 4, 4 ff. (PL 25, 1027 D-1028 A).

THE ALLEGORICAL

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tained by Philo,’*? that the laws of the Old Testament were meant both to be obeyed literally and to have a moral meaning,

though, as a Christian, Jerome believed that with the coming of Christ only the moral commands of the Old Testament, to the exclusion of its purely legal and ceremonial commands, were still to be obeyed literally. The second, described simply as allegorical and spiritual, could refer to both the adventual and the eschatological interpretation, for in the passage previously quoted the term spiritual, as we have seen, is used in both these senses, but inasmuch as the third, described as “according to the bliss of things to come,” quite obviously refers to the eschatological interpretation, the second must be taken to refer to the adventual interpretation. It will be recalled that the separation of the eschatological into a distinct type of nonliteral interpretation is already found in Origen.** Previous to this, in the same passage, as the opposite of the term “histor-

ical” (historiae fundamenta)'** Jerome uses the term “anagogical” (juxta anagogem),’*® from the context of which it is evident that the latter term is used by him in the general sense of non-literal. Such was the use of the term, as we have seen, also by Origen.’”°

Sometimes there occurs in Jerome what would seem to be a

twofold classification. Thus in one place he speaks only of “Jiteral” (littera) and “mystical” (mysticus)'*" and in another place he speaks only of historical (fundamenta historiae) and

spiritual (spirituale)*** and in still another place he speaks only of historical (juxta historiam) and tropological (tropologiae summa). All these, it seems to us, are not really twofold

classifications; they are only incomplete threefold classifications.

In Jerome, therefore, we have the following innovations in ” Cf. above p. 35.

8 Cf, above p. 61.

5 Ibid. (1077 B).

*° Cf, above at mn. 173-175.

14 Toc. cit. (1076 C). 11 Fpist. 18, 12, ad Damasum Papam (PL 22, 368). 18 In Isaiam VI, 13, Praef. (PL 24, 205 Cc). 1 Ibid. VII, 21, 1 (260 p). J. Forget (op. cit., col. 960) takes this passage to contain only a twofold classification.

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the use of terms. First, the term tropological assumes the special meaning of moral. Second, the term allegorical assumes the meaning of spiritual in the limited sense of adventual. Augustine favors fourfold classifications of various kinds. In one place, he says: “All that Scripture which is called Old Testament is handed down fourfold to them who desire to know them, according to history, according to aetiology, according to analogy, according to allegory.” °° But this fourfold classification is in reality a twofold classification, for the first three, as has been pointed out by Thomas Aquinas, all “pertain to the one literal sense.” *°* The term allegory in this classification thus stands for the non-literal sense in all its subdivisions. Augustine himself, in his explanation of the use of the term allegory,” extends the application of that term, which in Paul is explicitly applied only to one non-literal interpretation of an Old Testament text, namely, the adventual,?°* to all the other non-literal interpretations of Old Testament texts found in the New Testament. In the passage quoted, in explanation of the phrase “according to allegory,” Augustine says, “when it is taught that certain things which have been written are not to be taken in the letter, but are to be understood in a figure.” °* From the wording of this statement it would appear that the allegorical interpretation is taken by him to mean an interpretation which supplants the literal. This, however, is not what Augustine could have meant, for subsequently he illustrates the allegorical method by examples of New Testament allegorical interpretations of some Old Testament stories, such as the story

of Jonah and the whale, the story of the exodus from Egypt, and the story of Isaac and Ishmael, and nowhere in his writings is there any indication that he denied or even doubted the historicity of any of these stories. In fact, in one of his letters, *° De Util. Cred. 3, 5. Cf. De Gen. ad Litt. Imperf. 2, 2 * Sum. Theol. I, 1, 10, ad 2.

*? De Util. Cred. 3, 8. * Gal. 4:24, cf. above pp. 39 f. ™ De Util. Cred. 3, 5; cf. De Gen. ad Litt. Imperf. 2, 2.

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in answer to a question with regard to the miraculous story of

Jonah and the whale, which had been a subject of ridicule among pagans, Augustine defends the literalness of the story, though he also offers an allegorical interpretation of its meaning.**° A more carefully phrased definition of allegory is to be found in another place *°* in his writings, where he refers to some Latin translations of the New Testament in which Paul’s

statement “which things are an allegory” *” is rendered by “which things signify one thing by another.” In the same place, he is similarly careful to phrase his own definition of allegory as “a trope wherein one thing is understood from another.” °° In neither of these definitions is there any suggestion that the allegorical interpretation must always discard the literal meaning. With his use of allegory in the general sense of the nonliteral, he sometimes refers to various kinds of allegory. In one place, “enigma” is described by him as an “obscure allegory.” °° In another place, he enumerates four kinds of allegory, namely, (1) allegory of history (historiae), (2) allegory of facts (facti), (3) allegory of discourse (sermonis), and (4) allegory of rites (sacramenti).?*° In all of them, the term allegory is used in the general sense of non-literal interpretation, which does not necessarily supplant the literal sense but may only supplement it. Though in the passages quoted Augustine deals only with the interpretation of the Old Testament, still from his own example 7" it may be inferred that, like other Fathers before him,”? he would apply it also to the New Testament. Though,

again, in none of the passages quoted does he specifically mention philosophical allegory, still from his own example ** as 8 Epist. 102, 30-34 (PL 33, 382-384).

8 De Trinit. XV, 9, 15.

Ph Derrim XV 615: POT bid. * Gal.4324. ° De Vera Religione 50, 99. 1 See, e.g., his allegorical interpretation of Matt. 4:3-8 in his Enarr. in Ps..8,-13 (PL.36, 116). 2 Cf. above at nn. 2-33. ™3 See, e.g., his allegorical interpretation

of the four rivers of Eden

(Gen. 2:10-15) as referring to the four cardinal virtues, in his De Gen. const.

Manich. Il, 10, 13-14, and cf. above pp. 36-37.

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well as from the.fact that Greek philosophers, according to him, arrived by reason at some revealed truths of Scripture *™ and that one may use philosophy in explaining the truths of Scripture,” it may be inferred that among the various kinds of allegory he would also include philosophical allegory. Cassian begins with a twofold division, described as (1)

the historical interpretation and (2) the spiritual sense, for which he quotes as proof-text the verse, which in his text of the Septuagint would seem to have read, “All who were with her were clothed doubly.” **° Then he subdivides the spiritual into three kinds, described as tropology, allegory, and anagogy, for which he quotes as proof-text the verse already

quoted by Origen and Jerome, which in the Septuagint version, as we have seen, reads, “Write thou them for thyself triply.” 717 From his subsequent explanation of these three terms it is clear that by allegory he means the adventual interpretation, by anagogy he means the eschatological interpreta-

tions, especially with reference to the kingdom of heaven after the second coming, and by tropology he means the moral interpretation.”'® It is in these senses of adventual and eschatological respectively that the terms allegory and anagogy would seem to have been used in the well-known mediaeval Latin verse: Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia.”"® ™4 ™ ** **

Cf. below p. 127. Cf. below p. 128. Prov. 31:21-22; cf. Collatio XIV, 8 (PL 49, 962 8); cf. above n. 50. Prov. 22:20; cf. loc. cit. (962 B-963 A); cf. above nn. 134, 181.

*° Loc. cit. (963 AB). Farrar’s statement in his History of Interpretation, p- 24, n. 2, that “Eucherius is the first to use the word dvaywyy, to imply the reference of Scriptural passages to the New Jerusalem” is not correct. The

use of this term, illustrated by the reference to the New Jerusalem in Gal.

4:26, occurs in Cassian, loc. cit. (963 B).

*™ Cf. E. v. Dobschiitz, “Von vierfachen Schriftsinn,” Harnack-Ebrung

(1921), pp. 1-13; H. Caplan, “The Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation

and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching,” Speculum, 4 (1929), 282-290.

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ALLEGORICAL

METHOD

71

In our attempt to show how the Fathers came to use the allegorical method as a means of discovering the true teach-

ings of philosophy in Scripture, we have started our investigation not into the history of the use of the term allegory but rather into the history of the use of non-literal interpretation of texts. We have tried to find out, first, what was the something else which the non-literal interpretation sought to discover in texts and, second, what terms were used as a description of the non-literal method. Among the rabbis the something else which they tried to find in Scripture by the non-literal method of interpretation was of various kinds, among them what we have described as moral, preéxistential, and predictive, and this last one either historical or eschatological. Among Greek philosophers the something else which they tried to find in Homer by the nonliteral method was of a philosophical nature. In Philo the non-literal interpretations included the various rabbinic kinds, but these were supplemented by philosophical interpretations. In Paul the non-literal interpretations were mainly of the type that we have described as predictive, moral, and the preéxistential, the predictive referring either to the historical first coming of Christ, which we have called adventual, or to the expected second coming of Christ, which we have called eschatological. No philosophical interpretation is to be found

in Paul’s Epistles or in any other part of the New Testament. The term allegory as an exegetical term was introduced by Philo. Before him it was used only as a rhetorical term. Unlike its earlier use as a rhetorical term, where it meant a continuous succession of metaphors, in its use as an exegetical term it is applied by Philo even to the interpretation of one single term.

Again, unlike the non-literal interpretation of myths by Greek philosophers, the allegorical interpretation of Scripture in Philo is used even with reference to texts of which the literal meaning is not rejected. Two characterizations of the allegorical interpretation are to be discerned in Philo. First, it must involve a change in the meaning of a term. Second, it

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must be of a philosophical nature. With regard to the second characterization, however, it is not clear whether he would insist upon philosophy in its technical Greek sense of the term or whether he would extend its meaning to include religious beliefs which he considered as true. As the equivalent of the term allegory Philo uses a number of other terms, among them “type,” “shadow,” and “parable.” The term “allegory,” as well as the terms “‘type” and “shadow,” is used by Paul in connection with his predictive interpretations of the adventual kind. In other parts of the New Testament also the term “parable” is used in connection with this adventual kind of interpretation. In the Fathers, all the terms used by Philo, including the term allegory, as well as a few new terms, are used indiscriminately as a description of the four kinds of nonliteral interpretation inherited by them from the New Testament and also of the various philosophical interpretations which they adopted from Philo, though Fathers of the Antiochian school did not favor the use of the term allegory as a description of the non-literal kinds of interpretation found in

the New Testament, and John Chrysostom substituted for it the term “type.”

CHAPTER SCRIPTURAL

III

PRESUPPOSITIONS

Wirn THE establishment of the allegorical interpretation of Scripture in Christianity, the Fathers, like Philo before them, had to fight on two fronts. To the left of them were the extreme allegorists; to the right were those who were opposed to allegory.

In the case of Philo, the extreme allegorists whom he had to contend with were certain individuals, not necessarily or-

ganized into a sect within Alexandrian Judaism, who out of excessive concentration on the allegorical and inner meaning of the Law allowed themselves the privilege of disregarding its actual observance.’ In the case of Christianity, the extreme allegorists were those Gnostics who out of their extreme devotion to the allegorical interpretation of the New Testament denied the historicity of the birth and life and crucifixion

and resurrection of Jesus. The story of the Gospels to them was mere allegory, just as to the extreme allegorists in Alexan-

drian Judaism the commandments of the Law were mere allegory. A characteristic description as well as condemnation of the extreme and exaggerated allegorism of the Gnostics is found in Irenaeus. “They gather their views,” he says, “from other sources than the Scriptures” and then “they endeavor to adapt with an air of probability to their own peculiar assertions the parables of the Lord, the sayings of the prophets, and the words of the Apostles,” with the result that “by transferring passages, and dressing them up anew, and making one

thing out of another, they succeed in deluding many through their wicked art in adapting the oracles of the Lord to their opinions.” * And Tertullian, addressing himself directly to the Gnostic denial of the literalism of the passages which they interpreted allegorically, argues: “And, indeed, if all are figures, where will be that of which they are the figures? How * Cf. Philo, I, pp. 66-70.

* Adv. Haer. I, 8, 1.

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can you hold up a mirror for your face, if the face nowhere exists? But, in truth, all are not figures, but there are also literal statements; nor are all shadows, but there are bodies also.” Then he proceeds to argue that “it was not figuratively that the Virgin conceived in her womb; nor in a trope did she bear Emmanuel, that is, Jesus,” nor were the rest of the stories

and miracles recorded about the life of Jesus to be taken as mere allegory.® In the case of Philo, again, the literalists whom he had to contend with were really not thoroughgoing literalists. They were only indifferent or opposed to philosophic allegorization of Scripture; in their own way they had a certain traditional

allegorical method which allowed them a certain freedom in their interpretation of Scripture.* In the case of Christianity, too, the literalists whom the Fathers had to contend with were

not thoroughgoing literalists; they were literalists only in a certain respect; in some other respect they did believe in allegory. Of such literalists there were three classes, which are

enumerated and described by Origen.° The first class of literalists mentioned by Origen are the Jews. Now Origen, with his knowledge of Jewish traditions, both native and Hellenistic, was not ignorant of the fact that

Jews were not literalists in their interpretation of Scripture. In fact, he himself alludes to Philo’s statement as to the literal and the allegorical meaning of Scripture* and specifically mentions the name of Philo as well as the titles of two of his

works.’ But his description of Jews as literalists, we take it, refers only to their refusal to interpret certain passages in the Old ‘Testament allegorically as predictions of the coming of

Jesus. He thus says of them that both “the hardened in heart and the ignorant persons” among the Jews do not believe in Jesus as the promised Messiah, and this on account of the nonfulfillment, with the coming of Jesus, of certain Messianic ® De Carnis Resur. 29; ° Cf. above pp. 57, 58, nn. 121, 122. “Cf. Philo,I, pp.5 * Cf. abovep. 62, nn. 164, 165. Derrinc. INA? et ee CE J. Daniélou, Origéne, pp. 147-149.

SCRIPTURAL

PRESUPPOSITIONS

75

promises which they take literally “in a manner palpable to

their senses.” § Among the unfulfilled Messianic promises mentioned by Origen as examples of those erroneously taken by the Jews literally are the return of the exiles, the rebuilding of Jerusalem, and the reign of peace among the wild animals.° These are exactly some of the prophecies which Philo believed were to be literally fulfilled during the Messianic Age ?° and

it is quite possible that that was still the belief of Jews in

Alexandria with whom Origen must have debated this question and to whom he refers here, first, as the “hardened of

heart,” that is to say, the learned among the Jews who knew the truth but refused to accept it, and, second, as the “ignorant” among them, that is to say, those who know no better. Later, however, with the gradual disappearance among the

Fathers of a direct knowledge of Judaism, this Origenian stigmatization of the Jews as followers of the letter rather than the spirit '’ was raised into a general and unqualified descrip-

tion of the Jews as literalists in their interpretation of Scripture. Thus Gregory af Nazianzus describes the literal method

of interpreting Scripture as being “in a certain way Jewish and mean.” So also Theodoret of Cyrrhus speaks of the Jews as following the historical, that is, the literal, interpretation.'® Even Jerome, who should have known better, accuses the Jews of being literal in their interpretation of the anthropomorphic expressions in the Old Testament,” and in this respect he groups them together with those whom he refers to as “all the heretics” (omnes haeretici), by which, as we shall see in the case of Origen, he means the Gnostics. The second class of literalists mentioned by Origen are those whom he describes as the heretics (of te dad rv

aipécewv),*® by which he means the Gnostics. The Gnostics cannot properly be described as literalists, they were rather

extreme allegorists in the interpretation of the Gospels.** Some 8 De Princ. IV, 2, 1 (8). ® [bid.

* Orat. 45, 12 (PG 36, 637 D). 8 Praefatio in Psalmos (PG 8o, 860 c).

* Cf. Philo, Il, pp. 408-410. 4 Rom. 2:29; 2 Cor. 3:6.

In Amos ll, a (Pl 25, 10528).

* De Princ. IV, 2,1 (8).

Cf. above pp. 73-74.

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of them were also, we know, rather extreme allegorists in their interpretation of the story of creation in the Book of Genesis.‘7 But the accusation of literalism brought against them here by Origen, again, refers to their insistence upon a literal interpretation of the anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms in the Old Testament. With their conception of the God of the Old Testament as being an inferior and imperfect and unbenevolent deity ** they thought that all the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic descriptions of him in the Old Testament were meant to be taken literally. The God of the Old Testament to them was thus a God who is literally angry, and jealous, repenting for having done good, and plotting to do evil. The third class of literalists are described by Origen as “the more simple among those who profess to belong to the Church.” #® These, too, we take it, are not thoroughgoing literalists, for no Christian denied the possibility of allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament of the kind that is already found in the New Testament.”° But these simpleminded Christians, disparagingly spoken of here by Origen as being literalists, are those who for a lack of philosophic training were quite contented to conceive of the God of the Old Testament according to the literalness of the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic expressions by which He 1s described. They, therefore, imagine regarding God, complains Origen, “such things as would not be believed of the most savage and unjust of mankind.” *4 If we discount the heretical Gnostics and the simple-minded Christian believers, then among the Fathers themselves there was no theoretical difference of opinion as to the use of allegory. There were, however, among them differences as to the actual use of it. Some were more prone to use it, such as those “Trenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 18, 1 ff.

* Cf. below pp. 522 f.; 538 ff. > De Prine 1V, 25 1 (8).

” Cf, above pp. 43 ff. * De Princ. IV, 2, 1 (8).

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of the school of Alexandria, while others were less prone to use it, such as those of the school of Antioch. But that was only a question of individual or of collective predilections, determined by certain factors in training and background, but it involved no question of principle. The general attitude of those who were less prone to use allegory is expressed by Tertullian who says with regard to certain prophecies in the Old Testament that “no doubt we are accustomed also to give a spiritual significance to these prophecies . . . but still they were all fulfilled literally . . . except that very many of their words can only be taken in a pure simple signification, and free from all allegorical obscurity.” ** The attitude of those who were more prone to use the allegorical method is expressed by Origen who, while, on the one hand, insists that certain statements in Scripture, both the Old and the New Testament, cannot be taken literally,?* on the other, warns the reader not to suspect him of saying that “no history is real” or that “no law is to be literally observed” or that “the statements regarding the Saviour are not true in a manner perceptible to the senses.” ** Quite on the contrary, he contends, “the passages that are true in their historical meaning are much more numerous than those which are interspersed with a purely spiritual signification.” ** The composite view of the Fathers, like that of Philo, is that some passages in Scripture are to be taken only in an allegorical sense and some only in a literal sense, while others are to be taken both in an allegorical and in a literal sense. But what is to be the criterion as to whether a scriptural statement is to be taken literally or is to be denied any literal

meaning? When Philo was confronted with this question, he said, after the Stoics,”* that no statement in Scripture is to be taken literally if its literal acceptance would prove unworthy 2 De Carnis Resur. 20. 8 De Princ. IV, 2, 9 [16]-3, 4 [18]. Pel bid 21N G3, Avliolls * Ibid.; cf. In Gen. VII, 2 (PG 12, 199 B); In Num. XI, 1 (643 D). * Cf. Siegfried, op. cit., pp. 165-168, and to.

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of its dignity as the word of God * or would be contrary to reason (apddoyov) .78 The same rule is also followed by the Fathers. It is clearly expressed by Origen who, in almost the language of Philo, says that passages in the Old and the New Testament are not to be taken literally when they do not “wholly convey what is

agreeable to reason (evAoyov)” *° or when they are “contrary to reason (ddoyov).” °° But agreement with reason by itself, it was felt by the Fathers, could not be the sole guide in determining which texts should be taken literally and which should not. Left to itself, reason will lead to dissension, for what may to one appear reasonable may to others appear unreasonable. When the Gnostics, for instance, rejected the literalness of the story of the Gospels, they undoubtedly did so because in its literal sense it appeared to them to be repugnant to reason. The authority of reason, it was felt by the Fathers, must therefore be stopped at a certain point, and beyond that point it is not to be allowed to act as arbiter as to whether a text is to be taken as literally true or not. At what point, then, is reason to be stopped and what is to stop it? When a question like this arose in the mind of Philo, he answered in effect that there were certain scriptural presuppositions which constituted the fundamentals of scriptural religion. These fundamentals of scriptural religion, he felt, had their origin in revelation, not in reason. Reason, to be sure, may support them. The ground for their acceptance, however, was not reason but authority. On the mere authority of Scripture they were to be accepted even by those whose wrong philosophic training or whose perverted mental reasoning had led them to deny these fundamental beliefs. So also to the Fathers there were certain Christian presuppositions which were to be used as criteria in judging whether * Deter. §, 13; cf. Philo, I, pp. 123, 127. * Post. 14, 50; cf. Philo, I, p. 123. * De Princip. IV, 2, 9 [16]. (ed. Koetschau, Pp: 323, 1.2). © [bid. IV, 3, 3 [18] (p. 327, 1. 7).

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any scriptural statement is to be taken literally or not, irre-

spective of its agreeableness or unagreeableness with what may

appear to one as reason. These Christian presuppositions are called by Irenaeus the “rule of truth” (xavdv ddrnfetas)** or the “truth proclaimed by the Church” (dad rijs éxxdnoias Knpvocopévn ad7Oea)* or simply “faith” (aicris).** By this “rule of truth,” he says, one “will come to the knowledge of the words, expressions, and parables belonging to the Scriptures, but will by no means acknowledge the blasphemous use

which these men (i.e., the heretics) make of them.” ** Similarly Tertullian offers the tradition of the church and what he calls “the rule of faith” (regula fidei)®* as the guiding principle for

the interpretation of Scripture. Speaking of the heretics, he maintains that they should be denied the right to argue from Scripture, for the possession of Scripture does not properly

belong to them; it belongs to the Church and its true interpretation is embodied in its tradition; the heretics have no right to interpret it contrary to that tradition.*® So also Clement of

Alexandria insists upon the regulation of the interpretation of Scripture by “the rule of truth” (xavav ddnBeias)*” or the “tradition of the Church” (éxxAynovacruxy mapddoors) °° which

he describes as “the unwritten tradition (dypados wapddocrs) of that which is written,” *® and that tradition of the Church, he says, is one tradition which constitutes one faith.*° The same view is also laid down by Origen when he says that “that alone is to be accepted as truth which differs in no respect from ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition.” ** |

But more than that. Just as Scripture is to be taken literally, even against what appears to be reason, if required so by faith, so also, if required by faith, is it to be interpreted allegorically, even when the literal sense is more agreeable to what appears st Adv. Haer. I, 9, 4. SU Did- ls 9, 5: © 1a 1, 20, 1. SO OId 1,10; (4 %®De Praescr. Haer. 13. % Tbid. 15-22.

Strom. VII, 16" (PG 9, 532 A). [bid Nill, 16 > (53258) « ibid. Vis (356-8). bids

NAW) 21 (55248).

“ De Prine. I, Praef. 2:

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to be reason. Thus Irenaeus rejects the literal meaning of the verse, “That flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God,” *? on account of its disagreement with what he held to be the true Christian belief with regard to the temporal and earthly kingdom of the saints after their resurrection.*? The general rule, as formulated by Augustine, reads: “Whatever there is in the word of God that cannot, when taken literally, be referred either to purity of life or soundness of doctrine, ou may set down as figurative.” ** This rule of faith, serving as it does as a criterion in the interpretation of Scripture, which has its source in revelation, serves also as a criterion in the interpretation of philosophy, which has its source in reason. Philosophy is to be rejected if

it contains anything contrary to the rule of faith; otherwise one is free to roam among the philosophers and pick whatever views he may. Scripture is to be taken literally whenever the

rule of faith has already accepted it as literally true; otherwise one is free to accept any statement as literally true or not in accordance with his own particular judgment as to whether the literal meaning is in agreement with his own particular conceptions of reason and of goodness. What this rule of faith was may be gathered from the lists of such rules reproduced by Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen.*® For our purpose, the beliefs contained in these rules of faith may be divided into two main parts: First, those which may be called Christian Presuppositions, consisting generally of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, the Ascension, and the Second Coming. Second, those which can be identified with seven out of the eight topics enumerated in what we have called Philo’s “Scriptural Presuppositions.” *° Of these seven topics included by Philo in his eight Scriptural Presuppositions six are accepted and one is rejected. All these three Fathers explicitly mention “1 Cor. 15:50. * Adv. Haer. V, 9, 1-4; cf. above p. 45. “ De Doctr. Christ. Ill, 10, 14. i Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 10, 1; Ill, 4, 2; Tertullian, De Praescr. Haer. 13, Origen, De Princ. I, Praef. 4-8. “Cf. Philo, I, pp. 164-199.

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the belief in (1) the existence and (2) unity of God and (3) the creation of the world.” Origen alludes to the belief in (4) divine providence by including in his list of beliefs also the belief in reward and punishment** and he explicitly mentions the belief in (5) the revelation of the Law.* Tertullian by implication rejects the Jewish belief, affirmed by Philo, in (6) the

eternity of the Law, by his statement that Jesus Christ “proclaimed a new Law.” *° All three allude to a modified form of Philo’s assertion of the belief in (7) the existence of ideas, by their inclusion of the belief in the preéxistent Christ, whom

they call either explicitly or implicitly by the Johannine Philonic term Logos and to whom they apply the Johannine description that all things were made by Him.” The only Philonic scriptural presupposition which none of them mentions or alludes to in his rule of faith is the belief in (8) the unity of the world. Let us then compare the general attitude of the Fathers with that of Philo on the six of the latter’s eight scriptural presuppositions which were accepted by them as constituting their rule of faith, namely, (1) the existence of

God, (2) the unity of God, (3) creation of the world, (4) divine providence, (5) revelation of the Law, (6) the existence of ideas. In Philo, the Greek term atheism is used in two distinct

senses. Sometimes he uses it in its original Greek sense as meaning the denial of the existence of God, though he extends its

application also to those who were only skeptical about the existence of God.” But sometimes he uses it in a new sense, not as a designation of the denial of the existence of God but rather as a designation of the belief in the wrong kind of god, not all wrong kinds of god, to be sure, but only certain special wrong kinds of god, such, for instance, as natural objects or idols.>? These two kinds of usages of the term atheism, we shall try to show, are to be found among the Fathers. “LOC, Cit. “Loc. cit. 5. “Loc. cit. 4 and 8. SUL OCA

CW:

SOG NCI. "=Cf. Philo, I, p. 165. 8 [bid., 1, pp. 27-32.

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In Justin Martyr, the term atheism happens to be used as a description of the belief in a wrong kind of god, of which he mentions especially the wrong kind of conception of God of certain sects within Christianity ** and the idol worship of nonChristians who “inscribe the name of God upon the work of their hands.” © Similarly Irenaeus happens to use the term atheism as a description of the belief in a wrong kind of god. The terms “atheist” (atheus) and “irreligious” (irreligiosus) are thus applied by him to Anaxagoras and the statement “they know

not God” (Deum ignorant) is used by him with reference to Thales and Anaximander, whose views he describes as being “redolent of ignorance and irreligion (irreligisitas).” °° In Theophilus, on the other hand, the term atheism happens to be used in its Greek sense as a description of the denial of the existence of any kind of god. Evidently drawing upon an already known description of Euhemerus and Clitomachus as atheists,” he applies to the former the description “the most atheistic” *§ and to the latter the description “atheistic.” * Critias and Protagoras, however, are described by him as skeptics,°° even though in Greek sources,*" as well as in Philo,” the former is described as an atheist and also even though in Philo the latter is similarly described as an atheist.** Evidently,

like Philo, Theophilus would include skeptics among atheists. Clement of Alexandria uses the term atheism in its Philonic sense as a description of the belief in some wrong kind of god. In a general sense, he says, the term atheism could be applied to anyone who does not recognize the true God; but still, in its ™ Dial. 82.

NbHels ey °° Adv. Haer. Il, 14, 2.

* Sextus, Adv. Phys. I, 17 and 51 (Euhemerus); I, 182-183 (Clitomachus). *SAdv. Autol. Mil, 7. ° Ibid. °° Ibid. “Sextus, Pyrrh. Inst. Ill, 218; Adv. Phys. I, 54. “ C£. Philo, I, p. 167.

“ [bid., I, pp. 167-171. “ Tbid., I, p. 165.

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more specific sense, he adds, the term should apply only to those who, in addition to not recognizing the true God, worship idols. Accordingly he refuses to apply the term atheist to Euhemerus and others who, though having no knowledge of the true God, at least suspected the error with regard to the gods that were worshiped by their contemporaries.® He does, however, apply the term “atheists” to the early Greek philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, Diogenes, Parmenides, Hippasus, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, for “though they did not, indeed, pay religious honor to stocks and stones,” he argues, they “worshiped matter,” believing as they did that the elements were the first principles.®° But even though, like Philo, the Fathers would apply the term atheism to a belief in the wrong kind of god, still, again, like Philo, they would not apply it to a belief in all wrong kinds

of god. Accordingly, of the conceptions of God in the four great systems of Greek philosophy, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, the Stoic, and the Epicurean, not all are branded as atheistic. Let us see how the conceptions of God in those four systems are treated by the Fathers. Whether Epicurus is to be called an atheist or not is a ques-

tion discussed even in pagan philosophy.” The cause of the uncertainty is the fact that, as reported by Sextus Empiricus, “according to some, Epicurus in his popular exposition allows

the existence of God, but in expounding the real nature of things he does not allow it.” ° In Philo, Epicurus is never branded as an atheist; the Epicurean conception of God dealt with by him is evidently that of Epicurus’ popular exposition and it is condemned only on account of its corporeality and

its denial of divine providence. Among the Church Fathers, however, the two views of Epicurus about God, the popular and the philosophic, are both dealt with, though not always with a clear distinction between them. Thus Theophilus in % Protrep. 2*-*

(PG 8, 89 B-92 A).

Sibi, §" (2G. 8, 165. A). % Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I, 30, 85; Ill, 1, 3.

* Sextus, Adv. Phys. I, 58.

“Cf. Philo, I, p. 166.

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one place describes Epicurus as “teaching atheism”;’° in another place he describes him as saying that “there is no God at all; or, if there is, . . . He cares for none but himself”; and in still another place he describes him merely as saying that “there is no providence.” * Clement of Alexandria, too, in some places speaks of “Epicurus the leader of atheism” ”* and of “those who in Hellenic philosophy preach the atheism . of Epicurus,” ’* but, in another place, speaks of the Epicurean philosophy only as one “which abolishes providence.” ” Origen, in one place, attributes to the Epicureans a belief in gods, though gods who, unlike the true God, are changeable, for he speaks of the “gods of Epicurus” as “being composed of atoms” and as “capable of dissolution insofar as their structure is concerned” but as managing “to throw off the atoms which contain the elements of destruction.” ** In another place, however, he says of them that they “call it superstition to introduce a providence and to place a god over all things.” 77

In still another place he seems to apply to them the term atheists, for it is undoubtedly the Epicureans that are referred to in a passage of Gregory Thaumaturgus where it is reported of Origen that he had ordered his students to read the works

of all the philosophers and poets “except those of the atheists who, departing from the common opinion of mankind, denied

the existence of God or providence.” “* That their god exercises no providence is the charge brought against the Epicureans also by Irenaeus,” Tertullian,®° and Augustine.® As in Philo,® so also in the Fathers, Aristotle is not con” Ad Autol. Ii, 6.

"bid. Il, 4. Here Theophilus erroneously attributes this view also to the Stoics in general and to Chrysippus in particular. Cf. below n. 101.

® Ibid. Il, 2. © Strom. I, 12 (PG 8, 688 A). % Ibid. VI, 8° (PG 9, 289 A).

Ibid. I, 11 © (PG 8, 748 c). © Cont. Cels. IV, 14. ™ Ibid. 1, 133 cf. I, 8; V, 3.

*® Gregory Thaumaturgus, Oratio Prosphonetica ac Panegyrica in Originem XIII (PG 10, 1088 A); cf. J. Daniélou, Origéne, p. 32. ” Adv. Haer. Ill, 24, 2. © Apol. 47; Ad Nationes Il, 2. * De Civ. Dei XVIII, 41, 2. “Cf. Philo, I, p. 178.

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demned as an atheist; he is only declared by them to have a wrong conception of God. The conception which the Fathers had of Aristotle’s God was not that incorporeal immovable mover of the Meta-

physics *° and the Physics.** Their conception of Aristotle’s God was based either upon a combination of these two Aristotelian sources with some other sources or exclusively upon other sources. Of these other sources, there was, to begin with,

the now lost De Philosophia where God is spoken of either as mind (mens) or as the world itself (#zundum ipse) or as the “heat of the heaven” (caeli ardor), or as incorporeal (sine

corpore).*°

Then

there

was

the pseudo-Aristotelian

De

Mundo, where the stars are referred to as “the gods” so that heaven is described as “the abode of the gods,” ®* and the God

called Supreme (datos) is said to have obtained for himself the highest place.*’ Then there was also the Peripatetic Theophrastus, who is said to identify God either with mind (mens) or with the heaven or with the celestial stars and constellations.*® It is on the basis of either all or some of these statements, confused perhaps with some kindred statements of the Stoics,

that Aristotle’s God is portrayed by some representative Fathers. In Athenagoras, Aristotle and his followers are said to regard God “as a sort of compound living creature .. . consisting of soul and body,” whose body is “the ethereal space and the planetary stars and the sphere of the fixed stars,

moving in circles” and whose soul is “the reason (Aédyov) which presides over the motion of the body, itself not subject to motion, but becoming the cause of motion to the other.” * In Clement of Alexandria, the God of Aristotle is described as being “the soul of the universe,” which he explains to mean

that “the universe is God.” °° The Recognitions of Clement, probably through a confusion of the term dxatovduacros, 8 Metaph. XI, 7 ff.

" Tbid., 6, 397b, 24-26.

Phys. VIII, 10, 267b, 17-26. 8 Cicero, De Nat. Deor. 1, 13, 33.

®'Cicero, op. cit. 1,-13, 35. ™ Supplic. 6.

°°De Mundo, 2, 391b, 15-17.

© Protrep. 5 (PG 8, 169 B).

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which is applied to Aristotle’s fifth element ®* in the sense that it has no proper, name like the four sublunar elements, with the same term which is applied by Philo to God in the sense that He cannot be named,” attributes to Aristotle the identification of the fifth element with God. The passage reads as follows: ‘Aristotle also introduces a fifth element, which he called dxatovopacror; that is, that which cannot be named (z7compellabile), without doubt indicating Him who made the world by joining the four elements into one.” °* Lactantius gives expression to the general uncertainty among the Fathers as to what really constituted Aristotle’s conception of God when he says that “Aristotle, although he is at variance with himself, and both utters and holds sentiments opposed to one another, yet upon the whole bears witness that one Mind presides over the universe.” %4 So conceived, the God of Aristotle could not have satisfied the Father’s requirements for a true conception of God. For one thing, as the soul of the world or as the world itself, the God of Aristotle was like the God of the Stoics, and the God of the Stoics, as we shall see,®* was not incorporeal enough for the Fathers. For another thing, the God of Aristotle did not satisfy the Fathers’ requirements for divine providence, for, as conceived by them, the Aristotelian God extended His providence only as far as the moon, exercising no providence

on the sublunar part of the universe,®* or, as it is sometimes " Cf. expression “vacans nomine” applied to the fifth substance in Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 1, 10, 22, and the expression “nominis expers”

applied by Lucretius to the fourth substance in the composition of the soul (De

Rerum

Natura

Il, 242), the latter

of which

reflects

the

Greek

dxarovéuacroy used in the restatements of the Epicurean views by Plutarch

and Stobaeus (cf. H. A. J. Munro’s note in his edition of Lucretius ad loc.).

The term “aether” applied by Aristotle to his fifth substance is, as he himself explains, not a proper name like earth, water, fire, and air (cf. De Caelo I, 3, 270b, 20-24). ” Cf. Philo, Il, pp. 110 ff. * Recognitiones VIII, 15 (PG 1, 1378 B).

“ Div. Instit.I, 5 (PL 6, 135 A). * See below pp. 87-88. “Cf. Tatian, Orat. ad Gr. 2, Clement 8, 172 A); Strom. V, 14 (PG 8, 132 B).

: of Alexandria, Protrep. 5° (PG

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said, the Peripatetics “deny the existence of providence and the relation of Deity to man.” ® It is this denial of the relation of the Deity to man and hence the denial of individual providence that is also implied in Origen’s statement that the Peri-

patetics say that “prayers are of no avail,” °° though, in another place, he adds that Aristotle’s “sentiments regarding providence are not so impious” as those of the Epicureans.*® In Philo, the Aristotelian conception of God is rejected on the ground of its denial that God is the creator of the world whence He is an inactive God who exercises no providence.’ So also the Stoics, though not branded as atheists,’ failed to satisfy the requirements of the Fathers with regard to the incorporeality and the providence of God. The Stoic denial of the incorporeality of God is expressed by the Fathers in various ways, all based upon descriptions of

God as found in the reported teachings of the Stoics. Tatian,

without mentioning the Stoics, says: “One of you asserts that God is a body.” *” Athenagoras describes the Stoic God as

“an artistic fire” and as one whose Spirit permeates (xwpetv) through matter or pervades (6ujxe.) the whole world.’ Clement of Alexandria similarly says that the Stoic God, “being a body, pervades the vilest matter” ** or “like the soul, is essentially body and spirit.” *°° This last view is more clear] stated by Origen when he says that “even the God of the Stoics, because he is a body, at one time has all his essence consist of the guiding principle, when the conflagration of the ™ Origen, Cont. Cels. III, 75. Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Griech? II, 2, 468, n. 1 (English, Aristotle, I, 508, n. 3); Diogenes, V, 32. eo CONt« Elsen 13, Tbid. \; 21. © Opif. 2, 9-10; cf. Philo, I, pp. 298-299. 11In the statement by Theophilus, Ad. Autol. II, 4, that “some of the Stoics say that there is no God at all; or, if there is, they say that He cares for none but himself,” the words “of the Stoics” are probably an interpolation. Cf. Otto in his edition ad loc. 2 Orat. ad Gr. 25. 13 Supplic. 6. 6 Strom, t 11" (PG 8, 746, 4); cf. V., 14” (0; 126 Cc); Protrep. 5” (8, 169 B). 1 Strom. V, 14 (9, 129 B).

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world takes place; and at another, when a rearrangement of things occurs, he becomes a part thereof.” °° Augustine says

of the Stoics that their “God is the soul of the world, as the world is the body of God.” ** Even Tertullian, who on the whole follows the Stoic view in the denial of immateriality, even the immateriality of God, speaks with disapproval of the Stoic conception of God as corporeal.’* In Philo, the Stoic conception of God is likewise rejected on account of its implication of corporeality.*° Similarly the Stoic denial of individual providence is also

expressed by the Fathers in a variety of ways. Justin Martyr, again, without mentioning the Stoics, says with evident reference to them that “they moreover attempt to persuade us that God takes care of the universe with its genera and species, but not of me and you, and each individually.” **° Athenagoras describes the production of “each thing” (éxacra) by the seminal principles contained in the Stoic God as being “in accordance with fate.” ’* Irenaeus makes the general statement that not only the Stoics but “indeed all that are ignorant of God, poets and historians alike,” maintain that “God is the slave of necessity.” ** So also Philo, despite the protestations on the part of the Stoics of their belief in providence, characterizes them as believing in fate.'"* It is Plato whom the Fathers, like Philo, find to have arrived at a conception of God like that of Scripture. Athenagoras

says of Plato that he conceived of “one uncreated God, the Framer of the Universe” and he approves of the common judgment that “Plato is not an atheist.” ** Clement of Alexandria exclaims: “Well done, Plato! Thou hast touched on the truth.” *° And Augustine says: “Certain partakers with us in the grace of Christ, wonder when they hear and read that Plato had conceptions concerning God, in which they recog*° Contr. Cels. IV, 14. ™ Cf. Philo, I, pp. 176, 178.

= DeiCiveD

eyiNr nz

8 Apol. 47.

Philo, I, p. 329.

coe Dial sere ™ Supplic. 6.

™ Cf. Philo, I, p. 178. em Supplic. 6.

™? Adv. Haeres. Il, 14, 4.

™® Protrep..6°

(PG 8; 173 a).

SCRIPTURAL

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nize considerable agreement with the truth of our religion.” But with all this praise of Plato, the Fathers, just like Philo,” did not mean to say that Plato had a perfect knowledge of what they thought to be a true conception of God. Thus Augustine, after he had singled out the Platonists as those concerning whom Paul said that “that which is known of God is manifest among them,” ** adds that Paul “knows well, too, to be on his guard against even these philosophers in their errors.” **° The principle of the unity of God, which is explicitly mentioned in the rule of faith, is directed primarily, as in Philo,’”° against popular polytheism. To this end, there is a denunciation by all the Fathers of all forms of polytheism.’** With the rise of Gnosticism and its distinction between what it considered the deity of the New Testament who is represented as

the Father of Jesus and the deity of the Old Testament who is represented as the creator of the world and the revealer of the Law, the Christian conception of the unity of God came also to mean a direct denial of this Gnostic view, and an assertion of the view that the Christian God is the same as the God of the Old Testament. Thus the rule of faith, as it is formulated by the anti-Gnostic Fathers, after its assertion of the belief in

“one only God,” proceeds to explain that “He is none other than the Creator of the world” ’” and that “this just and good

God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, himself gave the Law, and the prophets and the Gospels, being also the God of the Apostles and of the Old and New Testaments.” 1” As Philo, again, who takes the unity of God to imply the self-sufficiency of God,’ so also the Fathers insist upon the “7 Philo, 1, pp. 112-113. ™8 Rom. 1:19. 1° De Civ. Dei VIII, 10, 1. Ct, Filo, Fp. 17t. 1 See, for instance, Theophilus, Ad Autol. 1, 9-10; II, 2-7; Athenagoras, Supplic. 7; Clement of Alexandria, Protrep. 1-4. #2 Tertullian, De Praescr. Haer. 13; Adv. Prax. 1; cf. Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 10, 1; I, 22, 1; Origen, De Princ. 1, Praef. 4,

“8 Cf. Origen, loc. cit. Cf. Philo, I, pp. 172.

go

THE

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OF THE

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self-sufficiency of God,!> sometimes taking it to be implied in the principle of the unity of God. Thus, just like Philo, who says that “neither before creation was there anything with God, nor, when the world had come into being, does anything take its place with Him, for He is in need of absolutely nothing whatever,” ##° Theophilus says in connection with the creation of the world, that “nothing was coeval with God... for he that is created is also needy, but He that is noncreated stands in need of nothing.” 177 But unlike Philo,’** and in direct opposition to him, they do

not mean by the unity of God the “aloneness” or “uniqueness” of God, for, with the rise of the view among the Fathers that from eternity the Logos was not within God but by the side of God, from eternity God was never alone.’”° Then they are also opposed to Philo in their conception of the unity of God in the sense of simplicity.*°° For while, like Philo, they express their belief in the simplicity of God, that

simplicity does not exclude the conception of a triune deity.’** The principle of the creation of the world, as in Philo, meant to them that the present would come into being after it had not been. More explicitly than in Philo, they give expression to the doctrine that the creation of the world was out of nothing. But as to the meaning of this doctrine, there were several interpretations.'*? As in Philo, the principle of divine providence meant not only opposition to the Epicurean denial of divine providence

altogether but also opposition to the kind of providence which Plato and the Stoics attributed to God. Justin Martyr speaks for all the Fathers when he says of the philosophers that they “attempt to persuade us that God takes care of the universe “Theophilus, Ad Autol. II, 10 (PG 6, 1064 8); Clement of Alexandria,

Protrep. 4" (PG 8, 153 B); cf. J. Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten, ao: Pr Sse eomallei, tec2.

“7 Ad Autol. Il, ro. * Cf. Philo, I, p. 172. ‘2 Cf. below pp. 305-363.

Cf. Philo, 1, ps agit

™ Cf. below pp. 310-312.

™ Cf. below Vol. II, in the chapter on creation.

SCRIPTURAL

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gl

with its genera and species, but not of me and you, and each individually.” 188

With regard to the revelation of the Law, the Jewish con-

ception of the Old Testament as a divinely inspired book was accepted by the Fathers and was extended by them to the books of the New Testament.'** When the Gnostics assigned the origin of the Old Testament to an inferior God, the Fathers maintained the same divine origin for both Testaments. “Both Testaments,” proclaims Irenaeus, “are the revelation of one and the same Householder” !** and “there is but one and the same God, who ordered them both for the good of those men in whose times the Testaments were given.” 1°° The belief in the divine inspiration of both the Old and the New Testament is succinctly stated by Origen as follows: “All the words of the prophets are inspired with the fullness of the Spirit and there is nothing in prophecy or in law or in gospel

or in apostle which is not from the fullness of the Spirit.” 1°7 Whether, however, all the books now included in the Hebrew canon are divinely inspired, or of an equal degree of inspiration, was a matter of discussion among the Fathers.’** The conception of the divine inspiration of Scripture meant with the Fathers, as in Judaism, that everything contained in it is of divine origin. Reflecting Philo’s statements that ‘“‘Moses

did not practice the worst form of prolixity (yaxpodoyias), namely, tautology (ravrodoyiav)” 1° and that he “never puts in a superfluous word (zepurrév dvoya),” 4° Origen says that one cannot find in Scripture anything that is “useless (otiosum) or superfluous (superfluum).” Elaborating on this

8 Dial. 1.

™ Literature:

E. Mangenot, “Inspiration de lEcriture,’ DTC, 7, 2177-

2181; P. Dausch, Die Schriftinspiration (1891); Id., “Die Inspiration des Neuen Testamentes,” Biblische Zeitfragen, 5 (1912), 49-92; L. Schade, Die Inspirationslehre des heiligen Hieronymus, 1910. 138 Adv. Haer. IV, 9, 1. 82 Del og 2ee 23) Cla nes Sala 181Im Jer., Homil. 21, 2 (PG 13, 536 c). 88 Cf. Tixeront, II,° p. 12 (English, II, 12). 180 CONST 145073. Mo Fug. 10, 54. 1 In Num., Homil. 27, 1 (PG 12, 782 A).

g2

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general statement,

OF THE

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Origen finds some purpose in every jot

(iGra) and tittle (xepaia) in Scripture **? and in every minute detail recorded in it, such as the names of the Hebrew midwives **? and the sum of all the congregation of the children of Israel.1#* Even those statements in Scripture which he brands as irrational and as impossible of acceptance as literally true were introduced, according to him, for some purpose, their purpose being to call the reader’s attention to the fact that not everything in Scripture should be taken literally.**° In consequence of this view, he believes that nothing is to be changed in Scripture, not even deviations from ordinary grammatical and idiomatic usages.*° So also Gregory of Nyssa maintains that in Scripture there is no garrulity (é8odecxéa) nor anything redundant

(zapédxov)

nor

does it talk idly (apyodoyet) .*47

And Augustine proclaims: “Believe me, whatever there is in these Scriptures, it is lofty and divine.” #8 This conception of the divine origin of everything in Scripture meant with the Fathers, as it did mean in Judaism, that everything in Scripture is significant and has a meaning beyond the mere form of expression. But whether the external form of expression or choice of words was equally divinely inspired is a question which did not come up among the Church

Fathers as it did not at that time come up in Judaism. When Philo says that in the case of the Ten Commandments, in some

miraculous way, every word uttered by God reached the ears of the people, his constant reminder that the words heard by the people were not physical speech by means of a physical voice and physical hearing “® makes it quite clear that the written words of Scripture, while faithfully reproducing the message communicated by God, were chosen by Moses him“In Jer., Homil. 39 (PG 13, 544 a); cf. Matt. 5:18; Luke Selecta in Psalmos, Psal. 1, 4 (PG 12, 1081 A). “8 In Exod., Homil. 2, 1 (PG 12, 306 a); cf. Exod. 1:15.

“In Num., Homil. 1, 1 (PG 12, 585-586); cf. Num. 1:2 ff. MuDe Princ: IV, 2,0 Lied “°E Commentariis in Osee

(PG

13, 825 B).

“" In Verba, Faciamus Hominem, Orat. 1 (PG 44, 272 cp). “8 De Util. Cred. 6, 13. ™ See Philo, Il, pp. 38 f.

16:17. Cf.

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self. So also among the Fathers, while on the one hand they maintain that the very words of the Scripture are divinely inspired, on the other hand they assume that the words which express the divinely inspired messages are chosen by the prophets, albeit accurately chosen. We may select characteristic utterances on this question by some representative Fathers. Gregory of Nyssa, on the one hand, maintains that all the

words in Scripture are “words inspired of God (Oedmvevora pyjwara)”’ *°° and that no word in it, as quoted above, is superfluous or vain or useless.1>* But, on the other hand, he also says that the words which are attributed to God in the Scripture were not uttered by Him either in Hebrew or in any other language, but all the discourses of God, written down by Moses and the prophets, are indications and expressions of the

divine will attributed to God.’

So also Jerome speaks of

Scripture as containing the word of God (verbum Dei) ;1*° still, following the rabbinic statement that “the same communication is revealed to many prophets, yet no two prophets

prophesy in the same style,” *°* he describes the differences of style in such prophets as Isaiah, Jeremiah, Hosea, and Amos, and explains them as individual differences not due to the Holy Spirit,’ and on similar human grounds he explains also the peculiarities of the style of the various writers of the books of the New Testament.’** Some of the Fathers say explicitly

that the language was chosen by the prophets themselves. Thus the pseudo-Justin Martyr says that the prophets “use with simplicity the words and expressions which offer themselves” to communicate to others “whatever the Holy Spirit which descended upon them, chose to teach through them,” *°7 25 In Canticum Canticorum, Homil. 1 (PG 44, 772 D). 81 Iy Verba, Faciamus Hominem, Orat.1

(PG 44, 272 cD).

188 Cont. Eunom. XII (PG 45, 997 cp); cf. Fragmenta (46, 1115 A-C). 18 In Ecclesiasten, on 3:12, 13 (PL 23, 1039 A). +64 Sanhedrin 89a. 5 Prgefatio in Isaiam (PL 28, 771 B); Prologus in Jeremiam (PL 28, 847 c); Praefatio in Ezechielem (PL 28, 938 p); In Amos, Prol. (PL 2 5, 990 A). 158 In Isaiam Ill, 6, 9 (PL 24, 98 c); Epist. 121, 10, ad Algasiam (PL 22,

1030). 17 Cohort. ad Gr. 35 (PG 6, 304 A).

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And so also does Augustine say, with regard to the inconsistencies in the Gospels, that, despite the fact that the Holy Spirit could have guided their authors in constructing narratives which would harmonize in every respect, for some unknown reason, which could be discovered only by the help of God, it “has left one historian at liberty to construct his narrative in one way, and another in a different fashion.” *°°

The Jewish conception of the Oral Law, both as a body of accumulated unwritten customs and beliefs and interpretations of the Written Law and as a method of eliciting from the Written Law that which was believed to be inherent in it, was also shared by the Fathers, but with the following difference. To the rabbis of the time of the Fathers, the Oral Law was that which was handed down to them by the Pharisees and it was they, as the successors of the Pharisees, who were en-

trusted with its further development. To the Fathers, the Oral Law was that which was handed down to them by Jesus and it was they, as the successors of Jesus, who were entrusted with its further development. This view is clearly stated by Clement

of Alexandria. Commenting upon the verse of Isaiah, “Take thee a strip of a large new roll and write thereon with a man’s

pen,” *°° he says: “The Spirit is prophesying that through the interpreation (é€nyjoews) of the Scripture there would come afterwards the sacred knowledge, which at that period was still unwritten, because not yet known, for it was spoken from the beginning to those only who understand. Now that the

Saviour has taught the apostles, the unwritten [interpretation] of the written [Law] has been handed down also to us, inscribed by the power of God on hearts new, according to the renovation of the book.” *° The implication of this passage is quite clear. At the time of Isaiah, there already existed a “sacred knowledge,” an Oral Law, which had been entrusted to a chosen few at the beginning, that is to say, at the time of the revelation of the Law of Moses. That Oral Law, further**° De Consensu Evangelistarum Il, 21, 52.

“ Isa.8:1 (LXX).

® Strom. VI, 15 ** ** (PG 9, 356 B).

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more, was not extraneous to the Written Law; it was implied in the Written Law, and it needed only the right kind of “in-

terpretation” to bring it out. Jesus it was who gave the right kind of interpretation of the Written Law, and this interpretation of his, which constitutes the true Oral Law, was handed down by him, through the apostles, to the subsequent spokesmen of Christianity. The same conception of an oral interpretation of the

Written Law which was transmitted by Jesus to his followers is to be found in Origen. Commenting on the verse, “The Scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat,” **! he says: “I think that those who understand and explain Moses according to the spiritual power, sit in Moses’ seat, but are not Scribes and Pharisees, but better than they. Such are Christ’s beloved disciples, who both interpret His word through the grace of God and find out things with a further meaning. Therefore, before Christ’s coming, they sat well in Moses’ seat, who interpreted Moses’ words well and according to reason. After

Christ’s coming, they sit in the seat of the Church, which is Christ’s seat and throne. As in Moses’ seat some sat ill, some

well; so also in the seat of the Church.” ?° This view that the New Testament is a sort of unfoldment of an Oral Law which was implied in the Old Testament 1s expressed succinctly by Augustine in his statement that “the New Testament reveals what was concealed in the Old.” ?®

It must, however, be added that it was not all of the Jewish Oral Law that was rejected. Those of the Fathers who had a knowledge of it, such as Origen and Jerome, accepted it and made use of it, in so far as it did not conflict with their Christian beliefs.1** UMatt: 23525 162 In Matth., Commentariorum Series 9 (PG 13, 1612 AB). 163 De Civ. Dei V, 18, 3.

2 Cf., e.g., M. Rahmer, Die hebraischen Traditionem in den Werken des Hieronymos (1861); L. Ginzberg, Die Haggada bei den Kirchenvitern, 1: Die Haggadah in den pseudo-Hieronymianischen “Quaestiones” (1899); G. Bardy, “Les traditions juives dans Poeuvre d’Origéne,” Revue Biblique, 34 (1925), 216-252.

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With regard to the existence of ideas, we shall state here, as a sort of preview, the salient points of our discussion of the

subject later in a special section of a chapter.*® On the one hand, the Fathers, as we shall see, adopted from Philo the belief that the Platonic ideas in their totality were contained in an incorporeal mind called Logos. That Logos to them either, as in Philo, existed from eternity within God and then, prior to the creation of the world, came to exist by the side of God or, in departure from Philo, existed from eternity by the side of God. Accordingly the Fathers may be said to have believed, like Philo, that the existence of ideas was a scriptural presupposition. But, on the other hand, as we shall also see, the Fathers, in departure from Philo, made the Logos, even after it came to exist by the side of God or during its eternal existence by the side of God, one with God, so that both of them form one simple and indivisible Godhead. Accordingly, the ideas contained in the Logos are said to be contained in the one simple and indivisible Godhead, and are no longer considered, as in Philo, as existing outside God. The question whether there are ideas outside those contained in the Logos and hence also outside the Godhead appears with the Fathers, as we shall see, as an entirely new and independent problem. *° Cf. below pp. 257-286.

CHAPTER HANDMAIDEN

IV

OF SCRIPTURE

In Puiro, the acceptance of certain scriptural presuppositions as a preamble of faith to serve as a criterion of the truth or the falsehood of any philosophic doctrine gave rise to his conception of the subordination of philosophy to Scripture —a subordination which, after the allegorical interpretation of Hagar and Sarah, is described by him as that of handmaid to mistress. The same conception of the subordination of philosophy to Scripture, symbolized allegorically by the figures of Hagar and Sarah, is also to be found in the Fathers. We shall select a few representative examples. One example is to be found in Clement of Alexandria. In one passage, following Philo’s use of the term “wisdom” in the sense of the revealed knowledge recorded in Scripture * and drawing also upon Philo’s statement that “just as the encyclical subjects contribute to the acquirement of philosophy, so does philosophy, to the getting of wisdom . . . and consequently, just as the encyclical culture is the bondwoman

(Sovdn) of philosophy, so also is philosophy the bondwoman

of wisdom,”? he says: “Just as the encyclical branches of study contribute to philosophy, which is their mistress, so also philosophy itself cooperates in the getting of wisdom...

Wisdom is therefore queen of philosophy, as philosophy is of preparatory culture.” * Then, in another passage, taking Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Sarah, the mistress, as symbolizing wisdom and of Hagar, the handmaid, as symbolizing the encyclical studies,* he reproduces, with a few slight verbal

changes, Philo’s version of Abraham’s words to Sarah °® as follows: “I embrace worldly culture as a younger maid and as

f

* Philo, I, pp. 147-149. ? Congr. 14, 79; cf. Philo, I, pp. 149-150. § Strom. I, 5° (PG 8, 721 B). * Congr. 14, 71-73. In Philo, I, p. 146, 1. 2, the term “philosophy” is to be

changed to “wisdom.” 5 Gen. 16:6; cf. Congr. 27, 154. “Fees

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a handmaid, but thy knowledge I honor and reverence as a full-grown mistress.” ° Another example is to be found in Origen. Commenting on the verse, “Then again Abraham took a wife; and her name was Keturah,” * and evidently acquainted with the rabbinic tradition that Keturah was only another name for Hagar,* and drawing also upon Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Hagar as symbolizing the encyclical studies,® he says: “If indeed besides that in which we are instructed by the Law we happen to come upon certain things in encyclical culture which seem to be extraneous to the Law, as, for example, literature, grammar, geometry, arithmetic, and dialectics, and if we bring all these extraneous objects of inquiry to the service of our own teachings and adopt them as aids in the instruction of our own Law, then we shall seem to have taken into matrimony these strange women, nay even concubines.” ”° A third example is to be found in Gregory of Nyssa, in his statement that secular knowledge is “a spouse of foreign stock” (7 e€ dhdogdAwv 6udlvyos), but still “ethical and physi-

cal philosophy may at some time become a wife (ovfvyés) and friend (Ay) and life-companion (kowwvds ris Cwis) to the higher life of religion, provided its progeny brings with it nothing of the foreign pollution.” ** Though the names Hagar and Sarah are not mentioned in this passage, they lurk behind it, and lurking behind it also are the scriptural verses, where “wisdom” is said to keep one from “a strange (dddorpias) woman” * and where marriage with heathen women is pro-

hibited for fear that their children might bring in heathen pollution.® These scriptural presuppositions constituting the preamble * Strom. I, 5” (PG 8, 725 B). Gen. 25:1. * Genesis Rabbah 61, 4. * Philo himself does not identify Keturah with Hagar, but following another Jewish tradition

(The Book of Jubilees 19:11; Tanhuma, Genesis: Hayye Sarah 5 and 8; Yalkut Shime‘oni, Job, 9004) takes Keturah to have been a third wife of Abraham (Virt. 38,207; Qu. in Gen. 1V, 147). “In Gen. Hom. XI, 2 (PG 12, 222 p-223 a); cf. J. Daniélou, Origéne, ps ai “ De Vita Moysis (PG 44, 336 D-337 A). * Prov. 7:5; cf. below p. 124, n.31. “Exod. 34:15-16; Deut. 7:3-4.

HANDMAIDEN

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99

of faith to which philosophy, according to both Philo and the Fathers, must accommodate itself, are not all of them to be regarded as mere arbitrary revelations whose truth cannot be demonstrated by reason. While indeed all of them are to be accepted as true, whether they can be demonstrated by reason or not, the possibility of their being demonstrated by reason is not excluded. In Philo, and so also in the Fathers, some of these

scriptural presuppositions, such as the existence of God, the creation of the world, and divine providence, have been treated as being subject to rational demonstration. Still more so are to Philo and to the Fathers all the other beliefs and practices prescribed in the Scriptures which they accepted as being divinely revealed. To all of them, the truth of these beliefs and the value of these practices could be established by human reason, even though it was not always that man was able to discover the reasons by which they could be established. But while Philo and the Church Fathers are all in agreement as to the subordination of philosophy to Scripture, or of reason

to faith, owing to certain differences in the religious situation between Hellenistic Judaism at the time of Philo and Christianity at the time of the Fathers, there arose certain differences between Philo and some of the Fathers as to the meaning and extent of that subordination of reason to faith.

In Alexandrian

Judaism, there were

renegades, but no

heretics. There were indeed individual differences of opinion

as to the use of philosophical allegorization of Scripture, and as to the extent of its use, but these never led to sectarianism.

Judaism at the time of Philo and the rise of Christianity, while tending more and more toward a rigidity of practice, showed no tendency toward a rigidity of thought. Within the framework of certain essential beliefs it allowed for a great variety of individual opinions. Philo’s conviction that the scriptural teachings can be demonstrated by reason, and his actual attempt to demonstrate them by reason, did not lead him to the view that the rationalization of Scripture is a religious obligation and hence it did not lead him to a condemnation of those

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who did not use it. Nor, on the other hand, were those of his contemporaries, whom he describes as literalists, led by their indifference to philosophic allegory to condemn the philosophic rationalization of Scripture as a religious offense. Thus when Philo tries to show that the literalists, by refusing to make use of philosophic allegorization, get themselves involved unconsciously in various inconsistencies,* he does not argue that their faith is therefore of an inferior kind and that they must therefore raise themselves, with the aid of philosophy, to a higher kind of religious faith. Similarly those literalists, as represented by Philo, while looking upon the philosophic rationalization of Scripture as something worthless and trivial, do not condemn it as harmful,*® even though they were aware of the existence among them of extreme allegorists

whose rationalization of Scripture led them to a disregard of its laws.1¢ Indeed Philo recognized the existence of various grades of religious belief, placing those who worship God out of love

above those who worship God out of fear.” But these two types of religious believers are not identified by him with those who rationalize Scripture and those who do not rationalize it. To him, as far as one can judge from his writings, the simple believer and the philosophic believer are both equally capable of serving God out of love. Again, when he insists that only those should be initiated into philosophical allegorization of Scripture who possess special moral and intellectual and

educational qualifications for it,** he does not — again, as far as we can judge from his writings — reduce those who remain outside the mysteries of philosophical allegorization to a lower rank of religious believers. In his writings, he is quite out-

spoken in his condemnation of those among Jews who used wrong philosophy,” but he has not the slightest word of condemnation for those who used no philosophy. Christianity, however, was torn by sects and heresies, and “Philo, I, pp. 59-61. * [bid., I, pp. 63-64.

*Ibid., I, pp. 66-70.‘ " Tbid., Il, p. 296.

Ibid., I, Pp- 52-55. * [bid., I, pp. 66-70; 83-85.

HANDMAIDEN

OF SCRIPTURE

IOI

those that were outvoted were anathematized. Rightly or wrongly, philosophy came to be held responsible for some of

the greatest of these heresies. What to do with philosophy,

which was thus regarded as the root of these heresies, became therefore a matter of deep concern to those who were engaged in the battle against heresies. Some of them thought that the elimination of philosophy from Christianity altogether would perhaps be the best way of checking the spread of heresy, but, since that was impossible, they satisfied themselves with the discouragement of the study of philosophy and with an insistence upon the self-sufficiency of faith and its complete independence of philosophy. Others thought that heresy could be best combated, not by the elimination of philosophy altogether, but by its transformation into a true Christian philosophy. But among these latter, differences of opinion appeared as to the relation between the Christianized true philosophy and simple faith untouched by philosophy. Thus the Fathers, all starting with the common principle of the subordination of philosophy to Scripture, fell into three groups with regard to the nature of that subordination. According to one group, simple faith in the teaching of Scripture

is sufficient; the search for philosophic demonstrations of matters in which one already believes diminishes their merit. According to a second group, the highest kind of faith is rational faith, and consequently, while simple faith has merit, faith supported by philosophic demonstrations has greater merit.

According to a third group, simple faith and rational faith are of equal merit. At the basis of the difference between these three groups, we shall try to show, is a difference as to the meaning of faith as used in Scripture, whether it means simple faith, of which the merit is either diminished or increased by philosophic rationalization, or whether it means both simple and rational faith. We shall designate the first of these views as the single faith theory, subdivided into the traditionalistic type and the rationalistic type, and the second of these views as the double faith theory.

CHAPTER SINGLE FAITH

V THEORIES

I. TERTULLIAN

As representative of the single faith theory of the traditional type we shall take Tertullian. To him, faith unadorned by reason or philosophy, even by that kind of philosophy which is in harmony with Christian teachings, is sufficient for salvation. : Starting in the same way as all other critics of philosophy, Tertullian repeats the two common charges which were raised against it even by those who recommended its study. First, philosophy “pretends to know the truth, whilst it only corrupts it, and is itself divided into its own manifold heresies, by the variety of its mutually repugnant sects.” * Second, its false doctrines are responsible for heresies within Christianity.” But, then, going beyond other critics, he begins to denounce the study of philosophy. Drawing upon Paul’s warning

to the Colossians, “Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit,” * he takes it as a warning against the study of Greek philosophy and its use even as an aid to Scripture. He exclaims therefore: “What indeed has Athens to

do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? . . . Our instruction comes from ‘the porch of Solomon,’ * who had himself taught that ‘the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart.’ ® Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition!” ® He is moreover opposed to the notion, which he describes

as unbelief, that Christianity “is not really a thing divine, but rather a kind of philosophy.” Christianity differs from philosophy both in its “knowledge” and in its “ways.” “So, then,” * De Praescr. Haer. 7; cf. De Animaz. *Col. 2:8. * De Praescr. Haer. 7. Acts 32015, 6212: 5 Wisd. 1:1. ° De Praescr. Haer. 7.

* Apol. 46.

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103

he adds, “where is there a likeness between the Christian and

the philosopher? . . . between the disciple of Greece and of heaven?” ® He hence concludes: “We want no curious dis-

putation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enpoying the Gospel. When we believe (credimus), we desire

nothing beyond it to believe (credere).”® The self-sufficiency of faith is strikingly expressed by him in a passage where, dealing with the death and burial and resurrection of him whom he held to be the Son of God, he says that “it is by all means to be believed, because it is senseless” (prorsus credibile est, quia

ineptum est) and that “the fact is certain, because it is impossible” (certum est, quia impossibile est).1° It is on the basis of these statements that Tertullian is generally quoted as saying: “I believe, because it is absurd” (credo, quia absurdum est).

This is clear-cut and decisive. He then proceeds to develop this view further. Indeed to seek after the truth is implied in

Jesus’ saying, “Seek, and ye shall find.” ” But this does not mean that men who have faith should seek after philosophy; it only means that those who have no faith must seek after faith,

and the search must come to an end with the finding of faith, for “your object, therefore, in seeking object in finding was to believe.” * To philosophy when one has already come would imply, he says, that “I either had

was to find; and your continue to seek after into possession of faith not believed, although

I apparently had become a believer; or else have ceased to believe.” But to have ceased to believe, he continues, means a desertion of faith, and “if I thus desert my faith, I am found to be a denier thereof.” And inasmuch as it means a desertion 8 Ibid. ° De Praescr. Haer. 7. De Carne Christi 5; cf. De Baptismo 2: “Indeed, if, because it is wonderful, it be therefore not believed, it ought on that account all the more to be believed”

(atquin eo magis credendum, si, quia mirandum

est, idcirco non

creditur). “Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages

(1955), P» 45.

2 De Praescr. Haer. 8; cf. Matt. 7:7. 8 Ibid. 10 (cf. De Test. Animae 8-9).

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and denial of faith, the search after philosophic demonstration on the part of a believer, he wants us to conclude, cannot pass with impunity, for “with impunity,” as he has said earlier in his discussion, “rambles [only] he who deserts nothing.” ** By his withholding impunity from believers who seek after philosophic demonstrations for their faith he means, we take it, that they suffer diminution in the merit of their faith, for, later in Christianity, whenever the use of philosophic demonstration in matters of faith was discountenanced, the diminution of merit was specifically mentioned as its possible harmful consemences” Going still further, Tertullian sees no useful purpose even in the attempts of those apologists who tried to find parallels to Christian teachings. All such efforts, he argues, are wasted upon the Gentiles, for “the unbelieving hardness of the human heart leads them to slight even their own teachers otherwise approved and in high renown, whenever they touch upon arguments which are used in defense of Christianity.” 1* He therefore resolves to have nothing to do with philosophic literature, declaring that “we shall lay no stress on it, if some of their authors have declared that there is one God, and one God only.” Despite all this, Tertullian himself does not hesitate to make use of the philosophic knowledge which he had acquired before he became converted to Christianity in explaining or demonstrating Christian beliefs. In his discussion of the proofs of the existence of God, for instance, he draws upon the Stoic proof of universal assent.1* Similarly in his contention that God is corporeal, he draws upon the Stoic repudiation of the notion of incorporeality for his support.!® In his attempt to explain to non-Christians the Christian conception of the Logos as the creator of the world, he explicitly says: “It is OI bid. 11. *Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol. Il, Il, 2, 10. Cf. also quotation from

Gregory the Great below p. 139, n. 68. * De Test. Animae 1.

" Ibid.

* Cf. below Vol. II, in the chapter on the proofs of the existence of God. * Cf. below Vol. II, in the chapter on divine predicates.

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105

abundantly plain that your philosophers, too, regard the Logos — that is, the Word and Reason —as the Creator of the universe,” and he then proceeds to mention Zeno and Cleanthes.”° In his discussion of the problem of triunity, he

explicitly says that “the simple, indeed, —I will call them unwise and unlearned, — who always constitute the majority

of believers . . . are startled at the dispensation [of the Three in One],” ** and when he consequently undertakes to explain this mystery of the Trinity, his explanation is couched in terms and notions borrowed from philosophic literature.” Similarly his conception of the soul is unfolded by him against the background of the various philosophic conceptions.” And so throughout his writings he draws upon all the philosophic writings that were known to him. He even openly admits that “philosophers have sometimes taught the same things as ourselves.” 74 The conclusion to be drawn from Tertullian’s apparently contradictory statements is that in a strict sense faith is the ac-

ceptance of the teaching of Scripture on mere authority. Such simple faith is sufficient for salvation. The search after philosophic demonstration, and the use of it, on the part of those who are already in possession of faith diminishes the merit of the faith. Should one, however, who had acquired a knowledge of philosophy before he came into possession of faith wish to use it for apologetical or pedagogical purposes in the explanation of faith, he may do so without suffering any

diminution in the merit of his faith. Tertullian himself, as we have seen, even though he did not believe in the utility of such effort, did not hesitate to explain Christian doctrines by

the philosophic knowledge which he happened to have acquired before his conversion; and it is hardly conceivable that he believed that he had suffered a diminution in the merit of his faith whenever he did so. Similarly should one, who is not as yet in possession of faith, happen to come into possession » Apol. 21 (PL 1, 398 4-399 A). ™ Adv. Prax. 3. ” Cf. below pp. 322-332.

* Ibid. 2.

* De Anima 5 ff.

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of it by way of philosophic reasoning, he would enjoy the full merit of his faith, for it is reasonable to assume that those philosophic explanations which Tertullian used for his Christian doctrines after his conversion had also helped him to come to the belief of them before his conversion and that the faith which he had thus acquired was not of a lesser merit. II. Or1GEN

Quite the opposite of the view of Tertullian is that of Origen.’ “There is a great difference,” he says, “between knowledge conjoined with faith (murrevew éyywxévar) and faith only (murrevew pdvov).” ® The former is to him superior, for, he maintains, “in agreement with the spirit of Christianity, it is of much more importance to give our assent to doctrines upon grounds of reason and wisdom than on that of faith only.” ® “Tt is only in certain circumstances,” he continues, “that the latter course was desired by Christianity, in order not to leave men altogether without help.” * Quoting Paul’s saying that, “seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God’s good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe,” ° he infers that “it is by the wisdom of God that God ought to be known.” ® Paul’s warning to the Colossians to beware lest any man spoil them “through philosophy and vain deceit” * is taken by him to refer only to such views of philosophers “which are plausible in the eyes of the many, but which represent falsehood as truth”;§ it is not a condemnation of philosophy as such. As Philo, who describes those who enter upon the philosophical interpretation of Scripture as being *Literature: Jules Leberton, “Les Degrés de la Connaissance religieuse d’aprés Origenes.” Recherches de science religieuse, 12 (1922), 265-296; Jean Daniélou, Origéne (1948), pp. 85-134. *In Joan. XIX, 1 (PG 14, 529 c); ed. Preuschen, XIX, 3, 20). “Cont. Cels \a13. ‘Cont. Gelsal, 13. ‘ Tbid. *Colha=8: SSR @ OL. wie. Te ® Cont. Cels. I, Praef. 5.

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initiated into allegory and philosophical allegory itself as a mystery,’ Origen uses the terminology of the mysteries in

describing the distinction between those who have simple faith and those who are philosophers in their religion. The former, those who only believe (awo7evovres), are described

by him as those who are learning the rudiments (cicaydpevor), whereas the latter, those who are philosophers in religion, are

described by him as those who are perfect (rédewor).2° The Greek terms eisagomenoi and teleioi used in this passage are technical terms taken from the language of the mysteries. With this general conception of the superiority of rational faith to simple faith, Origen proceeds to explain why it is to be considered superior. He gives three reasons: First, those of simple faith may prove to be less firm in their beliefs than those of rational faith. The former, he argues, “have believed by reason of miracles” and hence “they may soon fall, being deceived by their own sophisms or by those of others, who will represent to them the miracles as not having taken place in truth and reality.” The latter are those who believe by reason of “the knowledge concerning God” or “the intelligence they received from God,” and these will not easily be deceived.** Second, reflecting the qld distinction made in rabbinic

Judaism ” and in Philo” between the love of God and the fear of God and the generally accepted view as to the inferiority of the latter to the former,™* he describes the simple believers as those who adhere to God “through fear and dread

of future judgment” (pro metu et timore futuri judici) and the perfect as those who adhere to Him “through love” (pro caritate) .*° * Philo, I, pp. 48, 116.

In Matth. XII, 30 (PG 13, 1049 A). 4 In Joan., Fragm. 33 (ed. E. Preuschen, p. 509). * Cf. Philo, I, p. 287. * [bid., 1, pp. 296-297. 2 Oret law Vol. II, in the chapter on ethical theory.

* In Genes, Hom. VIL, 4 (PG 12, 201 B).

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Third, reflecting Philo’s classification of the commandments into moral and intellectual and his view that both these are

required for theperfect religious life,16 describes he those of simple faith as making use only of “common admonitions to

the people” (communibus ad populum monitis) and as being able to treat of “only a moral subject which pertains to modes

of behavior”

(moralem tantummodo

locum, qui ad mores

pertinet), whereas the perfect are in possession of the “knowledge of mysteries” (scientiam secretorum) and are able to

discuss expertly and cautiously on the “faith of God (de fide Dei), the mystery of Christ (de mysterio Christi), and the

unity of the Holy Spirit (de Sancti Spiritus unitate).” Finally, another kind of distinction between two grades of believers, the like of which he may have also drawn between simple and rationalist believers, is to be found in his comment on the verse, “One thing have I desired of the Lord, that I will seek after: that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life; that I may contemplate the delight of the Lord and visit His temple.” ** Taking the term “house” to refer to the Church, he finds among those who are within the Church two grades of believers, one who may only contemplate the delight of the Lord and the other who may also visit His temple. “But,” he says, “one contemplates the delight of the Lord when one sees the fundamental dogmas of the Church, but, on applying oneself to those of the Trinity, one will inspect all round His temple.” 7° Still, simple faith, though inferior to rational faith, is not without merit. In answer to Celsus, who maintained that “ adopting opinions we should follow reason and a rational guide, since he who assents to opinions without following this course is very liable to be deceived,” Origen, while admitting, as we have seen, that simple believers are liable to be deceived,”® still argues in their favor. “If it were possible,” he *° Cf. Philo, Il, pp. 200 ff.

* In Levit. Hom. XIII, 3 (PG 12, 548 as).

mus se27cae * Selecta in Psalmos XXVI, Vers. 4 (PG. 12, 1280 B).

* Cf. above p. 107.

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says, “for all to leave the business of life, and devote themselves to philosophy, no other method ought to be adopted by anyone, but this alone . . . But since the course alluded to is impossible, partly on account of the necessities of life, partly on account of the weakness of men, as only a very few individuals devote themselves earnestly to study,” it is better for the great multitude of men “to believe without a reason” and “on the strength of mere faith” rather than to wait “until they could give themselves to a thorough examination of the necessary reasons,” and in the meantime “continue to remain in the practice of a wicked life.” Simple faith, even when not

grounded upon reason, has in it the power to cause men to improve their way of life.?* Tertullian and Origen, despite the difference in their attitude towards the rationalization of Scripture and also the difference in their estimation of the relative value of simple faith and rationalized faith, hold the same view with regard to the meaning of the term faith. Both of them deal with the term faith as a scriptural concept. To both of them faith means, as

it generally means in Judaism and also in the New Testa-

ment,”* the acceptance of the teachings of the Scriptures. The difference between them consists only in this. To Tertullian, faith as used in Scripture means only the acceptance of the teachings of Scripture, and this kind of faith is sufficient for

all men; to Origen, while indeed faith as used in Scripture means the acceptance of its teachings, this kind of faith is

sufficient only for simple people; those who are capable of philosophic studies must learn to support their faith by philo-

sophic demonstrations. The meaning of the term faith, however, is not thereby changed for Origen; it still retains for him that single meaning of mere acceptance. That this is the view of Tertullian is quite evident from the

general drift of the passages we have quoted from his writings. * Cont. Cels. I, 9. * Cf. above p. 8.

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But that this is also a true representation of the view of Origen

may be supported by three passages. In one passage, already quoted above, he draws a distinction

between “knowledge conjoined with faith” and “faith only,” *° with the implication that the term faith has a certain fixed and definite meaning with which knowledge may be either joined or not. In another passage, again already quoted above, he says that “in agreement with the spirit of Christianity, it is of much more importance to give our assent to doctrines upon grounds of reason and wisdom than on faith only,” ** with the implication that as distinguished from the term “faith” (ators) there is the term “assent” (cvyxardfeows), which may be based either on “faith only” or on “reason and wisdom,” evidently conjoined with “faith.” In a third passage, after quoting Celsus’ statement that “faith, having beforehand taken possession of our soul, produces such an assent to Jesus,” Origen remarks that, “in truth, it is faith which does produce such an

assent,” and then proceeds to show how to have faith in the Gospels is a justifiable basis for assent to Jesus,”° the implication being again that there is a distinction between “faith” and “assent.”

From all these passages we may gather three conclusions with regard to Origen’s use of the term faith. First, the term faith is to be distinguished from the term assent. Second, assent may be based upon faith only, in which case we may say it is

identical with faith, or it may be based upon faith conjoined with reason, wisdom, or knowledge. Third, in either case it is faith which produces assent, in one case producing it di-,

rectly and in the other case producing it by means of reason,

wisdom, or knowledge. As we happen to know, and as in the course of our discussion we shall reproduce the source of this our knowledge, that “assent” is a philosophic term, we may

conclude that Origen in the passages on faith and assent means to say, first, that the scriptural term faith, which means the * In Joan. XIX, 1 (PG 14, 529 c); ed. Preuschen, XIX, 3, 20. * Cont. Cels. 1413. * Ibid. Ill, 39.

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acceptance of the scriptural doctrines without any demonstration is to be contrasted with the philosophical term assent, which means the acceptance of any kind of doctrine either

without demonstration or with demonstration; and, second, that, though in Scripture “faith” does not imply demonstration, it is still in accordance with the spirit of Christianity to conjoin with faith, reason, wisdom, and knowledge, and to raise it to what philosophers call assent.

CHAPTER DOUBLE

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FAITH THEORY

IN CONTRADISTINCTION to the view of both Tertullian and Origen is the view of Clement of Alexandria. According to his view, we shall try to show: (1) there is a term “faith” in philosophy corresponding to the same term in Scripture; (2) the philosophic term “faith” is identical with the philosophic term “assent”; (3) the philosophic term “faith” as well as the philosophic term “assent” has a twofold meaning, namely, the acceptance of some doctrine without rational demonstration and the acceptance of some doctrine as a result of its having

been rationally demonstrated; (4) the scriptural term “faith” similarly has a twofold meaning; (5) there are thus two kinds of “faith” with reference to the acceptance of the teachings

of Scripture; (6) these two kinds of “faith” are of equal merit. But before we take up our discussion of Clement, we shall try to build up the historical background of his double faith theory. I. Tue ARIsTOTELIAN “FaritH” AND Stoic “AssENT” *

The particular use of the term faith in Greek philosophic literature, which is necessary for our purpose as the historical background for the use of that term later in the various religious literatures, occurs first in Aristotle. In Plato, the term faith is used only as a designation of a special kind of know]edge in his general scheme of dividing knowledge into sensa-

tion (aic@yors), opinion (8d€a), and scientific knowledge (émuornpun).” Faith (iors) to him, together with conjecture * This and the next section are reprinted, with some revisions, from the Jewish Quarterly Review, N. S., 33 (1942), 215-230, where they appeared as parts of an article entitled “The Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas, and Its Origin in Aristotle and the Stoics.” * Theaet. 187 a ff.; cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. Il, 1‘, p. 588 (Plato and the Older Academy, p. 171); Grote, Plato, Il, p. 374, n. 1.

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(cixacia), is a subdivision of opinion.? Now in Aristotle, the term faith is still sometimes used in the sense of a special kind of knowledge, in such a passage as that, for instance, in which he says that faith is a vehement assumption (i7dAnus opodpd),°

assumption itself being used by him as somewhat the equivalent of opinion or as a sort of opinion.* But from many other passages in which Aristotle speaks of faith, we may gather that he also uses that term not in the sense of a particular kind of knowledge by the side of the other kinds of knowledge, but rather in the sense of a judgment of the truth of all the other kinds of knowledge, that is to say, as a judgment that the knowledge we have of a thing, be it sensation or opinion or scientific knowledge, corresponds to the reality of a thing— correspondence to reality being that which, according to him, constitutes truth.® In this new sense of the term, faith would seem to be regarded by Aristotle, in its relation to the various types of

knowledge, in the same way as he looks upon consciousness in its relation to the knowledge of sense-perception. With regard to consciousness, he says that “there is also a kind of

common faculty that is associated with all the particular senses,

by the virtue of which a person is conscious (aio@dverav) that he sees and hears.” ® Similarly with regard to faith, he could

have said, though he does not explicitly say so, that there is a certain faculty of judgment in the mind, by virtue of which a person comes to believe and to be certain that the knowledge he possesses is true. Thus, speaking of what he calls indemon-

strable and immediately known “primary premises” (dpxat), he says, “things are true and primary which obtain faith (riorw) not on the strength of anything else but of themselves.” 7 Again, speaking of opinion, of which he says that * Zeller, op. cit., p. 592sn. 6 (p. 174, n. 14). * Top. IV, 5; 126b, 18 “Cf. J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, IV, 3, 1139b, 17 (II, 34); J. Geyser, Die Erkenntnistheorie des Aristoteles, pp. 147-149. 5 Metaph. IV, 7, 1011b, 27. ® De Somno, 2, 455a, 15-16; cf. De An. III, 2, 425b, 12. 7 Top. I, 1, 100a, 30-100b, 18.

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“it may be true or false,” ® he also says that “opinion is attended by faith, for it is impossible to hold opinions without faith in them,”® and “further, every opinion implies faith

(iors), faith implies persuasion (76 memeto Oar), and persuasion implies reason (Adyos).” *° Finally, referring to sensation and demonstrative reasoning, he says that “faith is not only on the strength of sensation but also on the strength of reason

(Adyov)” 1 or that “faith concerning this is from induction and syllogistic proof.” ¥ From all these passages we may gather, then, that by faith in this new sense of the term Aristotle means the consciousness of the certainty of the truth of our knowledge, and that this consciousness of certainty, called faith, may, according to him, be associated with two kinds of knowledge: (1) an immediate kind of knowledge, such as’ sensation and primary premises, and (2) a derivative kind of knowledge, such as that which is based on reason. Though of this latter kind of knowledge, to which Aristotle says that the term faith is applicable, he mentions explicitly “opinion,” but does not mention “scientific knowledge,” yet from his statement that faith follows syllogistic reasoning one would be justified in inferring that the term “faith” would apply also to scientific knowledge (émorHun), for scientific knowledge, to him, is the conclusion

(cupmépacpa) of a syllogistic proof.1* Indeed, conclusions in scientific proofs, unlike opinions, are said by Aristotle to follow from their premises by necessity,"* and hence their accept-

ance would seem to imply no persuasion. On the basis of this, one would therefore be tempted to say that, unlike opinion,

scientific knowledge is not a matter of faith, for the latter, as

Aristotle himself says, does imply persuasion.’® But the persuasion which Aristotle says is implied in faith is itself said by ° De An. Il, 3, 428a, 19.

[bid., 22-23.

® Tbid., 19-21. “Phys. VIL, 8, 262a, 18-19. * De Soph. Elench., 4, 165b, 27-28; Anal. Post. Il, 3, gob, 14; Top. I, 8, 103b, 7. * Eth. Nic. VI, 3, 1139b, 31-36.

* Ibid. 18-24; Metaph. V, 5, 1015b, 6-9; cf. below n. 29. * Cf. above n. 10.

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him to imply reason,’ and nowhere does he say that this is to be only a faulty kind of reason and one which is to lead only to an inconclusive demonstration and hence only to opinion. On the contrary, it may be also that sound kind of reason which leads to a conclusive demonstration and hence to scientific knowledge. The very fact that he applies the term faith to primary premises whose truth is self-evident argues for the assumption that he would also apply it to conclusions which follow from primary premises. Still, despite all this, it is true that explicitly Aristotle does

not use the term faith with reference to scientific knowledge; only the terms sensation, opinion, and primary premises are explicitly used by him in this connection. The fact that Aristotle always speaks of faith as a judgment of the truth of our knowledge, and never as a judgment of the goodness of our desires, would seem to indicate that, according to him, faith was only a function of the speculative

intellect (vods Pewpyrixds), for it is the speculative intellect to which he ascribes the power to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the abstract." It would not be a function, accord-

ing to him, of the practical intellect (vods zpaxruxds), to which

he ascribes the power to distinguish between what is good and desirable and what is not good and undesirable.* And if we are right in this conclusion that Aristotle considered faith as a function of the speculative intellect only, and not of the practical intellect, then we would be right also in concluding that Aristotle did not make faith dependent upon free choice

(rpoatpeois) or will (BovAnous), for free choice and will, according to him, are the result of the codperation of practical intellect with desire.® In fact, we find that at least in one place Aristotle makes use of another term as a designation of the judgment of the practical intellect as to the desirability or the

good of a thing. In that one passage, speaking of the method

28 Ibid.

" Eth, Nic. VI, 2, 11394, 27-28; cf. De An. Il, 9, 432b, 27 ff. 8 Eth. Nic. VI, 2, 11398, 29-31; cf. De An. III, 10, 433a, 15 ff. ” Eth. Nic. VI, 2, 1139a, 21-26; cf. De An. III, 10, 433a, 22-25.

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of determining “which is the more desirable, or better, of two or more things,” *° he says that “our reasoning faculty (Sudvoua) will agree or assent (cvyxaraOycerar), that whichever side happens to excel is the more desirable.” ** According to this passage, then, the judgment of the mind that a thing, on account of its superior excellency, is more desirable and better,

is not a matter of faith but rather one of assent (ovyxardfeors) and that this assent is in our reasoning faculty (diévo.a), which term is undoubtedly used in this passage in the sense of the practical intellect. This analysis of Aristotle’s conception of faith, based upon carefully selected and controlled texts, could furnish us with all the necessary historical background for the problem which we have undertaken to investigate. But it happens that, by the time the problem of faith in its religious sense makes its appearance, the Aristotelian view has already become combined with similar views propounded by the Stoics. Let us then see what was the Stoic view, and how it became combined with that of Aristotle. In the literature which records the teachings of the Stoics, only one definition of faith is to be found. It is said of them

that they defined faith as “a strong assumption (émddybes ioxupa), confirming that which is assumed.” ?? Now this is nothing but a reproduction of Aristotle’s statement that faith is a “vehement assumption,” ** which we have quoted above

and which, as we have pointed out, refers to faith as a special kind of knowledge by the side of sensation, opinion, and scientific knowledge. Of the use of faith in the sense of a judgment of the truth of all the kinds of knowledge, such as we have

found in Aristotle, the Stoics do not speak. They do speak, however, of assent (ovyxardHeors) as being such a judgment. * Top. Ill, 1, t16a, 3. #1[bid., 11-12. ™ Stobaeus, Eclogae II, 7 (II, p. 112, 1. 12, ed. Wachsmuth); Arnim, Stoicorum V eterum Fragmenta, Ill, 548 (p. 147, l. 11). * Cf. above n. 3. Wachsmuth’s change of trédnYus to xarédnyis in the Eclogae (loc. cit.), which is adopted by Arnim (loc. cit.), is therefore unnecessary.

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In Aristotle, as we have seen, the term assent, as a verb, is used with reference to the judgment of the practical intellect as to whether a thing is desirable and good. What the Stoic seems to have done here, therefore, is to extend the meaning of that term so as to include also the meaning of Aristotle’s term faith and thus to use it as a judgment of the truth of a thing as well as a judgment of the goodness of a thing. This extension on the part of the Stoics of the meaning of the Aristotelian term “assent” so as to include both the judgments of practical intellect and the judgments of speculative intellect has led them to speak of assent as an act of free will

(éd’ jpiv),?* even when it is used in the sense of Aristotle’s use of the term faith, namely, as a judgment of truth. This would seem to be a departure from Aristotle. To Aristotle,

“assent,” as a judgment of the good of a thing, is indeed an act of free will, for virtue is defined by him as an act of deliberate choice (zpoatpeots),”> but, as for “faith,” he would

probably say that it is an act of deliberate choice only when applied to opinion, of which he says that it implies “persuasion.” *° With reference, however, to scientific knowledge, to

which the term faith is undoubtedly applied by him,” he would probably say that it is not an act of deliberate choice, for the determination of truth is, according to him, an act of the speculative intellect, in contradistinction to deliberate choice which is an act of the practical intellect.?* Furthermore, he explicitly says that demonstrations by which the conclusions of scientific knowledge are established belong to those

things which are necessary and that similarly the conclusions in such demonstrations, by reason of the fact that they cannot be otherwise, must likewise be necessary.” Still this difference between the Stoics and Aristotle is not of real significance. Cf. Index to Arnim, p. 136, col. 1, Il. 7-12; Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. Ml, 1‘, p. 84, n. 1 (Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics’, p. 88, n. 1). > Eth. Nic. Il, 6, 1106b, 36—11072, 2.

8 Cf. above n. ro. 27 Cf, above text at n. 16 ff. 6 Cf, above nn. 17, 18.

Metaph. V, 5, 1015b, 7-8; 1015a, 33-35.

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The free will which the Stoics attribute to the act of assenting to the truth of our knowledge does not mean a freedom of choice in an absolutely undetermined sense. Their freedom of choice in the assent to the true, like Aristotle’s freedom of choice in the assent to the good, merely means a choice free from any perceptible external compulsion and one which is made by the agent with a full knowledge of the rightness or wrongness of his act.*° In this case, as in many other cases, one

may quote Cicero’s statement to the effect that the difference between the Stoics and Aristotle is only one of terminology.** With the extension of the meaning of the term assent to include under it what Aristotle calls faith, the Stoics use this term as a judgment of truth with reference to all those immediate and derivative kinds of knowledge in relation to which Aristotle uses the term faith. With reference to sensation, they say that “all sensation is an assent,” ** or that the perception by the senses “cannot take place without assent.” ** Similarly with reference to indemonstrable primary premises, they say that “the notions of things” (notitiae rerum), in the same way as memory and art, can have no existence without assent.** And so also with reference to acquired knowledge, they are reported to have said that “all opinion (8é€a) and judgment (kpious) and assumption (d7ddyyus) and learning (udOyors), by which we live and have perpetual intercourse with the human race, is an assent.” ** By this they mean to say that assent may be given to any kind of acquired true knowledge, whether only probably true, such as opinion, judgment, and assumption, or also demonstratedly true, such as learning,** © Cf. Zeller, op. cit., III, 14, p- 205 (p. 217): J. S. Reid, M. Tulli Ciceronis Academica, p. 223, note to I, 20. * De Finibus IV, 9, 21. * Aetius, Placita IV, 8, 12; Arnim, op. cit., Il, 72. * Cicero, Academica Priora Il, 12, 37; Academica Posteriora I, 11, 40; Arnim, op. cit., II, 35, 123 I, 19, 1-3. * Cicero, Academica Priora Il, 12, 38; Arnim, op. cit., II, 11 Ge

* Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II, 12% (PG 8, 992 c). “The term pdOnors Suavonrixh in Anal. Post. I, 1, 71a, 1, is undoubtedly used by Aristotle in the sense of érioriun, which he discusses subsequently

in 2, 71b, 9 ff.

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thus reflecting the views of two Stoic teachers, one that assent may be given even to a reasonable probability (76 evdoyov) * and the other that there is “a plurality of standards of truth, namely, intelligence, sense perception, appetency, and scien-

tific knowledge (émue77un),” ** with the implication that assent may be given to all of them, including scientific knowledge. These then are the essential elements in the discussion of faith in Greek philosophy as a purely epistemological term. The salient point in this conception of faith is that it is of a double nature. It may be faith with reference to something immediately known as true without any demonstration, such, for instance, as sense-perception and primary premises, or it may be faith with reference to something known by demonstration, such as opinion and undoubtedly also scientific knowl-

edge. Now it was quite natural for Christian and Jewish and Moslem philosophers, to whom revelation was a new immediate source of knowledge in addition to the sources enumerated by the Greek philosophers, and to whom the teachings of

Scripture, while having their origin in revelation, could also be demonstrated by reason, to raise the question whether faith

in these teachings, which is enjoined by Scripture itself, means the same as the term faith used in philosophy or whether it means something else. In the former case, it would have a double meaning, namely, assent to the teachings of Scripture both as immediately known by revelation and as derivatively known by demonstration. In the latter case, it would have only a single meaning, namely, assent to the teachings of Scripture

only as immediately known by revelation. But if the scriptural

term faith was taken to have only a single meaning, it was also quite natural for them to raise the question whether the addition of rational demonstration diminished the merit of the faith or enhanced it. * Diogenes, VII, 177. =Thid:, Vil, 54:

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II. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

The first to apply this Aristotelian double the problem of the relation of philosophy Clement of Alexandria. He is also the first Aristotelian term faith with the Stoic term speaks of faith as an assent of the soul (wuxis

faith theory to to Scripture is to combine the assent. He thus ovyKcardbeors) *

and, reflecting more closely Aristotle’s statement that “our reasoning faculty (Sidvoi) will assent (ovyxarabjcerar),” he uses also the expression “an assent of the reasoning faculty”

(cvyxatdbeors Siavoias).? Once, after quoting in the name of the Stoics their statement that “all opinion and judgment and assumption and learning . . . is an assent,” he adds “which

is nothing else than faith.” * Again, following also maintains that assent is an act of choice or that it is voluntary (€éxovovos),° or that it is will (aire€ovouos),° or that it is in our power

the Stoics, he (poaipeous),* exercising free (颒 jyiv).” In

this instance, however, though the language used by Clement is the same as that of the Stoics, its meaning is different. To the Stoics, free will merely means an act free of external compulsion and based upon knowledge. To Clement it means, as it does to Philo, real freedom which man enjoys as a gift from God.® His assertion, therefore, that assent is a voluntary act really means that we are absolutely free either to believe that a thing is true or not to believe that it is true. Again, as faith in Aristotle and assent in the Stoics, so also

faith which is assent in Clement is a judgment of the truth of our knowledge, whether it be of the immediate kind of knowledge or of the demonstrative kind. With regard to the

application of the term faith to immediate knowledge, such * Strom. V, 13% (PG 9, 128 A). * Ibid. VII, 5** (9, 581 A). * Strom. II, 12° (PG 8, 992 c); cf. above p. 118. This seems to be Clement’s

own addition. It is so taken by Arnim quotation from the Stoics.

* Strom. II, 2° (8, 940 B). ® Ibid. V, 13° (9, 128 A). ® Ibid. V, 1° (9, 12 c).

(II, 292), who does not include it as a

" Ibid. Il, 12™ (8, 992 c). *Cf. Philo, I, pp. 224 ff.

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as what Aristotle calls “primary premises” and the Stoics as well as the Epicureans call “preconceptions,” he makes the

following statement: “Epicurus, too, who very greatly preferred pleasure to truth assumes faith to be a preconception of the mind (apéAnpus Svavoias); and defines preconception to be a grasping at something evident, and at the clear understanding of a thing; and asserts that without preconception, no one can either inquire, or doubt, or opine, or even argue.” ® With regard to derivative knowledge, we have already quoted his restatement of the Stoic use of the term assent with reference to learning, to which he adds the statement that it is “nothing else than faith.” ?° But it is quite certain that Clement understood Aristotle as

having used the term faith also with reference to that kind of derivative knowledge which is technically known as scientific knowledge, for he states the following in the name of Aris-

totle: “Aristotle says that the judgment (xptua) which follows scientific knowledge (émuor7jyy) is in truth faith. Accordingly, faith is more decisive than scientific knowledge, and is its criterion. Conjecture (eikaoia), which is only a feeble assumption (dodevijs dds), counterfeits faith.” * In this passage, his reference to “feeble assumption” as that which “counterfeits faith,” evidently reflects Aristotle’s statement, quoted above, that faith is a “vehement assumption.” ”” His statement, however, in the name of Aristotle that faith may also apply to scientific knowledge is not found in Aristotle. As we have shown, there is no direct statement in Aristotle to that effect, though it can be indirectly inferred from some of his statements.’ However, the expression “faith of scientific knowledge (mioris émoriyns),” used as the equivalent of “demonstration” and “syllogism” and “conclusion” derived from generally admitted propositions, is attributed to the Pythagoreans.14 That Clement himself accepted the use of the term ° Strom. II, 4°° (8, 948 B). ™ Strom. Il, 4° (8, 945 Cc).

Cf. above, at n. 3.

Cf. above, p. 113, n. 3, and PG 8, 947, n. 62. *® Cf. above, pp. 114-115. * Aetius, Placita I, 3, 8.

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faith with reference to scientific knowledge is quite evident. But how he could reconcile his own definition of faith as a voluntary assent with Aristotle’s conception of scientific knowledge as knowledge which follows by necessity as conclusions from the primary premises,” may only be conjectured. He would probably say that the human mind in its absolute freedom can refuse assent even to conclusions which follow by necessity from their premises, and consequently, when it does assent to them, the assent may be called voluntary. Thomas Aquinas has another view on this point.*® Faith with reference to derivative knowledge is thus, according to Clement, of two kinds, namely, either of opinion or of scientific knowledge. Now, according to Aristotle, opinion may be either true or false, whereas scientific knowledge, strictly speaking, refers only to knowledge which is true.” It is evidently with reference to this distinction between opin-

ion and scientific knowledge that faith is described by Clement as being twofold (ir74), the faith of scientific knowledge (émuornuovixy) and the faith of opinion (d0€acrnKy).'® The former is a faith in knowledge which is true, whereas the latter is a faith in knowledge which may be either true or false. This, then, is Clement’s restatement, in Stoic terms, of Aristotle’s conception of faith as a purely epistemological term. Coming now to faith in its religious sense, Clement defines it primarily as “obedience to the commandments.” ?® Such an obedience to the commandments is also described by him as the grasping of the teachings of Scripture “by faith,” in the same way as one grasps an “indemonstrable primary premise,” for, like a “primary premise,” the teachings of Scripture are self-evidently true, inasmuch as they have been given to us

“by the voice of the Lord.” ® Faith, in its religious sense, * Cf. above, p. 114, nn. 13, 14. * Cf. Sum. Theol. Il, Il, 1, 4c and sc; Il, Il, 2, 1c; and cf. my paper “The Double Faith Theory, etc.,” op. cit. (above p. 00, n.*), pp. 252 ff. * Cf, Eth. Nic. VI, 3, 1139b, 16-18; Anal. Post. Il, 19, roob, 11-12. *8Strom. Il, 11 (8, 984 c). *° [bid. (8, 984 c). » Ibid. Vl, 16" (9, 532 c).

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thus has the meaning of assent to the teachings of Scripture as an immediate sort of knowledge, for which no demonstration is necessary. But, while the teachings of Scripture can be accepted as an immediate truth without any demonstration, it does not mean that they cannot be demonstrated by reason or that one ought not to attempt to demonstrate them by reason. Throughout his work he argues both for the possibility of their being demonstrated by reason and for the desirability of

their being so demonstrated.** But once these teachings of Scripture have been demonstrated by reason, they cease to be

true in the sense that a “primary premise” is true; they become true in the sense that a “conclusion” (cvyépacpa) in a valid demonstration is true.” This, then, is the second meaning of the term faith in its religious sense. Strictly speaking, Clement does not use the term faith with

reference to the assent to teachings of Scripture after they have become demonstrated by reason. He uses in that connec-

tion another term. He calls it knowledge (yvdous) —a term used in the New Testament but syncretized by the Gnostics with their pagan gnosis** — but it is often used by him in-

terchangeably with the term scientific knowledge (émur77yjyn).”* Sometimes this technical distinction between “knowledge” and “faith” is abandoned by him and “knowledge,” in the sense of demonstrated scriptural teachings, and “faith,” in the narrow sense of undemonstrated scriptural teachings, are treated by him as two subdivisions of the term faith taken in a general sense. Thus in one place he says that scientific demonstration produces

“scientific

faith”

(émuornpovikn

miors ) which

be-

comes knowledge (yvdors).”* The implication is that “knowledge” is not something different from faith, but rather a sort of faith. In another place he makes the following statement: ™ Ibid. 1, 5-7, 9, 20; cf. J. Patrick, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 40-43.

2 *° % *

Ibid. Il, 11° (8, 985 A). Cf. below pp. 498-501 and above p. 8. Ibid. Il, 11 (8, 984 c); VI, 17°° (9,388 A). [bid. Il, 11 (8, 985 a). According to another reading of the text (cf.

PG 8, p. 985, n. 4, and ed. Stahlin), scientific demonstration is said to pro-

duce “faith” which becomes “knowledge.”

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“Faith is, then, so to speak, an epitomized knowledge (cvvropos . yroous) of the essentials; and knowledge is a strong and sure demonstration of what is received by faith (iorews).” 7° Here, again, faith and knowledge are not different from each other; each implies the other; “knowledge,” which is a “demonstration of what is received by faith,” may, therefore, be called “demonstrated faith,” just as it is called by him “scientific faith.” In still another place he says that “the discourse

which consists of demonstration implants in the soul of him who follows it the exact faith (dxpiBq miotw),” ** “exact faith” thus being the equivalent of “scientific faith” and “gnosis.” But, more than that, Clement throughout his writings tries to defend the equality of these two forms of faith against two extreme views. To begin with, there were those who saw no merit in philosophy, and among them there were some who found it even harmful. “The multitude,” he says, “are frightened at the

Hellenic philosophy, as children are at masks, being afraid lest it lead them astray.” ** Again, he says, “the most of those who

are inscribed with the name [of Christ]” do not avail themselves of the help of human knowledge in the study of Scripture, “since they know that, after lending their ears to Hellenic studies, they will never subsequently be able to retract their steps,” °° evidently alluding to the verse, which says concerning the “strange woman,” *° or, as the Septuagint has it, “evil counsel,” ** which was taken to mean philosophy,” that “none that go unto her return again.” ** It is with these people in mind that he speaks of some one who would “violently say” that the “strange woman” warned against in the Book of Proverbs ** refers to “Hellenic culture.” ** There were others

who found philosophy useless. “I am not oblivious,” he says, “of what is babbled by some, who in their ignorance are fright*° Ibid. VII, 10° (9, 481 A).

* Prov. 2:17 (LXX), but cf. Prov. 7:5.

* Ibid. 1, 6° (8, 728 B).

” Cf. above p. 98 at n. 12.

* Strom. VI, 10 (9, 301 A). *®Ibid. VI, 11 (309 c).

Prov. 2:19. * Prov. §:2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 20; ef. 23163.725.

® Prov. 2:16 (Hebrew).

* Strom. I, 5” (PG 8, 720 c).

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ened at every noise, and say that we ought to occupy ourselves with what is most necessary, and which contains the

faith; and that we should pass over what is beyond and superfluous, which wears out and detains us to no purpose, in things which conduce nothing to the great end.” ** Again, he says: “They demand bare faith alone,” ** arguing that astronomy, geometry, logic, and all the other branches of study “are of no service in the discharge of duties and the Hellenic philosophy is human wisdom, for it is incapable of teaching the truthy?’*8 In answer to all these objections he tries to show from Scripture itself the permissibility as well as the utility of philosophy.*° He sums up his own view in the following words: “T call him truly learned who brings everything to bear on the truth; so that, from geometry, and music, and grammar, and philosophy itself, calling what is useful, he guards the faith against assault.” *° It will be noticed, he does not say that with-

out philosophy faith in its simple state is imperfect. He only argues for the permissibility of philosophy and its utility for

religion, especially as a means of refuting heresies. So also

does he not recommend the use of philosophy without some restraint, for, in answer to the one who interpreted the “strange woman” warned against in the Book of Proverbs as referring to “Hellenic culture,” he says that the author of the book “admonishes us indeed to use secular culture, but not to linger and spend time with it.” *

Then, at the opposite extreme of those who depreciated reason there were the Gnostics, who depreciated simple faith.

Two statements were made by the Gnostics with regard to the distinction between

simple believers, whom

they called the

psychical (yvxuxot) men, and themselves, whom they called the spiritual (zvevjarixot) men: first, the spiritual men are as-

sured of salvation, whereas the psychical men may be either saved or lost; second, these two types of man have been pre® Strom. I, 1% (8, 708 B).

*®Tbid. I, 5-7, 9; VI, 10-11.

* [bid. I, 9* (740 B). * Ibid. VI, 11 (9, 313 B).

“ Ibid. I, 9. “ [bid. 1, 5” (721 A).

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destined to be distinct from each other, so that there was an impassable line between them.* In his answer to the Gnostics, Clement attacks both these statements. First, he argues that inasmuch as the teachings of Scripture are true, whether they are demonstrated by reason or not, the simple believer is not inferior to the rationalizing theologian. “He is not then imperfect,” he says, “who knows what is perfect” ** and “nothing is wanting to faith, as it is perfect and complete in itself.” ** The simple believer, therefore, who possesses only “faith” and the philosopher who possesses also

“knowledge” or “gnosis” are equal before God, for “there are not in the same Word some ‘gnostics’ and some ‘psychical men’; but all who have abandoned the desires of the flesh are equal and spiritual before God.” *° Simple faith and rationalized faith, he contends, are both of them alike roads to salvation, the one being the short road and the other the long road. “If any of the Greeks,” he says, “dispenses with the preliminary guidance of Greek philosophy and hastens straight to the true teaching, he, even though he be unlearned, at once distances all competition, having chosen the short-cut to perfection, that of salvation through faith.” *¢ Then, he argues that there is no impassable line between the simple believer and the rationalizing theologian. Every simple believer may become a rational believer, for “knowl-

edge (yvdous) 1s, so to speak, a kind of perfection of man as man” * and hence every man is capable of achieving it. Furthermore, every simple belief may become a rational belief without changing its essential character, for “by knowledge “Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 7, 5; I, 6, 2; Tertullian, Adv. Valent. 29; cf. Tixeront, HD, I’, pp. 199-200 (Eng. I, pp. 177-178). “8Paedag. I, 6° (8, 280 A). “ Tbid. 1, 6° (8, 285 A). * Ibid. 1, 6 (8, 288 aB); cf. E. de Faye, Clement d’Alexandrie, pp. 204205. “° Strom. VII, 2™ (9, 416 A). “ Ibid. VII, 10 (9, 477 c); cf. Hort and Mayor, Clement of Alexandria’s Miscellanies, Book VII, p. 18, ll. 19-21.

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faith is made perfect,” ** thus knowledge is also, so to speak, a kind of perfection of faith as faith, and consequently every

object of faith may become an object of knowledge. Finally, he that has simple faith will by the grace of God also be helped to acquire knowledge, for the verse which, as quoted by him, reads, “to him that hath shall be added,” *° is interpreted by him to mean that “to faith knowledge shall be added.” °° Ill. AuGustTINE

To this school of double faith theory, inaugurated by Clement, we shall try to show, belongs also Augustine.* Early in his life, on his way to his conversion, he was told by Simplicianus that Paul’s warning against “philosophy and vain deceit” * refers only to a certain kind of philosophy, that which Paul himself describes as being “after the rudiments of the world,” * but does not include the philosophy of the Platonists of which he says that it “led to the belief in God and His Word.” * Later in his life, he repeats this interpretation of Paul’s condemnation of philosophy and finds in Paul’s statements, “Because that which may be known of God is manifest

among them” ® and “as certain also of your own poets have said” ® an acknowledgment that certain Greek philosophers

and poets have arrived at some knowledge of the true nature of God." “Ibid. This is a paraphrase of “by work was faith made perfect” in James 2:22. The substitution of “knowledge” for “work” may be explained by the fact that “knowledge” is taken here by Clement to include “disposition,” “the manner of life,” and “speech,” all of which mean “ Cf. Luke 19:26. 5 Strom. VII, 10° (9, 480 A). *On Augustine’s treatment of the relation between faith E. Portalié, “Augustine (Saint),” DTC I, 2337-2340, J. F. philosophie de St. Augustine, II (1865), pp. 282-289; I. Storz,

“works.” and reason, see Nourrisson, La Die Philosophie

des bl. Augustinus (1882), pp. 85-101; M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, 1 (1909), pp. 129-133; with bibliography on p. 129, n. 5; E. Gilson, Introduction a Vétude de Saint Augustin (1943), pp. 31-47, with bibliography on p. 331. * Col) 2:8. 5Rom. 1:19. 8 [bid. ® Acts 17:28. * Conf. VIII, 2, 3.

* De Civ. Dei VIII, 10, 1.

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But he goes still further. Like Clement, he argues that philos-

ophy is useful for religion. “If those who are called philosophers,” he says, “and especially the Platonists, have by chance said things that are true and in harmony with our faith, we are not only not to shrink from them, but to claim them for

our own use from those who are, as it were, their illegal possessors.” * For the teaching of these true philosophers, he continues, contains “liberal instruction which is better adapted to the use of the truth, and some most excellent precepts of morality; and some truths even with regard to “the worship of the one God are found among them.” All these the Christian “ought to take away from them, and to devote to their proper use in preaching the gospel.” Even their “human institutions” ought to be taken from them and turned “to Christian use.” ° This view is summed up by him briefly in his statement that the objects of pursuit in religion “are to be defended by reason,” *° though he admits that the Christian religion also “commanded things to be believed that were not demonstrated (whether it was that they could be demonstrated, but not to anyone, or could not be demonstrated at all).” ™ With this recommendation of the use of reason in defense

of faith, Augustine explains what he means by these two contrasting terms. With regard to the term reason, he means by it, he explains,

both the exercise by each man of his own reasoning power, which is described by him as having “its starting-point either in the bodily senses or in the intuition of the mind,” !? and the use by each man of the entire accumulation of knowledge known as Greek philosophy, which he similarly describes as having been arrived at partly by “the bodily senses” and partl by “the intellect.” ** With regard to the term faith (fides), he

begins with an analysis of the meaning of this term as used in

Scripture. Like Philo,“ he finds that the term faith in Scripture ® De Doctr. Christ. Il, 40, 60. ° Ibid. Enchir. 4. CON eV 15.4:

* Enchir. 4. * De Doctr. Christ. Il, 27, 41. “Cf. Philo, Il, pp. 217-218.

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has two meanings. First, “we speak of that faith which we

employ when we believe anything,” as in the sentence, “He had no faith in me,” which means, “He did not believe what I said.” Second, we speak of that faith “which we give when

we make a promise,” as in the sentence, “He did not keep faith with me,” which means “He did not do what he promised.” He illustrates the first of these two meanings by the verse, “Abraham believed in God.” ** It is this first meaning of the term faith that he undertakes to discuss when he contrasts it

with reason. In a purely religious sense then, faith means belief that whatever is written in Scripture, supplemented by what is taught in tradition, is true. Thus Scripture is described by him as that “which has paramount authority and in which we have

faith (fidem) concerning all matters of which we ought not _ to be ignorant, and yet cannot know of ourselves.” 17 But by the time of Augustine the definition of faith in terms of assent, first technically formulated by Clement of Alexan-

dria, was already in common use. This definition of faith is also reflected in several statements of Augustine. ““What is believing (credere),” he exclaims, “but consenting (consentire) to the truth of what is said,” 18 for to believe in God, he further says, means nothing but “to yield our consent (comsentire), indeed, to God’s sermons” ?® and “‘to believe (credere) is itself nothing else than to think with assent (assensione)” *° In all these statements the term consent (consensio), which is implied in the term consentire, as well as the term assent (assensio), is

the Stoic Greek term ovyxardOeo.s; and, while the term faith is not directly defined as an assent in these statements, such a

definition of the term is implied in them. All these statements, therefore, reflect Clement of Alexandria’s definition of faith as an assent of the soul, which, in its turn, goes back to the % De Spir. et Litt. 31, 54. Gen.

15:6. In Philo, Il, p. 218, 1. 7, the words “this second” should be

changed to “the first.” "De Civ. Dei XI, 3. *®De Spir. et Litt. 31, 54. * Tbid. 34, 60. »”De Praedest. Sanct. 2, 5.

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Stoic definition of “assent” in terms analogous to Aristotle’s definition of “faith.” 74 Quite naturally, as the Stoics in their discussion of assent ** and Clement of Alexandria in his discussions of faith which is assent,”? Augustine also in his discussion of faith or belief which

is assent speaks of assent as “voluntary (volentis)” and of faith as being “in our own power (potestate).” ** But, in conformity with his view that as a consequence of the fall of Adam our will is free only by the grace of God,” he maintains that the will to believe is from God,”* as he expresses himself, and faith itself is the gift of God.” Thus, unlike Tertullian, but like Clement of Alexandria and Origen, Augustine recommends the use of reason in support of faith. But in the case of Clement and Origen, as we have seen, while both of them recommend the use of reason in support of faith, there are two differences between them with regard to the relation of faith and reason. First, to Clement, simple

faith and rationally demonstrated faith are of equal merit; to Origen, rationally demonstrated faith is of greater merit. Second, to Clement, faith in its technical sense means both assent to rationally undemonstrated teachings of Scripture and

assent to rationally demonstrated teachings of Scripture; to Origen, it means only assent to rationally undemonstrated teachings of Scripture. What, then, is the view of Augustine with regard to both these questions? Answers to these questions are to be found in Augustine. With regard to the question as to the equality of merit,

there is the following statement by Augustine: “What, then, is the case of those . . . who are able most easily to receive divine secrets by sure reason, will it, I ask, be to them an

hindrance at all, if they come as they who at first believe?” The answer given is: “I think not.” ** Though directly this statement asserts only that simple faith is not of greater merit = Cf. above pp. 116 f.

* Cf. above pp. 117-118. * Cf. above pp. 120, 122. * De Spir. et Litt. 31, 54.

* Cf. below Vol. II, in the chapter on free will.

* De Spir. et Litt. 34, 60. * Encbir. 31. *°De Util. Cred. 10, 24.

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than demonstrated faith, indirectly it implies also that demonstrated faith is not of greater merit than simple faith. In another passage Augustine says: “In order to learn, we must necessarily follow two ways, authority and reason. In time (tempore), authority is prior; in reality (re), reason is

prior, for one thing is that which is preferred (anteponitur) in action; another thing is that which is esteemed more highly in desire (quod pluris in appetendo aestimatur).” *® At first sight, it would seem that the description of reason as being prior in reality to authority and as being more highly esteemed as an object of desire means that rationally demonstrated faith is of greater merit than faith based merely on the authority of Scripture. However, a closer study of his wording will show that he does not mean by it greater merit. In his own explanation of the priority in reality, it will be noted, Augustine uses two terms, namely, “esteemed” and “desire.” ‘These two terms reflect two passages in Aristotle. The term “esteemed” reflects a passage in Aristotle where, after giving three senses of the term “prior,” he says: “Besides the senses men-

tioned, that which is better and more estimable (cipudrepov) is said to be prior in nature.

Thus the common

folk are

accustomed to speak of those whom they chiefly esteem (évriorépovs) and especially love as coming first with them.

This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched.” *° The term “desire” reflects another passage in Aristotle which contains the statement that “all men by nature desire (épéyov-

rat) to know.” #4 Accordingly, what Augustine means by his description of reason as being prior in reality is that it is prior in nature in the sense that the common folk chiefly esteem it and that all men by nature desire it. It does not mean that it is of greater merit in the eyes of God. That this is what Augustine means by his statement that in reality reason is prior to

authority may be supported by two of his own statements. First, there is his statement that “every man wishes to under» De Ordine Il, 9, 26 (PL 32,1007).

Categ. 12, 14b, 4-8.

“ Metapbh. I, 1, 980a, 21.

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stand (intelligere); there is nobody who does not wish it; but not all men wish to believe (credere).” ** This statement sounds almost like a comment on Aristotle’s statement that “all men by nature desire to know,” pointing out that, unlike the desire of all men by nature to know, not all men by nature desire to believe, and consequently knowledge or understanding or reason is prior in nature to belief or authority. Second, towards the end of the very same passage which contains the

statement that reason is prior in reality to authority there 1s another statement, in which, after expressing his doubt whether men who led a good and virtuous life only by following authority and without availing themselves of the benefits of reason can be called happy during their lifetime, he says: ** “However, I firmly believe that as soon as they shall have left this body, they will be liberated [from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God] ** with more or less difficulty, according as their life was more or less virtuous.” The implication of this statement is that simple believers will receive their full reward solely in accordance with their conduct in life, without suffering any diminution in the merit of their faith on account of their failure to avail themselves of the benefits of reason. This again makes it clear that his statement that reason is prior in reality to authority does not mean that it is of greater merit in the eyes of God. With regard to the question whether faith in its technical sense means assent only to undemonstrated teachings of Scripture or whether it means also assent to demonstrated teachings of Scripture, the passages in Augustine bearing directly on this question would seem to be contradictory. On the one hand, there are passages in which he maintains that belief is prior to understanding or knowledge or thought, with the implication that faith technically means assent to % Sermo 43, 3, 4.

* De Ordine Il, 9, 26.

“eo facilius aut difficilius liberari.” I take the term “liberari” to reflect the following verse: “quia et ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corrup-

tionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei” (Rom. 8:21). Hence, my bracketed addition.

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something which has not been rationally demonstrated to be true. He thus says: “We ought to believe before we understand (intelligamus)”;°° “we believe in order that we may know (cognoscamus), we do not know in order that we may believe”; *° “a sure faith is in some way the starting point of

thought (cogitationem).” ** But on the other hand, there are passages which imply that faith technically means assent to something that has already been an object of thought and consideration and hence has already been rationally demonstrated.

He thus says: “Who cannot see that thinking (cogitare) is prior to believing? For no one believes unless he has first

thought that it is to be believed”; ** “at is our duty to consider (considerare) what men or books to believe in order properly to honor God”; *° “we could not believe unless we possessed rational souls.” 4° A way of reconciling these two sets of statements is suggested by Augustine himself in a passage where, in answer to a question by an interrogator as to whether he should understand before he believes or should believe before he understands,*? he quotes the verse, “If you will not believe, you

shall not understand,” *? and comments upon it as follows: “Understand my word so that you believe; believe so that you understand the word of God.” ** What he means to say is that the process of belief involves two kinds of understanding. First, one must understand “my word,” that is to say, one must understand the meaning of that which he is asked to be-

lieve and determine whether there is at least some probability of its being true.** Then, when one has attained a proper understanding of the question and has satisfied himself that there * De Trinit. VI, 5, 5. ° De Vera Relig. 25, 46. °° In Joan. XL, 9. * Epist. 120, 1, 3, ad Consentium. ** De Trinit. IX, 1, 1. © Sermo 43, 3, 4. * De Praedest. Sanct. 2, 5. “Isa. 7:9, after the Septuagint: “Nisi credideretis non intelligetis.” “Sermo 43, 7, 9“Cf. Thomas Aquinas’ explanation of the term “to think” in Augustine’s

statement quoted above (n. 20) that “to believe is itself nothing else than to think with assent.” (Sum. Theol. Il, Il, 2, 1c).

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is a reasonable probability of its being true, he is fully justified in assenting to what he was asked to believe. This is in accordance with the Stoic teaching quoted above that assent may be given to a reasonable probability.** Finally, after one has given

assent to what is yet only a reasonable probability, he may proceed to the second kind of understanding, the understanding of “the word of God,” that is to say, one may proceed to establish the truth of the belief by demonstration so as to raise the reasonable probability to a demonstrated certainty. Belief

thus marks the end of one kind of thinking and the beginning of another kind of thinking. Elsewhere Augustine expresses this view in his statement that “everybody who believes thinks, but thinks in believing and believes in thinking.” *° In another place, however, instead of saying that some particular belief may involve two kinds of understanding, one preceding the belief and the other following it, he says that

there are two kinds of belief, in one of which understanding precedes the belief and in the other understanding follows belief. He says: *7 “Although, unless he understand somewhat, no man can believe in God, nevertheless, by the very faith whereby he believes, he is helped, that he may understand greater things (ampliora). For some kinds of things are those which we do not believe, save we understand them; and other kinds of things are those which we do not understand, save we believe them. For since ‘faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ,’ ** how can one believe him who preaches the faith, if he —to say nothing of other points —vunderstands not the very tongue which he speaks? But unless, on the other hand, there were some things which we cannot understand, unless we believe them first, the prophet would not say, ‘if you will not believe, you shall not understand..°”*?

In this passage quite clearly Augustine distinguishes between two kinds of objects of belief, of which one kind follows “Cf. above p. 119 at n. 37. “8 Rom. 10:17. “ De Praedest. Sanct. 2, 5. Isa. 729: “ Fnarr. in Ps. 118, 18, 3 (PL 37, 1552).

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understanding and the other kind must precede understanding. What these two kinds of objects of belief are is indicated by him in a passage in which he says that “in certain matters relating to the doctrine of salvation, which we are not able to grasp by reason, but which we shall be able to grasp sometime, let faith precede reason, by which faith the heart may be purified so as to receive and bear the light of the great reason,” °° for “it is reasonable that, with reference to certain great things which cannot yet be grasped, faith should precede reason.” °' The implication of this passage is that there are two kinds of objects of belief, of which one, though it may be grasped by reason sometime, cannot be grasped at once and the other can be grasped at once; and that, in the case of the former, belief is to precede reason, whereas in the case of the latter, reason is to precede belief. From the fact that these two

kinds of objects of belief are compared with each other with reference to the priority or the posteriority of belief to reason it is to be inferred that the term reason both in the case in which it is to be preceded by belief and in the case in which it is to precede belief is used in the same sense, namely, in the sense of a logical demonstration which establishes the truth of a belief. From all this it follows that belief and hence also faith, according to Augustine, is an assent not only to rationally un-

demonstrated teachings of Scripture but also to rationally demonstrated teachings of Scripture.” That faith, according to Augustine, includes also assent to truths already demonstrated by reason may also be inferred from another passage, where, in answer to the question whether a man who can arrive at religious belief by methods of reason should believe first or find reasons for his belief first, he answers that he should believe first, and the explanation given by Augustine for his answer is that, if one should defer his SEpist. 120, 1. 3+ % [bid.: “rationabile est, ut ad magnae quaedam, quae capi nondum possunt, fides praecedat rationem.”

* According to this interpretation, the view of Augustine differs from chat of Thomas Aquinas. Cf. above p. 122, n. 16.

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belief until after he had found reasons for it, he would set a bad example for those who are incapable of finding reasons for their belief.** It will be noticed that the explanation given here by Augustine is the bad example that a deferment of belief until after reasons for it have been found would set for those incapable of finding reasons for their belief and not that the belief itself would not be a true belief in the scriptural sense of the term. This clearly shows that the undemonstrated status of that to which an assent is to be given is not an essential requirement for faith. The same inference may also be drawn from his defense of undemonstrated faith, which he bases not on the ground that it is the only kind of faith that scripturally deserves to be described by that term but rather on the ground that it is as good as demonstrated faith. His defense is directed at the Manichaeans, who, like the Gnostics at the time of Clement of Alexandria, rejected simple faith and claimed to rely only on reason. “Your design,” Augustine challenges them, “clearly, is to deprive Scripture of all authority, and to make everyman’s mind the judge what passages of Scripture he is to approve of, and what to disapprove of.” "* He, therefore, again and again, throughout his writings, tries to justify simple faith. His justification is like that of Clement of Alexandria, though he makes no use of technical vocabulary. He tries to show that Christianity is not unique in its demand to have faith in something on the mere basis of the reasonable probability of its truth without proof of the absolute certainty of its truth. There is faith in many areas of knowledge outside religion, and even in philosophic knowledge. We take on faith many things in

secular history; we accept them as true, even though we were not present when they were enacted; we take on faith the many accounts of places and cities which we have not seen; we take on faith the loyalty of our friends and the competence of physicians; we even take on faith the authenticity of our par*®De Util. Cred. 10, 24. “Cont. Faust. Manich, XXXII, 19.

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ents.” “How do you know,” he challenges Faustus the Manichaean, “that there are eight continents and ten heavens, and that Atlas bears up the world, and that it hangs from the great world-holder, and innumerable things of the same kind? ” All these beliefs of yours, Augustine answers for his opponent, are not based on “sight,” but rather on “faith,” on the authority of books you have read. But all these books, he exclaims, are unreliable and only “misguided judgment” pronounces them trustworthy. “Why not rather submit to the authority of the Gospel?” . . . for the Gospel, he maintains, is historically

well-founded and trustworthy.®* And not only the Gospel but also the Old Testament is historically well-founded and trustworthy. When he has found that certain Greek and Egyptian documents ascribed to the world a history much longer than that in the Old Testament, he declares all such documents as

mendacious,” wherein, it may be added, Augustine is following an old method of attack, for when Celsus tried to refute the scriptural chronology by “Plato” and “the most learned

of the Egyptians,” evidently referring to the legend reported by Plato concerning an Egyptian priest who had told Solon of the founding of Athens nine thousand years before that time,*® Origen, reéchoing Philo’s dismissal of all the Greek myths as an “imposture” in contrast to the “truth” of Scripture,®® declared that “the dialogues of Plato” and the “fables” of the “boastful Egyptians” are not by any means to be re-

garded as more trustworthy than the Mosaic account in the Pentateuch: © All this, it will be noticed, is a defense of simple faith and not an argument that this alone is to be called faith.

In our analysis of these representative views among the Fathers on the question of faith and reason, we have seen that

the main issues are two: (1) the meaning of the term faith; (2) the relation between the merit of simple faith and the ® Conf. VI, 5, 7; De Fide Rer. Non Quae Vident. 4; De Util. Cred. 10, 24

and 12, 26. 8 Cont. Faust. Manich. XXXII, 19. ™ De Civ. Dei XII, 10, 2; XVIII, 4o.

8 Tim. 23 DE. ° Praem. 2, 8; cf. Philo, I, p. 32. © Cont. Cels. I, 19 and 20.

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merit of rationally demonstrated faith. With regard to the first of these issues, to Tertullian and Origen faith means the acceptance of the teaching of Scripture on mere authority; to Clement of Alexandria and Augustine it means the acceptance of the teaching of Scripture either on mere authority or as rationally demonstrated truths. With regard to the second issue, to Tertullian rational demonstration diminishes the merit of

the faith, if it precedes it, but does not diminish the merit of the faith, if it follows it; to Clement of Alexandria simple faith and demonstrated faith are always of equal merit; to Origen demonstrated faith is always of greater merit than simple faith. It is in the light of this analysis that we are to understand isolated or fragmentary statements made by various Fathers

on the question of faith and reason. Not every disparaging statement about philosophy necessarily means a single faith theory; nor does it necessarily mean that rational demonstration unqualifiedly diminishes the merit of the faith. When Gregory of Nazianzus, for instance, says that philosophic speculations “crept into our Churches like certain plagues of Egypt,” ® he may only reécho the common view that it was the false doctrines of philosophy which caused heresy. Similarly when Cyril of Alexandria says that “the arts of the Greeks are fruitless, containing much vanity and an expenditure of great labors for nothing,” ° and when Ambrose says that “it was not by dialectics that it pleased God to save His people,” * they may only mean to say that philosophy, when not controlled by the teaching of Scripture, is useless. So also when Hilary says that “steadfast faith rejects the vain subtleties of philosophic inquiry” and “will not confine God within the limits which bound our common reason” * and that “the sophistry of a syllogistic question easily disarms a weak understanding of the protection of faith,” ° he may only mean to * Orat. 32, 25 (PG 36, 201 c). ” Cont. Julian. V (PG 76, 773 D). —Dekide ls, 42. “De Trinit. 1, 13/(PLarons4 B). * Ibid. XII, 19 (444 B).

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emphasize the subordinate position of philosophy and to warn against exclusive reliance upon it. It is only this emphasis and warning that may also be the intention of Gregory the Great in two passages. In one of these passages, speaking of those who are about to regain the faith which they had lost, he represents the Church as saying:

“In all that I declare, give no credence to me upon grounds of authority, but consider on grounds of reason whether they

be true; and, if at any time she says what cannot be comprehended by reason, she reasonably advises that human reasoning should not be looked for in hidden truths.” * In another passage, in which he seems to speak about those who are to gain true faith for the first time, he warns them against prying with their own reason into the mysteries of God beyond their capacities, for, by so doing, he says, they will surely fall into error.” In both these passages, it will be noticed, he does not prohibit the use of reason as a help to the regaining or the gaining of faith; he prohibits only the exclusive reliance upon reason. In the light of these two passages, when in still another passage he makes the general statement that “faith to which human reason furnishes proof has no merit,” ° it certainly does not refer to those who regain or gain faith as a result of rational demonstration. It undoubtedly refers to those who, already having faith, start out in search of rational demonstration to support it. Gregory’s statement here thus reflects the view of Tertullian, namely, that rational demonstration diminishes the merit of faith only when it follows it but not when it precedes it. Thomas Aquinas, however, interprets this statement of Gregory the Great as referring to rational demonstration which precedes faith.”

In John of Damascus faith is defined as “assent without inquiry.” © From the very wording of his statement, it is clear % Moral. VIII, 2, 3 (PL 75, 803 cp). * Tbid. XVI, 67, 81 (1160 AB). *®Homil. in Evang. Il, 16, 1 (PL 76, 1197 c). ° Cf, Sum. Theol. II, Il, 2, 10 c and ad 1.

™ De Fide Orth. IV, 11 (PG 94, 1128 D).

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that assent to truths already rationally demonstrated is not faith. To that extent, he adopts a single faith theory like that of Tertullian and Origen. But he does not necessarily mean that, if undemonstrated faith is followed by demonstration, it becomes, as in Tertullian, of lesser merit or, if it is either preceded or followed by demonstration, it becomes, as in Origen,

of greater merit. It seems that John of Damascus introduces here a new conception of the relation between faith and reason. According to him, there is a diminution in the merit of the faith only when the faith is preceded by rational demonstration but not when it is followed by rational demonstration.

This is how John of Damascus’ view is interpreted by Thomas Aquinas and this is also the view adopted by Thomas Aquinas himself. As we have seen above, Aristotle does not explicitly apply the term faith to scientific knowledge.” ™ Cf. Sum. Theol. Ml, Il, 2, 1 c and ad 1; cf. Il, II, 2, 10 c and ad 1.

® Cf. above p. 115.

PART TWO THE TRINITY, THE LOGOS, AND THE PLATONIC IDEAS

CHAPTER ORIGIN

VII

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SCATTERED throughout the New Testament, in the Gospels and the Acts and the Epistles, are many scraps of informal confessions of faith, anticipating the rigorously drawn up formal

creeds of later times.* These scraps of confessions of faith vary both in form and in content, but on the whole they fall into three types. Some of them consist only of a single part, con-

taining a confession of belief in Jesus as the promised Messiah. Some of them consist of two parts, containing a confession of

belief both in the unity of God and in Jesus. Some of them, however, consist of three parts, containing a confession of belief not only in God and in Jesus but also in the Holy Spirit. Of these three types of confessions of belief found in the New Testament, the first and the second types present no

problem. That the belief in Jesus as the promised Messiah should have been selected by the first Christians as constituting *Cf. Survey of all these New Testament confessions of faith in J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (1950), pp. 13-23; O. Cullmann, Les Premiéres

Confessions de Foi Chrétiennes (1943), pp. 14 ff.; 27 ff. (Eng. pp. 19 ff.; 35 ff.).

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their characteristic belief is what was to be expected, for it is

the belief that Jesus was the promised Messiah that differentiated their religion from the parent religion from which it

sprang. That the confession of the belief in Jesus should have been coupled with a confession of a belief in the unity of God is also what was to be expected. For Christianity did not substitute the belief in Jesus for the Jewish belief in the unity of God; it only added it to the belief in the unity of God; and, inasmuch as Jews were wont to confess the belief in the unity of God twice daily and inasmuch also as Jesus himself had declared that the confession of belief in the unity of God, contained in the verse, “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one,”? was “‘the first of all the commandments,” * it was

only natural that the Christians should repeat that old confession of belief in the unity of God together with their new confession of belief in Jesus as the promised Messiah. It is quite possible that among the early Jewish followers of Jesus the confession of belief in him as the promised Messiah was added to the recitation of the verse, “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one,” but later, perhaps among the pagan con-

verts to Christianity, this old traditional Jewish form of confessing belief in the unity of God was rephrased and integrated

with the new Christian confession of belief in Jesus as the promised Messiah. The third kind of confession, however, that in which the belief in the Holy Spirit is added to the belief in God and in

Christ Jesus, needs an explanation. For the belief in the Holy Spirit was not peculiar to Christianity; it was one of many other beliefs which it inherited from Judaism. But in Judaism the belief in the Holy Spirit was never an object of confession by the side of the confession of belief in the unity of God.

Why then in Christianity was it made an object of confession of belief by the side of the belief in God as one and in Jesus as the promised Messiah? Let us then examine those instances in the New Testament * Deut. 6:4.

* Mark 12:29.

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where the tripartite confession of faith occurs to see whether they will disclose the required explanation. There are three such instances, or rather two single instances and one group of instances. First, there is the baptismal formula, attributed to Jesus, which reads: “Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” * Perhaps a suggestion of such a trinitarian baptismal formula may also be discerned in Paul’s statement, “But ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but

ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the name of the Spirit of our God.” ® Elsewhere, however, in the New Testament, the baptismal formula contains only the phrase, “in the name of Jesus Christ,’® with the additional clause, “and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit,” ” which was evidently also addressed by the baptizer to the baptizands. Critical scholarship, on the whole, rejects the tradi-

tional attribution of the tripartite baptismal formula to Jesus and regards it as of later origin. But whoever was the author of that tripartite formula, it must have already been in existence before the end of the first century, when the Gospel according to Matthew assumed its present form, for it already occurs in the Didache,’ which was probably composed in its present form at about the end of the first century. Certainly this tripartite baptismal formula was already in existence during the first part of the second century, for it occurs in

Justin Martyr’s First Apology,® which was composed at about 150 A.D. Undoubtedly then the baptismal formula originally consisted of one part and it gradually developed into its tripartite form. How that development took place can be explained by assuming that, just as the institution of Christian baptism as a * Matt. 28:19. 51 Cor. 6:11; cf. commentaries ad loc.

® Acts 2:38; 8:16; 10:48; 19:5; cf. Rom. 6:3; Gal. 3:27. 7 Acts 2:38; cf. Acts 8:16, 17; 10:47, 48; 19:5, 6. 8 Didache VII, 1 and 3. ® Apol. I, 61.

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whole has its origin in the baptism of gentile converts to Judaism,?° so also the formula recited at the Christian baptism has its origin in some formula recited at the baptism of gentile con-

verts to Judaism. To be sure, nowhere in the literature of Judaism is it recorded that a formula was ever recited, either by the baptizer or by the baptizand, at the baptism of gentiles. But we shall try to establish the possibility of the recitation by the baptizand of some formula at such baptism and, with the establishment of that possibility, we shall try to show how the Christian baptismal formula could have arisen from it. To begin with, there are the phrases “in the name of heaven,” ‘“‘in the name of the holiness of Israel,” 2 and “in the name of the covenant” ?? which occur in the Talmudic literature as a description of what was to be the motives of gentiles

who desired to be converted to Judaism. Whether any of these phrases was actually recited as a formula at the time of the baptism is nowhere stated. But the possibility that the baptizand actually recited some such formula as “I baptize myself in the name of heaven” or “in the name of the holiness of Israel” or “in the name of the covenant” is not to be excluded, for there is at least one instance when, as reported in the name of a Babylonian Amora of the fourth century, the actual recitation of a formula beginning with the phrase “in the name of,” that is to say, for the sake of, was required. The instance of such a requirement is reported in the case of.a slave, purchased by a

Jew from a non-Jew, who, before he was taken possession of by the Jew, hastened and baptized himself in the name of freedom. In such a case, we are told, the slave does not acquire his freedom unless he actually recites the formula, “I baptize myself in the name of freedom,” ** and from the manner in

which reference is made here to this requirement of the actual Cf, A. Plummer, “Baptism,” DB, I, pp. 239-241; K. Lake, “Baptism (Early Christian),” ERE, Il, pp. 379-381. But see J. J. I. v. Déllinger, Christenthum und Kirche in der Zeit der Grundlegung,’ p. 340, and note by H. N. Oxenham in his English translation, The First Age of Christianity and the Church,’ Vol. Il, p. 182. 4 Jer. Kiddushin IV, 1, 65b. * Yebamot 4s5b-46a. % Tos. ‘Abodab Zarah Il, 13. -

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recitation of the formula in this particular case it may be gathered that it reflects a practice, already established and well known, which was followed in similar other cases under similar other conditions. Here then we have one definite case when the formula expressing the purpose of the baptism, beginning with the phrase “in the name of,” was actually recited at the time of the baptism. It is therefore possible that also in the case of the baptism of gentile converts the formula “in the name of Heaven” or some similar formula had to be actually recited, if not always, at least under certain circumstances, when, as in the case of the slave cited, there was special reason for it. Then, there is a statement, again, in Talmudic literature, that immediately after the baptism of the gentile convert, his sponsors were to address the baptizand “good and fitting words,” ** Specimens of these “good and fitting words” are given. They read as follows: “Blessed art thou, for unto whom hast thou been joined? Thou hast been joined unto Him by whose word the world came into being, for the world was created only for the sake of Israel, and none are called sons of the Lord but Israel, and none are favored in the presence of the Lord but Israel’’?® and “know thou that the world to come is prepared only for the righteous.” ** Whether these “good and fitting words” also included the promise that he had now become one of those who deserve that the Holy Spirit should rest upon him is nowhere stated. But the possibility of the inclusion of such a promise among the “good and fitting

words” is not to be excluded, for a convert to Judaism is de-

scribed as one who is brought “under the wings of the Shekinah” 17 and he who is brought under the wing of the Shekinah or, as the saying in this case goes, “he who is joined unto the Shekinah,” is said to deserve that “the Holy Spirit should rest upon him.” ** Accordingly among the “good and fitting words” there may have also been the promise that by “ Gerim I, 5. % Tbid.

* Yebamot 474. " Leviticus Rabbab 2, 9.

8 Sifre, Deut. 173.

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his having been joined unto God he has become deserving of the Holy Spirit. In the light of all this and in view also of the fact that early Christians regarded the acceptance of Christ as a form of conversion, which required baptism, it is quite understandable why a formula was recited at this Christian baptism and why also it began with the phrase “in the name of.” But inasmuch as all those first Christian converts who are mentioned in the New

Testament as having been baptized were either Jews’ or Samaritans *° or gentiles of the kind described as “devout” and as those who “feared God,” ** all of whom had already believed in God, it is quite understandable why the formula read

“in the name of Jesus Christ” and not “in the name of God.” It is also quite understandable why after the baptism the baptizer addressed the baptizands with the words “and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit,” for these were the “good

and fitting words” with which the Jewish baptizers were expected to address the gentile converts to Judaism. This, then, we may imagine, was the origin of the baptismal formula in the first stage of its existence, when it consisted

only of the one single part, “in the name of Jesus Christ” followed by the “good and fitting words,” the promise, “and ye shall receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit.” But soon idolatrous gentiles, without the intermediate purifying stage of devoutness and God-fearingness, began to plunge themselves right into the Christian baptismal waters. What formula was used in the case of this new type of converts

we are phrase would cluded

not told. But we imagine that in their case, besides the “in the name of Jesus Christ,” and the promise that the receive the gift of “the Holy Spirit,” the formula inalso the phrase “in the name of God.” ” The baptismal

* Acts 2:14-38. ” Acts 8:14-17. * Acts 10:1-48; 19:1-6; cf. 8:26-39. Rom. 6:3 and Gal. 3:27 refer either to Jews or to “devout” gentiles who “feared God.” So also “gentiles” in Acts 10:45 probably refers to those who were “devout” and “feared God.” ™ This explanation was suggested by Cyprian, Epist. 73, 17-18, ad Jubianum (PL 4, 412 and PL 3, 1119-1120). Cf. J. A. Robinson, “Baptism,” EB,

474.

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formula in the second stage of its history, we imagine, thus

read: I baptize you in the name of God and of Jesus Christ, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. We now come to the third and last stage in the development of the baptismal formula, when the words “and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit,” which follow the words

“in the name of God and of Jesus Christ,” were changed into “and of the Holy Spirit.” It is quite possible that the change was only for the sake of literary symmetry, to make all the three parts of the formula begin with the same phrase, “in the name of.” But is it not possible that the change was dictated by some change in the conception of the Holy Spirit? This question will be answered later. A second instance of the trinitarian formula occurs in the

salutation at the end of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, which reads: “The grace (xdpis) of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love (dydaan) of God, and the communion (kxowwvia) of the Holy Spirit, be with you all.” *? Elsewhere in the Pauline Epistles there are other salutations, variously phrased. They

fall into four groups: (1) ten salutations containing the terms “grace” and “peace” (eipyvn) and described as coming from “God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ”;** (2) seven salutations containing the term “grace” and described as com-

ing from “our Lord Jesus Christ”;?* (3) two salutations containing again the term “grace” but without any mention of the source from which it is to come;** (4) one salutation containing the terms “peace” and “love” and described as coming

from “God the Father and the Lord Jesus.” *” Of the salutations of these four groups, those of the first occur at the beginning of Epistles and those of the other three groups occur at the end of Epistles. In the non-Pauline Epistles the saluta-

tions fall into five groups containing the following terms: (1) > 2 Cormigsta. * Roun. 1275.17 Cor.ir:3%'2 (Cor. 1725/Galeit:33 Ephiirs25/Phil.,1:25 Cole 1323 1 Thess. 1:1; 2 Thess. 1:2; Philemon 3. Rom. 16:24; 1 Cor. 16:23; Gal. 6:18; Phil. 4:23; 1 Thess. 5:28; 2 Thess.

3:18; Philemon 25.

* Eph, 6:24; Col. 4:18.

* Eph. 6:23.

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“grace,” “mercy” (édeos), and “peace” described as coming from “God our Father and Jesus Christ our Iord”;?* (2) “grace” and “peace” either with no mention of source ”? or described as coming “through the knowledge of God and of

Jesus our Lord”;*° (3) “mercy,” “peace,” and “love” with no mention of source;*! (4) “grace” either with no mention of source * or with the suggestion that it is to come through “the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ”;*? (5) “peace” with no mention of source.** Of these five groups of salutations in the non-Pauline Epistles the first three occur at the beginning of Epistles, while the last two at the end of Epistles. Taking those salutations which mention no source whence the salutation came as fragmentary, we have three types of

salutation: (1) a unipartite type, in which only Christ is mentioned; (2) a bipartite type, in which God and Christ are mentioned; (3) a tripartite type, in which God and Christ and the Holy Spirit are mentioned. Of this last type, we have only one example, that which occurs at the end of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. It is quite possible that, as contended by many scholars, this trinitarian salutation at the end of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians did not come in its present form from the hand of Paul. Still it is to be assumed that it acquired its present form by the time the tripartite baptismal formula came into existence, which, as we have seen, must have been before the end of the first century. How then can we explain the origin of this trinitarian salutation? Here, again, an explanation, we shall try to show, is to be found if we assume that these epistolary salutations are not mere arbitrary elaborations upon the expression “peace be mul-

tiplied upon you” commonly used in Jewish epistolary saluta= 1sDun. pi22s) 2 sbners2s wtuser “" “8 “

ohn 15:26. johnei 8. ™ Justin Martyr, Apol. II, 6. Origen, De Princ. IV, 4, 1 (28), ed. Koetschau, p. 349, 1. 13. Ignatius, Ad Magn. VI, 1. Ignatius, dd Magn. VIII, 2; Tatian, Orat. ad Gr. 5; Athenagoras, Sup-

plic. 10; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. V, 3" (PG 9, 33 A). *® Tatian, Orat. ad Gr. 5; Justin Martyr, Dial. 128. * Novatian, De Trinit. 21 (16) (PL 3, 928 a). * Hippolytus, Cont. Haer. Noeti 10 (PG to, 817 B). * Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 5. 4 Ibid. 6.

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duxit).1°*° A similar laxness is to be found also in the use of terms describing the coming into existence of the Holy Spirit. The indifference of the early Fathers toward the choice of terms describing the coming into existence of the Logos, and for that matter also of the Holy Spirit, is evidenced in the following statement of Irenaeus: “If any one, therefore, says to us, “How was the Son emitted (prolatus) by the Father?’ we reply to him, that no man understands that emission (prolatio), or generation (generatio), or utterance (nuncu-

patio) or manifestation (adapertio) or by whatever name one may describe His generation.” °° Note how Irenaeus does not

hesitate to use even the Gnostic term “emission” (prolatio). But with the general acceptance of the equality of the Holy Spirit with the Logos some formal distinction had to be made between them, and so finally, at the Second Oecumenical Council at Constantinople (381), it was decreed that the term “generated” (yevvnfévta) should be used in connection with

the Son or Logos and the term “proceeding” (éxzopevduevor) in connection with the Holy Spirit.°? As to what exactly is

the difference between generation and procession, John of Damascus declares that “we have learned that there is a difference between generation and procession, but the nature of that difference we in no wise understand.” ** And Augustine says that only when we are in heaven “shall we discern by a

mind that contemplates, why the Holy Spirit is not a Son, although He proceeds from the Father.” *%° A second distinction that entered into the discussion is that of a causal relation between the Logos and the Holy Spirit. In the New Testament, the preéxistent Christ, now identified by the Fathers with the Logos, is definitely stated to have been generated from the Father. But with regard to the Holy Spirit, while in one place the New Testament says that it “pro#6 Tactantius, Div. Inst. II, 9 (PL 6, 294 A). 166 Adv. Haer. Il, 28, 6. *' Hahn, § 144; Denzinger, § 86.

188 De Fide Orth. I, 8 (PG 94, 824 a; cf. 820 A). 6° De Trinit. XV, 25, 45.

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ceedeth from the Father,” '® in another place Christ 1s reported to have said that it “shall receive of mine.” *** Amon the Fathers, Tertullian merely states his belief that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father through the Son.'” Origen, however, discusses the question. From the verse that “all things were made through him” 1% he infers that even the Holy Spirit was made through the Logos and that consequently the Logos is older than the Holy Spirit in existence,‘ that is to say, it is prior to the Holy Spirit in a causal sense of priority.” But from the use of the expression “through (6a) him “instead of

the expression “by (76) him” he infers that in the creation of all things, including the Holy Spirit, the Logos was merely acting as the instrument of God.'®* The conclusion of his reasoning is stated by him as follows: “As for us, persauded as we are that there are three hypostases, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and believing that nothing is ungenerated

(dyévyyrov) but the Father, we admit, as the more pious and truer belief, that all things were made through the Logos and that the Holy Spirit is the most excellent and the first in order of all that was made by the Father through the Son.” 16% Ostensibly the solution is based upon an inference from a scriptural verse. But, philosophically, it may be regarded as the application to the Holy Spirit of the Plotinian view with regard to the origin of the Soul, which view may go back to Ammonuus Saccas, the teacher of both Plotinus and Origen.

Just as in Plotinus the Nous is eternally generated by the One + *% ” *°8 * * * *

John 15:26. John 16:14. Adv. Prax. 4; cf. above p. 235. John 1:3. In Joan. Il, 6 (PG 14, 125 c); (ed. Preuschen, II, 10, 73). Cf. above p. 196, n. 31. In Joan., loc. cit. [bid. (128 A-129 A). Still, despite this definite statement, Origen says:

“God the Father, from whom the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds” (De Princ. I, 2, 13) and “the Father generates an only-begotten Son and

brings forth a Holy Spirit” (ibid. II, 2, 1). This latter statement is included by Origen within an inquiry which he attributes to certain people, but with which he does not disagree. Both these statements, however, are to be taken to mean that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.

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and the Soul is eternally generated by the Nous,*® so also in Origen the Logos is eternally generated by the Father and the Holy Spirit is eternally generated by the Logos or, in Origen’s “more pious and truer” manner of expression, “by the Father through the Son.” This view of Tertullian and Origen, the essential point of which is the assumption of a causal relation between the Logos and the Holy Spirit, is followed, and variously restated, by later Fathers,1® such, for instance, as Athanasius in his statement that “the Holy Spirit is a procession of the Father, ever in the hands of the Father who sends him and the Son who upholds him; Gregory of Nyssa in his statement that the Holy Spirit “is out of God and is of Christ” ** or that “He

proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son”;1” Epiphanius in his statement that the Holy Spirit is “from both

the Father and the Son”? or that he “proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son”;’* Augustine in his statement that He comes forth from both the Father and the Son; Cyril of Alexandria in his statement that He “proceeds from the Father and the Son” 1”* or that He proceeds from the

Father through the Son;'" John of Damascus in his statement that He “proceeds from the Father through the Son.” 18 Theodore of Mopsuestia *”° and Theodoret of Cyrrhus,’*° however, deny any causal relation between the Logos and the Holy 18 Enn. V, 1, 1-10.

*° Cf. Hagenbach, § 94; G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp. 249-

255. 7 Expositio Fidei 4 (PG 25, 208 A).

1% Adv. Macedon. 2 (PG 45, 1304 A). “Ibid. 10 (1313 B)= 3 Ancoratus 8 (PG 43, 29 BC); 70 (148 A). PO bid. FA(28iA)e

™ De Trinit. IV, 20, 29; In Joan. XCIX, 8. 8 Thesaurus 34 (PG 75, 585 A). TTT DIG 33 (571) = “8 Te Fide Orth. I, 12 (PG 94, 849 A). a Ghani. sears. 8° Reprehensio Duodecim Anathematismorum Cyrilii, TX (in Cyril of Alexandria’s Apologeticus contra Theodoretum pro XII Capitibus, 1X, PG 76, 432 D; B. Theodoreti Episcopi Cyri Opera Omnia, ed. J. L. Schulze, Vol. V, p. 47).

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Spirit, maintaining that the Holy Spirit derived its existence directly from the Father, both of them probably making only a verbal distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, such as the use of the term “generation” with respect to the former and the term “procession” with respect to the latter, for in the passages referred to, it is to be noted, neither of them uses the term “generation” with respect to the Holy Spirit and Theo-

doret quotes from John (15:26) the words, “the Spirit . . . which proceedeth from the Father.” These are representative examples of the views expressed

by individual Fathers. But when Christianity came to formulate its creed, at first, at the Second Oecumenical Council at Constantinople (381),'*t it adopted a formula which described the Holy Spirit as “proceeding from the Father,” in contradistinction to the Son who was “generated from the Father,” the distinction between them thus being only verbal. This remained the creed of the East. Later, at the Third Coun-

cil of Toledo (589),'* it adopted a formula which described the Holy Spirit as “proceeding from the Father and the Son,” in contradistinction to the Son who was “generated from the Father,” the distinction between them thus being both verbal and causal. This became the creed of the West. * Hahn, § 144; Denzinger, § 86. * Denzinger, loc. cit., p. 38, n. 1; cf. Hahn, § 177.

CHAPTER THE

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WHEN Joun in his Gospel adopted the Philonic term Logos as a description of the Pauline preéxistent Christ, he explicitly retained the Philonic description of the Logos and the Pauline description of the preéxistent Christ as an instrument of creation. His preéxistent Christ, now surnamed Logos, is he by whom all things came into being. In Philo, however, the preexistent Logos is described also as the place of the intelligible world and the intelligible world is described as consisting of ideas.* Of such an intelligible world of ideas contained within

the Logos there is no mention by John. Nor is there in his Gospel any indirect allusion to an intelligible world or to ideas. But in the Church Fathers who developed the skeletonlike concept of the Logos as given in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel by consciously adding to it details borrowed from the writings of Philo, the question of an intelligible

world and of ideas was bound to come up and, when it came up, three positions could logically be taken by them. First, following Philo, they could say that the preéxistent Christ, now identified with the Logos, like the Philonic Logos, contained within himself the intelligible world consisting of ideas. Second, departing from Philo, they could deny the existence of an intelligible world of ideas altogether. Third, again departing from Philo, they could admit the existence of an intelligible world of ideas but place it outside the Logos. What their view was with regard to an intelligible world and ideas is one of the questions, the first question, which we shall try to answer. Then there is another question. The Fathers, beginning

with Justin Martyr, occasionally make reference to the Platonic ideas. It happens, however, that by the time references to the Platonic ideas begin to make their appearance among Cf. Philo, I, pp. 261 ff.

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the Fathers there existed three distinct interpretations of these ideas. One of them is the Aristotelian interpretation. According to this interpretation, the Platonic ideas are self-subsistent real incorporeal beings, among which one of the ideas, the idea of the Good, is identified with God.? According to another interpretation, which is first mentioned by Albinus but must have been current among Platonists before him, the ideas are

not real beings; they are only thoughts of God.® According to a third interpretation, that of Philo, the ideas, which constitute the intelligible world and are contained in the Logos, have two successive stages of existence, first as thoughts of God and then as real beings created by God.* In view of this, whenever any of the Fathers happens to refer to the Platonic ideas, the question may be raised as to which of these three interpretations he refers to. Let us examine texts in which the Fathers happen to deal with the intelligible world or with ideas either as an expression of their own view or as a restatement of the view of Plato.

Justin Martyr tells us how prior to his becoming a Christian the Platonic “conception of incorporeals (7év dowpdrwv) quite overpowered me, and the contemplation of ideas furnished my mind with wings.” ° From this statement we ma gather that after his conversion he abandoned his belief in the Platonic ideas. But how the existence of the Platonic ideas was conceived by him he does not say. His use of the term “incorporeals” as a description of ideas does not necessarily imply the Aristotelian interpretation, for in the literature of the time an idea in the Platonic sense is described as an “‘in-

corporeal substance” (ovcia dowuaros) even when taken to be only as a thought of God.° Nor does Justin say whether after his conversion to Christianity he has abandoned his belief in Platonic ideas altogether or whether he has only given them another interpretation. * Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. I, 1*, pp. 712-713.

°Cf. R. M. Jones, “The Ideas as Thoughts of God,” Classical Philology, 21 (1926), pp. 317-326. “Cf. Philo, I, pp. 204-210; 221-223; 229-233. 5 Dial. 2.

* Aetius, Placita I, 3, 21; cf. I, 10, 3, quoted below at n. 78.

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Of these two doubtful points in Justin the first is cleared up in the Cohortatio ad Graecos, which, while not written by Justin himself, must have been written by one of his followers who was acquainted with his view. The author of this work finds in Plato two inconsistent views on the ideas. At one time, according to this author, Plato says that “there are three first principles of the universe, God and matter and form (€?80s),”

that is, idea, and that that form “subsists in virtue of itself (xa@ éavrd otooGax),” 7? that is, it does not depend upon anything else, even upon God, for its existence. This reflects the Aristotelian interpretation of Plato, except that it takes out God from among the ideas and makes it a self-subsistent incorporeal real being distinct from the ideas — an innovation which was introduced by Speusippus.’ At another time, however, adds our author, Plato says that the idea exists “in

thoughts (voyjacr).” The expression “in thoughts,” we shall show later,° does not mean here in thoughts of man but rather in the thoughts of God. This reflects, then, the Albinian interpretation of Plato. We may, therefore, assume that Justin, like this anonymous follower of his, in his reference to the Platonic theory of ideas, had in mind both its Aristotelian and its Albinian interpretation. This Platonic theory of ideas, whether conceived in its

Aristotelian interpretation or in its Albinian interpretation, is rejected by our author. The reason for his rejecting it is, as he says, that Plato “has manifestly received this suggestion from no other source but from Moses,” but that he misunderstood the meaning of the words of Moses.’° First," Plato misunderstood the verses in which Moses speaks of a pattern (wapddevypa)*? or figure (réos)* or form (eidos)** of the tabernacle and its vessels by taking them to refer to an idea of the tabernacle and its vessels. Second,” “he was obviously ™ Cohort. ad Gr. 7; cf. Aetius, Placita I, 3, 21. * Zeller, Phil, di Gr. lL, 1%, p- 713; at 0. 1. ° Cf. below at n. 80. Cohort. ad Gr. 29.

" Ibid.

¥ ** * *

Exod. 25:8 (LXX). Exod. 25:40. Exod. 26:30. Cohort. ad Gr. 30.

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tripped up in the same way regarding the earth and heaven

and man, for he supposes that there are ideas of these,” and in connection with this he quotes the verses, “In the begininng

God created the heaven and the earth; and the earth was invisible and unfashioned,” *® which Plato, he says, has erroneously taken to refer to the creation of the idea of heaven and earth, and he alludes also to the verses, “Let us make man after our image” *” and “after an image of God He made him,” ** which, again, he says, Plato has erroneously taken to refer to an idea of man. It happens, however, that the interpretation of these verses as referring to the idea of the tabernacle and its vessels and to the ideas of heaven and earth and to the idea of man is to be found in Philo.’® The question therefore arises whether in accusing Plato of misunderstanding the words of Moses, our author only meant to say that Plato misunderstood Moses to teach a theory of ideas after its Aristotelian or Albinian interpretation or whether he also meant to say that Plato misunderstood Moses to teach any theory of ideas, including even that of the Philonic interpretation. In other words, our author leaves us in doubt as to whether in accusing Plato he also meant to accuse Philo of misunderstanding Moses. A similar doubt with regard to an author’s own view as to the theory of ideas is to be found in De Resurrectione, which

is again falsely ascribed to Justin Martyr. Commenting on the verse, “Let us make man after our image and after our likeness,” *° this pseudo-Justin says:*! “What kind of man? Manifestly he means fleshly man. For the word says, ‘and God took dust of the earth, and made man.’ ”? It is evident, there-

fore, that man made in the image of God was of flesh.” Here, 6 Gen. 1:1-2. ™ Gen. 1:26.

eo Grenenn: 277. * (1) Tabernacle: Mos. II, 15, 74; Congr. 2, 8; Qu. in Exod. Il, 52° (2) heaven and earth: Opif. 44, 129-130; (3) man: Opif. 6, 25; 46, 134. Cf. Philo, I, pp. 181 ff.; 306 ff.; 310.

” Gen. 1:26, ™ De Resurrectione 7.

2 (260.0375

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it would seem, the author, by interpreting “man” in the words “let us make man” to mean “fleshly man,” is coming out openly

against Philo’s interpretation of the verse as referring to the creation of the idea of man. However, this statement lends itself to another interpretation. In Philo, it is to be noticed, the words “let us make man in our image, after our likeness” are interpreted in two ways. In one place,” they are interpreted to mean the creation of the mind of man. In another place,” they are interpreted to mean the creation of the idea of man, that is to say, the idea of man as a being who consists of both

mind and body. In the light of this, what the pseudo-Justin means to say here is that the verse in question does not refer to the creation of the mind of man but rather to the creation of the idea of a “fleshly man,” that is to say, the idea of a complete man who consists of a mind enfleshed in a body. A vagueness as to which interpretation of Plato was followed is to be found also in Irenaeus. “Plato,” he says, “speaks

of matter and pattern (exemplum) and God.” ** This is exactly the statement which we have met with before in pseudo-

Justin’s Cohortatio ad Graecos.** There, as we have seen, the statement is used in the sense of the Aristotelian interpretation of the Platonic ideas. This, however, is not the only possible meaning of the statement. In other sources the same

statement is used in the sense of the Albinian interpretation of the Platonic ideas.” The question therefore arises here as to the sense in which the statement is used here by Irenaeus. This vagueness with regard to his interpretation of the Pla-

tonic theory of ideas is to be found also in his attempt to show how the Platonic theory of ideas was the source of the Gnostic theory of Aeons. Describing these Gnostic Aeons as consti-

tuting a sort of ideal world, which served as “figure” (figura, figuratio) or “pattern” (exemplum) or “image” (imago) of this sensible world of ours, he challenges the Gnostics to tell * Opif. 23, 69-71. * Thid. 46, 134.

* Adv. Haer. Il, 14, 3. * Cf. above n. 7.

7 Aetius, Placita I, 3, 21; I, 10, 3; Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer. X, 7,

6; cf. below n. 79.

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him, with regard to this ideal world, whether God “made it out of himself” or whether He “received (accepit)” it from “some other power above Him.” ** From this query addressed to the Gnostics it would seem that the Platonic ideas, which are assumed to be the source of the Gnostic ideal world, are real beings outside the mind of God and that with regard to them, as with regard to the Gnostic intelligible world, Irenaeus was in doubt whether they were made by God or whether God had received them from some other power above Him. However, it is possible that in assuming that the Platonic ideas were the source of the Gnostic Aeons, he merely meant that they were the source of inspiration of their theory of Aeons in general, without necessarily meaning that they were the source of every detail in their theory of Aeons, and consequently his statements about the Gnostic Aeons do not necessarily show what his conception of the Platonic ideas was. While there is an uncertainty as to how Irenaeus conceived of the Platonic ideas, it is possible to determine with certainty what his own view of the ideas was. After rejecting the Gnostic conception of an ideal world, he says: “How much safer, then, and more accurate, at once from the beginning to confess, that which is indeed true: that this God, the Creator, who made the world, is the only God, and that there is no other God besides Him, He himself receiving from himself the pat-

tern (exemplum) and figure (figurationem) of those things which have been made.” ” In this passage, then, Irenaeus admits the existence of an ideal world, which serves as a “pattern and figure” of this world of ours and of all things within it. This ideal world, according to him, has no eternal existence apart from God nor was it created by God out of nothing; but, as he says, God re-

ceived it from himself, that is to say, it was generated out of the essence of God. Now, as a Christian, Irenaeus was already

committed to the belief that the only thing which was generated directly from the essence of God was the Logos and *°Adv. Haer. Il, 16, 1-2, and cf. Il, 14, 3.

* Ibid. Il, 16, 3.

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indirectly also the Holy Spirit.°° Everything else was made by God through the Logos. When, therefore, he says that the “pattern and figure” of the world was generated directly from the essence of God, the inference is that he places that “pattern and figure” within the Logos and identifies them. Thus to Irenaeus, the Christian Logos, like its prototype the Philonic Logos, contains within itself the intelligible world of ideas, described by him as the “pattern and figure” of this created world of ours. Still while, on the whole, Irenaeus’ theory of ideas, in so far as the ideas are said to be contained within the Logos, is the same as that of Philo, it is not the Philonic theory of ideas in its original form: it is a revised Philonic theory of ideas, for Irenaeus differs from Philo on two points. First, unlike Philo, who believed that the Logos and hence also the ideas had two stages of existence, Irenaeus believed that the Logos and hence also the ideas had only one single stage of existence.** Second, unlike Philo, who believed that the Logos during its second stage of existence was not God and hence the ideas within the Logos were not within God, Irenaeus believed that the Logos during its entire single stage of existence was God, though distinct from Him as a person, and hence the ideas within the

Logos could be spoken of as being within God. Whether Irenaeus was conscious of these differences between his own view on the ideas and that of Philo cannot be ascertained. References to the Platonic theory of ideas are also to be found in Tertullian, but, in his case, it can be shown that he

followed the Aristotelian interpretation. In a passage in which, like Irenaeus, he asserts that the source of the error of the Gnostic theory of Aeons is to be traced to the Platonic theory of ideas, he describes the Platonic ideas as “lying in secret in

the heights above and apud ipsum Deum, for Plato maintains that there are certain invisible substances, incorporeal, supramundane, divine, and eternal, which they call ideas (ideas), that is to say, forms, which are patterns (exempla) and causes of those objects of nature which are manifest to us and lie * Cf, above pp. 253-255.

* Cf. above pp. 198-201.

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under our corporeal senses, the former being verities (veritates) and the latter images of them.” *

In this passage, the expression apud ipsum Deum is rather ambiguous and lends itself to two interpretations. First, it may be taken to mean “near God himself.” Taken in this sense, the implied interpretation of Plato would be the Aristotelian,

except that God, as in the case of pseudo-Justin’s Cobortatio ad Graecos, is taken out from among the ideas and is placed beside them as something distinct from them.** Second, it may be taken to mean “in God himself.” Taken in this sense, the implied interpretation of Plato would be the Albinian. It hap-

pens, however, that the expression apud ipsum Deum reflects the expression pds 7ov Oedv by which John describes the relation of the Logos to God.** Now we have shown elsewhere

that that Johannine description of Logos is taken by Tertullian to refer to the Logos in its second stage of existence, when it was a generated real being and no longer a thought of God,** so that the expression pds rév Gedy is taken by him to mean “near God.” Consequently here, too, in his description of the

ideas of Plato in their relation to God, the expression apud ipsum Deum is to be taken to mean “near God himself.” Accordingly, -Tertullian’s description of the Platonic ideas as being “near God himself” and as “eternal” shows that he considered them as self-subsistent real beings, which existed from eternity by the side of God. This reflects the Aristotelian interpretation, except, as we have said, for placing God outside of the ideas. In another passage, dealing with the Platonic theory of the soul, which he elsewhere presents as being “unborn and uncreated,” ** he says that the soul, prior to its descent into man on earth, “had lived with God in the heavens above in the fellowship of the ideas (in commercio idearum).” ** In this passage, the meaning of the statement that the soul “had lived . in the fellowship of the ideas” may be explained by * De Anima 18. On the use of the term veritates as a description of the ideas, see below 56. Cf. above at n. 8. * Johni rer. * Cf. above p. 198. * De Anima 4; cf. 24. ao lbids23.

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Tertullian’s own statement elsewhere that, according to Plato, the soul is endowed with a natural competency for the understanding of the ideas.3° What he, therefore, means here is that that soul, while living with God in the heavens above, had a knowledge of the ideas. But, as for the ideas themselves, from this passage alone, it is not clear whether they were, like the soul, self-subsistent beings by the side of God or whether they were thoughts of God. But in view of what we have shown to be the meaning of the preceding passage, the ideas in this passage are to be taken as self-subsistent beings. Tertullian does not say explicitly whether he accepted or rejected the Platonic ideas as understood by him. But from his statement that in Plato’s theory of ideas lies the erroneous Gnostic theory of Aeons * it may be inferred that Tertullian has rejected the Platonic ideas just as he has rejected the Gnostic Aeons. Still, while he rejected the Platonic ideas, conceived by him in accordance with the Aristotelian interpretation, namely, ideas which have existed from eternity by the side of God and independent of God, he did not reject the Philonic conception of ideas, namely, ideas which, after having existed

from eternity as thoughts of God, have been brought forth into existence by God. This may be gathered from a passage in which, after identifying the Wisdom (sophia) of Proverbs 8:22-30 with “the Reason (ratio) or the Word (sermo) of God,” he describes the generation of the Word as follows: ‘As soon as God willed to put forth into their respective sub-

stances and forms the things which He, together with His Wisdom’s Reason and Word, had devised within himself, He first brought forth the Word itself, having within it its own indivisible Reason and Wisdom, in order that all things might be made through that through which they had been planned and devised, yea, and already made, in so far as they were in the

mind of God (in dei sensu).” *° From this passage it may be gathered that, according to Tertullian’s own belief, there were two stages in the existence 8 bid. 24.

*° Cf. above at n. 32.

” Adv. Prax. 6.

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of the ideas. First, prior to the creation of the world the ideas, which had been planned and devised by God “together with” or “through” the Word, were, as he says, “within [God]

himself” or “in the mind (sensu) of God.” Inasmuch as the Latin term sensus in the expression in dei sensu, which we have translated here by the term “mind,” has been previously

explained by Tertullian himself to mean the Word or the Logos, for he says “This Reason

(ratio) is His own mind

(sensus) which the Greeks call \éyov, by which term we also

designate Word

(sermonem),” ** when he says here that the

ideas, prior to the creation of the world, were “within [God]

himself or “in the mind (sensu) of God,” he means that the were then in the Word “together with” which or “through” which they had been planned and devised by God, and that the Word was identical with God. Second, “as soon as God willed” to create the visible world in accordance with the ideas which were in the mind or Word of God, “He first brought forth the Word itself” and with the Word, of course, God also brought forth the ideas contained in it. Here then we have Tertullian’s explicit acceptance of a theory of ideas as conceived by Philo in contradistinction to his rejection, in the passage quoted above, of the Platonic theory of ideas in its Aristotelian interpretation.** Here, again, as in the case of Irenaeus, the Philonic theory of ideas which he accepted is a revised Philonic theory of ideas, inasmuch as the Logos during its second stage of existence is believed by him to be God and hence the ideas within them can be spoken of as being in God. While in Irenaeus and Tertullian a distinction is made between what they conceived to be the erroneous Platonic theory of ideas and what they conceived to be the correct theory of ideas, no such distinction is made by Clement of Alexandria. Plato is understood by him in terms of Philo, and their common view on ideas is adopted by him as his own

“ Ibid. 5. “But see Waszink on Tertullian, De Anima 43, 11 (p. 470), who on the

basis of this passage in Adv. Prax. 6 concludes that “the only ‘world of ideas’ known to Tert. [is] constituted by the thoughts of God.”

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Christian belief. This may be gathered from several passages. In one passage, Clement attributes to Plato the view that “Nous is the dwelling-place of ideas.” 4? As we have shown above,** the term Nous in this passage is used as the equivalent of the Philonic Logos and that the description of Nous as the

“dwelling-place (xépa) of ideas” reflects Philo’s statement that the Logos is the “place” (réos) of ideas.*® The fact that Clement attributes here to Plato a view taken from Philo shows that he followed the Philonic interpretation of the Platonic ideas. In a second passage, he says that Plato called God “the

dwelling-place (x#pa) of ideas.” *° Here, again, the statement attributed to Plato is based upon Philo’s statement that God is “the incorporeal dwelling-place (x#pa) of incorporeal ideas.” *7 In fact, Clement himself indirectly acknowledges the Philonic origin of the statement attributed by him to Plato, for immediately after the statement that Plato called God “the dwelling-place of ideas,” he adds: “having learned from Moses that He was a place (7émov) which contained all

things (7v dadvrwr kat tdv 6hov).” *° The Moses to whom he traces the view which he attributed to Plato is really Philo’s

interpretation of the term “place” in the verse, “and he saw the place afar off,” *° as referring to God °° and his explanation that God is called place “by reason of His containing all things (ra 6\a).” ** And so here, again, he interprets Plato in terms of Philo. In a third passage,” referring to the Christian Logos, he says:

“Now the Logos of God says, ‘I am the truth.’” °* Then he says: “In the Phaedrus also, Plato, speaking of the truth, shows it as an idea,” adding the following comment of his own: “Now an idea is a conception of God; and this the Barbarians “8 Strom. IV, 25°" (PG 8, 1364 c). “ Cf. above pp. 209-210. “ Opif. 5, 20; cf. Philo, I, p. 230. Stroy Vette) (eGo; tae). “7 Cher. 14, 49. 48 Strom. V, 113

“ Gen. 22:4.

(PG 9, 112 A).

° * * *

Somn. I, 11, 64. [bid., 63. Strom. V, 3°° (PG 9, 32 B-33 A). John 14:6.

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(that is, the Hebrews) have termed the Logos of God.” This Logos, however, he continues, did not remain a mere concep-

tion of God, for “the Logos issuing forth was the cause of creation.” In this passage, Clement makes two identifications. First, he

identifies the Christian Logos of John with the Jewish Logos of Philo, and in both of them he distinguishes two stages of existence, one before it issued forth to create the world, when it was only a conception of God, and another after it issued forth to create the world, when it became a distinct personal being. Second, he identifies the Logos with truth, and in support of this identification he refers to Plato in his Phaedrus. Now in the passage in the Phaedrus which he refers to * and part of which he himself quotes in the course of his discussion, Plato does not speak of truth as a single idea, that is, an ideal truth as the pattern for the particular truths in our world; he rather speaks of it as the totality of ideas. Similarly in the

Philebus °° and the Republic °° Plato speaks of truth as a characterization of the ideas in general. Consequently the Christian Logos, which is compared by Clement to the truth which is spoken of by Plato as an idea, is conceived by Clement, after

Philo, as including the totality of ideas. In a fourth passage,” using the Philonic expression ‘ “intelligible world” °° and following Philo’s description of it,®® he says that “the Barbarian philosophy knows the intelligible world and the sensible world, the former archetypal, and the latter the image of that which is called model.” Then, following Philo’s interpretation of the first day of creation as referring to the creation of the intelligible world consisting of seven ideas, which he calls “ancorporeal heaven,” 9) es“invisible earth,” “idea of air,” 99 ¢ce“idea of void,” that is, the idea of soul and mind, “the incorporeal essence of light,” and “an incorporeal es™ Phaedr. 247 c. Phileb. 59 c. * Rep. IX, 585 c. Cf. the term veritates used by Tertullian as a description of the ideas, above at n. 32. = CE,.E BvO 1 p.0227, 1s, * Strom. V, 14* (PG 9, 137 A). ° Opif. 4, 15-16.

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sence . . . of the sun and of all the luminaries,” ® Clement of Alexandria similarly interprets the first day of creation as referring to the creation of the intelligible world, mentioning

three of the seven ideas enumerated by Philo, calling them “the invisible heaven, the unseen (or holy) earth, and intellectual light.” ** This scriptural conception of an intelligible world, he intimates, was borrowed by Plato, for “does not Plato hence appear to have left the ideas of living creatures in the intelligible world, and make intelligible objects into

sensible species according to their genera?” * The reference is to Plato’s description of the ideal pattern of the visible world as “the intelligible animal,” which contains four ideal types of living beings in the world, to which he refers as “intelligible animals.” & In this passage, then, the intelligible world, which is the term used by Philo for the totality of ideas and which to him

is contained in the Logos as in a place and was created by God on the first day of creation, is adopted by Clement and iden-

tified with the “intelligible animal,” which is Plato’s term for the ideal pattern of the visible world. Combining all these passages from Clement we may gather the following general view of his own theory of ideas. The ideas constitute an intelligible world, which is contained in the Christian Logos as in a place. The Christian Logos has two stages of existence, during the first of which it is identical with God, but during the second it is a distinct personal being. Accordingly, the ideas, too, which are contained in the Logos, may be said to have the same two stages of existence. All this is acknowledged by Clement to have its source in the Barbarian philosophy, that is, the scriptural philosophy as formulated by Philo, and it is this Barbarian philosophy which, according to him, is also the source of the Platonic theory of ideas. He thus definitely attributes to Plato the Philonic view that the ideas are contained within a Logos and that the Logos © [bid. 7, 29; cf. Philo, I, pp. 306 ff. " Strom. V, 14” (137 B).

® Ibid. V, 14% (140 A). °°Tim. 30 CD.

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had two stages of existence. But here a question arises. As a Christian, Clement believed that the Logos, even during its second stage of ‘existence, was God. Does he attribute this view also to Philo and to Plato? Or, does his identification of the Philonic and Platonic and Christian views on the Logos exclude that particular conception of the Logos as being God even during its second stage of existence? Unlike Clement, but like Irenaeus and Tertullian, Origen distinguishes between false theories of ideas, which he rejects, and a true theory of ideas, which he accepts. In a comment on the words of Jesus, “I am not of this world,” ®* from which he infers that there is another world, Origen says:° “Now, of this other world we have said beforehand that the explanation

is difficult; and for this reason, that there might not be afforded to any an occasion of entertaining the supposition that

we maintain the existence of certain images (imagines) which the Greeks call iSéas.” In this passage, which is extant only in the Latin translation

of Rufinus, we take it, the expression “certain images which the Greeks call id€as (imagines quasdam quas Graeci i8Séas nomuinant)” is a direct translation of the original Greek which must have read eixdévas twas ds “EdAnves idéas dvoudlovor and is not Rufinus’ way of rendering into Latin the single Greek term idéas, and this for the following reasons. To begin with, there was no need for Rufinus to try to improvise a Latin translation of the Greek term idéas and then add “which the Greeks call idéas,” when the term idea had been treated as a Latin word ever since Seneca ® and it is used as a Latin word, as we have seen, by Tertullian.°’ Then also, if Rufinus were looking for a Latin translation of the Greek term iSéas here

he would have used the term formas or species, as does Augus* John 8:23. In John 17:14 and 17:16, which are cited as references in the Koetschau edition of De Principiis, the reading is “the world” instead of “this world.” = De Princwil, 3y 6: * Epist. 58, 26; cf. J. Waszink’s note in his edition of Tertullian’s De Anima 18, 3 (p. 258).

“ Cf, above at nn. 32 and 37.

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tine,”* instead of imagines and, even assuming that he preferred the term imagines, he would have said simply “images” (imagines) instead of “certain images” (imagines quasdam). The expression “certain images,” therefore, must have been used here by Origen himself, as his own designation for the ideas, and it reflects Philo’s distinction between corporeal im-

ages and incorporeal images and his use of the term “images,” in the sense of “incorporeal images” (eikdves dodparor), as a description of the ideas.® In Plato, the ideas are never described as “images.” By the same token, Origen’s description of the Son or the Logos as “‘an image that is invisible,” *° which is directly based on the New Testament expression “the im-

age (eixav) of the invisible God,” ultimately reflects Philo’s description of the Logos, which to him is the totality of ideas, as “the invisible image” of God.”* To Origen, as to Philo, we may assume, the term “images” (eixdéves) and also the term “powers” (Suvduers; dperat) “ are scriptural equivalents of the Greek term “ideas” and consequently, just as Philo, on discussing the scriptural term “powers,” adds, “some among you call

them not inaptly ideas,”* so also here Origen, on referring to the ideas by the scriptural term “images,” adds, “which the Greeks call idéas.” Similarly in another passage, which is extant in the original Greek, he says, “as the Scriptures would say invisible (déparov) and the Greeks would call incorporeal (dodparov).”™ In still another passage, which, again, is extant only in Rufinus’ Latin translation, he likewise says: “We shall inquire, however, whether the thing which the Greek philosophers call do#parov, that is, incorporeum, is found in the Holy Scriptures under another name.” “° * Cf. below quotation at n. 139. ® Somn. I, 14, 79, in contrast to “visible image” (épary elxwy) in Opif. 51, 146; cf. Philo, I, pp. 238-239.

© DerPrincy ly 2,16: POM At8S: ® Conf. 28, 147. The term dperai is used by Origen as the equivalent of Philo’s term

duvdmes in the sense of ideas; cf. Philo, I, pp. 217-220 and below n. 122. * Spec. I, 8, 47.

% In Joan. XIII, 22, 132 (ed. Preuschen). In PG 14, 436 B, the reading is corrupt. © De Princ. I, Praef. 9.

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This interpretation which Origen suspects might occur to some people is rejected by him on the ground that “it is certainly alien to our ways of thinking to speak of an incorporeal world existing in the mere fancy of the mind (mentis fantasia) or the fleeting stream of thoughts (cogitationum lubrico); and how can they assert either that the Saviour comes from thence, or that the saints will go hither, I cannot see.” *’ From this statement it is quite clear that he considered the ideas, as taught by the Greeks, to have existence only in mind and thoughts as a mere fancy or as a fleeting stream. But in whose mind and thoughts they exist as a mere fancy or as a fleeting stream he does not make clear.

Let us then try to find out what each of these two parts of the statement might mean. As for the first part of the statement, namely, “the mere fancy of the mind (mentis fantasia),” it can be shown that it means the thought of God, for the expression here reflects exactly expressions used in the description of the Platonic ideas as thoughts of God to be found in the following passage: “Plato conjectures that these ideas are substances (otcias) separate from matter, having their existence in the thoughts (vorjpacr) and fancies (davracias) of God, that is to say, of the mind.” ** This interpretation of Plato’s ideas is followed also by Origen’s contemporary Hippolytus in his statement that “the model is the thought (8:évo.av) of God, which Plato also calls ideas, to which giving heed as to an image (cixévicpa) in the soul God fashioned all things.” 7 It is this conception of

the ideas that pseudo-Justin Martyr finds in certain places of Plato’s dialogues, for, in his attempt to show how the Greek philosophers contradict themselves, he says of Plato that “having first given to form its peculiar rank as a first principle and having asserted for it self-subsistence, he afterwards says that

the same thing exists in the thoughts of the mind (év rots vonpaciv).”” 8° ™ Ibid. Il, 3, 6.

® Aetius, PlacitaI, 10, 3; cf. Philo, I, p. 200, n. 2.

2 Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer. I, 19, 2.

© Cohort. ad Gr. 7.

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The second part of Origen’s statement, however, namely, “in the fleeting stream of thoughts (cogitationum lubrico),” is rather difficult. It is introduced by the disjunctive conjunc-

tion “or” (vel). At first sight, therefore, it would seem that it introduces only an alternative expression for the statement in the first part that the ideas are the thoughts of God. But it is hardly possible that the thoughts of God would be described by the use of the term /ubricum, which probably is a transla-

tion of the Greek dd @npdv, with the implication of their being “slippery,” “insecure,” and “perilous.” Undoubtedly, therefore, the second part of the statement is to be taken to introduce a new view, asserting, in contradistinction to the view expressed in the first part, that the ideas are not the thoughts of God but rather the thoughts of man. Taken in this sense, the statement would seem to refer to a view which at the time of Origen was identified not with Plato but rather with opponents of Plato. It reflects the wording used in the

description of the Stoic opposition to Plato, as, for instance, in the following statement: “Those Stoics, who are of the school of Zeno, profess that the ideas are nothing but thoughts

of our mind

(évvojpata jpérepa).” §* Indeed some modern

scholars try to show that such a conception of the ideas is entertained by Plato himself,*? but in the Parmenides Socrates,

who tentatively suggests this conception of the ideas, is made to abandon it.** From Aristotle, too, it may be gathered that it was not considered a Platonic view, for, alluding to that tentative suggestion of Socrates in the Parmenides, he says that “St has been well said that the soul is a place of forms, except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the intellective soul.” ** Certainly the approval with which he quotes this 5 Aetius, op. cit. I, 10, 5. * Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. II, 1‘, p. 664, n. 4. 8 Parm. 132 Bc. From the context, as well as from Aristotle’s allusion to it in De Anima Ill, 4, 429a, 27-28, it is clear that Socrates’ suggestion that each of the forms is a thought which cannot be but “in souls” (év yuxais) (132 B) refers to the existence of the ideas in our souls and not in the mind of God.

This is how the passage is generally understood. But cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 92. % De Anima Ill, 4, 429a, 27-28.

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view indicates that he did not take it as representing the true view of Plato, for his own representation of the Platonic view, we know, is quite the opposite of this one. The second part of

the statement, therefore, must be taken to refer to a nonPlatonic view of the ideas current among Greek philosophers.

It is to be noted that Origen does not say quas Platonici iSéas Nominant but rather quas Graeci idéas nominant. Under Graeci, we take it, he includes not only Plato, who, according to him, believed that the ideas were thoughts of God, but also the Stoics, who believed that the ideas were thoughts of man. In the light of this interpretation of Origen’s statement, his argument against the interpretation which takes the other

world implied in the saying of Jesus to refer to what the Greeks call ideas is to be taken to mean that however these ideas are conceived by the Greeks, whether as thoughts of God or as thoughts of man, they cannot be identified with that other

world from which Jesus is said to have come and to which the saints are said to go. Though Origen rejected the interpretation of the other

world implied in the words of Jesus as referring to what, according to him, the Greeks called ideas, namely, as mere concepts either of the mind of God or of the mind of man, in either case of which they had no real existence, still he did not reject the existence of another world in the sense of real

other world from which Jesus could have come and to which saints could go. That real other world is described by him in terms which are reminiscent of Philo’s description of the intelligible world. To begin with, this other world, he says, is that which is meant by the verse “In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth,”® “for another heaven and another earth are shown to exist besides that ‘firmament’ which is said

to have been made after[wards on] the second day, or that ‘dry land’ which was afterwards called ‘earth.’” * Supplementing this statement that the other world is that which is spoken of in the account of the creation of the heaven and “Generis

*'De Princ..I1,:3, 6.

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the earth on the first day of creation, he says in another place that the heaven and earth spoken of in the account of the first day of creation is “that heaven and earth from which this present heaven and earth, which we now see, afterwards borrowed their names,” *” that is to say, it is the ideal heaven and earth in imitation of which the visible heaven and earth was formed. This reflects exactly Philo’s view that the scriptural account of the first day of creation refers to the creation of the intelligible world.** Then, that other world is described by him as consisting of things which are “invisible” (invisibilia) and “incorporeal” (dodpara, incorporea).*® These are exactly the terms which are used by Philo in describing his intelligible world, when he says, for instance, that “the Maker made an incorporeal (do#pmarov) heaven and an invisible (déparov) earth.” ®° Furthermore, like Philo’s intelligible world, which is said to consist of ideas *! or to be a commonwealth of ideas,*?

the other world of Origen is described by him as containing certain ideas,** mentioning especially ideas of two things: first, “the true and living forms,” which in the New Testament are

called “the heavenly things,” that is to say, the ideal laws, of which the Mosaic Law is “a copy and shadow,’ second, the ideal pattern of the tabernacle and its vessels, which is described in the Pentateuch by the terms “form” (eiSos, forma) °°

and “pattern” (apddevypa, similitudo) .°° But where is this other world located? Is it, like the intel-

ligible world of Philo, located in the Logos? This question is discussed by Origen in several passages.

In one passage, he states the question as follows: “But * Ibid. Il, 9, 1. 8 Opif. 7, 29; 44, 129-130; cf. Philo, I, pp. 306 ff. ll) 3, 6, “Opi. 75 29: * De Princ. Ill, 6, 8. * Opif. 4, 17; cf. 5, 20; Sommn. I, 32, 186. * Heb. 8:3. * Gig. 13, 61; cf. Philo, I, p. 228. * Num. 8:4 (LXX). * Exod. 25:9 (LXX). The verse quoted here by Origen is Exod. 25:40, which in the Latin translation of Rufinus reads: “Vide ut facias omnia secundum formam et similitudinem, quae tibi ostensa est in monte.” The Deane.

Septuagint as well as the Hebrew of this verse uses only the term rizos,

tabnit.

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whether that world to which He (Christ) desires to allude be far separated and divided from this, either by situation or nature or glory; or whether it be superior in glory and quality, but confined within the limits of this world, which seems to me more probable, is nevertheless uncertain, and in my opinion an unsuitable subject for human thought.” °* In this passage, then, he is inclined to place that other world “within the limits of this world” and hence not in the Logos. In another passage he says: °° “It is also a question for investigation whether the only-begotten *° and first born of all creation © is to be called ousia of ousias (otcia ovoidv) and idea of ideas (ida iSedv) and arche (dpy7y), while his Father and God is above all these.” In this passage, Origen raises the question whether the

Logos, which in John is described as “the only-begotten” and is identified with the preéxistent Christ and hence is the same as Paul’s “firstborn of all creation,” is to be called ‘“‘ousia of ousias” and “‘idea of ideas” and “‘arche.”’ Of these three subjects of his investigation, the expression “idea of ideas” is used in Philo as a description of the Logos in the sense that it contains all ideas;’*’ the expression “ousia of ousias” must have been coined by Origen himself, as a description of the Logos, after the analogy of Philo’s “idea of ideas,” following Plato’s use of the term “‘ousia” in the sense of idea; 1° the term “‘arche”

seems to reflect the expression “archetypal pattern” (aapddevyya apxérutov) by which Philo describes the Logos in his statement that the “intelligible world” is “the archetypal pattern, the idea of ideas, the Logos of God,” ?° and the conclud-

ing statement that “his Father and God is above all these” seems to reflect Philo’s statement that God is “older and higher than

every archetype.” ** Consequently the question raised here by De Princ. 35 6; a Coleners: * Cont. Cels. VI, 64. © John 1:14. ” Opif. 6, 25; Migr. 18, 103; cf. Philo, I, pp. 233, 247. * Cf. Philo, I, p. 210, n. 36; cf. above at nn. 6 and 78. * Opif. 6, 25. But see ed. Leopold Cohn for reading of text.

** Sommn. I, 13, 75.

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Origen is to the effect whether the Christian Logos, like the Logos of Philo, is to be called “idea of ideas” in the sense that it contains the totality of ideas. In a third passage, commenting upon the opening words of the Fourth Gospel, “In the beginning was the Logos,” he says: *°° “Consider whether it is possible for us to interpret the verse to mean that all things are created according to the wisdom and the models (rvovs) of the system of intelligible things (vonudrey) in it. For I think that just as a house and a ship are built or fabricated in accordance with the models of the architects, seeing that a house and a ship have the models and logoi (Aéyovs) in the artisan as their origin, so also all things have been created in accordance with the logoi of future things previously manifested by God in wisdom.” In this passage, then, the Christian Logos, like the Philonic Logos, is said to contain the ideal models and rational plans of the sensible world and, as proof for the existence of such ideal models in the Logos, he uses, like Philo,*°* the analogy of architectural planning. The term “logoi,” literally “reasons,” in the sense of rational plans, and hence of ideas,*®” is an abbre-

viation of the Stoic “seminal reasons” (oepparixoi dédyor), which were divested here by Origen of their materiality and used in the sense of ideas in the mind of God, after the analogy of Philo who uses this Stoic expression in the sense of the powers of the Logos which are immanent in the world.*°* In a fourth passage, addressing himself to the reader, he says: 1° “You may investigate, whether in any sense the ‘firstborn of all creation’ "*° can be the [intelligible] cosmos, espe-

cially in so far as he is the manifold wisdom,’ for since [in wisdom] are logoi of anything whatever, in accordance with 105 Im Joan.1, 22 (PG 14, 56 cp); (ed. Preuschen, I, 19, 113-114).

10 Opif. 4, 17-5, 20; cf. Philo, I, pp. 243f. 17 Cf. below n. 138. +8 Cf. Philo, I, pp. 342-343. 109 In Joan. XIX, 5 (PG 14, 568 Bc); ed. Preuschen, XIX, 22, 147. Cf. discussion of the translation of this passage by Ralph Marcus in Harvard Theological Review, 47 (1954), 317-318. 2. Colmer5, ™ Eph, 3:10.

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which all things made by God in wisdom came into being, as the Prophet says, ‘In wisdom hast thou made them all,’ *”

then in him [i.e., the firstborn] would also be the [intelligible] cosmos itself, which is much more manifold than the sensible

cosmos and different from it as the matterless Logos, [which is the instrument of the creation] of the whole cosmos (édov xéapov),1!? differs from the enmattered cosmos, [the latter of which is a cosmos or an ordered and harmonious whole] not on account of its matter but on account of its participation in the Logos and in the wisdom, which bring order to the matter of all ordered things.” . In this passage, again, Origen plays with Philonic and Christian concepts. First, prior to the creation of the world there was a Logos or wisdom, which was the abode of the intelligible world, which in turn consisted of ideas,* called by him again logoi. Second, the sensible world is said by Origen to have become a cosmos or an ordered whole through its par-

ticipation (uerox7) in the Logos, which reflects Philo’s statement that the sensible world is an imitation (uiunua) of the Logos,"* “participation” and “imitation” being terms used by Plato,"'® and after him by Philo,’ in describing the relation of the visible things to the ideas. Finally, following the Christian traditional identification of the preéxistent Christ with wisdom and the Logos, he argues that the “firstborn of all creation,” that is to say, the preéxistent Christ, contains in himself the intelligible world of ideas. In a fifth passage, referring to the Logos as wisdom, he says:*** “On account of these very creatures which had been

described, as it were, and prefigured in wisdom herself, does wisdom say, in the words of Solomon, that she was created "2'Ps. 104:24. ™° Cf. Philo’s description of the Logos as that “by which cosmos

(cvmmras xéouos)

was

formed”

“used like an instrument when He was making the cosmos” 31, 96) and cf, also above p. 254 at n. 166. ™ Cf. Philo, I, pp. 226 ff. ™ Opif. 6, 25; cf. Philo, I, p. 332, n. 46.

"° Parm. 132 CD; Tim. 49 A.

the whole

(Sacr. 3, 8) and as that which

God

(Leg. All. Ill,

™ Leg. AA, 22. * De. Pring. Ia.

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the beginning of the ways of God,1® inasmuch as she con-

tained within herself the principles (initia = dpyds) or logoi (rationes = Néyous) or forms (species = etSn).” In this passage, too, wisdom or the Logos is said to have contained within itself the “principles,” the “logoi,” or the “forms” of all things to be created. In other words, the Logos contained within itself the intelligible world of ideas. In a sixth passage, adopting Philo’s description of the Logos as “the second God” (6 Sdevrepos beds, secundus Deus) 1*° and

applying it to the Christian Logos, he says: *** “And although we speak of a second God (Sdevrepov Oedv), let men know that by the term second God we mean nothing else than a power (dperjv) which includes all other powers and a Logos which includes every Logos that exists in everything which has arisen naturally, directly, and for the general advantage.”

In this passage, again, the Logos is said to contain all the ideas, referred to as powers and logoi, which, with the creation of the world, became immanent in things, the term “‘powers”

(dperai) used here by Origen for the ideas being the equivalent of the term “powers” (Suvdyes) used by Philo in the same Setise.7

In a seventh passage, playing upon the double meaning of the terms “Logos” and “logoi,” one in the literal sense of “word” and “words” and the other in the special sense of total-

ity of ideas and the individual constituent ideas of that totality, he says, with evident reference to the analogy of the relation

of the individual ideas to the totality of the ideas, that the “words” or promises of God contained in Scripture are related to the “Word” which was with God in the beginning as “parts of a whole or as species of a genus.” ?”° In Philo the relation

of the individual ideas to the Logos as the totality of the ideas is described as the relation of that which is “generic” (yerixdv) 7 PLOVerS: 22's 2 Qu. in Gen. Il, 62, and Ralph Marcus’ note in his edition (Vol. I, p- 150, note 7). Cf. Leg. All. II, 21, 86, where the Logos is described as “second” (detrepos) to God, and Philo, I, p. 234.

11 Cont. Cels. V, 39.

at, above Na73.

3 Cont. Cels. V, 22.

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to that which is “most generic” (yexdéraros),’** which in that context means the same as saying the relation of the species

to the genus. The cumulative effect of these seven passages, taken from works written at various times, is that throughout his lifetime Origen was wrestling with this problem. In one passage,’

taken from his De Principiis (ca. 230), raising the question with regard to that other world implied in the statement of Jesus, he was inclined to place it outside the Logos. In one passage, taken from his Contra Celsum (248),'°* raising the question with regard to ideas as to whether they are contained in the Logos, he leaves it unanswered. In two passages,’** taken

from his commentary on John (228—post 238), he raises again the same question with regard to the ideas, but is inclined to place them within the Logos. In three passages,’”* taken from

his De Principiis and Contra Celsum, he assumes that the ideas are contained in the Logos. Like Origen who investigated the meaning of the other

world implied in Jesus’ saying “I am not of this world,” *° Augustine, in one of his earliest works, De Ordine, investigated the meaning of the other world implied in another saying of

Jesus: “My kingdom is not of this world.” **° From the fact that the verse reads “My kingdom is not of this world” and not “My kingdom is not of the world” he argued that there must be another world, an intelligible world, beyond this our world of sense.1*t However, in one of his latest works, Retractiones,'*” he retracted this view, explaining the other world

which is implied in the words of Jesus to refer not to an intelligible world existing beyond this our world of sense but rather to the new world with its new heaven and its new earth which will come into being as a fulfillment of the prayer, “Thy kingdom‘come.” 748 ™ Cf. Philo, I, pp. 251-252. =~ Cf. above:n. 67.

%” John 8:23. 7 John 18:36.

Cf. above n. 98. “7 Cf, above nn. 104 and 108. Cf. above nn. 116, 119 and 121.

™ De Ordine I, 11, 32 (PL 32, 993). ma IRCEFACES Ing 2: ** Matt. 6:10; Rev. 21:1.

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This retraction, however, refers only to his earlier interpretation of the verse as implying the existence of an intelligible world which, like its counterpart the sensible world, existed outside the thoughts of God. It does not mean a denial of the existence of an intelligible world altogether. For in the same passage in which he retracts his earlier interpretation of the verse he explains that that earlier interpretation of his, with its assertion of the existence of an intelligible world beyond the world of sense, was not given by him under the influence of Plato or the Platonists but rather under the influence of the wording of the verse, for, he argues, Plato never meant by his intelligible world, and hence also by his ideas, anything but the thought of God, and he concludes his argument by saying that the existence of an intelligible world of this kind, and hence also of ideas of this kind, is implied in the Christian belief in the Logos. To quote: “Nor did Plato err in stating that there is an intelligible world, if we disregard his terminology, which is not of the customary ecclesiastical usage in this connection, and attend only to the matter of what he says. For the world which he called by the name ‘intelligible’ is that eternal and unchangeable reason (rationem) by which He made the world. Any man who denies that such a reason exists will find himself compelled to say either that God made what He made without reason or that He did not know what He made either while He made it or before He made it; such would be the consequence if there were not with (apud) Him that reason by which He made the world. But if that reason was with Him, as the case really is, then Plato seems to have called it intelligible world.” In this passage, the Platonic ideas in their totality, described by the Philonic and Plotinian term “intelligible world” are taken to exist only as thoughts of God, thus following the Albinian and Neoplatonic interpretation of the Platonic theory of ideas. This “intelligible world” is identified with “that eternal and unchangeable reason (ratio) by which He made the world,” that is to say, it is identified with the Logos who “was

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with God” and who “was God” and by whom “all things were made.” 1%4 Thus the Platonic intelligible world of ideas and the Christian Logos are identified and both of them are said to be in God. This view of his with regard to his conception of the

Platonic theory of ideas as existing in God and also with re-

gard to his conception of the Christian Logos as containing Platonic ideas is given expression to by Augustine in many passages in his other works, written at various times. In one passage, he refers to Plato as continuously maintaining that God “embraced in His eternal intelligence the ideas of both the universe and of all animals.” !*° The reference here is to the statement of Plato that there was an ideal world, or as he calls it an “intelligible animal,” *°* after which “this universe” was modeled and that in that ideal world there were four ideal animals or as he calls them “intelligible animals,” **” after which the four types of living beings in the world were modeled. And this ideal world with its ideal animals is said here by Augustine to exist only in the intelligence of God. In a second passage, he starts with the statement that, though Plato was the first to describe his pattern of things by the term ideas, the existence of such patterns was known before him. Then, after announcing his intention to use, as a description of these patterns, the term rationes, “reasons,” which stands for the Greek term Jogoi (Adyor),'** rather than the Latinized

Greek term ideae or its Latin equivalents formae or species, he proceeds to define ideas as “certain principal forms or certain fixed and immutable reasons of things, which have not been formed and hence are eternal and always in the same state of existence, and are contained in the divine intelligence.” Finally he concludes: “What religious man imbued with the true religion, however much he may as yet be incapable of contemplating this, would dare to deny . . . that the universal preservation of things and the very order itself by which all ™ John.1:1-3.,.. “De Cro, Det XI 26.) *8 Cf. above at nn. 108-109 and 118.

(°* Tang

& 4

bid 0 c

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things changeable run their temporal course according to a certain rule are contained and governed by the laws of God the highest? This agreed upon and admitted, who would dare to say that God has established all these without a rational plan? Since one cannot properly say or believe this, it follows that all things have been established according to reason.” 1°° In this passage, then, Augustine restates the Platonic theory of ideas as meaning “certain principal forms or certain fixed and immutable reasons of things” which are “eternal” and “contained in the divine intelligence.” This Platonic conception of ideas is also taken by him to have been anticipated

by “sages” of “other nations,” among whom he undoubtedly includes Moses and the prophets, thus alluding to the view, inherited by the Fathers from Philo, that Scripture contains the doctrine of ideas and of the Logos.*#° And when he says that no “religious man imbued with religion” would deny that “all

things have been established according to reason” or according to “a rational plan” and that they are “governed by laws of God the highest” he certainly means that no Christian who believes in the Logos would deny the existence of ideas of this kind.

In a third passage, trying to explain how the angels know all the works of creation, he says that “all these things are known in one way by the angels in the Word of God, in which they see the eternally abiding causes and reasons according to which they were made.” ™* In this passage he quite clearly states that the Logos contains “reasons,” the term “rea-

sons” (rationes) representing, as he himself has said, the Greek

logoi used by him as the equivalent of the Platonic term “ideas.” In a fourth passage where, like Philo “? and Origen,™* he tries to argue for the existence of ideas from the analogy of

human workmanship, he explains the term Logos to mean “design” (consilium) and concludes his argument with the fol189 De Divers. Quaest. LXXXIII,

Qu. 46, 2 (PL 40, 30).

“© Cf, above pp. 267-269. 1 De Civ. Dei XI, 29. ™ Opif. 4, 17-5, 20; cf. Philo, I, pp. 243 f.

“8 Cf. above at n. 105.

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lowing words: “If, then, on account of some great building a human design receives praise, do you wish to see what a design

of God is the Lord Jesus Christ, that is, the Word of God? Mark this fabric of the world. View what was made by the Word, and then thou wilt understand what is the nature of the Word.” *** Here again the Logos is said to contain ideas. Ina fifth passage, where he again tries to prove the existence of ideas, he starts out by showing that our ideas of number and wisdom are neither derived from sense perception nor are they mere fictions of our mind, but that they reflect the existence of a supersensible real and immutable number and wisdom.'*® In this he follows Plato.14® Then he tries to show that the totality of ideas are contained in the idea of truth.**’ In this, too, he follows Plato.‘4* Finally he concludes that “truth itself is God,” “° by which he means to say that, inasmuch as truth, which is the totality of ideas, is spoken of in the New Testament as being the Logos, for Jesus, who is the Logos incarnate, says of himself, “I am the truth,” *°° it is also God. And so here, again, the ideas are said to be contained in the Logos, with the additional statement that, since the Logos is God, they are contained in God. In all these passages, then, as in his Retractiones, Plato’s intelligible world of ideas and the Christian Logos are identified and the ideas are said to be in God. But, with regard to the Christian Logos, we know that Augustine, while considering it as God, considered it also as a personal being distinct from God. The question therefore arises whether the analogy which Augustine draws between the Christian Logos and the Platonic world of ideas implies that the latter was also conceived by him as a personal being distinct from God. A similar question, it will be recalled, was raised by us also in the case of ND Qi Oe “ De Libero Arbitrio Ml, 8, 20-11, 32. “For a detailed discussion, cf. below Vol. II, in the chapter on the proofs of the existence of God. “™ Op. cit. II, 12, 33-14, 38. MSCf. above at nn. 53-56. oll OF Barer sal Oea8 (o © John 14:6.

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28 5

Irenaeus *** and Clement of Alexandria.“? If an argument from silence could be used in this case, there are two passages which would seem to show that Augustine saw no distinction whatsoever between the Christian Logos and the Platonic

world of ideas. In his Confessiones he enumerates analogies as well as differences between the teachings of John and Paul and those of the books of the Platonists.t°*

From the fact that

he mentions no differences between John’s Logos and the Platonic world of ideas, it would seem that he found no difference

at all between them. Similarly in his Commentary on John he says without any qualification that in “the books of the philosophers” is also to be found “that God has an only-begotten Son, by whom are all things.” *°* Taking these Fathers to speak for all those who do not discuss the subject, we may conclude that to all of them, though

Justin and the pseudo-Justin are not explicit on the point, the Christian Logos retained its original Philonic character as the place of the intelligible world or the totality of ideas. But, inasmuch as they differ from Philo in their conception of the relation of the Logos to God, they may be said to differ from him also in their conception of the relation of the ideas to God. To Philo the Logos during its second stage of existence is a creation of God and so are also the ideas within the Logos,

and hence the ideas during their second stage of existence cannot be said to be in God. To the Fathers, however, both to those who followed Philo in his twofold stage theory and to

those who adopted a single stage theory, the Logos is never a creation of God, it is always God, and hence in that sense the ideas can be said to be always in God. But still, inasmuch as to

all of them the Logos as a person, either only during its second stage of existence or during its entire single stage of existence, is distinct from God the Father, the ideas in the Logos may in that sense be also said to be distinct from God the Father. While they all agree that the ideas may be said to be in God 451 Cf. above p. P- 263.203 2 Cf. above p. 270.

8 Confessiones VII, 9, 13-15. *4 In Joan. Il, 4.

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in so far as the Logos is called God but may be said to have a reality distinct from that of God in so far as the Logos has a reality distinct from that of God the Father, they differ among themselves as to their interpretation of the Platonic theory of

ideas. One of the pseudo-Justins, and hence probably also Jus-

tin, had knowledge of both the Aristotelian and the Albinian interpretation of Plato. Irenaeus may have followed either the Aristotelian or the Albinian interpretation, but certainly not the Philonic. Clement of Alexandria follows the Philonic inter-

pretation. Origen and Augustine follow the Albinian interpre-

tation. It is in the light of this general view of the Fathers as established by the statements of those of them who explicitly expressed themselves on the subject of ideas that we must interpret any vague statement made by any particular Father with regard to ideas. When Leontius of Byzantium, for instance, using the term “nature” in the sense of “universal” and the term “hypostasis” in the sense of “individual,” says that “there exists no nature without a hypostasis” *** or that “‘a nature, that

is, an ousia, can never exist without a hypostasis,”*°* he is indeed aligning himself with Aristotle against Plato in asserting that ideas do not exist apart from individuals. But it does not mean, as it has been assumed,’*” a rejection of the Platonic theory of ideas altogether. It may only mean a rejection of the Platonic theory of ideas as interpreted by Aristotle, namely, ideas that exist as real incorporeal beings apart from individuals and apart also from God. It does not necessarily mean a rejection of the Platonic theory of ideas interpreted to mean ideas that exist apart from individuals but not apart from God. It is reasonable to assume that, like all the other Fathers, Leontius believed in ideas that have their existence in the Logos and in that sense also in God. And such an assumption, we dare say, may be made about all the other Fathers. *5 Lib. Tres I (PG 86, 1277 D). *8 Ibid. (1280 A). *" Cf. J. P. Junglas, Leontius von Byzanz, pp. 67-68: “Durch diesen Satz ist die platonische

Byzanz, p. 63.

Ideenlehre

ausgeschlossen.”

Cf. Loofs,

Leontius

von

PART THREE THE THREE

MYSTERIES

CHAPTER THE MYSTERY

XIV

OF THE GENERATION

THE BELIEFs connected with God, the Logos, and the Holy Spirit constitute, according to the Fathers, three mysteries.’ First, the generation of the Logos from God is to them a mystery. Thus Novatian, who like Tertullian * refers to the gen-

eration of the Logos as “nativity,” speaks of the “mysteries” of the “sacred and divine nativity” of the Logos.* Second, the conception of a triune God is also spoken of by them as a mystery. Thus it is described by Tertullian as the “mystery of the economy,” * by Gregory of Nyssa as “the profundity of a mystery,” ° and by Ambrose as a “divine and wonderful mys-

tery.” ° Third, the incarnation is a mystery. Thus, speaking of the incarnation, Clement of Alexandria exclaims, “‘O divine mystery!” * and Augustine refers to it as “this mystery.” ® It would seem rather strange that the Fathers, with all their belief in a God whose nature and whose actions are incompre*Though

resurrection, too, is called a mystery

(1 Cor.

15:51), it is

general, whereas these three mysteries are confined either to the Logos, or to God, or to Jesus.

* Adv. Prax. 7; cf. above p. 195. * Adv. Prax. 2.

= De miniitis ts ° Oratio Catechetica 3 (PG 45, 17 ¢).

° De Fide IV, 8, 91.

*Protrept. 11

(PG 8, 228 c).

8 De Catechizandis Rudibus XVII, 28 (PL 40, 332).

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hensible and in a world which had come into existence and is still governed by a power which is unlimited and by a will which is inscrutable, should single out these three beliefs as

special mysteries. There would seem to be no more mystery about the belief in the generation of the Logos than in the belief in the creation of the world; nor would there seem to be more mystery about the belief in one God who is three than in the belief in mutable actions proceeding from a God who is immutable; nor, again, would there seem to be more mystery in the belief that the Logos was made flesh than in the belief that God breathed into the nostrils of Adam a breath of life. If, despite all this, the Fathers describe these three beliefs as mysteries, it must be because they considered these three beliefs to be unique even among all kinds of beliefs in things miraculous and mysterious. What the uniqueness of these three beliefs consists in, will now be the subject of our discussion. In both popular Greek religion and the Hebrew Bible God is represented after the analogy of a human being, and philos-

ophers, both Greek and Jewish, were aware of it and commented upon it. Xenophanes, reflecting upon the anthropomorphic descriptions of the gods in Homer and Hesiod, which were taken literally in the popular religion of the Greeks, says irreverently that “if oxen and horses . . . could paint . . horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen,” ° and Philo, reflecting upon the anthropomorphic descriptions of God in Scripture, which were already interpreted figuratively in the popular teaching of religion to the

Jews, says reverently that they are used only out of regard “for the ways of the thinking of the duller folk.” 1° There is, however, a fundamental difference between the general tenor of the anthropomorphism of Greek popular religion and the anthropomorphism of the Hebrew Scripture. In Greek popular religion, the gods as producers of things are ° Cf. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 21, Xenophanes, Fr. 15. *° Somn. I, 40, 237.

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described after the analogy of animal beings as procreators, begetting, by a process of natural generation, other gods, the world, and also human beings. In the Hebrew Scripture, God as the creator of the world and man is described after the analogy of an artisan. The Hebrew Scripture, indeed, often

speaks of the people of Israel as “the sons of Jehovah” their God ™ and of Jehovah their God as their “Father,” ” and it also refers to certain beings as “the sons of God.” ** But whatever primitive Semitic mythology these expressions may reflect, already in Scripture itself the father-son relationship between God and Israel is conceived of in a figurative sense."4 And with regard to those beings described in Scripture as

“the sons of God,” Jewish tradition, long before its contact with philosophy, identified them with the scriptural angels,” and these angels were conceived of as having been created b God, as if by an artisan, like the heaven and earth and all the living beings and the first man.*®

The difference between the conception of God as begetter and the conception of God as artisan resulted in a difference between two conceptions of God with reference to His like-

ness or unlikeness to the things produced by Him. In natural generation, the begetter begets something like itself, for that which it begets must be of the same species as itself; *” in artificial production, the artisan is capable of producing something unlike himself. In mythology, therefore, God, however magnified, is still like things in the world. In Scripture, God, however anthropomorphically described, is still taught to be unlike “anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.” * 4 Deut. 14:1 et al. ” Deut. 32:6 et al. 8 Gen. 6:2, 4; Job 1:6; 38:7; Dan. 3:25 (“son of God”). “Cf. J. S. Cavendish, “God, Children of,” DB, II, 215-217; N. Schmidt, “Son of God,” EB, 4690-4694. 6 Septuagint version of Gen 6:2 (in some MSS.); Job 1:6; 38:7; Dan. 3:25; Gen. 6:2 in Jubilees 5:1; Enoch 6:2. 16 Jubilees 2:2; Slav. Enoch 29:3; Syriac Apocal. of Baruch 21:6. Metaph. VII, 7, 10324, 23-24; LX, 8, 1049b, 27-29; cf. below p. 307. 8 Deut. 4:15; Exod. 20:4.

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Among the Greeks, mythology, in its contact with philosophy, produced two kinds of theism, an anti-mythological theism, in which God is conceived of as an artisan, and a mythological theism, in which God is conceived of as a begetter. The theism of Plato and Aristotle is anti-mythological. Starting with an anti-mythological conception of God as something incorporeal and hence as something unlike the world, both Plato and Aristotle, quite logically, endow their God with the anti-mythological character of artisan. In Plato, indeed, God is still sometimes described as He who “begot (yevvjoas) this universe” and is still called “Father” (warjp),”° but these terms are only survivals of popular forms of speech, like similar terms in the Hebrew Scripture. In Plato’s own philosophy, God is a Demiurge, a maker, a craftsman, who shapes the world out of a matter which coexisted with Him independently from eternity and was not generated out of himself.?? And so also in Aristotle, God is only the artisan of the motion of a world which has existed by His side from eternity.** The theism of the

Stoics, however, is not anti-mythological, it is only a rationalization of mythology. Starting with a God who is primordial fire, they make him generate out of His own self a world like himself after the analogy of the seed in the generation of animals.?? Later, when Plotinus tried to combine the PlatonicoAristotelian anti-mythological immaterial God, who was unlike the world, with the Stoic conception of a mythological God, who was the begetter of the world, he was confronted with the difficulty of how, on the principle of natural generation, God could generate a world unlike himself, expressed by him in the question: “How from the One, as we conceive it to be, can any multiplicity or number come into existence?” 7° or, “How could all things come from the One which is simple and which shows in its identity no diversity and no duality?” > ° Tim. a A.

* Ibid.5 ™ Phys. Vit, 1, 252b, 5-6; 4, 256a, 2-3; Metaph. XI, 7. ” Diogenes, VI, 136.

Enns: Ve 106s

= 1Dids Napa

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Among the Jews, Scripture, in its contact with Greek philosophy, produced only one kind of theism, one in which God is conceived of only as artisan. The theism of Philo starts with both characteristic features of the scriptural conception of God, namely, His unlikeness to anything iin the world and His bringing the world into existence as artisan and not as begetter. But going further than Plato and Aristotle in his conception of the unlikeness of God, he takes it to mean that God is not only unlike the world in incorporeality but that He is also unlike the world in eternity. Philo is, therefore, opposed to all the three types of theism which he has found in Greek philosophy, that of Plato, that of Aristotle, and that of the Stoics. Maintaining that God alone is eternal, he rejects the eternity of Matter of Plato * and the eternity of the world of Aristotle ** and he accepts the ideas of Plato only as creations of God.” Maintaining that God is incorporeal and the maker of the world by will and design, he directly rejects the Stoic conception of God as body and fate ** and indirectly, by stressing that God made the world by will and design * and out of nothing,” he rejects also the Stoic conception of the generation of the world as a necessary emanation out of the essence of God, which in his case would have meant the necessary emanation of a corporeal world out of the essence of an incor-

poreal God. The fourth type of theism in Greek philosophy, that of Neoplatonism, had not yet come into existence by the time of Philo, and he does not happen to discuss it proleptically. But from his contention that the sensible world was created by

the will of God out of nothing and from his use of terms meaning creation in connection with the intelligible world of ideas contained in the Logos as well as from his statement that that intelligible world came into existence, prior to the creation of

the sensible world, by an act of will on the part of God,** it may be inferred that he would be opposed to the Neoplatonic ae id., 1,

I, pp. 300-312. p . 295-299.

21 bid-. 1, ae 204-210.

* Tbid., 1, pp. 176-177; 328-330.

ee

lie aS ., 1, p: 304-310.

* [bid., 1, pp. 204-210; 226-236.

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conception of an eternal necessary emanation by which the sensible world came into existence out of the essence of God indirectly through the intermediacy of the intelligible world, consisting of Nous and Soul, which in turn also came into existence by a process of eternal necessary emanation out of the essence of God, the Nous directly from God and the Soul indirectly through the intermediacy of Nous.

Christianity started with the Jewish conception of God as artisan and not as begetter. In its original account of the life of Jesus, Jesus, as the promised Messiah,*” was born after the manner of any human being and not begotten of God. Simi-

larly when Paul, out of Jewish tradition, introduced the conception of the preéxistent Christ, whom he called wisdom and

also Holy Spirit,** and when John adopted that conception of the preéxistent Christ and renamed him by the Philonic term Logos,** that preéxistent Christ or wisdom or Holy Spirit or

Logos was presumably, as in Judaism, created by God and not begotten of Him,* and the terms “Son” and “firstborn” used

by Paul *° and the term “only-begotten” used by John,*” were used by them in a figurative sense. But when, with the general

acceptance of the miraculous birth of Jesus,** the Christian God assumed the character of a begetter with regard to the born earthly Christ, He also became a begetter with regard to the preéxistent heavenly Christ. The Logos was thus no longer

created; it was generated in the more literal sense of the term and it was called “son” and “firstborn” and “only-begotten”

also in a more literal sense of the term. Justin Martyr already describes the Logos as one whom “God begot from himself”; *°

Tatian describes him as “emanating from the Father”; 4° Athenagoras describes him as coming forth after God had him “in

himself”; #* and Theophilus describes him as “being naturally produced (aefuxds) from God,” * by which is meant that * Cf, . Cf. * Cf. * Cf. *° Cf.

above above above above above

p. 155. * Cf. above p. 178. pp. 159, 164. “Cf. above pp. 168 ff. p. 177. = Didl er. pp. 170, 175, 179. * Orat. ad Gr. 7. p. 159. © Supplic. 10. “Ad Autol. Il, 22.

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he was generated after the manner of things produced by nature and not created after the manner of things made by art. When later the Philonic conception of the Logos as created, and as created out of nothing, was revived by Arius,** his view

was anathematized as heresy. In the Creed of Nicaea it was formally declared that He was “begotten of the Father . . . that is, of the substance of the Father.” #4 In the second of the fourteen anathematisms of the Fifth Oecumenical Council at Con-

stantinople (553) it was declared: “If anyone does not confess that there are two births of God the Logos, the one before ages from the Father, out of time and incorporeal, and the other in the last days, in that He came down from heaven, and was made flesh . . . let him be anathema.” # Thus in Christianity the Logos of Philo, when transferred to the preéxistent Christ, ceased to be created by God and became begotten of God. With this difference between Philo and Christianity in the conception of the origination of the Logos a difference also appears in the conception of the term Father, which describes the relation of God to the Logos in both Philo and Christianity. To express this difference in the philosophic language of the time, we may say that in Philo

God is called Father in relation to the Logos in the sense that He is its efficient cause; in Christianity God 1s called Father in relation to the Logos in the sense that He is its material cause. As its efficient cause, God, according to Philo, is the cause of the Logos in the same sense that He is the cause of the world, namely, He created it out of nothing. In Christianity, however, the father and son relationship between God and the Logos means a special kind of relationship, unlike that which exists between God and the world or any particular being within the world. Of the world, Christianity still continued to believe

that God is the efficient cause, having created it out of nothing.*® Of the Logos, it has now come to believe that God is

also the material cause, as it were, having generated it out of * Cf. below pp. 585 f. “ Hahn, § 142; Denzinger, § 54. * Hahn, § 148; Denzinger, § 214. “© Cf. below Vol. II, in the chapter on creation.

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himself. The Logos is the son of God after the manner in which a son is described in Scripture, namely, as that which comes of

the “thigh”“7or of the “loins”**or of the “bowels” (xovdiar) of his father. In fact, in Theophilus, the eternal existence of Christ, prior to his generation, in the thought of God, is described as having been “within His own bowels (omhdyYOU). >

This then constitutes the mystery or rather the uniqueness of the generation of the Logos. All things are made by God; the Logos alone is begotten of God. The Fathers of the Church, while, indeed, not conscious of the pagan origin of the belief in the generation of the Logos out of the essence of God, were conscious of the analogy of that belief to the pagan myths of the birth of gods, which were still current in their time. They were therefore constantly warning their readers against confusing the father-son relationship between God and the Logos with various pagan myths about the birth of gods. Thus Athenagoras, speaking of the Christian belief in the Logos or the preéxistent Christ as a Son of God, says: “Nor let any one think it ridiculous that God should have a son, for though the poets, in their fictions, represent gods as no better than men, our mode of thinking is not the same as theirs, concerning either God the Father or the Son.” °* Similarly Theophilus warns his readers that when Christians talk of the Logos or the preéxistent Christ as the Son of God, it is “not as the poets and writers of myths talk of sons of gods begotten from intercourse [with women].” And so also Tertullian, having in mind pagan myths about men

born of gods, says of Jesus that he was “not so born as to blush at the name of son and at his paternal origin. It was not by incest with a sister, or by violation of a daughter or another’s wife, that he got a god for father, a lover disguised with

scales, or horns, or feathers, or turned into gold for Danaé.” And in the same vein Lactantius, speaking of the term Son of “ Judges 8:30. * Supplic. 10.

“1 Kings 8:fo. “2 Sam. 16:11. ©" Ad Autol. Il) 10. ° Ad Autol. Il, 22. * Apol. 21 (PL 1, 395-396).

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God as applied both to the preéxistent Christ and to Jesus, declares: “He who hears the Son of God mentioned ought not to conceive in his mind so great impiety as to think that God begot Him by marriage and union with a woman, which none does but an animal possessed of a body, and subject to death.” *4 The preéxistent Christ who is called the Son of God, and is himself a God, is generated from God indeed after the analogy of animal procreation, but it is unlike animal procreation; it is a unique kind of generation, the generation of an incorporeal being from another incorporeal being, and since it is a unique procreation it constitutes a mystery. The confusion of the Christian belief in the generation of the Logos with the various mythical theogonies which the Fathers warned against did actually take place among the Gnostics. Moreover, those Gnostics who philosophized confused it with the more refined forms of these theogonies as they were reflected in the theories of physical emanation in the Stoic philosophy. Out of these two sources they developed a conception of a preéxistent Christ, called by various names, among them also Logos, whose generation from God was described as a physical process.** The characteristic term used by them as a description of that physical process of generation was “prolation” or “emission” (zpoBodyj). The preéxistent Christ as well as the Spirit is described in one of these Gnostic

systems, the Valentinian, as having each been emitted (apoBdnGeis) .°° 5 Div. Inst. 1V, 8 (PL 6, 466 a). Cf. below pp. 531 ff.; 549 ff. °6Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer. V1, 31. The Latin translation of Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses renders the Greek probole (I, 1, 1 ff.) indiscriminately by prolatio or emissio. The term prolatio is also used by Tertullian (below n. 57) and by Rufinus in his translation of Origen’s De Principiis (below nn. 62, 63). In modern

Latin translations of Hyppolytus’ Refutatio

Omnium Haeresium, L. Duncker and F. G. Schneidewin (1859) render the Greek proballein (VI, 29) by proiicere, whence probole would be proiectio, whereas P. Cruice (1860) renders the Greek proballein by producere (also by procreare) and probole (VI, 37) by emanatio. On the term inectio, used

by Tertullian in his De Anima 34, whether it stands for the Greek probole or not, see E. Evans in his Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas (1948), p. 240, and J. H. Waszink in Tertulliani De Anima (1947), pp. 407-408.

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Against this Gnostic use of the term “prolation” in the literal sense of the physical generation of the preéxistent Christ the

Fathers argue in a variety of ways. Thus Justin Martyr, though he does not hesitate to describe the generation of the Logos by the term “prolation,” maintains that the generation was not

by abscission (daoroyy).°” Tatian similarly maintains that the Logos “came into being by participation, not by abscission

(daoxomy); for what is cut off is separated from the original substance, but that which comes by participation, making its

choice by function, does not render him deficient from whom it is taken.”°*The phrase “by participation” (xard pwepurpdv) here reflects the term participation (é0eéis) used by Plato in describing the coming into existence of visible things through their participation in the ideas,*® even though the Greek term for “participation” used here by Tatian is different from that used by Plato. The original Platonic term, it may be remarked in passing, was restored by Athanasius in a passage, in which he reproduces Tatian’s thought, as follows: “And since to be par-

ticipated (yeréyeoOar) no one of us will ever call affection or division of God’s substance, for it has been shown and acknowledged that God is participated, and to be participated is the same thing as to beget, therefore that which is begotten is neither affection nor division of that blessed substance.” °° What Tatian, therefore, means to say is that the Logos is generated from God “by participation,” after the manner of the * Dial. 61; cf. 128. For Justin’s use of “prolation” as a description of the generation of the Logos, see Dial. 62 (rpoBdnéeév) and 76 (mpoBdddovTos). So also Irenaeus does not hesitate to use the term “prolation,” provided only it

is taken in the right sense (Adv. Haer. Il, 8, 6, quoted above p. 253). The same view is also expressed by Tertullian in Adv. Prax. 8: “If any man from this (i.e., from the expression quod ex ipsius substantia emissum est used in the preceding chapter) shall think I am introducing some zpofod74 — that is

to say, some prolation of one thing out of another, as Valentinus does when he sets forth Aeon from Aeon, one after another —then this is my first reply to you: Truth must not refrain from the use of such a term, and its

reality and meaning, because heresy also employs it. The fact is, heresy has rather taken it from Truth, in order to mold it into its own counterfeit.” Cf. Evans, op. cit., pp. 237-240; J. H.Newman, The Arians of the Fourth Century,* pp. 190-191. = Orainad Gis. °° Parmenides 132 D. ® Athanasius, Orat. cont. Arian. I, 16 (PG 26, 45 B).

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participation of things in the Platonic ideas, and that consequently, like the ideas of Plato, which are not lessened by the participation of things in them, God is not lessened by the participation of the Logos in Him. This criticism of the Gnostics is also implied in a statement by Clement of Alexandria in

which he speaks of the Logos as “not being divided (jepufdpevos), not dissevered (daoreuvduevos).”°' More clearly does Origen argue that “we must be careful not to fall into the absurdities of those who picture to themselves certain emissions (prolationes), so as to divide the divine nature into parts . . since even to entertain the remotest suspicion of such a thing regarding an incorporeal being is not only the height of im-

piety, but a mark of the greatest folly.” Similarly, “the Son is not generated from Him by emission (prolatio = mpoBodn), as some suppose. For if the Son were an emission of the Father, the term emission being used to signify such a generation as that of animals or men usually is, then, of necessity, both He who ‘emitted’ and He who ‘was emitted’ are corporeal.” But while, on the one hand, the Fathers tried to guard their belief in the generation of the Logos against being confused with the pagan belief in the physical generation of the gods, on the other hand, they also tried to guard it against the Philonic belief of the creation of the Logos from nothing. They do not argue directly against Philo; but they argue against Basilides, who had adopted the view of Philo and applied it to the preéxistent Christ. As presented by Hippolytus, Basilides, unlike other Gnostics, “shuns and dreads the substances of things

generated in the way of emission (zpoBody),” for God does

not generate things out of himself “‘as the spider does its web,” maintaining that “from nothing” (é€ oddevds) or “from things nonexistent (€€ ov« évtwv) God produces a seed, in which are contained a conglomeration of all the germs of the world and also a triple sonship, so that that triple sonship “is begotten

from things nonexistent” (yevvnry é€ od« évrwv),* by which *%Strom. VII, 2° (PG 9, 408 c). ST bid lVevasat (28). “ Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer. VII, 22, 2-7.

® De Princ. I, 2, 6.

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is meant that the preéxistent Christ was created ex nibilo, for, as we shall see,® Basilides’ triple sonship represents his own version of the preéxistent Christ. It is evidently against this Basilidian conception of the creation of the preéxistent Christ from nothing that Origen, after rejecting the Valentinian view that the Son was generated by “emission,” adds that neither “was the Son created by the Father out of things nonexistent (ex nullis substantibus), that

is, beyond His own substance.” ® An indirect opposition to Philo on the part of the Fathers is also to be found in their opposition to Arius, whose view on the preéxistent Christ, as we shall see, was a revival of Philo’s view on the preéxistent Logos.** Thus the sonship of the preéxistent Logos is to be understood neither in the crude sense of pagan mythology nor in the sense of “emission” as in Valentinus nor in the sense of creation ex nibilo as in Basilides. It is the generation of something incorporeal from something incorporeal. Such a conception of the generation of the Logos is exactly like the Plotinian conception of the generation of the Nous. Still, in the Plotinian system of thought, with its conception of emanation as a universal principle, applied alike to the intelligible world and the corporeal world, the generation of the Nous from the One was not a unique act; for all things within the world, if not directly, at least indirectly, were generated in the same way from the One. In the Christian system of thought, with its

belief that all things, apart from the Logos and the Holy Spirit, were created by God out of nothing, the generation of the Logos from God was a unique act and hence a mystery. Still while unique and unlike anything in nature, the Fathers try to make it intelligible to the believers by certain analogies taken from natural objects. The most common analogy used by them is that from the term Logos by which the Son of God is called. Logos means © Cf. below p. 534. * De Princ. IV, 4, 1 (28); cf. above p. 224.

” Cf. below pp. 585 f.

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both thought, or rather reason, and word. A word is a born thought, born out of the essence of the thought, without the

thought thereby suffering any diminution. Thus Justin Martyr, evidently arguing against the prolation or emission theory of Valentinus, says: ‘““When we give out some word, we beget the word, yet not by abscission, so as to lessen the word which is in us, when we give it out.” ® So also Tatian, explaining it more elaborately, says: “I myself, for instance, talk, and you hear; yet, certainly, I who converse do not become destitute of speech by the transmission of speech, but by the utterance of my voice I endeavor to reduce to order the unarranged matter in your minds.” * Sometimes, in the use of this analogy of the double meaning of the term Logos, the Fathers make use of the Stoic expression “internal (évduaBeros) Logos” and

“uttered (apodopixds) Logos,”

either taken directly from

the Stoics or, what is more likely, indirectly through Philo.” Thus Theophilus says of the Logos that after having been internal (évéidHeros) within the heart of God it was begotten

of Him as externally uttered (zpodopixés).” Tertullian refers to the double meaning of the term Logos in his statement that

God “first put forth the Word (= Aoyos mpogopixds), having within Him His own inseparable Reason and Wisdom (= )dyos évdoudbetos).”

Not all the Fathers, however, are satisfied with this analogy. Irenaeus thinks that the analogy between the generation of the Logos and the uttered Logos of the Stoics is the source of the Gnostic erroneous conception of the generation of the Logos as a physical process and so, addressing the Gnostics directly, he says: “You transfer the prolation of the word of men which takes place by means of a tongue to the Word of God.” ™* Clement of Alexandria seems to object to this 8 Dial. 61. ° Orat. ad Gr. 5. Sexus Empiricus, Pyrrbon. Instit. 1, 65; Adv. Logicos Il, 275 (Arnim, II, 135 and 223). CMOS ige2 Sel 27 % Ad Autol. Il, 22. 3 Adv. Prax. 6. % Adv. Haer, il, 28, 5; cf. Il, 28, 6; Il, 13, 8.

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analogy on the ground that it might lead to the misunderstanding that the Logos is a mere empty word. He thus argues that “the Logos of the Father of the universe is not the uttered word (Aédyos zpodopixds), but the wisdom and most manifest kindness of God, and His power, too.” 7 Other analogies used by the Fathers for the generation of the Logos from God is the kindling of one fire by another,” or of many fires or torches by one torch,” or of the flowing of a stream from the fountain,’* or of the procession of will

from mind.” All these analogies, however, are used only to illustrate that the generation of the Logos was neither by emission nor from nothing, but from the very essence of God. While the analogy of one fire or torch kindled by another is generally approved of, the analogy of the light of the sun is a matter of debate. Justin Martyr, for instance, rejects the analogy of “the light of the sun” as inept on the ground that

it would imply that the Logos, like the “light of the sun,” had existence “in name only.” ®° This view that light has only a nominal existence reflects a view expressed in the pseudoAristotelian De Mundo, according to which rainbows and streaks of light in the sky are said to be appearances only and

to have no actual subsistence (iado7racrs).5' A similar view is also expressed by Philo in his statement that, because light issues from coal and flame it has no actual subsistence (iadéo7aous) by itself * or of its own.®? Still light as a term metaphorically applied to the Logos and the preéxistent Christ and used as a description of their derivation from God had already had the sanction of both Philo and the New Testament. In Philo, the Logos is spoken of as “the most brilliant and radiant light ® Strom. V, 1° (PG 9, 16 8). Cf. Dorner, ELPC, pp. 288-289); Patrick, Clement of Alexandria, p. 105. © Justin Martyr, Dial. 61; 128.

P, p. 247

(Eng. I, 1

™ Tatian, Orat. ad Gr. 5. “ Hippolytus, Cont. Haer. Noeti. 11, Lactantius, Div. Inst. IV, 29. ® Origen, De Princ. I, 2, 6; IV, 4, 1 (8). *° Dial. 128. Cf. comment on this in G. Archambault, Justin Dialogue avec

Tryphon, Vol. Il, pp. 258-259, nn. 3 and 4. * De Mundo, 4, 395a, 29-31. * Aet. 17, 88. 8 Tbid. 18, 92.

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of the invisible and almighty God” * and, in the New Testament, the preéxistent Christ is spoken of as the “brightness” of God’s glory *° and the Logos is spoken of as “light.” °° Accordingly the analogy of light continued to be used by the Fathers as an illustration of various aspects of the relation of the Logos to God, but always without the implication that the Logos, like light, has no real subsistence. Origen in his statement concerning the Son that “His generation is as eternal as the radiance which is produced from the sun” * only means to say that the Logos is as coexistent with God as is the radiance with the sun and consequently, since God is eternal, the generation of the Logos is eternal. Similarly many other Fathers, as we shall see,** use the analogy of light only to illustrate the unity of God and the Logos, without denying the

reality of the latter. John of Damascus may be taken to speak for all the Fathers when, after using the example of the procession of light from fire as an analogy of the generation of the Son from the Father,*® warns the reader not to stretch this analogy too far, for, as he says, “whereas light possesses no proper subsistence (trécracw) of its own,” distinct from that of fire, the Son is a perfect subsistence inseparable from the Father’s subsistence.” ** What has been said about the generation of the Logos became in the course of time also true of the origin of the Holy

Spirit. In the Synoptics and in John, the Holy Spirit is described neither as the Son of God nor as being equal with God. But in the Pauline Epistles, where, as we have seen, Spirit is the name used for the preéxistent Christ, it is described both as the Son of God and as being equal with God. With the har-

monization of Paul and John, whereby the preéxistent Christ was the Logos and the Holy Spirit was a third preéxistent member of the Trinity, the question naturally arose whether the Holy Spirit should retain the equality with God ascribed SOM. Wy 13, 72. IDR eViaaos | $45

Saldenwins. * John 1:4. * Cf. below pp. 359-360.

8°De Fide Orth. 1, 8 (PG 94, 820 B).

* Cf. above n. 82.

°° De Fide Orth. 1, 8 (PG 94, 821 A).

* Cf. above p. 164.

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to it by Paul or whether, now that the Logos has become Paul’s preéxistent Christ and Son of God, the Holy Spirit should be relegated to a lower position. Ultimately the view prevailed that the Holy Spirit, though not the Son of God, is to be regarded, like the Logos, as being equal with God and also, like the Logos, proceeding from the substance of God, either directly from God, or from God through the Logos, or from both God and the Logos. In the discussion of the procession of the Holy Spirit from God through the Logos some of the analogies used in explaining the generation of the Logos from God came into play. Thus taking the analogy of the ray and the sun, which was used as an illustration of the generation of the Logos from God, Tertullian adds to it the terms “apex of the ray” in order also to illustrate the procession of the Holy Spirit, saying: “Now the Spirit indeed is the third from God and the Son, just . . . as the apex of the ray is third from the sun.” * Other similar analogies used by Tertullian are: “just as a fruit of the tree is third from the root, or as a stream out of the river is third from the fountain.” Throughout their discussion of the Holy Spirit, whether they call it God or not and however they describe its relation to God and the Logos, the Fathers all take it to be a real being like God and the Logos. The case of Athenagoras, however, is somewhat puzzling. He mentions the Trinity of God, the Logos, and the Holy Spirit. In the case of the Logos, as we have seen, he clearly takes it as a real being who was generated from God prior to the creation of the world.® But in the case of the Holy Spirit, he describes it in the following words: “The Holy Spirit himself also, . . . we assert to be an affluence of God, flowing from Him, and returning back again like a beam of the sun” or to be “like light from fire.” ** Now

Justin Martyr, referring to those who believe that the Logos is distinct from the Father “in name only,” *’ describes their

conception of the Logos in exactly the same words that Athe°° Adv. Prax. 8. * Supplic. 10 and 24.

bid:

* Cf. above p. 193. * Dial. 128.

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nagoras describes his own conception of the Holy Spirit. He says: “They maintain that this power (that is, the Logos) is indivisible and inseparable from the Father, just as the light of the sun is indivisible and inseparable from the sun in the heavens; as when it sinks, the light sinks along with it; so the Father, when He chooses, say they, causes His power to spring forth, and when He chooses, He makes it return to himself.” °° The question, therefore, is whether Athenagoras, in describing the Holy Spirit in the same words that those who denied the real-

ity of the Logos described the Logos, did not similarly deny the reality of the Holy Spirit. In answering this question, we shall try to show that, while indeed the words used by Athenagoras are exactly like the

words used by Justin Martyr in describing the Logos as having only a nominal existence, there is nothing in them intrinsically, as used by Athenagoras, to imply a denial of the reality of the Holy Spirit. His description of the generation of the Logos as an “affluence,” as a “beam from the sun,” and as “light from fire” reflects Philo’s description of the creation of the ideas, which constitute the Logos, as “myriads of rays” which God as the “archetypal light” pours forth (é«Bddde),°? or again, Philo’s description of “what we justly call idea” as a certain splendor which God caused to shine forth from himself,°° or, once more, his description of the idea of virtue as that which “issues forth” (éxzopeverar).*°* In all these passages of Philo, there is no implication that the ideas have only a nominal existence; the ideas to him have a real existence as incorporeal beings.*°”? Moreover, all these descriptions, as we have seen,’ are used by many Fathers as illustrations of how

the Logos emerges into existence as a real incorporeal being, all of them evidently reflecting the New Testament description of the Son as the “brightness” (dratyaopa) of God’s glory. As for the expression “flowing and returning back and again” ® Ibid. ® Cher. 28, 97. “Ou, in Gen: IV; 1. a Seg Al My 19,165.

8 Ch. Pbvo, 1p. 207. *°8 Cf. above pp. 300-301. a Hebe 33:

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used by Athenagoras, it merely intends to convey the generally accepted view that the Holy Spirit, which is the spirit of prophecy, does not rest permanently on the general run of men; it may be sent by God to rest upon them when they deserve and to be withdrawn from them when they fail.’ We have thus seen how the Fathers tried to explain by various analogies the generation of the Logos. Still, despite all their attempts at explanation, they felt that generation cannot be explained. It is a unique event, a mystery, unlike any other kind of creation or generation in the world. Even in a world full of miracles, where all things were created by God, the generation of the Logos is a unique miracle, for all things, corporeal or incorporeal, are created by God ex nibilo, whereas the Logos is generated out of the essence of God. And what 1s true of the Logos is also true of the Holy Spirit. And so Irenaeus says: “If any one, therefore, says to us, ‘How was the Son emitted by the Father?’ we reply to him, that no man understands that emission, or generation, or utterance, or manifestation, or by whatever name one may describe His generation, which 1s in fact indescribable,” and that those who try to explain it by the analogy of the emission of a word or any other emissions in natural objects “set forth the emission and formation of His first generation, as if they themselves had assisted at His birth, thus assimilating Him to the word of human utterance.”!°* So also Basil, evidently with a view to pointing out the inadequacy of corporeal analogies, tells the believers that the substance of the Father did not generate the Son “by fluxion, or by putting forth shoots, as plants put forth their fruits; on the contrary, the method of divine generation is ineffable and inconceivable to the human mind.”2°? And

John of Damascus declares that “no other generation is like the generation of the Son of God” °° and that “the nature of the

generation and procession is quite beyond comprehension.”1” * Cf. Philo, Il, pp. 32-33. 2° Adv. Haer. Il, 28, 6. a Epist. 52, 3 (PG 32, 396 A). *% De Fide Orth. I, 8 (PG 94, 816 c). =I Did a(8200A))%

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I. Tue ProspieM aAnp Its Two SoLuTions

When Paul described the preéxistent Christ as being “in the form of God” and hence “equal with God,” ! he did not necessarily mean that he was of the essential nature of God and hence was God. He may have only meant to say that Christ during the state of his preéxistence was incorporeal like God, not having as yet taken “the form of a servant” ® or been made “in the likeness of men” ? or been found “‘in fashion as a man,” 4 and hence, in so far as he was incorporeal like God, he was equal with God. Similarly when he further said that God gave to both the earthly and the postresurrection Christ “the name

which is above every name,”’® that is to say, the name Jehovah or the Lord, so that “every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord,” ® again he did not necessarily mean to assert the

divinity of Christ. He may have only reflected a Jewish tradition, based upon the interpretation of a scriptural text, that the Messiah would be called Jehovah, that is, the Lord.” And since

on the basis of Jewish tradition Paul gave to Christ the name Lord without necessarily implying his divinity, it was quite natural for him to interpret certain Old Testament passages

about the Jehovah or the Lord as referring to Christ,® without again necessarily implying his divinity. By the same token, in

a verse in which Paul uses the expression “God over all blessed for ever,” ® even assuming that the expression is used by him Phil. 2:6. Cf. discussion of term

“form”

(yop¢7)

in J. B. Lightfoot’s

commentary ad loc. (pp. 127-133). S Philee7: BE: > Phill 2s9: a Phils2:8: * Phil sian: * Baba Batra 75b, referring to Jer. 23:6: So also Psalms of Solomon 17:36. Cf. Strack-Billerbeck on Rev. 3:12 (III, 796) and on 1 Cor. 1:30 (III, 327); Sanday-Headlam on Rom. 1:4 (p. 10). 8Cf., for instance, Rom. 1o:11 and Isa. 28:16 (LXX); 1 Cor. 2:16 and Isa. 40:13, 143 2 Cor. 3:16 and Exod. 34:34. °Rom. 9:5.

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with reference to Christ,’ there is no necessary Christ’s divinity. To Paul therefore there was no between calling Christ Lord or the Lord or God in the unity of God. With perfect ease he could

implication of inconsistency and the belief proclaim that

“there is no God but one,” ™ reéchoing Jesus’ declaration that the verse, ““Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God: the Lord is one God,” ” constituted the first of all commandments. And so

also in the case of John, when he said that “the Logos was God,” ** he did not necessarily mean to assert the divinity of the Logos. He may have only meant thereby the same as when Philo interprets the name “God” in a certain scriptural verse to mean the Logos * or as when he speaks of the Logos as “the second God” » or “second to God.” ?® In the case of Philo, he himself explains that the name “God” which he interprets to mean the Logos is not the real God, who is usually called “the God,” ** and furthermore that the Logos is called God only “by catachresis” ** and that it is God only “to us imper-

fect beings”; *® in short, he would say that the Logos is called God only in the sense that it is “divine” (Oetov).?° This is also what John could have meant when he said that “the Logos was God.” *! And so in the case of John, too, there is no conclusive evidence that he held the Logos to be God in the literal sense of the term and so he, too, saw no inconsistency between his assertion that the Logos was God and the established belief in the unity of God, which is reaffirmed by him in his report

that Jesus addressed God as “the only true God.” * The very fact that as late as the fourth century there were those within Christianity who, despite their acceptance of the Epistles of * See the various interpretations of this verse in Sanday-Headlam, ad loc. (pp. PP: 233-238). 233-23 “1 Cor. 8:4; cf. 8:5; Eph. 4:3-6. % Mark 12:29; cf. Deut. 6:4. * John 1:1. * Somn. I, 39, 227-230; Leg. All. Ill, 73, 207. * Qu. in Gen. Il, 62; cf. original Greek expression quoted by Marcus in his edition ad loc. “Leg. AU. il, 73, 207: * Leg. All. Il, 21, 86.

” Abr. 41, 244.

* Somn. I, 39, 224. i Videlesom220.

* John 1:1. “Jonny 17236

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Paul and the Gospel of John, still argued against the divinity of the preéxistent Christ ** shows that there was nothing in these writings which could be taken as conclusive evidence of a belief on the part of Paul and John that the preéxistent Christ was God in the literal sense of the term. But by the time of the Apologists, with the new harmoniza-

tion of the Synoptics with the Epistles of Paul and the Fourth Gospel, when the Christian God had become the begetter of the earthly Christ, He also became the begetter of the preéxistent Christ. The preéxistent Christ was no longer created by God after the analogy of the handiwork of an artisan; he was

generated by God after the analogy of the offspring of a human father, and, having been generated by God after the analogy of the offspring of a human father, he was God like his Father, for so is every human son generated by a human father man. like his father. Philosophically minded Church Fathers found support for this kind of reasoning in the philosophic principle that that which is generated must be of the same species as that which generates it, to which Aristotle gave expression in his statement that “man begets man.” ** Thus Augustine, in his argument against the Arian Maximinus, after restating the philosophic principle that all animal beings reproduce their kind and illustrating it by quoting the Aristotelian statement that “man begets man,” with his own additional words “and dog dog,” challenges his opponent as follows: “For you see that a corruptible creature can beget an offspring like itself, and yet you believe that God, the Father almighty, could not

beget His only-begotten Son except with a nature of an inferior kind.” * It was under this changed conception of the origin of the preéxistent Christ that Paul’s declaration that

Christ was “equal with God” and John’s declaration that “the Logos was God” began to be taken literally. The preéxistent Christ, now identified with the Logos, was not merely divine,

he was God. And similarly the Holy Spirit, now definitely dis*° Cf. below p. 586. > Cont. Maximin. Il, 6. * Metaph. VII, 7, 1032a, 23-24; cf. IX, 8, 1049b, 27-29.

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tinguished from the preéxistent Christ, though not as yet declared to be God, was recognized as an object of worship and adoration by the side of God and the Logos.”* With this elevation of the Logos to the position of God in the literal sense of the term and with the elevation also of the Holy Spirit first to the position of an object of worship and adoration like God and then gradually to the position of God in the literal sense of the term,2” the Fathers found themselves confronted with a new problem, the problem of how to reconcile their new Christian

belief in three Gods with their inherited Jewish belief in one God. As philosophers, the problem must have presented itself to them in a double aspect. First, they must have asked themselves, how can immaterial beings like God and the Logos and the Holy Spirit be counted as three. Second, granted that they can be counted as three, they asked themselves, how can they be one. An indication of the consciousness on the part of the Fathers of these two phases of the problem is implied in Athenagoras who, after stating that the Christians “know God and His Logos . . . [and] what is the Spirit,” adds that they know also “what is the unity of these three, the Spirit, the Son, and the Father, and their distinction in unity.” 7 In other words, the Christians know how the three are distinct from each other and also how they are one.

The first phase of the problem, in the history of philosophy, arises out of Aristotle’s statement that “all things that are many in number have matter,” 7° on account of which interpreters

of Aristotle have been in search of some difference, not implying matter, by which his own immaterial substances which move the spheres are described as being many in number. This phase of the problem, however, is not openly discussed by any of the Apologists, for from its very outset the belief in the Trinity assumed that there was a distinction of cause and effect * Justin Martyr, Apol. I, 6.

* Cf, above pp. 242 ff. * Supplic. 12. * Metaph. XI, 8, 10744, 33-34. Cf. the use of this Aristotelian statement by Basil, below p. 338, n. 18.

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between the three members of the Trinity, the Father being ungenerated, the Son being generated from the Father, and the Holy Spirit being generated, or rather proceeding, from the Father through the Son or from both the Father and the Son.*° Already in Athenagoras there is a conscious reference to this kind of difference between the three members of the Trinity when he speaks of “their distinction in order (ré&eu).”** By the term “order” here he means, as does later Tertullian by the term “degree,”* priority in nature, that is, the priority of the cause to the effect.** Such a difference between things immaterial is also conceived by Philo to exist between his immaterial God and his immaterial Logos and his immaterial Divine Spirit and by Plotinus between his immaterial One and his im-

material Intelligence and his immaterial Soul.** In these three trinities, the Christian and the Philonic and the Plotinian, it may be added, since their members are all immaterial beings, the differences between these members are not individual differences but specific differences. Each member of these trinities is therefore a species. But inasmuch as there is only one of each of these members and inasmuch also as each of them is a real being, each of them is also an individual. Each member of these trinities is therefore an individual species. This is an anticipation of the later mediaeval conception of a multiplication of species

(multiplicatio specierum) wherein there is no multiplication of individuals (multiplicatio individuorum).*° While the first phase of the problem was not openly discussed by the Apologists, the second phase of it was a subject of wide discussion. The question as it posed itself to them was: How can three beings, each of them a God, constitute one °° Cf. above pp. 254-256. Supplic. 10. * Cf. below p. 330. * Cf. Aristotle, Categ. 12, 14a, 36; 14b, 12-13. * There is, however, the following difference between Philo and Plotinus: to Philo, both the Logos and the Holy Spirit are created directly by God; to Plotinus, the Nous only emanates directly from the One, whereas the

Soul emanates from the Nous. * Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol. 1, 50, 4c, and ad 4.

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God? To them, that was a mystery, which they tried, if not to solve, at least to free from the charge of its being self-contra-

dictory and meaningless, and this by showing how philosophers in a variety of ways justify the common practice of designating the many by the term one. But before they enter upon their own attempts to explain

the mystery of triunity, they try to dispose of an explanation of that mystery, which to them was erroneous. It would seem that already at the beginning of the age of the Apologists there appeared in Christianity a conception of the Trinity which later crystallized into the heresies of Praxeas, Noetus, and Sabellius. According to this view, the unity of God is preserved by taking the distinction between the three members of the Trinity to be not real but only nominal. The terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit by which the Godhead is described are only names or predicates or attributes without any reality.*° In opposition to this view the Apologists maintain that the three members of the Trinity are real beings and not mere names, and therefore the distinction between them is real and not nominal. They are as real, they argue, as individual things are real according to the philosophy of Aristotle. Now, in Aristotle, an individual (76 &ropov) is described as that which

is one in number (év a.piOu),*" with the implication that many individuals are many in number and the difference between individuals is a difference in number. Thus, drawing upon this

Aristotelian terminology, Justin Logos is distinct from the Father not “in thought” (yréun);** in (6véuare) only.” *° And this view

Martyr maintains that the “in number” (dps0u6) and number and not “in name of Justin Martyr constitutes

from now on the orthodox view. The mystery of triunity to the Fathers was thus not to be solved by obliterating the real distinction between the three

members of the Trinity. The distinction between them is real, for they are each a real individual species, and if, therefore, they are still to be regarded as one, some new interpretation

has to be given of the concept of the unity of God. * Justin Martyr, Dial. 128. * Categ. 2, 1b, 6-7.

* Dial. 56. ® Ibid. 128. Cf. below p. 584, at nn. 40, 41.

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The new interpretation given by them of the concept of the unity of God is that God’s unity is not absolute but only relative. They boldly reject the Philonic conception of the unity

of God as a God who is “alone” (uédvos)*® and with whom nothing is combined as his “equal.”** In opposition to Philo, they maintain that the Logos, being generated from God, is not merely divine but is God and is combined with God as His “equal,” with the result that God is not to be considered as being absolutely “alone.” This bold revision of the Philonic conception of the unity of God occurs in two passages in the writings of the Apologists, which passages seem to be aimed directly at Philo. In Philo, the conception of the absolute unity of God is based upon the verse, “It is not good that man should be alone,” ** which is taken by him to mean that “it is good that the Alone should be alone,” for “God is alone and one in virtue of himself, and like God there is nothing.” ** This interpretation, we find, is directly rejected by two Apologists.

First, there is Theophilus. Commenting upon the verse, “In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God,” *

and evidently having in mind Philo’s comment upon the verse, “It is not good that man should be alone,” ** he says that this shows that at first, before the Logos was generated, “God was

alone (ydvos) and the Logos in Him.” ** The implication is that, in opposition to the view of Philo, he maintains that, with the generation of the Logos, God was no longer alone, for united with him was the Logos who “was God” and “equal with God.” Second, there is Hippolytus, whose opposition to Philo is expressed still more pointedly. Again, with the verse, “Tt is not good that man should be alone,” * in his mind, like Philo, he describes God as “subsisting alone” and infers from it that “there was nothing contemporaneous with God” and that “beside Him there was nothing.” ** But then, in direct opposition to Philo, he maintains that “while existing alone, He yet * Leg. “Leg. “ John * Gen.

All. Il, 1, 2. lvidance “” Gen. 2:18. All. Il, 1, 1; cf. Philo, 1, pp. 171-172. 1:1. * Ad Autol. Il, 22. 2:18. “ Gen. 2:18.

*8 Cont. Haer. Noeti 10.

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existed in plurality,” inasmuch as from eternity there was the Logos in Him,** and, moreover, with the generation of the Logos, God was no longer alone, for “there appeared another beside himself.” °° Thus the Fathers in direct opposition to Philo maintain that

the unity of God preached by Moses and reaffirmed by Jesus is not absolute unity but relative unity — a unity which would allow within it a combination of three distinct elements. From now on the search among the Fathers will be for a kind of

relative unity that would be most suitable for the belief in the Trinity. Let us then trace the various kinds of relative unity which have suggested themselves to the Fathers in their discussion of the problem of triunity. The first conception of relative unity that suggested itself to them is unity of rule. The unity of God, they seem to argue, does not mean one absolutely simple being; it means one absolute ruler of the world. Given a God who alone rules over the world, it makes no difference, they argue, whether intrinsically He consists of one single part or of many parts inseparably united. This conception of the unity of God could have been justified by them both on the basis of Scripture and on the basis of philosophy. On the basis of Scripture, they could say, it reflects the conception of God as king, as the sole creator and ruler of the world, and as the only Lord to be recognized by all mankind, which conception of God is expressed in such verses as “hearken unto the voice of my cry, my King, and my God”, ** “Thou art thyself the only Lord; Thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth and all things that are thereon, the seas and all that is in them, and thou preservest them all”; ©? “And let them know that thy name is the Lord — that thou art alone the Most High over all

the earth.” °° On the basis of philosophy, they could say, it re-

flects Aristotle’s comparison of God in his relation to the world ® Thid.

* Neh. 8:6.

Lid

aa.

Ps. 83:19 (LXX).

aS

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to that of a general in his relation to the army ™ and also his

argument for the unity of God which he concludes by quoting from Homer the verse, “The rule of the many is not good; one is the ruler.” ®5 This conception of therelative unity of God is expressed by the Apologists in the term monarchy, that is, unity of rule, which they use as a description of the unity of God. Thus

Justin Martyr, wishing to say that the philosophers are engaged in the investigation of the problem of the unity of God, says that questions continually arise for them about “the monarchy” of God.** And so also Tatian, contrasting the polytheism of the Greeks with the monotheism of the Christians, describes the former as acknowledging “the dominion of many rather

than the rule of one (ovapxiav),” *” the implication being that the Christian monotheism consists in the unity of rule. Similarly Theophilus describes the scriptural principle of the unity of God as the “monarchy of God” *§ and when he wishes to say that many heathen writers at last recognized the unity of God,

he says that those “who spoke of the multiplicity of gods came at length to the doctrine of the monarchy of God.” °° The same view is expressed by Athenagoras in his statement that God, the Logos, and the Holy Spirit are “united in power (kara Stvaptv),”®° that is, in rule. The term “monarchy” and the expression “united in power” which they use as a description of the unity of God mean that, according to them, the unity of God is only a relative unity, a unity of rule. The conception of the unity of God in the sense of the unity of His rule, expressed in a variety of ways, continues to be used as an explanation of the mystery of triunity by Fathers after the time of the Apologists. But with these later Fathers another explanation makes its appearance, one which tries to show that the relative unity of God means not merely a unity of rule but a closer and more intimate kind of unity. Their ex% Metaph. XII, 10, 1075a, 11-15. % [bid., 1076a, 4; cf. Iliad Il, 204. EoD ialae

* Orat. ad Gr. 14.

88 Ad Autol. Il, 35. °° Tbid. Il, 38. © Supplic. 24.

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planation, as we shall see, is based upon Aristotle’s discussion of unity. The term one, says Aristotle, is a relative term. It is always relative to the term indivisible, and, inasmuch as everything, which is indivisible in one respect may still be divisible in another respect, everything may also be one in one respect and yet many in another respect. He then proceeds to enumerate five types of unity. First, any accident or accidents which inhere in a subject may be called one together with the subject in which the single accident or the many accidents inhere. This

is called one by accident. Second, any number of objects may be called one if combined to form a single collection. This is called one by continuity. Third, two different liquids, such as oil and wine, may be called one, because they have a common underlying element, and that is water. This is called unity of substratum, of which the Greek term is hypokeimenon, used here in the sense of the underlying matter. Fourth, three species of beings, such as horse, man, and dog, may be called one, because they are all animals. This is called unity of genus. Fifth, two individuals of the same species, say Socrates and Plato, may be called one because they have one formula (Adyos) or definition, that is, rational animal, which states their essence (7d 7é jv efvar).®' This kind of relative unity is described by Aristotle also as one in species (xar’ \ Alexandria: The discussion occurs in two passages which complement each other.

In one of these passages, pseudo-Cyril says: ** “And this is the manner of the interchange: each nature interchanges with the other its peculiar properties, through the identity of

hypostasis and their (adrdv) penetration into one another (eis dAnha). It is in accordance with this that it is possible to say concerning Christ that “This our God . . . was seen upon earth, and conversed with man’ ™ and that “This Man is uncreated and impassible and uncircumscribed.’ 8” In this passage, pseudo-Cyril quite clearly deals with the interchange of properties only, or what Gregory of Nazianzus calls the interchange of appellations, and this interchange of properties is explained by him on two grounds: first, on the = Orang 8.130 (PG36.1325) ©) a Sie Cyril of Alexandria,

De Sacrosancta

Trinitate

27

™ Baruch 3:36 and 38. * Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. V, 14% (PG 9, 140 A).

(PG

77,

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ground of “‘the identity of hypostasis,” that is, the unity of person; second, on the ground of “their (ad7év) penetration into one another (eis d\An\a),” that is, the penetration of the prop-

erties into one another, for from the use of the neuter é\\nda it is evident that the pronoun “their” refers to the properties and not to the natures.?® In the second passage, he says: *° “Through this hypostatic union, the flesh is said to have been deified and to have become God, a God like unto the Word, and God the Word is said to have become incarnate and to have been made man and to have been spoken of as ‘creature’ (xricua) ** and to have been called ‘last.’ *? Not that the two natures have been changed into one composite nature, for it is impossible for two natural contraries to be in one nature, but rather the two natures are united hypostatically and receive an inconfused and unchange-

able penetration into one another (eis dd\Ajhas wepexdpyow). This penetration springs not from the flesh but from the divin-

ity, since it is impossible for the flesh to penetrate through

(Sia) the divinity; still the divine nature, having once pene-

trated through (da) the flesh, bestows on the flesh an ineffable penetration with (mpds)_ itself, which.in_particular we call union.”

In this passage, pseudo-Cyril quite evidently deals not with the “properties” but rather with the “natures,” and what he

is trying to do is to explain how the man in Jesus humanates the divine in him. The starting point in his explanation, logically, is his analysis of the hypostatic union into two acts, the deification of the flesh and the incarnation of the Word. Then as the next step in his explanation he shows how each of these two acts is a penetration, as a result of which he describes the

confluence of these two acts as the penetration of the two natures, the Word and the flesh, into one another. Finally he ” Prestige, op. cit., p. 295, takes the pronoun “their” to refer to “natures,”

for he translates the last part of the passage quoted by “through the identity of hypostasis and the perichoresis of the natures into one another.” 0 De Sacrosancta Trinitate 24 (1165 C). * Col. I: 15 (xréous).

Si Cor-st5-45.

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concludes that these two penetrations do not spring simultaneously from the Word and the flesh as from two independent sources. There is a causal relation between them and hence, in that sense, one of these penetrations may be described as prior to the other. The penetration of the divine nature into the human nature, or the deification of the human nature, may be said to have come first, or, as he expresses himself, “this generation arises (yéyovey) . . . from the divinity.” It was only after the first penetration, whereby the flesh became

deified, had taken place that the second penetration occurred, namely, the penetration of the already deified human nature into the divine nature, and it is this second penetration “which in particular,” as in the passage quoted he says, “‘we call union” and by which, as he says in an earlier passage, “God the Word is said to have become incarnate and to have been made man,” ** that is to say, to have been humanated. “Humanation,” as we have seen, is another word for “incarnation.” 24 And so the penetration of the human nature into the divine nature or the humanation of the divine nature only means the act of the Incarnation. It is in the light of this conception of the mutual penetration of the natures, as explained in pseudo-Cyril, that one is to understand any statement in which the mutuality of the penetration is asserted. When Gregory of Nazianzus, for instance, in the passage quoted above, says that the divine natures pene-

trate into one another, by the penetration of the human nature into the divine nature is to be understood the act of the Incarnation, which took place after the human nature had already been penetrated by the divine nature and thereby became deified. It is in this sense also that one is to understand the following statement of Maximus Confessor: “The [human] nature,

by being inconfusedly united with the [divine] nature, has * But see Prestige (op. cit., p. 295), who in his comment

on this passage

says: “Here it is to be observed that the process is one-sided.” * Cf. above p. 417.

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penetrated through the whole (8 ddov meprydpyxe)

425

[of the

divine nature], possessing thenceforward absolutely nothing that is detached or separated from the deity which is hypostatically united with it.” 7 In this passage, it will be noticed, there is mention only of one kind of penetration, and that is the penetration of the human nature through the divine nature, and this penetration is said to have taken place in virtue of the union of the human nature with the divine nature. In the light, however, of our analysis of the pseudo-Cyril passage, it is quite clear that the penetration spoken of here by Maximus represents the second of the two penetrations spoken of by pseudo-Cyril, namely, the penetration of the already deified flesh into the Logos, “which in particular,” as pseudo-Cyril says, “we call union.” It is to be noted that Maximus does not hesitate here to speak of the human nature as penetrating “through” the divine nature. Elsewhere ** he quotes with approval the statement of Gregory of Nazianzus, quoted above, that the natures “pene-

trate into one another (eis addjAas),” thus implying that he

would not hesitate to speak of the human nature as penetrating ‘Gnto” the divine nature.” The penetration of the human nature “through” or “into” the divine nature, as we have seen, only means the act of the Incarnation, and consequently there was no hesitancy on the part of Maximus, or on the part of any other Father, to make use of that expression in his attempt to explain the mystery of the Incarnation by the analogy of some physical kind of union. Under the influence of both Gregory of Nazianzus and ® Ambiguorum Liber (PG 91, 1053 B).

*° Scholia in Epp. St. Dionysii 4 (PG 4, 533 ¢). But see Prestige (op. cit., pp. 292-293), who in his comment on this passage says: “The meaning [of perichoréke] here cannot be ‘interpenetrate, because no one ever had the hardihood to suggest that the human nature is capable of interpenetrating the divine; the process, where it is alleged, is always in the opposite direction, and for reasons sufficiently obvious.” Later (p. 294), commenting on Maximus’ use of the noun perichorésis in Christology, he says: “And it should be added that he always calls the process a perichoresis of the two natures ‘to’ (eis or mpés) one another, never a perichoresis ‘in’ (€v) one another or ‘through’ (é:4) one another.”

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pseudo-Cyril, the analogy of penetration as an explanation of both the interchange of properties and the deification of the

human nature in Jesus is used also by John of Damascus. In one place, applying the term penetration to the interchange of properties, he says: *§ ““The Word appropriates to

himself all the human [properties], for all that pertains to his holy flesh is his, and he imparts to the flesh his own properties in accordance with the manner of an interchange in virtue of

the penetration (zepixdpyows) of the parts into one another (eis &AAnAa) and the hypostatic union . . . Hence it is that ‘the Lord of Glory’ is said to have been crucified,”? although his divine nature never endured suffering, and ‘the son of Man’ is declared to have been in heaven before the passion.” *° In the light of pseudo-Cyril’s statement that the hypostatic union consists of the two reciprocal penetrations, namely, the deification of the flesh and the incarnation of the Word, the statement “in virtue of the penetration of the parts into one another and the hypostatic union” in this passage is to be taken to mean “in virtue of the penetration of the parts into one another which is the hypostatic union.” In another place, commenting upon the words of Gregory of Nazianzus with regard to the Logos and the flesh that “the one deified and the other was deified,” *! he makes two statements. First, he says: “These words [of Gregory the Theologian] do not mean any change in nature, but rather . . . the hypostatic union . . . and the penetration of the natures into one

another (év d\AnjAaus).”

In this passage, too, in the light of pseudo-Cyril’s statement, the statement “the hypostatic union . . . and the penetration of the natures into one another” is, again, to be taken to mean “the hypostatic union . . . which is the penetration of the natures into one another.” * De Fide Orth. Ill, 3 (PG, 94, 993 D-996 A). sa tuCoreaes: * John 3:13. * Cf. above n. 15. * De Fide Orth. Il, 17 (1069 a).

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Second, trying to explain the first statement of his, that the words of Gregory of Nazianzus do not mean any change in

nature, he says: “Just as we confess the humanation (évavOpdéanors) to have taken place without change and alteration, so we also believe that the deification (@éwow) of the flesh took place without change and alteration.” * Here, as in pseudo-Cyril, the two penetrations are respectively described as the deification of the flesh and the incarnation of the Word, for the latter of which he uses the term “humanation,” in accordance with an earlier statement of his that the term “incarnation” means the same as the term “humanation.” *4 In still another place, he again tries to explain the phrase “the penetration of the two natures into one another.” He says: “But observe that though we hold that the natures of the

Lord penetrated one into another (zepixwpely ev addndats), yet we know that the penetration springs (yéyovev) from the

divine nature. For it is that that pervades (8ijxer) and penetrates (epixwpe?) through all things (dia wévrwv) as it wills, while nothing [pervades and penetrates] through it; and it is that, too, that imparts to the flesh its own peculiar glories, while remaining itself impassible and without participation in the affections of the flesh. For if the sun imparts to us its energies and remains without participation in ours, how much more must this be true of the Creator and Lord of the sun.” *® On the face of it, this passage would seem to say that the penetration is only in one direction. But in the light of pseudo-

Cyril’s statement as well as John’s own statements in the preceding passages, the statement in this passage that “the penetration springs (yéyovev) from the divine nature” is to be taken to mean that it only begins from the divine nature, with the implication that, once the penetration of the divine nature into

the human nature started and the man in Jesus became deified, the penetration of the deified man into the divine Logos in 8 Tbid. ** Cf. above p. 417.

*® De Fide Orth. Ill, 7 (1012 ¢c).

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him, in the sense of his union with that divine Logos, followed as a consequence.

The result of our discussion is that the term perichoresis, with either eis or év or Sia or zpos, is used by the Fathers in the sense of a “thorough penetration,” as a physical analogy for the purpose of explaining the commumnicatio idiomatum, just as other physical analogies were used by them for the purpose of explaining the trinity of persons in the Godhead and the

unity of person in Jesus. The physical analogy meant by the term perichoresis is the same as that of the Stoic “mixture.” The perichoresis or penetration is always used as a mutual act, but the two sides of this mutual act are conceived as being neither simultaneous in occurrence nor the same in meaning. The penetration of the divine nature into the human is conceived as occurring first, in a causal sense; the penetration of the human nature into divine is conceived as following the first penetration as a consequence. Again, the penetration of the divine nature into the human is taken to mean the deification of the human nature, without completely destroying it; the penetration of the human nature into the divine is taken to mean the assumption by the divine nature of a human nature, without suffering any change in its divinity. While both these penetrations constitute what is called the hypostatic union, it is the second penetration that constitutes what is called the Incarnation.

(e) The Mystery of It Gregory of Nyssa, on trying to explain the Incarnation by certain analogies, such as the union of soul and body in man and the union of fire and wood in a torch, warns the reader against taking any such analogies too literally. He says: “Let one accept only what is fitting in the likeness, but reject what is incongruous.” * Similarly Leontius of Byzantium, on trying to explain the Incarnation by the analogy of the union of soul and body in man, remarks: “There is no exemplification but * Oratio Catechetica 10 (PG 45, 41 D).

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contains some unfitness.” * And so to all the Fathers, despite their attempts to explain by certain physical analogies how in

Jesus two natures were to be found in one person, the Incarnation still did not cease to be something unique and a mystery. Above all they tried to establish the uniqueness of the

two natures in Jesus by showing that, despite the analogy between these two natures of Jesus and the two natures of soul and body in any human being, there are still certain differences

between them. On the whole we find that the Fathers stressed three differences. The first difference is like that drawn by Philo between the relation of soul to body in man and the relation of the immanent Logos to matter in the world. Soul, according to Philo, does not always succeed in dominating the body completely, whereas the domination of the immanent Logos over matter is complete.* So also is the view of the Fathers with regard to the mystery and uniqueness of the Incarnation. In man, there is a continuous conflict between soul and body and, since the Fathers believed in free-will, in that conflict it may happen

that the body will conquer the soul. But in the case of Jesus, there was no conflict between the divine and the human within

him. The man in Jesus, despite his being like all other human beings physically, emotionally, and intellectually, was unlike

them morally, for though Jesus “was in all points tempted like as we are,” * he never succumbed to temptation. Unlike all human beings, it is said, he “knew no sin” ° or he ” was without sin” ® or he was “as a lamb without blemish and without spot.” 7 It is in accordance with this view that Nemesius, after show-

ing that both the soul in man and the Logos in Jesus remain unmixed in their union with the body or with the humanity, tries to show that there is a difference between the unmixed2 Lib. Tres 1 (PG 86’, 1280 D).

° Cf. Philo, I, p. 425.

* Heb 415. 2 Core 5:21. Heb: 4:15; 7, Pet. 1:19. On the meaning of freedom of the will in Jesus see below p- 486.

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ness of the soul and the unmixedness of the Logos. “The soul,” he says, “belonging as it does to the class of things which have a multiplicity in their nature, seems, by reason of its intimate connection with the body, to be affected along with it in a certain way, with the result that, while sometimes it rules the body, it also lets itself be ruled by the body. God the Logos, however, in no way suffers any change by reason of its communion with the body and the soul; it does not participate in their weakness, but on the contrary it imparts to them of its own divinity; it becomes one with them, while remaining in the same nature in which it was before the union. This is a

mode of mixture (kpéo.s) or union (€vwo.s) which is altogether new.” § In other words, it is a unique kind of union; it is a mystery. Similarly Leontius of Byzantium, after drawing an analogy between the union of soul and body in man and the union of the divinity and the humanity in Jesus, says there is still a difference between these two cases. In the former case, the soul is as circumscribed by the body and hence is as affected by the body as is the body by the soul; in the latter case the divinity

is uncircumscribed and unaffected by the humanity in Jesus.° The same difference between the two cases is also found

by John of Damascus. He says: “The soul, taken possession of beforehand by the passions of the body, often suffers before the body and always, without surcease, suffers along with the body. Often it is anxious about the impending cutting of the body, so that even before the body experiences pain, it undergoes suffering and change and, after the cutting, it is afflicted by pain no less than the body. But no sane man would say the same thing about the divinity in the Lord.” The second difference between the two analogous cases of two natures is that the two natures of soul and body are to be observed daily in all human beings, whereas the two natures

of divinity and humanity were unique in Jesus. Augustine ex® De Nat. Hom. 3 (PG 40, 601. AB). ° Lib. Tres 1 (PG 86", 1284 B f.). * Contra Jacobitas 57 (PG 94, 1465 cD).

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presses himself on this point as follows: “Some insist upon being furnished with an explanation of the manner in which the Godhead was so united with a human soul and body as to constitute the one person of Christ, when it was necessary that it should be done once in the world’s history, with as much boldness as if they were themselves able to furnish an

explanation of the manner in which the soul is so united to the body as to constitute the one person of a man, an event which is occurring every day.” "' The implication of this passage is that the union of soul and body in man is no less an inexplicable

miracle than the union of the Logos and the man in Jesus. But tht former is a daily occurrence and is among what Augustine calls elsewhere everyday miracles (quotidiana miracula) ; the latter is a unique event in human history. The third difference is that the possession of the two natures of soul and body does not prevent man from being in a certain

respect of one nature, whereas Jesus is in no respect of one nature. This difference is stressed by Leontius of Byzantium

and John of Damascus. Both of them argue that, while Jesus, like any other individual human being, consisted of two natures, there is still a difference between him and other individual human beings. In the case of any other individual human beings, there is a human species, which is regarded as being logically distinct from the individual man, with the re-

sult that, while in one respect every individual human being consists of two natures, namely, soul and body, in another re-

spect, he is of a single nature, namely, of the nature of humanity, in so far as he is one of many individuals belonging to the

same species. In the case of Jesus Christ, however, there is no Christic species which is to be regarded as being logically dis-

tinct from the individual Jesus Christ. Jesus, therefore, as Christ, does not belong to a Christic species and hence he is not of one nature in any respect. As phrased by Leontius of Byzantium, the argument, in its main points, reads as follows: “No man can be found who is DE Dist. 137353 Ble

% Sermo 126, 3, 4 (PL 38, 699).

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of a different species than man in general. In Christ, however, such an order of relation is not to be found, for, unlike ‘man’ which is a species containing individual men, there is not a species Christ containing individual Christs, so as to lead us to say that from among these Christs the One who, on account of the general and common Christ, bears the title Christ, as if somehow it were a proper name, is one nature, one with those individual Christs and one of them, with the result that we may call him both one nature and two natures: one, on account of the common nature he shares with the other Christs; two, on account of the two natures of which he consists, a composition of natures like that observed in ourselves.” **

As phrased by John of Damascus, it reads as follows: “But a common species cannot be admitted in Jesus Christ. For neither was there ever, there ever be another Christ constituted ity, and existing in deity and humanity,

the case of our Lord nor is there, nor will of deity and humanat once perfect God

and perfect man. And thus in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ we cannot speak of one nature made up of divinity and humanity, as we do in the case of the individual made up of soul and body. For in the latter case we have to do with an individual [under a species], but Christ is not an individual [under a species], seeing that he has no species of Christhood (e?Sos Xpurrérntos) as a predicate.” And so, despite its analogy with the union of soul and body,

the union of the Logos and the humanity in Jesus still contained an element of uniqueness. The union of soul and body may indeed have been proclaimed as somewhat of a mystery by Gregory of Nyssa in his statement: “If you are ignorant of the manner by which your soul is united to the body, do not think for a moment that it is within the province of your understanding to know the manner of the union between the Godhead and the manhood.” * It may have similarly been * Lib. Tres 1 (PG 86", 1292 AB). * De Fide Orth. I, 3 (PG 94, 993 4). * Oratio Catechetica 11 (PG 45, 44 A).

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also proclaimed as somewhat of a mystery by Augustine in the statement quoted above,** in which he reminds those who demand an explanation of the union of the Godhead and the manhood that they have no explanation of the manner in which the soul is united to the body. But as to both of these Fathers, so also to all the other Fathers, the union of divinity

and humanity in Jesus was still a greater mystery; it was the greatest mystery; it was a unique mystery. IV. UnortHopox UsE oF THE ANALOGIES OF PuysicaL UNION

(a) Apollinaris and the Later Monopbhysites In contrast to the orthodox Fathers who, on the basis of purely theological reasoning, started with the belief that the flesh which the Logos became or the body which was prepared for it was a complete man, a flesh or a body endowed with an irrational and a rational soul, Apollinaris, also on the basis of purely theological reasoning, started with the belief that the flesh or the body was not a complete man. It lacked, he had at first believed, any soul at all. Ultimately he came to believe that it lacked a rational soul, possessing only an irrational soul, which was conceived together with the body and was in-

separable from it.’ In Jesus, the Logos took the place of the rational soul of the ordinary man. As a result of this denial that

Jesus possessed a rational soul, Apollinaris could not very well say, in philosophic language, as did the orthodox Fathers, that Jesus had two natures, a divine nature and a human nature, for

to have a human nature meant to possess a rational soul, inasmuch as by definition man was a rational animal. It is be-

cause of this denial of a rational soul in Jesus that Apollinaris, in departure from the orthodox Fathers, denied the existence

in Jesus not only of two persons but also of two natures,” * Cf. above p. 431. 1Cf. Voisin, L’Apollinarisme, pp. 273 ff. ?Draeseke, Apollinarios von Laodicea, p. 377, 1. 9; Lietzmann, A pollinaris von Laodicea, p. 179, ll. 2-3.

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maintaining that there was in him only one nature 3 or ousia 4

and that Jesus was “one incarnate nature of God the Logos (uia dvows Tod Oeod Néyou cecapKxwpévn).” © Accordingly, in an allusion to Paul’s statement that the preéxistent Christ “emptied himself, taking the form of a servant,” ° he says, “he emptied himself according to the form of a servant, but he was not emptied or altered or diminished according to his divine

ousia, for there is no alteration in the divine nature; and neither does it diminish itself nor does it increase itself.” 7 What Apollinaris means to say here is that the preéxistent Christ in his incarnation retained his divine ousia or nature and did not take on a human nature. But here a question may be raised. Inasmuch as it is only be-

cause of the lack of a rational soul in the body of Jesus that Apollinaris denies it a human nature, may we not assume that,

inasmuch as Apollinaris does not deny the body of Jesus an irrational soul, he does not also deny it an animal nature? For, ordinarily, just as a body endowed with a rational soul is both a human person and a human nature so also a body endowed with an irrational soul is both an animal person and an animal nature. Consequently, may we not assume that just as both the orthodox group of Fathers and Apollinaris affirm that the

body of Jesus is not a person, the former that it is not a human person and the latter that it is not an animal person, so also both of them affirm that it is a nature, the former that it is a human nature and the latter that it is an animal nature? In other words, the question is whether Apollinaris in his insistence upon one nature meant to deny only a human nature

in Jesus or whether he meant to deny in him also a bodily nature, that is to say, the nature of an irrationally animated body. The question is not discussed by him directly. Let us therefore examine passages in which he happens to speak of “Dy 0.34%) ks 27: Ly pe 2570 ets. *D,, px 363, 1-233 by ps 236, Ets

°D, p. 341, ll. 25-26; L, p. 251, ll. 1-2. Cf. Voisin, p. 304; Lebon, Le Monophysisme Sévérien, pp. 300 ff. © Phils 27; “D, p. 344, ll. 29-32; L, p. 188, Il. 2-4.

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the body of Jesus and try to find out what his answer to this question would have been if it had been put to him. First, there are two passages which may be regarded as constituting two mutually complementary parts dealing with one single topic, namely, that by their union neither the Logos nor the body with the irrational soul was destroyed. In the first part of the passage, he says: “Of things mixed together the qualities are mixed but not destroyed. Thus it comes to pass that some are separated from the mixed parts as wine from water. There is no mixture [of body] with body or of things like bodies with bodies but has also that which is mixed... . Now if the mixture of bodies suffered no change, how much more that of the divinity?” * In the second part of the passage, he says: “If the mixture [of fire] with iron, which makes the iron itself fire, so that it performs the work of fire, does not change the nature of the iron, then too the union of God with the body implies no change of the body, even though the body extends its divine energies to those who are able to come within its reach.” ®

In this passage, the term mixture is used by Apollinaris in the Stoic sense, as is evident from the following facts. In the first part of the passage he says that in a mixture some qualities “are

separated from the mixed parts as wine and water.” This reflects the Stoic statement that the wine and the water in a

mixture can be separated by means of a sponge dipped in oil.° In the second part of the passage he uses as an illustration of mixture the example of the mixture of fire with iron, in which, he says, the nature of the iron does not change. This again reflects the Stoic use of the mixture of fire with iron as an illustration of their own conception of mixture.t Now the characteristic feature of the Stoic mixture is that the resultant is an imperceptible juxtaposition of its constituent parts, none of which is destroyed, and it is the analogy of this Stoic concep®*D, p. 365, l. 35 —p. 366, 1. 8; L, Fragm. 127, p. 238. °D, p. 366, ll. 9-13; L, Fragm. 128, p. 238.

* Cf. above p. 380. Cf. above p. 381.

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tion of mixture by which Apollinaris tries here to prove that in the union of the Incarnation neither the Logos nor the body is destroyed. But if the body is not destroyed in that union, how should that undestroyed body be described? No direct answer is given by Apollinaris in either of these two passages. From the first part of the passage, however, it may be inferred that the undestroyed body is to be described as having a “quality” but not a “nature,” for in his description of mixture he says that “of things mixed together the qualities (woudrnres) are mixed but not destroyed.” From the second part of the passage it may only be inferred that he avoided the use of the term nature in connection with the body, for in that passage, after saying that the mixture of fire with iron “does not change the nature (¢vow) of the iron,” he goes on to say that so too “the union of God with the body implies no change of the body”; he does not say that it implies no change in the nature of the body. Second, there are two other passages, which again may be regarded as constituting two mutually dependent parts of one single passage dealing again with the same single topic, namely, that by their union neither the Logos nor the body with its irrational soul was destroyed. In the first part of the passage, he says: “If a man has soul and body, and these remain (péver) even when they are in unity, much more does the Christ, who has Godhead

with body, keep both

constantly

remaining

(Sauévovra) and unconfused.” * In the second part of the

passage, he explains the analogy as follows: “If the mixture (kpa@ovs) of soul and body, although from the beginning they coalesce (kara cupdviav otaoa), does not make the soul visible on account of the body, nor change into the other properties of the body, so as to allow of its being cut or diminished, how

much more God, who is not coalesced (cuudvijs) with the body, is united with the body without undergoing change. And if the body of man remains in its own nature, and this when it is animated by a soul, then in the case of Christ the *D, p. 366, Il. 14-17; L, Fragm. 129, p. 239.

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commixture (o¥yxpacis) does not change the body so that it should not be a body.” 8 In this passage, too, the statement that the constituent ele-

ments in both cases “remain” and are “unconfused” implies that their union is conceived after the analogy of the Stoic mixture, for the characteristic distinction between “mixture” and “confusion,” according to the Stoics, is that in mixture the natural qualities survive or “remain alive” (izopevovadr)." But here, again, it will be noticed that in the second part of the passage, while with reference to “the body of man” he says that in its union with the soul it “remains in its own nature,” with reference to the body of Christ, he does not describe it

as nature; he only says that its union with the Logos “does not change the body.” Third, there is a passage in which, referring to the Logos

and the body in Jesus, he says that “‘one and the same is the body and the God, of whom it is the body, not that the flesh has been changed into that which is incorporeal, but that it

has a property which is from us (16 idvov 76 é€ judv), in accordance with the generation from the Virgin, and that which

is above us (76 twép Huds), in accordance with the mixture or union with God the Logos.” *° In this passage, he starts out by saying that the body and the

Logos in Jesus are one and the same, by which he means, as we know from other statements of his, that they are one nature. But he then goes on to say that there is still a difference be-

tween the body and the Logos in Jesus, in view of the fact “the flesh has [not] been changed into that which is incorporeal.” What the difference between the body and the Logos is he explains by saying in effect that in the body there are two properties, one “a property which is from us” and the other a property which comes from its union with “that which is above us.” The implication thus is that whatever distinction *D, p. 366, 1. 35 —p. 367, 1. 6; L, Fragm. 134, pp. 239-240. “ Cf. above p. 380, at n. 66. *D, p. 396, ll. 25-26; L, p. 199, Il. 24-27.

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there is between the body and the Logos in Jesus it is to be described as “property.” Fourth, in a passage, in which he refers to the Logos as the invisible, he says: “The invisible which is compounded with a visible body and thereby is beheld, remains invisible, and it remains without composition because it is not circumscribed

together with the body, and the body, remaining in its own measure (jéz7pov), accepts the union with God in accordance with its being vivified, nor is that which is vivified the cause of the vivification.” 1°

In this passage, the body of Jesus is described as “remaining in its own measure.” The term “measure” taken literally— and there is no reason why it shoulld not be taken literally — means a certain measure of the quantity of the body or of some quality of it or a certain property of the body which does not constitute its nature.

Fifth, referring to Jesus, Apollinaris says as follows: “Although he has his nature from men, he has his life from God and his power from heaven and his divine virtue.” 17 Here the term “nature” undoubtedly refers to the body. Sixth, there are the following two passages: (1) “It is a

flesh of the same ousia (éoovcvov) as our flesh that the living Logos of God has taken from Mary.” 48 (2) “Men are of the same ousia as the irrational animals, according to their irrational body, but they are of another ousia, according as they

are rational. Just so God [that is, Jesus], who is of the same ousia as men, according to the flesh, is of another ousia, according as he is Logos and God.” ?° In these passages, the use of the term homoousion implies that the body is an ousia, a term used by Apollinaris as synonymous with “nature.” ?° Seventh, in two passages, he says, first, “The body is not a * D, p. 366, ll. 29-34; L, Fragm. 133, p. 239. Cf. above p. 332, n. 77.

“D, p. 386, ll. 6-8.

* D, p. 339, ll. 20-21; L, p. 262, ll. 28-29. © D, p. 365, I. 31-35; L, Fragm. 126, p. 238.

» Cf. above at nn. 3-4.

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proper nature (idia Pious) as the divinity is a proper nature in the incarnation,” ** and, second, “The body is not a nature by itself (xa éavrd diois) in the one Christ, for it does not live by itself and it cannot be separated from the Logos by whom

it is vivified.” 2?

Eighth, referring to the body of Jesus as “the created part” and to the Logos in him as “the uncreated,” he says:*8 “It is admitted that in him the created part is in unity with the uncreated and the uncreated is in commixture with the created, one nature being constituted from both parts, and the Logos, by means of its divine perfection, accomplishes its partial operation throughout the whole, which very thing in the ordinary man happens from two incomplete parts, which make complete one nature and are called by one name, since the whole is called flesh, the soul not being excluded thereby, and the whole is also called soul, the body not being excluded, even though it is different from the soul.”

In this passage he draws a comparison between the union of the body and the Logos in Jesus and the union of body and soul in man. In both cases, he maintains, the resultant is one

nature. Ninth, referring to the Logos as “ruler”

(jyeuorrxds), a

term used by the Stoics as a description of the rational faculty of the soul, he says:** “The flesh, being altogether moved ex-

ternally by a mover and agent, whatever this may be, and not being a perfect living being by itself, but, having been com-

pounded so as to become a perfect living being, has come together with its ruler into unity and has been compounded with the heavenly ruler [just mentioned], having adapted itself to it by reason of its own passivity (76 wa@nruxov) and re-

ceiving the divinity, which has been appropriated to it, by reason of the activity (76 évepynruxdv) [of its ruler]. For thus ™D, =D, 2D), »

p. 349, ll. 1-2; L, p. 257, ll. 16-17. p. 349, 1. 38— p. 350, 1. 2; L, p. 259, Il. 15-18. P-p. 344 34 ,

ll. 13-23; 3-23 L, P p. 187, ll. 5-14.

“1D, p- 304 4. 12-23; L, Fragm.

1124 A.

107, p. 232, ll. 10-21; PG

86°, 1121

D-

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does one living being, [that is, man] arise out of that which is moved (xwovpévov) and that which causes motion

(xivntixod), not two living beings nor one living being out of two complete and self-moving parts. Therefore [ordinary] man is a living being different from God and is not God but [only] a servant of God and, even if a certain power is from heaven, the same situation obtains. The flesh of Jesus, however, because it became the flesh of God, is an animal which

thereafter was compounded [with God] into one nature.” In this passage he draws again a comparison between the union of the body and the Logos in Jesus and the union of body and soul in man. In both cases, he says, the union forms what he calls “‘a living being.” That living being in the case of

Jesus is described by him as constituting “one nature.” In the case of man he does not describe it as “one nature”; he only says that soul and body in man constitute “one living being” and not “two living beings nor one living being out of two complete and self-moving parts.” By this he means, we take it, as in the preceding quotation, that they constitute one nature. Still there is a difference, he says, between the one living being

that is Jesus and the one living being that is man. In Jesus, the body is united with the Logos, which is God, and hence the

one nature in Jesus is God. In man the body is united with soul, which is not God but only a “power [which] is from heaven,” and hence the one nature in man is not God but only

“a servant of God.” What he means by this last distinction may be explained by what he says in the following passage: “The human nature is partaker of the divine energy as far as it is capable, but it is distinct [from the latter] as the least from the greatest, and man is a servant of God, but God is not a servant of man.” > From these nine passages it may be gathered that, while the

body and the Logos in Jesus form one nature by reason of the lack of a rational soul in the body (“Third,” “Eighth,” “Ninth”), the body with its irrational soul is still something *D, p. 366, ll. 17-20; L, Fragm. 130, p. 239, ll. 6-9; PG 83, 216 B.

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distinct from the Logos, inasmuch as in its union with the Logos it is not completely destroyed (“First,” “Second”) or

completely changed into the Logos (“Third”). But as to what that body with its irrational soul should be called he makes various statements. In some passages he describes it as nature (“Fifth”) or ousia (“Sixth”), the latter of which means the same as nature. But these terms evidently are not used by him in those passages in their strict technical sense, for in other passages he seems purposely to avoid describing the irrationally animated body as a “nature” (“First,” “Second” and in one passage he says explicitly that it is “not a proper nature” and “not a nature by itself” (“Seventh”). The term which he favors as a description of the irrationally animated body is “quality” (“First”) or “property” (“Third”) or “measure” (“Fourth”), the last of which means a certain measure of “quantity” or of “quality” or a certain “property.” We have thus here an answer to our question. In his in-

sistence upon one nature Apollinaris meant to deny in Jesus not only a rationally animated bodily nature but also an irrationally animated bodily nature, though for different reasons.

His denial in Jesus of a rationally animated bodily nature is due to his denial in him of a rational soul; his denial in him of an irrationally animated nature is due to his particular conception of what becomes of the weaker constituent in a union of “predominance.” For any particular body, according to the common analysis followed by him, is (1) a person, in the sense of its being an individual thing, and (2) a nature, in the sense of its belonging toa species, and (3) a property or quality or quantity, in the sense of its being a body possessing certain accidents. But what happens when a body is united with another body which is of a greater power of activity? In such a case, which constitutes a union of “predominance,” it is the contention of Apollinaris that the weaker constituent ceases to be a person as well as a nature and survives only as a property or quality or quantity. Accordingly, the irrationally ani-

mated body of Jesus in its union with the Logos, which is a

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union of “predominance,” is to Apollinaris neither a person nor a nature, that is, neither an animal person nor an animal nature; it is only an animal property or quality or quantity. The sithodge Fathers, however, in their contention that the ra-

tionally animated body of Jesus in its union of “predominance” with the Logos, while not being a person, that is, a human person, is still a nature, that is, a human nature, believe that in any union of “predominance” the weaker constituent only ceases to be a person but survives as a nature. There is thus a difference of opinion between the orthodox Fathers and Apollinaris with regard to the general question as to whether what survives of the weaker constituent in a union of “predominance” is a nature or only a property or quality or quantity. It will be recalled that Aristotle describes that which remains of the weaker constituent in a union of “predominance” as mere volume or bulk or as mere color, that is to say, as a mere quantity or quality, which may be called accidental properties. It is these descriptions of Aristotle that are reflected in those passages in which Apollinaris describes the body of

Jesus as “measure” (“Fourth”) or as “quality” (“First”) or as “property” (“Fourth”). But in Aristotle, besides his description of that which remains of the weaker constituent in a “predominance” as bulk or as color,”® there is also his description of the relation of the recessive weaker constituent to the dominant stronger constituent as a relation of matter to form.” This Aristotelian description is again reflected in Apollinaris’ statements, in the passages quoted, that the relation of body to soul in man as

well as of the body of Jesus to the Logos in him is like that of the passive to the active or like that which is moved to that

which moves (“Ninth”) or like that which is vivified to that which vivifies (“Fourth,” “Seventh,” “Eighth”). What Apollinaris means by all these statements is that the irrationally animated body ceases to be a nature both in the case of man in

its union with the rational soul and in the case of Jesus in its *® Cf. above p. 379.

7

27 Cf. above p. 378, at n. 46.

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union with the Logos, and this because its relation to the ra-

tional soul in man and to the Logos in Jesus is like the relation of the passive to the active or like that of the thing moved to the thing which moves it or like that of the thing vivified to the thing which vivifies it or, in general, like that of what Aristotle calls matter to what he calls form.28 Man, indeed, Apollinaris seems to argue, consists of a rational soul and an irrationally animated body and the rational soul and the irrationally animated body, indeed, are each a nature. Still when any man is considered as one individual human being, that is, as one person, he is also to be considered as one nature. For soul, according to Aristotle, is the form of the body,” but, inasmuch as according to him it is always the form which constitutes the essence (76 ri jv efvar) of a thing *° and hence also the nature of a thing,** it is the soul, he says, that is the essence of the body * and hence, of course, also the nature of the body. By the same token, Jesus indeed consists of the Logos and his irrationally animated body and both the Logos and the irrationally animated body, indeed, are natures. Still,

when Jesus is considered as one person, he is also to be considered as one nature, inasmuch as his irrationally animated body is related to the Logos as matter to form and it is form that constitutes the essence and nature of a thing. In the light of all this, when Apollinaris describes the union of the incarnation by such physical terms as “mixture” (utévs)*® or “commixture” (ovyxpacts),** or when he de-

scribes the one nature by such physical terms as a “commixed nature” (cvyxparos dvots)* or as a “composite nature” (diais otvOeros),°** he means by “mixture” and “composition” Cf. Metaph. VIII, 6, 1045b, 16-19; De Gen. et Corr. II, 9, 335b, 30-35. De Anima Il, 1, 412a, 203; 414a, 14. ° Metaph. VIl, 7, 1032b, 1-2. * Thid. V, 4, 1015b, 10-11. * Dy ips 352, le ars, p.234, 4.020: 2 De Anima Il, 1, 412b, 15-16.

* Cf. above 1. 25.

=D, p. 352, 1. 35 p. 389, 1. 36; L, p. 149, l. 15.

*°D, p. 4o1, 1. 22; L, Fragm. 111, p. 233; Diekamp, Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi, Ch. 9, pp. 58 f. Cf. Harnack, DG, II*, p. 338 (Eng. IV,

p. 162); Lebon, Le Monophysisme Sévérien, p. 325, n. 3.

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a union of “predominance.” The one nature to him, just as the one person, is not a unity resulting from the juxtaposition,

though an imperceptible juxtaposition, of two natures; it is a unity resulting from the survival only of the nature of predominant element of the union, which in this case is nature of the Logos. Thus both the orthodox Fathers and Apollinaris apply analogy of predominance to their respective conceptions

the the the of

unity in Jesus, the former to the unity of person in the union of the Logos and the complete man in Jesus, the latter to the unity of nature in the union of the Logos and the irrationally

animated body in Jesus. The former try to prove thereby that, in the union of the Logos and the man, man as the weaker

member is a nature without its being a person; the latter tries to prove thereby that, in the union of the Logos and the irrationally animated body, body as the weaker member, is only a property without its being either a person or a nature. Apollinaris thus agrees with the orthodox Fathers on one point and disagrees with them on two points. He agrees with

them that Jesus is one person, that person being the Logos. But he disagrees with them, in the first place, on the question

whether Jesus has a rational soul. To him, Jesus has no rational soul and hence he has no human nature. He disagrees with them, in the second place, on the question whether in a union of “predominance” the weaker member has a nature. To him, it has no nature; it has only properties; and hence the body,

which Jesus does have, implies only bodily properties but not a bodily nature. Such was the Monophysitism of Apollinaris and his followers, which arose in the fourth century and flourished and declined and disappeared during the same century. In its stead,

however, a new kind of Monophysitism made its appearance, in the fifth century, under Eutyches and Severus. The ex-

ponents of this new kind of Monophysitism departed from

Apollinaris in that they accepted the orthodox view that Jesus had a rational soul, agreeing thus with the orthodox Fathers

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that the union in Jesus was between the Logos and a complete man. But then they departed also from the orthodox Fathers, disagreeing with them on the question whether in a union of “predominance” the weaker member was a nature or a property. Adopting Apollinaris’ view that in such a union the weaker member was only a property, they argued that the

man in Jesus was only a property and not a nature. Thus like Apollinaris they spoke of only one nature in Jesus, denying that the body was a nature, though, unlike Apollinaris, they did

not hesitate to endow that body of Jesus with a rational soul and to consider it a complete man. This new kind of difference betwen the later form of Monophysitism and orthodoxy is clearly brought out in Theo-

doret of Cyrrhus’ dialogue between a Eutychian Monophysite and an orthodox. The orthodox questions the Monophysite as follows: “Explain to us, however, in what sense do you assert one nature after the union. Do you mean one nature derived from both or that one nature remains after the destruction of the other?” 27 In other words, the orthodox wants to know whether

the unity of nature is conceived after the analogy of “composition” or after the analogy of “predominance.” The Monophysite answers: “I maintain that the Godhead remains and that the manhood was absorbed (katamoOjvar) by it.” 8 In other words, he accepts the second alternative men-

tioned by the orthodox, namely, the analogy of “predominance,” which he describes as an “absorption,” that is, the

absorption of the weaker element by the predominant element. The orthodox finds it hard to understand and queries: “How could a nature absolute and uncompounded, comprehending the universe, unapproachable and uncircumscribable, have absorbed the nature which it assumed?” *° Thereupon the Monophysite tries to illustrate his point by a concrete example, as follows: “Like the sea receiving a drop | Franistes, Dial. Il (PG 83, 153 c). 8 Thid.

°° Tbid. (153 D).

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of honey, for straightway the drop, as it mixes with the sea’s water, vanishes.”.*° The fact that the “drop of honey” is said here to “vanish” in the “sea” indicates quite clearly that it reflects Aristotle’s example of a “drop of wine” in “ten thousand gallons of water” as an illustration of “predominance” rather than the Stoic example of a “drop of wine” in “the sea” as an illustration of “mixture,” for concerning his “drop

of wine” Aristotle says that “the form of the wine is dissolved and changes into the whole of the water,”** whereas concerning their “drop of wine” the Stoics say that “it will mutually coextend [with the sea] and “be mixed [with it].”” What the Monophysite does here is to argue from Aristotle’s statement that the “form (eéSos) of the wine is dissolved,” that its “species” and hence also its “nature” is dissolved, drawing therefrom the conclusion that in any union of “predominance” the weaker member does not retain its “nature.” The orthodox refuses to accept this analogy. While ab-

sorption, he argues, is possible between two corporeal substances, such as honey and water, it is not possible between the incorporeal divinity and the corporeal humanity. But he slyly adds: “I will, however, endeavor to point out to you several instances of substances which are mixed, without being

confounded (ovyxedueva), and remain unimpaired.” * In other words, he volunteers to offer some analogies nance” in which, while the stronger element pletely unchanged, the nature of the weaker completely destroyed. “If then,” he argues, “in

of “predomiremains comelement is not natural bodies,

instances may be found of an unconfounded

(dovyyxurov)

mixture, it is sheer folly in the case of the nature which knows neither corruption nor change to entertain the idea of confusion and destruction of the assumed nature.” ** It will be noticed that the “predominance,” which his opponent uses in the sense that the nature of the weaker element is destroyed, is loosely referred to by him as “confusion.” Technically, as © Tbid. “ Cf. above p. 383 at n. 81.

“ Cf. above p. 377 at n. 42. > ODNClEn (156.4) 2 “Op. cit. as A).

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we have seen, the term “confusion” describe a union wherein the natures elements are destroyed.** But, as we the fourth anathematism of the Fifth

©

447

is used by the Stoics to of the two constituent have seen, also later in Oecumenical Council at

Constantinople (553) is the term “confusion” applied to the Monophysite view.** The Monophysite appears skeptical of his interlocutor’s ability to produce such examples. He says: “Who in the world ever heard of an unmixed mixture.” 47 It will be noticed how the Monophysite uses the expression “unmixed mixture” for the Dyophysite conception of “predominance.” In answer, the orthodox produces two analogies.

First, he says, at the rising of the sun, all the light seems to penetrate (xwpety) through all the air. This penetration of all the light through all the air is, therefore, to be called mixture, for “the mixture penetrates through all that is mixed.” Now, the “illuminated air” is seen as light and is called light. And yet when the light is present in the air, the air still retains its nature, as is evidenced by the fact that it can be moist or dry, hot or

cold. Similarly, “after the departure of the light the air afterwards remains alone by itself.” *8 Second, he says, “when iron is brought in contact with fire, it is fired” and “the fire penetrates through its whole substance.” And yet, though it is a “mixture totally penetrating” and the iron “has the active power of fire,” still the iron continues to be called iron and is put on the anvil and is smitten with a hammer and “the nature of the iron was not damaged by its concourse with the fire.” * Both these examples, it will be recalled, occur in Alexander Aphrodisiensis as illustrations of the Stoic “mixture.” °° For

the purpose of his argument here against the Monophysite, the orthodox, as may be judged from his vocabulary, drew upon the Stoic conception of mixture, according to which the qualities which belong to the constituent elements by nature sur“ Cf. above p. 384. “Cf. above p. 418.

“Op. cit. (156 A). “Op. cit. (156 Bc).

“ Op. cit. (156 C-157 A). ™Cf. above p. 381.

448

THE

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vive.! With equal appropriateness, however, the orthodox could have drawn upon the same examples, as did Alexander Aphrodisiensis himself and other orthodox Fathers,”? as illustrations of “predominance” and hence as analogies of the belief in “one person,” which the Monophysite shared with him. Thereupon the Monophysite says: “What we assert is not the destruction of the assumed nature but its change to the substance of divinity.” °° In this passage, the Monophysite draws a distinction between the destruction of the human nature and the change of the human nature into the divine nature. The latter does not mean its destruction, nor does it mean its survival. Evidently what it means is that, while the humanity ceases to be a nature, something of it still survives. What that something is he does not say. In our discussion of Apollinaris we have tried to show how between the complete destruction of a nature and the complete survival of a nature there may be the survival of a nature as a property. What the Monophysite may, therefore, mean to say here is that, while the humanity in Jesus is not a “nature,” it is a “property.”

But can one say that the humanity in Jesus is not a “nature” but only a “property”? This, as we shall now see, becomes a subject of debate between two Monophysites, Sergius the Grammarian and Severus of Antioch.** In this debate, both Sergius and Severus, like Cyril of Alexandria,** use the term “nature” in the sense of “person” and both of them are in

agreement that in Jesus there is not only what is usually called one “person” but also what is usually called one “nature.” The debate betwen them turns only on the question whether in

Jesus there is also only one “property.” * Cf. above p. 380, at n. 66.

* Cf. above pp. 384-385, 395, 399, 494-405, 409, 412, 417. 2 © psicitsy Gis7eAe

“Cf. J. Lebon, (a) Severi Antiocheni ac Sergii Grammatici Epistulae Mutuae, in Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium: Scriptores Syri, IV, 7 (1949), Syriac, pp. 70-187; Latin, pp. 51-144; (b) Le Monophysisme Sévérien (1909), pp. 163-172, 538-551. *° Cf. above p. 408.

THE

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449

Sergius is openly in opposition to a duality of properties, insisting upon the formula “one property, out of two, of the incarnate God the Word.” ** This union of the God and

the man in Jesus resulting not only in a unity of person but also in a unity of property is described by Sergius as a “‘mixture,” °’ for which term he suggests as an equivalent also the term “composition.” °$ This “mixture,” and for that matter also his “composition,” is said by him not to be a “confusion” nor a mere “juxtaposition,” °° undoubtedly because in a “confusion” both elements are destroyed and in a “juxtaposition” both elements survive, whereas, according to Sergius, one element survived and the other was destroyed. Consequently, when in

his second letter Severus describes Sergius’ use of the term “composition” as a “mixture and confusion of diminution,” °° he does not use the expression “confusion of diminution” as an exact equivalent of the term “confusion” in its strictly technical sense. It is used by him here as a term of opprobrium. As we have seen, the term “confusion” was constantly hurled by the orthodox against the Monophysites.** Here we have an example of one Monophysite hurling it against another Monophysite.

Severus, however, in opposition to Sergius, argues that there is a human property in Jesus distinct from the divine property in him. In support of his view he appeals to the authority of Cyril of Alexandria. Each of these two properties, the divine and the human, is described by him, after the analogy of

Cyril’s expressions “natural property” (idirns 7) Kara fiow) and “natural quality” (aoudrns dvouy),°* by the expression % Sergius’ First Letter to Severus, (a) p. 72, ll. ro-11; p. 52, 1. 34 —p. 53,

I. 1; (b) pp. 538-539.

*" Sergius’ Second Letter to Severus, (a) p. 99, ll. 22-24; p. 73, Il. 24-25;

(b) p. 543-

Ibid. (a) p. 99, 1. 25; p. 73, 1. 26; (b) p. 543. ® Ibid., (a) p. 99, ll. 14-15 and 22-23; p. 73, ll. 15-16 and 24; (b) p. 543. © Severus’ Second Letter to Sergius, (a) p. 108, ll. 26-27; p. 81, Il. 14-15; cf. (b) p. 294 at n. 3. * Cf. above pp. 418, 447. ® Severus’ Third Letter to Sergius, (a) p. 158, ll. 23 ff.; p. 125, ll. 10 ff.;

(b) pp. 334 ff.; p. 349.

* Cf. above p. 408.

450

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“property as in natural quality” (idvérns as év movdryte dvouxy).°* Like Cyril, again, he uses the term “nature” in the

sense of “hypostasis” * and hence, in order to express the unity of person in Jesus, like Cyril,®* he uses the Apollinarian

formula

“one incarnate nature of God the Word”

(pia

divas Tod Heod Néyou cecapkwpévy).*® As a designation of this kind of union, like Cyril,* he rejects the term “mixture,” which was used by Sergius the Grammarian, but he does not hesitate to use the term “composition,” in the sense of “predominance,” of course,”° and he thus speaks of “one composite

(cvvOeros) nature and hypostasis.” ™ Thus, like Cyril, Severus saw in Jesus an element of unity and an element of duality, calling the element of unity “nature” and the element of duality “property,” a divine and a

human “property in natural quality,” and describing the union by the term “composition” in the sense of “predominance.” But in the history of Christianity his place is unlike that of Cyril, and this because Cyril lived before the Decree of Chalcedon was adopted in 451, whereas Severus lived after that decree was adopted. Cyril was thus not called upon to declare himself whether he would consent to the use of the Chalce-

donian formula that there are two natures in Jesus, and so orthodoxy could claim that he would have consented to it, for he would have argued that by “two natures” was meant what he would call two “natural qualities” or two “qualities of existence” or two “natural properties.” Severus, however, lived after the Decree of Chalcedon had formulated its doctrine of two natures and he refused to use the expression two

natures, even though he could have argued that the two natures

were only what he would call two “properties in natural quality.” ee P- 433 ff.

=)

polog. pro XII Cap. cont. Orientales, VIII (a. 76, 349 B). “Cf. G. Voisin, L’Apolinarisme, p. 21; J. Lebon, Le Monophysisme Séveérien, pp. 300 ff. * (b) pp. 319 ff. ® Cf. abovep. 408.

® Severus’ First Letter to Sergius, (a) p. 76, ll. 12 ff.; p. 56, ll. 8 ff.; (b) p- 540 and cf. p. 293 at n. 4. ™ (b) pp. 319 ff.

THE

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451

As for the reason of his objection to the Chalcedonian formula, two possible explanations may be given. First, and this is the prevailing explanation, it is assumed that what he calls properties are the same as what the Chalcedonians call nature, the difference between them being only verbal, so that his opposition to the Chalcedonian formula is to be explained on the ground of his fear that it might be used by the unwary in a Nestorian sense.” Second, he may have really conceived of his properties as something different from the Chalcedonian

nature. As we have seen, Apollinaris in one sense and Theodoret’s Monophysite in another sense thought that in Jesus there were bodily properties without a nature. Severus’ opposition to the Chalcedonian formula would accordingly be based upon a real difference.

(b) Nestorius

While both the Dyophysites and the Monophysites used the analogy of “predominance” as an explanation of their common

view of the unity of person in Jesus, Nestorius used the analogy of “composition” in its strictly technical sense of “juxtaposition” as an explanation of his view of the duality of per-

sons in Jesus. Externally Nestorius, like the orthodox Fathers, asserted

that in Jesus there were two natures and one person.* Formally he differed from them only in his assertion that the union of

the two natures was not by hypostasis but rather by “good pleasure” (ev8oxia).” From this assertion, however, his oppo-

nents inferred that he believed that in Jesus there were two persons. This is how his view was characterized by the assembly of the Fathers at the Fifth Oecumenical Council at Con-

® (b) pp. 334 ff.

Cf. Loofs, Nestoriana, p. 196, ll. 15-16, 21-23. * Ibid., p. 220, ll. 1-4. Eudokia is a Septuagint and New Testament term, which, before Nestorius, was used by Theodore of Mopsuestia in his description of the union of the Incarnation (Fragmenta Dogmatica, PG 66, 1012 ¢, 1013 A; H. B. Swete, Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni in Epistolas B. Pauli

Commentarii, Vol. Il, pp. 338, 339)-

452

THE

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stantinople (553) * and this is also how it continued to be characterized by individual Fathers.* But inasmuch

as Nes-

torius never said directly that in Jesus there were two persons and inasmuch also as he presented himself as following in the footsteps of the ancient Fathers and vehemently argued against those who maintained that there were two Sons and two Christs, some modern scholars have tried to rehabilitate his orthodoxy.® Let us therefore make a new examination of the facts. To begin with, there are passages in his writings which point to a belief that before the union of the man and the Logos in

Jesus the man was a person distinct from the Logos. In one place, referring to the Logos, he speaks of “the union of his own person and that in which he became incarnate.” ® In an-

other place, speaking of Jesus as being both “the only begotten Son of God and the Son of man,” he says that “he has made the things of their persons his own person.” ” In still other places, he refers to the flesh as a person. He thus says: “He who is the similitude of God has taken the person of the flesh.” § Also: “And it is known that God the Word is said to have become flesh and the Son of man after the likeness and after the person of flesh.” ® And so also: “Therefore Christ took upon him the person of the nature which was in debt, and by means of it as Adam’s son paid the debt.” ° “The person of the nature which was in debt” means the person of the flesh. Now to say that before the union the flesh was already a person may mean three things. First, it may mean that, while 207

*Fourth and Fifth Anathematism.

Cf. Hahn, § 148, Denzinger,

§§ 216,

“See, for instance, John of Damascus, Fragmenta (PG 95, 233 A). °Cf. J. F. Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching (1908); F. Loofs, Nestorius (1914). * Nestorius, The Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 23 [34], translated from the Syriac by G. R. Driver and Leonard Hodgson (1925); original Syriac, under the title of Le Livre d’Heraclide

de Damas,

edited by P. Bedjan

(1910);

French translation, under the same title, by P. Bedjan and M. Briére (1910). "[bid., p. 53 [78]. * Ibid. p. 158 [230]. *Ibid., p. 55 [80].

* Loofs, Nestoriana, p. 255, ll. 20-21.

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453

the incarnation took place at the conception, the flesh of Christ had some kind of real existence before the conception. Second, it may mean that, while again the incarnation took place at the conception, the flesh had some kind of ideal existence before the conception. Third, it may mean that, while the incarnation took place after the conception, the union of the human soul with the flesh took place at the conception, so that during the interval between the conception and the incarnation the flesh was already a person. In this last case, it must be added, the incarnation, though assumed to have taken place after the conception, would have to have taken place before the birth, probably at the time the embryo attained its complete human form," for, according to Nestorius, the union took place in the womb.” All these three possible interpretations are sustainable, for they are all precedented or paralleled. The view that there was a preéxistent real flesh before the conception is attributed by Gregory of Nyssa to Apollinaris.** The view that there was a preéxistent ideal flesh before the conception is attributed by some modern scholars to Cyril of Alexandria,* who was a contemporary of Nestorius. The view that the union of the human soul with the flesh took place at the conception but that the incarnation took place at the time the embryo attained its complete human form, in its first part, reflects the view of Tertullian ” and, in its second part, re-

flects the view of Origen.’® The second part of this view * Cf. above pp. 393-394: * By implication of such passages in which he says of Mary that she “bore the manhood which is Son because of the Son who is joined thereto” (Loofs, Nestoriana, p. 274, ll. 16-17) or that she is to be called “Godreceiver (theodochos)” (ibid., p. 276, ll. 3-5) or that she is to be called even “God-bearer

(theotokos)” in the sense that “God the Word

the temple [that is, the body]”

was united to

(ébid., p. 303, ll. 4-5), and explicitly in a

passage where he speaks of “the union” as being “since the womb”

(Bazaar

of Heracleides, p. 171 [250] ). *8 Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrheticus 13 (PG 45, 1148 8); cf. Dorner, ELPC, I’, pp. 100 f. (Eng. I, 2, pp. 371 f.). 4 Cf, Harnack, DG, II*, p. 352 (Eng. IV, 177); Lebon, op. cit., p. 379 ff.; Tixeront, HD, III’, pp. 66-67 (Eng. III, p. 64).

* De Anima 27; cf. above p. 391. *° Cf. above p. 393.

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is probably also the view of Theodore

of Mopsuestia, the

forerunner of Nestorianism, for he says that the union took place “in the very formation (8:amAdce),” ** wherein the term “formation,” we take it, refers to the completion of the human form in the embryo rather than to its conception (avdAyYus).'® The third possible interpretation of Nestorius that we have sugested would seem to have been the one adopted

by Severus of Antioch, for he attributes to Nestorius the view that “first the babe was formed in the womb, and so by a kind

of love that exists between friends (bebubo derohmuto) and by friendship [the Word] took up His abode [in it] after a brotherly fashion and gave [it] the title and honor of Son and the equality implied in the sameness of name.” ° According to this statement, then, the incarnation, in the view of Nestorius as understood by Severus, took place in the womb between the conception and the birth. The same interpretation of Nes-

torius is also found in Emperor Justinian’s Second Edict against the Three Chapters, where he says that, according to Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, “there was first a man subsistent, and then he was united with the Logos.” °°

And so from all these passages it may be gathered that, according to Nestorius, before the union of the Incarnation the Logos and the flesh were two persons. Then, there are passages in his writings which indicate that these two persons with their distinctive natures, which existed * Theodore of Mopsuestia, Fragmenta Dogmatica (PG 66, 977 c); H. B. Swete, op. cit., Vol. Il, p. 297, 1. 4. *®Tixeront, however, takes the term dcdé7rAacis here to mean “conception” (AD, Ill’, p. 18, n. 2; Eng. Ill, p. 17, n. 16). So also J. Mahé, “Les anathématismes de saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie,” Revue d’Histoire ecclésiastique 7, (1906), 527, takes the term magéév7s in PG, 76, 393 A to mean “conception.” ” Severus’ Second Letter to Sergius (cf. above p. 448, n. 54), p. 109, 1. 27 —p. 110, 1. 2; p. 82, ll. 8-11; “prius plasmatum esse infantem in utero, sicque per amoris affectum et per amicitiam Verbum in illo fraterne habitasse et

ili dedisse appellationem et honorem Filii atque aequilitatem homonymiae.” In my translation of this passage I tried to bring out the significance of the

Syriac expression behubo derohmuto, namely, that the union, according to Nestorius, was “by a kind of love that exists between friends” and not by a love that exists between father and son. * Mansi, IX, 556 £.

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455

before the union, continued to exist after the union. Just as, according to the orthodox Fathers, there were two natures after the union so, according to Nestorius, there were also two persons after the union, for nature and person, to him, always exist together. This view is implied in a passage where, after drawing a comparison between the “three persons of one ousia” in the Trinity and the “two ousias of one person” in the Incarnation, he says: “There the persons exist not without ousia, nor here again does the ousia exist without the person, nor also the nature without person, nor yet the person without

ousia.” ** It is implied also in another passage, where, speaking of Jesus, he says: “Divine Scripture, sometimes after the person

of the divinity and sometimes after the person of the humanity, names him son and Christ and Lord.” ?? And so, unlike the orthodox Fathers, to whom, after the union, while the Logos is both person and nature, the flesh is only a nature, Nestorius maintains that even the flesh is a person after the union. Still, though there are two persons and two natures after the

union, there is a difference between the union of the persons and the union of the natures. The union of the two persons results in a new person, namely, the person of Jesus, of which the original two persons are component parts, whereas the

union of the two natures does not result in a new nature.

Jesus to Nestorius is indeed one person, for he is what Aristotle describes as an “individual” and as “one in number.” 78

But he is one person made up of two other persons, the Logos and the man in him. He is one in the sense of what Aristotle calls a “continuous” one or a “composite” one, illustrated by

the example of “a bundle made one by a band.” ** Thus, as the individual objects of the bundle become component parts of the one banded bundle, the two persons in Jesus, the Logos

and the man, become component parts of the one person of Jesus. In this he reflects the view of his predecessor Theodore ™ Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 247 [342]. ” [bid., p. 262 [362-363]. *8 Categ. 2, 1b, 6-7.

* Metaph. V, 6, 1o16a, 1.

45 6

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of Mopsuestia who says: “When we distinguish the natures, we say that the nature of the Divine Logos is complete and

that His person also is complete . . . [likewise we say] that man’s nature is complete and his person also is complete. But when we consider the union, we say there is one person only.” * It is this kind of union, which in philosophical language is to be described as “composition” in the sense of “juxtaposition,” that Nestorius, and before him Theodore of Mopsuestia, describes, as mentioned before, by the use of the theological expression “good pleasure.”

But, while the two persons in Jesus become component parts of one person, the two natures in him do not become component parts of one nature. For, take again Aristotle’s example of a bundle made up of individual things of different natures or species — say wood, iron, gold, straw, and their like. When bound together into a bundle, all these different individual things form one individual thing. Within that one individual thing, however, the various individual things, the wood, the iron, the gold, and the straw, still continue to exist actually each in its own nature, though they no longer exist actually as individual things. So also the two natures, the divinity and the humanity, of which Jesus consists, unlike the two persons in him, do not become one nature, even though

Jesus is regarded as one person; they still continue to exist as two distinct natures within that one person of Jesus. In contrast to the orthodox Fathers, therefore, to whom the Logos in

Jesus is both a person and a nature and the man in him is only a nature, so that when they speak of Jesus as one person they mean the person of the Logos, to Nestorius the man in Jesus, too, is both a person and a nature, so that when he speaks of

one person in Jesus he means thereby the person of Jesus, which is made up of both the person of the Logos and the person of the man. This contrast between himself and the orthodox Fathers is clearly stated by him in a passage where, * Fragmenta Dogmatica (PG 66, 981 B); H. B. Swete, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 299, ll. 18-26. Cf. Tixeront, HD, III’, p. 18 (Eng. III, p. 17).

THE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION

457

addressing Cyril of Alexandria, he says as follows: “I said and affirmed that the union is in the one person of the Messiah . . .

But thou [actest] in the reverse way, because thou wishest that in the two natures God the Word should be the person of the union.” 76 As a consequence of this difference there is another difference between them. To the orthodox Fathers, with their belief that there can be a nature without a person and that the hu-

manity in Jesus is only a nature, the humanity in Jesus is to be said to exist in the person of the divinity in him. To Nestorius, however, with his belief that every nature exists together with a person, so that the humanity and the divinity

in Jesus are two natures as well as two persons, and with his belief also that these two persons in their union result in the

one person of Jesus, the humanity in Jesus may be said to exist together not only with its own person but also with the person of the divinity in him; similarly the divinity in him may be

said to exist together not only with its own person but also with the person of the humanity in him. This aspect of his view is expressed by Nestorius in such statements as “the humanity making use of the person of the divinity and the divinity of the person of humanity,” ** or “they took the person of one another,” ** or “making use of the persons of one another,” *® or “the person of the divinity is the humanity and the person of the humanity the divinity.” *°

It is because of this conception of Jesus as being one person composed of the person of the Logos and the person of the man in him that at the Fifth Oecumenical Council at Con-

stantinople (553) the Nestorians are anathematized on the ground that they “name the man separately Christ and Son, and so clearly speak of two persons, and hypocritically speak of one person and of one Christ only according to designation and honor and dignity and worship.” ** *° Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 143 [211-212]. “hid. p. 241 1334]. * Ibid., p. 207 [289]. ® [bid., p. 190 [144]. * Ibid., p. 220 [307]. Hahn, § 148 (IV); Denzinger, § 216.

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| THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS

It would seem that the charge that the Nestorian unity of

person was not a real unity was already made during the lifetime of Nestorius by his own contemporaries, who found his view to be analogous to the view of Paul of Samosata and his followers. Nestorius undertakes to answer this charge, prefacing his answer with a restatement of the view of Paul of Samosata and his followers. In his restatement of their view he says of the Paulinians that “they approach those who say that Christ was only a man” or that “he received the honor and the name Son by grace” or that “he is not God the Word” ® or that “these

things [that is, the divine and the human descriptions of the Son and Christ found in the New Testament] have been divided between the Sons [that is, the Word and the Man] in such a way that some befit the one and others the other,” and that consequently “they speak of a double Son and Christ in respect to persons as well as in respect to hypostases [that

is, natures] °° and, in the same manner as the saints have received the indwelling of God, they say also that His image [had its indwelling in Christ].” ** Nestorius then undertakes to show at great length that his view is not the same as that of the Paulinians. In this lengthy and complicated answer of his he tries to show that there are three logically interrelated differences between him and the Paulinians. First, according to his own view, while the Logos and the flesh started as two persons as well as two natures and while also the two natures remained distinct from one another even after the union, the two persons were united to form one united person. According to the Paulinians, just as the natures remained distinct from one another and were never united. to form one united nature, so also the persons remained distinct ” Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 44 [64-65]. ® The term “hypostasis”

(Syriac: q’némd@)

is used by Nestorius, with a

few exceptions, as the equivalent of ousia and hence of nature. Cf. BethuneBaker, op. cit., p. 50, and L. Hodgson in Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 412.

* Bazaar of Heracleides, pp. 45-46 [67].

THE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION

459

from one another and were never united to form one united person. Second, his own description of the union as being by “good pleasure” or “dignity” or “honor,” while not meaning the same as a union by “hypostasis,” still means a real union and is thus not a denial of the incarnation, but only an interpretation of it. The Paulinians, however, in describing the union as

being in “appearance” (iskema = oxjua),*° denial of the reality of the union and hence incarnation which took place for God the Third, the Paulinians “confess that there

mean thereby the the denial of “the Word.” *° are two Words as also two Sons and that the one is the divinity and the other the passibility in that it became flesh.” ** According to his own view, however, the two persons are not as distinct from one another as are the two natures and do not constitute two Words and two Sons, for to him there is a union of the two constituent persons which results in one person. He therefore addresses his opponent as follows: “Thou wilt confess aloud with us that there are not two Gods the Words or two Sons or two Only-begottens, but one, and so on with all the rest of them.” *8 This contention is repeated by him again and again in such statements as “we know not two Christs or two Sons

or Only-begottens or Lords . . . but one and the same’”*® and “the visible and the invisible are one Son; he who uses and he who is used is one Christ.” *° In none of these statements, it may be remarked, does the denial of two Sons or Christs or the assertion of only one Son or Christ imply a denial of two

persons in Jesus. In this he follows his predecessor Theodore of Mopsuestia who, though speaking of the Logos and the

man in Jesus as persons,*? insists that on account of their union into one person there are no two Sons or two Lords or two Christs.*? Every one of these denials only means that, in view

“Ibid. p. 44 [64].

® Ibid. p. 46 [67].

* Ibid. p. 46 [68].

* [bid., p. 47 [69]. * Loofs, Nestoriana, p. 280, ll. 11-15. Tbid., p. 299, ll. 19-20; cf. above p. 332 atn.77. “Cf. above at n. 25. “Fragmenta Dogmatica (PG 66, 1013 B); 1017 c); H. B. Swete, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 323, ll. 5-8; p. 329, Il. 25-26.

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of the fact that the two persons in Jesus are not as distinct from one another as are the two natures and in view of the fact also that they are so united as to form one person, these two persons are not to be considered as two Sons or two Christs. Since to Nestorius, on the one hand, the two persons still exist as component parts of the one person but, on the other, they do not exist as distinct from each other as do the natures and do not constitute two Sons and two Christs as they do according to the Paulinians, he ocasionally expresses himself in terms which would seem contradictory to each other. Thus in one place he speaks of the one person as “the union of the persons of the natures” ** and in another place, quite the opposite of this, he says that “we say not ‘the union of the persons’ but ‘of the natures.’ ” ** From the context of this latter passage, however, it is evident that what he means to say by this statement is that, unlike the union of the two natures, in which the two natures remain distinct from one another, the union of the two persons is such that the two constituent persons in it do not remain distinct from one another. It is also in this latter sense, as a contrast to the two natures and as a denial of two persons in the Paulinian sense of two Sons, that Nestorius is quoted as having denied “two persons” in the following passage: “The natures must remain in their own properties, and so one Glory must be understood and one Son confessed in virtue of the wonderful union which transcends all reason . we do not make two persons one person, but by the one name ‘Christ’ we denote the two natures together.” #° What he means to say here is that though he believes that the two natures must remain distinct from each other in their own properties and that these natures are not without their respective persons, still this does not mean that there are two persons in the Paulinian sense of two Glories or two Christs or two Sons, for, inasmuch as the two natures with their re“ Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 163 [238]. “ Ibid. p. 172 [252]. “ Loofs, Nestoriana, p. 196, ll. 18-23.

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spective persons, according to him, are united into one person of two natures, there is only one Glory or one Christ or one Son. The same distinction between his own use of the expression two persons and the Paulinian use of it is also made by him in a passage in which he answers one of his opponents. His opponent, it would seem, accused him of believing in two persons. Nestorius does not deny the charge. But he argues

(1) that the charge could equally be brought against his opponent himself who believed in two natures, “for in the natures thou dividest also the persons, man and God,” *¢ and (2) that such a division into two persons is not objectionable, inasmuch as ‘‘there are not two Sons nor two men.” #* Thus to Nestorius, there were two persons with their respective natures before the union and these two persons with their respective natures continued to exist after the union, with the only difference that, while the two persons were united into one person, of which the two persons were component

parts, the two natures remained distinct from one another in that one person. This kind of unity is analogous, as we have suggested above, to the second of the five kinds of relative unity enumerated by Aristotle, described by him as unity by

continuity, which we have shown to mean the same as unity by composition.** This is exactly the kind of analogy that Nestorius himself approves of when he maintains that the union is not a “mix-

ture” (xpéovs) * nor a “confusion” (adovyxvros) *° but rather a “conjunction” (cvvddea).°* What he means by the “mixture,” which he rejects, is not clear. Undoubtedly he means by it “mixture” in all its senses, whether used in its technical Aristotelian sense or in its technical Stoic sense or in its loose sense of “predominance.” °* What he means by the “confu** Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 246 [340].

“ Ibid. * Cf. above pp. 314 and 375.

* Cf. Loofs, Nestoriana, “Register C. Namen, Worter und Sachen,” s. v. i bidawsats BOT Did. SoU.

° Cf, above pp. 376, 380, 379.

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~ sion,” which he also rejects, may be gathered from a passage where, speaking of the common view shared by himself and the orthodox Fathers, namely, that the union of the divinity

and the humanity in Jesus is not one of confusion, he says: “even as the fire was united with the bush (sanya) and the bush with the fire and they were without confusion (bulbala).” ** There is evidently an allusion in this passage to the verse, “And he (Moses) looked, and, behold, the bush (ha-

seneh) burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed.” *4

Assuming, as we have a right to do, that Nestorius believed that not only was the bush not consumed but also the fire was not extinguished, we may infer that when he says that, like the burning bush, the union of the Logos and the flesh was “without confusion” he means that in their union neither the Logos nor the flesh suffered any change. By the “confusion,” which he rejects, he therefore means “confusion” in its technical Stoic sense, as a union in which the constituent parts are completely and irretrievably changed.” Since of the five kinds of union of physical things known to the Fathers °° four are rejected by Nestorius as unsuitable for his purpose as analogies for his own conception of the union of the Incarnation, three of them under the term “mixture” and one under the term “confusion,” there is only one other analogy left to him, namely, the analogy of “composition” or “juxtaposition” or “continuity.” This, as we have shown, would be suitable for his purpose.” It is this analogy therefore that he draws upon for the explanation of his views, but instead of using the term “composition” or “juxtaposition” or “continuity,” he uses

the term ovvdédea, “conjunction.” Etymologically the Greek term ovoddeva belongs to the same group of terms as dareo Oa, cvvaryis, ady, and dazdpevor, all of which are used by Aristotle

as descriptions of his “composition” in the technical sense of “juxtaposition.” °° By “conjunction,” therefore, Nestorius “The Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 156 (228). Cf. also p- 157 [229]; p. 160 [234-235]. exOduigi25 © Cf. above p. 384. *' Cf, above pp. 374-375, 379. °° Cf, above p. 385. “Cf. above p. 375.

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means “composition” in the sense of “juxtaposition.” © Quite rightly, therefore, does Severus of Antioch condemn the union

of Nestorius as a “juxtaposition” (zapdOeors),°° for Severus himself, as we have shown, uses the term “composition” in the sense of “predominance.” V. Dua.iry oF WILLS AND OPERATIONS

(a) Analysis of the Problem To the Dyophysites, as we have seen, the unity of person

in Jesus despite the duality of natures in him meant that the incarnate Logos, by reason of its complete mastery over the humanity, has eliminated the possibility of any conflict between them. It is in this respect that the relation between the

Logos and body in Jesus differs from the relation of soul and body in man. In the latter case, the two natures, represented by soul and body, are always in conflict with one another and it is not always that the soul gains mastery over the body. And what is true of the Dyophysites, with their assertion of two natures, is all the more true of the Monophysites, with their assertion of one nature, and is even true of the Nestorians, with their assertion of two persons, for, two persons though

they were, they were one in will and operation. In the technical language of philosophy, as fixed by Aristotle, the conflict between these two natures in man is ascribed

to a difference in the cause which is assumed to produce action, or what is called motion (xivnous) or operation (évépyea), in

living beings. That cause is called appetency (épefis), which produces action always in combination with either intellect (vods) or imagination (¢avracia).* The actions produced by appetency as a result of these two combinations are conceived as conflicting actions,” for when appetency is combined with * Cf. above pp. 389-390. ° Cf. Lebon, Le Monophysisme Sévérien, p. 295. * Cf. above p. 450. 1De Anima Il, 10, 4338, 9-12; 20-23, 433b, 13-18. * Thid., 433b, 5-13.

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intellect, man is moved in accordance with reason (Aoyurpds) ; when it is combined with imagination, he is moved contrary to reason. In the former case, man is also said to be moved by wish (Govdnots); in the latter case, man is said to be moved by

concupiscence (érOvyia).* “Wish” is furthermore explained as being an “appetency for the good” * or as relating “rather to the end” ® and as being “even for impossibles, as, for instance, immortality.” © This general outline of the psychology of action may be pieced together from the discussions of the Fathers, though with occasional change of detail and vocabulary. As an exam-

ple we make take John of Damascus, whose formal treatment of the subject reflects on the whole the general philosophic background of this phase of the Christological discussions of the Fathers before him. Following Aristotle’s use of the term “appetency” in the sense of an inclination to action, which by itself is neither ra-

tional nor irrational, John of Damascus says that “it should be understood that there is implanted in the soul by nature an

appetitive faculty (Svvapyis dpexrixy).” Continuing to follow Aristotle, he then proceeds to subdivide this appetitive faculty into that which is “rational” (Aoyux7y), described by him also as “natural” (dvouxn) and “vital” (Cerin), and that which is not rational (47 AoyucH).° The “rational appetitive faculty,” which

Aristotle calls “wish,” is described by John of Damascus in two places by two different terms. First, using Aristotle’s term “wish” and reflecting Aristotle’s definition of “wish” as relating “rather to the end” and as being “even for impossibles, as, for instance, immortality,” he says that “wish (BovAnors) is a rational appetency and longing for some definite thing” ® and then proceeds to say that this appetency may be even “for impossibles,” *° for “we may perhaps also wish never to die.” 1! 5 Tbid., 433a, 23-30. * Rhet. I, 10, 13692, 3. ° Eth. Nic. Ill, 2, 1111b, 26. °Tbid., 22-23. "De Fide Orth. Il, 22 (PG 94, 944 B).

* Tbid. ° Ibid. (944 c). ” [bid. * [bid. (945 A).

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Second, using the term “will” (@é\nows), which does not occur in Aristotle,” he applies it also to the “rational faculty,” *® but unlike the Aristotelian “wish,” which is a rational appetency for “some definite end,” he defines it as a rational appetency for “all that constitutes the nature, a simple faculty,” ' or, as he says later, “the simple faculty of willing.” * This distinction between “wish” and “will,” it may be remarked in pass-

ing, is taken by John of Damascus from Maximus Confessor, who quotes it in the name of Clement of Alexandria.1° As for

irrational appetency, he says, it is not called “will” (Aé\nows) 17 nor “wish” (BovdAnors).'® What it should be called, he does not say. Probably, like Aristotle, he would call it concupiscence (émOupia), for concupiscence (émOupia) is defined by him elsewhere as an “expected good,” by which good, he adds, he means either a “true good” or an “apparent good.” Then taking up the term “operation” (évépyeva), he gives it

four meanings: (1) “the natural power (¢vouxy Svvayis) and motion (xivnois) of every substance, which only the nonexistent is without”; (2) “actions” (apdéeus), as eating, drinking, and so forth; (3) “natural affections” (7d@n), as hunger, thirst, and so forth; (4) “the completion (dmorédeopa) of po-

tentiality (8vvdpews).” °° Each of these meanings of the term “operation,” we shall try to show, reflects some Aristotelian statement. The first meaning reflects Aristotle’s statements that “opera-

tion (évépyea)

in a strict sense is identified with motion

But it is used in the Septuagint, the New Testament, and post-Aristotelian Greek philosophy.

® De Fide Orth. Il, 22 (944 B). Thid.

Ibid. (948 Cc). Cf. Maximus,

Disputatio cum Pyrrho

(PG 2, 317 c). The reference

given by Maximus is “Strom. Lib. VI’; but the statement quoted does not occur there (cf. n. (e) in PG 8, 318). It was taken from Clement’s lost work

De Providentia (cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, ed. Stahlin, III, p. 200).

“De Fide Orth. Ul, 22 (944 3c).

8 Ibid. (945 B). » [bid. Il, 12 (929 B). » Ibid. Il, 23 (949 A-952 A). Cf. the somewhat similar threefold distinc-

tion in Basil and Severus of Antioch below pp. 470 f.

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(xivnows), wherefore people do not assign motion to nonexistent things,” *! and that “nature means a source of motion within a thing itself,” 22 added by Aristotle’s use of “power” (Svvapis) both as the opposite of “nature” and as the equivalent of “nature,” 7? whence the significance of the expression “natural power” in his statement here that “operation” means “the

natural power and motion of every substance.” The second meaning reflects Aristotle’s use of the term energeia synonymously with the term praxis, as, for instance,

when he says that the “operation (energeia) of soul” in man means “actions (praxeis) with reason.” ** The third meaning reflects Aristotle’s statement in the Metaphysics that the term “affection” (wd@os), among its several meanings, has also the meaning of “operations of qualities” (rovrwy évépyear).”> What he means by “operations of qualities” is not explained by him, but its meaning may be derived from the fact that, in contrast to “affection” in the sense of “operations of qualities,” he uses “affection” simply in the sense of “qualities,’ which he illustrates by “white” and “black” and “sweet” and “bitter.” 7° It happens that in the

Categories “whiteness” and “blackness” and “sweetness” and “bitterness” are described by Aristotle as “affective (aa0nrixat) qualities” in contrast to “blushing” and “growing pale,” which he describes simply as “affections.” ®’ From the fact that “affec-

tive qualities” in the Categories are the same as “affections” in the sense of “qualities” in the Metaphysics, seeing that they are illustrated by the same examples, it may be inferred that

their opposites, “affections” in the Categories and “affection”

in the sense of “operations of qualities” in the Metaphysics, are also the same and that consequently the latter could also be illustrated by the examples of “blushing” and “growing pale.” But then also, in the Categories, “affections,” which * Metaph. IX, 3, 10478, 32-33. ” De Caelo Ill, 2, 301b, 17-18. * Cf. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, under divaus, p. 206, col. 1, Il. 38 ff.; col. 2, ll. 20-23, 38 ff. * Eth. Nic. I, 6, 1098a, 13-14. * Ibid. 15-17. * Metaph. V, 21, 1022b, 18. ™ Categ. 8, ga, 28-ob, 27.

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are the same as “‘affection” in the sense of “operations of qualities” in the Metaphysics, are said to apply only to states of the body which are not permanent but arise from certain temporary causes, with the removal of which those states of the body will disappear, such for instance, as blushing which comes through shame and growing pale which comes through fear. Now the examples of “hunger” and “thirst” by which

John of Damascus illustrates the meaning of “operation” in the sense of “natural affections” are states of the body which, like blushing through shame and growing pale through fear, are not permanent but arise from certain temporary causes,

namely, the lack of food and water, with the removal of which causes the hunger and the thirst will disappear. Conse-

quently John of Damascus’ use of the term “operation” in the sense of “natural affection” reflects Aristotle’s use of the

term “affection” in the sense of “operations of qualities” in the Metaphysics and his use of the term “affections” as a description of blushing which comes through shame and growing pale

which comes through fear in the Categories. The fourth meaning reflects Aristotle’s use of energeia as the opposite of dynamis and as the equivalent of entelecheia,”* the term apotelesma here being thus only a substitute for the term entelecheia as used by Aristotle in such an expression as “the

entelecheia of that which is in potentiality (rod Suvdwer évrehéxeva).”” 7?

John of Damascus, in this philosophic analysis of the faculties of will and operation in man, may be considered as repre-

sentative of all the Fathers. It is with this analysis as a back-

ground that they all approach their discussion of will and operation in Jesus. With their common belief that in Jesus there was no conflict between his two natures, the divine and the human, the orthodox Fathers also believed that within the human nature * Cf. Bonitz, op. Cit., S. v. * Phys. Ill, 1, 201a, 10-11; cf. above p. 406 on the use of cvymrdjpwors as the equivalent of évredéxera.

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of Jesus there was no conflict between body and soul. In him the rational soul always had the mastery over the body as the divine Logos always had the mastery over the rational soul.

Speaking for the Fathers, John of Damascus says that Jesus indeed had “a natural simple will, like that found in all per-

sons of men, but a design (yrdunv) or an object of will (Oehnrov) in opposition to his divine will or different from his divine will his sacred soul did not possess,” *° for, he goes on to say, “his human will clearly follows his divine will and wills that which the divine will willed it to will.”**And what is true of his will is also true of his operation, for, as again he says elsewhere, “we hold that it is one and the same person who wills and operates naturally in both natures, out of which and in which and also which is Christ our Lord.” *” With this view, constantly stressed by the Dyophysites, in so far as it merely asserts that there was no conflict of wills and

operations in Jesus, the Monophysites would agree. But there would be a difference between the Dyophysite use of this assertion and the Monophysite use of it. To the Dyophysites, the assertion that there is no conflict of wills and operations

in Jesus does not mean a denial of the existence of a human will and operation in Jesus; it only means that the divine will and operation in him dominated his human will and operation, for, as says John of Damascus on behalf of the Dyophysites, “since then Christ has two natures, we hold that he has also two natural wills and two natural operations.” ** To the Monophysites, this assertion, if used by them, would mean a denial

of the existence of a human will and operation in Jesus, for with their denial of a human nature in Jesus they must also deny in him a human will and operation. The problem of one will and operation or two wills and operations was thus logically a corollary of the problem of one or two natures and it must have appeared simultaneously with the problem of one or two natures. Already in the fourth

* De Fide Orth. Il, 22 (948 a). * Ibid. (948 c).

* bid Tl, 14 (1033 B). ® Tbid.

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century different views on will and operation were expressed by those who held different views on nature. Apollinaris, who believed in one nature, spoke also of one will and one operation. “We profess,” he says, “that Christ is one and, because he is one, we worship in him one nature and one will and one operation.” ** The orthodox Fathers of the same time, with their belief in two natures, spoke, on the other hand, of two wills and natures.*° These contrasting views with regard to will and operation are to be found also in the later exponents of the two contrasting views with regard to nature. Thus when Severus of Antioch, a Monophysite, maintained one operation ** as well as one will,®* Leontius of Byzantium, a Dyophysite, in opposition to him, maintained two operations.*® Unity of will is also maintained by such Monophysites as Philoxenus of Mabug *° and Colluthus,*° whereas such Dyophysites as Ephrem of Antioch,** the monk Eusthathius,*” John of Scythopolis,** and Eulogius of Alexandria ** argue for a duality of wills and operations. New Testament verses, it must be remarked, would all seem to support the view that there were two wills and two opera-

tions in Jesus. Such verses as, “I seek not mine own will (0é\nua), but the will of the Father which hath sent me”; *° “I came down from heaven not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me’; *° “not what I will (@€\), but what *Draeseke, p. 400, ll. 15-17; Lietzmann, p. 248, ll. 5-7; cf. Voisin, p. 301 ff.; Lebon, p. 454 f. * Lebon, p. 459, n. 2, referring to Diekamp, p. 310, ll. 20 ff. *Lebon, p. 443, n. 3, referring to Mansi, X, 1116. Cf. J. P. Junglas, Leontius von Byzanz, pp. 107-108, 117. *Lebon, p. 459, nn. 1 and 2, referring to Mansi, X, 1117, and Diekamp,

Pp- 310, 311. % Cf. F. Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz, p. 70, referring to Lib. Tres. II (PG 867, 1320 aB) and Adv. Argumen. Severi (PG 86’, 1932 c); cf. Tixeront, HD, III’, p. 158, n. 1 (Eng. III, 151, n. 83).

*° Lebon, p. 459, 0. 3. UNGl saa “ Tixeront, HD, Ill’, p. 160, n. 2 (Eng. Il, p. 153, n. 2). “lhids po tot, ne 1 “(a g)* “Tid. Ieaze (is 4).

“Tbid., n. 3 (p. 154, n. 5). * John 5:30.

John 6:38.

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thou wilt,” 47 would all seem to indicate that there were in him two wills, a human and a divine. With regard to operation, to be sure, there is no verse which would directly indicate that there were in him two contrasting operations, a human and a divine. Still there are many verses which describe

Jesus as performing two contrasting kinds of actions, human and divine. On the one hand, he is described as performing such human actions as eating, drinking, speaking, and their like, and also as undergoing such human passions as hunger, thirst, anger, sadness, weariness, fear, and their like. But on the other hand he is also described as working, by the divinity within him, such divine miracles as healing the incurably sick, raising the dead, walking on the sea, and their like. Two kinds of answer are recorded in the name of those who

attributed one will and one operation to Jesus in explanation of these New Testament verses. One kind of answer is to be found in Severus of Antioch.*® Addressing himself directly to the problem of operation and drawing upon a distinction made by Basil between the agent

of the operation (6 évepyjoas) and the act of the operation (1) évépyera) and the effect of the operation (76 évepynfév),*° he makes a similar threefold distinction, except that he includes under the agent also the power or faculty of the will which he

calls “impulse” (bafé = épuy). He then contends that, just as a plurality of effects of an operation does not necessarily mean a plurality of agents, So also does it not mean a plurality of acts of operation in one agent. On the basis of this, he argues that the duality of operations attributed in the New

Testament to Jesus refers only to effects of one operation performed by one agent and it does not mean that there were

two acts of operation and two agents in Jesus corresponding to two natures within him. To quote his own statement: “One “ Mark 14:36; Matt. 26:39. * Cf. J. Lebon, (a) Severi Antiocheni ac Sergii Grammatici Epistulae Mutuae, in Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium: Scriptores Syri, IV, 7 (1949), Syriac, pp. 81-83; Latin, pp. 59-61; (b) Le Monophysisme Sévérien (1909), pp. 445-447. “ Basil, Adv. Eunom. IV (PG 29, 689 c).

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is the man who operates, though composed of soul and body; one is the operation, for one is the operative motion, which is the impulse of him who wills; but the effects vary: some of them being, indeed, of the intelligible order and others of the sensible and corporeal order.” °° Applying this analysis to

the natural and miraculous operations recorded of Jesus, he says: “One is the agent, that is, the incarnate Word of God; one is the operative motion, which is the operation; but different are the effects, that is to say, the results accomplished by the operation. To illustrate: that Christ bodily walked and

journeyed on earth —that is a human operation; that those who were lame and felt no sensation in their legs down to the very soles and had to roll and crawl like reptiles he set up and enabled to run about —that is an operation which

more than anything else is proper to God. However, one is the incarnate Word and one is its operation, which is the operative motion that produces both these two sorts of effects, and we do not say that, because the effects are of two different sorts, there are also to be two different natures, for, as we have said, it is the one and only incarnate Word of God which produces

both these two sorts of effects. Just as one does not separate the

Word from the flesh so cannot one separate or divide these operations.” ** Undoubtedly, following his own analysis of operation, Severus would have also analyzed will into corresponding three elements, (1) the agent of the will, (2) the act of willing,

and (3) the effect of the will, and, as in the case of operation, he would have also argued that, while the effects of the will may be many, the act of the will is one, just as the agent of the will is one. Another kind of answer is to be found later among the Monotheletes. It tries to explain the contrast between the will

of the Father and his own will, of which Jesus himself speaks, after the manner of Philo’s and the rabbis’ explanation of the © Lebon, op. cit. (a) p. 82, ll. 26-31; p. 60, Il. 29-33; (b) p. 446. 1 [bid. (a) p. 83, II. 1-16; p. 60, 1. 1 — p. 61, 1. 11; (b) p. 447.

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anthropomorphisms found in the Old Testament,” maintain-

ing that “these words are not meant to imply a split will but are used in a dispensational sense, by reason of the manhood which he assumed, for they are said for our sakes, to serve us as an example, that, following the footsteps of him, a religious teacher edifying his pupils, we should not do each our own will but we should rather in everything do the will of the Lord.” =

Still, while the problem of will and operation was logically bound up with the problem of nature and while informally, whenever the occasion presented itself, those who believed in two natures expressed also their belief in two wills and two operations, no formal action was taken by those who believed in two natures with regard to two wills and two operations.

At the Councils of Chalcedon in 451 and Constantinople in 553, where the belief in two natures was formally proclaimed, no mention was made of a belief in two wills and operations. Two questions may therefore be raised. First, in view of the fact that the wills as well as the operations, though two and distinct from each other, still act in harmony with each other as though they were one, would it be allowed to speak of them as one, with reference to the harmony between them, in the same way as the Fathers allowed themselves to speak of them as two, with reference to the distinction between them? Second, in view of the fact that the decrees of Chalcedon and Constantinople make no mention of two wills and operations, would it be heretical if one happened to arrive at the conclusion that the belief in one will and one operation was compatible with the belief in two natures? We do not know what the answers would have been if these questions had been raised on purely theoretical grounds. But

it happens that these questions were raised on grounds which ” Cf. Philo, I, pp. 121-122; 272. “First Letter of Pope Honorius \ \

to Sergius of Constantinople

(Mansi,

XI, 541 a); cf. Letter of Paul of Constantinople to Pope Theodore

(Mansi,

X, 1025 a ff.; Dorner ELPC, Il, p- 227, Eng. II, 1, p. 183); Macarius at the ninth session of the Sixth Oecumenical Council (Mansi, XI, 381 p ff.).

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were not purely theoretical, and so it gave rise to the great controversy over what is known as Monenergism and Monotheletism. Without going into the political and ecclesiastical history of the controversy, we shall try to trace only the history and the development of the theoretical aspect of the prob-~ lem. (b) The Monenergistic and Monothelete Controversies Farly in the seventh century, religious zeal as well as political expediency actuated both the ecclesiastical and the secular authorities in the Eastern Empire, who themselves were Dyophysites, to bring about a union between the Dyophysites and Monophysites within their empire. The earliest reference to such an attempt at a union appears in a letter written in

619 by Sergius of Constantinople to a certain Monophysite leader. Other Dyophysites, besides Sergius, who appear in the early negotiations with the Monophysites are Emperor Heraclius and Cyrus of Phasis. The union between the Dyophysites

and the Egyptian Monophysites was completed in 633, when Cyrus, who in 631 had become patriarch of Alexandria, published nine chapters or anathematisms, to which both sides subscribed. The seventh of these anathematisms condemns anyone who does not confess that “this one and the same Christ and Son worked both the divine and the human by one thean-

dric operation, as the holy Dionysius teaches.”* In other words, the condition on which the union was effected did not

require of either side a direct commitment on the question of two natures or one nature. It only required: of both sides openly to use the expression “one operation,” leaving each of them free to interpret it in accordance with its own particular

belief, the Dyophysites using it in the sense of two natures 1Hefele, Conciliengeschichte’,

§ 293 (Ill, 139; Eng. V, 20); Mansi, XI,

565 p; Hahn, § 232. The expression “theandric operation” (deavdpixh évépyeca) occurs in Dionysius’ Epist. 1V (PG 3, 1072 Cc).

474

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and the Monophysites in the sense of one nature. It will be noticed that, though logically whatever is true of operation is also true of will, the anathematism insisted only upon “one operation,” without mentioning “one will.” Perhaps the reason for this was that the existence of two wills, which is explicitly mentioned several times in the New Testament,” would have been more difficult to explain away than the existence of two operations, which is not explicitly mentioned in the New Testament. It must, however, be remarked that in the alleged letter of Mennas, patriarch of Constantinople, to Pope Virgilius, which, according to Maximus the Confessor, Sergius sent to Theodore of Pharan and to Paul the Severan,® both “one operation” and “one will” are mentioned.* But while it is quite clear that the use of the formula “one operation” by Dyophysites did not require of them a renunciation of their belief in two natures, it is not clear whether it also did not require of them a renunciation of a belief in two operations. For the seventh anathematism, as phrased, leaves us in doubt as to whether only the use of the expression “one operation” was required of the Dyophysites or whether also a belief in one operation was required of them. The expression “one theandric operation” does not throw light upon this question, for it may mean either (a) that the two operations, the divine and the human, on account of the harmony between them, may be spoken of as “one theandric operation” or it may mean (b) that the “one” divine operation, on account of its working either through the divine nature or through the human nature, may be spoken of as a “‘theandric operation.” Nor is light thrown upon this question by the statement in the letter

of Sergius to Pope Honorius, in which he quotes Cyrus as justifying his use of the expression “one operation” on the ground that “often also the Holy Fathers, in order to gain a great number of souls, have shown a God-pleasing pliancy

(oikovopie.) towards certain expressions, without surrendering * Cf. above pp. 469-470. °H, § 291 (IU, 124-125; V, 5).

“H, § 292 (III, 134; V, 15-16).

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anything of their orthodoxy.” ® For here, too, the question may be raised whether the “orthodoxy” which he said was not to be surrendered by the expression “‘one operation” was the orthodoxy of the belief in two natures or the orthodoxy of the belief in two operations. The introduction of the expression “‘one operation” was thus justified on the ground that it was a “God-pleasing pliancy” towards a mere expression for the purpose of establishing unity among Christians. But opposition to this disingenuous method of attaining unity among Christians was raised by the Palestinian monk Sophronius, who is described by Sergius in his letter to Pope Honorius as having “altogether disapproved of the pliancy” ® and as having therefore “opposed the chapter

of the one operation, maintaining that we should teach decidedly two operations of Christ.” * In a letter ® which Sophronius himself wrote to Pope Honorius and the various patriarchs

in 634, after he had been elected patriarch of Jerusalem, he makes it quite clear that he had understood Cyrus to have used the expression “‘one operation” as indicating a belief in one operation. For he points out that, by changing the original Dionysian expression “a new theandric operation” to “one

theandric operation,” Cyrus has changed its meaning from a belief in two operations that may be spoken of as “a new theandric operation” to a belief in “one” divine operation that

may be spoken of as a “theandric operation.” ° He thus makes it clear that not only did he insist upon the use of the expression “two operations,” as reported by Sergius, but that he also

insisted upon a belief in two operations. To him there were in Jesus two faculties and two acts of operation corresponding to his two natures, for, as he says, “in each of the two natures

he had a power unconfused, but also unseparated” and “as in Christ each nature possesses its property inviolable, so each form (= nature) works, in communion with the other, what 5H, § 295 (III, 143; V, 24); M, XI, 532 &£. °H, loc. cit., M, XI, 533 A.

7H, loc. cit.,; M, XI, 532 v. 5H, § 297; M, XI, 461-509; PG 87°, 3148-3200. ®M, XI, 488 p; PG 87°, 3177 B.

47 6

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_ is proper to itself.” 1? And so, because he believed that in Jesus there were two operations, even though they acted in communion with each other, he was opposed to the use of the formula “one operation.” In this letter of his, Sophronius discusses only the problem of “one operation” or “two operations.” He does not discuss the problem of “one will” or “two wills,” and this probably because those whom he opposed did not advocate the expression “one will.” But while he does not explicitly mention the problem of “one will” or “two wills,” he does touch upon it. He says: “He (the incarnate Logos) gave to the human nature, when He would, time to work and to suffer that which is proper to it, that His incarnation should not be regarded as mere appearance. Not unwilling or by constraint did He undertake this, although He let it come to Him physically and humanly, and worked and acted in human movements . . . He suffered and acted and worked humanly when He himself willed, and when He regarded it as profitable for the onlookers; and not when the natural and carnal movements willed to be naturally moved to operation.” ‘* What these passages imply with regard to the question of “one will” or “two wills,” which had not yet been raised by the time of the writing of this letter but were raised later, is not clear. On the one hand, they may imply only an emphasis on the harmonious working of two wills, after the analogy of the harmonious working of the two operations. But, on the other hand, they may imply a belief in only one will, in contradistinction to his belief in two operations. In Sophronius’ own letter there is nothing that would throw light on this question. In a later report of the

synod held at Jerusalem in 634, at which Sophronius was installed as patriarch, it is said that the doctrine of “two wills and operations” was decreed at that time.’? How reliable that report is with regard to “two wills” it is hard to tell. And so the problem of “one operation,” or, as it is called, *° M, XI, 480 pe; PG 87°, 3168 cp. % M, XI, 485 aB; PG 87°, 3173 Bc. * HY, § 297 CII, 159; V, 42); M, X, 607 a.

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Monergism or Monenergism, arose among the Dyophysites themselves, as a result of the publication of the nine anathe-

matisms, written by Cyrus of Alexandria in the year 633, and the letter to Pope Honorius, written by Sophronius in the

year 634. No problem of “one will” or, as it is called, Monotheletism, existed at that time. The anathematism against those who did not confess “one theandric operation” evidently did not require a confession of belief in one will nor did it prohibit a confession of belief in two wills. The next event in the history of this Monenergistic controversy was an exchange of letters between Sergius and Pope Honorius, in which a revision of the seventh anathematism of Cyrus was proposed.

In his letter to Pope Honorius,* Sergius shows concern about the opposition that had arisen against the use of the expression “one operation.” He feared that the controversy among the Dyophysites themselves over the use of this expression might grow and spread and ultimately give rise to a new heresy within the Church. Still wishing, he says, to preserve that union which had been brought about in Alexandria between the Dyophysites and the Monophysites, he has written

to its patriarch Cyrus, suggesting that “after accomplishing the union with those who were formerly separated he should

allow no one to confess one or two operations.” * Then he proceeds to give reasons why one should not be allowed to use either the expression one operation or the expression two operations. With regard to the expression one operation, he says: “The

expression one operation should not be employed, since, although it was used by some of the Fathers, it seems strange to many, and offended their ears, since they entertained the suspicion that it was used in order to do away with the two natures in Christ, a thing to be avoided.” * In other words, he does not agree with Sophronius that the expression “one opera-

*° H, § 295; M, XI, 529-537.

WIM DG Geir Ce

‘

5M, XI, 533 b.

478

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tion” should be given up on the ground that it is incompatible with the belief in two natures; but he is willing to give it up out of consideration for the prejudices of such Dyophysites as Sophronius and his followers who suspected all those who used the expression “one operation” of being believers in one nature. But when he comes to give his reason for not allowing the use of the expression “two operations,” he does not merely say that it was out of consideration for the prejudices of certain people, but adds his own belief that the use of such an expression is wrong in itself. His statement reads as follows: “In like manner, to speak of two operations gives offense to many, because this expression occurs in none of the holy Fathers;

moreover (dad yap), there would indeed follow thence the doctrine of two contradictory wills.” *® But such a doctrine of two contradictory wills, he goes on to say, is false, for “the Fathers teach that the human nature of Christ has never, separately and of its own impulse, fulfilled its natural movement in opposition to the leading of the Logos which is united with it, but only when, and as, and in the measure in which the Logos willed it.”*”In other words, the expression “two operations” is to be avoided by the Dyophysites not merely because it would give offense to many on the ground of its not having been used by the Fathers, but also on the ground that by itself the expression implies a belief in two contradictory wills. The implication

of this second ground is that the expression “two operations” implies a belief not only in two operations but also in two wills and that a belief in two wills necessarily means a belief in two wills which are contradictory to each other. Despite the fact, however, that, according to his understanding of Cyrus, the difference between the expressions “one operation” and “two operations” is not merely a verbal difference but a difference between two beliefs, still Sergius characterizes the controversy over the matter as “this superfluous dispute about words.” 18 What he means, as we have suggest**M, XI, 533 &; cf. H, § 299 (III, 180; V, 63); M, X, ae B.

mM, XL 536 a.

MM, XI, 533¢

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ed above,” is that, though those who use these different ex-

pressions maintain different beliefs, and even though in his opinion one of these beliefs is wrong, still this difference of belief with reference to one operation or two operations should be tolerated by the Church as two permissible interpretations of the doctrine of two natures. Consequently he considers the controversy over it as a mere “superfluous dispute about words,” which should be brought to an end by a concession on both sides, the one by discontinuing the use of the expression “one operation” and the other by not taking up the use of the expression “two operations.” In his answers to Sergius, for he wrote him two letters,”° Honorius agrees with him that the controversy is only a dispute over “a novelty in words,” ** inasmuch as he believed that either one operation or two operations were permissible interpretations of the doctrine of two natures, for, as he says, ‘Gn respect to natures, the doctrine of the Bible is clear; but it is quite idle to ascribe one or two operations to the Mediator

between God and man.”*””He therefore commends Sergius for having removed the cause of the controversy by not using either the expression one operation or the expression two oper-

ations. In giving the reason why the expression “one operation” should not be used, he says that it is in order that “we may not seem to simple ears to teach Eutychianism.” * This is exactly the reason given by Sergius. But in giving the rea-

son why the expression “two operations” should not be used, he says that it is in order that “those who are under age may not, taking offense at the expression two operations, hold us for Nestorians.” *4 This may be taken to correspond to Sergius’

first reason against the use of the expression “two operations,” namely, that it would give “offense to many.” But, it will be noticed, there is nothing here in Honorius to correspond to ” Cf. above p. 472. First Letter: H, § 296; M, XI, 537-544. Second Letter: H, § 298, M,

XI, 579-582.

2M, XI, 544 A. NUL DS ezfo) (ob

*M, XI, 544 A. * Thid.

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Sergius’ second reason, namely, that the expression “two operations” implies a belief in two contradictory wills. Evidently Honorius did not believe that the expression “two operations” necessarily implied a belief in two wills that were contradictory. To him, undoubtedly, while the expression did indeed imply a belief in two wills, the two wills which it implied were not contradictory, but rather, like their corresponding two natures, they were in harmony with each other. To a belief in such harmonious two wills he evidently had no objection. When therefore in an earlier part of his first letter he says,

“whence, also, we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ, since our [human] nature was plainly assumed by the Godhead, and this being faultless, as it was before the fall,” *° he

does not mean that there was in Jesus only one will, namely, the divine will. What he means is that, inasmuch as the human

will in Jesus was not the will of the ordinary human nature as it was corrupted by the fall, but rather the will of an uncorrupted human nature “as it was before the fall,” it always acted in harmony with the divine will and therefore the

two wills in Jesus may be spoken of as one will. Though later, at the Sixth Oecumenical Council at Constantinople, Honorius was singled out for special condemnation in the general condemnation of the Monotheletes as a whole, there is no evidence, as we have seen, that he was a Monothelete. In fact, on various other grounds, students of the history of doctrine have tried to exonerate Honorius from the charge of Monotheletism and to show that his condemnation was not because he was held to believe in one will but rather because he was careless in using words which could be taken to mean a belief in one will.?¢ Thus while Honorius disagreed with Sergius and believed

that in Jesus there were two operations and evidently also two wills, corresponding to the two natures in him, he agreed with *° M, XI, 540 Be. *On the history of the various interpretations of the expression “one will” as used by Honorius, see H, § 296 (III, 150-159; V, 32-41); § 298 (III, 167-177; V, 50-61); § 324 (III, 290-313; V, 181-205).

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him that these two different beliefs were to be tolerated by the Church as two permissible interpretations of the doctrine of two natures, and hence the controversy was only a dispute over “a novelty in words.” Consequently he also agreed with Sergius’ recommendation that for the sake of peace neither the expression “one operation” nor the expression “two operations” should be used. Inasmuch as the use of the expression “one will” or “two wills” was not a problem as yet, Honorius did not express an opinion on it. His statement in the early part of his first letter, “whence, also, we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ,” as we have tried to show, did not necessarily mean an expression of belief in “one will” nor an approval of the use of such a formula. This proposal of Sergius, which was drawn up by him into

a formal Ecthesis in the year 634, four years before its publication in the year 638,”" was primarily intended to pacify the Dyophysites. We may reasonably assume that Cyrus tried to put it into effect even before its publication and we may also reasonably assume that it roused opposition on the part of the Monophysites. For after all, they had agreed to the Egyptian

Union of 633 on the condition that the Dyophysites should use the expression “one operation”; now this condition was revoked and they were asked to abide by the union and be satisfied with what was held out to them as a concession on the part of the Dyophysites in not using the expression “two operations.” But to them this was no concession. For the Dyophysites, they must have argued, had never used the expression

“two operations” as formal confessions of faith; it was only as a result of their union with the Monophysites that those among them who were against that union, with Sophronius at their head, began to demand the use of that expression. The union was thus in danger of breaking up, and Cyrus and Sergius and Heraclius tried to prevent it. A new concession, they must have felt, had to be made to the Monophysites, one more tangible than the mere avoidance on the part of Dyophysites 77H, § 299; M, X, 992-997; Hahn, § 234.

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of the use of the expression “two operations,” and so in 636, two years before the publication of the Ecthesis, Sergius added to it a new clause, in which the use of the expression “one will” was to be made mandatory. Evidently, he was assured that this new clause would pacify the Monophysites. While primarily the insertion of this new clause about “one will” in the Ecthesis was, as it would seem, for the purpose of satisfying the Monophysites, Sergius must have also felt that it would meet with no opposition on the part of the Dyophysites, and this probably for the following reasons: To begin with, in its external form the clause could be taken to mean not so much an assertion of the existence of one will

in Jesus as a denial of the existence of two contradictory wills in him. To this, he must have felt, no Dyophysite could object. Then, it is possible that Sergius honestly believed that his clause about the confession of one will represented not only the view of Honorius, who explicitly said, “whence, also, we

confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ,” 7° but also the view of Sophronius. For nowhere in his letter does Sophronius exlicitly mention two wills and there are certain phrases he uses in it which lend themselves to the interpretation of a belief in one will. In fact, on the basis of the statements we have quoted above, that the incarnate Logos “gave to the human nature, when He would, time to work and to suffer that which is proper to it,” so that “He suffered and acted and worked himself when He himself willed . . . and not when the natural and carnal movements willed to be naturally moved to operation,” *? Dorner arrives at the conclusion that “Sophronius,

with whatever zeal he might assert the duality of the operations, placed above them the will of the hypostatsis . . . In reality, therefore, if not in words, he posits one will... a duality of wills he never mentions.” ®° If Dorner could interpret Sophronius as believing in one will, why could not Sergius *° Cf. above p. 480.

* Cf. above p. 476.

* Dorner, ELPC, Il, p. 213 (Eng. Il, 1, p. 173).

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have done so? Evidence that such was Sergius’ understanding of Sophronius’ words is to be found in Sergius’ own letter and Ecthesis, in both of which he makes use of the very same words

of Sophronius, attributing them to the Fathers. Just as Sophronius, in the passage quoted, says that the incarnate nature

“gave to the human nature, when He would (éze #Oede), time to work . . . and worked humanly when He himself willed

(€BeBovdnro),” so also Sergius says that the human nature fulfills its natural movement only when (éadre) . . . God the Logos willed (7Bovdero).” 3 But contrary to what we may assume to have been Sergius’ expectation, not only was the original demand of Sophronius for the use of the expression “two operations” not silenced, but also a new demand for the use of the expression “two wills” was raised. The problem of Monenergism was thus transformed into a problem of Monotheletism. In our analysis so far of the documents which deal with the controversy during its Monenergistic period, namely, the nine anathematisms of Cyrus, the letter and the Ecthesis of Sergius, the letters of Honorius, and the references to the still earlier

events found in the Disputation of Maximus with Pyrrhus, we have tried to show how uncertain it is whether Cyrus demanded actually a belief in one operation or only the use of the expression “one operation,” how Sophronius understood Cyrus’ seventh anathematism to mean an actual belief in one operation, how he himself believed in two operations but how

doubtful it is whether he believed in two wills or in one will, how Sergius actually believed in one operation, and how Honorius, though agreeing with Sergius on the avoidance of

the expression “two operations,” actually believed in two operations and also how, though he uses the expression “we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ,” he may have actually believed in two wills. We must confess, however, that the texts are vague enough to lend themselves to other interpretations. Some readers of the same documents may perhaps 9H, § 295 (III, 144; V, 26); § 299 (III, 180; V, 64); M, XI, 536 a; 996 c.

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be more certain about a belief in one operation on the part of Cyrus or a belief in two wills on the part of Sophronius or a belief in one operation and one will on the part of Honortus, while others may perhaps consider the entire controversy as merely a dispute over a verbal formula. To the impartial reader it would seem that, irrespective of what these particular

documents might mean, those who aligned themselves on the side of the Monenergists represented various views, some of them actually believing in one operation and others only advocating the use of the expression one operation, and among the

former, not all those who confessed a belief in one operation, conceived of that unity of operation in the same way. Similarly later, with the introduction of the Monothelete stage of the controversy, not all who placed themselves on the side of the Monotheletes were of exactly the same view. There was among them a fluctuation between a verbal Monotheletism and a real Monotheletism as well as a fluctuation between various kinds of real Monotheletisms. An illustration of such fluctuations among those who counted themselves as Monotheletes may be found in the Disputation of Maximus Confessor with Pyrrhus of Constanti-

nople, which took place in the year 645. When the disputation opens Pyrrhus represents himself as one who, while a follower of the orthodox doctrine of two natures and one person, does not believe that the doctrine of two natures means also a doctrine of two wills, a divine and a human will, corresponding to the divine and the human

nature. He insists that there was in Jesus only one will, a divine will. He moreover raises a series of objections against the belief in two wills. Will, he assumes at the start, is a matter

of person and not of nature, and since there is in Jesus one person there must be in him one will.** Furthermore, two wills presuppose two willers.** Still further, reflecting Sergius’ statements in his letter and in his Ecthesis, as well as the statement * H, § 303; M, X, 709-760; PG 91, 286-353. *M, X, 712 c; PG g1, 289 c.

°°M, X, 712 A; PG 91, 289 A,

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of Honorius, he argues that “‘it is not possible that there should be in one person two wills that do not contradict each other.” *° Then, granting with Maximus for the sake of argument that “the willing is a matter of nature,” ** he raises other objections. First, saints are said by the Fathers to have one will with God, and consequently they would have to be of the same nature as God.*" Second, men are observed to change their will, and consequently they would have to be assumed to change also their nature.** Third, evidently having in mind Aristotle’s statement that to work in accordance with nature and impulse may be described as necessity,*® he says that “what is natural is entirely necessary” and consequently argues that, by assuming will to be a matter of nature, there will be in

Jesus two natural wills and, being natural, each of them will be necessary, and thus Jesus would be deprived of freedom.*° Maximus answers all these objections one by one. His answer to the last objection, which is of especial interest philosophically, is rather short. All he says is that, if it were true that “what is natural is entirely necessary,” then it would

follow that God who is “God by nature, good by nature, creator by nature” would be “God and good and creator by necessity.”*tOn the face of it, Maximus would seem to reject outright the Aristotelian statement that “what is natural is entirely necessary,” and this on the ground that it is incompatible with the Christian conception of God. But we shall try to show that what Maximus does here is not to reject this Aristotelian statement but rather to explain what Aristotle means by it. His argument may be restated as follows: Pyrrhus’ statement that

“what is natural is entirely necessary” is not altogether true; it is true only in part. For it reflects only one part of a statement of Aristotle upon which it is based. The full statement of Aristotle reads as follows: “Necessity is of two kinds, one accord-

ing to nature and impulse, another by compulsion and contrary 3 M, X, 712 E; PG 91, 292 A. 0M, X, 713 tes PG 91, 292 B.

5" Tbid. * M, X, 713 c; PG 91, 292 D.

%® Anal. Post. Il, 11, 94b, 37-958, 1. 9M, X, 713 E; PG 91, 293 B.

“ M, X, 716 B; PG 91, 293 c.

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to impulse; as, for instance, by necessity a stone is borne both upwards and downwards, but not by the same necessity.”* Necessity, according to Aristotle, then, means either to act by compulsion contrary to one’s own nature or to act according

to one’s own nature without any compulsion. Now, argues Maximus, necessity in the sense of acting under compulsion is

the opposite of freedom, but necessity in the sense of acting in accordance with one’s own nature and without any compulsion is the highest kind of freedom. This kind of freedom which follows from the necessity of one’s own nature, he continues his argument, differs from the freedom of choice which is ordi-

narily attributed by philosophers to men,** for freedom of choice implies a decision between two conflicting natures in the agent, whereas freedom which follows from the necessity of one’s own nature implies no conflict of natures in the agent, and this in either of two senses, either because there is in the agent only one nature, as in the case of God, or because the two natures in the agent are always in harmony with each

other, as was the case of Jesus. It is this highest kind of freedom in the first sense, he concludes, that God is said to possess when he is said to act in accordance with His own simple nature and similarly it is this highest kind of freedom in the sec-

ond sense that Jesus is said to have possessed when he is said to have acted always in accordance with the will of the divine nature within him, with which the will of the human nature within him always harmonized.** Hereupon Pyrrhus becomes convinced by Maximus’ arguments. He gives up his original view that there was in Jesus only one divine will. He concedes that “there are in Christ natural wills.” *® But still he wants to show that these natural wills, though two, may be regarded as one and should there-

fore be spoken of as one. He says: “Just as out of two natures ” Anal. Post. Il, 11, 94b, 37-958, 3. “Cf. Philo, I, pp. 424-462.

“Tt is for this reason that John of Damascus says that in God and in Jesus there is no deliberation

(Sovdj)

Orth. II, 22 (PG 94, 945 c-948 c),

and no choice

(mpoatpecis). Cf. De Fide

*M, X, 716 c; PG 91, 296 a.

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we acknowledge some composite one thing (é 7 otvOerov) so also out of two natural wills may we acknowledge some composite one thing. Therefore they who, because of the natural distinction of natures in Christ, acknowledge two wills and they who, because of the closest union, acknowledge one will should not quarrel with one another over mere words.” *° In this passage, then, Pyrrhus quite clearly presents himself as a different kind of Monothelete, contending no longer for

the existence of only one will in Jesus, but rather for the privilege of merely using the expression one will. His justification for his request of this privilege, however, requires an explana-

tion. Ostensibly what he says is this: Just as “we,” that is to say, we who believe in two natures, acknowledge “some one composite thing” out of the two natures, so also should we

acknowledge “some one composite thing” out of two wills. But what does that “some one composite thing” out of two

natures, which the Dyophysites are said to acknowledge, mean? It could not mean, as at first sight it would seem to mean, that out of the two natures they acknowledge one composite nature, for the expression “composite nature,” as we

have seen, was used by Apollinaris *7 and Severus *° as a description of their respective Monophysite views and Maximus

has explicitly rejected the use of the expression “‘composite nature.” *° Since it could not mean a “composite nature,” it must necessarily mean a “composite person.” What therefore the statement means is that those who believe in two natures acknowledge one composite person, that is to say, one person composed of two natures. Taken in this sense, it reflects the expression “according to composition” (xara otvfeow), which is used in the fourth of the fourteen anathematisms of the Fifth

Oecumenical Council at Constantinople (533) as a description of the union of “God the Word with the flesh” into one person.” It is exactly in this sense that the expression “‘accord46 M, X, 716 cp; PG, 91, 296 AB. “ Cf, above p. 443, n. 36. * Cf. above p. 450, n. 71. Fpist. XIII (PG g1, 517 c f.).

° Cf. above p. 418.

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FATHERS

ing to composition” of the Fifth Oecumenical Council is paraphrased by Eniperor Justinian in his Second Edict against the Three Chapters. He says: “If we say that Christ is composed (cvvberos) of two natures, that is, Godhead and manhood, we bring no confusion into this unity; and if we recognize in each of the two natures, that is, Godhead and manhood, the

one Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God incarnate and made man, we bring no separation nor partition nor division into this unity.” ** Again: “Even after the Incarnation, He is one of the Holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, composed (ovvOeros) of both natures.”? Again: “We may therefore speak of a composite one hypostasis of God the Word (piav imécracww 70d Geod Aéyou octivOerov), but

not of a composite one nature (piav diow ovvberov).” * In the light of this, the argument of Pyrrhus may be unfolded to read as follows: I now admit that there are two wills as there are two natures. But just as all of us who believe in two natures agree that, on account of the harmony between them, these two natures have some underlying thing in common, which in this case happens to be a common underlying person, whom we describe as “‘a composite one person,” that is to say, one person composed of two natures, so also all of us who believe in two wills should, on account of the harmony between them, similarly agree that these two wills have some underlying thing in common, which in this case should be regarded as a sort of common underlying will, to be described, after the analogy of the expression “a composite one person” as “a composite one will,” that is to say, one common will composed of two individual wills. Consequently, concludes Pyrrhus, inasmuch as the two wills in which we all believe form a sort of composite one will, we should be allowed to speak either of two wills or of one will, the difference between these two expressions being only verbal. © Hy. § 263) (1, 837; TV,.270)s MTX,

941 ap.

@ H, § 263 (Il, 837; IV, 271);_M, LX, 544.p. ° H, § 263 (II, 838; IV, 272); M, IX, 556 8.

THE

MYSTERY

OF THE

INCARNATION

489

In his answer, Maximus tries to show why, under the belief in two wills, we cannot justify the use of the expression one will on the ground that we mean thereby something which is one but is composed of two wills or a sort of composite one will. He says: “You see that you are mistaken because of the fact that you do not quite know that composition takes place only in things which are in the hypostasis, but not in things which are in another . . . If you assume a composition of the wills, you would also be forced to assume a composition of all the other properties of the natures, . . . namely, of the created with the uncreated, of the finite with the infinite, of the determinate with the indeterminate, of the mortal with the immortal, of the corruptible with the incorruptible.” Then in answer to Pyrrhus’ question, “Have not these properties of the natures, like the natures themselves, anything in common?” Maximus says, “No, they have nothing in common, except the one hypostasis.”’ * What Maximus means to say is this. There is only one thing which can be said to be common to the two wills, and that is

the one hypostasis, for, inasmuch as the two wills exist in the two natures and the two natures exist in the one hypostasis,

the two wills may be said to exist in the one hypostasis through the intermediacy of the two natures. Besides the one hypostasis, there is nothing else which is common to the two wills and with reference to which the two wills can be spoken of as one will. Consequently, concludes Maximus, the two wills, to be sure, like the two natures, can be spoken of as being in one hypostasis; but, just as the two natures can nowise be spoken of as one nature, so the two wills can nowise be spoken of as one will. In this, Maximus reflects the statement we have

quoted above from Emperor Justinian’s Second Edict against the Three Chapters that, while we may speak of “a composite one hypostasis,” we cannot speak of “a composite one nature.” While Pyrrhus, who was the successor of Sergius as patriarch of Constantinople, was still fluctuating between two * H, § 303 (III, 192; V, 76); M, X, 716 DE; PG 91, 296 Bc.

490

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

kinds of Monotheletism, a real and a verbal, his successor in the patriarchate, named Paul, in his Typus °° which was published by Emperor Constans II, in 648, envisages only one kind of Monotheletism, that which we have described as real. The

purpose of the Typus was to put an end to the Monothelete phase of the controversy by prohibiting the use of both the expression “one will” and the expression “two wills,” just as

in 638 the Ecthesis tried to put an end to the Monenergistic

phase of the controversy by prohibiting the use of both the expression “one operation” and the expression “two operations.” In that document, the Monotheletes are represented not as those who merely advocated the use of the expression

“one will” but rather as those who believed that in Jesus there actually existed one will. They are described as those who “recognized and maintained only one will” and as those “who

have hitherto taught one will and one operation.” With the failure of the Typus to establish peace, the controversy continued to 681, when the Monotheletes were anathematized at the Sixth Oecumenical Council at Constantinople. In the interval, the Monotheletes, while still insisting upon the belief in one will, and not merely upon the use of the expression one will, would seem to have given up the belief in one operation as well as the demand of the use of the expression one operation. This may be gathered from the following facts. First, at the second session of the Sixth Oecumenical

Council, in answer to all challenge by the papal legates, Macarius of Antioch, the spokesman of the Monotheletes, said “I do not speak of two operations” and “I use no word of number (one or two) in regard to the operation, but teach with Dio-

nysius the Areopagite the theandric operation,” and when asked what he meant by “theandric operation,” he said: “I form no judgment on the subject.”°®But while he refused to commit himself on the problem of operation, he spoke out boldly on the problem of will. Second, at the eighth session, when asked *H, § 306; M, X, 1029-1032. ° Hi, § 316 (III, 264; V, 153-154); M, XI, 221 B.

THE

MYSTERY

OF THE

INCARNATION

491

whether he would admit that in Jesus there were “two natural operations and two natural wills,” >” he answered: “I do not say two wills or two operations . . . but one hypostatic will and a theandric operation.”**Note the omission of the term “one” with reference to operation. Third, in his Ecthesis or Confession of Faith, which was read at the same session, while, with

reference to operation, he merely quotes the words of Dionysius the Areopagite by describing it as “a new theandric operation,” °° which, as we have seen, may mean two similar and harmonious operations,® with reference to will, he describes it as “the one and only divine will,”* saying explicitly

that he rejects in Jesus not only two contending wills but also two “similar (émova) wills.”®? Fourth, when, at the sixteenth session, the priest Constantine of Apama proposed a mediation doctrine to the effect that “there were two operations, since these belonged to the properties of the two natures of Christ,

but there was in Christ only one personal will, that of the

Logos, and with this a atural will, the human,”® he thought that this was also the doctrine of Macarius.** The theory underlying this distinction between will ad operation, as it unfolds itself in Macarius’ own Ecthesis,*° may be restated as follows. Will, according to him, is a matter of person and not of nature, a contention which was maintained by Pyrrhus of Alexandria in his disputation with Maximus the

Confessor.** And since there was only one person in Jesus, that of the Logos, there was also one will in him. The case of operation, however, is different. The will in Jesus, which is one in the sense that it is only the will of the divine nature in him, operates through the medium of both the divine and the human nature in him. There are therefore really two operations, corresponding to the two natures through which the one 7M, 5M, OM, SE

XI, 345 v. ~Cf. above p. 474. XI, 345 E; cf. 349 ¢. M, XI, 353 D. NL 353°C. ° Ibid. esea2 Telly 282 Viet 72 073) MeL Ol7aDs

AFI loc. cite: IM Xd. 62016;

% H, § 317; M, XI, 353 c-357 4.

* Cf. above p. 484.

492

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

will operates. They are regarded as one operation only because of the union and harmony between them, and this on account of the union and harmony of their corresponding two natures. This, then, is the development of the problem of will and operation in the Monenergistic and Monothelete controversies. But besides the difference in doctrine between the exponents of the two sides of the controversy, there is also a noticeable difference between them in their respective attitudes towards the view of their opponents. The Monenergists and, following them, the Monotheletes, with all their insistence upon their

own particular belief, still considered the entire problem as one on which a diversity of opinion could be tolerated by the Church, just as a diversity of opinion was tolerated by the Church on the question of a single stage or a twofold stage theory of the Logos.® This attitude, which is so evident in Cyrus and Honorius and in all the other writings on the side of Monenergism and Monotheletism, is dramatically exemplified in the proposal submitted by Theodore of Melitene, probably under the inspiration of Macarius, at the eighth session of the Sixth Oecumenical Council, to the effect that neither side make the other heretical, whether it teaches two operations and wills or only one operation and will, inasmuch as both sides cited patristic passages in support of their respective views.°®

The Dyotheletes, however, insisted that the belief in two wills and two operations was the only true interpretation of the Chalcedonian doctrine of two natures, and that the denial of this belief was to be considered as heretical as the denial of the belief in two natures. Thus in the Disputation between

Pyrrhus of Constantinople and Maximus the Confessor in 445, Pyrrhus asks: “What have I, or what has my predecessor (the Patriarch Sergius) done to you that you everywhere decry us as heretics?” To this Maximus answers: “You have violated the Christian dogma.” ® At the first session of the Lateran Council, Pope Martin I denounced the teaching of one will * Cf, above p. 217. Silly § 303) (Loo

SElnsa3t7)

(i 267 5eVieeis

7) pave

Ven7a)) M, X, 709 A; PG g1, 288 B.

leas

THE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION

493

contained in the Typus as being “against the faith.”*° Similarly at the first session of the Sixth Oecumenical Council, the papal legates denounced the expression one operation and one will as “a novelty contrary to the orthodox belief.” ™* The Christian doctrine to which the belief in one operation and one will was held to be contrary was, of course, the Chalcedonian creed of two natures, which to their way of thinking implied also a belief in two wills and two operations. And so whenever the Dyotheletes came together, first at the Lateran Council in

649,"" then at the Council at Milan in 680,” and finally at the eighteenth session of the Sixth Oecumenical Council at Constantinople in 681,’* the Chalcedonian creed about the two natures was emended to include the creed about two natural wills and two natural operations, though always with the expected qualification, as phrased on the last of these three occasions, that “the two natural wills are not opposed to each other . . . but His human will follows, and it does not resist and oppose, but rather is subject to, the divine and almighty

will,” ° with the understanding, of course, that its being subject to the divine will does not imply compulsion. Having thus emended the Chalcedonian creed, this Sixth Oecumenical Council clinched the matter by concluding that “no one is allowed to bring forward, that is to say, to write down or to compose or to think or in some other way to teach another be-

lief. Those who venture to compose another belief . . . shall, if bishops or clerics, be deposed, the former from their bishopric and the latter from their clericity, but, if monks or laymen, shall be anathematized.” “° 7M, VE ? H, H,

X, 880 a. M2137. § 307; M, X, 1150 p; Hahn, § 181 (p. 238, n. 510). § 313; M, XI, 208 as; Hahn, § 183 (p. 250).

* H, § 322; M, XI, 637 aB; Hahn, § 149 (p. 173); Denzinger, §§ 290-291. % M, XI, 637 c; Hahn, Joc. cit., Denzinger, § 291. 7° M, XI, 640 Bc; Hahn, § 149 (p. 174); Denzinger, § 293.

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PART FOUR THE ANATHEMATIZED

CHAPTER

XVII

GNOSTICISM I. VERBAL CHRISTIANIZING OF PAGANISM

From the early part of the second century Christianity began to use the term catholic (xafoduxy) as a description of its church (éxx«dynota).* At first, it was used in the sense of the Christian church in general as distinguished from the particular or local Christian churches. Used in this sense, it reflected

Philo’s use of the expression “more universal polity” (7 kaBodukwtépa mrohureta) * as a description of the entire Jewish nation of his time as distinguished from any local Jewish community such as Alexandria which he describes simply as a polity.* But gradually the term “catholic” came to be used

in the sense of true as opposed to false, on the assumption that what was believed by Christians in all their churches constituted the true doctrine of Christianity. Used in this sense, it was analogous to the Stoic argument for the existence of God from the common consent of all men.* *Cf. J. B. Lightfoot, “The Epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans,” VIII, in his The Apostolic Fathers, Vol. Il, 1, p. 310, n.; J. H. Maude, “Catholicism, Catholicity,” ERE, III, 258-261. * Legat. 29, 194. * Ibid. 44, 349. Cf. Philo, Il, p. 432. * Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I, 16, 43 ff.; Seneca, Epist. 117, 6.

496

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

The conception of catholicity in this latter sense was already common in Christianity by the middle of the second century. It is reflected in the confessions of faith and the rules of faith to which the Fathers from that time on refer as universally accepted and hence as constituting the true belief of Christianity. In our analysis of these rules of faith eae the framework ofthe Philonic eight scriptural presuppositions,” we have found that its purely Christian element consisted of ‘two main beliefs: first, the belief in a preéxistent Christ, called ‘Logos, and with it also the belief in a preéxistent Holy Spirit;

~second, the belief in the incarnation of that_preéxistent Christ “in_Jesus. With regard to the first of these two main beliefs, while some phases of it had not yet received by that time their final formulation,® the following phases had already been generally accepted: (1) that the Logos and the Holy Spirit were both real personal beings, as real as God the Father himself; (2) that both the Logos and the Holy Spirit were to be worshiped as God the Father himself, one of them, the Logos, already formally called God, and the other, the Holy Spirit, well on its way to being called God;* and (3) that despite the fact that the Father and the Logos and the Holy Spirit_ were |

‘three real and distinct personal beings, of the first two each|L ~ E|already called God and all of them to be equally worshiped, [ they constituted one single God. With regard to the second /of the two main beliefs, it was already generally. recognized |

‘that what the i incarnation meant was that in Jesus, who was a, “real human being, there were two natures, a divine and a hu-|

‘man, but that of these two natures, only the divine ‘nature was | “Jalso a person, so that the oro natures in Jesus constituted, as the, “saying goes, one leperson.® ' These two main beliefs of Christianity had grown up gradu-

allyin successive stages. They started with the belief that Jesus, who, as narrated in the Synoptic Gospels, lived and preached

“and died amongthe Jews, was the promisedJewish Messiah.® ° Cf. above pp. 80 ff. * Cf. above pp. 183-191.

* Cf. above pp. 242-244. ° Cf. above pp. 364-372.

° Cf. above p: 155.

GNOSTICISM

497

yl ‘

¥

To this belief in Jesus as the promised Messiah Pauladded the, hf.) Sar belief in apreéxistent }Messiah, of whom the born J. Jesus was_an|. petDae

earthly revelation, Just_as the Law of Moses was =the earthly ons hy ‘revelation of a preéxistent Law. This preéxistent Messiah is

“explicitly referred to by Paul as wisdom, but undoubtedly it is ”

oo

also this preéxistent Messiah that he has reference to when he uses the term Spirit or Holy Spirit.1° Then two new versions ee ip of Paul’s conce tions of th e preéxistent Messiah_ appeared, One fortg was introduced by the gentile converts to Christianity and is to be found in the prologues to the Gospels of Matthew and .& ) HeyG Luke. ‘Taking Paul’s Holy Spirit to refer to the preéxistent|vvdewtif

Messiah, these two prologues present the revelation of thar oe wt preéxistent Messiah in the earthly Jesus as meaning that Jesus5Reokealn -

was conceived of the Holy Spirit.11 The other was apts eee 4 doh, by John, and is to be found in the prologue to his Gospel. | Taking the term wisdom, which Paul explicitly applies to the preéxistent Christ, he subscirates for it the term as which tyvadom = Aoy'r in Philo is used as _synonymous with wisdom, and, takking the term Holy Spirit, the relation of which tothe preéxistent _Mes-_ siah in Paul is not clearly defined, he uses it, after Philo, as a_

being distinct from the Logos.” Gradually, by a process iG the nit harmonization of the Synoptic Gospels and the Epistles of Paul|\UM “ualA and the prologues to Matthew and Luke and the prologue to \(>p/? 0. John, the catholic conceptions of the preéxistent Christ and )Sampt bie Q : the incarnation assumed the form which is to be found in the |Op a y writings |of the Apologists at about the middle of the second | century." i

But by the time Christianity arose in Palestinian Judaism and the Philonic philosophy was being formed

in Alexandrian

Judaism, syncretisms of the various kinds of heathenism had been in the process of formation ever since the conquests of Alexander everywhere in the Hellenistic world. Polytheisms of all kinds, Egyptian, Greek, Phrygian, Babylonian, and Persian, combined themselves into new forms of religion. Un* Cf. above p. 164. “ Cf. above pp. 168 ff.

Cf. above pp. 177 ff. * Cf. above pp. 183 ff.; 192 ff.; 232 ff.

498

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

doubtedly with philosophically trained pagans some syncretisms had taken on some philosophic form and possible that on the fringes of the Jewish world some syncretisms, in their contact with Judaism, had taken

of these it is also of these on some

Jewish form. And so during the century following the apos-

of his teachof Paul, when the variousinterpretations tolate

Christ and the incarnation ings with regard to the preéxistent “were being advanced by. the authors_of the prologuesto

and Luke, by John, and by the Apostolic Fathers, fol Matthew “Towers of these various syncretisms came upon Christianity. Adopting its two beliefs of the preéxistent Christ and the In-

carnation, they either mounted them upon certain syncretisms already formed or proceeded to form new Christianized syncretisms of their own. The result was that by the middle of the second century, when the catholic formulation of these two Christian beliefs reached its completion, other formula_tions of these two beliefs by the followers of these syncretic religions had already made their appearance. | The followers of these new Christianized syncretisms are

_ known as Gnostics.* The term gnosis, “knowledge,” upon which the term Gnostics is based, had been used in the sense

of a higher knowledge in pagan as well as in Jewish and Christian writings. In Plato, the term gmosis is used in the sense

of the knowledge of theideas.’® “The magical papyri,” we are * Literature: H. L. Mansel, The Gnostic Heresies of the First and Second Centuries (1875); W. Anz, Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung des Gnostizismus (1897); W. Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis (1907); E. Buonaiuti,

Lo Gnosticismo

(1907); E. de Faye, Gnostiques

et Gnosticisme

(1913,

1925"); F. Legge, Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity (1915); H. Leisegang, Die Gnosis (1924); F. C. Burkitt, Church and Gnosis (1932); H. Jonas, Die mythologische Gnosis (1934); R. P. Casey, “The Study of Gnosticism,” Journal of Theological Studies, 36 (1935), 45-60; J. Dupont, Gnosis: La Connaissance Religieuse dans les Epitres de Saint Paul (1949); M. P. Nilsson, Geschichte der griechischen Religion, Il (1950), pp: 586-596; J. Quasten, Patrology, I (1950), pp. 234-277; A. D. Nock, Discussion of (1) R. Bultmann’s Das Urchristentum in Rabmen der antiken Religionen, in Nuntius, 5 (1951), pp. 35-40, and of (2) the Jung Codex translated and edited by F. L. Cross, to be published in JTS for 1956, R. Bultmann, “Gnosis,” JTS, N'S., 3 (1952), pp. 10-26; R. M. Grant, (1) “The Earliest Christian Gnosticism,” Church History, 22 (1953), pp. 81-97; (2) “Gnosis Revisited,” ibid. 23 (1954), pp. 36-45. * Rep. VI, 508 E.

GNOSTICISM

499

told, “describe their contents as gnosis.” 1° “In the lannguage of the mystery religions,” we are also told, “the word gnosis aas q “sumes a peculiar and technical meaning.Te I is the gnosis. Theou

ne

qo

—the knowledge byt means ‘of which man_is.able to—resist. the. ae esent

evil influence of destiny (heimarmene) and which makes no longer a hylic (hyle = matter) |or even a payshiebeing, but, “higher ~still,a_pneumatic — a ‘being purel,y_spiritual (pneuz matikos).”*" In the Old Testament various forms of the termi ywoéoxw occur in the sense of a knowledge of God or of a superior kind of knowledge in general, such for instance as “full knowledge (értyvwois) of God”;** “knowing (yvdvar) the Lord”; 1° “thy not knowing (yvévat) Me”;*°“know (yv80:)

the Lord”;** “know (yv6.) the God of thy fathers”;*?“that you may know (yvére) and believe (auoredonre) and understand (ovvre) that I am”;** “knowing (yvdvar) the glory of

God”;*4 and “wisdom (codia) and knowledge (yvacus).””° Both these types of sources, the scriptural and the pagan, as to

the use of the term gnosis are reflected in the New Testament. Such

expressions

as “the full knowledge

(ériyvwous)

of

God”;”¢ “the full knowledge (émiyvwous) of the Son of God”; *

“knowing (yvdvres) God”;**“know (yvaéx) the Lord”; “the knowledge (yracus) of God”;*° “the knowledge (yvéors) of Christ’”’;*! “we have believed (wemurrevcapnev) and know (éyvéxapev) that thou art the Holy One of God”;* “we know

(éyvéxapev)

and

have

believed

(memovrevkapev)”;**

“the

knowledge (yvdo1s) of the glory of God”;** “the wisdom 1% EF. Scott, “Gnosticism,” ERE, VI, 231». “FE. Buonaiuti, Fragmenti gnostici, p. 6 (Eng. p. 33). 2 FI0s.c4:1;.6:6; Prov. 275.

eo lsan ett; ® Jer: 22216.

1 Chron. 28:9. = Isa. 43:10.

* Jer. 31:33 (34). * Eccles.

Hab. 2:14.

1:16, 173_2:21, 26. On the currency of the use_of the term.

“\nowledge” in-a technical sense_among Jews, see W. D.Davies, “‘Knowl-. €dge’ in

the Dead Sea Scrolls and |Matthew

Review, 46 Ce ye 113-13 BCol vito u- ets an DN, 4: 13. >Romats21. * FAlebs 8311.

11:25-30,” ” Harvard. Theological

Trea ON, 1015s Clk Pee, Lak Phil. 3:8;cf. 1 Pet. 1:2, 8; 2:20; 3:18. * John 6:69. $7 John 4:16. * 2 Cor. 4:6.

ye & 1S

Ona

500

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

(codia) and the knowledge (ywdors) of God”;*°and “wisdom (codia) and knowledge (yvdors)” ** reflect the Old Testament use of gnosis, but such expressions as “knowledge (yvdous) puffeth up”;*” “the knowledge (yvéors) which is falsely so called” ** refer to a gnosis borrowed from pagan sources.

The term gnosticos, “Gnostic,” however, as_a_description _ of a group of people who claimed to possessa special kind of

“gh bunsIs‘not. found 1in the literature of the time. except in in its its _tian ( Co ‘Evidently the term originated among the new converts to Christianity from among the syncretic pagans.”

v This may be gathered also from various statements of the iy [ F athers, where the term Gnostic is quoted as if it were of

JY S

| recent coinage. Irenaeus, speaking of certain followers of Car| pocrates, says that “they call themselves Gnostics.” *° Clement of Alexandria, speaking of the followers of Prodicus, says that “they proclaim themselves gnostics, falsely so called.” ** Ori_gen, commenting upon |Celsus’ statement that some Christians

maintain that their God is different fifrom. that of the Jews, de“scribes them_as “some who call themselves Gnostics.”ied) 8sFie polytus, speaking of the Naassenes, says that “they called

themselves Gnostics, alleging that they alone knew (ywdoxeww) the depths (7a Ba0n).” *° Even if we areto take the Gnostics_ referred to by Porphyry and criticized -d by Plotinus tc to be non-

“Christian Gnostics,‘* it_is_still_true_to. sayry_that no. group of * Rom. 11:33. sColoaes:

“1 Cor; 82. 1 Tim. 6:20.

* Cf. R. A. Lipsius, “Der alteste Gebrauch des Gnostikernamens,” in his Die Quellen der aeltesten Ketzergeschichte, pp. 190-225; J. Matter, Histoire critique du Gnosticisme, I, p 48. ““Trenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 25, 6; cf. Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. XXVII, 6. * Strom. Ill, 4°° (PG 8, 1136 a). “” Cont. Cels. V, 61. “ Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer. V, 6, 4; cf. V, 10, 11. “See comment on the Gnostics of Plotinus and on the opening sentence of Porphyry’s Plotini Vita 16 by Bousset in his Hauptprobleme der Gnosis, pp. 186-187. Porphyry’s opening sentence, however, is taken to refer to Christian Gnostics in the following translations of his Plotini Vita: Latin (Ficino), English (Guthrie, Mackenna), French (Miller, Harder), Italian ( peRTOT:

(Bouillet, Bréhier), German

GNOSTICISM

501

people prior to the rise of Christian Gnosticism are known to_ |ae ie have been called Gnostics.

|paren ist 2 6

The name Gnostics was w thus adopted by these new Chris-

Arthrtegy

_tians because of a special kind of gnosis \which they claimed to4 Lt

possess. This special kind of gnosis was a new syncretism. of|.fei)se io their old_ pagan_ gnosis and fei newly acquired Christian!

ne

gnosis, which ‘they.described as a gnosis of the‘depths” and for_, ie “es7a2 ; “the possession of which they held themselves superior to others, "Boem abywr The others to whom they held themselves superior by reason. ofl iw os i

of this claim to the possession of a knowledge of the depths @. pie de must have been Jews and Christians and philosophers alike, “' et for all of these are to be found to have made certain assertions_ | oi _ with regard to a_ knowledge «of. of depths, 1towhich assertions the. Gnostic claim _may be taken to refer. The Jews openly disclaimed any knowledge of depth, for, referring to God, Scripture says, “Thy thoughts are very deep (€éGabivOncav)”;* “deeper (8aftrepa) than the nether-world; what canst thou (man) know?” ** and, referring to wisdom, Scrip-

ture again says, “It is a deep depth (Ba) Bdfos), who psgone % yy find it out?” “” Againstthis Jewish admission of an ignorance | / Jopths of the deep thoughts of God and of the deep depths of wisdom. lo ) yvwe | the Gnostics claimedthatthey had aknowledge of the depths. | Geol a Christians, indeed, did claim a knowledge of depths, for Paul,|Sapra who in one place, reéchoing the Old Testament sentiment, , O°09 0 of says, “O the depths ((Bd8os) of the riches both of the wisdom ©a and the knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!” ** in another place proclaims, “But unto us God revealed them through the Spirit:

for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the depths (8dé@n) of God.” * Against this claim of the Christians that now all of them possess a knowledge of the depths of God the Gnostics argued that it was only they to whom God had revealed the depths through the Spirit. And as for the Gnostic claim of superiority to philosophers, we SIP SHO2: ONG5)) * Job 11:8.

“Beccles 324. “6 Rom. 11:33.

have Porphyry’s testimony Sat Coro 10:

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that the Gnostics “deceived a great many people, and even deceived themselves, into believing that Plato had not pene-

trated into the depth (800s) of the intelligible essence (vonrijs ovaias).” ®° The implication here that Plato did claim to have penetrated into the depths of the intelligible essence undoubtedly has reference to Plato’s declaration that he would give a true description of that “of which no poet here ever yet

sang nor ever will sing,” namely, “the supercelestial place” where abides “the truly existent essence (ovcia)” which is “visible only to the intelligence (v@).” °* What the Gnostics

did, then, was to arrogate to themselves that knowledge ‘of of t the de;pths“which, according to the Hebrew Scripture, ispastf find“ing out, but which, according 1to Paul, God throughtthe Holy _ Spirit causes to be. revealed to every true believer_ in n Christ _

_and, according to Plato, reveals itself to every_true. philosopher. It is against this arrogation to themselves of the knowledge of the depths that the Book of Revelation alludes to the Gnostics

as those who know “the deep things (ra Baféa) of Satan.” °? In a similar way the Gnostics also arrogated to themselves the term “spiritual.” According to Paul, the term spiritual

(xvevparucds) applies to him who has a true knowledge of Christ,”* in contrast to the term psychical (vxuKds) ** or carnal (capxuxés),°° which is to be applied to him who has not a true knowledge of Christ. he Gnostics, however, in their formal

division of men into three classes, the spiritual (avevparixdv), the earthly (xotxov), and the psychical (yuxuxdv),°* arrogated the term “spiritual” to themselves. As for the other two terms, it would seem that they applied the term “psychical” to the

ordinary Christians and the term “earthly” to the Jews and © Plotini Vita 16. * Phaedr. 247¢ 23~ Rev. 2:24; cf. commentaries ad loc. Corea sr5ets “1 Cor. 2:14. On the origin of the contrast between spiritual and psychical in Peal,see A. J. Festugiere, L’/déal Religieux des Grecs et ’Evangile (1932), pp. 212-218; J. Dupont, op. cit., pp. 172-180; to be discussed also below in Vol. II, in the chapter on the soul. peel Cor. 21k. “Irenaeus, Adv. Haer.I, 7, 5; cf. Tertullian, Adv. Valent. 29; Clement of Alexandria, Paedag. I, 6° (PG 8, 288 as).

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the heathen.” It is in answer to this arrogation to themselves

of the term “spiritual” that the Epistle of Jude, in a verse in which it alludes to the Gnostics as those “who make separa-

tions,” describes them as “psychical (ysvyuKot), having not the spirit (wvedua),” °* thus reclaiming for the ordinary Christians the term “spiritual” and hurling back at the Gnostics the term “psychical.” Gnosticism has been defined as “the acute secularizing or_ Hellenizing of o Christianity, > 59 A more accurate definition of Gnosticism, to our mind, would be that it is the verbal Christianizing of paganism. Accordingly a study of any Gnostic system would involve a twofold task: first, a study of the

origin and formation of the particular paganism, or_rather theparticular pagan syncretism, with which it started; second, a __

_studyof themanner in which it verbally Guricuana that.

__particular pagan syncretism..We shall apply ourselves to the _ second of these tasks..

Our knowledge of Gnosticism during the period of its flower in the second century, which period alone is relevant for our

purpose, is based upon the Christian polemical writings, even though recent discoveries may add to our knowledge. The main works are those of Irenaeus and Hippolytus, supplemented, whenever necessary, by the works of some other Fathers, especially those of Tertullian, Philaster, Epiphanius, and Theodoret.** With due allowance for a tendency on the

part of the Fathers to emphasize the un-Christian character of the teachings of their opponents and hence perhaps also to distort their true views, we may on the whole gather an adequate idea of what Gnosticism did with these two Christian beliefs, the preéxistent Christ_ and the Incarnation, and how 51 Cf. L. Duchesne, Histoire ancienne de I’Hagens , p. 169 (Eng. I, pp. 123-

124); Tixeront, HD, I°, p. 200 (Eng. I, p. 177); E. F. Scott, “Gnosticism,” ERE, VI, p. 235. 8 Jude 19. BCE Harnack, DG, I*, p. 250 (Eng. I, p. 226). Cf. belowp. 574,n. 121. ° Cf. The Jung Coden, by F. L. Cross es with bibliography. enSee survey of modern studies of the writings of the Church Fathers on Gnosticism in E. de Faye, “Introduction a l’étude du Gnosticisme au Ie et au Ille siécle,” Revue de lHistoire des Religion, 45 (1902), 299-319; 46 (1902), 31-57, 145-172, 363-399.

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their conceptions of these two beliefs compared with that which was considered as constituting the belief of catholic Christianity. In order to discover the common elements with regard to these two beliefs in the many systems of Gnosticism reported by the Fathers, we have selected two systems as a starting point for special analysis. In these two systems we shall try to discover what the Fathers could have seen in them of the nature of deviations from their own conception of catholic Christianity. After our analysis of the two systems, we shall study all the other systems with respect to those deviatory elements found in these two systems. As our model systems we have selected the systems of Cerinthus and Simon. In the accounts given of them by the Fathers, Simon and Cerinthus are represented aas two of the oldest Gnostics. It is quite possible that both of them are legendary figures and that systems attributed to them come from periods later than those in which those two figures are placed. But irrespective of their provenance and age, these two systems are ideal subjects as model studies for all other systems of Gnosticism, for they contain, in simplest and complete form, all the peculiar characteristics which are to be found, in complicated and incomplete form, in all the other systems. Furthermore, even if they are not as early as the Fathers have placed them, they belong to the earliest forms of Gnosticism. We shall therefore treat these two systems hypothetically as if they were two original systems, after which all other systems were deliberately modeled. In this way, we shall be able to bring out the characteristics common to all the systems of Gnosticism. et

II. CertntHus

Cerinthus is said to have been a contemporary of John,! author of the Fourth Gospel, who lived presumably toward the end of the first century. By that time the Pauline conception of Jesus in its main outline was already fully established among the greater number of Christians. There was a preéxist* Cf. below n. 4.

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ent Christ, identified with the Holy Spirit, by whom all things

came into being and who, in the birth of Jesus, was made in. the likeness of man.” Both Cerinthus and John, we may assume,. set out to rewrite this Pauline conception of ‘Jesus*in terms | of another system, , but each of them selected a different system. MY and followed a different 1 method. Cerinthus took a certain SySz,

tem of syncretic paganism, probably already. Judaized, as_his. basis and upon it he superimposed the system of Paul; John |_ took the systemof Paul as his basis and upon it he superimposed | ~ the:system ¢ of Philo. lo. The result of their efforts was two new.

‘rival Gospels. Infact, Irenaeus explicitly states that John wrote} _his Gospel out of i Mesite £ ‘to remove the error which. Cerin-

thus had been: sowing. among men.” :

The Fourth Gospel, written by John, is preserved in the New Testament and we have already discussed ° its version of Paul’s conception of the preéxistent Christ in terms of the Philonic Logos. The Fourth Gospel of Cerinthus, however, is not extant. There are only brief restatements of it in the works of the Fathers, of which the work of Irenaeus,® preserved only in its Latin version from the Greek, and the work of Hippolytus,” which has preserved the original Greek of

Irenaeus, are the most important. On the basis of these restatements in Irenaeus and Hippolytus, supplemented occasionally by those of the other Fathers,* we shall try to reconstruct Cerinthus’ theology and Christology.° * Cf. above pp. 183-190. *In Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. XXVIII, 4, and Philaster, Lib. de Haer. XXXVI, Cerinthus is represented as an opponent of Paul’s antinomianism. But, even if true, it does not mean that he did not agree with Paul in his teaching of a preéxistent Christ, which was originally a Jewish belief. ‘Trenaeus, Adv. Haer. Ill, 11, 1.

° Cf. above pp. 177 ff. ®Trenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 26, 1.

" Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer. VII, 33; X, 21. 5 Pseudo-Tertullian, Adversus Omnes Haereses 3; Epiphanius, Adversus Haereses Panarium XXVIII; Theodoret, Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium Il, 3. ®The exposition which follows, including the Greek and Latin terms quoted, is based upon Hippolytus, VII, 33, and Irenaeus,I, 26, 1, unless otherwise referred to in the footnotes.

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There is a supreme Deity, described as “the first God” or “the God who is over all” or “the power (é€ovcia, aifertia,

principalitas) which is above all things” or “the unknown Father.” _Below God there are two other kinds of supramundane.

_beings. One kind, consisting of one single being,called “Christ” and identified with the Holy. Spirit, is suggested by_ him_in~ directly 1in his statement concerning Jesus that “after his bapa tism Christ descended upon him in the form of a a“dove” and.

that that‘“Christ” was spiritual (avevparixés, spiritualis)°or, _ —as in later sources, “[the] Spirit of [the] Lord” Er aes piov)? if or “the Holy Spirit” (76 mvebpa 76 dyov). 12 The abode

“of Christ is described as the‘‘pleroma”’ (mdijpoya) 1? The second kind of supramundane being isi described, in the original source, as “a certain power” (dvvauts tus, virtus quaedam) ™*

and, in later sources, as “certain separate powers” (duvdépeus TWAS KEXwpiepévas) *° OF “powers” (virtutes) 1® or “a certain yangelic power” ™’ or “angels.” 1* It is by this power, and not by ie _First_God, that, according to him, the world ‘was was made. mai \But inasmuch as in the Old Testament the creator ofthe e wo: world — is said to be God, it may be ‘inferred that Cerinthus distin-_ “guished between the God of the Old Testament and the God

of the New Testament, identifying th the former. with an inferior _ pene whom he calls a certain power. ‘How these two types of supramundane beings came into Meiceace is not clear. With regard to the Holy Spirit or Christ,

Cerinthus is reported to have said that at the baptism of Jesus “qt descended upon him from the Power (avdevtias, principalitate) which is over all things.” On the evident assumption that the Holy Spirit was not unoriginate and eternally coexistent with God, it is to be assumed that it originated directly from God, though not necessarily at the time of its descent upon * Hippolytus, VII, 33, 2; Irenaeus, I, 26, 1.

“% *Epiphanius, XXVIII, 1 (PG 41, 380 4). *Trenaeus, III, 11, 1; Ill, 16, 1; cf. J. B. Lightfoot, * Hippolytus, VII, 33, 3; Irenaeus, I, 26, 1. ** * Theodoret, I], 3. “ * Pseudo-Tertullian, 3; Epiphanius, XXVIII, .

Hippolytus, X, 21, 3.

Comm. on Col.’, p. 264. Pseudo-Tertullian, 3. Hippolytus, X, 21, 1.

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Jesus. But, with regard to that “certain power” which created.

_the the world,, itis said by him that it was “far separated and distant from the Power-over-all- things-andignorant_of the God.

over all.”‘This would-seem-to-indicate-that-this power did not.

originate directly from God, Probably it originated from some. other intermediate being. 2 As the only other being besides. “God and1 that “certain power’ ’ mentioned. by--Cerinthus-is-the--

Holy | Spirit, we may assume..that.the power..originated..from... the Holy Spirit. This is t the theology of Cerinthus. In it we may distinguish a pre-Christian syncretic stock and a Christian ingraftment, though it is quite possible that the pre-Christian syncretic stock

had already been partly Judaized. In the pre-Christian syncretic stock, we imagine, there were a number of successive supramundane beings, all of them considered as deities, in which each of the lower ones was generated from the one above it and in which also one of the lower deities was the creator of the world. It is quite possible that already in the pre-Christian syncretism, the topmost of the deities was called “the first God” or “the God who is over all” or “the power which is above all things” or “the Father,” for among the Greeks the topmost god is known to have been described as

“most high” *° (tuoeros) and as “Father of gods and men” * and as “Father of all . . . who is called many names according to his various powers (Sdvvdyes).” ?? In his attempt to Christianize this syncretism, if we assume that it had not already been partly Judaized before that, Cerinthus, we further imagine, started by giving a new meaning to the original pagan

description of the topmost God. The expression “the first. God” came to be applied by |him to the God of the New.

‘Testament, just as inPhilo itwas applied. tothe God of the. Old Testament. Ibid.

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- come in flesh is of God” ® and the Second Epistle of John says that “many deceivers are gone forth into the world, even

they that confess not that Jesus Christ cometh in the flesh,” °° the implication is that there were those who believed that Jesus Christ was not a real human being but only an appearance. IV. Oruer Gnostic SysTEMS

(a) God In these two representative, and probably also earliest, systems of Gnosticism, the method of the Christianization of the underlying syncretisms is quite evident. The many supramundane beings are arranged in three tiers. The upper tier consists of only one supramundane being identified with God. The second tier consists either of one supramundane being identified with the preéxistent Christ or of two supramundane beings identified respectively with the preéxistent Christ and the Holy Spirit. The third tier consists of supramundane beings identified with angels. The terms by which the supramundane beings of the three tiers are described are either of Christian

origin or of pagan origin; but, in the latter case, the pagan terms are sometimes given Christian meanings. Probably the God in the first tier is the God of the New Testament, and one of the angels in the third tier is the God of the Old Testament. The manner in which the supramundane beings of the two lower tiers came into existence, according to both these syssystems, too, the creation of the world ‘was ‘not directly by. _ God. Finally, two different unorthodox views of Christology are presented by these two Gnosticic systems. The Christology _

of Cerinthus is Ebionitic; theChristology of Simon is Docetic._ We shall now try to apply the same analysis to other Gnostic systems which flourished during the second century, selecting for our special purpose, again, systems which are described in Irenaeus and Hippolytus, though we shall occasionally draw 1 John 4:2.

*2 John 7.

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also upon the descriptions of these systems found in later Fathers. The systems that we shall deal with are those of Menander, a disciple of Simon; Saturninus, a disciple of Menander; Basilides, also a disciple of Menander, of whose system there are two accounts, one in Irenaeus and the other in Hippolytus; Carpocrates and his son Epiphanes; Valentinus, of whose view on God there were two interpretations among his followers; Ptolemy, a disciple of Valentinus; Cerdo and his disciple Marcion; Lucian, a disciple of Marcion; Apelles, also a disciple of Marcion, of whose view on God there are two accounts, one in Hippolytus and the other in pseudo-Tertullian and Epiphanius; the book entitled the Great Announcement attributed to Simon; the Barbelo-Gnostics and the Ophites of Irenaeus; and finally the Ophites of Hippolytus, under whom are included the Naassenes, the Perates, the Sethians,

and Justinus. In dealing with each of these systems, we shall. try to find outwhat conception it had of its supreme supra-_

“mundane being, what its other supramundane beings were and_ how they :were Christianized, how these supramundane beings _ ~ came into existence, which of these supramundane beings was

_the creator of the world, and finally what conception it had of | _ Jesus. In all these, as we have said before, leaving out the ques-_ “tion of the origin and formation of the syncretism underlying _ “Christian Gnosticism, we shall deal only” with the manner in _ which that underly1 ing syncretism \‘was Christianized) ‘Ofthese Gnostic systems, which we have selected as the subject of our study, most of them are reported to have mentioned three tiers of supramundane beings, corresponding to those of Cerinthus and Simon. The report on one of them * mentions only what may be identified as the first tier of supramundane beings and the reports on six of them * mention only what may be identified as the first and the third tier. In all of them, the first tier of supramundane beings constitutes God. * Ptolemy; cf. below p. 537. *Saturninus, Cerdo, Marcion, 531-5325 5415543.

Lucian,

Apelles, Justinus, cf. below

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But with regard to that first tier or God there are certain differences of opinion among them. Some of them‘conceive of God as one single being. This type of Gnostic conception of God is represented by Menander, who describes God as “‘the first Power”;* by Saturninus, who describes Him as “one Father”; * by Basilides of Irenaeus, who describes Him as the “unborn Father”; ® by Basilides of Hippolytus who describes Him as “Nothing” (ovdév) or “Godnonexistent” (ovx dv Oeds);® by Carpocrates, who describes Him as the “unbegotten Father” or the “unbegotten God”;* by Valentinus as interpreted by those of his followers who are said to consider “the Father, femaleless, spouseless, and alone”’;* by the Apelles of pseudo-Tertullian and Epiphanius, who is said to have introduced “one God in the infinite upper re-

gions,” ®which God he describes as a “holy and good God.”*° Some of the Gnostic systems, however, assume more than one God but from among them they select one for identification with the Christian God and identify the other God with the God of the Old Testament. This type of Gnostic Christianized God is represented by Cerdo and Marcion, both of whom believed in two supreme Gods," evidently each of them ungenerated, but out of these two supreme Gods, only one is identified by them with the Christian God, who is described

by Cerdo as “‘the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” and as “ known” and “good” ” and by Marcion as “that Father” from whom Jesus came * and as “mild, placid, and absolutely good and excellent.” 1* The other God, that of the Old Testament, *Trenaeus, I, 23, 5. “Irenaeus, I, 24, 1; Hippolytus, VII, 28, 1. mlrenacus, 1) 245.3%

* Hippolytus, VII, 21, 1; X, 14, 1. The meaning of these terms will be discussed in Vol. II of ‘this work, in the chapter on divine predicates. ei aeuisw lees nere; Hippolytus, Williaa 2x * Hippolytus, VI, 29,3 ® Pseudo-Tertullian, eo. Ommn. Haer. 6. *Epiphanius, XLIV, 1. “Cf. Tertullian, Adv. Marc. I,3. “Irenaeus, I, 27, 1; Hippolytus, VII, 37, 1; Pseudo-Tertullian, 6; Epi-

phanius, XLI.

**Trenaeus, I, 27, 2.

“Tertullian, Adv. Mare. L,6.

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is described by Cerdo as “the God proclaimed by the Law and the Prophets” and as “known” and “just” *® and by Marcion as “the God who made the world” and as “the author of evils, fond of wars, inconstant also in His judgment, and contrary to himself,” *° as “judicial, harsh, mighty in war,” 1” and, in general, as “wicked.” ** This view is represented also by Lucian who, from among his three ungenerated Gods, selected for his Christian God the one whom he describes as “good,” whereas the other two Gods, who are evidently subdivisions of Marcion’s Old Testament God, he describes respectively as (1) “creator and also judge and just” and (2) “evil.”*®It is represented similarly by Apelles of Hippolytus*® who, from among his four Gods,” selected for his ungenerated Christian God the one whom he described as “a good God,” whereas the three other Gods, who are the two Old Testament Gods of Lucian and a God derived from the Gnostic description of the Old Testament God as He “who spoke to Moses,””? he describes

respectively as (1) “He who created all things” and is “just,” (2) He “who spoke to Moses,” and (3) He who is “a cause of evil.” Some of the Gnostic systems, however, place at the head of their supramundane beings two ungenerated beings, a male and a female. This type of Gnosticism is represented by those inter-

preters of Valentinus who make his supreme Deity consist of a male deity called the First Principle (proarche) or the First Father (propater) or Depth (bythos) and a female deity, his spouse, called Thought

(ennoia)

or Grace

(charis)

or

Silence (sige).*? “Grace” here is evidently a Christian term.”* * Loc. cit. (above n. 12). “Irenaeus, 1,27, 2. “ Tertullian, Adv. Marc. I, 6. ** Hippolytus, VII, 30, 2, but in X, 19, 1, this view is attributed to some disciples of Marcion.

* Epiphanius, XLIII, 1 (PG 41, 817 p). Cf. below pp. 542-543. * Hippolytus, VII, 38, 1; X, 20, 1.

* Cf. below pp. 541-542. Cf. Basilides in Hippolytus, VII, 25, 4; Valentinus in Hippolytus, VI,

35, 1; Marcion in Irenaeus, I, 27, 2; Cerdo in Hippolytus, VII, 37, 1. * Hippolytus, VI, 29, 3; Irenaeus, I, 1, 1; I, 11, 1.

*Cf. John 1:14.

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It is also represented by the Barbelo-Gnostics of Irenaeus, to whom the supreme Deity consists of what is described as “a certain father who is unnamable” and “a never-aging Aeon in a virginal spirit (wapOevixd wvevparr) whom they name Barbelos.” ?> ““Virginal Spirit” here is evidently a Christian expression, suggesting the terms “virgin” and “spirit” and, in their combination, meaning the pure or clean spirit, that is to say, the Holy Spirit, in contrast to the expression “unclean (dxd-

Oaprov) spirit” or “impure spirit” which is often used in the New Testament as the opposite of the Holy Spirit. In both these foregoing Gnostic systems, the conception of two deities is undoubtedly a survival of the original syncretic pagan stock. Its retention even after the original syncretic paganism was Christianized and made into a Gnosticism was probably due to its accommodation to the early Christian binitarian conception of God which we have met among the Apos-

tolic Fathers, when the harmonization of Paul and John took the form of an identification of the Holy Spirit and the Logos.”* In this case, the two elements of the binitarian Christian God, after the analogy of which the original pagan two deities were Christianized, were conceived to exist as two separate beings, though inseparably united with each other. Sometimes a system, which evidently started with two separate ungenerated beings, a male and a female, tried to Christianize them, again after the analogy of a Christian binitarian God, but one in which the two elements were conceived only as two natures, by integrating them into one being of two natures. This type is represented by the book entitled the Great Announcement which is attributed to Simon. In this book “the principle of all things,” * which is called “a boundless power” ”® and “the unbegotten fire,”*® is described as having a twofold

nature, one part of which is hidden and potential and the other manifest and actual, the latter having come into existence from * Trenaeus, I, 29, 1; Theodoret, I, 13.

* Cf. above pp. 183 ff. * Hippolytus, VI, 9, 4. Slbid:

* Ibid., VU, 12, 1;:ef.. Vilico, 3:

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the former,®° and that twofold nature, it is intimated, is twofold also in the sense that it consists of a male and a female ele-

ment, for it is according to that “boundless power” or “‘unbegotten fire” that a certain power called “he who stood, stands, and will stand” is said to be described as ‘“‘masculo-feminine.”’*? Certain Gnostic systems group together the first and second tiers of supramundane beings into triads. Of these, in the systems taken for our subject of study, there are five examples. First, there are the Ophites of Irenaeus. They are reported to have placed at the head of their supramundane beings three

beings which, though grouped together, remain separable from each other. These three beings are: (1) “a primary Light,” who is “the Father of all” and is called “the First Man.” (2) “Thought” (ennoia), which is described as “coming forth,” evidently coming forth from the Father alone without a mother, and is called “the Son of Him who emitted him” or

“the Son of Man” or “the Second Man.” (3) The “Holy Spirit” or “Superior Spirit” or “the First Woman,” which is

described as being “below” (sub) the former two, evidently as beginningless as the Father.” Second, there are the Naassenes. In the report of their teachings, the first and second tiers of their supramundane beings are said to form a triad, consisting of ““a man and a son of man, but this man is masculo-feminine and is called among them Adamas.” 38 Third, there are the Perates. In the report of their teachings, too, the first and the second tiers of their supramundane beings

are said to form a group which they call “triad.”**Two different descriptions of this triad are given in two statements. According to one statement,** it consists of (1) what “1s called

perfect good and fatherly greatness” and is “good and unbegotten,” (2) “a certain infinite multitude of powers which have come into being from themselves,” so that it is “good and * Ibid., VI, 9, 5-6. * Tbid., V1, 18, 4. =" IFEMACUSS 11 30;n1%

e Hippolytus, WHO, Zip Celt Ds Conse [bid., WW ty Be SIGN eel 223s

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self-begotten,” and (3) that which is “formal” (i8:«éy) and is “begotten.” According to another statement, the triad consists of “(1) father, (2) son, and (3) matter,” the “son” being also called “the Logos” and “the Serpent.”**These two statements, we take it, mean the same thing. The “perfect good and fatherly greatness” of the first statement is obviously the same as the

“father” of the second statement. The “formal” of the first statement means, we take it, being composed of matter and form, that is, “informed matter” or corporeal,*” and hence the same as “matter” of the second statement, by which is meant matter already informed or something material. As for the “infinite multitude of powers” of the first statement, it means the same as “the son” or “the Logos” of the second statement, reflecting Philo’s view,** followed also by the Fathers,*® that the Logos is the totality of “powers” or “ideas.”

Fourth, there are the Sethians. At the head of their supramundane beings they are said to have placed a triad, described as “‘three definite principles of all things,”*°namely, “light and darkness, and between them . . . uncontaminated spirit.” * These three principles are evidently conceived by them as being each beginningless, for, though it happens that they are re-

ported to have said only about “light” that it is “unbegotten,” # they are also reported to have stated that “wind” was “the first-born principle,” ** thus implying that “darkness” and “uncontaminated spirit” are unbegotten.

Fifth, there is Justinus. At the head of his system he is reported to have placed a triad which is described as -“three unbegotten principles of all things,” ** of which one is “male” * Tbid., V, 17, 1-2. * Cf. Hippolytus’ own explanation of this term in his statement: “our world, which they call formal” (V, 15, 2). Cf. also his statement that it is

this “formal world” of ours of which Scripture speaks as being destructible (V, 12, 7). Both these statements imply that the term “formal” is used in the sense of “informed matter” or corporeal. * Cf. Philo, I, pp. 226 ff. °° Cf. above p. 285. “° Hippolytus, V, 19, 1. SL Uid VEO 2 aalDidin Nino. bid, V3.19;, 35: eclbid Ve 2O.ate

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and “good”; another, also “male,” is called “Elohim”; and a third is “female” and is called “Eden and Israel.” 4° In all these five systems there is one common characteristic. They all attempt to place at the head of all beings, whatever they are, a triad. This triad in every one of these systems, we may assume, is a survival of the pre-Christian syncretic stock, with which each of them started, for such triads are known to have been common in pagan religions. We may also assume that the retention of this triadic principle even after the original syncretic paganism was Christianized and made into a Gnosticism was due to its accommodation to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which in some form or other must have already existed at the time each of these Gnostic systems made its appearance. We may still further assume that each of these triads in its original form consisted of a father, a mother, and a son, for father, mother, and son were as a rule the constituents of most pagan triads.** In four of the five systems discussed, something of the original father-mother-son triad is preserved. It is preserved intact in the “first man” or “father,” “second man” or “son,” and “first woman” of the Ophites of Irenaeus and with but a slight modification also in the masculofeminine man and son of the Naassenes. It is also preserved in the “father,” “son,” and “matter” (d\n) of the Perates, according to one of the restatements of their view, for “matter” here may stand for “female,” after Aristotle’s statement that matter

(8\n) desires form “as the female desires the male.”** It is similarly preserved in the two males and one female of Justinus. The triad of the Sethians, light, uncontaminated spirit, and darkness, reflects a Zoroasterianization of an original fathermother-son triad.*® The use of such terms as “Thought” Tbid., V, 26, 1-2. “ Cf. Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis, pp. 331-338. In the lost Gospel according to the Hebrews, as reported by Origen (/n Joan. Il, 6, PG 14, 132 c; or II, 12, 87 in ed. Preuschen), the Holy Spirit was identified with Mary the mother of Jesus, and so the Christian Trinity would consist of Father, Mother, and Son. *" Phys. I, 9, 1928, 22-23. © Cf. Bousset, op. cit., pp. 119 ff.

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(ennoia) in the. Ophites of Irenaeus, “form” and “matter” in the Perates, and “principles of all things” (rv édwv apyat) in the Sethians and Justinus indicates an attempt at a philosophization of the original father-mother-son triad. The attempts at the Christianization of the original triad are to be discerned in the use of the expressions “son of man” *° in the Ophites of Irenaeus and in the Naassenes, “Holy Spirit” in the Ophites of Irenaeus, and “uncontaminated spirit” in the Sethians, for the “uncontaminated (dxépaiov) spirit” is the opposite of the “unclean (dxé0aprov) spirit” of the New Testament and hence

the same as the “Holy Spirit.” In Justinus, the Christianization of the original pagan triad of father-son-mother seems to have been attempted by identifying the “father” with the Christian

God described as “good,” the “son” with the Jewish God described as “Elohim,” and the “mother” with described as “female.” A new kind of triad is to be found in teachings of the disciples of Ptolemy, which those of Ptolemy himself. The report reads

“Eden and Israel”

the report of the are probably also as follows: “The

followers of Ptolemy, being yet more skillful, say that Bythus has two wives, whom they also call dispositions (dvabéces), namely, Thought (ennoia) and Will (thelema).” Subsequently these “dispositions” are also described as “powers” (Svvépes) .°° In this passage, then, we may discern two stages in the history of this view. First, Ptolemy departed from those Valentinians who gave to Bythus one spouse by giving to him two spouses. Second, he then departed from them still further by reducing these spouses, who to those Valentinians were real beings, to mere dispositions or powers within Bythus. Thus instead of a triad of distinct deities, one male and two females, there resulted one single God in whom there were three dispositions or powers or natures. Sometimes a Gnostic system seems to have started with a combination of two pairs of males and females and then reJohn 3:13 et passim. * Irenaeus, I, 12, 1; cf. Hippolytus, VII, 38, 6-7; Epiphanius, XXXIII, 1.

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duced them to one deity consisting of four inseparable na-

tures. An example of this is to be found in Epiphanes. It reads as follows: *! “There is before all things a certain Proarche (first principle) . . . which I reckon as Monotes (unity). With this Monotes there coexists a power, which very power I name Henotes (oneness). This Henotes and Monotes, being one, emitted, yet without emitting [it outside themselves], a principle over all things, the object of thought only, unbegotten and unseen, which principle their speech calls Monas (unit). With this Monas there coexists a power of the same

substance with itself, which very power I call Hen

(one).

These powers then — Monotes, and Henotes, and Monas, and Hen—emitted the other emanations which make up the Aeons.” In this system, it will be noticed, at the head of all supramundane beings, called Aeons, there are two pairs of supramundane beings. In each of these two pairs, one supramundane being is described as “principle” and the other as “power,” and the “power” in each case is described as having “coexisted” with its corresponding “principle” and as being “one” with it oras being “of the same substance.” Then, it will also be noticed, that the second “principle,” evidently together with its coexistent “power,” was emitted from the union of the first “principle” and “power,” without, however, having acquired

thereby an existence outside the first pair. From all this we may gather that originally this system started with four distinct deities, divided into two pairs of male

and female each, the second pair having been generated from the first pair. These deities probably also had distinctive names like those which are common in the various popular religions. Then, in an attempt to reduce these four deities to one single God, the male in each of these two pairs was renamed “prin-

ciple” and the female was renamed “power” and was made inseparable from its corresponding “principle.” Similarly the

“generation” of the second pair from the first pair was changed Irenaeus, I, 11, 3; Hippolytus, VI, 38, 2-3; Epiphanius, XXXII, 5.

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to an “emission,” which took place within the first pair, so that it did not bring about a separation between the two pairs. Then also the original pagan names of the four deities were changed to four abstract terms, “unity,” “oneness,” aares “one.” The result was one deity of a fourfold nature.

In the foreging survey we have seen how, with the exception of the systems of Marcion and his followers, in all the other systems, even in those systems which place at the head of all their beings a dyad or triad or a tetrad, there is always one being which stands out above all others. He is singled out

from all other beings by such distinguishing names as “Power,” qualified by the terms “first” and “boundless”; “Father,” qualified by the terms “one,” “unborn,” “unbegotten,” “of our Lord Jesus,” “unknown,”

“good,” “first,” “unnamable,”

and “of

all”; “God,” either without any qualifying term or qualified by the terms “nonexistent,” “one,” and “good”; “Principle,” qualified by the terms “first” and “good” or identified with “unbegotten light”; “Man,” either without any qualifying term or qualified by the term “first”; “Perfect Good,” qualified further by the term “unbegotten.” We have also seen how those systems which retain an original pagan female deity by the side of the chief God try to Christianize it by renaming the female deity either “Grace” or “Virginal Spirit,” both of which are associated with the preéxistent Christ, and thus the pagan two deities become the Christian one binitarian God to be found among the Apostolic Fathers. Similarly we have seen how those systems which retain an original son and mother by the side of the father try to Christianize these three pagan deities by reducing them to the Christian one trinitarian God, and in some of these systems, we have further seen, how the son of the original pagan triad is renamed “the Son of Man” or “the

Word” and how the mother in the original pagan triad is renamed “the Holy Spirit.” Finally, we have seen how one system Christianizes two pagan deities by reducing them to one God of a twofold nature,.how another system Christianizes

GNOSTICISM 531 three pagan deities by reducing them to one God of a threefold nature, and how still another system Christianizes four pagan deities by reducing them to one God of a fourfold

nature.

(b) Preéxistent Christ: Logos and Holy Spirit In our analysis of what these Gnostic systems conceived of their supreme deity, we have seen how, with all their attempt to Christianize that supreme deity, some of them still retained elements of the original polytheism with which they started, so that their supreme deity either was himself bisexual or had by his side one female or two females or a female and a child. Similarly some of these systems still retained certain pagan names by which their supreme deity had originally been known. We shall now try to show how, in a similar way, in their attempt to Christianize the second type of supramundane being by identifying it either with the preéxistent Christ or

with the preéxistent Christ supplemented by the Holy Spirit, some of these systems, having started with a multiplicity of supramundane beings of this type, retained that multiplicity even in their Christianization, so that these systems wound up with a multiplicity of preéxistent Christs or with a multiplicity of preéxistent Christs supplemented by a multiplicity of Holy Spirits. They similarly retained, as we shall see, some of the

original pagan names by which the multiplicity of supramundane beings of this second tier had originally been known, so that these supramundane beings, even on their becoming preexistent Christs or preéxistent Christs and Holy Spirits and on their acquiring new Christian names, sometimes still continued to be called by their original pagan names. We shall illustrate this general observation by an analysis of the generated supramundane beings, below God and above

those who are described as angels, as they are found in the reports of the various Gnostic systems. In the reports of the teachings of Saturninus,* Cerdo,? Mar+Trenaeus, I, 24, 1.

* Irenaeus, I, 27, 1; Hippolytus, VII, 37, 1.

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cion,® Lucian,* Apelles,> and Justinus,® there is no mention of supramundane beings of a second tier and hence there is nothing in those reports of their teachings which could be identified with the preéxistent Christ. Whether this is only an accidental omission or whether this is a real departure from the established Christian belief there is no way of telling. In Epiphanes,’ there is no direct mention of any supramundane beings below God, but there is an indirect reference to such supramundane beings in his statement where, after describing his tetradic Deity, he says that “these powers then — Monotes and Henotes, and Monas, and Hen — emitted the other emanations which make up the Aeons.” By these “other emanations which make up the Aeons” he undoubtedly means the supramundane beings of the second and third tiers. Simi-

larly no direct mention of a supramundane being of an intermediate second tier is to be found in Carpocrates.* But here, again, from his statement that “a power (virtus, Svvays) was sent down to him [that is, Jesus]” from the “unbegotten God” and that “this power, after passing through all, and remaining in all points free, ascended again to God,” it may be inferred that between God and the angels he posited ove supramundane being, whom he identified with the preéxistent Christ and the

Holy Spirit, after the New Testament application of the term “the power of the Highest” to the Holy Spirit.® In Menander,”* there is mention of ove supramundane being in the second tier, and it is called, as in Simon, by the nonChristian name Thought (enmoia), but in Simon, whom Menander follows, Thought is also called, as we have seen, by

the Christianized Wisdom and the Christian Holy Spirit,“ and so we may assume that the omission of these names by Menan-

der is accidental. One supramundane being of this kind is to be discerned also in the Naassenes. It is the “Son of Man” *Trenaeus, I, 27, 2. ° Hippolytus, VII, 38, 1. *Epiphanius, XLIII. S1DiGE NG: “Irenaeus, I, 11, 3; Hippolytus, VI, 38, 2-3; Epiphanius, XXXII, 5. * Irenaeus, I, 25, 1; Hippolytus, VII, 32, 1-2.

* Luke 1:35.

“Trenaeus, E23, 5.

“Cf. above p. 515.

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which is included in their triad of masculo-feminine Man and Son of Man.” They mention also a Logos,'® but that Logos seems to be another name for their Son of Man, for from the

statement attributed to their spokesman, with regard to Jesus, that “this is the Christ who, in all that have been generated, is the portrayed Son of Man from the unportrayable Logos,” it may be inferred that the “unportrayable Logos,” after whom

Jesus is the “portrayed Son of Man,” is the same as the “Son of Man” in their triad of masculo-feminine Man and Son of Man. In the Perates,” there are two supramundane beings between their supreme supramundane being called Father and their supramundane being of the third tier. Both of them are grouped

together with the Father to form a triad. One of them is called “son” or “the Logos” or “serpent”; the other is called “matter.” The “son” and “Logos” are quite obviously either Christian or Christianized terms.*®

The Sethians have four supramundane beings of this type. Two of them, called “uncontaminated spirit” and “darkness,” are grouped together with their supreme supramundane being, called “light,” to form a triad.’ The other two are outside the triad. One of them is called “serpent” and derives its existence from “darkness.” 1® The other, deriving its existence from “ight,” is called “the perfect Logos of the light on high” *

or “the Logos of God” or “the perfect man (rédevos dvOpwos)” or simply “Logos,” *° and is described also as assuming the form of the “serpent” and descending “into the womb of a virgin.”**Of these terms, “the Logos” may be taken here as a Christian term, the “uncontaminated spirit” is only another way of saying the Holy Spirit, which in the New Testament “ Hippolytus, V, 6, 4. Hels Vos ah, 3% SLICER 7 20 a0! 3 2. * Ibid., V, 17, 1-2; cf. above pp. 525-526. 16 The term “son” occurs in the non-Christian triads of father-mother-son. “Logos” occurs in a non-Christian triad (cf. Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis, p. 334, n. 2), though it may have been adopted there from Jewish or Christian sources. “ Hippolytus, V, 19, 1-2; cf. above p. 526. 8 [bid., V, 19, 13 and 18; cf. below pp. 544-545. BIG: Nowa te WI bids Vexg; 20: end Did a Nnalouc Or

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is regarded as the opposite of the oft-repeated “unclean (axé-

Oaprov) spirit,” and even “the perfect man” is either a Christian or a Christianized expression.” Four beings of this type may

be similarly discerned

in Ptolemy.**

Two

of them,

Thought (ennoia) and Will (thelema), are included in his triad *4 and two of them are below his triad. The latter two are called by the Christian names Only-begotten (mogenes) and Truth (aletheia),° but the Only-begotten is also called by the non-Christian name Mind (nous).

In Basilides of Hippolytus,”* of the four supramundane beings of this type three are called Sonship and one is called Holy Spirit, names derived from the Christian vocabulary, though the term Sonship may be only a Christianized name. Of the

five corresponding supramundane beings of this type in Basilides of Irenaeus,*’ two are called Logos and Power, which are Christian names; ** one is called Wisdom, which is either a Christian or a Christianized name; but two are called by the non-Christian names Mind (nous) and Prudence (phronesis).

In the Ophites of Irenaeus,*° there are five supramundane

beings between “the Father of all” and the supramundane beings of the third tier. Two of these five are included within the triad which is placed above all the supramundane beings*! and are called (1) thought (ezoia) and “the son of man” and “the second man”; (2) “Holy Spirit” and “superior spirit” and “the first woman.” The other three are below the triad

and are called (3) “light incorruptible” and “third male being” and “Christ”; (4) “the true and holy church (ecclesia, éxkdnota)”; (5) “the left” and “Prunicus” and “wisdom” and “masculo-feminine.” Of these the terms “the son of man,’?? * Cf. rédecos dvpp in Eph. 4:13; James 3:2. The term rédevos in the New Testament is said to have been borrowed from the ancient mysteries where it is used in the sense of the fully instructed, as opposed to the novices (cf. Lightfoot on Col. 1:28). * Irenaeus, I, 12, 1; Hippolytus, VI, 38, 5-7.

* Cf. above *Trenaeus, * Irenaeus, * Cf. above

p. 528. ~*~ John 1:14. * Hippolytus, VII, 25-27. I, 24, 3. ™ But cf. above pp. 507-508. ® Cf. above p. 515. I, 30, 1-3; Theodoret, I, 14. p. 525. % John 3:13 et passin.

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“Holy Spirit,” “light,”** and “church”* are all taken from the Christian vocabulary where they are used in connection with Christ. The term “wisdom” is either a Christian or a Christianized term.*®

In the Great Announcement of the Simonians,** the fourteen supramundane beings of the two hebdomads below the supreme Deity correspond to what in other systems constitute the supramundane beings of the second tier. Now in the second of these two hebdomads there is what is called the “Seventh Power” and is identified with both the Logos *” and the Holy Spirit,** but the other powers of these two hebdomads are called Mind and Thought, Voice and Name, Reason and Desire, Heaven and Earth, Sun and Moon, Air and Water. Evidently these supramundane beings, together with the “Seventh Power,” are conceived of as varieties of a multiple preéxistent Christ, but at the same time they are also conceived of as

paradigmatic ideas of things in the visible world —a view parallel to the view of the single preéxistent Christ of the orthodox Fathers, according to which the single preéxistent Christ contained within himself the paradigmatic ideas of all things in the created visible world.*°

The list of supramundane beings of the second tier in the Barbelo-Gnostics of Irenaeus *° contains twenty-three names arranged in seven successive groups. They are as follows: GroupI (1) Thought (ennoia); (2) Foreknowledge (prognosis); (3) Incorruption (aphtharsia);** (4) Eternal Life (zoe

aionios);** Group II (5) Light** or Christ; (6) Mind (nous); (7) Logos; (8) Will (thelema);** Group III (9) Self-begotten (autogenes); (10) Truth (aletheia);*° Group IV, called “Four Luminaries,” (11) Grace (charis);*® (12) Will (thelesis; (13) Understanding (synesis); (14) Prudence (phro_ Joba 1:9. : Irenaeus, I, 29, 1-4. Eph 122505323; Rom DS * Cf. above p. 515. Rom. 2:7. * Hippolytus, VI, 12-14. John 1:9. * Tbid., V1, 13; cf. below P:544, n. 46. “ John 6:39. * Tbid., VI, 14, 3-4; cf. below p. 544, nn. 47-51.“ John 1:14. * Cf. above p. 285 and below pp. 546, 558. * John 1:14.

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nesis),; Group .V, called “Four Emissions,” (15) Saviour (soter) *7 or Hermogenes; (16) Raguel; (17) David; (18) Eleleth; Group VI (19) Perfect Man;** (20) Perfect Knowledge (gnosis); (21) Tree; Group VII (22) the first Angel;* (23) the Holy Spirit or Wisdom or Prunicus. In this list, besides the obvious Christian terms such as Christ, Logos, Saviour, Holy Spirit, the Christian origin of other terms has been

called attention to in the footnotes. Of the thirty-three supramundane beings in Valentinus, thirty-two,” including the female spouse of the male supreme being, may be considered as constituting what in his system

corresponds to the preéxistent Christ and the Holy Spirit in Christianity, the two of them probably identified. They are

called by the following names: 1. Thought (ennoia) or Grace (charis) ** or Silence (sige); 2. Mind (nous); 3. Truth (aletheia); *® 4. Word (logos); ** 5. Life (zoe); ** 6. Man (anthro-

pos);*°° 7. Church (ekklesia); °° 8. Profundity (bythios); 9. Mixture (mixis); 10. Ever-young (ageratos); 11. Unification Syphilis 3: 205 “Eph. (4:133- Jamies 3:2 “In the printed editions, the expression “the first Angel” is followed by the words “who stands by the Only-begotten (monogenes).” Harvey (ad loc., Vol. I, p. 225, n. 2) omits them on the ground that they “seem to be an interpolation, no mention of Monogenes having preceded, and they are

not expressed by Theodoret.” But these additional words are not without relevance, for the expression “the first Angel” is used here as a description of

what we have tried to show is a preéxistent Christ, and hence a Monogenes, which reflects a view expressed by Justin Martyr, namely, that the Logos and

Christ are designated by the term “angel” in the Old Testament (cf. Apol. I, 63; Dial. 56, 58, 59, 61, 127, 128). The adjective “first” is used here with “Angel” in order to distinguish it from the “angels” in the third tier of supramundane beings mentioned subsequently (in I, 29, 4). Irenaeus, I, 1, 1-2; I, 2, 5-6. According to the account in Irenaeus

(I,

1-2), all the thirty-three Aeons in Valentinus are divided into (I) a group of thirty and (II) a group of three. The group of thirty is subdivided into (1) a group of eight (ogdoad), (2) a group of ten (decad), and (3) a group of twelve (dodecad).

John 1:14, where it is used with reference to the preéxistent Christ. Cf. above n. 46. John 1:14. Sonne rst eslohnerea: “Cf. 1 Tim. 2:5, where “man” is used with reference to the postresurrection Christ, and Justin Martyr, Dial. 34, 59, and

existent Christ is called “man.” “ Epb.-1:22; 5:23.

128, where

the pre-

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(henosis); 12. Self-grown (autophyes); 13. Pleasure (hedone); 14. Motionless (akinetos); 15. Commixture (synkrasis); 16. Only-begotten (7onogenes);*" 17. Blessedness (smakaria) ;8 18. Comforter (parakletos) ;© 19. Faith (pistis); © 20. Fatherly (patrikos) ;°* 21. Hope (elpis); °° 22. Temperate (metrikos) ;

23. Love (agape); * 24. Ever-thinking (aeinous); 25. Intelligence (synesis); 26. Of the Church (ekklesiastikos);°* 27. Blessedness (makariotes);* 28. Willed (theletos);°° 29. Wisdom (sophia, Achamoth),;* 30. Christ; * 31. Holy Spirit;

32. Jesus or Saviour or Patronymically Logos ® or All Things (panta).™ Of the names by which these thirty-two supramundane beings are called twenty-one are definitely either Christian or Christianized and in the footnotes we have indicated their possible sources in the New Testament. The terms Truth (aletheia) and Wisdom (sophia) are used by Plutarch among his philosophized names of the six Zoroastrian Amesha Spentas,” but, as in the case of Wisdom in Simon,” they must have been given a Christian meaning by Valentinus. The remaining names are non-Christian, one of them, Pleasure (hedone), probably reflecting “pleasure (ton... hédedn) in noble actions” mentioned by Plutarch.” Ptolemy, a disciple of Valentinus, does not discuss supramundane beings below the first tier, but he probably followed his teacher with regard to the supramundane beings of the second tier, for the reports of his teachings speak only of his de-

parture from his teacher with regard to the supramundane beings of the first tier.” In the foregoing survey we have seen how, with the exception of six systems, all the others mention an intermediate 7 John 1:14. “JyeTipe 58 1heB CORO %° John 14:16; 15:26; 16:7. Eleb, 1222. «John es 38. Che (Bina Heke 1 John 4:7-9. “Eph. 12225 5223: 8 Cf. above p. 515. OCa

or Dim 6215. ® John 1:13; 4:34. era Cona24s2 7. * 1 Cor. 1024. a Cor. ten John 1:1, 1:14-173 4:42. CED st. ” De Iside et Oriside 47, p. 370 A. cit: * Cf. above p. 528, n. 50.

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second tier of supramundane beings; how that tier consists

either of one being or of two or four or five or fourteen or twenty-three or thirty-two beings; how in all these systems this type of supramundane being was a survival from the preChristian syncretic pagan stock and was Christianized by its being transformed into either a preéxistent Christ or into a preexistent Christ supplemented by a Holy Spirit or into a multiplicity of preéxistent Christs and Holy Spirits; and how this Christianization is evident in names derived from Christian sources given to some of these intermediate supramundane beings. Of these names, such names, for instance, as Holy Spirit, Christ, Comforter (parakletos), are definitely of Christian origin, whereas such names as Wisdom, Son, Truth, and their like, may have had a non-Christian origin and have only been given a Christian meaning. (c) Creator None of the Gnostic systems which we have taken as the subject of our study assign the act of the creation of the world to that supramundane being which in their systems constitutes the supreme deity. In this they all resemble our two model Gnostic systems of Cerinthus and Simon. But as to who among the other supramundane beings is to be taken to be the creator of the world, there is a difference of opinion among them, not all of them agreeing with Cerinthus and Simon in assigning the task of creation exclusively to one or to some or to all of the supramundane beings of the third tier. On the whole, we shall find that with regard to this question they all fall into four groups.

The first group consists of those who, like Cerinthus and Simon, assign the act of the creation of the world either to one

or to some or to all of those generated supramundane beings who are called angels or some other name equivalent to angels. Of these, some merely attribute the act of creation to angels without explicitly identifying any of these angels with the

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God of the Old Testament. Thus Menander simply says that “the world was made by angels,” + and “‘Carpocrates and his followers” similarly simply say that “the world and the things which are therein were created by angels greatly inferior to the unbegotten Father.” ? But, as we have remarked in the case of Cerinthus and Simon, the assignment of the act of the creation of the world to angels implies the identification of the God of the Old Testament with one of these angels. Some, however, say explicitly that one of these angels who created the world is the God of the Old Testament, whereas the God of the New Testament is the supreme God who is at the top of all the supramundane beings. This view is shared by Saturninus, Basilides, Valentinus, the Ophites of Irenaeus, and the Barbelo-Gnostics. In Saturninus, “the world and all things therein” are said to have been made “by a certain company of seven angels” * and

“the God of the Jews” is said to have been “one of the angels.” In Basilides, both the Basilides of Irenaeus and the Basilides of Hippolytus, the task of creation is divided between two sets of supramundane beings of the third tier or between two individual supramundane beings of that tier: to the one is assigned the task of the creation of the translunar world; to the other the task of the creation of the sublunar world. In Basilides of Irenaeus,® the third tier of the supramundane beings consists of three hundred and sixty-five successive series of “powers and principalities and angels,” who occupy three hundred and sixty-five heavens which they themselves have successively created. The angels who occupy the lowest heaven formed all things which are in the world. Their chief

is he who is thought to be the God of the Jews. In Basilides of Hippolytus,* both the creator of the translunar part of the world and the creator of the sublunar part Pinenacussl 23705. Witkeie IG, ie

SIDI lea, 2 ° Tbid., 1, 24, 3-4.

DN eftake Me os Sie

° Hippolytus, VII, 23-24.

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of the world are, described by the term Demiurge.” But whereas

the former is called “the Great Archon” ® and is described as “Gneffable” (dppnros),® the latter is called simply “Archon” *° and is described as “effable” (jy7ds).1* Both these Archons are identified with the God of the Old Testament, the first Archon being he who was “imagining that He alone was God and that there was nothing higher than He,” and the second Archon being the one “who spoke to Moses”; and so also, he adds, “all the prophets who were before the Saviour spoke from that source [of inspiration].” In Valentinus, the creator of the world, who is placed outside the pleroma, is called Metropator, Apator, Demiurge, Father, and Hebdomas, and 1s referred to also as “being an angel bearing a likeness to God,” * and it is that Demiurge by whose inspiration * ‘all the prophets and the Law spoke” ” and who, “being incapable of recognizing any spiritual essences, imagined himself to be God alone, and declared through the prophets, ‘I am God, and besides me there is none else.’ ®” 17 This is probably also the view of Ptolemy, a disciple of Valentinus, for, as we have pointed out above, the reports of his teachings speak only of his departure from his teacher with regard to the supramundane beings of the first tier. In the Ophites of Irenaeus,'* the chief of the third tier of supramundane beings is called Ialdabaoth. Descending from him in succession, one from another, are the following six: Iao, Sabaoth, Adoneus, Eloeus, Oreus, and Astanpheus. All these seven are called heavens or potentates or virtues or angels or creators, all of them sitting in their proper order in heaven and ruling over things celestial and terrestrial. Their chief, Jaldabaoth, becoming uplifted in spirit and paraphrasing the words of the God of Israel,’® exclaimed: “I am Father and God, and above me there is no one.” "[bid., Vil, 23, 7; VU, 24, 4.

8 Tbid., Vil, 23, 6.

WWE, SMS Gs he

*Nsan46:93 ChaAgsss 6

°*Tbid., Vil, 25, 4.

* Tbid., VII, 25, 4-5.

*Trenaeus, I, 4, 5.

= bid. Nal ode 3. * bids Aly 25.4

“Irenaeus, I, 5, 1-2. * Hippolytus, VI, 35, 1.

** Ibid., I, 30, 5-6. * Cf. above n. 16.

GNOSTICISM

541

The Barbelo-Gnostics ”° call the chief of their third tier of supramundane beings by the name of Protarchon (First Beginner). He is described as “the framer of this creation” and as dwelling in “the firmament of heaven” which he himself has made. He is also described as having made “the powers which are under

him and angels and firmaments

and all things

earthly” and as having united himself with Authadia (audacity) and produced vice, jealousy, envy, fury, and concupiscence. Finally, he is described as having imagined himself to be the only being in existence and on that account declared, “I am a jealous God,”* and besides me there is no one.” ” In the system of Apelles, as we have said before,”* there is no mention of a supramundane being like that of the second tier in other Gnostic systems, but, according to the two reports of his system, one as found in pseudo-Tertullian and Epiphanius and the other as found in Hippolytus, his creator of the world is a supramundane being like that of the third tier in other Gnostic systems and is similarly called angel. In pseudo-Tertullian, Apelles is reported to have said of the God of the New Testament that “He made many powers and angels, therefore also another Virtue, which he affirms to be

called Lord, but represents as an angel. By him he will have it appear that the world was founded.” ** In Epiphanius, the report reads as follows: “Moreover, that same holy and good God, who from the beginning has been God and good, produced one other God, and it is this produced God who created all things, heaven and earth, and everything in the world.” As reported by Hippolytus, Apelles taught that “there is a certain good God as Marcion supposed, but he who created all things is just . . . and there is a third who spoke to Moses . and yet a fourth, a cause of evils. And he names these angels.” ?° Though Apelles does not say explicitly that the creator of the world was a generated being, by naming the last °° Irenaeus, I, 29, 4. * = Exod. 20:5. * ”Tsa. 45:5, 6; 46:9. * * Hippolytus, VII, 38, 15 cf. X, 20,

Cf. above p. §21. Pseudo- Tertullian, ddv. Omn. Haer. 6. Epiphanius, XLIV, 1. 1, and above p. 523.

542

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

three Old Testament Gods angels, he makes all of them, including the creator of the world, generated beings.

The second group consists of those systems which, like the systems of the first group, assign the act of creation to a supra-

mundane being identified with the God of the Old Testament, but, unlike those systems of the first group, they do not make that creator of the world a generated being and an angel placed

in the third tier; they make him an ungenerated being and a

supreme God by the side of the Christian God. To this group belong Cerdo, Marcion, Lucian, and Justinus. In Cerdo and Marcion the God of the Old Testament, who is the creator of the world, and the God of the New Testament, who is the Father of Jesus, are both described as supreme beings.” In Cerdo the contrast between these two supreme Gods is described as that the former was “known” and “just” but the latter was “unknown” and “good,” ** or that the former was “creator, evil, and known” but the latter was “good and unknown” ” or that the former was “cruel” and “creator of the world” but the latter was “good” and “superior.” *° In Marcion, the contrast between the God of the Old Testament and the God of the New Testament is described in a number of antitheses,** “one judicial, harsh, mighty in war; the other mild, placid, and simply good and excellent.” * The God of the Old Testament is further declared by him “to be the author of evils, to take delight in war, to be infirm in purpose, and even to be contrary to himself.” ** In sum, he is reported to have said, “the Demiurge of the world is wicked.” *

Lucian and Justinus, like Apelles of Hippolytus, whom we have discussed above,** attempt to subdivide the Old Testa* * * * “ * *

Cf. Tertullian, Adv. Marc. I, 2-3. Irenaeus, I, 27, 1; Hippolytus, VII, 37, 1. Fpiphanius, XLI, 1 (PG 41, 692 c). Pseudo-Tertullian, Adv. Omn. Haer. 6. Hippolytus, VII, 37, 2. Tertullian, Adv. Marc. I, 6. “Irenaeus, 5275-2. Hippolytus, VII, 30, 2, but in X, 19, 1, this description of his being

“wicked,” as distinguished from his being merely “just,” is attributed only

to some of his followers.

© Cf. above n. 26.

GNOSTICISM

543

ment God of Marcion into several Gods, one of whom, however, remains the creator of the world; but, unlike Apelles, they do not reduce the Old Testament Gods to angels. Like Marcion, they continue them in their status of supreme Gods. Lucian ** is reported to have said that there are three Gods, of whom one is “creator and judge and just,” another is “good” and a third is “evil.”

Justinus combines the good and evil deities of Marcion and the male and female deities of other Gnostic systems and thus arrives at three Gods. According to him, it is reported, there are “three unbegotten principles of all things.” One of them

is “male” and is called “good.”*’ The second, also “male,” is “father of all begotten things,” ** and is called “Elohim,” ® and it is this Elohim who “had built and fashioned the world.” *° The third is “female” and is called “Eden and Israel.” ** From Elohim and Eden were begotten twenty-four angels,** and these angels created beasts and man.

The third group consists of those who, like Paul and John, assign the act of creation of the world to one or more of those

supramundane beings whom they describe by terms which suggest the Holy Spirit and the Logos of Christianity, both of which terms, we take it, through a harmonization of Paul and

John like that found in the Apostolic Fathers,** refer to the preéxistent Christ. Unlike Paul and John, however, this group of Gnostics considered those inferior supramundane beings to whom they assign the act of creation not as mere instruments in carrying out the will of the supreme Deity but rather as primary agents of creation acting independently of the supreme Deity. To this group of Gnostics belong the Simonians of the Great Announcement and the Sethians. In the Great Announcement, it is the “Seventh Power,” which is identified both with the Logos and with the Holy Spirit, that is the creator of the world. Thus in one place,** °° Epiphanius, XLIII, 1 (PG 41, 817 pD). * Hippolytus, V, 26, r. QD 5 BO, TAS

8 Ibid. Did Na 20s De

pS eLOIG meN a2 Onis CU ial \UaeXon oe “Cf. above pp. 183 ff. “ Ibid., V, 26, 3-5.“ Hippolytus, VI, 13.

544.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS

after introducing a scriptural quotation with the words, “the Logos . . . says,” and adding that “he who thus speaks is the Seventh Power,” goes on to explain that “he is the cause of those fair things which Moses praised and said that they were very good.” ** Thus also in another place,*” after stating that it is the “Seventh Power” which is referred to in two scriptural verses, one in which “Wisdom” says that it was begotten before the ages #8 and the other in which the “Spirit of God” is said to have been borne over the water,*® and after also describing the “Seventh Power” almost in the terms of Paul’s description of the preéxistent Christ as “containing all things in itself” °° and as “an image of the Infinite Power,” ** he says that it “alone orders all things.” The Sethians seem to be following Philo » in taking the act of creation to consist of two creations, the creation of an intelligible ideal world and the creation of a visible corporeal world. The creation of the ideal world is taken by them to be the direct work of what they call the “three definite principles of all things,” ** namely, “light,” “uncontaminated spirit,” and “darkness,” ** the last of which Philo also calls “water.” ®® According to the Sethians, “from the first great concourse of the three principles came into being a certain great form (idéa) of a seal, of heaven and earth,” °° that is to say, the intelligible heaven and earth, and from the infinite concourses of the infinite powers of the three principles are necessarily produced “amages of infinite seals,” which images are “the forms (iSéav) of the different animals,” * that is to say, the intelligible animals. Then, again, according to them, from one of the three principles of all things, namely, water or darkness, was produced a supramundane being described as “the first-born prines Genwr13. “ Hippolytus, VI, 14, 3-4. “Cf. Prov. 8:23-25; Col. 1:15.

+ Ch. Genestea. “Ch. Cole resrs. = Ch Gols.

* Opif. 7, 293 10, 36-21, 66; 44, 129-130; 46, 134. Cf. Philo, I, pp. 306-310.

* Hippolytus, V, 19, 1. SDT RLOn 2 ie SINTlesWI NIG), fe CADid aN eTOve Te

Pal DId = \VamlOvnlO:

GNOSTICISM

545

ciple” and called “wind” ® and also “serpent,” °® and it is that “wind” or “serpent” which is the “cause of all generation” °° or “the principle of generation,” * that is to say, of the generation of things in the visible world. But associated with the “serpent” in the creation of things in the visible world is another supramundane being, called “the perfect Logos of the light on high” or “the Logos of God” ® or “the perfect Man” or simply “the Logos” ** and described as “having been made like the beast, the serpent.” °* Thus the creators of the visible world are two supramundane beings, the serpent and the Logos, both of them having derived their existence from ungenerated supramundane principles above them, the serpent from “darkness” or “water” and the Logos from “light.” No third tier of supramundane beings, corresponding to those of angels in other Gnostic systems, is mentioned in the reports of the teachings of this third group of Gnostics. But inasmuch as there is no reason to assume that this third group of Gnostics did not believe in a third tier of supramundane beings called angels, the omission of any mention of them may be only accidental. It is quite possible, therefore, that the angels, in whose existence they presumably believed, were also conceived by them as creators of the world together with the

preéxistent Christ, a view similar to that of the fourth group of Gnostics, which we are now going to discuss. The fourth group consists of those who combine Paul’s and John’s teachings that the world came into being through the preéxistent Christ, called by the former Holy Spirit and by the latter Logos, and the Gnostic teaching that the world came into being through an inferior tier of supramundane beings called angels. In this combination, the preéxistent Christ is probably taken to be the indirect cause of the creation of the world and the angels are taken to be the direct cause. If, as we

have tried to show,® the conception of the angels as creators Wala, ie, Wp E¥s °° Tbid., V, 19, 18. COUDIASUN pelOs 53.

® Tbid., V, 19, 18.

© Tbid., V, 19, 20. * [bid., V.105 202 ILIds V5 195 20% * Cf. above pp. 508-509.

5 46

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

of the world was taken by the Gnostics to have been sanctioned by Paul in his statement that the Law “was ordained through angels,” ° then the view of this fourth group of Gnostics that both the preéxistent Christ and angels were the creators of the world was ultimately meant to be a harmonization of that statement of Paul with his statement with regard to the preéxistent Christ that “all things were created through him.” * To this group of Gnostics belong the Naassenes and the Perates. As for the Naassenes, their assignment of the act of creation to the preéxistent Christ occurs in a passage where Hermes, who is identified by them with the Logos,®* is described as being “the Demiurge of the things that have been produced simultaneously, and that are being produced, and that will exist.” °° Their assignment of the act of creation to one of the angels occurs in a passage where “the Demiurge of this creation” is said by them to be “Esaldaios, the fiery God, a fourth number,” “° Esaldaios is an inferior deity," a sort of angel,

who is not the same as the preéxistent Christ. As for the Perates, their assignment of the act of creation to the preéxistent Christ occurs in two passages. First, there is the passage in which they say that “matter, being without

quality and unshaped, imprints into itself forms (iSéas) from the Son, which the Son imprinted into himself from the Father.” ” Second, there is the passage in which they say that “as one who paints animals, though he takes nothing away from the animals, yet transfers with his pencil to the drawingtablet all their forms (iséas), so the Son, by a power which

belongs to himself, transfers the paternal forms (yapaxrfpas) from the Father into matter.” "* In these passages, then, the Son, called also the Logos, whom, like Philo, they conceive of as the totality of ideas,” is said by them to impress these ideas 66

;

is ae 2

*

67

Col. 1:16.

68

Ly;

Hippolytus, IV, 48, 2; V, 7, 29.

* Ibid., V, 7, 30. Some texts read “Ialdabaoth” for “Esaldaios.” "Cf. Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis, p. 168, n. 4. ® Hippolytus, V, 17, 2. Pibid., Va tases. ™ Cf. above p. 535.

GNOSTICISM

547

or forms upon matter, which of itself is without quality and unshaped, the implication being that thereby the Son or Logos creates the things of the world out of an eternal preéxistent matter. Their assignment of the act of creation to a being who is not the preéxistent Christ occurs in a passage in which they say as follows:*® “When, therefore, the Saviour observes, ‘Your Father which is in heaven,’ “* he means Him from whom

the Son takes the forms

(yapaxrjpas)

and transfers them

hither. When, however, he remarks, ‘Your Father is a murderer from the beginning,’ he means the Ruler and Demiurge

of matter, who, receiving the forms (xapaxrffpas) transmitted by the Son, works generation here.” In this passage, as will be noticed, “the Ruler and Demiurge of matter,” identified with “your Father” described as a “murderer,” is different from both “your Father” described as being “in heaven,” that is to say, the Christian God, and from “the Son,” that is to say, the preéxistent Christ, who “takes the forms” from his “Father” who is “in heaven.” The “Father” who is “the Ruler and Demiurge of matter” is therefore to be identified with the God of the Old Testament, who in the other Gnostic systems, as we have seen, is placed at the head of the supramundane beings of the third tier and is described as the chief of the angels. That the Naassenes and the Perates in attributing the crea-

tion of the world both to the preéxistent Christ and to an angel did not heedlessly commit themselves to two contradictory views but rather, as we have tried to show, with full aware-

ness of what they were doing tried to present a harmonious composite view based upon two statements in Paul may be

confirmed by the fact that such a composite view was openly maintained by the Gnostic Heracleon in a passage of his lost commentary on the Gospel of John which has been preserved by Origen. Referring to Heracleon, Origen says: “He had also a private interpretation of his own of the words, ‘All

things were made through him,’ when he said that it was the ® Hippolytus, V, 17,7.“ Matt. 7:11.

™ Cf. John 8:44.

548 | THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS Logos who caused the Demiurge to make the world,” . . for he says, ‘It was not the Logos himself who made all things, as if acting under another who was the cause of the action

(évepyodvros),’ thus taking the phrase ‘through him’ in this sense, ‘but rather another made them, the Logos himself being the cause of the action.’” ”* In this passage it is quite clear that, according to Heracleon, while the world was created b him whom he calls the Demiurge, the Logos was still he through whom all things were made, inasmuch as it was he who was the cause behind the action of the Demiurge. In other words, in contrast to Origen, who interprets the phrase “through him” in the sense of through his instrumentality, thus making God the real creator and the Logos only the instrument of creation,*° Heracleon interprets the phrase “through him” in the sense of by his authority, thus making the Logos the real creator and the Demiurge, that is, the God of the Old Testament or the chief of the angels, only the instrument of creation.

In the foregoing survey we have seen how none of the Gnos-

tic systems examined assign the act of creation to their ungenerated supramundane being identified by them with the God of the New Testament. They assign it either, as in the

first group, to a generated supramundane being called angel and identified with the God of the Old Testament or, as in the

second group, to another ungenerated supramundane being called God and again identified with the God of the Old Testament or, as in the third group, to a supramundane being, either generated or ungenerated, identified with the preéxistent

Christ or, as in the fourth group, to both the supramundane being identified with the preéxistent Christ and the supramundane being identified with the God of the Old Testament or the chief angel, though, as we have suggested, the view of * Origen, In Joan. II, 8 (PG 14, 137 c); ed. Preuschen, II, 14, 102.

® [bid. (137 D-140 a); Il, 14, 103; A. E. Brooke, “The Fragments of Heracleon” Fr. 1, in Texts and Studies, 1, 4 (1891), pp. 51-53. © Cf. above p. 254 at n. 166. °

GNOSTICISM

549

the third group may not differ from that of the fourth group, the former being only an incomplete statement of the latter.

(d) Prolation In the model systems of Cerinthus and Simon, as may be recalled, of the three tiers of supramundane beings every lower tier is generated from the one above it. Then also, while in Cerinthus no special term is used as a description of that generation, in Simon the terms used for it are “leaping forth” and “emitted” as well as “generated,”* all of which describe a process which may be called “prolation.” In the other systems of Gnosticisms in which there is mention of more than one tier of supramundane beings, with the exception of the systems of Cerdo, Marcion, Lucian, and Justinus, in which there is only one tier but in that tier the second deity, the creator, corresponds to an angel in the third tier of other systems, and with the exception also of the system of Basilides of Hip-

polytus, the tiers of supramundane beings are similarly conceived as successive generations and the terms for generation used are always those suggestive of the generation of animals. We may illustrate this by examples from Menander, Basilides of Irenaeus, Carpocrates, Valentinus, the Ophites of Irenaeus, and Apelles. In Menander, while no special term is used in describing the origination of Ennoia from God, in dealing with the origin of the angels he says that they “have been emitted” (emzissa?

apoBd\nOyvar*).

In Carpocrates* there is no statement

as

to the origin of the angels, but inasmuch as the supreme deity, with respect to whom the angels are said to be

“much inferior,” is described as the “ungenerated (ayévvnros) Father,” it may be assumed that the angels, by contrast, would have been described by him as having been “generated.” In pseudo-Tertullian’s restatement of the same view of Carpoc-

rates, the angels are said to have been “emitted” (prolatos).° * Cf. above p. 516. *Trenaeus, 1, 23, 5. 3’Theodoret, Haer. Fabb. I, 2. “Irenaeus, I, 25, 1; Hippolytus, VII, 32, 1. 5 Adv. Omn. Haer. 3.

550

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

In Valentinus, the First Father or God is described as having

determined to emit (mpoBahéoOa, emittere) Mind and also as He who emitted (6 rpoBaddv, is qui emiserat) Mind.® Mind is described as that which emitted (apoBaheiv, emisisse) Logos and Life.” Similarly all the other supramundane beings are described as having been emitted (mpoBeBdnuévous, emissos).° Mind is also said to have emitted (apoBadréoOa, emisisse) Christ and the Holy Spirit.® Then all the supramundane beings

together are said to have emitted (zpoBadréoOa, emisisse) another preéxistent Christ, called Jesus, and this other preéxistent Christ is described as a “most perfect emission (7péBdnua, problema).” *° Basilides of Irenaeus, according to the Latin version of Irenaeus," is reported to have said “that Nous was first born (natum) of the unborn Father, that from it, again, was born

(natum) Logos.” According to the Greek text of Theodoret,” however, Basilides is reported to have said “that the unborn

Father first begot (yevvioar) Nous and that from Nous the Logos was emitted (apo8eBdyOjvor). Again, according to the Latin version of Irenaeus, Basilides is reported to have said that “from wisdom and power the virtues and princes and

angels [were born]” and that “by derivation

(derivatione)

from these, others were made (factos).” * In Theodoret, the same statements in Greek read that “from these (that is, wisdom and power) angels and archangels [were emitted]” and

that “by emanation (é€ dwoppotas) from these, other angels have come into being (yevouévous).” ™ In the Ophites of Irenaeus, the terms used in the Latin translation of Irenaeus are “going forth” (progrediens), “emitting” (emittens), “did generate” (generavit),° “did boil over” (superebullut),*°and “did emit” (emisit)." In the correspond®°Trenaeus, I, 1, 1. * [bid. pbid- weet. “Did lass bay tole My 63. sslbids l,.24,3* Theodoret, I, 4 (PG 83, 348 c).

* * * Sy

Trenaeus, loc. cit. Theodoret, loc. cit. Irenaeus, I, 30, 1. Lbids Ngo:

™Ibid., I, 30, 4.

GNOSTICISM

551

ing Greek text of Theodoret the terms used are “to have begotten” (aadoroujoa)'® and “emitted” (apoeBddero).1 Of four of the five exceptions, the systems of Cerdo, Marcion, Lucian, and Justinus, according to which the two deities are each independent of the other, we have already spoken. As

for the fifth exception, the system of Basilides of Hippolytus, it maintains that the inferior supramundane beings, namely, the three Sonhoods, the two Archons, the Sons of the two Archons, and the Holy Spirit, have all come into being out of nothing. According to this view, the three Sonhoods and the two Archons are said to have come into being from the “seed”

(oméppa) which was cast down by God-nonexistent.?° Since that “seed” is described as “the nonexistent (ovx« év) seed”! or as that which “came into being from nonexistent things (é ov« évrwv),” *’ the three Sonhoods and the two Archons may be said to have been created out of nothing. Similarly the Sons of the two Archons came out of the seed and hence out of nothing, for in the case of the son of the first Archon it is said

that the Archon “made (éoince) unto himself and generated (éyévvnoe) from the substrata (é« tév taoKepévwv) a Son,” 78 and from the context it is clear that by “substrata” is meant here the nonexistent seed. In the case of the Son of the second

Archon, it is said more clearly that “he created unto himself from the seed-mass a son.” ** As for the Holy Spirit, nothing is said about its origin, but we may assume that like the three Sonhoods and the two Sons of the Archons it came from the “seed” and hence from nothing. But a question may be raised with regard to the Old Testa-

ment God of Appelles, who corresponds to an angel in the third tier of other systems, whether He was generated by the supreme Christian God out of himself or whether He was

created by the supreme Christian God from nothing. Accord*® * * =

Theodoret, I, 14 (PG 83, 365 A). Tbid. (365 B). Hippolytus, VII, 21, 4-5. lathe, AUG Dis GF

” Tbid., VII, 22, 4. raIbid., AWWAUGS Pek, bye * Tbid., VU, 24, 4.

552

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

ing to both pseudo-Tertullian *° and Epiphanius,”* the supreme Christian God is said to have been made (fecisse, éwoinoe) “the Lord” or the “other God” who created the world. Now the term “made” usually means “created” and in this case it would undoubtedly mean created out of nothing. Subsequently, however, Epiphanius describes that “other God,” that is, the God

of the Old Testament, by the term yevdpevos,”” which term may be taken to mean either that he was “created” or that he was “generated.”

(e) Christology In the two model systems of Gnosticism, that of Cerinthus

and that of Simon, the earthly Jesus was conceived after the manner

of what later in the history of Christian doctrine

would be described as Monophysitical.* Jesus was of only one nature. But as to what that one nature was, these two model systems of Gnosticism differed. According to Cerinthus, he was only of a human nature. According to Simon, he was only of a divine nature. The view of Cerinthus may therefore be

described as Ebionitic Monophysitism; that of Simon as Docetic Monophysitism. In the other Gnostic systems which we have selected for examination, besides these two types of Monophysitism, the Ebionitic and the Docetic, there is a third type, which may be called Sidereal Monophysitism. But, in addition to these three

types of Monophysitism, there is in these Gnostic systems, corresponding to the orthodox Dyophysitism, a view which may be described as Polyphysitism. Representatives of Ebionitic Monophysitism are to be found

in Carpocrates and Justinus. Like Cerinthus, Carpocrates de-

clared that “Jesus was the son of Joseph, and was just like other men,” but by reason of the greater strength and purity of his soul, he was endowed with the gift of recollecting things he had seen before his birth in the sphere of the unbegotten * Adv. Omn. Haer. 6. *° Adv. Haer. Panar. XLIV (PG 41, 821 c).

* Ibid. *Cf. above pp. 433 ff.

GNOSTICISM

553

God.’ This would seem to be an interpretation of the prophetic

gift which came to him with the descent upon him of the Holy Spirit in terms of Plato’s theory of recollection. In Philo, as we have seen, prophecy was used as a substitution for Plato’s recollection.® A similar Ebionitic view is reported in the name

of Justinus. Jesus, according to him, was the son of Joseph and Mary. At the age of twelve, he received the gift of prophecy from an angel called Baruch, who urged him to go out and preach unto men.‘ Representatives of Docetic Monophysitism are to be found in Menander, Saturninus, Basilides of Irenaeus, Cerdo, and Marcion. Menander,® who is described as the “successor” of Simon and, like Simon, “a Samaritan by birth,” is said to have affirmed that “he himself is the person who has been sent forth

from the invisible [Aeons or Power] as Saviour, for the deliverance of men.” This brief and vague statement means, we ma assume, that Menander claimed to have succeeded Simon as the

manifestation in human form of some supramundane being or of God himself, even as Simon before him claimed to have succeeded Simon of the Acts as the manifestation of God in human form. Thus, according to Menander’s claim neither he

nor his teacher Simon nor Jesus was a real human being; they were all mere appearances of God in human form. Saturninus is said to have declared “that the Saviour was without birth and without body and without figure and in appearance only was

he seen as a man.” ®Basilides of Irenaeus is reported to have said that Jesus “appeared on earth as a man” and that “accordingly he did not himself suffer death”; the one who suffered death was “Simon, a certain man of Cyrene,”* whose figure he changed, so that Simon was thought by people to be Jesus, ‘““while Jesus himself took the form of Simon and, standing by, laughed at them,” for “since he was an incorporeal power and ?Trenaeus, I, 25, 1. * Cf. Philo, Il, p. 10. * Hippolytus, V, 26, 29 5 Irenaeus, I, 23, 5; cf. Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. II, 26, 1; Theodoret, I, 2. °Trenaeus, I, 24, 2; cf. Hippolytus, VII, 28, 5; Theodoret, I, 3.

7 Cf. Matt. 27:32; Mark 15:21, Luke 23:26.

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the Nous of the unborn Father, he transformed himself as he pleased.” * Cerdo is said to have maintained that, as “the Son of

the superior God,” Jesus “‘was not in the substance of flesh,” that “he was only in a phantasmal shape,” that “he did not really suffer but only appeared to suffer,” and that “he was not born of a virgin, nay, he really was not born at all.” °Marcion is reported to have “repudiated altogether our Saviour’s birth,”

maintaining “that without birth, in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar, he came down from on high’”*° and “that he appeared as a man, but was not a man, and as incarnate, but was not incarnate; that he was manifested in appearance only and that he underwent neither birth nor suffering except in appearance.””"* Sidereal Monophysitism is a sort of combination of the Ebionitic and the Docetic Monophysitism. Like the former,

it maintains that Jesus had a real body; like the latter, it maintains that the body was not a human body. This type of Gnostic Monophysitism is represented by Apelles, as reported in

pseudo-Tertullian. According to him, Jesus had “a flesh which was not at all born” but was borrowed “from the stars and from the substances of the higher world,” arguing that the belief in “a body without nativity is nothing to be astonished at, because it has been permitted to angels to appear even amongst ourselves in the flesh without the intervention of the womb.” ” His use of the analogy of the appearance of angels in the form of human beings as an explanation of the incarnation shows that he considered the incarnation as a sort of transformation of a divine being into something terrestrial or more

specifically into something human, the like of which, as we have seen, lies at the basis of Docetism.* But there is the fol-

lowing difference between the Docetists and Apelles. To the *Irenaeus, I, 24, 4. A. Fortescue, in “Docetism,” ERE

IV, 833°, denies

that Basilides of Irenaeus was a Docete, maintaining that he “solved the Gnostic problem in the other way, by distinguishing the man Jesus from the Spirit, who entered into him at his baptism.” * Pseudo-Tertullian, Adv. Omn. Haer. 6, Epiphanius, XLI, 1.

* Hippolytus, VII, 31, 5. SAGE HG GH Sy

* Tertullian, De Carne Christi 6.

* Cf, above pp. 518 f.

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Docetists, the body assumed by Jesus is not real; it is only a phantasm. To Apelles, the body assumed by him is real, for, though the body assumed is not of human flesh, it is still a real body, for “it is composed of celestial elements,” ‘* and the celestial elements are real bodies and not mere appearances and phantasms. It will be with reference to the Docetic and Sidereal Monophysitisms that the Fathers accuse the Gnostics of decrying the historicity of the Gospel accounts of the birth

of Jesus. Gnostic Polyphysitism arose from a combination of two beliefs: (1) a belief, which, like that of the orthodox Fathers, maintained that, while in Jesus there was a passible nature, there was in him also an impassible nature, which came from a preéxistent Christ incarnate in him from birth, and (2) a belief in the multiplicity of preéxistent Christs. Out of this combination of beliefs, of necessity, there followed the view that in Jesus, besides his passible nature, there were as many impassible natures as there were preéxistent Christs who were incarnate in him from birth. Gnostic Polyphysitism is thus fundamentally a Dyophysitism, its many natures being reducible to two fundamental natures, namely, a nature which is passible and a nature which is impassible. Representatives of Polyphysitism are to be found in Valentinus, Basilides of Hippolytus, the Ophites of Irenaeus, and the Naassenes and Perates from among the Ophites of Hippolytus.

According to Valentinus, Jesus had four natures, coming from four different supramundane beings or preéxistent Christs. One is described as psychical (bvxuKds, animalis) and as having come from that supramundane being called Dem-

iurge 1° and as having “passed through Mary just as water flows through a tube.” The second is described briefly as that “ of the

dispensation (ék ris oixovouias, de dispositione) or more fully as “corporeal” (corporalis) and as having been “constructed

of the psychical nature (ex animali . . . constructam)” and “ Tertullian, op. cit. 8.

* Cf. above pp. 73-74. * Irenaeus, I, 7, 2; Epiphanius, XX XI, 22. All quotations in this paragraph which contain Greek followed by Latin are from these two works.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS

as having been worn by Jesus “for a dispensational purpose, in order that he might, in spite of his own unwillingness, be capable of meeting persons and being seen and touched by them, and even dying.” 7 That corporeal nature, however, had nothing material (7ateriale) in it,"* that is to say, it is made of a psychical substance which is free of that kind of matter of which ordinary bodies are made. How that corporeal nature was constructed out of the psychical is not explained. All that

is said is that it was “constructed with ineffable skill (appyre réxvy, inenarrabili arte)” or “wonderful and inenarrable skill (miro et inenarrabili rationis ingenio).”*® By that “ineffable skill” probably is meant that inexplicable transformation by which angels, according to Apelles,?° assume the form of human beings. But by its transformation into a corporeal nature, the psychical nature did not disappear. Either only part of it was transformed or the transformation was a sort of emanation in which the sources remained unexhausted. These two natures therefore continued to exist side by side. The third nature is

described as spiritual (zvevparixy, spiritualis) and as having come down from Achamoth.”! The fourth nature is described as that “of the Saviour” (ék tod Lwrfpos, de Salvatore) or the soterical (sotericiana) or columbine (columbina).*? These four natures are reduced to two, the impassible which includes the spiritual and soterical natures, and the passible, which includes the corporeal and psychical natures.

Four natures or rather parts are ascribed to Jesus also by Basilides of Hippolytus. They are as follows: (1) that which comes from what in his system is described as seed, and is

called “corporeal part” (cwparixdv pépos); (2) that which comes from the Archon in the Hebdomad; (3) that which “Tertullian, Adv.

Jesus came

Valent. 26. This view, that the corporeal nature

of

from the physical nature, which is stated by Tertullian ex-

plicitly and seems to have been assumed also by Irenaeus and Epiphanius,

represents,

according to Hippolytus,

the view of the Italian school

of

Valentinians, whereas the Eastern school maintained that the body of Jesus

came from the spiritual ee 8 Thid. * Cf. above p. 537.

Hippolytus, VI, 35, 5-7). ® Cf. above p. 554. ™ Tertullian, op. cit. 27.

ud

GNOSTICISM

comes from the Great Archon in the Ogdoad; (4) that which comes from the Holy Spirit in the firmament.”* But, as in Valentinus, these four natures are reduced to two, a passible, consisting of the corporeal nature, and an impassible, consisting of the other three natures. “That which was his corporeal part,” he says, “which was from the formlessness, suffered and returned to formlessness,” whereas the three incorporeal parts returned to their respective sources.™*

Three natures are assigned to Jesus by the Naassenes and the Perates. According to the Naassenes, God, who in their system consists of a bisexual Man, called Adamas, combined with a Son of Man, contains in himself three parts or natures, the intellectual, the psychical, and the earthly, and these three parts or natures “proceeded and came down together into one man,

Jesus who was born of Mary.” *° There was thus in Jesus an earthly nature besides a psychical and an intellectual nature.

No statement is reported in their name as to whether, as in Valentinus, both the earthly and the psychical natures in Jesus were passible nature in him According down “from

or, as in Basilides of Hippolytus, only the earthly was passible. to the Perates, a certain man called Christ came on high, from the unbegottenness and the first

section of the cosmos,” ** that is to say, Jesus came down

directly from God, who in their system is called “Father” and is described as “unbegotten.” 7’ But while he came down from the unbegotten God, he contained within himself “all the concretions and powers from the three parts of the cosmos,” **

that is to say, besides his being of the nature of that part of the cosmos described as (1) “Father” and “unbegotten,” Jesus shared also the natures of the two other parts of the cosmos, namely, (2) “son” or “infinite multitude of powers,” that is to say, the preéxistent Christ, who, like the Logos of Philo, is * Hippolytus, VII, 27, 10. * Ibid. V, 6, 7.

Hippolytus, 1d., V V, 12, 4. ** Ibid.

oe ippolytus, eeeV,

* Cf. above pp. 525-526. 12, 4.

558 | THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS the totality of powers,”® and (3) “matter” or “formal,” that is to say, the corporeal world of matter and form.*° Accordingly Jesus is described by them as “triple-natured and triple-bodied and triple-powered,” ** that is to say, he has in him the nature and the body and the power of the Father himself, the nature and the body and the power of the preéxistent Christ, and the nature and the body and the power of the material world. As to which of these three natures was passible, again, as the

Naassenes, they do not say. Three natures are assigned to Jesus by the Ophites of Irenaeus.*? Two of these natures came from two of their five supramundane beings of the second tier called Christ and Wisdom.** The third nature was the body which consisted of three parts, the psychical (animale), the spiritual (spzrituale), and the worldly (smundiale). Jesus, according to them, however, “being born of a Virgin by the working of God, was wiser and purer and more righteous than all men,” ** that is to say, his body by its very constitution was superior to that of all men.*° And because of this, “Christ conjoined with Wisdom descended, and so [Jesus] was made Jesus Christ.” °° This statement by itself does not make it clear whether the descent

of Christ conjoined with Wisdom was at the baptism of Jesus or at his birth, in the former case of which these Ophites would be Ebionists rather than Polyphysites. But their subsequent

statement that some disciples of Jesus were mistaken in thinking that the descent took place at his baptism,*” “not knowing

that Jesus was united to Christ,” °° shows that the union, according to their own view, took place before the baptism,° which could only mean that it took place at his birth. Of these three natures, only the third, the body, probably in all its * Cf. above p. 535. . Cf. above p. 526, n. 37.

* Irenaeus, I, 30, 12. 5,Cf. below pp. 592, 594.

Hippolytus, V, 12, 4. Irenaeus, I, 30, 12. SJ irenacuss le sonra. * [bid., I, 30, 13 and 14. * Cf. above p. 534. * Ibid., I, 30, 14. * So interpreted also by F. C. Baur in his Die christliche Gnosis, Pp. 190, n. 34. But see W. W. Harvey’s disagreement with this interpretation in his edition of Irenaeus, ad loc. (Vol. I, p. 240, n.).

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559

three parts, suffered at the crucifixion, for those natures which came from Christ and Wisdom departed prior to the crucifixion.

There is no way of telling how the person of Jesus was conceived by those Gnostic sects of whose teachings on this subject there are no reports. In the case of the Sethians, however, the report of their teachings contains an allegorical interpretation of the New Testament account of the incarnation, both

the Johannine account as expressed in the words “and the Logos became flesh” *° and the account of Matthew

as ex-

pressed in the quotation from Isaiah, “Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son.” *' Interpreting these New Testament accounts of the incarnation as referring to the process of the creation of the world, they describe the process of the creation of the world as having been accomplished by “the descent of the Logos of God into the womb of a virgin.” *? What this allegorical interpretation of the New Testament accounts

of the birth of Jesus implies with regard to the Sethian belief as to the person of Jesus, whether he was a real man or only the appearance of a man, or even whether the story of his

existence should be taken as a fact or only as an allegory, is a matter of conjecture. V. GNOsTICISM AND PHILOSOHY

The Fathers, in their attempt to discredit Gnosticism, tried to show that neither were its doctrines taken from Scripture nor were they new.’ As evidence of lack of novelty in those Gnostic doctrines they undertook to show the sources from which they were taken. The sources mentioned by them fall, on the whole, into two main groups, the beliefs of various heathenish religions and the opinions of various Greek philosophers, and these two groups of sources are used by them inJohn 1:14. “Isa. 7:14 and Matt. 1:23. “ Hippolytus, V, 19, 20. 1Trenaeus, I, 8, 1; I, 14, 2; Hippolytus, VI, 3; VII, 5.

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discriminately, very often both of them as the source of the same doctrine. Irenaeus tries to show that the system of Valentinus is taken from the mythologies in the works of Antiphanes,” Homer,’ and Hesiod,* as well as from the philosophies of the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, Democritus, Anaxagoras, the Cynics, Plato, and Epicurus,* testifying also that among the images worshiped by the Gnostics there were, besides the image of Christ, also “the images of the philosophers of the world, that is to say, the images of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the rest.” ° Similarly Hippolytus tries to show how the systems of various Gnostics were taken from both heathenish religions and philosophy. Thus —to name them in the order in which they occur in his work — the system of the Naassenes was taken from the Greek philosophers” and from the mysteries of the Assyrians,’ Chaldaeans,® Phrygians,” Egyptians,’ Thracians,’* and Athenians;* that of the Perates from the astrological art of the Chaldaeans;** that of the Sethians from “physicists” * and from “the ancient theologians

Musaeus, Linus, and Orpheus”; ** that of Justinus from “the marvelous tales of Herodotus”; ** that of Simon Magus from “magicians and poets”;"* that of Valentinus from the Pythagoreans and Platonists;° that of Secundus, Ptolemy, and Herocleon from “the wise men among the Greeks”; *° that of Marcus and Colarbasus from “magical arts and Pythagorean numbers”; 7! that of the Simonian Great Announcement from Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle; ?? that of Basilides from Aristotle; ** that of Marcion from Empedocles; ** that of Cerinthus *Trenaeus, II, 14, 1. “Yierte Me te, Ge Odell Vaso. *Tbid., Il, 14, 2-6. “Ibid, Vy 23 V,775.6 (Ch. Vs, 75.0 andi2o).

ei bids, ” Tbid., She, Did 1D SL UIC bid * Tbid., “Ibid,

ieee Me ois O. “Hippolytus, V, 2.

Neva. 16. * Ibid. Vite. de ClLN A. V, 7, 20. SULDida Nts: Mo Gy ee * [bid., VI, 2; cf. Acts 8:9. NVGiSs) 13 MV lbid., Nip guctaV I, 2i5.1.and 35 Ni8s°30: Did VW laa. AVE, SH CUVR IO 3 * Ibid. Vijes: Ni2owle * Ibid., V1, 9, 3 and 6. VIL, 25. VIL t§31972ts VIL, 24). 12. Vil, 5; cf VIL) 29.0

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561

from the Egyptians; ** that of Cedro again from Empedocles; *® and that of Apelles from “the physicists.” ?* The manner in which the Gnostics used the philosophers is characterized by Irenaeus in the following passage: “They also bring together the things which have been said by all those who were ignorant of God and who are termed philosophers; and, sewing together, as it were, a motley garment out of a heap of miserable rags, they have, by their subtle manner of expression, furnished themselves with a cloak which is really not their own.” ?° A similar view is expressed by Hippolytus in the following passage: “Starting with opinions borrowed from philosophers and like cobblers patching together, according to their own particular interpretation, the blunders of the ancients, the heresiarchs have advanced them as novelties to those who can be deceived.” ”® The passages in which the Fathers discuss the philosophic origins of certain Gnostic ideas show no evidence that the

original Gnostic texts drawn upon by them contained any direct references to philosophers. The search for philosophic origins would seem to have been started by the Fathers themselves. The motive behind that search was a desire to discredit Gnosticism by showing up its foreign origin. The method employed by them in establishing philosophic origins consisted in

an attempt to find philosophic parallels or analogies for Gnostic views. Within the field of the two problems to which we have thus far confined our discussion, the particular views for which the Fathers, in the passages quoted, claimed to have found philosophic origins are four: (1) the distinction between the upper and the lower world; (2) the denizens of the upper world and their various groupings; (3) Basilides’ description of God as nonexistent; (4) Marcion’s description of the Old Testament God as bad and of the New Testament God as

good; though, as we shall see, the docetic conception of the person of Jesus, which is characteristic of some Gnostic sys2 Tbid.wNALaT. * Trenaeus, II, 14, 2.

6 Ibid., VI, 10. ZT Bidss Ville 12s ” Hippolytus, V, 6, 2.

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tems, is also given a philosophic origin by Hippolytus

in his

discussion of the heresy of Noetus. Let us examine these attempts of the Fathers in tracing these four Gnostic views to philosophy. Irenaeus *° begins by trying to show a philosophic origin for the Valentinian description of this world below as “vacuum” and the things within it as “nonexistence” (”on esse), in contrast to their description of the world above as “‘pleroma” and of the things within it as “existence” (esse). This contrast, he says, is taken from Democritus and Epicurus, who contrast “Vacuum” and “‘atoms” and describe the former as “that which

does not exist” (quod non est) and the latter as “something of existence” (quid esse). The reference here is to Democritus’

identification of “atoms” with “plenum” (7d wAfpes) and his description of it as “existent” (é), in contrast to the “vacuum” which he describes as “nonexistent” (ov« dv),** the assumption being that the Valentinian “pleroma” is the same as the Demo-

critean “pléres.” Then in the course of his discussion, Irenaeus takes up another contrast made by the Valentinians between the lower and the upper world. The world below, he says, is called by them “shadow” (wmbra) and the things within it are described by them as being merely “images of those things which really

exist (7magines eorum quae sunt),” in contrast to those really existent things themselves which are called by them “images

which are on high (imagines quae sunt sursum).” ** This conception of the existence of “images on high” of which things below are “images” in the sense of “shadow,” he adds, is borrowed from Democritus and Plato. His statement with regard to Democritus reads as follows: “For Democritus was first who maintained that numerous and diverse expressed figures * Irenaeus, I, 14, 3.

* Aristotle, Phys. I, 5, 188a, 22-23; cf. Hippolytus, I, 13, 2; I, 22, 1. *I follow here the reading of the Clermont Ms. which, as recorded in Harvey’s edition ad loc. (Vol. I, p. 293, n. 3), omits “eorum” between “imagines” and “quae.” With “eorum,” the text makes no sense, so that, in order to make sense, Heinrich Hand, in his German translation, was com-

pelled to emend “sursum” by “deorsum.”

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563

(figuras expressas) descended from the universe (uwniversitate) into this world.” ** The reference here is to Democritus’ teaching that “in that which is surrounding” (év 76 wepiéxovze), that is to say, in the air surrounding this world of ours,** there are “extraordinary figures (eiSwda) of human shape” * which “ampinge on men.” ** In this passage of Irenaeus, Democritus’ “air surrounding this world of ours” is simply referred to as the “universe,” ** his “extraordinary images of human shape”

are sunply referred to as “expressed figures,” and his statement that they “impinge on men” is expressed by the statement that they “descended into this world.” As for his statement with regard to Plato, it reads as follows: “But Plato, for his part, speaks of matter and pattern and God.” ** The reference is to certain doxographic summarizations of Plato, which attribute to him three principles, “God, matter, and the idea,” *° in the reproduction of which Irenaeus substituted “pattern”

(exemplum = mapddevypa) for “idea.” *° But perhaps, in this attempt of his to show how the Valentinians were dependent upon Plato, Irenaeus also had in mind Plato’s use of the term “shadows” (oxvat)** and “image” (eixév)* as a description of

this world below, in contrast to the ideas in the world above

which he describes by their respective opposite terms “the truly existent things” (ra évra) ** and “patterns” (aapadetypara).** Irenaeus thus concludes that the Valentinians, by

merely changing Democritus’

“figures” and Plato’s “pat-

8 Irenaeus, II, 14, 3. Cf. notes ad Joc. in ed. Harvey (Vol. I, p. 292, n. 4) and in ed. Mannuci (p. 364, n. 1). Cf. also Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, I, 2°, p. 1160, n. 1. * Sextus, Adv. Phys. I, 42.

% Tbid. * thd. 1, 19} * Cf. a similar expression in Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I, 43, 120: “Tum enim censet imagines divinitate praeditas inesse in universitate rerum.”

*8 Irenaeus, II, 14, 3; cf. note ad loc. in ed. Harvey (Vol. I, p. 293, n. 1). ® Aetius, Placita I, 3, 21. “Cf. Hippolytus, I, 19, 1, and note ad loc. in ed. Wendland.

above pp. “ Rep. “Tim. Rep.

259, N. 7; 261, N. 25. VII, 515 A; 532 B, C. 29 B. VIL, 532 c.

“Tim. 28 A.

Cf. also

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terns” *° to “images on high,” “boast themselves as being discoverers and contrivers of this kind of imaginary fiction.” It must be remarked that Irenaeus’ statement that the Valentinians substituted “images on high” for Democritus’ “figures” is only partly right. It is right only in so far as Democritus used the term “figures” (ei8wAa) rather than the term “images”

(eixoves). However, the term “images” for Democritus’ “figures” is already to be found in Greek philosophy *° before Valentinus. Similarly his statement that they substituted ‘“amages on high” for Plato’s “patterns” or “ideas” is again only partly right. It is right only in so far as Plato never used the term “images” for the term “ideas.” However, the use of the term “image” as a description of the “ideas” of Plato was introduced by Philo, when he described the Logos, which is the totality of the ideas, by the term “image,” ** and therein, as we have seen, he was followed by Origen.** In fact, the very use of the term “image” in two senses as found in the Valentinians, one in the sense of the Platonic ideas and the other in the sense of the sensible copies of these ideas, is traceable to Philo.*®

Just as Democritus and Epicurus and Plato are taken by Irenaeus to be the source of the Valentinian descriptions of the distinctions between the upper world and the lower world, so are the Pythagoreans taken by him to be the source of the Valentinian division of the original thirty Aeons within the pleroma into an ogdoad and decad and dodecad.” Beginning with a sketch of the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, he tells us that they “affirm that hen (év) — that is, one — is the first “In the statement “figuras illius et exemplum,” on the basis of the statement preceding it, quite evidently “figuras” refers to the view of Democ-

ritus and “exemplum” to that of Plato. In Plato the term efdwda

(Rep. VII,

532 B, c), for which the Latin translation of Irenaeus uses here “figurae,” does not stand for the ideas or what the Valentinians, according to Irenaeus, een. on high” (cf. James Adam’s edition of the Republic, Vol. “Cf. “Wortindex”

to Diels, Die Fragmente

der Vorsokratiker®,

eikov,

“Cf. Philo, I, p. 238.

“ Cf. Philo, I, p. 238.

“Cf. above pp. 270 f.

© Cf. above p. 536, n. 50.

under

GNOSTICISM

565

principle of all things. . . From this, moreover, proceeded the dyad, the tetrad, the pentad, and the manifold generation of the others. These things the heretics repeat, word for word, with reference to their pleroma and Bythus, whence they also strive to introduce those conjunctions which proceed from unity.” °* It is quite clear that what he means to say is that the classification of Valentinus’ thirty Aeons into an ogdoad, decad, and dodecad, at the head of which is the “preéxistent Aeon,” Bythus, with its coexistent female Aeon, Sige,*? corresponds to what he describes here in the Pythagorean system as the hen, the dyad, the tetrad, and the pentad. How the two correspond to each other he does not tell us. Harvey suggests: “the term Hen representing Bythus and Sige, Dyas may be taken as the first two pair of Aeons, Tetras for the Ogdoad, and Pentas for the Decad evolved by Logos and Zoe.” ** While Irenaeus traces the Valentinian description of the distinction between the two worlds to Democritus and Epicurus and Plato and the emanations as well as the groupings of the Aeons within the upper world to the Pythagoreans, Hippolytus traces them all to the Pythagoreans and Plato. Starting out with the statement that Plato’s distinction between the two worlds, which he describes by the Philonic terms “intelligible world” (xécpos vonrés) and sensible world (xdcpos aic6n76s),°* as well as the rest of his philosophy, is traceable to the Pythagoreans * and ultimately to the Egyptians °° and to Zoroaster,”” he proceeds to show how that distinction appears in the philosophy of Pythagoras. According to Pythagoras, he says, the principle of all things is the “male monad,” from it is generated the dyad, which is female, and from the dyad

the triad, which is male, and from the triad the tetrad, which is female. From this four (1 + 2 + 3 +4) was constructed the perfect number, the decad.** The decad is a “sacred TetTrenaeus, II, 14, 6.

* Cf. above p. 523, n. 23.

* Harvey in his edition of Irenaeus, ad loc., Vol. I, p. 299, n. 1.

* Hippolytus, VI, 24, 1-3; cf. Philo, I, p. 227. ® Hippolytus, VI, 21, 1. PDId Nil 2 ies

Ibid... NA, 23, 2° ® Hippolytus, I, 2, 6-8; VI, 23, 1-3.

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ractys” °° and “the Tetractys is the originating principle of natural and solid bodies as the monad is of the intelligible ones.” © “There were, then, according to Pythagoras,” he concludes, “two worlds: one intelligible, which has the monad for an originating principle; the other sensible.” * This distinction between three kinds of beings, (1) a monad, (2) an intelligible world, and (3) a sensible world, Hippolytus then proceeds to show, is to be found also in Plato, not only in the Timaeus,” but also in his Second Epistle. In that Epistle, Plato speaks of “the King of all,” about whom “all things are” and who is “the cause of all that is beautiful”; of “the second,” about whom “the secondary things are”; and of “the third,” about whom “the tertiary things are.” ° After having sketched these views in Pythagoras and Plato, Hippolytus tries to show the dependence of Valentinus on Pythagoras and Plato. Valentinus’ “unbegotten Father,” he says, is Pythagoras’ “monad” ** and Plato’s “King of all” ® and Valentinus’ pleroma with its Aeons is Pythagoras’ “intelligible world” °° and Plato’s “second” and “secondary things.” ** Within that pleroma, he proceeds to say, Valentinus’ triplicate “dyad” is Pythagoras’ “dyad,” Valentinus’ “decad” is Pythagoras’ “decad,” which is the perfect number,® and Valentinus’ “dodecad” is Pythagoras’ first imperfect even number after the decad.® Tertullian, like Irenaeus and Hippolytus, finds in Plato the philosophic source of what he himself in one passage describes as “those inexplicable genealogies of the Valentinian Aeons,” “° which inhabit the upper world. In another passage, one in which he finds Plato to be the source of certain errors in the Gnostic theory of the soul, he similarly remarks that “in this ® [bid., 1, 2, 9. On the Quaternion (rerpaxris), see Sagnard, La Gnose Valentinienne, Pp: 337-348. * Tbid., V1, 24,1 bid. lavas as © Tbid., Wile oieersmVily 224 Te ° Tbid., VIL, 37, 23 cf=Plato, Epist. Il, 312 5. Sal Did = Nile 20sn5 SLD id aN lana * Tbid., VI, 37, 6 °° [bid., VI, 24, 1 and VI, 29, 1. * Tbid., VI, 29, 6-8. * [bid.,. V1, 30; 1-23 cial; 2hop ay 23; 3 ® De Carne Christi 24.

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philosophy,” that is, in the Platonic theory of ideas, “lie both

their Aeons and genealogies.” ™ A combination of Heraclitus and Plato and Aristotle is offered by Hippolytus as the philosophic source of the system of the Great Announcement which is attributed to Simon. In one passage he quotes Simon as saying that “fire is the principle of all things,” “ that that fire is a “boundless power” ** in which there is a twofold nature, of which parts are hidden and parts manifest,"* that “the hidden parts have been hidden in the manifest parts of the fire, and the manifest parts of the fire have come into being from the hidden,” and that “the manifest part of the fire contains within itself all which one can perceive [as something sensible] . . . but the hidden part contains everything which one can perceive as something intelligible.” *° In another passage he quotes Simon as saying that a certain supramundane being, called “he who stood, stands, and will stand,” is “a masculo-feminine power after the likeness of the preéxisting boundless power,” ™ from which it may be

inferred that the two natures of the boundless power or fire, which previously in the first passage were described as hidden and manifest, are the same as those which now in the second passage are described as masculine and feminine. Commenting upon Simon’s view as quoted by him in the first passage, Hippolytus says that the statement that “fire is the principle of all things” is a misunderstanding of Moses’ statement that “God is a burning and consuming fire” “* and a plagiarism from Heraclitus,”® and the distinction of a “hidden” and a “manifest”

nature in fire is “what Aristotle calls potentiality (8vvapts) and actuality (évépyea) or what Plato calls intelligible (vonrév) and sensible (aicAnrév).”*°The arrangement of terms in this passage, it may be remarked, is by itself not sufficient to

show how the terms are correlated by Hippolytus, but from ™De Anima 18.

NS hi : is eee ee ie 4 Thid. CUDIa NAO 6.

(ST bid, Nil, (9.7. TDida NAG Ss Ae ie eer peu i Exod. 24:17. * Hippolytus, VI, 9, 3. “ih, Woy Ce

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the context of the passage it is quite clear that the “intelligible’ of Plato is correlated by him with the “potential” of Aristotle

’

and his own “hidden” and that the “sensible” of Plato is correlated by him with the “actual” of Aristotle and his own “‘manifest.” In this passage, the reference to Heraclitus is correct, for the statement quoted from Simon with regard to fire is to be found in Heraclitus.*! So also is the reference to Aristotle correct, for the “hidden,” from its description, quite evidently refers to what Aristotle would call potentiality and the “manifest,” again from its description, quite evidently refers to what Aristotle would call actuality. But his reference to Plato is not quite correct. To be sure, there is in Plato a distinction between “4ntelligible” and “sensible” *? and the term “sensible” could be applied by him after a manner, to what Aristotle calls “actuality,” and quite evidently also to what Simon calls “manifest.” In fact Plato calls the “sensible” also “visible” (éparév),**

which is only another word for Simon’s “manifest” (davepédv). There is no statement, however, in Plato where the term ‘“‘intelligible” is used by him with reference to what Aristotle calls “potentiality,” even though the Aristotelian concept of potentiality could be described as intelligible in so far as it can be grasped only by the intelligence. In Plato, however, the term intelligible is used only with reference to the ideas and with reference also to scientific knowledge in general,** neither of which would be described by him as potentiality in the Aristotelian sense of the term. Aristotle is also drawn upon by Hippolytus as the exclusive source of the system of his Basilides. We shall present first, in a rather free manner, Hippolytus’ sketch of Aristotle’s philosophy; then we shall restate his comparison of it with Basilides’ system. * Diels, Die

Fragmente der Vorsokratiker’, 22, Herakleitos, Lehre Ge

SELL T71as TACIGs 8 Tbid. 51 A. “ Rep. VI, 509 c-s11 8. Cf. Adam in his edition of the Republic, Vol. Il,

pp. 157 ff.

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What he describes as “the definition which Aristotle furnishes of God” is phrased by him to read that God is “‘a thinking on thinking (véno.s vojoews),” * to which he adds: “but this is altogether nonexistent (ovx dv).” ® Still this “nonexistent” God is “the cause of all these beautiful beings (dvrwv)” * which constitute the world. These beings which constitute the world are divided by Aristotle into substance (otcia) and accidents (cvpeBnxdra),°* and substance is divided by him into genus (yévos), species (e?dos), and individual (dromov).*? But accidents, argues Hippolytus, are nonexistent,*° inasmuch as “4t is impossible for any one of these to subsist itself by itself, but it must inhere in something else.” ** Similarly “genus” is nonexistent, for, while it is the generating principle of the species, “it is not itself any of the things generated.” * It follows, therefore, concludes Hippolytus, that the individual substance, which does not exist without the genus and without accidents, “derives its existence, according to Aristotle, from things nonexistent.”

With this restatement of the philosophy of Aristotle, Hippolytus then proceeds to show that Basilides will be found “not only potentially but in the very words and names to have transferred the tenets of Aristotle into our evangelical and saving doctrine,” in order to prove to his disciples that “Christ will in no wise profit them, since his tenets are heathenish.” ** The supreme God in Basilides’ system is described as “Nothing” (ovdév) * or “God-nonexistent” (ovK dv Geds).°° This, he says, is the same as the God of Aristotle who is described as “thinking on thinking” —a phrase he takes to mean the same as “nonexistent.” ®* Then “the God-nonexistent,” according to ® Cf. Metaph. XII, 9, 1074b, 34.

*" Ibid., VII, 19, 6.

* Hippolytus, VII, 19, 7.

Did. NLL Sense

° Tbid., VII, 15, 1; cf. Categ. 5, 3a, 36-39; 3b, 11-15. Cf. Aristotle’s statements that “the accidental is practically a mere name” (Metaph. VI, 2, 1026b, 13-14) and “is obviously akin to nonexistence” (ibid., 21). * Ibid., VI, 19, 9. “ Hippolytus, VII, 18, 5. bias Villy 16, 2:

%® Tbid., VIl, 20, 1. * Ibid. Cf. above p. 522, n. 6.

DIA

” Ibid.

VAN L851 Oe

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Basilides, “made the world out of things nonexistent, casting and depositing ‘some one seed that contained in itself a conglomeration of the germs of the world,” which seed is described as “the nonexistent seed of the world.” ** This “nonexistent seed of the world,” which has in itself the entire conglomeration of germs, says Hippolytus, is what Aristotle calls “genus,” for the nonexistent genus is divided into infinite species °° and is “a sort of aggregate made up of many and different germs. °*> In this passage, Hippolytus’ attempt to give an Aristotelian origin to Basilides’ description of God as “nonexistent” as well as to his description of the world as having come into existence “from things nonexistent” is based upon an interpretation of Aristotle which to us today seems rather peculiar. Even though God is described by Aristotle as being “a thinking on thinking,” He could not on that account be described as “nonexistent,” in the sense in which, we know, Aristotle himself uses the term “nonexistent,” which undoubtedly is also the sense in which Basilides uses it. Similarly, even though genera are said by Aristotle not to exist apart from individuals, they could not on that account be described as “nonexistent,” again, in the sense in which Aristotle, and undoubtedly also Basilides, use the term “nonexistent.” The origin of Basilides’ theory of creation as well as his description of God as “nonexistent” will be discussed by us later.*°* The philosophy of Empedocles is taken by Hippolytus as the source of the view of Cedro and Marcion that the two Gods, that of the Old Testament and that of the New Testament, represent two principles in the universe, an evil one and a good one. Marcion, as well as Cedro, according to him, supposes that there are “two principles of the universe, alleging one of them to be a certain good principle, but the other an evil one.” *° In propounding this doctrine, he says Marcion Ni atek., AU, Ong Zh, Niele Ws BA. = Tbid.,, Vil ersa 28 *™ Cf. below Vol. II, in the chapters on creation and divine predicates.

Hippolytus, VII, 29, 1.

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thought that “the multitude would not notice that he was not a disciple of Christ but of Empedocles, who, preceding him

by a long time, framed and taught the same opinions, namely, that there are two causes of the universe, strife and love.” 1° It may be remarked that, while in this passage Hippolytus attributes the doctrine of “strife (vetxos) and love (duAia)” to Empedocles, in another passage he attributes it to the Pythagoreans *°* and in a third passage, where it is phrased “discord (o7dous) and love,” he attributes it to Heraclitus.1 But

Hippolytus seems to have thought that Empedocles came before Heraclitus °° and belonged to the Pythagoreans.’”" In a fourth passage Hippolytus seems to suggest that Pythagoras had derived his doctrine of strife and love from Zoroaster’s doctrine of darkness and light.*°* On the whole, by the time of Hippolytus it was already well known that the belief in this

kind of dualism was shared by many religions and philosophies. Plutarch finds it to be the common belief of such religions as the Zoroastrian, the Chaldaean, and the Grecian, and of the systems of such philosophers as Heraclitus, Empedocles, the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and Plato. Analogous to this attempt on the part of Hippolytus to trace the origin of Cedro’s and Marcion’s differentiation of the God of the Old Testament and the God of the New Testament to Empedocles is the attempt on the part of the anti-Christian Celsus, with which Origen seems to agree, to find the origin of this differentiation in Plato. Evidently referring to orthodox

Christians and Gnostics, Celsus is quoted by Origen in one place as saying: “Let no one suppose that I am ignorant that some of them will concede that their God is the same as that

of the Jews, while others will maintain that he is another God, who is in opposition to that of the Jews, and that it was from 48 [bid., Vl, 29, 2. a aptela WAL Sa te SS Diaemnas 2. 18 Thid., Prooem. 3; I, 3-4. MOTI, 3, 35 1, 45.291, 53° V1, 25; 13) V1, 26, 2.,So also Heraclitus; 5). 28 Ibid., 1, 2, 12; cf. Harvey, “Preliminary Observations on the Gnostic System,” in his edition of Irenaeus, I, pp. xliv—xlv.

2 De Iside et Osiride, 46-48.

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Him that the Son came.” **° In another place, referring again to the Gnostics, ‘Celsus is quoted by Origen as saying: “Certain Christians, having misunderstood the words of Plato, loudly boast of a supercelestial God, thus ascending beyond the

heaven of the Jews.” * In this latter passage, what Celus means to say is that the Gnostic contention that the God of the New Testament is different from that of the Old Testament has its

origin in some misunderstood words of Plato. The misunderstood words of Plato to which Celsus refers are to be found, as suggested by Origen in the course of his comments on the statement of Celsus, in a passage in the Phaedrus, where Plato speaks of a “heaven,” in which Zeus reigns supreme,’ and of a “supercelestial place,” in which abides “the truly existent essence . visible only to the intelligence.” ""* The implication of Celsus’ statement is that the Gnostics, misunderstanding Plato to say that there are two gods, a celestial one and a supercelestial one, somehow conceived the idea of differentiating between the Old Testament God and the New Testament God by making the former to have his abode in heaven and the latter to have his abode above the heaven. Commenting upon the second quotation from Celsus, Origen says: “By these words, indeed, he does not make it clear

whether they also ascend beyond the God of the Jews, or only beyond the heaven by which they swear.” ** What Origen means by this cryptic remark is that Celsus’ statement lends itself to two interpretations. First, it may mean that “certain Christians,” by a misunderstanding of a passage in Plato, at-

tributed to the Jews a belief in one God who is in the heaven and claimed for themselves a belief in one God who is above

the heaven, denying that the God of the Jews is a true God. Second, it may mean that while the Jews, because they believed that the one and only God is above the heaven, swore by heaven even though they did not swear by God, “certain Christians,” by a misunderstanding of a passage in Plato, came |) Cont CelsaNenGrs "8 Ibid. 247 Cc.

sd ae, NW iG ™? Phaedr. 246 &. ™* Cont: Cels: Visii9:

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to believe that there were two Gods, an inferior in the heaven and a superior God who is above the hence, because they believed that there was a heaven, they refrained from swearing by heaven,

God who is heaven, and God in the in the same

way as the Jews refrained from swearing by God. This allusion to the difference between the Jews and “certain Christians” with regard to swearing by heaven made here by Origen

undoubtedly reflects two passages, one representing Judaism and the other Christianity. In the passage representing Judaism, Philo, after interpreting the commandment not to take the name of God in vain ** as meaning not to swear by the name

of God,"* says that “a person may add [by way of oath], if he wish, not indeed the highest and most venerable cause [of all things], but earth . . . [and] heaven.” ™” In the passage representing Christianity, Jesus is quoted as saying, “Swear not at all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth.” "8 What Origen, therefore, means by his comment is that Celsus’ vague

statement implies either (1) that the Gnostics, to whom he refers as “certain Christians,” believed only in one God, namely, the God of the New Testament, for the God of the Old Testament is not called by them God, or (2) that they believed in two Gods, for the God of the New Testament and

the God of the Old Testament are both called by them God. As we have seen above," the Gnostics differed among themselves with regard to the Old Testament God, whom they all distinguished from their own New Testament God, as to whether He was only an angel generated from God or an ungenerated being and God on a par with the New Testament God. But whatever Celsus may have meant by his statement, whether a belief in only one God or a belief in two Gods, Origen concludes that “those who acknowledge another God than the one worshiped by the Jews,” that is to say, the Gnos-

tics, are wrong, for the same God is worshiped by both Jews ™ Exod. 20:7.

us Matt. 5:34-35.

ate Spee. Aly a2

“ales

Ge

™° Cf. above pp. 538, 542.

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and Christians, and that God is “supercelestial,” and, what is of still greater importance, the conception of a supercelestial

God was not borrowed by the Jews from Plato, for it is to be found in the prophets, “who were older than he.” **° This is about all the philosophy that the Fathers found in Gnosticism: a few strange terms, upon which they forced some philosophic meanings; a world beyond ours, which they sought to identify with something found in philosophy; a duality of deities, in which they fancied they saw the teaching of some philosophers — enough, indeed, to strengthen their contention that the Gnostic beliefs were not based upon Scripture but not enough to prove, which they never tried to do, that the Gnostics were philosophers. None of the medleys of pagan and Christian beliefs attributed to the various masters of Gnosticism, as will have been noticed, was ever harmonized by them with philosophy so thoroughly and so systematically as was

Judaism by Philo and Christianity by the followers of Philo among the Fathers of the Church." > Gont, Gels..Vil, 10: ™ This judgment will stand even if we add all the possible traces of philosophic influence upon Gnosticism not dealt with by the Fathers. In his Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (1885), Harnack, after defining Gnosticism as “the acute secularizing and Hellenizing of Christianity” (I, 162-163), proceeds to describe it as “just Hellenism” (I, 163) and as “determined by the interests and doctrines of the philosophy of religion of the Greeks” (I, 165) and as “a speculative philosophy” (I, 167). Later, however, in the fourth edition of his work

(1909), he modified his view somewhat. While

still re-

taining his definition of Gnosticism as “the acute secularizing and Helleniz-

ing of Christianity” (I, 250), he rewrote the words “just Hellenism” to read “a mysteriosophic Hellenism”

(I, 250) and the statement “determined by the

interests and doctrines of the philosophy of religion of the Greeks” was qualified by the additional words “to be sure, themselves already involved in syncretism” (I, 252) and then the words “a speculative philosophy” were

changed to read “a speculative mystery philosophy” (I, 255). Cf. E. de Faye, Gnostiques et Gnosticisme

(1925), pp. 517 f. The prevailing view among

scholars today with regard to the relation of Gnosticism to philosophy is expressed in the following statements: (1) “It is a mistake to regard... Gnosticism as an intellectual tendency chiefly concerned with philosophical speculation, the reconciliation of religion with philosophy and theology” (W. Bousset, “Gnosticism,” EBr*, XII, 153°); (2) “While Gnosticism availed

itself freely of the language and ideas of philosophy, the appearance which it thus assumed was for the most part deceptive. It was not a speculative but a mythological system” (E. F. Scott, “Gnosticism,” ERE, VI, 234°).

CHAPTER

XVIII

HERESIES I. Tue Locicat Basis or THE HERESIES

Gnosticism, though generally included among the anathematized heresies, which are to be dealt with in the present chapter, was never banished from Christianity by a formal anathema of an Oecumenical Council; ? rather was its admission into it barred by argumentative discourses of individual Fathers. From the very beginning, the Fathers saw in Gnosticism not a mere erring deviation from established creeds on the part of pious believers but rather the intrusion of something alien from without. “For,” exclaims Irenaeus, “prior to Valentinus there were no Valentinians nor prior to Marcion were there Marcionites, nor in general were there the other malignant-minded people . . . until those who initiated and invented their perversity came into being.” * And Origen, speaking especially of the Ophites, maintains that it is wrong to regard them as Christians.* Constantly the Fathers repeated their slogan that Gnosticism was a strange doctrine and must not be admitted into the Church. Against its claim that the

God of the Old Testament, who is the creator of the world, is not the same as the God of the New Testament, who is the

father of Jesus, they repeatedly proclaimed their belief in “one God, the Father Almighty, who made the heaven and the earth and the seas and all that is therein.” * Against its claim that there was a multiplicity of preéxistent Christs they repeatedly 1A formal anathema

against the Gnostics in general and Cerdo and

Marcion in particular is to be found in the anathematisms of the Council of Braga, 563, which were primarily directed against Priscillianism (quoted in Hefele, § 285 (2, 4); Hahn, § 176 (II, IV); Denzinger, §§ 232, 234). ?Trenaeus, Adv. Haer. Ill, 4, 3 * Origen, Cont. Cels. III, 13; VI, 26, 28, 33; VII, 40. So also Cyril of Jerusalem says of Valentinus that, though he is called a Christian, he is not a Christian (Catech. VI, 17). ‘Irenaeus, op. cit., I, 10, 1; cf. Origen, De Princ. I, Praef. 4; Tertullian, De Praescr. Haer. 13.

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proclaimed their belief “in one Jesus Christ, the Son of God,” ® by which is meant one preéxistent Christ.* Against its claim that the generation of the preéxistent Christ was after the analogy of physical generation of animal beings, they repeatedly

proclaimed that the generation of the Logos was not by “abscission”* and not by “being divided” or “dissevered” * and not by “prolation.” ® Against its claim that Jesus was either a mere man or a God transformed in the mere appearance of a man they repeatedly proclaimed that he “was incarnate although God, and while made a man remained the God which He was.” ?° This constant hammering against Gnosticism succeeded in keeping it out of the Church, so that, when at the beginning of the fourth century the authoritative representatives of Christianity assembled in Nicea to discuss differences that had appeared within the Church itself, Gnosticism was not a subject of discussion. But by the time Christianity through its spokesmen entered

upon its campaign against Gnosticism, and partly as a result of that campaign,” it also began to speculate about its own beliefs. A true Gnosticism was set up against the false Gnos-

ticism. That true Gnosticism, like the false Gnosticism, was also to be a combination of the original Christian gnosis with a certain foreign gnosis. But the foreign gnosis which it tried to combine with the Christian gnosis was different from that of the false Gnosticism and different also was the method of their combination. The foreign gnosis was not mythology sprinkled over with a few philosophic terms, but rather philosophy as known as such among the Greeks. And the method of combination was not to take indiscriminately everything in

the foreign gnosis —in this case philosophy — and garb it in Christian vocabulary, but rather to select from that foreign 5 Trenaeus, Joc. cit.

°Cf. Origen, loc. cit., Tertullian, loc. cit. * Justin Martyr, Dial. 61 and 128; Tatian, Orat. ad Gr. 5. Cf. above p. 296.

*Clement of Alexandria, Strom. VII, 2° (PG 9, 408 c). Cf. above p. 297. * Origen, De Princ. IV, 4,1 (28); cf. I, 2, 6. Cf. above p. 297. * Origen, loc. cit.; cf. Irenaeus, loc. cit.; Tertullian, loc. cit.

“Cf. above pp. 13-14.

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gnosis or philosophy only that which when tested by certain presuppositions of the Christian gnosis has proved to contain certain kernels of truth, for, as says Clement of Alexandria, by philosophy he does not mean “the Stoic or the Platonic or the Epicurean or the Aristotelian but whatever has been well said by each of these sects, which teach righteousness along with a science pervaded by piety.” * But conversely, too, in that combination of the philosophic gnosis and the Christian gnosis, the method of reasoning employed in philosophy was adopted to explain, and hence also indirectly to scrutinize, the truths of Christianity. Philosophic scrutiny into established Christian beliefs brought to light certain inherent difficulties. Especially were such difficulties revealed in the belief about the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God and also about the relation of the born Christ to God. In each of these beliefs a certain inconsistency appeared. But inconsistencies in beliefs which were accepted as true were inconceivable. And so the need for a solution became urgent. In this search for a solution, two main methods suggested themselves. One was to harmonize the inconsistencies; the other was to eliminate one of the recalcitrant

elements. But if the method employed happened to be that of elimination, the further question arose as to which of the recalcitrant elements should be eliminated. Differences of method and of procedure led to differences of opinion and hence to controversies. All these controversies started within the body of Christianity which called itself catholic and among persons who held positions of authority within the Church. They all argued from commonly admitted premises, they all supported themselves by proof-texts of commonly recognized Scriptures, and they all claimed to represent the ancient tradition of Christianity. But the controversies were not allowed to go on as free individual discussions. Councils were called to decide which side was right. The decision of right and wrong was arrived at by majority vote. Those who won retained to them™ Serom. 1, 7

(PG 8, 732 D).

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selves the name catholic. Those who were voted down were anathematized and declared as heretics. Thus a statutory Catholicism of Christianity emerged to take the place of the consentaneous catholicism which had fought and won its victory over Gnosticism. This is the history of Christianity for over three centuries and a half, from the First Oecumenical Council at Nicea (325) to the Sixth Oecumenical Council at Constantinople (680). We shall now try to analyze the problems which arose in connection with the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God and also those which arose in connection with the relation of the born Christ to God, the two sets of problems under which we shall include all the heresies of that period. II. Heresies witH REGARD TO THE PREEXISTENT CHRIST

The problems arising from the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God had their origin in the two conflicting elements

which orthodox Christianity tried to harmonize. On the one hand, there was the original Jewish belief in the unity of God, which is reaffirmed in the repeated by the Fathers in of the heathens.” On the arisen belief that the Logos

New their other was

Testament’ assaults upon hand, there God * or that

and constantly the polytheism was the newly both the Logos

and the Holy Spirit were Gods.* Already by the time of Justin Martyr, with the very first attempts at the rationalization of

Christian beilefs, this inconsistency became apparent and the search of a solution began. The solution advanced by the orthodox Fathers has already

been unfolded by us.® It is a solution by harmonization, an attempt to combine, as Gregory of Nyssa characterizes it, the monotheism of the Jews and the polytheism of the Greeks.° The method of harmonization used by them was to thin down * Cf. above pp. 142, 306. *Cf. above pp. 242 ff. * Cf. above p. 89. *° Cf. above pp. 310-361. ° Cf. above p. 307. * Oratio Catechetica 3 (PG 45,17 D-20 A); cf. above p. 363.

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the Jewish monotheism as a concession to Greek polytheism. The unity of God was not to mean, as insisted upon by Philo,

absolute unity; it was to mean relative unity, or else it was to mean unity of rule. But within the then catholic Christianity there were those who felt that in the New Testament there was no warrant for a triune God such as would have to lead to an attenuation of the principle of the unity of God. The scriptural injunction, both of the Old Testament and of the New Testament, that God is one, to them, was to be understood in the Philonic sense, and generally in the Jewish sense, that He is absolutely one. Beside God so conceived as one neither the Logos nor the Holy Spirit could be conceived by them as God. In the New Testament they found no statement by which they felt themselves compelled to believe that the Logos and the Holy Spirit were each God, and this despite Paul’s description of the preéxistent Christ, whom he also called the Holy Spirit, as

being equal with God, and John’s description of the Logos as being God.’ However, already in the New Testament, in the baptismal formula as well as in the Epistles of Paul,’ both the Son and the Holy Spirit have been associated with God the

Father as objects of invocation and prayer and praise. There was thus already an established Trinitarian formula, which, they felt, must be preserved. This, they admitted, constituted

the fundamental faith of Christianity: catholic Christianity in its true sense. But once one had confessed his belief in the

Trinity, one was free to conceive of that Trinity in a way in

which it would not infringe upon the unity of God in the strict sense of the term. And so they felt that the true meaning - of the Logos and the Holy Spirit could not be that which through some misunderstanding had become current in the

Church. Their true lost meaning had to be searched after and rediscovered. And in their search for this true lost meaning of

the Logos and the Holy Spirit two alternatives suggested them"Cf. above pp. 305-306. ® Cf. above pp. 143, 147, 153 f.

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selves. First, the Logos has no reality as a being distinct from

God; it is only a power of God and hence it is God himself, its distinction from God being only as that of a mode of His manifestation to us. And what is true of the Logos is true also of the Holy Spirit. This view is usually referred to as Modalism, though in the case of some of its exponents, those who use the term “name” as a description of the Logos,® the term Nominalism would be a more appropriate description of their view. However, the difference that one may discern between Modalism and Nominalism was not a conscious issue with those Fathers who were battling against the reality of the Logos. Second, the Logos, though admitted to have a real existence, was conceived to have been created by God out of nothing, and consequently, like everything else created by God, is not to be thought of as God. And what is true of the Logos is true also of the Holy Spirit, though in the case of the Holy Spirit its creation may have come about by the intermediacy of the Logos. This view shall be referred to as Creationalism. We thus have two solutions of the difficulty by means of elimination. One eliminates the reality of the Logos but retains the description of it as God, using this description in the sense of its being identical with God. The other eliminates the description of the Logos as God but retains its description as a real being, using this description in the sense of its being a creation of God. The difficulty faced by faithful Christians with regard to what had already become the orthodox conception of the preexistent Christ, on the score of the unity of God, and the refuge they sought from it in the two alternative positions of Modalism and Creationalism is depicted by Origen. He says: “Now there is that which disturbs many who sincerely profess to be lovers of God. They are afraid that they may be proclaiming two Gods, and their fear drives them into doctrines which are false and wicked. Either they deny that the hy postasis

(iduéd7n7a) of the Son is different from that of the Father, and * Cf. above p. 310 and below p. 584.

HERESIES

581

make Him whom they call the Son to be God in all but name, or they deny the divinity of the Son, giving his hypostasis

(i8iérn7a) and essence (ovciay) a sphere of existence which falls outside that of the Father.” ?° The same difficulty faced by faithful Christians is also referred to by Tertullian, when he says: “The simple, indeed, —I will not call them unwise and unlearned — who always constitute the majority of believers,

are startled at the oixovouia, [that is, the dispensation of the Three in One], on the ground that their very rule of faith withdraws them from the world’s plurality of gods to the one only true God.” A reference to the first of these two alternative solutions is to be found, before the time of Origen, in a work by Justin Martyr, which was composed at about the middle of the second century. Justin Martyr himself, as we have seen, had solved the problem of triunity by interpreting the unity of God as preached in the Old and the New Testaments in the sense of unity of rule,” a conception of unity which to him did not exclude the existence of the Logos as a real personal being and as God. But there were others, he says, who, while admitting with him that there was a preéxistent Christ called Logos, took that Logos to be a “power” which is “indivisible and inseparable from the Father, just as they say that the light of the sun on earth is indivisible and inseparable from the sun

in the heavens.” 7° Who were those people who denied the reality of the Logos and took it to be only a power of God? Some scholars take

them to be a “class of Jewish theologians” * or “Jews of 0 Im Joan. Il, 2 (PG 14, 108 c-1og A), the term id:érns here is used in the sense of iméaracis (cf. E. A. Sophocles, Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods, s. v., and n. 77 in PG 14, 108). See also the use of the term “property” by Tertullian and Basil (above, p. 339, n. 21). Harnack, however, (DG, I*, p. 719, n. 3; Eng. III, p. 34, n. 3) seems to take this passage to refer

to the problem of Christology, that is, the problem of the relation of the born Christ to God. But cf. Entretien d’Origéne avec Heéraclide Evéques ses Collégues, ed. J. Scherer (1949), pp. 126, 128. ™ Adv. Prax. 3. 4 Cf. above p. 313. = Dial, 128: ™“Neander, Kirchengeschichte’, 1848, I, p. 597).

Il, pp. 1028-29

(Eng., 2nd Amer.

et les ed.,

582

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

Alexandrian culture,” or those who reflect “Jewish notions”;?®or, more specifically, followers of Philo.” In proof of this last view, they point to a similarity between the example of

the sun and its light used by Justin in the passage quoted and an example of the sun and its light used by Philo.’* It seems to us, however, that against this identification of the view men-

tioned by Justin with that of Philo two objections may be raised. In the first place, while indeed Philo uses the example of the sun and its rays to illustrate something about the Logos,

unlike those referred to by Justin, he does not use it as an illustration for the unreality of the Logos. What he uses it for is only to prove the incomprehensibility of God and also to explain such verses as “the Lord is my light,” ?® “Let there be light,” *° and “God divided the light from the darkness.” *! In the second place, on independent ground we have shown that Philo’s view,” like that of Justin Martyr,?* maintained that the antemundane Logos had two stages of existence and that, while during its first stage it existed only as a power in God, during its second stage it existed as a real being outside of

God. These anonymous people referred to by Justin were, therefore, neither Jews nor followers of Philo. They were Christians, who, like the Christians in the passage quoted above from Origen, “sincerely professed to be lovers of God” and tried to maintain the absolute unity of God. What they did was to reject the second stage in the existence of the Logos

held by both Philo and Justin, and to make it continue in what Philo as well as Justin would call its first stage of existence, an existence as a mere power of God. The Logos thus with * Dorner, ELPC,

I’, p. 421 (Eng. I, 1, p. 269); cf. also Otto, Justini . opera I, 2°, p. 458, n. 4, quoting also Weizsicker, “Die Theologie des Martyrers Justinus,” Jabrbicher ftir Deutsche Theologie, 12 (1867), p. 81, and Tixeront, HD, I’, p. 348 (Eng. I, p. 286). * Harnack, DG, I’, p. 217, n. 2 (Eng. I, p- 196, n. 1).

“Cf. G. Archambault, Justin: Dialogue avec Tryphon, CXXVIII. 3, Note

(vol. II, p. 258), referring also to Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria, P- 334, Geffcken, Zwei griech. Apolog., pp. 181-182. ** Somn. 1, 13, 72-76. aa Genmateae UES. AaIBT

” Cf. Philo, I, pp. 226 ff.

*®Gen, 1:3.

* Cf. above pp. 192-193.

HERESIES

583

them ceased to be a real being and was reduced to the status of those predicates of God which Philo calls names or properties of God.™* It is quite possible that, just as Philo’s conception of the Logos as a real being reflects an interpretation of the Platonic ideas as real beings,”* so this interpretation of the Christian Logos as a power within God without any real subsistence may reflect the interpretation of the Platonic ideas as mere thoughts of God which were common among late Platon-

ists."° Such an interpretation of the Platonic ideas, as we have seen, was known to the Fathers.?”

While those to whom Justin Martyr refers cannot be identified, a little later, toward the end of the second century and the beginning of the third, representatives of this view appear under the names of Praxeas, Noetus, Epigonus, Cleomenes, Callistus, Sabellius, Paul of Samosata, and Commodian. Out of this list of names we shall take as our subject of discussion Praxeas, Noetus, Sabellius, Paul of Samosata, and Commodian. All of them insist upon the unity of God in the absolute sense of the term. Concerning Praxeas and his followers it is said that “they will have the two to be but one, so that the Father shall be deemed to be the same as the Son,” ** for “He himself, they say, made himself a Son to himself.” *° Concerning Noetus it is said that “he thinks to establish monarchy by asserting that the Father and the Son so-called are one and

the same, not another from another but himself from himself.” ®° Concerning Sabellius it is said that he maintained that “Father and Son are the same” ** and “in hypostasis one.” * Concerning Paul of Samosata it is said that he believed that “God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one

God,” ** that is to say, one person.** And Commodian, speak* Cf. Philo, Il, pp. 127, 131-134. * Ibid., 1, pp. 181 ff., 200. * Cf. above p. 258. *" Cf. above p. 286. %1 Athanasius, Orat. cont. Arian. IV, 2 Ibid. Wi, 25 (505 ¢).

* Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 5. * Ibid. 10. *° Hippolytus, IX, 10, 11. (PG 26, 469 c).

* Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. LXV, 1 (PG 42, 13 A). * Ibid. LXV, 3 (16 8B).

584

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

ing for himself, says almost in the words quoted above as representing the views of Praxeas and Noetus: “God is omnipotent, one, having been created out of himself” *° and “Hereupon the Father went into the Son, one God everywhere,” *° by which he means that the Father and the Son are one person, for he immediately continues: “nor would He have been called Father had He not been made Son.” ** All of them similarly maintain that the term Logos is not to be taken as a real personal being. Concerning Praxeas and his followers it is said that they will not allow the Logos “to be really a substantive being, by having a substance of His own, in such a way that He may be regarded as an objective thing and a person, and so be able, as being constituted second to God the Father, to make two, the Father and the Son, God and the Word,” for they will say, “what is a word, but a voice and sound of the mouth, and, as the grammarians teach, air when struck against, intelligible to the ear, but for the rest a sort of void, empty, and incorporeal thing.” ** Concerning Noetus, it is said that “he thinks to establish monarchy by asserting the Father and the Son so-called are one and the same, not another from another, but himself from himself, and that He is called by the name of Father and Son according to the change of times.” *® Concerning Sabellius it is said that he maintained that “the Father is Son and again the Son Father, in hypostasis one, in name two,” *° or that the terms Father and Son and Holy Spirit are but actions (évépyear) or names

(dvoyaciar) and are to be compared to “the light and the heat and the circular form in the sun.” ** Concerning Paul of Samosata it is said that he held that “God’s Logos and His Holy Spirit are eternally in God [the Father], just as man’s own reason (Adyos) is in his heart; the Son of God has no sub* Carmen Apologeticum, v. 91, in Commodiani Carmina, ed B. Dombart. he Nis aah 8" Tbid., v. 278. * Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 7. * Hippolytus, LX, 10, 11. * Athanasius, Orat. cont. Arian. IV, 25 (PG 26, 505 c). “ Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. LXII, 1 (PG 41, 1052 8).

HERESIES

585 .

sistence of his own; it subsists in God [the Father].” 42 And Commodian speaking for himself describes God as one “who is called Father and Son and Holy Spirit.” * So much for the first of the two alternative unorthodox solutions of the problem of triunity, the one which retained the description of the Logos as God but denied its reality. We shall now take up the other alternative unorthodox solution, the one which retained the reality of the Logos but discarded the description of it as God. The first unorthodox solution of the problem of triunity, in so far as it discarded a second stage of existence in the Logos, that of its real existence, may be regarded as a reversal of Philo’s view of the Logos; the second solution, as we shall see, is a reversion to the original view of Philo. This second solution is that which is identified with the name of Arius. Like the Modalists before him, Arius tries to restore the

absolute unity which God had enjoyed under the philosophy of Philo. To this end he deprives both the Logos and the Holy Spirit of the Godhood with which they had been endowed by the philosophy of the Fathers. This act of depriving them of Godhood is accomplished by him in two logical stages. First, he rejects the principle of the eternal generation of the Logos, which was introduced by Irenaeus ** and Origen,*° and restores the twofold theory of the preéxistent Christ, which was held by the Apologists.*® Evidently making use, like Hippolytus, of Philo’s interpretation of the verse, “It is not good that man

should be alone (ydvov),” *” as meaning that it was good that God was alone before the Logos entered its second stage of existence,** he says, “God was not always Father, but there was [a time] when God was alone (yévos) and was not yet Father, but afterwards He became Father.” *° Second, he goes 2 [bide IOXV,-1, (13)A). * Carmen Apologeticum, Vv. 94. “Cf. above p. 198.

“Cf. above p. 201. “ Cf. above p. 192. * Gen. 2:18.

*8Philo, Leg. All. Il, 11, 1-2; Hippolytus,

Cont.

Haer,

Noeti

10; cf.

above p. 194. # Athanasius, Orat. cont. Arian. 1,5 (PG 26, 21 A); excerpted from Arius’ lost Thalia.

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THE

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OF THE

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FATHERS

further and departs also from the Apologists. Whereas to them the second stage of the existence of the Logos started when, prior to the creation of the world, God generated it by nature out of His own essence,” to Arius the second stage of its existence started when, prior to the creation of the world, God created it, like the creation of anything else in the world, by will (GeAjoe), out of things nonexistent (€€ ov« dévrwy), admitting, however, with the exponents of the twofold stage theory that, prior to its entrance upon its second stage of existence, the Logos had coexisted with God from eternity as a property of His essence.™* Arius thus returns to the original view of Philo. The Logos, like the matter out of which the world was created, was created by God from nothing. Like Philo, therefore, who says about the world that “there was a time when it was not” (jv mote Xpovos, OTe ovK HV),°” so also Arius says about the Logos that “there was [a time] when it was not” (Hv zoe, dre ovK

nv),°* which is in direct opposition to Origen’s statement about the Logos that “there never was [a time] when it was not”

(numquam fuit quando non fuit).°* Unlike Philo, however, Arius follows Christian tradition in identifying that created preéxistent Logos with the preéxistent Christ. But, then, that created preéxistent Christ, like the created preéxistent Logos of Philo, is not God ,and just as Philo, on finding in the Old Testament what seemed to be the application of the term “God” to the Logos, says that “He that is truly God is one” and that the Logos is only “improperly so called,” © so also Arius, referring to the application of the term “God” to the Logos in the New Testament,” says that “the Logos is not true God; though it is called God, yet it is not true God, but, by par°° Cf. above pp. 292-294. * Athanasius, loc. cit. (21 AB).

= Decal. 12.858:

* Athanasius, Joc. cit. (PG 26, 21 A). A similar statement, “There was, however, a time when neither sin nor the Son was — fuit autem tempus cum

et delictum et filius non fuit” (Adv. Hermog. 3), is made also by Tertullian, but Tertullian means by it only that there were two stages in the existence of the antemundane Logos and that during the first stage God was called neither judge nor Father (cf. above pp. 195, 217). ** De Princ. IV, 4, 1 (28); cf. above p. 202.

= Somn. I, 39, 229.

* John 1:1.

HERESIES

587

ticipation of grace, as all others, it is called God only in name.” °* And just as he held that the Logos was not generated from the essence of God but was created by God out of nothing so he probably also held that the Holy Spirit was created by God through the Logos,** undoubtedly, like the Logos itself, out of nothing, so that the essence of the Holy Spirit is described by him as being different not only from the essence

of God but also from the essence of the Logos.*® III. Heresies with REGARD TO THE Born Curist

Just as the controversies within catholic Christianity with regard to the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God arose as a reaction against the orthodox combination of two contradictory elements, described by Gregory of Nyssa as the mono-

theism of the Jews and the polytheism of the Greeks,’ so also the controversies with regard to the relation of the born Christ to God similarly arose, we shall now try to show, from the orthodox attempt to combine two contradictory conceptions

of Jesus, the Jewish and the pagan, or the Ebionitic and the Docetic. From the earliest times in the history of Christianity these two non-catholic views about the relation of the born Christ to God existed by the side of its gradually developing catholic

view. Ebionism represents the view of the original Jewish followers of Jesus, who conceived of him as a mere human being upon whom, as the promised Messiah, “the spirit of the Lord”

rested, “the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the Lord.” ? Docetism represents a view introduced by pagan con* Athanasius, op. cit. I, 6 (PG 26, 21 p f.). So also Origen in his comment on John 1:1 distinguishes, like Philo, between God with the article, which means the “very God”

(airédeos)

or “true God,” and God without

the article, which means the Logos who is made God “by participation in His divinity” (Jn Joan. II, 2, PG 14, 108 B f.). Cf Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p. 144. Unlike Arius, however, Origen is led by this distinction

only to subordinationism but not to a denial that the Logos is God. 8 Athanasius, Epist. ad Jovian. 1 (PG. 26, 816 B).

°° Id., Orat. cont. Arian. I, 5 (248). "Cf. above p. 363.

asa, 00s2:

588

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH

FATHERS

verts to Christianity who, after the analogy of pagan deities who

assumed

the appearance

of some

human

being, con-

ceived of Jesus not as a real human being but as God who only appeared in human form.*® These two conceptions of the born Christ, as we have seen, are to be found among the Gnostics: the Ebionitic in Cerinthus, Carpocrates, and Justinus;* the Docetic in Simon, Menander, Saturninus, Basilides of Irenaeus, Marcion, and, in a modified form, in Apelles.° The catholic Christian conception of the born Christ may be considered as a combination of these two extreme conceptions.

Jesus was not a mere appearance of God in human form; he was a real man; but he was not a mere man; he was also God. He was, as Tertullian puts it, “both man and God, the Son of man and the Son of God.’’® As man, he had a complete human nature besides his complete divine nature; as God, the person in him was only that of the Logos: the humanity in him was not a person. It is this view, which had been implicit in the orthodox teachings of catholic Christianity from its very beginning, that ultimately found expression in the formula of one person and two natures, the one person in him being the person of the Logos in him and the two natures being the natures of the Logos and the man in him. But just as the harmonization of what Gregory of Nyssa

described as the Jewish monotheism and the Greek polytheism in the conception of the preéxistent Christ roused opposition to it within catholic Christianity among those who insisted upon a rigid conception of the unity of God, so also the view

interposed between Jewish Ebionism and pagan Doceticism in the conception of the born Christ roused opposition to it within catholic Christianity, again among those who insisted upon a rigid conception of the unity of God. If there is to be one God, they argued, then Jesus can be no God, not even in part. And just as in the problem of the preéxistent Christ the opposition to the catholic conception of him fell into two ° Cf. above p. 519. * Cf. above, pp. 512, 552.

°Cf. above, pp. 516, 553, 554. * Adv. Prax. 2.

HERESIES

589

groups, one making the preéxistent Christ a mere mode of God and the other making him a mere creature of God, so now in the problem of the born Christ the opposition to the catholic conception of him fell also into two corresponding groups, one making the born Christ a mere appearance of God and the other making him a mere man. That it was the attempt to preserve the unity of God in its strict sense that gave rise within catholic Christianity to these two contrasting views with regard to the born Christ is attested by Novatian in a passage where, after referring to the Old and the New Testament as the source of true faith, he proceeds to say:’ “For both they

who say that Jesus Christ himself is God the Father and they who would have him to be only man have gathered thence

(from Scripture) the sources and reasons of their error and perversity, because, when they perceived that it was written that ‘God is one,’ * they thought that they could not otherwise hold such an opinion than by supposing that it must be believed either that Christ was man only or really God the Father.” In this passage, the expression “Christ was man only” reflects the Ebionitic alternative, whereas the expression “really God the Father” reflects the Docetic alternative. Thus Docetism and Ebionism, which were never part of catholic Christianity, were about to be brought into catholic Christianity by zealous catholic Christians. It was not, how-

ever, Docetism and Ebionism in their purest form that were to be brought into catholic Christianity, but each of them in some modified form, a sort of neo-Docetism and neo-Ebionism.

For, while like the old Docetism of the type we have met with in Simon, this new kind of Docetism took the incarnation to mean the transformation of God into the mere appearance of man, still, unlike the old Docetism as repre-

sented in Simon, which took the suffering of Jesus to be also a mere appearance,® it took the accounts of the suffering of Jesus to be literally true. And since to them Jesus, whose suffering Novation, De Trinit. 30.

§ Gal. 3:20; Deut. 6:4.

° Cf. above p. 519.

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THE

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OF THE

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FATHERS

was real, was not a real man but God the Father in the appearance of man, it follows that it was God the Father himself who

experienced all the real suffering that is ascribed to Jesus. It is for this reason that they are not called Docetists but rather Patripassians, that is to say, those who believed that it was the

Father himself who suffered in the passion of Jesus. But Patripassianism, as it was well said, cetism” #° or had an “affinity” while, like the old Ebionism of with in Cerinthus, this new kind

“was a higher form of Dowith Docetism.” Similarly, the type which we have met of Ebionism took the incarna-

tion to mean the indwelling of God or His Logos in Jesus as in any righteous man, still, unlike the old Ebionism as represented in Cerinthus, it attributed some miraculous element to

the birth of Jesus, either by making the indwelling to have begun with his birth ” or by making his birth to have been from a virgin.” One would expect that logically Modalists in the problem of the preéxistent Christ would be Docetists in the problem of the born Christ, and some Modalists indeed met this logical expectation and were Docetists. Similarly one would expect that logically Creationalists in the problem of the preéxistent Christ would be Ebionites in the problem of the born Christ, and, again, some Creationalists were Ebionites. But it also happens that some who preserved the unity of God in the problem of the preéxistent Christ by resorting to Modalism tried to preserve the unity of God in the problem of the born Christ by resorting to Ebionism. We thus have three groups. One group was led from Modalism to a modified form of Docetism. A second group was led from Modalism to a modified form of Ebionism. A third group was led from Creationalism to a modified form of Ebionism. We shall try to illustrate this generalization by concrete examples. The first group, that which was led from Modalism to a ** Dorner, ELPC, I’, p. 500 (Eng. I, 2, p. 4). " Ibid. I, p. §30, n. 21 (Eng. I, 2, p. 24,n. 2).

* Cf. below p. 592. * Cf. below pp. 602-604.

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591

modified form of Docetism, is represented by Praxeas, Noetus, and Commodian, who in their views of the relation of the Logos to God, as we have seen, were Modalists. Praxeas and his followers are reported to have said that “in the course of time, then, the Father forsooth was born, and the Father suffered, — God himself, the Lord almighty, whom in

their preaching they declare to be Jesus Christ.” 4* Noetus is reported to have said that God the Father “was He who appeared and underwent birth from a virgin and dwelt as a man among men, and acknowledged himself to those who saw him to be a Son by reason of the birth that had taken place, but did not conceal from those who could receive it that he was also the Father, and that he also suffered . . . and died and did not die.” ’* Commodian similarly says of the crucified Christ that “He was indeed not a man, but He was a God” '¢ and he speaks of God as “having suffered” ” and as “capable of suffering.” 78 Hippolytus, following his habit of tracing Christian heresies to pagan philosophers, tries to find the origin of the Noetean Christology in Heraclitus. The Noetean Christology in its broader implications means to Hippolytus that God who is one and the same in reality assumes many forms in appearance, so that, though “invisible” and “unbegotten” and “immortal,” took on the appearance of one who is “‘visible” and “begotten”

and “mortal,” when He wished to take on that appearance.*® Such a conception of God, a God who is one in reality but who appears to us in more than one form, maintains Hippolytus, is implied in a statement which he quotes from Heraclitus, as follows: “God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger, . . . but He takes various shapes, just as [fire], when it is mingled with spices, is named * Tertullian, Adv. Prax. 2; cf. 1. In 29, Tertullian refers to some heretics who granted that “the Father and Son are two” but added that “since it is

the Son indeed who suffers, the Father is only his fellow-sufferer.” * Hippolytus, IX, 10, 11-12. *° Carmen Apologeticum, V. 342. MNO Mes BGs 18 Did... Vs 414.

* Hippolytus, IX, ro, 11.

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THE

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OF THE

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according to the savor of each.” *° Irrespective of the question whether the Noetean Patripassianism was derived, as asserted here by Hippolytus, from Heraclitus or whether it was derived from the general mythological belief in the transformation of gods into the form of human beings,” it is quite clear that Hippolytus took the Patripassianism of Noetus as a sort of Docetism. And what he says of Noetus would be true of all the other Patripassians. The second group, that which was led from Modalism to a modified form of Ebionism, is represented by Paul of Samosata, who in his view of the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God, as we have seen, was a Modalist. Paul of Samosata is re-

ported to have said of Jesus that “he was in his nature an ordinary man” or “a mere man.” *? But, while Jesus was a mere man, he was a superior man, for, as he says, “the constitution of Christ differs from that of ours” ** and wisdom, that is, the Logos, he says by implication, came to dwell in Jesus at his

birth.”° ‘The superiority of Jesus was thus not acquired; it was native. It was a free grace to him from God. Jesus may be said to have belonged to that class of men who are described by Philo as those whom “even before their birth God endows with a goodly form and equipment, and has determined that they shall have a most excellent portion” ** and among whom he includes Noah, Melchizedek, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and

Moses." To Paul of Samosata, however, Jesus was superior even to these, for, using the term wisdom for the Logos and with evident reference to the statement just quoted from Philo, he says, God had ordained that “wisdom should not so dwell in any one else, for it was in the prophets, to a still higher degree in Moses and in many men of eminence, but to a still ” Ibid., 1X, 10, 8; cf. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 22, Herakleitos, Fragm. 67; Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 136 (36). = Cf. above p. 519. “Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. V, 27, 2. * Theodore of Raythu, De Incarnatione (PG 91, 1485 D). *M. J. Routh, Reliquiae Sacrae, III’, p. 311, cf. 45; H. J. Lawlor, “The Sayings of Paul of Samosata,”

JTS, 19 (1918), p. 28, Fragment V.

*® Cf. below at nn. 33-34. *° Leg. All. Ill, 28, 85.

* Cf. Philo, I, pp. 450-452.

HERESIES

593

higher degree in Christ.” ** But following the view of those Fathers who distinguished between the Logos and the Holy Spirit,” he says concerning Jesus that subsequently, at his baptism, “having been anointed with the Holy Spirit, he was named Christ.” *° But neither the indwelling of wisdom or Logos in him which started at his birth nor the descent of the

Holy Spirit upon him at his baptism did make Jesus a God. With regard to the indwelling of the Logos in Jesus, he maintains that its union with Jesus left him still a mere man. “Jesus Christ is one thing, and the Logos is another thing.” ** The union between them is “according to knowledge and communion and not according to a substance subsisting in a

body.” * “Wisdom was not begotten together with the humanity substantially, but according to quality.” ** “Mary did not bear the Logos . . . she bore a man like us,” ** that is to say, like wisdom, the Logos was not begotten together with the humanity substantially but only according to quality. Sim-

ilarly with regard to the descent of the Holy Spirit upon him, he maintains, as we have seen, that it only proclaimed him a Christ. The third group, that which was led from Creationalism to neo-Ebionism, is represented by Arius and his followers. The Logos to Arius was a created incorporeal being which upon

the birth of Jesus became immanent in his body, just as the created preéxistent Logos, according to Philo, upon the creation of the world, became immanent in the body of the world. And just as in Philo the immanent Logos of the world takes the place of what the Stoics called the mind of the world * and the mind in man is described as being “allied to the divine

Logos, having come into being as an impression or fragment or *8 Routh, p. 301, ll. 3-5; Lawlor, p. 22, Fragment II, ll. 9-11.

* Cf. above pp. 232 ff. * Routh, p. 329, l. 2; Lawlor, p. 39, Fragment XI. * Routh, p. 301, ll. 6-7; Lawlor, p. 22, Fragment II, ll. 12-13.

* Routh, p. 312, ll. 8-9; Lawlor, p. 30, Il. 2-4. * Routh, p. 310, 1. r9-p. 311, 1. 2; Lawlor, p. 28, Fragment IV. * Lawlor, p. 22, Fragment II, ll. 4-6.

* Cf. Philo, I, pp. 325 ff.

594

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

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FATHERS

ray of that blessed nature,” ** so also in Arius, the Logos, on

becoming immanent in Jesus, becomes the mind of Jesus. Consequently, according to Arius, the Logos on its becoming flesh, assumed a body with an irrational Soul; the Logos itself is in

Jesus what the rational soul is in any other human being.** And since in Jesus, according to Arius, there was no rational soul apart from the Logos, Jesus was to him always what prophets were to Philo during the periodic visits of the Holy Spirit upon them, for, be it remarked, with the disappearance of the rigid distinction of functions between the persons of the Trinity,** the Logos could be taken to perform the prophetic function usually ascribed to the Holy Spirit. During a prophetic experience, according to Philo, the rational soul of the prophet is evicted and its place is taken by the Holy

Spirit.” During the entire lifetime of Jesus, according to Arius, there was no rational soul in him; in its place there was the Logos. And since the Logos, to him, was not God, there

was no divine nature in Jesus by the side of the human nature in him. Logically Arius could have said with the Ebionites that Jesus was a mere man, though, of course, a superior man, since in him the Logos took the place of the rational soul in ordinary men. The case of Sabellius deserves special attention. Though his view on the preéxistent Christ, as we have seen, is definitely Modalistic, his view on the born Christ is open to doubt as to whether it is Docetic or Ebionitic. In the teachings reported in

his name, he is never quoted as saying that Jesus was God or that it was God who suffered, but neither is he quoted as say-

ing that Jesus was a mere man. Whatever statements are quoted in his name on the relation of the born Christ to God lend themselves to opposite interpretations. He is, for instance, reported to have used the expressions * Opif. 51, 146; cf. Philo, I, p. 395. * Cf, Athanasius, Cont. Apollin. Il, 3 (PG 26, 1136 cp); Fragm. (1232 D); Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. LXIX, 19 (PG 42, 232 B), LXIX, 49 (277 8); Theodoret, Haer. Fabb. 1V, 1 (PG 83, 413 A). * Cf. above p. 251. ® Cf. Philo, Il, pp. 28-30.

HERESIES

595

“the man which the Logos wore (édpecev)” *° and “the flesh which the Logos wore (efdpecev).” #4 These expressions undoubtedly suggest an analogy between the body of Jesus and a garment. Generally the analogy of garment, as we have seen, whether used with reference to the relation of the body of

Jesus to the Logos in him * or with reference to the relation of body to soul in man in general,** always implies that the body,

whether in its relation to the Logos in Jesus or in its relation to the soul in man, is a real body. But at the same time it also

implies that the Logos to which the body of Jesus is related is a real being and similarly the soul to which the body of man is related is also a real being. But we already know from his view on the preéxistent Christ that the Logos to him is not a real being. Consequently the Logos, which in the passage quoted is said to have worn the man or the flesh, is not a real being. The question, therefore, may be raised whether in the same passage the terms man and flesh, which the Logos is said to have worn, like the term Logos, are similarly not used by him in the sense of a real being or whether, unlike the term Logos, these terms are used by him in the sense of a real being. In the former case, his two expressions, “the man which the Logos wore” and “the flesh which the Logos wore” would be interpreted Docetically to mean that God transformed himself into the mere appearance of man or flesh. In the latter case, they would be interpreted Ebionitically to mean that God

came to indwell in the real man or flesh of Jesus as He does in any real righteous person.

Sabellius is also reported to have said: “In name indeed [God is] Son and Spirit, but in reality Father only, having a beginning in that He becomes a Son, and then ceasing to be called

Father, and becoming man in name, but in truth not even coming among us (émdnyrjcas).” * This statement, the last part of which is undoubtedly meant to be a comment on the 40 “ “8 4

Athanasius, Orat. cont. Arian. IV, 20 (PG 26, 497 A). Ibid. (497 B). “” Cf. above pp. 367, 368. Cf. above pp. 366, 373Athanasius, Orat. cont. Arian. IV, 25 (505 D).

596

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

New Testament statements “being made the likeness of men” *®

and “the Logos became flesh and dwelt (éoxjvwoev)

us” 4° and “he that came down

among

(xaraBds) from heaven,” *7

again lends itself to two interpretations, a Docetic and an Ebionitic. In the former case, it would mean that the human likeness or flesh which the preéxistent Christ became was a human

likeness or flesh in name only, for in reality he did not come down from heaven to dwell among us. In the latter case, it would mean that the expressions “being made in the likeness of men” and “became flesh” and “came down from heaven” and “dwelt among us” are to be understood figuratievly, inasmuch as the preéxistent Christ, called Son or Logos, is really not distinct from the Father and hence was not really made in the likeness of men and did not really become flesh nor did he really come down from heaven. All these expressions are to be taken to mean only that God has caused His Word, that is to say, His wisdom, to dwell in Jesus as He causes it to dwell in any righteous person. A similar vagueness is to be found in a restatement of the view of Sabellius by Basil, which reads as follows: “God exists in one hypostasis (dzoordcer), but is represented by Scripture

under different persons (rpocwmomoiobar . . . Siaddpws) according to the peculiarity of the need arising in each case, and so at one time it applies to Him terms relating to His paternity, when there is a proper occasion to mention this person, at another time terms suited to the Son, when He descends

(daoBaivyn) to take care of us or to do some other work of dispensation,

and

again He

assumes

the person

(dodveoOau

mpooometov Or mpdcwrov) of the Spirit, when the occasion demands the terms referring to such a person.” ** In this passage the term “person” quite obviously is used, in contrast to the term “hypostasis,” in the sense of appearance. Still the statement that God, who “exists in one hypostasis,” is represented in Scripture “under different persons” is not necessarily to be

taken Docetically to mean that the man Jesus in whom God is Oeil Ses * John 1:14.

“John 3213. * Basil, Epist. 214, 3 (PG 32, 788 cp).

HERESIES

597

represented in Scripture under the person of the Son is only the appearance of a man and not a real man. It may be taken Ebionitically to mean that of the three powers in God represented in Scripture under the persons of Father, Son, and Spirit, one power, namely, Son, was caused by God to dwell in the man Jesus, who was man in reality, as it is caused by Him to dwell in any other righteous man. Similarly his reference to the occasion which demands the description of God by the person of Spirit may again be taken either Docetically, to mean the actual appearance of God in the form of some earthly thing, or Ebionitically, to mean the action of God’s power upon some earthly thing. In another passage, however, Basil describes the view of Sabellius as follows: ‘““The same God,

though one in substratum (dzoxeiyevm), is tranformed (perapopdovpevov) On every occasion according to the necessary circumstances, and is spoken of now as Father, and now as Son, and now as Holy Spirit.”*°Here the application of the phrase “being transformed” to God would seem to imply that God himself assumes different earthly forms on those occasions when He is described by different terms and thus it would seem to attribute to Sabellius a Docetic view. We have thus seen that except for the inference from this last statement in Basil there is no evidence to show whether Sabellius’ view on the born Christ was Docetic or Ebionitic. Two eminent students of the history of doctrine assume, without sufficient evidence, we believe, that Sabellius’ view on the born Christ is Docetic. Thus Dorner is inclined to reject a certain interpretation of Sabellius’ view on the plurality in the work of God on the mere ground that it would imply Ebionism °° and Sabellius’ Christology is described by him as “simply a higher potence of Docetism” ** or as that in which Patripassianism “attained its most perfect form and expression.” ©? Similarly with evident reference to Sabellius’ state“Ids Epist: 210,-5. (PG 32, 7476.e):. ° Dorner, ELPC, I’, p. 705 (Eng. I, 2, p. 154 f.). [bid., p. 807 (p. 228).

® [bid., p. 518 (p. 15); cf. above p. 590.

598

| THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS

ments quoted above about the Logos wearing the man or the flesh, he says that the statements to the effect that “the Logos

was clothed with the man Jesus” show that Sabellius “was far from sharing the Ebionism of elder writers, or of Paul of Samosata.” ®? But, as we have seen above, these statements lend themselves either to a Docetic or to an Ebionitic interpretation. Moreover, on finding that the statement “not the Logos was the Son, but this man was the only-begotten Son of God” at-

tributed to Sabellius** implies that the personality of Jesus is derived from the humanity alone, he rejects this implication of the statement, again, on the mere ground that it “would lead to Ebionism, contrary to the fundamental view of Sabellius,”°° and hence proceeds to argue that the statement must have some other meaning. Thus also Harnack similarly assumes a Patripassian and hence Docetic interpretation of Sabellius’ Christology and so, on the basis of a remark by Epiphantus that “the Sabellians derived their whole heresy and its strength from certain Apocrypha, especially the so-called Gospel of the Egyptians,” he infers that “it confirms the view that the Christology of Sabellius cannot have been essentially different from the older, the so-called Patripassian doctrine.” *° But whatever Sabellius’ view may have been it is clear that the various forms of modified Docetism we have discussed followed logically from Modalism and that the various forms of modified Ebionism we have discussed followed also logically either from Modalism or from Creationalism and that ultimately the opposition of all these neo-Docetic and neo-Ebionitic views to the orthodox view of two natures arose out of a desire to preserve the principle of the unity of God in its strict sense. Then we meet, however, with two heretical views on the relation of the born Christ to God, one a still further modified Docetism and the other a still further modified Ebionism, which have no logical basis in an attempt to preserve the strict * [bid., p. 722 (p. 164). ** Athanasius, Orat. cont. Arian. TV, 20 (497 A). * Dorner, ELPC) VY, ps 722) (Bag 1) 2 p. 164). ** Harnack, DG, I*, p. 765 (Eng. III, p. 86).

HERESIES

599

conception of the unity of God which, in connection with the preéxistent Christ, had given rise to Modalism and Creationalism. They are held by men who in their views on the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God are strict followers of the orthodox view. Their deviation from orthodoxy on the problem of the relation of the born Christ was due to theological considerations of a different kind. An example of orthodoxy on the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God but a modified form of Docetism on the relation of the born Christ to God is to be found in Apollinaris and its offshoot Eutychian Monophysitism. Apollinaris himself would undoubtedly have repudiated any accusation of being a Docetist even in its modified form of Patripassianism or Theopaschitism. For while he denied that

Jesus had a human

nature

or even an animal nature, he

bestowed upon him human properties *’ which allowed some reality to his humanity and thus diverted his suffering from the divine nature in him to his human properties. Still Gregory of Nazianzus ** and Gregory of Nyssa *° found in his statements enough provocation to accuse him of Theopaschitism, which, like Patripassianism, is only a disguised form of Docetism.” Moreover, some of his own followers took his view to mean that “the Lord wore a body by position (@é0e) and not by nature (dvce.).” °' Now the term “position” as opposed to “nature” is used in Greek philosophy as synonymous with the term “convention” (cvvOyxn) as opposed to “nature” ® and hence what these followers of Apollinaris meant to say 1s that

Jesus is described in the New Testament as having a body only by a convention of speech, that is to say, by a figure of speech, but not in reality. This is exactly the Docetism of Simon the Gnostic and his followers.*? The same view found * Cf. above pp. 440 ff. Gregory of Nanzianzus, Epist. 202 (PG 37, 333 A). °° Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrheticus 5 (PG 45, 1132 B). © Cf. above p. 590. % Athanasius, Epistola ad Epictetum 2 (PG 26, 1053 A). * Compare Aristotle, De Interpr. 2, 16a, 27-28, with Diogenes, X, 75.

* Cf, above pp. 516 ff., 553 ff.

600

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

expression in the later development of Apollinarianism among some of the followers of Eutychian Monophysitism, who are

reported to have maintained that Jesus’ humanity was nothing but an external appearance, for they explained the incarnation by the illustration of a “signet-ring which, after the impression, leaves no part of its substance upon the wax or the clay.” * Again, both Gregory of Nazianzus °° and Gregory of Nyssa ** found in Apollinaris’ statements also enough provo-

cation to interpret his view to mean that Jesus had a celestial body. This is exactly the modified form of Docetism which we have met with in Apelles.°* The same view again found expression later among certain followers of Apollinaris.°* An example of orthodoxy on the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God but a modified form of Ebionism on the relation of the born Christ to God is to be found in Theodotus of Byzantium and Nestorius. The orthodoxy of Theodotus with regard to the relation of the Logos to God needs explanation, for there is a difference of opinion among scholars as to whether his heresy was not also a Trinitarian heresy.®? In the reports of his teachings there is no mention of a Logos but there is mention of “the Christ from on high,” that is to say, the preéxistent Christ, who is described by him as “the Spirit,” that is to say, the Holy Spirit. His failure to mention the Logos cannot be explained on the ground that he was un-

acquainted with the Gospel of John or that he did not acknowledge its authority, for he is quoted by Epiphanius as “Cf. The Syriac Chronicle Known

as that of Zachariah

of Mitylene,

V, 4, translated into English by F. J. Hamilton and E. W. Brooks (1899), p. 109; Die sogenannte

Kirchengeschichte

des Zacharias Rhetor, V, 4, in

deutscher Ubersetzung herausgegeben von K. Ahrens [und] G. Krier (1899), p. 64, quoted in J. Lebon, Le monophysisme Sévérien, p. 496.. Cf. Tixeront, HD, III’, pp. 114 ff. (Eng. III, pp. 108 ff.).

* Gregory of Nazianzus, Epist. 202 (PG 37, 332 C-333 A).

* Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrheticus 11-13. " Cf. above p. 554. “Cf. G. Voisin, L’apollinarisme, pp. 334, 347; J. Lebon, op. cit., Pp: 497, nn. 1 and 4. * Compare, for instance, Bethune-Baker, JEHCD, HD, I’, p. 349 (Eng. I, pp. 286-287).

p- 99, with Tixeront,

HERESIES

601

having used a verse from the Gospel of John as a scriptural proof-text.”° It is to be explained on the ground that in his

harmonization of Paul and John, like the Apostolic Fathers,” he identified the Spirit of the former with the Logos of the latter and, since he considered them identical, he did not think it of importance to mention both the Spirit and the Logos. He therefore spoke only of the Spirit. Such was also the case, among the Apostolic Fathers, of the First Epistle of Clement and of the Shepherd of Hermas.” Though Epiphanius describes him as “a shred of the heresy of the Alogi” and de-

scribes the Alogi as a sect which “denied the Gospel of John and God the Logos who is said therein to have been in the beginning,” “* it is quite clear that, whatever Epiphanius may have meant by these descriptions,’* Theodotus was not an Alogos in the sense of having denied the reality of the preexistent Christ. Thus, according to Theodotus, there was a preéxistent Christ, whom he explicitly called Spirit but whom he also identified with the Logos. That preéxistent Christ or Spirit or

Logos was a real personal being distinct from God. Whether it was created by God from nothing and hence not to be called God or whether it was generated from the essence of God and hence to be called God is not reported in the name of Theodotus. But when it is reported that among his followers there was a discussion as to whether, as a result of the descent of the Spirit, that is to say, of the preéxistent Christ, on him, Jesus did become a God or did not become a God,” the inference to be drawn is that he did consider the Spirit or the preéxistent Christ or the Logos as a God and hence not as a creature. ”Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. LIV, 1 (PG 41, 964 8). Cf. Harnack, DG, T, p. 710, nu. 1 (Eng. Ill, p. 22, n. 2.).

™ Cf. above pp. 183 ff. ” Cf. above pp. 188-189. *Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. There is doubt as to whether Alogi Epiphanius meant that they Christ altogether. ® Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer.

LIV, 1 (PG 41, 961 B). by his description of certain heretics as denied the existence of the preéxistent

VII, 35, 2; cf. below p. 604.

602

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

In his conception of the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God, Theodotus was, therefore, orthodox, though not orthodox according to the orthodoxy of the time during which he

lived, when the harmonization of Paul and John meant the addition of the Holy Spirit as a third preéxistent personal being by the side of the Father and the Logos. It must have been with reference to this failure on the part of Theodotus to differentiate between the Logos and the Holy Spirit and with reference also to the verse in John that “all things (advra) were made through” the Logos * that Hippolytus says concerning Theodotus that his assertions “about the beginning of

the all (706 wavrds)” only “partly agree with [the account] of the true Church, in so far as he admits that all things (aév7a) were made by God,” ™ that is to say, in so far as he disagreed with Cerinthus who, as previously reported by Hippolytus himself, said that “the world was not made by the First God, but by a certain power . . . which is ignorant of the God who is above all.” 7° But while Theodotus was orothodox in his conception of the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God, he was Ebionitic in his conception of the relation of the born Christ to God. He is

generally reported to have said that Jesus was “a man” ” or “a man akin to all” °° or “a mere man.” ** Still, while only a man, and akin to all men, he was superior to all men. His superiority to all men, as stated in what may be considered the most reliable report of his teachings, consisted in two things; first, in the manner of his birth; second, in what happened at his bap-

tism. With regard to the manner of his birth, Theodotus is re-

ported to have said that Jesus was “born of a virgin according to the will (xara Bovdrv) of the Father.” ®? In this statement, 6 John 1:3. ™ Hippolytus, VII, 35, 1.

Cbid |Viliesaaate ENdrehe NAVE iy De

* Tbid., X, 23, 1; cf. Philaster, Lib. de Haer. L. * Hippolytus, Cont. Haer. Noeti 3; pseudo-Tertullian, Adv. Omn. Haer. 8; Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. V, 28, 6; Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. LIV, 1.

* Hippolytus, Refut. Ommn. Haer. VII, 35, 2.

HERESIES

603

the expression “born of a virgin” reflects the statements in Matthew and Luke with regard to the virgin birth of Jesus * and the expression “according to the will of the Father” evi-

dently reflects the expression in John “not of blood nor of the will (@eAjparos) of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God (ék #e08),”**which expression Theodotus, like some Fa-

thers,*° must have taken to refer to Jesus and in which the words “but of God (ék 606)” must have been interpreted by him to mean “but of the will of God (é« Oedxjpartos beod),” for so also in Irenaeus are the words “but of God” paraphrased to read “but of the will of God (sed ex voluntate Dei)” *° and “of the pleasure of the Father (ex placito Patris)” *" and so also, as we have shown, are they interpreted by Ignatius.** The implication of this statement is that, while admitting a super-

natural element in connection with the birth of Jesus, he denied that he was born of God and that he was not a man like all other men.® It is exactly this sense which is given to this passage in the summary of it, which reads as follows: “But he differed [from others] in that he, according to the will of God, was born of a virgin who had been overshadowed by the Holy Spirit, although he was not incarnate in the virgin.” °° In this summary, Theodotus explicitly denies incarnation in the orthodox sense of the term, and allusively interprets the words in Luke, “‘and the power of the Most High shall over-

shadow thee,” *! to mean simply “according to will of God.” In another text, Theodotus is reported to have taught that

Jesus “was born of the Holy Spirit indeed of a virgin” but “denied that he was God.” * In still another text, his followers

are reported to have taught that Jesus “was born of the seed of a man,” ** which statement is not necessarily contradictory to = Matt.11:23. luke: 1:27. % Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. Ill, 16, 2. “John 113: CU DId aeNa Tense * Cf. above p. 180. * Cf. above p. 185. * On the question whether Theodotus believed in the supernatural birth of Jesus, see Dorner, ELPC, I, p. 504, n. 3 (Eng. I, 2, p. 433). * Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer. X, 23, 1. **Weuker1: 35. ® Pseudo-Tertullian, ddv. Omn. Haer. 8.

* Epiphanius, Adv. Haer. Panar. LIV, 1 (PG 41, 964 A).

THE

604.

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

the statements previously quoted that he was born “of a virgin” and “of the Holy Spirit,” for the statement here that he “was born of the seed of man” may merely mean a denial of the Incarnation in the orthodox sense of the term. On the

whole, this denial of the orthodox belief that Jesus was con-

ceived of the Holy Spirit, while at the same time affirming the orthodox belief that he was born of a virgin, reflects the view of that branch of Ebionites, known as Nazarenes, who, while not accepting the orthodox view of the Incarnation, are de-

scribed by Origen as acknowledging that “Jesus was born of a virgin.” *° With regard to what happened at his baptism, Theodotus is reported to have said as follows: “After he had lived the common life of all men and had become most pious, he subse-

quently at his baptism in the Jordan received Christ from on high, who descended in the form of a dove.” °* From this statement we may gather that his superiority to other men was still further acquired by him by his own free will, which he exercised in the attainment of extreme piety, and that the descent

of the preéxistent Christ or the Holy Spirit upon him at his baptism was a merited grace extended to him by God as a reward for his piety. But this descent of the Holy Spirit upon him at his baptism did not change him from man into God, for Theodotus himself is reported to have said that the descent of the Holy Spirit upon Jesus had only endowed him with miraculous powers and proclaimed him to be the Christ,°* though from the statement that among his followers “some will have it that he did not become God on the descent of the Spirit” it would seem that there were others who believed that he became God on the descent of the Spirit, as there were also those who believed that He became God “‘on his resurrection from the dead.” ** From all this we may gather that while “Cf. Dorner, ELPC, I’, pp. 306-309, and nn. 157 and 160 (Eng. I, 1, pp. 192-195, and Appendix, Note NNN (p. 428), and Note PPP (p. 430). ® Cont. Cels. V, 61.

*

Hippolytus, Refut. Omn. Haer. VII, 35, 2.

* Ibid.

**Ibid.

HERESIES

605

Theodotus rejected the incarnation in its orthodox sense, deny-

ing thereby also that Jesus was God and explicitly affirming that he was a mere man, he still believed that in some miraculous way, “according to the will of God,” he was “born of a virgin” and that later at his baptism, as a reward for his righteousness, the Holy Spirit descended upon him and endowed him with a power to work miracles and proclaimed him the Messiah. In the case of Nestorius, his orthodoxy on the relation of the Logos to God was never questioned, but the Ebionism of his

conception of the relation of Jesus to God needs explanation. Nestorius would have undoubtedly denied any accusation of being an Ebionite. In fact, like the orthodox Fathers, he denies the Ebionitic assertion that Jesus was a mere man.° Again, he explicitly dissociates himself from the followers of Paul of Samosata whom he characterizes as approaching “those who say that Christ was only a man.” ™” Still his insistence that the union of the Logos and flesh was only by conjunction (cvvddea)* or operation (évépyea)*°” or God’s good pleasure

(evSoxia) 1°? terms which are all used by Theodore of Mopsuestia,*°* has caused his opponents to associate him with Theodore of Mopsuestia.*®* Now this union of the Logos with the

humanity in Jesus according to God’s good pleasure, as explained by Theodore of Mopsuestia,”* is analogous to the way in which God is said to unite himself with any righteous person, in accordance with the words of the Psalmist that “God

takes pleasure (edSoxe?) in them that fear him” *” and that “the ® Loofs, Nestoriana, p. 259, 1. 16. °° The Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 44 [64-65]; cf. above p. 458. 11 Loofs, Nestoriana, p. 176, 1. 17 et passim. Pvide

Daziol.

20:

WT bid., p. 220, 1. 4, ch. Eph. 125. 1 Theodore of Mopsuestia, Fragmenta Dogmatica (PG 66, 1012 C-1013 a); H. B. Swete, Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni in Epistolas B. Pauli Commentarii, Il, pp. 338-339. 1 Cf, Fourth and Fifth Anathematisms of the Fifth Oecumenical Council at Constantinople, 553, in Hahn, § 148, pp. 168-169. 106 Fragmenta Dogmatica (PG 66, 973 AB); Swete, op. cit., pp. 294, 1. 32295, 1. 10. PSL AT:(ie (L4On0l)

606

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH

FATHERS

Lord is nigh unto them that are of broken heart,” 1° though,

of course, in Jesus the union is a closer one.’ Essentially then his union according to God’s good pleasure is the same as the

union between the humanity of Jesus and the Holy Spirit as conceived by Cerinthus *° and Theodotus of Byzantium *”

and as the union between the humanity of Jesus and the Logos as conceived by Paul of Samosata.”” And so, while Nestorius

openly denies that Jesus was a mere man and while he openly criticizes the followers of Paul of Samosata whom he characterizes as approaching “those who say that Christ was only a man,” ** logically his assertion that the union is by God’s good

pleasure really implies that Jesus was a mere man. Accordingly, Cyril of Alexandria, in a letter to his monks of Egypt,

argues that, if Nestorius were right, then Jesus would not be essentially different from Moses.'* In other words, if Nestorius

were right, Jesus would be a mere man. We have analyzed the various dissenting views which, out of a desire to preserve the strict unity of God, have arisen within catholic Christianity itself with regard to both the preéxistent Christ and the born Christ in their relation to God. With regard to the relation of the preéxistent Christ to God, an attempt was made to introduce into catholic Christianity two new views. One was a revival of the Philonic view that the Logos was a creature of God. Its exponent in Christianity was Arius. We have described this view as Creationalism. The other view was that the Logos was only the thought of God and a mode of His manifestation in the world. This view is analogous to an interpretation of the Platonic ideas, current at that time, according to which the ideas were only thoughts of

God. The chief exponent of this view in Christianity was

Sabellius. As a description of this view we have adopted the SNES eV Gy (ERI). “ Fragmenta Dogmatica

9. = Cf. above p. 512. ™ Cf. above p. 602.

(976 ac); Swete, op. cit., pp. 295, 1. 29-296, 1. ™ Cf. above p. 592. ™8 Cf. above n. 100. ™ Cyril of Alexandria, Epist. 1 (PG 77, 33 a).

HERESIES

607

term Modalism. With regard to the relation of the born Christ to God, again, an attempt was made to introduce into catholic Christianity two new sets of views. One was certain modified forms of Docetism, the mildest of which forms was Apollinarianism, with its offshoot Eutychianism and the suspected offspring of the latter, Monenergism and Monotheletism.1!> The other was certain modified forms of Ebionism, the mildest form of which was Nestorianism. All these dissenting views were voted down at various Oecumenical Councils and anathematized as heresies. The First Oecumenical Council at Nicea (325) condemned Arianism; the Second Oecumenical Council at Constantinople (381) condemned Sabellianism and Apollinarianism; the Third Oecumenical Council at Ephesus

(431) condemned Nestorianism; the Fourth Oecumenical Council at Chalcedon (451) condemned Eutychianism; the Fifth Oecumencial Council at Constantinople (553) confirmed the first four Oecumenical Councils and again condemned

Apollinarianism,

Nestorianism,

and Eutychianism,;

the Sixth Oecumenical Council at Constantinople

(680), in

its condemnation of Monenergism and Monotheletism, again condemned what it considered a disguised form of Eutychianism. Had we undertaken a study of the Christian doctrines of the Fathers rather than the philosophy behind their doctrines we would have included among these heresies two other sets of

dissenting opinions. First, we would have discussed the dissenting opinion about the Holy Spirit, which, under the name of Macedonianism, was condemned at the Second Oecumenical Council at Constantinople (381). Philosophically, however, the problem involved in that controversy was the same as that we have discussed under the Logos, namely, whether, like the orthodox conception of the Logos, it was a distinct per-

sonal being, or, whether like the two heretical views of the Logos, it was either a creature of God or God himself. Second, we would have discussed the various opinions that have arisen ™ Cf. above pp. 463-493.

608

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CHURCH

FATHERS

with regard to the resurrection of Jesus, and especially the Origenistic view with regard to the nature of the resurrected

body of Jesus, which was condemned by the Fifth Oecumenical Council at Constantinople (553). But this is primarily a theological problem. Whatever philosophic elements it contains will be discussed in the second volume of this work, in connection with the general problem of resurrection.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX

INDEX

NOTE

OF REFERENCES

OF SUBJECTS, NAMES,

AND

TERMS

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

REFERENCES to pages of Migne’s Patrology are to the 1845-1866 edition of PG and to the 1844-1865 edition of PL. The section divisions in the references to the works of the Apostolic Fathers are those introduced in the Gebhardt-Harnack-Zahn edition. In references to the works of Clement of Alexandria, the section divisions of Dindorf’s and Stahlin’s editions, and sometimes also the subsection divisions of Sthalin’s edition, are added in suspended numbers. References to Book IV of Origen’s De Principiis are to Koetschau’s edition, the references to the chapter divisions of PG being included, as in Koetschau’s edition, within parentheses or brackets. Refer-

ences to Preuschen’s edition of Origen’s commentary on John are added to those of PG, whenever divisions.

there is a difference between

References to Hippolytus’ Refutatio Omnium

them in chapter Haeresium

(Philo-

sophumena) are to Wendland’s edition. Biblical quotations are from the Authorized Version and the English Revised Version. The Edinburgh edition of the Ante-Nicene Christian Library

(1867-1872) in its American reprint (1885-1887)

and the two series

of A Select Library of the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (1886-1890, 1890-1900) were used, with occasional changes, in

English quotations. tions:

Use was also made of the following English transla-

The Apostolic Fathers by K. Lake

(1912-13);

Irenaeus’

Adversus

Haereses by J. Keble (1872); Tertullian’s Apologeticus by A. Souter (1917)

and by T. R. Glover (1931) and his Adversus Praxean by E. Evans (1948); Hippolytus’ Philosophumena by F. Legge (1921); Clement of Alexandria’s Protrepticus and Origen’s De Principiis by G. W. Butterworth (1919, 1936); Origen’s Contra Celsum by H. Chadwick (1953) and Selections from the Commentaries and Homilies of Origen by R. B. Tollinton (1929); Basil’s letters by R. J. Deferrari (1926-1934). Works referred to in abbreviated form are as follows: Bethune-Baker (J.F.), JEHCD = An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine’, 1942. CE = Catholic Encyclopedia, 1907-1912. DB = Dictionary of the Bible, 1898-1904. DCB = Dictionary of Christian Biography, 1877-1887. Denzinger (H., et Bannwart, C.) = Enchiridion Symbolorum™™, 1922. DTC = Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, 1903-1950. Dorner (I.A.), ELPC = Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre der Person Christi’, 1851-1853. EB = Encyclopaedia Biblica, 1899-1903. EBr = Encyclopaedia Britannica™, 1926. ’ ERE = Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, 1910-1920.

612

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE

Hahn (A.) = Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche’, 1897. Harnack (A. v.), DG = Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 1909 JE = Jewish Encyclopedia, 1901-1906. JOR = Jewish Quarterly Review. JTS = Journal of Theological Studies. Mansi (G. D.) = Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio,

1759-1798.

Tixeront (J.), HD

= Histoire des Dogmes dans l Antiquité Chrétienne,

121924, Lie wrozr, Llero22.

INDEX

OF REFERENCES

CHURCH

FATHERS

AMBROSE

De Fide, ad Gratianum

ATHANASIUS

I, 2, 16...

246||5, 42... 138 ||IV, 8, or... 287 ll9, 103... 231 De Spiritu Sancto I, 7, 58...249 AMPHILOCHIUS OF IcONIUM

Fragmenta

i5...342

APOLLINARIS OF LAODICEA

Draeseke, J., Apollinarios von Laodicea, 1892

p+ 337, 1. 9....433 ||p. 339, Il. 20-21 +438 |p. 431, I. 25-26... 434 ||

[?] Contra Apollinarium I, 20...240

I|I, 3.--594||5...240

Epistola ad Epictetum 2...599 Epistola ad Jovianum 1 ...587 Epistola de Decretis Nicaenae SynOU p33 0 Epistola de Synodis 15 ...227 || 16...

334 Il 41-337 I| 51 ...246, 343 |]53

p33 Epistolae ad Serapionem I, 2 ff.... 244 ||26...249 Expositio Fidei 4...255 Fragmenta ... 368, 370, 594

p- 344, Ul. 13-23...439 ||p. 344, ll. Orationes contra Arianos DSi2104-2855) 28000287 |[(Ore ate 29-32... 434 ||p. 348, 1. 27... 434 | 244, 334, 587 ||16...296 ||29...228 p- 349, 1. 2...439 ||p. 349, 1. 38-p. 350; 1 2.0430)p. 352,.b 32-2443

llp- 363, 1. 23... 434 ||p. 365, ll. 3135... 438 ||p. 365, 1. 35-p. 366, 1. 8... 435 ||p. 366, Il. 9-13... 435 [I

p. 366, Il. 14-17... 436 ||p. 366, ll. 17-20...440|| p. 366, ll. 29-34...

438 ||p. 366, 1. 35—p. 367, 1. 6....437

Ilp- 377, L. 9... 433 Ilp. 384, I. 1213...439||p.

386, ll. 6-8... 438 ||

TU r6ets62) saree 368illisonee 224, 227 ||60...227 ||62...228 ||63 se 228) ||(O4ie a 103) ||(60).6 220 DV 6e2 1-125 83412 Ol 945. 505e05 08

Il 25... 583, 584, 595

Oratio de Incarnatione

Verbi 44...

368 ATHENAGORAS

P- 389, 1. 36... 443 ||p. 396, Il. 25-

Supplicatio pro Christianis 3...13 || bons Me)ISoootkt Gi Il|S/an0 me Oye

Lietzmann, H., Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule, 1, 1904.

89 || 10...193, 205, 207, 234, 248, 252, 292, 294, 302, 309 || 12... 308 ||

26.437 (|p. 4o1, Ki 22:..0443

p- 149, 1. 15...443 || p. 179, Il. 2-3

.-. 433 ||p. 187, Il. 5-14... 439||p.

188, ll. 2-4...434|| p. 199, Il. 24272437 | Er. 107, p= 232, 1). t0204-2439 ||FE. TIT; p. 233.443 || P2234 i 2022. 443) P2236; Iota... 434\| Fr. 126, p. 238 ..2438)|| Fr. 127, p23 «+435 ||Fr. 128, p.238 435 Pra. 129, p..(2392i1-436'|| Fr. 130, p. 239, ll. 6-9...440 ||Fr. 133, P- 239--- 438 ||Fr. 134, pp. 239240... 437 ||p. 251, ll. 1-2... 434|l De 25741 15 59494 llPx 257511. F6— 17...439 ||p. 259, Il. 15-18...439

||p. 262, ll. 28-29... 438

DAs2345 3020) 31134 |silent AUGUSTINE

Confessiones VI, 5, 7...128, 137 || WAU Oy BEG aoe teds [I]WAUUL 23.) sc 127 Contra Faustum Manichaeum XXXII, 10). 30; Contra Maximinum Arianum Il, 6 $9 25307, De Catechizandis Rudibus XVII, 28 ao cre) De Civitate Dei IVa 12. 88

VS; S105:

614.

INDEX

OF

REFERENCES

VIII, 10, 1... 18;.23)80; Beret ee 23

XE?

4. s 120 ||to,

+354, 359 ||29--283

1...355 1124

WIG Ion Bonney) ||| Wan oe XIII, 24... 372

XOVITL,

gon 2137 lata

ON

XXII, 30, 5... 364 Evangelistarum

Il, 21,

eo ncoy De Diversis Quaestionibus ad SimpliCLAN 1 5 2 50 De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII

37... 222/46, 2... 284 73... 308 De Doctrina Christiana Il, 27, 41... 128 ||28, 43...23||40, 60...128| III, 10, 14...80

De Fide et Symbolo 9, 18... 357 De Fide Rerum Quae Non Videntur Avert Ov

De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus Liber 2,2...68 De Genesi contra Manichaeos Il, 10, 13-14... 69 De Librero Arbitrio WI, 8, 20-11, 32 5.028412, 33-14) 38... 284)|| 15, 39... 284

De Ordine I, 11, 32...280|| II, 9, 26 soa UeNigs WEY) De Praedestinatione Sanctorum 2, 5 aie PLO TY, 1B YDe Spiritu et Littera 31, 54...129, 130 ||34, 60...129, 130 De Trinitate Disa Sienyy

Il, 5,9---359

IN On 20i 25,5112 0513OF A OO Vi 556.192.2225 355) 828 LO-O nT O Sao O Pe Topo 2Gi Wiis i=3h 24 Ole ea i

5, 5+--133|15, 10... 353 ||6, 11. 350» 3515-352

VIII, Prooem ... 357 DTG os URS XIEXIV ... 361

XOV Geno 2 40) (Opes OO)|| 17,28). «246 ||20; 38... 0238 Ws.45

» +253||26, 47...354

25, 46 .. .133

Enarrationes in Psalmos 2, 6...221 || 8 ues 69 | 68)" i Fa eS I TES,

4I,2...84 De Consensu

136, 137 || 12, 26...137 || 16, 34... NOG epono® De Vera Religione 3, 3-4, 7...20||

De Utilitate Credendi 3, 5...68|| 3, 8...68 ||6, 13 ....92||10, 24.7130,

ey sion onleyl

Enchiridion 4...128 || 31...130 ll 37 Henze Sie 41835050) Epistolae 102, 30-34...69 || 120, 1, 3 na 33s 135 | 120; 3) 7 ate S52se3

354 [| 120, 3, 13.--352, 353, 354l 137, 3, I1---369, 371, 399, 431ll 187, 4, 144.6259 || 187, 4,15 «5.258

Il189, 7.-.356|| 283, 3 ff. ...354ll

2832 Ave 2k

In Joannis Evangelium 1, 9...284 || Il, 44% 285 |)MEX a5. 53360; syn] XXHL 6...3694| XL. ores XEVII, 92-2365) |EXCGLXG Sipe 25s: Retractiones I, 3, 2...280|| II, 4, 2 sai

Sermones 43, 3, 4--+132, 133 ||43, 45

5...20||43, 7, 9---133 || 126, 3, 4 20+ 437 || 186, 122-369 BaRNABAS

Epistola V, 5...188||6...189 ||11 22.01 80)|| WieS=10.. 545) lesen 188 ||6-10... 44|] VIII, 1-2... 44]| X, 24 4alleke 44 Basin Adversus Eunomium 1, 20...341 |l Ul; «.... 360 |}3; 4,5: