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The “Persistence of
MUP BRITISH OF
POLITICAL THE
RIE, CULTURE
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REVOLUTION
Eliga H. Gould
Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia,
by the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London
The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture is sponsored jointly by the College of William and Mary and the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation. On November 15, 1996, the Institute adopted the
present name in honor of a bequest from Malvern H. Omohundro, Jr. © 2000 The University of North Carolina Press All rights reserved Designed by April Leidig-Higgins Set in Caslon type by Keystone Typesetting, Inc. Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gould, Eliga H.
The persistence of empire : British political culture in the age of the American Reyolution / Eliga H. Gould.
p.
cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8078-2529-8 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Great Britain—Politics and government—1760-1789. States—History—Revolution, 1775-1783. History—18th century.
I. Omohundro Institute of Early American
History & Culture. DASIO.G68
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3. Great Britain—Colonies—
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PREFACE
To the generation that came of age during the Vietnam War, the United States’ disastrous intervention in Southeast Asia offered a model for understanding Britain’s otherwise inexplicable response to the American Revolution. According to this interpretation, an arrogant government, emboldened by past triumphs and convinced of its own moral superiority, embraced reckless policies that enjoyed little domestic support. It was, of course, a timely argument, but it was also one with deep roots in
the scholarship of the twentieth century. During the interwar period, * historians mindful of the “special relationship” between Britain and the United States often depicted Parliament’s attempts at colonial taxation as a series of unintended blunders, none of which reflected the wishes of
ordinary Britons. Such ideas gained added force at the end of the Second World War, as the Labour Party’s electoral victory and the coming of decolonization encouraged scholars to emphasize popular hostility and indifference to Britain’s overseas empire. In each instance, the result was
an interpretation of the American Revolution based on a perceived dichotomy between an aristocratic, unrepresentative, and self-absorbed government, and a wider public for whom Parliament’s actions were
blatantly unjust. In recent years, however, historians have been reminded of what we
probably should have recognized from the start, namely that no government could project the kind of sustained external power that Britain did during the American Revolution without a measure of popular acquiescence at home. Inspired in part by the jingoism of the Falkland’s War, scholars working in the history of eighteenth-century Britain have begun rethinking a number of cherished assumptions. This book is one product of that reassessment. Without discounting those men and women who identified with the colonists’ plight, I am primarily concerned with the arguments that made the actions of George III and his ministers seem acceptable to the metropolitan public. This rationale was not chiefly that of an ancien régime or a hidebound, aristocratic establishment—though it certainly had elements of both—but of a political culture where the government had to maintain at least the appearance of popular approval. Despite the colonists’ radically different view of the
Vill
Preface
matter, this book is thus the story of a people whose own sense of
modernity and what it meant to be free played a central, albeit ironic, role in the making of the American Republic.
Without the generous assistance of numerous friends and colleagues, I could not have written this book. Foremost among these are J. G. A. Pocock and Jack P. Greene. As readers will discover, I am indebted to
John Pocock for my understanding of British political thought and the way ideas shape the contexts within which people think and act. To Jack Greene, I owe my appreciation of the complexities of Britain’s constitu-
tional development, both at home and in America. I am also grateful to Nicholas Phillipson, with whom I spent a delightful year studying the Scottish Enlightenment at the University of Edinburgh. Finally, I must thank John R. Gillis and Lawrence Stone, neither of whom allowed his
awareness of the vagaries of the academic job market to inhibit the enthusiasm of an undergraduate who aspired to write and teach history. Insofar as I have succeeded, it is in no small measure because of the
generous example and continuing friendship of such gifted teachers. Ona more tangible level, Iwish to thank the many people and institutions that provided me with the necessary financial and scholarly support to complete this project. The editorial staff at the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture is famous for the scrupulous care with which they shepherd manuscripts to completion; I greatly appreciate the efforts of Fredrika J. Teute, James Horn, Gil Kelly, and,
especially, Kathryn Burdette, whose meticulous copyediting has been wondrous to behold. While researching the book, I benefited from the expertise of numerous librarians, in particular those at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California, and the British Library (then at Great Russell Street), who cheerfully fulfilled what must have seemed
like an unreasonably large number of requests for pamphlets and manuscripts. The Johns Hopkins University and the University of New Hampshire both provided me with crucial financial support; I am like-
wise thankful for the generous assistance I received from the FulbrightHays Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the
William Andrews Clark Library at UCLA, the Charles Warren Center at Harvard University, and the Huntington Library, in the last instance
with special thanks to Martin Ridge. Over the last decade, I have accumulated an even larger number of debts to colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic. Among the people who generously gave of their time by discussing problems and posing ques-
Preface
ix
tions are Fred Anderson, Bernard Bailyn, Daniel Baugh, John Brewer, J. H. Burns, Jonathan Clark, Linda Colley, Joanna Innes, Mark Kishlansky, Thomas Laqueur, Paul Langford, P. J. Marshall, John Morrill, John Robertson, Nicholas Rogers, and Laurel Ulrich. Daniel Baugh also read the entire manuscript, and Bernard Bailyn, John Robertson, and P. J.
Marshall each read parts. The initial inspiration for this book came from the seminars that John Pocock organized in the history of British politi-
cal thought at the Folger Library in Washington. I have since been fortunate to participate in similar ventures at the Institute of Historical
Research in London, the Massachusetts Historical Society, and Harvard University, both as a member of the International Seminar in Atlantic History and as a fellow at the Charles Warren Center. Bernard Bailyn, Susan Hunt, and the other Warren Center fellows, Steven Beherndt, Rosalind Beiler, David Hancock, Willem Klooster, and Mark Peterson,
were especially encouraging during the book’s final revisions. In addi- ¢ tion, I have benefited immeasurably from sharing work and discussing ideas with David Armitage, Christopher Brown, Philip Harling, Lawrence Klein, Paul Landau, Patricia Lin, Elizabeth Mancke, Ian Mc-
Bride, Paul Monod, Andrew O’Shaughnessy, Jeffrey Ravel, Stuart Semmel, Dror Wahrman, Joseph Ward, and Kathleen Wilson. I also thank Margot Finn, Fred Leventhal, Maura O’Connor, and Christopher Waters for their constant encouragement and support. Closer to home, both
the Dean of Liberal Arts, Marilyn Hoskin, and my colleagues in the History Department at the University of New Hampshire have been
invariably supportive. I am especially grateful to Jeffry Diefendorf and William Harris, for their assistance as department chairs; to Jeftrey Bolster, Charles Clark, Ellen Fitzpatrick, Jan Golinski, Lucy Salyer, and
Cynthia Van Zandt, for their timely thoughts and suggestions; to David Frankfurter, for dragging me off to climb Mount Washington, and, again, to Charles Clark, for serving (gratis) as my personal grammar consultant.
My final thanks go to those people for whom it is most difficult to make an adequate acknowledgment. I have known Jebtha Palmer for more than half my life; road trips, Scrabble, and a camaraderie born of
misspelled first names cannot begin to describe what our friendship has meant to me. Over the last fifteen years, Kurt Nagel, with whom I roomed in Baltimore and London, has likewise been a wonderful friend
and intellectual companion. I would also like to thank Dave Brown and Mary Brunton, who continue to make London feel like a second home, _and my English in-laws, Florence Tallerman and John and Ruth Keeble,
whose gracious hospitality has always made me feel the same way in Suf-
x
Preface
folk. Sabrina Klein has been a dear friend throughout, as have Thomas
Goebel and Ronald Yanosky. My deepest thanks of all are for my family. My wife’s parents, Hilary and Carmelo Gullace, have supported me in ways that most people would reserve for their own children. My brother, Warren Gould, who
was both flatmate and roommate during the first of my two years in London, has participated in the ups and downs of this book as if it were
his own. I owe more than I can possibly express to my parents, Glen Hibbard and Mildred Nisbet Gould, two gifted teachers in their own
right who nurtured in every conceivable way my interest in history. I credit my mother with imparting her love of writing and a sense of ar.cestral time reaching back to the Reformation, and it was my father, through his own field of music theory and history, who first introduced me to the joys of historical analysis. Last of all, in a category by themselves, are two people. Charlie Gould arrived just in time to save me
from superficial analogies between parenthood and completing a book. Becoming a father is one of the two best things I have ever done. The other was marrying Nicoletta Gullace, my closest colleague, dearest friend, and partner for life.
CONTENTS
Preface vii List of Maps and Illustrations xiii Introduction
xv
One. An Empire ofLiberty Whig Identity in the Reign of George II it
i. Maintaining the Balance of Power 3 i. A Matchless Constitution 14
i. The Liberties of Britain and Europe 30
Two. The Blue Water Vision British Imperialism and the Seven Years’ War
35
1. “The Sepulchre of British Interest” 38 11. Oceans, Indians, and Colonists 53
m1. The Legacy of William Pitt 69
Three. Patriotism Established The Creation of a “National Militia” in England 72
1. The Power of Popularity 75 i. The Militia Riots of 1757 83 a. The Price of Victory 98
Four. The Nation Abroad The Atlantic Debate over Colonial Taxation 106
1. The Origins of the Stamp Act (1765) 110
i. An American Theory of Empire 123
i. The Plunge of Lemmings 136
Five. The Revolution in British Patriotism The Friends of Government and the Friends of America 148
1. Ambivalent Patriots 150 1. The County Associations (1780) 164
11. A People above Reproach 179
Six. The Experience ofDefeat The British Legacy of the American Revolution I8I
1. The Limits of Greater Britain 183 i. “The Isle of Liberty and Peace” 198
m1. A Multiracial Empire 208
Bibliography 215 Index 253
MAPS
AND
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1. Apothecaries, Taylors, Etc. Conquering
France and Spain xix
Figure 2. An Englishmans Delight xx
Figure 3. The British Empire in 1775 xxii Figure 4. George II at Dettingen 2 Figure 5. Northern and Western Europe, 1740 8
Figure 6. Briton’: Association against the Pope's Bulls 26 Figure 7. The British Jubilee 32
Figure 8. The Kentish Out-Laws 36
Figure 9. The H—v—n Confectioner General 45 ieate 10. Power ofBritain by Land; Power ofBritain by Sea 54
Figure 11. The Congress ofthe Brutes 64
Figure 12. The Contrast 69 Figure 13. The English Lion Dismemberd 80 Figure 14.4 Militia Meeting 94
Figure 15. Sic Transit Gloria Mundi 104
Figure 16. British North America, 1763 107 Figure 17. The Indians Delivering up the English Captives 112
Figure 18. Virtual Representation 124
Figure 19. Mr. Pitt Scorns to Invade the Liberties
of Other People 127 Figure 20. The Parricide:ASketch ofModern Patriotism 131 Figure 21. A Visit to the Camp 156
Figure 22. The Three Graces of Cox-Heath 157
Figure 23. Association Meeting at York 170 Figure 24. No Popery; or, Newgate Reformer 175
Figure 25. Volunteers at Dublin 178 Figure 26. The Bostonian’s Paying the Excise-Man 188 Figure 27. The Congress; or, The Necessary Politicians 195
Figure 28. The Commissioners 197 Figure 29. The Sinking Fund 201
Figure 30. The American Rattle Snake 207 Figure 31. Confucius the Second; or,
ANew Sun Rising
in the Asiatic World! 209
INTRODUCTION
William Cobbett never forgot the fascination that the American Revolution held for his native village of Farnham in Surrey. Though only a boy when the fighting began, the future champion of England’s poor remembered the war as a captivating drama, seizing the attention of his
family and their neighbors as few external events ever had. As Cobbett recalled, this was partly out of sympathy for the Americans, especially among people like his father, a humble farmer for whom the principle of no taxation without representation embodied truths essential for free- # dom everywhere. But Cobbett was equally clear that such sentiments were far from universal. For many of Farnham’s inhabitants, the cause of
liberty and justice lay not on the side of the Americans but on that of the British king and Parliament, and it was the ministry of Lord North that deserved the support of men and women on both sides of the Atlantic. “It is well known,” wrote Cobbett, “that the people were, as to numbers,
nearly equally divided in their opinions, concerning that war.” Indeed, as he reflected on the passionate debates that the Revolution stirred in the England of his youth, Cobbett had to concede that the better arguments belonged to the government’s supporters—including his father’s principal antagonist, “a shrewd and sensible old Scotchman” who gardened for a local nobleman and who, whenever the discussion turned to the war in
America, proved to be his father’s “superior in political knowledge.” 1 For anyone with even a passing knowledge of Georgian politics, Cobbett’s observation about the degree of support for the government is hardly surprising. Although Britain’s eighteenth-century rulers were notorious for regarding the common people with disdain, it was also well known that neither the king’s ministers nor Parliament could afford to ignore their wishes indefinitely, especially when they were engaged in an >
a
1. [William Cobbett], The Life and Adventures ofPeter Porcupine (1927; Philadelphia, 1796), 22. There is, of course, no such thing as a completely impartial observation.
During his time in Philadelphia, when Cobbett wrote the passage quoted here, he was a staunch anti-Jacobin and opponent of Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic Republicans. Despite Cobbett’s polemical purpose in making such claims, even avowed friends of America admitted that support in Britain for the Revolutionary cause was not nearly as broad as they might have wished.
xv1
Introduction
undertaking as massive and expensive as the War of American Independence. To a surprising degree, though, the question of why so many
people accepted the government’s ill-fated policies is one that few historians have treated as a subject worthy of study in its own right.” There are books on British military and diplomatic strategy, books on the formation of colonial policy at Whitehall and in Parliament, and books—
enough to fill a small library—on the people who, like Cobbett’s father, found themselves in broad sympathy with their “fellow subjects” on the far shores of the Atlantic. Despite this interest in the British dimensions of the American Revolution, we have much to learn about the public support that helped make the Revolutionary war the longest colonial conflict in modern British history. On what ought to be one of the period’s central questions, it is as though there were still some truth in
the words of Sir John Seeley, the great nineteenth-century historian of the British Empire, who jested that, insofar as the British gave the Revolution any thought at all, it was to discount it as an embarrassing episode, “which we have tacitly agreed to mention as seldom as we can.”? 2. On British colonial, military, and diplomatic policy, see Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution, 15 vols. (New York, 1939-1970); Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1961); Piers Mackesy, The War forAmerica, 1775-1783 (London, 1964); John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, 1965); John L. Bullion, 4 Great and Necessary Measure: George Grenville and the. Genesis of the Stamp Act, 1763-1765 (Columbia, Mo., 1982); Jonathan R. Dull, 4 Diplomatic History ofthe American Revolution (New Haven, Conn., 1985); H. M. Scott, British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution (Oxford, 1990). The literature on the Americans’ British sympathizers is even larger, but see Ian R. Christie, Wilkes, Wyvill, and Reform: The Parliamentary Reform Movement in British Politics, 1760-1785 (London, 1962), chap. 3; Colin Bonwick, English Radicals and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1977); John Sainsbury, Dis-
affected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America, 1769-1782 (Montreal, 1987); James E. Bradley, Religion, Revolution, and English Radicalism: Nonconformity in Exghteenth-Century Politics and Society (Cambridge, 1990); Peter N. Miller, Defining the Common
Good: Empire, Religion, and Philosophy in E1ghteenth-Century Britain
(Cambridge, 1994), esp. chap. 4; Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People: Politics,
Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785 (Cambridge, 1995), esp. 237-283. 3. J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (1883, Boston,
1900), 26. On the need for further investigation of British loyalism among the general public during the Revolution, see Linda Colley, “The Politics of Eighteenth-Century British History,” Journal of British Studies, XXV (1986), 375-376; T. H. Breen, “Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: Revisions Once More in Need of Revising,” Journal ofAmerican History, LXXXIV, no. 1 (1997), 13-39. Colley’s
path-breaking work has been indispensable in opening up British patriotism as a
Introduction
XVil
With this tendency in mind, I have set out to examine the public rationale that, despite its eventual repudiation, made the North Ameri-
- can policies of George III and his ministers appear both necessary and justifiable. As we shall see, this rationale was chiefly the result of a burgeoning desire for imperial self-sufficiency. The pursuit of empire held a tremendous appeal for the metropolitan public throughout the eighteenth century. Although this interest waxed and waned according to the vagaries of popular opinion, almost every foreign initiative between the Glorious Revolution of 1689 and the battle of Waterloo had
something to do with protecting the nation’s imperial standing, usually from the competing interests of Catholic France.* If empire represented a persistent theme in Georgian politics, however, the isolationism implicit in the British understanding of the term became increasingly pronounced in the decades just before the American Revolution. Although the colonists obviously saw things differently, the proponents of both the Stamp Act (1765) and the Townshend Revenue Act (1767) claimed that
strengthening the government’s administrative powers in North America would reverse decades of neglect by ministers who cared more for maintaining the balance of power in Europe than they did the welfare of Britain’s prodigious maritime empire. At the same time, people assumed that, because the Americans formed integral parts of a greater British nation, they could be taxed in the same manner as the inhabitants of subject for scholarly inquiry; see Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, Conn., 1992). In response to the trends noted here, historians have begun to
broaden their perspective to include the wider public; see James E. Bradley, Popular Politics and the American Revolution in England: Petitions, the Crown, and Public Opin-
ion (Macon, Ga., 1986); J. C. D. Clark, The Language of Liberty, 1660-1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World (Cambridge, 1994); Stephen Conway, The War ofAmerican Independence, 1775-1783 (London, 1995), esp. chaps. 1, 2, 8. There is, of course, a substantial literature on the strength of the government’s
support within Parliament, much of it following arguments first advanced by Sir Lewis Namier in England in the Age ofthe American Revolution, 2d ed. (New York, 1961). 4. Colley, Britons; Wilson, The Sense ofthe People; John Brewer, The Sinews ofPower: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York, 1989); C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The First British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (New York, 1989); Paul
Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England, 1727~1783 (Oxford, 1989), esp. 621— 636; Daniel Baugh, “Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce: The Uses of ‘a Grand Marine Empire,’” in Lawrence Stone, ed., 4n Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (New York, 1994), 185-223; P. J. Marshall, “A Nation Defined by
Empire, 1755-1776,” in Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer, eds., Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History (London, 1995), 208-222; David Armitage, The Ideological Origins ofthe British Empire (Cambridge, forthcoming).
XVil1
Introduction
England, Scotland, and Wales. Indeed, most Britons accepted the project of colonial taxation in the mistaken belief that the government pos-
sessed the military and political resources necessary to defend Parliament’s imperial sovereignty without placing undue burdens on ordinary men and women at home.° Because these assumptions proved so wrong-headed, the British quickly forgot how widespread they had once been. But to understand what the American Revolution meant to people on both sides of the Atlantic, we must grasp a paradox. On one hand, we need to bear in mind the enlarged, often unrealistic, expectations that characterized British opinion about the empire beyond their shores; on the other, we have to
account for a system of political obligation that turned patriotism itself into a kind of collective act of theater, replete with symbolic meaning but with few deeper consequences, at least for its most vocal partisans. The result was explosive: the remote and limited nature of Britain’s wars left the shapers of metropolitan opinion free to respond in the most bellicose manner to any external threat or provocation, no matter how exagger-
ated the danger or how great the costs, without suffering unduly from the error of their ways. As one of the Americans’ British sympathizers admitted in 1783, there was a time when the government's determination to force the colonists to pay parliamentary taxes was “popular.” Without understanding why, we cannot hope to comprehend either Britain’s own response to the problems of empire or the reasons that eventually per5. To American historians, Parliament’s attempt to tax the colonists has often been taken as a sign that the British government was treating them “differently from ordinary men and women who happened to live in England” (Breen, “Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution,” Journal ofAmerican History, LXXXIV, 33). However, the metropolitan proponents of Parliamentary taxation understood the issue in exactly the opposite way, that is, as a vehicle for incorporating people who enjoyed the
full rights of British subjects into the national system of revenue as it existed in Britain. In a sense, the American Revolution had its origins in a failed attempt to complete the
integration of a Greater British nation. See Eliga H. Gould, “A Virtual Nation: Greater Britain and the Imperial Legacy of the American Revolution,” American Historical
Review, CIV, no. 2 (April, 1999). For the collision between metropolitan and colonial conceptions of British rights and obligations, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities ofthe British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (Athens, Ga., 1986); J. G. A. Pocock, “Empire, State and Confederation: The War of American Independence as a Crisis in Multiple Monarchy,” in John Robertson, ed., 4 Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British
Union of1707 (Cambridge, 1995), 318-348.
Introduction
FIGURE
xix
I
Apothecaries, Taylors, Etc. Conquering France and Spain. 1779. In this satire on a London coffeehouse, the martial spirit ofthe British people is at its most
conspicuous among
those with the least direct military experience. © The British Museum
suaded the American colonists that declaring independence was the only possible solution to the resulting crisis.° Because this is primarily a study of political consciousness, the bulk of its evidence comes from nearly a thousand political pamphlets, most of which were published somewhere in Britain between the early 1740s and
the end of the Revolution. As readers versed in the history of printing and publication will be aware, there are definite advantages to looking at this sort of material. With prices that ranged from a few pennies to a 6. [Andrew Kippis], Considerations on the Provisional Treaty with America, and the Preliminary Articles ofPeace with France and Spain (London, 1783), 9. The current work
on British patriotism has tended to emphasize the breadth of support for Britain’s foreign adventures, but for some salutary reminders about the underlying resentment over the costs such wars generated at home, see E. P. Thompson, “The Making of a Ruling Class,” Dissent, XL (1993), 377-382; Nicholas Rogers, Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain (Oxford, 1998), chaps. 2-5. :
Xx
Introduction
5
ENGLISHMANS DELIGHT OR NEWS OF ALL SORTS.
oe
All Englishnen delight 1m News
tn London theres enough to chuse Of morning papers near a Ream Filid with every ksnd of theme
eee
ss
Forth from the Prefs te Fapurs fly
iach greedy reader te eupytly
Of baths fought, and numters vlan , Of Trane tesieg d, and prisoners taen
At Noon theres vuch a duccod Clatter Strangers must wonder whats the malter
Engagements bothbvSea and Land tseche from Aldgate te the Strand
And Ben that day the Lord hats blest:
Hail! happy land. sure nenes 00 blest
te new ne more a day of reat
Bith Sovetecomfort every Enact.
Published as the Act dirsete 30 Dec? i790 by Richardoon N08 huohilelbon.
FIGURE 2 An Englishmans Delight; or, News of All Sorts. 1780. During the later eighteenth century, observers attributed the expansion of the British press partly
to widespread interest in the American Revolution. © The British Museum
Introduction
XX1
shilling or two, pamphlets were inexpensive and readily available to readers of all ranks and both sexes. They also tended to circulate widely, ~ with the more popular often running through numerous subsequent imprints, some with the consent of their authors, others in editions pirated by interlopers scattered throughout the English-speaking world. Boosting this reach even further, excerpts from particularly successful ventures were typically reprinted either in periodical journals like the London-based Literary Magazine or in one or more of the metropolitan and provincial newspapers whose number expanded at such an astonishing rate during the period covered by this book. Indeed, there is no
better indication of the genre’s popularity than the tendency of taverns and coffeehouses to maintain collections of whichever titles their patrons seemed most likely to want to read and discuss. “For my part,” remarked
Anglican archdeacon of Carlisle William Paley during the early 1780s, “I know not whether I could make choice of any [entertainment] in which #
I could find greater pleasure than what I receive from expecting, hearing and relating public news.”” For all their strengths as primary documents, of course, pamphlets tend to privilege controversy over consensus and to give special weight to the perspectives of what contemporaries referred to as the “middling sort.” For this reason, the book also draws on a variety of other sources, including newspaper and journal articles, speeches delivered in Parliament, satiric prints and cartoons, popular memoirs, political peti-
tions, and even such apparently nonpolitical documents as published drill manuals and the private descriptions of riots and other public disturbances. Wherever possible, I have used this material to leaven my 7. William Paley, The Principles ofMoral and Political Philosophy (1785), in The Works of William Paley D.D. (Philadelphia, [1857]), 121. There is an enormous literature on the
popularity of pamphlets and newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic, but see G. A. Cranfield, The Development of the Provincial Newspaper, 1700-1760 (Oxford, 1962); John Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III (Cambridge, 1976), 148-150; John Money, Experience and Identity: Birmingham and the West Midlands, 1760-1800 (Manchester, 1977), esp. chaps. 3-6; Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench, eds., The Press and the American Revolution (Worcester, Mass., 1980); Ian K.
Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford, 1986), 132-167; Jeremy Black, The English Press in the Eighteenth Century (Philadelphia, 1987); Charles E. Clark, The Public Prints: The Newspaper in AngloAmerican Culture, 1665-1740 (Oxford, 1994); David W. Conroy, In Public Houses: Drink and the Revolution ofAuthority in Colonial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995), 158,
177-179, 233-236.
XXi1
Introduction
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