The Peace Process between Turkey and the Kurds: Anatomy of a Failure [1 ed.] 1138564109, 9781138564107

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The Peace Process between Turkey and the Kurds

In January 2013, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government initiated a peace process in order to settle the Kurdish question through peaceful means. However, this sanguine atmosphere gradually disappeared, before finally collapsing after the general elections of 7 June 2015. This book addresses the question of why the peace building attempts that culminated between 2013 and 2015 failed. It deals with the historical background of the Kurdish question and contemporary complexities of the Turkish politics to explain how they eventually jeopardized the peace process. This is an important and relevant research question because the Kurdish question has been viewed as a variable shaping Turkey’s domestic politics and its foreign relations. The Kurdish question’s influence on Turkish foreign policy is not confined to its neighbors. Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union was also shaped by the issues stemmed from the Kurdish question. As this was the first serious peace attempt in a conflict that lasted over three decades, examination of why it failed will inform any future attempts at peace and will help pinpoint the potential path that Turkey might face in both the domestic and international realm. This book will appeal to students and scholars with an interest in Turkey and the Kurdish issue, peacekeeping, security studies and Middle East Politics. Burak Bilgehan Özpek is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Ankara.

Routledge Focus on the Middle East

1 Presidentialism in Turkey Instability and Change Serap Gur 2 The Peace Process between Turkey and the Kurds Anatomy of a Failure Burak Bilgehan Özpek

The Peace Process between Turkey and the Kurds Anatomy of a Failure

Burak Bilgehan Özpek

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Burak Bilgehan Özpek The right of Burak Bilgehan Özpek to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Özpek, Burak, author. Title: The peace process between Turkey and the Kurds : anatomy of a failure / Burak Özpek. Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Routledge focus on the Middle East ; 2 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017043014 | ISBN 9781138564107 (hbk) | ISBN 9781315122182 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Kurds—Turkey—Politics and government. | Kurds—Politics and government. | Turkey—Politics and government. | AK Parti (Turkey) Classification: LCC DR435.K87 O965 2018 | DDC 323.1191/ 5970561—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017043014 ISBN: 978-1-138-56410-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-12218-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To Melike

Contents

List of tables Acknowledgements Abbreviations

viii ix x

Introduction

1

1

Was the peace process a deviation?

7

2

Conceptualization of the peace process

21

3

Why did the peace process fail?

37

4

The year after the “peace process”

53

5

Conclusion

59

Appendix: Chronology of the peace process Index

61 79

Tables

2.1 Annual deaths during the armed conflict between Turkey and PKK 3.1 Turkey’s democratization performance, 2002–2016 4.1 National election results, 7 June 2015 4.2 National election results, 1 November 2015

27 42 54 55

Acknowledgements

This book developed out of a newspaper article entitled “Deconfliction or Peace?” that I wrote for Taraf in May 2013. It was published during the heyday of the “peace process” and attracted almost no intellectual attention. Furthermore, I was criticized for being overly pessimistic about the intentions of the government and the PKK. Nevertheless, Nil Satana encouraged me to study this issue comprehensively and prepare an academic book. I wish to thank Nil Satana for her support along the way. I am also indebted to Bill Park, who accepted me to King’s College Defence Studies Department as a post-doctoral researcher and served as my supervisor. I am particularly thankful to İhsan Sezal, the Dean of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at TOBB University of Economics and Technology. His comments and recommendations helped me to complete this manuscript. I am also indebted to my research assistant Çağrı Pehlivanlı for his never-ending energy and technical assistance. I owe my deepest gratitude to my family. My parents, Eralp and Sevda, have always supported me. When I feel exhausted I have been motivated by my brother, Miraç Kültigin, his wife, Selin, and their son Kağan Kartal. Finally, Melike has always been a perfect companion. Without her support, this study would not have been completed. Ankara / 2017

Abbreviations

AKP CHA CHP DBP DDKD DDKO DEHAP DFLP DP ETA EU HADEP HDP HSYK KRG MBK MGK MHP MİT PKK PRP PYD RPP TAF TAK TİP TKDP TMT TRT

Justice and Development Party Cihan News Agency Republican People’s Party Democratic Regions Party Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths Democratic People’s Party Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Democrat Party Euskadi Ta Askatasuna European Union Peoples Democracy Party Peoples’ Democratic Party High Council of Judges and Prosecutors Kurdistan Regional Government National Unity Committe National Security Council Nationalist Movement Party Turkey’s Intelligence Service Kurdistan Workers Party Progressive Republic Party Democratic Union Party Republican People’s Party Turkish Armed Forces Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Worker’s Party of Turkey Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Turkey Turkish Resistance Organisation Turkish Radio and Television Corporation

Introduction

In January 2013, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, in power for over a decade, initiated a peace process in order to settle the Kurdish question through peaceful means. This was a radical shift from the counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency strategy the Turkish state followed since the 1980s. Accordingly, Turkey’s Intelligence Service (MIT) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been the main actor in the Kurdish armed struggle since 1984, started to negotiate the terms and conditions of a potential peace. Upon initiation of the peace process, the PKK declared a truce and its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan, pledged that “a new phase in our struggle is beginning. Now a door is opening to a phase where we are moving from armed resistance to an era of democratic political struggle.” Nevertheless, this sanguine atmosphere gradually disappeared before finally collapsing after the general elections of 7 June 2015. The results of the parliamentary elections indicated that the AKP votes declined and the party lost its overall majority in the Parliament due to the electoral success of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The post-election fallout failed to produce stability. The AKP did not make a serious offer to any of the opposition parties during coalition negotiations, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not extend the mandate to other parties to form the government. Thus, holding a snap election remained the only option. Strategically, the AKP used the snap elections option to avoid sharing power with opposition parties and resumed its control over the political system with the help of a provisional government under the tutelage of President Erdoğan. This picture was complicated due to the changing policy of the AKP government towards the Kurdish question. The day after election day, Deputy Prime Minister of the AKP government posited that “[t]he HDP can only make a movie about the peace process from now on. The peace does not come by saying ‘peace, peace.’” On the other hand, the PKK declared that the truce was over due to the reluctant and accusatory stance of the AKP government. Following the harsh statements of the AKP and the PKK elites,

2

Introduction

both the PKK attacks and the Turkish army’s operations commenced with an intensity not seen since the inauguration of the “peace process” in 2013. This book mainly addresses the question of why the peace-building attempts that culminated between 2013 and 2015 failed. This question is important because the Kurdish question, ever since its inception in the republican period, has been a factor shaping the domestic political atmosphere of Turkey and its relations with other states. For example, Gunter argues that Turkey has decided on securitization instead of democratization to deal with the Kurdish question and this strategy has undermined the development of democracy. According to him, solution of the Kurdish question by peaceful means is a precondition for full democracy in Turkey.1 In a similar but more comprehensive vein, Ersanlı and Özdoğan posit that the Kurdish question, especially following the PKK-led insurgency that started in 1984, has reinforced the role of the Turkish military in the political space and hindered understanding of the problem as a matter of democracy.2 Cizre concludes that the establishment has addressed the challenges of the Kurdish question through “emergency military measures” rather than parliamentary and civilian wisdom.3 Thus, discussing the Kurdish question on a political basis has been viewed as an attempt to justify the aims of the PKK, and those who criticize the official line of the establishment have been criminalized on grounds of treason. After the AKP’s successful campaign to push the military out of the political space, the Kurdish question has continued to be a useful tool in order to legitimize the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling elite in a different way. That is to say, the AKP government used its attempts to solve the Kurdish question as a shield to justify its anti-democratic practices and avert the criticisms of the opposition circles. For example, during the Gezi protests in June 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay accused the protestors of having a secret agenda and stated that “Gezi Park and other incidents are strongly related with hindering the peace process.”4 Similarly, upon facing the graft probe in December 2013, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, prime minister at that time, claimed that the corruption probe was a sabotage against the peace process.5 Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that the solution of the Kurdish question by peaceful means was also securitized in order to maintain the hegemony of the ruling class. On the other hand, the Kurdish question has also affected Turkey’s foreign relations since the founding of the republic in 1923. According to Kirişçi, founders of the republic aimed to transform the collapsed Ottoman Empire into a modern and secular state by developing a sense of nationhood based on Turkishness. This paradigm shift frustrated the Kurdish tribe leaders who had supported the liberation war from 1919 to 1922 because the driving force of the solidarity between the Turks and the Kurds was

Introduction 3 Islam. In other words, introducing a secular nation-state both abolished the common bond of Islam and excluded the Kurdish identity. That is why the Kurds were involved in 16 of the 18 rebellions against the government between the years 1924 and 1938.6 Thereafter, the Turkish government’s relations with the Kurds became prone to conflict and influenced Turkey’s relations with the actors of the international system. In the history of Turkish foreign policy, there are noteworthy cases relevant to the Kurdish question. For example, one of the motivations of Turkey’s involvement in the Sadabad Pact, signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937, was to contain transnational and secessionist Kurdish nationalism, which could undermine the territorial integrity of the pact members.7 Another example is Turkey’s reaction towards the General Qasem Coup, which overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. According to the mainstream conception of this reaction, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes aimed to convince the United States to intervene in Iraq and restore the monarchy. In doing so, he sought to discourage the potential putschists in Turkey. Nevertheless, it is safe to argue that the Kurdish question played a key role in shaping Turkey’s policy towards the General Qasem coup. According to Kumral, involvement of the Iraqi Kurds within the anti-monarchy campaign alarmed the Menderes government. This situation was regarded as a sign of the Kurdish secessionism in Iraq, which could undermine the territorial integrity of Turkey as well.8 Bozarslan’s argument supported the concerns of the Ankara government. To him, Kurdish nationalism in Turkey revived after the 1958 coup when the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani returned from exile. In the late 1950s, the Kurdish intellectuals and students in Istanbul founded secret organizations to appreciate the Kurdish culture and criticize the official Turkish position towards the Kurdish question.9 It would not be wrong to argue that the Kurdish question’s influence on Turkish foreign policy is not confined to its neighbors. Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union was also shaped by the issues stemming from the Kurdish question. For example, Satana argues that end of the Cold War and the US policy towards Iraq since the Gulf War in 1990–1991 marked a milestone for the relations between Turkey and the United States. The creation of a safe haven for the Kurds in northern Iraq following the Gulf War irritated Turkey, which had been dealing with the PKK attacks since 1984. Turkey agreed to cooperate with the United States in protecting the autonomy of northern Iraq, but due to the unipolar structure in the post–Cold War period, members of the Turkish military elite expressed their discontent with the links between the Iraqi Kurdish political groups and the PKK. For example, in 1992, Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş contended that the autonomy of the Kurds in Iraq encouraged

4

Introduction

the PKK-led Kurdish secessionism in Turkey. The ultimate goal of these Kurdish groups was to establish a unified state. This project was backed by the United States and the European Union. According to Satana, the lack of confidence between the parties destabilized US–Turkey relations in the 1990s. Unsurprisingly, the fluctuation continued upon the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as a federal unit. The political and military elite of Turkey believed that the US-backed KRG was responsible for the rising number of PKK attacks. Thus the Kurdish issue once again strained US–Turkey relations.10 Finally, Turkey’s long accession process to the European Union (EU) has also been influenced by the Kurdish question, especially after the end of the Cold War. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, according to Weaver, the European integration process was accelerated to overcome potential security problems. This was necessary because fragmentation of the European Union, which stood united against the threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, might trigger a balance of power system to emerge again among its member states. That is why the Maastricht Treaty, suggesting common European values and institutions to enhance the integration, was accepted and signed in 1992.11 This step has changed the EU’s growth as well. For a candidate state to be eligible for membership, it is required to have institutions preserving democratic governance and human rights, and a functioning market economy. This policy, based on democratic values, has aimed to prevent any individual state from pursuing its own national interest, which might create a discrepancy among the EU member states. The identity- and value-based policy put the Kurdish question on the agenda of Turkey’s accession process to the EU. As Cengiz and Hoffman point out, the EU has used the “conditionality” card for Turkey to settle the Kurdish issue by peaceful means. However, the EU’s influence on Turkey has remained limited due to the fragile nature of the accession process and Turkish politicians’ pragmatic approach to nationalism.12 In conclusion, it is safe to argue that Turkey’s domestic political atmosphere and Turkish foreign policy will take shape based on how the Kurdish question is dealt with. Thus, examining the question of why the “peace process” failed allows us not only to analyze the causes of failure and realize lessons to learn for future attempts but also to pinpoint the potential path that Turkey could face in the domestic and international realms. In order to answer the question posed above, this study is constructed around five chapters, including historical background, theoretical framework and empirical findings. Chapter 1, entitled “Was the peace process a deviation?”, analyzes the historical trajectory of the Kurdish question and reveals how the Turkish state dealt with it starting from the founding of the republic in 1923. In addition to that, I pay particular attention to the AKP

Introduction 5 period to explain why the AKP became the first government attempting to solve the Kurdish question through peaceful means instead of offensive deterrence. This chapter ends with the argument that the AKP government conceptualized the long-lasting struggle with the PKK as a civil conflict rather than a fight against terrorism. Then, I explore in Chapter 2 whether or not Turkey’s struggle with the PKK is generally regarded as a civil conflict. In doing so, literature on the causes of civil conflict and operational definitions are reviewed. Then, history of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK is elaborated within the framework of this literature and operational definitions so as to identify the peace process. In line with the findings, I argue that Turkey’s struggle with the PKK was a civil conflict rather than a fight against terrorism and the peace process could be conceptualized by dealing with the post-conflict peace-building theories. In line with this argument, Chapter 3 discusses the post-conflict peacebuilding process between the AKP government and the PKK and addresses the question of why the efforts to establish peace failed. In doing so, the argument is laid out by examining the political atmosphere during the peace process. As mentioned previously, I argue that the peace process was presented as a pre-condition of democratization by the negotiating parties. Nevertheless, peace-building was seen as an instrument to keep criticism away from the AKP government, and the PKK and democratization trend sharply declined after the peace process started. Following the 7 June elections, interests of the AKP and the PKK elite diverged and the violent clashes recommenced. That is to say, the peace process failed because it left no room for non-state actors to interact and produce a stable peace. In order to make a conceptualization, I use the point of Posen, who argues that postcivil-conflict societies are similar to the sovereign states of an international system. I assert that theories of international relations could be applied to post-civil-conflict societies. Therefore, I present hypotheses stemming from two grand theories of international relations, realism and liberalism. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are the empirical chapters of this study. The aforementioned alternative explanations are tested by dealing with Turkish politics between 2013 and 2016, during the peace process and its aftermath. On the one hand, in line with the rational choice understanding of realism, I deal with the interests of the negotiating parties, the AKP government and the PKK. On the other hand, the liberal approach simply requires dealing with the relationship between political authority and non-state actors. That is to say, the influence of democratization in Turkey and the PKK ideology and leadership style on the peace process is examined. Building on the empirical findings, Chapter 5 concludes that the increasing authoritarianism of the AKP and the militant nature of the PKK leadership

6

Introduction

seem to make the peace process futile. This means that peace process was a truce rather than a peace, meeting the contextual needs of the political authorities, which easily ignore the interests of the individuals they rule over.

Notes 1 Gunter, M. M. “Turkey, Kemalism, and the ‘Deep State’.” In Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East, edited by D. Romano and M. Gurses, 17–39, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 2 Ersanlı, B., and G. G. Özdoğan. “Obstacles and Opportunities: Recent Kurdish Struggles for Political Representation and Participation in Turkey.” Southeastern Europe 35, no. 1 (2011): 62–94. 3 Cizre, U. “The Emergence of the ‘Government’s Perspective on the Kurdish Issue.” Insight Turkey 11, no. 1 (2009): 1–12. 4 “Gezi Park Incidents Related with Hindering Solution Process, Says Turkish Deputy Pm.” 20 June 2013, http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/gezi-park-incidents-relatedwith-hindering-solution-process-says-turkish-deputy-pm/237324, (Last Access: 24 November 2016). 5 “Turkish PM Calls December Anti-Graft Probe Coup Attempt in Disguise.” 15 January 2014, http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkish-pm-calls-december-antigraft-probe-coup-attempt-in-disguise/190355, (Last Access: 24 November 2016). 6 Kirişçi, K. “The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy.” In The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, edited by L. G. Martin and D. Keridis, 273–309, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004. 7 Robins, P. “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue.” International Affairs 69, no. 4 (1993): 657–676. 8 Kumral, M. A. Rethinking Turkey-Iraq Relations: The Dilemma of Partial Cooperation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 9 Bozarslan, H. “Kurds and Turkish State.” In The Cambridge History of Turkey, edited by R. Kasaba, 333–356, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 10 Satana, N. “Kürt sorunu ve Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri.” Demokrasi Platformu 4, no. 1 (2008): 89–106. 11 Wæver, O. “European Security Identities.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 1 (1996): 103–132. 12 Cengiz, F., and Lars Hoffmann. “Rethinking Conditionality: Turkey’s European Union Accession and the Kurdish Question.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 3 (2013): 416–432.

1

Was the peace process a deviation?

“The Turkish Republic is one nation on this soil. That one nation includes everyone. Whoever pursues ethnic nationalism is of ill-intent. No one should come to us about being Turks or being Kurds. We have no separatism or divisions. Our nationalism is about patriotism and about humanism,” said Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to explain the details of the “peace process”, which aims to solve the long-lasting Kurdish question and started on 3 January 2013.1 On the other hand, Öcalan, jailed leader of the PKK, appeared as the counterpart of the “peace process” and the government allowed Öcalan’s letter to be publicly read during the Nawroz celebrations in Diyarbakır in March 2013. Eventually Öcalan’s isolation ended and he was provided opportunities to contact influential actors of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. Following the initiation of the “peace process”, a legal framework making the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) responsible for conducting the negotiations with Öcalan was enacted with the votes of AKP lawmakers in Parliament. In addition to that move, the government formed the “Wise People Committee”, which consisted of 63 members from academia, civil society, business associations, media and the cultural world in order to deal with the “public relations” dimension of the “peace process”.2 It would not be wrong to argue that normalization of Kurdish identity and the positive image of the peace rapidly increased during the “peace process”. This was a departure from Turkey’s traditional policy towards the Kurdish question, which had been regarded as a security issue since the founding of the republic. This security-based paradigm had led Turkey to deal with the Kurdish question by military measures. According to Yeğen, founding principles of the republic have played a key role in shaping Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish question. For example, the founders of the republic opted for building a nation-state, which did not allow the society to be defined as ethnically plural. Thus, unlike the Ottoman practice, the Kurdish

8

Was the peace process a deviation?

identity was totally rejected and Turkishness constituted the legal spirit of the official discourse and policy. In addition to that, the Turkish state exercised the privilege to identify the attempts to revise the status quo in favor of the Kurds. For example, the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925 was regarded as a religion-based reactionary movement aspiring to undermine the progressive reforms made by the young republic. Similarly, it was not uncommon to assume that the Kurdish question derived from the Kurds’ resistance against the modern way of life introduced by the republic. Accordingly, the Kurds’ persistence in preserving their autonomy against the interventionist nature of the nation-state was viewed as an indication that they were a tribal and uncivilized community. This kind of approach is accompanied by the idea that the Kurdish question stems from economic problems and underdevelopment of the Kurdish-populated areas in Turkey. Finally, the Kurdish movements are seen as extensions of the foreign powers3 that aim to destablize Turkey. Accordingly, the Kurdish question is assumed to be artificially created and provoked by the foreign states.4 To sum up, in line with the points of Yeğen, it is safe to argue that the Turkish state failed to conceive and identify the Kurdish question. That is to say, political goals of the Kurdish movements were ignored and demonized. The marginalization of the Kurdish question in the eye of the Ankara government also shaped its reaction towards the instruments that the Kurdish movements used. In other words, violent and non-violent activities of the Kurdish groups were indiscriminately suppressed since the Kurds’ political ends were already not recognized as legitimate by the establishment. Therefore, the Kurdish question remained as a matter of national security and it was kept away from the political agenda. Political parties refrained from suggesting comprehensive peace plans to solve this problem due to the fear of violating the security architecture of Turkey. And this leads us to discuss whether the Kurdish question was a security problem or a securitized problem manipulated by the security elite to dominate the political space. This question is highlighted by the fact that the Turkish state insistently kept the Kurdish question out of the legal and political framework. Most of the literature examined so far points out a causal connection between how the Kurdish question was defined and how the Turkish government reacted. According to mainstream opinion, Ankara governments used military instruments since the Kurdish question was believed to be a security problem impeding the nation-state principle. On the other hand, it could be argued that regarding the Kurdish question as a security issue might also be related to the strategies of the domestic political actors’ survival game in Ankara. For example, Özoğul argues that the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925 was viewed as an opportunity by the Turkish government to eliminate the political opposition, the Progressive Republic Party (PRP),

Was the peace process a deviation? 9 led by prominent commanders of the liberation war, including Kazım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay and Refet Bele. Accordingly, the radical wing of the government party, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), exaggerated and manipulated the Sheikh Said Rebellion to suppress the opposition. That is why the infamous Takrir-i Sükun Law (Maintenance of Order) passed and the Progressive Republic Party was eliminated. Somer is one of the few scholars who considered the role of inter-elite competition on the development of the Kurdish question. Political rivalry between and within the secularist and Islamist circles has prevented them from building a consensus on the Kurdish question. Each circle has perceived the other’s attempt to settle the Kurdish question as a step toward domination of the political space. For example, the radical wing of the Republican People’s Party eliminated the moderate conservatives, Islamists and moderate seculars by using its struggle against the Kurdish rebellion in 1920s.5 Likewise, Kemalists abstained from the Islamists’ agenda to solve the Kurdish question with the help of the Islamic brotherhood discourse due to similar reasons in 1990s. Bozarslan is another scholar who argues that the Turkish state’s use of force to supress internal threats, including the Kurdish question, is the product of certain actors’ bid for legitimizing their positions in power relations. For example, Turkey’s military-bureaucratic complex is inclined to use fighting against security problems as an method of dominating a power group (or some power groups) within the political space.6 In a similar vein, Cizre also includes the military in the political competition game and points out how the Kurdish question was an efficient and useful tool in the hands of the military to keep their position in the system and intervene in politics. This explains how the National Security Council functioned like a shadow cabinet in the 1990s, during the heydays of the struggle against the PKK. In line with these points, it is safe to argue that the Turkish government’s reaction to the Kurdish question before the peace process was shaped by two parameters. First, military measures were taken and almost no room was left for the legal activities of the Kurdish political movements. Second, the necessity of dealing with the Kurdish question was exploited by the ruling elite to consolidate its political position. Thus, examining the progress of the Kurdish national movement allows us to explore this continuity, possibly enabling us to identify whether or not the peace process was a deviation. As introduced previously, the founding of the republic on the basis of secularism and the nation-state undermined the solidarity between Turks and Kurds during the days of the Liberation War. The first Kurdish rebellion burst out in 1925, immediately after the abolishment of the sultanate and caliphate. Under the leadership of Sheikh Said, a Kurdish rebellion

10

Was the peace process a deviation?

aiming at restoring the caliphate broke out. According to Jwaideh, shortly before the rebellion started, some of the Kurdish tribe leaders, intellectual and nationalist activists, had been exiled to western Asia Minor and use of the Kurdish language had been prohibited. In other words, nationalist sentiments contributed to the outbreak of the Sheikh Said Rebellion.7 Therefore, it could be argued that the Islamic tone of the rebellion might be regarded as a claim to preserve ethnic equality with the Turks. Nevertheless, the Kurds’ first attempt was harshly suppressed and hierarchy between Turks and Kurds continued in the later periods of the republic. On the other hand, the strategy that the Ankara government pursued during the Sheikh Said crisis determined a framework for its approach towards the Kurdish question in the forthcoming years. According to Tunçay, the radical wing of the Republican People’s Party viewed the Sheikh Said Rebellion as an opportunity to establish and consolidate the single-party rule. In doing so, moderate figures inside the RPP were eliminated, a state of emergency was declared, the press was silenced and the Progressive Republic Party was closed down. In addition, suppression of the Sheikh Said Rebellion cost the lives of thousands of soldiers, more than the losses of the Liberation War.8 In search of a pattern, it could be argued the first Kurdish rebellion was responded to via military action, coupled with authoritarian suppression of internal criticisms. In other words, militarization of the Kurdish question and restriction of political liberties had gone hand in hand since the beginning of the republic. And the founding principles of the Turkish republic justified both militarism and authoritarianism. This pattern continued in the following years. Kirişçi and Winrow argue that there remained no sign of the Kurdish nationalism when the Democrat Party (DP) took over the government in 1950, which became possible only after a multi-party system was allowed in 1945. Accordingly, RPP authoritarianism had dramatically increased under the single-party rule. This enabled the RPP to accomplish its nation-building project by suppressing the weak and disorganized Kurdish uprisings and implementing assimilation policies.9 During this time period, the Ankara government dealt with 16 Kurdish rebellions, including the Ağrı Rebellion (1927–1930) and Dersim Rebellion (1936–1937). At the end of the day, the authority of the central government over the Kurdish populated areas was fully established. The Democrat Party’s takeover of government in 1950 introduced a new atmosphere of political liberalization and created new opportunities for the Kurds to join the intellectual and political system. In the 1950 general elections, the DP nominated the Kurdish figures who, and whose fathers, had been sentenced during the single-party regime. For example, Abdülmelik Fırat, grandson of Sheikh Said, was chosen as a deputy of Erzurum village. Similarly, Halis Öztürk, one of the commanders of the Ağrı Rebellion,

Was the peace process a deviation? 11 became the deputy of Ağrı. It should be noted that prominent figures of the Kurdish national movement such as Remzi Bucak and Yusuf Azizoğulu were also elected as deputies from the list of the Democrat Party.10 Nevertheless, the Democrat Party did not deviate from the official line of the Turkish state regarding the Kurdish question, although it pragmatically took advantage of Kurdish voters’ discontent with the single-party regime of the RPP. That is to say, the DP remained committed to the principles of nation-state and secularism. Ozbudun and Hale argue that the DP attracted religiously oriented conservatives but made few concessions to them. The DP governments did not attempt to change the secular civil and criminal legal codes and undermine the secular identity of the republic. That is why “trying to destroy secularism” was not among the charges levelled against the DP when the military junta of 1960 executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.11 On the other hand, it is safe to argue that the DP did not take any concrete or large-scale steps to settle the Kurdish question. According to Romano, the strategy of political clientelism, or cronyism, was adopted by the DP in order to appeal to voters from the Kurdish-populated areas. In doing so, local patrons were allocated additional economic sources to distribute to their clients. In return for this, the clients were expected to vote for the DP.12 Furthermore, Tan argues that most of the local patrons were integrated into the “system of Ankara” after getting a seat in the Parliament. As a result, they were easily pacified and controlled. That is to say, the DP viewed the Kurdish question as nothing but an election issue.13 The 49ers event fully unmasked the DP and its pragmatic approach towards the Kurdish question. It should be noted that the 49ers file was the product of the General Qasem coup in Iraq in 1958. General Qasem toppled the Iraqi monarchy, which had close ties with the Menderes government, and opened the doors of government to the representatives of Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish communities. Thanks to the political atmosphere that emerged after the coup, Mullah Mustafa Barzani returned from exile to Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party supported the Qasem administration. However, the increasing role of the Kurds in Iraqi politics alarmed Turkey’s security elite, which regarded any kind of Kurdish autonomy in the north of Iraq as a threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey. The Turkish security elite believed that political achievements of the Iraqi Kurds would automatically trigger Kurdish secessionist sentiments in Turkey. According to an intelligence report leaked by Yön magazine in 1959, Kurdish nationalism, encouraged by the 1958 revolution in Iraq, gained ground among university students. To intimidate these Kurdish organizations, imprisonment of some 40 or 50 of these students was recommended. This policy brief was implemented when the clashes between Turcoman and Kurdish groups in Kirkuk, Iraq, became an issue in Turkish domestic politics. In December

12

Was the peace process a deviation?

1959, 50 Kurdish university students, activists and intellectuals protesting the anti-Kurdish statements made by Asım Eren, an RPP member of Parliament, were arrested and imprisoned. They were accused of being involved in subversive activities. After one of them died, the remaining 49 people were released in 1961. This event became known as “49ers”.14 The 49ers event verifies the argument that the Kurdish movements were criminalized regardless of the method they used to challenge the nationstate understanding; even the non-violent actions were harshly suppressed. In addition to that, the Kurdish question was seen as an instrument that regulated relations among the ruling elite. Towards the end of the 1950s, opposition parties and university students began to criticize the Democrat Party government for its anti-democratic practices. Then the Qasem coup happened in Iraq. Prime Minister Menderes was concerned about the possibility of a military coup against his government inspired by the Qasem coup. That is why he opted for intimidating the opposition by curtailing democratic principles while remaining loyal to the statist understanding of security. For example, Pelt argues that Menderes’ government viewed the creation of the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT), a paramilitary and pro-taksim organisation of the Turkish Cypriots, as an opportunity to appease the army because the TMT was intended to be under the direct command of the Turkish Armed Forces.15 In a similar vein, Menderes seems to use the Kurdish question to show his commitment to the pillars of the establishment. Söyler explains this phenomena by using the term “deep state”. The deep state emerged as an organism between 1945 and 1947. She argues that the deep state created a tutelage over the political parties and kept them within certain limits that were determined by the Cold War and Turkey’s established security paradigm.16 Menderes viewed imprisonment of 49 Kurdish activists as a necessary step to avert the pressure of establishment. In other words, the Kurdish question was used as an instrument to regulate the relations among elites in Ankara once again, in a different way. Nevertheless, Menderes’ strategy did not prevent the mid- and low-ranking soldiers from forming a junta and toppling the Democrat Party government in 1960. According to the junta’s manifesto, the coup aimed to restore democracy and prevent the occurrence of further domestic crises. That is why the National Unity Committee (MBK), the transitional government formed by the junta leaders, began to create a constitution. The MBK aimed to design a new political system by enforcing constitutional limits on the elected government’s ability to violate democratic rights and liberties. In doing so, the MBK hoped to create efficient checks and balances to avoid the problems stemming from authoritarian and arbitrary policies of the elected civilian governments. The 1961 constitution provided room for civil liberties with the thought that civil society, media and academia could

Was the peace process a deviation? 13 limit the civilian government’s authoritarian tendencies. In addition, constitutional institutions such as the Supreme Court and the National Security Council were established as tutelage mechanisms over the political system. It would not be wrong to argue that the 1961 constitution gave rise to civil society and political pluralism. This atmosphere helped the Kurds to be more effectively involved in political activities. Bozarslan defines the period starting in 1961 until the 1980 military coup d’état as “problematic renewal” for the Kurds. Accordingly, two factors stimulated the renewal of the Kurdish movement in Turkey.17 First, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who returned from exile in 1958 after the Qasem coup, initiated a revolt against the Baghdad government in 1961 due to discrepancies in issues related to the economic and social rights of the Kurds.18 Bozarslan argues that the Kurdish insurgency had a tremendous effect on the Kurds in Turkey and led them to regard Barzani as the father of their nation and to reject the historical and moral authority of Mustafa Kemal. Thus, not surprisingly, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Turkey (TKDP), was established (as an illegal organization) with the support of Barzani in 1965.19 Secondly, the younger generation of the Kurds was attracted by the robust left-wing movement’s discourse based on social justice and equality and its criticism of statesponsored nationalism. Furthermore, the Marxist-Leninist left introduced such issues as the “national question” and “the right of the oppressed people to determine their own fate” into the Kurds’ agenda. For example, the Worker’s Party of Turkey (TİP) officially accepted the existence of the Kurdish question in 1970 and managed to receive support from the Kurds living in urban areas. On the other hand, some of the Kurds who split from the Turkish left formed Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (DDKO) in 1969 to advocate the existence of a distinct Kurdish cultural and linguistic entity in Turkey by non-violent and legal means.20 Nevertheless, it would be misleading to think that expansion of civil liberties following the 1961 constitution eradicated the Turkish establishment’s approach towards the Kurdish question. For example, Faik Bucak, head of the TKDP, was assassinated, allegedly by police agents, in July 1966.21 Similarly, left-wing Kurdish groups were also intimidated by the security forces. As the DDKO increased in popularity among the Kurds, gendarmerie forces, under the command of the Turkish Armed Forces, systematically raided the Kurdish villages. Furthermore, members of the DDKO were subjected to mass detention in 1970.22 The Kurdish question continued to be a useful tool that allowed the military to intervene in politics. According to Watts, the Kurdish activism that gained ground during the 1960s helped to rationalize the Turkish army’s “coup by memorandum” on 12 March 1971. The pattern which explains the behavior of the Turkish state regarding the Kurdish question was repeated. That is to say, the

14

Was the peace process a deviation?

Kurdish question was criminalized and it was used to shape the inter-elite competition in Ankara. The military’s intervention into politics gave rise to the radicalization of the Kurdish movement. Following the 12 March memorandum, the DDKO and TİP were closed down by the military court and the Kurdish activists were imprisoned. In other words, political channels that helped the Kurds to be involved in the political arena were abolished. Most of the Kurdish activists were released only when the government declared “general amnesty” in 1974. It is safe to argue that the organizations formed by the Kurds after 1974 adopted a radical programme, including the initiation of an armed struggle to achieve this end. Of these organizations, the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (also known as Road to Freedom) was the only one that defended federalism and rejected armed struggle as a strategy for change. Other organizations, such as the Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association (DDKD), Ala Rizgari, Kawa and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), pursued a secessionist agenda and established militant training camps in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. The Kurdish organizations were prepared to initiate an armed struggle when, in 1980, the military coup happened and political activism in Turkey was interrupted. Kurdish prisoners were held in miserable conditions and subjected to ill treatment, which unsurprisingly spurred them to join radical organizations after being released. For example, members of the PKK, the most radical Kurdish organization, survived the 1980 coup by fleeing into Syria and Lebanon, and PKK was able to easily recruit new militants and follow an entrenchment strategy away from the repressive atmosphere in Turkey. Until the first attack of the PKK took place in 1984, its militants joined the training camps of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in Lebanon, and experienced Palestinian fighters trained the PKK militants in the mainstays of guerrilla war. As time progressed, the PKK opened new camps to train the militants escaping from Turkey while other radical organizations were scrambling to stay afloat under the military regime in Turkey. The PKK was the only survivor of the Kurdish organizations due to its timely exit strategy.23 Systemic armed resistantce by the PKK started on 15 August 1984, when the military units in Eruh and Şemdinli were attacked and two soldiers were killed. It would not be wrong to argue that the PKK regarded violence as their only option for survival in the following years. Other factions of the Kurdish movement such as the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (Road to Freedom), DDKD and Ala Rizgari rejected cooperation with Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, due to his extremist nature. According to Kemal Burkay, leader of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan, Öcalan defined the PKK as a group of uneducated people with a low level of consciousness. Likewise,

Was the peace process a deviation? 15 Haco Yaşar, one of the leaders of Ala Rizgari, contended that Öcalan was bloodthirsty and would never change. Leaders of the other Kurdish factions were right to be suspicious, because Öcalan’s PKK had assasinated the members of leftist and Kurdish organizations in order to gain ground and eliminate its rivals prior to the 1980 coup.24 According to Özcan, during the establishment phase of the PKK until the 1980 coup, the PKK killed 354 people and wounded 386 people, ostensibly to eliminate fascist spies and local obscurantists.25 Nevertheless, the PKK’s choice to use extremist violence might be explained in different ways rather than emphasizing Öcalan’s personality. According to Martin von Bruinessen, absence of channels through which the Kurdish community could express its discontent helped the PKK to recruit new followers and initiate systematic anti-state violence. The emergence of such a security threat paved the way for the military to dominate the struggle against the PKK. This did not leave any room for political parties to articulate alternative views to solve the Kurdish question.26 Similarly, the PKK managed to justify the use of extreme violence by insisting it was fighting the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). This also ruled out the rival Kurdish factions and allowed the PKK to monopolize the Kurdish question. The violent clashes created a snowball effect that transformed Turkey’s Kurdish problem into TAF’s PKK problem. Following the first attacks of the PKK in 1984, the conflict gradually escalated. It peaked in the 1990s until the arrest of Öcalan in 1999. Nevertheless, the PKK has never laid down its weapons and continues its armed struggle today despite the transformation of the international system, Turkish domestic politics and regional complexities. That is why Öcalan was regarded as the focus of the peace process initiated by the Justice and Development Party government in 2013. Bozarslan argues that the PKK flourished in the Kurdish urban centers, which were traumatized by the military’s repression. The guerrilla war conducted by the PKK was viewed as a way to restore collective prestige and enact revenge by the younger generation who witnessed the sufferings of elder generations. In addition, the PKK monopolized the Kurdish national movement and completed its instiutionalization process by imitating the vocabulary and symbols of Turkish nationalism and adopting the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of party organization and guerrilla warfare. As part of this process, the counter-insurgency strategy of the PKK was paired with the emergence of political and social organizations. The Kurdish parties that were backed by the PKK challenged the influence of the traditional Turkish political parties in the Kurdishpopulated areas.27 In line with these points, it can be argued that the PKK’s capacity to influence the competition among the elite to control the bureacuratic machine

16

Was the peace process a deviation?

in Ankara has been quite high, hitherto unprecedented. The previous cases indicate that the elites, who want to have an upper hand over the rival factions, subjectively interpreted the Kurdish question and viewed the actors of the Kurdish movement as an instrument in their struggle for power. The PKK itself has also become a deliberate player in the inter-elite competition, yet with awareness of the political repercussions that its violence produced. As Bruinessen posits, the PKK aimed to bring the government to the negotiation table.28 Thus, Öcalan was quite interested in the political atmosphere in Ankara and had an impact on issues such as election results, composition of the Parliament and the government’s foreign policy agenda. However, Öcalan’s strategy was oxymoronic because the PKK’s strategy – based on extremist violence, including terrorist acts – undermined the influence of political parties, even government parties, on the decision making process. Thus, bringing the government to the negotiation table could have been possible only if the millitary consented. Using political violence and terrorism as an instrument to solve the Kurdish question pulled this problem away from the political sphere, leaving the PKK with the TAF as the negotiator. In the history of the struggle against the PKK, the military’s shadow over politics rarely disappeared, until its role in the political system gradually declined during the the Justice and Development Party governments starting in 2002. For example, during the initial years of the PKK attacks, the problem was not identified with the Kurdish question and it was deliberately minimized. In addition to the military circles, even the civiliancivilian Prime Minister Turgut Özal defined the PKK as a “bunch of bandits” between 1983 and 1989.29 Nevertheless, Özal’s attitude towards the PKK changed after he replaced General Kenan Evren, leader of the 1980 coup, as the new president in 1989. Ataman argues that Özal managed to establish his authority over the military and attempted to change Turkey’s traditional ethnic policy based on “Anatolian Turkism” and denial of all other ethnic groups during his presidency between 1989 and 1993. During this period, Özal declared he was one-quarter Kurdish in 1989, recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in 1990, allowed the written, verbal and recorded expression of non-Turkish languages and contended that he was open to discuss the idea of federation.30,31 Following the death of Özal in 1993, the conflict between the TAF and the PKK sharply escalated, and it continued until Öcalan was captured and jailed in 1999. Nevertheless, violent clashes paved the way for the military’s ultimate control over the political system. Cizre argues that national security discourse placed security over democratic and developmental objectives beginning in the second half of the 1990s. The military aimed to monopolize the national security area, which was assumed to encompass threat/risk perception and social, economic and military parameters.

Was the peace process a deviation? 17 In so doing, the military could spread its influence over the major political areas by controlling the national security discourse. In line with this argument, the question of how the national security policy was formulated gains prominence. According to Cizre, there was no room for the Parliament in formulating the national security policy because national security policy documents were being prepared by the Secretariat of the National Security Council (MGK). These documents were turning into the official view of the government after being accepted by the civilian (government) and military members of the MGK. Unbalanced power relations between the military and the civilians prevented any antagonism. One can argue that the government was expected to implement the decisions reached in the MGK meetings rather than deciding what national security policy should be. Ultimately, the military justified its influence on politics by using the national security policy that it had formulated. This inevitably prevented the civilian actors from solving such problems as the Kurdish question and radical Islam by political means.32 Building on this point, it seems reasonable that the struggle against the PKK helped the military elite to sideline the Parliament and the civilian governments and dominate the decision making process. This is fully compatible with the pattern of Turkey’s traditional policy towards the Kurdish question. On the one hand, the problem was confined to security concerns and dealt with by military means. On the other hand, the Kurdish question swung the power pendulum away from civilians and towards the military. However, this pattern was seriously challenged by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2002. According to Öniş, following the AKP’s triumph, Turkish politics had become polarized around two camps. This polarization indicated competition between conservative globalism, represented by the AKP, and defensive nationalism, represented by the Republican People’s Party and the Nationalist Movement Party. “Conservative globalism” refers to a synthesis of liberal ideas based on democratization, a free market, European Union membership and defense of traditional values that appeal to large segments of voters. “Defensive nationalism” refers to a strong commitment to secularism and the nation-state. Furthermore, defensive nationalist parties have an anti-progressive image due to their fear-based policies and authoritarian biases.33 Therefore, it is safe to argue that the military, which regarded itself as the guardian of secularism and nation-state principles, was a member of the defensive nationalist camp and remained skeptical of the agenda of the AKP, which was led by ex-Islamist politicians. The AKP founders claimed that they abandoned the orthodox version of political Islam and defined themselves as conservative democrats. In military and secular circles, the AKP cites such universal values as democracy, human rights, civilianization and European Union

18

Was the peace process a deviation?

membership to define its position and unmask its real intentions. To push the military out of politics in the initial years of its office, the AKP ambitiously made democratic reforms that were required before Turkey could be accepted as a member of the European Union. This was a well-designed strategy because being a full member of the EU was compatible with the modernist spirit of the republic, and it had been adopted as an official foreign policy goal by the previous governments. Using this strategy, the AKP could limit the role of the military without jeopardizing its survival. During this period, the AKP did not take any concrete step to solve the Kurdish question and mainly focused on de-militarization of the bureaucratic and political system. It would not be wrong to argue that the AKP added the Kurdish question to its agenda only after the Ergenekon investigation in 2007. Members of an alleged secularist and ultra-nationalist organization named Ergenekon – including high-ranking generals, journalists, academics, politicians and retired officers – were accused of making preparations to overthrow the government. Within the scope of the Ergenekon case, 68 army generals and 125 colonels were detained. According to Aydınlı, norms and paradigms of the civil–military relations changed after the Ergenekon case because the strength and confidence of the civilians, coupled with the ongoing governing performance of the AKP, undermined the military’s supremacy.34 This explains why the AKP waited until 2009 to initiate a peace process with the Kurds. The first phase, called the Democratic Initiative: The National Unity and Brotherhood Project, in 2009, failed thanks to the increasing criticisms of nationalist circles in Turkey. For example, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) argued that the PKK terrorism, which had come to an end when Öcalan was captured in 1999, began again under the tolerant policies of the AKP. According to Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the MHP, the Democratic Initiative project encouraged the PKK to follow a secessionist agenda. On the other hand, Deniz Baykal, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), criticized the AKP government for negotiating with the PKK, which was defined as a terrorist organisation by domestic law. The criticism of the opposition mostly derived from the non-transparent nature of the Democratic Initiative project. Details of this initiative never became clear, but it was expected to include steps such as “restoring the original names of the Kurdish villages,” “granting amnesty to the PKK militants,” “allowing the elective Kurdish language courses at schools” and “amending the constitution to redefine the concept of Turkish citizenship.”35 As mentioned above, this project failed because of the rising criticisms of the domestic opposition circles, and the AKP did not push too hard on the eve of the 2011 general elections. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the AKP directly addressed the Kurdish question for the first time among its election declarations before

Was the peace process a deviation? 19 2011 and signalled that the Democratic Initiative would proceed if it won the majority in the Parliament and formed a single-party government again. In line with the predictions, following the election victory of the AKP in 2011, the government initiated the “peace process” (also known as solution process) in January 2013 in order to settle the Kurdish question through peaceful instead of military means. Therefore, one can argue that the “peace process” was a departure from Turkey’s traditional policy on the Kurdish question. It is apparent that the Turkish government decided to deal with the Kurdish question through non-military ways for the first time since the founding of the republic. This was a deviation from one of the patterns: responding to the Kurdish question by taking military measures. However, for the peace process to be called a full deviation, examination of the second pattern, using the Kurdish question as political leverage, is required.

Notes 1 “Turkey Enters Key Week in Kurdish Solution Bid.” 18 February 2013, www. hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-enters-key-week-in-kurdish-solution-bid.aspx? pageID=238&nID=41327&NewsCatID=338, (Last Access: 23 October 2013). 2 It should be noted that the “Wise People Committee” was not a civil society initiative. It was organized by the government. 3 Küçükşahin, A. “Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’yu PKK Terörüne Hazırlayan Nedenler.” Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi 2 (2005): 63–94. 4 Yeğen, M. Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015. 5 Somer, M. Milada Dönüş: Ulus-Devletten Devlet-Ulusa Türk ve Kürt Meselesinin Üç İkilemi. Istanbul: Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2016. 6 Bozarslan, H. “Why the Armed Struggle: Understanding the Violence in Kurdistan of Turkey.” In The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, edited by F. İbrahim and G. Gülbey, 17–30. New York: St. Martin Press. 7 Jwaideh, W. The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2016. 8 Tunçay, M. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923– 1931. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015. 9 Kirişçi, K., and G. M. Winrow. Kürt Sorunu, Kökeni ve Gelişimi. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997. 10 Tan, A. Kürt Sorunu. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009. 11 Özbudun, E., and W. Hale. Türkiye’de İslamcılık, Demokrasi ve Liberalizm, AKP Olayı. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010. 12 Romano, D. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 13 Tan, Kürt Sorunu, 2009. 14 Watts, N. “Silence and Voice: Turkish Policies and Kurdish Resistance in the Mid20th Century.” In The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism Costa Mesa, edited by M. Ahmed and M. Gunter, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2007. 15 Pelt, M. Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and Its Demise. London: I. B. Tauris, 2014.

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16 Söyler, M. “Informal Institutions, Forms of State and Democracy: The Turkish Deep State.” Democratization 20, no. 2 (2013): 310–334. 17 Bozarslan, H. “Kurds and Turkish State.” In The Cambridge History of Turkey, edited by R. Kasaba, 333–356, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 18 Stansfield, G. Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy. London: Routledge, 2010. 19 Bozarslan, “Kurds and Turkish State,” 2008. 20 Ibid. 21 Gunter, M. M. The A to Z of the Kurds. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2009. 22 Tan, Kürt Sorunu, 2009. 23 Marcus, A. Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence. New York: New York University Press, 2007. 24 Ibid. 25 Özcan, N. A. PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi): Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi. Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 1999. 26 Bruinessen, M. V. “The Nature and Uses of Violence in the Kurdish Conflict.” Paper presented at the International colloquium “Ethnic Construction and Political Violence”, organized by the Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli. Cortona, 1999, www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/publications/Violence.htm, (Last Access: 23 June 2015). 27 Bozarslan, “Kurds and Turkish State,” 2008. 28 Burinessen, “The Nature and Uses of Violence in the Kurdish Conflict,” July 2–3, 1999. 29 Criss, N. B. “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 18, no. 1 (1995): 17–37. 30 Ataman, M. “Özal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s.” Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 4 (2002): 123–142. 31 Beriker, N. “The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects.” Security Dialogue 28, no. 4 (1997): 439–452. 32 Cizre, Ü. “Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey.” The Middle East Journal 57, no. 2 (2003): 213–229. 33 Öniş, Z. “Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and Development Party and the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey.”, Mediterranean Politics,14, no. 1 (2009): 22. 34 Aydınlı, E. “Civil-Military Relations Transformed.” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 1 (2012): 100–108. 35 Pusane, Ö. K. “Turkey’s Kurdish Opening: Long Awaited Achievements and Failed Expectations.” Turkish Studies 15, no. 1 (2014): 81–99.

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Conceptualization of the peace process

Turkey’s state-run television channel, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), became an efficient propaganda tool of official state discourse during the struggle against the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s. One of the most popular TV shows, Anadolu’dan Görünüm (Panorama from Anatolia), contained an intriguing segment that reflected the state’s view of the Kurdish question. One of the scenes showed a helicopter landing in a rural area while shots were fired over a mountain. The next scene showed a young, bespectacled Turkish doctor examining an elderly Kurdish man with stethoscope. The message conveyed here is quite clear: the Turkish state attempts both to demonstrate its hard power capacity and determination in fighting against PKK terrorism and to emphasize that there is no inherent problem between Kurdish people and the benevolent state. With the help of such propaganda, most of the Turks viewed the PKK as a marginal group. This is not surprising, because Prime Minister Turgut Özal called the PKK a “bunch of bandits” between 1983 and 1989.1 In addition to this view, there were several arguments about the goals of the PKK. For example, some argued that the PKK was the extension of the foreign powers2 which aim to destabilize Turkey. Others asserted that the PKK was the missionary of Zoroastrianism,3 the religion of the Kurds before they encountered Islam. Furthermore, the more Turkish civilians, officers and conscripts were killed by the PKK, the more the Turkish public opinion’s tendency to define the PKK as a marginal and irrational terrorist organization increased. Nevertheless, even such a wave of hatred and official propaganda of the Turkish state could not conceal two phenomena. First, the Turkish state’s struggle against the PKK was not as clear as the state argued. Evacuated Kurdish villages, deportations of Kurds, human rights abuses and illegal activities of security sector members created grief for the Kurdish people. At the same time, it should be noted that Turks also suffered from state’s fight against the PKK. For example, Turkish intellectuals criticizing Turkey’s attitude towards the Kurdish question were

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Conceptualization of the peace process

labelled as a threat to national security. Politicians and bureaucrats alike used a similar pattern in order to avert such criticisms: We need unity and togetherness more than any time period. In sum, Turkey’s struggle against the PKK was not as benevolent as the propaganda would have it, because attempts to securitize the country against the PKK desecuritized millions of people. The second phenomenon is the achievement of the PKK-backed Kurdish political parties in local and general elections since 1999. In the general elections of 1999, the Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP) received 4.75% of total votes. In 2002, after HADEP was banned, the Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) competed electorally and received 6.1 % of total votes. However, the 10% threshold in Turkey’s electoral system led many in the Kurdish political movement to participate as independent candidates in the following elections. Independent candidates received 20 deputies in 2007 and 29 deputies out of 550 in the 2011 elections. At the local level, Kurdish parties won municipal elections in some of the Kurdish-populated southeast provinces in 1999, 2004 and 2009. These results indicate that the PKK and its political extensions are not viewed as radical and marginal organizations by the Kurdish voters. One can thus assert that the PKK and PKK-backed political parties have a significant amount of Kurds’ popular support to represent them in Parliament and the municipalities. These two phenomena imply that the struggle between the Turkish state and the PKK could be called a civil war as opposed to fighting against terrorism. Sambanis argues that regimes are inclined to define guerrilla insurgencies as terrorism in order to downgrade the importance of the opposition they face. According to Sambanis, however, there is a distinction between terrorism and civil war. Unlike terrorist groups, rebel armies are hierarchically and coherently organized. They can access more resources in the territory they claim to control and recruit new members by the help of mass level support from civilians.4 Furthermore, there is a literature debating the idea that terrorism is a strategy of civil war. For example, Findley and Young argue that forms of politcal violence (terrorism, insurgency or civil conflict) might overlap. Accordingy, terrorism might be used as a complementary/supplementary strategy during the civil conflict.5 As Kalyvas posits, “resorting to violence in the context of civil war in order to achieve compliance” might be regarded as terrorism as well. This could strengthen the authority of the insurgent group over the community it represents and deter future defections.6 But this does not change the fact that there is an ongoing civil war. In a similar vein, Stepanova coins the terms “conflict-related terrorism” and “militant terrorist group”. In clarifying these terms, she argues that there is a difference between terrorist organizations and organizations that

Conceptualization of the peace process 23 resort to terrorism to achieve political ends in a less costly way.7 Similarly, Crenshaw puts forward the term “revolutionary terrorism”, which refers to using terrorist methods strategically to reach revolutionary goals. In doing so, she cites Frantz Fanon, who significantly shaped Öcalan’s philosophy and methodology.8 In line with the literature and emprical findings, Coşar concludes that the PKK engaged in terrorism from its inception to eliminate the intra-Kurdish opposition and maintain compliance. Furthermore, the PKK also resorted to terrorism as a part of its attrition strategy in western metropolitan cities. Nevertheless, considering its organizational structure, political aims, level of popular support and non-violent activities in social, political and economic realms, the PKK has an insurgent character, which leads us to examine the struggle between the Turkish state and the PKK in the context of an intra-state war.9 Such a denomination is arguably supported by several definitions in the literature dealing with the causes of civil war. According to Wilkenfeld and Brecher, a state consists of several identity groups among which crises often arise. Identity, in this context, is not necessarily ethnic or religious identity. It may very well be ideological identity.10 Similarly, Horowitz acknowledges the force of ethnic loyalty and argues that ethnic affiliation has a permeative character which finds its way into a myriad of social and political issues in divided societies. That is to say, revolts, insurgencies or political discrepancies may derive from ethnic aspirations although the role of ethnicity varies widely from one society to another. Therefore, ethnic diversity can be regarded as an underlying cause of the political problems that divided societies face.11 However, Fearon and Laitin challenge the conventional wisdom which holds that religous or ethnic division makes countries more prone to civil conflicts. In their research, they find that “ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant violence” when the variable of per capita income is controlled.12 In a similar vein, Lake and Rothchild also oppose the argument that intergroup differences and historical hatreds are the sources of civil conflicts. They posit that civil conflict is the product of “collective fears of the future”, referring to an identity group’s fear for its future survival.13 This argument implies that there is a zero-sum game structuring relations among different identity groups in the same country. Therefore, “threatened” groups use violence in order to maintain their survival. In addition to the “collective fear of future” argument, Ted Gurr highlights the term “relative deprivation” in order to explain the causal connection between identity and the circumstances which one expects. According to this view, a person might feel frustrated if he believes he has been deprived of opportunities due to his identity. Such frustration

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Conceptualization of the peace process

leads to aggression and conflict. However, it should be noted that economic deprivation is not the sole condition affecting levels of frustration. Political and social grievances also matter.14 Şatana argues that grievance is the product of political and social deprivation. From this perspective, conflict is more likely if political access and formal recognition of identity are not provided.15 In the final analysis, besides the ethnic diversity, the literature suggests that institutional capacity problems of states to provide credible guarantees of protection for groups and adequate distribution of wealth and political rights potentially influence the occurrence of civil conflicts. The story of the struggle between Turkey and the PKK provides empirical findings that help us to test the conditions presented above and understand whether this conflict is labeled as a civil war. First of all, Kurds are different from Turks in terms of ethnicity, language and culture. However, as Yeğen posits, the Turkish state has categorically denied the idea that there is a diverse society in Turkey since the founding of the republic in 1923. According to the 1924 constitution, those who live in Turkey are called “Turks” regardless of religion and ethnicity. Such an understanding, which reflects the nationalist and authoritarian nation-state philosophy of the republic, could not conceal the fact that there is a Kurdish population in Turkey.16 Secondly, PKK and Kurdish political figures argue that a centralistnationalist understanding of Turkey aims to assimilate Kurds. For example, Abdullah Öcalan states that “in Turkey, they say there are no Kurds, that they don’t exist. The government says this. Even the professors at universities say this. The Turks don’t want to accept the Kurds; they want to finish [with] them. Turkey only accepts the Kurd who denies he is a Kurd. The 70,000 Village Guards [Turkish Kurds armed by the government to support the government] who claim they are the best Turks cannot even speak good Turkish. Turkey’s obstinate, ignorant refusal to negotiate with me has led to a cul-de-sac it cannot get out of. Only a dialogue between Turkey and its Kurds can get the victims out of this continuing trap.” In addition to the assimilation argument, Öcalan accuses the Turkish state of murdering thousands of Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage due to their support for Kurdish rights and defines the Turkish state as a terrorist organization.17 Such views of Öcalan imply that the PKK aims to protect Kurdish people from assimilation policies and other assaults of the state. In other words, the PKK regards itself as the natural outcome of Kurds’ “collective fears of the future”. According to Gurr and Harff, competing ethnic groups are organized around an autocratic leadership in order to preserve their cohesiveness, as this is the only way to maintain their survival.18 One can thus assert that Öcalan regards himself as the leader of a competing ethno-political group threatened by the central authority.

Conceptualization of the peace process 25 It should be noted that militarization of the Kurdish question and violent clashes between the TAF and the PKK set the stage for the esacalation of collective fears among the Kurds. According to Jenkıns, during the heydays of the anti-PKK campaign in the 1980s and 1990s, a matrix of security and intelligence officials, ultranationalist members of the Turkish underworld and renegade former members of the PKK conducted covert operations free from any financial and political oversight. Thousands of suspected PKK sympathizers were tortured, killed or disappeared and these claims were dismissed by the Turkish authorities.19 Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that such illegal activities have exacerbated the concerns of the Kurds about their physical safety, and this has been efficiently propagandized by the PKK. The relative deprivation argument also finds support in the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK. In their seminal work, İçduygu, Romano and Sirkeci deal with the effects of an “environment of insecurity” on the mobilization of Kurdish ethnic nationalism in Turkey. In examining the data of the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey, the main argument of the study is that the Turkish population lives in better conditions than the Kurdish population in Turkey. Considering factors such as material conditions, access to land, income, education, health, possession, state resources and lifespan, the research points to a causal mechanism between material and non-material deprivation and the ethnic revival of Kurds. The empirical data demonstrates that material resources are distributed disproportionally among Turks and Kurds. The research also engages issues of non-material insecurity, referred to as deficiencies of cultural rights. According to this study, Kurdish identity has been suppressed by the state and Kurdish-speaking people have experienced psychological insecurity.20 In sum, a combination of material and non-material insecurities produces a motivation for Kurds to initiate an ethnic revival. It should also be noted that political access could be a factor conditioning relations between an ethnic group and its state’s government. As Şatana points out, absence of political access increases the likelihood of civil conflict.21 In Turkey since 1989, five Kurdish political parties have been banned by the Turkish Supreme Court for alleged activities undermining the territorial integrity and national unity, while the 10 % election threshold has become an obstacle preventing Kurdish parties from joining the Parliament. Although some Kurdish politicians were elected as independent candidates and formed a party group after joining the Parliament, they have never been a coalition member in a government. This means that Kurds have exerted almost no influence over the policies of the government, which is centralist and leaves scant room for local administration. In this view, advocates of political violence could easily find support in the Kurdish society.

26

Conceptualization of the peace process

While the violence between Turkey and the PKK demonstrates characteristics of a prototypical intra-state conflict, one can ask the question of what the objective criteria are for labeling an armed clash between government forces and rebel groups as civil conflict. Such objectivity is necessary because governments are inclined to define rebel groups as terrorist organizations in order to justify their policies and downgrade the political dimension of the violence. In attempting to delineate these criteria, Small and Singer argue that there should be at least 1,000 combat-related casualties within a year and both government forces and rebel groups should each suffer at least 5% of these deaths.22 However, Sambanis criticizes Small and Singer’s operational definition by suggesting that scholars revisit questions of what constitutes the “threshold of violence that distinguishes civil war from other forms of internal armed conflicts”; and asks, “How do we know when civil war starts and ends?” According to Sambanis, the annual-death criterion of 1,000 casualties introduces problems when the level of violence fluctuates during the same conflict. Thus, a violent event could be coded as civil war even if the annual number of deaths does not reach 1,000. In other words, a civil war does not start or end when the number of casualties exceeds 1,000 or drops below 1,000. Therefore, there is a need for an operational definition resolving such problems. For an armed conflict to be classified as a civil war, Sambanis proposes that “the start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths. If the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 3 years reach 1000.” Thus, he presents a more inclusive start date for civil war. Sambanis also emphasizes the importance of the sustainability of the civil war, arguing that “throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, at least at the minor or intermediate level. There should be no 3-year (or more leniently 5-year) period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths.”23 In line with the operational definition of Sambanis, Table 2.1 shows that in the armed conflict between Turkey and the PKK, cumulative death numbers reach 1,000 in 1985, 1986 and 1987. This means that the civil war began in 1985. In regard to the sustainability of the civil war between 1985 and 2009, the number of deaths reaches the threshold outlined by Sambanis. Thus, the armed conflict between Turkey and PKK could be classified as a civil war. Continuing to follow Sambanis’ definition, the “peace process” that started in January 2013 can be considered an attempt to end the civil war. In addition to theoretical support from literature, the AKP’s initiative to settle the Kurdish issue in practice through non-military methods implies that Turkey started to define the PKK as a belligerent party instead of a terrorist

Conceptualization of the peace process 27 Table 2.1 Annual deaths during the armed conflict between Turkey and PKK24,25 Year

Armed forces number of deaths

PKK number of deaths

Civilian casualties number of deaths

Total

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

26 58 51 71 54 153 161 244 629 715 1145 772 608 518 383 236 29 20 7 31 75 105 111 146 171 62 104 142 184

28 201 74 95 123 179 368 379 1129 3050 2510 4163 3789 7558 2556 1458 319 104 19 87 122 188 132 315 696 65 112 164 316

43 141 133 237 109 178 204 233 832 1479 992 313 170 158 85 83 17 8 7 63 28 30 38 37 51 18 29 82 41

97 400 258 403 286 510 733 856 2590 5244 4647 5248 4567 8234 3024 1777 365 132 33 181 225 323 281 498 918 145 245 388 544

organization. As noted previously, the official state discourse of Turkey had viewed the PKK as a radical terrorist organization. However, the AKP government departed from the traditional behavior of the Turkish political elite, who had principally rejected negotiating with the PKK. As Dağı argues, the peace process, which involves a ceasefire and negotiation, provided an opportunity for the PKK to gain legitimacy as a political actor.26

What kind of peace? Building on the arguments and data presented above, it is reasonable that the armed conflict between Turkey and the PKK was classified as a civil war

28

Conceptualization of the peace process

after the AKP government regarded the PKK as the addresee of the Kurdish question and initiated the “peace process”. As noted previously, this was a radical departure from the Turkish state’s traditional, military-driven approach towards the Kurdish question. Nevertheless, there was another condition required for the “peace process” to be labeled as full deviation; the non-instrumentalization of the Kurdish question. In that sense, the AKP should have avoided using the “peace process” in order to consolidate its power base. Following the declaration of the “peace process” in January 2013, some intellectuals argued that the AKP’s enthusiasm to solve the Kurdish problem affirmed its commitment to democratic values. According to them, the AKP was still representing the revisionist wing in Turkish politics and those, who criticized the “peace process” and the AKP, were defenders of the status quo, which regards the military as the guardian of the nation-state. On the other hand, some other scholars remained sceptical about the AKP’s commitment to the ideal of democratization, especially after the peaceful Gezi protests were harshly and blatantly suppressed in June 2013. Therefore, they thought that the AKP misappropriated the “peace process”, using it as political immunity against domestic political opposition. Therefore, answering the question of whether the AKP used the “peace process” to exempt itself from criticism will allow us to understand what kind of peace the AKP envisioned.27 The above-mentioned debate on the AKP’s way of dealing with the Kurdish question centers on the causal connection between the democracy and the sustainability of peace between conflicting ethnic groups. The civil conflict literature is heavily inclined to regard the democracy and other regime type indicators as the explanatory variable of peace. For example, Hartzell et al. argue that civil war settlements established in democratic or semi-democratic countries are more likely to be stable than the authoritarian regimes.28 Similarly, Muravchik pinpoints that the diffusion of democracy is not only “conducive to peace among states, but it can be the key to resolving bloody battles within them.”29 In regard to the economic realm, Collier et al. find that economic development substantially reduces the risk of post-conflict relapses.30 Paris shares the optimistic “democracy brings peace” argument but underlines the importance of institutions in the peacebuilding process.31 Post-conflict governments should adopt the strategy of “institutionalization before liberalization” and promote effective institutions first in order to minimize the destabilizing effects of political and economic liberalization. It is safe to argue that proponents of the institutionalist approach stress building institutions to efficiently support democracy in post-conflict societies. For example, Lake and Rothchild suggest implementing power-sharing agreements to build trust between ethnic groups.32

Conceptualization of the peace process 29 Herein, Ljiphart’s “consociational democracy” model, which is a seminal attempt to bridge democracy with power-sharing agreements, should be examined more closely. According to Ljiphart, executive power–sharing in the government, autonomy, proportional allocation of the resources and veto right are necessary conditions to build a stable peace.33 Nevertheless, the literature dealing with the causal mechanism between democracy and post-conflict peace misled many scholars into thinking the AKP government’s attempt to initiate the peace process with the Kurds was an indicator of democratization. In other words, they put forward the idea of “peace brings democracy” instead of “democracy brings peace.” Therefore, they regarded any attempt to criticize the democratic deficits of the AKP government as the discontent of nationalist and anti-democratic circles.34 Instead, they urged the critics to be patient and silent because a strong government was required to solve the deep-rooted Kurdish question. Suspension of democratic practices during the “peace process” should be tolerated in order to reach a permanent peace. Sooner or later, suspended democratic institutions would be restored after peace is achieved. The reformist agenda of the AKP disappeared when it consolidated its power within the political system and pushed the military out of the political space. As a result of this, liberal circles in domestic politics and international society, which had supported the AKP’s struggle to undermine the status quo under the tutelage of military in Turkey, became critical of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP government. It should be noted that following the Gezi protests in June 2013 and the graft probe in December 2013, Erdoğan’s statements and practices indicated that the political system could easily turn into a personalistic rule capable of controlling media, the economy and society in addition to the administrative bodies. Critical scholars argue that the “peace process” was used as an immunity shield, especially by Erdoğan, to justify his authoritarianism. Thus, they argued that peace could not be reached without democracy.35 In order to elucidate the debate between the ideas of “peace brings democracy” and “democracy brings peace”, I suggest using international relations theories, which deal with the relationship between political violence and democracy in the international realm, to comprehend the peace-making efforts in post–civil war societies. Applying international relations theory to explain the causes and prevention of internal conflicts is justified by Lake on the grounds that inter-state wars and intra-state wars are different forms of political violence. Following the exploration of commonalities and differences among them, a single, unified and general theory of political violence could be proposed.36 That is why theories of international relations are expected to help us in identifying the peace process between the AKP government and the PKK.

30

Conceptualization of the peace process

The main commonality between inter-state conflict and intra-state conflict is the concept of a “security dilemma”. The literature on how to build peace in post–civil conflict countries underscores the role of concepts and devices such as “confidence building measures,”37 “power sharing agreements,”38 “federalism”39 and a “consociational model.”40 The rationale behind suggesting these designs to provide peace and stability for the post–civil conflict period stems from the idea that there is a “security dilemma” between belligerent parties of the civil war period that remains even after the war ends. According to Posen, the term “security dilemma” – which is typically used to capture how states’ efforts to secure themselves unintentionally reduce the security of other states in the international system – could also be applied to competing ethnic, religious or cultural identity groups.41 In other words, when identity groups begin to fear for their future survival, a security dilemma occurs at the domestic level.42 It is safe to argue that parties to civil war behave like sovereign states in the international system. Krain and Myers argue that democratic peace theory, which aims to explain inter-state wars between democracies, could also be applied to internal conflicts.43 The role of democratic norms and democratic institutions on the decisions of political leaders might eradicate the security dilemma between the parties of intra-state conflicts. Therefore, it would be reasonable to use international relations theory to overcome the violence stemming from security dilemmas among the actors of the internal conflict. Two conceptual frameworks, inspired by realist and liberal theories of international relations, are presented below. The term “strategic peace” is used to discuss how peace is instrumentalized for strategic gains. The term “self-generative peace” is used to describe the state of peace that is able to survive notwithstanding the strategic calculations of the political elite. The “strategic peace” argument derives from realist approaches, which generally view the state as the main actor in the international system. This means that realism leaves no substantive room for considering non-state actors and their agendas. According to realism, the international system is anarchic; there is no world government that can guarantee the survival of states. Therefore, self-help is the main strategy that states use to survive. Realism assumes that a state’s decision makers behave as rational actors to pursue their main objective, which is survival. That is why states seek power. However, states’ bid for power and survival unavoidably threatens the other actors and paves the way for inter-state competition. The realist school views war as a product of such competiton. The rationale is quite simple. States can go to war in order to defend themselves or promote their interests. Nevertheless, war is a strategy, not an ideal, for realist approaches. This means that making peace might be as rational as war in some cases. However, peace is also a strategy and it is not a normative idea as well.

Conceptualization of the peace process 31 According to realism, peace is defined as “absence of war” and it is contextual. In other words, states might prefer to make peace or go to war in accordance with alterations in power relations, the structure of international system or the composition of decision makers. Peace is thus temporal and conjuncturall.44 In line with the premises of realist approach, “strategic peace” explains the “peace process” between ethnic rivals from the perspective of power and interest. An agreement ending the armed conflict is reached only if the the agreement serves the interests of the parties. In other words, parties to a civil war agree on ending the conflict because it is a more beneficial option for all parties than fighting. Therefore, the “strategic peace” argument views the peace process between Turkey and the PKK as a contextual silence, which is temporal and valid until the existent conditions change. There are similar volatile peace attempts in history. For example, in 1970, Ba’ath Party Secretary-General Saddam Hussein visited Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s headquarters in order to end the Kurdish armed struggle for autonomy in Iraq, which began in 1961. The Ba’ath Party proposed a plan that could meet the demands of the Kurdish movement, establishing a Kurdish Autonomous Region that encompassed Arbil, Duhok and Sulaimania. Furthermore, Kurds were promised representation in Baghdad’s government. During the meeting, Masoud Barzani, son of Mullah Mustafa, asked how Baghdad would solve the democracy problem for all of Iraq. Saddam Hussein said, “The system how we govern in the rest of Iraq is none of your business. You will have autonomy in Kurdistan. Why do you care about this?” The importance of the question asked by Masoud Barzani was understood in 1974, when the Ba’ath Party initiated a new offensive against Iraqi Kurds after consolidating its power, overcoming internal party divisions and ending its diplomatic isolation.45 This anecdote demonstrates that peace is volatile and temporal if the parties of the civil war view the settlement as a strategy to increase their power. On the other hand, liberalist appproaches, which inspire the “self-generative peace” argument, highlight the role of non-state actors and their interaction in peace-building processes. According to liberal approaches, the state of nature can be peaceful because individuals are inclined to cooperate. However, for peace among individuals to be sustained, their natural rights such as life, liberty and property should not be violated. Therefore, the liberalist school views the state apparatus as an organization protecting the natural rights of individuals from the assaults of others. Nevertheless, historical developments show that the state, which was designed to be strong enough to protect individuals’ natural rights, has been transformed and abused its power. Private agressors disappeared but were subsequently replaced by the state. According to liberalism, unrestrained states damaged cooperation

32

Conceptualization of the peace process

and peace in the domestic realm by violating citizens’ fundamental rights. Furthermore, liberals also argue that inter-state conflicts are the products of unrestrained states as well. That is to say, the more a state violates the natural rights of its citizens, the more it behaves aggressively in its foreign policy. Thus, liberals underscore the causal connection between regime type and foreign policy. Accordingly, for cooperation among states to emerge and continue, governments should be restrained by the non-state actors.46 In line with these theoretical views, the self-generative peace argument focuses on the role of domestic institutions, which could keep governments in check and thus protect individuals from violation by the state, in producing international peace and cooperation. The rationale behind this explanation reflects the idea that democratic governments tend to cooperate with one another. This argument asserts that the existence of a republican, representative, democratic government, constitutional rights and a free market economy give rise to many non-state domestic actors such as social, political and commercial organizations. The existence of such non-state actors and their interactions with the non-state actors of other countries could limit the aggression of state apparatus. This picture creates a transparency that could assure other democracies about a democratic polity’s credibility in foreign policy. Therefore, peace is not made by the leaders and their strategic calculations. Nor is peace necessarily a preferred option. According to self-generative peace, leaders are the agents of interaction and cooperation among the non-state actors of various polities. They become obliged to choose peace instead of preferring it.47 The concept of self-generative peace suggests it is necessary to examine whether the actors in the Turkish post–civil conflict process were democratic polities, which is the sine qua non for non-state actors to interact with each other and restrain the political elites’ decisions. Such an examination helps to explain why the “peace process” between the Ankara government and the PKK collapsed. The followers of the self-generative peace approach cite the Basque conflict in Spain as an example of the influence of regime type over the conflict resolution. After the death of General Franco in 1975, a restoration process started in Spain, and Franco’s legacy, based on authoritarianism and centralization of the administrative system, was abandoned. A new constitution was adopted in 1978 and Spain entered a phase of democratization. Furthermore, Spain’s transition to democracy was catalyzed when it was granted membership in the European Union in 1986. The end of the Franco regime also created an opportunity to solve the Basque question. The authoritarian regime had birthed an armed struggle against the Madrid government, especially after the establishment of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in 1959. Nevertheless, during the peace process between the Madrid and Basque governments, ETA was not acknowledged

Conceptualization of the peace process 33 as the representative of the Basque community. Instead, the Basque Country (this is the official name) gained extensive autonomy and significant powers in the areas of local security, education, health, broadcasting and fiscal policy. These competencies were tranferred to the Basque government in the 1978 constitution. Both Spain and the Basque Country governments adopted democratic principles, which helped pluralist socieities to emerge and interact with each other. According to Jebb, democratic values and institutions isolated ETA, delegitimized its cause in Spain’s newly opened political space and created open political communities.48 As a result of the democratic transformation of Spain, the “destructive cycle of violence” was replaced by the “cycle of political dialogue.”49 Building on the aforementioned discrepancy over the methodology of the “peace process”, I raise the argument that the “peace process” is an example of strategic peace. Negotiating parties – the AKP government and the PKK – instrumentalized the peace process in order to maximize their interests. The AKP government aimed to monopolize political power while the PKK sought to gain legitimacy and political rights such as autonomy, general amnesty for PKK members and freedom for the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Therefore, the “peace process” managed to cease the violence between 2013 and 2015 because the interest of the AKP and the PKK overlapped. Unsurprisingly, these parties’ diverging interests following the 7 June 2015 elections have paved the way for the recommencement of conflict. This argument also implies that instrumentalization of the Kurdish question resumed in a different way. As noted previously, suppressing the Kurdish movements and revolts was the only method used to affect the political competition among the elites. The AKP government, per contra, preferred to negotiate with the Kurdish armed rebels for the first time in the history of the Turkish republic. Nevertheless, the AKP government viewed the “peace process” as an opportunity to avert the criticisms of domestic opposition. Therefore, the Kurdish question continued to shape the balance of power among the political actors in Ankara. This means that the “peace process” did not result in a full deviation from the traditional approach towards the Kurdish question.

Notes 1 Criss, B. N. “The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 18, no. 1 (1995): 17–37. 2 Küçükşahin, A. “Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’yu PKK Terörüne Hazırlayan Nedenler.” Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi 2 (2005): 63–94. 3 “Zerdüştlük Propagandası Yapan PKK, Gözünü Kurbalıklara Dikti.” 25 October 2012, www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_zerdustluk-propagandasi-yapan-teror-orgutupkk-gozunu-kurbanliklara-dikti_2007288.html, (Last Access: 12 September 2012).

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4 Keefer, P., and N. Loayza. ed. Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 5 Findley, M. G., and J. K. Young. “Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem.” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012): 285–305. 6 Kalyvas, S. N. “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War.” The Journal of Ethics 8, no. 1 (2004): 97–138. 7 Stepanova, E. A. Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects. SIPRI Research Reports Vol. 23. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 8 Crenshaw, M. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 379–399. 9 Ünal, M. C. “Terrorism versus Insurgency: A Conceptual Analysis.” Crime, Law and Social Change 66, no. 1 (2016): 21–57. 10 Wilkenfeld, J., and M. Brecher. “Interstate Crises and Violence.” In Handbook of War Studies II, edited by M. I. Midlarsky, 271–300. Boston: The University of Michigan Press, 2000. 11 Horowitz, D. L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 12 Fearon, J. D., and D. D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 75–90. 13 Lake, D. A., and D. Rothchild. “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 41–75. 14 Gurr, T. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 15 Satana, N. Third Party Intervention in Civil Conflicts: Sorting out the Effects of Domestic Factors, Doctoral Dissertation submitted to State University of New York at Buffalo, 2006. 16 Yeğen, M. Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009. 17 Gunter, M. M. “An Interview with the PKK’s Ocalan.” Journal of Conflict Studies 18, no. 2 (1998): 104–109. 18 Gurr, T., and B. Harff. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. 19 Jenkins, G. 2008. “Susurluk and the Legacy of Turkey’s Dirty War.” https:// jamestown.org/program/susurluk-and-the-legacy-of-turkeys-dirty-war, (Last Access: 26 November 2016). 20 İçduygu A., D. Romano, and İ. Sirkeci. “The Ethnic Question in an Environment of Insecurity: The Kurds in Turkey.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 6 (1999): 991–1010. 21 Satana, Third Party Intervention in Civil Conflicts: Sorting out the Effects of Domestic Factors, 2006. 22 Small, M., and J. D. Singer. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816– 1980. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982. 23 Sambanis, N. “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 828–830. 24 “26 Yılın Kanlı Bilançosu.” 24 June 2010, www.milliyet.com.tr/26-yilin-kanlibilancosu/guncel/haberdetay/24.06.2010/1254711/default.htm, (Last Access: 3 November 2013). 25 Tezcür, G. M. “Prospects for Resolution of the Kurdish Question: A Realist Perspective.” Insight Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013): 69–84.

Conceptualization of the peace process 35 26 Dağı, İ. “PKK Ne Kazandı?” Zaman, 28 April 2013, (Last Access: 27 November 2016). 27 The daily Taraf newspaper has become an umbrella for the representatives of the left and the classical (genuine) liberals in Turkey. However, it can be argued that Taraf ’s liberalism has been confined to anti-militarism and democratization, which have made the ideological friction among left and classical liberals insignificant. In other words, political liberalism has been the primary identity for the Taraf columnists and editorial staff. In other words, Taraf could be viewed as a sample set that represents the population of liberal intellectuals. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the resignation of 19 columnists from Taraf, which was the main voice of the anti-militarism campaign of the JDP government, shows how the “peace process” created a split among liberals. According to a letter signed by several columnists in April 2013, Taraf ’s editorial policy undermined the peace process by emphasizing the democratic deficits of the AKP government and the Kurdish movement. However, supporters of Taraf’ editorial policy argued that the columnists aimed to hide the AKP government’s democratization failure by exploiting the “peace process”. 28 Hartzell, C., M. Hoddie, and D. Rothchild. “Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables.” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 183–208. 29 Muravchik, J. “Promoting Peace through Democracy.” In Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, edited by C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampsen, and P. Aall, 573–585. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996. 30 Collier, P., A. Hoeffler, and M. Söderbom. “Post-Conflict Risks.” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 4 (2008): 461–478. 31 Paris, R. At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 32 Lake, and Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” 41–75. 33 Lijphart, A. “Consociational Democracy.” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969): 207–225. 34 Oğur, Y. “Vurun Barışa.” Taraf, 5 March 2013. and Özipek, B. “Mutsuzsun çünkü Savaş Bitti.” 2014, www.serbestiyet.com/yazarlar/berat-ozipek/mutsuzsun-cunkusavas-bitti-131961, (Last Access: 28 November 2016). 35 Gürsel, K. “Erdoğan’ın Otoriter Başkanlık Rejimine Kürt Desteği Aranıyor.” 2013, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/contents/articles/opinion/2013/02/kurds-turkishconstitution-akp-chp-mhp-factions.html, (Last Access: 25 October 2013). 36 Lake, D. A. “IR Theory and Internal Conflict.” International Studies Review 5, no. 4 (2013): 81–89. 37 Hartzell, C. “Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 1 (1999): 3–22. 38 Hartzell, C., and M. Hoddie. “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and PostCivil War Conflict Management.” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 (2003): 318–332. 39 Riker, W. Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964. 40 Lijphart, A. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999. 41 Posen, B. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 27–28.

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42 Lake, D. A., and D. Rothchild. “Containing Fear.” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 41–75. 43 Krain, M., and M. M. Myers. “Democracy and Civil War: A Note on the Democratic Peace Proposition.” International Interactions 23, no. 1 (1997): 109–110. 44 Layne, C. “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 5–49. 45 Galbraith, P. Irak’ın Sonu: Ulus Devletlerin Çöküşü mü? İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2006. 46 Moravcsik, A. “Liberalism and International Relations Theory.” Working Paper Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1992. 47 Doyle, M. W. “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace.” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 463–466. 48 Jebb, C. R. The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy vs. Terrorism. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006. 49 Idoiaga, G. E. “The Basques Conflict.” USIP Report. No. 161, 2006.

3

Why did the peace process fail?

Turkey was confronted with a political scene for which it was not prepared before the elections on 7 June 2015. None of the political parties could set up a one-party majority government as a result of this legislative election. More specifically, a decrease in the vote share of the AKP, which had dominated the Parliament since 2002, revealed the fact that the “peace process”, which started in January 2013, triggered reactions from nationalist and Kurdish voters at the same time. The AKP took Öcalan’s participation into the “peace process” into account, and this created a considerable disturbance among the nationalist voters. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) successfully exploited the fact that the peace process was managed behind closed doors. Probably Erdoğan and the AKP chose not to pursue a transparent process in order to preserve nationalist votes. However, this strategy did not work out. Even though no one had an idea of what was going on behind closed doors, the MHP interpreted the “peace process” as negatively as possible and claimed that it would be a threat to territorial integrity. It can be claimed that there was a confidence crisis between the Kurds and the AKP government. In particular, President Erdoğan’s involvement in the election process alongside the AKP to change the constitution in a way that would allow an à la turca presidential system, and his persistence to put the presidential system forward as a pre-condition for the continuation of the “peace process” made members of the Kurdish political movement uncomfortable. Their discomfort was complicated by the fact that no concrete steps had been taken since the beginning of the negotiation. There was no option offered to the Kurds but to continue a process which was solely linked to Erdoğan’s personal will and political future. That is why the pro-Kurdish HDP’s leader Selahattin Demirtaş announced that the peace process would not be an issue of political negotiations, and why the HDP declared its decision to stand for elections as a party rather than as independent candidates. Ultimately, HDP’s decision to stand for the

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Why did the peace process fail?

elections as a party and its success in passing the threshold undermined the AKP’s one-party majority government. However, the AKP did not propose a long-term coalition to any party and President Erdoğan assign no other party leader to form a coalition government but the leader of the AKP. After all, the constitutional process started for snap elections to be held on November 1, 2015. It is safe to argue that nationalist wave branded its stamp on domestic political atmosphere during the period between June 7 and November 1. That is to say, the AKP suspended the “peace process” and rapidly shifted to nationalist policies in the Kurdish question. President Erdoğan (and the AKP elite) appeared as the champion of nationalism, fighting against the PKK terrorism. Such a dramatic U-turn on the “peace process” attracted the sympathy of the nationalist voters and brought a clear victory for the AKP in the snap elections. In the final analysis, the AKP missed the last opportunity to present itself as a reformist party and became deprived of the “peace process”, which had successfully masked its authoritarian practices since January 2013. Therefore, the AKP’s departure from the democratic values was clearly revealed. This shows that the reason why the “peace process” ended also explains the reason why the “peace process” started. It is apparent that the AKP withdrew from the negotiation table after losing its majority in the Parliament on 7 June 2015. Furthermore, the AKP did not choose to form a coalition government with the CHP, which had openly declared its support for the resolution of the Kurdish question by political means before the elections. Thus, it is safe to argue that political survival of the AKP prevailed over the “peace process”. This means that the AKP preferred peace to war as a strategy to preserve and even increase its power in the political system. This, coupled with rising authoritarianism, allows us to label the “peace process” as a strategic peace.

Democracy matters The younger generation that split from the fold of Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party and founded the AKP in 2001 – the reformist wing led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç who redefined themselves as “conservative democrats” – abandoned the anti-Western and political Islamist rhetoric. This was in line with the adoption of a generally more inclusive discourse, which attracted the support of centrist voters and liberal circles. In addition, the European Union accession process was seen as an opportunity to undermine the influence of the military. The reformist wing of the Turkish Islamic movement reinvented itself as a promoter of liberal values, democracy, human rights and a free-market economy; this ensured that the AKP gained international legitimacy. Building coalitions

Why did the peace process fail? 39 internally as well as externally – with liberals at home and the Western powers on the international stage – was a way for the AKP to gain power and secure its hold on it. However, according to Tibi, the AKP leveraged the reformist strategy “to create an illusion of tolerance and reform” in order to mask its Islamist heritage and ambitions and to consolidate its authoritarian regime.1 The AKP adopted the discourse of democracy and the EU membership process in order to undermine the military, which regards itself as the guardian of secularism and the nation-state-based Kemalist regime. Therefore, the AKP had no ideational commitment to democratic values and viewed democratic reforms as an instrument of consolidation of its power in the political system. Tibi’s and like-minded scholars’ predictions came true. The coalition formed around the AKP gradually dissolved and scepticism towards its intentions gained ground in light of the increasingly obvious authoritarian tendencies of Erdoğan. Dağı noted that “the moment the AKP secured its power within the state, it started to act like the old Kemalist state” and used state apparatus in order to construct its own “imagined society.” To him, the AKP rolled back democratic reforms, and as such this process could be called “de-democratization”.2 As a result of the AKP’s authoritarian shift, most of the liberal intellectuals, pro-EU circles, Istanbul-based business associations and conservative Gülen movement members withdrew their consent from the coalition led by the AKP. The AKP government’s response to the Gezi Park protests, which began in May 2013, signalled the rising authoritarianism. Following Erdoğan’s decision to construct a shopping mall on Taksim’s Gezi Park, a small group of environmental activists started a campaign to protect the park. However, police brutality against the sleeping demonstrators on the morning of 31 May triggered mass protests all over the country. According to legal documents of the Turkish police, over 2 million people protested against the government. During the Gezi Park uprising, seven protestors died and 7,822 protestors were injured. Amnesty International’s correspondent reported, “The attempt to smash the Gezi Park protest movement involved a string of human rights violations on a huge scale. They include the wholesale denial of the right to peaceful assembly and violations of the rights to life, liberty and the freedom from torture and ill-treatment.”3 In addition to police brutality, the arguments of Erdoğan and his inner circle also manifested the AKP government’s inclination to behave like a conspiracy-minded authoritarian regime when threatened. For example, Yiğit Bulut, Chief Adviser to Erdoğan, argued that the Gezi Park protests were controlled by secret services that had also hired a team to kill Erdoğan from abroad via telekinesis. During the protests, pro-AKP circles variously

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Why did the peace process fail?

accused Gezi protestors of being the agents of the CIA-backed Serbian movement Otpor (Resistance), paid provocateurs of Germany (who wanted to defend Frankfurt Airport’s prestige against the intended airport project in İstanbul) and collaborators of the international finance lobby. Furthermore, AKP member Melih Gökçek, mayor of Ankara, argued that the protestors were preparing atomic bombs in their Gezi Park tents. The Gezi Park protests showed that Erdoğan could easily control or threaten such non-state actors as journalists and members of the media, business interests, academicians and civil society organizations. This was manifested when the Turkish TV channels and newspapers kept their silence during the protests. For example, one of the most popular news channels, CNN Türk, showed a penguin documentary while thousands of people were clashing with the police in the heart of Istanbul on the first day of the protests. Turkey’s Journalists Union stated that 22 journalists were fired and 37 journalists were forced to resign following interventions by the government during the Gezi protests.4 The Gezi protests also demonstrated how the AKP government could arbitrarily use the fiscal bureaucracy to punish the members of the private sector that supported the Gezi protests. For example, Koç Holding, which accounts for 9% of Turkey’s GDP, was raided by financial investigators in August 2013. Moreover, the government cancelled the contract with one of the Koç companies to build warships. During the Gezi protests, Divan Hotel, which is owned by Koç Holding, had sheltered the protestors from police brutality. According to Benmayor, the hostility of the goverment toward Koç Holding made people wonder if it was retaliation for Gezi.5 In addition to the pressure over business circles, Erdoğan’s aggressive attitude also affected universities. Ankara Municipality, which is ruled by the AKP, issued fines totalling 14.3 million Turkish lira (US$7 million) to Middle East Technical University (one of the top universities of the country and known for its leftist students and faculty) for not paying a water emission fee to the municipality.6 In sum, Erdoğan’s rising authoritarianism went beyond intellectual speculation and commentary to be felt on the ground during – and following – the Gezi Park protests. The graft probe and its aftermath also revealed the fact that the four members of the cabinet and Erdoğan’s inner circle, including his own son, were involved in a corruption scandal. What makes the situation worse is the AKP government’s intervention into judicial bodies in order to obstruct the case. Furthermore, Erdoğan defined the graft probe as a coup d’état attempted by the Gülen movement’s prosecutors in the bureaucracy to topple the AKP government with the collaboration of international lobbies. After successfully obstructing the graft case, Erdoğan argued for the continuation of the AKP government as a national liberation war against international lobbies,

Why did the peace process fail? 41 which aimed to undermine Turkey’s rising power since the AKP took office in 2002. Fighting against Gülen movement created an exceptional opportunity for the AKP to re-design the bureacuracy, push Gülen-linked companies out of public contracts, confiscat Bank Asya, the bank of the Gülen movement, and raid the journalists working for pro-Gülen media in the name of defending democracy. Fighting against the Gülen movement, which was defined as a threat to national security by the National Security Council, made Erdoğan free to increase its arbitrary power on the political system: the executive body could easily intervene in the judiciary and violate the freedom of non-state actors using security concerns as an excuse. Many believe Erdoğan is a very talented politician who shapes public opinion. That is how he survived the Gezi protests and the graft probe and became president, receiving nearly 52 percent of the total votes cast in the August 2014 presidential election. Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s presidency also started a new debate about the jurisdictional limits of the office. Winning the presidential elections emboldened Erdoğan to pursue a new agenda, namely amending the constitution to mandate a president with full executive powers. In order to achieve this goal, Erdoğan violated the presidential neutrality principle of the constitution and got involved in the election rally in favor of the AKP ahead of the 7 June . Opposition circles regarded Erdoğan’s agenda as an attempt to abolish the parliamentary system. It has become apparent since the Gezi protests in June 2013 that Erdoğan has a limited view of democracy. He regards it as restricted to the right to vote, while excluding the other conditions of democracy such as freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom of association and the right to protest. Erdoğan’s bid for an à la turca presidential system has been evaluated as movement toward an unpredictable and personalistic rule with popular support instead of a quest for an institutional democracy by his opponents. Freedom House data on democracy in Turkey between 2002 and 2016 helps to simplify the AKP’s complex and fluctuating dance with democracy. The Freedom House Index measures democracy based on political rights (electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government) and civil liberties (freedom expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights). In addition, Freedom House includes freedom of the press as a separate category. Table 3.1 shows how Turkey’s ratings for civil liberties, political liberties and press freedom improved after the AKP swept to power in 2002. As mentioned before, the AKP was the flagship of the globalist and conservative coalition against the secularist and statist mindset of the Kemalist regime, which was under the tutelage of the military. The AKP used democratic

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Why did the peace process fail?

Table 3.1 Turkey’s democratization performance, 2002–2016.7 Years

Civil liberties (1 = Best, 7 = Worst)

Political liberties (1 = Best, 7 = Worst)

Press freedom (0 = Best, 100 = Worst)

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

5 (partly free) 4 (partly free) 4 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 4 (partly free) 4 (partly free) 4 (partly free) 4 (partly free)

4 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free) 3 (partly free)

58 (partly free) 55 (partly free) 52 (partly free) 48 (partly free) 48 (partly free) 49 (partly free) 51 (partly free) 50 (partly free) 51 (partly free) 54 (partly free) 55 (partly free) 56 (partly free) 62 (not free) 65 (not free) 71 (not free)

values as an instrument to curb the military’s influence on politics in order to protect itself from military aggression. This explains why freedom scores gradually improved following the AKP’s ascendance to power. Nevertheless, after pushing the military out of politics, the AKP consolidated its power in the political system and violations of civil liberties and press freedom increased. Turkey has been categorized as “not free” in regard to press freedom since 2014, and the civil liberties score worsened to (partly free) following the Gezi protests in 2013. One could argue that it has become an academic paradigm that the AKP has lost its energy to make democratic reforms and sought to consolidate its power base by violating democratic principles, especially after pushing the military off the political stage. Even the scholars who had supported the civilianization project of the AKP raised criticisms. For example, Özbudun defines Turkey’s regime as competitive authoritarianism in which political competition is real but unfair. Turkey’s shift from illiberal democracy to competitive authoritarianism became possible after the AKP tightened its grip on the judiciary. Following the graft probe in December 2013, Erdoğan accused the Glen movement, which is believed to have many sympathizers within the judiciary and the police force, of plotting a coup against the government. He also weakened the autonomy of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) while strengthening the role of the Ministry of Justice.8 Similarly, Sayarı argues that there is a predominant party system in Turkey that does not necessarily endanger democracy, although it excludes the opposition parties from power sharing. Furthermore, such a system might

Why did the peace process fail? 43 contribute to political stability and economic progress. However, for this to happen, the predominant party system should not be established under the rule of a party that adopts an authoritarian type of governance. According to Sayarı, a predominant party system moves toward competitive authoritarianism if the ruling party favors non-democratic practices such as restrictions on freedom of expression, censorship of social media and partisan use of the judiciary. Recent developments show that competitive authoritarianism seems to be the direction Turkey is heading under Erdoğan’s personalist rule.9 The optimism about democratization gradually disappeared as the AKP centralized power. According to Bac and Keyman, regression of democracy, suspension of rule of law and violations of rights and freedoms under the AKP rule indicate the structural and institutional problems of the Turkish political system, which mainly suffers from the absence of checks and balances. To them, it is not surprising to see that the dominant party model combined with weak institutions easily turned into a majoritarian authoritarianism in Turkey.10 In the final analysis, illiberal practices of the AKP government, Freedom House data and views of the prominent scholars confirm that the peace process was conducted under the strong leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoan. He survived serious challenges such as Gezi protests and the graft probe initiated by the Gülen movement. However, such challenges also provided an opportunity to increase his control over media and the judiciary system. Furthermore, due to his charismatic leadership style, Erdoğan managed to consolidate his voter base and keep his popularity. Turning to Öcalan, his personality, leadership style and ideology has determined the organizational behavior of the PKK since its inception in 1978. It is possible to analyze Öcalan’s personality by examining his autobiographical book entitled The Language and Action of the Revolution. This book starts with stories from his childhood in Amara, a Kurdish village, and Öcalan underscores how opposed he was to the traditional and feudal values. A similar pattern continues in Ankara during Öcalan’s high school and university years. Öcalan does not follow the lifestyle of the bourgeoisie. He aims to be a conqueror and refuses to have non-hierarchical relations with the people he meets or political associations he is involved in. According to Öcalan, such an allergy towards both feudalism and the bourgeoisie and refusing to be a harmonious component of the social system are the key characteristics that enabled him to establish the PKK, which is politically disharmonious to the current paradigm of the Turkish state.11 Öcalan implies that the PKK would not have been established without his personal ambitions. That is why he regards himself as a man who changed the course of history. He says: There were daughters of bureaucrats and army officers in the Faculty of Political Sciences (Mulkiye). Most of them were admirers of me

44

Why did the peace process fail? because I was a student leader. They were supporting me. Yet, for me, it was not easy to communicate with them. And fortunately, I did not deceive myself. Otherwise, if I did this might have derailed history.12

The egocentric personality became more visible after he fled to Syria and found a safe haven for the PKK militants. Özcan noted that Öcalan’s name and picture were rarely printed by the PKK’s official magazine Serxwebun until 1983. Nevertheless, from this date on, the PKK propaganda tools idolized Öcalan and presented him as an ubermensch.13 Öcalan ruled the PKK with an iron fist, eliminated his internal rivals and created a cult of personality that persisted for decades. Kemal Burkay, the founder of the Kurdistan Socialist Party in 1975 who is known as a critic of Öcalan’s militant strategy for the Kurdish national movement, accuses Öcalan of being inspired by the authoritarian style of Saddam and Assad.14 In a similar vein, an article in The Guardian examines parallels between Abdullah Öcalan and Nelson Mandela, and concludes that Öcalan’s cultlike following does not fit the Mandela template. Öcalan is feared and worshipped; Mandela was respected and loved.15 Öcalan’s ideological stance also sheds light on the political goals of the PKK regarding the Kurdish question. Öcalan was motivated in the 1970s by the ideas of Lenin on self-determination. He argued that Kurdistan is a colony of Turkey. This idea, which had also been promulgated by Sait Kırmızıtoprak, was a deviation from the current paradigm because Öcalan refused to identify the Kurdish question as an internal problem of Turkey. Instead, he regarded Turkey as an external problem for Kurdistan. Therefore, anti-imperialism became Öcalan’s ideological framework. According to Bozarslan, such an anti-imperialist discourse has coupled with the ideas of Frantz Fanon, who argues that the slave is responsible for his slavery and he should resist to become a freeman. Self-sacrificial forms of violence became the methodology of the PKK’s anti-colonial war. That is how the PKK managed to remain as a radical left-wing movement despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.16 In addition to anti-imperialism and violence, pragmatism also coloured Öcalan’s ideology. At the fifth congress of the PKK in 1995, Öcalan stated that the PKK aimed to spread socialism to the people of the region (Kurdishpopulated areas), and asserted that the PKK represented the vanguard of global socialist movements. Although professing socialist solidarity, the PKK controversially dropped the hammer and sickle from its flag in the same year as Öcalan’s declaration. He argued that Soviet Union collapsed because it ignored human security by glorifying the state. Öcalan’s shift does not, however, mean that he adopted democratic ideals. According to Ünal, the PKK pragmatically

Why did the peace process fail? 45 shifted to different ideological paths in order to attract various segments of the Kurdish society that have religious and traditional views. In addition to de-emphasizing socialism, the PKK also founded the Federation of Kurdish Alewites in 1993 and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan in 1994.17 The PKK placed its ethnic goals of before ideological commitment. In other words, Öcalan’s pragmatism efficiently exploited political ideologies, religious tendencies and sectarian identities to gain popular support from the Kurds. Öcalan’s violent and pragmatic dance with the Turkish state to become the leading figure of the Kurdish question has caused many ideological inconsistencies over the years, but his distate for feudalism and the bourgeoisie remained constant. In his book Problems of Surpassing Capitalist Modernity and Democratization, Öcalan defines capitalist modernity as the source of oppression. According to Öcalan, the individualism that stems from capitalism and liberal ideas consolidates nation-states because it produces a standardized identity for individuals with the help of the media and the free market. Capitalism creates masses of self-interested individuals and enables the nation-state to rule comfortably. In other words, he argues that there is no dichotomy between the state and the individual in capitalist and modern societies. Not least, he posits that the Hobbesian view of the state of nature has not disappeared following the diffusion of capitalist modernity but is revealed in the form of inter-state wars, genocides, ecological problems, unemployment and poverty. So, he refuses the idea that capitalism gives rise to non-state actors that check and balance the aggression of the state apparatus in foreign policy.18 Although he applies post-modern reasoning to arrive at this conclusion, Öcalan reaches the point of orthodox Marxism, which views the state as an oppression machine protecting the benefits of the privileged classes. This explains his hatred of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, Öcalan applies to feudalism his formulation based on congruence between state apparatus and capitalism in modern societies. Feudalism, similar to capitalism, is one of the systems that contradict the nature of society. It connotes an unfair hierarchy organized by the state. That is why capitalist modernity has not abolished the spirit of feudalism but transformed it in accordance with the needs of industrialization and urbanization. Öcalan dismisses the idea that capitalism has enabled individualism to challenge the traditionalist societies. To him, the individual has become the slave of capitalism and the nation-state as s/he was prisoner of feudalism before that. As we can see, there is no room for individual liberties in Öcalan’s world. He argues that individualism is an illusion that was created by the hegemonic state in order to depotentiate the society’s capacity for objection and resistance. Individualism acquires meaning regarding liberties only if

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Why did the peace process fail?

the interest and security of communal groups in which the individual is involved are guaranteed. Thus, instead of capitalist modernity, Öcalan suggests “democratic modernity”, which requires the modes of production to be non-feudal and non-capitalist. Furthermore, a regime ruled by democratic modernity should adopt democratic confederalism – a power-sharing agreement among several identity groups – and abolish the nation-state’s monopoly over security forces and ideological imposition.19 Building on the political views and leadership style of Öcalan, one can argue that the PKK is not an ideal partner to make a self-generative peace that requires the existence of liberal and democratic institutons. Öcalan has used two strategies to achieve his end. First, the PKK has undertaken populist and pragmatic policies, combined with violence, in order to mobilize the Kurds around the same flag. Second, the PKK has aimed to bring the government to the negotiation table and reach a power-sharing deal. It is obvious that this strategy does not require building liberal and democratic institutions that guarantee individual rights, a free market economy, freedom of media and civil society activities. Öcalan has always preferred to reach a peace deal concluded by the ruling elites of the Turks and the Kurds. On the other hand, the rising authoritarianism of the AKP government during the “peace process” undermined the autonomy of non-state actors. This means that the AKP managed to silence the voice of opposition due to its control over media, the economy and civil society. Similar to Öcalan’s strategy, the AKP, under the strict leadership of President Erdoğan, also used populism and pragmatism to attract the masses and eliminate the opposition. In doing so, Erdoğan aimed to sit at the negotiating table with Öcalan and conclude a peace deal by ignoring criticisms raised by the non-state actors. Liberal and democratic institutions played no role in the inception and duration of the “peace process”. Instead, the “peace process” was initiated because the ruling elites of the Turks and the Kurds were convinced that making a peace deal was more beneficial than fighting with regard to their stratic goals.

From strategic peace to strategic war In February 2015, President Erdoğan in a public speech asked voters to provide him with 400 lawmakers in the upcoming elections in order for the à la turca presidential system to be introduced. Furthermore, he established a direct correlation between the presidential system and the solution of the Kurdish issue. Erdoğan posited, “If you want the peace process to continue, you have to ensure that there are 400 lawmakers so that a strong party can come to power to realize it.”20 Needless to say, Erdoğan was asking the

Why did the peace process fail? 47 public to vote for the AKP and presented the AKP’s election victory as a condition for the continuation of the peace process. In line with Erdoğan’s statements, clearly he aimed to amend the constitution in a way that would allow the president to have full executive power. For this to happen, the AKP needed to return to Parliament with at least 330 deputies. According to the constitution, there are two ways for a constitutional amendment to be adopted: either support of 367 deputies out of 550 is required or amendments are voted on and ratified through a referendum, which can be held only if the draft gets the support of 330 deputies out of 550 in the Parliament. Therefore, Erdoğan’s strategy was based on keeping the diverse sections of the society under the umbrella of the AKP and gaining sufficient seats in Parliament so as to make constitutional amendments. To reach his goal, Erdoğan used an issue linkage strategy and presented the AKP’s success in the elections as a pre-requisite for the peace process to continue. This strategy was expected to attract the Kurdish voters. On the other hand, Erdoğan did not want to lose nationalist voters due to the peace process. Erdoğan might have calculated to keep the loyalty of Kurdish voters without offending the nationalist voters. That is why the peace process was conducted in a secluded manner. Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s causal connection was approached with suspicion by the Kurdish political elite. They regarded Erdoğan’s engagement with the Kurdish question as part of his personal ambitions rather than an ideational stance on a solution to the problem. HDP co-chairman Demirtaş sums up this scepticism by saying that “the issue of peace should be freed from being part of a political gain, or a bargaining chip for the AKP.”21 Such scepticism stemmed from a very essential point of political science: “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. Therefore, the Kurds have legitimately questioned whether Erdoğan as absolute ruler would be willing to make any concessions to the Kurds. In other words, they viewed the presidential system, which would make Erdoğan free from any kind of checks and balances, as a threat undermining the “peace process”. In addition to the hypothetical objections, Kurds have also become deeply concerned over the increasing authoritarian practices of Erdoğan. For example, the law for internal security that the AKP government passed, despite heavy criticism from the opposition parties in parliament, expands the authority of the police to deal with social movements and street protests. According to this law, the police are authorized to detain suspects for up to 48 hours without a court order. From a Kurdish perspective, the internal security law is directed specifically against a potential Kurdish uprising. It should be noted that violent protests broke out in the Kurdish areas of Turkey in October 2014, as a reaction against the neutrality policy of the Turkish government

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Why did the peace process fail?

regarding Syria and as an expression of solidarity with the Kurdish city of Kobane in Syria that was then besieged by the jihadi group ISIS. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the AKP’s initiative to legislate the internal security law has contributed to undermining the confidence of the Kurds in the “peace process”. Halil Aksoy, an HDP lawmaker, posited that the internal security act “dynamites the peace process.”22 Furthermore, it has become apparent since the Gezi protests in June 2013 that Erdoğan has a limited view of democracy. He regards it as restricted to the right to vote, while excluding the other conditions of democracy, such as freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom of association and the right to protest. Therefore, Erdoğan’s bid for an à la turca presidential system has been evaluated as footsteps toward an unpredictable and personalistic rule with popular support instead of a quest for an institutional democracy by the Kurdish elite. The statements of Kandil – the headquarters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – and of the HDP reflected the concerns of the Kurds over a possible election scenario in which the AKP wins big majority in the June 7 general election. Indeed, for the peace process to produce a fair and stable peace, the Kurds have asked themselves what leverage they are going to be left with in case the AKP reaches 400 members of Parliament, thereby having enough power to amend the constitution. In sum, the question was clear for the Kurds: how are they going to be able to keep a check on the AKP government if Erdoğan becomes president with extended authority? Kurdish politicians’ concerns gained strength when President Erdoğan opposed the memorandum of understanding known as the Dolmabahçe Protocol, setting the conceptual and methodological framework of the “peace process”, concluded and declared by the AKP government and the proKurdish HDP deputies on 28 February 2015. This was supposed to be a concrete output of the peace process and a binding commitment for negotiating parties. It is safe to argue that such a memorandum might have eliminated the question marks in the minds of the Kurdish politicians and the PKK. According to the Dolmabahçe Protocol, the parties agreed to negotiate the extent of cultural rights, self governance, general amnesty and the new constitution that guarantees the conclusion of the negotiations. In this manner, the Dolmabahçe Protocol reflects the expectations of the Kurdish movement to end the armed struggle against Turkey. Nonetheless, Erdoğan’s objection nullified the AKP’s signature and the “peace process” stopped. As noted before, Erdoğan established his strategy on how to keep both Turkish nationalist and Kurdish voters’ loyalty in the meantime. To achieve this end, he refused to take any concrete step to persuade the Kurdish voters to vote for the AKP, and ensured that he did nothing to irritate nationalist voters. In line with this strategy, on the eve

Why did the peace process fail? 49 of the parliamentary elections, Erdoğan made a sudden nationalist turn and contended, “There is no Kurdish question, but the Kurds have some problems.”23 In reaction to this turn, Cemil Bayık, the number two man of the PKK, posited that the PKK would not lay down its arms unless the AKP government took concrete steps.24 The stalemate turned into a contradiction when the HDP launched an aggressive election campaign based on criticizing Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies. On the other hand, increasing popularity of the HDP among voters also alarmed the AKP elite on the grounds that the HDP should not have crossed the 10% election threshold for the AKP to maintain its single-party rule. Therefore, the AKP’s negative campaigns against the HDP branded its stamp on the election process. That is to say, on the eve of the 7 June elections, interests of the AKP and the HDP sharply diverged. Following the 7 June elections, the AKP did not make any serious offer to the parties in the Parliament to form a coalition government. Furthermore, Erdoğan also refused to give a mandate to the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), to form a government. Instead, Erdoğan called snap elections and designed a new caretaker cabinet. This means that the AKP effectively maintained control over the government with the help of Erdoğan’s constitutional power. Nevertheless, prior to the snap elections, the AKP radically changed its attitude towards the Kurdish question and followed a nationalist and militarist agenda. Similarly, the PKK also left no room for the HDP to develop a new strategy in the realm of politics. The PKK ended the truce, Turkish security forces initiated operations against the PKK and the conflict recommenced. This story shows that absence of democratic institutions gives a free hand to the leaders of the negotiating parties. This implies that authoritarian leaders should share common strategic interests for peace to be sustained. Accordingly, the “peace process” failed and conflict recommenced because Erdoğan’s bid for a presidential system with full executive powers did not overlap with the PKK-led Kurdish movement’s demands for constitutional guarantees. Before the elections, Erdoğan had initiated the peace process to retain and increase the support of the Kurdish voters for the presidential system. The PKK had welcomed this initiative, which would lead to constitutional autonomy. This supports the idea that convergence of strategic interests produced a ceasefire between January 2013 and June 2015. Nevertheless, following the 7 June elections, Erdoğan’s priority shifted from making constitutional amendments in favor of presidential system to maintaining the status quo. That is why Erdoğan called a snap election, suspended the “peace process” and initiated military operations against the PKK. It is apparent that Erdoğan aimed to attract the nationalist voters so the AKP could regain the majority in Parliament. Yet, the PKK immediately

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Why did the peace process fail?

took the helm and restricted the policy making capability of the HDP, which managed to receive the support of the secular, liberal and leftist circles before the 7 June elections. Therefore, one can ask the question of why the PKK enthusiastically joined the armed struggle at the expense of losing the political coalition formed around the peaceful and democratic discourse of the HDP. Gunter argues that the PKK’s policy hardened after the United States and Turkey agreed on the İncirlik deal, which allowed the US-led coalition forces to use the İncirlik airbase to carry out air operations against ISIS in July 2015. Instead of striking ISIS targets, most of the Turkish aircrafts hit the PKK camps in the Qandil Mountains in Iraq and the PKK-affiliated PYD/YPG forces in Rojava.25 This means that the end of the “peace process” did not only demonize the PKK but also jeopardized the survival of the PYD. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that rising activities of the PKK following the 7 June elections aimed to protect the PYD-controlled autonomous zone in northern Syria. In other words, the PKK’s enthusiasm to turn back to violence in Turkey sacrificed the political process that was supposed to be carried out by the HDP for the sake of protecting the PYD’s autonomy. In a similar vein, Aktürk also addresses the role of the PKK’s strategy on the PYD’s struggle to keep its autonomy in northern Syria. Accordingly, the PYD might have been informed that Russia would intervene into Syria in order to support the Assad government and its allies. Therefore, the PKK aimed to stall the Turkish security forces by complicating the security atmosphere inside Turkey until the Russian intervention.26 The PKK’s call for self-rule zones in urban districts across the southeast of Turkey in August 2015 moved the conflict from rural areas into city centers. Thousands of civilians were caught between two fires and left their houses, and cities turned into battlegrounds for the Turkish security forces and the PKK. According to Bilici, known for his critical thoughts towards the established paradigm of the Turkish state regarding the Kurdish question, the PKK’s decision to create conflict zones in Kurdish towns destroyed historical and cultural assets and endangered the lives of civilians. In doing so, the PKK behaved like a military dictatorship and shadowed the rightfulness of the Kurds.27 The PKK managed to save the PYD from the assaults of Turkey but easily sacrificed the Kurds of Turkey and their political ambitions. In conclusion, coupled with the evidence on the regime types of the AKP and the PKK, absence of democratic institutions paved the way for the respective elites to dominate, and it prevented an institutional and perpetual peace among Turkish and Kurdish societies. It is safe to argue that the continuation of the peace process would be possible only if the strategic interests of the negotiating leaders continued to overlap. To put it another way,

Why did the peace process fail? 51 the main factor that led to initiation of the “peace process” was the converging interests of the AKP government and the PKK. Upon the divergence of these interests, when the AKP lost its majority in the 7 June elections and the PKK opted for protecting Syrian Kurds by sacrificing the political struggle of the Kurds of Turkey, the “peace process” suddenly collapsed. As the “strategic peace’ argument suggests, peace becomes a more viable option than war only if it benefits the elites conducting the peace negotiations.

Notes 1 Tibi, B. “Islamists Approach Europe: Turkey’s Islamist Danger.” Middle East Quarterly 16, no. 1 (2009): 47–54. 2 Dağı, İ. “AK Party’s New Mission.” Today’s Zaman, 2015, (haberin tarihine ulaşılamıyor)www.todayszaman.com/columnist/ihsan-dagi/ak-partys-new-mission_ 270569.html, (Last Access: 5 July 2015) 3 “Turkey: Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey.” 2 October 2013, www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/022/2013/ en, (Last Access: 23 November 2013). 4 “Gezi Direnişinde 59 Gazeteci İşten Çıkarıldı, İstifaya Zorlandı.” 22 July 2013, www.bianet.org/bianet/medya/148636-gezi-direnisinde-59-gazeteci-istencikarildi-istifaya-zorlandi, (Last Access: 5 August 2014). 5 Benyamor, G. “How Far the Gezi Retaliation to the Business World.” 6 August 2013, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/how-far-the-gezi-retaliation-to-the-businessworld-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=52060&NewsCatID=402, (Last Access: 5 September 2014). 6 “ODTÜ’ye 14 Milyon Liralık Atık Su Cezası.” Radikal, 19 November 2013, www. radikal.com.tr/turkiye/odtuye_14_milyon_liralik_atik_su_cezasi-1161620, (Last Access: 3 May 2014). 7 This table is sourced from Freedom House, available at: https://freedomhouse. org/country/turkey. (Last Access: 5 January 2016). 8 Özbudun, E. “Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift toward Competitive Authoritarianism.” The International Spectator 50, no. 2 (2015): 42–55. 9 Sayarı, S. “Back to a Predominant Party System: The November 2015 Snap Election in Turkey.” South European Society and Politics 21, no. 2 (2016): 263–280. 10 Müftüler-Baç, M., and F. Keyman. “Turkey’s Unconsolidated Democracy: The Nexus between Democratisation and Majoritarianism in Turkey.” In Global Turkey in Europe III: Democracy, Trade, and the Kurdish Question in Turkey-EU Relations, IAI Research Papers, 2015. 11 Öcalan, A. Devrimin Dili ve Eylemi. Serxwebun Yayınları, 1996. 12 Ibid. 13 Özcan, N. A. PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi): Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi. Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 1999. 14 “Kemal Burkay: ‘Apo, Saddam’ı ve Esad’ı Taklit Etti’.” http://t24.com.tr/haber/ kemal-burkay-34apo-saddami-ve-esadi-taklit-etti34,88964, (Last Access: 19 May 2017). 15 “Nelson Mandela: A Leader above All Others.” www.theguardian.com/comment isfree/2013/dec/05/nelson-mandela-a-leader-above-all-others, (Last Access: 29 April 2017).

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16 Interview with Bozarslan, H. “Between Integration Autonomization and Radicalization: Hamit Bozarslan on the Kurdish Movement and the Turkish Left.” European Journal of Turkish Studies, 12 (2012), https://ejts.revues.org/4663, (Last Access: 23 April 2017). 17 Unal, M. C. “Strategist or Pragmatist: A Challenging Look at Ocalan’s Retrospective Classification and Definition of PKK’s Strategic Periods between 1973 and 2012.” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 3 (2014): 419–448. 18 Öcalan, A. 2012. “Kapitalist Modernitenin Aşılma Sorunları ve Demokratikleşme.” downloaded from kurdpedia.info, (Last Access: 5 April 2017). 19 Öcalan, A. Özgürlük Sosyolojisi. Abdullah Öcalan Sosyal Bilimler Akademisi Yayınları, 2009. 20 “Erdoğan Wants 400 Deputies for His Former AKP at Turkish Elections.” Hürriyet Daily News, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Erdoğan-wants-400-deputies-for-hisformer-akp-at-turkish-elections-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78015&NewsCat ID=338, (Last Access: 9 July 2015). 21 “Peace Should Not Be Part of Bargain: HDP Co-Chair Demirtaş.” Hürriyet Daily News, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/peace-should-not-be-part-of-bargain-hdp-cochair-demirtas.aspx?pageID=238&nID=68289&NewsCatID=338, (Last Access: 10 July 2015). 22 “İç Güvenlik Paketi çözüm sürecinin varoluşuna aykırı.” http://t24.com.tr/haber/ ic-guvenlik-paketi-cozum-surecinin-varolusuna-aykiri,287708, (Last Access: 10 July 2015). 23 “President Erdoğan Says Turkey Never Had a Kurdish Problem.” www.todays zaman.com/anasayfa_president-Erdoğan-says-turkey-never-had-a-kurdishproblem_375334.html, (Last Access: 7 July 2015). 24 “Bayık Says PKK Wont Lay Down Arms.” www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_ bayik-says-pkk-wont-lay-down-arms-unless-govt-takes-concrete-steps_376828. html, (Last Access: 8 July 2015). 25 Gunter, M. M. “The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: Back to Square One?” Turkish Policy Quarterly 14, no. 4 (2016): 77–86. 26 Aktürk, Ş. “PKK Neden 11Temmuz 2015’teAteşkese SonVerdi.” Karar, 2017, www. karar.com/gorusler/doc-dr-sener-akturk-yazdi-pkk-neden-11-temmuz-2015 de-ateskese-son-verdi-540674#, (Last Access: 26 July 2017). 27 Bilici, M. Hamal Kürt: Türk İslamı ve Kürt Sorunu. İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2017.

4

The year after the “peace process”

The “peace process” ended following the national elections which took place on 7 June 2015. The result of these elections meant no single party could be in government without a coalition. Table 4.1 illustrates the percentage of votes acquired by each party that passed the 10% threshold and the seats they won in the Parliament. These results indicated that the AKP, which had ruled Turkey since 2002, was no longer able to form a singleparty government. The social and political context preceding the elections are quite important in understanding these results. The “peace process” which aimed to solve the Kurdish issue with non-militaristic but political methods was proceeding. In the meantime, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, and the government were conducting negotiations. As a result of this process, a full ceasefire had been reached in January of 2013 and no considerable armed clashes took place between the two sides. Therefore, the party that followed the political discourse of PKK, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), could campaign peacefully without being criminalized. Furthermore, this environment allowed the HDP to develop a more inclusive campaign emphasizing democratization, ecology, gender equality and worker’s rights – much like a western European Green Party, instead of one evolving around ethnic Kurdish nationalism. The HDP became more visible in the media with its new image stripped of the criminal aspects of the Kurdish movement, and it attracted the support of different groups in society. The Republican People’s Party (CHP), with its campaign emphasis on increasing authoritarianism and corruption in the country, and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), with its emphasis on the peace process’s increasing threats to territorial integrity, could raise their voices in multiple news outlets, which were not under the control of the government, including those associated with the Gülen movement. The overall picture leading up to the elections was one with neither any militarized disputes internally or externally, nor terrorist threats, and with a media atmosphere still somewhat under pressure yet one that allowed diverse political opinions.

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The year after the “peace process”

Table 4.1 National election results, 7 June 20151 Political parties

Percentage of vote

Seats in parliament

Justice and Development Party (AKP) Republican People’s Party (CHP) Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) People’s Democratic Party (HDP)

40.66 25.13 16.45 12.96

258 132 80 80

Yet, this relatively liberal environment ceased to exist after the elections of 7 June. The AKP did not come up with a serious and long-term proposal for a coalition formation to any of the parties in the Parliament. The president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, did not nominate any party other than the AKP to form the government – a constitutional prerequisite for forming the government – and managed to carry a cabinet under his control to early elections, leading the country into an election environment once again. This was nothing but the AKP’s mere dismissal of the 7 June election results. Three important developments took place during this process. The first of those is the end of the “peace process”. The AKP officials held the success of the HDP in the 7 June elections responsible for their loss of any chance for a single-party government. The aggressive anti-Erdoğan discourse during the HDP’s election campaign resulted in the AKP’s loss of votes. The HDP preferred to end the “peace process” by weakening the AKP and keeping it from a single-party rule. Criticisms against the AKP were also rising from the PKK wing, and even acquired a threatening tone when the PKK issued an ultimatum of resuming violence if no visible steps towards the peace process were taken. This tension gradually mounted and AKP turned to a militaristic and nationalistic agenda, and even became the bellwether of nationalism. The AKP underlined that there is no difference between the HDP and the PKK, thereby “criminalizing” the cause of the HDP. It should also be added that the PKK attacks during this period further narrowed HDP’s chances for political manoeuvring. Another important development during the period between 7 June and 1 November, when the snap election was held, was the increased pressure on the media. The leading names in the AKP blamed the mainstream media support for the electoral success of the HDP. Doğan Media Group was a special target of this criticism. The critical tone soon evolved into a threatening one and a group of AKP supporters led by an AKP Istanbul member of Parliament attacked the headquarters of the widely circulated Hürriyet newspaper in September 2015. One of the paper’s most popular columnists, Ahmet Hakan, has been assaulted by assailants, some of them linked to the AKP. In the meantime, the media organs known for their proximity to

The year after the “peace process” 55 the Gülen movement got their share of this pressure. Claiming that they received a communication from the office of the general attorney to the effect, Turkey’s largest cable providers, Digiturk, Kablonet and Teledunya unilaterally cancelled their contracts with several TV channels associated with the Gülen movement.2 While thousands protested these actions by cancelling their subscription, President Erdoğan posed for a publicity photo holding a Digiturk remote control to show his support for these cable providers. Last but not least, during the period between the two elections, terrorist attacks against civilians considerably increased. The first, a suicide attack, took place on 20 July 2015 in Suruç. The target was the 300 members of the Socialist Youth Associations Federation who had gathered in the city to bring aid to the Kurdish city Kobane, within former Syrian borders, which was recently liberated from an ISIS siege. Thirty-four people lost their lives as a result of this attack. On 10 October, a similar suicide bombing targeted members of various trade unions, NGOs and political party members, who gathered in front of the Ankara train station for a “peace meeting”, asking for the peace process to be resumed. As a result of the explosions, 107 were killed and about 500 were injured. Following these attacks, political parties cancelled all their campaign gatherings across the country.3 These developments point out a major change in the political environment in Turkey in the aftermath of the 7 June elections. The clashes with PKK resumed, a nationalist wave spread across the country, attacks against civilians started and pressure on the media – especially on media outlets not controlled by the government – has increased. Millions of Turkish citizens went to the polls in such a turbulent environment. As a result of the early re-elections, AKP has increased its votes, ensured a majority in the Parliament and gained the power to form a single-party government. Table 4.2 illustrates the vote shares of the political parties which have succeeded in passing the 10% threshold and the seats they secured in the Parliament in the 1 November elections. These election results reinstated the AKP’s single-party rule. Notwithstanding, the issues have not been settled in Turkish domestic and external politics. A Russian aircraft was brought down by Turkish armed forces on Table 4.2 National election results, 1 November 20154 Political parties

Percentage of votes

Seats in parliament

Justice and Development Party Republican People’s Party Nationalist Movement Party People’s Democratic Party

49.46 25.32 11.91 10.75

317 134 59 40

56

The year after the “peace process”

24 November 2015 for transgressing into Turkish airspace. This severely damaged the bilateral relations of these countries. An air defense system that Russia embedded in Syria crippled Turkey’s ability to fly over Syria. This gave the Kurdish groups known to be associated with the PKK room to maneuver. Encouraged by the fact that there was no more “peace process” to be cautious about, Turkey claimed that the PYD/YPG forces were not any different than the PKK and declared that the country was made uncomfortable by their presence and activities in the region. Not surprisingly, as the discourse against Syria became tougher, the clashes with the PKK intensified. In particular, PKK’s self-defense/liberated area (or self-rule zone) declaration faced a strong response from the Turkish forces. In many areas of south-eastern Turkey, martial law was implemented and curfews were imposed. During the operations, many people had to leave their homes and many towns became heavily damaged. But violence did not only affect this area. In Ankara, 71 people were killed in two suicide bomb attacks in February and March. These attacks were claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), known to be associated with the PKK.5 These developments reflected the already precarious position of the HDP, and the Parliament, with the full support of the AKP and the MHP and partial support of the CHP, lifted members of Parliament’s immunity from prosecution, mostly targeting the HDP. At the end, the non-violence era of the “peace process” was only a memory. As the clashes continued, government pressure against Gülenist media intensified. A trustee was appointed to Feza News Group, which meant the high-circulation newspaper of Gülen, Zaman and one of the most organized news agencies of the country, Cihan News Agency (CHA), came under direct control of the government. In addition to the Gülen movement, the peace activists, who criticized the government’s militaristic approach towards the Kurdish question, were also intimidated. For example, academics who signed petitions denouncing military operations and calling for an end to deliberate massacre and deportation of the Kurdish people were subject to a harsh crackdown. Of the signatories (also known as Academics for Peace), three academics were jailed, 30 were dismissed and 27 were suspended by their universities pending investigations in March 2016.6 15 July was an important critical juncture for Turkish politics. A coup attempt by a group of soldiers calling themselves the Peace at Home Council resulted in a failure. During the failed attempt, the Turkish Parliament was bombed and 250 civilians lost their lives during the clashes between the public and the soldiers. The government claimed this attempt was made by soldiers affiliated with the Gülen movement, which stirred purges in the armed and security forces as well as the judiciary. A state of emergency was declared and within this framework over 50,000 civil servants were laid off

The year after the “peace process” 57 or suspended. Due to claims of their affiliation with the Gülen movement, 16 universities and about 1,000 private schools were shut down. With the same allegations, trustees were appointed to many firms linked to Gülen. Although it is an undeniable fact that infiltration by Gülenists posed a serious threat to Turkey’s bureaucracy and state security, investigations after the failed coup attempt turned into a purge of critical voices from public institutions, media and universities. As of November 2016, almost 130,000 civil servants, including academics, judges, soldiers, teachers and police officers were dismissed or suspended.7 However, the government’s retaliation was not confined to Gülen sympathizers. Socialists, liberals and members of Academics for Peace were also dismissed from universities. Furthermore, 120 journalists were jailed and 150 news outlets, among them TV stations and web sites, were shuttered.8 It should be noted that proKurdish media and the liberal Taraf newspaper were closed down and the flagship newspaper of secular media, Cumhuriyet, was raided, its prominent columnists detained. The post-coup atmosphere also allowed the government to intimidate the HDP and the Kurdish movement. Between the failed coup attempt on 15 July and November 2016, the government appointed trustees to 34 municipalities ruled by the HDP’s sister party, the Democratic Regions Party (DBP), and detained 27 co-mayors of these municipalities.9 In addition to that, the co-leaders of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, and another seven HDP members of Parliament were detained on 4 November 2016.10 Last but not least, the AKP government’s security-driven approach to the Kurdish question went beyond domestic developments and influenced Turkey’s policy towards Syria. On 24 August, the Turkish army joined forces with the Free Syrian Army against ISIS and the town of Jarablus was liberated. According to Taştekin, Turkey initiated this operation in order to prevent a “Kurdish corridor” which could bridge the Kurdish cantons to be formed in the north of Syria. Therefore, Turkey liberated Jarablus from ISIS before the PYD (Democratic Union Party, the sister organization of the PKK) did it. In doing so, Turkey aimed to use the “fighting against ISIS” card to justify this operation in the eyes of the international community.11 The year after the “peace process” reminds Turkey of the 1990s, characterized by militarism, nationalism, undemocratic practices, deep state and cross-border operations. However, the uniqueness of contemporary Turkish politics following the failure of the “peace process” derives from the fact that Turkey turned back to its traditional security-driven policy under the rule of a civilian government, which has absolute power in the decision-making process. After the failed coup, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reached the peak of his power under a state of emergency, which allowed him to issue presidential decrees free from parliamentary and judiciary oversight. It is

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The year after the “peace process”

counterintuitive, but assuming that the military’s influence over the political sphere is the main obstacle to solving the Kurdish question is incorrect. The civilian AKP government carried the torch of militarism, nationalism and authoritarianism. This means that democracy is something different than political parties’ survival strategies.

Notes 1 For the national election results of 7 June, see: www.hurriyet.com.tr/ysk-7-hazirangenel-secimlerinin-kesin-sonuclari-acikladi-29321915, (Last Access: 15 November 2016). 2 “Cemaat Kanalları Digitürk’ten Çıkartıldı.” www.iha.com.tr/haber-cemaat-kanallaridigiturkten-cikarildi-501726/, (Last Access: 24 November 2016). 3 “Türkiye’nin Bombalı Saldırı Haritası.” http://journo.com.tr/turkiyenin-biryillik-bombali-saldiri-haritasi, (Last Access: 25 April 2017). 4 For the national election results of 1 November, see: www.hurriyet.com.tr/secim/ sonuclar?agency=aa, (Last Access: 10 December 2016). 5 Ibid. 6 “Turkey: Academics Jailed for Signing Petition.” www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/16/ turkey-academics-jailed-signing-petition, (Last Access: 22 March 2017). 7 “KHK’larla ihraç edilen memurlar: Mağduruz, bizi soruşturun.” www.bbc.com/ turkce/haberler-turkiye-37904717, (Last Access: 12 December 2016). 8 Nordland, R. “Turkey’s Free Press Withers as Erdoğan Jails 120 Journalists.” New York Times, 17 November 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/world/europe/ turkey-press-Erdoğan-coup.html?_r=1, (Last Access: 12 February 2017). 9 Tahaoğlu, Ç. “Hangi Belediyelere Kayyum Atandı? Hangi Belediye Başkanları Tutuklu?” 17 November 2016, http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/180838-hangibelediyelere-kayyum-atandi-hangi-belediye-baskanlari-tutuklu, (Last Access: 24 November 2016). 10 “Demirtaş ve Yüksekdağ dahil 9 HDP milletvekili tutuklandı.” www.bbc.com/ turkce/37868309, (Last Access: 25 December 2016). 11 “Fehim Taştekin: Cerablus operasyonunun beş nedeni var.” www.bbc.com/turkce/ haberler-turkiye-37179115, (Last Access: 22 January 2017).

5

Conclusion

What are the lessons learnt from the story of the “peace process”? The optimism that appeared following the initiation of the “peace process” led many scholars to raise two important questions. The first question was related to the AKP government’s enthusiasm to solve the Kurdish issue by nonmilitary means. Was this step a deviation from the traditional policy of Turkish governments and the security establishment towards the Kurdish question? This study examines the Turkish state’s way of dealing with the Kurdish question by addressing two patterns. The Kurdish national movements were viewed as security problems threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity and they were harshly suppressed by security forces. In addition, the ruling elite used the struggle against the Kurdish movements as an instrument to eliminate political rivals. Therefore, for the “peace process” to be labeled as a deviation, these established patterns, namely securitization and instrumentalization, should change. It would not be wrong to argue that the first pattern disappeared after the AKP government and the PKK sat at the negotiation table and declared a ceasefire in January 2013. Nevertheless, this study shows that the AKP used the “peace process” as a bargaining chip to receive the support of the Kurds for the à la turca presidential system and as an immunity shield to avert the criticism of the domestic opposition. That is to say, the second pattern – the instrumentalization of the Kurdish question – did not disappear. This conclusion implies that the “peace process” was not a deviation and that it was initiated to consolidate the position of the AKP on the domestic front and meet the demands of the PKK. Unsurprisingly, the “peace process” collapsed because strategic interests and priorities of the negotiating parties diverged and necessitated a return to fighting. The second question that stemmed from the “peace process” is about the causal relation between democracy and peace in post–civil conflict countries. The literature underscores the fact that institutional mechanisms capable of supporting democracy are necessary conditions for durability of the

60

Conclusion

peace deals concluded between the warring parties of the internal conflict. Nevertheless, defendants of the “peace process” re-interpreted the “democracy brings peace” argument, replacing it with “peace brings democracy”. Accordingly, Turkish democracy mainly suffered from the deadlock on the Kurdish question for decades. Anti-democratic policies of the AKP might be temporarily tolerated for the prolonged Kurdish question to be solved. Nevertheless, undermining the democratic atmosphere and suspending democratic practices granted the AKP and the PKK the ability to sit around the negotiating table alone. Opposition parties and non-state actors were not informed about the content of the ongoing talks and they were not allowed to be involved in the process. Even the members of the HDP delegation that regularly visited İmralı Prison and conducted the letter diplomacy between Öcalan and the PKK headquarters were chosen by the AKP government. For example, Sırrı Süreyya Önder was excluded from the delegation due to his active role in the Gezi protests. Furthermore, the AKP government efficiently mobilized its organic intellectuals and media to intimidate the critical voices by labeling them as bloody-minded. In the end, the “peace process” continued as the personal perceptions and initiatives of Erdoğan and Öcalan. This study indicates that the “peace process” ended with the same reason that initiated it. That is to say, the “peace process” started and ended because strategic interests of the AKP and the PKK converged in January 2013 and diverged following the 7 June elections in 2015. On the other hand, the weakness of democratic institutions paved the way for the negotiating elites on both sides to arbitrarily terminate the “peace process”. In other words, non-state actors did not have sufficient power to prevent the AKP and the PKK from ending the “peace process” just because their strategic interests diverged. The failure of the “peace process” cast an empirical challenge to the idea of sacrificing democratic practices for the sake of peace-building efforts in post–civil conflict societies. In conclusion, the failure of the “peace process” indicates that efficient democratic institutions are necessary, rather than illusory and contextual steps taken by the governments and insurgent groups for building peace in post–civil conflict societies. Otherwise, as the recent Turkish experience shows, sacrificing democracy for the sake of peace may result in losing both democracy and peace. In line with this point, the question of why the “peace process” failed to solve the Kurdish question can be answered by highlighting the absence of democratic institutions, which meant the Turks and the Kurds were ruled by authoritarian leaders.

Appendix Chronology of the peace process1

3 January 2013: Democratic Society Congress (DTK) Chairperson and Mardin Independent Member of Parliament Ahmet Türk and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Batman Member of Parliament Ayla Akat held a meeting with PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) leader Abdullah Öcalan at Imralı Prison. 5 January 2013: Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairperson Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu declared his support to the government in its negotiations with Öcalan: “Despite all its mistakes in the past, we offer the Justice and Development Party (AKP) a new credit. Solve the problem.” 6 January 2013: Prime Minister Erdoğan rejected the “credit” offered by CHP Chairperson Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: “Who do you think you are offering credit, you need credit yourself!” 24 January 2013: The right of self-defense in one’s mother tongue became law. 8 February 2013: Erdoğan announced that MİT (National Intelligence Organization) Undersecretary Hakan Fidan had held a meeting with Öcalan at İmralı. 15 March 2013: Murat Karayılan, acting leader of the PKK, announced their decision to strongly participate in Öcalan’s solution.

62 Appendix 21 March 2013: Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that the government were working on forming a delegation of “wise people”. 22 March 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s letter calling on the PKK to declare ceasefire and withdraw from within Turkey’s borders was read out at the Newroz celebration in Diyarbakır/Amed. Abdullah Öcalan’s letter included no call for disarmament. 23 March 2013: The PKK declared a ceasefire. 29 March 2013: Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that the peace process was developing as planned. Prime Minister Erdoğan responded to criticism from the opposition by saying that no concessions at all would be made to Öcalan and the PKK in the process, that the conditions of Öcalan’s cell had been improved and that it was not possible to take any further step. 30 March 2013: Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that PKK members would not be allowed to withdraw from Turkey with their arms, and that therefore organization members had to first disarm and then withdraw. 1 April 2013: The PKK reacted to the prime minister’s directive that it must disarm, and stated that “disarmed withdrawal was not part of their agenda.” 3 April 2013: The government formed a “Wise People Committee” to contribute to the solution process. The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) delegation, formed of Co-Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş, and also Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, travelled to İmralı for the fourth time. Öcalan sent a letter to the PKK asking it to comply with the instruction to withdraw to positions beyond Turkey’s borders.

Appendix 63 4 April 2013: Prime Minister Erdoğan met for the first time with the Wise People Committee at the Prime Minister’s Office in Dolmabahçe, Istanbul. Here, Erdoğan announced his message: “The solution process is a process in which arms will be set aside, and politics will be put to use.” 9 April 2013: At a parliamentary vote, which the main opposition party, CHP, and the other opposition party MHP (National Movement Party), did not attend, the “Solution Process Commission” was formed with votes in favour from the AKP and the BDP. 11 April 2013: Known publicly as the fourth judicial reform package, the “Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Laws in the Context of Human Rights and Freedom of Expression” was accepted at the General Assembly of the Parliament and became law. According to this new law, “legitimizing and praising methods involving force, violence or intimidation, or the encouragement of the employment of such methods” was to be a consideration in sentencing those who created propaganda for a terror organization or printed and broadcast their announcements and declarations. 21 April 2013: News appeared in the media that the construction of kalekols – fortress-like high-security military stations – and regular military stations had accelerated since the beginning of the ceasefire and solution process. 25 April 2013: KCK Executive Council Member Murat Karayılan held a press conference at Qandil. In attendance were a large group of journalists from Turkey and international press organizations. Karayılan announced that PKK members in Turkey would begin to gradually withdraw on May 8. 30 April 2013: The Ministry of Justice announced that 200 suspects under arrest in the KCK trial had been released in the past two months.

64 Appendix 1 May 2013: Nechervan Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, announced that the government supported the solution process. 8 May 2013: As it had announced previously, the PKK began to withdraw from Turkey. The first phase was to involve groups exiting via the Şemdinli District of Hakkari Province to reach Iraq within a week. The withdrawal was to be carried out in secret, and was also to be observed by the Turkish Armed Forces. At this point, the Prime Minister made a statement announcing that there were 1,500–2,000 PKK members in Turkey. 11 May 2013: KCK Executive Council Chairperson Murat Karayılan announced that the PKK was disturbed by the new military station and dam constructions. 16 May 2013: President Barack Obama announced US support of the solution process during Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s official visit to the United States. 28 May 2013: The Gezi protests began. 8 June 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan announced that he saluted the Gezi resistance and added: “However, no one should allow themselves to be used by nationalist circles, or circles favouring a military coup.” BDP MP Sırrı Süreyya Önder, who became a symbolic figure of the Gezi resistance, was excluded from the delegation travelling to İmralı. 20 June 2013: The continuing construction of kalekols, or fortress-like military stations, was protested in many cities and towns. Security forces continued excessive use of force and carried out executions that targeted the continuing Gezi resistance. 21 June 2013: BDP Co-Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş announced that the first phase of the solution process, consisting of the declaration of ceasefire and withdrawal,

Appendix 65 had concluded, and that the second phase had begun. The government was expected to take legal steps in the second phase. 26 June 2013: The final meeting of the Wise People Committee was held in Istanbul. The “Wise People” presented to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan the reports they had prepared on the process following their work in seven regions across Turkey. 12 August 2013: Salih Muslim, Co-Chairperson of the PYD (Democratic Union Party) of Rojava, the de facto autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria, visited Turkey for the second time upon an official invitation from the Foreign Ministry. 18 August 2013: Abdullah Öcalan said, “Our meetings and discussions with the State delegation continue. From our viewpoint, the process continues in this aspect. Until this phase I found it meaningful that my position was ascribed an instrumental value, however from this point on, my position must evolve from an instrumental to a strategic position. For me to contribute to a solution to both Turkey’s domestic problems, and also problems in the region with Syria first and foremost among them, my position must be treated strategically. I also think that for the process to progress in a healthy manner, it is necessary for the government to take practical steps regarding democratization via democratization packages to be prepared with a participatory method.” 19 August 2013: Cemil Bayık argued that Turkey was not serious about the peace process, saying, “If the process collapses, let alone the PKK’s withdrawal, those who have withdrawn to the south could return to the north. Then there may be an even greater war.” 20 August 2013: PKK Leader Abdullah Öcalan was transferred to a larger room in İmralı Prison. 23 August 2013: Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan stated that the government would announce the democratization package in one to two weeks. Erdoğan said, “We will

66 Appendix never end operations in this country before disarmament takes place. We endured certain intolerable incidents in order not to carry out operations.” 27 August 2013: KCK Executive Council Co-Chairperson Cemil Bayık announced that the KCK would stop the withdrawal if no concrete steps from the government were seen by 1 September, and that the armed forces that had withdrawn to positions outside Turkey’s borders would return. 29 August 2013: Interior Minister Muammer Güler announced that the expected outcome from the first phase of the solution process could not be achieved. KCK Executive Council Co-Chairperson Cemil Bayık said, “The Hizmet Movement is opposed to a solution.” 30 August 2013: BDP Co-Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş stated that the government was informed about the dates the PKK had given, but that they no longer had any hope that this calendar would be met. The PKK made a statement, saying, “AKP is preparing for war. They want to expel Kurds from Rojava.” 9 September 2013: The PKK announced that it had stopped its withdrawal because the government was not taking steps on toward democratization and a solution of the Kurdish question. On the same day, the BDP announced that it was going to participate in the 2014 local elections under the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) banner as well as BDP. 30 September 2013: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the “Democratization Package”. BDP and DTK stated that the package had turned out to be empty. 29 October 2013: Cemil Bayık demanded the improvement in Öcalan’s imprisonment conditions, the establishment of a legal platform and the inclusion of a third party for the continuation of the process. 16 November 2013: Şivan Perwer, a singer from Urfa who had lived in exile for 37 years, and Masoud Barzani, the president of the Iraqi Kurdistan (autonomous) Region,

Appendix 67 came together in Diyarbakır/Amed. Barzani declared his support for the solution process. 3 December 2013: Cemil Bayık stated that they had given the government until Spring 2014 to take action, and if no steps were taken, clashes could resume. 4 December 2013: Leyla Zana, speaking at a conference on the European Union, Turkey and the Kurds’ held at the European Parliament, stated that the peace process initiated during the AKP’s term in government was different than others. Zana said, “The difference of the İmralı peace process from previous attempts at peace is that it is being carried out personally by the two people with a real say in the question, by two powerful leaders. Esteemed Mr. Öcalan’s influence over Kurdish public opinion is indisputable in the same way that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s influence is over Turkish public opinion.” 11 January 2014: Öcalan, commenting on the clash between the government and the Hizmet movement, said, “Those who want once again to turn the country into bedlam by igniting the fire of a coup, should know that we will not pour gasoline onto such a fire. We will stand in the way of every attempt at carrying out a coup, as we have done until now.” 21 January 2014: PYD declared autonomy in the Rojava region in the north of Syria where the majority of the population is Kurdish. 13 February 2014: Abdullah Öcalan voiced his demand for the government to form a delegation for negotiations, to accelerate of legal steps and to increase of the frequency of visits to İmralı. His proposals were announced by members of Parliament in the İmralı delegation. 2 March 2014: The Democratization Package was accepted at the General Assembly of Parliament. The package permitted private schools to provide education in Kurdish and election propaganda in Kurdish. Parties receiving over 3% of the vote would qualify for state benefit.

68 Appendix 15 March 2014: Prior to Abdullah Öcalan’s March 21 announcement for Newroz, a message in contrast to Öcalan’s most recent positive message was issued by Qandil. KCK announced that the government “was no longer the addressee of the democratization move”. 26 April 2014: The Law on Amendments to the State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization [MİT] Law, alleged to have been introduced to protect MİT officials assigned in the solution process, was published in the Official Gazette. The new law included the clause, “MİT members, in carrying out their duties, may communicate and may order meetings with detainees and convicts in penal institutions on condition that they provide advance notice, and may as part of the requirements of their duty, contact all structures threatening national security, including terror organizations.” 28 April 2014: All BDP members of Parliament other than Selahattin Demirtaş and Sırrı Sakık transferred to the HDP. 11 July 2014: No detainees remained in the main KCK trial held in Diyarbakır/Amed following the release of two detained defendants. 5 August 2014: Öcalan, in a meeting with his lawyer, declared that he was troubled by the failure to begin negotiations in the solution process, and that he had reached the end of his patience. 20 August 2014: MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan travelled to İmralı Island where he held a meeting with Abdullah Öcalan. Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay stated that it was now their desire to broaden meetings to include Europe and Qandil. 27 August 2014: Ahmet Davutoğlu became AKP chairperson and prime minister. Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that he would be closely involved in the solution process during his term as president as well.

Appendix 69 29 August 2014: Beşir Atalay was not named in newly appointed Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s cabinet, while Yalçın Akdoğan, claimed to be one of the first advocates of the “Sri Lanka model”, became deputy prime minister. 30 August 2014: Chief of General Staff Necdet Özel made a statement, saying, “The government did not ask us our opinion regarding the road map, we are finding out about it from the press. We wish that our view had been sought. The government said the problem would be solved without arms, we do not want mothers to cry. If the red lines of the solution process are transgressed we will give the necessary answer.” 15 September 2014: ISIS laid siege on Kobani, a town across the border from the Suruç district of Urfa. 20 September 2014: At least 60,000 civilians entered Suruç following the ISIS siege of Kobani. 30 September 2014: Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç announced that a Solution Process Council would be formed to accelerate the solution process. 6–12 October 2014: As ISIS’s siege of Kobani entered its first month, a new dynamic was triggered in Turkey. In response to the KCK and HDP’s “call for permanent action,” people took to the streets. Following incidents that led to the deaths of 49 people in some 40 cities, curfews were imposed in many cities. Many groups clashed with one another (followers of HDP and the Free Cause Party [HÜDA PAR] in the east, and followers of HDP and nationalist groups in the west). The protests were ended by a call from Öcalan. Öcalan reminded protestors that the solution process and Kobani were parts of an inseparable whole. 10 October 2014: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu made a statement regarding the four persons killed in Genç: “Terrorists, in a position of being the perpetrators of the

70 Appendix attack, were punished within one or two hours.” Davutoğlu’s words were criticized as a sign of the government adopting extrajudicial killing as a method of punishment. 11 October 2014: Cemil Bayık held the government responsible for incidents in Kobani and Turkey, adding that the resolution that the Parliament had passed was a declaration of war, and that therefore the PKK had sent back all the units it had withdrawn from Turkey. 19 October 2014: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu held a meeting with the Wise People Committee. At the meeting, after which only Davutoğlu’s speech was shared with the public, the prime minister stated that the solution process had three characteristics: national, local/domestic and unique. 9 November 2014: Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan responded to questions as to whether the solution process continued. Akdoğan stated that the solution process was experiencing turbulence in the aftermath of the 6–12 October Kobani protests, adding, “I assume meetings between the State and İmralı are continuing.” 18 November 2014: Prime Minister Davutoğlu commented on KCK Co-Chairperson Cemil Bayık’s recently voiced demand for inclusion of a foreign state in the solution process, saying: “There will be no foreign eye, or in other words, a third eye. The solution process is a natural outcome of the democratization process. We already have the Wise People Committee. There can be no external eye. We already tried that at Oslo. Oslo was a mediated process and we saw how that concluded. It did not work.” 21 November 2014: HDP Group Deputy Chairperson Pervin Buldan stated that the visit to İmralı Prison would from now on be carried out by a delegation of five persons, and a total of 25–30 persons would work on the process, including the observation committee, an expanded negotiations delegation and a secretariat. Selahattin Demirtaş stated that the CHP, too, should be included in the process.

Appendix 71 28 November 2014: AKP Deputy Chairperson Beşir Atalay stated that the road map of the solution process would sooner or later inevitably involve disarmament, and the legal regulation by the state of the return home of guerrillas. “Then comes a period without arms and violence, and everyone’s involvement in politics. That is the ultimate target.” 29 November 2014: CHP Chairperson Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, speaking at a CHP Regional Meeting in Diyarbakır/Amed, said that the Kurdish question was one of the main issues Turkey faced. The CHP leader added that they had stated before that the problem could not be solved with security measures. Kılıçdaroğlu said, “We are going to solve the problem with democracy and freedom. I am asking you to give me power for four years. I promise you democracy, freedom, factories and food.” 1 December 2014: In a document described as the “Draft for Peace and Democratic Negotiation Process”, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan proposed four main headings for the solution of the Kurdish question. Sırrı Süreyya Önder, who announced the details of the draft, did not provide any information regarding the contents of the fourth heading, titled “Action Plan”. 9 December 2014: The HDP delegation formed of İdris Baluken, Pervin Buldan, Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Hatip Dicle held a meeting with Yalçın Akdoğan. Önder announced that they would hold further meetings with the government on Öcalan’s draft. However, Yalçın Akdoğan made a statement via his Twitter account to refute claims that the draft had been discussed. 19 December 2014: Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan stated that major developments may take place in the solution process for the Kurdish question before the 2015 general election. 22 December 2014: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, commenting on debates on autonomy, stated that the solution process was being carried out on the principle of the “unitary State”.

72 Appendix 25 December 2014: CHP Chairperson Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu stated that the government did not share information about the process of finding a solution for the Kurdish question, and that it received detailed information from statements made by Qandil. 26 January 2015: Under ISIS attacks since 15 September 2014, the town of Kobani was liberated after 134 days. 6 February 2015: President Erdoğan said, “If we want a solution process, then we must deliver 400 members of parliament so that a party in power with all its might can realize this.” 9 February 2015: Yalçın Akdoğan stated that “a favorable point had been reached” in the Solution Process, saying, “Previous processes were disrupted because of very serious acts of sabotage. The Solution Process suffered serious turbulence in the Kobani incidents as well.” 11 February 2015: Figen Yüksekdağ said, “The process is now at the stage where it passes onto negotiations. If negotiations do not commence, there can be no joint statement. We are ready. The government has failed to complete its preparation for negotiations. We expect the government to take this decision in two weeks so negotiations can commence. Certain legal steps must be taken in addition to the framework law.” 22 February 2015: The Turkish Armed Forces carried out the Shah Euphrates Operation. YPG made a press statement announcing that it had provided support to Turkish forces entering Kobani, and that it had formed a five-kilometre security corridor. 28 February 2015: The Dolmabahçe Consensus was announced.

Appendix 73 3 March 2015: Making a statement following a cabinet meeting, government spokesperson Bülent Arınç strongly criticized Selahattin Demirtaş, claiming he was hindering the solution process. Arınç said, “Demirtaş is not a person who shows well-intentioned efforts regarding the solution process, or desires this process to succeed. I hope from now on he won’t become involved in a movement that will sabotage this process”. Claiming that the text made public on 28 February had been changed, Arınç said, “The text that was read out was not the text presented to us and that was to be accepted. Sixty percent of the text was changed.” 4 March 2015: HDP Co-Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş responded to Arınç’s claims that the 10-article text had been changed, stating that the 10 articles that had been announced overlapped 99.9% with Öcalan’s call, and that HDP had not touched the text. 12 March 2015: An HDP delegation formed of Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder held a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister. The first statement after the meeting was made by the HDP. Pervin Buldan announced that a 16-person Observation Committee had been formed and that HDP members would travel to İmralı Island with this committee, and that the committee would include “wise people”, regional chairpersons and a further nine people yet to be determined. 13 March 2015: Pervin Buldan’s statements regarding the Observation Committee were refuted by Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan. 15 March 2015: President Erdoğan, speaking at a ceremony he attended, said, “Turkey has no Kurdish question. In Turkey, our Kurdish brothers have problems, like people from all sections of society. They have the problem that their identity is not recognized. They have the problem that their beliefs are not respected. They have problems such as underdevelopment, neglect and discrimination.” 19 March 2015: KCK Executive Council Co-Chairperson Cemil Bayık commented on President Erdoğan’s assertion that “Turkey has no Kurdish question” in a

74 Appendix published article. Bayık stated that no politician who prioritizes the solution of the Kurdish question can have a future. 20 March 2015: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in reference to Deputy Prime Minister Akdoğan’s statement regarding the Observation Committee, said, “I’m reading this in the newspapers. To be frank, I don’t know anything about it. And I’ll put this very clearly, I do not have a positive view of it. I had also said that we did not find it right when I was asked during my term as Prime Minister.” 21 March 2015: Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesperson Bülent Arınç commented on President Erdoğan’s statements regarding the Observation Committee, saying, “Statements such as ‘I’m not happy with it’, I don’t like it’, I treat it coldly’ or ‘I treat it warmly’ are his own views. The responsibility of the process carried out by our government belongs to our government. It is not possible for him to be considered unaware of developments, our President knows everything very well.” Arınç stated that the government was determined to establish an Observation Committee. 22 March 2015: After stating that he did not approve of an Observation Committee, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that he was also against the Dolmabahçe meeting consensus and the 10-article-declaration. 25 March 2015: A statement made by the Turkish Armed Forces announced that PKK forces were carrying out mortar shelling in Dağlıca, and that the army had responded. HDP Co-Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş stated that an Observation Committee was, rather than an indispensable exclusive demand of the HDP, a requirement in peace processes implemented across the world. 26 March 2015: Selahattin Demirtaş claimed that there was a crisis in the AKP and that this crisis would harm the process if the Observation Committee was not formed and visits to İmralı Island ceased. 27 March 2015: The Internal Security Package was accepted in Parliament.

Appendix 75 28 March 2015: Selahattin Demirtaş stated that the government had not, since the beginning of the process, taken steps that met expectations. Demirtaş underlined that all manner of provocative acts could take place during their election campaign. 3 April 2015: The Internal Security Package, debated in the General Assembly of Parliament since February 17, was accepted and ratified by President Erdoğan. 5 April 2015: The HPG announced that the Turkish army persisted in making ambushes and that they were attempting to provoke clashes with guerrillas. 14 April 2015: HDP Group Deputy Chairperson İdris Baluken said, “The solution process is progressing thanks to the efforts of Mr. Abdulah Öcalan. Despite the continuing solution process and our efforts, the AKP government has taken a decision to go to war in the most recent 13-hour National Security Council meeting.” 15 April 2015: It was revealed that there was only one reference to the “solution process” in the AKP Election Declaration announced by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. 19 April 2015: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu responded to criticism regarding the absence of the solution process in the AKP declaration, saying: “This was due to some digital mishaps that took place when the text was sent off to the printer’s, and one or two pages went missing.” 20 April 2015: The KCK Executive Council Co-Directorate made a statement, saying, “This policy, which the government has built on conflict and tension, has resulted in a situation that considerably endangers both the solution and election processes.” 22 April 2015: The HDP Election Declaration stated that “the 10 articles announced in the Dolmabahçe Consensus are accepted as the principal framework of the solution” under the heading “Kurdish Question and Solution Process”.

76 Appendix 28 April 2015: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, “Saying ‘There is a Kurdish question’ constitutes, from this point on, separatism. The Kurdish question is caused precisely by those who say that there is a Kurdish question. There is no longer a Kurdish question in our country. There is the State in this country.” 6 May 2015: Pervin Buldan, commenting on Yalçın Akdoğan’s statement that it would be excellent if the HDP failed to reach the election threshold, said Akdoğan should stop worrying about the HDP and focus on filling the other side of the table at İmralı and forming the observation committee. 12 May 2015: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, “Who is in Kobani at the moment? Around 60,000 people. And they are people who have returned from Turkey. Now they are exploiting this situation. There are almost no Arabs left in Kobani. In other words, a very different method is being implemented in the region. This begins in Afrin, and extends towards Kobani and Qamışlı. Their target now is to connect these points. Their efforts aim to form a certain ethnicity there.” 16 May 2015: HDP Co-Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş stated that the process was now frozen, that the party delegation had not been able to visit İmralı Island for more than two months and that at the moment isolation was imposed on Öcalan. 17 May 2015: Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan stated that the HDP was creating every obstacle imaginable in the solution process, and that it would mean nothing even if the HDP did pass the election threshold. 19 May 2015: Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was not under isolation, that the solution process would not progress if no steps were taken regarding disarmament and that the continuation of visits to İmralı was not meaningful as long as the step of disarmament was not taken.

Appendix 77 23 May 2015: KCK Executive Council member Murat Karayılan said, “The Turkish Army is displaying a certain mobility aimed at breaching the rules of ceasefire. If it were not for the outstanding care and sensitivity of our forces, clashes could have taken place in many areas by now.” 5 June 2015: A bomb attack was carried out on an HDP rally at Diyarbakır/Amed İstasyon Square. Following two consecutive explosions, five people lost their lives and more than 400 people were injured. 12 June 2015: İmralı Delegation spokesperson Sırrı Süreyya Önder made a statement to the press following the application the delegation made to the Ministry of Justice to hold a meeting with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Önder demanded the establishment of a “national coalition”, the involvement in the solution process of an observation committee and an end to the isolation imposed on Öcalan, condemning the AKP and Erdoğan’s anti-solution policies. 14 June 2015: Deputy Prime Minister and AKP spokesperson Beşir Atalay said that it had been wrong to halt the solution process before the elections, and that this decision had led to the AKP losing votes in the region. 15 June 2015: YPG forces seized Tel Abyad (Girê Spî) from ISIS. 17 June 2015: KCK Executive Council Co-Chairperson Bese Hozat stated that Turkey had entered a new period with the 7 June general election. He claimed that AKP had squandered all its chances, and added that an arbitrary peace could be possible if equal negotiation conditions were prepared and Parliament became part of the process. 19 June 2015: HDP Co-Chairperson Figen Yüksekdağ stated that a possible AKP-CHP coalition would have to make progress in the solution process in order to succeed.

78 Appendix 26 June 2015: Selahattin Demirtaş said, “There is a solution process that has been left halffinished. Let us begin anew, not from where we left, but let us now make it a transparent process, and involve Parliament, too. Let us have negotiations under equal conditions. Let us carry out a process with the involvement of an observation committee, with decisions taken brought to Parliament and made law. This should then be followed by disarmament, so that internal peace can be secured.” 11 July 2015: The KCK Executive Council Co-Directorate made a statement on the ceasefire that has continued for two and a half years, declaring, “Our Freedom Movement will no longer accept the exploitation of our ceasefire position, and will take a stance against policies that have left the Kurdish question unsettled. We will no longer tolerate those who exploit our patient and reasonable position, and implement a policy of delay diversion.”

Note 1 This chronology is concluded from the “Chronology of The Peace Process” file of Center for Truth-Justice-Memory, http://hakikatadalethafiza.org/en/chronologyof-peace-process-in-turkey/

Index

Academics for Peace 56, 57 Ağrı Rebellion 10 Akat, A. 61 Arınç, B. 38, 69, 73, 74 Atalay, B. 2, 68, 69, 71, 77 Azizoğlu, Y. 11

57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77 Ergenekon Case 18 European Union 3, 4, 17, 18, 32, 38, 67 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 32 Evren, K. 16

Baluken, İ. 71, 75 Barzani, M. 3, 11, 13, 31, 66, 67 Bayık, C. 49, 65, 66, 67, 70, 73 Bele, R. 9 Bucak, R. 11 Buldan, P. 62, 70, 71, 73, 76 Bulut, Y. 39 Burkay, K. 14, 44

Fidan, H. 61, 68 Free Cause Party 69

Cumhuriyet 57 Davutoğlu, A. 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 76 Demirtaş, S. 37, 47, 57, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78 Democratic Initiative-The National Unity and Brotherhood Project 18, 19 Democratic modernity 46 Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Turkey, (TKDP) 13 Democratic Regions Party (DBP) 57 Democratic Union Party (PYD) 50, 56, 57, 65, 67 Democrat Party 10, 11, 12 Dersim Rebellion 10 Dicle, H. 71 Dolmabahçe Protocol 48 Erdoğan, R.T. 1, 2, 7, 29, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55,

General Qasem 3, 11 Gezi Protests 2, 28, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 60, 64 Gökçek, M. 40 Gülen movement 39, 40, 41, 43, 53, 55, 56, 57 Güler, M. 66 Güreş, D. 3 Hussein, S. 31, 44 ISIS 48, 50, 55, 57, 69, 72, 77 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 1, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 67, 68, 71, 74, 75, 77 Karabekir, K. 9 Karayılan, M. 61, 63, 64, 77 Kawa 14 KCK 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75, 77, 78 Kılıçdaroğlu, K. 61, 71, 72 Kobani 69, 70, 72, 76

80

Index

Kurdistan Regional Goverment 4, 64 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 71, 74, 76, 77

Republican People’s Party (CHP) 9, 10, 17, 18, 38, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 61, 63, 70, 71, 72, 77 Revolutionarty Democratic Cultural Association 14 Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths 13, 14 Rizgari, A. 14, 15

Menderes, A. 3, 11 Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 17, 18, 37, 53, 54, 55, 56, 63 National Security Council 9, 13, 17, 41, 75 National Unity Committee 12 Ocalan, A. 1, 7, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 24, 33, 37, 43, 44, 45, 46, 53, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77 Önder, S.S. 60, 62, 64, 71 Orbay, R. 9 Özal, T. 16, 21 Özel, N. 69 Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP) 22 People’s Democratic Party (HDP) 37, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77 Progressive Republic Party (PRP) 8, 9, 10

Sadabad Pact 3 Shah Euphrates Operation 72 Sheikh Said Rebellion 8, 9, 10 Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan 14 Taraf 57 Türk, A. 61 Turkey’s Intelligence Service (MIT) 1 Turkish Resistance Organisation 12 Village Guards 24 Wise People Committee 7 Worker’s Party of Turkey (TİP) 13, 14, 53, 71 Yaşar, H. 15 Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) 50, 56, 72 Yön 11 Yüksekdağ, F. 57, 72