The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1 [1st ed. 2023] 3031308964, 9783031308963

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The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1 Edited by José Pedro Zúquete

The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1 “A first full-scale, remarkably broad conceptual and historical study of left-wing extremism. Bringing together some thirty scholars, the book combines perspectives from social psychology, political sociology and history and covers a variety of aspects and regions from the nineteenth century to the present. An indispensable reading in the field.” —Azar Gat, Ezer Weitzman Professorial Chair, School of Political Science, Tel Aviv University, Israel “Until now, remarkably, there has been no serious academic handbook of research on left-wing extremism. This ambitious, international and research-led ‘two-volume set’ not only fills this glaring gap but pushes the frontiers of knowledge. It pulls together a deeply impressive list of academics who are at the cutting edge of research on left-wing extremism. It should be essential reading for students, researchers, and practitioners who are serious about understanding the contemporary challenges faced by liberal representative democracy.” —Matt Goodwin, Professor of Politics, University of Kent, UK “A work of impressive originality, this remarkably comprehensive book is badly needed, providing broad comparative perspective and objective analysis of the extreme left around the world. It will be an indispensable handbook not merely for scholars but also for all those interested in contemporary affairs, for it has no equal in the current literature.” —Professor Stanley Payne, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, USA “While right-wing extremism has been the subject of a great deal of academic work, left-wing extremism, in all its aspects, has been strangely neglected by scholars of political extremism. We must therefore welcome the publication of this Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, which breaks with the underestimation of a polymorphic phenomenon that can now be observed all over the world. This underestimation derives from the perceived asymmetry between the far right and the far left, a legacy of Soviet anti-fascism that has remained uncriticized, which postulates that the right tends to turn right, and therefore to extremize itself to the point of fascism, which embodies the only existing threat. From then on, left-wing extremism is supposed not to exist or to be reduced to a negligible phenomenon. In a scientific approach aiming for objectivity and a consequent anti-totalitarian perspective, left-wing extremism must be approached as a phenomenon as important and dangerous as right-wing extremism. Its main features are the legitimization of violence as a method of solving political problems, the intolerance associated with sectarianism, and fanaticism, which involves intransigence, Manichaeism and diehardism. Left-wing extremism places the defense of the Cause above all else, which amounts to postulating that “the end justifies the means”, the end being defined either as the liberation or

the emancipation of the human race, or as the realization of the utopia of the perfect society, without inequalities or discrimination. This is why the field explored in this Handbook is as vast as it is diverse: it ranges from revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist or anarchist ideologies and movements, advocating violence as a method of salvation, to the punitive hyper-moralism of “Wokism”. and cancel culture as well as the purifying utopias of radical environmentalism, which, through actions of sabotage, can lead to eco-terrorism. He also does not forget to point out the violence of the “antifas”. The main ideological invariant of left-wing extremisms is a radical anti-liberalism, whose project is to destroy capitalist society and eliminate the liberal-pluralist democracy supposed to be at the service of the globalized financial oligarchies. Left-wing extremist movements often find support in certain autocracies (Russia, China, etc.) or Islamist groups hostile to Western democracies and their allies. This Handbook, which gives an overview of left-wing extremism, is promised to become an indispensable working tool and a precious source of reflection on the new world disorder.” —Pierre-André Taguieff, Director of the Centre for Political Research at Sciences Po, Paris

José Pedro Zúquete Editor

The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1

Editor José Pedro Zúquete Institute of Social Sciences Lisbon, Portugal

ISBN 978-3-031-30896-3 ISBN 978-3-031-30897-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Europa Press News This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Anca Pusca for believing in this project since I first pitched the idea in the Spring of 2021. I am also grateful to Supraja Yegnaraman for her continuing assistance to this project. Finally, I am forever indebted to all the authors that contributed to this volume.

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About This Book

This handbook provides a broad overview of left-wing extremism and its associated key issues and themes. It breaks new ground by assembling in a two-volume set a comparative analysis of the phenomenon that is both multidimensional and multidisciplinary. Gathering a wide range of influential scholars who have worked at length in the field of extremism studies from different perspectives, backgrounds, and geographical settings, the Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism presents an array of thought-provoking and innovative as well as informative analyses and discussions—both historical and contemporary—about the phenomenon of left-wing extremism and how researchers conceive of and approach it in their study. The handbook is designed to be, for the foreseeable future, the reference work for all students, researchers, and general readers interested in achieving a comprehensive understanding of left-wing extremism in all its manifestations, subtleties, and dynamics, and both its current and its potential directions.

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Introduction José Pedro Zúquete

Extremism: History, Issues, and Challenges It has been a long time coming, for sure—this volume is in fact the first academic handbook of left-wing extremism. Neither in this century nor in the previous one has a handbook, companion, or even a reader on extremism from the left side of the political spectrum resided upon the bookshelves of college libraries or received any search results in their digital catalogs.1 With this in mind, and before addressing the specific category of left-wing extremism—and why it has been somewhat neglected as a field of research, at least compared with other varieties of the phenomenon—let us first delve into the term “extremism”—starting with its history and continuing with its far from consensual conceptual definition as well as related debates. A brief glimpse at the history of the term shows that its popular usage— both in English and in other languages—began roughly with the twentieth century and the advent of revolutionary times in Russia.2 For example, in a 1916 letter to the Dutch communist poet Henriette Roland Holst, Leon Trotsky, not yet in the Bolshevik camp, noted that “Russian extremism is the product of an amorphous and backward social milieu,” adding “where the initial historical movement of the proletariat naturally requires a simplification and vulgarization of theory and politics.”3 Across the Atlantic a couple of years later, Theodore Roosevelt warned his readers at the Kansas City Star not to “follow the wild-eyed extremists of radicalism or the dull-eyed extremists of reaction,” because “either set of extremists will wreck the Nation just as certainly as the other.”4 In the late 1920s, the Portuguese writer Fernando Pessoa reflected on the “extremists (of the right or the left)” in the party system and noted that “individuals with criminal instincts naturally converge towards these parties, and towards the doctrines they defend, because these parties and these doctrines instinctively support them and feed their bad instincts.”5

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In these early examples, two traditions that will become consistently linked to the terms extremism and extremist have already begun to emerge. The first is the pejorative tradition—extremism is a derogatory, disparaging term. As a consequence, extremist is rarely a self-designation; it is almost always “the other”—whether an individual or a group—accused of being unreasonable, unacceptable, and unsuitable. The second, inextricably bound to the first, is the middle-of-the-road tradition. According to it, the middle way is the one-and-only path; it is the reasonable, acceptable, and suitable way of doing politics and intervening in human affairs at large. Opposed to the politics of extremism stands then the politics of moderation—the politics of the center. As noted by scholars of extremism,6 the lineage of this last tradition in political thought is ancient. “There are many advantages for those who adopt a middle course; that’s the course I want in the city,” is one of the few words of wisdom of the Greek poet Phocylides that has not been lost to time. Phocylides was duly quoted in Aristotle’s Politics, where he emphasized the middle path of moderation as the condition for a virtuous and legitimate form of government. The extremes, according to Aristotle, led to illegitimate rulers, a way of thinking that has remained prevalent in Western culture.7 In fact, the search for middle way politics only intensified in modern times—especially after the French Revolution and the looming threat of popular upheaval— with the concept of the Juste milieu (or “happy medium”) that was exalted by rulers and statesmen as the bulwark against revolutionary extremism. As noted by the Prussian politician and historian Friedrich Ancillon, the key for any sound government was to strike the right balance, or “the mediation between extremes.”8 The history of extremism—and of any attempt to define it—is therefore intertwined with the history of political moderation—with the pursuit of the golden mean. Thus, as scholars have pointed out, there is an inherent relativism to the term. Not only does the phenomenon referred to by the word extremism need to be understood in a diachronic context, as it is shaped and reshaped as society changes. But extremism also demands a “center” to give it meaning, fluctuating according to the prevailing currents of opinion, either of the elites or of the general public, but not necessarily both.9 Adding another layer to the discussion, if extremism is constructed, this also means that it is not a neutral designation but also serves as a “rhetorical device” of specific actors, with specific agendas, at a specific point in time.10 In this case, it is possible that extremism is a gatekeeping word—a way of offsetting and disqualifying any perceived threats to the status quo.11 The image of the political spectrum as shaped in the form of a horseshoe12 —in which the extreme left and the extreme left approach one another in their opposition to the virtuous midpoint—derives from the middle-of-the road tradition. However, and to further complicate the study of extremism, the hypothesis that extremism is not exclusive to the margins but pervades the political spectrum including the center may also be taken seriously. This “extremism of the center” may take a variety of forms, not least the way that

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so-called centrists can be so hell-bent on their own vision of the “good society” or on the preservation of their own self-interests, that they may become extremists themselves, whether in their exclusion of any alternative views or in the persecution of individuals or rival groups that they label extremists.13 No wonder, then, that the author of a recent volume on the “objective study of extremism” holds as a “crucial truth” that “extremism is rarely simple.”14 One can say that if there is a consensus on what constitutes extremism, it is that there is no consensus on a settled definition of extremism.15 However, this elusive and context-dependent nature of the term—which is often acknowledged in its study—has not stopped the scholarly quest to offer a definition of extremism, and even to identify and catalog the phenomenon’s major characteristics. There have been three major approaches to the scientific study of extremism. The first major approach—and the one most-commonly followed in political sociology—focuses upon the ideology of extremism and extremism in the field of politics. The early 1970s volume by American academics Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason— which opens with a chapter titled “Political Extremism”—has cast a long shadow over this stream of research. Lipset and Raab basically argue that at the heart of extremism is “monism”—a term they took from its philosophical origin—to indicate a kind of thought in which everything emanates from One simple truth. A monistic impulse is pluralism’s nemesis, driven as it is toward the “repression of difference and dissent, the closing down of the market place of ideas.” The monism of political extremism, as alleged by Lipset and Raab, is motivated by a simplistic, dualistic (light against darkness), and conspiratorial spirit that drives a dagger through the heart of pluralist democracy.16 It has become common in political research to brand extremism as the antithesis of democracy; this categorization can be done in myriad ways,17 and with many specificities and characteristics. This category always implies a broad monistic push for power concentration, whether in the system of government or in the marketplace of ideas.18 The second major approach to extremism is largely grounded in social psychology. This approach can be applied in many ways, focusing not only on political extremism but on all kinds of extremisms.19 In broad terms, this approach primarily treats extremism not as an ideology but as a mindset; instead of doctrine and beliefs, the focus of this approach tends to be more on emotions as well as on individual and group psychological strategies and mechanisms. Studies have focused on the role played by hostile emotions such as fear and anger—and resulting hostility—as well as humiliation, resentment, or emotional over-involvement, as constitutive of an extremist state of mind.20 Another field of research deals with theories of uncertainty—in face of ambiguity and unease about life or societal issues, individuals may be predisposed to identify with groups that provide definitive and absolute answers, as well as rigid boundaries between “us” and “them,” thereby offering a feeling of certainty that amplifies the attractiveness of extremist groups.21 “Extremism is a psychological state, where a person aligns their identity with a group

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that is absolute in their moral agenda,” writes the editor of a volume on The Psychology of Extremism.22 This focus on a shared identity based on attributes such as class, nationality, ethnicity, religion, or others, is also at the basis of a recent study that defines extremism as the belief that the success or survival of an in-group is dependent from the need for hostile action against an outgroup—even if, as pointed out by some critics, one accepts that in-group favoritism or bias is hardwired into human psychology, to describe extremism in such a way risks blurring its meaning and contours.23 When both of these approaches are taken into account, the emerging picture is that individuals or groups labeled as extremist are anti-establishment, seek radical change, and are emotionally driven by a sense of mission that they see—and feel—as the struggle of good against evil. In their righteousness—as people who believe “in the inevitable and absolute” as described by the novelist Dana Spiotta in Eat the Document —extremist individuals and groups are naturally driven toward action against the source of the putative evil. As stated by a character from the novel, “I had to do something. I had to put myself at risk, personally. I had to meet the enormity of what they were doing with something equal to it.”24 The question arises about what action entails, and formulating a response to this is the goal of the third approach to extremism, which is common in security and terrorism studies, and is more focused on behavior and on the methods of action and resulting violence.25 For the most part, such analysts see ideas and attitudes in an instrumentalist way: they serve as a springboard for action and a predictor of future acts of a violent extremism that constitutes yet can also eclipse/exceed terrorism. Therefore, the cognitive and behavioral dimensions exist in a continuum—and this is the basis of the analytical paradigm of radicalization, or the making of a violent extremist and potential terrorist. This theoretical approach—central to counter-terrorism—has been challenged by the emerging subfield of the study of non-violent extremism, which puts at the center of analysis individuals or groups that may be anti-establishment, hold extreme ideas, and seek radical change, but do not espouse violent methods. Vocal extremism is not necessarily—or automatically—the first step upon the path to violent extremism.26 In any case, it is safest to say—as argued by some scholars of extremism—that violence is not a necessary condition for extremism.27 Suffice it to say, these three approaches to extremism—ideological, psychological, and behavioral— interrelate, and even if one of the approaches is favored by a scholar, they tend to complement each other.

Extremism from the Left Research interest in extremism has been uneven—individuals, groups, parties, and subcultures associated with religious (especially Islamic) and rightwing extremism have triggered substantially more interest from journalists, academics, and policymakers than left-wing extremism has. The number of mainstream media investigations and exposés, watchdog reports, and academic

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papers and monographs on the phenomenon pale in comparison with those on other types of extremism. This is especially evident in Europe and the American continent—to be sure, there are other regional and national contexts, often tied with separatist causes, such as in the Indian Subcontinent, where left-wing extremists are often on the media and academic radar. A look at history helps to account, at least in part, for this disparity. Compared to the last decades of the twentieth century—especially to the period between the 1960s and early 1990s, when left-wing political violence of an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist variety, both in the West and in the developing world, was rampant, in what was dubbed a “third wave” of terrorism—the threat and lethality of left-wing armed resistance faded away. This fact—the quasi-absence, especially in Western democracies, of abductions, bank robberies, hijackings, bombing and murder campaigns—helps to explain the limited attention from researchers and practitioners from the turn of the century to the present day. The widespread sentiment is that it is not as burning a topic as it once was. This perception may have helped generate, since the turn of the century, a significant blind spot to other instances of left-wing extremism: intimate knowledge of left-wing extremist milieus, their internal dynamics, discourses and drivers of radicalization, and also its violent manifestations. These manifestations can range from violence at protests, harassment, threats and intimidation of rivals, politicians and journalists to physical attacks on the putative enemies of their cause. As noted by the authors of a recent report on militant anti-fascism, for a security research center, “scholarly understanding of this violent form of extremism is still lacking,” and “as neglected actors, militant anti-fascists have been left in the academic cold.”28 Further, the lesser threat paradigm of left-wing extremism may also be connected to the historical trauma of fascism and Nazism and the way in which their legacies are portrayed in collective memory as the most destructive threat to the stability of liberal democracies. This production of a collective memory in which rightwing extremism is the ultimate, dangerous “Other” facilitates the perception of left-wing extremism as the default lesser evil. At the same time, there is the idea that the self-designated values of leftwing extremism—for example, anti-discrimination, anti-racism, anti-fascism— are more attuned to the values of the wider society than those of other types of extremism—they do not clash with the center of society but are a radicalization of its primordial values. This not only reinforces the soft-pedaling of left-wing extremist manifestations—which may not even be perceived as extremist by researchers—but also justifies for practitioners the lessening of its position in the hierarchy of democratic and security threats.29 Finally, this asymmetry between interest and research on left-wing extremism and other sorts of extremism may be justifiable in theory given the fact that—in terms of political violence—the data show that left-wing groups and networks have been comparatively less lethal than right-wing and Islamist groups.30 This latter fact must not be taken on its own as constituting a sufficient reason

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for disregarding left-wing extremism as a subject of study, at least not to the extent that it has been disregarded. Many other non-violent dimensions of the phenomenon remain unexplored—for example, vocal extremism and its consequences on the public sphere. Also, a new wave of political violence, as in the past, may remerge. In fact, it can be argued that, at least in some Western European countries, as well as in North America, this variety of extremism is intensifying, not only in regard to a monistic impulse by some groups to shut down pluralism but also in terms of violence itself against political adversaries and enemies. Since the 2010s, a dissident strain of scholarship has challenged the dominant orientation in the study of extremism. This dissident strain is best encapsulated by the call from the German scholar Eckhard Jesse that, for the sake of academic integrity, “we need an anti-extremist consensus,” tout court, instead of a selective one, loaded with double-standards, in which demonization is a one-way street.31 Another German, the political scientist Klaus Schroeder—who co-authored a history of left-wing political violence32 —says that its downplaying “It’s a phenomenon I’ve been observing for years. Many believe that it is about a good cause and that when the boys go overboard again, you have to turn a blind eye. If that came from the right it would never be accepted.”33 Another critical voice has been Pierre-André Taguieff who has written extensively about the phenomenon of extremism in France and acknowledges the inequality of treatment between the extremes. “Leftwing extremism is often perceived as tolerable, even deemed sympathetic (the ‘intentions’ of far-left activists being presumed to be good, even among thugs and terrorists),” he notes. By contrast, “right-wing extremism is hateful and condemnable in all cases, never benefiting from mitigating circumstances or attempts at understanding or contextualization.”34 Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go in the process of filling the gaps in the knowledge of left-wing extremism. It will take time—and maybe a new generation of scholars. There are reasons for this caveat. For a start, there is a reluctance to accept “extremism” as a valid analytical key to unlocking an understanding of a variety of discourses and other political activities coming from the left. As pointed out by an academic to justify his refusal to contribute to this volume, “If the title of the book or its organizing intellectual principle is ‘Left-wing Extremism’, then I’m not interested. Extremism is a pejorative term and gives the project an ideological orientation that undermines understanding the subject in its own terms.” This reasoning would hardly be applied to any other type of extremism. Further, for many scholars, studying the left in its extremist manifestations runs the risk, whether explicitly or implicitly, of accepting a moral or political equivalence between left-wing and right-wing extremisms. The fact that the extreme-left claims an ideological foundation based on a humanist and universalist vision of society—that is, at the antipodes of the particularism of the extreme-right—plays a role in this refusal. This is regardless of the fact that, in practice, the situation is more complex. Not

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only is this humanism often denied to those perceived as enemies35 ; empirical research also illumines both a “common ground” and a set of shared psychological and ideological structural characteristics in the extremist mindset regardless of the political bent.36 Contrary to work on right-wing extremism, most scholarly work on left-wing extremism as such has been done not by researchers at universities—certainly not in the social sciences—but by law enforcement agencies, intelligence assessments, and think tanks. There is, however, a new stream of academic research emerging that often brings up two fundamental challenges to the research: first, the lack of literature and empirical studies from which to build on their work, and, second, the greater difficulty—compared to other types of extremism—in defining and delimiting the object of study. This later aspect complicates the ideological approach to left-wing extremism—there is no clean, “concise” definition of it.37 It is true that left-wing extremism has traditionally been associated with two major strands: communism and anarchism—with sub-varieties in between. It is also true that, if we take their advocates at their word, the communist and anarchist variants of left-wing extremism are driven by an extreme egalitarianism that, when enforced upon sociopolitical realities, clashes with established liberties, institutions, and the constitutional order.38 Marxism and anarchism, in the post-Cold War, remain two paramount frames of reference. However, present-day left-wing extremism does not seem steered so much by a structured ideology—at least not to the same extent as in the past. Rather, it is driven by a diversity of issues and causes, often fought for simultaneously39 —broadly under a tent that includes anti-fascism/ human rights/environment and animal themes40 —which may be taken upon by justice-seekers, thrill-seekers, or both. Moreover, present-day left-wing extremism at least seems always to be intentionally oriented—and here we get close to an objective meaning of left-wing extremism—toward taking down oppressive powers, seeking radical change, and ushering in a new society as envisioned, exclusively, by their own community of believers. These goals are frequently articulated in more or less diffuse communist or anarchist shades, and either as a collective or as an individual emancipation here on earth. There is also a further testament to the centrality of praxis in left-wing extremism and not merely a static attachment to an ideology: left-wing extremism must also be understood in dynamic relationship with different forms of extremism, particularly coming from the right, in what has been characterized as cumulative extremism.41 These feeding dynamics, in which actions set off further reactions, often intensified by interactions in the digital environment, are characterized not only by extreme narratives (vocal extremism) but also extreme forms of action—from violence and counter-violence at protests to the physical targeting of each side’s chief enemies.42

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The Volume’s Setup and layout The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism brings in more than thirty political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, criminologists, and historians who give a comprehensive view of the phenomenon of left-wing extremism— conceptually and empirically, with coverage of historical cases as well as contemporaneous trends and topics. These two volumes reflect the diverse and wide range of cases and themes that characterize left-wing extremism. At the beginning of each chapter authors address, some briefly and others in greater detail, the concept of leftwing extremism and at the end lay out prospective scenarios for the specific subjected analyzed. Many other themes and research areas could obviously have been added to the volume; it is the editor’s hope that this handbook will serve to encourage other researchers to navigate left-wing extremism and contribute their own insights to the evolving literature. The handbook consists of three main sections. The first segment focuses on the theory and practice of left-wing extremism, and addresses conceptual and empirical issues. “Nobody will ever have the final word on an essentially contested concept,” writes Uwe Backes on the first chapter about the conceptual dimension of left-wing extremism. After offering his own conceptualization of the term, Backes suggests a “balancing act” in the study of the subject between understanding left-wing extremism as a self-concept— —how its advocates conceive of it—and analyzing it in conjunction with other categories, such as democratic theory, in order to avert the risk of misunderstanding or trivializing it. In Chapter Two, Garth Davies and Vanja Zdjelar map out the evolution of left-wing extremism through its changes and adaptations in order to give a better grasp of its current incarnations and to conjecture future developments. Katharina Krüsselmann and Daan Weggemans survey the individual pathways, and the impact had upon them by the sociopolitical context, that lead to non-violent activism or left-wing radicalization—which other scholars, as pointed out earlier, categorize as non-violent extremism. Irina Jugl and Daniel Koehler give an overview of women’s involvement in left-wing extremism, identify the determinant factors for engagement, and—through an analysis of empirical cases—indicate that female agency should not be underestimated in research. Philip Gray then assesses the concept of vanguardism, spotlights its epistemology and influence on left-wing extremist ideologies and organizations, and suggests that rather than a dead weight from a bygone era, the concept plays a role today with the mainstreaming of forms of vanguardist thinking. Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca delves into the issue of the role played globally by revolutionary violence in left-wing extremism—from clandestine groups to open insurgencies—and proposes that even though it has subsided today, it may be reenergized in the near future. Josh Vandiver’s chapter explores a phenomenon connected with both vanguardism and violence, exploring contemporary theorizations of strategy and war against the global order and showing how the

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concept of a decentralized, transnational left-wing revolutionary warfare lives on in the work of vanguardist political philosophers. The last two chapters of this segment plunge into the empirical analysis of left-wing extremism and explore the operationalization of the concept. For Sebastian Jungkunz, the measurement of left-wing extremist attitudes—and the development of research tools to capture and measure them—is crucial, especially regarding “latent” or implicit extremist attitudes within the population. Arjie Antinori, in his chapter, expands on the theme of research techniques applied to the study of left-wing extremism, and illumines the potential benefits of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research tools in supporting this study. The second section looks at manifestations of left-wing extremism both in specific country and regional case studies, and beyond borders. Focusing on Germany, Eckhard Jesse sees left-wing extremism as one of the major challenges to its democratic order and traces its development in political parties, violent direct action groups, and the intellectual sphere as well as in attitudinal values in the wider population. Isabelle Sommier, writing about France, emphasizes the new nature of French left-wing extremism—which is less attached to orthodox ideologies as in the past, more decentralized and fluid in terms of organization, and fundamentally action-based; as in Germany, dynamics of reciprocal radicalization (between the extremes) seem to be under way. Assessing the extreme-left spectrum in the United Kingdom—political parties, affiliated groups, and inorganic direct action subcultures—Luke March argues that left extremism has had a limited sociopolitical impact there, even though a new window of opportunity may emerge in the future. Unlike the UK, Greece has a long history of left-wing and anarchist extremist violence, and Lamprini Rori and Vasiliki Georgiadou outline its evolution and changes, from the first generation of Marxist-Leninist organized violence to the current more fluid, doctrinally flexible, and decentralized Greek anarchist and nihilistic milieu of violent actors. In Spain, Carles Viñas analyzes how since the regime change in the 1970s, the extreme left has shifted its axis from MarxistLeninist Parties to new actors with a wider range of causes, often coming from the milieu of social movements and anti-globalization. Viñas suggests that the failure of the institutional-political experience of the populist left may precipitate the further radicalization of the Spanish extremist, anti-system left. Like Greece, Italy has a long history of left-wing extremism, and in his chapter, Francesco Marone traces its origins from the “Years of the Lead”— where Marxist-Leninist groups played a central role—to the present day where autonomist groups and insurrectionary anarchists play first fiddle. Next, looking at Scandinavia, and particularly to the empirical cases of Denmark and Sweden, Jan Jämte, Måns Lundstedt, and Magnus Wennerhag—who refrain from using the word extremism and prefer instead the word radicalism—scrutinize the non-violent and violent direct actions of activists in both countries (including violence against objects or even human beings) and note a decrease since the 2010s in favor of protests that are more conventional in terms of institutional routines and norms.

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The four subsequent chapters turn the lens to the United States. Rick Jensen examines anarchist violence—most of it propelled by the invention of dynamite in the previous century—in the first decades of the twentieth century, of which the Wall Street Bombing was its “climax.” He notes that, compared to the Propaganda by the Deed of classical anarchism, there hasn’t been any subsequent revival of anarchist terrorism. Moving on to contemporary times, George Michael looks over militant anti-fascism, vulgo Antifa: its emergence, structure, strategy and tactics, and support network. Michael ends with a reflection on the impact of Antifa, polarization, and subsequent urban unrest on America’s civil society. Examining a US national public opinion survey, George Hawley reassesses the assumption that those on the right are more likely to support violence than their counterparts on the left. According to Hawley, data indicate that the left, instead, is more supportive of political violence than the right—“though even on the far left, support for political violence of any kind remains a minority position.” Concluding the US subsection, Jacob Zenn, using the concept of reciprocal radicalization—and how extremisms may feed off each other—explores how the triad of Charlottesville, the BLM Antifa riots, and January 6th, 2021, has served as a turning point for far-left extremism in the country. Turning the attention to the southernmost region of North America, Alberto Martín Álvarez looks at the trajectory of the revolutionary left in Central American countries—the dynamics of armed struggle and guerillas in the last decades of the twentieth century—and the later integration of revolutionary leftist individuals and movements within each country. On the South American continent, Juan Federico Pino Uribe and Andrea Marcela Cely survey the case of Colombia—which has had some of the largest leftist guerilla networks of the twentieth century—focusing on the influence and impact of Maoism on the decades-long insurgency. Martin Tanaka turns to Peru and two of its Marxist-Leninist groups, including one of the most brutal revolutionary insurgencies—the Maoist Shining Path, led by a former philosophy professor—to explore the persistence of the radical tradition that is a legacy of those movements. In Margarita López Maya and Juan Luis Sosa’s account of the Venezuelan case study, the origins of left-wing extremism—in anti-imperialist mode—can be traced back to the armed struggle period that began in the 1960s. Decades later parties, groups, and leaders of this extremist tendency entered as allies in the political coalition of the governments of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, and, the authors argue, contributed to the radicalization and autocratization of these governments. This section of the handbook then shifts to the Asia–Pacific region, starting with China. Barbara Mittler gauges how the revolutionary trope of Chairman Mao as the all-powerful and undying red sun is at the center of his sacralization and continuing influence at both an intellectual and popular level in the People’s Republic. Writing about Southeast Asia, Matthew Galway charts how the Communist Parties in several countries rose post-World War II to the forefront of anti-colonial and nationalist politics—with varying degrees of

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success. Niranjan Saho probes the conflict between Maoist insurgent groups and the Indian State—with a focus on the Naxalite Movement, its history since the late 1960s, and its evolution and future prospects. Finally, exploring the contemporary landscape of Australian left-wing extremism—from environmental groups to militant anti-fascism—Kristy Campion explains that “thus far the line dividing civil disobedience from extremist violence and terrorism has not been crossed.” From the Asia–Pacific, John LeJeune turns attention to the African continent and to specific case studies of anti-colonial movements in the Gold Coast, Guinea-Bissau, and Algeria. LeJeune investigates the ways that intellectual support for revolutionary violence, and defense of its legitimacy— of which Frantz Fanon’s work is central—boosted and shaped the strategies of liberation. The second section ends with a look beyond regions and countries and covers the whole world—with a foray into the theme of global collapse and the ways that, in the twenty-first century, it has become a master framework for a variety of groups and networks on the extreme left. José Pedro Zúquete scrutinizes the struggle against civilization—understood as the techno-industrial system, a multifaceted phenomenon that comprises groups of primitivists, environmentalists, anarchists, and other networks that operate within a shared frame of collapsism. In addition, Miroslav Mareš gives a sweeping view on eco-extremism—the debates around it, dynamics, modus operandi, apocalyptic overtones, and future perspectives. Finally, the third and final section of the handbook is dedicated to contentious issues that both are polarizing and speak to the theme of the mainstreaming of extremism—a topic prevalent in the study of rightwing extremism but that merits also being explored in regard to left-wing extremism. In different ways, these chapters cover the issue of the normalization of the extreme left—the way that fringe beliefs make their way into the mainstream and come to be seen as dominant and natural. Or to put it another way, the adoption of the language, modes of thought, and behavior of extremists by political parties, media actors, universities, and sectors of civil society at large. Eric Kaufmann traces the rise to cultural power of an outof-control ideology of an extreme and illiberal “left-modernism” at the basis of “Woke fundamentalism” and its weaponization of cancel culture to ban heretics, its threat to individual liberties, and a whole series of downstream negative sociopolitical effects. Pierre Valentin delves into the phenomenon of Wokeism, or Wokeness, comparing its expansion in the Anglosphere to other parts of the world and exploring the reasons for the somewhat dissimilar reception in Protestant and Catholic countries. The remaining two chapters are dedicated to academia. John Staddon reevaluates the statement that the “right is anti-science”—arguing instead that the relegation of science to second rank status for ideological and political reasons is much more prevalent on the left. The other chapter, on the “radicalization of academia”—with the United States as a case study—is a collective effort by Lee Jussin, Nathan Honeycutt, Akeela Careem, Danica Finkelstein, Joel Finkelstein, and Pamela

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Paresky. These authors reviewed evidence that, they argue, confirm not only such extreme-left radicalization but its link with the production of ideologically corrupt and invalid scholarship. “If little or nothing is done, the American academy is on a course to become the intellectual wing of Far Left political movements,” the authors somberly conclude, in the final chapter of a handbook that does not shy away from the hot topics of our age.

Notes 1. The only exception to this state of affairs is Cas Mudde’s edited collective 4-volume set on “Political Extremism”. One volume is dedicated to “LeftWing Extremism”. Cas Mudde. 2014. (ed.) Political Extremism, Volume III , London: Sage. 2. Backes, Uwe. 2014. “Meaning and Forms of Political Extremism in Past and Present,” in Cas Mudde (ed.) Political Extremism, Volume 1: Concepts, Theories and Responses, Los Angeles: SAGE, p. 5. 3. Cliff, Tony. 1989. Trotsky—Volume 1: Towards October 1879–1917 , London: Bookmarks. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/ebooks/cliff/trotsky_v ol1_towards_october-cliff.pdf. 4. Roosevelt, Theodore. 1918. “Good luck to the anti-Bolsheviks of Kansas,” in Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star: War-Time Editorials, 1921, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Available at: https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/ epub/67811/pg67811-images.html. 5. Pessoa, Fernando. “Podem os elementos militares, que promoveram o pronunciamento recente.” Available at: http://arquivopessoa.net/textos/4340. 6. See Backes (2014: 5–6) and Taguieff, Pierre André. 2022. Qui est l’extrémiste? Paris: Éditions Intervalles, pp. 15–17. 7. On the permanence of this Aristotelian tradition see Backes, Uwe. 2010. Political Extremes: A conceptual history from antiquity to the present, London: Routledge, pp. 25–38. 8. Caruso, Amerigo. 2019. “In Medio Stat Virtus ? The Adaptability of the Moderate Project of Politics in Mid- nineteenth-Century Europe (1830– 1870),” in The Politics of Moderation in Modern European History, edited by Ido de Haan and Matthijs Lok (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 111–115. 9. On this issue see Darren Mulloy discussion of his “alternative approach” to define extremism. Mulloy, D. J. 2004. American Extremism: History, politics, and the militia movement, London: Routledge, pp. 29–32; See also, Michael, George. 2013. Extremism in America, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. 10. Ido de Haan and Matthijs Lok (eds.). 2019. The Politics of Moderation in Modern European History, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 16. 11. On this point see, for example, Jungkunz, Sebastian. 2022. The Nature and Origins of Political Extremism in Germany and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 36–38. 12. Pels, Dick. 2000. The Intellectual as Stranger: Studies in Spokespersonship, London: Routledge, p. xv. 13. See, for instance, Backes 2014, p. 7; Also, Taguieff 2022, 17. 14. Berger, J.M. 2018. Extremism, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, p. 23.

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15. See, for example, Michael 2013 p. 2; Also, Ross, Jeffrey Ian. “Misidentified and Misunderstood,” Extremism in America, edited by George Michael, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, p. 290. 16. Lipset, Seymour Martin and Raab, Earl. 1970. The Politics of Unreason: RightWing Extremism in America 1790–1970, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, pp. 1–33. 17. For example, Jeffrey M. Bale does not equate monism with extremism but sees monism as one of the core characteristics of extremism. See Bale, Jeffrey. M. The Darkest Side of Politics, I: Post-War Fascism, Covert Operations, and Terrorism, London: Routledge, 2018, p. 167. 18. See, for example, Bobbio, Norberto. 1997. Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 21, who sees the “rejection of democracy” as a “point of contact between the ‘opposing extremes’”; see also, Mudde 2014, p. xxiv; Backes 2014, pp. 9–10; Jungkunz 2022, pp. 21, 46–48. 19. Cassam 2021, 84. 20. Cassam 2021, p. 112. 21. Michael A. Hogg, Danielle L. Blaylock. 2011. Extremism and the Psychology of Uncertainty, Wiley-Blackwell. 22. Katherine V. Aumer (ed.). 2021. The Psychology of Extremism, Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 23. Berger 2018, pp. 23–26. 24. Spiotta, Dana. 2007. Eat the Document: A Novel, London: Picador, pp. 14, 188–89. 25. Cassam see this as one type of extremism (“methods extremism). 2021, p. 65. 26. See Orofino, Elisa and Allchorn, William. 2023. “Introduction—Why Do We Need a Handbook of Non-Violent Forms of Extremism?” in Routledge Handbook of Non-Violent Extremism: Groups, Perspectives, and New Debates, edited by Elisa Orofino and William Allchorn, London: Routledge. 27. Berger writes that “not all extremist movements begin and end with violence,” 2018, p. 47; Jungkunz says, “ we conclude that violent behavior can be a manifestation of political extremism, but it is not a necessary condition for it,” 2022, p. 23; George Michael, writing on the link between extremism and terrorism notes, “While it is axiomatic to say that terrorism is usually perpetrated by extremists, the vast majority of extremists are not terrorists,” in Michael, George. 2003. Confronting right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA, London: Routledge, p. 2. 28. Copsey, Nigel and Merrill, Samuel. 2021. Understanding 21st-CenturyMilitant Anti-Fascism, Full Report, April, CREST: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, p. 8. 29. See Ellefsen, Rune and Jamte, Jan. 2021. “Violent extremism is not a uniform phenomenon: The key differences in prevention of left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremism,” January 8. Available at: http://www.diva-portal.org/ smash/get/diva2:1515490/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 30. Jasko, Katarzyna, LaFree, Gary, Piazza, James and Becker, M.H. 2022. “A comparison of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and the world,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119 (30), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2122593119.

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31. Jesse, Eckhard. 2018. “Extremismus: Warum wir linke Gewalt milder bewerten als rechte Gewalt,” Der Tagesspiegel, September 20, available at: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/warum-wir-linke-gewalt-milderbewerten-als-rechte-gewalt-5532439.html. 32. Schroeder, Klaus, Deutz-Schroeder, Monika. 2019. Der Kampf ist nicht zu Ende: Geschichte und Aktualität linker Gewalt, Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder. 33. Schroeder, Klaus. 2021. “Increase in violent left-wing extremism,” April 30, available at: https://gettotext.com/researcher-klaus-schroeder-increase-in-vio lent-left-wing-extremism/. 34. Pierre-André Taguieff. 2022. “L’extrémisme: représentation et anathema,” Cités 4 (N° 92), pp. 127–140. He sees this as the result of the “heritage still present in the political imagination: the supposed heirs of communism remain less unacceptable than those of fascism.” See also, Taguieff 2022, p. 61. 35. As argued by Bale, about left-wing extremists, “In short, one can be a fanatically intolerant, self-righteous anti-authoritarian ideological extremist, just as one can be a fanatically intolerant, self-righteous authoritarian or totalitarian ideological extremist.” See Bale, 2018, p. 170. 36. See, for example, Jungkunz 2022, pp. 45–49; Also Taguieff 2022, pp. 96–97. 37. Jungkunz 2022, p. 27. 38. Backes 2014, p. 12. 39. See, for example, Farinelli, Francesco and Marinone, Lorenzo. 2021. Contemporary Violent Left-wing and Anarchist Extremism (VLWAE) in the EU , RAN, Luxembourg: EU, pp. 12–13. 40. See, for example, the study by Tom van Ham et al. on left-wing extremism in the Netherlands. Van Ham, Tom, Hardeman, Manon, van Esseveldt, Juno, Lenders, Anouk and Anton van Wijk. 2018. A View on Left-Wing Extremism: An exploratory study into left-wing extremist groups in the Netherlands, Available at: https://www.bureaubeke.nl/doc/2018/Summary_A_view_on_left_wing_e xtremism.pdf. 41. Eatwell, Roger. 2006. “Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain,” The Political Quarterly 77, 2, pp. 204–216. 42. Busher, J. and Macklin, G. 2015. “Interpreting “cumulative extremism”: six proposals for enhancing conceptual clarity.” Terrorism and Political Violence, volume 27 (5), pp. 3–4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.870556; for an example from Denmark see Larsen, Chris Holmsted. 2020. “ Partners in crime? A historical perspective on cumulative extremism in Denmark,” available at: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2020/ partners-in-crime.html.

Contents

Part I Conceptual/Empirical Issues 1

Left-Wing Extremism: The Conceptual Dimension Uwe Backes

3

2

The Evolution of Left-Wing Extremism in the West Garth Davies and Vanja Zdjelar

23

3

Radicalization and Left-Wing Extremism Katharina Krüsselmann and Daan Weggemans

55

4

Women in Left-Wing Extremism Irina Jugl and Daniel Koehler

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5

Vanguardism and Leftwing Extremism Phillip W. Gray

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6

Left-Wing Extremism and Violence Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca

7

Guerrilla and Cognitive Warfare in Transnational Left-wing Extremism Josh Vandiver

8

The Measurement of Left-Wing Extremist Attitudes Sebastian Jungkunz

9

Online Research Techniques and Methodologies in the Study of Left-Wing Extremism Arije Antinori

105

121 141

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CONTENTS

Part II Manifestations of Left-Wing Extremism 10

Left-Wing Extremism in Germany Eckhard Jesse

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11

France Isabelle Sommier

193

12

Left-Wing Extremism in the UK: The Struggle for Relevance Luke March

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13

Far Left Organized Violence in Greece: The Second Generation Lamprini Rori and Vasiliki Georgiadou

223

14

Contemporary Left-Wing Extremism and Violence in Spain Carles Viñas

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15

Left-Wing and Anarchist Extremism in Italy Francesco Marone

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16

Radical Left Movements in Scandinavia, 1980–2020: Straddling Militant Counterculture and Popular Movements Jan Jämte, Måns Lundstedt, and Magnus Wennerhag

Index

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305

Editor and Contributors

About the Editor José Pedro Zúquete is Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Lisbon, Portugal. He is a political scientist whose research focuses mainly on comparative politics, social movements, and extremism. His previous books include The Identitarians: The Movement Against Globalism and Islam (paperback edition, Notre Dame University Press, 2021).

Contributors Arije Antinori holds a Ph.D. in Criminology for Investigation and Security and Ph.D. in Communication and Media Studies, and is a professor of Criminology and Sociology of Deviance at Sapienza University of Rome. Some of his publications are Terrorism in the Early Onlife Age: From Propaganda to ‘Propulsion’ in Terrorism and advanced technologies in psychological warfare: New risks, new opportunities to counter the terrorist threat (Nova Science Publications, 2020) and The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the impact on the extreme-right infosphere. Strategic communication challenges for EU Member States RAN Policy Support ad hoc strategic paper (European Union, 2022). Uwe Backes is a deputy director at the Hannah Arendt Institute on Totalitarianism Research and teaches Political Science at the University of Dresden, Germany. His research focuses on the history and present of extremism and autocracy. He is an editor of the Yearbook “Extremismus & Demokratie” (Baden-Baden: Nomos, vol. 34, 2012). (Latest monograph: Autokratien, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2022.) Garth Davies is the Associate Director of the Institute on Violence, Extremism and Terrorism at Simon Fraser University. Because he has a short attention span, he is currently interested in anything related to violent extremism. His article “A Witch’s Brew of Grievances: The Potential Effects of xxv

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EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

COVID-19 on Radicalization to Violent Extremism” was published in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vasiliki Georgiadou is Professor at the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences of Athens and Director of the Centre for Political Research. Her research interests focus on far-right parties, political radicalism, and violent extremism. She has co-edited the special section “Aspects of Political Violence in Greece” (Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 40/1, 2022) and published on non-state violence, far-right vote, and extremist organizations. Phillip W. Gray is a scholar of extremism and totalitarianism, and taught at Texas A&M University at Qatar, the United States Coast Guard Academy, and various universities in Hong Kong. He primarily focuses on the interaction between ideational and organizational structures in extremist movements and parties. His most recent book is Vanguardism: Ideology and Organization in Totalitarian Politics (Routledge, 2020). Jan Jämte is an associate professor in Political Science at the School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences at Örebro University in Sweden. His research focuses on social movements, political activism, and the interplay between movements and institutionalized politics. He has written extensively on the radical left and the anti-racist and anti-fascist movements, as well as on policies and practices to “prevent radicalization and violent extremism.” Eckhard Jesse studied Political Science at the FU Berlin, was a research assistant at the University of Trier, and Professor at the Technical University of Chemnitz. His main areas of focus are: extremism and totalitarianism, parties and elections, historical foundations of politics. Most recently, he is co-editor of: Yearbook Extremism & Democracy, Vol. 34, Baden-Baden 2022. Irina Jugl is a forensic psychologist and a researcher at the Competence Center Against Extremism in Baden-Wuerttemberg at the State Bureau for Criminal Investigation in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Her fields of study include the prevention of crime and violent extremist radicalization with a focus on left-wing extremism. Sebastian Jungkunz is a post-doctoral researcher at the Chair of Political Sociology at the University of Bamberg, Germany. His research focuses on (youth) political participation, populism, and political extremism. He published his work, among others, in the European Journal of Political Research, Political Research Quarterly, and West European Politics. His latest book The Nature and Origins of Political Extremism in Germany and Beyond was recently published by Palgrave. Daniel Koehler is a researcher at the Competence Center Against Extremism in Baden-Wuerttemberg at the State Bureau for Criminal Investigation in Baden-Wuerttemberg. His work focuses on terrorism (far-right, jihadist, and left-wing), radicalization, and deradicalization processes and programs.

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He is the Editor in Chief of the peer reviewed Journal on Deradicalization and member of the Editorial Board of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague (ICCT). He is also a research fellow at the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (PERIL) at the American University in Washington, DC and at the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) in the United Kingdom. His most recent publication is From Traitor to Zealot: Exploring the Phenomenon of Side-Switching in Extremism and Terrorism with Cambridge University Press (November 2021). Katharina Krüsselmann is Ph.D. Researcher at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. Her research centers around different types of violence, including firearm violence in Europe. She also been involved in projects focusing on radicalization, including intergenerational radicalization. Måns Lundstedt is a project researcher at the Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Malmö University, Sweden. He holds a Ph.D. in sociology and political science from the Department of Political and Social Sciences at Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence, Italy. His research concerns political violence, migration, and local political processes. Luke March is Professor of Post-Soviet and Comparative Politics at the University of Edinburgh. His research interests include the politics of the European (radical) Left, Russian domestic and foreign politics, nationalism, populism, radicalism, and extremism in Europe and the former Soviet Union. His books include The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia (2002), Radical Left Parties in Europe (2011), and Europe’s Radical Left. From Marginality to the Mainstream? (edited with Daniel Keith, 2016). His latest publication (edited, with Fabien Escalona and Daniel Keith) is The Palgrave Handbook of Radical Left Parties in Europe (2023). Francesco Marone is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Teramo, Italy. He is also a fellow of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, USA, an associate fellow of the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), The Hague, The Netherlands, and an associate research fellow of ISPI—Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Italy. His current research interests include violent extremism, political violence, and contemporary security threats. Lamprini Rori is Assistant Professor in Political Analysis at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, member of the ECPR steering committee on Political Violence, and Press Relations officer of the PSA Greek Politics Specialist Group. She has previously been Lecturer in Politics at Exeter University, Jean Monnet Fellow at the EUI, Early Career Fellow at the British School at Athens, Post-Doctoral Fellow at Oxford University, and Marie Curie Fellow at Bournemouth. She is a comparativist, specializing on party change, the far right and far left in Europe, and political violence. She has co-edited the special section “Political Violence in Greece.” Her latest publication “Political

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Violence in Crisis-Ridden Greece: Evidence from the Far Right and the Far Left” appears in the Journal of Modern Greek Studies. Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca is Professor of Political Science at Carlos III University of Madrid. His main research area is political violence. He has published articles on conflict and terrorism in journals such as Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Terrorism and Political Violence, and several others. His last book is The Historical Roots of Political Violence. Revolutionary Terrorism in Affluent Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2019). Isabelle Sommier is Full Professor of Sociology in the Department of Political Science at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Researcher at the European Centre for Sociology and Political Science of which she is deputy director. Specialist in social movements and political violence, she has recently published Violences politiques en France de 1986 à nos jours, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2021. Carles Viñas is Assistant Professor in Contemporary History in the Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Barcelona (UB) and member of the Expert Network of the International Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence of the C-REX (University of Oslo) and of the ECPR. Her research interests focus on far-right, political and sport extremism, terrorism, and social movements. She has coordinated Història de l’Esquerra Independentista (2021). Josh Vandiver is an assistant professor of Political Science and the Director of European Studies at Ball State University. His research interests include extremist thought, organizations, and strategic cultures in Europe and the USA, with focus upon men and masculinities. Among his recent publications, “‘Apollo Has Saved Us!’ Global Ambition and Metapolitical Warfare in Alt-Right Religion” appears in the Journal for the Study of Radicalism. Daan Weggemans is Director of Security Studies at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. His research focuses on contemporary security and terrorism. Her recent publications discuss the reintegration and rehabilitation of terrorists, the role of family members in radicalization processes, and the use of digital technologies in the field of security. Magnus Wennerhag is Professor in Sociology at the School of Social Sciences, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden. His research focuses on social movements, political participation, social stratification, climate protests, political violence, and sociological theory. His most recent publication is “Social class and environmental movements” (co-authored with Anders Hylmö), in Maria Grasso & Marco Giugni (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Environmental Movements (2022). Vanja Zdjelar is a Ph.D. student in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University and a recipient of a Doctoral Canada Graduate Scholarship. Her

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research interests include modern left- and right-wing extremism, misogynist extremism, and countering violent extremism. Her most recent publication, “Let’s not put a label on it: right-wing terrorism in the news,” was published in Critical Studies of Terrorism.

Abbreviations

17N AS EA EED ELA K12F KP LED LT MA OLA PAD PTA SE SPF

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (Επαναστατική Οργάνωση 17 Νοέμβρη) Deviant Behaviors for the Diffusion of Revolutionary Terrorism (Αποκλίνουσες Συμπεριφορές για τη Διάδοση του Επαναστατικού Τερορισμού) Revolutionary Struggle (Επαναστατικός Αγώνας) Armed Revolutionary Action (Ένοπλη Επαναστατική Δράση) Revolutionary Popular Struggle (Επαναστατικός Λαϊκός Αγώνας) Movement of 12 February (Κίνημα 12 Φλεβάρη) Circles of Delinquents (Κύκλοι Παραβατικών) Popular Revolutionary Action (Λαϊκή Επαναστατική Δράση) Popular Will (Λαϊκή Θέληση) Zero Tolerance (Μηδενική Ανοχή) Group of Popular Fighters (Ομάδα Λαϊκών Αγωνιστών) Cell of Guerrilla Action (Πηρήνας Αντάρτικης Δράσης) Class Solidarity Initiative (Πρωτοβουλία Ταξικής Αλληλεγγύης) Sect of Revolutionaries (Σέχτα Επαναστατών) Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (Συνωμοσία Πυρήνων της Φωτιάς)

xxxi

List of Figures

Fig. 8.1

Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3

Fig. 8.4

Fig. 13.1

Mean values of support for socialism by left-right self-placement and vote choice (2019). Results are based on data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). Reported are mean values of voters on both variables with 95% confidence intervals. The shaded area displays the mean values of socialism by values of the left-right scale with 95% confidence intervals for mean values of socialism. Socialism: “Socialism is a good idea which has just been poorly implemented in the past”. 0 indicates low support for socialism and strong left-wing placement, 1 refers to strong support for socialism and strong right-wing placement Conceptual measurement of left-wing extremist attitudes Distributions of left-wing extremist attitudes by aggregation method. Results based on own data (NDE =2.117, NGB =2.039, NNL =2.045). Shown are histograms with percentages of respondents by degree of left-wing extremist attitudes for different methods of aggregation. Higher values indicate stronger left-wing extremist attitudes. Numbers in the plot area refer to the share of respondents that on average at least “agreed” with all items Share of respondents with left-wing extremist worldview in Germany (1994–2019). Results for east and west Germany are based on data from six studies (Falter et al. 2012; GLES 2015, 2016, 2019, 2021; Heitmeyer et al. 2013; Neu 2009; Rattinger 2012; Stöss 2007). The items are highly similar across years and the aggregation is based on the multiplication method. For more information see Jungkunz (2022). The line for Schroeder and Deutz-Schroeder refers to individual studies that were summarized in their book and that tried to capture left-wing extremist attitudes or closely related concepts Far left organized violent attacks, 2003–2019 (Source PVGR and authors’ calculations)

144 145

149

151 232 xxxiii

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 13.2 Fig. 13.3 Fig. 13.4 Fig. 13.5 Fig. 16.1

Kinds of far left organized violent targets (Source PVGR and authors’ calculations) Means of far left organized violent attacks (Source PVGR and authors’ calculations) Far left organized violent means of attack, 2003–2019 (Source Authors’ calculations) Ten most active far left violent organizations, 2003–2019 (Source Authors’ calculations) Number of RLLM protest events per year in Denmark (1998–2015) and Sweden (1997–2016)

234 234 235 236 285

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table

1.1 8.1 8.2 10.1

Table 12.1 Table 16.1

Indicators for determining the extent of extremist tendencies Overview of question wording Correlations between indices Election results of the PDS and the party Die Linke in the federal elections since 1990 (in percent) ELPs in the latest UK general elections RLLM protest issues in Denmark (1998–2015) and Sweden (1997–2016)

15 146 150 184 210 285

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PART I

Conceptual/Empirical Issues

CHAPTER 1

Left-Wing Extremism: The Conceptual Dimension Uwe Backes

Introduction This essay is not intended as a contribution to the ‘war of words’ (Mudde 1996), but as a guide through the maze of terms. Hence, I will first provide a rough outline of the discussions around the concept of left-wing extremism (alternatively referred to as left-wing radicalism or left-wing populism), a concept that has been vigorously debated since about the middle of the twentieth century. I will then present a proposal on how to conceptualise the term—not to exclude alternative terminology, but to offer a more consistent option and to make the choice of terminology with all its conceptual consequences as transparent as possible. Ultimately, the choice of terminology will always depend on the respective issues and research approaches. It would be an illusion to think that a consensus can be reached within the extremely heterogeneous international scientific landscape. However, studies that investigate the conditions for the development and success of ‘radical left’ groups without focusing on the relationship to democracy or the threat to democracy will also benefit from the analytical categories that result from normative research into extremism.

U. Backes (B) University of Dresden, Dresden, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. P. Zúquete (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_1

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Conceptual Controversies ‘Left-wing extremism’ is one of the ‘essentially contested concepts’ (Gallie 1956) whose content is hardly ever agreed upon—not in the scientific community and even less so in public debates—because of the normative implications (both explicit and implicit) of the term. Both components of the concept—‘left’ and ‘extremism’—have been the subject of lively discussions for decades. In politics, the directional concept ‘left’ is part of the right-left dichotomy which became established as a result of the French Revolution, primarily as a typological distinction in the field of political orientation and belief systems. The concept of ‘left’ has continued to remain relevant, despite the profound changes in the key issues under contention and the constellation of actors in the party systems of the developing constitutional states, both within and outside Europe (Laponce 1981; Ignazi 2003: 10–12). However, the directional concepts have undergone a semantic change and as a result, political organisations that saw themselves as ‘left’ continuously discussed what it meant to define yourself as ‘left-wing’ so as to keep the content of the ‘signalling word’ (Fahnenwort, Panagl 1998) alive and distinctive under ever-changing conditions (Mair 2007). A historical account of these debates could start with the most frequently used ‘stigmatising words’ (Stigmawörter) (royalism, conservatism, nationalism, imperialism, fascism, neoliberalism) and trace the fluctuating antagonistic positions towards the respective political opponents through the associated content. This would highlight the interdependence of the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ in terms of content (Rémond 1982: 389; Scherer 2020). The directional concepts continue to play a part in how political identity is formed. However, depending on the educational level of the respondent, these abstract terms are associated with different parties, political ideologies or certain contentious issues (such as social justice, women’s and minority rights or immigration) (Bauer et al. 2017; Jungkunz 2022). Left-wing parties redefining their political programme has no doubt contributed to this. In search of lost votes in times of crisis, left-wing parties sought to refocus their profile and reposition themselves in a space ‘beyond left and right’ (Giddens 1994). For the typological mapping of extreme positions, these debates were less significant. At the political margins, far more so than in the contested centre with its compromises and syntheses, the basic alternatives were found to be clearly defined, with ideologies of inequality on the one side and doctrines of equality based on the idea of universal human equality on the other (Bobbio 1996). Finding consensus for a definition of extremism is far more difficult. Not least in Germany, with its predisposition (rooted in history) to develop ideologies at the windy heights of abstraction (Bracher 1984), some researchers with leanings towards the left show a tendency to identify being left-wing with being democratic, i.e. to assign everything clearly undemocratic (such as ‘real

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existing’ socialism) to the ‘right’ (Grebing 1971: 8f.). ‘Right-wing extremism’ therefore remained far less controversial as a concept than ‘left-wing extremism’ because the combination of ‘left-wing’ and ‘extremism’ could, from this point of view, only pass as an ‘ideology’, a ‘battle cry’ (Narr 1980: 374), a ‘political scientist’s fallacy’ (Wippermann 2010), a ‘slogan of the Cold War’ (Backes and Jesse 2005: 172) or similar, but not as a concept suitable for scientific investigation. However, many key words of the language of politics were and are politically disputed, ideology-laden and have ambiguous connotations. If social scientists were to dispense with these words, they would only have recourse to an esoteric constructed language with no hope of reaching a wider audience. Many authors seeking to identify areas of tension and contradictions relating to the fundamental values and rules of liberal democracy from the perspective of democratic theory have therefore resorted to the concept of extremism (or radicalism) while at the same striving to define it more clearly. As early as in the mid-1920s, the social psychologists Floyd H. Allport and D. A. Hartman (1925) attempted to identify a ‘radical type of personality’ using attitudinal studies. They found it mainly in ‘reactionaries’, whom they described as ‘tough-minded’ and ‘extroverted’. At the University of London, Hans J. Eysenck (1944, 1954) questioned the connection between the ‘radicalism’ of the ‘extreme left’ and their ‘tender-mindedness’ and introversion. According to Eysenck, ‘fascists’ and ‘communists’ alike proved to be ‘tough-minded’, i.e. both groups were not prepared to question their own position and consequently tended to impose their own point of view on others. The Chicago sociologist Edward A. Shils (1954: 28) argued along similar lines when he criticised the ideas of expatriate social scientists Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer from the Frankfurt school. According to Shils, Adorno and Horkheimer did not pay enough attention to the analogies between fascism/National Socialism and Bolshevism/communism, for the antagonistic ideologies/currents were by no means worlds apart in every respect. Rather, Shils argued, they share an antagonism towards civil rights and political democracy, contempt for parliamentary institutions, individualism and private enterprise, a Manichean worldview and a penchant for conspiracies and conspiratorial thinking. Adorno and some of his colleagues at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung) subsequently addressed this criticism and developed a scale to identify ‘left-wing radicals with an authoritarian character’ (Freyhold 1971: 19). Shils’ critical observations led him to highlight a dividing line that lay across the ideological movements of the time: ‘the really crucial dividing line in politics is between pluralistic moderation and monomaniac extremism’ (Shils 1956: 227). Seymour M. Lipset (1959: 30–47) later systematically developed the antithesis of ‘pluralism’ versus ‘extremism’, linking the major ideologies to a social stratification model. In addition to the ‘moderate’, pluralistic currents of the ‘lower class’ (socialism), the ‘middle class’ (liberalism) and the ‘upper class’ (conservatism), he distinguished between (monistic) extremisms of the ‘lower

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class’ (communism, Peronism), the ‘middle class’ (fascism) and the ‘upper class’ (traditional authoritarianism). He identified what he called ‘extremism of the centre’ or the ‘middle’. His use of the German term ‘middle’ led to some misunderstanding because ‘middle’ can refer both to moderation as well as to middle-class leanings. For Lipset, however, moderation stood for pluralism, ‘middle’ for a social class (Lipset and Raab 1978: 5). Furthermore, electoral and membership research showed that German National Socialism enjoyed support from all social classes (Falter 1993, 2020), while the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), for example, could rightly be considered a ‘pure workers’ party’ (Mallmann 1995: 11) right up to the world economic crisis. Anti-pluralism remained a central feature in the research on defining ‘extremist’ positions, even though minimal definitions of a process-oriented concept of democracy—inspired by Joseph A. Schumpeter’s (1942) theory of competition and Robert A. Dahl’s (1971) theory of pluralism—were expanded to include certain institutional characteristics, such as ‘checks and balances’ and ‘balance of power’ (with the corresponding safeguards of freedom) (Lauth 2007; Coppedge et al. 2011). Definitions of extremism therefore also emphasised the concentration of power as a goal or consequence of the corresponding political understanding (Backes 1989: 102; 2010: 183; Backes and Jesse 1989: 33f.). Pluralism/anti-pluralism and checks and balances/ concentration of power are mutually dependent: checks and balances serve to safeguard freedom and plurality; anti-pluralism leads down a slippery slope towards autocracy (Loewenstein 1957). Added to this, as a further defining element, is the ethos of fundamental human equality (the concept of human rights), which distinguishes the modern democratic constitutional state from its historical predecessors (even if predecessors already had democraticegalitarian roots, as expressed in the ancient Greek concepts of isonomy and isegory) (Sternberger 1984). Using three main criteria to define the (democratic) constitutional state means any attempts to define extremist antagonists to the state an equally complex undertaking. With the aim of reducing this complexity and to create analytical clarity, a number of writers created new terminologies that deviated from Lipset’s dichotomy. While Erwin K. Scheuch (1974: 462) referred to Lipset in a research outline published in the mid-1970s, his collaborators in Cologne at the time, Hans D. Klingemann and Franz U. Pappi (1972: 73–75), introduced an analytical distinction between extremism and radicalism in their theoretically and methodologically sophisticated study of the electoral system. When comparing voter attitudes, they found that the supporters of the GDR-aligned German Communist Party (DKP)—unlike those of the right-wing extremist National Democratic Part of Germany (NPD)—appeared to affirm democracy in the sense of expanding democratic participation (‘democratisation’) while at the same time (like NPD voters) approving of ‘undemocratic methods’, such as the use of violence. Consequently, they differentiated between ‘radicalism’ in the sense of a rejection of democratic means/instruments and ‘extremism’ in the sense of a negation of

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democratic goals/values. With this in mind, left-wing extremism, according to Max Kaase, included a ‘radical democratic, egalitarian understanding of politics’, while right-wing extremism was characterised by anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian positions. Radicalism, on the other hand, referred to the ‘rejection of institutionalised procedures’ (Kaase 1983: 218). Two decades later, Cas Mudde (2006: 89) proposed a partial reversal of these terms. He argued that the term ‘radicalism’ should be reserved for those associations that accept democratic methods (such as competitive elections) but negate democratic values (such as pluralism). Extremism, on the other hand, encompasses both: the rejection of democratic methods and values. Hans-Gerd Jaschke criticised the differentiation between radicalism and extremism because ‘radicalism’ thus degenerates into a ‘non-binding catch-all term’ (Jaschke 2001: 27)—an objection that could also be extended to the term ‘populism’. Moreover, with the rationale usually being that the goal justifies the means, there are serious doubts as to whether a party with pronounced anti-pluralist tendencies would accept democratic methods if it were to be in a strong position of power. While some authors differentiate between radicalism and extremism depending on the degree to which democratic principles are rejected, others— such as Jean Chiche and Dominique Reynié (2001)—distinguish a ‘hard’ ‘extreme left’ from a ‘soft’ ‘radical left’ depending on whether it sits within or outside the constitutional arc. This differentiation is also used by the German agencies for the protection of the constitution (Maihofer 1975). ‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ naturally take on a different definition when they are used to refer to extremism as the antithesis of liberal democracy and to outline a spectrum of more or less pronounced extremist positions. Eckhard Jesse and Tom Thieme (2011: 20), for example, have developed criteria that can be used to differentiate between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of extremism. In the case of political parties, for example, they suggest examining whether the parties are guided by one of the ‘classic’ grand ideologies, are explicitly striving for a dictatorship, or are cooperating with militant-anti-democratic groups or groups that condone the use of violence. Another important consideration is the question of whether extremist positions are dominant within a party or are only supported by minorities. While numerous authors place the relationship of radical/extremist actors to democracy at the centre of their studies, others largely ignore this aspect. ‘Radical left’ then only refers to the advancement of certain ideas (March and Mudde 2005: 24), especially the pursuit of a ‘“root-and-branch” transformation of capitalism’ (March 2018: 23) or the broader use of methods to protest and challenge the status quo (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013: 14; Wennerhag 2018: 5) without necessarily condoning the use of violence. Consequently, ‘radical left’ in this sense does not necessarily include those actors who are considered ‘radicalised’ by researchers of political movements (as in Della Porta 2013, for example). Taking a theoretical approach that contrasts democratic with extremist runs the risk of losing sight of the self-concept, the

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impulses and motives as well as the heterogeneity of the corresponding political factions (Fuhrmann 2021; Imbusch 2021: 60). The debates around the concept of left-wing populism have many structural and substantive similarities with those around left-wing extremism/ radicalism. The plea for a value-neutral use of the term populism (in the sense of populism as a strategy when competing for office and power to which almost all parties temporarily resort) is just as common (Weyland 2001) as the propagation of left-wing populism as a counterforce to right-wing populism in the conflict dynamics of ‘agonal democracy’ (Mouffe 2018). Left-wing populism can refer to actors who combine an ‘anti-political establishment’ stance with ‘support of the liberal-democratic regimes in which they operate’ (Damiani 2020: 2). Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2012: 17), on the other hand, distinguish between democracy-compatible and democracy-incompatible dimensions of (left-wing) populism. The advocacy of popular sovereignty and majority rule contrasts with the undermining of the protection of minorities (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012: 17). Notwithstanding, many authors value the concept of populism because of its normative ambiguity which, it appears, allows a greater focus on the self-concept of the actors. However, it is possible to do one without abandoning the other: to try and understand a phenomenon as a self-concept and at the same time analyse it on the basis of criteria derived from an overarching (democratic theory) perspective. Those who understand ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalism’ as a superlative form (the intensification of a characteristic) still cannot escape the problem of have to draw clear boundaries. And a ‘“root-and-branch” transformation of capitalism’ is not likely to be sufficient as a characteristic to distinguish ‘radical left’ from ‘radical right’ actors—at least not if one concentrates on the self-concept of the respective factions. Conversely, anti-capitalism in itself is of course not a compelling indication of left-wing extremism (Pfahl-Traughber 2013).

A Suggested Definition Nobody will ever have the final word on an essentially contested concept. That expectation would be non-scientific, at least if one regards the maxim de omnibus dubitandum as the core of scientific endeavour. However, this does not release researchers from the obligation to define their terms in such a clear and conclusive manner that scientific discussion is possible, misunderstandings are avoided and knowledge can be advanced. Theories must be either true or false, but concepts essentially contain definitions of the semantic content of linguistic expressions—even if these contents are not chosen arbitrarily but always fit into a conceptual framework that reflects our relationship to the world.

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The basic tenet of the proposed definition sounds banal: left-wing extremism is a left-wing form of political extremism. In the sense of Aristotle’s method of division (Smith 2022: 7.4), “extremism” is therefore the generic term (genus proprium) and “left” the distinguishing feature (differentia specifica) compared to other variants of extremism. But in order to make this definition more precise, we need to define its main components. As far as the directional concepts ‘left’ and ‘right’ are concerned, their content has changed multiple times since the French Revolution, even though one pole could not be thought of without the other. ‘Left’ and ‘right’ have always gained their content through the interaction between ideas and political concepts. However, the principle of equality already played a leading role in the late eighteenth century in the controversy of royal sovereignty and popular sovereignty. Taking up this insight in the 1990s, the Turin-based philosopher of law Norberto Bobbio (1996) proposed terminology that can serve as the basis for meaningful differentiation. The pair of opposites expresses the opposing attitudes to the principle of equality, however, not in the simple sense that one (the left) affirms it, whereas the other (the right) denies it. Because the concept of equality allows very different interpretations with regard to the type of goods to be distributed, the mode of distribution and the scope of the circle of recipients. Moreover, there are undoubtedly qualities that make people equal to each other (such as their mortality), but also others (such as language and religion) that make them appear unequal to each other: ‘We can then correctly define as egalitarians those who, while not ignoring the fact that people are both equal and unequal, believe that what they have in common has greater value in the formation of a good community. Conversely, those who are not egalitarian, while starting from the same premise, believe that their diversity has greater value in the formation of a good community’ (Bobbio 1996: 66f.). Leftists or egalitarians are thus inclined to interpret inequalities as a consequence of changeable social conditions and insist on eliminating them, while the right is more willing ‘to accept the natural and that second nature constituted by custom, tradition and force of the past’ (Bobbio 1996: 67). Bobbio’s differentiation is certainly not suitable for distinguishing between parties vying for a place in the centre in highly competitive ‘multi-party systems’. But it is well-suited to identifying ‘right’ and ‘left’ formations on the wings of party systems, even if the degree of egalitarianism/anti-egalitarianism may diverge there. However, Bobbio introduces a second analytical category that is equally as relevant for defining left-wing extremism: the principle of freedom, as he calls it. Within the groups of ‘egalitarians’ and ‘antiegalitarians’, he distinguishes between ‘extremists’ and ‘moderates’, depending on whether they pursue a libertarian (liberal) or authoritarian (anti-liberal) political approach. He argues that in some respects, the ‘extremists’ from both sides have more in common with each other than the representatives of more moderate positions (Bobbio 1996: 20f.). Bobbio’s argument may not be well developed in terms of democratic theory, but on the basis of historical and moral philosophical differences between ‘extremists’ and ‘moderates’,

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there are important fundamental differences that reveal similarities between extremists across the right-left dichotomy (Craiutu 2017: 145). According to Bobbio, ‘moderates’ are ‘gradualists’ who tend to imagine progress as advancing tentatively, while ‘extremists’ tend to conceive of progress as the result of breakthroughs or ‘sudden leaps forward’ (Bobbio 1996: 22) into a new social situation. And in terms of moral philosophy, Bobbio sees extremists as advocates for the ‘heroic, warrior virtues of courage and boldness’, while ‘moderates’ emphasise the ‘virtues of prudence, tolerance, calculating reason and patient mediation’. Here, the conceptual link to (liberal) democracy becomes clear; the virtues associated with the moderates are ‘essential in market relations and in that more wide-ranging market of ideas and conflicting interests which constitutes the essence of democracy, given its reliance on compromise’ (Bobbio 1996: 25). By combining the principles of equality and freedom, Bobbio creates a typology of a conceptual political space that is of great importance for a definition of left-wing extremism. He distinguishes between a moderate and an extremist variant for both the right and the left. While the ‘centre left’ combines egalitarian and ‘libertarian’ values (Bobbio cites social democracy as an example), the ‘extreme left’ (Bobbio 1996: 78f.) combines egalitarian and authoritarian approaches. He cites Jacobinism in France as the most important and tradition-forming historical example. In order to grasp and operationalize this ‘authoritarianism’ (or ‘antiliberalism’) of parts of the left more clearly, we can proceed in two different ways. The first takes us via a minimal definition of liberal democracy that captures elements of left-extremist theory and practice that are at odds with it. The second explores the characteristics of left-wing extremist thought that give rise to the negation of liberal democracy. Both groups of characteristics form a logical set of relationships, even if in reality they do not always have to be developed to the same extent in the formation of specific factions. When theories of democracy name political, social and cultural pluralism as a central feature of liberal democracy, it is anti-pluralism that divides moderate and extreme left. The conviction of the legitimacy of a diversity of political opinions, views and interests underpins an understanding of politics that affirms dialogue, dispute and (non-violent) conflict, considers opposition necessary, treats dissenters with respect, seeks solutions in a tentative and compromise-oriented manner and accepts majority decisions in the absence of broad consensus-building. Anti-pluralism, on the other hand, is based on the conviction of being in possession of absolute truth, of possessing the only correct solution to central political questions and of representing the ‘true interests’ of the people. The claim to superiority of an extreme left defined in this way justifies intolerance towards alternative political ideas and a tendency towards Manichaeism with a mentality of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. This polarising distinction between good and bad, friends and enemies, leaves little room for a peaceful contest around suitable political solution. Any group claiming to have exclusive understanding and knowledge with ‘superior insights’, an authority

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that cannot be challenged and a profound grasp of the ‘laws of history’ immunises itself against criticism and justifies a tendency towards dogmatism (Backes 1989: 298–310). Anti-pluralism goes hand in hand with anti-constitutionalism because the quintessence of historical constitutionalism is the quest for institutional protection of political pluralism and the fundamental freedoms it entails. Anti-pluralism/monism instead pushes for monocracy/autocracy and for the implementation of a closed political concept that knows no legitimate alternatives and therefore fails to recognise the value of institutions that uphold checks and balances to safeguard our freedom. The development of realistic alternatives fails because of the monistic mindset. At first glance, egalitarianism seems to exclude the possibility of an antidemocratic left. But when the freedom of citizens is undermined, equality also falls by the wayside. For already in Periclean Athens (Bleicken 1994: 289), equality of citizens meant isonomia and isegoria. However, being equal before the law and equal freedom of expression exist in name only if the institutions that secure these freedoms are lacking. A fundamental criticism of the concept of political order (‘anti-repression’) also fails to recognise the importance of statehood for the provision of rudimentary goods (security, basic services, protection of minorities, etc.) and often goes hand in hand with wishful anthropological thinking and a lack of tried and tested alternative concepts. ‘Anti-authoritarian’ Leftists like the German ‘Autonomen’ (Autonomous) see the use of violence, even in a liberal democracy, as a legitimate means of resistance on the way to overcoming the ‘repressive’, ‘capitalist’ system (Leach and Haunss 2009; Mannewitz and Thieme 2020: 76–79). They sometimes ‘place themselves at the top of a moral hierarchy and place at the bottom those who engage in forms of domination of which they do not approve’ (Carls 2023: 84). In this way, civil equality and civil freedom are challenged in equal measure. Political exclusion can also result from an understanding of democracy based on a model that proclaims the identity of governors and the governed (Fraenkel 1991). But the true will of the people is just as much a fiction as the true government of the people. A democratic claim does not in any way guarantee the recognition of fundamental values and procedural rules of liberal democracy (statehood that safeguards freedom, balance of power, pluralism, human rights). Left-wing extremism includes the negation of at least one of these principles, even if the groups concerned see themselves as the guardians of “emancipation” and “true democracy”. In this sense, left-wing extremism in established democratic constitutional states justifies an anti-system stance. In the case of a party, one can only speak of left-wing extremism ‘whenever it undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes’ (Sartori 1976: 132f.). If the political influence of such actors grows, there is a risk of deconsolidation of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996: 15).

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Overview: Ideologies, Organisations and Strategies On an ideological level, a distinction can be made between anarchist and communist forms of the extreme left (Joll 1979; Pfahl-Traughber 2015: 43– 67). Both movements share a radical, egalitarian, emancipatory concept of society and the conviction that a qualitative leap from previous history to a completely new society of the free and equal is possible. Anarchism aims for the absence of domination and the liberation of the individual from all constraints; emphasises the importance of raising awareness for fundamental change; shuns comprehensive, systematic theory building; and sees a repressive danger in every form of differentiated organisation (and statehood). Communism strives for a ‘classless society’, makes the act of liberation contingent on overcoming existing socio-economic structures, is more theory-oriented and focuses on long-term planning and organisational unity as a revolutionary strategy. In reality, there are many hybrid forms of these two movements. While left-wing revolutionary groups usually emphatically invoke the values of ‘democracy’ and ‘equality’, wherever they have reached the levers of power, they regularly ran afoul of the principles of ‘freedom’, the ‘rule of law’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘tolerance’ (Brown 2009; Courtois 1999; Furet 2000; Priestland 2009; Service 2010). The anarchists did not get put to the test because they did not succeed in gaining a permanent foothold anywhere—if only because of their reluctance to get organised and leading theoreticians distancing themselves from anarchist terrorism (Maitron 1975: 206–260). Communists, on the other hand, took power in many countries—and exercised it autocratically everywhere. Thus, especially with regard to communism, it seems obvious that we can assume that this is not merely an accident that can be explained by special circumstances, but a substantial phenomenon that arises from the political understanding and the mindset of these movements. Hence the question of the compatibility of communist (and also anarchist) doctrines with the fundamental rules of liberal democracy is the focus of numerous studies critiquing ideology (Bracher 1984; Joll 1979; Kołakowski 2005; Talmon 1952, 1960, 1981). A number of radical left-wing intellectuals who seek to revitalise communism (and anarchism) are seeking to dispel reservations based on such findings. The anthology ‘The Idea of Communism’, with contributions from a conference held at London’s Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities in March 2009, brings together authors who share the following premises: In the face of progressive depoliticisation, the idea of communism inspires new hope among the population. Communism is ‘the’ idea of ‘radical philosophy and politics’. But if communism was to guide ‘radical action’, it had to break away from its fixation on the state and the economy and come to terms with the experiences of the twentieth century. The communist emphasis on commons (such as communal precautions and institutions against the overexploitation of nature or the unjust distribution of educational opportunities) challenges the privatisation projects of ‘neoliberal capitalist exploitation and domination’ (Douzinas

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and Žižek 2010: IX). At the same time, the (new) communism strives to link freedom and equality—freedom does not flourish without equality, and equality cannot exist without freedom. However, even those who dismiss the experiences with ‘real existing’ communism regimes of the past will doubt whether this can succeed. In the authors’ considerations, the constitutional state as institutional order is immaterial. The constitutional state is effectively equated with ‘capitalism’ or ‘neoliberalism’—and is thus equally condemned. ‘Being a communist’ means ‘being against the state’ (Negri 2010: 158), according to one of the prominent authors, Antonio Negri, a sociologist and philosopher from Padua who was sentenced to prison for supporting the Red Brigades. None of the authors gives an answer as to what should take the place of the allegedly repressive state after its dissolution, i.e. how an order establishing freedom and equality can be institutionalised. But that is not the reason why the French philosopher Alain Badiou, student of the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser and co-founder (1969) of the Maoist ‘Marxist-Leninist Union of French Communists’, has few illusions about the chances of success of the communist idea (in Europe). He deplores the quarrelling among the revolutionaries, the ‘nihilistic despair’ of ‘broad sectors of working-class youth’ and the ‘servile’ attitude of the ‘vast majority of intellectuals’ (Badiou 2010: 14). While avowed neo-communists like Badiou, Negri and Žižek spread their ideas and court followers in order to shift the political weight towards a leftrevolutionary transformation, other groups are pushing for militant action. Much attention was given to the treatise of an ‘invisible committee’ in France, which was seized by the police in 2008 as evidence in connection with acts of sabotage targeting the tracks of the French high-speed TGV train (Affaire Tarnac). Later, the ‘libertarian’ writer Serge Quadruppani claimed to be one of the authors of the text. The treatise was quickly translated into other languages (Spanish, English, German) because the treatise—according to the editors—did not settle for just describing the poor conditions but discussed concrete steps to overcome them. Only a new communism can lead out of the ‘impasse of the present’ (Invisible Committee 2009: 28). Among others, the ‘invisible committee’ proposes using every crisis—such as natural disasters, the disruption of the flow of goods and power cuts (also triggered by ‘blockades’)—to exploit the inadequacies of the reaction of the state for revolt and the ‘potentialities for self-organisation’ (ibid., 119), while avoiding sectarian cell formation in the Trotskyist style as well as the convening of plenary assemblies (following the ‘bad example of bourgeois parliaments … not a place for decisions but for talk, for free speech exercised without a goal’; ibid., 122; emphasis in the original). One should avoid confrontations but arm oneself and, if possible, not use weapons at all, the authors write. When the situation is right, power will fall into the hands of the ‘communes’ like a piece of ripe fruit. French extremism experts consider the writing to be ideologically aligned with the ‘ultra-gauche’, a movement whose anti-Leninism distinguishes it from

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Moscow-style communist orthodoxy as well as from Trotskyism and Maoism (Bourseiller 2021). The criticism of ‘plenary assemblies’ should be understood as a distancing from council communism. The ‘invisible committee’ shares anarchism’s scepticism of organisation and the rejection of hierarchies and dependent relationships. What separates it from anarcho-syndicalism and all other strands of the trade union movement and the reformist labour movement is the attitude of refusal, the basic motif of dropping out, of not participating, of staying on the sidelines (Hirsch 2011). Consequently, the uprising that is being propagated is not the result of long-term planning and organisation but arises spontaneously through the spillover of the revolutionary spark to a multitude of ‘communes’ that have formed of their own accord on the basis of a shared awareness of problems at the local level. Strategically, the authors thus propagate the opposite of an accelerationism that wants to push capitalism to its extremes from within in order to overcome it (Noys 2014). Nor do they develop a strategy of achieving cultural hegemony in the sense of Antonio Gramsci. Rather, they want to use crises to escalate social conflicts and unhinge the existing system. Violence is not ruled out—to be armed is a necessity, but violence is seen as a last resort. Ideologically and strategically, the ‘invisible committee’ is far removed from Marxist-Leninist left-wing terrorism aiming to kill representatives of the system and embodied by the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, Action Directe in France or the Sendero Luminoso in Peru (Yonah and Pluchinsky 1992). And just as far from the authors’ minds is forming a party or getting involved with one of the party alliances that are Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist or reform communist in character (most of which are linked across national borders). It is evident that left-wing revolutionary aspirations are as diverse as they are complex. Consequently, any attempts to classify movements according to the core elements and analytical dimensions of the concept of left-wing extremism also requires a differentiated approach. What may be of help here are indicators that have been developed to distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ extremisms (Jesse and Thieme 2011) as well as ascertaining behaviours that are ‘authoritarian’ or jeopardise freedom in liberal democracies (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mannewitz 2018). These indicators can also help front any claims of being democratic—usually raise ostentatiously—with practices that in fact endanger democracy (Table 1.1). The ‘radical left’ does not have to fulfil any of the characteristics that can be drawn from the elements defined in the previously outlined concept of left-wing extremism. However, such an approach raises questions that can lead to a more precise definition of ‘radicality’. Is the democratic constitutional state delegitimised across the board as a ‘repressive’, ‘capitalist system’? Is the formation of parties and participation in elections advocated or—as with the ‘autonomists’ (Katsiaficas 1997)—categorically rejected? Are alternative concepts (such as the advocacy of a council system) linked to the rejection of representative democracy and parliamentarism? Do reform communist parties,

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Table 1.1 Indicators for determining the extent of extremist tendencies Level of analysis

Indicators

I. Relationship to the democratic state

1. Blanket rejection as a ‘repressive system’?

II. Internal organisation

III. Ability to form alliances

IV. Relationship to violence

V. Relationship with autocracies

2. Antiparliamentary? 3. Propagation of the concentration of powers? 4. Claim to ‘true democracy’ and enunciation of the ‘true will of the people’? 5. Guided by an anti-democratic grand ideology? 1. Minimum degree of internal organisational democracy met? 2. Tolerating left-wing extremist substructures? 1. Ability to form alliances with democrats? 2. Ability to form alliances with (hard) extremists? 3. Fundamental delegitimisation of opponents? 1. Dehumanising images of the enemy? 2. Paramilitary activities? 3. Support for politically motivated perpetrators of violence? 4. Advocacy of violent action? 5. Limitation of violence? 1. Promotion of existing autocracies? 2. Cooperation with supporters of autocratic systems?

for example, pose the ‘system question’? Are they aiming exclusively at the economic system, or would the transformation sought also be linked to a profound change in the political system? For example, the party ‘Die Linke’ (The Left), which emerged from the dictatorship party SED in 1989/1990 after undergoing a process of transformation and internal diversification, states in its Erfurt Programme (2011): ‘Where profit rules above all, there is little room for democracy. The unbridled freedom of big corporations means lack of freedom for the majority of people’ (Die Linke 2011: 4). Were the lives of people in Western Germany therefore ‘less free’ than the lives of people in the GDR? Equating ‘unfreedom’ and ‘capitalist system’ is not a banality because this is how ‘communist movements […] historically also justified the right to overthrow’ (Kailitz 2017: 136). Programmatic statements like these are often formulaic and the result of compromises. They send messages to different associated target groups inside and outside of the party. Their meaning can therefore only be understood in connection with an analysis of the internal organisation and party practices (or those of other political organisations) around forming alliances. Which internal organisational groupings are making compromises with each other? Do these also include associations that are aligned with a major left-wing extremist ideology such as Marxism-Leninism (Backes and Moreau 2008)?

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Do the ‘reform communist’ parties tolerate sub-organisations aligned with Marxism-Leninism in their ranks? What influence do they have? Are their representatives to be found in the leadership structures of the party? Do the parties clearly distance themselves from associations that condone the use of violence? Or do they act as a kind of lobby for militant groups? In terms of forming alliances, it is the relationship with organisations that are loyal to the democratic system and with forces that are hostile to the system that is of particular significance. This question is closely linked to the question of how to deal with rival organisations. Are they accepted as actors? Or does the organisation in question tend to fundamentally delegitimise its rivals? Parties that operate legally might be supporting paramilitary organisations or be cultivating links to a terrorist underground organisation (Pedahzur et al. 2008). Regarding militant groups, the degree of willingness to use violence and the type of violence used is significant. We can also draw important conclusions from how the enemy is portrayed. Does the portrayal feature dehumanising tendencies, such as comparisons with pests (‘rats’, ‘pigs’, ‘fleas’)? Is the (targeted) killing of people propagated or condoned? What role do considerations regarding the level of violence play in debates on the use of force? And a final important point to consider is how an organisation relates to autocratic regimes abroad. While for research into historical communism the connection to the Communist International played an important role, the question of ‘regime legacies’ (Kitschelt 2002; Backes and Moreau 2008) is also key for assessing left-wing organisations today. What kind of relationship do communist parties maintain with regime-supporting bodies in Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea or the People’s Republic of China? It is the relationship to Xi Jingping’s regime in particular that divides the Marxist-Leninist camp. Criticism of Xi Jingping does not signal support for democracy. While the non-reformed parts of the former Western satellites of the Soviet Union praise Xi Jingping’ historical achievements in sometimes panegyric tones, parties loyal to Mao see today’s regime elite as a clique unrestrainedly enriching itself (Backes 2022: 136f.). The discussion of ‘radical left’ groups on the basis of the category grid I outlined allows for differentiated classification depending on which characteristics are fulfilled and to what extent. In this way, the extent of left-wing extremist tendencies or the absence of such tendencies can be determined in a differentiated manner.

Future Research Quite a few authors who dedicate themselves to parties or other organisations of the ‘radical left’ focus on the self-concept at the level of political content and warn against a narrow or distorted interpretation of the phenomena by applying standards that do not arise from within those phenomena. If we were to proceed in the same way with political actors such as the ‘Identitarians’ or

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the ‘New Right’, we would be criticised for trivialising and misjudging the inherent threat. Therefore, we need to take a middle course, grasping the self-concept and the inner developmental logic of the objects of research and at the same time applying analytical categories acquired from, for example, democratic theory or the critique of ideology. This is certainly a balancing act that requires a high level of differentiation and analytical sensitivity for the respective object. But researchers should rise to the challenge by shining a light from both perspectives on precisely those phenomena that defy easy categorisation. This applies, in particular, to the grey areas between liberal-democratic loyalty to the system and resolute rejection of the system—areas that have grown since the demise of ‘real existing socialism’ and are waiting to be surveyed in detail.

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CHAPTER 2

The Evolution of Left-Wing Extremism in the West Garth Davies and Vanja Zdjelar

Introduction Traditionally, right-wing extremism and left-wing extremism have existed as political counterweights to each other. This tension has often been most prevalent in highly polarized political contexts (see, e.g., Italy in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, or Spain in the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s). Somewhat predictably, the rise in violent right-wing extremism in the Western world that began in 2016 has been accompanied by an increase in far-left activity. But while considerable effort has been put into understanding the resurgence of the extreme right, the extreme left has received far less attention. In the United States, the very term far left seems to function as an opaque catch-all term identifying that which is “not right” (politically). But as with right-wing extremism, the far left has always been comprised of a broad array of loosely connected constituents. Moreover, the nature of the left-wing movements has move past the comparatively straightforward communism vs. capitalism rhetoric of the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of “left-wing extremism” today by reviewing its history, assessing the current threat level, and examining how and under what circumstances that threat may change in the future.

G. Davies (B) · V. Zdjelar Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] V. Zdjelar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. P. Zúquete (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_2

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Historical Context The Anarchist Wave and Propaganda of the Deed In his now classic treatise, Rapoport (2004) identified the surge of insurrectionary anarchist violence in Russia in the 1880s as the “first wave” of modern terrorism. To be sure, the practice of terrorism began will before this time, dating at least as far back as the Zealots-Sicarii in 70 CE. But for Rapaport, the Anarchist Wave was historically distinct as the first terrorist activity with an international dimension. And if the anarchist wave marked the origins of modern terrorism, then Narodnaya Volya, or the People’s Will, can legitimately lay claim to being the first modern terrorism group. People’s Will evolved out of the group Zemlya I Volya (Land and Liberty), which began its attempts to foment revolutionary social change in Russia in the early 1860s (Offord, 1986). In contrast to those who saw the “working class” as the foundation of the revolution, Land and Liberty focused more on inciting peasants through demonstrations, strikes, and revolts. Although the group did engage in acts of terrorism, most notably the assassination of Nikolay Mezentsov, the head of the Russian security police, in 1878, violence was not central to its program (Venturi, 1966). After nearly 20 years of limited gains, Land and Liberty divided into two factions in 1879. One, “Black Repartition,” would continue as a more populist organization to promote ground up revolution through discussion and propaganda, while the other, People’s Will, would focus more expressly on terrorism (Yarmolinsky, 1959). Rapaport argued that the distinguishing feature of this first wave was the creation of doctrine. A central facet of the anarchist movement represented by People’s Will was what Kropotkin would term “propaganda by the deed.” In contrast to earlier revolutionary efforts that relied on argument, persuasion, and nonviolent means, anarchists would, through acts of politically motivated violence, signal their ideological message to the masses, thereby shocking, inspiring, inciting, or provoking them and ultimately catalyzing a socialist revolution among the proletariat. The height of these efforts was marked by the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in March 1881. But People’s Will would ultimately prove to be short-lived, a victim of its own success. The Tsar’s murder stimulated anti-terrorism sentiment. The five main organizers of the plot were hanged the following month in St. Petersburg. The ranks of People’s Will were decimated by mass arrests, and it collapsed only a year later (Offord, 1986). Between 1881 and 1884, over 10,000 people were arrested, jailed, or killed for revolutionary activity (Yarmolinsky, 1959). Despite its short tenure, the People’s Will left an indelible mark. Its emphasis on the propaganda of the deed has served as the inspiration of countless terrorist groups. And not just for groups on the far left. The idea of instigating widespread social and political change through violence has become a sine qua non of modern violent extremist groups. But the revolutionary socialism that underpinned their ideology has a particular resonance with the far left and has continued to animate these groups. More generally, the events

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of the anarchist wave established a nearly permanent link between revolutionary socialism and terrorist violence for many in the Western world. This connection remains evident today, adding an additional layer of complication to already fraught narratives in a time of intense political polarization. Anti-Colonialism and Nationalism The second wave of modern terrorism was precipitated by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which signaled the end of World War I. In the aftermath of the war, the Allied Powers used the principle of national self-determination to break up the Central Power empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottomans. Many former colonies of these empires in Africa, the Pacific, and Western Asia (what would today be referred to as the Middle East) became League of Nation “mandates,” or territories that were administered on behalf of the League of Nations. But it was really World War II that more directly set the conditions for the political violence that would come to characterize this period; in particular, a joint statement issued by the leaders the United States and Great Britain on 14 August 1941 that set out their goals for the world following the end of the war. This joint statement, later dubbed the Atlantic Charter, mandated (among other things): no territorial aggrandizement, no territorial changes made against the wishes of the people (i.e., self-determination), and the restoration of self-government to those deprived of it. In other words, the Atlantic Charter provided the formal foundation for all colonial territories to become independent nations. This precept was then codified into the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. But many former colonial powers proved to be reluctant to release their colonies, prompting national independent struggles, many of which featured terrorist violence, including: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Angola, Kenya, Rwanda, Cyprus, Mozambique, and Madagascar. Although many of these countries adopted socialist or communist systems following independence, revolutionary socialism did not play a significant role in these anti-colonial conflicts. However, some of the ethnic nationalist terrorist groups that arose in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, in the gray period that traversed waves two and three, featured revolutionary socialism or communism as central facets of their platforms, including Euskadi ta Askatasuna ( Homeland and Freedom; ETA) in Spain and Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdish Workers’ Party; PKK) in Turkey. The New Left and the Internationalization of Terrorism Like the first wave of modern terrorism, revolutionary socialism again provided the basis for terrorism during wave three. The primary difference between the two eras was essentially one of scale, as wave three, the “New Left” wave, ushered in the internationalization of terrorism. The terrorist campaigns that marked the second wave were broadly dispersed, but the vast majority of

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the violence, and its attendant goals, were decidedly national in nature. With the ascent of the New Left, terrorism became a truly global phenomenon. Many groups were borne out of particular national contexts, but they were also motivated by international events and linked by their broader ideological commitments to revolutionary socialist ideals. For Rapoport, the galvanizing issue for many New Left groups was the Vietnam War. Often referred to as the “first television war” or “living room war” (Ramjattan, 2020), the war in Vietnam was a watershed moment in portraying the grim realities of war. By the late 1960s, televisions, which had only 15 years earlier been a rare commodity in US homes, had become ubiquitous (from 1950 to 1966, the proportion of Americans who owned a television had gone from 9 to 93%) (Kratz, 2018). As networks proliferated and competed for viewers, they needed to provide something previously not seen before. They found that in the near synchronous coverage of the war in Vietnam. “For the first time in American history, the news from the front lines was brought straight into the living room” (Kratz, 2018). The portrayals were damning and played a role in fomenting anti-war sentiments in the United States and later large parts of the world. Anti-war protesters argued that the war was unnecessary. They were further galvanized by images of military abuses and atrocities, such as the M˜y Lai Massacre in 1968, which sparked riots in cities and university campuses across the United States. But the impacts of the Vietnam War were not limited to the United States. In Europe in the late 1960s, they helped provide the impetus for broad-based student movements that revolted against existing systems and structures. The movements would coalesce a number of interrelated themes, including antiimperialism, anti-capitalism, anti-United States, and anti-NATO, and from these movements would emerge groups willing or dedicated to using revolutionary violence to raise class consciousness and establish new societal orders, such as the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in (West) Germany, and the Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (Dev-Genç) in Turkey. New left terrorist groups would also emerge from student movements in Japan (Japanese Red Army), Columbia (National Liberation Army), and Peru (Shining Path). These groups would then give rise to left-wing terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s. Europe The New Left was broadly united in terms of its ideological agenda and its desire for revolutionary change. But the specifics of New Left terrorism varied by country, in response to disparate historical and social conditions. The collective and unique contexts have implications for how New Left terrorism developed, and provide important clues for understanding the left-wing extremism today.

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Italy Somewhat obscured by the historical focus on broader context, the actual triggering event for New Left violence, and one with potentially important parallels in the current environment, may have been the Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan on 12 December 1969, in which 17 people were killed and another 86 were injured. The bombing was originally blamed on anarchists, over 80 of whom were arrested (Foot, 2009). One suspect, Giuseppe Pinelli, “fell to his death” from a police station. After being held in preventive detention for three years, anarchist Pietro Valpreda was sentenced; however, he was later acquitted in 1987 for a lack of evidence. In 2004, the Milan Court of Appeal attributed the bombing to Ordine Nuovo, a neo-fascists organization that was founded in the mid-1950s. Although the primary focus of political violence in what has become known as the Years of Lead (approximately 1969– 1988) in Italy has been the far left, the far right (possibly with state collusion) was active as well in what was really more of a reciprocal spiral of violence (particularly through the 1970s). The Piazza Fontana bombing and its immediate aftermath played out against a very turbulent time in Italy, marked by social strife that included student protests and labor movement unrest. Those on the political left were also fearful of a right-wing takeover such as those that had transpired in Greece and Chile. In this context, the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades; BR) were formed in 1970 to produce a grassroots revolution to overthrow capitalism; its self-proclaimed aim was to undermine the Italian state and pave the way for a Marxist upheaval led by a “revolutionary proletariat” (Orsini, 2011). Consistent with anti-US sentiment, the group also sought to remove Italy from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Early BR operations involved burning the vehicles of company directors, damaging company property, firebombing factories, and kidnapping business executives, including the personnel director of Fiat in December 1973, and a right-wing judge in Genoa in April 1974 (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992). The first deaths attributed to RB occurred in the same year; two members of the neo-fascist Italian Socialist Movement Party died during an RB raid on their offices in Padua, while the Inspector of the Turin anti-terrorism was killed in a separate incident. BR violence, including lethal violence, escalated following the arrests of leaders Curcio and Franceschini in 1974, culminating in the kidnapping and assassination of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. Although BR terrorism continued sporadically through the 1980s, the group was hampered by increased police efforts and public opprobrium wrought by the Moro assassination. The fallout may also have prompted the 1981 split that produced two BR factions: the larger Communist Combatants Party (BR-PCC) and the smaller Union of Combatant Communists (BR-UCC). High profile assassinations by both factions through 1986 (Lando Conti, former mayor of Florence), 1987 (General Licio Giorgieri), and 1988 (Senator Roberto Ruffilli) resulted in a massive number of police arrests of BR leadership that decimated the group, which dissolved itself in 1988 (Meade, 1990).

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This iteration of BR was responsible for nearly 50 deaths. The Brigate Rosse were resurrected in 1999, but it was essentially a new group, with no significant ties to its predecessor. While this most recent iteration of RB has also been involved in lethal terrorist violence, it has failed to regain its previous status. The BR had the highest profile, but they were not the only New Left terrorist groups in Italy. Other groups contributed to the Years of Lead. For example, Prima Linea (Front Line; PL) also committed acts of terrorism between 1976 and 1983. PL was ideologically distinct from BR; rather than positioning itself as the “vanguard of the working-class party,” PL instead aspired to be directly connected to the masses (Del Vecchio, 2018). Eschewing BR as elitist, PL instead defined itself as “pluralist.” In contrast to the “military verticalism” of BR, PL was structurally flat and emphasized reciprocal connection with the proletariat; the group felt it was crucial to have roots in the factories and to have workers involved in the organization (Del Vecchio, 2018). Also founded in 1976 (and active until 1979), the Proletari Armati per il Comunismo (Armed Proletarians for Communism: PAC) similarly adopted a more horizontal structure than BR, operating as independent cells. The groups, which operated in Lombardy and Veneto, was estimated to include approximately 60 individuals. Although most of its operations did not result in victims, its actions did produce four deaths. The Nuclei Armati Proletari (Armed Proletarian Cells; NAP), active between 1974 and 1979, was very similar to PAC; it was structured horizontally and was more geographically bounded (to southern Italy). Together, the New Left groups that emerged in Italy reflected structural and ideological differences that have traditionally existed between far-left organizations (Pisano et al., 1984). West Germany As was the case in Italy, New Left terrorism in Germany grew out of the student protests of the late 1960s. But what was then known as West Germany was also struggling to deal with trauma of Weimar and Nazi Germany. Many West German youth blamed their parents’ generation for failing to confront its Nazi past. This struggle set the stage for the far-reaching rejection of deference to traditional social norms that characterized the protest movement in Germany. World War II was only twenty years earlier. Those in charge of the government — they were the same people who’d been in charge under Nazism. People started discussing this only in the 60s. We were the first generation since the war, and we were asking our parents questions. The moment you see your own country as the continuation of a fascist state, you give yourself permission to do almost anything against it. You see your action as the resistance that your parents did not put up. (Anonymous)

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Consistent with what was going on in Italy at the time, the historical legacy of Nazism had caused a huge generational rift. Many youth were alienated both from their parents and from state institutions. Radicals were angry that former Nazis continued to occupy a wide range of government positions; many felt that government at all levels was merely continuing authoritarian policies, with no resistance from the public (Smith et al., 2013). Some contended that these Nazi links made government irredeemable and peaceful social change impossible. Gudrun Ensslin, who would go on to be a co-founder of the Red Army Faction, wrote: “They’ll kill us all. You know what kind of pigs we’re up against. This is the Auschwitz generation. You can’t argue with people who made Auschwitz. They have weapons and we haven’t. We must arm ourselves!” (Ensslin, 2001, p. 314). It has been argued that far-left terrorism was catalyzed by the death of German student Benno Ohnesorg, who was shot in the head by police offer Karl-Heinz Kurras at a protest against the Shah of Iran in West Berlin on 2 June 1967 (Scally, 2017). Kurras was acquitted at trial, but Ohnesorg’s death came to represent the brutality of the state and served as a rallying point for the New Left in West Germany. Tensions were further exacerbated when Rudi Dutschke, a leading spokesman for protesting students, was shot in the head in an assassination attempt by the right-wing sympathizer Josef Bachmann for inciting violence against Dutschke (Spiegel, 2008). Against this backdrop, the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction; RAF) was formed in 1970. Some sources cite the bombing of a department store in 1968 by Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin as the first RAF operation, but most point to the events of May 1970. While Baader and Ensslin were on day release, Ulrike Meinhof helped the couple evade custody. Soon after, Meinhof published Ensslin “urban guerrilla” strategy in a left-wing magazine and called for the creation of the Red Army Faction with the words “Let the armed resistance begin” (Passmore, 2011). Together with Horst Mahler, Meinhof, Baader, and Ensslin would constitute the leadership of what is generally regarded as the “first” generation of RAF. Through the next two years, the RAF would commit at least five major bomb attacks, killing four people and injuring another 41 (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992). But by the end of 1972, most original RAF, including all of its leaders, had been imprisoned. The “second” generation of RAF committed several high-profile assassinations, particularly in 1977. RAF operations were less frequent but continued through the 1980s. Although the fall of the Soviet Union deprived numerous far-left group of critical support, RAF attacks persisted. After the reunification of Germany in 1990, the long suspected connection between RAF and the Stasi in East Germany was confirmed: the Stasi had provided both financial and logistic support to RAF (Schmeidel, 1993). The last notable RAF bombing occurred in March 1993. In April 1998, the news agency Reuters received a communique declaring that RAF had ceased operations. As was the case in many European countries during the New Left wave, West Germany experienced attacks from several far-left groups. For example,

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the Revolutionäre Zellen (Revolutionary Cells; RZ), while less well-known than RAF, was nonetheless more active; the group claimed responsibility for nearly 190 attacks and was suspect in approximately 100 other incidents (predominantly involving bombs and arson) between 1973 and 1995 (Jander, 2015). The RZ would gain worldwide notoriety in 1975 when two of its members, working in concert with members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—External Operations, hijacked an Air France flight traveling from Tel Aviv to Paris in an attempt to secure the release of 40 Palestinian militants being held in prisons throughout Israel. The hijacked aircraft was diverted to Entebbe, Uganda. The incident, widely referred to as Operation Entebbe, ended when 100 commandos from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raided the airport, saving 102 of the 106 hostages. All seven hijackers were killed, as were and between 33 and 45 Ugandan soldiers. IDF unit commander Lt. Col. Yonatan Netanyahu died during the rescue, and five IDF commandos were wounded (Herf, 2016). The period between 1972 and 1980 also saw numerous attacks perpetrated by Bewegung 2. Juni (June 2 Movement; J2M), which took its name from the date Benno Ohnesorg had been murdered. Operating almost exclusively in West Berlin, the groups most notable action was the kidnapping of West Berlin mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz only days before the mayoral election in 1975, which prompted the release of several members of J2M and RAF. In contrast to the Marxist ideology of RAF, J2M was an anarchist group. But the groups were able to cooperate despite their ideological differences and found “unity in the anti-Imperial armed struggle” (Mapping Military Organizations, 2012). On 2 June 1980, a letter sent to German newspaper indicated that J2M had disbanded and merged with RAF. Greece In 1967, the Greek military seized power in a coup d’état, overthrowing the center-right government of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos. It established a military junta led by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos that became known as the Régime of the Colonels. The dictatorship of Papadopoulos was anticommunist and ultranationalist. Political rights and civil liberties were immediately curtailed as a part of the larger project of dismantling democracy in Greece. During the first week of the coup, over 8,000 “suspected communists” and other political adversaries were arrested and subsequently exiled or imprisoned and tortured (Woodhouse, 1985). Following a rigged election in July 1973 that abolished the Greek monarchy and ratified a constitution that transformed the country into a presidential republic, Papadopoulos became President of Greece. In September 1973, he began a process of liberalization intended to establish the legitimacy of the government, which had been rejected by other European and international governments. President Papadopoulos abolished martial law, ordered the release of all political prisoners, and eased censorship. One notable effect of this easing was that prominent Marxist and anarchist texts and treatises became

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more widely available (Kassimeris, 2013). At the same time, the government was struggling to address mounting tensions with student activists. In an attempt to quell protests, the government revoked a long-standing measure that allowed students to defer their service in the army in 1972. On 21 February 1973, the first large-scale public action against the military dictatorship saw law students from the University of Athens go on strike and barricade themselves inside the law school in protest of the law imposing forcible conscription (Kornetis, 2013). After repelling an attempt by junta-backed fascists to break up the student occupation, the “occupation committee” agreed to end it. This protest marked the start of an anti-authoritarian movement among students and youth. Later in 1973, on 14 November, students at the National Technical University of Athens (also referred to as Athens Polytechnic) went on strike and occupied the school in protest against the military junta. The following day, thousands of people joined the occupation in support, and the protests spread through various neighborhoods in Athens. On 17 November, the government used a tank and the military to crash the gates of the polytechnic and bring an end to the occupation. Although a subsequent investigation concluded that no one at the campus was killed, 24 civilian deaths and hundreds of injuries were reported around Athens. Within a week of the uprising, Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis, who, along with other hardliners, vehemently opposed Papadopoulos’s liberalization, used the outcry over the bloody and draconian response to the uprising to oust Papadopoulos in another coup that reversed the ongoing process of liberalization and re-established a military dictatorship. An extreme nationalist, Ioannidis, orchestrated a coup in Cyprus on 15 July 1974 in an attempt to annex the country. The coup prompted Turkey to invade Cyprus on 20 July, which resulted in a military and political disaster for both Greece and Cyprus and led to thousands of dead and hundreds of thousands of Greek-Cypriot refugees (Mallinson, 2005). Although a complete rationale has never been articulated, only three days after the Turkish invasion, military junta abandoned Ioannidis and agreed to relinquish power to an appointed national unity government (Mallinson, 2005). Konstantinos Karamanlis, a former Prime Minister of Greece, was sworn in on 23 July 1974 with a mandate to transition from military dictatorship to representative democracy (Panteli, 1990). Although President Karamanlis enjoyed broad popular support, the transition was unsurprisingly, perilous. Many on the left were furious that some former junta members were given positions in the new cabinet. At the same time, neo-fascist groups began a campaign of terrorist bombings intended to create an atmosphere of fear and instability (Panteli, 1990). Many of the students who had been instrumental in resisting the junta grew disillusioned at the government’s inability to “turn the page” on the junta’s reign and questioned the government’s legitimacy. From this discontent would arise New Left terrorism in Greece.

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The most notable groups were Epanastatiki Organosi dekaefta Noemvri (Revolutionary Organization 17 November; N17) and Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA), both of which were, in addition to being dedicated to revealing the “democratic façade” of Greek government, characteristically antiAmerican, anti-NATO, and anti-EC (Kassimeris, 2013). N17, which took its name from the Athens Polytechnic events of 1973, was the deadlier group, while the ELA was more active. The ELA, which emerged first, argued that “meaningful revolutionary change needed strategic direction from an armed vanguard of professional revolutionaries,” and to that end conducted hundreds of non-lethal, low-level bombings aimed at symbolic targets, including US military and business facilities, European Community and United Nations offices, and foreign embassies, to “educate the ‘passive’ masses and convert them to the cause” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). In contrast, N17 regarded the ELA tactics as ineffectual and was critical of its poor target selection and operational incompetence (Kassimeris, 2013), embarked instead on a campaign of assassinations, knee-cappings, and armed raids and bombings. Its first recorded, and most notorious, act was the assassination of Richard Welch on 23 December 1975. Between this killing and its last known operation in 2000, N17 carried out over 100 operations and was responsible for 23 deaths and scores of injuries. The ELA disbanded in 1995, while the arrest of 14 N17 members in 2002 in attempts to stem terrorism prior to the 2004 Olympic Games (CNN, 2002) is generally considered to be the end of the group. Spain New Left violence in Spain began in 1975, during the months following the death of General Francisco Franco and during the transition to democracy, but the seeds were planted in 1968, when the Organización de Marxistas Leninistas Españoles (Organization of Spanish Marxist-Leninists; OMLE) split off from the Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain; PCE). The OMLE accused the PCE of revisionism, while certain groups of leftist Spanish exiles were disappointed with the staunchly pro-Soviet and “frozen” stance of PCE. The OMLE renamed itself Partido Comunista de España Reconstituido (Communist Party of Spain (Reconstituted); PCE(r)) in June 1975. To wage its armed revolutionary struggle against the political reforms of the newly established monarchy of King Juan Carlos I, the PCE(r) restructured itself into different commissions, one of which was a “front against fascism” that became Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups; GRAPO), in reference to the first violent action of the PCE(r), the killing of four Spanish policemen on 1 October 1975 (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992). Specifically, GRAPO sought to overthrow the parliamentary monarchy that was replacing Franco’s authoritarian state (Pesta, 2022). Like RAF, GRAPO was also fiercely anti-NATO; it saw NATO countries as providing support and legitimacy to the newly developing Spanish state. Between its inception in 1975 and 2006, the last

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year during which GRAPO claimed credit for an attack, the group committed bombings and shootings that killed over 80 people, including police, military personnel, judges, and civilians. GRAPO have never formally disbanded, but the Spanish government believe the group to be inactive since the arrest of six of its militants in June 2007 (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992). Portugal Similar to the situations in Greece and Spain, New Left terrorism in Portugal erupted during the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy. Owing to chronic political instability, the First Portuguese Republic ended via a military coup on 28 May 1926 that would establish one of the most enduring twentieth-century authoritarian regimes in Europe. The first period, the Ditadura Nacional (National Dictatorship) ran until 1933, when António de Oliveira Salazar, who had been appointed Prime Minister (and de facto Dictator) of Portugal in 1932, established the Estado Novo (New State), an autocratic, nationalist regime that sought to continue Portuguese colonialism and expansionism; championed the Catholic Church; and opposed communism, socialism, anarchism, and liberalism (de Meneses & McNamara, 2017). Salazar ruled until he had a stroke and fell into a coma in 1968, when he was replaced by Marcelo Caetano. Although he was committed to authoritarianism, Caetano began to introduce small economic and social reforms, including slight increases to freedom of speech and of the press, in hopes of modernizing the country. But even these limited changes proved to be too much for President Américo Tomás and his hardline supporters, who rolled back all of Caetano’s reforms following national elections in 1973 (Ferreira & Marshall, 1986). This return to authoritarianism, combined with the devastating effects of the Portuguese Colonial War, which has been ongoing since 1961, provided the impetus for the Carnation Revolution that ended Estado Novo: on 25 April 1974, left-wing military officers staged a bloodless coup that would soon thereafter see the termination of the Colonial War and mark the beginning of the transition to democracy in Portugal. Even before the Carnation Revolution, the tentative experimentation with democratic reforms hinted at by Caetano had opened a small crack for activist political organizations in Portugal, such as the Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses/Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (Portuguese Workers’ Communist Party/Re-Organized Movement of the Party of the Proletariat; PCTP/MRPP) and the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado—Brigadas Revolucionárias (Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat—Revolutionary Brigades). Comprised of dissidents from the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) who had grown disillusioned with the PCP’s aversion to violence, the Revolutionary Brigades committed its first armed action, a bomb attack against NATO facilities in Fonte da Telha on 7 November 1971 (Da Silva & Ferreira, 2020). Following the Carnation Revolution, the Revolutionary Brigades became increasingly frustrated with the political direction of the country during the consolidation of democracy (e.g., Portugal’s pending

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entry into the European Economic Community) and waged a campaign of bombings and bank robberies between 1975 and 1980, when the group was terminated by the imprisonment of several leaders. This did not, however, extinguish New Left terrorism, as the most radical factions of the left in Portugal, including the remaining members of the Revolutionary Brigades, came together to found Forças Populares 25 de Abril (Popular Forces 25 April; FP-25) in 1980. Through 1984, FP-25 typically targeted small businessmen and administrators, usually involved with companies facing serious labor disputes, for execution. In June 1984, the largest police operation ever to occur in Portugal, referred to as Operation Orion, resulted in the arrest of more than 60 terrorists, including many of FP25’s leaders (Da Silva & Ferreira, 2020). These arrests damaged but did not destroy the group. Their most well-known attack, the assassination of Prison Services General Manager Gaspar Castelo-Branco, occurred in 1986. There we no recorded incidents involving FP-25 after 1987, and on 10 May 1991, the presumed remaining terrorists handed over their weapons and renounced armed violence, thereby dissolving the group (Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992). France In stark contrast to the groups that emerged in European societies that were undergoing civil strife and political challenges, New Left terrorism in France was borne of a much more stable context. Nonetheless, there were elements of French political violence that were similar to those in other countries, most notably ideological battles between “mainstream” and “insurgent” left-wing movements. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the rise of a young vanguard of extreme leftists who regarded the mainstream left as being too conformist and ineffective. This new movement, referred to as gauchisme, sought to adapt left-wing principles to evolving social conditions; it highlighted controversial issues that were being ignored by the mainstream left, such as the Vietnam War, the university, and the status of the capitalist worker (Dartnell, 1995). But gauchisme was largely ignored until May 1968, when a combination of domestic and international issues briefly raised the possibility of revolution. Across the country, a series of wild-cat strikes and student rebellions paralyzed France for a month. For most, the fervor soon passed, and a sense of normalcy returned. The student movement dissipated by 1973, and the rebirth of the Socialist Party made political change through the electoral system appear much more feasible. But some gauchistes believed (mistakenly) that the events of May showed a larger reservoir of untapped revolutionary potential and spent the next five years unsuccessfully trying to recreate what they perceived to be the necessary conditions for a socialist revolution. Out of these efforts would emerge perhaps the most notable New Left terrorist group in France, Action Directe (Direct Action; AD). Active between 1979 and 1987, AD represented an amalgam of two groups:

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Groupes d’aaion rivolutionnaires internationalistes (Internationalist Revolutionary Action Groups; GARI) and Noyaux armes pour l’autonomie populaire (Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy; NAPAP). GARI was based in southwestern France and was heavily influenced by the anti-Franco Spanish anarchists; it was particularly active in the Toulouse area and Spain between 1972 and 1979. NAPAP was a Maoist organization that was mostly active in 1977 and 1978. Characterized as the “military-political co-ordination of the autonomous movement,” AD served as an umbrella for several affiliated groups. In 1979 and 1980, the Lyon and Paris factions of AD conducted machine gun attacks and bombings, as well as bank robberies to fund operations. This first phase of AD effectively came to an end in 1980, however, when several leaders were arrested during a police ambush (Dartnell, 1995). The election of Francois Mitterrand, the First Secretary of the Social Party, as the first left-wing President of France during the Fifth Republic in 1981, as well as the inclusion of the Communist Party in his government, appeared to remove any further motivation for extreme left violence. But despite this electoral success, and an amnesty that pardoned AD prisoners who had not spilled blood or committed felonies against state security, the Paris faction began to slowly regroup and increasingly engaged in more violent assaults. In 1982, the Lyon and Paris factions split into separate organizations: the former became Action Direct Nation (ADn) and continued to function as in the same matter as AD proper, while the latter, Action Direct International (ADi), began to see imperialism as the great impediment to revolution and began trying to forge an network of like-minded groups across Europe and the Middle East (although its actions continued to be focused on France). ADn was dismantled with the capture of several of its most prominent leaders in 1986; ADi was similarly decapitated the following year (Dartnell, 1995). United States The rise of New Left activism in the United States was centered on the Students for Democratic Society (SDS), a national organization that was founded in 1960 and grounded in socialist principles dedicated broadly to social change. In the same way as leftist student groups in Europe, SDS was animated by events of the Vietnam War. Through the 1960s, however, it would expand to champion other social issues, including the women’s liberation and civil rights movements. Infighting between different factions within the coalition fractured SDS in 1969. From this split emerged the Weather Underground Organization (WUO), a far-left militant organization that first gained prominence with its violent “Days of Rage” protests in Chicago in 1969 (Varon, 2004). In addition to its aggressive opposition to the Vietnam War, WUO also operated in solidarity with the Black Power movement, which eschewed the moderate or incrementalist approaches of the mainstream or peaceful civil rights movement as being out of touch with the lived realities of Blacks in many areas of the country. Following the riots that roiled many

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US cities and the assassination of Malcolm X in 1965, leading Black Power voices called for immediate and violent action, black nationalism, to counter the threat posed by white supremacy. The fusion of revolutionary socialist ideals with radical civil rights distinguished the New Left in Europe from that in the United States (Burrough, 2015). WUO committed numerous attacks linking the US executive branch and military to the events in Southeast Asia. Following the bombings of the US Capitol in 1971, Pentagon in 1972, and US Department of State in 1975, WUO communications indicated the attacks were “in protest of the U.S. invasion of Laos,” “in retaliation for the U.S. bombing raid in Hanoi,” and “in response to the escalation in Vietnam,” respectively. The WUO was weakened significantly after the United States reached a peace accord in Vietnam in 1973, and was also plagued by infighting; the group ceased operations in 1977. Following its demise, some of the former members that favored more extreme actions joined with individuals from the black power Black Liberation Army to form the May 19th Communist Organization (M19CO). Between 1979 and 1985, M19CO staged prison breaks to free left-wing terrorists, engaged in at least 10 bombings, and robbed a Brinks armored car near Nyack, New York. The Nyack attack left two police officers dead and netted $1.6 million that was intended to create an ethnostate for black Americans in the south, termed “New Afrika” (Horowitz, 2001). With one exception, all of the members of M19CO had been arrested by May 1985, and the group was essentially defunct (Jacobs, 1997). A lesser known but arguably more successful Marxist terrorist group was the United Freedom Front (UFF). The UFF claimed that US interference was helping to prop up the apartheid regime in South Africa, and opposed interventionist US foreign policies in Central America. The group carried out at least 20 bombings in the northeastern United States, targeting corporate buildings, courthouses, and military facilities, and financed their activities with a number of bank robberies between 1975 and 1984 (Smith, 1994), but by 1985, all of the members of UFF had been arrested. Religious Terrorism and Beyond The 1980s marked the transition from the New Left wave of terrorism to religious terrorism. The religious wave was ignited by the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, both of which set the stage for religious fundamentalism (Rapoport, 2004), particularly jihadism. By the mid-1980s, most of the New Left terrorist groups had disbanded or been decimated by arrests. In some countries, new groups tried to pick up where previous efforts had failed, but none of these have matched the prevalence or lethality of their predecessors, and left-wing terrorism was relegated to the shadows of jihadism. In the past five years, as the threat of jihadism appears to be receding in the West, there has been a rush to identify the next wave of terrorism. Among the contestants are technologically based terrorism

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and lone actor terrorism. But in light of events that have unfolded across the Western world since 2016, there is an emerging consensus that the next wave will be right-wing terrorism. The remainder of this chapter highlights what has been impact of the shift on left-wing extremist groups and how it might look moving forward.

The Current Threat The current risk presented by left-wing extremism in the West seems to involve a combination of “traditional” groups and more recent incarnations. These differences are evident in comparisons between Europe and North America. In Europe, the left-wing landscape is more reflective of long-standing anarchist traditions in countries such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. Conversely, the North American landscape is reflective of groups such as Antifa, social justice groups such as Black Lives Matter, and environmental extremism. The following section of this chapter maps out the impacts of these disparate threats. Europe Compared to the historical context, the modern left-wing extremist milieu has received far less attention and research; as result, knowledge of presentday left-wing extremism is scarce (Koehler, 2021). This is partly a result of research and policy focus on other more imminent threats, such as the threat from Islamist extremism in the early 2000s and more recently the threat of right-wing extremism. Other common problems in terrorism and extremism research, such as access to participants, also likely play a role. However, this dearth of knowledge is also at least partly a result of the fact that at least some of the left-wing extremist ideology is in line with general left-wing thought; critiques of capitalism are not limited to extremist groups and are a mainstay in mainstream liberal left-wing politics. Thus, the study of these groups may be seen as “unliberal.” Farinelli and Marinone (2021) reiterate these issues and point to additional challenges, including the lack of access to left-wing extremists by researchers. The resulting gaps in knowledge mean that very little is known about the contemporary left-wing threat level in Europe. Another challenge is posed by the lack of consensus over what constitutes left-wing terrorism. Much like other ideologies, a lack of agreement on definitions makes comparisons challenging. Europol defines left-wing extremism and anarchism as separate but connected ideologies. Left-wing extremism includes groups that “seek to trigger a violent revolution against the political, social and economic system of a state, in order to introduce socialism and eventually establish a communist and a classless society” (Europol, 2022, p. 59). Anarchism, on the other hand, refers to “terrorism is a term used to describe violent acts committed by groups, and to a lesser extent individuals, promoting the absence of authority as a societal model. Anarchists pursue a revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian agenda” (Europol,

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2022, p. 59). Anarchists are considered to have a “strong tendency towards violence and destruction” (Europol, 2022, p. 69). Of note, anarchists are said to “loosely fall under the umbrella term of the anti-fascist movement (Antifa)” (Europol, 2022, p. 67); it remains unclear, however, whether Antifa is simply a modern label being used to describe these anarchists converging or if anarchists are distinct from general antifascists. Finally, a common feature of left-wing extremism in Europe is extremist support for the Kurdish people and the development of an independent Kurdish state (Europol, 2022; Farinelli & Marinone, 2021). In the past, those who left Europe to become foreign fighters fighting for the Kurdish cause, forming connections with the separatist group PKK or Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) and the People’s Protection Yunit Militia (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel ), have been considered to be left-wing extremists (Europol, 2022). Trends in European reporting have shown that left-wing and anarchist extremism are persistent and increasing issues in certain European countries, most notably Italy, Spain, Greece, and Germany (Europol, 2021, 2022,). Incidences of left-wing extremism, however, are substantially less than that of the past and thus are often not perceived as serious threats (Farinelli & Marinone, 2021). In addition, left-wing extremist actors work in groups often and connect both across Europe and Latin America, creating a network of groups working together on common issues (Europol, 2022; Farinelli & Marinone, 2021). For example, in Europe, there appear to be three core networks of left-wing extremists, one between Italy, Greece, France, and Spain, a second between Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, and a third between Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (Europol, 2022). In some cases, members of other groups have been arrested in Europe; in 2021, individuals identified to be part of the Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front; DHKP-C) were put on trial in Greece following their arrest (Europol, 2021, 2022). DHKP-C holds Marxist ideals and desires to overthrow the Turkish government (Europol 2022). An interesting point of conversion between the extremist right and extremist left has been their reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic; at times, the rhetoric of both groups converged in their reaction to what was perceived as government overreach (Farinelli & Marinone, 2021). For example, while some left-wing extremists supported government measures and became counter-protesters to those who opposed the government measures, others paradoxically disapproved of lockdowns and vaccine passports, believing that the government was overreaching and overbearing (Farinelli & Marinone, 2021). These groups often used elements of the COVID-19 pandemic to create propaganda furthering more traditional left-wing and anarchist arguments around anti-capitalism and anti-government. In addition, Europol (2022) reports that left-wing extremists in Europe have begun to incorporate more general left-wing causes. It lists “scientific and technological advancements, such as 5G antennas, social injustice, the growing economic gap within society, living costs and shortages in housing, especially in bigger European

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cities and metropolitan areas, gentrification, patriarchy, LGBTQ+ , women’s rights and Black Lives Matter” as new areas of far-left concern (Europol, 2022, p. 69). These concerns are much closer to the concerns of many liberal and socially progressive individuals, and thus may be appealing to a new demographic set of individuals, but not all of the concerns reflect traditional tenants of left-wing extremism. These changes suggest that what is considered left-wing extremism is evolving and requires our attention. Still, Europe’s much longer history of left-wing extremism has also translated to more left-wing extremist activity today. Using Europol’s annual reports on terrorist activity, Farinelli and Marinone (2021) identify 14 key groups who have engaged in violent extremism over the past two decades, although two, the Federazione Anarchica Informale (Informal Anarchist Federation; FAI) and the Synomosía Pyrínon tis Fotiás (Conspiracy of the Cells of Fire; SPF), are considered to be the groups posing the highest threat (EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 2021). That most of this activity has occurred in Spain, Greece, and Italy is unsurprising, given the long histories of left-wing extremism in these areas. This is not to say other European nation-states have not experienced left-wing extremist activity. For example, left-wing extremists in Switzerland are characterized as anti-capitalists, antifascists, and those who support the Kurdish plight (Switzerland’s Security Situation Report, 2022). The UK has reported that a small number of left-wing extremists have been referred through the Prevent Programme in 2021–2022; however, the details of these cases are not included (Home Office, 2023). In France, protests attributed to the “Black Block” have resulted in clashes with police (BBC, 2019). In Ireland, a unique iteration of Antifa exists; with no identified extreme right to oppose, antifascists work to prevent its emergence, and to unite left-wing activists and radicals (Arlow, 2020). But the bulk of left-wing extremism has been borne by four countries. In Italy, organizations such as the Nuove Brigate Rosse (New Red Brigades; NBR) and FAI are the most well-known for violent extremist activity. Now considered to be defunct, it is unclear how much of the original Marxist Red Brigades ideology was retained by NBR (Westcott, 2004). They were considered most active in 1999, but there appears to be no new activity following the early 2000s (Westcott, 2004). FAI become active in 2003, when they sent a series of letter bombs to leaders and representatives of the European Union (Marone, 2014, 2015). FAI originally consisted of a series of groups and individuals that relies on a horizontal structure between individuals and other cells, including the “July 20th Brigade,” the “Five C’s,” “International Solidarity,” and the “Cooperative of Hand-Made Fire & Related Items” (Informal Anarchist Federation, 2010; Marone, 2014, 2015). This list has since expanded and includes a variety of associated groups within Italy and around the world (Marone, 2014). For example, they are closely aligned with SPF (Marone, 2014, 2015; Conspiracy of Cells of Fire, 2016). FAI identifies itself as anarchist and anti-government in nature, stating that they seek to “attack and destroy the responsible for repression and exploitation! Attack and destroy

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prisons, banks, courts and police stations” and engage in a “social war against capital and the State” (FAI, 2003). As anarchists, the group opposes what they perceive as “the Marxist cancer, which is nothing more than a fascinating and dangerous siren that claims freedom for the oppressed but actually denies the possibility of a free society and just substitutes one dominion with another” (FAI, 2003). FAI’s informal network of groups has perpetrated anarchist attacks around the world, including the UK, Spain, and Slovenia (Marone, 2014, 2015). Greece has seen a number of leftist-anarchist groups emerge since the demise of N17 in 2002. Some of groups have been small and or short-lived, such as the Mahomenes Laikes Epanastatikes Dynameis (Militant Popular Revolutionary Forces), the Organosi Politofylakis Laiki Dikeosyn (Militia Group Popular Justice), and the Enoples Epanastatikes Dynameis (Armed Revolutionary Forces) (Farinelli & Marinone, 2021; See Europol, 2021, 2022). Other groups are more well-known, including the SPF , the Epanastatikos Agonas (Revolutionary Struggle), the Sekta Epanastaton (Sect of Revolutionaries or Rebel Sect), and the Organosi Epanastatikís Aftoámynas (Revolutionary Self-Defence Organisation). The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire or SPF defines themselves as an anarchist guerrilla made up of a variety of cells that “wage ware against the state” (Fire Cells Conspiracy, 2011). They also critique society as whole, as individuals, and their relationships inform and create the state. As a result, they claim not to represent a marginalized population; rather, they argue that “each rebel is a revolutionary subject” working alone but toward a collective “we” (Fire Cells Conspiracy, 2011). They also forged networks with FAI, arguing that the groups must support each other in an effort to create solidarity between causes (Fire Cells Conspiracy, 2011). Revolutionary Struggle is an anti-capitalist, anti-government group originating in 2003 (Revolutionary Struggle, 2010). It is socialist in nature and “somewhat anarchist” (Revolutionary Struggle, 2010). Similarly, the Sect of Revolutionaries appeared in 2009, but was not necessarily considered to be purely leftist, and is instead defined as nihilistic, using violence indiscriminately against institutions and civilians (Chantzi, 2012). Similarly, the Revolutionary SelfDefence Organisation is an anarchist group, also adopting a nihilistic approach (Karatrantos, 2018). Left-wing extremism in Germany has been increasing incrementally and is considered to pose a significant threat both in terms of direct interpersonal violence and in terms of destruction to property. Strictly ideologically left groups wiling to use violence include the Workers’ Power (Gruppe ArbeiterInnenmacht ), REVOLUTION a youth chapter of Workers’ Power, and the Socialist German Workers Youth (Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend) (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2021, 2020, 2019). These groups have traditional left-wing extremist goals to achieve a communist society. Other groups, such as the Communist Party of Germany, the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany, and its youth group REBELL and the Trotskyist Socialist Equality Party, are non-violent in nature. Lastly, and

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perhaps uniquely, Red Aid (Rote HIIlfe e.V.), considered to be “one of the largest and most important groupings of left-wing extremists in Germany” (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2021, p. 33), supports leftwing extremist both in prison and as they navigate the criminal justice system. They provide “political and social backing and […] legal and financial support” (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2021, p. 33). There are also number of groups and individual networks within Germany that are willing to use violence, such as the autonomists, generic anarchists and antifascists, and some strictly ideologically left groups. Autonomists (or Autonomen) appeared in the 1970s and pull from Marxist, feminist, and anarchist ideologies (Leach, 2009). Autonomous left-wing extremists despise all forms of control and strive for freedom from the state completely (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2020, 2019); they reject all forms of government, but do not believe in the gradual transition that Marxists believe in (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2020, 2019). They are willing to collaborate with non-extremists to achieve their goals. In fact, those identifying as post-autonomists focus on working with non-extremist groups and individuals to achieve their goals (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2019). Part of their modus operandi is also to “capture and defend free spaces” (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2021, p. 30). More specifically, they take over spaces they deem to be “free” to create their own communities. Antifascists also exist in Germany and have been known to use violence against those they define as fascists. Interestingly, much like critiques of other antifascists in other areas, it is far from clear who is and what is categorized as “fascist.” “[The term fascist] cannot be clearly defined, and in the leftwing extremist scene there is a tendency to label any political opponent as a ‘fascist’” (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2021, p. 29). Like other antifascists, their goal is to counter perceived fascists and prevent them from existing (Bundesministerium des Innern und fur Heimat, 2021). United States In contrast to Europe, left-wing activity in the United States and Canada is not prominent nor truly traditionally left. In the United States, Antifa has essentially become synonymous with left-wing violence. A second element of the North American far left is social justice groups, particularly Black Lives Matter, which is consistently vilified as a leftist threat by the political right. Finally, environmental extremism, which has traditionally not been perceived as problematic in Europe, as featured prominently is assessments of left-wing violence in the United States and Canada since the 1970s.

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Antifa Research focusing on left-wing extremism in both the United States and Canada is scarce and what exists, is largely focused on Antifa. Antifa, short for the Antifascist Network or Antifascists in general, reflects a loosely connected movement focused on fighting perceived fascism from the far-right (ADL, 2017; Bray, 2017; Copsey & Merrill, 2020; Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020; Vysotsky, 2021). Antifa has existed in Europe since the 1960s, but it did not gain prominence in North America until they clashed with right-wing extremists at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017. At its core, antifascism is the opposition to fascism. How fascism is defined, then, is key. Vysotsky, a scholar and self-proclaimed antifascist, states that “The fascist movement in the United States is distinguished by a distinct ideology that is rooted in white supremacy and patriarchy, and follows a clear organizational structure and strategies that unify disparate tendencies into a cohesive movement” (Vysotsky, 2021, pp. 26–27). Antifascism and Antifa can then be conceptualized as a response to a perceived threat of right-wing extremism and could be considered a counter-movement (Vysotsky, 2021). While Antifa is most often considered a social movement, others have argued that Antifa could be considered a terrorist organization, while others have further argued it to be a gang. For example, while conversationally many have argued Antifa is a terrorist group, most notably Former President Donald Trump (Beinart, 2017; Jones & Doxsee, 2021), LaFree (2018) argued that while violence by “Antifa” may have some elements of a terrorism, the clashes between Antifa and the far right in Charlottesville cannot be considered terrorism. Using the criteria used to determine inclusion in the global terrorism database, Lafree argues that although the clashes in Charlottesville were violent and were perpetrated by sub-national actors, the incident itself was not considered intentional (LaFree, 2018). Other extremist researchers have similarly argue that Antifa is not a single group and therefore cannot be singly defined as a terrorist group itself (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020). Speckhard and Ellenberg (2020) state that “while some far-left groups may consider themselves to be part of the Antifa movement, there is […] no formal structure that links these groups to each other or to other individuals who participate in violent counter-protests.” The above discussions of Antifa appear to focus on Antifa being a single type of entity. Vysotsky (2021) argues that there are both militant and non-militant antifascists as well as formal antifascists and informal antifascists. Militant antifascists are those that use violence, in response to fascism, whereas nonmilitant antifascists do not condone or engage in violence (Vysotksy, 2021). Formal antifascists are those who engage in organized and planned, whereas informal antifascism is that which is considered to be “Ad hoc” or reactionary responses to fascism (Vysotsky, 2021, p. 21). Formal antifascism “consist of the activities of groups and organizations that distinctly focus on opposition to fascist organizing” (Vysotsky, 2021, p, 21). These distinctions highlight the

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complex nature of antifa. Given these distinctions, talking about “antifa” may be more akin to talking about a larger umbrella ideology, rather than a specific entity. Mark Bray, a historian and self-identified antifascist, argues that Antifa is not just about being antifascist or opposing fascism and is instead as a “method of politics” (Bray, 2017, p. xiv), infiltrating all aspects of life. Similarly, Vysotsky (2013), who interviewed militant antifascists, reports that these individuals appear to be part of specific groups such as anarchists, anarchist punks, and anti-racist skinheads. For many of Vysotsky’s (2021) contacts, anarchism was part of some antifascist’s identities; for some antifascism was secondary to that their anarchist beliefs. Through individual interviews with self-proclaimed militant antifascists, he concludes that there are “overlaps between forms of leftist activism and militant antifascism. Antifa activists do not trade their desire to address one set of issues for antifascism but incorporate it into their existing activist work” (Vysotsky, 2021, p. 57). Although Antifa itself is not identified explicitly in their work, anarchists have been known to consider themselves to be antifascists (Vysotsky, 2021). This is not surprising as there is some level of “correlation between the goals of anarchists and those of antifascists” (Koch, 2018, p. 24; see also Copsey & Merrill, 2020). Both seek to eliminate white supremacy. Regardless of the definition, Antifa includes both groups and untethered individuals operating in a loose network centered on the antifascist ideology (ADL, 2017; Bray, 2017; Copsey & Merrill, 2020; Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020; Vysotsky, 2021). There are a series of groups or local chapters that identify with the Antifa moniker and engage in antifascist activity across the United States and in Canada. This includes a rather informal network called the Torch network that is made up of Antifa chapters across the United States and includes as the Philly Antifa Chapter, South Side Chicago Anti-Racist Action, Rose City Antifa, and Atlanta Antifascists, among others (Bray, 2017). Not all groups, however, use the moniker “antifa” and instead consider themselves to simply be anti-fascist. These groups include Smash Racism DC, the Twin City General, Defense Committee (or Twin City GDC), the Redneck Revolt (also known as RnR), and the Maoist Red Guards, among others (Bray, 2017). Further still, some individuals may identify as being a part of “antifa” but this could reflect their antifascist views more generally, or their involvement in more “formal” militant Antifa groups. It is these militant groups that extremism researchers should be focused on. It is accepted that there is a substantial group of those who identify as Antifa but are not engaging in violence (ADL, 2017; Bray, 2017; Vysotsky, 2021) or condoning violence online (Lenihan, 2021). These individuals involve themselves in everyday activities such as educating others on the threat of fascism (Bray, 2017; Vysotsky, 2021), while others may engage in “community organizing, letter writing, [and] doxing or exposing white supremacists” (Williams, 2022). Militant Antifa, on the other hand, believe that violence is a legitimate response to the rise of fascism and more specifically right-wing extremists (ADL, 2017;

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Bray, 2017; Vysotsky, 2021). However, research has shown that even militant antifascists may not engage in violence indiscriminately (Copsey & Merrill 2020). Instead, militant antifascists consider the tactical and logistical practicalities of the use of violence in order to avoid sanctions by the states and ultimately the dissolution of antifascist groups (Copsey & Merrill 2020, 2021). It is important not to conflate the liberal or left-wing politics of today with the traditional left wing. Today, the left-wing politics is focused more on attaining individual rights of marginalized groups. The traditional left, however, was defined by Marxist, Maoist, and anarchist ideologies. And although Antifa does borrow anarchist imagery (i.e., red and black flag) (Vysotsky, 2021), their ideologies do not seem to be the same. Vysotsky (2021) argues that antifascists and anarchists both oppose fascism and specifically right-wing extremism, and while this is true, this alone does not connect the ideologies. His work, however, does highlight that many who identify as antifascists also identify as anarchists, opposing authority and government (Vysotsky, 2021). His interviews showed that “Antifa activists do not trade their desire to address one set of issues for antifascism, but incorporate it into their” (Vysotsky, 2021, p. 57). But this is not the case with all who identify as antifascists, militant, or not. Black Lives Matters Specific to the United States is the concern regarding what the FBI has called “Black Identity Extremists.” In 2017, under the Trump presidency, the FBI issued a document claiming that “It is very likely Black Identity Extremists (B.I.E.) perceptions of police brutality against African Americans spurred an increase in premeditated, retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement and will very likely serve as justification for such violence” (F.B.I. Counter-Terrorism Division, 2017 as cited in Winter & Weinberger, 2017). The language used insinuates that Black civil rights activists, protesting the systemic use of police violence against African American men, are terrorists; a thought that has been critiqued for its potential effects on legitimate protest (Beydoun & Hansford, 2017; Tau, 2019; Winter & Weinberger, 2017). These critiques are legitimate given that 93% of protests involving Black Lives Matter activists have been non-violent (Kishi et al., 2021). More recently, the FBI has defined domestic terrorism to include both “racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism” and “anti-government or anti-authority violent extremism” (FBI, 2020). The language does not explicitly reference black identity extremists; however, it does not differentiate the far-right extremists from the far left. The use of the single category was initially criticized for equating the threat from right-wing extremists to that of left-wing extremists (Tau, 2019). While it is important for extremist and terrorist researchers and government officials to not show bias toward either right-wing extremism or left-wing extremism, we must also carefully weigh the need to label groups such as BLM terrorist organizations. It is worth noting that extremist beliefs on their

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own are not problematic; most political revolutionary groups are extremist compared within their context. However, violent extremism is something we must worry about, regardless of the morality of their motives. Still, labeling any dissenting group as a terrorist organization as a whole must be done with some level of caution. This is not to say that violent extremism and hate groups cannot be perpetrated by members of the left and Black individuals. For example, Micah Xavier Johnson killed five police officers in Dallas in 2016 during a Black Lives Matter protest (Associated Press, 2016). He, however, was not linked to the BLM movement. Online, he followed and liked, Facebook posts by the African American Defense League and the New Black Panther Party, both groups that have called for violence toward police in the United States (Associated Press, 2016). However, these groups would be incorrectly categorized as left-wing groups and instead would be better defined as groups based on racial prejudice or black separatist groups.

The Possible Futures of Extreme Left Terrorism Predicting the future, particularly in relation to a complex and dynamic phenomenon such as terrorism, is a most perilous endeavor. At present, there is a general consensus that while far-right terrorism constitutes a much greater threat, left-wing terrorism is nonetheless a matter of concern. Included with most of these assessments are allusions to how the risk posed by far left could increase, usually by referencing the history of New Left Violence in the 1970s and 1980s. Often ignored, however, are both the likelihood of that happening, as well as specific considerations of what might spur an increase in left-wing terrorism. What are the chances it will grow into something larger? And under what conditions might that happen? The following section discusses considerations that could factor into the future trajectory of far-left terrorism. Still Waiting for the Shoe That May Never Drop The literature on environmental extremism in North America provides a consistent example of the “perpetual but unrealized” model evaluating the risk of violent left-wing extremism. Consider, for example, the warning offered by Carson et al. (2012) over a decade ago. Through the course of their analyses, the authors find that “attacks by environmental and animal rights groups have thus far been almost universally nonviolent” (2012: 295). They further note that concerns over the moral implications of criminal behavior, as well as, to a lesser extent, the worries over the legal consequences of such actions, “seemed to be very important in respondents’ calculations of the costs and benefits in participating in criminal acts associated with environmental or animal rights causes” (2012: 314). Despite these findings, the authors conclude that “the unanswered question is whether this almost universally nonviolent movement will remain so in the future” (2012: 316) and further suggest that “concerns linger that this situation might change in the future” (2012: 295). This

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conclusion is of course correct on the face of it; but it is unclear as to how this conclusion follows from the results presented and engenders a number of questions. Why would this wholly non-violent movement turn to violence? Under what conditions would the moral calculus around violence change? Expanding this argument to left-wing terrorism more generally, there is no evidence that points to this form of violence posing a significantly increasing threat, in terms of numbers or lethality of incidents. Apart from anti-fascism and sporadic outbursts, one could reasonably conclude that left-wing terrorism will continue to constitute a real but comparatively small threat, particularly in comparison with the threat posed by the far right. In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, present social and political conditions are not particularly conducive to sustained revolutionary left-wing violence. The Fall of the Soviet Union While the risk posed by left-wing extremists did not die with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was greatly diminished. First, the Soviet Union (SU) had been a source of sanctuary and support for a wide array of far-left groups. As noted earlier, for example, RAF in West Germany was for years assisted by the Stasi, East Germany’s security service. The fall of the SU resulted in the loss of a critical source of materiel support. But perhaps more importantly, its demise stripped left-wing groups of their ideological foundations. While they existed, the republics of the SU demonstrated the viability (albeit imperfect) of communism as a political system. Today, communism is the official form of government in only five countries—China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam—and each of these governments is only nominally communist. All five exhibit some variation of mixed economies; with the exception of North Korea, all combine state-owned enterprises and either public sector enterprises or private ownership of companies, and encourage direct foreign investment. North Korea continues to follow a more centrally planned economy, but the role of the markets is rapidly increasing. In short, it is increasingly challenging to present communism as viable political or economic model as the basis for revolution. In the United States, only people who talk about “communists” are far-right politicians and the talking heads at Fox News. Moreover, the unjustified invasion of Ukraine has further eroded Western attitudes toward Russia. While vestiges of more traditional left-wing extremists persist in Europe, there is no potentially untapped groundswell of support for radical left-wing ideas. The Rise (and Rise) of the Right (and Extreme Right) Since the mid-2010s, many countries in the West have experienced notable political shifts to the right. While there are no dictatorships in the vein of Papadopoulos or Franco, turns to populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are becoming increasingly pervasive. Political discourse has become polarized

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and divisive. On the one hand, this would seem to foreshadow a potentially violent left-wing response. On the other hand, however, few are arguing for left-wing alternatives, as evidenced by the declining support of traditional leftwing political parties. Explicit calls for socialism, communism, Marxism, and Maoism do not feature prominently in proposed responses. In the United States, left-wing “radicalism” or “extremism” often is merely the labels applied by those on the far right to anyone perceived as an opponent; the actual left has been fragmented and seems at a loss as to how best combat the rising tide of the right. Losing the Cyberwars One of the most significant factors in the rise of the far right has been its weaponization of the internet for the purposes of recruitment and radicalization. The explosion of extremist platforms and social media has produced a distinct far-right milieu, characterized by its own idiosyncratic language, references, and visual representations (most notably memes). Ideological entrepreneurs on the far right attract and mobilize individuals to “the cause” by stoking and capitalizing on pre-existing resentments and grievances. Among the more insidious effects of the COVID-19 pandemic was the virtual eruption of conspiracy theories and disinformation, the spread of which has been aided by changes in the nature of disinformation. Where conspiracy theories once focused on attempts to explain “inconsistencies” or “anomalies,” the “new conspiracism” does not require any facts at all: only assertion or innuendo. Furthermore, these disinformation campaigns are designed not to explain, but to foster and provoke violence. Perhaps the best example of this is the Great Replacement Theory, which has been implicated as a motivation for many of the worst mass casualty attacks of the past decade, including: the 2011 Norway attacks; Charleston Church in South Carolina in 2015; Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 2018; El Paso Walmart in Texas in 2019; Christchurch mosques in New Zealand in 2019; and Tops supermarket in Buffalo, New York in 2022. The efforts of the far right have been so pervasive that extremist ideas have entered the mainstream political discourse and greatly expanded the so-called Overton Window, the range of “acceptable” discourse. Instances of racist, misogynistic, anti-Semitic, and anti-LGBTQ2A+ rhetoric that would have been deemed wholly unacceptable only a decade ago have become commonplace. For extremists, trafficking in conspiracies and demonstrating an understanding of particular words, phrases, symbols, and images has become a shibboleth, a “secret handshake” that demonstrates commitment to the far right (Askanius & Keller, 2021). Among the most salient fears prompted by the right’s weaponization of the internet is the increasing normalization of violence. In comparison, the left’s utilization has been far more muted, and far less effectives; the extreme left has been conspicuous through its absence. In fact, rather than arguing that the far left has lost the cyberwars, it might be more

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appropriate to suggest that it has, as yet, never fully engaged. As Andersson has noted, the internet has not been a “not a prioritized arena for propaganda and recruitment for the radical left in Sweden” (2018: 384). Andersson’s research on the far-left digital landscape uncovered only three sites that met the study’s inclusion criterion of “groups that explicitly promoted or in other ways presented the use of violence as a legitimate means of political pressure” (2018: 386). The study further found these sites did not encourage the type of connectivity, accessibility, and interactivity that is required to promote radical social change (see Gerbaudo, 2012). On the contrary, “none of these sites was interactive, they gave no opportunities for comments or feedback, and they were based strictly on one-way communication” (Andersson, 2018: 387). Until the far left more fully embraces the affordances offered by the internet, the likelihood that associated groups come to present an elevated risk will remain low. Antifa as the New, New Left Since 2017, Antifa has become the standard bearer for left-wing extremism. According to our analysis of the Global Terrorism Database (GDT), approximately three-quarters of all identified attacks classified as “left-wing” were attributed to Antifa. But with one possible exception, none of these incidents have involved lethal violence. Antifa activity has primarily focused on engaging in conflict with far-right individuals and groups, much of it consensual in nature. In some of these cases law enforcement officers have also been attacked, but always an ancillary to the conflict with right-wing activists: law enforcement has not been the explicit target of Antifa violence. Isolated events such as the shooting of Congressman Steven Scalise in 2017 and the attempted bombing of a US Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention center in Tacoma, Washington in 2019 notwithstanding, Antifa has not attacked state representatives or symbols, and has shown no proclivity toward what traditional left-wing parlance would refer to as revolutionary violence. “Antifa is not going around murdering people like right wing extremists are. It’s a false equivalence” (Beirich, as cited in The Guardian, 2020). Some researchers have questioned whether the actions of Antifa during protests and other rallies even constitutes terrorism. LaFree (2018) maintains that “while the events share many characteristics of terrorist attacks,” the actions by Antifa supporters during [the Unity the Right Rally in 2017] do not include all of the elements of terrorism.” Addressing directly the threat posed by Antifa, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that “the threat from Antifa-associated actors in the United States is relatively small” (Jones, 2020). There is nothing in the European context that contradicts this assessment.

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The “Evolution” of Left-Wing Ideology Somewhat analogous to the way that many New Left groups incorporated the civil rights movement and feminism into the ideological tenets of socialism and communism, today’s left is very much animated by issues of racial, gender, and economic inequality. It is not unreasonable to conceptualize these “social justice movements” as the evolution of, or at least one potential extension, of traditional left-wing movements. We are now several generations removed from the youth who embraced communist and Marxist ideals as the foundations for new, better social orders, and the youth of today are, not surprisingly, intent on creating their own version of social change, one that is not necessarily tied to strict adherence to existing ideologies. Many youth agitate for social change, but their ideological underpinning is more diverse than they were previously. Perhaps more importantly, these evolving ideas about social change are not premised on the need for, or even the acceptance of, “revolutionary” change, insofar as revolutionary change is itself inherently linked to violence. There is no doubt that there have been sporadic instances of violence tied to social justice movements, such as murder of five police officers in Dallas, Texas in 2016, but these events have been isolated and have not coalesced into a campaign of violence. There is nothing intrinsically violent about calls for social justice, and these movements are generally not reliant on the same sort of scapegoating, demonizing, and othering that the extreme right uses to rationalize violence. Put another way, while there will almost certainly always be particular individuals who feel that violence is absolutely required, that belief is not shared by those who otherwise support left-wing causes. The shift away from violence will take more time in those places that have longer, more entrenched histories of justification for extreme left violence, but overall, in the short and intermediate terms, the tides seem to be moving away from terrorism in the name of left-wing ideologies. Far Left Extremists Have Miscalculated Before Thus far, our analysis aligns with previous assessments on the level of risk presented by left-wing terrorism: existent, but small, especially in comparison with the extreme right. With the possible exception of the specter of left-wing, particularly antifa, violence that is a reaction to increasing terrorism from the extreme right, there are a number of currents working to moderate the threat posed by the far left. Nonetheless, there remains one notable danger that is virtually impossible to counter fully: the possibility of leftist groups overestimating the revolutionary potential of the general population. This was a recurrent theme in the analyses of New Left terrorism: these groups repeatedly, if mistakenly, concluded that there was an untapped mass of people looking to be led by a vanguard, or grassroots movement waiting to be mobilized. These assumptions consistently proved to be false then and would be equally as wrong now. While variations on the call to “overthrow the government”

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have pervaded right-wing political discourse in the United States, they come from the right of the political spectrum, including even mainstream politicians (see, e.g., Stop the Steal and the baseless belief that the 2020 election results are invalid). Conversely, the continued persistence of terrorist campaigns being waged by organizations such as the SPF, FAI, and NBR indicates that the potential for miscalculation by European left-wing groups remains. In the final analysis, the threat posed by left-wing terrorism is legitimate, but it is several orders of magnitude smaller than that posed by the extreme right, and it is important not to fall into the trap of false symmetry. The chapters that follow more clearly elucidate the specifics of the left-wing threat.

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Koehler, D. (2021). Disengaging from Left-Wing Terrorism and Extremism: Field Experiences from Germany and Research Gaps. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1917639. Kornetis, K. (2013). Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the ‘Long 1960s’ in Greece. New York: Berghahn Books. Kratz, J. (2018). Vietnam: The First Television War. Retrieved from: https://prologue. blogs.archives.gov/2018/01/25/vietnam-the-first-television-war/. LaFree, G. (2018). Is Antifa a Terrorist Group? Society, 55(3), 248–252. https://doi. org/10.1007/s12115-018-0246-x. Leach, D. K. (2009). An Elusive “We” Antidogmatism, Democratic Practice, and the Contradictory Identity of the German Autonomen. American Behavioral Scientist, 52(7), 1042-1068. Lenihan, E. (2021). A Classification of Antifa Twitter Accounts Based on Social Network Mapping and Linguistic Analysis. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 12(1), 12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-021-00847-8. Mallinson, W. (2005). Cyprus: A Modern History. New York: I. B. Tauris. Mapping Military Oganizations. (2012). Bewegung 2. Juni / Movement 2 June. Retrieved from: https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/gro ups/view/351?highlight=Yemen. Marone, F. (2014). A Profile of the Informal Anarchist Federation in Italy. CTC Sentinel, 7(3), 21–25. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-profile-of-the-informal-anarch ist-federation-in-italy/. Marone, F. (2015). The Rise of Insurrectionary Anarchist Terrorism in Italy. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 8(3), 194–214. https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2015. 1038288. Meade, R. C. (1990). The Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism. Houndmills Eng: Macmillan. Offord, D. (1986). The Russian Revolutionary Movement in the 1880s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Orsini, A. (2011). Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-set of Modern Terrorists. (S.J. Nodes, Trans.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Panteli, S. (1990). The Making of Modern Cyprus: From Obscurity to Statehood. Barnet: Interworld. Passmore, L. (2011). Ulrike Meinhof and the Red Army Faction: Performing Terrorism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. Pesta, M. (2022). The Leftist “Imagined Community”: The Transnational Imagination of Left-Wing Subversive Organizations in Western Europe. Historical Reflections, 48(2), 79–104. Pisano, V. S., Boorstin, D. J., & Blumer, T. J. (1984). Terrorism and Security: The Italian Experience. Report of the Sucommittee on Security and Terrorism. Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Ramjattan, B. (2020). The Vietnam War and Media: How Television Played a Vital Role in the War. Retrieved from: https://coffeeordie.com/vietnam-war-media. Rapoport, D. C. (2004). Modern Terror: The Four Waves. In Cronin, A. K. and Ludes, J. M. (eds.) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Revolutionary Struggle. (2010). Terrorist Profiles. START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Retrieved from the

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Wayback Machine: https://web.archive.org/web/20100605163227/http://www. start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3672. Scally, D. (2017). A Bullet That Changed Germany: The Shooting of Benno Ohnesorg. Retrived from: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/a-bullet-that-cha nged-germany-the-shooting-of-benno-ohnesorg-1.3104212. Schmeidel, J. (1993). My Enemy’s Enemy: Twenty Years of Co-operation Between West Germany’s Red Army Faction and the GDR Ministry for State Security. Intelligence and National Security, 8(4), 59–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/026845293 08432225. Smith, B. L. (1994). Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams. New York: SUNY Press. Smith, J., Moncourt, A., & Churchill, W. (2013). Red Army Faction, A Documentary History: Volume 1: Projectiles for the People. Oakland: PM Press. SPLC. (n.d.). New Black Panther Party. Retrieved from https://www.splcenter.org/ fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/new-black-panther-party. Spiegel. (2008). A Revolutionary Who Shaped a Generation. Retrieved from: https:/ /www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-attack-on-rudi-dutschke-a-revolutio nary-who-shaped-a-generation-a-546913.html. Speckhard, A., & Ellenberg, M. (2020). Perspective: Why Branding Antifa a Terror Group Is a Diversion—Homeland Security Today. Retrieved from https://www.hst oday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/perspective-why-branding-antifa-aterror-group-is-a-diversion. Switzerland’s Security. (2022). Situation Report of the Federal Intelligence Service. Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport https://www.vbs.admin.ch/en/documents/search.detail.document.html/ VBS. vbs-internet/en/documents/intelligence-service/situation-reports/LageberichtNDB-2022-e.pdf.html. Tau, B. (2019). FBI Abandons Use of Term ‘Black Identity Extremism’. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-abandons-use-ofterms-black-identity-extremism-11563921355. Varon, J. (2004). Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Venturi. V. (1966). Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia. New York: Grosset & Dunlap. Vysotsky, S. (2021). American Antifa: The Tactics, Culture, and Practice of Militant Antifascism. Westcott, K., (2004). Italy’s History of Terror. The BBC News. http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/3372239.stm. Williams, H. J. (2022). The Consequences of Designating Antifa as a Terrorist Organization. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/multimedia/video/2020/08/11/ the-consequences-of-designating-antifa-as-a-terrorist-organization.html. Winter, J., & Weinberger, S. (2017). The FBI’s New U.S. Terrorist Threat: ‘Black Identity Extremists’. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2017/10/06/the-fbi-has-identified-a-new-domestic-terrorist-threat-and-its-blackidentity-extremists Woodhouse, C. M. (1985). The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels. London: Granada. Yarmolinsky, A. (1959). Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism. New York: Macmillan.

CHAPTER 3

Radicalization and Left-Wing Extremism Katharina Krüsselmann

and Daan Weggemans

Introduction Left-wing extremism has many faces: In September 2020, the Mikhail Zhlobitsky Cell of the Informal Anarchist Federation in Italy claimed two parcel bombs that were sent to an employer’s union president in Brescia and the police union office in Modena (Europol 2021). Fortunately, neither of the bombs exploded. Elsewhere, many individuals who identify with far-left ideologies joined the fight against the Islamic State in Syria as foreign fighters in various armed groups (Koch 2021). In 2017, during a G20 meeting in Hamburg, several hundred far-left extremists from Germany and other countries were arrested after violent protests resulted in vandalism of streets, cars and shops in part of the city (Oltermann 2017). Although very different in nature, all these events have been associated with left-wing extremism and all have received attention from the media and governmental security agencies due to their violent features. Yet, next to anecdotal evidence from reports on violent events like the ones described above, there is a lacuna of knowledge on the broader phenomenon of left-wing radicalism and extremism, due to sparsity of academic empirical studies on the subject. Koehler (2021), for example, notices a discrepancy between the relative importance placed on the Far-Left by governmental—and K. Krüsselmann (B) · D. Weggemans Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] D. Weggemans e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. P. Zúquete (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_3

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security agencies and the lack of scholarly attention on the topic. Schuurman’s (2019) review of terrorism studies published between 2007 and 2016 reveals that only 7.6% of almost 3500 academic publications discussed content related to left-wing extremism, compared to almost 75% of publications related to jihadism. From these few studies, we gain only few insights into leftwing radicalization and extremism. In addition, most of the available studies, particularly in the field of terrorism studies, focus on violent extremist or terrorist groups. However, what about the majority that follows the same far-left ideologies but does not make use of violent means—individuals we would classify as non-violent radical, rather than extremist? What characterizes radical left-wing groups? What motivates individuals to become part of a radical but non-violent left group or movement? What broader political and societal development impact non-violent radical left groups? In this chapter, we aim to review the existing literature of radicalization in the context of non-violent left radical groups or movements. Specifically, we present the broad phenomenon of left-wing radicalization as a conjuncture of individual processes on the micro-level, as well as broader socio-political factors on the macro-level that encourage or discourage radicalization processes. The interplay between these individual and contextual factors is central to understand the global differences between and the historical developments of radical left-wing groups and their individual participants. To provide examples to our arguments, we will make use of existing case studies on left-wing radicalization, as well as draw on our own empirical research on radicalization processes of anarchists in the Netherlands to provide examples. The next section defines the concept of radicalization, outlines its differences with the concept of extremism and introduces the social movement approach of studying radicalization, which we will use throughout this chapter. After, we first discuss micro-level factors, before reviewing relevant macro-level factors in the radical left-wing context.

The Study of Left-Wing Radicalization The Concepts of Radicalization and Extremism The definition of the concepts of radicalization and extremism originate in the sub-discipline of terrorism studies and have been the subject of many conceptual debates (see for example Borum 2011; Schmid 2014). However, both concepts remain contested in scholarly literature. As pointed out by Borum (2011) in a review of existing definitions and usages of the term radicalization, many scholars conflate the concept of radicalization with other related, yet separate concepts of extremism or terrorism. According to most scholars that do apply a differentiation between the concepts, extremism or terrorism is defined through the use of violence, which is sometimes—but not always— paired with radical beliefs, whereas radicalization constitutes the adoption of

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radical beliefs but is generally non-violent (Schuurman & Taylor 2018; Weggemans 2013). For example, the Red Army Faction (RAF) from Germany is considered an extremist or even terrorist group today, due to several violent attacks organized by the group. However, many of the members of that group started out in (mostly) peaceful protests before splintering off into a separate group that used violence (Aßmann 2018). In hindsight, the RAF is defined as an extremist group, yet could have been considered radical of nature before endorsing and embracing violent tactics. Other scholars have approached the concept of radicalization from a social movement perspective, which is mostly embedded in the discipline of sociology. In social movement studies, radicalization is mostly defined more so through the types of actions taken by an individual or a group of people that could be perceived as radical in the given context, rather than through specific political or societal beliefs (della Porta 2008; Tilly 1978). Several researchers further differentiate between moderate and radical social movements (Bittner 1963; Fitzgerald & Rodgers 2000). The latter is defined among other things by a radical agenda, non-violent, but not necessarily legal actions, and is “subject to intense opposition and government surveillance” (Fitzgerald & Rodgers 2000, 578). Although originating in different disciplines, both perspectives from terrorism—and social movements studies complement each other rather well. For example, renowned terrorism-scholar Alex Schmid discusses the difference between extremism and radicalization through the use of violent versus non-violent actions, adding that “nonviolence as an activist strategy goes beyond passive, peaceful resistance: it involves an array of direct political actions, both individual and collective, such as hunger-strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, blockades, acts of civil disobedience and other persuasive and even coercive tactics (…)—but all fall short of the use of violence against persons or objects (…)” (2014, 13). Converging these dominating definitions from terrorism—and social movement studies, we define a radical person, group or social movement as an entity that strives for significant political social changes through active legal or illegal non-violent means outside the realm of institutionalized politics in this chapter. Still, it must be noted here that this definition is not free from ambiguity, as are previously used definitions of radicalization. For example, a group or movement may be considered radical based on the tactics employed, although many participants may not hold radical beliefs per se. In other instances, a group may be regarded as radical due to extreme, but non-violent tactics, yet individual participants could incidentally make use of violent means—such as in clashes with the police. Similarly, what constitutes a radical belief or tactic may differ between political, social, regional, and historical contexts. What then constitutes left-wing radicalization? Like the concept of ‘radicalization’, what constitutes radical ‘left-wing’ is contested as well. As pointed out by Carson (2016), left-wing terrorist groups vary from traditional political ideological groups—such as anarchists, socialists, Maoists, communists and others—that are considered radical in the current capitalist world order

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to single-issue groups that are concerned with changes to specific aspects of society, such as the climate crisis or animal rights through radical tactics, and through left-wing ideals, but without following a defined political ideology. A similar variety of groups exist in the radical realm, as the examples of the following sections will reveal. Researching Left-Wing Radicalization The literature on radicalization is ever-growing, and contributions are made from various disciplines and subfields, including—but not limited to— terrorism or political studies, history, psychology, criminology and sociology, including social movement studies. Yet, there are relatively few empirical studies on left-wing radicalization, or even extremism (Schuurman 2019). A common approach to study individual or group processes of radicalization in several disciplines is through case studies of specific groups or movements. For example, Wennerhag and colleagues (2018) published a bundle of case studies of different types of left-wing movements, ranging from communist groups in Finland and France to student-protests in Ukraine to highlight the current state of social movements in Europe. Other examples of case studies include Karpantschof’s (2015) study on radicalization and de-radicalization in the Danish squatter movement or Ackerman’s (2003) threat assessment of the Earth Liberation Front in the United States. Some of these case studies draw detailed data from long-term ethnographic fieldwork, such as in O’Connor’s (2003) ethnography on the anti-globalization movement in Mexico. Lessons on radicalization may also be drawn from (historical) case studies or (auto-)biographies of left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (Aßmann 2018), that include accounts about how these groups or individual members came to adopt radical beliefs. Some studies also employ a comparative approach, contrasting left-wing groups with right-wing or Islamist groups or movements. Windisch and colleagues (2019), for example, compare the disengagement processes of leftand right-wing extremists in the United States through life-history interviews. Cross (2011) made use of participant observation, interviews and content analyses of documents to understand the radicalization processes of a right- and left-wing grassroots movement. Others compare two or more leftwing groups or movements with each other, to understand differences and similarities in the demise of these groups (Zwerman et al. 2000). Furthermore, political scientists and philosophers have reviewed the history of the traditional leftist ideologies, which are often considered radical today, such as anarchism, Marxism, Maoism and others. Some of these studies also comment on the development of the movements behind these ideologies. For example, Gordon (2007) and Williams (2007) both discuss contemporary anarchist movements, and how the current historical context impacts the characteristics of the movements today.

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Notwithstanding these efforts to shine a light on current left-wing radical groups or movements, there is still relatively little (empirical) research on non-violent radical groups or movements compared to religious or rightwing radicalization. The following sections will review what is known about socio-psychological micro-factors of left-wing radicalization—specifically the radicalization process of becoming part of a radical group or movement— and the environmental macro-factors that determine individual, as well as group-level radicalism in the current age.

Micro-Factors of Left-Wing Radicalization Researchers have developed different models to explain the process of radicalization on the individual- and group-level. The initial proposition that radicals, extremists or terrorists are all mentally ill has long been debunked (Horgan 2004; Trimbur et al. 2021). Since then, terrorism scholars, social psychologists and social movement researchers have contributed several models to understand individual processes leading to radicalization and, specifically, engagement in radical groups or movements (see Borum 2011 for an overview). In these model, individual propensity for radical beliefs still plays a role, yet environmental push- and pull-factors are considered equally, if not more, important. The motives for engaging in radical groups or movements commonly identified in the literature (see for example della Porta 2018; Krüsselmann & Weggemans 2018; van Stekelenburg 2006; van Stekelenburg et al. 2011) can be categorized into four categories (following the categorization provided by Demant et al. [2008]): ideological motives, collective instrumental motives, identity motives and individual instrumental motives. This section will review the relevance of these factors in the context of left-wing radicalization, making use of existing literature, as well as data collected from interviews with Dutch anarchists by the authors. In these in-depth life-history interviews, participants were asked about their motives for joining the radical Dutch anarchist movement, direct or indirect recruitment processes through peers, family and factors that motivated them to remain part of the movement or leave (see Krüsselmann & Weggemans 2018 for detailed methodological discussion). Ideological Motives Ideological motives reflect an individual’s need to a sense of purpose in life. Social movements can provide such a purpose, through clearly defined shared values and beliefs that are expressed not just among the participants but also in direct action (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2017). Participation in radical social movements, more specifically, provide an outlet for individuals whose values are not shared by the government or the general public—or even more poignant: whose values are violated by them. Next to being an outlet for expressing one’s morals, radical social movements often also provide

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goals to work towards to an ideal world order according to the respective ideology. Ideological motives for participation are noted in several studies on radical left-wing groups. For example, Bosi and Della Porta (2012), who studied mobilization processes of (later) members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army ((p)IRA) and the Red Brigade in Italy, describe how early ideological education from parents lead to a ‘sort of moral obligation’ to join the groups (371). Similarly, several of the anarchists interviewed in our own study mentioned how the anarchist movement showed them how to combine many of their beliefs about certain aspects of society, such as environmentalism or feminism, into a greater, all-encompassing ideology, including a certain associated lifestyle (Krüsselmann & Weggemans 2018). Although the importance of ideology is generally acknowledged in literature, some scholars note that the importance of ideology may be overstated as such a coherent system of beliefs that generally develops only after becoming part of a radical movement or group (Schils & Verhage 2017). The latter is also supported through our interviews with Dutch anarchists. Although all felt ideological identification with radical leftist ideas, only few—and in particular the older generation who joined the movement during the 1970s or 1980s— had received any formal or informal education through school, parents, peers, music or films about the anarchist ideology in particular. Most sharpened their ideological beliefs through involvement with the movement: they took part in ideological discussions or reading groups and gained more understanding of the ideology behind the collective action they were already taking part in (Krüsselmann & Weggemans 2018). Similarly, Kitis (2015) observes that not all participants of the anti-authoritarian chorós in Greece are driven by ideologies. Collective Instrumental Motives Closely related to ideological motives are collective instrumental motives. Collective instrumental motives reflect an individual’s need to obtain justice for perceived injustices. Injustices, in the realm of (radical) left-wing ideologies can range from injustices against certain groups of people—based on their background, skin colour or (political) beliefs—as well as injustices against animals, nature, groups of people or humanity as a whole. Whereas an individual may not be able to achieve the intended political or social change to correct said injustices by themselves, taking part in collective action or becoming part of a group or movement can increase chances of success. According to some scholars, participation then becomes a rational cost–benefit calculation in which the expected success of the movement is weighed against the costs associated with participation (Klandermans 1984; van Zomeren 2013). The notion of collective instrumental motives is reflected in several studies. Unfairness and perceived injustice for oneself as well as others also formed a motivation for participants of the Global Justice Movement in Scandinavia

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(Zackariasson 2009). Participants of Bosi and Della Porta’s (2012) study on the (P)IRA and the Red Brigade, recounted that their participation in these radical groups seemed like the only effective strategy to reach change, thereby supporting the notion of instrumental motives for engagement in radical groups and movements. In addition, perceived injustices motivated several Dutch anarchists to search for a group of like-minded individuals that are equally willing to take action (Krüsselmann & Weggemans 2018). Some interviewees observed injustices against other individuals, whereas others felt personally affected. For example, the grandfather of one of our participants was evicted due to his participation in the socialist labour movement. This perceived injustice has instilled his grandson to fight for left-wing values 40 years later. At the same time, however, there is not a lot of evidence here for a rational cost–benefit analysis that motivated their participation with the anarchist movement. Although some respondents who engaged with the movement during the 1970s and 1980s recollected the benefit of housing through the squatting culture of the movement, most respondents expected more costs than perceived benefits before joining, such as the risk for backlash from the government in the forms of arrests or potential involvement in violence. Furthermore, most of the respondents did not expect any significant political or social changes through successful collective action in the movement, but joined anyways (Krüsselmann & Weggemans 2018). Identity Motives In addition, to ideological and collective instrumental motives, motives related to one’s own identity or the group’s identity could lead to engagement in a radical group or movement. From an individual perspective, participation in a radical group or movement allows for identification with an (ideally) welldefined social group—the “I” changes to “we” (Schils & Verhage 2017; van Stekelburg & Klandermans 2017). Next to the expression of similar values and morals by being part of the group and the opportunity to express anger or other grievances, participation in a radical group or movement thus also offers the chance for social belonging and a social identity (Demant et al. 2008). Social aspects related to continued participation in the Dutch Anarchist movements were important to our interviewees. Some joined the movement through peers, others found their group of peers once they started participating in illegal demonstrations or other forms of direct actions (Krüsselmann & Weggemans 2018). Furthermore, some interviewees identified that the anarchist movement also came with a subculture that prescribes a certain lifestyle—from appearances and clothing to music or nutrition. In other words, the movement offered them not just ideological belonging, but also the opportunity to evolve one’s identity around the movement. Similar observations of identity-related aspects are made in other radical left-wing movements or groups. For example, through interviews with participants of the 2013

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Gezi protests in Turkey, Uncu (2016, 204) demonstrates how the protestors bonded through shared feelings of “isolation, atomization and despair” and how these shared anger against the authoritarian leadership and belonging to a community lead to positive feelings of hope in the light of the protests. Individual Instrumental Motives Finally, participation in radical social groups or movements can provide other, individual, incentives that could influence the cost–benefit analysis mentioned previously (Klandermans 1984). Such incentives can be material, as well as non-material, such as a career within the movement or group organization. Individual incentives are not often discussed in the limited literature on leftwing radicalization. In our own study, some Dutch anarchists who became associated with the movement in the 1970s or 1980s mentioned that the movement’s culture of squatting houses helped them to overcome the housing crisis of that time. With the introduction of the anti-squatting laws, this incentive is not applicable anymore to the younger generation of Dutch anarchists. Other material benefits gained from participation seem limited, possibly due to the often-non-hierarchical structure and limited resources of radical social movements (Fitzgerald & Rodgers 2000). In the end, individual motives underlying the radicalization process vary for everyone. Whereas ideological motives play an important role for some, others initially join a radical movement to find social belonging with a group, or to express anger with regard to a certain topic. Furthermore, radicalization processes may also be impacted by external factors, such as direct or indirect recruitment by radical groups, peers, family members, or through social media and other types of online formats (Schils & Verhage 2017). Such influences have not been explored extensively in the context of left-wing radicalization yet. Of particular interest here is a comparison with other types of radicalization, as some of our conclusions mirror findings from studies on right-wing radicalization, while others differing on some aspects. For example, Klandermans and Mayer (2005) identified how individual instrumental motives, such as the possibility of a career in the movement, motivated some to join radical right-wing groups. While not mentioned in many studies on left-wing groups, including our own, one could expect that similar motives exist in left-wing groups as well. This short summary of findings, based on a limited number of studies, intends to provide some direction for further exploration.

Macro-Factors of Left-Wing Radicalization The previous section reviewed micro-factors associated with engagement in radical left-wing groups or movements. However, these individual pathways do not take place in isolation, but are embedded in broader political and societal context that set the conditions in which individuals, groups and movements exist and operate. Over the years, a large number of such macro-factors

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influencing radical groups have been identified through case studies, participant observation and other types of studies across various radical left-wing movements. One important factor to consider is the political context in which radical left groups or movements operate. First, the political context defines what is deemed radical to begin with. The term ‘radical’ already signals that the group or movement or even the individual person does not (a) follow conventional political or social beliefs and/or (b) does not make use of conventional tactics. For example, in the current context in which the most countries are capitalist, fighting for communist values seems radical. However, just thirty years ago, a significant number of countries identified with communist political values (e.g. Soviet Union and related satellite states)—and Cuba still does today. In these contexts, communist beliefs would not be deemed radial. This dependency on the (historical) political context lies at the heart of any definition of what is deemed left or radical to begin with. Furthermore, the political context also determines the demand for radical left groups or movements. If individuals can express their left ideological beliefs through existing institutionalized left-wing political parties, and if they believe that such parties can bring about the desired political or social change, they may be less inclined to take part in a radical group or movement, thus decreasing the need for radical groups. Williams and Lee (2012), for example, highlight how the win of communist parties in Greece and other countries lead to a demobilization of the anarchist movement, as most of the left found a way to use institutionalized politics as a tool for political change. Similarly, Zibechi (2005) remarks how left-wing political leaders in the Americas have adopted demands and the language of (radical) social movements, resulting in the end of some initiatives without the actual goal being reached. On the other hand, electoral wins of far-right leaning parties in Scandinavian countries created a demand for the radical anti-fascism movement to find new ways to confront their adversaries. Whereas some members chose to confront their adversaries through conventional political means, others tried to open and broaden the movement for further mobilization of the (local) masses (Jämte 2017). Either way, radical left groups and movements operate in a political context that shapes goals, tactics and mobilization and thus, cannot be ignored. Another important factor to consider as a macro-factor shaping affect radical left groups and movements is state repression. Repression by the state can have varying impacts on a radical left movement, as becomes evident through comparative case studies. Williams and Lee (2012) illustrate how state repression almost eradicated anarchist activism in early twentieth-century Japan, whereas in Greece and the Czech Republic, state repression actually led to further radicalization and increased mobilization for the anarchist movement. Zwerman and colleagues (2000) paint a similar picture for New Left movements in Japan, Germany, Italy and the US: whereas state repression of these movements may have led to a decline of mass protest, many of the movements went underground instead; the core groups who continued their

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activism radicalizing further, with some making increasing use of violence. Other examples show how specific events of state repression can trigger a mobilization of the masses, or at least a significant increase in support for radical left groups or movements. Aßmann’s (2018) biography of Gudrun Ensslin, a former member of the terrorist Red Army Faction, shows how the violent death of German student Benno Ohnesorg during a demonstration in Berlin set off a process of radicalization that later turned into extremism. Finally, general changes in the political as well as social landscape can generate the need for radical action from extra-parliamentary left groups and growing public support for such radical actions. In recent years, in the light of growing poverty, a shortage of affordable housing, the exposure of structural and institutional racism, rising awareness for violence against women and many other societal issues, the support for radical political and societal changes and radical actions has grown. As a result, existing radical left groups or movements, that seemingly offer potential solutions against such problems, or at least a plan of action to mobilize the masses have grown in size. Simultaneously, new movements—often targeted at specific societal issues, such as the Occupy Movement against austerity measures—emerged. At the same time, however, it must be noted that societal changes may also have the opposite effects: the influx of refugees, following several conflicts, such as in Afghanistan or the Ukraine, increased nationalism, the call for closed borders and electoral success for right-wing parties in many countries. Another factor impacting the growth or decline of (demand for) radical left groups and movements is growing (scientific) knowledge about certain topics. For example, recent reports about the disastrous effects of climate change and perceived shortcomings in governmental responses may fuel individual, as well as broader societal radicalization processes and strengthen the demand for radical actions and broader political and societal changes as proposed by radical groups or movements. Like this example shows, radical left groups or movement do not operate in a vacuum, but are intrinsically impacted by their societal and political context. The Old and the New the Radical Left? Changing political or societal contexts can have short-term impact on how radical left-wing groups or movements operate, what tactics they employ or how their organizational structures look like. However, scholars have also observed significant long-term changes in the characteristics of radical leftwing movements. In the most recent decades since the 1960s, researchers have noted a shift from traditional left-wing radical groups or movements based on political ideologies, such as anarchism or Marxism, to radical activism increasingly oriented towards single issues, including environmentalism or feminism that are based on broader social or cultural values, rather than political ideals (Wennerhag 2018). As put by Della Porta (2018, 268):

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[…] while NSMs [New Social Movements] were considered as promoters of innovative values, reflecting a shift into a new society, the radical left was seen as a remnant of the past. […] The NSMs were peaceful and colourful, the radical left rather dull and, at times, violent. Radical left ideology was considered as perpetuating an outdated class vision, appealing to a society that was long dead.

In interviews with Dutch anarchists, some voiced concerns that traditional ideologies have become too complex for activists, who are taking part in relatively short-term single-issue radical activism rather than committing themselves long-term to the anarchist movement that strives for a complete change of the political and social world order. Are these new (radical) social movements thus taking over? Do these changes reflect the demise of traditional radical left-wing groups? No, according to some scholars who argue that new radical social movements and the traditional radical left are not only co-existing, but actively cooperating (Wennerhag et al. 2018). Hammond’s (2015) analysis of the occupy movement, for example, shows its deep rootedness in the anarchical philosophy of horizontal organizational structure, anti-authority values and autonomy from institutionalized politics. And although the Occupy movement never adopted a specific political ideology, its popularity helped to spread anarchist ideals among a broader population. Likewise, a sub-group of anarchists consider themselves eco-anarchists, and find common grounds with radical environmental groups like EarthFirst!, which make use of similar forms of radical direct actions as traditional political anarchist groups (Clark 2020). One of the Dutch anarchists that we interviewed equally identified himself as a political anarchist with a strong focus on environmental issues. He founded his own radical environmental group which attracted many members, equally from the Dutch anarchist movement, as well as from activists mainly concerned with the single issue of environmentalism. Thus, rather than taking over from traditional radical left groups, the new left radical social movements have incorporated characteristics from traditional groups. Equally, traditional groups can make use of social support for the new movements by embedding parts of their political and social values in new types of activism.

Conclusion and Future Research In the introduction, we asked: what about the majority that follows the same far-left ideologies but do not make use of violent means—individuals we would classify as non-violent radical, rather than extremist?In this chapter, we discussed the contested concepts of radicalization and left-wing radicalization in particular, highlighting the lacuna of empirical research on this phenomenon and how both terrorism—as well as social movement research have contributed to the discussion. Furthermore, we described a variety of individual motives for engaging in radical left activism, ranging from the need

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for a purpose in life or social belonging, to feelings of injustice. However, individual radicalization processes do not take place in a vacuum, but are impact by the societal and political context, which can both fuel as well as repress individual and group radicalization. This short overview of left-wing radicalization is possible due to empirical studies conducted by sociologists, anthropologists, social movement—and terrorism researchers. In-depth interviews with radicals and detailed (historical) case studies form the basis of this knowledge. However, the quantity of studies on non-violent left-wing groups or individuals is still low in comparison with left-wing violent extremism or other types, such as Islamist or right-wing radicalization. There is a need for substantial research on both traditional radical left groups, as well as affiliated modern movements and their interactions; multi- or interdisciplinary approaches that combine microand macro-level factors associated with left-wing radicalization and comparative research that explores the various manifestations of left-wing radicalization in different global regions.

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Fitzgerald, Kathleen J., and Diane M. Rodgers. “Radical social movement organizations: A theoretical model.” The Sociological Quarterly 41, no. 4 (2000): 573–592. Gordon, Uri. “Anarchism reloaded.” Journal of Political Ideologies 12, no. 1 (2007): 29–48. Hammond, John L. “The anarchism of occupy Wall Street.” Science & Society (2015): 288–313. Horgan, John G. The psychology of terrorism. Routledge, 2004. Jämte, Jan. “Radical anti-fascism in Scandinavia: Shifting frames in relation to the transformation of the far right.” In Radical Left Movements in Europe, 248–267. Routledge, 2017. Karpantschof, René. “Violence that matters! Radicalization and de-radicalization of leftist, urban movements–Denmark 1981–2011.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 7, no. 1 (2015): 35–52. Kitis, E. Dimitris. “The anti-authoritarian chóros: A space for youth socialization and radicalization in Greece (1974–2010).” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 9, no. 1 (2015): 1–36. Klandermans, Bert. “Mobilization and participation: Social-psychological expansisons of resource mobilization theory.” American Sociological Review (1984): 583–600. Klandermans, Bert, and Nonna Mayer. Extreme right activists in Europe: Through the magnifying glass. Routledge, 2005. Koch, Ariel. “The non-jihadi foreign fighters: Western right-wing and left-wing extremists in Syria.” Terrorism and Political Violence 33, no. 4 (2021): 669–696. Koehler, Daniel. “Disengaging from left-wing terrorism and extremism: Field experiences from Germany and research gaps.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2021): 1–21. Krüsselmann, Katharina and Daan Weggemans. “Trajectories to Radical Anarchist Activism-A qualitative study on the motivations to join and stay involved in the Dutch anarchist movement.” Master’s thesis, 2018. O’Connor, Alan. “Punk subculture in Mexico and the anti-globalization movement: A report from the front.” New Political Science 25, no.1 (2003): 43–53. Philip Oltermann. “Hamburg braces for G20 violence as tensions rise over police tactics.” The Guardian, July 5, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ jul/05/hamburg-braced-for-huge-violent-protests-in-run-up-to-g20-summit. Schils, Nele, and Antoinette Verhage. “Understanding how and why young people enter radical or violent extremist groups.” International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV) 11 (2017): a473–a473. Schmid, Alex P. “Violent and non-violent extremism: Two sides of the same coin.” ICCT Research Paper 1 (2014): 29. Schuurman, B, and Max Taylor. “Reconsidering radicalization: Fanaticism and the link between ideas and violence.” Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no. 1 (2018): 3–22. Schuurman, Bart. “Topics in terrorism research: reviewing trends and gaps, 2007– 2016.” Critical Studies on Terrorism 12, no. 3 (2019): 463–480. Tilly, Charles. From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA. [etc.]: Addison-Wesley, 1978. Trimbur, Margot, Ali Amad, Mathilde Horn, Pierre Thomas, and Thomas Fovet. “Are radicalization and terrorism associated with psychiatric disorders? A systematic review.” Journal of Psychiatric Research 141 (2021): 214–222.

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Uncu, Baran Alp. “From a conflictual coalition to a social movement? The transformative capacity of the Gezi protests.” Southeastern Europe 40, no. 2 (2016): 188–216. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien. “Promoting or preventing social change: Instrumentality, identity, ideology and group-based anger as motives of protest participation.” 2006. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, Bert Klandermans, and Wilco W. Van Dijk. “Combining motivations and emotion: The motivational dynamics of protest participation.” Revista de Psicología Social 26, no. 1 (2011): 91–104. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, and Bert Klandermans. “Individuals in movements: A social psychology of contention.” In Handbook of social movements across disciplines, 103–139. Springer, Cham, 2017. Van Zomeren, Martijn, Russell Spears, Agneta H. Fischer, and Colin Wayne Leach. “Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy.” Journal of personality and social psychology 87, no. 5 (2004): 649. Van Zomeren, Martijn. “Four core social-psychological motivations to undertake collective action.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 7, no. 6 (2013): 378–388. Weggemans, Daan. J. “Radicalisme: hét fundament voor geweld?” Volonté Générale (2013). Wennerhag, Magnus, Christian Fröhlich, and Grzegorz Piotrowski, eds. Radical left movements in Europe. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. Wennerhag, Magnus. “Radical left movements in Europe. An Introduction.” In Radical left movements in Europe, edited by Wennerhag, Magnus, Christian Fröhlich, and Grzegorz Piotrowski, 267–279. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. Williams, Leonard. “Anarchism revived.” New Political Science 29, no. 3 (2007): 297– 312. Williams, Dana M., and Matthew T. Lee. “Aiming to overthrow the state (without using the state): Political opportunities for anarchist movements.” Comparative Sociology 11, no. 4 (2012): 558–593. Windisch, Steven, Gina Scott Ligon, and Pete Simi. “Organizational [dis] trust: Comparing disengagement among former left-wing and right-wing violent extremists.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 6 (2019): 559–580. Zackariasson, Maria. “Angry young men? Masculinities and emotion among young male activists in the global justice movement.” The Journal of Men’s Studies 17, no. 1 (2009): 31–46. Zibechi, Raúl. “New challenges for radical social movements.” NACLA Report on the Americas 38, no. 5 (2005): 14–21. Zwerman, Gilda, Patricia Steinhoff, and Donatella Porta. “Disappearing social movements: Clandestinity in the cycle of New Left protest in the US, Japan, Germany, and Italy.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2000): 85–104.

CHAPTER 4

Women in Left-Wing Extremism Irina Jugl

and Daniel Koehler

Introduction Radicalized women have often been overlooked in countering violent extremism (see Norton 2022). Oftentimes, they are perceived as victims rather than perpetrators of extremist or terrorist acts and generally believed to show little agency in regard to choosing violence to achieve political or religious goals (Mondani et al. 2021; Herschinger 2020; Cunningham 2007). However, certain examples clearly stand out and illustrate that women actively choose to engage in and perpetrate extremist violence rather than being passively drawn into extremism (Norton 2022). Right-wing extremists such as Beate Zschäpe who was convicted as part of the terror cell “National Socialist Underground” (NSU) which murdered ten people in Germany during 2000 to 2007, as well as women fighting for the so-called Islamic State (IS), illustrate that women are indeed actively engaged in extremist and terrorist violence. Among left-wing extremism, women have always been more prominent in comparison with other extremist milieus. During the late 1960s and 1970s, women such as Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof co-founded the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany (Norton 2022) and female militants participated in the Weather Underground Movement (WUO) in the United I. Jugl (B) · D. Koehler Competence Centre Against Extremism in Baden-Wuerttemberg, State Criminal Police Office Baden-Wuerttemberg, Stuttgart, Germany e-mail: [email protected] D. Koehler e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. P. Zúquete (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_4

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States (USA; Rocha 2020). Recent examples illustrate ongoing female engagement in left-wing extremism as well. In 2020 in the United States, two women aged 28 and 24 were charged for terrorism and sentenced to prison a year later for dangerously tampering with train tracks and signals driven by an anarchist ideology (Department of Justice 2021, 2020). In Germany, the case of a 28-year-old woman has made headlines since 2021. Lina E. had been charged with being a leading member of a criminal left-wing group and having committed several attacks against right-wing extremists (Moritz and Lopez 2022). These attacks took place between September 2018 and February 2020. An attack in June 2020 was prevented by the authorities. Some of these attacks are believed to have been committed by a group of up to 20 individuals. The group, which allegedly formed around Lina E., is believed to have nationwide connections. The federal prosecution accuses Lina E. to have taken on a leadership role in the group which included leading some of the physical assaults, preparing attacks by spying on the victims, as well as offering her car as an escape aid (Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof 2021). Lina E. has given testimony on some of her personal affairs. She told the judge that her mother is a social education worker, while her father is a teacher. Lina E.’s parents separated when she was in elementary school. After finishing her Abitur (A-level or high school diploma), she worked in a hotel in Tenerife and then traveled around Southeast Asia for five months. Afterward, she started and finished a bachelor in Educational Sciences at a university in Eastern Germany. She wrote her bachelor’s thesis on the right-wing terrorist group “National Socialist Underground” (NSU) and examined how youth clubs might have facilitated radicalization processes for the NSU members. According to Lina E., her interest in these topics stemmed from the seminars she took at the university and books she read (Lopez 2022c; Ramm, 2022). Only twelve days after handing in her thesis, she was allegedly involved in the first left-wing extremist action in 2018 according to the federal prosecutor (Ramm, 2022). After finishing her bachelor’s degree, she worked in housing units for children and youths for about a year before starting her master’s degree in 2019. Her studies were suspended when she went into custody in November 2020 (Lopez, 2022c). Lina E. did not answer questions on her relationship to Johann G., who is believed to be her fiancée and involved in the attacks as well. Johann G., however, has went into hiding in June 2020. His role has been uncovered in greater detail by a former member of the group who gave his statement as a principal witness in court (Lopez, 2022b). The same witness also describes Lina E. in one of the attacks in December 2019 as responsible to keep the overview during the attack (Lopez, 2022a). Lina E. was sentenced to five years and three months in prison in May 2023. Since she filled an appeal motion, the verdict is not yet final as of July 2023. Due to those very recent developments the court verdict is not yet available and, therefore, no final assessment on the case can be made. Furthermore, the little available information on her personal life leaves many questions open, including whether radicalization processes happened through her social environment or

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the critical analysis of right-wing extremism during her studies. Her conviction for participating in and leading left-wing extremists’ attacks makes Lina E. an important figure for left-wing extremists, male as well as female, in Germany and beyond. Besides these prominent cases, establishing databases on terrorist activities such as Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism START (2018) as well as crime statistics collected by the police that span several decades of extremist violence have helped to make female engagement in violent extremism more visible. The databases show that female radicalization is not a new phenomenon, and women can also play a significant role in violent forms of extremism (Mondani et al. 2021; Herschinger 2020; START 2018). Analyses from different extremist groups across different countries reflect the prominent role of women in left-wing extremism as well. In a study of domestic terrorism cases in the United States between 1980 and 2002, Makin and Hoard (2014) found that 52% (n = 19) of women were involved in leftwing terrorism. While absolute numbers for male participation in left-wing activities were higher (n = 47), this only amounts to 22% of males engaged in left-wing terrorism. The remaining 78% of examined men were engaged in right-wing extremist actions. Compared to women conducting right-wing terrorism (n = 17), more female left-wing terrorists (n = 7) took on leadership positions in contrast to women in right-wing milieus (n = 2; Makin and Hoard 2014). Further historical accounts mainly from the 1970s and 1980s also reflect a high percentage of female engagement in left-wing terrorism ranging from around 30% to equal proportions or even more female than male engagement as Koehler (2021b) summarizes. Studies examining this time frame in the United States and Germany report between 27 to 33% females among indicted and convicted individuals and sometimes even all-female or gender balanced groups (Smith 1994; Süllwold 1981; Rosenau 2020). Notably, with more than 60%, women accounted for the majority of left-wing terrorists that were wanted by the German police between 1971 and 1986 (Diewald-Kerkmann 2006). A recent study on women in violent extremism in Sweden based on cases registered by law enforcement gives interesting insights into the situation in Nordic countries (Mondani et al. 2021). In accordance with observations in other countries, females were more present in left-wing extremist milieus (18.1%). In contrast, there were 10.7% females in extreme right-wing milieus, and among Islamist extremists only 8.2% women were reported. Analyzing the criminal involvement of women from different ideological backgrounds, female left-wing extremists were again the most involved. In this group, 60% were reported to have a criminal record, which was higher compared to rightwing extremists (44%) as well as Islamists (37%). The results also indicated that left-wing female perpetrators are more involved in co-offending networks than right-wing and Islamist perpetrators, who often acted more isolated (Mondani

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et al. 2021). According to recent reports by German law enforcement, about one-third of the members in the left-wing extremist milieu are female, which— similarly to the findings in Sweden—is higher in comparison with other forms of extremism (35 Prozent Frauenanteil in linksradikaler Szene 2021). Especially female engagement in violence seems to be higher in certain German states when compared to right-wing extremist violence (Linke Gewalt wird weiblicher 2017). In a report on extremist violence in the German state of Saxony in 2017, officials stated that women made up about 50% of perpetrators of left-wing extremist offenses in contrast to 6.8% of actions committed by female right-wing extremists. Regarding violence, 12% of the recorded acts were committed by female left-wing extremists, which was considerably larger than compared to the extreme right (3.7%; Linke Gewalt wird weiblicher 2017). Recent studies trying to assess antecedents of left-wing extremist attitudes and behavior report an inconsistent pattern regarding the role of gender in left-wing extremism (e.g., Baier et al. 2016; Treskow and Baier 2020). Treskow and Baier (2020), for example, report that in samples with older participants, women agree more often with left-wing extremist attitudes while in younger samples males show higher support. Regarding violent behavior and intentions, Treskow and Baier (2020) report a correlation between leftwing militancy and male gender while Baier et al. (2016) or Jugl et al. (2021) found no differences between males and females for engaging in left-wing extremist violence. Considering that the patterns of female engagement are still not quite clear, more in-depth research on current involvement of females in left-wing extremist milieus is necessary. The focus on left-wing extremism in this chapter is, therefore, of importance, since the reports on the proportions of females engaged in different types of extremism (Mondani et al. 2021; Koehler 2021b) indicate that left-wing extremism could have greater potential for radicalizing women than other ideologies. This chapter discusses the roles and potential factors for radicalization of women into left-wing extremism and terrorism. It offers insights into research on female engagement and presents current case studies for illustration. Even though especially from the 1960s to the 1980s left-wing extremist groups gained popularity (Carson 2016; Cunningham 2007), we decided to focus on case studies of female left-wing extremists in more recent times. The chapter proceeds with presenting the theories and findings on (female) radicalization. Afterward, we present two German female left-wing extremists who have been convicted for ideologically motivated violent crimes. We analyzed their court verdicts and compare them to findings of female terrorists in the United States drawn from the PIRUS database. We then proceed to discuss the findings, their implications, and potential pathways to prevent female radicalization.

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Theoretical Considerations and Findings on Female Radicalization in Left-Wing Extremism Radicalization can be understood as a process of depluralization of political concepts and goals, e.g., justice, freedom, honor, and democracy (Koehler 2016). Depluralization includes a gradual shift toward the support for violence based on a political or religious ideology in which the development of extremist attitudes involves the individual decrease of perceived solutions to societal or personal grievances in combination with an increased sense of urgency to act (Koehler 2016). Ideologies that legitimate violence as a tool to achieve political and social change can be roughly categorized in right-wing, left-wing, religious, national/separatist, or single-issue motivated extremism (see Doosje et al. 2016). However, ideological motives can on the one hand overlap across these categories and on the other hand groups and ideologies within certain categories can differ regarding their goals and actions (Lösel et al. 2018). Especially left-wing extremism (LWE), which includes different groups with different aims (such as creating an anarchist society or a communist government), challenges researchers in regard to its definition due to the plurality of milieus and goals (Carson 2016; Pfahl-Traughber 2020). Common aspects of LWE include the opposition to free and democratic social orders as well as the willingness to use violence to achieve change. Left-wing extremists often aim to fight capitalism or fascism and try to take over topics of general public interest, e.g., the fight against climate change (Treskow and Baier 2020; Doosje et al. 2016). Further goals of LWE can include the fight against racism, anti-immigration, or police brutality (Vysotsky 2020). To avoid conflating legitimate forms of protest with LWE, definitions need to make clear that extremism includes both attitudes as well as extremist behavior and/or behavioral intentions (Treskow and Baier 2020). Anarchist and anti-fascist groups sharing left-wing ideologies have been active for several decades now and some European countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain, or Greece have seen violent activities for many years (Koch 2018). In the United States, especially during the presidency of Donald Trump, the Antifascist Action (Antifa) has gained traction and applied militant means to achieve their left-wing extremist goals. The Antifa uses both online and offline forms of activism. It often employs the tactic of the Black Bloc during protests, whereby individuals wear black clothes to conceal their identity (Copsey and Merrill 2020). The Antifa as well as individuals participating in the Black Bloc, however, reflect the heterogeneity of the left-wing extremist scene. Rather than a terrorist group with clear organizational structures, it is a social movement that encompasses extremist as well as non-extremist actors (LaFree 2018; Vysotsky 2020; Logan and Ligon 2021). Especially when drawing parallels between left-wing movements in the 1960s and 1970s that were responsible for multiple deaths but also in comparison with right-wing extremist movements in the present day as concluded by Logan and Ligon (2021), present-day left-wing extremist and anti-fascist violence has been less lethal. Nevertheless, some terrorist tendencies can be

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identified in the movement which warrants further examination of the topic (Logan and Ligon 2021; LaFree 2018). Regarding female engagement in left-wing extremism, some scholars assume that this is due to more female friendly beliefs that encompass ideas of gender equality and equal rights for women, especially in comparison with other ideologies (Cunningham 2007; Koehler 2021b). Herschinger (2020), for example, concludes that women participated in left-wing movements during the 1960s to overcome traditional gender roles. This holds for other countries such as India as well where women in left-wing extremist movements seek to overcome a patriarchal society (Narain 2017). In Germany, for example, during the 1980s female anti-fascist groups (FANTIFA) slowly established within the autonomous milieu. They heavily criticized the male dominance, which was reflected in traditional role distribution, such as men being at the forefront of the black bloc, while females were given tasks in the background such as coordination or providing first-aid services. FANTIFA groups also voiced their grievance that autonomous groups fought too little against sexism. Although higher engagement of women triggered some reflection processes among the scene, the milieu nevertheless stayed very male dominated (Rohrmoser 2022). And even besides many aspects within leftwing milieus appearing to be more relatable to women, especially the anarchist scene still stands for masculinity often represented by masked street fighters revolting against society and governments (Rohrmoser 2022; Haunss 2014). In an analysis of an extensive collection of posters from the extreme leftwing milieu in Germany since the 1960s, Haunss (2014) found the lone male fighter to be a common theme. This depiction of masculinity replicated traditional male stereotypes such as physical willingness to fight, independence as well as adventure seeking. While he also found alternatives to such a hegemonic masculinity (such as presentations of homosexual or postmodern men), the male fighter was often reproduced (Haunss 2014). A current analysis from 2020 of seven male German anarchists also revealed that extreme left-wing spaces were not always as female supportive as expected with women’s opinions being valued less or women given more stereotypical task in autonomous centers such as house-cleaning (Schröder 2020). Research in India has shown as well that women are encouraged to take on a more nurturing role and need to work harder to receive recognition (Narain 2017). Therefore, while a female friendly ideology might explain higher engagement of women, male-dominated environments as well as a partial lack of equal treatment suggest that ideological content cannot be determined as the main driver of radicalization. Additionally, ideology is only one component fostering radicalization and not necessarily a precursor for violence. In their Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) Model, Khalil et al. (2022) underline that attitudes and behavior, i.e., involvement in violence, are partly disconnected. Somewhat similar, McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) have proposed a two-pyramid model distinguishing between radicalization of opinion and action. Studying ex-female terrorists in

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the Italian Red Brigades, Glynn (2009) found for the left-wing context that ideological goals were much less relevant in motivating for extremist violence than issues of identity. Koehler (2021b) studied 13 biographical accounts of female terrorists from Germany and the United States engaged in violent activities between the 1970s and the 1990s and was able to identify four main themes among these women that motivated them to participate in left-wing extremist movements. One frequent theme was consequentialism, i.e., having a very strong desire to act on individual beliefs. This motive was often accompanied by perceptions of being a soldier and the positive connotation of fighting for one’s beliefs. Consequentialism also goes along with being true to one’s own values. Being connected to an international, global revolution and feeling the need to take action due to perceived global injustices was another theme widely present among female left-wing terrorists. Women further believed their actions to be of moral superiority. Some females’ motivation was also rooted in perceived injustices in the prison system (Koehler 2021b). Themes such as identity (Glynn 2009) as well as motives of belonging and being part of a bigger movement correspond with drivers of radicalization identified in a review by Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018). Oftentimes, negative life events can generate feelings of loss and uncertainty and lead individuals to turning toward extremist groups (Gøtzsche-Astrup 2018). Since radicalization is a multi-faceted phenomenon determined by a multitude of factors (Wolfowicz et al. 2020; Lösel et al. 2018), categorizations are applied to facilitate understanding of these processes. One concept refers to risk and protective factors. Protective factors should be taken into consideration since despite a high accumulation of risk factors, only few individuals turn to violent extremism in the end (Lösel et al. 2018). Another approach distinguishes between those aspects that push an individual into radicalization (e.g., negative life experiences) and pull factors that draw them to an extremist group or ideology. Similarly, this concept of push and pull factors also applies to processes of disengagement (Cherney et al. 2021; Vergani et al. 2020; Altier et al. 2014). While gender is related to violent extremism as a risk factor, it is not a direct cause for engaging in politically motivated violence (Schils and Pauwels 2016). Rather, it is a cause of the causes, i.e., it is not a reason for radicalization but rather an antecedent that goes along with certain experiences that foster radicalization. The Swedish report shows that there are indeed certain differences in men and women but also across women engaged in different types of extremism (Mondani et al. 2021). Generally, lack of education and employment have been identified as risk factors for radicalization (Wolfowicz et al. 2021) while good education and employment have been found to protect against radicalization (Lösel et al. 2018). However, females in left-wing extremism in Sweden showed higher education levels, less unemployment, and overall, a better work situation than their male counterparts as well as females in right-wing or Islamist groups. Furthermore, female left-wing extremists generally had a less problematic social background.

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Remarkably, women in left-wing extremism were more frequently registered for having mental health issues (Mondani et al. 2021). Recent systematic reviews, however, show that radicalization is not psychopathological and mental illnesses are not a main driver for engaging in violent extremism (Gill et al. 2021; Misiak et al. 2019). The systematic review by Misiak et al. (2019) revealed no clear pattern of risk due to mental health issues. While in some cases depression might increase proneness to radicalization, it also emerged as a protective factor in other cases. Only regarding lone actors, a higher prevalence of mental health issues such as psychotic or mood disorders was present (Misiak et al. 2019). However, this would not explain, why female left-wing extremists showed a higher prevalence in the Swedish sample, since lone actors are not very common in left-wing extremism (Bakker and Graaf 2010). For example, the Swedish report shows that left-wing extremist women were more frequently engaged in collective actions than women with other ideologies (Mondani et al. 2021). Notably, rather than a precursor, it could be the radicalization process in itself as well as the phase of engagement in extremism that negatively impacts mental health (Koehler 2020). Koehler (2020) proposes that participation in extremism can create an ongoing trauma and groups attempt to capitalize on individuals by feeding their insecurities while simultaneously providing quasi-therapeutic relief through positive emotions such as camaraderie, understanding, happiness, and joy.

Methodology and Sources Research on female engagement and especially women in left-wing extremism offers certain insights into motives and risk factors but is restrained by small samples and ongoing debates of female agency (Carter 2013). We aimed to contribute to the body of research through the exploration of two violent female left-wing extremists in Germany and corresponding accumulated data in the United States. We examined German court verdicts on two violent female left-wing extremists. To locate relevant verdicts from 2000 onwards, we first screened newspaper articles and legal resources through search in relevant press databases. The first search included both male and female defendants and resulted in ten potentially relevant cases. This small number stands in contrast to the high numbers of left-wing extremist violent crimes committed in Germany. The German Federal Office for the Protection of The Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) registered 987 violent acts by left-wing extremists including especially arson attacks and physical assault in 2021 (Bundesministerium des Innern 2022). However, tight-knit milieus and professional counter-investigation or counter-intelligence tactics often impede prosecution. Out of the ten identified court verdicts, two cases included female offenders. The cases are described in detail below. Since some court verdicts include biographical information on defendants as well as describe their participation in the plots or acts, verdicts offer a valuable source for tracing potential

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push and pull factors of radicalization processes and are generally available for research purposes in Germany in anonymized form. After receiving the court verdicts, the authors of this chapter independently assessed the court rulings and applied qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2022) on the source material. Discrepancies in assessment were solved through discussion. Furthermore, we used the PIRUS database to compare relevant factors from the German cases and a US sample. The PIRUS database offers extensive insights into cases of violent and non-violent extremists from 1948 to 2018 in the United States. We drew on the data for cases categorized as left-wing extremism from the year 2000 onwards. The database provides information on biographical data (such as employment or childhood trauma), radicalization circumstances, as well as ideological tendencies. Even though the database is limited due to lack of information on certain variables and results in high numbers of missing values, some valuable information can be drawn from it. We screened the court verdicts and the PIRUS database for demographic information, social background (e.g., education and employment), as well as mental health issues. We analyzed the source material for potential push and pull factors as well as the role of women in the plots.

Results Case Descriptions of Court Rulings Case A Case A was accused alongside two male defendants and one unknown individual of preparing arson attacks in 2019. The trial identified multiple motivations for the plot. For instance, the group wanted to commemorate the violent riots that occurred in 2017 in Hamburg in protest against the meeting of the G20 member states. Furthermore, according to the verdict, they wanted to protest gentrification, which encompasses processes to improve social and physical appearances of neighborhoods and often leads to misplacement of poorer individuals that cannot afford rising prices (Cole et al. 2021). Therefore, their planned attacks targeted real estate companies and their properties (one car, two office buildings) as well the residential building in which the city’s senator for urban development lived. Hence, the plot was also meant to intimidate individuals but not intended to harm them physically. The group minus the unknown perpetrator were arrested on their way to carry out the attacks in the early hours of 8 July in 2019. Case A was at the time of the planned attacks around 28 years old and held a German citizenship. Regarding her educational development, there seem to have been no unusual interruptions during her school career. She also received her qualification for higher education certificate (A-level or high school diploma) with a good to average performance (Abitur; Grade: 2.4). She carried out different internships in social work and began studying for a bachelor’s degree in sign language interpretation. However, it is notable that

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Case A had not finished the degree until the trial ended with her conviction in November 2020. Case A has no criminal record. No information was provided regarding her mental health status. There is also little information regarding Case A’s family. It is only stated in the verdict that she has regular contact with her family, especially her mother and her sister. However, it seems that she was well integrated into an extreme left-wing network. This is supported for example by her living arrangements. Until 2019 she lived in a flat-sharing community, a self-declared self-governing collective, with the other defendants and two or three other individuals, where members held outspoken anti-state and anti-police attitudes and also supported anarchism and violence to achieve goals directed against state institutions (especially the police). Later, she moved to a housing project in which inhabitants also shared anarchist and left-wing extremist views and supported violence. Her ongoing commitment for the left-wing extremist milieu also became apparent by material found in her belongings calling for solidarity for the defendants of her trial. Furthermore, during a police search of her home, about 25 members of the extreme left-wing scene were mobilized to interrupt the investigation, for example by insulting and photographing police officers. Her strong integration into an extreme left-wing network was also visible through her engagement in the left-wing extremist milieu for several years. Evidence, especially posters and pictures, found during the police investigation, reflect an anarchist, anti-authoritarian world-view held by Case A. Symbols such as the Anarcho-A or depictions of violence against the police or dehumanization of police officers show the rejection of the police as well as mainstream media or the justice system. Looking at the role Case A has played in the plot, the court stated that one male defendant contributed significantly more to the plot while Case A and the second male defendant were judged to have contributed comparatively less. Nevertheless, the sentences were quite similar with Case A receiving one year and eight months and the other two receiving one year, ten months and one year, seven months in prison. While these sentences were confirmed for the two males during the appeal trial, the appeal for Case A is still ongoing (“Drei von der Parkbank” scheitern mit Revision 2022). Furthermore, in contrast to her male co-defendants, Case A was released from investigative custody during the trial. She and her co-defendants did not provide statements regarding their actions during the trial. Case B Case B and her fiancée were put on trial for sending out threatening letters starting from December 2019 until October 2020 to politicians, civil servants as well as members of the juridical system and the economic sector. They enclosed, for example, knifes, ammunition, and parts of incendiary devices in the letters to emphasize their claims. Furthermore, they referred to left-wing terrorist groups such as the RAF to lend more seriousness to their threats. They wanted to force the targeted individuals to take action against, among

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others, fascism, gentrification, climate change, and exploitation and demanded the abolition of prisons and the police. Four waves of threat letters were send out until May 2020. But since they did not receive any reaction to their (death) threats, they committed an arson attack against a governmental institution on the second on August 2 in 2020. Furthermore, they laid out the components of an incendiary device in front of the private home of the owner of an industrial meat processing slaughterhouse on August 27 in 2020 to signal their environmentalist standpoints as part of their overall ideology. A last round of letters was sent in October 2020 threatening transport associations and demanding to abolish the laws in regard to fare evasion. At the time of the court verdict in 2021, Case B was 39 years old, and was, therefore, around 37 when the first letters were sent out. Her childhood contained several potential strains and sources for grievances. After her parents divorced when Case B was four years old, her mother joined the Jehovah’s Witnesses and remarried one of their members. Strict parenting rules including the acceptance of corporal punishment in the group resulted in numerous conflicts between Case B and her mother as well as corporal punishment by her step-father. After a few years, the mother and Case B distanced themselves from the group, but their relationship continued to be strained. As a result of the accumulating domestic issues, Case B’s school grades deteriorated, and she moved down in her secondary education to a lower educational level. While she graduated from school, she did not manage to finish any kind of further vocational training. In 2000, she developed mental health issues and has been in voluntary inpatient treatment several times. She was diagnosed with an emotionally unstable personality disorder as well as borderline syndrome. In 2009 and 2012, respectively, she held a job for one year at Disneyland in Florida, United States. After her return in 2013, new mental health issues including fatigue syndrome as well as physical health problems appeared, which is why she was attested a severe disability in 2014. This made working full-time impossible and apart from a short position at a train company, she was unemployed. From 2019 onwards, she nevertheless held a vice chair position in a local political party that was active in one of the German states. In August 2019, Case B met her now-fiancée at an event of the environmentalist group “Extinction Rebellion.” The fiancée had left the right-wing extremist scene in 2009 and had committed some minor criminal offenses, such as, for example, fare evasion and trespassing. Case B does not have a criminal record. Case B and her partner were unhappy with the current political situation according to the verdict. Case B stated during the trial that she had perceived a sense of helplessness and felt the same from her social surrounding. They were positively influenced by youth movements such as “Fridays for Future” and “Extinction Rebellion” but realized that policies were not changed by these non-violent actions. Therefore, they aimed to cause a public debate through their actions and since they perceived options to change social grievances to be less and less effective, they decided that they had to use

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different, more aggressive approaches. When their letters did not evoke any reactions, they became angry and disappointed. As they perceived their threat letters as unsuccessful, they decided to use seemingly more effective measures and escalated their tactics to the arson attack. For the second planned attack, they laid out the components of the potential incendiary device because they stated that they were afraid to physically hurt people during the first arson attack. Case B and her partner were both cooperative during the trial and were sentenced to 2 years and four months in prison. Findings from PIRUS Database In total, the database includes 37 women who were engaged in left-wing extremism compared to 103 men since 2000, which is 39% and 37%, respectively, of women and men engaged in left-wing extremism since 1946. While the age of these 37 women ranged widely from 15 up to 70 years, the median age of exposure, i.e., when the incidents took place, was between 25 and 30 years. Regarding the extremist incidents, the majority (n = 34) did not engage in violent extremism. In the definition of the PIRUS coding, violence includes actions that are intended to harm individuals. Therefore, non-violent extremism includes, among others, actions that aim for property destruction, threats, or incitement of violence, as well as intentions of violent extremism. Information on the social background including the social stratum, education, and work history is not available for the majority of cases. For six cases, it is reported that they were located in the middle stratum during their childhood and two cases in the low category. Regarding education, 18 cases have no available information. For 11 individuals, it is known that they have at least a college degree or a higher education, while eight women have no or at least a high school diploma. Where information is available, the dataset reveals that eight cases were regularly employed, while four were serially employed and one was unemployed. The dataset also shows radical individuals in the social environment of the left-wing extremists. In five cases, radical family members were reported, one did not have radical family members while in 31 cases this was unknown. Regarding radical friends, more information was available with only 14 cases missing that data. In total, 23 cases had friends that were somehow involved in radical activities. Significant others were engaged in 11 cases, for 24 cases, this was unknown and two had significant others that were not radical. All women were in some way engaged in political groups. For example, 17 were members of non-clandestine political movements or activist groups, 13 members of formal extremist organizations/extremist movements, and seven women were members of an informal extremist group. The majority of women (n = 23) were identified as followers of the group, while nine took on leadership roles. Only one case was a loose associate, four cases unknown. The duration of the radicalization processes is unknown in 20 cases. For eight cases, this process

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took between one to five years and eight cases had a longer radicalization process of more than eight years. Only one woman radicalized within a year. Regarding further potential reasons for radicalization, for 17 individuals group grievances, i.e., perceiving the in-group as threatened or treated unjust, were reported. For six cases, no such grievances were listed and in 15 cases this was unknown. Regarding individual grievances, no mental health issues and no past alcohol or drug abuse were registered among the sample. Traumatic experiences were also only present for one case, although it remains unclear whether there was a temporal connection between the trauma and the radicalization. Note, however, that for 30 cases, no data on traumatic experience is available. Specific traumatic experiences such as childhood abuse or abuse in adulthood were not experienced in any case.

Conclusions Concerning demographics, Case A falls into the median age of female leftwing extremists in the United States since the year 2000, while Case B is a few years older. Our findings are in line with recent examinations of violent leftwing extremists and anti-fascists. For example, Jugl et al. (2021) found for the German context that mean age in a radicalized sample was around 27 years. Similarly, studies in the United States identified radicals to be in their midto late twenties and early thirties (Logan and Ligon 2021; Vysotsky 2020). This suggests that engagement in left-wing extremism is not only attractive for young (teenage) individuals. Examples like Case A, who has been engaged in the left-wing extremist scene for several years, indicate that engaged individuals might either not be discovered earlier or it could have taken longer for them to reach the tipping point to participate in extremist actions. The findings from the United States also show that the majority of radicalized females have had a medium or long duration of radicalization, suggesting that it might take a longer time until extremist action is being taken or that the surrounding social environment for various reasons either does not recognize the radicalization processes or misjudged them as insignificant. This could indicate a societal bias in detecting and preventing violent extremist radicalization toward men, who might be perceived to be more dangerous and affected by extremist radicalization. However, just like one case in the US sample, Case B seemed to have had a rather short period from showing first evidence of radicalization to being involved in extremist actions. Regarding upbringing and education, no clear pattern emerged from the German and American cases. While there are some individuals acquiring higher degrees, others such as Case B struggled with education and finding permanent jobs. Often, such negative life events trigger processes of radicalization and are an important driver for engaging in violent extremism (Gøtzsche-Astrup 2018). Logan et al. (2022) found in a comparison of left- and right-wing extremists that individuals from both groups had often experienced adverse childhood experiences. Many came from dysfunctional

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backgrounds, i.e., experienced abuse and neglect. Regarding our sample, only Case B showed a history of abuse by her caregivers. Furthermore, while neither mental health issues nor individual grievances were registered in the PIRUS database, Case B seemed to be an exemption to the female cases. The negative life events are reflected in her experiences of physical abuse growing up, her inability to secure long-term jobs, and her experiences with physical and significant mental health issues. Only because mental illness predates radicalization however, it cannot be automatically seen as a cause of the radicalization process (Sarma et al. 2022). Rather, the accumulation of risk factors including the negative experiences due to abuse and lack of stable employment seemed to have increased Case B’s vulnerability. This is insofar plausible as radicalization is not determined by a single factor but rather influenced by the accumulation of risk factors and lack of protective factors (Lösel et al. 2018). A common theme that can be identified in both the US sample and the German cases is involvement in an extreme left-wing milieu and/or close contacts to radical individuals such as friends or significant others. Furthermore, all women were involved in political groups although the degree of extremism present in the groups varied. Legal activism as well as contact with other activists is often recognized as an important aspect of radicalization (e.g., Horgan 2004; Hafez and Mullins 2015; McCauley and Moskalenko 2017). From our sample, we can, therefore, draw the conclusion that vulnerability for engaging in left-wing extremism is higher, when people are involved in legal activism as well as groups with extremist members. One major strategy of left-wing extremists is to engage in topics and concerns that are shared by legal demonstrators to recruit individuals (van Hüllen 2012). For example, the climate crisis has sparked initiatives by young people such as “Friday’s For Future” to demonstrate for more sustainability and more political actions to stop climate change (Stuart et al. 2020). In Germany, the left-wing extremist alliance “Interventionistische Linke (IL)” has created a sub-group called “Ende Gelände” that aims to engage youths and encourage them to use civil disobedience to achieve their political goals (Pfahl-Traughber 2021; Weichert 2022). Therefore, joint protests and engagement in legal activism where politically interested individuals meet extremists could increase the risk for becoming radicalized. Vulnerability for radicalization increases in groups due to several processes including identity fusion and group dynamics (Gøtzsche-Astrup 2018). These group dynamics also become apparent, for example, in opinion polarization where individuals form increasingly extreme opinions in like-minded groups (Strandberg et al. 2019; Sunstein 2002). Furthermore, the process of identity fusion which means to feel being at one with a group leads to higher willingness to make sacrifices (Atran 2017; Swann et al. 2012; Swann and Buhrmester 2015). A stronger connection to the in-group also results in devaluing and dehumanizing the outgroup and elicits negative reactions when the in-group is perceived to be threatened or discriminated against (Vergani et al. 2020; Gøtzsche-Astrup 2018; Hudson et al. 2019; van den Bos 2020).

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Case B also expresses perceptions of unfair treatment of a group. However, this relates lesser to a tight-knit in-group but rather to the general population and youths especially. She supported the engagement of young people to protest against climate change among other issues. She perceived the protestors to be treated unjust due to the results of climate change they might experience in their own future lives. Furthermore, together with her partner, she recognized that the protest forms of the youths did not result in positive change, which was one motivator to use more extreme means. Being motivated by perceived unfairness and discrimination of others could be explained by observer sensitivity. Jahnke et al. (2020) found in a study of young individuals that those with a left-wing political orientation related more strongly to perceptions of injustices within the society. This corresponds with the findings of Koehler (2021b), who also identified the perception of global injustices as a motive to engage in violence among female left-wing extremists. The PIRUS database does not disclose the specific perceptions of group grievances. However, the majority of women in the US sample were reported to have perceived group grievances. Therefore, these group processes seem to play an important role in left-wing female radicalization. Although it cannot be generalized to the other female cases in this sample, Case B’s radicalization process exemplifies Koehler’s (2016) depluralization theory that postulates a shift toward the use of violence since other means to achieve change are experienced to be ineffective and, hence, become discarded. When Case B and her partner realized that protest organizations such as FFF were not as successful as they had expected, they decided to take action by sending threat letters. When this still did not lead to their desired outcome, they radicalized to the point of planning and conducting an arson attack. This process was accompanied by feelings of frustration, helplessness, and anger, when the initial means did not elicit the results Case B and her partner hoped for. This is somewhat similar to a process described by Moghaddam (2005), whereby negative emotions such as frustration and anger due to unsuccessful attempts to achieve change foster radicalization (Moghaddam 2005; Borum 2011; Silke and Brown 2016). Finally, when looking at the role females play in left-wing extremism, the German cases illustrate that both women took an active part in the left-wing extremist actions. Case B was even described as a woman of action by one witness. In the US sample, 28% took on leadership positions. Differences between the German cases emerge when looking at their behavior during the trial, while Case B admitted her involvement, Case A did not testify in court and might even have played a role in providing solidarity to her other inmates, since material supporting the actions were found in her possessions. Challenges and Recommendations The qualitative nature of our research limits the generalization of our findings to other contexts. While our sample was bigger for the United States, only

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two German cases were used and, therefore, the individuals’ circumstances need to be considered in the interpretation of our findings. Furthermore, our comparison of a database and court verdicts reveals strengths and weaknesses in both types of data. While the PIRUS database offers easily accessible information, a deeper understanding can be gained from analyzing the court verdicts. Therefore, a combination of these approaches can help to develop a broader understanding of processes. Our analyses also illustrate a limitation in using court verdicts due to the varying amount of information found in the verdicts of Case A and Case B. While Case B gave a statement and extensive background information was provided, fewer information could be retrieved regarding personal information of Case A. Still, we can draw certain conclusions for future research and practice. Group membership and especially contact with other individuals engaged in left-wing extremism regardless of friends in general or significant others is a common theme for female radicalization. Taking into account the long engagement with such groups before the women were exposed, the necessity to intervene early becomes apparent but ongoing offers for individuals to disengage are of importance as well. Regarding early intervention, our findings reveal an important environment where action is necessary: Since women were often engaged in legal activist groups, interventions in these contexts are important. Prior research has shown that even governmentally led prevention and countering violent extremism programming targeting the extreme left can be effective, if the persons radicalizing into this environment are identified and approached early on (Koehler 2021a). Furthermore, organizers and coordinators of legal protest groups must be aware of the necessity to maintain a critical distance to violence supporting groups, e.g., by refusing joint protests or other forms of collaboration. Additionally, our insights into the court verdicts showed that both female left-wing extremists took an active role in the plots. Therefore, prevention of female radicalization needs to find a balance between not stigmatizing women and not underestimating them.

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CHAPTER 5

Vanguardism and Leftwing Extremism Phillip W. Gray

Introduction A consistent element appearing in extremist forms of leftwing politics is vanguardism. Most discussions of “vanguardism” usually focus upon the specific structure of the vanguard party within systems of explicit MarxismLeninism, or upon certain trends within artistic communities at points within the twentieth century (see Maerhofer 2009; Bürger 1984). These approaches are not wrong, per se, but instead are overly limited in their scope. However, it is necessary to go beyond a narrow focus that investigates simply Party organizational structure or on direct connections with Marxism-Leninism specifically both generally as well as in relation to leftwing extremism specifically. If one views “vanguardism” as entailing a particular form of ideological and organizational infrastructure, connections between various modes of thought and sundry extremist organizations become clearer. This chapter will undertake to clarify this understanding of vanguardism, as it relates to leftist extremist ideologies and groups. This chapter consists of four parts. The first section provides a general overview of an expanded notion of “vanguardism,” noting its structural assumptions regarding reality, the epistemological abilities of certain populations, and organizational configurations, and how these elements shape (and in turn, are shaped by) the typical vanguard party organizational structure. Second, the chapter will discuss vanguardism’s origins within the thought of Lenin, with specific reference to P. W. Gray (B) Athens, OH, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. P. Zúquete (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_5

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how Lenin’s theory and practice indelibly shaped leftwing extremism from his time onward. The third part will examine briefly the influence of vanguardism on leftwing extremist ideologies and organizations over the course of the twentieth century. As this section will note, this influence touches not only on explicitly Marxist-Leninist groups, but upon numerous other types of leftist extremists who otherwise would reject the label of Leninist (and perhaps even Marxist). The final section of this chapter will discuss if vanguardism still maintains an influence on extremists of the left, and if so, how that might develop over the course of the current century. To begin, we will consider vanguardism itself as a conceptual framework for understanding certain forms of extremist political activity.

Overview of Vanguardism Before delving into the origins of vanguardism and the influence of this system on leftwing extremism, it would be best to provide some definition for the framework. Vanguardism can defined as: …a certain form of political phenomena based upon an intermeshing of ideology and organizational form. On the ideological level, vanguardism is based upon an epistemology that holds that only some types of people – based on some traits – are capable of seeing the ‘truth’ of historical and social dynamics. … On the organizational level, vanguardism takes the notion of epistemology and moves it to practical reality: all of those within the epistemologically-privileged population will not be similarly ‘advanced’. … It is this ‘advanced wing’ of the ‘advanced population’ that is the vanguard party, and its organizational form will influence and shape the ideology from which it arose. (Gray 2020, 1–2)

There are six elements of importance in vanguardism: a notion of “categorybased epistemology” that is held by a specific (“world-historic”) population, the belief in a knowable and determinate dynamic of History, the creation of a specialized “science” to understand this History, a totalistic notion of human existence, a specific categorization of Enemy, and the organizational structure of the vanguard party itself. While a full discussion would require greater detail (see Gray 2020), each element will be summarized here. (a) “Category-based epistemology” refers to the manner in which a specific, “world-historic” population has the ability to “see” the History that shapes human society. Because of its placement within society and History, this population has unique access to understanding “true” reality and places a central role in moving History forward. Connected with its ability to access History’s truth, this “epistemologically-privileged” population’s main “task” is to bring about a social revolution that will sweep away the current (corrupted, inefficient, twisted) society with a new society and, with it, a new type of humanity. The second, related element is (b) the notion of History itself: specifically,

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that there is a driving dynamic that moves human life in a determinate direction. For many earlier leftwing vanguardists, the dynamic of History was the Marxian notion of technological development in conjunction with ownership of the “means and modes of production,” while other types of vanguardists would place the driving “engine” of History elsewhere (for instance, the Nazi form of vanguardism viewed the dynamic through the lens of group-level biological differences and the struggle for survival). Particularly for leftwing versions of vanguardist History, there is an “end” of History where the types of oppression endemic in human society will be finally resolved and purged. The third element of vanguardism is the notion that a (c) “science” can be created to understand History: not only how History has progressed thus far, but also the directions in which History is leading humanity. This type of specialized knowledge is not the same as science as ordinarily understood (the disinterested pursuit of objective reality)—although vanguardists will tend to play on the equivocality of the word “science” to grant greater legitimacy to their own views—but rather follows Marx’s example when he wrote, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” [emphasis in original] (Marx 1978: 145). It is this “science” that, for vanguard thinkers and movements, distinguishes them from “utopians” and dreamers of a better world: rather than “wishing” a better reality into being, vanguardists believe they are simply following what reality itself by necessity must become. The fourth trait is (d) totalism: in other words, that the dynamics of History are not limited to one sphere of society, but instead permeate every element of human existence (at a minimum). Regardless of the “motor” that is driving History, all parts of human collective experience, as well as most (or perhaps all) individual life, are shaped, inundated, and permeated by it. While this totalism is clearest in vanguardism when focused on major societal institutions, intergroup interactions, and mores, this totality also shapes family life, what types of aesthetic experience are socially preferred or shunned, forms of daily interpersonal interactions, and sundry other aspects of life. This totalistic view of human affairs, beyond what it implies for the time after the social revolution, also results in a highly negative view of present society among vanguardists. In this view, a substantial level of corruption and oppression in one aspect of society is not limited or contained: rather, this type of corruption is endemic throughout the social system itself, and indeed current social arrangements function as a means of continuing and advancing this corruption. This brings us to the fifth element of vanguardism, which can be called (e) the role of the Enemy. Just as vanguardist systems view a specific mass population as epistemologically-privileged as the instrument that will purge the corrupt contemporary society through social revolution, bringing about a new society (and usually a “New Man” as well), there is another population that benefits from the corrupt present. It is not necessarily that this population is intentionally seeking to perpetuate oppression and evil (although much vanguardist rhetoric will often imply such willful malevolence), but rather that

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it is the main beneficiary of the contemporary society, and will do all in its sizeable power to prevent even minor changes to the social system. While the “world-historic” population can observe the dynamics of History, this Enemy population is fundamentally incapable to see it (although perhaps some individual member might somehow become “declassed” or the like): as such, the Enemy population cannot be converted to the revolutionary side, nor can a modus vivendi exist between the Enemy and the “epistemologically-privileged” population. For the “world-historic” population to succeed, and indeed for History to proceed on its determinate course, the Enemy population must be defeated—indeed, it must “disappear” in some sense. Even if not explicitly stated, vanguardism’s notion of the Enemy tends toward an eliminationist form of reasoning: in a strong sense, the very survival of the Enemy population is an ongoing existential threat, be it as the most powerful population in the corrupt present or as fearsome “counter-revolutionaries” after the social revolution. The final element of vanguardism, and the origin of its name, comes from the organizational structure this framework will use: (f) the vanguard party. In a strong sense, vanguard party organization is the means by which the elements already discuss move from theory to practice. The Party’s legitimacy (both for itself and for others) derives from its role as the “advanced wing” of the epistemologically-privileged population. This connection to the “world-historic” population is what distinguishes the vanguard party from a mere group of “adventurers,” at least in the vanguardist’s mind. While History itself is what pushes the “world-historic” population toward its main task, the Party acts to guide, direct, and organize the population: in contrast to other styles of thought that envision a type of “spontaneous” uprising that will bring about social revolution, vanguardist extremists emphasize the need for organizing and mobilizing the population to ensure its most efficient means toward victory. A significant part of the Party’s legitimacy arises from the idea that its members can best assess the “science” of History, and thus direct the “worldhistoric” population in the best manner, particularly as the Party’s cadre of professional revolutionaries is better placed to comprehend the necessary implications of this “science” in its relation to the totality of social interactions. Finally, the organization and vigilance of the Party provides it the means to be wary of the Enemy population, and to prevent the epistemologically-privileged population from seeking compromise or coexistence with the Enemy group. In itself, vanguardism is an ideational/organizational structure that has been used by various ideologies across the political spectrum. Two of the most notorious vanguardist regimes, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, did not place themselves among leftwing extremists, as the “world-historic” populations upon which their systems were founded based themselves upon nation and race rather than on class (although this will show similarities to forms of leftwing extremism that developed in the latter half of the twentieth century). In its origins and its most prolific forms, however, vanguardism is

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closely connected with leftwing extremism. Whether in the form of political extremist groups (including such groups as the FARC in Colombia, the Shining Path of Peru, the Weather Underground Organization of the United States, the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction of West Germany, the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in India, the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States, and perhaps groups like Antifa today) or as extremist regimes (such as the Soviet Union and its Easter Bloc satellites, North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, the Somali Democratic Republic, and others), the vanguardist framework highly influenced leftwing extremism throughout the twentieth century. For leftwing extremists, vanguardism is attractive along six domains, three of which are ideational while three are organizational in nature. Ideationally, vanguardism provides an overarching narrative (or “myth” in Sorel’s terminology: see Sorel 2004 [1950], as well as Ohana 2009). The activities of leftwing extremists, then, become part of a longer “story,” reaching back to the beginning of human society and going forward to the “new society” of their dreams. If we look at a story as having a beginning, a middle, and an end, most leftwing vanguardists see themselves (and the world-historic population) as being in the transition point between the midsection of the story and its conclusion. This “placement” in the narrative is most helpful as a matter of motivation and mobilization: the extremist is “on the cusp” of a new world, and the work of the vanguard organization will play a pivotal role in moving humanity to its beatific final point. The second ideational benefit of this narrative, along with providing motivation, is in affording an internal avenue by which to deny epistemological or rational ability to one’s opponents. Writing in this vein, Georg Lukács notes: …the objective reality of social existence in its immediacy “the same” for both proletariat and bourgeoisie. But this does not prevent the specific categories of mediation by means of which both classes raise the immediacy to the level of consciousness, by means of which the merely immediate reality becomes for both the authentically objective reality, from being fundamentally different, thanks to the different position occupied by the two classes within the “same” economic process. [emphasis in original] (Lukács 1970, 150)

In other words, the vanguardist view of reality relieves its adherents of the need to engage in typical forms of good-faith argumentation: the vanguardist will engage in instrumentalist/strategic “discussions” with those incapable of observing the “authentic” reality, which does permit a highly instrumentalist form of morality and interaction with others (for instance, see Brown 1992). A third ideational benefit of the vanguardist ideational structure is its creation of a rationalization for the practical supremacy of the Party (frequently, its leadership that belongs to the “wrong” class or group) over the expressed wishes or goals of the epistemologically-privileged population in general. Being the “advanced wing,” the vanguard party understands the “science” of History in

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a way that the mass of the epistemologically-privileged population lacks due to “false consciousness” and the “miseducation” caused by the corrupt system of the present. As such, vanguardism provides a means to avoid cognitive dissonance when conflicts arise between the aims of the revolutionary party and the expressed interests of the “world-historic” population. At the organizational level, vanguardism is appealing insofar as it gives a means for various types of leftwing extremists to be involved in the “revolution” even if not engaged in more clearly dangerous pursuits. Beyond “extralegal” activities (such as paramilitary violence, “expropriations” via robbery, strike-breaking, and the like), the vanguard party provides room for more mundane activities of a more administrative or managerial type. Another organizational benefit is similar to the point already made about individuals in leadership who may not “fit” comfortably within the epistemologicallyprivileged population. Large numbers of those individuals attracted to revolutionary activity often come from the “Enemy” population: for leftwing extremists focused particularly on class, the propensity for leading activists to be bourgeois in origin (including, but not limited to, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, and Mao) is an ongoing problem and continues with other forms of leftwing vanguardists as well, such as the cases of white, middle-class members the Weather Underground Organization or Symbionese Liberation Army “acting on behalf” of Black Americans or previously colonized foreign nations. One final appeal of vanguardism’s organizational structure is the manner in which the “seed” of the revolutionary state is already developed within the vanguardist organization itself. The transition problems that often occur for a new political elite are mitigated through the already existing infrastructure provided by the vanguard party, formed during its time before taking power. By creating a party infrastructure that can impose itself as the ruling body over a state, vanguardism gives a “ready-made” political organization for maintaining rule of a country after the previous political leadership has been removed.

Vanguardism and Its Origins in Leninism While various “precursors” existed for a vanguardist system, such as during periods of the French Revolution (see Tackett 2015), the most “pure” form of vanguardism arose with V. I. Lenin and his Bolshevik Party in Tsarist Russia. Lenin’s theoretical insights into the role of the “advanced wing” party over the “habituated” epistemologically-privileged population, his practical roles as leader of the Bolshevik (later Communist) Party, and his actions as a founder and key leader in the new Soviet Union, make him the first and perhaps most important of vanguardist thinkers/leaders. Providing the initial framework in What Is To Be Done? (1969 [1902]), Lenin would perfect the vanguardist style of ideology and organization in his work to overthrow the Tsarist regime. Lenin’s challenge was to structure an effective organization that, on the one hand, would not slip into “revisionism” or an acceptance of

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the status quo (as seemed the case with the Second International and especially the German Social Democratic Party), and on the other, to not engage in counterproductive forms of “adventurism” (as exemplified for Marxists with Blanquism) or fruitless types of activism (such as the “Going to the People” movement in Russia during the late nineteenth century, see Walicki 1979). Beyond his theoretical exposition, Lenin in practice put forward an example of an ideological-organizational system that could make use of existing movements, put into place an infrastructure available for unforeseen revolutionary opportunities, and then move to take power violently while simultaneously setting a legitimation structure to justify such actions. Lenin’s main focus in What Is To Be Done? is the creation of a party newspaper, but his expansion on the idea for party organization provides the backdrop for vanguardism. However, Lenin’s discussion must be placed within the context of debates within Marxism in his time. Many of the vanguardist elements within Lenin’s thought—and later, within the Bolshevik Party and Communist Party—are based on the foundation of Marxism, or at least one interpretation of that system. Perhaps the most fundamental debate focused upon the role of voluntary action versus determinate systems in society. More particularly—and of special relevance for vanguardism—is the role of the revolutionary party: if social revolution by the proletariat is inevitable, what role (if any) does the party play? What should it be doing? One answer that developed was Eduard Bernstein’s “revisionism” (or more evolutionary model of socialism) that downplayed the determinism of Marxism and its eschatological elements. The German Social Democratic Party (considered the most “advanced” of the Social Democrats) attempted to take a “middle ground” of determinism with guided action. Lenin’s response, however, was unique: he placed voluntary action within the determinism of Marxism. It was the special role of the revolutionary party to push the world-historic proletariat from their “habitual” forms of thinking—which, according to Lenin, would inevitably lead to the dead end of “trade unionism” (with the working class satisfied with increased pay or lower hours, rather than a radical transformation in the social system)—through education, agitation, organization, and especially through leadership. Within this leadership party, the professional revolutionary holds pride of place. The role of the “professional revolutionary” garners particular attention in What Is To Be Done?, but one must also keep in mind the underlying organizational and ideational framework that makes the existence of such a professional revolutionary possible (Harding 2009). It is here that vanguardism gains its initial shape. Of particular note is how Lenin’s notion of vanguardism framed the perspective of later leftwing extremists on the epistemologically-privileged population, beginning with the proletariat. A key element is “habituation,” which later vanguardists would usually refer to as “false consciousness.” In Lenin’s eyes, the vanguard party’s role of guiding and organizing the proletariat (his “world-historic” population) went beyond mere stage directions for

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revolution, but also involved education (or perhaps what could be called “reeducation”). The proletariat’s main problem was its “habitual” nature (Meyer 1957), leading it toward “trade unionist” mentalities. As such, the vanguard party was a necessary part of determinist History: the party acts as the “catalyst” that “awakens” the world-historic population to its task. For aspiring leftist revolutionaries, this framework provided a means to lead radical movements while also maintaining a belief in acting “on behalf” rather than “over” the proletariat.

The Influence of Vanguardism on Leftwing Extremism For nearly 40 years (from 1917 until about 1956), the primary form of vanguardism that influenced leftwing extremists was that of the Soviet Union, and specifically Marxism-Leninism in theory as well as practice (up to and including its Stalinist variant). The Hungarian Socialist Republic of 1919, the Bavarian Soviet Republic of 1918–1919, the advances of the Chinese Communist Party, the Communist Party of (North) Korea, and others all have notable instances of vanguardist influence, usually mimicking (or even outright stating) Leninist vanguardist language, ideas, and organizational structures. During Stalin’s long rule over the USSR, Communist parties in multiple parts of the world would take on vanguardist elements, or be founded along vanguardist principles. Some of these groups would take power as well, most especially the Stalinist variants of Marxism-Leninism in North Korea and in China. Even after the Soviet Union ceased to be the “shining beacon” for many leftists, a significant number of new leftwing extremist groups—often emphasizing national liberation, anti-imperialism, antiracism, or being part of the amorphous “New Left”—still adhered to vanguardist foundations, be it through explicit allegiance to Maoist or similar forms of ideology. While the causes for vanguardism’s appeal to various leftwing groups will vary in specific cases, we can point to four reasons for vanguardism’s persistence within leftwing extremism. The first, and most practical, reason is the activity of the Soviet Union itself. Most notably with its Comintern (Third International), the Soviet Union actively encouraged and supported leftwing groups in other nations that shared its general vanguardist structure (as well as pledging allegiance to the Soviets). Even small vanguardist groups, comparatively isolated and lacking the broader appeal or influence of other leftwing groups in a country, could gain significant financial, organizational, and other support from the USSR. This type of support provided noteworthy incentives to shifting in a vanguardist direction. Communist parties aligned toward Comintern and the USSR could expect greater assistance, particularly against their domestic leftist opponents, than other groups, with the Soviet interactions in the Republic during the Spanish Civil War serving as a good example (for instance, see Preston 2006).

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A second, and more broadly applicable, reason is the victory of Lenin’s Bolsheviks. Success tends to breed emulation, and the Leninist form of vanguardism was quite successful. In gaining—and more importantly, maintaining—power over Russia, vanguardism (be it in a specifically Leninist form or in some variation on it) quickly became an influential structure for leftwing extremists across the globe. The impetus to attempt social revolution is no doubt increased once a group has taken revolution out of the realm of theory and successfully into the world of practice. With its Party structure being both “aboveground” as well as “underground,” the Leninist vanguard organization had the additional benefit of being “transferable” to other countries and contexts: it could—at least potentially—operate beneficially in a repressive, economically underdeveloped country (such as Tsarist Russia or China after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty) as well as in a comparatively free, economically developed nation (be it Weimar Germany, the United Kingdom, or elsewhere) Emulation of this type was not limited to leftwing, Marxian organizations. While not a direct connection, vanguardist parties based on populations other than class—specifically, those focused on the nation (such as the Italian Fascists) or race (such as the Nazis)—also gained some inspiration from vanguardism’s success in Russia; however, leftwing extremists would have the closest affinity to the successful vanguards of Russia. A third reason relates specifically to lacunae within Marxist theory itself (with Marxism generally serving as a foundational lingua franca of most major leftwing movements of the last 150 years). An ongoing tension within Marx’s thought is the role of economic determinism versus volitional action: depending upon the work examined, it seemed that Marx believed both that the dynamics of History made proletariat victory an absolute certainty while also maintaining that a workers’ party and its actions were vitally important for the social revolution. What role, if any, does individual (or group), willed, planned activity play in the arc of History? Vanguardism, in its Leninist form, provided a means to “square the circle,” as it were: in this system, group/ party action would play a pivotal role in bringing about social revolution while simultaneously acknowledging how the vanguard operates within the determinate economic factors underpinning Marxism (and thus avoiding the “utopianism” and “adventurism” of other movements). Finally, the interdependent relationship between knowledge, legitimacy, and authority within vanguardism grants additional attractiveness for extremist leftwing activists. Inspired perhaps more by Marx’s own style (both as an author as well as an activist) than specific substance in his theories, leftwing activists influenced by Marx placed a substantial prominence on understanding and explicating the “science” of liberation. As many of the leading figures within leftwing extremist groups arise from middle-class, education-focused backgrounds, vanguardism allows potential revolutionaries to seek out leadership and legitimacy within radical politics, even if they share little to no experience or background with the working class (or other forms of the “marginalized” and “oppressed”) for whom they are “speaking.” What these revolutionaries

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lack in personal connection to the epistemologically-privileged population can be “overcome” through styles of reasoning and theorizing with which, by background and education, the budding leftwing extremist is more comfortable. The vanguard form of organization creates a means by which the theorist can become actor in History: now the theorist is not merely an “armchair” revolutionary, but can be part of (and even lead) the “struggle.” Genealogically, one cannot underestimate the influence of the Leninist form of vanguardism (and the Soviet Union) on extremism broadly among the Left in the twentieth century. But this influence is not static, as changes do occur in the content of vanguardism as the century progressed. It is notable, however, that it is often the admission of error—rather than the committing of atrocities—that would undermine the legitimacy of some nations or groups in the eyes of other leftwing extremists. The “secret speech” of Khrushchev in 1956 provides the best example: perhaps even more delegitimizing than the admission of Stalin’s actions against Party members was the sotte voce acknowledgment that the vanguard party both was erroneous in its explication of the emancipatory “science” as well as acting against the movement toward the full social revolution (something that, within leftwing vanguardists’ own theories, should be impossible). After about 1956, the halo over the USSR dimmed for many leftwing extremists, but vanguardism itself remained attractive, both among “national liberation” movements in the developing world and among the “New Left” in Western countries. Within the 1960s and 1970s, another form of vanguardism would renew interest in its use by leftwing extremists: specifically, variants of Leninism found among “national liberation” movements or “Third World” groups, most especially in its Maoism form. For many national liberation movements (as well as various “New Left” organizations), the Maoist form of vanguardism was held in high esteem. As with the Bolshevik Party in Russia, the Chinese Communist Party—especially with its focus on “anti-imperialism—acted as an example and inspiration for radicals in developing and underdeveloped nations, especially those under (or recently freed from) Western colonization. As “Chairman Mao” entered the pantheon of leftwing extremist leaders, he and his party did not draw concerns about imperialism by different means from many developing world leftwing revolutionaries, unlike the Soviet Union. Many of these national liberation leftwing vanguards destabilized various colonial power and developing nations, while some would succeed taking control of their countries. But unlike the USSR or PRC (or Cuba), these vanguard party states tended to be highly unstable and often short-lived. In contrast to the successes of various vanguardist national liberation organizations, the vanguard organizations of the “New Left” did not succeed in overthrowing the governments of Western nations. The greater level of stability in these countries, the Cold War alliance dynamic between the Western and Eastern blocs, and the increased level of awareness (and concern) over vanguardist politics in the West after the Second World War all acted to minimize the effectiveness and appeal of leftwing vanguardism in these areas.

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New Left extremists did not abandon vanguardism so much as modify it, both ideationally and organizationally. The ideational modifications reflected both the loss of faith in socialism of the Soviet variety, as well as socio-economic changes within the West after the Second World War: In effect, the ‘task’ of the ‘generation of ‘68’ was replacing a failed epistemologically privileged population (the working class) with a new, preferably more revolutionary, population. Domestically within the United States, the revolutionary subject shifted away from primarily economic identity to other forms: racial identity (or being an ‘ally’ with racially conscious marginalized groups) in the period of the Civil Rights era, gender identity with Second Wave feminism, a more ambiguous identity of ‘youth’ or students, moving on to other forms of marginalized identity, including orientation, non-binary views of gender, and others. (Gray 2018, 150)

This ideational shift would have major implications not only for the manner in which leftwing vanguardism developed ideologically, but also would influence (and be influenced by) organizational changes. Organizationally, leftwing vanguardism became both more segmented and more coalition-oriented. On the one hand, leftwing extremist groups focused on increasingly narrow “world-historic” populations, limiting membership opportunities as well as narrowing the attractiveness of their ideologies to other groups in society. On the other hand, these vanguard groups also showed a greater proclivity toward forming alliances with other extremist leftwing groups: while the vanguard groups fixated upon particular forms of identity, these organizations were willing to coordinate with each other as part of a larger coalition of the “oppressed” or “marginalized.” Some of these Western groups overlapped in a sense with national liberation movements, as in the case of the Black Panther Party (at certain points), taking on language and ideas from a mixture of Maoist as well as “national liberation” thinkers (such as Fanon). Thus, even some “national liberation” movements that appeared more Fascist (in the sense of being nation-focused vanguardists) could join the “Left” through recognition by other groups of nation’s “oppression” (under the “New Left” ideational rubric for marginalization). One can see this mentality clearly within the Red Army Faction, in its belief that “[t]he commitment to the revolutionary struggle can only come from one’s own experience of the system and its brutality and destructiveness, and from one’s own goals and ideas of how one wants to live” (Red Army Faction 1992 [1990], 73). Additionally, many of these vanguardist groups viewed themselves as precursor organizations: rather than the mass party that would eventually lead the epistemologically-privileged population to victory, these groups were intended to be a “spark” to ignite revolutionary fervor in the population that would lead to a larger party organization (for instance, see Weather Underground 1974, 3–4). In the view of the Weather Underground Organization (WUO), “[t]he role of the clandestine organization would be to build the

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‘consciousness for action’ and prepare the way for the development of a people’s militia. Concurrently, the role of the mass movement would include support for, and encouragement of, armed action” (Jacobs 1997, 164). The WUO is also useful in showing the changes in “world-historic” populations among leftwing groups (see, among others, Varon 2004, 50): viewing the working class more as a problem than a revolutionary subject, the WUO would shift its ideational focus to antiracism, anti-imperialism, and feminism, among others. A more radical example of such shifts is the Japanese Liberation Army: beginning as a generally Leninist group (focused on anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism), its interaction with various Middle Eastern extremist groups would shift its focus to a predominant concern with Palestinian populations.

What Lays Ahead In some senses, vanguardism is past its time, organizationally speaking. Within the last 20–30 years, technological changes change the material prerequisites that previously would make vanguardism organizationally attractive. Especially at its origin point in the early twentieth century, “[f]or a movement/ party to function, an infrastructure, containing a press, propaganda agents, communications links, revenue collection/allocation, and most importantly organizational offices to keep the whole thing together, was necessary” (Gray 2013, 656). The “New Left” vanguard organizations already signaled the decreased efficacy of this structure form, as these groups sought to be a “spark” or “precursor” to a mass movement party rather than being the core of such a group. And yet, vanguardism remains prevalent in much leftwing extremism, often denying vanguardist inclinations while advancing along those lines all the same. Perhaps the most concerning current trend is the “mainstreaming” of forms of vanguardist thinking, particularly its category-based epistemology. For instance, “standpoint epistemology”—as is popular in some feminist writings—would be an instance of this mainstreaming, as would the centrality of “lived experience” delimited by identity affirmation, as is noticeable in many forms of arguments in intersectionality. Intersectionality “arose out of a critique of gender-based and race-based research for failing to account for lived experience at neglected points of intersection – ones that tended to reflect multiple locations as opposed to dominant or mixed locations” (McCall 2005, 1780). In effect, the coalitional ideology and organizational style of “New Left” vanguardism has sunk deep roots into various disciplines in academia (be they narrow areas such as Black Studies or Queer Studies, or more established fields such as sociology, anthropology, or education). One might question if these types of thinking are “mainstreamed,” as it appears primarily within academic settings. This itself, however, is concerning. Elements of “New Left” vanguardism in the period after 1969:

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…came to dominate some academic disciplines, while also spawning many new ‘disciplines’ that were explicitly focused upon advocacy and praxis rather than more traditional forms of scholarship. Lacking the ‘correct’ standpoint or experience, these earlier forms of research were often rejected as reflecting inherent flaws, structural biases, and marginalizing conclusions: as such, a new ‘critical’ form of research-cum-activism instead was promoted as the new norm. (Gray 2020, 201–202)

These styles of thinking did remain limited to the academy. While one does not find the language of “bourgeois rationality” or “bourgeois legality” in popular language, New Left analogies such as “white privilege” or “cis-het” (a shortened form of “cis-heteronormativity”) increasingly show themselves in popular culture as well as to the corporate world. Whether the continuation of these types of ideologies will result in a reforming of vanguardist organization remains to be seen.

References Brown, Chris. 1992. Marxism and international ethics. In Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds., Traditions of international ethics, 225–249. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bürger, Peter. 1984. Theory of the avant-garde. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gray, Phillip W. 2013. Leaderless resistance, networked organization, and ideological hegemony. Terrorism and Political Violence 25: 655–671. ———. 2018. ‘The fire rises’: Identity, the alt-right and intersectionality. Journal of Political Ideologies 23: 141–156. ———. 2020. Vanguardism: Ideology and organization in totalitarian politics. New York: Routledge. Harding, Neil. 2009. Lenin’s political thought. Chicago: Haymarket Books. Jacobs, Ron. 1997. The way the wind blew: A history of the weather underground. London: Verso. Lenin, V. I. 1969 [1902]. What is to be done? Burning questions of our movement. New York: International Publications. Lukács, Georg. 1970. Lenin: A study of the unity of his thought. Trans. Unnamed. London: Verso. Maerhofer, John W. 2009. Rethinking the vanguard: Aesthetic and political positions in the Modernist debate, 1917-1962. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Marx, Karl. 1978. Theses on Feuerbach. In Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels reader, Second Edition, 143–145. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. McCall, Leslie. 2005. The complexity of intersectionality. Signs 30: 1771–1800. Meyer, Alfred G. 1957. Leninism. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Ohana, David. 2009. Homo mythicus: Volume II of nihilist order. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. Preston, Paul. 2006. The Spanish civil war: Reaction, revolution, and revenge. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

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Red Army Faction. 1992 [1990]. Communique on the attempted assassination of Hans Neusel, State Secretary in the German Ministry of the Interior in Cologne on 27 July 1990. In Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, eds., Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations, 70–74. New York: Frank Cass. Sorel, Georges. 2004 [1950]. Reflections on violence. Trans. T. E. Hulme and J. Rother. Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc. Tackett, Timothy. 2015. The coming of the Terror in the French Revolution. Cambridge: Belknap Press. Varon, Jeremy. 2004. Bringing the war home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and revolutionary violence in the sixties and seventies. Berkeley: University of California Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1979. A history of Russian thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Weather Underground. 1974. Prairie fire: The politics of revolutionary antiimperialism. Political statement of the Weather Underground. San Francisco: Communications Co.

CHAPTER 6

Left-Wing Extremism and Violence Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca

“Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one” Karl Marx, Capital (1867)

Introduction The most pressing question for the revolutionary or extremist Left is whether violence helps to bring about the revolution. A revolution is an irregular (noninstitutional) regime change caused by a popular movement (Goodwin 2001, 9). A revolution does not necessarily require the use of organized violence. The force of the masses may be such that the existing regime collapses and is replaced by a new one. Famous non-violent revolutions were registered in Eastern European countries and other former Communist countries in 1989 and in the after years (Kuran 1997). Given the relaxation of the threat of a Soviet invasion, popular pressure was sufficient to provoke regime breakdown. For a very long time, the extreme Left has considered that violence was necessary to trigger a revolution and that the revolution was in itself a violent takeover. Violence (the use of force to destroy property or life) can take many different forms. In this chapter, I focus mainly on armed violence, which is, by far, the most disruptive and destructive. The use of armed violence has been a constant temptation for the extreme Left since the very beginning. In I. Sánchez-Cuenca (B) Carlos III University of Madrid, Getafe, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. P. Zúquete (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_6

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the ideological tradition of the extreme Left, there are several justifications for this kind of violence: the weakness of the state, revolutionary impatience (in more technical terms, a low time discount factor), the conviction that the path to reform is blocked, the assumption that violence radicalizes political preferences and raises class consciousness, the rigged or biased nature of institutional politics, and so on and so forth. Whatever the ultimate reason for the adoption of violence may be, we need to analyze the consequences of committing violence for revolutionary political movements. The underlying issue is whether mass mobilization and violence are complements or substitutes. Does violence hinder or foster mobilization? Under what conditions does mass mobilization prevent the appearance of violence? Is violence the tactic chosen by extremists when they perceive insufficient mobilization of the masses? Does violence expel the moderates from the movement, or does it rather increase the mass base of the movement? In order to address these questions, two different types of situations are distinguished. In the first one, the extremists willing to take arms create an underground organization specialized in the production of violence. Given the constraints of clandestinity, the extremists lose touch with the social movement, become increasingly isolated, and engage in a bilateral confrontation with the state in which the challenger is usually defeated by security forces. In the second situation, the extremists are able to mount an insurgency, which implies that the rebels gain territorial control in some area of the country, develop a large organization, possibly with several thousand recruits, and enjoy a significant amount of popular support. Some leftist insurgencies have succeeded and have taken over government. Based on this, it might seem that the extremist Left should always strive for the insurgent model rather than for the underground one. However, this is rarely a matter of choice. The options for organized violence are dictated by the circumstances. More concretely, the key factor is the political and economic development of the country. In developed countries, the state has large military capabilities and full control and presence over its territory, so that the chances for an insurgency are fairly minimal; the only feasible option is to create an underground group. In less developed countries, insurgencies are possible. The implication is that objective conditions matter a lot. As shown at the end of this chapter with a brief analysis of three Maoist organizations in countries with very different levels of development, the differences among them regarding violence are a consequence of the level of development of the state.

Terrorist Violence and Revolution In a short piece published in 1911 in Der Kampf , the monthly of the Austrian Social Democracy, Leon Trotsky criticized terrorist violence in unequivocal terms. He compared the effects of conducting a strike with murdering a prominent official. In his own words, “in the first case, there is a social

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struggle, whose methods and means flow necessarily from the nature of the prevailing social order; and in the second, a purely mechanical reaction identical anywhere—in China as in France—very striking in its outward form (murder, explosions and so forth) but absolutely harmless as far as the social system goes” (Trotsky 1974, 6). Whereas a strike has positive consequences for class consciousness, workers’ mobilization, and unions’ organizational capacity, the killing of a capitalist or a state official assumes a passive role of the masses. In another article of 1909, Trotsky established the opposition between mass protest and violence in these terms: “The revolvers of individual heroes instead of the people’s cudgels and pitchforks; bombs instead of barricades –that is the real formula of terrorism” (Trotsky 1974, 13). Trotsky’s analysis is based on the assumption that terrorism is a kind of violence fully detached from the masses and with no positive effects on the revolutionary movement. On the opposite side, we have the anarchists, who thought otherwise: violence may generate the conditions for a successful revolution. The propaganda by the deed doctrine is an attempt to elaborate on this general thesis. Thus, the father of the anarchist movement, Mikhail Bakunin, considered that political discourse was but cheap talk, with little effect on the working class. In his Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis (1870), he argued that the anarchists “must spread our principles not with words, but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda” (Bakunin 1971: 195–196). Violence is a more powerful signal than words. It conveys determination and commitment. Hence the inspiring power of the deed for those who contemplate it. The Italian anarchist leader, Errico Malatesta, formulated the propaganda by the deed doctrine in 1876 as follows: The Italian Federation believes that the insurrection, reinforcing socialist principles through deeds, is the most effective means of propaganda; and, without deceiving or corrupting the masses, it is also the only means of reaching even the lowest social classes and to involve these strongly alive forces of mankind in the struggle of the International. (Quoted in Linse 1982: 202)

Similar ideas were entertained by Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) in Russia. In their 1876 manifesto, they held that violence was but a form of agitation that would develop revolutionary attitudes (Clutterbuck 2004). The propaganda by the deed doctrine was implemented by the anarchists in several ways, from insurrections to direct action in the workplace (sabotage, strikes), though it was the campaign of terrorist attacks what left a more indelible mark in the movement. In my own research, I have identified 194 fatalities caused by anarchist attacks during the period from 1875 to 1925 in developed countries (not counting Russia or Latin-American countries, see Sánchez-Cuenca 2019: 139). The countries most heavily hit by this violence were Spain (75 fatalities), the US (48), Italy (28), and France (23). It is worth

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noting that in the US, most of the attacks were carried out by European immigrants (mostly Italian and German). The first car-bomb in history, the one that exploded in Wall Street in 1920, killing 38 people, was organized by Italian anarchists who had migrated to the US (Gage 2009: 325–6). The most significant aspect of anarchist violence was its underground nature. Attacks were often carried out by single individuals, targeting symbols of the bourgeois system, particularly rulers (kings, presidents, ministers). Sadi Carnot, the French President, was killed by an Italian anarchist in 1894. There were also indiscriminate attacks, as the bomb that exploded in the opera theater in Barcelona, the Liceo, killing 20 people in 1893. This was violence executed independently of mass mobilization, though it was supposed to trigger mobilization on a large scale. By understanding violence as a form of propaganda (armed propaganda), violence was supposed to open the people’s eyes. Against Trotsky’s original ideas, those who favored armed propaganda thought that the workers would learn the true path of the revolution thanks to the attacks against the system. Violence, in fact, would have a sort of pedagogical intent. It is not by chance that in one of their first actions, the Red Brigades kidnapped the engineer Idalgo Machiarini on March 3, 1972, and released a photo of him with this added sentence: “Colpiscine uno per educarne cento!” (“hit one to educate one hundred”) (Ruggiero 2007, 141). In a similar vein, the Weather Underground Organization wrote that “armed actions push forward people’s conviction and commitment; they are a great teacher and example” (Weather Underground Organization 1974, 4). The Black Panther Party put it in this way: “When the people see the advantage in the activities of the guerrilla warfare method, they will quickly follow this example” (In Foner 1995, 45). From this perspective, violence is supposed to have a transformative power on the people’s beliefs and preferences. Thanks to the exemplary condition of the violent deed, people will feel obligated to follow the path. Violence is thus inspirational and pedagogical. The violent deed is established as an example that will be emulated by others. More specifically, the theory establishes that violence raises class consciousness for at least four related reasons. Firstly, violence gains much greater visibility than traditional forms of propaganda. The people learn that there is a group of activists committed to the cause of revolution who are willing to risk their lives. This, of course, may insufflate hope and optimism in the masses, but the effect is deeper than that: the core of activists may act as the critical mass of revolutionaries that will attract others to the movement (Oliver et al. 1985). Secondly, violence proves the vulnerability of the state. Non-revolutionary workers tend to think that the state is all powerful. But this impression is created by the state’s effective monopoly over the means of violence. As soon as an armed group challenges this monopoly, the state looks more fragile. Thus, the German Red Army Faction explained in their famous manifesto, “The Urban Guerrilla Concept” (1971), that “the urban guerrilla aims to

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destroy certain aspects of the state structure, and to destroy the myth of state omnipotence and invulnerability” (In Smith and Moncourt 2009, 98). Thirdly, the state cannot but react violently to an armed challenge, revealing its true nature, usually concealed in peaceful times. The workers learn not only that the state can be beaten, but also that the state will defend the bourgeois order not matter what, overcoming any legal qualms. The bourgeois institutions (the rule of law, basic rights, and so on) are a façade that the state is willing to suspend if the challenge is serious enough. Lastly, violence has a polarizing potential, revealing the internal contradictions of the system. Mario Moretti, the leader of the Red Brigades who shot Aldo Moro, the Christian Democratic leader, explained the action as follows: “we thought that the contradiction between the base and apex would explode, putting the Christian Democrats on the ropes” (Moretti 1994, 171; my translation). In other words, the internal tensions of power structure become visible and the system crumbles. All these arguments point in the same direction: violence is an instrument of mobilization. In the words of a member of the Portuguese April 25th Popular Forces, We thought that armed propaganda actions and direct action in support of workers and peasants involved in land occupations generate greater mobilization as well as a radicalization of the social movement (or of a part of it), forcing a retreat of the ruling class and achieving some tactical victories and the accumulation of forces. (de Sousa 1992, 48; my translation)

This conception of violence makes sense in theory, but it hardly works in practice. The theory assumes that there is a sort of positive feedback loop between violence and mobilization. More violence leads to greater mobilization, which makes higher levels of violence possible. This is the core point of the political-military model of violence, in which violence fosters mobilization. The problem with this conception is not an internal inconsistency in the argumentation, but, rather, that the conditions are almost never ripe for the materialization of the idea. In most cases, violence and mobilization decouple from each other: the masses either are indifferent to the violent deeds carried out by the avant-garde (the most highly committed activists) or abandon the movement because of its violent dimension and the risks and costs that come with it. This null or negative effect is particularly clear when the producers of violence act underground, in a clandestine way. If the activists have to hide all the time, their links with the popular movement are necessarily severed. Their violence, so to say, does not resonate in the masses. Because of its isolation, the violent group cannot engage in the popular mobilizations and therefore initiates a purely bilateral confrontation with the state in which the masses are relegated to the passive role of spectator; in this way, Trotsky’s misgivings about political violence are bitterly confirmed. In her analysis of

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underground violence, Della Porta (1995) found a strong trend to increasingly self-referential violence by clandestine groups; by that she means attacks that are more related to the survival of the organization than to the cause for which it fights, as when organizations commit attacks against the prison system or organize kidnappings to liberate members of the group from jail. Empirically, it has been documented that violence under the form of armed propaganda (that is, left-wing terrorism) tends to emerge precisely when mobilization is waning (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986). As long as the number of supporters keeps growing, violence is unnecessary, or, alternatively, the power in numbers is sufficient. However, when numbers are faltering, violence may be a substitute rather than a complement. Thus, according to the argument, violence would be a resource employed by the social movement’s extremists in order to compensate the loss of supporters. However, if violence expels moderates from the movement, then a self-reinforcing mechanism of growing radicalization and higher violence is set in motion (De Nardo 1985). The moderates abandon the movement, and the extremists take control of it. This dynamic can be nicely illustrated with the protest movements of the late sixties and the posterior emergence of left-wing extremist violence in the 1970s. While the movements were expanding, violence was not present or, if it was, it was merely marginal. But in the early seventies, when the movement faded because of fatigue or frustration, the extremists formed underground groups and started campaigns of violence. Many of the armed groups of the 1970s in the Left (the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the GRAPO in Spain, the Revolutionary Group 17 November in Greece, the United Red Army in Japan) were formed in the aftermath of the mobilization cycle of the late 1960s. All of them followed a similar path: even if the violence was carried out in the name of the people (the workers, the oppressed, the exploited, the marginalized), the people played a very minor role in the struggle; the struggle evolved into a fight between underground groups and states. Given the huge asymmetry between the contenders, it is no wonder that the underground armed groups had to focus on surviving state repression. In the middle of the clash with the state, the aim of triggering a revolution was a political incantation rather than a realistic goal. Groups such as the Red Brigades or the Red Army Faction kept carrying out attacks against the state not any longer for the revolution, but for something certainly more mundane, the conditions of their recruits in prison. If we assume that terrorism is the violence exerted by underground or clandestine groups, as I have argued elsewhere (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2011b), it is obvious that no leftist terrorist group has ever succeeded. The terrorist leftist groups of developed countries in the 1970s and 1980s can be considered the last revolutionaries of our time. This is the term that Valerio Morucci, a noted member of the Red Brigades, used in his memoirs: they were “the last revolutionaries of the twentieth century. It was the last chance. Then

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things changed. The revolutionary myth collapsed” (Morucci 2004: 45, my translation). There has not ever been a successful leftist terrorist organization. Revolutions are not started by terrorist campaigns. Underground armed groups of the Left have failed in their own terms (as in many developed countries) or have provoked a reactionary backlash (as in some developing ones). For instance, in the 1970s, the terrorist activity of the Tupamaros in Uruguay and of Montoneros in Argentina destabilized their respective polities, provoking military coups in 1973 (Uruguay) and 1976 (Argentina). It might be argued that the problem does not lie in the armed group: the reason why they failed in so many places, particularly in the developed West, is because of the strength of the state. In affluent countries, the state has the capacity to resist and eventually defeat the armed challenge of underground groups. Police forces have sufficient intelligence to prevent the formation of armed groups. Yet, the separation between the type of armed group and the state is largely artificial, since the two are mutually dependent. That is, armed groups go underground precisely because the state is very powerful. Were the state weaker, the armed group might create an insurgency. To put it in another way, extremists act underground when they are unable to mount an effective insurgency against the state. The armed group being so weak vis-à-vis the state, security becomes more important than influence (McCormick 2003): the group invests most of its resources on survival, while influence (the revolution) is postponed. Eventually, the incapacity for advancing the cause makes the group politically irrelevant. To recap: when violence is underground (that is, terrorist), committed by an avant-garde formed by strongly committed activists, the armed group loses touch with the movement. The supposedly positive consequences of violence on the masses (greater class consciousness, a source of inspiration for further acts against the system, and so on) vanish due to the social isolation of the group. From this viewpoint, the terrorist campaigns conducted by some extreme Left groups have all ended in an utter failure.

Insurgent Leftist Violence I move now into the more complex case of the revolutionary insurgency, where violence is executed at a larger scale and the masses can be involved in several ways. By a revolutionary insurgency, I understand an armed group with the capacity to launch an irregular war (guerrilla warfare) against the state. An irregular war is conducted employing light military power, sustaining physical encounters with the enemy (which may become small-scale battles), hit and run tactics, and, more importantly, some degree of territorial control (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). When the rebels gain territorial control, they can hide from the state, store weapons, and train recruits. Also, territorial control usually entails some contact with the local population (except if the

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controlled territory is empty, in the jungle or in the hills). The theory of revolution assumes that as the rebels gain new territory, their popular support increases and the armed group becomes stronger. If the insurgents acquire great military capacity, the conflict may evolve into a conventional civil war (with well-defined fronts and heavy weaponry). The model of revolutionary insurgency may overlap with the more specific one of national liberation, typically in colonial or post-colonial contexts. Indeed, many national liberation insurgencies have been of Marxist persuasion, but not all Marxist revolutionary movements have national liberation among their goals. What they share is that both seek regime change. Historically, there have been two ways of thinking about the revolution (for a more fine-grained typology, see Medina and Sarkar 2022). In the first one, the main actor is the proletariat: the model, obviously, is the Russian, Leninist revolution of 1917, based on an urban insurrection featured by the working class. In the second one, the main actor is the peasantry: the model is the Chinese, Maoist revolution (1945–1949), with a strong rural component. While the Russian revolution was a game-changer event that inspired several generations of Communists all over the planet, there were no successful replicas, simply because the countries in which the proletariat was powerful were precisely the Western industrializers, where economic development diffused the revolutionary path and some form of class compromise was reached (Przeworski 1986). In those countries, the Communist parties opted for playing the institutional card and participated in elections and in legal forms of protest and mobilization, averting violence. By contrast, the Chinese model was replicated by endless insurgencies in developing countries, becoming a sort of paradigm (see Balcells and Kalyvas 2022). In the Maoist insurgency, the revolution is the culmination of a long process (a protracted war) in which the revolutionaries accumulate forces in the countryside, encircle the cities, and eventually fall on the capital, provoking the collapse of the system. Understood in these broad terms, most leftist rural insurgencies can be regarded as Maoist in inspiration, including, for instance, the “foco” theory developed by Regis Debray (1967) and Ernesto “Che” Guevara (1960): the central idea is that a small bunch of guerrilleros acting in the hills can attract a growing number of peasants to their ranks, creating the embryo of a popular army with high mobility and great capacity to surprise the enemy. Whereas leftist underground groups, as noted above, fail systematically, insurgencies succeed in some cases (Cambodia, Cuba, Nepal, Nicaragua, North Vietnam). Leftist or Marxist insurgencies show the same rate of success as other insurgencies (Balcells and Kalyvas 2022). It goes without saying that this partial degree of success is due not only to the greater weakness of the state (which makes insurgencies feasible in the first instance), but also to the greater popular roots of the movement. In this context, violence and mobilization are necessarily intertwined, if only because of the size of the armed organization.

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Two issues must be considered at this point: on the one hand, the characteristics of the armed group and on the other, the relationship between the armed rebels and the local population. Regarding the first point, the size of the armed, insurgent group is usually larger than that of underground groups. Insurgencies survive to the extent that they are able to recruit on a wide basis. Whereas in underground groups the number of recruits seldom goes beyond 1,000 (in most case, it is a few hundreds), in the case of an insurgent group the numbers are clearly over 1,000 (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2011b, Table 4). The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) had, at its peak, more than 25,000 recruits (Ríos 2021). This is only possible if the armed group has wide support among certain social groups (mainly peasants, but also urban students and some sectors of the working class). Of course, some people may join an insurgency for purely instrumental reasons (in order to secure income, as in Collier and Hoeffler 2004), but this cannot be universalized, there must be a significant core of ideological believers, and otherwise, the revolutionary army would transform itself into a looting group. Although ideological and material incentives may complement each other, there can be also a crowding out effect: the original ideological motivations of the group are at some point replaced by material concerns. In this regard, the narco temptation may be hard to resist, as it happened for instance with the Shining Path in the Huallaga Valley (Weinstein 2007, 192–95). When the revolutionary group becomes an extractive organization, ideology becomes secondary or disappears altogether. In most revolutionary groups, however, ideology remains the main motivating factor. Even in the FARC, whose involvement in the narco-business is well known, ideological beliefs were crucial for the group’s survival and for its capacity to attract new recruits (Ugarriza and Crieg 2013). Regarding the second point, the relationship between the armed rebels and the local population may have varying degrees of intensity (Arjona 2016). The most interesting possibility is that of the rebels becoming the new rulers, generating a sort of shadow state that provides public goods (internal order, justice, some social services) and expects some reciprocity from the local inhabitants under some form of taxation. If the rebels want to maintain, or to gain, the favor of the population, they will show some degree of self-restraint, using repression and coercion in a limited way. Repression will be mainly selective, aimed at deterring collaboration with the enemy (Kalyvas 2006). However, when the locals turn against the insurgents, then massive, indiscriminate punishment may be employed. A good case in point might be the massacre caused by the Peruvian Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), a powerful Maoist insurgency, in the small, hilly village of Lucanamarca in April 1983. The triggering event was the killing of a member of the group, Olegario Curitomay, by a group of local resisters. The Maoist insurgents responded with a bloody raid in which 69 people were killed, 18 of them children. The goal, in

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the words of the Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzmán, was to teach a lesson to those who dared to attack any member of the group (Degregori 2011). When the existing regime is perceived as weak and illegitimate, and the insurgents obtain the sympathy of the people, the revolutionary movement is likely to succeed. These are the only conditions under which violence works in favor of the rebels’ political goals, that is, where violence and mobilization feed each other in a positive loop.

Three Varieties of Maoism As stated above, the choice between terrorist and insurgent violence is dictated by conditions, not by will. Ideology, as such, plays no role or, at most, a very little one. In order to account for the form that rebellion takes, state capacity seems more important than rebels’ goals and beliefs. When the state is strong (in both “despotic” and “infrastructural ways,” see Mann 1986), rebels either give up on launching an insurgent movement or try it but they are easily defeated. By contrast, a weak state is unable to prevent the formation of an insurgent group that gains territorial control and engages in an irregular war against the government. This claim can be illustrated by comparing three extremist groups that shared the same ideology, Maoism, but, nonetheless, behaved very differently. The ideological diffusion of Maoism peaked in the period in the 1970s and 1980s. Its influence was pervasive in the extremist Left, in both developed and developing countries (Wolin 2010 called it “the wind from the east”). However, despite the similar ideological principles, Maoism adopted very different forms, adapting to the circumstances of each country. Let us focus on the Shining Path in Perú, the GRAPO (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups, Grupos de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre) in Spain, and Proletarian Left (Gauche prolétarianne) in France. The three of them were extremist groups that regarded violence functional for the cause of the revolution. The Shining Path (SP) was a formidable revolutionary insurgency that controlled large rural areas in the Ayacucho region. It had several thousand recruits at its peak and, according to the Peruvian Truth Commission, it was responsible for the killing of more than 30,000 people during the period 1980–2000.1 The SP engaged in a long war with the Peruvian state, trying to enlarge its areas of territorial control and weakening the regime, with the aim of capturing the capital, Lima, at the end of the conflict. That would mean the final success of the revolutionary movement. Most of the SP’s actions took place in the countryside. The SP’s constituency was the deprived peasants in the sierras. The GRAPO was an underground group, the armed branch of a Maoist party, that started to kill in 1975, the year of Franco’s death. It was an urban group, acting in big cities. Its recruits were industrial workers and intellectuals, not peasants. The group survived to several police blows, becoming the

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longest-lasting revolutionary group in the West. Actually, the GRAPO was the most lethal leftist organization in Europe (excluding nationalist organizations with leftist leanings such as ETA in Spain and the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland).2 The GRAPO killed 88 people in the period 1975–2000. The Red Brigades, including the various splits (Brigate Rosse-Walter Alasia, Brigate Rosse-Partito Guerriglia, and Brigate Rosse-Partito Comunista Combattente), were responsible for 78 killings.3 These numbers pale in comparison with the killings caused by an insurgency such as the SP. Finally, Gauche proletariénne (GP) was created in 1968 and soon became the largest group of the French extra-parliamentary Left. As a matter of ideology, GP considered that violence was a complement to workers’ struggles. The party decided to create an underground armed branch, the New Popular Resistance (Nouvelle résistance populaire, NRP). Although the NRP committed some violent acts, including “symbolic bombs” not aimed at people, but, unlike the SP or the GRAPO, it refused to carry out lethal attacks. As one of its leaders, Alain Geismar, wrote in his memoirs: I never thought that it was our duty to start a sort of war against the bourgeois state. The visible consequences of the adoption of terrorism in Italy, Germany and Japan, made me unfavorable to this view. The escalation between a group and a state, rather than galvanizing the masses, had the opposite consequence of putting greater distance between them, breaking the solidarity of the masses with the revolutionaries. (2008: 211, my translation)

There is a sharp contrast between the three extremist groups: an insurgent group, a lethal underground one, and a non-lethal underground one that only engaged in low-level violence. This variation is mainly due to the level of development and the strength of the state. Perú is a developing country with a relatively weak state that had low capacity to hold control of remote areas (such as the Ayacucho Sierra). It was relatively easy for the SP to liberate territory and to attract destitute peasants to its ranks. In a brief span of time, a large insurgency was organized. By 1992, the SP was making inroads in Lima. Had it not been for the arrest of the leader, Abimael Guzmán, the Maoist guerrilla might have had a chance. By the mid-1970s, Spain was an industrialized and urbanized country; during the previous two decades, an exodus from the countryside to the big cities had taken place. The state had the resources to exert full control over its territory. Consequently, the extremist groups had to go underground. Apart from the Basque nationalist ETA, the most successful group was the GRAPO. The Spanish state had the capacity to prevent the formation of an insurgency, but not an underground group. On the other hand, given the convulse and traumatic political history of Spain, there was a constituency in the extremist Left that supported armed struggle. The conditions, therefore, were ripe for the emergence of a leftist terrorist group.

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France was the most developed country of the three. Despite a long national tradition of rioting and violent politics, the GP decided not to go into lethal violence. It created an armed branch, the NRP, but it avoided killing anyone. The perpetrators were aware of the capacity of the French state to crush the challengers; besides, they had learnt from the experience of other developed countries (Germany, Japan) that underground violence did not lead anywhere. But, perhaps more importantly, the leaders of NRP anticipated that a lethal attack would be met with disgust in its constituency (Sommier 2008: 201–02). This brief comparison between three forms of Maoism shows that the association between ideological extremism and violence is crucially mediated by the structural and political conditions in which the conflict takes place. Whether violence is adopted, and, if so, which kind of violence is employed, depends crucially on the strength of the state as well as on the constraints imposed by the community of support.4

Future Directions Since the beginning of the current century, extremist left-wing armed violence has almost disappeared in developed countries and has retreated considerably in developing ones. As in the quote of Morucci above, the wave of left-wing terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s was probably the last attempt to use armed struggle in the developed world. The Great Recession of 2008 and the austerity politics that were implemented in its aftermath had dire social consequences in many European countries, particularly in the southern ones. The extremist Left might have tried to capitalize on the wide dissatisfaction that was perceivable in public opinion surveys by launching an armed campaign against the system. However, lethal violence was remarkably absent, as if it were not an option any longer. Greece was the country most severely hit by the crisis and the policies of adjustment. A plethora of extremist groups, of anarchist persuasion, have acted violently after 2008, including rioting, bombs against infrastructure, destruction of cash machines, and the like (Williams 2018). Lethal violence, however, has been pretty much absent, except for an attack to militants of the neo-fascist party Golden Dawn that caused two deaths in 2013. An anarchist group, the Fighting People’s Revolutionary Powers, claimed the attack. In most attacks lethal violence has been avoided; this contrasts with the previous cycle of left-wing terrorism featured by the Revolutionary Movement 17 November (Kassimeris 2001). Germany has also registered several attacks by the extremist Left against members of the extreme Right, but, again, the intensity of the violence is much lower than that of the previous period. Even if the extreme Left has survived and has committed some violent attacks in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the temptation of armed violence has been avoided so far. If we look at the developing countries, left-wing insurgencies are residual (Balcells and Kalyvas 2022: Fig. 2). There are old conflicts still going on (such as the Naxalites in India, see chapter on this volume), but no new left-wing

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insurgencies are observed. Most current insurgencies today are Islamist. The extent to which Marxist and Islamist revolutionary movements are similar is a fascinating question, but still unexplored. The end of Cold War, the lack of political allure of Communism, the strength of the state plus the record of failures of previous left-wing violent campaigns are the main factors that might explain the stunning fact that, even if some level of low-scale violence persists, leftist armed violence seems to be something of the past. Nevertheless, there are some disturbing elements in the near future. The increase of political polarization in many countries, either developed or developing, is a matter of serious concern. The lack of recognition of the political rival, the erosion of institutional rules, and the attempts to topple governments using lawfare might generate the conditions for a revival of political violence. Liberal democracy rests on the principle of mutual toleration. If this principle is abandoned, the temptation to use violence to solve political conflicts may be irresistible. The main danger lies not in the extreme Left, but rather in its opposite, the extreme Right. If the extreme Right organizes armed violence to bring about authoritarian regimes, the extreme Left might follow suit. Although this is still an unlikely development, it is not any longer an unthinkable one. Of course, even if this danger materializes, the forms of political violence might be different to the ones that have been observed in previous cycles of conflict. It is still too soon to discern whether political polarization is a passing phenomenon or will become part of the political system on a more permanent basis.

Notes 1. See https://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/. 2. The figures on lethality come from the Domestic Terrorist Victims dataset (DTV), see De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2011a) and Sánchez-Cuenca (2019). 3. In Italy, revolutionary terrorism was more lethal than in Spain, but the authorship was much more fragmented in the former than in the latter. In Italy there were dozens of armed groups, whereas in Spain almost all the lethal violence was carried out by the GRAPO. 4. In my own research, I have shown that these conditions are historically determined: the long-term path of political and economic development generate the conditions that are conducive to extremist leftist violence. This long-term analysis helps to explain the startling association between the events of the interwar period in the West and the emergence of left-wing revolutionary violence in the 1970s and 1980s. The countries that suffered democratic breakdowns (and rightwing authoritarianism) in the inter-war period are the ones that had armed leftist groups in the 1970s and 1980s. For a full analysis of this historical correlation, see Sánchez-Cuenca (2019).

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References Arjona, Ana (2016) Rebelocracy. Social Order in the Colombian Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bakunin, Mijhail (1971) Bakunin on Anarchy. Selected Works (edited by Sam Goldoff). New York: Vintage Books. Balcells, Laia, and Stathis Kalyvas (2022) “Revolution in Civil War: The “Marxist Paradox”. Available at SSRN (https://ssrn.com/abstract=4055392 or https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.4055392). Clutterbuck, Lindsay (2004) “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?” Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(1): 154–181. Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler (2004) “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4): 563–595. Debray, Regis (1967) Revolution within the Revolution: Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America. New York: Groove Press. Degregori, Carlos I. (2011) Qué difícil es ser Dios. El Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso y el conflicto armado interno en el Perú: 1980–1999. Lima: IEP. De la Calle, Luis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2011a) “The Quantity and Quality of Terrorism: The DTV Dataset”. Journal of Peace Research, 48(1): 49–58. De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2011b) “What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism”. Politics and Society, 39(3): 451–472. Della Porta, Donatella (1995) Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Della Porta, Donatella and Sidney Tarrow (1986) “Unwanted Children: Political Violence and the Cycle of Protest in Italy, 1966-1973”. European Journal of Political Research, 14: 607–632. DeNardo, James (1985) Power in Numbers. The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. De Sousa, Manuel Ricardo (1992) Guerrilha no Asfalto. As FP-25 e o Tempo Português. Coimbra: Fora do Texto. Foner, Philip S. (1995 [1970]). The Black Panthers Speak. Cambridge, MA: Di Capo. Gage, Beverly (2009) The Day Wall Street Exploded. A Story of America in IIs First Age of Terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Geismar, Alan (2008) Mon Mai 1968. Paris: Perrin. Goodwin, Jeff (2001) No Other Way Out. States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945– 1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guevara, Ernesto ‘Che’ (2002 [1960]) La Guerra de Guerrillas. Tafalla: Txalaparta. Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Laia Balcells (2010) “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict”. American Political Science Review, 104(3): 415–429. Kassimeris, George (2001) Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November. London: Hurst. Kuran, Timor (1997) Private Truths, Public Lies. The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Linse, Ulrich (1982) “‘Propaganda by the Deed’ and ‘Direct Action’: Two Concepts of Anarchist Violence.” In Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld (eds)

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Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century Europe, 201–229. Houndmills: Macmillan. Mann, Michael (1986) The Sources of Social Power. Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCormick, Gordon H. (2003) “Terrorist Decision Making.” Annual Review of Political Science, 6: 473–507. Medina, Luis Fernando, and Radha Sarkar (2022) “Blueprints for Red Insurgencies: Revolutionary Ideology and Strategy in India and Colombia.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2082858). Moretti, Mario (1994) Brigate Rosse. Una storia italiana. Milano: Anabasi. Morucci, Valerio (2004) La peggio gioventù. Una vita nella lotta armata. Milan: Rizzoli. Oliver, Pamela, Gerald Marwell, and Ruy Teixeira (1985) “A Theory of the Critical Mass: I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action”. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3): 522–556. Przeworski, Adam (1986) Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ríos, Jerónimo (2021) Historia de la violencia en Colombia, una mirada territorial. Madrid: Silex. Ruggiero, Lorenzo (ed) (2007) Dossier Brigatte rosse 1966-1975. La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime Br. Milan: Kaos edizioni. Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio (2019) The Historical Roots of Political Violence. Revolutionary Terrorism in Affluent Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, J., and André Moncourt (2009) The Red Army Faction. A Documentary History. Volume 1: Projectiles for the People. Oakland: PM Press. Sommier, Isabelle (2008) La violence politique et son deuil. L’apres 68 en France et en Italie. Rennex: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. Trotsky, Leon (1974) Against Individual Terrorism. New York: Pathfinder. Ugarriza, Juan E., and Matthew J. Craig (2013) “The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts: A Quantitative Analysis of Former Combatants in Colombia”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57(3): 445–477. Weather Underground Organization (1974) Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism. San Francisco: Communications Co. Weinstein, Jeremy (2007) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Dana M. (2018) “Contemporary Anarchist and Anarchistic Movements”. Sociology Compass, 12: e12582. Wolin, Richard (2010) The Wind From the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 7

Guerrilla and Cognitive Warfare in Transnational Left-wing Extremism Josh Vandiver

Introduction 5 March 1960 At a mass funeral-cum-protest in Havana on March 5, 1960, a new form of extremist emerged, a left-wing new man.1 Standing tall upon the speaker’s dais, long-haired, heavy brow furrowed in anger, Communist revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara was photographed by Alberto Korda. Light and lens and celluloid captured a man who, having triumphed in guerrilla war and emerged victorious in armed insurrection, now turned to statecraft and international affairs. The day before, an explosion in the harbor destroyed the freighter La Coubre as workers unloaded a Belgian arms shipment—one vital to the chronically under-equipped revolutionaries—killing and wounding dozens. The protest featured a fiery speech in which Fidel Castro pronounced the explosion a covert action engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the strategic intelligence arm of his nemesis, the USA. Then and there, Castro unveiled for the first time the nationalist refrain “Patria o Muerte!”2 Strategic performances can produce unexpected strategic effects (C. S. Gray 1999, 19–20). In the cunning of strategic history, not Fidel’s speech but Che’s manhood possessed the greater impact—for it moved into the domain of cognitive warfare.3

J. Vandiver (B) Ball State University, Muncie, IN, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. P. Zúquete (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_7

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In this chapter, we focus upon transnational left-wing extremism and phenomena American military strategists categorize as the fourth and fifth generations of modern warfare—in which the cognitive domain, “where decisive concepts emerge,” becomes increasingly dominant (Reed 2008, 692, emphasis added).4 Conceptualizations of men qua men, representatives of the male sex, play a central role in transnational extremist strategy as it evolves and intensifies over time, as witnessed in the work of the arch-left-wing French poststructuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze, a key theorist of extremist strategic concepts. His magnum opus, A Thousand Plateaus , circles relentlessly around men as revolutionary agents against the State, a key target of leftwing extremism.5 In the present analysis, we consider the Deleuzean extremist (to coin a conceptual persona): how such a man functions as a revolutionary and how he navigates the evolution from communist and anticolonial guerrilla warfare to global cognitive warfare—the changing demands revolutionary warfare make upon men.6 The Deleuzean extremist is a revolutionary warfighter. Revolutionary war is distinctively European in origin, in the sense of the conceptual field giving it meaning.7 The State in its modern European form orients the revolutionary warfighter, who defines himself in opposition.8 In the French Revolution, the Left itself is born in opposition to the State form of the European ancien régime, as indeed the Right is born in its belated defense.9 Strategic theorists characterize the revolutionary wars which followed as the culmination of the “first generation” of modern warfare; by the twentieth century, revolutionary warfare against the global empires of Europe and its settler colonies, including the USA, had evolved into “fourth generation warfare” (Hammes 2006).10 Over the centuries, both revolutionaries and the State change shape, evolving through strategic contestation with the enemy: new forces of revolution and counterrevolution, new powers, and new forms of resistance.11 “War consists in a continuous interaction of opposites” (Clausewitz [1832] 2008, 136). Where to Look for Extremist Strategy? Deleuze stands in a long line of European philosophers whose theories of politics and war—and their interpenetration—engage deeply with questions involving both men and strategy. Deleuze differs from many predecessors, however. According to a leading scholar of grand strategy, the line of great philosophers who contribute to the discipline includes “Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant” because they develop “the concept of national interests” as delineated by “the ultimate ends of the state” (Martel 2015, 66). According to poststructuralists like Deleuze, such thinkers elaborate a Eurocentric and patriarchal lineage of “State philosophy,” first fathered by Plato, which their feminist allies castigate as “phallogocentrism” (Massumi 1992, 4– 5).12 Deleuze emerges as their nemesis, a philosopher of nomads, guerrillas , revolutionaries, and extremists who ruthlessly targets the State, joyfully theorizing the manifold forces which attack and conspire against the State, flee

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and escape the State, speculate upon, and generate alternatives to the State. Since Machiavelli ([1532], 1998), strategy is a discipline which studies all sides in conflict. Indeed, the conviction there are always (at least) two sides to a conflict, each striving to outmaneuver the other in a dynamic and everchanging strategic environment, is at its heart (C. S. Gray 1999). Deleuze deserves a place in the Western strategic canon not despite his anti-State thought, but precisely because of it. In the strategic canon of the Left (if such a thing exists), Deleuze deserves pride of place. Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, currently a top left-wing thinker in Europe, declares “Deleuze more and more serves as the theoretical foundation of today’s anti-global Left” (Žižek 2004, xi). I propose Deleuze offers nothing less than the paradigm of anti-hierarchical, decentralized, transnational left-wing extremism—ranging from Che’s global struggles and Zapatista netwar to the Occupy and “woke” movements in the global North—all potent new forms of becoming-revolutionary (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 292). The target? Global order. (Deleuzean extremists are nothing if not ambitious.) Global order consists of national and international forces arising from and serving the modern State and transnational forces arising from and serving capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari [1972] 1983, [1980] 1987). The weapons? Concepts. We will meet several, for “every concept relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or its present connections” (Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994, 19). Many Deleuzean concepts target for destruction key concepts in the history of European philosophy and politics. Most Deleuzean concepts are unusual, outlandish, “monstrous offspring” (Massumi 1992, 145n24), concepts meant to bring about a true becoming, an event so new and unforeseeable that no name yet exists for it. Rather like a revolution. Given such titanic ambitions, are Western strategists and defense intellectuals clamoring to understand Deleuze? No. They had studied the thinking of earlier opponents—Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Che (Shy and Collier 1986; Mackinlay 2012). Deleuze is ignored.13 Why? Let us face it: Deleuzean thought is rebarbative, formidable to access—if it were a castle or fortress, we would call it impregnable. But does no one think that strategic? Why would the Deleuzean extremist write down his strategy in pellucid prose and crystal-clear concepts? Why make his strategy easily understood by his enemy?

The War Machine How do Deleuzean extremists conceptualize revolutionary warfare? We have met the concept of the State, and we will meet several more. Given the nature of this initial, introductory, scouting exploration of Deleuzean strategic theory, I endeavor to tame its monstrous conceptual fecundity, alternating between abstract concepts and concrete examples in politics and warfare,

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aiming to map elements of Deleuzean strategic culture or way of war.14 Che, his iconic manhood, and guerrilla warfighters will remain signposts for our understanding of left-wing extremism, as they evince key features of the war machine which opposes the State. Always, we must keep both men and strategy in view: You cannot understand the Deleuzean extremist apart from his relation to virility. The Deleuzean extremist strategizes on many planes, a thousand plateaus. Let us begin with his organizational theory. He contrasts centralized, hierarchical “unities” like the family and the State with decentralized, nonhierarchical “multiplicities” like packs or bands (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 21, 4). One “rigid, molar, and organized” and the other “supple, more molecular, and merely ordered” (41). One “arborescent” like trees and the other “rhizomatic” like networks (18). Deleuze says we see the latter in wolf packs and nomadic bands like the ancient Scythians traversing the Eurasian steppe and striking fear in the hearts of sedentary folk, occupants of cities— the city being a key precursor to the State (26–38, 351–423). Nomadic bands illustrate Deleuzean “nomad thought” (379) focused on the “essence of the war machine” opposing the State: “guerrilla warfare, minority warfare, revolutionary and popular warfare are in conformity with the essence” of the war machine (423). Deleuzean concepts, recall, are always multiplicities. Jargon? If you say so. Meant to confuse? Strategic, rather. I will keep giving you more. War machines, like wolf packs and nomadic (or guerrilla) bands, traverse the earth without paying heed to territorial divisions imposed upon it: they “smoothen” or “deterritorialize” space. In contrast, the State works to “striate” or “territorialize” the earth: impose boundaries and defend them, conduct cadastral surveys and divide surveyed land into property, and impose law upon bodies within the territory (19). War machines “decode” what the State has “over-coded” (8). Imagine Che and the Cuban guerrillas. They obviously do not request entry visas from the regime of Fulgencio Battista sitting in Havana. Several dozen men board the Granma in Mexico, steam across the Caribbean, and disembark at night upon a deserted beach. War machines are transnational, always transgress boundaries. Once within the State, they keep transgressing: Do not observe property divisions, do not consult relevant laws, go where the war demands, and turn regime subjects into guerrilla recruits. Clandestine men elude the “phallic gaze” of the State which seeks to penetrate all veils of secrecy, to be ignorant of none.15 The State ceaselessly eyes its environs: categorizing, counting, identifying, and naming. Who is in its territory? What are they doing? How many oppose the regime? How many are armed? To see like a State is always to be paranoid (112). Many of the men are Cuban, traitors. Perhaps allies of foreign powers? Who funded the Granma expedition? Mexican communists? The Soviets? The State never knows all the conspiracies against it, but paranoically imagines far more than there are. War machines do operate like “secret societies” (242), always aiming at becoming-imperceptible (232–309).

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Fourth Generation Warfare How did the guerrilla war machine emerge? According to theorists of the generations of modern war, third generation warfare (3GW) reached its terrifying culmination in the German blitzkrieg.16 Yet in its shadow, new forms of war started to arise: nuclear and revolutionary warfare. Each would be unveiled as World War II approached its denouement. But quite unlike nuclear warfare—developed by both East and West, communists and capitalists, autocrats, and democrats—revolutionary warfare bore a distinctly left-wing profile. Typically fusing a combination of Marxist, Leninist, or Maoist theory with communist and anticolonial practice, not since the Bolshevik Revolution had left-wing extremism proven so spectacularly successful (Westad 2005; Mackinlay 2012). Across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Western hegemony was gravely challenged by such transnational phenomena, often fatally (Young 2001). Never did revolutionary warfare hinge on conventional military dominance. Nor did it arise as a consequence of technological innovation. Yet revolutionaries kept winning. A new epoch in war had dawned: fourth generation warfare (4GW). 4GW is an “evolved form of insurgency” (Hammes 2006, 2), an outgrowth of the guerrilla “war of the flea” (Taber 1965), which seeks to strategically outmaneuver conventional State political and military power. In previous generations, from the Napoleonic wars through World War II, men fought in the domains of land and sea—later also air and cyberspace—as members of conventional military forces whose strategic objective was to overthrow similarly conventional adversaries. In a threefold shift, 4GW changes the domain of war from the military to the political realm, the nature of adversaries from states to nonstate networks, and the strategic objective from the overthrow of conventional forces to destruction of the enemy political and public will to fight (Reed 2008, 691). Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy—measured in decades rather than months or years. (Hammes 2006, 2)

Guerrilla warfare is but one stage in the multidecade evolution of 4GW. Later, Islamic extremists waged 4GW with considerable operational and tactical success (Hammes 2006, ch. 10). But Islamist 4GW generates little transnational appeal—aside from certain pockets in the West—and activates fewer

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global networks, whereas communist and anticolonial 4GW deeply impressed left-wing extremists worldwide (Westad 2005), including on the New Left (Elbaum 2002). New Left extremism was remarkably short-lived, however. Unable to replicate earlier communist and anticolonial successes, in the 1970s the New Left fell before State counter-intelligence and law enforcement forces (Rafalko 2011; Chard 2021). Deleuze was highly attuned to this process: “We have watched the [State] war machine grow stronger and stronger…we have seen it put its counterguerrilla elements into place, so that it can be caught by surprise once, but not twice” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 422). To counter the State, extremism needed a new strategy, an evolved form of war. Deleuze wrote the conceptual and strategic manifesto of left-wing fifth generation warfare (5GW).

Guerrillero Heroico New forms of war demand new forms of manhood. War and virility deeply interrelate: the war–virility nexus.17 In classical Greek, the concept of a distinctly male virtue, andreia, the quality of being a real or true man, an aner and not a mere anthropos (a male human), inextricably links to martial courage (Rosen and Sluiter 2003). In Latin, virtus, full and vigorous manhood, the quality of the vir, springs from similarly martial roots (McDonnell 2006). Scholars now speak of masculinity, yet the phenomenon remains inescapable: Innovations in warfare demand changes in masculinity, new martial masculinities (Higate 2003). Every form of warfare exacts unique demands from the bodies, minds, and spirits of men. Each reshapes masculine lived experience—and not only of combatants. In left-wing extremism, the virility of a guerrilla like Che appeals to allies globally, activating transnational networks and shifting the political calculus of his opponents. Yet analysts of 4GW and 5GW ignore sex and gender.18 Guerrillero Heroico, as Korda’s image of Che was subsequently christened, traversed the planet in the years and decades following March 5, 1960 (Ziff and Lopez 2008). Che became the preeminent icon of revolution (SpicerEscalante 2014), his heroic manhood a unique new weapon in revolutionary war, impacting political consciousness and, thereby, political will. In an important study of left-wing extremism and its transnational appeal, Where the Boys Are, Gosse (1993) highlights how seductive Cuban revolutionaries appeared in 1950s North America—particularly to young men on the Left. Such men formed new political networks, like Fair Play for Cuba, which sought through domestic influence to soften American foreign policy toward Cuba. In 1968 Paris and in uprisings across Europe, youth mobilized under the sign of Che’s manhood with Korda’s image emblazoned upon countless banners and posters. The Black Panthers and Brown Berets in the USA also celebrated and emulated Che and the figure of the virile guerrilla (Montejano 2012; Watkins 2012). Over the years, Che’s appeal not only endured, it notably increased.

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Korda’s photograph, which he chose not to copyright, was endlessly reworked by admirers and emulators, creating a distinctive masculine archetype of left-wing extremism: guerrilla warrior turned sovereign statesman, communist compañero turned global icon, his heroic manhood emerging from the steamy jungles of the Sierra Maestra as a potent weapon in transnational extremism. Che’s image spread more widely than the ideas of Marx, Lenin, Mao, or those of the Cuban revolution itself. People who would never read a word of such thinkers, nor of Che himself—nor even know their names— could nevertheless admire the revolutionary archetype and draw inspiration from it for their own confrontations with the State or capitalism (Ziff and Lopez 2008). If the beauty of the classical Helen launched a thousand ships, the virility of Che spurred the imaginations of innumerable revolutionaries and allies of revolution. In the global appeal of Che’s manhood, we see left-wing 4GW beginning to evolve into 5GW. Networks of nonstate actors, key adversaries as in 4GW, become more rhizomatic. The domain of war shifts from the purely political to the cognitive, informational, and social domains of 5GW (Reed 2008). Even while midcentury State counterguerrilla forces were learning how to deal with armed left-wing insurgencies, the next phase of revolutionary warfare was assuming germinal form, “the beginning of the postmodern era of war” (Reed 2008, 695).

Cognitive Warfare Left-wing extremists did not coin concepts like 4GW and 5GW. These are State concepts emerging long after extremists had successfully waged guerrilla and then cognitive warfare. Not only in practice, but also in theory, left-wing extremists were far ahead of State defense intellectuals—who, as noted above, do not bother to study left-wing strategists like Deleuze. Twenty to thirty years before analysts at the RAND Corporation, under contract with the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, probe the noosphere, “the broadest informational realm of the mind (from the Greek noos ),” and urge American grand strategy shift toward noopolitik (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999), Deleuzean extremists have such State phenomena on their radar and are practicing counterassaults. As Deleuze puts it: “Noology, which is distinct from ideology, is precisely the study of images of thought, and their historicity” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 376). Critically analyzing State concepts, ideas, and images of thought—like patriarchy, which we will discuss in a following section—the left-wing war machine wages cognitive warfare, dismantling weapons the State seeks to create and use for its own strategic purposes. In Che’s manhood, on the other hand, we see an image of left-wing “counter-thoughts,” always “violent in their acts and discontinuous in their appearances, and whose existence is mobile in history” (376). The defense intellectuals at RAND theorized the noosphere and noopolitik from the late 1990s, arguing for a crucial role in American grand strategy

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for “information strategy” and “information-age statecraft” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999, 2020). They recognized analysts and policymakers had been caught off-guard by left-wing extremism, as in the 1994 “social netwar” of the indigenous Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico (Arquilla et al. 1998). Their thinking would prove highly influential in the American defense and security establishment (Samaan [2010] 2012, 92–102). Over twenty years later, their netwar concept features in a leading textbook of intelligence analysis as a framework for understanding strategic challenges posed by contemporary asymmetric conflicts: Such networks and nonstate actors take advantage of globalization and information technology to pursue in new ways “violent ideological competition” aimed at the “subversion or overthrow of established governments” (Clark 2020, 12–13). The RAND defense intellectuals, and intelligence analysts who rely upon them, here fall into a trap. They impute the rise of phenomena like netwar to recent developments such as globalization and information technologies like the internet (Clark 2020, 13). But the relevant shifts in extremist strategic theory predate such technological developments by several decades. We see again the danger for State analysts and strategists of not studying the thought of their opponents.19 And they do not comprehend how intensive extremist strategy intends to be, encompassing “private” realms like sex and gender, waging warfare on a thousand plateaus. 5GW figures like Che and his emulators—including the early Black Panthers in the USA, left-wing masculinists (Vandiver 2016)—wage cognitive warfare in a gendered mode, centering extremist virility. Therein lies a certain strategic genius. Who before them thought to use sex and gender as weapons against the State? Certainly, such strategies are only some of many employed by left-wing extremists. That is precisely the point: 5GW does not limit itself to one strategic plane but includes “operations conducted across multiple domains of conflict simultaneously” (Reed 2008, 698).

Patriarchy Transnational left-wing extremists wage revolutionary war not only in the military domain, but strategically contest other 5GW domains like the cognitive sphere of “decisive concepts” (Reed 2008). Deleuzean extremists target concepts with influence over sex and gender, above all those of the patriarchal Signifying regime (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 111–148, 351–423). Family, State, and capitalism all center upon a “despotic signifier” (126), the Phallus, as conceptualized by French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan ([1958] 2007). Which family? The classical Greek family, of course, or rather its representation by Sophocles: the Oedipal family of psychoanalysis—understood (following French feminist Juliet Mitchell) not as “a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one” (qtd. in Easthope 1990, 3, emphasis

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original). Father, mother, child, but something more: “This common, transcendent, absent something will be called phallus or law, in order to designate ‘the’ signifier that distributes the effects of meaning…Oedipus has as its formula 3 + 1, the One of the transcendent phallus” (Deleuze and Guattari [1972] 1983, 73). The organizing power of the phallus is detailed in Anti-Oedipus, the precursor to A Thousand Plateaus , but few are the concepts in the latter—including State and war machine—which do not reference the phallus, however obliquely. Quite contrary to an “absent analysis of patriarchy” (Thornton 2019), almost every page of Capitalism and Schizophrenia advances the critique of patriarchy.20 Let us not try to make sense of Lacan. In an accessible formulation by a leading left-wing critic of patriarchy, we see how the phallus proffers masculine meaning and sustains hierarchy, prime target for attack by Deleuzean extremists: A Greco-Roman word signifying the penis, the phallus should be thought of as the abstract representation of male power…. Imagined culturally as gigantic and as permanently erect…no physical penis, no matter how large, can ever rival the imagined grandeur and splendor of the phallus, which we may think of as engorged, not with blood (as a real, erect penis would be), but with power. By representing the sum of potential masculine power, the phallus becomes also an object of desire because (notionally anyway) the individual who attained it would wield all the power that it both possesses and represents. (Buchbinder 2013, 75, emphasis original)

In this account, Western institutions—family, school, military, workplace, and State—run on forms of “phallic power,” the energy of “masculine rivalry through hierarchical positioning” which sustains patriarchy (75). The phallus stands at the center of such institutions, pumping out meaning through a chain of signs or symbols which radiate from it and demonstrate how close or distant one is from idealized male power—awards and demerits, honor and stigma, all the tools of hierarchy—“a series of symbols that indicate power” or lack thereof, including “actual power within an organization ranging from the family to the multinational corporation or the government” (75). But because the phallus must be “thought of as always to be attained, but as ultimately unattainable” (75, emphasis original), such systems are tormented by lack, by fear of never measuring up to and satisfying this despotic ideal. Deleuzean extremists seek to destroy such regimes through intensifying processes of revolutionary warfare—starting in the cognitive domain. To build a war machine, one needs warfighters. How to find them? As we will see, Deleuzean extremists emerge through a highly gendered, “resolutely masculine passion” (Thornton 2019, 358): They reject despotism and pursue processes of becoming revolutionary. Che’s “new man” (Guevara 1961), evinced in his own virility, is one such model.

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The True Man Three times Deleuze names him: le vrai homme, the true man (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 123–124). The true man is a rebel who angrily rejects a patriarchal Signifying regime, turns away, and sets out on his own path (119– 134). Cain, who betrays the Jewish God, is one; Oedipus, “the Greek Cain” who kills his father–King, another (123, 125). Deleuze constructs a revolutionary archetype of masculine passion, a prophet of rebellion and the “wrath of God” (126).21 While he does not name Deleuze, philosopher Alphonso Lingis elaborates a similar type based on Che, a model for the contemporary Left (Lingis 2002). Save in exceptional cases like Nietzsche, virility rarely occasions the attention of modern philosophers. Yet Lingis, a phenomenologist, lionizes both masculinity and the fundamental phenomena of “male identity and pride”: We are indeed impressed by someone superlatively male. One prizes one’s own superlative maleness. Who is not awed by the splendor of a bull, a buck antelope, a ram, or a male silverback gorilla? And—noblesse oblige—one expects the guy with such balls to be enterprising and forceful in actions. We are captivated by the glamorous masculinity of medieval knights and samurai, nineteenth-century cavalry and naval officers, banditos decked out in black and silver, and highsociety conmen suave and charming. Knights, bullfighters, skydivers, compound male splendor with masculine glamour. (Lingis 2002, 146)

Published in a volume on male bodies featuring critical feminist and queer approaches, such effusive celebration is all the more astonishing. And while we are impressed, awed, and captivated by male splendor and masculine glamor, Lingis insists, “what we especially care about is being a man, a real man” (147), and we look for such a type in men like Che, “our buddy, our comrade” (153). Lingis gives renewed voice to a time when left-wing extremists proudly gathered beneath the banner of the Guerrillero Heroico and sought such men in their ranks. Virility is not simply an ethical trait, produced by character management and determination. It requires the chance of a body that is sexually excitable, that has the physical power to be courageous, the strength to impose justice. (147)

Virility comes through nature, through chance endowment, but can be lost and evaded: “Virility is lost by giving up…by giving in, it begins in comfort” (150), including the compromising certainties of family, State, and capitalism: For how many men the press of family and professional responsibilities, economic necessities, the importance of a long-term job function as alibis! Alibis for not being compulsively aroused by chance nakedness, alibis for not ecstatically opening one’s eyes to the fierce bird of hope and risk soaring in the skies of chance. He took on this summer job lest a buddy would roar by on a wreck

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of a motorcycle and shout, “Let’s travel the hemisphere!” He hastily married and sired a child in case his buddies would rush off to break out a revolution. (151)

Two years later, the blockbuster Motorcycle Diaries (Salles 2004) depicts Che’s revolutionary origins in just such an adventurous and youthful virility. Through his and his buddy’s many jocular mishaps on their famous journey, through his witnessing the injustices of capitalism and society across Latin America, this masculine Bildungsroman culminates in Che meeting Fidel in Mexico and his entry into fraternity with the guerrillas. No alibis, no compromises. “Virility requires courage” and courage arises by seeing it in one’s buddy or comrade, “feeling the pounding of that very courage in us” (Lingis 2002, 149–150). We find here a phenomenology of the guerrilla band, the fraternity of extremists, and the power of Che’s righteous manhood as captured by Alberto Korda and admired by countless aspiring revolutionaries. In military terms, imitation of Che and his vanguardist foco theory proved catastrophic (Hammes 2006, 77). Yet, on another plane, his iconic virility advanced the war in unforeseen ways.

Post-Virile Extremism One must grant them this: Deleuzean extremists possess certainty regarding their enemies, a firm strategic intent against the family, the State, and capitalism. When conservatives accuse extremists of targeting these sacred cows, they joyfully reply, “But of course! Bring out the knives…” Deleuzean extremists mobilize practices of counter-Signifying, always “polemical or strategic” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 136, emphasis original). For Deleuzeans, a key to left-wing extremism is the polemical or strategic contestation with the phallic Signifier—the decisive concept par excellence—and Signifying regimes: not to seize them, but to replace with new forms of humanity and post-humanity. The essence of the extremist war machine is neither war itself—which the State also wages—nor to seize the State or other institutions. Deleuzeans differ from Leninist or other vanguardist models (P. W. Gray 2020), including that of the early Che (Guevara 1961), and representatives of what the philosopher and Maoist Alain Badiou calls “the last great emancipatory narrative: the revolutionary Party-State” (qtd. in Nail 2015, 3). Deleuzeans are postmodern and post-representational, declaring “We can change the world without taking power.”22 In intensifying revolutionary practice, Deleuzean extremists pursue forms of becoming-minoritarian vis-à-vis the “majority” of the Signifying regime. The opposition between minority and majority is not simply quantitative. Majority implies a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard

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measure by which to evaluate it. Let us suppose that the constant or standard is the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language (Joyce’s or Ezra Pound’s Ulysses). It is obvious that “man” holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 105)

Put differently, at the center of the Signifying regime is a face: “The face is not a universal. It is not even that of the white man; it is White Man himself,” which designates and judges others by degrees of excess or lack from an ideal (176 ff). The extremist can attack this majoritarian standard through a plethora of “becomings,” breaks from the ideal—even in his own mind and body—which “express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions” (247). Such becomings range from “becoming-woman” to processes involving how to “become-Jewish” or “become-black,” for instance (291–292), to the “becoming animal of the human being” (238) and beyond. Simply in the realm of sex, an extremist man can “strategically” break from the majoritarian standard “in any number of ways, from having a sex-change operation, to being the ‘passive’ partner in a gay relation, to living as a ‘female-identified’ heterosexual” (Massumi 1992, 88). Che thus emerges as a transitional figure for left-wing extremism: An adult, white, heterosexual male speaking a major European language and descending from Spanish and Irish nobility, one of his “ancestors had been the Spanish royal viceroy of colonial Peru” (Anderson 2010, 4). Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatistas is more fully counter-Signifying: he wears a black ski mask, face and identity obscured, and declares himself “gay in San Francisco, a black in South Africa, Asian in Europe, a Chicano in San Isidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel…Marcos is every untolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is resisting and saying ‘Enough!’” (qtd. in Nail 2015, 25). Left-wing extremism advances toward increasing subalternity. In retrospect, Che proved a high point for extremist virility—one unlikely to ever be repeated.

State Counter-Virilities A presumed CIA covert action sparked the Havana protest in which Che attained iconic status. If the CIA engineered the destruction of La Coubre, American intelligence may count itself tactically and operationally victorious. Strategically, the action served to strengthen the revolutionary cause. Strategic intelligence in Europe and the USA was hard-pressed to make sense of, and respond to, transnational left-wing extremism in this period (Ranelagh 1987). Even now, the full scope and interconnected nature of this global revolution remain obscure—so, too, the effectiveness of counterrevolutionary responses. Consider Che’s killing in Bolivia, again purportedly with CIA involvement,

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which led to his global canonization as martyr. Or the presumed assassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba by Belgian and American security services: his death so spurred tricontinental solidarity, the USSR would create an eponymous university for global revolutionaries in his honor. More examples could be adduced. Operational and tactical successes all, yet strategic blunders. How many Western strategic failures occur due to blindness regarding sex and gender? Left-wing revolutions stretched from Asia to Africa and Latin America yet always featured leading men: Mao, Lumumba, Frantz Fanon, Fidel, and Che, the full account would be long (Young 2001). What motivates such men—or US radicals like Huey P. Newton and Eldridge Cleaver who look to them for inspiration—as men? What motivates the Parisian masses in 1968 who gather beneath gigantic posters emblazoned with Che’s manhood? Could strategists and policymakers in Europe and the USA see extremist sex and gender, much less articulate their significance? A half century later, one startles to learn that the CIA’s director of leadership profiling still completely ignores gender in his analyses (Post 2003). Revolutionary wars give rise to counterrevolutionary warfighters. President John F. Kennedy, a man of the Left, did respond to both nuclear and revolutionary warfare with a highly masculinist policy of the New Frontier (Watts 2016), reactivating the paradigm of settler colonialism for the Cold War. New threats tend to reactivate historical referents, earlier conflicts against putatively similar enemies. In American strategic culture, the conflicts of frontier expansion were among the most irregular in its history, so are deemed appropriate referents for new forms of insurgency. In urging American grand strategy center upon “information-age statecraft,” RAND analysts call for a new “Manifest Destiny” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999, 75). Revolutionary irregularity gives rise to irregularity among counterrevolutionary cadres, from European colonial paratroopers to the special forces Kennedy championed in his “ideology of masculinity” (Dean 1998). Many of the former went on to reshape European domestic politics, especially on the Right (cf. Schmitt [1975] 2007, 81–92; Veugelers 2019), and we may now be observing similar effects in American politics (Vandiver 2023). In terms of gender, the New Frontier is only the most prominent of efforts on the midcentury Left to craft martial masculinities for emerging domestic and international conflicts (cf. Gosse 1993; Dean 2001; Vandiver 2016). Such efforts were terminated by the New Left and the Vietnam War. Martial masculinities became increasingly the domain of the Right: from the “remasculinization of America” under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s (Jeffords 1989) to the trans-Atlantic masculinist Right of the third millennium (Vandiver 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023).

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Notes 1. The study of men and masculinities—including the study of manhood and boyhood, to invoke older keywords (Janssen 2015, 6)—is a young but robust scholarly discipline, giving rise over several decades to seminal work in history, literature, political science, and sociology (Reeser 2010; Buchbinder 2013). Reshaping international relations (IR) and war studies has taken considerably longer, despite important feminist IR contributions at the millennium (Parpart and Zalewski 1998; Hoganson 1998; Hooper 2001). Two decades later, Anglo–American strategic studies seem little changed by the “masculine turn”: one finds no mention of masculinity in its most prominent reader (Mahnken and Maiolo 2014) and but one in the leading textbook (Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray 2019)—notably regarding the phallic language of nuclear defense intellectuals (Cohn 1987). 2. On masculinity and sacrifice, see the feminist philosopher Mann (2014, 129) on the phenomenon of “masculinist fraternity” at the heart of martial nationalism and powerful sense of belonging it generates, “the object of a kind of greaterthan-life passion.” 3. Cognitive warfare is now a key strategic concept and priority amongst Euro– Atlantic foreign policy élites, as seen in publications by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the realm of strategic theory, cognitive warfare has been characterized as “noopolitik” by defense intellectuals at the RAND Corporation (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999), an American think tank central to the national security establishment since its founding in 1945 (C. S. Gray 1971). These strategists had developed the related concept of “netwar” in reaction to the 1994 insurgency of the indigenous Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Chiapas, Mexico (Arquilla et al. 1998). 4. Strategic theorist William S. Lind and several American military officers writing in the Marine Corps Gazette first formulated the concept of fourth generation warfare (Lind et al. 1989). It was later developed by Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (2006), who had served in the US Marine Corps for twenty-nine years in infantry and intelligence assignments, and then intensively debated by academic strategists (Karp, Karp, and Terriff 2008). Reed (2008) is the leading theorist of fifth generation warfare. 5. The work is the second of the two-volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia, coauthored with the radical left-wing activist and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987). When capitalizing the State throughout this chapter, I adopt their usage. From their translator and commentator (Massumi 1992), I adopt the practice of flagging key Deleuzean concepts with small caps. 6. In this analysis, Deleuzean extremists need not have read or understood Deleuze, but simply evince features of “Deleuzean” strategy. They may generate such strategies independently, purely through strategic practice and experimentation, or through alternative forms of theorizing, as the Zapatistas appear to have done. For instance, according to Nail (2015, 7), Deleuze and the Zapatistas create “common strategies at roughly the same time (1980s and 1990s) in two different regions of the world (France and Mexico) and in two different domains (politics and philosophy) without direct influence on one another.”

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7. In prioritizing the cultural and historical contexts of key concepts—including “the Left” and “revolution”—I follow the practice of the Cambridge School of political thought whose most prominent methodologists and practitioners are J. G. A. Pocock (1971, 1975) and Quentin Skinner (Tully 1988; Skinner 2002). Such concepts, like the State, possess meaning only in determinate cultural and historical contexts, namely the discourses or languages in which they are situated in relation to a broader conceptual field. 8. The first, and still best, magisterial overview of revolutionary warfare is Shy and Collier (1986). Their chapter appears in the second edition of The Makers of Modern Strategy, the leading postwar overview of strategic theory and history. No similar chapter appeared in the first edition (Earle and Craig 1941), which concluded with the grand strategy of the Third Reich. No sooner had the Axis powers fallen, however, than revolutionary wars emerged worldwide as strategic challenges, particularly in the colonies and empires of the former Allies. Strategists and defense intellectuals took decades to properly analyze this development, often narrowing their focus to operational and tactical “irregularity.” Most neglect the grand strategic ambitions of revolutionary warfighters: their political aim and the variety of tools they deploy, only some of which are military in nature—for an exception, see Byman (2021). 9. The seminal right-wing text is obviously Reflections on the Revolution in France by Edmund Burke ([1790] 1987), an Irishman serving in the British House of Commons. Burke was subsequently credited with having fathered the modern Right. Already in 1790, this analyst and critic of left-wing extremism makes two points which stand out for our purposes. First, he conceptualizes the Revolution as a highly gendered phenomenon, as in the famous passage on the death of Queen Marie Antoinette, a daughter of the Holy Roman Emperor, and the end of the Age of Chivalry: “Little did I dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honor and of cavaliers. I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists; and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever.” (Burke [1790] 1987, 66) Second, Burke hints at left-wing extremism as a distinctly transnational phenomenon, albeit deeply enmeshed in conspiracy: “Everywhere states were running deeper into debt, and becoming vulnerable to antireligious conspiracies like that of the Bavarian Illuminati. [Burke] was not far from that identification of Freemasons and Jews as the revolutionary underground which was to haunt the imagination of the Catholic Right for at least a century and half,” as one of his recent commentators, J. G. A. Pocock, avers (Burke [1790] 1987, xxx–xxxi). 10. In treating the USA as a European settler colony, albeit one which became an empire in due course, I follow postcolonial scholars (Young 2001; Hixson 2013). 11. As fellow Gallic philosopher Michel Foucault, a friend of Deleuze, famously posited: “There are no relations of power without resistance; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised.” (Foucault 1980, 142) 12. We discuss below the latter element in this conceptual fusion of classical Greek logos (word, discourse, reason, or command) with the phallus (the virile

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member, especially in an idealized state of complete and perpetual engorgement), as it forms a key element of Deleuzean strategic theory regarding the State and revolutionary war against it. “Phallogocentrism unites an interest in patriarchal authority, unity of meaning, and certainty of origin.” (Culler 1982, 61) As Deleuze emphasizes, the State shapes the conduct of war through its military institutions, so we note in passing that these three elements of phallogocentrism are prominent in the contemporary Western military doctrines of command, control, and communication, and intelligence (3CI), which require significant masculine acculturation—as seen in the classic study of Parker (1998, 12). In the Middle East, matters are different. Weizman (2006) has observed the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) uses concepts from A Thousand Plateaus to rethink strategy in its ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. These approaches to strategy, while typically used to analyze states (C. S. Gray 1999, 129–151; Sondhaus 2006), are increasingly informing work on nonstate actors like al-Qaeda (Long 2009) and the Identitarian movement (Vandiver 2023). On the feminist notion of the phallic gaze as developed in film and porn studies, see Williams (1989). In Deleuzean thought, one would approach a concept of the phallic gaze via the concept of faciality (Massumi 1992, 173n55). Each new generation of warfare emerges as a mode of counterattack aiming to break an impasse among forces in the previous generation. To break through the immobility of forces in World War I—which evinced second generation warfare (2GW) in its use of artillery, barbed wire, and trenches—required the emergence of new forms of maneuver warfare. Drawing from British strategist J. F. C. Fuller, an inventor of armored strategy, Deleuze says the following regarding the transition from 2GW to 3GW: “An equilibrium of forces is a phenomenon of resistance, whereas the counterattack implies a rush or change of speed that breaks the equilibrium: it was the tank that regrouped all of the operations in the speed vector and recreated a smooth space for movement by uprooting men and arms.” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 397) In speaking of virility, a heightened state of manhood, I signal my focus upon one specific, culturally and historically bounded, European concept—a masculine ideal which is one long-enduring, but highly-contested, legacy of the classical Greeks and Romans (Corbin, Courtine, and Vigarello [2011] 2016). As such, virility is ultimately but one concept among many within the global study of masculinity. We observe the erasure of masculinity among the major theorists of generations of war (Lind et al. 1989; Hammes 2006; Reed 2008) as in strategic studies more broadly (Mahnken and Maiolo 2014; Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray 2019). In an otherwise superb work, the dean of the discipline goes so far as to change the figure of the Renaissance Man to “Renaissance Person” and almost manages to discuss the importance of “people” in military organizations without mentioning most are men (C. S. Gray 1999, 50, 26–27). Why is this? It may be that strategic analysis of molecular phenomena like 4GW and 5GW—not to mention left-wing thought and subjectivity—will always be difficult for molar organizations like State intelligence, military, and security services and affiliated think tanks.

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20. There are two starting points for pursuing the complex phenomenon of capitalism in Deleuzean terms. First, like the Western molar institutions of the family and the State, it is oriented around the phallus, but focused and figured as the commodity: “The Commodity is the capitalist incarnation of the phallus as Master Attractor.” (Massumi 1992, 84) Yet capitalism is also highly molecular, rhizomatic, a kind of war machine—indeed, it emerges in “Amsterdam, a city entirely without roots, a rhizome-city with its stem-canals, where utility connects with the greatest folly in relation to a commercial war machine.” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 15) 21. Without reference to the Deleuzean revolutionary wrath noted here, but analyzing similar currents of transnational left-wing extremism—Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist—German philosopher and cultural theorist Peter Sloterdijk has gone so far as to posit a global communist “rage revolution” (Sloterdijk 2010, 111–181). 22. This declaration by the Zapatistas is manifested in a number of Deleuzean revolutionary concepts and practices, as elaborated by Nail (2015).

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Schmitt, Carl. 2007. Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political. 2nd ed. New York: Telos Press. Original, 1975. Shy, John, and Thomas W. Collier. 1986. “Revolutionary War.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig and Felix Gilbert. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Skinner, Quentin. 2002. Visions of Politics. Vol. 1, Regarding Method.Visions of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sloterdijk, Peter. 2010. Rage and Time: A Psychopolitical Investigation. New York: Columbia University Press. Sondhaus, Lawrence. 2006. Strategic Culture and Ways of War. London: Routledge. Spicer-Escalante, J.P. 2014. “From Korda’s Guerrillero Heróico to Global Brand: Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara.” In Latin American Icons: Fame Across Borders, edited by Dianna C. Niebylski and Patrick O’Connor. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. Taber, Robert. 1965. The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practise. New York: Lyle Stuart. Thornton, Edward. 2019. “Deleuze and Guattari’s Absent Analysis of Patriarchy.” Hypatia 34 (2): 348–368. Tully, James, ed. 1988. Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Vandiver, Josh. 2016. “Plato in Folsom Prison: Eldridge Cleaver, Black Power, Queer Classicism.” Political Theory 44 (6): 764–796. ———. 2020. “Alt-Virilities: Masculinism, Rhizomatics, and the Contradictions of the American Alt-Right.” Politics, Religion & Ideology 21 (2): 153–176. ———. 2021. “Metapolitics, Masculinity, and Technology in the Rise of ‘Bronze Age Pervert’.” In Far Right Thinkers and the Future of Liberal Democracy in the TwentyFirst Century, edited by A. James McAdams and Alejandro Castrillon. London: Routledge. ———. 2022. “‘Apollo Has Saved Us!’ Global Ambition and Metapolitical Warfare in Alt-Right Religion.” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 16 (1): 135–182. ———. 2023. “Masculinist Identitarians, Strategic Culture, and Eurocene Geopolitics.” In Global Identitarianism, edited by José Pedro Zúquete and Riccardo Marchi. London: Routledge. Veugelers, John W. P. 2019. Empire’s Legacy: Roots of a Far-Right Affinity in Contemporary France. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watkins, Rychetta. 2012. Black Power, Yellow Power, and the Making of Revolutionary Identities. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. Watts, Steven. 2016. JFK and the Masculine Mystique: Sex and Power on the New Frontier. New York: Thomas Dunne. Weizman, Eyal. 2006. “Walking Through Walls: Soldiers as Architects in the Israeli– Palestinian Conflict.” Radical Philosophy 136 (March/April): 8–22. Westad, Odd Arne. 2005. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Linda. 1989. Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible”. Berkeley: University of California Press. Young, Robert. 2001. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Ziff, Trisha, and Luis Lopez. 2008. Chevolution. Red Envelope Entertainment. Žižek, Slavoj. 2004. Organs Without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 8

The Measurement of Left-Wing Extremist Attitudes Sebastian Jungkunz

Introduction Left-wing extremist attitudes have hardly been studied so far. While there are numerous publications and regularly collected survey data on right-wing extremism, e.g. in the German Mitte-Studien (e.g. Decker et al. 2022), there is no such data and research basis for left-wing extremism. On the one hand, this is due to the relatively greater prevalence of right-wing extremist attitudes and the greater electoral success of right-wing populist and extremist parties in Western Europe and North America.1 On the other hand, however, it is also due to the phenomenon of left-wing extremism itself. Left-wing extremism does not constitute a uniform concept in itself, but is divided into two clearly different streams, Marxism and anarchism (Jungkunz 2022). Extremism initially describes the rejection of the pluralistic democratic constitutional state, its norms, values, and rules of the game. Extremist ideologies are further characterized by claims to absoluteness, dogmatism, utopianism, friend-and-foe stereotypes, conspiracy theories, fanaticism, and activism (Backes 1989, 2007).2 Common to both is the striving for a socially homogeneous community. To the extent that extremism extends the principle of equality to all areas of life at the expense of individual freedom, it is generally understood as Marxism3 or communism, while the fundamental rejection of any state activity is classified as anarchism (Jungkunz 2022).

S. Jungkunz (B) University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. P. Zúquete (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Left-Wing Extremism, Volume 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30897-0_8

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While both streams fundamentally strive for a classless society, their paths are marked by distinctly different approaches (Pfahl-Traughber 2014). Thus, the position of Marxist extremists, i.e. those who understand Marx’s teachings as absolute, is clearly more characterized by the struggle against capitalism. This can be seen, for example, in the advocacy of nationalization measures, the rejection of globalization and gentrification, and the contempt for military and imperialist efforts by Western industrialized countries, especially the United States (Dunphy 2004; Hloušek and Kopeˇcek 2010; Keith and March 2016). For anarchists, on the other hand, overcoming state constraints and repression is the primary goal. However, their ideas are much less coherent, since they are divided into two ideological blocks (Marshall 2008). If one follows, for example, the individualistic approaches of Max Stirner and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who famously described “property as theft,” the ideal “society” consists of a mass of individuals who are not subject to any mutual ties. On the other hand, there are thinkers like Mikhail Bakunin or Peter Kropotkin, who put a much stronger focus on social relations and the (necessary) interaction and dependence of individuals (Dolgoff 1972; Maximoff 1964). Overall, however, this composition of left-wing extremist streams makes empirical investigation difficult. While it is possible to focus on the support of individual groups, organizations or parties, this would only pick up the proportion of supporters who already exhibit manifested attitudes and behavior. A much larger part of the population, which has latent attitudes that exist only loosely in the minds of individuals without having yet turned into corresponding behavior, would not be captured. For example, studies on groupfocused enmity (GMF) have already shown that attitudes such as nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and welfare chauvinism are widespread in many European countries, even in those that have no right-wing radical or extremist party parliament (Zick et al. 2008, 2011). Unfortunately, the political elite and media attention are more inclined to focus on individual cases of extremist or terrorist actors, while latent attitudes in the population remain undetected. Thus, this “selective inattention” leads political elites to blank out the “destructive of normality.” They construct a dichotomy between the good and intact society and evil extremist perpetrators. This selective inattention among relevant parts of the political elites thus leads rather to self-exculpation than self-enlightenment (Heitmeyer 2018). Moreover, a substantial and potentially much more problematic and subversive part of the extremist potential in society remains undetected. Under certain circumstances, this potential can be activated by political actors (see also Hawkins et al. 2020) as was evident, for example, in the case of the AfD in Germany a few years ago. It is thus of central importance to gain insights into how widespread latent left-wing extremist attitudes are in the population. This chapter provides an overview of the measurement of left-wing extremist attitudes and its implications for the distribution of extremism in society. I begin with highlighting why previous ways of gauging left-wing

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extremism (e.g., vote choice or the left-right self-placement scale) are inappropriate for assessing actual extremist attitudes. I then develop a systematic conceptualization of left-wing extremist attitudes that distinguishes left-wing radicalism from actual extremism. Using data from Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, I highlight how different methods of aggregation affect the reported distribution of left-wing extremist attitudes across societies. The chapter concludes with a call for more systematic thinking about theoretical concepts and its operationalization.

Why Traditional Approaches Fail to Capture Left-Wing Extremist Attitudes Due to the lack of suitable indicators, previous research on left-wing extremism often relied on using voting intentions for far-left parties or through very general questions such as the ideological left-right self-classification (e.g., Visser et al. 2014).4 However, both variants are unsuitable for assessing the left-wing extremist potential in societies due to measurement problems. Although there is a correlation between attitudes and behavior, this relationship often does not hold (Ajzen 1991). Voting for a left-wing extremist party can be an indication of holding left-wing extremist attitudes, but this is not necessarily the case. Conversely, not everyone who does not vote for such a party can be classified as non-extremist. In survey research in particular, respondents are much less likely to indicate their intention to vote for extremist parties due to social desirability. At the same time, voting can be seen as an instrument of protest or of tactical calculation, especially in secondorder elections (Reif 1985; Riera 2016; de Vries and Edwards 2009). As a result, we would overestimate or underestimate the proportion of people with left-wing extremist attitudes. Finally, we would hardly be able to make longterm comparisons if a party were to change its party program significantly over time like in the cases of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) in Germany (Olsen 2007), the Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands (van Kessel 2015), or elsewhere (Gomez et al. 2016). A similar problem underlies the one-dimensional question of ideological self-classification. Citizens differ significantly in their conceptions of “left” and “right” (Bauer et al. 2017; Jungkunz 2019). As a researcher, one therefore does not know in most cases whether the respondent classifies himself as “left” on an economic or a cultural axis (Jost et al. 2009). Moreover, such perceptions vary greatly across social groups, educational level, political cognition, and over time (Neundorf 2009, 2011). For instance, the notion of “left” has shifted from ideological conflict with the Eastern Bloc to redistribution and social justice in Germany between 1991 and 2007 (Trüdinger and Bollow 2011). In the Netherlands, left-right identification has moved from issues of redistribution to division based on pro- or anti-immigration attitudes between 1980 and 2006 (de Vries et al. 2013). And similar dynamics can be expected in countries where immigration issues are more polarized, such as Belgium,

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Denmark, or Switzerland (de Vries et al. 2013). Since 2015, migration to Europe has partly led to a shift in left-right perceptions across countries. Moreover, as a one-dimensional axis, the left-right scale does not adequately capture the complexity of political issues (Jost et al. 2009). Whenever people express their political ideology, they may have economic, social, or even environmental cleavages in mind. As the salience of such ideological dimensions varies among citizens, different reference points emerge from which they interpret the meaning of ideological labels (Conover and Feldman 1981). Thus, if we are to assess the potential for political extremism, it is critical that we do not reduce such complex issues to the point where the outcome depends largely on the interpretation of a survey question. Instead, we should focus on studying actual attitudes. Figure 8.1 illustrates this relationship for Germany by plotting the mean values of support for socialism by vote choice and left-right self-placement of respondents using data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES 2021). In this case, supporters of the Left Party constitute the only group of voters that slightly agree with the notion that socialism is a good idea that

Fig. 8.1 Mean values of support for socialism by left-right self-placement and vote choice (2019). Results are based on data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). Reported are mean values of voters on both variables with 95% confidence intervals. The shaded area displays the mean values of socialism by values of the left-right scale with 95% confidence intervals for mean values of socialism. Socialism: “Socialism is a good idea which has just been poorly implemented in the past”. 0 indicates low support for socialism and strong left-wing placement, 1 refers to strong support for socialism and strong right-wing placement

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has just been poorly implemented in the past. However, their average support of 0.62 on a scale from zero to one is far from indicating strong support for socialism and rather constitutes a loose affinity than anything remotely related to an extremist position. Furthermore, we also see that respondents who consider themselves as “very left” favor socialism only slightly (mean value 0.57). This pattern also holds and fails to capture extremism even more so for attitudes toward, e.g. nationalization, anti-imperialism, and the support for authoritarian rule (Jungkunz 2019, 2022).

Conceptualizing the Measurement of Left-Wing Extremist Attitudes To advance our understanding of the concept of left-wing extremism, it is important to underscore that there is not one left-wing extremist attitude, but that a left-wing extremist worldview results from a combination of radical left-wing attitudes and a rejection of democratic values. Consequently, since we are talking about a non-compensatory concept (Goertz 2006), it does not imply that someone who advocates socialism, rejects capitalism, or calls for the abolition of nation states can be classified as a left-wing extremist. Only if someone absolutizes such radical views and simultaneously rejects the democratic constitutional state and its values can we call him a left-wing extremist. Figure 8.2 represents this in a very simplified way. The operationalizing of non-compensatory concepts like left-wing extremism is not trivial.5 Regardless of the selection of suitable indicators, the choice of aggregation method is of central importance. If one follows the assumption that an individual must possess radical left-wing attitudes while at the same time rejecting the values of the democratic constitutional state, this cannot be operationalized by a simple sum or mean index. Doing so implies that all aspects, radical left-wing attitudes and anti-democratic attitudes, are equally important and interchangeable. For example, someone could be classified as left-wing extremist if he or she (very) strongly agrees with all radical left-wing positions, but is indifferent or even averse to rejecting democracy and its values. Unfortunately, survey researchers often ignore these preconditions

Anti-Democrats

Left-Wing Extremists

Supporters of Socialism

Anti-Capitalists

Left-Wing Radicals

Fig. 8.2 Conceptual measurement of left-wing extremist attitudes

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and construct compensatory mean indices for non-compensatory concepts. While methodologically more refined, this problem also applies in the case of structural equation modeling and the creation of second-order factors. To operationalize left-wing extremist attitudes in a non-compensatory way, it is actually necessary to make sure that respondents hold strong left-wing radical attitudes and reject democratic values at the same time. To illustrate this problem and its consequences, I use data from an own study conducted in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in 2022.6 The survey contained, among others, questions on left-wing radical attitudes and the rejection of democratic values. All items were measured on five-point Likert scales which were coded to a range from zero (“fully disagree”) to four (“fully agree”). Table 8.1 gives an overview along with the respective question wording of the items. The items can be grouped into two dimensions. The first one consists of five items that represent classical left-wing radical attitudes like support for socialism, anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, anti-repression, and antiracism. While these items do not constitute a full list of possible characteristics of such a worldview, they give a wide range of issues to reasonably capture the breadth of left-wing radicalism. The second dimension consists of three items that represent anti-democratic attitudes like support for non-democratic forms of government. In the following, I present the distributions of different indices of left-wing extremism based on different aggregation methods of the individual items. First, I use an additive method that simply calculates the mean across all eight items. While this method is probably the most common one among survey researchers, it is also the most problematic one. It implicitly assumes that there exists no dimensional structure and that all items are substitutable; that is, each item contributes equally to the aggregation of the total construct. In practice, Table 8.1 Overview of question wording Dimension

Question wording

Support for socialism Anti-capitalism Anti-fascism Anti-repression

Socialism is a good idea which has until now only been put into practice badly Capitalism is ruining the world Fascism shows the true face of capitalism The persecution of and spying on of left-wing system critics by the state and police is increasing Deeply rooted racism can be seen everywhere in daily life It is necessary to do away with the democratic form of government if we want to have a decent society Under some circumstances, a nondemocratic government can be preferable I prefer a non-democratic government that pursues a policy I agree with, rather than a democratically elected government whose policies I oppose

Anti-racism Anti-democracy Anti-democracy Anti-democracy

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it thus could occur that someone scores very high on all left-wing radical items and very low on all anti-democracy items. In sum, however, this person would be assigned an average to above average value on the left-wing extremism index. Unfortunately, as outlined above, this violates the two-dimensional non-compensatory concept of left-wing extremism which is composed of leftwing radicalism and anti-democracy. This problem becomes even greater if researchers use an asymmetrical number of items for the two dimensions, e.g. in our example with five left-wing radical items and only three anti-democracy ones.7 Secondly, I use the additive method using a two-step method. In the first step, I calculate an index for all left-wing radical items and all anti-democracy items, respectively. In the second step, I then calculate a total index across both sub-indices to create the total left-wing extremism index. While this method adjusts for a potentially asymmetric number of items in each dimension, it still violates the non-compensatory structure of left-wing extremism. Again, respondents could score high values on the total index if they hold strong left-wing radical attitudes and only moderate anti-democratic attitudes. Thirdly, I use an aggregation method that takes the minimum value across both dimensions.8 Mathematically, taking the lowest value across dimensions makes sure that a respondent’s score on the overall index cannot take higher values than his value on the lowest dimension. Thus, someone has to have strong left-wing radical attitudes and anti-democratic attitudes to be considered left-wing extremist, which captures the non-compensatory nature of left-wing extremism. The downside of this approach is that it completely disregards any information of any other dimension outside the one with the lowest value. Thus, one could score very high values on left-wing radicalism and very low anti-democracy and would then we classified as very low on the overall index. Finally, I use a multiplication method that multiplies the indices of two dimensions to form an overall index.9 Although not perfect in itself, it combines some of the advantages of the two-step additive method and the minimum value method. In practice, this method punishes overall scores if a respondent has a low value on either one dimension. Also, since all individual items and sub-dimensions are coded to a range from zero to four, it assures that respondents that are classified as extremist cannot have very low values (i.e., zero) on one dimension, as this would result in a zero value for the overall index. In turn, holding strong attitudes on both dimensions results in particularly high values on the overall index. Thus, this method captures (although not perfectly) the non-compensatory nature of left-wing extremism while taking all of the dimensions into account. However, since the multiplication results in a different range of the overall index, I recoded it again to a scale from zero to four for comparison. Figure 8.3 displays the overall left-wing extremist attitudes index by different methods of aggregation. In addition, it includes the share of respondents that we could classify as having at least a tendency toward a left-wing

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extremist worldview. The cutoffs refer to the share of respondents that on average at least “agreed” with all items, i.e. scored a three on a scale from zero to four. Due to differences in the aggregation via multiplication, this results in a cutoff value of 2.25 for the multiplication method. Of course, cutoff values are always arbitrary. The point here is, however, to show how different methods of aggregation result in different distribution patterns and shares of respondents with left-wing extremist attitudes, which occurs regardless of cutoff value. The first major finding from this exercise is that using an additive way of aggregating left-wing extremist attitudes results in a fairly normal distribution of the overall index. Thus, a substantial number of respondents hold average values on the index which most likely results from the respondents’ tendency to answer with the midpoint on response scales due to a mix of social desirability bias and acquiescence bias. In both cases, close to five percent of respondents in Germany, seven percent in Great Britain, and four percent in the Netherlands could be classified as possessing a tendency toward a left-wing extremist worldview. The minimum value aggregation method in the third row presents a more skewed distribution which indicates that a large number of respondents hold low values on the overall index and only a small minority rather high ones. The share of respondents with a tendency toward a left-wing extremist worldview is much lower compared to the first two methods and ranges from 1.7% in the Netherlands to 2.4% in Germany and 4.1% in Great Britain. Similarly, the overall index based on the multiplication method is also strongly skewed and only few respondents hold values above the midpoint of the scale. However, the share of respondents with a tendency toward a left-wing extremist worldview is somewhat similar to the additive methods with about 4.5% in Germany, 6.8% in Great Britain, and 3.8% in the Netherlands. Taken together, these results indicate that the aggregation method can have strong effects on the distribution and classification of left-wing extremist attitudes in societies. Even more problematic, however, is the fact that the aggregation methods capture different strata of respondents. Table 8.2 shows the correlations between the four aggregation methods and the left-wing radicalism and anti-democracy indices. The findings show that the two additive measures correlate very strongly with each other (r = 0.973) but much less with the minimum method (r = 0.805 and r = 0.872) and the multiplication method (r = 0.856 and r = 0.912). In turn, the minimum and multiplication methods correlate very strongly with each other (r = 0.951). Given that these correlations are not based on relationships between different phenomena but are supposed to reflect the same concept, these differences in correlations are quite substantial. Importantly, the two additive measures and the minimum and multiplication measures seem to capture the two dimensions of left-wing extremism differently. While the additive measures correlate strongly with the left-wing radicalism (r = 0.790 and r = 0.730) and anti-democracy (r = 0.748 and

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Fig. 8.3 Distributions of left-wing extremist attitudes by aggregation method. Results based on own data (NDE =2.117, NGB =2.039, NNL =2.045). Shown are histograms with percentages of respondents by degree of left-wing extremist attitudes for different methods of aggregation. Higher values indicate stronger left-wing extremist attitudes. Numbers in the plot area refer to the share of respondents that on average at least “agreed” with all items

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Table 8.2 Correlations between indices Additive

Additive Additive (two-step) Minimum Multiplication Left-wing radicalism Anti-democracy

Additive (two-step)

Minimum Multiplication Left-wing Anti-democracy radicalism

0.973 0.805 0.856 0.790

0.872 0.912 0.730

0.951 0.359

0.468

0.748

0.837

0.955

0.916

0.230

Results based on own data (N=6.201). Shown are Pearson correlations between indices in the pooled sample. All correlations are significant with p