The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Africa (OXFORD HANDBOOKS SERIES) 9780197608494, 0197608493

Citation preview

T h e Ox f o r d H a n db o o k of

T H E S O C IOL O G Y OF A F R IC A

The Oxford Handbook of

THE SOCIOLOGY OF AFRICA Edited by

R. SOORYAMOORTHY and

NENE ERNEST KHALEMA

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2023 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Control Number: 2023020443 ISBN 978–​0–​19–​760849–​4 DOI: 10.1093/​oxfordhb/​9780197608494.001.0001 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

Contents

Preface  About the Editors  List of Contributors 

ix xi xiii

I .   T H E S O C IOL O G Y OF A F R IC A : C ON T E X T A N D P E R SP E C T I V E S 1. The Sociology of Africa: A Thematic Contextualization of the Discourse  R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema 2. The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices  Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-​Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor 3. Decolonizing Sociology in Africa: Insights from Zimbabwe and South Africa  Simbarashe Gukurume

3 19

37

I I .   R AC E , E T H N IC I T Y, A N D R E L IG ION 4. Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa: Problematic Suppositions and Contemporary Predicaments  Nene Ernest Khalema

59

5. Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-​Building in Africa  Inyokwe Sunday Otinche

77

6. Religious Life in African Societies  Nicolette D. Manglos-​Weber

97

7. The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa  Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu

117

vi   Contents

I I I .   G E N DE R , SE X UA L I T Y, A N D I N T E R SE C T IONA L I T Y 8. Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa  Nakanyike B. Musisi

137

9. Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures  Gabi Mkhize

155

10. Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-​Based Violence on Families in Africa  Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa

173

I V.   M E DIC A L S O C IOL O G Y 11. Medical Sociology in Africa: Understanding Health, Illness, and Healing  Tọ́lá Olú Pearce

195

12. African Sociology of Health and Well-​Being  Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo

213

13. Social Determinants of Health in Africa  Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo

229

14. Infectious Diseases in Africa: Emergence, Social Contexts, Political and Media Discourses  N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto

247

V.   P OL I T IC A L E C ON OM Y A N D DE V E L OP M E N T 15. The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy  Manu Lekunze 16. Pan-​Africanism and Development in Africa: Trajectories and Prognoses  Ernest Toochi Aniche, Ikenna Mike Alumona, and Victor H. Mlambo 17. The Sociology of Science in Africa  Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya

267

285

305

Contents   vii

18. Sociological Processes of Urbanization: The African Experience since the Twentieth Century  Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu

325

19. Africa’s Nature: A Continental Treasure, a Global Heritage, and the Real Wealth of the Present and Future Generations  Noel Chellan

345

20. Climate Governance and Justice: Power Pull and Unequal Exchanges with Peripheral Africa  Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje

363

21. Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa  Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou

385

V I .   C R I M E A N D V IOL E N C E 22. Criminology in Africa  Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile

407

23. African Criminologies: Decolonization, Relativism, and Resistance  Ian Warren and Emma Ryan

425

24. Elusive Peace: Extraction and Violent Conflict in Africa  David Matsinhe

445

25. Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa: A Cross-​National Approach  Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola

465

V I I .   T H E FA M I LY A N D E DU C AT ION 26. Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity in Diverse African Societies  Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé 27. Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability: The Enduring Value of Kinship for Family Formation  Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim

485

503

viii   Contents

28. Challenges to Higher Education in Africa and the Decolonized “Academia We Want”  Christine Scherer

521

Index 

541

Preface

This is a proud moment, not only for us as the editors, but also for the contributors and peer reviewers who made this undertaking to compile the knowledge of the sociology of Africa possible. The hard work of completing the task has finally borne fruit. We presume and hope that the contents of this volume will be of great use to students and scholars who are interested in both the sociology of Africa and African knowledge. It has been a difficult, yet joy-​filled journey. Once we had a blueprint for the project and had laid out the individual chapters after a thorough review of the existing literature and prominent databases, it was a daunting task to find, approach, and coax experts in the respective fields to contribute. Because the volume is the first of its kind in compiling sociological knowledge about African societies, we needed well-​researched pieces on the relevant topics and themes that collectively contribute to the sociology of Africa. We are grateful to those who not only were kind enough to accept our invitation, but also willing to draft the chapters as they had been outlined in the request. Our contributors were also patient and accommodative while revising the chapters in line with our comments and that of the peer reviewers. Fifty authors from within and outside the continent of Africa and its diaspora contributed to this handbook. Peer reviewers lent us a supportive hand in returning the reviews timeously, and this helped us to work according to the schedule. Needless to say, their recommendations were instrumental in maintaining the quality and standards of the chapters. We are grateful to both the contributors and the peer reviewers who graciously spent their valuable time to help materialize this project. When we were proposing the idea for this volume, we received a very positive and encouraging response from Anthony Wahl, a senior commissioning editor at Oxford University Press. He has supported us unconditionally at every stage. His team of content and technical experts at OUP were also instrumental in moving us forward. This was a great inspiration for us to keep our commitment to the completion of the Handbook. Anthony was soon joined by his colleague Holly Mitchell to make sure that the project moved ahead seamlessly. We are grateful to both of them, and to the teams at Oxford University Press and Newgen Knowledge Works under the able leadership of Jaishree Srijan. R. Sooryamoorthy Nene Ernest Khalema University of KwaZulu-​Natal, South Africa

About the Editors

R. Sooryamoorthy is Professor of Sociology at the University of KwaZulu-​Natal in South Africa. He is also a Research Fellow at the DSI-​NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (CREST), Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Nene Ernest Khalema is Associate Professor and Dean and Head of the School of Built Environment and Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-​Natal in South Africa.

Contributors

Aisha A. Adaranijo, Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Federal University Lokoja Biko Agozino, Professor, Virginia Tech Moses M. Akpoughul-​Abunya, Auxiliary Provincial Superior, De La Salle Brothers, Lwanga District of Africa Ikenna Mike Alumona, Professor of Comparative Politics and Security Studies, Department of Political Science, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University Kafayat Aminu, Senior Research Fellow, Sociology Department, University of Ibadan Jimoh Amzat, Professor, Usmanu Danfodiyo University Ernest Toochi Aniche, Senior Lecturer and Head, Department of Political Science, Federal University Otuoke Isaac Deji Ayegboyin, Professor, University of Ibadan Nelius Boshoff, Associate Professor, The Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology and the DSI-NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and STI Policy, Stellenbosch University Noel Chellan, Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-​Natal Nontyatyambo Dastile, Director, Walter Sisulu University Rosalie Aduayi Diop, Professor, Sociology (Family-Education-Youth), Institute of Population, Development and Reproductive Health, Cheikh Anta Diop University Ruth Evans, Professor of Human Geography, University of Reading Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole, Senior Lecturer, Federal University of Technology Simbarashe Gukurume, Senior Lecturer, Sol Plaatje University Mohamed El Hachimi, Professor, National School of Statistics and Applied Economics, Mohamed V University David Houéto, Professor, Health Promotion and Social Determinants of Health, University of Parakou Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje, Senior Lecturer, Obafemi Awolowo University

xiv   Contributors Peace O. Jemibor, Research Assistant, Saints Peter and Paul Catholic Major Seminary Anselm K. Jimoh, Professor of African Epistemology, Philosophy Department, Saints Peter and Paul Catholic Major Seminary Fatou Kébé, Sociologist, GRESAFRIC Seung Wan Kim, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park Sitawa R. Kimuna, Professor, East Carolina University Manu Lekunze, Lecturer, International Relations, University of Aberdeen Sangeetha Madhavan, Professor, African American Studies and Sociology, University of Maryland Nicolette D. Manglos-​ Weber, Assistant Professor, Boston University School of Theology David Matsinhe, Associate Research Fellow, University of the Witwatersrand Gabi Mkhize, Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-​Natal Victor H. Mlambo, Lecturer, University of Johannesburg Johann Mouton, Professor in the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology and Director of the DSI-NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and STI Policy, Stellenbosch University Brenda Muchabveyo, Lecturer, Midlands State University Nakanyike B. Musisi, Associate Professor, History Department, University of Toronto Similo Ngwenya, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology and the DSI-NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and STI Policy, Stellenbosch University Michael Adeleke Ogunewu, Senior Lecturer, Nigerian Baptist Theological Seminary Donald Chiuba Okeke, Associate Professor of Planning, University of Nigeria Pacificah F. Okemwa, Lecturer, Kenyatta University Obasesam Okoi, Assistant Professor of Justice and Peace Studies, University of St. Thomas, Minnesota Temitope B. Oriola, Professor of Criminology, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta Inyokwe Sunday Otinche, Professor, Federal University Lokoja TỌ́ lá Olú Pearce, Professor Emerita, University of Missouri

Contributors   xv Oliver Razum, Professor, Bielefeld University Emma Ryan, Lecturer, Deakin University N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni, Lecturer, University of Parakou Christine Scherer, Senior Researcher and Coordinator of Early Career and Equal Opportunity, Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence, University of Bayreuth Kirsten Stoebenau, Assistant Research Professor, Department of Behavioral and Community Health, University of Maryland Rachid Touhtou, Professor, National School of Statistics and Applied Economics Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu, Senior Lecturer, University of Nigeria Ian Warren, Senior Lecturer, Deakin University

I

T H E S O C IOL O G Y OF A F R IC A Context and Perspectives

Chapter 1

T he So ciol o gy of A fri c a A Thematic Contextualization of the Discourse R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema

Introduction Africa is a continent of rich diversity. This makes a varied understanding and interpretation of African societies necessary. Social scientists have posited Africa as foundational to human life. Historical evidence supports the notion that Africa once stood as a gateway to divergent civilizations, technologies, and cultures. Sociological discourse about African societies has therefore been progressive, challenging, and mostly difficult. This also owes to a lack of both comprehensive analyses and holistic sociological evidence that covers all the zones of Africa, from the past to the present times. It has left Africa’s sociological scholarship in the hands of the Western knowledge producers, most of whom have not critically ventured beyond the sociocultural and ontological lenses they were trained in. Here we examine the roots and emergence of the sociology of Africa, current debates, relevant sociological themes, and the need for a sociology of Africa.

The Sociology of Africa Any study on the sociology of Africa needs to start from its origin and focus. The historical roots of it can be traced back to the colonial period and to the contemporary times. While it is relevant to see the epistemological background of the sociology of Africa it is important to see what and who has written about it; and what knowledge has been produced in areas that contributed to the development of a sociology of Africa.

4    R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema

The Roots The sociology of Africa tends to focus on the professional activities of two groups—​ namely, the classical Western-​based sociologists who write about Africa, and the European migrant sociologists who live and work in Africa. This situation has produced a medley of confused ideas about African sociology, first, because African history was written from Western perspectives and, second, because it was sequenced following theoretical, conceptual, and methodological patterns of developments outside the continent. The consequence of this was that Africa’s sociological discourse became tangled in externalities that are not congruent with the trends in Africa’s past and present experiences that have shaped her realities. The literature on the knowledge of Africa and African societies is, unsurprisingly, sparse. This has been a historical pattern in the production of knowledge and its dissemination. The colonizing Western world dismissed Indigenous knowledge systems in Africa and promoted Western ideas and knowledge (Mlambo, 2006). This influence is still reflected in the production of knowledge in Africa and is largely based on Western epistemology and theories (Mlambo, 2006). The writing about Africa’s sociology by Western thinkers, who wrote from their own perspectives on the continent and about what they thought would fit, was not about Africa’s realities. With the independence of African countries in the 1950s, there was renewed interest in the study of Africa (Sooryamoorthy, 2020), and the need to produce knowledge unique to the continent gained more acceptance and recognition. Still, Indigenous scholarship about African societies and their (dis)organization did not emerge until well into the twentieth century. This was when students from African countries who were privileged to receive higher education outside Africa began to return home to teach in the institutions of higher learning that had been set up by the respective colonial powers. It was in this way that the idea of an African sociology was (re)discovered.

Emergence and Development African sociology, or the sociology of Africa, is and has been an eclectic, often amorphous field of contestation that draws on the insights, theories, and methods from the postcolonial critique. That is to say, the centrality of sociology in African societies underscores the utility of studying society from a standpoint born out of struggle and an understanding of a wide range of concerns, from income inequality to family dynamics to social organization and social stratification. As such, African sociology emerged because of the relentless struggle by Indigenous African thinkers to restore, reimagine, and rethink the meaning of African sociological thinking and analyses of social, cultural, religious, economic, and political realities. The sociology of Africa has thus become an area of academic interest in the recent decades of the postcolonial period, as is evident in the publication of a number of country-​ specific studies (Sooryamoorthy, 2016, 2017). In the initial years of

The Sociology of Africa    5 independence, efforts were mobilized to decolonize the disciplines (Zeleza, 2009). The decolonization debates had a direct effect on the scientific practice in the sociology of non-​European societies (Balandier, 1970; Go, 2013). At this juncture, as Claude Ake mentioned, the role of social scientists is to advance social progress by decolonizing knowledge production in Africa (Arowosegbe, 2008). Scholars who work on African topics, whether they are in Africa or spread throughout the diaspora, are now venturing to develop a stream of knowledge that is rooted in African epistemology. While there were some efforts to study African societies from an African perspective, there has been a surge of recognition of the need to look at African societies through the natural prism. Such initiatives gradually led to noticeable changes in the approaches, both theoretical and methodological, to the study of African societies. These have been, however, sporadic and are yet to assume an organized character. Moreover, endeavors to collect the works of those who wanted to develop a sociology for the continent were almost absent. Sociology seems to have been indifferent to Africa, except for a few scattered works. At the beginning of the twenty-​first century, Magubane (2000) declared that African sociology is in a state of crisis. He found that the social analysis of Africa was uncritical. Following him were scholars who looked critically at the state of African sociology. In the view of Anugwom (2019), what sociology in Africa lacks, particularly in theory, is the ability of scholars to question the theories and perspectives employed in describing realities. He asserts that sociology in Africa cannot be separated from the European origins of the discipline. At the same time, it should transcend its European origins and boundaries and become more critically grounded in African social realities. Dodoo and Beisel (2005) observe that sociology is virtually unique in its silence on Africa, compared to political science, economics, and anthropology. In his article “Toward a Sociology of Africa,” van den Berghe (1964) argues for an appropriate approach to the study of African societies. He bases his argument on Africa’s pluralism, rapid rates of change, and challenged conventional structural and functional sociology in African societies. Naturally, van den Berghe’s views for a sociology of Africa sparked considerable interest among the academic community. Despite the limited growth of African sociology there have been efforts to deliberate on the contents of sociology. Decolonization, indigenization, and African-​centered sociology are those topics of interest that received the attention of sociologists for serious deliberations.

Eurocentrism and Indigenization In the view of Akinsola Akiwowo (1999), Indigenous sociology is a necessity. To create it, he called for a mental shift from a positivistic tradition to an oral tradition. To produce sociological knowledge, it is of great consequence to integrate indigenous concepts. To create an Indigenous sociology, it is not mandatory to rely on Western philosophy. Scholars such as Onwuzuruigbo have demonstrated why African sociologists

6    R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema agitated against the Eurocentric knowledge that does not acknowledge indigenization in African sociology. Onwuzuruigbo’s (2018) assessment of Nigerian sociology is that indigenization works against its own processes because of the captive minds of Nigerian sociologists and the conditions of knowledge production in Nigeria. He also pointed out that Nigerian sociology is promoted by hegemonic Western agenda and is still under the influence of Eurocentrism. In his view, Eurocentrism suppressed Indigenous knowledge and impeded the development of Indigenous sociology. These observations cannot be taken lightly. Nigerian sociology is a predominant form of sociology that currently exists in Africa. Endeavors to create an indigenized sociology on the continent therefore must take into consideration the realities that Onwuzuruigbo brings to the attention of African sociologists. As others have recognized (Carroll, 2014, for instance), African-​centered sociology has the potential to develop the strongest social theories.

Decolonization The debates around indigenization are related to decolonization. Scholars such as Balandier (1970) thought that decolonization exerts a direct influence on the practices in sociology in non-​European societies. Discussions of decolonization are generally founded on the epistemology, epistemic inequality, and dependences on theory and methods (Go, 2017; Oloruntoba, 2014). It is a fact that African social scientists are in a bind, trying to address the African social realities in borrowed languages and paradigms (Zeleza, 2002) and working with theories from the West that do not fit in the African reality (Brock-​Utne, 2017). As Connell (2021) emphasized, the global North has depended on knowledge from the colonized and postcolonized world for the development of its own knowledge. In Hountondji’s (1997) view, the Europeans owe the global South a debt for enhancing the development of their knowledge by processing voluminous quantities of fresh data extracted from the global South. Similar views have been expressed by Keskin (2014), Lawuyi and Taiwo (1990), and Olutayo (2014), who agree that an African-​ centered sociology requires the incorporation of Indigenous knowledge. It is not impossible to have a sociology of African theories, knowledge, and idioms when the concepts used to convey meaning do not make sense of African social realities. Carroll believes that to develop an African worldview that will be relevant in an African sociology, the research of African sociologists needs to cover how this worldview reflects belief in the interdependent and interconnected nature of the universe. Carroll (2014, 2018) argues that to develop the concepts, theories, and models in African sociology, a serious engagement with the role of epistemology and its impact on knowledge production is paramount. In the conversation on indigenization, decolonization, and African-​centered sociology no voice is insignificant. This means that, for practical reasons, it is not necessary to totally reject Western knowledge. Based on this premise, Anugwom (2019) and Gukurume and Maringira (2020) advanced the idea of a creating a hybridized sociology. In their view, a hybrid version of sociology can accommodate and integrate both

The Sociology of Africa    7 canonical thinking and localized knowledge. It can appreciate both the Eurocentric practices and decolonial practices reasoned in local knowledge and wisdom. They argue that decolonization should not be about discarding Eurocentric sociological canons; the approach should be to promote a democratic and globalized sociology that blends the Eurocentric canons and local knowledge. This approach, they reiterate, can expose students to Western epistemologies and at the same time keep them rooted in African social realities.

Production of Sociological Knowledge Two groups of scholars are engaged in African studies. One group lives and works in institutions in Africa; the other labors in institutions outside Africa and specializes in African studies. Both are indispensable to the study of Africa. The contributions of all these scholars are crucial to the development of an African sociology. And in some areas, scholars have made remarkable progress in developing an African sociological approach (Maat, 2014, for instance). Because of this, the knowledge produced about African societies has taken a distinctively progressive path and created new perspectives about Africa and its people. This is evident in African sociology, as well, which is experimenting with new perspectives and methodologies in the study of the diverse realms that are relevant to African life. Many scholars in their times have laid the foundation for a sociology of Africa. William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, better known as W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–​1963), particularly in the early years of his career as a sociologist, made significant inputs to the study of human society through the use of empirical research (Green & Driver, 1976). His focus was on the topic of race and race relations, and he produced an in-​depth understanding of the problem that is of great interest in African sociology. Du Bois provided answers to the questions of racialization, of decoloniality and the enslavement of African descendants and about the role of theory in social change and the role of race in the dehumanization of African peoples (Zuberi, 2004). His prominent works, among others, are The Philadelphia Negro (1899/​1966), The Souls of Black Folk (1903/​1989), and The World Africa (1947/​2007). Sociologists were not the only group of scholars who ventured into researching African societies, and so sociological knowledge does not always fall within the domain of sociologists alone. Social scientists in Africa produced the knowledge to recreate the social sciences in Africa as a unified body of knowledge relevant to the continent (Arowosegbe, 2008). This is important in the development of sociological knowledge about African societies. Africana studies research, which mostly looks at African culture, African people, and their experiences (Carroll, 2008), for instance, is conducted by a range of social scientists, not just sociologists, but is closely related to the sociology of Africa. The relevance of Africana studies led to a critical examination of the methodological approaches to researching Africans (Carroll, 2008). The importance of this was best articulated by Ali Mazrui (1967), who posited a “Pax Africana that is protected

8    R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema and maintained by Africa herself.” In another thought-​provoking observation of the approaches to understanding African discourse, Kwame Nkrumah (1961), in his classic book I Speak of Freedom, declared: “We must find an African solution to our problems . . . This can only be found in African unity. Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world” (pp. xi–​xiv). Africa is a conglomeration of heterogeneous societies. The pluralistic nature of African society is evident in its structural segmentation and cultural diversity (van den Berghe, 1964). As a continent of fifty-​five countries, Africa’s distinctive sociocultural features stretch across numerous different realms of social life, and the sociology of Africa needs to take this element into account. Attempting to provide a holistic view of Africa from a sociological perspective is a challenging but rewarding endeavor. The attempt should therefore be general and specific to provide an understanding of both general and individualistic views of African sociological themes.

The Need for a Sociology of Africa Amid the contemporary debates on the decolonization and indigenization of knowledge, the attention and demand by scholars and students for a specific sociology of Africa is increasingly felt. The approaches to the study of African social realities, as Mkandawire (1994) argues, have led to a new sense of urgency and self-​confidence in African scholarship. Yet there is the persistent issue of African sociologists who are ignorant of the work done by their peers on the continent (Akiwowo, 1980). Akiwowo believed that non-​European cultures have a great deal to contribute to the production of sociological knowledge globally (Pearce, 2021), and he argued vehemently for incorporating African perspectives on the sociology and theory generated in Africa. In his trend report on African sociology, Akiwowo (1980) conceded that it was difficult to state categorically that any distinctive African sociology existed or had ever existed. Although he compiled his report more than forty years ago, continues to sheds light on the state and content of African sociology. In his analysis Akiwowo identified the importance of making sociology reflect the intellectual and social realities of Africa so that it could be called a truly African sociology. Akiwowo’s work illustrated that there are resources in African culture for doing sociology in Africa that is as good as Western sociology (Táíwò, 2021). His underlying perception about African sociology was to view humanity as a whole, and he believed that sociologists have to help build a world society to which all can contribute (Pearce, 2021). The domination and marginalization of the African continent in the ideas of Western sociology, as Mlambo (2006) holds, have also had consequences for the study of African societies and African sociology. Mlambo also encourages African scholars to develop an independent African social science tradition to reflect African problems and address the challenges confronting African societies. In the same vein, called on scholars working in Africa or on African topics to develop new paradigms that can be used as frameworks and reading grids to give an independent view of African societies.

The Sociology of Africa    9 As Nwabueze (2021) rightly argues, African sociology should prioritize the “African condition by introducing into its homegrown analytical arsenal, domestic-​oriented problems, language, methods and philosophy” (p. 18). Western sociology, he writes, is not universal because it does not represent the variety of possibilities from around the world. African sociology is sociology by Africans, or others with the Africanized worldview, not an Africa viewed through the lens of Eurocentric sociology. There is room for a sociology of Africa, and it is essential to produce a better understanding of the heterogenous African societies. Such an understanding will be a valuable contribution to global sociological knowledge.

This Handbook The handbook is organized around seven major areas of sociology that have had a significant presence in Africa during the last seventy years. This distinguishes it from other volumes that deal with regional or international sociologies. Each of these sections gather and examine sociological knowledge that has accumulated over the years. Although the field of sociology is spread across hundreds of specializations and practiced all over the world, not all of them are relevant to African sociology. We have made a careful selection of the branches of sociology that are highly pertinent to an African sociology and the study of African societies. We made our selection based on a survey of the literature on African sociology found in key databases and citation indexes. Our intention has been to provide an inclusive view of African societies, in general, and of African sociology, specifically. The chapters in each section describe the historical development of the topic, relevant theoretical perspectives and approaches, the major works in the area, and they critically examine the debates and discuss anticipated developments in the future. In addition to these, the chapters of the introductory section deal with the fundamental and epistemological perspectives and current debates in African sociology. The handbook is a novel attempt to present an accessible, comprehensive, up-​to-​date, and topical analysis of sociological thinking in Africa by focusing on examples from its various countries. The goal was to bring together analyses of sociological phenomena by scholars and researchers working in each of the thematic areas, whose contributions locate African sociological thinking in its historical context and take a critical look at its current manifestations across the continent. The handbook builds on an existing body of literature, which, as suggested, is often scattered and unorganized. While the analysis of African societies has long been an item on the agenda of sociologists worldwide, advances in the decolonial critique—​notably, by African scholars in Africa—​have enhanced the scholarship. The collection is, therefore, premised on the assumption that to imagine the sociology of Africa as a significant intervention, the participation and representation of African ways of knowing and doing is a critical starting point.

10    R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema This handbook comprises scholarly and interdisciplinary perspectives on current debates and shows how best to unpack sociological imaginations in the African context. The scholarly contributions include original works taking a broad approach and illustrating the importance of specificity in sociological phenomena. Collectively, the handbook illuminates the particularity of African lives, the unique contextual challenges, and the resourcefulness with which these challenges are negotiated and mitigated. The handbook is designed to be voluminous and multilayered, spanning the conceptual, theoretical, and concrete dimensions of sociological thought across Africa. It divided into seven sections covering the context and perspectives the sociology of Africa; race, ethnicity, and religion; gender, sexuality, and intersectionality; medical sociology; political economy and development; crime and violence; and the family and education. The details of these sections are as follows.

The Sociology of Africa: Context and Perspectives This introductory section presents the development of sociology in Africa after the 1950s when countries on the continent began to attain political independence. It begins with a discussion of the background of the sociology of Africa from both historical and contemporary perspectives. As noted, the sociology of Africa is not an integrated entity; it is still in its incipient stages of development. Seven thematic sections in this volume trace the elements and set the background for a deeper understanding of the sociology of Africa. These provide the context of the handbook that covers the sociological knowledge produced by scholars both in and outside Africa. The chapters in the first section examine the epistemological characteristics of African sociology to see whether they are distinctive to Africa or like the other forms of sociologies that exist at the global and regional levels. Essentially, African sociological knowledge deals with the epistemic relevance of the relationship between individuals and social practices in varied African cultures. A chapter in this section emphasizes the legitimacy of alternative sociological knowledge practices and the possibility of their global character. Decolonization, being a topical issue in African sociology, finds a critical and objective assessment in this introductory section. Drawing on the empirical research conducted in selected African countries, another chapter focuses on the decolonization of sociology. It investigates the ways in which sociology academics are responding to the calls to decolonize curricula and pedagogy. The chapters in general elaborate on the fundamental ideas, current debates, and issues relevant to the study of the sociology of Africa.

Race, Ethnicity, and Religion This section explores the three principal aspects of African society and sociology—​ namely, race, ethnicity, and religion. For sociologists, race, ethnicity, and religion in

The Sociology of Africa    11 Africa are major areas of inquiry, and this has led to the production of a substantial volume of knowledge. Race, ethnicity, and religion are integral to the social life of people on the continent and are often a source of division and conflict. Some African countries have a prolonged and troubled past of racial and ethnic segregation and conflict. Studies of race and ethnicity in Africa have also given rise to new theoretical and methodological perspectives. The chapters in this section elaborate on how race and ethnicity are different from an African sociological standpoint. Ethnic experiences on the continent are shared to underscore the role the colonialists played in ethnic identity formation, classification, and discrimination. Research on race in Africa has created new openings for the study and analysis of human differences. The chapter on race addresses how African sociology has responded to the dominant use of the concept of race. It outlines the historiography related to racialization and the methodological dilemmas in the measurement of race in African societies. Religion plays a pivotal role in influencing human relations in Africa, which is endowed with many religious streams. Christianity and Islam have been the fastest-​ growing religious traditions in Africa. Alongside the modern religions, traditional religion continues to be integral to many African societies. Sociologically, religion is viewed as an ideological, practical, and symbolic system through which certain beliefs are constituted, maintained, and controlled. The sociology of religion can reveal several dimensions of the social structure and social life of Africans. The array of topics that are contextual for Africa include Indigenous African religions, beliefs, practices, the spread of Christianity and Islam, the regional variations in the practice of various religions (North to South, East to West), African Pentecostalism, reforms in religion, and the role of religion in the lives of Africans. The chapters on religion also seek to explain its relationship with societal structures and processes. They explore the interaction between religious institutions and the political, social, and economic structures. The appropriateness of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of religion in Africa is emphasized. The contributions in this section also call for a closer examination of the study of religion in African societies to capture the significance of global religion, especially as it relates to religious pluralism. Because Christianity is a prominent religion on the continent, a chapter investigates the development of the church in Africa and shows its impact on the religious, social, and even economic lives of the African people.

Gender, Sexuality, and Intersectionality As a growing area of scholarly interest, gender, sexuality, and intersectionality jointly offer critical insights into the dynamics of gender relations in Africa. These areas constitute an indispensable part of African sociology bearing national, regional, and continental features. Gender in this section is viewed as an analytical tool to see how the rules, customs, and practices are disadvantageous to women in Africa. Intersectionality considers that certain social identities such as race, gender, class, and sexuality intersect

12    R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema and inform each other and produce complex power relations within society. This section presents an overview of gender research in Africa and explores intersectional identities and the state of gendered violence in African societies. The contributions discuss, among other things, the conditions under which African women’s and gender studies emerged and the its historiography, and the key suppositions underlying its methodological and theoretical approaches in defending specific epistemic positions. As a prevalent form of crime, gender-​based violence deserves attention, and this section investigates its impact on families in Africa. Intersectionality as a theoretical tool can be used to examine the ways in which gender and sexuality intersect in African cultures and how these intersections add to normalized female oppression and patriarchal power and control. A chapter in this section applies an intersectional feminist lens to unpack a social perspective on how gender and sexuality play out in African cultures.

Medical Sociology A central sociological concern in medicine is the interaction between the individual and the health system of which they are part. Medical sociology, or the sociology of health, as a subfield looks at the social causes and consequences of health and illness. Postcolonial Africa has suffered from frequent disease pandemics that have affected African society in multiple ways and caused a severe strain on the health systems of several African countries, and its sociological significance needs to be assessed. Sociologists have attempted to study the situation from several angles, and this has resulted in the emergence of a medical sociology for Africa. African sociology of health refers to the social causes and consequences of health and illness. Access to health has been a fundamental concern of every African nation and threats to human rights constitute a danger to humanity, particularly to human health. The chapters in this section present an overarching view of medical sociology in Africa, including the African sociology of health and well-​being and the social determinants of health and infectious diseases and their social and political contexts in Africa. The orthodox medical models dominated by those pursuing Western medicine have set the agenda in the social analysis of illness. The sociological paradigm offers a more critical and nuanced understanding of the issues by drawing on the expertise and knowledge of healthcare practitioners, risk assessors, sociotechnical innovators, sociology of health and illness experts, and organizational and institutional culture practitioners. The section further questions the distribution of power as the explanation behind the link between inequality and ill-​health as a particularly useful and appropriate measure of inequality in the African context.

Political Economy and Development Political economy and development are perennial topics of interest for Africa. Poverty levels, natural disasters, the prevalence of fatal diseases, the lack of proper

The Sociology of Africa    13 development-​oriented policies and programs, the absence of able political leadership, widespread corruption, and the existence of civil society organizations and human rights determine the nature and quality of Africa’s development. For sociologists, development is an ever-​growing area of knowledge. The sociology of development, being an important branch within the field of sociology, has attempted to address the issues through empirical research and theoretical formulations. This section relates to the phases of development on the continent by focusing on certain selected realms. Chapters in this section elaborate on political economy, Pan-​Africanism, the sociology of science, urbanization, the environment and climate change, and civil society and human rights. The interaction between political power and authority influences the nature and evolution of macrosociological features of African societies. A chapter on the political economy of Africa captures the nature of the current political order, political development, economic systems, and social order. The chapter rests on certain fundamental features, such as the historical ability to form self-​sufficient societies in isolation; the historical possibility of trade as a strategy of self-​sufficiency; a historical link between family, labor, wealth, political power, and order; the history of external domination, and the disproportionate structural power of domestic and international political economies on externally dominated societies. Pan-​ Africanism evolved from a liberation movement to eradicate oppression, slavery, and colonialism. It has changed to an ideology of achieving continental unity, interdependence, self-​sufficiency, and economic transformation. The chapter on Pan-​ Africanism shows that the traditional Pan-​Africanism was a strategy for decolonization, anticolonial struggles, and Black unity, whereas the modern Pan-​Africanism developed as a means of engaging in neocolonial struggles, collective self-​reliance, a development framework, or an ideology of economic transformation. In the sociology of science, four themes are unique to the African science landscape. These relate to the decline and revival of African science, trends in African scientific production, challenges in the local and international funding of science in Africa, and the dynamics of different forms of research collaboration on the continent. It calls for making a case for more in-​depth, microlevel sociological studies of scientific communities, cultures, and practices on the continent. The sociological processes of urbanization in African civilization have been modified by contact with Western civilization, as traditional institutions have been replaced by modern alternatives in the sociological process of urban development in Africa. The chapter on urbanization presents the case for reforms in the sociological processes of African urbanization that drive sustainable cities. It suggests measures that will reverse the processes of urbanization experiences in Africa. Environmental sociology is growing in its value and entails great significance for Africa in the present times. This subfield covers people, animals, plants, land, water and air, and their interrelationships. A range of topics is crucial for Africa: the relationship between environmental problems and social inequality, environmental justice, climate change, desertification, drought, floods, monitoring and management of natural disasters and sustainable development.

14    R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema Governance is central to managing climate change; mainstreaming justice globally; and reducing unequal exchanges concerning financing, mitigation, and adaptation mechanisms. In this section, climate governance, justice, power pull and unequal exchange discourse, and climate change response strategies are examined using the theoretical lenses of power and imbalances. Africa’s efforts on mitigation, adaptation, and financing strategies in the contexts of sociotechnological and economic differentials are discussed. The authors of the chapters on the environment and climate change are of the view that the peripheral Africa continues to bear the brunt of climate injustice and power pull from the global North and other core countries. They acknowledge that Africa has huge tracts of land referred to as the green lungs of the world, and its abundance of natural spaces make it a huge producer of the world’s oxygen. This requires regulation of global temperature and biodiversity. However, colonialism and its incumbent capitalist economic system are subjecting Africa’s abundant natural riches to large-​scale destruction. Environmental destruction and climate change, their genesis and impacts on Africa are also discussed in this section. In the study of civil society organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) the core aspect is to learn how they operate in the various parts of Africa. Given the contemporary sociopolitical situation of African societies, the topic is timely and demands sociological treatment. The persistent conflicts between the state and civil society in some African countries have caused sociological problems. Civil society organizations and NGOs often work under limiting conditions when the state is not supportive of the critical role they are playing in the society. State–​civil society relations are therefore vital in studying civil society. From a sociological perspective, it is necessary to focus on the presence of civil society organizations on a continent like Africa as being different from other contexts. A chapter in the section examines the relationship between the state and civil society organizations in relevant African countries. It deals with the involvement African civil society with human rights issues. It shows that civil society in Africa works in an environment where there is lack of democracy and the presence of authoritarianism and conservatism that not conducive to its thriving. It reflects on the diversity of African civil society activism and the uses of human rights discourses for policy reforms.

Crime and Violence Sociologists have been drawn to the study of crime and violence in Africa. A sociological engagement with the phenomenon of crime and violence by state and non-​state actors is evident in the literature. The study of crime (criminology) as a subfield of sociology, has yielded the sociological understanding of traditional and colonial assumptions of crime and delinquency in African societies. In this body of work, criminality, the nature and impact of violence, the meaning of crime, victims of crime and their rights, the impact

The Sociology of Africa    15 of colonial criminal codes and their suppositions, and state and political violence have been key areas of the research and scholarship. A chapter in this section reviews criminology in Africa and the interests of Africans. Reviewing the historical underdevelopment of criminology in Africa, it finds that the development of critical criminology in Africa will be of benefit to all, and not only to people of African descent. Noting that most of the criminological discourses about Africa are conservative, orientalist, and pathological, the authors suggest that the decolonization paradigm will both help Africans to hold those in power accountable and at the same time contribute new ideas for reparative justice. The discussion on the decolonization of criminology and criminal justice in Africa is elaborated further. In another chapter, the emphasis is on the interconnected problems specific to the colonial and postcolonial conditions in Africa. These include the gradual shift in the use of criminal law to suppress political violence. The highly selective use of the international criminal law to address mass atrocities is another interconnected problem for Africa. Insurgency has increasingly dominated the changing nature of violence and the possibilities of peace and security. Insurgency and organized violence are increasing on the continent. The presence of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, al-​Shabaab, and other insurgency organizations warrants a deeper sociological analysis, and so the section looks at crime, violence, and insurgency in Africa to provide an African dimension. Violent conflicts, including civil wars, coups d’état, and insurgencies assisted by religious ideologies have characterized Africa since independence. The driving forces behind such acts are examined in a chapter that interrogates the sociological drivers of insurgent activities, the characteristics of insurgent groups, and the impact of the response of state actors vis-​à-​vis organized violence in Africa. Another chapter provides a comparative sociological analysis of resource-​driven hostilities, drawing on cases from Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa.

The Family and Education As an expanding area of sociological research, family studies in Africa have a strong presence in the contemporary literature. The African Union has a plan of action for the family in African societies. Owing to their structural and functional characteristics, families in Africa offer unique patterns in the roles and responsibilities of family members. The African family is also important in view of the positions of children and grandparents. The chapters on family in this section deal specifically with family research in Africa, familial roles and responsibilities, and policy implications. A chapter examines the contrasting contexts in East Africa and West Africa by comparing the disruptions and changes in familial responsibilities caused by the death of a family member, and the policy implications of these changes on the social protection and care of vulnerable family members. Similarly, another chapter shows how the role of kin in contemporary Africa is linked to both the marriage process and the rearing of children. Kin

16    R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema recognition is therefore essential for attaining legitimacy for the union and to secure support for children of that union. It also plays a critical role in the material exchange between partners and families as an indication of commitment and in the payment of bride wealth. The analysis in this chapter can encourage policymakers to move away from prescriptive interventions about the timing of childbearing and union formation. The sociological debates on decolonizing knowledge have prompted the need for the Africanization of knowledge in higher education. More and more, the importance of Indigenous knowledge is emphasized in Africa. A chapter in this section examines education challenges; it reflects on the promise and challenges of global education and unpacks the historical, political, and social configurations of the emergence of decoloniality as an issue in education. The differences between national, international, and global models of education and their specific contexts in which each is grounded are explained. Against the backdrop of colonial and postcolonial legacies, the chapter discusses how decolonial discursive approaches on epistemological diversity are becoming increasingly relevant within and beyond the continent. The chapter presents a typology of pertinent literature with an emphasis on the future design of higher education on the continent.

Conclusion The handbook contains sociological knowledge of core areas relevant to Africa. One cannot, however, claim that the themes described in the handbook are exhaustive. As sociology of Africa continues to evolve, more relevant themes that are applicable to a broad and extensive understanding of African societies will be added to these in future. Eventually, they will become essential to have a holistic coverage of topics. The purpose of the volume, as indicated earlier, is to bring together the key contributions to the knowledge of African society and African sociology and thus pave the way for more rigorous undertakings in developing a sociology of the continent. Drawn from a range of disciplinary expertise not limited to sociology, the objective of this handbook was to compile sociological knowledge on African societies. We hope that this handbook will be valuable resource for students, lecturers, scholars, and researchers, and that it will trigger further discussion, debate, and research in this area.

References Akiwowo, A. A. (1980). Trend report: Sociology in Africa today. Current Sociology, 28, 1–​126. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​001​1392​1800​2800​202 Akiwowo, A. (1999). Indigenous sociologies: Extending the scope of the argument. International Sociology, 14, 115–​138. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​0268​5809​9901​4002​001

The Sociology of Africa    17 Anugwom, E. E. (2019). Beyond the narratives of decolonization: Resituating sociological knowledge within the context of development in South Africa. South African Review of Sociology, 50, 18–​33. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​21528​586.2019.1583​122 Arowosegbe, J. O. (2008). The social sciences and knowledge production in Africa: The contribution of Claude Ake. Africa Spectrum, 43, 333–​351. Balandier, G. (1970). The sociology of Black Africa: Social dynamics in central Africa (D. Garman, Trans.). Praeger. Brock-​Utne, B. (2017). Decolonisation of knowledge in the African university. In M. Cross & A. Ndofirepi (Eds.), Knowledge and change in African universities. Vol. 1. Current debates (pp. 161–​182). Sense Publishers. Carroll, K. K. (2008). Africana studies and research methodology: Revisiting the centrality of the Afrikan worldview in Africana studies research and scholarship. Journal of Pan African Studies, 2, 4–​27. Carroll, K. K. (2014). An introduction to African-​centered sociology: Worldview, epistemology, and social theory. Critical Sociology, 40, 257–​270. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​08969​2051​ 2452​022 Carroll, R. (2018). Decolonizing sociology. Contemporary Sociology, 47, 399–​407. https://​ doi​.org/​10.1177/​00943​0611​8779​811 Connell, R. (2021). Contesting Northern knowledge: Akinsola Akiwowo and the worldwide struggle to change the social sciences. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 39, 340–​352. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​02589​001.2021.1902​956 Dodoo, F. N.-​A., & Beisel, N. (2005). Africa in American sociology: Invisibility, opportunity and obligation. Social Forces, 84, 595–​600. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​sof.2005.0095 Du Bois, W. E. B. (1966). The Philadelphia Negro: A social study. University of Pennsylvania Press. (Original work published in 1899). Du Bois, W. E. B. (1989). The souls of Black folk. Penguin Books. (Original work published in 1903). Du Bois, W. E. B. (2007). The world of Africa. Oxford University Press. (Original work published in 1947). Go, J. (2013). For a postcolonial sociology. Theory and Society, 42, 25–​55. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1007/​s11​186-​012-​9184-​6 Go, J. (2017). Decolonizing sociology: Epistemic inequality and sociological thought. Social Problems, 64, 194–​199. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​soc​pro/​spx​002 Green, D. S., & Driver, E. D. (1976). W. E. B. DuBois: A case in the sociology of sociological negation. Phylon, 37, 308–​333. Gukurume, S., & Maringira, G. (2020). Decolonising sociology: Perspectives from two Zimbabwean universities. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 5, 60–​78. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​23802​014.2020.1790​993 Hountondji, P. (1997). Introduction: Recentring Africa. In P. Hountondji (Ed.), Endogenous Knowledge: Research Trails (pp. 1–​39). CODESRIA. Keskin, T. (2014). Sociology of Africa: A non-​orientalist approach to African, Africana, and Black studies. Critical Sociology, 40, 187–​202. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​08969​2051​2444​635 Lawuyi, O. B., & Taiwo, O. (1990). Towards an African sociological tradition: A rejoinder to Akiwowo and Makinde. International Sociology, 5, 57–​73. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​026​8580​ 9000​5001​005

18    R. Sooryamoorthy and Nene Ernest Khalema Maat, S. R. E. K. (2014). Towards an African-​centred sociological approach to Africana lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersexed identities and performances: The Kemetic model of the cosmological interactive self. Critical Sociology, 40, 239–​256. Magubane, B. M. (2000). African sociology—​towards a critical perspective: The collected essays of Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane. African World Press. Mazrui, A. (1967). Towards a Pax Africana: A study of ideology and ambition. Weidenfeld and Nicholson and University of Chicago Press. Mkandawire, T. (1994). Social sciences in Africa: Some lessons for South Africa. South African Sociological Review, 6, 1–​13. Mlambo, A. S. (2006). Western social sciences and Africa: The domination and marginalisation of a continent. African Sociological Review /​Revue Africaine de Sociologie, 10, 161–​179. Nkrumah, K. (1961). I speak of freedom: A statement of African ideology. William Heinemann. Nwabueze, N. (2021). Sociology in Africa: Between domestication and indigenization. In O. Yacoh–​Haliso, N. Nwogwugwu, & G. Ntiwunka (Eds.), African indigenous knowledges in a postcolonial world: Essays in honour of Toyin Falola (pp. 17–​33). Routledge. Oloruntoba, S. O. (2014). Social sciences as dependency: State apathy and the crisis of knowledge production in Nigerian universities. Social Dynamics, 40, 338–​352. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​02533​952.2014.946​268 Olutayo, A. O. (2014). “Verstehen,” everyday sociology and development: Incorporating African Indigenous knowledge. Critical Sociology, 40, 229–​238. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 08969​2051​2446​094 Onwuzuruigbo, I. (2018). Indigenising Eurocentric sociology: The “captive mind” and five decades of sociology in Nigeria. Current Sociology Review, 66, 831–​848. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1177/​00113​9211​7704​242 Pearce, T. O. (2021). The “outward/​inward-​looking principle”: Akìwowo and the sociology of development in Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 39, 318–​329. https://​doi​.​org/​ 10.1080/​02589​001.2021.1902​957 Sooryamoorthy, R. (2016). Sociology in South Africa: Colonial, apartheid and democratic forms. Palgrave Macmillan. Sooryamoorthy, R. (2017). Sociological research and collaboration in South Africa: Past and present. International Sociology, 32, 567–​586. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​02685​8091​7725​235 Sooryamoorthy, R. (2020). Science, policy and development in Africa: Challenges and prospects. Cambridge University Press. Táíwò, O. (2021). Doing sociology in Africa: Notes towards advancing the Akìwowọ project. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 39, 364–​383. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​02589​ 001.2020.1858​227 van den Berghe, P. L. (1964). Toward a sociology of Africa. Social Forces, 43, 11–​18. https://​ doi.org/​10.1093/​sf/​43.1.11 Zeleza, P. T. (2002). The politics of historical and social science research in Africa. Journal of South African Studies, 28, 9–​23. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​030570​7012​0116​953 Zeleza, P. T. (2009). African studies and universities since independence. Transition, 101, 110–​135. Zuberi, T. (2004). W. E. B. Du Bois’s sociology: The Philadelphia Negro and social science. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 595, 146–​156. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1177/​00027​1620​4267​535

Chapter 2

T he Epistemol o g y of Af rican So ci ol o g i c a l Knowled ge Prac t i c e s Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-​ Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor

Introduction Even though it is often taken for granted that they are the same thing, reality and knowledge are distinct concepts that describe different phenomena. Reality broadly refers to the state of things as they actually exist—​that is, fact; whereas knowledge in its broad sense is our understanding about a given subject matter. Both concepts are intrinsically connected, and they are usually discussed in process terms because they are reciprocally related and socially constructed. Thus human knowledge is developed, transmitted, and maintained within social loci. The structures of human engagement with reality—​ideas, concepts, and systems of thought—​are largely, if not entirely, determined by the cultural filaments of society. The outcome of this is clear: specific agglomerations of reality and knowledge pertain to specific social contexts. The logic of this argument makes a certain fact inevitable: Africans, like all peoples with a common identity and culture, have their own ways of constructing ideas about what they accept as real and therefore as knowledge. This chapter employs a critical and analytic approach to examine the epistemology of African sociological knowledge. The aim is to identify and explicate sociological knowledge practices in Africa using proverbs and divination in Yoruba culture as examples. The chapter acknowledges the legitimacy of alternative sociological knowledge practices and emphasizes the need to accommodate alternative (indigenous) knowledge in the global epistemological discourse. It therefore criticizes all forms of theoretical imperialism.

20    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor The chapter discusses (1) the epistemic status of African sociology, explicating the meaning and nature of African sociological knowledge; (2) the epistemic silencing (epistemicide) of African indigenous knowledge within the context of the coloniality of power; and (3) how and why African sociological knowledge should be recognized and accommodated in epistemological discourse in the global space. It concludes by advocating for a knowledge democracy in which different cultural approaches to knowledge would be recognized, accommodated, and respected, which would enrich and bring about an integral, comprehensive, and holistic understanding of reality.

The Epistemic Status of African Sociology: African Sociological Knowledge Practices In the broadest sense, sociology investigates how social structure(s) and individual human agency affect human activity. African sociology is thus the systematic study of the African mode or process of social interaction. This entails the study of the social behavior of Africans, the patterns of their social relationships and interactions and aspects of their everyday lives as they relate with the African culture. It also employs endogenous ontological narratives to study African societies and assumes ontological standpoints. In social interaction, knowledge is generated, justified, retained, and transmitted from one generation to another. Accordingly, the chapter critically reviews African sociological knowledge as the product of African social interactions. Sociological knowledge is compatible with the idea of the sociology of knowledge, where the latter is conceived as the empirical study of the contingent social conditions and causes of knowledge. According to Steve Fuller (2014), the sociology of knowledge is the empirical aspect of social epistemology, whose roots spread across the French and German traditions. Both traditions are “based on the proximity of knowers in space and time, respectively” (p. 189). The focus in the French tradition is on how people, regardless of their different origins, acquire the same mindset because they live in the same space over the same period of time. The focus in the German tradition, in contrast, is on how people who are born around the same time retain a common mindset even though they are dispersed over a wide space. The sociology of knowledge complements the psychology of the normal thought processes by which individuals fit themselves into the world they live in. The inquiry on sociological knowledge closes the gap between philosophy and sociology, as psychologism has done for the gap between philosophy and psychology. Generally, the fundamental issue of disagreement between philosophy and sociology has been the red herring fallacies—​fallacies of relevance. Based on these fallacies, we cannot infer a justified conclusion from premises that are logically irrelevant to the

The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices    21 conclusion. For instance, using “the threat of force to cause the acceptance of a conclusion”—​argumentum ad baculum: for example, “Nigeria should join the Non-​Aligned Nations if she wants the Non-​Aligned Nations to buy her oil.” (Offor, 2010, p. 41). Whereas philosophy discourages the use of the forms of assumptions that are common to these fallacies, sociology considers such assumptions a starting point of inquiry because they provide explanatory strategies that are regularly employed in sociology. Consequently, over the centuries, red herring fallacies have been a barrier to interdisciplinary inquiry between philosophy and sociology. With an inquiry in sociological knowledge, social epistemology transcends this barrier, largely because, as Fuller (2014) explains, it recognizes that “philosophers inhabit two social worlds: the sociologically real but philosophically virtual world that transpires on the surface of metaphysical discourse and the philosophically real but sociologically virtual world that transpires beneath the surface” (p. 117). Hence, Fuller argues, there are four possible strategies by which we can evolve a productive relationship between philosophy and sociology: when philosophy relates to sociology as (1) form to matter, (2) the rational to the irrational, (3) metaphysics to physics, and (4) the conscious to the unconscious. Being more sympathetic to (1), Fuller considers philosophy and sociology to be overlapping stages in the same knowledge inquiry. This is where sociological knowledge intersects with philosophy and sociology. Sociological knowledge in Africa, which is described here as African sociological knowledge, is about the epistemic output of the relationship between the social practices in African cultures and the individuals in those cultures. It is a discourse on how African cultures and environments influence epistemic output. Therefore, it is a product of socially situated activities and practices, the social organization of communities and social institutions, and an appraisal of the ideas generated in social relationships and how these inform the beliefs and understanding of reality by and among Africans. A critical analysis of African sociological knowledge reveals the various layers of the African epistemological experience and the different structures of meaning involved in the different objects of consciousness. This enables a closer exploration of the complex world of lived experiences from the African point of view. It also provides an understanding of how everyday life for Africans, which presents itself as an intersubjective world, accounts for their ontological and epistemological conception of the world (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Knowledge is not separable from the history, cultural contexts, and worldviews of a people. This does not mean that knowledge is necessarily relative or lacks universality. Rather, it emphasizes that the presuppositions that ground knowledge vary from culture to culture. It means that, if lived experiences constitute ideation, cognition, and consciousness, how people make sense of the world in which they live is based on their sociocultural contexts. An individual’s social environment constitutes the source of her thinking because her thought is influenced by her experiences and her community. This implies that human knowledge is situated; it is knowledge from a certain socially and culturally grounded position. Such sociocultural grounds are a given in society, and they exist prior to an individual’s experience and representation of reality. They provide

22    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor order, and shape the individual’s cognitive experience, regardless of the sociocultural situatedness. They provide the individual with a natural way of interpreting reality. Africa’s sociological knowledge is encapsulated in her oral traditions. Here, oral tradition is understood as “an informal method of learning, acquiring, imparting, and transmitting knowledge, beliefs, traditions, and values, [which] involves among other things, parables, myths, proverbs, artwork, and folklore” (Ikuenobe, 2018, p. 23). We do not take for granted the discourse in the extant literature over the legitimacy of the oral tradition as a source of knowledge. Space does not allow for a full discussion of that discourse, except to note that our position here is contrary to the argument that orality is not a legitimate and genuine source of knowledge because it lacks authenticity; rather, the chapter insists that the oral tradition is not only a veritable and legitimate source of knowledge; it is a means by which knowledge is preserved and transmitted from one generation to another. In response to Paulin Hountondji’s (1976) denial that ethnophilosophy is philosophy because of its orality, Ikechukwu Kanu (2014) argues that “philosophy is not philosophy because it has been written down; it is philosophy because it is first an idea. . . . [Secondly] writing is not the only way of transmitting information; oral tradition is one” (p. 67). If documentation (written tradition) is the paradigm for “philosophiness,” the ideas of Socrates, which he communicated orally, would not qualify as philosophy. His ideas were only documented later, in the dialogues of Plato, and today Socrates enjoys the status of intellectual giant, one of the greatest early Western philosophers. Given this, it is unjust to deny plausibility to indigenous knowledge systems on account of their oral tradition. According to Kanu (2014, p. 67), the purpose of writing is primarily to communicate, and the spoken word, in the form of oral tradition, is a “permanent and mightier” means of communication in traditional African cultures. Kanu’s emphasis is not to say which is better between documentation and the oral tradition; rather, it is to emphasize that orality does not imply the absence of philosophy and knowledge. He admits that the oral tradition as a stage of development in the history of African philosophy has given way to the written tradition, which facilitates the broad transmission and preservation of philosophical ideas. This chapter agrees with David Cohen (1989), Noah Dzobo (1992), and Polycarp Ikuenobe (2018) that the oral tradition captures the communal ways in which African traditional cultures create, justify, encode, archive, preserve, and transmit knowledge. The validity of knowledge does not consist in documentation, which, as noted, is a means of knowledge preservation and transmission but is not necessarily essential to knowledge derivation. It is therefore misleading to argue against the genuineness of African sociological knowledge on account of its earlier orientation toward orality. We examine proverbs and divination among the Yoruba as examples of sociological knowledge practices in Africa. The Yoruba consist of a group of cultures bound together by common language, history, social institutions, and ancestral linkages. They are a Sub-​ Saharan African ethnic group in West Africa, found mainly in the southwestern part of Nigeria, as well as in southern Benin; some parts of Togo; Sierra Leone; and the diasporic regions of Cuba, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago (Fadahunsi & Owoseni, 2016).

The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices    23 Proverbs are wise sayings whose understanding requires a measure of criticality. They express basic truths about common situations and present imagery to analyze and resolve complex situations. They capture the wisdom and experience of a people, as well as expressing the interpretation of their beliefs, moral principles, and codes of conduct. According to Kanu (2015), proverbs express enormous knowledge because they constitute a people’s entire worldview, culture, and tradition. Other studies (Isidienu, 2016; Momoh, 2000) consider them the base of African intelligence and an embodiment of African wisdom; therefore they serve as a pedagogical instrument to instruct and educate African children and youth. According to Sophie Oluwole (1997), proverbs are related to all aspects of Yoruba life; they convey lessons and knowledge about the world. She analyzed some Yoruba proverbs, of which we consider two, to establish their distinctive epistemological connotation. 1. Ibi tí a bá fé gbin igi ógbón sí, igi àbámò ni kí á kókó tu kúrò. Nítorípé kí á ròó k’ ó ki ní à n pè ní àròki. Àrògún ní í fún ni lór’íyìn ní gbèhìn: àrògún ní í n m ú òrò omo èdá gún régé. Eni b’ákúrí se pò, ika àbámò ni yíó fi s’énu nígbèhìn. (Wherever we want to plant the tree of wisdom, we should first uproot from there those of regret, critical thinking is what leads to genuine knowledge: critical thinking is the basis of intellectual soundness. It is only an examined life that leads to ideal existence. Anyone who aligns himself with a thoughtless person will live a life of regret). 2. Ohun t’ó k’ojú síni, èhìn l’óko s’élòmí ì. (What has its face toward one observer, has its back to another). According to Oluwole, the first proverb, which is a cluster of proverbs, reflects both metaphysical and epistemological analysis by stressing the need for a critical examination of the ideas that inform our way of life. It emphasizes the importance of constructive criticism in intellectual endeavors and tells us that wisdom and knowledge are only possible after the removal and clarification of ambiguities and vagueness in human thought. To fail to clarify ambiguities and vagueness leads to the disappointment that comes with lack of knowledge. The conclusion here is that “intellectual integrity is inseparable from the thinker’s critical ability” (Oluwole, 1997, pp. 91–​92). The second proverb is a claim against monolithic objectivity. If the same object has its face toward one person but its back toward another, the possibility that both observers will have an identical experience of that object is limited. Because this implies relativity, Oluwole avers that the relativity here is not “between a moral judgment and an empirical one, since both observers are confronted by the same object” (p. 92). The proverb expresses the impossibility of absolute knowledge based on the premise that both observers experienced the same object from different standpoints. Divination is an epistemological practice closely associated with indigenous knowledge systems that “seeks to acquire knowledge that is otherwise unattainable because it is hidden” (Annus, 2015, p. 445). Laura Grillo’s (2005) definition captures its essence as an epistemological practice: “Divination is a technique used to determine the future and

24    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor to make pronouncements about it . . . [it] inquires about the significance of the present. Its aim is not prediction, but diagnosis” (p. 438). She further explains that people seek knowledge and truth through divination when they are experiencing a crisis, or when they perceive a nonconformity between what “is” and what “ought” to be. There are many divination systems with similar characterizations in African cultures. Our focus, however, is on that of Ifá, “the Yoruba deity of wisdom and intellectual development” (Nwosimiri, 2019, pp. 62–​63). Citing Omotade Adegbindin (2014), Ayo Fadahunsi and Adewale Owoseni (2016) posit that the Ifá divination system is characterized by “the pursuit of knowledge about truth, destiny, morality, social order and other virtues” (p. 49). Jacob Olupona (2005) describes Ifá as a significant main source of knowledge, cosmological ideas, and a belief system in Yoruba religion, culture, and society. It is a complex divination system that employs an extensive corpus of texts and mathematical formulas. In the Ifá oral text or literary corpus, “there are 16 basic and 256 derivate figures. The 256 derivative figures are divided into two parts, namely, the major categories known as Ojú Odù which are 16 in number and the minor categories known as Ọmọ Odù or Àmúlù Odù which are 240” (Adegbindin, 2010). In the complex process of Ifá divination (which space does not allow us to recount here), the casting of Ìkín, Òpęlè, and the analytic function of Ìbò enables the Babalawo (Ifá priest) to access Ifá’s epistemic assertions on issues. The Ìkín, Òpęlè, and Ìbò are among the paraphernalia of Ifá divination whose usage is specific and procedural. For the Yoruba, “Ifá is omniscient: it is a repository of unsurpassable knowledge and wisdom” (Taiwo, 2004, p. 305). Ifá is believed to know from several perspectives at the same time because it is not constrained by time and space; it transcends the cognitive capabilities of humans. Ovett Nwosimiri (2020) succinctly argues that the Yoruba consult Ifá because they believe that Ifá knows and can provide answers to their inquiries. The belief in the efficacy of Ifá’s knowledgeability and ability to proffer solutions to their problems rests on their “reflective awareness and cognitive access to their belief ” (p. 89). Both the individual who seeks knowledge and solutions from Ifá and the Babalawo who does the actual consultation with Ifá share the same belief in Ifá’s potency, though the Babalawo appears to hold a stronger belief and conviction by virtue of his or her role as an intermediary. What is significant about this for our study are “the reasonable grounds, cognitive access, and reflective awareness” of the individual who seeks Ifá’s assistance and the Babalawo who consults Ifá. This goes to show that the participants in Ifá divination have a rational basis for their beliefs, which is justified by their cognitive access to the beliefs. The foregoing indicates how African beliefs and cultural practices ground an Afrocentric engagement with reality. To talk about an Afrocentric engagement with reality is to suggest a unity or common characterization of the diversity of African cultures and, therefore, an African worldview. Yet the term worldview causes uneasiness for some because of its various connotations among different scholars and disciplines. At its most basic, a worldview is a set of beliefs that present the individual or society with a mental state of reality. It influences how the individual or society perceives, thinks, knows, and relates to the world. Thus we can understand a worldview as a cognitive orientation; it

The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices    25 consists of the individual’s or society’s knowledge and conception of reality (Bell, 2014; Pinxten, 2015). By “African worldview,” we mean the beliefs and assumptions by which Africans understand, conceptualize, and interpret reality, and even though we have a multiplex of cultures in Africa, they all share a similar worldview. According to J. E. Daniels: Afrocentric writers agree that the African community, regardless of divergent life experiences, has retained basic principles of the African value system to some degree, for example, the ideas of interconnectedness of all things; oneness of mind, body and spirit; collective identity as opposed to individual identity; consanguineous family structure; phenomenological time; and spirituality. (Daniels, 2001, as cited in Thabede, 2008, p. 238)

He identifies some of the enduring themes that characterize African culture, including cosmology, belief systems, epistemological systems, and the experience of colonization and domination by the European nations. These shared themes unify the African people despite their cultural diversity. The African valorizes the interconnectedness of beings, including human, nonhuman, animate, inanimate, and visible and invisible entities. The African thought system does not deny the uniqueness of the individual, but it does not prioritize individualism. Instead, it promotes a communal notion of the self. Furthermore, it is characterized by a profound spiritual, almost mystical, orientation. And though it does not deny the material, the spiritual takes precedence over the physical. There is no strict distinction between matter and spirit because they constitute a continuum in a connected categorization of being (Agulanna & Osimiri, 2017). Consequently, African sociological knowledge has its foundations in an interconnected notion of reality wherein the physical, metaphysical, and spiritual are experienced as causally related. As such, reality extends beyond the empirical world of space and time. Knowledge for the African is a social web that involves the spiritual and the physical (Hamminga, 2005); it is an experiential knowledge grounded in a cultural worldview that is relational. In other words, it relies on the immaterial and spiritual aspects of reality in interpreting lived experiences. Hence, we refer to it here as African communitarian epistemology (ACE). ACE is a critical, coherent, and systematic assemblage of African sociological knowledge. It is the indigenous ways in which Sub-​Saharan Africans acquire, retain, and transmit knowledge. These include proverbs and divination, which provide a meaningful and rational basis to guide the life of the natives of a particular place. The term indigenous has no officially adopted definition because of the complexities surrounding its use and the diversity of indigenous peoples. As used here, indigenous refers to the natural belongingness that characterizes the African continent despite the multiplicity of cultures and of native peoples without common ancestry. The emphasis in ACE is on the dialectics, cooperation, and togetherness that constitute knowledge derivation. Knowledge itself is derived from a chain relationship wherein the cognition of any aspect of reality is intrinsically linked to and with other aspects of reality (Jimoh,

26    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor 2018). It is a holistic and integrative grasp of reality in a unitary universe. According to Ndubuisi Ani (2013), it entails the intuitive, religious, and mythological. The intuitive aspect comprises all the faculties of the cognitive agent. The religious aspect consists of the agent’s epistemic experiences facilitated by a religious prism that enables the agent to make sense of her existence (Ellis & Haar, 2007). The mythological aspect refers to the use of myths as verbal and gestural signs to explain fundamental problems and express profound issues that are beyond the rational comprehension of the human mind (Gyekye, 1987). Therefore, knowledge is perceptual, inferential, holistic, extrasensory (mystical), premonitive, ontological, and oral (Uduigwomen, 1995). Knowledge is constituted in the intercourse between the cognitive agent and the object of cognition that occurs in the agent’s interaction with others, the community, and the environment. As Anselm Jimoh and Peace Jemibor (2020) explain: Africans believe in the independent existence of a contingent world, which they come to know through the mind’s association with the objects in the world. The latter impose themselves, through the windows of the human senses, upon the human mind. The mind assimilates, frames, conceptualizes and interprets these objects in accordance with its own categories, which are informed by subjective and empirical (a posteriori) factors like culture, environment, experience, etc. (pp. 16–​17)

The African is a being in harmony with reality; thus, Africans make sense of (interpret) phenomena within the framework of the mind. “Being in harmony with reality” describes the African ontology of communality or unitiveness of existence. This is different from Bronislaw Malinowski’s (2018) idea of “the noble savage” as an idealized concept of the uncivilized man. Being in harmony here refers to the unity of the individual and the world, such that the individuals do not consider themselves to be a separate reality from the world. Molefe Asante (2000) argues that someone educated and influenced by the linearity in the Western notion of reality would not easily comprehend this because such a person would be stuck in an empiricism that depends solely on the operation of the senses. In African thought, the human person is conceived as an entity that is constituted by the mutual relations between the self and others and the visible and invisible, as well as the human and the spirit. This ontology of communality explains why the African approaches the universe, the environment, society, and the divine with a sense of commonality. The communitarian character of African epistemology is grounded in the African belief in the existence of spiritual entities that are part of the living world because of their participation in shaping human events. Because they are not limited by time and space, they are considered to be in a better position to determine and influence human events (Mawere, 2011). Consequently, knowledge is not solely derived from an individual’s rational endeavors; it is also a “given” from the world beyond human natural experience. The latter is part of the rational basis for the Yoruba belief in Ifá divination as a medium of genuine knowledge. It also explains why intuition is a viable part of reason in the African cognitive experience. The subject and object of cognition enter an organic and

The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices    27 dynamic relationship where intense perception through the senses culminates in the conscious apprehension of reality. Thus, the cognitive agent and the object of cognition are mutually inclusive rather than exclusive; they are both aspects and parts of a reality that is conceived as a single whole in which each aspect is meaningful in relation to the other aspects. This analysis shows that the epistemological importance of African sociology is in the epistemic implication of the connection between the spiritual and the physical, on the one hand, and among the physical entities themselves, on the other. Although classical Western epistemology tends to discount the epistemic importance and implications of sociocultural factors in knowledge inquiry, it is a fact that all forms of human knowledge are susceptible to them. Since sociocultural factors have implications for how we formulate and establish our beliefs, the truth and justification of beliefs arising from different sociocultural backgrounds cannot be evaluated by a single system of knowledge. The tendency to objectify and present Western epistemology as an evaluative paradigm for other knowledge systems is therefore unjustified. We cannot universalize one form of knowledge and constitute it as a paradigm for epistemic evaluation. To allow this is to engage in the coloniality of power and the epistemicide of other forms of knowledge.

Coloniality of Power and the Epistemicide of Indigenous Forms of Knowledge The term coloniality of power describes the interrelation between the practices and legacies of European colonialism within social orders and forms of knowledge. According to Aníbal Quijano (2007), in the structure of colonialism, the colonizers considered those they colonized inferior because of their different phenotypic traits. Thus, the colonizers imposed their own cultures and practices on the colonized, privileging the Western form of knowledge over indigenous forms of knowledge (Ndlovu-​ Gatsheni, 2013). The colonizers assumed hegemony over the colonized, placing them in a mental and psychological predicament, and bequeathing to them a colonial mentality. Colonial mentality refers to the mental constructs of personal feelings or beliefs of ethnic or cultural inferiority in the colonized. Ustey et al. (2015) argue that the colonial mentality left indelible scars on the psyches of many Africans, who have suffered both psychological subjugation and the devaluation of their cultures. The subjugation of indigenous knowledge systems paved way for epistemicide—​the killing of other knowledge systems (Hall & Tandon, 2017)—​which has devastating and far-​reaching consequences. Epistemicide is a form of cognitive injustice whereby the different ways of knowing that enable people across the globe to make meaning of their existence and guide their lives are not recognized (Santos, 2014). The lack of recognition and tendency of Western colonizers to subjugate indigenous knowledge systems made

28    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor the Western knowledge system more appealing to many Africans. This created a new mind frame in these Africans that the epistemological structures of the colonial powers were superior and more valid. Achille Mbembe’s (2017) Critique of Black Reason drives home this fact. He weaves together the effects of slavery, colonialism, and apartheid, using the term “Black reason,” in the title to elucidate how these experiences shape the way Africans view themselves. He describes Black reason as a collection of discourses and practices that include forms of knowledge, among other things, and avers that the Black or African idea of reason differs from the Western idea of reason, given that both are products of geographies (Europe and Africa) and experiences. Mbembe argues that contact between the Western and African worlds produced two narratives—​a Western consciousness of blackness and a Black consciousness of blackness. The former denies Blacks freedom and the light of reason because it does not consider them to be full human beings on a par with others. Thus, Blacks are not supposed to have rights and values since they lack reason, which is a generic characteristic and universal essence of humans; as such, Blacks are considered to be incapable of pure forms of knowledge. On the other hand, the Black consciousness of blackness calls to mind the obscurity of the color black and characterizes Blacks as locked-​in victims who, though they are aware of their situation, lack the power to express their thoughts and feelings due to the psychological subjugation arising from being Black in a world mostly conditioned by Western ideology. In such a world, Black reason makes sense only when it has “washed itself with the soap of white reason”—​that is, when it adopts Western practices. Mbembe’s analysis provides an insight into why many Africans became suspicious of, and gradually began to despise, their indigenous knowledge practices. This created inroads allowing Western knowledge paradigms to infiltrate African scholarship, which became replete with intellectual mimetism. This has led to continental crises of identity, legitimacy, relevance, authority, epistemology, politics, and history. Johannes Seroto (2011) has argued that education in precolonial Africa “took place through the socialization process which had to do with the acquisition of cultural norms, values and beliefs, and rules of interacting with others” (p. 79). The socialization process begins in the family context with the central concern of teaching the African child the appropriate way to think, act, and feel. There was a two-​tier education process: the informal transmission of knowledge to children and youth by parents and the elders in the society, and the formal transmission of knowledge through initiation rites and by apprenticeship and craftsmen. In this way, children and entrants learned the culture, values, knowledge, and practices of their communities. Knowledge was passed from one generation to the next via customs, laws, and tribal institutions and through proverbs, myths, music, the arts, and folklore, which were carefully preserved and told repeatedly. If education is a process of propagating knowledge and transmitting culture for continuity and growth to ensure social or rational control (or both) of society, one cannot justifiably argue that the precolonial African forms of education were ineffective and unproductive (Ezeanya-​Esiobu, 2019). But one can argue that colonization did not introduce education to Africa. What colonization did was to introduce a new form of formal

The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices    29 education through educational institutions, which partly supplemented and partly replaced existing African forms of education. Colonialism restructured African scholarship to reflect and perpetuate Western forms of knowledge; it made Western scientific standards synonymous with knowledge. Sadly, most of the literature by scholars with a Western orientation has made a substantial contribution to the epistemic silencing of indigenous knowledge in Africa. In addition to reinforcing cognitive injustice, this epistemic silencing, or epistemicide, decontextualizes African sociological knowledge. To reverse the cognitive injustice of epistemicide, there is the need for a knowledge democracy that accounts for the pluralistic sociocultural diversity of the world. Such a knowledge democracy would accommodate fluidity in knowledge inquiry, and it would ensure genuine philosophical dialectics and the interaction of knowledge systems. In a knowledge democracy, different knowledge systems would have equal space to contribute to epistemic discourse.

African Sociological Knowledge in the Global Epistemological Space Knowledge democracy would create a space for African sociological knowledge in the global epistemological space, which has been hitherto colonized by the dominant Western epistemic system. Because it recognizes the importance of multiple knowledge systems, knowledge democracy provides an opportunity to share knowledge from different epistemological perspectives, without marginalizing any particular knowledge system. Thus, the “organic, spiritual and land-​based systems; frameworks arising from social movements; and the knowledge of the marginalized or excluded” would become relevant in the consideration of what knowledge is (Hall & Tandon, 2017, p. 6). Because it is a transdisciplinary discourse, knowledge democracy is against intellectual colonialism and epistemicide; it gives both dominant and nondominant actors in the field of epistemic research equal space and opportunities to contribute to epistemic discourse. Among other things, knowledge democracy involves the accommodation of multiple epistemologies and the affirmation of multiple forms of knowledge derivation and representation (Rowell & Feldman, 2019). Championed by social epistemology, the shift from understanding knowledge as the representational product of the mind’s activity to understanding it as a product of social interaction provides the required space for every form of knowledge. To justify this shift, Alvin Goldman (1999) argues that “epistemic access . . . is not the same for all peoples at all times” (p. 8); as a perceptual and inferential function, it varies from time to time and person to person, just as circumstances vary. Classical Western epistemology ignored this fact and refused to acknowledge situated reality and the plurality of knowledge forms in order to universalize its knowledge culture. The universalization of one knowledge culture does not illuminate human understanding; it distorts it and prevents

30    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor holistic and genuine epistemic success. To achieve the latter, epistemological inquiry must recognize and relate to the diversity of relevant variables that influence the process of knowing, such as cognitive agents, sociocultural and environmental conditions, gender relations, epochal factors, and the goals of knowledge. Since the early part of this century, contemporary approaches in most disciplines have been returning to sociological systems and reintroducing them into the global discourse. There has been a recognition that the visible progress of the human race brought about by the westernization of the world has had some detrimental effects on the well-​ being of the world’s supportive sociocultural systems. It is in this way that the idea of recognizing the contributions of African sociological knowledge practices in global epistemological discourse is justified. As Paul Feyerabend (2010) claimed, it is naive to have a fixed method or theory of rationality: [W]‌e must stop the scientist from taking over education and from teaching as “fact” and as “the one true method” whatever the myth of the day happens to be . . . such change in education as a result, in perspective, will remove a great deal of intellectual pollution rationalists deplore. The change of perspective, makes it clear that there are many ways of ordering the world that surrounds us, that the hated constraints of one set of standards may be broken by freely accepting standards of a different kind. (p. 162)

He argues further that we can only defend the principle of “anything goes” if we must avoid the danger of universalizing one particular epistemic culture. By “anything goes” he is not suggesting that we embrace a relativistic approach to epistemic research; rather, he is emphasizing that every epistemic culture is plausible in its own right, and applicable where fitting. The implication here is that no knowledge culture can or should make exclusive claims about truth or to be superior to another knowledge culture. Within a specific knowledge culture or tradition, all knowledge is, at best, approximate to the truth. The need for epistemological pluralism or polycentric epistemology—​different ways and approaches to knowledge inquiry, which would enable the respectful interaction between different forms of knowledge—​is therefore clear. To this end, one can appreciate the 2007 United Nations Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which affirms that a transcultural search for genuine knowledge, which implies the acceptance of indigenous knowledge systems, would provide indigenous peoples with a right to their own knowledge. Thus they can revitalize, use, develop, and transmit their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems, and literature to future generations. This would further enable them to exercise the “right to maintain, control, protect, and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions, as well as [manifest their own] science, technologies and cultures” (United Nations, 2007, pp. 13–​14). This epistemological pluralism would enable practitioners of both “truth-​centered” and “way-​centered” epistemologies (Horsthemke, 2016, p. 1) to understand that the

The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices    31 two approaches are not mutually exclusive. The “truth-​centered” approach to knowledge, which is associated with Western epistemology, makes truth the cognitive goal of inquiry and considers knowledge, in the classical sense, to be justified true belief. The “way-​centered” approach, which is associated with indigenous knowledge systems, such as African ones, considers knowledge to be the holistic and integrative understanding of phenomena. The way-​centered approach is “concerned with identifying the proper path or appropriate models of conduct that will enable humans to live the kind of lives suitable for human beings” (Hall & Ames, 1998, p. 57). For scholars sympathetic to Western epistemology, this implies that the way-​centered approach is not concerned with truth, true belief, and truthful representation and is therefore opposed to the truth-​centered approach. For example, James Maffie (2009) argued that the approach to knowledge of many (if not most) indigenous knowledge systems does not consider the issue of correspondence to the truth but, rather, “consists of living harmoniously with one’s surroundings. [The aim is to attain] authenticity, genuineness, rectitude and wholeness—​not knowledge defined as justified true belief ” (p. 57). Henry Rosemont et al. (2014) argued that knowledge traditions outside the Anglo-​European mainstream “draw on an integrated view of thinking, feeling, and living a human life. For their practitioners, truth is less a correspondence with a given reality. In fact, it enables human beings to strike the right path in living good, social lives” (p. 150). From the Western perspective, the way-​centered approach only makes sense in relation to knowing how—​that is, practical knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance. In relation to theoretical or propositional knowledge (knowing that), where belief, evidence, and truth are the goals of cognitive research, the way-​centered approach leads to relativism and superstition. This view presupposes that the way-​centered approach de-​ emphasizes the concepts of belief, evidence, and truth that are central to knowledge, and thus it and the truth-​centered approach are mutually exclusive. However, this is not true because to identify appropriate models of conduct, one must hold some justified beliefs about appropriateness. Horsthemke (2016) argues that [the] identification of the “proper (or right) path,” etc., will almost certainly involve some beliefs about appropriateness and correctness of this identification. Surely, there must be beliefs about which paths are “improper,” “wrong” or which models are “inappropriate” and what counts as “correct” identification of proper paths and appropriate models. One can quite coherently aim both for “a life of authenticity, genuineness, rectitude and wholeness” and “knowledge defined as justified true belief.” The two are not mutually exclusive. (pp. 8–​9)

The essence of evidence is to provide justification for the truth of our beliefs, and we need true beliefs to contribute and ensure appropriate ways of conduct. Beliefs are maps that enable humans to understand and navigate reality. According to Horsthemke, “While propositional and practical knowledge are clearly distinct, and one does not collapse into the other, they are considerably more intimately connected than [many truth-​centered oriented practitioners] are willing to acknowledge” (2016, p. 9). He

32    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor maintains that “one cannot hold views about how one ought to live, and what one ought to practice, without holding justified and true beliefs about the utility, appropriateness, and sustainability of one’s practices and life. The point of this analysis is to establish that the so-​called Western scientific epistemology and ACE are not mutually exclusive. This provides the basis for the advocacy of a polycentric epistemology. A polycentric epistemology projects into a future where many knowledges would coexist (Mignolo, 2011) because of the interactions of different forms of knowledge. It recognizes that every knowledge culture has something to contribute to human understanding because each provides an entry point into the complexities of reality. While it is true that different knowledge cultures may have different methodological approaches, and even different goals, essentially, they are all engaged in the same project—​to attain a clearer and genuine understanding of the world (Alem, 2019). Polycentricity is, therefore, a better approach to knowledge research because it enriches our knowledge of reality. A polycentric epistemology requires an indigenous decolonial thought and a decolonial methodology to build a conceptualization and theoretical framework for unde1rstanding indigenous knowledge. Decolonial thought entails the theoretical deconstructions of colonial structures and proposes alternatives to them by sometimes appealing to the precolonial. It is a commitment to untangle knowledge from a Eurocentric episteme (Quijano, 2007) by adopting “a truly universal outlook which looks . . . at how ideas are always arrived at from a variety of sources” (Lentin, 2021, p. 9). A decolonial methodology “seeks to recover the lost identities of colonized people by championing self-​determination, empowerment, decolonization, and social justice” (Dorpenyo, 2020, p. 53). Indigenous decolonial thought and methodology require the deconstruction of the unhealthy false European descriptions and narratives of indigenous peoples, their cultures, ontological worldviews, epistemologies, and philosophies. These are to be replaced with the view of the African from the perspective of African lived experience. In this way, Bagele Chilisa (2012) insists, we will be able to rediscover and recover the African heritage and correctly represent the silenced voices and ideas so that they can be heard, engaged, and interrogated. A notable effort in this direction is found in Asante’s (1988) Afrocentricity. Afrocentricity is a cultural theory committed to reclaiming ancient African classical civilizations as the place for integrity and understanding the history of African peoples, narratives, myths, spirituality, and cosmogonies. It conveys the African peoples’ sense of the world and their existence and provides an epistemological framework for dealing with social and cultural manifestations, from a cultural-​aesthetic, social-​behavioral, or even a political-​functional perspective, in the search for the foundations of the African identity. It is committed to liberating Africans from the restraints of Eurocentrism so that they can see themselves as key players rather than victims in the study of ideas and events. It emphasizes the African epistemological relevance. Afrocentricity creates awareness and expands the epistemological horizon for African scholars. It challenges African researchers to provide an epistemology founded on the African worldview rather than forge fake knowledge by creating African approximations of Western

The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices    33 specifications. The idea is to decentralize powers around the right to knowledge for all communities. The dominance and growing overreliance on Western research methodology and epistemology, and the internationalization of academic collaboration that purports to provide exposure to African scholars, exposes knowledge research to the danger of a “monoculture of the mind.” This is a colonization of the senses, such that they are unable to open up to other sociocultural worldviews and epistemologies, consequently impeding the diversification of knowledge. The idea that dominant ideologies, theories, and methodologies of scholarship picked up generally from a conglomerate of Western fields are the standard defining authentic academic scholarship is representative of a monoculture of the mind. It is counterproductive to polycentric epistemology and perpetuates intellectual colonization and the epistemicide of other forms of knowledge. Hence there is a need for the decentralization of powers in knowledge inquiry. To decentralize the powers around the creation of new forms of knowledge is key to a renewed and reinvigorated epistemological inquiry. This is not an invitation to relativism; rather, it is a call to acknowledge the diversity in epistemic cultures and embrace cross-​cultural epistemological interaction. Nor does it necessarily imply that knowledge cultures should be merged or mixed; instead, it is an invitation for knowledge cultures to enrich one another when and where possible, while each retains its unity and totality. This implies breaking out of the circle of epistemological paradigms created by the limits of a single knowledge culture, as it will bring different human horizons, traditions, and cultures into contact with one another, each mindful of its cultural differences and valid particularity, but also cognizant of the equal validity of others within their various contexts and culture.

Conclusion The motivation for this study is the realization that no particular knowledge culture can provide all that we can know about reality. The study has reviewed African sociological knowledge to show that Africa is a repository of knowledge resources, which until recent decades had been silenced through a systematic cognitive injustice—​epistemicide. It argues that, as an alternative and indigenous form of knowledge, the legitimacy of African sociological knowledge should be recognized and respected, and that its claims and methods should not be subjected to validation by Western or Euromerican paradigms of epistemological evaluation. On the premise that no knowledge culture has a bird’s-​eye view and therefore a complete understanding of reality, the study calls for epistemological pluralism or polycentric epistemology. This is to engender an integral and comprehensive understanding of reality. Therefore, the chapter concludes that a knowledge democracy that would acknowledge, accommodate and respect the different approaches to knowledge is not only desirable but imperative for epistemological inquiry.

34    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor

Acronym ACE

African communitarian epistemology

References Adegbindin, O. (2010). Ifá and the consequences of literacy: A philosophical analysis. Lumina, 21, 1–​23. https://​ejourn​als.ph/​arti​cle.php?id=​7311 Adegbindin, O. (2014). Ifá in Yoruba thought System. Carolina Academic Press. Agulanna, C., & Osimiri, P. (2017). African worldview and the question of democratic substance. In I. E. Ukpokolo (Ed.), Themes, issues and problems in African philosophy (pp. 333–​ 349). Palgrave Macmillan. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​40796-​8_​22 Alem, A. (2019). African systems of thought: Whether they fit scientific knowledge. Journal of Philosophy and Culture, 7, 14–​25. https://​doi.org/​10.5897/​JPC2​018.0024 Ani, N. (2013). Appraisal of African epistemology in the global system. Alternation, 20, 295–​319. Annus, A. (2015). Divination. In R. A. Segal & S. von Kocku (Eds.), Vocabulary for the study of religion (pp. 445–​450). Brill. Asante, M. K. (1988). Afrocentricity (Rev. ed.). Africa World Press. Asante, M. K. (2000). The Egyptian philosophers: Ancient African voices from Imhotep to Akhenaten. African American Images. Bell, K. (2014). Worldview. In K. Bell (Ed.), Open education sociology dictionary. Accessed October 18, 2021. https://​soci​olog​ydic​tion​ary.org/​worldv​iew/​. Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. Penguin. Chilisa, B. (2012). Indigenous research methodologies. SAGE Publications. Cohen, D. W. (1989). The undefining of oral tradition. Ethnohistory, 36, 9–​18. https://​doi.org/​ 10.2307/​482​738 Daniels, J. E. (2001). Africentric social work practice. International Social Work, 44, 301–​309. Dorpenyo, I. K. (2020). User localization strategies in the face of technological breakdown. Palgrave Macmillan. Dzobo, N. K. (1992). African symbols and proverbs as source if knowledge and truth. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies (pp. 89–​100). Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Ellis, S., & Haar, G. (2007). Religion and politics: Taking African epistemology seriously. Journal of Modern African Studies, 45, 385–​401. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00222​78X0​7002​674 Ezeanya-​Esiobu, C. (2019). Indigenous knowledge and education in Africa. Springer. https://​ doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​981-​13-​6635-​2 Fadahunsi, A., & Owoseni, A. (2016). A philosophical reflection on some key issues in Yoruba knowledge system. Caribbean Journal of Philosophy, 8, 47–​63. Feyerabend, P. (2010). Against method (4th ed.). Verso. Fuller, S. (2014). The knowledge book: Key concepts in philosophy, science and culture. Routledge. Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Clarendon University Press. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1093/​019​8238​207.001.0001 Grillo, L. S. (2005). Trajectories in African ethics. In W. Schweiker (Ed.), The Blackwell companion to religious ethics (pp. 438–​447). Blackwell.

The Epistemology of African Sociological Knowledge Practices    35 Gyekye, K. (1987). An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Cambridge University Press. Hall, B. L., & Tandon, R. (2017). Decolonization of knowledge, epistemicide, participatory research and higher education. Research for All, 1, 6–​19. https://​doi.org/​10.18546/​RFA.01.1.02 Hall, D., & Ames, R. (1998). Thinking from the Han: Self, truth and transcendence in Chinese and Western culture. State University of New York Press. Hamminga, B. (2005). Epistemology from the African point of view. In B. Hamminga (Ed.), Knowledge cultures: Comparative Western and African epistemology (pp. 57–​84). Rodopi. Horsthemke, K. (2016). Way-​ centered versus truth-​ centered epistemologies. Education Sciences, 6, 1–​11. https://​doi.org/​10.3390/​edu​csci​6010​008 Hountondji, P. (1976). African philosophy: Myth and reality. Indiana University Press. Ikuenobe, P. (2018). Oral tradition, epistemic dependence, and knowledge in African cultures. Synthesis Philosophica, 65, 23–​40. https://​doi.org/​10.21464/​sp33​102 Isidienu, I. C. (2016). Philosophy of Igbo proverbs: The logic, ethics and esthetics in Igbo culture. Journal of Religion and Human Relations, 8, 69–​83. Jimoh, A. K. (2018). Reconstructing a fractured indigenous knowledge system. Synthesis Philosophica, 65, 5–​22. https://​doi.org/​10.21464/​sp33​101 Jimoh, A. K., & Jemibor, P. O. (2020). Knowledge derivation in Thomistic and African communitarian epistemologies. WAJOPS: West African Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20, 1–​26. Kanu, I. A. (2014). African philosophy and the problem of methodology. International Journal of Scientific Research, 3, 66–​68. Kanu, I. A. (2015). A hermeneutic approach to African traditional religion, theology and philosophy. Fab Anieh. Lentin, A. (2021). Decolonial thought: A lecture for the Institute of Culture and Society Key Thinkers and Concepts series. https://​www.alan​alen​tin.net/​2021/​07/​05/​dec​olon​ial-​thou​ ght-​a-​lect​ure-​for-​the-​instit​ute-​for-​cult​ure-​and-​soci​ety-​key-​think​ers-​conce​pts-​ser​ies/​ Maffie, J. (2009). In the end, we have the gatling gun, and they have not: Future prospects of indigenous knowledges. Futures, 41, 53–​65. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.futu​res.2008.07.008 Malinowski, B. (2018). Argonauts of the Western Pacific. Ubu Editora. Mawere, M. (2011). African beliefs and knowledge systems: A critical perspective. Langaa RPCIG. Mbembe, A. (2017). Critique of Black reason (L. Dubois, Trans.). Duke University Press. Mignolo, W. D. (2011). The darker side of Western modernity: Global futures, decolonial options. Duke University Press. Momoh, C. S. (2000). Philosophy in African proverbs. In C. S. Momoh (Ed.), The substance of African philosophy (2nd ed., pp. 359–​376). African Philosophy Projects’ Publication. Ndlovu-​ Gatsheni, J. S. (2013). Empire, global coloniality and African subjectivity. Berghahn Books. Nwosimiri, O. K. (2019). Epistemology in African philosophy: A critique of African concepts of knowledge [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of KwaZulu-​Natal. Nwosimiri, O. K. (2020). Ifá divination system as an embodiment of both the internalist and externalist bases of justification in African epistemology. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 9, 79–​96. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​ft.v9i1.6 Offor, F. (2012). Essentials of logic. Book Wright Publishers. Olupona, J. (2005). Divination: Ifa divination. Encyclopedia.com. https://​www.encyc​lope​ dia.com/​envi​ronm​ent/​encycl​oped​ias-​alman​acs-​tran​scri​pts-​and-​maps/​div​inat​ion-​ifa-​div​ inat​ion. Oluwole, S. B. (1997). Philosophy and oral tradition. ARK Publications.

36    Anselm K. Jimoh, Moses M. Akpoughul-Abunya, and Peace O. Jemibor Pinxten, R. (2015). Worldview. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), International encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences (2nd ed., pp. 753–​757). Elsevier. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​B978-​0-​08-​097​ 086-​8.12228-​7 Quijano, A. (2007). Coloniality and modernity/​rationality. Cultural Studies, 21, 168–​178. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​095023​8060​1164​353 Rosemont, H., Jr., Maffie, J., Maraldo, J., & Thachoe, S. (2014). Symposium: Does the concept of “truth” have value in the pursuit of cross-​cultural philosophy? Confluence, 1, 149–​217. https://​ schol​arwo​rks.iu.edu/​iupj​ourn​als/​index.php/​con​flue​nce/​arti​cle/​view/​518/​26 Rowell, L., & Feldman, A. (2019). Knowledge democracy and action research. Educational Action Research, 27, 1–​6. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09650​792.2019.1557​456 Santos, B. de S. (2014). Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide. Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978131​5634​876 Seroto, J. (2011). Indigenous education during the pre-​colonial period in Southern Africa. Indilinga: African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems, 10, 77–​88. Taiwo, O. (2004). Ifá: An account of a divination system and some concluding epistemological questions. In K Wiredu (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 304–​312). Blackwell. Thabede, D. (2008). The African worldview as the basis of practice in the helping professions. Social Work /​Maataskaplike Werk, 44, 233–​245. https://​doi.org/​10.15270/​44-​3-​237 Uduigwomen, A. F. (1995). Footmarks on African philosophy. Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers. United Nations. (2007, September 13). United Nation’s Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (61/​295). https://​www.un.org/​deve​lopm​ent/​desa/​indige​nous​peop​les/​decl​arat​ion​ -on-​the-​rig​hts-​of-​ind​igen​ous-​peop​les.html Utsey, S. O., Abrams, J. A., Opare-​Henaku, A., Bolden, M. A., & Williams, O. (2015). Assessing the psychological consequences of internalized colonialism on the psychological well-​being of young adults in Ghana. Journal of Black Psychology, 41, 195–​220. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 00957​9841​4537​935

Chapter 3

De c ol onizing S o c i ol o g y in Afri c a Insights from Zimbabwe and South Africa Simbarashe Gukurume

Introduction The call for the decolonization of sociology is not new. Scholars like Mamdani (2016) have noted that African people have historically fought for political, economic, and epistemic decolonization. This dates back to the late 1950s, at the height of the liberation struggle for independence, when efforts were made to decolonize both universities and Eurocentric disciplines like sociology in Africa and beyond. The calls to decolonize became more vigorous from 1950 to 1970, a period that coincided with the emerging spirit of nationalism that was sweeping across the continent. In Latin America, decolonial discourses transformed from a political locus to a more intellectual and epistemological one in the 1980s. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2018) echoed this when he noted that the first wave of decolonization largely targeted the “physical empire,” whereas the second wave of decolonization targeted the “metaphysical empire.” However, decolonization in Zimbabwean and South African tertiary institutions, in general, and sociology, in particular, was slow. If the debates on decolonization have a long history, the practical processes of decolonization have remained elusive for many years. Consequently, the past few years have seen renewed vigor and demands for decolonization, triggered by student protests in South Africa demanding free and decolonized education (Maringira & Gukurume, 2021). This chapter contributes to the growing body of work on decolonization by examining the ways in which some universities in Zimbabwe and South Africa are trying to achieve it. Scholars have argued that the need to decolonize sociology is particularly pertinent given the field’s Eurocentric, ethnocentric, and androcentric nature (Connell, 2018; Gukurume & Maringira, 2020). The discipline of sociology was born, along

38   Simbarashe Gukurume with European and American imperialism, in Western European thought, which was premised on the epistemicide of knowledge(s) from around the world (Hunter, 2015). Hunter (2015) asserted that when sociology came to colonized countries like Zimbabwe and South Africa as a colonial import, it remained anchored in colonial epistemological and ontological foundations, and resulted in multiple forms of negations and epistemicides (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2018). There is today a burgeoning body of work on the decolonization of universities, curriculum, and knowledge, but much of this research does not give voice to or provide a detailed analysis of the practical ways in which this is being done. There is also emergent scholarship on the decolonization of sociology. Much of what we know reflects top-​down approaches that hardly capture the perceptions and experiences of academics and students pertaining to the politics of decolonization. The chapter adopts a holistic understanding of decolonization, which includes both curriculum and pedagogical transformations at South African and Zimbabwean universities. Decolonization in Africa is not new. It has a history that dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. For many scholars, this earlier form of decolonization was mainly concerned with the politicojudicial freedom of autochthonous people and spaces (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2012), and it has been associated with a call for the political liberation of African people and political systems from centuries of racial segregation, discriminatory colonial rule, and domination. Critics view this form of decolonization as incomplete, given that the White monopoly in economic, intellectual, and other strategic sectors remained intact. Similarly, epistemic freedom and the decolonization of knowledge production and the institutions of knowledge production figured less prominently during this first phase. The university as a colonial project and other inherited colonial systems of oppression persisted into the postcolonial epoch. These inherited colonial structures, including the universities, kept alive the colonial matrices of power, which some scholars have referred to as the “coloniality of power” (Quijano, 2007). For Quijano (2007) the coloniality of power accentuated by African universities relates to “the invisible matrices or colonial matrices of power that involve the control of subjectivity and epistemology . . . authority and power, labour, religion and the economy as well as other socio-​political aspects of human existence for the benefit of the western world and its predominantly white citizens” (p. 155). The chapter is divided into six sections. The first, “Methodology,” explains the techniques and methods of data collection from sociology academics and students in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The second, “Sociology in Zimbabwe and South Africa” discusses the historical development of sociology in South Africa and Zimbabwe and shows how its evolution was linked to empire formation, colonialism, and apartheid. This history sets the scene for our understanding of the ongoing controversies around the discipline in the two countries and in Africa more broadly. The third section, “Decolonization of Universities and Knowledge,” elaborates on the concept of decolonization, showing why it is particularly pertinent to the discipline of sociology, which emerged from Eurocentric modernity. The subsection “Decolonizing Sociology in Zimbabwe” examines the perceptions of Zimbabwean academics and students on the

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    39 decolonization of sociology and the ways in which they are trying to decolonize the discipline. This is followed by the subsection “Decolonizing Sociology in South Africa,” which discusses the perceptions of South African academics and students on the decolonization of sociology and how it is being transformed. This section is then followed by the conclusion which foregrounds the argument of the chapter.

Methodology Qualitative ethnographic research was conducted in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The study seeks to understand the everyday experiences of students and academics and their perceptions on the decolonization of sociology. I selected two universities in Zimbabwe and two universities in South Africa to study because I spent several years in these four spaces as both a student and a sociology lecturer. Thus the data used in this chapter can also be viewed as auto-​ethnographic. I also draw on my personal experiences and critical reflections on my own teaching methods and the transformation of curriculum over the years. I conducted in-​depth interviews and informal conversations with academics and students at the four universities, augmented these with semistructured interviews with sociologists from four other universities in South Africa, and used secondary sources of data. Secondary sources included course outlines from universities that offer sociology as a subject, as well as published articles and newspaper reports on decolonization. Thirty-​five course outlines and guides to such courses as Introduction to Sociology, the History of Sociological Thought, the Sociology of Development, and Social Theory were collected and analyzed to gain an understanding of the content being taught and prioritized in these courses. Course outlines and guides are particularly enlightening when trying to reconcile what sociologists say they teach and what they actually do teach. The in-​depth interviews were conducted with 50 participants (30 in Zimbabwe and 20 in South Africa), who were purposively sampled. In addition, ten key informant interviews were conducted at the four departments (two departments of sociology, one department of social sciences, although focus was on the sociology subject area, and the last was the department of sociology and social anthropology) in question.

Sociology in Zimbabwe and South Africa Sociology has a long history in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, having initially been established in the 1900s as practical social science dealing with the problems confronting both the Black natives and the White poor (Groenewald, 1989; Jubber, 2007). In South

40   Simbarashe Gukurume Africa, sociology was established as an academic discipline around the 1930s (Jubber, 2007); in Zimbabwe the first sociology department was established around 1955, at the inception of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (UCRN; (Gelfand, 1978; Gukurume, 2018). As Groenewald (1989) noted, the eventual formal institutionalization of sociology was spearheaded by the South African Association for the Advancement of Science. According to Azari and Sitas (2017), before sociology was the formally established as an academic discipline in South Africa, sociological thought and social thinking were mediated and informed by jurists, missionaries, and commissioners, among others. In 1919, the first sociology course was introduced at the University of South Africa. The intensification of poverty among White people and skyrocketing social problems had engendered the mining revolution, industrialization, and the attendant urbanization, which increased the practical value of sociology and the social sciences in general. This coalesced into the establishment of departments of sociology in at the Universities of Pretoria (1931), Stellenbosch (1932), Cape Town (1934), Witwatersrand (1937), Potchefstroom (1937), Natal (1937), and the Orange Free State (1939) (Jubber, 2007). They were all led by White professors who had been trained in Europe, including Hendrik Verwoerd and Geoffrey Cronjé, at Stellenbosch University and University of Pretoria, respectively. Edward Batson at the University of Cape Town and John Gray at the University of Witwatersrand had trained at the University of London and the University of Edinburgh, respectively (Jubber, 2007). They established a sociology discipline with a European flavor and bias. Nwabueze (2020) asserts that it is a form of “received Sociology” characterized by adapting and domesticating Eurocentric sociology in African universities. For Nwabueze, “received Sociology” was part of a repertoire of strategies used by the colonial powers to consolidate Europeans’ gains from the Scramble for Africa. Universities in both Zimbabwe and South Africa were established by colonial regimes and, as noted, staffed by professors trained in Europe. Alatas (2000) has noted that local academics trained in Europe who tend to reproduce the epistemic hegemony of Western epistemes represent a “captive mind.” With captive minds, universities have continued to advance Eurocentric epistemologies, at the expense of non-​Western and Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies (Dawson, 2020; Nyamnjoh, 2020). Disciplines like sociology thus emerged during the colonial era to serve the interests of colonial administrations and contributed to the subjugation of the natives (Jubber, 2007). For instance, in South Africa, the pioneering sociologist Hendrik Verwoerd, a professor at Stellenbosch University, doubled as a politician, prime minister, and an advocate of apartheid (Azari & Sitas, 2017; Verwoerd, 1961). According to Jubber (2007), Verwoerd tarnished the image of sociology through his role in cementing the apartheid regime and intensifying the exploitation of Black people. Verwoerd’s colleague Geoffrey Cronjé, based at the University of Pretoria, also supported the apartheid regime. Critics argued that by promulgating total theoretical support for apartheid, Cronjé’s research equipped the proponents of apartheid with the arguments they needed to make apartheid a reality (Coetzee, 1991; Jubber, 2007; Moodie, 1975).

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    41 Verwoerd and Cronjé are considered among the key intellectual architects and brains behind the apartheid regime (Coetzee, 1991). Both men were instrumental in crafting policies that justified racial segregation and native administration instruments. Sociological knowledge production was thus mediated by and through the colonial system and apartheid. This was not unique to African colonies like South Africa; it was also salient in other countries specifically Latin America and Asia where early sociologists were directly engaged with imperialism as proponents, supporters, critics, or beneficiaries of imperial expansionism (Go, 2013). Following this, Hunter (2015) noted that as a colonial import, sociology was deployed to (re)produce a colonial gaze from within Africa. This led to the epistemicide (Grosfoguel, 2013) of African knowledge(s) and negations of Africans and African thought through the imposition of Western sociological theories (Magubane, 2000). Yet Connell (2021) reminds us that to think of the knowledge economy as merely an imposition of “Western Knowledge” on other regions of the world is not only flawed but also mistaken. She describes the ways in which knowledge development in Europe and North America depended significantly on flows of knowledge and sometimes concepts from the colonized and postcolonial world. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the colonized world became a major source of the knowledge from which academic sociology and anthropology were constructed. It is therefore important to highlight that colonial sociology in Southern Africa, in particular, and in Africa, in general, is more than just an imposition of “Western episteme from outside the continent.” Instead, it was an eclectic mixture of the local and the global, albeit with little acknowledgment of the mutual and reciprocal borrowing between the two. South African sociology was not only sharply divided but also racialized (Hendricks, 2006). These divisions stemmed from the discipline’s close relationship with the apartheid regime. When he was teaching sociology at the University of Cape Town, Edward Batson (1950) used his work on Black poverty in urban spaces to offer a veiled critique of the unequal redistributive politics of the apartheid regime. Some early industrial sociologists in South Africa also worked with the unions to produce counterhegemonic agendas, at a time when the industrial struggle was crucial in the fight against the exploitative labour regimes during apartheid. Beginning in the 1970s, Kuper’s and Batson’s works set the tone for South African sociology, which Burawoy (2004) branded as “public sociology” that critiqued the apartheid regime. Sooryamoorthy (2016) identifies the three key historical epochs in the development of South African sociology as colonial, apartheid, and democratic phases, when South African sociology respectively emerged, adapted, and transformed. What is clear is the enduring legacy of the Eurocentric canon in sociological epistemologies and ontologies in the democratic phase. Although the UCRN was established as a nonracial enclave (Gelfand, 1978) in a racially segregated Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the sociology faculty was exclusively White and dominated by expatriates who had studied in Europe and South Africa. Thus the curriculum and pedagogy were also British. Some white Rhodesians who studied at South African universities also came back to teach. This reinforced by the influence of South African sociology in Rhodesia. South Africa had an outsized influence on the

42   Simbarashe Gukurume establishment of sociology as a discipline in Zimbabwe and other African countries (Chachage, 2004; Sooryamoorthy, 2016). Still, the UCRN saw itself and was perceived as a liberal university with a relatively “inclusive” and “open” racial policy in both hiring faculty and student enrollment. Article 4 of the founding royal charter declared: “No test of religious belief or profession of race nationality or class shall be imposed or required on any person in order to entitle him to be admitted as a member, professor, teacher, or student of the University College or to hold office therein or any advantage or privilege thereof ” (Gelfand, 1978; Gukurume, 2018; Mackenzie, 1987). This allowed sociology to develop in a relatively liberal space. Interestingly, sociologists at the university such as D. H. Reader questioned the racial prejudice of White European employers in his work on Black unemployment in the 1970s (Reader, 1972). In 1980, when Rhodesia gained formal independence as the newly named Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980, the sociology department of the UCRN—​now the University of Zimbabwe (UZ)—​inherited a Eurocentric sociology curriculum and pedagogy. Although the faculty was becoming cosmopolitan with the recruitment of a few Black academics, it remained largely White. Similarly, the sociology curriculum retained and sustained its Eurocentric bias. There are close affinities between South African and Zimbabwean histories of sociology pertaining to their colonial roots in curriculum and pedagogy. For many years, sociology departments in both countries have not only struggled to shake off the influence of and linkages with the Euro-​Western sociological canon, but have also actively produced and reproduced the hegemony of the Eurocentric sociological canon in teaching, curriculum, and pedagogy (Gukurume & Maringira, 2020). Scholars like Meghji (2021) observed that sociology was conceived at the peak of global colonialism and imperialism. In many African countries, it emerged in the service of empire and colonialism. In South Africa, as Webster (1998) stated, the first generation of South African sociologists became servants of the apartheid regimes. It is against this background that the decolonization of sociology in South Africa and Zimbabwe should be understood.

Decolonization of Universities and Knowledge Since the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall student protests, discussions about decolonizing universities and curriculum have gained traction in South Africa and beyond. During the protests, which started at the University of Cape Town, students demanded free and decolonized education, as well as the fall of colonial iconography and cultures (Maringira & Gukurume, 2021). Students also demanded a decolonized curriculum that reflects and relates to their everyday lived realities as Black Africans. According to Zwiener-​Collins et al. (2021), decolonization of the curriculum denotes

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    43 a radical, transformative process of change that interrogates the enduring Eurocentric and racist narratives surrounding the production of academic “knowledge.” Swarts et al. (2020) framed decolonization as the historical and enduring process through which formerly colonized societies think through the legacies of colonial domination and attempt to disentangle themselves from them. The proponents of decolonization are concerned with the continued dominance of Eurocentric frameworks of knowledge production (Spivak, 1998). Decolonization unsettles the hegemonic Eurocentric epistemology that occupies the larger share of space in the university landscape at the expense of African epistemological paradigms. For decolonial thinkers, universities need to produce knowledge that is relevant to and resonates with the values of the spaces in which they are rooted and located. Many scholarly works on decolonization have focused on the university and its curriculum. There is little research that has focused on both curriculum and pedagogy. For Morreira et al. (2020), the process of decolonizing curricula and pedagogy involves changing methods of instruction and institutional systems that mimic and reproduce European education systems. Scholars like Nyamnjoh (2016) have argued that this may require a paradigm shift that moves away from the traditional ivory towers of knowledge production.

Decolonizing Sociology in Zimbabwe My interviews with academics in Zimbabwe revealed a consensus that there was a need to decolonize sociology. But there were some disagreements about how this should be done. Some advocated for more radical Africanization and localization so that the discipline could speak to the daily realities and challenges confronting the local communities. Of the 35 course outlines collected for this study, more than half had a decolonial component. In The Great Zimbabwe University (GZU) in Zimbabwe had more courses with a decolonial orientation as compared to the UZ. This is understandable because not only is GZU is a postcolonial university, but it was established with a very specific focus on culture and heritage. This had a bearing on the design of curricula and courses and the pedagogy used to teach them. As one participant, Chozi, noted: I would say that the university does have a deliberate decolonial orientation. If you look at our school, it was named after a prominent Pan-​Africanist, it is named “Julius Nyerere School of Social Sciences” and in our courses and teaching we also deliberately center local ideas, theories, philosophies and epistemologies.

Unlike at UZ, where the introduction of new courses and redesign of existing courses to incorporate decolonization was recent, many of the courses at GZU had adopted a decolonial approach from the outset. At UZ, Mararike incorporated the human factor into all his modules and research, which he based on the works of Senyo Adjibolosoo, Molefi Kete Asante, and other prominent Afrocentric scholars. The human factor theory

44   Simbarashe Gukurume underlines humanity and human interconnectedness as well as appropriate anthropic space (hunhu) and values of ubuntu. His modules Rural Development, the Sociology of Organizations, and the Sociology of Mass Communication, were anchored the human factor approach as the key theoretical and analytical lens. Accordingly, his research on rural development in Zimbabwe considered humans and relationships as assets underpinning rural development processes. By triangulating Weber’s bureaucratic theory and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs with the human factor approach to management and development, Mararike was making a deliberate effort to bring Weber into conversation with Adjibolosoo and other African scholars, thereby decolonizing sociological curricula and pedagogy. Some of my interlocutors in Zimbabwe felt that the discipline was already decolonized because they taught and engaged with feminism and postmodernism, which critique the masculine, androcentric, and meta-​/g​ rand narratives of sociological theory. Chakauya, an academic teaching at UZ, remarked: If you look at our courses and topics, you will see that we have already sort of decolonized. Yes, we talk of the founding fathers of the discipline of sociology like Comte, Durkheim, Marx and Weber as the canon of sociological theory when teaching introduction to sociology at first year, but we also have courses like gender studies and topics such as feminism in many courses which enable students to critique patriarchy in sociology, so for me we have decolonized way back.

These views were echoed by his colleague Sandura, who felt that inasmuch as there has always been a lot of talk about decolonization at UZ, the curriculum began to engage with local realities and address local problems before the colonial era: If decolonization is about engaging local problems or localizing faculty like what some of the proponents of decolonization demand, then we have long decolonized because people like Diana Patel, Michael Bourdillon, White sociologists started doing this long back and if you look at all the academics in our department, they are all Black. So, if that is what decolonization means then we have decolonized the discipline. We also have some courses which specifically foreground local epistemological and ontological orientation.

UZ’s attempts at decolonization and curriculum and pedagogical transformation are neither a new nor postcolonial phenomenon. Instead, sociologists Michael Bourdillon, Angela Cheater, Diana Patel, and others started locating their research, teaching within the local context and also redesigning their course outlines in the late 1970s, at the peak of decolonization. They sought to teach in ways that made sense for local students, needs, and realities. For instance, Bourdillon began teaching about the Shona people, cultures, and rituals, and Diana Patel’s course on social policy was designed to engage with local problems and realities. While these academics continued using hegemonic “standard” texts written by Anthony Giddens and George Ritzer, among others, they taught sociology which foregrounded and took southern espistemologies seriously. This

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    45 illustrates that sociology has been, in practice, composite and incomplete, even within a hegemonic disciplinary framework. Chakauya and Sandura felt that decolonization should not be a radical deconstruction, which they felt would make the discipline lose its identity. Chakauya emphasized, “While we call for decolonization, we also need to know that the world is globalizing and we need to teach students a sociology that will make them relevant globally.” He felt it is a disservice to students to teach them what will not enable them to find work outside Zimbabwe or Africa because their employment opportunities limited inside the country. He asked, “What will it benefit to teach students a lot of localized courses that will limit their opportunities out there when the local labor market cannot even absorb a quarter of the graduates?” Chakauya noted that locally oriented courses should be triangulated with the traditional globally relevant courses. For him, a decolonized sociology should be a cosmopolitan hybrid of locally and globally oriented sociology. This form of decolonization acknowledges what Nyamnjoh (2017) referred to as the compositeness and “incompleteness” of knowledge forms. Incompleteness is a productive way of understanding decolonization in that it goes beyond a framing of the North and the South as “frozen” or fixated geopolitical spaces. Incompleteness allows for a convivial interface between Eurocentric and Afrocentric sociological epistemologies and ontologies and the emergence of “frontier” sociology and sociologists of significance. Anugwom (2019) argues that a “frontier” sociology is not only contextually relevant but also engages with knowledge from outside. Such entanglements between Northern and Southern epistemologies and ontologies create space for equitable, convivial, and collaborative production of sociological knowledge. As Nyamnjoh (2017) argues, composite sociology becomes a form of sociology that is in a perpetual process of becoming through convivial encounters with other sociologies. The UZ introduced a compulsory first-​year course called African Epistemologies. It focuses on African epistemologies and introduces students to African ways of knowing and thinking, and offers a powerful critique of Eurocentric sociology by grounding sociological knowledge production firmly in the African context (Ake, 1984; Gukurume & Maringira, 2020). The recommended texts in this module are all African, with some additional readings from the Latin American decolonial school. The course outline showed that students were required to read and engage with the works of Claude Ake, Akinsola Akiwowo, Bernard Magubane, Paulin Hountondji, Sabelo Gatsheni-​Ndlovu, Frantz Fanon, Valentin-​Yves Mudimbe, Kwame Nkrumah, Solomon Plaatje, Archie Mafeje, and Ngugi wa Thiongo, among many other African scholars. This course provides an alternative theoretical foundation to Eurocentric sociological theory by deliberately decentering sociological theoretical canons in a way that gives value to African thinkers, ideas and theories. It can be viewed as an innovative way of decolonizing sociology. As noted earlier, as a post-​independence university, GZU was established to entrench a culture and heritage niche. Deriving its name from the ruins at Great Zimbabwe, a UNESCO-​accredited heritage site and national monument, the university situates the landscapes of the Great Zimbabwe monument at the center of its curriculum and pedagogical practices. The iconic walls of the monument and surrounding communities act

46   Simbarashe Gukurume as an informal lecture theater. During orientation week, all first-​year students take a trip to Great Zimbabwe, where they are inducted and apprised of the monument’s importance as the epitome of the country’s national heritage. Furthermore, all first-​year undergraduate students, regardless of their degree program and field, are required to take African Philosophy and Thought as part of the foundation module (Morreira; Taru et al., 2020). At the center of this compulsory module is an emphasis on Afrocentric ways of knowing and thinking that transcend disciplinary boundaries and a valorization of African civilizations, as represented by the Great Zimbabwe monuments and the archetypal Egyptian pyramids. In the social sciences, including sociology, all the first-​year students also do two extra modules grounded in African philosophical thought. During their first semester, they do “Introduction to Zimbabwe Cultures and Heritage” as a compulsory module. In this module, students are introduced to local cultures and learn about their importance to national development. In the second semester, they register for Indigenous Knowledge Systems. In the teachings of these modules, the Great Zimbabwe monument is taken as the bedrock of knowledge production. It becomes a second classroom, and the traditionalists and curators resident at the monument become co-​lecturers. At Sol Plaatje University, students in a medical anthropology course are exposed to both biomedicine and traditional or alternative healthcare systems in the local community. They go beyond reading medical anthropology texts, taking field trips to visit traditional healers (sangomas) and private hospitals as part their coursework (Truyts, 2020). Students reported that having the monument as an alternative classroom had shown them that the university classroom is not the only space where scientific knowledge is produced and reproduced. In this way the university and the community become mutually reinforcing and convivial spaces in the coproduction of knowledge. And in many other modules academics tapped into the rich wisdom of nonmainstream and nonacademic sociology generated by local and African figures, especially anticolonial nationalist scholars, such as Solomon Plaatje, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, and Kwame Nkrumah. This is in keeping with Nyamnjoh’s (2015) work on the elusiveness of completeness in the production of social scientific knowledge. Drawing from unheralded writers such as Amos Tutola, Nyamnjoh (2015) foregrounds endogenous epistemologies on the margins of “mainstream academia.” He points out that despite the richness of their ideas, these scholars are nearly invisible in scholarly circles and are often ignored, caricatured, or misrepresented through problematic categories. Centering the ideas of silenced Africans immersed in localized ways of knowing and popular traditions of meaning-​making is a way to reclaim the value and right of these marginalized ideas and scholars to think and represent their realities in relation to their civilizations and universes (Nyamnjoh, 2015). Scholars have shown how landscapes, space, and materiality can be critical technologies that allow innovative pedagogical raptures or epistemic disobedience in social sciences like anthropology (Morreira, Taru et al., 2020) and sociology (Gukurume & Maringira, 2020). Morreira, Taru et al. (2020) argued that the use of place, space, and materiality as teaching tools allows students to locate themselves as embodied persons

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    47 embedded in material spaces with specific social, economic and political histories. Therefore the deliberate use of the Great Zimbabwe monuments and surrounding communities by Zimbabwean sociologists at GZU becomes an interesting form of epistemic freedom. As already noted, sociologists at GZU take students to the traditional village at the monuments and surrounding communities. In so doing, they take teaching beyond the confines of the classroom walls and invite people and spaces on the margins of the so-​called formal and “conventional” epistemic corridors at the center of sociological knowledge production. Students and the surrounding Masvingo community become co-​creators of sociological knowledge rather than its passive consumers or recipients. This strategy also meant that both the students and the community are emplaced (Morreira, Taru et al., 2020) in the teaching and learning, as well as in the way knowledge is produced. These acts represent what scholars have framed as a form of “epistemic disobedience” (Mignolo, 2009; Morreira, 2017). For Mignolo (2009), “epistemic disobedience” is the refusal to accept Westernized and modernist disciplinary norms and canons and their assumptions about methods or forms of individualized personhood. This practice deconstructs the dominant belief that the university and the university lecturer are the “knower” and the only source of “true” or “real” knowledge. Such practices not only diffuse deep-​seated knowledge hierarchies but also unsettle epistemic hegemonies in sociological theorizing and knowledge production. At GZU, lecturers who taught first-​ year courses such as the Introduction to Sociology introduced students to classical scholarly works that are often ignored or silenced in classical sociological theory. In addition to the “founding fathers,” Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber, students were also exposed to the “founding mothers,” including Harriet Martineau, Marianne Weber, Anna Julia Cooper, and to “Black” sociologists such as William Edward Burghardt Du Bois and Ibn Khaldun (Burawoy, 2021). By bringing these marginalized scholars and voices from the margins to the center of sociological theorizing, the GZU sociologists sought to critique the patriarchal, racial, and ethnocentric nature of classical sociological theory and questioned the hegemony of the so-​called founding White male fathers. By teaching the works of those who had been written out of the traditional Eurocentric canon, these sociologists successfully recovered some of the subaltern voices in sociological scholarship (Chakrabarty, 2002; Said, 1994). In addition, another second-​ year course, Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development, was introduced. The rationale for introducing the course was a realization that there was a conflation of development with Eurocentric modernity. Most of the literature on the sociology of development foregrounded the modernization theory, which dismisses non-​Western cultures as inimical to modernization and development. In the modernization development discourse, Rostow’s stages to modernity are not only presented as the “true” path but also the universal and “only” way to development and modernity. Less economically developed countries are expected and sometimes forced to imitate Western norms, values and standards. The West is portrayed as the “model” or “ideal” to be reproduced by all other countries. This resonates with

48   Simbarashe Gukurume Mudimbe’s (1988) argument that the colonial and modernization project was meant to transform non-​European communities into carbon copies of Europe. This entrenched the mythical belief that European modernity was superior to indigenous knowledge systems. For Connell (2007), this represented a “grand erasure” of indigenous knowledge systems from the development landscape. For many scholars, modernity is intricately linked to coloniality which valorizes and privileges Western civilization and developmental ideologies while simultaneously undermining non-​Western civilization. For example, Onwuzuruigbo (2018) noted that the existing body of social science knowledge is arrogated by Euro-​American societies and cultures and creates the impression that the eventual goal of all other human societies is to imitate and adopt Euro-​American cultures, structures and knowledge production processes. In the Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development course, the perceived universality, objectivity and hegemony of European modernity as the “model” and the only path to development is contested and unsettled. The course was designed to allow students to question the hegemonic ideological belief that non-​Western cultures and social realities are idiosyncratic deviations from an idealized Western standard. In an interview with the lecturer, he asserted that I recommended and urged my students to read and engage scholarly works that took indigenous knowledge systems, epistemologies and ontologies seriously. In our engagements we drew largely on the works of prominent critiques of Eurocentrism in development such as Samir Amin, Walter Rodney and Andre Gunder Frank among other scholars.

Instead of dismissing indigenous knowledge systems as an obstacle to development, this course made them the cornerstone and foundation upon which development should be constructed and understood. This approach should be viewed as an attempt to undo the deep-​seated epistemicide of the modernization theory of development. Lebakeng (2011) conceptualized epistemicide as the violent imposition of Western knowledge systems and creating the myth that Africa had no developed indigenous knowledge systems. For Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2013), epistemicide relates to the displacing of African culture, relegating it to the margins of society and unleashing epistemological violence against indigenous epistemology.

Decolonizing Sociology in South Africa As noted earlier, contemporary debates around the decolonization of the university, knowledge and sociology were triggered by student protests mobilized under the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements. The #RhodesMustFall movement which began in 2015 at the University of Cape Town (UCT) demanded the removal of a statue of the British imperialist Cecil John Rhodes on the university’s upper campus (Bosch, 2017; Maringira & Gukurume, 2016; Nyamnjoh, 2016). While the UCT students’ key demand was the removal of Rhodes, they took advantage

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    49 of this political moment to ask critical questions about curriculum and pedagogy, among other issues (Mangcu, 2016, 2017). At the top of students’ demands was an accelerated transformation of the university’s curriculum and pedagogy from what was being taught and how it was being taught (Maringira & Gukurume, 2021; Morreira, Luckett et al., 2020). For many of the students, decolonization should entail a fundamental rethinking and reframing of the curriculum and bringing South Africa and Africa to the center of teaching, learning and research (Heleta, 2016). Through these protests, decolonization became the epicenter of sustained debates and engagements on the nature of the university in South Africa and the unequal and Eurocentric nature of knowledge production in and beyond the geopolitical space of South Africa. After the fall of Rhodes on campus, students further demanded a curriculum centered on African and subaltern epistemologies and realities (Morreira, Luckett et al., 2020). During interviews and informal conversations, many of my interlocutors spoke of the enduring hegemony of Eurocentric sociological epistemology and ontology. Many of them felt that South African sociology has largely remained colonial, privileging Western sociological “canons.” Jubber (2006) notes that the term canon refers to the core concepts, texts, theories, and authors in scientific and artistic disciplines. However, some of the sociologists who were interviewed felt that there has been an intellectual commitment to decolonize sociology in South Africa. For instance, Mash told me that since 1994, the South African Sociological Association has been trying to advance an Afrocentric turn in South African sociology. But this has largely been at a theoretical level. Although there was a commitment to transforming the curriculum and decolonizing sociology, many South African sociologists hardly walk the talk. This was echoed by Hunter (2015) who noted that at the University of Witwatersrand, sociology courses like “Identity and Society” largely perpetuated coloniality and that the content had remained the same for more than 25 years. For Hunter (2015) this revealed the enduring influence of colonialism and apartheid on curriculum and the ways in which sociological knowledge was produced in contemporary South Africa. Based on an ethnography of the University of Witwatersrand sociology department, Hunter (2015) concluded that the department as a whole and many of the academics who make it up, have been epistemically obedient and refuse to see and break from the coloniality of sociology in ways akin to Alatas’s (2000) “captive minds.”. In the teaching guides and outlines I collected from some of the universities teaching sociology, Durkheim, Marx, and Weber are still the dominant figures in the classical theory syllabuses. Most of the course textbooks included George Ritzer, Michael Haralambos, Martin Holborn, Irving Zeitlin, and Anthony Giddens, among other Europeans. It emerged that some students fail to understand the sociological concepts because the text is situated in Europe or America and cite examples that are far removed from Africa. Mangcu (2016) noted that to decolonize sociology, the curriculum should be based on a shared “text of blackness” (Gates, 2014, p. 140). For instance, Alexander, one of my interlocutors noted:

50   Simbarashe Gukurume If you look at our prescribed textbooks in the module guide, you will see that it’s either George Ritzer or Martin Haralambos and Martin Holborn. Our lecturer said these are the bibles for introduction to Sociology, but when I read, for instance, about crime and deviance or socialization the illustrative examples are all European or American, and I have to take myself out of Africa and imagine who the “Saints” or the “Roughnecks” are that theorists like Howard Becker and Edwin Lemert talk about.

The continued overreliance on European and American textbooks tends to displace local students, which sometimes adversely affects their understanding and by extension their performance (Morreira et al., 2020). In his work on the politics of knowledge production in West Africa, Hountondji (1997) developed the concept of “extraversion” to highlight the unequal nature of knowledge production processes. He described extraversion as a scenario in which scholars based in former colonized “peripheries” are oriented to the sources, theories, and methodologies of authority of former colonizers in the Global North. Similar trends of extraversion and academic dependency have been observed in Asia (Alatas, 1974) and Latin America (Mignolo, 2005; Quijano, 2000). Similarly, Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2018) argued that the imposition of foreign languages and texts and the displacement of Indigenous languages, texts, and knowledge(s) were deliberate interventions by the metaphysical empire into the colonized spaces. This resonates with Mangcu’s (2016) argument that a decolonized South African sociology must place Black perspectives on race at the heart of its curriculum. Quality control by university departments through committees and other structures, as well as subtle surveillance (Gukurume, 2019) of what is being taught, partly explains the enduring epistemic privilege of Durkheimian, Marxian, and Weberian sociology in both Zimbabwean and South African universities. Interestingly, the process of perpetuating the epistemic privilege of the Western canon occurs simultaneously with the epistemicide of the non-​Western sociological other. This is in keeping with arguments put forward by Morreira (2017), who pointed out that at many universities in Southern Africa, there is a very specific “epistemic stratification” in which local knowledge systems and ways of knowing are not only suppressed and undervalued but also misrecognized. This argument was also made much earlier other scholars, including Akinsola Akiwowo (1980), who noted: At both levels of doing Sociology, Africans show that they are more influenced by North American sociologists for whom they show far greater respect than they demonstrate towards their own colleagues . . . Classical writers like Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber continue to be relevant whenever African sociologists seek to clarify for others and for themselves their own ideal of society . . . Otherwise, the painful truth is that African sociologists are woefully ignorant of the excellent work being done by their colleagues both inside and outside their own countries. (pp. 62–​63)

At Sol Plaatje University (SPU) in South Africa, the birth of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences in 2016 coincided with nationwide student protests demanding

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    51 free and decolonized education (Maringira & Gukurume, 2016, 2021). The social sciences curriculum influenced by the political environment of the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall protests. There was a conscious attempt at decolonizing the curriculum and pedagogy from the outset. For instance, some of the pioneering modules such as Borders, Boundaries and Belonging, explored South American and Southern African experiences of slavery, spirituality, and embodiment, with group projects exploring student-​led protests in South America and Southern Africa (Truyts, 2020). Decolonization is also salient in other generic first-​year social science modules, such as Theory and Philosophy in the Humanities. Other first-​year modules, such as Individual and Society, which introduces students to sociology and social anthropology, have a decolonial orientation and approach. These modules allowed the academics at Sol Plaatje to put African theoretical and philosophical epistemology and ontology in conversation with the Eurocentric theory and philosophical canon. In modules such as Theory and Philosophy, African philosophical thought is foregrounded. Key topics like ubuntu and Black consciousness, among other important Afrocentric topics, are given adequate attention in discussions. Some students started using vernacular concepts in discussing ubuntu concepts such as “Umntu Ngumntu Ngabantu” (Xhosa/​Zulu) and “motho ke motho ka batho babang” (Tswana), which translate to “a person is a person because of other people.” The use of the vernacular made it easier for students relate to the text and understand the philosophy and concepts than the Eurocentric concepts of metaphysics, axiology, and logic used earlier. In the SPU’s module Individual and Society, the emphasis had traditionally been on classical sociological theory based on the works of the “founding fathers” and the influence of Euro-​American modernity. These figures continue to be regarded as key foundational thinkers, but the module was revised to cover important and neglected Black and African thinkers as well. For instance, the works of Bernard Magubane, Solomon Plaatje, Archie Mafeje, Fatima Meer, Steve Biko, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Ibn Khaldun were included with the traditional canons of Durkheim, Marx and Weber. In addition, students were also introduced to “founding mothers,” such as Harriet Martineau, Jane Addams, Ida B Wells, and Anna Julia Cooper, who have been pushed to the margins of classical sociological theory (Thomas & Kukulan, 2004). On the module outline, students had essential recommended texts, including Lengermann and Niebrugge-​Brantley’s The Women Founders (1998), Lynn McDonald’s Women Founders of the Social Sciences (1994), and Mary Jo Deegan’s Women in Sociology: A Bio-​bibliographic Sourcebook.

Conclusion This chapter examined the ways in which academics at Zimbabwean and South African universities are trying to decolonize the discipline of sociology. It also explored the perceptions and experiences of decolonization of sociology students and academics. It emerged from empirical findings that academics’ and students’ understanding of

52   Simbarashe Gukurume decolonization are complex and ambivalent. Although there is an enduring hegemony of the Western sociological canon, there are attempts at decolonizing sociology through innovative pedagogical practices and curriculum transformation in South African and Zimbabwean universities. Academics have altered their curriculum and pedagogy to incorporate local epistemologies and ontologies along with the theoretical perspectives. However, some structural constraints hinder the process. Decolonized sociology should promote epistemic diversity and convivial encounters between Western and non-​Western sociologies. It should not be about discarding Eurocentric sociological canons, but about promoting a “democratic” and “glocalized” sociology that “blends” or entangles both Western and non-​Western knowledge forms. The decolonization of sociology should not be about rejecting Western canons and theories or all sociological knowledge that was developed outside Africa. Rather, it should be about convivial sociological scholarship and knowledge entanglements akin to border thinking. The decolonized sociology should be about curriculum and pedagogical balancing that advances epistemological and ontological equality, interface, and justice. There is a case to be made for transmodernity and border thinking as an idealized form of thinking about the decolonization of sociological curricula and pedagogy. Decolonized sociology needs to create an epistemic space that promotes conviviality between different sociological epistemes and ontologies that warm up to the logic of inclusivity and diversity. It should be more inclusive in terms of representation of the epistemologies, voices, and ideas of those previously ignored or suppressed. Decolonized sociology should be structured around the reality of incompleteness as a normative way of being and becoming. Such a structure should valorize the interconnections and interdependencies of knowledge forms.

Acronyms GZU

Great Zimbabwe University

UCRN

University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

UCT

University of Cape Town

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UZ

University of Zimbabwe

SPU

Sol Plaatje University

References Ake, C. (1984). Social science as imperialism. NISER. Codesria: Dakar. Akiwowo, A. A. (1980). Sociology in Africa today. Current Sociology, 28, 1–​73. Alatas, S. H. (1974). The captive mind and creative development. International Social Science Journal, 26, 691–​700.

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    53 Alatas, S. H. (2000). Intellectual imperialism: Definition, traits and problems. Asian Journal of Social Science, 28, 23–​45. Anugwom, E. E. (2019). Beyond the narratives of decolonization: Resituating sociological knowledge within the context of development in South Africa. South African Review of Sociology, 50, 18–​33. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​21528​586.2019.1583​122 Azari, S. A., & Sitas, A. (2017). The development of sociology in South Africa. In K. O. Korgen (Ed.), The Cambridge handbook of sociology: Core areas in sociology and the development of the discipline (pp. 72–​81). Cambridge University Press. Batson, E. (1950). The poverty datum line in Cape Town in 1938-​39 and in 1949. South African Journal of Science, 46(7), 212–​216. Bosch, T. (2017). Twitter activism and youth in South Africa: The case of #RhodesMustFall, Information, Communication & Society, 20, 221–​232. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​13691​ 18X.2016.1162​829 Burawoy, M. (2004). Public sociology: South African dilemmas in a global context. Society in Transition, 35, 11–​26. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​21528​586.2004.10419​104 Burawoy, M. (2021). Decolonizing sociology: The significance of W. E. B. Du Bois. Critical Sociology, 47, 545–​554. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​089692​0521​1005​180 Chachage, C. S. L. (2004). Sociology and the future: Resistance, reconstruction and democracy. Society in Transition, 35, 42–​60. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​21528​586.2004.10419​106 Chakrabarty, D. (2002). Habitations of modernity: Essays in the wake of subaltern studies. University of Chicago Press. Coetzee, J. M. (1991). The mind of apartheid: Geoffrey Cronjé (1907–​). Social Dynamics, 17, 1–​35. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​025339​5910​8458​500 Connell, R. (2007). Southern theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in social science. Allen and Unwin. Connell, R. (2018). Decolonizing sociology. Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 47, 399–​407. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00943​0611​8779​811 Connell, R. (2021). Contesting Northern knowledge: Akinsola Akiwowo and the worldwide struggle to change the social sciences. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 39, 340–​352. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​02589​001.2021.1902​956 Dawson, M. C. (2020). Rehumanising the university for an alternative future: Decolonisation, alternative epistemologies and cognitive justice. Identities, 27, 71–​90. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​10702​89X.2019.1611​072 Gates, H. L., Jr. (2014). The signifying monkey: A theory of African American literary criticism. Oxford University Press. Gelfand, M. (1978). A non-​racial island of learning: A history of the University College of Rhodesia from its inception to 1966. Mambo Press. Go, J. (2013). For a postcolonial sociology. Theory and Society, 42, 25–​55. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1007/​s11​186-​012-​9184-​6 Groenewald, C. J. (1989). Die Rol Van die Sosiologie in die Suid-​Afrikaanese samelewing: Die Verlede [The role of sociology in South African society: The past]. South African Journal of Sociology, 20, 67–​79. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​02580​144.1989.10431​671 Grosfoguel, R. (2013). The structure of knowledge in Westernized universities: Epistemic racism/​sexism and the four genocides/​epistemicides of the long 16th century. Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-​Knowledge, 1, 73–​90. https://​www.niwrc.org/​ sites/​defa​ult/​files/​ima​ges/​resou​rce/​2%20The%20St​ruct​ure%20of%20Kn​owle​dge%20in%20 West​erni​zed%20Un​iver​siti​es_​%20Ep​iste​mic.pdf

54   Simbarashe Gukurume Gukurume, S. (2018). New Pentecostal churches, politics and the everyday life of university students at the University of Zimbabwe [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Cape Town. Gukurume, S. (2019). Surveillance, spying and disciplining the university: Deployment of state security agents on campus in Zimbabwe. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 54, 763–​779. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00219​0961​9833​414 Gukurume, S., & Maringira, G. (2020). Decolonising sociology: Perspectives from two Zimbabwean universities. Third World Thematics, 5, 60–​78. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​23802​ 014.2020.1790​993 Heleta, S. (2016). Decolonisation of higher education: Dismantling epistemic violence and Eurocentrism in South Africa. Transformation in Higher Education, 1, 1–​8. https://​doi.org/​ 10.4102/​the.v1i1.9 Hendricks, F. (2006). The rise and fall of South African sociology. African Sociological Review, 10, 86–​97. Hountondji, P. J. (1997). Introduction: Recentring Africa. In P. J. Hountondji (Ed.), Endogenous knowledge: Research trails (pp. 1–​39). CODESRIA. Hunter, M. J. (2015). Perpetuating coloniality: A decolonial critique of Wits sociology’s “Identity and Society” compulsory first year [Unpublished paper]. https://​www.acade​mia​ .edu/​37492​807/​Perpetuating_​C oloniality_​A_​decolonial_​critique_​of_​Wits_​S ociologys​ _Identity_​and_​Society_​c​ompu​lsor​y_​fi​rst_​year​_​mod​ule Jubber, K. (2006). Reflections on canons, compilations, catalogues and curricula in relation to sociology and sociology in South Africa. South African Review of Sociology, 37, 321–​342. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​21528​586.2006.10419​161 Jubber, K. (2007). Sociology in South Africa: A brief historical review of research and publishing. International Sociology, 22, 527–​546. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​02685​8090​7080​485 Lebakeng, T. J. (2011). Discourse on colonial epistemicide and contemporary attempts to re-​ affirm indigenous knowledge systems, with particular reference to South Africa. Caribbean Journal of Philosophy, 3, 1–​12. Mackenzie, C. G. (1987). The University of Rhodesia: A re-​appraisal. Journal of Educational Administration and History, 19, 62–​7 1. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00220​6287​0190​207 Magubane, B. (2000). African sociology: Towards a critical perspective. Africa World Press. Mamdani, M. (2016). Between the public intellectual and the scholar: Decolonization and some post-​independence initiatives in African higher education. Inter-​Asia Cultural Studies, 17, 68–​83. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​14649​373.2016.1140​260 Mangcu, X. (2016). Decolonizing South African sociology: Building on a shared “text of Blackness.” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race, 13, 45–​59. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1017/​S17420​58X1​6000​072 Mangcu, X. (2017). Shattering the myth of a post-​racial consensus in South African higher education: “Rhodes Must Fall” and the struggle for transformation at the University of Cape Town. Critical Philosophy of Race, 5, 243–​266. https://​doi.org/​10.5325/​critp​hilr​ace.5.2.0243 Maringira, G., & Gukurume, S. (2016). Being Black in #FeesMustFall and #FreeDecolonisedEducation: Student protests at the University of the Western Cape. In M. Langa (Ed.), #Hashtag: An analysis of the #FeesMustFall movement at South African universities (pp. 33–​46). Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Maringira, G., & Gukurume, S. (2021). Politics, (re)possession and resurgence of student protests in South African universities. Politikon, 48, 486–​505. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​02589​ 346.2021.1952​738

Decolonizing Sociology in Africa    55 Meghji, A. (2021). Decolonizing sociology: An introduction. Polity Press. Mignolo, W. D. (2005). Prophets facing sidewise: The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference. Social Epistemology, 19, 111–​127. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​026917​2050​0084​325 Mignolo, W. D. (2009). Epistemic disobedience, independent thought and decolonial freedom. Theory, Culture and Society, 26, 159–​181. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​02632​7640​9349​275 Moodie, T. D. (1975). The rise of Afrikanerdom. University of California Press. Morreira, S. (2017). Steps towards decolonial higher education in Southern Africa? Epistemic disobedience in the humanities. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 52, 287–​301. https://​ doi.org/​10.1177/​00219​0961​5577​499 Morreira, S., Luckett, K., Kumalo, S. H., & Ramgotra, M. (2020). Confronting the complexities of decolonising curricula and pedagogy in higher education. Third World Thematics, 5, 1–​18. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​23802​014.2020.1798​278 Morreira, S., Taru, J., & Truyts, C. (2020). Place and pedagogy: Using space and materiality in teaching social science in Southern Africa. Third World Thematics, 5, 137–​153. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​23802​014.2020.1747​944 Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988). The invention of Africa: Gnosis, philosophy and the order of knowledge. Indiana University Press. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2012). Fiftieth anniversary of decolonisation in Africa: A moment of celebration or critical reflection? Third World Quarterly, 33, 71–​89. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 01436​597.2012.627​236 Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. (2013). Empire, global coloniality and African subjectivity. Berghahn Books. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2018). Metaphysical empire, linguicides and cultural imperialism. English Academy Review, 35, 96–​115. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​10131​752.2018.1530​178 Nwabueze, N. (2020). Sociology in Africa between domestication and indigenization. In O. Yacob-​Haliso & N. N. G Nwogwugwu (Eds.), African indigenous knowledges in a postcolonial world (pp. 70–​87). Routledge. Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2015). Amos Tutuola and the elusiveness of completeness. Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien, 29, 1–​47. Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2016). #RhodesMustFall: Nibbling at resilient colonialism in South Africa. Langaa Research and Publishing CIG. Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2017). Incompleteness: Frontier Africans and the currency of conviviality. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 52, 253–​270. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00219​0961​5580​867 Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2020). Amos Tutuola as a quest hero for endogenous Africa: Actively anglicizing the Yoruba language and Yorubanising the English language. Acta Academica, 52, 89–​98. https://​doi.org/​10.18820/​24150​479/​aa5​2i1/​KN Onwuzuruigbo, I. (2018). Indigenizing Eurocentric sociology: The “captive mind” and five decades of sociology in Nigeria. Current Sociology, 66, 831–​848. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00113​ 9211​7704​242 Quijano, A. (2000). Coloniality of power and Eurocentrism in Latin America. International Sociology, 15, 215–​232. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​0268​5809​0001​5002​005 Quijano, A. (2007). Coloniality and modernity/​rationality. Cultural Studies, 21, 168–​178. Reader, D. H. (1972). African education and the Rhodesian employer. The Rhodesia Journal of Economics, 6, 1–​9. Said, E. (1994). Culture and imperialism. Vintage Books. Sooryamoorthy, R. (2016). Sociology in South Africa: Colonial, apartheid and democratic forms. Palgrave Macmillan. Spivak, G. C. (1998). In other worlds: Essays in cultural politics. Routledge.

56   Simbarashe Gukurume Swart, S., Nyamnjoh, A., & Mahali, A. (2020). Decolonising the social sciences curriculum in the university classroom: A pragmatic-​realism approach. Alternation Special Edition, 36, 165–​187. http://​hdl.han​dle.net/​20.500.11910/​16035 Thomas, D. F., & Kukulan, A. (2004). “Why don’t I know about these women?”: The integration of early women sociologists in classical theory courses. Teaching Sociology, 32, 252–​263. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​009​2055​X040​3200​301 Truyts, C. (2020). Eating in class: Notes on nourishment and decolonial pedagogy. Science, Medicine and Anthropology, 1, 1–​6. http://​hdl.han​dle.net/​10625/​58763 Verwoerd, H. F. (1961). Live and let live. South African Information Service. Webster. E. C. (1998). The sociology of transformation and the transformation of sociology in Southern Africa. Social Dynamics, 24, 117–​129. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​025339​5980​8458​654 Zwiener-​Collins, N., Juvaria, J., Rima, S., & Poulter, T. (2021). Decolonising quantitative research methods pedagogy: Teaching contemporary politics to challenge hierarchies from data. Politics, 41, 1–​17. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​026339​5721​1041​449

II

R AC E , E T H N IC I T Y, A N D R E L IG ION

Chapter 4

Race and I ts So c iol o gica l I nqu i ry in Afri c a Problematic Suppositions and Contemporary Predicaments Nene Ernest Khalema

Introduction Over the last decades there has been a deepening contradiction in the sociological imagination about the meaning of “race” as a concept that explains human differences. Vigorous debates have taken place in sociology over the proper use of “race” in research that seeks to explain human differences and diversity in populations. Most sociologists do not share a clear consensus on how “race” ought to be used or conceptualized. On one hand, social scientists propose abandoning “race” as a category of analysis, positing that maintaining its use does more damage than good. The opponents of using racial categories point to the perpetuation of the already debunked myth of racial differences that was advanced by eugenicists at the turn of the twentieth century (Shor, 1999). Two assumptions are often suggested to justify such inattention to racial data. The first is that racial inequalities are the result of class and regional disparities, and so collecting data by race is unnecessary. The second assumption is that racial classifications are so subjective that they are not useful for understanding human differences, and so the process of racial classification itself is meaningless. On the other hand, the proponents of using race as a variable in explaining human differences argue that data collection using racial categories is necessary to determine whether social, economic, and political conditions vary and impact diverse populations differently, and that race is a central variable to explain this difference (American

60   Nene Ernest Khalema Sociological Association,1 2003; Krieger, 2004). Simply put, proponents argue that race is essential to the understanding of the racialization processes at play in most pluralistic societies, and that abandoning racial classifications would be a setback to social justice efforts in many areas of social life, such as health, education, and the economy (Agyemang et al., 2005; Akyeampong, 2000). To cement this social justice intention, several guidelines have been suggested for the continued use of race categories and classifications in social science research. The first statement to this effect was proposed authoritatively by the American Anthropological Association (AAA) in the late 1990s, followed by the American Psychological Association (APA) in 2000. In 2002, the American Sociological Association (ASA) proposed a third statement on race. According to the AAA, APA, and ASA, the purpose of the guidelines is to guide ethical and transformative research on race, highlighting how the racialization process is embedded in daily life. According to the American Psychological Association (2003): A central focus of sociological research is systematic attention to the causes and consequences of social inequalities. As long as Americans routinely sort each other into racial categories and act on the basis of those attributions, research on the role of race and race relations in the United States falls squarely within this scientific agenda. Racial profiling in law enforcement activities, “redlining” of predominantly minority neighborhoods in the mortgage and insurance industries, differential medical treatment and tracking in schools, exemplify social practices that should be studied. Studying race as a social phenomenon makes for better science and more informed policy debate. As the United States becomes more diverse, the need for public agencies to continue to collect data on racial categories will become even more important. Sociologists are well qualified to study the impact of “race”—​and all the ramifications of racial categorization—​on people’s lives and social institutions. The continuation of the collection and scholarly analysis of data serves both science and the public interest. For all of these reasons, the American Sociological Association supports collecting data and doing research on “race.” (p. 1)

This statement, from 2002, explains, further, that socially defined race is a sorting mechanism for friendship, mating, and marriage. It has been a basis for the distribution of social privileges and resources, and a reason to organize social movements to preserve or challenge the status quo. At the core of the statement is the adoption of race as a social construct that is used to organize our social and economic lives. What is different about sociology is that sociologists seek to explain the nature of power relationships between and among racialized groups and to understand more fully the nature and evolution of belief systems about race (i.e., the dimensions of how people use the concept and apply it in different circumstances). The statement also forcefully defends the sociological practice of researching racialization processes. Such data, according to the statement, allows critical scientific analyses of differences between socially defined groups (including economic, educational, and other inequalities), as well as the study of social relations between these groups.

Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa     61 Over the last decade a plethora of studies have sprung up to position race and racialization processes as reasons, or culprits, that contribute to increased inequalities worldwide (Popay et al., 2003; Smith et al., 1990). Yet the field of sociology convincingly uses the concept of race as a variable to explain disparities among population groups and to document patterns of vulnerabilities experienced by these groups, including the substantial and persistent inequalities between population groups differentiated by racialized categories. Additionally, the persistence of poorer economic, health, and educational outcomes for diverse groups raises the specter of the usual suspects: a lack of truly equal access to resources and a breakdown in effective interactions between racialized groups in pluralistic societies. Global, national, and local sociological reports explaining inequalities and differences have generated interesting knowledge regarding race. Some of this is evidenced by the World Health Organization (WHO) efforts to implement equity initiatives aimed at addressing disparities in health, for example, on a global scale (World Health Organization, 2011). Increasing public attention to the matter and advocacy for greater interventions have also advanced the discourse to a point where nation-​states are urged to collect surveillance data using race or ethnicity as variables (WHO, 2011). Whether these disparities are theorized as social, biological, or even genetic differences, race is being promoted as consequential to health disparities and thus to the policies that governments and state institutions pursue, from interventions to funding sociological research to the services they offer their constituencies. This research agenda reveals not only how race is conceptualized in sociology, but also how it impacts everyday understandings of race and is framed in relation to other social welfare agendas.

Methodological Underpinnings Informed by the Foucauldian analysis of discourse as a critical interrogation of knowledge production, situated power, and resistance, this chapter will address how African sociologists use and conceptualize race. The point of entry into the discussion is an examination of the nature of race as a category of analysis within African sociology and the prevailing modes of social science research. The account given here focuses on how these prevailing discourses on race take shape and operate, and how in turn, they are resisted and transformed. The issue of if and how race is conceptualized in African sociology is particularly important, given the mountain of empirical evidence that shows the continued racialized inequalities that exist in society (Etches et al., 2006; Krieger, 2000). The chapter makes use of the richness of critical analyses of studies of race as a concept and of racialization processes on the continent to analyze how particular accounts of knowledge formations within the qualitative and quantitative research processes could become hegemonic or counter-​hegemonic. The importance of utilizing a critical discourse analysis framework

62   Nene Ernest Khalema is in understanding the contestations and “discursive explosions” (Foucault, 1976/​1990, p. 17) that have emerged in the sociological research on race in Africa. How sociologists research race is potentially hugely consequential. The chapter argues that discussions of race are discursive formations, operating within terrains of knowledge-​production practices and producing objects of knowledge that, in turn, generate both hegemonic and counter-​hegemonic storylines. This necessitates an analysis of the practice of knowledge production, and how particular knowledge in the research process becomes “true” and “normal.” Bringing together diverse critical voices spanning a variety of methods, disciplines, and approaches, the chapter proposes that these normalized storylines about race do not stand alone but are intricately connected to other discourses that have come and gone or have remained to influence African sociological scholarship about human differences. First, despite the absence of conceptual and operational definitions of race, sociologists and other social scientists have managed to construct and use race instrumentally to meet specific research goals. Second, despite the absence of these definitions, using race as a variable in demographic research has facilitated the identification and documentation of surveillance systems and demographic information aimed at alleviating the racialized inequalities in access to the economy, health, and education found in most pluralistic societies. This paradoxical use of race as a category of inquiry raises the question that interrogates the manner in which sociologists manage, construct, and sustain race as an instrumental idea that circulates in sociological research. To answer this question, one must concede that making racial characterizations of individuals as units of analysis to account for the distribution of disparities is a routine sociological practice. The practice of characterizing and differentiating humans by creating classificatory systems in the research process makes certain claims about the nature of bodies, differences, and sources of well-​being, and serves to order and shape human interaction in particular ways. The chapter concludes by elaborating on how the colonial classification schemes adopted and adapted in contemporary postcolonial states limit the necessary decolonial analysis of human differences and of what African sociology can potentially contribute. Thus, because sociology is a field that enables societies to be understood in their contexts, the chapter proposes the view of the African continent as a racialized space, ready for a critical African-​centered, decolonial, and multilayered sociological analysis of human differences as the sociology of race, identity, and differences is further advanced in African sociological epistemology. The foundational work of many thinkers in the field of sociology and beyond and the theoretical and conceptual hardware they have provided to enable critical inquiries are useful here. The inquiry is informed by and engages with critical scholarship on the nexus of race research, drawing on the theoretical well of critical race theory, and its critical verities as sketched by postcolonial theorists, but extending and insisting upon the hegemonic and counter-​hegemonic discourses these critiques offer. The ideas and approaches of the key theorists of critical inquiry on racialization, critical race theory, and postcolonial fields, and the early sociological rebuttals as seen in the works of W. E. B. Du Bois, Franz Fanon, Loring Brace, Joseph Graves, Dorothy Roberts, Stuart Hall,

Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa     63 bell hooks, and Bonilla-​Silva are taken up. Equally, the work of critical theorists such as Omni and Winant, Nancy Krieger, Paul Gilroy, and Theo Goldberg, who have built on the critical foundations of Franz Fanon, is of fundamental importance. The fields of critical race theory and “Whiteness” studies (Delgado & Stefanic, 2017; Hall, 1980, 2000, 2017; hooks, 1990; Kesse, 2017) have informed this approach to analyzing the ways in which racialized discourses have been constructed, and how these constructions trouble race as an idea, identity, and practice, especially as it interlocks and intersects with other markers of differences such as class, gender, sexuality, and culture. In this way, the chapter offers a lens to advance a critical Africa-​centered, decolonial, and multilayered sociological analysis about human differences.

Researching Race and Human Differences in Sociology: Problematic Suppositions in Its Early Conceptualization and Inquiry Ideas about the meaning of race did not come from nowhere. They are products of discursive (re)productions of knowledge, generated through the spaces and dynamics of sociohistorical circumstances. To say that the concept of race is a product of discursive (re)productions of knowledge is not only to deal with the problem in its conceptualization, but also to interrogate how prevailing discourses on race take shape and operate and how they are resisted and transformed. Despite more than two centuries of scholars from diverse disciplines debunking the validity of the existence of human biological races, the use of biological data to investigate purported racial differences persists in sociology and social science research. Biological race, it has been said repeatedly, is not real. However, according to Hanley-​Lopez (2006), Khalema (2015), and Roberts (2011), society has made race real through laws, public policies, and social practices designed historically for the primary purpose of circumscribing and controlling the lives of people of color. Over the last two centuries there has been a burgeoning academic preoccupation with explaining “human differences” (Banton, 1979; Jones, 2005; Newby & Newby, 1995; Sampson, 2005; Wallenstein, 1991). This has generated an increasing amount of scholarship in the natural and social sciences (including sociology) concerning what these differences entail, and concepts such as “race” have been tossed around, increasing the controversy. Gould’s (1981/​1996) book The Mismeasure of Man offered what he thought was a succinct chronological history of race theorizing in Western thought. Gould’s study of the construction of racial differences and racial inferiority in the eighteenth-​and nineteenth-​century scientific discourse highlights several observations about the nature of the “science,” inquiry, and discourse on human differences informed and influenced

64   Nene Ernest Khalema modern understandings of race as a concept, idea, and practice. Gould traces the history of “race theorization” to the German popular philosopher Christoph Meiners, who, in 1785, in a book titled Outline of the History of Humanity, posited that there exist two great branches of human beings: the Caucasian and Mongolian. Blumenbach’s (1795) book On the Natural Variety of Mankind adopted this view by using the term Caucasian to refer to White peoples of Europe.2 Meiners’s and Blumenbach’s theorization about race gave rise to more benign theories about human differences. According to Gould, after Meiners’s and Blumenbach’s interventions, several theorists reclaimed the notion of race as one of the three great “races of man”—​that is, Caucasians alongside Negroes and Mongolians, sometimes called Caucasoids, Negroids, and Mongoloids. Theorists such as de Gobineau (1967)3 distinguished Caucasians, Negroes, and Mongolians as racial types, and argued further that among Europeans there was a more sophisticated “brand” of races that included Aryans and Nordics, and thus Caucasoids could be further stratified ethnically. As scholars moved away from orthodox biological notions of race and rigidity of what that classification brings, theorists argued for a more reformist view of race that allowed further articulations based on colonial situations, cultural differences, and development ideologies. For example, in tracing the history of the construction of the race concept, Immanuel Wallerstein (1991), in The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity, noted that the shift away from theorizing about race as biology offered theorists space to deconstruct how the construction and the politics of racial identities are informed and influenced by factors such as the experiences of colonialism and migration; social, political, cultural, and economic exclusion; and marginalization and racism. Wallerstein used a Marxist and post-​Marxist perspective to examine the adequacy of the notions of race, nation, and class in explaining the divisions of the postcolonial world. He showed how the construction of race operates as a form of social, political, and cultural expression, differentiation, and integration or political resistance (or both) to White hegemony; racial conflict; race relations; and social, political, economic, and cultural conditions. He argues that the typical sociological constructs of race versus class are a mistaken analytic starting point. The origin of “races” in a national society is either migration from a different nation (usually working-​class immigrants moving from the periphery to the core in search of higher paying jobs) or internal colonialism. In addition to Wallenstein (1991), Bonilla-​Silva (2001) argues that the use of the race concept still follows, that what Eurocentric notions of human differences “ought to be,” and have historically been used to characterize those deemed different to them during the pre-​capitalist expansion ideas of savagery, barbarism, and cultural inferiority of the “other.”4 In his critique of the contemporary production of the race concept in Western thought in White Supremacy and Racism in the Post–​Civil Rights Era, Bonilla-​Silva (2001) argues that the structural outcomes of race theorizing are linked to symbolic representations that extend from individual imagery to sanctioned societal fictions, constituting historically based and currently practiced racist systems. Bonilla-​ Silva also traces the history of racism to early theories of racial classification, which are still prevalent in many forms today. For Bonilla-​Silva, colonial social policies created a

Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa     65 racialized social system that reinforced the tripartite racial order via segregated schools, hospitals, prisons, social clubs, and residences. Although racial segregation was not part of the official colonial policy, colonial concerns over hygiene, intermarriage, and sexuality were used to justify racial separation. Bonilla-​Silva (2001) begins with a discussion of the colonialists’ first contact with Indigenous peoples, and then proposes that in many ways, stereotypical representations, of, for example, American Indians, represent both the historical and contemporary racialized subjectification of Indigenous peoples in the United States of America. He suggests that the academic treatment of Indigenous peoples resembles and emanates from an unconstrained past when the institutions of higher education throughout the United States, and indeed the world, discriminated against racial minority groups. Ideologies that rationalize and justify systems of social stratification are particularly important because they are inextricably linked to the nature of dominance by elites or political groups. Because in American social institutions, especially in the spheres of higher education, the economy, and health, the mainstream ideologies are those of meritocracy and constitutionally stated foundational freedoms, most academics follow the public and historical scholarship by either denying or downplaying systems of racial exploitation and oppression, such as race-​based slavery or Indigenous genocide.5

Contemporary Predicaments and Dilemmas An equally revealing dilemma in the analysis of the race concept in contemporary studies, one that is both strange and instructive, is how early race theorization negated the “ethnic variety” found in the two other identified races: Negroes and Mongolians. The silence in the scholarship on the multiplicity of identifications among Negroes and Mongolians highlights how the articulation of race early in Western thought shaped certain ideas about racial purity and authenticity. Not surprisingly, early theorists of the race concept relied on such prominent categories of differences, which according to Gould (1981/​1996), retained a prominent place in the contemporary discourse about race. This is where the dilemma begins concerning how the use of race as a unit of analysis (i.e., including its social constructivist elements) departs from the foundational milieu in which the term originated and embraces something else. Does simply redefining or reconceptualizing a word settle its significance? For me, it is apparent that the academic treatment of race still operates in a manner similar to that of the early theorists. This is not to negate the theoretical breakthroughs by notable theorists such as Paul Gilroy (1987, 2000), Theo Goldberg (1993), Omni and Winant (1994), and Ann Stoler (1991), to name a few. In fact, contemporary interventions by critical sociologists and feminist historians of science have produced similar critiques positing the problems with

66   Nene Ernest Khalema justifying the use of a complex race category in scientific discourse. Social theorists Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994), for example, ask questions about the sociopolitical use of race through social institutions and illustrate how race has been constituted in the modern nation-​state by a set of changing social relations, especially between Indigenous peoples and colonialists. Omni and Winant (1994) demonstrated that the meaning and use of race as a concept has varied over time and is open to contestation. Such variance is antithetical to the needs of research, where analytical variables must be consistent, and their categories mutually exclusive. Critical anthropologist Ann Stoler (1991) looked further at how the intersections of gender and race and the power relations between the colonizer and the colonized in colonial Asia help to constitute each another; and Anthony Kwame Appiah (1994) points to the role that nationalist, anticolonialist movements play as they produce their own constructions of the authentic and collective self, symbolized by one’s gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, or able-​bodiedness as defining the social.6 The distinguished deconstructionist Gayatri Spivak (1988) questions the assumption that a woman’s identity means that she speaks for women from a position of “knowledge.” She prefers to highlight the cultural and discursive construction of female subjectivity and cautions against the urge to claim to know or speak on behalf of other women based on shared or common identities (Harasym, 1990). Race has emerged as an essential concept in the contemporary sociological study of human differences (Agyemang et al., 2005; Etches et al., 2006; Fang et al., 1996; Krieger, 2000, 2004). Although its viability has been variously conceived and critiqued, in all cases it involves messages of identification, biological or otherwise. Numerous theorists have examined the problem of defining the concept of race, and the structures of racial categorization schemes, with respect to its historiography, philosophy, and application. South Africa–​born sociologist David Theo Goldberg (1993) has observed that social exclusion in the form of racialization and racism cannot be fully understood without at least some allusion to the concept of race (p. 61). He suggests that the concept of race “necessarily preceded the phenomenon of racism both conceptually and as matter of historical fact” (p. 62). Goldberg identifies at least two ways in which scholars have attempted to get at the meaning of the term race. One is a purely conceptual approach. Thus, one can stipulate a definition a priori based on what the term ought to signify in relation to “the conceptual scheme in which it is taken most convincingly to make sense” (p. 62). The second is a social and historical approach. This considers not just the usage of the term at different times in history, but also the sociohistorical conditions in which the meaning emerges and changes.7 Agreeing with Michael Banton (1998) that the idea of race conceptually stems from a long history of “classification science,” Knowles (2003) further argues that race is neither an illusion nor a biological fact, that it has a salience and a social reality in everyday lives, and that, despite its crucial importance to the organization of things, it is often overlooked. For Knowles, academics must begin to examine the small, everyday aspects of the structures of race. She declares that her book “is an attempt to nudge [race] into the mainstream; to insist that race is a central, not peripheral, part of the way things work” (p. 11).8

Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa     67 The pseudo-​scientific doctrines linking “racial types” to cultural and sociological differences and establishing a hierarchy of races belong here. During this phase, the term race attempted to characterize differences between groups of people as natural, biological, and irrevocable. Scholars theorized that the biological differences between Whites, Blacks, and Yellows were persistent and empirical. The differences were deemed permanent, universal, and fundamental in determining social structure (Goldberg, 1993). Thus, differences in cultural, social, and economic structures were explained in terms of the different races as natural and biological givens. Banton (1998) identifies a third phase, which can be described as the contemporary phase. According to Banton, the contemporary conceptualization of race has moved away from the idea of race as a biological entity. Emerging from a critique of critical race theorists and anticolonial and feminist movements, race was emptied of its scientific and objective claims. The pseudo-​scientific theories of race were discredited and dismissed as bad science. More sophisticated ways of explaining differences, without the idea of race, were introduced. Goldberg (1993) adds that in the contemporary phase, the notion of race no longer has its own content that is independent of social considerations and relations. He suggests that “any appeal to race is seen as masticatory, a form of false consciousness or misleading ideology” (p. 69). The value in observing changes in the use and meaning of the term race at different points in history is that it avoids rushing to definitions or racialization within the health field that are simply uncritical interpretations of the present in terms of the past, and vice versa (Banton, 1998, p. 8). For some analysts, the cause of eliminating social exclusion suffers when the discourse around exclusion is framed in a manner that gives credibility to an already discredited concept (for example, Banton would suggest this). For this reason, Banton expresses serious reservations about the concept of exclusion in the form of racism, for instance. According to Banton (1979), racism has no meaning or validity outside the faulty conception of race as a type or species. Since social and natural scientists have concluded that there are no genetically determined groups called human races, it must be concluded that, at least, “as [a form of] . . . doctrine, racism is dead” p. 28). In other words, both concepts are of little socio-​ analytical value today. Contemporary sociological approaches to the conceptualization of race employed by Banton (1979, 1998), Goldberg (1993), Knowles (2003), and Omi and Winant (1994) are very useful in that they illuminate the complexity of defining the race concept. Whether it is conceptualized as a biological, social, or political identification marker, race functions as a conduit between identity and social structures—​that is, between the meanings and values that groups and individuals place on human differences and the selection, imposition, and reinforcement of those meanings and values in political, cultural, and social institutions. For the purposes of this chapter, the discussion of the concept of race is disassociated from the notion that race is biologically determined. The discussion relies heavily on phenotype (skin color) as a symbol of social distinction used in the creation of hierarchical categories of status, class, and political power. Critical sociologists such as Paul Gilroy (1987) and Frantz Fanon (1967) have argued that race and racial differences (physical, phenotypical, cultural, and ideological) become a

68   Nene Ernest Khalema mechanism for the creation and maintenance of the power structure of domination and subordination in society. Cumulatively, all these interruptions problematize the race concept at its core: its definition, conceptualization, and embodiment. According to Ann Stoler (1991), understandings of race are always already embedded with racialized discourses and practices that are, she suggests, “woven into the weft of the social body, threaded through its fabric” (p. 69). Thus, they are sites whereby racialized understandings are recuperated, sometimes unwittingly, as one of the tactics in a “permanent social war” (p. 69) to “purify” society. Many progressive scholars, such as Stuart Hall (1986), agree with Stoler’s arguments and maintain that racial categories refer to objective realities, and that race operates as an independent causal force. In the words of Hall, “a ‘relatively autonomous’ affectivity, as a distinctive feature” of social life. Yet the status of race as a scientifically credible category (along with its three identifiers: Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid) remains in use in research practice in most postcolonial nations and settler societies. This leads to another tense question: To what does Hall’s phrase “autonomous affectivity” of race refer? How does one measure this affectivity? According to Gilroy (2000), to continue to use racial categories, even in efforts to combat racism, is to be complicit “in the reification of racial differences.” Gilroy’s view, though motivated by commendable goals, fails to adequately address the powerful continuing effects of processes of racialization in shaping the social structures of many modern societies and the lived experiences of the members of those societies. In defense of Hall’s position, Gilroy writes: “In leaving racial essentialism behind by viewing race itself as a social and cultural construction, it has been insufficiently alive to the lingering power of specifically ‘racial’ forms of power and subordination” (p. 492). Thus, race is still retained as an analytical category, not because it corresponds to any biological absolutes, but because it refers investigation to the power that collective identities acquire by means of their roots in tradition.9 It is clear from these analyses that in acknowledging the problematic history of racial categories and the enormous role they have played in knowledge production, contemporary social scientists have concluded that the scientific project of race theorizing ought to continue. This is not only because, in refining and critiquing the errors of the early analyses through research, researchers can offer useful critiques on a number of epochal events that have shaped the knowledge about race, including the consolidation of land during the late Middle Ages; the construction of the idea of Africa, Asia, and Europe as geographically distinguishable regions; and the rise of race-​based assumptions of innate phenotypical, moral, intellectual, and cultural superiorities and inferiorities. The critiques also offer a space in which to shed some light on the racist social and political practices of the contemporary world by insisting on supposedly “constructed” hierarchies of human difference. Racism plays a crucial role in explaining socioeconomic inequalities and the exclusion of racialized communities. For example, racism can be expressed through restricted socioeconomic opportunities and mobility, limited access to medical care and unequal treatment, residential segregation, and chronic stress. These denying

Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa     69 ideologies allow theorists and researchers alike to avoid meaningful discussions of racism in contemporary research, and even allow for a gentler interpretation of undeniable historical systems. Thus, social scientists and sociologists become prime players in the reproduction and dissemination (some say the actual production) of these ideological positions.

Colonial State Formations and Racial Classification Schemes in Africa: More Than Just “Race” Race made its first appearance in colonial classification systems in various countries in Africa in census enumeration schemes (Green & Darity, 2010; Zeleza, 2008). In the ensuing two centuries, official racial designations increased from three (White, slave, and other). Between 1880 and 1935, the African continent experienced the most dramatic and tragic changes of imperialism and colonialism in the consolidation and exploitation of the African states by the European colonialists (UNESCO, 1985). This was accomplished through treaty signings and military conquests (Rodney, 1972). By the late 1880s, the whole of West Africa, including the coastal areas of Senegal, Sierra Leone, the southern parts of the Gold Coast (now Ghana), the Ivory Coast and Dahomey (now Benin), and the island of Lagos (now Nigeria) had been directly incorporated under the French colonial rule. East Africa and Southern Africa survived the first scramble and partition for Africa until late in 1895, when the British colonialists established their rule. The Portuguese controlled the whole of Central Africa (Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Chad) until the late nineteenth century, when Belgium and France also began to contest for colonial rule. By 1914, with the exception of only Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole of the African continent had been firmly implanted and subjected to European colonization (UNESCO, 1985). While Rodney (1972) defines imperialism as a capitalist phase of dominance in which capitalist nations established political, economic, military, and cultural sovereignty over other parts of the world, Maldonado-​Torres (2007) defines colonialism as the political and economic relation by which the supremacy of a nation is controlled by another nation through economic and military power. Simons and Simons (1969) assert that upon arriving in Africa, the European imperialists displaced Black people by stripping them of their best fertile land and apportioning it among themselves. Cecil John Rhodes is a good example of the British imperialist with ambitions to advance Britain’s objective of expanding her empire. This goal was to be achieved through the annexation of the African continent by building a railway line from the Cape colony in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt. Rhodes played a crucial role in colonizing South Africa, which would be incorporated into the British empire from 1870 to 1910 (Nyoka, 2016).

70   Nene Ernest Khalema Colonial racialization in Africa caused serious major setbacks for the continent that affected the socioeconomic well-​being of the African people, and the impact is still felt even today (Magnarella, 2002). In Rwanda, the European political and socioeconomic reconstruction of the Rwandan society escalated ethnic tensions that resulted in extreme racial and ethnic discrimination and hate by those oppressed and suppressed, leading to targeted ethnic killings between the Tutsis and Hutus (Magnarella, 2002; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1995; White, 2009). In South Africa, racial classification was the foundation of all apartheid laws. The Indigenous African populations were seen as a biologically inferior (Magubane, 1996). Beginning in 1950, South Africans were classified based on race into one of four groups: native, Colored, Asian, or White. By 1966, 11 million people had been so classified under the Population Registration Act of 1950, which cemented the racial categories as real. For more than a century, racial segregation has been and still is the persisting problem at the heart of South African history (Irobi, 2005). Various racial classification acts, such as the Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950, the Pass Laws Act of 1952, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, among others, were introduced by the apartheid government with the intention to humiliate, control, and disadvantage the Black population by turning them into second-​ class citizens whose role was to serve the interests of the superior White race. These administrative measures had disastrous effects and further stripped local ethnic groups of their dignity and their social, economic, and political rights to exist as human beings in their homeland (see SAHO, 2021; Irobi, 2005). Ethnicity is the embodiment of values, institutions, and cultural patterns of behavior, and it represents a complex set of people’s historical experiences, aspirations, and worldviews that goes beyond race, language, or beliefs (Irobi, 2005). The discussion about the reification of race in academia becomes a primary battleground in the debates over the meaning and practice of scholarship. The dilemma of understanding where racism as institutionally practiced enters this debate, especially with the contemporary rethinking of race as a political and social reality in sociological thought. What is troubling is that if race is a concept belonging to the sociopolitical realm, and thus not a biologically meaningful concept, how does its use in academia move from biological determinant to political entity? The literature reviewed here treats race as a socially constructed phenomenon, yet this is often countered in research with the claim that there are obvious, observable racial differences among people. That is, there are significant phenotypic or morphological differences between groups of people from distinct geographical origins, and the race concept denotes these differences precisely. Given the historical meanings of race described earlier in the chapter, why should we persist in calling such differences racial? Moreover, what should we make of the fact that people are now, in our historical moment, likely to assume that certain superficial differences, particularly in skin tone, hair texture, and facial features, truly distinguish distinct human races, while other comparable differences among people (for example, differences in eye color or blood type) are discounted as indices of race differences? These questions and many more warrant further investigation and analysis.

Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa     71

Conclusion This chapter has highlighted several of the ways in which race as a sociological concept has shaped our understanding of humans. It has also shown how the concept of race can be resisted and transformed in many ways. The end of colonialism in Africa did not mean the end of a racialized system of oppression, nor did it empower postcolonial governments to abandon the use of racial categories or systems of racial classifications. Africa continues to represent racial otherness as it was constructed by the early racial scientists to say that there are biological differences between human populations. For example, the possibility that the race concept is best understood in terms of contextually embedded experiences (i.e., social and political processes of racialization) may give rise to new openings in the study and analysis of human differences. Given the debunked notion of biological race in favor of the social construction perspective, it is neither possible nor desirable to establish a valid sociological measurement of race in biological terms. At the same time, race is a very meaningful social category that can determine differential access to a broad range of societal resources. As we have seen in this chapter, the use of racial categories in sociological research measurement depends on the purpose for which race is being used. Measuring race in an African context is not simple, not only because of the complexities of the colonial situations in different African countries, but also because race intersects with other markers of difference such as ethnicity, origin, ancestry, nationality, and identity. In the Rwandan and South African examples described here, the lack of boundaries between ethnicity and race is a clear example of this complexity. Thus, ethnicity as a proxy for race may not be perceived as important when people feel themselves to be part of another group. However, when individuals have multiple ethnicities that intersect with other markers of difference (i.e., religion), the choice may be situational and consequential. There is good reason to conclude that in conceptualizing race in African sociology, a specific set of beliefs about human races that is used to justify the exclusionary practices of institutions and social structures is a distinctive product of the development of race thinking. From this perspective it is important to recognize that the inequalities in many spheres of African societies (i.e., the economy, health, and education) can now be found within many, if not most, societies globally. It would be disingenuous to equate these inequalities solely with the existence of biological races or skin color. Within and between countries, differences in racial measurement may arise due to diversity in the race concept, data collection methods, question format, terminology, or classification system. As noted throughout the chapter, the skin color concept of race might be more influenced by the intersection of many factors, including socioeconomic position. Hence, studies on socioeconomic distribution in African sociology must be mindful that color discrepancies may be partial, since socioeconomic status shapes racial

72   Nene Ernest Khalema identity, and can lead to errors in association when data on race and socioeconomic status (SES) are collected at the same time, especially in a continent as diverse as Africa.

Notes 1. The American Sociological Association goes on the record as opposing the elimination of data collection on racial classifications, because sociological studies show that this practice does not eliminate its use in daily life, both informally by individuals and formally within social and economic institutions. 2. Significantly, as a “racial” designation for the White peoples of Europe, the notion of a Caucasian race has been deconstructed in recent interventions. In recognizing these critiques, Blumenbach’s theorization of Whiteness can be viewed as part of a much larger story in which the complex interplay between politics (broadly understood) and science has shaped the development of “race science,” the still-​prevalent use of “race ideas” to interpret human diversity, and the production and reproduction of racialized social and political inequalities. 3. As seen in de Gobineau (1967). 4. See also Sampson’s (2005) Race and Empire, which provides an in-​depth introduction to the sociohistorical articulation of race, and explores the connections between constructions of racial differences and its justifications. 5. Equally important are the material functions appropriate to the precapitalist mode of production that subjugated minoritized and racialized communities as subordinates in a capitalistic mode of production. Thus, the material nature of capitalist production meant a reconstruction of ideas about human differences within a capitalist mode of production. 6. This list does not present the breadth and depth of the contemporary interrogation of race as a concept, idea, and practice. Several authors not mentioned above have “troubled” the idea of race in many ways indicating how it interlocks and/​or intersects with other markers of differences. For further analysis see Agyemang et al. (2005); Anthias & Yuval-​Davis (1993); and hooks (1990). 7. Knowles (2003) suggests: “Race is all around us . . . race is mundane” (p. 10), reminding me of W. E. B. Du Bois’s contention that race is the most important issue in the twentieth century. 8. For example, researchers like Herrnstein and Murray (1994) have argued that racial differences such as Caucasian (White or European), Negroid (Black or African), Mongoloid (Asian, Chinese or Indic), and Australoid (Aboriginal to Australia) exist. The authors fail to note that the genetic makeup of human beings is common to all ethnic groups and that the existence of human differences largely reflects superficial physical characteristics (phenotypes), such as facial features, hair, and skin color. See also Phillipe Rushton (1998), who shares much ground with Herrnstein and Murray. Rushton advocates a bio-​scientific concept that details significant biological differences between human populations. He classified all human beings somewhere among the three major racial groups: Black (Negroid), White (Caucasoid), Asian (Mongoloid). He claimed to have scientific evidence of an inherited link between brain size, intelligence, and race, where Blacks and Asians are on opposite ends on a spectrum and Whites are in-​between. Blacks, according to Rushton, have larger genitals, making them more promiscuous, and smaller brains, making them less intelligent than Whites and Asians. Using sixty different measures, Rushton ranks the races

Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa     73 along an evolutionary scale, with Blacks at the bottom and Asians at the top. The biological focus in Rushton`s conceptualization of race serves to “naturalize” the boundaries that divide human populations, making it appear that the differences reflect laws of nature. 9. Unfortunately, Gilroy’s defense flounders; he fails to infuse the “race” concept with any meaningful content. Gilroy and Hall’s equivocation inhibits the use of the race concept in rigorous social scientific inquiry as a necessity for examining the political use of race.

References Agyemang, C., Bhopal, R., Bruijnzeels, M. (2005). Negro, Black, Black African, African Caribbean, African American or what? Labelling African origin populations in the health arena in the 21st century. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 59, 1014–​1018. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.1136/​jech.2005.035​964 Akyeampong, E. (2000). Africans in the diaspora: The diaspora and Africa. African Affairs, 99, 183–​215. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​afraf/​99.395.183 American Sociological Association. (2003). The importance of collecting data and doing social scientific research on race. Washington, DC: American Sociological Association. https://​ www.asa​net.org/​sites/​defa​u lt/​f iles/​s avvy/​ima​ges/​press/​docs/​p df/​asa​_​rac​e_​st ​atem​ent​ .pdf?_​ga=​2.139177​907.164​1817​383.149​5044​876-​137​6519​990.147​8034​948 Anthias, F., & Yuval-​Davis, N. (1993). The concept of race and the racialization of social divisions. In F. Anthias & N. Yuval-​Davis (with H. Cain) (Eds.), Racialized boundaries: Race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-​racist struggle (pp. 1–​20). Routledge. Appiah, K. A. (1994). Identity, authenticity, survival: Multicultural societies and social reproduction. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition (pp. 149–​163). Princeton University Press. Banton, M. (1979). This idea of race and concept of race. In G. Verma & C. Bagley (Eds.), Race, education and identity (pp. 15–​31). MacMillian Press. Banton, M. (1998). Racial theories. Cambridge University Press. Blumenbach, J. F., & Banks, J. (1795). De generis humani varietate nativa. Vandenhoek et Ruprecht. In Blumenbach, J. F., & Bendyshe, T. (1865) (Eds.), The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (pp. 141–​171) (3rd ed.). Anthropological Society. Bonilla-​Silva, E. (2001). White supremacy and racism in the post–​civil rights era. Lynne Reinner. de Gobineau, A. C. (1967). The inequality of human races. Howard Fettis. Delgado, R., & Stefanic, J. (2017). Critical race theory: An introduction. New York University Press. Etches, V., Frank, F., Di Ruggiero, E., & Manuel, D. (2006). Measuring population health: A review of indicators. Annual Review of Public Health, 27, 29–​55. https://​www.annual​revi​ews​ .org/​doi/​10.1146/​annu​rev.pub​lhea​lth.27.021​405.102​141 Fang, J., Madhavan, S., & Alderman, M. H. (1996). The association between birthplace and mortality from cardiovascular causes among Black and White residents of New York City. New England Journal of Medicine, 335, 1545–​1551. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.1056/​NEJM​1996​1121​3352​101 Fanon, F. (1967). Black skin, white masks (C. L. Markman, Trans.). Grove. Foucault, M. (1990). The history of sexuality (Vol. 1, R. Hurley, Trans.). Vintage. (Original work published in 1976). Gilroy, P. (1987). There ain’t no Black in the Union Jack’: The cultural politics of race and nation. Hutchinson.

74   Nene Ernest Khalema Gilroy, P. (2000). The dialectics of diaspora identification. In L. Back & J. Solomos (Eds.), Theories of race and racism: A reader (pp. 490–​502). Routledge. Goldberg, T. D. (1993). Racist culture: Philosophy and politics of meaning. Blackwell. Gould, S. J. (1996). The mismeasure of man (Rev. an exp. ed.). W. W. Norton (Original work published in 1981). Green, T. L, & Darity, W. A. (2010). Under the skin: Using theories from biology and the social sciences to explore the mechanisms behind the black–​white health gap. American Journal of Public Health, 100, S36–​S39. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.2105/​AJPH.2009.171​140 Hall, S. (1980). Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance. In Blumer, H., & Dustin, T. (1980). UNESCO, Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1215/​978147​8002​413-​010 Hall, S. (1986). Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 10, 5–​27. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​019​6859​9860​1000​202 Hall, S. (2000). Old and new identities, old and new ethnicities. In L. Back & J. Solomos (Eds.), Theories of race and racism: A reader (pp. 144–​153). Routledge. Hall, S. (2017). The fateful triangle:Race, ethnicity, nation. Harvard University Press. Haney-​López, I. (2006). White by law: The legal construction of race. New York University Press. Harasym, S. (1990). The postcolonial critic: Interviews, strategies, dialogues. Routledge. Herrnstein, R., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in American Life. Free Press. hooks, b. (1990). Writing the subject: Reading the color purple. In H. L. Gates Jr. (Ed.), Reading Black, reading feminist (pp. 454–​470). Plume. Irobi, E. G. (2005). Ethnic conflict management in Africa: A comparative case study of Nigeria and South Africa. https://​www.beyon​dint​ract​abil​ity.org/​casest​udy/​irobi-​eth​nic. Copyright © 2003-​2022 The Beyond Intractability Project c/​o the Conflict Information Consortium. Jones, R. A. (2005). Race and reversibility. Journal of Black Studies, 35, 612–​632. Kesse, E. (2017). The Lives of the DuBoises in Ghana, 1961-​1963: The Silences, Thoughts, and Theorizing. In ASA 2017 Annual Meeting Paper. https://​ssrn.com/​abstr​act=​2937​027 Khalema, N. E. (2015). The fecundity of the race discourse in public health and epidemiology: Understanding the limits of explaining health disparities using race categories in Brazil. International Journal of Translation & Community Medicine, 3, 71–​78. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.19070/​ 2333-​8385-​1500​013 Knowles, C. (2003). Race and social analysis. SAGE Publications. Krieger, N. (2000). Refiguring “race”: Epidemiology, racialized biology and biological expressions of race relations. International Journal of Health Services, 30, 211–​216. https://​ journ​als.sage​pub.com/​doi/​10.2190/​672J-​1PPF-​K6QT-​9N7U Krieger, N. (2004). Data, “race,” and politics: A commentary on the epidemiologic significance of California’s Proposition 54. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 58, 632–​633. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.1136/​jech.2003.018​549 Magnarella, P. (2002). Explaining Rwanda’s 1994 genocide. Human Rights & Human Welfare, 2, 25–​34. Magubane, B. (1996). The making of a racist state: British imperialism and the Union of South Africa, 1875–​1910. Africa World Press. Maldonado-​Torres, M. (2007). On coloniality of being. Cultural Studies, 21, 240–​270. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​095023​8060​1162​548 Newby, R. G., & Newby, D. E. (1995). The bell curve: Laying bare the resurgence of scientific racism. American Behavioral Scientist, 39, 12–​24. https://​journ​als.sage​pub.com/​doi/​10.1177/​ 0002​7642​9503​9001​003

Race and Its Sociological Inquiry in Africa     75 Nyoka, B. (2016). Bernard Magubane’s the making of a racist state revisited: 20 years on. Journal of Black Studies, 47, 903–​927. https://​journ​als.sage​pub.com/​doi/​10.1177/​00219​3471​6658​864 Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). Racial formation in the United States from the 1960s and 1990s (2nd ed.). Routledge. Popay, J., Thomas, C., Williams, G., Bennett, S., Gatrell, A., & Bostock, L. (2003). A proper place to live: Health inequalities, agency and the normative dimensions of space. Social Science and Medicine, 57, 55–​69. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0277-​9536(02)00299-​X Roberts, D. (2011). Fatal intervention: How science, politics and big business re-​create race in the twenty-​first century. New Press. Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Bogle-​L’Ouverture. Rushton, J. P. (1998). Race is more than just skin deep: A psychologist’s view. Mankind Quarterly, 39, 231–​249. Sampson, J. (2005). Race and empire. Pearson Education. Sellstrom, T., & Wohlgemuth, L. (1995). The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience—​ historical perspective: Some explanatory factors. Overseas Development Institute. Shor, I. (1999). What is critical literacy? In I. Shor & C. Pari (Eds.), Critical literacy in action (pp. 1–​30). Boyonton/​Cook Publishers. Simons H. J., & Simons R. E. (1969). Class and colour in South Africa, 1850–​1950. Penguin Books. Smith, G. D., Bartley, M., & Blane, D. (1990). The Black Report on socioeconomic inequalities in health 10 years on. British Medical Journal, 301, 373–​377. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.1136/​ bmj.301.6748.373 SAHO [South Africa History Online]. (2021). Race and ethnicity in South Africa https://​www​ .sahist​ory.org.za/​arti​cle/​race-​and-​ethnic​ity-​south-​afr​ica Spivak, G. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the interpretation of culture (pp. 271–​313). University of Illinois Press. Stoler, A. L. (1991). Carnal knowledge and imperial power: Gender, race and morality in colonial Asia. In M. di Leonardo (Ed.), Gender at the crossroads of knowledge: Feminist anthropology in the postmodern era (pp. 51–​101). University of California Press. UNESCO. (1985). General history of Africa VII: Africa under colonial domination. UNESCO. Wallerstein, I. (1991). The construction of peoplehood: Racism, nationalism, ethnicity. In B. Etienne & I. Wallerstein (Eds.), Race, nation and class: Ambiguous identities (pp. 71–​ 85). Verso. White, K. R. (2009). Scourge of racism: Genocide in Rwanda. Journal of Black Studies, 39, 471–​ 481. https://​journ​als.sage​pub.com/​doi/​10.1177/​00219​3470​6297​877 World Health Organization (WHO). (2011). Causes of death 2008: Data sources and methods Department of Health Statistics and Informatics World Health Organization. Geneva: OMS, 1–​28. https://​kipdf.com/​cau​ses-​of-​death-​2008-​data-​sour​ces-​and-​metho​ds_​5​ae50​46c7​f8b9​ aa65​58b4​5ab.html Zeleza, P. T. (2008). The challenges of studying the African diasporas. African Sociological Review, 12, 4–​21. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.4314/​asr.v12i2.49831

Chapter 5

Ethnicit y, P ol i t i c s of P ower Sha ri ng , an d Nation-​Bu i l di ng in Afri c a Inyokwe Sunday Otinche

Introduction African countries share commonalities in ethnic characteristics, colonial experiences, patterns of governance and interethnic relations, the politicization of ethnicity, democratic traditions, subjective criteria for sharing power, and the challenges of state-​and nation-​building. This chapter examines the relationship between ethnicity and state-​building in Africa and explains how the colonial government built upon links between primordial identities and constructed ethnic identities for its own imperial gain, with social, political, and economic consequences for nation-​building in the postcolonial era. This manipulation created ethnic superiority and inferiority complexes among the colonized, and, at independence, political power was handed over to the most surreptitiously superior and privileged ethnic groups, leaving a legacy of ethnic domination, discrimination and alienation, and interethnic conflicts, as is evident in Rwanda, Kenya, and Nigeria. The chapter charts a way forward for African leaders by urging them to create ethical values and liberal democratic environments that promote interethnic harmony, collaboration, and equity in the sharing of political and economic resources as pathways to promoting the common African identity and national unity.

78   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche

Ethnicity and the Politics of State-​Building in Africa The sociopolitical relations in Africa are ethnocentric in nature. Drawing from the experiences of Ludwig Gumplowcz, Bizumic (2014) defined ethnocentrism as the belief by one ethnic group that it is superior to other ethnic groups in terms of “language, behavior, customs and religion” (quoted in McCornack & Ortiz, 2017, p. 109) and culture (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). Ethnocentric belief is center stage in the North-​South divide in Nigeria, the Hutu-​Tutsi dilemma in Rwanda, and the Anglophone-​Francophone dichotomy in Cameroon. The anthropological notes of Clyde, Mitchell J. (1957), Epstein, Arnold Leonard (1958), Dworkin Ronald (1977) and Kymlicka Will (1996) evaluating ethnicity in Africa reveal the contrasting rights of ethnic minorities and social majorities and the willingness to accommodate and safeguard the pluralities of ethnic identities for nation-​ building. Anja’s (2015) thesis presents ethnicity and ethnic identity as a sociopolitical resource that inspired nationalism in the colonial era and ethnopolitical nationalism in postindependence African countries. Taking inferences from his work in Uganda, Green (2020) argued that a major determinant of national identification is membership of a “core ethnic group or staatsvolk,” whether the group is in power or not. He argued that “when the core ethnic group” gains control of political power, in-​group members identify with the president and the nation; and when their group is not in power, members of the core ethnic group “identify more with their ethnic group” (p. 2). These primordial dynamics of ethnic identification, solidarity, and affiliation influenced the distribution of political and economic resources in Africa throughout the colonial era and continued into the precolonial era. Colonialism introduced a new civilization and value system into Africa, and the colonialist altered ethnic identities and interethnic relations to suit that new civilization through what Mamdani (1996) called “indirect rule policy” (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012, p. 4) and constructive ethnic solidarity. Through indirect, or in some cases direct, rule, the colonialists organized ethnic groups into distinct ethnic categories to facilitate administration and subsumed minority ethnic groups under the homogeny of the core ethnic group. Green (2013) identified the corresponding relationships between tropical location, precolonial slave trade, the colonial creation of nation-​states, and low levels of urbanization, which, in addition to Ahlerup and Olsson’s (2012) “modern state experience, distance from the equator and insufficient supply of collective goods” (p. 71) and Blanton’s (2015) “finite common pool resources” (p. 9177), influenced ethnic-​identity formation and diversity. These scholars agreed that the slave trade, nation-​state creation, and the insufficient supply of collective goods played significant roles in ethnic segmentation and ethnic-​identity formation during the colonial period. Although these summative factors may not apply to all case-​study scenarios in Africa, the factors of tropical location, distance from the equator, and low levels of

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    79 urbanization have been vitiated by the experiences of Nigeria. In Nigeria, urbanization has increased the relevance of ethnic identities in nation-​building given the issue of social status and increasing relevance of ethnotraditional institutions and authorities,such as the Oba of Benin, the Oba of Lagos, the Emir of Kano, the Sultan of Sokoto, the Obi of Onitsha, the Olubadan of Ibadan, Tor Tiv, the Ooni of Ife and, in general, the paramount rulers in state administration and urban regional governance. Most of the leaders of these traditional institutions and authorities in Nigeria retired from exalted positions in post-​independent government and became custodians of the cultural heritage and traditions (Chandra, 2012) of their ethnic groups in urban cities, and they provide ancestral and cultural links between urban dwellers and rural ethnics. The existence of ethnotraditional institutions in the cities reinforces the value of ethnicity and ethnic identity as a resource for cultural and political mobilization of ethnic constituents. Chandra’s (2012) evaluation of the effect of ethnic identity on political and economic outcomes underscores ethnicity’s instrumental political and economic value in liberal democratic states. An examination of interethnic relations in Rwanda presents a good case study. Germany (1885–​1919) and Belgium (1919–​1959) defied existing historical interethnic friendships and constructed the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic identities that have become so divisive. It can be inferred from Peter van den Berghe’s (1978) thesis that the precolonial Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups were bounded by the shared belief in common group interests and the desire of each to maintain its unique ethnic group descent (Connor, 1994; Kataria, 2018) without jeopardizing the interests of each other. They were united by the Kinyarwanda language and as such, the precolonial Hutu-​Tutsi interethnic conflict was subsumed under the “center-​periphery conflict” (Prunier, 1995, p. 21). However, the social context of Hutu-​Tutsi relations changed with the arrival of the Germans and Belgian colonialists, who described the Tutsi as distinct from the Hutu in origin, economic orientation, social status, and physical appearance despite their shared language, religion, and settlement patterns. This new ethnic identity established the superiority of the Tutsi (also called Batutsi), who made up 15 percent of the population, over the 85 percent population who were Hutu (Bahutu), the 1 percent who were Twa (Batwa), and the 1 percent of abazungu (or Europeans) put together. The colonialists privileged the Tutsis because of their affiliation with the Hamitic race and Christian churches and schools Generally, ethnic conflict and conquest were essential features of the empire-​building, exploited by the colonialists to achieve their imperial goals. After the Berlin Conference 1884/​5, the Tutsi assisted the Germans on the expedition that conquered the Northern Hutu and triggered historic animosity between the northern Hutu and the Tutsi and the Southern Hutu (Dursey, 1994; Stafford, 2000). The Germans then appointed many Tutsis to privileged positions in government, gave them greater access to traditional landholdings than the Hutu received, and created a “patron [Tutsi]/​client[Hutu]” relationship (Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1996) between them. Records shows that by 1959, 43 of the 45 chiefs and 549 of the 559 subchiefs appointed by the colonial government were Tutsis. This created an pattern of “dominance-​subordination, superiority-​inferiority and

80   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche exploitation-​suffering” (Ashutosh, 2016, p. 82) between the Tutsi and Hutu and altered the balance of power in Rwanda in favor of the Tutsi, leading to the interethnic hate, resentment, and alienation that eventually triggered the Rwandan genocide. Segregation of the Hutu/​Bahutu ethnic group was justified in the churches, schools, public administration, and the army, as revealed in the letter written by the White Christian Missionary Fathers (working hand-​in-​hand with the German and Belgian colonial authorities) to the British authorities in London: The greatest mistake this government could make would be to suppress the Mutusi [Tutsi] caste. Such a revolution would lead the country directly to anarchy and to hateful anti-​European communism. We will have no better, more active, and more intelligent chiefs than the Batutsi. They are the ones best suited to understand progress . . . The government must work with them. (Ashutosh, 2016, p. 80)

In 1922 the missionaries relocated the mission school in Nyanza to Kabyagi to facilitate enrollment of the Tutsi (Ashutosh, 2016); this resulted in low Hutu literacy and employment in the colonial public service. The colonialists used means-​based criteria to classify ethnic identities. Individuals with 10 head of cattle were classified as Tutsi/​ Batutsi; those with fewer than 10 cattle were classified as Bahutu/​Hutu and Batwa/​Twa (Ashutosh, 2016). These inequities triggered the violent 1959–​1962 Rwandan Revolution, the overthrow of the Hutu-​led president Gregoire Kayibanda (a southern Hutu), the ascension of Juvenal Habyarimana (a northern Hutu) to power in 1973 (Stafford, 2000), and his death in a plane crash in 1994. Amid these national tragedies, President Habyarimana adopted a one-​party system as an instrument of national integration, but the prevailing political, social, and economic crisis weakened his capacity to achieve his vision. Instead, he politicized ethnicity, promoting the politics of ethnic divide and rule that ultimately increased the temperature of Hutu-​Tutsi hostility. Other national crises also impacted state-​building in Rwanda negatively: the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) rebellion, led by Fred Rwigema and Paul Kagame; the 1959–​1962 revolution; the formation of the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement and the Hutu Manifesto of 1957; and the emergence of Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwanda National Army), which was supported by the French government, and the RPF as revolutionary actors in Rwandan politics. To address these challenges, President Paul Kagame implemented many social, political, and economic reforms aimed at promoting interethnic harmony, national integration, political stability, and participatory governance (Stafford, 2000). Berman (1998) has argued that ethnicity is created by elites seeking an opportunity to promote conservative modernization in a “personalistic, materialistic and opportunistic” manner (p. 305). The elites of the ruling ethnic group fragment the other ethnic groups into subregional political units to diminish their political strength and bargaining power. Che (2016), Esteban et al. (2012), and Vanhanen (1999) have provided a conservative account of the biological and generational nature of ethnic groups based on the myths

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    81 about common blood, descent, ancestry, and social solidarity, but Che, Esteban, et al and Vanhanen reveal the in-​group kindness and out-​group hostility between the Hutu and Tutsi. Ethnic solidarity is associated with in-​group kindness,whereas out-​group hostility accounts for ethnic mistrust, discrimination, domination, alienation (Geertz, 1963), and competition for political power by any means possible (Otinche, 2022). Out-​ group hostility motivates a utilitarian inclination to breach power-​sharing agreements, politicize ethnicity, and create ethnic conflicts that generate serious security concerns (Chandra, 2004; Ruane & Todd, 2004). Unhealthy competition for power breeds political “greed” (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2000, 2004; Ellingsen, 2000); structural “inequality” (Gurr, 1993, 1994); and grievances and frustration, as is evident in Rwanda, Kenya, Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. In the pursuit of this selfish agenda, history is written and rewritten by ethnic groups to justify their claims to land, state resources, self-​determination, and autonomy in dimensions that lead to ethnic conflict, state failure, state fragility, and state collapse (Otinche, 2021a). State failure and state collapse call into question the ability of the leaders to effectively manage interethnic relations. Otinche (2021a) has argued that “ethnicity is not in itself a dysfunctional phenomenon but its politicization” in favor of relative advantages over political and economic resources (p. 7). The politicization of ethnicity by the British colonial authority in Nigeria and the advantaged position of the Hausa-​Fulani ethnic groups over other ethnic groups created by the indirect rule system, regionalism, and the allocation of seats in parliament undermined the identity and integrity of the other ethnic groups. The resultant North-​South dichotomy, suspicion, and disagreement delayed Nigeria’s independence from 1956 to 1960. The Richard constitution of 1946 and the Willink Commission of 1957 (Çanci & Odukoya, 2016; Otinche, 2012) undermined the agitation by minority ethnic groups for the creation of the Middle Belt, the Calabar-​Ogoja-​Rivers (COR) region by the colonial government and invariably the creation of the Mid-​West region in 1963 to the neglect of the agitation for the creation of the Middle Belt and the Calabar-​Ogoja-​ Rivers regions (Izuagie, 2015). Irked by this development, the Borno Youth Movement (Kanuri) called for the redrawing of the map of Nigeria to correct the ethnic-​identity imbalances (Ejobowah, 2000; Izuagie, 2015). The emergent contradiction led to the creation of many states and local government councils to give ethnic groups in Nigeria more political recognition and representation (Dworkin, 1977; Kymlicka, 1996; Rawls, 1971). However, the creation of states by the colonial and postcolonial governments was a political undertaking, meant to weaken the political influence of other ethnic groups (Thomson, 2000) in favor of the Hausa-​Fulani ethnic group. That there was a need to promote unity and nationhood among the various ethnic groups was emphasized in the national anthem the British colonialists handed over to Nigeria at independence,which reads in part “though tongues and tribes may differ, in brotherhood we stand.” The absence of a feeling of brotherhood in intra-​ethnic relations is responsible for the Ife-​Modakeke conflict (Yoruba) and the Aguleri-​Umulere conflict (Igbo), among others. These intra-​ethnic conflicts challenge van den Berghe’s (1978) claim that unique descent is the basis for the formation and identity of ethnic

82   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche groups, but without undermining Connor’s (1994) assertion that some ethnic groups become ethnic based on ancestral origin and evolution, and others by assimilation and/​ or Geertz’s (1963) “social existence” and “ineffable and overpowering coercive influence” of colonialism, religious and inter-​tribal wars that united them (p. 2). From the case of Nigeria, it is evident that the changes in the dimensions of ethnicity in relation to the dialectics of social and political boundaries as noted by Sama and Johnson-​Ross (1978) and the “formation, crystallization, and development of ethnic communities, cultures, and identities (Yancey et al., 1976) can be shaped by the process of industrialization and the position of ethnic groups within it” (Yang, 2000, p. 44). In Rwanda and Nigeria, ethnic identity was shaped by the ascriptive relationship of ethnic groups to the colonial government and the Christian missionary churches and schools (Sama & Johnson-​Ross, 1978). This also created and reinforced ethnic diversities, prejudices, discrimination, hostility, and identity politics, obliterating old identities and boundaries (Yang, 2000, p. 45) and creating a symbolic or resurgent identity (Omi & Winnant, 1986) or floating identities (Otinche, 2022) that provided the subjective conditions for interethnic conflict in Africa. This instrumentalist assumption reveals the fluidity and contingency of ethnic identity. Barth (1969) constructed specific historical and social contexts of ethnic groups as induced by political affiliation that yield significant returns to in-​group members (Portes, 1984). Chandra (2012) also raised concerns about the sociopolitical effects of ethnicity and ethnic-​identity formation and the crystallization into ethnic movements, such as the Arewa Consultative Forum, Ohaneze Ndigbo, Afenifere, and South-​South People’s Assembly, and the Middle Belt Forum in Nigeria, to buttress Yang’s (2000) potential costs and benefits of ethnic affiliation, competition, and bargaining for political, economic, and sociocultural resources. Kenya presents another case study. Kenya became a British protectorate in 1890, a colony in 1920 (Renu & Seema, n.d.), and the British Crown Colony of Kenya of about 40 constituent ethnic groups (Cohen & Middleton, 1970, cited in Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019, p. 165) as other European powers (Rosenberg, 2019) were also creating nation-​ states in Africa. In creating the Crown Colony of Kenya, tribal and ethnic boundaries and cultural values were distorted, with ethno-​divisive implications for Kenyan politics (Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019, p. 165). The process of state creation was guided by the Europeans’ erroneous belief that Kenyans and Africans were organized along tribal lines (Sandbrook & Barker, 1985), and accordingly, the colonial governments created local governments along linguistic, cultural, and tribal lines (Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019), which had far-​reaching consequences for interethnic relations, governance, and nation-​ building (Ogot, 2000; Mamdani, 1996). The British colonialists invariably legislated class and ethnic identity into politics with a view to integrating the new Kenya state into the emerging capitalist economy (Kitching, 1980; Shilaho, 2008) and to forestall unity of purpose and rebellion against the colonial government (Berman, 1998). These efforts sowed the seeds of the Mau Mau rebellion in 1952 (Renu & Seema, n.d.), ethnic discord, chauvinism, activism, and cleavages (Atieno-​Odhiambo, 1996) and primordial consideration by the Kikuyu Central Association to mobilize the people of its ancestral homeland for the liberation of the Kikuyu nation (Gachanga, 2012). At the Lancaster Conference held in Lancaster, representatives of the Kenya African National

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    83 Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union disagreed on the political and economic future of post-​independent Kenya. Ethnic mistrust ensued, as ethnicity was politicized and voting behavior took on ethnic dimensions and turned democratic elections into fierce interethnic struggles for political power (De Smedt, 2009). Ethnic violence in 1992 and postelection violence in 2008 (Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019) were signs of colonialism. Reviewing the ethnocentric phenomenon in Kenya, Leys (1975) argued that “Kenyans do define themselves in terms of ethnic group membership and very frequently see their ethnic groups as being in an antagonistic relationship with other groups” (p. 46). Confronted by these national challenges on taking office, President Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu) adopted the one-​party system and Swahili and English as official languages to unify the ethnic nationalities in Kenyans. The effort to promote national unity was constrained by the over-​centralization of power, lack of legislative autonomy and judiciary independence, and an intraparty crisis that led to the sacking of Vice President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Luo) and his replacement with Daniel Arap Moi (Kalenjin). The collapse of the Kikuyu-​Luo alliance in favor of the Kikuyu-​Kalenjin alliance complicated the management of interethnic relations and governance for presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Arap Moi and the successive governments. The Nyayo philosophy that was introduced by President Moi failed to provide adequate guarantees for national peace, love, unity, and national integration as envisaged owing to the political avarice, abuses of power, political assassinations, victimization of political opponents, and human rights abuses Moi allegedly committed. These crises raised political consciousness and ethnic mobilization and bargaining (Gachanga, 2012) for electoral votes among the Kikuyu (17.15 percent), Luhya (13.82 percent), Kalenjin (12.86 percent), Luo (10.47 percent), and Kamba (10.07 percent) ethnic groups (Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019). Th demographics show that the size of each ethnic group was insignificant in aiding any single ethnic group to win presidential elections without the support of one or more of the other ethnic groups, or ethnic coalition (Elischer, 2008, cited in Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019, p. 168), given the 50 percent–​plus-​one vote requirement to win the presidential election. Elections enable ethnic groups to gain control of power and an alienated political culture where members of other ethnic groups are excluded from privileged positions in government, it weakens the ability of other ethnic groups to compete for power. Rationally, the elites of the ruling ethnic groups invent political tradition (Hobsbawm, 2012) and a system of education (Gellner, 1983) to justify and mobilize “ethnic group members” and compete (Brass, 1979) for power and or retain it against liberal democratic traditions.

Consociationalism and Power-​Sharing Agreements Consociationalism provides an excellent intellectual analysis of the relationship between ethnicity, power sharing, and nation-​building. The democratic relations and

84   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche philosophy of governance in Africa are established on the baseline of ethnicity, which drives the agendas of constitutional reform and political transition. Even though political parties are the platforms for leadership selection and political representation, ethnic variables exert a strong influence on the allocation of political positions. Political leaders in many countries have reached political agreements on how to share power (a zoning system and rotational presidency in Nigeria) that aren’t backed up by a firm commitment to implement them. To properly understand these dynamics, consociationalism, which was developed by Arendt Lijphart (1977), seeks to explain how political stability can be achieved in an ethnically heterogeneous society through institutionalized power-​sharing agreements entrenched in the political culture and the constitution. By directing attention to consociational democracy and the behavior of the elites, the self-​negating prophesy of the elites in Lijphart’s thesis reveals their intent to restructure ethnic relations and create channels of political communication that foster mutual consent for power-​sharing agreements in heterogeneous societies, as seen in: 1. Kenya’s Government of National Unity (2008–​2013). 2. South Africa’s Interim Constitution (1993–​1996). 3. The 2008 Global Political Agreement of Zimbabwe between the President Mugabe–​led African National Union–​Patriotic Front and Morgan Tsvangirai’s opposition-​led Movement for Democratic Change (Kendhammer, 2015), with Mugabe having advantage over Tsvangirai. 4. South Sudan’s Transition National Government (2011), the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan 2013, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development(IGAD)–​ led High Level Revitalization Peace Forum (HLRPF) 2015–​2016 (Onditi et al., 2018). 5. The Gambia’s 2016 Coalition Agreement and the three-​yearJotna (2017–​2020; Otinche, 2021a). 6. Nigeria’s interim national government, rotational presidency, federal character principle, zoning principle, 13 per cent derivation. These power-​sharing agreements are not honored due to political avarice and the fear by ethnoregional elites of losing power, which often escalates ethnoreligious conflicts and threatens democratic growth and political stability. Le Van (2011) argued that this kind of “power sharing emerges as resources distribution, rather than an aggregating device for formulating a shared policy agenda” (p. 16) for national development, and where “power sharing agreement emerged through elites[’]” (p. 42) consensus or “extra-​ constitutional channels,” it jeopardizes the growth of democracy and the “consolidation of democratic institutions” (p. 18). African leaders hold on to power at the expense of social justice and against Lijphart’s model of how political power should be shared in multiethnic societies through the following:

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    85 1. Grand executive coalition among the elites for national unity.. This requires elites coalition, consensus building, trade-​off and compromise to agree, honour and implement power sharring agreement. 2. Mutual veto, which allows groups to reject decisions detrimental to their interests and to build consensus with other ethnic groups. For instance, in the colonial era, the Northern elites vetoed the motion moved by Chief Anthony Enahoro on the floor of parliament in 1953 for Nigeria to become self-​governed in 1956. This attracted violent reactions and counter-​reaction (civil unrest) from the masses in Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1953 and underscored the fact that the power of veto was strong in the colonial ear and is seemingly weak in contemporary Nigerian politics. 3. Proportionality, which provides the framework for representational equity (equality of state in Senate where each state is represented by 3 Senators, zoning, federal character principle) and proportional representation (population in the House of Representatives). 4. Segmented autonomy (Belay, 2013), which results in the creation of state and local government, decentralization of power, concurrent legislations, and delegated legislation. Lijphart’s thesis of power sharing and nation-​building enables ethnic groups to make political and economic gains and acquire more democratic credentials where it is judiciously implemented. Power-​sharing agreements based on proportionality, reciprocity, and the mutual veto improve the quality of governance, interethnic relations, and national integration. Proportional representation at the level of state administration secures “freedom and autonomy for each segment” (Kendhammer, 2015, p. 115), minimizes ethnoreligious and political tensions, and promotes national integration. But even where consociational agreements are institutionalized, they can be abused if the elites fail to respect the norms of reciprocal power exchange. Reacting to this challenge, Kendhammer (2015) argued that “agreements are entered (into) by ethno-​religious elites that controls power but (and) are unwilling to share” (p. 115) presidential power with the constituent ethnoreligious elites as evident in many African countries. Generally, power-​sharing agreements promote national integration or disintegration, or both. As Deng (1997) argues, consociational power sharing is linked to value systems, institutions, and patterns of behavior and conflict resolution. Andeweg (2000) and McGrattan (2012) acknowledged the danger that those wishing to retain power may dishonor power-​sharing agreements against democratic standards. Onditi et al. (2018) claim that the elites use nonmajoritarian principles to resolve conflict. Barry (1975) queries the complicated processes of conflict resolution and identity transformation in multiethnic societies by hinging his argument on the failure of consociationalism to guarantee peace through bridge-​building. The cases of South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo and the evolving trend in The Gambia are frightening threats to the propriety of consociational power-​sharing arrangements

86   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche and bridge-​building across ethnopolitical divides. Consociationalism provides the sociopolitical capital that sustains power-​sharing agreements and disagreements. The capacity of members of ethnic groups to negotiate favorable terms for power-​ sharing agreements can be weakened by the greater power of the president and his ethnic cronies and the support from the former colonial government that created and sustained ethnic divisiveness in Africa. The nonconsensual mode of creating state and local government councils alienates ethnoregional elites in power-​sharing arrangements. Efforts to share political power between the country’s north and the south have been challenging in Togo. Shortly after independence in 1960, the ethnopolitical class in Togo engaged in a struggle to control the national government, with dire consequences that led to: 1. The assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio by the military-​dominated North led by President Nicholas Gruntzsky in 1963; 2. The overthrow of President Nicholas Gruntzsky by Gnassingbe Eyadema on January 13, 1967; 3. The stranglehold on power by Gnassingbe Eyadema from 1967 to 2005; 4. The death of President Eyadema in 2005 and the transfer of political power to his son Fourah Eyadema by the military elites in breach of the constitutional arrangement that favored the Speaker of the Togolese Parliament (Chimtom, 2017). These completely altered the power structure in Togo in favor of the Habye ethnic group and reduced the public-​service dominance of the Ewe ethnic group from 70 percent to 25 percent (Chimtom, 2017; Otinche, 2022). The breach of the statutory mechanism for transferring power and the unwillingness of President Fourah Eyadema to initiate democracy reforms and broaden political participation and representation has threatened political stability in Togo. In Rwanda, the attempt by President Habyarimana to address the devastating crisis of governance and nation-​building led to the Arusha Accord of 1993 and a broad-​based transitional government based on a power-​sharing agreement between the government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The accord, which signaled the end of the civil war, advanced a proposal for integrating the RPF into the national army to facilitate a smooth political transition. In a related development, the Ambazonia rebellion in the Cameroon is a product of the power-​sharing dilemma between Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon. Even though it was devoid of ethnic connotations, the overwhelming influence of the Francophone on the Anglophone undermined the cultural identity of the Anglophone, the two-​state structure power-​sharing agreement (Agwanda & Asal, 2011), and the allocation of a development infrastructure (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2020; Sama & Johnson-​Ross, 1978). These are also the challenges of nation-​building in ethnofederal Ethiopia (Richard et al., 2022), where the alienation of the Tigray fostered the Tigray rebellion. The attempts by the Hutu in Rwanda and the

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    87 Tutsi in Burundi to alter the power structure through nonstatutory means led to a genocidal crisis as well as the ethnomilitia nationalism of the Boko Haram insurgency, the Niger Delta militancy, the Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, Amotekun, and Fulani herdsmen. These reveal that the propriety of consociational power sharing agreement that worked in Switzerland and other European countries (Mueller, 2014) failed in Africa because of patronage politics (Berman, 1998).

Identity Classification, Power Sharing, and Nation-​Building In nation-​ building, power-​ sharing arrangements are fundamental to democracy, good governance, national integration, interethnic relations, consensus-​and political coalition–​building, and national unity (Stigant & Verjee, 2018). Many African countries are confronted with the challenges of sharing political power. In Sudan, this led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 (Rolandsen, 2011) that signaled the end of the Darfur conflict (1955–​1972, 1983–​2005). The independence of South Sudan was marred by the power-​sharing disagreement between President Salva Kiir, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-​in-​Government, and Vice President Riek Machar, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-​in-​Opposition (Menocal, 2011; Onditi et al., 2018). The Transitional Government of National Unity that was put in place to mediate between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan 2013, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-​led HLRPF 2015 was marred by political ineptitude, injustice, broken power-​sharing agreements, and the fear of ethnic domination and alienation (Kalyvas, 2006; Onditi et al., 2018; Pinaud, 2014). In postindependence Kenya, the political disagreement among ethnopolitical actors was centered on the future of Kenya and the political conflict between President Jomo Kenyatta and Vice President Jaramogi Odinga (Adeagbo, 2011; Ajulu, 1998). The sacking of Odinga occasioned the collapse of the Kikuyu-​Luo (Central-​West) alliance and the emergence of Daniel Arap Moi as Vice President with the Kikuyu-​Kalenjin political alliance. The handover of political power to President Daniel arap Moi (1978–​2002) and subsequently to President Mwai Kibaki (Adar & Munyae, 2001; Ajulu, 1998 ) reveals the interplay of ethnic conflict (Bazzi & Gudgeon, 2021), ethnic favoritism (Franck & Rainer, 2012), “ethnic voting” (Banerje & Pande, 2007), and ethnic politics. This development led to election rigging, vote buying, electoral violence (Akiwumi Commission, 1999), intraparty and interparty crisis, power-​sharing disagreements, hate speeches, and militia politics (Khadiagala, 2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2008; Mwagiru, 2008). A National Accord and Reconciliation agreement of February 28, 2008, and the Bridge Building Initiative for Peace Accord were signed with a proviso to amend the constitution for more inclusive governance.

88   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche In The Gambia, opposition political parties led by the United Democratic Party formed a coalition that brought the dictatorial and repressive regime of president Yahya Jammeh (1991–​2016) to an end in the December 2016 elections (Gambia, 2016; Human Rights Report, 2016). Embedded in the 2016 Coalition Agreement was a power-​sharing agreement that assigned a three-​year tenure to President Adama Barrow, and a two-​ year tenure to Vice President Oussainou Darboe, of the statutory five-​year tenure for a single president. At the terminal date of President Barrow’s three years, in 2019, he challenged the constitutionality of the 2016 Coalition Agreement on the grounds that it violated­chapter 6, part 1, sections 63–​67 of the 1997 Constitution of The Gambia, which established the five-​year term for a democratically elected president and the conditions for resigning from office (Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia, 1997; Otinche, 2021a). The resultant three-​year Jotna intraparty crisis led to the defection of President Barrow and the formation of the National People’s Party, where he contested and won the elections held on December 4, 2021. A strong coalition of ethnic forces against the Barrow administration (Fula ethnic group) may trigger interethnic animosity and a cabinet reshuffle that may entrench the Fula ethnic group hegemony in The Gambian politics, contrary to historical realities. A strong appeal is therefore advocated for political leaders in The Gambia to promote interethnic harmony, smooth democratic transition and political stability in The Gambia. The absence of a constitutional provision for political power sharing between the North and the South in Nigeria from the colonial era to date has split the country into a North–​South dichotomy and ethnopolitical domination and alienation. The struggle to retain control of political power between the Hausa-​Fulani dominated North and the South led to the annulment of the elections of June 12, 1993, by General Ibrahim Babangida’s Hausa-​Fulani–​led military government. The outcome of this annulment is deep-​rooted interethnic suspicion, fear, acrimony, and conflict that have undermined the unity in diversity as a baseline of the Nigerian federation. The agitation by the Yoruba-​dominated human rights and prodemocracy activists pressured the Northern oligarchy to hand over political power to President Olusegun Obasanjo (May 29, 1999–​ May 29, 2007). The Hausa-​Fulani ethnic group controlled political power in Nigeria from 1960 to 1976 and 1978 to 1999; they regained power in 2015, which continues today. The Yoruba ethnic group controlled political power from 1976 to 1978 and 1999 to 2007. Ironically, no one from the Igbo ethnic group or any minority ethnic group has ever been elected president of Nigeria. The Obasanjo government initiated a broad-​based bridge-​building political process and distributed political appointments among both minority and majority ethnic groups and the first-​class majority ethnic group (Hausa-​Fulani), second-​class majority ethnic group (Yoruba), and the third-​class majority ethnic group (Igbo majority ethnic group and other minority ethnic groups). Scholars may object to the seemingly pejorative use of these first-​, second-​and third-​class ranking of ethnic groups in Nigeria without considering the political dynamics that informed their relevance to the Nigerian situation. The attendant inter-​ethnic crisis between the Hausa/​Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba and other minority ethnic groups and the alienation of the Igbo and Minority

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    89 ethnic groups has threatened the emergence of an Igboman, or ethnic-​minority, presidency from 1960 until today. Ethnic divisiveness has been made worse by the discriminatory appointments made by President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration since assuming office in 2015, against the “federal character principle” (Otinche, 2021b, p. 22). These antecedents have encouraged members of the various ethnic groups to compete as enemies for political power (Falola, 1999) at the federal-​, state-​, and local-​government levels. Otinche (2021b) argued that “an ethnic group may have quantitative control of political power without exercising qualitative control over it” (p. 19), and vice versa, hence the need to build an ethnically neutral nation and equitably distribute political power and economic resources among constituent ethnic groups. The balance of power-​ sharing agreements between the North and South was threatened with the death of President Umaru Musa Yar Adua, on May 5, 2010, and the transfer of presidential power to Vice President Goodluck Jonathan based on the Doctrine of Necessity. The Northern oligarchy resisted the transfer of power to Jonathan as justified by the Doctrine of Statutory Obligation enshrined in section 146 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999,which mandates that the vice president, deputy governor, or vice chairman of a local government will assume power in the event of the death or incapacitation of the principal leader. The jettisoning of the Doctrine of Statutory Obligation for the Doctrine of Necessity by the National Assembly reveals the propriety of political rationality over legal rationality in the nation-​building process in Nigeria.

The Way Forward Africa is ethnically heterogeneous. However, ethnicity and ethnic identity did not acquire political relevance in many African societies until the European colonialists arrived and seized on ethnic identity as a valuable political and economic resource. The lack of mutual understanding of the relevance of historic linkages and “common identity” (African Union, 2000, p. 3) among African people and a reciprocal respect for ethnic identity and integrity have turned many African countries into theaters of ethnic conflict, lacking democratic values and with retrogressive development. This African dilemma has compounded the tasks of leadership recruitment, democratic transition, and nation-​building. The logic of using ethnodemographic data and solidarity to gain control of political power and alienate others undermined the African Union’s (2000) vision of common identity and “collective action” (p. 3). A strong appeal is therefore made to African leaders to promote interethnic harmony, social cohesion, cooperation, and the historic continuity of identity of the Black race as ingredients of national integration and sustainable development. This will go a long way toward democratizing the conscience of Africans and achieving a sharing of power based on equity, fairness, and social justice, in turn minimizing the threat of ethnic domination and alienation that inhibits participatory governance and nation-​building.

90   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche

Acronym HLRPF High Level Revitalization Peace Forum

References Adar, K. G., & Munye, I. M. (2001). Human rights abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978–​2000. African Studies Quarterly, 5, 1–​17. https://​asq.afr​ica.ufl.edu/​files/​Adar-​Mun​ yae-​Vol-​5-​Issue-​1.pdf Adeagbo, O. A. (2011). Post-​election crisis in Kenya and internally displaced persons: A critical appraisal. Journal of Politics and Law, 4, 174–​179. https://​doi.org/​10.5539/​jpl.v4n2p​174 African Union. (2000). Constitutive Act of the African Union. Addis Ababa. African Union. https://​au.int/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​pages/​34873-​file-​con​stit​utiv​eact​_​en.pdf Agwanda, B., & Asal, U. Y. (2011). The Anglophone problem in Cameroon: The change from crisis to conflict, and a possible way forward to resolution. African Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 9–​34. http://​rep​osit​ory.riar​auni​vers​ity.ac.ke/​xmlui/​bitstr​eam/​han​dle/​123456​ 789/​1291/​ACC​ORD-​AJCR-​2021-​1.pdf?seque​nce=​1&isAllo​wed=​y Ahlerup, P., & Olsson, O. (2012). The roots of ethnic diversity. Journal of Economic Growth, 17, 71–​102. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​887-​011-​9075-​0 Ajulu, R. (1998). Kenya’s 1997 elections: Making sense of the transition process. New England Journal of Public Policy, 14, 73–​88. https://​schol​arwo​rks.umb.edu/​nejpp/​vol14/​iss1/​5/​ Akiwumi Commission. (1999). Report of the Judicial Commission appointed to inquire into the tribal clashes in Kenya. https://​sear​chwo​rks.stanf​ord.edu/​view/​5080​176 Andeweg, R. B. (2000). Consociational democracy. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 509–​ 536. https://​doi.org/​10.1146/​annu​rev.poli​sci.3.1.509 Anja, K. B. (2015). Introduction: Ethnicity as a political resource viewed by scholars from different disciplines. In K. B. Anja, S. Albiez-​Wieck, K. Mario, S. A. Antonio, S. Tobias, S. Sofie, & W. Thomas (Eds.), Ethnicity as a political resource: Conceptualization across disciplines, regions and periods (pp. 11–​24). University of Cologne Forum. Arusha Accord. (1993). Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and Rwandese Patriotic Front. August 3, 1993. pp. 1–​8. https://​pea​cema​ker.un.org/​sites/​pea​ cema​ker.un.org/​files/​RW_​9308​04_​P​eace​Agre​emen​tRwa​nda-​Rwa​ndes​ePat​riot​icFr​ont.pdf Ashutosh, S. (2016). Colonial roots of the Rwandese conflicts. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Invention, 5, 79–​83. www.ijh​ssi.orght​tps://​www.ijh​ssi.org/​ pap​ers/​v5(5)/​vers​ion-​2/​M05050​2079​083.pdf Atieno-​Odhiambo, E. S. (1996). Reconditioning the terms of fact: Ethnicity, nationalism and democracy as political vectors. In B. A. Ogot (Ed.), Ethnicity, nationalism and democracy in Africa. Maseno University College, Institute of Research and Graduate Studies. 74–​ 84. https://​unes​doc.une​sco.org/​ark:/​48223/​pf000​0111​569 Banerje, A., & Pande, R. (2007). Parochial politics: Ethnic preferences and politician corruption(CID Faculty Working paper no. 147). Center for International Development Harvard University.https:/​www.hks.harv​ard.edu/​cent​ers/​cid/​publi​cati​ons Barry, B. (1975). The consociational model and its dangers. European Journal of Political Research, 3, 393–​412. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1475-​6765.1975.tb01​253.x Barth, F. (1969). Ethnic groups and boundaries. Little Brown.

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    91 Bazzi, S., & Gudgeon, M.(2021). The political boundaries of ethnic divisions. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 13, 235–​266. https://​doi.org/​10.1257/​app.20190​309 Belay, A. A. (2013). Evaluating the system of power sharing Ethiopia in light of Arend Lijphart’s model of power sharing. European Scientific Journal, 9, 258–​266. Berman, B. J. (1998). Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: The politics of uncivil nationalism. African Affairs, 97, 305–​341. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​oxf​ordj​ourn​als.afraf.a007​947 Bizumic. B. (2014). Who coined the concept of ethnocentrism? A brief report. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 2, 3–​10. https://​doi.org/​10.5964/​jspp.v2i1.264 Blanton, R. E. (2015). Theories of ethnicity and the dynamics of ethnic change in multiethnic societies. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112, 9176–​9181. https://​doi.org/​ doi:10.1073/​pnas.142​1406​112 Brass, P. R. (1979). Ethnicity and nationalism: Theory and comparison. SAGE Publications. Çanci, H., & Odukoya, O. A. (2016). Ethnic and religious crises in Nigeria: A specific analysis upon identities (1999–​2013).African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 16, 87–​110. https://​www​ .ajol.info/​index.php/​ajcr/​arti​cle/​view/​144​735 Chandra, K. (2004). Why ethnic parties succeed. Cambridge University Press. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1017/​978110​8573​481 Chandra, K. (2012). Constructivist theories of ethnic politics.Oxford University Press. Che, A. M. (2016, June 1). Linking instrumentalist and primordialist theories of ethnic conflict. E-​international Relations. https://​www.e-​ir.info/​2016/​06/​01/​link​ing-​inst​rume​ntal​ist-​and​ -primor​dial​ist-​theor​ies-​of-​eth​nic-​confl​ict/​ Chimtom, N. K. (2017, November 8). Togo crisis takes a religious and ethnic dimension: Country’s bishops are worried. Crux: Taking the Catholic pulse. https://​crux​now.com/​glo​bal​ -chu​rch/​2017/​11/​togos-​cri​sis-​takes-​religi​ous-​eth​nic-​dim​ensi​ons-​count​rys-​bish​ops-​worr​ied Clyde, M. J. (1957). The Kalela dance: Aspects of social relationships among urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Manchester University Press. Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 563–​ 573. http://​web.worldb​ank.org/​arch​ive/​websi​te01​241/​WEB/​IMA​GES/​ON_​EC​ONO.PDF Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2000, May). Greed and grievances in civil war(Policy Research Working Paper no. 2355). World Bank Development Research Group. https://​doc​umen​ts1​ .worldb​ank.org/​cura​ted/​en/​359​2714​6873​9530​199/​pdf/​multi-​page.pdf Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievances in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 563–​595. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​oep/​gpf​064 Connor, W. (1994). A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a. . ., Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1, 377–​400. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​01419​870.1978.9993​240 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) . https://​edoju​dici​ary.gov.ng/​wp-​cont​ent/​ uplo​ads/​2016/​10/​1999-​Niger​ian-​Const​itut​ion.pdf Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia (1997). hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/gambia​ -constitution.pdf. Deng, F. M. (1997, June 1). Ethnicity: An African predicament. Brookings. 15(3), 28–​31 https://​ www.brooki​ngs.edu/​artic​les/​ethnic​ity-​an-​afri​can-​pred​icam​ent/​ De Smedt, J. (2009). “No raila, no peace!”:Big man politics and election violence at the Kibera grassroots. African Affairs, 108, 581–​598. https://​www.jstor.org/​sta​ble/​40388​421 Dursey, L. (1994). Historical dictionary of Rwanda. Scarecrow Press. Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press. Ejobowah, J. B. (2000). Political recognition of ethnic diversity: Lessons from Nigeria. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 6, 143–​165. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​135371​1000​8428​601

92   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche Ellingsen, T. (2000). Colourful community or ethnic witches brew? Multiethnicity and domestic conflict during and after the cold war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, 228–​249. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​0022​0027​0004​4002​004 Epstein, A. L. (1958). Politics in an urban African community. Manchester University Press. Esteban, J., Laura, M., & Debraj, R. (2012). Ethnicity and conflict: An empirical study. American Economic Review, 102, 1310–​1342. https://​doi.org/​10.1257/​aer.102.4.1310 Falola, T. (1999). The history of Nigeria. Greenwood Press. Franck, R., & Rainer, I. (2012). Does the leader’s ethnicity matter? Ethnic favoritism, education and health in Sub-​Saharan Africa. American Political Science Review, 106, 294–​325. https://​ doi.org/​10.1017/​S00030​5541​2000​172 Gachanga, T. (2012). Kenya: Ethnic agendas and patronage impede the formation of a coherent Kenyan identity. Africa Files At Issue E-​Zine, 14, 1–​7. http://​genoc​ide-​watch.com/​ima​ges/​ Kenya_​12_​A​pril​_​10.pdf Geertz, C. (1963). The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states. In C. Geertz (Ed.), Old societies and new societies states: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa (pp. 105–​157). Free Press of Glencoe and Collier-​Macmillan. http://​hype​rgee​ rtz.jku.at/​Geer​tzTe​xts/​Int​egra​tive​_​Rev​olut​ion.htm Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Cornell University Press. Green, E. (2013). Explaining African ethnic diversity. International Political Science Review, 34, 235–​253. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​01925​1211​2455​075 Green, E. (2020). Ethnicity, national identity and the state: Evidence from Sub-​Saharan Africa. British Journal of Political Science, 50, 757–​779. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00071​2341​ 7000​783 Gurr, R. T. (1993). Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization and conflict since 1945. International Political Science Review, 14, 161–​201. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​019​ 2512​1930​1400​203 Gurr, R. T. (1994). Peoples against states: Ethnopolitical conflict and the changing world system. International Studies Quarterly, 38, 347–​377. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​2600​737 Hammond, R. A., & Axelrod, R. (2006). The evolution of ethnocentrism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50, 926–​936. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00220​0270​6293​470 Hobsbawm, E. (2012). Introduction: Inventing tradition. In E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (Eds.), The invention of tradition (pp. 1–​14). Cambridge University Press. Human Right Watch. (2016, February 11). Gambia’s 2016 presidential election .The Gambia. https://​www.state.gov/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2019/​01/​The-​Gam​bia-​1.pdf Intergovernmental Authority on Development. (2015). Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Addis Abab, Ethiopia. https://​unm​iss.unm​issi​ons​ .org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​final_​proposed_​compromise_​agreeme​nt_​f​or_​s​outh​_​sud​an_​c​onfl​ ict.pdf Institute for Peace and Security Studies.(2020, March). Peace and security report: Cameroon conflict insight. https://​docpla​yer.net/​219674​109-​Camer​oon-​confl​ict-​insi​ght.html Izuagie, L. (2015). The Willink Minority Commission and minority rights in Nigeria. EJOTMAS: Ekpoma Journal of Theatre and Media Arts, 5, 206–​223. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​ ejot​mas.v5i1-​2.16 Kalyvas, N. S. (2006). The logic of violence in civil war. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge. Cambridege University Press. www.cambri​dge.org/​978052​1854​092 Kataria, S. (2018). Explaining ethnicity: Primordial vs. instrumentalism. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 5, 130–​135. https://​doi.org/​10.14738/​assrj.54.4394

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    93 Kendhammer, B. (2015). Getting our piece of the national cake: Consociational power sharing and neopatrimonialism in Nigeria, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 21, 143–​165. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1080/​13537​113.2015.1032​023 Khadiagala, G. M. (2008). Forty days and nights of peacemaking in Kenya. Journal of African Elections, 7, 4–​32. https://​www.eisa.org/​pdf/​JAE7.2Khad​iaga​la2.pdf Kisaka, M. O., & Nyadera, I. N. (2019). Ethnicity and politics in Kenya’s turbulent path to democracy and development. Journal of Social Policy Conferences, 76, 159–​180. https://​doi.org/​ 10.26650/​jspc.2019.76.0002. Kitching, G. (1980). Class and economic change in Kenya: The making of an African petite-​ bourgeoisie. Yale University Press. Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. (2008, August). On the brink of the precipice: A human rights account of Kenya’s post-​2007 election violence [Report, preliminary edition]. https://​www.knchr.org/​port​als/​0/​repo​rts/​knchr_​report_​on_​t​he_​b​rink​_​of_​the_​prec​ipe.pdf Kymlicka, W. (1996). Contemporary political philosophy: An introduction. Oxford University Press. Le Van, A. C. (2011). Power sharing and inclusive politics in Africa’s uncertain democracies. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institution, 24, 1–​35. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1468-​0491.2010.01514.x Leys, C. (1975). Underdevelopment in Kenya: The political economy in neocolonialism 1964–​1971. Heinemann. Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. Yale University Press. Mamdani, M. (1996). Indirect rule, civil society, and ethnicity: The African dilemma. Social Justice, 23, 145–​162. McCornack, S., & Ortiz, J. (2017). Choices and connections: An introduction to communication. Bedford/​St. Martins. McGrattan, C. (2012). Policing politics: Framing the past in post-​conflict divided societies. Democratization,21, 389–​410. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​13510​347.2012.734​809 Menocal, A. R. (2011). State-​building for peace: A new paradigm for international engagement in post-​conflict fragile states? Third World Quarterly,32, 1715–​1736. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 01436​597.2011.610​567 Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2012). Pre-​colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African development(NBER working paper No. 18224). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://​eco​npap​ers.repec.org/​paper/​nbrnbe​rwo/​18224.htm Mueller, S. (2014). Shared rule in federal political systems: Conceptual lessons from Subnational Switzerland. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 44, 82–​108. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1093/​publ​ius/​pjt​009 Mwagiru, M. (2008). The water’s edge: Mediation of violent electoral conflict in Kenya. Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. https://​sear​chwo​rks.stanf​ord.edu/​view/​8506​241 Ogot, B. A. (2000). Boundary changes and the invention of tribes. In B. A. Ogot&W. R. Ochieng (Eds.), Kenya: The making of a nation (pp. 16–​31). Maseno University Institute of Research and Postgraduate Studies. Omi, M., & Winnant, H. (1986). Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s. Routledge. Onditi, F., Sabala, K., & Wassara, S. (2018). Power-​sharing consociationalism in resolving South Sudan’s ethno-​political conflict in the post-​comprehensive Peace Agreement era. African Journal on Conflict Resolution,18, 37–​64. https://​www.ajol.info/​index.php/​ajcr/​arti​cle/​view/​175​828

94   Inyokwe Sunday Otinche Otinche,S. I. (2012). Identity crisis and nation building in Nigeria. EBSU Journal of Social Sciences, 3, 111–​122. https://​fulok​oja.edu.ng/​ass​ets/​publi​cati​ons/​438_​i​dent​ity-​cri​sis-​and-​nat​ ion-​build​ing-​in-​nige​ria.pdf Otinche, S. I. (2021a, December 19). A situational analysis of the responsibility to uphold the rule of law and protect democracy in The Gambia. Political Science Network.SSRN. 1–​23. https://​pap​ers.ssrn.com/​sol3/​pap​ers.cfm?abst​ract​_​id=​3506​437 Otinche, S. I. (2021b, March 22). A social analysis of identity discrimination, identity conflict and nation-​building in Nigeria. Political Science Network. SSRN. 1-​37. https://​pap​ers.ssrn​ .com/​sol3/​pap​ers.cfm?abst​ract​_​id=​3791​687 Otinche, S. I. (2022). Ethnicity, citizenship identity and nation building in Africa: The Nigerian experience. In S. O. Oloruntoba (Ed.), The political economy of colonialism and nation building in Nigeria(pp. 237–​ 255). Palgrave Macmillan. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​ 978-​3-​030-​73875-​4 Pinaud, C. (2014). South Sudan: Civil war, predation and the making of a military aristocracy. African Affairs, 113, 192–​211. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​afraf/​adu​019 Portes, A. (1984). The rise of ethnicity: Determinant of ethnic perception among Cuban exiles in Miami. American Sociological Review, 49, 383–​397. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​2095​282 Prunier, G. (1995). The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide. Columbia University Press. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Harvard University Press. Renu, M., & Seema, S. (n.d.). The Kenyan crisis: Post December 2007 elections (Working Paper No.1). Centre for African Studies, University of Mumbai. https://​arch​ive.mu.ac.in/​arts/​soc​ ial_​scie​nce/​afri​can_​stud​ies/​ren​umod​iwp.pdf Richard, B., Roland, H., & Schaudt, P.(2022). Ethnofederalism and ethnic voting (CESifo Working Paper Series 9314). CESifo. https://​ideas.repec.org/​p/​ces/​ces​wps/​_​9314.html Rolandsen, Ø. H. (2011). The making of the Anya-​Nya insurgency in the Southern Sudan, 1961–​ 64. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5, 211–​232. https://​www.prio.org/​publi​cati​ons/​4991 Rosenberg, M. (2019, June 30). The Berlin Conference to divide Africa: The colonization of the continent by European powers. ThoughtCo. https://​www.though​tco.com/​ber​lin-​con​fere​ nce-​1884-​1885-​div​ide-​afr​ica-​1433​556 Ruane, J., & Todd, J. (2004). The roots of intense ethnic conflict may not in fact be ethnic categories, communities and path dependence. European Journal of Sociology,45, 209–​232. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00039​7560​4001​432 Sama, M. C., & Johnson-​Ross, D. (1978). Reclaiming the Bakassi Kingdom: The Anglophone Cameroon-​Nigeria border. Afrika Zamani, 13, 103–​122. https://​docs​lib.org/​doc/​8910​002/​rec​ laim​ing-​the-​baka​ssi-​king​dom-​the-​ang​loph​one-​camer​oon-​nige​ria-​bor​der Sandbrook, R., & Barker, J. (1985). The politics of African economic stagnation. Cambridge University Press. Shilaho,W. K. (2008). Ethnicity and political pluralism in Kenya. Journal of African Elections,7, 77–​112. https://​www.eisa.org/​pdf/​JAE7.2Kwate​mba.pdf Stafford, J. E. (2000). Ethnic settlements in post-​colonial Africa: A comparative study of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda [Master’s dissertation, Harvard University]. https://​nrs.harv​ ard.edu/​URN-​3:HUL.INSTRE​POS:37365​015 Stigant, S., & Verjee, A. (2018, February 16). South Sudan’s pitfalls of power sharing: The latest proposals by mediators won’t end the war or transform state-​citizen relations. Washington DC. United States Institute of Peace. https://​www.usip.org/​publi​cati​ons/​2018/​02/​south-​sud​ans​ -pitfa​lls-​power-​shar​ing Thomson, A. (2000). An introduction to African politics. Routledge.

Ethnicity, Politics of Power Sharing, and Nation-Building    95 Sellström, T. and Wohlgemuth, L. (1996, March 1). The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Nordic Africa Institute. https://​www.alnap​ .org/​help-​libr​ary/​the-​intern​atio​nal-​respo​nse-​to-​confl​ict-​and-​genoc​ide-​less​ons-​from-​the​ -rwa​nda-​exp​erie​nce van denBerghe, P. L. (1978). Race and ethnicity: A sociological perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies,1, 401–​411. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​01419​870.1978.9993​241 Vanhanen, T. (1999). Domestic ethnic conflict and ethnic nepotism: A comparative analysis. Journal of Peace Research, 36, 55–​73. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​0022​3433​9903​6001​004 Yancey, W. L., Ericksen, E. P., & Juliani, R. N. (1976). Emergent ethnicity: A review and reformulation. American Sociological Review, 41, 391–​402. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​2094​249 Yang, P. Q. (2000). Ethnic studies: Issues and approaches. State University of New York Press.

Chapter 6

Religiou s L i fe i n African So c i et i e s Nicolette D. Manglos-​W eber

Introduction On a visit to Malawi as an early researcher, I witnessed three poignant scenes of religious life. The first was the Catholic church in Balaka, a large and pristine structure with beautiful stained glass on all sides, located in an otherwise unremarkable trading center. I was taken on a tour of the church one weekday morning by a bystander, who explained that it was newly rebuilt using accumulated small contributions from members. The second was the primary school on a Sunday morning in the nearby town of Liwonde. The school comprised about half a dozen brick classroom blocks arranged around a yard. A Pentecostal pastor, whose new congregation was gathering in one of the blocks, had invited me. After I arrived, I learned that his church was not the only church there: other classroom blocks also hosted fledgling Pentecostal congregations, which were identifiable by simple signs or banners hung over the open doorways. The third was a crowded event in Balaka, where the international organization Samaritan’s Purse had dropped a container of packages of supplies to be distributed to orphans. Many families with children were present, and in the crowd was a group of roughly a dozen religious leaders, including the same Pentecostal pastor and the priest from the Catholic church, deciding who counted as “orphans,” and who most deserved to receive the boxes (Manglos, 2011). Each of these scenes showed the importance of religion in the social life in Malawi, as in so many settings across the continent. Religion in Africa matters: it matters for how people create communal space and shared projects, how and where they gather, how they form new communities and connections, and how they allocate resources and who has the authority to do so. Finally, it matters for how people understand themselves and the world around them and engage with modern social and political challenges.

98   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber This chapter presents general attributes of religious life in African societies today, attending to two themes: rethinking religious categories and unpacking religious politics. It has three sections: the first section addresses the dynamism, diversity, and historical origins of religious life in Africa; the second examines religion along the dimensions of practice, authority, identity, and place; and the third evaluates the ambivalent relationship of religion to politics, especially a politics shaped by global imperialism and religious pluralism. It concludes with thoughts on why the study of religion and Africa should occupy a central place in the field, and how it can help to advance sociological thought.

Religious Dynamism and Diversity The borders between African territories that were drawn by the leaders of European empires in the latter 19th century reflected the geographical features those leaders considered important for dividing up land: rivers and lakes, trade routes, and the footprints of White explorers and missionaries (Pakenham, 1992). Those borders were retained by African leaders in the postcolonial period (Okhonmina, 2009), but they did not necessarily reflect how Africans themselves imagined the meaningful attributes and differences within the space. The borders of Malawi, for example, follow Lake Malawi and echo the path traveled by David Livingstone, but they bisect indigenous kingdoms in the west, north, and south. Because the world religions Christianity and Islam had by the late 20th century been widely adopted throughout the region, it is easy to forget that those categorical boundaries may reflect meaningful divides in Europe and North America but may not reflect what matters most within those communities themselves (Meyer, 2021; Mudimbe, 1988). The populations of many African countries include Muslims, Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Catholics, as do those of North American and European countries; and African religious communities, because of their transnational origins and history, share some religious culture with their foreign counterparts (Burchardt & Swidler, 2020; Meyer, 2021; Robinson, 2004). Yet when scholars of religion and African religionists use religious identity labels, it is often with quite different layers of meaning. Dominant categories, associations, and theories within the sociology of religion must therefore be rethought or discarded. Theories about modernity and secularization, in particular (e.g., Chaves, 1994; Smith, 2003), may be limiting, most obviously because African modernities are generally associated with religious intensification rather than decline. Similarly, given their distinctiveness in North Atlantic contexts, studying Pentecostal and Charismatic groups as a singular phenomenon may obscure the political reasons for their emergence and what they share with renewal and reform movements across traditions (Janson, 2021; Meyer, 2004). On the positive side, critically reflecting on these categories, associations, and theories in relation to African religion can only advance the understanding of religious diversity elsewhere.

Religious Life in African Societies     99 African religious life is also highly dynamic, in both senses of the word. It is full of activity and in constant flux. Christians and Muslims alike tend to practice regularly and express deep commitment to those faiths. The majority attend religious services at least weekly, pray at least daily, and/​or consider religion to be very important in their lives (Manglos & Weinreb, 2013; Manongi & Balint, 2014; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010; Sarkissian, 2012). Attending church on Sunday or Saturday or prayers on Friday are normative communal rituals (Manglos, 2011; Rahemtulla, 2015; Schulz, 2012). Regular prayer gatherings and worship events also take place on other days of the week, especially among Charismatics and Pentecostals (Gifford, 2004; Haynes, 2017; Marshall, 2009). The now-​pervasive practice of the Abrahamic faiths on the continent is the result of various historical processes. North African countries from Egypt to Morocco were part of the premodern Christian and Islamic worlds, the latter having had a vast Sunni Muslim majority since the 8th and 9th centuries ce (Barton, 2020; Jenkins, 2008; Kane, 2016; Robinson, 2004). Outside North Africa, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church dates from at least the 4th century ce (Jenkins, 2008); the kingdom of the Kongo was widely Christianized in the late 15th century (Hastings, 1996); and Islam was present in what is now Tanzania from the 9th or 10th centuries, where Sunni Islam became part of the emerging Swahili culture of East Africa (Nimtz, 1980). In the interior and south of the Sahel, full-​scale conversion took place a bit later and more slowly. The mid-​20th century was the turning point when most Africans had joined either Christianity or Islam; and today in Sub-​Saharan Africa, just over half the population is estimated to be Christian and a third are Muslim (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010). Twentieth-​century Christian growth happened in phases. First, there were conversions to mission churches and newly arising African indigenous movements under colonial rule (Hastings, 1996; Meyer, 2004). Second, in the immediate postcolonial period, leadership and practices within mission churches were indigenized, and there was also steady growth in Pentecostal and Charismatic organizations (Hastings, 1979; Maxwell, 1999). In the third and current phase, there has been more growth in locally originating Christian movements and “mega-​churches,” alternately labeled as Pentecostal, Charismatic, or “born again,” that fit within a globalizing evangelical movement (Manglos, 2010; Manglos-​Weber, 2018; Meyer, 2004). In this third phase, Christian churches have also intensified their civic and social engagement, and expanded their political voice (Dowd, 2015; Marshall, 2009). African Christians today are split between Catholics and Protestants, although the demographics vary by country. Protestants are divided between the older and more centralized mission churches and diffuse Pentecostal and evangelical groups (Agadjanian 2017; Alava & Ssentongo, 2016; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010; Manglos & Weinreb, 2013). Pentecostals are split between first-​wave groups, such as the Apostolic Church and the Assemblies of God, and second-​wave groups, such as the Winner’s Chapel or the Redeemed Christian Church of God (Gifford, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Ukah, 2018).

100   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber The growth of Islam has been more gradual, although it also involves conversion and reform movements and the indigenization of authority. During the 20th century, Muslims engaged in mobilization and missionization efforts to counter the alliance between Christianity and the colonial state (Dowd, 2015; Schulz, 2013; Seesemann & Soares, 2009; Soares, 2016). Muslim identity and belonging were also strengthened through Sufi orders and brotherhoods, local congregations, and Islamic education, increasingly supported by and connected to global Muslim organizations (Hanson, 2017; Kaarsholm, 2014; Kilonzo, 2011; Loimeier, 2016; Robinson, 2004). Sunni branches of Islam predominate, although some countries, such as Tanzania, have sizable Shi’a minorities (Becker, 2007). Sufi brotherhood communities define Muslim membership in Western Africa, especially in Mali and Senegal (Seeseman & Soares, 2009; Schulz, 2012), and they are also important institutions in Southern Africa and the Indian Coast (Kaarsholm, 2014). Like other regions of the world, Africa has experienced a rise in globalizing and reformist Salafiyya movements, also known as da’wa (Brenner, 2001; Loimeier, 2016; Sounaye, 2017), which are often connected to hubs in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Loimeier, 2016). In many sub-​Saharan countries, Sunni-​Salafi and Sufi organizations are the two poles of authority in Islamic life, alternating between contention and cooperation (Isa, 2017; Madore, 2021). As Christianity and Islam have grown, African indigenous religions have persisted, though the indigenous traditions have a complicated relationship to the category “religion” (Olupona, 2014; Westerlund, 2006). Because African traditional religions were historically so interlaced with other areas of social life, in colonial-​era thought it was questioned whether Africans had “religions” at all (Chidester, 1996). European missionaries sometimes treated the local faiths as pagan antitheses to Christian belief and practice from which Africans needed to be converted (Kaplan, 2004; Olupona, 2014). As scholars continue to debate these analytic issues, they are being creatively resolved by many African practitioners who retain their “traditional” or “cultural” practices while adopting Christianity or Islam as their religion (Grillo et al., 2019; Olupona, 2014; Orubator, 2018). Indigenous religious practice is common and can be seen in family and clan-​based festivals, the everyday use of herbal remedies, the sharing of ancestral mythologies, and, during times of crisis, collective healing rituals and antiwitchcraft movements (Scherz and Mpanga, 2019; Swidler, 2010; Ukah, 2018; Westerlund, 2006). In a few places, such as Benin and Burkina Faso, a sizeable percentage of people claim primary adherence to indigenous faiths (Kaplan, 2004); and there are notable groups in Nigeria, Ghana, and the broader diaspora that have recovered African traditional religion as a primary identity (Janson, 2021; De Witte, 2005; Johnson, 2007). There are also movements that mix elements of the three main traditions. Groups that integrate Christianity and indigenous religion are especially common, and in the early 20th century these African Indigenous Churches (AICs) were an Africanized Christian alternative to the mission-​founded churches (Gampiot, 2017; Maxwell, 1999; Meyer, 2004). Examples include the Harrist Church of West Africa (Walker, 1980), the Zionist Christian Churches of South Africa (Cabrita, 2018), and the Faith of Unity Movement

Religious Life in African Societies     101 in Uganda (Ukah, 2018). Beyond the AICs, other ecumenical groups include the Ridge Church of Accra—​a blend of Mission Protestant denominations—​and Chrislam in Nigeria, which is a hybrid of Christianity and Islam (Janson, 2016).

Practice, Authority, Identity, and Place Religion can be sociologically defined as the things people do together out of faith in a divine, supernatural, and/​or ultimate reality, and the social and material institutions that emerge from such activities over time. This definition borrows from several recent theoretical innovations, especially the move toward “lived religion,” and the accompanying interest in how religion is practiced, embodied, and emplaced within specific communities (Ammerman, 2020; Riesebrodt, 2010; Tweed, 2006; Vasquez, 2011). This definition also balances the focus on practice with attention to the institutionalization of authority: how certain ways of thinking, seeing, and acting come to be religiously authoritative, governing practice in turn (Asad, 1993; Riesebrodt, 2010; Tweed, 2006). The interplay of practice and authority gives rise to patterns of identification and belonging (Mahmood, 2011; Smilde, 2007), and these elements are each constrained or enabled by the built and natural geography (Brenneman & Miller, 2016; Vasquez, 2011). I will draw out commonalities and differences in religious life on the African continent around these four axes—​practice, authority, identity, and place.

Practice Religious practices that are common to Christians and Muslims globally exist in African societies as well. Communal gatherings on Sundays, Saturdays, or Fridays are tremendously important, and often serve civic and political functions as well as spiritual ones, given that few social institutions are as ubiquitous as religion (Manglos, 2010, 2011; Rahemtulla, 2015; Swidler, 2010). In fact, the institution of the weekly gathering of the local religious community across the region has perhaps been one of the most meaningful social impacts of missionization (Burchardt & Swidler, 2020). Congregational practices provide a regular rhythm to social life on evenings and weekends and have value for those who are out of school, unemployed, or unable to access costlier forms of entertainment (Manglos-​Weber, 2018; Manglos, 2011; van Dijk, 1992). Although the forms of these gatherings vary, the rituals of preaching and prayer are widely shared. Mission churches still adhere to the liturgies of their global organizations; Pentecostal churches tend to begin their gatherings with energetic singing and dancing, followed by long and dynamic sermons and periods of effervescent prayer (Hackett, 1998; Meyer, 2004; Reinhardt, 2017). Although preaching is also part

102   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber of mission-​founded church practice, the Pentecostal and Charismatic movements have made preaching more effusive, performative, and politically potent (Cox, 2001; Marshall, 2009; Reinhardt, 2017; van Dijk, 1992). Pentecostal growth has also resulted in the broader diffusion of effervescent and expressive modes in other Christian spaces (Cox, 2001; Csordas, 2007; Manglos, 2010). African Muslim communal practice centers on weekly prayer gatherings on Fridays, which tend to follow simple conventions of preaching and Salat prayer, with the sexes sitting separately. However, echoing the diffusion of Charismatic and Pentecostal styles, Muslim ritual life encompasses other practices that tend toward greater spontaneity and effervescence, such as the musical performances of Gnawa music in Morocco or the expressive preaching of baraka-​inspired Sufi leaders (Madore, 2020; Schulz, 2014; Sounaye, 2017; Spadola, 2014). As with the most well-​ known Christian Charismatic preachers, recordings of gifted Muslim preachers are coped, shared, and debated by devotees, taking full advantage of new media forms (Schulz, 2012). Ritual healing is also practiced across traditions, where healing is understood in both a bodily and social sense (Okwu, 1979; Westerlund, 2006). The ritual thread of seeking health and repair ties together indigenous, Christian, and Muslim cosmologies. Ritual healing practices take many different forms, and occurring in both regular life and during times of collective sickness and crisis, such as the HIV/​AIDS epidemic (Adogame, 2007; Becker, 2007; Nieber, 2017; Parkin, 2014; Trinitapoli & Weinreb, 2012). Everyday healing practices include the use of medicinal herbs; this is not always described as explicitly “religious,” though it often has roots in traditional cosmologies (Trinitapoli & Weinreb 2012; Westerlund, 2006). Periodic ritual healing also occurs through the divination and purgation of evil spirits, alternately identified as witches, malicious ancestors, or, in both Christian and Muslim terminology, demons (Meyer, 1992; Wilkens, 2009). Antiwitchcraft movements often arise when a collective crisis has confounded other epistemic strategies, and when social disorder is so severe that it demands to be viewed as the product of a supernatural agency (Behrend, 2007; Feierman, 1985).

Authority Christian authorities have enjoyed political and economic advantages in Africa as part of the colonial legacy (Chidester, 1996; Katongole, 2010; Mudimbe, 1988). This has forced Muslim and indigenous leaders to assert their authority by adapting to Western conceptions of power and citizenship (Bamyeh, 2019; Brenner, 2001; Madore, 2021). Yet the legitimation of religious authority in the postcolonial period has been more ambiguous for Christian, Muslim, and traditionalist leaders alike (Alava & Ssentongo, 2016; van Dijk, 1992). The expansion and centralization of state power has left religious leaders of all faiths on less secure ground, vying for political influence to ensure their survival (Boyle, 1995; Englund, 2000; Longman, 1998).

Religious Life in African Societies     103 Groups also differ in how authority is structured. Mission Protestants and Catholics have highly bureaucratic and centralized structures that are governed by global organizations, although the degree of coordination varies (Englund, 2003; Manglos & Weinreb, 2013). Evangelical Protestants and Muslims exhibit more diffuse and variable organizational structures that are not usually subject to formal external governance (Bamyeh, 2019; Maxwell, 2006; Meyer, 2004). This more diffused structure has allowed different sects and organizations to proliferate and to adapt to local concerns. At the same time, the challenges of postcolonial politics and social welfare have also spurred many religious authorities to form national-​level federations focused on social activism, for example, the Christian Council of Ghana (Kuperus, 2018) or the Inter-​Religious Council of Uganda (Alava & Ssentongo, 2016). In a broader sense, religious authorities also include objects, texts, and encoded doctrines that guide and constrain religious practice. The Bible and Qur’an are the obvious examples from Christianity and Islam, and these sacred texts are highly revered within African religious communities in Africa (Brenner, 2001; Jenkins, 2006). Yet the form of interacting with these texts can vary: in Catholic and Mission Protestant churches, biblical texts are read in English, French, or indigenous languages during gatherings, often following liturgical calendars (Jenkins, 2006). There is also public reading in evangelical Protestant churches, but private and personal reading by members of the congregations is also strongly encouraged (Haynes, 2017; Manglos-​ Weber, 2018). African Muslims’ relationship to the Qur’an is shaped by a provision that the formal reading and study of the text be conducted in Arabic rather than in the local vernaculars. Yet notwithstanding this seeming restriction for non-​Arabic speaking Africans, these communities have developed numerous ways to engage with the authority of the text (Brenner, 2001; Loimeier, 2005). The most obvious of these are the Qur’anic schools, which teach students to read Arabic. Others include translations or paraphrases into local languages, expositional preaching, and even honorific rituals such as drinking kombe, the water washed off Qur’anic verses written in saffron ink (Nieber, 2017). Church and mosque schools are another widespread expression of religious authority. Under European missionaries, Catholic and Protestant mission schools often operated in de facto interdependence with colonial governments, especially as settings for training local populations in biblical literacy and civil service (Hastings, 1996; Stambach, 2010). In the postcolonial period, Christian schools continue to exist with varying degrees of cooperation with government-​run schools (Dilger, 2017; Garnier & Schafer, 2006). In North Africa and Islamic West Africa, Muslim school systems arose organically over time, often built around the teaching work of special individuals. Major Sunni Muslim universities like Al-​Azhar in Egypt, founded in the 10th century ce, had a major influence on the madrasah systems for children and youth (Arjmand, 2011). Today in West, Central, and East Africa, there are often two kinds of Islamic schools: local madrasahs that train students in Qur’anic learning apart from the government school system, and new Muslim schools using “modern” curricula and methods that are

104   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber integrated into the formal system (Boyle, 2011). In the most heavily Christianized parts of East Africa, nearly all Islamic schools are of the informal, nonintegrated Qur’anic school variety (Svennson, 2011). Gender roles are also significant in relation to authority, but again, just how they matter varies. The nature of gender relations across the continent is fluid and diverse, in part because of the coexistence of patrilineal and matrilineal systems (Oduyoye, 2005). In religious life, indigenous traditions have often designated certain positions of authority to women, and although many Christian and Muslim communities exhibit patriarchal forms, it is also common for women to hold high-​level positions, both those particular to their gender and other more general roles, such as pastor (Doyle, 2007; Madore, 2020; Manglos-​Weber, 2018; Orobator, 2018).

Identity Although international surveys and censuses measure religious identities at a single point in time, such reported religious identities result from dynamic processes, wherein a person’s sense of their religious self in relation to others develops through embodied participation in group ritual (Mahmood, 2011; Winchester, 2008). Studying religious identity in African societies sociologically therefore means analyzing the processes of participation and control that lead to the reporting of certain identities on surveys. These processes have always been complicated by the colonial politics of classification, when colonial powers implemented new systems to count and classify their subjects, creating religious identity, whether Christian, Muslim, or pagan, as a political category (Chidester, 1996; Christopher, 2014; Wyrtzen, 2015). Their taxonomies were all-​encompassing and reinforced by missionary efforts, such that religious identity became an ascribed status as much as an adopted one (Walters, 2016). As a reaction to this, religious identity also became an arena for anticolonial resistance (Hill, 2018). Early African indigenous churches can be seen in this light, given their propensity to mix “pagan” and “Christian” rituals in ways that confounded colonial authority (Meyer, 2004; Walker, 1980). Indeed, the sheer range of interstitial, alternative, and innovative religious identities on the continent suggests a progressive refusal of colonial taxonomy. Religious identification has also shifted from being a kin-​based process to a more individual one. In the precolonial period, religious identity was usually linked to one’s clan, tribe, or kinship group, and early conversion to Christianity and Islam was often a collective response to missionary presence in an area (Nunn, 2010; Walters, 2016). Yet as evangelical and Pentecostal theologies with their emphasis on authentic individual piety have grown in influence, personal choice in religious identity has become more widely accepted, and it is now common for kin groups to be religiously mixed (Agadjanian, 2017; Leichtman, 2015; Manglos-​Weber, 2018). Like racial and ethnic identities, religious identities can vary in terms of how “bright” or “blurred” they are, meaning the degree to which they are fixed, impermeable, and politically meaningful (Alba, 2005). The most salient example is the line between Christian

Religious Life in African Societies     105 and Muslim. In North America and Europe, and in international geopolitics, this line is presumed to be very bright, characterized by conflict and xenophobia (Selod, 2018). Yet this is not always or even usually true for African Christians and Muslims. In the existing scholarship, nearly every country exhibits different contours of Christian-​Muslim relations (Janson, 2021; Soares, 2016). In some settings these relations are largely peaceful or go through waves of contention and cooperation. In other cases, hostile Christian-​ Muslim relations are a recent development resulting from modern polemical reform movements that do not reflect the religious ecumenism of everyday life (Obadare, 2006; Peel, 2016; Soares, 2016). These variations reflect the region’s distinctive conditions of religious pluralism. African people groups have encountered practitioners and affiliates of alternative traditions for generations, and those histories of encounter have long shaped their religious lives (Chidester, 1996; Peel, 2016; Soares, 2016). Even in Muslim North Africa and majority Christian countries like Zambia or Namibia, the long copresence of Abrahamic faiths and diverse indigenous traditions is a major factor influencing how people practice and identify (Hastings, 1996). As a result, there is always the potential for either pluralist integration or polemical exclusion, and these patterns often exist side by side or in alternating waves.

Place Religious places in Africa are also diverse and dynamic, and they integrate a wide range of topographies. Important sites include the 12th-​century rock churches of Ethiopia, constructed as a kind of “holy land in exile” by some of the region’s earliest Christians (Phillipson, 2009), and the enormous Redemption City of the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Nigeria, with a stadium in progress that will fit one-​and-​a-​half million worshippers (Ukah, 2018). They include the pristine and immense Grand Mosque of Algiers (Djamaâ el Djazaïr), an ivory-​colored gem of Islamic architecture (McDougall, 2010), and the cone-​shaped, industrial-​looking Basilica of the Ugandan Martyrs, built to evoke a traditional hut, which attracts millions of Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim pilgrims each year (Kassimir, 1991). Given the importance of religious gathering in African life, houses of worship are ubiquitous and take all kinds of forms. Like the Catholic church in Balaka mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, such places have historically been created and invested in as collective property, reflecting the priorities and orientations of the religious community. They also reflect encounters and relations between religious groups in the wider context of coexistence described earlier (Babou, 2005; Isa, 2017; McDougall, 2010). Similarly, the implementation and occupation of a religious place reflects the legacies of imperialism. Colonial governments granted extensive lands to Protestant and Catholic missions, often overriding indigenous land tenure. During the postcolonial transition, missions usually held onto their lands and enjoyed relatively secure property rights (Alava & Schroff, 2019). Colonial authorities often likewise granted Muslim

106   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber communities land rights, which have been preserved in the postcolonial period, serving similar social and communal functions (Barton, 2020; McDougall, 2010). Pilgrimage as a spiritually motivated movement across space is one of the five pillars of Islam (Hajj). Although many African Muslims lack the resources to travel to Mecca, the most holy pilgrimage site, well-​off Muslims prioritize the trek, and regional pilgrimages, such as to Touba in Senegal, are popular among the devout (Babou, 2005; Parkin, 2014). Because Sufi orders predominate in much of North, Western, and Eastern Africa, there also are many Islamic shrines where pilgrims travel to venerate their founding wali (i.e., “saint” or “teacher”; Barton, 2020). As elsewhere, there are differences in how Sufis and other schools of Sunni Islam theorize sacred sites and leaders, which at times results in conflicts over religious places (Isa, 2017). Intersecting the geography of Christian and Muslim spaces are the dense networks of shrines, temples, and other sites sacralized by indigenous traditions. The ownership of these spaces has often been contested under colonial and postcolonial law, yet many such sacred sites remain and continue to have ritual significance (Fay, 2011; Frescura, 2015; Nakayi & Witte, 2019). Indigenous shrines have a range of social functions such as commemorating ancestral mythologies, marking burial grounds, establishing political control, and serving as points of access to the spirit world, to name a few (Kodesh, 2008; Olupona, 2006). Shrines can also be held by specific clans and families, or they can be identified with villages, wider ethnolinguistic communities, or separate spiritual sects and healers (Doyle, 2007; Lentz, 2009).

The Political Ambivalence of African Religious Life In his book The Ambivalence of the Sacred, Scott Appleby (2000) argues that both religious violence and religious peacemaking stem from the basic desire for transcendence beyond the material world and human history. This dynamic, as well as other seemingly contradictory elements, is particularly visible on the African continent. Religious life in Africa is at once revolutionary and conservative, divisive and unifying, and aligned with and resistant to democratization (Katongole, 2010; Longman, 1998). This ambivalence is due in part to the diversity and dynamism of religion in Africa. Because religion is so many things, it is natural that some would contradict others. Yet it is also a function of global imperialism, as a totalizing historical moment for Africans that continues to define their place in global politics, economics, and culture (Du Bois, 2007; Rodney, 2018). Whether imperialism takes the form of settler colonialism or economic dependency, it presses religious authorities to take sides on questions of freedom and justice. Africa’s imperialist history makes the general ambivalence of the sacred that much more acute. This imperialist history and Africa’s long-​ standing religious diversity has created an intricate web of institutional relations, including those between among

Religious Life in African Societies     107 religious communities; between religious communities and the state; between religious communities and other political entities such as clanship, kingdom, or tribe; and among internal factions in each religious community (Boyle, 1995; Charrad, 2001; Isa, 2017; Soares, 2016). Moreover, because religious diversity and imperialism have taken strikingly different forms across the region—​that is, different mixes of Christianity and Islam, different precolonial political forms, and different European empires employing different colonial strategies—​the character and effects of these relations are highly variable (Garnier & Schafer, 2006; Manglos & Weinreb, 2013). What is generally true is that, in each stage of modern African history, it is possible to identify some religious dynamics that buttress and benefit from imperialism and other religious dynamics that subvert it (Chidester, 1996; Dunch, 2002; Fields, 1982). For example, European missionaries took advantage of the freedoms and protections afforded to them by European colonialists. They even sometimes participated in the colonial economy, as when representatives of the Church Missionary Society in Uganda helped to establish the cotton export system (Wrigley, 1957). Yet missionary interests also sometimes conflicted with the colonial government, for example, in in Malawi and Zambia, where missionaries attacked the traditions of chieftaincy on which colonialists relied for indirect rule (Fields, 1982). Africa’s own grassroots religious movements, from the aladura and Harrist churches of the colonial period to the new Pentecostals and Charismatics, have also tended toward anticolonial critique. While this critique is not always explicit, it is implied within their apocalyptic, reformist theologies that call out the “powers and principalities” of the modern world (Marshall, 2009). Viewed through a decolonial lens, it is not surprising that many new Christian, Muslim, and traditionalist sects and movements have been birthed on the continent. The temptation for religious leaders to make peace with totalizing state power triggers cycles of internal fissures and grassroots reform. How this will play out into the future remains to be seen. What is clear is that struggles over imperialist legacies often play out in the religious arena, and the outcome is perpetually uncertain because of the complexity of religious and political interests involved (Bongmba, 2006). These struggles again raise the question of which religious categories and boundaries are most analytically meaningful for sociologists of Africa. It may be that lines between identity categories like Christian and Muslim ultimately matter less than the gaps between classes and interest groups within these faiths, and their impact on human security and well-​being. If so, then redrawing and reframing those lines in our research is even more important.

Conclusion This chapter has made the case for studying religious life as a core social institution within modern African societies and reassessing meaningful lines of religious differences within the sociology of religion. It provided a necessarily broad overview of religious life on the continent around the dimensions of practice, authority, identity, and

108   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber place, and discussed the political ambivalence of African religious life that stems in large part from its characteristic pluralism and histories of imperialist encounters. As the wider field of sociology has become increasingly attuned to the global impacts of imperialism past and present, and the challenges associated with local formations of religious pluralism within global imperialist structures, it is an especially good time to pay attention to religion in Africa and make it even more central to these discussions. If, as some have argued, America, Europe, and Africa are co-​constituted through colonial and postcolonial political relations (Du Bois, 2007; Meyer, 2021; Mudimbe, 1988), and if American religion cannot be understood apart from its racialized construction (Yukich & Edgell, 2020), then studies of African Christianity, Islam, and indigenous religions are necessary for understanding the broader relations between religion and modern politics more generally, and the possibilities for inclusive and peaceful pluralism in the racialized world system. This means that certain categories, assumptions, and questions will have to be reworked. These include the debates about secularization and secularism, and the meanings of religious identities on a continuum of “liberal” to “conservative” that are canonical in the wider field but have dubious use value for understanding African religion. By the same token, renewed attention to religion in, from, and out of African societies should spark more relational, liberatory, and decolonial sociologies of religion that can help us better understand racialized and interstitial religious communities in the United States and Europe. Rather than let White American Protestantism, and especially its politicized evangelical sects, continue to dominate the scholarly narrative, it is time for a truly transnational study of religion that recognizes the importance of African expressions; and ultimately “redraws the lines” that have long segregated African religion as an object of scholarly and public interest.

References Adogame, A. (2007). HIV/​ AIDS support and African Pentecostalism: The case of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG). Journal of Health Psychology, 12, 475–​484. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​13591​0530​7076​234 Agadjanian, V. (2017). Women’s schooling and religious mobility: Joining, switching, and quitting church in a Christian sub-​Saharan setting. Sociology of Religion, 78, 411–​436. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1093/​soc​rel/​srx​027 Alava, H., & Shroff, C. (2019). Unravelling church land: Transformations in the relationship between church, state and community in Uganda. Development and Change, 50, 1288–​1309. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​dech.12503 Alava, H., & Ssentongo, J. S. (2016). Religious (de)politicization in Uganda’s 2016 elections. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 10, 677–​692. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​17531​ 055.2016.1270​043 Alba, R. (2005). “Bright” vs. “blurred” boundaries: Second-​generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28, 20–​50. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​0141​9870​4200​0280​003

Religious Life in African Societies     109 Ammerman, N. T. (2020). Rethinking religion: Toward a practice approach. American Journal of Sociology, 126, 6–​51. https://​doi.org/​10.1086/​709​779 Appleby, R. S. (2000). The ambivalence of the sacred: Religion, violence, and reconciliation. Rowman & Littlefield. Arjmand, R. (2011). Islamic education in Egypt. In H. Daun & R. Arjmand (Eds.), Handbook of Islamic education (pp. 577–​592). Springer. Asad, T. (1993). Geneaologies of religion: Discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam. Johns Hopkins University Press. Babou, C. A. (2005). Contesting space, shaping places: Making room for the Muridiyya in Colonial Senegal, 1912–​45. Journal of African History, 40, 405–​426. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​ S00218​5370​5001​295 Bamyeh, M. A. (2019). Lifeworlds of Islam. Oxford University Press. Barton, K S. (2020). Geography, Islam, and Africa. In F. Ngom, M. H. Kurfi, & T. Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of Islam in Africa (pp. 133–​148). Palgrave Macmillan. Becker, F. (2007). The virus and the scriptures: Muslims and AIDS in Tanzania. Journal of Religion in Africa, 37, 16–​40. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​15700​6607​X166​573 Behrend, H. (2007). The rise of occult powers, aids, and the Roman Catholic Church in Western Uganda. Journal of Religion in Africa, 37, 41–​58. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​15700​6607​ X166​582 Bongmba, E. K. (2006). The dialectic of transformation in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. Boyle, H. N. (2011). Islamic education in West and Central Africa. In H. Daun, & R. Arjmand (Eds.), Handbook of Islamic education (pp. 637–​650). Springer. Boyle, P. M. (1995). School wars: Church, state, and the death of the Congo. Journal of Modern African Studies, 33, 451–​468. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00222​78X0​0021​200 Brenneman, R., & Miller, B. J. (2016). When bricks matter: Four arguments for the sociological study of religious buildings. Sociology of Religion, 77, 82–​101. 10.1093/​socrel/​srw001 Brenner, L. (2001). Controlling knowledge: Religion, power, and schooling in a West African Muslim society. Indiana University Press. Burchardt, M., & Swidler, A. (2020). Transplanting institutional innovation: Comparing the success of NGOs and missionary Protestantism in Sub-​Saharan Africa. Theory and Society, 49, 335–​364. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​186-​020-​09380-​7 Cabrita, J. (2018). The people’s Zion: Southern Africa, the United States, and a transatlantic faith healing movement. Harvard University Press. Charrad, M. M. 2001. States and women’s rights: The making of postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. University of California Press. Chaves, M. (1994). Secularization as declining religious authority. Social Forces, 72, 749–​774. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​2579​779 Chidester, D. (1996). Savage systems: Colonialism and comparative religion in Southern Africa. University Press of Virginia. Christopher, A. J. (2014). The “religion” question in British colonial and commonwealth censuses 1820s–​2010s. Journal of Religious History, 38, 579–​596. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ 1467-​9809.12107 Cox, H. (2001). Fire from heaven: The rise of Pentecostal spirituality and the reshaping of religion in the 21st century. Da Capo Press. Csordas, T. (2007). Global religion and the re-​enchantment of the world: The case of the Catholic charismatic renewal. Anthropological Theory, 7, 295–​314. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 14634​9960​7080​192

110   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber De Witte, M. (2005). The spectacular and the spirits: Charismatics and neo-​traditionalists on Ghanaian television. Material Religion: The Journal of Objects, Art, and Belief, 1, 314–​334. https://​doi.org/​10.2752/​174​3220​0577​8054​050 Dilger, H. (2017). Embodying values and socio-​religious difference: New markets of moral learning in Christian and Muslim schools in urban Tanzania. Africa, 87, 515–​536. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1017/​S00019​7201​7000​092 Dowd, R. (2015). Christianity, Islam, and liberal democracy: Lessons from Sub-​Saharan Africa. Oxford University Press. Doyle, S. (2007). The Cwezi-​Kubandwa debate: Gender, hegemony, and pre-​colonial religion in Bunyoro, Western Uganda. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 77, 559–​ 581. https://​doi.org/​10.3366/​afr.2007.77.4.559 Du Bois, W. E. B. (2007). The world and Africa and color and democracy. Oxford University Press. Dunch, R. (2002). Beyond cultural imperialism: Cultural theory, Christian missions, and global modernity. History and Theory, 41, 301–​325. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​1468-​2303.00208 Englund, H. (2000). The dead hand of human rights: Contrasting Christianities in post-​ transition Malawi. Journal of Modern African Studies, 38, 579–​603. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​ s00222​78x0​0003​487 Englund, H. (2003). Christian independency and global membership: Pentecostal extraversions in Malawi. Journal of Religion in Africa, 33, 83–​111. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​157​ 0066​0376​5626​721 Fay, D. (2011). Migrants, forests and houses: The political ecology of architectural change in Hobeni and Cwebe, South Africa. Human Organization, 70, 310–​321. https://​doi.org/​ 10.17730/​humo.70.3.f3463​6122​7x06​866 Feierman, S. (1985). Struggles for control: The social roots of health and healing in modern Africa. African Studies Review, 28, 73–​147. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​524​604 Fields, K. E. (1982). Christian missionaries as anticolonial militants. Theory and Society, 11, 95–​ 108. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​BF0​0173​110 Frescura, F. (2015). A case of hopeless failure: The role of missionaries in the transformation of Southern Africa’s indigenous architecture. Journal for the Study of Religion, 28, 64–​86. https://​bupr​ imo.hos​ted.exlibr​isgr​oup.com/​permal​ink/​f/​g23​ind/​TN_​cdi_​p​roqu​est_​jour​nals​_​177​9974​235 Gampiot, A. M. (2017). Kimbanguism: An African understanding of the Bible. Pennsylvania State University Press. Garnier, M., & Schafer, M. (2006). Educational model and expansion of enrollments in Sub-​ Saharan Africa. Sociology of Education, 79, 153–​175. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​003​8040​7060​ 7900​204 Gifford, P. (2004). Ghana’s new Christianity. Indiana University Press. Grillo, L. S., van Klinken, A., & Ndzovu, H. J. (2019). Religions in contemporary Africa: An introduction. Routledge. Hackett, R. I. J. (1998). Pentecostal/​charismatic appropriation of media technologies in Ghana and Nigeria. Journal of Religion in Africa, 28, 258–​277. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​1570​0669​ 8X00​026 Hanson, J. H. (2017). The Ahmadiyya in the Gold Coast: Muslim cosmopolitans in the British Empire. Indiana University Press. Hastings, A. (1979). A history of African Christianity 1950–​1975. Cambridge University Press. Hastings, A. (1996). The church in Africa, 1450–​1950. Oxford University Press.

Religious Life in African Societies     111 Haynes, N. (2017). Moving by the spirit: Pentecostal social life on the Zambian Copperbelt. University of California Press. Hill, J. N. C. (2018). Imperial classifications and anti-​colonial resistance in North Africa. Middle Eastern Studies, 55, 464–​474. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00263​206.2018.1546​174 Isa, K. H. (2017). The “Triangular Politics” of mosque ownership and Imamship in Kano State: The case of Sabuwar Gandu Juma’a mosque. Journal for Islamic Studies, 36, 173–​195. https://​ bupr​imo.hos​ted.exlibr​isgr​oup.com/​permal​ink/​f/​g23​ind/​TN_​cdi_​p​roqu​est_​jour​nals​_​234​ 8211​807 Janson, M. (2016). Unity through diversity: A case study of Chrislam in Lagos. Africa, 86, 646–​ 672. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00019​7201​6000​607 Janson, M. (2021). Crossing religious boundaries: Islam, Christianity, and “Yoruba religion” in Lagos, Nigeria. Cambridge University Press. Jenkins, P. (2006). The new faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South. Oxford University Press. Jenkins, P. (2008). The lost history of Christianity: The thousand-​year golden age of the church in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia—​and how it died. Harper Collins. Johnson, P. C. (2007). Diasporic conversions: Black Carib religion and the recovery of Africa. University of California Press. Kaarsholm, P. (2014). Zanzibaris or Amakhuwa? Sufi networks in South Africa, Mozambique, and the Indian Ocean. Journal of African History, 55, 191–​210. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00218​ 5371​4000​085 Kane, O. O. (2016). Beyond Timbuktu: An intellectual history of Muslim West Africa. Harvard University Press. Kaplan, F. E. S. (2004). Understanding sacrifice and sanctity in Benin indigenous religion, Nigeria: A case study. In J. K. Olupona (Ed.), Beyond primitivism: Indigenous religious traditions and modernity (pp. 181–​199). Routlege. Kassimir, R. (1991). Complex martyrs: Symbols of Catholic Church formation and political differentiation in Uganda. African Affairs, 90, 357–​382. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​oxf​ordj​ourn​als​ .afraf.a098​438 Katongole, E. (2010). The sacrifice of Africa: A political theology for Africa. Wm. B. Eerdmans. Kilonzo, S. M. (2011). The Ahmadiyya Muslim community and peacebuilding in Kisumu District, Kenya. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 8, 80–​85. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 15423​166.2011.34903​9879​305 Kodesh, N. (2008). Networks of knowledge: Clanship and collective well-​being in Buganda. Journal of African History, 49, 197–​216. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00218​5370​8003​629 Kuperus, T. (2018). Democratization, religious actors, and political influence: A comparison of Christian councils in Ghana and South Africa. Africa Today, 64, 29–​52. https://​doi.org/​ 10.2979/​afri​cato​day.64.3.02 Leichtman, M. A. (2015). Shi’i cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese migration and religious conversion in Senegal. Indiana University Press. Lentz, C. (2009). Constructing ritual protection on an expanding settlement frontier: Earth shrines in the Black Volta region. In A. C. Dawson (Ed.), Shrines in Africa: History, politics, and society (pp. 121–​146). University of Calgary Press. Loimeier, R. (2005). Translating the Qur’an in Sub-​Saharan Africa: Dynamics and disputes. Journal of Religion in Africa, 35, 403–​423. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​157​0066​0577​4832​180 Loimeier, R. (2016). Islamic reform in twentieth-​century Africa. Edinburgh University Press.

112   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber Longman, T. (1998). Empowering the weak and protecting the powerful: The contradictory nature of Christian churches in Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo. African Studies Review, 41, 49–​72. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​524​681 Madore, F. (2020). Muslim feminist, media sensation, and religious entrepreneur: Aminata Kane Kone as a figure of success in Cote d’Ivoire. Africa Today, 67, 16–​38. https://​doi.org/​ 10.2979/​afri​cato​day.67.2_​3.02 Madore, F. (2021). “Good Muslim, bad Muslim” in Togo: Religious minority identity construction amid a sociopolitical crisis (2017–​2018). Journal of Modern African Studies, 59, 197–​217. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00222​78X2​1000​094 Mahmood, S. (2011). Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject. Princeton University Press. Manglos, N. D. (2010). Born again in Balaka: Pentecostal vs. Catholic narratives of religious transformation in rural Malawi. Sociology of Religion, 71, 409–​431. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​ soc​rel/​srq​021 Manglos, N. D. (2011). Brokerage in the sacred sphere: Religious leaders as community problem-​solvers in rural Malawi. Sociological Forum, 26, 334–​355. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ j.1573-​7861.2011.01243.x Manglos, N. D., & Weinreb, A. (2013). Religion and interest in politics in Africa. Social Forces, 92, 195–​219. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​sf/​sot​070 Manglos-​Weber, N. D. (2018). Joining the choir: Religious memberships and social trust among transnational Ghanaians. Oxford University Press. Manongi, F. S., & Balint, P. J. (2014). Prayer behavior in rural Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53, 760–​774. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​jssr.12146 Marshall, R. (2009). Political spiritualities: The Pentecostal revolution in Nigeria. University of Chicago Press. Maxwell, D. (1999). Historicizing Christian independency: The Southern African Pentecostal movement c. 1908–​60. Journal of African History, 40, 243–​264. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​ S00218​5379​8007​35X Maxwell, D. (2006). African gifts of the spirit: Pentecostalism and the rise of a Zimbabwean transnational religious movement. Ohio University Press. McDougall, J. (2010). The secular state’s Islamic empire: Muslim spaces and subjects of jurisdiction in Paris and Algiers, 1905–​1957. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 52, 553–​ 580. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00104​1751​0000​307 Meyer, B. (1992). “If you are a devil, you are a witch and, if you are a witch, you are a devil”: The integration of “pagan” ideas into the conceptual universe of Ewe Christians in Southeastern Ghana. Journal of Religion in Africa, 22, 98–​132. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​1580​958 Meyer, B. (2004). Christianity in Africa: From African independent to Pentecostal-​ Charismatic churches. Annual Review of Anthropology, 33, 447–​474. https://​doi.org/​10.1146/​ annu​rev.ant​hro.33.070​203.143​835 Meyer, B. (2021). What is religion in Africa? Relational dynamics in an entangled world. Journal of Religion in Africa, 50, 156–​181. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​15700​666-​12340​184 Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988). The invention of Africa: Gnosis, philosophy, and the order of knowledge. Indiana University Press. Nakayi, R., & Witte, A. (2019). Making cultural heritage claims on profitable land: The case of the Ngassa wells in Uganda’s oil region. Africa Spectrum, 54, 222–​243. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 00020​3972​0906​247

Religious Life in African Societies     113 Nieber, H. (2017). “They all just want to get healthy!”: Drinking the Qur’an between forming religious and medical subjectivities in Zanzibar. Journal of Material Culture, 22, 453–​475. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​13591​8351​7729​427 Nimtz, A. H. (1980). Islam and politics in East Africa: The Sufi order in Tanzania. University of Minnesota Press. Nunn, N. (2010). Religious conversion in colonial Africa. American Economic Review, 100, 147–​152. https://​doi.org/​10.1257/​aer.100.2.147 Obadare, E. (2006). Pentecostal presidency? The Lagos-​Ibadan “theocratic class” and the Muslim “other.” Review of African Political Economy, 33, 665–​678. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 030562​4060​1119​083 Oduyoye, M. A. (2005). Daughters of Anowa: African women and patriarchy. Orbis Books. Okhonmina, S. (2009). The African Union: Pan-​Africanist aspirations and the challenge of African unity. Journal of Pan African Studies, 3, 85–​100. https://​bupr​imo.hos​ted.exlibr​isgr​ oup.com/​permal​ink/​f/​g23​ind/​TN_​cdi_​proq​uest​_​jou​rnal​s_​23​7003​066 Okwu, A. S. O. (1979). Life, death, reincarnation, and traditional healing in Africa. Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 9, 19–​24. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​1166​258 Olupona, J. (2006). Religion and ecology in African culture and society. In R. S. Gottlieb (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of religion and ecology (pp. 259–​282). Oxford University Press. Olupona, J. (2014). African religions: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press. Orobator, A. E. (2018). Religion and faith in Africa: Confessions of an animist. Orbis Books. Pakenham, T. (1992). The scramble for Africa: White man’s conquest of the dark continent from 1876–​1912. Harper Collins. Parkin, D. (2014). Pathways to healing: Curative travel among Muslims and non-​Muslims in eastern East Africa. Medical Anthropology, 33, 21–​36. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​01459​ 740.2013.775​129 Peel, J. D. Y. (2016). Christianity, Islam, and Orisa-​Religion: Three traditions in comparison and interaction. University of California Press. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. (2010, April 15). Tolerance and tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-​Saharan Africa. [Report]. Pew Research Center. Phillipson, D. W. (2009). Ancient churches of Ethiopia: 4th–​14th centuries. Yale University Press. Rahemtulla, S. (2015). Toward a genuine congregation: The form of the Muslim Friday prayer, revisited. In C. Carvalhaes (Ed.), Liturgy in postcolonial perspectives: Only one is holy (pp. 33–​44). Palgrave Macmillan. Reinhardt, B. (2017). The pedagogies of preaching: Skill, performance, and charisma in a Pentecostal Bible school from Ghana. Journal of Religion in Africa, 47, 72–​107. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1163/​15700​666-​12340​099 Riesebrodt, M. (2010). The promise of salvation: A theory of religion. University of Chicago Press. Robinson, D. (2004). Muslim societies in African history. Cambridge University Press. Rodney, W. (2018). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Verso. Sarkissian, A. (2012). Religion and civic engagement in Muslim countries. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 51, 607–​622. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1468-​5906.2012.01677.x Scherz, C., & Mpanga, G. (2019). His mother became medicine: Drinking problems, ethical transformation and maternal care in Central Uganda. Africa, 89, 125–​46. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1017/​s00019​7201​8000​736 Schulz, D. (2012). Muslims and new media in West Africa: Pathways to God. Indiana University Press.

114   Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber Schulz, D. (2013). What makes a good minority Muslim? Educational policy and the paradoxes of Muslim schooling in Uganda. Contemporary Islam, 7, 53–​70. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​ 562-​013-​0246-​y Schulz, D. (2014). Transmitting divine grace: On the materiality of charismatic mediation in Mali. In H. Behrend, A. Dreschke, & M. Zillinger (Eds.), Trance mediums and new media: Spirit possession in the age of technical reproduction (pp. 183–​200). Fordham University Press. Seesemann, R., & Soares, B. F. (2009). “Being as good Muslims as Frenchmen”: On Islam and colonial modernity in West Africa. Journal of Religion in Africa, 39, 91–​120. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1163/​15700​6609​X409​067 Selod, S. (2018). Forever suspect: Racialized surveillance of Muslim Americans in the war on terror. Rutgers University Pres. Smilde, D. (2007). Reasons to believe: Cultural agency in Latin American evangelicalism. University of California Press. Smith, C. (2003). The secular revolution: Power, interests, and conflicts in the secularization of public life. University of California Press. Soares, B. F. (2016). Reflections on Muslim-​Christian encounters in West Africa. Africa, 86, 673–​697. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00019​7201​6000​619 Sounaye, A. (2017). Salafi aesthetics: Preaching among the Sunnance in Niamey, Niger. Journal of Religion in Africa, 47, 9–​41. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​15700​666-​12340​101 Spadola, E. (2014). Rites of perception: Mass-​mediated trance and public order in Morocco. In H. Behrend, A. Dreschke, & M. Zillinger (Eds.), Trance mediums and new media: Spirit possession in the age of technical reproduction (pp. 137–​155). Fordham University Press. Stambach, A. (2010). Education, religion, and anthropology in Africa. Annual Review of Anthropology, 39, 361–​379. https://​doi.org/​10.1146/​annu​rev.ant​hro.012​809.105​002 Svensson, J. (2011). Islamic education in East Africa. In H. Daun & R. Arjmand (Eds.), Handbook of Islamic education (pp. 651–​671). Springer. Swidler, A. (2010). The return of the sacred: What African chiefs teach us about secularization. Sociology of Religion, 71, 157–​171. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​soc​rel/​srq​036 Trinitapoli, J., & Weinreb, A. (2012). Religion and AIDS in Africa. Oxford University Press. Tweed, T. A. (2006). Crossing and dwelling: A theory of religion. Harvard University Press. Ukah, A. (2018). Emplacing God: The social worlds of miracle cities: Perspectives from Nigeria and Uganda. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 36, 351–​368. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 02589​001.2018.1492​094 van Dijk, R. A. (1992). Young puritan preachers in post-​independence Malawi. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 62, 159–​181. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​1160​453 Vasquez, M. (2011). More than belief: A materialist theory of religion. Oxford University Press. Walker, S. S. (1980). Young men, old men, and devils in aeroplanes: The Harrist church, the witchcraft complex and social change in the Ivory Coast. Journal of Religion in Africa, 11, 106–​123. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​1581​260 Walters, S. (2016). Counting souls: Towards an historical demography of Africa. Demographic Research, 34, 63–​108. https://​doi.org/​10.4054/​Dem​Res.2016.34.3 Westerlund, D. (2006). African indigenous religions and disease causation: From spiritual beings to living humans. Brill. Wilkens, K. (2009). Mary and the demons: Marian devotion and ritual healing in Tanzania. Journal of Religion in Africa, 39, 295–​318. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​15700​6609​X453​310 Winchester, D. A. (2008). Embodying the faith: Religious practice and the making of a Muslim moral habitus. Social Forces, 86, 1753–​1780. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​sof.0.0038

Religious Life in African Societies     115 Wrigley, C. C. (1957). Buganda: An outline economic history. Economic History Review, 10, 69–​ 80. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​2600​062 Wyrtzen, J. (2015). Making Morocco: Colonial intervention and the politics of identity. Cornell University Press. Yukich, G., & Edgell, P. (2020). Introduction: Recognizing raced religion. In G. Yukich & P. Edgell (Eds.), Religion is raced: Understanding American religion in the twenty-​first century (pp. 1–​18). New York University Press.

Chapter 7

The Advent, Dev e l op me nt, and Impac t of Christianit y i n A fri c a Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu

Introduction Christianity has come to stay in Africa as one of the foremost religion of the people. Philippe Dennis (2016) and Alfred Kodua (2004) have testified to the prominence of Christianity in Southern Africa and Ghana, respectively. Dennis avers that culturally, economically, and politically Christianity remains a force to reckon with in Southern Africa, and Kodua asserts that Christianity has become a way of life in Ghana, accounting for 69.1 percent of the population. With respect to Nigeria, Ukah (2016, p. 138) writes: “Religion is the second most important export of Nigeria; the first is crude oil . . . the second is Pentecostal missionaries.” He further explains that Bigard Memorial Major Seminary, Enugu, in Nigeria ordains nearly 2,000 Catholic priests annually and sends hundreds of missionaries to other countries in and beyond the continent (p. 138). An estimated 18,400 Africans served as missionaries abroad in 2007, a number that by 2016 had risen to over 550,000. African Christians serve as pastors, priests, nurses, and social workers overseas in countries in Asia, Europe, Russia, Oceania, and the Americas. And as Mbiti (2016) points out, there are many thriving African-​founded churches and congregations in the diaspora. To many keen observers of the phenomenal growth of the church, this development harmonizes with the prognostications of Andrew Walls (1984), a doyen of African Christianity, who decades ago projected a paradigm shift in Christianity from the countries of the West to the southern continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Global Christianity in the early 21st century represented only 40 percent of the European and North American populace, down from 80 percent in 1900. As Bonk (2008) reveals,

118    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu Christian numerical growth in Africa has burgeoned from an estimated 8 million to 9 million in 1900 to some 424 million in 2008. Now there are roughly 575 million Christians in Africa in approximately 2,208 denominations, which in 2015 represented 48 percent of the continent’s total population. A study by the Gordon Conwell Theological Seminary in 2018 affirmed that today more Christians live in Africa than on any other continent. This implies that Africa now has almost 600 million Christians, with a projected increase to 633 million by 2025 and 1.25 billion by 2050. By 2050, together with the estimated figures of 705 million for Latin America and 490 million for Europe, the numerical and creative center of Christianity will have shifted to the Global South, notably, to Africa, which with an annual growth of 3.05 percent will have become a de facto hub of Christianity (Zurlo & Johnson, 2016). This shift in the preponderance and dynamics of Christianity to Africa locally and globally has some obvious implications. Walls (1998) asserts: “The things by which people will recognize and judge what Christianity is (for good or ill) will increasingly be determined in Africa” (p. 2). He further maintains that “the characteristic doctrines, the liturgy, the ethical codes, the social application of the faith will increasingly be those prominent in Africa . . . and new agendas for theology will appear in Africa” (p. 2). Walls (1998), Jenkins (2002), and Bediako (1998), among others, predicted that there would be significant historical and social developments concerning African Christianity in the 21st century. First, there will be a phenomenal numerical surge of the faith in Africa. The statistics given in the previous paragraph seem to confirm this assertion. Second, Christianity will evolve permanently into a primarily non-​Western religion. It is evident now that Christianity, whatever it used to be, can no longer be considered the religion of White Europeans and North Americans. Christianity has not only ceased to be an exclusively Western religion in our generation, but it is also no longer holding its own in Europe and other parts of the West. Third, Africans will be the main actors and catalysts shaping Christian cultures in the 21st century. In other words, the contemporary generation of African churches will determine the shape of the history and theology of the Christian Church for centuries to come. This has been referred to as the paradigm shift of Christianity from the northern hemisphere to the southern hemisphere. All these developments are happening now, apparently even faster than was originally anticipated. This chapter presents the beginnings and evolution of the Christian Church in Africa and examines its impact on the religious, social, and even economic life of the people. It makes recommendations for how the faith can be better solidified on the continent.

The Evolution of Christianity in Africa The advancement of Christianity across Africa occurred in phases. Some parts of Northern Africa came in contact with Christianity in the first century, and the faith

The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa    119 then flourished until the 8th century, when Christianity suffered near extinction in the Roman (African) region. Providentially, Christianity made a sudden reappearance in the 15th century, followed by a spectacular and enduring re-​emergence in the 19th century in West, East, Central, and Southern Africa. Given the current Christian numerical growth in Africa, it can be asserted that Christianity will remain a formidable force to be reckoned with in the life of the people.

Northern Africa The Acts of the Apostles points to Africa’s early contact with the Gospel. The first mention of such contact was that of the Ethiopian eunuch (recorded in Acts 8: 26–​38), who no doubt proceeded to Africa after his Christian baptism. According to Hildebrandt (1996, p. 6), the Ethiopian (or rather, Nubian) had opportunities to witness for Christ in Africa. Later, in Acts 18:24–​28, mention was also made of Apollos, a convert from Alexandria in Egypt. The church in Northern Africa flourished in the cities of Alexandria, Carthage (Tunisia), and Cyrenaica (Libya) for some centuries before the incursion of Islam into the region. The Egyptian Christian Church burst on the scene around ad 180 with the emergence of the Catechetical School of Alexandria, which can boast of being the first academic center established by the church. The Alexandria School, with its outstanding library, became a gathering place for intellectuals and later gave rise to the establishment of a university, which was the standard for any other university in Europe (Oden, 2007, pp. 43–​44). The Greek translation of the Old Testament, otherwise known as the Septuagint, was compiled in Alexandria, and the decisions on the 27 books that would officially make up the New Testament were taken at the Councils of Hippo Regius in ad 313 and Carthage in ad 397 (Barackman, 1992, p. 34). Other examples that illustrate the unique position of Africa in shaping Christianity include the recognition of distinguished African Christian thinkers and leaders. These emerged in Northern Africa during this early period of Christianity, and their works had a profound influence on the subsequent development of Christianity worldwide. These distinctive early African church leaders included the popes Victor I (189–​199), Melchiades (311–​314), and Gelasius (492–​496) and the theologian Church Fathers Origen, Augustine, Tertullian, Pachomius, Cyprian, Athanasius, and Cyril, whose views shaped the doctrinal consensus for world Christianity. Their responses to Gnosticism, Arianism, Montanism, Marcionism, Pelagianism, and Manichaeism influenced the Christian world outside Africa. For example, Tertullian coined the term “Trinity” around ad 220; and during the Arian controversy, Athanasius tenaciously affirmed and upheld the deity of Christ as it is known today, at the expense of his life. Augustine, the bishop of the North African Diocese of Hippo, wrote not only specifically on doctrinal matters but also on such matters as church-​state relations, and his book The City of God is still widely used by students of history of religions and political theory, among others. Hildebrandt (1996) posits that the growth of the North African Church was remarkable, noting that it was called “the regions of many Bishops” because of its flourishing

120    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu mission territories, with many dioceses and bishops. Whereas there were 70 African bishops in the church around ad 220, the number had increased to 150 by about ad 250, and by ad 300, there were more than 250. However, starting in ad 700, the North African Church began dwindling rapidly. The number of bishops fell to between 30 and 40; by around 1050 only six bishops were left; and by 1300, there was only one bishop remaining, with the last Christian villages in North Africa disappearing, seemingly around the 15th century (Hildebrandt, 1996). Many factors led to the decline of the North African Church, including heresy and theological controversies, schisms, vandalism, a lack of appropriate pastoral oversight, persecution, absence of contextualization, and Islamic invasion. Except in Egypt, where the impact of the church only diminished, in the other Northern African sectors, the church literally vanished (Zurlo & Johnson, 2016).

Christianity in Western Africa Africa’s second encounter with Christianity took place from 1500 to 1800, when the faith was introduced by Catholic Portugal, motivated by the pioneering efforts of Prince Henry the Navigator, around 15th century (Agbeti, 1986). The reasons for Henry’s expeditions to Africa were varied, ranging from the scientific to the political to personal ambition as well as missionary work. Ultimately, his efforts led to an incursion of Portuguese Catholic missionaries into many parts of West Africa, including Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and the Kingdom of Kongo (Falk, 1997). However, the Portuguese missionary efforts unfortunately acceded to an overriding focus on economic and commercial interests, and their impact was ultimately insignificant. In most places the mission produced only a thin veneer of Christianity before it finally became extinct. The second attempt, which eventually endured, came in the middle of the 19th century. It was spearheaded by the Protestant missionary movements from Europe. The antecedents of the Protestant and Catholic efforts were the two great events: First, the Great Evangelical Awakening made significant contributions to the evangelization of West Africa (Hanks, 1998). The second was the abolition of the slave trade. Slavery was outlawed in England in 1772, and the Parliament passed an antislavery bill in 1807 (Hildebrandt, 1996). This eventually led some freed slaves to resettle in West Africa, first in Sierra Leone and later in Liberia, which was created for the ex-​slaves from America. Most of the Black settlers from America who arrived from Nova Scotia in 1792 professed Christianity, as did their counterparts from Britain (Clarke, 1986). This led to the establishment of the first Black church in Africa (Hanciles, 2007). Christianity was later solidified in Sierra Leone, which became the base from where it spread to other parts of West Africa. Decades later, the Catholics staged a comeback and joined the Protestants in many parts of Africa. Today, with the exception of the resistant Islamic Republic of Mauritania, foreign and indigenous African missionaries have been at work in varying degrees in each of the countries in this region. Zurlo and Johnson (2016) project that 11

The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa    121 out of the 17 countries in Western Africa will continue to see an increase in the Christian share of the growing population (p. 168).

Eastern Africa Christianity emerged in Ethiopia in the mid-​4th century, or possibly earlier, and assumed an important role in Ethiopian life. The Ethiopian Orthodox Täwahdo Church, as it is officially called, is a unique African church deeply rooted in Ethiopian history, social life, and ethics. Unlike the churches in Northern Africa, the Ethiopian church survived the threats from Islam. This is because, among other reasons, first, efforts were made to indigenize Christianity so much that it was easy for the people to understand what they were being taught. Second, Christianity had the support of the Ethiopian kings and was pronounced a national religion. Third, the Bible and other liturgical materials were translated into the native language (Ge’ez). As a result, the Ethiopians looked at the church as a symbol of not just their faith but also of their nationalism and a practical manifestation of divine assistance and providence in times of crisis. Therefore, although the Muslims fought for more than 200 years to capture the Ethiopian kingdom, and even penetrated Ethiopia, they could not destroy the church. The Ethiopian church served as a foundation for all nationalist and African indigenous churches in the sense that African indigenous churches emphasized the African way of worship. The introduction of Christianity to some other parts of East Africa followed virtually the same pattern as that of the West. Portuguese Catholic missionaries introduced Christianity to East Africa through Kenya in the 16th century. The Portuguese were expelled from Kenya in 1698 by the forces of Oman. It was another 150 years before Christianity was re-​established in the region, when Johann Ludwig Krapf, a German serving with the Anglican Church Missionary Society, was the first Protestant missionary to arrive in East Africa. Krapf had initially been a missionary in Ethiopia. But in 1842, when Western missionaries were barred from Ethiopia, he and his wife went to Mombasa, arriving in 1844, and with the permission of Sultan Sayyid Said of Zanzibar, Krapf started doing missionary work in the region (Gitau, 2017). For the next 11 years (1844–​1855) Krapf worked in the coastal area of what is today modern Kenya, first in Mombasa, and then at Rabai. In 1846, Johannes Rebmann arrived to assist Krapf in evangelizing the interior. Various Protestant and Catholic missions were later established along the coast and in the interior, including the Holy Ghost Fathers, Benedictines, Lutherans, Methodists, and the American Africa Inland Mission (Jowitt, 2010). Whatever the success or otherwise of Krapf ’s work, the Anglican Church of the Province of Kenya, which celebrated its first century and a half of existence in 1994, looks back to him as its founder. In 1862, the British Methodists came to Mombasa. The White Fathers of the Roman Catholic Church were initially more active in Uganda and Tanzania and then in Kenya from the late 1880s. In the 1920s, Pentecostalism arrived via representatives of the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada. The Salvation Army started work in Kenya in 1921. Today, it is held that if the current transformation of the religious

122    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu landscape persists, by 2025, Christians will constitute a majority in 14 of the 20 Eastern African countries (Olwa, 2016).

Southern Africa As in Western Africa, Christianity was first introduced to the Southern part of Africa with the arrival of the Portuguese in the 15th century. The Portuguese explorers, led by Bartholomeu Diaz, apparently demonstrated their penchant for the mission by erecting a cross made of limestone at the Cape of Good Hope in 1488. Since only a few Catholic priests accompanied the explorers, their service was limited to the explorers stationed in the fort built at the kingdom of Monomotapa (now Zimbabwe) up until the end of the 16th century. Later, some Portuguese Catholic priests found their way to the Congo and Angola. Without having achieved much, they closed down their missions in Angola and Southeast Africa in 1835. By the middle of the 17th century, the Dutch East India Company had established a station at the Cape of Good Hope, where the Dutch eventually launched the Dutch Reformed Church in 1652 without missionary intent. By 1658, when more Dutch Reformed Church missionaries settled in the Cape, they started their mission services, extending them to the slaves. A Moravian missionary, George Schmidt, who arrived in South Africa at the request of the Dutch church in 1737, was determined to reach the Khoi and San people for Christ. Providentially, he won five converts and baptized them. The Dutch clergy, out of envy that he was establishing a competing church, obstructed his work. Consequently, he returned to Europe where he remained until his death in 1785 (Falk, 1997). It was only later that the Dutch Reformed Church extended missionary activities to the indigenous population. The London Missionary Society (LMS) sent four missionaries to the Cape Colony in 1799. In 1817, Robert Mofatt joined the LMS team and opened a mission in Kuruman. All these missionaries working together helped to extend the ministry of the LMS to other parts of the region, evangelizing among the various tribes of South Africa (Falk, 1997). David Livingstone joined the LMS in 1841, moving northward to set up new mission stations. From Kuruman, Livingstone embarked on series of journeys across central Africa with the objective of bringing Christianity, commerce, and civilization to Africans (Falk, 1997). His various journeys to central Africa paved the way for further Protestant outreach into areas such as Uganda and Zaire (Hanks, 1998). Earlier, the Methodist fellowships had been held by soldiers at Cape Town in 1806 but the Methodist Church sent Barnabas Shaw as its first missionary to South Africa in 1816. By 1817, 17 adults and 11 children had been baptized, and by 1826 a prosperous station had been established that had 97 church members. The Paris Evangelical Missionary Society also joined the race, devoting its ministry to the Basuto, while the Congregational, Lutheran, and Anglican Churches established ministries along the east coast (Falk, 1997). Virtually all these missions prioritized literacy and biblical instruction. There are

The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa    123 diverse Christian expressions in South Africa, and the church witnessed tremendous growth in the 20th century.

Reactions to Missionary Christianity and the Taxonomy of African Churches Compared to the first advent of the 15th century, the second advent of Christianity in the 19th century enjoyed the support of Africans and led to the spread of the faith across the continent. However, before the close of that century, agitations against mission Christianity that had become “over-​Europeanized” had commenced. Consequently, rapidly many strands of Christian traditions developed, which bore the African imprints. Three such traditions are observable across Africa. These are the African or Nationalist Churches (West Africa), otherwise referred to as Ethiopian Churches (South and Eastern Africa); the African Indigenous Churches (AICs) also known as Aladura ( southwest Nigeria), Roho and Amazioni (in East and South Africa respectively), and the indigenous Pentecostal denominations.

Ethiopianist, or Nationalist (African), Churches The earliest revolts against the leadership of the mission churches in many African countries were led by the Ethiopian or Nationalist churches. It should be recalled that most of the Western missionaries who came to Africa had biases against Africans, their culture, and their way of life, notably, the misconception that White people were superior to Africans. Consequently, some of the Ethiopian) or Nationalist churches evolved out of the reactions of the Africans against the biases of the missionaries. In West Africa, particularly in Nigeria, these churches included the Native Baptist Church (1888), the United Native African Church (1891), the African Church (1901), and the United African Methodist Church, Eleja (1917). In Ghana were the National Baptist Church (1898), the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, and the Nigritian Fellowship (1907). To varying degrees these churches were characterized by a desire for African self-​expression and freedom from the control of foreign missionaries (Ayegboyin & Ishola, 2013). They were therefore established without any support, monetary or otherwise, from the foreigners. In East Africa, the Ethiopian churches include the Nomiya Luo Mission, which seceded from the Anglican Church in 1914. Also included are the Church of Christ in Africa, known popularly as Johera, which is a schismatic group from the Anglican Church in Western Kenya, and the Mario Legio of Africa, a noteworthy split from

124    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu Roman Catholicism. Similarly, in South Africa, the secession of Nehemiah Tile, a Wesleyan Methodist, from the Methodist Church was informed by the need for freedom from the authoritarian control of the Western missionaries. As a further demonstration of the African opposition to foreign missionary control, Tile’s church adapted its mode of worship to the ways of life of the Tembu tribe and appointed its chief as their spiritual and political head, just as the king or queen of England serves as the head of the Anglican Church in Britain.

African Indigenous Churches (AICs) The second response came from the African Indigenous Churches (AICs), whose nomenclature varies from place to place. Among the Yoruba in Nigeria, they are called Aladura (praying movements) or Ijo elemi (spirit churches); and among the Akans in Ghana, they are called Sunsum sore (spirit movements). In East Africa, the Roho, or Holy Spirit, movements first emerged and are still popular among the Luo in Western Kenya and the Kikuyu lands; in South Africa, amaZioni (Zionist churches) first surfaced among the Zulus and Swazis during the first decade of the 20th century. These churches emphasize the guidance of uMoya (the Spirit), with healing and deliverance as the dominant interests.

Importance of the Ethiopian and Indigenous Churches Two factors helped to shape and sharpen the spirituality of the spirit churches right from their inception, as noted by Ayegboyin (2011, p. 167). These are, first, the belief in God and, second, an attitude and outlook rooted in the African worldview. They are pragmatic in contextualizing Christianity in African culture. The worldview of the members informs their beliefs, such as about the forces of evil, malevolent spirits, witches, and wizards. The Ethiopian church and the AIC have provided continuity and helped to perpetuate the culture and ways of life of Africans who are able to worship in ways that reflect their cultural backgrounds. In this way, the roots of Christianity have been entrenched in African societies. First, Christianity has to a large extent been contextualized. Second, these churches have helped to restore the dignity of the indigenous people. Third, the Ethiopian churches and the subsequent Indigenous churches and their paraphernalia contributed significantly to the early nationalist movements in Africa. Fourth, they have served as precursors of the modern-​day scholarship of contextualization and alternative ways of interpreting the scriptures in Africa. The efforts of the Ethiopian churches and the AICs to indigenize theology have become a primary focus among African theologians and Bible scholars, who have since felt that there is something unique about these Indigenous churches that makes them worthy of scholarly attention.

The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa    125

Pentecostal Movements Pentecostalism is the third reaction of Africans to missionary Christianity. The claim by some scholars that Pentecostalism was “imported” into Africa has been contested by others, who argue that Pentecostalism is not solely an American affair. They claim instead that it evolved in some other parts of the world, including in Africa, at different times, independent of both Topeka (Kansas) and Azusa. (See Gifford, 1990; Fatokun, 2005). Prominent Pentecostal churches are scattered across Sub-​Saharan Africa. In Nigeria, they are the Apostolic Faith, the Apostolic Church, the Foursquare Gospel Church, the Gospel Faith Mission International, the Redeemed Christian Church of God, the Church of God Mission, the Deeper Life Bible Church, the Mountain of Fire and the Miracle Ministries, the Living Faith Church Worldwide, and the Christ Embassy. In Ghana there are the International Central Gospel Church; the International Bible Worship Centre, now the Royal House Chapel; the Word Miracle Church International; the Victory Bible Church; the Christian Action Faith Ministries International; and the Christ’s Citadel Church. Similarly, the Pentecostal and charismatic movements in Kenya constitute a large Christian constituency that commands hundreds of thousands if not millions of followers. Since the 1970s Pentecostal and charismatic churches, fellowships, and ministries have increased throughout the country, and in South Africa Pentecostalism is said to be the fastest growing strand of Christianity. The prominent Pentecostal churches in South Africa include the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, the Rhema Bible Church, the Grace Bible Church, the Christ Glorious Ministries, and the Liberty Gospel Church.

Christianity and Social Transformation in Africa Christianity has made tremendous contributions to the modernization of African countries in many ways. It is not an overstatement to say that without the groundwork laid by the missionaries, many African countries would not have the civilization they know today. The transformation happened in diverse ways.

Social Amenities The provision of social amenities is one of Christianity’s greatest contributions to African communities. From its inception, the missionary enterprise in Africa was interwoven with active humanitarianism. This resulted in the missionaries’ investing heavily in the provision of social amenities. Consequently, many countries in

126    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu Africa owe their social development and transformation to the activities of Western missionaries. In the context of the Nigerian experience, Ayegboyin and Ogunewu (2014) have shown the influence of Christianity in formal education, healthcare services, sociocultural change, economic development, and the employment sectors. The missionaries initiated and sustained formal education in Sub-​Saharan Africa for many years before the colonial powers saw the need for it. The first missionary primary and secondary schools in Nigeria were established in 1843 and 1859, respectively. The colonial powers were not actively involved in primary education until 56 years later, in 1899, when the first government primary school was founded. Similarly, the first government secondary school was established 50 years after the one started by the missionaries. Building on the legacy of the missionaries, the church in Nigeria has advanced further through the provision of tertiary education, and many churches can now boast of faith-​based universities of their own (Ayegboyin & Ogunewu, 2014). The Nigerian experience has been repeated in many other countries in Sub-​Saharan Africa where formal education was the brainchild of the Christian missionaries. It was reported that in 1899 in Nigeria, only 33 of the 8,154 primary schools, 9 of the 136 secondary schools, and 13 of the 97 normal schools were government-​run. Similarly, in the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1914, the government was responsible for only 8 percent of the schools. In Kenya and Uganda, all schools were managed by missions. It was not until 1922 that the British government assumed some responsibility for education in Uganda when it opened the first government technical school at Makerere, which later became the Makerere University College. The British took over the administration of existing government schools only in the territories they had seized from the Germans in World War I (Bowen, 2021). While providing education placed a heavy strain on missionary finances, it also afforded them the unique opportunity to shape the character of several generations of Africans and served as an agent of “acculturation” among the people. Southern Nigeria is a typical example of an environment that enjoys the social transformation brought about by Christianity through Western education. At the time, the activities of Christian missionaries were restricted to the southern part of Nigeria as a matter of colonial policy. This policy naturally delimited Western education in the north (Crampton, 2004). The effect is that today the northern part of Nigeria lags behind the rest of the country in Western education. It is speculated that there are about 13.2 million out-​of-​school children in Nigeria, most of whom are in Northern Nigeria (Obiezu, 2018). This is close to 10 percent of the Nigerian population. The result has been abject poverty and insurrection in Northern Nigeria. The Christian missions also invested in healthcare services and pioneered medical services across countries in Africa. Before the advent of Christianity in Africa, traditional medicine and healing practices were the standard treatment. Although this was helpful to certain extent, it was deficient in many ways. Africans were therefore faced with sundry health challenges and the mortality rate was high. Christianity therefore improved health outcomes; the church considered healing the sick and helping the needy integral to its redemptive ministry, and it responded to the need by promoting

The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa    127 medical missions, including clinics, dispensaries and hospitals; it also built medical schools in some areas. The missionary organizations were the first to establish modern healthcare facilities in several African countries. Generally, the early Christian missions of the various denominations working in different parts of Africa were accompanied by medical doctors, which marked the beginning of the spread of modern healthcare facilities across the continent (Onokerhoraye, 1984). Mbiti (2016) asserts that the Christian hospitals and medical centers in Africa are often reputed to offer better medical care for the sick and expectant mothers and babies than many other hospitals. A typical missionary healthcare institution in Nigeria is the Bowen University Teaching Hospital, formerly the Baptist Medical Centre, Ogbomoso. Established by the Baptists in 1907 as the medical arm of its mission, for over a century it catered to the health needs of people within Ogbomoso and its environs and is still functioning today. The Baptist mission also established ancillary medical institutions in Ogbomoso and other areas. These include a center for the blind, a leper colony, the School of Nursing and Midwifery, and a home for motherless babies (Ayegboyin & Ogunewu, 2013). Commenting on the contributions of Christian missionaries in Zaire, Carpenter (1952) testifies that at one point, missionary societies operated 171 hospitals and dispensaries served by 56 doctors, 166 foreign nurses, and an African staff of 1,097 persons. Falk (1997) avers that the churches also contributed immensely to the care and healing of lepers. Leprosy was very prevalent in many parts of the equatorial forest belt of Africa. From West Africa to East Africa, missionary societies established leprosy colonies that had hospitals where systematic treatments were given. The American Leprosy Missions were of great assistance. They funded the siting of a leper colony on 350 acres of land for the Assemblies of God in Liberia (Glover, 1960). This type of service was replicated across African communities to alleviate the deplorable health conditions and, if possible, reintegrate the lepers into society. For instance, the Lutheran Brethren operated the leprosarium in Lere, Cameroun, which treated close to 300 patients in 1970. By 1950 there were 35 leprosy colonies in Zaire treating 6,600 patients (Carpenter, 1952), and the Worldwide Evangelization Crusade was providing treatment for leprosy patients in Ghana (Grooves, 1958). Today, many of these healthcare facilities are still operating in communities across Africa.

Sociocultural Transformation Despite what missionary healthcare in Africa became, the early missionaries were often met with hostility. This is because the Christian message was critical of certain practices, which it regarded as obnoxious. Before the introduction of Christianity, many African societies were involved in intertribal warfare because it was a means of capturing prisoners of war who could then be sold off as slaves. According to Herbert Kane (1982), “The missionaries in alliance with the colonial government were able to put an end to internecine warfare and the infamous slave trade, both of which were decimating the

128    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu population, and engendered the much-​needed peace on the entire continent” (p. 141). Thus, the missionaries were instrumental in bringing about peaceful coexistence among African communities. Other obnoxious customs were common on the continent at that time. Among these were the killing of twins at infancy, human sacrifice, female circumcision, and ritual killings of various kinds. In some West African societies, the tradition whenever a paramount king died was that some of his slaves must either be killed or buried alive with him so they could continue to serve him in the hereafter. In certain African communities, twins were considered evil children who had to be eliminated so as not to put the well-​being of the community in jeopardy (Buchan, 1980). Today, all these practices have been outlawed by government legislation, but it was the missionaries who first inveighed against these evils, often at great cost to themselves. Through this, the missionaries contributed in no small measure to peace, progress, and stability across African communities.

Political Reforms The missionaries introduced sociopolitical reforms in Africa. In some countries they initiated reforms by indirect rather than direct methods. Quietly, consistently, and modestly, they went about teaching and preaching the Christian message with its revolutionary tendencies. Leading by precept and example, many missionaries inculcated Christian values, including the sanctity of human life, the worth of the individual, the dignity of labor and the importance of social justice, personal integrity, and freedom of expression, all of which have been incorporated into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drawn up by the United Nations. These Christian ideals sparked sociopolitical reforms in Africa, as many African countries fashioned their constitutions to include many of them. Indubitably, Western education produced an educated citizenry who helped to accelerate the efforts to gain political independence of many African countries. Kane (1982) explains that without this groundwork laid by the missionaries, it is possible that not many countries in Black Africa would be independent of European control today. He notes that many past African leaders were aware of this. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, testified to this when he said, “We owe much to the missionary and we will continue to welcome them to our country.” And Tafawa Balewa and Jomo Kenyatta, respectively the first prime minister of Nigeria and president of Kenya, similarly commended the missionaries for the part they played in the independence of their respective countries. Sundkler and Steed (2004, p. 902) extol the virtues of the founding fathers of African nationalism. According to them, such men who included Nkrumah of Ghana, Azikiwe and Awolowo of Nigeria, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Houphouet-​Biogny of the Ivory Coast, all of West Africa, and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Banda of Malawi, all of East Africa, were men with wide international experience who

The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa    129 had spent long periods of time in either the United States, Britain, or France and been inspired and influenced by the ideas and visions of Pan-​African leaders like Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, George Padmore, and Ras Makonen. But even as Sundkler and Steed emphasized the international dimension of their success in political careers, they conceded that the local domain could not be ignored. They observed that these leaders had been influenced in their formative years by missionary education and were products of church-​related educational institutions. The authors conclude that the commitment of churches to Western-​type schools throughout the continent and the educational efforts of their congregations were among the factors that led to the creation of a group of brilliant and activist leaders who later became the founding fathers of the African nations.

Economic Advancement Christianity also fueled the economic advancement of many African countries. Many of the social institutions established by the Christian missionaries have metamorphosed into commercial outfits providing economic sustenance for individuals and also contributing to government coffers. The Church Missionary Society (CMS) started the first newspaper printing press in Nigeria, Iwe Irohin. By so doing, the CMS provided the populace with an instrument of enlightenment, which undoubtedly laid the foundation for nationalism and, in later years, also provided economic sustenance for many. From the economic standpoint, Ajibade (2003) explains that the work of the missionaries helped significantly in two ways. First, it provided an avenue for the printing of newspapers that were later established. Second, it provided the training ground for the first set of Nigerian printers, who later became instrumental in the country’s newspaper publishing business. Ajibade’s assertion is indubitable: The seed of newspaper publishing the missionaries planted in 1859 has grown into a mighty oak, an enterprising industry that employs a diverse set of people and experts from wide range of disciplines. Several churches across Africa have moved from being mere worshipping communities to employers of labor. Churches employ many categories of professional clergy, who earn their living through church appointments, along with other secular workers. These are the lecturers in both theological institutions and faith-​based universities, teachers in mission schools, and church administrative staff and drivers (Ayegboyin & Ogunewu, 2014). Afe Adogame (1999) expatiates on several ways by which religion contributes to economic development, citing employment opportunities provided for the masses by churches, the ownership of properties and facilities, and the establishment of printing presses and bookshops. He traces the ownership of certain commercial organizations to certain churches. For instance, the ownership of Haggai Bank and the New Life Zion Community Bank in Lagos and an enormous Commercial Press are linked to the Redeemed Christian Church of God. The Anglican Communion has been in the printing and bookshop business since 1913 and has an insurance company

130    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu in Lagos. In the same vein, Living Faith Ministries–​Winners Chapel runs the Dominion House Publishers, while the Deeper Christian Life Ministry has Life Tapes and the Life Press Limited. The Dag Heward-​Mills Church in Ghana is making a fortunes from her media ministries because the church has many titles of books and thousands of cassettes to her credit, many of which sell in the thousands. Apart from enriching the church, this also provides sources of livelihood for many printers, proofreaders, and bookshop attendants, to mention a few. From the foregoing, it is evident that there is nowhere in Africa where a thriving church is a passive onlooker in economic and social development. The church has become an institution that the government cannot afford to ignore because of its communal influence and enormous financial contributions to government revenue. Many churches in Africa are investing massively in structural development, paying development charges that go straight into government coffers. They pay utility bills amounting to millions of dollars and customs duty and Value Added Tax on materials they import, while church employees and ministers pay personal income tax to the government.

Humanitarian Services The churches in Africa have contributed and are contributing to the welfare of the citizens, especially the underprivileged. Many are to be commended. In Nigeria, Prophet T. B. Joshua of the Synagogue Church of All Nations, based in Lagos, is known for his exceptional care of the poor and destitute. The prophet regularly gives bags of foodstuffs and money to the poor. In 1997, the Living Faith World Outreach provided food, clothing, and other relief materials to indigenes of the Koma Hills in Adamawa State, where natives had long been disconnected from civilization. The year before, the church had given relief materials to victims of the Liberian Civil War. The humanitarian gestures of churches include prompt responses during pandemics and emergencies. For instance, across denominations churches in Africa responded promptly and favorably to the HIV/​AIDS pandemic when it ravaged the nations in the 1980s. According to Vitillo (2009), faith-​based organizations, including the churches, were among the earliest social institutions to respond to the pandemic at local, national, regional, and global levels. In his opinion, the research carried out by the World Health Organization in 2007 in Zambia and Lesotho gave credence to this fact. Joseph Mujuni (2012) reports on the efforts of churches in South Africa to alleviate the suffering of AIDS victims and their families. The assistance they provided included forming faith-​ based organizations that concentrate on offering compassionate care to those infected with HIV and supporting orphaned and vulnerable children, lobbying to raise funds to support the HIV/​AIDS program, counseling, care for those orphaned due to AIDS pandemic, and establishing teams of home-​based caregivers. Similarly, many of the leaders of the Pentecostal churches are also involved in the campaign against HIV/​AIDS. For instance, the Redeemed Christian Church of God has formed partnership with the National Agency for the Control of AIDS (NACA).

The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa    131

The Downside Even though Christianity has been intricately intertwined with the history and formation of African society, not all activities initiated by organizations in lieu of the church have been rated as positive. During the Portuguese missionary enterprise in Africa, the missionaries initially worked with a lot of zeal and enthusiasm, but within a very short time, their interest in trade outstripped their interest in the mission. The Portuguese built a trade empire and claimed that it was by divine intervention that they were brought to Africa to trade in gold, liquor, and, eventually, slaves. Indeed, some missionaries supported their ministry by trading in slaves (Ayegboyin & Fatokun, 2016). In the end, it was obvious that the Portuguese mission enterprise was unsuccessful. Another negative aspect of Christianity in Africa is the stigmatization and demonization of the African culture. The missionaries are to be celebrated for freeing Africans from the claws of certain intolerable cultural practices, but they also went to the other extreme by labeling virtually everything African as fetishistic or idolatrous. This stigmatized many of the laudable African cultural practices that could have been used in the domestication of Christianity on the continent. It is in this context that Barett (1968) stated that the Christianity of the time was over-​Europeanized. It probably never occurred to Europeans in certain parts of Africa that Christianity could retain its essential core values while at the same time being expressed in non-​ Western culture. Even though contextualization makes the faith more relevant to the environment where it is being practiced, they did not see much need for the indigenization or contextualization of the faith until after the second decade in the 20th century. Another serious concern with Christianity many Africans have expressed is the tacit endorsement by some churches of apartheid, the segregated political system in South Africa that discriminated against the Black citizens and gave privileges to those of European origin. The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa, in particular, supported this system claiming that it was theologically and morally acceptable if it was administered with justice (Pirouet, 2005). This social discrimination against Black, colored, and White people was reflected in the establishment of three groups of churches to accommodate this segregation. These were the Afrikaner church, the English-​speaking church, and the church for black Africans. Although some church leaders supported the apartheid policy, there were some who stood against it. One of the exceptions was Bishop Desmond Tutu, who selflessly fought racism during apartheid (Mandela, 1995). Another atypical puzzle about Christianity in Africa is the chaos often observed within political governance on the continent. The majority of African political leaders are referred to as Christians because of the names they bear, however their leadership patterns have over the decades occasioned harrowing experiences for their subjects. Political corruption, robbery, armed struggles, violence, poverty, wars, and tyranny are typical experiences of Africans under most so-​called Christian leaders.

132    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu Expectations were high when many of those leaders took over at independence because they were considered “messiahs” by their people, but it was not long before many of them became tyrannical and fetishistic. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, declared himself as the “Osagyefo” (the Savior), and soon became so despotic that he had to be ousted in a military coup. In Liberia, the civil war that ravaged the country for years was instigated by two Christians: Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor. Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and Paul Biya of Cameroun cannot be said to have accomplished their mission as exemplary Christians. Many African leaders have distorted justice by manipulating existing laws to suit themselves. This leaves a sour taste in the mouth because of the natural expectation that Christian leaders would act according to biblical principles. Materialism among Christian ministers in Africa is also a matter of grave concern. With Pentecostalism came the prosperity teaching which introduced materialism into the church. Apparently, the spirit of materialism pervades the lives of many African Christians, leaders and followers alike. Many Christians in Africa seem to be shifting their emphasis from concern with spirituality and things of eternal value to more temporal, earthly values and valuables, and this has negative implications for the church in Africa.

Conclusion Christianity in Africa has come a long way. Today, it has saturated the continent and developed into a religion that is loved and embraced by most of the African populace. This chapter has examined its beginning, development, progress, and limitations. So far, the faith has gained ground on the continent, producing both favorable and unfavorable experiences. The weaknesses of the church notwithstanding, it should be commended for its humanitarian involvement in Africa. Over the decades it has been, and remains today, the voice of the voiceless, the hope of the hopeless, and the support of the weak and the destitute in many African communities. Njoku (1980) states that “the sick, the needy, the abandoned, the orphan and the helpless found a ready welcome and solace in the hands of the missionaries. It is this enticing and selfless missionary charity that attracted and convinced the Africans and brought about their conversion to the Christian faith” (p. 255). What the missionaries did in their day, the church is doing today. The foregoing submission implies that while the Church has its deficiencies, it has done more good than bad to communities in Africa. However, the positive traits should be improved upon by African Church and Christian political leaders by revisiting key issues and doing their best to rectify any anomalies discovered.

References Adogame, A. (1999). Religion and economic development in Nigeria. Nigerian Journal of Economic History, 2, 23–​36. Agbeti, J. K. (1986). West African Church history (Vol. 1). Brill.

The Advent, Development, and Impact of Christianity in Africa    133 Ajibade, O. (2003). Contributions of the religious publications to the development of Nigerian journalism: The past, present and future. In A. R. A. Akinfeleye & I. E. Okoye (Eds.), Issues in Nigerian media history: 1900–​2000 (pp. 1–​9). Malthouse Press. Ayegboyin, D. I. (2011). Aladura spiritually: Authentic African initiative in Christian mission. Ogbomoso Journal of Theology, 16(1), 165–​177. Ayegboyin, D., & Fatokun, S. (2016). Statistics in Christianity in Western Africa. In I. Phiri, D. Werner, C. Kaunda, & K. Owino (Eds.), Anthology of African Christianity (pp. 205–​221). Regnum. Ayegboyin, D., & Ishola, S. A. (2013). African indigenous churches. Bukuru: African Christian Textbooks. Ayegboyin, D., & Ogunewu, M. A. (2013). Ogbomoso and the Baptist enterprise: Lessons for today. In D. F. Oroniran (Ed.), Ogbomoso: Jerusalem of the Baptist in Nigeria papers in honour of Solomon Ademola Ishola (pp. 14–​35). Titles Publishers. Ayegboyin, D., & Ogunewu, M. A. (2014). Christianity in Nigeria: The gains, the bane and the way forward. In O. Aderinto (Ed.), Nigeria, yesterday, today and beyond: Prophetic journey of a century (pp. 75–​96). Baptist Press. Barackman, F. H. (1992). Practical Christian theology. Kregel. Barett, D. (1968). Schism and Renewal in Africa. London: Oxford University Press. Bediako, K. (1998). Facing the challenge: Africa in world Christianity in the 21st century: A vision of the African future. Journal of African Christian Thought, 1, 52–​56. Bonk, J. J. (2008, October 15). Ecclesiastical cartography and the invisible continent: The dictionary of African Christian biography for African Studies Lecture Series [Paper presentation, Council on African Studies and MacMillan Center, Yale University]. https://​dacb.org/​ about/​bonk-​arti​cle/​ Bowen, J. (2021). Education in British colonies and former colonies. Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed September 11, 2021. https://​www.bri​tann​ica.com/​topic/​educat​ion/​ South-​Afr​ica. Buchan, J. (1980). The expendable Mary Slessor. Saint Andrew Press. Carpenter, G. W. (1952). Highways of God in Congo. Librairie Evangélique au Congo. Clarke, P. B. (1986). West Africa and Christianity. Arnold. Crampton, E. P. T. (2004). Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Geoffrey Chapman. Dennis, P. (2016). Christianity in Southern Africa. In I. Phiri, D. Werner, C. Kaunda, & K. Owino (Eds.), Anthology of African Christianity (pp. 248–​258). Regnum. Falk, P. (1997). The growth of the church in Africa. African Christian Textbooks. Fatokun, S. A. (2005). Christianity in Africa: A historical appraisal. Verbum et Ecclesia, 26, 357–​ 368. https://​doi.org/​10.4102/​ve.v26i2.229 Gifford, P. (1990). Prosperity: A new and foreign element in Africa’s Christianity. Religion, 20, 373–​388. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​0048-​721X(90)90119-​Q Gitau, W. M. (2017). Kenya and Tanzania. In K. R. Ross, J. K. Asamoah-​Gyadu, & T. M. Johnson (Eds.), Christianity in Sub-​Saharan Africa (pp. 106–​118). Edinburgh University Press. Glover, R. H. (1960). The progress of world-​wide missions. Harper and Row. Groves, C. P. (1958). The planting of Christianity in Africa 1840–​1954. Lutterworth. Hanciles, J. (2007). Back to Africa: White abolitionists and Black missionaries. In O. Kalu (Ed.), African Christianity (pp. 67–​189). Africa World Press. Hanks, G. (1998). 70 great Christians: The story of the Christian Church. Evangelical Publication. Hildebrandt, J. (1996). History of the Church in Africa. African Christian Press. Jenkins, P. (2002). The next Christendom: The coming of global Christianity. Oxford University Press. Jowitt, D. (2010). Christianity: A concise history. David Jowitt.

134    Isaac Deji Ayegboyin and Michael Adeleke Ogunewu Kane, J. H. (1982). A concise history of the Christian world mission: A panoramic view of missions from Pentecost to the present. Baker Book House. Kodua, A. (2004). Christianity in Ghana today. Advocate Publishers. Mandela, N. (1995). Long walk to freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela. Little, Brown and Company. Mbiti, J. (2016). Foreword. In I. A. Phiri, D. Werner, C. Kaunda, & K. Owino (Eds.), Anthology of African Christianity (pp. xvii–​xxi). Regnum. Mujuni, J. (2012). The church in the struggle against HIV/​AIDS: A case study in Southern Africa. Accessed September 11, 2021. https://​www.uibk.ac.at/​theol/​leser​aum/​pdf/​muj​uni2​012.pdf Njoku, R. A. (1980). The advent of the Catholic Church in Nigeria: Its growth in Owerri diocese. R. A. Njoku. Obiezu, T. (2018, December 12). Nigeria has world’s largest number of out-​of-​school children –​Boko Haram is a major factor contributing to the increase. Voice of America News. https://​ www.global​citi​zen.org/​en/​cont​ent/​un-​nige​ria-​13-​mill​ion-​child​ren-​out-​of-​sch​ool/​ Oden, T. (2007). How Africa shaped the Christian mind. IVP Books. Olwa, A. (2016). Christianity in Eastern Africa. In I. Phiri, D. Werner, C. Kaunda, & K. Owino (Eds.), Anthology of African Christianity (pp. 222–​236). Regnum. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​ j.ctv​1ddc​qdc.33 Onokerhoraye, A. G. (1984). Social services in Nigeria: An introduction. Kegan Paul International. Pirouet, M. L. (2005). Christianity worldwide church history, 4: AD 1800 onwards. SPCK. Sundkler, B., & Steed, C. (2004). A history of the church in Africa. Cambridge University Press. Ukah, A. (2016). Mission migration and African diaspora inside the continent. In I. Phiri, D. Werner, C. Kaunda, & K. Owino (Eds.), Anthology of African Christianity (pp. 134–​143). Regnum. Vitillo, R. J. (2009). Faith-​based responses to the global HIV pandemic: Exceptional engagement in a major public health emergency. Journal of Medicine and the Person, 7, 77–​84. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s12​682-​009-​0020-​3 Walls, A. F. (1984). Culture and coherence in Christian history. Evangelical Review of Theology, 9, 215–​223. Walls, A. F. (1998). Africa in Christian history: Retrospect and prospect. Journal of African Christian Thought, 12, 2–​15. Zurlo, G. A., & Johnson, T. D. (2016). Religious demographies on African Christianity, 1970–​ 2025. In I. Phiri, D. Werner, C. Kaunda, & K. Owino (Eds.), Anthology of African Christianity (pp. 155–​169). Regnum. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​j.ctv​1ddc​qdc.29

III

G E N DE R , SE X UA L I T Y, A N D I N T E R SE C T IONA L I T Y

Chapter 8

Wom en’s and G e nde r Studies in A fri c a Nakanyike B. Musisi

Introduction From the late 1950s onward, the professionalization of mainstream social sciences and humanities disciplines in Africa concealed women in the disciplines’ grand narratives, rendering them almost invisible and inconsequential.1 Empowered by a combination of local and global events, African women’s and gender studies made its début in the 1970s as a protest and an interdisciplinary endeavor to end this erasure. African women’s histories of struggles and accomplishments remained absent from the burgeoning global feminist narratives. By and large, the first generation of scholars to do research on African women emerged out of the North American civil rights protest movement of the 1960s. Many of these scholars, who self-​identified as feminist, were motivated to search for and make visible stories they could use to advance their cause and claim that women have not always been subordinate to men and that women have always had agency (Sacks, 1982). Covering a vast array of topics, this pioneering scholarship showed women’s subjugation and how historically specific networks of power and relations existed for women to resist or negotiate oppressive circumstances (Wright, 1982). This early scholarship was, however, marred by certain assumptions, the most important being the universality of the Western concepts of “men,” “women,” “gender,” “patriarchy,” “class,” and “race and ethnicity.” The imbalance in this early scholarly production between scholars in the Global North and scholars in Africa did not owe to a dearth of ideas from African scholars but, rather, to structural and political factors, one of which Raewyn Connell (2015) called the “deficit of recognition and circulation” (p. 52). Others included the uneven conditions for research and publishing.2 Across much of Africa, many would-​be African feminist historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists working in unfavorable conditions found themselves seeking career paths outside the continent. In due course,

138   Nakanyike B. Musisi they formed a nascent African diasporic intellectual community that contributed significantly to key debates pertaining to African feminist women’s and gender historiography. Nevertheless, the Western scholarly predominance did not preclude excellent women’s and gender scholarship being done and published on the African continent. For example, Bolanle Awe and Nina Mba (1991), at the University of Ibadan, wrote about the African academics who were creating Women in Nigeria as a women’s movement with the aspiration of turning it into a radical national socialist movement. Some African women expressed concern about the “imposition of concepts and proposals for political solutions” developed outside the lived experiences of Africans and called for the intervention of “the untapped indigenous expertise” (Amadiume, 1987, p. 8). Although the University of South Africa opened its first women’s studies center in 1984, it was unable to offer a full-​fledged teaching program. By the early 1980s, courses on women’s studies and gender were being offered in other South African universities, but not in independent departments (Bonnin, 1996). Eventually, in 1989, the first women’s studies department on the continent was established at the Makerere University in Uganda. Thereafter, several such units were established (Ernstberger, 2010). A good body of literature now exists on the origins and development of such programs on the African continent (Ampofo et al., 2004; Bonnin, 1996). James Etim (2016) argues that three factors account for this phenomenon—​the global push for human rights, the role of international institutions, and governments’ implementation of gender policies. Amanda Gouws (2004), Josephine Ahikire (2004), and Adrianna Ernstberger (2010) concur. These scholars have in common their acknowledgment of the contributions of both the internal and external processes and players, including feminist activism and the growth of women’s movements inflamed by tensions emerging out of oppressive and disempowering colonial histories and postcolonial realities. These processes were supported by the development of feminist publications such as Agenda (1987), Journal of Reproductive Health (1993), Sefere: Southern African Feminist Review (1995), and Feminist Africa (2005). However, some scholars have been critical of the institutionalization of these research and teaching programs in Africa’s tertiary institutions. For instance, Desiree Lewis (2008) observed that as research started to encourage “technocratization,” “teaching increasingly became less concerned with feminism in the academy . . . or with making women visible in research and writing and progressively more preoccupied with how gender analysis should equip students with applied or analytical skills” (p. 87). Lewis lamented the co-​optation of progressive spaces and discourses to advance and consolidate neoliberal state-​building. Notwithstanding this, Alicia Decker and Gabeba Baderoon (2018) have emphasized the diversity of African feminist perspectives within women’s and gender studies. They argue that, rather than being divisive, the multiplicity of perspectives in African feminism is the subdiscipline’s strength. It is important, however, to point out that though this diversity of thought is highly desirable, it is imperative to carve out actual political commitments and to reject presentations of feminism that are harmful and increase vulnerability, such as feminist positions that do not value the lives of queer and trans people, working-​class or unemployed women, and sex workers.

Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa    139 Notwithstanding their contribution to the diversity of the African feminist movement, such trends and scholarship hardly strengthen it.

Historiography By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, major shifts in the social sciences and humanities had begun to impact and influence the work of women’s studies and gender scholars. Moreover, African women’s studies more critically engaged with and called for a disruption of Western feminist gender discourses in favor of others that would appropriately capture and represent African sociocultural gendered realities (Amadiume, 1987, 1997; Oyewumi, 1997). Thus, in its second and subsequent phases, African women’s and gender historiography was not only defining its terms, but was doing in the company of new trends that would contribute to its growth in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This new shift reflected the emergence of postmodernism and poststructuralist theories, which, among other things, gave rise to cultural studies. The visibility of postmodernist and poststructuralist influences in the work of Africanists’ in the second and subsequent phases was manifested in their studies’ commitment to one or the other of the emerging “turns” in the social sciences and humanities—​the spatial turn, the linguistic/​discursive turn, the memory turn, and the identity politics turn, or what Simon Susen (2015) has called the “autonomous turn.” By this, he refers to “the paradigmatic transition that underscores the normative significance of the relentless search for different forms of autonomy pursued by both individual and collective actors” (p. 171). These turns opened new areas of inquiry, such as the female body, the emotions, and the construction of historical memory, while drawing attention to the shifting, multiple, often conflicting ways in which women and men developed gendered identities. Attention to language and discourse led to the questioning of earlier, outdated feminist certainties about lived experience, the nature of women’s subordination, and the use of the category “woman”; it also led to a popularization of the concept of “gender” to denote the socially constructed nature of naturalized characteristics of both men and women (Hunt, 1989). It is at this point that a shift to women’s and gender studies occurred. It involved moving from simply documenting the historical or otherwise material conditions of women’s lives to investigating gendered representation, symbolism, discourse, and texts. Alongside work on perennial topics such as colonialism’s various impacts on women (in education, labor, legal systems, and politics), innovative work was being done, some of which analyzed the body as a text, social object, and terrain for the inscription and exercise of colonial and patriarchal power (Cornwall, 2005). This literature examined the impact of colonial ideologies, as well as the transformative power of colonial material culture, from clothing to biomedicine (Allman, 2004; Klausen, 2015; Moran, 2007). The best illustration of the latter is probably Nancy Hunt’s (1999) exquisitely written A Colonial Lexicon, which examined objects, rituals, and customs

140   Nakanyike B. Musisi surrounding birthing in the Congo to construct and reveal the historical irony of reproductive life and its meanings. But if postmodernism’s intersections with postcolonial and other poststructuralist discourses was attractive, from the beginning, women’s and gender scholars were concerned that the opaque, impenetrable theory and language of postmodernism would exclude rather than attract many to the discussion table (Okeke, 1996). Lewis (2008) cautioned that poststructuralist concepts and methods also “hold out the possibility of disarticulating power relations—​shifting attention away from identifying power and its effects” (p. 92). The spatial turn infused historical, sociological, geographical, and anthropological writing and analysis with a new dynamism that located agency in spaces. Allen Howard (2005) articulated spatial analysis as an “organic perspective,” which, in the hands of African feminist historians, offered new viewpoints on old topics such as state formation, slavery, religion, trade, and commerce. David Shoenbrun (1998) examined the deep precolonial past and showed how gender played out among farmers, hunters, herders, and state-​builders in the frontier politics of groups occupying vast areas of the African Great Lakes region. Still other scholars investigated ritual sites and discovered that they were not innocent religious spaces but, instead, spaces where fecundity struggles were waged by both kings and lineage leaders to gain control of resources and women’s local authority (Bay, 1998). The discursive turn called for recognizing words (utterances), language, and texts as constituting a form of social action. Grasping the meaning of words necessitates understanding both their contexts and intended effects—​not only what is said, but also why and for what purpose (Atanga et al., 2013). In Women in African Colonial Histories, Allman et al. (2002) noted that perceptions and representations in words or terms often carried within them “Western ideological assumption, arrogance, fears, ignorance and, always, the need to exercise control—​often circumscribing or negating women’s economic activities, mobility, political power and institutions and status in their respective societies” (p. 6). In “Discursive Challenges for African Feminisms,” Lewis (2008) called our attention to the need to connect nation and state feminist challenges to those of other feminists globally. She discussed two main discursive manifestations of the neoliberal co-​optation of feminism: first, the growth of moderate rights-​based discourses and, second, the co-​optation and adulteration of gender research and teaching. Using South Africa as a case study, Lewis analyzed the downside of rights discourse, arguing that the “pervasiveness of the current language revolves considerably around the fact that it often refers to conditions or situations that are fundamentally in accord with neoliberal development and patriarchal anxieties around changing the gendered status quo” (p. 83). Sanitized terms such as ‘women’s empowerment,’ ‘women’s equality,’ and ‘gender equity,’ she wrote, “are often used in policy documents or public discourse, rather than phrases such as ‘women’s freedoms’ or ‘feminist liberation’ ” (p. 83). Because it interrogates the sociopolitical context in which a discourse is created or uttered, discourse analysis does not share the empiricists’ drive to uncover “truths” about women or marginalized groups; rather, it wants to investigate how meanings are

Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa    141 produced within narrative accounts. For instance, in investigating feminisms in African hip-​hop, Kibona Clark (2018) surveyed 300 songs by African women rappers and hip-​ hop artists, primarily in English-​speaking Africa. Her fascinating analysis highlights the subversive messaging of certain hip-​hop discourses, particularly those that cryptically emphasize support, love, and protection for queer and transgender people in Africa. Similarly, while Isaac Dery’s (2020) investigation of Ghanaians’ attitudes toward feminism found that both men and women perceived feminism as a dangerous and feminizing Western concept that would disrupt Ghana’s ‘exceptional culture’; his discourse analysis revealed an array of contradictory attitudes among the men and women who rejected the feminist label. For example, women’s rights activists who find it extremely difficult to identify themselves as feminists. Although this is not uncommon elsewhere in Africa, one should not accept this stance at its face value since some of such contradictions raise an interesting reinterpretation of how the homogeneous patriarchy framework can sometimes obscure more than it reveals. Occasionally the patriarchy label collapses because men are also subordinated by certain patriarchal attitudes. Moreover, women occasionally reproduce the construction of these subordinate men as predators when they are, in fact, also victims. On the basis of this discursive analysis, Dery calls for a serious investigation of what an African feminism for men could and should look like. The memory turn called attention to how social groups or individuals, including historians, psychologists, and legal experts constructed the past, particularly what was recalled and to what end. Problematizing memory has spotlighted the process of constructing the past and a nuanced articulation, as well as reinterpretation, of moral and political concerns. A slowly growing stream of literature testifies to the truth in this assertion and points to the methodological challenges of using memory as a source, as text, and as an analytical tool (Burnet, 2012; Coombes, 2015). Last but not least, Africanist gender scholars used the autonomous turn to confront normative assumptions that certain homogeneous group identities, including the categories of “woman” and ethnicity, are primordial and permanent. Their work showed how such categories were socially and historically constituted and rejected the universalists’ accounts of citizenship that marginalized and disadvantaged women and some men (Ekine & Abbas, 2013; Gqola, 2009; Gaudio, 1998). The reluctance of earlier scholars to use the terms feminism and feminist in the titles of their work is strikingly clear in this historiography, although there have been a few notable exceptions (Cromwell, 1986; Geiger, 1990; Hubbard & Solomon, 1995; Mama, 1995). But shyness about putting the F word in a title faded fast in the first decade of the 21st century. Today, searching a catalog for “feminism/​feminist” commonly yields multiple returns. Whether or not feminism was an African phenomenon was being debated, historicized, and appropriated at the same time that its impact as a movement and an analytical tool was being assessed (Abusharaf, 2004; Day, 2008; Hassim, 2004; Magubane, 2010; Oyewumi, 2004). For example, Amina Mama (2011a, 2011b) had argued that feminist theory and discourse have the capacity to transform discourses on academic freedom and social responsibility in profound ways. But despite this potential

142   Nakanyike B. Musisi to enlarge academic freedom and intellectual responsibility, African universities have not created space for feminist intellectuals to thrive. Mama advanced her argument by reconstructing feminist paradigms from between 1990 (the year of the academic freedom conference in Kampala) and 2010. Sifting through the questions raised in those two decades, Mama arrived at the conclusion that denying the mounting evidence of gender inequity in universities, the existence of androcentrism, and its negative impacts on social scientific research, is ethically indefensible. Naomi Nkealah (2016) is critical of some “indigenous feminisms” that exclude men and women based on their ethnicity, location, and sexuality, designating the latter a private affair, thus removing it from the realm of politics. Generational differences that divide women in the feminist movement have also been noted (Bawa, 2018). Nonetheless, Nanjala Nyabola (2018) used case studies to show the overwhelming success that has been attained when the younger and older generations in the feminist movement have worked together. Catherine Nyambura (2018), a young feminist working with FEMNET (the African Women’s Development and Communication Network), contends that young African feminists have played a vital role in reclaiming the women’s rights agenda from political actors, who they believe appropriated the concept of women’s rights and gender equality to serve their own opportunistic if not divergent political agendas. She argues that the idea of gender equality has become increasingly depoliticized and professionalized at a time when young women and their rights are increasingly under threat. It is critical to consider identity politics of difference and recognition when answering the questions: What is African feminism, and who and what is African? What is sexuality, and who decides what constitutes African sexuality? These key questions inform the contributions to Sylvia Tamale’s (2011) comprehensive exploration of African sexuality. Drawing on the disciplines of sociology, history, law, fiction, public health, art, music, spirituality, feminism, and rhetoric, her book exposes the clear and lasting imprint colonial modes of researching and theorizing African sexuality have left on African lives. Camminga (2018), on one hand, has demonstrated how the terms “transgender” and “gender refugees” have been produced in a particular way in South Africa based on the country’s social, political, and cultural specificities. Kibona Msia Clark (2018) has shown how African women have created spaces for themselves within the genre of African hip-​hop, despite the hypermasculine environment. Clark insists that the tensions within this musical space have motivated young women artists to create their own narrations of gender and sexuality, and offered challenges that align with and, at times, diverge from African feminist ideology. Particularly captivating is the subversive hip-​hop messaging that cryptically emphasizes support, love, and protection for queer and transgender people in Africa. Jordache Ellapen (2021) describes how the art collective FAKA uses performance art and aesthetic practices to trouble the relationship between blackness, Africanness, and cisnormativity through which the idea of an authentic African subject is produced by postapartheid and postcolonial state formations. FAKA’s performance art enables them to reimagine Black masculinity. Ellapen argues argue that FAKA produces a distinct Pan-​African queer feminist praxis, which it

Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa    143 calls Siyakaka feminism, and which celebrates Black, queer, femme, and gender-​ nonconforming Africans living in conditions that render them abject and disposable. Matebeni et al.’s (2018) collection on queer, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI) identities in Africa demonstrates ways in which specific categories of gender and sexuality can limit, condition, expand, and empower individuals and groups, and highlights the failure of human-​rights-​based discourses and approaches to address the needs of nonheterosexual subjects. Among sociologists, anthropologists, and historians, “family” remains central to the discussion of kinship in Africa. Seeking a deepened understanding of queer kinship formation, Morison et al. (2020) examined multiple facets of queer life, including interracial queer partnerships, lesbian and gay parenting, the desires of queer youth, queer futurity, and queer photography. Given that scholarly discussions of kinship in South Africa and in the wider South African society often position the family as the bedrock of society, they point out that the notion of “queer kinship” is often met with hostility and moral panic. They argue that the meanings given to various named actors in kinship systems are products of historical developments, ideological maneuvers, and societal structures, and contend that the hostility to nonheteronormative kinship formations in South Africa causes pain and suffering when those who identify with them are targeted and delegitimized.

Methodological and Theoretical Approaches Although African women’s and gender scholarship continues to be allied with the continent’s historical and current political and economic struggles and to adhere to respective social science and humanities research methodologies, it also questions, rejects, and/​or modifies, to varying degrees, the old investigative methodological traditions. At the same time, women’s and gender scholarship is popularizing new or hybrid methods and, more importantly, gradually leading to a move away from structuralist to poststructuralist conceptions of the social science and humanities research methodological agendas (Ampofo et al., 2004). Particularly challenged is the empiricist model, which claims objectivity (value-​free and neutral research) and obscures the politics of research, subjectivity, the identification of discoverable natural laws that govern events and experiences, universalizations, linearity (in history, economics, and politics), and the scientific method as the only valid means to knowledge. The best example is the continent-​wide five-​volume publication (Southern Africa, Western Africa and the Sahel, Eastern Africa, Northern Africa, and Central Africa) Women Writing Africa started two decades ago by Tuzyline Allan and Abena Busia (Busia, 2018). Women’s and gender scholarship also critiques experimental methods, particularly their inherent reductionism and the artificial context of research and interpretation.

144   Nakanyike B. Musisi The impetus to revolutionize disciplinary traditions emerges out of feminist research goals and aspirations, which, by putting gendered everyday experiences at the center of analysis, seek to expose omissions, silences, androcentric biases, and distortions in current knowledge and to challenge normative beliefs and understandings that are largely based on misinformation. Above all is a call to decolonize gender studies in Africa (Kisiang’ani, 2004). The objective is both to redefine the spaces of knowledge production and to provide alternative knowledge and ways of knowing that are capable of addressing gender inequalities, empowering women and marginalized groups, and transforming society (Gqola, 2001; Mbilinyi, 1984). This scholarship, which is essentially multidisciplinary/​ interdisciplinary, decolonial, intersectional (race, class, ethnicity, rural-​urban, and sexuality) and Africa-​centric in approach, is marked by innovative and versatile methodologies (Gatwiri, 2017; Kiguwa, 2019; Lewis, 2003; McFadden, 1992; Parry, 2020). For instance, Abosede Ipadeoloa (2017) approaches her analysis of the subaltern in Africa’s political space not only through the framework of subaltern studies but also through cultural analysis, Afrocentricity, and feminism. Her methodological approach situates Africans in a subordinate position in the cultural hegemony generated by colonialism and maintained by Western powers. Drawing from Afrocentricity scholars such as Molefi Asante, Ipadeoloa argues that an ideological decolonization that considers gender relations must have an Afrocentric meaning that is centered on African agency in transhistorical and transcontinental contexts, and that rejects Eurocentric discourses and concepts. Ipadeoloa draws on the concept of the subaltern to recognize that modifications of Eurocentric concepts can be deployed in the service of African women’s interests providing the women themselves are the agents who carry out such a project. Although not necessarily recent, autoethnography and autotheory are the fastest-​ growing approaches in women’s and gender scholarship. As a form of qualitative research, autoethnography allows scholars to exercise reflectivity in their research and writing because they link and contextualize their personal reflections to broader political, cultural, and social interpretations, meanings, and understandings. Malvern Chiweshe (2018), for example, blends his personal experiences as a man working in feminist academic spaces to derive theoretical and political conclusions from his experience. In his utilization of this method, Chiweshe prescribes universalized conclusions from individualized experiences. Although Chiweshe’s methodological approach is not without attendant shortfalls, it is welcome, as many African women feminists insist that African men must take up the mantle of feminism as partners, not patriarchs, if the struggle is to succeed on any terrain. Catherine Nyambura (2018) combines autoethnography with oral history approaches. Drawing on interviews she conducted with young feminist activists, as well as her personal experience working with FEMNET, she contextualizes these experiences through a historical frame of thinking about the years (25 at the time of this writing) that have passed since the UN conferences in Cairo (1994) and Beijing (1995), where women’s issues were front and center on the international agenda. Reflecting on this context, Nyambura is adamant that gender mainstreaming has in fact depoliticized the feminist

Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa    145 agenda. She uses her experience at FEMNET to offer an analysis of several components that are key to the outlooks of young African feminist scholars, such as the centrality of a rights-​based agenda, intersectionality as a framework for analysis, a critique of politicians’ “demographic dividend” approach to young political constituencies, digital activism, and barriers to organizing. The rejection in women’s and gender studies of a single narrative (patriarchy) as the sole explanation of gender inequality has led to a search for and recognition of multiple intersecting factors that influence sociocultural systems that constrain women’s lived experiences and sustain gender and power inequalities. Illustrative of the numerous excellent monographs that have been produced, particularly in South Africa, consider, for example, Yemisi Akinbobola’s (2020) “Defining African Feminism(s), and #BeingFemaleinNigeria,” which uses both intersectional and feminist critical discourse analysis. Akibbobola emphasizes the interconnectedness of race and gender in shaping the conditions of African men and women and draws on feminist critical discourse analysis to explore how language and power interact to facilitate transformation in gender dynamics. This work is particularly interesting methodologically since Akibbobola uses Twitter specifically to demonstrate how women in Nigeria give voice to their conditions and visions for change through the hashtag #BeingFemaleinNigeria. Moreover, Shewarega Hussen (2018), who researches digital activism in South Africa with special attention to how gender is shaped in digital spaces, uses a quite fascinating methodology that, despite a discussion of social media, is not limited to discourse analysis. Instead, Hussen examines the locations in which digital activism and in-​person political demonstrations meet. Her analysis shows how #RapeMustFall was digitally connected to other issues in South bringing, including #FeesMustFall and #PatriarchyMustFall. Hassen’s method was intersectional, bringing together economic, racial, and gender issues. Nevertheless, women also protested naked in the streets, and turned to virtual forms of justice seeking, such as tweeting lists of the names of known abusers and rapists on campus. From these actions and discourses, Hussen reveals the kinds of feminist disruptions being waged on both digital and human fronts and shows how each terrain offers different possibilities for feminist interventions. Desiree Lewis (2008), though she appreciates the benefits of electronic media in advancing feminist causes, is similarly wary of its “pervasive role” in “adulterating and de-​politicizing ostensibly subversive knowledge” (p. 92). Photo or photovoice and aesthetics approaches are among the innovative and creative methodologies women’s and gender studies scholars employ. Engaging in aesthetic criticism, as well as analysis of the body and politics, Jordache Ellapen (2021) treats performance art and the body as a text through which Ellapen (They) can read the political interruptions that FAKA’s art practice generates through what they calls Siyakaka feminism. FAKA’s art often involves performances of noncisnormative sexual acts under political backdrops of homophobic speeches by religious and political leaders. Ellapen’s (Their) purpose is to critique the idea that blackness in the postapartheid/​postcolonial context can be connected to notions of freedom while still elevating is heteronormativity. Through FAKA’s art performance, Siyakaka feminism seeks to disarticulate

146   Nakanyike B. Musisi blackness from a cis-​hetero African subject and create new ways of imagining and practicing African freedom and humanity.

Knowledge Producers and Feminist Activism A debate concerning the relationship between women’s studies and women’s feminist movements endures. In exploring the relationship of the knowledge producers in women and gender studies to feminist activism, Ampofo et al. (2004) contend that, contrary to popular perception (see, for instance, Bonnin, 1996 and Hassim & Walker, 1993), the connection between knowledge production and grassroots African feminist organizing is a much stronger on the continent than it is in the diaspora. Following are only a few of several exemplary cases revealed by research for this chapter, presented in alphabetical order: Nigerian Yemisi Akinbobola is the cofounder of African Women in Media, which is aimed at addressing the needs of African women media-​content producers. Ifi Amadiume is on the advisory board of the Centre for Democracy and Development, which seeks to promote democracy and human rights in the West African region. Msia Kibona Clark, though she does not necessarily “organize,” has an important public education role as she teaches her followers about hip-​hop culture and Pan-​Africanism through her Hip-​Hop African Blog and the Podcast, which present a blend of hip-​hop music and scholarly sources. Shewarega Hussen does digital activism through the Association for Progressive Communications, a feminist Internet initiative. The resilient Amina Mama has been a strong supporter of feminist causes within and outside the academy. She was director of the African Gender Institute (AGI) at the University of Cape Town and helped establish its journal, Feminist Africa. Through the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), Mama is also an outspoken critic of the US military presence in Africa. Zethu Matebeni, who has been an LGBTQI activist since the 1990s, was part of the Uthingo Womyn’s group, one of the first lesbian feminist collectives in South Africa. She was also a part of Free Gender, a Black lesbian organization in Cape Town. Within the academy, Matebeni was also active in the #RhodesMustFall movement. Catherine Nyambura is an advocacy officer at FEMNET and runs their thematic programing on sexual and reproductive health and rights. Mercy Oduyoye (1995) has no explicit ties to feminist organizing, but she is undeniably the most significant African Christian theologian. Sharon Adetutu Omotoso (2019), the head of the Women’s Research Documentation Centre (WORDOC) at the University of Ibadan, produces an indigenous radio education program on women in politics and development. Last but not least, and though it is difficult to do justice to her feminist

Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa    147 activism in this short tribute, Sylvia Tamale has been vital to achieving key feminist victories in law, media, and research; she has successfully fought and won many legal battles in the Uganda Constitutional Court, including cases concerning the right to privacy and be protected from torture for Ugandan lesbians and gays. She is an outspoken opponent of homophobic legislation, an advocate of African feminist pedagogies, and the author of a ground-​breaking magnum opus, Decolonization and Afro-​Feminism (2020). Finally, though Amina Mama (2009) argues that feminist scholarship in African universities plays a pivotal role in bringing about transformation, she also contends that African feminism is not reducible to “women’s studies,” “gender studies,” or “gender analysis.” For Mama, these areas are the result rather than the cause of engagement between academics and feminists on the ground. In addition to focusing on institutional challenges and responses to and by African feminists in the academy, Mama focuses on the institutional cultures of universities, androcentric knowledge, feminist research, and activist agendas, as well as pedagogical challenges. Notwithstanding the success of these impressive activists, Ampofo et al. (2004) maintain that given the contemporary context in many African countries there is a significant threat to the maintaining activist connections to an academy faced with the looming emergence of deradicalized and depoliticized gender studies.

Significance of Women’s and Gender Studies Scholarship In the past, but more aggressively so during the last 20 years, the significance of women and gender studies’ scholarship has lain, not in the quantitative measure of the number of published monographs, but in its qualitative achievements (Miescher et al., 2007). Generally, these have involved contestation, the waging of an assault on the foundational epistemic cornerstones of African studies, studies of Africa, and mainstream disciplinary and praxis silos. Women and gender studies’ scholarship has revitalized and revolutionized these canons by weaving narratives of the misrepresented, subjugated, and silenced into their work (Falola & Amponsah, 2013). In so doing, women’s and gender scholarship is achieving two goals. First, it is weakening the androcentric and Eurocentric grip on knowledge production about the African past and present. Second, it is liberating African women and men from a colonizing history and presentism by exposing the reality that what seems to be normal, natural, or even traditional, has a history, and that history has never been static or necessarily just (Amadiume, 1987; Kisiang’ani, 2004; Oyewumi, 1997). From the beginning, women’s and gender scholarship has been interdisciplinarity and has popularized this approach. Interdisciplinarity has permitted scholars to branch out, to explore outside the perennial fields of political and economic history, for instance, and to embrace histories of kinship and marriage systems, sexuality, household relations, identity politics, material culture, memory,

148   Nakanyike B. Musisi health and well-​ being, gender-​ based violence, genital manipulations, and many more subjects without completely abandoning their disciplines (Bakare-​Yusuf, 2003; Nnaemeka, 2005). It also provides a means for building cross-​cultural theories of gender oppression, globalization, and the feminization of labor markets, as well as poverty (see, for instance, Darkwah, 2007; Pereira, 2004). Thus, within individual disciplines, women’s and gender studies scholars have challenged the unchecked privileging of certain subjects or approaches over others. Although women’s and gender scholars have not always claimed to be providing new knowledge per se, they have questioned the central role privileged subjects, based on biology or sexuality, have traditionally been accorded in the disciplines’ conical narratives. In a sense, in questioning what counts as historical, geographic, psychological, sociological, and theological knowledge, women’s and gender scholarship unveils hidden or subjugated knowledge—​a type of knowledge equally worth knowing—​to espouse and defend our commitment to representing the past as it might have been, and to address present injustices as we work to prevent their recurrence in the future. Not content with a simplistic recounting of the great deeds performed by men and women in the past or present, women’s and gender scholarship aims to expose silent and hidden operations at the societal level. Hence, it critically confronts gendered politics in existing disciplines as it inevitably begins rewriting their narratives and informing their praxis. As is clear from its persistent borrowing of feminist methodologies and revising of disciplinary paradigms, women’s and gender scholarship has added dynamism to traditional disciplines in the study of Africa.

Conclusion Considered as a whole, the rich historiography of women’s and gender scholarship exposes an intimate relationship between the processes of production and reproduction and of societal transformation at different and intersecting levels and in different temporal times. In so doing, it questions the material and ideological underpinnings of colonial and postcolonial politics and disavows normative concepts and categories. The literature calls for dismantling these underpinnings through the deconstruction, recategorization, and demythologization of deeply entrenched ideological myths to create new and liberatory knowledge that challenges the legitimacy of oppressive and exploitative ways of organizing cultural, social, political, and economic ventures. Emancipation lies at the heart of any project of women’s and gender studies (Anfred & Ampofo, 2010; Lewis 2008). This scholarship provides evidence of the development of critical approaches to politics that focus on structures, as well as the “individual,” to unpack and expose the tensions between equality and difference. The sources surveyed in this chapter raise new questions: Has academic knowledge production resulted in an elevated feminist consciousness among the African masses?

Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa    149 Do tweets and other social media communications offer insight into the conditions of African women, or do they simply reify the grievances of the middle and upper classes in African society? If human rights have yet to be realized through a heteronormative approach to African feminism, does this frame have any utility for queer African subjects? And, do African queerness and nonnormative gender expression offer a new subjectivity from which new feminist politics can emerge, or does that simply place identity ahead of politics? Inasmuch as the prime objective of women’s and gender studies is to produce knowledge that will ameliorate conditions for women and society at large, its impact in tandem with gender-​based activism will remain significant and meaningful insofar as it can continue to compel and energize “traditional” academic disciplines and sociopolitical institutions (including societies and communities, states, and organizations at both the local and international levels) to become invested in a project of gender emancipation for women, men, and transgender people.

Acronyms FEMNET

The African Women’s Development and Communication Network

LGBTQI

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex

Notes 1. This review is largely limited to English language scholarship pertaining to women’s and gender studies in English speaking Sub-​Saharan African countries. I am grateful to my research assistant, Khaleel Grant, and my long-​time friend Jane Turrittin for her editorial help. 2. In the 1970s and 1980s, many postcolonial African states were experiencing severe political and economic crises under military dictatorships and structural adjustment programs that contributed to major cuts to education budgets and a massive loss of life.

References Abusharaf, R. M. (2004). Narrating feminism: The woman question in the thinking of an African radical. Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 15, 152–​171. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1215/​10407​391-​15-​2-​152 Ahikire, J. (2004). Locating gender studies in the pan-​African ideal: A reflection on progress and possibilities in Uganda. In S. Arnfred (Ed.), Gender activism and studies in Africa (pp. 54–​65). Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. https://​codes​ria​ .org/​spip.php?arti​cle1​385 Akinbobola, Y. (2020). Defining African feminism(s) while #BeingFemaleinNigeria. African Diaspora, 12, 64–​88. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​18725​465-​bja10​009

150   Nakanyike B. Musisi Allman, J. (2004). Fashioning Africa: Power and the politics of dress. In J. Allman (Ed.), Fashioning Africa: Power and the politics of dress (pp. 1–​13). Indiana University Press. Allman, J., Geiger, S., & Musisi, N. (2002). Women in African colonial histories: An introduction. In J. Allman, S. Geiger, & N. Musisi (Eds.), Women in African colonial histories (pp. 1–​ 15). Indiana University Press. https://​quod.lib.umich.edu/​cgi/​t/​text/​text-​idx?c=​acls​​ ;cc=acls;view=​toc;idno=​heb04​111.0001.001 Amadiume, I. (1987). Male daughters, female husbands: Gender and sex in an African society. Zed Books. Amadiume, I. (1997). Re-​inventing Africa: Matriarchy, religion, and culture. Bloomsbury. Ampofo, A. A., Beoku-​Betts, J., Njambi, W. N. & Osirim, M. (2004). Women’s and gender studies in English-​speaking Sub-​Saharan Africa: A review of research in the social sciences. Gender and Society, 18, 685–​7 14. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​08912​4320​4269​188 Anfred, S., & Ampofo, A. A. (2010). Introduction: Feminist politics of knowledge. In A. A. Ampofo & S. Arnfred (Eds.), African feminist politics of knowledge: Tensions, challenges and possibilities (pp. 5–​27). Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Atanga, L. L., Sibonile, E. E., Litosseliti, L., & Sunderland, J. (2013). Gender and language in Sub-​ Saharan Africa: Tradition, struggle, and change. John Benjamins. Awe, B., & Mba, N. (1991). Women’s research and documentation centre (Nigeria). Signs, 16, 859–​864. Bakare-​Yusuf, B. (2003). Beyond determinism: The phenomenology of African female existence. Feminist Africa, 2, 8–​24. http://​www.agi.ac.za/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​ima​ge_​t​ool/​ima​ges/​ 429/​femin​ist_​afri​ca_​j​ourn​als/​arch​ive/​02/​fa_​2_​fe​atur​e_​ar​ticl​e_​1.pdf Bawa, S. (2018). “Feminists make too much noise!”: Generational differences and ambivalence in feminist development politics in Ghana. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 52, 1–​17. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00083​968.2018.1462​720 Bay, E. G. (1998). Wives of the leopard: Gender, politics, and culture in the Kingdom of Dahomey. University of Virginia Press. Bonnin, D. (1996). Women’s studies in South Africa. Women’s Studies Quarterly, 24, 378–​399. Burnet, J. E. (2012). Genocide lives in us: Memory and silence in Rwanda. University of Wisconsin Press. Busia, A. P. (2018). Creating the archive of African women’s writing: Reflecting on feminism, epistemology, and the women writing Africa project. Meridians, 17, 233–​245. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1215/​15366​936-​7 176​406 Camminga, B. (2018). Transgender refugees and the imagined South Africa: Bodies over borders and borders over bodies. Springer. Chiweshe, M. (2018). African men and feminism: Reflections on using African feminism in research. Agenda, 32, 76–​82. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​10130​950.2018.1460​088. Clark, M. K. (2018). Feminisms in African hip hop. Meridians, 17, 383–​400. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1215/​15366​936-​7 176​538 Connell, R. (2015). Meeting at the edge of fear: Theory on a world scale. Feminist Theory, 16, 49–​56. https://​doi.org/​10.1177%2F1​4647​0011​4562​531 Coombes, A. E. (2015). The gender of memory in postapartheid South Africa: The women’s jail as heritage site. In S. Macdonald & H. R. Leahy (Eds.), The international handbooks of museum studies (pp. 207–​226). John Wiley & Sons. Cornwall, A. (2005). Introduction: Perspectives on “gender” in Africa. In A. Cornwall (Ed.), Readings in gender in Africa (pp. 1–​19). Indiana University Press.

Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa    151 Cromwell, A. M. (1986). An African Victorian feminist: The life and times of Adelaide Smith Casely Hayford, 1868–​1960. F. Cass. Darkwah, A. (2007). Making hay while the sun shines: Ghanaian female traders and their insertion into the global economy. In N. Gunewardena & A. E. Kingsolver (Eds.), The gender of globalization: Women navigating cultural and economic marginalities (pp. 61–​83). School for Advanced Research Press. Day, L. (2008). “Bottom power”: Theorizing feminism and the women’s movement in Sierra Leone (1981–​2007). African and Asian Studies, 7, 491–​513. Decker, A. C., & Baderoon, G. (2018). African feminisms: Cartographies for the twenty-​first century. Meridians, 17, 219–​231. https://​doi.org/​10.1215/​15366​936-​7 176​384 Dery, I. (2020). A situated, African understanding of African feminism for men: A Ghanaian narrative. Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography, 27, 1745–​1765. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​09663​69X.2020.1724​896 Ekine, S., & Abbas, H. (2013). Queer African reader. Pambazuka Press. Ellapen, J. A. (2021). Siyakaka feminism: African anality and the politics of deviance in FAKA’s performance art praxis. Feminist Studies, 47, 114–​146. https://​doi.org/​10.15767/​femi​nist​stud​ ies.47.1.0114 Ernstberger, A. L. (2010). A history of women’s and gender studies in the global South. [Doctoral dissertation, Purdue University]. Etim, J. (2016). Introduction to gender studies in eastern and southern Africa: A reader. Sense. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​94-​6300-​558-​6 Falola, T., & Amponsah, N. A. (2013) Introduction. In T. Falola & N. A. Amponsah (Eds.), Women, gender, and sexualities in Africa (pp. 3–​20). Carolina Academic Press. Gatwiri, G. (2017). Phenomenological, African feminist research: Kenyan women’s stories of living with vaginal fistulas. In SAGE research methods cases (pp. 1–​16). https://​dx.doi.org/​ 10.4135/​978147​3977​778 Gaudio, R. P. (1998). Male lesbians and other queer notions. In S. O. Murray & W. Roscoe (Eds.), Boy wives and female husbands: Studies of African homosexualities (pp. 111–​124). Palgrave Macmillan. Geiger, S. (1990). What’s so feminist about women’s oral history? Journal of Women’s History, 2, 169–​182. Gouws, A. (2004). Establishing gender studies programs in South Africa: The role of gender activism. In S. Arnfred (Ed), Gender activism and studies in Africa (pp. 41–​53). Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. https://​codes​ria.org/​spip.php?arti​cle1​385 Gqola, P. D. (2001). Ufanele uqavile: Blackwomen, feminism and postcoloniality in Africa. Agenda, 16, 11–​22. Gqola, P. (2009). “The difficult task of normalizing freedom”: Spectacular masculinities, Ndebele’s literary/​cultural commentary and post-​apartheid life. English in Africa, 36, 61–​76. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​eia.v36i1.42868 Hassim, S. (2004). Nationalism, feminism, and autonomy: The ANC in exile and the question of women. Journal of Southern African Studies, 30, 433–​455. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​0305​ 7070​4200​0254​056 Hassim, S., & Walker, C. (1993). Women’s studies and the women’s movement in South Africa: Defining a relationship. Women’s Studies International Forum, 16, 523–​534. Howard, A. (2005). Nodes, networks, landscapes, and regions: Reading the social history of tropical Africa, 1700–​1920. In A. Howard & R. Shain (Eds.), The spatial factor in African history (pp. 21–​140). Brill. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​978904​7405​627_​005

152   Nakanyike B. Musisi Hubbard, D., & Solomon, C. (1995). The many faces of feminism in Namibia. In M. Basu (Ed.), The challenge of local feminisms: Women’s movements in global perspective (pp. 163–​186). Westview Press. Hunt, N. R. (1989). Placing African women’s history and locating gender. Social History, 14, 359–​379. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​030710​2890​8567​748 Hunt, N. R. (1999). A colonial lexicon: Of birth ritual, medicalization, and mobility in the Congo. Duke University Press. Hussen, T. S. (2018). Social media and feminist activism: #RapeMustFall, #NakedProtest and #RUReferenceList movements in South Africa. In T. Shefer, J. Hearn, K. Ratele, & F. Boonzaier (Eds.), Engaging youth in activism, research, and pedagogical praxis (pp. 199–​214). Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978131​5270​470-​12 Ipadeoloa, A. (2017). The subaltern in Africa’s political space: African political philosophy and the mirror of gender. Journal of Black Studies, 48, 391–​407. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00219​3471​ 7696​793 Kiguwa, P. (2019). Feminist approaches: An exploration of women’s gendered experiences. In S. Laher, A. Fynn, & S. Kramer (Eds.), Transforming research methods in the social sciences: Case studies from South Africa (pp. 220–​235). Wits University Press. Kisiang’ani, E. N. W. (2004). Decolonising gender studies in Africa. In S. Arnfred, B. Bakare-​ Yusuf, E. W. Kisiang’ani, D. Lewis, O. Oyewumi, & F. C. Steady (Eds.), African gender scholarship: Concepts, methodologies and paradigms (pp. 9–​26). Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. Klausen, S. M. (2015). Abortion under apartheid: Nationalism, sexuality, and women’s reproductive rights. Oxford University Press. Lewis, D. (2003). African feminist studies: 1980–​2002: A review essay for the African Gender Institute’s “Strengthening gender and women’s studies for Africa’s social transformation project.” In B. Boswell (Ed.) Gender and Women’s Studies Africa (pp. 1–​137). http://​www.gwsafr​ ica.org/​knowle​dge/​ Lewis, D. (2008). Discursive challenges for African feminism. QUEST: An African Journal of Philosophy, 20, 77–​96. Magubane, Z. (2010). Attitudes towards feminism among women in the ANC, 1950–​1990: A theoretical re-​interpretation. In S. Ndlovu (Ed.), The road to democracy in South Africa, vol 4, 1980–​1990 (pp. 975–​1034). Pretoria: University of South Africa Press. http://​www.sadet​ .co.za/​docs/​rtd/​vol4/​rtd_​vol4​_​par​t_​2_​ch19​pdf Mama, A. (1995). Feminism or femocracy? State feminism and democratisation in Nigeria. Africa Development, 20, 37–​58. https://​www.ru.ac.za/​media/​rhode​suni​vers​ity/​cont​ent/​ equity​ampi​nsti​tuti​onal​cult​ure/​docume​nts/​Ami​na_​M​ama.pdf. Mama, A. (2009). Challenging patriarchal pedagogies by strengthening feminist intellectual work in African universities. In J. Sudbury & M. Okazawa-​Ray (Eds.), Activist scholarship: Antiracism, feminism, and social change (pp. 65–​82). Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​ 978131​5636​177-​11 Mama, A. (2011a). The challenges of feminism: Gender, ethics and responsible academic freedom in African universities. Journal of Higher Education in Africa, 9, 1–​23. https://​codes​ ria.org/​IMG/​pdf/​1-​Amina_​JHEA​_​1_​2​_​11.pdf Mama, A. (2011b). What does it mean to do feminist research in African contexts? Feminist Review, 98, 4–​20. https://​doi.org/​10.1057/​fr.2011.22 Matebeni, Z., Monro, S., & Vasu, R. (Eds.). (2018). Queer in Africa: LGBTQI identities, citizenship, and activism. Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978131​5406​749

Women’s and Gender Studies in Africa    153 Mbilinyi, M. (1984). Research priorities in women’s studies in Eastern Africa. Women’s Studies International Forum, 7, 289–​300.https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​0277-​5395(84)90054-​2 McFadden, P. (1992). Sex, sexuality, and the problem of AIDS in Africa. In R. Meena (Ed.), Gender in Southern Africa: Conceptual and theoretical issues. SAPES Books (pp. 157–​195). Miescher, S. F., Manuh, T., & Cole, C. M. (2007). Introduction: When was gender? In C. M. Cole, T. Manuh, & S. F. Miescher (Eds.), Africa after gender? (pp. 1–​14). Indiana University Press. Moran, M. (2007). Clothing difference: Commodities and consumption in Southeastern Liberia. In N. Gunewardena & A. E. Kingsolver (Eds.), The gender of globalization: Women navigating cultural and economic marginalities (pp. 85–​102). School for Advanced Research Press. Morison, T., Lynch, I., & Reddy, V. (2020). Queer kinship: South African perspectives on the sexual politics of family-​making and belonging. Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978042​ 9198​403 Nkealah, N. (2016). (West) African feminisms and their challenges. Journal of Literary Studies, 32, 61–​74. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​02564​7 18.2016.1198​156 Nnaemeka, O. (2005). African women, colonial discourses, and imperialist interventions: Female circumcision as impetus. In O. Nnaemeka (Ed.), Female circumcision and the politics of knowledge: African women in imperialist discourses (pp. 27–​46). Praeger. Nyabola, N. (2018). Kenyan feminisms in the digital age. WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, 46, 261–​271. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​wsq.2018.0046 Nyambura, C. (2018). Repoliticising women’s rights in development: Young African feminisms at the cutting edge. Gender and Development, 26, 423–​437. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​13552​ 074.2018.1523​284 Oduyoye, M. A. (1995). Daughters of Anowa: African Women and Patriarchy. Orbis Books. Okeke, P. E. (1996). Postmodern feminism and knowledge production: The African context. Africa Today, 43, 223–​233. Omotoso, S. A. (2019). When the rains are (un)stopped: African feminism(s) and green democracy. Ethics and the Environment, 24, 23–​41. https://​doi.org/​10.2979/​ethic​senv​iro.24.2.02 Oyewumi, O. (1997). The invention of women: Making an African sense of western gender discourses. University of Minnesota Press. Oyewumi, O. (2004). Conceptualising gender: Eurocentric foundations of feminist concepts and the challenge of African epistemologies. In S. Arnfred, B. Bakare-​ Yusuf, E.W. Kisiang’ani, D. Lewis, O. Oyewumi, & F. C. Steady (Eds.), African gender scholarship: Concepts, methodologies and paradigms (pp. 1–​8). Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. https://​doi.org/​10.1057/​978023​0116​276 Parry, B. (2020). Feminist research principles and practices. In S. Kramer, S. Laher, A. Fynn, & H. H. Janse van Vuuren (Eds.), Online readings in research methods (pp. 1–​29). Psychological Society of South Africa. https://​doi.org/​10.17605/​OSF.IO/​BNPFS Pereira, C. (2004). Locating gender and women’s studies in Nigeria: What trajectories for the future. In S. Arnfred (Ed.), Gender activism and studies in Africa (pp. 1–​26). Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. https://​codes​ria.org/​spip.php?arti​cle1​385 Sacks, K. (1982). Sisters and wives: The past and future of sexual equality. University of Illinois Press. Shoenbrun, D. (1998). A green place, A good place: Agrarian change, gender, and social identity in the Great Lakes region to the 15th Century. Heinemann. Susen, S. (2015). The “postmodern turn” in the social sciences. Palgrave Macmillan.

154   Nakanyike B. Musisi Tamale, S. (2011). African sexualities: A reader. Pambazuka Press. Tamale, S. (2020). Decolonization and Afro-​feminism. Daraja Press. Wright, M. (1982). Justice, women, and the social order in Abercorn, northeastern Rhodesia, 1897–​1903. In M. J. Hay & M. Wright (Eds.), African women and the law: Historical perspectives (pp. 33–​50). Boston University African Studies Center.

Chapter 9

Intersectiona l i t y of Ge nder and Se x ua l i t y i n African Cult u re s Gabi Mkhize

Introduction The objective of this chapter is to apply an intersectional feminist lens to critique the matrix systems of gender and sexuality that are entrenched in African cultures. It uses this intersectional feminist lens to challenge the heteropatriarchal biasness that promotes heterosexual, binary gender and sexuality and essentializes other gender and sexual identities and orientations. While acknowledging the richness of African cultures, it reveals embedded, historical, complex, and interlocking forms and dynamics of gender and sexual oppression and privilege. Africa is known for the diversity and richness of its cultures. It has a pride in these multiple cultures, which aim at instilling moral values and ubuntu, “humanity to others.” Africa is also a zone of various forms of intersecting isms, hierarchies, and inequalities, including those on gender and sexuality. Alidou (2005), Andrade (2007), McFadden (2005), Mohanty (2003), Tripp (2003), and Turner and Brownhill (2001) have shown that African people face intersecting oppressions produced by, among others, colonialism, neocolonialism, oppressive cultures, patriarchy, racism, and gender and sexuality. In terms of African cultures, these intersecting isms, hierarchies, inequalities, and oppressions are mostly felt by women and individuals of different sexual orientations—​ lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and questioning (LGBTQ+​). Although literature (Andrade, 2007) reveals that “African women have always had access to public spaces” (p. 92), Africa remains a patriarchal society, where heterosexuality is viewed as a norm and homosexuality is socially constructed as the other. That is, Africa’s dominant heteropatriarchal ideologies of gender and sexuality have long served to oppress most women and LGBTQ+​s, including all minority

156   Gabi Mkhize gender and sexual identities that are considered to be outside the dominant cultures. This is because most African cultures are rooted in hegemonic masculinities (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) and heteropatriarchal values and practices (Mkhize & Vilakazi, 2021). Most heteropatriarchal African cultures are centered on hierarchal gender and sexual power and control that view males as superior or dominant and females as inferior, what Simon de Beauvoir (2007) called the “second sex.” In essence, a female is viewed as the other and has no place in Africa and its cultures (Matebeni et al., 2018; Wahab, 2016; Tamale, 2013). The view that women are the second sex does not only marginalize them as subalterns (Spivak, 2005) in their own political, geographical, and sociological spaces; it also stereotypes them as “nothingness” (Butler, 1986), dispositioning and reinforcing contested politics not only of identity but also of citizenship. Thus Africa does not only embody political liberation and racial justice and women’s suffrage movements for franchise (Mkhize & Mgcotyelwa-​Ntoni, 2019); it also presents historical struggles against intersecting gender inequalities and sexual inhumanity. McFadden (2005) confirms that the challenge of patriarchal hegemonies is embedded in Africa’s politics, economies, cultures, and citizenship. Women and girls bear the brunt of this; in Africa they are victims of not only colonialism, apartheid, and capitalist exploitations, but also heteropatriarchal cultures. Women’s resistance movements can be found from Cape Town to Cairo. Examples could be highlighted from Kenyan, Nigerian, South African, and Zimbabwean women’s resistances against patriarchal oppression, racial oppression, and “housewifization,” which constantly privatize and devalue women’s work and agency (Turner & Brownhill, 2001). Alidou (2005) has described the resistance of Islamic women in Nigeria against the heteropatriarchal Islamic cultures that define their societal roles and control their sexuality and bodies, speaking to the intersectionality of gender and sexuality manifested in some African cultures. Using secondary data as part of qualitative research, this chapter applies a textual and narrative analysis from various sources, broader epistemologies, and experience-​centered observations to present and understand the intersectionality of gender and sexuality in African cultures, including the meanings attached to the social and cultural constructions and socialization of gender and sexuality. Based on feminist and sociological perspectives, the chapter also applies theoretical intersectionality thinking in unpacking how the intersectionality of gender and sexuality is part of African cultures. In discussing the intersectionality of gender and sexuality in Africa, the chapter refers to broader African cultures but cites specific examples from Southern Africa.

Theoretical Frameworks A feminist theory of intersectionality is linked to Crenshaw (1995) in theorizing the intersection oppressions of race, class, and gender women of color face in the United

Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures    157 States. Crenshaw (1995, 2015) views intersectionality as a living reality for people who experience oppressions, inequalities, and some privileges (Mkhize, 2015), which speaks to the experiences of Africa’s people. Crenshaw (2015) and Mkhize (2015) further refer to intersectionality as an analytical tool that can be used to think about the matrix of identities and the interlocking relationships located in power and control. Hence, intersectionality focuses on multiple forms of oppression, exclusion, inequality, and benefits that women and individuals of different sexual orientations, people living with disabilities, and various other vulnerable groups constantly face in society (Collins & Bilage, 2020; Mkhize, 2015). Scholars of gender, sexuality, sociological, cultural, and ethnic studies commonly use intersectional theorizing (Collins & Bilage, 2020). This chapter thus suggests that gender and sexuality are not independent variables in reference to African cultures; there is instead a constant relationship between them because they also reinforce hierarchal social identities and structures (Collins & Bilage, 2020). Gender and sexuality are social and cultural constructions based on the social perspectives of the heteronormative expectations of males and females. Gender and sexuality vary from one culture to another, based on what each culture regards as appropriate gender and sexual performativity (Butler, 1986; Mkhize & Vilakazi, 2021) for males and females; and culture plays a role in determining such performativity (Purnama et al., 2018). What culture and society deem appropriate for males and females strongly influences people’s behavior, attitudes, and personalities, and provides them with specific roles and responsibilities that are socially and culturally constructed (Hadebe, 2010). While gender and sexual performativity is socially constructed and defined, it is also commonly perceived as masculine and feminine. Men and women are forced to act differently and to carry specific assigned gender traits and behavior that are based solely on heteronormative expectations (Purnama et al., 2018). The African Bantu and Islamic communities, for instance, are the most dominant African cultures with strong patriarchal traditions, structures, and ideas, including socially expected normative roles for women and men. Thus, Bantu-​and Islamic-​ dominant cultures place extremely high importance on the gender and sexual roles and responsibilities of the male and female child. That is, males are often viewed as leaders and providers, and females are mostly valued for domestication, reproduction, and the expansion of families and clans (Zondi, 2013). Dating back the 1800s and 1900s, African cultures and practices have been mostly patriarchal, heterosexual, and endocentric. Girls are raised to be subordinate to males, and their entire existence is based on supporting males and acknowledging that males are always in power (Hadebe, 2010). Such gender-​normative roles, responsibilities, and expectations are also applied to sexuality. Sexual oppression rooted in heteropatriarchal power and control is common in Africa, and it is promoted in most African cultural practices. On one hand, girls and females, at large, are often socialized to African womanhood—​that is, to be obedient and moral women, meaning passive, and to adhere to the controlled and policed gender and sexuality. On the other hand, boys and males are socialized to manhood, which means having power and control, being assertive, brave, and unrestricted in

158   Gabi Mkhize the exploration of their sexuality. Sexuality thus centers on the objectification, sexualization, instrumentalization, and construction of women, where a woman’s body is represented as an exhibition of the masculine desire. A sexual desire for the “other” is more prevalent in Lacan’s theorization of feminine sexuality (Mitchell, 1982). In African cultures, most women are subordinate to men and deprived of control over their bodies and sexuality. In her conceptualization of women’s sexuality as property, Petchesky (1995) articulates that in African cultures, a woman’s body is plainly a heteropatriarchal property, whose value is that it serves male interests. Male dominance is encouraged and applauded in most African cultures, attributable to Bantu and Islamic practices and beliefs. In this way, African cultures arguably contribute to influencing people to maintain patriarchal and heteronormative socially constructed and produced gender and sexual roles. Hence, gender and sexuality in African cultures intersect in their embedment in socially constructed masculine and feminine attributes and influence male and female acts and behaviors in families and society (Mathonsi & Mpungose, 2015). This is particularly promoted by the idea that an African male is of high importance while female opinions are often devalued (Carton & Morrel, 2012). The intersectional forms of gender and sexual oppression, inequalities, and privileges can thus be viewed as the effect of the social construction of heteronormative gender and sexual roles that privilege the socially, culturally, economically, and politically dominant groups (typically those of men) and exclude subservient groups (typically those of women). According to Veltman and Piper (2014), “Oppression does not only limit opportunities and life options; thus preventing an oppressed person from acting autonomously in ways that reflect [women’s] values and commitments, but also deform [women’s sexual] desire” (p. 2). Most Eastern, Western, Central Northern, and Southern African cultures share similarities, such as raising girls into domesticating and nurturing roles, and pushing boys into leadership and provider roles (Booi, 2021). Most African cultures, like those of the Bantus and Muslims, are extremely patriarchal and heterosexual, and society expects women and girls to live under the authority of men (Mtshiselwa, 2011). Many African men, because of hegemonic masculinity and heteropatriarchal beliefs, possess unearned rights, providing them with an entitlement to exert power and control in society.

Intersectional Social Construction of Gender and Sexuality Masculine identities and feminine identities are constructed as total opposites of each other. As discussed, the Zulu culture emphasizes what is expected of a girl child and a boy child. A girl child is raised to be timid, submissive, and inferior because they are viewed as ones lacking masculine traits (biological), powerful traits that make one a boy (Booi, 2021). Gender and sexuality are intertwined because sexuality is subject to gender

Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures    159 norms and social expectations. Sexuality, sexual behaviors, and sexual identities are strongly influenced by social structures (gender). According to Booi (2021), “Children are taught to embrace certain identities and exert particular behaviors that are aligned with those identities in order for them to fit into society that they are born into” (p. 14). Similarly, from a young age, children are socialized to sexual identities and behaviors that align with the identities of masculinity and femininity, or what is particularly expected from women and men sexually (Booi, 2021). Young girls are made aware of their sexuality—​this is in reference to some African cultural practices such as virginity testing and female genital cutting. Young females are taught to take pride in the preserving their virginity for heterosexual marriages (Booi, 2021). Heterosexual marriages and relationships are strongly encouraged in African cultures (Mkhize & Njawala, 2016). Girls are encouraged to grow up and get married. Boys are encouraged to be strong, get married, and be leaders of their communities (Makwanise & Masuku, 2015). Unmarried men and women in African cultures are ridiculed and shunned, referred to using derogatory terms like uzendazamshiya (unmarried woman) and isishimane (unmarried man). Marriage in African communities and cultures has high importance and is equated with having respect in society. Some African traditionalists even claim that a male ought to marry a female to be considered a man and socially and culturally valued (Makwanise & Masuku, 2015). Although marriage is significant in most African cultures, it is promoted among heterosexual but not homosexual relationships. Discrimination and violence against members of the LGBTQ+​community are still harsh realities in many African communities. For instance, women in same sex relationships are often humiliated, discriminated against, and violated by such acts as “corrective rape.” The perpetrators of these horrendous crimes hide behind culture and often suggest that homosexuality disrespects the values and cultural and social norms of society, and demean and stereotype homosexuality as not African (Makwanise & Masuku, 2015). Because of the obvious roles males and females are expected to follow, binary genders—​men and women—​are normalized in most African cultures, and there is no place for LGBTQ+​ people. African cultures are therefore used to maintain socially constructed and normalized gendered and sexual roles, disregarding gender dynamics and reinforcing compulsory heterosexuality, male superiority, female inferiority, and homophobic attitudes.

Feminist Analysis of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures There are many cultural practices in Africa. This section refers to a few of the dominant ones—​ polygyny, virginity testing, and genital cutting—​ in highlighting the intersectionality of gender and sexuality.

160   Gabi Mkhize

Polygynous Cultural Practice in Africa Both polygamy and polygyny are cultural and religious practices that allow multiple partners or spouses in heterosexual sexual relationships. The difference is that polygamy refers to an individual with multiple spouses while polygyny specifically denotes a male with more than one female partner, spouse, or wife. Most people use the words polygamy and polygyny interchangeably. Both polygyny and polygamy are widely practiced throughout Africa and in many other parts of the world (Thobejane & Flora, 2014). The focus here is on polygyny. Polygyny is most popular in the Islamic and Bantu cultures, but is not to limited them. It is widely practiced in South Africa and Eswatini, mostly among the Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, and Venda groups. The same applies to the Islamic groups Africa-​wide because the Quran allows a man to have more than one wife. Polygyny is much more common in Africa than it is in Western countries. Between 20 percent to 50 percent of all marriages in Africa are polygynous (Thobejane & Flora, 2014). As a cultural practice, polygyny in Africa existed even before colonization. It has been preferred because it is said to avoid infidelity or divorce in the case of female barrenness (Mwambene, 2017). In the Zulu culture of South Africa, a marriage is viewed as incomplete if the wife is unable to have children, especially because women are “brought into” marriage for reproduction to prolong a male’s surname, family, and clan lineage (Mwambene, 2017). The concept that growth of a man’s clan and family is only through the birth of boys is promoted in most African patriarchal cultures. Thus monogamy and different sexual orientations (LGBTQ+​) are viewed as a threat to Zulu cultural norms (Mdumiseni, 2012). Polygyny in Africa symbolizes a man’s power, leadership, and wealth (Baloyi, 2013). It is also promoted to satisfy a man’s sexual needs; a man cannot abstain at times when a woman is unable to engage in sexual intercourse, whether because of pregnancy, birth, or menstruation (Baloyi, 2013). Polygyny is not an issue only in South Africa; it can be found in most African countries faced with economic challenges. Eswatini is one of those countries. It is engulfed by poverty, high HIV/​AIDS and unemployment rates, and an extremely low life expectancy with the male mortality rate at 33 years (Manson, 2009). Polygyny is encouraged to increase the slowly declining population. In 2020, the male to female ratio in Eswatini was 96.7 males to 100 females (Population Statistics, 2020). Because of the huge difference in the size of the male and female populations in Eswatini, single and widowed women are forced into polygynous marriages. In Eswatini, men who are married to women who are unable to have children are encouraged to take another wife. As in many African societies, the growth and reproduction of children is an important aspect of marriage in Eswatini; marriage in Eswatini is regarded as the social role of all women. Polygyny is therefore emphasized to ensure that all women are given the opportunity to fulfill their socially and culturally prescribed gendered and sexual roles (Manson, 2009). Clearly, polygyny reinforces sexual inequalities. Males, unlike females, are permitted to have multiple wives, accentuating patriarchal sexual power and control because only

Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures    161 males are socially and culturally allowed to have sexual activities with multiple females concurrently. Thus polygynous culture not only reinforces intersectional forms of gender and sexual oppression and inequality (Mwambene, 2017) but also sustains the dynamic of male superiority and female inferiority (Mkhize & Njawala, 2016). A polygynous male has the right to be sexually involved with each of his female spouses, while a female spouse is expected to be sexually active with the same male or husband (Costa, 1994). Females are permitted to have multiple spouses under polygamy and polyandry (the female equivalent of polygyny). However, these practices are not common in most African cultures (Sánchez-​Conejero, 2015), signifying the entrenched hegemonic masculinity and heterosexual male dominance in Africa. Manifestly, polygyny enforces compulsory heterosexual patriarchy in African marriage institutions, in which a wife is not only her husband’s property but is also subjected to patriarchally centered power and control (Mkhize & Njawala, 2016; Sánchez-​Conejero, 2015). One may argue that polygyny is a choice for women who agree to be involved in it as a second wife and thus not a form of intersectional gender and sexual oppression. Contrariwise, even though it can to a certain extent be the choice to some women because of the entrenched patriarchy, women’s lack of agency in the in a polygynous marriage denigrates the practice. A women in this kind of marriage is under her husband’s control and has no say in decision-​making and no financial independence (Gouws, 2021). Since polygyny is perceptibly founded on heteropatriarchal discourses, it promotes normative a gendered social and cultural perspective that one man is not only able to lead and provide but is also able to sexually satisfy multiple women, whereas a woman is culturally not able to do so. Such patriarchal discourses predominant in polygyny normalize male-​centered power control of female sexuality (Derr & Grow, 2009). Further, in polygynous marriages, men have the exclusive authority over women’s reproductive capacities, property ownership, bodies, and sexual desires (Gouws, 2021). That is, the husbands control not only their spouses and children but also “own” their wives’ sexual needs, expressions, and feelings (Manson, 2009). Evidently, the African cultural practice of polygyny is gendered and centered on hegemonic masculinities as heterosexual males rather than heterosexual females and enduringly and overtly uphold dominant gendered and sexual roles (Thobejane & Flora, 2014). Polygyny is clearly fundamentally patriarchal, as women’s roles remain inferior and opposite to those of men who endure superiority (Sánchez-​Conejero, 2015). By reducing female agency and keeping women in a socially and culturally inferior position, polygyny consciously or unconsciously exposes them to increased risk of gender-​based violence, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including human papilloma virus (HPV), human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). There is no emphasis placed on the sexuality (sexual desire and sexual satisfaction) of women in polygynous marriages. This predominant African cultural practice instead advocates patriarchy, hegemonic masculinities, and compulsory heterosexuality (World Bank, 2020). Whereas the gender and sexuality

162   Gabi Mkhize of a man intersect and are socially constructed and normalized as hegemonic, the gender and sexuality of a woman interlock to produce various forms of oppression and subordination. Hence, in most African communities, women and girls continue to be the majority of victims and survivors of gender and sexual violence (Baloyi, 2013).

Virginity Testing in African Cultures Even though abstinence before marriage is typical and promoted in most African cultures, the virginity testing of girls and young women is a common custom in East, Central, and Southern Africa. Ancient African cultures strongly advocate preserving female virginity until marriage and discourage female premarital encounters (Kang’ethe & Nomngcoyiya, 2014). In South Africa and Eswatini, virginity testing is mostly administered during the annual umkhosi wohlanga, also known as the reed dance, which is aimed at celebrating and promoting the young women’s virginity preservation and honoring the king. The reed dance also acts as a form of unity as many people from various backgrounds across gender, class, ethnic, racial groups, including international community, gather together to celebrate this event. In these countries, virginity testing is deeply rooted in Zulu, Eswatini, and Venda communities to ensure that girls and young women abstain from sexual activities before marriage (Kang’ethe & Nomngcoyiya, 2014). This African cultural practice is believed to empower girls and young women, because it includes educating them about sexual and woman’s rites of passage. Virginity testing is also encouraged to protect girls from unplanned pregnancies and contracting sexual diseases such as HIV/​AIDS, STIs, and STDs at younger ages (Vincent, 2006). Hence, female virginity testing continues to be practiced in some African cultures (Chisale, 2016). The West and most international human rights organizations shun the practice of virginity testing because they believe that it violates girls’ and young women’s bodily autonomy and human rights (Thobejane & Mdhluli, 2015). Yet despite the world backlash against the practice, virginity testing is still celebrated and embraced by many in the communities where it is practiced (Thobejane & Mdhluli, 2015). Virginity testing, moreover, plays a vital role in increasing bride wealth (lobola) because women who remain sexual abstinent and maintain their innocence are said to deserve a high bridal price. In this context, female virginity is viewed as a gift, not only to a woman’s husband but also to his family. A man is not expected to reciprocate the same virginity gift to a woman and her family (Kang’ethe & Nomngcoyiya, 2014). Girls are culturally taught to preserve their virginity so that they will be marriageable to men. However, as mentioned earlier, virginity testing is also viewed as a tool for curbing the spread of sexual diseases, and is linked to HIV/​AIDS prevention throughout Africa (Chisale, 2016). In Kenya, it is believed that HIV/​AIDS is spread by sexually promiscuous women and prostitution, and therefore enforcing female virginity testing is viewed as a way to mitigate the spread of the virus (Thobejane & Mdhluli, 2015). Problematically, there are no popular African cultural practices to ensure that males are not sexually active before marriage and remain virgins. This means that, socially

Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures    163 and culturally, males are not required to keep their sexual pureness (Olsen & García-​ Moreno, 2017) or curb the spread of sexual diseases like HIV/​AIDS. But if moral uprightness comes with virginity testing, the practice is also argued to reinforce and promote gender and sexual inequalities. Female virginity testing problematically insinuates that only females are carriers and transmitters of HIV/​AIDS; therefore, if females remain virgins, it will go a long way to halt spread of the disease in Africa. This is problematic because it places the responsibility to curb HIV/​AIDS wholly on girls and women. In this way, sexual diseases are socially constructed and normalized as only a woman’s problem, which is troubling feminization of sexual diseases. And because females are more vulnerable than males to gender-​based violence and other social ills embedded in gender and sexual inequalities and oppressions, the culture of virginity testing in Africa contributes to the intersectionality of gender and sexuality by reinforcing the normalization of those inequalities and oppressions. Thus, it can be argued that the African culture of female virginity testing intensifies the policing of women’s sexuality, gender, and bodies, including violating their unalienable human rights. Prominently, virginity testing is centered on heteropatriarchal influence, power, control, and normative social and cultural policing of female sexuality and bodies.

Female Genital Cutting Cultural Practice in Africa Female genital cutting, also called “female circumcision” or “female genital mutilation,” is another cultural practice in some parts of Africa that is known to subjugate women. Female genital mutilation has been documented across the African continent, especially in Eastern, Central, and Western Africa. Tanzania, Cameroon, and Kenya have recorded cases of female genital mutilation. One in five Kenyan women has experienced female circumcision (United Nations, 2020). Female genital mutilation is also widely practiced in Nigeria, where occurrence is at 61 percent, particularly within the Yoruba ethnic group (Abiodun et al., 2011). Research conducted among women who have been circumcised indicates that female genital circumcision is believed to make women more feminine, desirable, and attractive to men (Abdel-​Azim, 2013; Abiodun et al., 2011). As with virginity testing, circumcised women are believed to raise the status of their families by commanding a higher bride price and bigger dowry. Circumcised women are thought to have better marriage prospects because they are considered clean and are socially acknowledged as full women (Abiodun et al., 2011). Discrimination against both women and men who are not circumcised is common in communities. Female circumcision and male circumcision are viewed as rites of passage into womanhood and manhood (World Bank, 2020). Unlike female circumcision, male circumcision is mostly performed privately, and not as a cultural practice in many African communities. However, South Africa has a cultural practice of male circumcision that is popular among the Xhosa ethnic group (Vincent, 2008). Male circumcision involves only the removing the foreskin (Vincent, 2008); unlike for females, there is no complete removal of any sexual organs. Like male

164   Gabi Mkhize circumcision, female genital cutting is sometimes regarded as an initiation process or a rite of passage (James & Robertson, 2002) into womanhood for girls, and afterward their status changes. However, some women are forced to undergo circumcision to be seen “complete” women and to qualify for a heterosexual marriage (Kassindja & Bashir, 1999). From African patriarchal perspective, a good woman is one who can satisfy her husband’s sexual desire, a woman who adheres to her African culture without question. I argue that female genital cutting embodies multiple forms of gender and sexual oppression by patriarchal influences that play a significant role in the reinforcement of this practice, which aligns with Foucault’s (1980) paradigm of forms of power. Although female genital cutting is an act performed by women on other women, it is still gendered because practically and functionally, it reinforces sexual inequalities. That is, female circumcision is supposedly a female domain, but it promotes male dominance by weakening or completely eradicating women’s sexual desires, with an aim to provide men with more sexual pleasure and satisfaction, although men act as if they are not involved (Kassindja & Bashir, 1999) since the practice is done primarily for women. In essence, female genital cutting is performed on girls so they are viewed as marriage material for men and will be sexually desirable to men, so that they can give birth to children to continue a man’s surname and help the families involved to generate more income, which turns them into commodities. Men are involved in this practice because of gendered and sexual ideologies that turn circumcised women into their property, and they ostracize uncircumcised women as the other and locate them outside socially sanctioned womanhood. In such a patriarchal culture, a woman is not considered a complete woman if female genital cutting has not been performed on her. It is treated as a qualifier for womanhood and marriage.

Oppression of Female Sexuality in African Cultures Objectification, “otherness,” sexualization, construction, and instrumentalization of female bodies are intersectional layers of gender and sexuality that are embodied in the practice of female genital cutting. In her study on women’s bodies and images, Berger (1972) illustrates the objectification of women through their bodies, images, and performance in their social realities. Her theory of female bodies and images embodies the practice of female genital cutting, through which a woman’s body is a male’s property and female sex is about a male’s desire. Sex thus centers the objectification, sexualization, instrumentalization and construction of women where their bodies are used for masculine sexual power and control. The practice of female genital cutting robs women of sexual control and pleasure and turns them into objects of male gratification. In her conceptualization of women’s sexuality as property, Petchesky (1995) articulates the intersectional gendered and sexually oppressive situation of women involved in female genital cutting. In the African cultures where female circumcision is practiced, a woman’s body is plainly a male’s sexual property (Petchesky, 1995) that serves a male’s sexual interest.

Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures    165 Colonialism disrupted African gender and sexual systems (Carby, 2005), resulting in the extension of direct patriarchy and subordination of a woman’s identity, body, sexuality, and labor. According to Jacque Lacan (Mitchell, 1982) sexuality is embodied in human beings. In Lacan’s symbolism (Mitchell, 1982), a female is represented as the “other,” a signifier that does not signify anything. In this context, a woman is not only an icon of “otherness,” objectification, and sexualization but also of sexual instrumentalization. Most African cultures deprive women of their being and turn them into social and cultural instruments of masculinity. In the cultural practices of polygyny, virginity testing, and female genital cutting, a woman is portrayed as having no sense of sexual direction; her sexuality is only good for male sexual pleasure, reproduction, and production. In Lacan’s (Mitchell, 1982) sexual symbolic system, a woman is just a constituted sexual subject. The objectification of women in these exemplified African cultures reflects the intersectional and normalized gender and sexual construction that is further socialized in most African communities and families. In patriarchal societies and cultures, like those in Africa, a woman is not only good for procreation but is also viewed as a sex object. Essentially, a female is valued for what she does for others. Hence, women involved in such patriarchal African cultures are represented as passive, exploited, voiceless, subordinated victims and sexual objects, basically the instruments used to maintain compulsory heterosexuality and patriarchy. Nevertheless, and undeniably, some women involved in these African cultural practices view them as a form of female empowerment. In his theory of power, Foucault (1980) describes a relation of power to the body and sexuality that problematizes some forms of gender and sexual inequality and oppression; but, he says, at each social level, there is a possibility of power and resistance. Accordingly, then, there is a form of female agency in African cultures that speaks to the uniqueness of intersectionality theorizing because it unpacks various intersectional forms of oppression, inequalities, and the benefits attached and the representations of gender and sexuality. From a different perspective, then, we can postulate that the involvement of female agency ought to be viewed from a relative point of view. Some women benefit from African cultural practices, since they carry, train, and teach virginity testing and female genital cutting, and willingly join polygyny (James & Robertson 2002), which is a form of power to them. This means that some women, as well as men, participate in one way or the other in reinforcing the patriarchy. Petchesky’s (1995) concept of property further suggests that women involved in the African cultural practices of polygyny, virginity testing, and female genital cutting can be viewed as patriarchal properties (objects), instruments, and commodities. So even though most African cultures are irrefutably patriarchal, it is crucial to be aware of a danger of reducing African women, girls, and LGBTQ+​s to victims of their cultures. There is a need to apply the African feminist-​centered critical lens in scrutinizing the intersectionality of gender and sexuality because these concepts are dynamic and often intertwine with the role of race in the context of Africa. Equally, Oyewumi (2004) challenges the universalization of gender discourse, which tends to homogenize gender,

166   Gabi Mkhize sexuality, and their roles as a single entity. That is, the experiences of African women, girls, and LGBTQ+​s are not located outside the politics of difference, dynamics of gender and sexuality, and the role of race and power. Such African feminist-​centered discourse helps in not reducing all African women, girls, and LGBTQ+​s to the status of victims of cultural practices and their controlled sexuality. The underlying oppositional African-​centered discourse does not ignore the multiple layered forms of gender, sexuality, and racial oppressions, but it also focuses on the alternative lens that acknowledges interlocking oppressive and privileged gendered, sexual, and racial experiences that are, further, shared among all people. African women’s and LGBTQ+​s’ agency has always been evident in their dynamics of gender and sexuality roles and forms of resilience through texts and activism across the continent of Africa. Such forms of agency helps to deconstruct socially constructed images and a subjective narrative that most African women, girls and LGBTQ+​s are passive, helpless victims of in African cultures. The social realms of the African cultures presented here are thus embodied in the intersectionality of gender and sexuality because they produce multiple layers of oppressions and privileges. However, the chapter argues that heteropatriarchal-​ influenced gendered Africa cultures that also deny females the right of choice and limit them to normative social constructions of female sexuality and womanhood. Most African cultures favor males more than females, and there are fewer gender and sexual benefits for African girls and women involved in these cultures. Instead, most girls and women involved in African cultures are often sexually exploited. Their involvement, including their reproduction and reproductive labor, is to benefit patriarchy. To support this argument, we can turn to African feminist theorizing. Ogundipe-​Leslie (1994) affirms that an African woman is customarily confronted with six mountains to climb: outside oppression, patriarchal society, neocolonialism or development, race, and herself. All these mountains work against African women, further subjugating most and causing them to live with little or no female agency and a very low self-​image and self-​ esteem. Some of these mountains that African women face are evident in the intentionality of gender and sexuality in some African cultures, exemplified by the polygyny, virginity testing, and female genital cutting presented here.

Essentialization of Gender and Sexuality Dynamics in African Cultures The African cultures discussed here also signify what Gouws (2017) refers to as “simultaneous entanglement of inequalities” (p. 20), and Collins (1990) views as a matrix of domination and/​or interlocking systems of oppressions. Observed in most African cultures, and exemplified in polygyny, virginity testing, and female genital cutting, is the intersection of gender and sexuality discrimination and stereotypes based on sexual orientation, which is an exclusion of and discrimination against LGBTQ+​people. They seem to have no space in these heterosexual cultures that promote heteronormative sexual and gender roles and practices. The heteronormative nature of African cultures

Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures    167 reinforces compulsory heterosexuality and binary gender identities, man and woman, in a way that promotes homophobia and prejudices against individuals of different sexual orientations—​LGBTQ+​s. The African cultures represented in the chapter troublingly reinforce binary gender, an essentialization of existing multiple genders and what Amadiume (2015) refers to as the “dual-​sex social systems” (p. 17) in Africa, where women can take on the roles of men in some cultural rituals, as represented by male daughters (boys who also take on daughter’s roles) and female husbands in the traditional Igbo society of West Africa. Most African cultures promote the claim that a singular heteronormative narrative is attached to these cultural practices, omitting Africa’s traditional complexity and gender and sexuality dynamics and their intersectionality based on varied social acts, identities, and orientations. Using the term homosexuals, Alidou’s (2005) presents Hausa LGBTQ+​, who reclaim their sexual agency, reinforcing Africa’s dynamics of gender and sexuality while challenging African heteronormative notions of gender and sexuality. Problematically, most African cultures such as polygyny, female virginity testing, and female genital cutting remain ignorant of the existence of multiple gender identities, reinforcing heteropatriarchal and heteronormative cultural (and religious, exemplified by Islamic religion) ideologies that perceive gender as a natural category. Seedat (2018) views Islamic religion, for instance, as embodying gender and sexuality embedded inequalities and prejudices, resulting in what she refers to as “Islamophobia” (p. 50). Hence, Seedat’s proposal for queering Islamic cultures and religions to promote alternative gender and sexual identities, which are mostly viewed culturally and religiously as nonconformities. In Africa, LGBTQ+​gender identities and sexual orientations are viewed as nonconformative, as challenging cultural and religious gender and sexual norms, and thus as un-​African. Most African cultures promote a binary-​gender-​defined sexuality in which heteronormative masculine and feminine identities are culturally constructed as a norm. In terms of intersectionality theorizing, Africa’s gender and sexuality norms embody imbalanced power relations founded in the social construction of masculinity and femininity, where the female sex ought to perform stereotypical feminine activities, use feminine language and gestures, wear feminine clothing, and assume women’s domestic and public chores. The same applies to the male sex; they ought to only engage in masculine defined roles. In this way, African cultures play a huge role in reinforcing compulsory heteronormative gender roles and gendered power relations, and in the discrimination against LGBTQ+​people. The practices of polygyny, virginity testing, and female genital cutting are emblematic of the interlocking power dynamics and complexities of gender and sexual identity that exist in Africa’s predominantly patriarchal communities and institutions. The African cultures we have looked at further unpack Africa’s dominant ideologies of gender and sexuality that have for so long been oppressive to most women and the LGBTQ+​community, including all gender and sexual identities that are considered to be outside the dominant heteronormative cultures. The chapter is in no way promoting viewing African culture through a patriarchal lens; instead, it is trying

168   Gabi Mkhize to show that African cultures are mostly patriarchal, with rigid notions of gender and sexuality, and that homosexuality remains labeled as nonconformative because of the homophobia of most African societies.

Conclusion Intersectionality theorizing has something to offer in the conceptualization and unpacking of the interlocking forms of gender and sexual oppression and inequalities embedded in male-​dominated African cultures, and their representations of and social perspectives about women as a gender. Intersectionality is a distinctive theoretical framework (Crenshaw, 1995), unlike other feminist theories, because it recognizes the interlocking forms of normalized gender and sexual oppression, and of inequality and privileges, and it further acknowledges their existence in most patriarchal African cultures, including, as we have seen, polygyny, virginity testing, and female genital cutting, among others. Intersectionality is thus a theoretical tool that can be used in responding to the ways in which gender and sexuality intersect in African cultures and in showing how these intersections contribute to normalized female oppression and patriarchal power and control (Mkhize & Njawala, 2016). The chapter therefore postulates that using theoretical intersectionality thinking provides alternative lenses in unpacking and understating the interlocking gender and sexual oppressions, inequalities, and benefits or privileges reinforced in African cultures. Through a feminist lens, the chapter tried to unpack the intersectionality of gender and sexuality embodied in the exploitation and control of women’s bodies through the heteropatriarchal cultural practices of polygyny, virginity testing, and female genital cutting as a violations of female sexuality, female bodies, and women’s rights. The chapter further assumed that historical, cultural, and social impairments and power hierarchies are fundamental to intersectional forms of repression of women and girls and their sexuality. And it engaged the sexual context of gender and sexual oppressions, “otherness,” and objectification embedded in African cultures. Heterosexuality and male dominance are fundamental in the intersectionality of gender and sexuality embedded in African cultures. Polygyny, virginity testing, and female genital cutting are cultural practices inspired by a heterosexual and hegemonic masculine worldview for the purposes of regulating gender and sexuality and of further policing and controlling female bodies in the name of culture. In these African cultures there is also a substantial emphasis on the protection of girls and women, on curbing the spread of sexual diseases by controlling women’s sexuality (but not that of men), and making women more marriageable and able to bear children for men to prolong their families and clans. Such emphasized claims about girls and women are significant attributes in most African cultures. However, it is important to be cognizant of the untold sufferings and oppressions these practices cause girls and women, which far outweigh the apparent benefits or privileges and status that women accrue from them. Evidently,

Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures    169 African cultures have interlocking and controversial gender and sexual inequalities, oppressions, and representation. There may be some limited benefits, such as female collectivism and agency, because these cultures bring women together, opening spaces for education, engagement, activism, and solidarity. Nevertheless, efforts to empower women and girls in most African communities practicing these patriarchal cultures are of significance so that they will be able to sustain themselves, rather than subjugate themselves to culturally embedded gendered and sexual oppressions such as marriage to survive.

References Abdel-​Azim, S. (2013). Psychosocial and sexual aspects of female circumcision. African Journal of Urology, 19, 141–​142. Abiodun, A. A., Benjamin, A. O., & Obalowu, J. (2011). Female circumcision in Nigeria, prevalence and attitudes. CPJ, 17, 89–​98. Alidou, O. D. (2005). Engaging modernity: Muslim women and the politics of agency in postcolonial Niger. University of Wisconsin Press. Amadiume, I. (2015). Male daughters, female husbands: Gender and sex in an African society. Zed Books. Andrade, S. Z. (2007). Rioting women and writing women: Gender, class and the public sphere in Africa. In C. M. Cole, T. Manuh, & S. F. Miescher (Eds.), Africa after Gender (pp. 85–​107). Indiana University Press. Baloyi, E. M. (2013). Critical reflections on polygamy in the African Christian context. Missionalia: Southern African Journal of Mission Studies, 41, 164–​181. https://​doi.org/​10.7832/​41-​2-​12 Beauvoir, S. de. (2007). The second sex. In B. A. Arrighi (Ed.), Understanding inequality: The intersection of race/​ethnicity, class, and gender (pp. 75–​84). Rowman & Littlefield. Berger, J. (1972). Ways of seeing. Penguin Books. Booi, M. (2021). Growing up women and men: Gendered housework in Xhosa households in Langa [Masters thesis, Stellenbosch University]. Butler, J. (1986). Sex and gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex. Yale French Studies, 72, 35–​49. Carby, H. V. (2005). Schooling in Babylon. In The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain (pp. 181–​ 210). Routledge. Carton, B., & Morrell, R. (2012). Zulu masculinities, warrior culture and stick fighting: Reassessing male violence and virtue in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 38, 31–​53. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​03057​070.2011.640​073 Chisale, S. S. (2016). Decolonising HIV prevention: A critical examination of ukusoma and virginity testing. Alternation Journal, 23, 217–​235. Collins, P. H. (1990). Black feminist thought in the matrix of domination. In P. Collins (Ed.), Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment (pp. 221–​ 238). Unwin Hyman. Collins, P. H., & Bilge, S. (2020). Intersectionality. John Wiley & Sons. Connell, R. W., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Hegemonic masculinity: Rethinking the concept. Gender & Society, 19, 829–​859.

170   Gabi Mkhize Costa, A. (1994). Polygamy, other personal relationships and the Constitution. De Rebus, 1994, 914–​918. Crenshaw, K. (1995). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. In K. Crenshaw, N. Gotanda, G. Peller, & K. Thomas (Eds.), Critical race theory: The key writings that formed the movement (pp. 357–​383). New Press. Crenshaw, K. (2015, September 24). Why intersectionality can’t wait. Washington Post, 24. https://​w ww.was​hing​tonp ​ost.com/​news/​in-​the​ory/​wp/​2015/​09/​2 4/​why-​inters​ecti​onal​ ity-​cant-​wait/​ Derr, J. M., & Grow, M. J. (2009). Letters on Mormon polygamy and progeny: Eliza R. Snow and Martin Luther Holbrook, 1866–​1869. Brigham Young University Studies, 48, 139–​164. Foucault, M. (1980). Power/​knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–​1977. Vintage. Gouws, A. (2017). Feminist intersectionality and the matrix of domination in South Africa. Agenda, 31, 19–​27. Gouws, A. (2021). Reducing women to bare life: Sexual violence in South Africa. Feminist Encounters: A Journal of Critical Studies in Culture and Politics, 5, 1–​12. https://​doi.org/​ 10.20897/​fem​enc/​9740 Hadebe, L. (2010). Zulu masculinity: Culture, faith and the constitution in the South African context [Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of KwaZulu-​Natal]. James, S. M., & Robertson, C. C. (2002). Introduction: Reimaging transnational sisterhood. In S. M. James & C. C. Robertson (Eds.), Genital cutting and transnational sisterhood: Disputing US polemics (pp. 5–​15). University of Illinois Press. Kang’ethe, S. M., & Nomngcoyiya, T. (2014). Exploring selected cultures in mitigating an array of social vices in South Africa: A literature review. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5, 458–​458. https://​doi.org/​10.5901/​mjss.2014.v5n14p​458 Kassindja, F., & Bashir, L. M. (1999). Do they hear you when you cry. Delacorte Press. Makwanise, N., & Masuku, M. (2015). Gender and land dispossession in Zimbabwe: A case of the Ndebele at Esigodini area, 1893–​2003. Oral History Journal of South Africa, 3, 55–​68. https://​doi.org/​10.25159/​2309-​5792/​335 Manson, K. E. (2009). Comparing and contrasting liberal, communitarian and feminist approaches to resolving tensions between customary and constitutional law: The case of polygamy in Swaziland [Masters thesis, Rhodes University]. Matebeni, Z., Monro, S., & Reddy, V. (2018). Introduction. In Z. Matebeni, S. Monro, & V. Reddy (Eds.), Queer in Africa: LGBTQI identities, citizenship, and activism (pp. 1–​16). Taylor & Francis. Mathonsi, N., & Mpungose, Z. (2015). Perceived gender inequality reflected in Zulu proverbs: A feminist approach. Southern African Journal for Folklore Studies, 25, 30–​42. https://​journ​ als.co.za/​doi/​pdf/​10.10520/​EJC-​696e16​170 McFadden, P. (2005). Becoming postcolonial: African women changing the meaning of citizenship. Meridians, 6, 1–​22. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​mer.2005.0030 Mdumiseni, M. L. (2012). Some gendered practices in a Zulu family: A feminist perspective. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of KwaZulu-​Natal]. Mitchell, J. (1982). Introduction. In J. Rose & J. Mitchell (Eds.), Feminine sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne (pp. 1–​15). W. W. Norton. Mkhize, G. (2015). Problematising rhetorical representations of individuals with disability—​ disabled or living with disability? Agenda, 29, 133–​140. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​10130​ 950.2015.1040​692

Intersectionality of Gender and Sexuality in African Cultures    171 Mkhize, G., & Mgcotyelwa-​Ntoni, N. (2019). The impact of women’s movements’ activism experiences on gender transformation policies in democratic South Africa. Agenda, 33, 9–​ 21. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​10130​950.2019.1618​637 Mkhize, G., & Njawala, L. (2016). Rethinking hegemonic masculinity and patriarchal privilege within heterosexual interpersonal relationships. Oriental Anthropologist, 16, 379–​397. https://​journ​als.sage​pub.com/​doi/​pdf/​10.1177/​09763​4302​0160​211 Mkhize, G., & Vilakazi, F. (2021). Rethinking gender and conduits of control: A feminist review. Image & Text, 35, 1–​22. http://​www.sci​elo.org.za/​pdf/​it/​n35/​07.pdf Mohanty, C. T. (2003). “Under western eyes” revisited: Feminist solidarity through anticapitalist struggles. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28, 499–​535. Mtshiselwa, N. V. N. N. (2011). A biblical perspective and critique of homosexuality by the Xhosa culture. Theologia Viatorum, 35, 273–​301. Mwambene, L. (2017). What is the future of polygyny (polygamy) in Africa? Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/​Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 20, 1–​33. https://​doi.org/​ 10.17159/​1727-​3781/​2017/​v20​i0a1​357 Ogundipe-​Leslie, M. (1994). Re-​creating ourselves: African women and critical transformations. Africa World Press. Olson, R. M., & García-​Moreno, C. (2017). Virginity testing: A systematic review. Reproductive Health, 14, 1–​10. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​978-​017-​0319-​0 Oyewumi, O. (2004). Conceptualizing gender: Eurocentric foundations of feminist concepts and the challenge of African epistemologies. Jenda: A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies, 2, 1–​9. Petchesky, R. P. (1995). The body as property: A feminist re-​vision. In F. D. Ginsburg & R. Rapp (Eds.), Conceiving the new world order: The global politics of reproduction (pp. 387–​406). University of California Press. Population Statistics. (2020). Swaziland population. https://​pop​ulat​ions​tat.com/​swazil​and/​ #:~:text=​Swazil​and%20Pop​u lat​ion%20Pop​u lat ​ion%20now%201%2C159%2C977%20M​ ale%3A%20569%2C987%20%2849.15,Rates%20%282​020%29%20M​ale%3A%2056.52%20ye​ ars%20Fem​ale%3A%2065.41%20ye​ars Purnama, H., Darmawati, I., & Lindayani, L. (2018). The effectiveness of Skills for Adolescents with Healthy Sexuality (SAHS) Program on Reducing the Risk of HIV Transmission among adolescents. Indonesian Nursing Journal of Education and Clinic (INJEC), 3, 1–​8. http://​ dx.doi.org/​10.24990/​injec.v3i1.170 Sánchez-​Conejero, C. (2015). Sex and ethics in Spanish cinema. Palgrave Macmillan. Seedat, F. (2018). Sitting in difference: Queering the study of Islam. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 34, 149–​154. Spivak, G. C. (2005). Scattered speculations on the subaltern and the popular. Postcolonial Studies, 8, 475–​486. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​136887​9050​0375​132 Tamale, S. (2013). Confronting the politics of nonconforming sexualities in Africa. African Studies Review, 56, 31–​45. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​asr.2013.40 Thobejane, T. D., & Flora, T. (2014). An exploration of polygamous marriages: A worldview. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5, 1058–​1058. https://​doi.org/​10.5901/​mjss.2014.v5n​ 27p1​058 Thobejane, T., & Mdhluli, T. (2015). Probing the efficacy of virginity testing on the fight against HIV/​AIDS: The case of the KwaZulu-​Natal, South Africa. OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development, 8, 11–​20.

172   Gabi Mkhize Tripp, A. M. (2003). Women in movement transformations in African political landscapes. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5, 233–​255. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​1461​6740​3200​ 0080​585 Turner, T. E., & Brownhill, L. S. (2001). Gender, feminism and the civil commons: Women and the anti-​corporate, anti-​war movement for globalization from below. Canadian Journal of Development Studies/​Revue canadienne d’études du développement, 22, 805–​818. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1080/​02255​189.2001.9669​943 United Nations. (2020). With millions of girls “at risk” today of genital mutilation, UN chief calls for zero tolerance. https://​news.un.org/​en/​story/​2019/​02/​1032​061 Veltman, A., & Piper, M. (2014). Introduction. In A. Veltman & M. Piper (Eds.), Autonomy, oppression, and gender (pp. 1–​11). Oxford University Press. Vincent, L. (2006). Virginity testing in South Africa: Re-​traditioning the postcolony. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 8, 17–​30. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​136910​5050​0404​225 Vincent, L. (2008). “Boys will be boys”: traditional Xhosa male circumcision, HIV and sexual socialisation in contemporary South Africa. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 10, 431–​446. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​136910​5070​1861​447 Wahab, A. (2016). Homosexuality/​homophobia is un-​African? Un-​mapping transnational discourses in the context of Uganda’s anti-​homosexuality bill/​act. Journal of Homosexuality, 63, 685–​7 18. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00918​369.2015.1111​105 World Bank. (2020, February). Compendium of international and national legal frameworks on female genital mutilation (4th ed.). Washington, DC. Zondi, N. (2013). Position of women in Zulu and Shona societies: The case of Uvalo Lwezinhlonzi and nervous conditions. Alternation, 20, 164–​182.

Chapter 10

Prevalenc e a nd C onsequen c e s of Gender-​B ased V i ol e nc e on Fam ilies i n A fri c a Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa

Introduction This chapter provides an overview of the prevalence and consequences of gender-​based violence (GBV) in Africa based on the literature review of relevant studies. The focus is on intimate partner violence (IPV), a form of GBV faced by many women around the world. IPV is a critical problem that is recognized as a human rights issue by the United Nations, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other international organizations. The annual 16 Days campaign of Activism against GBV, known as the “International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women,” begins on November 25 and ends on December 10, has been designated as the Human Rights Day (UN Women, n.d.). According to WHO, up to 70 percent of women around the world experience physical and sexual violence by an intimate partner at some point in their lives. The “WHO’s Global and Regional Estimates of Violence against Women” report from 2013 defines IPV as any behavior by a current or former male intimate partner within the context of marriage, cohabitation or any other formal or informal union that causes physical, sexual or psychological harm. The report notes that Oceania, Southern Asia, and Sub-​ Saharan Africa have the highest IPV rates among women aged 15 to 49 years. Although IPV happens to women and girls of all ages, women of reproductive age have an augmented risk, making IPV a significant contributor to women’s ill health, including physical, mental, and reproductive health. IPV risks to women and girls increased during the COVID-​19 lockdown (World Health Organization, 2013).

174    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa

The Surge in IPV Prevalence during COVID-​19 In Africa and around the world, a surge in GBV cases has been observed since the beginning of the COVID-​19 outbreak (Godin, 2020; Women’s Aid, 2020). This current surge in IPV prevalence levels has been attributed to the COVID-​19 lockdown mandates, which had a devastating impact on families. The stay-​home restrictions designed to control COVID-​19 infections had the unwanted effect of exacerbating IPV. Xue et al. (2020) analyzed more than one million Twitter feeds and extracted nine themes related to family violence and the COVID-​19 pandemic. They found an increased vulnerability for women and children and increases in hotline calls and homicides. The stay-​home restrictions to curb the spread of COVID-​19 did not cause IPV; however, there is evidence that these measures might have increased IPV incidents in households where violence was already being perpetrated. The forced isolation of families in their homes might have created dangerous situations with the potential to trigger domestic confiicts and episodes of abuse within the family. According to the United Nations (UN Women, n.d.), domestic abuse cases increased by 25 percent during lockdowns, a disturbing trend the organization called a “shadow pandemic.” Moreover, it should be noted that these data indicating a recent increase in violence against women rely on service use and are not representative of the overall prevalence, which can only be measured through population-​based surveys. Thus the overall impact of COVID-​19 on prevalence estimates of IPV can only be accurately ascertained through surveys as societies slowly get back to normality.

Definition and Measures of IPV in the Literature Prevalence studies of IPV focused on respondents’ experience of physical violence (using a range of violent acts), sexual acts, and emotional and psychological acts. Physical violence and sexual violence do not happen in isolation but in tandem with emotional and psychological abuse. This chapter provides a snapshot of the nature and scope of IPV and its impact on families in Africa. Studies have used varying measures to assess emotional and psychological violence; however, these types of abuse are deemed to be precursors to physical and sexual violence, whose measures have been consistent in many studies since 1972 (Straus, 1990; Straus et al., 1996). The revised Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS2) measure concrete acts and events—​that is, the extent to which intimate partners engage in physical attacks on each other. These are shown in Table 10.1.

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    175 Table 10.1. Operational Definitions of Categories Frequently Used to Measure IPV against Ever-​Married Womena in Surveys and the DHSb Domestic Violence Module Categories of IPV

Definition and Measures

Physical violence

Operationalized as acts that can physically hurt the victim, including but not limited to: (a) Being pushed/​shoved, shaken, or having something thrown at you that could hurt you. (b) Being slapped; hit with a fist or something else that could hurt. (c) Being kicked, dragged, or beaten up. (d) Having your arm twisted, or your hair pulled. (f) Being choked or burned on purpose and/​or being threatened with or having a gun, knife, or other weapon used on you.

Sexual violence

Operationalized as: (a) Being physically forced to have sexual intercourse when you do not want to. (b) Having sexual intercourse out of fear of what your partner might do or through coercion. (c) Being forced to perform sexual acts you do not want to perform and that you consider humiliating or degrading.

Emotional/​psychological violence

Operationalized as: (a) Being humiliated in front of others. (b) Threatening you with hurt or harm; threatening to hurt or harm someone close to you. (c) Being insulted or made to feel bad about yourself.

a

  Only ever-​married/​partnered women were included in the measure of IPV.

b

  The measures used here are from the modified version of the Conflict Tactics Scale (Straus et al., 1996).

Theoretical Explanations of IPV in Africa It is undisputed that in African society the family provides economic and social support to its members; therefore, it is considered a central and important institution. Caldwell (1982) noted that Africans place a high value on the family and married life. But some studies have alluded to the other side of the family, one considered private and not for public discourse—​IPV or violence among family members (Amoakohene, 2004; Coker-​ Appiah & Cusack, 1999)—​which can be seen in the reported high prevalence of IPV. Many African societies are patriarchal, and women have limited resources and power within the home (Takyi & Dodoo, 2005), which makes their situation more precarious

176    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa when it comes to IPV. It is not uncommon to have conflicting theories proffered to explain IPV in the African context. Some theories have conceptualized violence as a problem of the individual, family, community, and society (Black et al., 2010; Dienye & Gbeneol, 2009; Kimuna et al., 2018; McCloskey et al., 2005). Others have focused on patriarchy and male dominance and control. Central to these arguments is that violence against women is a result of the unequal power relations that are structurally embedded in patriarchy. Furthermore, cultural explanations that emphasize tradition, customs, and norms are linked to the gendered power imbalance in structural patriarchal systems, where within these different African cultural contexts, wife-​beating and other forms of violence are considered normal and legitimate, and are therefore condoned by communities as well as the state (Lawoko et al., 2007). For example, Uthman and colleagues (2009) explain violence against women as socially learned, suggesting that individuals learn to be violent by observing and re-​enacting the violent behavior of those around them. Thus social norms and gender roles in a patriarchal society are learned within a social group and transmitted from generation to generation. Another cultural explanation has to do with the nonperformance of marital duties and obligations. According to this explanation, the incidence of IPV is intertwined with traditional gender roles and their performance. Traditional gender roles and socialization patterns implicitly or explicitly dictate what men and women do and how they behave (Amoakohene, 2004; Kimuna et al., 2018; Mann & Takyi, 2009). Gender roles are clearly defined among the numerous ethnic groups found in African countries. Male dominance and male control are maintained and exercised through traditional values, beliefs, and customs (Ellsberg et al., 2001; Koenig et al., 2003; Lawoko et al., 2007). Women’s experiences in the domestic sphere are shaped by sociocultural expectations of their specific tribal or ethnic norms that dictate what kind of behavior is appropriate for women, such as passivity and submission, just as men are expected to display dominant and authoritarian behavior in the domestic sphere, especially when bride wealth is exchanged (Bowman, 2003). Bride wealth may regulate the behavior and actions of wives toward their husbands, and it gives husbands the authority to make critical decisions within the family, which can lead to conflict and IPV. The social and cultural acceptance that husbands are superior and wives are subordinate and the power inequities that characterize the martial relationship promote husband-​to-​wife violence. Some studies argue that the major causes of IPV are societal norms that promote the subordination of women (Garcia-​Moreno, 2002; Uthman et al., 2009). The lack-​of-​resources or resource-​scarcity explanation argues that men who lack resources in societies that assume that males are breadwinners are likely to express their frustration through violence (Kimuna & Djamba, 2008; Kimuna et al., 2018). Similarly, it has been observed that both women with little access to resources and women who have greater access to resources than their partners, thereby usurping the traditional position of men, are at a higher risk of being victimized by their male partners (Hindin, 2003; Jewkes, 2002). These theoretical explanations have been used to explain IPV in the selected studies synthesized in this chapter.

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    177

Methods: Inclusion Criteria and Article Selection We conducted a comprehensive and extensive search of electronic databases of peer-​ reviewed studies and non-​peer-​reviewed literature published between 2000 and 2021 on the prevalence in and consequences of IPV in African countries. The search was limited to studies using population surveys, and included only those that assessed experiencing violence from an intimate partner. Thus we reviewed studies of ever-​ married or partnered women. We also included one study that used couple data and five other studies that used data from both men and women to assess the justification of IPV and controlling behavior. The social sciences databases search was limited to articles published in English. Other databases included African Healthline, Web of Science, Popline, PsychINFO, and Google Scholar. Articles with prevalence estimates for IPV among women ages 15 to 49 years based on relevancy and using titles and abstracts were selected. In some countries girls are married off before the age of 15 years; however, most surveys that collect representative data on IPV focus on women in the reproductive age group (15 to 49 years). The search also included articles that measured intermediate types of IPV, such as attitudes about wife beating, controlling behavior, and other factors that have been found to be risk and/​or protective for IPV. Further, we reviewed the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS of 39 African countries presenting data collected from 2005 to 2020 from cross-​sectional nationally representative surveys; thus each country-​level prevalence estimate of physical, sexual, and psychological violence is cross-​nationally comparable. To extend the breadth and reach of the chapter, we also included as many academic studies as possible, as well as reports from various community based organizations, including health. A majority of the relevant empirical studies asked about IPV, the justification of wife-​beating, and the controlling behavior of the perpetrators of IPV and its health consequences. The quantitative studies used samples that are somewhat representative of general populations in the African countries that were eligible for the study. Selected studies used different types of instruments to measure IPV (Table 10.1). The cross-​sectional studies that used DHS data included the CTS2 (Straus, 1990; Straus et al., 1996). Other studies used the Modified Gender-​Equitable Men’s Attitude and Beliefs Scale (Kazaura et al., 2015) to assess how attitudes and beliefs respond to the spread of HIV and GBV; the Sexual Relationship Power Scale (Dunkle et al., 2004) to assess experience of GBV and risk behaviors, including HIV; and the WHO Violence Against Women instrument, which assessed lifetime experiences of IPV. The mixed-​methods study assessed triggers of domestic violence (Ajayi & Soyinka-​Airewele, 2018); others used investigator-​designed questionnaires. Qualitative studies explored community attitudes on IPV (Abeya et al., 2012), victims’ justification of IPV and the rationalizing of IPV as socially acceptable (Adjei, 2018), and perceptions of IPV and the role of culture in the perpetration of IPV against

178    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa women (Amoakohene, 2004). Other studies found that alcoholism (Ajayi & Soyinka-​ Airewele, 2018; Kimuna & Djamba, 2008; Shamu et al. 2011; Tumwesigye et al., 2012), patriarchy (Asiedu, 2016), and women’s economic independence (Ogland et al., 2014; Oyediran, 2016) were triggers of violence. A further examination of the synthesized studies reveals interesting patterns. The most frequently reported IPV types were physical and sexual or a combination of both. The high prevalence of IPV was bolstered by patriarchy (Asiedu, 2016), rationalization, and/​or justification (Heise & Kotsadam, 2015; Hindin, 2003; Kimuna et al., 2018), and a discourse of entitlement and blame projection by perpetrators (Adjei, 2018). Heise and Kotsadam (2015) found macrolevel measures of socioeconomic development, women’s status, gender inequality, gender-​ related norms, and gender-​related factors at the national and subnational levels were associated with the population prevalence of physical and sexual partner violence. Next, the prevalence estimates from the DHS data of 39 African countries are described.

Results from the Demographic and Health Surveys (2005–​2020) Table 10.2 presents prevalence levels by African region in percentages of physical, sexual, and emotional violence against ever-​married or partnered women by their current and former husbands or partners. In Eastern Africa, the prevalence estimates for physical and sexual violence were lowest in the Comoros and highest in Burundi, ranging from almost 2 percent to 42 percent. Emotional and psychological violence was highest in Uganda at 41 percent; Tanzania and Kenya followed at 37 percent and 32 percent, respectively. In comparison to all other African regions shown in Table 10.2, prevalence levels of physical violence reported in Central African countries were quite high, with estimates above 26 percent. The highest rates of physical and emotional/​psychological violence were reported in Equatorial Guinea, at 54 percent and 48 percent, respectively. Physical violence in Gabon was 46 percent; in the Democratic Republic of Congo, physical violence was at 46 percent and emotional/​psychological violence, at 37 percent; and in Cameroon, physical violence was at 34 percent and emotional violence, at 29 percent. The highest rate of sexual violence was reported in the Democratic Republic of Congo, at 26 percent. Other relatively high rates of sexual violence were reported in Equatorial Guinea, at 17 percent; Gabon 17 percent; and Cameroon and Chad, at 10 percent each. In Northern Africa, only Egypt had eligible DHS data on the domestic violence module. Physical violence was the most common, at 25 percent. The sexual violence estimate was low, at 4 percent; and 19 percent reported ever experiencing some form of emotional/​psychological violence perpetrated by their husbands or partners.

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    179 Table 10.2. Prevalence of Physical, Sexual, and Emotional IPV among Ever-​Married/​Partnered Women Aged 15–​49 Years in Selected African Countries

African Countries by Region

Physical Violence Sexual Violence Prevalence, % Prevalence, %

Emotional/​ Psychological Violence Prevalence, %

41.6

25.6

Eastern Africa Burundi (2016–​2017 DHS)

27.2

Comoros (2012 DHS)

5.6

1.8

8.1

Ethiopia (2016 DHS)

23.5

10.1

24.0

Kenya (2014 DHS)

36.9

13.3

32.4

†

†

†

Rwanda (2019–​2020 DHS)

27.0

12.0

27.0

Tanzania (2015–​2016 DHS)

39.3

13.6

35.9

Uganda (2016 DHS)

40.1

22.9

41.1

Cameroon (2018 DHS)

34.0

10.0

29.0

Chad (2014–​2015 DHS)

26.4

10.0

24.1

Madagascar (2008–​2009 DHS)

Central Africa Region

§

§

§

Dem. Republic of Congo (2013–​2014 DHS)

45.9

25.5

36.6

Equatorial Guinea (2011 DHS)

54.4

17.4

48.0

Gabon (2012 DHS)

46.2

17.0

35.1

Sao Tome and Principe (2008–​2009 DHS)

26.5

8.3

23.2

25.2

4.1

18.8

33.0

8.0

28.0

¥

¥

¥

Malawi (2015–​2016 DHS)

25.9

19.2

29.5

Mozambique♣ (2015 DHS)

18.6

6.3

14.9

Namibia (2013 DHS)

23.4

7.6

25.0

South Africa* (2016 DHS)

20.6

6.2

17.1

Congo, Brazzaville (2011–​2012 DHS)

Northern Africa Egypt (2014 DHS) Southern Africa Angola (2015–​2016 DHS) Lesotho (2014 DHS)

€

€

€

Zambia (2018 DHS)

36.6

14.8

31.1

Zimbabwe (2015 DHS)

30.7

12.7

31.5

20.7

9.6

37.6

Swaziland (Eswatini 2006–​2007 DHS)

Western Africa Benin (2017–​2018 DHS)

(continued)

180    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa Table 10.2. Continued Emotional/​ Psychological Violence Prevalence, %

African Countries by Region

Physical Violence Sexual Violence Prevalence, % Prevalence, %

Burkina Faso (2010 DHS)

11.1

1.5

9.3

Cape Verde (2005 DHS)

16.0

4.0

14.1

Cote d’Ivoire (2011–​2012 DHS)

24.5

5.3

18.3

Gambia (2019–​2020 DHS)

29.1

5.5

24.0

£

£

£

Ghana (2014 DHS)

♣

♣

♣

Liberia (2019–​2020 DHS)

44.8

8.1

41.8

Mali (2018 DHS)

36.8

11.8

38.4

ϕ

ϕ

ϕ

Nigeria (2018 DHS)

19.2

7.0

31.2

Senegal (2018 DHS)

ǂ

ǂ

ǂ

Sierra Leone (2019 DHS)

49.8

8.1

45.9

Togo (2013–​2014 DHS)

20.2

7.5

29.7

Guinea (2018 DHS)

Niger (2012 DHS)

†  Madagascar’s (2008–​2009 DHS) data collected information on attitudes toward wife-​beating, which assessed the reasons for justifying wife abuse. Among the 32% of women who believe that a man has the right to beat his wife/​partner, the most-​cited reasons to justify wife-​beating were neglecting children (28%); going out without informing the husband/​partner (19%), and refusing the husband/​ partner sexual intercourse, which varied significantly by region, ranging from 2% to 20%. §  Congo, Brazzaville (2011–​2012 DHS) data provide information on the status of women and attitudes toward the justification of IPV. For 73% of women, a man has the right to beat his wife/​ partner. Frequently cited reasons include disrespecting the husband/​partner (58%), being unfaithful (50%), disrespecting the husband/​partner’s family (48%), neglecting children (47%), and denying the husband/​partner sexual intercourse (26%). ¥  Lesotho’s DHS data on the empowerment module collected information on attitudes of wife-​ beating, which assessed the reasons for justifying wife abuse. Thirty-​three percent of women believe that a husband’s beating his wife/​partner is justified in at least one specified category. The most cited reasons were arguing with husband/​partner (24.6%) and neglecting children (22%). ♣  Mozambique’s (2015 DHS) sample is women aged 18–​49 years. *  South Africa (2016 DHS) sample is women aged 18–​49 years. €  Swaziland (Eswatini 2006–​2007 DHS) data from the women’s empowerment module provides information on attitudes toward the justification of IPV. Approximately 38% believe that a husband is justified in beating his wife/​partner. The most-​cited reasons were being unfaithful/​sleeping with other men (32.7%), arguing with husband/​partner (17.1%), neglecting children (11.1%), and going out without telling husband (9.2%). £  Ghana (2014 DHS) data from the women’s empowerment module provide information on attitudes toward justification of IPV. Twenty-​eight percent of women aged 15–​49 years who agree that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife/​partner for specific reasons cited neglecting children (21%), going out without telling husband/​partner (17%), arguing with husband/​partner (16%) and refusing to have sexual intercourse with husband/​partner (12%).

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    181 Table 10.2. Continued ♣  Guinea (2018 DHS) data from the women-​empowerment module were collected on the opinions about wife-​beating. Of the 67% of women aged 15–​49 years who believe that wife-​beating is justified, nearly 54% cited going out without informing the husband/​partner; 52% cited neglecting children; 49% cited arguing with husband/​partner; almost 48% cited refusing to have sexual intercourse with husband/​partner; and nearly 24% cited burning food. ϕ  Niger (2012 DHS) data were collected on women’s opinions about wife-​beating. Nearly 60% of women aged 15–​49 years believe that for at least one of the reasons cited, a man is justified in beating his wife. The most frequently cited reasons in order of prevalence are arguing with the husband/​ partner (50.4%), refusing to have sexual relations with the husband/​partner (50.1%), going out without informing the husband/​partner (42.7%), neglecting children (42.0%), and burning food (34.6%). ǂ  Senegal (2018 DHS) data were collected on the knowledge and prevalence of female circumcision. Overall, 92% of women aged 15–​49 years had knowledge of female circumcision and 23% were circumcised.

In Southern Africa, the prevalence estimates of ever-​married/​partnered women aged 15 to 49 years who reported ever experiencing physical violence were highest in Zambia at 37 percent. Angola, at 33 percent, had the next highest rate, followed by Zimbabwe at 31 percent, and Malawi at 26 percent. The rest of the countries in the region reported lower prevalence estimates, at below 23 percent. The prevalence levels for sexual violence range from 6 percent to 19 percent. In South Africa it was 6 percent; Mozambique, 6 percent; Namibia, 8 percent; Angola, 8 percent; Zimbabwe, 13 percent; Zambia, 15 percent; and Malawi, 19 percent. Meanwhile, estimates for emotional/​psychological violence were high for all countries in the region, ranging from 15 percent to 32 percent. In Western Africa, the prevalence estimates of ever-​married/​partnered women aged 15 to 49 years who reported ever experiencing physical violence and emotional/​psychological violence were highest in Sierra Leone, at 50 percent and 46 percent, respectively. The next highest prevalence levels were reported in Liberia, 45 percent and 42 percent, respectively. Mali had the highest prevalence estimates of sexual violence at 12 percent, and respectively 37 percent and 38 percent reported being victims of physical violence and emotional/​psychological violence.

Combined Prevalence Estimates of IPV Table 10.3 shows the combined prevalence estimates for physical, sexual and emotional/​ psychological violence and levels of violence during pregnancy for selected African countries based on eligible 2005–​2021 DHS data on ever-​married women aged 15 to 49 years. The combined prevalence levels show a broader picture of the proportions of women subjected to violence. Nonetheless, the proportions do not represent the full extent of violence that women experience.

182    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa Table 10.3. Combined Prevalence Estimates of IPV for African Regions with Eligible 2005–​2021 DHS Data for Ever-​Married/​Partnered Women Aged 15–​49 Years

African Region

Physical Violence and/​or Sexual Violence Prevalence, %*

Physical, Sexual, and/​or Emotional/​Psychological Violence Prevalence, %*

Eastern Africa

36.1

41.8

7.1

Central Africa

41.5

48.6

10.1

Northern Africa

25.6

30.3

6.6

Southern Africa

29.1

36.3

5.0

Western Africa

28.6

38.5

6.0

Physical Violence during Pregnancy Prevalence, %*

*  Aggregated average calculated from African countries with eligible data.

The aggregated average proportions for the different African regions show, again, that ever-​married/​partnered women in Central African countries experienced physical and/​or sexual violence at 42 percent; 49 percent suffered from one and/​or all listed forms of IPV, and 10 percent experienced physical violence while they were pregnant. Eastern Africa followed with the second highest IPV levels, at 36 percent of ever-​ married/​partnered women experiencing physical and/​or sexual violence, 42 percent experiencing one and/​or all types of violence and 7 percent reported suffering from physical violence during pregnancy. Aggregated average proportions in Northern Africa, Southern Africa, and Western Africa showed that less than 30 percent of women reported experiencing one or both physical and sexual violence, less than 40 percent experienced one or all forms of IPV; and less than 7 percent suffered from physical violence while pregnant. IPV during pregnancy not only harms women by jeopardizing their health and survival, but also puts women at an increased risk of miscarriage, stillbirth, pre-​term delivery, and low-​ birth-​weight babies (WHO, 2005, 2013), endangering the survival of their unborn babies. These are not the only effects of violence; and other types are detailed in the consequences of IPV section.

Consequences of IPV It is particularly difficult to respond effectively to IPV because many women accept it as “normal.” Adjei (2018) analyzed qualitative data collected from semistructured focus groups and personal interviews in the Ashanti and greater Accra regions in Ghana to assess the justifications of IPV used by victims and perpetrators. Findings

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    183 showed that both victims and perpetrators rationalized IPV as socially expected. In addition, a discourse of entitlement and blame projecting emerged among perpetrators. Reviewed studies reveal other factors that impede the total elimination of IPV, including institutionalized cultural factors such as harmful traditional practices, as well as legal, educational, economic, and political factors (Sardinha & Catalán, 2018; Tenkorang et al., 2013; Uthman et al., 2009), which should essentially be considered the most challenging. Sardinha and Catalán (2018) used data drawn from several sources, including 49 DHS conducted between 2005 and 2017, United Nations Statistics, and topic-​specific metadatabases to assess country-​level predictors of justification of domestic violence (DV). The results suggested that women were more likely to justify DV in Sub-​Saharan Africa and South(east) Asia where there is widespread societal acceptance of DV. Further, political conflict and limited economic rights for women were associated with higher levels of DV acceptance. The findings reify the notion that in most African countries, husbands have implicit moral rights and obligations to punish their wives for disobedience and other frivolous infractions against male authority in marriage (Adjei, 2018; Lawoko, 2008; Mugoya et al., 2015). For example, Lawoko’s (2008) study used 2003 Kenya DHS and 2001–​2002 Zambia DHS to examine attitudes toward justifying IPV and women’s autonomy. They found that 71 percent of men in Zambia and 68 percent of men in Kenya justified IPV to punish a woman for transgression from normative domestic roles. Mugoya and colleagues (2015) analyzed data from the 2008–​2009 Kenya DHS to explore the association between IPV and reported victimization among women and women’s perceptions of IPV. Similarly, their study reaffirmed the high correlation between sociocultural factors and IPV. The prevailing discourse that institutes the idea of positioning husband/​partner-​to-​ wife-​violence as normal, legitimate, disciplinary, and corrective is linked to traditional African patriarchal norms that determine the gender power structure. The patriarchal norms (Ajayi & Soyinka-​Airewele, 2018) invariably give the husband/​partner the liberty to violate and batter a wife if he feels she has failed to fulfill her obligations to him or on some other pretext. These powerful cultural practices hinder the eradication of IPV and make it difficult to eliminate the harm and suffering of victims, families, and communities. Nonetheless, violence against women has a far deeper impact than the immediate harm it causes. It has devastating consequences for the women who experience it and a traumatic effect on those who witness it, particularly children. Studies have shown that women who experience violence during pregnancy are at risk of preterm births and low-​birth-​weight babies. Berhanie and colleagues (2019) analyzed data from a sample of 954 mothers who visited four zonal hospitals in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. They found that almost 69 percent had been exposed to IPV and 41 percent had experienced IPV during pregnancy. Being exposed to and experiencing IPV during pregnancy has negative reproductive and maternal health outcomes, such as lower use of contraception and high fertility

184    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa (Kishor & Johnson, 2004), terminated pregnancies (Pallitto et al., 2013), and infant mortality (Emenike et al., 2008; WHO, 2005, 2013). Further, women who believe that a husband or partner is justified in hitting or beating his wife or partner for any reason at all may believe in the notion that they have low status, both absolutely and relative to men, which could lead to alcohol and drug abuse. In addition, the perception of low status and helplessness could act as a barrier to their accessing healthcare for themselves and their children and could have an impact on their general well-​being (Mayeya et al., 2004) leading to episodes of anxiety and incidences of mental disorders (Gass et al., 2011). There is also a growing awareness of the links between IPV and a range of sexual health problems, such as sexually transmitted infections, including HIV (Jewkes et al., 2010; WHO, 2013). Women who experience IPV are one-​and-​a-​half times more likely to have a sexually transmitted infection, and in some cases HIV, compared to women who had not experienced partner violence. Also, women with abusive and/​or controlling husbands or partners live in fear of violence, and thus may be unable to negotiate safe sex, which exposes them to an increased risk of HIV infection. Dunkle and colleagues (2004) analyzed data from a sample of 1366 women who attended antenatal care clinics in Soweto, South Africa, between November 2001 and April 2002 to assess experiences of GBV and risk behaviors including HIV. They found a significant association between IPV and HIV seropositivity. Additionally, the Durevall and Lindskog (2015) study used data from 12 DHS surveys (2004–​2011) in 10 Sub-​Saharan African countries to examine the relationship between the role of male controlling behavior and IPV. Findings showed that IPV was associated with HIV infection in women and that male controlling behavior put women at risk. Using data compiled from 10 electronic databases and reference lists, Kouyoumdjian and colleagues (2013) completed a systematic review of studies on IPV and HIV correlation. Their results revealed that people living with HIV had experienced several types of IPV. It is within this gender imbalance and unequal distribution of rights in African countries that IPV and the increased risk of HIV coexist. Furthermore, the health, economic, and social impacts of IPV are enormous and have ripple effects throughout society. The consequences can last for years. For instance, women may suffer isolation, inability to work, loss of wages, lack of participation in regular activities and limited ability to care for themselves and their children. Cases of women who have been injured or murdered by their current or former husband or partner abound in African countries. A star athlete in Kenya was recently murdered by her husband (Africa News, 2021), and though this was just one death at the hands of a husband/​partner in Africa, there are numerous others. In 2017, 69 percent of women in Africa who were murdered were killed by their current or former husband or partner (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018). In other incidents women have been left maimed. For instance, a 22-​year-​old woman’s legs were cut off and her hands deeply cut by her former husband/​partner (Ochunge, 2021). Such incidents leave not only permanent scars, but also profound physical pain and the psychosocial health outcomes that battered women endure.

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    185

Sociological Significance of Gender-​ based Violence in Africa GBV is intricately linked to other social problems examined across disciplines, hence the sociological significance of GBV in Africa. For instance, IPV is a clear indicator of inequality—​in some African countries more than 50 percent of women report experiencing physical violence (Table 10.2). Scholars have used the term “wife-​beating” in making a case against patriarchy, and some of the studies synthesized in this chapter detail the role of patriarchy in impeding the total elimination of IPV, often citing institutionalized cultural factors, such as harmful traditional practices. Determining the sociological significance of GBV in Africa lies in the appropriate theoretical frameworks as well as methodological techniques that capture the complexities of each African country. Researchers studying GBV in Africa often use quantitative methods, especially the CTS surveys, which ignore the nuances of GBV. Although quantitative studies can document the existence and prevalence of GBV, they often fail to explain how gender inequality is extended and maintained. Thus the investigation of GBV requires the use of qualitative studies that would tease out nuances by examining the function of violence in intimate relationships and how violence preserves and extends gender inequalities in the African context. There is the need for scholars studying IPV in Africa to use theoretical frameworks that consider the complexities found in African countries.

Conclusion As human beings, we are primed to want the same things: good health, well-​being, and to live in a just and fair society. Too often, women live in fear and distrust of their intimate partners, which impedes progress toward the goals of good health and well-​ being. African countries must acknowledge the harms that have been inflicted on some women and girls by their intimate partners, family members, communities, and society. The review of the articles and DHS data here has revealed that gender-​related and cultural factors at the country and regional levels influence IPV. These factors include patriarchal norms related to male authority over female behavior, norms that justify wife-​beating, and practices that disadvantage women by denying or severely limiting access to land, property, and other productive resources. These factors are not exhaustive. Regional conventions over the last 30 years have made strong calls for the elimination of violence against women (WHO, 2018), and the international human rights law is clear: countries have a duty to exercise due diligence to prevent, prosecute, and punish violence against women.

186    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa In 2003 African countries jointly adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights of Women in Africa, better known as the Maputo Protocol. It went into effect in 2005. It is the main legal instrument for the protection of the rights of women and girls in Africa. Article 14 of the Maputo Protocol guarantees women’s right to health, including sexual and reproductive health (African Union, 2021; News and Insights, 2021). According to Solidarity for the African Women’s Rights, 42 of the 55 African countries have ratified the Maputo Protocol and 13 countries have not yet signed the treaty (Solidarity for Africa Women’s Rights, 2021). Ratifying and incorporating the Protocol into domestic laws would ensure that the issues disproportionately affecting women are addressed and at the same time meet international standards of fundamental human rights. Nonetheless, the countries that have ratified the Maputo Protocol are significant works-​in-​progress when it comes to in implementing the rights enshrined within the Protocol. It is acknowledged that the call for laws to curb domestic violence has culminated in an increase in the number of countries with laws and policies aimed at responding to and preventing violence against women (World Bank, 2020). However, the prevalence estimates recorded in this chapter show that violence against women persists at unacceptably high levels. This is because most of the laws that have been enacted in African countries are ineffective, and are quite often trumped by the adherence of ethnic groups to traditional norms that supersede the these laws in certain matters. The countries that have passed laws to criminalize domestic violence often lack the manpower and funding to implement them. What is the way forward? The chapter has presented the variations in the magnitude and direction of factors associated with IPV across African countries, suggesting a need to tailor interventions to the conditions in each country. One path toward alleviating the IPV scourge in Africa is to increase awareness of the issue through research and education, and to work with government entities to develop and implement anti-​GBV policies that are effective and with social agencies to provide services to victims, including educational information and dissemination. UN Women is working hard to put gender equality at the forefront and encourage continued activism to end GBV altogether. Until the time when women and girls can enjoy gender equality, efforts to focus on primary prevention that seeks to change social norms among men and women related to GBV are critical in addressing IPV. These efforts should also include questions that examine the future role of men and women within households and communities using a mixed-​ methods approach to tease out the individual country nuances that pertain to gender-​ related and cultural factors. The prevalence estimates reported in this chapter might be even higher. It is important to keep the likelihood of underreporting in mind when interpreting the overall level of IPV and the differentials in the rates of violence described here. While the contents of the DHS domestic violence module and the procedures for its administration were designed to facilitate women’s reporting of abuse, it is still likely that there was some underreporting based on variations in the respondent’s demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Ideally, the multidimensional

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    187 estimate of IPV could ultimately assist African governments in developing multisectoral responses as a step toward fulfilling their obligations to eliminate the scourge.

Acronyms AIDS

Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome

CEDAW

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CTS

Conflict Tactics Scales

DHS

Demographic and Health Surveys

DV

Domestic violence

GBV

Gender-​based violence

HIV

Human immunodeficiency virus

IPV

Intimate partner violence

SOAWR

Solidarity for the African Women’s Rights

References Abeya, S. G., Afework, M. F., & Yalew, A. W. (2012). Intimate partner violence against women in West Ethiopia: A qualitative study on attitudes, woman’s response and suggested measures as perceived by community members. Reproductive Health, 9(1), 14. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​ 1742-​4755-​9-​14 Adjei, S. B. (2018). “Correcting an erring wife is normal”: Moral discourses of spousal violence in Ghana. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 33, 1871–​1892. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​08862​6051​ 5619​751 Africa News. (2021, October 13). Olympian Agnes Tirop dies at age 25. https://​www.afr​ican​ews​ .com/​2021/​10/​13/​olymp​ian-​agnes-​tirop-​dies-​at-​age-​25/​ African Union. (2021, July 28). Maputo Protocol scorecard and index: A stepping stone towards achieving women’s rights. https://​au.int/​en/​artic​les/​map​uto-​proto​col-​scorec​ard-​index​ -stepp​ing-​stone-​towa​rds-​achiev​ing-​wom​ens-​rig​hts. Ajayi, L. A., & Soyinka-​Airewele, P. (2018). Key triggers of domestic violence in Ghana: A victim-​centered analysis. African Population Studies, 32, 4097–​4108. https://​doi.org/​ 10.11564/​32-​1-​1181 Amoakohene, I. M. (2004). Violence against women in Ghana: A look at women’s perceptions and review of policy and social responses. Social Science & Medicine, 59, 2373–​2385. https://​ doi.org/​10.1016/​j.socsci​med.2004.04.001 Asiedu, C. (2016). Lineage ties and domestic violence in Ghana: Evidence from the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey. Journal of Family Issues, 37, 2351–​2367. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1177/​01925​13X1​4561​523

188    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa Berhanie, E., Gebregziabher, D., Berihu, H., Gerezgiher, A., & Kidane, G. (2019). Intimate partner violence during pregnancy and adverse birth outcomes: A case-​control study. Reproductive Health, 16(1), 22. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​978-​019-​0670-​4 Black, B. M., Weisz, A. N., & Bernett, L. W. (2010). Graduating social work students’ perspectives on domestic violence. Journal of Women and Social Work, 25, 173–​184. https://​ doi.org/​10.1177/​08861​0991​0364​824 Bowman, C. G. (2003). Theories of domestic violence in the African context. Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 11, 847–​863. https://​dig​ital​comm​ons.wcl.ameri​can.edu/​cgi/​view​ cont​ent.cgi?arti​cle=​1411&cont​ext=​jgspl Caldwell, J. C. (1982). A theory of fertility decline. Academic Press. Coker-​Appiah, D., & Cusack, K. (1999). Breaking the silence and challenging the myths of violence against women and children in Ghana: Report of a national study on violence. Gender Studies and Human Rights Centre. Dienye, P. O., & Gbeneol, P. K. (2009). Domestic violence against men in primary care in Nigeria. American Journal of Men’s Health, 3, 333–​339. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​15579​8830​ 8325​461 Dunkle, K. L., Jewkes, R. K., Brown, H. C., Gray, G. E., McIntryre, J. A., & Harlow, S. D. (2004). Gender based violence, relationship power and risk of HIV infection in women attending antenatal clinics in South Africa. Lancet, 363, 1415–​1421. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​ S0140-​6736(04)16098-​4 Durevall, D., & Lindskog, A. (2015). Intimate partner violence and HIV in ten sub-​Saharan African countries: What do the demographic and health surveys tell us? Lancet Global Health, 3, e34–​43. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S2214-​109X(14)70343-​2 Ellsberg, M., Heise, L., Pena, R., Agurto, S., & Winkvist, A. (2001). Researching domestic violence against women: Methodological and ethical considerations. Studies in Family Planning, 32, 1–​16. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1728-​4465.2001.00001.x Emenike, E., Lawoko, S., & Dalal, K. (2008). Intimate partner violence and reproductive health of women in Kenya. International Nursing Review, 55, 97–​102. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ j.1466-​7657.2007.00580.x Garcia-​Moreno, C. (2002) Dilemmas and opportunity for an appropriate health service response to violence against women. Lancet, 359, 1509–​1514. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​ S0140-​6736(02)08417-​9 Gass, J. D., Stein, D. J., Williams, D. R., & Seedat, S. (2011). Gender differences in risk for intimate partner violence among South African adults. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 26, 2764–​2789. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​08862​6051​0390​960 Godin, M. (2020, March 18). As cities around the world go on lockdown, victims of domestic violence look for a way out. Time. https://​time.com/​5803​887/​coro​navi​rus-​domes​tic-​viole​ nce-​vict​ims/​ Heise L. L., & Kotsadam A. (2015). Cross-​national and multilevel correlates of partner violence: An analysis of data from population-​based surveys. Lancet Global Health, 3, e332–​340. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S2214-​109X(15)00013-​3 Hindin, M. J. (2003). Understanding women’s attitudes toward wife beating in Zimbabwe. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 81, 501–​508. https://​apps.who.int/​iris/​han​dle/​ 10665/​268​991 Jewkes, R. (2002). Intimate partner violence: Causes and prevention. Lancet, 359, 1423–​1429. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0140-​6736(02)08357-​5

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    189 Jewkes, R. K, Dunkle, K., Nduna, M., & Shai, N. (2010). Intimate partner violence, relationship power inequity and incidence of HIV infection in young women in South Africa: A cohort study. Lancet, 376, 41–​48. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0140-​6736(10)60548-​X Kazaura, M., Ezekiel, M., Chitama, D., & Mlang’a, E. (2015). Gender equitable men’s attitudes and beliefs to reduce HIV risk and gender-​based violence in Tanzania. Tanzania Journal of Health Research, 17(1), 1–​10. Kimuna, S. R., & Djamba, Y. K. (2008). Gender based violence: Correlates of physical and sexual wife abuse in Kenya. Journal of Family Violence, 23, 333–​342. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​ s10​896-​008-​9156-​9 Kimuna, S. R., Tenkorang, E. Y., & Djamba, Y. (2018). Ethnicity and intimate partner violence in Kenya. Journal of Family Issues, 39, 2958–​2981. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​01925​13X1​8766​192 Kishor, S., & Johnson, K. (2004). Profiling domestic violence: A multi-​country study. ORC Macro. https://​dhs​prog​ram.com/​pubs/​pdf/​od31/​od31.pdf Koenig, M. A., Lutalo, T., Zhao, F., Nalugoda, F., Wabwire-​Mangen, F., Kiwanuka, N., Wagman, J., Serwadda, D., Wawer, M., & Gray, R. (2003). Domestic violence in rural Uganda: Evidence from a community-​based study. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 81, 53–​60. https://​ apps.who.int/​iris/​han​dle/​10665/​268​798 Kouyoumdjian, F. G., Calzavara, L. M., Bondy, S. J., O’Campo, P., Serwadda, D., Nalugoda, F., Kaqaayi, J., Kigozi, G., Wawer, M., & Gray, R. (2013). Risk factors for intimate partner violence in women in the Rakai Community Cohort Study, Uganda, from 2000 to 2009. BMC Public Health, 13, 566. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​1471-​2458-​13-​566 Lawoko, S. (2008). Predictors of attitudes towards intimate partner violence: A comparative study of men in Zambia and Kenya. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 23, 1056–​1074. https://​ doi.org/​10.1177/​08862​6050​7313​972 Lawoko, S., Dalaln, K., Jiayou, L., & Jansson, B. (2007). Social inequalities in intimate partner violence: A study of women in Kenya. Violence & Victims, 22, 773–​784. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1891/​088​6670​0778​2793​101 Mann, J. R., & Takyi, B. K. (2009). Autonomy, dependence or culture: Examining the impact of resources and socio-​cultural processes on attitudes towards intimate partner violence in Ghana, Africa. Journal of Family Violence, 24, 323–​335. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​ 896-​009-​9232-​9 Mayeya, J., Chazulwa, R., Mayeya, P., Mbewe, E., Magolo, L. M. M., Kasisi, F., & Bowa, A. (2004). Zambia mental health country profile. International Review Psychiatry, 16, 63–​72. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09540​2603​1000​1635​113 McCloskey, L. A., Williams, C., & Larsen, U. (2005). Gender inequality and intimate partner violence among women in Moshi, Tanzania. International Family Planning Perspectives, 31, 124–​130. https://​doi.org/​10.1363/​ifpp.31.124.05 Mugoya, G. C. T., Witte, T. H., & Ernst, K. C. (2015). Sociocultural and victimization factors that impact attitudes toward intimate partner violence among Kenyan women. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 30, 2851–​2871. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​08862​6051​4554​287 News and Insights. 2021. The Maputo Protocol turns 18 today. But what does this mean for women and girls in Africa? https://​www.equa​lity​now.org/​news_​a​nd_​i​nsig​hts/​maput​o_​pr​ otoc​ol_​t​urns​_​18/​ Ochunge, N. (2021, November 3). Man suspected of chopping off wife’s hands after quarrel. The Standard. https://​www.standa​rdme​dia.co.ke/​west​ern/​arti​cle/​200​1428​072/​man-​suspec​ted​ -of-​chopp​ing-​off-​wifes-​hands-​after-​quar​rel

190    Sitawa R. Kimuna and Pacificah F. Okemwa Ogland, E. G., Xu, X., Bartkowski, J. P., & Ogland, C. P. (2014). Intimate partner violence against married women in Uganda. Journal of Family Violence, 29, 869–​879. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​ s10​896-​014-​9640-​3 Oyediran, K. A. (2016). Explaining trends and patterns in attitudes towards wife-​beating among women in Nigeria: Analysis of 2003, 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data. Genus, 72:11. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s41​118-​016-​0016-​9 Pallitto, C., García-​Moreno, C., Jansen, H. A. F. M., Heise, L., Ellsberg, M., & Watts, C. (2013). Intimate partner violence, abortion, and unintended pregnancy: Results from the WHO Multi-​country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence. International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics, 120, 3–​9. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.ijgo.2012.07.003 Sardinha L., & Catalán, H. E. N. (2018). Attitudes towards domestic violence in 49 low-​and middle-​income countries: A gendered analysis of prevalence and country-​level correlates. PLoS ONE, 13(10), e0206101. https://​doi.org/​10.1371/​jour​nal.pone.0206​101.t003 Shamu, S., Abrahams, N., Temmerman, M., Musekiwa, A., & Zarowsky, C. (2011). A systematic review of African studies on intimate partner violence against pregnant women: Prevalence and risk factors. PLoS ONE, 6(3), e17591. https://​doi.org/​10.1371/​jour​nal.pone.0017​591 Straus, M. A. (1990). The Conflict Tactics Scale and its critics: An evaluation and new data on validity and reliability. In M. A. Straus & R. J. Gelles (Eds.), Physical violence in American families: Risk factors and adaptations to violence in 8,145 families (pp. 49–​73). Transaction. Straus, M. A., Hamby, S. L., Boney-​McCoy, S., & Sugarman, D. B. (1996). The revised Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS2). Journal of Family Issues, 17, 283–​316. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​019​2513​ 9601​7003​001 Solidarity for Africa Women’s Rights. (2021). Protocol Watch. https://​soawr.org/​proto​ col-​watch/​ Takyi, B. K., & Dodoo, F. N.-​A. (2005). Gender, lineage and fertility-​related outcomes in Ghana. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 67, 251–​ 257. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ j.0022-​2445.2005.00019.x Tenkorang, Y. E., Owusu, A. Y., Yeboah, E. H., & Bannerman, R. (2013). Factors influencing domestic and marital violence against women in Ghana. Journal of Family Violence, 28, 771–​ 781. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​896-​013-​9543-​8 Tumwesigye, N. M., Kyomuhendo, G. B., Greenfield, T. K., & Wanyenze, R. K. (2012). Problem drinking and physical intimate partner violence against women: Evidence from a national survey in Uganda. BMC Public Health, 12, 399. http://​www.biomed​cent​ral.com/​1471-​2458/​ 12/​399 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2018). Global Study on Homicide: Gender-​Related Killing of Women and Girls. https://​www.unodc.org/​docume​nts/​data-​and-​analy​sis/​GSH2​ 018/​GSH18​_​Gen​der-​related​_​kil​ling​_​of_​wome​n_​an​d_​gi​rls.pdf UN Women. (n.d.). In focus: 16 days of activism against gender-​based violence. https://​www​ .unwo​men.org/​en/​news/​in-​focus/​end-​viole​nce-​agai​nst-​women Uthman O. A., Lawoko S., & Moradi T. (2009). Factors associated with attitudes towards intimate partner violence against women: A comparative analysis of 17 Sub-​Saharan countries. BMC International Health Human Rights, 9, 14. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​1472-​698X-​9-​14 Women’s Aid. (2020, March 17). The impact of COVID-​19 on women and children experiencing domestic abuse and the life-​saving services that support them. https://​www.womens​aid.org​ .uk/​the-​imp​act-​of-​covid-​19-​on-​women-​and-​child​ren-​exper​ienc​ing-​domes​tic-​abuse-​and​ -the-​life-​sav​ing-​servi​ces-​that-​supp​ort-​them/​

Prevalence and Consequences of Gender-Based Violence    191 World Bank. (2020). Women, business and the law 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://​ wbl.worldb​ank.org/​en/​wbl World Health Organization. (2005). WHO multi-​country study on women’s health and domestic violence against women: Summary report of initial results on prevalence, health outcomes and women’s responses. https://​apps.who.int/​iris/​han​dle/​10665/​43310 World Health Organization. (2013). Global and regional estimates of violence against women: Prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and non-​partner sexual violence. https://​apps.who.int/​iris/​han​dle/​10665/​85239 World Health Organization. (2018). Violence against women prevalence estimates 2018: Global, regional and national prevalence estimates for intimate partner violence against women [Executive summary]. https://​www.who.int/​publi​cati​ons/​i/​item/​978924​0022​256 Xue, J., Chen, J., Chen, C., Hu, R., & Zhu, T. (2020). The hidden pandemic of family violence during COVID-​19: Unsupervised learning of tweets. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 22(11), e24361. https://​doi.org/​10.2196/​24361

IV

M E DIC A L S O C IOL O G Y

Chapter 11

M edical So c i ol o g y in Afri c a Understanding Health, Illness, and Healing TỌ́l á Olú Pearce

Introduction After Africa gained independence from colonial rule, academics were encouraged by their new governments to produce knowledge and programs to help develop and “modernize” their nations (Escobar, 1995; Pearce, 2021). Medical sociology was part of this “development” project. To understand the concerns of scholars at that time, it is necessary to situate the continent within its historical and global context. As each nation sought independence, no dimension of African life drew as much attention to the urgency of “development” as the problem of health and disease. For decades, missionaries, medical personnel, explorers, and administrators had produced reports that defined Africa as a sick region, “the dark continent,” burdened by ignorance, strange customs, dangerous environments, and in need of civilizing. Many have critiqued these reports, including Butchart (1998), Comaroff (1993), and Vaughan (1991), who have exposed these negative constructions and shown how power is marshaled to create knowledge. Both Comaroff (1993) and Vaughan (1991) criticized racist constructions that depicted Africans and their healing systems as degenerate and evil, and ignored the physical suffering, emotional confusion, and social chaos brought on by imperial conquest, colonization, and the “civilizing mission” of Western nations. Both sociology and the subfield of medical sociology were introduced to Africa during colonization, and therefore several schools of thought were imported. Medical sociology in the United Kingdom focused on the training of physicians (sociology in medicine; Collett et al., 2016). In the United States more attention was paid to studying health systems as social systems and to critiquing medicine rather than being its handmaid (Freidson, 1970; Parsons, 1951; Zola, 1972). As medical sociologists turned their attention to Africa, both strands arrived with a conservative bent, with the United

196   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE Kingdom and Europe using Africa to develop tropical medicine to protect settlers and administrators. In the United States, Parsons (1966) and his colleagues studied health as an aspect of modernization arguing that development could only occur through the diffusion of Western institutions, including medical institutions. Fortunately, these mainstream arguments found plenty of critics in the West and in Africa (Amin, 1972; Ake, 1979; Frank, 1969; Navarro, 1974; Shenton & Watts, 1979; Waitzkin & Waterman, 1974). Therefore a competing, though secondary, perspective has always existed in medical sociology. Broadly speaking, the critique is a political economic one. It focuses on how economic power relations within and between societies “govern the distribution and use of resources, benefits, privileges and authority” (True, 2012, p. 7) to impact illness, health, and healing within each society and between nations. The four sections of this chapter cover these important areas of concern: (1) African contributions to analytical tools in medical sociology, (2) African healing systems, (3) epidemiological studies on the social determinants of health and disease, and (4) policy and health reforms.

African Contributions to Analytical Tools in Medical Sociology Concepts developed by Western scholars, such as the sick role (Parsons, 1951), professional dominance (Freidson, 1970), illness behavior (Mechanic, 1962), stigma (Goffman, 1963), and many others, are taught on the continent and used to understand developments in medical sociology (Amzat & Razum, 2014). These, however, are generally not the main focus of scholars in Africa, whose interest, by and large, has not been to domesticate European and American concepts and tools, although several of these have proven useful. Instead, there has been a determined effort to understand the African experience on its own terms and to generate relevant knowledge about health and disease in Africa. In addition, the late Akìwọwọ and others turned attention to the possibility of developing knowledge that would be useful to others outside Africa. Having rejected the idea that research in Africa should only serve to confirm Western concepts and theories, Akìwọwọ (Bengolea & Akìwọwọ, 1974) suggested that Indigenous knowledge should be added to the box of global survival tools. One important domain of this knowledge is that of health and healing systems. Since independence there has been a real concentration of research on African constructs of health and disease. The research reveals that African cultures had developed advanced theoretical perspectives on these issues.

Distinguishing Concepts and Perspectives Research in Africa indicates that Western conceptualizations of health, disease, and illness behavior are often not helpful in developing health projects and programs on

Medical Sociology in Africa     197 the continent. For instance, the Western construct of a “person” in Parson’s sick role is different from African constructions of a person because African communities are not seen as composed of autonomous, self-​managing, self-​contained individuals. The African person has been described as a “being-​in-​relation” (Awólalu, 1972), a node in a vast network with several layers, a thoroughgoing relational self. As Mbiti (1970) has shown, African precolonial philosophy with respect to persons was “I am because we are, and because we are therefore I am” (p. 141). I was attached to we, and people understood life to be cyclical. This cycle comprised the unborn (who could reincarnate within a family), living individuals (who possess a body, mind, and life force), and the dead (ancestors). An individual can pass through any of these levels, and those on each plane have rights and duties to those on other planes. Any disruption in the relationships between an individual and others on any of the planes could result in misfortune either for the individual or others. Disease was merely one example of misfortune. The focus was on imbalances, disruptions, rule-​breaking, or one’s obligations to others (Ngubane, 1976). The Yorùbá of Southwestern Nigeria believe that an individual is composed of the physical body (ara), the unconscious self (Ìpòrí, sometimes referred to as one’s destiny, selected before birth) and the conscious self (Orí-​Inú, the mental), and there is a spiritual guardian (Orí) that watches over the individual. The belief is that humans and all living things possess their share of the life force (ẹ̀mí) bestowed by the Supreme Being (Olódùmarè). The life force connects each individual to others, to the supernatural world, and to the life force of flora and fauna. The strength/​power of the life force in vegetation and animals is important for healing (Akìwọwọ, personal communication, 1983). Imbalance, tension, and conflict are not limited to relationships with others, Africans also recognize tensions arising within the individual that can lead to illness. One may have character tendencies that conflict with the dominant values or expectations of one’s community (Turner, 1967). Among the Yorùbá, for instance, tensions between the unconscious self and conscious self (Ìpòrí and Orí-​Inú) were and still are handled by consultations with diviners to align any imbalances. The belief in life forces was a gateway to understanding illness as also connected to our relationships with the nonhuman environment. Among the Zulu, for instance, humans are said to adjust to both the human and nonhuman forces around them. Changes such as migration require adjustment. As humans move about, they absorb things from the environment, but they also leave something behind when they move on. Humans are constantly upsetting the environment by introducing items that alter existing balances. These include waste products of healing techniques or even the disease itself (Ngubane, 1976). Today, this perspective goes to the heart of the debates over the use of chemical pesticides and herbicides or the disposal of industrial and medical waste. However, such theories originating within native communities would have been considered nonsensical by early explorers and settlers, prior to the development of the germ theory or knowledge of DNA. This approach to health situates the person within the totality of his or her environment: psychological, social, spiritual, and ecological. The person was never theorized as a bounded entity. This has caused problems in applying Western concepts and expectations of patient behavior. Piot (1999) notes in regard to African personhood: “This

198   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE diffuse, fluid self—​a self that is multiple and permeable and infused with the presence of others, both human and non-​human is not captured by much of Euroamerican social theory” (p. 19). He even suggests that the atomistic, self-​starting individual described in Western theory is the West’s misrepresentation of itself: “Westerners appear to me far less individualistic and self-​authoring than our ideology and our theories suggest” (p. 20). In critiquing this atomistic construct, Alubo (2008) argues that in refusing to take the holistic approach to personhood seriously, programs will continue to have less than optimum impact. Africans assume that to restore health, both physical and social problems must be addressed. Many today remain dissatisfied with the mere dispensing of drugs to combat illness. Impilo (“health” among the Xhosa) connotes a fullness of life in which the person is in harmony with the forces around him or her and a breakdown in any area weakens the individual. None of this is to suggest that communities have remained static in their understanding of disease and health. As new diseases emerged or ideas were exchanged through travel, conquest, and trade, changes occurred. In everyday life, we all participate in constructing and reconstructing social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Nonetheless, reality is constructed on foundations of accepted frameworks and worldviews. We see this, for example, with HIV/​AIDS. Across several countries including Nigeria, Ghana, Congo, and South Africa, HIV/​AIDS is often understood in terms of “social relations and personal malevolence” (Eaton, 2008, p. 321). As Alubo (2008) points out, African patients have not abandoned the holistic conceptualization of “the person,” and across the continent many “feel alienated by a treatment regime that does not reflect their conceptions of health and illness” (p. 2). As a result, elements of both Western and Indigenous therapies are often combined during a single disease episode. This is discussed further in the section, “African Healing Systems.” What is relevant here is that studies clearly indicate that theories developed abroad cannot be imported uncritically into other cultures. Furthermore, when taken seriously, African constructions and understanding of terms such as person, health, and disease add to the global pool of knowledge within medical sociology.

African Healing Systems It should come as no surprise, then, that local healing systems are widely used even when Western medical services are available. Between 60 percent and 80 percent of patients seek care from indigenous practitioners (Amegbor, 2017; Zuma et al., 2016). The use of these practitioners is well documented (Ademuwagun, 1979; Aikins, 2005; Babb et al., 2007; Chavunduka, 1986, 1994; Feierman 1985; Gyasi et al., 2015; Mothupi, 2014; Mureyi et al., 2012; Nxumalo et al., 2011). There is now a better understanding of practitioners’ knowledge base, organization of local practitioners, and their relationship to Western medical services. To date, several important arguments have been made.

Medical Sociology in Africa     199 First, on the scope of healing practices, African healing systems were pluralistic prior to their encounters with either Islamic or Western medicine (Ajima & Ubana, 2018; Baronov, 2008). The holistic perspective on health recognizes biopsychosocial and spiritual causes of ill-​health and had evolved techniques to handle all dimensions, often with the same practitioner working on more than one plane to effect healing. Thus, these systems were internally pluralistic prior to Western contact, although their biomedical knowledge based on observation, experimentation, prediction, and knowledge of botanical pharmacopeia was downplayed during colonization. Given this pluralistic framework, Baronov (2008) insists that these systems are unusually open and pragmatic, able to absorb elements of foreign systems without much ado. The foundational philosophy is not rooted in an either/​or model of life and does not erect barriers between the natural, social, and supernatural worlds (Baronoy, 2008). It uses a vast array of biophysical items, including herbs, oils, spices, minerals, animal parts, water, and instruments. There are recipes for self-​care (Amegbor, 2017), specialized care by healers (Adu-​ Gyumfi & Anderson, 2019), prevention (Pearce, 1995c), and cures (Janzen & Green, 2016). Today, there is increased interest in the “active” ingredients in these medicines as pharmaceutical companies and the public seek alternative remedies to Western drugs. Healers generally attempt to activate the “power” in medicaments “by calling down a measure of the universal powers (life force),” or relying on their own personal gods to assist (Adu-​Gyamfi & Anderson, 2019, p. 79). Second, at the core of healing is the attention to social relationships. In 1967, Turner noted that the healer undertakes a social analysis of the illness, locating the problem within configurations of tensions and conflicts in the patient’s psychosocial environment. Taking this one step further, Pearce (1986) suggests that with “this process of social analysis and in the treatment prescribed, the Indigenous healer’s model takes seriously the role of emotions and the place of emotionality in disease and recovery” (p. 252). Enlightenment thinking elevated rationality in the West and demoted the emotions. Now, however, the role of emotions, particularly those related to stress, is taken seriously. African healing systems were advanced in this regard, in recognizing those emotions that affect health and disease. Healers who are experts in rituals can arouse emotions and energy to allow the self-​healing power of the body to take over. Adu-​ Gyamfi and Anderson (2019) note that some African cultures (e.g., Bantu-​Bakongo) already recognized the body’s own self-​healing power, which the authors equate with biomedicine’s present understanding of the invisible immune system. As noted earlier, different ethnic groups theorized about the unconscious and conscious self. It can therefore be assumed that local rituals, group therapy, and other social healing practices highlight Africa’s theories about and use of emotions. The pluralism embedded in these systems also means that the fragmentation of treatment was traditionally minimized. Thirdly, sociological investigations into healing through the spiritual realm are not done to uncover the exotica but to understand the social role of religious beliefs in health and illness. Social analysis is merely extended to the realm of religion. In Africa, the following beliefs still resonate for many and affect health behavior: ancestors and gods are part of social life; bad behavior brings misfortune; unresponsive spirits are

200   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE readily discarded, since Indigenous religions are generally “this world” oriented; the wrath of spirits does not always descend on the deviant one but may target others close by, indicating that you are your brother or sister’s keeper; malevolent beings abound (witches, the Christian devil), and so forth. When disease strikes, people use divination systems, incantations, rituals, and exorcism, as well as herbs and other natural substances. These activities are also used to prevent diseases and other misfortunes (Adu-​Gyamfi, 2016). The role of sociology is to demystify local religious beliefs and healing practices. Thus, Olúpọ́nà (2011), the foremost scholar on Yorùbá religion, writes: “Yorùbá religious ceremonies focus on healing, procreation, human and agricultural fertility, and the quest for long life and wealth. The materiality of the spiritual is an integral part of religion” (p. 87). Indeed, in his own research in Ilé-​Ifẹ̀, Olúpọ́nà discusses the many categories of beings with whom diviners, medicine men and women (olóògùn), and òriṣá priests grapple. His story about the activities of one famous olóògùn, Bàbá Mòrú, exposes the emotion work of healers. One day, Olúpọ́nà passes a woman on the stairs to Bàbá Mòrú’s place whom the latter later describes as a witch. B.M: “This particular woman came to plead with me that I release her wings, which I took yesterday because she will not leave my clients alone” (Olúpọ́nà 2011, p. 101)

Bàbá Mòrú told Olúpọ́nà that the woman was trying to devour a client. One can say without a doubt, that since Bàbá Mòrú’s clients believe he has the power to prevent misfortunes and control malevolent forces around them, the power of their own emotions (self-​healing power) has a chance to work for them. What is significant for research is that since African practitioners cannot use Freud’s framework of the id, ego, and superego on patients who have different models of the human psyche, Morakínyọ̀ (1982) explained that he (a psychiatrist) was experimenting with concepts such as àyanmọ́, ìpórí, and orí, based on Yorùbá ontology. In 2018 Kpanake made similar suggestions about therapeutic approaches arguing that methods need to be developed that acknowledge cultural concepts and local constructs of the mind in African settings. A definitive list of categories of Indigenous practitioners is impossible to construct. Many studies focus on just one ethnic group and do not attempt comparisons, and much of the research comes from only a few countries, notably Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, and Zimbabwe, resulting in minimum information on other countries. Nonetheless, a picture of practitioners is emerging (Adu-​Gyamfi & Anderson, 2019; Ajima & Ubana, 2018; Staugard, 1986). Across the board, practitioners include herbalists, diviners, priests of numerous deities, Indigenous pharmacists, bonesetters, Indigenous psychiatrists, traditional birth attendants, midwives and childcare specialists. One problem requiring closer attention is training and accreditation. Although some practitioners undergo extensive training as apprentices for 7 to 10 years, others have minimal formal training. Local practitioners are not only interested in how the disease came about, but why: why this person, why now? A focus on psychosocial relations remains in the forefront,

Medical Sociology in Africa     201 and one dimension of interest to sociologists is the practitioner/​patient relationship, given its impact on the healing process, patient satisfaction, appointment keeping, and acceptance of medications. One small but relevant study compared the communication styles of seven traditional healers and eight Western-​trained providers in Cameroon (Labhardt et al., 2010). It was discovered that traditional healers were significantly more patient-​oriented in several aspects: They focused more on psychosocial topics and on issues of daily life than on purely medical questions, and in particular, they more often asked for the patient’s opinion and frequently discussed their concept of illness (Labhardt et al., 2010, p. 1106)

Labhardt et al. note that more studies with larger samples are needed. Similarly, the first ever systematic literature review of studies on the use of Indigenous healers also points to the need for larger, more methodologically sophisticated research to be done in more countries (James et al., 2018). In addition to studies on practitioner/​patient interaction, there is an urgent need to investigate product toxicity as patients are clearly combining drugs without divulging this information to anyone. These concerns overlap with the long-​standing interest in integrating Western and Indigenous services, to be discussed shortly (Abdullahi, 2011; Khaitsa et al., 2017).

Epidemiological Studies on Social Determinants of Health and Disease The most basic contribution of medical sociology to understanding the incidence and distribution of diseases (epidemiology) is the thesis that social factors play a significant role. Link and Phelan’s (1995) theory of fundamental causes argues that a fundamental cause of differences in health and mortality is socioeconomic status (socioeconomic inequalities). The resources that are available to people at the micro (individual), intermediate (family/​community) and macro (national) levels of society truly matter. This thesis will be highlighted to attempt to build research frameworks for Africa that combine several theoretical insights. Epidemiological studies in Africa have come under strong criticism. Àìná (2004) argues that much of this research is driven by the concerns of Western institutions, with Africans merely serving as consultants or project managers. Ẹrinoshó (1998) notes that such research is, largely, applied and descriptive. Thus findings that “are used to shape health policy, programs, and/​or improve services, could undermine the intellectual worth of the field” (p. 93). Further, operationalizing Western concepts is often problematic (Ichoku et al., 2013). In what class does one place a university lecturer who moonlights as a taxi driver in response to Africa’s crushing debt peonage? In some

202   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE countries, though not all, a poor urbanite may have access to land in his village that impacts his social status. Colonial practices, land dispossession, and new global economic policies create unique class configurations. The above criticisms notwithstanding, there has been a thread of progressive scholarship using material from other disciplines and other branches of sociology. In other words, the attention to micro-​, intermediate-​, and macro-​structural issues referred to earlier has, for some scholars, always been important and incorporates an international dimension. Since the 1960s, dependency theorists and others who focus on political economy (Amin, 1972; Frank, 1969; Hountondji, 1990; Mamdani, 1996; Rodney, 1972; Táíwò 2010) have argued that exploitative relations between First World and Third World nations stalled endogenous processes of transformation in the latter. Building on this, Mignolo (2002), Quijano (2007), and others now insist that the grip of colonial power, the coloniality of power, runs through all sectors of former colonies, including health. Control has persisted through theories, aid, loans, and programs. Attempts by some independence leaders to formulate endogenous development were blocked, and now successive generations of leaders work with external institutions to exploit their own populations. Nonetheless, interest in global political economic models is growing. For example, the concept “Colonial Contract,” stimulated by Quijano’s work, suggests that Africa is still laboring under “an (un)written set of rules, regulations and norms which inform, organize and order society’s social, religious, economic, moral and political obligations” (Benyera, 2020, pp. 2–​3). Violence was and remains at the center of colonial relationships. Thus, for medical sociology to make any real headway in understanding epidemiological issues, political economy models are required. Structure, power, and people’s relationships to resources must be brought into play. Since it is impossible to review all of Africa’s health problems here, two have been selected to underscore what is required for medical sociology to remain relevant to Africa’s transformations: the HIV/​AIDS pandemic and Africa’s persistent reproductive and child health problems.

The HIV/​AIDS Pandemic HIV/​AIDS brought enormous attention to Africa, which by the mid-​1990s was the world’s epicenter of the pandemic. In 2020, 67 percent of persons living with HIV/​ AIDS resided in Africa (UNAIDS, 2021). Initial explanations from Western researchers were like those that were given prior to and during colonization: African bodies and cultures are different. The power to define African reality persisted. According to Stillwaggon (2003), the focus was on individual behavior and African hypersexuality, which then influenced policies and programs. She notes that “the standard epidemiological cofactors in disease transmission (malnutrition, parasite load, access to healthcare, etc.) were generally overlooked” (p. 811). Stillwaggon (2003) points out that many scholars took their cue from Caldwell and Caldwell who, after years of fertility research in Africa, constructed Africans as strange, a people “so different, their belief system

Medical Sociology in Africa     203 so ancient, that they are inscrutable to the Western (read ‘modern’) mind” (p. 814).Yet the impoverishment and chaos resulting from colonial violence and global economic policies were ignored. African life was interpreted outside any political economic context. Alternatively, Hunter’s (2007) study of the rapid spread of HIV in South Africa begins with a powerful statement: “Important scholarship has demonstrated how racialized structures entrenched by colonialism and apartheid set the scene for the rapidly unfolding of the AIDS pandemic, like other causes of ill-​health before it” (p. 689). Hunter (2007) argues that it is important to consider connections between political economy, the body, and health. Reviewing why some women developed multiple sexual relations, he outlines the instability and lack of economic opportunities through the 1990s. The South African state was pressured by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to withdraw public assistance at the very time people needed it most. Rural women began moving to urban centers to work and augmented their wages through friendships with men. Hunter insists that they were not prostitutes and that their children benefited from the remittances they sent home. The cruelty of the economic situation had forced women into this new pattern of migration. In her award-​winning book on the risk of contracting HIV in Kenya, Mojola (2014) also discusses the impact of poverty among young women. Under the global economic policies, the material and social needs of women in search of education and employment landed them in relationships from which they contracted HIV. Work, pay, and promotion put women at a disadvantage. Like Hunter, Mojola observes that women are not making relationship decisions in a vacuum: “There are structural mechanisms in place that keep reproducing the same gendered and generational structured environments that have produced their disproportionate risk in the first place” (p. 202). Others have made similar structural arguments (Adédiméjì, 2005; Mbirimtengerenji, 2007; Ratele, 2008). Indeed, political economic questions must be brought to the forefront whether one is studying individual behavior, cultural practices, or even a global pandemic like COVID-​19.

Persistent Reproductive and Child Health Problems Concern over the high volume of maternal and infant death and disease in Africa is growing. But after colonial rule, the Global North was single-​mindedly focused on population control as a development strategy. Excess population was thought to consume resources that were required for modernization (Pearce, 1995a). Africa was flooded with long-​lasting and questionable contraceptives as a quick fix, as in Asia. These were often introduced into poorly regulated and chaotic health systems. Ogbuagu (1985) reported that in Nigeria, Depo-​Provera was sold over the counter and even from roadside kiosks. There was little or no monitoring where clinics were poorly equipped. Pearce (1995b) discovered at a rural clinic in Southwestern Nigeria that “no provision was made for any form of pelvic examination before the pill was issued or injections given. There was also no equipment for blood or urine tests” (p. 253). Clients went for up to five years without a pelvic examination. After similar pressures were exerted on women in Kenya, Uganda,

204   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE Ghana, and Egypt, feminists at the 1994 Population Conference in Cairo rejected this development blueprint, arguing that population decline in the West resulted mostly from raising the status of women through education, health, and political programs rather than by dispensing chemical contraceptives. In 2017, the maternal mortality ratio for Sub-​Saharan Africa was 535 per 100,000 live births, a figure much higher than the 135 reported for Arab states, or the 149 reported in South Asia (United Nations Development Programme, 2020a). Seventeen countries, including Nigeria, Burundi, Chad, Sierra Leone, Guinea-​Bissau, and Liberia, all had well over 500 per 100,000 live births. Still, few studies go beyond the usual community analysis. Pandolfelli et al. (2014) are a notable exception. They begin at the global level and interrogate the impact of IMF structural adjustment and neoliberal policies on the maternal mortality rates of 37 Sub-​Saharan African nations. They highlight the conditions required for IMF loans: cut governmental spending on education, health, and nutrition; privatize government assets; reduce tariffs, devaluate currency, and so forth: We find that Sub-​Saharan African nations that receive an IMF structural adjustment loan in a given year tend to have higher levels of maternal mortality than Sub-​ Saharan African nations that do not receive such a loan in a given year. (pp. 136–​137)

They reported that between 1990 and 2005, “approximately 360 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births can be attributed to structural adjustment over this period, with all else held constant,” and that the finding remained “stable and consistent across models that control for potentially biasing effects of endogeneity” (p. 137). This was the first cross-​national study on IMF policies and maternal health, and it highlights the lingering impact of colonial power. At the intermediate level, cultural practices expose women to illness and maternal mortality. Boateng (2017) argues that as caregivers, women are socialized to “sacrifice their health needs to ensure that members they care for in the family such as children, spouses, parents and the sick within the family are well” (p. 77). Patriarchal ideologies influence attitudes toward domestic violence, female education, son preference, and autonomy in seeking services, including abortion (Abdulqadir, 2018; Chirowa et al., 2013; Ẹrinoshó, 2006; Makínwá-​Adébusoyè 2013). Age, parity, distance from clinics, and poverty (Amzat, 2015) increase the risk of maternal death. High infant mortality rates also set Africa apart from the rest of the world (United Nations Development Programme, 2020b). To make useful contributions to understanding disease patterns, sociologists must go beyond secondary-​level analyses and focus on the underlying causes. Building on the arguments regarding causation that have been highlighted in this chapter, comprehensive models can be developed by combining the following various insights: (1) The social analysis embedded in African holistic models is foundational and existed centuries before sociology was invented. The focus is on stressful social relationships and the socioecological environment. Layers of relationships engulf the individual. (2) This Indigenous perspective needs more input from political economic theories that

Medical Sociology in Africa     205 emphasize ethnic, regional, and global power relations. Local healers may not have information about the policies and treaties that have been developed beyond their immediate localities. Uncovering the impact of these on people’s health is the responsibility of medical sociologists. (3) Intersectionality, an important critique of one-​dimensional research developed by African American feminists, is also receiving attention on the African continent (Collins, 2015; Couto et al., 2019; Crenshaw, 1989; Meer & Müller, 2017; O’Brien & Tolosa, 2016; Tsikata, 2009). I believe that sociologists now have useful theoretical frames that can be combined in epidemiological analyses.

Policy and Health Reforms Policies developed by colonial administrations were ill-​suited to the continent’s needs. Initially, governments focused on the curative needs of Europeans, not on prevention or public health, and gave medical missionaries, eager for religious converts, a free hand among natives in the rural areas. Segregation was the main tool for protecting Europeans from “African” diseases, although intermittent campaigns against specific diseases like smallpox, sexually transmitted infections, and malaria were conducted. (Mburu, 1992; Stilson, 2019; Turshen, 1999). After independence, plans to develop well-​ organized, functioning health sectors did not materialize. Overall, the health sectors still suffer from inadequate funding, the inaccessibility of facilities, and shortage of hospital beds. Nonetheless, there are important differences between nations. Rwanda, Ghana, Botswana, and Burkina Faso, for example, have expanded their systems of public care by using universal insurance or providing service at a minimal fee. Such programs are limited in Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya. South Africa’s public service extends coverage to most of the population, but as in Nigeria, the best health care is private and costly (Azevedo, 2017; Coovadia et al., 2009). External pressures remain a major problem, as Turshen (1999) points out: “The abandonment of public health in Africa is part of a global assault on public services” (p. 1). She notes that “private medicine, especially biomedicine as practiced in the individualized western tradition, robs people of the opportunity to identify the social origins of their illness . . . Privatization plans divert attention from the question ‘How can people prevent illness?’ to focusing on ‘How can they pay for treatment?’ ” (p. 3). Also, politicians and professionals are increasingly under attack for corrupt practices that hinder progress (Ọbadáre, 2005; Obi-​Ani et al., 2021). Ọbadáre and Okeke (2011) discuss the impact of state corruption and lack of regulation in Nigeria, where public distrust left the door wide open for anyone to make curative claims about AIDS, to the detriment of the population. Lack of community participation in policymaking is widespread, and power differentials both between and within communities have yet to be addressed. Further, there is limited program monitoring or evaluation (Coovadia et al., 2009; Kirigia & Barry, 2008; McCollum et al., 2016; Mwisongo et al., 2016). Notable exceptions are

206   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE some studies that evaluate the 1990s plan to decentralize decision-​making in Zambia, allowing decisions on expenditures, user fees, contracting, and governance to be made at the district level. Initial findings indicate that “even in a poor country with declining health budgets, allowing district health officials a moderate degree of choice for many key functions has not led to radical increase in inequalities among districts” (Bossert et al., 2003, p. 367). However, it was also noted that the move to real equality is slow (Chitah et al., 2018). Although the call to integrate Indigenous and Western services began during the 1960s, progress in developing models of integration or defining, regulating, and registering local practitioners has been slow. The oral nature of this knowledge, budgetary constraints, lack of political will, and resistance from Western-​trained practitioners are major problems. However, suggestions for integration include total integration with both groups of practitioners working together; developing parallel services; and cooperating in specific areas such as drugs, psychiatry, chronic illnesses, and pregnancy/​childbirth (Abrams et al., 2020; Ekeopara & Azubuike, 2017; Musyimi et al., 2019; Sargent, 1986; Semali, 1986; Twumasi & Warren, 1986).

Conclusion As a subfield of sociology, medical sociology in Africa cannot avoid taking a more critical perspective on its Western roots and the colonial route via which the discipline arrived on African soil. Again, mainstream sociology has been conservative regarding paths to development (including healthcare) in the Global South. Nonetheless, there has always been a progressive streak within the discipline, and it is gaining ground in Africa. The injunction is that Indigenous perspectives contain cogent theories that are ripe for assessment, amending, and further development. As outlined in this chapter, the strength of African perspectives on health is their attention to a holistic model that takes into consideration the emotional, social, and ecological aspects of health and healing. This traditional focus does not contradict the “sociological imagination.” Expanding from this foundation, research needs to incorporate the study of power relations (political economy) that affect health and disease at every level of interaction. Also, the impact of intersecting global and local systems must be highlighted. Since planning and monitoring remain problematic, work also needs to be done to shape ideas rather than just evaluate policy outcomes. Experts are needed who can simultaneously resist external policy pressures and help to construct relevant local policies and programs. The health sector cannot be imagined outside our overall models of society. If care is not taken, this sector will continue to be hamstrung by the imposed Western models of society that emphasize the linear, exclusionary frameworks and individualistic orientations. Medical sociologists can help to validate and seek to improve on the rudiments of Indigenous representations of group life that have hitherto focused on the cyclical, inclusive frameworks and relational orientations.

Medical Sociology in Africa     207

Acronyms IMF

International Monetary Fund

UNAIDS

Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/​AIDS

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

References Abdullahi, A. A. (2011). Trends and challenges of traditional medicine in Africa. African Journal of Traditional Complementary and Alternative Medicines, 8, 115–​123. https://​doi.org/​ 10.4314/​ajt​cam.v8i5S.5 Abdulqadir, U. A. (2018). Gender analysis of the Nigerian health sector. International Journal of Humanities, Art and Social Studies, 3, 59–​69. Abrams, A. L., Falkenberg, T., Rautenbach, C., Moshabela, M., Shezi, B., van Elewee, S., & Street, R. (2020). Legislative landscape for traditional health practitioners in Southern African development community countries: A scoping review. British Medical Journal Open, 10, 1–​10. https://​doi.org/​10.1136/​bmjo​pen-​2019-​029​958 Adédiméjì, A. A. (2005). Beyond knowledge and behavior change: The social-​structural context of HIV/​AIDS risk perceptions and protective behavior among young urban slum inhabitants in Nigeria [Research paper]. Harvard University School of Public Health. Ademuwagun, Z. (1979). The challenge of the co-​existence of orthodox and traditional medicine in Nigeria. In Z. Ademuwágun, J. Ayoade, I. Harrison, & D. Warren (Eds.), African therapeutic systems (pp. 165–​170). Crossroads Press. https://​doi.org/​10.1177%2F136​3461​5800​1700​313 Adu-​Gyamfi, S. (2016). Spiritual and indigenous practices among the Asante people of Ghana: A testimonial from twenty-​first century practitioners and recipients in Kumasi. Journal of Basic and Applied Research International, 12, 39–​50. Adu-​Gyamfi, S., & Anderson, E. (2019). Indigenous medicine and traditional healing in Africa: A systematic synthesis of the literature. Philosophy, Social and Human Disciplines, 1, 69–​100. Aikins, A. G. (2005). Healer shopping in Africa: New evidence from rural-​urban qualitative study of Ghanaian diabetes experiences. BMJ, 331, 1–​7. https://​doi.org/​10.1136/​bmj.331.7519.737 Àìná, T. A. (2004). Reclaiming the promise of the sociological imagination in Africa. African Sociological Review, 8, 90–​102. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​asr.v8i2.23252 Ajima, O. G., & Ubana, E. U. (2018). The concept of health and wholeness in traditional African religion and social medicine. Arts and Social Sciences International, 9, 1–​5. https://​doi.org/​ 10.4172//​2151-​6200.1000​388 Ake, C. (1979). Social science as imperialism. Ibadan University Press. Alubo, O. (2008). Ontological response to illness in Africa. Jos Journal of Social Issues, 6, 1–​23. Amegbor, P. M. (2017). An assessment of care-​seeking behavior in Asikuma–​Odoben–​Brakwa district: A triple pluralistic health sector approach. Sage Open, 7, 1–​17. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1177/​21582​4401​7710​688 Amin, S. (1972). Underdevelopment and dependency in black Africa: Origins and contemporary forms. Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, 503–​524. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00222​78X0​ 0022​801

208   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE Amzat, J. (2015). The question of autonomy in maternal health in Africa: A rights-​based consideration. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry,12, 283–​293. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​673-​015-​9607-​y Amzat, J., & Razum, P. (2014). Medical sociology in Africa. Springer International. https//​doi​ .org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​03986-​2 Awólalu, J. (1972). The African traditional view of man. Orita, 6, 101–​118. Azevedo, M. J. (2017). Historical perspectives on the state of health and health systems in Africa (Vol. 2). Palgrave Macmillan. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​32564-​4_​1 Babb, D., Pemba, L., Seatlanyane, P., Charalambous, S., Churchyard, G., & Grant, A. D. (2007). Use of traditional medicine by HIV-​infected individuals in South Africa in the era of anti-​ retroviral therapy. Psychology, Health and Medicine, 12, 314–​320. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 135485​0060​0621​511 Baronov, D. (2008) The African transformation of Western medicine and the dynamics of global cultural exchange. Temple University Press. Bengolea, R. P., & Akìwọwo, A. (1974). Problems in peripheral regions. International Social Science Journal, 26, 411–​426. Benyera, E. (2020). How and why is colonialism a contract? In E. Benyera (Ed.), Breaking the colonial “contract” (pp. 1–​28). Lexington Books. Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. Doubleday. Boateng, W. (2017). Socialization of women and its implication on their health status. UDS International Journal for Development, 4, 75–​18. Bossert, T., Chitah, M. B., & Bowser, D. (2003). Decentralization in Zambia: Resource allocation and district performance. Health Policy and Planning, 18, 357–​369. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1093/​hea​pol/​czg​044 Butchart, A. (1998). The anatomy of power: European constructions of the African body. Zed Books. Chavunduka, G. L. (1986). The organisation of traditional medicine in Zimbabwe. In M. Last & G. L. Chavunduka (Eds.), The professionalisation of African medicine (pp. 29–​49). Manchester University Press. Chavunduka, G. L. (1994). Traditional medicine in modern Zimbabwe. University of Zimbabwe. Chirowa, F., Atwood, S., & Van der Putten, M. (2013). Gender inequality, health expenditure and maternal mortality in sub-​Saharan Africa: A secondary data analysis. African Journal of Primary Health and Family Medicine, 5, 471. https://​doi.org/​10.4102/​phcfm.v5i1.471 Chitah, B. M., Chansa, C., Kaonga, O., & Workie, N. W. (2018). Myriad of health care financing reforms in Zambia: Have the poor benefited? Health Systems and Reform, 4, 313–​323. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​23288​604.2018.1510​286 Collett, T., Brooks, L., & Forrest, S. (2016). The history of sociology teaching in United Kingdom (UK) undergraduate medical education: An introduction and rallying call! [version 1]. MedEdPublish, 5, 152–​164. https://​doi.org/​10.15694/​mep.2016.000​152 Collins, P. H. (2015). Intersectionality’s definitional dilemmas. Annual Review of Sociology, 41, 1–​20. https://​doi.org/​10.1146/​annu​rev-​soc-​073​014-​112​142 Comaroff, J. (1993). The diseased heart of Africa: Medicine, colonialism and the black body. In S. Lindenbaum & M. Lock (Eds.), Knowledge, power and practice: The anthropology of medicine and everyday life (pp. 305–​329). University of California Press. Coovadia, H., Jewkes, R., Barron, P., Sanders, D., & McIntyre, D. (2009). The health and health system of South Africa: Historical roots of current public health challenges. Lancet, 374, 817–​ 834. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0140-​6736(09)60951-​X

Medical Sociology in Africa     209 Couto, M. T., de Oliveria, E., Separavich, M. A. A., & Luiz, O. C. (2019). The feminist perspective of intersectionality in the field of public health: A narrative review of the theoretical-​ methodological literature, Salud Collectiva, 15, 1–​14. https://​doi.org/​10.18294/​sc.2019.1994 Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and anti-​racist politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 140, 139–​167. https://​chi​cago​unbo​und.uchic​ago.edu/​uclf/​vol1​989/​iss1/​8 Eaton, D. (2008). Understanding AIDS in public lives: Luambo Makiadi and Sony Labou Tansi. In T. Fálólá & M. M. Heaton (Eds.), Health knowledge and belief systems in Africa (pp. 315–​332). Carolina Academic Press. Ekeopara, C. A., & Azubuike, M. I., Rev. (2017). The contributions of African traditional medicine to Nigeria’s health care delivery system. Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 22, 32–​43. https://​doi.org/​10.9790/​0837-​220​5043​243 Ẹrinoshó, O. (1998). Sociological research in health: Lessons from Nigeria. African Sociological Review, 2, 90–​94. Ẹrinoshó, O. (2006). The burden of our women. University of Ibadan. Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development. Princeton University Press. Feierman, S. (1985). Struggles for control: The social roots of health and healing in modern Africa. African Studies Review, 28, 73–​147. https//​doi.org/​10.2307/​524​604 Frank, A. G. (1969). The sociology of development and the underdevelopment of sociology. Afrografika. Freidson, E. (1970). Professional dominance: The social structure of medical care. Atherton Press. Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Simon and Schuster. Gyasi, R. M., Siaw, L. P., & Mensah, C. M. (2015). Prevalence and pattern of traditional medical therapy utilisation in Kumasi, Metropolis and Sekyere South District, Ghana. Journal of Ethnopharmacology, 161, 138–​146. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.jep.2014.12.004 Hountondji, P. (1990). Scientific dependence in Africa today. Research in African Literatures, 21, 5–​15. Hunter, M. (2007). The changing political economy of sex in South Africa: The significance of unemployment and inequalities to the scale of the AIDS pandemic. Social Science and Medicine, 64, 689–​700. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.socsci​med.2006.09.015 Ichoku, H. E., Mooney, G., & Ataguba, J. E.-​O. (2013). Africanising the social determinants of health: Embedded structural inequalities and current health outcomes in Sub-​ Saharan Africa. International Journal of Health Services, 43, 1–​13. https://​doi.org/​ 10.2190/​HS.43.4.i James, P. B., Wardle, J., Steel, A., & Adams, J. (2018). Traditional, complementary and alternative medicine use in Sub-​Saharan Africa: A systematic review. BMJ Global Health, 3, 1–​18. https://​doi.org/​10.1136/​bmjgh-​2018-​000​895 Janzen, J. M., & Green, E. C. (2016). Medicine in Africa. In H. Seline (Ed.), Encyclopedia of history of science, technology, and medicine in non-​Western cultures (pp. 30–​47). Springer, Dordrecht. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​1-​4020-​4425-​0 Khaitsa, M. L., Kaneene, J. B., Lumutenga, N. W., & Sengendo, M. (2017). The intersectionality of sociology and health: Case studies of the effect of culture on disease. Pan African Medical Journal, 27, 1–​6. https://​doi.org/​10.11604/​pamj.supp.2017.27.4.12446 Kirigia, J. M., & Barry, S. P. (2008). Health challenges in Africa and the way forward. International Archives of Medicine, 1, 1–​3. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​1755-​7682-​1-​27 Kpanake, L. (2018). Cultural concepts of the person and mental health in Africa. Transcultural Psychiatry, 55, 198–​218. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​13634​6151​7749​435

210   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE Labhardt, N. D., Aboe, S. M., Manga, E., Bensing, J. M., & Langewitz, W. (2010). Bridging the gap: How traditional healers interact with their patients. A comparative study in Cameroon. Tropical Medicine and International Health, 15, 1099–​1108. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ j.1365-​3156.2010.02575.x Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. C. (1995). Social conditions as fundamental causes of disease. Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 35, 80–​94. Makínwá-​Adébusoyè, P. (2013, June 17–​19). Health, population dynamics [Panelist]. 4th Season of the General Assembly of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, New York. Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and subject. Princeton University Press. Mbirimtengerenji, N. D. (2007). Is HIV/​AIDS epidemic outcome of poverty in Sub-​Saharan Africa? Croat Medical Journal, 48, 605–​617. Mbíti, J. (1970). African religions and philosophy. Prager. Mburu, F. M. (1992). The impact of colonial rule on health development: The case of Kenya. In T. Fálólá & D. Ityavyar (Eds.), The political economy of health in Africa (pp. 88–​106). Ohio University Press. McCollum, R., Otiso, L., Mireku, M., Thoebald, S., de Koning, K., Hussein, S., & Taegtmeyer, M. (2016). Exploring perceptions of community health policy in Kenya and identifying implications for policy change. Health Policy and Planning, 31, 10–​20. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1093/​hea​pol/​czv​007 Mechanic, D. (1962). The concept of illness behavior. Journal of Chronic Diseases, 15, 189–​194. https//​doi.org/​10.1016/​0021-​9681(62)90068-​1 Meer, T., & Müller, A. (2017). Considering intersectionality in Africa. Agenda, 31, 3–​4. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​10130​950.2017.1363​583 Mignolo, W. D. (2002). The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference. South Atlantic Quarterly, 101, 57–​96. https://​doi.org/​10.1215/​00382​876-​101-​1-​57 Mojola, S. A. (2014). Love, money and HIV. University of California Press. Morakínyò, O. (1982, September 1–​5). A cultural-​compatible psychodynamic theory using the Yoruba ayànmo myth for mental care in West Africa [Paper Presentation]. 12th Scientific and Annual Conference, Association of Psychiatrists in Nigeria, University of Ife. Mothupi, M. C. (2014). Use of herbal medicine during pregnancy among women with access to public healthcare in Nairobi, Kenya: A cross-​sectional survey. BMC Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 14, 1–​8. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​1472-​6882-​14-​432 Mureyi, D. D., Montera, T. G., & Maponga, C. C. (2012). Prevalence and patterns of prenatal use of traditional medicine among women at selected Harare clinics: A cross-​sectional study. BMC Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 12, 1–​7. https//​doi.org/​10.1186/​ 1472-​6882-​12-​164 Musyimi, C. W., Mutiso, V. N., Nyamai, D. N., Ebuenyi, I. D., & Ndetei, D. M. (2019). Integration of traditional birth attendants into mental healthcare: A multistakeholder qualitative study exploration. Biomed Research International, 2019, 1–​7. https://​doi.org/​10.1155/​2019/​8195​267 Mwisongo, A., Nabyonga-​Orem, J., Yao, T., & Dovlo, D. (2016). The role of power in health policy dialogues: Lessons from African countries. BMC Health Services Research, 16, 337–​ 366. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​913-​016-​1456-​9 Navarro, V. (1974). The underdevelopment of health or the health of underdevelopment: An analysis of the distribution of human health resources in Latin America. International Journal of Health Services, 4, 5–​26. https://​doi.org/​10.2190/​R3Y9-​T3WU-​6L3L-​LA3C

Medical Sociology in Africa     211 Ngubane, H. (1976). Some aspects of treatment among the Zulu. In J. B. Loudon (Ed.), Social anthropology and medicine (pp. 318–​367). Academic Press. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00332​ 9170​0004​700 Nxumalo, N., Alaba, O., Harris, B., Chersich, M., & Goudge, J. (2011). Utilization of traditional healers in South Africa and costs to patients: Findings from a national household survey. Journal of Public Health Policy, 32, S124–​S136. https://​doi.org/​10.1057/​jphp.2011.26 O’Brien, M., & Tolosa, M. X. (2016). The effect of the 2014 West Africa Ebola virus disease epidemic on multi-​level violence against women. International Journal of Human Rights and Healthcare, 9, 151–​160. https://​doi.org/​10.1108/​IJHRH-​09-​2015-​0027 Ọbadáre, E. (2005). A crisis of trust: History, politics, religion and the polio controversy in Northern Nigeria. Patterns of Prejudice, 39, 265–​284. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​003132​2050​ 0198​185 Ọbadáre, E., & Okeke, I. N. (2011). Biomedical loopholes, distrusted state, and the politics of HIV/​AIDS “cure” in Nigeria. African Affairs, 110, 191–​211. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​afraf/​ adr​001 Obi-​Ani, N. A., Ezeaku, D. O., Ikem, O., Isiani, M. C., Obi-​Ani, P., & Chisolum, O. J. (2021). Covid-​19 pandemic and the Nigerian primary healthcare system: The leadership question. Cogent Arts and Humanities, 8, 1–​16. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​23311​983.2020.1859​075 Ogbuagu, S. C. (1985) Women and Depo-​Provera usage in Nigeria: Chosen or imposed forms of birth control? Rural Africana, 21, 81–​90. Olúpọ̀nà, J. K. (2011). City of 201 gods. University of California Press. Pandolfelli, L. E., Shandra, J., & Tyagi, J. (2014). The international monetary fund, structural adjustment, and women’s health: A cross-​national analysis of maternal mortality in Sub-​ Saharan Africa. Sociological Quarterly, 55, 119–​1 42. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ tsq.12046 Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. The Free Press. https://​void​netw​ork.gr/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ ads/​2016/​10/​The-​Soc​ial-​Sys​tem-​by-​Talc​ott-​Pars​ons.pdf Parsons, T. (1966). Societies: Evolutionary and comparative perspectives. Prentice-​Hall. Pearce, T. O. (1986). Professional interests and the creation of medical knowledge in Nigeria. In M. Last & G. L. Chavunduka (Eds.), The professionalisation of African medicine (pp. 237–​ 258). Manchester University Press. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978042​9444​784 Pearce, T. O. (1995a). Women’s reproductive practices and bio-​medicine: Cultural conflicts and transformations in Nigeria. In F. Ginsburg & R. Rapp (Eds.), Conceiving the new world order: The global politics of reproduction (pp. 195–​208). University of California Press. Pearce, T. O. (1995b). Case study: Monitoring the impact of contraceptive technology in Nigeria. In M. J. Hay & S. Stichter (Eds.), African women south of the Sahara (2nd ed., pp. 250–​255). Longman. Pearce, T. O. (1995c). Women and health care: Preventative medication for children among the Yorùbá. In S. Afonja & B. Àìná (Eds.), Nigerian women in social change (pp. 129–​143). Obáfẹmi Awólọ̀wọ̀ University Press. Pearce, T. O. (2021). The “outward/​inward-​looking principle”: Akìwọwọ and the sociology of development in Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 39, 318–​329. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1080/​02589​001.2021.1902​957 Piot, C. (1999). Remotely global. University of Chicago Press. Quijano, A. (2007). Coloniality and modernity/​rationality. Cultural Studies, 21, 168–​178. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​095023​8060​1164​353

212   TỌ́L Á OLÚ PEARCE Ratele, K. (2008). Analysing males in Africa: Certain useful elements in considering ruling masculinities. African and Asian Studies, 7, 515–​536. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​15692​1008​ X359​641 Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Tanzania Publishing. Sargent, C. (1986). Prospects for professionalisation of Indigenous midwifery in Benin. In M. Last & G. L. Chavunduka (Eds.), The professionalisation of African medicine (pp. 137–​149). Manchester University Press. Semali, I. A. J. (1986). Association and healers: Attitudes towards collaboration in Tanzania. In M. Last & G. L. Chavunduka (Eds.), The professionalisation of African medicine (pp. 87–​97). Manchester University Press. Shenton, B., & Watts, M. (1979). Capitalism and hunger in Northern Nigeria. Review of Political Economy, 6, 53–​62. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​030562​4790​8703​396 Staugard, F. (1986). Traditional healthcare in Botswana. In M. Last & G. L. Chavunduka (Eds.), The professionalisation of African medicine (pp. 51–​86). Manchester University Press. Stillwaggon, E. (2003). Racial metaphors: Interpreting sex and AIDS in Africa. Development and Change, 34, 809–​832. https://​ssrn.com/​abstr​act=​1663​064 Stilson, B. (2019). A failure of care: Colonial power and healthcare in Africa, 1850–​1939. Undergraduate Historical Journal at UC Merced, 6, 24–​36. https://​doi.org/​10.5070/​h36​ 1046​187 Táíwò, O. (2010). How colonialism preempted modernity in Africa. Indiana University Press. True, J. (2012). The political economy of violence against women. Oxford Scholarship Online. https://​doi.10.1093/​acp​rof:oso/​978019​9755​929.001.0001 Tsikata, D. (2009). Gender, land and labour relations and livelihoods in Sub-​Saharan Africa in the era of economic liberalisation: Towards a research agenda. Feminist Africa, 12, 11–​30. Turner, V. (1967). The forest of symbols. Cornell University Press. Turshen, M. (1999). Privatizing health services in Africa. Rutgers University Press. Twumasi, P., & Warren, D. M. (1986). The professionalization of Indigenous medicine: A comparative study of Ghana and Zambia. In M. Last & G. L. Chavunduka (Eds.), The professionalisation of African medicine (pp. 117–​135). Manchester University Press. UNAIDS. (2021). Epidemiological estimates, global HIV and AIDS statistics fact sheet. https://​ www.una​ids.org/​en/​resour​ces/​fact-​sheet United Nations Development Programme. (2020a). Maternal mortality ratio. Human Development Reports. https://​hdr.undp.org/​en/​ind​icat​ors/​89006 United Nations Development Programme. (2020b). Mortality rate, under-​ five. Human Development Reports, https://​hdr.undp.org/​en/​ind​icat​ors/​57506 Vaughan, M. (1991). Curing their ills. Stanford University Press. Waitzkin, H., & Waterman, B. (1974). The exploitation of illness in capitalist society. Bobbs-​Merrill. Zola, I. (1972). Medicine as an institution of social control. Sociological Review, 20, 487–​504. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1467-​954X.1972.tb00​220.x Zuma, T., Wight, D., Rochat, T., & Moshabela, M. (2016). The role of traditional health practitioners in rural KwaZulu-​Natal, South Africa: Generic or mode specific? BMC Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 16(304), 1–​13. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​ 906-​016-​1293-​8

Chapter 12

Af rican So ci ol o g y of He alth and W e l l - B ​ e i ng Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo

Introduction The core of sociology is the quest to study how and why communities, societies, and individuals vary. Sociology examines the structural dynamics, social processes, social change and social institutions, organizations, groups, cultures, traditions, and individuals in the social world. Sociology arose from the social sciences in response to social changes, including the epistemological, technological, and economic changes that transformed the nature of social order, including epidemiological transitions. The social context of health and illness is thus an important focus in sociology. The concepts of health and well-​being have significant social dimensions. The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined health as a state of complete physical, social, and mental well-​being, not merely the absence of diseases or infirmities. It can be surmised that the social and mental components of the WHO’s definition refer to well-​being, which is characterized by positive emotions, the optimal performance of social roles, the development of one’s potential, a sense of purpose, and positive social relationships (Ruggeri et al., 2020). Well-​being is a socially embedded construct with intrapersonal and interpersonal aspects. Health and well-​being have subjective, material, and relational components (Khumalo et al., 2021). The social components are the priorities in the African sociology of health and well-​being. The focus is on material development, community embeddedness, cultural orientation and the social-​role performance indicating well-​being, and the social manifestations of disease in terms of the illness experience and the social response to illness. African sociology of health and well-​being has evolved in the years since Talcott

214    Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo Parsons (1951) did his ground-​breaking work on the sick role theory. Health sociology, also referred to as “medical sociology” or “sociology of health and illness,” has emerged as a crucial area of specialization in the sociology discipline. It involves the scientific study of the social patterning of health, disease, and illness in human society (Amzat & Razum, 2014). Hafferty and Castellani (2006) defined health sociology as the application of a sociological lens using theories, concepts, and methods to examine health and illness. The study of health sociology covers but is not limited to social pathology (the social etiology of illness and disease), epidemiology, interactions between society and health, social determinants of health, and medicalization. In general, health sociology studies the full social context of health and disease—​that is, interpersonal relations, social and health institutions, and the influence of social determinants on health and well-​ being. The most optimum health and wellness conditions, for instance, require lifestyle and behavioral changes. Although health sociologists recognize the biomedical dimension of the concepts of health, illness, and well-​being, they are more interested in their social construction, etiology, experience, and implications. Health and well-​being are strongly influenced by the social variables of race, gender, education, occupation, and income and by cultural factors such as traditions and beliefs. In Africa, health sociology is an established subspecialty in sociology. The first health sociologists in Africa were trained in the United Kingdom and the United States (Amzat & Razum, 2014). The earliest health sociologists in sub-​Saharan Africa, for instance, concentrated mainly on the social context of mental health and the scope of their study included social psychiatry, malaria, sexual behavior, family planning and contraceptive use, drug abuse, and the cultural definitions of illness. The chapter therefore uses a macro perspective to present topical themes of the African sociology of health and well-​being.

Topical Themes of the Sociology of Health and Well-​Being in Africa Health promotion, education, and the prevention of noncommunicable and infectious diseases are central concerns for the Global North and Global South countries. The Global South, including Africa, bears the brunt of the most communicable and noncommunicable diseases, and sometimes endemic diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/​AIDS. In discussing health sociology in Africa, specific persistent issues are pertinent. These include poverty and resource constraints, gender, high population size, access to healthcare and health politics, weak political will and low budgets, the context and social construction of health and illness, and the use of traditional medicine, among others. This section will briefly highlight some of these themes.

African Sociology of Health and Well-Being    215

Poor Socioeconomic Conditions and Health Africa is a continent with abundant natural and human resources yet a high poverty rate, especially in sub-​Saharan Africa, where most people live in poverty on an income of less than $1.90 per day (Amzat & Magaji, 2019). Hamel et al. (2019) described Africa as lagging behind in the struggle against extreme poverty. One-​third of Africans—​that is, over 420 million people—​live below the global poverty line, amounting to about 70 percent of the global number of the poorest people (Hamel et al., 2019). As far back as the 1970s, poverty was identified as a codeterminant of population health. To improve the health of all people, the Declaration of Alma-​Ata in 1978 introduced the essential components of the primary healthcare system. Later, the Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals in 2000 and 2015, respectively, were introduced with some goals targeting improved access to healthcare and reducing extreme poverty in Africa and other countries in the Global South, where most of the people had limited access to healthcare. The declaration also addressed the other associated poverty indicators—​ namely, hunger, disease, gender inequality, insufficient education, access to infrastructure, and environmental degradation. However, Africa has been left behind in the efforts to achieve all of these goals, meant to be a framework for global poverty reduction. Health sociologists generally look at the vast inequality that characterizes healthcare in Africa and examine how the social and economic determinants of health are affecting the poor. Health sociology has demonstrated a clear nexus between poverty and health. Poverty has multiple adverse effects on well-​being. Impoverished people tend to suffer worse health and to die younger because the healthcare and resources necessary to protect their well-​being are inadequate. They also tend to live in unsanitary environments and to have more children, as well as higher maternal and child mortality rates, mainly because of communicable and endemic diseases like malaria and diarrhea. Health is also a crucial economic asset for every individual because their livelihoods depend on being healthy enough to work. When a poor person is ill or injured, the entire family may become caught up in a vicious circle of poverty because of the loss of income and leads to the inability to pay for healthcare services and costs. There is also poverty at the macro (societal) level when a country is constrained by low per capita income and resources. Such nations are bedeviled by minimal spending on healthcare coupled with misplaced and poor planning, management, and delivery of interventions and resources (Oleribe et al., 2019).

Gender Analysis of Health and Well-​Being Gender is a social concept that describes the differential roles, attitudes, behaviors, values, power, and prestige that society ascribes to the two sexes. Gender analysis in health signifies not only human biological differences but also the social construction of gender roles and the power to determine human health. Gender is a social

216    Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo determinant of health, illness behaviors, and disease prevention, education, promotion, and health outcomes (McKague & Harrison, 2019). Gender inequalities translate to health inequalities, feminized poverty, and gender-​based violence, including rape, femicide, and female genital mutilation. Unfortunately, women bear the brunt of impact of gender inequality because their autonomy and agency are often undermined. For instance, gender discrimination starts before birth in the form of natality inequality—​that is, the preference for male children over female children, sometimes leading to selective abortion in many societies. Women also suffer from unequal care and opportunity (Lardies et al., 2019). African women bear the greater brunt of gender inequality because the gender gap is still wide in Africa. Women have specific health needs because of their roles as reproducers. For instance, their maternal healthcare needs are often unmet, and they are up against unfavorable cultural norms regarding childbirth and feminized poverty that also limit their access to healthcare. In sub-​Saharan Africa, which has the highest maternal mortality rates, giving birth is dangerous for women. And many other African countries, including Chad, South Sudan, and Sierra Leone, had maternal mortality rates above 1,000 deaths per 100,00 live births (WHO et al., 2019). The high maternal mortality in many African countries is connected to the gender inequality and discrimination responsible for feminized poverty, thereby preventing women from prioritizing their health needs. The social effect of gender on health and well-​being also leads to differences in terms of disease burden, health-​seeking behavior, the availability of support networks, and the stigma associated with illness and disease (Vlassoff, 2007). Using various sociological theories from the interpretive paradigms, health sociologists have been able to explain that women’s disadvantaged social position influences how communities respond when women are afflicted by stigmatized illnesses, such as vesicovaginal fistulae and breast and cervical cancer (Gatwiri & McLaren, 2016; Gilbert, 2010; Ogunmefun et al., 2011; Winskell et al., 2011). Women living with stigmatized illnesses are more likely to be marginalized, rejected, and abandoned. Unequal social circumstances account for women’s increased vulnerabilities, especially regarding body image and sexuality, life chances, aspirations, and well-​being. African women are also disadvantaged in terms of help-​seeking behavior, particularly in the sub-​Saharan Africa region, where they are more likely to use self-​medication or traditional medicine (Allen & Storm, 2012; Ashforth, 2005; Musoke et al., 2014; Otwombe et al., 2015). The intersection of gender and health is a significant focus in the sociology of African health and well-​being. Since gender is a social construct, the experience of illness is socially constructed differently for men and women. Because of the wide gender gap in Africa, gender-​related illness experience is always evident (Sia et al., 2016). Differential lived experiences of disease are also seen between men and women living with a similar disease. When a disease has adverse social consequences, such as social rejection or disgrace, or when it causes guilt or loneliness in the person with the illness, the negative experiences are often less intense for men than for women (Hammarström et al., 2021; Vlassoff, 2007). Hammarström et al. (2021) observed gender discrimination in

African Sociology of Health and Well-Being    217 public and private life and in health outcomes. There is a need to further interrogate such differentials to mitigate such gendered adversities. Most women in Africa have low levels and rates of education. They are usually engaged in subsistence living and unpaid reproductive labor, and often depend on their male counterparts for survival (Erzse et al., 2021; Dillip et al., 2018; Manda & Mwakubo, 2014). Productive labor is income-​generating; reproductive labor—​activities conducted at home, such as cleaning, cooking, childcare, washing, and care of domestic animals—​ is unpaid (Vlassoff, 2007). In addition to reproducing the daily activities necessary for domestic survival, reproductive labor socializes the young by ingraining society’s cultural norms and values. Sociologists have explored the effects of different types of work on illness behavior, healthcare, and well-​being. African health sociologists continue to interrogate gendered circumstances and their impact on health status and outcomes.

Growing Population and Health Situation Population increase is a major issue for Africa. Early marriage and the lack of access to reproductive health technologies influence fertility and birth rates. According to United Nations’ projections, Africa’s population will triple, from about 800 million in 2000 to approximately 2.4 billion in 2050, and then nearly double, to about 4.2 billion from 2050 to 2100 (UN, 2019). A population this size can constrain African lives, families, and communities and overburden an already weak healthcare system. The average number of children for an African woman is high at 4.7 children, compared to the global number of 2.5. Although it is expected that with better education and access to modern contraception, birth rates will drop, they presently remain high, partly due to factors such as the cultural value of children, cultural and religious beliefs about contraceptive use, limited access to or unmet needs for family planning, and limited sexual education. Sociologists have been able to demonstrate that the social and cultural bonds and exchanges in traditional kinship systems may explain, in part, the persistence of the desire for a large number of children in many parts of Africa (Bongaarts & Casterline, 2013; Geschiere, 2020). The need for labor and for resource sharing to take care of the family, and the desire to perpetuate the family lineage are norms (Casterline, 2017). The consequences are a sustained high birth rate and rapid population growth. Without adequate preparation, the current demographic trajectory will become a significant obstacle to development and improved lifestyles. Regarding feeding, looking at power relations within the household shows that inadequate access and control of food resources put women and children at a disadvantage. The other questions a medical sociologist might be interested in would revolve around the cultural differences in the use, accessibility, and uptake of reproductive health technologies. Is family planning culturally acceptable? What traditional methods are used for birth control? What are the culturally accepted means of birth control? What are the cultural reasons for marrying early? Why does early marriage persist in some communities and not others? Other challenges that have been documented are

218    Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo in the areas of spousal communication, reproductive health, family, community and religious misinformation about family planning, and access (Akamike et al., 2020; Kulczycki, 2018).

Cultural Beliefs and the Meaning of Illness Health sociologists have shown that it is simplistic to assume that the obstacles to healthcare access in Africa are caused only by the social and economic determinants of health (Barkan, 2017). The social construction or context of the meaning of a disease to a people matters a lot in how they evaluate, respond to, and access different types of healthcare (Conrad & Barker, 2010; Khaitsa et al., 2017). Social constructionism examines how race, ethnicity, traditional beliefs, culture, and other aspects of the social environment affect health, disease, and illness. Cultural values, beliefs, and norms shape the cultural classification of disease etiology and the way lay people understand disease. People’s cultural values often inform their choices when seeking help or managing and responding to illness and disease, as well as in constructing their self-​identity and recovering a sense of their value after a debilitating disease. It is therefore critical to be aware of and sensitive to the influence of culture. The second concern of social constructionism in health is to understand that certain conditions or behaviors that are often regarded as social problems need to be addressed as health problems, such as the use of recreational drugs and alcohol. An additional insight of social constructionism, then, is that certain conditions are medicalized even though some societies do not perceive them as medical conditions (Conrad & Barker, 2010). In Africa, pregnancy and birthing, for example, are usually considered natural occurrences, not medical conditions. But the experience of illness or sickness is heavily influenced by culture. Importantly, culture plays a vital role in the etiology and management of diseases. All cultures have health beliefs related to definitions of disease risk, the causes of disease, and patterns of treatment of disease. The literature on health sociology demonstrates that ethnicity, race, and culture influence people’s behaviors and play a vital role in determining how they feel about their health and illness and the management of their medical treatments (Constantinou, 2014). In most Sub-​Saharan Africa countries, there are disease-​causation beliefs that are not consistent with biomedical norms or germ theory. Some are misconceptions or conspiracy theories, and biomedical scientists often consider local beliefs about causality to be questionable. However, for those who hold them, such beliefs are real, and they should be considered in health interventions, especially when designing enlightenment programs (Amzat & Razum, 2018; Kahissay et al., 2017). The general belief about the etiology of illness in Africa is that three factors can cause disease: (1) natural factors, such as bad diet, insect bites, and so on; (2) preternatural actors, such as belief in witchcraft and enemies; and (3) mystical or spiritual factors, such as angry ancestors and curses, supernatural powers, evil spirits, or the wrath and will of God. These beliefs account for the prevalent use of traditional medicine in Africa and are why traditional medicine

African Sociology of Health and Well-Being    219 is the most sought-​after treatment to ensure well-​being in Africa, particularly in Sub-​ Saharan Africa.

African Traditional Medicine in Health and Well-​Being Sociological research also focuses on traditional medicine, also known as complementary and alternative medicine. Traditional medicine is an essential process of help-​ seeking and cure-​seeking behavior; it is perceived as holistic, attending to both the spiritual and personal needs of the sick. Awah (2006) referred to traditional medicine as practices and approaches that are applied separately or in combination with plant, animal, and mineral-​based drugs; spiritual therapies; manual techniques; and exercises to diagnose, prevent, and treat illnesses or maintain or enhance well-​being. Although the definition of traditional medicine is not unanimous agreed, it is a holistic healthcare system that can be explained at three levels of specialization, including spiritualism and faith healing, divination, and herbalism, which may overlap in some situations (Amzat & Razum, 2018). Traditional healing is much older than orthodox or biomedical science and is more commonly used in Africa than conventional medicine, especially in primary healthcare. Western or modern medical services were introduced during European expeditions in the early to mid-​19th century by health workers brought along by the explorers and traders (Lowes & Montero, 2021), and whose services were not generally available to the indigenes. Church missionaries established the first modern healthcare facilities in most African countries. The then-​modern health services were generally regarded as colonial medicine, primarily meant to provide health security for the colonialists (Lowes & Montero, 2021). For instance, the colonialists established cordon sanitaire, meant to restrict the movement of the local population into colonialist reserved areas as a preventive measure against infections (Headrick, 2014). Another similar colonial approach was residential segregation by establishing government reserved areas with adequate public health measures and amenities also for health protection from the locals with very minimal amenities, including healthcare. During World War I (1914–​1918), many Africans, from countries such as Gambia, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Uganda, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, participated. This resulted in mass casualties, so several military healthcare facilities were established to treat and care for the wounded (Schram, 1971). Other health facilities were established for civilians. With the emphasis on Western medicine, traditional medicine began to wane. However, it is imperative to say that traditional medicine never disappeared in Africa. But it did take a back seat to Western medicine. Traditional medicine is often thought to be a more humanistic and culturally competent approach to understanding specific illnesses; thus there has been a resurgence of interest in it and in use in the last two decades (Gyasi et al., 2016). Some countries have attempted to incorporate traditional medicine into primary healthcare (Innocent, 2016).

220    Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo Sociologists have intensively researched the use of traditional medicine in disease control and the cultural beliefs associated with its continuing patronage (Amzat & Razum, 2018). There is a constant debate over which system is superior, the Western or the traditional, making it challenging to integrate them. Some efforts have been made to integrate the two, but unfortunately, the lack of standardization and unverifiable practices and procedures in traditional medicine make the integration complex. Many African countries have formally recognized traditional medicine and moved to regulate it as an alternative or complementary medicine. Such regulation is also necessary because so many communities have limited access to modern healthcare. Traditional medicine seems to be the closest (physical nearness) healthcare system to underserved communities that lack modern health facilities (Amzat & Razum, 2018). Recently, with the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-​19) pandemic, there has been a clamor to consider using Africa’s indigenous knowledge to prevent and control emerging infectious diseases on the continent, pursuing an Afrocentric response. There is a constant need to understand the influence and limitations of religion and spirituality in healthcare. For instance, fatalism—​that is, resignation to a fate one cannot control—​can be problematic for healthcare, health and illness behavior, risk perception, and health intervention. The influence of spiritualism and religion on health continues to play a significant role in population health. Within the global health discourse, Addiss (2018) identified four spiritual themes or challenges: possible salvation, conspiracy of silence, compassion at a distance, and desire to save the world. Spiritual healing has always been a part of African curative practice. Disease and illness are sometimes attributed to attacks by spirits or to witchcraft and curse that may have ancestral roots. How ill persons choose to evaluate and respond to disease are often predicated on this belief on this causality. According to medical sociologists (Ahlberg, 2017; Shizha, 2012), magic and spiritual (faith) healings are common components of traditional medicine. Armstrong (2004) described (Christian) faith healing as a significant phenomenon in the two most distinctive indigenous Christian religious movements: the prophetic independent churches that appeared in Africa after World Wars I and II, and the charismatic and Pentecostal churches that sprang up in the 1970s. Faith-​healing procedures may include therapeutic fasting and praying for specific personal and health goals. They may involve complete withdrawal from modern medicine, the drinking of “holy water,” the use of “holy oil,” deliverance or exorcism, and sometimes sacrifice performed with the help of a prayer book (Borokini & Lawal, 2014). Islamic clerics also practice spiritual healing using the prayer rosary (tesbau) for spiritual divination to diagnose and treat patients.

Traditional Culture and Well-​Being Traditional cultural practices reflect community members’ norms, values, and beliefs. The most significant family value affecting health in Africa is social capital, that is, the interconnectedness and mutual support among community members that serve to

African Sociology of Health and Well-Being    221 enhance collective self-​efficacy and well-​being. There is a culture of cohesiveness and cooperation in the face of limited formal safety nets in Africa (Addae, 2020; Story, 2013). Addae (2020) observed that social capital is a cultural feature, a vital “health asset” promoting population health and well-​being. Social capital can help to mitigate potential social and health-​related risk behaviors over the life course. Social capital as a cultural feature can be leveraged to achieve specific health goals, including creating a social support system for people living with various health problems and reintegrating them at the end of disease. But some traditional practices could be regarded as harmful; this has been the focus of a critical stance in the African sociology of health and well-​being. Every society has traditional practices that are harmful to population health. Africans certainly have their share, especially with respect to females and children. These include nutritional taboos and traditional birth practices; force feeding children; facial scarification; female genital mutilation; son preference, which makes some women have large families in the quest to have a male child; death from uterus collapse; early and forced marriage; gender-​ based violence; traditional (gender-​ related) beading; and breast ironing. Breast ironing, which is common in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote D’Ivoire, Togo, Central African Republic, Kenya, South Africa, and Benin, is the ironing, flattening, or pounding of the breasts of a pubescent girl to slow or stop their growth (Amahazion, 2021). As with female genital mutilation, people who perpetuate the practice of breast ironing do so to prevent unwanted advances, harassment, or rape by males who view breast development as a sign that a girl is ready for sex, and to prevent HIV/​ AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy resulting from early sexual activity. The health consequences of this practice, apart from the physical pain and psychological trauma it causes, are increased risk of tissue damage, cysts, abscesses, and inability to breastfeed due to breast deformity, which may forever affect a girl’s self and body image.

The Discourse of Health Politics and Access to Healthcare Health policy is also about the effort to have governments assume responsibility for the healthcare of their people through political and economic institutions. Although some financial and political institutions are international, they do not always have a universal global structure because of the considerable differences in such factors as levels of technology and development, available resources, cultural values, and political and economic ideologies in their various locations worldwide. Different ideologies thus define both developed and developing countries—​that is, capitalism, socialism, and welfarism—​and underline the structures, policies, and development of that country. Healthcare is therefore said to be inextricably linked to national political and economic systems, which, are in turn, linked to the prevailing local circumstances and the history of the people. These factors determine the nature and structure of the government’s institutions, including its of healthcare institutions.

222    Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo Most African health sociologists are interested in the politics and policy environment. The focus is often on the formulation, implementation, and impacts of the health policies in African settings. How effective are they? Are they improving community members’ access to health? Availability? Affordability? Are the vulnerable groups considered in the policy process? The case in Africa is often one of good policies without adequate implementation or transferred policies without adequate localization (Odoch et al., 2022). For instance, health insurance is not adequately implemented on the continent, hence there is still a high prevalence of out-​of-​pocket payment for health services, which adversely affect access to healthcare and the ease of using health facilities (Barasa et al., 2021). The critical aspect of the focus on African governments is on weak political will and ineffective policies. In Nigeria, for instance, there has never been a clear health-​policy framework. However, there have been several attempts at health reform over the past 70 years. Before Western colonization, most African countries attempted to reform the traditional healthcare systems in different communities and ethnic groups. But immediate postcolonial unitary healthcare service catered to the British colonialists with less consideration for the indigenous population. The postindependence health plan of the 1950s to 1960s was fragmented. This healthcare plan still persists, and is a challenge to effectiveness and efficiency (Barr et al., 2019). The African Union developed the first Africa Health Strategy 2007–​2015 and a revised strategy from 2016–​2030 (African Union Commission, 2015). The strategy was a response to the inadequate progress being made by African countries, particularly in sub-​ Saharan Africa, in dealing with the increased disease burden caused by the emerging and re-​emerging zoonotic diseases, such as Ebola, Lassa fever, monkeypox, and yellow fever. The union’s revised strategy integrates health research and innovation by multidisciplinary researchers, including health sociologists. The plan aims to strengthen health systems through multisectoral partnerships to address the socioeconomic determinants of health. The Africa Health Strategy also acknowledges the need to expand social protection, ensure food security, and provide quality medicines and technologies, including nurturing African traditional medicine (African Union Commission, 2015). Effective policies and best practices must be implemented to improve population health. Although it is hard to argue that current policies are not limited, the most critical problem is implementation—​the need for adaptive, effective, and efficient implementation. General policies, like those emanating from the African Union, should be adapted to the local environment to achieve the desired outcomes.

Africa within Global Health Space Globalization is another central reality affecting human health. Africa is a shared space with a “common” destiny within the global space. It is about mutual risk, transmissible across the space. Globalization is about the compression of space and time due to advancements in transportation and communication technologies. The capacity for

African Sociology of Health and Well-Being    223 human mobility today is unprecedented and continues to improve. Such development signifies human progress, but it comes with “unintended” consequences, including the worldwide transmission of disease, especially infections. COVID-​19 became a pandemic, jeopardizing the health and economy of every affected country (Olarinde & Amzat, 2021). And there were global health concerns about infectious diseases, including HIV, the Zika virus, the Ebola virus, and Lassa fever, before COVID-​19. Africa could be the origin of or a destination for the global threat of infections. Most global health emergencies are primarily a result of a zoonotic spark, the introduction of a pathogen from either domesticated animals or wildlife into the human population. This possibility of this spark and risk of spread is constant because of intensive agriculture, poor animal management, population growth, and increasing urbanization (Amzat & Razum, 2022; Lindahl & Grace, 2015). Urbanization and human mobility are critical drivers in the spark and spread of infectious diseases. The risk of traditional disease (infectious diseases) remains high in Africa, which also faces increased health risks associated with modern life—​for example, excessive alcohol and tobacco use, unhealthy diets (mainly because of the easy access to fast food), and a sedentary lifestyle. There is increasing trade in unhealthy food (e.g., with high sugar and fat content), creating global health problems related to poor nutrition. Because Africa’s modernization is following in the hegemonic footprints of the West, the burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) is also growing. NCDs were once considered diseases of the rich and wealthy countries. Now low-​income countries carry the heavy burden of NCDs too (Budreviciute et al., 2020). Unfortunately, these countries have a low capacity to manage NCDs, which are often expensive to treat. Invariably, this results in a double burden of infection and NCDs in low-​income countries, including Africa. Despite the double burden, there are also global “threats” of policies that could affect healthcare in Africa. These originate in the continent’s precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial experiences and their adverse effects on the healthcare situation in Africa. The primary culprits are the neoliberal policies forced on African states from the 1970s onward. The International Monetary Fund, through the enforcement of Structural Adjustment Programs, deepens the adverse effects on determinants of health, including education and employment (Gatwiri et al., 2020). These programs’ unfavorable loan terms and constraints on public spending have manifested in significant adverse effects on healthcare. The hallmark of neoliberal policy is the commodification of health in Africa. Unfortunately, there is limited health insurance coverage. Gatwiri et al. (2020) supported the argument that neoliberalism defined the healthcare situation in Africa. This is mainly seen in the reduced healthcare budget, increased privatization of healthcare and social inequality within and between countries, decentralized healthcare governance and funding leading to structural segmentation and fragmentation. At the same time, most African governments are not doing enough to salvage the situation. Invariably, the problems are both internal and external. The global health problem requires both internal and external efforts in health partnerships. Hence, there have been insufficient palliatives through such partnerships, including large-​scale treatment

224    Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo programs, mass vaccination, harm-​reduction efforts, and nutritional programs. This is not to underestimate the contributions of many global health initiatives, but to underscore the prevailing healthcare challenges in Africa. More internal, and external, efforts are still required to alleviate the healthcare situation.

Conclusion The central focus in the African sociology of health and well-​being is the array of social conditions and factors affecting health. Health and well-​being have significant social dimensions, including material development, community embeddedness, cultural orientation, and social role performance. Health sociology recognizes the biomedical dimension of health, illness, and well-​being, but it is more interested in social framing and construction, etiology, experiences, and implications. The chapter has shown that the sociological interrogation of health and well-​being in Africa finds its space by exploring the social situation in Africa, including but not limited to economic and gendered circumstances, increasing population, cultural and traditional practices, limited access to modern medicine, the use of traditional medicine, the social construction of health, and the influence of globalization. Africa is modernizing by following the hegemonic footsteps of the Global North, but unfortunately, it carries the heaviest burden of infectious diseases and NCDs. The themes identified are central to a sociological understanding of health and well-​being in the African context.

Acronym NCD

Non-​communicable diseases

References Addae, E. A. (2020). Socioeconomic and demographic determinants of familial social capital inequalities: A cross-​sectional study of young people in sub-​Saharan African context. BMC Public Health, 20, 1–​14. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​889-​020-​09135-​0 Addiss, D. G. (2018). Spiritual themes and challenges in global health. Journal of Medical Humanities, 39, 337–​348. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​912-​015-​9378-​9 African Union Commission. (2015). Africa health strategy: 2016–​2030. https://​au.int/​sites/​defa​ ult/​files/​docume​nts/​30357-​doc-​final​_​ahs​_​str​ateg​y_​fo​rmat​ted.pdf Ahlberg, B. M. (2017). Integrated health care systems and indigenous medicine: Reflections from the sub-​Sahara African region. Frontiers in Sociology, 2(12). https://​doi.org/​10.3389/​ fsoc.2017.00012 Akamike, I. C., Okedo-​Alex, I. N., Eze, I. I., Ezeanosike, O. B., & Uneke, C. J. (2020). Why does uptake of family planning services remain sub-​optimal among Nigerian women? A

African Sociology of Health and Well-Being    225 systematic review of challenges and implications for policy. Contraception and Reproductive Medicine, 5, 1–​11. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s40​834-​020-​00133-​6 Allen, T., & Storm, L. (2012). Quests for therapy in northern Uganda: Healing at Laropi revisited. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 6, 22–​46. https://​doi.org/​doi:10.1080/​17531​ 055.2012.664​702 Amahazion, F. (2021). Breast ironing: A brief overview of an underreported harmful practice. Journal of Global Health, 11, 03055. https://​doi.org/​10.7189/​jogh.11.03055 Amzat, J., & Magaji, A. M. (2019). Sociology of social problems: An introduction. In A. A. Abdullahi & E. M. Ajala (Eds.), Contemporary issues in sociology and social work: An Africanist perspective (pp. 45–​60). College Press, Lead City University. Amzat, J., & Razum, O. (2014). Sociology and health. In Medical Sociology in Africa (pp. 1–​19). Springer. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​03986-​2_​1 Amzat, J., & Razum, O. (2018). Towards a sociology of health discourse in Africa. Springer. Amzat, J., & Razum, O. (2022). Globalization, health and the Global South: A critical approach. Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978100​3247​975 Armstrong, K. A. (2004). The spiral staircase: My climb out of darkness. Random House. Ashforth, A. (2005). Muthi, medicine and witchcraft: Regulating “African science” in post-​ apartheid South Africa? Journal of African Studies, 31, 211–​242. https://​doi.org/​doi:10.1080/​ 025339​5050​8628​7 14 Awah, P. K. (2006). Diabetes and traditional medicine in Africa. Diabetes Voices, 51, 24–​26. Barasa, E., Kazungu, J., Nguhiu, P., & Ravishankar, N. (2021). Examining the level and inequality in health insurance coverage in 36 sub-​Saharan African countries. BMJ Global Health, 6(4), e004712. https://​doi.org/​10.1136/​bmjgh-​2020-​004​7 12 Barkan, S. E. (2017). Health, illness, and society: An introduction to medical sociology. Rowman & Littlefield. Barr, A., Garrett, L., Marten, R., & Kadandale, S. (2019). Health sector fragmentation: Three examples from Sierra Leone. Globalization and Health, 15, 1–​8. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​ 992-​018-​0447-​5 Bongaarts, J., & Casterline, J. (2013). Fertility transition: Is sub-​Saharan Africa different? Population and Development Review, 38, 153–​168. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1728-​4457.2013.00557.x Borokini, T. I., & Lawal, I. O. (2014). Traditional medicine practices among the Yoruba people of Nigeria: A historical perspective. Journal of Medicinal Plants Studies, 2, 20–​33. https://​ asset-​pdf.scina​pse.io/​prod/​260​7329​632/​260​7329​632.pdf Budreviciute, A., Damiati, S., Sabir, D. K., Onder, K., Schuller-​Goetzburg, P., Plakys, G., Katileviciute, A., Khoja, S., & Kodzius, R. (2020). Management and prevention strategies for non-​communicable diseases (NCDs) and their risk factors. Frontiers in Public Health, 8, 57111. https://​doi.org/​Doi:10.3389/​fpubh.2020.574​111 Casterline, J. B. (2017). Prospects for fertility decline in Africa. Population and Development Review, 43, 3–​20. https://​doi.org/​DOI:10.1111/​padr.12064 Conrad, P., & Barker, K. K. (2010). The social construction of illness: Key insights and policy implications. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51, S67–​S79. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 00221​4651​0383​495 Constantinou, C. (2014). Applied sociology of health: A problem-​based learning approach. Radcliffe Publishing. https://​doi.org/​10.1201/​b20​746 Dillip, A., Mboma, Z. M., Greer, G., & Lorenz, L. M. (2018). “To be honest, women do everything”: Understanding roles of men and women in net care and repair in Southern Tanzania. Malaria Journal, 17, 459. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​936-​018-​2608-​7

226    Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo Erzse, A., Goldstein, S., Tugendhaft, A., Norris, S. A., Barker, M., & Hofman, K. J. (2021). The roles of men and women in maternal and child nutrition in urban South Africa: A qualitative secondary analysis. Maternal & Child Nutrition, 17(3), e13161. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ mcn.13161 Gatwiri, G. J., & McLaren, H. G. (2016). Discovering my own African feminism: Embarking on a journey to explore Kenyan women’s oppression. Journal of International Women’s Studies, 17(4), 263–​273. Gatwiri, K., Amboko, J., & Okolla, D. (2020). The implications of neoliberalism on African economies, health outcomes and wellbeing: A conceptual argument. Social Theory & Health, 18, 86–​101. https://​doi.org/​10.1057/​s41​285-​019-​00111-​2 Geschiere, P. (2020). “The African family is large, very large” mobility and the flexibility of kinship—​examples from Cameroon. Ethnography, 21(3), 335–​354. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 14661​3812​0938​076 Gilbert, L. (2010). “My biggest fear was that people would reject me once they knew my status . . .”: Stigma as experienced by patients in an HIV/​AIDS clinic in Johannesburg, South Africa. Health & Social Care in the Community, 18(2), 139–​146. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ j.1365-​2524.2009.00881.x Gyasi, R. M., Asante, F., Abass, K., Yeboah, J. Y., Adu-​Gyamfi, S., & Amoah, P. A. (2016). Do health beliefs explain traditional medical therapies utilisation? Evidence from Ghana. Cogent Social Sciences, 2, 1. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​23311​886.2016.1209​995 Hafferty, F. W., & Castellani, B. (2006). Medical sociology. In C. D. Bryant & D. L. Peck (Eds.), 21st century sociology: A reference handbook (pp. 331–​338). SAGE Publications. Hamel, K., Tong, B., & Hofer, M. (2019, March 28). Poverty in Africa is falling but not fast enough. The Brookings Institute. https://​www.brooki​ngs.edu/​blog/​fut​ure-​deve​lopm​ent/​ 2019/​03/​28/​pove​rty-​in-​afr​ica-​is-​now-​fall​ing-​but-​not-​fast-​eno​ugh/​ Hammarström, A., Lundman, B., & Norberg, A. (2021). The importance of having a paid job: Gendered experiences of health and ill-​health in daily life among middle-​aged women and men. BMC Public Health, 21, Article 2023. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​889-​021-​12034-​7 Headrick, D. R. (2014). Sleeping sickness epidemics and colonial responses in East and Central Africa, 1900–​1940. PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 8(4), e2772. https://​doi.org/​10.1371/​jour​ nal.pntd.0002​772 Innocent, E. (2016). Trends and challenges toward integration of traditional medicine in formal health-​care system: Historical perspectives and appraisal of education curricula in Sub-​Sahara Africa. Journal of Intercultural Ethnopharmacology, 5, 312–​316. https://​doi.org/​ 10.5455/​jice.201​6042​1125​217 Kahissay, M. H., Fenta, T. G., & Boon, H. (2017). Beliefs and perception of ill-​health causation: A sociocultural qualitative study in rural North-​Eastern Ethiopia. BMC Public Health, 17(1), 124. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​889-​017-​4052-​y Khaitsa, M. L., Kaneene, J. B., Lumutenga, N. W., & Sengendo, M. (2017). The intersectionality of sociology and health: Case studies of the effect of culture on disease. Pan African Medical Journal, 27(4), 13. https://​doi.org/​10.11604/​pamj.supp.2017.27.4.12446 Khumalo, I. P., Ejoke, U. P., Asante, K. O., & Rugira, J. (2021). Measuring social well-​being in Africa: An exploratory structural equation modeling study. African Journal of Psychological Assessment, 3, a37. https://​doi.org/​10.4102/​ajopa.v3i0.37 Kulczycki, A. (2018). Overcoming family planning challenges in Africa: Toward meeting unmet need and scaling up service delivery. African Journal of Reproductive Health, 22(1), 9–​13. https://​doi.org/​10.29063/​ajrh2​018/​v22i1.1

African Sociology of Health and Well-Being    227 Lardies, C. A., Dryding, D., & Logan, C. (2019). Gains and gaps: Perceptions and experiences of gender in Africa (Policy Paper No. 61). Afrobarometer. https://​afroba​rome​ter.org/​sites/​defa​ ult/​files/​publi​cati​ons/​Pol​icy%20pap​ers/​ab_​r7_​policypaperno61_​gains_​and_​gaps_​g​ende​r​​​ _​pe​rcep​tion​s_​in​_​afr​ica.pdf Lindahl, J. F., & Grace, D. (2015). The consequences of human actions on risks for infectious diseases: A review. Infection Ecology & Epidemiology, 5(1), Article 30048. https://​doi.org/​ 10.3402/​iee.v5.30048 Lowes, S., & Montero, E. (2021). The legacy of colonial medicine in central Africa. American Economic Review, 111(4), 1284–​1314. https://​doi.org/​10.1257/​aer.20180​284 Manda, D. K., & Mwakubo, S. (2014). Gender and economic development in Africa: An overview. Journal of African Economies, 23, i4–​i17. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​jae/​ejt​021 McKague, K., & Harrison, S. (2019). Gender and health social enterprises in Africa: A research agenda. International Journal for Equity in Health, 18, 95. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​ 939-​019-​0994-​2 Musoke, D., Boynton, P., Butler, C., & Musoke, M. B. (2014). Health seeking behaviour and challenges in utilising health facilities in Wakiso district, Uganda. African Health Sciences, 14(4), 1046–​1055. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​ahs.v14i4.36 Odoch, W. D., Senkubuge, F., Masese, A. B., & Honoro, C. (2022). How are global health policies transferred to sub-​Saharan Africa countries? A systematic critical review of literature. Global Health, 18, 25. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​992-​022-​00821-​9 Ogunmefun, C. G., Gilbert, L., & Schatz, E. (2011). Older female caregivers and HIV/​AIDS-​ related secondary stigma in rural South Africa. Journal of Cross-​Cultural Gerontology, 26, 85–​102. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​823-​010-​9129-​3 Olarinde, M. O., & Amzat, J. (2021). The infected economy: Interrogating the early economic impacts of COVID-​19 pandemic in Nigeria. Annals of Public Health Issues, 1, 50–​63. https://​ doi.org/​10.2478/​aphi-​2021-​0005 Oleribe, O. O., Momoh, J., Uzochukwu, B. S. C., Mbofana, F., Adebiyi, A., Barbera, T., & Taylor-​ Robinson, S. D. (2019). Identifying key challenges facing healthcare systems in Africa and potential solutions. International Journal of General Medicine, 12, 395–​403. https://​doi.org/​ 10.2147/​IJGM.S223​882 Otwombe, K., Dietrich, J., Laher, F., Hornschuh, S., Nkala, B., Chimoyi, L., Kaida, A., Gray, G. E., & Miller, C. L. (2015). Health-​seeking behaviours by gender among adolescents in Soweto, South Africa. Global Health Action, 8, 25670. https://​doi.org/​10.3402/​gha.v8.25670 Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. Free Press. Ruggeri, K., Garcia-​Garzon, E., Maguire, Á., Matz, S., & Huppert, F. A. (2020). Well-​being is more than happiness and life satisfaction: A multidimensional analysis of 21 countries. Health and Quality of Life Outcomes, 18, 192. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​955-​020-​01423-​y Schram, R. (1971). A history of Nigerian health care services. Ibadan University Press. Shizha, E. (2012). Health and wellness in Southern Africa: Incorporating indigenous and western healing practices. International Journal of Psychology and Counselling, 4, 59–​67. Sia, D., Onadja, Y., Hajizadeh, M., Heymann, S. J., Brewer, T. F., & Nandi, A. (2016). What explains gender inequalities in HIV/​AIDS prevalence in sub-​Saharan Africa? Evidence from the demographic and health surveys. BMC Public Health, 16, 1136. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​ 889-​016-​3783-​5 Story, W. T. (2013). Social capital and health in the least developed countries: A critical review of the literature and implications for a future research agenda. Global Public Health, 8(9), 983–​999. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​17441​692.2013.842​259

228    Jimoh Amzat, Oliver Razum, and Aisha A. Adaranijo United Nations. (2019). World population prospects 2019. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Dynamics. United Nations. https://​pop​ulat​ion.un.org/​wpp Vlassoff, C. (2007). Gender differences in determinants and consequences of health and illness. Journal of Health, Population and Nutrition, 25, 47–​61. WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group, & United Nations Population Division. (2019). Maternal mortality: Levels and trends: 2000–​2017. https://​www.who.int/​publi​cati​ons/​i/​item/​ 978924​1516​488 Winskell, K. H., Hill, E., & Obyerodhyamb, O. (2011). Comparing HIV-​related symbolic stigma in six African countries: Social representations in young people’s narratives. Social Science & Medicine, 73, 1257–​1265. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.socsci​med.2011.07.007

Chapter 13

So cial Determ i na nts of Health in A fri c a Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo

Introduction Social determinants of health (SDH) are associated with more than 50 percent of the differentials in health outcomes—​that is, the observed variations in disease burden, access to healthcare services, and treatment outcomes among various groups in Africa. Even so, the social factors associated with health outcomes differentials are often discounted by health authorities and researchers in favour of medical care and health services provision (Allen et al., 2020). SDH refer to the conditions into which individuals are born, grow up, live, work, and age. They include political, economic, social, and cultural factors such as education, employment, water and sanitation, housing and infrastructure, and social security (Umuhoza & Ataguba, 2018; WHO, 2008). The World Health Organization (WHO) has described SDH as “the social characteristics within which living takes place” (WHO, 2010, p. 9). Thus the WHO’s definition of health is holistic and acknowledges that social factors are as important as medical factors in shaping people’s health (Amzat & Razum, 2018a). As is evident from these definitions, the determinants of health extend beyond the domains of the healthcare sector. The unequal distribution of the disease burden is strongly linked to the social, political, historical, and power relations; social exclusion; deprivation; poverty; and inequality that affect health distribution. SDH are not particular to Africa but are found worldwide. This chapter discusses the basic concepts of inequity, equity, and inequality based on a few examples. Scientific investigations of health inequities in Africa acknowledge the need to shift the focus to political, demographic, socioeconomic, cultural, and other determinants of health. Studies in diverse social milieus have shown that health disparities are common globally, yet comparatively, the

230    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo burden of disease in Africa far outstrips that on any other continent (Amzat & Razum, 2022). Disease burden comprises noncommunicable diseases (NCDs); infectious diseases; maternal, neonatal, and child mortality; injuries; nutrition-​related diseases; and mental illnesses, all of which have been significantly reduced in developed nations. Yet reducing or eliminating health disparities in developing countries remains a global concern. Many perspectives have been used in the study of SDH, including the system approach and structural theory, among others. The theories of SDH and inequalities mainly address the power variations within a society (McCartney et al., 2013). The structurally embedded inequalities that give rise to inequities in health outcomes in Africa can be understood through the application of structural theory and the social production of health, which traces the cause of unequal health outcomes among social groups to the differential socioeconomic conditions they experience throughout the life course (McCartney et al., 2013). The focus is on the economic and political determinants. The structural theory acknowledges the negative impact of unequal income distribution on individual psychosocial well-​being and recognizes the structural determinants of such inequalities (WHO, 2010). Social stratification—​social ranking in terms of economic and political power and social prestige—​results in differential political and economic opportunities and resources. Figure 13.1 shows the vicious circle of SDH. The structural and systemic factors include socioeconomic structures, healthcare systems, policies, and financing related to access to health. The social structural issues include community norms and gender. Apart from these, structural issues also include historical power distribution and education. Much

Structural and systemic inequalities and imbalances Differential opportunities and resources (e.g., power, knowledge and money)

Differential morbidity and mortality

Differential disease burden and healthcare access

Differential exposure, risk and vulnerability

Figure 13.1  Vicious circle of social determinants of health

Social Determinants of Health in Africa    231 of the population is on a lower rung of society, with limited opportunities and resources to maintain quality healthcare. The limited opportunities that result from structural or systemic deprivation lead to differential exposure and vulnerability to diseases (Labonté & Schrecker, 2007; Marmot & Allen, 2014). The consequential results are the differential health outcomes and disease burden, leading to differential morbidity and mortality (Figure 13.1). The SDH cover a full set of factors that manifest as a vicious circle because they have the capacity to reproduce themselves. The sections that follow will examine the concepts of inequality and inequity in healthcare, the social determinants of health, the health needs of vulnerable groups, trends in health inequality, and how to address health inequities in Africa.

Central Themes in Social Determinants of Health: Inequality and Inequity in Healthcare Inequality, inequity, and equity in access to healthcare are major conceptual underpinnings of the SDH framework. The terms “health inequality” and “health disparity” are often used interchangeably, though most authors in the United States prefer “health disparity,” while those in Europe often use “health inequality” (Bleich et al., 2012). Both terms describe unavoidable variations in aspects of individual or group health. The interest here pertains to health differences that are related only to the social characteristics of people and are not moral judgments about the fairness of the health variations (Arcaya et al., 2015). This presupposes that health inequalities are socially determined and are generally defined based on unequal disease burden or behavioral risk factors found among population subgroups (Bleich et al., 2012). A third term, “health inequity,” describes a form of health inequality arising from unjust or unfair health differences in society. Moral judgments are applied to health inequity, but not to health inequality. Health inequity is an unnecessary and avoidable health difference that is unjustly permitted to persist and is perceived as a systematic health differential that is preventable with rational social measures (Arcaya et al., 2015). The WHO refers to health inequities as the systematic differences in the health status and the distribution of health resources between different groups, prompting differential health outcomes (WHO, 2018). The Commission on the Social Determinants of Health sees this as a situation where avoidable systematic differences in health are allowed to fester. Therefore, social justice is one of the ways of addressing health inequities in society (WHO, 2008). Health inequities are manifestations of differential SDH, leading to health variations and outcomes (Owusu-​Addo et al., 2019).

232    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo Healthcare equity obtains when healthcare resources and the accessibility of healthcare services are consistent with the people’s needs. The concept of “health equity” gained prominence in the late 1970s following the Alma-​Ata Declaration and the Health for All initiative. Health equity is “the absence of unfair and avoidable or remediable differences in health among population groups defined socially, economically, demographically or geographically” (WHO, 2010, p. 12). It is the opposite of health inequity, again, the unjust difference in health that is produced in the society and systematically spread among the population. Ethical norms and moral judgments are applied to health differences that lead to health inequity (WHO, 2010); whereas health equity entails political and economic efforts. Achieving equity in health is a daunting challenge in resource-​poor settings, where rationing healthcare services and resources is the practice. Although health should be a human right, healthcare access for all has been an illusion. Not everyone who needs and desires good healthcare has access to the services in low-​and middle-​income countries (LMICs) and even sometimes in economically advanced countries. SDH include social conditions, including material and living conditions, as well as the healthcare system (WHO, 2010). Material circumstances cover consumption patterns, including ability to purchase a healthy meal, housing quality, type of neighborhood, and work environment (WHO, 2010). Social circumstances encompass living conditions and social relationships and the availability or nonavailability of social support and coping mechanisms. Behavioral factors include issues of nutrition, tobacco and alcohol intake, and physical activity. Biological factors relate to individual genetic composition.

Social Determinants of Health in the African Context Debates on SDH emphasize the social gradient—​that is, assessing individual socioeconomic status based on personal characteristics. The social context of health in Africa necessitates shifting attention to political, demographic, socioeconomic, cultural and other variables (Amzat & Razum, 2014). The origin of most SDH in Africa is traceable to the colonial experience, which engendered the current political and socioeconomic structure in different countries. For instance, intracountry differences in health investment are seen between the northern and southern and the rural and urban parts of Nigeria, and are attributable to the varying colonial policies followed in these locations. These are like the regional health gaps in Ghana and the racial health inequalities in South Africa. The current healthcare system in South Africa replicates the former apartheid regime; that is, it benefits the powerful, White, wealthy elite more than the poor Black majority population (Ataguba & Alaba, 2012). As noted, historical power distribution is another explanation behind the connection between social inequality and disease burden in Africa. Most countries in

Social Determinants of Health in Africa    233 Africa experienced colonialism. The political class in many of them have maintained key elements of the colonial rule, such as power and resource control by the select few. Access to quality healthcare services therefore depends on social variables such as the racialized educational status, place of residence, and income level (Eshetu & Woldesenbet, 2011). Notable sociohistorical changes introduced by the imperialists that have left indelible marks on the social fabric in Africa include the installation of political elites that replaced precolonial social structures (traditional institutions); the introduction of the money economy, nuclear family system, and capitalism and capitalist values; and Westernization. These have conjointly entrenched the current social stratification system, promoting the health inequalities and inequities being witnessed across Africa today (Ichoku et al., 2013). The current distribution of health status on the African continent matches up to the social stratification experienced in each African country. However, there are country-​ level variations in the magnitude of these issues (Eshetu & Woldesenbet, 2011). In South Africa, the low-​income group tends to experience ill-​health and disability more than the high-​income group. At the same time, increased socioeconomic status can lead to a corresponding improvement in population health, especially among historically disadvantaged Black people. Similarly, health inequity differed for the residents of specific geographic locations (e.g., urban areas) and for those with higher education, depending on the type of housing. A study found that employment status, education and knowledge, type of housing, and infrastructure played significant roles in determining health and well-​being of South Africans (Ataguba et al., 2015). These were attributed to the historical systemic fragmentation and racial segregation in the country, which benefited the White majority. These deep-​rooted social determinants take longer to redress, just as community cultures, norms, and practices take time to change. Given the role of community norms and values in health promotion, prevention and treatment are critical factors in the SDH inequities in Africa and elsewhere. Evidence has shown that health and illness have a sociocultural context rather than universal precepts. The cultural nature of health and illness indicates that it should not be perceived from only one (Western) perspective (Ichoku et al., 2013). Neither should the social variables influencing it in different cultures be overlooked. Moreover, health and individual agency are mutually reinforcing. In Africa, harmful cultural practices such as the preference for sons and desire for large families have been blamed for health inequalities among population subgroups, especially those related to women and child health. Poor knowledge of harmful cultural practices contributes to ill-​health (Benatar, 2013), particularly among the less educated. Overall, a cultural conservatism in Africa sustains a preference for and the popularity of traditional and alternative medicine, as well as the resistance to practicing safe health behaviors. Another major determinant of health is healthcare financing. According to the WHO, healthcare financing has increased in Africa. However, public spending on health did not increase consistently with rising fiscal capacity in the region. Low healthcare financing was connected to political instability and fragility, corruption, and poor

234    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo governance. Typically, budgetary allocations to health do not always translate to actual expenditures because of resource instability. In most African countries, high-​end care (tertiary and secondary-​level) tends to receive more spending (up to 65%) than low-​ end care (primary-​level care), with allocations of less than 40 percent of government spending. Low-​end care was primarily financed by private and external donors, such as the Global Fund (WHO, 2016). The high cost of healthcare, coupled with low income and education, affects the pattern of healthcare seeking by Africans, also helping to explain their consistent preference for alternative healthcare options—​traditional medicine and spiritual healing; this often complicates ill-​health conditions due to misdiagnosis, poor treatment, and substandard medicine. Poverty or low socioeconomic status and poor health are mutually reinforcing. Poverty is the primary risk factor for illness and premature death (WHO, 2008) and the dominant socioeconomic variable responsible for health inequalities in Africa. Socioeconomic status is significantly associated with individual and household health via living and working conditions. It also impacts nutritional status, access to clean water, sanitary and hygiene conditions, the quality of healthcare services and health status. Unequal income distribution equals poor health outcomes (Eshetu & Woldesenbet, 2011). The poverty rate in the region is the highest in the world: approximately two-​thirds of the world’s extremely poor people ( more than 643 million) reside in Africa (Okoi & Bwawa, 2020). Poverty is often the reason for social vulnerability. The outbreak of COVID-​19 has exacerbated the age-​old social inequalities by causing a further deterioration of the conditions of vulnerable people worldwide, including Africa. Most urban residents in the low-​and middle-​income countries are also exposed to socioeconomic, political, ecological, and housing challenges (Oni et al., 2020). Unregulated industrial activity and poor enforcement of traffic laws increase urban residents’ exposure to air pollution. In contrast, the risk of physical injury from traffic accidents may discourage physical activities such as cycling and walking on busy urban roads (Oni et al., 2020). Additionally, intercontinental trade and globalization-​ induced movements and flows of people have increased the transmissibility of infectious diseases such as the Ebola virus and coronavirus diseases (Amzat & Razum, 2022). Inadequate human and vital healthcare resources, incessant strike actions, the brain drain, weak health systems due to bad governance, corruption, capitalism and the emphasis on profit, and poor healthcare governance all affect healthcare service delivery in the region. Most of the elected officials seldom implement people-​oriented policies that could reduce the social barriers to good health. A good number of foreign economic policies that have been forced on Africa are inimical to attaining better health outcomes (Eshetu & Woldesenbet, 2011). The International Monetary Fund’s economic policies, for example, the Structural Adjustment Programs, have worsened the situation for numerous impoverished households in Africa, further expanding health inequities. Many African countries have a low gross domestic product (GDP). Evidence proves that a fall in a

Social Determinants of Health in Africa    235 country’s GDP hinders healthcare improvement, while an increase in GDP promotes improvement (African Development Bank, 2021). The general weak production and industrial base in Africa is also problematic for healthcare. Most African countries are overreliant on the export of raw materials and import of finished pharmaceutical products (Holtz, 2021), illustrating another dimension of global health disparities. Infrastructural efficiency also affects healthy industrial development. Many countries are plagued by an erratic power supply, and most rural residents are not connected to the national electricity grid. A poor electricity supply also affects healthcare services, in general and in vaccine storage and distribution to hard-​ to-​reach communities. Similarly, there are the issues of overdependence on foreign aid from Western nations, underdeveloped health technology, and the mismanagement of inadequate healthcare resources. Poverty manifests in substantial differences in health outcomes in Africa, where an individual’s access to drinking water and hygiene depends on their income (Okoi & Bwawa, 2020). Between 2000 and 2017, an estimated 495 million Africans lacked access to safe drinking water, constituting another threat to health equity. Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Ethiopia were the most affected by water issues, where about 87 million, 60 million, and 23.9 million people, respectively, could not access safe drinking water between 2000 and 2017 (Okoi & Bwawa, 2020). In general, the poverty that itself creates poor attitudes to hygiene and sanitation and the inaccessibility to clean water are risk factors for communicable diseases. Open defecation remains a significant public health challenge in the region because many people lack toilet facilities due to poverty. About 18.75 percent of Ghanaians engaged in open defecation in 2015 (Osumanu et al., 2019); 46 million Nigerians reportedly practiced it in 2018 (Ajayi & Philip, 2018). Open defecation is significantly associated with poverty and a risk factor for the transmission of infection and under-​five mortality (Osumanu et al., 2019). Social cohesion, social capital, healthcare systems, and political and economic ideologies are prominent SDH and aspects of class structure that influence health. The social organization of health systems in Africa follows three broad patterns: socialist, capitalist, and mixed. Societies with an egalitarian political ideology with respect to socialized healthcare, such as in France, Cuba, Russia, and the United Kingdom, have better health indices than those with a neoliberal ideology that emphasizes markets and profits. Most countries established priorities to reflect international declarations (e.g., the Declaration on Primary Healthcare in 1978 and 2018 and the Rio Political Declaration on SDH of 2011) and the treaties to which they are signatories (e.g., the International Health Regulation, and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, both in 2005). The national health policy in South Africa, for instance, allows for a public-​private mix. Those at the bottom of the economic or income ladder patronize public health services; those at the top patronize private health facilities. The latter facilities receive more financing than the former, and the quality of services provided by the two are also not on a par (Ataguba & Alaba, 2012).

236    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo

Health Needs of Vulnerable Groups African researchers, epidemiologists, and sociologists have addressed the phenomenon of SDH from different perspectives. However, most of the health inequalities research takes a unidimensional approach, exploring a few dimensions of healthcare access and outcomes (Gordon et al., 2020). The underlying immediate and intermediary determinants of health among vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as people living with disabilities, women, children, the aged, the less educated, poor or low-​ income earners, and rural and urban slum residents, were not addressed holistically. This makes the formulation and implementation of policies targeted to their health needs more difficult. Racial, ethnic, and other social biases institutionalized by the social structures in African countries reduce the quality of life, life chances, and opportunities for better health among disadvantaged populations (Williams & Cooper, 2019). The origin of global health inequalities is associated with the financial deregulation, liberalization, and the privatization of trade, which began in the late 1970s. These economic realities shaped economic growth and impacted living conditions and access to public health services differently in affluent and developing countries (Benatar, 2013). The combined effects of economic recession, loan servicing, ever-​increasing debt, and a poor production base affect the value of many currencies against the US dollar (African Development Bank, 2021). Likewise, inflation has reduced the purchasing power of many currencies in Africa, affecting household consumption, the cost of living, nutrition, and health status. The response to the COVID-​19 pandemic has compounded the health disparities in Africa by increasing the government’s public financing and borrowing needs (African Development Bank, 2021; Olarinde & Amzat, 2021). The health of women and children is more threatened by the morbidity and mortality associated with poor nutrition and maternal and reproductive health issues stemming from gender inequality, which predisposes them to poverty (Duran et al., 2019). This is attributable to the intergenerational effects of gender biases and inequities in education, skills, and women’s economic participation (WHO, 2008). This is understandable, as education enlightens women to make decisions concerning their health and that of their children (Duran et al., 2019). In Africa and Asia, gender power relations are a significant determinant of health production and susceptibility to illnesses. The primary determining issues include gender roles, resource accessibility, health-​system organization, and lower investment in sexual and reproductive health services, with combined effects on the health and well-​being of women and the family. Women bear the brunt of gender inequality. Instances of gender inequalities, such as discriminatory feeding practices, violence against women, and unfair division of labor significantly affect women’s health, child health, and survival. African countries such as Libya, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and Niger face humanitarian crises due to conflicts, terrorism, and

Social Determinants of Health in Africa    237 persecution, which have worsened the existing health disparities (Okoi & Bwawa, 2020). Thousands of people who have been displaced from their homes in South Sudan have taken refuge in nearby countries, including Uganda, Ethiopia, the DRC, and Kenya (Okoi & Bwawa, 2020). Currently, there are numerous internally displaced persons in northeast Nigeria and the neighboring countries (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2021). Similarly, natural disasters have made people homeless, experiencing hardship and living in unsanitary conditions that predispose them to infections and diseases. The health risks posed by extreme weather, inadequate food and water, and the inaccessibility of healthcare services compound the existing health inequities. Notably, the health needs of women, children, and adolescents often go unmet during crises. Spatial inequalities impact SDH differently for rural and urban residents. Many rural communities and the slums in African cities are affected by diseases of inequity, attributable to sociopolitical neglect by the ruling class. The distance to the nearest health facility in the African region was two or more hours for an estimated one-​sixth of the population (Falchetta et al., 2020). In Malawi, it takes the average rural resident between 45 and 85 minutes to get to the nearest healthcare facility, depending on the mode of transportation used (Palk et al., 2020). In urban locations, even slum residents, who are closer to the city, face accessibility challenges due to bad roads and poor means of transportation. The geographical accessibility to healthcare services has implications for healthcare outcomes (Wariri et al., 2021). Most health outcomes were poorer in slum communities than in urban areas because slums are socially defined as informal settlements. Thus, they tend to suffer deprivation in terms of public service availability, infrastructural development, and physical planning (Zerbo et al., 2020). Urban slum residents in low-​to medium-​income communities are disproportionally more at risk than their rural counterparts due to their poor living conditions, poor diets, and low physical activity (Oni et al., 2020). In this population, alcohol, hunger, and other distressing situations are linked with suicidal thoughts. Swahn et al. (2010) found that slum children in Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia experienced more high-​level poverty, communicable and chronic diseases, and inadequate parental or family support than other children of their age, hence their vulnerability and the increased chance of suicidal ideations. Lifestyles both before and during adolescence define an individual’s health in adulthood. The experiences of adolescents in relation to social norms, media advertisements, their home and school environments, and their journeys to and from school were found to be associated with their dietary habits and physical activities (Oni et al., 2020). Adolescents and young persons in urban slums are more likely to be exposed to illicit drugs than children in middle-​and high-​income settlements. Kabore et al. (2019), studying Ghanaians who had been undergoing rehabilitation for substance use, reported drug availability and the cost of drugs as other predisposing factors. The prevalence of an unhealthy diet and illicit drug and alcohol use is associated with the impact of global trade and media.

238    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo Illicit drug use has significant physical and mental health impacts for both users and the public, since drug users are prone to engage in dangerous behaviors, including violence and armed robbery, and to make poor sexual choices that can put the health of others at risk (Kabore et al., 2019). Substance abuse triggers mental disorders among young persons (Kasirye & Mutaawe, 2018). And substance abuse is also a major predisposing factor for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV/​AIDS because users tend to have an early sexual debut and multiple casual sexual partners. They are also inconsistent in use of protections and delay care seeking (Murali & Jayaraman, 2018; Winston et al., 2015). Like slum children, street-​connected children and youth (SCCY) are exposed to risky behaviors and vulnerable, given the harsh conditions in which they live (Amzat, 2008; Winston et al., 2015). A study in Egypt showed economic instability that resulted in family dysfunction and exposed young persons to dangerous street life (Kasirye & Mutaawe, 2018). In Kenya, the prevalence of HIV/​AIDS and STIs among SCCY was higher than the national average. Poor knowledge and education, transactional sex, early sexual debut, poor use of condoms, drug abuse, and multiple sexual partners were identified as predisposing factors for these health outcomes (Winston et al., 2015). Social inequalities are linked with HIV/​AIDS prevalence and late HIV testing and treatment due to the costs involved and the inaccessibility of healthcare facilities. Similarly, social inequalities mean that the burden of HIV and STIs is heavily shouldered by women and girls (Lewis, 2011). Their vulnerability owes to structural barriers, social norms, inequalities, and social injustice. The high rate of social, cultural, and structural barriers to HIV/​AIDS prevention and control contributes to the burden of HIV/​AIDS on the continent. These barriers, including poor funding, corruption, unequal distribution of health facilities, and health workers’ migration (or brain drain), have denied many HIV/​AIDS patients access to qualified personnel, antiretroviral drugs, and prevention and treatment services, especially in rural Africa. Africa’s HIV/​AIDS response has been primarily donor driven. Just as the SDH have contributed to the incidence and outcomes of COVID-​19, the pandemic has worsened the SDH (Upshaw et al., 2021) by putting additional strain on scarce healthcare resources in Africa and presenting an ethical challenge with respect to resource allocation. The COVID-​19 outbreak has exposed and exacerbated the socioeconomic inequalities that affect health, especially among marginalized groups, who are further exposed to the risks of other health conditions because of the COVID-​19 control measures (WHO, 2021). For instance, persons living with HIV/​AIDS and NCDs have a higher risk of COVID-​19 complications and premature death. The more social, economic, and health effects of the COVID-​19 outbreak were found among low-​income earners living in poor and overcrowded housing and people whose occupations exposed them to the virus, increasing their susceptibility to and the negative consequences of the infection (Upshaw et al., 2021). Because of climate change, countries like Malawi and Somalia have experienced droughts and floods affecting agricultural yields, income, and household nutrition. The

Social Determinants of Health in Africa    239 implication is that climate change adversely affects food security and water accessibility in Africa. Farmers and others in the food supply chain face the risk of poverty and inaccessibility to health services (Stevens & Madani, 2016). International donors and funders, such as the Global Fund, WHO, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations Funds, are fixated on communicable diseases rather than a wider health sector engagement. A significant reason for this is that infectious diseases vastly preponderate in the disease burden in the region. Other reasons are the cost-​effectiveness of communicable disease interventions and the insufficient evidence to support the cost-​effectiveness of NCD interventions, which require behavioral modifications. NCDs do not pose risks to the health of others. Bias toward infectious diseases has impeded the control and management of NCDs in low-​and middle-​income communities, as is evident in poor policy commitments and lack of political guidance, thereby reducing life expectancy leading to untimely deaths.

Trends in Health Inequality in Africa In Sub-​Saharan Africa, unequal healthcare outcomes and inaccessibility to primary healthcare services are common among the marginalized social groups (Adeyanju et al., 2017). Trends in these healthcare inequalities are measured with indicators of health outcomes (Abekah-​Nkrumah, 2019). One of these is healthcare service utilization measured by maternal, newborn, and child healthcare-​coverage indicators. The coverage of healthcare services has been declining in developing countries for the last two decades (Gwatkin, 2017), causing differential health outcomes. A recent review reported a higher rate of health service utilization in Southern Africa than in other subregions. West Africa surpassed East Africa and Central Africa on all indicators of delivery in a health facility, delivery by a skilled health worker, and more than four visits to an antenatal clinic. In Africa, use of modern contraceptives was comparatively lower (18%) than for other health-​service indicators, and only a few countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Zambia) recorded utilization rates higher than 30 percent (Abekah-​Nkrumah, 2019; Boadu, 2022). Resource allocation to the healthcare sector is often low in most African countries due to economic challenges and resource inadequacy. Per capita health allocation was significantly associated with improved health equity in Morocco and Egypt. The Abuja Declaration of 2001 called for an increase of the budgetary allocation to the health sector to a minimum of 15 percent of the annual budget (Mutangadura et al., 2007). The Abuja Declaration produced an average of 10 percent growth in public-​health funding in 2014 in Africa. The highest increase (17%) was recorded in Swaziland; and the lowest (4%), in Cameroon. The annual budgetary allocation to healthcare had dropped in some countries and increased in others some 15 years after the declaration (WHO, 2016). Healthcare allocation has remained lower than what is required in most African

240    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo countries (Adeyanju et al., 2017). The implementation of policies that can reduce health inequalities is subject to resource availability (Mutangadura et al., 2007). Low funding affects the accessibility of healthcare services. The observed gender differences in health service utilization often increase with age. At an older age, female healthcare needs are higher than those of males because of women’s predisposition to chronic conditions, reproductive health challenges, gender-​based violence, and susceptibility to HIV/​AIDs and other sexually transmitted infections. Women are also more likely to engage in unpaid labor and to be unemployed; hence they constitute a higher proportion of the poor. They also lack healthcare decision-​making power (Amzat & Dantake, 2012). These factors financially prevent women from accessing healthcare services such as prenatal care, child delivery, and immunization. Providing spatial and financial accessibility to healthcare services for the citizenry helped some countries to reduce health inequities (Mutangadura et al., 2007). The quality and coverage of HIV/​AIDS treatment and care interventions have improved across Africa. From 2003 to 2008, a 2 percent increase in the number of adults and children receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) was recorded in the region. However, ART coverage, particularly for children, was lower in West Africa and Central Africa than in the eastern and southern Sub-​Saharan regions (Avert, 2020; Lewis, 2011). In Nigeria, about 212,000 additional patients were registered for ART from 2016 to March 2017. As of 2016, the rate of healthcare coverage to prevent mother-​to-​child transmission was low because pregnant women could only access the service in about 6,729 health facilities in the country (Olakunde et al., 2019). Nonetheless, a fall of approximately 13 percent in HIV infections was reported from 2010 to 2019 in Nigeria, attributable to the improved surveillance. From 2000 to 2020, the knowledge of HIV status improved, from 5.7 percent to 84 percent, and some African countries achieved the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/​AIDS 90 percent target within the period. Southern Africa recorded a 90 percent knowledge increase out of all the subregions. As of 2020, African men’s knowledge of their HIV status was lower compared to women’s (Giguère et al., 2021). The national prevalence rate reportedly surged among adults (15–​49 years) between 2000 and 2017 in 15 countries out of the 47 considered. In 2017, Southern Africa had the highest prevalence (slightly more than 10%) in Africa. A high prevalence (slightly more than 10%) was also found in Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda. Swaziland had the highest (27.2%) national prevalence rate (Dwyer-​Lindgren et al., 2019). Rural-​urban variation in the utilization of healthcare services in Africa was linked to socioeconomic disparities at the household and community levels (Mutangadura et al., 2007). Likewise, the distribution of the healthcare workforce, access to transportation, and communication in rural areas are grossly inadequate. Similar results have been reported from urban regions where there is a broad division between high-​and low-​density areas. These have consequences for healthcare accessibility, service utilization, and outcomes; health status and life expectancy, for example, are lower in rural and high-​density areas than in urban and low-​density locations (Amzat & Razum, 2018b). Africa has been recording an increase in life expectancy since 1950 (African

Social Determinants of Health in Africa    241 Development Bank, 2014) The number of years a child born in Africa was expected to live was 61.6 years as of 2019, with some subregional and country-​level variations (World Bank, 2021). However, the health of most Africans is poor due to the SDH, predisposing them to the risks of both NCDs and infectious diseases.

Addressing Health Inequities in Africa Over the years, international organizations and national governments have attempted to eradicate health inequalities by targeting the social differences that are the precipitating factors (Bleich et al., 2012). There are multiple interrelated causes of health inequalities, requiring multiple interrelated and intersectoral social interventions. Therefore, overcoming the regional problem of health inequities in Africa demands an agenda for action that spans different sectors. The underlying social factors must be addressed to eliminate the social barriers and determinants of health inequities. This entails a consideration of confounding variables (e.g., the availability of care facilities and health insurance) and an exploration of a whole-​person approach to health. In many countries, including Sub-​Saharan ones, such social policies as conditional cash transfers have been highly effective in cushioning the effects of SDH and reducing health disparities, improving the health and well-​being of vulnerable groups (Owusu-​Addo et al., 2019). Interventions at the international level, such as the Universal Health Coverage initiative by the World Health Assembly, in 2005, along with the health-​related Millennium Development Goals and subsequent Sustainable Development Goals, have failed to achieve their targets in Africa owing to some regional peculiarities that set Africa apart from developed regions (Alawode & Adewole, 2021). For example, a weak healthcare system, conflict and insecurity, heavy reliance on foreign aid, overly ambitious goals, and unrealistic expectations are hindrances. Examples of country-​level policy commitments in Africa include public awareness campaigns; policies and interventions, such as the Roll Back Malaria Initiative (Adeyanju et al., 2017); and the National Health Insurance Scheme, in Nigeria (Alawode & Adewole, 2021). In 1996, the South African government waived user fees for people who use primary public healthcare. About 84 percent and 16 percent of the population respectively utilize either public healthcare or private healthcare services (Gordon et al., 2020). Improvement of equity and access to healthcare in South Africa was associated with the reduction of inequalities in education, housing, employment, and social infrastructure (Umuhoza & Ataguba, 2018). Ethiopia has also reformed primary healthcare delivery to eradicate the social determinants of NCDs (Allen et al., 2020). Free healthcare has also increased access to and patronage of maternal, newborn, and child health services among low-​income earners in Kenya (Brault et al., 2017). There have been some health and nonhealth policies (e.g., poverty alleviation and education policies) that have improved access to quality healthcare and individual life

242    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo chances. Overall, however, the efforts to translate social policies into actions to counter the SDH and reduce health inequities are hindered by certain difficulties (Owusu-​ Addo et al., 2019). In most cases, low funding complicated the problem of healthcare service delivery. Specific indicators, such as the Millennium Development Goal of reducing under-​five mortality, had succeeded in only 12 countries in Africa as of 2015, and Sub-​Saharan Africa still recorded the highest under-​five mortality rate in the world, at 73 deaths per 1,000 children born in 2020 (World Bank, 2022). Failure to attain this goal and others, such as delivery by skilled health workers and antenatal care, in many settings was attributed to unfavorable local social, economic, and spatial conditions (Brault et al., 2017).

Conclusion The massive health inequalities and inequities in Africa are deeply rooted in sociocultural conditions. Many Africans are excluded from pursuing the kinds of social, economic, and political opportunities that they can use as leverage to access healthcare and improve their health status. Poor investment in health disproportionately affects vulnerable groups who cannot easily circumvent the social barriers inhibiting their access to good healthcare, and whose low income makes them more susceptible to non-​ disease-​related health determinants, including the inaccessibility of good nutrition, safe drinking water, hygiene, sanitation, safe neighborhoods, and quality healthcare services. The failure of African countries to address the SDH is partly due to the focus on medical models of health and illness and to generalizing the application of similar interventions from Western societies without regard to African social contexts, as well as neglect of the power of cultural and local determinants of health and diseases. The underlying, immediate, and intermediary SDH in Africa must be addressed, with particular attention to the sociocultural contexts and local circumstances. The reliance on foreign aid and donor agencies for healthcare funding needs moderating. This often sways the focus of healthcare policies and interventions, usually to the detriment of local needs.

Acronyms GDP

Gross domestic product

NCD

Noncommunicable disease

SCCY

Street-​connected children and youth

SDH

Social determinants of health

STI

Sexually transmitted infections

WHO

World Health Organization

Social Determinants of Health in Africa    243

References Abekah-​Nkrumah, G. (2019). Trends in utilisation and inequality in the use of reproductive health services in Sub-​Saharan Africa. BMC Public Health, 19(1), 1541. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1186/​s12​889-​019-​7865-​z Adeyanju, O., Tubeuf, S., & Ensor, T. (2017). Socio-​economic inequalities in access to maternal and child healthcare in Nigeria: Changes over time and decomposition analysis. Health Policy and Planning, 32, 1111–​1118. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​hea​pol/​czx​049 African Development Bank. (2014). Tracking Africa’s progress in figures. African Development Bank Group. African Development Bank. (2021). African economic outlook 2021: From debt resolution to growth: The road ahead for Africa. African Development Bank Group. https://​www.afdb.org/​ en/​knowle​dge/​publi​cati​ons/​afri​can-​econo​mic-​outl​ook. Ajayi, O. O., & Philip, K. (2018). Assessment of open defecation and prevalence of soil transmitted helminthes among a tertiary institution students in Nigeria. International Journal of Environment Agriculture and Biotechnology, 3, 2185–​2191. https://​doi.org/​10.22161/​ ijeab/​3.6.32 Alawode, G. O., & Adewole, D. A. (2021). Assessment of the design and implementation challenges of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Nigeria: A qualitative study among sub-​national level actors, healthcare and insurance providers. BMC Public Health, 21(1), 124. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​889-​020-​10133-​5 Allen, L. N., Smith, R. W., Simmons-​Jones, F., Roberts, N., Honney, R., & Currie, J. (2020). Addressing social determinants of noncommunicable diseases in primary care: A systematic review. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 98, 754–​765B. https://​doi.org/​10.2471/​ BLT.19.248​278 Amzat, J. (2008). Lumpen childhood in Nigeria: A case of the Almajirai in northern Nigeria. Hemispheres: Studies on Cultures and Societies, 23, 49–​59. Amzat, J., & Dantake, H. M. (2012). Gender studies. In I. S. Ogundiya & J. Amzat (Eds.), The basics of the social sciences (pp. 69–​88). Malthouse Press. Amzat, J., & Razum, O. (2014). Social determinants/​context of health. In Medical sociology in Africa (pp. 61–​82). Springer. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​03986-​2_​4 Amzat, J., & Razum, O. (2018a). Key concepts in healthcare delivery. In Towards a sociology of health discourse in Africa (pp. 1–​16). Springer. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​61672-​8_​1 Amzat, J., & Razum, O. (2018b). Rural health in Africa. In Towards a sociology of health discourse in Africa (pp. 109–​124). Springer. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​61672-​8_​8 Amzat, J., & Razum, O. (2022). Globalisation, health and the Global South: A critical approach. Routledge. Arcaya, M. C., Arcaya, A. L., & Subramanian, S. V. (2015). Inequalities in health: Definitions, concepts, and theories. Global Health Action, 8, 27106. https://​doi.org/​10.3402/​gha.v8.27106 Ataguba, J. E.-​O., & Alaba, O. (2012). Explaining health inequalities in South Africa: A political economy perspective. Development Southern Africa, 29, 756–​764. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 03768​35X.2012.730​962 Ataguba, J. E.-​O., Day, C., & McIntyre, D. (2015). Explaining the role of the social determinants of health on health inequality in South Africa. Global Health Action, 8, 1–​11. https://​doi.org/​ 10.3402/​gha.v8.28865 Avert. (2020). HIV and AIDS in East and Southern Africa regional overview. https://​www​ .avert.org/​print​pdf/​node/​393

244    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo Benatar, S. (2013). The challenges of health disparities in South Africa. South African Medical Journal, 103, 154–​155. https://​doi.org/​10.7196/​samj.6622 Bleich, S. N., Jarlenski, M. P., Bell, C. N., & LaVeist, T. A. (2012). Health inequalities: trends, progress, and policy. Annual Review of Public Health, 33, 7–​40. https://​doi.org/​10.1146/​annu​ rev-​pub​lhea​lth-​031​811-​124​658 Boadu, I. (2022). Coverage and determinants of modern contraceptive use in sub-​Saharan Africa: Further analysis of demographic and health surveys. Reproductive Health, 19 (1), 1–​11. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​978-​022-​01332-​x Brault, M. A., Ngure, K., Haley, C. A., Kabaka, S., Sergon, K., Desta, T., Mwinga, K., Vermund, S. H., & Kipp, A. M. (2017). The introduction of new policies and strategies to reduce inequities and improve child health in Kenya: A country case study on progress in child survival, 2000–​2013. PLoS One, 12(8), e0181777. https://​doi.org/​10.1371/​jour​nal.pone.0181​777 Duran, C. P., Dabalen, A., Narayan, A., Lucas, A., & Menéndez, C. (2019). Inequalities in sub-​ Saharan African women’s and girls’ health opportunities and outcomes: Evidence from the Demographic and Health Surveys. Journal of Global Health, 9, 010410. https://​doi.org/​ 10.7189/​jogh.09.010​410 Dwyer-​Lindgren, L., Cork, M. A., Sligar, A., Steuben, K. M., Wilson, K. F., Provost, N. R., Mayala, B. K., VanderHeide, J. D., Collison, M. L., Hall, J. B., Biehl, M. H., Carter, A., Frank, T., Douwes-​Schultz, D., Burstein, R., Casey, D. C., Deshpande, A., Earl, L., El Bcheraoui, C., Farag, T. H., . . . Hay, S. I. (2019). Mapping HIV prevalence in sub-​Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2017. Nature, 570, 189–​193. https://​doi.org/​10.1038/​s41​586-​019-​1200-​9 Eshetu, E. B., & Woldesenbet, S. A. (2011). Are there particular social determinants of health for the world’s poorest countries? African Health Sciences, 11, 108–​115. Falchetta, G., Hammad, A. T., & Shayegh, S. (2020). Planning universal accessibility to public health care in sub-​Saharan Africa. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(50), 31760–​31769. https://​doi.org/​10.1073/​pnas.200​9172​117 Giguère, K., Eaton, J. W., Marsh, K., Johnson, L. F., Johnson, C. C., Ehui, E., Jahn, A., Wanyeki, I., Mbofana, F., Bakiono, F., Mahy, M., & Maheu-​Giroux, M. (2021). Trends in knowledge of HIV status and efficiency of HIV testing services in sub-​Saharan Africa, 2000-​20: A modelling study using survey and HIV testing programme data. The Lancet HIV, 8, e284–​e293. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S2352-​3018(20)30315-​5 Gordon, T., Booysen, F., & Mbonigaba, J. (2020). Socio-​economic inequalities in the multiple dimensions of access to healthcare: The case of South Africa. BMC Public Health, 20(1), 289. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​889-​020-​8368-​7 Gwatkin, D. R. (2017). Trends in health inequalities in developing countries. The Lancet Global Health, 5, e371–​e372. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S2214-​109X(17)30080-​3 Holtz, L. (2021). Figure of the week: Africa’s trade in pharmaceuticals. [Africa in Focus Series]. Brookings. https://​www.brooki​ngs.edu/​blog/​afr​ica-​in-​focus/​2021/​12/​09/​fig​ure-​of-​the-​week​ -afri​cas-​trade-​in-​phar​mace​utic​als/​ Ichoku, H. E., Mooney, G., & Ataguba, J. E.-​O. (2013). Africanizing the social determinants of health: Embedded structural inequalities and current health outcomes in Sub-​Saharan Africa. International Journal of Health Services, 43, 745–​759. https://​doi.org/​10.2190/​HS.43.4.i Kabore, A., Afriyie-​Gyawu, E., Awuah, J., Hansen, A., Walker, A., Hester, M., Wonadé Sié, M. A., Johnson, J., & Meda, N. (2019). Social ecological factors affecting substance abuse in Ghana (West Africa) using photovoice. Pan African Medical Journal, 34, 214. https://​doi.org/​ 10.11604/​pamj.2019.34.214.12851 Kasirye, R., & Mutaawe, R. (2018). Sexual risks, substance abuse and protective factors among Kampala street and slum children. Journal of Mental Health & Clinical Psychology, 2(1),

Social Determinants of Health in Africa    245 14–​18. https://​www.ment​alhe​alth​jour​nal.org/​artic​les/​sex​ual-​risks-​substa​nce-​abuse-​and​ -pro​tect​ive-​fact​ors-​among-​kamp​ala-​str​eet-​and-​slum-​child​ren.html Labonté, R., & Schrecker, T. (2007). Globalization and social determinants of health: Introduction and methodological background (part 1 of 3). Global Health, 3, 5. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1186/​1744-​8603-​3-​5 Lewis, D. A. (2011). HIV/​sexually transmitted infection epidemiology, management and control in the IUSTI Africa region: Focus on sub-​Saharan Africa. Sexually Transmitted Infections, 87, ii10–​ii13. https://​doi.org/​10.1136/​sextr​ans-​2011-​050​178 Marmot, M., & Allen, J. J. (2014). Social determinants of health equity. American Journal of Public Health, 104, S517–​S519. https://​doi.org/​10.2105/​AJPH.2014.302​200 McCartney, G., Collins, C., & Mackenzie, M. (2013). What (or who) causes health inequalities: Theories, evidence and implications? Health, 113, 221–​227. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.health​ pol.2013.05.021 Murali, V., & Jayaraman, S. (2018). Substance use disorders and sexually transmitted infections: A public health perspective. BJ Psych Advances, 24, 161–​166. https://​doi.org/​10.1192/​ bja.2017.14 Mutangadura, G., Gauci, A., Armah, B., Woldemariam, E., Ayalew, D., & Egu, B. (2007). Health inequities in selected African countries: Review of evidence and policy implications. Proceedings of the African Economic Conference 2007 [Sponsored by African Development Bank Group; Economic Commission for Africa; United Nations Development Programme]. https://​www.afdb.org/​filead​min/​uplo​ads/​afdb/​Docume​nts/​Knowle​dge/​Con​fere​nce_​2007​ _ang​lais​_​21-​part-​V-​1.pdf Okoi, O., & Bwawa, T. (2020). How health inequality affect responses to the COVID-​19 pandemic in Sub-​Saharan Africa. World Development, 135, 105067. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​ j.world​dev.2020.105​067 Olakunde, B. O., Adeyinka, D. A., Olawepo, J. O., Pharr, J. R., Ozigbu, C. E., Wakdok, S., Oladele, T., & Ezeanolue, E. E. (2019). Towards the elimination of mother-​to-​child transmission of HIV in Nigeria: A health system perspective of the achievements and challenges. International health, 11(4), 240–​249. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​inthea​lth/​ihz​018 Olarinde, M. O., & Amzat, J. (2021). The infected economy: Interrogating the early economic impacts of COVID-​19 pandemic in Nigeria. Annals of Public Health Issues, 1, 50–​63. https://​ doi.org/​10.2478/​aphi-​2021-​0005 Oni, T., Assah, F., Erzse, A., Foley, L., Govia, I., Hofman, K. J., Lambert, E. V., Micklesfield, L. K., Shung-​King, M., Smith, J., Turner-​Moss, E., Unwin, N., Wadende, P., Woodcock, J., Mbanya, J. C., Norris, S. A., Obonyo, C. O., Tulloch-​Reid, M., & Wareham, N. J. (2020). The global diet and activity research (GDAR) network: A global public health partnership to address upstream NCD risk factors in urban low and middle-​income contexts. Globalization and Health, 16, 100. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​992-​020-​00630-​y. Osumanu, I. K., Kosoe, E. A., & Ategeeng, F. (2019). Determinants of open defecation in the Wa municipality of Ghana: Empirical findings highlighting sociocultural and economic dynamics among households. Journal of Environmental and Public Health, 2019, 3075840, 1–​10. https://​doi.org/​10.1155/​2019/​3075​840 Owusu-​Addo, E., Renzaho, A. M. N, & Smith, B. J. (2019). Cash transfers and the social determinants of health: A conceptual framework. Health Promotion International, 34, e106–​ e118. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​hea​pro/​day​079 Palk, L., Okano, J. T., Dullie, L., & Blower, S. (2020). Travel time to health-​care facilities, mode of transportation, and HIV elimination in Malawi: A geospatial modelling analysis. The Lancet Global Health, 8, e1555–​e1564. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S2214-​109X(20)30351-​X

246    Jimoh Amzat, Kafayat Aminu, and Brenda Muchabveyo Stevens, T., & Madani, K. (2016). Future climate impacts on maize farming and food security in Malawi. Scientific Reports, 6, 36241. https://​doi.org/​10.1038/​srep36​241 Swahn, M. H., Bossarte, R. M., Eliman, D. M., Gaylor, E., & Jayaraman, S. (2010). Prevalence and correlates of suicidal ideation and physical fighting: A comparison of students in Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and the United States. International Journal of Public Health, 2, 195–​205. Umuhoza, S. M., & Ataguba, J. E. (2018). Inequalities in health and health risk factors in the Southern African Development Community: Evidence from World Health Surveys. International Journal for Equity in Health, 17(1), 52. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​939-​018-​0762-​8 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2021). Nigeria emergency. https://​www​ .unhcr.org/​nige​ria-​emerge​ncy.html Upshaw, T. L., Brown, C., Smith, R., Perri, M., Ziegler, C., & Pinto, A. D. (2021). Social determinants of COVID-​ 19 incidence and outcomes: A rapid review. PLoS One, 16, e0248336. https://​doi.org/​10.1371/​jour​nal.pone.0248​336 Wariri, O., Onuwabuchi, E., Alhassan, J. A. K., Dase, E., Jalo, I., Laima, C. H., Farouk, H. U., El-​Nafaty, A. U., Okomo, U., & Dotse-​Gborgbortsi, W. (2021). The influence of travel time to health facilities on stillbirths: A geospatial case-​control analysis of facility-​based data in Gombe, Nigeria. PLoS One, 16, e0245297. https://​doi.org/​10.1371/​jour​nal.pone.0245​297 WHO. (2008). Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through action on the social determinants of health. [Final Report of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health]. World Health Organization. https://​www.who.int/​publi​cati​ons-​det​ail-​redir​ect/​ WHO-​IER-​CSDH-​08.1 WHO. (2010). A conceptual framework for action on the social determinants of health: Debates, policy and practice, case studies (Social Determinants of Health Discussion Paper 2). World Health Organization. WHO. (2016). Public financing for health in Africa: From Abuja to the SDGs [Technical report]. World Health Organization. https://​apps.who.int/​iris/​bitstr​eam/​han​dle/​10665/​249​527/​ WHO-​HIS-​HGF-​Tech.Rep​ort-​16.2-​eng.pdf WHO. (2018, February 22). Health inequities and their causes [Fact file]. World Health Organization. https://​www.who.int/​news-​room/​facts-​in-​pictu​res/​det​ail/​hea​lth-​ine​quit​ies​ -and-​their-​cau​ses WHO. (2021). Social determinants of health: Report by the Director-​General (Executive Board Provisional Agenda Item 16 E148/​24). Geneva: World Health Organization. Williams, D. R., & Cooper, L. A. (2019). Reducing racial inequities in health: Using what we already know to take action. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 16, 606. https://​doi.org/​10.3390/​ije​rph1​6040​606 Winston, S. E., Chirchir, A. K., Muthoni, L. N., Ayuku, D., Koech, J., Nyandiko, W., Carter, E. J., & Braitstein, P. (2015). Prevalence of sexually transmitted infections including HIV in street-​connected adolescents in western Kenya. Sexually Transmitted Infections, 91, 353–​359. https://​doi.org/​10.1136/​sextr​ans-​2014-​051​797 World Bank. (2021). Life expectancy at birth, total (years)—​Sub-​Saharan Africa [Data]. https://​ data.worldb​ank.org/​indica​tor/​SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locati​ons=​ZG World Bank. (2022). Mortality rate, under-​5 (per 1,000 live births): Sub-​Saharan Africa [Data]. https://​data.worldb​ank.org/​indica​tor/​SH.DYN.MORT?locati​ons=​ZG Zerbo, A., Delgado, R. C., & González, P. A. (2020). Vulnerability and everyday health risks of informal urban settlements in Sub-​Saharan Africa. Global Health Journal, 4, 46–​50. https://​ doi.org/​10.1016/​j.glohj.2020.04.003

Chapter 14

Infectiou s Di se ase s in Afri c a Emergence, Social Contexts, Political and Media Discourses N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto

Introduction The list of infectious diseases is very long. It includes tuberculosis, leprosy, Buruli ulcer, trepanematosis, streptococcal disease, tetanus, diphtheria, whooping cough, typhoid fever, salmonellosis, listeriosis, Helicobacter pylori infections, shigellosis, cholera, plague, anthrax, brucellosis, leptospirosis, HIV infections, enterovirus infections, viral hepatitis, herpes, viruses, chickenpox, rabies, malaria, intestinal parasitosis, tissue amebiasis, scabies, myiasis, filariasis, bilharzia, sleeping sickness, and trypanosomiasis (Collège des universitaires de maladies infectieuses et tropicales, 2016). The social and medical knowledge of these diseases, particularly in Africa, has resulted in a rich plural sociology. Health and its counterpart, disease, along with economy and religion, are the great fundamental roots of social life. It is neither required nor possible to provide with certainty the history of infectious diseases on the African continent. The entire continent is environmentally exposed to malaria, and there is exposure to hemorrhagic fevers in West and Central Africa, tuberculosis and poliomyelitis in Central and East Africa, and several other infectious diseases, such as smallpox, meningitis, onchocerciasis, and lymphatic filariasis which are sometimes combated successfully. Infectious diseases are thus linked to Indian Ocean coastal belt of Africa (Arnold, 1991). But it is possible to ask how the social sciences, in this case sociology, have positioned themselves on these diseases in Africa, with the first scientists on this continent.

248    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto The low life-​expectancy rates in Africa, which can be visualized as a pyramid, with a wide base narrowing to a point at the top, indicate high mortality, which is favored by factors such as infectious disease, among many others (war, trafficking, famine, and poverty). In recent years, especially with respect to emerging diseases, including pandemics and epidemics, the social sciences have been recognized as important to public health interventions. This recognition and the evolving and increasing scientific investment in the field of health and disease are leading scientists in these disciplines to take a reflexive, evaluative, and critical posture. This chapter is both evaluative and interrogative, asking the questions: How has sociology studied infectious diseases in Africa? What have been the main areas of interest? How has this work contributed to our knowledge of and the fight against infectious disease in particular and all disease in Africa more generally? The chapter begins with a brief history of the discovery of infectious diseases by scientists in Africa and the results of public-​health interventions to combat these diseases. Using examples, it will then present the interests of sociology in the study of infectious diseases. Finally, it will discuss the evolution of the objectives or lines of thought of contemporary sociology in the field of infectious diseases.

A History of Infectious Diseases in Africa and the World Many of the diseases that strike the Western or Mediterranean part of Europe are of foreign origin. It is possible to determine, often with great precision, both the date on which they appeared in our regions and the regions from which they came. The real plague, which is characterized by the bubo, did not exist in the Mediterranean West before the so-​called Justinian epidemic; it was imported from Egypt. Leprosy spread in the same way little by little from the East to the West; its introduction in France hardly dates from the time of the Crusades. Cholera also came to us from the East in the 19th century, just as the great influenza epidemics have come to us for a long time and still do. America gave us syphilis, we brought it smallpox. From Africa, yellow fever came to it, as a punishment for the slave trade with the Blacks. How many diseases our civilization has introduced in the uncultivated populations! I don’t know if these men owe us any good; they received from us smallpox, syphilis, tuberculosis, all our infectious diseases (not to mention alcoholism and other benefits); and many of these peoples died from them. (Nicolle, 1939, p. 105)

This quotation from Charles Nicolle, director of the Pasteur Institute of Tunis from 1903 until his death in 1936, shows that the social knowledge of infectious diseases in Africa is linked to human relations between continents. If the bacteriological or viral causes of infectious disease were discovered only at the end of the 19th century (Pasteur having

Infectious Diseases in Africa     249 discovered the bacterium as a pathogenic agent in 1870), the explorers, slave traders, and colonists who had arrived in Africa before then already had knowledge of them based on the illnesses they manifested and their morbidity and mortality. The first medico-​ethnomethodological research on infectious diseases, according to French sources, looked at yellow fever, typhoid fever, yaws, and leprosy in the western part of Africa. Senegal and Upper Volta (present-​day Burkina Faso) have been involved in epidemiological research since the beginning of the 20th century (the Pasteur Institute of Dakar was established in 1923). Early epidemiological work on infectious diseases sought to understand them in order to reduce their mortality among the populations of the colonial missions, on the one hand, and among Africans themselves, on the other, at a time when the colonizing countries were emerging from World War I and needed to rebuild themselves. Ethnomedicine succeeded the colonial medicine that was carried out by missionaries, soldiers, and merchants, the former always living among the “natives,” as the colonizers called the populations they encountered in Africa. This work used ethnobotanical and ethnographic approaches and has for the most part described the therapeutic plants, therapists’ specialties, and the ritual and phytosanitary modes of treatment of the different diseases.

Medical and Community Control of Infectious Diseases Elimination is the ultimate goal of infectious-​disease control in Africa and worldwide (Agoua et al., 1995). Yet history and our knowledge of control strategies show that very few of the world’s diseases have been eliminated, including infectious diseases (Jaffré, 2009). Diseases are therefore classified as “eliminated,” “difficult to eliminate,” “emerging,” or “neglected,” depending on whether the public-​health interventions being used have yielded convincing, dubious, or encouraging results.

The Elimination of Infectious Diseases in Africa As science has gained more knowledge of pathogens (microbe or virus) and how these organisms operate in the patient’s body, science and scientific institutions been able to reduce the incidence of certain infectious diseases if not completely eliminate them.1 Vaccination is the main medical intervention that has made this possible. Since 1980, smallpox vaccination has eliminated the disease in Africa, and many other diseases are targeted for the same result. The candidates for elimination are leprosy, river blindness, and poliomyelitis (World Health Organization, 2018). In Benin, for example, the Expanded Programme on Immunization covers a dozen infectious diseases, including

250    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto tuberculosis, poliomyelitis, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, measles, yellow fever, and hepatitis B.

Hard-​to-​Eliminate and Neglected Diseases According to national health statistics on the continent, malaria is the primary cause of hospitalizations and deaths in Africa. Its incidence and lethality can be attributed to conditions in the physical environment, difficulty of applying preventive measures, patient delays in seeking care, diagnostic errors, and the prohibitive costs of care. The prevention strategy of vaccination has been under consideration for years but has not yet implemented. Polio is the second most important target of disease-​containment strategies after smallpox. Yet polio is resistant to multiple international and national elimination strategies. There are regular cases of polio, for example, in Nigeria. One explanation for its slow elimination on the continent has to do with the political commitments and lifestyles of populations that are sometimes recognized as vaccine hesitant. Tuberculosis affected about 480,000 people worldwide in 2014, as reported in Revue de Biologie Médicale (2017). Household poverty, environmental hygiene problems, social vulnerability, and migration are among the factors cited as practical challenges for eliminating this disease. About 20 diseases are referred to as “neglected tropical diseases.” These include viral diseases (dengue, Chikungunya, rabies), bacterial diseases (trachoma, Buruli ulcer, yaws, leprosy), and parasitic diseases (Chagas disease, also called American trypanosomiasis; human African trypanosomiasis [sleeping sickness]; leishmaniasis; taeniasis and cysticercosis; dracunculiasis [Guinea worm]; echinococcosis [hydatidosis]; food-​ borne trematodosis; lymphatic filariasis [elephantiasis]; onchocerciasis [river blindness]; schistosomiasis [bilharzia]; and geohelminthiases; Pierre & Bernard-​Alex, 2021). These diseases are labeled neglected because they have not yet been eliminated but do not attract sufficient technical and political investment in prevention and treatment.

Emerging Infectious Diseases in the 21st Century Even as efforts to eliminate known diseases continue, new diseases emerge—​HIV/​AIDS in the 1900s; hemorrhagic fevers, especially in the 2000s; and most recently, COVID-​19 in 2019. HIV/​AIDS has been the subject of a great deal of scientific analysis, policy production, and pandemic coverage. Yet despite all the funding and awareness raising and all that has been written about the disease, HIV/​AIDS is still present and remains a morbid and lethal disease. Unlike other emerging diseases, HIV/​AIDS is a chronic disease, more virulent in the South than in the North. Ignorance or denial, depending on the context, explain its harmful effects.

Infectious Diseases in Africa     251 Hemorrhagic fevers, especially in West Africa (Nigeria, Benin, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Conakry), have caused major epidemics. Scientifically known, they have posed the problem of community adherence to containing the spread of the disease, in this case the problem of isolating patients and bodies in case of Ebola of lassa fever for example. Examples of recent epidemics include malaria, cholera, and Lassa fever, which have been endemic in Benin for many years. According to national statistics, malaria is the leading cause of hospitalization and hospital deaths in Benin (INSAE, 2013). The mosquito that causes malaria has long proved resistant to preventive measures such as indoor spraying and the use of mosquito nets impregnated with long-​lasting insecticide. Natural ecological conditions and household practices around water and household waste explain the difficulty of reducing malaria endemics. Some of Benin’s cities, such as Djougou in the northwest, have experienced also frequent cholera epidemics over the past 10 years. These are linked to the general environmental hygiene of the city and to household garbage disposal and water practices that favor the outbreak and development of the disease. The cholera epidemic is often associated with typhoid fever (Bati Koutoumpo et al., 2021). With respect to these known, eliminated, noneliminated, and emerging diseases, how has sociology and anthropology positioned themselves?

Major Areas of Interest in the Sociology of Infectious Diseases The sociological study of infectious diseases develops knowledge, beliefs, representations, and medical and community therapeutic practices around the disease. The human and social sciences situate health issues in their systemic contexts, highlighting the social inequalities in health. Not all people are affected by disease in the same way or have access to the same information or services or equal resources in the face of an epidemic and its consequences. This suggests a clear need to pay more attention to the most vulnerable social groups, people, or professions. Human and social sciences analyzes the functioning, or malfunctioning, of professional and administrative organizations and the relationships between actors. This can reveal the extent of the organizational crisis in the health system (Henrard et al., 2021).

Medical and Popular Knowledge and Representations of the Disease The medical approach to infectious diseases in Africa has links to colonial medicine, which was introduced into the colonies in the 19th century with the development of Pasteurian microbiology. As Van Dormael (1997) explains:

252    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto The usual sequence of Pasteurian research consists of gathering field observations (the first mass screenings will be carried out by teams of researchers), identifying the causative agent of malaria, cholera, brucellosis, trypanosomiasis, plague, leishmaniasis), to identify the mode of transmission, then to try to develop a treatment and/​or a vaccine. These works are the result of European and also Latin American researchers. (p. 7)

Most of the current strategies used in the fight against infectious diseases were already being applied in the colonial period: general screening, isolation of patients, and sanitary belts (the sanitary belt consists of defining an area as at risk and prohibiting access to it by people who are outside it. It is a measure to contain epidemics adopted during covid 19 in Benin for example). Bargès’s (2008) work on leprosy in Africa had both a cognitive and a representational dimension that describes the patient’s relationship to his community: This disease is not like the others: it is the most serious jugu of diseases. In Jugu, there is the idea of excess, chronicity, incapacity and incurability. The word has a force of action, the verb must be careful, hence the euphemisms used, bana-​ba (disease-​superlative) and more often, “the” disease. It is necessary to take into account the feelings, to avoid the real name: kuna and kunatò (leper). Bagi, kurunibagi are less known. Some names correspond to similar dermatological signs. Others exist on the basis of the means that would have given the evil: pouring on, spreading through the nyama, nyama inside, placing in, thing in the body. The nyama is the vital energy nor can it be evil and can be spread by direct maneuvering, dabali or by invisibility at a distance, korotè. The manògò catfish and the sulantèrè gecko cause disease mainly through human malfeasance. They are ambivalent, anomalous: the fish without scales, slimy, divine avatar linked to Niger; the gecko hated in its latitudes. (p. 34)

Marc-​Eric Gruénais (1995) has also written about knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and practices in his text on the application of research results in anthropology. Beliefs and the popular knowledge that generates them have often been evoked in the sociology and anthropology of illness to explain critical developments. This is the case, for example, with smallpox among the Yoruba of Benin and Nigeria. In discussing the cultural and social factors of health in West Africa, Cantrelle and Locoh (1990) showed that smallpox had more serious consequences in Benin and Nigeria than in other parts of Africa because of its association there with the Sakpata Vodoun deity. To avoid contagion, patients were taken to convents instead of being isolated and were treated close physical proximity to one another. Beliefs go hand in hand with the representations around a disease. Epidemic diseases and chronic diseases have been the raisons for various representations, notably, HIV/​ AIDS (Bibeau, 2003; Bonvalet, 2015; Chabrol, 2012; Chemtob et al., 1996; Cognet et al., 2009; Kanati, 2011; Taverne et al., 2012).

Infectious Diseases in Africa     253

Medical and Social Therapeutic Practices The therapeutic practices that sociologists study include treatments within the family, in the community, by traditional healers, and in biomedical care spaces for different infectious diseases. The research describes the successful and unsuccessful attempts at care that patients, at the onset of illness, undertake to restore their health. Researchers report that patients engage in self-​medication, drawing on their knowledge and experiences to care for themselves (Baxerres et al., 2015). The failures or dissatisfactions after this self-​medication engage the patients and their relatives on the trajectories, the itineraries or the therapeutic paths (Lepopa, 2020). Multiple parameters such as trust, availability, and financial accessibility will explain the recourse, their logic and their nature. Therapeutic practices are also classified as conventional, nonconventional, or alternative. The sociology of infectious diseases describes the care, organizational models, professionals, and contextualities of each (Benoist, 1996). Traditional and alternative care is increasingly important and sought after for diseases for which conventional care is nonexistent or inaccessible (hepatitis and tuberculosis). The sociology of public policies on the care of infectious diseases has been spontaneous and on demand, in response to the organizational and technical problems of such care.

Public Policies for International and National Response to Diseases The sociology of public policies on infectious diseases generally focuses on rules, norms, actors, material and immaterial resources, and actual practices, which are juxtaposed with the official recommended practices and sometimes replace them (Olivier de Sardan & Ridde, 2014; Oumarou & Abdourahamane, 2017; Ridde, 2006). The research of Olivier de Sardan and others does not necessarily mention a specificity on the infectious nature of the disease on which the public policy focuses. The cross-​cutting strategy in policy intervention remains communication (awareness raising and advocacy) to change or consolidate people’s behavior in relation to health problems. Sociology of disease analyzes tools, methods, and channels of communication to assess its relevance and sustainability. With the first known infectious diseases (yaws, yellow fever, leprosy, and smallpox), it seems that the community dimension was weak. Actions such as vaccination, sanitation according to the environment of the pathogens, and other technical possibilities were vertical, direct, and technical. HIV/​AIDS and malaria are among the diseases that most invested in social communication. Communication is focused on educating people about how these diseases transmitted and how to avoid becoming infected are generally. The unprotected sexual activity of the poor and vulnerable populations of the South, and who lack means for care, has been the highlighted in much of the writing about HIV/​AIDS. There have also certainly been writings on

254    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto homosexuality and drug addiction in Africa as factors in transmission. But considering the statistics that showed that the sexual transmission of HIV/​AIDS was at 92 percent, the national and international associative speakers concentrated the health message on reducing of sexual activity through the use of barrier measures such as condoms and through abstinence or fidelity as at the heart of the response.

Management of Epidemics Infectious disease epidemics are frequent, local, seasonal, or permanent. The study of epidemics includes the not only looking at the conditions of their occurrence (plagues, yellow fever, hemorrhagic fever, and meningitis) but also the popular and political responses at various levels. The work of Senegalese Oumy Thiongane (2013) has over the years questioned the basis for the programmed emergency response to meningitis in African countries. Why is it that the seasonal epidemic of meningitis in countries which appears each year since long time is still managed under an epidemic approach? (Bettaieb et al., 2013; Thiongane, 2013). Thiongane notes that the recurrence of public health emergencies in Niger, as in many other African countries, reflects the influence of issues other than health. The communication and organizational issues in the response to the viral hemorrhagic fevers (Lassa and Ebola) of 2014 in West Africa have been studied extensively (Le Marcis, 2017; Østergaard, 2015; Sambiéni et al., 2015) even though the World Health Organization (WHO) seems not to have been considered commensurate with the social sciences (Stocking, 2015). How do the medical and public health communities in African countries control and manage or eliminate infectious diseases? Because of the diversity of healthcare systems, sociological histories, and knowledge on the continent, efforts to determine the impact and success of control strategies (i.e., vaccinations and immunizations) did not succeed as planned. The current debate over vaccination as the primary medical strategy for COVID-​19 is a good example. There are historical examples of successful vaccination campaigns in Africa that have led to the elimination of smallpox, through campaigns in Africa. For example, HIV/​AIDS is still a deadly disease that affects African populations disproportionately. Successes in managing HIV/​AIDS in the global West or North cannot be applied on the continent, where the issues regarding community adherence to preventive measures, the isolation of patients and bodies, and the attached social stigma interfere with effective management.

Community and Societal Response to Care Practices Grassroots community-​based responses to pandemic (such as HIV, Ebola, Lasser fever, etc.) that have been proposed directly by those affected populations include variolization in the Sahel region (Cantrelle & Locoh, 1990) and various rabies treatments in many parts of the world. Spontaneous responses are interesting for sociological studies.

Infectious Diseases in Africa     255 The colonial period led to the emergence of infectious disease epidemics in Africa and the responses to them that Western medicine developed. As Van Dormael (1997) describes: The colonial powers are aware of the degradation of the state of health of the indigenous populations and attribute it to the population movements caused by the “development” of the colonies, movements which cause the spread of epidemics in previously preserved regions. This interpretation is perfectly consistent with the medical thought of the time, that is to say a monocausal etiological thought implicating the “microbe,” and is moreover partially adequate with regard to certain populations isolated who had effectively had no contact with the rest of the world until then. (p. 7)

The infectious-​disease discourse is part of a deeper sociological discourse on health and disease in Africa that has historical colonial roots (Bado, 1996). At a time when Western scientific medicine was taking shape in Africa, overcoming infectious diseases was a social and political challenge. Both discourse on the historiography of disease and health services in Africa and state of health of the indigenous populations showed that the main infectious diseases were trypanosomiasis, leprosy, and onchocerciasis (Hugon, 2005). Western medicine became a weapon in the colonial era, when pandemics of European diseases facilitated the subjugation of indigenous peoples (Lachenal, 2011) and created a template for disease management and control that continued in the postcolonial era (Becker & Collignon, 1998; Van Dormael, 1997). This is the starting point for the normative role of the postcolonial state and global actors in the politics of epidemics, emergency response, and the provision of health care in contemporary Africa (Sfeir, 2011). Behind the medical discourse about pandemics, in this case of infectious disease, there was the political discourse “to save the black race” (Bado, 1996).

Key Lessons from the Sociology of Infectious Diseases The research conducted on the different aspects of infectious diseases often presents very interesting conclusions if it is based on the public policies that are linked to recent epidemics in several African countries, which act differently, as certain comparative works have shown (Kapiriri & Ross, 2020).

A Weak National and International Response The state has often been slow to trigger response mechanisms to diseases and epidemics, mobilize material and financial resources, and organize treatment and communication processes. The weakness of states is maintained by the institutional and financial power of international and bilateral health organizations such as WHO and the West African

256    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto Health Organisation. The interventions of these institutions, which are declared to be partners of the states, legitimize the national organizational weakness. The presence and initiatives of WHO, for example, during the outbreak of Lassa fever in Benin in 2014, favored relegated the state and its branches to a secondary position in the response (Sambiéni et al., 2015). The handling of HIV/​AIDS has revealed the errors of policies (Chemtob et al., 1996; Cognet et al., 2009; Eboko, 2015; Taverne et al., 2012). In 2014, a large Ebola epidemic broke out in Sierra Leone, Guinea Conakry, and Liberia (Alexander et al., 2015). It lasted several years before being contained. It caused numerous losses of human lives and financial and material resources (Abramowitz et al., 2015). HIV/​AIDS spread rapidly in the 1900s and 2000s in South, East and Central Africa, with prevalence rates sometimes exceeding 50 percent among certain populations, such as caregivers, professionals, and gay men (Scheffler et al., 2016). Viral hepatitis, in particular, hepatitis virama C, has been observed with a high prevalence in Central Africa, sometimes more than 5 out of 10 people (Lachenal, 2011). Colonial medicine has been indexed in the spread of this virus by mass vaccinations administered without the necessary precautions to prevent contamination (Lachenal, 2011). Meningitis is a serious problem in the Sahel region, particularly in Niger, Mali, and Chad, with outbreaks every year in the hot weather. It is a major cause of mortality in these countries, with very often poorly coordinated and organized efforts between the State and its partners. These cases, drawn from various African experiences illuminate enough the experiences of managing infectious diseases at the level of African states, particularly with other actors, in the provision of healthcare, both locally and globally. From a meso-​ analytical point of view, the “glocal” response to infectious diseases has had an impact on the control, elimination, and management of infectious diseases. The specific challenges that some African countries face in coping with specific pandemics are numerous and are based on organizational paradigms, the involvement of communities and traditional healers, the training of health workers, and environmental issues.

Strategies Not Always in Line with Each Other Initiatives to exempt certain groups (pregnant women, children under five years of age, the indigent, and women in labor) from paying for healthcare are not always preceded by research and scientific evidence. They have sometimes shown fundamental limits, perversions, and administrative, bureaucratic, and routine drifts. Researchers in sociology and anthropology also evoke the notion of “traveling models” to speak about this (Olivier de Sardan et al., 2017).

Stronger Political and Economic Stakes Why do models travel? Researchers point to the existence of actors, often called “entrepreneurs,” who facilitate the transnational circulation of these technical travel

Infectious Diseases in Africa     257 devices (Sambiéni & Ridde, 2021). The entrepreneurial motivations of models that travel from one region to another and from one country to another within the same region are political or economic. Entrepreneurs quite often seek technical legitimacy once they have already acquired sufficient social and financial conditions in the development configuration (Olivier de Sardan, 1998, Olivier de Sardan & Bierschenk, 1993).

A Resilient Population? Marginalized populations, especially women, children, and the poor, have been at the heart of the social science literature, particularly in the area of the sociology and anthropology of infectious diseases. These populations generally pay a heavy price because of knowledge, representations, attitudes, behaviors, and practices of seeking care (Daff et al., 2020; Flink et al., 2016; Taverne et al., 2012; Yates et al., 2017). Outbreaks of infectious disease affect those who are marginalized, particularly those living in communities with a poor physical infrastructure and where access to quality public health services is limited (Bertillot, 2014; Fagbamigbe et al., 2017; Heilbron, 2006; Meessen et al., 2006; Ronsmans, 2001). Poverty is perceived as the greatest risk factor of contracting disease for populations, even when care is said to be free or subsidized. In the case of malaria, housing unsanitary conditions are a high vulnerability factor. The most universal finding in the sociological literature points to the impact of social and economic inequalities on epidemics in several African contexts (Lombrail, 2007; Lombrail et al., 2004). Regardless of national income level, marginalized communities are the most devastated by an epidemic. If African organizations and governments are to respond adequately to these individuals and communities, it is essential to consider the experiences of the most vulnerable populations, especially the poor Health promotion, programming, and policymaking now take into account these fundamental aspects of the public health and medical anthropology literature (Jong et al., 2017; Okello et al., 2014; Tanner et al., 2017; Yannick, 2007). The populations live always with the disease, in profane knowledge, medical ineffective care, and the implementation of public policies (Abramowitz et al., 2015), as is the case with malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/​AIDS, and COVID-​19. The health measures taken to combat these diseases are often not coordinated with the populations and communities that must apply them. The public health response to COVID-​19 that involved closing places of worship, mask wearing, frequent hand washing, and getting vaccinated have not been welcomed or rigorously followed by everyone in all countries. This is also the case with prevention measures, such as using long-​lasting impregnated mosquito nets, which households, especially those with pregnant women or children who are vulnerable to malaria, do not always put in place before going to sleep. It is this misunderstanding between the politicians in charge of thinking up measures and the populations expected to implement them that creates the space in which a disease can evolve and peak. The resilience to diseases such as malaria, AIDS, tuberculosis, and COVID-​19 of populations has been proved (Diez Roux, 2020; Ridde et al., 2021; Henrard et al., 2021).

258    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto

Challenges and Issues in the Sociology of Infectious Diseases in Africa Just as the health community faces challenges to improve population health through disease and epidemic control, the sociology community faces its own challenges—​namely, to attain greater legitimacy and involvement and thus to make a greater contribution to knowledge and action (Sambiéni, 2015). These challenges are methodological, disciplinary, and institutional. The institutional dimension often submits national borders, as well as patients, doctors, medicines, health, and healthcare to political, economic, and cultural constraints (Le Marcis, 2017; Østergaard, 2015; Walther, 2019).

Questions of Methods and Schools There is work to be done in sociology in terms of observation, structured and unstructured interviews, the time and duration of surveys, and the models and processes for analyzing the data produced. Researchers, at least academic sociologists working in the field of health and illness, use structured interviews (often called quantitative questionnaires) and ethnographic observation or unstructured interviews to gather qualitative data, depending on the amount of time that is available for the research. Finally, the sociology of illness requires a methodological update. The challenges of new objectives reinforce the need for interdisciplinarity.

The Difficult Practical Interdisciplinarity The sociology of health is intertwined with anthropology, public health, epidemiology, political science, and communication science. However, in the work of research and writing, these are not always considered together but one after the other, in alternating or juxtaposed movements. Outside sociology and anthropology, disciplines such as geography, demography, botany, and communication must be also be considered in an interdisciplinary practice, the modalities of which are still difficult to construct, to meet the challenges of health and science.

Access to Programmatic Resources Research is increasingly programmed and budgeted for by developers. Access to the resources thus made available is still discriminatory and unfavorable to sociology. Even when sociology is mentioned, it is typically to complete only a tiny part of picture, such as the collective representations around a disease. The most important budgets expected

Infectious Diseases in Africa     259 for the time necessary for disciplinary engagement research are not accessible. The often individual battle with methods that do not require great means explains why resources are not mobilized or directed toward this science, as is the case with public health and epidemiology.

Conclusion After curative and preventive medicine and epidemiology, the sociology of health has looked at a wide range of infectious diseases across the continent and the decades in parallel with biological research on microbes and viruses. At the frontiers of epidemiology and anthropology (including ethnology), the sociology of health has described diverse knowledge, beliefs, representations, treatments, and therapeutic practices. Despite the experiences and the rich theoretical and conceptual production, sociology has not yet succeeded in avoiding inappropriate, noncontextualized interventions by large institutions that do not encourage community adherence but which, if followed, could be good indicators of healthcare utilization. The fields of sociology and the sociology of health, born in the 19th and 20th centuries respectively, are perhaps still young. But they must grow at the methodological, institutional, and social levels in order to legitimize themselves and perform in the face of increasingly complex objectives.

Note 1. It is difficult to declare that a disease has been eliminated. The World Health Organization declares a disease eliminated on the basis of specific epidemiological verification criteria. Infectious diseases are eliminated at different times and in different regions of the world.

References Abramowitz, S. A., Mclean, K. E., Mckune, S. L., Bardosh, K. L., Fallah, M., Monger, J., Tehoungue, K., & Omidian, P. A. (2015). Community-​centered responses to Ebola in urban Liberia: The view from below. PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 1, 1–​18. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1371/​jour​nal.pntd.0003​706 Agoua, H., Alley, E. S., Hougard, J. M., Akpoboua, K. L. B., Boatin, B., & Sékétéli, A. (1995). Études entomologiques de post-​traitement dans le programme de lutte contre l’onchocercose en Afrique de l’Ouest Post-​treatment entomological studies in the onchocerciasis control program in West Africa. Parasite, 2, 281–​288. https://​doi.org/​10.1051/​paras​ite/​199​5023​281 Alexander, K. A., Sanderson, C. E., Marathe, M., Lewis, B. L., Rivers, M., Shaman, J., Drake, J. M., Lofgren, E., Dato, V. M., Eisenberg, C., & Eubank, S. (2015). What factors might have led to the emergence of Ebola in West Africa? PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 9, 1–​26. https://​ doi.org/​10.1371/​jour​nal.pntd.0003​652

260    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto Arnold, D. (1991). The Indian Ocean as a disease zone, 1500–​1950. South Asia: Journal of South Asia Studies, 14, 1–​21. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​008564​0910​8723​152 Bado, J. (1996). Médecine coloniale et grandes endémies en Afrique 1900–​1960. Colonial medicine and major endemics in Africa 1900–​1960 Karthala. Bargès, A. (2008). Contagion et hérédité, peurs et insertion: La lèpre comme métamaladie. Contagion and heredity, fears and insertion: Leprosy as metadisease Corps, 33–​40. https://​ doi.org/​10.3917/​corp.005.0033 Bati Koutoumpo, B. L. P., Sambiéni, N. E., & Ansèque, C. G. (2021). Vulnérabilité à la fièvre typhoïde dans les communes de Tanguiéta-​ Matéri-​ Cobly au Nord-​ Ouest du Bénin. Vulnerability to typhoid fever in the communes of Tanguiéta-​Matéri-​Cobly in northwestern Benin Revue Espace, Territoires, Sociétés et Santé, 4, 113–​129. Baxerres, C., Guienne, V., Houngnihin, R., & Marquis, C. (Coords.). (2015). L’automédicamentation et ses déterminants. Actes des rencontres scientifiques Nord/​Sud à Cotonou. Self-​medication and its determinants. Proceedings of the North/​South scientific meetings in Cotonou Becker, C., & Collignon, R. (1998). Epidémies et médecine coloniale en Afrique de l’Ouest. Epidemics and colonial medicine in West Africa Cahiers Santé, 8, 411–​416. Benoist, J. (1996). Soigner au pluriel: Essais sur le pluralisme médical. Caring in the plural: Essays on medical pluralism Karthala. Bertillot, H. (2014). La rationalisation en douceur: Sociologie des indicateurs qualité à l’hôpital. Smooth streamlining:. Sociology of quality indicators in hospitals Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris. Bettaieb, J., Bellali, H., Alaya, N. Ben, Mrabet, A., & Chahed, M. K. (2013). Évaluation de la surveillance des infections invasives à méningocoques à Tunis par la méthode de capture-​ recapture [Evaluation of the monitoring of invasive meningococcal infections in Tunis: The capture-​ recapture method]. Sante Publique, 25, 609–​615. https://​doi.org/​10.3917/​ spub.135.0609 Bibeau, G. (2003). L’Afrique, terre imaginaire du sida: La subversion du discours scientifique par le jeu des fantasmes. Africa, imaginary land of AIDS: the subversion of scientific discourse through the play of fantasies Anthropologie et Sociétés, 15, 125–​147. https://​doi.org/​ 10.7202/​01517​9ar Bonvalet, P. (2015). De l’urgence politique à la gestion de l’action publique: Construire et institutionnaliser l’accès aux traitements du VIH /​sida au Bénin From political urgency to the management of public action: Building and institutionalizing access to HIV/​AIDS treatment in Benin [dissertation, Université de Bordeaux]. Hal theses. https://​tel.archi​ves-​ouver​ tes.fr/​tel-​01233​856 Cantrelle, P., & Locoh, T. (1990). Facteurs sociaux et culturels de la santé en Afrique de l’Ouest. Social and cultural factors of health in West Africa CEPED. Chabrol, F. (2012). Prendre soin de sa population: Le sida au Botswana, entre politiques globales du médicament et pratiques locales de citoyenneté. Caring for its people:. AIDS in Botswana, between global drug policies and local citizenship practices Bulletin Amades, 86. https://​doi.org/​10.4000/​ama​des.1420 Chemtob, D., Rosen, H., Lazarus, A., Anteby, L., Berthomière, W., & Simon, G. (1996). Voyage vers un autre univers de santé: Exemple d’une approche transculturelle de problèmes de Santé Publique. Journey to another universe of health: Example of a cross-​cultural approach to public health issues Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 12, 99–​121. https://​ doi.org/​10.3406/​remi.1996.1518

Infectious Diseases in Africa     261 Collège des Universitaires de Maladies Infectieuses et Tropicales (France). (2016). Maladies infectieuses et tropicales. Infectious and tropical diseasesAlinea Plu. Cognet, M., Bascougnano, S., & Adam-​vezina, E. (2009). Traitement différentiel dans les parcours thérapeutiques [Research report]. DREES-​Mire. Daff, B. M., Diouf, S., Diop, E. S. M., Mano, Y., Nakamura, R., Sy, M. M., Tobe, M., Togawa, S., & Ngom, M. (2020). Reforms for financial protection schemes towards universal health coverage, Senegal. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 98, 100–​108. https://​doi.org/​ 10.2471/​BLT.19.239​665 Diez Roux, A. V. (2020). Population health in the time of COVID-​19: Confirmations and revelations. Milbank Quarterly, 98, 629–​640. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​1468-​0009.12474 Eboko, F. (2015). Vers une matrice de l’action publique en Afrique? Approche trans-​sectorielle de l’action publique en Afrique contemporaine. Towards a matrix of public action in Africa? Cross-​sectoral approach to public action in contemporary Africa Questions de Recherche, 45, 1–​40. http://​www.ceri-​scien​ces-​po.org/​publ​ica/​qdr.htm Fagbamigbe, A. F., Hurricane-​Ike, E. O., Yusuf, O. B., & Idemudia, E. S. (2017). Trends and drivers of skilled birth attendant use in Nigeria (1990–​2013): Policy implications for child and maternal health. International Journal of Women’s Health, 9, 843–​853. https://​doi.org/​ 10.2147/​IJWH.S137​848 Flink, I. J. E., Ziebe, R., Vagaï, D., Van De Looij, F., Van ’T Riet, H., & Houweling, T. A. J. (2016). Targeting the poorest in a performance-​based financing programme in northern Cameroon. Health Policy and Planning, 31, 767–​776. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​hea​pol/​czv​130 Gruénais, M. (1995). Anthropologie médicale appliquée: Connaissances, attitudes, croyances, pratiques. Applied medical anthropology:. Knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, practices In J.-​F. Bare (Ed.), Les applications de l’anthropologie: Un essai de réflexion collective depuis la France (pp. 179–​220). Karthala. Heilbron, J. (2006). Programme d’amélioration de la qualité et de l’accès aux soins obstétricaux d’urgence dans les pays en développement. Program for improving the quality and access to emergency obstetric care in developing countries Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 74. 1–​67. https://​doi.org/​10.3406/​arss.1988.2437 Henrard, J., Arborio, S., Fond-​Harmant, L., & Kane, H. (2021). Santé publique: Les réponses aux défis de la pandémie de la COVID 19. Public health: Responses to the challenges of the COVID 19 pandemic Santé Publique, 6, 785–​788. https://​doi.org/​10.3917/​spub.216.0785 Hugon, A. (2005). L’historiographie de la maternité en Afrique subsaharienne. The Historiography of Maternity in Sub-​Saharan Africa CLIO: Histoire, Femmes et Sociétés, 21, 1–​12. https://​doi.org/​10.4000/​clio.1466 Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Économique (INSAE). (2013). Enquête Démographique et de Santé du Bénin (EDSB-​IV) 2011–​2012 Benin Demographic and Health Survey (EDSB-​IV) 2011–​2012 [Statistiques sanitaires]. Jaffré, Y. (2009). Dynamiques et limites socio-​anthropologiques des stratégies de prévention et de contrôle des risques infectieux dans les pays en voie de développement. In Dynamiques et limites socio-​anthropologiques des stratégies de prévention et de contrôle des risques infectieux dans les pays en voie de développement [Report on science and technology, No. 24]. Paris Academy of Sciences, Paris. https://​doi.org/​10.1522/​030148​883 Jong, S. S., Carrico, A., Cooper, B., Thompson, L., & Portillo, C. (2017). Engagement with health care providers as a mediator between social capital and quality of life among a sample of people living with HIV in the United States: Path-​analysis. SSM -​Population Health, 3, 448–​ 454. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.ssmph.2017.05.001

262    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto Kanati, L. (2011). Des représentations sociales du VIH/​SIDA à la construction d’une identité séropositive: Analyse de discours en pays Moba (Nord Togo) From social representations of HIV/​AIDS to the construction of an HIV-​positive identity: Discourse analysis in the Moba country (Northern Togo). Université Paris Nanterre Ouest. Kapiriri, L., & Ross, A. (2020). The politics of disease epidemics: A comparative analysis of the SARS, Zika and Ebola outbreaks. Global Social Welfare, 7, 33–​45. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s40​ 609-​018-​0123-​y Lachenal, G. (2011). Quand la médecine coloniale laisse des traces. When colonial medicine leaves traces Les Tribunes de la Santé, 4, 59–​66. https://​doi.org/​10.3917/​seve.033.0059 Le Marcis, F. (2017). La mise en camp de la Guinée: Ebola et l’expérience postcoloniale. Guinea's encampment: Ebola and the postcolonial experience L’Homme: Revue Française d’anthropologie, 222, 57–​90. Lepopa, B. N. (2020). Itinéraires thérapeutiques et représentations de la santé à l’enfance chez les Nzèbi du Gabon. Unicersité de Loraine. Lombrail, P. (2007). Inégalités de santé et d’accès secondaire aux soins. Inequalities in health and secondary access to care Revue d’Epidemiologie et de Sante Publique, 55, 23–​30. https://​ doi.org/​10.1016/​j.respe.2006.12.002 Lombrail, P., Lang, T., & Pascal, J. (2004). Accès au système de soins et inégalités sociales de santé: Que sait-​on de l’accès secondaire? Access to the health care system and social inequalities in health: What do we know about secondary access?¨Santé, Société et Solidarité, 3, 61–​7 1. https://​doi.org/​10.3406/​oss.2004.995 Meessen, B., Musango, L., Kashala, J. P. I., & Lemlin, J. (2006). Reviewing institutions of rural health centres: The performance initiative in Butare, Rwanda. Tropical Medicine and International Health, 11, 1303–​1317. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1365-​3156.2006.01680.x Nicolle, C. (1939). Destin des maladies infectieuses. Fate of infectious diseases. Leçons du Collège de France (PUF). Okello, A., Welburn, S., & Smith, J. (2014). Crossing institutional boundaries: Mapping the policy process for improved control of endemic and neglected zoonoses in Sub-​Saharan Africa. Health Policy and Planning, 30, 804–​812. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​hea​pol/​czu​059 Olivier de Sardan, J.-​P., & Bierschenk, T. (1993). Les courtiers locaux du développement. Local development brokers Bulletin de l’APAD, 5. https://​doi.org/​10.4000/​apad.3233 Olivier de Sardan, J.-​P. (1998). Anthropologie de developpement: essai en socioanthropologie du changement social. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 68(2), 294. Olivier de Sardan, J. P., Diarra, A., & Moha, M. (2017). Travelling models and the challenge of pragmatic contexts and practical norms: The case of maternal health. Health Research Policy and Systems, 15 (Suppl 1). https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​961-​017-​0213-​9 Olivier de Sardan, J.-​P., & Ridde, V. (2014). A Public Health Policy and its Contradictions: Free Health Care in Burkina, Mali and Niger. Karthala. Østergaard, L. R. (2015). Ebola vu de loin: les agents de la santé face au risque et à l’incertitude dans les campagnes du Burkina Faso. Ebola seen from afar: health workers facing risk and uncertainty in rural Burkina Faso. Anthropologie et Santé, 11. https://​doi.org/​10.4000/​ant​ hrop​olog​iesa​nte.1833 Oumarou, H., & Abdourahamane, O. (2017). La gestion humanitaire des inondations dans une commune de Niamey. Humanitarian management of floods in a commune of Niamey. LASDEL. Pierre, A., & Bernard-​Alex, G. (2021). Maladies tropicales négligées: Actualités 2021. Médecine Tropicale, 57, 1–​7. https://​doi.org/​10.1159/​isbn.978-​3-​8055-​8992-​5

Infectious Diseases in Africa     263 Revue de Biologie Médicale. (2017). Echos de presse: L’objectif d’élimination de la tuberculose remis en question. Press echoes:. The goal of eliminating tuberculosis questioned https://​ www.revueb​iolo​giem​edic​ale.fr/​echos-​de-​pre​sse/​echos-​de-​pre​sse-​archi​ves/​395-​syste​mes​​ -de-​sante-​commun​icat​ion-​de-​la-​com​miss​ion-​eur​opee​nne-​10.html Ridde, V. (2006). L’accès des indigents aux services de santé au Burkina Faso: Un problème public? Access of indigents to health services in Burkina Faso: A public problem? Lien Social et Politiques, 55, 149–​163. https://​doi.org/​10.7202/​01323​2ar Ridde, V., Gautier, L., Dagenais, C., Chabrol, F., Hou, R., Bonnet, E., David, P. M., Cloos, P., Duhoux, A., Lucet, J. C., Traverson, L., de Araujo Oliveira, S. R., Cazarin, G., Peiffer-​Smadja, N., Touré, L., Coulibaly, A., Honda, A., Noda, S., Tamura, T., . . . Zinszer, K. (2021). Learning from public health and hospital resilience to the SARS-​CoV-​2 pandemic: Protocol for a multiple case study (Brazil, Canada, China, France, Japan, and Mali). Health Research Policy and Systems, 19, 1–​10. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​961-​021-​00707-​z Ronsmans, C. (2001). Les audits peuvent-​ils améliorer la qualité des soins obstétricaux? Réduire les risques liés à la maternité: Stratégies et évidence. Can audits improve the quality of obstetric care? Reducing Maternity Risks: Strategies and Evidence. Studies in Health Services Organisation & Policy, 18, 1–​19. Sambiéni, N. E. (2015). Les contraintes à l’utilisation des résultats de recherche: Point de vue d’un chercheur au Bénin. Constraints to the use of research results: Point of view of a researcher in Benin Santé Publique, 7, 171–​174. Sambiéni, N. E., Danko, N., & Ridde, V. (2015). La fièvre hémorragique à virus Lassa au Bénin en 2014 en contexte d’Ebola: Une épidémie révélatrice de la faiblesse du système sanitaire [The Lassa virus hemorrhagic fever in Benin in 2014: An epidemic that reveals the weakness of the national health system]. Lassa virus hemorrhagic fever in Benin in 2014 in the context of Ebola: An epidemic that reveals the weakness of the national health system Anthropologie et Santé, 11. https://​journ​als.open​edit​ion.org/​ant​hrop​olog​iesa​nte/​1772 Sambiéni, E., & Ridde, V. (2021). L’émergence du financement basé sur les résultats dans la santé au Bénin et au Burkina Faso. The emergence of results-​based financing in health in Benin and Burkina Faso. In V. Ridde (Ed.), Vers une couverture sanitaire universelle en 2030? Réformes en Afrique subsaharienne (Science et, pp. 119–​146). Ridde Valéry. Scheffler, R. M., Herbst, C. H., Lemiere, C., & Campbell, J. (2016). Health labor market analyses in low-​and middle-​income countries: An evidence-​based approach. World Bank Group. https://​openkn​owle​dge.worldb​ank.org/​han​dle/​10986/​25137 Sfeir, A. (2011). La santé est un devoir régalien de l’État, pas un pouvoir. Health is a sovereign duty of the State, not a power Les Tribunes de la Santé, 4, 99–​103. https://​doi.org/​10.3917/​seve.033.0099 Stocking, B. (2015). Report of the Ebola interim assessment panel. World Health Organization. Tanner, T., Bahadur, A., & Moench, M. (2017). Challenges for resilience policy and practice. (Working paper 519). Overseas Development Institute. Taverne, B., Desclaux, A., Sow, P., Delaporte, E., & Ndoye, I. (2012). Evaluation de l’impact bioclinique et social, individuel et collectif, du traitement ARV chez des patients VIH-​1 pris en charge depuis 10 ans dans le cadre de l’ISAARV -​Evaluation of the bioclinical and social impact, individual and collective, of ARV treatment in HIV-​1 patients treated for 10 years within the framework of ISAARV Cohorte ANRS 1215. Thiongane, O. B. (2013). Anthropologie de la méningite au Niger: Espaces épidémiques, mobilisations scientifiques et conceptions de la maladie. Anthropology of meningitis in Niger:. Epidemic spaces, scientific mobilizations and conceptions of disease École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.

264    N’koué Emmanuel Sambiéni and David Houéto Van Dormael, M. (1997). La médecine coloniale, ou la tradition exogène de la médecine moderne dans le Tiers Monde Colonial medicine, or the exogenous tradition of modern medicine in the Third World. [paper]. Institute of Tropical Medicine. Walther, O. J. (2019). Frontières, sécurité et développement en Afrique de l’Ouest. Borders, security and development in West Africa. Notes Ouest-​Africaines, 26, 1–​38. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1787/​74a9d​b76-​fr World Health Organization. (2018). Intégrer les maladies tropicales négligées dans l’action pour la santé mondiale et le développement. Integrating Neglected Tropical Diseases into Global Health and Development Action Yannick, J. (2007). Contributions of social anthropology to malaria control. In M. Tibayrenc (Ed.), Encyclopedia of infectious diseases (pp. 591–​602). John Wiley & Sons. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1002/​978047​0114​209.ch34 Yates, R., Brookes, T., & Whitaker, E. (2017). Hospital detentions for non-​payment of fees: A denial of rights and dignity. Centre on Global Health Security. https://​www.chath​amho​use.org/​ 2017/​12/​hospi​tal-​det​enti​ons^àç-​non-​paym​ent-​fees

V

P OL I T IC A L E C ON OM Y A N D DE V E L OP M E N T

Chapter 15

The So ciol o g i c a l Impl ications of A fri c a ’ s P olitical Ec onomy Manu Lekunze

Introduction How does the relationship between states or political power and markets structure societies in Africa? This chapter aims to provide a political economy theory that explains the current nature and the evolution of key macrosociological features of African states’ societies. The political economy approach to the study of African sociology is instructive because of the significant influence of imperialism, an international political economy phenomenon (Lenin, 1999), on the continent. The political economy literature defines the essence of the discipline as the study of the interaction between states and markets (Strange, 2015). There has been a consensus that the nature of the interaction between states and markets has profound implications for the nature of society, since Karl Marx’s work and in the subsequent Marxist literature (Baylis, 2020). Imperialism is also the use of political power, precisely military power, to advance economic interests. In imperially constructed or dominated societies, the state and the market loom large in the structure of society. Furthermore, the colonial power often does not pay attention to local social niceties it considers irrelevant to its economic or political interests. Ignoring or emphasizing certain sociological features eventually restructures society to meet specific political economy ends. Therefore, the study examines the implications of the interaction between the state and markets for society. This chapter argues that the nature and evolution of Africa’s political economies oriented Africa toward the macrosociological features of multinational political order (states), exterocentric economic systems, social order built on large families (often polygamous) or clans,, and largely authoritarian political systems. The argument rests

268   Manu Lekunze on four fundamental empirical observations: (1) the historical ability to form self-​ sufficient societies in isolation; (2) the historical possibility of trade as a strategy only of self-​sufficiency, and not integration; (3) a historical link between family, labor, wealth, political power, and order; (4) the history of external domination; and (5) the disproportionate structural power of domestic and international political economies on externally dominated societies. Moreover, the fundamentals of Africa’s political economies have changed little in more than 60 years of independence. Most remain significantly underdeveloped, and analysts can identify them by mineral or agricultural products with colonial origins, including oil in Nigeria, peanuts in Senegal, cocoa in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, and timber in Cameroon. African economies generally remain suppliers of primary products and importers of manufactured goods. The digital economy, especially the internet and mobile telephony, and the entrance of China as a major destination for exports and a source of imports and finance, have led to record levels of economic growth in Africa. Most African economies remain significantly small in Gross Domestic Product terms, despite a steady average growth since the 2000s. For example, the economy of Virginia, a small state in the United States, is larger than the economy of Nigeria, the most populous country and largest economy in Africa (World Bank, 2020b). In effect, much has changed, but much remains the same. The data for the analysis comes from secondary history sources and reports on the economics and sociology of African states from such organizations as the African Union, United Nations, African Development Bank, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The analysis is undergirded by Susan Strange’s political economy theoretical proposition that (1) all societies organize to achieve wealth, order, justice, and freedom; (2) power is the main determinant of the combination of institutions to achieve the four societal values; and (3) power accrues from the control of security, finance, production, and knowledge. Therefore, the relationship between power (states as an embodiment of political power) and markets shapes the nature of society. It is important to note that generalizing about Africa is particularly challenging. The arguments made here apply to different parts of Africa in varying degrees, and it is always possible to point to a case that does not quite fit. They are, however, largely correct in most cases.

Political Order in Africa This section examines the impact of the nature and evolution of Africa’s interaction between states and markets on political order—​namely, political communities such as chiefdoms, kingdoms, city-​states, and empires. The interaction between markets and states (the focus of the political economy approach) is particularly relevant to Africa because it forms the basis of African “worlds,” the interpolity or international systems that shape the nature of African states.

The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy    269

States and Worlds Most contemporary African states are multinational, integrating several subnational groups into a national superstructure. Going back centuries, African states of any scale were a vertical integration of separate groups into an imperial superstructure because of an evolutionary process that geography and political economy forces fundamentally influenced. Historically, the foundation of African societies is self-​sufficiency in small groups because of favorable natural conditions, such as abundant game, edible vegetation, and water-​rich geographies. Small group polities could survive for long periods without creating or connecting to a “world” or an “outside” world. The stimulus to create or connect with a world arose only when a polity could no longer survive self-​ sufficiently. As a result, communities created worlds for exchange. In turn, the nature of the exchange shaped the individual polities within the worlds. The need to exchange what one has in abundance, which is often a blessing of nature, for what one lacks, which is often a curse of nature, created worlds, or market networks. Most of Africa evolved into such “worlds,” which were often political units or polities connected by a network of markets capable of supplying all the products necessary for life in that specific geography. Each polity in the network had a major market that specialized in a specific product. These markets were mainly bounded networks. Long-​ distance trade enabled interconnected markets to crisscross entire African regions but not a merging of worlds. In what follows, I explore the influence of the interaction between markets and political power on the evolving nature of political order and political development. First, the interaction between markets and political power influenced states and worlds’ territorial and population size. “Territory” and “territoriality” remain important variables in explaining various national and international phenomena. Isolated polities came to markets fully formed, using the market as a tool to fill the gaps in their self-​sufficient strategies. The markets enabled polities to continue as small and separate ones. Several features of the market-​day systems prevented the expansion of worlds: 1. Markets provided basic needs. Markets had to occur frequently to allow citizens to replenish their supplies. 2. Extending markets too widely would cause language challenges. The isolation of some communities meant that languages, even those of the same origin, evolved differently in different communities and geographies. A wider market network would include too many languages, making trade challenging. 3. The laws governing trade were typically customary and religious. Trade is highly inefficient and challenging without a shared sense of justice, customs, and religion and authorities to enforce rules and settle disputes. Wider trading networks could include polities with significantly different cultures and practices, which inhibited the smooth functioning of trade.

270   Manu Lekunze 4. The difficulty of transporting certain products over long distances prevented the expansion of trading networks. Connectivity has always been a problem in parts of Africa. Large unnavigable rivers, mountains, and thick forests often create natural barriers to the expansion of market networks. Therefore polities’ size and interpolity systems (worlds) remained small. The second factor is colonialism, or empire-​building, which contributed to the emergence of interbounded market networks. For example, the Hausa, Dutch, Portuguese, British, French, and German worlds were bigger than the market-​ day system. Colonialism expanded the local bounded networks of the market-​day systems and interbounded markets relations by solving five crucial problems: 1. The colonizer’s language became the lingua franca of trade in the area under its influence. 2. The colonizer harmonized the currency of trade. 3. The laws the colonizers created, adopted, or modified become trade rules. Institutions that the colonizers created or modified adjudicated trade disputes and, eventually, other disputes in society. 4. The colonizer’s religion—​that is, shared origin myths, organized Animism, Islam, and, later, Christianity—​harmonized a sense of justice and fair play, providing trade rules throughout the territories ascribing to the religion. Hausa speakers, in the area now in northern Nigeria, expanded their suzerainty over several polities, known as the Hausa states, to create a Hausa world that lasted for several centuries, until the Fulani empire builders conquered it in the 19th century. The Hausa language, customs, and institutions provided the necessary framework to facilitate trade within the Hausa world (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Similar examples include Arabic in Northern Africa, Swahili in East Africa, and Pidgin English in littoral West Africa. Islam originated or influenced courts, and scholars designed trade rules and settled trade disputes across Africa. The Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch all had trade-​dispute mechanisms in Africa from the late 16th century. British, French, and German courts appeared in several parts of Africa later in the 19th century (Owona, 1973). Nevertheless, the colonizers’ reach and influence still bound African worlds. Externally and imperially dominated small worlds significantly impacted political development by limiting options and keeping attention focused on local dynamics. In a small, bounded Francophone world in Africa, for example: 1. The French language limits access to innovation and development in the English-​ speaking world. 2. French institutional types limit resist institutional innovations that could address Africa’s political order challenges.

The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy    271 3. French domination of the Francophone world limits political and economic choice. Learning from innovations in other worlds becomes the business of the metropole, which owns the language and power (political, military, knowledge, finance and cultural). At the peripheries, the colonized become followers of the parts that the metropole chooses to allow them to access. Africa’s access to the world is therefore predominantly mediated through or by the former colonial metropole. For example, financial transactions in the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc, the currency of 14 African states, convert only to Euros. To illustrate, Chinese who want to trade in Togo must change their money from Yuan to the Euro and then from the Euro to the CFA franc. Similarly, some flights from South Africa to Burkina Faso continue to route through Paris.

Political Development Africa’s political economies and geography set African states on a political development path to integrating polities into empires or multipolity or multinational states. As mentioned earlier, at the core of African political development was the creation of self-​sufficient political units (Clapham, 1996). Colonization expanded the worlds or created empires without broadening the internal subunits. Imperialism created core groups that became dominant powers in networks of separate, often poorly connected, polities. As such, vertically integrating polities into empires (rather than by the bureaucratic centralization and harmonization of identities seen in medieval Europe) characterized political development in many parts of Africa. The evolutionary path of African political development was toward empires, not (ethnic) nation-​states, as in the imagination of Europeans (Fukuyama, 2014). The use of markets as a self-​sufficiency tool allowed subpolities to remain separate but interconnected. Divide-​and-​r ule strategies and the incapacity to centralize prevented the imperial systems from harmonizing groups or society. European imperialism augmented and cemented the political developmental path toward empires, not nation-​states, through “tribalization” in their “indirect rule” policies (Mamdani, 2018). Imperialism underpins Africa’s political cultures, even in supposedly postimperial contemporary African nations. The core Hausa groups became dominant powers within the Northern Nigerian Hausa world, sowing the seeds for the emergence of the Sokoto Empire (Smaldone, 1970). The Europeans also inserted themselves as a dominant African tribe similar to the Hausa or the Fulani, within a preexisting “empiric” framework, albeit one with arbitrary boundaries. Lord Lugard, once the governor-​general of colonial Nigeria, stated:

272   Manu Lekunze The old treaties are dead . . . the Fulani, in old times, conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They [the Fulani] in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hand of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. (Herbst, 2014, p. 83)

Lugard cast the British as just another African tribe, like the Fulani. As Lugard noted, the arrival of new tribes to take over existing polities was not a new phenomenon. The Fulani had displaced the Hausa to form the Sokoto Caliphate; and farther west, the Moroccans defeated and occupied Songhai in the 16th century, to name just two examples (Gomez, 2018). Therefore, political-​development innovations in Africa have been in building, managing, and securing multinational states.

Economic Systems The economic systems of most current African states are “exterocentric”—​that is, they employ disproportionate economic resources to supply external markets and import from external markets, often at the expense of local needs. International political-​ economy structural power is disproportionately influential in exterocentric economic systems compared to what Samir Amin (2015) referred to as “auto-​centric” economic systems. This section discusses the salient features of Africa’s political economies and the international political economy that impacts the economic systems of African states, as a macrosociological feature. It shows how African economic systems have evolved from self-​sufficient, autocentric, metrocentric systems to dependent, exterocentric systems and the implications. Communities with self-​sufficient economic systems have existed in Africa for most of its history. And as we have seen, challenges to self-​sufficiency necessitated the use of the market as a tool of self-​sufficiency. Each polity had a market that specialized in specific products or in which specific products dominated. They traded to fill gaps in their self-​sufficiency, creating autocentric economic systems. Eventually, imperialism created states where an internal network of markets supplied all the products necessary for life in that specific geography. The imperial economic systems were invariably metrocentric—​an economic system with a core market and center of power that all the other satellite markets and political authorities prioritized. European imperialism in Africa created metrocentric economic systems with the core markets and political authority in Europe, Paris, Lisbon, and London. There were metrocentric economies in precolonial Africa, such as Sokoto’s role in the Sokoto Empire or Cairo in North Africa. As with political order, political economy forces have several implications on the nature and evolution of African economic systems.

The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy    273 The death of self-​sufficient polities is the first among them. Colonialism, as a form of interpolity or international political economy, expanded the bounded market networks. The new dispensation created several conundrums. The first was the simple addition of a second market to which African political power had to relate. The second was the question of which market is more valuable economically and politically? At the time of European imperialism in Africa, the Europeans also maintained “autocentric” economic systems. They mainly imported what they could not profitably produce themselves and exported what they had a competitive advantage in producing. “Auto-​centrism” in Europe clashed with auto-​centrism in Africa. The balance of military power between Africa and Europe determined which would follow an autocentric economic model. As a result, a European state’s political power, and not pure economic factors, determined its trade relations with other states. Colonialism created a situation where external powers forced African political power to prioritize external markets over their internal markets, leading to exterocentric dependent economic systems. Over time, Africa’s most important natural and human economic resources focused on producing and harvesting for the external market. The exterocentric model relegates the local markets to less and to the least important economic resources. It also shapes social values and social status. Individuals in Nigeria engaged in import-​export businesses have a higher social status than those who deal with local products, even if the export-​import business is less profitable. Colonialism and postcolonial confiscation of international political economy structural power through the control of security, finance, knowledge, and production meant that African states have struggled to reorient their economic systems. The result is inherently undiversified economies that intensify the political relevance of a few products, mostly minerals and forest and agricultural products, and destination states. The buyers of African minerals, forest and agricultural products, and vital supplies and the finance providers retain significant political relevance with imperial or neocolonial connotations. As a result, the influence on colonially bequeathed political economies perpetuates cycles of neocolonialism, creating vertically accountable political economies, with the Global North at the top of the international political economy hierarchy. Such political economies exacerbate the following:

Unfair Trade The political economy approach identifies several reasons why the nature of Africa’s political economy explains the phenomenon of unfair trade between Africa and the Global North. First, the history of African trade with external traders followed certain patterns: 1. The externals came to Africa; the Africans rarely went to external markets.

274   Manu Lekunze 2. The externals purchased what they valued, in some cases, items of little value in Africa. Naturally occurring items dominated and still dominate Africa’s trade with the rest of the world. Examples include humans (slavery), African hardwoods, salt, gold, ivory, zinc, copper, bauxite, and, recently, oil and gas. 3. The externals sold goods to Africa that they chose because they brought the trade to Africa. Africans did not go to Arabia or Europe to decide on what to purchase or not purchase. That creates a relationship where the external buyer and seller retains significant power in the relationship between states and markets. Second, Africa lacked structural power in the international political economy. Africa controls a small share of the world’s industrial power. It significantly relies on importing manufactured goods from Europe, North America, and increasingly Asia in recent decades. The failure of Africa to develop a Covid-​19 vaccine evidences that Africa controls littler of the world’s technology and know-​how required for production, research and development. Also, Africa remains one of the most indebted regions in the world. Africa creates less credit and borrows more than the Global North. Moreover, Africa retains little or no maritime commercial or naval power in a world where maritime transport continues to dominate the international trade. European airliners continue to dominate air transport into and out of Africa. Furthermore, the general military weakness of most African states means Africa is largely at the receiving end of international security dynamics. Therefore, Africa’s position of weakness in all areas of power compels it to accept unfair trade terms. Weakness due to historically unfair trade perpetuates unfair trade terms and more political weakness. The international political economy traps Africa in an unfair trade loop that exacerbates political weakness, which enables unfair trade.

Dependency European imperialism and postcolonial Western power over the international political economy forced African states to maintain exterocentric economic systems that are invariably dependent. African states continue to depend on external markets to purchase their raw materials and the income from those exports to import necessary manufactured goods. Furthermore, African exports are predominantly commodities whose prices are determined by external commodity markets. When Africa’s exports cannot provide enough foreign currency for consumer expenditure because of low externally determined prices, African states borrow, primarily from the same states in the Global North, to meet the gap. The export of raw materials, import of manufactured goods, and external borrowing have trapped African states in cycles of dependency originating in the colonial period that few, perhaps none, have been able to shake off completely.

Controlled Economies Markets are fundamentally “unfree” in Africa. The phrase “unfree markets” better captures the phenomenon often referred to as controlled/​ command economies

The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy    275 in Africa. Economic theory suggests that market forces should shape production practices in “free markets” (Strauss, 2012). External political power influences production practices that defy market forces, creating de facto “unfree” markets in supposedly “market economies.” African states maintain the orientation of their colonially installed economies. For example, Kenya uses its best agriculture assets, such as land, skills, and technology, to produce flowers for external markets, mainly in Europe. However, 26 percent of Kenya’s population faces severe food insecurity, and 68 percent face moderate food insecurity (World Bank, 2019a). Twenty-​five percent are undernourished -​ do not eat enough food to be functional humans (World Bank, 2019b). Fifteen percent of Kenya’s merchandise imports are food (World Bank, 2020a). In most staple food categories, such as rice, wheat, and livestock genetics, Kenya imports more than it produces. Kenya would not have the space to produce flowers for European markets in a pure market economy because of the high food demand. The prioritization of the external market in exterocentric economic systems distorts both political and market forces. It is potentially far more profitable for Kenya to produce food for the Kenyan market than flowers for external markets. It is also far more politically significant to reduce external influence on Kenyan politics by reducing Kenya’s dependency on flower exports to specific states with neocolonial tendencies. Kenya is only a clear and popular example. Several other examples abound. Cocoa in Ghana and the Ivory Coast are similar examples. The prioritization of external markets, normatively and in practice, continue to shape African societies. In a free-​market economy, the state focuses on regulating private firms. The nature of the international political economy often forces African states to get involved in production or harvesting for export markets. The Cameroon state produces bananas for the European market through a state-​owned enterprise, the Cameroon Development Corporation, using Cameroon’s best agricultural assets. Producing bananas in Africa for the European markets is not an attractive business endeavor. Bananas are important fruits for Europeans, but they cannot produce them because of their climate conditions. International politics forces an African government to produce the bananas because market forces cannot.

Formal and Informal Economies Exterocentric economic systems create a duality of formal economies and informal economies, reminiscent of the duality of local markets and external markets in imperialism. People live in Africa and must survive, despite the official exterocentric economic system. Thus power creates an exterocentric economic system and human necessity creates an informal sector to meet real needs. The relationship between power and markets, where external power is more influential, creates this inevitable duality in African economies. The prioritization of the export market at the expense of the local market requires enforcement. The state, the enforcer of countercurrents to market forces, develops to administer activities related to export markets rather than the domestic market. However, a significant portion of economic activity in the domestic market occurs outside the exports-​imports sector—​that is, in the informal sector.

276   Manu Lekunze “Informal” here means that which the state has not formalized or where the state’s role is less developed. Conversely, “formal” means that which the state has formalized or where its role is more developed. Genuine economic activities occur in both formal and informal economies. The formal economy caters to elite interests and external markets. The informal economy caters to the needs of the nonelite locals. The formal-​informal divide has profound implications, as follows:

Economies of scale The informality of the informal economy leads to “nonbankability” and “noninsurability,” therefore attracting less investment and attention. Lack of serious investment limits the ability to scale up enterprises, forcing most informal economic operators to remain small-​scale, often in one-​person or one-​family enterprises. This increases inefficiencies and retards innovation. Even if innovation occurs, there is little possibility of scaling it to broader interests. The overall effect impacts the availability of necessities and leads to high prices.

Uncertainty The small “firms” in the informal economy are vulnerable to changes in the personal circumstances of their proprietors. Health issues, family births, and bereavements can determine whether a proprietor opens his or her stall or shop each day. This uncertainty impacts not only the stall or shop owner but also the customers. For owners, a closed stall or shop means reduced income or even a loss of capital if the stock is perishable. For customers, unopened stalls reduce supply, leading to scarcity and higher prices.

Distortion of knowledge and policy Africa’s real political economies include both the formal and informal economies. Nevertheless, economic analysis and resulting policy focus on the formal economy. The informal sector, often subsidizes the formal sector, despite its informality. For example, Cameroon economic analysis and policy do not recognize the role of roadside fuel vending because it is an illegal activity that occurs in the informal sector. Notwithstanding, roadside fuel benefits both the formal and informal economies. The price of roadside fuel in Buea, in Cameroon, was 36.8 percent lower (one liter at XAF400) than the formal market prices, which stood at XAF633 in July 2021. The importance of fuel to the local transportation of people and goods, including necessities such as food, means that lower informal-​market fuel prices hold down inflation for the whole economy, both formal and informal. Bribes from the roadside fuel vendors to law enforcement officials subsidize the low incomes. In effect, then, the informal sector subsidizes Cameroon’s “formal” wage bill. Without the informal sector bribes, police officers might try to force the Cameroonian government to increase their salaries, with inflationary effects across the economy. There is little or no terminology in economics to describe the phenomena taking place in Africa’s informal economies, even though the informal economy is significantly larger than the formal economy in several African states (Meagher, 2010). Assumptions

The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy    277 about the behavior of markets in formal economic theory do not apply to the forced African exterocentric economic systems. This lack of understanding of the nature and size of Africa’s real economies sometimes leads to economic policies that appear extremely arbitrary and unconnected to reality.

Low productivity and wasted effort The nature of the informal sector (lack of investment, uncertainty, insurability, etc.) condemns enterprise to small sizes. The inability to scale up means that business remains with a single proprietor or in family ownership. The overreliance on the personal circumstances of the proprietor means that for the markets to work, there must be many small traders. For there to be an adequate supply of garri in the Ledega market in Ikorodu, Lagos, for example, there must be hundreds of garri sellers in Lagos so that if one is sick, there is always someone to take their place. The high number of sellers means that a significant portion of society is locked into an economic activity that can produce only marginal rewards for tedious efforts. Economically, this saps productivity. It also takes time and energy away from other socially beneficial activities such as raising families, going to school, and participating in communal activities, among other social contributions.

Social discord “Cutthroat competition among small-​scale traders, farmers and herders can lead to social discord. Small businesses are means of survival for some proprietors. They often have to compete with each other for sales, farmland or grazing land, for example. Nigeria is another example, where the competition between farmers and herders in largely informal spaces leads to violent conflict. In summation: the divide between the informal-​formal sector creates nonbankable, uninsurable, challenging-​ to-​ scale-​ up enterprises that trap their owners in effort-​ draining activities that condemn them to low incomes or poverty. The direct link between trade and survival for some market traders leads to cutthroat competition that adds to the existing economic strife and compounds social strife. The informality of the informal economic world means that academics know little of such worlds, and governments struggle to develop appropriate policies to address challenges . . .

Price African governments and economies have significantly constrained power over prices. The price of goods and services is an essential element of economies and political power. The statement “it is the economy, stupid,” associated with former US president Bill Clinton’s 1990 presidential campaign, expresses the importance of this link succinctly. The cost of living, related to the prices of goods and services, is often paramount in constructing the relationship between consumers or voters and their governments. As noted earlier, African states prioritize external markets, but most of the products they

278   Manu Lekunze supply to these markets are commodities, and they do not have political power over these markets. Commodity markets allegedly decide the prices of African commodities with little or no consideration of the cost of production. No one in London or New York, for example, asks the cocoa farmers in Cote d’Ivoire what their production costs are before setting cocoa prices. African states must enforce these prices, and African politics and politicians must deal with the negative consequences when they do not reflect the cost of production. Thus African states are left to find ways to subsidize the Global North’s chocolate, coffee, and oil addictions. Africa suffers from disproportionately high consumer prices (World Economic Forum, 2021). As we have seen, African states are significant importers of finished products from external markets in Europe, East Asia, and North America, and a significant portion of African imports are not commodities, but machines, electronic devices, and consumables, to name just a few examples. The prices of these products are decided at the source, by the producers, after they have factored in their own production costs and profitability. In other words, the power to set prices, at least the base price, is with the external markets, and again, local market forces are preconstrained. Additionally, the relatively low incomes and small populations in some African countries mean weaker purchasing power—​and the inability to buy in bulk to reduce prices, forcing high prices on African economies. African states have constrained market forces and political power over prices of crucial consumer products because they are primarily importing economies. The “constrained market forces” and political power to set prices create powerlessness over individuals and state control of economic circumstances. Cocoa farmers do not know from year to year or season to season what they will earn from their labor. One year might be profitable and worth the effort; the following year might be a disaster. Individual and family fortunes can swing from plenty to destitution from one cocoa season to another in the cocoa-​farming communities in Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Cameroon, to name a few. The government, too, has little control over the revenue and foreign exchange earned from commodity exports. The case of Zambia, which is often unable to pay its debts because of a fall in copper prices, demonstrates the powerlessness of African states over prices (Stubbington & Fletcher, 2020). Nigeria often revises budgets downward, with implications for the government’s ability to deliver services, when oil prices fall. The economic powerlessness of both individuals and states affects society in diverse and negative ways. Cocoa farmers, for example, do not see any direct link between effort and income. They perceive high cocoa prices as a windfall, a blessing, and low prices as a misfortune, perhaps the result of a curse for known or unknown transgressions. This impacts their behavior: they may overspend when there is a windfall or borrow when prices do not meet expectations, meaning that any cash they receive during the cocoa season has already been spent. The inability to determine or even know prices in advance leads to an inability to plan, perpetuating poverty. The governments face a similar dilemma: when oil prices are high, the tendency to overspend and for officials to embezzle is exceptionally high. Low income from oil leads to increased borrowing.

The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy    279

Social Order Social order in contemporary Africa is mainly built on large families or clans and their interrelations with respect to political power, security, justice, and wealth. This section examines how the interaction between political power and markets influences the nature and evolution of social order in Africa. It follows the logic that the nature of the interaction between political power and markets influences economic and political forces that, in turn, influence social organization and relations within society. It focuses on the family as an important unit of social order.

Family African families are generally large, and there is a high prevalence of polygamy, notwithstanding significant shifts away from this practice in the last century. Political power in several African states remains within a few families or clans. The nature of the political economies of African states demonstrates a link between the family, wealth, security, justice, freedom, and political power going back several centuries. This section shows how political economy factors shape the nature and size of families. Large families led to greater wealth, which could translate into political power. Hence, the appearance of an interwoven political economy and the family. The need for labor to cultivate food, control grazing animals, or organize large hunting expeditions motivated having large families. This led to polygamy, a family setting where a man marries multiple wives. The economic rationale for polygamy is that a female can only safely give birth to a limited number of children, regardless of how many husbands she has. In contrast, a male with multiple wives can in theory, at least, father an unlimited number of children. Thus the higher the number of wives, the potentially higher number of children, and the greater quantity of labor to transform into wealth. Multiple wives and children enable greater wealth and in turn a large family and wealth provide the numbers and money to create organized force –​armies. Families that cannot mobilize a similar force would naturally demand security from the family that can. There are always trade-​offs between the security supplier and the security consumer that constrain the consumer’s freedoms and increase the power and wealth of the provider. Over time, the security provider with higher number of wives and children and greater wealth gradually amasses greater military power. The family or clan with most military power monopolizes violence. The monopoly of violence automatically translates into political power. Political power leads to the acquisition of even more wives, children, cultivated land, and animals. In some societies, the king, the holder of political power, might marry between 5 percent and 10 percent of the women in the polity (Warnier, 1989), becoming a relative by blood or marriage of a significant portion

280   Manu Lekunze of the entire population. Family and tradition facilitate political power that was initially derived from economic power. Marriage was a necessary step toward starting a family—​the important social unit. The bride price in certain cultures is a powerful instrument of control and primarily a family affair. These societies maintained strict control over sex -​adultery, premarital sex, homosexuality, and divorce were taboo. Legitimate sex occurred mostly in heterosexual marriages, and marriage was a prerequisite for anyone who wanted to have sex. However, the exorbitant bride price meant that an individual who wanted to marry for the first time had to be of good standing within the family to receive the material support needed to raise the bride price (Warnier, 1989). This often meant working hard in the family’s business, and good standing in the family meant good standing in society. Work enabled one to marry; marriage enabled one to have children, marry again, and acquire wealth; and with more hard work, one could acquire enough wealth to transform it into political power. Therefore, a young man worked hard to get married and then worked even harder to take a second, third, and fourth wife, because the number of wives and children he had was a status symbol and a means to wealth and political power. The family, firm, and government are in many ways indistinguishable in certain African societies. In summation: the tradition of owning your labor, wives, children, or slaves, and the economic importance of labor ties the family to the economy. The relationship between wealth, family size, and mobilizing violence interweaves family, wealth, and political power. There were changes to this system during the colonial period, and postcolonial Africa retained various elements of the colonial political culture; however, it also continued “doing politics” within the family, clan, tribe, or within ethnic groups as an extension of the family. Postcolonial presidents and prime ministers saw themselves as “national chiefs” or “fathers of the nation,” just as they might have been the chiefs or fathers of their villages, but over a larger territory and population. Cases of African presidents with large families who pass power from father to son are increasing in Gabon, Togo, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and similar transfers are rumored in the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Cameroon.

Political Systems African political systems remain largely authoritarian (Lekunze, 2020), as noted earlier. Multiparty political competition and representation is largely absent in African history, although African political systems have shown varying degrees of accountability and responsiveness to the people throughout that history. This section explains the nature and evolution of Africa’s political systems as a macrosociological feature. The control of power resources is a major factor in Africa’s authoritarian political systems and in its current and historical political economy. In discussing the family structure (see the section, “Family”), I showed that if a patriarch possesses a big family, he

The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy    281 can have considerable control over labor, cultivated land, domesticated animals and can organize large hunting expeditions. A large family, therefore, creates the possibility of wealth. The patriarch could raise the necessary armed force to gain political power with a large family and wealth. At the fundamental level, the control of labor, land, domesticated animals and the ability to hunt provide wealth and political power. Here the critical variable is labor or a large family. African societies perfected their traditions of controlling labor, then using the people to exploit the most lucrative economic endeavors of agriculture, grazing, hunting, and mining, to name a few. In several African economies the physical control of sites of harvesting is an important influence on society and its politics supporting mainly authoritarian governments. I distinguish between harvesting and production. Production should be associated with industrial manufacturing and agriculture, where ingredients are used to produce something greater. For example, when agriculture turns a corn seed into thousands of itself. Conversely, industrial harvesting means gathering an item in the form that it occurs in nature, such as extracting crude oil, exploiting forests for timber, and mining gold. Except for agriculture, African states do not produce much. Rather, they are engaged in the industrial harvesting of items they export in their natural form, with little or no added value. In such political economies, physical control of the site where valuable resources exist in nature is all that is necessary to demand rents for its harvesting. Over centuries, African states have perfected their ability to control sites of valuable natural resources and trading routes in exchange for rents. Control and rent-​seeking strategies, therefore, outperform production strategies. Rulers who controlled the harvesting sites of exported products and lucrative trade routes could raise enough money to form a government that disregarded local interests. If the exported resources become too lucrative, they suck labor from the local economic activities into economic activities that benefit exports. At present, the elite confiscate lucrative exports industries, such as oil in Nigeria, Libya, and Algeria, timber in central Africa, and tourism in Northern, Eastern, and Southern Africa, to maintain their stranglehold on power. The primary objective of such governments is to control resources. People become potential disrupters of that objective. The government manages the people; it does not govern on their behalf or in their interests. The French term for French colonial policy, encadrement des paysan (loosely, “peasant management),” captures the essence of such governance. Therefore, the political systems that produce such governments or governance are inherently authoritarian. The increasing breakdown of the social order is also important. As was noted, new ideas, the slave trade, Islamic revivalism, the spread of Christianity at the end of the 18th century and in the 19th century, and colonialism caused high social mobilization that initiated the breakdown of traditional social orders. New forms of government were needed to restore or create new forms of social order. The breakdown of the Hausa world required the creation of the Fulani-​led Sokoto Caliphate as the new world in areas that are now in Northern Nigeria. Restoring or creating a new social and political order requires a firm hand, and the authoritarian nature of colonialism entrenched those

282   Manu Lekunze tendencies. The high social mobilization in the 19th century and European imperialism in the 20th century reinvigorated authoritarianism in Africa. The loss of an ideology in the political organization of Africa also must be considered. An ideology provides the philosophical underpinnings of political, social, and economic order. Most importantly, ideologies convince people to act voluntarily. States devoid of ideological content use force more often. Religion was the source of precolonial ideologies in Africa. The rapid social changes in the 19th century, especially those brought about by the expanding Christianity, challenged the core beliefs of African religions. The revivalism of Islam challenged previously stable schools of political Islam. European imperialism subjugated, corrupted, or replaced African ideologies during the colonial period. At the end of colonialism, Pan-​Africanism, the dominant ideology in Africa, was good at anti-​imperialism but overfocused on transnational governance in anticipation of a “United States of Africa.” Pan-​Africanism offered little guidance on governing small, separate, and multiple African states. Most states emerged into independence without a substantial ideological content. It quickly became apparent that hastily fabricated ideologies such as Nasserism, Nkrumahism, or Nyerereism, which were invariably socialist, were insufficient. The lack of ideological content pushed African states toward authoritarian political systems. Shortly after independence, one-​ party states governed in almost all of Africa. The impotence of African leaders due to the lack of structural power in the international political economy is important as well. In the late 1950s and 1960s, African states emerged into a world at a time when the Global North had already confiscated military (security) and international political economic (finance, production, and knowledge) power. Although countries such as France and Britain had lost their empires, they remained major powers in the international political economy, having seats in the UN Security Council and a major say in the Bretton Woods institutions. The Portuguese and white South Africans manipulated the “communist threat” to retain their political power, which shaped economics over Lusophone states and Southern Africa during the Cold War. The interests of the former European imperial metropoles subordinated the political power of African states to reshape their economies. Africa’s new, independent leaders gained control over local political affairs. But the power to shape market relations remained externally driven. African states had to play according to rules that had been designed without their contribution. Moreover, African states had to deal with any negative political fallout from the international political economy. The phenomenon whereby African states had to suffer implications of the international political economy without having any power to adjust the system rendered its leaders impotent. They turned to authoritarianism, which often included the use of physical violence, to fill the power gap. Finally, the high prevalence of authoritarian regimes in Africa demonstrates the partly internationally fabricated necessity of authoritarianism in Africa. The predominantly capitalist international political economy demands regulatory and political stability from African states to maintain the same exploitative system the African states cannot influence. Despite much talk about neoliberalism, African states have offered

The Sociological Implications of Africa’s Political Economy    283 mainly “authoritarian stability,” even when they regularly hold elections. For example, a single party has dominated all Tanzanian elections since independence, with essentially authoritarian leaders. Tanzania cannot be called a democracy; if anything, it has an electoral authoritarian political system (Tripp, 2000). The authoritarian stability that Tanzania offered under past presidents Benjamin Mkapa and Jakaya Kikwete resonates with the demands of the current capitalist international political economy. John Magufuli’s attempted move to authoritarian developmentalism was criticized as an “authoritarian turn.” But how can there be an authoritarian turn in an authoritarian state? The turn was, rather, an indication of the possibility of challenging Western demands for authoritarian stability that, in the case of Tanzania, suits the international banks to which the country is heavily indebted.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that the interaction between political power and markets has profound implications for the macrosociology of African states’ societies. As a result, the interaction between political power and markets is a potent force in African sociology. It has shaped the nature of Africa’s current macrosociological features, such as the nature of political order, social order, the prevalence of large families, exterocentric economic systems, and the prevalence of authoritarian political systems. Moreover, the interaction between states and markets has profoundly influenced the evolution of African societies, making change particularly difficult. This has meant that Africa’s macrosociology has remained remarkably stable over several centuries. A deeper understanding of the interaction between states, markets, and sociology could inform policies and begin blunting the edges of the negatives arising from Africa’s political economy.

References Amin, S. (2015). Understanding the political economy of contemporary Africa. Africa Development, 39, 15–​36. Baylis, J. (2020). The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations. Oxford University Press. Clapham, C. (1996). Africa and the international system: The politics of state survival. Cambridge University Press. Falola, T., & Heaton, M. M. (2008). A history of Nigeria. Cambridge University Press. Stubbington, T., & Fletcher, L. (2020) Financial Times (2020, November 13). Zambia on brink of default after lenders reject debt relief request. https://​www.ft.com/​cont​ent/​fc82c​f3f-​be77​ -4380-​9e44-​401ca​3bf4​ed5 Fukuyama, F. (2014). Political order and political decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy. Macmillan.

284   Manu Lekunze Gomez, M. (2018). African dominion. Princeton University Press. Herbst, J. (2014). States and power in Africa. Princeton University Press. Lekunze, M. (2020). Inherent and contemporary challenges to African security. Springer. Lenin, V. I. (1999). Imperialism: The highest stage of capitalism. Resistance Books. Mamdani, M. (2018). Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton University Press. Meagher, K. (2010). Identity economics: Social networks and the informal economy in Nigeria. James Currey. Owona, A. (1973). La naissance du Cameroun (1884–​ 1914). Cahiers d’Études africaines, 49, 16–​36. Smaldone, J. P. (1970). Historical and sociological aspects of warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate [Dissertation]. Northwestern University. Strange, S. (2015). States and markets. Bloomsbury. Strauss, K. (2012). Coerced, forced and unfree labour: Geographies of exploitation in contemporary labour markets. Geography Compass, 6, 137–​148. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ j.1749-​8198.2011.00474.x Tripp, A. M. (2000). Political reform in Tanzania: The struggle for associational autonomy. Comparative Politics, 32, 191–​214. Warnier, J.-​P. (1989). Traite sans raids au Cameroun [Slave trade without raids in Western Cameroon]. Cahiers d’Études africaines, 113, 5–​32. World Bank. (2019a). Prevalence of severe food insecurity in the population (%) –​Kenya. https://​data.worldb​ank.org/​indica​tor/​SN.ITK.SVFI.ZS?locati​ons=​KE World Bank. (2019b). Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) –​Kenya. https://​ data.worldb​ank.org/​indica​tor/​SN.ITK.DEFC.ZS?locati​ons=​KE World Bank. (2020a). GDP (current US$) –​Nigeria. https://​data.worldb​ank.org/​indica​tor/​ NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locati​ons=​NG World Bank. (2020b). Population, total –​Sub-​Saharan Africa. https://​data.worldb​ank.org/​ indica​tor/​SP.POP.TOTL?locati​ons=​ZG&mos​t_​re​cent​_​val​ue_​d​esc=​false World Economic Forum. (2021). How can rising food inflation be managed in Sub-​Saharan Africa? https://​www.wefo​rum.org/​age​nda/​2021/​12/​inflat​ion-​sub-​saha​ran-​afr​ica-​food-​secur​ity/​

Chapter 16

Pan-​A fricani sm a nd Devel opment i n A fri c a Trajectories and Prognoses Ernest Toochi Aniche, Ikenna Mike Alumona, and Victor H. Mlambo

Introduction Pan-​Africanism has historically evolved from being a liberation movement for eradicating oppression, slavery, and colonialism to an ideology of achieving continental unity, interdependence, self-​sufficiency, and economic transformation. In other words, traditional Pan-​Africanism served as a strategy of decolonization, anticolonial struggle, and “Black” unity, whereas modern Pan-​Africanism emerged as a strategy of neocolonial struggle and collective self-​reliance, and as a development framework or an ideology of economic transformation. More importantly, the modern Pan-​African developmental regionalism derives from the Pan-​Africanist philosophical traditions of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Nnamdi Azikiwe, and it culminated in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, which became the African Union (AU) in 2001 (Aniche, 2020c). This Pan-​Africanist sentiment gave birth to a number of African integration agendas, such as the 1979 Monrovia Strategy, the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 that metamorphosed into the African Economic Community (AEC; Adedeji, 1991). In the 21st century, it has re-​echoed in the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2002, the aspirations of the AU’s Agenda 2063, and visions of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agenda for solving African developmental challenges (Aniche, 2020a). At the outset of this movement, Kwame Nkrumah advocated for a more radical approach to Pan-​Africanism anchored in African socialism and African democracy

286    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. (Ejiofor, 2000; Grilli & Gerits, 2020). Nkrumah suggested the formation of the African Continental Government and African High Command (a sort of Pan-​African army) as means of decolonizing the continent and ultimately defeating neocolonialism through economic transformation (Nkrumah, 1963; Grilli & Gerits, 2020). Nyerere proposed the recreating the traditional African socioeconomic-​ cum-​ political systems and establishing a United States of Africa as development strategies for the economic transformation of the continent (Nyerere, 1963). But Nnamdi Azikiwe preferred a gradualist approach (Igwe, 2002). The viewpoints of these three African leaders were reflected in the two main blocs of the early modern Pan-​Africanist movement: the Casablanca and Monrovia groups. The Casablanca bloc championed a radical approach to Pan-​ Africanism; the Monrovia group canvassed for a moderate approach. The latter eventually prevailed, leading to the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (Englebert & Dunn, 2013; Grilli & Gerits, 2020; Wallerstein, 1961). How has this earlier (and later) Pan-​Africanism influenced developmental regionalism? African scholarship concerning Pan-​African developmental regionalism has been dominated by Afro-​pessimism and Afro-​optimism. But this chapter departs from both by embracing the emerging Afro-​realism (Aniche, 2020a). Perhaps the most pertinent question is: Has Pan-​Africanism been able to help Africa grapple with its developmental challenges? The objective is to appraise the relevance of Pan-​Africanism for African development trajectories and prognoses. It is arranged in five sections. The first section highlights the ideological and philosophical foundations of Pan-​Africanism with respect to African socioeconomic and political thought. The second section conceptualizes Pan-​Africanism as a movement, an ideology, and a philosophy. Then the third section traces the trajectories of Pan-​African developmental regionalism. The fourth section focuses on the prognostication of Pan-​African developmental regionalism, and the fifth and final section suggests policy options for Pan-​African regionalism in the 21st century.

The Ideological and Philosophical Foundations of Pan-​Africanism: African Social, Economic, and Political Thoughts Pan-​Africanism is rooted in the African ideological and philosophical foundations of African socialism, African democracy, African welfarism, and African humanism as enunciated by the Pan-​Africanist leaders Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kenneth Kaunda, Leopold Sedar Senghor, and others. These Pan-​Africanists believed that the Pan-​African movement should be grounded in African traditional humanistic values to revive the socioeconomic and political-​ideological traditions of

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    287 precolonial Africa, such as ujamaa (familyhood), ubuntu (humanism), and umunna (brotherhood). They suggested that mainstreaming these values on the continent was necessary step toward achieving a unique path or trajectory to African development. African socialism is seen as a reflection of the traditional African society as embedded in a primitive communism or communalism, where there was communal or common ownership of the means of production or land. In most traditional African societies, land was owned and farmed communally, and the proceeds or products were shared or distributed equally. In some cases, land was apportioned to people equally for farming and other purposes (Nkrumah, 1966). In light of this communal living, modern Pan-​Africanists have argued that socialism is rooted in Africa because it underscores the socialistic and humanistic values of ujamaa,1 umunna, and ubuntu in traditional African society. Specifically, Nyerere argued that ujamaa, meaning “familyhood” or “brotherhood,” is the basis of African socialism. This suggests that in the traditional African society, every able-​bodied adult was a worker (with the exception of the aged); no physically and mentally fit adult was allowed to be a “loiterer” or an “idler,”2 and nobody was in the employment of any other person—​the bedrock practice of capitalist ideology that breeds exploitation. Idleness was not tolerated. The elderly, for whom everybody else appeared to be working, had, in fact, worked hard in their younger days. Any wealth they now appeared to possess was not considered to belong to them—​they were only the guardians of community wealth. The wealth itself gave them neither power nor prestige, and the respect paid to them by the younger folk was owed to their being older and having served the community longer (Ejiofor, 2000; Nyerere, 1968). The family thus provides essential security for the individual, and so the foundation of African socialism is the extended family. The ujamaa brand of socialism is centered on humankind because it promotes human welfare. Ujamaa is an ideology that underscores the humanization of development (Ejiofor, 2000), which makes it synonymous with humanism. It is for this reason that Nnamdi Azikiwe argued that African socialism must return to its humanistic foundation and should, in returning to communal virtues, shun capitalist and materialistic values (Azikiwe, 1968). This is because traditional African society had a communistic nature and humanistic virtues (Igwe, 2002). For Kenneth Kaunda, African socialism epitomizes a brand of African welfarism or humanism that is anchored in the kinship, or extended family, system in which the kin or the umunna provides for the needy members, contributes to solving the problems of individual members, and assists in functions like burial and funeral rites and marriage ceremonies. Kaunda stressed that the African family differs from the Western family in that every member of the community is viewed as a “family” responsibility, and no distinction is made between the social obligations of a family and those of a state. In this way, the African family constitutes the social-​security system. The West celebrates individual capabilities and achievements, but in Africa, the family takes credit for individual achievements (Eze, 2008). Nelson Mandela associated African humanism with ubuntu as an innate duty to support or assist others and to contribute to the development of the community. Ubuntu

288    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. emphasizes a humanity in which an individual is defined as a person through their relationship with others. The central idea of ubuntu can be expressed “a person is a person through other persons” or “I am because we are” or “we are because I am.” Ubuntu is based on the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity. As an African philosophy of humanism, ubuntu links the individual to the collective through “brotherhood.” Ubuntu, like ujamaa and umunna, is thus seen as a humanistic ideal or way of life that exists in many variations within different African cultures and languages. This commonality can actually serve as a unifying factor in Africa and an impetus for Pan-​Africanism on the continent (Eze, 2017; Mandela, 1994; Oppenheim, 2012). African welfarism is underscored by basic African values, which are characterized by equality and respect for human dignity, the sharing of the resources that are produced by the people’s efforts, work by everyone and exploitation by none, cooperative endeavor, collective rather than individual advancement, and community centeredness, as attested to by traditional African family systems (Aja, 2002). African welfarism or humanism is part and parcel of African socialism and therefore synonymous with it. Julius Nyerere also argued that democracy, like socialism, is rooted in Africa. Democracy is neither novel nor foreign to Africa. This is because, in the traditional African society, the traditional method of conducting affairs is by a free discussion, where the elders sit under the big tree and talk until they agree. He contended that ujamaa exemplifies a typical African democracy, an ideal democracy in which every man has the right to participate in all spheres of decisions that affect him. African democracy ensures equal access to decision-​making, as well as compulsory participation in decision-​making processes (Ejiofor, 2000). The Igbo village democracy, for instance, captures a form of African direct democracy in which all the adult male citizens converge in the village or market arena or assemble under a tree to deliberate on important community issues and to arrive at a binding decision (Igwe, 2002; Nnoli, 1986). Generally, these interwoven ideological and philosophical traditions from the early modern Pan-​Africanism, despite their shortcomings or defects, have been reincarnated as Afrocentrism.

Conceptualizing Pan-​Africanism as a Movement, Ideology, and Philosophy Pan-​Africanism, sometimes referred to as “Black” nationalism or Afrocentrism, is an ideology or movement that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide and is sometimes conceptualized in contradistinction to external political and economic involvement on the continent. It is based on the notion that African solidarity enhances self-​reliance by harnessing the continent’s potential to independently provide for its people. This sentiment is also echoed in the AU’s Agenda 2063, a plan for African solutions to African problems. Crucially, it has been argued by many that an all-​African

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    289 alliance would empower African people globally (Gassama, 2013; Makalani, 2011; Nkrumah, 1962; Nyerere, 1963; Sherwood, 1996). The Pan-​African movement thus demands solidarity among people of African descent based on the belief that unity is vital for economic, social, and political progress, and it aims to “unify and uplift” them. As an ideology, it asserts that the fates of all African people and countries are intertwined. Pan-​Africanism is anchored in the belief that African people share not merely a common history, but a common destiny. Pan-​ Africanism, therefore, stresses the need for “collective self-​reliance” (Adi, 2005; Aniche, 2018; Gassama, 2013; Legum, 1965; Nkrumah, 1965; Sherwood, 1995). However, Pan-​Africanism has been expressed in different forms by different people in different historical moments and geographical locations. But common to all these perspectives of Pan-​Africanism is the belief in some form of unity or common purpose among the peoples of Africa and the African diaspora (Adi & Sherwood, 2003; Murithi, 2007). The Pan-​African movement can be divided into two main eras: traditional Pan Africanism and modern Pan Africanism.

Traditional Pan Africanism, Anticolonial Struggles, and the Decolonization of Africa The traditional, or early, Pan-​Africanism began in the 18th century as a liberation movement to decolonize Africa and as a prerequisite for achieving “Black” unity. Toward the end of the century, along with the slave insurrection, the Pan-​African movement developed across the Americas, Europe, and Africa as a reaction against all forms of slavery, racial segregation and discrimination, oppression, and exploitation. There were deliberate efforts to weld these disparate movements into a unified network and through this solidarity put an end to all forms of oppression and racism. These eventually turned into anticolonial struggles targeting all forms of slavery, oppression, and colonialism in Africa. In other words, traditional Pan-​Africanism was geared to the fight against racial discrimination and segregation, to nationalist resistance and agitation against European penetration or incursion, colonialism, imperialism, alien religion, and slavery, as well as the struggle for freedom, self-​determination, self-​government, independence, and decolonization (Aniche, 2020c). This era of traditional Pan-​Africanism is sometimes referred to as the “diaspora Pan-​ Africanism” because it was pioneered by diasporic Africans in the Americas and Europe, including Henry Sylvester-​Williams, Edward Wilmot Blyden, Marcus Garvey, W. E. B Du Bois, and Malcolm X (Coleman, 1958; Walters, 1997). They were mainly academics, journalists, grassroots organizers, and mobilizers. A good example of the leading role played by diasporic Africans in Pan-​Africanism was Henry Sylvester-​Williams’s formation of the African Association in 1897 (later renamed the Pan-​African Association) and the organization of the First Pan-​African Conference in London in 1900 (Hooker, 1975; Sherwood, 2012).

290    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. The conference was aimed at uniting all people of African descent, both in Africa and in the diaspora on the American continents and Europe, tackling racial discrimination and segregation, colonialism, imperialism, alien religions, and slavery against Blacks, and pursuing freedom, self-​determination, self-​government, independence, and decolonization for Africa (Gassama, 2013). This period of Pan-​Africanism was more socioculturally and politically oriented. It was, in fact, the beginning of “Black” nationalism (Aniche, 2018). As a philosophy, Pan-​Africanism represents and symbolizes the aggregation or collection of the historical, cultural, spiritual, artistic, scientific, and philosophical legacies of Africans from the past to the present. Historically, Pan-​Africanism traces its origins back to ancient times and promotes values enshrined in African civilization and the struggle against slavery, racism, and colonialism. Thus, as originally conceived by Henry Sylvester-​Williams and Edward Wilmot Blyden, Pan-​Africanism referred to the unity of all continental Africa (Aniche, 2018). The underlying theme of early Pan-​Africanism is the struggle for social and political equality and freedom from economic exploitation and racial discrimination. Pan-​ Africanism is originally the perception by Africans in the diaspora and on the continent that they share common goals. Thus, the global dispersal of persons of African descent is partly responsible for the emergence of the Pan-​African movement. The movement also emphasizes a celebration of “Africanness” and resistance to the exploitation and oppression of Africans and their kin in the diaspora, as well as staunch opposition to the ideology of racial superiority in all its forms and manifestations (Murithi, 2005). The traditional Pan-​Africanism was instrumental in the decolonization of most of the territories of Africa.

Modern Pan-​Africanism, Socioeconomic Transformation, and African Development Modern or contemporary Pan-​Africanism emerged in the 20th century as an emancipation movement against colonialism and neocolonialism and as a condition for achieving African unity (Gassama, 2013; Geiss, 1974; Sherwood, 2012). The advocates of modern Pan-​Africanism include such leaders as Haile Selassie, Julius Nyerere, Ahmed Sekou Toure, Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Muammar Gaddafi. Other proponents (mostly scholars) of the movement against colonialism and neocolonialism include Franz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, Ali Mazrui, Claude Ake, and Okwudiba Nnoli. This was the beginning of Afrocentrism. It was in this period, from December 8–​13, 1958, that the First All-​Africa Peoples (AAP) Conference took place in Accra, Ghana. It was attended by over 300 delegates representing over 200 million Africans from 28 African countries and colonies. Thus, unlike the Pan-​African Conference, which was spearheaded by diaspora Africans, the AAP Conference was dominated by Africans on

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    291 the continent. Yet the objectives of the latter did not depart significantly from those of the former. The objectives, resolutions, and recommendations of the conference, too, focused on anticolonial struggles or national wars of liberation, the decolonization of Africa, the abolition of all forms of racial segregation and discrimination, and the rejection of economic dependence, neocolonialism, and imperialism (Legum, 1962; Wallerstein, 1967). The AAP Conference thus succeeded the Pan-​African Conference. The Second and Third AAP Conferences were held in Tunis, Tunisia, from January 25 to 30, 1960, and in Cairo, Egypt, from March 25 to 31, 1961, respectively. Unfortunately, a fourth AAP conference that was scheduled to be held in Bamako, Mali, in February 1962 never took place for sundry reasons that led to the eventual demise of the Conference (Legum, 1962; Wallerstein, 1967). The 60th anniversary conference of the first AAP conference, entitled Revisiting the 1958 All-​African Peoples’ Conference: The Unfinished Business of Liberation and Transformation, which was held at the University of Ghana, from December 5 to 8, 2018, was actually a reincarnation of the AAP Conference (Aniche, 2020c). Modern Pan-​Africanism is thus an ideology aimed at the unification of Africa and the integration of the fragmented African economies through the fight against neocolonialism, apartheid, and White minority rule, especially in South Africa, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. It is also a movement for an African renaissance, African revivalism, the revival of African culture, philosophy, religion, arts, science, technology, ideology, common heritage, African socialism, African democracy, and African welfarism, as well as the struggle for the decolonization and independence of the remaining African territories, such as Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique, that were still under colonial rule when modern Pan-​Africanism emerged (Aniche, 2018). As an ideology, Pan-​Africanism is seen as an endeavor to return to singular, traditional African concepts of culture, society, and values. Examples include Léopold Sédar Senghor’s Négritude movement and Mobutu Sese Seko’s views about Authenticité. An important theme running through much of Pan-​Africanist literature is the historical links between different countries on the continent and the benefits of cooperation as a way of resisting imperialism and colonialism (Campbell, 2006; Gassama, 2013; Shivji, 2006). This belief in African unity has continued in the 21st century as a development framework for collective self-​reliance or an ideology of economic transformation (Gassama, 2013; Geiss, 1974; Sherwood, 2012). With the decolonization of the continent and the dismantling of the apartheid system and White minority rule, the movement has shifted its ideological focus and objectives in the 21st century. It has become an ideology geared toward African regionalism through regional integration and democratic reforms and a struggle against military rule and authoritarian regimes, or agitations for multiparty democracy (Aniche, 2020d). The modern Pan-​Africanism is essentially a recognition of the fragmented nature of the existence of Africans and their marginalization and alienation both on their own

292    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. continent and across the rest of the world. This era of Pan-​Africanism seeks to respond to Africa’s underdevelopment and exploitation and the culture of dependency on external aid that unfortunately continues to prevail on the continent. Modern Pan-​Africanism calls on Africans to look inward and draw on their own strengths and capacities to become self-​reliant (Murithi, 2007). Contemporary Pan-​Africanism stems from the recognition that Africans have been divided among themselves, that they constantly compete with one another, are deprived of true ownership of their own resources, and inundated with paternalistic external actors. The movement recognizes that the only way out of this existential sociopolitical crisis is by promoting solidarity among Africans. Although dialogue and debate in Africa will not always generate consensus, it will at least be a dialogue among Africans about possible resolutions to their problems. It holds out the belief that if ideas are not designed by Africans themselves, they will rarely be in the interests of Africans. It emphasizes African solutions to African problems (Murithi, 2005). Paradoxically, as Murithi (2007) noted, the idea of Pan-​Africanism has been misused in defending the rights of African states against external interference—​the principle of nonintervention—​and the majority of African leaders still hold onto this norm. This is antithetical to the ultimate goal of regional institutional autonomy or regional supranationalism. Thus, critics of Pan-​Africanism argue that this movement did not bring about any significant transformation of Africa in the past other than enabling “a trade union of dictators” in the form of the OAU/​AU Heads of State and government to rule unjustly and harshly. The effect of this is the deepening crisis of African integration and unification, sit-​tight syndrome, and the crisis of political succession. These manifest as disintegration, differentiation, or fragmentation in the form of disintegrative nationalism, subnationalism, separatism, secessionism, xenophobia, subgroupings, and the proliferation or multiple memberships of regional economic communities (RECs; Aniche, 2020c). The modern Pan-​Africanism was instrumental in decolonizing territories in Africa such as Angola and Mozambique, dismantling the apartheid policy of White minority rule in South(ern) Africa, and rejecting the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). It was also implicated in the late 20th-​century and early 21st-​century enthronement of multiparty democracy on the continent. But was the movement able to successfully abolish racial discrimination, achieve African unity and tackle neocolonialism, dependency, and the development challenges in Africa?

The Trajectories of Pan-​African Developmental Regionalism Modern Pan-​Africanism still echoes in the contemporary developmental regionalism, which led to the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (shortened to AU in 2001). In other

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    293 words, modern Pan-​Africanism has become a development framework or an ideology of economic transformation. There were, however, three main regional plans that triggered the need to fast-​track Pan-​African regionalism as a strategy of African development and transformation—​ namely, the 1979 Monrovia Strategy, the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, and the 1991 Abuja Treaty. The 1979 Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa, or the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment on the Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-​Reliance in Economic and Social Development for the Establishment of a New International Order was the outcome of the meeting of African Heads of State and the Council of Ministers of the OAU in their 16th and 23rd Ordinary Sessions respectively, in Monrovia, Liberia, from July 6 to 20, 1979 (Adedeji, 1983; Aniche, 2020c; Asuk, 2011). In consonance with Pan-​Africanism, the Monrovia Declaration set out to achieve a number of objectives, including the establishment of self-​sustaining, internally located processes of development and economic growth; the achievement of (sub)regional collective self-​reliance to end external dependence; the establishment of industrialization patterns that are consistent with the socioeconomic environment of each country, and not simply importations of foreign industrialization patterns, or of a sound industrial base within each country in accordance with its resource endowments; the physical integration of the continent through the expansion of a transport and communications network; the development of capabilities to maintain sovereignty over the region’s natural resources; the establishment of mutually beneficial and equitable relations between Africa and the rest of the world; and the attainment of a substantial increase in the approximately 5 percent share of intra-​African trade; and the eventual establishment of an African Common Market (ACM) leading to the AEC (Asuk, 2011; Sekgoma, 1987). To consider concrete measures for implementing the Monrovia Declaration, the summit resolved to hold a session in Lagos, Nigeria, devoted to the economic problems of Africa (Adedeji, 1991; Asuk, 2011). Then, at their first-​ever economic summit held in Lagos from April 28 to 29, 1980, African leaders unanimously adopted the LPA for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–​2000 (Adedeji, 1983; Aniche, 2020a). The document contained a commitment to establish the AEC by the year 2000 to foster the economic, social, and cultural integration of the continent. The LPA emphasizes self-​reliance and African ownership of and control over its own resources. It put forward a bold action program based on regional building blocks that would eventually lead to the economic unity of the African continent (Ravenhill, 1984). The plan was that Africa’s regional approach to the economic decolonization of the continent would provide a long-​term socioeconomic restructuring and development (Aniche, 2020c; Benachenhon, 1983). The plan elaborated on the declared policy priorities outlined in the Monrovia document. It set out to achieve institutional development at the national, subregional, and regional levels; the New International Economic Order through the transfer of technology from the industrialized to developing countries; the development of an industrial sector aimed at the satisfaction of the basic needs of the population and the

294    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. achievement of regional self-​reliance; the facilitation of the transport and communications system for regional integration, self-​reliance and an increase in intra-​African trade; the strengthening of the intra-​African institutions such as the Association of African Central Banks and the African Development Bank (AfDB); the creation of regional linkages that would facilitate intra-​African trade; the reduction of trade barriers among African states; the minimization of the use of foreign exchange in regional trade; and the policy reorientations of central and commercial banks in accordance with the needs of the individual national economies and regional linkages (Aniche, 2020d; Ravenhill, 1996; Sekgoma, 1987). One major similarity in the policy thrusts of the Monrovia Strategy and the LPA was to accelerate the process of regional economic integration through cooperation (Adedeji, 1991; Aniche, 2020c). Also, both documents emerged on the African development agenda as a critique of development approaches derived from the modernization thesis, particularly the World Bank’s Berg Report (Adedeji, 1991; Asante, 1991; Browne & Cummings, 1984; Sekgoma, 1987). The 1991 OAU Summit of African leaders in Abuja, Nigeria, which metamorphosed into the 1991 Abuja Treaty, was initially and primarily meant to assess the 1979 LPA that succeeded the Monrovia Strategy. The fallout of this treaty, which the OAU adopted at the meeting of Heads of State Government in Abuja, Nigeria, on June 3, 1991, was the establishment of the AEC. This AEC Treaty, also known as the Abuja Treaty, came into force after the requisite ratification by members in May 1994. It provided for the AEC to be set up through a gradual process which would be achieved by the coordination, harmonization, and the progressive integration of the activities of existing and future RECs in Africa (Aniche, 2020c). The AEC, an arm of the AU, was established in line with the Monrovia Declaration and the LPA to facilitate mutual economic development among the majority of African States with the following objectives as provided in the Article 4 of the Treaty: (a) to promote economic, social, and cultural development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-​reliance and an indigenous and self-​ sustained development; (b) to establish on a continental scale a framework for the development, mobilization, and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve a self-​reliant development; (c) to promote cooperation in all fields of human endeavor in order to raise the standard of living of African peoples and maintain and enhance economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations among member states and contribute to the progress, development and economic integration of the continent; and (d) to coordinate and harmonize policies among existing economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the community (Aniche, 2020d). The approach to developmental regionalism in Africa has deviated from that of 20th-​century modern Pan-​Africanism by embracing a neoliberal framework, or a neofunctional approach, to integration. Thus, it calls for integration in Africa rather than African integration (Aniche, 2020d). Consequently, it could neither achieve African unity nor tackle neocolonialism, dependency, and the development challenges

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    295 in Africa. It is in recognition of this fact that in the 21st century the AU envisioned Agenda 2063 and AfCFTA.

The Prognoses for Pan-​African Developmental Regionalism In the 21st century, modern Pan-​Africanism is echoed in the aspirations of AU’s Agenda 2063 and the visions of the AfCFTA agenda for tackling African developmental challenges. The Assembly of the AU, at the 24th Summit, in Addis Ababa in January 2015, adopted the draft document of Agenda 2063 after extensive consultations with regional civil societies. During the June 2015 meeting of the AU Policy Organ, the finalized First Ten-​Year Plan of Agenda 2063, presented for consideration by the African Union Commission (AUC), was adopted to ensure the effective implementation of Agenda 2063. It was designed to be implemented through a consecutive Ten-​Year Action Plan to ensure the appropriate guidance, monitoring, and evaluation at the national, subregional, and regional levels (Aniche, 2020a). The Agenda was developed by the AUC in collaboration with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the AfDB, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NEPAD-​NPCA), RECs, the organized private sector, and civil society organizations. It was thus defined as a people-​centered and private-​sector-​ driven indigenous strategic framework for Africa’s transformation, inclusive growth, and sustainable development for 50 years. It was built on past and current Pan-​Africanist initiatives, including the 1980 LPA, the 1991 Abuja Treaty, the Minimum Integration Program, the Program for Infrastructural Development in Africa, the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program, the NEPAD, RECs, the AEC, and AfCFTA. It therefore seeks to accelerate the implementation of these past and existing continental initiatives for socioeconomic transformation and development (Aniche, 2020a). The Agenda comprises seven aspirations and is the guiding principle of the AU vision for an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa” (De Ghetto et al., 2016). It is a continental action plan to make Africa “the Africa we want” by 2063, driven by its citizens, by optimizing the use of Africa’s resources for the benefit of all Africans, as well as to drive Africa’s change and development (Fagbayibo, 2018). Some of the strategic initiatives for realizing these aspirations include industrialization, human capital development, a stronger push for African integration and unity, strengthening regional institutions, agricultural development, natural resources management, conflict reduction, and the promotion of common African positions (El Fassi & Aggad, 2014). The Agenda aims to grow intra-​African trade from less than 12 percent in 2013 to near 50 percent by 2045 and to raise Africa’s share of global trade from 2 percent to 12 percent. It also wants to build integrative infrastructures across the continent by 2063, including a Pan-​African high-​speed train network, roads, sea shipping lines, air transport,

296    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. pipelines, information and communication superhighways and the digital economy; facilitate dynamic and mutually beneficial links with its diaspora; shift from a visa-​free to a borderless Africa; achieve a self-​reliant economy and full political liberation; and end all forms of gender, racial, ethnic, religious, social, cultural, economic, class, and political oppression and discrimination (Aniche, 2020c). The AfCFTA, which came into force on May 30, 2019, is governed by five operational instruments: the rules of origin, the online negotiating forum, the monitoring and elimination of nontariff barriers, a digital-​payments system, and the African Trade Observatory (Aniche, 2020a). The main objectives of the AfCFTA include gradually eliminating tariff barriers (TBs) on intra-​African trade; tackling trade and investment constraints to facilitate the ease of doing business across borders and increase foreign direct investment inflows; creating a single continental market for goods and services with free movement of business persons and investments; accelerating the establishment of the continental customs union or common external tariffs and ACM; expanding intra-​ African trade through better harmonization and coordination of trade liberalization regimes and trade facilitation instruments across the RECs; and enhancing industry competitiveness of through the exploitation of opportunities for large-​scale production, continental market access, and better reallocation of resources, unleashing the entrepreneurial potentials and skills across the continent. Finally, AfCFTA aims to develop the industrial sector to generate employment, reduce poverty, and achieve sustainable economic growth (Aniche, 2020c). The initiative adopted one-​stage and two-​stage approaches to the establishment of AfCFTA in Africa. The one-​stage approach is for RECs that have completed FTA to join the AfCFTA directly; while the two-​stage approach is to provide the RECs that are yet to complete FTA with a timeline to achieve it and join the AfCFTA. Thus, the REC-​FTAs will be the building blocks of the AfCFTA (Aniche, 2020a). It is perhaps useful to state at this juncture that the objectives of AfCFTA and the aspirations of the AU Agenda 2063 are closely related, mutually inclusive, and reinforcing. In line with the strategic objectives of the Union’s Agenda 2063 Initiative, the free trade area provides a lever that can be used to strategically position the continent to exploit its numerous trade and investment opportunities and contribute positively to the structural transformation of African economies and the eradication of poverty. Nor are strategic initiatives the AU Agenda 2063 and the AfCFTA objectives at variance. For instance, the Agenda’s strategic frameworks for ensuring a stronger push for African integration and unity and strengthening regional institutions like the RECs are in accordance with AfCFTA’s strategic blueprints for bringing about a gradual elimination of TBs on intra-​African trade, tackling trade and investment constraints, and fast-​ tracking trade and investment facilitations or infrastructures (Aniche, 2020c). Yet these 21st century initiatives, like 20th-​century developmental regionalism, have deviated from the 20th-​century modern Pan-​Africanism in terms of strategy. This is why most Afro-​optimists believe that if the CFTA is effectively implemented in a neofunctional strategy, it will contribute significantly to achieving an integrated,

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    297 prosperous, and peaceful Africa, which is consistent with the AU Agenda 2063 aspirations. For this, AfCFTA tried to create and support a neoliberal framework that may accommodate and benefit all the diverse economies of its member States (Adetula, 2009; Aniche, 2021a). The Afro-​optimistic theoretical narrative, therefore, emphasizes the prospects of AfCFTA as an important phase of Pan-​African regionalism. For Afro-​optimists, some of these prospects include unlocking the continent’s immense development potentials, boosting intra-​African trade, stimulating trade creation, boosting trade performance and integration into the global trading system, reducing the continent’s current heavy dependence on aid and external borrowing for development, ensuring deeper and better continental market integration, orchestrating the removal of tariffs, triggering the establishment and coordination of common rules of origin, fast-​tracking the harmonization and simplification of customs regulations and procedures, and accelerating the elimination of TBs (Saygili et al., 2018). Some of the opportunities include enhancing customs cooperation and broadening trade facilitation, increasing food security, improving the competitiveness of industries, increasing economies of scale and market size, enlarging markets for goods and services, increasing the rate of economic diversification and transformation; efficient allocation of resources, and reducing price differentials. This will lead to significant growth and sustainable development, just as the creation of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Free Trade Area led to a six-​fold increase in intra-​COMESA trade between 2000 and 2010 (Adedeji, 1970; Aniche, 2021b). Other potentials include the growing intraindustry trade and developing geographically based specialization, facilitating forward and backward linkages, reducing in Africa’s vulnerability to external trade shocks, enhancing Africa’s participation in global trade, tackling most of the trade constraints or obstacles to intra-​African trade, promoting of a broader relaxation of restrictions on the movement of capital and investments (goods, services, and persons), stimulating African industrial and agricultural exports, increasing in public revenue through the value-​added tax, and facilitating substantial social gains (Cofelice, 2018; Ogunyemi, 2017; Signé, 2018). Other benefits include resolving multiple and duplicative memberships, eliminating the proliferation of regional economic blocs and subgroupings, and fast-​tracking the realization of the vision of the 1991 Abuja Treaty of an ACM (Aniche, 2018). In contrast, some Afro-​pessimists have challenged the neofunctional approach to African integration and neoliberal Afro-​optimism. The theoretical basis for Afro-​ pessimism can be historically linked to Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s radical Pan-​Africanist and neo-​Marxist approach to African regionalism. Both men preferred a revival of African socialism, unification of the continent, integration of African economies and delinking of African economies from neocolonial ties of the developed countries. The current trend in Afro-​pessimism mainly suggests a more radical neo-​Marxist and regional protectionist theoretical approach to address the trade imbalance and relations of dependency between Africa and other regions and among African countries through programs of industrialization and import substitution. This entails replacing

298    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. extraregional products with African products to facilitate industrial development on the continent (Adetula, 2009; Aniche, 2020a). Most Afro-​sceptics, therefore, focus on the challenges and limitations of the neoliberal and neofunctional approach to Pan-​African integration. Some Afro-​sceptics argue that the establishment of the CFTA will not automatically enable Africa to tackle the various trade constraints hampering intra-​African trade because of the enormous challenges it will still have to confront, even beyond trade constraints (Aniche, 2020c). For Afro-​pessimists, these challenges include trade diversion, inadequate trade infrastructures and supply-​side constraints, lack of export diversification, and tariff and nontariff barriers. The difficulties include differences in trade regimes, restrictive customs procedures, delay and cost of doing business, limited productive capacity, paucity of trade finance and trade information, lack of credit guarantee, lack of factor market integration, inadequate focus on internal market issues, the multiplicity of inconvertible currencies, obstacles to factor mobility, poor private-​sector development, poorly developed financial markets, and the lack of widely available trade and investment finance (Disenyana, 2009; Nkuepo, 2012). Other obstacles include multiple or overlapping membership and subgroupings, bilateral agreements, unequal benefits, conflicting priorities of member states and RECs; development crises; foreign aid dependence; structural (economic) dependence; extraregional dependence; existing extra-​African bilateral and multilateral trading regimes with the European Union, the United States, China, Japan, and India in their new scramble for African resources; intraregional dependence as against interdependence; vertical integration as against horizontal integration; neocolonial ties; lack of political will; national interest versus regional interest; problems of implementation and enforcement; fear of domination (Afrophobia); institutional incapacity; inadequate manpower; customs revenue dependence; similar economic structures; and primary production-​based economy. Some other constraints include political instability, the crisis of political succession, sit-​tight syndrome, ethnic bigotry, religious intolerance, xenophobia, ideological differences, disintegrative nationalism, insurgency, militancy, civil wars, intrastate conflicts, and subnational centrifugal tendencies (Aniche, 2018; Jakobeit et al., 2005; Othieno & Shinyekwa, 2011). Based on Afro-​realism, perhaps two logical contrasting prognostic options can be derived from the two opposing views. One, if the prospects are enhanced to overcome the challenges of AfCFTA through strict implementation and enforcement, it will likely achieve the objectives of the Pan-​African developmental regionalism. Two, if the Agreement is poorly implemented and enforced such that its challenges are deepened and reduce its prospects, it will most likely be unable to accomplish the objectives of the Pan-​African developmental regionalism (Aniche, 2020a). The Afro-​ realistic narrative, like Afro-​ optimism and Afro-​ pessimism ones, recognizes that both the prospects and challenges of Pan-​African developmental regionalism, but it aligns with the latter in arguing that the challenges may outweigh the prospects. However, like the Afro-​optimists, Afro-​realists believe that these problems

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    299 are surmountable within the neoliberal framework but require a new approach that transcends the present neofunctional strategy (Aniche, 2020b).

Conclusion This chapter has shown that the traditional form of Pan-​Africanism was instrumental in the decolonization of most territories in Africa, and that the modern understanding of Pan-​Africanism was vital in decolonizing the remaining territories that were still under colonial and White minority rule. But Afro-​pessimists have pointed out that developmental regionalism in Africa has not been able to achieve African unity and tackle neocolonialism, dependency, and development challenges because it strategically deviates from the 20th-​century brand of modern Pan-​Africanism. Based on Afro-​realism, it can be concluded that there are two contrasting prognostic options that can be derived from the Afro-​optimistic and Afro-​pessimistic perspectives. Proceeding from the Afro-​realist perspective, the chapter suggested that Pan-​African developmental regionalism requires a new approach that can transcend the present neofunctional strategy to ensure that the Agreement is implemented and strictly enforced. This presupposes a people-​driven, interpeople, private-​sector-​led, human-​ centered, humanistic, and bottom-​top approach to integration or people-​to-​people integration instead of a state-​driven, public-​sector-​led, intergovernmental, and top-​ down approach. The private-​sector-​driven integration will inevitably foster transnational or transborder business integration. The free movement of capital and labor and unrestricted flow of investment will facilitate the integration of businesses, industries, and finances that will grow African multinational and transnational corporations. This is necessary for integrating and growing the African economy, boosting intra-​African trade, and enhancing Africa’s participation in global trade, as well as increasing the penetration of African products in the global market and eventual integration into globalization. This is necessary to ensure the administrative and fiscal autonomy of the regional institutions, free of state interference. Financial autonomy can be achieved through statutory allocations of a certain percentage of taxes. The role of states should merely be facilitation. Instead of relying on the political will of member states for compliance, the focus should be on strengthening the institutional capacity of the regional economic communities to implement and enforce compliance with the Agreement through administrative and financial autonomy.

List of Acronyms AAP

All-​Africa Peoples

ACM

African Common Market

300    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. AEC

African Economic Community

AfCFTA

African Continental Free Trade Area

AfDB

African Development Bank

AU

African Union

CFTA

Continental Free Trade Area

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa FTA

Free trade area

LPA

Lagos Plan of Action

NEPAD

New Partnership for Africa’s Development

OAU

Organization of African Unity

REC

Regional Economic Communities

TB

Tariff barriers

UNECA

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Notes 1. Note that ujamaa (especially as it is implemented in Tanzania) has been critiqued for being outdated, as well as for impoverishing, deindustrializing, and underdeveloping Tanzania because of its inability to develop productive forces post industrial revolutions, thus disincentivizing hard work and innovation, encouraging laziness, and distributing poverty (Ejiofor, 2000; Igwe, 2002). 2. Note that this assertion might have been exaggerated because there were in fact idlers or loafers in traditional African societies, and Tanzania was not an exception; which was why there were words for these in African languages (Aja, 2002).

References Adedeji, A. (1970). Prospects of regional economic cooperation in West Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 8, 1–​12. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00222​78X0​0019​637 Adedeji, A. (1983). The evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: A regional approach to economic decolonization. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Adedeji, A. (1991). Preparing Africa for the twenty-​first century: Agenda for the 1990s. Economic Commission for Africa. https://​hdl.han​dle.net/​10855/​22177 Adetula, V. (2009). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the challenges of integration in West Africa. In J. Ogwu & W. Alli (Eds.), ECOWAS: Milestones in regional integration (pp. 15–​58). Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Adi, H. (2005). Pan-​Africanism and the politics of liberation. African Holocaust. Adi, H., & Sherwood, M. (2003). Pan-​African history: Political figures from Africa and the diaspora since 1787. Routledge.

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    301 Aja, E. (2002). Philosophy and human values: An African perspective. Journal of Liberal Studies, 10, 32–​45. Aniche, E. T. (2018). Post-​neo-​functionalism, pan-​Africanism and regional integration in Africa: Prospects and challenges of the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-​FTA). In S. O. Oloruntoba & V. Gumede (Eds.), State and development in post-​independent Africa (pp. 155–​174). Pan-​African University Press. Aniche, E. T. (2020a). African continental free trade area and African Union agenda 2063: The roads to Addis Ababa and Kigali. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​02589​001.2020.1775​184 Aniche, E. T. (2020b). The Brexit: A massive setback for European Union and a lesson for African integration. Chinese Political Science Review, 5, 13–​30. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s41​ 111-​019-​00142-​0 Aniche, E. T. (2020c). From pan-​Africanism to African regionalism: A chronicle. African Studies, 79, 70–​87. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00020​184.2020.1740​974 Aniche, E. T. (2020d). Pan-​Africanism and regionalism in Africa: The journey so far. In S. Oloruntoba (Ed.), Pan-​Africanism, regional integration and development in Africa. (pp. 17–​ 38). Palgrave Macmillan. Aniche, E. T. (2021a). Beyond neo-​functionalism: Africa in search of a new theory of regional integration. In E. T. Aniche, I. M. Alumona, & I. Moyo (Eds.), Regionalism, security and development in Africa (pp. 28–​43). Routledge. Aniche, E. T. (2021b). Institutions, inequality and crisis of developmental regionalism in Africa. In E.T. Aniche & T. Falola (Eds.), Rethinking institutions, processes and development in Africa (pp. 241–​258). Rowman and Littlefield International. Asante, S. K. B. (1991). African development: Adebayo Adedeji’s alternative strategies. Spectrum. Asuk, O. C. (2011). Resolving the African development sclerosis: Two strategies, no future. Africa Research Review: An International Multi-​disciplinary Journal, 5, 133–​147. https://​doi​ .org/​10.4314/​afr​rev.v5i3.67347 Azikiwe, N. (1968). Renascent Africa. Frank Cass. Benachenhon, A. (1983). South-​South cooperation: The Lagos Plan of Action and Africa’s independence. Africa Development, 3, 1–​13. Browne, R. R., & Cummings, R. (1984). The Lagos Plan of Action vs the Berg Report: Contemporary issues in African economic development. Howard University Press. Campbell, C. Z. (2006). Sculpting a Pan-​African culture in the art of Négritude: A model for African artist. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 1, 28–​41. Cofelice, A. (2018). African Continental Free Trade Area: Opportunities and challenges. De Gruyter: The Federalist Debate, 31, 32–​35. http://​www.fed​eral​ist-​deb​ate.org/​index.php/​curr​ ent-​issue/​comme​nts/​item/​1215-​afri​can-​cont​inen​tal-​free-​trade-​area-​opport​unit​ies-​and-​cha​ llen​ges. Coleman, J. S. (1958). Nigeria: Background to nationalism. University of California Press. De Ghetto, K., Gray, J., & Kiggundu, M. (2016). The African Union’s Agenda 2063: Aspirations, challenges and opportunities for management research. Africa Journal of Management, 2, 93–​116. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​23322​373.2015.1127​090 Disenyana, T. (2009). Towards an EAC, COMESA and SADC Free Trade Area: Issues and challenges. South African Institute of International Affairs. Ejiofor, L. U. (2000). Nigeria: Preface to ideology. Willy Rose & Appleseed Coy. El Fassi, S., & Aggad, F. (2014). Implementing African development initiatives: Opportunities and challenges to securing alternative financing for the Agenda 2063 (Briefing Note No. 65).

302    Ernest Toochi Aniche et al. European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). https://​ecdpm.org/​wp​​ -cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​BN-​65-​Fassi-​Aggad-​Financ​ing-​Age​nda-​2063.pdf Englebert, P., & Dunn, K. C. (2013). Inside African politics. Lynne Pienner. Eze, M. O. (2008). What is African comunitarianism? Against consensus as a regulative Ideal. South African Journal of Philosophy, 27, 386–​399. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​saj​pem.v27i4.31526 Eze, M. O. (2017). I am because you are: Cosmopolitanism in the age of xenophobia. Philosophical Papers, 46, 85–​109. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​05568​641.2017.1295​617 Fagbayibo, B. (2018). Nkrumahism, Agenda 2063 and the role of intergovernmental institutions in fast-​tracking continental unity. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 53, 629–​642. https://​ doi.org/​10.1177/​00219​0961​7709​489 Gassama, M. I. S. (2013). African Union: A veritable progeny of pan-​Africanism. AU ECHO, 5, 1–​5. Geiss, I. (1974). The Pan-​African movement. Methuen. Grilli, M., & Gerits, F. (2020). Visions of African unity: New perspectives on the history of Pan-​ Africanism and African unification projects. Palgrave Macmillan. Hooker, J. R. (1975). Henry Sylvester Williams: Imperial pan-​Africanist. Collings. Igwe, O. (2002). Politics and globe dictionary. Jamoe Enterprises. Jakobeit, C., Hartzenberg, T., & Charalambides, N. (2005). Overlapping memberships in COMESA, ECA, SACU and SADC, trade policy options for the region and APA negotiations. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit. http://​hdl.han​dle.net/​11671/​24273 Legum, C. (1962). Pan-​Africanism. Pall Mall Press. Legum, C. (1965). Pan-​Africanism: A short political guide. Frederick A. Praeger. Makalani, M. (2011). Pan-​Africanism. Africana Age. Mandela, N. R. (1994). Long walk to freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela. Little, Brown and Company. Murithi, T. (2005). The African Union: Pan-​ Africanism, peacebuilding and development. Ashgate. Murithi, T. (2007, June). Institutionalising Pan-​Africanism: Transforming African Union values and principles into policy and practice [ISS Paper No. 143]. Institute for Security Studies, pp. 1–​16. https://​www.files.ethz.ch/​isn/​98931/​PAPER1​43H Nkrumah, K. (1962). Towards colonial freedom. Heinemann. Nkrumah, K. (1963). Africa must unite. Heinemann. Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-​colonialism: The last stage of imperialism. Heinemann. Nkrumah, K. (1966). African socialism revisited. African Forum: A Quarterly Journal of Contemporary Affairs, 3, 1–​7. Nkuepo, H. (2012). Africa’s Continental Free Trade Area: A closer look at the 2012 African Union’s Action Plan for boosting intra-​African Trade. Africa’s Trade Law Newsletter, Issue 5. Nnoli, O. (1986). Introduction to politics. Longman. Nyerere, J. K. (1963). A United States of Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 1, 1–​6. http://​ dx.doi.org/​10.1017/​S00222​78X0​0000​677 Nyerere, J. K. (1968). Ujamaa: Essays on socialism. Oxford University Press. Ogunyemi, I. (2017). African Continental Free Trade Area: Challenges and opportunities for small and medium scale enterprises in Nigeria. American Journal of Business. Economics and Management, 5, 30–​37. http://​www.opensc​ienc​eonl​ine.com/​jour​nal/​archi​ve2?journalId​ ­=​709&pape​rId=​3979 Oppenheim, C. E. (2012). Nelson Mandela and the power of Ubuntu. Religions, 3, 369–​388.

Pan-Africanism and Development in Africa    303 Othieno, L., & Shinyekwa, I. (2011). Prospects and challenges in the formation of the COMESA-​ EAC and SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (Research Series report, No. 87). Makerere University Economic Policy Research Center. https://​doi.org/​10.22004/​ag.econ.150​241 Ravenhill, J. (1984). The OAU and economic cooperation: Irresolute resolutions. In H. El-​ Ayouty & I. W. Zartman (Eds.), The OAU after twenty years (pp. 139–​166). Praeger. Ravenhill, J. (1996). Collective self-​reliance or collective self-​delusion: Is the Lagos Plan a viable alternative? In J. Ravenhill (Ed.), Africa in economic crisis (pp. 56–​67). Macmillan. Saygili, M., Peters, R., & Knebel, C. (2018). African Continental Free Trade Area: Challenges and opportunities of tariff reductions (Research Paper No. 15). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https://​ideas.repec.org/​p/​unc/​blu​pap/​82.html Sekgoma, G. A. (1987). The Lagos Plan of Action and some aspects of development in Sierra Leone. PulA: Botswana Journal of African Studies, 8, 68–​94. http://​pdfp​roc.lib.msu.edu/​ ?file=​/​DMC/​Afri​can+​Journ​als/​pdfs/​PULA/​pul​a008​002/​pula00​8002​006 Sherwood, M. (1995). Manchester and the 1945 Pan-​African Congress. Savannah Press. Sherwood, M. (1996). Kwame Nkrumah: The years abroad 1935–​1947. Freedom Publications. Sherwood, M. (2012). Pan-​African conferences, 1900–​1953: What did “Pan-​Africanism” mean? The Journal of Pan African Studies, 4, 106–​126. http://​www.jpan​afri​can.org/​docs/​vol4n​o10/​ 4.10Pan-​Afri​can Shivji, I. G. (2006). Pan-​Africanism or imperialism? Unity and struggle towards a new democratic Africa. African Sociological Review, 10, 208–​220. https://​www.pambaz​uka.org/​pan-​ afr​ican​ism/​pan-​afr​ican​ism-​or-​impe​rial​ism-​unity-​and-​strug​gle-​towa​rds-​new-​dem​ocra​tic​ -afr​ica Signé, L. (2018). How can the new African free trade agreement unlock Africa’s potential? Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. https://​oecd-​deve​lopm​ent​ -matt​ers.org/​2018/​10/​22/​how-​can-​the-​new-​afri​can-​free-​trade-​agreem​ent-​unl​ock-​afri​cas​ -potent​ial/​ Wallerstein, I. (1961). Africa: The politics of independence and unity. University of Nebraska Press. Wallerstein, I. (1967). Africa: The politics of unity. Random House. Walters, R. W. (1997). Pan Africanism in the African diaspora: An analysis of modern Afrocentric political movements. Wayne State University Press.

Chapter 17

The So ciol o g y of S cience in A fri c a Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya

Introduction The sociology of science focuses on science as a social system and studies what Ben-​ David and Sullivan (1975, p. 203) described as “the social structures and processes of scientific activity” and “the social conditions and effects of science.” It is generally acknowledged that the sociology of science, as a “subfield” of sociology, can trace its roots back to the seminal work of Robert Merton in the 1940s, which was republished in the 1970s (Merton, 1973). Subsequent contributions by Kuhn (1962) and Price (1963), followed by the works of Latour and Woolgar (1979), Whitley (1984), and other influential scholars, quickly led to the expansion of the field. The increasing use of bibliometric methods to study the science system, largely owing to the pioneering work of Garfield in the 1950s (Garfield, 1955), but also to Braun et al. (2006), Moed (2005), and others, such as Glänzel & Schubert (2004) and Schubert et al. (1989), meant that work in the field became more interdisciplinary. Not surprisingly, the terms “science studies” and “science and technology studies” were increasingly being used to describe the field. Historical studies of science in Africa that include studies of the histories of specific scientific fields or disciplines, institutions, and major scientists have been around for a long time. In his comprehensive bibliography of publications on the history of science in South Africa, Plug (1990) listed 716 references for the period 1838–​1987. An earlier study by Basalla (1967) combined historical and sociological insights, suggesting a three-​ phase model whereby modern science—​that is, Western science—​was introduced to non-​European countries, including African countries. During the first phase, the non-​ European countries provided a source for science in Europe. The second phase was

306    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya marked by a period of “colonial science,” Basalla wrote, while the third phase “completes the process of transplantation with a struggle to achieve an independent scientific tradition (or culture)” (p. 611). Basalla’s “model” subsequently became a popular lens through which subsequent studies of science would interpret the development of science on the continent. During the early 1980s, several studies began to emerge that focused on the social structures and conditions of African science. One of the first of these was done by Eisemon (1980) on scientists in Africa and presents the results of interviews conducted with scientists in Nigeria and Kenya. The interviews demonstrated how their work conditions had suffered because of the lack of government support, the devastating effects of the brain drain that had started in the 1970s, and the general precarity of doing science in a poorly resourced environment. Eisemon continued to do collaborative work in this field (Eisemon & Davis, 1991, 1992) and made significant contributions to the understanding of the state of science and scientific communities in many African countries. Gaillard et al. (1997) published what at the time was arguably the most comprehensive and detailed analysis of scientific communities in the developing world. Citing the work of Kuhn (1962) and drawing on the work of Whitley (1984) on scientific disciplines, their basic argument was that “modern science” is characterized by the establishment of and growth in national scientific communities: The concept of national scientific communities also signifies the formation of national identities (that is, a place in the international sphere of science), in the practice, production and advancement of scientific knowledge. (Gaillard et al., 1997, p. 19)

The basic indicator by which one recognizes scientific communities is the steady production of knowledge over the years in scientific fields. In addition, scientific communities are “institutionalized” through university chairs, systems of national recognition and rewards, networks of scientific research, the establishment of professional societies, as well as journals to support scientific communication. The past two decades have witnessed a significant increase in the field of science studies, with contributions increasingly focusing on topics such as the scientific production of African countries and trends in research collaboration between African countries and the rest of the world, as well as the changing regimes of science funding on the continent. These themes are discussed in the rest of the chapter, but before doing so, the state of higher education and science in the early years of postindependence in many African countries is first considered. The early years were generally marked by a decline in African science. Since then, a more positive narrative has also emerged, indicating a revival of African science. We discuss the contextual aspects of both the decline and revival of African science next.

The Sociology of Science in Africa     307

The Decline of African Science With the advent of independence for many African countries in the 1950s, several countries made efforts to develop a nationalist mode of science, by focusing on the areas of scientific development that best reflect their country’s socioeconomic needs (e.g., the development of agricultural sciences; Gaillard et al., 1997). The countries were not alone in pursuing a nationalist science mode but had the support of international organizations such as UNESCO. For UNESCO, it was initially a priority that the newfound political independence of their African member states should eventually lead to scientific independence. Starting as early as the 1960s, the organization invested therefore in the efforts in African countries to formulate science policies and to establish science policy units. However, many of these efforts would eventually come to naught. On the one hand, UNESCO seemed intent on imposing its model on African countries; on the other hand, it was also a period in the history of these countries when there was little local capacity for scientific research in the first place (Andersen, 2016). By 1980, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), today’s African Union, concluded that most of its member countries “still lack the necessary national scientific and technological capability and consequently remained dependent on foreign technical skills for the execution of their scientific and technological tasks” (Organization for African Unity, 1980, p. 35). It is therefore not surprising that UNESCO also began to place a stronger emphasis on the training of African scientists and engineers as part of its human-​capacity development agenda, from the mid-​1960s to the present (Andersen, 2016). However, since independence, especially in the period up to the turn of the 21st century, science and scientific research in many African countries, for the most part, struggled to grow and become embedded in the political culture amid several economic and social crises facing the continent. All the turmoil created a situation that Mouton (2018) describes as the “de-​institutionalization” of African science. Deinstitutionalized science is characterized by weak scientific institutes and other forms of scientific institutionalization such as unsustainable scientific journals and inefficient scientific societies, an overreliance on international funding for research, the building of individual science careers and consultancies rather than institutional building, neglected human resources at universities and research organizations, and a generally poor inscription of science in African society. Mouton (2018) argued that the following factors contributed to this state of affairs: the continuing legacy of colonial science in many African countries and associated dependency on European scientists, the destabilizing influence of political events and civil wars, the continued low investment in expenditure on research and development (R&D) by African governments, the lasting and pervasive negative effects of the brain drain, as well as the role of international agencies in trying to shape African science to their own priorities.

308    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya The role of the World Bank in the deinstitutionalization of African science requires special mention. As part of its policies of structural adjustment, the organization’s decision in the 1980s to prioritize funding for primary education at the expense of funding for higher education created a crisis for many public universities in Africa. Universities were suddenly forced to survive only on cost-​based fees with little financial support from their governments. The outcomes were more students and more consultation to generate additional income, and dwindling research activity in the few instances where it had previously existed (Mamdani, 2016). Research and scholarship in Africa would be one of the main losers during the 1980s and 1990s. Africa’s share of world science, as measured in papers published in the citation indexes of the Web of Science (WoS), declined steadily during these two decades. Bibliometric studies conducted at the University of Leiden’s Centre for Science and Technology Studies showed that Sub-​Saharan Africa’s share of world scientific papers declined from 1 percent in 1987 to 0.7 percent in 1996 (Tijssen, 2007). This diminishing share of African science overall did not reflect a decrease in the absolute sense, but rather an increase in publication output that was less than the worldwide growth rate. Africa had lost 11 percent of its share in global science since its peak in 1987; Sub-​Saharan science had lost almost a third (31%). During the years 1998 to 2002, according to Tijssen (2007), the countries in Northern Africa—​Egypt and the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia)—​accounted for the modest growth observed in Africa’s share of global output. A bibliometric analysis of research output is only one measure of the relative decline of research and scholarship at many African universities. Numerous case studies covering the period between 1990 and 2005 demonstrated quite convincingly that research at former well-​resourced and supported institutions such as the Makerere University in Uganda, the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, and the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania had deteriorated, and that research infrastructure and the general state of laboratories at many institutions had suffered from a lack of maintenance and timely replacement of old equipment. In addition, the generally poor quality of library resources has not improved significantly, and many university libraries were not even using automated management systems. At the same time, the demand for sufficient funding for ongoing research and scholarship continued, as did the need for adequate research management and support at most of these institutions.

The Revival of African Science Around the turn of the millennium a new narrative began to emerge about the “rise” of African science and an African renaissance. An increasing number of African countries have embarked on a path toward establishing democratic systems of governance. Africa’s economic performance in recent years has given rise to the hope that political maturity and stability are being translated into economic growth.

The Sociology of Science in Africa     309 It is important to mention that during the period of decline, efforts were being made to improve the state of African science. For instance, the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 of the OAU called for African countries to commit “1 percent of their GDP for the development of their scientific and technological capabilities” (Organization for African Unity, 1980, p. 52). More than 20 years later, however, the AU, in its Consolidated Science and Technology Plan of Action for Africa (CPA), had to reaffirm the importance of countries taking concrete steps to achieve the 1 percent target (African Union, 2005). Apart from emphasizing the need for domestic scientific investment, the CPA is considered groundbreaking with its introduction of a series of flagship R&D programs for the continent. The programs were organized into four thematic groups and followed on the heels of the adoption by African countries in 2000 of the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations. The goals, currently known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are considered “global standards” for tracking human development (African Union, 2005). In 2014, the AU released its 10-​year strategy, Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024 (STISA 2024), which built on the lessons learned from implementation of the CPA. STISA 2024 had to restate that those countries should aim to invest at least 1 percent of their GDP on R&D, because the target remained unachieved. STISA 2024 captures the AU vision of addressing six priority areas by mapping flagship research programs onto these areas, which are also reconcilable with the SDGs. The areas are (1) eradication of hunger and achieving food security, (2) prevention and control of diseases, (3) communication (physical and intellectual mobility), (4) protection of our space, (5) live together—​build the society, and (6) wealth creation (African Union, 2014). Addressing sustainability challenges generally calls for the involvement of a broad spectrum of actors from academic, policy, and local communities, where they interface by coframing research agendas, codesigning methodologies, and co-​ experimenting with scalable solutions (Buyana, 2020). The element of coproduction is important because it gives a new meaning to development. The understanding of development in science has grown beyond the idea of “bringing about social transformation and material prosperity in newly decolonized nations” to something much more inclusive—​namely, “a set of shared concerns, opportunities, and responsibilities across countries in the global north as well as the global south” (Khandekar et al., 2017, p. 666). In recent years, various international agencies have committed to increasing their investments in African science. An example is the World Bank, which on April 15, 2014, announced that they had approved US $150 million to finance 19 university-​based Centers of Excellence (CoEs) in seven countries in West Africa and Central Africa (World Bank, 2014). These competitively selected centers were allocated funding for advanced specialized studies in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics-​ related disciplines, as well as in agriculture and the health sciences. This landmark Africa Centers of Excellence (ACE) project was financed through International Development Association credits to the governments of Nigeria (US$70 million); Ghana (US$24 million); Senegal (US$16 million); and Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Togo (US$8 million each). The Gambia was to receive a US$2 million credit and a US$1 million grant

310    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya to provide higher education, including short-​term training, to students, faculty, and civil servants through the 19 ACEs (World Bank, 2014). In addition to the ACEs of the World Bank, several other CoEs have come into existence. In South Africa, the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI) has introduced more than a dozen CoEs since 2004 (National Research Foundation, 2021). The African Union Development Agency (AUDA) has established three CoEs in Egypt, Kenya, and Senegal respectively (African Union Development Agency/​ -​ NEPAD, 2019). The African Research Universities Alliance (ARUA) supports 13 CoEs at its member universities across the continent (ARUA, 2017). Recently, UNESCO has established a Center of Excellence in Engineering Innovation, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in Ghana (UNESCO, 2021). Moreover, the African Union Commission, together with Cornell University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had been selected to launch three CoEs in Egypt to foster research, scholarships, and innovation in water, agriculture, and energy (American University in Cairo, 2019). The project, worth a total of $90 million, is funded by the United States Agency for International Development.

Scientific Production in Africa There is some evidence that different positive developments—​more big funding of science in certain areas (health and agricultural sciences), the implementation of regular surveys on R&D indicators monitoring the expenditure on R&D, and attempts to the strengthen national funding councils in many African countries, as well as the general positive effects of the internationalization of science in promoting international mobility and networks of scientists—​have had a positive impact on scientific production. This is illustrated in Figure 17.1, which shows a steady increase in Africa’s scientific article publications in the WoS for the period 2000–​2020. The graph in Figure 17.1 not only indicates a sevenfold increase, from 11,606 in 2000 to 78,248 in 2020, in the absolute number of articles and review articles by African authors in the WoS, but also a commensurate increase in Africa’s share of the world output: from 1.4 percent in 2000 to 3.6 percent in 2020. Although the world-​share percentage is somewhat inflated because of the full-​paper counting method used here, the increase in Africa’s contribution to world science is noteworthy. Further analysis of the areas of specialization or relative activity shows where Africa as a continent is particularly strong. Figure 17.2 displays the areas of relative strength, as measured by the relative field strength (RFS) indicator. The focus is on shifts in relative activity between an earlier period (2000–​2004, dotted line) and a later period (2015–​ 2018, gray line). The RFS is a normalized indicator that shows where a continent or country produces more than the world does in a specific field. RFS values of greater than one (i.e., outside the bold circle in Figure 17.2) indicate fields where Africa is relatively more active compared to the rest of the world.

The Sociology of Science in Africa     311

90000

4

80000

3.5

70000

3

60000

2.5

50000

2

40000

1.5

30000 20000

1

10000

0.5

Number of articles

9

20

20 1

20

17

18

20

20

15

16

20

20

13

14

20

12

20

11

20

10

20

09

20

20

07

08

20

20

05

06

20

04

20

03

20

02

20

20

20

20

01

0

00

0

World share (%)

Total articles

According to Figure 17.2, African science continues its traditional areas of specialization in agriculture (RFS of 1.68 in the most recent period), earth sciences, and religious studies (RFS of 1.5 in both cases).1 Other fields that are global benchmarks, or slightly above, are the health sciences and the biological sciences. But equally striking

World share (%)

Figure 17.1  Africa’s article output in the years 2000 to 2020, also expressed as world shares

Sociology & related studies

Agricultural sciences 2.5 Basic health sciences

Religious studies Psychology

Biological sciences

2 1.5

Chemical sciences

1 Physical sciences

Clinical & public health

0.5 0

Other social sciences

Earth sciences

Economic & management sciences

Other humanities & arts

Multidisciplinary sciences

Education

Mathematical sciences & ICCT Law RFS 2000 to 2004

Engineering sciences & applied technologies Language & linguistics RFS 2015 to 2018

World as benchmark

Figure 17.2  Relative field strength of Africa’s scientific fields, 2004–​2018

312    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya is the relative “inactivity” or even “weakness” of African science in the engineering sciences, mathematics, and the physical sciences. The latter are typically the fields that drive technological development and innovation, but this is an area where Africa underperforms. But these results presented in Figure 17.2 do not distinguish between the contributions of individual countries on the continent. It needs to be kept in mind that Africa is neither a homogenous nor a monolithic entity. In 2021 it consists of 54 countries with a combined population of nearly 1.4 billion people. The cultural diversity is clearly illustrated by the fact that nearly 2,000 active languages are spoken on the continent. It is therefore not surprising that the national science systems in Africa vary considerably in terms of size (number of researchers, number of publications, number of doctoral graduates), expenditure on R&D, as well as RFSs and differences in international collaborations. Table 17.1 illustrates this by showing the huge inequality in scientific production among the top African countries in 2020. Table 17.1 illustrates a number of interesting features of the differential contribution of individual countries to the continent’s science and their share of world output. First, we selected only countries where scientists produced more than 500 articles in

Table 17.1. Scientific Articles in the Web of Science by the 17 Most Productive African Countries (2020) Country

Article counts

Percentage of world output

Egypt

21,670

1.00

South Africa

20,197

0.93

Nigeria

6,314

0.29

Tunisia

5,414

0.25

Algeria

4,584

0.21

Morocco

4,237

0.20

Ethiopia

4,021

0.19

Kenya

3,134

0.14

Ghana

2,574

0.12

Uganda

1,720

0.08

Tanzania

1,696

0.08

Cameroon

1,562

0.07

Zimbabwe

774

0.04

Senegal

613

0.03

Botswana

589

0.03

Mozambique

518

0.02

Burkina Faso

509

0.02

Source: The CREST version of the Web of Science database.

The Sociology of Science in Africa     313 2020. Table 17.1 shows that only 17 countries, less than a third of total number of countries on the continent, reached this threshold. Second, the results show that two countries now dominate scientific production: Egypt and South Africa. These two countries are followed by 10 medium-​sized science-​producing countries, with more than 1,000 publications in 2020, and then by 5 countries that produced fewer than 1,000 scientific publications. It is important to emphasize that these numbers are the absolute counts and do not normalize for the size of the country or the size of the science system.

Science Funding in Africa The importance of financing science in the governance and practice of science cannot be overemphasized. In Africa, the availability of science funding, especially funding that is embedded in the government’s own fiscus, is one of the most important factors that distinguish between the countries that have made great strides in developing their economies and scientific capabilities, and those that are struggling to do so. One indicator of whether a government is serious about investing in its scientific enterprise is whether there is a national funding agency or council that is itself properly funded and efficient in disbursing research grants and scholarships to the scientific community. In a study conducted by the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology (CREST) in 2014, it was shown that such science granting councils (SGCs) are a relatively new phenomenon, only a few countries2 having had such agencies for an extended period (Mouton et al., 2014; Mouton, 2019). Because SGCs operate as intermediaries between national governments that are responsible for science policymaking and local scientific communities, they have been receiving attention from international organizations with an interest in developing scientific capacity on the continent. The Science Granting Council Initiative (SGCI)—​a five-​year initiative jointly funded by the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the Canadian International Development Research Centre, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and the South African NRF—​targeted SGCs in 16 African countries to establish effective research management practices and strengthen partnerships between the SGCs and other science system actors (Science Granting Council Initiative, 2017). Although the CREST study provided relevant models for positioning the various African SGCs (the agents) vis-​à-​vis the government bodies overseeing the research (the principals), insufficient attention was perhaps paid to what Braun (1993) would describe as theorizing of the social relationship between government and SGCs in the making and implementation of policies for science and research. The lack of theoretical focus is not surprising, as many SGCs are still in an embryonic or early developmental state, and the commitments made in national STI policies have not always been implemented. A relevant question for theoretical consideration may be, for example, to what extent and

314    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya how SGCs as agencies serve the interests of their main principal (national government). The question is important because more recent modalities of science funding are not exclusively dyadic. Triadic relationships among the government, SGCs, and scientists are more realistic, as are tetradic relationships that include the public (the users of science) as a fourth role player and where the public’s interest is supposedly served by the government (Braun & Guston, 2003). Nonlocal actors (e.g., international donors and private organizations) also work in the African funding landscape, thus making the original principal-​agent idea in the African context socially complex and worthy of further analysis. A possible tension between global scientific merit and national relevance also applies to the activities of international funders of African science. What complicates matters for these funders, especially in their support for North-​South research partnerships, is that the “funding source and funding agencies involved in the research partnership program strongly influence the priorities, financial flows and research management structure of the programme” (Dodson, 2017, p. 9). In North-​South funding agreements trade-​offs must be made between project objectives (scientific excellence, development impact, capacity building, or tackling global challenges); approaches to agenda-​setting (top-​down or bottom-​up); and program management (North, South, or collectively North and South); these are often coupled with the complexity of more than one Northern or Southern funding agency involved (Dodson, 2017). International funders, typically from the Global North, strengthen scientific capacity in the Global South by investing in high-​quality research as an indication of excellence and by putting mechanisms in place to allow participating countries to reap the benefits of the sponsored research. However, the focus on excellence may exclude some countries in the South from participating at the outset because only a few countries have the potential to compete favorably in terms of scientific criteria (Maher et al., 2020). Consequently, international funding agencies often choose to support developing countries with established research capacities. Morel et al. (2018), for example, compiled an overview of international funding for postgraduate training in health research in Sub-​ Saharan Africa. They found that this support was mainly concentrated in two regions (Eastern Africa and Southern Africa) and specifically in six countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda). Often, the funding support for health reflects colonial ties, as Fitchett et al. (2014) showed in a study of UK funding allocated to low-​and middle-​income countries. International funding operates within a social system, which means that funding creates and reinforces system inequalities, not only in terms of country participation, but also in terms of field coverage and agenda setting. In Africa, the health sciences receive the largest share of international funding by far, followed by funding for agricultural research (Chataway et al., 2019). Because international funders prioritize health research, there is little funding left for basic scientific disciplines such as the physical, mathematical, and chemical sciences (Marincola & Kariuki, 2020). These disciplines, which are not considered attractive enough for international support, may not necessarily rely on national support, because the SGCs may not have the resources and political will to invest in them.

The Sociology of Science in Africa     315 In terms of inequalities reflected in agenda setting, Overland et al. (2021) analyzed a global database of research grants for climate-​change research, covering the period 1990–​2020, for 521 organizations worldwide. Less than 4 percent of global funding for climate change research has been spent on topics related to Africa, a figure that does not reflect Africa’s share of the world population or its vulnerability to climate change. In addition, institutions in Europe and North America received 78 percent of all funding for climate change research conducted across Africa, compared to institutions in Africa, which received less than 15 percent. Finally, a growing number of studies have drawn attention to the structural effects of science funding as they are manifested in Africa (see Arvanitis & Mouton, 2019). The effects refer to how funding may in some cases perpetuate inequalities in research capacities between the so-​called “North” and the “South.” These effects are also different depending on whether the funding targets individual-​research capacity building, such as in doctoral scholarships or mobility grants, or institutional strengthening, such as by supporting research institutes and centers of excellence.

Research Collaboration in Africa Being part of a social system of researchers provides access to ideas, information, and other resources, thereby enriching the individual members’ creative potential (Ghosh & Kshitij, 2017). According to Dusdal and Powell (2021), research collaboration extends beyond the generally cited definition of the “working together of researchers to achieve the common goal of producing new scientific knowledge” (Katz & Martin, 1997, p. 7). From a constructivist perspective, collaboration as a social concept is constantly evolving and takes on different forms depending on the relevant contexts and groups involved (Okwaro & Geissler, 2015). The different forms include, but are not limited to, a division of labor, service collaboration, transmission of know-​how, the provision of access to research equipment, mutual stimulation, and trusted assessorship (Laudel, 2002). Current insights into the patterns and structure of research collaboration in Africa are mainly derived from bibliometric studies. The bibliometric approach to studying collaboration involves the analysis of the coauthorships of publications. Existing bibliometric studies are both continent-​wide (e.g., Adams et al., 2014) and region-​ specific—​North Africa (e.g., El-​Ouahi et al., 2021; Landini et al., 2015), Southern Africa (e.g., Boshoff, 2010; Pouris, 2017), and West Africa (e.g., Mêgnigbêto, 2013). These are in addition to bibliometric studies of individual African countries. Moreover, only a few studies have used non-​bibliometric methods to investigate research collaboration in Africa. Examples include large-​scale projects such as studies on the next generation of scientists in Africa (Beaudry et al., 2018) and the state of public science in the Southern Africa region (Mouton et al., 2008). Both projects include self-​reported survey data and interview data along with the bibliometric data. Journal publications

316    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya that report a combination of bibliometric data and self-​reported survey data include studies by Achachi et al. (2016), Confraria et al. (2020), and Owusu-​Nimo and Boshoff (2017). Other studies in the journal literature that have relied solely on self-​reported surveys are those by Maluleka et al. (2016), Breet et al. (2018), and Muriithi et al. (2018). Sooryamoorthy (2014) used face-​to-​face interviews to study the relationship between publication productivity and the collaboration of academics at two South African institutions of higher education. The different bibliometric analyses have a similar and perhaps all too familiar message: collaboration between African countries is weak, and international collaboration is the dominant mode of knowledge production (see Adams et al., 2014; Boshoff, 2010; Guns & Wang, 2017; Mouton & Blanckenberg, 2018; Ngwenya & Boshoff, 2020; Sooryamoorthy, 2017). The non-​bibliometric analyses and discussions address to some extent the social dynamics surrounding research collaboration in Africa (i.e., the reasons for a research collaboration, experiences, and challenges faced by researchers during the collaboration). Confraria et al. (2020), for example, argue that African researchers collaborate with high-​income countries outside Africa to gain access to research infrastructure and funding and to build research capacities and scientific networks. The situation is such that many of Africa’s research institutions of higher education also largely depend on foreign funding for their research performance. This funding is often linked to a Northern-​based principal investigator in the United States or Europe who by default is indicated as an international coauthor of the publications emanating from the funded research (Mouton et al., 2019). This has led some to “question whether the phraseology of collaboration might not, in fact camouflage underlying asymmetry and northern dominance” (Okwaro & Geissler, 2015, p. 3). Concepts like dominance, asymmetry, dependence, and neocolonialism are commonly associated with studies of North-​South research collaboration (e.g., Boshoff, 2009; Dodsworth, 2019; Gaillard, 1994; Ishengoma, 2016). The increase in foreign or international collaboration—​that is, of African scientists coauthoring papers with scientists from outside the continent—​ is by now well-​ established. But what is perhaps not always highlighted is the very different relationship between international and national collaboration, especially at the country level. Figure 17.3 captures the international coauthorships of selected African countries and displays three categories of collaboration: no collaboration (effectively, single-​author articles), national collaboration (coauthorships with other scientists or academics within the country) and international collaboration (coauthorship with at least one author from outside Africa). The graph in Figure 17.3 shows that in many African countries most scientific articles are produced with foreign authors. For countries like Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Uganda, 90 percent of all articles fall into this category. In contrast, in countries such as Ethiopia, Morocco, Algeria, South Africa, and Egypt, internationally coauthored papers constitute around 60 percent of their scientific production. What is interesting about these countries is that there is significant national collaborative work. Stated differently, these countries display a better balance between international and national

The Sociology of Science in Africa     317 Burkina Faso Coite d'Ivoire Uganda Tanzania Kenya Senegal Botswana Zimbabwe Cameroun Ghana Tunisia Nigeria Egypt South Africa Algeria Morocco Ethiopia 0%

10%

20%

% No collaboration

30%

40%

50%

% National collaboration

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

% International collaboration

Figure 17.3  Collaboration patterns of selected African countries (2020)

collaborations. National collaboration can only take place in a country where there are enough strong research institutions that allow scientists to collaborate. Conversely, if more than 80 percent or 90 percent of a country’s scientific articles are produced by collaboration with foreign scientists, it is equally clear that national collaboration is not possible or desirable. Ultimately, we argue, the relationship between international and national collaboration is a proxy indicator of the strength of the national research system. The collaborations of African researchers are initiated by many factors, including previous collaboration, shared research interests, student-​supervisor interactions, mutual acquaintances, existing interinstitutional partnership agreements, and funding agency requirements (Maluleka et al., 2016; Owusu-​Nimo & Boshoff, 2017). These factors differ across age, career stage, field, gender, and geographic boundaries. Young scientists in Africa, for example, claim to have collaborated on research to increase their productivity, learn from others, subdivide research activities, share resources, and promote interdisciplinary knowledge (Beaudry et al., 2018). In terms of experiences and challenges, research collaboration in Africa brings together scientists across wide disparities in education, skills, and economic and social standing (Okwaro & Geissler, 2015). These differences are bound to create challenges. Muriithi et al. (2018) grouped the collaboration challenges faced by researchers in Kenya along three dimensions: (1) problems of a sociocultural nature, including such matters as scientific competition, cultural differences, information security, conflict resolution, authorship inclusion and order, diversity of collaborators’ disciplinary training, and selection of a publication forum; (2) issues of management and control, which consist of coordinating members’ activities, ensuring the timely delivery of results, defining roles, time (the availability of time to

318    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya commit to the research), leadership, and control, availability of skilled personnel, and administration of funding; and (3) problems of the availability of resources, consisting of ease of getting funding, the amount of funding, and the availability of and access to special equipment. Of these three dimensions, the problems of management and control and problems of availability of resources were cited as major issues.

Conclusion This chapter presented a broad but also an unavoidably selective view of four main themes in the sociology of science: the importance of creating strong scientific institutions in a country, trends in scientific production, new models and challenges in science funding, and the dynamics of research collaboration. An attempt was made to locate each of these issues against the peculiar background of the history of science in Africa and especially how the lasting effects of colonialism, the devastating impact of the World Bank’s structural adjustment policies, and the lack of commitment of many African governments to fund science in their countries have impacted scientific production and research collaboration. Over the past decades various initiatives to reinstitutionalize and strengthen science on the continent have been launched. The growing scholarship in the field shows that some of these have borne fruit. However, many more studies, especially sociological ones, of the nature of science and scientific communities in Africa are required if we are to reach a deeper, more nuanced understanding of how these initiatives will impact the science systems in African countries with very different histories of science, different cultures and perspectives on the value and social inscription of science in society, and very different material realities. Traditionally, the focus of the sociology of science has been the study of scientific communities, cultures, and practices. For Africa, this focus was probably most evident in the last two decades of the 20th century (e.g., the work of Eisemon, 1980 and Gaillard et al., 1997). However, studies of scientists in their respective disciplinary environments in Africa have over time given way to studies of the publication outputs of scientists, and whatever such studies allow (e.g., analyses of scientific collaboration based on article coauthorship and analyses of global visibility based on citation analysis). The shift to studies based on publication outputs is a result of the increased sophistication and general availability of global databases of publication outputs, such as the WoS and Scopus. Bibliometric and scientometric studies of African studies are therefore currently the primary sources of information on the state of science in Africa. Perhaps it is time for African sociologists of science to return to context-​specific, in-​depth, and microlevel studies of scientific communities, cultures, and practices by relying on study methods, such as interviews, that involve direct interaction with African scientists. This can be easier said than done given the anecdotal evidence of poor institutionalization of the sociology of science on the African continent. For instance, a scan of the titles of contributions in the African Sociological Review, a journal published by the Council

The Sociology of Science in Africa     319 for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, shows a striking absence of published research on scientists and scientific disciplines. This calls for a systematic mapping of the research specializations of academics in sociological departments at universities across Africa, in order to understand the position of the sociology of science in the broader landscape of sociological research in Africa.

Acronyms ACE

Africa Centers of Excellence

ARUA

African Research Universities Alliance

AU

African Union

CoEs

Centers of Excellence

CPA

Consolidated Science and Technology Plan of Action for Africa

CREST

Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology

DSI

Department of Science and Innovation

GDP

Gross domestic product

NRF

National Research Foundation

OAU

Organization for African Unity

R&D

Research and Development

RFS

Relative field strength

SciSTIP Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and Science, Technology and Innovation Policy SDGs

Sustainable development goals

SGCs

Science granting councils

SGCI

Science Granting Council Initiative

STI

Science, technology, and innovation

STISA

Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy for Africa

WoS

Web of Science

Notes 1. The result for religious studies should be interpreted with caution as it reflects the relatively extensive coverage of South African journals in theology and religious studies in the WoS and hence does not reflect a continent-​wide specialization. 2. The three countries are South Africa (with its National Research Foundation [NRF], which dates to the founding of the Research Grants Council in 1918); Kenya (with its National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation [NACOSTI], the successor to the National Council for Science and Technology [NCST], established in 1977); and Ghana

320    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya (with its Council for Scientific and Industrial Research [CSIR], established in 1969, which coordinates and administers research funds).

References Achachi, H., Amor, Z., Dahel-​Mekhancha, C. C., Cherraj, M., Bouabid, H., Selmanovic, S., & Larivičre, V. (2016). Factors affecting researchers’ collaborative patterns: A case study from Maghreb Universities [Les facteurs affectant les pratiques de collaboration des chercheurs: Une étude de cas des universités maghrébines]. Canadian Journal of Information and Library Science, 40, 234–​253. Adams, J., Gurney, K., Hook, D., & Leydesdorff, L. (2014). International collaboration clusters in Africa. Scientometrics, 98, 547–​556. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​192-​013-​1060-​2 Andersen, C. (2016). “Scientific independence,” capacity building, and the development of UNESCO’s science and technology agenda for Africa. Canadian Journal of African Studies /​ Revue Canadienne des études Africaines, 50, 379–​394. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00083​ 968.2016.1272​060 African Research Universities Alliance. (2017, February 9). ARUA launches first centre of excellence. https://​arua.org.za/​arua-​launc​hes-​first-​cen​tre-​of-​exc​elle​nce/​ Arvanitis, R., & Mouton, J. (2019, September). Observing and funding African research. [Ceped Working Paper No. 43]. Centre for Population and Development, Paris. African Union. (2005). Africa’s science and technology consolidated plan of action. African Union. African Union. (2014). Science, technology and innovation strategy for Africa 2024. African Union Development Agency–​NEPAD. (2019). Annual report 2019. AUDA-​NEPAD. American University in Cairo (2019). AUC, Cornell, MIT to establish centers of excellence in Egypt. AUC100. https://​auc​100.auceg​ypt.edu/​stor​ies/​auc-​corn​ell-​mit-​to-​establ​ish-​cent​ers​ -of-​exc​elle​nce-​in-​egypt/​ Basalla, G. (1967). The spread of western science. Science, 156, 611–​622. Beaudry, C., Mouton, J., & Prozesky, H. (2018). The next generation of scientists in Africa. African Minds. Ben-​David, J., & Sullivan, T. A. (1975). Sociology of science. Annual Review of Sociology, 1, 203–​ 222. https://​doi.org/​10.1146/​annu​rev.so.01.080​175.001​223 Boshoff, N. (2009). Neo-​ colonialism and research collaboration in Central Africa. Scientometrics, 81, 413–​434. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​192-​008-​2211-​8 Boshoff, N. (2010). South–​South research collaboration of countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Scientometrics, 84, 481–​503. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​ 192-​009-​0120-​0 Braun, D. (1993). Who governs intermediary agencies? Principal-​agent relations in research policy-​making. Journal of Public Policy, 13, 135–​162. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S01438​14X0​ 0000​994 Braun, D., & Guston, D. H. (2003). Principal-​agent theory and research policy: An introduction. Science and Public Policy, 30, 302–​308. https://​doi.org/​10.3152/​147​1543​0378​1780​290 Braun, T., Glänzel, W., & Schubert, A. (2006). A Hirsch-​type index for journals. Scientometrics, 69, 169–​173. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​192-​006-​0147-​4

The Sociology of Science in Africa     321 Breet, E., Botha, J., Horn, L., & Swartz, L. (2018). Academic and scientific authorship practices: A survey among South African researchers. Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics, 13, 412–​420. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​15562​6461​8789​253 Buyana, K. (2020). Keeping the doors open: Experimenting science–​policy–​practice interfaces in Africa for sustainable urban development. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 35, 539–​554. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​901-​019-​09699-​3 Chataway, J., Dobson, C., Daniels, C., Byrne, R., Hanlin, R., & Tigabu, A. (2019). Science granting councils in Sub-​Saharan Africa: Trends and tensions. Science and Public Policy, 46, 620–​631. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​sci​pol/​scz​007 Confraria, H., Blanckenberg, J., & Swart, C. (2020). Which factors influence international research collaboration in Africa? In M. Ramutsindela & D. Mickler (Eds.), Africa and the sustainable development goals (pp. 243–​255). Springer. Dodson, D. (2017). Building partnerships of equals: The role of funders in equitable and effective international development collaborations. UK Collaborative on Development Sciences. Dodsworth, S. (2019). The challenges of making research collaboration in Africa more equitable. Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Politics. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​acref​ore/​978019​0228​ 637.013.1389 Dusdal, J., & Powell, J. J. (2021). Benefits, motivations, and challenges of international collaborative research: A sociology of science case study. Science and Public Policy, 48, 235–​245. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​sci​pol/​scab​010 Eisemon, T. O. (1980). Scientists in Africa. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36, 17–​22. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​00963​402.1980.11458​692 Eisemon, T. O., & Davis, C. H. (1991). Can the quality of scientific training and research in Africa be improved? Minerva, 29, 504–​526. Eisemon, T. O., & Davis C. H. (1992). Universities and scientific research capacity. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 27, 68–​93. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​1568​5219​2X00​056 El-​Ouahi, J., Robinson-​García, N., & Costas, R. (2021). Analyzing scientific mobility and collaboration in the Middle East and North Africa. Quantitative Science Studies, 2, 1023–​1047. https://​doi.org/​10.1162/​qss_​a_​00​149 Fitchett, J. R, Head, M. G., & Atun, R. (2014). Infectious disease research investments follow colonial ties: Questionable ethics. International Health, 6, 74–​76. http://​doi.org/​10.1093/​inthea​ lth/​iht​036 Gaillard, J. (1994). North-​South research partnership: Is collaboration possible between unequal partners? Knowledge and Policy, 7, 31–​63. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​BF0​2692​761 Gaillard, J., Krishna, V. V., & Waast, R. (1997). Introduction: Scientific communities in the developing world. In J. Gaillard, V. V. Krishna, & R. Waast (Eds.), Scientific communities in the developing world (pp. 11–​49). SAGE Publications India. Garfield, E. (1955). Citation indexes for science: A new dimension in documentation through association of ideas. Science, 122, 108–​111. http://​doi.org/​10.1126/​scie​nce.122.3159.108 Ghosh, J., & Kshitij, A. (2017). Examining the emergence of large-​scale structures in collaboration networks: Methods in sociological analysis. Sociological Methods & Research, 46, 821–​ 863. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00491​2411​5606​153 Glänzel, W., & Schubert, A. (2004). Analysing scientific networks through co-​authorship. In F. Moed, W. Glänzel, & U. Schmoch (Eds.), Handbook of quantitative science and technology research (pp. 257–​276). Springer.

322    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya Guns, R., & Wang, L. (2017). Detecting the emergence of new scientific collaboration links in Africa: A comparison of expected and realized collaboration intensities. Journal of Informetrics, 11, 892–​903. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.joi.2017.07.004 Ishengoma, J. M. (2016). North-​South research collaborations and their impact on capacity building: A Southern perspective. In T. Halvorson & J. Nossum (Eds.), North-​South knowledge networks: Towards equitable collaboration between academics, donors and universities (pp. 149–​186). African Minds. Katz, J. S., & Martin, B. R. (1997). What is research collaboration? Research policy, 26, 1–​18. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0048-​7333(96)00917-​1 Khandekar, A., Beumer, K., Mamidipudi, A., Sekhsaria, P., & Bijker, W. E. (2017). STS for development. In U. Felt, R. Fouché, C. A. Miller, & L. Smith-​Doerr (Eds.), The handbook of science and technology studies (4th ed., pp. 665–​693). MIT Press. Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. International encyclopedia of unified science (Vol. 2, No. 2). University of Chicago Press. Landini, F., Malerba, F., & Mavilia, R. (2015). The structure and dynamics of networks of scientific collaborations in Northern Africa. Scientometrics, 105, 1787–​1807. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1007/​s11​192-​015-​1635-​1 Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1979). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. SAGE Publications. Laudel, G. (2002). What do we measure by co-​authorships? Research Evaluation, 11, 3–​15. http://​ doi.org/​10.3152/​147​1544​0278​1776​961 Maher, D., Aseffa, A., Kay, S., & Bayona, M. T. (2020). External funding to strengthen capacity for research in low-​income and middle-​income countries: Exigence, excellence and equity. BMJ Global Heath, 5, e002212. http://​doi.org/​10.1136/​bmjgh-​2019-​002​212 Maluleka, J. R., Onyancha, O. B., & Ajiferuke, I. (2016). Factors influencing research collaboration in LIS schools in South Africa. Scientometrics, 107, 337–​355. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​ 192-​016-​1846-​0 Mamdani, M. (2016). Undoing the effects of neoliberal reform: The experience of Uganda’s Makerere Institute of Social Research. In T. Halvorsen & J. Nossum (Eds.), North-​South knowledge networks: Towards equitable collaboration between academics, donors and universities (pp. 109–​133). African Minds. Marincola, E., & Kariuki, T. (2020). Quality research in Africa and why it is important. ACS Omega, 5, 24155–​24157. https://​dx.doi.org/​10.1021/​acsom​ega.0c04​327 Mêgnigbêto, E. (2013). International collaboration in scientific publishing: The case of West Africa (2001–​2010). Scientometrics, 96, 761–​783. http://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​192-​013-​0963-​2 Merton, R. K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. University of Chicago Press. Moed, H. F. (2005). Citation analysis in research evaluation (Vol. 9). Springer Science & Business Media. Morel, T., Maher, D., Nyirenda, T., & Olesen, O. F. (2018). Strengthening health research capacity in Sub-​Saharan Africa: Mapping the 2012–​2017 landscape of externally funded international postgraduate training at institutions in the region. Globalization and Health, 14, 1–​10. Mouton, J. (2018). African science: A diagnosis. In C. Beaudry, J. Mouton, & H. Prozesky (Eds.). The next generation of scientists in Africa (pp. 3–​12). African Minds. Mouton, J. (2019). Science-​granting councils in Sub-​Saharan Africa: A typology of diverse science funding configurations. In R. Arvanitis & D. O’Brien (Eds.), The transformation of

The Sociology of Science in Africa     323 research in the South: Policies and outcomes (pp. 13–​23). French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development. Mouton, J., Basson, I., Blanckenberg, J., Boshoff, N., Prozesky, H., Redelinghuys, H., Treptow, R., Van Lill, M., & Van Niekerk, M. (2019). The state of the South African enterprise. DST-​ NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and Science, Technology and Innovation Policy. Stellenbosch University. Mouton, J., & Blanckenberg, J. (2018). African science: A bibliometric analysis. In C. Beaudry, J. Mouton, & H. Prozesky (Eds.), The next generation of scientists in Africa (pp. 26–​42). African Minds. Mouton, J., Boshoff, N., De Waal, L., Esau, S., Imbayarwo, B., Ritter, M., & Van Niekerk, D. (2008). The state of public science in the SADC region (­chapter 4). In P. Kotecha (Ed.), Towards a common future: Higher education in the SADC region: Findings from four SARUA studies (pp. 197–​302). Studies Series 2008. Southern African Regional Universities Association (SARUA). Mouton, J., Gaillard, J., & Van Lill, M. (2014). Science granting councils in Sub-​Saharan Africa. [Final technical report submitted to the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)]. Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology. Muriithi, P., Horner, D., Pemberton, L., & Wao, H. (2018). Factors influencing research collaborations in Kenyan universities. Research Policy, 47, 88–​97. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​ j.res​pol.2017.10.002 Ngwenya, S., & Boshoff, N. (2020). Participation of “international national organisations” in Africa’s research: A bibliometric study of agriculture and health in Zimbabwe. Scientometrics, 124, 533–​553. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​192-​020-​03480-​y National Research Foundation. (2021). Centres of excellence. https://​www.nrf.ac.za/​divis​ion/​ rcce/​inst​rume​nts/​cen​tre-​of-​exc​elle​nce Okwaro, F., & Geissler, P. W. (2015). In/​dependent collaborations: Perceptions and experiences of African scientists in transnational HIV research. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 29, 492–​511. http://​doi.org/​10.1111/​maq.12206 Organization for African Unity (1980). Lagos plan of action for the economic development of Africa. UN Economic Commission for Africa. Overland, I., Sagbakken, H. F., Isataeva, A., Kolodzinskaia, G., Simpson, N. P., Trisos, C., & Vakulchuk, R. (2021). Funding flows for climate change research on Africa: Where do they come from and where do they go? Climate and Development. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​17565​ 529.2021.1976​609. Owusu-​Nimo, F., & Boshoff, N. (2017). Research collaboration in Ghana: Patterns, motives and roles. Scientometrics, 110, 1099–​1121. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​192-​016-​2221-​x Plug, C. (1990). Publications on the history of South African science: Annotated bibliography to the end of 1987. University of South Africa. Pouris, A. (2017). The influence of collaboration in research priorities: The SADC case. South African Journal of Science, 113, 1–​3. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.17159/​sajs.2017/​20170​150 Price, D. J. de S. (1963). Little science, big science. Columbia University Press. Schubert, A., Glänzel, W., & Braun, T. (1989). Scientometric data files: A comprehensive set of indicators on 2649 journals and 96 countries in all major science fields and subfields 1981–​ 1985. Scientometrics, 16, 3–​478. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​BF0​2093​234 Science Granting Councils Initiative. (2017). Welcome to the science granting councils initiative. Sgciafrica. https://​sgc​iafr​ica.org/​

324    Nelius Boshoff, Johann Mouton, and Similo Ngwenya Sooryamoorthy, R. (2014). Publication productivity and collaboration of researchers in South Africa: New empirical evidence. Scientometrics, 98, 531–​545. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​ 192-​013-​0990-​z Sooryamoorthy, R. (2017). Do types of collaboration change citation? A scientometric analysis of social science publications in South Africa. Scientometrics, 111, 379–​400. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1007/​s11​192-​017-​2265-​6 Tijssen, R. (2007). Africa’s contribution to the worldwide research literature: New analytical perspectives, trends, and performance indicators. Scientometrics, 71, 303–​327. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1007/​s11​192-​007-​1658-​3 UNESCO. (2021, November 26). UNESCO approves establishment of international centre of excellence in engineering innovation, manufacturing and technology transfer in Ghana under its auspices. https://​en.une​sco.org/​news/​une​sco-​appro​ves-​establ​ishm​ent-​intern​atio​ nal-​cen​tre-​exc​elle​nce-​engi​neer​ing-​inn​ovat​ion Whitley, R. (1984). The intellectual and social organization of the sciences (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. World Bank (2014, April 14). AUC, Cornell, MIT to establish centers of excellence in Egypt. World Bank [Press release]. https://​www.worldb​ank.org/​en/​news/​press-​rele​ase/​2014/​04/​15/​ world-​bank-​cent​ers-​exc​elle​nce-​scie​nce-​tec​hnol​ogy-​educat​ion-​afr​ica

Chapter 18

So ci ol o gical Pro c e s se s of Urbani z at i on The African Experience since the Twentieth Century Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu

Introduction The notion of Edwardo (1990) that civilization refers to the culture of cities applies to African civilization. By 1800, African civilization had already had a long and fascinating heritage of city development that characterized African urbanization in the Middle Ages, which prevailed in the context of fettered liberalism until the 15th century. The context of urbanization evolved from liberalism to unfettered capitalism in the mid-​ 19th century. Since the 20th century, the African continent has contended with the dilemma of embracing either Western-​oriented capitalist urbanization, which is linked to a market economy that upholds the principle of privatization, or Soviet-​style socialist urbanization, which depends on state intervention. By the mid-​20th century, the Western concept that begets colonial urbanization had largely gained acceptance (Mabogunje, 1968). Ever since the mid-​20th century, the capitalist urbanization concept has defined the theoretical frame of urbanization in Africa. This trend implies that African ideology toward urbanization does not exist, regardless of the urbanization experiences of the Middle Ages. Up until the third millennium, Africa has drifted awkwardly along paths charted by global forces in its urbanization experience. Although informality is not a traditional African legacy, Africa treads the path of pseudo-​urbanization, where the informal sector drives the urban economy and nurtures the informal city. Meanwhile, the presumption

326    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu that Africa treads the path of mainstream urbanization is one of the many myths in African urbanization studies. Some scholars presume that the alterations that derail mainstream urbanization in Africa are a colonial legacy. This chapter argues that it has been a continuous process. Since the 1980s, the alteration indicates the diffusion of neoliberal meta-​planning into Africa. The incidence of informal sociological processes of neoliberal planning that drives utopian neoliberal cities vis-​à-​vis informal cities constitutes the research problem. The critical research question is: How does neoliberal planning drive informal cities? The chapter makes the case for reforms of the sociological processes of urbanization in Africa that drive sustainable cities. It aims to suggest measures that will reverse the processes of urbanization experiences in Africa. The objective is to examine the sociological processes of urbanization experiences in African civilization. The significance of this underpins the reversion to a global frame of African sociology embedded in neo-​African development ideology for determining the processes of sustainable urbanization in Africa. The research method adopts a literature review from a historical perspective.

Conceptual Framework The definition of terms matters in the process of articulating the conceptual framework of the urbanization experience in Africa. The priority terms to define include “Africa,” “urbanization,” and “cities” because these often assume wide-​ranging meanings in African studies. The term “Africa” ethnologically describes individuals and the things associated with them who are native to Africa and can (in one way or another, but not necessarily regarding genealogy) trace their ancestry to Indigenous African people groups (Cossa, 2009). Africans are entitled to use the term “African” exclusively to describe their Indigenous experiences and traditions (Okeke & Ukonze, 2019). Africans share an Afrocentric outlook built on cultural relevance and territorial cohesion, although they have peculiarities that tend to polarize the vision of an African civilization. However, African civilization as one civilization suffices because it permits generalizations. Contemporary scholarship presumes that Africa contends with mainstream urbanization of either a capitalist or socialist orientation. Both orientations in the formal context emphasize the attributes of demographic change, resource utilization, and the administrative functions associated with the viewpoints of sociologists, economists, and political scientists. These attributes normally underpin the socioeconomic transformation of the population that leads to population urbanization (Wang, 2021). In informality, the transformation leads to pseudo-​urbanization. Pseudo-​urbanization, which is the informal brand of the resource-​led urbanization experience, manifests in Africa (Okeke, 2020). It indicates a situation where an informal tertiary sector rather than productive economic activities stimulate growth, presumably

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    327 economic growth. The subsequent review indicates the incidence of the informal city as the temporal frame of pseudo-​urbanization. The informal city shares the attributes of cities which Edwardo (1990) defined as locations where a heterogeneous mixture of people is concentrated in clusters of a meaningful size to exchange goods, services, and ideas. The sociological processes entailed in people compete and cooperate in the location distinguish between informal, sustainable, resilient, and global cities. Unlike for the other city categories, the sociological processes of informality characterize the informal city. The notion of informal cities in the context of pseudo-​urbanization is the reality in Africa. Somehow, African urbanization studies deny this reality. Ignoring or denying the reality implicates the oversight of the imperial structure that was established in the process of installing and managing a capitalist economy in urban Africa. The imperial structure in question referenced subsists in the alteration of the development ideology, development hypothesis, and planning theory in precolonial Africa. The alterations led to transitions from traditional development ideologies (e.g., Ubuntu) to modern ideologies (e.g., neoliberalism) and from a space-​economy development hypothesis (Okeke et al., 2018) to a massive infrastructure build hypothesis (Okpala, 2009), as well as from creative planning to conceptual planning. The new approaches constitute structural adversities in African urbanization that impede the productive health of cities and keep Africa in a condition of dependency (Okeke, 2020). The term “structural adversities” denotes a condition or context that includes the extroversion of the space economy where the city resides (that drives consumer cities), the “modernization” of cities (that begets imperialistic cities), and the informalization of cities (that consolidates informal cities) (Okeke, 2020). The space economy is the location, distribution, and spatial organization of economic activities in a space that becomes extroverted when the modern sector disconnects from the local economy. The structural adversities constitute the urban crisis in Africa. The African urban crisis is a complex phenomenon, hitherto loosely associated with environmental adversities in sustainability literature (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1996).

Methodology The methodology adopts the annals approach to research using a time frame and the regional distribution of countries as lines of argument in diagnosing the sociological processes of urbanization in Africa. The time frame under review spans the colonial period until the new millennium. The regional distribution derives from the subdivision used in historical studies to analyze traditional African civilization. The study used the criteria of subregions, country size, and urbanization patterns to identify ten countries for profile studies, including Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Africa. The others are Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, and Egypt. Also included are Senegal, Kenya, and Tanzania.

328    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu The chapter consists of three desktop studies—​namely, African history studies, African region-​settlement patterns, and African country-​profile studies. The African history and settlement studies focused on changes in sociological processes and their influence on settlement patterns after the colonial period, and the country-​profile studies focused on the paradigm shift in planning and urbanization patterns using the 1960s as the limit of retrospection.

At the Beginning: The Traditional African Setting The human institution as a society shares the lifestyle of either socialism or communalism in their ideologies of development. The combination of these lifestyles applies variously in Africa’s kingdom-​building and non-​kingdom-​building societies to nurture African civilization. African socialism is a mindset determined by socialist values and symbolized by the extended family system in much the same way that the Industrial Revolution and class distinction founded European socialism. On the other hand, African communalism underpins an approved code of conduct in which a code system of symbols applies to instill discipline and secure compliance to societal norms. Hence, socialist values and a code system of symbols nurture the use of the environment. The foregoing discussion characterizes the traditional African setting. The sociological processes in this context derive from the factors of mercantile trade relations, religion, and charismatic leadership. The defining factor is charismatic leadership provided by the likes of Shaka Zulu of the Zulu Kingdom, Idris Aloma of the Kanem Bornu Empire, Sonni Ali of the Mali Empire, Othman dan Fodio of the Fulani states, and Osei Tutu of the Asante Empire, among others (Robinson & Smith, 1979). These leaders contended favorably with external domination, and in the context of African socialism and/​or communalism sustained the urban growth of the Middle Ages, calibrated in spatial terms.

African Urbanization Experience: Myths and Realities Independent and institutional demographic data on urbanization in Africa abound, though nowadays, doubt surrounds the veracity of the many of the available databases. They exhibit the highest measure of inconsistency because the baseline data (census data) from which they are calculated lacks validity. Besides, the databases calibrated often in demographic terms measure urban agglomeration (Chandler, 1994). Therefore, the review comments on the impression of rapid urbanization in Africa, explores the

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    329 push-​and-​pull factors of urbanization in Africa, and concludes with the distribution of the urbanization phenomenon in spaces in select African countries. The review starts with a question: How many African countries have had authentic, locally certified census figures since the 1960s? The answer is most probably “none.” Given the very high prospect that no African country has had authentic census figure since the 1960s, we hypothesize, as Todaro (1980) indicates, that the deduction of rapid urbanization in Africa lacks an authentic database. African countries have the worst baseline data. Most of the available databases are projections into the future. Since the 1970s, several authors including Michael Todaro (1980), Eugene Linden (1996), Barry Cohen (2004), and Deborah Potts (2012) have contested the notion of rapid urbanization in Africa. Linden (1996) expresses reservations about the alleged acceleration of urbanization in developing countries. Cohen (2004) argues that the scale of urban growth in the developing world is significantly less than the prediction of 20 years ago: the 1999 projection of the urban population in 2000 is 12.4 percent less than the 1980 projection. Potts (2012) debunked and demystified the rapid urbanization thesis for Africa. Besides the statistical approach Potts (2012) used to debunk the rapid urbanization thesis, which confirms our hypothesis, it is not clear that the rapid urbanization thesis is theoretically compelling. Urbanization is a function of urban growth measured in demographic and spatial terms. The rapid urbanization thesis draws from urban growth measured in demographic terms that fundamentally measure urban agglomeration, which relates to the concentration of urbanization in a location or metropolis. The concentration of urbanization, which could be more than or less than urban concentration, explains introverted or extroverted urbanization (Kasarda & Crenshaw, 1991) and not necessarily the rapidity of urbanization. The demographic databases, regardless of the authenticity controversy, measure urban concentration that relates to metropolitanization (the process of becoming a metropolis) or city primacy or mega-​city syndrome, found especially in Francophone Africa. Therefore, urban demographic growth is localized and contextual. The literature indicates there were 4 metropolises in Africa in 1960, 18 in 1980, and 36 in 1990 (Attahi et al., 2009). However, dispersed urban population is also manifest especially in Botswana, Niger, and Lesotho (Henderson, 2002). Why does the rapidity thesis seldom relate to urbanization as a function of urban growth measured in spatial terms, which measures the distribution of people, activities, and infrastructure (otherwise urban systems) in a space? Spatial distribution is important, and so are the qualitative, quantitative, structural, spatiophysical, marginal or nonmarginal, smart characteristics of urban growth as development processes. Moreover, urban growth as a socialization process that measures the structural transformation of the social system also matters. The critical question is, how did these matters have any bearing on the claim of rapid urbanization? Rapid urbanization in Africa is a myth because it is not statistically and theoretically compelling. Perhaps it is a necessity for development policies that favor a massive infrastructure build in Africa. Contrary to alarmist views that the urban population will continue to grow, the pace of urbanization in developing countries is not accelerating

330    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu (Cohen, 2004). In this case, much depends on the dynamics of the push and pull factors of African urbanization. The push factors reside in the sociological processes of the resource-​led urbanization that is found in Africa. The processes that lead to the urbanization of poverty apply, in which case the perception of urban poverty in Africa matters (Cilliers, 2020). Urban poverty in Africa is the poverty of the dominant informal sector in the urban economy. In neo-​Marxist thinking, as is the case in Africa, the poverty of the informal sector comes from its exploitative relationship with capitalist production and distribution. Many scholars accept that poverty arises from the linkages between the proliferation of informality and global restructuring (Castells & Portes, 1989; Portes & Walton, 1981). We recall that against this backdrop, in 1993 the secretary-​general of the United Nations Organization indicated that urban poverty manifests itself in the sphere of economics as deprivation, in politics as marginalization, in sociological issues like discrimination, in culture as ruthlessness and in the economy as vulnerability. Up until now, the impression remains valid, and all of the dimensions mentioned reinforce one another to retain urban Africa in poverty. According to Onibokun and Kumuyi (1996), poverty indicates low-​calorie intake, inaccessibility to adequate health facilities, low-​quality educational systems, low life expectancy, high infant mortality, low income, unemployment, underemployment and inaccessibility to various housing and social facilities. The elements of deprivation, marginalization, discrimination, ruthlessness (informality), vulnerability and the indicators of poverty constitute the push factors of urbanization in Africa. The factors drive spatial migration that leads to urban concentration along development corridors in the context of informality. The informal context breeds pseudo-​urbanization, where a larger fraction of workers engages in nontradable services, such as commerce and transportation, or in personal services and government services. The alternative mainstream urbanization, where a larger fraction of workers engages in manufacturing or tradable services is a myth in Africa. The pull factors of urbanization connect with space economy that is “the spatial manifestation of hundreds of individual economic decisions, actions and connections that together influence space and are in turn influenced by space” (South African Cities Network, 2013). In pseudo-​urbanization, the space economy draws from the distribution of infrastructure building, socialization and growth processes that support the activity systems of a survivalist urban informal sector. The location-​specific opportunities the informal sector presents for survival in informal cities, which are meeting basic needs that influence the structural transformation of the social system, are the defining pull factors of pseudo-​urbanization in Africa. Often the opportunities are prospective, however they trigger urban migration that leads to agglomeration along development corridors. Nevertheless, urbanization patterns in Africa indicate tendencies of introversion and extroversion. In most African countries, introverted urbanization is commonplace, and this explains the high incidence of city primacy whereby urban growth concentrates in a single large primate city, invariably the capital city. City primacy associated with the

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    331 concentration of urbanization features prominently in Francophone Africa. In rare cases such as in Nigeria or Malaysia in Asia where extroverted urbanization patterns prevail, a more balanced spatial structure obtains in which several large cities of importance are spread across the country (Alkali, 2005; Richardson, 1981). From the impressions of UN-​HABITAT (2008) on urbanization in Africa, it is not difficult to deduce that introverted urbanization holds stronger implications for urban expansion than extroverted urbanization. The relationship between urbanization patterns and urban expansion on the continent is not clear because available urban expansion studies such as Herold et al. (2003, 2005) are grossly inadequate.

Transitions in Sociological Processes of African Urbanization Experiences since the Colonial Period This section attempts to review changes in the sociological processes of urbanization in Africa since colonization in the 20th century. The sociological processes under reference indicate urban ethnicity, inter-​personal relationships, family ties and networks, livelihood support systems and ultimately the culture of cities. The purpose of the review is to show the progression of transitions in sociological processes that lead to informal cities in the pseudo-​urbanization context in Africa in the third millennium. Sociological processes affect the functioning and the spatial structure of cities. In the culture-​specific pre-​industrial and pre-​capitalist urbanization of the Middle Ages in African societies, cities, particularly Timbuktu in Mali between the 12th and 14th centuries, serve as a symbol of power and authority (Chandler, 1994; Coquery-​ Vidrovitch, 1991). The spatial limit of these cities is visible often in the form of town walls (Thomas & Cousins, 1996). Town walls of great length (Kano, 22km; Ibadan, 16km; Old Oyo, 25km) identified these city-​states. By the mid-​15th century, the incursion of Western merchants and the growth of international trade engineered the transition of traditional urbanization to market towns situated at the interface of trade routes (Robinson & Smith, 1979). Local leadership still managed to control trade, although Europeans, especially the Portuguese in the 16th century period, sought control and trade monopolies in their trade relations (Davidson, 1966). Transitional changes in the sociological processes of African urbanization experiences started gradually in the mid-​19th century with the eventual European control of trade followed by resource control, political expeditions and finally the signing of war treaties. These events marked the inception of the colonial period in Africa (Davidson, 1978). The period indicates changes in trade routes and functional specialization of cities that underpin the first phase in the alteration of the African space economy. Subsequent phases of changes indicate the informalization of cities and the incidence of pseudo-​urbanization that extroverts the space economy.

332    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu

The Colonial Urbanization Period The colonial urbanization period followed in the early 20th century and prevailed until the independence decade of the 1950s and 1960s. The African socialist and communal ideologies gave way to periphery capitalism; production economy gave way to a consumer economy, and planning design based on the understanding of folk culture gave way to planning design driven by the imperial planning mandate.1 The strategic changes reworked the processes of urbanization to include spatial migration and convergence driven by non-​tradable services. New control instruments emerged in the form of trade monopoly, taxing peasants and forced labor in West Africa, and land expropriation, imposition of taxes and discrimination against African agriculture in the Southern and parts of Central and Eastern Africa (Rakodi, 1997). The new controls bulldozed cultural symbols, behavior and beliefs. Cities in Africa no longer derived from the sociological processes of indigenous values, attitudes and institutions. They became hybrids which were an inevitable product of intervening culture and hegemonic policy formulation that serve single-​ minded utilitarian objectives. A capitalist-​industrialist urban culture grew, overlapping or replacing the more culture-​specific pre-​industrial and pre-​capitalist urban forms of the Middle Ages (King, 1990). Pseudo-​suburbia of imperial orientation with segregation and homogeneity concepts emerged as colonial towns, sometimes from scratch and sometimes on the sites of earlier traditional settlements (O’Connor, 1983).The colonial city is a pastiche of zoned functions, land uses and the population that is European in appearance, planning and organization. An itinerant class of landless peasants, migrant black paupers, mine boys and domestic servants (Blair, 1971, p. 227) serve the colonial city. The city exhibits functional changes on the bases of which they serve as places for the “integration of households into new networks of capitalist production; the invention of new webs of concepts and practices of land and land laws; new patterns of foodstuff consumption; and new regulations governing social and political life” (Coquery-​ Vidrovitch, 1991, p. 73). A dual system of city administration prevailed. Europeans controlled the modern commercial and administrative center (the “industrial,” transport and military zones) and the well-​kept residential compounds for Europeans, and the African bourgeoisie on the other hand controlled the old city, the stranger’s quarters and the sprawling zones of squatters –​the trespassers of desperation –​scattered in the city and on its outer edges (Blair, 1971, p. 229). The cities are mostly parasitic cities defined as cities that grow fat on the produce of the hinterland without giving anything in return (Hoselitz, 1955 cited in the Federal Government of Nigeria, 2001, p. 2). The urban form indicates a framework of multiple urban systems, concentrated urban distribution and heterogeneous urban patterns.

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    333 The incidence of colonial cities is the outcome of the sociological processes of colonization and not necessarily the importation of British town planning laws, the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, as assumed especially in Anglophone Africa (Okpala, 2009). As a control instrument, the planning law enforces the controls inherent in the sociological processes of colonization, especially as it relates to the activity-​space relationship.

The post-​colonial urbanization period in African civilization The post-​colonial urbanization period stretches from the 1960s to the 1980s. Three major socio-​economic and political reforms occurred in this period, namely the institution of national government, the surge of pseudo-​neoliberal economy and globalization and rational planning. After the independence decade, the 1970s epitomized the institutional order of late capitalist modernity that deploys social management to coerce nationalist governance. Hawksley (2004) perceives it as the wholesale transformation of society to reflect the priorities of the colonial masters. Majekodunmi and Adejuwon (2012) interpret it more graphically wherein the emerging ruling class at independence continued to act on the script already written by the departing colonizers. The tendencies of neocolonization ushered the diffusion of global neoliberal economic orthodoxy into Africa in the 1980s. The African experience indicates pseudo-​ neoliberalism and its antecedent informality and pseudo-​ urbanization. Pseudo-​neoliberalism is a derogatory form of neoliberalism (Okeke, 2020). It derives from linkages between the proliferation of informality and global restructuring (Castells & Portes, 1989; Martinez-​Vela, 2001; Portes & Walton, 1981). Conceptually, pseudo-​ neoliberalism posits a situation where informal market systems and processes leverage support services for global mercantilism. According to Gërxhani (2004), the new order of pseudo-​neoliberalism leveraged informality in economic activities that gave impetus to the notion of economic dualism and social marginality in Africa. It applies individualism as the basis of social reproduction and to citizenship as the basis of political relations. Furthermore, it applies utilitarian rationality in a system of generational commodity production and market exchange (mediated by state redistribution) as the basis of economic relations (Jenkins, 2009). The new order drives structural adjustments in development policies for the poor environment. The structural adjustment program drives a survivalist informal sector that stimulates informal processes, migration, and agglomeration, which inform the urbanization of poverty (otherwise pseudo-​urbanization). In the context of pseudo-​ urbanization, urban primacy, the sprawl model of urban expansion, informal satellite

334    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu settlement development, and suburbanization are manifest (McTaggart, 1988). They draw from informal social networks built around friendship and family ties. Informal settlements tend to outnumber formal development, and their social legitimacy appears to be no longer in question (Geoffrey, 2005). The informalization effectively programs African cities to operate in the downstream activities of the global economy. Studies conducted in the 1970s by economic anthropologists Meillassoux (1972), Wolpe (1975), and others indicate the deliberate preservation of subsistence enclaves as labor reservoirs in Third World countries for the modern sector (Portes, 1983).

Sustainable Urbanization Period in African Civilization The sustainability concept epitomizes the 1980–​2000 period in Africa. Regardless of the plethora of conceptualizations of sustainability (Berke, 2002), sustainability in practical terms tends to underpin the socializing of informality, especially in the economic sector, as a survivalist strategy for the poor (UN-​HABITAT, 2008). Socializing in essence protects the right of the poor to the city, where they are required to provide downside support services in the informal economic sector of the world system (Watson, 2009). Recurrent neoliberal economic models, policies, and trade liberalization, which leverage Euro-​American and Chinese mercantilism, sustain the informal economic sector. The sector relies mainly on subsistent retail trade activities of foreign goods conducted mainly by migrants from rural areas. The flow of steady streams of this low-​skilled labor into the cities caused the urban informal sector to expand (Ishengoma, 2004). Consequently, cities in Africa degenerate fast into labor reservoirs for the survivalist economic sector (Portes, 1983). The adoption of the survivalist strategy concept for sustainability in Africa causes reforms in urban social structure in which per capita productivity dwindles and underemployment is ubiquitous (Onyenechere, 2011). The consequent drift of skilled and low-​ skilled labor to cities is not dependent on the availability of industries. The World Bank asserts that it is a response to distorted incentives to exploit subsidies rather than the attraction of functional cohesion of interdependent productive units in economic formal regions. Informal processes for sustainability, which suggest a transition from planning rationality to human rationality in the planning process, cause cities in Africa to acquire the sobriquet “informal city,” that is, cities that function in the realm of informality (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1996). The incipient human rationality, which derives from the socialization process of the pseudo-​neoliberal economy in Africa, pioneered the transition to rational planning based on participatory principles. Participatory planning, whatever it means, epitomizes the prevailing quiet revolution in planning and planning theory engineered in this period (Berke, 2002). It is not clear

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    335 whether the original intent of the revolution was to conceive a planning model for the delivery of informal cities in the context of pseudo-​urbanization. However, the consolidation of participatory principles found favor in rational planning. African countries responded differently. The review of the descriptive database from the 1960s of select African countries draws four conclusions. First, within three decades of the crusade for participatory planning, the performance sheet indicates accelerated progress in isolated cases (e.g., Egypt) due to the activities of external development partners. However, there are instances of zero tolerance for participatory planning, as is perhaps the case in the DRC, where the urban planning vacuum stretched from the 1970s until the 1990s and beyond. Second, slum clearance and urban upgrading schemes sponsored by donor agencies tend to serve as the entry point for a paradigm shift in planning. Third, where paradigm shifts on an urban scale (e.g., in South Africa) apply, the tactic of nonstatutory, broad-​guideline spatial planning obtains, and participation is consultative. Fourth, the resilience of master planning is ubiquitous. Ultimately, the participatory planning intended for a transition to sustainable cities in the context of pseudo-​neoliberalism somehow succeeds in delivering informal cities in Africa. Perhaps in the thinking of drivers of neoliberal content, sustainable cities in Africa are synonymous with informal cities. However, the universal search for sustainable development leveraged the Sustainable Cities Program (SCP) initiative as a capacity-​building instrument (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1996). The SCP policy frame is investment in infrastructure to redress environmental adversities.

Neoliberal Urbanization Period in African Civilization In the context of the increasing momentum of the informalization of cities (Bibangambah, 1992), the new millennium period sought to translate sustainable cities policy objectives to a sustainable urban development program. Therefore, in Quito in 2016, in the context of the transition from MDGs to Agenda 2030, Habitat III adopted Goal 11, which seeks to “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” (African Union et al., 2016, p. 125). This goal drives the policy frame of sustainable urban development, and it is quite difficult to fault its good dispositions in economic, social, and environmental terms. There are points of departure arising from the review of the descriptive database from the 1960s in select African countries that suggest policy changes for the African region. First, the sustainability being sought rests on the demographics of urbanization, and not on epistemologies that challenge sustainable urbanization in Africa. Second, the policy frame is disposed to investment planning that aligns with the business context of the city (Barkham et al., 2014) and associates a city crisis with deficiencies in

336    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu infrastructure. Third, the urban paradigm and African urban crisis do not draw from structural adversities. According to the African Union et al. (2016), the “New Urban Agenda” did not provide a truly global urban paradigm or much of an African Urban Agenda either. The challenge ahead deals with the informal city phenomenon. Informal cities occupy a shallow place and function in the global economy (Onyebueke, 2011). They lack networking (Rakodi, 1997), and they barely share the perception of global cities; that is, they are not seen either as economic centers of excellence for manufacturing and information products that influence the global economy or as profit-​making corporate entities with the potential to perform economic functions, or as a remote sensor for measuring capitalist development (Potts, 2012). Yet expectations are that they should engage in the global competition reserved for sustainable cities. Meanwhile, the introduction, with much fanfare, of the SCP initiative in the mid-​ 1990s had fizzled out in Africa by the turn of the 21st century (Okeke, 2005). A United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) evaluation of the implementation of SCP in the African region reports that the concept neither achieved its theoretical role nor addressed the integrated use of urban space (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1999). The concept of informality (De Soto, 2000; Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000) lingered until perhaps 2009, when its relevance in planning drew attention. Among other studies, one by Roy (2009) postulated that informality is an important epistemology of planning. Watson (2009) theorized informality in planning based on the idea of conflict of rationalities. The studies establish informality as either an object or a function of planning. It further defines informality in planning as the liberalization of planning decisions and procedures, in the economy as the adaptive capacities of the poor, and in administration as neo-​imperialism. The body of knowledge gave an impetus to the informal planning concept, or planning without a plan, which finds expression in neoliberal planning (Mohammadzadeh, 2011). The neoliberal planning concept mainstreams informality to promote a more radical dissociation of spatial planning from direct intervention in geographic space. It seeks growth that is individualistic, not collective; hence it disconnects with the traditional growth principles of form and function in planning. Consequently, it uses Darwinian survival logic to resort to economic reductionism, “a system of reducing the city to an ‘economy’ which defines everything and everybody as either economic gain or loss, with nothing outside this dichotomy” (Baeten, 2012, p. 209). Its attribute of informality draws from the mindset of freedom, not equity. Neoliberal planning shares strong causality with the informalization of cities (Roy, 2009). The direction of causality retains informality as an object or a function of planning. Informality as an object of neoliberal planning indicates the growth of informal land administration and land occupation (Huchzermeyer, 2009), informal housing (Kasarda & Crenshaw, 1991), and the proliferation of informal settlements, that is, cities (Geoffrey, 2005). Since the inception of neoliberalism as a metatheory of planning in the 1980s, informality as a function of neoliberal planning has been a response to the informalization of human, economic, spatial, and planning systems that is inherent in

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    337 the new capitalist or neoliberal globalization. Therefore, neoliberal planning is a new epistemology among others, especially the informal economic sector and the informal city—​that is, sustainable cities with an informal orientation.

Transition to Formal Sustainable Cities in Africa The transition to formal sustainable cities in Africa builds on the philosophy of Mangus (1998, p. 14) that “as Africans, we can no longer hide from the need to justify our existence and reconcile ourselves with our people, our science and our history.” The discourse asserts that the reconciliation subsists in re-​engineering the epistemological structures that the colonial administration installed in the early 20th century and that remain resilient in the third millennium (Nabudere, 2003). The epistemological structures point to fundamental changes in Africa’s development ideology, development hypothesis, and planning approach cum mandate. The revision of the socialization process of a neo-​African development ideology, which seeks eco-​centric values as a standard for mobilizing the culture of sustainable cities, is imperative (Okeke et al., 2018). The new ideology will work to reconnect the African people with those fundamental values of self-​respect, dignity, pride, moral integrity, self-​reliance, and independence (Dembele, 1998). Succeeding in this mission requires a resolutely optimistic attitude that will follow the path of spiritual and cultural renewal, along with the moral rearmament of the African people from around the world (Dembele, 1998). Success measured by the application of integrative principles, Africanist mandates for space economy, and city development applies. We suggest the neomercantile development ideology option for Africa (Okeke et al., 2018). In the neo-​African development ideology, the revision of the infrastructure build option as a development hypothesis to a space economy hypothesis is automatic. To this end, we suggest policy changes in four directions: from extroverted to introverted economic policies; from exogenous to endogenous economic activities; from a consumer economy to a production economy; and from the nontradable services of the consumer economy to the tradable services of the production economy. We believe that these policy changes will reverse the resource-​led urbanization that underpins consumer cities in Africa. Resource-​led urbanization can reverse. For example, resource-​led cities such as San Francisco, Denver, and Houston were in the past “consumption cities” but have developed over time into what we would term “production cities” (Okeke, 2020). For the delivery of the space economy hypothesis and sustainable cities, we suggest meta-​planning with integrative principles that can secure integration in space. The neoclassical category of planning suffices in the synergy between the human and planning rationalities that drive a common vision of the city as a worthwhile expression of culture and art. The common vision synchronizes the Africanist planning mandate

338    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu and creative planning that is reminiscent of Evans’s (2001) concept of “culture planning,” earlier mimicked in Perloff ’s (1979) study of the role of the arts in the city of Los Angeles. Although technicalities are inevitable in creative planning for sustainable cities, they will not divert attention from visual appeal, cultural significance, and aesthetic innovations, as was the case with creative urbanism in the traditional period reported in Tunnard (1951).

Conclusion This chapter has attempted to discuss the sociological processes of the African urbanization experience from both a historical perspective and the point of view of spatial scientists. To this end, three mindset issues are critical. As was highlighted in the discussion, the mindset issues are, first, that African civilization is one civilization; second, that African ideology toward urbanization does not exist; and third, that the informality that characterizes urban sociology in Africa is not a traditional African legacy. Hitherto, these mindset issues have not applied in African urbanization studies. What has applied since the 20th-​century contact with Western civilization is regard for the notion that informality is a traditional African legacy and the perception that African civilization is a one of isolated African societies. Remarkably, Europe shares the attributes of isolated societies, yet European civilization as one civilization applies in development studies. African civilization is one civilization. The principle of generalization should be part of African development studies as it was applied in the colonial period to nurture development ideology, development hypothesis, and as a planning approach to Africa as one society. Against this backdrop, the colonialists installed the system of capitalist infrastructure in the context of conceptual planning as a development model for Africa. The model indicates the attributes of a continuous process, contrary to the common impression that it is now a colonial legacy. At the outset of the colonial period, it drove imperial cities and the extroversion of the space economy. In the neoliberal era of the third millennium period, it describes the socialization of informality as a traditional African legacy. The socialization processes drive informal sustainable cities that breed pseudo-​ urbanization in Africa. As informality gains acceptance, the attributes of the informal city in the pseudo-​ urbanization context tend to fill the lacuna in African ideology toward urbanization. The rapid urbanization theory in the context of informality sustains the 20th-​century imperial system of “massive infrastructure build” as a development model for Africa. The imperial model of development for Africa is a continuous process that deepens the structural adversities of the African urban crisis. Agenda 2063 is under the influence of this process, and therefore the sustainability ideologies for creating inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable cities are illusions in practical terms. Africa’s urbanization experience will continue to drift awkwardly along the path of informal sustainable

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    339 cities charted by neoliberal globalization as it has for the past four decades, at least until Africans muster the political will to create a new path for development. The trend will not change on its own. The new path starts with the reversal of the imperial mindset that denies generalizations, disregards the African ideology of mainstream urbanization, and presumes informality to be a traditional African legacy. The new mindset must set aside the myth of rapid urbanization in Africa and adopt an Africanist planning mandate that synchronizes with creative planning to deliver a productive space economy as the context for sustainability ideologies in Africa. We are optimistic that these measures will end the continuous processes that have corrupted African urbanization since the 20th century. As Kofi Annan, the late secretary-​general of the United Nations asserted, “Optimism should not be mistaken for romanticism; rather it is tempered by realism even as we strive continuously for improvements in the human condition” (cited in Amoako, 2018, p. 1). The inevitable reforms will not be easy—​nevertheless, Africa must plan to re-​plan.

Note 1. The notion of planning here is contained within and constrained by economic and political forces and priorities (Owens, 1994, p. 439, cited in Rydin, 1995, p. 373). In practical terms, planning denotes a planning mandate that essentially gives geographical expression to policies (Metternich, 2017).

References African Union, UNECA, AfDB, & UNDP. (2016). MDGs to Agenda 2063/​SDGs; Transition Report 2016. [Summary report]. African Union & Economic Commission for Africa & African Development Bank & United Nations Development Programme. https://​au.int/​ sites/​defa​ult/​files/​pages/​32828-​file-​mdg-​sdg_​tra​nsit​ion_​repo​rt_​s​umma​ry_​e​n_​1.pdf Alkali, J. L. S. (2005, June 6). Planning sustainable urban growth in Nigeria: Challenges and strategies [Paper presentation]. Conference on Planning Sustainable Urban Growth and Sustainable Architecture, ECOSOC Chambers, United Nations Headquarters, New York. https://​www.un.org/​en/​eco​soc/​meeti​ngs/​2005/​docs/​Alk​ali.pdf Amoako, K. Y. (2018). Kofi Annan’s quest for a better Africa. https://​afric​anar​gume​nts.org/​ 2018/​09/​kofi-​annan-​quest-​bet​ter-​afr​ica/​ Attahi, K., Hinin-​Moustapha, D., & Appessikaa, K. (2009). Revisiting urban planning in the Sub-​Saharan francophone Africa: Global report on human settlements. UN-​HABITAT. http://​ citese​erx.ist.psu.edu/​view​doc/​downl​oad?doi=​10.1.1.553.4168&rep=​rep1&type=​pdf Baeten, G. (2012). Neoliberal planning: Does it really exist? In T. Tasan-​Kok & G. Baeten (Eds.), Contradictions of neoliberal planning (pp. 205–​211). Springer. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978​ -90-​481-​8924-​3_​11 Barkham, R., Brown, K., Parpa, C., Breen, C., Carver, S., & Hooton, C. (2014). Resilient cities: A Grosvenor research report. https://​doi.org/​10.13140/​RG.2.1.3066.5683

340    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu Berke, P. R. (2002). Does sustainable development offer a new direction for planning? Challenges for the twenty-​first century. Journal of Planning Literature, 17, 21–​36.https://​doi​ .org/​10.1177/​0881​2201​7001​002 Bibangambah, J. R. (1992). Macro-​level constraints and the growth of the informal sector in Uganda. In J. Becker & P. Pedersen (Eds.), The rural-​urban interface in Africa (pp. 303–​313). Scandinavian Institute for African Studies. Blair, T. (1971). Shelter in urbanising and industralising Africa. In P. Oliver (Ed.), Shelter in Africa (pp. 226–​239). Barrie and Jenkins. Castells, M., & Portes, A. (1989). World underneath: The origins, dynamics, and effects of the informal economy. In A. Portes, M. Castells, & L. A. Menton (Eds.), The informal economy: Studies in advanced and less developed countries (pp. 11–​40). John Hopkins University Press. Chandler, T. (1994). Urbanization in medieval and early modern Africa. In J. D. Tarver (Ed.), Urbanization in Africa: A handbook (pp. 15–​32). Greenwood. Cilliers, J. (2020). Africa first! Igniting a growth revolution. Jonathan Ball. Cohen, B. (2004). Urban growth in developing countries: A review of current trends and a caution regarding existing forecasts. World Development, 32, 23–​51. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​ j.world​dev.2003.04.008 Coquery-​Vidrovitch, C. (1991). The process of urbanization in Africa (from the origins to the beginning of independence). African Studies Review, 34, 1–​98. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​524​256 Cossa, J. A. (2009). African renaissance and globalization: A conceptual analysis. Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 36, 1–​25. https://​doi.org/​10.5070/​F736​1009​576 Davidson, B. (1978). Discovering African’s past. Longman. Davidson, B. (1966). Africa kingdoms. Time-​Life Books. Dembele, D. M. (1998). Africa in the twenty-​first century. CODESRIA Bulletin (9th General Assembly, Dakar, Senegal). De Soto, H. (2000). The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else. Basic Books. Edwardo, L. E. (1990). Community design and the culture of cities. Cambridge University Press. Evans, G. (2001). Cultural planning and urban renaissance. Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​ 978020​3459​744 Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). (2001). Report on the launching of the global campaign for good urban governance in Nigeria. Federal Ministry of Works and Housing. Geoffrey, N. (2005). The urban informal sector in Nigeria: Toward economic development, environmental health and social harmony. Global Urban Development Magazine, 1. https://​ www.glob​alur​ban.org/​Issue1​PIMa​g05/​NWAKA%20arti​cle.htm Gërxhani, K. (2004). The informal sector in developed and developing countries: A literature survey. Public Choice, 120, 267–​294. https://​doi.org/​10.1023/​B:PUCH.000​0044​287.88147.5e Hall, P., & Pfeiffer, U. (2000). Urban Future 21: A global agenda for twenty-​first century cities. E & FN Spon. Hawksley, C. (2004, September 29–​October 1). Conceptualizing imperialism in the 21st century [Paper presentation]. The 2004 Australian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Adelaide. Henderson, V. (2002). Urbanization in developing countries. World Bank Research Observer, 17, 89–​112. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​wbro/​17.1.89 Herold, M., Couclelis, H., & Clarke, K. C. (2005). The role of spatial metrics in the analysis and modelling of urban land-​use change. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 29, 369–​ 399. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.compen​vurb​sys.2003.12.001

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    341 Herold, M., Liu, X., & Clarke, K. C. (2003). Spatial metrics and image texture for mapping urban land use. Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing, 69, 991–​1001. https://​doi​ .org/​10.14358/​PERS.69.9.991 Huchzermeyer, M. (2009). The struggle for in situ upgrading of informal settlements: Case studies from Gauteng. Development Southern Africa, 26, 59–​73. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 037683​5080​2640​099 Ishengoma, E. (2004). The role of firm-​resources: Performance differentials between women-​and men-​owned micro-​enterprises in Tanzania. University of Leipzig. https://​www.projec​ttop​ ics​.org/​journ​als/​58935-​role-​of-​firm-​resour​ces-​perf​orma​nce-​differ​enti​als-​betw​een-​women​ -and-​men-​owned-​micro-​ente​rpri​ses-​in-​tanza​nia.html Jenkins, P. (2009). African cities: Competing claims on urban land. In F. Locatelli & P. Nugent (Eds.), African cities; Competing claims on urban spaces (pp. 81–​107). Brill. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1163/​ej.978900​4162​648.i-​308.29 Kasarda, J. D., & Crenshaw, E. M. (1991). Third world urbanization: Dimensions, theories, and determinants. Annual Review of Sociology, 17, 470–​479. https://​doi.org/​10.1146/​annu​rev​ .so.17.080​191.002​343 King, A. D. (1990). Urbanism, colonialism, and world-​economy: Cultural and spatial foundations of the world urban system. Routledge. Linden, E. (1996). The exploding cities of the developing regions. Foreign Affairs, 5, 52–​65. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​20047​467 Mabogunje, A. L. (1968). Urbanization in Nigeria. University of London Press. Majekodunmi, A., & Adejuwon, K. D. (2012). Globalization and African political economy: The Nigerian experience. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 2, 189–​206. Mangu, A. M. B. (1998). African Renaissance compromised at the dawn of the third millennium: Western responsibility and lessons of South African constitutionalism. CODESRIA Bulletin (9th General Assembly). Dakar, Senegal. Martinez-​Vela, C. A. (2001). World systems theory. ESD 83, pp. 1–​5. https://​web.mit.edu/​ esd.83/​www/​noteb​ook/​Worl​dSys​tem.pdf McTaggart, W. D. (1988). Geographic perspectives on spontaneous shelter. In C. V. Patton (Ed.), Spontaneous shelter (pp. 25–​48). Temple University Press. Meillassoux, C. (1972). From reproduction to production. Economy and Society, 1, 93–​105. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​030851​4720​0000​005 Metternich, G. (2017, September). Land-​use planning (Global Land Outlook Working Paper). United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. https://​knowle​dge.unccd.int/​sites/​ defa​ult/​files/​2018-​06/​6.%20L​and+​Use+​Plann​ing+​_​_​G_​Mett​erni​cht.pdf Mohammadzadeh, M. (2011, July 4–​8). Neoliberal planning in practice: Urban development with/​without a plan (a post-​structural investigation of Dubai’s development). The World Planning Schools Congress, Perth, Australia. http://​www.acade​mia.edu/​705​513/​Neoliberal​ _​planning_​in_​practice_​urban_​development​_​wit​h_​wi​thou​t_​a_​plan​_​A_​p ​ost-​structural​​​ _​investigat​ion_​of_​D​ubai​_​s_​d​evel​opme​nt_​ Nabudere, D. W. (2003). Toward a new model of production: An alternative to NEPAD. 14th Biennial Congress of the African. Association of Political Science (AAPS). Durban, South Africa. O’Connor, A. (1983). The African city. Hutchinson. Okeke, D. C. (2005). Toward a global system of planning practice: The Nigerian component. In W. Fadare, A. Ajayi, D. Amole, & B. Babalola (Eds.), Proceedings of a national conference

342    Donald Chiuba Okeke and Maxwell Umunna Nwachukwu on globalisation, culture and the Nigerian built environment (pp. 85–​88). Obafemi Awolowo University. Okeke, D. C. (2020). Prospects for sustainable urban development in Africa (re)viewed from planning perspective. International Planning Studies, 26, 198–​217. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 13563​475.2020.1785​278 Okeke, D. C., Cilliers, E. J., & Schoeman, C. B. (2018). Neo-​mercantilism as development ideology: A conceptual approach to rethink the space economy in Africa. African Studies, 77, 23–​52. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00020​184.2017.1390​912 Okeke, D. C., & Ukonze, I. (2019). Conceptualizing urban space (environment) for the delivery of sustainable urban development in Africa: Evidence from Enugu city in Nigeria. Land Use Policy, 87. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.lan​duse​pol.2019.104​074 Okpala, D. (2009). Regional overview of the status of urban planning and planning practice in Anglophone (Sub-​Saharan) Africa: Global report on human settlements. UN-​HABITAT. https://​stag​ing.unhabi​tat.org/​downlo​ads/​docs/​GRHS.2009.Regio​nal.Ang ​loph​one.Afr​ ica.pdf Onibokun, A. G., & Kumuyi, A. J. (1996). Urban poverty in Nigeria: Toward sustainable strategies for its alleviation. Centre for African Settlement Studies and Development (CASSAD) and Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Onyebueke, V. U. (2011). Place and function of African cities in the Global Urban Network: Exploring matters arising. Urban Forum, 22, 1–​21. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s12​132-​010-​9097-​2 Onyenechere, E. C. (2011). The informal sector and the environment in Nigerian towns: What we know and what we still need to know. Research Journal of Environmental and Earth Sciences, 3, 61–​69. http://​max​well​sci.com/​print/​rjees/​v3-​61-​69.pdf Owens, S. (1994). Land, limits and sustainability: a conceptual framework and some dilemmas for the planning system. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 19, 4, 439–​57. URL https://​www.jstor.org/​sta​ble/​622​834 Perloff, H. S. (1979). The arts in the economic life of the city: A study. American Council for the Arts. Portes, A. (1983). The informal sector: Definition, controversy, and relation to national development. Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center, 7, 156–​171. https://​www.econ​ biz.de/​Rec​ord/​the-​infor​mal-​sec​tor-​def​i nit​ion-​cont​rove​rsy-​and-​relat​ion-​to-​natio​nal-​deve​ lopm​ent-​por​tes-​alejan​dro/​1000​2673​249 Portes, A., & Walton, J. (1981). International migration: Conditions for the mobilization and use of migrant labor under world capitalism. In A. Portes & J. Walton (Eds.), Labor, class and the international system (pp. 21–​65). Academic Press. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​B978-​0-​12-​562​ 020-​8.50007-​9 Potts, D. (2012). Whatever happened to Africa’s rapid urbanization. Africa Research Institute. https://​www.afric​apor​tal.org/​docume​nts/​7 120/​Whatever_​happened_​to​_​Afr​icas​_​rap​id_​u​ rban​isat​ion.pdf Rakodi, C. (1997). 2 Global forces, urban change, and urban management in Africa. In R. Carole (Ed.), The urban challenge in Africa: Growth and management of its large cities. United Nations University Press. https://​arch​ive.unu.edu/​unupr​ess/​unupbo​oks/​uu2​6ue/​uu26u​ e06.htm Richardson, H. W. (1981). National urban development strategies in developing countries. Urban studies, 18, 267–​283. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​004209​8812​0080​591 Robinson, D., & Smith, D. (1979). Sources of the African past: Case studies of five nineteenth-​ century African societies. Heinemann.

Sociological Processes of Urbanization    343 Roy, A. (2009). Why India cannot plan its cities: Informality, insurgence and the idiom of urbanization. Planning Theory, 8, 76–​87. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​14730​9520​8099​299 Rydin, Y. (1995). Sustainable development and the role of land use planning. Area, 27, 369–​377. South African Cities Network. (2013, April 19). The space economy: An important consideration in spatial development planning. Economic Development Republic of South Africa. https://​ www.sacit ​ies.net/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo ​ads/​2020/​03/​t he_​sp​ace_​e con​omy-​_​an_​important​ _consideration_​in_​s​pati​al_​d​evel​opme​nt_​p​lann​ing.pdf Thomas, L., & Cousins, W. (1996). The compact city: A successful, desirable and achievable urban form? In E. Burton, M. Jenks, & K. Williams (Eds.), The compact city: A sustainable urban form? (pp. 36–​48). E & FN Spoon. Todaro, M. P. (1980). Urbanization in developing nations: Trends, prospects, and policies. Journal of Geography, 79, 164–​174. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​002213​4800​8980​194 Tunnard, C. (1951). Creative urbanism. Town Planning Review, 22, 216–​234. United Nations Centre for Human Settlements. (1996). An urbanising world: Global report on human settlement. Oxford University Press. United Nations Centre for Human Settlements. (1999). City experiences in improving the urban environment. (Urban Environment Sustainable Cities Programme Working Paper No. 1). UNCHS Habitat. https://​mir​ror.unhabi​tat.org/​downlo​ads/​docs/​2887_​8​2178​_​scp​wp1.pdf UN-​HABITAT. (2008). The state of African cities 2008: A framework for addressing urban challenges in Africa. https://​unhabi​tat.org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​downl​oad-​mana​ger-​files/​ The%20St​ate%20of%20the%20Afri​can%20Cit​ies%20Rep​ort%202​008.pdf Wang, X. (2021). Relationship between population urbanization and urban sprawl across different city sizes in China. Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 12, 202–​219. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1177/​097542​5321​1040​196 Watson, V. (2009). The planned city sweeps the poor away . . .: Urban planning and 21st-​ century urbanization. Progress in Planning, 72, 153–​193. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.progr​ ess.2009.06.002 Wolpe, H. (1975). The theory of internal colonialism: The South African case. In I. Oxaal, T. Barnett, & D. Booth (Eds.), Beyond the sociology of development (pp. 229–​252). Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Chapter 19

A frica’s Nat u re A Continental Treasure, a Global Heritage, and the Real Wealth of the Present and Future Generations Noel Chellan

He is a fool who praises the fruit of a tree and forgets its roots. —​African proverb

Introduction Two key factors in the time of COVID-​19 have demonstrated the inextricable link of humans to nature. Firstly, the importance of oxygen for the survival of a human who is infected with COVID-​19; and secondly, the influence of temperature. An optimal temperature is paramount for the survival of humans and Planet Earth. The present state of the natural environment in Africa is inextricably tied to the history of exploitation of its natural resources through colonial conquests. The harsh legacies and offshoots of the colonial and capitalist models of development are many and constantly mutating. These include wildlife and rhino poaching, environmental racism, environmental and social inequality, desertification, drought, more frequent and larger natural disasters, solid-​waste pollution, poverty on a continent of plenty, and environmental migration. Since the beginning of industrial capitalism, vast amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) have been emitted into the atmosphere, especially by the developed world. Three hundred years later there seems to be a worldwide realization that climate change poses an existential threat to life as we know it. Although fossil fuels are the major cause of climate change, the scientific community can no longer ignore the socioeconomic system that drives contemporary society’s energy consumption and dependence, particularly on fossil fuels, in unsustainable ways. Climate change, poverty, mass unemployment, inequality, and environmental racism can no longer be disconnected, delinked, and dissociated from the global capitalist

346   Noel Chellan system that continues to generate such contradictions. Contemporary society needs to move to new green and renewable forms of energy. More importantly, global society needs to transition away from the capitalist system itself, if humankind is to meaningfully address the huge social, economic, and environmental challenges in a holistic, integrated, and sustainable manner. Technological changes are necessary, but socioeconomic and cultural changes are too, and much more so. The current destructive relationship with nature needs to be changed. Environmental and socioeconomic sustainability and the livelihoods and well-​being of present and future generations calls for global society to embark on new ways of living and relating to nature. This chapter therefore aims at four key objectives: 1. To highlight the inextricable links between nature, climate change, and the capitalist mode of production. 2. To reason that Africa may be poor based on capitalistic measurements of economic development, but it is rich in nature and natural resources. 3. To argue that Africa and its people can no longer depend on capitalism to deliver on its promises for sustainable lives and livelihoods and a sustainable planet. 4. To put forward four recommendations for halting and reversing environmental degradation and climate change in Africa and to move to planetary sustainability and the well-​being of humanity.

Nature, Capitalism, and Climate Change Nature, capitalism, and climate change are inextricably linked. Only when the linkages are acknowledged and agreed to can analysis, understanding, and solutions for insurmountable environmental and social challenges be meaningfully designed and implemented. Nature is a mystery. But nature is what humans rely on to make their lives and livelihoods. In fact, humans are nature. As Yoshifumi Miyazaki of the Center for Environment, Health and Field Sciences at Chiba University, has said: “Because humans evolved in nature, it’s where we feel most comfortable, even if we don’t always know it” (as cited in Williams, 2017, p. 28). However, there is a dominant, disturbing, and persistent narrative under capitalism regarding humans and nature—​namely, “the idea that humankind is apart from nature seems to be one that is deeply rooted in Western civilization” (Colchester, 2003, p. 1). This dominant Western ideology may explain modern humans’ indifferent and often destructive relationship to the natural world. It is why on his watch Jair Bolsonaro, the president of Brazil, can easily enable the destruction of the Amazon rainforest, the largest green lungs of the world.

Africa’s Nature   347 COVID-​ 19 demonstrated how fragile humans are in the face of nature. Notwithstanding all human experience, scientific knowledge, technological development, wealth, and Western civilization, millions of people died from the virus. It seems that nature giveth but nature also taketh away. It has become evident that under capitalism, nature takes away society’s most vulnerable and destitute with that much more ease. The pandemic revealed this truth in many parts of the world. The rich and well-​ resourced were more protected than the poor and underresourced. This was harshly and glaringly visible in the life and death matters related to the vaccine, hence the terms vaccine apartheid and vaccine nationalism that have emerged in the time of COVID-​19. Vaccine development is, in essence, science and scientists’ building on the knowledge of how nature allows the body to develop immunity from different viruses. In other words, the developed world took the knowledge from nature that belongs to all of humankind to serve its own narrow self-​interest. One should not be surprised by this, given the centuries-​long history of the treatment of the developing world by the developed world. The poor suffer much more than the well-​off in capitalist societies during natural disasters. Through the development of science, climate change has been identified as the enabler of more frequent natural disasters and on larger scales. The poor, who are heavily concentrated in the developing world, are extremely vulnerable to the devastation caused by floods, droughts, hurricanes, fires, and pandemics. In mainstream society there is little understanding of the workings of nature and its importance in the lives and livelihoods of humans. Capitalist ideologies seem to have deliberately ignored the relationship between lives and livelihoods and the natural environment. Apart from the abundance of natural resources—​gold, diamonds, platinum, coal, timber, rubber, cobalt, and so on—​in the developing world, all other aspects of nature seem almost invisible. Nature is conveniently left out of economists’ accounting of the world economy. This has the effect of justifying the rampant exploitation of nature, of which there is plenty of evidence in all parts of the world. More importantly, the goodness and use-​value of nature are not factored into measures of the quality of life, happiness, and well-​being of humans in a capitalist society. The following view reflects the destructive logic of capitalism regarding nature: If a country cuts and sells all its trees, it gets a boost in GDP. But nothing happens if it nurtures and grows its forests. If a country preserves open spaces like parks and nature reserves for the benefit of everybody, it does not see this increase in human and ecological well-​being reflected in its economic performance. But if it privatises them, commercialising the resources therein and charging fees to users, then growth happens. (Fioramonti, 2017, p. 8)

Human societies have undergone different historical modes of engaging with the natural environment to produce and reproduce lives and livelihoods, from hunting and gathering to slavery to feudal modes of production. Modern society engages with nature through the capitalist mode of production, which is about 500 years old and has

348   Noel Chellan its genesis in Western Europe, specifically in England. Capitalism is a historical socioeconomic system, and it is not natural as it is made out to be by economists who believe this to be the case and would like the rest of humankind to believe it too. There is no argument that the capitalist mode of production has proven to be the most productive, innovative, and efficient at producing wealth when compared to previous modes of producing. Even Karl Marx (1848), the scholar who wanted to see capitalism end as quickly as possible, praised the capitalist mode of production in the Communist Manifesto: “It [capitalism] has been the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals” (p. 16). Notwithstanding these “wonders,” the capitalist mode of production has been and continues to be the most destructive socioeconomic system ever devised by humans. The evidence is there to see in the devastating impacts on the natural environment and on the poor, destitute, and vulnerable in society. Everywhere, from the local to the global, the natural environment is under huge stress. In South African communities, for example, it is rare to walk, cycle, or drive anywhere without seeing large quantities of waste that have been discarded on the natural landscape. In and around the city of Johannesburg are hills, what are called “gold mine dumps,” created by the waste from the gold mining activity since the 1800s, when gold was first discovered in this land. Gold was money for a long time in the lives of humans, and South Africa had plenty of it. The colonial powers were greedy; they wanted all the gold that nature had been guarding for millions of years. Children play in those dangerous mine dumps, which are believed to contain traces of radioactive waste material. Communities that are close to the mine dumps, together with their livestock, homes, and fruit and vegetable gardens, are known to be adversely impacted. Colonialism might seem a historical period, long past, but Africans live with its material, economic, and negative environmental legacies every day of their lives. Communities of color in general and of class in particular still live next to polluting power stations, dirty industrial zones, fossil-​fuel refineries, and landfill dumps. These are social stratifications that are most subjected to the endless pollution, waste, and filth a capitalist society generates. The term that has come to denote this sorry state of affairs is “environmental racism.” According to Chavis (1994, as cited in Holyfield, 2001) environmental racism is: racial discrimination in environmental policy-​ making and enforcement of regulations and laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of color for toxic waste facilities, the official sanctioning of the presence of life-​threatening poisons and pollutants for communities of color, and the history of excluding people of color from leadership of the environmental movement. (p. 83)

People in developing countries scavenge from waste dumps and landfill sites to survive from day to day. This is the life of the poor and destitute under Africa’s much-​celebrated capitalist system. Gaborone, Botswana, is one example of the urban poor surviving by

Africa’s Nature   349 scavenging from landfills (Rankokwane & Gwebu, 2006). Under capitalism, one is a daily witness to: A broken planet. Climate change. Ecological mayhem, natural disasters, biodiversity loss. A small minority consumes more than 75% of all planetary resources. Every minute, 41 hectares of trees are felled, the equivalent of 50 football fields. Most land has been replaced by concrete, with more people living in urbanised areas than in rural localities. Water is running out. Food is trashed rather than made available to hungry mouths. In some countries, the air is so dirty that people have to wear masks when outdoors. (Fioramonti, 2017, p. 2)

There has been a stark realization in recent years that human survival depends on a planet that does not warm more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. But capitalist society’s current use of fossil fuels continues warming the planet at a fast pace. Unless global society tackles the root cause of the crisis, it is committing what Richard Smith (2011) refers to as “ecological suicide.” The starting point to understanding the inextricable link between capitalism, severe environmental degradation, and climate change is to search for theoretical gems from scholars who have attempted to understand and analyze the world. For example, in Das Capital, Karl Marx (1867/​2011) states: If we take away the useful labour expended upon them, a material substratum is always left, which is furnished by Nature without the help of man. The latter can work only as Nature does, that is by changing the form of matter. Nay more, in this work of changing the form he is constantly helped by natural forces. We see, then, that labour is not the only source of material wealth, of use values produced by labour. As William Petty puts it, labour is its father and the earth its mother. (p. 30)

In this succinct and powerful analysis, Marx provides a brilliant insight into the role nature plays in the creation of wealth. One can therefore make the argument that the more the material wealth created in a capitalist society, the greater the degradation and diminishment of the natural environment. Nature’s rate of production cannot keep up with the rate of production of a capitalist society. In other words, endless economic growth must invariably lead to continued environmental degradation. When we look at the natural environment in all corners of the globe, it is not difficult to see the evidence of the contradictions of development so prevalent in the capitalist world: “the evidence of such destruction is there for everyone to see” (Olivier, 2005, p. 121). It is now common knowledge that the countries that became the wealthiest have contributed the most to environmental degradation and climate change. Prime Minister Boris Johnson, the current leader of the country that exported capitalism and colonialism to so many parts of the world, thinks so as well: It’s the developing world that are bearing the brunt of catastrophic climate change in the form of hurricanes and fires and floods, and the real long-​term economic damage

350   Noel Chellan that they face, and yet it’s the developed world that for over 200 years has put the carbon in the atmosphere (as cited in Stewart & Harvey, 2021, p. 37)

Africa’s Place in the World and the World’s Place in Africa Humans have roamed Planet Earth for hundreds of thousands of years. As hunter-​ gatherers they took from nature only what they needed for themselves, their families, and their clans. But capitalists are not satisfied with “enough”; they always want more, and therefore they take more from nature. This is the logic of profit accumulation, capitalism, and endless economic growth. This is the logic that was exported to so many parts of the world during colonial times. Being rich in natural resources, Africa was a paradise for the Western world. Since the beginning of capitalism in Europe, Africa has been forcibly entrapped in the capitalist mode of production, first through colonial conquest and exploitation, and subsequently through the profit-​based free market system. The continent now finds itself in the iron grip of capitalism. But it has taken millennia for capitalism to develop. According to Walter (1982): Taking a long-​term view, it can be said that there has been constant economic development within human society since the origins of man, because man has multiplied enormously his capacity to win a living from nature. Africa, being the original home of man, was obviously a major participant in the processes in which human groups displayed an ever-​increasing capacity to extract a living from the natural environment. (p. 4)

There was a time when humans worshipped nature. It is possible to argue that this was a form of superstition, but it could also be argued that it was an expression of humans’ gratitude to the natural world for the wonders nature provides. The capitalist society now worships money because money provides humans with a good life, at least for those who possess it in adequate amounts. For a vast majority of people living under capitalism, debt and dependency on the state are their only means of survival. The colonial project ripped away their means of production, their land, and nature. Marx referred to this early stage of capitalist development as “primitive accumulation,” the theft of land and nature using forceful and violent means. History lives with us every day. Whole countries are over their heads in debt because of capitalism. Now the entire world is preoccupied with converting the natural world into wealth and money. In Western thought and civilization, this is progress.

Africa’s Nature   351 Africans are now determined to transform their natural treasures in the way of the West. The developing world is expected to take advice from and be guided in development in general, and economic development in particular, by Western countries, their former colonial masters. Hence, the Washington Consensus has an almost religious connotation in countries that are said to be undeveloped, underdeveloped, or developing. If the developing world does not fall in line, then it will face the might of its former colonial masters in the form of harsh economic sanctions and withheld direct foreign investment. Institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization thus ensure the ongoing legacy of colonialism with policies that continue to favor the former colonial countries and the ruling elite in the developing countries. Structural adjustment programs favoring capitalism are prior conditions and requirements for any developing countries that want to secure major loans. Times do seem to be changing in the 21st century. Democratization and the greater transparency of information on global phenomena have highlighted the increasing socioeconomic and political challenges in the Western world. This is leading many parts of the world to be skeptical about the Western nations as leaders and exemplars of development, to be followed by all and sundry. Obviously, there are many things Africa can learn from the West, but development according to the capitalist logic of endless accumulation is not one of them. It is the West that has kept much of the world underdeveloped and burdened by climate change. Yet people in the South now emulate the West, even in the destructive policies and relationship to the natural environment. Before colonialism and capitalism, Africa did not have tarred roads, concrete bridges, cars, and factories. It also did not have poisonous gasses being spewed into the air by fossil-​fuel-​powered vehicles and polluting factories. It does now. So, Mpumalanga in South Africa is now the most polluted place in the country, if not the continent. Africa and Africans have worked hard to create wealth mostly for other countries and other races. It is not for nothing that slavery, colonialism, and apartheid are part of Africa’s anthropological, sociological, and historical record. Capitalist development in Europe was highly dependent on the natural resources of nature-​rich continents like Africa. Scholars have painstakingly analyzed and described the role of Africa’s natural environment in the making of the developed world. Hobsbawm (1987, as cited in Wily, 2013) states: Initially, the “Scramble for Africa” was economic: to capture the rubber, copper, timber and other materials needed to feed weak industry in Europe, to meet the demands of rising mass consumption for goods like cocoa, coffee, sugar and tea, and to find new markets to which to sell the millions of manufactures lying unsold in the Great European Depression of the 1870s and 1880s. (p. 73)

There can be no argument that Africa and its people need development. It therefore helps to view Africa’s vast expanses of natural environments, not merely as resources to be exploited by a profit-​based economic system but to be embraced as essential to

352   Noel Chellan the survival of humanity, the creation of sustainable livelihoods, and the well-​being of Planet Earth. There is no Planet B for Homo sapiens. With the 2008 financial crisis, rising inequality, climate change, and now COVID-​19, a global collective mindset is emerging that things must be done differently. Many people therefore speak of a “new normal.” The current human development paradigm focuses entirely on a form of economic development that is profit-​based and predicated on endless wealth accumulation. Meeting the needs of all people is not the main objective of the capitalist economy. Ensuring that the natural environment is engaged with sustainably is not the prerogative of capitalist logic. On the contrary, the people and the planet are subservient to the capitalist economy. In an article on modern slavery and global capitalism, Kate Manzo (2005) describes the proliferation of child slavery in West Africa, which is rich in cotton and cocoa: “West African agriculture is indeed embedded within an essentially capitalist world economy—​be it thanks to colonialism, modernisation, structural adjustment or something else” (p. 532). The same might be said of South Africa, which, paradoxically, is a shining example of the most dreadful form of capitalist development. Depressingly, the cover of Time Magazine, on May 13, 2019, proclaimed South Africa to be “the world’s most unequal country.” It is the wealthiest country on the African continent, but most of its people are still poor and black. South Africa also has the dubious honor of being the biggest emitter of CO2, and the biggest contributor to climate change on the African continent. The South Africa of the African National Congress certainly cannot be a model for Africa and other developing countries of how to develop a country and its people. The defenders of capitalist development often use an aphorism to justify the undesirable consequences of capitalism: “You have to break eggs to make an omelet.” The development of a country and its people does not have to yield “broken” consequences: the haves versus the have nots; underdevelopment next to development; extreme poverty sitting uncomfortably next to untold wealth, informal settlements adjoining world class cities, environmental destruction alongside economic growth; freeways in urban spaces versus rough-​terrain roads in rural communities, and rich geological energy reserves existing side-​by-​side with climate change, energy poverty, and pollution. These are the lived contradictions generated by the capitalist system in South Africa and in many parts of the developing world. According to Fioramonti (2017): Taking the cue from colonialism, apartheid built a powerful system of extractive industries, exploiting both workers and nature to achieve economic growth. Neither the human suffering nor the environmental destruction that accompanied this policy was ever a concern of lawmakers and global investors. (p. 5)

Africa’s development is crucial, but the records show capitalist development to be a double-​edged sword. Still, for all its failings, capitalism cannot take all the blame for everything that is wrong with Africa’s stunted and skewed development. Greedy, self-​ serving, and corrupt African leaders are famous for enriching themselves and their families and leaving their people to live in poverty and desperation. Conflict and

Africa’s Nature   353 continued civil wars that stem from greed for political power and wealth are endemic on the African continent. The casualties are the millions of citizens and the natural environment. It is why many Africans try to escape from the ethnic conflict, civil wars, environmental degradation, and abject poverty, often at significant risk to their lives and the lives of their children. Even though Africa is a minor contributor to climate change, it is nevertheless at the coalface of the negative impacts of global warming and climate change. On the world stage Africa contributes “only 3.6% of the total global emissions,” yet it is “disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change than any other continent” (Otekunrin et al., 2019, p. 1). In West Africa, the worsening effects of climate change may cause farmers and herders to clash over natural resources such as land and water (Cabot, 2017, p. xxxiii). Africa’s rich natural resources are not being used to meet sustainable development goals (SDGs) for its people. It is the poor and vulnerable who are and will be most affected by climate change and its adverse impacts. Africa is particularly threatened because of its “poor socioeconomic conditions, dependence on natural resources, and low capacity to take efficient adaptation actions” (Kapuka et al., 2022, p. 2).

Recommendations The global climate crisis compels 21st-​century societies to discover new ways to relate to nature if we are to achieve planetary sustainability, sustainable livelihoods, and human well-​being. In this regard, four recommendations follow.

Valuing Nature Firstly, societies in the 21st century should recognize and appreciate the use-​value of nature. There is too much emphasis on the exchange-​value of nature in the capitalist epoch. Humankind is ill-​advised to continue thinking that the economy is disconnected from the natural environment and ignoring the fact that economic fruit derives from the roots of the natural world. To borrow from the African proverb—​“He is a fool who praises the fruit of a tree and forgets its roots.” Expensive eco estates (residential development in conjunction with nature conservation) are evidence of the value and preciousness of nature in the lives and livelihoods of Homo sapiens. Expensive overnight stays in nature reserves and game parks are also a reminder of the value and preciousness of nature in the lives of humans. In some countries in Africa, the price of a permit to spend one hour with a mountain gorilla is approximately USD 1,500 per person (Trogisch & Fletcher, 2020). Nature is expensive, and Africa has plenty of it. Central to human needs and aspirations is the desire to be fulfilled, content, and happy. But capitalist logic programs people to believe that this is only possible through unrestrained material accumulation. Under such logic, people believe they can work,

354   Noel Chellan shop, and accumulate happiness. We need a new mode of production in humankind’s engagement with the natural world—​one that is democratically planned and agreed to, and not left to the vagaries and anarchy of the profit-​only free market. To revisit the value of nature is to recall our childhood days and interactions with nature: the rivers and streams we may have played and swum in, the tadpoles we may have held in the palms of our hands and let slip through our fingers, the wind against our backs as we ran through open fields, the puddles we may have played in on cool rainy days, all the trees climbed and branches swung from, and the first fish we ever caught. Being in nature contributes significantly to humankind’s well-​being. Its value often cannot be measured in monetary terms, but it certainly can be measured by the calmness, serenity, wholeness, and awe one feels in the presence of the wonders of nature. It is high time for 21st century society to replace the dominance of the exchange-​value of nature with that of its use-​value.

Toward Democratic Governance of the Natural Environment Secondly, the sustainable use and conservation of nature is more likely to become a reality if society agrees to the democratic management and governance of nature. Under the current models of capitalist management and governance, the exploitation and destruction of nature is encouraged and enabled. As an intelligent species, humans have developed powerful and effective social and cultural tools with which to mediate the affairs of society in a highly complex and ever-​ changing world—​namely, democracy and active citizenry. But the contemporary capitalist world seems “to be evolving into an economy and democracy of the 1 percent, for the 1 percent and by the 1 percent” (Stiglitz, 2020, p. xiii). This dismal, skewed state of affairs needs to change, and the active citizenry has the power to do it. The essence of democracy is a belief that each human being has the intelligence and capacity, no matter his or her race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, education level, or wealth, to contribute to societal decisions that would lead to the betterment of society as a whole. In the capitalist world, the exercise of democracy is mostly confined to periodic voting, and not to the more important spheres of lives and livelihoods. Democratic and citizen’s governance of communities and the natural environment is the surest way to ensure that nature is used wisely and sustainably. Indigenous communities have been using the natural environment in this way for millennia. One can learn from Indigenous knowledge systems on how to protect the natural environment. Accountability can no longer only be in terms of money and investor shares; it can and must also be for the present and future generations to make sure that they live in and inherit a habitable planet. For a long time, fossil-​fuel industries kept information about their business practices and the negative environmental impacts secret. For a long time, powerful and wealthy

Africa’s Nature   355 corporations denied that climate change was a real phenomenon. In a world fast becoming more transparent, especially with the global development of social media, companies with negative business practices have very few places to hide. With such seismic societal shifts, citizens must grasp the opportunity to deepen, strengthen, and consolidate democratic processes where they live, work, and take their rest and leisure. If businesses negatively impact the broader society, then society should have a say in their affairs and practices. For example, the tobacco industry claimed for a long time that their products were merely satisfying the needs and demands of their hundreds of millions of customers, suppressing and ignoring information about the health risks of smoking. This profit-​based narrative changed when health science proved beyond doubt the harmful effects of the smoking addiction on the unsuspecting public. In South Africa, active citizens are demanding that oil companies like Shell stop destroying precious ecosystems. In Namibia, resistance to uranium mining is evident at the local level. Uranium is key for the development of nuclear energy (Conde & Kallis, 2012). Kansanga et al. (2020) highlighted Ghana’s resistance to the creation of landfill sites in their communities. This citizen resistance to the natural environmental exploitation in Africa needs to grow and assume a formal and institutionally democratic shape. Democracy and active citizenry are proving to be effective social tools in nudging the world away from its current destructive development trajectory. At the local level, countries are separated into wards to enable political representation by a localized government. When viewing life and livelihoods processes in modern society through this sociopolitical infrastructural lens, it is clear that it is at the ward level that land and nature exist—​where water and food resources are present; where different forms of pollution are generated; where services such as water, sanitation, and refuse removal are either provided or not; where people reside, make a living, and interact with different spheres of society and the natural ecosystem. It therefore makes sense for citizens living in the wards to ensure democratic and participatory engagement with socioeconomic and environmental phenomena occurring in their wards. This will extend the principles and processes of democracy beyond only the political realm and into the daily lives and lived experiences of people in their communities. A local community at the ward level can demonstrate accountability to itself, to the nation, and to the world. Collective responsibility can be measured against individual rights, without making one superior to the other. A single ward councilor is a necessary condition for democratic representation, but an insufficient condition for meaningful active citizenry and participatory democratic practices at the local level. Ward-​level democratic bodies, organizations, and processes should oversee the challenges and opportunities within the ward in the same way that a democratic government oversees the challenges and opportunities within a country. In the same way that families know how best to take care of their homes and gardens, those living in wards will know how best to take care of the natural, physical, institutional, and human resources found there. It is they who can contribute to the democratic planning and securing of the lives and livelihoods of present and future generations. Citizens at the ward level can ensure that their rivers are clean, their air is fresh, and that the land is free of solid-​waste pollution.

356   Noel Chellan Democratic governance at the ward level is more likely to ensure that developers do not destroy wetlands and replace them with polluting factories, that any development includes ample green space and recreation spaces for children and adults, and that parks and gardens are not used for nefarious or criminal activities. Participatory democracy is more likely to ensure development that is not based on the view that nature should be eradicated but is vital to the well-​being of communities. It is the active citizens residing in wards who should democratically decide whether a coal mine should be closed or remain open, or whether an oil company should be given access to the oil that may lie beneath their soil and waters. Democratic processes based on human relationships with the natural environment are already taking place and gaining momentum in many parts of the world. For example, in South Africa: Public hearings are on the cards for the Presidential Climate Commission, which is tasked with developing a policy framework to ensure the country’s move to a low carbon economy is just and equitable. The commission is also planning a consultative conference in March for people in rural areas affected by climate change. (Phillips, 2021, p. 23)

Democratic governance is also evident in other parts of Africa. Based on their study of 100 villages in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia, Gebremedhin et al. (2000) reported: Collective action in managing woodlots generally functions well in Tigray, which supports the role of community resource management in redressing resource degradation. Despite the fact that the communities received little benefits from woodlots by 1998, the woodlots contribute substantially to community wealth, and community members are generally satisfied with the woodlots as a reserve of natural capital. (p. 24)

Money and green technologies are necessary for the global transition to a green economy. However, if these technologies are concentrated in the hands of a powerful few, then the vision for a sustainable world will continue to elude humankind and the result will be a burning planet. There is no better time than during this period of global crisis to commence with democratic and citizen “ownership” of the governance of the planet’s resources and the world economy. As Smith (2011) writes: We can’t shop our way to sustainability because the problems we face cannot be solved by individual choices in the marketplace. They require collective democratic control over the economy to prioritise the needs of society and the environment. And they require national and international economic planning to re-​organise the economy and redeploy labour and resources to these ends. (p. 112)

If nature’s treasures are left to wealthy businesses and politicians, then development without regard for the natural environment or communities’ views will continue

Africa’s Nature   357 unabated. Under such undemocratic conditions, environmental destruction will not be reversed or even halted. Active citizens and participatory democracy are key to ensuring a just and fair society, as well as a green and nondegraded planet.

Toward a Scientific Inventory of Nature at the Country and Ward Levels The third recommendation is to conduct periodic inventories and audits of the natural environment in all communities, both urban and rural. To achieve environmental sustainability is to know what natural treasures countries and communities possess. Contemporary society is vastly scientific, with the ability to quantify, measure, and take stock of things, including socioeconomic and environmental phenomena. Weather can be measured and predicted well in advance, climate scientists can measure whether the planet is warming 1 degree Celsius or 1.5 degrees Celsius, and the medical professionals can ascertain whether a person is sick by measuring body temperature. A census count can be done every 10 years to track a country’s population size. Humankind’s scientific prowess must be extended to the natural world as well. There is evidence that this is happening. Scientists study plants, animals, and creatures to see which have become extinct or are on the verge of extinction. And, according to Stork (2010), “there is considerable evidence for widespread loss of species at the local and regional level” (p. 12). Counting animal and plant species for conservation purposes has already commenced. Van Gemert et al. (2015) maintain that “accurate monitoring of the distribution and abundance of animal species over time is a key ingredient to successful nature conservation” (p. 255). Citizens need to know what natural treasures their countries and communities possess. As concerned citizens they should conduct regular inventories and audits of the natural resources in their countries and wards, and look at the ownership patterns of these natural treasures. Such information is usually kept by the capitalist state; private companies; specialized groups, such as geologists; and local government departments. Transparency is a fundamental pillar of a mature democracy. Information about the activities of private companies and of governments must be made transparent for all citizens and all communities. It is important to know which companies and countries are digging up the natural treasures and contributing to an unsustainable planet for present and future generations. Yet it is typically only after an environmental catastrophe such as an oil spill that ordinary citizens learn what natural resources their countries possess, how they are being used and, most of the time, abused and exploited. For centuries, Africa’s resources have benefited other countries and the elite, but not its own people. For example, after 2,722 kilograms of diamonds were taken out of the ground at Kimberly in the Northern Cape in South Africa (Thein & Wallin, 2004), the colonialists left behind what is called the Big Hole, a tourist destination.

358   Noel Chellan Conserving the natural environment means knowing what natural riches local communities possess. In addition to the 10-​year censuses, countries must also conduct periodic surveys of their natural resources: land, water, gold, diamonds, oil, gas, indigenous trees, creatures, and animals and the rate at which these resources are being used. Under the capitalist model of democracy, it is big private corporations that hold sway over the land and nature in many parts of the world. These are not democratic institutions but profit-​seeking businesses that have free rein in other countries and over other people’s land and nature. Citizens need to know what quantities of profits are made from the natural resources of their communities.

Toward a Postcapitalist Development Paradigm The fourth recommendation for planetary sustainability and the well-​being of all is for 21st century society to transition away from capitalism to a postcapitalist society. The fact that world leaders met for the 26th UN climate meeting, the Conference of the Parties, in Glasgow in 2021, to tackle climate change should be a worrying sign that the current stock of world leaders are unwilling and incapable of solving the climate crisis. They may have produced pages of resolutions, but they certainly have not yielded clear, meaningful, and long-​lasting solutions. Twenty-​six years of global climate conferences and world leaders are still dithering. The Swedish teen environmentalist Greta Thunberg summed up the lack of urgency and action: Build back better. Blah, blah, blah. Green economy. Blah, blah, blah. Net zero by 2050. Blah, blah, blah. This is all we hear from our so-​called leaders. Our hopes and ambitions drown in their empty promises. (as cited in Ancer, 2021, p. 15)

In the meantime, Planet Earth heats up unchecked. People can no longer put their hope and trust in self-​serving politicians and profit-​seeking corporations to clean up the mess generated by capitalism. The ordinary people in all parts of the world must instead demand a way out of the impending doom. The world is looking for new ways to live. The old ways have proven to be stressful, wasteful, sickening, alienating, confrontational, conflictual, desperate, and boring. It seems that under capitalism, “human beings have lost a sense of purpose” (Fioramonti, 2017, p. 2). The world must transition away from fossil fuels to green and renewable energy. Sovereign states must pass laws to protect the natural environment. People should reduce, reuse, and recycle. Global society must replace fossil-​fuel cars with electric cars. Efficient and effective mass public transport should take preference over private mobility. Polluters must be made to pay. A carbon tax is a necessary social and financial tool for tackling climate change. More trees must be planted, especially in urban areas. At the individual level, people should be aware of their carbon footprints. Schools, religious institutions, and women’s and youth organizations should be

Africa’s Nature   359 involved in environmental education. Taking part in community, beach, and river clean-​ups should be a civic duty. Our current social tools for addressing the environmental crisis are necessary and needed, but they have proved to be insufficient to halt the environmental catastrophe confronting humankind and Planet Earth. Ten years before the disappointing outcome of the 26th Conference of the Parties, the verdict was already in about the failure of existing social and technological tools to meaningfully address the climate catastrophe. As Smith (2011) notes: “But two decades on, for all the organic groceries, the energy efficient lightbulbs, appliances and buildings, the carbon trading and carbon taxes, still, the global ecology is collapsing faster than ever” (p. 115). Fast-​emerging scientific facts are beginning to prove beyond doubt that people cannot have both infinite economic growth and the sustainable conservation of the natural environment. Therefore, any talk of a green economy within a capitalist ideological framework is incongruous with capitalism’s goal of endless profit and wealth accumulation. Green and clean technology within a capitalist framework will merely shift problems elsewhere. When biofuels were mooted as a replacement and cure for fossil fuels and climate change, food prices went up. Food riots subsequently broke out all around the world. Environmental and societal problems are not resolved under capitalism but are moved elsewhere. If people in the developed world are relatively well-​off, it is because workers in developing economies work in almost slave-​like conditions. The products they produce are then shipped to the developed world and sold at cheap prices. Replacing fossil-​fuel-​powered cars with electric cars will simply mean that more of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will be dug up because of its huge reserves of cobalt, which is the main ingredient required to manufacture electric batteries. When the natural environment is destroyed for economic growth, then the people living in and around the places where such natural resources are found become the victims of the destructive logic of capitalism. For example: In the Katanga region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), increasing numbers of babies are being born with horrific birth defects. Some of this, scientists say, is due to a huge surge in the global demand for cobalt, a metallic element that is playing a key role in the battle to reduce carbon emissions and slow climate change (Flummerfelt & Lloyd-​Davies, 2021).

Africa and its people need development. Women and girls in rural communities should not have to walk long distances to fetch water from rivers and watering holes. A much more efficient and humane watering system can be developed for rural communities in Africa. This is a much better form of development than digging up the coal in rural communities and putting in polluting coal-​fired power stations. The development of decent habitable housing with ample green space for the millions of people living in makeshift shacks in Africa should be the priority of all development actors. Developing thriving and abundant community gardens is a much better form of development than placing miles of tarred roads over fragile natural landscapes.

360   Noel Chellan Developing small-​and family-​sized businesses is a more democratic and inclusive form of economic development than building huge malls with the same chain of minority businesses across the length and breadth of the African continent. Developing efficient, effective, and people-​centered public transport systems for Africa, like those found in Europe, is a more sustainable and green approach to moving people and goods than the millions of cars in Africa spewing poisonous gasses into the atmosphere. Developing a proper bicycle infrastructure will contribute to healthier citizens and a greener planet. Developing community buildings and spaces where communities can come together to discuss and debate how best to take care of nature and their communities, as well as deal with crime, pollution, and wayward politicians, is more meaningful than developing infrastructure that breaks up communities. The latter is what capitalism does. Africa needs development in the form of vaccine manufacturing plants, public healthcare centers, health and fitness centers, crèches, good schools, medical colleges, and universities. Africa needs the development of community markets for locally produced goods and commodities. Africans should not be resigned to operating businesses in townships only, the so-​called township economy. The poor should not be deprived of natural and green spaces when housing developments mushroom. Eco estates are not just for the rich and well-​off. One does not have to pay a lot of money to spend a night in a nature reserve or a game park and experience the wonder, joy, beauty, and serenity of nature. Nature can and should be a factor in community policy, planning, and development. The world requires a postcapitalist development paradigm that sees nature as essential to the well-​being of people and communities. Development can no longer be left to just investors and self-​seeking politicians. It is time to stop converting nature into money for money’s sake. It is time to agree to a postcapitalist development paradigm whereby nature is viewed as use-​value and not merely as exchange-​value or profit. It is time to have a mainstream global discussion and debate about capitalism, and why it is necessary to exit this 500-​year-​old historical system that has thus far generated a divided world and a carbon-​filled planet and continues to do so. Humans are an intelligent species. They have done away with slavery, feudalism, Nazism, colonialism, and apartheid and done well to conceptualize and develop the United Nations. Humans possess the resolve, the resilience, the intelligence, and the experience to do away with capitalism and climate change, before these both do away with the natural environment and human beings. After all, “when the last tree is cut, the last river poisoned, and the last fish dead, we will discover that we can’t eat money” (Cree Indian proverb).

Conclusion This chapter set out with four objectives in mind. The first objective was to highlight the inextricable links between nature, climate change, and the capitalist mode of production.

Africa’s Nature   361 It is important that socioeconomic and environmental phenomena be viewed through an integrated and holistic lens, and not in silos if 21st century society is to make any meaningful headway with regard to the huge challenges it faces. The second objective contended that nature should not be left out of any economic accounting with regard to nature’s role in wealth creation. Africa’s vast abundance of natural treasures must be acknowledged and recognized as the real wealth of present and future generations. The third objective was to argue that the 500-​year-​old system of capitalism is predicated on an ideology of the supreme importance of profit, regardless of the cost to planetary sustainability and the well-​being of Africa’s people. As far as this dominant ideology prevails, the goals for a sustainable planet and sustainable lives and livelihoods in Africa will not be realized. To meets its fourth objective, the chapter proposed recommendations for halting and reversing environmental degradation and climate change in Africa.

Acronym DRC

Democratic Republic of Congo

References Ancer, J. (2021, December 19). They said it. Yes, they really did. Sunday Times. https://​times​​ -e-​editi​ons.pres​srea​der.com/​sun​day-​times-​1107 Cabot, C. (2017). Climate change, security risks and conflict reduction in Africa: A case study of farmer-​herder conflicts over natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Burkina Faso 1960–​ 2000. Springer. Colchester, M. (2003). Saving nature: Indigenous peoples, protected areas and biodiversity conservation. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Conde, M., & Kallis, G. (2012). The global uranium rush and its Africa frontier: Effects, reactions and social movements in Namibia. Global Environmental Change, 22, 596–​610. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.gloenv​cha.2012.03.007 Fioramonti, L. (2017). Wellbeing economy: Success in a world without growth. Pan Macmillan. Flummerfelt, R., & Lloyd-​Davies, F. (2021). The cost of cobalt: People and power. Al Jazeera News Network. https://​pul​itze​rcen​ter.org/​stor​ies/​cost-​cob​alt Gebremedhin, B., Pender, J., & Tesfaye, G. (2000). Community natural resource management: The case of woodlands in Northern Ethiopia (EPTD discussion paper no. 60). International Food Policy Research Institute. Holyfield, R. (2001). Defining environmental justice and environmental racism. Urban Geography, 22, 78–​90. Kapuka, A., Hlásny, T., & Helmschrot, J. (2022). Climate change research in southern Africa in recent two decades: Progress, needs, and policy implications. Regional Environmental Change, 22, 1–​16. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​113-​022-​01886-​3 Manzo, K. (2005). Modern slavery, global capitalism and deproletarianisation in West Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 32, 521–​534. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​030562​4050​ 0467​013

362   Noel Chellan Kansanga, M. M., Ahmed, A., Kuusaana, E. D., Oteng-​Ababio, M., & Luginaah, I. (2020). Of waste facility siting and relational geographies of place: Peri-​urban landfills, community resistance and the politics of land control in Ghana. Land Use Policy, 96, 1–​10. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1016/​j.lan​duse​pol.2020.104​674 Marx, K. (1848). The communist manifesto. Progress Publishers. Marx, K. (2011). Das Capital: A critique of political economy. Vol. 1 (F. F. Engels, Ed., S. S. Moore and E. E. Aveling, Trans.). Dover (Original work published in 1867). Olivier, B. (2005). Nature, capitalism, and the future of humankind. South African Journal of Philosophy, 24, 121–​135. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​saj​pem.v24i2.31420 Otekunrin, O. A., Momoh, S., Ayinde, I. A., & Otekunrin, O. A. (2019). How far has Africa gone in achieving sustainable development goals? Exploring African dataset. Data in Brief, 27, 1–​7. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​saj​pem.v24i2.31420 Phillips, T. (2021, December 21). Reforestation boosts planet’s green lungs. Mail & Guardian. https://​mg.co.za/​envi​ronm​ent/​2021-​12-​20-​refore​stat​ion-​boo​sts-​plan​ets-​green-​lungs/​ Rankokwane, B., & Gwebu, T. D. (2006). Characteristics, threats and opportunities of landfill scavenging: The case of Gaborone-​Botswana. Geo Journal, 65, 151–​163. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1007/​s10​708-​005-​3122-​3 Smith, R. (2011). Green capitalism: The God that failed. Real-​World Economics Review, 56, 112–​ 144. http://​www.pae​con.net/​PAERev​iew/​issu​e56/​Smit​h56.pdf Stewart, H., & Harvey, F. (2021, September 20). Climate crisis: History will judge failure to act, Johnson says at UN. The Guardian. https://​www.theg​uard​ian.com/​envi​ronm​ent/​2021/​sep/​ 20/​clim​ate-​cri​sis-​hist​ory-​will-​judge-​fail​ure-​to-​act-​john​son-​says-​at-​un Stiglitz, J. E. (2020). People, power and profits: Progressive capitalism for an age of discontent. Penguin Books. Stork. N. E. (2010). Re-​assessing current extinction rates. Biodiversity Conservvation, 19, 357–​ 371. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​531-​009-​9761-​9 Thein, J., & Wallin, A. (2004). A master thesis in spatial planning. Department of Spatial Planning, Blekinge Institute of Technology. Trogisch, L. & Fletcher, R. (2020) Fortress tourism: Exploring dynamics of tourism, security and peace around the Virunga transboundary conservation area. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 30, 352–​371. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09669​582.2020.1857​767 van Gemert, J. C., Verschoor, C. R., Mettes, P., Epema, K., Koh, L. P., & Wich, S. (2015). Nature conservation drones for automatic localization and counting of animals. computer vision. In L. Agapito, M. Bronstein, & C. Rother (Eds.), Computer Vision: ECCV 2014 Workshops (pp. 255–​270). Springer. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​16178-​5_​17. Walter, R. (1982). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Howard University Press. Williams, F. (2017). The nature fix: Why nature makes us happier, healthier and more creative. W. W. Norton. Wily, L. A. (2013). Enclosure revisited: Putting the global land rush in historical perspective. In J. A. Allan, M. Keulertz, S. Sojamo, & J. Warner (Eds.), Handbook of land and water grabs in Africa: Foreign direct investment and food and water security (pp. 58–​91). Routledge.

Chapter 20

Climate Gov e rna nc e and Ju st i c e Power Pull and Unequal Exchanges with Peripheral Africa Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje

Introduction Africa is the second-​most populous continent, with an estimated 1.37 billion people. According to Dickie et al. (2014), by 2050, Africa’s population will have surpassed those of India and China. But notwithstanding the vast population and higher rate of population growth than any other region (United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], 2014), Africa is the lowest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent gases (Energy Information Administration, 2012). It is the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change because of its extant environmental, socioeconomic, and technological challenges, which partially or wholly evolved from the weak governance and poor financing of its mitigation and adaptation strategies (Faiyetole, 2019; Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017), which has resulted in poor resilience to the menace of climate change. The already weak posture of Africa in the face of climate change is being further weakened by the perpetuation of climate injustice accentuated through unequal exchanges (Burns et al., 2003), especially regarding mitigation, adaptation, and financing strategies. A lack of accuracy in monitoring and predicting climate change further weaken Africa’s mitigation and adaptation strategies (Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017). Enormous sectoral or countrywide studies of climate change impacts have been done, and the results are then combined to obtain an estimate of the overall change (Fankhauser & Tol, 2005). In a deductive manner, this approach does not offer probable significant transsectoral, interregional, intergovernmental, and multisociocultural

364    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje linkages. It negates the Afrocentric appeal promoted by this work in the climate change agenda over the efficient, resourceful, and results-​oriented mechanisms needed to fight climate change on the continent. Not to undermine the diversity of culture, economy, technological capability, and other variables in the countries in Africa, Faiyetole (2019, p. 767) demonstrated that progressive systemization is possible and able to “transform the continent into a people in a political, cultural, technological, social, and economic sense, on climate sustainability” (p. 767). It could translate to a more cohesive and holistic continent, warranting a bird’s eye view. Consistent with Wallerstein (1974), the ability to perceive the whole informs the macrosociological perspective needed to intelligently participate in and understand the dynamism of a total system, for example, the continent of Africa. Therefore we consider the striking diversities and similarities among African countries. Following this introduction, the chapter has six sections. The first discusses politicization and climate governance; the next section focuses on climate justice and injustice. This is followed by a section on power pull and unequal exchanges, and then one that lays the foundations of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies in selected African countries. This is followed by a section that looks at the imbalances in financing mitigation and adaptation strategies vis-​à-​vis the Global North, and then a summary conclusion.

Climate Governance and Politicization: The Issues, the Progress The inherent nexus between climate change and governance has spurred African scholars to begin a critical study of the continent’s weak position in the global climate change debate through the lenses of politicization and exchange. Empirically, Faiyetole (2019) and Faiyetole and Adesina (2017) have shown the importance of governance, the most crucial strategy in climate change management, especially in Africa. Meadowcroft (2010) showed the complex challenges of reaching global agreements and the efforts by governments to adopt ambitious climate programs, especially on mitigation and adaptation measures. Nonetheless, the climate change issue until recently did not gain much attention from some governments, scholars, and nongovernmental organizations, including social scientists. It was the core scientists in meteorology and physics who led the early studies on climate change (Landsberg, 1945). The lopsidedness in the climate change knowledge base between natural scientists and social scientists exacerbated and mainly owes to the preferences accorded to the natural sciences by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ([IPCC]; Bhatasara, 2015; Grundmann et al., 2012; Hulme & Mahony, 2010; Yearley, 2009). Set up in 1988 by the United Nations World Meteorological Organization

Climate Governance and Justice     365 and the Environment Program, the panel has submitted a series of periodic assessment reports (Bernauer & Schaffer, 2010). They include the first report (1990), the second (1995), the third (2001), the fourth (2007), the fifth (IPCC, 2014) and the sixth (2021/​ 2022). Climate change governance, otherwise known as climate governance, refers to the effective management of the global climate system (Global Challenges Foundation, 2021). The initiatives and deployable resources required to take collective decisions and actions on the climate system, and the different circumstances of the actors, present serious challenges. Climate governance remains a relatively new phenomenon, and policy experience in this area is relatively recent (Meadowcroft, 2009). Thus, “climate governance is the measure by which we ensure that interests of those most affected by climate change are met, that the different parties to the international instruments that govern climate actions live up to their obligations” (Makombe, 2013, p. 1). This implies that climate governance helps to assess the climate change issues that go beyond the science, which has been the core and leading basis for developing monitoring, mitigating, adaptation, and prediction strategies (Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017). Climate governance extends beyond the science of climate change to the social, economic, political, and technological implications. It interrogates the political and financial processes involved in achieving change to the extent and the scale required, from the global perspective to the regional, national, and local levels (Faiyetole, 2019; Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017; Makombe, 2013). Therefore, climate governance must be responsive to taking its rightful intra-​Africa position and to the externals in climate change management. But climate governance as we know it today is hinged on neoliberal policies that evolved as climate change became politicized. President Richard Nixon’s administration internationalized climate governance by entering into an environmental-​security alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (One Hundred Eighth Congress, 2003; Schulz, 2010). The genuine desire of Nixon’s urban affairs policy assistant Daniel Patrick Moynihan to focus the discourse on environmental security, as intended, aligned with the political intent of Nixon’s national security adviser Henry Kissinger (1968). Kissinger perceived environmental issues as a promising way to consolidate the transatlantic alliance (One Hundred Eighth Congress, 2003; Schulz, 2010). The dynamic political climate and the preceding political economy have shaped the state of the earth’s climate ever since (Faiyetole, 2019; Fankhauser et al., 2015; Steves & Teytelboym, 2013). The politicization concept rapidly gained international traction, leading in 1972 to the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment of the UN General Assembly. As the Brundtland Report accentuated, multilateralism and the interdependence of nations further laid the foundations for a political mechanism to address environmental issues and sustainable development (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Consequently, the paradigm shift in the climate change phenomenon today, which is within the purview of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, requires a purposive analysis of climate governance and climate justice that reflects the apathy and resistance to the

366    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje global initiatives among Africa’s governments. Since then, from the first Conference of Parties (COP), in Berlin in 1995, to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, and up to the twenty-​sixth Conference of Parties (COP26), held in Glasgow in 2021, the dynamism of the political climate that has shaped the state of the earth’s climate has remained intense.

Climate Justice or Injustice: Fair Play or Unfair Treatment? First, inequities in impacts, primarily due to geographic and socioeconomic disparities, characterize climate change. The weight of this imbalance rests on the poor and vulnerable. As UN Secretary-​General Antonio Guterres apt put it: “As is always the case, the poor and vulnerable are the first to suffer and the worst hit” (UN Blog, 2019, p. 1). Thus, climate change are not borne equally or fairly between the rich and the poor, women and men, and the older and younger generations (UN Blog, 2019). Sadly, Africa epitomizes everything that is poor, vulnerable, weakly resilient, and harder hit, and it suffers more from climate change—​an example of natural injustice, a level 1 climate injustice. It is even more pathetic when we recognize that the continent is the lowest contributor of carbon (Energy Information Administration, 2012) and other climate process drivers ([CPD]; Faiyetole, 2018). Consequently, the heavy emitters mete out a level 2 climate injustice on the continent. Climate impacts aggravate already the poor social conditions. Nations with weak per capita income may have equally poor housing options, for example, housing may be located in a flood plain and have inadequate insulation or air conditioning. Or they may be hard-​pressed to afford medical treatment after suffering the effects of extreme weather conditions (NAACP, 2021). This category of the climate change impact on the African people would imply a level 3 climate injustice. The fourth level of climate injustice is one of the greatest injustices to have confronted humanity; as wealthy countries and large multinational fossil fuel companies have gained their wealth and security at the expense of billions of poor people living in highly vulnerable circumstances around the world. These power countries, sadly, have shown no intention to compensate for or alleviate the harm caused and have little enthusiasm for mitigating the harm by reducing emissions. (Boom et al., 2016, p. 6)

Thus, climate injustice as shown comes in different levels to the African people. Level 1 is climate injustice caused by nature, while level 2 is based on the disparities in emission levels. Level 3 climate injustice is due to weak economies of African countries in

Climate Governance and Justice     367 comparision with the huge carbon emitters. Level 4 climate injustice is caused by the exploitation of African resources by the core countries yet failed to compensate commensurably. What is climate justice? Climate justice is the fair treatment of and freedom from discrimination for all people through the creation of policies and projects that address climate change and the systems that create and perpetuate discrimination (Makombe, 2013). Recognition of the need for climate justice has meant that the notion of “justice” has taken an increasingly central place among climate change issues (Boom et al., 2016), rightly so because climate injustice is considered the greatest injustice to confront humanity. The Paris Agreement was the first international agreement to explicitly incorporate the concept of climate justice (Boom et al., 2016), and it has been widely acclaimed as a tremendous international diplomatic success (Calliari et al., 2016). Boom et al. (2016) noted, “The Paris Agreement preamble effectively added a third pillar to the climate change regime alongside mitigation and adaptation and acknowledging that climate change is already causing impacts that poor communities cannot adapt to” (p. 5). The authors pointed out that this hard-​won yet miserly acknowledgment is built upon a long-​standing history. Statistics have shown that the loss and damage to all vulnerable developing countries can conservatively be estimated at least USD 100 billion a year in the near term, increasing to at least USD 200 billion by 2050. The estimates for all the developing countries are USD 400 billion a year by 2030, and over a trillion dollars by 2050 (Richards & Boom, 2015; Faiyetole et al., 2016; Oxfam, 2015). Arguably, strategies to manage the climate change crisis were initiated by the Global North and the well-​off countries, and forced on the countries in Global South, including Africa. To effectively contribute to and ensure climate justice in Africa, the balance of power and balance of exchanges with the Global North and the rest of the core countries must be addressed.

Power Pull and the Unequal Exchanges: The Dichotomy of the Global North and the Global South Level 1 climate injustice is a phenomenon caused essentially by nature, which separates the weak, poor, and vulnerable, mainly in Africa, for selective negative climate impacts. Nature itself shows inequity in exchanges through unfair directional power. Intuitively, if nature had shown such a level of injustice, humanity should seek to balance it. Sadly, the other levels of climate injustice are either engineered or perpetuated by humans using power pull to further the unequal exchanges. The Africa’s inadequate representation in multipolar and multilateral organizations, such as the Group of Twenty (G20), sets the stage for a power pull to the extent that Africa loses voting shares on the boards

368    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Wade, 2011). Two such organizations with neoliberal policies and implementation strategies were found to be “antithetical to the ideals of climate change-​mitigative targets” (Faiyetole, 2019, p. 772). Onyia (2015) argued that “the globalization of transnational capital has the propensity to shape state behaviors in developing countries,” and further, that “in the guise of the neoliberal agenda, these states lose huge vital resources needed for development, including responding to climate change” (p. 189). The considerable gap between the rich and emerging countries reflects a gap in the impacts, contributions, resilience, and responses to climate change of the Global South relative to those of the Global North. It is a core unequal exchange issue, emanating from the lopsidedness of the power balances. According to Meadowcroft (2010), conflicts of power and interests are inevitable in setting and implementing climate change policy. The power countries—​that is, the Global North and the other core countries, which benefit from the existing arrangements—​are reluctant to upset the status quo. Global Africa’s climate affairs therefore vividly demonstrate the interrelatedness of power pulls and unequal exchanges, which links with climate governance and injustice. The countries of Africa have, in most cases, continued to participate in global climate governance debates, but they are at the mercy of the developed nations, “including [in] negotiations at the different international climate change fora” (Faiyetole, 2019, p. 770). As the scientific evidence of climate changes increases, the UNFCCC’s conference of parties continues to provide a platform that supposedly gives different state parties an equal voice, sets the tone, and educates the international community about the state of the climate and the policies that address the changes. Africa remains insufficient and sometimes irrelevant in these discourse, because it lacks the capacity to negotiate effectively at the international fora due to a paucity of resources, finances, and expertise that is the result of the gaping disparity in global wealth between the core and the periphery (Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017; Gareau, 2012; Roberts & Parks, 2007). Contextually, governance is the springboard and connector for the sociotechnological and economic realities and climate change programs that permeate politics, policies, mitigation processes, and adaptation strategies. Climate governance determines the extent to which we can resolve the climate injustices stemming from power pulls and consequential unequal exchanges that do not benefit the African continent. If stakeholders fail to act in Africa or if they embrace climate inaction, it will be devastating and counterproductive.

The Foundations of Climate Change Strategies in Africa The methods and materials for this exploratory study on climate change adaptation measures and mitigation strategies in Africa vis-​à-​vis the rest of the world are here presented.

Climate Governance and Justice     369

Materials for the Exploratory Approach Climate change strategies within the contexts of monitoring, prediction, mitigation, adaptation, financing and governance capture the assessment of various modus operandi used by countries and regional blocks within Africa to address climate change issues. Thus, according to the African Climate Change Strategy (2014), “There is an urgent need for Member States to design robust approaches that would help to effectively address the challenges associated with climate change risks, disasters and sustainable development” (p. 2). According to Faiyetole and Adesina (2017), these strategies are monitoring, prediction, mitigation, adaptation, and, of course, financing and governance. We purposefully selected countries in Africa, by recognizing the diversity of states, interest, and ability to address climate-​related issues, and response to climate change through mitigation and adaptation mechanisms. Justifications for these mechanisms have been well documented (Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017; IPCC, 2014). The choice of regional case studies was guided by the UNFPA’s (2014) division of Africa into three broad regions: the Arab States region, the East and Southern Africa (ESA) region, and the West and Central Africa region. The analyses of six countries’ climatic impact signatures—​ two from each region and three on each of the mitigation and adaptation strategies—​ bring differences in political systems, cultures, and economies across the continent to the fore, with particular emphasis on the management of Africa’s climate change issues (Faiyetole, 2019; Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017). The six countries are Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, Angola and Nigeria (see Figure 20.1).

Climate Change Vulnerability and Adaptation Measures in Africa The negative impacts of climate change on humans and ecological, social, economic, and health systems and Africa’s vulnerability to them are pronounced. The systems in Africa were already weak before the impacts of climate change. According to the UNFCCC (2021), states need make adjustments to their ecological, social, and economic systems in response to actual and expected climatic stimuli and effects if they are to address climate change vulnerability. This means developing adaptation strategies for processes, practices, and structures. Countries and communities must find and implement adaptation solutions for the current impacts of climate change and prepare for those in future (UNFCCC, 2021). Considering the vulnerabilities in Africa, perhaps no other continent needs adaptation strategies more. Adaptation strategies in Africa are crucial. Africa is a multicultural place, where regions are as different from one another as are people within each country. Adaptation solutions may take many shapes and forms, depending on the context in the particular community, business, organization, country, or region. As the UNFCCC (2014, p. 1) puts it, there is “no-​one-​size-​fits-​all solution when it comes to adaptation strategies.” Adapting to extreme weather conditions could involve lifestyle changes for individuals,

370    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje

Figure 20.1  Map of the study area, with focus, on mitigation (black) strategies in Angola, Kenya and Egypt and adaptation (gray) strategies in South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria.

which morph through sociocultural preferences and behavioral change into social practices (Faiyetole, 2019). These changes are already imminent in African countries, no matter how incapable they are, and involve investments in resilient societies, economies, infrastructure, and health systems that can cost-​effectively manage the risks, both now and in the future. The UNFCCC (2021) rightly submits that successful adaptation depends not only on governments but also on the active and sustained engagement of stakeholders, including regional, multilateral organizations; the public and private sectors; civil society; and individuals, primarily through effective knowledge management. We will now look

Climate Governance and Justice     371 to explore the climate change adaptation measures of three African countries, one from each region—​namely, Algeria,. South Africa, and Nigeria. A large part of Algeria lies in the Mediterranean basin, a “hot spot” of climate change, and should be protected (Sahnoune et al., 2013). According to the UNFCCC (2018), “Algeria is facing extreme climate events recrudescence, which accentuates its vulnerability” (p. 5). Because of this vulnerability and water scarcity, Algeria’s adaptation measures prioritize nonconventional water and water reuse to benefit agriculture and health (Sahnoune & Imessad, 2017). Like the Arab States and countries in North Africa, Algeria imports most of its food from Europe, which makes it vulnerable to transborder climate risks and climate-​related agriculture impacts (Waha et al., 2017). However, there is a disconnect between the climate change adaptation measures already in place and the public policy efforts in Algeria (Mezahi, 2021), considering that the culture of importation from Europe offsets any cost benefits of implementing local adaptation measures. This is a typical signature all over Africa, signifying an entrenched sociocultural preference that has developed into a social practice (Faiyetole, 2019). The geography of South Africa is fascinating. Located on the southern tip of the continent, its coastlines on the Atlantic and Indian oceans make it a tourist destination (US News, 2021). Like other African countries, South Africa is no stranger to the devastation caused by weather-​related catastrophes such as floods, wildfires, storms, and droughts. Fitchett (2021) concludes that Southern Africa is in the throes of a climate emergency, citing the frequency of extreme weather events that have taken place over an extensive period and the changes this has caused in biological systems. Therefore, South Africa’s effective climate governance is contingent on adaptation—​that is, on creating coping mechanisms to help the vulnerable to adjust to and manage climate effects. Addressing power imbalances and gaining real decision-​making power are serious concerns for marginalized communities in South Africa. Ortega-​Cisneros et al. (2021) suggest engaging in the processes of policy formulation, which need to be democratic and require careful planning, early inclusion, transparency and trust,-​and capacity-​ building for all stakeholders, from decision-​makers to local community members. It is telling that climate change adaptation measures in South Africa are bedeviled by limited capacity and skills in the climate change field. Other challenges include securing funding and improving the dissemination of climate change information so that it reaches every segment of society. Due to Nigeria’s large population, abundant human and natural resources, and strategic location, the impacts of climate change felt there will indirectly affect other African countries, particularly West Africa. The corroborative records of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA, 2021) and the World Population Review (2021) show that Nigeria’s population has edged past 210 million, of which 53.9 percent are an active population aged 15 to 65 years, representing about 15 percent of the population of the continent (2021). This implies that Nigeria remains the most populous Black nation globally and could be worse impacted by climate change, especially by not putting appropriate climate change adaption mechanisms in place.

372    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje It is important to emphasize that the accelerating changes in climatic signatures, such as temperature increases, variable rainfall, sea-​level rise and flooding, drought and desertification, land degradation, depletion of freshwater resources, and biodiversity loss, are prominent in Nigeria. According to Tunji (2021), a World Bank report on internal climate migration in West African countries has shown that about 9.4 million people in Nigeria could become climate migrants by 2050. The report concluded that internal climate migration is unavoidable. Yet the effects differ from one country to another based on how climate factors interact with demographic and socioeconomic factors at the local level and on countries’ adaptation capacities. Nigeria’s institutional-​and scientific-​knowledge capacity to understand the prevailing climate change processes and impacts is, however, low. Onafeso et al. (2017) posited that notwithstanding the increasing scientific evidence of global warming, it is doubtful that Nigerian scientists and decision-​makers are ready to fill a widening gap with the core countries in meeting the numerous challenges of climate change. Climate change adaptation in Nigeria is therefore in its infancy. Offiong (2020) attributes this to policy somersault, corruption, overreliance on crude money, and inadequate awareness. He notes that among the measures needed to advance a climate agenda are education and broad stakeholder engagement in formulating common solutions and mobilizing resources and other support, including proactive coordination by the Ministry of Environment at the federal, state, and local levels. This position aligns with Faiyetole and Adesina’s (2017) assertion of the need to drive climate change solutions cooperatively and at the lowest and highest levels possible. Beyond Nigeria’s negotiations on the global stage, whether in a COP or bilateral sessions, it must gear its efforts toward intergovernmental collaboration, local implementation, and increased citizen participation.

Mitigation Strategies for Climate Change in Africa Kenya, located in the eastern part of the ESA region, has a population of approximately 55.5 million. It is imperative to state that Kenya’s current energy supply and economy are vulnerable to the adverse effects of the increase in the average atmospheric global temperature. Kenya relies heavily on hydropower for energy, and its economy relies on agriculture and tourism (Longa & van der Zwaan, 2017). COP21 confirmed the nation’s commitment to low-​carbon development. The National Climate Change Response Strategy ([NCCRS]; Government of Kenya, 2010, pp. 30–​31) noted that the effects of climate change are compounded by local environmental degradation, “illegal encroachments and settlements, logging and livestock grazing,” which among other adverse impacts, have aggravated Kenya’s water issues. Before highlighting Kenya’s mitigation measures to address climate change, it is necessary to define mitigation. Mitigation refers to efforts to prevent or slow down the increase of atmospheric GHG concentrations by limiting current and future emissions and enhancing potential sinks for GHGs. Kenya’s NCCRS (Government of Kenya,

Climate Governance and Justice     373 2010) captures the sectors associated with high emissions, including forestry (due to forest logging and land-​use change), agriculture, energy, and transport. Policies and projects are being developed to mitigate emissions in these sectors. For example, Kenya is transitioning from “dirty” energy to green energy to drive its economy, and has one of Africa’s most encouraging renewable-​energy policy frameworks. The NCCRS interventions include the Ministry of Energy’s green energy development, the Forest Service’s Forestry Development Plan, and others in the transport and agricultural sectors (Government of Kenya, 2010). Despite Kenya’s efforts aimed at lowering emissions, inclusion and exclusion challenges brought about by conflicts of interest and power plays among stakeholders were detected by Njoroge et al. (2017), who conducted semistructured interviews with respondents drawn from government departments, international nongovernmental organizations, the tourism sector, research institutions, and religious organizations. Similarly, Ageyo and Muchunku (2020) established that the dissemination of information about climate change practices at the grassroots community level is ineffective in Kenya because of language barriers, and thus inaccessible. It is, therefore, clear that Kenya’s climate change mitigation measures are not yet widespread, and those that are known are unpopular because of the lack of citizen awareness about climate change impacts in general, and that an overhaul of the process is needed. Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country, with a population of more than 100 million people, is modernizing and reasserting itself on the global stage (Congressional Research Service, 2021). Yet Egypt’s geographical position in the northern part of Africa and dependence on climate-​sensitive economic sectors make it particularly vulnerable to climate change. A rise in sea level could affect millions of people, especially those living in the Nile Delta and the southeast, exposing the populations in this part of the coastal zone to economic, social, or health risks (FAO, 2012; Leach et al., 2013). A recent study on climate change and agriculture in Egypt observed that changes that are making the climate hotter and dryer are affecting crop productivity because of increased evapotranspiration demand and direct heat stress (Perez et al., 2021). The study further suggests that the impacts on heat, salt, and pest-​tolerant crops could be addressed by adjusting planting dates and improving water-​use efficiency (Perez et al., 2021). Other studies have reported that climate change negatively impacts livestock production, which is a significant source of both global anthropogenic GHG emissions and livelihoods in Egypt (Al-​Sheikh, 2019; Habeeb et al., 2018). Thus the impacts on livestock and keepers are direct and indirect (Nardone et al., 2010; Rabie, 2020). The UNFCCC’s (2021) “no one-​size-​fits-​all” caveat equally applies to mitigation strategies. Because livestock significantly contribute to emissions at 14.5 percent, a focus is made on its production as a premise to determine mitigation measures. Goma & Phillips (2021) note that the available mitigation options to address the negative climate impacts of Egypt’s livestock production are expensive to implement and incompatible with the growing need of the human population for safe, affordable food. Further,

374    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje alternative high-​value foods with a limited carbon footprint, such as clean meat and cultured plant proteins (Rojas-​Downing et al., 2017), will need to be introduced to achieve food security (Goma & Phillips, 2021). Faiyetole (2019) stressed the need for sustainable consumption, due to climate’s stress point on food and health being within a sociological frame (Bhatasara, 2015; Fischer-​Kowalski & Herberl, 2007). Scholars have noted that in many African countries, including Angola, studying the impact of climate change is difficult because of the lack of infrastructure and adequate funding (Carvalho-​Santos et al., 2016). Nonetheless, the research carried out by Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling for Africa (Giorgi et al., 2009) proves useful for studying the evolution of Angola’s climate under the regional climate models (RCMs) framework. Certain regions have employed the RCM projections in different parts of Africa, including Eastern Africa (Endris et al., 2016), Northern Africa (Patricola & Cook, 2010), Southern Africa (Tadross et al., 2005), and West Africa (Abiodun et al., 2016). Carvalho-​Santos et al. (2016) established that climate change is very likely to bring stronger droughts throughout the 21st century, which will affect both human and environmental systems (e.g., water availability and wildfire potentials). Mitigation measures undertaken by the government of Angola can be seen in the light of its nationally determined contributions (NDCs), such as its NDC (UNFCCC, 2021) to reduce GHG emissions by up to 35 percent unconditionally, and 15 percent conditionally by 2030 (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2018). Recently, the government approved two mitigation programs: the National Strategy for Environmental Education and the Regulation on Green Spaces in Angola (Verangola, 2021). The NDCs of the selected countries in the three regions, especially Nigeria, outline ambitious mitigative efforts and mitigation targets that place demands on their economies, especially on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, that have the potential to strain national welfare and developmental trajectories if they are pursued. This illustrates an analogous description of the use of power pull by the Global North through international NGOs and other multilateral agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and others. The Global North and the other core countries use these institutions to enforce their will through policies that shift expectations to unrealistic demands from countries of Africa despite being minuscule emitters of carbon equivalent gases. Thus, unequal exchanges are created. As noted earlier, countries in Africa have continued to reduce emissions and climate change in terms of energy use. Africa’s mitigation strategies are not as economically viable as those implemented in developed countries. Some certifiable approaches involve advanced technologies, requiring technological additionality, which is new and expensive. In practice, these technologies, such as photovoltaic cell technologies, are not as efficient with respect to power output as more mature technologies. “The solar energy capture of today’s most efficient photovoltaic cell is about 40 per cent, a recent, not yet commercialized development representing an increase of over 15 per cent compared with a commercially available panel” (Faiyetole, 2018, p. 29; Green et al., 2015).

Climate Governance and Justice     375

Imbalances in Financing Mitigation and Adaptation Commitments of the NDCs with the Core Parties Inequality was the hallmark of the first round of the NDC submissions (Faiyetole, 2019). A typical core, the United States, intends to reduce emissions by 28 percent below its 2005 level to stand at 4,500 MtCO2eq (million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent). In contrast, Nigeria aims to achieve a 20 percent unconditional cut from its business-​ as-​usual (BAU) level, and a 45 percent conditional cut. But Nigeria’s emissions as a percentage of total global emissions are less than 1 percent (UNFCCC, 2018). Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows parties to voluntarily cooperate in implementing their NDCs through market and non-​ market-​ based mechanisms (UNFCCC, 2018). It realized early enough that there would be a need for burden-​ sharing, especially building on the experiences of the clean development mechanism (CDM), green climate fund (GCF), global environment facility (GEF), and other existing market mechanisms. Unfortunately, the CDM entails an unfair burden-​sharing formula that is skewed against the periphery, including African countries (Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017). According to Bode (2005, p. 225), to benefit from CDM, the non-​Annex-​I countries, usually the periphery and some economies in transition, are expected to have certified emissions reductions (CERs). The CER is buyable by the Annex B countries, which are the Annex I countries without Canada and the United States. Annex B countries are the Annex I countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The CERs must-​have aspects of technological additionality to be purchasable. Faiyetole and Adesina (2017, p. 742) recognized that “projects that can accrue CERs are hard and expensive, whereas on the other hand, projects with state-​of-​the-​art technologies certifiable for CDM are equally hard and expensive.” Projects such as space-​based solar power, if implemented, will sufficiently certify the conditions of CDM on the CER front with absolute technological additionality. Still, Africa’s knowledge base and capacity to develop such technology are currently out of reach and too expensive to implement (Faiyetole, 2018; Faiyetole & Adesina, 2017). Because of the bottleneck experienced in accessing CDM, Angola has only one registered project under CDM (UNFCCC, 2021). It is therefore reasonable to consider fair burden-​sharing principles, relaxing the power pull, and reducing the imbalance in exchanges. Instead, previous bilateral and multilateral agreements the Global North made with African countries are not being honored; or, in most cases, the conditional requirements from the periphery make it impossible for them to access the support they need. Africa tends to offer more toward mitigation of the meager carbon it emits, as shown by their determined and responsive NDC targets compared with core countries. For example, South Africa’s second NDC recognized that the “developed countries have to show progression beyond

376    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje previous efforts, to set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of $100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2021, p. 1). In light of new scientific findings that have revealed the emergency of climate change action through the fifth assessment report, nearly all the African countries have reaffirmed their willingness to achieve UNFCCC objectives, through the contracting parties’ Decision 1/​CP.21, to ensure the success of the Paris Agreement. “The ruthless shift from a 2°C to a 1.5oC warming limit above pre-​industrial levels and a net-​zero emission target in the second half of this century requires more stringent goals, hoped to be attained through nationally determined contributions” (Faiyetole, 2019, p. 772). Their provisional contribution concerns include mitigation of GHGs and adaptation to climate change impacts. Fostering climate resilience while making financial flows consistent with their sustainable development trajectories are the long-​term goals of the NDCs (UNFCCC, 2018). Mitigation techniques, mostly hinged on technological advancement, from energy, transportation, agriculture and food processes to health systems, require financial resources. The same applies to adaptation strategies but for four things: (1) African countries are generally poor with a weak GDP; (2) their people are even poorer, with a weak GDP per capita; (3) African countries are low contributors to carbon emissions; and (4) are more vulnerable to climate change impacts. It is noteworthy that Africa is shifting from aid relationships to trade partnerships, from victim mode to contributor-​type approaches. But the Global North cannot jettison the third of these factors: in addressing unequal exchanges, first, they need to contribute investment that is commensurate with their substantial emission scenarios in their mitigation NDCs, and second, to make the burden-​sharing mechanisms, such as the CDM and others, work. Yet in their commitment to mitigating emissions and adapting to climate change impacts, the African countries show signs of responsibility and responsiveness. Algeria, for example, adopted the contracting party Decision 1/​CP.21 in December 2014, established the national climate committee, and submitted its intentional NDC (INDC) in 2015, covering 2021 to 2030. According to the UNFCCC (2018), Algeria bases its mitigation contribution on the three most essential CPDs: CO2, methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), with plans to reduce gas flaring by 1 percent by 2030. Thus, despite the drop in oil prices, the mainstay of Algeria’s economy, the INDC focuses on energy, transportation, industry, construction, the environment, agriculture, and forestry. These sectors are both the biggest money earners, like energy, and the most vulnerable, like agriculture and forestry. Recognizing the need for North-​South cooperation, the Friends of Algeria’s Ambition for Adaptation and Mitigation was established to help Algeria in way necessary to achieve these ambitious NDC goals. And generally speaking, Egypt, in its INDC, defines a pathway toward low-​carbon energy systems. It understandably envisaged a funding flow from the core countries (Annex I countries)1 to burden-​share the brunt of the climate changes they largely cause. Egypt’s mitigation measures and actions are in transportation, industry, agriculture, oil and natural gas, waste processes, and electricity sectors.

Climate Governance and Justice     377 It was hoped that Kenya’s INDC, submitted in 2016, would be wholly conditional on international support. But so far, most of the progress has been entirely from domestic resources (UNFCCC, 2021). In its updated NDC, Kenya increased the target emission reduction from 30 percent to 32 percent relative to the BAU scenario of 143 MtCO2eq by 2030, in line with its sustainable development and national circumstances. It needs an estimated $62 billion for the second NDC implementation. To think Kenya could not realize much international support for its first NDC despite being so hinged, it is apparent that their 87 percent international expectation of the budget for the second NDC is a tall order. South Africa’s updated NDC shows that it has made progress since the first and ambitious new targets, from setting near-​to medium-​term targets to a long-​term target communicated to the UNFCCC through its low-​ emission development strategy. It commits to its national inventory report by reducing its gaseous compositions, CO2, CH4, N2O, hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorinated chemicals. Thus, by 2030, South Africa aims to maintain its annual GHG emissions within a range of 350 to 420 MtCO2eq, lower by 48–​90 MtCO2eq than its 2025 targets. According to Tyler and Hochstetler (2021), South Africa is institutionalizing climate governance to meet these ambitious decarbonization targets despite resistance from a political energy economy that empowers the energy actors with the sustained ability to block decarbonization in the energy sector. The INDC Angola submitted in November 2015 outlined ambitious goals to reduce GHG emissions up to 35 percent unconditionally by 2030, compared to the BAU scenario in the base year of 2005. Further, its conditional mitigation scenario calls for an additional 15 percent reduction below BAU emission levels by 2030. By achieving its unconditional and conditional targets, Angola expects to reduce emissions by nearly 50 percent below the BAU scenario by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2018). In May 2021, Angola submitted an even more elaborate NDC. The combined funding requirement for its mitigation and adaptation strategies is USD $44.1 billion, money Angola intends to raise using national and international climate-​finance mechanisms. The federal finance mechanisms include the national environment fund, the national electricity fund, the support fund for agricultural development in Angola, and the Angola sovereign fund. The international finance mechanisms include the least developed countries’ funds, the GEF trust fund, and carbon markets (UNFCCC, 2021). According to Faiyetole (2019), the measures Nigeria plans to take, like those of other African countries, affect the sectors of the economy that contribute most to its GDP. These measures include ending gas flaring, generating 13 gigawatts of off-​grid solar power, improving the electricity grid, practicing climate-​smart agriculture and reforestation, using efficient gas generators, and shifting from automobiles to mass transit (UNFCCC, 2018). These measures started to yield expected results, as revealed by Olayungbo et al. (2022), with evidence of the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis, implying that emissions started to reduce as Nigeria’s economy grows. However, the National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action for Climate Change for Nigeria requires adequate financing opportunities, benefiting from multilateral mechanisms

378    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje such as the GCF, to reduce the imbalance of exchanges regarding GHGs. Nigeria submitted its third round of the NDC in July 2021 (UNFCCC, 2021).

Conclusions Global climate governance is led by the core countries via multilateral or intergovernmental organizations. These developed countries, mainly in the Global North, are the highest emitters of carbon equivalent gases. Nonetheless, neoliberal policies drive climate change governance, resulting in power pulls by the core, which are antithetical to achieving mitigation and adaptation targets. In the same vein, the climate justice paradigm, expected to correct the skewed climate governance and power issues, performs below expectations. Instead, it embellishes the core’s unfair treatment of peripheral Africa. Well-​conceived and implemented climate governance and justice paradigms can correct these imbalances, mainstream fair play among advanced and emerging economies alike. They could define the scale and extent of the mitigation and adaptation strategies required to stem temperature rise, especially in peripheral Africa. Equity in administering global climate governance and justice could go a long way in addressing climate justice. Consequently, this study recommends that an IPCJ or a similar organization is given the responsibility to ensure that countries commit to mitigation and adaptation actions that are proportional to their emissions rates and climate change vulnerability indices.

Acronyms BAU

Business as Usual

CDM

Clean Development Mechanism

CER

Certified Emission Reductions

CH4 Methane CO2

Carbon dioxide

COP

Conference of Parties

CPD

Climate Process Drivers

ESA

East and Southern Africa

GCF

Global Climate Fund

GDP

Gross domestic product

GEF

Global Environment Facility

GHG

Greenhouse gases

INDC

Intentional Nationally Determined Contributions

Climate Governance and Justice     379 IPCJ

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Justice

MtCO2eq Million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent NCCRS

National Climate Change Response Strategy

NDC

Nationally Determined Contributions

N2O

Nitrous oxide

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Note 1. Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

References Abiodun, G. J., Maharaj, R., Witbooi, P., & Okosun, K. O. (2016). Modelling the influence of temperature and rainfall on the population dynamics of Anopheles arabiensis. Malaria Journal, 15, 1–​5. https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s12​936-​016-​1411-​6 African Climate Change Strategy. (2014). Draft of African Union strategy on climate change. African Union. https://​www.uneca.org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​ACPC/​Afr​ica-​clim​ate-​cha​nge​ -strat​egy/​AU%20CC%20S​trat​egy%20REV-​28-​12-​2020%20EN.pdf Ageyo, J., & Machunku, I. G. (2020). Beyond the right of access: A critique of the legalist approach to dissemination of climate change information in Kenya. Sustainability, 12, 1–​15. https://​doi.org/​10.3390/​su1​2062​530 Al-​Sheikh, O. (2019). Climate change in Egypt: From adaptation to mitigation. International Food Policy Research Institute. https://​egypt​ssp.ifpri.info/​2019/​04/​03/​clim​ate-​cha​nge-​in​ -egypt-​from-​ada​ptat​ion-​to-​mit​igat​ion-​of-​clim​ate-​cha​nge-​cau​ses/​ Bernauer, T., & Schaffer, L. M. (2010). Climate change governance (Working Paper No. 60). Center for Comparative and International Studies. htpps://​doi.org/​10.2139/​ssrn.1661190 Bhatasara, S. (2015). Debating sociology and climate change. Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, 12, 217–​233. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​19438​15X.2015.1108​342 Bode, S. (2005). Tenders: An option for developing countries to support renewable energies under the CDM. Climate Policy, 5(2), 221–​228. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​14693​ 062.2005.9685​552 Boom, K., Richards, J.-​A., & Leonard, S. (2016). Climate justice: The international momentum towards climate litigation. Heinrich Boell Foundation. https://​www.boell.de/​sites/​defa​ult/​ files/​rep​ort-​clim​ate-​just​ice-​2016.pdf Burns, T. J., Kick, E. L., & Davis, B. L. (2003). Theorizing and rethinking linkages between the natural environment and the modern world-​system: Deforestation in the late 20th century. Journal of World Systems Research, 9, 357–​390. https://​doi.org/​10.5195/​jwsr.2003.237

380    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje Calliari, E., D’Aprile, A., & Davide, M. (2016, May 4). Paris agreement: Strengths and weaknesses behind a diplomatic success. Review of Environment, Energy and Economics (Re3), 1–​7. https://​pap​ers.ssrn.com/​sol3/​pap​ers.cfm?abst​ract​_​id=​2774​267 Carvalho-​Santos, C., Nunes, J. P., Monteiro, A. T., Hein, L., & Honrado, J. P. (2016). Assessing the effects of land cover and future climate conditions on the provision of hydrological services in a medium-​sized watershed of Portugal. Hydrological Processes, 30, 720–​738. https://​ doi.org/​10.1002/​hyp.10621 Congressional Research Service. (2021). Egypt: Background and US relations (CRS Report RL33003). https://​crs​repo​rts.congr​ess.gov/​prod​uct/​pdf/​RL/​RL33​003 Dickie, A., Streck, C., Roe, S., Zurek, M., Haupt, F., & Dolginow, A. (2014). Strategies for mitigating climate-​change in agriculture: Recommendations for philanthropy. Climate Focus and California Environmental Associates (CEA). http://​www.climat​eand​land​usea​llia​nce. org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo ​ads/​2015/​08/​E xecutive_​Summary_​Mitigating_​C l​imat​e_​C h​ange​​ _in_​Agri​cult​ure.pdf Endris, H. S., Lennard, C., Hewitson, B., Dossio, A., Nikulin, G., & Panitz, H.-​J. (2016). Teleconnection responses in multi-​GCM driven CORDEX RCMs over Eastern Africa. Climate Dynamics, 46, 2821–​2846. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s00​382-​015-​2734-​7 Energy Information Administration. (2012). International energy statistics. www.eia.gov/​cfa​ pps/​ipdb​proj​ect/​iedind​ex3.cfm?tid=​90&pid=​44&aid=​8 Faiyetole, A. A. (2018). Potentialities of space-​based systems for monitoring climate policies and mitigation of climate process drivers. Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics and Policy, 16, 28–​48. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​14777​622.2018.1436​329. Faiyetole, A. A. (2019). Outside-​in perspectives on the socio-​econo-​technological effects of climate change in Africa. International Sociology, 34, 762–​785. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​02685​ 8091​9867​837 Faiyetole, A. A., & Adesina, F. A. (2017). Regional response to climate change and management: An analysis of Africa’s capacity. International Journal of Climate Change and Management, 9, 730–​748. https://​doi.org/​10.1108/​IJC​CSM-​02-​2017-​0033 Faiyetole, A. A., Adesina, F. A., & Oyebisi, T. O. (2016, June). An analysis of the costs and benefits of actions or inactions for Africa under variable climate policies. Ife Social Sciences Review 2016, 96–​104. Fankhauser, S., Gennaioli, C., & Collins, M. (2015). The political economy of passing climate-​ change legislation: Evidence from a survey. Global Environmental Change, 35, 52–​61. https://​ doi.org/​10.1016/​j.gloenv​cha.2015.08.008 Fankhauser, S., & Tol, R. S. (2005). On climate change and economic growth. Resource and Energy Economics, 27, 1–​17. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.resene​eco.2004.03.003 Food and Agriculture Organization. (2012). Developing a climate-​smart agriculture strategy at the country level: Lessons from recent experience [Background paper]. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. http://​www.fao.org/​doc​rep/​016/​ap4​01e/​ap4​01e.pdf Fischer-​Kowalski, M., & Haberl, H. (2007). Socio-​ecological transitions and global change: Trajectories of social metabolism and land use. Edward Elgar. Fitchett, J. (2021, October 25). Climate change has already hit Southern Africa. University of Witwatersrand. https://​www.wits.ac.za/​news/​lat​est-​news/​opin​ion/​2021/​2021-​10/​clim​ate​ -cha​nge-​has-​alre​ady-​hit-​south​ern-​afr​ica.html Gareau, B. J. (2012). Theorizing environmental governance of the world-​system: Global political economy theory and some applications to stratospheric ozone politics. Journal of World Systems Research, 18, 187–​210. https://​doi.org/​10.5195/​jwsr.2012.480

Climate Governance and Justice     381 Global Challenges Foundation. (2021). What is climate governance? https://​globa​lcha​llen​ges​ .org/​what-​is-​clim​ate-​gov​erna​nce/​ Giorgi, F., Jones, C., & Asrar, G. R. (2009). Addressing climate information needs at the regional level: The CORDEX framework. WMO Bulletin, 58, 175–​183. https://​pub​lic.wmo.int/​ en/​bulle​tin/​add​ress​ing-​clim​ate-​info​rmat​ion-​needs-​regio​nal-​level-​cor​dex-​framew​ork Goma, A. A., & Phillips, C. J. C. (2021). The impact of anthropogenic climate change on Egyptian livestock production. Animals, 11. https://​doi.org/​10.3390/​ani1​1113​127 Government of Kenya. (2010). National climate change response strategy [Executive brief]. Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources. Green, M. A., Keevers, M. J., Thomas, I., Lasich, J. B., Emery, K., & King, R. R. (2015). 40% efficient sunlight to electricity conversion. Progress in Photovoltaics, 23, 685–​691. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1002/​pip.2612 Grundmann, R., Rhomberg, M., & Stehr, N. (2012). Nature, climate-​change and culture of social science. In P. Almlund, P. H. Jesperson, & S. Riis (Eds.), Rethinking climate change research: Clean technology, culture and communication (pp. 133–​142). Ashgate. Habeeb, A. A. M., Gad, A. E., El-​Tarabany, A. A., & Atta, M. A. A. (2018). Negative effects of heat stress on growth and milk production of farm animals. Journal of Animal Husbandry & Dairy Science, 2, 1–​12. https://​www.srya​hwap​ubli​cati​ons.com/​jour​nal-​of-​ani​mal-​husban​ dry-​and-​dairy-​scie​nce/​pdf/​v2-​i1/​1.pdf Hulme, M., & Mahony, M. (2010). Climate change: What do we know about the IPCC? Progress in Physical Geography, 34, 705–​7 18. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​03091​3331​0373​7 19 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2014). AR5 Climate change 2014: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. (WG II AR5: Working Group II’s contribution to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report). https://​www.ipcc.ch/​rep​ort/​ar5/​wg2/​ International Fund for Agricultural Development. (2018). Republic of Angola country strategic opportunities programme, 2019–​ 2024. https://​www.ifad.org/​zh-​TW/​-​/​les-​pro​gram​mes-​d​ -opti​ons-​strat%C3%A9giq​ues-​pour-​les-​pays-​2019-​2024. Kissinger, H. (1968). Memorandum Kissinger to Nixon, “Clarence Streit Letter on Atlantic Union,” August 27, 1969. National Archives and Records Administration. Nixon Presidential Material, President’s Office, President’s Office Files, Handwritings Box 2. Landsberg, H. (1945). Climatology. In F. A. Berry, E. Bollay, & N. R. Beers (Eds.), Handbook of meteorology. McGraw Hill, 927–​998. Leach, K., Zalat, S., & Gilbert, F. (2013). Egypt’s protected area network under future climate change. Biological Conservation, 159, 490–​500. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.bio​con.2012.11.025 Longa, F. D., & van der Zwaan, B. (2017). Do Kenya’s climate change mitigation ambitions necessitate large-​scale renewable energy deployment and dedicated low-​carbon energy policy? Renewable Energy, 113, 1559–​1568. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.ren​ene.2017.06.026 Makombe, K. (2013). Climate governance in Africa: A handbook for journalists. Inter Press Service Africa. Meadowcroft, J. (2009). Climate change governance (Policy Research Working Paper 4941). World Bank. Meadowcroft, J. (2010). Climate change governance. World Bank. https://​openkn​owle​dge​ .worldb​ank.org/​han​dle/​10986/​9063 Mezahi, M. (2021, August 22). Algeria’s desperate wildfire fight: Buckets and branches. BBC News. https://​www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​afr​ica-​58269​789 NAACP. (2021). Environmental and climate justice. https://​naacp.org/​know-​iss​ues/​enviro​ nmen​tal-​clim​ate-​just​ice

382    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje Nardone, A., Ronchi, B., Lacetera, N., Ranieri, M. S., & Bernabucci, U. (2010). Effects of climate changes on animal production and sustainability of livestock systems. Livestock Science, 130, 57–​69. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.liv​sci.2010.02.011 Njoroge, J. M., Ratter, B. M. W., & Atieno, L. (2017). Climate change policy-​making process in Kenya: Deliberative inclusionary processes in play. International Journal of Climate Change and Management, 9, 935–​954. https://​doi.org/​10.1108/​IJC​CSM-​10-​2016-​0154 Offiong, P. (2020, February 14). Stakeholders mobilize climate change adaptation strategies in Nigeria. [Nigeria News Brief and Action Alert]. Climate Scorecard. https://​www.clima​ tesc​orec​ard.org/​2020/​02/​stake​hold​ers-​mobil​ize-​clim​ate-​cha​nge-​ada​ptat​ion-​str​ateg​ies-​in​ -nige​ria/​ Olayungbo, D. O., Faiyetole, A. A., & Olayungbo, A. A. (2022). Economic growth, energy consumption, and carbon emissions: The case of Nigeria. In A. Rafay (Ed.), Handbook of research on energy and environmental finance 4.0., 259–​276. IGI-​Global. https://​doi.org/​ 10.4018/​978-​1-​7998-​8210-​7.ch010 Onafeso, O. D., Akanni, C. O., & Badejo, B. O. (2017). The dynamics of climate change and global warming: Imperatives for food security in Nigeria. Journal of the Geographical Association of Tanzania, 36, 1–​13. https://​journ​als.udsm.ac.tz/​index.php/​jgat/​arti​cle/​downl​ oad/​666/​648 One Hundred Eighth Congress. (2003). Daniel Patrick Moynihan: Memorial addresses and other tributes. US Government Printing Office. Onyia, C. (2015). Climate change and conflict in Nigeria: The Boko Haram challenge. American International Journal of Social Science, 4, 181–​190. Ortega-​Cisneros, K., Cochrane, K. L., Rivers, N., & Saur, W. H. H. (2021). Assessing South Africa’s potential to address climate change impacts and adaptation in the fisheries sector. Frontiers in Marine Science, 8, 1–​20. https://​doi.org/​10.3389/​fmars.2021.652​955 Oxfam. (2015). Extreme carbon inequality: Why the Paris climate deal must put the poorest, lowest emitting and most vulnerable people first. Oxfam Policy and Practice. https://​pol​icy​ -pract​ice.oxfam.org/​resour​ces/​extr​eme-​car​bon-​ine​qual​ity-​why-​the-​paris-​clim​ate-​deal​ -must-​put-​the-​poor​est-​lowes-​582​545/​ Patricola, C. M., & Cook, K. H. (2010). Northern African climate at the end of the twenty-​ first century: An integrated application of regional and global climate models. Climate Dynamics, 35, 193–​212. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s00​382-​009-​0623-​7 Perez, N., Kassim, Y., Ringler, C., Thomas, T. S., & Eididi, H. (2021). Climate change and Egypt’s agriculture. International Food Policy Research Institute. https://​www.ifpri.org/​publ​icat​ion/​ clim​ate-​cha​nge-​and-​egy​pts-​agri​cult​ure Rabie, T. S. K. M. (2020). Potential climate change impacts on livestock and food security nexus in Egypt. In E. E. Omran & A. M. Negm (Eds.), Climate change impacts on agriculture and food security in Egypt (pp. 423–​450). Springer Nature. Richards, J.-​A., & Boom, K. (2015). Making a kill: Who pays the real costs of big oil, coal and gas. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. https://​www.boell.de/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​mak​ing-​a-​kill​ing.pdf Roberts T. J., & Parks, B. (2007). A climate of injustice. MIT Press. Rojas-​Downing, M. M., Nejadhashemi, A. P., Harrigan, T., & Woznicki, S. A. (2017). Climate change and livestock: Impacts, adaptation, and mitigation. Climate Risk Management, 16, 145–​163. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.crm.2017.02.001 Sahnoune, F., Belhamel, M., Zelmat, M., & Kerbachi, R. (2013). Climate change in Algeria: Vulnerability and strategy of mitigation and adaptation. Energy Procedia, 36, 1286–​1294.

Climate Governance and Justice     383 Sahnoune, F., & Imessad, K. (2017). Analysis of the impact of the measures to mitigate climate change in Algeria. Energy Procedia, 136, 495–​500. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.egy​ pro.2017.10.263 Schulz, T. (2010). Transatlantic “environmental security” in the 1970s? NATO’s “third dimension” as an early environmental and human security approach. Historical Social Research, 35, 309–​328. https://​doi.org/​10.12759/​hsr.35.2010.4.309-​328 Steves, F., & Teytelboym, A. (2013). Political economy of climate change policy (Working Paper 13-​02). Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford. https://​pap​ ers.ssrn.com/​sol3/​pap​ers.cfm?abst​ract​_​id=​2456​538 Tadross, M. A., Hewitson, B. C., & Usman, M. T. (2005). The interannual variability of the onset of the maize growing season over South Africa and Zimbabwe. Journal of Climate, 18, 3356–​ 3372. https://​doi.org/​10.1175/​JCLI3​423.1 Tunji, S. (2021, October 28). Climate change may displace 9.5 million Nigerians by 2050 –​ World Bank. The Punch. https://​punc​hng.com/​clim​ate-​cha​nge-​may-​displ​ace-​9-​4-​mill​ion​ -nigeri​ans-​by-​2050-​world-​bank/​ Tyler, E., & Hochstetler, K. (2021). Institutionalizing decarbonization in South Africa: Navigating climate mitigation and socio-​economic transformation. Environmental Politics, 30, 184–​205. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09644​016.2021.1947​635 UN Blog. (2019). Climate Justice. https://​www.un.org/​sus​tain​able​deve​lopm​ent/​blog/​2019/​05/​ clim​ate-​just​ice/​ UNFCCC. (2014). Adaptation, the UNFCCC and the convention. Resource. https://​unf​ccc.int/​ news/​adap​atat​ion-​and-​the-​con​vent​ion. UNFCCC. (2018). NDC Registry (Interim). www4.unf​ccc.int/​sites/​NDC​Stag​ing/​Pages/​All.aspx UNFCCC. (2021). NDC Registry (Interim). https://​www4.unf​ccc.int/​sites/​NDC​Stag​ing/​ pages/​Party.aspx?party=​NGA United Nations Population Fund. (2014). State of the world population 2014. United Nations Population Fund. (2021). World population dashboard—​Nigeria. https://​www​ .unfpa.org/​data/​world-​pop​ulat​ion/​NG/​ US News. (2021). Overview of South Africa. US News and Reports. https://​www.usn​ews.com/​ news/​best-​countr​ies/​south-​afr​ica Verangola, L. (2021). Government approved national strategy for climate change. https://​www​ .verang​ola.net/​va/​en/​102​021/​Envi​ronm​ent/​27939/​Gov​ernm​ent-​appro​ved-​Natio​nal-​Strat​ egy-​for-​Clim​ate-​Cha​nge.htm Wade, R. H. (2011). Emerging world order? From multipolarity to multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF. Politics & Society, 39, 347–​378. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00323​ 2921​1415​503 Waha, K., Krummenauer, L., Adams, S., Aich, V., Baarsch, F., Coumou, D., Fader, M., Hoff, H., Jobbins, G., Marcus, R., Mengel, M., Otto, I. M., Perrette, M., Rocha, M., Robinson, A., & Schleussner, C.-​F. (2017). Climate change impacts in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region and their implications for vulnerable population groups. Regional Environmental Change, 17, 1623–​1638. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​113-​017-​1144-​2 Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world system I: Capitalist agriculture and the origin of the European world economy in the sixteenth century. Academic Press. World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987). Our common future. Federal Office for Spatial Development. https://​www.are.admin.ch/​are/​en/​home/​media/​publi​cati​ ons/​sust​aina​ble-​deve​lopm​ent/​bru​ndtl​and-​rep​ort.html

384    Ayodele Adekunle Faiyetole and Godwin Chinedum Ihemeje World Population Review. (2021). Nigeria population. https://​worldp​opul​atio​nrev​iew.com/​ countr​ies/​nige​ria-​pop​ulat​ion Yearley, S. (2009). Sociology and climate change after Kyoto: What roles for social science in understanding climate change? Current Sociology, 57, 389–​405. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00113​ 9210​8101​589

Chapter 21

Civil So ciet y, NG O s , a nd Hum an Rights i n A fri c a Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou

Introduction In the modern world, civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) constitute a sphere in which nonstate actors serve as a real force capable of countervailing state power. Functioning as mediators between the state and society, these actors play a significant role in bringing about democracy and monitoring human rights. In Africa, how civil society and NGOs become involved in human rights issues and the strategies they use are not identical; nor do they have the same level of effectiveness everywhere on the continent. The chapter explores the multifaceted roles of civil society and NGOs in human rights in Africa, and provides a preliminary account of their effectiveness in dealing with human-​rights-​related challenges on the continent. The nature of political systems and the traditional understanding of the human rights culture are major factors that shape the role of civil society in advocating human rights in Africa (Oyowe, 2014). The first two sections of the chapter attempt to conceptualize civil society and human rights in Africa by discussing the Western notion of civil society and confronting it with what seems to be an emerging indigenous conception of civil society in Africa. The focus is on the peculiarities of the African society and polity that give rise to different practices and thus to a different normative framework for dealing with civil society and human rights. The subsequent sections deal with the various ways and strategies NGOs use to deal with human rights by analyzing cases from different regions in Africa and various topics within civil society. Thematic case studies are presented for each of the main subregions of the continent. The three main thematic cases discussed here—​ namely, transitional justice, women’s rights, and minority rights—​were selected because they illustrate the most common human-​rights-​related challenges now prevailing in Africa. Each thematic case study provides an overview of the ways civil society organizations are involved in the issue: the transitional justice case study sheds light on the role

386    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding; the women’s rights case study discusses how civil society is dealing with issues related to gender equality and discrimination against women; the minority rights case study deals with the mediating role of civil society in managing religious and ethnic-​minority-​based conflicts. The goal is to present the dynamic practices of civil society in relation to human rights and show how civil society advocates for these rights in their battles to advance human rights and democratic agendas. The chapter concludes by discussing the many challenges that African civil societies face.

Conceptualizing Civil Society and Human Rights in Africa In international contexts, the existence of a civil society has become one of the key criteria on which the quality of a modern democratic system is assessed. Nonetheless, defining civil society is not a simple task. Successive waves of political reforms in Africa seem to have been a source of confusion as far as the definition of civil society is concerned. The proliferation of NGOs in response to the various aid and democracy-​promoting programs launched by the United States and the European Union in the 1990s led academics and practitioners to take the existence of civil society for granted. The concept of civil society that originated with the writings of Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, and, later, Antonio Gramsci is endemic in Western political thought. To the extent that this concept grew out of the evolution of state-​society interactions in Western societies, it can travel outside the West only with some methodological precautions. This is not to say that civil society cannot appear in other sociocultural contexts or that it is the only valid form that can emerge out of state-​society interaction and perform the functions of Western civil society. It only means that, as with any other concept, the use of civil society as an analytical tool requires considering how well it is adapted to the reality of the state-​society relations it seeks to grasp. The liberal concept of civil society comprises a least three essential elements: civility, a public sphere, and a relationship with democracy. The first is linked to the values that define civil society as a space for exchange and conflict resolution. Civil society is based on the notion of civility, the requirement that the members of a society deliberate, behave, and act in a civic manner—​that is, out of concern for the common good and a willingness to solve conflicts peacefully (Shils, 1991). Typically, only organizations that are freely and voluntarily created by people acting as citizens are cited as examples of civil society. The second essential element of civil society is the existence of a public sphere that serves as an arena where civil society organizations interact. According to Jürgen Habermas (1991), the public sphere is

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    387 a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens. . . .Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion; thus with the guarantee that they may assemble and unite freely, and express and publicize their opinions freely. (p. 398)

Thus, the public sphere is part and parcel of a civil society. In the Habermas’s view, the emergence of both is inextricably linked to the emergence of the bourgeoisie. Organizations operating in a social context that lacks the “ingredients” to form the public sphere are not included in the liberal concept of civil society. The third core component of civil society consists of its relations with modern democracy. The historical evolution of the state-​society interaction in the Western context shows that democracy and civil society have, to a large extent, been mutually supportive. Democracy provides top-​down protection for the civil society, from the constitutional government of the state to the local activities of the people, which guarantees individual freedoms and the right to join and conduct NGOs (Patrick, 1996). At the same time, civil society provides bottom-​up support for the constitutional democratic state, which arises from the grassroots when community-​based NGOs act democratically for the public good (Patrick, 1996). In Africa, however, a large majority of civil society organizations operate in sociopolitical contexts that lack one or more of the aforementioned three essentials (Makumbe, 1998). Civil society organizations in most African societies share three peculiarities that make it difficult to assert that they meet the core criteria. First, they mainly operate in authoritarian or semi-​authoritarian political systems, where even when a political reform is introduced, it rarely meets the requirements of a liberal democracy (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). Second, under these authoritarian political systems, the public sphere is yet to emerge, and in many African countries there is no social arena where citizens can exchange views and opinions free from state control. Last, because the existing civil society organizations take either the form of service providers or are self-​organized based on ethnic origin, they do not embody the civic spirit that is so important to the concept of civil society.

Is There an African Indigenous Concept of Civil Society? Given these missing elements, is it possible to talk about an indigenous conception of civil society in Africa? The context-​related differences between African societies and Western European ones impose serious limitations on the use of the liberal civil society concept to understand state-​society interaction in Africa. To overcome this conceptual and methodological constraint, scholars such as Makumbe (1998) and Neubert (2011)

388    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou have dug deep into Africa’s precolonial history. Their objective was to detect forms of societal self-​organization that the liberal concept of civil society cannot capture. Unlike the NGOs, considered to have been imposed by colonial powers, local forms of African societal self-​organization are thought to be anchored in history (Neubert, 2011). These local forms cover a broad spectrum and range from local political organizations and institutions, such as chiefdoms, councils of elders, and local defense communities, to vigilante or militia groups, militant social movements, youth organizations, and violence entrepreneurs (Neubert, 2011). Regardless of whether they meet the requirements for a Western civil society, the functions these groups perform are similar to those a civil society organization today is supposed to play, especially that of mediating between the society and the state, and some have filled the vacuum created by a typically weak central power. Some scholars in fact argue that “elements of civil society may be found among political systems in Africa” (Appiagyei-​Atua, 2002, p. 2). This attempt to forge an alternative concept of civil society takes the traditional Akan political environment and philosophy as an illustrative example. Based on the assumption that the Western social sciences failed to recognize African civil society as one of the institutional component of the traditional African political system, scholars who believe in the idea of indigenous civil society argue that an African understanding of civil society is behind the various forms of societal organization that marked the evolution of the Akan community in Africa. This understanding of the notion of civil society has two serious limitations. First, restructuring the concept of civil society along the lines of the traditional African political systems is likely to be perceived as legitimizing the enduring authoritarian systems prevailing in most African countries. Second, rejecting the universal understanding of human rights because it is based on Western liberal ideology has proven to be merely a subtle maneuver instrumentalized by authoritarian regimes to justify human rights violations in the name of cultural specificities (cultural relativism) (Staub-​ Bernasconi, 2010). Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that the existence of an associational life is necessary but not enough for the existence of civil society. The mushrooming of associations and various other nonstate organizations, including those that lack the three aforementioned essentials, is seen as the only evidence of the existence of civil society, which led to a multitude of definitions of the concept (Hutchful, 1996). There are as many definitions as there are numbers of experiences and types of associations. In this chapter, we use the term civil society to refer to an arena outside the family, the state, and the market that is created by individual and collective actions, organizations, and institutions to advance shared interests (CIVICUS, 2012; PRIA, 2012). We recognize the validity of some of the arguments in favor of an alternative African concept of civil society; however, these efforts are yet to come up with an operational concept able to serve as an adequate analytical tool to shed light on the peculiarities of state-​society interactions in the African context (Obadare, 2014). The only way we can enrich the debate on the indigenous African civil society is to analyze the dynamism of organizations that defend their civil society identities. Instead of dwelling on the theoretical,

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    389 liberal, and normative discussion, we should observe how these organizations operate in their various contexts and how they define their work. As evidenced by the following three thematic cases, the functions performed by organizations claiming a civil society identity are shaped, inter alia, by a twofold constraint: on the one hand, by their struggle against various forms of repressive power, as shown by their roles in transitional justice and peacebuilding processes, and on the other hand, by coping with the traditions and cultural specificities of local societies, as reflected in their involvement in women’s rights and minority rights issues.

Civil Society Organizations and Human Rights in Africa The following sections seek to shed light on different ways African NGOs deal with human rights and the strategies they use to advocate their causes. To this end three thematic cases were selected, namely transitional justice, women’s rights, and minority rights. Indeed these three cases seem to illustrate the most prevailing human rights challenges in the continent.

Transitional Justice The waves of independence that swept across Africa in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the emergence of new political entities. In many cases, ethnic and religious divisions, as well as the struggle for wealth and power among different political protagonists, have hindered the economic expansion of African countries (Paroma & Iwuoha, 2018). These long-​lasting conflicts have often undermined state-​building processes and trapped many African societies in a vicious circle of violence. Civil society in various contexts played a significant role in choosing the transitional justice mechanisms that their countries adopted. One of the leading and most important examples of this is the case of South Africa. South Africa’s civil society was a key player in the debate on how to address the atrocities of the apartheid system, especially when it helped to forge the idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) at conferences and in public hearings (Crocker, 2015). Many of TRC members were representatives of civil society. They received nominations for TRC commissioners and recommended twenty-​five candidates to President Mandela, who appointed seventeen of them (Crocker, 2015). Regardless of the extent to which the TRC achieved its goals, it has nonetheless inspired human rights activists and prodemocracy civil society to push for the implementation of transitional justice across the continent. Zimbabwean civil society is a case in point. It helped advance the cause of transitional justice, from the early initiatives that

390    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou sought to put transitional justice on the public agenda to the more organized consensus-​ building initiatives introduced later on, such as the 2003 Johannesburg symposium on civil society and justice (Morrell and Pigou, 2004). It was also instrumental in the establishment of the National Transitional Justice Working Group and the adoption of a new constitution that paved the way for the establishment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission in 2013 (Dzikanai, 2020). In Northern Africa, the Moroccan transitional justice experience was shaped by the interaction between the state and civil society. An analysis of Morocco’s human rights discourse shows that, in contrast to the realist approach the state adopted at the outset, Moroccan NGOs relied on the idealist argument in building their reconciliation approach. For this reason, they were critical of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (ERC) before its creation, during its work, and after it released its final report. From the very beginning, some NGOs expressed deep concern with the Advisory Council on Human Rights recommendations on which the ERC was based (El Hachimi, 2012). After the release of that final report, the most influential human rights NGOs in Morocco concluded that while the ERC could be considered a good step forward, it fell short in redressing past violations. They deemed the commission as fundamentally different from the Independent National Commission for Truth recommended by the national symposium for gross human rights violations, which the NGOs had jointly organized in 2001. The role of civil society is far from limited to advocating for the implementation of conventional mechanisms of transitional justice. In some cases, civil society has contributed to the development of specific transitional justice models. For example, in Uganda, the government’s decision to refer the armed conflict in Northern Uganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC) sparked a controversy on the compatibility of local traditional justice with international justice, portrayed as Western. Whereas some of Uganda’s civil society groups deemed Western justice as a means to ending the war in Northern Uganda, others argued that Western justice would likely have a negative impact on the peace process, and preferred traditional justice to the ICC (Tom, 2006). In Gambia, civil society played a role in monitoring the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission (TRRC). According to the TRRC: Civil society organizations are integral to the work of the TRRC as leaders in the educative, outreach and public engagement elements of the truth commission. The TRRC is committed to strengthening partnerships with civil society and is actively reaching out to these important stakeholders as partners and as watchdogs. (International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, 2020, p. 28)

Some civil society organizations were created amid armed conflict, which enabled them to play a role not only during the peacebuilding process but also during the conflict. For instance, in Liberia, human rights organizations begun during the civil war, such as the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission and the Center for Law and Human

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    391 Rights Education, played a significant part in documenting and exposing the human rights abuses and atrocities perpetrated by the warring factions (Toure, 2002).

Women’s Rights: Sub-​Saharan Africa, West Africa, and North Africa Women’s rights in Africa cannot be dissociated from civil society and human rights activism (Tripp, 2016). Because of the nature of the political systems in African countries, where authoritarianism, human rights violations, and radicalization combine to deny women’s rights, feminist groups active on the African continent had recourse to the conception of universal human rights discourse to engage in the women’s rights debates and advocate for changes in the laws and policies regarding gender equality (Tripp, 2019). We draw on the work of the Development Alternatives with Women for New Era (DAWN) network, in particular its publications Marketisation of Governance: Critical Perspectives from the South (Taylor, 2000) and Development Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women’s Perspectives (Sen & Grown, 1987), references that emanate from African women and analyze the political and economic global impacts on women’s rights and how African feminist movements responded to challenging global issues (Berger, 2014). We highlight the regional perspective in analyzing the issues of early and forced marriage, political representation, and gender-​based violence that African women’s movements address in their quest for universal human rights. According to UNICEF,1 about 40 percent of African girls are married before the age of 18, which prevents them from fulfilling their potential. Feminists throughout Sub-​ Saharan Africa use universal human rights discourses to fight against early and forced marriage, advocating and lobbying in rural and urban areas across South Africa, Nigeria, Malawi, Tanzania, Ghana, South Sudan, and Morocco to pressure governments to raise the legal marriage age to 18. They use online petitions, advocate in UN world meetings, and lobby against conservative beliefs about gender roles. One of the best examples of such a group is the network of NGOs called Girls Not Brides: The Global Partnership to End Child Marriage.2 To support their case that child marriage is a violation of human rights, including the right to choose, they cite several African human rights instruments, including article 21 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Nwosu, 2021; Yahaya, 2020). The Western African region focus is on the issue of political representation and quota systems as positive policies adopted by all African governments in response to the efforts of internal and external feminist human rights activists. In Niger, women’s organizations have been mobilizing since 2000 to ensure the implementation of a gender quota. These groups have supported female candidates and coerced political parties to respect the law. They also used international organizations such as the UN to present their agendas globally and put pressure on their respective governments. Six countries—​Burkina

392    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou Faso, Cabo Verde, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal—​have instituted quotas to promote women’s political participation at both the national and subnational levels. In Northern Africa the issue is gender-​based violence (Ennaji, 2011), and women’s groups there have joined the international community to fight against it. Women in Africa suffer multiple forms of domestic, public, institutional, and other forms of violence. Gender-​based antiviolence campaigns are commemorated every year in all African countries. Women’s organizations and the UN celebrate antivolence activism around the globe between November 26 (the International Day of the Elimination of Violence against Women) and December 10 (the International Day of Human Rights). The local and global networking on this issue has yielded some results. For example, all North African countries have written laws into their penal codes criminalizing rape and imposed severe punishments on offenders. And most now prohibit and criminalize the practice of female genital mutilation. Many countries in North Africa have made legislative and policy changes to address sexual harassment, criminalizing it in their penal codes and labor laws. The women’s rights–​human rights sector in civil society in Africa succeeded in pressuring authoritarian governments to adopt universal laws by, as already noted, adopting the human rights discourse as a universal referential (Fallon, 2010). Being aware that the global forces are beneficial for empowering women and achieving gender equality, women activists in Africa have operationalized the slogan “women’s rights are human rights.”

Ethnic and Religious Minority Rights: North and West Africa The ethnic and religious minority debate in Africa is one of the major sources of political division. Civil society and human rights organizations defend the rights of ethnic and religious minorities to avoid civil conflicts around these issues (Appiagyei-​Atua, 2012), mobilizing human rights discourse and activism to do so. We discuss examples of how civil society in some African countries intervened to avoid conflicts or to find solutions to already divisive issues (Ndhlovu, 2010). The human rights discourse was also adopted by the minority groups themselves to advocate for their rights. The minority debate on the African continent is rooted in the colonial era, when some minority groups and identities were made visible by colonialism to counter the dominant hegemonic nationalist groups. The latter were expected to solve the cases of ethnic and religious minorities in some African countries right after independences. The following section deals first with ethnic minority groups in selected subregions, in particular, the Amazigh in North Africa, and civil society peacebuilding involvement in West Africa. We will look at how these ethnic identities have either managed to become dominant or have been marginalized, depending on each regional context, bearing in mind colonialism, post-​independence nationalist movements, and the modern era, to

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    393 see to what extent the state and society succeeded or failed in ethnicity policy management from a human rights perspective.

The Amazigh Cultural Movements in North Africa Although the Amazigh as an indigenous minority group in North Africa saw its visibility universally acknowledged due to the use of human rights discourse, locally, mainly Algeria and Morocco became the most dynamic groups calling for cultural and ethnic recognition (Maddy-​Weitzman, 2011; Touhtou, 2021). The Moroccan Amazigh Cultural Movement (ACM) became known after the dissemination of the 2000 Manifesto; the Manifesto was written by Mohamed Chafik, one of the icons of the movement, where it laid down all the grievances of the Amazigh movement, calling the Moroccan State to constitutionalize and recognize the Amazigh culture and language in all spheres of life in Morocco.3 The ACM is made up of civil society associations scattered all over Morocco, mainly in the Rif region, the High and Middle Atlas areas, the Agadir region, and Rabat. The main mission of these NGOs is the defense of the Amazigh culture and language from a human rights perspective. One of the strategic tactics of the ACM is to seek membership in international bodies, mainly in the UN autochthon bodies, in order to put pressure on the Moroccan government and the regime to abide by international covenants related to Amazigh cultural and linguistic rights. In 2011 a reform of the constitution culminated in the recognition of the Amazigh language as a national language (Boukous, 2015). In Algeria, the Kabyle movement called for self-​determination in the region. After the assassination of a young Kabyle high school student in 2011, the movement shifted from cultural and linguistic demands to a push for political autonomy. It relies on the right of the people to self-​determination established in the 1945 UN charter. The third generation of human rights advocacy also recognizes the right of people to self-​determination, as enshrined in articles 1 and 2 of the international covenant on civil and Political Rights. Despite the ethnic and tribal dimensions of the Amazigh movements in North Africa, their use of civil society and human rights as universal democratic tools was meant to incarnate the universal demands of ethnic minority groups because this would make their cause universal and avoid political and civil conflicts in the region (Ennaji, 2019; Sánchez-​García, & Touhtou, 2020).

Civil Society Involvement in Peacebuilding in West Africa As we have seen in the North African case, ethnicity is a predicament in Africa (Poroma, & Iwuoha, 2018), following either ethnic or religious lines. In West Africa, civil society, through trade and student unions, women’s groups, and professional associations, was active in the struggles for independence. For example, the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) has been instrumental in conflict monitoring as part of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Early Warning and Response Network. Another example is the fight against small arms of the West Africa Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA), which called for the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms. Civil society works hard to raise awareness of the dangers of arms

394    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou production. There is also the Senegalese movement against small arms (MALAO) that is working with the government. These examples attest that the West African civil society is deeply involved in specific conflicts caused by ethnicity or religion, using universally acknowledged means of conflict resolution. In case of civil wars, for example, groups like the Inter-​religious Council of Liberia and of Sierra Leone, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network, and the Women in Peacebuilding Network have used diplomacy, trust, and citizen education about conflict resolution and reconciliation. Civil society in West Africa has worked closely with ECOWAS to implement instruments of conflict prevention, such as the 2008 Conflict Prevention Framework. The case studies of the ethnic and religious conflict resolution in Africa are clear examples of the adoption of universalism, which has built bridges in the debate and solved some thorny issues. It becomes clear that the universal human rights discourse and civil society activism can create peacebuilding and conflict resolution in some cases. Despite the heavy involvement of civil society organizations in the resolution of ethnic and religious conflicts, civil society and state relations are still at stake in most African societies. The next section focuses on various human rights challenges faced by the civil society in Africa.

The Challenges Human Rights NGOs Face in Africa It is clear from the above cases that civil society in Africa faces many structural challenges that can be summarized in relation to the nature of states and societies, the state’s relation to democracy, and universal human rights influences, mainly the traveling of the human rights discourse to Africa and its adoption by NGOs. This section deals with the principal difficulties faced by human rights NGOs in Africa in understanding the linkages between states and societies in Africa, the hindrances to the emergence of a genuine and effective civil society independent of states and playing the role of a watchdog. When looking at the recent developments in human rights, civil society, and NGOs in Africa, we focus on two main challenges: the financial dependence on foreign aid and trust and familiarity. The major challenge to human rights NGOs in Africa is their financial dependence on foreign donors (Hulme & Edwards, 1996). A recent study by the Human Rights Funding organization4found that Sub-​Saharan Africa ranked third in receipt of foreign human rights grants, at 9 percent in world totals. This is low when compared to North America, which received 54 percent. Inequality between direct grant reception and intermediary NGOs is huge. However, the foreign assistance to African NGOs is believed to consolidate liberal values in social and political reforms (Reimann, 2006; Matanga, 2010). Heavy dependence on foreign donors in the human rights sector can be conducive to independent activism vis-​à-​vis the African States, but it can be negative when NGOs are accused of promoting Western agendas in Africa and lose mass legitimacy. Moroccan

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    395 human rights NGOs have always been accused of being antinationalist in their criticism of state violations of human rights. A recent move by the Moroccan government5 tightened the funding going to human rights NGOs; the goal was to reduce their visibility in the public sphere by restricting international funding and pressuring them to declare their funding sources. In Egypt, Saad Eddine Ibrahim, founder of a human rights organization, was famously sentenced to three years in prison for accepting financial aid without government authorization.6 In Ethiopia, the government passed a proclamation7 in 2009 establishing barriers to NGO entry, which deprived NGOs receiving financial resources. NGOs cannot spend more than 30 percent of their budgets on administration and cannot accept anonymous donations. Local human rights NGOs in these cases are denied flexible access to international funding, which impacts their activities and activism. Foreign funding can be double-​edged sword when human rights organizations are criticized for supporting foreign agendas that disadvantage their nations. Local human rights groups are attacked and criticized for receiving foreign funding. A recent public opinion survey (Ron et al., 2017) of local human rights groups focused on the issue of trust8: What does it mean for human rights organizations and the work they do? The survey was conducted in Morocco and used the concept of familiarity, asking the question: Does the familiarity with local human rights groups increase trust in them or not? We think that familiarity with the work of human rights NGOs in Africa would make these NGOs not elitist as is the case now.9 However, the research showed that Human rights, language, people, and activities are often controlled by elites; hence, human rights NGOs have become “toproots” not “grassroots” (Crow et al., 2013). This challenge is related to the internal workings of NGOs and how they reach out to their beneficiaries or social base. As Makau Mutua (2008) has argued about the human rights sector in East Africa, “The human rights movement in the region is a rump extension of the so-​called international human rights movement, which originated and is headquartered in the industrial democracies of the West. The relationship between the international human rights NGOs and domestic NGOs rhymes in conception, mandate, methods of work, and funding” (p. 18). In East Africa, major NGOs are concentrated in the capital cities of Kampala, Dar es Salaam, and Nairobi. Human rights NGOs in East Africa are self-​appointed, unelected, usually individual-​driven, and run by an individual or an elitist group that determines the organization’s agenda and priorities. As the cases presented here show, the challenges human rights NGOs in Africa face are threefold: their financial dependence on foreign aid, the lack of a social base, and lack of familiarity with their work (Manji, & O’Coill, 2002).

Restrictive Laws and Policies One of the common challenges facing civil society and NGOs in Africa lies in the legal framework regulating the civic space in which they operate (Sigrist, 1979). This situation can be explained in light of the reasons related to the nature of the prevailing political systems on the continent. Most of the African societies are ruled by nondemocratic

396    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou regimes, ranging from the outright authoritarian to neo-​authoritarian or pseudo-​ democratic ones (Néfissa, 2004). Even in countries that experienced some kind of political reforms and hold elections, elected institutions often enjoy poor democratic legitimacy. Another root cause of the prevalence of restrictive laws lies in the long-​lasting conflicts that make a large number of African societies unstable. In 2019 at least 15 countries were engaged in active armed conflicts in Sub-​Saharan Africa (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020). The Horn of Africa has also been torn by various episodes of intra-​state or inter-​state conflicts, or both, over the last few decades (Redie, 2013). In North Africa, the internationalized war in Libya and the long-​drawn out dispute between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara are sources of concern for security in the region. Because of this general atmosphere of instability and insecurity, civil society in Africa has increasingly been challenged by a shrinking civic space. A study conducted in 2018 showed a growing trend of restricting civil society activism in Sub-​Saharan Africa from 1994 to 2016 (Smidt, 2018). In some cases, governments impose restrictions on the activities of civil society as a way to hide human rights abuses perpetrated by authorities. Some researchers have established a link between the frequency of human rights violations in a country and the likelihood that its government will impose restrictions on civil society (Smidt, 2018). In other words, it is argued that “while human rights abiding governments employ only few restriction types, African governments that more severely repress their citizens impose significantly more restrictions” (Smidt, 2018). Most of the civil society organizations that are targeted by restrictive measures are those with human rights and democratization agendas (Nega, & Schneider, 2014). Authoritarian regimes are more tolerant of service providers across the continent. This attitude is arguably due to the role this type of NGO plays in alleviating socioeconomic crises and preventing people from developing grievances. This was the case in Egypt under the Mubarak regime (Hassan, 2009) and in Morocco during the 1990s and 2000s (El Hachimi, 2014). The phenomenon was symptomatic of the ability of both regimes to tame associations and NGOs that emerged in the context of the European Union’s and the United States’ democracy-​promotion programs, and to push them to change their focus from defending human rights and advocating for political reform to providing social services (Hawthorne, 2004). The legal restrictions are mainly related to registration procedures and government discretion. In many countries the law provides for the compulsory registration of any group of persons wanting to work together to pursue objectives for common good. If such groups do not register as a formal legal entity, their activities will be outlawed. This is the case in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Algeria, and Morocco. Some countries have passed laws that criminalize unregistered civil society organizations, such as the Non-​ Governmental Organizations Act of Zambia, and the NGO Registration Act of Uganda. In countries such as Angola, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where registration is not mandatory, would-​be civil society organizations are often overloaded

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    397 with time-​consuming or costly bureaucratic hurdles, or both. Other obstacles that discourage activists to register can take various forms, such as dilatory registration procedures, costly administrative requirements, and the requirement of a large number of founders of the would-​be civil society organization. In addition to these legal restrictions, civil society organizations also face serious challenges related to their financial dependence on aid providers. In some cases, governments may resort to an orchestrated campaign of demonization of civil society activists and organizations, especially those working in the field of human rights and democracy. Some researchers (Aly, 2021; Ferrié, 2003; Lillehammer, 2003; Toepler et. al., 2020; Yabancı, 2022) have noted that some governments make a distinction between what they see as good NGOs (those who provide services and infrastructure), and what they describe as “bad civil society” (those focusing on human rights and democracy). The various forms of restrictive laws and policies are increasingly limiting civil space in Africa, challenging the ability of associations and NGOs to perform the roles and functions of civil society in a democratic system. However, there is a growing awareness among civil society organizations of the need to work together to promote civic space. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire the Coalition Ivoirienne des Défenseurs de Droits Humains has played a significant role in advocating for the adoption of the Law on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Defenders by the National Assembly in 2014 (CIVICUS, 2015).

Conclusion Civil society, NGOs, and human rights are vast sectors of study. The chapter has tried to capture the most dynamic dimensions, which have certain specificities. The African civil sphere, mainly as it relates to the discourses and practices of human rights, does not follow the Western, liberal perspective of states and societies that influence the civil sphere. The colonial and postcolonial trajectories of African societies have ruptures from the old, traditional lost systems of social capital and solidarity safety nets. The postcolonial trajectories of these societies when they try to imitate Western development models seem to have failed in major African societies, giving rise to forms of civic engagement from the perspective of the people trying to help themselves (Ogbenika, & Omondiale, 2020). This chapter captured these nuances, trajectories, and cases of civil society reckoning with the universal discourses and laws of human rights, focusing on the juxtaposition of universalism and relativism. Associations and NGOs in Africa thrive in traditional societies where notions of tribe, family relations, and primordial forms of solidarity appear to be obstacles to the emergence of modern civil society (Jamal, 2007; Touhtou, 2012). Although modern NGOs bloomed in Africa from the 1990s because of international aid, pressures from global civil society, and transnational corporations, the hybrid civil society specific to Africa could not break from the chains of traditionalism flourishing in African societies. Even this

398    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou hybrid modern civil society could not craft the democratic civic space, the condition sine qua non for the emergence of a civil society in the Western model. Transitional justice mechanisms and women’s rights are proof that the boundaries between traditionalism and modern civil society are not easily crossed. Indeed, it seems that cultural specificities still have a strong weight when dealing with these two issues in this hybrid civil society that tends to mobilize identity, cultural specificity, and antimodernity arguments when dealing with transitional justice mechanisms and women’s rights. To large segments of African societies, civil society was not a natural evolving process but one which was created with the availability of aid and donor organizations (Zeleza 2007; Walker, 2013). Civil society in Africa, this sector is increasingly challenged by the emergence of new forms of activism, mainly mobilizing in the arts, the street, and online. These new forms of activism have become widespread in the continent. The future of human rights and democracy in Africa is likely to depend more on these new forms of activism rather than on traditional civil society. As argued above and based on the conceptualization of civil society in Africa, the chapter concludes that many forms of societal organizations in Africa do not meet the universal requirements of the conception of civil society. However, this did not prevent them from struggling against authoritarian regimes. The chapter has shown cases from different countries in Africa where independent groups attempt reforming laws and advocate for social change.

Acronyms NGOs

Nongovernmental organizations

TRCs

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

ERC

Equity and Reconciliation Commission

ACM

Amazigh Cultural Movement

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

Notes 1. UNFPA and UNICEF Regional Offices West and Central Africa, (2018).Child Marriage in West and Central Africa At a Glance Report (p. 11). Dakar: UNFPA/​UNICEF.URL: https://​ www.uni​cef.org/​wca/​child-​marri​age 2. https://​www.gir​lsno​tbri​des.org 3. The Amazigh Manifesto is the political declaration by the Amazigh movement to call for a constitutional and social recognition of the Amazigh language and culture in Morocco; http://​www.amazi​ghwo​rld.org/​human​_​rig​hts/​moro​cco/​manife​sto2​000.php. 4. Ingulfsen, I, Miller, K & Thomas, R, (2021). Advancing Human Rights: Annual Review of Global Foundation Grant making. 2018 Key Findings. Candid and HRFN: New York. https://​hum​anri​ghts​fund​ing.org

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    399 5. Miridjanian, A. (2018). Au Maroc, des ONG de plus en plus Muselées. Liberation (28Janvier, 2018). https://​www.lib​erat​ion.fr/​plan​ete/​2018/​01/​28/​au-​maroc-​des-​ong-​de-​plus-​en-​plus​ -musel​ees_​1625​156/​ 6. Committee on Human Rights (2001). Report on the Case of Dr. Saad Eddine Mohamed Ibrahim, Imprisoned Sociologist, Cairo, Egypt, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicines. https://​www.nap.edu/​read/​10148/​ chap​ter/​2 7. Amnesty International's written statement to the 20th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, (2012), Ethiopia: The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation as a serious obstacle to the promotion and protection of human rights in Ethiopia. 18 June–​6 July.https://​ www.amne​sty.org/​en/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2021/​06/​afr​2500​7201​2en.pdf 8. The survey was conducted in the Global South, including Morocco. Data and analysis of the survey can be seen at https://​www.jamesf​rohl​ich.com/​_​fi​les/​ugd/​f4c8b5_​c1cc0​6af3​e114​ 9dab​d141​d325​41d4​879.pdf. 9. Ron, James & Golden, Shannon & crow, David (2013). The Struggle for a Truly Human M Rights Movement. Open Democracy. https://​www.opende​mocr​acy.net/​en/​openg​loba​lrig​ hts-​openp​age/​strug​gle-​for-​truly-​gra​ssro​ots-​human-​rig​hts-​move/​

References Aly, R. (2021). Islamic NGOs under different authoritarian regimes [Unpublished master’s thesis]. American University in Cairo]. https://​fount.auceg​ypt.edu/​etds/​1618 Appiagyei-​Atua, K. (2002). Civil society, human rights and development in Africa: A critical analysis. Peace Conflict and Development, 2, 1–​22. https://​www.bradf​ord.ac.uk/​libr​ary/​find​ -materi​als/​jour​nal-​of-​peace-​confl​ict-​and-​deve​lopm​ent/​Civ​ilSo​ciet​yAfr​ica.pdf Appiagyei-​Atua, K. (2012). Minority rights, democracy and development. African Human Rights Law Journal, 12, 69–​88. http://​www.sci​elo.org.za/​pdf/​ahrlj/​v12n1/​04.pdf Berger, I. (2014). African women’s movements in the twentieth century: A hidden history. African Studies Review, 57, 1–​19. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​asr.2014.89 Boukous, A. (2015). Amazigh constitutionalization in Morocco: Stakes and strategies. In X. Irujo, J.-​P. Massias, & I. Urrutia (Eds.), Droits Culturels et Démocratisation /​Cultural Rights and Democratisation (pp. 67–​75). Institut Universitaire Varenne. CIVICUS. (2012). State of civil society 2011 (CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation report). https://​www.civi​cus.org/​downlo​ads/​2011St​ateO​fCiv​ilSo​ciet​yRep​ort/​Stat​e_​of​_​civ​ il_​s​ocie​ty_​2​011-​web.pdf CIVICUS. (2015). State of civil society 2015(CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation report). https://​www.civi​cus.org/​index.php/​socs2​015 Collier, D., & Levitsky, S. (1997). Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual innovation in comparative research. World Politics, 49, 430–​451. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​wp.1997.0009 Crocker, D. (2015). Truth commissions, transitional justice and civil society. In R. I. Rotberg & D. Thompson (Eds.), Truth v. justice: The morality of truth commissions (pp. 99–​121). Princeton University Press. Crow, D., Shannon, G., & Ron, J. (2013, June 18). The struggle for a truly grassroots human rights movement. Open Democracy. https://​www.opende​mocr​acy.net/​en/​openg​loba​lrig​ hts-​openp​age/​strug​gle-​for-​truly-​gra​ssro​ots-​human-​rig​hts-​move/​

400    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou Dzikanai, B. (2020). Civil society leading transitional justice in Southern Africa: Lessons from Zimbabwe[Policy brief no. 29]. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. https://​media.afric​ apor​tal.org/​docume​nts/​IJR-​Pol​icy-​Brief-​No-​29-​Role-​of-​civil-​soci​ety-​WEB.pdf El Hachimi, M. (2012). Debating transitional justice in Morocco: Truth, justice and democracy in a reconciliation context. Lambert Academic Publishing. El Hachimi, M. (2014). Société civile et démocratisation au Maroc : Le grand malentendu. (21PapersIEMed, EuroMeSCo). https://​www.eurome​sco.net/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2017/​10/​ 201​406-​EuroMe​SCo-​Paper-​21.pdf Ennaji, M. (2011). Violence against women in Morocco: Advances, contentions and strategies to combat it. In F. Sadiqi & M. Ennaji (Eds.), Gender and violence in the Middle East (pp. 200–​217). Routledge. Ennaji, M. (2019). The Berber (Amazigh) movement in Morocco: Local activism, the state and transnationalism. In M. Ennaji (Ed.), Multiculturalism and democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of the Arab Spring (pp. 92–​113). Routledge. Fallon, K. M. (2010). Democracy and the rise of women’s movements in Sub-​Saharan Africa. Johns Hopkins University Press. Ferrié, J. N. (2003). Les limites de la démocratisation par la société civile en Afrique du Nord. Maghreb-​Machrek, 1, 175, 15–​ 34. https://​www.sci​ence​spo.fr/​ceri/​sites/​sci​ence​spo.fr.ceri/​ files/​artj​nf2.pdf Habermas, J. (1991). The public sphere. In C. Mukerji & M. Schudson (Eds.), Rethinking popular culture: Contemporary perspectives in cultural studies (pp. 398–​404). University of California Press. Hassan, H. A. R. (2009). The state and civil society in Africa: A North African perspective. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 3, 66–​76. https://​acade​micj​ ourn​als.org/​jour​nal/​AJP​SIR/​arti​cle-​full-​text-​pdf/​D8F8​E465​895.pdf Hawthorne, A. (2004). Middle Eastern democracy: Is civil society the answer? (Carnegie Papers no. 44). Democracy and Rule of Law Project. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://​carneg​ieen​dowm​ent.org/​files/​Carn​egie​Pape​r44.pdf Hulme, M., & Edwards, M. (1996). Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on nongovernmental organizations. World Development, 24, 961–​973. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​ 0305-​750X(96)00019-​8 Hutchful, E. (1996). The civil society debate in Africa. International Journal, 51, 54–​77. https://​ doi.org/​10.1177/​002​0702​0960​5100​103 International Coalition of Sites of Conscience. (2020). Transitional justice and the Gambia. ICC and the Global Initiative for Justice, Truth and Reconciliation. https://​www.siteso​fcon​ scie​nce.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2020/​03/​Engl​ish-​TJ-​in-​the-​Gam​bia.pdf Ingulfsen, I & Miller, K & Thomas, R, (2021). Advancing Human Rights: Annual Review of Global Foundation Grant making. 2018 Key Findings. New York, NY: Candid and HRFN. https://​www.issue​lab.org/​resour​ces/​38475/​38475.pdf. Jamal, A. (2007). Barriers to democracy: The other side of social capital in Palestine and the Arab world. Princeton University Press. Lillehammer, G. C. (2003). State-​NGO relationships in transitional democracies: The case of CPA-​ ONG-​a government center for the advancement of NGOs in Benin. United Nations Development Programme. http://​www.alb​acha​ria.ma/​xmlui/​bitstr​eam/​han​dle/​123456​789/​30544/​0292​ The%20st​ate-​NGO%20r​elat​ions​hip%20in%20t​rans​itio​nal%20demo​crac​ies.pdf?seque​nce=​1 Maddy-​Weitzman, B. (2011). The Berber identity movement and the challenge to North African states. University of Texas Press.

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    401 Makumbe, J. Mw. (1998). Is there a civil society in Africa? International Affairs, 74, 305–​317. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​1468-​2346.00018 Manji, F., & O’Coill, C. (2002). The missionary position: NGOs and development in Africa. International Affairs, 78, 567–​584. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​1468-​2346.00267 Matanga, F. K. (2010). NGOs and the politics of development in Africa. Development, 53, 114–​ 119. https://​doi.org/​10.1057/​dev.2009.91 Miridjanian, A, (2018, January 28). Au Maroc, des ONG de plus en plus Muselées. Liberation. https://​www.lib​erat​ion.fr/​plan​ete/​2018/​01/​28/​au-​maroc-​des-​ong-​de-​plus-​en-​plus-​musel​ ees_​1625​156/​ Morrell, P., & Pigou, P. (Eds.). (2004). Civil society and justice in Zimbabwe: Proceedings of a symposium held in Johannesburg, 11–​13 August. Themba Lesizwe. Mutua, M. (2008). Human rights NGOs in East Africa: Defining the challenges. In M. Mutua (Ed.), Human rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and normative tensions (pp. 13–​36). University of Pennsylvania Press. https://​core.ac.uk/​rea​der/​236358​800 Ndhlovu, F. (2010). Language politics in postcolonial Africa revisited: Minority agency and language imposition. Language Matters, 41, 175–​192. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​10228​ 195.2010.492​231 Néfissa, S. B. (2004). Introduction. In S. B. Néfissa, N. Abd al-​Fattah, S. Hanafi, & C. Milan. (Eds.), ONG et Gouvernance dans le Monde Arab (pp. 11–​28). Karthala. Nega, B., & Schneider, G. (2014). NGOs, the state, and development in Africa. Review of Social Economy, 72, 485–​503. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00346​764.2014.958​901 Neubert, D. (2011). Civil societies in Africa? Forms of social self-​organization between the poles of globalization and local socio-​political order (Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers No.12). University of Bayreuth. https://​epub.uni-​bayre​uth.de/​1697/​1/​BayW​orki​ngpa​per%20 CSN​eube​rtEn​d_​2.pdf Nwosu, B. (2021). Civil society and democracy in Nigeria: A theoretical approach. Routledge. Obadare, E. (2014). Introduction: Turning the table on Gellner: Alternative discourses of civil society in Africa. In E. Obadare (Ed.), The handbook of civil society in Africa (pp. 1–​3). Springer. Ogbenika, G. E., & Omondiale, D. (2020). A critique of civil society: The African experience. East African Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 2, 12–​19. https://​doi.org/​10.37284/​ eajis.2.1.157 Oyowe, O. A. (2014). An African conception of human rights? Comments on the challenges of relativism. Human Rights Review, 15, 329–​347. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s12​142-​013-​0302-​2 Paroma, C. L., & Iwuoha, P. P. (2018). Power struggle and crisis in Africa: Implications for foreign direct investment. International Journal of Advanced Academic Research: Social & Management Sciences, 4, 33–​41. https://​www.ijaar.org/​artic​les/​Volu​me4-​Numb​er7/​Soc​ial​ -Man​agem​ent-​Scien​ces/​ijaar-​sms-​v4n7-​jul18-​p3.pdf Patrick, J. J. (1996). Civil society in democracy’s third wave: Implications for civic education[Opinion paper]. Indiana University. https://​files.eric.ed.gov/​fullt​ext/​ED406​ 297.pdf PRIA. (2012). Civil society @ crossroads: Shifts, challenges, options? [Report by the Civil Society @ Crossroads initiative]. PRIA&INTRAC&CDRA&PSO&EASUN & ICD. https://​ www.int​rac.org/​wpcms/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2016/​09/​Civil-​soci​ety-​at-​a-​Cro​ssro​ads-​Glo​ bal-​Synthe​sis-​Rep​ort.pdf Poroma, C. L., & Iwuoha, P. P. (2018). Power struggle and crisis in Africa: Implications for foreign direct investment. International Journal of Advanced Academic Research Social &

402    Mohamed El Hachimi and Rachid Touhtou Management Sciences, 4, 7, 33–​41. https://​www.ijaar.org/​artic​les/​Volu​me4-​Numb​er7/​Soc​ial​ -Man​agem​ent-​Scien​ces/​ijaar-​sms-​v4n7-​jul18-​p3.pdf Redie, B. (2013). The horn of Africa: Intra-​state and inter-​state conflicts and security. Pluto Press and Nordic African Institute. Reimann, K. D. (2006). A view from the top: International politics, norms and the worldwide growth of NGOs. International Studies Quarterly, 50, 45–​68. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ j.1468-​2478.2006.00392.x Ron, J., & Golden, S., & Crow, D., (2013, June 18). The Struggle for a Truly Human M Rights Movement. Open Democracy. https://​www.opende​mocr​acy.net/​en/​openg​loba​lrig​hts​ -openp​age/​strug​gle-​for-​truly-​gra​ssro​ots-​human-​rig​hts-​move/​ Ron, J., Shannon, G., Crow, D., & Pandya, A. (2017). Taking root: Human rights and public opinion in the Global South. Oxford University Press. Sánchez-​García, J., & Touhtou, R. (2020). De la Hogra al Hirak: Neocolonialismo, memoria y disidencia política juvenil en el Rif. Revista Latinoamericanade Ciencias Sociales, Niñezy Juventud, 19, 1–​20. https://​doi.org/​10.11600/​rlc​snj.19.1.4591 Sen, G., & Grown, C. (1987). Development crises and alternative visions: Third world women’s perspectives. Monthly Review Press. https://​dawn​net.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​1987/​12/​Deve​ lopm​ent-​Cri​ses-​ad-​Alte​rnat​ive-​Visi​ons.pdf Shils, E. (1991). The virtue of civil society. Government and Opposition, 26, 3–​20. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1111/​j.1477-​7053.1991.tb01​120.x Sigrist, C. (1979). Regulierte Anarchie: Untersuchungzum Fehlen und zur Entstehungpolitischer Herrschaft in segmentären Gesellschaften Afrikas. Syndikat. Smidt, H. (2018). Shrinking civic space in Africa: When governments crack down on civil society (GIGA Focus Afrika, 4). GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. https://​nbn​ -resolv​ing.org/​urn:nbn:de:0168-​ssoar-​60572-​3 Staub-​Bernasconi, S. (2010). Human rights: Facing dilemmas between universalism and pluralism/​contextualism. In D. Zaviršek, B. Rommelspacher, &S. Staub-​Bernasconi (Eds.), Ethical dilemmas in social work (pp. 9–​23). University of Ljubljana. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2020). SIPRI yearbook 2021: Armed conflict and peace processes in Sub-​Saharan Africa. Oxford University Press. Taylor, V. (2000). Marketisation of Governance: Critical feminist perspectives from the South. University of Cape Town. https://​dawn​net.org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​artic​les/​market​isat​ion-​of​ -gov​erna​nce-​allpa​ges.pdf Toepler, S., Zimmer, A., Frohlich, C., & Obuch, K. (2020). The changing space for NGOs: Civil society in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Voluntas, 31, 649–​662. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​ s11​266-​020-​00240-​7 Tom, P. (2006). The Acholi traditional approach to justice and the war in Northern Uganda. Website: Beyond tractability (August, 2006). https://​www.beyon​dint​ract​abil​ity.org/​casest​ udy/​tom-​ach​oli Touhtou, R. (2012). Debating civil society in Morocco: Dynamics of gender, development and social capital. Lambert Academic Publishing. Touhtou, R. (2021). Morocco: Breaking the mold case studies. Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs. American University of Beirut (AUB). https://​www.aub. edu.lb/​ifi/​Pages/​civil-​soci​ety-​act​ors-​and-​pol​icy-​mak​ing/​proje​cts/​break​ing-​the-​mold-​case​​ -stud​ies/​sor​ted-​by/​coun​try/​moro​cco-​case-​stud​ies.aspx Toure, A. (2002). The role of civil society in national reconciliation and peacebuilding in Liberia, International Peace Academy. Project on a Civil Society. International Peace

Civil Society, NGOs, and Human Rights in Africa    403 Academy. https://​www.ipi​nst.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​publi​cati​ons/​repor​t_​ci​vil_​soci​ ety.pdf Tripp, A. M. (2016). Women’s movements in Africa. In A. Basu (Ed.), Women’s movements in the global era: The power of local feminisms (pp. 1–​28). Routledge. Tripp, A. M. (2019). Seeking legitimacy: Why Arab autocracies adopt women’s rights. Cambridge University Press. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​978110​8348​621 Yabancı, B. (2022). Civil society and latent mobilisation under authoritarian neoliberal governance. In I. Borsuk, P. Dinç, S. Kavak, & P. Sayan (Eds.), Authoritarian neoliberalism and resistance in Turkey (pp. 211–​234). Palgrave Macmillan. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​981-​16​ -4213-​5_​10 Yahaya, M. (2020). Civil society organizations and the promotion of democracy in the Nigeria’s fourth republic. [Conference paper]. The International Seminar on Regional Politics, Administration and Development (INSORPAD2020), STISIPOL Raja Haji, Riau, Indonesia. Zeleza, P. T. (2007). The struggle for human rights in Africa. Canadian Journal of African Studies /​Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, 41, 474–​506. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 00083​968.2007.10751​366 Walker, N. (2013). Universalism and particularism. In C. Holder & R. David (Eds.), Human rights: The hard questions (pp. 39–​58). Cambridge University Press.

VI

CRIME AND V IOL E N C E

Chapter 22

Criminol o gy i n A fri c a Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile

Introduction This chapter reviews seminal works by a representative sample of scholars and seeks to chart a way forward toward a decolonization-​centered, liberation criminology in Africa. The problems of deviance and social control are older than the social science theories about them, which tend to pretend that any knowledge about criminology as a discipline in Africa is a product of the West. Ideas about deviance and social control are found in every society (Pfohl, 1994). Agozino (2003) theorized that criminology is a technology designed for the control of others under colonial conditions. This helps to explain why the discipline flourishes in former colonizing countries and settler-​colonial locations but remains relatively absent in former colonized countries and calls for a sustained decolonization of the field. Criminology in Africa by Mwena Mushenga (2004) brings together an unusual number of African authors and includes chapters on an impressive variety of topics on the theme, starting with one on precolonial and colonial Africa, though with the usual deference to Western thought. A chapter on theory examines labeling perspectives in Africa. Yet, though the decolonization process is mentioned a few times, there was no effort to explore the decolonization paradigm in criminology. Instead, the book, which was published first in Rome in 1992 and then republished in Nairobi in 2004, covered topics such as the rights of individual victims of crime, ritual murder, violence as a weapon of the poor, and crimes of the state; it also included reviews of national constitutions and criminal procedures in some countries, as if it were a work of Western criminology. The African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies was launched in 2005 by the African Criminology and Justice Association. It publishes different perspectives on criminology and criminal justice, but most of the contributors continue to adhere to Western paradigms. The South African Crime Quarterly is similar in that it represents conventional criminology, at the relative neglect of critical criminology. The Routledge

408    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile Handbook on Africana Criminologies has outlined the rich body of knowledge that criminologists may be missing by neglecting critical contributions from and about Africa (Agozino et al., 2020). The preferred approach in criminology on Africa is similar to what Edward Said (1978) theorized as orientalism; that is, there is an assumption that Africans and Indigenous peoples are inferior to Europeans and must be subjected to apartheid in colonies. Maureen Cain (2000) applied the theory of orientalism to criminology in Europe and concluded that more critical thought was needed. Bill Dixon (2004) examined the role of critical thought in the transition to democracy in South Africa and found that it did not conform to the “puzzle” of Left Realism in Britain (suggesting that the left does not take crime seriously at the working class level). In South Africa, critical scholars were engaged in the anti-​apartheid struggle but also focused on the nonviolent resolution of disputes within the community. When it came to the poor-​against-​poor crimes that ruin real lives in working-​class communities, the Left Realists just assumed that critical criminologists did not consider them an important concern. But to the Left Realists, crime was not just a myth created by the gutter press; it was something happening in the community that Black leaders needed to take seriously because of its tendency to divide and weaken the working class. Paul Gilroy (1982) dismissed the orientalist concern with Black crime by those who professed to be Left Realists because there is “no such thing as” Black criminality (crime does not have a skin color). Critical criminologists are not always Left Idealists, contrary to the caricatures drawn by Left Realism. At the Institute of Criminology in the University of Cape Town, critical criminologists attempted to expose the crimes of the state (though they were not hidden) to oppose the views of nationalist criminology that supported apartheid. They also paid attention to informal justice and nonviolent dispute resolution, given the mass violence that accompanied the transition to democracy. The philosophy of nonviolence is relevant to criminology in Africa. Readers may wonder if this is realistic. Students may ask, is there a realistic alternative to the incarceration of violent offenders? What about the victims’ lobby that has grown up in many parts of Africa? We answer that penal abolitionism is the original form of response to deviance and not an “alternative.” Imperialist reasoning in criminology is the more recent “alternative.” Considering that Indigenous peoples existed for millennia without the repressive fetishes of the commodity form in law, we can certainly learn from our original forms of social organization, even as we rely more on reparative justice to address the concerns of the victimized. The role that Ubuntu criminology played in the transition to democracy in South Africa remains to be fully theorized by criminologists. Elechi (2020) and other scholars have identified the Ubuntu form of cultural unity of Africa when it comes to nonviolent dispute resolution mechanisms that make prisons obsolete, in answer to Angela Davis’s (2003) rhetorical question, Are prisons obsolete? Gilmore (2007) also denounced the “Golden Gulag” in California prison industrial complex. Africa still has prisons today, but some African states have abolished capital punishment. Critical criminology in Africa should ask why the post-​apartheid state and the postcolonial states in Africa

Criminology in Africa    409 have retained the repressive fetishes of militarized policing and excessive incarceration imposed by the Europeans, and why criminologists accept them as the norm? Archie Mafeje (2008, p. 65) may have helped to answer the above questions when he noted in his seminal work that colonial scholarship contained two ideologies—​idealism and materialism—​and concluded that “liberalism is hegemonic and fully elaborated on in social sciences.” Liberalism, or conservatism, with its emphasis on the punishment of offenders, is the ideology that dominates criminology in Africa and elsewhere, and it almost turns a blind eye to the crimes by the state as theorized by Frantz Fanon (1963). The hegemonic explanatory frameworks that various institutions deploy and use to influence policy are endemic in academic institutions, which has resulted in what Sabelo Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2012) has termed a “crisis in epistemology.” This situation has been exacerbated by the refusal of knowledge makers to adopt epistemologies of the global South and by their shameless reliance on epistemologies of the West without critiquing their applicability in Africa or relevance to its history and the rich literature that the liberation struggles produced (Dastile & Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2020). Engagements with this Western dominance by scholars in the global South have been few and far between. The excellent history of criminology in the United Kingdom by David Garland (1995) dates the discipline to 1959 and Cambridge University’s establishment of the Institute of Criminology, but without reference to the decolonization struggle in Africa that was peaking at about the same time. Ahire (1990) offers a historical account of the imposition of colonial policing as a militarized occupation, which was modeled on the militarized police force in colonized Ireland rather than on the police service presumed to be the norm in England, where policing retained authoritarian colonialist assumptions that were racist, sexist, and imperialist—​and opposed by most peace-​loving people. Hall et al. (1978) called for the history of law-​and-​order societies like the United Kingdom to include a thorough accounting of the policing of the enslaved and the colonized. This chapter begins with an overview of the history of criminology in various parts of Africa and then offers a critique of the current state or status of criminology in various parts of Africa. It then presents an extensive and expansive discussion of the terrain that the criminology of Africa should follow. Finally, the conclusion highlights a few lessons that criminology could learn from the original contributions to knowledge found in African history.

Historical Overview of Criminology in Africa The historical overview presented in this section does not attempt to be a comprehensive history of the different traditions in criminology. It is meant to set the stage for a possible debate on the historical overview of criminology in Africa by identifying the original African Indigenous justice system and its emphasis on reparative justice, which is in

410    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile contrast to the Western alternative of punitive justice (Agozino, 2021). Whereas Western schools of thought always pair crime and punishment as if they are conjoined twins, the discourse on deviance in precolonial Africa did not always involve the hauntology of punitiveness (Saleh-​Hanna, 2015). Diop (1991) demonstrated that precolonial Black Africa was orderly and safe for foreign travelers. Kassala Kamara (1995) reported that, among its other exemplary policies, Africa should be lauded for the peaceful resolution of an uprising in Damascus, when instead of going to war to maintain imperial rule, the pharaoh invited the prince of Damascus to the palace and granted the principality independence. The ancient Egyptians left written accounts of the virgin birth of Horus, also known as the sun God Ra. The Virgin mother, Isis, got pregnant through artificial insemination, but did not seek punishment for the brother who killed her husband, Osiris, necessitating the recovery of the swallowed seeds of Osiris from a fish in the river. Karenga (2004) and Asante (2011) remind us that Africans used the jurisprudence of the Egyptian goddess, Ma’at, to maintain order, balance, reciprocity, morality, and justice without mass incarceration. When an eloquent peasant was robbed by a top official, he patiently and passionately pleaded his case and won, without obsessing about the punishment for the offender. Biblical accounts illustrate this philosophy in what Martin Luther King Jr. called the “thrilling tale” of Moses going down to Egypt and telling the pharaoh to “let my people go.” No punishment. Forgiveness. Jacques Derrida (2001) tried to trace the origins of forgiveness in judicial philosophy from the “religions of the Book.” He found that the holy books of all three of the major Middle Eastern religious traditions share an emphasis on the teaching of forgiveness, but each also believes that some things are not forgivable; whereas in Derrida’s view, forgiveness of the unforgivable is the best form of forgiveness. Derrida found that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa had demonstrated that the forgiveness of the unforgivable is more common in African traditions. Despite the injustices that people of African descent have suffered since slavery, they were not seeking revenge or punishment; they mostly seek reparative justice. The restorative justice in South Africa and the Gacaca justice in the wake of the Rwanda genocide show that even when crimes are unforgivable, Africans have formally drawn more than punitiveness from Ubuntu to try to heal the society. Desmond Tutu and Mpho Tutu (2014) observed that nothing is unforgivable, and that there is nobody who does not deserve to be forgiven under the philosophy of Ubuntu—​ the bundle of “humanity.” Achebe (2012) captured this idea when he wrote about the symbolism of Mbari sculptures, which are built by elected representatives from the community, who are isolated to commune with the spirits in the forest and build a miniature mud house peopled with characters from all over the world, and plants, animals, and spirit figures all living under one roof, to show how accommodating and tolerant the people are. Martin Luther King Jr. (1968) described his vision of a “world house,” where people of all races can cohabit in a beloved community or fight and burn it down in chaos.

Criminology in Africa    411 Without reference to classical African culture and knowledge systems, Igbinovia (1989) sketches criminology in Africa as an academic study that was introduced in Ghana by the colonizers in 1952. That history of the present also neglects the history of the criminalization of Africans by European enslavers, who built pens in which to hold kidnapped Africans, as if they were offenders in the penitentiary. Igbinovia described the other developments in the field by referring to the criminal justice research institutes that were formed in various countries, especially in South Africa and Egypt. This history is ahistorical because it ignores the original theories developed by Africans for addressing deviance and social control. Igbinovia bemoaned the lack of development of the discipline of criminology in Africa, calling it “stillborn” in the sense that it has not grown much and appears to be dead. This dead-​on-​arrival birth of criminology in Africa was also noted by Clifford (1974), who had recommended the adoption of failed policies from the West in Africa. To quote Igbinovia (1989): “Crime has only rarely been studied, attention having been given to the development of the basic social sciences and to providing the emerging territories with the teachers, doctors, lawyers and other professional men which they need” (p. v). Citing Clifford, Igbinovia asserts that even other social science subjects are underdeveloped within Africa based on the presumption that development equals Westernization rather than decolonization. Another factor in this underdevelopment is that Africa had concerned itself with other pressing problems in the newly independent countries, which seemed more important. As Brillon (1980, quoted in Igbinovia, 1989, p. v) noted, “In developing countries, too many economic and social priorities seem to be sharing the meagre budgets for much attention to be given to the crime situation . . . the politicians know very well that ‘an empty stomach has ears’ and that it is more practical politically to try to raise the peoples’ standard of living and thus establish their authority more clearly.” This view fails to explain why crime is rampant even in the well-​fed European and North American countries, where repressive rule remains, prompting calls for the defunding of the police and the abolition of prisons (Davis, 2005; Gilmore, 2007). The fragmented nature of the crime data in Africa has also led to a neglect of the development of criminology. Igbinovia (1989) noted that much of what passes for knowledge about crime and criminality in Africa is European in origin, adding that most of the pioneering researchers in African criminology have been Europeans rather than Africans. The few native-​born African criminologists there are have been trained in Europe and the Americas, though some have, nonetheless, managed to develop ideas that are critical of Western criminology (Agozino, 2020). These imported criminological ideas leave the African criminologist ill-​equipped to analyze deviance and social control in African states (Igbinovia, 1989, p. vii), just as mainstream criminology in the West has focused on punishment and neglected social justice. The dependence on Western criminology scholarship in Africa was acknowledged by Brillon (1980), who noted that not only did African criminologists confine their studies to modern systems of criminal justice, but they also confined their research to urban areas, where “true criminal behavior”—​that is, the crimes that most resemble

412    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile those of industrialized nations—​is concentrated. Brillon concluded that because of their training, African criminologists were more inclined to adopt macrosociological approaches to criminology than microsociological ones. The net result, described by Igbinovia (1989), was that the African criminologist “generalises observations and ignores the specific characteristics of the tribal groups” (pp. vii–​viii). Igbinovia’s reference to “tribal groups” is strange because what Europeans call tribal groups do not exist in Africa, and there is no record of genocide against one ethnic nationality by another prior to the slave raids and colonization by Europeans, according to Rodney (1972). But Igbinovia cautioned that “if African criminology is not to stagnate and if African criminologists are to make some meaningful contributions towards alleviation of the crime problem on the continent, they cannot afford to rely solely on imported ideas. By the same token they cannot afford to be islands unto themselves” (1989, p. viii). In contrast to the idealism of Igbinovia, Walter Rodney (1972) offered a materialist explanation for criminology when he wrote that talking about the maintenance of law and order in Africa under colonial rule was just a polite way of talking about maintaining the conditions that enabled the exploitation of Africa. A civilization that proves incapable of solving the problems it creates is a decadent civilization (Pinkham, 1972). By this, Pinkham was inferring that colonization is an organized crime problem created by decadent Europeans’ domination of the world. In the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized there is only room for forced labor, intimidation, pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, and degraded masses (Fanon, 1963). Colonization equals oppression and exploitation, aided by criminologists who strive to maintain law and order instead of supporting reparative justice and decolonization struggles (Agozino, 2003).

A Critique of the Current State of Criminology in Africa The discipline of criminology that was introduced in Africa was aligned with the continent’s colonization (Agozino, 2003). However, it is important for criminologists based elsewhere in the world to study and learn from the history of criminological knowledge in Africa, just as Africans study authors in other parts of the world. Criminologists who do so will find that the philosophy of nonviolence is the most important lesson that Indigenous African criminology can teach the world. Gandhi (1928) wrote in his autobiography that it was the Zulu who had taught him the philosophy of nonviolence before he took it to India to help the country regain its independence without seeking to mutiny or to punish the colonizers. Stephen Pfohl (1994) provides a comprehensive history of deviance and social control and concludes that Angela Davis’s (2003) call for a more humane society free of racism, sexism, poverty, prisons, war, and homophobia is worthy of having the support of criminologists. According to Davis (2005), it was W. E B. Du Bois who emphasized that the abolition of slavery helps to deepen democracy,

Criminology in Africa    413 and so abolition democracy remains a struggle that should be supported by all to avoid policies like convict–​leasing, disenfranchisement, and using the terror of lynching to reintroduce slavery (Du Bois, 1935). Criminology in Africa denies the abolitionist starting point and instead engages in philosophical debates about crime and punishment from Western perspectives. We agree with Agozino (2003) that criminology in Africa should go beyond the study of the law-​enforcement institutions that were imposed by colonizers for the purpose of dominating the people. Onyeozili et al. (2021) have responded to the increasing insecurity across Africa by recommending support for the ways that the communities resolve conflict by themselves nonviolently, pointing out that the militarized policing imported from Europe and North America results in protests, such as #EndSARS (Special Anti-​ Robery Squad) in Nigeria. We argue that the discipline of criminology should be seen as a problem imposed by what Agozino (2003), following bell hooks (1994) and Angela Davis (1981), theorized as racist-​sexist-​imperialist reason. The problem of criminology in Africa arose from the conflation of physiology with behavior in the work of Lombroso (1911), where the atavistic stigmata were said to be the African features of Sicilians that supposedly made them throwbacks to earlier stages of evolution. Therefore, they supposedly remained born criminals, who should not be punished (because they were not using free will) but should be given medicalized treatment to address the determinism of their conditions by forces beyond their control. Nelson Mandela (1994) fell into the trap of biological determinism when he wrote that he believed that some people were born to be criminals, even though, according to his own party politics, criminality was a socially constructed discourse of power in what Stuart Hall (1980, 2016) theorized as societies structured in dominance. Hall argued that a study of cheap labor in apartheid South Africa shows that authoritarian populism not only harms Black people but also adversely affected all poor people who risked their lives fighting for apartheid or voted for the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, mainly because the Left did not offer a credible alternative. The strategy of criminology in Africa should be based on broad, encompassing alliance-​and coalition-​ building against racism, sexism, and imperialism, and should not be what Stan Cohen (1988) called the “made for export criminology” based on ideas developed for Europe and North America that failed to reduce crime in those societies but were supposed to magically work when transplanted to Africa. As long as criminology in Africa hides its locus of enunciation and instead prefers to start its own critique of crime based on statistical inferences, then the decolonization turn and thus its development must be forgotten. At the moment, criminology, like some other disciplines that have yet to be decolonized in Africa, is driven by racist, sexist, imperialist, capitalist, and heteropatriarchal logics of domination, exploitation, and the dehumanization experienced by those people rendered as premodern but that ultimately hurts the entire society (Cabral, 2016; Dastile & Ndlovu Gatsheni, 2020). Criminology in Africa should also address harm reduction, or “zemiology,” even when the harm is caused by perfectly legal activities by the state and by corporations that frequently get

414    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile away with mass murder, such as in the case of tobacco’s killing of millions of people annually (Canning & Tombs, 2021). The question of who is a criminal in Africa needs to be examined from zemiological perspectives that emphasize the harms done to individuals and groups (Canning & Tombs, 2021). This will make it possible for criminologists to mobilize support and work toward decolonization in Africa by turning away from punitiveness and leaning more toward the Ma’at philosophy that values harmony (Asante, 2011; Karenga, 2004). African scholars cannot afford to remain enchanted and allow themselves to be seduced by empiricism when engaging with criminology in Africa. It can currently be seen that they indeed suffer from the “racial melancholia” (a desire to be White) that Ngugi wa Thiongo (2006) critiqued in The Wizard of the Crow, wherein corrupt politicians suffered from a desire for whiteness, and it took the activism of poor women to heal the society. According to Western writers, criminology in Africa should be considered part of the modernization process (Clifford, 1974; Clinard & Abbott, 1973). During apartheid, some suggested that African countries should adopt a policy of urban segregation to control the masses of the poor, and others recommended that corruption should be seen as a tool for the primitive accumulation of capital for development. Claude Ake (2000) dismissed such political theories of development in Social Science as Imperialism. Stan Cohen (1988) encouraged scholars interested in criminology in Africa to follow Fanon (1963) and abandon ineffective “made for export criminology” from the West. In his critique of modernization theories, Archie Mafeje (2008, p. 60) describes them as empirically invalid and theoretically wanting by their own standards. Sadiki and Steyn (2022) note that the criminology discipline has made only limited attempts to decolonize criminology in Africa. The study of deviance and social control that the discipline seeks to unravel is concentrated on subjects it dismally fails to understand. Agozino (1997, 2003) has called, not just for a liberatory curriculum in criminology, but for a decolonization of criminological theory, methodology, and policy. Criminology will be enriched by embracing and learning from the history of the struggles against injustice in Africa and by people of African descent globally (Agozino, 2020; Du Bois, 1898).

Critique of Empiricism and Positivism Bagele Chilisa (2012) and Linda Smith (1999) have offered thorough critiques of positivism in social research and concluded that Indigenous methodologies that emphasize the connections between researchers and the community with an emphasis on healing would be more appropriate, especially in Africa and under settler-colonialism. Lotter (2020) observes that criminology is “obsessed with empirical work” resulting in the neglect of “structural oppressions such as racism, inequality, poverty and unemployment as if they were not potentially criminogenic factors” (p. 106). Although he is speaking about the South African context, one wonders what the rest of Africa’s criminology landscape looks like. Not much different.

Criminology in Africa    415 A continent that has been bedeviled by slavery, colonialism, and other ills should be able to develop decolonization frameworks for analysis instead of following imperialist reason. Unlike all of the other social science disciplines, such as anthropology, that have attempted to decolonize knowledge, criminology has remained stagnant and disciplinary-​decadent. Criminology has failed to come to a realization that it is based on knowledge that “was never free” (Gordon, 2011, p. 95). For instance, Gordon (2011) questions the very existence of methodological frameworks in previously colonized countries, and the methodology, as follows: “If the epistemic condition of social life is colonized, would not that infection reach also the grammatical level as well? Put differently, couldn’t there be colonization at the methodological level as well? (p. 97). If so, then any presumed method, especially from a subject living within a colonized framework, could then generate continued colonization. Criminology in Africa, he notes, has followed an inward path, looking only within its racist theoretical boundaries to partially explain criminality and offending. As universities in Africa start establishing criminology programs, they should be aware that, according to Lotter (2020) “criminology as a mode of analysis and form of knowledge, is itself in need of ideological critique, in the form of broader framing, formulations and analyses, in order to expose the ideological function it both serves and has served in concealing and perpetuating the crimes of, and social oppression created by, the ruling elite” (p. 108). The work of Cunneen and Tauri (2016) on Indigenous criminology globally is applicable to Africa because it emphasizes the continued oppression of Indigenous people and the poor by imperialist-​sexist-​racist authorities. Blagg and Anthony’s (2019) call for the decolonization of criminology with reference to Indigenous peoples is also relevant to the work of criminology in Africa. Lotter (2020) argues that the institutional blind spot of insisting on empirical results leads to a serious neglect of the context of crime: “The suppression of context is always dangerous, as it leaves us nothing to read with. We are simply faced by an intimidating monolith and stark choice between complete and unconditional acceptance or unthinking rejection” (Macey, cited in Lotter, 2020, p. 110). Lack of context results in an inability to grasp how and why structural oppressions are criminogenic. What is needed is not only a theory of crime but also a more powerful critique of crime. Marxist criminology is more concerned with the political economy of deviance and social control, which benefits from and perpetuates crime in order to profit from it, than it is with the questions arising from a concern with the causes of crime (Agozino, 2003). Critiques of critical criminology have moved past causal explanations of crime to emphasize a form of correctional criminology in which the questioning of political and social control would take precedence over behavioral and correctional issues. The limited relevance of statistical criminology must be mentioned because, even in Western criminology, the top scholars are not statisticians but theorists, whereas graduate education in Africa overemphasizes the quantitative method and neglects theoretical training. As noted above, Western criminology is stuck in an epistemic impasse: “Our post colonial, postmodern world which is teeming with complex, even wicked, problems (such as crime in an increasingly unequal society) renders purely empirical

416    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile study inadequate for making any meaningful intellectual headway” (Lotter, 2020, p. 112). As Jean-​Paul Sartre observed in the preface to Fanon (1963): “Our methods are out of date.”

The Prison-​Industrial Complex There were no prisons in Africa prior to colonization, and many of the existing overcrowded prisons across Africa were built by the colonizers (Agozino, 2005). Criminology in Africa should commit to penal abolitionism to shift funds toward meeting the needs of the people. Dastile and Agozino (2019) observed that the imprisonment of women in the then newly democratic South Africa demonstrates the need to abolish prisons in Africa, where our people had managed to resolve disputes nonviolently for thousands of years before Africa was conquered and colonized by Europe. The institutional apparatus was fanning incarceration rates and generating top dollars from the perpetual recycling of (ex)offenders in stigmatizing, shaming cultures like those found in South Africa and the United States. Put another way, imprisonment as the dominant sentencing regime is ripe for an ideological critique (Lotter, 2020). Communities that are subject to surveillance are the most likely to produce bodies for the punishment industry. But even more important, imprisonment is the punitive solution for a whole range of social problems that are not being addressed by the kinds of social institutions that might help people to lead better and more satisfying lives (Davis, 2005). The prison has failed to deliver what it had promised (inroads on crime and recidivism), and from the point of view of the test of immanent criticism, it has botched the test on its own terms by fanning recidivism to the point of shamefully pursuing another altogether fraudulent agenda (Lotter, 2020). The prison-​industrial complex operates according to a business model that is not for the benefit of combating crime and slashing recidivism but, rather, has the opposite effect by encouraging crime. Recycling ex-​ offenders in and out of prison and portraying the poor as criminogenic are among other tricks of the trade of criminology (Lotter, 2020; Box, 1983). Analysis by way of ideological critique has been valuable in showing that incarceration has failed on its own terms by abandoning the ideal of rehabilitation and pursuing an illegitimate agenda, the prison-​industrial complex, which has actually encouraged an increase in crime rates. The discipline of criminology in Africa has been obsessed with empirical results, but this focus on the so-​called objective realm of empirical data (which, considering its political bias, is anything but objective) is actually a smokescreen concealing its ideological function of protecting the ruling classes (Lotter, 2020). Lotter (2020) provided examples of how incarceration, when it was managed by the now defunct company Bosasa, the private company that specialized in providing prison services in South Africa but was implicated in corruption allegations. It was driven by profit and benefited from inflating prices (of large television screens, for example). Nonviolent-​resolution resources could

Criminology in Africa    417 have been used to reduce prison overcrowding and help to usher in a future without the prison-​industrial complex in Africa. The critical criminology’s contributions to knowledge cannot be said to be lacking in objectivity because of the use of both objective and subjective faculties or what Agozino (1999) theorized as “committed objectivity in race-​class-​gender research.” Critical Scholars tend to reject objectivity and embrace subjectivity while conservative authors prefer objectivity and claim to reject commitment but decolonization requires both objectivity and commitment. The idea of the return of the repressed coincides with Foucault’s (1977) idea of a floating surplus population, although Foucault neglected to analyze colonial and anticolonial power struggles. This ties in with a politicized labeling of ex-​offenders that is counterproductive and criminogenic and drives recidivism. The idea of the return of the repressed, as is seen in recidivism, is relevant here because of a failure to sustainably resettle ex-​offenders. Labeling casts ex-​offenders out into a harsh, stigmatizing, shaming environment, driving the formerly incarcerated from mainstream society into the arms of criminal subcultures as they try to re-​enter society from prison subcultures, and vice versa (Lotter, 2020).

Toward a Liberation Criminology in Africa Liberation sociology was developed by Joe Feagin et al. (2015) as an advancement on public sociology, which could be engaged in by right-​wing scholar activists. Feagin et al.’s book contains multiple citations to the work of Agozino as examples of liberation sociology in criminology, along with the work of Du Bois and Marx. A collaboration between Agozino and Ducey, who was also one of Feagin’s coauthors, elaborated on the ideas of liberation criminology and public sociology based on what they learned from the work of liberation fighters (Agozino & Ducey, 2020). As more universities in Africa begin to develop criminology teaching and research programs, instead of allowing the settler-​colonial location of South Africa to monopolize the institutionalization of the discipline, it becomes even more necessary to decolonize the discipline. One response to disciplinary decadence has been interdisciplinarity, which criminology in Africa has failed to engage in. Gordon (2011) argues that while it may be a starting point, “interdisciplinarity too is a decadent structure. This is because the presumed disciplinary completeness of each discipline is compatible with disciplinary decadence. Disciplines could work alongside each other, like ships passing in the night” (p. 99). A more hopeful option is transdisciplinarity, where disciplines work through each other, though it, too, is susceptible to decadence if it fails to bring reality into focus. Nonetheless, it still promises much because it calls for what Gordon describes as the “teleological suspension of disciplinarity.” By that, he means the willingness to go beyond “disciplinary boundaries in the production of knowledge,” pointing

418    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile out that “teleological suspensions of discipline are also epistemic decolonial acts.” Subjects of dehumanizing social institutions suffer a paradoxical melancholia. They live in a haunted precolonial past, in a critical relation to the colonial world from which they are born, and a desire for a future, in which, if they enter, they are yoked to the past. A true new future stimulates anxiety because it appears, at least at the level of identity, as suicide. The constitution of such subjectivity is saturated with loss without refuge (Gordon, 2011). Criminology in Africa is coming at a time when scholars in other disciplines have already identified and dealt with the failures of modernity. Modernity is premised on Western science, which was marketed as being able to positively “solve all forms of obstacles facing humanity ranging from disease, poverty, ignorance, to oppression” (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2012, p. 1). There is a need to add deviance and social control into this mix. It was hoped that the introduction of Western-​style rehabilitation programs, would reduce crime, but the rehabilitation of individuals in deviant political economies will not solve the problem. Rehabilitation is a phenomena of modernity, which itself has been found to be “lacking in providing modern solutions to modern problems.” Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2012) argues that Africa needs to “escalate intellectual and academic interventions to the higher and practical level of unthinking some of the assumptions of dominant social science, mainly because many of its presumptions which were once considered liberating of the spirit, serve today as the central intellectual barrier to useful analysis of the social world” (p. 1). Joe Sim (1990) challenged the establishment of an unaccountable medical power in prisons separate from the National Health Service and revealed the scandal that prison doctors do not try to heal sick inmates but to keep them alive to be punished. Sim’s critique of this system forced the government to end the autonomy of prison health services and integrate the healthcare of prisoners into the NHS. Even a small abolitionist-​policy success like this is rare in critical criminology, but the struggle against apartheid that led to the eventual recognition of the right of prisoners in South Africa to vote in national elections, the abolition of the death penalty, the recognition of same-​sex marriage, and the legalization of marijuana are huge achievements by critical criminology in Africa. The tragedy for criminology is that accounts of these critical successes are more likely to be found in other disciplines, while African criminologists are deluded into the positivistic empiricism of attitudinal surveys. For instance, hardly any criminologists have studied the crime of genocide in Africa, even as Herbert Ekwe-​Ekwe (2019) in political science and creative writers like Chinua Achebe (2012) and Wole Soyinka (2012) have concentrated on related issues.

Toward a Decolonization Turn As an emotive force and agent of rehumanization, criminology in Africa must move toward a decolonization turn (Agozino, 2020). This implies rehumanizing the

Criminology in Africa    419 dehumanized and problematizing the hegemonic. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2020) has written that the core of decolonization is the “re-​writing of human history as opposed to a re-​ interpretation of the same history—​bringing forth new facts, new voices and fundamentally opening up new possibilities for mutual learning and new beliefs and learning” (p. 10). Where does criminology in Africa then start? It first centers on Africa as its locus of enunciation. Doing so indigenizes knowledge production while remaining open to contributions from allies around the world. The essence of criminology in Africa must examine how the colonization and theft of knowledge have taken place in the discipline of criminology and highlight the recognition that colonized knowledges of the “enslaved, racialised, Indigenous people, women and feminist formations” (p. 19) need to be excavated from their imperialist discourse. Criminology in Africa has to acknowledge knowledges born on the battlefields of history and struggle. The main question underpinning these new knowledge systems should remain “how to gather the self after a history of suffering, transportation, discontinuity, slavery and death” (p. 19). We should go beyond the pathological perspective of looking at what is wrong with Africa and emphasize the technologies of nonviolence that Africans developed and gifted to the world. Fanon (1963) called for humanity to “turn over a new leaf, work out new concepts and try to set afoot a new man” (p. 78) rather than try to recreate another monstrous Europe. African American writers applied this Fanonian “colonial model” of criminal justice to the explanation of the racist-​sexist-​imperialist control of people of color and the poor in the United States and elsewhere. These writers developed a theory of internal colonialism that is applicable to settler-​colonial locations, but also to colonialist countries like the United Kingdom, where multiple nationalities in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland yearn for the restoration of their independence (Agozino, 2018; Gabbidon, 2020; Hechter, 1975; Tatum, 2000). What would it be like to define criminology in Africa from the decolonization perspective? Agozino (2010) called criminology a control-​freak discipline designed for the control of others. What would it be like to define a deviant as the objectivization of a previously colonized, enslaved, nonhuman who continues to reside in a zone of non-​being in Africa? Instead of relying on texts that continue to gloss over these issues, criminologists in Africa need to wake up from their slumber and decolonize, depatriarchize, degenderize, and deracialize criminological knowledge in Africa for the greater goal of remembering what it means to be human and part of the human race. Mignolo (1995) said that “decoloniality struggles to bring into intervening existence an other-​interpretation that bring[s]‌forward, on [one] hand, a silenced view of the event, and on the other [hand], shows the limits of imperial ideology disguised as the true (total) interpretation of the events in the making of the modern world” (p. 33). Because of its origin in the humanities, the concept of decoloniality, however, sounds too metaphorical to satisfy the urgent call for struggle in support of further decolonization in Africa, beyond the epistemological issues. The colonial conception of being is important for criminology because it untangles the question of who is a criminal and who is a hero under apartheid. What does his or her being a criminal mean when the powerful corporations and genocidal states

420    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile imposed on Africa by colonizers are never considered to be suspects with body politics? What is his or her humanity, objectivity, and subjectivity, and most importantly, how do we decolonize criminology in Africa and make it more inclusive by expanding its focus on individual offenders and including what Frank Pearce (1976) theorized as “crimes of the powerful”? Because most “criminals” are racialized as Black in Africa, it is necessary to examine corporate and state criminality while seeking to determine how African humanity was questioned as well as the processes that contributed to the “objectification/​ thingification/​commodifications of Africans” (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2020, p. 36).

Conclusion What, then, is to be done? There is a need for criminology scholars in Africa to liberate themselves from the miseducation caused by neglect of the essential crimes of imperialism and colonialism, apartheid, patriarchy, homophobia, and other ills. If this is not the starting point of any engagement in crime, then we are lost in the wilderness and will never be found. We should turn over a new leaf by making decolonization part of the core of criminology in Africa. African criminologists should follow the lead of Soyinka (2012), Achebe (2012), and wa Thiongo (2006) and question the role of imperialism in maintaining the oppressive conditions under which Africans are forced to live and struggle for survival. The fact that it is creative writers and journalists in Africa who produce the most relevant criminological texts calls to question what is taught in the criminology programs that are producing those who work in criminology in Africa. The “deprived ontology” that is subjecthood and humanhood of the so-​called criminal and the examination of crime in Africa should be restored. The greatest challenge to criminology in Africa lies in the challenge of how to contribute to the restoration of community safety through social security with good governance in a reunited Africa, unhindered by colonial boundaries. Only then will the problem of terrorism, which Onwudiwe (2018) theorized as having been globalized under the world system, be brought under control. According to International Crisis Group (2022) the youth of Al Shabaab, should be allowed to engage in political affairs peacefully to help to end the violent terrorist attacks in Somalia. Since many of their acts of violence were motivated by financial gains, let the government make allocations of annual grants to the youth. Such grants may help them start their own enterprises and create jobs for others, the way many musicians and filmmakers have done without much help from the public funds that are routinely stolen by politicians. Youths should be allowed to form or join political parties. Only with the abolition of the colonial boundaries across Africa will the violence cease against fellow Africans as foreigners in different parts of Africa. Agozino (2003) concludes that power causes more crime than poverty, because the poor are overwhelmingly law-​abiding, while the powerful get away with murder. This implies that the increased democratization of power through increased decolonization would

Criminology in Africa    421 contribute to a more humane society, free of the prison-​industrial complex, war, racism, sexism, ethnicism, and imperialism. Criminology is only one aspect of social life, but small changes, such as legalizing marijuana in all African states, can potentially have a huge impact on poor families, who might grow and sell the plant for medicinal or recreational purposes. The people of South Africa struggled to legalize dagga (cannabis) eventually through a decision of the Constitutional Court making the private use of marijuana by adults legal. The apartheid-​era laws remain in place to criminalize the selling or possession outside the home. The South African Parliament was still trying to pass the Private Use of Marijuana Bill in 2021 (Republic of South Africa, 2020). In other parts of the world, the people have led the campaign to decolonize the justice system through abolitionism, community organization, and voter initiatives. Legislatures tend to lead on the abolition of the death penalty, even when it is still popular among the electorate. What is missing from Africa is the offer of reparative justice to the communities that were victimized under slavery, colonization, and apartheid, in the form of publicly funded healthcare and education at all levels, public housing, land redistribution, and seed grants to entrepreneurs. Similarly, criminologists in Africa should call on the African states that committed genocide against their own people with weapons supplied by colonizers to step forward and offer reparative justice to the survivors. This chapter has reviewed the impoverished state of criminology across Africa as a field dominated by intellectual imperialism under the domination of Western criminology and relatively lacking in institutionalization as an autonomous program in universities. We have provided a summary and brief critique of some of the existing texts on Africa in criminology. We demonstrate that the Africana studies principle of centeredness and critical scholar activism is a good model for those seeking to build an original African criminology instead of relying only on punitive theories from the North. We suggest that the Africana philosophy of nonviolence is supportive of penal abolitionism in favor of reparative justice. This conclusion is consistent with those of Onyeozili et al. (2021) on the strengths and weaknesses of community policing and protests around the world, with original lessons from Africa.

References Achebe, C. (2012). There was a country: A personal history of Biafra. Penguin. Agozino, B. (1997). Black women and the criminal justice system: Towards the decolonisation of victimisation. Routledge. Agozino, B. (1999). Committed objectivity in race-​class-​gender research. Quantity and Quality: International Journal of Methodology, 33, 395–​410. https://​doi.org/​10.1023/​A:100468​7117​402 Agozino, B. (2003). Counter colonial criminology: A critique of imperialist reason. Pluto. Agozino, B. (2005). Nigerian Women in Prison: Hostages in Law. In Julia Sudbury (ed.), Global Lockdown: Race, Gender, and the Prison-​Industrial Complex. Routledge. Republished in 2008 in V. Saleh-​Hanna, Colonial Systems of Control: Criminal Justice in Nigeria (pp. 245–​ 266). University of Ottawa Press.

422    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile Agozino, B. (2010). What is criminology? A control-​freak discipline! Editorial. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 4, i–​xx. Agozino, B. (2018). The Africana philosophy of forgiveness and Abrahamic traditions of Vengeance. Australasian Review of African Studies, 39(2), 239–​252. Agozino, B. (2020). Africana liberation criminology. In B. Agozino, V. Saleh-​Hanna, E. C. Onyeozili, & N. P. Dastile (Eds.), Routledge handbook on Africana criminologies. Routledge. 18–​31. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978100​3004​424-​4 Agozino, B. (2021). Reparative justice: The final stage of decolonization. Punishment & Society, 23, 613–​630. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​146247​4521​1024​342 Agozino, B., & Ducey, K. (2020). Articulation of liberation criminologies and public criminologies: Advancing a countersystem approach and decolonization paradigm. In K. Henne & R. Shah (Eds.), Routledge handbook of public criminologies (pp. 59–​72). Routledge. Agozino, B., Saleh-​Hanna, V., Onyeozili, E. C., & Dastile, N. P. (Eds.). (2020). Routledge handbook on Africana criminologies. Routledge. Ahire, P. (1990). Colonial policing. Milton Keynes, Open University Press. Ake, C. (2000). Social science as imperialism: The theory of political development. University of Ibadan Press. Asante, M. K. (2011). Maat and human communication: Supporting identity, culture, and history without global domination. International Communication Studies, 20, 49–​56. Blagg, H., & Anthony, T. (2019). Decolonising criminology: Imagining justice in a postcolonial world. Palgrave Macmillan. Box, S. (1983). Power, Crime and Mystifications. Tavistock. Brillon, Y. (1980). Crime and criminal justice in an affluent African country. University of Montreal. Cabral, A. (2016). Resistance and decolonization (D. Wood, Trans.). Rowman & Littlefield. Cain, M. (2000). Orientalism, Occidentalism and the sociology of crime. British Journal of Criminology, 40, 239–​260. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​bjc/​40.2.239 Canning, V., & Tombs, S. (2021). From social harm to zemiology: A critical introduction. Policy Press. Chilisa, B. (2012). Indigenous research methodologies. SAGE Publications. Clifford, W. (1974). Introduction to African criminology. Oxford University Press. Clinard, M. B., & Abbott, D. J. (1973). Crime in developing countries: A comparative perspective. John Wiley and Sons. Cohen, S. (1988). Against criminology. Transaction Books. Cunneen, C., & Tauri, J. (2016). Indigenous criminology. Policy Press. Dastile, N. P., & Agozino, B. (2019). Decolonizing incarcerated women’s identities through the lens of prison abolitionism. South African Crime Quarterly, 68, 21–​32. https://​doi.org/​ 10.17159/​2413-​3108/​2019/​v0n​68a5​622 Dastile, N. P., & Ndlovu-​Gathseni, S. J. (2020). Mandela’s criminology: A decolonial intervention. In B. Agozino, V. Saleh-​Hanna, E. C. Onyeozili, & N. P. Dastile (Eds.), Routledge handbook on Africana criminologies (pp. 7–​17). Routledge. Davis, A. Y. (1981). Women, race and class. The Women’s Press. Davis, A. Y. (2003). Are prisons obsolete? Seven Stories Press. Davis, A. Y. (2005). Abolition democracy: Beyond empire, prisons and torture. Seven Stories Press. Derrida, J. (2001). On cosmopolitanism and forgiveness. Routledge. Diop, C. A. (1991). Civilization or barbarism: An authentic anthropology. Lawrence and Wishart.

Criminology in Africa    423 Dixon, B. (2004). In search of interactive globalization: Critical criminology in South Africa’s transition. Crime, Law & Social Change, 41, 359–​384. https://​doi.org/​10.1023/​B:CRIS.000​ 0025​767.67115.f2 Du Bois, W. E. B. (1935). Black reconstruction in America: 1860–​1880. Harcourt Brace. Du Bois, W. E. B. (1898). The Study of the Negro Problems, The Annals of the American Political Science Association, Vol. 11, January, 1–​23. Ekwe-​Ekwe, H. (2019). The longest genocide from 1966. African Renaissance Press. Elechi, O. O. (2020). Mbari and Ubuntu in indigenous Africana criminologies. In B. Agozino, V. Saleh-​Hanna, E. C. Onyeozili & N. P. Dastile (Eds.), Routledge handbook on Africana criminologies (pp. 32–40). Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978100​3004​424-​5 Fanon, F. (1963). The wretched of the earth. Grove Press. Feagin, J., Vera, H., & Ducey, K. (2015). Liberation sociology (3rd ed.). Paradigm Books. Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Random House. Gabbidon, S. L. (2020). Criminological perspectives on race and crime (4th ed.). Routledge. Gandhi, M. K. (1928). Satyagraha in South Africa. Navajivan Publishing House. Garland, D. (1995). Of crimes and criminals: The development of criminology in Britain. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan, & R. Reiner (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of criminology (pp. 7–​50). Oxford University Press. Gilmore, R. W. (2007). Golden Gulag: Prisons, surplus, crisis and opposition in a globalizing California. University of California Press. Gilroy, P. (1982). The myth of Black criminality. The Socialist Register, 19, 47–​56. Gordon, l. (2011). Shifting the geography of reason in an age of disciplinary decadence. Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-​Hispanic World, 95–​ 103. https://​doi.org/​10.5070/​T41​2011​810. Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., and Roberts, B. (1978). Policing the Crisis. London: Macmillan. Hall, S. (1980). Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance. In UNESCO (Ed.), Sociological theories: Race and colonialism (pp. 305–​344). UNESCO. Hall, S. (2016). Cultural studies 1983. Duke University Press. Hechter, M. (1975). Internal colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development 1536–​ 1966. University of California Press. Hooks, B. (1994). Teaching to transgress. Routledge. Igbinovia, P. E. (1989). Criminology in Africa. Editorial. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 33, v–​x. International Crisis Group. (2022). https://​www.cris​isgr​oup.org/​afr​ica/​horn-​afr​ica/​soma​lia/​ 309-​cons​ider​ing-​politi​cal-​eng​agem​ent-​al-​shab​aab-​soma​lia Kamara, K. (1995). A tribute to African civilization. Sere Press. Karenga, M. (2004). Maat: The moral ideal in ancient Egypt. University of Sankore Press. King, M. L., Jr. (1968). Where do we go from here: Chaos or community? Beacon Press. Lombroso, C. (1911). Criminal man, according to the classification of Cesare Lombroso. G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Lotter, C. (2020). Critical theory and praxis in post-​apartheid South Africa: The case for a critical criminology. Acta Academica, 52, 106–​130. https://​doi.org/​10.18820/​24150​479/​ aa5​2i2/​6 Mafeje, A. (2008). African alternative framework to structural adjustment programmes: An African recovery in thought. Bulletin, 3–​4, 62–​76. Mandela, N. (1994). A long walk to freedom. Basic Books.

424    Biko Agozino and Nontyatyambo Dastile Mignolo, W. (1995). The darker side of renaissance: Literacy, territory and colonization. University of Michigan Press. Mushenga, M. (2004). Criminology in Africa. LawAfrica Publishers. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2012). Vision for the new Institute. Presentation : 14 June 2012 Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2020). Decolonization, development and knowledge in Africa: Turning over a new leaf. Routledge. Onwudiwe, I. (2018). The globalization of terrorism. Routledge. Onyeozili, E. C., Agozino, B., Agu, A., & Ibe, P. (2021). Community policing in Nigeria: Rationale, principles, and practice. Virginia Tech Publishing. Pearce, F. (1976). Crimes of the powerful. Pluto Press. Pfohl, S. (1994). Images of deviance and social control: A sociological history. McGraw-​Hill. Pinkham, J. (1972). Discourses on colonialism. Monthly Review Press. Republic of South Africa. (2020). Cannabis for Private Purposes Bill. https://​www.gov.za/​sites/​ defa​ult/​files/​gcis_​d​ocum​ent/​202​010/​canna​bis-​priv​ate-​purpo​ses-​bill-​b19-​2020.pdf Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Bogle L’Ouverture. Sadiki, L., & Steyn, F. (2022). Decolonising the criminology curriculum in South Africa: Views and experiences of lecturers and postgraduate students. Transformation in Higher Education, 7, 1–​9. https://​doi.org/​10.4102/​the.v7i0.150 Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. Penguin. Saleh-​Hanna, V. (2015). Black feminist hauntology: Rememory the ghosts of abolition? Penal Field /​Champ Penal, 12. https://​doi.org/​10.4000/​cha​mppe​nal.9168 Sim, J. (1990). Medical power in prisons: The prison medical service in England, 1774–​1989. Open University Press. Smith, L. T. (1999). Decolonising methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples. Zed Books. Soyinka, W. (2012). Of Africa. Yale University Press. Tatum, B. (2000). Towards a neocolonial model of adolescent crime. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 16, 157–​170. Tutu, D., & Tutu, M. (2014). The book of forgiving. Harper Collins. wa Thiongo, N. (2006). The wizard of the crow. Anchor.

Chapter 23

Af ri can Crimi nol o g i e s Decolonization, Relativism, and Resistance Ian Warren and Emma Ryan

Introduction Decolonization scholarship reconceptualizes ideas and practices about justice and its administration that were transplanted throughout Africa during various periods of colonization from the 15th century and fortified through systematic European colonization during the 19th century. Today, 55 nations with an extremely diverse mix of Indigenous and settler communities (Yacob-​Haliso & Falola, 2021) have experienced multiple phases of colonization. Arguably, a pure approach to African decolonization might consider jettisoning the concept of crime. This is because prejudice is embedded in most of the state institutions charged with administering criminal justice in the European and North American (Euro-​American) legal traditions. Colonization refers to the economic, political, and institutional governance of another nation or sovereign people that results in struggles for independence (Dimou, 2021). Coloniality is a systemic “matrix of power” inscribed in everyday life that operates across four interrelated domains: 1. Control of knowledge and understanding (aesthetics, epistemology, ontology, philosophy, religion, science) 2. Control of subjectivities (being, sensing, thinking) and intersubjective relations (racism, sexism) 3. Control of the economy (capitalism, control of natural resources, exploitation of labor, land appropriation) 4. Control of authority (the nation state and its institutions) (Dimou, 2021). Criminological theory and applied criminal justice reflect coloniality in various ways that are “underpinned by colonial epistemologies” (Dimou, 2021, p. 437). Decolonization

426    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan requires breaking free from the inherently biased institutional processes that have contributed to the displacement and subjugation of colonized subjects (Onyeozili, 2021). This raises fundamental questions about selective languages and forms of knowledge that inform the criminological knowledge base. Dominant languages and knowledges in criminology have generated a profound ignorance of the multifaceted manifestations of the present-​day colonial matrix of power that is wreaking havoc on postcolonial Africa, compromising, diluting and truncating trajectories of liberation struggles, preventing economic development and unleashing epistemic violence. (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2018, p. ix)

Coloniality has a subtle presence in everyday life. Understanding its impacts can reveal how structured forms of discrimination are validated through selective Euro-​ American criminological belief systems and legal concepts that falsely claim to promote “order to the real or imagined anarchy of our late modern age” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, p. 107). Unraveling the legacies of coloniality challenges prevailing epistemologies that tolerate structural discrimination and reinforce the ongoing neoliberal, political, economic, corporate, and cultural dominance of the Global North over the colonized South. Many African and Pan-​African scholars are engaged in direct advocacy that promotes the decolonization of Euro-​American criminological knowledges (Agozino, 2003, 2021a; Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2013). This reflexive contribution speaks to the hazards of following Euro-​American theoretical and applied developments that can further entrench the harms associated with criminal justice in both the Global North and the Global South. Australian Indigenous scholars (Watego, 2021; Yunkapoorta, 2019) reveal what White scholars should not do in fostering decolonization on behalf of African scholars and subjects. This requires learning about and listening to (Warren & Ryan, 2022) different knowledges that foster self-​determination among peoples who are persistently silenced in mainstream philosophical, cultural, educational, and criminological discourses. This discussion commences by outlining the general approach to criminology and criminal justice in the Euro-​American tradition. This “mainstream” emphasis on criminology provides the basis for the “epistemic break” promoted by decolonial critiques from Africa, South America, Australia, New Zealand, and other societies experiencing the ongoing legacies of coloniality (Carrington et al., 2019; Cunneen & Tauri, 2016; Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2018). Second, the chapter briefly describes precolonial forms of African social control, though it cautions against relying on these approaches as the basis for contemporary forms of decolonization. Third, it describes the impacts of colonization and coloniality to highlight various structural injustices associated with the transplantation of Euro-​American justice institutions into Africa. Importantly, these problems are also embedded in the operation of justice processes throughout the Global North. Fourth, the chapter describes the nature of decolonizing criminology, emphasizing the need to understand pluralized conceptions of justice. This section emphasizes synergies between decolonizing approaches in African cultures and more broadly across the

African Criminologies   427 colonized Global South. Fifth, a detailed description of the prospects and constraints of decolonial thought is presented by highlighting the ways several studies offer theoretical and conceptual insights into the operation of localized and international criminal justice processes. The chapter concludes by reinforcing the importance of local knowledges in the decolonization of African criminological theory and practice.

Euro-​A merican Approaches to Criminology Criminology is dedicated to understanding the nuances of crime. This includes positing individual, social, and economic causes of offending behavior and critiquing the content, enforcement, and administration of criminal law. Although the European enlightenment scholars who established the classical school advocated clear rules and just punishments to offset the impacts of state tyranny (Beccaria & Voltaire, 1872), much modern criminology since the 18th century has sought to develop universal explanations for why individuals might break the law, based on biological (Lombroso, 1911), psychological, and sociological causes (Taylor et al., 1973). However, the emphasis has been on understanding the crimes affecting the metropolitan centers of the Global North, which ignores the mass physical, economic, cultural, and social atrocities committed against Indigenous inhabitants of the colonized South (Carrington et al., 2019; Dimou, 2021). Resting on the foundations of enlightenment philosophy and early sociological analyses of the ties that bind communities together, pioneered by Thomas Hobbes, August Comte, and Émile Durkheim, criminology has evolved significantly from the early attempts of “criminal anthropologists,” including Cesare Lombroso, who is often referred to as the “father of criminology,” to understand the factors driving deviant choices and behaviors. This emphasis shaped the trajectory of the discipline and resulted in a persistent focus on the individual flaws that cause criminality. Lombroso, an Italian doctor who was influenced by Charles Darwin (Ryan & Beckley, 2020), famously argued that the propensity to commit crime was biologically determined by one’s genes. In doing so, he apparently sired the discipline itself and has undoubtedly become a figure of ongoing, far-​reaching influence. Not only did Lombroso undertake the first empirical study of crime to identify “criminal genes,” he is also infamous for the deeply racist, gendered, and flawed methodological approaches adopted in his research (Ryan & Beckley, 2020). Lombroso’s study sample was drawn largely from subjects who were housed within Italian “insane asylums.” This vulnerable, undernourished, impoverished, and quite feeble population also included many ethnic-​minority Sicilians, whose behaviors tended to be overcriminalized, with no comparative control group. Lombroso sought to create a criminal typology, linking many of its categories to the idea of “atavism,” which suggested that many “criminals” were biologically inferior

428    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan to law abiding and productive citizens. This perspective is a pertinent site of “epistemic violence” that Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2018, p. ix) identifies. Consider the following extract from an English translation of Lombroso’s (1911) work: If we examine a number of criminals, we shall find that they exhibit numerous anomalies in the face, skeleton, and various psychic and sensitive functions, so that they strongly resemble primitive races. It was these anomalies that first drew my father’s attention to the close relationship between the criminal and the savage and made him suspect that criminal tendencies are of atavistic origin. (p. 5)

The focus on individual characteristics, deficits, and social disadvantages has been carried forward in Euro-​American criminological discourse, theorizing, and epistemology ever since. In the 19th century, psychologists began to study factors that produce a “criminal mind,” joining a long line of criminological scholars who, in shaping the discipline’s contemporary emphasis, have ignored the impacts of colonization, coloniality, and the power to criminalize subjugated populations. Table 23.1 offers a truncated summary of Euro-​American criminological knowledge from the classical era to the present. Current and funded criminological studies tend to be positivist causal and administrative examinations of why people offend and how to make existing institutions more efficient. Realist perspectives uphold the sanctity of the criminal justice system but focus on a broader set of variables that incorporate the experiences of crime victims. Critical and ecological or green perspectives point out systemic problems in criminal governance that ignore environmental concerns yet appear to have a minimal applied weight in Euro-​American justice systems dominated by positivist thought. Decolonizing and abolitionist perspectives move outside conventional conservative or liberal approaches by invoking new languages, philosophies, and processes for conceiving crime and justice. Euro-​American theories recognize radical reformist approaches (Quinney, 2002; Smart, 1989) but seldom reference African or Pan-​African perspectives. Without this emphasis, African experiences of injustice, and methods to rectify them, cannot be developed. Similarly, Euro-​American criminologies that emphasize the issues, problems, and processes that are unique to the interests of the developed Global North are unlikely to see beyond their own restricted emphases. This helps to explain the persistence of various forms of direct and indirect discrimination, harm, prejudice, and control within advanced justice systems and the corresponding resistance to radical reform or abolitionist arguments (Vitale, 2017). Euro-​American criminology has not been entirely uncritical. Several renowned theorists have critiqued approaches that perpetuate entrenched harms among those drawn into or targeted by the justice system (Braithwaite, 1989; Cohen, 1988; Taylor et al., 1973), emphasizing the limited capacity of these institutions to protect vulnerable people or prevent the harms from “ethnic-​race-​class-​gender domination” (Agozino, 2003, 2020; Andreski, 1972; Lake & Reynolds, 2008; Quinney, 2002; Smart, 1989; Tauri, 2013). Nevertheless, the routine operation and enforcement of criminal law continues to produce ongoing problems of the over-​(and under)policing of crimes that affect Indigenous

African Criminologies   429 Table 23.1. Overview of Epistemological Perspectives in Criminology Type of criminological knowledge

Epistemology

Core objectives, emphasis, and limits

Classical

Rational choice

Articulating laws that balance individual responsibility with due process Known and proportionate punishments to promote deterrence of the individual and society as a whole

Positivist

Causal Administrative

Understand why people commit crime Offender-​focused Efficiency System-​focused Promotes improved crime control Punishment for reform and rehabilitation

Realist

Contextual

Understands interrelations between offenders, victims, and the state Potentially too victim-​centric and punitive Difficult to implement

Critical

Revisionist Reformist

Questions the system and its applications Limited policy uptake on politically significant issues

Eco/​Green

Critical; Zemiological (harm-​based)

Critical Limited policy uptake

Decolonizing

Reinventive; Indigenous

Built on alternate or customary knowledges and languages Revolutionary Limited deference to institutions

Abolitionist

Radical reformist Anarchist

The system is broken and too biased or harmful to be repaired New languages and approaches required No system is needed No institution will cede authority

and other minority groups in advanced colonized nations (Cunneen, 2001; Cunneen & Tauri, 2016). These discriminatory processes are embedded in Euro-​American justice theories and practices (wa Thiong’O, 2017). They are often linked to paternalistic strategies of “coercive assimilation” (Blagg & Anthony, 2019, p. 6) that persistently fail to address entrenched crime problems, institutional violence, or structural harms by governments and corporations (Canning & Tombs, 2021) that impact colonized peoples (Razack, 2015). The broader macro-​level effects of these harms are not unique to the African experience. However, the extent of Euro-​American colonization and coloniality throughout the Global South means it is crucial for proponents of decolonization to understand their particular localized effects and legacies. Thus, whereas Euro-​American criminologies seek universal explanations for crime and justice issues, decolonizing

430    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan approaches recognize the plurality of localized contexts, interpretations and harms in questioning established theories and applied modes of justice administration. Many coercive forms of direct colonial rule and indirect processes that commissioned colonized people to self-​govern under the guise of “customary law and supposedly traditional forms of administration” (Mamdani, 2020, p. 69) are undertheorized as crimes (see Dimou, 2021). An epistemic lens that emphasizes victimization in atrocity crimes (Hagan & Rymond-​Richmond, 2009, p. 29) attempts to address the harms that are linked to violent state or state-​corporate activity (Bittle et al., 2018; Canning & Tombs, 2021; Kauzlarich et al., 2001) but risks essentializing postcolonial African experiences. This is because an entrenched form of “criminological apartheid” (Morrison, 2006, p. 56) fails to rigorously question the sanctity of the modern state as the primary unit of democratic governance and justice administration. Criminology has also been slow to connect the historically arbitrary use of domestic criminal-​justice processes to colonial and postcolonial methods of suppressing political offending, which are often characterized by extreme violence and arbitrary detention (wa Thiong’O, 2017). Euro-​ American approaches also transplant questionable domestic notions of individual responsibility into the realms of international and atrocity crime (Mamdani, 2020) but overlook the importance of the transitional justice measures that are necessary in “failed states” when domestic justice processes break down. The historical misuse of domestic criminal laws against colonized Africans has produced a fundamental mistrust of their postcolonial operation, which is commonly reflected in high rates of informal securitization, “self-​policing” (Singh, 2016, p. 33), or “self-​reliance” (Kushner, 2019, p. 14). In this sense, a brief understanding of how these contemporary forms of justice might mirror or build from precolonial forms of African social control is necessary.

Precolonial African Social Control Sensitivity to cultural relativism is vital to understanding precolonial methods of African justice and the specific impacts of colonization and coloniality on different communities. Diverse methods of precolonial African social control reflected a wide range of social and governance structures, consisting of “highly organized semi-​feudal kingdoms,” as well as “scattered stateless village communities” (Shaidi, 2004, p. 13). However, the inherent violence associated with Euro-​American slavery and colonization, coupled with the dominance of oral forms of knowledge production, means that understandings of precolonial African forms of social control are scant. Nevertheless, ideas about justice were as diverse as the impacts of European conquest and coloniality on different African communities. In stateless societies such as precolonial Igboland in Nigeria, age-​grade associations, title-​making associations, fraternities, oracles, and secret societies combined to exercise formal and informal social control (Onyeozili & Ebbe, 2012). Gerontocracy determined local communal leadership, and the intertwining of religion and law reflected the community’s overriding belief in reincarnation. Ancestors are central to Igbo

African Criminologies   431 religion and philosophy, which means that “non-​transmigration is inevitably regarded as the most severe punishment for those guilty of abomination” (Onyeozili & Ebbe, 2012, p. 31) or of public offenses such as murder, incest, offending the gods, and other conduct harmful to the community. These offenses could result in death, exile, or excommunication. Throughout Sub-​Saharan Africa, crimes and punishments held a social orientation, as opposed to the individual orientation found in European law (Shaidi, 2004). For example, in reproducing anthropological evidence from the Kilimanjaro area, Shaidi (2004) indicates that treason, espionage, and witchcraft could result in the death penalty and that blood revenge was common in reconciling cases of homicide. Fewer blood feuds appeared evident where the local chiefs held more social power, and in some communities the death penalty was only applied to serious or repeat offenders who would not admit to public crimes or who failed to pay restitution (Bande, 2020). Many property offenses resembled civil wrongs, for which compensation rather than punishment was the norm. Personal redress, such as “shaming, restitution, a fine, compensation, a communion feast, or sale into slavery” applied for most private offenses, including theft, burglary, or robbery (Onyeozili & Ebbe, 2012, p. 34; Bande, 2020, p. 292). Contemporary views about “traditional” or “customary” leadership remain widely contested, as many colonial administrations embraced indirect rule by selectively appointing local leaders to suit European interests rather than those of the communities they governed (Mamdani, 2020). Precolonial belief systems that viewed kings as the agents of gods could produce corrupt, indulgent, and undemocratic governance, regardless of its beneficiaries. However, legal determinations by rulers would be considered sacrosanct (Igboin, 2016). A decolonization perspective suggests that corrupt or preferential behavior could be connected to the communal nature of African societies; more recent manifestations of this are evident in the operation of localized Gacaca courts in postgenocide Rwanda that adopted customary procedures (Palmer, 2015). It is highly plausible that biases associated with precolonial modes of governance have ongoing manifestations today. However, recent calls for decolonization do not necessarily mean returning to a precolonial past that cannot be recovered (Bande, 2020). For example, while Césaire (2000) defends the highly “courteous” (p. 51) precolonial civilizations, it is neither desirable to replicate the “exoticism” of the past, “(n)or is it the present colonial society that we wish to prolong.” Rather, decolonization should involve a collaborative effort “with all our brother slaves” to forge “a society rich with all the productive power of modern times, warm with all the fraternity of olden days” (p. 52).

The Impacts of Colonization and Coloniality Coloniality has produced a postcolonial epoch characterized by “illusions of freedom” and a “mantra of humanitarian intervention being used as a fig-​leaf covering the

432    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan nakedness of violent global neoliberal imperialism” (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2013, p. viii). The subtle intergenerational impacts of coloniality have normalized entrenched discrimination that deems African peoples to be criminals and savages (Pfingst & Kimari, 2021). Historically, criminology supported coercive and segregationist apartheid policies that rested on false ideas about Black criminality (Chanock, 1995). These views have been tempered as new critical perspectives have emerged from local African experience (van Zyl Smit, 1999). However, many prejudicial ideas within criminological theories and justice practices persist, and the potential for intergenerational internalization of inferiority inflicted on colonized peoples is commonly ignored, obscured, or enhanced by various criminological theories and entrenched forms of state conduct (Fanon, 2001; Mbembe, 2017). Historically Africa was viewed as a “laboratory for testing of concepts and theories” (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2018, p. 8) that reinforced Anglo Euro-​American conceptions of primitiveness, underdevelopment, backwardness, and superstition. The silencing of alternate belief structures persists because established forms of statehood, governance, and criminal-​justice administration have become the default rationalized standards by which failed states that plunge into uncontrolled violence are often erroneously judged (Mamdani, 2020, p. 233). Postcoloniality has also reinforced profound levels of “(s)ociopolitical and economic insecurity, social injustice, unprecedented rates of violent crime, and mass human rights violations [which] are another epoch of slavery in this African society” (Eribo, 2008, p. 122). Thus, decolonization presents important epistemic challenges to the role of criminology in questioning the harms of colonization, coloniality, and postcolonial revolution or independence. The laws and methods of governing the “colonies abroad . . . [were] the camera obscura image of the liberal nation-​states of Europe” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016, p. 36). This mirroring effect immunized the crimes of European states whereby they considered forced human displacement, the transnational commercial trade in African people as slaves (Beckles, 2013; Williams, 2022), and appropriation of lands and natural resources to promote European economic development and industrialization (Ezenou, 2018; Rodney, 2018) to be entitlements due them from their civilizing missions throughout the Global South. Euro-​American criminology’s failure to recognize the violence, subjugation, and harm inflicted by White colonizers on African peoples reinforces criminology’s predominantly White, male, and racist “epistemology of ignorance” (Mills, 2014, p. 18) by supplanting the social contract with a racial contract that promoted order through control. These processes also suppressed the empirical rigor and political advocacy of the 19th-​century Pan-​African scholars who documented the ongoing injustices affecting Black people in the developed world that continued long after the abolition of chattel slavery (Beckles, 2013; Gabbidon et al., 2002; Wells-​ Barnett, 2014). Modern international criminal justice formally began as a form of “victor’s justice” during the post–​World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals (Zolo, 2020). Despite a sophisticated jurisprudence and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002, the selective application of international criminal law to

African Criminologies   433 deal with violent conflicts in contemporary Africa validates its skewed role in ignoring the deliberate humanitarian and genocidal harms that were caused by European colonial action since the trans-​Atlantic slave trade. European partitioning of the African continent became an extension of this process of denial, whereby at “the end of the nineteenth century, less than one-​tenth of Africa remained in the hands of Africans” (James, 2012, p. 66). Many intentional acts of genocide (Lindqvist, 2021), including the systematic destruction of the Herero, Witbooi Nama, and Bethanie Nama peoples in Namibia, have not been viewed as crimes despite evidence of their direct relationship to 20th-​ century atrocities on European soil (see Olusoga & Erichsen, 2010). Despite the plurality of forms and effects of colonization, coloniality, and postcolonialism, Euro-​American criminology has remained quite static. Dominant trajectories of criminological thought emanating from the Global North shape a unified ideal in which institutions of policing, criminal justice, and punishment are considered standard elements of contemporary governance. This applies to all domestic legal systems throughout Africa and internationally. Decolonization directly confronts this hegemony by questioning the theoretical and empirical knowledge that underpins accepted notions of justice and draws on perspectives that have traditionally been silenced or hidden from empirical research. Decolonization views local knowledges as part of a meaningful epistemic voice rather than a mere object of study (Mignolo & Walsh, 2018; Tauri, 2013) to foreground the discriminatory effects of the “civilizing” processes generated by self-​sanctioned and highly selective methods of Euro-​American criminal governance (Lindqvist, 2021).

Decolonizing Criminology in Africa and Beyond While some Euro-​American theories are beginning to challenge the continual negative interpretation of African human experience (Mbembe, 2001, p. 1), African criminologies are central to developing “counter system approaches” (Agozino & Ducey, 2020) that can promote decolonization throughout the continent and promote the revision of criminological thought. Decolonization resets the aims and objectives of criminology to reveal the problems that stem from Africa’s history of colonization and contemporary experiences of crime and its control that are mirrored in Euro-​American theories and justice practices. These issues have important effects on individuals, defined groups, animals, land, and ecosystems throughout the world, despite their potentially fragmentary (Cunneen, 2018) and contextual nature. Decolonized epistemologies and methodologies place African experiences, knowledges, and languages at the center of critical and localized inquiries (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012; wa Thiong’O, 1993). Foregrounding the lived experiences of African peoples and the importance of their subjective interpretations of a world affected

434    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan by generations of violent Euro-​American intervention can reveal the arbitrary nature of much formal justice power in maintaining undemocratic colonial regimes and suppressing postcolonial resistance (Eribo, 2008; wa Thiong’O, 2017). African researchers can give a voice to those who have been silenced in mainstream criminological debates by incorporating new perspectives into established research paradigms (Ciocchini & Greener, 2021). This requires understanding the value of diverse forms of knowledge that critique colonial (Lindqvist, 2021) and postcolonial governance (wa Thiong’O, 2017, 2018) even if they are considered lacking in scientific or empirical weight (Warren & Ryan, 2022). As Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2013) indicates, alternate knowledges can enrich both criminological theory and social theory. I see great value in theorizing about the African predicament as a form of production of knowledge by African intellectuals and academics for use by Africans in Africa. Theory, to me, is a light that assists in avoiding ill-​focused, positivistic, shallow and prescriptive narratives divorced from complex historical, discursive and epistemological terrains that reproduce political and economic crises and problems that bedevil Africans today. (p. x)

Developments in African knowledge-​ building can also reveal “condensed, hyper-​extended prefigurations of what is becoming visible elsewhere” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, p. 105) in various subject areas. For example, the “militarization of law-​ enforcement . . . the mass incarceration of people of color” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016, p. 42) and the expanding public and private networks of state-​sanctioned carceral and shadow carceral practices (Beckett & Murakawa, 2012) are often framed as a product of the neoliberal “ideological imperative to ‘shrink’ the state in favour of the market” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016, p. 44). However, these processes have deeper epistemological foundations that connect African experiences to many equivalent developments in the Global North. Euro-​American theories also tend to perpetuate a false belief that structured forms of racial, gendered, and economic harm are somehow absent or self-​ correcting. These failures are openly critiqued in emerging critical criminology, but correcting them requires examining otherwise hidden histories of colonization, such as the management of European criminals transported to Australia (Warren & Palmer, 2019) and the treatment of Indigenous and cultural minorities in North America (Mamdani, 2020), Nazi-​Germany (Agozino, 2003; Mamdani, 2020; Morrison, 2006), and South Africa under apartheid (Mamdani, 2015; Mathews, 1986; Naidoo, 2022). North-​South corollaries extend to the exclusionary forms of national border protection and the executive detention of unlawful migrants (Franko, 2012) that are common in Europe, North America, and Australia, yet mirror examples of populist violence and arbitrary detention that targets illegal laborers in South Africa (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012). These synergies demonstrate how neoliberal market economics are often connected with “global agendas . . . to [develop] specific national institutions” (Chalfin, 2010, pp. xvi–​xvii) and tighter forms of national or transnational regulation and control (Titeca, 2013). They also have direct links to coloniality, where the “distinction between

African Criminologies   435 the licit and the illicit” and the “illegibility . . . of the line between law-​breaking and law enforcement” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016, pp. 53–​54) directly challenge Northern conceptions of criminality. Struggles for African independence have not eliminated the “structural, systemic, cultural, discursive, and epistemological pattern of domination and exploitation . . . in the ‘postcolonial neocolonized world’ ” (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2013, p. 3). Despite many landmark works that fueled African independence (Cabral, 2017; Césaire, 2000; Falola, 2022; Fanon 2001; James, 2012; Mbembe, 2001; Nkrumah, 1966; Rodney, 2018; Williams, 2022), full decolonization remains elusive because, “according to the teleology of anticolonial theory” the final stage of true independence, “epistemological revolution, whereby the very consciousness of being, the vocabulary in which we understand the world around us,” has yet to be reached (Mamdani, 2020, p. 33). Questions continue to be raised about the scientific and methodological legitimacy of the criminological field more broadly, given its abject failure to incorporate the multifaceted political elements of postcolonial violence. This includes the inability of Euro-​American theories and practices to map the intricate connections between crime, economics, and the harms associated with uncontrolled access to or exploitation of natural resources throughout many parts of contemporary Africa (Agozino, 2019; Ezeonu, 2018), or the role of international criminal law in dealing with conflicts stemming from internal factional and secessionist movements (Dimou, 2021).

Prospects and Constraints The prospects and constraints for decolonized African criminologies are best described through existing research practices. While Southern criminologists advocate for the democratization of knowledge to encompass more studies from the Global South (Carrington et al., 2019), there is a risk that African criminological knowledge could strive too hard to mirror narrow forms of empiricism that are common to Euro-​ American criminology (Dimou, 2021). African scholarship already recognizes the foundations of this problem. An important examination of publication trends in Acta Criminologica: African Journal of Criminology and Victimology reinforces “a key characteristic of apartheid architecture” involving the dominance of white male scholars publishing largely quantitative works” (Sadiki & Steyn, 2021, p. 101). Although amended publication standards are gradually diversifying African criminological research, Sadiki and Steyn (2021) affirm that the African experience mirrors the systemic and highly familiar gender and racial inequities that broadly pervade modern criminology. There is also growing criticism that much African university scholarship is too willing to reinforce externally imposed values about the types of social scientific knowledge that are deemed acceptable. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni (2013) is highly critical of the “consultancy culture” producing social research that is:

436    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan conceived in prescriptive terms rather than as diagnosis of issues. I am against the pervasive culture of consultancy that is threatening to destroy serious academic research . . . [and has] blinded some policy makers to the extent that they question the value of social sciences and humanities (sic) [in] market-​driven, parastatalized and commercialized institutions of higher education. (pp. ix–​x)

However, some African consultancy-​based research has generated innovative criminological insights that have local and global implications. This includes the use of metaphors, such as the “hyena-​like man to theorize the relationship between nature, man and woman in the broader context of organic human society” (Onditi & Odera, 2021, p. 5). This concept can help to explain embedded problems of violence against women in Africa and beyond. Such innovative discourses open new interdisciplinary possibilities for an African criminology that prioritizes localized or traditional knowledges while drawing on concepts and methods from Euro-​American social sciences (Chalfin, 2010; Schouten, 2022). As with Australian Indigenous storytelling, decolonized African criminologies can build viable “non-​empirical” knowledges to communicate significant historical and contemporary events relating to crime and harm as direct lived experiences (Phillips & Bunda, 2018; Warren & Ryan, 2022; wa Thiong’O, 2018). This approach questions the Euro-​American obsession with positivism, which increases the marginality of alternative knowledge forms and, in the name of rational scientific advancement, shields colonizers from atrocities committed against Indigenous peoples. “Non-​empirical” knowledges can take diverse forms, such as converting narratives of harm in formal legal and judicial records into “found poetry,” which has therapeutic value for those who have experienced trauma and survival, while preserving “the victim’s own language” within “the tedious legalistic arguments set forth by opposing attorneys and the panel of judges” (Stepakoff, 2021, p. 6; emphasis in original). Personalized autobiographical narratives describing imperial governance processes (Plaatje, 2007) or postcolonial independence struggles (Achebe, 2012) are also important forms of knowledge that respect the value of subjective experience in reinforcing, contradicting, or providing new avenues for rethinking established criminological constructs. Naidoo (2022) used first-​person oral histories to examine the immediate and ongoing legacies of the arbitrary imprisonment of female anti-​apartheid advocates during the 1970s. This important example shows the value of localized research in understanding and moving forward from embedded conflicts instigated by the democratic nation state. Official records have hitherto concealed this history because the female detainees were “not inmates” and “had not been convicted of a crime” (Naidoo, 2022, p. 2). These stories are significant to South African people of all creeds, as part of Naidoo’s personal attempt to understand “the psychological mess we’re in today,” through a platform that aims to “honor and respect those who suffered for justice and freedom” in formulating the current South African constitution (Naidoo, 2002, p. 4). These subjective experiences are sensitive to the wishes of research subjects, but avoid the tendency to recycle colonizing narratives that shape experiences of injustice

African Criminologies   437 by affirming the sanctity of the state and its discriminatory institutions (Eribo, 2008; Smith, 2012). Localized studies have also built on established Euro-​American theories. However, this emphasis can dilute the significance of African perspectives in explaining local phenomena. This problem is illustrated by Igbo (2017), who provides a very important in-​depth examination of four scenarios of extrajudicial killing by Nigerian police to develop a typology that is applicable throughout and beyond Africa. The typology identifies police killings that invoke lies and deceits to cover up the deliberate execution of ethnic-​minority traders under the false premise they were robbers, an organized conspiracy to execute a state governor, a killing that was a mistake, and the failure to formally intervene as police witnessed a violent a mob killing. Igbo bases this study on the United States crime-​control and due-​process models of criminal justice pioneered by Herbert Packer (1964) and the equivalent requirements under the Nigerian constitution. However, this emphasis potentially overlooks the salience of a decolonizing approach that is open to being more rigorous and radical. A decolonized framing suggests that “as long as the basic mission of police remains unchanged” viable reforms or adherence to due process protections cannot be achieved, because “coercive government action” reflects extremely “powerful political forces [that] benefit from abusive, aggressive, and invasive policing” (Vitale, 2017, p. 221). A localized decolonial approach would acknowledge that violent “techniques of exercising police authority and discipline . . . that characterized the colonial and postcolonial potentate, are gradually being replaced by an alternative that is more tragic because [it is] more extreme” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 86). This emphasis can also provide an understanding of why various private resistance and self-​help activities have emerged throughout Africa in response to ineffective or corrupt state processes (Kushner, 2019; Singh, 2016). Building local knowledge of the uses of lethal force by police that are specific to the Igbo context can thus enrich broader criminological understandings of the modern state’s failure to fulfill its basic mandate to protect human life. The experiences of international criminal justice in shaping contemporary Africa have also been highly selective and reveal important fissures in the response to atrocity crimes (Drumbl, 2007), as well as more routine forms of domestic criminal law enforcement. A consistent pattern of “colonization, the conditions of decolonization, and the reassertion of neocolonization . . . [forms] the bedrock of instability and mass violence that has given rise to most of the contemporary cases being taken up by the ICC” (Clarke, 2019a, p. 60). Thus, punitive forms of international criminalization are often invoked to consolidate state power where it is violently contested, at the expense of more “free ranging and authority-​diffusing modalities of justice that percolate bottom-​up from local constituencies” (Drumbl, 2007, p. 13). There is also concern that “governing through globalized crime” (Findlay, 2008) cannot address the artificial ethnic and tribal classifications embedded in the colonial and postcolonial political structures that have contributed to large-​scale mass atrocities. In many regions in contemporary Africa, these conflicts are often fueled by externally sanctioned corruption (Mamdani, 2001, 2020), yet are typically immune from formal justice intervention.

438    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan International criminal law is complicit in forging new forms of North-​South imperialism, exploitation, and neglect (Connell, 2007; Warren & Ryan, 2022) under the guise of justice. For example, legal records have invoked incorrect conceptions of local African history, religious adherence and ethnicity to ensure certain conduct “fits” predetermined legal categories (Mamdani, 2020; Wilson, 2012). While this is not uncommon in the technical operation of either international or domestic criminal law, these nuances overlook the continuation of flawed historical forms of coloniality that fuel atrocity crime and are tied to modern notions of statehood (Mamdani, 2001, 2020). Ongoing aspects of “colonial modernity” built on artificially constructed religious and tribal divisions that maintain globally accepted ideals of statehood (Mamdani, 2020) are now producing a backlash against the ICC. This is “because its investigations focus on weak states and erode their officials’ state immunity . . . [while] investigations . . . can be ordered by Great Powers who are not themselves subject to its authority” (Brett & Gissel, 2020, p. 4). After 20 years of activity, the ICC is considered a new form of imperial power because of its selective approaches to understanding and responding to atrocity crimes in Africa. The structure of subregional African courts enables states to contest investigative and adjudicative jurisdiction over human rights claims (Alter et al., 2016). Such forms of transnational charge-​or plea-​bargaining have direct equivalents in domestic criminal law that stem from the intrinsically political nature of the processes of criminalization. Even with moves to ensure “home-​grown” African international criminal and human rights courts (Clarke, 2019b; Jalloh, 2019), these processes adapt accepted norms of international jurisprudence to address localized problems in idiosyncratic ways. Such experiences open a window into the complexities of global legal pluralism (Berman, 2012), where international, national, and localized dispute-​resolution processes can intersect in quite problematic or contradictory ways (Palmer, 2015). These broader macro-​ level problems depoliticize formal responsibility for criminal conduct, while limiting any preemptive or general deterrent value of the criminal law (Mamdani, 2020). An African decolonization of international criminal justice focuses equally on what this branch of law has not achieved in bringing European colonial forces to account for their historical crimes through liability or adequate reparations (Agozino, 2021; Beckles, 2013). These failures can be juxtaposed against the intensive judicial interventions in Central Africa (Hagan & Rymond-​Richmond, 2009; Mamdani, 2001, 2020; Palmer, 2015) and Sierra Leone (Kelsall, 2009). Notably, alternate forms of restoration, reconciliation, and peacebuilding in postapartheid South Africa sought to limit the prospect of large-​scale retaliatory political violence by the democratically elected African majority, while largely dispensing with the criminal law (Braithwaite & D’Costa, 2018; Mamdani, 2015, 2020). Ensuring appropriate political representation sought to promote collective national development in the postapartheid era without recourse to Euro-​American criminal notions of deterrence or punishment. This approach highlights the limits of the classically based general deterrence theory, as one key example, which offers a useful starting point for exploring the limits of Euro-​American domestic and international justice in contemporary Africa.

African Criminologies   439

Conclusion Rather than treat Africa as a subject of criminological research, African researchers and advocates need to support local forms of knowledge production (Tauri, 2013) and to listen carefully to the concerns emanating from these perspectives. This approach promises to generate a rich and diverse series of Africana criminologies (Agozino, 2020; Cunneen, 2018; Warren & Ryan, 2022) that invoke decolonization to generate new understandings of how existing institutions should operate, while fostering political empowerment and critical reformist or abolitionist developments with transformative local and global impacts. Importantly, reconfiguring ideas of justice to emphasize reparations rather than deterrence, contrition rather than denial, and the centrality of politics to both domestic and international criminalization processes that are specific to the African experience are central to the future development of criminology.

Acronym ICC

International Criminal Court

References Achebe, C. (2012). There was a country: A personal history of Biafra. Penguin. Agozino, B. (2003). Counter-​colonial criminology: A critique of imperialist reason. Pluto Press. Agozino, B. (2019). Humanifesto of the decolonization of criminology and justice. Decolonisation of Criminology and Justice, 1, 5–​28. https://​doi.org/​10.24135/​dcj.v1i1.5 Agozino, B. (2020). Africana liberation criminologies. In B. Agozino, V. Saleh-​Hanna, E. C. Onyeozili, & N. P. Dastile (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of Africana criminologies (pp. 18–​ 31). Routledge. Agozino, B. (2021). Reparative justice: The final stage of decolonization. Punishment & Society, 23, 613–​630. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​146247​4521​1024​342 Agozino, B., & Ducey, K. (2020). Articulation of liberation criminologies and public criminologies: Advancing a counter system approach and decolonization paradigm. In K. Henne & R. Shah (Eds.), Routledge handbook of public criminologies (pp. 59–​7 1). Taylor and Francis. Alter, K. J., Gathii, J. T., & Helfer, L. R. (2016). Backlash against international courts in west, east and southern Africa: Causes and consequences. European Journal of International Law, 27, 293–​328. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​ejil/​chw​019 Andreski, S. (1972). Social sciences as sorcery. Andre Deutsch. Bande, L. C. (2020). A history of Malawi’s criminal justice system: From precolonial to democratic periods. Fundamina, 26, 288–​336. https://​do&.org/​10.47348/​FUND/​v26/​i2a2 Beccaria, C. di, & Voltaire, M. (1872). An essay on crimes and punishments (with commentary). W. C. Little & Co.

440    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan Beckett, K., & Murakawa, N. (2012). Mapping the shadow carceral state: Toward an institutionally capacious approach to punishment. Theoretical Criminology, 16, 221–​244. https://​ doi.org/​10.1177/​13624​8061​2442​113 Beckles, H. McD. (2013). Britain’s Black debt: Reparations for Caribbean slavery and native genocide. University of the West Indies Press. Berman, P. S. (2012). Global legal pluralism: A jurisprudence of law beyond borders. Cambridge University Press. Bittle, S., Snider, L., Tombs, S., & Whyte, D. (2018) Revisiting crimes of the powerful: Marxism, crime and deviance. Routledge. Blagg, H., & Anthony, T. (2019). Decolonizing criminology: Imagining justice in a postcolonial world. Palgrave Macmillan. Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge University Press. Braithwaite, J., & D’Costa, B. (2018). Cascades of violence: Crime and peacebuilding across South Asia. Australian National University Press. Brett, P., & Gissel, L. E. (2020). Africa and the backlash against international courts. Zed Books. Cabral, A. (2017). Resistance and decolonization (D. Wood, Trans). Rowman and Littlefield. Canning, V., & Tombs, S. (2021). From social harm to zemiology: A critical introduction. Routledge. Carrington, K., Hogg, R., Scott, J., Sozzo, M., & Walters, R. (2019). Southern criminology. Routledge. Césaire, A. (2000). Discourse on colonialism. Monthly Review Press. Chalfin, B. (2010). Neoliberal frontiers: An ethnography of sovereignty in West Africa. University of Chicago Press. Chanock, M. (1995). Criminological science and the criminal law on the colonial periphery: Perception, fantasy, and realities in South Africa, 1900–​1930. Law & Social Inquiry, 20, 911–​ 939. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1747-​4469.1995.tb00​696.x Ciocchini, P., & Greener, J. (2021). Mapping the pains of neo-​colonialism: A critical elaboration of southern criminology. British Journal of Criminology, 61, 1612–​1629. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1093/​bjc/​azab​041 Clarke, K. M. (2019a). Affective justice: The International Criminal Court and the Pan-​Africanist pushback. Duke University Press. Clarke, K. M. (2019b). Peace and “justice” sequencing in management of violence in the Malabo Protocol for the African court. In C. C. Jalloh, K. M. Clarke, & V. O. Nmehielle (Eds.), The African Court of Justice and human and people’s rights in context: Development and challenges (pp. 109–​146). Cambridge University Press. Cohen, S. (1988). Against criminology. Transaction. Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. L. (2012). Theory from the south: Or how Euro-​America is evolving toward Africa. Routledge. Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. L. (2016). The truth about crime: Sovereignty, knowledge and social order. University of Chicago Press. Connell, R. (2007). Southern theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in social science. Allen & Unwin. Cunneen, C. (2001). Conflict, politics and crime: Aboriginal communities and the police. Allen and Unwin. Cunneen, C. (2018). Indigenous challenges for Southern criminology. In K. Carrington, R. Hogg, J. Scott, & M. Sozzo (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of criminology and the global south (pp. 19–​41). Palgrave Macmillan.

African Criminologies   441 Cunneen, C., & Tauri, J. (2016). Indigenous criminology. Policy Press. Dimou, E. (2021). Decolonizing southern criminology: What can the “decolonial option” tell us about challenging the modern/​colonial foundations of criminology? Critical Criminology, 29, 431–​450. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​612-​021-​09579-​9 Drumbl, M. (2007). Atrocity, punishment and international law. Cambridge University Press. Eribo, O. (2008). Another face of slavery. In V. Saleh-​Hanna (Ed.), Colonial systems of control: Criminal justice in Nigeria (pp. 121–​126). University of Ottawa Press. Ezeonu, I. (2018). Market criminology: State-​corporate crime in the petroleum extraction industry. Routledge. Falola, T. (2022). Decolonizing African studies: Knowledge production, agency and voice. University of Rochester Press. Fanon, F. (2001). The wretched of the earth. Penguin. Findlay, M. (2008). Governing through globalized crime: Futures for international justice. Willan Publishing. Franko. K. A. (2012). “The earth is one but the world is not”: Criminological theory and its geopolitical divisions. Theoretical Criminology, 16, 5–​20. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​13624​8061​ 1433​433 Gabbidon, S. L., Taylor Greene, H., & Young, V. D. (2002). African American classics in criminology and criminal justice. SAGE Publications. Hagan, J., & Rymond-​Richmond, W. (2009). Darfur and the crime of genocide. Cambridge University Press. Igbo, E. U. M. (2017). The use and abuse of police powers and extrajudicial killings in Nigeria. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS, 10, 83–​99. Igboin, B. O. (2016). Traditional leadership and corruption in precolonial Africa: How the past affects the present. Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae, 42, 142–​160. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.17159/​ 2412-​4265/​2016/​228 Jalloh, C. C. (2019). The place of the African Court of Justice and human and peoples’ rights in the prosecution of serious crimes in Africa. In C. C. Jalloh, K. M. Clarke, & V. O. Nmehielle (Eds.), The African Court of Justice and human and people’s rights in context: Development and challenges (pp. 57–​108). Cambridge University Press. James, C. L. R. (2012). A history of pan-​African revolt. PM Press. Kauzlarich, D., Matthews, R. A., & Miller, W. J. (2001). Toward a victimology of state crime. Critical Criminology, 10, 173–​194. https://​doi.org/​10.1023/​A:101574​4304​749 Kelsall, T. (2009). Culture under cross-​examination: International justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Cambridge University Press. Kushner, D. C. (2019). The politics of everyday crime in Africa: Insecurity, victimization and non-​ state security providers. Palgrave Macmillan. Lake, M., & Reyonlds, H. (2008). Drawing the global color line: White men’s countries and the international challenge of racial equality. Cambridge University Press. Lindqvist, S. (2021). Exterminate all the brutes. Granta. Lombroso, G. (1911). Criminal man: According to the classification of Cesare Lombroso. G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Mamdani, M. (2001). When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism and the genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press. Mamdani, M. (2015). Beyond Nuremberg: The historical significance of the post-​apartheid transition in Africa. Politics and Society, 43, 61–​88. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00323​2921​4554​387

442    Ian Warren and Emma Ryan Mamdani, M. (2020). Neither settler nor native: The making and unmaking of permanent minorities. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Mathews, A. (1986). Freedom, state security and the rule of law: Dilemmas of the apartheid society. Juta. Mbembe, A. (2001). On the postcolony. University of California Press. Mbembe, A. (2017). A critique of Black reason (L. Dubois, Trans). Duke University Press. Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics (S. Corcoran, Trans.). Duke University Press. Mignolo, W. D., & Walsh, C. E. (2018). On decoloniality: Concepts, analytics, praxis. Duke University Press. Mills, C. W. (2014). The racial contract. Cornell University Press. Morrison, W. (2006). Criminology, civilization and the new world order. Routledge-​Cavendish. Naidoo, S. (2022). Women in solitary: Inside South Africa’s female resistance to apartheid. Routledge. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2013). Coloniality of power in postcolonial Africa: Myths of decolonization. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2018). Epistemic freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and decolonization. Routledge. Nkrumah, K. (1966). Neo-​colonialism: The last stage of imperialism. International Publishers. Olusoga, D., & Erichsen, C. W. (2010). The kaiser’s holocaust: Germany’s forgotten genocide and the colonial roots of Nazism. Faber and Faber. Onditi, F., & Odera, J. (2021). Understanding violence against women in Africa: An interdisciplinary approach. Palgrave Macmillan. Onyeozili, E. C. (2021). Gunboat criminology in the history of people of African descent. In B. Agozino, V. Saleh-​Hanna, E. C. Onyeozili, & N. P. Dastile (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of Africana criminologies (pp. 216–​234). Routledge. Onyeozili, E. C., & Ebbe, O. N. I. (2012). Social controls in precolonial Igboland of Nigeria. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS, 6, 29–​43. Packer, H. L. (1964). Two models of the criminal process. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 113, 1–​68. Palmer, N. (2015). Courts in conflict: Interpreting the layers of justice in post-​genocide Rwanda. Oxford University Press. Pfingst, A., & Kimari, W. (2021). Carcerality and the legacies of settler colonial punishment in Nairobi. Punishment & Society, 23, 697–​722. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​146247​4521​1041​845 Phillips, L. G., & Bunda, T. (2018). Research through, with and as storying. Routledge. Plaatje, S. T. (2007). Native life in South Africa: Before and since the European war and the Boer rebellion. Picacor Africa. Quinney, R. (2002). Critique of legal order: Crime control in capitalist society. Transaction. Razack, S. H. (2015). Dying from improvement: Inquests and inquiries into Indigenous deaths in custody. University of Toronto Press. Rodney, W. (2018). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Verso. Ryan, E., & Beckley, A. (2020). The origins and influence of positivist thought. In A. Rodas, M. Simpson, P. Rawlinson, R. Kramer, E. Ryan, E. Taylor, R. Walters, A. Beckley, C. Cunneen, A. Gore, A. Porter, S. Poynting, & E. Russell (Eds.), Crime, deviance and society: An introduction to sociological criminology (pp. 24–​47). Cambridge University Press. Sadiki, L., & Steyn, F. (2021). Sticky floors and glass ceilings: Transformation of a criminology journal in post-​apartheid South Africa. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 32, 90–​107. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​10511​253.2021.1874​033

African Criminologies   443 Schouten, P. (2022). Roadblock politics: The origins of violence in central Africa. Cambridge University Press. Shaidi, L. P. (2004). Traditional, colonial and present-​day administration of criminal justice. In M. T. Mushanga (Ed.), Criminology in Africa (pp. 35–​58). LawAfrica. Singh, A.-​M. (2016). Policing and crime-​control in post-​Apartheid South Africa. Routledge. Smart, C. (1989). Feminism and the power of law. Routledge. Smith, L. T. (2012). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples (2nd ed.). Zed Books. Stepakoff, S. (2021). Testimony: Found poems from the special court for Sierra Leone. Bucknell University Press. Tauri, J. M. (2013). Indigenous critique of authoritarian criminology. In K. Carrington, M. Ball, E. O’Brien, & J. M. Tauri (Eds.), Crime, justice and social democracy: International perspectives (pp. 217–​233). Palgrave Macmillan. Taylor, I., Walton, P., & Young, J. (1973). The new criminology: For a social theory of deviance. Routledge. Titeca, K. (2013). A historical perspective on state engagement in informal trade on the Uganda–​Congo border. In R. Bridenthal (Ed.), The hidden history of crime, corruption and states (pp. 171–​195). Berghahn Books. van Zyl Smit, D. (1999). Criminological ideas and the South African tradition. British Journal of Criminology, 39, 198–​215. Vitale, F. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso. wa Thiong’O, N. (1993). Moving the centre: The struggle for cultural freedoms. James Currey, EAEP and Heinemann. wa Thiong’O, N. (2017). Wrestling with the devil: A prison memoir. Vintage. wa Thiong’O, N. (2018). Petals of blood. Vintage. Warren, I., & Palmer, D. (2019). The penal surveillant assemblage: Attainder and tickets of leave in nineteenth-​century colonial Australia. In R. Heynan & E. van der Meulen (Eds.), Making surveillance states: Transnational histories (pp. 109–​132). University of Toronto Press. Warren, I., & Ryan, E. (2022). Southern criminologies, Indigenous stories and qualitative research. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 33, 230–​246. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​10511​ 253.2022.2027​480 Watego, C. (2021). Another day in the colony. University of Queensland Press. Wells-​Barnett, I. B. (2014). On lynchings. Dover. Williams, E. (2022). Capitalism and slavery. Penguin. Wilson, R. A. (2012). Writing history in international criminal trials. Cambridge University Press. Yacob-​Haliso, O., & Falola, T. (2021). Introduction: Decolonizing African women’s studies. In O. Yacob-​Haliso & T. Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of African women’s studies (pp. 3–​43). Springer. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​030-​28099-​4_​120 Yunkapoorta, T. (2019). Sand talk: How Indigenous thinking can save the world. Text Publishing. Zolo, D. (2020). Victor’s justice: From Nuremberg to Baghdad. Verso.

Chapter 24

Elusive Pe ac e Extraction and Violent Conflict in Africa David Matsinhe

Introduction In every subregion of Africa there is, and has been, some form of armed conflict. The Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts are afflicting Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy. Cameroon is fraught with hostilities between the Anglophone and the Francophone. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is embroiled in seemingly endless fights between different armed groups and government forces vying for territorial control. The Sahelian states of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania are being torn asunder by the centrifugal forces of Islamic insurgencies. After their recent independence, the South Sudanese chose a path of self-​destruction, killing one another in the hundreds of thousands. Mozambique is struggling to contain dispersed groups of local Islamic insurgents who are sowing death, fear and misery in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Even coups d’état, once considered things of the past, characteristic of the early years of independence, are making a return among the repressed. The causes of these conflicts and others before them have been multidimensional and complex; however, the governance of natural resources stands out as the catalyst. This chapter presents a comparative sociological analysis of resource-​driven hostilities, drawing on southern, central, western and eastern African cases. In the south, it analyses the unfolding Islamic insurgency in Mozambique, which led to the involvement of the Southern African Development Community and Rwandan troops. At the center, the chapter looks at the plunder-​and-​pillage-​driven conflicts in the DRC. In the west, it considers the resource-​driven conflicts in the Sahel and in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Finally, in the east, it examines the pre-​and postcessation conflicts in South Sudan. The chapter draws on Walter Rodney’s thesis that the development of Europe is inextricably connected to the underdevelopment of Africa. Rodney’s key insight was to show how the global exploitation of natural resources and labor depends on local

446   David Matsinhe relationships of exploitation, which during colonial rule, took the form of the exploitation of one country by another. The violent appropriation of wealth in the present conflicts is a contemporary reflection of this relationship. The evidence presented here shows how the interactions among the resource-​extraction process, the acquisition of land and extractive operations in rural communities, local social stratification, and the ordering of populations into hierarchies of unequal access to the means of power and survival all precipitate the hostilities.

Theoretical Framework In Capitalism and Slavery, Eric Williams (1994) painted a portrait of the ways in which the transatlantic enslavement of Africans became the most powerful economic engine propelling the Industrial Revolution in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. As the demand for “Black gold” (the bodies of Africans) increased in the Americas in tandem with the insatiable demand for sugar and cotton in Europe, European traders, adventurers, speculators, and investors quickly realized that there were great fortunes to be made in the evil trade. They then violently extracted, traded, and sold millions of Africans as commodities for a profit, much as European colonialists would later extract raw materials from the continent to fuel the European capitalist machine. African bodies were among the first coveted resources to be extracted to serve European economic interests. In How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Walter Rodney (2018) has demonstrated how the impoverishment of Africa through the slave trade, among other injustices, and Europe’s economic development are two sides of the same coin, making a compelling argument that Europe could not have reached its economic heights without the extraction of Black bodies and resources from Africa. Consequently, while Asian and European populations tripled and quadrupled respectively between 1650 and 1900, the African population shrank as Europe extracted the continent’s young, strong, and able-​bodied childbearing-​age women and economically active men into slavery. The extractions of Black bodies and resources from Africa necessitated wars. In addition to the direct waging of war, Europeans deployed divide-​and-​conquer tactics, exploiting the existing rivalries among social groups and fueling more conflicts in which the victors captured the vanquished to supply the slave trade. Rodney (2018) demonstrates how these extractive wars devastated the African states. Large areas of western and central Africa that had been thriving population centers became deserted as slave hunters tracked deeper into the continent in pursuit of male and female Black bodies in their prime. The European extraction of human and natural resources remained the driving force behind conflicts in Africa. Rodney’s theory of Europe’s predatory economic relationship with Africa remains relevant today as a valid framework for conceptually ordering the interaction between resource extraction, social stratification, and violent conflict in Africa. Since the birth

Elusive Peace   447 of the transatlantic slave trade, European (and, lately, also Asian) demand for African resources has driven conflict in Africa. The advent of independence did little to change this. Nkrumah (1965) understood Africa’s postcolonial condition early on: Neo-​colonialist control is exercised economically. The neo-​colonial State may be obliged to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the exclusion of competing products from elsewhere . . . Control over government policy in the neo-​colonial State may be secured by payments towards the cost of running the State, through civil servants who can dictate policy and monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power. (p. x)

Neocolonial resource extraction and governance in the globalized economy continue to be a root cause of conflict in Africa, and therefore, peace continues to elude the postindependence African states. These conflicts have complex causal layers. However, this chapter maintains that preponderant among these is the governance of natural resources, wealth, and opportunities—​who gets them, when, and how—​including land, water, food, clean air, timber, wildlife, fisheries, and minerals. Although the chapter underscores the role of extraction, it is crucial to indicate from the outset that the nexus of extraction and conflict in Africa does not occur in a vacuum. The cases discussed here emerge from multidimensional and complex economic, social, cultural, environmental, political, and psychological conditions of possibility, and the relationships between the independent, intervening, and dependent variables that lead to violent conflict are hardly simple, linear, or monocausal, as Cramer (2006) has forcefully argued. As will be shown, old ethnic rivalries have historically been exploited to add fuel to the fire, as this was done to render the extraction of African bodies into slavery more efficient.

Conflict in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique Cabo Delgado is the northernmost province in Mozambique, along the border with Tanzania. In October 2017, an insurgency broke out there, unleashing a violent conflict that killed and injured thousands of people and caused severe damage to public infrastructure. “Insurgency,” defined by Bard O’Neill (1990, cited in Enun, 2021, p. 53) as a “struggle between non-​ruling group and ranking authorities in which the non-​ruling group consciously challenges the existing government for control,” requires the “active support of some segment of the population.” For four decades, governance by Frelimo, or the Mozambique Liberation Front, gradually transformed Cabo Delgado into a field of straw, ready to be engulfed in flames of violent conflict. The roots of the Cabo Delgado armed conflict are found in a complex mix of economics, human development, politics, history, ethnicity, and religion.

448   David Matsinhe Poverty, sociopolitical exclusion, social inequality, governance of natural resources and opportunities have been driving forces of the conflict (Amnesty International, 2021; International Crisis Group, 2021b; Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019). Today, Cabo Delgado is one of the richest provinces in natural resources, if not the richest, where mining and agriculture are the central economic activities (Dubé & Rands, 2021). Mining rights and land ownership are under the near-​exclusive monopoly control of Frelimo’s political elites. These elites—​who include the current president, Filipe Nyusi, and other prominent men, notably, the retired generals of the anticolonial struggle—​control most of the licit and illicit trading networks in Cabo Delgado, dominate the political life of the province and enjoy Frelimo’s protection and patronage. As these elites moved to expropriate land and award themselves the mining rights, millions of peasants, fishermen, and artisanal miners became landless, dislocated, and impoverished, some of whom were forcibly evicted, beaten, and even killed (Columbo, 2020; Matsinhe, 2020). Since independence, the central government has demonstrated poor governance over the national territory; failed to effectively administer the rule of law; and proved unable to protect, promote, and fulfill the human rights and dignity of its citizens. The Frelimo-​ led government has failed to build new infrastructures (or maintain the colonial ones) or to provide social services such as education and health, water distribution, and sanitation. It has left the predominantly Muslim Makuwa-​Mwani ethnic groups, who account for over 70 percent of the province’s population, to fend for themselves, depending for their livelihoods and ways of life on the territories with vast mineral resources including rubies, graphite, and natural gas, among others. The discovery and exploitation of these minerals in the last 15 years have accelerated the antagonistic relations between the Makuwa-​Mwani and the Makonde because the latter used their status as Frelimo rulers to expropriate from the former to access these riches. As a result, on the social and political margins, a radical religious sect emerged among the Makuwa-​Mwani that adopted violent extremism as the means to gain greater economic, social, and political participation. The group claims to represent economic, social, and political interests of Muslim groups, who felt locked out of the decision-​making processes on provincial matters, most notably, in terms of the economic benefits that accrued to the province from the exploitation of natural resources (Barnett, 2020; Darch, 2018; Ramos, 2019). Since beginning their hostile activities in October 2017, the violent extremists have targeted civilian authorities and their alleged supporters. Traditional Islamic leaders accused of siding with the Frelimo elite are among those who have been attacked. The extremists have expressed the desire to return to a more authentic, purer, truer, and holier Islam (Dubé & Rands, 2021). Observers are increasingly convinced that the insurgency is the embodiment of the resource curse, seen elsewhere in Africa, whereby large extractive corporations share the surplus from resource extraction with a small group of local elites while depriving the masses of these benefits (Barnett 2020; Dubé & Rands, 2021; Matsinhe, 2021; Morier-​ Genoud, 2020). Indeed, the ordinary people become worse off—​a confirmation of Walter Rodney’s observation that the flip side of unequal development relationships the underdevelopment of the dominated communities. It is a common practice in

Elusive Peace   449 Mozambique to forcibly evict rural communities from their ancestral lands to make room for the extractive companies. Government officials and companies flout national, regional, and international human and environmental due-​diligence requirements—​ they deliberately fail to consult with these communities or to compensate or resettle them and conduct environmental-​impact assessment and monitoring. Minerals are extracted, exported, and sold abroad, depriving communities of the benefits from their mineral resources. Mining operations dispossess, dislocate, and impoverish local communities and contaminate community soil, air, water, and food sources, exposing residents to health risks and hazards previously unknown (Amnesty International, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Matsinhe, 2021; Valoi, 2016).

Conflict, Plunder, and Pillage in the Congo The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is confronting worsening poverty; widening inequality; growing unemployment, notably among the youth; inadequate access to basic social services for most of the population; and deficient communication and transportation systems and infrastructure (Ntung, 2019). The country has a troubled history of harsh colonial exploitation (Hochschild, 1999), political instability, authoritarianism, and mismanagement (Baraza, 2020). The DRC continues to experience the persistent presence of competing militias that often forcibly control the mines and seize the revenues from the foreign trade of local minerals to fund their guerrilla warfare (Akamo, 2021; Marcucci 2019). With a population of over 80 million people, the DRC is among the world’s richest countries, abundantly endowed with untapped natural resources, including minerals such as gold, tantalum, and cobalt and high-​grade copper reserves; hydropower potential; significant arable land; immense biodiversity; and the world’s second-​largest rainforest—​the economy is based primarily on agriculture, fishing, mining, forestry, and the informal sector (World Bank, 2020a). However, the DRC faces significant security risks relative to state fragility, the lack of robust infrastructure, and prolonged wars (International Crisis Group, 2016; International Alert, 2010). The country has experienced a major deterioration of its natural endowment—​ notably, the forests. In 2020, the DRC lost 1.31 million hectares of natural forests, leading to deleterious environmental impacts relative to climate change, biodiversity, and rainfall patterns, and threatening the livelihoods of 35 million people who depend on forest resources. The country has the third largest population of the global poor, and internal conflict displaced over five million people and claimed thousands of lives between 2019 and 2020. Poverty is multidimensional, widespread, and pervasive, exacerbated by the Ebola and Covid-​19 outbreaks and the age-​old killer malaria (Akamo, 2021; Misser, 2020; World Bank, 2020a). Scholars point out that when Laurent Kabila became DRC

450   David Matsinhe president in 1997, he inherited a country in a deep economic crisis that was the result of decades of plunder and pillage by his predecessor, Mobutu Sese Seko (Hanlon, 1999; Ndikumana & Boyce, 1998; Renton et al., 2007). In addition, decades of reliance on trade in unprocessed primary products and raw materials dealt heavy blows to the economy. Political instability and poor governance discouraged investors, further worsening the economic outlook (Mbubi, 2014; Ntung, 2019). The DRC is a fragile and fragmented state, conditioned by competition for resources, ethnic cleavages, ideological differences, and the alienation of the Congolese people from their government. The disconnect between the government and the people is manifest in the government’s inability to deliver public services and failure to protect basic human rights and dignity. This has lead to widespread insecurity and vulnerability and called into question the government’s political legitimacy (Ntung, 2019). Armed groups embedded in informal economic networks emerged out of these conditions, further limiting the sovereignty of the Congolese state (Iñiguez de Heredia, 2017; Ntung, 2019). The northern and southern rebels of Kivu fuel the conflicts in their regions to export coffee, gold, and diamonds illegally. Hema and Lendu ethnic groups (Ituri region) clash over communal access to land for mining, farming, and forestry (Iñiguez de Heredia, 2017). Over 130 active armed groups violently jostle for power and control (Stearns et al., 2013). The government has struggled to manage its institutional and operational crisis in the east, as groups of Rwandan and Ugandan rebels—​respectively, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic Force (ADF)—​ have used this part of DRC to launch attacks on their governments. The Ugandan insurgent group, the ADF, has been operating since 2007 with the aim of liberating Uganda from an alleged Rwandan Tutsi domination. The Rwandan Hutu rebel group, the FDLR, is opposed to Tutsis in Rwanda. In addition, the armed groups known as Mau-​Mau position themselves as protectors of the region from foreign invaders. The Mau-​Mau militias are highly decentralized, community-​based groups scattered across the eastern DRC (Bjarnadóttir, 2017; Iñiguez de Heredia, 2017). These groups have managed to gain control over natural resources in eastern DRC. Natural resources and conflict go hand in glove, and the relationship is entangled with the corrupt and authoritarian nature of the government, corporate conduct of foreign multinationals, and formation of rebel ethnic militia groups (Bjarnadóttir, 2017; Mbubi, 2014). As state and non-​state interests exploit natural resources, the groups and citizens who are excluded from the accumulation process resort to violence. The exploitation of key natural resources by various rebel groups has significantly prolonged the wars in the DRC (Mbubi, 2014). The forces that drive the wars are complex and multidimensional, with numerous players involved in conflict minerals. Minerals such as tin, tantalum, cobalt, and tungsten, which are used in cell phones, computers, batteries and in cabling, are magnets for armed groups locked in multilateral violent conflicts (Mbubi, 2014; Olaopa & Ojakorotu, 2016). The desire to maintain economic participation and the political power that having access to these resources provides has attracted numerous rebel armed groups and multinational mining corporations (International Crisis Group, 2016).

Elusive Peace   451 Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi have shown interest in controlling the eastern DRC and taken part in the plunder under the guise of offering support to the DRC government (International Crisis Group, 2016). These nations supported President Kabila, creating a buffer zone against their own rebel groups that were using eastern DRC as their base (Stearns et al., 2013). Stearns (2022) also shows how these African partners in the violent exploitation of resources remain part of the longer-​term structural dependency that, as Walter Rodney showed, characterizes the economic relations between Africa and the global economy and can be traced back to slavery. Rwanda and Uganda have been accused of funding the rebels in the DRC to sustain the war and facilitate their own exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources. As Marcucci (2019) and Olaopa and Ojakorotu (2016) point out, although most of the mineral extraction from the soil has been carried out at gunpoint, the use of existing networks suggests that there is little hope that the withdrawal of forces will stop the massive plunder and pillage of resources. The patterns of extraction and conflict in the DRC are consistent with Rodney’s thesis, for while extraction and its wars exact economic, social, and environmental costs on the country, most of the citizenry do not benefit. Rather, the minerals are destined to enhance the economic and social development of American, European, and Asian countries.

The Conflict in the Niger Delta Since democratic rule in Nigeria was re-​established in 1999 after 16 years of military dictatorship, the country has experienced a sharp increase in violent conflict leading to insurgencies (Osumah, 2010). The Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies stand out, and have attracted domestic and international counterinsurgency responses (Nwankpa, 2017). From 2004 to 2009, the Niger Delta insurgency reached its apogee, resulting in numerous bombings of oil installations and facilities, the kidnapping of foreign oil workers and local executives, piracy, illegal oil refining and bunkering, interethnic conflicts, and almost daily armed battles between the militants and security operatives (Aghedo, 2012; Akpan, 2008). The militant activities led to a sharp decline in oil production, and because 80 percent of the Niger Delta’s revenue came from oil, this had devastating economic and social effects in the region (Nwankpa, 2017; Onuoha, 2020). The Niger Delta is one of six regions in Nigeria generously endowed with rich oil deposits. The oil has attracted intense interest from the Nigerian government and multinational oil corporations. It was expected that the enormous oil deposits in the Niger Delta would stimulate an economic boom, human development, social stability, and a peaceful political atmosphere (Okinana et al., 2015; Ross, 2004). This, however, has not been the case, as the government and the oil multinationals have interfered with the economic, social, cultural, political, and environmental rights of the people of the Niger Delta. In 2001, the African Human Rights Commission ruled that the Nigerian government had failed to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the rights of

452   David Matsinhe the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta (African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 2021). The disenfranchisement, dislocation, environmental injustice, economic and social exclusion, and violent repression of rights are among the grievances fueling the Niger Delta conflict, with consequences that extend beyond the region to threaten the Nigerian economy at large. Following the failed hypermilitary response, the Nigerian government has experimented with developmental approaches designed to improve human development in the region (Akanji, 2009; Eegunlusi, 2014). For example, the government established the Niger Delta Development Commission to facilitate rapid and sustainable socioecological and infrastructure development, and increased its efforts to bring stability to the region by granting amnesty to militant youths. It also established the Niger Delta ministry, which is responsible for designing and implementing development, peace, and security policies and programs in the region (Obi, 2014; Okinono et al., 2015). Unfortunately, bad governance, corruption, greed, and a lack of coordination and community participation have undermined these efforts (Aghedo, 2012; Dode, 2012; Okinono et al., 2015). There is a consensus among researchers on the nexus of reasons that have caused the Niger Delta conflict, paramount of which are bad governance; business and human rights (oil and gas); clashes of interests among the various players, not least, the ethnic groups that lack social cohesion; and an overreliance on oil and gas revenues, which puts Nigeria in a vulnerable position (Haaga, 2015; Nwankwo, 2015; Ogungbemi, 2010; Okinono et al., 2015). Severe environmental pollution due to irresponsible extraction methods has interfered with livelihoods and quality of life of the people of the Niger Delta. Ecological degradation and injustice threaten the natural ecosystem and human development, as well as peace and security in the region (Laleye & Eegunlusi, 2020; Okwuchi, 2017). The Nigerian government’s failure to protect lives, livelihoods, health, housing, property, and the environment has driven residents of the region to anger, frustration, despair, and hopelessness and caused them to question the legitimacy of the central authority (Haaga, 2015; Nwankwo, 2015; Okwuchi, 2017; Ogungbemi, 2010). By failing to hold the mining and oil and gas multinationals to national, regional, and international human rights and environmental standards and permitting them to practice laissez-​faire resource extraction the detriment of human and environmental integrity, the government has failed to live up to its obligations under domestic and international law—​another example proving Walter Rodney’s thesis that dominant economic systems perpetuate the underdevelopment of subordinate communities and prolong social injustice.

Sahelian Conflicts The Sahel is a semiarid topographic belt that stretches from the shores of Atlantic Ocean in Northwest Africa to the shores of the Red Sea in East Africa. Dividing the

Elusive Peace   453 Sahara from the southern part of the continent, the Sahelian belt cuts through ten countries—​Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Sudan, and Eritrea. The Sahelian countries under consideration here are Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso, which have come to be known as the G5 Sahel (Cooper, 2018; World Bank, 2015). The region faces complex multidimensional crises that include the proliferation of insurgent groups, organized criminal networks, environmental pressures, state weakness, and poor governance. Deep structural conditions account for the fragile sociopolitical dynamics and internal divisions that once predominantly manifested in the Malian conflict, and now affect the whole Sahel region (Morten, 2017). Climate change and demographic pressures exacerbate disputes over access to and control of land and water resources (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2021; Mayans, 2020; World Bank, 2020c). Competition for the diminishing supply of land and resources becomes increasingly violent, as different groups vie for control of the means of production and survival (Peyton, 2017). Both pastoralism and agriculture depend on land and water to raise and keep livestock and grow food. However, land degradation due to climate change and limited access to water limit agricultural and livestock production, leading to food insecurity. This has created tensions between pastoralists and farmers, who fight against each other to gain and maintain control of farming and grazing lands (Cooper, 2018). Located on the economic and social margins, and without political representation, pastoralist groups are vulnerable to economic, social, and environmental volatility, often without any form of cushioning. These conditions of marginality and vulnerability functioned as favorable contingencies for the emergence of violent Islamic insurgencies in the region, including the re-​emergence of al-​Qa’ida with its nefarious networks of cells and fighters and transnational organized crime (Cooper, 2018; International Monetary Fund, 2016; Morten, 2017; United Nations, 2018; World Bank, 2015). The wealth of natural resources in the Sahel includes minerals, such as gold, manganese, and zinc in Burkina Faso and Mali; uranium and coal in Niger; and iron and copper in Mauritania; as well as oil, in Chad. Under global capitalism, these minerals have obviously attracted multinational extractive corporations into the region. In Chad, for instance, over a dozen extractive companies have been operating, some for longer than others. The Doba Consortium (ESSO Exploration and Production Chad) has been extracting oil from Chadian soil since 1988, and, since 2011, so has the Anglo-​ Swiss multinational commodity trading and mining company Glencore (Cooper, 2018). Some of these companies operate in more than one Sahelian country. In Chad these natural resources are destined for direct export without local value-​adding activities, which deprives the people of the Sahel of work opportunities (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Extractive corporations have presided over environmental degradation, an abysmal record of job creation for locals, capital flight, and lack of spillover economic effects (Antil, 2014). The scenario is the same everywhere in the Sahel, where the economies depend primarily on the production and extraction of raw materials for export. Because the people of the Sahel do not process their own raw materials, their

454   David Matsinhe extractives revenues accrue only through the tax regime (Antil, 2014; Cooper, 2018) and are easily appropriated by the political and economic elite. Given state weakness, corruption, and poor governance, the Sahel conflicts are likely to multiply, rendering the entire region even more lawless and ungovernable, potentially spreading beyond the Sahel frontiers (Baudais et al., 2021). On their own, the Sahel states remain unable to pacify their territories and restore peace, order, security, the rule of law, and human rights. The current international interventions are failing to support Sahelian states’ efforts toward pacification, order, and justice. The focus is on ending the migration of youth to Europe and fighting the insurgents, viewed as part of global jihadist terrorism (Cooper, 2018). The conflicts’ causal conditions—​weak states, poor governance, corruption, political marginalization, environmental degradation, dispossession and dislocation, lack of transparency about extractive state revenues, poverty, and youth unemployment—​are largely left unattended, making it unlikely that the region will be pacified in the foreseeable future (Baudais et al., 2021). Researchers who study the Sahel conflicts tend to focus on the numerous and complex internal and regional motivational processes that have historically driven the region’s conflict and fragmentation (Antil, 2014; Baudais et al., 2021; Cooper, 2018; Larsen & Mamosso, 2014; Peyton, 2017). However, the role of multinational corporations in the extractives industry has received insufficient attention as a contributor to the conflicts and fragmentation in the Sahel region. Because of its coveted natural wealth, the Sahel is sucked into global capitalism as a supplier of raw materials to countries in the Global North. Mali, the epicenter of the Sahel conflict, is the third largest producer of gold in Africa after South Africa and Ghana. In 2012, Mali had nine gold mines, employing 12,000 people, exporting gold ore to South Africa and Switzerland for processing and commercial use. This mining has been of little to no benefit to the people of Mali. Whatever benefits from gold mining that do accrue to the people of Mali are offset by environmental degradation it causes, and the dispossession and dislocation of farmers and pastoralists, which, in turn, drive the conflict. In addition, Mali’s mineral reserves include diamonds, bauxite, iron ore, limestone, manganese, nickel, phosphates, tin and uranium, kaolin, ornamental stone, gypsum, volcanogenic, phosphate, pegmatite, and lithium. At various times, multinational extractive companies have explored the feasibility of extracting these minerals for export to industries outside Africa. Recalling Rodney, the point is that strategic economic activities in Africa have always been geared to the Global North. This is another example of how conflicts that are stereotypically attributed to “African characteristics,” such as ethnic animosities, have deep roots in global economic hierarchies.

Conflict in South Sudan South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 after two successive civil wars. The first lasted from 1955 to 1972 and killed about 500,000 people; the second, from 1983 to 2005, killing

Elusive Peace   455 about two million and displacing about four million people. Between the two wars there were various uncoordinated battles between the parties to the conflict. These hostilities were between the Arabized northerners, who took of control of the state after independence, and the Christianized southerners, who felt politically, economically and socially marginalized (Arnold & LeRiche, 2012). The discovery of oil in South Sudan in the late 1970s and early 1980s precipitated the second civil war in 1983, as the central government in Khartoum in the north sought to tighten its grip on the south to control the newfound, lucrative resource. The southerners saw the petroleum as theirs and would use any means necessary to gain independence from Sudan. These disputes resulted in 22 years of hostilities between the northerners and the southerners, with tensions around political power, culture, ethnicity, identity, religion, and regionalism fanning the embers of violence (Cascão, 2017). Two years after secession, an ethnic-​based violent conflict broke out in 2013 in South Sudan, mostly between the Dinka and the Nuer—​again, the unequal distribution of oil revenues was center stage (International Crisis Group, 2021a). By the time the parties to the conflict reached a peace agreement, in 2018, the hostilities had claimed an estimated 400,000 lives and stunted the new country’s economic and social development (Checchi et al., 2018). South Sudan is abundantly endowed with such natural resources as land, water, hydropower, forests, fisheries, and mineral resources (e.g., petroleum, gold, silver, copper, iron ore, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, and mica). The causes of these conflicts are ascribed to competition over these natural resources, most notably oil, and internal ethnic rivalries owing to the failure of the new state to establish a monopoly over the means of violence. As a result, peace and economic stability have eluded Juba (Ottaway & El-​Sadany, 2012). The nexus of natural resources, primarily petroleum, and violent conflict in South Sudan is the subject of consensus among scholars (Yusuf et al., 2016). As in Angola and Nigeria, South Sudan’s economy is heavily dependent on oil extraction. In 2021, the country earned $1.4 billion in gross oil revenues. Consequently, “any move away from production clearly would precipitate a collapse in the government’s income and further diminish the authorities’ threadbare legitimacy” (International Crisis Group, 2021a, p. 7). Yet the development of oil projects has contributed to the displacement of farmers and pastoralists, even as some of the income was used to back the conflict and to enrich a small, politically connected elite (Yusuf et al., 2016). Despite this natural wealth, South Sudan scores very poorly on the human development index (HDI). In 2019, South Sudan’s HDI was low at 0.433; it was in the 185th position among the 189 countries and territories measured (United Nations Development Programme, 2020). In addition to income poverty, large parts of the population, including those living above the income poverty line, are multidimensionally poor, meaning they are subject to deprivations in health, education, employment, water, and sanitation and standard of living (United Nations Development Programme, 2020). South Sudan also performs poorly on the World Bank’s Human Capital Index (HCI), which “measures the amount of human capital that a child born today can expect to attain by age 18” (World Bank, 2020b, p. 1). Accordingly, a child born in South Sudan in 2020 would be “31 percent

456   David Matsinhe as productive when she grows up as she could be if she enjoyed complete education and full health.” This score was “lower than the average for Sub-​Saharan Africa region and Low-​income countries” (World Bank, 2020b, p. 1). In addition, about 90 out of 100 children born in South Sudan survived to age 5; and a child who starts school at age 4 could expect to complete 4.7 years of school by her or his 18th birthday. In terms of learning-​ adjusted years of school, factoring in what children learn, the expected years of school amounted to 2.5 years. About 69 out of 100 children enjoyed “healthy” growth, meaning not stunted. In other words, 31 out of 100 children were stunted and at risk for cognitive and physical limitations that can last a lifetime. Finally, 68 percent of 15-​year-​olds were expected to survive until the age of 60 (World Bank, 2020b). A report by Voice of America published in 2021 noted that South Sudan pumped 3.5 billion barrels of oil annually, boasted the third largest oil reserves in Sub-​Saharan Africa, and had lost more than $4 billion in unpaid taxes from 500 oil companies since 2011 (Voice of America, 2021). Before the war, the country extracted between 350,000 and 400,000 barrels per day, compared to 154,000 barrels per day in 2021 and 180,000 per day in 2019 (Reuters, 2021). Asian national oil companies dominate South Sudan’s oil industry, with three main consortia controlled by Malaysia’s Petronas, India’s ONGC Videsh, and the China National Petroleum Corporation. Other companies, such as Sinopec, TriOcean, and KUFPEC, hold minor shares. South Sudan’s national oil company, the Nile Petroleum Corporation, or Nilepet, is a stakeholder in all the operating consortia (Qekeleshe, 2020). Two petroleum export pipelines connect South Sudan oil fields to Port Sudan on the Red Sea in Sudan. The PetroDar Pipeline stretches 1,360 kilometers to Port Sudan on the Red Sea in Sudan. The Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, operated by the China National Petroleum Corporation, extends 1,610 kilometers to El Bashayer port, also on the Red Sea in Sudan. The former has a capacity of 500,000 barrels per day, while the latter has a capacity of 250,000 barrels per day. Consistent with Rodney’s thesis, this out-​of-​Africa-​ oriented economic and social organization of the oil industry in South Sudan, along with the associated armed conflicts, are part of the predatory global petroleum market from which the people of South Sudan gain little benefit and much misery.

Back to Walter Rodney The link between conflict and resource extraction in Africa is consistent with Rodney’s thesis that, for their development, Western countries have kept social groups in Africa busy at odds with each other to facilitate exploitation. Hence it is crucial to underscore that conflict in Africa does not occur in a vacuum but in and through a dense and intense web of unequal global economic and social relations in which the continent is the prey. The predatory relationship between the continent and the outside world intensified with the extraction of Black bodies as cheap and free labor destined for the economic

Elusive Peace   457 development of western regions of the world. Given impetus by Europe in the 16th century, the predatory economic relationships with Africa multiplied over centuries and expanded to other regions of the world. It is no longer Europe and America alone that see Africa as a source of cheap natural resources. Asian countries are now part of the club of predators. American, European, and Asian corporations are found throughout Africa, extracting natural resources to develop their own economies to the detriment of the economies of the places of extraction in ways that deprive most Africans of developmental opportunities. It is undeniable that endogenous precarious life conditions—​for example, inequality, multidimensional poverty, antagonistic group relations, political intolerance, and religious fundamentalisms—​are fodder for the hostilities throughout the continent. However, failure to see beyond these local causal conditions misses the picture of the complex ways in which African economies are disadvantageously entangled with the global economy. The latter-​day scramble for Africa, and the rush of American, European, and Asian multinational corporations to acquire large tracts of land for export-​oriented food production, mining, and oil and gas extraction to service their lucrative home economies, has introduced a new dynamic on the continent. It ultimately serves to reinforce the long-​term structural dependency through the violent appropriation of resources that Rodney identified as the root cause of Africa’s underdevelopment. The acquisition of land, in connivance with small numbers of local political elites, meant that communities in many parts of the continent, notably the naturally rich ones, were removed from their home ecosystems without adherence to any internationally recognized and sanctioned human rights standards. The prior free and informed consent of communities, which includes community consultations, just compensation, resettlement, environmental impact assessments, and monitoring, were ignored in the rush for profits. As a result, communities lost not only their means of making a living but also their ways of life. In other words, communities lost the ecosystems that provided them with the basic economic, social, and cultural necessities such as food, water, housing, health, sanitation, knowledge, religion, and leisure and recreation. These developments continue to put pressure on communities, which now must compete against one another over the shrinking means of survival. The jostling escalates to overt hostilities in a violent quest for survival. Meanwhile the resources continue to flow out of the continent, often without benefiting local economies. Tax evasion and illicit flows of capital out of Africa are part of the story.

Conclusion The extraction, conflict, and fragmentation in Mozambique (Cabo Delgado), the DRC, Nigeria (Niger Delta), the Sahel, and South Sudan are connected to the economic development of Western and Asian countries via those countries’ exploitation of the region’s

458   David Matsinhe natural capital. Western (and now various Asia-​based) extractive corporations have acquired large tracts of land for mining and oil exploitation, dispossessing and dislocating local farmers and pastoralists, who, in turn, are pitted against each other to violently compete for the remaining inferior land. This extraction without due diligence to prevent, mitigate, and remedy the adverse human rights impacts led to the expropriation and contamination of the natural ecosystems that had traditionally provided Africans with food, water, housing, and a healthy environment. Land expropriation and environmental degradation, in turn, aggravated the impoverishment of local communities. The contamination of water, soil, and air introduced diseases hitherto unknown to community residents. The immiseration of local communities is inextricably connected to the enhancement of Western life comforts that is enabled by their access to Africa’s minerals and petroleum. This external extraction without local benefits and the consequential armed conflict on the continent must be viewed as a reflex of the predatory economic relationships in the global economy between Europe, America, and Asia, on the one hand, and Africa, on the other. Extraction has driven millions of Africans to death, injury, poverty, misery, and strife, even as Western and Asian multinational extractive corporations and small numbers of local elites benefit immensely. African natural resources are powering Western and Asian economies by sacrificing rural communities throughout the continent. It is now fashionable among scholars to muse with pity about violent Islamic extremism in Africa, focusing almost exclusively on the ugly and the grotesque on and one-​sided exaggerations of the Islamic beliefs that are used to buttress the untold cruelty. The reality of the globalized predatory economic relationship between Africa and the outside world gets lost in the conversation. Here, too, European multinational corporations have been extracting minerals with little benefit to local communities. In collaboration with local political elites, multinational corporations have expropriated vast tracts of land without meaningful consultation, resettlement programs, and environmental impact assessment and monitoring, stripping communities of their economic, social, and cultural rights and dignity. The youth who had depended on the natural ecosystems to make their livings through artisanal mining, fishing, and agriculture suddenly became surplus populations. Beyond the readily visible Islamic violent extremism, this insurgency must be located within the coordinates of the global predatory economic relations in which Africa stands with the rest of the world. As long as the rest of the world continues to covet Africa’s natural resources and seeks to extract them without paying a fair price that will translate in palpable economic, social, cultural, and environmental benefits to local communities, Africa will continue to be the stage of a violent drama that spills sacrificial blood on the soil for the comfort and well-​being of others. Unless multinational corporations appreciate and treat local communities as partners who, in welcoming the extractives industry into their local ecosystems, are taking significant risks; and unless the local political elites cease to see their peoples as nuisances standing in the way of quick profits, then peace, security, and stability will remain elusive on the continent.

Elusive Peace   459

References African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (2021). 155/​96: Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)/​Nigeria. https://​ www.achpr.org/​pub​lic/​Docum​ent/​file/​Engl​ish/​ach​pr30​_​155​_​96_​eng.pdf Aghedo, I. (2012). Winning the war, losing the peace: Amnesty and the challenges of post-​ conflict peacebuilding in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48, 267–​280. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00219​0961​2453​987 Akamo, J. O. (2021, April 21). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict insights (Institute for Peace and Security Studies Peace and Security report). Africa Portal. https://​ www.afric​apor​tal.org/​publi​cati​ons/​dem​ocra​tic-​repub​lic-​congo-​drc-​confl​ict-​insig​hts Akanji, O. (2009). The politics of combating domestic terrorism in Nigeria. In W. Okumu & A. Botha (Eds.), Domestic terrorism in Africa: Defining, addressing and understanding its impact on human security (pp. 54–​65). Institute for Security Studies. https://​media.afric​apor​tal.org/​ docume​nts/​TERR​ORIS​MREP​ORT.pdf Akpan, W. (2008). Corporate citizenship in the Nigerian petroleum industry: A beneficiary perspective. Development Southern Africa, 25, 497–​511. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​037683​5080​ 2447​602 Amnesty International. (2018, March 28). “ Our lives mean nothing”: The human cost of Chinese mining in Mozambique. https://​www.amne​sty.org/​en/​docume​nts/​afr41/​7851/​2018/​en Amnesty International. (2021). “What I saw is death”: War crimes in Mozambique’s forgotten cape [Research report]. https://​www.amne​sty.org/​en/​docume​nts/​afr41/​3545/​2021/​en/​ Antil, A. (2014). The mining boom in the Sahel region: Will the development last? Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri). https://​www.ifri.org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​atoms/​ files/​note_​alai​n_​an​til-​boom​_​min​ier-​final-​en.pdf Arnold, M., & LeRiche, M. (2012). South Sudan: From revolution to independence. Columbia University Press. Baraza, S. (2020, October 30). DRC: A history of pillage, destination unknown. The Africa Report. https://​www.thea​fric​arep​ort.com/​47442/​drc-​a-​hist​ory-​of-​pill​age-​dest​inat​ion​-unkn​own Barnett, J. (2020). The “Central African” jihad: Islamism and nation-​building in Mozambique and Uganda. Hudson Institute. https://​www.hud​son.org/​resea​rch/​16471-​the-​cent​ral-​afri​ can-​jihad-​islam​ism-​and-​nat​ion-​build​ing-​in-​moz​ambi​que-​and-​uga​nda Baudais, V., Bourhrous, A., & O’Driscoll, D. (2021). Conflict mediation and peacebuilding in the Sahel: The role of Maghreb countries in an African framework. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://​www.sipri.org/​publi​cati​ons/​2021/​sipri-​pol​icy-​pap​ers/​confl​ ict-​mediat​ion-​and-​peaceb​uild​ing-​sahel-​role-​magh​reb-​countr​ies-​afri​can-​framew​ork Bjarnadóttir, E. S. (2017). Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A study of “new wars” [Masters dissertation, University of Iceland]. Cascão, A. E. (2017). Resource-​based conflict in South Sudan and Gambella (Ethiopia): When water, land and oil mix with politics. In A. M. Dias (Ed.), State and societal challenges in the horn of Africa: Conflict and processes of state formation, reconfiguration and disintegration. Open Edition Books. https://​books.open​edit​ion.org/​cei/​295 Checchi, F., Testa, A., Warsame, A., Quach, L., & Burns, R. (2018, September). Estimates of crisis-​attributable mortality in South Sudan, December 2013–​April 2018: A statistical analysis. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. https://​relief​web.int/​sites/​relief​web.int/​ files/​resour​ces/​LSHTM_​m​orta​lity​_​Sou​th_​S​udan​_​rep​ort.pdf

460   David Matsinhe Columbo, E. (2020). The secret to the northern Mozambique insurgency’s success. War on the Rocks. https://​waront​hero​cks.com/​2020/​10/​the-​sec​ret-​to-​the-​north​ern-​moz​ambi​que-​insu​ rgen​cys-​succ​ess Cooper, R. (2018). Natural resources management strategies in the Sahel [K4D Helpdesk Report]. Institute of Development Studies. https://​gsdrc.org/​publi​cati​ons/​natu​ral-​resour​ ces-​man​agem​ent-​str​ateg​ies-​in-​the-​sahel Cramer, C. (2006). Civil War is not a stupid thing: Accounting for violence in developing countries. Hurst & Company. Darch, C. (2018). A success story gone wrong? The Mozambican conflict and the peace process in historical perspective. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. https://​libr​ary.fes.de/​pdf-​files/​bue​ros/​ fes-​pscc/​14344.pdf. Dode, R. O. (2012). Nigerian security forces and the management of internal conflict in the Niger Delta: Challenges of human security and development. European Journal of Sustainable Development, 1, 409–​418. https://​doi.org/​10.14207/​ejsd.2012.v1n3p​409 Dubé, T. H., & Rands, R. (2021). Evolving doctrine and modus operandi: Violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33(3), 437–​466. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09592​ 318.2021.1936​956 Eegunlusi, T. E. (2014). Anyiam-​Osigwe’s (holistic) political philosophy and the Niger Delta post-​amnesty programme. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 4, 10–​19. Enun, N. (2021). Non-​state actors, terrorism and human security in Nigeria: An assessment of Boko Haram insurgency, 2009–​2019. African Journal on Terrorism, 1, 49–​74. https://​ caert.org.dz/​Publi​cati​ons/​Jour​nal/​Jour​nal-​Dec-​2021-​11-​1.pdf Haaga, T. P. (2015). On economic injustice and distribution of resources in Nigeria. In Y. Salami, J. Famakinwa, & G. Fasiku (Eds.), Nationalism and economic justice in Nigeria (pp. 191–​208). Obafemi Awolowo University Press. Hanlon, J. (1999). Take the hit. New Internationalist, 312. https://​new​int.org/​featu​res/​1999/​05/​ 05/​hit Hochschild, A. (1999). King Leopold’s ghost: A story of greed, terror, and heroism in colonial Africa. Houghton Mifflin. Human Rights Watch. (2013). “What is a house without food?”: Mozambique’s coal mining boom and resettlements. https://​www.hrw.org/​rep​ort/​2013/​05/​23/​what-​house-​with​out​ -food/​moza​mbiq​ues-​coal-​min​ing-​boom-​and-​res​ettl​emen​tsht​tps://​doi.org/​10.1163/​18218​ 89X-​12340​009 Iñiguez de Heredia, M. (2017). Everyday resistance, peacebuilding, and state-​ making. Manchester University Press. International Alert. (2010). The role of the exploitation of natural resources in fuelling and prolonging crises in the eastern DRC. https://​www.intern​atio​nal-​alert.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ ads/​2021/​09/​DRC-​Natu​ral-​Resour​ces-​Confl​ict-​EN-​2010.pdf International Crisis Group. (2016). Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s mineral heartland. https://​d20​ 71an​dvip​0wj.clo​udfr​ont.net/​239-​kata​nga-​tensi​ons-​in-​drcs-​mine​ral-​heartl​and.pdf International Crisis Group. (2021a). Oil or nothing: Dealing with South Sudan’s bleeding finances. https://​www.cris​isgr​oup.org/​afr​ica/​horn-​afr​ica/​south-​sudan/​305-​oil-​or-​noth​ing​ -deal​ing-​south-​sud​ans-​bleed​ing-​finan​ces International Crisis Group. (2021b). Stemming the insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado (Africa report no. 303). https://​www.cris​isgr​oup.org/​afr​ica/​south​ern-​afr​ica/​moz​ambi​que/​ 303-​stemm​ing-​insur​rect​ion-​moza​mbiq​ues-​cabo-​delg​ado

Elusive Peace   461 International Monetary Fund. (2016). Assisting resource rich countries mobilise and manage their revenues. https://​www.imf.org/​en/​Capac​ity-​Deve​lopm​ent/​trust-​fund/​MNRW-​TTF Laleye, S. A., & Eegunlusi, T. R. (2020). Ethics of civility as a panacea to Niger Delta conflicts in Nigeria. Oracle of Wisdom: Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4(5), 1–​20. Larsen, R. K., & Mamosso, C. A. (2014). Aid with blinkers: Environmental governance of uranium mining in Niger. World Development, 56, 62–​76. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.world​ dev.2013.10.024 https://​gga.org/​CAM/​Moz​ambi​que/​Viole​nce%20Ex​trem​ism%20in%20C​ abo%20Delg​ado%20-​%20Bles​sed%20Mang​ena%20and%20Mok​ete%20Pher​udi.pdf Marcucci, G. (2019). The war report 2018: The Democratic Republic of Congo. Geneva Academy. https://​www.gen​eva-​acad​emy.ch/​joom​lato​ols-​files/​doc​man-​files/​Dem​ocra​tic%20R​epub​ lic%20of%20The%20Co​ngo%20C​onfl​ict%20In%20The%20East​ern%20Regi​ons.pdf Matsinhe, D. (2020, May 29). Mozambique: The forgotten people of Cabo Delgado [Op-​ed]. Daily Maverick. https://​www.dailym​aver​ick.co.za/​arti​cle/​2020-​05-​29-​moz​ambi​que-​the​ -forgot​ten-​peo​ple-​of-​cabo-​delg​ado Matsinhe, D. (2021). Dispossession and displacement: Land, rights and dignity in Mozambique and Angola. In K. Mabasa & B. Mabasa (Eds.), Land in South Africa: Contested meanings and nation formation (pp. 212–​253). Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA). Matsinhe, D. M., & Valoi, E. (2019). The genesis of insurgency in northern Mozambique. Institute for Security Studies. https://​issafr​ica.org/​resea​rch/​south​ern-​afr​ica-​rep​ort/​the-​gene​sis-​of​ -ins​urge​ncy-​in-​north​ern-​moz​ambi​que Mayans, J. (2020). The Sahel in the midst of climate change. Solidarités International. https://​ www.soli​dari​tes.org/​en/​live-​from-​the-​field/​the-​sahel-​in-​the-​midst-​of-​clim​ate-​cha​nge Mbubi, B. (2014). The role of conflict minerals in the peace process in the DRC. Peacebuilding, 2, 224–​226. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​21647​259.2014.910​915 Misser, F. (2020). Rivers of arms, Democratic Republic of Congo: Arms flow. Africa in Fact, 52, 107–​111. Morier-​Genoud, É. (2020). The jihadi insurgency in Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 14(3), 396–​412. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​17531​ 055.2020.1789​271 Morten, B. (2017). Fragile states as the new development agenda? Forum for Development Studies, 44, 149–​154. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​08039​410.2017.1264​737 Ndikumana, L., & Boyce, J. (1998). Congo’s odious debt: External borrowing and capital flight in Zaire. Development and Change, 29, 195–​217. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​1467-​7660.00076 Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-​colonialism, the last stage of imperialism. International Publishers. https://​www.marxi​sts.org/​subj​ect/​afr​ica/​nkru​mah/​neo-​colo​nial​ism/​intro​duct​ion.htm Ntung, A. (2019). Dynamics of local conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Challenges ahead for president Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 43, 131–​150. Nwankpa, N. (2017). Sustainable agricultural development in Nigeria: A way out of hunger and poverty. European Journal of Sustainable Development, 6, 175–​184. https://​doi.org/​10.14207/​ ejsd.2017.v6n4p​175 Nwankwo, B. O. (2015). The politics of conflict over oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: A review of the corporate social responsibility strategies of the oil companies. American Journal of Educational Research, 3, 383–​392. https://​doi.org/​10.12691/​educat​ion-​3-​4-​1 Obi, C. (2014). Oil and the post-​amnesty programme (PAP): What prospects for sustainable development and peace in the Niger Delta? Review of African Political Economy, 41, 249–​263. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​03056​244.2013.872​615

462   David Matsinhe Qekeleshe, S. (2020, November 4). Meet South Sudan’s oil operators. Energy Capital & Power. https://​ene​rgyc​apit​alpo​wer.com/​meet-​south-​sud​ans-​oil-​operat​ors Ogungbemi, S. (2010). The conflict in the Niger Delta region and national interest. In V. Ojakorotu & L. Gilbert (Eds.), Checkmating the resurgence of oil violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (pp. 130–​146). Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. http://​www.iags.org/​ Niger​_​Del​ta_​b​ook.pdf Okinono, O., Salleh, D., & Din, B. H. (2015). Human development and capability building in the Niger Delta: Issues and challenges. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5, 406–​414. https://​doi.org/​10.5901/​mjss.2015.v6n​6s2p​406 Okwuchi, M. N. (2017). Conflict and development in Nigeria: Counterinsurgency and counter-​ terrorism strategies towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts [Doctoral dissertation, University of Roehampton]. Olaopa, O., & Ojakorotu, V. (2016). Conflict about natural resources and the prospect of development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Journal of Social Sciences, 49, 244–​256. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09718​923.2016.11893​618 Onuoha, A. (2020). Land ownerships, natural resources, and the evolution of conflicts in Nigeria. African Journal of Social Sciences, 10, 28–​40. Osumah, O. (2010). Governance and violent conflicts in Nigeria. Journal of Contemporary Research, 7, 254–​265. https://​doi.org/​10.4314/​lwati.v7i1.61064 Ottaway, M., & El-​Sadany, M. (2012). Sudan from conflict to conflict [Carnegie paper]. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://​carneg​ieen​dowm​ent.org/​2012/​05/​16/​sudan​ -from-​confl​ict-​to-​confl​ict-​pub-​48140 Peyton, N. (2017, March 8). Farmers in Sahel learn ways to avoid drought disaster. Thomson Reuters Foundation News. http://​news.trust.org/​item/​201​7030​8100​624-​10jxp Ramos, A. L. (2019). Peace and conflict in Mozambique: A long road to democracy? In N. Ganesan (Ed.), International perspectives on democratization and peace (pp. 149–​170). Emerald. Renton, D., Seddon, D., & Zeilig, L. (2007). The Congo: Plunder and resistance. Zed Books. Reuters. (2021, July 2). South Sudan oil output declines as fields reach peak. https://​www.reut​ ers.com/​busin​ess/​ene​rgy/​south-​sudan-​oil-​out​put-​decli​nes-​fie​lds-​reach-​peak-​2021-​07-​02 Rodney, W. (2018). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Verso Books. Ross, M. L. (2004). How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases. International Organization, 58, 35–​67. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00208​1830​4581​02X Stearns, J. (2022). The war that doesn’t say its name: The unending conflict in the Congo. Princeton University Press. Stearns, J., Verweijen, J., & Baaz, M. E. (2013). The national army and armed groups in the eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity (Usalama Project report). Rift Valley Institute. https://​rif​t val​ley.net/​publ​icat​ion/​natio​nal-​army-​and-​armed-​gro​ups-​east​ ern-​congo United Nations. (2018). UN support plan for the Sahel: Working together for a prosperous and peaceful Sahel. https://​www.un.org/​africa​rene​wal/​sites/​www.un.org.africa​rene​wal/​files/​ Engl​ish%20Summ​ary%20R​epor​t_​0.pdf United Nations Development Programme. (2020). The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene [Briefing note]. https://​hdr.undp.org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​Coun​try-​Profi​les/​ SSD.pdf United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2021). Climate risk profile: Sahel. https://​ www.unhcr.org/​61a49d​f44.pdf

Elusive Peace   463 Valoi, E. (2016, May 3). The blood rubies of Montepuez. Foreign Policy. https://​foreig​npol​icy​​ .com/​2016/​05/​03/​the-​blood-​rub​ies-​of-​montep​uez-​moz​ambi​que-​gemfie​lds-​ille​gal-​min​ing Voice of America. (2021). South Sudan’s oil industry remains dependent on foreign help. https://​www.voan​ews.com/​a/​afric​a_​so​uth-​sudan-​focu​s_​so​uth-​sud​ans-​oil-​indus​try-​rema​ ins-​depend​ent-​fore​ign-​help/​6207​908.html#:~:text=​S outh%20Su​d an%20ra​n ks%20th​ ird%20in,to%20i​ncre​ase%20pro​duct​ion%20and%20r​even​ues Williams, E. (1994). Capitalism and slavery. University of North Carolina Press. World Bank. (2015, May 26). World Bank mobilizes US$248 million to support 2 million pastoralists in the Sahel [Press release]. http://​www.worldb​ank.org/​en/​news/​press-​rele​ ase/​2015/​05/​26/​world-​b ank-​mobili​zes-​us248-​mill​ion-​to-​supp ​ort-​2-​mill​ion-​p asto​rali​ sts-​in-​the-​sahel World Bank. (2020a). Overview: Democratic Republic of Congo. World Bank. (2020b). South Sudan: Human Capital Index 2020 [brief]. https://​datab​ank​ .worldb​ank.org/​data/​downl​oad/​hci/​HCI​_​2pa​ger_​SSD.pdf World Bank. (2020c). Where climate change is reality: Supporting Africa’s Sahel pastoralists to secure a resilient future. https://​www.worldb​ank.org/​en/​news/​immers​ive-​story/​2020/​09/​ 21/​where-​clim​ate-​cha​nge-​is-​real​ity-​sup​port​ing-​afri​cas-​sahel-​pasto​rali​sts-​sec​ure-​a-​resili​ ent-​fut​ure Yusuf, K., Kamp, M., Mugisha, M. B., & Ojok, D. (2016). Conflict and state formation in South Sudan: The logic of oil revenues in influencing the dynamics of elite bargains. Journal on Perspectives of African Democracy and Development, 1, 30–​40.

Chapter 25

Insurgenc y a nd Organized Vi ol e nc e in Afri c a A Cross-​National Approach Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola

Introduction Insurgency and miscellaneous organized violence have been rising sharply on the African continent. The groups perpetuating this violence can be distinguished by their goals or by the methods and tactics they employ to achieve them. In some instances, multiple insurgent groups with conflicting identities and goals operate simultaneously within a given territory but use the same methods and tactics to achieve their goals. And though the goals of insurgent groups may evolve, certain sociological conditions contribute to and shape their insurgency and organized violence that deserve analytical attention. These sociological conditions shape the character and dynamics of violent insurgent groups. Recent studies have attempted to explain how extremism has developed in Africa over time, and why some African countries are more vulnerable to violent extremism than others (Allan et al., 2015; United Nations Development Programme, 2017). The review by Allan et al. (2015) provides a critical assessment of the causes of violent extremism, informed by an examination of the 17 hypotheses on the drivers of violent extremism that were identified in a 2008 publication by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. Their analysis shows that radicalization is a sociological process that develops from the actions of ideologues, who instrumentalize ethnoreligious identities for recruitment into extremist groups. Similarly, Boukhars (2020) traces the factors responsible for the variations in the target selections of violent extremist groups in Africa to differences in group dynamics, the degree to which

466    Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola groups rely on local support to consolidate their insurgent activities, intergroup rivalry resulting from shifts in the power structure, and the counterinsurgency strategies employed by governments. A gap in the literature has been the examination of the sociological conditions that shape the actions of violent extremist groups. In filling this lacuna, this chapter offers sociologically fascinating contexts for understanding the pattern of contemporary insurgencies, their differences and similarities, as well as their characteristics. Understanding the lethality of insurgencies and organized violence in Africa requires a painstaking sociological reconsideration of the underlying factors and actors, and their objectives, tactics, and modes of operation. Drawing on case studies in Mali and Somalia, this chapter interrogates the sociological drivers of insurgent activities, the characteristics of insurgent groups, and the impact of the response by state actors, vis-​ à-​vis organized violence in selected countries. It develops a cross-​national analysis of the sociological conditions that contribute to and shape insurgency and organized violence, as well as insurgent characteristics. A cross-​national approach to interrogating organized violence and insurgency in Africa has the potential to make both theoretical and policy contributions. The case studies were chosen because the violent insurgency in each country involves a unique set of actors and sociological circumstances that have produced contextually distinct outcomes (Kimenyi et al., 2014).

Theoretical Background An insurgency is an organized form of social movement that uses subversive strategies and armed conflict to weaken a constituted government’s claims to legitimacy and control of a population while reinforcing its own legitimacy and control over a territory and its resources (Domengeaux, 2014; Department of the Army, 2009). This definition is synonymous with what Galula (2005) describes as revolutionary war—​a conflict in which an organized group undertakes to challenge the authority of the state. It is worth emphasizing that insurgent groups are characterized by the objective of gaining control over a territory. One commonality among insurgent groups is that they mobilize organized violence through appeals to ideological, ethnic, or religious beliefs to achieve their political objectives. A study by Stanley (1967) provides a sociological overview of insurgency and draws theoretical attention to various understandings of what insurgency is or entails. These include defensive violence, where marginalized groups wage an insurgency to defend themselves against imperialist incursions; nationalistic insurgency, where groups wage violence to establish a new state; and revolutionary insurgency, where insurgent groups seek to overthrow an existing social order and establish a new one (Stanley, 1967). Insurgent groups primarily aim to gain control over territory. Sometimes they deploy terroristic tactics to achieve their objectives, which makes them practically

Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa     467 indistinguishable from terrorist groups. The challenge for the sociological conceptualization of “insurgency” is to place insurgent groups within the broad category of social movements, and then to explain the process by which social movements take on the character of insurgent groups to bring about sociocultural change (Stanley, 1967). For example, Bøås and Dunn (2017) have examined the complex and contradictory ways in which fundamentally localized insurgencies in Africa have arisen, and their similarities and differences in an historical context, drawing on empirically rich case studies from Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Scholarly theorization of the development of social movements has emphasized the importance of resource mobilization in understanding insurgency and class conflict (Horn, 2013; Jenkins, 1983; McAdam et al., 1996; Mueller, 1992; Tilly, 1978). The resource mobilization theory derives its intellectual roots from the work of Karl Marx and of Max Weber to analyze structural transformation in the political and economic system. It combines these ideas with other classical thoughts on conflict derived from Emile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto to provide a framework for the study of insurgency. In this context, the resource mobilization theory attempts to explain the sociological factors that influence the formation, development, and success of social movements, arguing that social movements arise from changes in group resources, organization, and the opportunities available for collective action. The resource mobilization theory thus emphasizes the importance of resource availability in promoting social change (Jenkins, 1983; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977; McAdam et al., 1996; Oberschall, 1973). Movements are successful to the extent that they can mobilize and utilize resources to bring about change. Resources are either tangible or intangible assets that enable a social movement to reach its strategic goal (Freeman, 1979; Horn, 2013). Moreover, structural theories of insurgency attribute the underlying causes of revolutionary insurgency to state fragility. A society whose state policies alienate people is vulnerable to insurgent forces due to the anger that alienation generates among the elite within society (Akinola, 2015; Barkan & Snowden, 1986; Hanlon, 2018; Jenkins et al., 2014; Okoi, 2021; Oriola & Akinola, 2018). Okoi (2021) has shown that local insurgents who perceive a sense of alienation tend to rearm to take advantage of the political opportunities available for them to negotiate with the state. This is consistent with structural theory, which presumes that politically and economically excluded groups can mobilize insurgency as a rational collective action that enables them to advance their interests. The nature of an insurgency can, then, be theorized within the context of social power—​the structures of economic and political domination that create opportunities for collective action—​and the power contestations that bring about transformations in the institutional structures of society. Against this backdrop, an analysis of the sociogenesis of insurgencies in Mali and Somalia requires that we give attention to the sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions that have contributed to and shaped the growth of insurgent activities in these countries.

468    Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola

The Structure and Dynamics of Mali’s Insurgency Since 2012, Mali has experienced a succession of Islamist uprisings in its northern cities that have resulted in military coups. Although these political upheavals mirror the recent manifestations in Mali’s political history since the 2012 crisis, they originate from long-​standing ethnic cleavages between the north and south that define the fragmented nature of Malian society (Chauzal & Damme, 2015). The origin of the Malian insurgency is rooted in the Tuareg rebellion, which mirrors colonial demarcations that negatively impacted the Tuaregs’ cultural values and livelihoods (Kisangani, 2012). The Tuaregs are a nomadic ethnic confederation that dominated economic activities across the Sahara Desert throughout the medieval period and are known as the founders of Timbuktu—​a medieval commercial hub known for coordinating trade between Sub-​Saharan and North Africa (Keita, 1998). French colonialism in the 19th century disrupted the Tuareg ethnic confederations and economic preponderance across the Sahara. By the end of colonial rule and the subsequent independence of African territories in the 1960s, the Tuareg ethnic configurations were fragmented because of the artificial colonial borders drawn between the postcolonial states of Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya, and Burkina Faso. One of the legacies of French colonization was the exclusion of the northern regions of Mali—​which the Tuareg regard as their own—​from the center of political power (Chauzal & Damme, 2015). Although the marginalization of the Tuareg population in northern Mali was a consequence of the Malian state’s strategy for affirming its legitimacy and authority over Malian society, it reinforced preexisting historical tensions, such as the mistrust between the north and south. Since Mali’s independence from France, in 1960, there have been four phases of rebellion in the northern region between the Malian state and the Tuareg people. From the rebellion against French colonialism between 1916 and 1917 to the postcolonial uprising against the central state over land reforms that infringed on Tuareg territories to the recent uprisings over the distribution of the country’s natural-​resource wealth, the Tuareg have sustained successive political struggles in Mali. Like many postcolonial states in Africa, the Republic of Mali has had a protracted history of ethnic rebellion (Romaniuk & Webb, 2015). The first postcolonial uprising in Mali occurred three years after independence, in 1963, when Tuareg insurgents launched an attack against the Malian state. The postcolonial state attempted to repress the Tuareg rebellion by imposing martial law in northern Mali, instead of addressing the underlying demands, which included officially recognizing the northern region and affirming the status of Tuareg people within an independent Malian state. The Tuareg rebellion is thus illustrative of the fault lines of postcolonial nationhood in Africa, where ethnopolitical communities with no historical cultural affinity were lumped into a single political configuration and then exploited by postindependence political elites,

Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa     469 who reinforced the differences between the component groups. As Horowitz (1985) notes, postcolonial policies tend to reinforce the group differences by creating dominant and marginal identities. Therefore, demographic diversity in itself is an insufficient condition for conflict; it is, rather, the exclusionary nature of a society’s ethnopolitical configurations (Wimmer, 2013). The second phase of the Tuareg rebellion occurred in the 1990s, when Tuareg insurgents attacked the towns of Yadean, Tidarmène, and Ménaka in the northern region. The antecedents of the uprising could be traced to environmental changes, particularly the 1970 drought that ravaged the Sahel region and parts of the Tuareg nomadic economy and its primary source of livelihood (Ba, 2014). The lack of intervention by the Malian government to alleviate the suffering of Tuareg pastoralists who had lost their animals to the drought led to a massive movement of the Tuareg population into the cities in search of employment opportunities in the mines (Gowan, 2013). The limited job opportunities in the mines in turn motivated many Tuaregs the Tuareg population to migrate to parts of Europe, where they acquired a Western education. This led to the emergence of a class of Tuareg intellectuals who had acquired new knowledge in Europe that could be adapted to be used at home, and returned to Mali to champion a discourse of collective identity across the Sahara. These Tuareg who emigrated to Europe had taken with them memories of the 1963 Tuareg rebellion (Boilley, 1999), which, to them, signifies an anti-​colonial struggle, and the post-​ independence struggle for autonomy from the Malian government and its neighboring states These developments led to the transformation of Tuareg societies from rural to urban and from predominantly pastoralist economies to self-​sustaining economies that brought about shifts in cultural forms of expression (Ba, 2014; Lecocq, 2010). By the 1980s, the conditions had been created for a rebellious struggle for an independent Tuareg state (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013). The third phase of the Tuareg rebellion occurred in 2006 when Tuareg insurgents, acting as members of the Democratic Alliance for Change, launched an attack on a military barracks in the towns of Kidal and Ménaka (IRIN News, 2012). This phase of the Tuareg rebellion was sparked by the actions of military officers, who mobilized their troops to defect from the Malian security forces (Ba, 2014), citing the nonfulfillment of the promises made to them in the 1992 National Pact (Thurston & Levovich, 2013). While the Algerian government attempted to mediate the signing of a peace agreement between the Malian government and the Taureg insurgents, a faction of the insurgents rejected the agreement. This effort to broker peace between the warring parties resulted in the signing of a disarmament agreement in 2007. Conflict resumed following attacks in the town of Nampala by Taureg insurgents in 2008, and another attack in the city of Gao in 2009. The central government reacted to these attacks by launching a counterattack on the Tuareg base. Tuareg insurgents eventually surrendered to the central government when their leader fled to Algeria. The fourth Tuareg rebellion, which led to the collapse of the Malian state, occurred in 2012, when Tuareg insurgents who identified with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) attacked the northern towns of Aguelhok, Ménaka,

470    Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola and Tessalit (Ba, 2014). After the MNLA attack, an al-​Qaeda affiliated Islamist militant group in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took control of the cities of Gao and Ménaka. Equally important were the demands from the northern Islamist group Ansar al-​Din (Defenders of the Faith), compelling the central government to implement Sharia law throughout its northern territory. Thurston (2013) notes that the implicit refusal of Mali’s interim president, Dioncounda Traoré, to renounce liberal democracy in defense of Islamic law set the stage for the mobilization of a separatist rebellion in 2012 by Ansar al-​Din and AQIM, along with the AQIM splinter group the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa. The fourth Tuareg rebellion differs from the previous ones in both structure and dynamics. For example, the rise of communitarianism in Mali reinforced primordial identities to the extent that people construct their identities in terms of their ethnicities before considering themselves Malian. Radical Islamist groups with an ideological connection to Salafism weaponized this identity to mobilize an insurgency against modern civilization and the threats it posed to Tuareg culture. This was compounded by the weakness of the central government and the distorted forms of governance in the northern states, where access to drinking water, healthcare, education, and infrastructure was lacking, and where jihadi groups have now replaced the central government in the provision of public goods. Thus, the fourth Tuareg rebellion began when the country descended into an ethnic insurgency and coup d’état, accentuated by al-​Qaida-​linked violence that saw an Islamist takeover of Mali’s northern cities (Armstrong, 2013). As Atallah (2013, p. 66) argues, the 2012 Tuareg uprising was not new but was historically contingent on the incompatibilities that arose “between Tuaregs and various states which attempted to subjugate their social, political, and economic practices.” There was a strong feeling among the Tuareg population of being marginalized by the central government’s modernization policies (Benjaminsen, 2008). This is important because, as nomadic pastoralists located in the Sahel amid worsening conditions of climate variability and exposure to severe droughts, many Tuareg were forced to migrate to find better pastures. But the postcolonial state in Mali has historically marginalized the Tuareg population by depriving them of access to land (Jalali, 2013). The worsening socioeconomic conditions associated with the droughts forced many young men of Tuareg origin to migrate to Libya and Algeria, where they were exposed to revolutionary discourses (Benjaminsen, 2008). The deteriorating economic conditions in the countries where the Tuareg had sought refuge prompted them to return to Mali. Upon their return, many who had acquired military experience in Libya mobilized their exposure to revolutionary ideas as a powerful weapon to organize insurgencies targeting the Malian government (Benjaminsen, 2008; Hershkowitz, 2005). Their grievances against the Malian state were compounded by the discovery that the drought relief funds meant to alleviate their suffering were being embezzled by government officials (Benjaminsen, 2008). It is worth pointing out that once the Tuareg began to view the loss of their land as a threat to their identity and survival, they mobilized those sentiments to legitimize their struggle to establish Azawad as an independent state (Jalali, 2013).

Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa     471

The Structure and Dynamics of the Somalian Insurgency Somalia ranks at the top of the 2021 Fragile States Index, coming in second out of the 179 countries surveyed. The protracted conflict in Somalia left the East African country struggling without a central government. The signs of state fragility became evident when the central government began to lose sovereignty over the northern region, which was overtaken by armed militias and rebel groups in the 1980s. The Somali state began to lose legitimacy when it became apparent that it could no longer protect its citizens from violence. Zartman (1996) has shown that a state’s authority can be deemed to have collapsed when the state no longer capable of exercising power over its sovereign territory. The Somali conflict, initially triggered by the authoritarian tendencies of the regime of former president Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991, has produced devastating consequences for the country’s social fabric. The collapse of the Somali government in the 1990s, was followed by bloody civil war, compounded by famine, that transformed Somalia into a failed state; in the absence of a central government, customary and religious laws returned in most regions of Somali to provide governance (International Crisis Group, 2002; Menkhaus, 2005, p. 27). Economic collapse arising from high inflation accentuated the vulnerability of Somali citizens and resulted in hunger, disease, and death. The fragility of the Somali state is evident in the government’s inability to enforce taxation laws. Although taxes remains the primary source of government revenue, Somali’s tax revenues are limited (World Bank Group, 2014). The government has directed its limited financial resources to funding security and remains constrained in its capacity to provide basic services such as healthcare, water, sanitation, electricity, and education (Ahmed, 2018). As a result, these social services have been privatized, forcing Somalis to contend with low-​quality services at exorbitant prices. The central government has also been unable to provide governance in conflicts over private property rights, contract enforcement, and dispute resolution. Eventually, these services are provided privately according to traditional governance processes, such as clan customs, demonstrating Somaliland’s political adeptness with the development of a hybrid governance model which enshrined the role of clan elders (World Bank Group, 2016). State collapse in Somalia is such that powerful local interests continue to prop up weak governance institutions that facilitate corruption and other illicit activities (Menkhaus, 2014), perpetuating the incapacity of the central government to provide basic services (Menkhaus, 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development, 2012; Osaghae, 2007). A state is considered fragile when it cannot meet the growing needs of citizens because of lean economic resources (Caldwell, 2022; Carment et al., 2010; Chauvet & Collier, 2004; Lyons & Samattar, 1995; Milliken & Krause, 2002; Stewart & Brown, 2009).

472    Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola Importantly, a defining characteristic of the Somali insurgency is clannism. Since the fall of the Mohamed Siad Barre military regime in 1991, the Somali society has been fragmented by clannish cleavages along family lines. Although the sociological meaning of clan is associated with social organization, the concept of clannism in Somalia is understood more broadly as the politicization of the clan structure by local elites (Minority Rights Group International, 2011). The clan is a significant social organization in Somalia because it extends to the social, political, and economic strata of society. During an upsurge of conflict, vulnerable groups with limited political power and access to resources could easily mobilize clannism as a powerful weapon. Although President Barre’s divide-​and-​rule policies exacerbated interclan rivalries in Somalia, the collapse of the Somali state reawakened long-​suppressed regional discontent, particularly the marginalization of various clan groups in the north (Minority Rights Group International, 2011). Concerns arose from the realization that Barre had filled his government with representatives of three clans belonging to the Darood clan family, while marginalizing other clans, particularly those from the north. Studies by Abraham (2002) underlined the complexity of Somali nationalism in which national identity derives from primordial ethnic cleavages based on kinship and mostly tied to the clan, in contrast to the claim that Somalia emerged from independence as a unitary state. The kin-​based clan families that shape Somalian identity are the Digile, Dir, Darood, Isaaq, Hawiye, and Rahanwein. The variations in Somali identity are seen in the clan systems; for example, the Rahanwein and the Digil clans identify as agropastoralists. Other clans, such as Dir, Darood, Hawiye, and Isaaq are characterized as nomadic pastoralists. The kin-​based family clans define Somalia as a culturally fragmented society to the extent that, historically, the rivalries between the various clan families presented obstacles to peaceful coexistence. Yet despite these polarizing differences, Somalis have historically maintained a distinct attachment to Islam. As Lewis (2002) pointed out, clannism in Somalia has often been manipulated by political elites for self-​serving purposes. By 1988, Somalia was embroiled in a bloody civil war between the central government and insurgent groups. In 1991, the capital city of Mogadishu was captured by the Hawiye clan people led by General Mohammed Farrah Aididd, prompting President Barre to flee to Kenya (Minority Rights Group International, 2011). Arguably, the collapse of the Somali state has its origins in the fall of President Barre. International efforts to establish a governance structure to facilitate social cohesion in Somalia have proven counterproductive as new insurgent factions continue to engage one another other in an unending cycle of war (Masibo, 2010, p. 2). Eventually, Somalia became a state without a central government. Consequently, Somalia has been transformed into a society in which political and ethnic conflict has led to systematic killings and massive population displacement as clans and insurgents continue to compete for the control of natural resources (Lyons & Samattar, 1995; Minority Rights Group International, 2011). In the early 2000s, Somalia experienced significant political changes (De Waal & Salaam, 2004) that turned it into a haven for terrorists (Bryden, 2003). Al-​Shabaab (the Youth), initially a militant youth wing of the defunct Islamic Courts Union that

Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa     473 emerged with nationalistic objectives (Fergusson, 2013) during the Ethiopian occupation, began carrying out deadly attacks targeting the Somali government and its foreign supporters with the aim of controlling territory and eventually transforming Somalia into an Islamic state based strictly on Sharia law (Felter et al., 2021). Al-​Shabaab has subsequently mobilized its ties to al-​Qaeda to frame the Somali insurgency as part of a global jihadist movement. Thus, external intervention in Somalia helped to transform a relatively unknown group into a radical jihadi movement. Since then, al-​Shabaab has exploited the power vacuum to transform Somalia into a theater of war, where poverty, violence, and instability are a constant. Clarke and Herbst (1997) observed that the collapse of the Somali state gave impetus to the emergence of armed insurgents and warlords whose activities rendered Somalia ungovernable. The warlords gained control over security and the economy and began imposing Sharia law and taxation, and their activities created a state of anarchy in the regions where they made territorial gains. But, if al-​Shabaab’s main objective was to establish a Somali Islamic state (Felter et al., 2021), the entrance of insurgent groups with ties to external terrorist groups further complicated the fragility of the Somali state. These insurgent groups eventually joined forces with al-​Shabaab to destabilize Somalia by imposing an alternative system of government based strictly on a Sharia regimen. Al-​Shabaab has become more sophisticated in its use of violent methods. It continues to pose a significant threat to the stability of Somali society. Although al-​Shabaab once held sway over the Somali capital city of Mogadishu and the countryside, research has shown that an African Union–​led military offensive has displaced the group from the major population centers including Mogadishu (Dagne, 2011; Felter et al., 2021). Despite this effort, al-​Shabaab continues to pose a major security challenge in Somalia by targeting civilians, the African Union, and Western intervention forces. The group funds its fighting capability through a racketeering operation of taxation and illicit trade in charcoal and sugar that is worth millions of dollars annually (Felter et al., 2021). United Nations experts reported that in 2019, al-​Shabaab raised over $21 million, which it invested in intelligence, weapons, and fighters (Lederer, 2020). The group has also built an extensive communication network via radio, the Internet, and social media. This infrastructure has enhanced al-​Shabaab’s ability to carry out violence against its targets and render Somalia ungovernable.

Insurgent Characteristics and Distinctive Features The case studies of Mali and Somalia demonstrate that insurgency and organized violence in Africa mostly develop as acts of rebellion carried out by belligerents against legally constituted governments. These rebellious uprisings originate from a confluence of factors including identity, nationalism, and political and economic marginalization.

474    Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola Bacon (2022), for example, identified four overarching identity types that define the character of al-​Shabaab: Muslims, Somalis, clans, and al-​Qaeda affiliates. It is important to point out that al-​Shabaab members share mutually exclusive motivations, including religion, identity, economic deprivation, political grievances, and nationalism. As such, their identity fluctuates across multiple levels of significance that are deeply entrenched in the organization’s clan, religious, and Somali-​centric nature. Because its members adhere to a Salafi jihadi interpretation of Islam, they mobilize religion as a unifying factor by defining themselves as true Muslims and using this identity marker to distinguish true Muslims from the out-​group (Bacon, 2022). The perceived threat to identity and the struggle to recreate the postcolonial state has given rise to politico-​religious aspirations driven by jihadi convictions. Although al-​Shabaab’s major goal is to resist any foreign presence in Somalia and to defeat the central government and impose an Islamic state based on Sharia law, in the current environment, the group has been successful in reinforcing its legitimacy through its capacity to provide governance where the central government has failed. Anderson’s (2006) concept of “imagined community” offers a sociological reconstruction of nationalism that connects with notions of belonging and cultural communities. Anderson uses this concept to analyze the social construction of nations, national identities, and nationalism. As Breuilly (2016) pointed out, the concept of “imagined community” does not suggest a false sense of national identity but directs attention to the social and cognitive elements in the construction of nation. It is clear from both case studies that the nationalistic tensions in Somalia and Mali arose from weak state structures that reinforced marginalization and from the mobilization of religious identity driven, especially, by jihadi convictions, to recreate the colonial state structure. As Wimmer (2013, p. 31) noted, violent conflict can arise from “ethnopolitical contestations over the state.” This does not, however, imply that all ethnopolitical struggles have insurgent motivations. Rather, the oppressive nature of the state can motivate identity groups without violent intentions to mobilize violence as a strategy of insurgency. As this study has shown, al Shabaab did not begin as a terrorist organization but as a revolt against the tyrannical regime of Siad Barre. The two case studies also suggest that insurgency and organized violence in Africa have their roots in the failure of governance. The situation in Mali confronts policymakers with a wide array of complex challenges including the collapse of institutions, poverty, population displacement, and insecurity. Mali ranks nineteenth on the 2021 Fragile State Index of 179 countries, for a Fragile State Index score of 96.6. The overall trend of fragility in Mali increased exponentially between 2006 and 2021. Similarly, Somalia ranks second in the 2021 Fragile State Index, corresponding to a Fragile State Index score of 110.9. The Fragile State Index, developed by the Fund for Peace, uses 12 indicators organized across four categories, including cohesion indicators, economic indicators, political indicators, and social indicators, to determine a state’s vulnerability to conflict or collapse. Cohesion indicators includes security, factionalized elites, and group grievance. Economic indicators include economic decline, uneven economic development, and human flight. Political indicators include state legitimacy, public services, and human

Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa     475 rights, while social indicators include demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, and external intervention. The indicator on security considers such variables as resistance to a governing authority that manifests as insurgencies, while the indicator on uneven economic development considers the ways in which perceptions of economic inequality can fuel grievances that reinforce communal or nationalistic tensions. Importantly, the indicator of state legitimacy considers the level of confidence that a population has in state institutions and processes, that manifest in the rise of armed insurgencies. The higher a state is ranked on the index, the more vulnerable it is to conflict or failure. In Somalia, for example, violence perpetrated by al-​Shabaab significantly increased in 2020 due to state fragility. The development of factional rebel forces has further emboldened al-​Shabaab, as the state is increasingly unable to coordinate a cohesive counterinsurgency response. According to Castagno (1964), the dispersion of pastoralists in northern Somalia and the degree of interclan competition over natural resources, particularly grazing rights and access to water, mark the distinctive features of the Somali insurgency. It is not surprising that as concerns about state stability appear more prominent on the national, regional, and international agendas, external interventions in Mali remain unprecedented. What needs to be settled is that insurgency manifests in societies marked by underlying social tensions within the populations (Domengeaux, 2014, p. 21). Therefore, the connection between governance failure and instability can be understood in the context of instability arising in societies such as Mali and Somalia, where belligerents are seeking to subvert or overthrow constituted authorities to impose theocratic forms of governance. Mali, for example, has been an exemplar of a stable democracy in the West African subregion since it transitioned to democratic rule in 1991. The country had successfully organized four presidential elections that culminated in the peaceful transition of power, in addition to creating an environment conducive to the flourishing of civil society (Bleck et al., 2016). Despite this success, Mali continued to struggle to provide equitable and accountable governance (Graham et al., 2003), particularly in its northern region, where jihadi insurgent groups and other criminal actors are competing for power, resulting in overlapping forms of governance (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013; Wing, 2013). Analysts have described Mali’s northern region as vulnerable to misgovernance (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013; Wing, 2013). This has increased concerns among Malian citizens about the legitimacy of Mali’s political leaders and their declining capacity to provide governance (Bleck, 2015). Religious and traditional leaders are viewed as more legitimate actors with greater capacity for governance who can be trusted to apply the law without bias (Bleck et al. 2016, p. 3). Perceptions of the government’s declining capacity to provide governance created the condition for a coup d’état (Whitehouse, 2013) that threw Mali into a state of instability. Jihadi insurgency surged in Mali in 2019 when al-​Qaeda affiliates Jama’at Nusrat al-​ Islam wal-​Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara launched an offensive in the tri-​state border region. This prompted French and Malian forces to increase counterinsurgency operations against the insurgent organizations, resulting in fatalities that

476    Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola significantly impacted civilians (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 2021). However, the current situation in Mali is an offshoot of the 2012 military coup led by military officers who were frustrated with the Malian state’s ineffective handling the Tuareg insurgency in the northern region. Overthrowing the Malian government created a power vacuum in Mali that violent extremist groups eventually exploited (Cole, 2020). While insurgent activities that grew from the 2012 conflict continue to haunt Mali today, what deserves attention is the understanding that the Malian conflict underscores several interrelated factors, including the colonial legacy and the presence of competing ethnonationalist forces, in its postcolonial configuration (Lecocq, 2010). Therefore, the postcolonial state in Mali continues to recreate itself through these competing nationalist forces that mirror the colonial imagination of nationhood.

Conclusion The lethality of insurgencies and organized violence in Africa requires a painstaking sociological reconsideration of the underlying factors and actors as well as their objectives, tactics, and modes of operation. The Malian and Somalian case studies offer sociologically fascinating contexts for understanding the patterns of contemporary insurgencies in Africa as well as the characteristics and distinctive features of terrorist and insurgent groups. Although the contextualization of insurgent groups in Mali and Somalia takes into consideration their motivations, strategies and tactics, the dynamics of violence over time are deeply connected to the colonial legacy and the fragility of the state. In these contexts, the character of insurgency and organized violence in Mali and Somalia and the distinctive features of insurgent groups across these societal contexts are not static but dynamic. These processes evolve as the conflict environment changes. In other words, the activities of insurgent groups in Mali and Somalia are derivatives of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical imperatives of the fragile environments in which the various actors operate. External influences are also evident, particularly connections to and support from global jihadi groups such as al-​Qaeda. Their globally diffused ideology, conscientious expansionist efforts, and material support also contribute to the contours of insurgency and organized violence in Africa.

Acronyms ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project AQIM

Al-​Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

DAC

Democratic Alliance for Change

IDP

Internally Displaced Persons

Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa     477 MRGI

Minority Rights Group International

MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

References Abraham, K. (2002). Somalia calling: The crisis of statehood and the conquest for peace. EIIPD Press. Ahmed, Y. A. (2018, May 10). Somaliland budget 2018: Another missed opportunity. Horn Diplomat. http://​www.hornd​iplo​mat.com/​2018/​05/​10/​som​alil​and-​bud​get-​2018-​anot​her​ -mis​sed-​oppo​rtun​ity/​ Akinola, O. (2015). Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: Between poverty, politics and Islamic fundamentalism. African Security, 8, 1–​29. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​19392​206.2015.998​539 Allan, H., Glazzard, A., Jesperson, S., Reddy-​Tumu, S., & Winterbotham, E. (2015). Drivers of violent extremism: Hypotheses and literature review. Royal United Services Institute. Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism. Verso. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. (2021, March). ACLED 2020: The year in review [Annual report]. https://​acledd​ata.com/​acled​data​new/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2021/​08/​ ACLED​_​Ann​ual-​Rep​ort-​2020_​Upd2​021.pdf Armstrong, A. (2013, May 31). Crisis in Mali: Root causes and long-​term solutions. United States Institute of Peace. https://​www.usip.org/​publi​cati​ons/​2013/​05/​cri​sis-​mali-​root-​cau​ses-​and​ -long-​term-​soluti​ons Atallah, R. (2013). The Tuareg revolt and the Mali coup. Air & Space Power Journal: Africa & Francophonie, 4, 66–​79. Ba, O. (2014). Tuareg nationalism and cyclical pattern of rebellions: How the past and present explain each other (Sahel Research Group Working Paper No. 007). University of Florida. https://​sites.clas.ufl.edu/​sahelr​esea​rch/​files/​Ba_​Tua​reg-​Nation​alis​m_​fi​nal.pdf Bacon, T. (2022). Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: An identity, mind, emotions and perceptions analysis of al-​Shabaab [Nexus report]. Center for Empathy in International Affairs, George Washington University. https://​extrem​ism.gwu.edu/​sites/​g/​files/​zax​dzs2​ 191/​f/​Al-​Shab​aab-​IMEP_​Baco​n_​Ma​rch-​2022.pdf Barkan, S., & Snowden, L. L. (1986). Collective violence. In J. A. Goldstone (Ed.). The comparative and historical study of revolutions (pp. 1–​17). Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Benjaminsen, T. A. (2008). Does supply-​induced scarcity drive violent conflicts in the African Sahel? The case of the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. Journal of Peace Research, 45, 819–​ 836. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00223​4330​8096​158 Bleck, J. (2015). Education and empowered citizenship in Mali. Johns Hopkins University Press. Bleck, J., Dembele, A., & Guindo, S. (2016). Malian crisis and the lingering problem of good governance. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 5, 1–​18. http://​doi​ .org/​10.5334/​sta.457 Bøås, M., & Dunn, K. C. (2017). Africa’s insurgents: Navigating an evolving landscape. Lynne Rienner. Boilley, P. (1999). Les Touaregs Kel Adagh: Dépendances et révoltes; du Soudan français au Mali. Karthala.

478    Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola Boukhars, A. (2020). The logic of violence in Africa’s extremist insurgencies. Perspectives on Terrorism, 14, 117–​129. https://​www.uni​vers​itei​tlei​den.nl/​binar​ies/​cont​ent/​ass​ets/​cust​omsi​ tes/​persp​ecti​ves-​on-​terror​ism/​2020/​issue-​5/​boukh​ars.pdf Breuilly, J. (2016). Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities: A symposium. Nations and Nationalism, 22, 1–​35. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​nana.12236 Bryden, M. (2003). No quick fixes: Coming to terms with terrorism, Islam, and statelessness in Somalia. Journal of Conflict Studies, 23, 24–​56. Caldwell, Z. (2022, February 18). Fragile states. CQ Researcher, 32, 1–​30. https://​libr​ary.cqpr​ess​ .com/​cqres​earc​her/​docum​ent.php?id=​cqr​esrr​e202​2021​800 Carment, D., Press, S., & Samy, Y. (2010). Security, development, and the fragile state: Bridging the gap between theory and policy. Routledge. Castagno, A., Jr. (1964). A pastoral democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among the northern Somali of the Horn of Africa, I. M. Lewis. American Anthropology, 66, 468–​469. Chauvet L., & Collier, P. (2004). Development effectiveness in fragile states: Spillovers and turnarounds (Working Paper). Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University. Chauzal, G., & Damme, T. V. (2015, March 1). The roots of Mali’s conflict: Moving beyond the 2012 crisis [Conflict Research Unit report]. Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague. https://​www.clin​gend​ael.org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​pdfs/​The_​root​s_​of​​ _​Mal​is_​c​onfl​ict.pd Clarke, W., & Herbst, J. (1997). Learning from Somali: The lesson of armed humanitarian intervention. Routledge. Cole, E. (2020). Five things to know about Mali’s coup. United States Institute of Peace. https://​ www.usip.org/​publi​cati​ons/​2020/​08/​five-​thi​ngs-​know-​about-​malis-​coup Dagne, T. (2011). Somali: Current conditions and prospects for a lasting peace. [CRS report for Congress]. Congressional Report Service. https://​sgp.fas.org/​crs/​row/​RL33​911.pdf De Waal, A., & Salam, A. (2004). Africa, Islamism and America’s “war on terror.” In A. De Waal (Ed.), Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa (pp. 231–​257). Hurst & Company. Department of the Army. (2009). Tactics in counterinsurgency. [Field manual 3-​ 24.2]. Government Printing Office. Domengeaux, D. D. (2014). Big, not so easy: Comparing insurgency theory to the complex problem of violence in New Orleans (Report No. 2014-​05-​16). United States Army Command and General Staff College. https://​apps.dtic.mil/​sti/​pdfs/​ADA611​750.pdf Dowd, C., & Raleigh, C. (2013). Briefing: The myth of global Islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel. African Affairs, 112, 498–​509. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.1093/​afraf/​adt​039 Felter, C., Masters, J., & Sergie, M. A. (2021, May 19). Al-​Shabab [Backgrounder report]. Council on Foreign Relations. https://​www.cfr.org/​backg​roun​der/​al-​sha​bab#chap​ter-​title-​0-​4 Fergusson, J. (2013). The world’s most dangerous place: Inside the outlaw state of Somalia. Da Capo Press. Freeman, J. (1979). Resource mobilization and strategy. In M. N. Zald & M. J. McCarthy (Eds.), The dynamics of social movements (pp. 167–​189). Winthrop. Galula, D. (2005). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. Hailer. Gowan, R. (2013, January 21). Diplomatic fallout: Is Mali Africa’s war now? World Politics Review Special Report: Mali’s Conflict, the Sahel’s Crisis. http://​www.worl​dpol​itic​srev​iew​ .com/​artic​les/​12454/​spec​ial-​rep​ort-​malis-​confl​ict-​the-​sah​els-​cri​sis Graham, J., Amos, B., & Plumptre, T. (2003). Principles for good governance in the 21st century [Policy brief]. Institute for Governance.

Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa     479 Hanlon, J. (2018, June 19). Mozambique’s insurgency: A new Boko Haram or youth demanding an end to marginalisation? Africa at LSE blog. London School of Economics and Political Science. https://​blogs.lse.ac.uk/​afri​caat​lse/​2018/​06/​19/​moza​mbiq​ues-​ins​urge​ncy-​a-​new​ -boko-​haram-​or-​youth-​demand​ing-​an-​end-​to-​marg​inal​isat​ion/​ Hershkowitz, A. (2005). The Tuareg in Mali and Niger: The role of desertification in violent conflict. TED Conflict Studies [Case No. 151]. Mandala Projects, School of International Service, American University. http://​www.ameri​can.edu/​ted/​ice/​tua​reg.htm Horn, J. (2013). Gender and social movements: Overview Report. Institute of Development Studies. http://​www.ids.ac.uk/​files/​dmf​i le/​IDSOpe​nDoc​sSta​ndar​dTer​msOf​Use.pdf Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press. International Crisis Group. (2002). Somalia: Countering terrorism in a failed state (Report No. 45, Africa). https://​www.cris​isgr​oup.org/​afr​ica/​horn-​afr​ica/​soma​lia/​soma​lia-​cou​nter​ing​ -terror​ism-​fai​led-​state IRIN News. (2012, March 26). Warriors and websites: A new kind of rebellion in Mali? The New Humanitarian. http://​www.irinn​ews.org/​rep​ort/​95170/​analy​sis-​warri​ors-​and-​websi​ tes-​a-​new-​kind-​of-​rebell​ion-​in-​mali Jalali, M. (2013, May 30). Tuareg migration: A critical component of crisis in the Sahel. Migration Policy Institute. https://​www.migr​atio​npol​icy.org/​arti​cle/​tua​reg-​migrat​ion-​criti​cal​ -compon​ent-​cri​sis-​sahel Jenkins, J. C. (1983). Mobilization theory and the study of social movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 9, 527–​553. https://​doi.org/​10.1146/​annu​rev.so.09.080​183.002​523 Jenkins, J. C., Maher, T. V., & Fahrer, C. (2014). Seedbeds of insurgency: Structure and dynamics in the Egyptian Islamist insurgency, 1986–​99. Journal of Peace Research, 51, 470–​486. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00223​4331​4523​027 Jenkins, J. C., & Perrow, C. (1977). Insurgency of the powerless: Farm worker movement (1946–​ 1972). American Sociological Review, 42, 249–​268. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​2094​604 Keita, K. (1998). Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 9, 102–​128. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​095923​1980​8423​221 Kimenyi, M., Adibe, J., Djiré, M., Jirgi, A. J., Kergna, A., Deressa, T. T., Pugliese, J. E., & Westbury, A. (2014). The impact of conflict and political instability on agricultural investments in Mali and Nigeria (Working paper 17). Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings. https://​www. brooki​ngs.edu/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2016/​06/​14-​07-​22-​imp​act-​of-​confl​ict-​malini​geri​a_​fi​ nal.pdf Kisangani, E. F. (2012). The Tuaregs’ rebellions in Mali and Niger and the U.S. global war on Terror. International Journal on World Peace, 29, 59–​97. Lecocq, B. (2010). Disputed desert: Decolonisation, competing nationalisms and Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali. Brill. Lederer, E. M. (2020, October 28). Focused on disrupting finances for Somalia’s al-​Shabab. Associated Press. https://​apn​ews.com/​arti​cle/​terror​ism-​soma​lia-​uni​ted-​nati​ons-​3a7b0​dbdf​ 0095​9637​4179​249e​eb62​d36 Lewis, I. M. (2002). A modern history of the Somali: Nation and state in the Horn of Africa. Ohio University Press. Lyons, T., & Samattar, A. (1995). Somalia: State collapse, multilateral interventions and strategies for political reconstruction. Amsterdam University Press. Masibo, M. (2010). The political impact of the instability of Somalia to the Horn and East Africa. Missouri State University Press.

480    Obasesam Okoi and Temitope B. Oriola McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1996). Comparative perspectives on social movements. Cambridge University Press. Menkhaus, K. J. (2005). Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, political Islam, and state collapse. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), Battling terrorism in the Horn of Africa (pp. 23–​47). Brookings Institute Press. Menkhaus, K. (2014). State failure, state-​building, and prospects for a “functional failed state” in Somalia. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 656, 154–​172. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​00027​1621​4547​002 Milliken, J., & Krause, K. (2002). State failure, state collapse, and state reconstruction: Concepts, lessons and strategies. Development and Change, 33, 753–​774. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1111/​1467-​7660.t01-​1-​00247 Minority Rights Group International. (2011). World directory of minorities and indigenous peoples—​Somalia. Refworld. https://​www.refwo​rld.org/​docid/​4954ce​42c.html Mueller, C. M. (1992). Frontiers in social movement theory. In A. D. Morris & C. M. Mueller (Eds.), Building social movement theory (pp. 3–​25). Yale University Press. Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movements. Prentice-​Hall. Okoi, O. (2021). Punctuated peace in Nigeria’s oil region: Oil insurgency and the challenges of post-​conflict peacebuilding. Palgrave Macmillan. Organisation for Economic Co-​ operation and Development. (2012). Fragile states 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world. https://​www.oecd.org/​dac/​confl​ict-​fragil​ity-​res​ ilie​nce/​docs/​Fragil​eSta​tes2​013.pdf Oriola, T. B., & Akinola, O. (2018). Ideational dimensions of the Boko Haram phenomenon. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 41, 595–​618. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​10576​10X.2017.1338​053 Osaghae, E. E. (2007). Fragile states. Development in Practice, 17, 691–​699. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​096145​2070​1470​060 Romaniuk, S. N., & Webb, S. T. (2015). Mali’s rebels: Making sense of the national movement for the liberation of Azawad insurgency. In S. N. Romaniuk and S. T. Webb (Eds.), Insurgency and counterinsurgency in modern war (pp. 135–​144). Routledge. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1201/​b18​753 Stanley, M. (1967). The turn to violence: A sociological view of insurgency. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 8, 232–​244. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​1568​5426​7X00​187 Stewart, F., & Brown, G. (2009). Fragile states (Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity Working Paper No. 51). Department of International Development, University of Oxford. https://​www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/​publi​cati​ons/​frag​ile-​sta​tes Thurston, A. (2013). Toward an “Islamic republic of Mali.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 3, 45–​66. Thurston, A., & Lebovich, A. (2013). A handbook on Mali’s 2012/​2013 crisis (Working Paper Series No. 13I001). Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA). Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Addison-​Wesley. United Nations Development Programme. (2017). Journey to extremism in Africa: Drivers, incentives and the tipping point for recruitment. http://​jour​ney-​to-​extrem​ism.undp.org/​cont​ ent/​downlo​ads/​UNDP-​Jou​rney​ToEx​trem​ism-​rep​ort-​2017-​engl​ish.pdf Whitehouse, B. (2013). A festival of brigands: In search of democracy and political legitimacy in Mali. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 35, 35–​52. https://​doi.org/​10.35293/​srsa.v35i2.136 Wimmer, A. (2013). Waves of war: Nationalism, state formation, and ethnic exclusion in the modern world. Cambridge University Press.

Insurgency and Organized Violence in Africa     481 Wing, S. D. (2013). Mali: Politics of a crisis. African Affairs, 112, 476–​485. http://​dx.doi.org/​ 10.1093/​afraf/​adt​037 World Bank Group (2014, January 29). New World Bank GDP and poverty estimates for Somaliland. https://​www.worldb​ank.org/​en/​news/​press-​rele​ase/​2014/​01/​29/​new-​world​ -bank-​gdp-​and-​pove​rty-​estima​tes-​for-​som​alil​and World Bank Group (2016). Somaliland’s private sector at crossroads: Political economy and policy choices for prosperity and job creation. https://​openkn​owle​dge.worldb​ank.org/​han​dle/​ 10986/​2258 Zartman, W. (1996). Collapsed states: The distinction and restoration of legitimate authority. Indiana University Press.

VII

T H E FA M I LY A N D E DU C AT ION

Chapter 26

Fam ilial Rol e s , Re sp onsibili t i e s , a nd Solidarit y i n Di v e rse African So c i et i e s Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé

Introduction In many African societies, familial roles and responsibilities, household structures, and support networks are changing in response to global challenges, including economic restructuring, urbanization and rapid technological change, chronic illness and health emergencies (HIV, Ebola, the Coronavirus), climate change, conflict, and displacement. Such challenges are often viewed through the lens of crisis and of the chronic poverty and exclusion facing African youth (Cruse O-​Brien, 1996; De Boeck & Honwana, 2005). This chapter explores understandings of “the family” and family structures in Africa from a gendered and generational perspective and analyzes how familial roles and responsibilities may change in response to such pressures at the local level. Drawing on qualitative research with children and families conducted in Tanzania, Uganda, and Senegal, we address the research question: What disruptions and changes in familial responsibilities does the death of a family member cause in East and West Africa?1 Grandmothers and orphaned children and youth have played increasingly important roles in caring for children after an AIDS-​related parental death and in postconflict situations in Eastern Africa and Southern Africa, leading to the emergence of what have been termed “skipped generation” and “child-​and youth-​headed households” (Beegle et al., 2010; Foster et al., 1997; Samuels & Wells, 2009).

486    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé The impact of the HIV epidemic has been less severe in many West African countries. Yet in Evans’s (2014) and Evans et al.’s (2016) research on family deaths in Senegal, a strong sense of familial responsibility to care for surviving parents and siblings was also evident, affecting young people’s well-​being, educational opportunities, and aspirations for the future (Bowlby et al., 2021). The chapter reflects on the policy implications of these changes in familial responsibilities for social protection and the care of vulnerable children and families following a family death.

Family Structures and Responsibilities in African Societies Families in Africa are characterized by considerable diversity, as they are global. They often encompass extended family structures and serve multiple functions, roles, and responsibilities. As Sy (1999) remarked, families in Africa can be seen as a network of solidarity and reciprocal support. Consequently, it is difficult to delineate the boundaries of “the African family.” Even if some have comparatively restricted (nuclear) forms where family members share the same residence, families in Africa are nevertheless more complex than that because they include relationships and linkages that may not be immediately visible, whether nuclear or extended. Although qualitative understandings of the meanings of “family” in African contexts are limited, classic authors such as Ocholla-​Ayayo (1976) have observed that the family represents the basic social unit in which norms and values, beliefs, knowledge, and daily life skills and competencies are communicated to younger generations. The family is also regarded as the basic economic unit, which enables babies’ and children’s survival. Ocholla-​Ayayo (1976) has argued that it is the biological unit where reproduction and biological continuity usually take place. According to Adepoju and Mbugua (1999), the family remains the most important factor in socialization because it is made up of individuals who are in long-​term interaction with one another, translated through relations of reproduction and production. From this perspective, the family is not only a “center of life” but also a “socio-​economic organization” (Diop, 1985/​2012), a unit or “cell” of production and consumption in the subsistence economy that is mostly found in traditional settings. Oheneba-​Sakyi and Takyi (2006) emphasize that “family” is practiced as “a dynamic social institution, with members coming and going,” rather than being defined primarily by “biological ties that household members may have with each other” (p. 2). This is a fluid understanding of “family” and kinship being constantly remade as particular relationships may be emphasized at certain times, while others may be de-​emphasized. Although the meanings of terms “family” and “household” are debated and are often used interchangeably, they are significantly different. Varley (2008) defines households as “task-​oriented residence units” characterized by coresidence, economic cooperation,

Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity    487 reproductive activities, and the socialization of children. In contrast, Varley defines families as “kinship units that need not be localized,” and family members may live at some distance from one another and yet retain kinship ties and responsibilities across space. Based on our study in Senegal, for example, the family cannot be equated to the household. The family may comprise a father, a mother, and their children, whether the parents are married or not. Yet the family also comprises the whole lineage, from ancestors to the youngest (last born) member and as such is accorded great significance. Elders are treated with the utmost respect, and their words have a major influence on family decisions. In the past, in both urban and rural areas all members of the family in one household lived under the same roof and shared the same meals. Over time, these arrangements have shifted. Even in rural areas, changes have occurred; a family may live in the same concession, but in different households; they may not share communal meals, but each couple has meals with their own children. This process of change can be seen as a dislocation, potentially leading to the break-​up of large families. It is usually accompanied at the very least by a reduction in cooperation, and therefore solidarity, which in its traditional form was crucial in organizing labor on the large agricultural fields managed by the father or eldest brother. A concern to preserve the autonomy of the household after the death of the father or brother who owned the land is often the key factor determining whether there will be a retention of the extended family structure or a reconfiguration of extended family relations. In urban areas, smaller families mean that each family lives in their own household. There is often a powerful nostalgia for the wider family and a desire to reunite with them during religious ceremonies, such as korité (Muslim festival of Eid el fitr) and tabaski (Muslim festival of Eid el Kébir), and to celebrate together at the familial home. In many African societies, patrilineal and matrilineal lineages may be significant in understanding meanings of “family.” Among the Wolof in Senegal, each lineage has a different name and attributes that children inherit (Diop, 1985/​2012; Ndiaye, 2009). Additionally, it is through the paternal lineage, Guegno, that one inherits the family name, family totem (an animal which represents family belonging or membership), and social status, based traditionally on a hierarchical caste system. The latter ranges from the superior class (free men), the middle class (artisans or craftsmen with hereditary specialisms), and the inferior class, or slaves (Diop, 1985/​2012). It is from the maternal lineage, or Meen, that one receives one’s character or personality, closely linked to one’s mother and the lineage’s association with blood, flesh, and spirit (Diop, 1985/​2012). Among most ethnic groups in Senegal, mystical powers are perceived to be transmitted by the mother to the next generation. These meanings of maternal and patrilineal lineages underpin familial caring responsibilities and generational transfers of values, attributes, and wealth in many African societies. Material inheritance practices and generational transfers of wealth are shaped by gender, ethnicity, religious, and customary and statutory law, and there is considerable legal pluralism and syncretism in African countries (Evans, 2016).

488    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé

Changes in Family Structures, Roles, and Responsibilities Urbanization and economic crises in recent decades have led to increased marital dissolution in many African countries, and growing numbers of women head or principally maintain households, particularly in urban areas (Dial, 2008; Oheneba-​Sakyi & Takyi, 2006). This change has been accompanied by considerable mobility between rural and urban households and intrahousehold exchanges of resources. Family members of different generations may move to live with relatives temporarily or for longer periods to gain access to care, material resources, education, training, and employment opportunities (Skovdal, 2011; Van Blerk & Ansell, 2006). Generational transfers and intergenerational caring responsibilities can be theorized using the framework of a “generational bargain” (Collard, 2000) or “intergenerational contract” (Kabeer, 2000). The bargain is that family members in the most economically active “middle generation” transfer resources to the young with the expectation that the young will reciprocate when the middle generation reaches old age and requires care and support themselves, Doing so fulfills the familial obligation to support elderly parents. Research suggests that the “generational bargain” is coming under increasing pressure in many African countries in response to societal transformations associated with a range of global processes (Evans, 2015). These include globalization, neoliberal economic restructuring, the HIV and AIDS epidemic, and reductions in public health spending, fees charged for accessing healthcare and education and policies that emphasize home-​based care, rapid urbanization, high levels of transnational and rural–​urban migration, greater emphasis on education, changing family structures, and the individualization of kinship responsibilities (Kabeer, 2000). These changes affect the ability of the middle generation to provide care and support for older people and children in different contexts, and relatives from maternal and paternal lineages and young people now have different roles and responsibilities from those usually expected. In Senegal, significant transformations in family structures and responsibilities have been observed for decades. These changes have taken place in long-​term contexts of poverty (Antoine et al., 1995). Referring to changes in the socioeconomic organization of the family, Diop (1985/​2012) emphasized that completely integrated family communities no longer exist as they once did in the traditional subsistence economy. Differentiations between households are evident across all types of family communities. These dynamics are closely linked to the unfavorable socioeconomic climate. Although the family is the principal source of protection, many families now often lack the means to provide parental care for their children due to exposure to multiple vulnerabilities. Global challenges and crises directly affect families’ abilities to provide for their children’s basic needs, creating extreme poverty and precarious health and social environments (Tall, 2009).

Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity    489 Household size is a key factor used to categorize families’ circumstances. Size may vary because of choices made by the concerned actors or by the needs and challenges they face. Tall (2009) suggests that though the family in the widest sense remains the key identity-​forming network of support, the close family can be seen as the “space of actual support, while the extended family is a space of emotional support.” The extended family system remains the most common form in Senegal and many African countries. Traditionally, families lived in a concession that grouped several households, and small families were discouraged. The family provided total security for individuals, and unmarried people often stayed with their parents until they were 40 years old. Leaving the family concession to live elsewhere was seen as transgressing social norms and values. Gender and generational relations are central to analyzing changing familial caring responsibilities, intrahousehold resource allocations, and inequalities. De Vreyer and Nilsson (2019) conceptualize households and intrahousehold resource allocations in Senegal by distinguishing subgroups of household members, or “cells,” which are at least partly autonomous in their budget management, with gender and generational inequalities. Productive and social reproductive work, including doing domestic chores, caring for children, sick, disabled, or older relatives, and making household decisions are often shaped by such subgroups of coresiding family members, underpinned by hierarchies of gender and generation, including sibling birth order. Nevertheless, nonresident patriarchs or other senior kin who might live some distance away may still play important roles in family decision-​making and resource allocations. The literature often represents extended families as reflecting a low standard of living, based on, for example, the head of household’s lack of education or low income, or a household size of more than seven people (Adepoju & Mbugua, 1999).. Some argue that smaller households are better able to meet the educational and health needs of their children (Berger & Font, 2015). It is interesting to consider whether general household composition directly or indirectly affects the well-​being of the family. Evans et al. (2016) research into families who experienced a family death in urban Senegal, however, demonstrated that many larger families with middle or higher incomes were often able to provide more support and protection to bereaved family members, compared to those living in smaller households, who may be more isolated and lack sustained social support after the death (Bowlby et al., 2021). Changes are also evident in the socialization roles of parents and their brothers and sisters of the same generation, who previously were expected to play the same role in a child’s upbringing as the biological parents. This social parenting role of uncles and aunts meant that they could instruct their nieces and nephews and correct their behavior and actions whenever they wanted. Social parenting, which was common and widespread in Senegal, has declined in the last decade, and wider family members no longer have a responsibility to take action toward the children around them. Only parents are responsible for their children. In the context of globalization, children’s independence has also increased because they now have greater access to mobile phones, information technology, and knowledge and no longer must rely exclusively on parents (Porter et al., 2015). This has resulted in a reconfiguration of the social roles of parents and new

490    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé demands and expectations placed on both children and parents, resulting in intergenerational tensions. It is important to acknowledge that many children in Senegal and other African countries do not live with both biological parents. This is related to the widespread tradition of confiage, or child fosterage/​kinship-​care arrangements, in many West African countries (Beck et al., 2015). Children are often entrusted to a close relative, an uncle, aunt, namesake, grandparents, or sometimes a marabout (religious teacher) for Koranic education or to meet their educational needs (see also Evans et al., 2017). According to a mapping and analysis of child-​protection systems in Senegal (Krueger & de Vise-​ Lewis, 2011), 68 percent (58 percent in urban areas, and 72 percent in rural areas) of children aged under 15 years were living with both parents. Almost 9 percent of girls and 7 percent of boys were entrusted to relatives through kinship-​care arrangements, and almost 6 percent of children had lost one or both parents. Another survey (République du Sénégal, 2011) suggested that the proportion of children not living with either biological parent is much higher among those aged 10 years and over (20 percent aged 10–​14, of which 17 percent were girls and 13 percent were boys). This may be linked to gendered expectations about girls’ contributions to the household in terms of domestic and care work, and hence, a preference among relatives to foster girls to undertake these roles.

Changes in Familial Responsibilities after a Family Death in Urban Senegal This section presents the particular dynamics of care and familial responsibilities after the death of a family member in urban Senegal, based on Evans et al.’s (2016) qualitative research in Dakar and Kaolack, where large, multigenerational households continue to be common. Urban households with 7 people on average are slightly smaller than rural ones where the average is 10 people (Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2014). Households are comparatively large in urban Senegal compared to elsewhere in West Africa and Central Africa, where on average between 4.5 and 6 people live in urban households (Jacquemin, 2010). Evans et al.’s (2016) research2 with families affected by bereavement found that familial responsibilities and a renewed commitment to the “success” of the family were central to the identity and well-​being of family members after a death. Such responsibilities are enmeshed in wider family and community networks of solidarity, which provide crucial support in the short term, but are less able to meet longer-​term social protection needs. This may result in considerable mobility and the dispersal and reconfiguration of households and familial responsibilities, sometimes including child fosterage arrangements. In most cases, the interviewees received care and support from family members in adjusting to the death. For some families and individuals, the loss of income that the deceased had provided and changes in familial roles and relationships following the

Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity    491 death led to financial difficulties and to challenges to the continuation of the children’ s schooling. Significant changes in material circumstances were particularly apparent if the deceased had been the head of household or main income earner. Several young people had to start working after the death, and some young people had stopped studying due to poverty and the need to work. Poorer households were more likely to suffer major disruptions, such as migrations in search of work or residential relocations to join another household, including child fosterage practices. Such movements may help to prevent extreme poverty but may also create emotional, social, and practical difficulties for both adults and children. “Comfortable” and “middling” (middle-​income) households were less likely to have to make such major adjustments to their lives. Most of the interviewees reported that the deceased had very few heritable assets to pass on to family members or significant others. Clothing and other small items, and sometimes furniture, were usually the only belongings, which were distributed between family members and other people. Young people’s caring and domestic responsibilities, particularly for daughters, may increase after the death of a mother or older sibling, with a detrimental impact on their education. Hawa (16 years old), who was in secondary school and whose older brother (the main income earner) had died, explained: It was my brother who used to go and look for water. He would take a cart (and horse) to go and get water. And now, it’s my sister and me who do it. . . . In any case, every day I go to school after having done the housework. When I finish I go and get water. . . . [During vacations] I’m at home with my father and my mother but they are elderly. So I stay with them. . . . My sister-​in-​law was here at home; when my brother died, she went back to hers. . . . I go to the market, prepare meals, do the housework.

Family deaths often led to changes in family practices and household routines, with young men acknowledging the need to be at home more and not socializing as much as they had before the death. Young people also often provided emotional support to siblings, their remaining parent, and other bereaved family members, especially among older youth, as N’diogou, a young 29-​year-​old man whose mother died explained: “I’m my father’s support, we talk about things. What’s important for me is to try and focus on him because me too, I feel he’s alone. It’s just to support him you know.” Several people talked about needing to be a role model and to take on new roles in disciplining younger siblings, especially among young men. There was often a strong sense of responsibility for siblings, especially among older youth and married young women. Diami, age 26 and married with two children, commented about her siblings: “I don’t want them to go hungry or thirsty. I want them to succeed in their life. . . . I stopped my studies so they could continue theirs” (Bowlby et al., 2021). The death often led to closer family relations among the living, especially between co-​resident siblings and the remaining parent. The loss of material support, which was interwoven with the emotional impact of loss, could lead to feelings of fearfulness and

492    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé even despair about how to face problems in life without a much-​loved relative. Young people in particular missed their parent’s guidance, protection and care. Selbe, a young 13-​year-​old woman, said: “When my father was alive it was him who gave me strength. . . . Today I don’t see him anymore; I only have my mother and my brothers and sisters to advise me.” This illustrates the increasing importance of parental roles in providing advice and guidance to their children and a possible accompanying decline in “social parenting” by relatives, as discussed earlier. Many young people felt that a mother or father was “irreplaceable,” in terms of the loss of their love, guidance and care, despite being often surrounded by aunts, uncles, grandparents, and other relatives. The next section draws on Evans’s (2011, 2012b, 2012a) research on orphaned siblings living in child-​and youth-​headed households in Tanzania and Uganda to explore changing familial roles and responsibilities in the contrasting settings of Eastern Africa and Southern Africa; both regions were been severely affected by the HIV epidemic.

Changes in Familial Roles and Responsibilities in Households Affected by AIDS in Eastern and Southern Africa Evidence from 21 African countries, including those with high and low HIV prevalence, suggests that there has been a shift toward grandparents’ providing childcare in recent years, especially where there are high orphan rates (Beegle et al., 2010). The crucial roles of women and children in caring for sick, disabled and older family members, and orphaned siblings have been increasingly recognized in response to the HIV epidemic in Eastern Africa and Southern Africa. The loss of the parental “middle generation” has led to the emergence of new household forms, such as “skipped generation households” (Samuels & Wells, 2009). Maternal kin, particularly grandmothers, have filled in the gaps by providing care for orphaned children that was traditionally provided by paternal kin in patrilineal societies (Beegle et al., 2010; Cooper, 2012; Evans & Thomas, 2009; Nyambedha et al., 2003; Oleke et al., 2005). Data from Demographic and Health Surveys from 24 countries in Sub-​Saharan Africa indicate that 41 percent of adults aged 60 or over live with a grandchild under the age of 15 years (cited in Zimmer & Dayton, 2005). Of these grandparents, almost 14 percent live with one or more grandchildren without any co-​resident adult children, and most of these households are headed by grandmothers living with young children in rural areas (Zimmer & Dayton, 2005). Children and elderly grandparents living in skipped-​generation households often share caring and domestic responsibilities and may develop close loving relationships, enhancing the emotional well-​being of both the children and older people (Clacherty, 2008; Evans & Becker, 2009). They may also experience chronic poverty that impacts older people’s health and longevity and children’s educational outcomes and life. The number of skipped generation households is expected to increase in the future because of the continuing impact of orphanhood related to AIDS, Ebola, and the Coronavirus,

Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity    493 among other long-​wave health emergencies, and the intensification of negative shocks such as conflict, natural disasters, and climate change (Samuels & Wells, 2009). Several studies have highlighted the significance of children’s roles in caring for chronically ill parents, younger siblings, and other community members in HIV-​ affected communities in Eastern Africa and Southern Africa (Bray, 2009; Evans & Becker, 2009; Skovdal, 2011). Children’s responsibilities to provide care for adults call into question conventional norms of childhood, youth, parenting, and intergenerational relations. Research reveals the poverty, stigmatization, and marginalization that child-​and youth-​headed households may face (Francis-​Chizororo, 2008; Meintjes et al., 2010; Ruiz-​Casares, 2009; Thurman et al., 2006). Orphaned children’s inheritance rights to their deceased parents’ land and property may be denied after their parents’ deaths (Clacherty, 2008; Evans, 2005). This appears to be linked to the stigma surrounding AIDS and children’s weak socioeconomic position in the community (Evans, 2005; Rose, 2007). While the majority of orphaned children and youth are cared for by extended family members (Beegle et al., 2010; Cooper, 2012; Meintjes et al., 2010), Evans’s (2011, 2012b, 2012a), exploratory research in Tanzania and Uganda showed that some orphaned children and youth are heading households independently to care for younger siblings and safeguard inherited assets from unscrupulous relatives. The research3 found that the eldest co-​resident sibling was usually considered to have more caring responsibilities than other siblings, although both older and younger siblings engage in “care-​giving” and “care-​receiving.” A strong feeling of familial responsibility to one another among siblings was evident, particularly if young people had experienced harassment or exploitative relations among extended family or community members. Young people emphasized in a workshop: “We are happy living together as a family,” and Tumaini, age 19, commented: “I feel good because we comfort each other about everything. We feel bad when we’re harassed.” Young people heading households in such situations can be seen as reconfiguring the usual intergenerational expectations of household headship and their place in the family and community. In contrast to their previous negative experiences in the households of foster relatives, several young people enjoyed the freedom of being able to “manage their own lives” and make their own decisions. Others expressed more contradictory feelings about assuming “adult” responsibilities while they are still a “child.” Young people’s care work within the household was usually shared but often reproduced conventional gender norms. Young women had greater and more direct involvement than young men in childcare and domestic work within the home. Although siblings of both genders undertook household tasks, young people’s care work appeared to reproduce conventional norms about the gendered division of labor within the household and other public and private locales. Young women spent more time managing the household and doing household chores, while young men spent a significantly longer time seeking paid work to support the family. These findings are related to gendered constructions of care and to young women’s reduced access to employment

494    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé opportunities in Tanzania and Uganda, as previous research in African contexts has shown (Chant & Jones, 2005; Langevang, 2008). Young men also spent more time seeking support and participating in neighborhood activities. Older and younger boys reported spending more time engaged in community activities outside the household compared to girls, reflecting conventional gender norms about the use of public and private space, and boys’ and young men’s greater spatial mobility and freedom to engage with the wider environment (Katz, 1993). Young men shared or allocated household chores to younger siblings, especially girls. Young women heading households appeared to be in a weaker bargaining position when it came to allocating household chores to younger brothers. Younger siblings mainly spent their time doing household chores, self-​care activities, and playing with friends. The gendered division of labor was not as pronounced as was expected (Evans, 2012b). Young men were responsible for activities conventionally perceived as “women’s work.” They reported spending almost as much time as young women doing household chores and more time engaged in childcare. This suggests that age and sibling birth order may be more significant than gender in determining young men’s involvement in care and domestic work in sibling-​headed households when they lacked sisters perceived as old enough to perform these tasks. In such situations, young men heading households were likely to allocate domestic tasks to younger brothers and to undertake more childcare and household chores themselves. These findings about the involvement of young men and boys in domestic and care work refute the broad generalization that women and girls do all the unpaid care work in Tanzanian society, and they are supported by Budlender’s (2010) analyses of time-​use data from Tanzania. Young people’s ambivalent position between the norms of “childhood,” “youth,” and “adulthood” appeared to be stigmatized by some adult family and community members, through harassment, bullying, and property grabbing. Almost all of the young people interviewed had inherited agricultural land, property, or other assets from their parents. As Evans (2012a) observed, under the conventional inheritance practices in patrilineal societies, paternal relatives typically kept children’s land and other inherited property in trust until they reached the age of majority (Rose, 2007). But the deaths of both parents due to AIDS and the negative experiences of children who had been placed in foster care resulted in some young people, especially older children, securing control of their land at a younger age than usual. This ownership of land, property, and other assets before young people had made “successful” transitions to adulthood (Langevang, 2008) challenged the conventional norms of inheritance, household formation, and generational relations. The result is that young people sometimes experienced property grabbing, stigmatization, exploitation, and accusations of wrongdoing in the community (Evans, 2011). Yet despite this stigmatization and marginalization, young people developed supportive social networks to meet their needs and protect themselves and their property, gaining access to material and emotional resources and enhancing their skills and capabilities to develop sustainable livelihoods. The next section explores the policy implications in the context of social protection stemming from the death of a family member and the changes in household structures

Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity    495 and disruptions to family life that result, based on the findings from the diverse research contexts in urban Senegal and in Tanzania and Uganda.

Policy Implications for Social Protection after a Family Death The research from Tanzania and Uganda (Evans, 2012a) found that safeguarding asset inheritance and building the resilience of child-​and youth-​headed households in the face of chronic poverty were best supported through a combination of • physical and financial assets and material resources (support from nongovernmental organizations); • individual factors (age and capabilities when the eldest sibling started caring, health and well-​being, motivations, values and beliefs, outlook, and aspirations); • relational factors (availability of supportive older siblings, relatives, and/​ or neighbors who can share unpaid and paid work responsibilities, strong social ties); and • structural factors (access to education, skills development, healthcare, employment opportunities). (p. 187) These findings support the significant literature that argues that unconditional cash transfers and other direct provisions of financial and material support to households have considerable potential to alleviate the chronic poverty that most vulnerable children and families experience (Molyneux, 2016; Richter, 2010). These supports need to be part of a rights-​based long-​term commitment to social protection institutionalized in government-​led structures (Richter, 2010). The research also reveals the dangers of creating dependency on external support that will be available only in the short or medium terms. When the funding streams end, it may have long-​term negative consequences for building strong social networks and ensuring that child-​and youth-​ headed households are fully integrated within communities. Targeted external support only for the category “orphaned and vulnerable children” for example, rather than supporting other community members in need, may result in resentment and increased stigma, exacerbating the marginalization of young people (Thurman et al., 2008). In Evans et al.’s (2016) research with families who had experienced the death of a relative in urban Senegal, only a tiny minority of the participants mentioned receiving support or assistance from formal government or nongovernmental actors/​stakeholders, and most were not aware that such services or assistance was available in their locality. The vast majority of interviewees relied on their social ties and informal networks of family, friends, neighbors, and colleagues for material, practical, and moral and emotional support after the death of a relative. Some also drew on informal relationships

496    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé with members of local associations, local and religious leaders, and members of their faith community to access support. Government and NGO representatives expressed frustration with the very limited availability of resources to fund social protection services for vulnerable children and families in need. Lack of funding, alongside lack of coordination and a shared understanding of who the target beneficiaries should be, undermined their ability to “function” and do the minimum their professional roles required. The overall messages for policy and practice from Evans et al.’s (2016) research focused on the need to consider the death of a relative as a potential criterion for vulnerability when targeting cash transfers and other social protection services to poor families. There was a strong consensus among community members and policymakers and practitioners that, alongside indicators of poverty, vulnerability criteria should include orphaned children and youth, widows (particularly those who were in polygamous unions), and widowers with young children, as well as other female heads of households with young children. Efforts to tackle governance issues and improve coordination among policymakers, practitioners, and community members were also identified as necessary to develop a shared understanding of the diverse circumstances of “vulnerable” children and families in need of support. A further policy recommendation from the research in Senegal (Evans et al., 2016) was to work to raise awareness of the social services and assistance available to poor families, make these services more accessible at the local level, and improve governance issues in the allocation of resources to target groups. The minimal government assistance that is currently available for “vulnerable groups” via local social-​service centers in urban areas of Senegal, together with the lack of trained personnel and logistical problems, such as lack of transport, severely undermines the contributions of social workers and those responsible for social action and support services. Although some school and university bursaries were reported to be available to orphaned young people, none of the interviewees had received such support or knew about it. Similarly, there was almost unanimous skepticism among family interviewees, focus group participants, and local and religious leaders about whether any available government or NGO resources that were available would reach the intended beneficiaries. This underscores the need for urgent action to build the capacity of social workers, schools, universities, and other social-​support services to provide more inclusive and transparent social and educational support for poor children, young people, and families who experience the death of an adult relative. These policy and practice recommendations relate to a broader concern highlighted by Evans et al. (2016) and Evans (2017) for development agencies, policymakers, and practitioners to globally recognize the interconnected nature of the material, emotional, social and spiritual dimensions of the death of a relative, with lasting repercussions for children, younger, middle, and older generations. The widespread poverty, lack of social protection and welfare services, adherence to widowhood-​mourning practices, and religious and moral imperatives about the need to persevere mean that death results not

Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity    497 just in an emotional upheaval, but also an economic, social, and cultural struggle to survive and “succeed” in life. These findings need to be understood within the wider legal and political framework of providing social protection for vulnerable children and families in Africa. While such a framework has recently been established in Senegal to provide a program of support for vulnerable children and families, analysis reveals that there are numerous diverse actors working on child protection who are often invisible in policy documents and national strategies. Significant barriers are evident in the application of the laws the protecting of vulnerable children. There is also a lack of information on the considerable funding available from international organizations and private donors, while funding provided by governmental cash transfers and other welfare benefits and by the community is wholly inadequate to meet the social protection needs of vulnerable children and families. Greater coordination and political will is needed to implement the policies and strategies that have been developed, as well as to maximize the use of funding from diverse sources to more effectively support families and communities in Africa (Krueger & de Vise-​Lewis, 2011).

Conclusion Research in Tanzania, Uganda, and Senegal has shown that families in Africa are characterized by a considerable diversity of household structures and networks of solidarity and interdependence. Familial roles and responsibilities have changed in response to global challenges and are constantly being reinforced and transformed through diverse kinship relations and community ties at the local level in environments that are often resource constrained. In many African societies, the social protection of children and families significantly depends on processes of socialization and social values of solidarity. Familial roles and responsibilities are often based on gendered and generational hierarchies, which shift over time. Global challenges, including the HIV and Ebola epidemics, economic crises, climate-​related shocks, and processes of urbanization linked to economic, political, and cultural globalization have placed pressure on families regarding their socioeconomic status and the extended family systems and conventional matrilineal and patrilineal responsibilities, household structures and relationships. These pressures and transformations may lead to an increased individualization of familial responsibilities and declining solidarity, particularly in urban areas. In some situations, the changes are linked to conflict, disruptions, migration and household dispersals, and ruptures within families and communities. Conflictual, asymmetrical power relations often result in gendered and generational inequalities in outcomes for education, training, employment, and health and well-​being and mostly impact children and other marginalized groups.

498    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé Thus the situation of vulnerable families is embedded in the dynamics of economic and sociohistorical change over time, provoked and accelerated by a wider context of crises, chronic poverty, and exclusion (Cruise O-​Brien, 1996; De Boeck & Honwana, 2005). Young people who head households or have significant responsibilities to care for family members occupy an in-​between place between childhood and adulthood as “not-​quite adults” taking on adult roles, and are often considered with suspicion and sanctioned by society (Evans, 2011). Unease about the place of orphaned children and youth in many African societies can be related to wider concerns about large, youthful populations, who are viewed as threat to the moral and social order (Cruise O-​Brien, 1996; Diouf, 2003). Within the dynamic context of urbanization, socioeconomic pressures, and changing familial responsibilities and intergenerational relations found in many African cities, Evans et al. (2016) concluded that there is a need for more recognition of family and community solidarity as crucial sources of reciprocal informal support in urban environments, while also recognizing the limits of such resources. Informal mechanisms of social solidarity beyond the family and neighbors, based on ethnic, religious, or community networks, women, youth, and civil-​society associations, were particularly important for poorer families and those of minority ethnicities or religious affiliations, who often had less extensive family ties to draw on. Strengthening informal associations and networks may help to support families in need in low-​income urban neighborhoods. Such sources of support may be increasingly important within the context of urbanization, perceived to coincide with a declining sense of solidarity in urban Senegal. Moreover, this analysis of the literature suggests that there is a need to develop a family-​focused approach that goes beyond targeting individuals or households for social protection. What is required instead is a more holistic understanding of the interdependent, reciprocal, and extensive nature of family and community ties, diverse arrangements for care, and recognition of the fluidity and mobility of people and resources between and among households. Efforts to strengthen existing forms of informal family and community solidarity and support networks are needed, alongside a significant expansion and effective implementation of formal social protection mechanisms, such as cash transfers, for the most vulnerable in African societies.

Acknowledgments Ruth Evans is grateful to all the participants and organizations who helped to facilitate the research in Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda for sharing their perspectives and experiences. She expresses particular thanks to Jane Ribbens McCarthy, Sophia Bowlby, Joséphine Wouango, Rosalie A. Diop, and Fatou Kébé for their major contributions to the research in Senegal reported in this chapter. She also thanks the research assistants, translators, and interpreters in both studies. The research in Senegal was funded by The Leverhulme Trust, research grant number RPG-​2013-​336 (2014-​16). The research in Tanzania and Uganda was funded by a

Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity    499 research grant from the Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) and the University of Reading (2008–​2009).

Notes 1. The chapter summarizes key findings of Ruth Evans from her research in Tanzania and Uganda (Evans, 2011, 2012b, 2012a) and in Senegal (Evans et al., 2016). 2. Using a qualitative methodology, in-​depth interviews were conducted with 59 family members who had experienced the death of a family member in recent years living in two cities (Dakar and Kaolack): including children, youth, middle-​aged and older people. Focus groups were also facilitated with women and youth, and interviews were conducted with local and religious leaders and, policy and practice professionals. See Evans et al. (2016) for further information. 3. Using a qualitative, participatory methodology, 12 semistructured interviews were conducted with orphaned young people (9 girls, 5 boys) from 8 child-​headed households, 3 youth-​headed households, and 1 skipped-​generation household in rural and urban Tanzania and Uganda. Interviews were also conducted with 15 project workers from 5 nongovernmental organizations. Participatory feedback workshops were later conducted with 33 orphaned young people (15 young people heading households and 18 of their siblings from 16 child-​/​youth-​headed households), and 39 NGO workers and community members. See Evans (2012b, 2012a) for further information.

References Adepoju, A., & Mbugua, W. (1999). Les mutations de la famille africaine. In A. Adepoju & W. Mbugua (Eds.), La Famille Africaine (pp. 59–​84). Karthala. Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie. (2014). Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitat, de l’Agriculture et de l’Elevage 2013, Rapport Définitif. ANSD and Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et du Plan, République du Sénégal. Antoine, P., Bocquier, P., Fall, A. S., Youssouf, G., & Nanitelamio, J. (1995). Les familles dakaroises face à la crise. IFAN, ORSTOM, & CEPED. Beck, S., De Vreyer, P., Lambert, S., Marazyan, K., & Safir, A. (2015). Child fostering in Senegal. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 46, 57–​73. https://​doi.org/​10.3138/​jcfs.46.1.57 Beegle, K., Filmer, D., Stokes, A., & Teirerova, L. (2010). Orphanhood and the living arrangements of children in Sub-​Saharan Africa. World Development, 38, 1727–​1746. https://​ doi.org/​10.1016/​j.world​dev.2010.06.015 Berger, L. M., & Font, S. A. (2015). The role of the family and family-​centered programs and policies. Future Child, 25, 155–​176. https://​files.eric.ed.gov/​fullt​ext/​EJ1062​953.pdf Bowlby, S., Evans, R., McCarthy, J. R., & Wouango, J. (2021). Time-​space caring practices after a death in the family in urban Senegal. Social & Cultural Geography, https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 14649​365.2021.1901​978 Bray, R. (2009). A literature review on child careers in Angola, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe [Unpublished report]. Save the Children UK. Budlender, D. (2010). Tanzania: Care in the context of HIV and AIDS. In D. Budlender (Ed.), Time use studies and unpaid care work (pp. 46–​68). Routledge.

500    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé Chant, S., & Jones, G. (2005). Youth, gender and livelihoods in West Africa: Perspectives from Ghana and The Gambia. Children’s Geographies, 3, 185–​199. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​147332​ 8050​0161​602 Collard, D. (2000). Generational transfers and the generational bargain. Journal of International Development, 12, 453–​462. Cooper, E. (2012). Sitting and standing: How families are fixing trust in uncertain times. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 82, 437–​456. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00019​ 7201​2000​320 Clacherty, G. (2008). Living with our Bibi: A qualitative study of children living with grandmothers in the Nshamba area of northwestern Tanzania. World Vision and REPSSI. Cruise O’Brien, D. B. (1996). A lost generation? Youth identity and state decay in West Africa. In R. Werbner & T. Ranger (Eds.), Postcolonial identities in Africa (pp. 55–​74). Zed Books. De Boeck, F., & Honwana, A. (2005). Introduction: Children and youth in Africa—​agency, identity and place. In A. Honwana & F. De Boeck (Eds.), Makers and breakers: Children and youth in postcolonial Africa (pp. 1–​18). James Currey. De Vreyer, P., & Nisson, B. (2019). When solidarity fails: Heterogeneous effects on children from adult death in Senegalese households. World Development, 114, 73–​94. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1016/​j.world​dev.2018.09.018 Dial, F. B. (2008). Mariage et divorce à Dakar: Itinéraires féminins. Karthala. Diop, A. B. (1985/​2012). La famille wolof: Tradition et changement. Karthala. Diouf, M. (2003). Engaging postcolonial cultures: African youth and public space. African Studies Review, 46, 1–​12. https://​doi.org/​10.2307/​1514​823 Evans, R. (2011). “We are managing our own lives . . . ”: Life transitions and care in sibling-​ headed households affected by AIDS in Tanzania and Uganda. Area, 43, 384–​396. https://​ doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1475-​4762.2010.00954.x Evans, R. (2012a). Safeguarding inherited assets and enhancing the resilience of young people living in child-​and youth-​headed households in Tanzania and Uganda. African Journal of AIDS Research, 11, 177–​189. Evans, R. (2012b). Sibling caringscapes: Time-​space practices of caring within youth-​headed households in Tanzania and Uganda. Geoforum, 43, 824–​835. https://​doi.org/​10.4236/​hea​ lth.2019.1110​099 Evans, R. (2014). Parental death as a vital conjuncture? Intergenerational care and responsibility following bereavement in Senegal. Social and Cultural Geography, 15, 547–​570. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​14649​365.2014.908​234 Evans, R. (2015). Negotiating intergenerational relations and care in diverse African contexts. In R. Vanderbeck & N. Worth (Eds.), Intergenerational space (pp. 199–​213). Routledge. Evans, R. (2016). Gendered struggles over land: Shifting inheritance practices among the Serer in rural Senegal. Gender, Place & Culture, 23, 1360–​1375. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09663​ 69X.2016.1160​872 Evans, R. (2017). “Bereavement awareness” is crucial to achieving the 2030 Agenda: Evidence from Senegal. [Policy brief]. University of Reading. http://​blogs.read​ing.ac.uk/​deathi​nthe​ fami​lyin​sene​gal/​pol​icy-​brief/​ Evans, R. M. C. (2005). Social networks, migration and care in Tanzania: Caregivers’ and children’s resilience in coping with HIV/​AIDS. Journal of Children and Poverty, 11, 111–​129. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​107961​2050​0195​527 Evans, R., & Becker, S. (2009). Children caring for parents with HIV and AIDS: Global issues and policy responses. Policy Press.

Familial Roles, Responsibilities, and Solidarity    501 Evans, R., Ribbens McCarthy, J., Bowlby, S., Wouango, J., & Kébé, F. (2016). Responses to death, care and family relations in urban Senegal (Research report 1). Human Geography Research Cluster, University of Reading. http://​blogs.read​ing.ac.uk/​deathi​nthe​fami​lyin​sene​gal/​files/​ 2016/​02/​Evans-​et-​al-​2016-​Rep​ort.pdf Evans, R., Ribbens McCarthy, J. R., Bowlby, S., Wouango, J., & Kébé, F. (2017). Producing emotionally sensed knowledge? Reflexivity and emotions in researching responses to death. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 20, 585–​598. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 13645​579.2016.1257​679 Evans, R., & Thomas, F. (2009). Emotional interactions and an ethic of care: Caring relations in families affected by HIV and AIDS. Emotions, Space and Society, 2, 111–​119. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1016/​j.emo​spa.2009.08.003 Foster, G., Makufa, C., Drew, R., & Kralovec, E. (1997). Factors leading to the establishment of child-​headed households: The case of Zimbabwe. Health Transition Review Supplement, 2, 155–​168. Francis–​Chizororo, M. (2008). The formation, constitution and social dynamics of orphaned child-​headed households in rural Zimbabwe in the era of HIV/​AIDS pandemic [Doctoral thesis, University of St. Andrews, Scotland]. https://​resea​rch-​rep​osit​ory.st-​andr​ews.ac.uk. Jacquemin, M. (2010). Urbanization, social change and child protection in West and Central Africa. UNICEF. Kabeer, N. (2000). Inter-​generational contracts, demographic transitions and the “quantity-​ quality” trade-​off: Parents, children and investing in the future. Journal of International Development, 12, 463–​482. https://​doi.org/​10.1002/​1099-​1328(200​005)12:43.0.CO;2-​S Katz, C. (1993). Growing circles/​closing circles: Limits on the spaces of knowing in rural Sudan and US cities. In C. Katz & J. Monk (Eds.), Full circles: Geographies of women over the life course (pp. 88–​106). Routledge. Krueger, A., & de Vise-​Lewis, E. (2011). Cartographie et analyse des Systèms de protection de l’enfance au Sénégal. Child Frontiers. https://​res​ourc​ecen​tre.save​thec​hild​ren.net/​pdf/​ 5094.pdf Langevang, T. (2008). “We are managing!”: Uncertain paths to respectable adulthoods in Accra Ghana. Geoforum, 39, 2039–​2047. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.geofo​rum.2008.09.003 Meintjes, H., Hall, K., Marera, D.-​H., & Boulle, A. (2010). Orphans of the AIDS epidemic? The extent, nature and circumstances of child-​headed households in South Africa. AIDS Care, 22, 40–​49. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​095401​2090​3033​029 Molyneux, M. (with Jones, N., & Samuels, F.). (2016). Can cash transfer programmes have “transformative” effects? Journal of Development Studies, 52, 1087–​1098. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​00220​388.2015.1134​781 Ndiaye, L. (2009). Parenté et mort chez les Wolof: Traditions et modernité au Sénégal. L’Harmattan. Nyambedha, E. O., Wandibba, S., & Aagaard-​Hansen, J. (2003). Changing patterns of orphan care due to the HIV epidemic in Western Kenya. Social Science and Medicine, 57, 301–​311. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0277-​9536(02)00359-​3 Ocholla-​Ayayo, A. B. C. (1976). Traditional ideology and ethics among the Southern Luo. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Oheneba-​Sakyi, Y., & Takyi, B. (2006). Introduction to the study of African Families: A framework for analysis. In Y. Oheneba-​Sakyi & B. Takyi (Eds.), African families at the turn of the 21st century (pp. 1–​23). Kendall/​Hunt.

502    Ruth Evans, Rosalie Aduayi Diop, and Fatou Kébé Oleke, C., Blystad, A., & Rekdal, O. (2005). “When the obvious brother is not there”: Political and cultural contexts of the orphan challenge in northern Uganda. Social Science and Medicine, 61, 2628–​2638. Porter, G., Hampshire, K., Abane, A., Munthali, A., Robson, E., Bango, A., de Lannoy, A., Gunguluza, N., Tanle, A., Owusu, S., & Milner, J. (2015). Intergenerational relations and the power of the cell phone: Perspectives on young people’s phone usage in sub-​Saharan Africa. Geoforum, 64, 37–​46. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.geofo​rum.2015.06.002 République du Sénégal. (2011). Enquête démographique et de sante à indicateurs multiples (EDS-​ MICS) 2010, 2011. Richter, L. (2010). Social cash transfers to support children and families affected by HIV/​AIDS. Vulnerable Children and Youth Studies, 5, 81–​91. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​174501​2100​3668​350 Rose, L. (2007). Children’s property and inheritance rights, HIV and AIDS and social protection in Southern and Eastern Africa (HIV/​AIDS Programme Working Paper 2). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://​www.fao.org/​3/​ai4​86e/​ai486​ e00.htm Ruiz-​Casares, M. (2009). Between adversity and agency: Child and youth-​headed households in Namibia. Vulnerable Children and Youth Studies, 4, 238–​248. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 174501​2090​2730​188 Samuels, F., & Wells, J. (2009). The loss of the middle ground: The impact of crises and HIV and AIDS on “skipped-​generation” households [ODI Project Briefing No. 33]. Overseas Development Institute. www.odi.org.uk Skovdal, M. (2011). Examining the trajectories of children providing care for adults in rural Kenya: Implications for service delivery. Children and Youth Services Review, 33, 1262–​1269. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.chi​ldyo​uth.2011.02.023 Sy, H. (1999). Le rôle de la famille et de l’école dans la reproduction des inégalités scolaires au Sénégal [Thèse pour le Doctorat d’Etat, Es lettres sciences humaines, CAS]. Tall, S. M. (2009). Investir dans la ville africaine: Les émigrés et l’habitat à Dakar. CREPOS-​Karthala. Thurman, T. R., Snider, L. A., Boris, N. W., Kalisa, E., Nyirazinyoye, L., & Brown, L. (2008). Barriers to the community support of orphans and vulnerable youth in Rwanda. Social Science and Medicine, 66, 1557–​1567. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.socsci​med.2007.12.001 Thurman, T. R., Snider, L., Boris, N., Kalisa, E., Mugarira, E. N., Ntaganira, J., & Brown, L. (2006). Psychosocial support and marginalization of youth-​headed households in Rwanda. AIDS Care, 18, 220–​229. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​095401​2050​0456​656 Van Blerk, L., & Ansell, N. (2006). Children’s experiences of migration: Moving in the wake of AIDS in southern Africa. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 24, 449–​471. https://​doi.org/​10.1068/​d65j Varley, A. (2008). Gender, families and households. In V. Desai & R. Potter (Eds.), The companion to development studies (pp. 346–​351). Hodder Education. Zimmer, Z., & Dayton, J. (2005). Older adults in sub-​Saharan Africa living with children and grandchildren. Population Studies, 59, 295–​312. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​003247​2050​0212​255

Chapter 27

M anaging Unc e rta i nt y, Creating Sta bi l i t y The Enduring Value of Kinship for Family Formation Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim

Introduction “Does it take a village to raise a child?” Caldwell and Caldwell (1987), in their often-​ cited research from Nigeria in the 1980s, not only said yes, but argued that access to kin for childrearing was one of the reasons for high fertility in Africa. More recent work has shown the benefits of coresidence with grandmothers for the education of maternal orphans in Lesotho (Parker & Short, 2009) and positive effects for boys’ education when they live with grandparents in the absence of parents (Madhavan et al., 2017). Like other social institutions in Africa, kinship obligations are undergoing a significant transformation as a result of economic precarity, changing social norms, migration, and urbanization. Moreover, the answer to the question, Does it take a village depends on multiple factors, including marital status, residential status, extent of support, and gender. This chapter pursues three goals: (1) present a comprehensive review of the recent scholarship on the role of extended kin in Sub-​Saharan Africa; (2) identify gaps in our knowledge base and the limitations of data-​collection tools; and (3) present findings from our research on kinship and marriage conducted in urban Kenya to address these gaps. It closes with a discussion of the contributions to sociology in the African context and ideas for future research.

504    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim

Kinship in Contemporary Africa The study of kinship in Africa has a long history though the lion’s share has come from anthropologists. We present some of the key highlights of this vast literature but are more interested in addressing the gaps and the questions that remain.

What Do We Know? Although individualization is often presented as a key feature of modernity (Giddens, 1991), it is a contested concept in the African context (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012) because marriage, intimate relationships, and the claims on children are situated within a system of extended kinship and lineage rules (Radcliffe-​Brown & Forde, 1950). It has long been shown that kinship is an inextricable dimension of personhood (Riesman, 1992), and it continues to be a key vehicle for transmitting resources, securing social standing, and cementing identity. However, kinship rules vary across lineage types and gender. In patrilineal systems, men, and by extension patrilineal kin, can exercise claims over children even if they are not their genitors, and they are expected to provide critical forms of social support (Silberschmidt, 1999). The lineage claims of women in patrilineal systems are secured through marriage as they transition from the natal home to the marital home. Therefore, a woman’s position may be compromised in the context of an informal relationship with the father of her child(ren) because neither her kin nor those of her partner were included in the marriage process (Hakansson, 1994). Jackson (2015) argues that more recently, kinship has taken a decidedly “matrifocal” turn in many contexts in the Global South, in particular, urban Africa, such that women and men increasingly depend on female kin for support. Nonetheless, despite these changes in the composition and roles kin continue to bestow moral legitimacy through their roles as guardians of the rules and behaviors of marriage and family systems and by providing support (Erdmute et al., 2010). In the absence of state-​provided safety nets, children’s health and well-​being in low-​ income families in many contexts in Africa continue to be largely a function of support provided by immediate and extended kin. Scholarship in the social sciences has highlighted the benefits of a grandmother presence (Cunningham et al., 2010; Duflo, 2003; Levetan & Wild, 2016; Madhavan, Myroniuk, et al., 2017; Parker & Short, 2009) and receiving assistance with childrearing from female kin (Madhavan et al., 2012). Other work, mostly from South Africa, has demonstrated the critical role of paternal kin in supporting low-​income fathers (Clark et al., 2015; Madhavan & Roy, 2012; Mkhize, 2006; Swartz & Bhana, 2009). These studies are consistent with Sear’s (2016) concept of “alloparenting,” which highlights the flexibility of parenting such that a range of kin members take on different childrearing responsibilities.

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability    505 Families and kin groups in Africa are undergoing profound changes as a result of economic instability, migration, urbanization, and changing kinship and marriage norms. Individuals continue to face pressure to provide support to their kin; however, they often lack the financial means to do so. Recent work from urban Kenya has shown that single mothers receive financial support from a very select, small number of kin, and that 18 percent of mothers reported receiving neither financial nor child-​care support from kin (Clark et al., 2017). HIV/​AIDS put considerable pressure on kin groups to care for orphans and the sick (Foster, 2000), but kin were nonetheless available (Ankrah, 1993; Madhavan, 2004). Although women have dominated the caregiving provided within kin groups, recent work has highlighted the role of men, in particular, fathers. Clark et al. (2018) found that support from a father, though quite limited, is more beneficial for child health than support from grandmothers. Other research has shown that emotional support from male kin is associated with lower stress among single mothers (Madhavan et al., 2018).

What Don’t We Know and Why? There are two significant gaps in our understanding of the role of kin in contemporary Africa; these are accompanied by limitations in data collection. The first conceptual problem is how we consider who “counts” as kin in assessing the support networks for women and their children. Much of the scholarship and data-​collection efforts have treated the coresidential household as the only or most important form of family organization. But when we accord primacy to the people living in the household, we leave out potential financial, emotional, and practical support from kin and non-​kin who reside outside the boundaries of the household. This is particularly problematic in the context of “stretched households” (Spiegel et al., 1996) resulting from institutionalized labor migration and the dispersion of kin (Madhavan et al., 2014) seen in many contexts throughout Africa. In a systematic review of the use of households, Randall et al. (2011) argue that as the unit of data collection and analysis in surveys, the household is not necessarily consistent with the social units in which people actually live. They write, “The use of the single term ‘household’ to refer to different concepts allows and encourages the assumption that survey data on households refer not simply to units of residence but also to units of production and consumption, often also involving marriage and kinship relationships” (p. 225). Simply put, relying on the household has greatly limited our understanding of access and support to and from kin, offering at best an incomplete picture of the effects of kin support on child health and well-​being. Kin may, for example, play an important role in providing a stimulating environment for optimal early childhood development outcomes, but most data-​collection efforts do not take into account the role of nonresidential kin (Alcock et al., 2015). Similarly, mothers in poor urban settings often rely on rural kin to supplement their nutritional intake, which is linked to improved breastfeeding (Kimani et al., 2015). Not capturing these connections will limit

506    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim our ability to fully understand breastfeeding practices and outcomes for child health. Moreover recent work from Tanzania shows that coresidence with kin is not as benefi­ cial to child survival as support from nonresidential kin (Gaydosh, 2015). The vast majority of surveys in Africa, including the extensively used Demographic and Health Surveys, rely on coresidential households to establish sampling frames and for data collection. Panel studies such as the Cape Area Panel Study in South Africa, the Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health, and the Kagera Health and Development Survey in Uganda have attempted to capture nonresidential connectivity with questions about resource transfers from nonresidents, conversations on sensitive topics, and sources of household income, but none of these studies have included an enumeration of kin structure, nor do they capture multiple types of connection. The second gap results from failing to view kinship support to mothers and children as a function of the formalization of unions. By union “formalization” we refer to the gendered process of moving from a high risk/​unstable relationship to one marked by some financial stability and social legitimacy. Union formalization processes are inextricably linked to kinship. A union cannot transition from informal to legitimate without kin recognition and exchange. Kin recognition is an essential step toward attaining social legitimacy for the union in the eyes of the community and securing support for the children that result from the union. Kin also play a critical role in the negotiation of monetary or material exchange between partners and families; this further legitimizes a union by demonstrating commitment through the eventual payment of bride wealth in the form of livestock, household goods, and, more recently, cash, from the groom’s kin to the prospective wife’s kin (Adams & Mbuguru, 1994; Jensen, 2015; Sennott et al., 2020). Marriage practices in Africa are changing; in particular, there is a move toward prioritizing the conjugal relationship (Thomas & Cole, 2009) and diminishing the role of kin. But kin continue to be very important. Smith (2004) has shown that, even among “modern” educated Igbos in Nigeria, couples actively seek kin approval in spouse selection and their advice on childrearing. Smith (2010) has also argued that shifts in marriage practices have left men and women caught between traditional expectations and modern aspirations. Men face pressure to perform traditional masculinity by having multiple partners and, at the same time, to conform to modern expectations of fidelity to a wife and ability to provide through the individual accumulation of wealth. Women aspire to uphold values of a committed relationship through a “love marriage” but risk losing kinship support if they do not involve kin in the selection of partners or the formalization of the union. In sum, kin support to women and children cannot be understood without incorporating marriage and, more specifically, the process of getting married. We are aware of no scholarship that has explicitly brought together kinship support and union formalization processes, let alone employ appropriate measures. The measurement of marriage in nearly all surveys includes a limited set of “union status” categories, with no attempt to capture the process of union formalization. We therefore

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability    507 do not know much about the extent to which kin are involved in this process. The chapter therefore addresses both the conceptual and empirical challenges of understanding the interaction of union formalization and kinship support in contemporary African contexts through ongoing work in Nairobi, Kenya.

Conceptualizing Kinship in Contemporary Africa Our approach to conceptualizing the role of kin in family life is informed by kinship and life-​course theories, particularly the principle of “linked lives,” which emphasizes the interconnectedness of lives over the life course (Elder, 1998; Elder et al., 2003). We draw mainly on Bourdieu’s (1990) distinction between theoretical kinship (the genealogically mapped universe of kin) and practical kinship (the extent of support provided by selected kin). We refer to these categories as “potential kin,” which refers to the child’s biological relationships with kin, and “functional kin,” which identifies the kin who provide one or more forms of support. Recent work has used principles from evolutionary biology that link the provision of kin support to genetic closeness (Hamilton, 1964) to explain the investment in children (Case & Paxson, 2001; Case et al., 2004; Sear et al., 2002). However, genetic closeness does not always determine kinship support (Anderson et al., 1999; Weismantel, 1995). Moreover, people may have several kinship support groups that are functionally distinct, change over time, and vary across space. Here, we are interested in uncovering how, when, and why functional kin are selected from all potential kin. We also draw on the scholarship on intimacy, risk, and economic insecurity to understand how the role of kin in the marriage process interacts with the role of kinship support to women and children. According to Giddens (1992) and Beck and Beck-​ Gernsheim (2009), “modern” intimate relationships are characterized by individualization achieved through separation from family and kin and high levels of financial, moral, and social risk. In contexts marked by deep economic insecurity, as are found in much of Africa, neither women nor men can afford to separate from kin despite their aspirations for a “modern” relationship. Therefore, intimacy in a union must be balanced with maintaining functioning kin connections. High unemployment makes it exceedingly difficult for most men to meet “male provider role” expectations, yet they continue to feel the pressure to provide and are aware that their partners can leave them if they do not provide. Functional kin can play a role in helping men meet these expectations (Mkhize, 2006; Roy & Burton, 2007; Stack & Burton, 1993). The focus on collective responsibility to meet provider expectations is consistent with the enduring importance of kin not only to mitigate economic risk but also to address moral risk. Whereas the bulk of the investment in rearing children comes from maternal kin, paternal kin can also play important roles (Clark et al., 2018; Madhavan & Roy, 2012). This

508    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim investment is a function of their involvement in formalizing the unions that produce the child in the case of biological fathers, or in raising the child in the case of nonbiological fathers. In other words, the involvement of kin in the marriage process can be seen as a way to enhance access to social capital through family-​based altruism (LaFave & Thomas, 2017). This may be particularly true for children’s paternal kin, who may be more willing to invest if their role is recognized in some way (Mkhwanazi & Block. 2016). A mother’s access to resources critical to her child’s well-​being is a function of her personal attributes, relationship to the biological or nonbiological father of the child, and connection to the child’s maternal and paternal kin. Connections to paternal kin and between maternal and paternal kin are forged and maintained through union formalization processes; thus the effect of kinship support on children’s outcomes is likely to depend on these processes. Alternatively, it is possible that the effect of union formalization on children’s outcomes is mediated by the quantity and quality of the kinship support, and specifically from paternal kin. Therefore, we are left with two empirical questions: (1) to what extent is the effect of kinship support on children’s well-​being dependent on the extent of union formalization and (2) to what extent does kinship support explain effects of union formalization on children’s well-​being.

Kinship and Marriage in Nairobi To address the gaps in understanding the linkages between marriage, kinship and child well-​being, we developed the Kinship Support Tree (KST) and administered it to single mothers with young children residing in a low-​income community in Nairobi, Kenya. Such communities are characterized by a lack of sanitation, limited healthcare facilities, congested and low-​quality housing, high crime levels, and widespread unemployment and poverty. Infant and child health outcomes—​nutritional status, vaccination coverage, and educational progress—​are very poor (Wamukoya et al., 2020). One of the key innovations of the KST is the enumeration of all close kin from the perspective of the child, regardless of kin residence or their roles as support providers. Close kin include the child’s biological father and maternal and paternal grandparents, aunts, and uncles. For each kin we collected demographic data, GPS-​linked location data, and the type of support (financial, practical, and emotional) and the amount and frequency of support provided to the mother and child. This enabled us to identify potential kin, whom we operationalized as those living and over the age of seven and therefore in a position to provide support, and functional kin. By identifying an accurate denominator of potential kin, we were able to determine the relative value of named support providers. For example, support received from two maternal uncles out of ten named kin had a different substantive and empirical meaning from the same kin provision out of five named kin. Information on distant and non-​kin support providers was also collected. Data was collected from 462 single mothers and 3,453 potential kin. The KST was administered twice in a six-​month period spanning 2015 and 2016. The longitudinal

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability    509 design captures the dynamism of kinship structure and support as responses to shocks and can better identify the directionality of effects. The feasibility of collecting such data was established, retaining the sample over time (92%) and established reliability (Madhavan, Clark, Beguy, et al., 2017; Madhavan, Beguy, Clark, et al., 2018). Moreover, the composition and functionality of kin groups were described (Clark et al., 2017; Madhavan, Clark, Araos, et al., 2018), along with their role in protecting child health (Clark et al., 2018) and mitigating stress for women (Madhavan Clark, Hara, et al., 2018). We then extended this work in the Jamaa na afya ya mtoto (JAMO) project (or the Kinship and Child Health project), a five-​year study of two communities, with a larger sample size and, most importantly, mothers at all stages of union formalization, to capture the ways in which kinship and marriage interact to affect children’s well-​being. The role of kin is captured through direct questions on kin involvement in the union formalization process and in the reporting of potential and functional kin. Because the data are collected from the child’s perspective, we can ascertain both partner involvement and that of his kin. In other words, it allows us to measure the level of kin support for women and children from both the maternal and paternal sides at various stages of union formalization. New findings from the pre-​test for this project with 132 women, which was completed in 2021, are presented. In addition, findings are presented from qualitative work done in 2017 and 2018 in which women and men who had ever lived with a partner for at least six months were recruited for inclusion in four focus group discussions (FGDs) and 18 in-​depth interviews. The themes included the different steps involved in formalizing a marriage, the value placed on different marriage types and processes, steps that gave the marriage legitimacy, and the role of kin in marriage and childrearing. Taken together, the findings demonstrate the value of capturing union formalization processes for understanding kinship support and the complexities of kinship support in the context of economic uncertainty.

The Necessity of Kin Recognition for Union Formalization Kin recognition includes the introduction of families and the negotiation of bride wealth and its eventual payment. Recognition by kin is different from kin selecting a spouse in that recognition serves as a risk-​mitigation strategy without ceding total control to parents. Its importance is most evident where it is absent. In Kenya, the shift from formal to informal arrangements is reflected in what are known as “come-​we-​ stay” unions. These are unions marked by quick progression into cohabitation and no family involvement, and are often precipitated by an unplanned pregnancy (Bocquier & Khasakhala, 2009). The absence of kin opens up both economic and social risk as expressed by Lillian, a 24-​year-​old FGD participant:

510    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim In this come-​we-​stay, you left your home without your parents’ consent; they didn’t release you to go . . . you don’t know where to start if you want to go back home. . . . They don’t even know who your husband is . . . . But in a wedding they know your husband. Maybe they can start by calling both families just as they did when you started; they settle and solve all those problems.

Being in a union that is not recognized by kin is akin to living a secret life without practical or emotional support. The introduction to kin is a sign of respect and accountability, as 40-​year-​old Doris explains: I feel this new way [come-​we-​stay] is not a good one because if a boy has gone unto your place and done some introductions, he will show you some respect because he knows you also have your own people, but this other one that you just live without the person going to your home, it will cause a lot of troubles because maybe at times he has not decided to commit to you then later he chases you away.

Come-​we-​stay relationships are understood as less respectful because formalization processes require material resources, and being able to afford such processes garners respect. More importantly, formalization processes enlist the help of kin and facilitate the processes by which the seeking and granting of elders’ approval can take place, in turn, demonstrating respect for their role in the process. Kin introductions, then, are also about investing in a relationship by showing respect for and actively involving the parents on both sides, as this young female participant made clear in an FGD: If respect is in a marriage, it’s something that is very important, because if I respect my husband’s parents and the husband also respects my parents, that one is a good marriage. But the one that the husband does not respect your parents, he just carries them like that, that is not a marriage.

By “just carrying them like that” this participant is referring to carrying on in a relationship without involving the couples’ respective kin, and without the partners’ taking steps to demonstrate commitment to and support in-​laws as they age. Other participants went on to describe instability in a come-​we-​stay marriage resulting from “abusing” the woman’s parents by not involving them in the marriage itself or assisting them in a time of need. The recognition by kin is cemented in the payment of bride wealth, which continues to have value for both men and women. The payment of bride wealth is the part of the formalization process that demonstrates, perhaps more than any other, the inextricable links between kin recognition and union formalization, as this male FGD participant explained: Now when you involve the parents, you know there are those procedures that, like my parents and her parents sit down together, get to know each other, you see. After we have already done this and this but when they come and sit down together and get to know each other, I think that the come-​we-​stay ends, you see. It now comes to

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability    511 dowry payment. So these ones, they will come and say, “We need this.” You see, the others will say, “We have this,” you see. So it now becomes a marriage.

For the woman, bride wealth provides material benefit for her family—​which denotes respect—​and demonstrates that she has legitimate claims to her husband’s lineage. Doris explains why, after 18 years of marriage, her husband finally paying bride wealth mattered so much to her: I: How important was the bride wealth that they took to you? R: It was important and it was a happy moment. I: Why? R: It is important that when you get married, your parents should also rejoice, you give them something to rejoice with . . . it was different [after he paid bride wealth] . . . Between me and my husband it was a stumbling block because anytime we quarreled in the house I used to tell him there is nothing you have taken to our place [her family], after that it changed and I couldn’t tell him that anymore.

Kin recognition and involvement are related to the stability of the union, which in turn may impact kinship support. These linkages are highlighted in the following vignette about relationship history of Cecilia, a 26-​year-​old participant: Cecilia found herself pregnant at 17, and left home to live with the father of her first child. Despite the fact that he was not able to provide steady financial support nor fidelity, she tried to save the relationship by calling on his kin to intervene because she believed this was their role. This was unsuccessful and when asked to reflect on this relationship, she explained, “I was not happy because my parents too were not happy with me because they [her parents] did not know who the man was and he also did not want to come and meet my parents.” By contrast, when she met her second husband, he was very serious about marrying her and agreed to meet her parents even before they moved in together, knowing that she already had a child. He brought his kin to meet her kin as an initiation of a traditional marriage. At the time of the interview they had been married for four years, had a two-​year-​old child, and reported being very happy. The interviewer asked if there were any other steps she would want to happen in her current marriage and her reply was, “I would like him to come and pay bride wealth and after that people can know I am truly married so that I don’t get disappointed like in my first marriage.”

Cecilia’s story of a failed first marriage and child followed by a more strategic and formalized second marriage was repeated by other participants, who described the steps they took to mitigate economic and moral risks through marriage. In Cecilia’s case, she sought early kin recognition to assess her partner’s commitment and ensure security in her second marital relationship. What Cecilia, as well as the other participants, emphasized most was the importance of her partner’s willingness to introduce her to his people and to be introduced to her people. It is evident that without kin recognition and involvement, a union has far less chance of success.

512    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim Being known by kin offers women security in multiple ways. First it helps ensure that the husband accepts paternity for any children resulting from the union and the accompanying financial support for these children. Giving a child a father’s surname is a direct way of obligating him and his kin to the child and thus can be seen as a purposeful and strategic act by a woman to ensure support for her children. Second, in the event of a divorce or significant disagreement, kin can be called upon to play a mediating role to resolve the dispute. Men, too, view kin recognition and, in particular, the payment of bride wealth, as a way to ensure security for their wives after they die. If a man does not pay bride wealth and fulfill those obligations before death, his wife will not be allowed to bury him or inherit their property, even if they have children. Finally, kin are almost always needed to carry out the elusive “white wedding” (Erlank, 2014), which takes place in a church with great pomp and fanfare. For all its symbolic value as a marker of a modern identity (with financial resources), the white wedding reflects, at its core, recognition by kin. Whereas Giddens (1991) sees a clear schism between traditional and modern practices, our respondents recognized kin involvement as a critical part of the modern, albeit mostly unattainable, white wedding.

Kinship Support in a Context of Economic Instability In the context of heightened financial precarity, monetary and material exchanges related to marriage featured prominently. Nearly all the participants, particularly women, sought some level of financial security from their partners and, ideally, from their partner’s kin as well, but recognized that receiving such support depended on the extent of union formalization, as Jane, aged 29, describes: [With] come-​we-​stay [the man] will disrespect you, because he sees you had no other option apart from being with him, but if he got to know your people, before you moved in, there is a way your relatives will talk some sense into him on the dos and don’ts when it comes to their daughter. I want someone to mediate between us so that our union can be good. But many [unions] are done [for] because when you meet it’s just the two of you and you handle your business just the two of you. That is what contributes to such things [conflict] . . . When you do a wedding the children will be assisted. But if you do not do a wedding there is no assistance you shall be getting for the children and you shall struggle with them.

Does Jane’s perception of the differences in support based on union formalization translate into differences in actual support? Table 27.1, based on the pre-​test data, shows the differences in the mean proportion of kinship support reported in each category of union formalization.

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability    513 Table 27.1. Union Formalization Process and Kin Support Received monetary support

Could ask for monetary support

Received assistance with childcare

Could ask for childcare help

No formalization steps (31)

25.8%

17.1%

26.8%

10.4%

Stage 1: Only introduction (79)

23.7%

28.2%

21.0%

25.6%

Stage 2: Add negotiation of bride wealth (13)

14.9%

32.8%

17.9%

43.2%

Stage 3: Add payment of bride wealth (6)

24.8%

41.1%

21.6%

37.7%

N

129

128

129

128

As the table shows, those who had progressed further in the union formalization process were more likely to report being able to ask for help. For example, women who had completed the introduction of families, negotiations, and payment reported being able to ask for monetary help from an average of 41 percent of their kin group. This is higher than those who had completed introductions and negotiations (32.8%), those who only completed introductions (28.2%), and those who had taken no formalization steps (17.1%). A similar pattern is evident for being able to ask for childcare assistance, although there is no real difference between stages 2 and 3. Based on these early findings, there is good reason to expect variation in child outcomes, yet it is notable that reported support received is low across all stages of union formalization, with little variation. This is underscored in Table 27.2, which shows selected descriptive statistics of kin structure and support from 1578 surviving kin. On average, each respondent reported 14 kin in her extended family, of which only about 18 percent were coresidents. Only 20 percent of kin were reported as providers of monetary support, although a slightly higher percentage (25%) were seen as kin who could be approached for help. The percentages for nonmonetary and childcare support were 18 percent and 20 percent, respectively. Lastly, 33 percent of kin were reported as providing advice and another 20 percent as providing assurance and comfort. These results corroborate our earlier findings that there may be a large kin group, but only a very select number of kin who actually provide any type of support.

514    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim Table 27.2. Selected Descriptives of Kin Structure and Support Descriptives Average number of kin per respondent

N (%) 14

Lives in household

280 (17.7)

Provide monetary support (n =​1367)

284 (20.8)

Could you ask for $$ support (N =​1083)

281 (25.9)

Provide nonmonetary support (n =​1365)

251 (18.4)

Assist with childcare

309 (19.6)

Could you ask for childcare help (N =​1268)

331 (26.1)

Any other type of support provided? Advice when needed

525 (33.3)

Assurance and comfort

315 (20.0)

Companionship/​friendship

178 (11.3)

No other support N (Number of reported Surviving Kin)

981 (62.2) 1578

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because the categories are not mutually exclusive.

It is possible that these numbers partly reflect Covid-​19–​related needs and constraints, something that will be confirmed through a follow-​up over the next few years. However, the fragility of support is real, as 26-​year-​old Evelyn explained in this interchange: I: 

So up to now, you are not getting any support apart from your family side? From their [her partner’s] side you have said there is no support? R: Unless I meet his mother on the road and maybe she says hi to the child even if she will talk some shit but she will say hi and maybe give the child KS1500. I: She gives you the money? R: No, she gives the baby and the baby will give it to me, she normally says she can’t give me the money. I: So the relationship between you and the mother to your child’s father has changed? R: It has completely changed, it changed when they came to the hospital, and I refused to go home with them.

Evelyn described being in a relationship that failed and the extent of the support for her child she receives from the paternal kin. The support from the family of the child’s father is no longer secured, and any offer of support she does receive is the exception rather than the rule. Despite the dissolution of a union, in the context of economic precarity, the provision of support often ultimately depends on having the means. Doris was in a similar situation; she was in a come-​we-​stay union that had only recently become more formalized. She recalled that when she was giving birth to her children, she received

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability    515 very little support from her partner’s family or kin. Instead, matrifocal and fictive kin networks were her source of support during this time. R: 

When it comes to raising children, it faces the parents only, there is no difference [between come-​we-​stay and more formalized unions]. Maybe if a situation arises then one parent passes away, then if you have caring relatives then they will support you but if you don’t have supporting relatives, you will be required to raise them [the children] alone. I: That means it is not a must for them to help you, it’s only the willing? R: Yes, that’s why am telling you that even if their brother dies, you will be lucky to have relatives who will support you. Life has become difficult. I: After giving birth to your firstborn who assisted? During and after pregnancy? R: Neighbors . . . I gave birth at home. I: So the neighbor assisted you to give birth? R: Yes. I: After giving birth . . . who assisted you? R: The family cooked for me. I: Who exactly? R: My sister . . . She came from upcountry to assist me. I: What about your second-​born? R: I gave birth at the hospital. I: Who assisted you before you gave birth and after? R: Neighbors. I: Who assisted after giving birth? R: Still neighbors.

Doris clearly very wary of having any expectations of kin support, regardless of the status of her relationship with the child’s father. When pushed for specifics, she mentioned her own sister and neighbors who, because of their proximity, provided her with support.

Discussion and Conclusion In the context of deep economic insecurity, whether it be in urban Kenya or other low-​income contexts in Africa, support from kin continues to be critical for securing livelihoods and safeguarding health and well-​being. However, as the findings show, though women report having large potential kin groups (those who can theoretically provide support), the number of functional kin (those who actually provide support) is quite small. This may not be particularly surprising considering the deep economic insecurity felt by everyone, but it may also reflect changing norms of kinship obligations in urbanizing contexts. Previously, there was the expectation that kin would move to the city and send money to those left behind (Azam & Gubert, 2006). This simplistic model is clearly no longer as relevant amid a set of countervailing forces of geographic dispersion and financial constraints that weaken ties

516    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim and communications technology that arguably strengthens connections (Madhavan et al., 2018). It is also clear that the likelihood and extent of kin support is at least partly a function of the process of union formalization. The analysis advances our understanding of the importance of social legitimacy amid increasing individualization. Most respondents considered kin recognition to be a key feature of formalization because it signals a step toward legitimizing the union, culminating in the payment of bride wealth. Simply put, not having kin recognition is perceived as risky, despite the state’s efforts to sell the marriage certificate itself as a means to stability and security. In a departure from Giddens (1991) and Beck and Beck-​Gernsheim (2009), our research found that the process of making partners known to kin and actively seeking kin approval are acts of agency and part of a modern identity. The selection of partners may increasingly be in the hands of the individuals, but the process of formalizing the union continues to necessitate kin approval. We suggest this is likely to be a common attribute of low-​income contexts globally, where individual survival is inextricably linked to a safety net of kin and non-​kin. Moreover, the shift from event to process enables an appreciation of how people combine “modern” resources, such as the state, with “traditional” institutions, such as kinship, in distinctly gendered ways to attain their goals. The benefits and liabilities will undoubtedly vary but, in a context of extreme economic precarity and shifting norms about gender roles, the marriage process provides an opportunity to exercise agency by trying out relationships, strengthening economic security, and cementing social legitimacy through kin recognition. The coupling of risk and modern intimacy is a function of globalization (Beck & Beck-​Gernsheim, 2009) and larger forces of political economy that have exposed deep fault lines in the institutions of marriage and the family both within and between countries. These conceptual insights, though important in their own right, need to be operationalized with robust measures and the accompanying data-​collection tools. If we are to capture the complexities of kinship in contemporary Africa, three key shifts are necessary: (1) to move beyond the household; (2) to differentiate potential kin from functional kin; and (3) to move from event to process for both kinship support and union formalization. In short, we need to strengthen efforts to collect robust data on kinship support and union formalization in tandem, given the consensus that marriage and kinship are two fundamental social institutions critical to the well-​being of women, children, and all family members. In addition, we would advocate for a mixed-​methods approach to measure and model the relationships among union formalization, kinship support, and any resulting impacts on family health and well-​being, as well as to improve our understanding of the meaning and social significance of these linkages. In closing, we would like to highlight some key contributions the examination of kinship in contemporary Africa makes to the field of sociology. First, it helps to advance our understanding of the mechanisms through which traditional value systems are maintained, despite the significant economic and cultural forces drawing people toward a modern identity. In other words, young people today are able to adopt certain aspects of modernity, for example, the love marriage, and at the same time retain claims to moral

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability    517 and social legitimacy through kin recognition. Second, it enables us to interrogate the meaning of family as a key organizing social unit. The questions of who gets counted, for what purpose, when, and from whose perspective need to be put forth as both conceptual and empirical questions during a time of profound economic, social, and cultural change. Third, it advances our understanding of the management of risk amid increasing individualization. We might benefit from drawing on the idea of “provider love” (Hunter, 2010), which describes the gendered process that ties love and money to the building and maintaining of an intimate relationship. Expectations of provision come not only from male partners but also from their kin as an expression of emotional investment. As the findings from Nairobi clearly illustrate, kin play a role in the provision of economic and material support, which, in turn, contributes to the strengthening of unions and ensuring moral legitimacy. As family sociologists, we have an opportunity to expand and enrich our understanding of how social connections between partners and among family members are shaped by structural inequalities and cultural changes.

Acknowledgments We acknowledge the funding support received from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute for Child Health and Human Development (Grant # 1R01HD101613-​01A1) and the Maryland Population Research Center (P2C-​HD041041).

Acronyms FGD

Focus group discussion

KST

Kinship Support Tree

References Adams, B. N., & Mburugu, E. (1994). Kikuyu bridewealth and polygyny today. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 25, 159–​166. https://​doi.org/​10.3138/​jcfs.25.2.159 Alcock, K., Rimba, K., Holding, P., Kitsao-​Wekulo, P., Abubakar, A., & Newton, C. R. (2015). Developmental inventories using illiterate parents as informants: Communicative Development Inventory (CDI) adaptation for two Kenyan languages. Journal of Child Language, 42, 763–​785. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S03050​0091​4000​403 Anderson, K. G., Kaplan, H., Lam, D., & Lancaster, J. (1999). Paternal care by genetic fathers and stepfathers II: Reports by Xhosa high school students. Evolution and Human Behavior, 20, 433–​451. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S1090-​5138(99)00022-​7 Ankrah, E. M. (1993). The impact of HIV/​ AIDS on the family and other significant relationships: The African clan revisited. AIDS Care, 5, 5–​22. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​095401​ 2930​8258​580 Azam, J. P., & Gubert, F. (2006). Migrants’ remittances and the household in Africa: A review of evidence. Journal of African Economies, 15, 426–​462. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​jae/​ejl​030

518    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim Beck, U., & Beck-​Gernsheim, E. (2009). Losing the traditional: Individualization and “precarious freedoms.” In A. Elliott & P. Gay (Eds.), Identity in question (pp. 13–​36). SAGE Publications. Bocquier, P., & Khasakhala, A. (2009). Factors influencing union formation in Nairobi, Kenya. Journal of Biosocial Science, 41, 433–​455. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00219​3200​9003​319 Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Stanford University Press. Caldwell, J. C., & Caldwell, P. (1987). The cultural context of high fertility in sub-​Saharan Africa. Population and Development Review, 13, 409–​437. Case, A., & Paxson, C. (2001). Mothers and others: Who invests in children’s health? Journal of Health Economics, 20(3), 301–​328. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0167-​6296(0  0)00088-​6 Case, A., Paxson, C., & Ableidinger, J. (2004). Orphans in Africa: Parental death, poverty, and school enrollment. Demography, 41, 483–​508. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​dem.2004.0019 Clark, S., Cotton, C., & Marteleto, L. J. (2015). Family ties and young fathers’ engagement in Cape Town, South Africa. Journal of Marriage and Family, 77, 575–​589. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​jomf.12179 Clark, S., Madhavan, S., Cotton, C., Beguy, D., & Kabiru, C. (2017). Who helps single mothers in Nairobi? The role of kin support. Journal of Marriage and Family, 79, 1186–​1204. https://​ doi.org/​10.1111/​jomf.12404 Clark, S., Madhavan, S., & Kabiru, C. (2018). Kin support and child health: Investigating two approaches in an African slum. Social Science Research, 76, 105–​119. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​ j.ssr​esea​rch.2018.08.001 Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. L. (2012). Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-​America is evolving toward Africa. Anthropological Forum, 22, 113–​131. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00664​ 677.2012.694​169 Cunningham, S. A., Elo, I. T., Herbst, K., & Hosegood, V. (2010). Prenatal development in rural South Africa: Relationship between birth weight and access to fathers and grandparents. Population Studies, 64, 229–​246. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00324​728.2010.510​201 Duflo, E. (2003). Grandmothers and granddaughters: Old-​age pensions and intrahousehold allocation in South Africa. The World Bank Economic Review, 17, 1–​25. http://​hdl.han​dle.net/​ 10986/​17173 Elder, G. H. (1998). The life course as developmental theory. Child Development, 69, 1–​12. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​j.1467-​8624.1998.tb06​128.x Elder, G. H., Johnson, M. K., & Crosnoe, R. (2003). The emergence and development of life course theory. In J. T. Mortimer & M. J. Shanahan (Eds.), Handbook of the life course (pp. 3–​19). Springer. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​0-​306-​48247-​2_​1 Erdmute, A., Häberlein, T., & Martin, J. (2010). Changing webs of kinship: Spotlights on West Africa. Africa Spectrum, 45, 43–​67. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​000​2039​7 100​4500​303 Erlank, N. (2014). The white wedding: Affect and economy in South Africa in the early twentieth century. African Studies Review, 57, 29–​50. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​asr.2014.46 Foster, G. (2000). The capacity of the extended family safety net for orphans in Africa. Psychology, Health & Medicine, 5, 55–​62. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​1354​8500​0106​007 Gaydosh, L. (2015). Childhood risk of parental absence in Tanzania. Demography, 52, 1121–​1146. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s13​524-​015-​0411-​4 Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-​identity. Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1992). The transformation of intimacy. Polity Press. Hakansson, N. T. (1994). The detachability of women: Gender and kinship in processes of socioeconomic change among the Gusii of Kenya. American Ethnologist, 21, 516–​538. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1525/​ae.1994.21.3.02a00​040

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Stability    519 Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 17–​52. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​0022-​5193(64)90039-​6 Hunter, M. (2010). Love in the time of AIDs: Inequality, gender, and rights in South Africa. Indiana University Press. Jackson, C. (2015). Modernity and matrifocality: The feminization of kinship? Development and Change, 46, 1–​24. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​dech.12141 Jensen, A. M. (2015). Changes in brideprice payments in Christian and Muslim villages of Kenya. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 46, 105–​120. https://​doi.org/​10.3138/​ jcfs.46.1.105 Kimani-​Murage, E. W., Wekesah, F., Wanjohi, M., Kyobutungi, C., Ezeh, A. C., Musoke, R. N., Norris, S. A., Madise, N. J., & Griffiths, P. (2015). Factors affecting actualisation of the WHO breastfeeding recommendations in urban poor settings in Kenya. Maternal and Child Nutrition, 11, 314–​332. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​mcn.12161 LaFave, D., & Thomas, D. (2017). Extended families and child well-​ being. Journal of Development Economics, 126, 52–​65. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.jdev​eco.2016.11.006 Levetan, J. L., & Wild, L. G. (2016). The implications of maternal grandmother coresidence and involvement for adolescent adjustment in South Africa. International Journal of Psychology, 51, 356–​365. https://​doi.org/​10.1002/​ijop.12178 Madhavan, S. (2004). Fosterage patterns in the age of AIDS: Continuity and change. Social Science & Medicine, 58, 1443–​1454. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0277-​9536(03)00341-​1 Madhavan, S., Beguy, D., Clark, S., & Kabiru, C. (2018). Measuring extended families over time in informal settlements in Nairobi, Kenya: Retention and data consistency in a two-​round survey. Demographic Research, 38, 1339–​1358. https://​doi.org/​10.4054/​Dem​ Res.2018.38.44 Madhavan, S., Clark, S., Araos, M., & Beguy, D. (2018). Distance or location? How the geographic distribution of kin networks shapes support given to single mothers in urban Kenya. The Geographical Journal, 184, 75–​88. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​geoj.12230. Madhavan, S., Clark, S., Beguy, D., Kabiru, C. W., & Gross, M. (2017). Moving beyond the household: Innovations in data collection on kinship. Population Studies, 71, 117–​132. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​00324​728.2016.1262​965 Madhavan, S., Clark, S., & Hara, Y. (2018). Gendered emotional support and women’s well-​ being in a low-​income urban African setting. Gender & Society, 32, 837–​859. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1177/​08912​4321​8786​670 Madhavan, S., Mee, P. & Collinson, M. (2014). Kinship in practice: Spatial distribution of children’s kin networks. Journal of Southern African Studies, 40, 401–​418. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​03057​070.2014.906​211 Madhavan, S., Myroniuk, T. W., Kuhn, R., & Collinson, M. A. (2017). Household structure vs. composition: Understanding gendered effects on educational progress in rural South Africa. Demographic Research, 37, 1891–​1916. https://​doi.org/​10.4054/​Dem​Res.2017.37.59 Madhavan, S., & Roy, K. (2012). Securing fathering through kin work: A comparison of black fathers and families in South Africa and the U.S. Journal of Family Issues, 33, 801–​822. https://​ doi.org/​10.1177/​01925​13X1​1426​699 Madhavan, S., Schatz, E., Clark, S., & Collinson, M. (2012). Child mobility, maternal status, and household composition in rural South Africa. Demography, 49, 699–​7 18. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1007/​s13​524-​011-​0087-​3 Mkhize, N. (2006). African traditions and the social, economic and moral dimensions of fatherhood. In L. Richter & R. Morrell (Eds.), Baba: Men and fatherhood in South

520    Sangeetha Madhavan, Kirsten Stoebenau, and Seung Wan Kim Africa (pp. 183–​198). Human Sciences Research Council Press. http://​hdl.han​dle.net/​ 20.500.11910/​7 109 Mkhwanazi, N., & Block, E. (2016). Paternity matters: Premarital childbearing and belonging in South Africa and Lesotho. Social Dynamics, 42, 273–​288. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​02533​ 952.2016.1218​137 Parker, E. M., & Short, S. E. (2009). Grandmother coresidence, maternal orphans, and school enrollment in Sub-​Saharan Africa. Journal of Family Issues, 30, 813–​836. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1177/​01925​13X0​9331​921 Radcliffe-​Brown, A. R., & Forde, D. (1950). African systems of kinship and marriage. Routledge. Randall, S., Coast, E., & Leone, T. (2011). Cultural constructions of the concept of household in sample surveys. Population Studies, 65, 217–​229. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​00324​ 728.2011.576​768 Riesman, P. (1992). First find your child a good mother: The construction of self in two African communities. Rutgers University Press. Roy, K., & Burton, L. (2007). Mothering through recruitment: Kinscription of nonresidential fathers and father figures in low-​income families. Family Relations, 56, 24–​39. https://​doi​ .org/​10.1111/​j.1741-​3729.2007.00437.x Sear, R. (2016). Beyond the nuclear family: An evolutionary perspective on parenting. Current Opinion in Psychology, 7, 98–​103. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.cop​syc.2015.08.013 Sear, R., Steele, F., McGregor, I. A., & Mace, R. (2002). The effects of kin on child mortality in rural Gambia. Demography, 39, 43–​63. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​dem.2002.0010 Sennott, C., Madhavan, S., & Nam, Y. (2020). Modernizing marriage: Balancing the benefits and liabilities of bridewealth in rural South Africa. Qualitative Sociology, 44, 55–​75. https://​ doi.org/​10.1007/​s11​133-​020-​09457-​w Silberschmidt, M. (1999). “Women forget that men are the masters”: Gender antagonism and socio-​economic change in Kisii district, Kenya. Nordic Africa Institute. Smith, D. J. (2004). Contradictions in Nigeria’s fertility transition: The burdens and benefits of having people. Population and Development Review, 30, 221–​238. https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ j.1728-​4457.2004.011_​1.x Smith, D. J. (2010). Promiscuous girls, good wives, and cheating husbands: Gender inequality, transitions to marriage, and infidelity in Southeastern Nigeria. Anthropological Quarterly, 83, 1–​20. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​anq.0.0118 Spiegel, A., Watson, V., & Wilkinson, P. (1996). Domestic diversity and fluidity among some African households in greater Cape Town. Social Dynamics, 22, 7–​30. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​025339​5960​8458​599 Stack, C. B., & Burton, L. M. (1993). Kinscripts. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 24, 157–​ 170. https://​doi.org/​10.3138/​jcfs.24.2.157 Swartz, S., & Bhana, A. (2009). Teenage tata: Voices of young fathers in South Africa. HSRC Press. Thomas, L. M., & Cole, J., & (2009). Thinking through love in Africa. In J. Cole & L. M. Thomas (Eds.), Love in Africa (pp. 1–​30). University of Chicago Press. Wamukoya, M., Kadengye, D. T., Iddi, S., & Chikozho, C. (2020). The Nairobi urban health and demographic surveillance of slum dwellers, 2002–​2019: Value, processes, and challenges. Global Epidemiology, 2, 1–​10. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.glo​epi.2020.100​024 Weismantel, M. (1995). Making kin: Kinship theory and Zumbagua adoptions. American Ethnologist, 22, 685–​704. https://​doi.org/​10.1525/​ae.1995.22.4.02a00​010

Chapter 28

Challenges to H i g h e r Edu cation i n A fri c a and the Dec ol oni z e d “ Academ ia W e Wa nt ” Christine Scherer

Introduction On March 11, 2020, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, director-​general of the World Health Organization (WHO), declared that SARS-​CoV-​2 virus to be a global pandemic (World Health Organization, 2020). On April 16, WHO offered a preliminary estimate that 10 million people on the African continent would be infected with the virus within the next three to six months, although the WHO officials stressed that this forecast could change “for better or for worse.” By April 24, 2020, the COVID-​19 respiratory disease caused by the virus had been officially tracked in 52 African countries, for a total of 23,500 confirmed cases, 1,100 deaths, and 5,800 full recoveries (African Academy of Sciences, 2020). The pandemic’s epicenter had by then shifted from Asia to Europe. Concerns were expressed about the evolution of the fatalities in African countries. Despite swift moves and immediate measures against the coronavirus in many African countries, European media notably assumed that “without a miracle or a pandemic Marshall Plan by richer countries, disaster will engulf everyone as the virus explodes in poorer countries” (Malik, 2020). However, over the ensuing months, all of the countries on the African continent seemed to be much more resilient than predicted to the virus and its mutants, as revealed in the daily statistics presented online by the Coronavirus Resource Center of Johns Hopkins University in the United States. Big yellow dots covering the website’s world map showed that the regions with particularly high incidence rates and fatalities were concentrated in the Global North. The yellow dots were lacking in Africa, with the

522   Christine Scherer exception of South Africa (Johns Hopkins University, n.d.). The media in the Global North had explanations for this difference at the ready: it assumed, in the first place, that Africa lacked valid data on the incidence and spread of COVID-​19 because it lacks respective research capacity, and that the low rates were therefor not indicators of low infection and fatalities due to the countries’ successful strategies for dealing with the virus (Soy, 2021). Even though any other explanations of the low incidence rates lacked the same evidence in the early days of the pandemic, this is but one example of the narrative about the marginal African contribution to the production of knowledge on COVID-​19 (Mehler & Njamnjoh, 2022). In this regard, Asubiaro and Shaik (2021, p. 275) examined COVID-​19 research papers published in the countries of Sub-​Saharan Africa over an 18-​month period. They found that this research amounted to only 2 percent of the total global research on COVID-​19, and that there was limited intra-​African collaboration, in particular, among the countries the Sub-​Saharan region. More than half of the published papers they examined were written in collaboration with researchers from outside the region. In contrast, Guleid et al. (2021) performed a thorough bibliometric analysis of COVID-​19 research in Africa that yielded the following results: • Africa is contributing to the generation of COVID-​19 knowledge by publishing primary and secondary research articles and editorial and commentary-​type articles. • African authors have made significant contributions to this productivity and are listed as first authors in 78.5 percent of the articles and last authors in 63.5 percent of the articles. • South Africa has the highest COVID-​19 research productivity among all the African countries. • How countries prepared and responded was the most recurring research theme while studies on therapeutics and vaccines were under-​represented. (n.p.) The differing perspectives of Asubiaro and Shaik and of Guleid et al. show two scholarly approaches to evaluating research production in higher education in Africa in the context of COVID-​19. The pandemic impacted African higher education and research institutions, including teaching and learning (Muftahu, 2020) as much as it impacted higher education worldwide. Institutions in 185 countries around the globe had been closed by April 2020, and 1,542,412,000 learners (89.4 percent of total enrolled learners) had to adjourn their studies because of the disruptions to their tertiary training and university life (Marinoni et al., 2020). Remote teaching and distance learning were the only options for continuing training, but these were not available everywhere (Ali, 2020; Woldegiorgis, 2022). The current view of higher education in Africa and of its potential for African societies is characterized by two distinct perceptions. One reflects on the low performance of Africa’s higher-​education systems and their weak contribution to worldwide knowledge production. It describes and analyzes reasons and impacts resulting from regional historical contexts and discusses the present set-​ups and future designs of higher education in Africa in terms of its systemic global relations. These systemic global relations include

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    523 research, training, and learning structures as integral aspects of a worldwide institution for the production of knowledge in universities and other tertiary education organizations (Assié-​Lumumba, 2007; Jegede, 2012; Sawyerr, 2004; Teferra & Altbach, 2004). The other refers to the neglected young populations and the high potential of African intellectual contribution to global research and knowledge generation—​if there is the political will in continental and country policies to make the revision and transformation of higher education in Africa a priority (Aina, 2010; Brock-​Utne, 2003; Levy, 2007; Ramphele, 2004). With respect to the phase of the pandemic from 2020 to 2022, the scientific debate on the so-​called Africa paradox (e.g., Lawal, 2021, p. 119) is an important example of the battle for hegemony in the scholarly interpretation of the distinct regional situations globally, in particular, Africa. (Ogola, 2021; Zheng & Walsham, 2021). Higher education in Africa, understood as a social institution in the sociological sense, is complex, challenged, and challenging for its multiple stakeholders. It is dynamic and diverse on the functional, operational, and political levels, reflecting global and universal trends (Zeleza, 2016). In its organizational composition and interactions and national, regional, and international relations, it is part of the global institution of higher education. But as this chapter will show, Africa is increasingly becoming its own agent in creating new architectures of higher education. On an intellectual level, scholars from the continent challenge the globalized institution to rethink itself as African intellectuals have hinted for more than half a century at the imbalances the institution of higher education perpetuates on the continent. Why, they ask, out of 1,225 higher education institutions in Africa, were academics from only 12 universities included on the 2021 list of highly cited researchers? (Sawahel, 2021). The growing body of academic writing on higher education in Africa is a sign that change on a discursive level is at the doorstep, with the capacity to change perceptions and perspectives in a systemic interplay. However, authors also explain why on a practical level it has a long way to go in all directions, in Africa and beyond (Barbosa, 2010; Brahima, Turner, & Woldegiorgis, 2021; Cloete et al., 2015; Seale & Cross, 2016; Zeleza, 2005). Another reason to increase scholarly engagement in the research of institutions on the continent and beyond is to not only explain but also change Africa’s position in the global context of higher education. This carries with it the necessity for an intrinsic motivation of contemporary scholarship to strive for pathways that boost the potential and creativity of younger generations in academia on the continent. Higher-​education stakeholders in and from Africa have started to embrace “engaged social scholarship” from their viewpoint and geographical perspective to set the course well (Cross, 2004). This chapter is based, firstly, on a selective overview of the literature with a clear emphasis on publications “from within,” and, secondly, on external observations from 2006 to the present regarding systemic developments of the institutions of higher education on the continent. It is complemented by discussions with individuals from within Africa: representatives of supranational agencies, stakeholders, politicians, activists, intellectuals, and scholar activists who have spent their professional lives reflecting on the academia they want for Africa. The chapter thus considers the following questions: What main issues, trends, and challenges are being articulated in higher education and

524   Christine Scherer higher-​education research in Africa at present? What is at stake on the functional, organizational, and political levels from a systemic perspective? What connects the discourse between Africa’s colonial legacies and a decolonized future of higher education? How will Africa find its own pathway to the higher education it wants in relation to necessities and desired outcomes, and its obvious potentials and strengths? Before answering these questions, it might be useful to state what “Africa” means for the purposes of the chapter. Is Africa, a continent of 54 independent countries, and each with its own distinct system of higher education, too diverse and too complex to meaningfully generalize on higher education on the continent? The answer is clearly no. Generalization is but one way to analyze pluriverse empirical realities. Constantly regrounded in how much sense it makes (Chabal, 2009), generalization can usefully highlight new perspectives despite the myriad diversities and complexities of the higher-​education contexts of a huge continent.

Coloniality as a Continuum in African Higher Education At the risk of repeating what numerous scholars have since some time hinted at, it is a fact that Africa has a long history of institutionalized academic teaching and learning frameworks and infrastructures for the creation, documentation, discussion, and dissemination of knowledge that is rooted in written and oral forms of expression. It is widely recognized that intellectual debate, a dialectical approach, and skepticism were institutionalized in Africa long before European colonialization (Jeppie & Diagne, 2008; Lulat, 2005; Teferra & Altbach, 2004; Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013). In the sociological sense, modern institutional higher education in Africa is defined here in alignment with Kenton Bell’s (2013, n.p.) definition of the “institution” as “a large-​scale social arrangement that is stable and predictable, created and maintained to serve the needs of society.” Viewed this way, higher education as it has been introduced on the continent is a consequence of colonialism embedded in modernity, as Bhambra (2011), Mbembe (2017), and Mignolo (2011) have described it each from their distinct scholarly perspectives and geographies. The higher-​ education landscapes in Africa were the systems that the colonial powers Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom implemented to meet their need for people with the administrative skills to work in the colonial administrations and settler societies. Fourah Bay College in Freetown, Sierra Leone, was the first college to be established by a colonial power, founded in 1827 by the United Kingdom’s Church Missionary Society. Between 1827 and 1952 the colonial regimes founded universities in South Africa, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Yet, as Assié-​Lumumba (2007) points out, the implementation of colonial education in universities was met with resistance: “The

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    525 reactions of Africans in general, when European education was first introduced, was characterized by the overwhelming rejection by leaders and the general population” (p. 30). Training and education in colonial universities nevertheless offered individuals diverse options to enhance their social status. However, critical intellectual and political leadership during and shortly after the struggles for independence was not necessarily based on training and education in a university but on the independent mind and agency of charismatic leaders. Only a few African intellectuals, including Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Kambarage Nyerere, followed the road to political leadership through the universities in Africa and, later, went abroad. The critical thinking and agency, including their admonitions about the Western education in African universities, can be seen in their numerous writings and speeches. Keeping in mind Bell’s definition of the “institution,” the following question becomes important from a systemic point of view: What kind of “social arrangement” has been created in Africa and maintained since independence, and for the needs of which societies? Nyamnjoh and Jua (2002) point out, “The practice since independence has been to model university education after universities in the West with each drawing of the institutions of the immediate past colonial master, or from the U.S.” (p. 8). Between 1960 and 1970, African organizations held a series of conferences to discuss the future of higher education on the continent. Supranational stakeholders like the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the Organization of African Unity (OAU); the Association of African Universities (AAU); and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) developed strategies in high-​level meetings with the ministers of education in the African member states held in Addis Ababa (1961), Abidjan (1964), Nairobi (1968), and Lagos (1976). Fewer than ten universities across the continent during this decade became central agents as “developmental universities” (Cloete et al., 2011). This shows how the idea of Africa's development after independence was linked to the university and the important role it could play. At the same time, public universities in many African countries were a manifestation of “national pride and self-​respect.” Governments were willing to provide them with funding because they believed in the central role of higher education in political as well as economic development (Coleman & Court, 1993). The goals of these universities were not only to teach Africans the skills they needed for postindependence development but also to restore identity and self-​esteem on a continent where, for centuries, human beings had been dehumanized and enslaved, colonized and exploited. The “Africanization” project thus became the second task of the modern institution as “a large-​scale social arrangement” (Woldegiorgis & Doevenspeck, 2013). Yet this arrangement lost its stability and predictability for several reasons. During the 1970s, as Africa’s public universities gained respect, trust, and esteem, enrollment rates grew considerably, and the teaching and learning infrastructures could not keep up. At the same time, as economic development stagnated, the need for well-​trained and skilled labor declined and led to unemployment.

526   Christine Scherer New economic priorities, strategies, and policies in the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had severe consequences. As Brock-​Utne (2003), among others, argues, these priorities, strategies, and policies were extremely hostile actions and damaged the development of the public institution of higher education in Africa with lasting consequences in order to reduce government spending and with it state deficits. One single example may illustrate this: The average government expenditure per student in Sub-​Saharan Africa was 6,300 USD in 1980, but in 1988, only 1,500 USD per student could be allocated. The revealing World Bank Policy Research Report (1994, p. 87) provoked scholarly debate when it was released in 1994, since the actions of the structural adjustment programs themselves contributed to the weakening of higher education in Africa to a large extent (Samoff & Caroll, 2003). At the end of 1990s, higher-​education organizations in Africa tried to regain their role. But by then, public trust in the reliability of the institution had been severely damaged, which, increasingly, led outstanding young academics to seek higher-​education training outside the continent. The era of the brain drain had begun. It became a severe burden for a continent whose young academics and skilled researchers sought affiliations beyond Africa. Only during the last two decades has Africa begun to reassert the importance of higher education as a key institution for the continent’s well-​being, despite giant challenges in curricula and teacher-​student ratio, strategic research priorities, and languages, just to mention a few (Bloom, 2005; Bloom et al., 2006).

The Institution from Within: Research on Higher Education in Africa In general, systematic research on higher education is a relatively young field of multi-​ and/​or interdisciplinary inquiry in all regions of the world. The same is true in Africa, where most of the higher-​education research has been published during the last two decades by a community of prolific authors. The analysis of Zavale and Schneijderberg (2020) showed that the increasing scholarly attention relates to four main spheres: (1) learning and teaching, (2) international organization, (3) transformation, and (4) social relevance. Conceptually, one may add two other perspectives: research on higher education as, first, a normative and conventional complex of functions, organizations, and policies and, second, a social field with immanent rules, power relations, and patterns of interaction on the personal and organizational levels. By examining 6,483 publications on higher education in Africa published between 1980 and 2019, Zavale and Schneijderberg identified these fields of research: policy and strategy, politics and governance, administration and organization; funding; societal engagement and third mission; teaching and learning; curriculum and disciplinary knowledge; student experience; access and equity; academics; history; quality assurance; gender; scientometrics;

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    527 globalization and internationalization; data and information systems; graduate education; challenges/​transformation; private institutions; and research methodology. Higher education in Africa has become an e​ ncompassing topic of scholarly debate over the last two decades. The research themes are manifold, specific, and increasingly differentiated, exploring questions on research and innovation; teaching, learning, and student engagement; gender, equity, and the social dimensions of higher education; digitalization and green higher education; internationalization, infrastructure, financing, and governance; research excellence and the diversification of missions; standards and quality assurance; the efforts and impacts of regionalization; evidence-​based research, modes of knowledge production in preparation for or the evaluation of higher-​ education policies and strategies. Higher-​ education research reflects multiple disciplinary perspectives, and it is undertaken by sociologists, lawyers, political scientists, historians, economists, administrative scientists, educationalists, philosophers, psychologists, literary scholars, geographers, and anthropologists, among others. Higher-​education research often investigates and reflects on themes in tandem with prepolicy or postpolicy objectives to develop evidence-​based understandings of aspects of higher education from an individual perspective, as well as from the functional, organizational, and political angles. Knight (2017, p. 18) introduced a model known as the as Functional, Organizational and Political Angles model (FOPA; Figure 28.1) to examine regionalization in African higher education. This model is useful in sketching the current alignments of the distinct functional higher-​education systems, organizational architectures, and political will, complex as these may be in their respective national, subregional, or continental set-​ups. In an ideal type, the common denominators design the higher-​education institution from a functional perspective toward an “Africa we want” to facilitate the alignment and transparency needed to guide the systematic involvement of organizations, networks, and agencies. This relies on common ground and the political will to provide the higher-​education frameworks that Africa for itself wants to see institutionalized: as the academia Africa wants, so that it can claim its space and stake its position within a global framework of higher education. As the model suggests, the three conceptual approaches—​functional, organizational, and political—​are connected. These perspectival angles oscillate between the micro-​and macro levels and tackle all aspects of institutional higher education, including the African university, research, teaching and learning, infrastructure and financing, international cooperation, local organizational governance, quality assurance, research excellence, and, more recently, gender and digitalization. However, these themes are examined differently in each approach, and the perspectives on the themes also differ due to the distinct sociocultural contexts of the subregions and countries. In South Africa, for example, the conceptual topic and practical implementation of the decolonialization of the system has been a major driver of higher-​education transformation since the 1980s. Decolonialization, however, is less tackled and discussed in publications that report the research done in regional and local contexts elsewhere on

528   Christine Scherer

Functional Interaction of systems and policies, collaborative programs

Organizational Organizations, networks, frameworks, agencies

The Academia Africa wants

Political Declarations, agreements, summits

Figure 28.1  The Functional, Organizational, and Political Angles model. Adapted from Knight (2017, p. 18).

the continent. In an operationalized sense, then, the academia Africa wants lies in the common denominator of functional, organizational, and political alignment. When we engage with the perspectives on higher education in distinct regions based on the literature, we can identify three main categories of scholarly engagement and perspectival priorities; there is an interplay among these, but each also follows a particular agenda: (1) the recommendation agenda; (2) the decolonization agenda; and (3) the alternative agenda.

Recommendation Agenda This constitutes the major part of literature and centers on structural and organizational developments in public and private universities. Empirical, evidence-​based, and in-​depth observations yield insights into challenging and problematic issues—​namely, weak research and teaching infrastructure, bad top-​down governance, inefficient management, massification, the lack of funding, unequal access to tertiary education, and discrimination of women and minorities in universities. Such criticism of the current higher-​education set-​ups in Africa are reflected in the descriptions of the status quo and of the urgent need for change and improvement. The focus is on the problems that are pressuring the existing set-​ups of higher education systems in the countries and nations of Africa. This line of scholarly engagement can be summarized as recommendation research because it contains recommendations for how higher education in Africa can “catch-​up”; it not only identifies the challenges and problems but also proposes short-​, mid-​, or long-​term solutions. The goal is to foster better understanding and to trigger swift action to achieve competitive excellence, improved pedagogy and training. Another aim is to promote a more Africanized curricula, or to advocate for the enhancement of student affairs such as improved scholarship and funding structures, and to reflect measures for increased employability. In this context, the critique refers

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    529 to the immanent aspects of systems; organizations such as colleges, public and private universities; and research institutions in Africa, which are implicitly compared with those of other world regions.

Decolonialization Agenda A more conceptual direction of research and writing that is dedicated to pointing to the continuum of dominant, postcolonial, Eurocentric power structures that claim to be “universal, disembodied, truthful, and decontextualized” (Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2021, p. 86). Under critical scrutiny as elitist sciences “made in the West,” these structures are being questioned, not only in terms of their suitability as agents for the betterment of the world but also as tools for maintaining a status quo that disadvantages Africa and the Global South. Thus the current global institution of higher learning is perpetuating higher education systems in Africa as a continuum of colonial legacies, neoliberal agency, and neoliberal ways of knowledge production (Mbembe, 2016; Nyamnjoh, 2019; Santos, 2018). Intellectuals from the Global South, Africa in particular, and the diaspora have long since articulated a strong critique of the colonialized mind in local, regional, and international contexts and of higher education worldwide. Ngugi wa Thiong’O (1992, 2014) was one of the first to scrutinize Eurocentrism and to point out the need to be emancipated from it by decolonizing the mind. And now other scholars are rethinking the social sciences, in particular, European approaches to African studies (Akyeampong, 2012; Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, 2018, 2020, 2021; Taiwo, 2012). African feminist scholars paved the way for reflections on the politics of gender in the social sciences and the male-​dominated institution of higher education on the African continent (Mama, 2017). As diverse as the epistemic points of departure in the current project of decolonializing higher education may be, most authors agree that it is a joint endeavor. This means that the continent no longer provides for sites and locations of research for the knowledge production of the Global North but “re-​ searches” itself. Scholars in South Africa who have witnessed the Apartheid system follow a particularly consequent route of transformation of higher education and accompany its core organization, the African university, in the framework of decolonization. This route engages scholarship far beyond the continent in a dialogue and dialectic debate over taken-​for-​granted paradigms. It can be summarized as the decolonialization approach. Despite its diversity of approaches, viewpoints and distinct foci, the decolonization approaches have in common the aim of calling attention to that and to why things in a globalized knowledge economy are uneven, unjust, and do go wrong—​not only in and for Africa but also for other regions of the Global South—​where research, teaching, and learning need to provoke existing structures and power relations (Shay, 2016).

530   Christine Scherer

Alternative Agenda The alternative agenda of scholarly debate represents the smallest published body of work. It can be understood as a search for alternatives and a “re-​search” for creativity in the generation, not the production of knowledge. It juxtaposes and emphasizes new activist concepts, practical ideas, and theoretical approaches to higher education coming from the Global South, and combines these with a seminal scrutiny of conventional academia with its claims of meritocracy, standards, quality, and excellence as both elusive and critically resistant to change in the institution of higher education in general. International measuring tools and performance indicators such as rankings, ratings, and different forms of metrics for publishing, among others, are under scrutiny in these perspectives on the functional level. By providing examples and creating knowledge about the alternatives to a standardized status quo that exist in African contexts without dismissing some of the potentials of the status quo, such voices make the case for an open and inclusive institution of higher education. One important facet of this research agenda is that strategies are articulated for a variety and diversity of stakeholders, locally, nationally, and internationally. However, these three research agendas do not exist in isolation from each other. Instead, they reflect the multiple systemic relations of higher education in Africa with its three core missions as a social institution of (1) teaching and learning, (2) researching and innovating, and (3) outreaching and transferring into society.

The Institution from Outside: Higher Education in Africa from a Systemic Perspective By mid-​2021, news had quickly spread via social media that the African Academy of Sciences (AAS), founded in 1985 and based in Nairobi, Kenya, was undergoing a severe crisis (Nature, 2021). There were reports in the media that the academy, traditionally responsible for capacity building and science advocacy, had lost key international funders, who had withdrawn from a funding partnership called the Alliance for Accelerating Excellence in Science in Africa. The alliance had been created in 2015 by global funding partners, among them the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the UK government, and the London-​based Wellcome Trust, the African Union Development Agency, and the academy. Despite the unusual constellation of a science academy being a central agent for and host of international funding schemes, the international funders agreed that the AAS hosts the funding platform in order to bring “the center of gravity” for African research and funding closer to Africa. The August editorial in the journal Nature (2021) explained that the AAS platform hosted such schemes as the Human Heredity

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    531 & Health in Africa (H3Africa) project, with US $176 million in funding, a consortium that undertakes fundamental research into diseases in Africa. Another of its schemes is a $100 million initiative called Developing Excellence in Leadership, Training and Science in Africa. The succinct explanation for the withdrawal of the funders was a “loss of trust” owing to corruption and mismanagement in the AAS. The Science for Africa Foundation, headquartered in New York, immediately began hiring staff who had been released by the AAS (Nordling, 2022). As a core mission the foundation addresses scientific capacity building, knowledge transfer, and science diplomacy. As the group’s website, Science4Africa, explains: We pair experienced and established academics in the U.S., Canada and Europe to emerging scientists and researchers on the African continent. Whether it is joint research projects, young scientist mentorship, or virtual lectures, we empower scientists in Africa to address critical issues relevant to the continent through scientific research. (Science for Africa, 2020)

One is reminded of what Hountondji (1990) more than 30 years ago called “scientific dependency.” But achieving independent agency in organizations of higher education in Africa will need not only the political will from outside the continent but also common ground on functional levels within Africa. However, the AAS example illustrates how African stakeholders continue to grapple with their relative systemic autonomy in their mission, and more so, for ownership of developments in higher education for Africa. “Weak performance,” and not only in the AAS case, is the institutionalized narrative that African higher education lags behind that of other world regions and is trying to catch up. The AAS example is embedded in the narratives of dysfunctional organizational structures in institutional higher education in Africa and in the connected organizations, from the university to the science academy. On functional, organizational and political levels, the AAS example can be situated in the ongoing framework of dependency (Hountondji, 1990). What follows is a reflection on the mission and vision of the institution of higher education in Africa as it looks toward future possibilities. A “possibility” is a choice among a range of options, one alternative among several imagined alternatives that already exist. Possibilities are rooted and imagined in scholarly contributions and also in political will and claim in the African Union’s Agenda 2063, titled The Africa We Want. The following reflections deal with this imagination, critical as this may be, reflected by knowledgeable authors like Ndizera and Muzee (2018). Nonetheless, the question must be asked: From a systemic point of departure, what can be envisioned for higher education in Africa for future generations? Table 28.1 sketches some of the possibilities based on the dependencies described by Paulin Hountondji in the 1990s (without any claim of completeness). While the status quo as summarized by Hountondji (1990) may develop into future alternatives over time, it is necessary to return to the definition of an institution of higher education as “a stable and predictable large-​scale social arrangement created and

Table 28.1. Future Alternatives Dependencies

Present

Future

Technology

Stems often from other world regions. Africa is barely producing.

Collaboration on subregional and Pan-​ African levels to invent and produce technology in Africa crucial for the research on the continent.

Research

(Ethno) sciences in Africa conducted by non-​African researchers, often with the support of African researchers but with reduced acknowledgment of them

Facilitation of potentials of coming generations of scholars as a priority of intra-​African higher education development and research strategies by reconfigured international research collaboration.

Library

Large repositories, libraries, Joint efforts of global (supranational) and research archives on Africa organizations and concerted partnerships exist in other world regions. to create and digitalize libraries and open-​ access programs with African stakeholders for international and reciprocal share of content

Mobility

Movement of young intellectuals to other world regions (brain drain) to learn, research, and engage in academic communities disconnected from the continent

African regional and subregional research areas with local, regional, and intra-​African exchange; joint intra-​Africa research strategies; programming and collaboration with other world regions

Application

Lack of basic research and theorization

New methodologies, creative approaches, basic research, and the offer of continental epistemological and ontological pluralism

Target

Research results are directed and disseminated to international scientific communities.

Research in Africa on Africa is disseminated by Africans for Africans (also). Science communication via diverse channels in Africa is becoming another priority for international collaboration.

Appropriation

“Ethno” science as Western invention of Africanized approach

Revaluation of indigenous/​endogenous sciences as political will and research complex for the “unlearning” of dominant anthropocentric knowledge production: (new) epistemologies from the Global South.

Language

European languages are “Radical Copernical revolution” by dominant in the systems; Asian revaluing, and reintroducing African languages are also increasing. languages on large scales

Internationalization

Lacking communication within Increasing self-​esteem of intra-​Africa and between African countries academic exchange and push for international collaboration beyond the West.

Source: Adapted from Hountondji (1990).

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    533 maintained to serve the needs of society.” What, then, will the future mission of higher education in Africa be? Long-​term observation suggests that such visions have existed quietly in the background but are at hand and on the table today and in the imaginations of numerous intellectuals. Yet they are not manifested in the organizations. Therefore, the following assumption: African intellectual approaches to redesigning higher education in Africa, as multiple as these may be and expressed from the distinct geographies on and beyond the continent and its subregions including distinct countries, all these approaches are pushing for the theoretical rethinking of higher education with practical social scholarly and activist engagement for the creation of “better knowledge,” as has been discussed elsewhere (Scherer & Sooryamoorthy 2022, p. 29). As such, these theoretical reflections and practical engagements are reactions to a more general, timelier project: The “re-​ search” of higher education with its conventional ways of producing knowledge. As a timely project it is spearheaded by scholars in the humanities and, in particular, from the Global South.

Visions from Africa for the Decolonization of the Mind beyond Africa Despite all constraints, researchers in and from Africa, from their institutional and individual positions in higher-​education organizations in Africa and worldwide, contribute to basic and seminal research; theorize and challenge existing theories in the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences; and offer new concepts. African scholars foster research training on the continent and create, generate, and share their knowledge at international conferences and in African and international peer-​reviewed journals, and they support relevant research on the local, national, subregional levels as much as on the continental and global ones. It is because of widespread ignorance that Africa is deemed marginal in the “creation” of knowledge of the world. Other world regions may see it marginal in comparison with their sheer “production” of knowledge and thus as trying to catch-​up with research, development, and innovation. But socially engaged African researchers, lecturers, supervisors, administrators, and leaders in top management positions in African universities, colleges, and other higher-​education organizations are meeting the daily demands of academic life in challenging settings; and they are, nonetheless, aligning transformative dynamics and values within the institution of higher education. Current international indicators of excellence characterize and create visibility with rankings that prioritize the recognition of citations, prizes, and third-​party funding; the impact on the research community; the numbers of scholarly exchange; transfer to the

534   Christine Scherer society and the economy; relation to and impact on society; and publications in highly ranked journals identified as such mainly beyond Africa. Due to systemic facets of how the global institution of higher education is functioning, organized, and politically prepared, Africa is striving for harvesting capacity. This is guided and evaluated, generating and manifesting ownership of African pathways to higher education, diverse as these may be in their organizational missions and, certainly, in the visions of many individual intellectuals. It is therefore not only timely that scholars from the Global South and in particular Africa sensitize and spearhead a scholarly activism for a decolonialization of the university as a core organization of the institution of higher education. One central option is to reinsert and renew academic skepticism into the set-​up of the institution itself, whose maxim and current aim is to accelerate knowledge production using every means and at all costs. Theoretical standpoints and operationalized approaches in the self-​reflection of academia are important to rebalance and foster the identification of new institutional priorities: the teaching, learning, and researching in its organizations, including colleges, public and private universities, research centers, alliances of excellence, science academies, and others. Thinking, designing and implementing diverse epistemologies for a “re-​vision” of the institution can impact and strengthen higher education as a global institution.

Conclusion The chapter offered an overview of higher education in Africa by discussing it within an institutional framework as a modern social institution in the sociological sense. It summarized main approaches, lines of scholarly approaches, and thought based on a thorough look at the literature, by reviewing contributions from authors based in Africa and African authors based in the diaspora. By framing and categorizing diverse lines of approach and priorities, the chapter provided an insight into higher education in Africa in its systemic relational contexts. One aspect of these is the powerful discourse on decolonization being driven by intellectuals and activist scholars in and from Africa and the diaspora. Positioned in a relational context, the chapter suggested that any agency—​be it of the individual scholar or the institution—​is shaped by this discourse and embedded in systemic agency. Both are primed by African scholarly activism for a renewal, not least of the institution of higher education. By observing the institution of higher education in Africa from a scholarly standpoint that is located outside the continent yet collaborates closely with and has listened for three decades to socially engaged intellectuals from Africa, a curious view of possibilities and alternatives is not astonishing. Long ago, African intellectuals initiated the rethinking of all facets of higher education in Africa and suggested an Africa-​ centered approach to the empirical and creative generation of knowledge. This approach is today challenging anyone on a systemic relational level to rethink the production of

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    535 knowledge and acknowledge that some aspects of it need reconsideration. What has been taken for granted, starting with the narrative of marginality, is deeply rooted in the historical legacy of colonialism and the modern global institution of higher education. The reasons for African marginality in higher education, or the narrative about it, have ceased to be taken for granted in Africa and the diaspora. However, some current scenarios, such as the case of the AAS, reveal contradictions and discrepancies. But since institutions are made by humans, the human factor in these scenarios in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, does not always self-​evidently imply responsibility and reliability. Here, the consideration of values comes in. Will these values be the same tomorrow? However, the momentum toward responsibility and reliability for an institution of higher education that serves the relational world in a systemic sense is a global endeavor that, at its core, must engage with the decolonialization of one’s own anthropocentric mind. As mentioned before, pioneering examples stem from African scholarly contexts in which politically driven activist scholars are revaluing diverse forms of knowing. One of these is exposed in the form of so-​called Indigenous knowledge and consequently imagined and implemented in alternative ways of observing and finding solutions. Solutions from the Global South are at hand and ready for exchange. Therefore, research on the multiple functional aspects, organizational issues, and political dimensions of higher education will not only address but also prepare for and accompany indispensable change, and not only in the realm of teaching, learning, and research. Also, for example, the context of international collaboration will have to accommodate the permeability of the diversity in the knowledge created, which is aimed at learning to accept and acknowledge diverse epistemologies. Universities in Africa were initially formed and developed in relation to specific colonial needs of teaching, research, and knowledge transfer. After the 1960s, when most countries on the continent became independent, national, international, transnational, and supranational policies shaped and impacted how universities were governed and managed and how those policies served various functions in their immediate local or national contexts. Africa’s universities experience most of the trends and challenges that exist in universities elsewhere, including underfunding and massification. However, they have been marginalized as a sphere for the creation of knowledge by complex systemic relationalities. The big and open question nonetheless remains: What kind of institution will higher education (in Africa) have to be in the future to serve the needs of societies? To summarize what a vision would or could mean for Africa means looking beyond the African continent: knowledge generated creatively for a carefully sustained globe, created by a diversity of decolonialized minds whose relational mindful reflexivity could become the momentum for a reconfiguration of higher education. This is not naive—​on the contrary, it is important and timely. So far, in its higher-​education landscapes, Africa shares the institutional claims that were inserted with Western modernity and currently reflects them in its systems, academic structures, and scholarly conventions, which are perpetuated by individuals in the organizations who make the institution. Higher

536   Christine Scherer education in Africa is systematically and systemically impacted by the narrative of its marginality. This narration is at present largely positioned within a neoliberal framework clothed in the respective jargon. Understanding “knowledge production” as the measurable generation of new knowledge for innovation, impacting the contribution to dissemination, sidelines the continent (Marginson, 2010; Obeng-​Odoom, 2019) to the periphery of what this globe’s regions could learn with and from each other.

Acronym AAS

African Academy of Sciences

References African Academy of Sciences. (2020, May 14). Research and development goals for COVID-​19 in Africa [AAS priority setting exercise]. https://​relief​web.int/​rep​ort/​world/​resea​rch-​and-​deve​ lopm​ent-​goals-​covid-​19-​afr​ica Aina, T. A. (2010). Beyond reforms: The politics of higher education transformation in Africa. African Studies Review, 53, 21–​40. https://​doi.org/​10.1353/​arw.0.0290 Akyeampong, E. K. (2012). The African voice in African studies today. In H. Lauer & K. Anyidoho (Eds.), Reclaiming the human sciences and humanities through African perspectives (pp. 982–​989). Sub-​Saharan Publishers. http://​197.255.68.203/​han​dle/​123456​789/​4433 Ali, W. (2020). Online and remote learning in higher education institutes: A necessity in light of COVID-​19 pandemic. Higher Education Studies, 10, 16–​25. https://​files.eric.ed.gov/​fullt​ ext/​EJ1259​642.pdf Assié-​Lumumba, T. (2007). Higher education in Africa: Crises, reforms and transformation. African Books Collective. Asubiaro, T. V., & Shaik, H. (2021). Sub-​Saharan African countries’ COVID-​19 research: An analysis of the external and internal contributions, collaboration patterns and funding sources. Open Information Science, 5, 263–​277. https://​www.degruy​ter.com/​docum​ent/​doi/​ 10.1515/​opis-​2020-​0125/​html Barbosa, A. (2010). Modern colonialism in African education: The wave of foreign investment in Sub-​Saharan Africa. Vermont Connection, 31, 29–​36. https://​schol​arwo​rks.uvm.edu/​tvc/​ vol31/​iss1/​4 Bell, K. (Ed.). (2013). “Institution.” In Open Education Sociology Dictionary. Retrieved from https://​soci​olog​ydic​tion​ary.org/​inst​itut​ion/​ Bhambra, G. K. (2011). Historical sociology, modernity, and postcolonial critique. American Historical Review, 116, 653–​662. https://​doi.org/​10.1086/​ahr.116.3.653 Bloom, D. (2005). Raising the pressure: Globalization and the need for higher education reform. In G. Jones, P. McCarney, & M. Skolnik (Eds.), Creating knowledge, strengthening nations: The changing role of higher education. University of Toronto Press (pp. 21–​41). https://​ doi.org/​10.3138/​978144​2673​564 Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., & Chan, K. (2006). Higher education and poverty in Sub-​Saharan Africa. International Higher Education, 45, 6–​7. https://​doi.org/​10.6017/​ihe.2006.45.7924

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    537 Brahima, A., Turner, I., & Woldegiorgis, E. T. (2021). Epilogue: A long way towards a decolonial future in African higher education. In E. T. Woldegiorgis, I. Turner & A. Brahima (Eds.), Decolonisation of higher education in Africa. Perspectives from hybrid knowledge production (pp. 230–​239). Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978042​9355​288 Brock-​Utne, B. (2003). Formulating higher education policies in Africa: The pressure from external forces and the neoliberal agenda. Journal of Higher Education in Africa /​Revue de l’enseignement supérieur en Afrique, 1, 24–​56. Chabal, P. (2009). Africa: The politics of suffering and smiling. Bloomsbury. Cloete, N., Bailey, T., & Pillay, P. (2011). Universities and economic development in Africa. African Minds. Cloete, N., Maassen, P., & Bailey, T. (2015). Knowledge production and contradictory functions in African higher education. African Minds. http://​libr​ary.oapen.org/​han​dle/​ 20.500.12657/​28918 Coleman J. & Court D. (1993). University development in the Third World: The Rockefeller Foundation experience. Pergamon. Cross, M. (2004). Institutionalising campus diversity in South African higher education: Review of diversity scholarship and diversity education. Higher Education, 47, 387–​410. https://​doi.org/​10.1023/​B:HIGH.000​0020​854.04852.80 Guleid, F. H., Oyando, R., Kabia, E., Mumbi, A., Akech, S., & Barasa, E. (2021). A bibliometric analysis of COVID-​19 research in Africa. BMJ Global Health, 6, 1–​7. http://​dx.doi.org/​ 10.1136/​bmjgh-​2021-​005​690 Hountondji, P. J. (1990). Scientific dependence in Africa today. Research in African Literatures, 21, 5–​15. Jegede, O. (2012). The status of higher education in Africa. http://​pro​duct​ion-​carne​gie​ .s3.amazon​aws.com/​filer​_​pub​lic/​5e/​d0/​5ed04​cc9-​b250-​48e5-​b9ee-​dd97b​3f91​39a/​ccny​_​spe​ ech_​2012​_​sta​tus.pdf Jeppie, S., & Diagne, S. B. (Eds.). (2008). The meanings of Timbuktu. HSRC Press in association with CODESRIA. Johns Hopkins University. (n.d.). COVID-​19 Map. https://​coro​navi​rus.jhu.edu/​map.html, accessed on December 4, 2020. Knight, J. (2017). The concept and process of higher education regionalization. In J. Knight, & E. T. Woldegiorgis (Eds.), Regionalization of African higher education: Progress and prospects (pp. 11–​28). Springer. https://​link.sprin​ger.com/​book/​10.1007/​978-​94-​6300-​956-​0 Lawal, Y. (2021). Africa’s low COVID-​19 mortality rate: A paradox? International Journal of Infectious Diseases, 102, 118–​122. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.ijid.2020.10.038 Levy, D. (2007). A recent echo: African private higher education in an international perspective. Journal of Higher Education in Africa /​Revue de l’enseignement supérieur en Afrique, 5, 197–​220. Lulat, Y. M. (2005). A history of African higher education from antiquity to the present: A critical synthesis. Greenwood. Malik, N. (2020, March 23). Afrika steht alleine da. Der Freitag Plus [The Friday plus]. https://​ www.frei​tag.de https://​www.frei​tag.de/​auto​ren/​the-​guard​ian/​afr​ika-​steht-​alle​ine-​da Mama, A. (2017). The power of feminist Pan-​African intellect. Feminist Africa, 22, 1–​15. https://​ fem​inis​tafr​ica.net/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2019/​05/​fa2​2_​sp​ecia​l_​ed​itor​ial.pdf Marginson, S. (2010). Higher education in the global knowledge economy. Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2, 6962–​6980. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.sbs​pro.2010.05.049

538   Christine Scherer Marinoni, G., van’t Land, H., & Jensen, T. (2020). The impact of Covid-​19 on higher education around the world (IAU global survey report). International Association of Universities, pp. 42. https://​www.uniss.it/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​news/​iau_​covid19_​and_​he_​s​urve​y_​re​port​_​fin​ al_​m​ay_​2​020.pdf Mbembe, A. (2017). Critique of black reason. Duke University Press. https://​doi.org/​10.1515/​ 978082​2373​230 Mbembe, J. (2016). Decolonizing the university: New directions. Arts & Humanities in Higher Education, 15, 29–​45. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​14740​2221​5618​513 Mehler, A., & Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2022). Academic cooperation in the humanities and social sciences: A post-​Covid future. In C. Greiner, S. V. Wolputte, M. Bollig (Eds.), African Futures (pp. 367–​374). Brill. https://​doi.org/​10.1163/​978900​4471​641_​032 Mignolo, W. (2011). The darker side of Western modernity: Global futures, decolonial options. Duke University Press. Muftahu, M. (2020). Higher education and Covid-​ 19 pandemic: Matters arising and the challenges of sustaining academic programs in developing African universities. International Journal of Educational Research Review, 5, 417–​423. https://​doi.org/​10.24331/​ ijere.776​470 Nature (2021, November 3). The African Academy of Sciences is in crisis—​responsibility must be shared [Editorial]. https://​www.nat​ure.com/​artic​les/​d41​586-​021-​02991-​9 Ndizera, V., & Muzee, H. (2018). A critical review of Agenda 2063: Business as usual? African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Review, 12, 142–​154. https://​doi.org/​ 10.5897/​AJP​SIR2​018.1114 Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2018). Epistemic freedom in Africa. Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​ 978042​9492​204 Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2020). Decolonization, development and knowledge in Africa: Turning over a new leaf. Routledge. Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J. (2021). Internationalization of higher education for pluriversity: A decolonial reflection. Journal of the British Academy, 9, 77–​98. https://​doi.org/​10.5871/​jba/​ 009s1.077 Nordling, L. (2022, January 27). Funds pulled from AAS may flow to new foundation. Research Professional News. https://​www.resea​rchp​rofe​ssio​naln​ews.com/​rr-​news-​afr​ica-​pan-​afri​ can-​2022-​1-​funds-​pul​led-​from-​aas-​may-​flow-​to-​new-​fou​ndat​ion/​ Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2019). Decolonizing the university in Africa. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. https://​doi.org/​10.1093/​acref​ore/​978019​0228​637.013.717 Nyamnjoh, F., & Jua, N. (2002). African universities in crisis and the promotion of a democratic culture: The political economy of violence in African educational systems. African Studies Review, 45, 1–​26. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00020​2060​0031​401 Obeng-​Odoom, F. (2019). The intellectual marginalisation of Africa. African Identities, 17, 211–​ 224. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​14725​843.2019.1667​223 Ogola, G. (2021). Covid-​ 19, knowledge production and the (un)making of truths and fakes. Journal of African Cultural Studies, 33, 305–​311. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​13696​ 815.2021.1897​536 Ramphele, M. (2004). The university as an actor in development: New perspectives and demands. Journal of Higher Education in Africa /​Revue de l’enseignement supérieur en Afrique, 2, 15–​33. Samoff, J., & Carrol, B. (2003). From manpower planning to the knowledge era: World Bank policies on higher education in Africa [Document code ED.2004/​WS/​8]. UNESCO. https://​ unes​doc.une​sco.org/​ark:/​48223/​pf000​0134​782

Challenges to Higher Education in Africa    539 Santos, B. de S. (2018). The end of the cognitive empire: The coming of age of epistemologies of the South. Duke University Press. https://​doi.org/​10.1215/​978147​8002​000 Sawahel, Y. (2021, December 9). Academics from 12 universities on a global citation list. University World News Africa edition. https://​www.univ​ersi​tywo​rldn​ews.com/​post​ .php?story=​202112​0813​5142​566 Sawyerr, A. (2004). Challenges facing African universities: Selected issues. African Studies Review, 47, 1–​59. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00020​2060​0026​986 Scherer, C., & Sooryamoorthy, R. (2022). Understanding higher education in Africa from distinct geographies. In C. Scherer & R. Sooryamoorthy (Eds.), Doctoral training and higher education in Africa (pp. 18–​35). Routledge. https://​doi.org/​10.4324/​978100​3183​952 Science for Africa. (2020). Scientific research capacity building for Africa. Science4Africa. https://​sci​ence​4afr​ica.org/​ Seale, O., & Cross, M. (2016) Leading and managing in complexity: The case of South African deans. Studies in Higher Education, 41, 1514–​1532. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​03075​ 079.2014.988​705 Shay, S. (2016, June 13). Decolonising the curriculum: It’s time for a strategy. The Conversation. https://​thec​onve​rsat​ion.com/​deco​loni​sing​the-​cur​ricu​lum-​its-​time-​for-​a-​strat​egy-​60598 Soy, A. (2021, October 8). Coronavirus in Africa: Five reasons why Covid-​19 has been less deadly than elsewhere. BBC News. https://​www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​afr​ica-​54418​613 Taiwo, O. (2012). What is “African studies”? African scholars, Africanists, scholars and the production of knowledge. In H. Lauer & K. Anyidoho (Eds.), Reclaiming the human sciences and humanities through African perspectives (pp. 966–​981). Sub-​Saharan Publishers. http://​ 197.255.68.203/​han​dle/​123456​789/​4433 Teferra, D., & Altbach, P. G. (2004). African higher education: Challenges for the 21st century. Higher Education, 47, 21–​50. https://​doi.org/​10.1023/​B:HIGH.000​0009​822.49980.30 Wa Thiong’O, N. (1992). Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature. East African Publishers. https://​www.uibk.ac.at/​anglis​tik/​staff/​davis/​decol​onis​ing-​the​ -mind.pdf Wa Thiong'O, N. (2014). Globalectics: Theory and the politics of knowing. Columbia University Press. World Health Organization. (2020). WHO director-​ general’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-​ 19 –​ 11 March 2020. https://​www.who.int/​direc​tor-​gene​ ral/ ​ s peec ​ h es/ ​ d et​ a il/​ w ho-​ d irec​ t or-​ g ene​ r al-​ s - ​ o pen ​ i ng- ​ rema ​ r ks- ​ at- ​ t he- ​ m edia- ​ brief​ ing-​on-​covid-​19-​-​-​11-​march-​2020 Woldegiorgis, E. T. (2022). The challenges of online learning in African higher education: A critical reflection on the digital divide associated with the COVID-​19 pandemic. In E. T. Woldegiorgis & P. Jonck (Eds.), Higher education in the face of a global pandemic (pp. 11–​ 27). Brill. Woldegiorgis, E. T., & Doevenspeck, M. (2013). The changing role of higher education in Africa: A historical reflection. Higher Education Studies, 3, 35–​45. https://​doi.org/​10.5539/​ hes.v3n6​p35 World Bank. (1994). Higher education: The lessons of experience. https://​doi.org/​10.1596/​ 0-​8213-​2745-​3 Zavale, N. C., & Schneijderberg, C. (2020). Mapping the field of research on African higher education: A review of 6483 publications from 1980 to 2019. Higher Education, 83, 199–​233. https://​doi.org/​10.1007/​s10​734-​020-​00649-​5 Zeleza, P. T. (2005). The academic diaspora and knowledge production in and on Africa: What role for CODESRIA? In T. Mkandawire (Ed.), African intellectuals: Rethinking politics,

540   Christine Scherer language, gender, and development (pp. 209–​234). Zed Books. https://​doi.org/​10.5040/​978135​ 0218​147.ch-​010 Zeleza, P. T. (2016). The transformation of global higher education, 1945–​2015. Springer. Zheng, Y., & Walsham, G. (2021). Inequality of what? An intersectional approach to digital inequality under Covid-​19. Information and Organization, 31, article 100341 https://​doi.org/​ 10.1016/​j.inf​oand​org.2021.100​341

Index

Tables and figures are indicated by t and f following the page number Abraham, K., 472 Abuja Declaration (2001), 239, 285, 293–​95 Achachi, H., 316 Achebe, C., 410, 420 Acta Criminologica: African Journal of Criminology and Victimology, 435 Acts of the Apostles, 119 Addae, E. A., 221 Adegbindin, O., 24 Adejuwon, K. D., 333 Adepoju, A., 486 Adesina, F. A., 364, 369, 372, 375 Adjei, S. B., 182 Adogame, A., 129 AEC Treaty, 294 Afenifere, 82 Africa Health Strategy 2007–​2015, 222 African Academy of Sciences (AAS), 530–​ 31, 535 African Church, 123 African Common Market (ACM), 293 African communitarian epistemology (ACE), 25–​26 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), 285, 295–​97 African Economic Community (AEC), 285, 293–​94 African Epistemologies course, 45 African Gender Institute (AGI), 146 African Human Rights Commission, 451–​52 African Indigenous Churches (AICs), 100–​ 101, 124–​25 African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 407 African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 123 African National Congress, 352

African National Union–​Patriotic Front, 84 African Philosophy and Thought module, 46 African Research Universities Alliance (ARUA), 310 African Sociological Review, 318–​19 African sociology concepts, definitions, 20–​21 emergence/​development, 4–​5 Eurocentrism in, 4–​6 Indigenization in, 5–​6 Indigenous knowledge systems in, 4 knowledge production in, 6–​8 need for, 8–​9 population statistics, 363 roots of, 4 African Trade Observatory, 296 African Union, 15, 89, 222, 285, 307, 309 African Union Commission (AUC), 295 African Union Development Agency (AUDA), 310, 530 African Women in Media, 146 Africa We Want, The, 531 Afrocentricity in education, 45–​49 epistemology, 32–​33 worldview, 24–​29, 42–​43 Agenda, 138 Agenda 2063, 285, 288–​89, 295–​97 Ageyo, J., 373 Agozino, B., 407, 413, 414, 416, 417, 419 Aguleri-​Umulere conflict (Igbo), 81 Ahikire, J., 138 Ahlerup, P., 78 Aididd, M. F., 472 Àìná, T. A., 201 Ajibade, O., 129

542   Index Akan, 388 Ake, C., 5, 290, 414 Akinbobola, Y., 145, 146 Akìwọwọ, A. A., 5, 8, 50, 196 Aladura, 124–​25 Alatas, S. H., 40, 49 Al-​Azhar, 103 Alexandria School (Egypt), 119 Algeria climate change in, 369–​72, 370f climate change mitigation strategies, 376 human rights NGOs in, 396–​97 Kabyle movement, 393 political economy in, 281 religious places in, 105 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 312t university founding in, 524–​25 Alidou, O. D., 155, 156, 167 Allan, H., 465 Alliance for Accelerating Excellence in Science in Africa, 530 Allied Democratic Force (ADF), 450 Allman, J., 140 alloparenting, 504 Alma-​Ata Declaration (1978), 215 al-​Qaida, 470, 473 Al-​Shabaab, 15, 420, 472–​75 Alubo, O., 198 Amadiume, I., 146, 167 Amazigh/​Amazigh Manifesto, 393, 398n3 amaZioni, 124–​25 Ambivalence of the Sacred, The (Appleby), 106 American Africa Inland Mission, 121 American Anthropological Association (AAA), 60 American Psychological Association (APA), 60 American Sociological Association (ASA), 60 American trypanosomiasis, 250 Amin, S., 272, 290 Ampofo, A. A., 146 Àmúlù Odù, 24 Anderson, B., 474 Andeweg, R. B., 85 Andrade, S. Z., 155 Anglican Church/​Province of Kenya, 121

Anglican Communion, 129–​30 Angola climate change in, 369–​72, 370f climate change mitigation strategies, 374, 377 human rights NGOs in, 396–​97 IPV in, 179t, 181 Pan-​Africanism in, 291 urbanization in (see urbanization) Ani, N., 26 Anja, K. B., 78 Ansar al-​Din, 470 Anugwom, E. E., 5–​7, 45 apartheid. See also South Africa authoritarian populism effects, 413 Christian church endorsement of, 131 criminology under, 413, 414 education and, 529 Euro-​American criminological knowledge, 408–​15, 418, 426–​30, 429t healthcare system under, 232 imprisonment of women, 436–​37 Pan-​Africanism and, 291 racial classification laws, 70 redistributive politics, 41 socialization process, 40–​41 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 389–​90, 410 Appiah, A. K., 66 Appleby, S., 106 application dependencies, 532t appropriation dependencies, 532t AQIM, 470 ara (physical body), 197 Arewa Consultative Forum, 82 armed conflict. See also insurgency in DRC, 445, 449–​51 Islamic insurgency/​Mozambique, 445, 447–​49 multinational corporations role in, 454, 457–​58 Niger Delta/​Nigeria, 445, 451–​52 overview, 15, 445, 457–​58 resource mobilization theory, 445–​47, 467 Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 slave trade and, 446–​47, 456–​57 South Sudan, 445, 454–​56

Index   543 structural dependency and, 457 theoretical framework, 446–​47 Armstrong, K. A., 220 Asante, A., 26 Asante, M. K., 144, 410 Asia, 41, 50, 66, 68 Assié-​Lumumba, T., 524–​25 Association of African Universities (AAU), 525 Asubiaro, T. V., 522 Atallah, R., 470 Athanasius (Church Father), 119 Augustine (Church Father), 119 Awah, P. K., 219 Awe, B., 138 àyanmọ́, 200 Ayegboyin, D., 126 Azari, S. A., 40 Azikiwe, N., 285, 286, 290 Babalawo, 24 Bàbá Mòrú, 200 Babangida, I., 88 Bacon, T., 474 Baderoon, G., 138 bagi, 252 Balandier, G., 6 bana-​ba, 252 Banton, M., 66, 67 Bantu, 157–​58 Baptist Medical Centre, Ogbomoso, 127 Barett, D., 131 Bargès, A., 252 Baronov, D., 199 Barrow, A., 88 Barry, B., 85 Barth, F., 82 Basalla, G., 305–​6 Basilica/​Ugandan Martyrs, 105 Batson, E., 41 Beck, U., 507, 516 Beck-​Gernsheim, E., 507, 516 Bediako, K., 118 Beisel, N., 5 Belgium, 69, 79–​80, 524 Bell, K., 524 Ben-​David, J., 305

Benin breast ironing in, 221 colonial rule of, 69 education funding in, 309 immunization programs in, 249–​50 Indigenous traditions in, 100 infectious diseases in, 247, 251, 252, 256 political economy in, 268 Berger, J., 164 Berg Report, 294 Berhanie, E., 183 Berman, B. J., 80 Bible, 103, 121 Bigard Memorial Major Seminary, 117 bilharzia, 250 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 530 Biya, P., 132 Bizumic, B., 78 Blumenbach, J. F., 64 Blyden, E. W., 290 Bøås, M., 467 Boateng, W., 204 Bode, S., 375 Boko Haram, 15, 445, 451 Bolsonaro, J., 346 Bonilla-​Silva, E., 64–​65 Bonk, J. J., 117–​18 Booi, M., 159 Boom, K., 367 Borders, Boundaries and Belonging module, 51 Borno Youth Movement (Kanuri), 81 Boshoff, N., 316 Botswana capitalism effects on, 348–​49 public care systems in, 205 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 312t slums/​healthcare outcomes, 237 urbanization in, 329 Bourdieu, P., 507 Bourdillon, M., 44 Bowen University Teaching Hospital, 127 breast ironing, 221 Breet, E., 316 Bridge Building Initiative for Peace Accord, 87 Brillon, Y., 411–​12

544   Index Britain. See United Kingdom Brock-​Utne, B., 526 Brownhill, L. S., 155 Buhari, M., 88 Burawoy, M., 41 Burkina Faso armed conflict in, 445 breast ironing in, 221 education funding in, 309 Indigenous traditions in, 100 infectious diseases in, 249 IPV in, 180t natural resources in, 453 public care systems in, 205 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 science/​scientific research in, 309, 312t women’s rights in, 391–​92 Buruli ulcer, 250 Burundi human rights NGOs in, 396–​97 IPV in, 179t maternal mortality ratio, 204 plunder of DRC by, 451 Butchart, A., 195 Cabo Delgado/​Mozambique insurgency, 445, 447–​49 Cabo Verde, 391–​92 Cain, M., 408 Calabar-​Ogoja-​Rivers (COR) region, 81 Caldwell, J. C., 175, 202–​3, 503 Caldwell, P., 202–​3, 503 Cameroon armed conflict in, 445 breast ironing in, 221 colonial rule of, 69, 132 consociational power sharing in, 86–​87 education funding in, 309 female genital cutting in, 163–​64 healer communication study, 201 humanitarian crises, 236–​37 IPV in, 178, 179t political economy in, 268, 276 power relationships in, 81 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 309, 312t

Camminga, B., 142 Canada, 313 Cantrelle, P., 252 Cape Area Panel Study, 506 Cape Verde, 180t Capitalism and Slavery (Williams), 446 Castagno, A., 475 Catalán, H. E. N., 183 Catholics, 103, 120–​22 Central Africa breast ironing in, 221 colonial rule of, 69 education funding in, 309 female genital cutting in, 163–​64 humanitarian crises, 236–​37 IPV in, 178, 179t, 182t political economy in, 281 Centre for Democracy and Development, 146 Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology (CREST), 313 Chad armed conflict in, 445 breast ironing in, 221 colonial rule of, 69 infectious diseases in, 256 IPV in, 178, 179t maternal mortality rates, 204, 216 natural resources in, 453 Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 Chagas disease, 250 Chandra, K., 79, 82 Charismatics, 98–​99, 102 Che, A. M., 80–​81 Cheater, A., 44 Chikungunya, 250 Chilisa, B., 32, 414 China, 268, 298, 363 Chiweshe, M., 144 cholera, 248, 251 Christ Glorious Ministries, 125 Christian Action Faith Ministries International, 125 Christian Council of Ghana, 103 Christianity. See also religiosity/​spirituality adoption of, 98, 117 African Indigenous Churches (AICs), 124–​25

Index   545 authority, 102–​4 cultural stigmatization/​demonization via, 131 diversity in, 98–​100 economic advancement via, 129–​30 Ethiopian/​Nationalist churches, 123–​24 faith healing, 220 formal education via, 126, 128 humanitarian services provision via, 130 impacts of, 11, 118, 131–​32, 282 imperialism impacts on, 106–​7 Pentecostalism, 11, 97–​102, 121, 125 political reforms via, 128–​29, 131–​32 practices, 101–​2 prevalence/​growth of, 117–​18 reactions to, 123–​24 religious identity, 82, 104–​5 social amenities provision via, 125–​27 sociocultural transformation via, 127–​28, 131 texts, 103 Christ’s Citadel Church, 125 Church Missionary Society, 107, 129, 524 Church of Christ (Johera), 123 civil society organizations Amazigh/​Amazigh Manifesto, 393, 398n3 associational life, 387–​89 authoritarian political systems and, 387 challenges, 394–​97 civility in, 386 concepts of, 386–​87 elements of, 386–​87 foreign assistance, 394–​95, 397 human rights, 386–​87 human rights NGOs, 394–​97 Indigenous concepts of, 387–​89 minority rights, 385, 392–​94 NGOs, 14, 385, 387, 394–​97, 496 overview, 14, 385–​86, 397–​98 public sphere in, 386–​87 relationship with democracy, 387 restrictive laws/​policies, 395–​97 transitional justice, 385, 389–​91 trust and, 395 women’s rights, 385, 391–​92 Clark, K. M., 141, 142 Clarke, W., 473 Clifford, W., 411

climate change African position in relation to, 363–​64 African strategies, 368–​74 capitalism/​nature relationships, 346–​50 certified emissions reductions (CERs), 375 clean development mechanism (CDM), 375 climate injustice, 14 environmental security discourse, 365 exploratory approach materials, 369 as global threat, 345–​46 governance, 364–​68, 378 impacts/​injustice, 366–​67 justice, 367 mitigation financing, 375–​78 mitigation strategies, 372–​74 nationally determined contributions (NDCs), 374–​78 natural disasters and, 347 politicization of, 364–​66 power relationships, 14, 367–​68 regional climate models (RCMs) framework, 374 science/​scientific research, 315 social determinants of health, 238–​39 vulnerability/​adaptation measures, 369–​ 72, 370f Clyde, M. J., 78 Coalition Agreement 2016, 88 cobalt mining, 359 Cohen, B., 329 Cohen, D., 22 Cohen, S., 413, 414 Collins, P. H., 166 Colonial Contract concept, 202 coloniality of power, 27–​29, 38, 202 Colonial Lexicon, A (Hunt), 139–​40 Comaroff, J., 195 Common Market for Eastern/​Southern Africa Free Trade Area (COMESA), 297 Comoros, 179t Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, 87 Comprehensive Peace Agreement/​Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan 2013, 84 Conference/​Parties (2021), 358 confiage, 490 Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS2), 174, 175t Confraria, H., 316

546   Index Connell, R., 6, 41, 48, 137 Connor, W., 82 consociational power sharing, 83–​87 Consolidated Science/​Technology Plan of Action for Africa (CPA), 309 Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity, The (Wallerstein), 64 Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling for Africa, 374 cordon sanitaire, 219 Cote d’Ivoire breast ironing in, 221 IPV in, 180t political economy in, 278 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f COVID-​19 pandemic, 220, 223, 234, 236, 238, 254, 345, 347, 449, 513–​14, 521–​22 Crenshaw, K., 156–​57 criminology African criminologists approach to, 411–​12 atrocity crimes, 437 biological determinism, 413, 427–​28 colonial hegemony and, 408–​15, 418, 426–​ 30, 429t colonization/​coloniality, 425–​26, 431–​33 consultancy culture/​publication, 435–​36 criminalization of Africans, 411 critique of, 412–​14 Damascus uprising, 410 decolonization paradigm, 15, 412–​15, 418–​ 20, 425–​26, 432–​38 empiricism critique, 414–​16 forgiveness in judicial philosophy, 410 harm reduction/​zemiology, 413–​14 history of, 409–​12 innovations in, 436–​38 intergenerational impacts, 431–​33 international criminal law in, 390, 432–​ 33, 438 liberation, 417–​18 Ma’at philosophy, 414 Marxist, 415 neoliberal policies, 434–​35 nonviolence philosophy, 408, 412–​13, 416–​ 17, 419 orientalism approach, 408

overview, 14–​15, 407–​9, 420–​21, 426–​27 penal abolitionism, 408–​9, 416 positivism critique, 414–​16, 428 power relationships, 408–​15, 418, 420–​21, 426, 433–​34 precolonial African social control, 430–​31 prison health services, 418 prison industrial complex, 408–​9, 416–​17 rehabilitation programs, 418 reparative justice, 15, 409–​10, 420–​21 ways of knowing/​thinking, 434–​38 Criminology in Africa (Mushenga), 407 Critique of Black Reason (Mbembe), 28 Cronjé, G., 40–​41 cultural beliefs gender/​sexuality impacts, 157, 166, 167 in health/​well-​being, 218–​19 IPV, 176 social capital, 220–​21 traditional practices in health/​well-​ being, 220–​21 Cunneen, C., 415 Cyprian (Church Father), 119 Cyril (Church Father), 119 cysticercosis, 250 dabali, 252 dagga (cannabis), 418, 421 Dag Heward-​Mills Church, 130 Dahomey. See Benin dan Fodio, Othman, 328 Daniels, J. E., 25 Darboe, O., 88 Darfur conflict, 87 Darwin, C., 427 Dastile, N. P., 416 Davis, A., 412 DAWN network, 391 death of family member. See family/​family structures de Beauvoir, S., 156 Decker, A., 138 decolonization of African sociology, 6–​7, 10, 37–​38, 51–​52 decolonial methodology, 32 decolonial thought, 32 of higher education, 42–​51, 523–​29, 534

Index   547 paradigm, 15, 412–​15, 418–​20, 425–​ 26, 432–​38 in South Africa, 48–​51 study methodology, 39 in Zimbabwe, 43–​48 Decolonization and Afro-​Feminism (Tamale), 147 Deeper Christian Life Ministry, 130 de Gobineau, A. C., 64 Democratic Alliance for Change, 469 Democratic Forces/​Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), 450 Democratic Republic/​Congo armed conflict in, 445, 449–​51 capitalism effects on, 359 colonial rule of, 69 consociational power sharing in, 83–​87 drinking water/​hygiene access, 235 humanitarian crises, 236–​37 human rights NGOs in, 396–​97 IPV in, 178, 179t resource governance in, 449–​51 urbanization in (see urbanization) Deng, F. M., 85 dengue, 250 Dennis, P., 117 Depo-​Provera, 203 Derrida, J., 410 Dery, I., 141 de Sardan, O., 253 Developing Excellence in Leadership, Training and Science in Africa, 531 De Vreyer, P., 489 diamond mining, 357 Diaz, B., 122 Dickie, A., 363 digital-​payments system, 296 Dinka, 455 Diop, C. A., 410 diphtheria, 249–​50 Dixon, W., 408 Doba Consortium, 453 Dodoo, F. N.-​A., 5 Doe, S., 132 Dominion House Publishers, 130 dracunculiasis, 250 DRC. See Democratic Republic/​Congo

Du Bois, W. E. B., 7, 412–​13, 417 Dunkle, K. L., 184 Dunn, K. C., 467 Durevall, D., 184 Durkheim, E., 47, 49–​51, 427, 467 Dusdal, J., 315 Dutch East India Company, 122 Dutch Reformed Church, 131 Dworkin, R., 78 Dzobo, N., 22 Eastern Africa African Indigenous Churches (AICs), 124–​25 Christianity in, 121–​22 climate mitigation strategies, 374 colonial rule of, 69 Ethiopian/​Nationalist churches in, 123–​24 female genital cutting in, 163–​64 HIV/​AIDS familial roles/​responsibilities changes, 492–​95 IPV in, 179t, 182t political economy in, 281 Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 science/​scientific research in, 312t, 314 Ebola, 223, 254, 256, 449 echinococcosis, 250 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), 393, 394 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, 393–​94 education. See also under University of Afrocentrism in, 45–​49 alternative agenda, 530–​33, 532t canon in, 49 captive minds in, 40–​41, 49 Centers of Excellence (CoEs), 309–​10 colonialism effects on, 524–​26 concepts, definitions, 524 critical thinking/​agency, 525, 529–​31, 535 decolonization of, 42–​51, 523–​29, 534 developmental universities, 525–​26 engaged social scholarship, 523 epistemic disobedience in, 47 epistemic privilege in, 50–​51 FOPA model, 527–​28, 528f frontier sociology, 45 funding, 308–​10, 530–​31

548   Index education (cont.) government expenditure per student, 526 human factor theory, 43–​44 Indigenous knowledge in, 16, 535 knowledge production, 521–​24, 526–​28, 528f, 533–​34 missionary provision of, 126, 128, 524–​25 modernization theory, 47–​48 precolonial forms of, 28–​29, 524–​25 racial policies in, 41–​42 recommendation agenda, 528–​29 religious, 103–​4, 117, 119 scientific dependency, 530–​33, 532t sociology curricula, 43–​51 systematic research on, 526–​28, 528f text of blackness in, 49–​50 transdisciplinarity, 417–​18 ways of knowing/​thinking, 45 as Western socialization process, 28–​29, 40, 48–​48, 525 of women, 141–​42, 217, 528, 529 Edwardo, L. E., 325, 327 Egypt Centers of Excellence in, 310 Christianity in, 119–​20 climate change in, 369–​72, 370f climate change mitigation strategies, 373–​74 criminology history in, 411 human rights NGOs in, 395, 396 IPV in, 178, 179t, 182t political economy in, 281 religious education in, 103, 119 reproductive/​child health problems in, 203–​4 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 308, 312t street-​connected children/​youth in, 238 university founding in, 524–​25 urbanization in (see urbanization) Eid el fitr/​Eid el Kébir, 487 Eisemon, T. O., 306 Elechi, O. O., 408 elephantiasis, 250 Ellapen, J., 142–​43, 145 ẹ̀mí (life force), 197 Enahoro, A., 85 encadrement des paysan, 281

#EndSARS, 413 England, 120 environmental sociology, 13–​14 epistemology African communitarian epistemology (ACE), 25–​26 African sociological knowledge, 29–​33 in African sociology, 5, 6, 10, 19–​20 African sociology epistemic status, 20–​27 Afrocentricity, 32–​33 Afrocentric worldview, 24–​29, 42–​43 being in harmony, 26 coloniality of power, 27–​29, 38, 202 colonial mentality, 27 communitarian character of, 26–​27 crisis in, 409, 415 divination, 23–​24 Euro-​American criminological knowledge, 408–​15, 418, 426–​30, 429t forms of assumptions, 20–​21 Indigenous knowledge, 25–​29 knowledge, 19 lived experiences, 21–​22 oral traditions, 22 philosophy/​sociology relationship, 21 pluralism, 30–​31 polycentric, 32 proverbs, 22–​23 reality, 19 social loci, 19 sociology of knowledge, 20 terminology, 19 Epstein, A. L., 78 Equatorial Guinea, 178, 179t Equity/​Reconciliation Commission (ERC), 390 Ẹrinoshó, O., 201 Ernstberger, A., 138 Esteban, J., 80–​81 Eswatini, 160, 162, 179t Ethiopia Christianity in, 121 colonial rule of, 69 drinking water/​hygiene access, 235 Ethiopian/​Nationalist churches in, 123–​24 Ethiopian Orthodox Täwahdo Church, 121 humanitarian crises, 236–​37

Index   549 human rights NGOs in, 395, 396–​97 IPV in, 179t power relationships in, 81 religious places in, 105 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 312t, 314 terrorist groups in, 472–​73 university founding in, 524–​25 urbanization in (see urbanization) ethnicity. See race/​ethnicity Etim, J., 138 Europe, 68, 118, 195–​96, 351 European Union, 298, 386 Evans, R., 489, 490, 493–​96, 498 Expanded Programme on Immunization, 249–​50 Fadahunsi, A., 24 Faith of Unity Movement, 100–​101 Faiyetole, A. A., 364, 369, 372, 374, 375 FAKA, 142–​43, 145–​46 Falk, P., 127 family/​family structures caste system, 487 child-​ /​youth-​headed households, 493–​ 95, 498 East vs. West Africa, 15 elders in, 487, 491, 510 gender/​generational relations, 489 gender norms, 493–​94 generational care/​transfers, 488, 491–​94 HIV/​AIDS-​associated roles/​responsibilities changes, 492–​95 household autonomy, 487 household size, 489 inheritance, 487, 493, 494 lineage, 487 overview, 15–​16, 485–​86 post-​death case studies, 490–​95 public policy, 495–​97 in Senegal, 487–​92, 495–​97 siblings in, 491–​94 socialization vis, 486, 489–​90, 493–​94 social order, 279–​80, 287, 300n1 standards of living, 489 structures/​responsibilities, 486–​90 study methodology, 490, 493, 499nn2–​3

support/​protection, 489, 491–​97 as task-​oriented residence units, 486–​87 urbanization and, 490, 495–​98 women head of household, 494 Fanon, F., 67, 290, 409, 414, 419 Feagin, J., 417 #FeesMustFall protests, 42, 48–​51, 145 female genital cutting, 159, 163–​64, 168–​69, 221 feminism/​feminist activism, 12, 65–​67, 137–​42, 145–​47, 156, 392 Feminist Africa, 138, 146 FEMNET, 142, 144–​46 Feyerabend, P., 30 Fioramonti, L., 352 First All-​Africa Peoples (AAP) Conference (1958), 290–​91 First Pan-​African Conference (1900), 289–​90 First Ten-​Year Plan of Agenda 2063, 295 Fitchett, J. R., 314, 371 food-​borne trematodosis, 250 Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwanda National Army), 80 fossil fuels, 349, 351, 354 Foucault, M., 164, 417 found poetry, 436 Fourah Bay College, 524 Fragile State Index, 471, 474–​75 France, 69, 524 Frelimo, 447–​49 Fuller, S., 20, 21 Functional, Organizational, Political Angles (FOPA) model, 527–​28, 528f Fund for Peace, 474 Gabon, 69, 178, 179t Gaddafi, M., 290 Gaillard, J., 306 Galula, D., 466 Gambia Christianity in, 120 colonial infectious diseases policies, 219 consociational power sharing in, 83–​87 education funding in, 309–​10 IPV in, 180t political power sharing in, 88 transitional justice in, 390 Gandhi, M., 412

550   Index Garland, D., 409 garri sellers, 277 Gatwiri, K., 223 Geertz, C., 82 Gelasius (Pope), 119 gender and sexuality. See also intimate partner violence (IPV) aesthetic practices in, 142–​43, 145–​46 African-​centered discourse, 165–​66 autoethnography in, 144–​45 autonomous turn, 139, 141 breast ironing, 221 corrective rape, 159 cultural impacts on, 157, 166, 167 decolonization of, 144, 148 digital activism in, 145 discourse analysis, 140–​41, 145 discrimination, 216–​17 discursive turn, 139, 140 dual-​sex social systems, 167 essentialization of, 166–​68 female agency, 156, 161–​62, 165, 176, 216 female genital cutting, 159, 163–​64, 168–​ 69, 221 feminism/​feminist activism and, 12, 65–​67, 137–​42, 145–​47, 156, 392 feminist analysis of, 159–​68 gender differences/​service utilization, 240 gender role expectations, 157–​59, 165–​ 66, 176 health/​well-​being, 215–​17 heterosexuality, 159, 166–​67 historiography, 139–​43 HIV/​AIDS in, 203 HIV/​AIDS/​STIs, 238 in identity formation, 139–​43, 157–​59 intersectionality in, 11–​12, 145, 155–​58, 168–​ 69, 216–​17 knowledge production in, 146–​47, 149 knowledge/​ways of knowing, 144 LGBTQ+​/​LGBTQI, 142–​43, 146, 155–​56, 159, 160, 165–​67 lived experiences, 21–​22, 145 male circumcision, 163–​64 marriage importance, 159, 280 memory turn, 139, 141

methodological/​theoretical approaches, 143–​46 oppression of women, 156–​58, 161–​66 overview, 11–​12, 137–​39 patriarchal hegemonies in, 155–​56, 160–​68 performance art in, 142–​43 photo/​photovoice in, 145–​46 polygyny/​polygamy/​polyandry, 160–​62, 168–​69, 279–​80 power relationships, 156–​66, 215–​17, 236 in race/​ethnicity, 66 rights-​based agenda, 145 sexuality, 142, 146 significance of, 147–​48 social construction of, 158–​59 spatial turn, 139, 140 stigmatized illnesses, 216 theoretical frameworks, 156–​57 university education, 141–​42 virginity testing, 159, 162–​63, 168–​69 women as second sex, 156 women’s education, 141–​42, 217 women’s movements, 138 women’s rights, 391–​92 gender-​based violence (GBV). See intimate partner violence (IPV) geohelminthiases, 250 Germany, 79–​80, 121, 524 Gërxhani, K., 333 Ghana attitudes towards feminism study, 141 Centers of Excellence in, 310 Christianity in, 117, 120, 125 citizen activism in, 355 colonial rule of, 69, 219, 233 criminology history in, 411 drinking water/​hygiene access, 235 economic advancement in, 130 education funding in, 309 Ethiopian/​Nationalist churches in, 123–​24 formal education in, 126 healthcare/​medical services provision, 127, 232 infectious diseases policies, 219 IPV in, 180t, 182–​83 political economy in, 268, 278 public care systems in, 205

Index   551 religious life in, 100, 103 reproductive/​child health problems in, 203–​4 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 312t university founding in, 524–​25 Ghebreyesus, T. A., 521 Giddens, A., 44, 507, 516 Gilroy, P., 65, 67, 72n9, 408 Girls Not Brides: The Global Partnership to End Child Marriage, 391 Glencore, 453 Goldberg, D. T., 65–​67 Gold Coast. See Ghana Goldman, A., 29–​30 gold mining, 348 Goma, A. A., 373 Gordon, I., 415, 417 Gordon Conwell Theological Seminary, 118 Gould, S. J., 63–​65 Gouws, A., 138, 166 governance climate change, 364–​68, 378 democratic in South Africa, 356 failure and insurgency, 474–​75 overview, 14 resource governance, 354–​57, 448–​49 Grace Bible Church, 125 Gramsci, A., 386 Grand Mosque of Algiers (Djamaâ el Djazaïr), 105 Gray, J., 40 Great Britain. See England Great Evangelical Awakening, 120 Great Zimbabwe monument, 45–​46 Great Zimbabwe University (GZU), 43–​48 Green, E., 78 Grillo, L., 23–​24 Groenewald, C. J., 40 Group of Twenty (G20), 367 Gruénais, M.-​E., 252 Guegno, 487 Guinea infectious diseases in, 247, 251, 256 IPV in, 178, 179t, 180t maternal mortality ratio, 204 women’s rights in, 391–​92

Guinea worm, 250 Gukurume, S., 6–​7 Guleid, F. H., 522 Gumplowcz, L., 78 Guterres, A., 366 Habermas, J., 386–​87 Habyarimana, J., 80, 86 Haggai Bank, 129 Hajj, 106 Hall, S., 68, 413 Hammarström, A., 216–​17 Haney-​Lopez, I., 63 Harrist Church of West Africa, 100–​101 Hausa-​Fulani, 81, 88, 270–​72, 281–​82 Hawksley, C., 333 health/​well-​being. See also medical sociology; social determinants of health African traditional medicine in, 219–​20 breast ironing, 221 cultural beliefs in, 218–​19 gender analysis of, 215–​17 globalization impacts, 222–​24, 234 healthcare access, 221–​22, 233 health policy, 221–​22 illness concepts in, 218–​19 infectious diseases, 219 neoliberalism effects on, 223, 236 population increase effects on, 217–​18 power relationships in, 215–​17 social capital, 220–​21 social relationships/​analysis, 199–​201, 204–​ 5, 213–​14 socioeconomic conditions and, 215 spiritual healing, 220 stigmatized illnesses, 216 traditional cultural practices in, 220–​21 Hegel, F., 386 Heise L. L., 178 Hema, 450 hemorrhagic fevers, 247, 251, 254 Henry the Navigator, 120 hepatitis B, 249–​50 Herbst, J., 473 Herrnstein, R., 72n8 higher education. See education; University of

552   Index High Level Revitalization Peace Forum (HLRPF) 2015–​2016, 84 Hildebrandt, J., 119–​20 HIV/​AIDS in Africa, 202–​3, 250 familial roles/​responsibilities changes and, 492–​95 gender differences/​health service utilization, 240 as global health concern, 223 humanitarian aid for, 130 IPV and, 184 national/​international response, 256 polygyny and, 160 prevalence, 238, 256 public policy, 253–​54 social analysis of, 198 social determinants of health, 202–​3 social inequalities and, 238 virginity testing and, 162–​63 hooks, bell, 413 Horsthemke, K., 31–​32 Hountondji, P., 6, 22, 50, 531–​33 How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Rodney), 446 human African trypanosomiasis, 250 human factor theory, 43–​44 Human Heredity & Health in Africa (H3Africa) project, 530–​31 human rights. See civil society organizations hunhu, 43–​44 Hunt, N., 139–​40 Hunter, M. J., 38, 41, 49, 203 Hussen, S., 145, 146 Hutu Manifesto of 1957, 80 Hutu-​Tutsi interethnic conflict, 79–​81, 86–​87, 450 hydatidosis, 250 Ìbò, 24 Ibrahim, Saad Eddine, 395 identity African personhood, 197–​98 being-​in-​relation concept, 197 ethnic identity classification, 87–​89, 104 ethnic identity formation, 11, 64, 66, 78–​82 gender and sexuality in, 139–​43, 157–​59

imagined community, 474 individualization, 504 religiosity/​spirituality, 104–​5 restoration of via education, 525 Somali nationalism, 472, 474 urbanization/​ethnic identities, 78–​79 weaponization of in insurgency, 470 Idris Aloma, 328 Ifá divination system, 24 Ife-​Modakeke conflict (Yoruba), 81 Igbinovia, P. E., 411, 412 Igbo (tribe), 81, 167, 430–​31, 506 Igbo, E. U. M., 437 Ijo elemi, 124–​25 Ìkín, 24 Ikuenobe, P., 22 impilo (health), 198 India, 298, 363 Indigenous Knowledge Systems course, 46, 48 Indigenous practitioners (olóògùn), 198–​ 201, 219–​20 infectious diseases bacterial, 250 colonial policies and, 219, 254–​55 community-​based responses, 254–​55 elimination of in Africa, 249–​50, 259n1 emerging 21st century, 250–​51 epidemic management, 254 ethnomedicine, 249 factors affecting spread of, 223 globalization impacts, 222–​24 hard-​to-​eliminate/​neglected diseases, 250 history of, 219, 248–​49, 254–​55 intervention funding, 239 medical approach to, 251–​52 national/​international response, 255–​56 noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), 223, 230 parasitic, 250 population resiliency, 257 prevalence/​impacts of, 247–​48 public policy, 253–​54 representations of, 252 self-​medication, 253 social relationships/​analysis, 252 sociological study of, 251–​55, 258–​59 therapeutic practices, 253

Index   553 traveling models, 256–​57 vaccination, 249–​50, 254 viral, 250 Institute of Criminology, 408 insurgency. See also armed conflict characterization/​features, 473–​76 concepts, definitions, 466–​67 extremism/​radicalization in, 15, 465–​66 governance failure, 474–​75 identity, 474 Mali Islamist uprisings, 468–​70, 474–​76 nationalistic, 466 resource mobilization theory, 445–​47, 467 revolutionary, 466 sociological conditions affecting, 466, 470 Somalia, 471–​76 structural theory, 467 theoretical background, 466–​67 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 84, 87 International Bible Worship Centre, 125 International Central Gospel Church, 125 International Criminal Court (ICC), 390, 432–​33, 438 internationalization dependencies, 532t International Monetary Fund, 367–​68, 526 Inter-​religious Council of Liberia/​Sierra Leone, 394 Inter-​Religious Council of Uganda, 103 intersectionality in gender and sexuality, 11–​12, 155–​58, 168–​ 69, 216–​17 in race/​ethnicity, 67–​68 intimate partner violence (IPV). See also gender and sexuality bride wealth and, 176 consequences of, 182–​84 COVID-​19 impacts, 174 cultural explanations, 176 definitions, measures of, 174, 175t emotional/​psychological violence, 175t HIV/​STIs and, 184 physical violence, 175t power relationships, 175–​76, 183–​85 pregnancy and, 183–​84 prevalence of, 173, 178–​82, 179–​82t public policy regarding, 186

rationalizations of, 182–​83, 204 resource-​scarcity explanations, 176 sexual violence, 175t sociological significance of, 185 study methodology, 175t, 177–​78 theoretical explanations, 175–​76, 185 women’s rights and, 392 Introduction to Zimbabwe Cultures and Heritage, 46 Ipadeoloa, A., 144 Ìpòrí (unconscious self), 197, 200 IPV. See intimate partner violence (IPV) isishimane, 159 Islam characterization, 98–​106 extremism/​terrorism, 468–​70, 474–​76 family/​family structures, 487 gender role expectations, 157–​58 growth of, 11 in Northern Africa, 120 Qur’an, 103, 160 Qur’anic schools, 103 revivalism of, 282 Islamic Courts Union, 472–​73 Islamic Republic of Mauritania. See Mauritania Islamic State/​Greater Sahara, 475–​76 I Speak of Freedom (Nkrumah), 8 Italy, 524 Ivory Coast. See Benin Iwe Irohin, 129 Jackson, C., 504 Jama’at Nusrat al-​Islam wal-​Muslimin, 475–​76 Jammeh, Y., 88 JAMO project, 509 Japan, 298 Jemibor, P., 26 Jenkins, P., 118 Jimoh, A., 26 Johns Hopkins University, 521–​22 Johnson, B., 349–​50 Johnson, T. D., 120 Johnson-​Ross, D., 82 Joshua, T. B., 130 Journal of Reproductive Health, 138 Jua, N., 525

554   Index Jubber, K., 40, 49 Jugu, 252 Kabila, L., 449–​51 Kabyle movement, 393 Kagame, P., 80 Kagera Health/​Development Survey, 506 Kamara, K., 410 Kane, H., 127, 128 Kanem Bornu Empire, 328 Kansanga, M. M., 355 Kanu, I., 22, 23 Karenga, M., 410 Kaunda, K., 286 Kayibanda, G., 80 Kendhammer, B., 85 Kenya African Indigenous Churches (AICs), 124–​25 breast ironing in, 221 Centers of Excellence in, 310 Christianity in, 121–​22, 125 climate change in, 369–​72, 370f climate change mitigation strategies, 372–​ 73, 377 colonial infectious diseases policies, 219 consociational power sharing in, 83–​87 ethnic mobilization/​bargaining, 83 female genital cutting in, 163–​64 food insecurity in, 275 formal education in, 126 HIV/​AIDS in, 203 humanitarian crises, 236–​37 interethnic conflicts in, 77, 82–​84 IPV in, 179t, 183, 184 kinship system in, 505 political economy in, 275 power relationships in, 81 public care systems in, 205 reproductive/​child health problems in, 203–​4 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 306, 312t, 314 slums/​healthcare outcomes, 237 street-​connected children/​youth in, 238 university founding in, 524–​25 urbanization in (see urbanization)

virginity testing in, 162–​63 Kenya African Democratic Union, 82–​83 Kenya African National Union, 82–​83 Kenyatta, J., 46, 83, 87 Keskin, T., 6 Khalema, N. E., 63 Kibaki, M., 87 Kiir, S., 87 Kikuyu Central Association/​Kikuyu nation, 82–​83 King, M. L. Jr., 410 Kinship/​Child Health project, 509 Kinship Support Tree (KST), 508–​9 kinship system child care/​fosterage, 15–​16, 490–​92, 503, 507–​8 clannism, 472 conceptualization of, 507–​8 coresidence, 505–​6 economic instability context, 512–​15, 513–​14t elders in, 487, 491, 510 family organization in, 505 functional kin, 507, 516 gender role expectations, 506 genetic closeness, 507 intimate relationships, 507 kin recognition importance, 509–​16, 513–​14t LGBTQI, 143 marriage in, 15–​16, 504, 506–​12 Nairobi case study, 508–​9 overview, 15–​16, 503 population increase effects on, 217–​18 potential kin, 507, 516 religious identity and, 104 role of, 504–​7 social order, 279–​80, 287, 300n1 support/​protection via, 504–​7, 511–​15, 513–​14t theoretical vs. practical kinship, 507 union formalization processes and, 506–​16, 513–​14t urbanization, 505–​6, 515 women’s role in, 504, 516 Kissinger, H., 365 Kivu, 450 Knight, J., 527 knowledge

Index   555 African communitarian epistemology (ACE), 25–​26 African sociological knowledge, 29–​33 African traditional medicine, 219–​20 Afrocentric worldview, 24–​25, 42–​43 co-​creation of, 47 communitarian character of, 26–​27 of criminology, 434–​38 critical thinking importance, 23 decolonial methodology, 32 decolonial thought, 32 decolonization of, 42–​51 democracy, 29 divination, 23–​24 epistemicide, 27–​28, 41 Euro-​American criminological, 408–​15, 418, 426 evidence and, 32–​33 extraversion in production processes, 50 first-​person oral histories, 436–​37 found poetry, 436 incompleteness of forms, 45 Indigenous education, 43–​48 Indigenous epistemology, 25–​33 monolithic objectivity, 23 polycentric epistemology, 32 proverbs/​divination, 22–​24 socialization process, 28–​29 truth-​centered vs. way-​centered approaches, 30–​32 Knowles, C., 66, 67 Kodua, A., 117 kombe, 103 korité, 487 korotè, 252 Kotsadam A., 178 Kouyoumdjian, 184 Kpanake, L., 200 Krapf, J. L., 121 Kuhn, T., 306 Kumuyi, A. J., 330 kuna/​kunatò, 252 kurunibagi, 252 Labhardt, N. D., 201 Lacan, J., 165 Lagos. See Nigeria

Lagos Plan of Action (LPA, 1980), 285, 293–​ 95, 309 language dependencies, 532t Lassa fever, 223, 251, 254, 256 Latin America, 41, 118 Lawoko, S., 183 Lawuyi, O. B., 6 Left Realism, 408 leishmaniasis, 250 Lendu, 450 leprosy, 127, 248–​50, 252, 253, 255 Lesotho IPV in, 179t kinship system in, 503 Pan-​Africanism in, 291 urbanization in, 329 Le Van, A. C., 84 Lewis, D., 138, 140, 145 Lewis, I. M., 472 Leys, C., 83 LGBTQ+​/​LGBTQI, 142–​43, 146, 155–​56, 159, 160, 165–​67 Liberia civil war in, 132 colonial rule of, 69, 132 healthcare/​medical services provision, 127 infectious diseases in, 256 IPV in, 180t, 181 maternal mortality ratio, 204 peacebuilding in, 394 political economy in, 281 transitional justice in, 390–​91 Liberty Gospel Church, 125 library dependencies, 532t Libya, 308, 396 Life Tapes/​Life Press Limited, 130 Lijphart, A., 84–​85 Linden, E., 329 Lindskog, A., 184 Link, B. G., 201 Living Faith Ministries–​Winners Chapel, 130 Living Faith World Outreach, 130 Livingstone, D., 122 Locoh, T., 252 Lombroso, C., 413, 427–​28 London Missionary Society (LMS), 122 Lotter, C., 414–​16

556   Index Lutherans, 121, 122 lymphatic filariasis, 250 Machar, R., 87 Machunku, I. G., 373 Madagascar, 179t Mafeje, A., 409 Maffie, J., 31 Magubane, B. M., 5 Majekodunmi, A., 333 Makerere University College, 126, 138 Makonde, 448 Makumbe, J., 387–​88 Makuwa-​Mwani, 448 malaria, 205, 247, 250, 251, 449 Malawi colonial infectious diseases policies, 219 healthcare access in, 237 IPV in, 179t, 181 kinship system, 506 Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health, 506 religious life in, 97, 107 religious places in, 105 Maldonado-​Torres, M., 69 Mali armed conflict in, 445 gold resources in, 454 governance failure in, 475 government embezzlement in, 470 infectious diseases in, 256 IPV in, 180t, 181 Islamist uprisings, 468–​70, 474–​76 Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 socioeconomic conditions in, 470, 475 urbanization in (see urbanization) Malinowski, B., 26 Maluleka, J. R., 316 Mama, A., 141–​42, 146, 147 Mamdani, M., 37, 78 Mandela, N., 287–​88, 389, 413 Mangcu, X., 50 Mangu, A. M. B., 337 manògò, 252 Mano River Women’s Peace Network, 394 Manzo, K., 352 Maputo Protocol, 186

marabout, 490 Marcucci, G., 451 marijuana legalization, 418, 421 Maringira, G., 6–​7 Mario Legio of Africa, 123–​24 marriage bride price, 163, 280, 509, 511, 513t come-​we-​stay unions, 509–​11 importance of, 159, 280 kin recognition importance, 509–​16, 513–​14t in kinship system, 15–​16, 504, 506–​12 union formalization processes, 506–​16, 513–​14t Marx, K., 44, 47, 49–​51, 348–​50, 386, 467 Masvingo community, 47 Mau Mau rebellion, 82–​83 Mauritania armed conflict in, 445 Christianity in, 120 natural resources in, 453 Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 science/​scientific research in, 308 women’s rights in, 391–​92 Mazrui, A., 7–​8, 290 Mba, N., 138 Mbembe, A., 28 Mbiti, J., 127, 197 Mbugua, W., 486 McFadden, P., 155, 156 McGrattan, C., 85 Meadowcroft, J., 364, 368 measles, 249–​50 Mecca, 106 medical sociology. See also health/​ well-​being African healing systems, 198–​201, 219–​20 analytical tools/​African contributions, 196–​98 anthropology courses, 46 being-​in-​relation concept, 197 coloniality of power, 202 concepts vs. perspectives, 196–​98 decolonization of, 196, 206 development of in Africa, 12, 195–​96 emotions in, 199, 200 epidemiological studies, 201–​5 fundamental causes theory, 201

Index   557 healthcare/​medical services provision, 126–​27 Indigenous practitioners (olóògùn), 198–​ 201, 219–​20 maternal mortality rates, 204, 216 openness/​pragmatism, 199 pluralism, 199 policy/​health reforms, 205–​6 religiosity/​spirituality in, 199–​200, 220 reproductive/​child health problems, 203–​5 self-​healing power, 199, 200 sick role concept, 196–​97 social relationships/​analysis, 199–​201, 204–​ 5, 213–​14, 252 Meiners, C., 64 Melchiades (Pope), 119 meningitis, 247, 254, 256 Middle Belt Forum, 82 Mignolo, W. D., 47, 202 Millennium Development Goals, 215, 241 minority rights, 385, 392–​94 Mismeasure of Man, The (Gould), 63–​64 missionization, 101–​2, 105–​7, 120–​32 Miyazaki, Y., 346 Mkandawire, T., 9 Mkhize, G., 157 Mlambo, A. S., 8 mobility dependencies, 532t Mofatt, R., 122 Mohanty, C. T., 155 Moi, D. A., 83, 87 Mojola, S. A., 203 Monrovia Strategy (1979), 285, 293, 294 Morakínyọ̀, O., 200 Morel, T., 314 Morison, T., 143 Morocco Amazigh/​Amazigh Manifesto, 393, 398n3 human rights NGOs in, 394–​95, 396–​97 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 308, 312t transitional justice in, 390 Morreira, S., 46–​47, 50 Morrell, P., 390 motho ke motho ka batho babang, 51 Mouton, J., 307 Movement for Democratic Change, 84

Movement for Unity/​Jihad, 470 Moynihan, D. P., 365 Mozambique IPV in, 179t, 181 Islamic insurgency in, 445, 447–​49 Pan-​Africanism in, 291 resource governance in, 448–​49 science/​scientific research in, 312t Mubarak, H., 396 Mudimbe, V. Y., 47–​48 Mugabe, R. G., 84, 132 Mugoya, G. C. T., 183 Muriithi, P., 316, 317 Murithi, T., 292 Murray, C., 72n8 Mushenga, M., 407 Mutua, M., 395 Muzee, H., 531 Naidoo, S., 436 Nairobi kinship system, 508–​9 Namibia citizen activism in, 355 IPV in, 179t, 181 Pan-​Africanism in, 291 National Accord/​Reconciliation agreement of February 28, 2008, 87 National Baptist Church, 123 National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS), 372–​74 National Movement/​Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), 469–​70 National Pact (1992), 469 National Peace/​Reconciliation Commission, 390 National Transitional Justice Working Group, 390 Native Baptist Church, 123 NATO, 365 natural resources African sovereignty over, 293 capitalism/​climate change relationships, 346–​50 capitalism effects on, 350–​53 citizen activism in protecting, 354–​56 collective responsibility, 355–​56 colonial/​capitalist effects on, 345–​46

558   Index natural resources (cont.) democratic governance of, 354–​57 ecological suicide, 349 economic exploitation of, 347, 355 environmental racism, 348–​49 green economy development, 358–​60 postcapitalist paradigm, 358–​60 scientific inventory of, 357–​58 sustainable management of, 346, 353–​60 use-​valuation of, 353–​54 wealth creation via, 349 Natural Variety of Mankind (Blumenbach), 64 Ndizera, V., 531 Ndlovu-​Gatsheni, S. J., 37, 50, 409, 418, 419, 428, 434–​36 Netherlands, 524 Neubert, D., 387–​88 New Life Zion Community Bank, 129 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 285, 295 NGO Registration Act of Uganda, 396 Nicolle, C., 248–​49 Niger humanitarian crises, 236–​37 infectious diseases in, 256 IPV in, 180t natural resources in, 453 Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 urbanization in, 329 women’s rights in, 391–​92 Nigeria argumentum ad baculum, 20–​21 Christianity in, 117, 120 climate change in, 369–​72, 370f climate change mitigation strategies, 374, 375, 377–​78 colonial rule of, 69, 81–​82, 219 consociational power sharing in, 83–​87 drinking water/​hygiene access, 235 economic advancement in, 129–​30 education funding in, 309 Ethiopian/​Nationalist churches in, 123–​24 ethnic classification in, 88–​89 ethnic identities in, 78–​82 ethnotraditional institutions in, 79 female genital cutting in, 163–​64 formal education in, 126

healthcare/​medical services provision, 127, 222 humanitarian services provision in, 130 Indigenous traditions in, 100 infectious diseases in, 219, 247, 251, 252 interethnic conflicts in, 77, 81–​82 IPV in, 180t kinship system in, 503, 506 knowledge production in, 6 maternal mortality ratio, 204 newspaper printing in, 129 Niger Delta conflict, 445, 451–​52 Niger Delta Development Commission, 452 police killings in, 437 polio in, 250 political economy in, 268, 270, 277, 278, 281 political power sharing in, 88–​89 power relationships in, 81–​82 precolonial social control in, 430–​31 public care systems in, 205 religious places in, 105 reproductive/​child health problems in, 203 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 306, 308, 312t, 314 social amenities provision in, 126 university founding in, 524–​25 urbanization in (see urbanization) Nigritian Fellowship, 123 Nisson, B., 489 Nixon, R. M., 365 Njoku, R. A., 132 Njoroge, J. M., 373 Nkealah, N., 142 Nkrumah, K., 8, 45, 46, 128, 132, 285–​86, 290, 297, 447, 525 Nnoli, O., 290 Nomiya Luo Mission, 123 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 14, 385, 387, 394–​97, 496 Northern Africa Christianity in, 118–​20 climate change mitigation strategies, 374 human rights NGOs in, 396 IPV in, 178, 179t, 182, 182t minority rights in, 392–​94 political economy, 270

Index   559 science/​scientific research in, 308 transitional justice in, 390–​91 women’s/​gender studies in, 143 women’s rights in, 391–​92 Nuer, 455 Nwabueze, N., 9, 40 Nwosimiri, O., 24 Nyabola, N., 142 nyama, 252 Nyambura, C., 144–​46 Nyamnjoh, F. B., 45, 46, 525 Nyerere, J. K., 46, 285, 286, 288, 290, 297, 525 Nyusi, F., 448 Obasanjo, O., 88 Ocholla-​Ayayo, A. B. C., 486 Odinga, J. O., 83, 87 Oduyoye, M., 146–​47 Offiong, P., 372 Ogbuagu, S. C., 203 Ogoni, 451–​52 Ogundipe-​Leslie, M., 166 Ogunewu, M. A., 126 Ohaneze Ndigbo, 82 Oheneba-​Sakyi, Y., 486 Ojakorotu, V., 451 Ojú Odù, 24 Okoi, O., 467 Olaopa, O., 451 Olódùmarè (Supreme Being), 197 Olsson, O., 78 Olúpọ́nà, J., 24, 200 Olutayo, A. O., 6 Oluwole, S., 23 Omni, M., 65–​67 Omotoso, S. A., 146 Onafeso, O. D., 372 onchocerciasis, 247, 250, 255 Onditi, F., 85 O’Neill, B., 447 Onibokun, A. G., 330 Onwudiwe, I., 420 Onwuzuruigbo, I., 5–​6, 48 Onyeozili, E. C., 413 Òpęlè, 24 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 285, 292–​94, 307, 309, 525

Orí (spiritual guardian), 197, 200 Origen (Church Father), 119 Orí-​Inú (conscious self), 197 Ortega-​Cisneros, K., 371 Osagyefo, 132 Otinche, S. I., 81, 89 Outline of the History of Humanity (Meiners), 64 Overland, I., 315 Owoseni, A., 24 Owusu-​Nimo, F., 316 Oyewumi, O., 165–​66 Pachomius (Church Father), 119 Packer, H., 437 Pan-​Africanism AAP Conferences, 290–​91 Afro-​realism, 298–​99 Authenticité, 291 Casablanca group, 286 concepts, definitions, 288–​92 criticisms of, 297–​98 decolonization, 289–​90 democracy, 288 developmental regionalism, 292–​99 development of, 128–​29 humanism, 43–​44, 287–​88 ideological/​philosophical foundations of, 286–​88 LGBTQI, 142–​43 modern/​contemporary movement, 290–​92 Monrovia group, 286 Négritude movement, 291 nonintervention principle, 292 overview, 13, 285–​86 in political economy, 282 socialism/​communal living, 287, 300n1 socioeconomic transformation, 290–​92 traditional movement, 289–​90 unity/​solidarity, 286–​92 welfarism, 288 Pandolfelli, L. E., 204 Pareto, V., 467 Paris Agreement, 367, 375, 376 Parsons, T., 196, 197, 213–​14 Party/​Hutu Emancipation Movement, 80 Pass Laws Act of 1952, 70

560   Index Pasteur Institute of Dakar, 249 Patel, D., 44 #PatriarchyMustFall protests, 145 Pearce, F., 420 Pearce, T. O., 199, 203 Pentecostalism, 11, 97–​102, 121, 125 pertussis, 249–​50 Petchesky, R. P., 158, 164 Pfohl, S., 412 Phelan, J. C., 201 Philadelphia Negro, The (Du Bois), 7 Phillips, C. J. C., 373 Pigou, P., 390 Piot, C., 197–​98 Piper, M., 158 Plaatje, S., 46 Plug, C., 305 poliomyelitis, 247, 249–​50 political economy auto-​centrism, 273 colonialism/​empire-​building, 270–​73 controlled economies, 274–​75 dependency, 274 digital economy, 268 economic systems, 272–​73 economies of scale, 276 formal/​informal economies, 275–​77 ideology loss, 282 imperialism and, 69, 267, 271–​72 knowledge/​policy distortion, 276–​77 language, 269–​7 1 market-​day systems, 269–​72 marriage importance, 280 medical sociology and, 202–​3 overview, 12–​14, 267–​68 political development, 271–​72 political systems, 280–​83 power relationships, 206, 269–​73, 277–​82 price, 277–​78 productivity/​effort, 277 religiosity/​spirituality in, 270 resource control, 280–​81 social discord, 277 social order, 279–​82 states/​worlds, 269–​7 1 territory/​territoriality, 269 uncertainty, 276

unfair trade, 273–​74 unfree markets, 274–​75 polygyny/​polygamy/​polyandry, 160–​62, 168–​ 69, 279–​80 Population Registration Act of 1950, 70 Portugal, 120–​22, 131 Potts, D., 329 Powell, J. J., 315 power relationships authoritarian political systems, 280–​83 climate change, 14, 367–​68 coloniality of power, 27–​29, 38, 202 consociational power sharing, 83–​87 constructive ethnic solidarity, 78–​79 in criminology, 408–​15, 418, 420–​21, 426, 433–​34 ethnic identity classification, 87–​89 gender and sexuality, 156–​66, 215–​17, 236 in health/​well-​being, 215–​17 indirect rule policy, 78–​79 in-​group kindness/​out-​group hostility, 80–​81 in IPV, 175–​76, 183–​85 overview, 11–​12 political economy, 206, 269–​73, 277–​82 political power/​authority, 13, 79–​80 in race/​ethnicity, 66, 79–​83 self-​sufficiency and, 13 social determinants of health, 231–​34, 236 prison industrial complex, 408–​9, 416–​17 Private Use of Marijuana Bill (2021), 421 Protestants, 99, 103, 120 Protocol/​African Charter on Human and People’s Rights of Women, 186 public policy capacity building, 496 cash transfers, 495–​96 family/​family structures, 495–​97 health/​well-​being, 221–​22 indirect rule policy, 78–​79 infectious diseases, 253–​54 IPV, 186 medical sociology, 205–​6 power relationships, 78–​79 raising awareness/​services, 496 social determinants of health, 205–​6, 241–​42 social protection services, 495–​97

Index   561 Quijano, A., 27, 38, 202 Qur’an, 103, 160 Qur’anic schools, 103 rabies, 250 race/​ethnicity biological race, 63–​64, 67, 71 colonial social policies in maintenance of, 11, 64–​65, 69–​70, 78–​79 consociational power sharing, 83–​87 contemporary studies, 65–​69, 72nn8–​9 critical discourse analysis, 61–​62, 68 critical theorists list, 62–​63 dilemmas in, 65–​66 early conceptualizations/​inquiry, 63–​ 65, 72n5 ethnic identity classification, 87–​89, 104 ethnic identity formation, 11, 64, 66, 78–​82 Eurocentric concepts of, 64–​69 gender in, 66 intersectionality in, 67–​68 knowledge production and, 62, 63, 68, 72n5 national identification determinants, 78 overview, 10–​11 power relationships in, 66, 79–​83 pseudo-​scientific doctrines, 66–​67 race/​race relations, 7 race science/​ideas, 65–​69, 72n2, 72nn8–​9 racial classifications, 59–​70, 72n1 racial differences/​inferiority, 63–​64, 72n8 social exclusion and, 66, 67 in social inequalities, 59–​62, 68–​69 social stratification and, 64–​65 socioeconomic status and, 71–​72 sociological conceptions of, 59–​61, 72n1 in South African sociology, 41–​42, 61–​ 63, 71–​72 state-​building politics and, 78–​83 in United States, 60, 65 Randall, S., 505 #RapeMustFall protests, 145 Reader, D. H., 42 Rebmann, J., 121 Redeemed Christian Church of God, 129 Redemption City/​Redeemed Christian Church of God, 105 reed dance, 162

regional economic communities (RECs), 292, 296 religiosity/​spirituality. See also Christianity; Islam anticolonial resistance, 104, 107 authority, 102–​4 Catholics, 103, 120–​22 Charismatics, 98–​99, 102 dynamism/​diversity in, 98–​101 education, 103–​4, 117, 119 gender roles, 104 identity, 104–​5 imperialism impacts on, 106–​7 Indigenous knowledge, 25–​26 Indigenous traditions, 100–​101, 106 insurgency and, 15 land rights, 105–​6 Lutherans, 121, 122 in medical sociology, 199–​200, 220 Methodists, 121–​24 missionization, 101–​2, 105–​7, 120–​32 overview, 10–​11, 97–​98 Pentecostalism, 11, 97–​102, 121, 125 pilgrimage, 106 places, 105–​6 political ambivalence of, 106–​7 in political economy, 270 practices, 101–​2 Protestants, 99, 103, 120 ritual healing, 102 social activism, 103 societal structures/​processes, 11 texts, 103, 121 reparative justice, 15, 409–​10, 420–​21 Republic of Mali. See Mali research dependencies, 532t Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, 70 resource mobilization theory, 445–​47, 467 Rhema Bible Church, 125 Rhodes, C. J., 69 Rhodesia. See Zimbabwe #RhodesMustFall protests, 42, 48, 50–​51 Richard constitution of 1946, 81 Ritzer, G., 44 river blindness, 250 Roberts, D., 63

562   Index Rodney, W., 69, 290, 412, 445–​47, 451, 456–​57 Roho, 124–​25 Rosemont, H., 31–​32 Routledge Handbook on Africana Criminologies, 407–​8 Royal House Chapel, 125 Rushton, P., 72n8 Rwanda colonial rule of, 70 consociational power sharing in, 86–​87 ethnic identities in, 82 interethnic conflicts in, 77, 79–​81, 86–​87, 450 IPV in, 179t plunder of DRC by, 450–​51 public care systems in, 205 Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), 80 Rwigema, F., 80 Sadiki, L., 414 Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 Said, E., 408 Saïd bin Sultan al-​Busaidi, Sayyid, 121 Sakpata Vodoun deity, 252 Salafism, 470 Sama, M. C., 82 Sao Tome/​Principe, 179t Sardinha L., 183 SARS-​CoV-​2. See COVID-​19 pandemic schistosomiasis, 250 Schmidt, G., 122 Schneijderberg, C., 526 Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024 (STISA 2024), 309 Science for Africa Foundation/​ Science4Africa, 531 Science Granting Council Initiative (SGCI), 313 science/​scientific research climate change, 315 collaboration, 315–​18, 317f decline of, 307–​8 deinstitutionalization of, 307–​8 funding, 308–​10, 313–​16 international investments in, 309–​10, 314 overview, 13, 305–​6, 318–​19 priority areas in, 309 production, 310–​13, 311f, 312t

relative field strength (RFS), 310–​12, 311f revival of, 308–​10 science granting councils (SGCs), 313–​14 SDH. See social determinants of health Seedat, F., 167 Sefere: Southern African Feminist Review, 138 Sekou Toure, A., 290 Selassie, H., 290 Senegal Centers of Excellence in, 310 colonial rule of, 69 education funding in, 309 family/​family structures in, 487–​92, 495–​97 IPV in, 180t political economy in, 268 religious places in, 106 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f Sahelian conflicts, 452–​54 science/​scientific research in, 309, 312t urbanization in (see urbanization) women’s rights in, 391–​92 Senghor, L. S., 286, 291 Septuagint, 119 Seroto, J., 28 Sese Seko, M., 132, 291, 450 sexuality. See gender and sexuality sexually transmitted infections, 205, 238, 313. See also HIV/​AIDS Shaidi, L. P., 431 Shaik, H., 522 Shaka Zulu, 328 Shaw, B., 122 Siad Barre, M., 471, 472 Sierra Leone Christianity in, 120 colonial infectious diseases policies, 219 colonial rule of, 69 infectious diseases in, 247, 251, 256 IPV in, 180t, 181 maternal mortality rates, 204, 216 peacebuilding in, 394 university founding in, 524 Sim, J., 418 Simons H. J., 69 Simons R. E., 69 Sitas, A., 40 slave trade/​slavery

Index   563 abolition of, 120, 412–​13 armed conflict and, 446–​47, 456–​57 democracy and, 412–​13 intertribal warfare and, 127–​28 missionaries supporting, 131 as punishment for crimes, 430–​33 sleeping sickness, 250 smallpox, 205, 247, 252–​54 Smith, D. J., 506 Smith, L., 414 Smith, R., 349, 356 smoking, 355 social constructionism, 218 social determinants of health adolescent lifestyles, 237 African context, 232–​35 antiretroviral therapy (ART), 240 class structure aspects, 235 climate change, 238–​39 coloniality of power, 27–​29, 38, 202 community norms/​values, 233 concepts, definitions, 229–​31 cultural beliefs in, 218–​19 drinking water/​hygiene access, 235 epidemiological studies, 201–​5 gender as, 215–​17 gender power relations, 236 healthcare access, 233, 237 healthcare financing, 233–​34, 239–​40 healthcare service utilization, 240–​41 heath disparity/​inequality/​inequity, 215, 231–​32 heath equity, 232 heath trends, 239–​41 HIV/​AIDS, 202–​3 humanitarian crises, 236–​37 illness concepts in, 218–​19 interventions addressing, 241–​42 maternal mortality ratio, 204 natural disasters, 237 poverty/​socioeconomic status, 234–​35, 240 power relationships, 231–​33, 236 production/​industrial base, 235 public policy effects on, 205–​6, 223, 241–​42 reproductive/​child health problems, 203–​5 sexually transmitted infections, 238 slums/​healthcare outcomes, 237

social stratification, 230, 233, 237 socioeconomic conditions and, 215 street-​connected children/​youth, 238 structural/​systemic factors in, 230, 230f substance abuse, 238 vulnerable/​marginalized groups, 236–​39 socialism, 287, 300n1, 328 social relationships/​analysis, 199–​201, 204–​5, 213–​14, 252 Social Science as Imperialism (Ake), 414 sociology of Africa. See African sociology sociology of health. See medical sociology Socrates, 22 Sokoto Caliphate, 281–​82 Sol Plaatje University, 46, 50–​51 Somalia clannism in, 472 insurgency, 420, 471–​76 Sharia law in, 472–​73 socioeconomic conditions in, 471, 475 terrorist groups in, 420, 472–​73 Sonni Ali, 328 Sooryamoorthy, R., 41, 316 Souls of Black Folk, The (Du Bois), 7 South Africa. See also apartheid African Indigenous Churches (AICs), 124–​25 breast ironing in, 221 capitalism effects on, 348, 351, 352 Christianity in, 117, 122–​23, 125, 131 citizen activism in, 355 climate change in, 369–​72, 370f climate change mitigation strategies, 374–​77 colonial rule of, 69, 219, 233 criminology in, 408, 411, 414, 418 decolonization of education in (see decolonization) democratic governance in, 356 digital activism in, 145 Ethiopian/​Nationalist churches in, 123–​24 healthcare access in, 235 HIV/​AIDS familial roles/​responsibilities changes, 492–​95 HIV/​AIDS in, 203 infectious diseases policies, 219 IPV in, 179t, 181, 182t, 184 Islam in, 99–​100

564   Index South Africa (cont.) kinship system in, 503, 506 marijuana legalization in, 418, 421 Pan-​Africanism in, 291 political economy in, 281 prison-​industrial complex in, 416 public care systems in, 205 racial classification in, 70 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f rights discourse case study, 140 science/​scientific research in, 312t, 313, 314 social stratification in, 233 sociology in, 39–​42 transgender/​gender refugees in, 142 transitional justice in, 389 university founding in, 524–​25 urbanization in (see urbanization) virginity testing in, 162 South African Crime Quarterly, 407 South African Sociological Association, 49 Southern African Development Community, 445 South-​South People’s Assembly, 82 Soyinka, W., 420 staatsvolk, 78 Stanley, M., 466 Stearns, J., 451 Steed, C., 128 Steyn, F., 414 Stillwaggon, E., 202 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment, 365 Stoler, A., 65, 66, 68 Stork, N. E., 357 Strange, S., 268 Structural Adjustment Programs, 223, 526 Sub-​Saharan Africa disease-​causation beliefs in, 218–​19 ethnic groups in, 22 family/​family structures in, 492 formal education in, 126 government expenditure per student, 526 healthcare access, 222 heath trends in, 239 human rights NGOs in, 396 IPV in, 173, 183–​84 kinship system in (see kinship system)

maternal mortality rates, 204, 216 precolonial social control in, 431 religiosity/​spirituality in, 99, 125–​26 science/​scientific research in, 308, 314 women’s health inequalities in, 216 women’s rights in, 391–​92 Yorùbá proverbs/​divination study, 22–​24 Sudan consociational power sharing, 83–​87 ethnic identity classification, 87 human development in, 455–​56 humanitarian crises, 236–​37 maternal mortality rates, 216 oil extraction in, 455, 456 South Sudan conflict, 445, 454–​56 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-​in-​ Government, 87 university founding in, 524–​25 sulantèrè, 252 Sullivan, T. A., 305 Sundkler, B., 128 Sunsum sore, 124–​25 Susen, S., 139 Sustainable Development Goals, 215, 241, 309 Swahn, M. H., 237 Swart, S., 43 Sweden, 313 Sy, H., 486 Sylvester-​Williams, H., 290 Synagogue Church of All Nations, 130 tabaski, 487 taeniasis, 250 Taiwo, O., 6 Takyi, B., 486 Tall, S. M., 489 Tamale, S., 142, 147 Tanzania authoritarian political system in, 283 child-​ /​youth-​headed households in, 495 female genital cutting in, 163–​64 HIV/​AIDS-​associated familial roles/​ responsibilities changes, 492–​95 IPV in, 179t kinship system in, 505–​6

Index   565 public care systems in, 205 religious life in, 99–​100 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 308, 312t, 314 socialism in, 287, 300nn1–​2 urbanization in (see urbanization) target dependencies, 532t tariff barriers, 296 Taru, J., 46–​47 Tauri, J., 415 Taylor, C., 132 technology dependencies, 532t Tertullian (Church Father), 119 tetanus, 249–​50 Theory and Philosophy in the Humanities module, 51 Thiongane, O., 254 Thunberg, G., 358 Tile, N., 124 tobacco, 355 Todaro, M., 329 Togo, 86, 180t, 221, 309 Touba, 106 trachoma, 250 traditional healers (sangomas), 46 Transitional Government of National Unity, 87 transitional justice, 385, 389–​91 Transition National Government, 84 Traoré, D., 470 Tripp, A. M., 155 Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission (TRRC), 390 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 389–​90, 410 trypanosomiasis, 250, 255 Tsvangirai, M., 84 Tuareg rebellions, 468–​70, 476 tuberculosis, 247, 249–​50 Tunisia, 308, 312t, 315–​18, 317f Tunji, S., 372 Turner, T. E., 155 Turner, V., 199 Turshen, M., 205 Tutola, A., 46 Tutu, D./​M., 410

ubuntu, 43–​44, 51, 155, 287–​88, 327, 408–​10 Uganda child-​/​youth-​headed households in, 495 Christianity in, 121–​22 colonial infectious diseases policies, 219 cotton export system, 107 feminist activism in, 147 formal education in, 126 HIV/​AIDS-​associated familial roles/​ responsibilities changes, 492–​95 humanitarian crises, 236–​37 human rights NGOs in, 396–​97 IPV in, 179t kinship system, 506 plunder of DRC by, 451 religious life in, 100–​101, 103 religious places in, 105 reproductive/​child health problems in, 203–​4 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 312t, 314 slums/​healthcare outcomes, 237 transitional justice in, 390 university founding in, 524–​25 ujamaa, 287, 288, 300n1 Ukah, A., 117 umkhosi wohlanga, 162 Umntu Ngumntu Ngabantu, 51 uMoya, 124–​25 umunna, 287, 288 UN Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 30 UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 525 UNESCO, 307, 310, 525 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 365–​66 United African Methodist Church, Eleja, 123 United Kingdom, 195–​96, 313, 408, 413, 524, 530 United Native African Church, 123 United States, 60, 65, 156–​57, 196, 298, 375, 386, 419 Universal Church/​Kingdom of God, 125 Universal Health Coverage initiative, 241

566   Index University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (UCRN), 40–​42 University of Cape Town, 40, 41, 48–​49, 408 Dar es Salaam, 308 Edinburgh, 40 Ibadan, 146 Leiden, 308 London, 40 Natal, 40 Orange Free State, 40 Potchefstroom, 40 Pretoria, 40 South Africa, 40, 138 Stellenbosch, 40 Witwatersrand, 40, 49 Zimbabwe, 42–​46 uranium mining, 355 urbanization Africa as one society, 338 capitalist-​industrialist culture, 332 city primacy, 330–​31 colonial period, 332–​33 conceptual framework, 326–​27 data sets, 328–​29 ethnic identities and, 78–​79 family/​family structures and, 490, 495–​98 formal sustainable cities, 337–​38 healthcare service utilization, 240–​41 health inequity and, 233, 237 infectious diseases and, 223 informal cities, 327, 330, 334–​37 informal sustainable cities, 338–​39 kinship system, 505–​6, 515 metropolitanization/​mega-​city syndrome, 329 neoliberalism, 335–​37 participatory planning, 335 patterns of, 328–​31 post-​colonial period, 333–​34 poverty and, 330 pseudo-​neoliberalism, 333 pseudo-​urbanization, 326–​27, 330, 333 rapid urbanization thesis, 329–​30 slums/​healthcare outcomes, 237 socialism in, 328 sociological processes of, 13, 325–​26, 331, 338–​39 space economy, 330, 337–​38

structural adjustment program, 333–​34 structural adversities, 327 study methodology, 327–​28 sustainability, 334–​36 Sustainable Cities Program (SCP) initiative, 335–​36 traditional African setting, 328 Uthman, O. A., 176 uzendazamshiya, 159 vaccine apartheid/​nationalism, 347 van den Berghe, P. L., 5, 79, 81–​82 Van Dormael, M., 251–​52, 255 Van Gemert, J. C., 357 Vanhanen, T., 80–​81 Varley, A., 486–​87 Vaughan, M., 195 Veltman, A., 158 Venda, 162 Verwoerd, H., 40–​41 Victor I (Pope), 119 Victory Bible Church, 125 virginity testing, 159, 162–​63, 168–​69 Vitillo, R. J., 130 Voice of America, 456 Wallerstein, I., 64, 364 Walls, A., 117, 118 Walter, R., 350 Washington Consensus, 351 wa ThiongʼO, Ngũgĩ, 414, 420, 529 Watson, V., 336 Weber, M., 47, 49–​51, 467 Web of Science (WoS), 308, 310, 311f, 312t Wellcome Trust, 530 West Africa Christianity in, 119–​21 climate mitigation strategies, 374 colonial rule of, 69 education funding in, 309 Ethiopian/​Nationalist churches in, 123–​24 female genital cutting in, 163–​64 feminist activism in, 146 hemorrhagic fevers in, 247, 251 insurgency in, 470 IPV in, 179–​80t, 181, 182t minority rights in, 392–​94 peacebuilding in, 393–​94

Index   567 slave trade abolition in, 120 women’s rights in, 391–​92 West Africa Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA), 393 West African Health Organization, 255–​56 West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), 393 White Christian Missionary Fathers, 80 White Fathers/​Roman Catholic Church, 121 White Supremacy and Racism in the Post–​Civil Rights Era (Bonilla-​Silva), 64–​65 Will, K., 78 Williams, E., 446 Willink Commission of 1957, 81 Wimmer, A., 474 Winant, H., 65–​67 Wolof, 487 Women in African Colonial Histories (Allman), 140 Women in Nigeria, 138 Women in Peacebuilding Network, 394 Women’s Research Documentation Centre (WORDOC), 146 women’s rights, 385, 391–​92. See also gender and sexuality women’s studies. See gender and sexuality Word Miracle Church International, 125 World Africa, The (Du Bois), 7 World Bank, 309, 367–​68, 526 World Health Organization (WHO), 61, 173, 255–​56 World War I, 219 Worldwide Evangelization Crusade, 127 Xhosa, 163 Xue, J., 174 Yang, P. Q., 82

Yar’Adua, Umaru Musa, 89 yaws, 249, 250, 253 yellow fever, 249–​50, 253 Yorùbá being-​in-​relation concept, 197 healing systems, 197, 200, 252 proverbs/​divination study, 22–​24 Zaire, 122, 127 Zambia IPV in, 179t, 181, 183 political economy in, 278 public care systems in, 205–​6 religious life in, 107 slums/​healthcare outcomes, 237 Zartman, W., 471 Zavale, N. C., 526 Zika virus, 223 Zimbabwe Christianity in, 122, 132 colonial infectious diseases policies, 219 consociational power sharing in, 83–​87 decolonization of education in (see decolonization) human rights NGOs in, 396–​97 IPV in, 179t, 181 Pan-​Africanism in, 43–​44, 291 research collaboration in, 315–​18, 317f science/​scientific research in, 312t sociology in, 39–​42 transitional justice in, 389 university founding in, 524–​25 Zionist Christian Churches of South Africa, 100–​101 Zulu, 158–​60, 162, 197, 328, 412 Zurlo, G. A., 120 Zwiener-​Collins, N., 42–​43